Atlas of the European Campaign: 1944–45 1472826973, 9781472826978

Table of contents :
Contents
Glossary and Abbreviations
Introduction
1. The Invasion Front, June 6, 1944
2. The Battle for France, June–August 1944
3. The Battles Along the German Frontier, September–December 1944
4. The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945
5. Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945
6. Endgame Against the Third Reich, April–May 1945
Further Reading
Author Biography

Citation preview

Atlas of the European Campaign 1944–45

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Atlas of the

European Campaign 1944–45

Steven J. Zaloga

OSPREY Bloomsbury Publishing Plc PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK 1385 Broadway, 5th Floor, New York, NY 10018, USA E-mail: [email protected] www.ospreypublishing.com OSPREY is a trademark of Osprey Publishing Ltd This electronic edition published in 2018 by Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain in 2018 © Steven J. Zaloga, 2018

A NOTE ON OPERATIONAL TIMING The terms D-Day and H-Hour are used throughout this work to indicate the day (D) and hour (H) at which a combat operation was initiated. D+1 indicates one day after the day the operation begins. D-1 indicates one day before the first day of the operation. H+5 indicates H-Hour plus 5 minutes, i.e. if H-Hour is 0630hrs, then H+5 would be 0635hrs. H-5 indicates H-Hour minus 5 minutes, i.e. if H-Hour is 0630hrs, then H-5 would be 0625hrs.

Steven J. Zaloga has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Author of this work. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers.

LEGEND FOR MAPS

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: HB 9781472826978; eBook 9781472826992; ePDF 9781472826985; XML 9781472827005

Maps by Bounford.com Osprey Publishing supports the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity. Between 2014 and 2018 our donations are being spent on their Centenary Woods project in the UK.

UNIT SYMBOLS Infantry

Mountain

Armored unit

Artillery

Armored infantry

Armored artillery

Airborne infantry

Coastal artillery

Armored cavalry

Assault gun

Reconnaissance

Tank destroyer

Glider infantry/air landing

To find out more about our authors and books visit www.ospreypublishing.com. Here you will find extracts, author interviews, details of forthcoming events and the option to sign up for our newsletter.

UNIT SIZES XXXXX Army Group XXXX Army XXX Corps XX Division X Brigade III Regiment II battalion I Company

A NOTE ON MILITARY UNIT NAMES Traditional conventions have been used in this work when referring to military units. In the case of US units, 2/39th Infantry refers to the 2nd Battalion, 39th Infantry Regiment. The US Army traditionally uses Arabic numerals for divisions and smaller independent formations (9th Division, 743rd Tank Battalion), Roman numerals for corps (VII Corps), and spelled numbers for field armies (First US Army). In the case of German units, field armies were designated in the fashion 7.Armee, but sometimes abbreviated as AOK.7; the former style is used in this work. German corps were designated with Roman numerals, as in LXXXIV.Armee-Korps, but the alternate version 84.AK was also used. Arabic numerals were used for divisions (e.g. 352.Infanterie-Division) regiments (Grenadier-Regiment.919), separate battalions (i.e. non-regimental) and Abteilungen (e.g. PanzerAbteilung.100), and companies (2./Grenadier-Regiment.919 refers to the 2nd Company within the regiment); Roman numerals were assigned to regimental battalions (II./Grenadier-Regiment.919 indicates the 2nd Battalion of Grenadier Regiment.919). British practices were less formal, for example, both 3rd Division and 3 Division, 30 Corps and XXX Corps, 8th Army and Eighth Army were used. The former styles have been used in this work.

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PHYSICAL FEATURES XXXXX

XXXX

XXX

XX

X

Army group boundary Army boundary Corps boundary Division boundary Road Railroad River Canal Bushes/woodland Marsh

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CONTENTS GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

9

INTRODUCTION 11 Map 1: The European Theater of Operations – June 1944 to May 1945 Map 2: The Strategic Debate – 1942–44 Map 3: Precursors to Overlord – 1942–44 Map 4: German Assessment of Allied Divisions in the UK – May 31, 1944 Map 5: The Atlantic Wall in France – 1944

CHAPTER 1: THE INVASION FRONT, JUNE 6, 1944

23

CHAPTER 2: THE BATTLE FOR FRANCE, JUNE–AUGUST 1944

63

Map 6: Routes to the D-Day Invasion Beaches Map 7: Naval Bombardment on D-Day Map 8: Western Task Force’s Assault on D-Day Map 9: German Defenses on the Cotentin Peninsula – June 6, 1944 Map 10: US Airborne Landings – June 6, 1944 Map 11: Utah Beach – June 6–7, 1944 Map 12: Pointe du Hoc – June 6, 1944 Map 13: Assault Landing Plan, Western Side, Omaha Beach Map 14: German Defenses on Omaha Beach Map 15: D-Day Operations on Omaha Beach – June 6, 1944 Map 16: The Eastern Task Force Map 17: German Defenses on Gold Beach Map 18: Gold Beach on D-Day Map 19: German Defenses on Juno Beach Map 20: The Canadians at Juno Beach Map 21: German Defenses on Sword Beach Map 22: British 6th Airborne Division Landings Map 23: Amphibious Landings on Sword Beach Map 24: The British Lodgment Area – Night, June 6, 1944

Map 25: The Battle for Carentan – June 10–13, 1944 Map 26: Cutting off the Cotentin – June 10–18, 1944 Map 27: Festung Cherbourg Map 28: The Advance on Cherbourg – June 19–21, 1944

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Map 29: The Attack on Cherbourg – June 22–26, 1944 Map 30: First Allied Moves on Caen Map 31: Villers-Bocage – June 12–14, 1944 Map 32: Planned Panzer Offensive, June 22, 1944 Map 33: Operation Epsom – June 25–30, 1944 Map 34: Railway Interdiction on the Normandy Front – June 1944 Map 35: Operation Charnwood and the Capture of Caen Map 36: The Battle of the Hedgerows Begins – July 3–11, 1944 Map 37: German Hedgerow Defenses – July 1944 Map 38: The Battle for St-Lô – July 14–20, 1944 Map 39: Operation Goodwood – July 18, 1944 Map 40: Strategic Situation in Normandy – July 2–24, 1944 Map 41: The Operation Cobra Plan Map 42: Operation Cobra Breakthrough – July 25–30, 1944 Map 43: Operation Bluecoat – July 30, 1944 Map 44: On the Eve of Breakout – July 31, 1944 Map 45: Race into Brittany – August 1944 Map 46: Operation Lüttich – August 7, 1944 Map 47: Operation Totalize, Phase I – August 7–8, 1944 Map 48: Operation Totalize, Phase II – August 8–11, 1944 Map 49: Operation Tractable – August 14–16, 1944 Map 50: The Strategic Situation in Normandy in Early August 1944 Map 51: The German Predicament – August 16, 1944 Map 52: The Collapse of the Falaise Pocket – August 18–19, 1944 Map 53: Closing the Falaise Pocket – August 18–21, 1944 Map 54: The US Army Advance to the Seine – August 19–24, 1944 Map 55: The Advance on Paris – August 23–24, 1944 Map 56: Operation Dragoon – August 15, 1944 Map 57: The Rhône Triangle – August 20–25, 1944 Map 58: Liberation of Marseilles – August 20–27, 1944 Map 59: The Pursuit to Lyon – August 29 to September 3, 1944 Map 60: The German Rout in France – August 1944

CHAPTER 3: THE BATTLES ALONG THE GERMAN FRONTIER, SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 1944 Map 61: The Void: Pursuit to the German Frontier – August 26 to September 11, 1944 Map 62: Clearing the Channel Ports – September 1944 Map 63: Airborne Options – June–September 1944 Map 64: Operation Market Garden: the Plan Map 65: German Dispositions in the Netherlands – September 16, 1944 Map 66: 101st Airborne Division Landings – September 17–18,1944 Map 67: 82nd Airborne Division Landings – September 17–18, 1944 Map 68: The Arnhem Landing Plan – September 17, 1944 Map 69: The Advance of XXX Corps on Hell’s Highway – September 17–25, 1944 Map 70: The End at Arnhem Bridge – September 20–25, 1944

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Map 71: The End of Market Garden – September 26, 1944 Map 72: The Strategic Debate – Autumn 1944 Map 73: Westwall Defenses in the Aachen Sector Map 74: The First Battle of Aachen: Stolberg Corridor – September 12–29, 1944 Map 75: Aachen: the Northern Attack – October 2–8, 1944 Map 76: The Battle for Aachen – October 7–20, 1944 Map 77: The Hürtgen Forest – October–December 1944 Map 78: Operation Queen: XIX Corps – November 16 to December 9, 1944 Map 79: The Final Push: VII Corps Reaches the Roer – December 10–16, 1944 Map 80: Conflicting Plans in Lorraine – September 1944 Map 81: Third US Army along the Moselle – September 5–11, 1944 Map 82: XII Corps Bridgeheads near Nancy – September 1944 Map 83: Lorraine: the Strategic Situation – September 25, 1944 Map 84: Encirclement of Metz – November 9–19, 1944 Map 85: Operation Madison – November 8 to December 19, 1944 Map 86: 6th Army Group’s Advance on the Rhine – November 14 to December 16, 1944 Map 87: Opening the Scheldt – October 6 to November 3, 1944 Map 88: Clearing the Scheldt: Operation Infatuate Map 89: The Fall of Walcheren – November 3–8, 1944 Map 90: Red Ball Express – September 1944 to February 1945 Map 91: Autumn Frustrations – September 15 to December 15, 1944

CHAPTER 4: THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN, DECEMBER 1944 TO JANUARY 1945

201

CHAPTER 5: BATTLES FOR THE ROER AND RHINE, FEBRUARY–MARCH 1945

231

Map 92: The Strategic Situation – December 16, 1944 Map 93: Initial Attacks of 6.Panzer-Armee – December 16–19, 1944 Map 94: Kampfgruppe Peiper – December 20–25, 1944 Map 95: Destruction of 106th Infantry Division – December 16–19, 1944 Map 96: The Defense of St-Vith Map 97: Attack in the Center: 5.Panzer-Armee vs. the 28th Division Map 98: Attack in the South: 7.Armee vs. XII Corps Map 99: Bastogne – December 19–23, 1944 Map 100: Patton’s Relief of Bastogne – December 22–26, 1944 Map 101: Eliminating the Bulge – January 3–28, 1945 Map 102: Operation Nordwind – December 31, 1944 Map 103: Operation Sonnenwende – January 5–12, 1945 Map 104: The Battle of Haguenau – January 6–21, 1945 Map 105: Operation Cheerful: Strangling the Colmar Pocket – January 19 to February 9, 1945

Map 106: Allied Plans following the Battle of the Bulge – February 1945 Map 107: West-Stellung – February 1945 Map 108: Operation Veritable – February 8, 1945 Map 109: Operation Blockbuster – February 1945

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Map 110: Operation Grenade – February 23 to March 10, 1945 Map 111: Closing on the Rhine – February 8 to March 10, 1945

CHAPTER 6: ENDGAME AGAINST THE THIRD REICH, APRIL–MAY 1945

245

FURTHER READING

278

Map 112: The Strategic Situation in the West – March 1945 Map 113: The Rhine Rat Race – March 12–21, 1945 Map 114: The Rhine Crossings in the South – March 22–28, 1945 Map 115: Operation Plunder – March 23–24, 1945 Map 116: Operation Varsity – March 24, 1945 Map 117: Operation Flashpoint – March 24, 1945 Map 118: Breakout from Remagen – March 25–28, 1945 Map 119: The Strategic Situation – March 28, 1945 Map 120: Encircling the Ruhr – March–April 1945 Map 121: Reduction of the Ruhr Pocket – April 1–18, 1945 Map 122: The Liberation of the Netherlands – April–May, 1945 Map 123: Advance into Northern Germany – April–May 1945 Map 124: Advance to the Elbe – April 1945 Map 125: Advance in the South – April 24 to May 11, 1945 Map 126: The Final Campaign in Germany – April–May 1945 Map 127: Hitler’s Last Defenses in France – 1944–45

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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS Abteilung: German unit between battalion and regiment in size AFV: Armored fighting vehicle AOK: Armee Oberkommando (Army High Command); German field army headquarters AVRE: Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers Bataillon: Germany formation comprising several companies Battalion: Allied formation of several companies Combat Command: A brigade-sized, combined-arms formation in a US armored division Combat Command R: Headquarters for reserve units in a US armored division COSSAC: Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander DD: Duplex Drive Division Blindée: French Armored Division Division d’Infanterie Algérienne: French colonial infantry division raised in Algeria Ersatzheer: Replacement Army; German organization for raising and rebuilding army units inside Germany ETO: European Theater of Operations Fallschirmjäger-Regiment: German paratrooper regiment Festung: Fortress; a selected town or city acting as a German stronghold FFI: French Forces of the Interior FHW: Fremde Heere West (Foreign Armies West) Flak: Flugabwehrkanone: German antiaircraft gun G-2: US Army intelligence at divisional or higher level GMC: Gun Motor Carriage; typically, a self-propelled tank destroyer GPF: Grande Puissance (High Power) Filloux gun Heeresgruppe: German army group consisting of several field armies Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung: Army Coastal Artillery Battalion Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Regiment: Army Coastal Artillery Regiment Hochleitstand: German fire-control tower Infanterie-Division: German infantry division Kampfgruppe: German battle group; an extemporized formation of a few companies to a regiment or more in size Kompanie: German Army company Korps: German for corps, a formation consisting of several divisions and supporting units KVA: Küsten Verteidigung Abschnitt (Coastal Defense Sector) KVU: Küsten Verteidigung Untergruppe (Subdivisional Coastal Defense Group) LCA: Landing Craft, Assault LCI: Landing Craft, Infantry LCM: Landing Craft, Mechanized LCT(R): Landing Craft Tank (Rocket) LCT: Landing Craft, Tank LCVP: Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel leichte Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung: German Light Naval Artillery Battalion

LST: Landing Ship, Tank LVT: Landing Vehicle, Tracked; an amphibious tractor, also called the Buffalo by the British Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung: German Naval Artillery Battalion Marine-Küsten-Batterie: German Naval Coastal Battery MGK: Marinegruppenkommando (Naval Group Command) MTO: Mediterranean Theater of Operations OB Nordwest: Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest (Northwest High Command) OB West: Oberbefehlshaber West (High Command West) OKH: Oberkommando des Heeres (Army High Command), primarily responsible for the Eastern Front OKW: Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Armed Forces High Command), in charge of the Western Front Osttruppen: Former Red Army prisoners of war recruited into the Wehrmacht PaK: Panzerabwehr Kanone: antitank gun Panzer-Ersatz-und-Ausbildungs-Abteilung: Tank Replacement and Training Battalion Panzergrenadier: German mechanized infantry Panzerjäger: Tank destroyer Panzerstellung: Turret of an obsolete tank mounted on a small concrete bunker Pionier: German engineer unit PzKpfw: Panzerkampfwagen: tank RAD: Reichsarbeitsdienst (Reich Labor Service) RCT: Regimental Combat Team RE: Royal Engineers Reichs Verteidigungs Kommissar: Reich Defense Commissar; Nazi party official in charge of homeland defense SAS: Special Air Service schwere Panzer-Abteilung: Heavy Tank Battalion, usually a Tiger battalion SHAEF: Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force; Eisenhower’s headquarters StuG: Sturmgeschütz: a German assault gun, typically the StuG III on a PzKpfw III chassis mounting a 75mm gun Stützpunkt: Strongpoint (a company-sized defense position) Tactical Air Command: USAAF unit providing tactical air support to Allied ground forces USAAF: US Army Air Forces Volksgrenadier: People’s Grenadier; typically a reduced-scale 1944 army division for defensive missions Volkssturm: National militia established in Germany in the closing months of World War II WBN: Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Niederlands (Armed Forces Command Netherlands) Wehrkreis: German regional military district for raising and training troops WN: Widerstandsnest (Defense Nest); a platoon-sized defensive position 9

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INTRODUCTION The Atlas of the European Campaign chronicles the campaign in western Europe from the amphibious landings in Normandy on DDay, June 6, 1944, through the German capitulation on May 8–9, 1945. Different names have been applied to this campaign by the various armies. The US Army referred to it as the European Theater of Operations (ETO) while the British army usually referred to it as the campaign in Northwestern Europe (NWE) since it was not heavily involved in the campaign in southern France. The Germans have generally referred to this theater simply as “the West”. The maps are based on the Osprey Campaign series of books, which are primarily focused on land campaigns. As a result, neither air nor naval campaigns are depicted here, except to the extent of their connection with the land campaigns. This atlas is a companion volume to the previous Osprey Atlas of Eastern Front 1941–45 that covers the conflict between Germany and its allies versus the Soviet Union. One of the obvious differences between the two is the duration of coverage – about four years in the case of the Eastern Front, compared to less than year in the case of this volume on the European Theater. There was a substantial chronological interlude in the campaigns in western Europe between the defeat of France in the summer of 1940 and the Allied amphibious landings in Normandy in the summer of 1944. War between Germany and the western Allies continued during this interlude, but in three different theaters: the naval war in the Atlantic; the air war over Europe; and the war in the Mediterranean Theater in 1939–44. This long interlude was the result both of British strategic culture and the configuration of its armed forces. As the world’s premier naval power for more than a century, British strategy attempted to leverage its naval advantages when it was obliged to conduct land campaigns. A “Peripheral Strategy” emerged, which depended on naval power to shield Britain, while relying on a small British army fighting alongside Allied armies on the European continent when necessary. In the wake of the defeat of the British Expeditionary Force in France in the summer of 1940 and its subsequent evacuation back to Britain, the United Kingdom did not have the land power to return to the European continent for the foreseeable future. Its army was a fraction the size of Germany’s, and its focus in the second half of 1940 and early 1941 was the defense of Great Britain against a potential German amphibious invasion. The British army was active in other theaters, notably North Africa and Greece in 1940–41, but these were relatively small campaigns against small Axis forces.

The German invasion of its erstwhile ally, the Soviet Union, in June 1941 completely altered the strategic picture. Britain no longer confronted Germany alone, but now had an ally with a substantial land army. This alliance conformed to Britain’s preference for a “Peripheral Strategy” since the Soviet Union’s substantial ground forces counterbalanced Britain’s strengths on the sea and in the air. A major British concern over the next three years was to placate the Soviet Union. Stalin insisted on a “Second Front” in Europe to relieve the German military pressure on the USSR. Since Britain did not have an army sufficient for a campaign in Europe, Churchill attempted to placate Stalin by campaigns in other theaters, short of a direct confrontation on the European mainland. The second critical turning point of 1941 was Germany’s foolhardy declaration of war on the United States in the wake of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. This brought the United States into the conflict on Britain’s side. Although the United States had substantial manpower, financial, and industrial resources, it would take some time to mobilize and militarize this power. Furthermore, Britain now had to contend with two other strategic problems – convincing the United States to give the European Theater priority over the Pacific Theater, and synchronizing the strategic timetables of Britain and the United States in regards to operational planning for future campaigns. The strategic issue of the European/Pacific balance is outside the scope of this book; suffice it to say that Churchill had little trouble in convincing Roosevelt to emphasize Europe over the Pacific. As will be detailed in the map narratives in the next few pages, the synchronization of British and American operational planning remained contentious through 1942–43. The American strategic outlook was fundamentally different from the British, preferring the start of a European campaign as soon as possible and disdaining British preferences for campaigns in peripheral areas such as North Africa and the Balkans. British military and political leaders tried to cool American impatience, warning of the pitfalls of a hasty intervention on the European mainland. In 1942 and early 1943, the British were able to convince the Americans of the value of chipping away at Axis power, starting with Germany’s most significant ally, fascist Italy. By the autumn of 1943, these arguments had run their course once Italy withdrew from the war. The United States made clear its intentions to refrain from any further commitments in Italy and the Mediterranean Theater, and Britain was obliged finally to start the countdown clock to invasion of France in the late spring or early summer of 1944.

Germany’s defense of Festung Europe was based on the Atlantic Wall. This is one of the massive 406mm guns of the naval coastal battery MAA.244 “Lindemann” near Sangatte after its capture by Canadian troops in 1944. (Library and Archives Canada, Donald Grant, PA 133140) 11

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MAP 1: THE EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS – JUNE 1944 TO MAY 1945 Operation Overlord, the Allied amphibious landings in Lower Normandy (Basse-Normandie) on June 6, 1944, started the campaign. It took nearly six weeks for the Allies to fight their way out of the beachhead, including a campaign to capture the port of Cherbourg, the First US Army campaign to fight free of the bocage (hedgerow) area, and the British/ Canadian struggle to overcome German defenses in the Caen sector. In late July 1944, the First US Army launched Operation Cobra, which started to break out from Normandy. Hitler ordered a Panzer counterattack, Operation Lüttich (Liège), which quickly failed and which weakened the German forces around Caen. As a result, the Allied forces trapped a large portion of the remaining German forces in the Falaise Pocket. The destruction of much of the German Army in Normandy led to a race beyond the Seine River into Belgium and the Netherlands and to the German frontier. General George S. Patton’s Third US Army raced toward Paris, and, after a popular insurrection, Paris was liberated by the Allied armies on August 24, 1944. The defeat of the German Army in France was completed with Operation Dragoon, a second amphibious landing on the French Mediterranean coast that sent the German Army in southern and central France into headlong retreat. For a moment, it appeared that the German Army would collapse in much the same fashion as the Kaiser’s army in November 1918. To exploit this situation, the Allies launched Operation Market-Garden, a combined ground–airborne operation intended to capture Rhine bridges to facilitate a race into Germany. In the event, the German Army rallied and restored the situation in September 1944, dubbed the “Miracle of the Westwall.” Bitter fighting broke out along the German frontier, including the bloody battle for the Hürtgen Forest. The Allies had raced across France and the Low Countries so quickly that they were beyond the reach of their logistics train. Furthermore, they had overlooked the need to clear the access to the port of Antwerp, the most suitable port near the battlefield. As a result, Canadian and British forces spent much of the early autumn clearing the Scheldt Estuary to open Antwerp for traffic. With German military resources on the verge of exhaustion, Hitler planned a final desperate gamble to redeem the situation in the West. Recalling the victory over France in 1940 that had begun with a surprise Panzer attack through the forested Ardennes in Belgium, Hitler gambled on a similar venture in December 1944 aimed at splitting the American 12

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and British armies by a surprise Panzer offensive toward Antwerp. Although the Ardennes offensive made some headway in its first week, by Christmas 1944, it had been halted. It took another three weeks of fighting to eliminate the “Bulge” that had been created by the German attack. A second series of smaller offensives were launched in Alsace, starting with Operation Nordwind on New Year’s Day. Defeat in the Battle of the Bulge left Germany with few military options. However, it took another four months of fighting to force the German surrender. In February and March 1945, the Allied armies fought a series of battles to push to the Rhine River, in the process destroying much of the remainder of the German Army in the West. The Rhine was the last substantial geographic barrier to the Allied advance into Germany, and, during the third week of March 1945, the Allies conducted a series of operations to cross the river in force. In the north, General Bernard Montgomery’s 21st Army Group staged Operation Plunder, a river-crossing operation with an associated airborne assault, Operation Varsity. In the center, the First US Army had captured the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen early in March, but waited until late March to execute Operation Voyage, a breakout operation south of the Ruhr industrial zone. Farther south, Patton’s Third US Army was the first across the Rhine with a hasty jump over the river near Oppenheim on March 22–23, 1945. The weakness of the German Army in early April 1945 allowed Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group to surround the main German force, Heeresgruppe (Army Group) B in the Ruhr with the Ninth US Army converging from the north and the First US Army converging from the south. Hitler refused permission for a withdrawal and, as a result, some 370,000 German troops were trapped, leading to a surrender larger than at Stalingrad or in Tunisia. The reduction of the Ruhr pocket marked the end of large-scale operations by the German Army in the West. In the north, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group continued the liberation of the Netherlands and pushed on toward Denmark. In the center, Bradley’s 12th Army Group pushed to the Elbe River to link up with the advancing Red Army. In the south, Patton’s Third US Army and Lieutenant-General Jacob Devers’ 6th Army Group pushed into Bavaria, Austria, and the border areas of Czechoslovakia. Germany surrendered on May 8, 1945, ending the conflict.

Introduction

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Breakout from Rhine bridgeheads, March–April 1945

Wismar

Hamburg

Stettin r

Westwall battles, October–November 1944

NETHERLANDS

Ode

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Kiel

Closing on the Rhine, February–March 1945

North Sea

Wittenburg

Bremen er

Berlin e

Clearing the Scheldt, October–November 1944

The Hague

Elb

GREAT BRITAIN

We s

Amsterdam Arnhem Munster

London

BELGIUM

21

Remagen Mo

LUX.

se

Frankfurt

lle

Mainz

Prague

Luxembourg

Le Havre X X

Paris

Strasbourg

12

Brest Loir

Bradley e

Brunn Dan

Salzburg

XX

XXX

AT L A N T I C OCEAN

Zurich

Dijon

FRANCE

Devers Lyon

Geneva

Royan

Milan

Allied monthly advance June 6–7, 1944

August 8–September 7, 1944

Garo

Rhône

July 8–August 7, 1944

Toulon

April 8–May 8, 1945

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13

Ravenna

Ligurian Sea Marseilles

March 8–April 7, 1945

200km

YUGOSLAVIA

Ferrara Bologna

Zagreb

Venice

La Spezia

February 8–March 7, 1945

0

Verona

Genoa

November 8–December 7, 1944

200 miles

Trieste

Po

nne

September 8–October 7, 1944 October 8–November 7, 1944

0

ITALY

Turin

Bordeaux

June 8–July 7, 1944

Graz

SWITZERLAND

6 La Rochelle

Clearing the national redoubt, April 1945

AUSTRIA

Innsbruck

Berne

Vienna

Linz

Munich

XXXXX

ube

German Ardennes offensive, December 1944–January 1945

Troyes

Over the Vosges, November 1944

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Regensburg Stuttgart

rne

XXXXX

Pilsen

Nurnberg Metz

Ma

X

use

ine

X

X

Reims

Me

Se

Caen

Breslau Chemnitz

in

Cherbourg

Operation Cobra breakout, August 1944

Liège

Montgomery

Dresden

Ma

Operation Overlord, June 1944

Aachen

r

ine

Normandy fighting, July 1944

Brussels XXXXX

Cologne Rh

Race to the Seine, August–September 1944

Ode

Torgau

Leipzig

Kassel

Antwerp

ta

Posen

e

Advance to the Elbe, April–May 1945

GERMANY

Duisburg

Wa r Spre

SPAIN

Heeresgruppe G retreat, September 1944

Operation Dragoon, August–September 1944

Perugia

CORSICA Rome

Adriatic Sea

Split

MAP 2: THE STRATEGIC DEBATE – 1942–44 Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt met at the Arcadia Conference in Washington, DC in December 1941 where Churchill outlined the basic British strategic concept. The Axis countries would be strangled by a tight naval blockade; Germany would be devastated by a heavy bomber offensive; a propaganda war would be waged against German morale and to bolster the morale of the occupied countries; raids would be conducted on the periphery of Europe from Norway to Greece; and a final assault would be conducted on Fortress Europe once Germany was sufficiently weakened. This reflected the traditional British strategic approach, variously called a peripheral strategy or indirect strategy. This was reflected in the British order of battle, which placed greater emphasis on the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force than on the Army. The US strategic concept was developed in late 1941 and early 1942 under the Chief of the War Plans Division, Major-General Dwight Eisenhower, and presented to Roosevelt on March 27, 1942. As an essential first step, American forces would be built up in Great Britain, codenamed Bolero; this would take a year or more. The ensuing military campaign would consist of aerial bombardment and coastal raids on occupied Europe. An emergency campaign codenamed Sledgehammer would establish a beachhead on the Cotentin Peninsula, including Cherbourg, sometime in 1942 in the event of a major German defeat on the Eastern Front or a weakening of German forces in France. The main amphibious assault, codenamed Roundup, would take place somewhere between Le Havre and Boulogne in 1943. Although not explicitly stated, US strategic cooperation with both Britain and France was conditional on the expectation that US operations would remain indifferent to their imperial concerns, notably in the Mediterranean. British planners felt Sledgehammer was premature and dangerous. But there was a consensus that something had to be done to mollify Moscow since the Red Army was bearing the brunt of the land campaign. In July 1942, the Allies agreed to a compromise, Operation Torch. This consisted of amphibious landings in French North Africa to support the British advance across Libya. The American strategic drift into the Mediterranean Theater continued into 1943. The American Joint Chiefs of Staff under General George C. Marshall continued to press for the cross-Channel Roundup attack into northern France in 1943. The British chiefs under Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke contended that such an operation was 14

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premature until Allied forces were stronger. He forcefully argued that continued Allied operations in the Mediterranean were more feasible, would maintain the momentum in the region, and would force the Wehrmacht to divert additional divisions to this theater, thereby weakening defenses in northern France. Both sides agreed that some large operation would be needed to placate the Soviets. In the end, Marshall agreed to continued operations in the Mediterranean in the summer of 1943, provided that they did not require the diversion of troops earmarked for the future cross-Channel operation. Since the US side would not commit to further operations in Italy after the summer 1943 landings, Sicily was the prudent choice, and a decision for Operation Husky was reached on January 18, 1943 at the Casablanca Conference. The first step in preparing for Roundup was the creation of the COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) planning group under Lieutenant-General Frederick Morgan in March 1943. The initial focus of COSSAC was to consider possible raids along the European coast to keep the Germans guessing about the direction of an Allied invasion. A secondary mission was to plan a follow-on to Sledgehammer, codenamed Rankin, to consider a rapid operation somewhere in Europe in the event of a sudden German collapse. In June and July 1943, COSSAC provided a basic outline for future operations consisting of an initial three-division landing in Normandy, and a simultaneous invasion of southern France. This was approved during the Quadrant Conference of Roosevelt and Churchill in Quebec in August 1943. Churchill opined that the initial landings should be larger and include landings on the Cotentin coast as well. The new plan was codenamed Overlord with the cross-Channel portion of the plan dubbed Neptune and the invasion of southern France codenamed Anvil. Through the course of late 1943 and into 1944, there continued to be changes. The size and scope of the Neptune landings in Normandy gradually became larger, forcing the postponement of the Anvil landing in southern France since there was insufficient amphibious lift to conduct both simultaneously. The codename for Anvil was changed to Dragoon when it was rescheduled. Neptune and Dragoon marked the gradual shift away from the traditional British peripheral strategy and toward American priorities of a direct assault on the center of German power in France. This was due in no small measure to the growing preponderance of American military power within the coalition.

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North Sea

GREAT BRITAIN WA LE S

The Hague

Rankin Cardiff

Th

am

Bristol

es

Rotterdam

NETHERLANDS

London

E NGLAND

Ostend Bruges Calais

Antwerp

Ghent

Dunkirk

Portsmouth

Brussels

BELGIUM

Boulogne Lille

Plymouth

Charleroi

SLEDGEHAMMER 1942 English

ROUNDUP 1943

Mauberge Som

Channel

Dieppe

NEPTUNE 1944

Cherbourg

me

Le Havre

CO TEN

Oise ine

Marne

NORMANDY

St-Malo

Reims

Se

TIN

Caen

Aisne

Châlonssur-Marne

Paris

Brest

Chartres

B R I T TA N Y

Troyes

Rennes Le Mans Orléans e Yonn

N

FRANCE St-Nazaire

0 0

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15

50 miles 50km

Loir

Nantes

e

Tours Vierzon

MAP 3: PRECURSORS TO OVERLORD – 1942–44 The success of the D-Day invasion, Operation Overlord, was due in no small measure to previous Allied amphibious landing operations, primarily in the Mediterranean theater. These operations tested out a host of new technologies such as landing craft, tank landing ships, amphibious trucks, amphibious tractors, assault transports, and many other essential devices. In addition, it built up experience in tactics by addressing questions about night versus daytime landings, the value of associated airborne operations, the level of necessary naval gunfire support, coordination of air support, and a host of other issues. Operation Jubilee, the Dieppe raid on August 19, 1942 on the French coast, was the first large-scale landing against a contested shore. It was not intended to create a permanent lodgment, and, aside from its value in testing amphibious tactics and equipment, its ultimate operational value remains controversial. The more cynical evaluation of its motives is that Churchill desired such a costly operation to impress upon the Americans how unprepared the Allies were to conduct an amphibious landing in France in 1942, which the United States had been pressing for. Regardless of the real motives of the Dieppe raid, it was instrumental in exposing shortcomings in Allied amphibious landing equipment and tactics. It also raised the question of whether it was prudent to conduct a landing directly against a fortified port. The first amphibious operation after Dieppe was Operation Torch in November 1942, which led to the seizure of French North Africa and the introduction of the US Army into the North African campaign. This operation against the halfhearted Vichy French opponent was far more successful than Dieppe. However, it did underscore lingering technical issues, such as the lack of sufficient landing craft, and the need for larger landing ships such as the forthcoming LST (Landing Ship, Tank) to deliver heavier equipment ashore such as tanks. Operation Husky in July 1943 was the pioneer amphibious operation and was by far the largest and most complicated to date. Although Italian coastal defenses were not especially effective, the operation was more technically challenging than Torch. Husky saw the debut of several new technologies including newer types of landing craft, LSTs, and DUKW amphibious trucks. More importantly, it saw several tactical innovations including associated parachute and glider landings, and the first real test of Allied naval gunfire support. The problems with the airborne operations on Sicily were instrumental in planning the airborne operations for Normandy. By far the most 16

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important tactical lesson from Operation Husky was that it was possible to conduct an amphibious operation away from a major port. Until Husky, planners had generally preferred landings at ports on the assumption that the docks would be needed for logistical purposes after the landing. Husky proved that the growing Allied technical capability in amphibious operations made it possible to land away from heavily defended ports and still provide adequate logistical support until a port could be captured. This meant that a Normandy landing did not have to be directed against a heavily defended port such as Cherbourg, Calais, or Le Havre. The next two operations in early September, Baytown and Slapstick, exploited the success of Husky to put the British Eighth Army on the Italian mainland, using the same assets and tactics as Husky. Operation Avalanche at Salerno later in the month showed the value of amphibious landings as a means of operational mobility. Although the Salerno landing ultimately succeeded, there were numerous tactical shortcomings that needed to be addressed. From the German perspective, the lesson that was not learned was that the preferred tactical response to an amphibious landing, a Panzer counterattack against the beachhead, was not a reliable solution in the face of Allied naval gunfire. This lesson was repeated at Anzio in early 1944, but the lesson continued to be ignored. German planning for the defense of the French coast still placed great reliance on a Panzer counteroffensive as a means to challenge Allied landings. Operation Vésuve was the most obscure of the amphibious operations from an Anglo-American perspective. This was a landing by Free French forces to liberate Corsica from Italian occupation, exploiting the political chaos created by the Italian withdrawal from the war. This operation offered few technical or tactical lessons. Operation Shingle at Anzio on January 22, 1944 was the culmination of the Allied landings in the Mediterranean theater and was a clear demonstration of the growing Allied technical skill at amphibious operations. On the other hand, its operational failure was due to the American unwillingness to provide adequate resources for its success. If Dieppe was a British warning to the Americans about unpreparedness in initiating a second front in 1942–43, Anzio was an American warning to the British that they had lost patience with the British peripheral strategy in the Mediterranean and demanded a landing in France in mid-1944.

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SWEDEN DENMARK

North Sea

Baltic Sea

Copenhagen

Wismar

Hamburg

Stettin

NETHERLANDS

er

Bremen

Arnhem

The Hague

e

We s

Amsterdam

GREAT BRITAIN

POLAND

Berlin

Elb

IRELAND

London Brussels

Jubilee 19 Aug 1942 Se

Caen

ine

Le Havre

Cherbourg

Rh

BELGIUM LUX.

Reims

ine

CZECHOSLOVAKIA Dan

Strasbourg

Troyes Loir

FRANCE Lyon

Royan

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND Geneva

Bay of Biscay

e

Venice

Po

Genoa Bologna

Perugia

Toulon

CORSICA Eb

ro

VÉSUVE 21 Sep 1943

SPAIN PORTUGAL Guad

Lisbon

Salerno

AVALANCHE 9 Sep 1943

iana

TORCH (Center TF) 8 Nov 1942

TORCH (Western TF) 8 Nov 1942

SPANISH MOROCCO Rabat

Casablanca

Mediterranean Sea

SLAPSTICK 9 Sep 1943

Messina

SICILY Algiers

Gibraltar

Foggia Naples

SARDINA TORCH (Eastern TF) 8 Nov 1942

Adriatic Sea

Rome Anzio

SHINGLE 22 Jan 1944

Madrid

YUGOSLAVIA

Ravenna

Marseilles

Duero

Zagreb

Trieste

Verona

Turin Rhône

onn

HUNGARY

ITALY Milan

Gar

Vienna Salzburg

Dijon

Bordeaux

ube

Munich

e

La Rochelle

Bone

Tunis

La Marsa Carthage

ALGERIA

BAYTOWN 3 Sep 1943 HUSKY 10 Jul 1943

Mostaganem Oran

er

Prague

Frankfurt

Metz

Brest

Od

GERMANY

Cologne

TUNISIA 0 0

200 miles 200km

17

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MAP 4: GERMAN ASSESSMENT OF ALLIED DIVISIONS IN THE UK – MAY 31, 1944 This map shows the German appreciations of the Allied forces in the UK compiled by the army intelligence agency Fremde Heere West (FHW – Foreign Armies West) for May 31, 1944, the last such assessment prior to the D-Day invasion. Besides the divisions shown on the map, FHW assumed there were a further three infantry divisions, two armored divisions, and one airborne division for which the location was unidentified but presumed to be in southern England. In total, the FHW assessment tallied 79 Allied divisions (56 infantry, 15 armored, and 8 airborne) as well as 20 separate infantry, armored, and airborne brigades. In reality, this was a substantial overestimate. Actual Allied strength in the UK at the time was closer to 38 divisions (28 infantry, 6 armored, and 4 airborne) with the caveat that numerous US and Canadian divisions were arriving continually during this period. The FHW correctly identified the locations of about 27 of the 38 actual Allied divisions, and missed the locations of the remainder. In addition, they counted over 40 “ghost” divisions. The overestimate was due to a number of factors. German intelligence networks in Britain had been compromised by British counterintelligence. Operation Bodyguard was a coordinated deception program, feeding false information to turned German agents, using fake radio networks to create a fictional order of battle, and creating dummy garrisons and port installations to fool German aerial reconnaissance. These actions were based on false invasion scenarios such as operations Fortitude North (amphibious landings in Norway, to tie down the 400,000 German troops there), Fortitude South (the Pas-de-Calais) and Ironside (the Bay of Biscay) to shield the actual landing plans in Normandy. Numerous Allied “ghost” divisions were part of the bluff. Berlin remained convinced well into August 1944 that Normandy was only the first of potentially several Allied amphibious operations using the numerous divisions assumed to be in Britain. The FHW had no reliable method of comparing its assessments using other technical means. Owing to Allied air superiority over the UK, Luftwaffe photo-intelligence missions were not numerous enough to create an up-to-date aerial overview of military garrisons in the UK. Other traditional intelligence methods such as signals intelligence were not entirely useful. The Allied deception plans included radio transmissions from fake Allied ghost divisions, and actual divisions could limit their transmissions since landlines were available. Prisoner-of-war interrogations were of limited utility since the source of recent prisoners, 18

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mainly from Italy, had little or dated information about forces back in the UK. Aside from the difficulties of assessing the Allied order of battle, Berlin faced the dilemma of determining where and when the Allies would stage their main amphibious operation. The issue of “when” was perhaps the easiest to answer. It seemed apparent that an Allied landing would occur in the late spring or early summer of 1944. Determining the precise date proved elusive, largely owing to the Allied deception effort. Too many dates were offered by too many intelligence sources, essentially clouding the issue. The issue of “where” was a greater dilemma. Assessments through spring 1944 tended to place the landing site somewhere on the Pas-de-Calais since this was the narrowest section of the English Channel and offered the shortest route to Germany. This was reflected in the disposition of Wehrmacht units in France, as well as the construction of the Atlantic Wall. There was always a stipulation in these assessments that the landings might occur elsewhere, including on the Belgian or Dutch coasts, or even Brittany or the Bay of Biscay. This confusion was reflected in the dispersion of the Atlantic Wall defenses. The Marinegruppenkommando (MGK) West (Naval Group Command West) began changing its assessment in the months prior to D-Day. The MGK West reacted skeptically to agent reports claiming a concentration of Allied shipping in the southeast of England, correctly judging that the majority was in fact in the Portsmouth area or to the immediate west. The MGK West assessments from April 26 and May 2, 1944 both suggested that the Allied landings might occur from the Somme all the way west to the Cotentin Peninsula. Assessments of Allied transport capability were poor, with little firm evidence of the number of critical landing ships, especially the LST. The MGK West believed that the Allies could deliver about eight divisions with conventional assault ships, but the number would expand to 13 divisions if the Allies had 120 LSTs available and 17.4 divisions if they had 220 LSTs. Luftwaffe assessments in the pre-invasion months also hinted at a more westerly landing site. The Luftwaffe noted that the Allies seemed to be trying to isolate the future Normandy battlefield by attacks against the Seine bridges. Strikes against bridges across the Loire at Angers, Tours, and Orléans all pointed to an effort to isolate the Normandy region. In the event, neither the Kreigsmarine nor Luftwaffe intelligence estimates held much sway in Berlin or in the Oberbefehlshaber (OB) West (High Command West) headquarters in France.

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N

Allied Division identified (correct)

Inverness

Allied Division identified (mistake) Allied Division not identified

Aberdeen

0

50 miles

0

SCOTLAND

50km

XX

Dundee

XX

Edinburgh

XX XX

Firt

h of

Fort

h

XX

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Glasgow

XX

XX

NORTHER N IR ELA ND

Newcastle XX

XX

So

Belfast

lw

a

ir yF

Edinburgh

th

XX

Middlesbrough

XX

XX

XX

XX

ENGLAND Hull

XX

XX

Sheffield

Liverpool

IR E L A N D

XX

XX

XX XX XX

Nottingham XX

XX

Leicester

Norwich

XX

XX

XX

Birmingham

XX XX

WALES

Coventry

XX

Cambridge

XX

XX

Northampton

XX

XX

Swansea

Oxford

XX

XX

Cardiff

XX

Bristol

XX

London

XX

XX

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

XX XX

XX

Exeter

XX

XX XX

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX XX

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

XX XX

XX

Plymouth

XX

XX

Bristol Channel

XX

Harwich

Gloucester

XX

Brighton

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX XX

Hastings

Dover Calais

Weymouth

XX

English Channel

Falmouth Dieppe

19

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MAP 5: THE ATLANTIC WALL IN FRANCE – 1944 The German defenses against an anticipated Allied amphibious landing were called the Atlantic Wall. Construction of these defenses began in earnest in 1942, accelerating in 1943 as the possibility of an Allied landing increased. The density of defenses along the Atlantic Wall varied considerably owing to German intelligence assessments of Allied intentions. The English Channel was narrowest in the Pas-de-Calais area, and there were significant ports in the area, such as Boulogne and Calais. German planning assumed that it was the most likely point for an Allied landing. As a result, the Wehrmacht deployed its most formidable defenses in this sector. Well into 1944, German intelligence believed that the Allies would try to seize a major port at the outset of the invasion to provide for their logistical needs. As a result, the major ports in the English Channel and the Bay of Biscay were heavily fortified and designated as Festungen (fortresses). The ports received extensive coastal fortifications, coast defense batteries, and other defenses to repel an Allied landing against the port itself and the surrounding area. These were by far the most heavily defended strongpoints of the Atlantic Wall. The first defenses erected along the Atlantic Wall between the Festung ports were the coastal artillery batteries. In 1942 and 1943, these were deployed along the coast “like a string of pearls” as an economical means to cover France’s long coastline until more elaborate infantry defenses could be created. The Atlantic Wall’s coastal defense artillery was divided between Army (Heer) and Navy (Kriegsmarine) battalions. In general, the Navy tended to control the batteries near major ports while the Army controlled the batteries along the coast between the ports. The use of different types of coastal artillery battalions was due to the pernicious interservice rivalry in the Nazi state. The tactical doctrine between the two services differed. The Army battalions (Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilungen) were intended to engage Allied forces near the shoreline and in the immediate beachhead area. For targeting, they relied on preregistration of fixed targets; the Navy criticized them because they had little capability against moving targets such as Allied ships. The Army derisively referred to the Navy battalions (Marine-ArtillerieAbteilungen) as the “battleships of the dunes.” Each naval battery was organized like a landlocked destroyer with central fire-direction control that enabled the gun batteries to engage Allied ships. Although they had much better antiship capability than the Army batteries, they were generally not well deployed to provide fire support once the 20

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Allied landing force reached the beach. The Navy also deployed light artillery battalions (leichte Marine-Artillerie-Abteilungen) which were intended for coast defense and which included numerous Flak batteries. The Atlantic Wall was organized into Coastal Defense Sectors (Küsten Verteidigung Abschnitte – KVA), which generally consisted of an infantry division, plus the coastal fortifications and coastal defense gun battalions in that sector. The infantry divisions assigned to the coastal defense mission were a type called the Static Infantry Division (Infanterie-Division bodenständig). Compared to a normal infantry division, they suffered from a nearly complete lack of horses and motor vehicles. On the other hand, they had substantially greater firepower than normal infantry divisions as a result of the numerous weapons allotted to the coastal defense bunkers. The Static Infantry Divisions depended on substandard allotments of personnel, usually men from older age groups not suitable for deployment in active combat theaters. The average age in these divisions was 35–45 years old. Many of the Static Divisions stationed in Normandy were filled out with Volksdeutsche, nominally ethnic Germans from regions outside of Germany. Owing to severe manpower shortages by 1944, the Volksdeutsche category was extended to include large numbers of unreliable non-German troops such as Polish men from regions of western Poland absorbed into the Reich. The Static Divisions were further weakened by their dependence on even less reliable troops, the Osttruppen. These were former Red Army prisoners of war recruited into the Wehrmacht. While some Osttruppen were genuinely disaffected from the Soviet regime, most simply wanted to escape from the lethal prisoner-of-war camps. In some sectors such as Normandy, battalions of Osttruppen were substituted for normal German infantry battalions, much to the chagrin of local German commanders, who regarded them as untrustworthy should fighting break out. The OB West was in overall command of the anti-invasion front, led by Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt. It controlled two army groups on the invasion front: Heeresgruppe B in northern France under Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, and Heeresgruppe G under Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz covering the Bay of Biscay and the Mediterranean coast. Each of the army groups had two field armies. Heeresgruppe B controlled 15.Armee in the Pas-de-Calais, and 7.Armee in Lower Normandy. Heeresgruppe G controlled 1.Armee on the Bay of Biscay and 19.Armee on the Mediterranean coast.

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Cardiff

Th

Bristol

am

London

es

KVA B

E N GL A N D KVA C

Calais 244

XX

KVA D1 240 Channel

KVA E1 KVA J1 Cherbourg

XX

260

519

XX

Caen

711

681 688

XXXX

15

1245

UPPER NORMANDY Oise

OB WEST

Marne

Orléans

Loir

e

280 Tours

Nantes

St-Nazaire

B XXX XX G

Vierzon

684 685

XX

158

KVA D

Poitiers

282

ÎLE DE RÉ

FR A NC E

686 XXXX

1181

1180

ÎLE D’OLERON

Royan Gironde Estuary

KVA E1

Vichy

1

687 1282

Bisca y

me

Le Mans

XX

ÎLE D’YEU

of

245

Chartres

275

KVA C2

Ba y

Som

XX

e Yonn

XXXX

683

PICARDY

Paris

7 264

Lille

XX

Rennes

265

BELLE-ÎLE

XX

348

Dieppe

1255

608

XX

KVA C1

1254 266

XX

77

1273

Lorient

1253

345

716

LOWER NORMANDY

XX

B R I T TA N Y 1274

XX

18 Lw

344

ine

KVA J2

XX

Le Havre

XX

352

54

15 X X XX 7

262

PAS-DE-CALAIS

St-Malo

266

Brest

KVA H1

XX

KVA D2

BELGIUM

Se

KVA A1

XX

XX

343

XX

709

Channel Islands

KVA A2

KVA H2

243

KVA E2

KVA KVA F G

1265

XX

Channel Islands

KVA B

204 1244

49

Plymouth

English

XX

48

XX

47

242 Boulogne

Bruges

Ostend

Dunkirk

Portsmouth

KVA A2

KVA A3

Limoges

284 XX

708

618

Bordeaux

KVA E2

XX

159

Static division

Ga

ron

MASSIF CENTRAL ne

1287

Infantry division

Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung

Leichte-Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung Festung port

KVA Coastal defense sector

KVA F

286

(Küsten Verteidigung Abschnitt)

0 0

75 miles

XX

Toulouse

276

75km

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CHAPTER 1

THE INVASION FRONT, JUNE 6, 1944

Troops of the 16th Infantry Regiment, 1st Infantry Division wade ashore from an LCVP on Omaha Beach during the D-Day landings, June 6, 1944. (NARA) 23

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MAP 6: ROUTES TO THE D-DAY INVASION BEACHES The initial stage of Operation Neptune involved a complex naval plan to deliver the Allied forces to the target beaches in Normandy. Planning for the invasion of France was undertaken by COSSAC, starting in earnest in 1943. Allied intelligence had a very good appreciation of German defenses in France. Allied planning was complicated by the continual improvements in German forces along the French coast, especially after the appointment of Erwin Rommel as the head of the invasion front in the autumn of 1943. Contrary to German assumptions, Allied planners did not favor a landing against a major French port. The failure of the Dieppe raid on August 19, 1942 certainly shaped this view, as did the extensive German Festung fortification of French ports in the aftermath of the Dieppe raid as part of the Atlantic Wall program. The Operation Husky landing on Sicily on July 10, 1943 provided a model for Operation Neptune. From an operational standpoint, Husky made it clear that it was possible to conduct a landing operation away from a deep-water port and to supply the landing force over open beaches. This was in no small measure due to Allied innovations in a host of new technologies including DUKW amphibious trucks, improved landing craft, and production of sufficient numbers of the larger landing craft such as the LCI (Landing Craft, Infantry), LCT (Landing Craft, Tank) and LST. The most innovative aspect of the Neptune plan was the creation of artificial harbors, codenamed Mulberry with one planned for the British sector off Arromanches-les-Bains, and one in the American sector at Omaha Beach. These were erected off the Normandy coast in the days after the D-Day landings. The Neptune plan underwent continual alterations through the end of 1943 and into early 1944. The most important change occurred in January and February 1944 after the commander of Allied ground forces, General (later Field Marshal) Bernard Montgomery, was briefed on the initial plan to land with three divisions. Montgomery felt that the original plan did not deliver sufficient forces and wanted at least five 24

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divisions in the initial wave. The original strategic scheme was to conduct Operation Neptune across the English Channel against Normandy simultaneously with Operation Anvil across the Mediterranean against Provence in southern France. To build up sufficient naval forces for the main Normandy landing, it was necessary to delay Operation Anvil until later in the summer. The expanded Neptune plan involved two naval task forces. The Western Task Force under Rear Admiral Alan Kirk was in charge of the two American beaches, with Force U under Rear Admiral Don Moon on the extreme western (right) flank at Utah Beach, and Force O under Rear Admiral John Hall at Omaha Beach. The Eastern Task Force under Rear Admiral Philip Vian contained three naval forces: Force J in the center under Commodore Geoffrey Oliver at Juno Beach, Force G under Commodore Cyril Douglas-Pennant at Gold Beach, and Rear Admiral Arthur Talbot at the easternmost flank at Sword Beach. Besides the main landing forces, there were two follow-up forces with additional landing ships and troops for reinforcements. Follow-Up Force B under Commodore Campbell Edgar supported the American Western Task Force, while Rear Admiral William Parry led Follow-Up Force L in support of the British/Canadian Eastern Task Force. To prevent German discovery of the Neptune objective, the Allied naval forces were widely scattered along the southern English coast and farther north up the coast to Norfolk and beyond. Dummy forces were created as part of the Operation Fortitude deception plan, aimed at reinforcing the German view that the Allied landing would be conducted against the Pas-de-Calais. The primary Allied staging area was in Portsmouth, with the various naval forces gradually converging on the Area Z deployment zone in the darkness of June 5, 1944. The two naval task forces plus their considerable supporting elements were massed together in order to protect them against any potential German naval response, as well as to simplify the task of breaching the German minefields in the English Channel that shielded the Normandy coast.

The Invasion Front, June 6, 1944

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D1 D2 D3

WALES

Milford Haven

Felixstowe Harwich L2

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Tilbury

Th

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am es

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Southampton

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Weymouth

E1

O1 C2

Portland E1

Dungeness Shoreham

C1 J1 S2 Portsmouth

I. OF WIGHT

E1

E1

S1

Selsey

E1

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Boulogne

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O1

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U1

Falmouth

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er

rri

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a eb

n

mi

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Caen

N

Covering Forces C1 Covering forces destroyers C2 Covering forces, coastal forces Bombarding Forces D1 Eastern Task Force bombardment ships, assembly port the Clyde D2 Western Task Force bombardmentSt-Malo ships, assembly port Belfast

FRANCE Swept channels Coastal channels

Blockships D3 Corncob blockships, assembly port Oban Mulberry Units E1 Mulberry units, assembly ports Selsey, Dungeness, the Thames, Portland, Solent and Spithead

ine

Embarkation Ports Sword Group 1, loading ports Newhaven and Shoreham Sword Group 2, loading port Portsmouth Juno Group, loading ports Southampton and Portsmouth Gold group, loading port Southampton Omaha Group, loading ports Weymouth and Portland Utah Group, loading ports Torquay, Brixham, Dartmouth and Plymouth Follow-up Group L, loading port Tilbury Follow-up Group L2, loading port Felixstowe Follow-up Group B1, loading port Plymouth Follow-up Group B2, loading port Falmouth

Ouistreham Se

S1 S2 J1 G1 O1 U1 L1 L2 B1 B2

Rouen Trouville

Destroyer/frigate patrol lines Coastal forces

0 0

50 miles 50km

MAP 7: NAVAL BOMBARDMENT ON D-DAY The preliminary naval operation on D-Day was a bombardment of the coast. This bombardment had two principal objectives: to demolish German coastal artillery batteries in order to prevent them from interfering with the amphibious landing operation, and to soften up the German beach defenses by bombarding the most substantial German beach strongpoints. COSSAC had created the special Martian Committee in 1942 to monitor the German construction of coastal artillery sites, and the naval plan assigned specific ships to engage and destroy every identified battery. It is worth noting that the Wehrmacht began fortifying some of the divisional artillery battalions in Lower Normandy in the spring of 1944, and these were gradually added to the bombardment list as they were identified by the Martian Committee. The Neptune plan generally assigned one battleship or cruiser to each identified battery from the prelanding bombardment. Two of the gun batteries were considered to pose a significant enough threat that they were targeted by special forces operations on the morning of D-Day: the Pointe du Hoc Battery in the American sector between Utah and Omaha beaches, and the Merville Battery on the extreme eastern side of the Neptune landing site near Sword Beach. The Longues-sur-Mer naval gun battery between Omaha and Gold beaches provides a good example of the naval bombardment force in action on D-Day. The battery was subjected to several bombing attacks in 1944, including two major raids in the week before D-Day, but none of the gun bunkers was disabled. On D-Day, it was assigned to HMS Ajax, which began firing at it around 0530hrs without causing major damage. After the preliminary naval bombardment, the battery began firing on the command ship HMS Bulolo around 0600hrs, forcing it to move station. HMS Ajax returned along with HMS Argonaut and began bombarding the battery again, ceasing fire around 0845hrs after two of its guns were knocked out by direct hits through the open embrasures. The cruisers had fired a total of 179 rounds against the 26

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battery. The Longues-sur-Mer battery crew cleaned up the position in the late morning, and the remaining two guns opened fire again in the afternoon toward Omaha Beach, prompting the attention of the French cruiser Georges Leygues, which was defending the American sector. This final bombardment put the battery out of action for the last time on D-Day after it had fired 115 rounds during the course of the day. The battery was captured by British Army units on June 7, 1944. The effectiveness of the naval bombardment plan has been controversial. Prior Allied amphibious operations in the Mediterranean that formed the basis for Neptune planning had not involved extensive beach fortification or substantial coastal artillery. Although the Neptune bombardment proved effective at most of the beaches, the bombardment of Omaha Beach was inadequate. Eisenhower had brought several Pacific veterans to the UK to offer their experiences, notably Major-General Charles “Cowboy Pete” Corlett, who had commanded the US forces in the Aleutians and again in the invasion of Kwajalein in February 1944. Corlett argued that the Pacific experiences were more relevant than the Mediterranean theater experiences owing to the closer similarities of Japanese beach defenses to German ones in Normandy. He argued for a more prolonged bombardment of the beaches, but his advice was largely ignored, leading to bitter recriminations after the landings. Besides the naval bombardment plan shown here, the German defenses were also subjected to heavy air attack in the early morning hours of D-Day. As in the case of the naval bombardment, the results were mixed. Some sites were particularly hard hit. For example the Pointe du Hoc Battery was largely obliterated by a predawn raid by eight RAF Lancaster squadrons dropping 635 tons of bombs, or about 20 tons per acre. The air bombardment plan was far less effective elsewhere, for example at Omaha Beach, where the bombers dropped their payloads too far inland from the beaches to damage the German defenses.

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N

WILLIAM

Grandcamp

EASY

FOX

USS Arkansas GEORGE

HOW

Port-en-Bessin

ITEM

Longues

Isigny

Carentan

Vaux-sur-Aure

Bayeux

JIG

iadem

es

KING LOVE

HMS Scylla (NCETF)

JUNO

GOLD MIKE

Le Havre HMS Roberts

HMS Dan ae HMS Dra gon

Pointe du Hoc Maisy

DOG

HMS Ramillies

HMS Mauritius (NCBFD) HMS Frobisher

PETER

Bénysur-Mer

Benervillesur-Mer

QUEEN

Langrunesur-Mer

ROGER

Collevillesur-Orne

Houlgate

Ouistreham

0

11/01/2018 13:43:22

27

Merville Cabourg

Sallenelles

Cae

e Orn

Div

es

10km

Caen

nC

ana

l

Flagships

10 miles

Villerville

OBOE

German fortified zones and coastal guns

0

Seine

HMS Arethusa

SWORD

NAN

RED GREE N RED

CHARLIE

ABLE

GREEN

VICTOR

HMS Belfast (NCBFE and K)

HMS Hilary (NCFJ)

Le Havre Grand Clos

HMS Warspite

HMS Largs (NCFS)

GR E WH EN ITE

USS Montcalm

BAKER

HMS D

OMAHA

UNCLE

USS George Leygues

WHITE RED

HMS Glasgow

Bombardment Force E

HMS Bulolo (NCFG)

RED GREEN

TARE

St-Martinde-Varreville

USS Texas (NCBFC)

HNLMS Soemba

SUGAR

USS Ancon (NCFO)

Flor

ROGER

Émondeville

Bombardment Force C

GREEN

USS Enterprise

UTAH

GREEN

USS Nevada

ILES ST MARCOUF

Bombardment Force D

Bombardment Force K

RED

QUEEN

GR WH EEN ITE GR RED EEN RE GRE D EN

Quinéville

PETER

USS Augusta (NCWTF)

USS Bayfield (NCFU)

USS Quincy

SA jax HM SA rgo HM nau SE t HM mera l SO rion d

USS Tuscaloosa (NCBFA)

HMS

Bombardment Force A

HM

HMS Erebus

C h a n n e l

Naval Commander Western Task Force Naval Commander Eastern Task Force Naval Commander Bombardment Force A Naval Commander Bombardment Force C Naval Commander Bombardment Force D Naval Commander Bombardment Forces E and K Naval Commander Force Gold Naval Commander Force Juno Naval Commander Force Omaha Naval Commander Force Sword Naval Commander Force U

Eastern Task Force Area

HMS Black Prince

St-Vaast-la-Hougue

Morsalines

Western Task Force Area

E n g l i s h

NCWTF NCETF NCBFA NCBFC NCBFD NCBFE and K NCFG NCFJ NCFO NCFS NCFU

MAP 8: WESTERN TASK FORCE’S ASSAULT ON D-DAY Rear Admiral Kirk’s Western Task Force had the responsibility of delivering the American beach assaults against Utah Beach to the west and Omaha Beach to the east. The two beaches were separated from one another by almost 15 miles, owing largely to the Vire River Estuary between them. The German defenses were actually strongest in the area between the two assault beaches, as Rommel believed that the Vire Estuary would make an attractive landing site because of the harbor at Grandcamp, as well as giving potential access to the interior via the river. Western Task Force began arriving off the landing beaches around 0300hrs. The conditions were not ideal because of a recent Channel storm that left the sea agitated and the sky overcast. The amphibious assault ships began to deploy in a predetermined pattern in their respective transport areas. These areas were at the outer reaches of the German coastal gun batteries. They might have been threatened if the Germans had more naval gun batteries in this sector. The German naval gun batteries were capable of engaging targets at sea using radar data fed into the battery fire-control bunkers. Allied planners were aware of this, and had deliberately targeted surface search radars along the coast to blind the gun batteries. There had been a set of Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine radars on a station on the bluffs between Grandcamp and Vierville-sur-Mer, but these were knocked out in the preinvasion air attacks. The Kreigsmarine had insufficient supplies of naval mines for any extensive mining of the coastal waters in Lower Normandy, except for the high-priority ports. Allied minesweepers attempted to clear the fields that did exist, but there were a few mine casualties. The main activity in the transport area was in preparing the smaller landing craft, such as the LCAs (Landing Craft, Assault) and LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel), which were carried aboard the assault transports since they were too small to survive the Channel crossing. The landing craft were lowered into the water, and the assault 28

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infantry was loaded into them. Owing to the highly choreographed nature of the assault landing, this meant that many landing craft had to make shallow circles near their assault transports until the beach landing began. As a result, many infantrymen became seasick in the hours preceding the landings. Accompanying the transport groups were the bombardment groups consisting of the battleship USS Texas, and several cruisers and destroyers. Each of these warships had been assigned specific targets on shore with a predetermined amount of ammunition per target. The bombardment groups began to open fire between 0536 and 0540hrs. Targeting of the shore defenses was the responsibility of the destroyers and converted LCT(R)s (Landing Craft Tank (Rocket)). These began their bombardment around 0600hrs. The maps that follow provide greater detail concerning the conduct of the actual beach assaults. The preinvasion naval bombardments had very mixed results. The naval gunfire directed against the modest German strongpoints on Utah Beach were quite effective in demoralizing the small German garrison, and resulting casualties to the US Army troops landing there were modest. In contrast, the naval gunfire against Omaha Beach was largely ineffective. The ships used in the assault were not powerful enough to damage the larger reinforced bunkers. The rocket ships largely missed their targets. Furthermore, Allied intelligence was unaware of the fact that the 352.Infanterie-Division had moved into this area, along with its four field artillery battalions and an attachment of Nebelwerfer artillery rockets. As a result, this substantial German artillery force was never targeted and wreaked havoc on Omaha Beach. The naval bombardment force proved much more effective after the initial landings, when several destroyer commanders brought their warships into shallow water close to the beach to blast German bunkers from point-blank range.

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1

3

7 USS Tuscaloosa

1 USS Bayfield

9

Tra n

sp 4 ort are

6

USS Corey

3 5

a

ILES ST MARCOUF

USS Augusta

Tran s

port

USS Hobson

St-Marcouf

R

GE

USS Ancon USS Shubrick

N

GA

USS Herndon

R

9

USS Satterlea

E

9

USS Talybont

LE

UNC

RED EN GRE

Ste-Mère-Église

10

USS Texas

USS Thompson

OMAHA Pointe du Hoc

VICTOR

Ste-Mariedu-Mont

9

USS McCook

RED

11

CHAR

DO

G

EE

EAS

11/01/2018 13:43:23

29

FOX

St-Cômedu-Mont

RED

St-Laurentsur-Mer

Close Support Destroyer Force

0

Y

GR

Flagships

0

R GR ED EE N

GR

Viervillesur-Mer

Swept channels

3 miles 3km

Le Port

HMS Melbreak

USS Doyle

N

Grandcamp

USS Harding

USS Emmons USS Baldwin

LIE

RE D EEN

D RE N EE GR

TAR

St-Martin-deVarreville

8

SU

EE

GR

area 2

UTAH

RO

Ravenoville

4

English Channel

USS Fitch

Quinéville

2

Western Task Force Area Eastern Task Fo rce Area

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 29

1. 0229hrs, June 6, Naval Commander Task Force U, Rear-Admiral D. Moon USN, aboard USS Bayfield, arrives in the Transport Area. 2. 0251hrs, June 6, Naval Commander Task Force O, Rear-Admiral J. Hall USN, aboard USS Ancon, arrives in the Transport Area. 3. 0300hrs, June 6, Naval Commander Western Task Force, Rear-Admiral A. G. Kirk, aboard his flagship USS Augusta arrives in the area to command the American landings. 4. 0230–0330hrs, transport ships begin to arrive in Utah Beach’s Transport Area and move into lowering positions for the embarkation of assault forces which begin immediately. 5. 0230–0330hrs, transports begin to arrive in Omaha Beach’s Transport Area and move into lowering positions for the embarkation of assault forces which begins immediately. 6. 0430hrs, 4th Cavalry Squadron engineers land and seize the St Marcouf islands. 7. 0536hrs, Commander Bombardment Force A, Rear-Admiral Deyo, aboard USS Tuscaloosa gives the order to open fire on the German defenses. 8. 0540hrs, Commander Bombardment Force C, Rear-Admiral Bryant, aboard USS Texas gives the order to open fire on German defenses. 9. 0600hrs, destroyers move close to inshore to begin bombardment of enemy defenses and landing beaches. 10. 0630hrs, assault landings begin on Utah Beach. 11. 0630hrs, assault landings begin on Omaha Beach.

HMS Tanatside GEORGE

Cabourg Collevillesur-Mer

Port-enBessin

MAP 9: GERMAN DEFENSES ON THE COTENTIN PENINSULA – JUNE 6, 1944 The western side of the Allied D-Day landings in Lower Normandy took place on the Cotentin Peninsula. This was a key German fortified strongpoint since Berlin expected that a major harbor would be a prime requirement of any Allied amphibious operation. As a result, Cherbourg was given Festung status and the area was especially well fortified both in the harbor and along the immediate coast. These defenses consisted of both Army and Navy coastal gun batteries. An area of secondary concern to German planners was the Vire Estuary at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. The mouth of the river offered some opportunities, and the small port of Grandcamp was also viewed as being a useful asset to support the landing of follow-on forces. German Army deployments in the area had been relatively modest through the spring of 1944, mostly owing to a general shortage of firstclass infantry divisions. As the probability of an Allied landing increased, Erwin Rommel began to change the disposition of forces in light of likely Allied actions. Rommel had noted the use of British and American airborne units in the Operation Husky landings on Sicily in June 1943, and recognized that an Allied amphibious operation would likely include an airborne component. In a prescient move, Rommel ordered the 91.Luftlande-Division to be moved into the center of the Cotentin Peninsula in May 1944 to prevent the Allies from landing an airborne 30

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force in the Douve River valley, thereby cutting off and encircling Cherbourg. In addition, the area had many streams and rivers blocked to created large flooded areas, further restricting the use of gliders and airborne forces. Rommel was indeed right in predicting Allied intentions, and the deployment of 91.Luftlande-Division forced Operation Neptune planners to reconfigure the landings by the 82nd Airborne Division on May 28, 1944. Instead of its original mission deeper into the Cotentin Peninsula, the division was dropped closer to the coast to expedite the Utah Beach landings. The Operation Neptune plan placed high priority on the capture of the deep-water port of Cherbourg. Although provisions were in place to create artificial Mulberry harbors at Omaha Beach and Arromanchesles-Bains, possession of a good, high-volume port would be essential to Allied logistics requirements for the conduct of operations after D-Day. This was at the core of the American landings at Utah Beach and Omaha Beach. Since Cherbourg was so heavily fortified from the ocean side, the Allied plans were to land at a weak point on the Normandy coast, cut off the Cotentin Peninsula, and then reduce the German defenses south of Cherbourg in anticipation of capturing this key seaport.

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N

KVU Gruppe Cherbourg-See

I

2

I

1

1262

17 MG

I

3

1262

II

I

MKB Landemer

206 MKB York

I

KVU Gruppe Jobourg

III

1262

739

1262

7 X 09 24 X 3

III

729 II

729 Barfleur

St-Pierre-Église

Sturm AOK 7

I

I

II

9

I

10

I

II

Fest 84

729 St-Vaast-la-Hougue I

XX II

14

1262

III

Valognes

Bricquebec

II

II

3

1058

919

1261 I

MKB Marcouf I

1262

2

Ravenoville

1261

I

XX

1262

Barnevillesur-Mer 921

1

91. LL

243 XX 91. L L

922 III 921

Carteret

II

I

II

II

Ste-MèreÉglise II

III

III

1057 St-Sauveurle-Vicomte

1261

Quinéville

Montebourg

1057

I

4

I

5

919

70 9 91 XX .L L

II

922

I

KVU Gruppe St Vaast

II

III

243

8

1261

1261

1058

XX

KVU Gruppe Cotentin-West

6

I

5

II

I

920 III 922

Les Pieux

1261

Quettehou

709

I

1261

II

920

561 Ost

1261

II

II

Cherbourg

MKB Ft du Roule

I

6

III

1261

II

739

I

7

II

II

II

I

649 Ost

I

MKB Brommy

I

MKB Blankenese

I

Fermanville

I

8 2

MKB Hamburg

I

MKB Bastion II

Beaumont-Hague

I

MKB Molenbatterie

II

KVU Gruppe Barfleur

I

MKB Seebahnhof

1262

Pontl’Abbé

1261

St-Martin-de-Varreville

795 Geo

II II

I

Chef-du-Pont

919 Pouppeville

Douve

KVU Gruppe Granville

Portbail

St-Sauveur-dePierrepont

1 92 I II 2 75

II

III II

II

I

752 zbV

100

1057

III

St-Jores

III

La Hayedu-Puits

1058 St-Cômedu-Mont

709 XX2 35

Carentan

II

Lessay

6 91 X .L 35 X L 2

I

II

II

6 II

III

KVU Gruppe

Festung Cherbourg Landfront Subdivisional coastal defense group Coastal gun battery Inundated area

0 0

6

XX

352

Périers

5 miles 5km

31

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 31

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MAP 10: US AIRBORNE LANDINGS – JUNE 6, 1944 Utah Beach was at the extreme western end of the Allied landing beaches, and so could be vulnerable to German counterattacks from the forces on the Cotentin Peninsula as well as those in the immediate beach area. To facilitate a rapid capture of Utah Beach, Operation Neptune incorporated the use of two American airborne divisions in a night drop immediately behind the beach area. The 101st Airborne Division began landing around 0130hrs in the vicinity of St-Martin-de-Varreville and Pouppeville. It included three Parachute Infantry regiments (501st, 502nd, and 506th) and one Glider Infantry Regiment (327th). The division was assigned three drop zones (A, C, and D) and its mission was to defend the southern side of the arriving VII Corps by securing or destroying key bridges and other features facing Carentan and defending against any German counterattacks from the Carentan sector. The 82nd Airborne Division was originally scheduled to land farther west of the Merderet River, but in late May 1944, the division was assigned drop zones N, O, and T covering the northern flank of the VII Corps landing operation. The division was configured like the 101st Airborne Division with three Parachute Infantry regiments (505th, 507th, and 508th) and one Glider Infantry Regiment (325th). Its mission was to secure the bridges over the Merderet River to hasten the breakout from the beachhead, and to cover the northwestern flank of the VII Corps sector. The early morning airborne drops were confronted with a host of problems. Weather conditions over Lower Normandy were not ideal, with a coastal storm exiting the area, leaving turbulent air and scattered clouds. Night navigation aids were inadequate and a significant number of pilots became lost or disoriented. German Flak defenses consisted mainly of 20mm automatic cannon and machine guns, and a total of 21 transport aircraft were lost and a further 196 damaged out of an original force of 821 aircraft. The hostile fire added a layer of chaos to an already confused situation. As a result, the paratroop battalions were 32

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often dropped some distance from their intended drop zones. Accompanying containers of weapons and supplies often went missing, and larger equipment such as 75mm pack howitzers often disappeared. Several units dropped directly into areas controlled by German troops, with firefights erupting even before the paratroopers had reached the ground. In spite of the chaotic conditions, most of the paratroop battalions managed to regain some measure of cohesion and set off to their objectives. Glider reinforcements began arriving after sunrise. The paratroopers managed to accomplish an important portion of their missions largely through their courage, initiative, and superior combat efficiency. The immediate objectives of the paratroop drops, the causeways leading over the water obstacles from Utah Beach, were secured by dawn. Additional objectives such as the La Barquette Locks were secured. Some objectives such as the bridge over the Merderet at La Fière, were still contested for the rest of D-Day and beyond. Overall, the airborne missions were barely successful. Total casualties were extremely high. Some US commanders, especially Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley, were badly disappointed with the results, given the amount of effort devoted to these forces. In contrast, the German commanders considered the Allied airborne landings in Normandy to have been a stunning success. They forced the Germans to commit their only mobile reserve to track down the paratroopers, leaving them without the forces necessary to stage counterattacks against the Omaha and Utah beach landings. The Wehrmacht was very confused by the tactics employed, and some German staff officers were convinced that the US airborne was using a cunning new tactic of widespread dispersion to maximize the effect of light forces in undermining defensive positions. Whether they performed their specific missions on time or not, the US airborne divisions completely undermined German defenses behind Utah Beach. The casualties suffered by the 4th Infantry Division at Utah Beach were lower than those on any other D-Day beach.

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N

Drop zone Drop zone ‘A’ units: 502nd Prcht Inf, 377th Prcht FA Bn Drop zone ‘C’ units: 3rd Bn 501st Prcht Inf, 1st & 2nd Bns 506th Prcht Inf, Div HQ Drop zone ‘D’ units: 1st & 2nd Bns 501st Prcht Inf, 3rd Bn 506th Prcht Inf, 326th Abn Engr Bn Drop zone ‘T’ units: 507th Prcht Inf Drop zone ‘O’ units: 505th Prcht Inf, Div HQ & 6 sticks of miscellaneous troops

Aumeville

Drop zone ‘N’ units: 508th Prcht Inf & 15 sticks of miscellaneous troops

Tamerville A

Pathfinder beacon for intended drop zone Glider landing zone Note: Each dot represents one stick (one plane load)

Huberville 0 Valognes

0

Quinéville

Éroudeville

Crisbecq

Lieusaint rde

ret

3km

Fontenaysur-Mer

Montebourg

Me

3 miles

Taret de Ravenoville

Joganville

Écausseville

Colomby

Émondeville Urville

Azeville

Ravenoville

Le Ham Fresville Ste-Colombe

AH UT CH A BE

A

Biniville Gourbesville

Orglandes

T

Reigneville

St-Martin-de-Varreville T

LZ O O

O

A Ste-Mère-Église

La Bonneville Renouf Étienville Pont-l’Abbé

Audouvillela-Hubert

La Fière

N

Chef-du-Pont Picauville

Ste-Mariedu-Mont

N

C

LZ W

Pouppeville

C

Dou

Beuzevillela-Bastille

LZ E

ve

D

St-Cômedu-Mont

14 Sticks

D

26 Sticks

Le Port

St-Jores

Baupte

Le Mesnil

Carentan

Auvillesur-le-Vey

Vir ea nd Tau te Ca na l

33

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 33

11/01/2018 13:43:26

MAP 11: UTAH BEACH – JUNE 6–7, 1944 The landing at Utah Beach by Combat Team 8 of the 4th Infantry Division was the least costly of all the Allied beach landings. The predawn airborne landings drew away any reserves that might have been available to counterattack the beachhead. In contrast to Omaha Beach, the prelanding bombardment was very effective. The amphibious DD tanks managed to reach the shore without excessive casualties. Curiously enough, there was a navigation error by the leading landing waves. Instead of landing near Les Dunes-de-Varreville, which had relatively dense beach defenses, the landings occurred near La Grande Dune, weakly defended by the shattered WN5 defense nest. This defense nest was held by an infantry platoon of Grenadier-Regiment.919 and many of the bunkers had been smashed by naval gunfire or aerial bombardment. Those bunkers that remained active were engaged by the supporting M4 medium tanks. Unlike at Omaha Beach, the German defenders were few in number, and the flat terrain offered them no special defensive advantage. The main tactical problem facing the assault force was the need to secure several causeways leading away from the beachhead. The area behind the beach was flat, with numerous coastal marshes. As part of their defensive efforts, the German engineers had deliberately flooded the lowlands to discourage paratroop and glider landings, and to make rapid exit from the beach more difficult. The causeways were the only dry access routes off the beach. Several of the key causeways were secured by the paratroopers in the early morning hours, and others were seized by Combat Team 8 in the hours after the landings. With the causeways secured, Combat Team 8 poured off the beachhead, followed by other elements of the 4th Infantry Division. The two airborne divisions were badly scattered, and much of June 6 was spent trying to organize the paratroopers into functional companies and battalions. Much of the fighting centered around the town of StMère-Église and the northern sector facing toward Cherbourg. The town of St-Mère-Église had been the scene of fighting since the previous night’s parachute landings. It was defended by elements of GrenadierRegiment.919 and Ost-Bataillon.795, a formation of former Soviet prisoners of war from the republic of Georgia who had volunteered for 34

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service with the Wehrmacht as an alternative to the lethal German prisoner-of-war camps. Although the Georgians put up a stiff fight early in the morning, their enthusiasm quickly waned and there were wholesale surrenders. The town was secured using tank support shortly before counterattacks by the neighboring 91.Luftlande-Division began in the early afternoon. The German counterattacks included a push by Grenadier-Regiment.1057 attacking from west of Cauquigny with the support of war-booty French light tanks of Panzer-Abteilung.100; and another thrust by Grenadier-Regiment.1058 from the north along the Montebourg road, supported by Sturm-Abteilung-AOK.7 with some StuG III assault guns. This fighting continued well into June 7, 1944. Aside from beating back the initial German counterattacks around St-Mère-Église, the 4th Infantry Division directed two of its infantry regiments, the 12th and 22nd, to push northward out of the beachhead area. There were still a substantial number of German troops manning the fortified strongpoints along the beaches, and it was presumed that they would withdraw once they realized that they were being cut off by the American advance behind them. Besides the coastal defenses, there were several significant coastal gun batteries in this sector at Azeville, Crisbecq, and Quinéville that continued to fire on the Utah Beach landing area. These batteries engaged in duels with Allied warships for much of June 6 and 7 and were so well fortified that only a few of the guns were knocked out during these engagements. Aside from the inherent threat posed by the batteries, they served as a magnet to attract retreating German troops from the beach defenses, thereby creating formidable strongpoints blocking the US advance toward Cherbourg. The long delays in consolidating the 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, the slow pace of the assault northward up the Montebourg road, and the growing problems of infantry combat in the coastal hedgerows forced a reconsideration of Allied plans on June 7. When Eisenhower visited Bradley that day, he expressed his concerns that the Germans might focus their attention on the gap between Utah Beach and Omaha Beach. Therefore, instead of focusing on a push northward to reach Cherbourg, the First US Army reoriented its short-term goals to securing a juncture between Utah Beach and Omaha Beach.

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N

German strong point

WN21

Huberville

US beachhead end of D-day WN19

Position established, evening, June 7

I

4

1261

US attacks, June 7

StP18

Quinéville

Pocket of German resistance, night, June 6/7

WN20

German counterattack, June 7

0

WN17

0

StP16

St-Floxel Fontenaysur-Mer

Montebourg Éroudeville

2 miles 2km

WN14a

Crisbecq

WN14

I

3

1261

Taret de Ravenoville

Joganville

WN13

Montebourg Station

I

Écausseville

2

Émondeville

1261

Azeville

StP12

Le Ham

WN11

Ravenoville

WN10a

III

1058

II

(+) II

Fresville

Sturm

Gourbesville

III

22 III

A

III

1

III

II

505

III

508

(-)

Merderet

Picauville

WN8

795

(-)

WN4 WN3

II

2

8

8

WN2a

Pouppeville

III

8

II

(-)

3

XX

101 HQ Dou

WN5

La Grande Dune 8

Les Forges

Pont-l’Abbé

WN7

Audouvillela-Hubert

II

3

La Madeleine

II

1

II

XX

4 HQ

Turqueville

(-)

III

Chef-du-Pont

746

II

2/505 2/8, 70

595

507 508

La Fière

100

StP9

St-Martin-deVarreville

502

II

TF

XX

II

T

AH UT CH A BE

III

1057

(-)

899

TD

Ste-Mère-Église

82 HQ

Les Dunesde-Varreville

II

12

I

(-)

22 WN10

7 Army

Neuvilleau-Plain

507

3

Foucarville

506

506

Beuzevillela-Bastille

WN2

III

Hiesville

III

ve

Ste-Mariedu-Mont

501

(-) WN1

Vierville

(-)

II

1

6

II

1

506

II

3

St-Cômedu-Mont

St-Jores

506

Le Port

III

501

(-)

Baupte Carentan

Le Mesnil

Auvillesur-le-Vey

35

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 35

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MAP 12: POINTE DU HOC – JUNE 6, 1944 Allied concern over the threat posed by German coastal artillery batteries led to two special forces raids: one against the Merville Battery on the far eastern end of Sword Beach, and a second against the Pointe du Hoc Battery, located on a rocky outcrop between Utah Beach and Omaha Beach. The battery at Pointe du Hoc had been established in November 1942. Its six war-booty French 155mm GPF guns were originally deployed in open “kettle” gun pits and they were manned on D-Day by the second battery of Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Regiment (Army Coastal Artillery Regiment) 1260. Starting in August 1943, the site saw another wave of construction as work on new enclosed gun casemates began, along with better personnel and ammunition bunkers. Although construction was nearly complete, the new gun casemates were never occupied. As part of the D-Day preparatory bombing, the site was struck by A-20 medium bombers of the 409th and 416th Bomb Groups on the evening of April 25, 1944 that dropped 40 tons of bombs on the site. This attack knocked out one of the guns and damaged two others. The two damaged guns and three intact guns were removed from the kettle pits on April 26 and moved to a tree line about a three-quarter mile south of the original site, where they remained until D-Day. The site was cleaned up, the guns were replaced by wooden telephone poles, and the kettle pits had their camouflage umbrellas restored. As a result, Allied intelligence thought that the gun pits remained occupied. A Ranger force consisting of the 2nd and 5th Rangers was assigned to attack the battery on D-Day to prevent it from firing on Allied forces around Omaha Beach. At 0445hrs on June 6, the RAF staged Operation Flashlamp against Pointe du Hoc, dropping about 635 tons of bombs on the site, about 20 tons per acre. This left the site a lunar landscape of craters. Pointe du Hoc was labeled as Target No. 1 on the naval bombardment plan, and so, at 0550hrs, the battleship USS Texas pounded the site with 250 rounds from its 14in. guns. At 0630hrs, nine B-26 medium bombers struck the smoldering site with another 16 tons of bombs. There were very few Germans left alive on the site, mainly a group in the firecontrol bunker on the cliff overlooking the sea, and a small group of about 15 men of Werfer-Regiment.84, who survived the air attacks in 36

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personnel bunkers and who subsequently manned machine-gun pits at the site. The plan was to land Ranger Force A, consisting of companies D, E, and F, 2nd Rangers by LCAs on either side of the cliffs; rappel up the cliffs; and seize the gun site as shown on the map here. In the event, delays in the arrival of Force A led the commander, Lieutenant-Colonel James Rudder, to have all three companies land on the eastern side of the cliffs. They installed climbing ropes using special rocket projectors mounted on the LCA, and then began climbing the ropes to the top of the cliffs. Casualties at first were light owing to the lack of German defenders, but the fighting intensified as they moved through the site. Plans to land further reinforcements did not take place owing to a breakdown in communications. As a result, the remainder of the 2nd Rangers, as well as the 5th Rangers, followed the alternate plan and landed on Omaha Beach near the Vierville draw. Their mission was to continue to attack Pointe du Hoc by marching against it from the land side. Ranger Force A set out to find the missing guns, which were located by mid-morning, abandoned by their crews. The guns were spiked, and the Rangers established a defensive perimeter. Over the next two days, Rudder’s isolated force was subjected to repeated German infantry counterattacks. The Rangers received gunfire support as well as supplies from Navy destroyers off shore. Force A on Pointe du Hoc was not relieved until June 8, when a relief force fought its way up the road from Omaha Beach. By the end of that day, the 2nd Rangers had suffered 263 casualties of the original 545 men, both in the companies at Pointe du Hoc and in the companies that had landed at Omaha Beach. The assault on Pointe du Hoc has become a military legend and a cornerstone in Ranger history. In retrospect seven decades later, a case can be made that the Allied planners underestimated the results of the air attacks on Pointe du Hoc and overestimated the capabilities of the Pointe du Hoc Battery, which was one of the first German coastal batteries discovered. The Longues-sur-Mer naval battery to the east of Omaha Beach, arguably a much more dangerous threat because of its superior fire control, was never subjected to such intense attack in large measure owing to its late construction.

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N

Rocks Rocky cliffs Hedges Fences Buildings 155mm gun emplacement Anti-aircraft gun emplacement Machine gun emplacement

I

Trench

E

I

Communication trench

D

2 Rn

2 Rn

Covered trench I

Casemate or shelter

F

Barbed wire

2 Rn

Mines

0

100 yds

0

100m

Grandcamp

Vierville

37

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MAP 13: ASSAULT LANDING PLAN, WESTERN SIDE, OMAHA BEACH On Omaha Beach, two infantry regiments were landed in the first wave: the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division on the eastern side of Omaha Beach, and the 116th Infantry Regiment of the 29th Infantry Division on the western side. These formations were called Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) since they included not only the basic infantry regiment, but also supporting elements including tanks and combat engineers. H-Hour for the assault was 0630hrs. The assault landing itself began at 0630hrs. The timeline is shown on the map on the far left side. The assault landing followed a tightly choreographed pattern. The lead wave at H-5 (i.e. 0625hrs) consisted of LCTs carrying DD (Duplex Drive) amphibious M4A1 tanks and M4 tanks fitted with deep-wading gear. These were supposed to be the first US forces ashore to help suppress any surviving German beach defenses. Their performance on D-Day was controversial. The DD tanks on the eastern side of Omaha Beach mostly sank; those on the western side of Omaha Beach reached shore but took heavy casualties to German antitank guns; those on Utah Beach landed largely intact and helped push US forces across the beach relatively quickly. The first wave of tank-carrying LCTs was followed at H-Hour by waves of LCAs and LCVPs carrying the assault infantry. The LCAs were an older configuration and slightly smaller; debarkation was through a narrow passage at the front with a small bow ramp. The LCVP, also called the Higgins Boat after its designer, was an enlarged type which had a bow ramp wide enough to permit the debarkation of a small vehicle such as a jeep. In the case of the 116th RCT, most of the first wave used LCVPs, but Company A, 116th Infantry Regiment and Company C, 2nd Rangers used the LCA. Immediately behind the first wave of infantry were combat engineers of the 146th Engineer Combat Team, a mixed Army–Navy force of specialized demolition experts. Their task was to destroy the numerous beach obstructions to permit landings by the larger LCIs in subsequent 38

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waves. They traveled in LCMs (Landing Craft, Mechanized). The LCMs were originally designed to carry tanks ashore in open ocean. However, from the time of their design in 1941 to 1944, the weight of the standard US Army tank, the M4 Sherman, had increased to the point where it was no longer safe to use these craft in open ocean except in calm conditions. However, they remained in widespread use for other applications since they could also carry lighter vehicles. The combat engineers needed this larger craft since they were carrying substantial amounts of explosives and demolition equipment. The next wave arriving at H+30 consisted of another wave of infantry companies in LCVPs, various headquarters companies, and a small number of Antiaircraft Automatic Weapons companies since there was concern that the Luftwaffe might appear over the beach. Over the course of the next half hour, additional infantry was scheduled to arrive, including the first LCIs. These were much larger craft than the LCVPs and LCMs and provided a more efficient way to deliver infantry ashore. But unless enemy beach defenses had been eliminated, they were too large and too vulnerable. The engineers and infantry in the first wave of LCIs took heavy losses on Omaha Beach since German defenses had not been overcome before they arrived. A modest number of 4.2in. mortars arrived with Company D, 81st Chemical Weapons Battalion around H+40, but the first heavy fire support was not scheduled to arrive until H+90, around 0800hs. This was the 58th Field Artillery Battalion (Armored) equipped with a dozen M7 105mm Howitzer Motor Carriages (Priests) fitted with deepwading gear. Most of these never made it to shore. They were followed shortly after by a variety of other artillery including towed 105mm howitzers of the 11th Field Artillery Battalion landing in DUKW amphibious trucks, 57mm antitank guns, also landing in DUKWs, and short M3 105mm howitzers of the regimental cannon company. The DUKWs with 105mm howitzers were overloaded and most were lost. Specialized units continued to land in subsequent waves.

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OMAHA BEACH (WEST)

EASY GREEN

Time

DOG RED

DOG WHITE

DOG GREEN

Co. C, 743rd Tank Bn.

Co. B, 743rd Tank Bn.

Co. G, 116th Infantry

Co. A, 116th Infantry

H-5

H Hour Co. A, 743rd Tank Bn.

Co. A, 743rd Tank Bn.

Co. E, 116th Infantry

Co. F, 116th Infantry

H+01

H+03 146th Engineer Combat Team

146th Engineer Combat Team HQ

H+30 AAAW Battery

Co. H

HQ Co. E, Co. H 116th Infantry

AAAW Battery

HQ

146th Engineer Combat Team

146th Engineer Combat Team

Demolitions Boat

Co. C, 2nd Rangers

HQ Co.

2nd Bn. Co. H Co. F Co. H 2nd Bn. 116th Infantry

AAAW Co. H HQ Co. G Co. H Battery 116th Infantry

AAAW Battery 112 Engr.

AAAW Battery

Co. B

HQ Co. A 116th Infantry

Co. B

AAAW Battery

H+40 112th Engineer Bn.

Co. D, 81st Chem W Bn.

149th Engr. Beach Bn.

149th Engr. Beach Bn.

121st Engr. Bn.

1st Bn. 149th Engr. 121st Co. D,116th Infantry 116th Inf. Beach Bn. Engr. Bn.

H+50 Co. L, 116th Infantry

Co. I, 116th Infantry

Co. K, 116th Infantry

Co. C, 116th Infantry

121st Engr. Bn.

H+57 HQ Co. 3rd Bn.

Co. B, 81st Chemical Weapons Bn.

Co. M, 116th Infantry

H+60 112th Engineer Battalion

HQ & HQ Co. 116th Infantry

121st Engr. Bn.

Cos. A & B 2nd Ranger Bn.

H+65 5th Ranger Bn.

H+70 149th Engineer Beach Battalion

112th Engineer Battalion

Alternate HQ & HQ Co. 116th Infantry

121st Engr. Bn.

5th Ranger Bn.

H+90 58th Field Artillery Bn. (Armd)

H+100 6th Engineer Special Brigade

H+110 111th Field Artillery Battalion

AT Plat. 2nd Bn. AT Plat. 3rd Bn.

AT Plat.1st Bn.

29 Sig. Bn.

Cannon Co. 116th Infantry

H+120 467 AAAW Bn. AT Co. 116th Inf. 467 AAAW Bn.

AT Co. 116th Inf. 467 AAAW Bn.

149th Engr Beach Bn.

467th Anti-Aircraft Bn.

467th Anti-Aircraft Bn.

H+150 DD Tanks

H+180 to H+215

461st Amphibious Truck Co.

HQ Co. 116th Infantry 104th Medical Bn.

Navy Salvage

H+225 461st Amphibious Truck Co.

Landing Craft Infantry (LCI)

Landing Craft Assault (LCA)

DD Tank

Landing Craft Mechanized (LCM)

Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP)

DUKW

Landing Craft Tank (LCT)

39

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MAP 14: GERMAN DEFENSES ON OMAHA BEACH German defenses along the Atlantic Wall were organized in a stereotypical fashion, tailored to the geographic details of particular sectors. Lower Normandy was not well fortified compared to the beaches in the Pas-de-Calais region, and most of the construction was undertaken in the spring of 1944 and was not complete on D-Day. The first layer of defenses was the “Devil’s garden” of beach obstructions erected along the tidal edge to prevent landing craft from reaching the shore during high tide. These consisted of a variety of different types of obstructions. The outer layer typically consisted of telephone poles or other timber obstacles that were buried in the sand. When submerged during high tide, they were capable of penetrating the lower hull of a landing craft. They were sometimes topped with Teller mines or metal-cutting devices to increase further the threat against landing craft. They were usually followed by a line of Belgian Gates, also called “Element C,” which were a type of large steel frame originally built in the 1930s as Belgian frontier barriers and repurposed for beach defense. These defenses were often intermixed with steel hedgehogs and other types of obstacles. The Germans generally did not lay minefields in the immediate beach area since the tidal action washed them away or interfered with their pressure fuzes. There were extensive minefields beyond the waterline. One of the reasons that Operation Neptune scheduled the D-Day landings at low tide was the threat posed by these beach obstructions. The beach defenses consisted of concrete reinforced bunkers as well as trench systems. German tactical doctrine did not encourage the use 40

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of bunkers for normal infantry troops, only for heavy weapons teams such as machine guns, antitank guns, and mortars. Infantrymen were expected to fight from trenches, though they did have some shelters available that were used during initial naval and air bombardments. At the tactical level, the basic organization was a Stützpunkt (Strongpoint), which was roughly a company-level sector. There were two of these on Omaha Beach: Stützpunkt Vierville-sur-Mer covering the western end of the beach, and Stützpunkt St-Laurent-sur-Mer covering the sector west of WN70. Each strongpoint consisted of several defense nests (Widerstandsnester – WN) that were platoonsized defenses. The composition of each defense nest varied considerably. Usually there was at least one bunker or gunpit armed with an antitank weapon, plus several smaller bunkers with machine guns. There were usually a few smaller bunkers for protection during naval bombardment and for ammunition stowage. One of the less common forms for beach defense was the Panzerstellung, consisting of the turret of an obsolete tank mounted on a small concrete bunker. The layout of German beach defenses was situated to take advantage of the beach topography. The beach was lined with high bluffs that were too steep for tanks to overcome and that provided an advantage to the defender. There were ravines through the bluffs that served as the main avenues of transit through them. German defenses exploited the natural geography and placed anti-tank ditches backed by extensive strongpoints to block the draws.

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N

CHARLIE

DOG

DOG GREEN

EASY

DOG WHITE

EASY GREEN

DOG RED

FOX

FOX GREEN

EASY RED

WN72 WN71

I

11

Hamel au Prêtre

Viervillesur-Mer

WN68

WN70

726

WN65 WN66

D-3

I

D-1

10

726

Mont les Moulins

WN60 I

5

916

E-1

WN62

I

8

I

3

WN67

Panzerstellung

St-Laurentsur-Mer

Gun in casemate Machine-gun tobruk/bunker Mortar tobruk

Stakes or fence Hedgehogs, tetrahedra or unidentified obstacles Element ‘C’ Curved rail or ramp

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41

Collevillesur-Mer Le Bray

Vacqueville

MinesLouvières Barbed wire

0

1 mile 1km

726

Cabourg WN63

WN60 German strongpoint designation

0

E-3

916

Château de Vaumicel

Field gun/AT gun

F-1

WN61

WN64

MAP 15: D-DAY OPERATIONS ON OMAHA BEACH JUNE 6, 1944 The D-Day landings by V Corps at Omaha Beach were a mixed success. Casualties were the heaviest of all five Allied beach operations, and the landings failed to achieve their initial geographic goals. On the other hand, after a harrowing day of intense fighting, the 1st and 29th Infantry divisions were firmly ashore, and the German 352.InfanterieDivision was sufficiently battered to prevent any significant counterattack. One of the main problems of the Operation Neptune plans at Omaha Beach was that they presumed that the German beach strongpoints would be obliterated by the prelanding bombardment. As a result, the main landings were conducted directly against the entrances to the draws where the German fortified defenses were the densest. The five draws on Omaha Beach were given codenames based on their presence in the various landing sectors: the D-1 draw was in the Dog Beach sector, E-1 in the Easy Beach sector, and so on. Owing to the failure of the initial naval bombardment and the completely ineffective aerial bombardment, the first landing waves of landing craft unloaded directly in front of the main German bunker complexes. Although the German strongpoints along the beach caused very high casualties among the first assault waves, the main effect of the German strongpoints was to tie down the American infantry and engineers along the exposed beach, making them extremely vulnerable to over an hour of mortar and artillery fire from German positions farther away from the beach. The Allies were under the mistaken impression that the 352.Infanterie-Division was stationed south of the beach area and that Omaha Beach was weakly defended by a few 42

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battalions of the second-rate 716.Infanterie-Division. In fact, the 352. Infanterie-Division had begun to move into the Omaha Beach area in February and March 1944. Aside from increasing the number of troops defending the beach, this meant that the division’s four artillery battalions were within range of the beach. Unaware of this extensive artillery force, no counterartillery plan was prepared for Omaha Beach. The battered landing force received significant help in mid-morning when the accompanying destroyers ignored the shallow water offshore and steamed to point-blank range off the beach to pound the German defenses. The German bunkers were so thickly built with steelreinforced concrete that they could not be easily penetrated by 5in. destroyer guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers approached so close to shore that they were able actually to hit the insides of the most dangerous gun bunkers through their open embrasures. In spite of the casualties, the German defenses began to crumble by mid-morning. US infantry platoons away from the main killing zones near the draws were able to make their way up the bluffs between the main German strongpoints. The main penetrations occurred east of the D-1 Vierville draw by the 116th Infantry Regiment and 2nd Rangers, and west of the E-3 draw by the 16th Infantry Regiment. The gradual reduction of the German defenses had a dramatic impact on the casualties of the 1st and 2nd Wave, falling from 1,978 casualties in the 1st Wave to 307 men in the 2nd. By the end of D-Day, V Corps had a solid foothold on Omaha Beach, which German forces in the immediate area would have a hard time to contest over the next few days.

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WN67

Main penetrations at noon

Stakes or fence

Beach access routes

Infantry positions at close of D-day

D-1 Viervilles

German strong points and designation

Hedgehogs, tetrahedra or unidentified obstacles

Main German resistance at close of D-day First gaps in obstacles

Element ‘C’ Curved rail or ramp

E-1 St-Laurent

0

D-3 les Moulins E-3 Colleville F-1 Cabourg

1 mile

0

N

1km CHARLIE

DOG GREEN

I

DOG WHITE

I

C

2 Rangers

A

I

C

DOG RED I

I

116

G

EASY GREEN I

F

116

EASY RED

116

FOX GREEN I

I

E

116

E

I

F

16

16

I

I

16

L

A

I

116 I

116

I

I

G

III

115

D-1

Hamel au Prêtre

116

5 Rangers II

I

10

(-)

16

F(-)

726

F

26

III

(Part)

(Part)

116

116 F-1

III

116

WN60

WN61 WN62

WN66

WN64

I

916

3(-)

First assault wave infantry landings

16

E-3

WN65

Mont les Moulins 5

16

I

III

16

16

16

II

I

8

916

I

3

726

1

II

26

3

Cabourg

III

Château de Vaumicel

III

116

(Part)

WN68

116

Viervillesur-Mer

I ••

E

E-1

III

WN70

I

116

L

116

D-3

III

(Part)

••

18

Rangers WN71

116 E

III

II

WN72

2 Rangers

E

E(-)

E(-)

••

116

I

I

I

F

II

First assault wave infantry plan

I

2 Rangers

C

16

Le Grand Hameau

116

(-)

16

WN63

II

3

115

II

2

WN67

115 II

2

St-Laurentsur-Mer

Louvières

26

II

II II

1

115

3

2

II

26

II

3

18

Vacqueville

1

18

16

Collevillesur-Mer

Le Bray

II

2

II

1

16

18

I

2

I

352

I

6

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43

916

3

352

II

1

I

II

I

915

7

916

352

MAP 16: THE EASTERN TASK FORCE Rear Admiral Sir Philip Vian’s Eastern Task Force was responsible for delivering the British–Canadian forces on the eastern side of the Overlord landing area. The Eastern Task Force consisted of three assault forces, one per landing beach. From west to east, this consisted of Commodore Douglas-Pennant’s Assault Force G against Gold Beach, Commodore Oliver’s Assault Force J against Juno Beach, and Rear Admiral Talbot’s Assault Force S against Sword Beach. There was also a reinforcement force, Rear Admiral Parry’s Follow-Up Force L. Each of the beaches was also assigned a Bombardment Force consisting of a mixed assortment of battleships, monitors, cruisers, and destroyers tailored to the density of German forces in each sector. This included Captain J. Wold’s Bombardment Force K off Gold Beach directed from the cruiser HMS Ajax, Captain F. Parham’s Bombardment Force E of Juno Beach directed from the cruiser HMS Belfast, and Captain G. Middleton’s Bombardment Force D off Sword Beach directed from the battleship HMS Ramillies. The landing tactics were heavily stereotypical and followed essentially the same pattern as those of the Western Task Force described earlier. The assault transport ships began arriving in the Lowering Positions off the coast around 0445hrs to begin the process of disembarking the smaller landing craft and transferring troops from the ships to the landing craft. While this process was under way, the three Bombardment Forces began to move into position to begin the preliminary gunfire strikes against German defense positions. Bombardment Force D off Sword Beach began to engage shore targets around Sword Beach at 0530hrs. At roughly the same time, Bombardment Force K off Gold Beach and Bombardment Force E off Juno Beach also began their bombardments. Each warship had an assigned target and an assigned number of rounds of ammunition per 44

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target. The primary targets were the numerous German artillery positions along the coast. While some of these were dedicated coastal artillery positions, the German 716.Infanterie-Division had fortified most of their divisional artillery batteries with steel-reinforced concrete casemates which were subjected to concentrated naval gunfire. Once this preliminary bombardment was complete, around 0700hrs, the destroyers moved closer to shore to permit pinpoint strikes on any remaining German defense positions. The assault landings began around 0730hrs. The landing craft of Force G proceeded from their Lowering Positions about 7 miles ashore toward Gold Beach. This assault wave established a firm beachhead, except for strong German resistance around Le Hamel. The Canadian Force J assault landings were the most fiercely contested of the three beaches of the Eastern Task Force. Force J landings began later than the other beaches, around 0745hrs. German resistance in the seaside town of Courseulles-sur-Mer was very determined and many of the bunkers were still operational at the time of the landings in spite of the naval bombardment. Force S was assigned the toughest of the three beaches at the extreme eastern end of the Neptune landings. Owing to its proximity to the Orne Estuary and the Caen Canal, Sword Beach was especially well defended by coastal gun batteries, and was more exposed to German surface warships from ports farther to the northeast. As a result, special operations were conducted in the predawn hours, most notably the airborne action against the Merville Battery on the eastern side of the beach. In addition, Bombardment Force D was much stronger than the forces assigned to the neighboring beaches. Three assault groups were assigned to Sword Beach and commenced landing at 0725hrs. This landing force made immediate gains along the beachhead and had begun moving inland by mid-morning.

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5

6

7

8

9

10

English Channel

2

Lowering Position

MIKE EN

WHITE

RED

La Rivière

Courseullessur-Mer

Versur-Mer

Crépon

St-Aubinsur-Mer

Bernièressur-Mer

8

PET

ER

Lucsur-Mer

Plumetot

3km

FrancevillePlage

Ouistreham

Collevillesur-Orne Cazelle

Anisy

Riva-Bella

Hermanvillesur-Mer

Anguerny

Close Support Destroyer Force e 3 miles mm Cairon iro Ch

ER

RED

Basly

e

ROG

La Brèche

Cresserons

Mu

EEN

ITE

Bény-sur-Mer

Flagships

QU

N

Douvres-laDélivrande

Swept channels

HMS Saumarez HMS Swift

10 Lionsur-Mer

Tailleville

FontaineHenry

4

HMS Scourge H Nor MS Stord HMS Scorpion HMS Middleton ORP Slazak

SWORD Langrunesur-Mer

Banville Reviers

7

HMS Virage HMS Verulam HMS Serapis

WH

1. 0455hrs, Naval Commander Task Force G, Commodore Ste-CroixC. Douglas-Pennant RN, aboard HMS Bulolo, arrives at the sur-Mer Lowering Position. 2. 0510–0600hrs, June 6, transport ships begin to arrive in the Lowering Positions off the Eastern Task Force’s beaches for the embarkation of assault forces which begin immediately. 3. 0515hrs, June 6, Naval Commander Task Force S, Rear-Admiral A. Talbot es RN, aboard HMS Largs, arrives in the Seull Lowering Position 4. 0530hrs, Commander Bombardment Force D, Rear-Admiral Patterson RN, aboard HMS Mauritius gives order to open fire 5. 0545hrs, Bombardment Forces E and K under the command of Rear-Admiral Dalrymple-Hamilton RN aboard HMS Belfast open fire on enemy positions in the area of Gold and Juno Beaches. 6. 0558hrs, Naval Commander Task Force J, Commodore G. Oliver RN, aboard HMS Hilary, arrives in the Lowering Position 7. 0610hrs, Naval Commander Eastern Task Force, Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian RN, aboard his flagship HMS Scylla, arrives in the area to command the British/Canadian landings. 8. 0700hrs, destroyers move close inshore to begin bombardment of enemy defenses and landing beaches. 0 9. 0730hrs, assault landings begin on Gold Beach. 10. 0730hrs, assault landings begin on Sword Beach. 0 11. 0759hrs, assault landings begin on Juno Beach.

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45

8

HMS Mauritius

HMS Scylla

HMS Kelvin H Nor MS Eglinton

NAN

GRE

Mont Fleury

HMS Algonquin HMS Sioux HMS Kempenfelt ORP Vigilant

11

Grayesur-Mer Meuvaines

8

LOVE RED

RED

GREEN

GREEN

Asnelles Le Buhot

KING

GREEN

JIG

ITEM

3

HMS Largs

Merville

St-Aubind’Arquenay

Sallenelles

Périerssur-le-Dan

Le Plein Beuville

Le Landel

Biéville

Bénouville

e

JUNO

GOLD

Arromanchesles-Bains Le Hamel

HMS Stevenstone FFS La Combattante HMS Bleasdale H Nor MS Glaisdale

8

EE

9

8

HMS Faulkner HMS Fury HMS Venus

2 2

HMS Hilary

Orn

HMS Ulstel HMS Urchin HMS Undaunted HMS Ursa

2

6

5

Lowering Position

HMS Pytchley HMS Cattistock HMS Collesmore ORP Krakowiak

HMS Grenville HMS Jervis HMS Undine HMS Urania HMS Ullysses

2

HMS Belfast

GR

HMS Bulolo

1

RED

2

Gonnevilleen-Auge

Amfreville Bréville

MAP 17: GERMAN DEFENSES ON GOLD BEACH The attack on Gold Beach by the British 50th Division faced a significant number of German strongpoints. The area was defended primarily by Grenadier-Regiment.726 of the 716.Infanterie-Division (bodenständig), a typical German static infantry division with little tactical mobility but heavy firepower owing to the many weapons associated with its coastal defense strongpoints. The divisional boundary between the 716.Infanterie-Division and the neighboring 352. Infanterie-Division ran through Item Beach on the western side of the sector, so some elements of Grenadier-Regiment.916 from this division were encountered on D-Day. Likewise, the internal regimental boundaries of the 716.Infanterie-Division ran through King Beach, with Ost-Bataillon.414 situated on the eastern side of the Gold Beach Sector. As on the other Atlantic Wall beaches, the basic tactical structure was the Widerstandsnest, or defense nest, which typically contained a platoon of infantry or a single artillery battery. This sector had seaside villages along the coast, and many of the German defenses were built into the seawalls. Of all the German strongpoints along Gold Beach, WN37 at Le Hamel on the extreme western end of the beach proved to be the most troublesome. This section of the beach was defended by Ost-Battalion.411 and was the one Russian platoon that remained resolute in the face of the British attack. Built around a sanatorium, the most formidable bunker in the strongpoint proved to be a bunker armed with a World War I 75mm field gun. The Allied planners had expected trouble from this strongpoint, and, besides the naval bombardment, it had been hit by a dozen Typhoon fighter-bombers shortly before the landings with 1,000lb bombs, which did not have much effect. The defenses at WN37 around the Le Hamel sanatorium were finally overcome in mid-afternoon after they had been outflanked from the land side. The 1st Hampshires were supported by a Churchill AVRE (Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers) tank of the 82nd Assault Squadron, which proceeded to blast the defenses with its Petard 46

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mortar. The deadly 75mm bunker was finally silenced when the AVRE placed a Petard round against the armored rear door, blasting the interior in the process. Defenses in the center of Gold Beach were less formidable, in no small measure owing to the terrain, which did not favor the construction of concrete bunkers. The situation on the eastern side of Gold Beach somewhat replicated the western side as there was an enfilade bunker with a powerful 88mm PaK 43/41 antitank gun positioned in WN33 that quickly took a toll on British tanks as they arrived along the beach. This bunker proved to be more short-lived than its counterpart in WN37, when a Sherman flail tank of the Westminster Dragoons approached the bunker from close range and placed a well-aimed shot through the embrasure, knocking out the gun. The smaller bunkers proved to be more vulnerable to tank fire, especially the massive dustbin rounds of the Petard mortar on the Churchill AVRE tanks. The four field-gun bunkers of WN35b at Hable de Heurlot were assaulted by the 6th Green Howards supported by Churchill AVREs; the Petards made short work of the casemates and Sergeant-Major S. E. Hollis of the Green Howards was awarded the Victoria Cross for “utmost gallantry” during an attack on one of the positions. In general, the numerous artillery batteries along Gold Beach proved to be much less dangerous than was anticipated because of the effective preliminary naval bombardment. The Army coastal battery at strongpoint WN35a at Mont Fleury had been roughed up by the preliminary air attack and then struck repeatedly by HMS Orion. The position was overrun by the Green Howards shortly after they dispatched the gun bunkers at WN35b, and there was little resistance from the German artillerymen. The 6th Battery of Artillerie-Regiment.1716 at WN32 was armed with Czech 100mm field guns in four sturdy H669 bunkers, but under air attack and the gunfire of HMS Belfast, the crews retired to their personnel bunkers, where they were captured by the 7th Green Howards.

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 47

N

Heavy gun in casemate Gun in casemate Pill box Mobile gun Anti-tank gun Machine gun Dug-out shelter Wire Mines Steel anti-tank or underwater obstructions Anti-tank ditch

0

GOLD

1 mile

0

1km

ITEM

JIG

KING

GREEN

RED

WN35

Arromanchesles-Bains

WN37

LOVE

GREEN

RED

Hable de Heurlot

WN36

Customs House

WN33

La Rivière

Sanatorium WN38

Radar Station WN39

WN34

Le Hamel Road under

Asnelles

441 Ost

construction

II

HQ

II

716

WN35a

414/716

Mont Fleury

WN40 WN41

I

Puits d’Herode

7

Meuvaines

Ver-sur-Mer

Le Buhot III II

III

916

916 (-)

352

La

Gr

e ond

726

Ryes

716

ov

en

ce WN32

Crépon

WN35b

II

I

11/01/2018 13:43:33

47

Pr

III

916

Ste-Croixsur-Mer

736

MAP 18: GOLD BEACH ON D-DAY The British assault on Gold Beach was conducted by the 50th Division with two brigades in the initial assault waves. As on the other beaches, DD tanks were supposed to constitute the initial wave. However, rough seas delayed their release, and so they arrived on shore along with the infantry in landing craft and specialized armor of the 79th Armoured Division landing in LCTs. The western (right) flank of the landings against Jig Green Beach were conducted by the 231st Brigade. This area had a significant concentration of German bunkers around the sanatorium that had not been eliminated by the prelanding bombardment. To make matters worse, the accompanying Sherman DD tanks were slow to proceed off the beach and intended fire support from Royal Marine Centaur tanks was also slow in arriving. As tanks and infantry came ashore, they were pounded by the 75mm gun and a supporting 50mm gun. As a result of these strongpoints, much of the advance in this sector was accomplished by moving around the Le Hamel strongpoint. The steel-reinforced concrete of these gun bunkers was too thick to be penetrated by either the 75mm gun of the Sherman tanks or the Petard launcher on the Churchill AVRE tanks. The only way to knock them out was by a precise shot through the open gun embrasure, or an attack on the rear of the bunker, which had a large and vulnerable steel access door. Eventually, a Churchill AVRE tank of the 82nd Assault Squadron made its way around the main gun bunker and put it out of action with a Petard round fired against the rear steel door. The 1st Dorsets, farther east of the Le Hamel strongpoint, made much better progress inland and were followed by the brigade’s reinforcing battalion, the 2nd Devonshires landing around 0815hrs. These two battalions, along with 47 Royal Marine Commando, began to curl to the west. Since this was the westernmost of the British/ Canadian beaches, one of its major tactical objectives was to push westward toward Port-en-Bessin to link up with the American forces on neighboring Omaha Beach. Later in the day, the 231st Brigade was hit by German counteratttacks by the 352.Infanterie-Division, delaying a link-up with the US Army until D+1. 48

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The eastern side of the Gold Beach assault was conducted by the 69th Brigade with the 5th East Yorkshires on the left (eastern) flank and the 6th Green Howards on the right, with the 7th Green Howards as the reinforcing battalion. The sea in this sector was so choppy that the DD tanks were landed directly ashore by their LCTs. The German defenses were strongest in the hamlet of La Rivière, but one of the most troublesome gun bunkers was eliminated by a Sherman flail tank from the Westminster Dragoons which placed a well-aimed shot directly into the embrasure. While the 5th East Yorkshires were entangled in the three German strongpoints around La Rivière, the 6th Green Howards pushed in from the beach against more modest German defenses. The German artillery battery on Mont Fleury was cleared, and supporting tanks were soon approaching the road network behind the beach. A major problem in this sector was the relatively narrow access areas off the beach, since the area west of King Red was obstructed by coastal marshes and a flooded zone immediately behind the beach. This slowed the process of pushing follow-on forces off the beach to speed the assault inland. By midday, the beach was relatively secure and the 56th Brigade arrived to push inland toward Bayeux. The progress out of the bridgehead was slow and the brigade advanced about 4 miles in five hours, setting up night-defense positions short of Bayeux, its D-Day objective. The other reinforcing unit, the 151st Brigade, came ashore on King Beach and proceeded inland to the left (east) of the 56th Brigade with an objective of seizing the main road net in the vicinity of Bayeux. The brigade made a substantial penetration during the day’s advance, short of the Bayeux highway. The 69th Brigade, having fought its way out of King Beach earlier in the morning, made good progress in the afternoon, albeit short of the Bayeux road. By day’s end, the 50th Division had a solid foothold on Gold Beach, had repulsed several German counterattacks, but was still short of its objectives of Bayeux and the Bayeux highway at nightfall.

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N HMS Ajax

HMS Emerald HMS Argonaut

HMS Bulolo

Hunt Class destroyers: HMS Cattistock HMS Pytchley HMS Cottismore ORP Krakowiak

HMS Orion

Fleet Class destroyers: HMS Ulysses HMS Urania HMS Jervis HMS Grenville HMS Ursa HMS Ulster HMS Undaunted HMS Urchin HMS Undine

Follow-up Brigades X

X

56

151

II

Assault Brigades

X

Longues Point 72

47 RM Cdo

La Rosière

II

2 Glos

Pouligny Vaux-sur-Aure

Sully

2 Essex

Ryes

II

1 Hampshires

Vaux

La

G

d ron

1 Dorsets

e

5 East Yorkshires

II

Villiersle-Sec

Seull

es

St-Gabriel II

7 Green Howards

II

Le FresneCamilly

St-Leger Ste-CroixGrand-Tonne

German Gun Batteries

2 miles

ull

Coulombs Nonant

2km

Se

es

Aure

0

XX

Tierceville ColombiersCreully sur-Seulles

Brécy

0

Ste-Croixsur-Mer 3 Can

II

6 Green Howards

Subles

Banville

II

151

8 DLI

Esquay-surSeulles

50

Bazenville

II

6 DLI

XX

X

56

9 DLI

II

Crépon

II

Sommervieu

Meuvaines Versur-Mer

II

2 Devons X

me

Bayeux

II

Le Buhot

Magny

St-Sulpice

Drô

Mont Fleury

Asnelles

2 SWB

LOVE

La Rivière

Le Hamel

Puits d’Herode II

KING

HMS Belfast

XX

Arromanchesles-Bains

Tracysur-Mer

1 Dorsets 2 Devons 1 Hampshires

JIG

ITEM

Port-en-Bessin

69

8

GOLD

X

X

231

6 Gr een H ow ards 7 Green H ow ards 5 East Yorkshires

47 RM Cdo

Ducy-Ste-Marguerite

e Thu

Ch

iro

mm

e

Secquevilleen-Bessin

Loucelles

49

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 49

11/01/2018 13:43:34

MAP 19: GERMAN DEFENSES ON JUNO BEACH The German defenses on Juno Beach were located along the seaside hamlets of Courseulles-sur-Mer, Bernières-sur-Mer and St-Aubin-surMer. The sectors between the hamlets were heavily mined. This sector was manned primarily by a single battalion of Grenadier-Regiment.736, with Ost-Bataillon.414 of Grenadier-Regiment.716 at the extreme western end of the sector. Beyond the immediate beach defenses, there was a pair of substantial strongpoints on the hills west of Douvres-laDélivrande consisting of a large Luftwaffe radar station codenamed Distelfink with a defensive strongpoint, Stützpunkt I, in the foreground and the main fortified radar station in Stützpunkt II behind it. An infantry company of Grenadier-Regiment.736 was stationed in this area for defensive purposes and to serve as a reserve. At Juno Beach, the preliminary naval bombardment was not as effective as hoped. A later Royal Navy survey concluded that only 14 percent of the intended targets had been put out of action. Nevertheless, the bombardment did have important consequences. German fire was intense and in one flotilla of five LCA landing craft, four were sunk or severely damaged by mortar fire, obstructions, and mines on the obstructions. The bombardment did knock out one of the bunkers at the far western side of the beach, which facilitated assault landings on Mike Beach. The strongpoint in the center of Courseulles-sur-Mer, WN29, contained a formidable array of defenses including a massive 88mm enfilade bunker and a pair of enclosed 75mm gun casemates. None of these was significantly damaged by the naval bombardment and all three were eventually silenced by Royal Marine Centaur tanks and tanks of the 26th Assault Squadron RE firing into their open embrasures. These bunkers were a major source of the casualties on the beaches in front of Courseulles-sur-Mer. One of the 75mm gun casemates was littered with about 200 shell casings, giving some idea of the amount of fire it had poured against the incoming Regina Rifles. Besides the bunkers and small Tobruk gun pits along the shore, many 50

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of the houses had been converted into firing positions. These defenses in the town of Courseulles-sur-Mer proved to be stubborn. To make matters worse, the defense nests inside the town could call on supporting fire from strongpoint WN30 on the hill behind the town. After bitter house-by-house battle in Courseulles through the morning, defense nest WN30 was captured around noon. On the eastern side of Juno beach, the Canadian 8th Brigade landed while under fire from the WN27 strongpoint in the seaside village of St-Aubin. The seawall in this sector was high, sometimes up to 12ft. The most effective defense in the village was a 50mm pedestal-mounted gun in a non-standard bunker built into the seawall. The basis for the bunker was a normal open gun pit, but this had been substantially enhanced by creating a wall more than 3¼ yards thick facing the sea, and an overhead extension added for good measure. It was basically invulnerable to fire from the sea, while at the same time the gun had a 180-degree arc of fire along the seawall and inland toward the town. Several tanks were knocked out in quick succession as they came ashore, and the 50mm bunker continued in action for over 3 hours until assaulted by infantry from the landward side around 1115hrs. The situation was even hotter to the east where 48 Royal Marine Commando landed in front of WN26 near Langrune-sur-Mer. The landing took place around 0900hrs when many of the offshore obstructions were partially or fully submerged, causing widespread damage to their LCI craft. The WN26 strongpoint included a 75mm field gun and defenses built into the existing seawall. A pair of Royal Marine Centaurs attempted to provide assistance, but one came to grief on a mine and the other found that its gun could do little against the concrete emplacements. The 48 Royal Marine Commando suffered nearly 50 percent casualties in the morning and was unable to overcome the strongpoint.

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LOVE

N

JUNO MIKE

La Rivière

NAN

GREEN RED GREEN

WHITE RED

414 Ost

II

Vaux 716

WN29

WN31

WN28 WN27

Bernièressur-Mer

I

6

Grayesur-Mer

736

St-Aubin-sur-Mer

Courseullessur-Mer

I

5

WN30

736

WN26

II

II/736

716

Langrunesur-Mer I

9

Ste-Croixsur-Mer I

8 736 (Reserve)

Banville

Reviers

II

II

736

Tailleville

Gun in casemate

Colombiers-Pill box sur-Seulles

Concrete bunker Seull

es

Machine gun Wire

WN28

Single row of stakes

Douvres-laDélivrande Bénysur-Mer

StP II

Mines Steel anti-tank or underwater obstructions Anti-tank ditch

0 0

11/01/2018 13:43:35

51

Distelfink

1500 yds 1500m

StP I

736

MAP 20: THE CANADIANS AT JUNO BEACH Of the three British–Canadian beaches on D-Day, the Canadian landing on Juno Beach proved to be the most hotly contested. The main assault force was the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division, landing with two brigades forward. The Canadian landings were later than those on the neighboring beaches, around 0745–0755hrs, owing to the need to allow the tide to cover offshore reefs. Brigadier H. W. Foster’s 7th Brigade landed on the right (western) flank on Mike Red and Nan Green against the village of Courseullessur-Mer. The assault waves came ashore amongst the numerous beach obstructions. The beach itself was confined by the seawalls in front of the shoreside villages. These seawalls had been converted into fortified positions with numerous gun and machine-gun positions. As was so often the case on D-Day, the plans to land the DD tanks before the arrival of the infantry landing craft went awry, and on Nike Beach the Royal Winnipeg Rifles had to conduct a difficult assault to root out the numerous German defensive strongpoints, incurring significant casualties in the process. The DD tanks arrived late, but provided valuable fire support after reaching the shore. Nevertheless, the fortifications were overcome and the Canadian infantry began to move over the dunes inland. The Regina Rifles landed directly in front of Courseulles-sur-Mer, facing the densest of the German defenses. Fortunately, the DD tanks from the 1st Hussars, 6th Canadian Armoured Regiment landed moments before the infantry landing craft, providing some immediate fire support. The Canadian infantry was exposed on the sandy shoreline with the only shelter being the seawall bristling with German guns. The German fortified positions were gradually eliminated by tank fire and destroyer fire. The village of Courseulles-sur-Mer was heavily defended, and fighting was house to house until midday, by which time the town had been cleared and the two battalions of the 7th Brigade linked up. The follow-on Canadian Scottish Regiment arrived to help provide momentum for the push inland. 52

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The Canadian 8th Brigade landed on left (eastern) flank against the villages of Bernières-sur-Mer and St-Aubin-sur-Mer. This followed the same pattern as the neighboring brigade with two infantry battalions in the lead assault waves, supported by tanks, with a third follow-up battalion landing by mid-morning. Armored support came from the DD tanks of the Fort Garry Horse, 10th Armoured Regiment and specialized armor of the British 79th Armoured Division. The Queen’s Own Rifles landed on Nan White in front of Bernières-sur-Mer. The DD tanks were again late, and the opening moments of the fighting consisted of a mad dash across the exposed beach followed by close-range fighting to overcome the numerous German gun pits and machine-gun nests. Some of the lead companies suffered 50 percent casualties in the morning engagements alone. Nevertheless, the Canadians pushed into Bernièressur-Mer. The neighboring North Shore Regiment landed in front of StAubin-sur-Mer, followed ashore by 48 Royal Marine Commando. The mission of the latter was to push through Langrune-sur-Mer and link up with neighboring British forces on Sword Beach. However, heavy casualties during the day’s fighting prevented this from being realized. The 8th Brigade was followed ashore by the 3rd Infantry Division’s main reserve, the 9th Brigade. These additional forces helped to provide the momentum to push out of the seafront villages and farther inland. A major problem by the early afternoon was heavy congestion in the beachhead area because of the volume of troops and equipment arriving, combined with the constricted nature of the beach with its confining seawalls. By the afternoon, the North Nova Scotia Highlanders had reached Villons-les-Buissons and the Queen’s Own Rifles had reached Anisy. The landings on Juno Beach elicited one of the few major German counterattacks of the day, a disorganized attempt by the 21.PanzerDivision to push from Caen to the sea on the eastern flank of the Canadian positions. Although small elements of the division did reach the coast, they had practically no effect on the day’s fighting.

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N

Fleet destroyers: HMS Sioux HMS Algonquin

HMS Hilary

X

Free French destroyer: FFS La Combattante

X

7 Can

III

Follow

Scottis h

ttalion

Follow

1 Can

Pro

v

en

GREEN

48 RM

Shore

tre haudiè iment

WHITE

RED

Vaux

Versur-Mer

Meuvaines

ns

La Rég

RED

Mont Fleury

de la C

’s Own

JUNO

La Rivière GREEN

lt Batt alio

Queen

Royal

MIKE

ttalion

Assau

Rifles

Rifles

ons

Winnip

LOVE

-up Ba

Regina

GOLD

III

10 Can

lt Batt ali

eg Rifl

es

Assau

X

8 Can

-up Ba

North

6 Can

HMS Diadem

III

27 Can (Reserve)

ando

Hunt destroyer: HMS Stevenstone

Reserv e Briga

de

9 Can (Reserve)

Comm

Fleet destroyers: HMS Faulknor HMS Fury HMS Venus

Hunt destroyers: HMS Bleasdale HMS Glaisdale

Fleet destroyers: HMS Vigilant HMS Kempenfelt

Royal Winnipeg Rifles

ce

III

48RM Cdo

Courseullessur-Mer

Grayesur-Mer

Bernièressur-Mer

Ste-Croixsur-Mer

XX

Crépon

St-Aubinsur-Mer

North Shore (New Brunswick)

1 Can Scottish

III

III

III

Langrunesur-Mer

Lucsur-Mer

Banville Tailleville

Reviers

XX

50

Villiersle-Sec

Colombierssur-Seulles

Tierceville Creully

3 Can

XX

Se

ull

es

Douvres-laDélivrande

Regina Rifles

St-Gabriel

III

Bénysur-Mer

Cresserons

FontaineHenry Basly Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry Highlanders

T

e hu

Highland Lt. Inf. of Canada

Le FresneCamilly

III

La Régiment de la Chaudière

III

Anguerny Colombysur-Thaon

Thaon

Bombardment of beaches and strongpoints by naval warships

Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada

Area of rocket bombardment from Landing Craft Tank Rocket

Mu

Area of bombardment from the self-propelled artillery in Landing Craft Tanks during the run in

0 0

2 miles 2km

Plumetot

III

Ch

iro

mm

e

North Nova Scotia Highlanders

e

III

Périerssur-le-Dan

III

Villons-lesBuissons

Cazelle Anisy

Cairon Les Buissons

Cambesen-Plaine

Le Landel

53

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MAP 21: GERMAN DEFENSES ON SWORD BEACH The German defenses on Sword Beach were quite mixed in layout. Those concentrated on the eastern side around Ouistreham were fairly typical of those on the eastern beaches such as Gold and Juno, with numerous buildings along the seafront and the beaches lined by high seawalls. Those on the western side around Queen Beach had less extensive habitation and were generally without large seawalls. The coastal defenses along Sword Beach contained some of the most elaborate fortified zones of the D-Day beaches, mainly in the Ouistreham area. This was in no small measure due to Ouistreham’s control over the Orne Estuary and the access to the Caen Canal. German planners felt that these features would make this beach attractive to Allied forces since they provided a measure of logistical access into the countryside after the landings. The individual defense nests (Widerstandsnester) were linked as strongpoints (Stützpunkte) with WN21 in Lion-sur-Mer through WN18 in Colleville-Plage constituting Stützpunkt Colleville-sur-Orne; the defense nests in Ouistreham including WN14 (Sole) and WN12 (Daimler) constituting Stützpunkt Riva-Bella; and the defense nests on the eastern side of the Orne constituting Stützpunkt Franceville. These three strongpoints were further connected into a more substantial defense sector as Stützpunkt Gruppe Orne with their headquarters linked by radio and cable as an integrated defense zone. The British landings came ashore in the area around WN20 in La Brèche d’Hermanville-sur-Mer and WN18 at Colleville-Plage. Both of these defense nests had a single enfilade gun casemate, the one in WN18 armed with a 7.5cm FK.231(f ) and the one in WN20 armed with a 7.5cm PaK 40 antitank gun. The rest of the defenses consisted of the usual assortment of Tobruk gun pits, mortar Tobruks, personnel bunkers and machine-gun pits. This sector was defended by a single infantry company, 10./Grenadier-Regiment.736 of the 716.InfanterieDivision (bödenstandig). The most powerful defense nest in this sector was WN08, sometimes called Stützpunkt Caen.08 where 1./Heeres-Küsten-ArtillerieAbteilung.1260 was deployed. This Army coastal gun battery was armed with six 15.5cm K.418(f ) guns, the German term for war-booty French 155mm GPFs. These had originally been deployed in open 54

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concrete gun pits since 1942, but new fully enclosed casemates were subsequently constructed. Perhaps the most impressive fortification in this sector was a multistory fire-control tower (Hochleitstand) which still exists today and now serves as the basis for the local Musée du Mur de l’Atlantique (Atlantic Wall Museum). This battery was regarded as so serious a threat that there was a dedicated strike by 114 Lancaster heavy bombers on D-Day morning, smothering the site with some 580 tons of bombs. As occurred at Pointe du Hoc, the Germans had withdrawn the guns prior to D-Day as a result of previous bombardment. Besides the defenses along the shore, there were four significant strongpoints farther inland on the hills overlooking Sword Beach. The principal German force in this sector was Grenadier-Regiment.736 of the 716.Infanterie-Division (bodenständig). Much of the artillery in the area was under control of I./Artillerie-Regiment.1716, the first battalion of the divisional artillery regiment of the 716.InfanterieDivision. Both of these formations had their headquarters within the WN17 defense nest, codenamed “Hillman” by the British, and also called Höhe 61 (Height 61) by the Germans. Each of the headquarters had its own large command bunker at the center of this defense nest, each based on the massive H608 design. The other headquarter defense nest in this sector, WN14, codenamed Sole, was the battalion headquarters for I./Grenadier-Regiment.736 defending the Ouistreham sector. The map here shows the defenses in the immediate Sword Beach area. It is worth noting that there were substantial defenses to the east of this area connected to the Stützpunkt Gruppe Orne as mentioned earlier. Certainly the best known was the Merville Battery, officially designated as WN01. The construction of this battery was noted by Allied intelligence but its exact role was misunderstood. It was suspected of being a naval coastal artillery battery armed with 150mm guns capable of firing on the Allied invasion fleet. As a result, it was struck by Operation Tonga, a dedicated British airborne operation by the 9th Parachute Battalion in the predawn hours of D-Day. In reality, it was an ordinary, albeit well-fortified, battery of I./Artillerie-Regiment.1716 armed with World War I-vintage Czech 100mm guns without the type of fire controls needed to engage ships at sea.

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PE

N

TE

R

Panzerstellung Gun in casemate/concrete gun pit Field gun/AT gun Anti-tank emplacements Hedgehogs Stakes

QUE

EN

GR

EEN

Double row of ramps Anti-tank ditch Barbed wire

0 WN21 (TROUT)

WH

ITE

1 mile

0

1km

Lion-sur-Mer

ROGER

RED

La Brèche WN20 (Cod)

WN18

WN10

CollevillePlage

Banc des Corbeilles

Riva-Bella

StP Caen 08

Hermanvillesur-Mer

Ouistreham

Locks

WN19

Bridge WN14 (Sole) II

Collevillesur-Orne

WN16 (Morris)

HQ

I/736/716

WN12 (Daimler)

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55

II

HQ

I/1716

736/716

St-Aubind’Arquenay

e

Périerssur-le-Dan

III

HQ

Orn

WN17 (Hillman)

Point 61

MAP 22: BRITISH 6th AIRBORNE DIVISION LANDINGS As was the case on the American beaches to the west, the Overlord plan included a substantial British airborne landing to seal off the extreme left (eastern) flank. This consisted of landings on either side of the complex river and canal network to the east of Ouistreham consisting of the Orne River and the parallel Caen Canal. There were several distinct missions within the overall airborne operation. One of the high-priority missions was the seizure of the bridges over the Orne River and Caen Canal near Bénouville. This had the dual task of preventing the Germans from using the bridges to counterattack the main landings at Sword Beach, as well as to secure the bridges for their use in pushing out of the Sword beachhead. The coup de main of Operation Deadstick was conducted by glider landings into Landing Zones X and Y by Major John Howard’s 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry of the British 6th Airborne Division. Both bridges were quickly captured shortly after midnight, and the small force was reinforced by the arrival of paratroopers of LieutenantColonel Geoffrey Pine-Coffin’s 7th Parachute Battalion landing in Drop Zone N. They were to be followed by the main force of the 5th Parachute Brigade starting around 0045hrs. This parachute landing proved to be chaotic because of the difficulties of establishing adequate and reliable radio beacons on the ground to guide the transport aircraft. The airborne force was quickly counterattacked by local German forces and fierce fighting continued until later in the day, when relief forces arrived from Sword Beach. Operation Tonga was a separate action to eliminate the Merville artillery battery. The 3rd Parachute Brigade landed on Drop Zone V to the southeast of the coastal town of Franceville-Plage on the eastern side of the Orne River. The brigade’s 9th Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Terence Otway was assigned to proceed from the drop zone and capture the Merville Battery. Unfortunately, an RAF bombing attack on the Merville Battery left the area obscured in smoke and many of Otway’s men were dropped too far east into the inundated marches along the Dives River. Nor did the gliderborne heavy equipment, including jeeps and anti-tank guns, arrive in time. With only about 150 of the 750 paratroopers assigned to the mission, Otway launched the attack around 0300hrs. The attack coincided with a glider landing directly in the vicinity of the Merville Battery, which helped confuse the defenders. After breaching the barbed wire around the battery, the paratroopers charged into the defense nest, which quickly surrendered. 56

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To isolate the Sword Beach area, Lieutenant-Colonel George Bradbrooke’s 1st Canadian Parachute Battalion landed on Drop Zone V with the 3rd Parachute Brigade. They were assigned to demolish the bridges over the Dives River at Varaville and Robehomme to prevent a German threat against the left (eastern) flank of the Sword Beach landing. This battalion was badly scattered during the nighttime drops. In the event, small groups of the paratroopers made their way to the bridges. With no explosive charges on hand, the paratroopers tried to render the bridges unusable by massing all available Gammon grenades together in a single charge. This failed to do serious damage to the bridge, but engineer troops with proper explosive arrived shortly after and the bridges were demolished as planned. Lieutenant-Colonel Alastair Pearson’s 8th Parachute Battalion was given a similar mission to demolish the Dives River bridges at Buressur-Dives and Troarn. Although intending to land on Drop Zone K, the force was badly scattered during the night drop. By 0330hrs, only about 140 men had gathered at the main rendezvous point, and Pearson set off for the objective substantially understrength. Part of the missing troops, led by Major J. Roseveare of the Royal Engineers, had been dropped near Drop Zone N. This force included about 60 paratroopers and 60 engineers, and more importantly had a jeep, trailer, and 400lb of high-explosive. They set off on their own for the Bures-sur-Dives bridge, encountering numerous German troops. They managed to place a charge in the middle of the Troarn bridge, substantial enough to make the bridge impassible. The landing of the 6th Airborne Division proved successful in its immediate tactical objectives, seizing or destroying the most critical bridges in the sector and eliminating the threat of the Merville Battery. The German response was to mobilize the elements of the 716. Infanterie-Division on the eastern side of the Orne River to repulse the attack, but there were insufficient troops to do so. The division commander, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Richter, attempted to convince Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger of the 21.Panzer-Division to activate his forces in the Caen area to move against the Allied force. Feuchtinger was reluctant to commit his forces short of a direct order from Berlin. Although the bulk of the 21.Panzer-Division remained inactive until much later in the day, there was some scattered fighting between elements of the 6th Airborne Division and the 21.Panzer-Division on D-Day morning.

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642 Ost/716 I

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9

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Coup de Main 5 Howard

5

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3

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-8 Bn

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I/736/716

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642 Ost

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Varaville

Amfreville

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Ranville

5

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3

Robehomme

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Émiéville

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MAP 23: AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS ON SWORD BEACH The assault by the 8th Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division on Sword Beach was somewhat similar to the US 4th Infantry Division at Utah Beach, landing along a fairly narrow corridor only two battalions wide but thereby concentrating the entire force against a single strongpoint. The 1st South Lancs landed west of WN20 in La Brèche, codenamed “Cod.” This strongpoint included a 75mm PaK 40 in an H677 enfilade bunker as well as three 50mm pedestal guns. At the same time, the neighboring 2nd East Yorks landed on its eastern side. The gun bunkers took a toll on tanks assisting the 2nd East Yorks, knocking out many Sherman flail tanks as they attempted to clear paths off the beach. The British infantry moved over the beach as quickly as possible to avoid the heavy fire against the shoreline. After the wire entanglements were breached, Cod was assaulted by elements of both battalions supported by DD tanks from the 13th/18th Hussars and was overcome shortly after 1000hrs after nearly 3 hours of fighting. By H+60, the follow-on waves began to arrive. The defenses in the center portion of Sword Beach had largely been eliminated once Cod was overwhelmed, but the beach remained under fire from scattered snipers, and from mortars and artillery located away from the beach. The German defensive positions on either side of the 8th Brigade were assigned to commando units. In another parallel to the landings on the American beaches and the assault by the Rangers on Pointe du Hoc, the task of silencing the artillery batteries at the extreme eastern side of Sword Beach was assigned to 4 Commando. The battalion landed away from the defenses, and advanced along the road eastward to attack the defensive positions from the land side. Two French troops from 10 Commando were attached to 4 Commando, and led the attack on WN10. The lightly armed French commandos had a hard time dealing with the numerous defenses, which included a 75mm field gun in an H626 bunker, and the attack stalled. By this time, Sherman tanks from the neighboring 8th Brigade had arrived near Ouistreham, and a DD tank was dispatched to assist in the commando assault. Once the WN10 defenses were overcome with the help of tank fire, 4 Commando proceeded to assault the artillery battery in Stützpunkt 08 in Riva Bella. This strongpoint was dominated by a multistory observation tower at the far end. As the commandos fought past an outer ring of Tobruk pits and other defenses into the heart of the battery positions, they realized that the Germans had withdrawn the guns owing to the preinvasion 58

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bombardment, much as had occurred at Pointe du Hoc. German troops continued to hurl grenades from the observation tower, but, rather than waste time and lives to capture the structure, 4 Commando left the tower for clean-up by follow-on troops. To the west, 41 Royal Marine Commando assaulted the WN21 (Trout) strongpoint in Lion-sur-Mer, which included a single 75mm field gun and two pedestal-mounted 50mm guns in open pits. The WN21 strongpoint was found to be deserted, but the neighboring château proved more difficult, and 41 Royal Marine Commando was unable to proceed to its secondary objective (the Luftwaffe radar station at Douvres-la-Délivrande) with the help of tanks from the 5th Assault Regiment, Royal Engineers. With the defenses on Sword Beach thoroughly penetrated, albeit not entirely subdued, the follow-on waves moved off the beaches to carry out their further objectives. The 185th Brigade proceeded through Colleville-Plage on their way to Caen, encountering two major fortified areas in the process, an artillery battery in the WN16 strongpoint codenamed Morris, and the heavily fortified headquarters complex of Grenadier-Regiment.736 in strongpoint WN17, codenamed Hillman. The 1st Suffolks overwhelmed the artillery battery at WN16 and then proceeded to the Hillman complex. WN17 was encircled by minefields and barbed wire, and the British infantry fought its way into the strongpoint after breaching the wire. The personnel bunkers inside the strongpoint were the heavy bombproof type as used on the Westwall, and not the more vulnerable Tobruk type common elsewhere on the D-Day beaches. As a result, the 1st Suffolks brought up some 17-pdr antitank guns, attempting to crack open the bunkers by blasting their armored cupolas. There were so many bunkers and firing ports that it took the 1st Suffolks the entire day to overwhelm the headquarters, finally eliminating resistance at 2015hrs that evening. Although casualties in the 1st Suffolks were not particularly heavy from the attack on Hillman, during the afternoon the 1st Royal Norfolks unwarily marched through a field within range of Hillman, and suffered about 150 casualties from machine-gun fire from the strongpoint. The prolonged resistance by the WN17 strongpoint, as well as the later counterattack by elements of the 21.Panzer-Division, were some of the reasons that 185th Brigade was unable to press on to its intended objective that day, the city of Caen.

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HMS Eglinton HMS Kelvin

Destroyers bombarding beach defenses, 3,000–6,000 yards offshore

Cruisers bombarding coastal artillery sites at Colleville, Ouistreham and Riva Bella, 5–7 miles offshore HMS Dragon

HMS Virago

HMS Frobisher

HMS Danae

HMS Verulam HMS Serapis

Landing Craft Task (Rocket) fire salvos of 8-inch rocket projectiles onto the area of Green, White and Red beaches and the roads backing onto the sea front, from 5,000 yards offshore

HMS Scourge

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INTERMEDIATE BRIGADE, landing from H Hour + 150 minutes to H Hour + 250 minutes J. 2 King’s Shropshire Light Infantry, 185 Brigade K. The Staffordshire Yeomanry, 27 Armoured Brigade L. 2 Royal Warwickshire Regiment 1 Royal Norfolk Regiment M. 185 Brigade priority vehicles and stores

Further bombardment provided from assault craft 1. Landing Craft Flak (LCF) 2. 3 Division’s self-propelled artillery on board Landing Craft Tank (LCT)

e

RESERVE BRIGADE, landing from H Hour + 270 minutes to H Hour + 360 minutes N. 2 Lincolnshire Regiment, 9 Brigade 1 King’s Own Scottish Light Infantry, 9 Brigade 2 Royal Ulster Rifles, 9 Brigade O. 1 East Riding Yeomanry, 27 Armoured Brigade P. 9 Brigade priority vehicles and stores

Orn

ASSAULT BRIGADE, landing from H Hour to H Hour + 120 minutes A. 13/18 Hussars (DD tanks), 27 Armoured Brigade 22 Dragoons, 79 Armoured Division Westminster Dragoons, 79 Armoured Division 5 Assault Regiment Royal Engineers, 79 Armoured Division B. Assault Companies, 1 South Lancs and 2 East Yorks, 8 Brigade C. 7 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, 3 Division (self-propelled guns) 33 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, 3 Division (self-propelled guns) 76 Field Regiment Royal Artillery, 3 Division (self-propelled guns) D. Follow-up Companies, 1 South Lancs and 2 East Yorks, 8 Brigade Périers-sur-le-Dan E. 4 Commando, 41 RM Commando F. 8 Brigade priority vehicles and 79 Division’s wading tanks G. Reserve Battalion, 1 Suffolk Regiment, 8 Brigade H. Remainder 1 Special Service Brigade I. 8 Brigade priority vehicles and stores

Sallenelles

Infantry Armor and self-propelled artillery Commandos Support vehicles

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MAP 24: THE BRITISH LODGMENT AREA NIGHT, JUNE 6, 1944 Overall, Operation Overlord on June 6, 1944 was a great success for the Allies. Casualties were far lower than preinvasion estimates, and only at Omaha Beach had the outcome ever been in serious doubt. The German response had been feeble, and the two German divisions in most immediate contact with Allied forces had taken very heavy casualties and were in no position for a major counterattack. Of all the outcomes of the D-Day landings, the most consequential and controversial was the failure of the British 3rd Infantry Division to capture Caen on D-Day according to the original plan. In fact, most of the divisions landing on D-Day failed to reach their objectives. But it was the longterm consequences around Caen that have attracted attention to this one shortcoming of the day’s operations. The reasons for the failure to take Caen were numerous. Even though the 3rd Infantry Division had secured a firm beachhead by midmorning, the follow-on waves found the shoreline to be extremely congested. It took precious time to free units from the traffic jams along the beachhead, move them through the rubble, mines, and debris of the coastal towns, and deploy them in the countryside to the south. Overcoming the fortified command posts on Hillman took more time than expected and the site was not easily bypassed owing to its outstanding vantage point over the surrounding countryside. By the time that the 185th Brigade had cleared this sector, the 21. Panzer-Division had finally been activated after a day of dithering between its commander, Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger, and the Oberbehelfshaber West in Berlin about its assignments. As part of the theater Panzer reserve, Feuchtinger felt obliged to receive direct instructions from Berlin before committing his force. In the event, the attack was halfhearted consisting of a Kampfgruppe of two tank battalions of Panzer-Abteilung.100 and a battalion from Panzergrenadier-Regiment.192. This attack in the late afternoon ran into tanks and antitank guns of the 185th Brigade, losing 13 of the 40 tanks in the initial wave. The Panzergrenadier force had greater success, 60

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reaching outposts of Grenadier-Regiment.736 on the coast near Lionsur-Mer, followed shortly afterwards by a few tanks. By early evening, both sides reconsidered their objectives. MajorGeneral Tom Rennie, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, had strong doubts that Caen was a realistic objective that day. The sudden appearance of a significant German Panzer force certainly raised the threat of even more severe counterattacks later in the day against the exposed positions of the 185th Brigade. At the time, the 185th Brigade had barely two battalions of tanks in its spearhead, and was apparently facing a full Panzer division. Rennie chose the cautious approach and ordered his forces to assume defensive positions for the evening, waiting for the next day to reach Caen. There was still a considerable amount of chaos behind the lines as additional forces landed on the beach, and a well-organized attack on Caen on D+1 seemed more prudent than a hasty and risky thrust late in the day against an unknown German Panzer force. On the German side, Feuchtinger was taken aback by the brusque reception his first counterattack had received, and his division was the only force standing in the way of the Allies and the city of Caen. He was demoralized by the massive display of airpower in the late evening around 2100hrs when over 200 Allied transport aircraft were seen to the northeast, bringing the 6th Air-Landing Brigade into the Orne River sector around St-Aubin-sur-Mer on their gliders. He was concerned that an Allied airborne landing to the rear of his division could completely disrupt his defenses. Instead of any further counterattacks against the British 3rd Infantry Division that day, Feuchtinger ordered his Kampfgruppe to withdraw back toward Caen. He began to deploy the other elements of the division as a cordon around Caen for the next day’s fighting. A more vigorous response by the 21.Panzer-Division on D-Day might have placed Sword Beach at greater risk, but Feuchtinger showed little inclination toward boldness.

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Anguerny

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X

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Cambesen-Plaine La Bijude Galmanche

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CHAPTER 2

THE BATTLE FOR FRANCE, JUNE–AUGUST 1944

An M4A1 (76mm) medium tank of the 2nd Armored Division fitted with “Rhino” hedgecutters pushes through the bocage during Operation Cobra in late July 1944. (NARA) 63

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MAP 25: THE BATTLE FOR CARENTAN JUNE 10–13, 1944 The original US intentions for VII Corps in the Utah Beach area was for a swing right out of the beachhead and a rapid advance on the key port of Cherbourg. This was frustrated by the density of German fortified defenses along the coast and the unanticipated difficulties of operating in the French bocage hedgerow country. On June 8, Rommel received a set of orders for VII Corps that had been found by a German unit near Utah Beach. In response, he diverted a first-rate unit, the 77.InfanterieDivision, which had been intended to prevent the link-up of Omaha and Utah beaches, and ordered it instead toward Valognes to block the US advance on Cherbourg. In view of these difficulties, Eisenhower ordered Bradley to reorient the short-term objectives of both VII Corps at Utah Beach and V Corps at Omaha Beach to focus on linking up. The task of linking Utah Beach to Omaha Beach from the west largely fell on the 101st Airborne Division. The key town in this sector was Carentan. A force was organized under Brigadier-General Anthony McAuliffe to push through the town of St-Côme-du-Mont and capture Carentan. Opposing this force was a pair of elite German formations: the Sturm-Abteilung-AOK.7, and the paratroopers of FallshirmjägerRegiment.6. After a preliminary artillery preparation on the morning of June 8, three American paratroop and one glider infantry battalions began the assault. By the end of the day, McAuliffe’s forces had gained control of the northern side of the causeway leading to Carentan over the Douve and Merderet rivers. The ensuing fighting was complicated by the local terrain that consisted of impassable marshes and flooded farmland. The fighting had to be conducted down the narrow causeway and across each of its four bridges. The retreating German forces had blown the first bridge over the Douve River, and so the advance along the bridge did not begin until the night of June 9/10 while the engineers attempted to span the gap. The bridges were gradually captured in intense close-combat actions. By June 11, the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) had three battered battalions barely clinging to positions near the final bridge, but the German paratroopers had been decimated and were short of ammunition. In the early morning hours of June 10, the 327th Glider Infantry Regiment, reinforced by 1/401st Glider Infantry, had crossed the Douve farther east. This force seized the road leading out of Carentan and one 64

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company moved east toward Isigny. This company met up with scouts from the 29th Infantry Division, marking the first contact between Utah and Omaha beaches. By the end of June 10, Carentan was surrounded and McAuliffe planned for a final assault on June 12. The situation of the German garrison had become so perilous that on the afternoon of July 11, the commander of the German paratroop regiment decided to withdraw his force rather than face certain annihilation. The attack on Carentan in the early morning hours of July 12 encountered only a token rearguard force. After Carentan was taken, VII Corps began reinforcing the connection with V Corps to the east. In the meantime, Rommel had ordered the 17.SS-PanzergrenadierDivision to attack toward Carentan to prevent the link-up of Utah and Omaha beaches. The divisional commander, SS-Gruppenführer Werner Ostendorff, decided that the attack would not be preceded by reconnaissance or artillery fire, in order to gain tactical surprise. The spearhead was SS-Panzer-Abteilung.17 equipped with four dozen StuG IV assault guns. McAuliffe had deployed the 506th PIR into this sector on the morning of June 13 to thicken the defenses. The German columns were slowed by the congestion on the country roads, and first contact was not made with the paratroopers until around 0900hrs. The 506th PIR was able to slow the attack by using the hedgerows to good effect, and this sector was reinforced by the 2/502nd PIR on the right flank. Allied signals intelligence had caught wind of the German plans, prompting Bradley to create a task force from the newly arrived 2nd Armored Division, including a company of medium tanks, a company of light tanks, and an armored infantry battalion as a counterattack force. When the paratroopers reported the Panzer attack around 0900hrs, the task force began moving, reaching Carentan around 1030hrs. The German attack petered out by noontime owing to the unexpected difficulties of fighting in the bocage. The US armored counterattack began around 1400hrs down the Carentan–Baupte road and disrupted the German force. A later assessment by the 7.Armee concluded that the counterattack at Carentan had failed owing to the 17.SS-PanzergrenadierDivision’s inexperience. The rebuff of the German counterattack allowed Major-General J. Lawton Collins’ VII Corps to consolidate the link-up with Major-General Leonard Gerow’s V Corps on June 14.

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MAP 26: CUTTING OFF THE COTENTIN JUNE 10–18, 1944 While the 101st Airborne Division pushed to the southeast to link up with Omaha Beach, the rest of Major-General Collins’ VII Corps began taking the first steps to capture Cherbourg. The original plan had been a fast breakout from Utah Beach with a swing northward toward Cherbourg. When it became evident that no fast maneuver was possible, the plan changed. The focus now became to push across the base of the Cotentin Peninsula to isolate the German garrison in Cherbourg. Once this was accomplished, VII Corps would push northward against Cherbourg. The 4th Infantry Division led the attack on the right (northern) front toward the city of Montebourg. It was faced by the 709.InfanterieDivision, bolstered by some reinforcements from Cherbourg. The initial fighting on June 7–9 involved the capture of a succession of German strongpoints that had been created around the coastal artillery batteries dotting this sector. The fighting on June 12–14 on the outskirts of Montebourg severely weakened the defenses of the German battle groups in this area. However, on June 14, the division was told to hold its positions in anticipation of actions farther south, aimed at cutting across the Cotentin Peninsula. The initial attacks across the Cotentin were conducted by the 82nd Airborne Division along the Merderet River and the inexperienced 90th Infantry Division. There had been no intention of using the paratroopers beyond the initial phase of the operation on account of their heavy losses, and, once the Merderet River had been secured, the 82nd Airborne Division was pulled back into reserve, with the 90th Division taking over the attack. The performance of the 90th Division was extremely poor, and, after four days of fighting, Collins became so frustrated that he pulled the division out of the line in favor of its replacement by the experienced 9th Infantry Division. The attack across the Cotentin resumed on June 14 with good results. From the German perspective, the American intentions were obvious. Rommel was not keen on having large numbers of scarce troops bottled up on the Cotentin Peninsula. Hitler had other ideas and wanted Cherbourg held “to the last man, and last bullet.” Rommel consolidated the remnants of the 709.Infanterie-Division and the 243.InfanterieDivision into Kampfgruppe Schlieben facing the American 4th Infantry Division on the Montebourg front. Their mission was to delay the northward advance as long as possible, and gradually withdraw into 66

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Festung Cherbourg. To the west, Rommel consolidated the remnants of the 91.Luftlande-Division with the newly arrived 77.Infanterie-Division to form Kampfgruppe Hellmich. Rommel misunderstood the intentions of the American drive across the Cotentin Peninsula. He thought that the attack was aimed at reaching the coast and then pushing southward toward Brittany or into the rear of German forces facing Omaha Beach. As a result, the mission of Kampfgruppe Hellmich was to delay the 9th Infantry Division advance across the Cotentin, but once its back was to the sea, it was to maneuver to the southwest, not toward Cherbourg, with the aim of blocking any American advance to the south. As the 9th Infantry Division approached its objective across the base of the Cotentin Peninsula, the 4th Infantry Division reactivated its attack on Montebourg on June 16. This created a crisis in the senior German command. Rommel and von Rundstedt knew that Kampfgruppe Schlieben would have a hard time delaying the attack toward Cherbourg. Since there were no other significant German forces to defend Cherbourg beyond garrison troops, they proposed Plan Heinrich, a scheme to withdraw Kampfgruppe Schlieben into the Cherbourg Landfront defenses, while at the same time permitting Kampfgruppe Hellmich to withdraw down the coast to serve as a blocking force. Hitler adamantly refused any sort of withdrawal and the meeting between the Führer and his senior West Front commanders dragged on through the day. Rommel and von Rundstedt argued for the transfer of the idle 319.InfanterieDivision to Cherbourg, another initiative that Hitler refused. Finally, at day’s end, Hitler acquiesced to the withdrawal of Kampfgruppe Hellmich. This proved to be too late, and the 77.Infanterie-Division was decimated when it attempted to move through US lines on June 17. General Bernard Montgomery met with Bradley on July 18 to discuss immediate tactical plans. The mission of Bradley’s First US Army was to take Cherbourg, while the British Second Army would take Caen. With the 9th Infantry Division across the Cotentin Peninsula, Bradley reinforced Collins’ VII Corps to three divisions with instructions to begin the advance northward on Cherbourg. The 79th Infantry Division had been added to the center of Collins’ force, driving up the center of the peninsula. The three American divisions were facing the remnants of four German divisions, but the attritional struggle of the past two weeks had reduced actual German strength to barely a single division. The American drive on Cherbourg began in the predawn hours of June 19.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 67

Ruffosses Helleville St-Christophedu-Foc

St-Martinle-Gréard

Couville

N

St-Vaast-la-Hougue

Delasse Brix

Les Pieux

Aumeville

Rauvillela-Bigot

Grosville

Tamerville

Rocheville

St-Germainle-Gaillard

III

Me

77

Colomby

rde GR 1058 ret

265

I III

II

June 14

Ste-Colombe

Biniville Orglandes

60

II

3/60

June 17

III

60

9

9

St-Sauveurle-Vicomte

III

Barnevillesur-Mer

505 II

1/47

La Grande Huanville

82

II

9 2/47

III

47

920

325

III

921

508

243

82

III

II

3/47

9

1057

357

90

Amfreville

Foucarville

Ste-MèreÉglise

Cauquigny

Turqueville

St-Martinde-Varreville

III

359

90

Gottot III

358 Étienville Pont-l’Abbé

III

9

243

III

82

Ravenoville

Beuzevilleau-Plain

Neuvilleau-Plain

III

243

La Bonneville Renouf

III

Taret de Ravenoville

St-Marcouf Azeville

Gourbesville

III

9

Joganville

Fresville

Reigneville 922

Fierville-les-Mines

St-Mauriceen-Cotentin

Carteret

9

St-Jacquesde-Néhou

III

77

1/39

9

4

Émondeville

1049

Golleville

8

Fontenay-sur-Mer Crisbecq

Écausseville Le Ham

Urville

Le Valdécie

St-Floxel

4

Ozeville

III

II

St-Pierred’Arthélglise

AOK.7

22

Éroudeville

III

June 17

4

II

Sturm

Quinéville

III

III

12

Montebourg

Lieusaint

1049

KG Muller

III

KG Simoneit

Bricquebec

III Keil

III

KG Rohrbach

Valognes

Négreville

1050

III

KG

Huberville

90

Picauville

St-Sauveurde-Pierrepont

Forward positions, evening, June 9

KG

Pouppeville

Chef-du-Pont Les Forges Hiesville

91. LL Douve

265

St-Jores

Forward positions, evening, June 13 Forward positions, evening, June 16 Positions reached, night, June 17/18 and early morning, June 18

Ste-Mariedu-Mont Vierville

St-Cômedu-Mont

Le Port

Baupte Carentan

La Haye-du-Puits

Le Mesnil

Inundated area

11/01/2018 13:43:48

67

5 miles 5km

St-Germainsur-Sévres

nd l e a na Vir te Ca Tau

0

La Grande Dune

III

St-Lôd’Ourville

0

La Madeleine

Audouvillela-Hubert

La Fière

Beuzevillela-Bastille

Portbail

Les Dunesde-Varreville

MAP 27: FESTUNG CHERBOURG The Wehrmacht had presumed that any Allied landings in Lower Normandy would require a port. As a result, both Cherbourg and Le Havre were heavily fortified between 1942 and 1944 as part of the Atlantic Wall program. This included the erection of an extensive network of coastal artillery batteries on both sides of the Cotentin Peninsula, extensive defenses in the immediate Cherbourg area, and a landfront defense to the south of the city. On February 4, 1944, Hitler declared Cherbourg to be a Festung (Fortress), which meant that it would be defended to the last man. The Cotentin coastline was defended by fortified coastal artillery positions. This was a more economical solution than large numbers of infantry units since a single gun battery could cover about 6 miles on either side. The coastal gun batteries were subordinate to Seekommandant Normandie when engaging naval targets, and control reverted to the Army once the batteries were targeted on Allied landing sites. The east coast of the Cotentin was shielded by the ten artillery batteries of Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Regiment.1261. The Kriegsmarine had a substantial coastal artillery force in and around Cherbourg harbor consisting of the nine batteries of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.260. The western Cotentin coast starting at the Cape de la Hague was covered by the Army’s Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Regiment.1262 while the Navy’s Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.608 protected the port of Granville. The coast defenses were divided into sectors starting with the divisional Küsten Verteidigung Abschnitte (KVAs – Coastal Defense Sectors), which consisted of several Küsten Verteidigung Untergruppen (KVUs – Subdivisional Coastal Defense Groups). The Cherbourg area was designated KVA-J and consisted of five subsectors: KVU-Jobourg to the west, KVU-Cherbourg-See for the harbor, KVU-CherbourgLand for the Landfront, and KVU-Barfleur and KVU-St-Vaast on the eastern coast. When a second division was added to the Cotentin coast in May 1944, the defense sectors were bifurcated as KVA-J1 (709. Infanterie-Division) and KVA-J2 (243.Infanterie Division). Cherbourg is located in a shallow bowl surrounded by hills on all sides, making it very difficult to defend close to the port itself. As a result, as part of the Atlantic Wall fortification program, a separate Cherbourg-Landfront, known officially as KVU Cherbourg-Land, was built in 1943 and 1944. This defensive line consisted of about 85 defense nests (Widerstandsnester) in a hemispherical shape about 15 miles wide, 6 miles deep and about 28 miles long. These defense nests 68

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 68

were built in a similar fashion to those on the coast and typically contained a gun casemate with an antitank gun or field gun, supported by Tobruk pits or other small defense positions with mortars and machine guns and extensive trenches. Besides the defense nests on the periphery, the interior zone had a significant number of Flak positions for city defense. An American report described a typical Landfront defense nest: “Pillboxes in the first line of German defenses … were actually inland forts with steel and reinforced concrete walls four or five feet thick. Built into the hills of Normandy so their parapets were level with surrounding ground, the forts were heavily armed with mortars, machine guns and 88mm rifles. Around the forts lay a pattern of smaller defenses, pillboxes, redoubts, rifle pits, sunken well-like mortar emplacements permitting 360-degree traverse, observation posts, and other works to enable the defenders to deliver deadly crossfire from all directions. Approaches were further protected by minefields, barbedwire and antitank ditches at least 20 feet wide at top and 20 feet deep. Each strongpoint was connected to the other and all were linked to the mother fort by a system of deep, camouflaged trenches and underground tunnels. The forts and pillboxes were fitted with periscopes. Telephones tied in all the defenses. Entrance to these forts was from the rear, below ground level, through double doors of steel armor plate which defending garrisons clamped shut behind them. The forts were electrically lighted and automatically ventilated.” In spite of the many concrete bunkers and coast defense guns, the actual fighting power of the Wehrmacht on the Cotentin Peninsula was hampered by lingering shortages of good quality troops. German General Erich Marcks summed this up in his assessment during the Cherbourg maneuvers in 1944: “Emplacements without guns, ammunition depots without ammunition, minefields without mines, and a large number of men in uniform with hardly a soldier among them.” Oberst Friedrich von der Heydte of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment.6 recalled: “The troops for a defense against an Allied landing were not comparable to those committed in Russia. Their morale was low; the majority of the enlisted men and noncommissioned officers lacked combat experience; and the officers were in the main those who, because of lack of qualification or on account of wounds or illness, were no longer fit for service on the Eastern Front.” The weapons were “from all over the world and seem to have been accumulated from all periods of the 20th century.”

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 69

N

Luftwaffe Flak, radar site Coastal artillery batteries Defense nest Strongpoint

0

3 miles

0 MKB Seebahnhof I

MKB Landemer

Panzerwerk Westeck 396

Gruchy

226 230

227

Fleury

484 483 482 481

279

538

276

554

275

2

Acqueville

257 256

470

468 467

TeurthévilleHague

496

Martinvast

464

455 463 462

Hardinvast 461

458

St-Christophedu-Foc

454

456 457

Tollevast

453

450 451

448

Stp. 452 Valogener Strasse

Stp. Reveillerie 445

446

444

443

St-Martinle-Gréard

516

441

425

428

551

438

429

430 431 432 433 434

435

517 439

426

437

436

Ruffosses

Le Theil

Hameau Gallis

423 424

416

506 419

421

1079 514

Le Mesnil-au-Val

518

442

KVU Gruppe Cherbourg-Land

I

427

La Bourdonnerie 519

440

Brix

11/01/2018 13:43:51

69

491

Stp.

509 511

408 409 410 411 412 413 414

501

Theville

508

420

7

1079

522

449

407

502

512 Gonneville

490

La Glacerie

Delasse Couville

6

515

459

460

Helleville

Stp. La Vaquerie

510 513

Digosville I

243

492

548 443

525

525

553 495

465

488

521

524

405 406

Maupertus-sur-Mer Flugplatz

487

242

247

Sideville 466

Hameau Gringor

251

529

528

Baudienville Vasteville

246

255

La Mare à Canards

469

244

489

533

472 471

249

254

530

531

473

258

St-Sauveur

539

244

250

503

504

237

238 530

253

236

204

239

206

252

260

Octeville

205

207

208

261

266

360

Flottemanville474 Hague 475

265

534

Nouainville

209

264

270

401 402 403 1079 404

232

235

Seebahnhof

267

I

Fermanville

203

214

263

268

202

5

I

MKB Ft du Roule

262

217

1079

535

Gourbesville 476

Cherbourg 216 215

Arsenal

218

Hainneville

291 I

536

Biville

274

Tonneville

477

Haut Biville

220

Stp. Fermanville

201

I

MKB Hamburg

I

MKB Brommy West

222

537

478

KVU Gruppe Cherbourg-See

273

Ste-Croix-Hague

539

221

Nocqueville

Branville-Hague

479

223

225

Stp. Branville

Stp. Cap Levy

Stp. Querqueville

278

280

I

I

MKB Les Couplets

224

480

L’Épinette

MKB Bastion II

Querqueville

229

485 390

I

MKB York

GrévilleHague

I

MKB Molenbatterie

231

3km

I

422

Stp. Hameau les Ronches

MAP 28: THE ADVANCE ON CHERBOURG JUNE 19–21, 1944 When VII Corps initiated the final push northward to Cherbourg, its three divisions faced Kampfgruppe Schlieben, a force of roughly a division in size. The drive on Cherbourg began in the predawn hours of June 19 with the 4th Division starting at 0300hrs followed by the 9th and 79th divisions at 0500hrs. Kampfgruppe Schlieben by this stage of the campaign consisted of the disorganized remnants of four divisions. The 9th Division was facing portions of Grenadier-Regiment.920 and Grenadier-Regiment.921 from the 243.Infanterie-Division along with some elements of the 77.Infanterie-Division that had failed to escape southward during the breakout attempt two days before. The 79th Division in the center faced parts of the 77.Infanterie-Division as well as remnants of the 91.Luftlande-Division. The 4th Division was facing most of the 709.Infanterie-Division, the survivors of Sturm-AbteilungAOK.7, and surviving parts of the 243.Infanterie-Division. The strongest German defenses were those along the Montebourg–Valognes axis. The initial attacks made steady progress, as the German units tended to withdraw after first contact. Owing to the limited mobility of his forces, at noon on July 19, General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben ordered the disengagement of his forces from the Montebourg front, and withdrawal into the Cherbourg Landfront. The main retreat route along the Valognes–Cherbourg highway was protected by a rearguard from Pionier-Bataillon.709 and the obsolete, war-booty French tanks of Panzer-Abteilung.206. The withdrawal proved to be less costly than expected, because the wet, cloudy weather prevented interference from Allied fighter-bombers. When the withdrawal finally began, Kampfgruppe Schlieben was still in close contact with the advancing American divisions. The lack of transport for the division meant that the withdrawal was slow and time-consuming. By the time the troops reached the defensive perimeter, they were exhausted, and there was considerable shuffling around as units attempted to create some form of coherent organization amongst the scattered defense nests. Berlin looked at its maps of the defensive ring around Cherbourg and deluded itself into thinking that it represented a formidable bastion. The Cherbourg garrison commander, Generalmajor Robert Sattler, later remarked: “a 3-year-old boy does not grow a beard if you declare him a man, and a town does not become a fortress by being declared a fortress.” Schlieben also complained that the 70

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 70

troops had developed a “bunker psychosis.” After having been pounded by American field artillery and naval gunfire for more than a week, some units hunkered down in the bunkers of the Landfront and showed little inclination toward aggressive patrolling. Schlieben organized the defense of the Landfront based on the four remaining regimental headquarters. From west to east, they were deployed as follows: Kampfgruppe Müller (Grenadier-Regiment.922 from 243. Infanterie-Division); Kampfgruppe Keil (Grenadier-Regiment.919 from 709.Infanterie-Division); Kampfgruppe Köhn (Grenadier-Regiment.739 from 709.Infanterie-Division); and Kampfgruppe Rohrbach (GrenadierRegiment.729 from 709.Infanterie-Division). The regimental sectors were grossly overextended. The original plans expected the Landfront to be manned by three divisions, not four emaciated regiments. Oberst Köhn estimated the battalion strengths in his command to average about 70–180 men compared to a starting strength of about 800 men. On June 20–21, many of the regiments received hasty reinforcements from the city including Navy Alarm Units (Marine Alarmheiten) consisting of naval personnel organized into infantry. These naval units were usually deployed in company strength, but the Army commanders soon despaired over their willingness to fight after many companies simply wandered back to the security of Cherbourg. The other source of reinforcement came from teenage German workers of the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD – Reich Labor Service) who had been involved in the numerous construction projects around Cherbourg. These recruits were enthusiastic but not well trained. The unit commanders had a hard time integrating these naive youngsters with the weary, battle-shocked veterans who had been fighting continuously for more than a week. The last-minute infusion of these recruits brought many of the battalions close to paper strength, though in reality their combat value was low. Von Schlieben attempted to reinforce the front with Flak batteries from within the Cherbourg defenses; this proved difficult on account of a lack of prime movers. For the final defense of Cherbourg, the garrison had a ration strength of about 25,000 men, though many of these were tied down to the coastal defenses or were naval personnel assigned to the various port commands. Von Schlieben reported the Festung Cherbourg strength to be 21,000 men, of which 4,100 were naval personnel.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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Front line, night, June 18/19 Positions reached, June 19

Fermanville

Beaumont-Hague

Positions reached, June 20

II

3

Cherbourg Landfront

Cherbourg

60 I

Inundated area

0

Hainneville

4 June 21

Gonneville

FlottemanvilleHague

Haut Biville

Biville

Front line, evening, June 21

St-PierreÉglise

III

KG Keil

60

22

Martinvast KG Köhn

Keil II I Köhn

47

Teurthéville-Hague

III

III

12 III

Couville

III

XX

8

Delasse

St-Vaastla-Hougue

II

4

24 June 20

St-Martin-le-Gréard

4

XX

III

313

314

III

St-Christophedu-Foc

Quettehou

Hardinvast III

Helleville 60

24

B 24 June 21

Le Theil

ch ba hr I Ro I I hn Kö

Boguenville Sideville

III

3km

I

III

KG Rohrbach

Acqueville Vasteville

I

A

III

III

3 miles

0

(-)

Brix

9

XX

79

Les Pieux

Rauvillela-Bigot

Grosville

II

1

359

Huberville

June 19

I

Rocheville

II

24

III

79

Valognes

III

79 X XX 9

St-Germainle-Gaillard

Aumeville

Tamerville

XX

KG Schlieben

313

June 19

12

III

8 12

Négreville

Montebourg

av 4 CI I

Me

rde

Colomby

Golleville

39

III

60

N Carteret Barnevillesur-Mer

St-Mauriceen-Cotentin

Le Valdécie St-Jacquesde-Néhou

4

III

(-) SteColombe

Écausseville

Fierville-les-Mines

St-Marcouf

Émondeville Azeville

Ravenoville

Le Ham

315

Biniville

Joganville

8

ret

III

313

III

Crisbecq

III

Urville

St-Pierred’Arthélglise

Fontenaysur-Mer

Éroudeville

Lieusaint

III

Quinéville

Ozeville

III

315

Bricquebec

II

24

III

Foucarville

Fresville Orglandes

Reigneville

Gourbesville

Neuvilleau-Plain

Amfreville

Ste-MèreÉglise

Beuzevilleau-Plain

Turqueville

La Bonneville Renouf St-Sauveurle-Vicomte Douve

Audouvillela-Hubert

Gottot Pont-l’Abbé

St-Martinde-Varreville

Picauville

Chefdu-Pont

Les Forges

71

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MAP 29: THE ATTACK ON CHERBOURG JUNE 22–26, 1944 Following a surrender ultimatum on the evening of June 21, preliminary artillery bombardments of Cherbourg began in the late morning of June 22 followed by air strikes by fighter-bombers and medium bombers. To the southwest, the 9th Infantry Division attacked Kampfgruppe Keil and, by the end of June 23, it had penetrated a few miles past the crust of the Landfront and was about 3 miles from the outskirts of Cherbourg. The 79th Division attacked in the center along the heavily fortified Valognes–Cherbourg highway, and, by the afternoon of June 23, the 9th and 79th divisions had pulled alongside one another a short distance from the outer Cherbourg suburbs. On the right flank, the 4th Division had already penetrated the Landfront defenses prior to the June 22 airstrikes. The opposing German battlegroup commander, Oberst Helmuth Rohrbach, was captured during the June 23 fighting. The division’s spearhead, the 2/8th Infantry, only reached the outskirts of La Glacerie on June 24. As VII Corps began reaching the outer suburbs of Cherbourg on June 24, Collins’ new plans placed the onus of the assault on the city on the 9th and 79th divisions. The 9th Division was assigned to push into the western side of the city through the suburb of Octeville. The 79th Division was assigned to attack into Cherbourg by first overcoming the fortified hill occupied by Fort du Roule. The 4th Division, battered after two weeks of costly fighting, was given a secondary role of taking the eastern Tourville-sur-Odon suburb. On June 22, Hitler sent a personal message to von Schlieben, the Festung Cherbourg commander, invoking Gneisenau’s miraculous defense of Kolberg during the Napoleonic Wars and hinting that the same was expected of him. Some senior German commanders in Berlin were under the impression that the garrison could hold out for months on account of the geography and the extensive fortifications around the port. There was little appreciation in Berlin of the weakness of the Cherbourg garrison after a month of fighting. The attack on Fort du Roule began at 0800hrs on July 25 by a squadron of P-47 Thunderbolts. This was an old French fort on a rocky outcrop overlooking the city that had been heavily fortified over the 72

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 72

past two years by German engineers. It was a key outpost in the final defense of the city. The fort was meticulously assaulted by the 314th Infantry Regiment, which began to blast various entrances and pillboxes with gunfire and explosive. The rest of the 79th Division attempted to advance into the city but was stymied by heavy artillery fire from the four gun casemates on the lower levels of Fort du Roule. As darkness fell, the city glowed from the fires that the Germans had set in the port as the final stage of the destruction of the facilities. The final assault into the city by the 9th and 79th divisions began on June 26. Although the 314th Infantry gained control of the upper portions of Fort du Roule, the gun casemates on the north face of the cliffs were still in German hands. US infantrymen snaked their way along the cliff face on the western side of the fort and blasted one of the tunnel openings with pole charges and bazookas. Troops below the fort began firing into the embrasures with 57mm antitank guns. Resistance at Fort du Roule finally collapsed in the early evening and about 500 prisoners were taken. The 39th Infantry, 9th Division pushed down the Octeville road into Cherbourg during the morning. A captured German soldier reported that the Cherbourg command bunker was located in a series of French Navy tunnels that had been carved into one of the rocky hills in St-Sauveur. A prisoner was sent to one of the three armored doors covering the cave entrances with a surrender message. The surrender was refused, so a pair of M10 3in. GMC tank destroyers was driven up and began to fire directly at the three doors at point-blank range. Conditions in the tunnels had already become intolerable through overcrowding and fumes, and von Schlieben agreed to surrender. A white flag was raised outside one of the doors, and eventually some 800 troops emerged, including von Schlieben. Although most of the city was in American hands by the evening, there were still numerous pockets of resistance and scattered fighting. The last holdouts in the forts along the breakwater surrendered on June 29 around 1900hrs. Although the city had finally surrendered, it would take months of intense work to get the port back into working order. The capture of Cherbourg was the first major Allied victory in Normandy.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 73

N

Night positions reached by forward elements June 21 June 22 June 23 June 24 June 25 Coastal artillery batteries Strongpoint

I

Panzerwerk Westeck

I

MKB York

Gruchy

GrévilleHague Fleury

Stp. Branville BranvilleHague

I

MKB Brommy West

Nocqueville

Cherbourg

Querqueville

er MüllI II e K il

Ste-CroixHague

Arsenal

Tonneville 2

Haut Biville

2

II

3

60 1

60

Gourbesville 2

60

1

Nouainville

60

Vasteville

9

Baudienville

II

3

Sideville

47 47

La Mare à Canards

Kampfgruppe Köhn Stp. La Vaquerie

Hardinvast

Tollevast 1

2

Helleville St-Christophedu-Foc

3

II

39

3

39

II

2

Couville

315 II 3

St-Martinle-Gréard

313

22 II

I

Stp. Valogener Stp. Strasse Reveillerie 2

1 314

315

314

3

2 II

313

3 1

Delasse

XX

79

Brix

8

II

313

3

12

II

2

La Bourdonnerie

8

Ruffosses

22

II

Le Mesnil-au-Val

12

Le Theil

II

12

II

II II

II

2

1

II

Det

1079

Kampfgruppe Rohrbach

Hameau Gallis XX

8

4

Stp. Hameau les Ronches III

22

I

7

2

12 III 8

La Glacerie

1079 I 22 I 1 I

6

Gringor

315

1

Digosville

314Hameau

II

II

II

II

39

Rohrbach II I Köhn

1

II

Gonneville

2 313

1 314

2

II

Martinvast

II

TeurthévilleHague

II

39 3

1

Stp. Flugplatz Theville

3

12

ch ba hr I Ro I I hn Kö

XX

47

St-Sauveur

39 II 315I

II

2

II

2

Kampfgruppe Keil

Acqueville

22

II

II

47 I II 39

II

22

II

2

47

Octeville 60

3

2

12

313 II I 314

II

3

II

Flottemanville-Hague

II

Biville

3

Maupertus-sur-Mer

II

12

II

Seebahnhof

II

1079

II

60

47

1079

Fermanville

II

60 III 47

(-) II

3

1

I

5

Panzerwerk Osteck

1

II

I

III

4

47

315 II 314I

L’Épinette

2

I

Stp. Fermanville

I

MKB Hamburg

I

MKB Ft du Roule II

Hainneville

Stp. Cap Levy

KVU Gruppe Cherbourg See

Stp. Querqueville

Kampfgruppe Müller

3km

I

MKB Bastion II MKB Les Couplets

3 miles

0

I

MKB Molenbatterie

7 X 9 X 4

MKB Landemer

0

I

MKB Seebahnhof

24

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MAP 30: FIRST ALLIED MOVES ON CAEN The focal point of British and Canadian operations in June 1944 was in the Caen sector. Although the city was a D-Day objective for the British 3rd Infantry Division, the original Overlord plans proved to be far too ambitious. The fortified headquarters strongpoint at defense nest WN17, codenamed Hillman, combined with a late-afternoon attack by a Kampfgruppe of 21.Panzer-Division, stalled the British attack. By nightfall on June 6, 1944, the spearhead of the 185th Brigade was stalled about 6 miles north of the center of Caen. The German reaction to the Allied D-Day landings was delayed because of the need to receive Hitler’s permission to commit the theater reserves, Panzergruppe West. This reserve was under the command of General der Panzertruppe Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, and consisted of several Panzer divisions stationed farther inland and away from the beaches. The only Panzer division in the immediate landing area was the 21.Panzer-Division, stationed around Caen. Although local corps commanders had attempted to initiate a prompt counterattack by the unit on D-Day, its commander, Generalmajor Feuchtinger, had hesitated to commit his units without explicit approval from Berlin. As mentioned earlier in the text accompanying Map 24, this attack had been limited to a Kampfgruppe of the 21.Panzer-Division including about 40 tanks and a Panzergrenadier regiment. Although a small number of troops and tanks reached the coast between Juno Beach and Sword Beach, the counterattack was not vigorous enough to stem the British advance. By nightfall, Feuchtinger had ordered his units to withdraw back toward Caen and create a defensive cordon around the city. From the German perspective, the British attack toward Caen was the most serious threat in Normandy. To begin with, initial intelligence reports suggested that the American landings at Omaha Beach had been crushed; reports from Utah Beach were confused. Regardless of the progress in the American sector, the Caen Corridor was worrisome since the terrain in this sector was much more suitable for a mechanized offensive. The areas behind the American beaches were dominated by marshland and bocage hedgerows. The terrain around Caen was open farmland, easily traversable by tanks and armored vehicles. Because of this perceived threat, Hitler approved of the commitment of Panzergruppe West to crush the Allied beachheads. Geyr’s tactical approach was to mass the Panzer divisions for a coordinated blow to push the Allies into the sea. As was so often the case, Hitler approved 74

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this concept but his impatience led to the piecemeal commitment of units as they arrived in the battle zone. The Allies had anticipated the commitment of the Panzer reserve and had taken steps to dilute its impact by ruining the local railroad network, and committing very strong tactical air units to interdict approaching mobile reserves. As a result, German Panzer formations moving toward the beachhead were subjected to punishing attacks. While few tanks were destroyed, fighterbomber attacks disrupted any daytime movement and caused heavy losses to trucks and vehicles of the logistical trains. As a result, there was significant delay in moving the Panzer divisions into the beachhead area. The next German unit to arrive in the Caen sector was the 12.SSPanzer-Division “Hitlerjugend” which arrived in the area west of Caen facing Juno Beach. Much of the fighting on June 7 (D+1) involved skirmishes between the 185th Brigade of the British 3rd Infantry Division and 21.Panzer-Division on the approaches to Caen, and fighting between the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and 12.SSPanzer-Division. The attempt by the Canadian 9th Infantry Brigade to seize the Carpiquet airfield was stymied when struck by an afternoon counterattack of a Kampfgruppe including elements of SS-PanzerRegiment.12 and SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.25. The Canadian 9th Infantry Brigade attempted to regain the village of Buron in the evening, but was unable to do so. The fighting on June 7 established a frontline that would last for several weeks. The 12.SS-Panzer-Division gradually arrived in full strength over the next several days and attempted to push through the Canadians to the sea. Both sides suffered heavy losses in this fighting without any appreciable gains. The Panzer-Lehr-Division was the next major formation to arrive in this sector and faced the 50th Northumbrian Division at the northern end of the Seulles River valley. Much of the fighting in this sector took place on the approaches to the town of Tillysur-Seulles, which controlled the main road heading south to the road junction at Villers-Bocage. As in the case of the fighting closer to Caen, these battles were costly but indecisive, with neither side able to amass enough force to reach its objectives. One of the few gains accomplished in the days after D-Day was a push out of Gold Beach toward Port-enBessin to link up the British and Canadian beaches with the American forces at Omaha Beach to the west.

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l

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MAP 31: VILLERS-BOCAGE – JUNE 12–14, 1944 In the days after D-Day, Montgomery planned an offensive, codenamed Perch, to seize Caen using a pincer movement of Lieutenant-General Gerard Bucknall’s XXX Corps from the west and Lieutenant-General John Crocker’s I Corps from the Orne River lodgment in the east. The offensive was supposed to start on June 10, but was delayed in the I Corps sector because of local German counterattacks. The I Corps attack was very short-lived on account of the counterattacks of the 21.Panzer-Division in the Orne area. In the Bayeux sector to the west, Major-General George Erskine’s 7th Armoured Division arrived on the beaches on June 7 and moved forward. The aim was to pass the division through the 50th Division positions leading to a capture of Tilly-sur-Seulles and an advance down the Seulles River valley to the road junction at Villers-Bocage. On reaching the latter, the 7th Armoured Division would make a sharp turn east, cutting off German defenses around Caen from the rear. The attack towards Tilly-sur-Seulles proved to be very frustrating for XXX Corps. By this time, the Panzer-Lehr-Division had moved into the sector and deployed Panzergrenadier-Regiment.901 in the Tilly-sur-Seulles area, with Panzergrenadier-Regiment.902 immediately to the west. Its tank regiment was held in reserve and its reconnaissance and pioneer battalions were to the southwest covering the western flank of the division from the US V Corps. After two days of fighting, XXX Corps made only a modest dent in the Panzer-LehrDivision defenses. In the meantime, farther to the west, the US 1st Infantry Division had been smashing up the easternmost Kampfgruppe of 352.InfanterieDivision, which it had been fighting since D-Day. On the night of June 10, OB West gave the Kampfgruppe permission to withdraw back to St-Lô. Plans were under way to move the 2.Panzer-Division into this sector to cover the gap, but its movements were slowed by the usual friction of war and Allied air attacks. The 1st Division advanced cautiously because of concern over the vulnerability of its eastern flank facing the Panzer-Lehr-Division. On June 12, the 26th Infantry Regiment (1st Division) resumed its advance through the Caumont Gap, reaching the outskirts of Caumont by the evening of June 12. The US V Corps informed the neighboring British XXX Corps about their advance, and, on the morning of June 12, Major-General Erskine met with British Second Army commander Lieutenant-General Miles Dempsey to discuss the disengagement of the 7th Armoured Division from the Tilly-sur-Seulles stalemate, reorienting the attack along the 76

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inter-army border that was being cleared by the actions of the 26th Infantry Regiment. The movement was spearheaded by Brigadier Robert Hinde’s 22nd Armoured Brigade, which raced to a point about 5 miles west of VillersBocage before dark on June 12. The town of Villers-Bocage was taken unopposed by the 4th County of London Yeomanry and A Company, 1st Battalion, The Rifle Brigade around 0800hrs on June 13. Hinde pushed elements of the force farther east to Point 213, a vital hill overlooking the main road toward Caen. In the meantime, I.SS-Panzer-Korps had dispatched its reserve, two Tiger tank companies from schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung.101, east of the Villers-Bocage area to cover the road from Tilly-sur-Seulles should the British secure a breakthrough in that fighting. German troops alerted the Tiger companies of the sudden appearance of British forces in VillersBocage, and five Tiger tanks, led by tank ace Obersturmführer Michael Wittman, headed southwest alongside the road toward Villers-Bocage. Wittman’s Tigers encountered the lead British column near Point 213, destroyed most of its armoured vehicles, and then proceeded into VillersBocage, destroying most of the vehicles of the regimental headquarters of 4th County of London Yeomanry. British losses in the initial encounter were about 27 tanks and numerous light armored vehicles and lorries. Lacking any infantry to hold the town, Wittman withdrew to the woods outside town and later went back to his company positions to rearm and refuel. In the afternoon, Wittman’s Tigers were reinforced by several tanks of II./Panzer-Lehr-Regiment.130, which took part in renewed attacks on British positions around Villers-Bocage. Wittman tried again to advance through the town, but by this time, British 6-pdr antitank guns were in ambush position, knocking out three Tigers and a PzKpfw IV from Panzer-Lehr-Division. Wittman escaped on foot. By evening, Hinde’s 22nd Armoured Brigade was in a precarious position with elements of the 2.Panzer-Division beginning to appear on their southern flank. Hinde pulled his forward units back a few miles to the village of Tracy-Bocage while waiting for the decisions of higher commands. Bucknall attempted to relieve the 7th Armoured Division by a renewed attack around Tilly-sur-Seulles, rather than reinforcing Hinde’s position and continuing the advance. When this failed to yield results, he ordered the 7th Armoured Division to withdraw on the night of June 14/15. This threw away an opportunity to envelope Caen from the west and was one of the most discouraging and controversial actions of the Normandy campaign.

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Agy

Aure

Subles

St-Leger

Nonant X

X III

26 III

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Positions reached, evening, June 9 Positions reached, evening, June 10 Positions reached, evening, June 12

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Positions reached, evening, June 13 German positions, evening, June 13

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MAP 32: PLANNED PANZER OFFENSIVE JUNE 22, 1944 By the third week of June, II.SS-Panzer-Korps was beginning to arrive in the beachhead area. The commitment of these fresh Panzer divisions was intended to reinforce the Normandy front sufficiently to conduct a longplanned Panzer counteroffensive against the Allied bridgehead. This map shows one of the iterations on these plans from Rommel’s Chef des Generalstabes Heeresgruppe B (Chief of the General Staff, Army Group B) circulated on June 22, though planned for a later date. It should be noted that the German plan did not include Allied units, and these have been added to provide a better sense of likely opponents. Also, the frontline illustrated here shows the status on June 30, roughly the timeframe in which the offensive would have taken place rather than when it was being planned. The Schwerpunkt (focal point) of the attack was along the boundary between the First US Army and the British Second Army, roughly along the Drôme River where the 7th Armoured Division had advanced during its attack on Villers-Bocage. This portion of the attack was to be conducted by II.SS-Panzer-Korps, reinforced with the 2.SS-Panzer-Division “Das Reich,” recently arrived from southern France, and the fresh 2.PanzerDivision. This location was chosen for a variety of reasons. Boundaries between allied field armies can have weaknesses since coordination on either side of the boundary is apt to be awkward. Secondly, the curving motion of the attack towards the west shown on the map was a recognition of the terrain difficulties in this sector, namely the bocage found most heavily to the west of the Drôme River. The difficult conditions in the bocage also led to the addition of the 3.Fallschirmjager-Division to the offensive to conduct an advance out of St-Lô and into the bocage, a mission that would have been impossible for a Panzer division. The second arm of the offensive was to be conducted by I.SS-PanzerKorps against the British Second Army. The main blow was to come from the Panzer-Lehr-Division and 1.SS-Panzer-Division west of the Seulles River, and the 12.SS-Panzer-Division to the east of the Seulles. The map here shows the frontlines after the British Epson offensive with the Odon bridgehead containing the 15th Scottish Division and 43rd Wessex Division; on June 22, this boundary would have been farther to the northwest. The final element of the offensive was a push of the 21.PanzerDivision out of the Caen area with an aim toward overwhelming the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and British 3rd Division on the 78

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approaches to Caen. The prospects for this offensive were questionable even under the most optimistic scenarios. The offensive never took place owing to the friction of war. The Panzer divisions were late in arriving because of Allied air attacks on rail and road communication. Allied pressure on the frontline made it very difficult for Panzergruppe West to keep the Panzer divisions in reserve since the available German infantry divisions were too weak on their own to resist the Allied offensives. Even assuming that these factors miraculously vanished, the German plan was overly optimistic and unrealistic. The main thrust into the First US Army sector did not show an appreciation of the difficulties of operating mechanized units in the bocage. This would become evident three weeks later when PanzerLehr-Division attempted a smaller counteroffensive along the Vire River against the US 30th Division and elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The attack was crushed within hours of being launched, in part owing to terrain difficulties. Aside from the inherent difficulties of operating in hedgerow country, this type of terrain favors the infantry defender. The US Army quickly recognized this issue and did not begin a full-scale commitment of the 2nd and 3rd Armored divisions until late July after the infantry divisions had pushed the First US Army out of the worst of the bocage country. Another and better example of the perils of mechanized attack in bocage was Operation Lüttich, the counteroffensive toward Avranches in August 1944, prematurely stopped at Mortain. Lüttich in fact was the final iteration of these assorted Normandy counteroffensive plans. It had originally been conceived in late July as an attack against the British forces in the Caen sector. However, when Operation Cobra started the breakout from Normandy, Lüttich was reoriented to the west with the aim of dealing with the threat posed by the American advance. It ran out of steam almost immediately owing to the difficulties of conducting mechanized operations in the bocage country, especially without air superiority. Operation Lüttich is described in more detail in the text accompanying Map 46. The June 22 plan ultimately was abandoned when the British Second Army launched operations Martlet and Epsom on June 25, forcing the commitment of most of these divisions to defensive missions, as shown in Map 33.

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N Grandcamp

Pouppeville

Vierville-sur-Mer

St-Laurent-sur-Mer Port-enBessin

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Arromanchesles-Bains

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Pont-Farcy 5 miles

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MAP 33: OPERATION EPSOM – JUNE 25–30, 1944 By the third week of June, the arrival of the British VIII Corps added enough strength for Montgomery’s next offensive against Caen. The initial phase, codenamed Operation Martlet, was a diversionary attack by XXX Corps to seize the high ground around Rauray to shield the main attack. Lieutenant-General Richard O’Connor’s newly arrived VIII Corps would provide the main assault force for the follow-on Operation Epsom, pushing out of the sector held by the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division. The initial attack by the 15th Scottish Division had the mission of reaching the Odon River, followed by the 43rd Wessex Division to consolidate the ground. Once this succeeded, the 11th Armoured Division would pass through and advance on the Orne River, aiming to reach the high ground overlooking the main Caen–Falaise road. These divisions were supported by the 4th Armoured Brigade and 31st Tank Brigade, bringing total tank strength to about 600. The assault would be supported by the artillery from three corps. Operations Martlet/Epsom were intended to be part of a one-two punch by the Allies, with the Americans simultaneously seizing the port of Cherbourg and the British finally seizing Caen. As shown on Map 32, the Germans were in the process of planning their own offensive. To accomplish this, II.SS-Panzer-Korps was on the move into the Caen sector with the 1.SS-Panzer-Division, 9.SSPanzer-Division, and 10.SS-Panzer-Division to reinforce the existing I.SS-Panzer-Korps. Aside from the imminent arrival of II.SS-PanzerKorps, Operation Epsom also faced an enhanced defense line that had been reinforced by the 88mm antiaircraft guns of III.Flak-Korps. The opening phase of Operation Martlet on June 25 was inauspicious. When XXX Corps launched the 49th West Riding Infantry Division toward Rauray, the division ran into elements of Panzer-Lehr-Division to the west and the 12.SS-Panzer-Division to the east. As a result, they were unable to seize the high ground that overlooked the main corridor for the VIII Corps advance. Instead of having a secure right flank, O’Connor’s VIII Corps would have German forces on the neighboring high ground. Operation Epsom began on June 26, 1944 under cloudy skies with an initial barrage by 700 guns of the three British and Canadian corps, supplemented by a substantial naval bombardment. Air support was limited by the weather. The attack by the 15th Scottish Division was two infantry brigades wide with a tank brigade in support, across a sector about 2½ miles wide. The opposing forces consisted mainly of the 12.SS-Panzer-Division. The Scottish infantry fought through 80

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the main line of resistance around Cheux, but failed to reach the Odon River. As the day wore on, I.SS-Panzer-Korps threw in available reserves. The delays prompted O’Connor to commit elements of the 11th Armoured Division in the afternoon before a penetration had been fully secured by the infantry. On the outskirts of Cheux, they were halted by a counterattack of PzKpfw IV tanks of 12.SS-PanzerDivision. Epsom continued on June 27 with the 43rd Wessex Division consolidating the ground behind the Scottish advance, and the 15th Scottish Division attempting to push down the “Scottish Corridor” toward the Odon. A crossing over the river was secured at Tourvillesur-Odon in the afternoon, leading to an armored thrust to Hill 112. XXX Corps also secured Rauray that day. The British advances forced I.SS-Panzer-Korps to push in more reinforcements including elements of the 2.Panzer-Division and a Tiger battalion. Instead of a rapid advance, Epsom was turning into an attritional slogging match. On June 28, the 11th Armoured Division made an attempt to secure Hill 112, but was met by intense fire from German defenses. The 15th Scottish Division continued to enlarge and strengthen the Odon River bridgehead. Late in the day, the weather finally cleared, permitting Allied air support. However, new worries arose when the identity of some German prisoners was discovered including troops of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division. Furthermore, intelligence information made it clear that II.SS-Panzer-Korps’ arrival was imminent. O’Connor decided to halt the southward advance until the Odon bridgehead was secure. The newly arrived II.SS-Panzer-Korps began its counterattacks in force on the afternoon of June 29 with 9.SSPanzer-Division striking the western side of the Scottish Corridor, 10.SS-Panzer-Division in the center near Baron-sur-Odon, and the 1.SS-Panzer-Division on the eastern side of the salient. The battered 12.SS-Panzer-Division was relocated to the quieter Carpiquet sector. By June 30, the tactical initiative had switched to the German side owing to the scale of Panzer reinforcements, newly arrived in the Odon sector. The commitment of these three Panzer divisions had been piecemeal and hasty; their attacks were beaten off by the 15th Scottish Division and 11th Armoured Division with a substantial assist from corps artillery. Epson failed in its tactical mission of encircling Caen, but managed to derail a major German Panzer offensive by forcing Heeresgruppe B prematurely to commit II.SSPanzer-Korps away from its original mission.

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MAP 34: RAILWAY INTERDICTION ON THE NORMANDY FRONT – JUNE 1944 One of the most serious problems facing the Wehrmacht in Normandy was the air superiority enjoyed by the Allied air forces. This was the result of a deliberate campaign to crush the Luftwaffe in the months preceding D-Day to give the Allied tactical air forces freedom to conduct their missions without Luftwaffe interference. The consequence was the destruction of the railways supporting the German forces in Normandy. The primary means to defeat the Luftwaffe was Operation Pointblank initiated in the summer of 1943 as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive. The early phases of Pointblank in late 1943 revealed serious problems in the US Army Air Force (USAAF) plans, notably its excessive faith in “self-defending” heavy bombers to conduct precision daylight bombing missions. Raids against the ball-bearing industry around Schweinfurt in the summer and autumn of 1943 proved unexpectedly costly. The solution was the long-range escort fighter, such as the P-47D Thunderbolt and the P-51B Mustang. By early 1944, the USAAF had accumulated sufficient heavy bombers and escort fighters to initiate the final phase of Pointblank, codenamed Argument. In the final week of February 1944, the Eighth Air Force launched systematic bombing attacks on the German aircraft industry, while at the same time staging a broader campaign against German day-fighters by means of more aggressive fighter tactics. “Big Week” did not defeat the Luftwaffe, but it marked a major turning point in the air campaign. German losses, especially the loss of experienced fighter pilots, was so debilitating that the Luftwaffe never fully recovered. The relentless campaign in the spring of 1944 continued to batter the Luftwaffe fighter force and won daylight air superiority over Germany for the USAAF. From January to June 1944, the Luftwaffe day-fighter force lost 1,712 fighters destroyed, 298 missing and presumed destroyed, and 894 damaged, besides a substantial number of aircraft lost from damage to the aircraft plants. By the time of the Normandy landings, the Luftwaffe fighter force had been decisively defeated and failed to present a significant barrier to Allied operations in Northwest Europe. The effects of the air battles over Germany from January to May 1944 were evident in the skies over Normandy on D-Day. Luftflotte 3 in France had been held back from some of the worst May 1944 air battles in hope of conserving its strength for the expected invasion. Nevertheless, its paltry forces could do nothing in the face of the massive 82

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scope of Allied missions on D-Day, which totaled about 13,700 sorties. The Allies had total air superiority and the Luftwaffe fighter force was almost completely ineffective against this vast armada. The fighter units of Luftflotte 3 on D-Day claimed to have shot down 24 Allied aircraft out of the approximately 130 lost that day to all causes; Luftwaffe fighter losses were 16. The emaciated state of the Luftwaffe fighter force in the West was largely attributable to the Pointblank air battles of the previous several months. It took Luftflotte 3 the remaining three weeks of June to match the number of sorties that the Allies had conducted on D-Day alone, a 20-fold difference in sortie rates. Luftwaffe strength in France increased in June and July as more units were pushed forward from the Reich defense force. However, the Luftwaffe never managed to seriously challenge Allied air supremacy in the summer battles over France. One of the consequences of Operation Argument was that the Allied tactical air forces had almost free rein to strike at Wehrmacht communication links in support of the ground campaign. The most important aspect of this effort was the attack on rail targets, since the bulk of German military equipment and supplies were delivered by rail. These attacks tended to be delivered against rail centers, especially switching yards, which were time-consuming to repair. Map 34 is based on German maps issued every month to show the extent of damage to the railways caused by Allied actions. Since Paris was the major rail hub feeding the Normandy front, bomber attacks in the suburbs around Paris made up a large proportion of the Allied sorties. By the end of June 1944, OB West’s logistics network was on the verge of failure. Allied air strikes had caused the loss of 10,050 tons of munitions, 1.6 million gal. of fuel and lubricants, and trucks with the capacity for hauling 3,400 tons. By the end of June, units in OB West were suffering from a daily deficit of 220,000 gal. of fuel. The units had a daily requirement of 14,000 tons of truck capacity but had only about 5,000 tons. The French rail network was on the verge of collapse and on June 24 and 25, Allied air attacks shut down the last rail lines between France and Germany. By the end of the month, OB West could transport only about 400 tons out of the daily minimum requirements for 2,250 tons of supplies (1,000 tons of munitions; 1,000 tons of fuel; 250 tons of rations).

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NETHERLANDS

N

Sabotage Bombing attacks

0

Antwerp

50 miles

0

50km

BELGIUM Brussels Boulogne

Namur

English Channel Abbeville Dieppe

Amiens

LUX. Rouen

Caen St-Lô

Paris Nancy Alençon Chartres

FRANCE

Troyes Sens

Le Mans Orléans

Angers

Langres

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MAP 35: OPERATION CHARNWOOD AND THE CAPTURE OF CAEN After attempting to outflank Caen from the west, south, and east, Montgomery now decided to take a more direct approach, with the British Second Army assaulting the city in a display of brute force and overwhelming air power. Under the Operation Charnwood plan, British I Corps was once again given the opportunity of fulfilling its D-Day objective of seizing Caen and the bridges over the Orne River. With 115,000 men from three infantry divisions, supported by a range of other formations, Lieutenant-General Crocker’s corps was to attack straight down the roads from the north and smash its way through to the city center and its bridges. Prior to their advance, an immense air raid by the heavy bombers of RAF Bomber Command would pulverize the enemy in front of the attacking troops. Since D-Day, the Germans had been fortifying the area to the north of Caen. Antitank ditches and weapons pits had been strengthened by the addition of minefields and other obstacles. A defensive belt 1½–2½ miles deep had been constructed, with virtually every infantry position below ground. The ring of villages from Lébisey near the Orne Canal round to Franqueville near Carpiquet had been turned into tankproof strongholds, able to support each other with interlocking fields of fire. Dug-in tanks, assault guns and multibarreled rocket launchers were emplaced to support the infantry. Behind this defensive belt, more artillery and mortar positions covered the ground over which the British were to attack. The battle began on the late afternoon of July 7 when the Allied fleet began pounding all known German strongpoints with gunfire. The Lancaster and Halifax heavy bombers from RAF Bomber Command struck next, carpet-bombing the northern Caen suburb for an hour. This was followed by RAF tactical strike aircraft suppressing logistics and troop movement. An hour before midnight, the two nearest corps began more than five hours of artillery bombardment, ceasing around 0420hrs. The ground attack began around 0430hrs on July 8 with a push by the British 3rd and 59th divisions, followed by the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division around 0730hrs. Although the artillery had lifted along the forward edge of battle, Allied air attacks resumed with the RAF Second Tactical Air Force dispatching fighter-bombers and rocketfiring Typhoons, along with medium bombers of the US Ninth Air Force. The Canadians pushed into Buron and beyond, but the 59th 84

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Division managed a penetration only about a mile deep owing to the tenacity of the numerous German reinforced strongpoints. Nevertheless, the attritional struggle of the past month had severely weakened the German formations defending Caen. Late on July 8, Rommel instructed the three corps in the Caen sector to withdraw their heavy weapons to new defense lines after dark. The British and Canadian attack advanced into the city on July 9. By this stage, the city was in ruins and the rubble and debris slowed the progress of the Allied infantry. By the end of the day, the city north of the Orne River was in the hands of British and Canadian troops, though the Germans still held the southern sector. Casualties in the fighting had been high on both sides, and for civilians too. Nevertheless, the capture of the city was more a symbolic triumph than a complete military success since the Germans still controlled the road network southward out of the city. This would take another offensive to secure. The capture of Caen on July 8–9 marked a subtle but important shift in Allied operational goals. Prior to D-Day, Eisenhower was clearly under the impression that Montgomery intended the Caen sector to be the main axis for the Allied advance out of Normandy to the Seine and Paris. The Wehrmacht’s substantial reinforcement of the Caen sector brought this goal into question. By the middle of June, the British and Canadian forces around Caen were facing four German Panzer divisions, with a combined strength of more than 675 German tanks and armored fighting vehicles (AFVs) on a front only 20 miles wide. By way of comparison, the Wehrmacht’s Heeresgruppe Mitte (Army Group Center), the target of the Red Army’s Operation Bagration offensive in late June 1944, had about 500 tanks and AFVs on a sector about 250 miles wide. In other words, Montgomery’s forces were facing an opponent with an armored density about 15 times greater than during Bagration. Even Heeresgruppe Nordukraine, the most heavily defended sector of the Russian Front in June 1944, had a German armor density that was less than six times as dense as the German Panzer force facing the British in late June 1944. The addition of II.SS-PanzerKorps increased the German panzer density in the Caen sector. By early July, Montgomery had accepted the fact that the British–Canadian forces around Caen might not instigate the Allied breakthrough from Normandy owing to the strength of German defenses. The breakout mission would fall to Bradley’s neighboring First US Army.

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Front line, July 7 Front line, July 10 Area of carpet bombing carried out by heavy bombers

0

Colombysur-Thaon

Thaon

XXX

Le FresneCamilly

I

Mu

N

Anguerny Périers-surle-Dan

Cazelle

e

1 mile

0

1km Thu

Ch

e

i

m rom

Anisy

e

Villons-lesBuissons

XX

Cairon

Beuville

59

Secquevilleen-Bessin

3 Can

XX

Le Landel

Cambesen-Plaine

Les Buissons

Biéville

XX

3

Blainvillesur-Orne

La Bijude

Galmanche

Épron Buron Putot-enBessin

Brettevillel’Orgueilleuse

Gruchy St-Contest Rots

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Orn

Hérouville

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Lébisey ana nC

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l

Franqueville

Colombelles

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Carpiquet St-ManvieuNorrey XX

Airfield

Cheux

XX

Caen

XXX

16 Fd(L)

Hangars

XXX XX

Odo

Verson

XXX FontaineÉtoupefour

Tourville-sur-Odon

n

10.SS

12.SS

Louvigny

Mouen Colleville

XX

II.SS XX Éterville

XXX

43

Grainvillesur-Odon

Mondeville

Brettevillesur-Odon

VIII Le Haut du Bosq

XX

1.SS

(-) Fleurysur-Orne

21

(-)

XXX

I.SS

Faubourg de Vaucelles

XXX

XLVII

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MAP 36: THE BATTLE OF THE HEDGEROWS BEGINS – JULY 3–11, 1944 By the end of June 1944, Bradley’s First US Army had secured the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg. The next operational goal was to slog through the marshes and hedgerows of the bocage country to the higher and drier ground south of the Coutances–St-Lô highway. Once this area was reached, Bradley’s force would be expanded by the addition of Patton’s Third US Army, which would turn westward into Brittany while First US Army covered the southern flank of Montgomery’s advance to the Seine. Bradley planned to push through the bocage country in a series of sequential offensives by each of his four corps, starting with Major-General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps in the west. Bradley expected this attack to proceed relatively briskly, since it seemed that the German defenses were mostly the remnants of the divisions smashed up in fighting on this front earlier in June. These plans underestimated the difficulties of conducting attacks in the bocage. The terrain was ideal for defense since the hedgerows created a natural pattern of inverted trenches. Each small field was bounded by hedgerows that the Germans converted into fortified positions. To make matters worse, the Germans had deliberately flooded many areas to make them unsuitable for airborne landing, and this situation was exacerbated by the unusually wet weather in June 1944. This created large areas of impassible marshland. Middleton’s VIII Corps began the attack after dawn on July 3, 1944. The advance proved exceptionally slow and costly on both sides, and VIII Corps did not manage to capture the town of La Haye-duPuits until July 9. When the corps reached the Ay River on July 14, it had penetrated barely 12,000 yards after 12 days of fighting, far short of its objectives. While not immediately apparent at the time, the attritional battles had forced SS-General Paul Hausser’s 7.Armee to commit its reserves prematurely, significantly weakening its responses to further American attacks over the next few weeks. Major-General Collins’ VII Corps began its attack a day after, on July 4 along the swollen Taute River. The fighting in this sector lasted until July 16 at a cost of 4,800 casualties. As in the case of Middleton’s 86

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VIII Corps, the most consequential effect was the steady attrition of German forces in the area, forcing the transfer of additional divisions out of Brittany and elsewhere in France. From the German perspective, the most worrisome American attack was in the center by Major-General Corlett’s XIX Corps along the Vire and Taute Canal toward the key road junction at St-Lô. The attack on July 7 managed to push forces over the canal on the first day, in no small measure owing to the fact that the attacks on the preceding days had consumed most of the limited reserves of the German 7.Armee. Rommel warned his subordinate commanders, including Hausser of the 7.Armee, that an American breakthrough in this sector would trap the several divisions to the west. The threat was serious enough that for the first time, one of the Panzer divisions from the Caen sector, the Panzer-Lehr-Division, was shifted against the Americans. In addition, the 2.SS-Panzer-Division “Das Reich,” arriving in Normandy from southern France, was directed to the American sector instead of reinforcing the Caen sector. The Panzer-Lehr-Division was directed to counterattack the American bridgehead over the Vire River on July 9. Owing to the difficulties of moving quickly in the face of overwhelming Allied air power, the Panzer-Lehr-Division counterattack did not begin until July 11, by which time it faced both the 9th and 30th Infantry divisions as well as lead elements of the 3rd Armored Division. The German counterattack was a costly failure. The success of Corlett’s XIX Corps attack shifted the focus of the Battle of the Hedgerows to the center. The heavy attrition of German units in this sector forced Hausser to commit his paltry resources to prevent a breakthrough. The Panzer-Lehr-Division remained fixed in place along with the 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division. When the poorly trained 5.Fallshirmjäger-Division arrived, it too was pushed into the St-Lô sector in a futile attempt to resist the growing American incursions.

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Me

St-Jacquesde-Néhou

rd

N er

et

St-Sauveurle-Vicomte

St-Jores

XX

Isigny

Carentan

90

Aure

XX

8

15

XX

77

Prairies Marécageuses de Gorges

(-) XX

353 4.SS

XX

4

III

nd l e a na Vir te Ca Tau

XX

XX

83

2

XX

3

XX

Lessay

9

XX

17.SS XX

2.SS

(-)

Ta

ute

St-Jeande-Daye

III

38.SS

XX

17

Périers

30 XX

III

901

35

Pz. Lehr Pont-

XIX XXX V

III

KG König

Formigny

Baupte

XX

La Hayedu-Puits

Grandcamp

V XX II XIXX

Marais de Ste-Anne

79

I VII X XX II V

Douve

Hébert

III

XX

902

Pz. Lehr

Balleroy

XX

29

2

III

KG

275

XX

352

Hill 192

Marigny

St-Lô

Vir e

Forward positions, July 2 Forward positions, July 6 Forward positions, July 11

0 0

Coutances

5 miles 5km

Torignisur-Vire

Drôme

XX

3

St-Gilles

87

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MAP 37: GERMAN HEDGEROW DEFENSES JULY 1944 This map is an example of typical German defense configurations in the hedgerow fighting. This area, between the village of La Meauffe and St-Lô, was held by roughly a battalion of troops from Kampgruppe Kentner. This was a combat formation based on GrenadierRegiment.897 of the 266.Infanterie-Division that was detached to the 352.Infanterie-Division in mid-June 1944. This sector was called the “La Mare–Le Carillon Nose” position by the attacking American 35th Division since it formed a distinctive salient. The 2nd Battalion, 137th Infantry Regiment pushed into the defenses on July 13 and 14, but the position was not finally cleared out until it was outflanked to the southeast. The hedgerow country is called bocage in France. Bocage is a type of terrain found most commonly in the western area of Lower Normandy consisting of pastures boxed in by hedgerows. It was most widespread in the departments of Manche and Calvados west of the Orne River to the Cotentin Peninsula, and so largely in the battle zone of the First US Army and German 7.Armee. The terrain east of the Orne gradually shifted to open pastureland and rolling hills where the British Second Army engaged Panzergruppe West. An American officer described the hedgerows: “These hard earthen banks, with their matted head-dress of stumpy trees and hedges, have been standing for centuries, as boundaries between tracts of land parceled out in the days of feudalism. As time went on, the land had been sub-divided in order to give each son a plot which he could call his own, until now the fields and orchards bordered by these hedgerows are so small that further sub-division would render most of them useless for any form of farming or grazing. These hedgerows are fifty to one hundred yards apart, on the average, and made very formidable barriers to our advance, for the earthen portions range from three to eight feet in height and anywhere from three to ten feet in thickness at the base. From the tops of these banks grow the trees and hedges, thickened by the indiscriminate pruning carried on by the Norman farmers, who use them as a principal source of fire kindling wood.” From a military perspective, the hedgerows created a network of inverted trenches, forming a natural, layered fortification system that 88

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was well suited to defense. The earthen base of the hedgerow shielded the defender from enemy fire and was thick enough to protect against small-arms and machine-gun fire. The vegetation on top of the hedgerow provided concealment for the defenders and restricted the observation of the attacking force. Bocage complicated the use of field artillery since the vegetation could prematurely detonate the artillery rounds in the trees above before their intended impact against enemy positions. In addition, the hedgerows provided a solid basis for foxholes to shield against mortar and artillery fire. The bocage severely constrained maneuver by the infantry, and even more so for vehicles. Many hedgerows were too tall to be surmounted by tanks, and even the lower hedgerows created problems, since a tank climbing over the earth wall exposed its weakly protected underside to enemy antitank weapons. The road network in the bocage was poor since this region made little use of motorized farming techniques. Aside from a limited number of regional roads between the major towns, the individual hedgerows were connected by small openings and footpaths with the occasional cart path or small unpaved road. The bocage country was well suited to German defensive doctrine. The outer layer of the German defenses was a thinly manned outpost line. This served to identify the approach of American units and the tenacious defense of an outpost line by a small number of troops was often able to stop the advance of a much larger force. Furthermore, it served to tie down the attacking force, fixing it in place for mortar and artillery bombardment. In the event that the outpost line was captured, one or more additional defense lines were behind it to provide resilience. This type of defense was not entirely dissimilar to World War I trench warfare. However, there were some significant differences. The German commanders called this fighting Buschkrieg, bush warfare. Static defense was not sufficient since the defense lines could be gradually worn down by infantry attack and artillery fire. German commanders placed considerable stress on the individual initiative of small-unit commanders. Once the attacking force was halted by machine-gun and mortar fire at the outpost line, small combat teams would maneuver on foot to disrupt the attack further by strikes against their flank or rear.

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III

137

La Petite Ferme

Le Craillon

La Mare

III

KG Kentner

352

Machine gun Mortar Antitank gun Bakooka Mine field Dugout Rifle pit

N La Raoulerie

Roadblock

0 0

200 yds 200m

89

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MAP 38: THE BATTLE FOR ST-LÔ – JULY 14–20, 1944 By the middle of July 1944, Bradley was convinced that Hausser’s 7.Armee was vulnerable to a breakthrough. The cost of the bocage fighting in the first two weeks of July had been high on both sides, but Berlin had remained fixated on the threat in the Caen sector. Some German reinforcements had been fed into the St-Lô sector, but not enough to compensate for the arrival of Patton’s Third US Army. Bradley proposed a breakout plan, codenamed Operation Cobra. The prerequisite for the plan was the capture of the crossroad town of St-Lô. The town itself was not essential, but it was part of a broader effort for the First US Army to emerge out of the swamps and hedgerows of Normandy’s bocage country and into the high ground and more open countryside south of St-Lô. The final attacks toward St-Lô began on July 15, 1944. The US forces were reorganized prior to the attack with Collins’ VII Corps taking over the fighting on the west side of the Vire River and Corlett’s XIX Corps responsible for the capture of St-Lô itself. The mission of Collins’ VII Corps was to reach the highway to St-Lô, which was intended to be the start point for the Cobra offensive. The 9th and 30th Infantry divisions were the principal elements of this assault. They were opposed by the Panzer-Lehr-Division. By this stage, the division’s two Panzergrenadier regiments had been bled white by the summer’s fighting and they had to be reinforced by regiments of the inexperienced and poorly trained 5. Fallshirmjäger-Division. By July 20, Collins’ VII Corps was on the edge of the highway and Panzer-Lehr-Division was on the verge of exhaustion. Corlett’s XIX Corps pushed forward toward St-Lô with the 29th and 35th Infantry divisions. The main opposition on the approaches to the city comprised the 352.Infanterie-Division, which had been stationed on Omaha Beach on D-Day. Berlin had made two attempts to pull the division out of Normandy for rebuilding. However, the desperate shortage of infantry divisions had forced Rommel to keep it in place. Its remaining infantry strength was less than a regiment, with its other two regiments coming from a hodgepodge of other battered units. To the east of the city, the elite 3.Fallshirmjäger-Division had earned the reputation of being the most effective German unit in this sector; but by the third 90

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week of July, one of its regiments was essentially destroyed, and its two remaining regiments were barely capable of maintaining their existing positions. By the afternoon of July 17, the remnants of the 352.InfanterieDivision were on the verge of being trapped against the Vire River, with only one bridge remaining. That evening, the division was authorized to begin withdrawing over the Vire River to avoid catastrophe. The 29th Infantry Division had organized a mobile task force to push into the city, and began advancing into St-Lô on the afternoon of July 18. The 7.Armee had finally received reinforcements that day in the form of the 275.Infanterie-Division from Brittany. Hausser was in a quandary whether to commit it to reinforce the shaky Panzer-Lehr-Division or the 352.Infanterie-Division. In the event, he kept it as one of his few reserves except for one battalion which staged a hopeless counterattack toward St-Lô on July 19. The Battle of the Hedgerows had been enormously costly to both sides. However, attritional battles of this sort favored the American side, which had an ample supply of reinforcements compared to the German side, which did not. Berlin was still deceived by the Allied Fortitude plan and Patton’s phantom “First US Army Group,” which they feared might stage a second D-Day landing in Brittany or the Pas-de-Calais. As a result, Berlin would not authorize any further transfers from these sectors to Normandy. Hausser’s 7.Armee in the St-Lô sector had been crippled by the bocage fighting, with few prospects for reinforcements. Furthermore, the fighting had prompted Hausser to push two of his three mechanized formations, Panzer-Lehr-Division and 17.SS-Panzergrendier Division, into the frontlines rather than keep them as mobile reserve for counterattacks. Instead, he had two infantry divisions in reserve, which did not have enough mobility to be effective in this role. The new theater commander, Generalfeldmarschall Hans Günther von Kluge, had reproached Hausser over this issue, but was himself so fixated on the British threat near Caen that he failed to insist that Hausser rectify this mistake. The price would be paid a week later when Operation Cobra struck.

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Airel

Tribehou

Front line, July 14 Front line, July 20

St-Fromond 0

Bois du Hommet

0

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Les Champsde-Losque

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HautsVents

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PontHébert

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St-Lô

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MAP 39: OPERATION GOODWOOD – JULY 18, 1944 Although Montgomery had finally succeeded in gaining control of most of Caen by mid-July 1944, the city was not an ideal jump-off point for a further advance beyond Caen, especially for an armored attack, since the Germans still controlled the southern portion of the city. Instead, the main focal point of the attack would be from the area east of the Orne secured on D-Day by the airborne landings. This was not without its problems, since it meant transferring three armored divisions across the river and the Orne Canal. In view of the heavy losses of British and Canadian infantry in the previous five weeks of fighting, Montgomery decided to use novel tactics for the breakthrough. Instead of using infantry to penetrate the initial German defenses, massive carpetbombing attacks would be substituted. Three armored divisions would then pass through the shattered defenses directly to the exploitation phase. Operation Goodwood was planned to coincide with the American attacks in the St-Lô sector, making it impossible for Berlin to shift resources from a quiet to an active sector. Furthermore, both XII and XXX Corps staged attacks on July 15 in the western part of the British sector, effectively tying down II.SS-Panzer-Korps. The preparatory stage for Operation Goodwood began on the evening of July 17 with the initial movements across the Orne River and the Orne Canal. The Bomber Command attacks began shortly after dawn on July 18 against five distinct target sets, held mainly by the 16.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division. Each of the major target areas received 2,500 tons of bombs. The area in the center of the attack zone was struck at 0700hrs by medium bombers of the US Ninth Air Force. As if this was not enough, naval gunfire was used to conduct counterbattery fire against known German positions, and US heavy bombers of the Eighth Air Force attacked targets farther to the south. One of the immediate goals of the offensive was to finally secure the southern half of Caen over the Orne River, and the city was enveloped by the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division from the west and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division from the east. The spearhead of the Goodwood attack was the 11th Armoured Division, which made good progress in the opening hours against the demoralized and shattered German defenses. The 7th Armoured Division headed forward to the prime tactical objective of the Bourguébus Ridge; the Guards Armoured Division formed the follow-on force, but neither division kept pace with the spearhead. The British 3rd Infantry Division formed the 92

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eastern wing of the initial attack. Not all of the intended targets had been bombed accurately, and the German defense of several of the towns remained strong through the evening hours. If the open countryside provided good motoring for the armored divisions, it also provided clear fields of fire for the German defenders. Elements of the 21.Panzer-Division counterattacked the 11th Armoured Division around Cagny, and the improvised self-propelled guns of Panzerjäger-Abteilung.200 played an important and underappreciated role in weakening the British tank attack. Tiger tanks of schwere PanzerAbteilung.503 intervened in the early afternoon. The 1.SS-PanzerDivision began its counterattacks in the afternoon around Bourguébus. By the end of the day, the British units had lost about 200 tanks and penetrated the German defense lines to a depth of about 3 miles, far less than anticipated. The fighting resumed on July 19 with the two Canadian divisions making progress in the envelopment of the southern side of Caen. The main tank thrusts toward the Caen–Falaise highway ran into increasing German resistance, especially on the approaches to the Bourguébus Ridge. Panzergruppe West was determined to prevent a breakthrough. The 12.SS-Panzer-Division, decimated in previous fighting and heading away from Caen for refitting, was ordered to turn around and return to the fight. II.SS-Panzer-Korps to the west was instructed to prepare battle groups to intervene in the Caen sector if needed. British tank casualties by the end of July 19 were alarmingly high. By July 20, Operation Goodwood had stalled far short of its objectives. Rainy weather on July 20 restricted Allied air power, and further attacks were called off. Total British tank losses were around 275 with more than 100 other tanks damaged in combat, while the Germans lost about 100 tanks and tank destroyers. Although the whole of Caen had finally been cleared, Goodwood failed to secure the high ground on the Caen–Falaise highway. The offensive had penetrated about 6 miles deep and captured 32 square miles of territory. One of the most significant operational outcomes of Goodwood was that it cemented the attention of the German theater commander, Hans von Kluge, on the Caen sector and distracted him from the weaknesses in the St-Lô sector. The consequences would become evident less than a week later when Operation Cobra finally resulted in an Allied breakout from the Normandy bridgehead.

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Front line, July 18 Area of carpet bombing carried out by heavy bombers

Courseullessur-Mer

Area of carpet bombing carried out by medium bombers

St-Aubinsur-Mer Langrunesur-Mer

Bernièressur-Mer

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La Brèche

Cabourg

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Riva-Bella

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ne

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Giberville Airfield

Sannerville

3 Can

Faubourg de Vaucelles Odo

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XX Manneville

n

XX

Cagny Grentheville HubertFolie

XX

11

Hill 112

Émiéville

Soliers

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Bourguébus

Feuguerolles

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XLVII

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272

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21 XX

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ce

1.SS La

St-Aignande-Cramesnil

ize

XXX

XXX

I.SS

93

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 93

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MAP 40: STRATEGIC SITUATION IN NORMANDY JULY 2–24, 1944 The strategic situation in Lower Normandy in the third week of July 1944 found the Allies far short of their Operation Overlord objectives. On the other hand, the six weeks of fighting since D-Day left the German defenses in a very precarious situation. Several developments outside of Normandy had a profound impact on the forthcoming battle. On July 5, Von Rundstedt was ousted from command of OB West and replaced by Hans Günther von Kluge. On July 20, a plot to assassinate Hitler at the Wolf’s Lair headquarters failed, but the Führer was seriously injured. The plotters were mainly from the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army), but many officers in France, including Rommel and von Kluge, were aware of the plot. Both Rommel and von Kluge would commit suicide in connection with the plot. Hitler’s military judgment became increasingly rigid and uncompromising, and he gave his field commanders little latitude in conducting the summer campaigns. In the east, the Red Army had launched its Operation Bagration offensive on June 22, 1944. By the end of July, Heeresgruppe Mitte had been overrun and the Red Army was nearing Poland. The massive losses on the Russian Front and the initiation of further Soviet offensives along the Balkan axis severely restricted the availability of reinforcements to Normandy. Berlin’s assessment of the Allied threat in Normandy focused on the relentless British attacks in the Caen sector. This was reflected in the commitment of Heeresgruppe B’s best resources, the Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. Of the 11 German mechanized divisions in France, seven were in the Caen sector, three in the St-Lô sector, and one remained in southern France. Of the mechanized divisions committed to Normandy, only one division in the St-Lô sector, the 2.SS-PanzerDivision “Das Reich,” was near full strength, while four of the divisions facing Caen were reasonably fresh. Allied armored strength in the St-Lô sector had substantially increased in July with four US armored divisions ready for action; more were arriving. This was not immediately apparent to Berlin since the bocage country did not favor the employment of massed armor. There had been minimal use of the US armored divisions in the six weeks since D-Day, and most tank use was confined to the separate tank battalions used to support the infantry divisions. The threat of an American armored breakout remained more theoretical than real in the minds of German planners, completely overshadowed by the very 94

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extensive use of British armored divisions in the July fighting. Aside from a mistaken appreciation of the Allied threat in Normandy, Hitler was continuing to insist on another Panzer offensive, scheduled to strike the Caen sector on August 1. To free up the Panzer divisions, Hitler instructed that they be pulled out of the frontlines and their places taken by infantry divisions. This decision drained the modest pool of infantry available to von Kluge and Heeresgruppe B, and left the St-Lô sector defended by weak and exhausted units. The 7.Armee sector facing the First US Army was ripe for a breakthrough. As mentioned earlier, Hausser had been forced to plug gaps in the line using his three Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. By the time that St-Lô fell on July 18–19, the only reserves were two understrength infantry divisions. In the interlude between the fall of StLô and the start of Operation Cobra, Hausser might have pulled the Panzer divisions out of the frontline and substituted the infantry divisions in hope of creating a more mobile reserve. In spite of von Kluge’s instructions, he failed to do so. The slow pace of the American advance through the bocage country in July may have lulled Hausser into the belief that future actions in this sector would be equally sluggish. If so, he seriously misjudged the changing nature of the terrain. The terrain south of the Coutances–St-Lô highway still had some areas confined by hedgerows. But the elevation of the terrain farther south from the coast marked the end of the extensive coastal marshlands. As a result, the area was much more trafficable for armored columns. Aside from the terrain changes, the Battle of the Hedgerows in the first three weeks of July had left 7.Armee a hollow shell. German casualties in France in July had been about 81,000 but only about 10,000 replacements had arrived. LXXXIV.Armee-Korps in the Operation Cobra attack zone had only one unit, the new 275.Infanterie-Division, rated as strong enough for offensive operations. The rest of the divisions were rated as only suitable for defense, or limited suitability for defense. For example, the Panzer-Lehr-Division, in the immediate path of Operation Cobra, had six Panzergrenadier battalions, of which three were rated as weak, two as exhausted, and one which was merely the cadre of a replacement battalion. Its total tank strength was only 12 PzKpfw IVs and 16 Panther tanks; its large fleet of armored halftracks were parked 25 miles to the south since they were useless in bocage fighting.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 95

N

Allied front line, July 2 Allied front line, July 24 Bocage

0

Fermanville

Cherbourg

Barfleur

10 miles

0

10km

St-Vaast-la-Hougue

Valognes

Quinéville Montebourg

Me

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Les Dunesde-Varreville Ste-MèreÉglise

St-Sauveurle-Vicomte

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XX

346

2 Can XX

10.SS

XX

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272

Odon

XXXX

XX

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Bourguébus

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21

12.SS XX

Amayésur-Orne

Troarn

XX

XX

Pz Gp West

3

51

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XX

XX XX

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X XX

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277 XXX

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XXX

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XX

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XXXX

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XX

St-ManvieuNorrey

XX

15

II

Coutances

50

XX

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Tilly-sur- 59 Seulles

XX

5

XX

352

Balleroy

XX

Bérigny XX

XX

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XX

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91

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83 XX

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XX

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St-Lôd’Ourville

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Portbail

Vierville-sur-Mer

6

LXXXVI

95

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MAP 41: THE OPERATION COBRA PLAN In late June 1944, Eisenhower’s SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) had developed a plan called Lucky Strike to provide an option for an offensive operation in the event of a sudden German collapse. Intelligence was beginning to suggest that the Wehrmacht was running out of reserves and would soon become exhausted. The commander of First US Army, Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley, developed a variant of this plan around July 8 specifically aimed at a breakthrough operation in the St-Lô sector. Bradley felt that the German 7.Armee was becoming weak through the attritional struggles in the hedgerows, and that once better terrain was reached south of the Coutances–St-Lô highway, the First US Army could finally employ its accumulating armored strength. Eisenhower approved the plan and it was formally presented to the senior commanders of First US Army on July 12. The principal role in the breakthrough was handed over to Major-General Lawton “Lightning Joe” Collins and his VII Corps. Collins was one of two Pacific theater veterans (the other being XIX Corps commander Major-General Charles Corlett) brought to the European Theater of Operations (ETO) by Eisenhower to add seasoned veterans to the Normandy campaign. Collins had earlier been involved in the Guadalcanal campaign in the southwest Pacific. More importantly, Collins had proven himself an able corps commander in the first major Allied victory in Normandy, the capture of Cherbourg at the end of June 1944. Bradley had taken note of Montgomery’s use of heavy bombers to blast a hole through German defenses, first with Operation Charnwood on July 7. Operation Cobra planned a similar “bomb carpet” against the forward Panzer-Lehr-Division defenses on the St-Lô–Coutances highway. This became one of the controversial aspects of the operation. General Carl Spaatz, commander of US strategic bombers in the ETO, was becoming frustrated by the continual diversion of the Eighth Air Force from the Combined Bomber Offensive into what he viewed as secondary missions such as the support of ground forces in Normandy and the Operation Crossbow counter-V-weapon campaign. He felt that these missions were better performed by the medium bombers of the Ninth Air Force. In the event, he was overruled by Eisenhower. Besides this controversy, there was also some dispute over the tactics of the 96

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bombing mission. The Air Force commanders wanted to stage the bombing runs perpendicular to the St-Lô–Coutances highway since this would minimize their exposure to German Flak defenses. However, Army commanders were concerned that such an approach would increase the chances of fratricide by the shortfall of bombs, and wanted the Air Force to stage the mission in parallel to the St-Lô–Coutance highway. Bradley thought that the Air Force had conceded the point, which they had not, and this misunderstanding would have tragic consequences. In contrast to Montgomery’s tactics during Operation Goodwood, Bradley’s Cobra plan intended to use the infantry divisions to secure the initial breakthrough and not to depend solely on the bombardment to accomplish this mission. Two armored divisions, the 2nd and 3rd, were ready to begin the exploitation phase once the German defenses were thoroughly penetrated. The infantry divisions were then assigned the mission of securing the shoulders of the penetration zone to prevent German units from intervening from the eastern or western flanks. Operation Cobra contained a deeper exploitation phase, assuming that the original mission succeeded. During July, Patton’s Third US Army had gradually been brought over from the UK, including two fresh armored divisions, the 4th and 6th. Some of these units were temporarily assigned to the First US Army for the opening phase of Cobra. However, once Cobra penetrated deeply enough, the intention was to field Patton’s force. At this point, Patton’s Third US Army would turn westward into Brittany to secure the ports of Quiberon Bay and Brest. The First US Army would then turn eastward to serve as the flank of Mongomery’s breakout from the Caen–Falaise sector. Bradley’s original plan was to initiate Operation Cobra on July 18, roughly in parallel with Montgomery’s Operation Goodwood. In the event, this proved impossible since the plan required the capture of the key crossroads town of St-Lô. Although US troops entered St-Lô on this date, it was not firmly in US hands for another day. The final field orders were issued on July 20 with plans to start the offensive on July 24. The start of the offensive depended largely on the weather, since the Eighth Air Force required clear conditions to conduct the preliminary bombing mission.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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Sainteny Lessay

S

s éve

St-Jean-de-Daye

Tribehou XXX

Périers

VII

XXX

XIX

e XXX

t Tau

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La Varde

VIII

Marchésieux

XX

30

XX

4

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XX

9

XX X

XX

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XX

Hébécrevon

Ob j

9

XX

St-Lô

30

St-Gilles Monthuchon

Marigny

XX

XX

1

4

XX

e

XX

Coutances

Vir

Canisy

Carantilly

3 CCB

30

Condésur-Vire

St-Samsonde-Bonfossé XX

Soulle

Le MesnilHerman

X

X

XX

2

XX

3

Hyenville

Moyon 2 CCB

Notre-Damede-Cenilly

La Denisière

Quettrevillesur-Sienne Tessysur-Vire

Villebaudon Hambye

Lengronne

St-Denis-le-Gast Pont-Farcy

Cérences

Percy Gavray

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Montbray

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Armored objectives Infantry objectives Area to be carpet bombed by American Air Force Front line, evening, July 20 Bridge sites to be bombed

0 0

Villedieules-Poêles

St-SeverCalvados

5 miles 5km

Fontenermont

Forêt de Sever

97

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 97

11/01/2018 13:44:50

MAP 42: OPERATION COBRA BREAKTHROUGH JULY 25–30, 1944 Operation Cobra was scheduled to begin at 1300hrs on July 24 with the preliminary bomber attack. Owing to thick ground fog in the target area, the attack was canceled in the late morning. However, some aircraft had not received the abort message and about 335 bombers dropped 685 tons of bombs. Some bombs fell north of the intended bomb zone, causing 156 casualties in the 30th Division. The PanzerLehr-Division suffered about 350 casualties and lost ten armored vehicles. Combined with some skirmishing, the divisional commander, General Fritz Bayerlein, believed his forces had defeated an American attack. However, he pulled his forward defense lines back across the St-Lô–Coutances highway, inadvertently placing them directly in the bomb zone for the next day’s attack. After a week of delays, Operation Cobra began on the morning of July 25 with strafing attacks by P-47 fighter-bombers. They were followed by 1,495 B-17 and B-24 bombers dropping 3,370 tons of bombs in an area 7,000 yards long and 2,500 yards wide. They were followed by 380 B-26 medium bombers, bringing the total to 4,700 tons of bombs. Of the 3,600 combat troops in the Panzer-LehrDivision, about a thousand were killed outright and an equal or greater number deafened and dazed. Shortfalls struck American lines causing 590 casualties. Among these was Lieutenant-General Lesley McNair, architect of the US Army of World War II, head of Army Ground Forces, and the highest-ranking US Army officer killed during the war. As the dust cleared, the US infantry divisions began their advance. The bomb zone was a mixed blessing. Although it blasted the German defenses, the area was so shattered that it hindered advances in some sectors. The first day’s advance was disappointing. Instead of the anticipated penetration of 3 miles, the attack pushed in only about a mile. Collins was in a quandary. Doctrine said that the armored divisions should not be unleashed on the exploitation mission until the infantry had won a clean breakthrough. But Collins had fought the Germans long enough to know that the German Army reflexively launched counterattacks against enemy penetrations. There had been no significant German counterattacks on July 25, leading Collins to believe that VII Corps was facing a beaten enemy. Against doctrine, he decided to launch the 2nd and 3rd Armored divisions on July 26. The armored assault included several innovations. Owing to the 98

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churned-up terrain, Collins believed that the armored infantry battalions could not keep up with the tanks in their halftracks. As a result, the assault waves had the infantry ride the tanks “Russian style.” Tanks were fitted with “Rhino” prongs, a secret device that permitted the tanks to plow through hedgerows. Of the two armored divisions, the 2nd Armored Division enjoyed the best progress, pushing down two separate road nets with two Combat Commands abreast. Combat Commands were a type of brigade headquarters used to create a combined-arms force from the division’s tank, armored infantry, and armored field artillery battalions. In two days of fighting, VII Corps was on the verge of bagging much of General Dietrich von Choltitz’s LXXXIV.Armee-Korps, including the 2.SS-Panzer-Division and 17.SS-Panzergrenadier Division. Von Kluge insisted that the trapped forces conduct a counterattack to break out of the encirclement. Von Choltitz realized that under the circumstances, the best he could do was rapidly to evacuate the trapped divisions before the American lines hardened. By the afternoon of July 28, Collins warned his armored spearheads that German breakout attempts should be anticipated. The German forces in the Roncey pocket began their breakout attempts on the night of July 28/29. Most were stopped in a series of confused nighttime firefights. Allied fighter-bombers discovered a mass of German vehicles and horse columns the morning of July 29 and staged day-long attacks. Later, some 122 tanks, 259 other vehicles, and 11 artillery pieces were found destroyed or abandoned in the Roncey pocket. On July 29, the second phase of Cobra began when the 4th and 6th Armored divisions began their attack down along the coast toward Coutances and Avranches. Opposition was extremely weak. By the end of July, the First US Army had captured about 20,000 German troops. In the face of this disaster, von Kluge telephoned higher headquarters and described the situation as a total mess. When Berlin asked what defenses were in place, he sarcastically replied that the high command must be “living on the moon.” The whole of 7.Armee was retreating and von Kluge warned Berlin that if they reached Avranches, “the Americans could do whatever they wished.” Operation Cobra won not only a tactical breakthrough, but a breakout as well.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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La Vincenterie

2

XXX

353(-)

35

Hébécrevon

2 CCA

XXX

LXXXIV

Marigny

Camprond

Army Reserve

XX

St-Samsonde-Bonfossé

X

Cerisyla-Salle

X

Notre-Damede-Cenilly

La Pompe

Biéville

Ste-Suzannesur-Vire Condésur-Vire

XX

326

Torigni-sur-Vire

Troisgots Roncey

3

e

Le MesnilHerman Le MesnilOpac

Pont-Brocard

3 CCA

6 CCB

La Denisière

Pz Gp West

XXX

II

XXXX

St-Martindes-Besaces

Moyon

XXXX

Quettrevillesur-Sienne

7

Cambry 2 CCB

Allied front line, July 25, 1944

Beaucoudray

Sie nn e 4 CCB

Allied front line, July 24, 1944

Tessy-sur-Vire

Villebaudon

Lengronne

St-DenisLa Chappelle le-Gast

Hambye

Gavray

3

Allied front line, July 26, 1944 Allied front line, July 27, 1944

2 CCA

Allied front line, July 28, 1944

Pont-Farcy

La Baleine

Cérences

Bréhal

Vir

Caumontl’Évente

XX

X

Montpinchon

X

2 CCB

St-Jeandes-Baisants

XXXX

X

Ouville

Hyenville

6 CCA

352

Quibou

Second Br

Vidouville

XX

275(-)

Dangy

Soulle

Pont-dela-Roque

XXXX

5

Savigny

Coutances

XXX

XXX Br

St-Lô

Canisy Carantilly

Bérigny

St-Gilles

Guesnay

X

X

X

La Calvaire

XX

XX

3 CCB

St-Andréde-l’Épine

XX

Lehr

La Chapelleen-Juger

Montcuit

Monthuchon

XX

2

X

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Montreuil

XX

Balleroy

X

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XX

XX

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30

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XX

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XX

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XX

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XX

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 99

XX

Vir

e

Allied front line, July 29, 1944 Allied front line, July 30, 1944

N Percy

German front line, July 24, 1944

0 0

5 miles 5km

99

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MAP 43: OPERATION BLUECOAT – JULY 30, 1944 With Operation Cobra under way, Montgomery planned a supporting breakout effort, both to take advantage of the American progress as well as to prevent von Kluge from shifting resources against the American advance. In light of the extreme concentration of Panzergruppe West’s forces to the south of Caen, Montgomery chose to conduct Operation Bluecoat in the center along the boundary between the First US Army and the British Second Army. This sector had not seen extensive fighting since the Villers-Bocage fighting in June, as the terrain was an eastward extension of the bocage country that had so hampered the American advance in early July. The attack was conducted by two corps: O’Connor’s VII Corps to the west, and Bucknall’s XXX Corps to the east, emanating out of the Caumont region. The British forces in this sector were reinforced by units from the Caen area, including the Guards Armoured Division and the 11th Armoured Division that had fought in Operation Goodwood ten days earlier. The German forces opposing Bluecoat were along the boundary between 7.Armee and Panzergruppe West. The western flank of the German positions was held by II.Fallschirmjäger-Korps, which had been involved in the defense east of St-Lô earlier in July. The area south of Caumont was General Hans von Obstfelder’s LXXXVI.ArmeeKorps, consisting of three infantry divisions. Operation Bluecoat began in the early morning hours of July 30. It was not characterized by the high drama of recent Allied offensives, lacking the heavy bomber attacks. In most respects, it more resembled the grim attritional Battle of the Hedgerows fought earlier in the month in the First US Army sector. The first day’s attack was painfully slow for XXX Corps, but the 15th Scottish Division of VIII Corps made a sizable penetration about 5 miles deep to the immediate south of Caumont against the 326.Infanterie-Division. This success led to the commitment of the 21.Panzer-Division into this sector, still recuperating after its heavy losses in the Operation Goodwood fighting. The infantry penetrations of the front led to the introduction of the 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division. British advances along the Vire and the general decay in the 7. Armee sector led the commander of Panzergruppe West, General Heinrich Eberbach, to request permission from von Kluge to reinforce 100

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the sector with chunks of the idle II.SS-Panzer-Korps. Permission was granted, and efforts were made to coordinate three Panzer divisions: the 21.Panzer-Division (already in the area), and the newly arriving 9.SSand 10.SS-Panzer divisions. The British VIII Corps continued to push the 11th Armoured Division and the Guards Armoured Division southward, and, on August 2, they began to encounter the first elements of the reinforcements from II.SS-Panzer-Korps. The XXX Corps penetration was far less successful than the neighboring attack by O’Connor’s VIII Corps, even after the addition of the 7th Armoured Division to the attack. On August 3, the 10.SSPanzer-Division pushed back the 7th Armoured Division near Le Breuil-en-Auge, a setback that infuriated Montgomery, only adding to his dismay over their performance at Villers-Bocage. As a result, both Lieutenant-General Bucknall, the XXX Corps commander, and Major-General Erskine, the 7th Armoured Division commander, were sacked. Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks was given command of XXX Corps. In view of the deteriorating situation on the 7.Armee front owing to Operation Cobra, Hitler decided to activate his delayed plan for a major Panzer offensive. Instead of being directed against the British sector, the aim was shifted to the west. The objective was to make a bold advance through the advancing First US Army aimed at Avranches, thereby halting the American advance and cutting off Patton’s Third US Army, which had started its turn into Brittany. To accomplish this impossible feat, the Panzer divisions facing British and Canadian forces had to be pulled back from the frontline and their place taken by infantry divisions. Operation Lüttich was scheduled to begin on August 7. As a consequence of Hitler’s rash plan, German forces in several sectors were obliged to pull back to more defensible lines, including some of the forces facing Operation Bluecoat. The British Second Army took advantage of this unexpected opportunity and the 43rd Wessex Division seized Mont Pinçon on August 7–8. The success of Operation Bluecoat, combined with the opportunities presented by the foolish Operation Lüttich, opened up new opportunities in the contested Caen–Falaise Corridor. Montgomery planned to take advantage of this with Operation Totalize, starting on August 8, 1944.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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Guards Br XX

326

XXX

Amayé-surSeulles

XXX

301

XXX

205

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X X X X X X B II X r Br

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140

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195

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Étouvy

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206

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XXXX

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XXX

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49 Can

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277

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St-Gilles

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 101

First US

Lessay

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Caen

Balleroy

Pont-Hébert

Forêt de Sever

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Front line, July 29 Front line, August 4

0 Briouze

0

5 miles 5km

101

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MAP 44: ON THE EVE OF BREAKOUT JULY 31, 1944 By the end of July 1944, Heeresgruppe B was on the verge of catastrophe. Von Kluge, the dual OB West/Heeresgruppe B commander, had warned Berlin that once one of the Allied armies punched through the thin and brittle crust of German defenses, they could be poised for an accelerating breakout from Normandy into Brittany in the west and toward the Seine in the east. The greatest calamity had befallen Hausser’s 7.Armee on the German left flank. The 7.Armee had been neglected for much of the June and July fighting, receiving few of the premium Panzer divisions. Those that had been sent west had mostly been chewed up in the hedgerow fighting of mid-July, and then decimated in the Cobra offensive. Panzer-Lehr-Division was overrun by Cobra, and both 2.SSPanzer-Division and 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division had much of their equipment destroyed in the Roncey pocket. The 2.Panzer-Division and 116.Panzer-Division were sent from Panzergruppe West in an attempt to stanch the rupture. Not only were they unable to accomplish this mission, but Bradley had also injected the first elements from Patton’s arriving Third US Army into the fray. VIII Corps, with the 4th and 6th Armored divisions, had skirted around the congestion and chaos of the Vire front, and had raced down the coast to Avranches. With nothing substantial in their way, they were on the verge of spilling out into Brittany or to the east, behind the Heeresgruppe B frontlines. For Berlin, there were no easy options. On the one hand, the heavy concentration of Panzer divisions remaining on the Caen front, including both I.SS-Panzer-Korps and II.SS-Panzer-Korps, could be used in an attempt to crush the American breakout. In theory at least, a brisk attack toward Avranches could cut off the American spearheads and redeem the situation. However, there were two major problems with this plan. To begin with, German Panzer divisions did not have the operational mobility to execute such rapid maneuvers on the Normandy front. The railways were completely devastated by air attack. Road marches were vulnerable to air attack. Even if the Allied fighter-bombers could not knock out many tanks from the air, they could completely ruin the division’s more vulnerable motor transport as they had demonstrated time and time again. German tanks by this stage of the war, especially the Panther and Tiger, were vulnerable to mechanical breakdown exacerbated by a shortage of spare parts and recovery assets. By the time a Panzer division arrived, its strength was likely to be 102

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substantially less than at the start. The second problem for a German Panzer counterattack against VIII Corps was the British reaction. Montgomery had been pushing south out of Caen all month in a grueling series of costly mechanized battles. The latest, Operation Bluecoat, had begun the day before to the west of Caen. In the event that one of the Panzer corps was taken out of this sector, there was every likelihood that the British would stage yet another tank attack from the Caen sector. Berlin’s other options were not especially attractive either. Hausser’s 7.Armee controlled the divisions guarding Brittany, the nearest likely source of reinforcements. The defenses in Brittany had gradually been pilfered through June and July and were now threadbare. There were no Panzer divisions in Brittany, and elite infantry units such as the Fallschirmjäger divisions had already been thrown into the Normandy meat grinder. On the far right flank of OB West, 15.Armee in the Pasde-Calais still had a number of intact infantry divisions, but as in the case of Brittany, these forces had been thinned out over the summer to feed the voracious demands of the Normandy front for manpower. The same was largely true of 1.Armee on the Bay of Biscay and 19.Armee in Provence. With the Red Army on the rampage in Belarus, East Prussia, and Poland, there would be no solace from the east. In the event, Hitler decided to opt for a Panzer counteroffensive, codenamed Lüttich. The units involved in this attack were drawn primarily from the Caen sector. This operation is described in more detail below. From the Allied perspective, the breakout in the right flank as a result of Operation Cobra proceeded in a planned fashion. The original Overlord plans had placed a premium on the capture of ports to support Allied logistical needs. However, by following the plan, the Allies threw away the potential to quickly collapse the German western flank by pushing VIII Corps to the east and the Seine rather than west into Brittany. The ensuing race into Brittany was the fastest on record in the summer of 1944; a similar advance eastward to the Seine probably would have had more or less the same results but with more dramatic consequences for the Wehrmacht. After seven weeks of grueling attritional battles, the senior Allied commanders – Eisenhower, Montgomery, and Bradley – opted for tactical inertia and followed the conservative and conventional approach laid out months before in the Overlord plan.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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St-Laurent-sur-Mer

ve

Carentan

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Courseullessur-Mer Lion-sur-Mer

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MAP 45: RACE INTO BRITTANY – AUGUST 1944 One of the highest priorities for the Allied armies in Normandy in the summer of 1944 was to secure good port facilities to provide for their future logistics needs. Although Cherbourg had been captured at the end of June, the Germans had demolished the port, requiring weeks of work to make the docks functional. Furthermore, Cherbourg had limited capacity. The Allies had long viewed the Breton ports, such as Brest, as more desirable objectives since they had significantly greater capacity. These logistics requirements shaped the operations of the newly created 12th Army Group. Once Patton’s Third US Army was activated on August 1, 1944, it was combined with First US Army to form a new American command under Bradley, rather than their previous subordination to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. The first assignment for Patton’s Third US Army was to swing westward from Avranches and capture the Breton ports. This task was feasible only on account of the weakness of German forces in Brittany. Since June 1944, German divisions that had been stationed in Brittany were gradually transferred to the Normandy battle front. The remaining force was barely capable of manning the extensive fortified zones created under the Atlantic Wall program. The German position in Brittany was further weakened by the creation of a well-armed French resistance movement in the summer of 1944 that was able to take control of large areas of the countryside. Against very weak opposition, Patton decided to capture Brittany on the run using his two armored divisions. The 4th Armored Division was ordered to race across the base of the Breton peninsula to Quiberon Bay. The 6th Armored Division was ordered to race through central Brittany to liberate the main port of Brest. This was one of the most rapid mechanized advances of the war. The 4th Armored Division reached Vannes on Quiberon Bay on August 5, and one of its Combat Commands reached the outskirts of Lorient on August 7. Although the 104

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armored divisions were well suited to rapid exploitation, they had only three battalions of infantry and so were far too weak to conduct a siege of a fortified city or port. Lorient, for example, had a garrison of 25,000 troops and a substantial amount of artillery. Likewise, the 6th Armored Division managed to reach Brest very quickly, but did not have the force to capture it once it became evident that the German garrison intended to fight. More infantry was needed. The first of the fortified ports to be attacked was the “pirate’s den” of St-Malo in the northeast corner of the peninsula. An assault by the 83rd Division began on August 5, but the port was not finally cleared until August 14. By this time, Patton was beginning to have second thoughts about the mission. Operation Cobra had been so successful that Allied armies were racing eastward much faster than expected. Instead of securing the Breton ports hundreds of miles west of the main battlefields, why not seize the Channel ports such as Le Havre and Boulogne, or perhaps even Antwerp? Patton argued persuasively that the Third US Army would be better employed by exploiting the collapse of the German Army in Normandy and racing to Paris. Eisenhower and Montgomery agreed, dramatically changing Patton’s mission. This did not remove the need for the Breton ports, but it did change their priority. Instead of the entire Third US Army, Patton left only a single corps behind to capture the ports. His two armored divisions were redirected eastward and began a race for the Seine along the Loire River valley. These opened the gateway to Paris a week later. The siege of Brest took over a month, and it was not secured until the third week of September 1944. After the experience at Brest, the US Army decided to forego attacks on the two other main ports, Lorient and St-Nazaire. Instead they were bottled up and left to rot on the vine. As a result, Lorient and St-Nazaire remained German bastions until the end of the war.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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KVA B

St-Michel-en-Greve

Lesneven

Aug 7

Aug 9

B

R

Milizac

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KG Pietzonka

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Concarneau XX

Pont-Scorff

265

Aug 7

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Bain-de-Bretagne

Hennebont

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0

25km

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Rocheforten-Terre Auray

Vannes

Châteaubriant 4

Aug 3

Derval

Aug 5

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La RocheBernard

Festung Saint-Nazaire

Task Force A

25 miles

Aug 3

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Malestroit

Coastal defense sector (Küsten Verteidigung Abschnitt) 6th Armored Division 4th Armored Division

0

CCA

Aug 3–4

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4 (-)

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Nantes

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MAP 46: OPERATION LÜTTICH – AUGUST 7, 1944 Operation Lüttich was Hitler’s plan to defeat Operation Cobra by launching a major Panzer offensive across the path of the First US Army to the sea at Avranches, thereby cutting off Patton’s Third US Army. The attack force consisted of several Panzer divisions that had been pulled out of the frontline in anticipation of the aborted August 1 Panzer counterattack. The operation started around midnight on August 6–7 and first made contact with elements of the 30th Infantry Division around the town of Mortain. The Ultra signals intelligence system had learned of the plans hours before the attack, and the 30th Division was ordered to hunker down for an attack. This division had two of its regiments deployed forward: the 117th Infantry around St-Barthélemy and the 120th Infantry near Mortain. The 2.SS-Panzer-Division “Das Reich” pushed into the town of Mortain before dawn, largely unopposed, and sent a column down the road to St-Hilaire-du-Harcouët against no opposition. However, the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry was entrenched on Hill 137 on the eastern edge of the town behind German lines, giving it vistas over the town and the neighboring roads. The 2.Panzer-Division found another gap in the American lines and advanced almost 6 miles. Shortly after daybreak, it was halted by a task force of the 119th Infantry in the town of Le Mesnil-Adelée. The left column of the 2.Panzer-Division waited until dawn to attack when the Panzer battalion from 1.SS-PanzerDivision finally arrived, permitting a two-pronged attack against StBarthélemy. This attack finally overcame the infantry battalion in the town late in the morning, but any further advance proved impossible. The northernmost element of the attack, the 116.Panzer-Division, failed to launch its attack. From the American perspective, the most alarming element of the German attack was the 2.SS-Panzer-Division battlegroup on the St-Hilaire-du-Harcouët road. The VII Corps commander, Major-General Collins, ordered Combat Command B of the 3rd Armored Division to deal with this threat. After sunrise, the ground fog began to dissipate. The US infantry, in the hills overlooking the German positions, directed divisional artillery against the exposed German columns. By late morning, Allied aircraft swarmed the area attacking the German columns. Although the Allied pilots claimed to have destroyed 120 German tanks, later battlefield 106

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surveys indicated that only nine armored vehicles had been lost to air attack. But the threat of air attack was as debilitating as actual losses, paralyzing German ground operations. The German units were not able to advance much farther than the positions they had reached by early morning, and, indeed, they would not proceed any farther through the course of the fighting. Over the next day, the fighting around Mortain shifted to small unit actions, with GIs and Panzergrenadiers bitterly contesting hedges, ruined farms, and road junctions. The 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry remained surrounded on the crest of Hill 137 on the eastern side of Mortain, and a Kampfgruppe from the newly arrived 17.SSPanzergrenadier-Division could not dislodge it. Hitler was furious at the paltry gains made by Operation Lüttich, and he accused OB West commander von Kluge of a hasty and careless execution of the attack. Against his better judgment, von Kluge was forced to order three more SS-Panzer divisions (the 9., 10., and 12.) to begin to disengage from the British sector and to move to the Mortain area. On the morning of August 8, the First Canadian Army launched Operation Totalize, an offensive aimed at Falaise, 21 miles south of Caen. For the Allies, the timing of Operation Lüttich could hardly have been better. The Germans had denuded the British sector of Panzer units precisely before the Canadian offensive. Von Kluge managed to halt the movement of the Panzer divisions so that they could resist the Canadian drive. A more ominous development was Patton’s capture of Le Mans, which strongly hinted that the Allies were in the process of carrying out a deep envelopment of the German forces in Normandy. Hitler insisted that the Mortain attack be resumed by August 11. However, by the evening of August 10, the situation in Normandy was nearing a crisis. The Canadians had resumed their attack toward Falaise, and Patton’s XV Corps had begun to swing to the northeast toward the main German supply center in Alençon. Von Kluge asked Berlin to call off Operation Lüttich to free up two or three Panzer divisions to counterattack Patton’s spearheads around Alençon. Operation Lüttich had accomplished nothing save for fatally weakening the German defenses in the Caen sector. The price for this mistake would be the encirclement at Falaise.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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XX

III

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Cuves

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MAP 47: OPERATION TOTALIZE, PHASE I AUGUST 7–8, 1944 The next attempt to overcome the German defenses south of Caen was Operation Totalize, scheduled to begin late on the night of August 7/8. After the numerous previous attempts to break out of Caen, it was clear that the Germans had built up multiple lines of defense, and so the Totalize plan was intended to overcome these, both by obtaining tactical surprise with a night attack, as well as by using a series of three sequential attacks each aimed at overcoming the deep German defenses. The first two surges were reinforced infantry attacks, each intended to push about 5 miles southward. The plan was modified on August 6 owing to changes in the German defenses. The principal force on the Bourguébus Ridge had been 1.SSPanzer-Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler,” one of the few divisions of I.SS-Panzer-Korps not decimated in the previous Caen fighting. Around August 6, Allied intelligence learned that the 1.SS-PanzerDivision was pulling out of its defenses, which were being taken over by the newly arrived 89.Infanterie-Division. It was presumed that the 1.SS-Panzer-Division was being redeployed to deepen German defenses to the south of Caen. In reality, the divison was being pulled out for the Operation Lüttich Panzer offensive toward Avranches. Nevertheless, the change in German deployment prompted the II Canadian Corps commander, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, to consolidate the second and third phases, together into an enlarged second phase. The German defense of the Bourguébus Ridge was in a state of flux owing to the demands of the Operation Lüttich offensive. Von Kluge, the OB West commander, had instructed SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich, the commander of I.SS-Panzer-Korps, that the Bourguébus Ridge defenses were the key hinge of German defenses in the British sector and that they must be held with protracted, unyielding defense. This sounded all well and good when the defenses were held by an SS-Panzer-Division, but they began to ring hollow when the defenses were suddenly turned over to a fresh and untested infantry division, recently arrived from training in Norway, and lacking the firepower of a Panzer division. Furthermore, previous plans to counter any major Allied breakthrough in this sector using battle groups from neighboring Panzer divisions had evaporated once these divisions were also pulled out of the line for the Lüttich attack. The German defenses consisted of 108

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a forward defense zone about 4 miles deep using four of the six infantry battalions of the 89.Infanterie-Division. The infantry defenses were concentrated in the villages. A second defense line was held by two further infantry battalions behind this zone. Phase I was an infantry break-in battle, intended to overcome the German defenses on the Bourguébus Ridge. This would consist of the British 51st Highland Division on the left (eastern) flank and the Canadian 2nd Infantry Division on the right (western flank). The tactics for the Phase I break-in battle accented mobility. The plan was to use a variety of infantry transporters including Universal Carriers, M3A1 scout cars, and halftracks to transport the six assault infantry battalions and to permit them to skirt around the German strongpoints in the villages. A shortage of carriers led to the conversion of surplus Canadian M7 Priest self-propelled howitzers into “Kangaroos” by removing their howitzers and plating over the embrasure. These 76 Kangaroos provided the lift for the equivalent of one battalion. The infantry assault included a substantial supporting element of tanks and specialized armored vehicles. In contrast to other offensives in the Caen–Falaise Corridor, the Totalize plan employed bomber attacks on the periphery to isolate the battlefield from reinforcements, but not to crater the center of German defenses. Artillery was used for immediate support of the advancing columns. Phase I of Operation Totalize began shortly before midnight on the night of August 7/8. The advance achieved tactical surprise and penetrated the German defense line over the space of about three hours. There were the usual types of problems in the conduct of a night operation. Various illumination schemes using searchlights or tracer fire had mixed results owing to the enormous clouds of dust raised by the advanced columns. The intricate scheme of dismounting from the infantry transporters midway through the advance was revised by various units in favor of continuing to the eventual objectives in a mounted fashion. Nevertheless, Phase I was a considerable success, completely penetrating the initial layer of German defense to a depth of 4 miles across the entire front. Initial German counterattacks around 1000hrs were beaten off.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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Grentheville

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Ifs

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Allied units: 1. Les Fusiliers Mont-Royal 2. The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders of Canada 3. The left (Essex Scottish) column 4. The central (Royal Regiment of Canada) column 5. The right (Royal Hamilton Light Infantry) column 6. The South Saskatchewan Regiment 7. The eastern (8th Recce Regiment: The 14th Hussars) column 8. The British right-forward column 9. The British right-rear column 10. The 5th Camerons 11. The 2nd Seaforths 12. The 5th Seaforths 13. The British left column 14. The 5th Black Watch

1 St-Martinde-Fontenay

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La Hogue

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G St-Aignande-Cramesnil

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German units: A. I/Grenadier-Regiment 1055 B. II/Grenadier-Regiment 1055 C. III/Grenadier-Regiment 1055 D. I/Grenadier-Regiment 1056 E. II/Grenadier-Regiment 1056 F. III/Grenadier-Regiment 1056 G. Battery, Artillerie-Regiment 189

Allied front, 2330hrs August 7 German front line , 2330hrs August 7

A Robertmesnil

German infantry battalion defensive sector German Nebelwerfer battery

Le Point de Fresney

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1 mile 1km

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MAP 48: OPERATION TOTALIZE, PHASE II AUGUST 8–11, 1944 The second phase of Operation Totalize began in the late morning and early afternoon of August 8, 1944. This phase was originally conceived as another infantry assault, to be followed by a tank exploitation phase. Under the modified plan, these phases were run concurrently with the addition of the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division as well as the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and the Polish 1st Armored Division. By the late morning of August 8, I.SS-Panzer-Korps was attempting to scrape together any available reserves to plug the gaps in the shattered defenses. The primary reserve was from the battered but experienced 12.SS-Panzer-Division, reinforced by Tiger tanks of schwere SS-PanzerAbteilung.101. The village of Cintheaux became a rallying point for the reinforcements, slowing the advance of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division. The 12.SS-Panzer-Division commander, SS-Brigadeführer Kurt Meyer, conducted a forward reconnaissance in the morning with his senior commanders. While consulting with his commanders around noon, Meyer observed an Allied bomber dropping colored flares. Suspecting that this signaled the beginning of an Allied bomber attack, Meyer ordered the immediate launch of a spoiling attack by all available forces. This narrowly averted the destruction of the 12.SS-PanzerDivision counterattack force. Shortly after noon, Kampfgruppe Waldmüller struck the spearheads of the Allied advance along the Caen–Falaise road and St-Aignan-deCramesnil. This force consisted of about 20 tanks and two companies of Panzergrenadiers from 12.SS-Panzer-Division, supported by Tiger tanks of schwere SS-Panzer-Abteilung.101. Shortly after noon, the Tiger of tank ace Michael Wittman and two other Tigers were knocked out by a Sherman Firefly along the Caen–Falaise road. It remains a controversy whether it was British or Canadian tanks that finally got Wittmann, the victor at Villers-Bocage two months earlier. Kampfgruppe Waldmüller pushed up the east side of the Caen–Falaise road and set up defenses in Le Petit Ravin defile. They engaged in a costly afternoon skirmish with the tanks of the 1st Northamptonshire 110

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Yeomanry. They withdrew to the southeast where they repulsed the spearhead of the Polish 1st Armored Division about an hour later. By the late afternoon, the Canadian and Polish armored advance began to stall at a significant distance from the day’s objectives. In an unusual change of plans, Lieutenant-General Simonds ordered the 4th Canadian Armoured Division to continue their advance after dark, with the objective being Hill 195. To accomplish this mission, two combined-arms formations were used, Halpenny Force and Worthington Force, based on elements of the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade supported by two attached infantry companies. Both task forces set out for their objectives in the early morning hours. Worthington Force reported around dawn that it had reached Hill 195 when in fact it was some 4 miles farther east on the Hill 140 ridge. Isolated from the main body of the Second Canadian Army, Worthington Force was subjected to day-long counterattacks by Kampfgruppe Waldmüller and elements of the 83.Infanterie-Division. In spite of rescue attempts by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, the force was overwhelmed by the end of the day. The Totalize offensive continued on August 10, finally securing the Hill 195 objective. An attempt to push the Germans out of a strongpoint in the Quesnay Woods failed after nightfall. As a result, LieutenantGeneral Simonds called off the offensive in the predawn hours of August 11. Operation Totalize had proven to be surprisingly effective in its first phase, the nighttime attack of August 8, but also ultimately unsatisfying in its loss of momentum in the final two days of fighting. Its accomplishments were notable compared to earlier offensives on the Caen–Falaise axis, since the attacks had pushed 21st Army Group a full 10 miles farther south. Sadly, the penetration had been very narrow and would require a supplementary offensive on August 14. Operation Tractable involved most of the same forces as Totalize, and it would represent the culminating offensive along the Caen–Falaise road.

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Ifs Maltot

2 Can

51 Br

XX

N

XX

Soliers

Frénouville

Hubert-Folie

Or ne

Vimont

Bourguébus

St-Andrésur-Orne

Argences

Feuguerolles La Hogue

Moult Chicheboville

Secquevillela-Campagne Rocquancourt

GarcellesSecqueville

Fontenayle-Marmion

Laize-la-Ville

2 Can

XX

4 Can

Conteville

XX

an

ce

1 Pl XX

XX

51 Br

Mu

May-surOrne

St-Aignande-Cramesnil

Cramesnil

Le Point de Fresney

Poussyla-Campagne

Robertmesnil Lai

ze

zon

Tilly-laCampagne

Lai

Verrières

St-Martinde-Fontenay

Vieux

Fierville-laCampagne

Cintheaux

St-Sylvain

Brettevillesur-Laize

3 Can

XX

Soignolles

XX

85

Brettevillele-Rabet

Urville Barbery

GrainvilleLangannerie

Allied front 2330hrs, August 7 Allied front end Phase I 1000hrs, August 8

Hill 140 XX

Allied front 2359hrs, August 8

12.SS

Allied front at end of Totalize 0300hrs, August 11 Wittmann–Waldmüller counterattacks 1220–1340hrs, August 8 German counterattacks against Worthington Force 0830–2100hrs, August 9

0 0

2 miles 2km

Estrées-laCampagne

Hill 195

(-)

Ouilly-leTesson XX

89

Potigny

(-)

Olendon

(-)

111

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MAP 49: OPERATION TRACTABLE – AUGUST 14–16, 1944 The focus of Tractable was Lieutenant-General Simonds’ II Canadian Corps, attacking down the eastern side of the Caen–Falaise highway. This force consisted of the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, 4th Canadian Armoured Division and Polish 1st Armored Division. The 2nd Canadian Infantry Division had continued its advance to the west of the Caen–Falaise highway and had been engaged against the 89. Infanterie-Division since August 13. In the wake of Operation Totalize, an additional German infantry division was rushed into this sector in an attempt to stiffen the defense line across the Caen–Falaise highway. The 85.Infanterie-Division had arrived earlier from coastal defense duty in the Pas-de-Calais on August 10 and was assigned to cover the highway, deploying its Grenadier‑Regiment.1054 to the west near the road and its Grenadier‑Regiment.1053 farther east. On the west side of the Caen–Falaise highway, the 89.Infanterie-Division had been brought in from Norway, arriving in the Caen sector on August 6. It deployed its Grenadier-Regiment.1055 to the west close to the highway and its Grenadier-Regiment.1056 farther east. It had been engaged in combat since August 8 and had been gradually pushed back during Operation Totalize. The battered 12.SS-Panzer-Division was deployed to the north of Falaise and had been reduced to 24 operational tanks and several assault guns and tank destroyers. It fed small battle groups into the frontlines during the course of the fighting to bolster the two infantry divisions in front of it. The Germans captured plans of the operation on August 13 when a scout car carrying an officer strayed into German lines. Operation Tractable began around noon on August 14 with artillery and air attacks. The two columns from the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 4th Armoured Division reached the Laison River without difficulty. The intermediate objectives, a string of small villages along the Laison, were taken by the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade on the right flank and the 8th Canadian Infantry Brigade on the left. Bridges were found intact in some sectors, but assurances that the river could be forded by vehicles proved incorrect and engineer assistance was required before the 4th Canadian Armoured Division could press its attack farther south. This began around 1430hrs. A strike force of the Lake Superior Regiment supported by a reconstituted British Columbia Regiment advanced quickly to Perrières where the eastbound road emanated from Falaise. One of the few successful defenses in the 85.Infanterie-Division’s sector was in front of the 3rd Canadian Infantry 112

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Division, where 3./Grenadier-Regiment.1054 set up a strongpoint east of the Caen–Falaise highway near the high ground called Point 159 after having been reinforced by the small tank and tank-destroyer reserve of the 12.SS-Panzer-Division. By the end of August 14, the Canadian divisions had reached their intermediate objectives, but had another hard day of fighting ahead of them. The original plan had been for Simonds’ II Canadian Corps to swing east towards Trun while the British took care of Falaise. However, the slow pace of the British advance led to a change of plans, with Falaise now falling into the Canadian sector. On August 15, the Polish 1st Armored Division was injected into the fray, advancing to the east of the two Canadian divisions, crossing the Laison River in the afternoon and eventually reaching the bridge over the Dives River near Jort. The 4th Canadian Armoured Division committed the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade forward to its next major objective, the road junction near Versainville. The 3rd Canadian Division continued to face significant opposition nearer to the Caen-Falaise highway owing to the defenses of Grenadier-Regiment.1054 reinforced by the 12.SSPanzer-Division. However, by the afternoon, the 85.Infanterie-Division had a strength of barely two infantry battalions after the day and a half of fighting. In Berlin, word arrived on August 15 that the US Army had staged another major amphibious landing in southern France. Hitler authorized the forces in the Caen sector to withdraw over the Dives River. In the Falaise area, many units did not receive word until August 17 and so the fighting on the approaches to Falaise continued. By this stage, the 12.SS-Panzer-Division could muster around 15 tanks and tank destroyers and the 85.Infanterie-Division was in desperate shape. By the morning of August 16, Falaise was finally in sight, but there was no dramatic conclusion to Operation Tractable. Falaise was entered from the west by the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, not by the divisions involved in Tractable. The town was held by remnants of the Panzergrenadier regiments of 12.SS-Panzer-Division and some troops of the 85.Infanterie-Division. Fighting continued in Falaise through August 17 and the town was not finally cleared of the last pockets of resistance until August 18. By this time, the focus of attention was farther to the southeast. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division were reoriented farther eastward to reach Trun in an attempt to close the Falaise pocket.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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May-surOrne

Rocquancourt Fontenayle-Marmion

XX

Conteville

Laize-la-Ville

272

Cramesnil

La

St-Aignan-deCramesnil

ize

Poussy-laCampagne

Robertmesnil Le Point de Fresney

Fiervillela-Campagne St-Sylvain Brettevillesur-Laize XX

4 Can XX

3 Bretteville-Can

Urville

Soignolles

le-Rabet

Barbery

Estrées-laCampagne Quesnay

1 Pl

XX

85

XX

159

Ouilly-leTesson 195 XX

89

2 Can

XX

Clair Tizon

Potigny

Jort

Olendon

XX

12.SS

Epaney

53 Br

XX

VillersCanivet

Morteau Coulibœuf

XX

271

Falaise

Cordey Start line, August 14 Morning, August 15 Midnight, August 15/16

N

Finish line, August 16

0 0

2 miles 2km

113

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 113

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MAP 50: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN NORMANDY IN EARLY AUGUST 1944 This strategic overview map helps to provide a recapitulation of the Allied offensives in early August 1944 which helped to shape the final destruction of the Wehrmacht in Normandy. Operation Cobra precipitated a complete collapse of the western flank of the German defenses in Normandy, largely destroying 7.Armee in the process. By early August, 7.Armee was attempting to resist further advances by both the First US Army and the British VIII Corps in the area around Vire. Any hope of holding this line was undermined by the rapid exploitation by Patton’s Third US Army past Avranches into Britanny, and the subsequent reorientation of Patton’s thrust by August 8. Leaving one corps behind in Brittany to deal with the ports, the remainder of Patton’s Third US Army was redirected eastward toward Paris. From Hitler’s delusional perspective, the Avranches Corridor seemed too tempting a target to avoid. Hitler had been insisting on a massing of the Panzer divisions of Panzergruppe West for a counteroffensive against Montgomery’s 21st Army Group around August 1. This never materialized, but the creation of this modest Panzer reserve convinced Hitler that he had the means to pull off a miracle and rout the Americans. The result was the foolish Operation Lüttich offensive toward Mortain on August 7. In theory, Operation Lüttich might have cut off Patton’s Third US Army, thereby stanching the breakout of Bradley’s 12th Army Group. Hitler opined: “The decision in the battle for France depends on the success of the [Avranches] attack. OB West has a unique opportunity which will never again be repeated to advance into the enemy’s extremely exposed flank and thereby change the situation completely.” The forces available for Hitler’s Mortain offensive were not sufficient for so bold a venture. The Panzer divisions had been exhausted by the prolonged fighting on the Caen–Falaise axis through the month of July. Furthermore, while the Panzer divisions had proven themselves as masters of the defensive battle, they were not well suited to offensive adventures against the better-equipped Allied forces. They lacked the 114

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mobility of US armored divisions owing to inadequate motor transport, and the vulnerability of their logistical train to Allied air attack. Furthermore, they were no better suited to offensive actions in the bocage than the Americans, and lacked sufficient infantry for an attritional offensive struggle. The attack petered out in the first day, when it ran into the stout defenses of the 30th Infantry Division around Mortain. The attack quickly bogged down, and the Panzer divisions were then subjected to the Allies’ superior firepower, both in the form of US artillery and Allied fighter-bombers. Aside from wasting the paltry remainder of the Wehrmacht’s Panzer strength in Normandy, Operation Lüttich had two catastrophic operational consequences. To begin with, the shift of the Panzergruppe West Panzer divisions to the Mortain sector fatally weakened the German defenses on the Caen–Falaise axis. Montgomery’s relentless attacks continued, with Operation Totalize followed by Operation Tractable, pushing the Canadian and Polish armored divisions to the outskirts of Falaise. The second operational catastrophe was the shift of Heeresgruppe B’s most mobile units too far to the west. To any sober observer, Heeresgruppe B was on the verge of being trapped in a sack by the converging Allied breakout attempts. The Panzergruppe West Panzer divisions would be desperately needed to prevent the entrapment of Heeresgruppe B, and to fight to keep an escape corridor open to the east. Instead of being positioned to do so, Panzergruppe West was bogged down on the opposite side of the pocket near Mortain, and its Panzer divisions would have to run the gauntlet of Allied fighterbomber attacks another time to keep open the corridor between Falaise and Argentan. Although not apparent on this map, Berlin began attempts to shift some forces from 1.Armee on the Bay of Biscay to the northeast to begin to create blocking positions along the Seine River. However, the remaining forces in central and southern France were mostly infantry divisions, in many cases the static infantry division configuration for coastal defense, and so not easily moved in haste.

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German front line, August 1, 1944 German front line, August 3, 1944 German front line, August 7, 1944 German front line, August 13, 1944

ALDERNEY

Date of capture by Allied forces

0

50 miles

0

CHANNEL ISLANDS

50km

Cherbourg

XXXXX

Bay of the Seine

21

GUERNSEY

Montgomery XXXXX

Bradley

Gulf of St-Malo

XXXX

V

XIX

XXXX

Orn

XXX

VII

Vire

B Kluge

Falaise

XXXX

5

7

Mortain

XXX

Eberbach

Chambois Argentan

Domfront XXX

XXX

Brest

e Dietrich

XXXX

VIII

83

5

Hausser

Avranches XX

XXXXX

VIII

XV

August 7

August 8

XXX

XXX

Patton XXX

St-Malo

Caen

XII

XXX

XXX

I Br

II

XXX XXX

XXX

Crerar

s

XX

XXX

XXXX

Second Br Dempsey

XXXX

XXXX

XXX

Third US

e

First US Hodges St-Lô

XXX

XII

English Channel

Vir

XXXX

XXXX

JERSEY

XXXX

First Can

Grandcamp

Carentan

XV

St-Hilairedu-Harcouët

XXX

VII

XV

Alençon

XX

XX

Fougères

B R I T T A N Y XX

Mayenne

Loudeac ne

6

August 10

yen

XXX

XX

Vitré

Ma

Rennes

Laval

XX

8

XXX

Vannes

Sart

Château-Gontier

XX

Lorient

O C E A N

Le Mans

he

4

XXX

Loir

August 13 N

XX

August 8

August 7

A T L A N T I C

Seine

Le Havre

St-Martin-de-Varreville

ve

12 US

SARK

Di

August 7

St-Nazaire

Loire

BELLE-ÎLE

Nantes

Angers

XII

Tours

115

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MAP 51: THE GERMAN PREDICAMENT AUGUST 16, 1944 Hitler authorized Generalfeldmarschall von Kluge to call off Operation Lüttich on August 10 when it became clear it had no prospect of success. Furthermore, Patton’s Third US Army had already begun its advance eastward and its XV Corps was heading for Alençon. On August 8, Eisenhower met Bradley at the 12th Army Group headquarters to discuss the conduct of the forthcoming battle. Both agreed to pursue a deep envelopment of the German forces in Normandy with Hodges’ First US Army tidying up the Mortain sector while Patton’s Third US Army continued to exploit eastward. As can be seen on this map, First US Army was positioned on the southeastern and southern quadrants of the Allied envelopment of the Wehrmacht in Normandy. Patton was moving fast enough that Eisenhower phoned Montgomery to discuss a potential juncture of US and British forces to seal the Falaise Pocket. Montgomery agreed and began pressuring the Canadians to step up their advance southward from Falaise toward Argentan. One of Patton’s corps, XV Corps, was directed to pass through Alençon and then head northward to serve as the easternmost element of Bradley’s 12th Army Group in the encirclement of the German forces. Patton’s other two corps, XII Corps and XX Corps, continued their race eastward. Berlin viewed Patton’s Third US Army as the most worrisome threat, and the new head of Panzergruppe West, General Heinrich Eberbach, was ordered to prepare a Panzer counterattack toward Le Mans. By August 13, Eberbach had collected the remnants of three Panzer divisions in the area west of Argentan. However, this force could deploy only 70 functional tanks. Facing them was the approaching XV  Corps, consisting of three divisions: the 90th Infantry Division, French 2e Division Blindée (Armored Division), and the 5th Armored Division. The opposing XV Corps had two full-strength armored divisions with more than 500 tanks, substantially outnumbering Eberbach’s motley force. The head of the newly created 5.Panzer-Armee, SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer “Sepp” Dietrich began to challenge Berlin 116

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over the wisdom of such an attack, arguing that Heeresgruppe B should be withdrawing its forces eastward while there was still a corridor open between Falaise and Argentan, and not sending these Panzer divisions on another mad adventure. The absence of any serious defenses south of the Falaise Pocket prompted Berlin to order a few units from the 1.Armee on the Atlantic coast near Bordeaux to begin to create some sort of defensive line on the Seine. Heeresgruppe G in central and southern France had already been combed of most of its better units for the Normandy Front, so it had little left but second-rate static infantry divisions. The situation became even more desperate on August 15 when the Americans and French staged another amphibious landing on the Mediterranean coast of southern France, Operation Dragoon. This meant that no further reinforcements could be expected from Heeresgruppe G in southern and central France. The town of Falaise finally fell to the Canadians on August 16. In a series of bitter telephone calls, von Kluge finally convinced senior army commanders in Berlin that Eberbach’s Panzer attack was a complete fantasy and he received assurances that they would secure Hitler’s permission to begin a withdrawal. At 1440hrs, von Kluge ordered the withdrawal from Normandy to begin, followed two hours later by Hitler’s acquiescence. By that time, Patton’s spearheads were already on the outskirts of Chartres and Orléans, creating the conditions for a deep encirclement of German forces on the Seine in addition to the shallow envelopment in the Falaise area. Von Kluge was relieved of command on August 17 and replaced by Hitler’s miracle worker, Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model. Frustrated by Hitler’s unrealistic demands, and deeply worried that his role in the July 20 bomb plot would soon be discovered, von Kluge committed suicide on August 18.

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N

XXXXX

SHAEF XX

ADSEC

First Can

9 ADC

XXXX

I Br

XXX

Seine

Bayeux II Can

XXXX

Second Br

St-Lô

XX

XXXX

12 XXXXX 21

Twenty-first Br

XXX

711

XXI II C X an

XX

6 AB Br

Caen

XX

346

XX

48 Br

Lisieux XX

VIII XXX XXX

XXX Br

I XI X XX XX X

VIII Br

XXX

7 Br V X XX XIX XXX

XIX

XXX

V

XXXX

3 Br

11 Br XX

2 Can

XX

53 Br

XX

271

XX

Évreux

XX

1 Pl

XX

XX

89

Falaise

XX

XX

326

3

4 Can

XX

277

XX

XX

51 Br

XX

85

XX

12.SS

XX

270

XX

Lehr

XX

303

XX

XIXX XX II V

First

Gds

Vire

43 Br

XX

Bernay XX XX

3 Can

59 Br

XX

50 Br

XX

XX

272

an tC X r rs X B Fi XX nd co Se

XX

15 Br XXX

2

XX

9

Falaise Pocket

XX

84

XX

XX

29

XX XX

XX

10.SS

28

XX

XX

6 XX

XX

2

331

90

2 Fr

XX

Dreux

XX

5

XX

3

1

XX

2.SS

1.SS

XX

2

9.SS

XX

XX

708

XX

XX

115

Argentan

XXX

30

XXX

XV

XX

XV

XX

4

9

Châteauneuf

XX

79 XXX

VII

XX

XX

XX

XX

XX

7

XXX

XX

Alençon

Chartres XX

5

Fougères Mayenne

XX

80

Vitré XXXX

Laval 0 0

Third

Châteaudun

20 miles 20km

XX

Le Mans

XXX

XII

35

117

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MAP 52: THE COLLAPSE OF THE FALAISE POCKET AUGUST 18–19, 1944 By the middle of August, both German field armies in Normandy were being squeezed into the Falaise Pocket. Hausser’s 7.Armee held the western portion of the salient, mostly with infantry divisions, since the area had hedgerows that favored infantry defense. The newly created 5.Panzer-Armee under SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Sepp Dietrich, took over most of the resources from the former Panzergruppe West. This field army was the main defense force facing Montgomery’s 21st Army Group on the Falaise axis. However, its task was made all the more difficult by Hitler’s insistence that a Panzer counterattack force be created to strike at the northern wing of Patton’s Third US Army. Major-General Wade Haislip’s XV Corps had pushed up from the Alençon region toward Argentan. Dietrich put General Eberbach, the former Pazergruppe West commander, in charge of the counterattack force. This included elements of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division and 116. Panzer-Division. The force was too small seriously to contest the advance of XV Corps, but its diversion to the southern side of the Falaise Pocket further denuded the forces facing Falaise. XV Corps reached Argentan and the inter-army boundary on August 12, and so Haislip asked Patton for further guidance. On August 13, Bradley ordered Patton to redirect XV Corps eastward to the Seine, rather than northward toward the Canadians. In its place, Patton created a Provisional Corps under his aide Major-General Hugh Gaffey to push towards Chambois. This consisted of the 90th Infantry Division and the French 2e Division Blindée. This decision would become extremely controversial in later years, with many historians blaming Bradley for failing to close the Falaise Gap when he had the opportunity. At the time, the decision seemed prudent. Hodges’ First US Army was still over 10 miles to the west, compressing the western side and southwestern flanks of the Falaise Pocket. XV Corps was operating on its own to the south of Argentan with its flanks exposed. To the north, it faced Eberbach’s forces, while to the east there were hardly any opposing German forces. Bradley was also concerned that the mad dash through Argentan toward Falaise posed risks of fratricide if American forces collided with the advancing First Canadian Army. In retrospect, such risks might have seemed worth it to trap the Wehrmacht in Normandy. However, Allied intelligence was reporting that the 118

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German Army was withdrawing toward the Seine, clouding the issue. Haislip’s XV Corps reached the Seine River on August 17. On August 14, the First Canadian Army began Operation Tractable shortly before noon. The aim of this attack was finally to win control of Falaise and to push across the open end of the Falaise Pocket to meet up with US forces near Argentan. After two days of heavy fighting, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division finally gained control of Falaise on August 16. There was a rising crescendo of voices from the senior German commanders in France warning Berlin that 7.Armee and 5.PanzerArmee would soon be trapped if withdrawal was delayed. Finally, in the late afternoon of August 16, von Kluge won the acquiescence of Generaloberst Alfred Jodl of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht – Armed Forces High Command) to begin the withdrawal. As a result, German formations began a gradual withdrawal out of the western portions of the Falaise Pocket starting on the evening of August 16. The spearhead of the First Canadian Army, the Polish 1st Armored Division, managed to send one of its battlegroups to Mont-Ormel, in the center of the rapidly shrinking Falaise Corridor. The Poles were soon isolated in a sea of retreating German troops, assaulted from all sides. It took several days for the First Canadian Army to push southward from Falaise to link up with the Poles and the Americans near Chambois. In the meantime, the shrinking Falaise Pocket had become a killing ground. Allied fighter-bombers swarmed over the retreating German columns, and the corridor was so narrow that Allied artillery bombarded it from both sides. In the predawn hours of August 20, II.SS-PanzerKorps conducted a breakout operation to push past the Poles and Canadians and create a passage route out of the cauldron; it largely failed in its mission. The corridor was not finally closed until August 21, and this is covered in more detail in the text accompanying Map 53. Inside the Falaise Pocket, the Allies captured 50,000 German troops and counted the bodies of 10,000 more. Estimates of the number of escaping troops range from 20,000 to 40,000. Only 62 tanks escaped the pocket, and most of those would be lost the following week in the mad dash to the Seine.

The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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N Thury-Harcourt XXXX

First Potigny Can

XXXXX

Clair Tizon

21

XXX

II Can

St-Jean-le-Blanc X

X

XXXX

X

XII

XXX

XX

XX

XXX

3 Can

X

XXX

Second Br

53

59

4 Can 2 Can

43

St-Marc-d’Ouilly

XX

326

XX

12.SS

XX

Trun

5

Pierreâtte

XX

363

XXX

II

XX

Or ne

XXXX

331

7

Forêt de Gouf fern

Putanges

XXX

Flers

XX

353

3

LVIII

XXX

LXXXIV

XX

243

X

XX

Pz Group Eberbach

XXX

XXX

VIII

XX

XX

X

10.SS

XX

28

XX

XIX

XX

116

XX

XX

90

XX

XXX

12 US

XV

XXXX

XX

XXXXX

XX

XXX

9

1

First US

2 Fr

3

30 XXXX

Écouché

I.SS

XX

275

XXX

XVII.SS

2

Briouze

9

XX

XXX

XXX

II.SS

XX

XXX

84

Argentan

XLVII

708

Le BourgSt-Léonard

XXXX

XXX

XX

XX

XX

Les Hordousseaux

XXXX

LXXIV

XX

XX

11

Les Champeaux es

XX

XXX

Athis

XX

1.SS

21

XXX

III

Vimoutiers

Div

89

271

277

276

XX

85

XX XX

XX

XX

XX

Condé-surNoireau

XX

Falaise

50

Vassy

1 Pl

XX

XX XX

XXX

LXXXVI

XX

VII

Rânes XXXX

Third US Front line, August 16 Front line, August 19

0 0

5 miles 5km

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MAP 53: CLOSING THE FALAISE POCKET AUGUST 18–21, 1944 The “tips of the spear” assigned to close the Falaise Pocket in the Trun– Chambois Gap were Lieutenant-General Simonds’ II Canadian Corps from the north, and Major-General Gaffey’s Provisional Corps from Third US Army. By August 16, II Canadian Corps had captured Falaise and there was considerable pressure to close the remaining gap, which at this point was about 12 miles wide. On August 17, the 90th Division of Gaffey’s Provisional Corps overcame the Le Bourg-St-Léonard ridgeline being held by the 2.SS-Panzer Division and 116.Panzer Division. By August 18, the 90th Division had reached 3 miles south of Chambois. On the north side of the gap, II Canadian Corps was employing the 4th Canadian Armoured Division in the direction of Trun and the 1st Polish Armoured Division farther east in the direction of Mont-Ormel. On August 18, the 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division liberated Trun. Simonds placed considerable pressure on General Stanisław Maczek to get his division to Mont-Ormel and Chambois to close the gap in the east. The Polish 1st Armoured Division was deployed in three battle groups with two aimed at Mont-Ormel and one at Chambois. The two battle groups reached Hill 262 North around noon on August 19. The Poles dubbed the hill area as Maczuga (the Mace) from the shape of the hill on the maps. The units on Hill 262 North comprised the bulk of the Polish division’s combat strength, including the 3rd Rifle Brigade, and both the 1st and 2nd Armoured regiments. From the high ground, the Polish tanks began to engage the numerous German columns moving through the valley below. Efforts were made to push rifle battalions forward to seize Hill 262 South, but the difficulty of the terrain and heavy German fire prevented this. As the German forces started to take fire from Hill 262 North, they began desperate steps to remove this dangerous obstruction. Several of the German Panzer divisions were directed to wipe out the detachments on Hill 262 North and over the course of the next two days, bitter hand-tohand fighting raged over Mont-Ormel. The third Polish battle group under Lieutenant-Colonel Władysław Zgorzelski fought its way through the German columns to Chambois and set up a perimeter defense on the evening of August 19. This included his regiment, the 10th Dragoons, as well as the 24th Lancers and the 10th Mounted Rifles. In the meantime, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division was attempting to link up with the Poles in Chambois by pushing down the 120

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road from Trun towards St-Lambert-sur-Dive. On August 18, Simonds ordered the division to push as far south as Moissy near where it was expected that the Canadian, Polish, and American forces would join to seal off the gap. The South Alberta Regiment was assigned to capture St-Lambert-sur-Dive, and on August 18, C Squadron under Major David Currie reached the outskirts of the town. This created a firestorm from the German side since the advance down the road cut several bridges over the Dives River being used by escaping German units. Later that evening, additional forces arrived to reinforce Currie’s squadron. The fighting around Mont-Ormel and St-Lambert-sur-Dive intensified substantially on August 20 as the German forces realized that they were on the verge of being trapped. II.SS-Panzer-Korps, which had already escaped the pocket, was ordered to attack the Polish positions on Hill 262 North from the eastern side to keep open the routes for retreating German troops. By this stage, a substantial amount of Allied artillery had been brought into range, and forward observers stationed with the various Canadian, Polish, and American units were directing a tremendous amount of fire against the Germans in the pocket. The northern side of the gap was finally closed late on August 21 when the Grenadier Guards from the Trun area connected with the Poles on Hill 262 North. Around 2000hrs, the British Columbia Regiment finally seized Hill 262 South. The 1st Hussars and Highland Light Infantry pushed down the Trun road past St-Lambert-sur-Dive and finally linked up with the Polish and American forces in Chambois. On the southern side of the gap, the US 90th Division had launched its attack towards Chambois on August 19 with two of its regiments, the 358th and 359th Infantry, approaching Chambois from either side. At this point, the division had been allotted 16 extra battalions of field artillery for support beyond its own four battalions. The other division of Gaffey’s Provisional Corps, the French 2e Division Blindée, was operating to the east and Groupe Tactique Langlade provided some tank support for the 90th Division attack. The first juncture of the American and Polish troops took place near Le Haut Fel on the late afternoon of August 19 with the 2/359th Infantry. This division solidified the southern end of the Trun–Chambois Gap until the Falaise Pocket was finally closed on August 21.

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XX

Neauphe-sur-Dive

Trun 10 Can

1 Pol

XX

X

(-)

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3

Coudehard

XX

Fou Div

lbe

10

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Mont-Ormel

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12.SS

262 South

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1 Pl Zgorzelski

226

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358 III

359

Omméel

Le Haut Fel

Miguillaume

Ste-Eugenie XX

N

Fougy

Villebadin

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X

GTL

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MAP 54: THE US ARMY ADVANCE TO THE SEINE AUGUST 19–24, 1944 By August 15, Patton’s Third US Army had three corps advancing toward Dreux (XV Corps), Chartres (XX Corps), and Orléans (XII Corps). The aim was to reach the Seine River and establish what was called the “D-Day lodgment area,” the section of northwest France up to the Seine that would be the base for further Allied operations in the autumn and winter of 1944. There were no orders to cross the Seine, only to clear the western bank. On August 16, Eisenhower had met with Montgomery and Bradley to discuss operational planning. The original D-Day plans had not expected Allied forces to reach the outer boundary of the D-Day lodgment area until D+90, when in fact it had been reached on D+74. This had created significant logistics challenges which slowed the advance of Patton’s Third US Army. All three commanders agreed to ignore earlier plans and to exploit the current German predicament. As part of this issue, Bradley raised the problem posed by the intrusion of Haislip’s XV Corps into the British 21st Army Group sector near Mantes-la-Jolie. Montgomery had always proposed a long envelopment on the Seine, which might trap as many as 75,000 German troops on the left bank. As a result, he encouraged Bradley to ignore the interAllied boundaries and exploit the opportunity. Bradley contacted Patton and authorized him to begin a crossing operation over the Seine. Haislip’s XV Corps encountered modest resistance, as the German 7.Armee was preoccupied trying to fight their way out of the Falaise Gap. The 79th Division established a bridgehead over the Eure on the afternoon of August 16, placing it only 37 miles from Paris, and later in the day secured a foothold over the Seine. On August 17, the 79th Division expanded its foothold over the Seine at Mantes-Gassicourt, at first by improvised means and subsequently by organized ferries. The 5th Armored Division provided a Treadway bridge which was established near Rosny-sur-Seine to permit expanded crossings on August 20. The unexpected attack surprised the new Heeresgruppe B commander, Generalfeldmarschall Model, at the underground bunker complex at La Roche-Guyon. The Heeresgruppe B command staff hurriedly evacuated the site for Soissons. Model quickly appreciated the threat posed by the bridgehead, but, lacking ground forces, attempted to stop the expansion of the bridgehead with heavy air attacks. In one of the largest showings of strength that month, several Luftwaffe squadrons began incessant air attacks using strafing, bombs, and rockets 122

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to stifle the bridgehead. In response, XV Corps moved all available antiaircraft defenses around the bridge. Luftwaffe attacks failed to inflict significant damage on any of the bridges, and, starting on August 22, the 18.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division arrived in the Mantes-la-Jolie sector and began counterattacks. The advance by General Walton Walker’s XX Corps encountered the only significant German resistance to Patton’s Third US Army at Chartres. An improvised headquarters from 1.Armee under General Kurt von der Chevallerie arrived in the city on August 15 and began creating a defense force from parts of the 48.Infanterie-Division, security units, stragglers, and local Flak units. It took two days for the 7th Armored Division to liberate the city, with a final assault on the morning of August 19 taking 2,000 more prisoners. Delayed by the defense of Chartres, Walker’s XX Corps reached the Seine on August 22–23. The 5th Infantry Division reached the heights overlooking Fontainebleu in the early morning hours of August 23 and rushed the river at dawn. A second crossing was made to the east at Montereau against the remnants of the 48.Infanterie-Division. By the end of the day, XX Corps had five bridgeheads over the river, and corps engineers began constructing four Treadway bridges. This permitted exploitation out of the bridgeheads the following day using tanks. Farther south, General Gilbert Cook’s XII Corps served primarily as a flanking force through the Loire Valley. Patton was concerned that the Germans might push units up from the south against the undefended American southern flank, and the XII Corps mission was largely intended to prevent this. Owing to the enormous amount of ground to be covered, a major role in this operation was assigned to the XIX Tactical Air Command, which conducted repeated sorties along the Loire to look for German activity. In addition, the USAAF systematically destroyed bridges over the Loire to prevent any German flank attacks. As a result of the actions of Patton’s three corps, by August 24, the Seine had been breached both north and south of Paris. Instead of attempting to set up a comprehensive defensive line behind Paris, 1.Armee was ordered to conduct counterattacks against the bridgeheads over the next few days using weak and unprepared formations. This did little to halt the American advance, and led to the rapid attrition of the Wehrmacht units involved, speeding the rout of 1.Armee in the area northeast of Paris in the final week of August.

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XX

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5

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0

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MAP 55: THE ADVANCE ON PARIS  AUGUST 23–24, 1944 Tensions in Paris rose steadily through the summer as evidence increased of the German catastrophe in Normandy. By the second week of August 1944, it was obvious to the average Parisian that the Germans were abandoning the city. On Sunday, August 13, OB West ordered the Paris police force disarmed. On August 14, the French Resistance called for a police strike, instructing the police to keep their weapons and join the Resistance. Hitler again instructed the Paris commander, General Dietrich von Choltitz that Paris was to be burned rather than surrendered. As strike fever spread, the postal workers went out on August 16, and the Metro workers on August 17. A final mass evacuation of German administrative personnel from Paris took place on August 17, followed the next day by the last senior German police and Nazi functionaries. The French Resistance began the uprising on the morning of August 19 with the seizure of the police headquarters. The Wehrmacht response to the uprising was feeble owing to the lack of resources following the calamitous Falaise encirclement. On August 19, Generalfeldmarschall Model of OB West allotted a paltry two battalions of the 6.Fallschirmjäger-Division to Paris. That evening, Model bluntly informed Berlin that Paris could not be held with existing forces in the face of a major insurrection. Neither Model nor Berlin had a clear appreciation of the events in Paris and were unaware of the depth of US Army penetrations toward the Seine on either side of the city. Allied planning had expected to skirt around Paris to avoid a major urban entanglement. The head of the Free French government, Charles De Gaulle, threatened to order the French 2e Division Blindée to liberate the city. The division was part of Haislip’s XV Corps of Patton’s Third Army. During a meeting on August 22, Bradley and Eisenhower agreed that the situation in Paris was getting out of hand and that they would have to intervene regardless of previous planning. Eisenhower had already promised that General Philippe Leclerc’s 2e Division Blindée would be given the honor and Bradley reinforced it with the reliable and experienced 4th Infantry Division. The orders stated that the city was to be entered only if enemy resistance was such that it could be overcome with a light force. To avoid destruction of the city, there 124

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would be no severe fighting, and no air or artillery bombardment. Indeed, Major-General Gerow ordered the reduction of artillery battalions from the force to discourage excessive artillery use. The advance on Paris began on the morning of August 23. Although the German forces in the area were not crack troops, the approach route was heavily urbanized and most of the main roads were covered by Flak batteries protected by small detachments of troops from Kampfgruppe von Aulock. An advance force from the 2e Division Blindée entered Paris on the late afternoon of August 23, with the main force entering the city on Friday August 24 along with the American 4th Infantry Division. German resistance was weak and halfhearted, and the Paris garrison commander, General Choltitz, was captured at his headquarters in the early afternoon. The fighting continued in many parts of Paris through Friday afternoon. The city streets were a bewildering confusion of celebrations and sporadic gunfire. The last major stronghold to surrender was the Palais de Luxembourg, held by German diehards with several tanks. They were ordered by Choltitz’s officers to surrender, and, after firing off their ammunition, they capitulated at 1935hrs. In total, about 20,000 German troops surrendered on August 24 and 25, and German casualties during the week of the uprising were estimated at 3,200 soldiers. On Friday as the 2e Division Blindée was entering Paris, Hitler demanded of Jodl, Chief of the General Staff: “Brennt Paris?” (“Is Paris burning?”) On learning of the capitulation of Paris the next day, Hitler ordered the city retaken, that all available V-weapons be launched against the city, and that the Luftwaffe obliterate the city by bombing attack. The Luftwaffe staged a single bombing raid on Saturday night, August 26, but the V-1 missile sites were in the process of evacuating the bases in the Pas-de-Calais so none was fired against Paris. Regardless of Hitler’s instructions, the rout of German forces throughout northern France made any organized attack on Paris impossible. A Kampfgruppe of the Panzer-Lehr-Division with about 800 troops and a few tanks reached the northern section of the city, but hastily withdrew rather than face the wrath of inflamed Parisians.

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cq Our al Can

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Aug 25

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MAP 56: OPERATION DRAGOON – AUGUST 15, 1944 An Allied amphibious landing on the Mediterranean coast of southern France had been a bone of contention between the US and British governments since 1943. Churchill firmly opposed the scheme in favor of continued operations in Italy, while US Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall was equally adamant that the defeat of the German Army in France take precedence over the “Italian sideshow.” As a result, there were few British Army troops in the operation except for a contingent of paratroopers. The ground forces were predominantly from the US Army during the initial landings, with French units landing in the subsequent days. First called Operation Anvil, the amphibious landing was supposed to coincide with Neptune in Normandy. However, a shortage of amphibious landing ships and craft forced its postponement till mid-August when it had been renamed as Dragoon. By this time, the defending German Heeresgruppe G had been substantially weakened by transfer of its best units to Normandy. The Western Naval Task Force responsible for Operation Dragoon included some 843 ships and 1,267 landing craft, and was organized into six task forces: TF80 Control Force, the command element; TF84, TF85 and TF86, assigned to each of the three landing beaches; TF86, assigned to the special forces operations; and the carrier force TF88. The Dragoon plan incorporated an airborne landing to secure the high ground beyond the beachheads using the improvised 1st Airborne Task Force. Sitka Force, consisting of the 1st Special Service Force and the associated Naval TF86 were assigned to seize the Île du Levant and Île de Port-Cros on the southern side of the landing zones to silence coastal batteries prior to the main landings. Although the Normandy airborne landings had demonstrated the problems of dropping airborne forces at night given the limitations of the existing navigation technology, the Dragoon airborne landings were scheduled for the predawn hours anyway. Mission Albatross arrived over the coast after 0400hrs consisting of 396 aircraft carrying 5,600 paratroopers. The drops were widely dispersed but about a third of the force landed near enough to the drop zone to assemble and move against their objective. The glider reinforcements, Mission Bluebird and Mission Dove, brought in reinforcements. There was little German resistance in the landing zones. 126

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The battle-hardened 3rd Infantry Division was assigned to land on the southernmost of the beaches, codenamed Alpha, since it was expected to face the strongest German counterattacks while at the same time being closest to the prime objectives of Toulon and Marseilles. German resistance was sporadic and the division captured 1,627 prisoners on D-Day. The center landings, codenamed Delta, were conducted by the 45th Infantry Division near Ste-Maxime. As in the case of the Alpha landings, the German resistance in this sector was weak. Camel Beach in the Gulf of Fréjus on either side of the port of St-Raphaël was assigned to the 36th Infantry Division. This sector was guarded by unusually strong German defenses compared to the other Dragoon landing beaches. This was not altogether surprising, as Fréjus had been a traditional invasion point since antiquity: Julius Caesar had landed there to initiate his conquest of Gaul, and Napoleon had picked the same spot on his return from exile on Elba. German coastal defense doctrine emphasized the protection of ports, and this area contained not only the port of St-Raphaël, but also a flat beach leading into the Argens River Valley, which offered a direct route to Le Muy and Draguignan beyond. The most heavily defended sector was Camel Green Beach, assigned to the 142nd Infantry Regiment. Initial efforts to land in this sector were greeted with heavy artillery fire, and the regiment was prudently routed to Camel Green instead, averting a potential bloodbath. The only major casualties suffered by Camel Force came later in the evening during a Luftwaffe raid when a Do-217 bomber hit the vessel LST-282 with a Hs 293 antiship missile, sinking it in shallow water. Allied casualties on D-Day have never been carefully tabulated owing to incomplete records, but were extremely light, about 95 killed and 385 wounded. Compared to the Normandy landings, the Dragoon landings met very light resistance. The landing beaches were well fortified with ample artillery, but on average were manned by only a battalion of German troops. Furthermore, the quality of the troops was poor, with large numbers of impressed foreigners in their ranks. By this stage of the war, Allied forces in the Mediterranean theater had staged several large amphibious landings, and this experience, combined with the use of seasoned troops, resulted in a well-organized, swift, and successful operation.

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MAP 57: THE RHÔNE TRIANGLE AUGUST 20–25, 1944 Fully aware of the catastrophe unfolding in Normandy, Heeresgruppe G commander Generaloberst Blaskowitz held little hope that southern France could be held with the weak forces at his disposal. Word of the Allied landings began to filter into Heeresgruppe G and 19.Armee headquarters in the early hours of August 15. Local forces were able to cobble together little more than an infantry regiment to counterattack the Allied beachhead. By the night of August 16/17, Blaskowitz had little detailed information about the Allied landings because the units along the coast had largely vanished, their communication lines had been cut, and the Luftwaffe was incapable of conducting reconnaissance over the beachhead. The movement of reinforcements to the east side of the Rhône proved extremely difficult both owing to the thorough Allied destruction of major bridges, as well as to the presence of Allied aircraft, which mercilessly strafed and bombed any moving column. The countryside was alive with French Maquis (Resistance) partisans, who made movement difficult even under the cover of darkness. The landings in southern France threatened to cut off both 1.Armee and 19.Armee unless prompt action was taken. At a briefing with Hitler on August 16, the OKW offered the stark choice of immediately withdrawing both Heeresgruppe B from Normandy and Heeresgruppe G from southern France or risk destruction of both, leaving the German frontier in the west unguarded. In complete contrast to his previous insistence on the Wehrmacht holding territory “to the last man,” Hitler agreed to the OKW plan and authorized the withdrawal of Heeresgruppe G. This decision essentially conceded two-thirds of France to the Allies without a fight. Hitler insisted that the garrisons of several fortified ports remain to keep them out of Allied hands. On the afternoon of August 17, the 19.Armee headquarters was instructed that all units except for forces in the ports of Toulon and Marseilles were to withdraw northward and establish a new defensive line from Sens through Dijon to the Swiss frontier. The 242.InfanterieDivision in Toulon and the 244.Infanterie-Division in Marseilles would 128

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be sacrificed to buy time for the rest of 19.Armee to withdraw. Blaskowitz attempted to establish successive defense lines to be held by the 11.Panzer-Division and 198.Infanterie-Division. These were codenamed C, D, and E, and were intended to keep the access to the Rhône Valley blocked long enough to allow German divisions to escape. In reality, there were few contacts between the pursuing US Army units and the German rearguards at this stage of the campaign. The main German force on the eastern bank of the Rhône was Korps Kniess, based around General Baptist Kniess’ LXXXV.ArmeeKorps. IV.Luftwaffen-Feld-Korps, which had been stationed farther west near the Spanish frontier, retreated up the west bank of the Rhône in parallel to Kniess’ command. On August 21, 11.Panzer-Division sent another small battle group toward Aix-en-Provence to discourage any further advance by the US 3rd Division, which was moving on Aixen-Provence with the aim of following the retreating German forces up the Rhône Valley. Allied signals intelligence had decrypted the German retreat orders and on the evening of August 18, the Seventh US Army commander, Lieutenant-General Alexander Patch met with 6th Army Group commander Lieutenant-General Jacob Devers to determine future courses of action. Major-General Lucian Truscott, commander of VI Corps, was instructed to accelerate the pursuit of the fleeing German columns up the Rhône Valley. The retreat of the 157.Infanterie-Division from Grenoble left a void in this sector, which allowed a parallel pursuit by Task Force Butler and the 45th Infantry Division to the east of the Rhône Valley. The follow-on French forces of II Corps were instructed to conduct their original mission of liberating the ports of Toulon and Marseilles in sequence. The rapid capture of the ports had become urgent owing to severe shortages of fuel. Allied plans had not anticipated such a rapid collapse of the German defenses in southern France, nor the rapid pace of the pursuit.

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Lin

eE Orange

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MAP 58: LIBERATION OF MARSEILLES AUGUST 20–27, 1944 The largest component of the French Army fighting alongside the Allies was Armée B, later called the 1re Armée Française (First French Army) commanded by Général Jean de Lattre de Tassigny. This army was composed of French units stationed in North Africa that had been modernized and re-equipped by the US Army in 1943–44. They were assigned to Lieutenant-General Devers’ 6th Army Group, alongside Patch’s Seventh US Army. Only a single corps of this field army had landed in August 1944, and their principal assignment was the liberation of the ports of Toulon and Marseilles. These were the only two garrisons in southern France heavily defended by the Wehrmacht in August 1944. The first of the ports to be assaulted was Toulon, which was attacked by three French infantry divisions starting on August 19. Most of the port was liberated by August 24, though some German holdouts on the offshore islands and peninsulas did not surrender until later in the month. While most of the 3e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne was taking part in the Toulon fighting, a battle group of the 7e Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens (7th Algerian Rifle Regiment) headed for Marseilles on August 20 along with armored columns of the 1re Division Blindée. The French advance enjoyed almost complete freedom of movement except for occasional German military police units. This allowed de Lattre to deploy his forces on all sides of Marseilles for the final attack. Besides the regular French forces involved in the fighting for Marseilles, the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) resistance played a significant role. The German garrison thought it might face as many as 80,000 insurgents. In fact, there were fewer than a thousand armed insurgents. An uprising broke out in the city on August 21, prompted less by the FFI resistance and more by local citizenry, thoroughly fed up with the brutal German occupation, and inspired by the insurrection in Paris. Marseilles was held by the three regiments of the 244.InfanterieDivision (Grenadier-Regiment.932, 933, and 934), commanded by Generalleutnant Hans Schaefer. The city garrison numbered about 13,000, including 2,500 Kriegsmarine and 3,900 Luftwaffe personnel. Schaefer was not convinced of the value of the numerous naval coastal defense strongpoints, and so he ordered the Kriegsmarine to convert most of these troops into infantry and to deploy them in the second line of defense. French forces reached the outskirts of Marseilles on August 21 near Auriol. The appearance of French troops in the suburbs led to the start 130

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of a disjointed popular insurrection and the establishment of a “provisional government” within the city. In reality, the FFI lacked the strength to wrest control of the city from the Germans, but the Germans lacked the strength to suppress the revolt. The French attack was commanded by the 3e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne’s Général de division Joseph de Goislard de Monsabert. French columns began probing the outskirts of the city on August 22. Monsabert believed the German forces in the city were weak and disorganized, and he gave Colonel Abel Chappuis of the 7e Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens a free hand. This regiment advanced through most of the eastern suburbs against little opposition, and, on the morning of August 23, they were coaxed into the heart of city to the acclaim of the growing French crowds. The 3e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne attempted to negotiate a capitulation of the German garrison with the aid of the German consul general but the fighting for the city took three days. The Vieux Port (Old Port) fell almost immediately and large sections of the city came under French control. The German garrison remained ensconced in the numerous fortifications along the seacoast as well as in the heights near Notre-Dame-de-Garde. On August 25, the remainder of the 3e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne that had been fighting in Toulon arrived in Marseilles and overwhelmed the last German holdouts in the southern sector. Mop-up operations of numerous small German strongpoints scattered around the city and the suburbs continued until the end of the month. French casualties were 1,825 men killed and wounded, and about 11,000 German troops surrendered. The capture of Marseilles was a month earlier than expected in Allied planning, on D+13 instead of D+45. German engineer teams had done a thorough job of destroying port facilities, and obstructing the harbor with sunken ships and mines. Owing to the port’s importance, specialized US forces moved into the port immediately to begin its rehabilitation. The first Liberty ship unloaded a cargo on shore on September 15, and, by the end of the month, the port had already handled over 100,000 tons of cargo. Marseilles became the main Allied port in southern France and, by October, the southern French ports accounted for over a half-million tons of cargo each month. In total, Marseilles and the other southern ports accounted for nearly a third of the Allied cargo delivered to the European Theater of Operations in 1944 and 1945.

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III

2 Cuir

Auriol III

II

2

1 GTM

7 RTA

III

II

1

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III

932 III

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2 miles 2km

M e d i t e r r a n e a n

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MAP 59: THE PURSUIT TO LYON – AUGUST 29 TO SEPTEMBER 3, 1944 In spite of the vulnerability of the retreating Heeresgruppe G, Patch’s Seventh US Army was not able to fully exploit the German predicament. The 19.Armee was able to escape a potential encirclement around Montélimar on August 25–26. The pursuit up the Rhône Valley continued through the last week of August. Patch had a good appreciation of German intentions thanks to Ultra signal intelligence decrypts, and an OKW signal from August 25, received on August 28, laid out the German intentions to regroup around Dijon and to use the 11.Panzer Division as a rearguard to prevent a repeat of the Montélimar mess by shielding the retreating forces on the east side of the Rhône. Patch maintained the original plans to use Truscott’s VI Corps as the main pursuit force heading up Route 7 to Lyons and beyond, with French forces of de Lattre’s Armée B providing a covering force to the west. Since it would take de Lattre some time to secure Toulon, Marseilles, and the surrounding coastal area, only some of these forces were available for the pursuit to Lyons. The French IIe Corps provided two divisions to cover the west bank of the Rhône, with Général Jean du Vigier’s 1re Division Blindée at the extreme left, and Général Diego Brosset’s 1re Division de Marche d’Infanterie on the west bank of the Rhône. Patch hoped that if the 3rd and 45th divisions could move fast enough, they could reach Bourg and block the main German escape route. The Heeresgruppe G commander Blaskowitz was anxious to push his units through Lyons as rapidly as possible, as there were reports that an insurrection had broken out in the city. IV.Luftwaffen-Feld-Korps, which had escaped largely unscathed up the west side of the Rhône, was assigned to regain control of the city and hold it open through the night of August 31, by which time Blaskowitz expected his forces to have passed through. He instructed 11.Panzer-Division to destroy all the bridges over the Rhône and Ain rivers east of Lyons in hope of thwarting any American drive toward Bourg. The race between the 11.Panzer-Division and the 45th Division was won by the Americans, who passed over both rivers and reached the area north of Meximieux by September 1. Over the next few days, there were several sharp skirmishes between both units, which tied down the 45th Division’s advance. A Kampfgruppe from 11.Panzer-Division launched an attack into Meximieux behind the 45th Division’s main 132

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force, colliding with two reserve companies of the 179th Infantry and the regimental headquarters. The Kampfgruppe reported that it had destroyed the regiment when in fact US casualties were about 215 men, two M10 tank destroyers, two M8 armored cars and a few vehicles, while the Germans lost 85 men killed, 41 captured, 12 tanks, three selfpropelled guns and several vehicles. Lyons was enveloped by September 2 and Patch gave the French divisions the honor of liberating the city. By September 3, most of the German forces had already escaped. Efforts to cut off the escape route farther north at Bourg were frustrated by German defenses. Truscott used his sole mobile force, the overworked 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, to try an end run around Bourg by taking the towns of Montreval and Marboz farther north. This squadron pushed into Montreval on September 3 after a first attempt the night before had failed. Two troops from the cavalry squadron routed a force of about 300 German rear service personnel, but quickly found themselves trapped by an 11.Panzer-Division Kampfgruppe based around the division’s reconnaissance battalion reinforced with tanks, assault guns, and engineers. During the one-sided skirmish that ensued, the 117th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron had five men killed and 126 taken prisoner along with 20 jeeps, 15 M8 armored cars, and two M5A1 light tanks captured. By this stage, most of 19.Armee had escaped by an alternate route through Macon. The only German force to fall victim to the Allied advance was the rearguard of IV.Luftwaffen-Feld-Korps, which lost 2,000 troops, captured by the French 1re Division Blindée. The first two weeks of September saw a continued pursuit of the ragtag Heeresgruppe G through central France, with Blaskowitz unable to hold any of the intended objectives such as Dijon or Besançon. Patch’s Seventh US Army was equally frustrated in its attempts to outrace and trap any significant portion of the German force owing to overextension and the lingering fuel shortages. By September 10, patrols from the Dragoon units began meeting up with forward patrols from Patton’s Third US Army. In the process, they trapped the final 1. Armee column under Generalmajor Botho Elster from the Bordeaux area on the Loire River, and 20,000 troops surrendered on September 15, largely ending the pursuit. Heeresgruppe G lost about 150,000 troops in the retreat as well as 1,316 of its original 1,481 field guns.

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N XX

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MAP 60: THE GERMAN ROUT IN FRANCE AUGUST 1944 The Wehrmacht later referred to the last week of August and the first week of September 1944 as “the Void.” By this stage, all semblance of a coherent defense collapsed across France. From the perspective of Model’s Heeresgruppe B in northern France, and Blaskowitz’s Heeresgruppe G in southern and central France, the main objective was survival. There was a wholesale retreat to the German frontier. The sole exception was several naval garrisons including St-Nazaire, Royan, Dieppe, and the Gironde Estuary. Hitler designated these ports as Festungen, to be defended to the last man, leaving a quarter-million troops isolated and abandoned. The Wehrmacht in the West suffered about 725,000 casualties between June and September 1944: about 55,000 killed in action, 339,000 missing, and 332,000 wounded. In early September 1944, the German Army in the West had only 13 infantry divisions, three Panzer divisions, and two Panzer brigades rated as combat effective. A further 42 infantry divisions and 13 Panzer divisions were ineffective, and, of the infantry divisions, seven were simply disbanded. Virtually all of the tanks and armored vehicles deployed in northern France in the summer of 1944 had been lost. This totaled over 2,900 armored vehicles, including about 2,010 tanks, 590 assault guns, and over 300 tank destroyers. On September 12, 1944, Heeresgruppe B had only 82 operational tanks and assault guns. Of Heeresgruppe B’s three field armies, 7.Armee and 5.PanzerArmee had been decimated in the Falaise Gap, followed by further losses in the withdrawal over the Seine River in late August and in encirclements in Belgium in early September 1944. Only 15.Armee on the North Sea coast was still intact, but most of its best divisions had been shipped off to Normandy during the summer, and it was left with poor-quality, static infantry divisions, suitable for coastal defense. Aside from the crippling defeats in Normandy and southern France, the most profound event of the summer was Operation Valkyrie, the attempted assassination of Adolf Hitler on July 20. Many senior commanders in France were implicated in the bomb plot, including OB West commander von Kluge and Heeresgruppe B commander Rommel. Hitler lost confidence in his military commanders, especially those 134

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in the west, and began to take an increasingly intrusive role in German military planning. General Hasso von Manteuffel, appointed commander of 5.Panzer-Armee in September 1944, described the change: “The previous style of flexible and self-reliant German military leadership was paralyzed, shifting more and more to mechanical and perfunctory execution of orders issued as Führer Directives, concocted in a map room far away from the battlefield. That spelled death for the traditional German ‘Art of Command’ in mobile warfare. Even the most outstanding senior commanders, raised under the traditional training regime, were compelled to follow these orders to the letter, and were not permitted to independently make decisions, even in small tactical matters involving single divisions.” For senior Allied commanders like Eisenhower and Montgomery, the situation was reminiscent of the state of the Kaiser’s Army in November 1918, on the verge of collapse and surrender. Many officers thought the war would be over within a few weeks, and that the Allied soldiers would be home by Christmas. The main problem facing the Allies in early September was that their field armies were overextended and pushing beyond the limits of their logistics. The Overlord plans had expected the Allied forces to be on the Seine River in early September when in fact they were now 150 miles beyond. On September 11, 1944, the first day US troops entered Germany, the Allies were along a phase line that the Overlord plans did not expect to reach until D+330, May 2, 1945 – some 233 days ahead of schedule. Patton’s Third US Army was at the phase line expected for April 1945. The overextension was not important if in fact the Wehrmacht was on the verge of collapse. The Allied euphoria lasted until the middle of September when an ugly new reality emerged. As the Wehrmacht approached home soil, the late summer panic subsided and the will to fight returned. The rabbit had turned back into a porcupine. Partially formed divisions were created in the border districts of western Germany, and thrown into battle ready or not. The fuel shortage caused by the Allied bombing offensive grounded much of the Luftwaffe and kept most of the Kriegsmarine in port. These troops were hastily converted into infantry. The “Miracle along the Westwall” had begun.

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The Battle for France, June–August 1944

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CHAPTER 3

THE BATTLES ALONG THE GERMAN FRONTIER SEPTEMBER–DECEMBER 1944

A US Army infantry company of the 399th Infantry, 100th Division in a defensive position in the Vosges mountains on November 4, 1944, with a water-cooled Browning .30 machine gun in the foreground. (NARA) 137

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MAP 61: THE VOID: PURSUIT TO THE GERMAN FRONTIER – AUGUST 26 TO SEPTEMBER 11, 1944 The Wehrmacht staged no significant defensive action in the final week of August and the first week of September 1944 during the retreat from northern France. It was a chaotic rout back to the German frontier, with occasional rearguard skirmishes in the hope of delaying the Allied pursuit. Many of the troops who had escaped the Falaise Pocket were netted by deeper Allied envelopments along the Seine or in Belgium around Mons. Generalfeldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt returned to command the OB West on September 5, having been relieved of the same post on July 1 over disagreements with Hitler about operations in France. His principal subordinates were Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, commanding Heeresgruppe B northwestern Germany and Holland, and Generaloberst Johannes Blaskowitz, commanding Heeresgruppe G in the Alsace and Saar region. The short-term objective of the Wehrmacht in September 1944 was simply to survive after the devastating losses of the previous month. This process was greatly aided by three factors: the returning morale of the German troops on reaching German soil, the sudden increase in the manpower pool caused by the fuel shortage, and the halt in the Red Army offensive in Poland. Even if the Westwall was more symbolic than real, there was a sense that the frontier could and should be defended. Constructed in the late 1930s, the Westwall had been stripped of most of its armament for the Atlantic Wall, and most of the fortifications had been abandoned. Hitler had ordered the reinforcement of the obsolete Westwall with additional field fortifications and weapons, a program called the WestStellung (Western Position). It was better known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line. The proximity of the Siegfried to German industry and supply dumps simplified German logistics even as it complicated Allied logistics. Furthermore, the congested industrialized terrain of the Roer, and the mountainous forests of the Hürtgen Forest (Hürtgenwald) were well suited to defense. 138

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The US Eighth Air Force had begun a campaign against German fuel supplies in May 1944 that had considerable effect by the end of the summer. The Romanian oilfields were lost in August 1944, depriving Germany of its main foreign source of fuel. One of the short-term consequences of the fuel shortage was that it forced the Luftwaffe to ground much of its combat force except for fighters involved in the defense of the Reich. Likewise, the Kriegsmarine was obliged to limit its operations to the submarine campaign, its surface fleet idling in port. As a result, there was a sudden increase in the manpower pool that could be diverted to the German Army at its most desperate moment. The halt of the Red Army offensive along the Vistula River in August 1944 also freed up resources for the western front. While fighting on the Russian front continued in the Balkans and in other peripheral theaters, the main front facing central Germany remained quiet until January 1945. In spite of these temporary reprieves, the Wehrmacht in the West was living on borrowed time. Allied operational planning during this period was largely reactive and opportunistic. The Wehrmacht had fought with extreme tenacity all through July in the bocage country around St-Lô and along the Caen–Falaise axis. The abrupt change in the battlefield dynamics was stunning and disconcerting. The predominant viewpoint among senior Allied commanders was that the German rout presaged a collapse akin to the German collapse in November 1918. Indeed, the August– September 1944 advances covered much of the same ground as those in 1918. The three Allied army groups advanced along a broad front. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group advanced along the Channel coast through Belgium and into the Netherlands. Bradley’s 12th Army Group advanced in the center through Belgium and was the first to reach German soil near Aachen. Devers’ 6th Army Group advanced up the Rhône Valley, finally ending up along the Vosges Mountains in Alsace.

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rces Armed Fo ds Netherlan XXXX ger jä m ir ch 1 Falls

Allied front line, date indicated 15.Armee

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MAP 62: CLEARING THE CHANNEL PORTS SEPTEMBER 1944 The First Canadian Army took its place on the extreme left flank of the Allied advance beyond the Seine in late August 1944. Its principal mission during early September was the liberation of the numerous ports along the English Channel. The Pas-de-Calais had been the most heavily fortified part of the Atlantic Wall, and so there were not only fortified ports to capture, but also some significant fortified strongpoints, especially in the Calais region. While the Germany Army retreated with some haste up along the coast, Hitler declared several of the Channels ports to be Festungen, meaning that they were to be defended to the last man. The honor of taking Dieppe was given to the 2nd Canadian Division and the city fell without a major fight on September 1. The second major port in Normandy, Le Havre, was invested by the British I Corps starting on September 3, and the Royal Navy monitor HMS Erebus conducted several gun duels with the German coastal batteries. Operation Astonia began on September 10, starting with a six-hour bombardment against coastal fortifications and defenses. The battle for Le Havre was conducted by two divisions supported by the specialized armour of the 79th Armoured Division. It lasted only two days, in no small measure owing to the demoralized state of the isolated garrison. With Operation Astonia under way, Canadian forces had begun to probe the outer defenses of both Boulogne and Calais. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was assigned Operation Wellhit, the assault against Festung Boulogne. In light of the experiences at Le Havre, the specialized armour of the 79th Armoured Division was also used to support the Canadians. Festung Boulogne had three major concentrations of fortifications. Operation Wellhit began on September 17 and lasted until September 22, when the garrison finally surrendered. Operation Wellhit led to the capture of about 10,000 German troops at a cost of about 600 Canadian casualties through the use of proven combined tank–infantry tactics. The capture of the port took six days instead of the planned two days, but the operation involved only about a third of the troops used at Le Havre. Although consideration was given to simply bypassing Calais in late August, Montgomery was convinced that it was necessary to deal with Festung Calais, because of the havoc that its strong gun positions could cause to Allied shipping in the Channel. On the night of September 140

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9/10, the Regina Rifles took the fortified port town of Wissant and overran the bunkers on Mont de Couple which offered excellent observation of the Cap Gris Nez and Calais region. Operation Undergo was again assigned to the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division, supported by the specialized armor of the 79th Armoured Division. The attack began on September 25 with heavy tank and artillery support. Within two days, the two Canadian brigades had cleared through most of the defenses to the southwest of the city, while at the same time routes of escape to the east were cut off. A temporary truce was called on September 29 to organize the evacuation of civilians still in the city. While the 7th and 8th brigades were busy in Calais, the 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade was assigned to clear the fortified belt along Cape Gris Nez including the Batterie Todt with its four massive 380mm guns. By this stage, the Canadians had a well-orchestrated scheme for dealing with the bunkers and all four of the main German batteries were overcome in a few hours’ fighting on September 29. The evacuation of the civilians from Calais served only to undermine morale further within Festung Calais. When the truce ended on September 30, the defense simply collapsed and the garrison formally surrendered. In spite of the enormous numbers of heavy gun bunkers and coastal defenses, the landward defenses were completely inadequate to hinder a determined attack, especially considering the lack of sufficient infantry in the Festung Calais garrison. The garrison did manage to wreck the harbor thoroughly, and it took more than three weeks to rehabilitate the port. Unlike Calais and Cape Gris Nez, Dunkirk lacked long-range gun batteries, so Montgomery decided to contain the port rather than waste time and troops capturing it. The Festung Dunkirk garrison numbered about 12,000 troops. Both sides engaged in periodic artillery skirmishes, and evacuation of the civilian population occurred during a truce on October 3–6. Most of the Canadian troops cordoning the city were replaced by the 1st Czechoslovak Armoured Brigade after the truce. After the German garrison staged a raid on the night of October 19/20, Operation Waddle was conducted on October 28 to discourage further actions; it was the last major military action of the siege. The garrison offered to surrender on May 4, 1945, and the town was finally liberated on May 6.

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Front line, September 30 First Canadian Army

Breda

NETHERLANDS

Tilburg

Second British Army First US Army

Zeebrugge

Third US Army

0

25 miles

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Bruges Sep 8

Dunkirk

Folkstone

E NGL A ND

Sangatte Calais Cape Gris Nez

Oct 1

Eastbourne

Boulogne

Sep 9

Ghent

Sep 25

1 Pl

2 Can

Sep 6

XX

Sep 21

Albe

rt Ca

XX

1 Pl

Scheldt

49 Br

nal XX

Sep 3

Ypres

Brussels

St-Omer

Sep 22

Sep 22

Antwerp

XX

XX

2 Can

Sep 5

Sep 11

Sep 12

Sep 9

XX

4 Can

Sep 6–7

Guines

Sep 29

Lille

Lys

E n g l i s h

Sep 21

Sep 9

Dover

25km

Turnhout

Sep 20

BELGIUM

Tournai

C h a n n e l

Sep 3

Sep 3 Sep 3

Sep 1

Meuse

Namur

Charleroi Arras XX

XXXX

1 Pl

Som

Sep 1

bre

Dinant

Mauberge

Second Br Dempsey

Abbeville

Le Tréport

Sam

Sep 2

Sep 1

Cambrai

me

Dieppe St-Valery Sep 1

51 Br

Le Havre

3 Can

XX

XX

2 Can

Amiens

XX

Aug 31

4 Can

Mézières Sedan

XX

Aug 30 Aug

Sep 4

Rouen 31

XXXX

Aug 26

Aisne

Hodges

Elbeuf Aug 25

Lisieux

Se

Oise

FRANCE

ine

Bernay

Trun

Reims

XXXX

MantesGassicourt

Vimoutiers XXXX

Third US

Patton

e

First US Pont L’Eveque

Meus

Sep 12

49 Br

XX

Sep 1

Third US

Aug 19

Paris

Marne

N

Patton

Châlonssur-Marne

141

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MAP 63: AIRBORNE OPTIONS JUNE–SEPTEMBER 1944 Several airborne operations were proposed before Market-Garden. One of the few small-scale airborne missions was Wildoats, an operation proposed for mid-June 1944 using the British 1st Airborne Division and associated with the Operation Perch attack. The plan was a ground attack from either side of Caen with the 1st Airborne Division dropping behind Caen and between the two pincers. Air Chief Marshal LeighMallory, the Allied air commander, quickly rejected the airborne plan as too dangerous. SHAEF studied plans in July 1944 to accelerate the capture of ports in Brittany once a Normandy breakthrough had occurred. This included Operation Hands Up to seize Quiberon Bay, Beneficiary to seize St-Malo, and Swordhilt to seize Brest. In the event, the Third US Army advance into Brittany was so fast as to preclude any such missions. Eisenhower decided that a separate command was needed to facilitate the planning and execution of airborne missions, and this led to the establishment of the First Allied Airborne Army under LieutenantGeneral Lewis Brereton. The new organization made its debut on August 2, 1944, directly subordinate to Eisenhower’s SHAEF rather than to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group or Bradley’s 12th Army Group. Following the Normandy breakout, a number of schemes were considered to help exploit the advance. Operation Transfigure was a plan to drop the US 101st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade into the Orléans Gap in mid-August as a means to accelerate the advance of Patton’s Third US Army and to trap remaining elements of the 7.Armee. Patton’s advance proved fast enough. There were several schemes to drop airborne forces ahead of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Operation Boxer aimed to capture Boulogne, as well as hinder retreating German forces. Aside from the large operations, on August 25, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group headquarters wanted to stage an immediate drop around Doullens, 25 miles north of Amiens, to facilitate their advance, but Brereton refused. Eisenhower agreed with Brereton that the First Allied Airborne Army should be reserved for mass operations with strategic significance. The two subsequent plans, operations Linnet and Linnet II, were large-scale missions involving the US 82nd and 101st Airborne divisions, the British 1st Airborne Division, and the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade. Linnet was aimed at Tournai around September 3, but was stillborn owing to the speed of the British advance. Linnet II was 142

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approved on September 3 with the goal of seizing Meuse River crossings in the Aachen and Maastricht areas. This was one of the few operations before Market-Garden where airborne and transport units were actually activated and prepared for the mission. Brereton’s deputy, LieutenantGeneral Frederick Browning, argued that the plan did not provide enough time. In the event, Linnet II was canceled. On the evening of September 3, Montgomery raised the issue of a landing in the Arnhem or Wesel area three days later, dubbed Operation Comet. First Allied Airborne Army ruled out Wesel on account of the density of the Flak in the area, and settled on Arnhem, with a scheme to seize the bridge by a coup de main using 18 gliders with the British 1st Airborne Division and Polish 1st Airborne Brigade landing nearby, followed by landings at nearby airfields by the airportable 52nd Division. Comet was planned for September 7, but postponed because of poor weather and then again by stiffening German resistance along the Albert Canal. Comet was canceled on September 10, but it would be resurrected later in the month as Market-Garden. Montgomery also raised the possibility of an airborne mission, part of Operation Infatuate, against Walcheren Island at the mouth of the Scheldt Estuary in hope of rapidly freeing up the port of Antwerp. Brereton adamantly opposed this mission owing to the nature of the terrain on the island and the intensity of the Flak. There was also a string of missions considered for a potential breakthrough to the Rhine in Bradley’s 12th Army Group sector in September. Operation Naples I was located east of Aachen to assist First US Army break through the Siegfried Line. Naples II was proposed to seize a Rhine bridge in the Cologne area ahead of Patton’s Third US Army. Operation Milan I was aimed at the Trier area to assist Third US Army penetrate the Siegfried Line; Milan II was a scheme to seize a Rhine bridge in the Koblenz area. The two Choker plans were counterparts for the Seventh US Army, Choker I in the Saarbrücken area to help break through the Siegfried Line, and Choker II to seize a Rhine bridge in the Mannheim area. One of the most intriguing plans was Operation Talisman, which planned to deal with a rapid German collapse by dropping airborne forces into Berlin, and possibly the port of Kiel, to seize airfields and port facilities in order to speed the assumption of control over the German government.

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 143

N

North Sea

Kiel Wismar Hamburg

London

Linnet September

Boxer August

Leipzig Dresden

Milan II September

Remagen

Chemnitz

lle

Frankfurt se Mo

Mainz

in

Choker I September

Choker II September

use

Paris

Rennes

Regensburg Danu

Stuttgart

Strasbourg

Munich Salzburg

Orleans Lo

ire

Nantes

Dijon

Tours

Zurich

Innsbruck

Berne

La Rochelle

Geneva

ITALY

Lyon Royan

100km

Trieste

Milan

Garo

nne

Verona

Venice

Po

Turin

Bordeaux Rhône

0

AUSTRIA

SWITZERLAND

FRANCE

100 miles

be

Troyes

Le Mans

Vannes

0

Pilsen

Nurnberg

Metz

rne

Lorient

Naples II September

Torgau

Kassel

Ma

Hands-Up July

Quimper

ine

Transfigure August

St-Brieuc

Brest

Liège

LUX.

Se

GERMANY

Aachen Rh ine

Luxembourg

Caen

Duisburg

Cologne

Milan I September

Le Havre

Münster

Me

Beneficiary July

ser

e

BELGIUM

Reims

Swordhilt July

Naples I September

Ma

Cherbourg

Arnhem

Linnet II Antwerp September

Abbeville

Wildoats June

Berlin

Elb

The Hague

Brussels Arras

Talisman September

We

Infatuate September

GREAT BRITAIN

Comet September

Amsterdam

Wittenburg

Bremen

NETHERLANDS

Ferrara Genoa La Spezia

Bologna

Ravenna

143

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MAP 64: OPERATION MARKET-GARDEN: THE PLAN Following the Normandy airborne landings, Eisenhower’s SHAEF and the First Allied Airborne Army considered numerous future airborne operations. When the German Army in the West began collapsing in mid-August, the First Allied Airborne Army considered an assortment of missions to conduct a deep envelopment of withdrawing forces by dropping airborne units in their path of retreat into Belgium. These schemes fell by the wayside for two principal reasons. Firstly, some of the plans were overtaken by events owing to the rapidity of the Allied advance. Secondly, many of the plans proved difficult to implement since much of the Troop Carrier Command was committed to fuel and supply missions between Britain and the Continent because of the logistics problems created by the rapid Allied advance. On September 3, the First Allied Airborne Army received tentative approval for Operation Linnet II, a plan to seize Meuse River crossings in the Aachen and Maastricht areas in advance of the Allied armies. Airborne commanders felt the scheme was too hasty, and Linnet II was canceled by (newly appointed) Field Marshal Montgomery. Instead, Montgomery raised the issue of a landing in the Arnhem or Wesel area three days later in order to leap over the Rhine. First Allied Airborne Army headquarters ruled out Wesel owing to the density of the Flak in the area, and settled on Arnhem. Codenamed Operation Comet, the mission was planned for September 7, but postponed for a day owing to poor weather. It was postponed again the following day following reports of stiffening German resistance along the Albert Canal, before being canceled altogether on September 10. Operation Comet was reborn a few days later in modified form as Operation Market-Garden. Both Montgomery and Brereton were strong proponents of the new plan. Operation Market resembled Comet in its objectives, but added a larger airborne element including two US 144

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airborne divisions. Operation Garden was also included, a more methodical ground campaign utilizing the British Second Army that would consolidate the corridor originally secured by the airborne forces. This plan was approved by Eisenhower for several reasons. In view of the collapse of the Wehrmacht, it seemed an opportune time to exploit the situation with a bold venture. In addition, Eisenhower had been under pressure by senior American commanders including US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and Army Air Forces commander General Henry “Hap” Arnold to employ the new airborne force on a mission of strategic significance. In contrast to the Normandy airborne landings, the Dutch mission would be flown in daylight. This was in part owing to the view that neither the Luftwaffe fighter force nor Flak posed a major problem, but also owing to lingering night navigation problems displayed in Sicily and Normandy, and the lack of moonlight on the night of the planned mission. The British 1st Airborne Division and the Polish 1st Paratroop Brigade would be landed in the Arnhem area to seize the Arnhem Bridge. The 82nd Airborne Division was assigned to secure the bridges from Grave to Nijmegen, while the 101st Airborne Division secured those south of Grave. The XXX Corps plan was to reach the Arnhem Bridge “if possible in forty-eight hours” (D+2), while Lieutenant-General Browning’s I Airborne Corps expected the link-up on D+3 or D+4. The Market-Garden plan was based on the intelligence premise that “once the crust of resistance had been broken, the German army would be unable to concentrate any other troops in sufficient strength to stop the break-through,” and that “the capture of the bridge objectives was more a matter of surprise and confusion than hard fighting.” As would soon become apparent, the Allied intelligence assessment was fundamentally flawed.

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Front line, September 17, 1944

N

Siegfried Defense Line Airborne drop zones

0

25 miles

0

25km

Groningen

Leeuwarden 1. British XXX Corps attacks northwards along a single route to Arnhem. 2. US 101st Airborne Division lands north of Eindhoven to capture bridges at Son and Veghel. 3. US 82nd Airborne Division lands east of Nijmegen to capture bridges over the River Maas at Grave and River Waal at Nijmegen. 4. British 1st Airborne Division lands west of Arnhem to capture the road and rail bridges over the Lower Rhine at Arnhem. 5. British XXX Corps advances northwards to the Zuider Zee to cut off German forces in western Holland. 6. British XXX Corps swings eastwards into Germany to get behind the Siegfried defense line and attack the Ruhr industrial area.

Assen Den Helder

NETHERLANDS

IJsselmeer

Ijmuiden

Zwolle

5

Amsterdam

Almelo IJss

North Sea Leiden

el

Hilversum Apeldoorn

Amersfoort

Zutphen

The Hague

Utrecht

1 Br

Gouda

XX

4

Ede

Schiedam

Wa

Gorinchem

al

Grave

Maas

Moerdijk

GERMANY

3

Rh

’s-Hertogenbosch

Tilburg

Son

Wesel

R UHR

elmin

Duisburg

a Ca

a Ma Es

XXX

u

XXX

Krefeld

s

Neuss

Roermond

e Ca na

l

Ro

l

er

Cologne

Julich Brussels

Düsseldorf

eus

ana

ca

t -M

Sch

rt C

Venlo

nal

1 Antwerp

Dorsten

Wilh

Eindhoven

eldt

e

XX

101 US

ldt

Albe

in

Veghel

2

Breda

Ghent

Aalten

XX

82 US

Nijmegen

Dordrecht

Sche

6

Arnhem

Lek

Rotterdam

Maastricht

BELGIUM

Aachen

Düren

Liège

145

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MAP 65: GERMAN DISPOSITIONS IN THE NETHERLANDS – SEPTEMBER 16, 1944 Prior to Operation Market-Garden, Allied intelligence had a good, but not flawless, appreciation of the German order of battle. Assessments were clouded by the chaotic conditions facing the German Army. Allied intelligence was weakest in its failure to appreciate the ability of the rear-area commands rapidly to create tactical formations from local replacement and training units. These units would be instrumental in preventing the early capture of the Arnhem and Nijmegen bridges. Through early September 1944, Wehrmacht units in the Netherlands were administered by the Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Niederlands (WBN – Armed Forces Command Netherlands), which was primarily a military occupation command managing the Feldkommandanturen occupation headquarters at regional level with about 20 Ortskommandanturen in the smaller cities. These Ortskommandanturen were typically battalion-sized units with modest but not negligible combat potential. On September 4, 1944, Berlin instructed the WBN to begin to raise tactical defense units from the replacement, training, and security units in the Netherlands to create a secondary defensive line called the Waalstellung, running along the Waal River from Moerdijk to Nijmegen. This little-appreciated effort in the first two weeks of September had profound implications for Market-Garden since these improvised units were used as battle groups in the first days of the fighting, and provided an embryonic core for the Division von Tettau that fought against the 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem. Prior to Market-Garden, II.SS-Panzer-Korps was withdrawing through Belgium and had reached the area northeast of Arnhem. On September 10, the corps was instructed to leave one division in the Arnhem area for refitting while the other returned to Germany. The 10.SS-Panzer-Division “Frundsberg” was selected to remain and was headquartered in Ruurlo to the northeast of Arnhem. The 10.SSPanzer-Division formed a number of battle groups that were dispatched to the Nijmegen area to fight against the US 82nd Airborne Division. After the start of Market-Garden, elements of the 9.SS-Panzer-Division “Hohenstaufen” that had returned to Germany were recalled to the Arnhem area and played a central role in the fighting against the British 1st Airborne Division around Arnhem. On September 16, Generalfeldmarschall Model divided the Netherlands into three sectors, The WBN remained in control of the rear areas to the north. General Gustav-Adolf von Zangen’s 15.Armee covered the western sector, Generaloberst Kurt Student’s 1.FallschirmArmee covered the western sector. Student’s field army was the formation most directly in the path of the American airborne landings. 146

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The intention was to use the headquarters as the nucleus of an elite Luftwaffe parachute force, eventually including three Luftwaffe parachute divisions. None of these divisions was ready at the time and Student’s command was filled out using the handful of available paratroop regiments as well as the Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-undAusbildungs-Regiment “Hermann Göring” based near Utrecht. This training regiment became bloated to almost divisional strength with 12,000 troops in August 1944. It was fed into the battle piecemeal, leading to some confusion, since many of its units bore the name “Hermann Göring,” but had no real connection to the combat division of that name. Aside from some understrength infantry divisions, the strongest forces in the sector were not supposed to be there at all. Generalleutnant Kurt Chill’s 85.Infanterie-Division had been smashed in France. When Brussels fell to the Allies on September 3, Chill took it upon himself to establish a defense line along the Albert Canal. At the time, his troops numbered barely a thousand men. One of the main outcomes of this decision was that the canal defense line served as a collection point for numerous stragglers, mostly Luftwaffe ground personnel and Flak troops retreating from air bases in France. These brought the unit strength up to about 4,250 men. Within a few days, Kampfgruppe Chill had created a viable if spotty defense force along the canal. This unit resisted the original ground attack by the British XXX Corps. An important source of fresh units during Market-Garden was the neighboring military district command in the Westphalia region of Germany, Wehrkreis VI. Homeland military units along the frontier had been subordinated to OB West tactical command on September 9. This district was responsible for refitting shattered divisions and creating new units. Its proximity to the Netherlands was a major advantage to the German defense, since units could be quickly sent to the battlefield. Many improvised units were sent into combat in the Netherlands a day after having been created. The desperate conditions of September 1944 forced it to convert its training units into improvised infantry divisions, sometimes called “shadow divisions.” In September 1944, Korps Feldt, under General der Kavallerie Kurt Feldt, was organized in the district to set up a hasty defense line along the German frontier using two improvised divisions: Division z.b.V.406 from Münster to Cologne, and Division Rässler from Cologne to Trier. After the Market-Garden landings, Korps Feldt was put in temporary charge of the attacks from Germany toward Nijmegen, using Division z.b.V.406.

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German Army Occupation Units 1 Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Hilversum Niederlande (WBN) 2 Feldkommandantur 674 Groningen 3 Feldkommandantur 724 Utrecht 4 Kreiskommandantur 772 Almelo 5 Ortskommandantur 215 Breda 6 Ortskommandantur 778 Arnhem 7 Ortskommandantur 782 Zwolle 8 Ortskommandantur 783 Groningen 9 Ortskommandantur 784 Rotterdam 10 Ortskommandantur 868 Schiedam 11 Ortskommandantur 869 Nijmegen 12 Ortskommandantur 870 Venlo 13 Ortskommandantur 871 ’s-Hertogenbosch 14 Ortskommandantur 872 Dordrecht 15 Ortskommandantur 873 Leiden 16 Ortskommandantur 874 Leeuwarden 17 Ortskommandantur 875 Gouda 18 Ortskommandantur 876 Gorinchem 19 Ortskommandantur 877 Den Helder 20 Ortskommandantur 878 Roermond 21 Ortskommandantur 879 Venlo 22 Ortskommandantur 880 Amersfoort 23 Ortskommandantur 881 Tilburg 24 Ortskommandantur 938 Utrecht

N

Waffen-SS Training and Replacement units A Befelshaber der Waffen-SS in den Niederlanden B SS-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Battalion16 C SS-Panzergrenadier Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Battalion 4 D V./SS-Artillerie-Ausbildungs-und-Ersatz-Regiment E SS-Panzerjäger-Ausbildungs-Abteilung 2 F SS-Infanteriegeschutz-Ausbildungs-Battalion 2 G SS-Wachbattalion 3 H SS-Kraftfahrschule I I SS-Unterfuhrerschule Arnheim

Den Haag Arnhem Ede Amersfoort Hilversum Apeldoorn Amersfoort Apeldoorn Arnhem

Luftwaffe Fallschirm Training and Replacement units X Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-AusbildungsRegiment “Hermann Göring”

Utrecht

16

Den Helder

2

Leeuwarden

Groningen

8

Assen

19

NETHERLANDS North Sea IJsselmeer Zwolle

7

Ijmuiden

KVA Amsterdam

Amsterdam

4

A

Leiden 3 24 X

10 Rotterdam Schiedam W Lek BN

XX

XXXX 14 15

Dordrecht

Gen. Ko. Schelde

WBN XXXX 1.Fs

XXX

1 XX 5 X 1.FS X

Eindhoven XX

Walther

59

Albe

Raesler

12 21

rt C

ana

eu

l

20

XX

se

XX

176

Neuss

Roermond

Düsseldorf

11

Sonningen

l

Scheldt

XX

Venlo

Krefeld

t -M

Gds

50

R UHR

na

Ghent

XX

XX

XX

7 X XX II XX X X

1 Pl

XX

Escau

Antwerp

XX

Dorsten

Essen

Chill

719

XX

175

Ro

er

GERMANY Cologne

Julich Brussels Front line September 16, 1944

0 0

Maastricht

BELGIUM

Aachen

Siegburg

Düren Bonn

25 miles 25km

Haltern

Duisburg

XX

XX

XX

ian nad t Ca Firs XXXX itish r nd B Seco

XX

XX

e Wesel

XXX

Son

XX

in

Wehrkreis VI

Feldt

Erdmann

70

Rh

Veghel

LXXXVIII 23 Tilburg

Ca

4 Can

XX

64

Grave

346 XX

XX

406

s

245

1 Fs

LXVII

712

11

aa

XX

17Lw.

Gorinchem

Aalten

Pannerden

al

M

331 XX

ldt

Wa

ina elm Wilh anal C

XX

711

Bruges

Sche

II.SS

Arnhem

n

13

5

XX

XXX

6 B I

’s-Hertogenbosch

Breda

XXX

XX

10.SS

Nijmegen

Moerdijk

XX

errij

Waalstellung

Maas

15

17Lw.

Ned

Tettau 18

Zutphen

7.SS

Ede

C

9

F H XX

Utrecht

Gouda

17

Apeldoorn Amersfoort

22 D G

The Hague

KVA Dordrecht

el

Hilversum

1 E 15

Almelo

IJss

WBN

Meu

se

Liège

Euskirchen

147

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MAP 66: 101st AIRBORNE DIVISION LANDINGS SEPTEMBER 17–18, 1944 The American role in Operation Market-Garden was to deploy two airborne divisions to seize key bridges and terrain objectives to provide the means to connect the British Army’s XXX Corps to the British 1st Airborne Division in Arnhem. The 101st Airborne Division landed in the southern sector, immediately in front of the advance of the XXX Corps while the 82nd Airborne Division landed farther north with an objective of seizing the bridges around Nijmegen. The initial 101st Airborne Division force was carried to the Netherlands in 436 C-47 transports and 70 gliders and began around 1300hrs on September 17. Owing to the dispersion of the objectives, the division landed together in a central area, and then proceeded to the objectives, rather than employing dispersed landing sites. Jump casualties were less than 2 percent of the 6,809-man force and most battalions were able to assemble within an hour of landing. In comparison to the Normandy night drops, it was a textbook example of navigation and planning. The 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment landed on Drop Zone B without enemy opposition. The 1/502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment set out for Sint-Oedenrode and seized the bridge over the Dommel River after a short skirmish. Company H of 3/502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment was assigned the highway bridge at Best and secured the bridge without initial resistance. However, in the early evening the bridge site was attacked by Kampfgruppe Rink, an improvised formation including the remnants of Major von Zedlitz’s GrenadierRegiment.723, 719.Infanterie-Division, bits of the 245.InfanterieDivision, and the Tilburg military police battalion. The remainder of 3/502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment was ordered to reinforce Company H and to take back the bridge the next morning. The divisional command echelon landed with the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment and set up a command post in Son. The initial glider force followed an hour behind the parachute landings. The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed at Drop Zone C without opposition, and elements of the 1/506th Parachute Infantry Regiment immediately set out for the three bridges over the Wilhelmina 148

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Canal near Son without formal assembly. As it transpired, two of the bridges had already been blown up by German engineers. The third bridge was held by II./Fallschirm-Panzer-Ersatz-und-AusbildungsRegiment “Hermann Göring,” which kept control of it long enough to finish its demolition before the arrival of the American paratroopers. The 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment began crossing the canal by expedient means and created a bridgehead south of the canal, about 4 miles north of Eindhoven. The 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment landings on either side of Veghel were not entirely accurate but the main objectives of the four bridges over the Aa River and the Willems Canal were quickly seized. Accompanying engineer troops assembled a second bridge over the Willems Canal. Resistance in the area was sporadic and light. In contrast to other sectors of the 101st Airborne Division, the 502nd Parachute Infantry Regiment continued to experience a far heavier level of German resistance in their attempts to recapture the bridge at Best. German troops demolished the bridge during the morning of September 18. The American paratroopers had landed in the German rear area where defenses were light or nonexistent. This was not the case along the forward edge of the battle area, where the British XXX Corps began its advance on Eindhoven. This delayed its link-up with the paratroopers. Eindhoven was captured on September 18 by the 101st Airborne Division, which linked up with the main body of the Irish Guards in the late afternoon on the south side of Eindhoven. The original expectations were that XXX Corps would have reached Veghel by this time. British engineers began bridging the Son Canal late in the day and it was ready for vehicle traffic after dawn on September 19, D+2. The timetable to reach Arnhem was already slipping badly. With the bridge at Son open, XXX Corps began a rapid exploitation out of Eindhoven on September 19. Lead elements of the Guards Armoured Division reached Sint-Oedenrode and Veghel by 0645hrs, heading for a link-up with the 82nd Airborne Division later in the morning.

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Drop Zone A-1

N

III

501

Veghel

Drop Zone A

Aa

Dom

me

Wi

l

lle ms

St-Oedenrode

Ca

III

na

Gemert

l

502 Drop Zone B Drop Zone C

Landing Zone W

III

KG GR 1036

II

III

II

502 III

KG Rink

Breugel

Son

506

EuA HG

Helmond

Best III

506

KG Walther

XX

Do

mm

el

Eindhoven

Bridge demolished, September 17–18, 1944 Bridge captured, September 17–18, 1944 Allied defensive perimeter, evening, September 17, 1944

Valkenswaard XX

Guards

0 0

2 miles 2km

149

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MAP 67: 82nd AIRBORNE DIVISION LANDINGS SEPTEMBER 17–18, 1944 The 82nd Airborne Division landed to the south of Nijmegen to seize the bridges in the area. The division was carried into battle by 482 C-47 transports and 50 gliders, and included 7,277 paratroopers and 209 glider infantry. Most of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed in Drop Zone O near Overasselt, and fanned out in multiple directions to seize crossings over the Maas-Waal Canal and to take the eastern side of the Grave Bridge (Bridge 11) from the Heumen side. Company E, 2/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed in Drop Zone O-1 immediately to the west of the Grave Bridge while the rest of 2/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed in Drop Zone O and marched to the bridge. The bridge had been prepared by German engineers for demolition on September 7, but on September 17, before the airborne landings, one of the main fuzes was found to be inoperative. During the American attack, only a single soldier from the demolition party was present at the bridge, and unable or unwilling to activate the demolition charges himself. Even though the bridge was protected on both sides by prewar Dutch bunkers, the German troops guarding the bridge were quickly overcome. The 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment was also tasked with capturing the west side of four other bridges along the Maas-Waal Canal in conjunction with other units of the division from the eastern side. The southernmost bridge (Bridge 7) was captured, those north of Malden (Bridge 8) and Hatert (Bridge 9) were blown by the Germans, and the damaged bridge at Honinghutje (Bridge 10) was seized the following day. The 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed farther east around Groesbeek in two drop zones, established a defensive perimeter toward the Reichswald to the southeast, and linked up with the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment along the Maas-Waal Canal. The rail bridge on the northwest side of Mook had already been demolished by the Germans. The 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed northeast of Groesbeek in Drop Zone T and its principal mission was to seize and control the Groesbeek Heights west of Berg en Dal, including the hills 150

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that dominated the flat Dutch landscape in the area. Once the area was secure, Browning’s I Airborne Corps headquarters landed, consisting of 105 troops. The headquarters was transported in 32 Horsa and six CG4A gliders, 28 of which arrived safely. The most controversial aspect of the 82nd Airborne Division mission was the issue of the Nijmegen bridges. The division commander, Brigadier-General James Gavin, had authorized the 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Roy Lindquist, to commit a battalion to a rapid seizure of the highway bridge at Nijmegen via the open terrain along the Waal River once it was clear that the Groesbeek Heights were secure. Following the landings, Company A of 1/508th Parachute Infantry Regiment set out for Nijmegen at 2100hrs while waiting for Company B to arrive. By the time it arrived in the city, it was already dark and there was scattered skirmishing with German patrols. One patrol reached the southern end of the Nijmegen highway bridge. Gavin realized that his forces near the bridge were too small to capture and hold it, and he ordered the two companies to withdraw. The division’s frontage of over 25,000 yards was far in excess of what could be adequately defended and the 1/508th Parachute Infantry Regiment was badly needed on the Groesbeek Heights. In the meantime, Company G, 3/508th Parachute Infantry Regiment had also sent out patrols toward the bridge along the river’s edge and around 0745hrs on the morning of September 18, the battalion commander instructed the company to capture the bridge. German defenses were too substantial to be overcome by a single company, and Company G was forced back. The bridge would not be captured until September 20 in a combined effort by the 82nd Airborne Division and the British Guards Armoured Division. Historians have argued subsequently that a coup de main landing near the bridge should have been included in the original plans and the bridge seized early on before the Germans could react and reinforce the bridge defenses. The lack of such a mission was due in no small measure to the Allied tendency to underestimate the German defenses.

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Bridge demolished, September 17–18, 1944

Slijk Ewijk

Bridge captured, September 17–18, 1944 US defensive perimeter, September 17, 1944

Waal

0 0

2 miles

Gent

Ewijk

2km Beuningen

N

KG Gräbner

II

9.SS

I

III

KG Henke

G

I

G II

NETHERLANDS

508

1

Nijmegen

508

(-) 508

I

F

508

I

C

504

1

Hatert

I

H

Wychen

504

508

508

GERMANY

II

2

I

C

II

Hill 3 95.6

II

508

508

I

I

504

F

I

G

C

504 III

DZ O

I

A

504

2

504 A

I

I

B

504

LZ T KG Kretzisch

II

505

504

F

505

505

II

September 18 406

September 18

I

DZ O

504

Grave

Hill 81.8

I

I

DZ O-1

Groesbeek

Malden

I

E

505

504

LZ O F

Afternoon September 18

DZ T

I

III

LZ N

505

KG Stargard

II

406

I

Heumen I

Meuse

B

G

DZ N

505

I

H

505

505

Reichswald

I

I

505

Mook I

C

Cuyk

KG Göbel

II

406

505 September 18

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MAP 68: THE ARNHEM LANDING PLAN SEPTEMBER 17, 1944 In view of the later difficulties at Arnhem, it is worth considering the original plan as detailed in this map. On Day 1, Brigadier Philip Hicks’ 1st Air-Landing Brigade was to land by glider and hold the drop and landing zones until the arrival of the following waves on the second and third days (1). The Reconnaissance Squadron, mounted on modified jeeps, was to be sent ahead of the main bodies of paratroopers along “Leopard” Route to seize the road bridge in a coup de main attack (2). They were to be followed by Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie’s 1st Parachute Battalion in an advance along “Leopard” Route, and then hold the high ground to the north of Arnhem to prevent an enemy attack from this direction (4). In the meantime, Lieutenant-Colonel John Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion was to advance along the central route (“Tiger”) and make straight for the road bridge in the center of Arnhem (4). Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion was to advance along the southern route (“Lion”) toward the road bridge (5). Along the way, it was to seize the railway bridge and pass C Company over the river to advance along the southern side of the Lower Rhine. This company was also to capture the southern side of the pontoon bridge and the far end of the road bridge. On Day 2 of the operation, the 4th Parachute Brigade was to land on Drop Zone Y (6) with Polish transport and antitank weapons, arriving by glider on Landing Zone L (7). Additional supplies were earmarked for landing on Drop Zone V (8). Finally, on Day 3, the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade was to arrive on Drop Zone K (9). The Arnhem operation ran into difficulty from the start. The 1st Air-Landing Brigade disembarked from its gliders and secured the landing zone. The Reconnaissance Squadron ran into a German ambush, losing its two lead jeeps, and the unit soon became entangled in a skirmish and unable to proceed on its critical mission, seriously jeopardizing the entire operation. Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion, advancing along Tiger Route, likewise became caught up in a firefight with German troops short of its objective, eventually digging in near the Hartenstein Hotel. Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion was the only element of the 1st Parachute Brigade to enjoy any success on the first day of the operation. It advanced as planned along Lion Route, passing through Heveadorp and Oosterbeek, and deploying Major Victor Dover’s C Company to secure the railway bridge. When the Germans 152

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demolished the bridge, Dover’s company turned to its secondary mission of attacking the Arnhem garrison’s headquarters. The pontoon bridge site was active with Germans and Frost instructed B Company to find craft to ferry them to the opposite shore. Later that night, most of the company joined the battalion at the bridge. The remainder of Frost’s battalion eventually infiltrated its way into Arnhem and a platoon reached the Arnhem road bridge around 2000hrs. This force was eventually enlarged when the brigade headquarters group arrived. By day’s end, the British force on the north side of the Arnhem road bridge was between 600 and 700 men instead of the intended force of 2,000 paratroopers. Frost’s understrength battalion was insufficient to secure the southern side of the bridge, which by this time was defended by a growing German force. Dobie’s 1st Parachute Battalion was the last to depart the drop zone, but brigade headquarters modified its advance route since it was presumed that the two other battalions would be sufficient to capture the main road bridge. The battalion’s mission was to defend the northern approaches to the Arnhem Bridge to prevent any German attack from that direction. Dobie’s 1st Parachute Battalion ran into Kampfgruppe Spindler from 9.SS-Panzer-Division and was soon tied down in a skirmish. By the end of the day, the 1st Parachute Brigade had failed to secure the main road bridge at Arnhem and had not been able to gain control of either the pontoon bridge or railroad bridge, the latter of which had been demolished by the Germans. The brigade had less than a battalion at the road bridge and the other two battalions tied down in skirmishes with German troops. German opposition was much stronger than anticipated, and the German defenders were reinforcing their troops more quickly than their British opponents. The airlanding plan for Arnhem has been roundly criticized in later years. The main objection has been the significant distance that the paratroopers had to cover between the drop zone and the main bridge objectives along the Rhine River. The argument has been made that a glider or paratroop coup de main should have been conducted on the open ground south of the road bridge. The original plan had deliberately avoided this because of concern about the number of German Flak positions in the area around Arnhem.

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N

1. Day 1 – 1st Airlanding Brigade is responsible for holding the drop and landing zones until the arrival of the following waves on the second and third days. 2. Day 1 – the Reconnaissance Squadron was to be sent ahead of the main bodies of paratroopers along ‘Leopard’ Route to seize the road bridge in a coup de main attack. 3. Day 1 – 1st Parachute Battalion was to advance along the northern route, ‘Leopard’ Route, and hold the high ground to the north of Arnhem to prevent an enemy attack from this direction. 4. Day 1 – 3rd Parachute Battalion was to advance along the central route, ‘Tiger’ Route, and make straight for the road bridge in the centre of Arnhem. 5. Day 1 – 2nd Parachute Battalion was to advance along the southern route, ‘Lion’ Route, towards the road bridge. Along the way it was to seize the railway bridge and pass C Company over the river to advance along the southern side of the Lower Rhine. This company was also to capture the southern side of the pontoon bridge and the far end of the road bridge. 6. Day 2 – 4th Parachute Brigade was to land on DZ-Y. 7. Day 2 – Polish transport and anti-tank weapons, arrive on LZ-L. 8. Day 2 onwards – supplies dropped on DZ-V. 9. Day 3 – 1st Polish Parachute Brigade was to arrive on DZ-K.

Leopard Route Tiger Route Lion Route Final Bridgehead of British and Polish Troops Landing or drop zone

0

1 mile

0

1km

6 DZ–Y X

4 Br

1 2

X

1 Br

LZ–S

I

Recce 1 Br

7

3

II

II

LZ–Z

1 Br

3 Br

Wolfheze

1 Br

16

(-)

2 3 8

1st Airlanding Brigade

I

X

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LZ–L

1 X

2 Br

(-)

DZ–V

Hotel Wolfheze

II

4th Parachute Brigade

4

4

II

Oosterbeek

Feld Comd 642

5

5

5

Pontoon bridge

4

5

5 Ferry

5

Ned

erij

n

Driel

Arnhem

16

2

4

Heelsum

Renkum

1st Polish Parachute Brigade

3

9 DZ–K

II

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1st Parachute Brigade

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MAP 69: THE ADVANCE OF XXX CORPS ON HELL’S HIGHWAY –SEPTEMBER 17–25, 1944 The airborne landings on September 17, 1944 were supposed to provide an “airborne carpet” along which the British XXX Corps would advance to link up with the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. Ultimately, the 82nd Airborne Division and 101st Airborne Division were unable to secure all of their objectives as quickly as expected, nor was XXX Corps able to advance as fast as its ambitious schedule dictated. Operation Market-Garden started at 1330hrs on September 17, with the landings of the British 1st Airborne Division near Arnhem, the American 82nd Airborne Division near Nijmegen, and the American 101st Airborne Divisions near Eindhoven (1). Shortly after the start of the airborne drops at 1415hrs, XXX Corps began its advance from out of the bridgehead over the Meuse-Escault Canal with the Guards Armoured Division as its spearhead (2). The Guards Armoured Division reached as far as Valkenswaard around 1900hrs on September 17, short of its expected rendezvous with the 101st Airborne Division at Eindhoven (3). The Guards Armoured Division made contact with elements of the 101st Airborne Division around noon on September 18 at Eindhoven (4), and the division was firmly established in the city by day’s end (5). In the afternoon of September 18, the British XII and VIII corps attacked northward on the flanks of XXX Corps (6). On September 19, XXX Corps continued its advance northward, replacing the blown bridge at Son (7). By 0820hrs, first contact was made with the American 82nd Airborne Division at Grave (8). By this stage, the Germans had begun to feed new units into the Netherlands, and attacks began along the narrow corridor, including an attack by PanzerBrigade.107 against the bridge at Son on September 19 (9). Lead elements of the Guards Armoured Division began to conduct a coordinated attack with units of the 82nd Airborne Division within Nijmegen in an attempt to wrest control of the road and rail bridges over the Waal River; surprisingly, the Germans failed to demolish either bridge (10). The combined attacks in Nijmegen continued into September 20. An assault group under Major Julian Cook of the 3/504th Parachute Infantry Regiment seized the railroad bridge after a costly boat crossing of the Waal in the early evening, while a combined British–American assault overwhelmed the German defenses in Nijmegen and gained control of the road bridge by 2000hrs (11). 154

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When the Germans finally overcame British paratroops at the Arnhem road bridge on September 20, this opened up a flow of German reinforcements from the north to block the approach of XXX Corps. When XXX Corps attempted to push north out of Nijmegen on September 21, their tank columns were quickly halted along the exposed highway near Elst (12). The 43rd Wessex Division attempted to sidestep the road ambushes around Elst on September 22, but made very slow progress in the face of stiff German resistance (13). On “Black Sunday,” September 22, Kampfgruppe Walther in conjunction with Panzer-Brigade.107 and other units conducted spoiling attacks against “Hell’s Highway” north of Veghel, temporarily closing the road at a critical moment (14). The 43rd Wessex Division in conjunction with US paratroopers reopened the road on September 23 (15). Further German attacks along Hell’s Highway by Kampfgruppe Chill again interdicted the road on September 24, shutting off the flow of traffic for 36 hours (16). The following day, the 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment pushed out of Uden while the British 7th Armoured Division, with support from the 50th and 52nd divisions, finally cleared the Germans from Hell’s Highway. The underlying premise of Market-Garden was that the two American airborne divisions along Hell’s Highway would only encounter minor “line of communication” troops. The gross overextension of the two airborne divisions from Eindhoven to Nijmegen was only plausible if facing minor enemy forces. In fact, by D+1, they were already facing elements of three German divisions, and by D+2 they were facing significant enemy Panzer forces as well. As the timetable slipped, the situation became markedly worse owing to continued reinforcement of the German units along Hell’s Highway. This might have been alleviated by a more vigorous attack by the two British corps on either side of Horrocks’ XXX Corps that would have pushed the Germans away from the highway. In the event, both corps were largely exhausted from the Normandy campaign and the race through Belgium. Nor did the Dutch terrain favor mechanized advances. As a result, they were very slow in coming abreast of Horrocks’ harried XXX Corps, giving modest German forces the opportunity to harass the Allies along Hell’s Highway.

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N

Allied front line, September 17 Allied landing zones

0

XXX

Deelen

0

II.SS

1

10 miles Ede

10km

Bittrich

XX

1 Br Urquhart IJss

el

Arnhem Lek

X

Driel

1 Pl Sosabowski

13

Elst

Waal

Valburg

12

NETHERLANDS

1

Bemmel

Pannerden Rh

11 Nijmegen 10

asMa anal al C

Ma

GERMANY

Wa

Zaltbommel as

Grave

Oss

8

Reichswald

1 82 US

’s-Hertogenbosch Aa

Vught

XXX

ine

16

XX

Gavin

15 Uden

LXXXVIII

Boxmeer

Reinhard

14 Veghel XXX

W ille

1

Sint-Oedenrode

Overloon

Ca

XX

ms

Meindl

na l

101 US

II

Taylor

7 Son

Wilhelmina Canal

9

Helmond Deurne

4

Eindhoven

5

Dommel

1

Reusel

Venlo Valkenswaard

3

BELGIUM 6

Esca

ut-M

Lommel XXX

XXX Richie

Ma

Guards Br

eu s e C a n a l

XXX

XII

as

XX

43 Br Thomas

Horrocks

XX

Weert

Adair

2 Neerpelt

SintHuibrechtsLille

6 XXX

VIII O’Connor

Roermond

155

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MAP 70: THE END AT ARNHEM BRIDGE SEPTEMBER 20–25, 1944 By Wednesday September 20, Frost’s command inside Arnhem was completely isolated from the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division, and the divisional commander, Major-General Roy Urquhart, had begun to accept that there was little more that could be done from his side of the river. During the course of the day’s fighting, Frost’s dwindling force was gradually overwhelmed, and most of the diehards surrendered by that evening. Urquhart consolidated his command into the area around the Hartenstein Hotel. For the remainder of the 1st Airborne Division, all now depended on reinforcements from outside the Arnhem bridgehead. The only bright spot in the operational picture was that the 82nd Airborne Division, in conjunction with the Guards Armoured Division, had finally secured the two bridges over the Waal River at Nijmegen on September 20, increasing the chances that XXX Corps could reach Arnhem in time. Once the Arnhem road bridge was firmly in German hands, this permitted the 9.SS-Panzer-Division and other units to move south to block the advance of XXX Corps. In spite of the dire situation in Arnhem, a decision was made to drop the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade on September 21, but not on its original mission. Instead, it was dropped on the south side of the river opposite the 1st Airborne Division, with the expectation that the troops could be ferried across to reinforce Urquhart’s beleaguered division. In the event, the ferry had been sunk and there were few boats or craft to be found. On the night of September 22/23, the Polish 3rd Parachute Battalion attempted to cross the Lower Rhine to reinforce the airborne perimeter. Only 52 men made it safely over the river. Further crossings were attempted the next night by the 3rd Battalion, but were again unsuccessful, with only 153 Poles making it across. As a result, the brigade commander, Brigadier-General Stanisław Sosabowski, set up a defensive perimeter near Driel to the south to wait for the arrival of XXX Corps. Recognizing the desperate conditions in Arnhem, XXX Corps tried 156

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to launch a flying column toward Arnhem to create a corridor. The lead battalion of 43rd Wessex Division, the 4th Dorsetshire Regiment, arrived first, and on the night of September 24/25, attempted a crossing near the ferry site. Only the battalion’s Lieutenant-Colonel George Tilly, 17 officers, and 298 men made it across, but were unable to move inland. Most of the Dorsets were captured. Further crossings intended to be made that night by the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade were canceled. On Sunday morning, September 24, Lieutenant-General Horrocks of XXX Corps, Lieutenant-General Browning of the British 1st Airborne Corps, and General Sosabowski of the Polish 1st Airborne Brigade met at the church tower in Driel to discuss the options. There was general agreement that the situation of the 1st Airborne Division had become untenable and the Arnhem perimeter was likely to be overrun by the increasing scale of German attacks before XXX Corps could arrive in force. As a result, a decision was made to evacuate the 1st Airborne Division the night of September 25/26, codenamed Operation Berlin. A messenger was sent over the river to Urquhart’s headquarters with the instructions. On the morning of September 25, Urquhart informed his senior officers to prepare to evacuate the Arnhem bridgehead that night. To shield the withdrawing force, the field artillery of the 43rd Wessex Division began to conduct fire missions starting at 2050hrs all along the perimeter to dissuade the Germans from interfering in the evacuation. In the meantime, divisional engineers supported by the Canadian 23rd Field Company prepared storm boats for the river crossing. The crossings began around 2100hrs, with each storm boat able to take 14 men at a time. This required numerous trips across the river, often under fire. The last storm boat crossed back to the south side of the Lower Rhine after dawn on the morning of Tuesday September 26. A total of 2,163 airborne troops, 160 Polish paratroopers, and 75 men of the Dorsetshire Regiment made it back across the river that night. The 1st Airborne Division had suffered 1,200 men killed in action and another 6,642 missing, wounded, or captured.

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XX

Airborne perimeter, September 20

N

9.SS

Airborne perimeter, September 25 Polish drop zone

0

500 yds

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1 Br

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SS Von Tettau

Oosterbeek

Church

Westerbouwing Heveadorp Ferry (out of action)

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er

er R

hine

ne Rhi

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130 Br

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MAP 71: THE END OF MARKET-GARDEN SEPTEMBER 26, 1944 When the British 1st Airborne Division was withdrawn from Arnhem across the Lower Rhine on September 26, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was left in control of a narrow corridor along the German frontier, farther north than envisioned in the Overlord plans. Indecisive fighting would continue along this perimeter through much of October 1944. The failure of Operation Market-Garden can be traced to numerous factors, but intelligence misjudgments were at its heart. The central intelligence question was the assessment of whether the German Army was still in the chaotic condition of early September when MarketGarden was planned, or whether its situation had stabilized. Montgomery argued that the German situation was still so fragile that Market-Garden was worth the risk. His subordinate commanders in British Second Army and XXX Corps had doubts that this was still the case after having seen firsthand evidence of the increasing German resistance along the Albert Canal and Meuse-Escault Canal during early September. Montgomery dismissed these assessments, as he did similar warnings from SHAEF. This was a commander’s prerogative; bold commanders often have to ignore the anxieties of the naysayers and the timid and take necessary risks. The most charitable interpretation that can be made of Montgomery’s intelligence mistake was that he genuinely believed that the German Army was on the brink of collapse and that a risky operation held enormous potential to end the war in 1944. A less charitable interpretation was that Montgomery craved a successful Market-Garden operation to bolster his argument with Eisenhower over the proper strategic approach in the European theater. Had MarketGarden succeeded, it would have validated his “dagger thrust to Berlin” approach with his forces taking the lead. The intensity of his conviction about the shape of future Allied operations in Northwest Europe may have blinded him to the significant changes in German capabilities from the beginning of September to the middle of that month. MarketGarden was not only “a bridge too far” but also “two weeks too late.” 158

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The unexpected presence of II.SS-Panzer-Korps in the Arnhem area has often been cited as the principal reason for the failure of MarketGarden. Yet Allied intelligence did have some inkling that the two Panzer divisions were in the area, and they were discounted owing to their weakened state. In the event, the presence of these units near Arnhem was not the immediate cause of the initial Allied setbacks. Rather, Allied intelligence had failed to understand that the threat of a British ground attack into the Netherlands from the Meuse-Escault Canal had prompted the Germans to begin the activation of large numbers of improvised battle groups and shadow divisions during the first weeks of September in the Netherlands. It was these unrecognized battle groups that stymied the Allied efforts. The most debilitating consequence of Market-Garden from the Allied perspective was that it diverted attention from the essential task of clearing the Scheldt River Estuary leading into Arnhem to make this vital port accessible to Allied shipping. The Allies desperately needed port facilities near the forward battle line. Antwerp was the ideal choice owing to its proximity to the battle zone and its high cargo capacity. Eisenhower had instructed Montgomery to clear the Scheldt in early September after the liberation of Antwerp, but he did not press Montgomery on the matter. Montgomery, convinced that MarketGarden would bring the war to a swift end, did not pay sufficient attention to the Scheldt mission. While Montgomery and Eisenhower were focused on “a bridge too far,” the German 15.Armee was methodically reinforcing its defenses along the Scheldt Estuary, fully appreciating that without the control of the waterway, the port of Antwerp was useless. It would take two more months of fighting until late November 1944 before the Scheldt was cleared and the port opened. In the meantime, logistical shortcomings would slow the pace of Allied operations in Northwest Europe through the autumn of 1944.

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Deelen

Front line, September 16

XXX

II.SS

Front line, September 26 “Hell’s Highway”

0

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IJss

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Oosterbeek

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NETHERLANDS

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Bemmel

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Oss XX

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ine

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XXX

Ma

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el

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Heumen

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190

712

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Aa

Boxmeer XX

XX

101

Chill

XX

11

Veghel

XX

59

Overloon

ille ms

LXXXVIII

W

SintOedenrode

XXX

Tilburg

Ca

Best

15

Son

XX

l

lhe l Ca mina na l

na

XX

XX

Wi

50

Walther

Helmond Deurne

XX XX

245

53

XXX

Eindhoven XXX

XII

Do

mm

XX

VIII

XX

3

el

180 XXX

LXXXVI

XX

719

Venlo

Valkenswaard

Reusel

Ma

as

Turnhout XX

49 XX

Erdmann

Esca

ut-M

euse

Cana

Weert

l

Lommel

Aart

Neerpelt

X

4

SintHuibrechtsLille

X

Belgium

Roermond

Gheel Albe

rt C

Hechtel ana

l XX

176

BELGIUM

Beringen

XX

21 X XXXX 12

183

Sittard XX

2

Hasselt

XXX

XIX

159

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MAP 72: THE STRATEGIC DEBATE – AUTUMN 1944 When the the two US field armies were reorganized as the new 12th Army Group under Bradley’s command in August 1944, this ended Montgomery’s temporary role as overall land commander. In conjunction, Eisenhower moved SHAEF headquarters to the Continent in September, taking overall charge of the land campaign. Montgomery was never content with this change, and would continue to urge Eisenhower to appoint an overall land commander in the ETO to take over tactical direction, namely himself. Egged on by British Army Chief of the Imperial General Staff Field Marshal Alan Brooke, Montgomery pointed to the model of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) where Alexander had been deputy commander for land forces. Eisenhower retorted that the fundamental difference between the ETO and the MTO was the size of the forces involved (three army groups in the ETO versus only one in the MTO), and that he did not want an unnecessary new layer of command interjected between SHAEF and the three army group commanders. Eisenhower did not feel that a single ground force commander could stay abreast of the developments on all the fronts, and so he preferred a decentralized command structure which gave greater freedom to the three senior Allied army group commanders: Montgomery, Bradley, and Devers. Montgomery remained unhappy with this solution and the controversy simmered into early 1945. The successes of Overlord and Dragoon in the summer of 1944 created a solid Allied front from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. With the defeat of Operation Market-Garden, the unrealistic dream of an end to the war by Christmas had evaporated. SHAEF planning for the defeat of Germany intended to “rapidly starve Germany of the means to continue the war” with an emphasis on the capture of the two industrial concentrations in western Germany, the Ruhr and the Saar Basin. Of the two regions, the Ruhr was the more significant, and the loss of the Ruhr combined with the loss of the Low Countries would eliminate 65 percent of German steel production and 56 percent of its coal production. Besides the ground campaign, SHAEF supervised the destruction of German industry by an expanded Allied Combined Bomber Offensive. Allied attention now shifted to the best operational approach for the defeat of Germany in 1945. 160

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Allied strategic planning had focused on two principal invasion routes into Germany: the Aachen–Stolberg corridor toward Westphalia on the northern side of the Ruhr, and the Moselle gate in the Saar toward central Germany. These choices were reflected in German defenses, and can be seen in the layout of the Westwall, with both these sectors being the most heavily fortified. Even before the Market-Garden failure, Montgomery and Brooke pushed for a single northern thrust by the 21st Army Group, while Eisenhower preferred a broad-front approach, albeit one favoring the northern wing. Eisenhower’s viewpoint had been outlined in SHAEF’s May 18, 1944 report Post-Overlord Planning: “The Allies should advance on more than one axis of advance to keep the Germans guessing as to the direction of our main thrust, cause them to extend their forces, and lay the German forces open to defeat in detail. A single axis would lead us to collisions with the enemy main forces on narrow fronts and with no power of maneuver or surprise.” The debate about broad versus narrow front was temporarily submerged after the failure of Market-Garden. The shortfall in Allied logistics left Eisenhower with two broad operational tempos for the autumn campaign. One of Eisenhower’s options was to cease operations temporarily along the German frontier until the logistics caught up; this was the option chosen by the Red Army, which had halted operations on its central front in Poland after August 1944 to build up for the final offensive into Germany in the early winter of 1945. Eisenhower was not keen on this option because it would permit the Germans to rebuild the Wehrmacht in relative peace, resulting in a more formidable opponent when the offensive resumed in early 1945 after the winter weather abated. Instead, Eisenhower decided to conduct limited offensive operations, which would drain the Wehrmacht by attrition. Some senior US commanders, such as Bradley, believed that it might be possible to reach the Rhine in the autumn, a viewpoint that gradually succumbed to reality in the face of determined German defenses. The resulting autumn 1944 campaign was a frustrating and costly battle of attrition. From October 1 to December 16, the Germans lost about 350,000 casualties and prisoners in this campaign, but Allied territorial gains were modest and casualties high.

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The Narrow Front Option

NETHERLANDS North Sea

0

N Arnhem

Rotterdam

50 miles

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Maas

50km

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Ostend

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Dunkirk

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Antwerp

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Montgomery

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12

FRANCE

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Strasbourg

NETHERLANDS

The Broad Front Option 0

North Sea

N Arnhem

Rotterdam

50 miles Maas

50km

Essen Ostend

Dover Calais

Scheldt

Boulogne

First Can

Cologne Aachen

XXXX

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Ghent

Ruh

Rh

English Channel

Bruges

Dunkirk

s aa

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0

FRANCE Strasbourg

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MAP 73: WESTWALL DEFENSES IN THE AACHEN SECTOR The First US Army was the first Allied force to reach German soil when a reconnaissance patrol of the 5th Armored Division crossed the Our River on September 11, 1944. Facing the First US Army was the old Westwall. An appreciation of the geography of the Westwall provides a useful guide to the natural terrain features that formed the basis for German defense preparations in the autumn of 1944. This defense belt was better known to Allied troops as the “Siegfried Line.” This misnomer stemmed from Hitler’s April 28, 1939 Reichstag speech in which he described the new Westwall as 40 times stronger than the old Siegfried-Stellung fieldworks of 1918. Owing to a misunderstanding, the British press began referring to the Westwall fortifications as the Siegfried Line in 1939–40. When Allied forces reached the old Westwall in September 1944, the German defensive positions were again called the Siegfried Line. The Westwall program began in 1938 but it was not as extensive as France’s Maginot Line. It was intended as a defensive fortified zone facilitating offensive action. By 1938, Hitler was already planning military actions against Czechoslovakia and Poland and fortifications were a vital ingredient in these plans. The Westwall could be held by a modest number of second-rate troops while the bulk of the Wehrmacht was deployed in combat to the east. The initial construction program skipped the Aachen area since it faced neutral Belgium. Once the section facing central France was complete, Hitler decided to extend the Westwall along the Belgian frontier owing to concerns that the French could deploy their mobile forces through Belgium. The Westwall in the Aachen area, called the Düren Fortification Sector (Festungsdienststelle Düren) was one of only two sectors with a double set of defensive lines. The other was in the Saar, which like the Aachen Corridor was one of the traditional invasion routes between France and Germany. The initial defensive line was called the Scharnhorst Line and was located about a kilometer behind the German border. A second defensive belt, called the Schill Line, was created to the east of Aachen. The Westwall was a far less elaborate defensive system than the Maginot Line. With few exceptions, the fortifications were relatively small infantry bunkers with machine-gun armament and few of the elaborate artillery bunkers that characterized the French defenses. There was never any expectation that the Westwall alone could hold out against a 162

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determined enemy, but after the experiences of trench warfare in World War I, there was a clear appreciation that modest fortifications could amplify the defensive capabilities of the infantry. The Westwall began with a barrier of antitank ditches and concrete dragon’s teeth antitank obstacles. The layout and density of the subsequent bunkers depended on the geography and were designed to exploit local terrain features. Machine-gun bunkers were placed to cover all key roads and approaches as well as to prevent the antitank obstacles from being breached. Antitank bunkers were equipped with the 37mm antitank gun – adequate in 1939, but obsolete in 1944. Another characteristic type of bunker was a forward observation post for artillery spotters, connected to the rear to take maximum advantage of artillery firepower in defending the frontier. In the Aachen area, the Westwall had a linear density of about 60 bunkers per 6-mile stretch. During 1943 and 1944, the Westwall was stripped of anything removable such as wire obstructions, armored doors, guns mounts, and armored fittings to equip the Atlantic Wall against the impending Allied invasion. As a result, when the Wehrmacht retreated into Germany in September 1944 the Westwall was overgrown and largely abandoned. Hitler intended to revive the Westwall under his WestStellung (Western Position) program started in August 1944. The 1944–45 West-Stellung program differed considerably from the earlier Westwall. Owing to the poor weather as well as the lack of material and skilled labor, few new concrete bunkers were constructed. The old Westwall served as the concrete spine of the new West-Stellung and additional defense lines were layered around it using fieldworks reinforced with obstacles and gun emplacements. Special emphasis was placed on antitank defense in the form of numerous antitank obstacles as well as dense antitank gun positions. Instead of a thin and brittle string of obsolete concrete bunkers, the West-Stellung offered defense in depth. The West-Stellung was a significant enhancement to the Wehrmacht campaign in the West in the autumn of 1944, serving both to reinforce the declining combat effectiveness of German infantry units while at the same time providing a shield behind which the army could hoard its elite panzer units for the planned December offensive in the Ardennes.

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Inden

e

N

Ind

Kohlscheid

Roe r

Eschweiler

Langerwehe

Würselen

Düren

Schill Line

Laurensberg

Aachen

GERMANY Münsterbusch Stolberg

or

rid

rg

be

ol St

AAC H EN MUNI C I PAL F OREST

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HÜRTGEN FOREST

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t

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Hürtgen

Ka

Nideggen ll

Vossenack

Schmidt

Roer

Roetgen

Eupen

BELGIUM

Dragon’s teeth Bunkers Luftwaffe flak bunkers

Simmerath

0 0

3 miles 3km

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MAP 74: THE FIRST BATTLE OF AACHEN: STOLBERG CORRIDOR – SEPTEMBER 12–29, 1944 Following the pursuit campaign in Belgium in early September, the First US Army began reaching the German frontier during the middle of September. Collins’ VII Corps reached the Aachen Corridor and began battalion-sized reconnaissance probes against the Scharnhorst Line of the Westwall on September 12. Aachen had been Charlemagne’s capital and the imperial city of the kings of Germania from 936 to 1531; as a result, Hitler was adamant that the city be defended. On September 16, Hitler issued a Führer Directive: there was no room for strategic maneuver now that the enemy had reached German soil; “every man was to stand fast or die at his post.” To facilitate the defense, Hitler ordered the civilians evacuated and by mid-September, the population had fallen from 165,000 to about 20,000. LXXXI.Armee-Korps assumed that the main US objective would be the city, and so assigned the defense to its best unit, the 116.Panzer-Division, which began arriving on September 12. The main objective of VII Corps was not the capture of Aachen, but was instead to push through the Stolberg Corridor to reach the Roer River. The 3rd Armored Division began moving forward at dawn on September 13. By the 15th, both combat commands of the 3rd Armored Division penetrated into the Schill Line. The 9.PanzerDivision claimed the destruction of 42 US tanks that day, an exaggeration, but a clear indication of the intensity of the fighting. Closer to Aachen, the attack by the 16th Infantry Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division stalled along the Westwall in the Aachen municipal forest. On the right flank of the 3rd Armored Division, the 9th Infantry Division began a methodical advance into the Hürtgen Forest, moving through both the Scharnhorst and Schill lines as far north as Schevenhütte. The attempt to clear the Hürtgen Forest ground to a halt after encountering units of the 89.Infanterie-Division in the bunkers of the Schill Line. Even though the German defenders were outnumbered, the well-placed bunkers considerably amplified their combat effectiveness. The determined defense by the regular infantry was a complete contrast to earlier fighting against the initial Scharnhorst Line, where local territorial defense units had not been so resolute. The momentum of the battle shifted on September 17 following the arrival of the 12.Volksgrenadier-Division. This fresh, full-strength division had been allotted by Hitler to ensure the defense of Aachen. The arrival of these critical reinforcements permitted counterattacks all 164

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along the American lines, including determined attacks against the US 9th Infantry Division near Schevenhütte. With his troops overextended and short of ammunition, Collins ordered them to consolidate their positions on the evening of September 17, except for the 9th Infantry Division still fighting in the Hürtgen. Skirmishes continued over the next several days with little movement. The Wehrmacht succeeded in halting the advance but at a heavy cost in infantry. The 12. Volksgrenadier-Division dropped in combat strength from 3,800 to 1,900 riflemen and the 9.Panzer-Division lost over 1,000 men, mainly in its Panzergrenadier regiments, equivalent to about two-thirds of their combat strength compared to a week earlier. Collins hoped that the 9th Infantry Division could push southeast out of the Hürtgen Forest and seize the towns on the road to Düren. With the fighting along the Stolberg Corridor stalemated, the continuing US advance in the woods attracted the attention of the 7.Armee commander, General Erich Brandenberger, who scraped together a few assault guns to reinforce the patchwork infantry holding these towns. Both sides were badly overextended and exhausted, and small reinforcements had a disproportionate effect. After repeated attempts, the 9th Infantry Division pushed east through the wooded hills and was halted short of the Hürtgen-Kleinhau clearings, ending the first attempt to clear the Hürtgen Forest. While most of the fighting by the US First Army had been concentrated in the VII Corps sector, Corlett’s XIX Corps had taken advantage of the weak German defenses in the southern Netherlands to push up to the Westwall. In spite of the severe fuel shortage, the 2nd Armored Division pushed beyond the Albert Canal to Geilenkirchen, while on its right flank the 30th Division pushed toward Rimburg, an advance of about 15 to 33 miles in ten days. Nevertheless, German resistance was continuing to harden, and XIX Corps was unable to intervene in the fighting around Aachen as a result. With the launch of Operation Market-Garden farther north in the Netherlands on September 17, American operations against the Westwall came to a halt for the rest of September owing to supply shortages. Low on supplies, out of fuel, overextended by the vagaries of the summer advance, and now facing a much more vigorous defense, it was time to recuperate and take stock. During the final week of September, the US forces in the Aachen sector reorganized with the arrival of the Ninth US Army.

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Schill Line

XX

Würselen

49

US positions, night of September 12

Eschweiler

US advance by evening of September 18 US gains by end of September

Laurensberg

Axis of US armored attack, September 12 Axis of US armored attack, September 13

N

Verlautenheide

Axis of US armored attack, September 14

XX

Aachen

Scharnhorst Line

Axis of US armored attack, September 15

12

Westwall defenses

Sep 16–17 XX

Penetrated Westwall defenses

0

Stolberg

116

Eilendorf

200 miles

0

Gressenich

200km

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e

rW

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T S E R

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1 B

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X

1 X d X rm A 3

3

60 III 39

Kall

Jägerhaus

Roetgen XX

89 Eupen

III

39 XX

39

353

N

Germeter

G

XX

Hürtgen

T

3

Vic

A

(After Sep 18)

Schmithof

X

Eynatten

III

60

ht

BELGIUM

d rm 3 A XX 9

Kleinhau

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Nütheim

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F

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GERMANY

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Cre

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Büsbach

d m Ar 3 XX 9

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Lammersdorf

Rollesbroich

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MAP 75: AACHEN: THE NORTHERN ATTACK OCTOBER 2–8, 1944 Following the VII Corps penetration of the Stolberg corridor in midSeptember 1944 on the southeast side of Aachen, the next phase of the operation was a penetration of the Scharnhorst Line of the Westwall on the northern side of the city between October 2 and 9 by MajorGeneral Corlett’s XIX Corps, with the aim of encircling it. The initial attack to penetrate the Scharnhorst Line was assigned to the experienced 30th Division. Once the infantry had secured a firm bridgehead over the Wurm River, the 2nd Armored Division would commit one of its combat commands to exploit the penetration toward the northeast, while at the same time the 30th Division would turn south and complete the envelopment toward Aachen’s northern suburbs. Defending this sector was General Friedrich Köchling’s LXXXI. Armee-Korps. At the start of the October 1944 fighting, LXXXI. Armee-Korps deployed four infantry divisions in this area. German commanders were anticipating another American push in early October but mistakenly believed that the main blow would fall on Geilenkirchen. In order to deceive the Germans, a “demonstration” was conducted by the 29th Division in the predawn hours of October 2 near Geilenkirchen to draw away attention from the actual attack site. The 30th Division attack began with a river crossing operation near Palenberg by two infantry battalions of the 30th Division using specially constructed footbridges. Resistance was modest and consisted mainly of machinegun fire from pillboxes and artillery fire directed from the bunkers. Owing to the misperception about the focus of the American attack, the first counterattack did not begin until 0030hrs on October 3, toward Castle Palenberg, but the attack was halted by heavy American artillery fire in the predawn hours. The American force was further enlarged on October 3 when Task Force 2 of Combat Command B of the 2nd Armored Division moved across the Treadway bridges to help the 117th Infantry in its assault on Übach. As it became apparent that the attack on Übach-Palenberg represented the main American attack, General Köchling reinforced the 183.Volksgrenadier-Division counterattack. Instead of a concentrated blow, the counterattack degenerated into a series of small, disjointed attacks starting around 0215hrs on October 4. In the meantime, Task Force 1 of Combat Command B advanced into Übach. The commitment of the American armored division was deeply worrying to senior German commanders, who feared that it could lead to a breakthrough 166

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in the Aachen sector. On the morning of October 4, the German front commander Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt and the 7.Armee commander General Brandenberger both arrived at Köchling’s LXXXI. Armee-Korps command post to survey the situation. They concluded that the corps did not have the resources to crush the attack and determined to rush all available forces into the sector. The forces immediately available were not especially impressive, and mostly involved transferring forces from the Aachen area to the threatened sector farther north. As German reinforcements arrived, they were plugged into the line in hope of restraining the American advance. Fighting in the Übach-Palenberg area took on a grim tactical monotony. Advances by US tank–infantry teams were met first by artillery fire, and then by infantry counterattacks, sometimes supported by a few assault guns. The German counterattacks were beaten up by heavy American artillery and tank fire, and then the process began all over again. Both sides commented on the intensity of artillery fire in their reports. On the morning of October 7, Combat Command A pushed out of the Übach salient in force and reached the outer edge of Baesweiler and Alsdorf. With the defenses north of Aachen on the verge of collapse, 7. Armee finally agreed to major reinforcements, including PanzerBrigade.108. The key objective was the town of Alsdorf, since it controlled one of the two main routes into Aachen from the north. The fighting for Alsdorf on October 8 was especially confused, with both sides launching attacks in the morning. Street fighting continued in Alsdorf through the afternoon, when a battalion of the 117th Infantry pushed the weak remnants of the German counterattack force out of the town around 1600hrs. The failed attack on Alsdorf sealed the fate of Aachen. That same day, the US Army’s VII Corps restarted its attack in the southern Aachen sector. Köchling’s LXXXI.Armee-Korps now had two sectors to defend, without adequate forces to do so. The fighting around Alsdorf and Mariadorf on October 8–9 narrowed the gap between the two American corps to only a few miles. The attempted junction point of the “steel ring around Aachen” became the scene of the most intense fighting in the Aachen campaign and lasted a week. The final encirclement of Aachen was not completed until October 16, and the city itself fell on October 21.

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N

Tank obstacles Wire Pillboxes

Geilenkirchen

US line of departure, October 2

343

US positions, 2200hrs, October 6

183

US movements

183 Lange

III

29 XX 30

US positions, 2200hrs, October 7

XX

3 34 III 4 40

III

US positions, 2200hrs, October 3

404

183

German positions, 1500hrs, October 4

Immendorf

German positions, night, October 7 German counterattacks, October 4 II

German counterattacks, October 8

0

Waurichen

1 mile

Frelenberg

1km

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Oct 6 40 I 4 33 II 0

0

GG

Floverich

III

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Scherpenseel 2 117 III 119

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White I 1

C

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117

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148

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49 III

149

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III

14 I 8 14 II 9

148

49

4 X 9 24 X 6

167

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MAP 76: THE BATTLE FOR AACHEN OCTOBER 7–20, 1944 With Corlett’s XIX Corps bearing down on Aachen from the north, Hodge’s First US Army planned to finish the encirclement of the city using the overstretched 1st Infantry Division of Collins’ VII Corps. The division was already deployed in a cordon defense around the southern edges of Aachen with only one regiment free for the assault, the 18th Infantry. The attack started in the predawn hours of October 8, using combined tank–infantry tactics to bust open the bunkers in the Schill Line defenses. The initial objectives were a series of hills with commanding views of the area north of the city, and these were captured by October 10. The main impediment to the American attack was the intense German artillery fire. To prevent the encirclement of Aachen, Model’s Heeresgruppe B created a counterattack force called Kampfgruppe Diefenthal, which had been scraped together from survivors of the 1.SS-Panzer and 12. SS-Panzer divisions, as well as Panzergrenadier-Regiment.60 of the 116.Panzer-Division. This force began to arrive on October 11. In view of the gravity of the situation around Würselen, Model authorized Brandenberger’s 7.Armee to use the units as they became available instead of waiting for the whole force to arrive. As a result, the outlying positions of the 30th Division were hit by a succession of German attacks on October 12, heavily supported by Panzers. After days of overcast conditions, the weather that day was crystal clear, allowing Allied air power to intervene. The final push to complete the encirclement of Aachen was reinforced by two battalions from the 116th Infantry, 29th Division, a battalion of tanks from the 2nd Armored Division, and an engineer battalion staging a direct frontal assault through the streets of Würselen. The attack was very slow going, since the town was occupied by the entire Panzergrenadier-Regiment.60, supported by dug-in Panzers, and little progress was made in three days of fighting. Having already committed bits of the arriving 116.Panzer-Division, Brandenberger received permission from Model to commit the 3. Panzergrenadier-Division against the other wing of the American advance, the 18th Infantry positions on the hills around Verlautenheide. On the morning of October 14, Panzergrenadier-Regiment.29, 168

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supported by Tiger II heavy tanks of schwere Panzer-Abteilung.506, staged their attack. When the German force formed up in the meadows in front of the US positions, it was hit by fire from six US artillery battalions, leading the divisional commander, Generalmajor Walter Denkert, to conclude, “it was obvious that an advance through this fire was impossible.” The violent attacks finally petered out by evening with the US infantry still in control of their defenses. The 3.PanzergrenadierDivision returned to the attack in the predawn hours of October 15, nearly overrunning an infantry company in the dark. The US infantry huddled in their foxholes while US mortar fire and artillery landed nearly on top of them. As dawn arrived, the German survivors retreated into the early morning haze. Fighting continued over the next few days, but on a much smaller scale. With the German counteroffensive exhausted, Hodges put more and more pressure on the 30th Division to finish the task by sealing the Aachen gap in conjunction with the 1st Division. Since Würselen had proven to be impossible, Hobbs redirected the focus of the October 16 attack west through Kohlscheid. At 1615hrs, patrols from both divisions linked up near Ravels Hill (Ravelsberg), finally closing the Aachen Gap. Defending Aachen was the 246.Infanterie-Division under the command of Colonel Gerhard Wilck. The 1st Infantry Division was so tied down defending the northern salient against German counterattacks that only two battalions of the 26th Infantry could be spared to assault the city; the assault began on the morning of October 13. Bitter street fighting took place for several days, and the US attack was reinforced on October 18 by Task Force Hogan from the 3rd Armored Division with an armored infantry battalion and parts of a tank battalion. The fighting largely ended on October 19 when Colonel Wilck was surrounded in an air-raid shelter in Lousberg that was serving as the divisional HQ. The formal surrender of the Aachen garrison took place at 1205hrs on October 21. About 1,600 German troops surrendered at the end, bringing the total number of German prisoners of war to 3,473 of the original garrison of about 5,000. Aachen was the first German city to be captured in the west.

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XX

German main line of resistance, morning of October 7

18 XX 3 49

2 miles

0

N

183

German positions, night of October 20 West wall

0

S I.S XI XX I X XX LX

Geilenkirchen

US positions, night of October 20

2km X

CCB

2

XX

B

2

X

A

Baesweiler

ÜbachPalenberg

X

CCA

2

XX

d rm 2 AXX 30

30 Eigelshoven

XX

Aldenhoven

49

X

Fritzohen

Alsdorf

49 X X 46 2

III

117

Kerkrade

III

120

Kampfgruppe Diefenthal

X

108

III

Dürwiss

116

Kohlscheid III

Eschweiler

60 III

30 XX 1

XX

119

XX

46

4 XX6 12

Würselen

3

Ravels Hill

Laurensberg

Verlautenheide

XX

Aachen

XX

II

3

12

26

246 Stolberg

II

2

Eilendorf

26

III

16

Münsterbusch III

Mausbach

III

X

26

106 XX

AACHEN M U N I C IPAL FOR ES T

Brand

1 XXrmd 3A

Büsbach XX

3A r XX md 9

18

3 Vicht

1 XX

Kornelimünster

9

169

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 169

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MAP 77: THE HÜRTGEN FOREST OCTOBER–DECEMBER 1944 The First US Army’s autumn campaign in the Hürtgen Forest was originally intended to reach the Roer River and capture the key road junction at Düren in order to circumvent the hotly contested Stolberg Corridor. The first phase of the operation started on October 6 with the 9th Infantry Division pushing through the Westwall. In view of the 9th Infantry Division’s heavy casualties after ten days of fighting, the 28th Infantry Division was brought in to continue the attack in early November. This was intended to be a prelude to the larger Operation Queen starting a few days later. The division’s three regiments proceeded each on a separate mission. The senior German commanders expected that the principal US mission would be a northward attack to seize the road network through Hürtgen as an avenue to reach Düren, and so the defenses were heaviest along this corridor. Another operational worry was the Schwammenauel Reservoir south of Schmidt and associated dams that controlled the water flow into the plains around Düren along the Roer River. Should the US Army advance over the Roer without first controlling the dams, the Wehrmacht could unleash the dams and flood the Roer Plain. This threat had not yet been appreciated by Hodges and the First US Army, but senior German commanders were aware of their strategic significance and considered any advance toward Schmidt with special alarm. The 28th Division began its assault on November 2, but the attacks on both wings progressed poorly from the outset. In the center, the advance by the 112th Infantry encountered little opposition at first, moving through the Kall Ravine to take Schmidt. The Heeresgruppe B commander Generalfeldmarschall Model presumed that the Americans were heading for the dams, and so stopping this thrust became the priority. The 89.Infanterie-Division was ordered to recapture Schmidt and it was reinforced with the army’s best mobile reserve, the 116. Panzer-Division. The German counterattack began on the morning of November 4, and the 3/112th Infantry in Schmidt was overrun by the afternoon. With the momentum of the attack in their favor, the Panzers and assault guns charged out of Schmidt toward Kommerscheidt, defended by the 1/112th Infantry. While the 1/112th Infantry was defending Kommerscheidt, Panzer-Aufklärungs-Abteilung.116 conducted attacks against the Kall Trail to cut off the American units. 170

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The two Panzergrenadier regiments of 116.Panzer-Division assaulted the positions of the 2/112th Infantry in Vossenack. The 28th Division sent two task forces through the Kall Ravine to recapture Schmidt on November 6–7, but the furious German counterattacks forced the withdrawal of US forces back toward Vossenack by the end of the day. Casualties in the 28th Division had been 6,184; German casualties in this phase were about 2,900 troops. The reasons for the debacle were many. The attack plan dispersed the 28th Division on three separate missions leaving each regiment isolated and outnumbered. The delay of Operation Queen from November 5 to November 16 allowed the 7.Armee to throw all of its reserves against the hapless 28th Division. By mid-November, Bradley and the rest of the senior American leadership were finally aware of the threat posed by the Roer dams, and so were more determined than ever to gain control of the dams as well as obtain another route to Düren. The 4th Infantry Division was assigned to lead the third phase of the Hürtgen campaign, which started on November 16 on the northern shoulder, aimed at Grosshau. The Germans threw in reinforcements and Grosshau was not finally taken until November 29. In the center of the sector, the 8th Division was assigned to take the town of Hürtgen. Two of its regiments advanced from Vossenack, capturing Hürtgen on November 28 after three bloody days of fighting. With the road through Hürtgen finally clear, Combat Command R, 5th Armored Division exploited the road network to advance on Kleinhau in the north and toward Bergstein in the south. The V Corps dispatched one of its last reserves, the 2nd Ranger Battalion, to assist in the final push around Bergstein. By the beginning of December, the First US Army had fought its way through the Hürtgen Forest but at a horrible cost. Combat casualties in the four infantry divisions involved totaled 23,000 dead, wounded, captured, and missing, plus an additional 8,000 men incapacitated by trench foot, combat fatigue, and disease. The campaign had been waged in a piecemeal fashion, with little appreciation of the difficulties of fighting in mountainous, forested terrain. It had been further handicapped by the lingering tendency to underestimate the German defenses. Furthermore, the dams were still in German control. The fighting would continue.

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Front line, November 9 Front line, November 20 Front line, December 6 Westwall bunker

Luftwaffe bunkers/gun pits of Air Defense Zone West 0

1 mile

0

Gey

1km

III

4

Strass

rW

eh

Cr

ee

k

8

Ro

the

Grosshau

III

22

4

Kleinhau XX

344

Untermaubach

III

Hürtgen

4

er

X

CCR

5

Ro

12

HÜRTGEN FOREST

III

39

III

9

121

8

III

109

28

II

Bergstein

2 Ranger

Germeter III

112

28

Vossenack

XX

III

60

9

Ka

ll

275

XX

272 III

110

28

XX

116

III

47

9

Kommerscheidt

Schmidt

N

XX

89

171

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 171

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MAP 78: OPERATION QUEEN: XIX CORPS NOVEMBER 16 TO DECEMBER 9, 1944 Bradley’s major autumn offensive, Operation Queen, was scheduled to begin on November 5, but was repeatedly delayed until November 16 owing to rainy weather that limited air support. Bradley saw Operation Queen as a replay of Operation Cobra in Normandy, a massive air strike paving the way for a quick US Army breakthrough out of congested terrain into open tank country for a deep envelopment of German defenses. As in the case of Cobra, the starring role was given to Hodges’ First US Army, while Simpson’s neighboring Ninth US Army was given the mission of pushing the XIX Corps up to the Roer on the left flank. The comparison to Cobra was a fundamental mistake. The rainy weather inhibited a mechanized advance and the urbanized terrain favored the defender. Unrecognized by Bradley, the German defenders were serving as a shield for the units preparing for the Ardennes offensive. Whenever American units closed on key objectives, von Rundstedt’s OB West fed in reinforcements from the reserve. The preliminary air bombardment on November 16 shattered several German towns, but caused very modest casualties among the Wehrmacht infantry. Collins’ VII Corps attack was conducted by the 1st Infantry Division on the right and the 104th Division on the left. The 1st Division attack made slow but steady progress on the edge of the Hürtgen Forest. After the first four days of fighting, the 1st Division had penetrated only about 2 miles into the forest at a cost of a thousand casualties. By the beginning of December, the 1st Division was a spent force, having suffered 3,993 battle casualties, and more than 2,000 non-battle casualties. The 104th Division advanced into the Inde River valley. The division commander, Major-General Terry Allen, had taken great pains to train the division in night operations, and in the fighting after November 23, night attacks proved successful in cases where day attacks had faltered. After five days of fighting, the town of Inden was finally taken, setting the stage for crossing the Inde River toward the Roer. The main obstruction to the crossing was the town of Lucherberg, which was not secured until December 4. Collins planned to use Combat Command A, 3rd Armored Division to support the 104th Division while Combat Command B would operate independently to take a series of villages along the northwestern fringe of the Hürtgen 172

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Forest. The Combat Command B tank advance was hampered by the mud and by the skillful deployment of long-range flak guns on the heights around Eschweiler. Collins began to realize that his hope for a quick breakthrough to the Roer had evaporated. In the Ninth US Army’s sector, the XIX Corps advanced into relatively flat farmland interspersed with small farm villages. The 30th Division cleared the Würselen area in four days of fighting. As the division shifted its orientation towards the Roer, German defenses stiffened. After capturing the town of Bourheim on November 23, the advance ground to a halt. Both sides engaged in several days of attack, counterattack, and heavy artillery action. The attacks resumed on November 26 and the town of Altdorf was finally captured in a night attack. The advance in the center by the 29th Division did not go as smoothly. After a change of tactics, with more emphasis on tank support, by November 18, the division finally began to penetrate the initial layer of the fortified city of Jülich. By December 9, the 29th Division had cleared the western bank of the Roer up to the Jülich defenses. The sudden capture of Puffendorf by the 2nd Armored Division so alarmed German commanders that von Rundstedt consented to the release of the only mechanized theater reserves available, the 9.PanzerDivision and 15.Panzergrenadier-Division, supported by a battalion of Tiger II tanks. This force immediately counterattacked on November 17, halting the advance. The Germans were forced out of Apweiler using the attached infantry from the 102nd Division, and after another day of fruitless skirmishes, the 2nd Armored Division launched its major attack on Gereonsweiler in the driving rain on November 20. The town was pummeled by artillery, then quickly overwhelmed in the early afternoon. German resistance stiffened on November 22 owing to the arrival of reinforcements, but the division battered its way to the Roer by November 28. The 2nd Armored Division’s battle to push out to the Roer had been one of the few clear successes of Operation Queen. For the XIX Corps, Operation Queen ended after three weeks with hopes for an easy breakthrough over the Roer dashed by stiff German resistance and debilitating weather.

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N rm

Allied front line, morning of November 16 Wü

Tei c

No

k

Final gains by US VII Corps by December 6, and by XIX Corps by December 9

Nov 30

c

De

Antitank ditch ) 3/335(-

Dec 4

0 8 X 4 10 X 2

0

33 I 5 40 I I 6

Te mp No bdry v3 84 0 XX 102

Gereonsweiler

10

Apweiler

III

334 S I.S XI XX I X XX LX

XX

84 XX 2 Armd XX

Beggendorf

84

md 2 Ar X X 29

Temp Bdry

(Nov 24)

Fro

m

Freialdenhoven ov

0 80

XX

Jülich Dec 9

III

115

Engelsdorf

2 Armd XX 29

246

116

21

1

III

Dec 9

Koslar

Nov 18

29

Nov 27

Merzenhausen

,N

Baesweiler

XX

Nov 28

Barmen

Nov 27

,N 00 24

II XI X XXIX X

Setterich

2 10 X d X rm A 2

Ederen

XX

7)

Flossdorf

B X A

102

v1 No z ( 183 P 9 XX9 Loverich 2

2 ÜbachPalenberg

Puffendorf Floverich

(+) Pz .SS X 0 X 0 2 1 34 Dec 3 36

Roerdorf

24

183

2

v2

ov

Immendorf

S I.S XI XX I X XX LX

o +) N

( Pz .SS XX 0 34

335

to

18 XX 3 (N 9 Pz ov 17 )

Welz

III

2km

Dürbuslar

Siersdorf

9

4 X 3 84 X

Prummern

Geilenkirchen

2 miles

5 40 I I I 6 Linnich 40

Süggerath

Waurichen

Westwall, American-held

Lindern

Beeck

X X X XXII X I X

German positions at the end of the operation Westwall, German-held

Würm

00 3 18 v 2 No

US axis of attack, date indicated German main line of resistance, morning of November 16

Gr Pz 15 XX z (+) SP 0.S 11

Brachelen

Müllendorf

XX

Line reached by US VII and XIX Corps on November 29, and by XIII Corps on December 4

9

Leiffarth

Tripsrath

Bauchem

Allied forward positions, night of November 22

S I.S XI XX Pz X II V XL

Hoven

6 17 X X 3 18

Allied initial penetration, night of November 18

XX

Bourheim

Aldenhoven Oidtweiler

Schleiden

29 XX 30

29 XX 30

From Nov 19

Altdorf

Obermerz 117 XX

30 III

11 7 II 12 I 0

7

6

120I II 119

N 6 24 X X Gr z 3P

Euchen

ee

Kinzweiler

XX

30 XX4 10

X XI X XX II V

Röhe

nth Ni XX XX irst F

12

Nov

29

Lucherberg Frenz

Weisweiler

8 ov

N

r zG 3 P XX 2 1

Inde XX

(Nov 24)

Luchem

Hehlrath Eschweiler

3 P X zG 12 X r

m Wür XIX XXX VII

Würselen

r zG 3 P XX

Dürwiss

Cr

3 Broichweiden

Lammersdorf

30 XX4 10

rz

XX

Inden

Lürken

k

Me

Kohlscheid

30 XX4 10

Fronhoven

1 ov

119

Lohn

Nov 1

Warden

120 III

246 X 3 Pz X Gr

Hongen

Erberich

reek

III

Pattern

m ro

No

1 X 04 X 1

Schaufenberg

Roer

2

v2

F

Langerwehe

1 X 2 47 X

Alsdorf

Kirchberg 340 Nov 22 XX 3 Pz Gr

Niedermerz

Bettendorf

29 XX 30

v2

176

ree

No

6 17 X r X zG P 15

hC

We h C

XX

v

25

Roer

104 Verlautenheide

173

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 173

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MAP 79: THE FINAL PUSH: VII CORPS REACHES THE ROER DECEMBER 10–16, 1944 Of the four corps taking part in Operation Queen, three had reached most of their objectives along the Roer River by the end of the first week of December. Curiously enough, it was the main push by Collins’ VII Corps which had failed to meet its objective, due in no small measure to the intractability of the Hürtgen defenses. As a result, Collins called a halt to the VII Corps operations on December 7 to permit a reorganization. Two of the four divisions committed to the Hürtgen, the 1st and 4th Infantry divisions, were burnt out and badly in need of rehabilitation out of the line. The 4th Infantry Division was replaced by the 83rd Division, while the 1st was replaced by the veteran 9th Division, which had been rebuilt after its own struggle in the Hürtgen in October. The aim of this final series of actions was to conclusively push VII Corps out of the Hürtgen Forest up to the edge of the Roer and the key city of Düren. The forces opposing VII Corps were primarily Köchling’s LXXXI.Armee-Korps with the 246. Volksgrenadier-Division north of Düren, the 3.FallschirmjägerDivision defending Düren and its approaches, and the 353. Volksgrenadier-Division to the south of the city. The German strength lay more in its potent artillery than in its battered infantry. To the south, the 83rd Division was tasked with the final push out of the Hürtgen through Gey, while to the north, the 9th Division was tasked with pushing beyond the corner of the Hürtgen near Langerwehe on to the Roer Plain beyond. The offensive resumed on December 10. In the north, the 104th Division continued its assault out of the Inde River area, and within four days pushed the 246.VolksgrenadierDivision back to the Roer. The attack in the center by the 9th Infantry Division was supported by armor from the 3rd Armored Division and made slow progress at first. The division attacked with all three regiments, the 47th Infantry to the north, the 60th Infantry in the center, and the 39th making the turn southward to clear out the towns along the eastern edge of the Hürtgen Forest. By this stage, the 3. Fallschirmjäger-Division was in little position to resist, but attempts to 174

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replace it with the inadequately rebuilt 47.Volksgrenadier-Division did not provide enough strength to hold on to the towns west of Düren. Within four days, the 9th Division reached its objectives. Total casualties in the three divisions taking part had been 1,074, including 179 killed. The 83rd Division had the unenviable task of pushing through the final portion of the Hürtgen Forest to reach the towns of Gey and Strass. The division decided to conduct a night advance through the woods to minimize the risk of German artillery, and, despite the usual assortment of minefields and obstacles, two infantry battalions reached the outskirts of Gey and Strass by dawn on December 10. The towns were stubbornly defended by the 353.Volksgrenadier-Division and attempts to move up tanks to assist in the attack on Gey floundered owing to the mud and minefields. In contrast, the arrival of a platoon of tanks at Strass helped ensure its fall before dusk. The German infantry infiltrated into the village of Schafberg that night, essentially cutting off the US infantry battalion in Strass and setting the stage for several counterattacks against Strass on December 11. The main push by the division came on December 14 when the road situation had improved to the point that the 83rd Division could be supported by two combat commands of the 5th Armored Division. The 329th Infantry pushed out of the woods and took Gürzenich, while the 331st Infantry overcame a battalion of the 47.Volksgrenadier-Division in Birgel. Although the Combat Command B, 5th Armored Division had a hard time moving beyond Strass, a rapid advance by Combat Command A on Kufferath forced the defenses in the Combat Command B sector to fold. By December 16, VII Corps had reached the Roer, the same day the German offensive in the Ardennes struck the neighboring V Corps. The month-long fight, from the launch of Operation Queen to December 16, had cost VII Corps 15,908 battle casualties, including 2,448 killed as well as 8,550 non-battle casualties. The heaviest losses had been suffered by the 104th Division, the only division actively committed every day of the offensive.

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30 XX Schophoven 104

XX

Altdorf

30

414 3

Pier

3

10–1

246 XX mjäger r schi l l Fa

XX

Inden

415

Inde

104

Merken

104 XX 9

Luchem

3

6 24 X X 47

Lucherberg

Frenz 104 XX 9

XX

(47 Div relieves 3 Fallschirmjäger 14 ec by Dec 13) yD r a nd bou New

III

Lammersdorf

XX

3

414 II I 415

413 II I 415

Weisweiler

Dec

III

XIXX XX II V th Nin XX XXirst F

XX

246

Dec 13

III

47 III 60

47

(-)

Hoven

Echtz

XX

Ro

47

er

Geich

Düren

III

Langerwehe

60

XX

Mariaweiler

9

60 I Jüngersdorf II 9 3

60 III 39

Derichsweiler Schlich

Merode III

39 We

hC

re

ek

Gürzenich 9 XX 83 3 Fallschirm jäger XX 353 (+)

81 XX 74

9 XX 83

III

XX

9 32 I I I 1 33

Schevenhütte

II

24

Lendersdorf

III

4

331

Berzbuir

Dec 13

F O R E S T Cre

331 III

eh rW the

III

Ro

Grosshau

US positions, night of December 16

Bergheim

B X

Roe

Untermaubach

r

III

US axis of armored drive XX

German main line of resistance, morning of December 10

Kleinhau

4

(-)

5 35 3 X (+ X )

German positions, night of December 16

2 miles 2km

III

83 XX 8

US frontline, morning of December 10

0

A X B

Strass

Kreuzau

Kufferath

8 5 XX 3 A rm d

ek

Gey

330

0

353

Dec 13

H Ü R T G E N

N

XX

9 32 I I I 1 33

Birgel

329

83

Gressenich

Rölsdorf

XX

85

Hürtgen

175

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MAP 80: CONFLICTING PLANS IN LORRAINE SEPTEMBER 1944 In spite of the dire situation at the beginning of September, Hitler began to consider possible offensive options to redeem the disaster in the area opposite the Saar region. The only large force that remained relatively intact was Blaskowitz’s Heeresgruppe G, at the time retreating from central and southern France. It was badly needed to help restore the defense along the German frontier in Lorraine and Alsace. As early as August 1944, the OKW had considered a Panzer offensive from the Langres Plateau toward Reims to cut off and destroy Patton’s Third US Army, to prevent it from interfering with Heeresgruppe G’s retreat. Patton’s forces were the focus of the Panzer offensive for several reasons. The Third US Army had engineered the boldest most impressive offensive advance of the summer, charging across the breadth of France in little more than a week. Secondly, Patton’s advance toward Lorraine posed a special threat. Heeresgruppe G had not yet completed its retreat from the Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts, and many of its units were still on the road. Not only might Patton’s advance cut off these units, but their loss would also make it very difficult to defend the entire German frontier from Luxembourg to Switzerland. Hitler began to define the objectives of the attack further, and issued his first directive on the matter on September 3. Hitler’s September 1944 Panzer offensive never received a formal codename, but is usually called the Vosges Panzer Offensive in German accounts since its concentration points were in the western foreground of the Vosges Mountains. In order to coordinate the Vosges Panzer Offensive, Hitler assigned the mission to the 5.Panzer-Armee under a new commander, General Hasso von Manteuffel. Under Hitler’s initial plan, the attack would be launched by one Panzer division, three Panzergrenadier divisions, and three of the new Panzer brigades; it would then be reinforced by two more Panzer divisions and three more Panzer brigades. The date of the counterattack was initially set for September 12, but events quickly overtook these plans. Patton had begun discussions with Bradley about the future missions of the Third US Army in late August after the liberation of Paris. Patton’s “Plan A” was to strike behind the Seine in a northerly direction with the aim of trapping remaining German forces. During a meeting on August 23, Bradley pointed out that the problem with Plan 176

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A was that it drove the Third US Army across the path of Hodges’ First US Army and into the zones allotted to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. Plan B was to continue advancing east into Lorraine toward the Charmes Gap, one of the traditional invasion routes into Germany. In view of Eisenhower’s preference for a broad front strategy, this was the more plausible direction. Bradley confirmed this option at an August 25 meeting. Curiously, Patton had foreseen the likely direction of his advance and as early as March 1944 had told his intelligence staff to prepare for moving toward Metz. The geography of Lorraine held mixed opportunities for both sides. From the German perspective, the Moselle River Valley formed a natural defense line since the river has a high rate of flow, many potential crossing sites were wooded, the river banks have a high gradient, and most crossing sites are covered by hills on the east bank. This area had been a traditional invasion route for centuries, and the areas on both sides of the river were filled with ancient and modern fortifications. The Moselle defenses were particularly formidable in the northern portion of the sector, since likely river crossings were covered by the artillery in the Metz fortresses. Germany had controlled the area around Metz from 1870 to 1918, and again after 1940, so the most modern defenses faced west. The traditional capital of Lorraine, Nancy, had not been fortified in modern times but the river lines and the plateau of the Massif de Haye on its west bank serve as a significant natural obstacle. The ground most suitable for mobile operations was in the southern sector between Toul and Épinal. This region, known to French planners as the Trouée de Charmes, or the Charmes Gap, had witnessed several battles, notably in the opening phases of World War I. On September 12, patrols from Patton’s Third US Army and Patch’s Seventh US Army met north of Dijon, creating a solid Allied front from the North Sea to the Mediterranean. It would take a week to firm up this juncture, but the rapidity of the American advance forced Hitler to postpone and reorient the Vosges Panzer Offensive. Patton’s immediate objective was to cross the Moselle River and advance as rapidly as possible toward the Saar region beyond. In view of the precarious situation facing the Wehrmacht, Patton was optimistic that he could reach the Westwall by the end of September, placing Third US Army in a position to leapfrog the Rhine.

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LUXEMBOURG

Mairy

N

Luxembourg XX

XXXX

Stenay

XX

First US

Aisn

XX

XXX

Thionville XX

XX

559VG

XX

5

XX

Reims

7 XX

462

Verdun

Metz

XX

Marne

XX

Me

7 XXX

XX

Pont-à-Mousson

Ma

80

rne -Sa ône

Ma

rne

Can

Bar-le-Duc

hin

al XXX

eC

XX

553VG

Commercy an

al

Toul

Nancy

4

Mo

XX

35

XII

Lunéville

lle

X

112

XX

ne

XX

Joinville

se

(-)

4

79

(-)

Sept 3

Charmes

Troyes

2 Fr

XX

Neufchâteau

(-)

Dompaire 111

St-Diédes-Vosges

XXXXX

Gérardmer Remiremont

Bains-les-Bains

SG

Ottenbacher

G

(-)

XX

(-)

XXXXX

Épinal

X

Chaumont 2 Fr

21

16

Andelot

FRANCE

XX

Mirecourt

XX

ES

Sei

XX

35

XX

15

XX

St-Dizier

LXVI

Langres

Châtillon-sur-Seine

VO

XXX

Sept 12

INE

XX

80 –R

LORRA

3 XX

Third US

XX

17.SS

5

use

Châlonssur-Marne XXXX

SAAR

ar

E NN GO AR REST FO

XX

90

Sa

e

90

Sarre

Rethel

XXXX

19 XX

Rcn Tr

LXXXV

XXX

1 Fr

LXVI

(-)

113

Vesoul IV Lw Fd Corps

Saô

2 Fr

Patrol

Sept 10/11 Sombernon

Rcn Gp

Seventh US

Dijon

(-)

Belfort

(-) XX

Sept 11

ne

Giromagny

XX

(-)

11

XXXX

Dou

bs

Besançon

Disposition of Third Army units, September 3, 1944

Saô

ne

5.Panzer-Armee concentration area as planned Direction of projected attack Spearheads of Third Army units, September 11, 1944 German front line and units, September 11, 1944

0 0

25 miles 25km

Châlons-sur-Saône

177

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MAP 81: THIRD US ARMY ALONG THE MOSELLE SEPTEMBER 5–11, 1944 The attacks by Patton’s Third US Army in Lorraine in the first two weeks of September brought American forces to the Moselle, the last major river barrier in front of the central German frontier. Patton was anxious to advance over the Moselle, as the terrain on the east bank up to the German frontier was mostly rolling hills and farmland, well suited to mechanized operations. With enough fuel and supplies, Patton was convinced he could reach the Rhine by the end of the month. The three corps of the Third US Army had varying degrees of success in achieving this goal. Of Patton’s three corps, Walker’s XX Corps near Metz had the most difficulty in executing a river crossing. This was in no small measure due to the heavy concentration of old German and French forts that had been built in the 19th century specifically to prevent river crossings. Although the artillery in the forts was antiquated, it was still more than capable of retarding the advance over the river in this sector. The XX Corps attempted to secure several Moselle River crossings from the run starting on September 7. The 2/11th Infantry, 5th Infantry Division secured a shallow bridgehead at Dornot on September 8, but its expansion was stopped. The 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division repeatedly counterattacked the bridgehead. On September 10, the bridgehead came under fire from Fort Driant and the neighboring Fort Jeanne d’Arc, making the site untenable. To cover its withdrawal, XX Corps artillery conducted counterbattery fire against the forts and the 2/11th Infantry troops on the east bank of the Moselle were withdrawn back to the west bank. The withdrawal of the 2/11th Infantry back across the Moselle was also due to the 5th Division’s attempt at securing a broader and more useful bridgehead near Arnaville. This was less than 3 miles away from Fort Driant, and the site quickly came under fire. Engineers attempting to erect a bridge across the Moselle at the Arnaville site were continually harassed by fire from the fort. On September 13, the Fort Driant artillery sank a ferrying raft, partially demolished the Treadway at the river ford, and broke up a pontoon bridge that was nearly completed. In view of the problems facing the 5th Infantry Division in front of 178

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the forts, Patton hoped that the 7th Armored Division could still push across the river to the south of Metz, and envelop it by a drive to the northeast. However, the 7th Armored Division attack stalled because of stiff German resistance, the timely destruction of key bridges, and the effective use of the old fortifications. Fort Driant would remain a thorn in Patton’s side until the Third US Army staged Operation Thunderbolt later in the month to overwhelm the fort. On September 5, a regimental combat team from the 80th Infantry Division secured a crossing near Pont-à-Mousson. There was a sharp counterattack by the 3.Panzergrenadier-Division that quickly overwhelmed the small force. The Germans created a defense zone on the western side of the Moselle using the 92.Luftwaffen-Feld-Division and Fallschirmjäger-Regiment.3. These units resisted the 80th Infantry Division attack until September 10, when they withdrew to the eastern bank of the Moselle. The 80th Infantry Division shifted its attention from Pont-à-Mousson to a crossing site near Dieulouard. The vestiges of Celtic earthworks, a Roman fort, and a medieval church-fortress testified to the military significance of the crossing site. Before dawn on September 11, two battalions from the 80th Infantry Division crossed the river and took the high ground overlooking it. The Germans counterattacked at 0100hrs on September 13 with a battalion from the Panzergrenadier-Regiment.29, 3.Panzergrenadier-Division backed by ten assault guns. In a vicious nighttime battle, the attack pushed the US troops back within 100 yards of the bridges by 0500hrs. In the meantime, a company of M4 medium tanks from the 702nd Tank Battalion had moved forward, engaging the German armor at ranges of only 200 yards. The American bridgehead came very close to being overrun, but the area near the crossing site was stoutly defended by the engineers who had erected the bridges. In the face of growing American resistance, the German attack lost its momentum. A morning counterattack by the 80th Division supported by the 702nd Tank Battalion recovered the lost ground and halted the German counterattack. This created the first firm foothold for Patton’s Third US Army over the Moselle.

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XX

7 X XXX 1

2

Front line Maginot line

XXX

LXXX

West wall

XX

0

5

10 miles

0

10km N

LUXEMBOURG

XX

Trier

Grevenmacher Arlon

GERMANY

XX XX

48

16

Saarburg

Luxembourg XXX

Remich XX

19 XXX

LXXXII

Merzig

Sierck-les-Bains XX

Koenigsmacker

Thionville

X

106

XX

Dillingen

559 Mos

Metzervisse

elle XXX

Conflans

XXXX

Boulay-Moselle

XX

462

Les Étangs

Metz

1

XXX

XIII.SS

XX

Sarreguemines

St-Avoid

5

es

Saarbrücken

Nied

Maizières-lès-Metz

Bli

Saarlautern

Bouzonville

XX

Dornot Arnaville

Sanrysur-Nied

XX

17.SS

Faulquemont Sarralbe

XX

XX

7

Sarre-Union

3

FRANCE

re

Delme

lle

XX

Sei

Nomény

Sar

Seille

Pont-à-Mousson

Morhange

XX

Dieulouard Château-Salins

15

Dieuze

Mo

se

Moyenvic

XX

lle

Donnelay

Sarrebourg

XX

Marne-Rhine Canal

80

Toul

Nancy

XX

553

Forêt de Parroy

St-Nicolas Mo

Blâmont

rta

Lunéville

gn e XX

21

1 XX XX 9 1

Me

urt

he

Ve z XXXX

ous

e

19 Badonviller

179

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MAP 82: XII CORPS BRIDGEHEADS NEAR NANCY SEPTEMBER 1944 Owing to the difficulties north around Metz, Patton directed XII Corps to attempt crossings south near the provincial capital of Nancy. On September 10–11, the 35th Infantry Division gained a foothold over the Moselle south of Nancy, prompting counterattacks by the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division. Combat Command B of the 4th Armored Division found a fordable stretch of the Bayon Canal. The streams of the Moselle in this area were shallow enough to push over tanks, and soon Combat Command B was moving out of the bridgehead. On the evening of September 11, the 137th Infantry, 35th Division linked up with Combat Command B and they began pushing out of the bridgehead. To complete the encirclement of Nancy, Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division crossed the river early on the morning of September 13 at the Dieulouard bridgehead previously captured by the 80th Infantry Division. This bridgehead was under intense German attack, but Combat Command A was able to repulse the German attack and begin to exploit the penetration with an advance north of Nancy toward Château-Salins. The envelopment of Nancy by the 4th Armored Division was viewed with considerable alarm in Berlin, and Hitler ordered 5.PanzerArmee to crush Patton’s spearhead. This used the resources that had been accumulating for Hitler’s planned Vosges Panzer Offensive. Two of the Panzer brigades intended for the offensive had already been frittered away in local counterattacks against the Third US Army, Panzer-Brigade.108 in the fighting with the 90th Division near Mairy on September 8, and Panzer-Brigade.112 in the fighting with a combat command of the French 2e Division Blindée near Dompaire on September 13. On September 18, 5.Panzer-Armee dispatched elements of three Panzer brigades to attack the flank of 4th Armored Division near Lunéville. Panzer-Brigade.111 clashed with the 42nd Cavalry Squadron on the approaches to the city, and the attack petered out after the other two brigades failed to reach the objective. On September 19, Panzer-Brigade.113 launched an attack on Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division around Arracourt, but the attack was beaten off with heavy losses. The fighting continued the following day with Panzer-Brigade.111 joining the fray in a series of intense tank battles. Unable to overcome the Combat Command A units around Arracourt, the attack shifted focus to the Dieuze sector on September 22, with no better results. These disjointed attacks burned out the two Panzer brigades, and the attacks did not resume until 180

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September 24 with 11.Panzer-Division attacking Arracourt from the southeast and 559.Infanterie-Division from the north. On September 23, Bradley told Patton to halt any further attempts to push to the Saar since supply problems would force the Third US Army to shift to the defensive. As a result, on September 25, Combat Command A, 4th Armored Division withdrew to more defensible lines closer to Arracourt. German attacks continued along the Arracourt perimeter for several days. On September 29, while the fighting was still raging on the hills east of Arracourt, the new Heeresgruppe G commander, General Hermann Balck, visited the OB West commander von Rundstedt at his headquarters in Bad Kreuznach. Balck told the Generalfeldmarschall that if his forces did not receive reinforcements with at least 140 tanks and more artillery, it would be impossible to continue any offensive actions in Lorraine against Patton. Von Rundstedt replied that any reinforcements were out of the question, and tacitly accepted that the Lorraine panzer offensive would come to an end without fulfilling Hitler’s objective. At 2300hrs, Balck informed 5.Panzer-Armee to call off the attack. The battered 11.Panzer-Division was pulled out of the line and defensive positions secured. As a result, the Arracourt fighting concluded in stalemate, with most of the resources hoarded for Hitler’s Vosges Panzer Offensive frittered away in disjointed attacks against Patton’s Third US Army. German casualties in Lorraine in September 1944 totaled about 38,000, and 40,500 captured or missing; US casualties were about 18,500. Tank and armored vehicle losses totaled over 150 for the 5.PanzerArmee compared to 42 for the 4th Armored Division. Heeresgruppe G had very low priority for reinforcements owing to Hitler’s decision to hoard a strategic reserve for an early winter offensive in the Ardennes. As a result, the Lorraine front remained static until November 1944 when Patton’s Third US Army revived its push toward Metz. The Lorraine defeat had some impact on Hitler’s planning for the Ardennes offensive. After seeing the Vosges Panzer force frittered away in small-scale counterattacks, Hitler adamantly refused later requests by von Rundstedt to dip into the Ardennes reserve to reinforce the Roer front in November 1944. The success of Allied air power in blunting several German tank attacks in Lorraine also reinforced Hitler’s decision to stage the Ardennes offensive in the late autumn or early winter, when weather conditions would prevent Allied air power from intervening.

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Front line, September 11

elle

Amanvillers

Front line, September 15 Front line, September 20

Mos

Les Étangs

Front line, September 23 Front line, September 28

Metz

Front line, September 12 Maginot line

Gravelotte 0 Nie

Sep 11

XXX

0

d

St-Avoid 10 miles

10km

Sanry-surNied Faulquemont

Corny

Sep 27–28

XX

5

Pournayla-Chelive

XX

17.SS

Arry

Verny

Sep 11

Sillegny

XX

Sep 27–28

XX

Chérisey

17.SS Oct 12

Morhange

X

X

Seille

XX

553

Pont-à-Mousson

Oct 12

Nomény

XX

Delme

3 X

Sep 11

X

Aulnois-sur-Seille X

CCA

4

Sep 16–20

Sep 15

XX

Jallaucourt

Dieulouard

559 Oct 12

Sep 15

Sep 25–28

Millery

Château-Salins Sep 25–28

Dieuze

Sep 25–28

X

Seille

XX

Moyenvic Mo

XX

le sel

Donnelay XX

11 t6

p

Se

c –O

LVIII

9

Oct 12

1 X X X z X 5P

Nancy

XXX

Oct 12

Arracourt

Sep 15

Marne-R

XX

hine Can

al

15 XX

Sep 11

Sep 18–20

St-Nicolas Mos

Forêt de Parroy

Sep 11

553

Dombasle

Sep 15

rta

1 Oct 6 XXXX 19

Lunéville

gn

Se

Oct 12

15

Mo

1 X XXXz 5P 6 t c p 9–O

elle

XX

XX

15

e

XX

35

Sep 15

Sep 18–20

N X

CCB

4

Meur

the

181

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 181

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MAP 83: LORRAINE: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION SEPTEMBER 25, 1944 By the end of September, Patton’s Third US Army had been halted by the logistical problems affecting the entire Allied front. The breakout from Normandy had exhausted fuel supplies, and units were far deeper in France and Belgium than had been anticipated. On September 22, Eisenhower ordered Allied forces to halt and await further instructions, resulting in a six-week lull in most Allied ground operations. For the Germans, the Arracourt battles had exhausted what few reserves were immediately on hand, and the formations on the western front were in a desperate state after the summer defeats. The 1.Armee had to create new defenses in Lorraine with minimal forces. The one asset in 1.Armee’s favor was the extensive array of defensive fortifications in Lorraine (Lothringen). Lorraine had long been a traditional warpath between France and Germany. In the contemporary era, the province had been a bone of contention between France and Germany, with Germany coveting the region as a means to shield the Saar region by preventing access into central Germany via the “Moselle Gate.” In the wake of the 1870–71 Franco-Prussian War, Lorraine became part of the Reich. The Moselle River Valley took on considerable importance in German war planning since a well fortified Metz–Diedenhofen (Thionville) barrier could act as a pivot for German forces advancing into northern France through Belgium. As a result, the Mosel-Stellung (Moselle Line) was constructed in the Moselle Valley from Metz to Diedenhofen in the last decades of the 19th century. It served this strategic objective well in World War I, shielding the Moselle Gate and allowing the execution of the Schlieffen Plan in 1914. In the wake of the war, Lorraine returned to France and the Mosel-Stellung fell into neglect. Instead, the French built a portion of the Maginot Line in Lorraine farther east along the German frontier. Following the rise of Hitler to power in the 1930s, German strategic planners again sought to use this region as a fortified pivot point for further operations into France down the Belgian corridor. As a result, the Westwall fortification line constructed in the Saar opposite Lorraine was especially dense. With its purpose served, the Westwall fell into disrepair following the defeat of France in 1940. Nevertheless, the paucity of forces available to 1.Armee led to a rejuvenation of the old fortification lines as well as the 182

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construction of an extensive network of new field fortifications under Hitler’s new West-Stellung program. Many senior German commanders were skeptical of the value of the old and forgotten Mosel-Stellung forts around Metz, and it took the initiative of local junior commanders to show them the intrinsic tactical value of these forts, even in an age of mechanized warfare. There had been a significant shake-up in German leadership in Lorraine in September 1944. Hitler relieved Blaskowitz from commanding Heeresgruppe G on September 21, because of his displeasure over the high cost of the retreat from southern and central France and the failure of the Lorraine Panzer counterattack. Many German commanders felt that Blaskowitz had done a commendable job in saving much of Heeresgruppe G in the retreat, but he had never been found in favor by the Nazi regime. He was replaced by General Balck, who had commanded 4.Panzer-Armee on the Easter Front. Balck was one of the best-known Panzer commanders on this front, and he had been elevated from corps to army command only at the beginning of August 1944. His rise was unusually rapid and part of Hitler’s effort to reinvigorate key command positions in the West with an infusion of young blood from the East. In the event, Balck’s command of Heeresgruppe G would be short-lived after both 1.Armee and 19.Armee were comprehensively smashed in the November and December 1944 fighting. Blaskowitz was called back to command on December 23 in hope of providing a steady hand after the autumn disasters. General Kurt von der Chevallerie was relieved of the command of 1.Armee on September 5, owing to Berlin’s dissatisfaction with his handling of the defense along the Seine. Command was transferred to General Otto von Knobelsdorff, another distinguished Eastern Front Panzer veteran. There was some concern over his appointment to lead 1.Armee owing to the heavy toll on his health from the Eastern Front battles; he had been temporarily relieved on two occasions in 1942 and 1943 owing to serious illnesses. This proved justified, as by the beginning of November, Knobelsdorff’s health had deteriorated to the point where he was sent on furlough for several weeks during the height of the fighting.

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N

Trier

Front line Maginot line

Grevenmacher Arlon

t rs Fi XX d X r X hi T

West wall

0

B X XX XX G

0

Luxembourg

GERMANY

XX

48

83

10km

Saarburg

XX

LUXEMBOURG

10 miles

(+)

Remich

Merzig

Sierck-les-Bains Koenigsmacker

Dillingen

XX

559 VG

(-)

Metzervisse

Saarlautern

Bouzonville Moselle

XX

Nied

Saarbrücken

Maizières-lès-Metz XX

Conflans

90

Blies

Thionville

462 VG

XX

Boulay-Moselle

Les Étangs

St-Avoid

Metz

XX

XX

Sanrysur-Nied

Faulquemont

17.SS

Arnaville

Sarreguemines

Sarralbe

XX

5 XX

Sarre-Union

3

XX

553 VG

Dieulouard

80

559 VG

Delme

Nomény

X

XX

Château-Salins

Se

s Mo

ell

e

Dieuze

ille

FRANCE

XX

35 XX

6

1 XX XX Pz 5

106

(-) XX

XX 35

(-)

re

Pont-àMousson

Sar

XX XXX XII

Morhange

XX

11

Moyenvic

(-) 35 XX

(-)

Donnelay X

4

111

Nancy XX

15

Forêt de Parroy Blâmont

Lunéville

X XX II XV X

rne -Rh i n e Can a l Ma

113

Toul

St-Nicolas

Sarrebourg

X

XX

Ve z

ous

e

XX

XX

79 2 Fr

Bayon

XX

Me

urt

Badonviller

XX

he

21

(-)

Morta

Baccarat

gne 5 Pz XXXX 19

Mirecourt

Châtel

XX 12 X 6 XX

Charmes Rambervillers

St-Dié-desVosges

183

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MAP 84: ENCIRCLEMENT OF METZ  NOVEMBER 9–19, 1944 When the supply situation eased in November 1944, Patton initiated Operation Madison to capture the remainder of Lorraine up to the German frontier. At the time, Third US Army had been reduced to only two corps after having four corps through much of the summer fighting. This consisted of Walker’s XX Corps facing Metz, and Eddy’s XII Corps on the Seille River. The principal mission of XX Corps was the elimination of the Metz fortified zone. Owing to the heavy cost of capturing Fort Driant the previous month, the final field orders for Operation Madison moved away from the mission of reducing the forts, and instead aimed at the “destruction or capture of the Metz garrison, without the investiture or siege of the Metz forts.” The XX Corps attack began with a diversionary “demonstration” by a regiment of the 95th Division near Uckange to draw attention away from the main river crossing operation by the 90th Division. The latter began at midnight on November 8/9 and consisted of two regiments landed by assault boats over the flooded Moselle. The early morning rain was so severe that German troops in the area were not on alert. Fort Koenigsmacker was isolated and bypassed, but its artillery continued to bombard the river landing sites. The 90th Division foothold remained precarious through November 10, as the Moselle had continued to flood and the landing sites endured several counterattacks. A German attempt to reinforce Fort Koenigsmacker on November 11 was ambushed and the garrison was forced to surrender. With the Moselle floodtide receding and a new bridge erected, the 90th Division was able to repulse a counterattack by the Kampfgruppe from Panzergrenadier-Regiment.35 that day as well. In an effort to sufficiently solidify the bridgehead over the Moselle to permit the deployment of the 10th Armored Division, steps began to expand the 95th Division “demonstration” into a functional bridgehead by clearing out forts near Thionville that covered the Thionville–Metz highway. After several counterattacks were repulsed and tactical bridging erected, two combat commands of the 10th Armored Division began moving out on the afternoon of November 15. A Kampfgruppe from Panzergrenadier-Regiment.35 attacked the 90th Division at daybreak on November 15, leading to a four-hour melee in Distroff that eventually was crushed. This was the last major German counterattack in this sector owing to dwindling resources. 184

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In view of the continued advance of the 90th Division southward on November 17, the Heeresgruppe G commander General Balck decided to sacrifice the Metz garrison to tie up the Americans as long as possible and provide time to pull out both 19.Volksgrenadier-Division and 416. Infanterie-Division to the Nied-Stellung to the east. On the right flank, the 5th Infantry Division along the Seille River southwest of Metz launched its river crossing near Sanry-sur-Nied on November 9, avoiding the Metz fortification belt and pushing eastward to sever the main roads leading into Metz. This triggered a strong counterattack by a Kampfgrupppe of SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.38 and the 21.Panzer-Division, but it was beaten off. On November 13, the 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division and 21.Panzer-Division joined again to stage a major counterattack against the Sanry-sur-Nied bridgehead; the fighting lasted into the morning of November 14, without overcoming the bridgehead. On November 11, 1.Armee began evacuating Metz of nonessential personnel. By November 14, American patrols were probing the outer Metz defenses from the northwest, west, and the southeast. The fighting had proceeded rapidly enough for the 95th Division to contact Walker’s XX Corps headquarters to request a change of plans. Instead of waiting until the 5th and 90th divisions had completely sealed off the city, the 95th Division wanted to proceed immediately to an attack into Metz. Over the next three days, the American infantry, with armored support, began methodically to clear the numerous fortified strongpoints ringing the city. By November 17, the end of Festung Metz seemed near. With all four columns of the 95th Division within reach of the city from the west and north, and with two regiments of the 5th Division within range from the southeast, Walker ordered the start of the final push into Metz at 1400hrs of November 17 with an initial race to major bridges in hope of securing them prior to German demolition. Patrols entered the city later in the day, and by November 18, resistance largely evaporated except for scattered outbursts of shooting. The US divisions began mopping up last pockets of resistance. Some of the isolated fortifications held out for weeks: Fort St-Quentin on December 5, Plappeville on December 7, and the final holdout Jeanne d’Arc on December 13.

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N

XX

416 XX 19 VG

XX

416

90 X X 5 9

90 Koenigsmacker

X

XX

CCB

10 Thionville

XX

19 VG

10

X

CCA

10

Distroff

Metzervisse III

Uckange

358 III

Bouzonville

III

377

III

357

359

XX

95

Nie

d

19 V X G 462 X VG

Maizièreslès-Metz III

St-Privat

377

TF Bacon

III

FRANCE

Boulay-Moselle

III

378 Mos

elle

Amanvillers

Les Étangs

Front line, November 9 Front line, November 14

Metz

XII Corps advance to November 14 XX Corps advance to November 19

Gravelotte III

462 VG

379

Maginot line

XX

0 0

Jouy-auxArches 462 VG XX 17.SS

Dornot

III

10

11

5km

Sanrysur-Nied

III

III

95 XX 5

5 miles

2

XX

17.SS Arnaville

Verny

Chérisey

Marieulles XX

5 Sei

lle

X

CCB

XX XXX XII

5 XX 6

6

X

CCA

6

Nancy

185

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MAP 85: OPERATION MADISON – NOVEMBER 8 TO DECEMBER 19, 1944 The push to the Saar was conducted by the two corps of Patton’s Third US Army, with Walker’s XX Corps on the left flank (see Map 84), and Major-General Manton Eddy’s XII Corps on the right. Eddy’s XII Corps began the Operation Madison attack on November 8, a day before the attack in the neighboring XX Corps sector. The attack won tactical surprise owing to careful attention to camouflage when the three infantry divisions moved into their start positions the night before, and the rainy weather helped mask the preparations. The initial objectives, including key bridges, were mostly attained in the first day. On the right flank of the XII Corps attack, the fighting near Moyenvic began to force open a gap between the 361.VolksgrenadierDivision and 559.Volksgrenadier-Division, which Eddy exploited by committing Combat Command A (of the 4th Armored Division. The threat was so serious that von Knobelsdorff committed the 1.Armee reserve, 11.Panzer-Division, to stabilize the front. This halted the attack in this sector but in the meantime the 26th Division had continued its advance to the Koecking Ridge, which eventually forced 1.Armee to begin to withdraw. A similar tactic was used in the XII Corps center, which began with an attack of the 35th Division near Château-Salins, followed by exploitation by Combat Command B, 4th Armored Division once the initial German defense lines had been overcome on November 9. With steady but slow progress, the 35th Division reached Morhange on November 15. The left-flank attack of XII Corps elicited the most violent German counterattacks. By nightfall on November 8, the 80th Division had ten bridges over the Seille River. Once the defenses on Delme Ridge were overcome, two combat commands of the 6th Armored Division pushed ahead to the Nied Française River and then to the main corps objective of Faulquemont. This advance posed a major threat to 13.SS-ArmeeKorps and there was a scramble by Heeresgruppe G to scrape together reinforcements, including transfers from 19.Armee to counterattack the bridgehead, but to no avail. The advance on the right flank of XII Corps was affected by developments in the neighboring XV Corps sector of the Seventh US Army to the southeast. The American attacks into the Saverne Gap at the boundary of 1.Armee and 19.Armee were so threatening that Balck was able to secure the Panzer-Lehr-Division from the strategic reserve. This reinforcement spilled over into the XII Corps sector with a series of bitter fights between elements of the 4th Armored Division and 186

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Panzer-Lehr-Division. The 4th Armored Division ground its way through the German defenses, finally reaching the outskirts of SarreUnion by the end of November. In a series of seesaw battles, SarreUnion changed hands several times in the first few days of December, finally being captured on the 4th by 4th Armored Division and the 104th Infantry Division. The fighting on the left wing of XII Corps was significantly different, as this sector was dominated by swathes of the Maginot Line fortifications. The 6th Armored Division was used in concentrated fashion to push up the road from Morhange toward the Maginot Line. The attack against dug-in elements of the 17.SS-PanzergrenadierDivision and the left flank of the 11.Panzer-Division was very slowmoving owing to the soggy ground conditions as well as an extensive and effective West-Stellung field fortification belt. The month ended with the 6th Armored Division and 35th Division along the Maderbach River, about 27 miles from the start line three weeks earlier at the start of the offensive. On December 4, the attack resumed in this sector by the 35th and 80th Infantry divisions to secure Sarreguemines on the Saar River. The advance reached the outer perimeter of the Westwall by December 17, when news from the Ardennes offensive brought further operations to a halt. After Walker’s XX Corps secured the Metz fortified sector as described in the previous map, it continued to push on toward the German frontier, encountering the Westwall. The 10th Armored Division began to grind into the Orschloz Switch Line (OrschlozRiegel-Stellung) on November 19, but it stalled, lacking the dedicated engineer equipment and infantry needed to penetrate such fortifications. The 90th and 95th divisions pushed on toward the Saar Heights Line (Saar-Höhen-Stellung), and this pressure forced the right wing of 1.Armee to abandon the line and pull back over the Saar at midnight on November 30. In the predawn hours of December 3, a battalion of the 379th Infantry found an undefended bridge and gained a foothold in Germany at Saarlautern. This led to several furious counterattacks on December 3–4. Von Knobelsdorff was relieved of command of 1.Armee for this failure. The 90th Division seized another bridgehead over the Saar near Pachten and fought its way into the neighboring town of Dillingen. Hitler was so enraged by the events on the Saar that Heeresgruppe G’s Chief of Staff Colonel Friedrich von Mellenthin was relieved, followed by Balck himself on December 23.

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Trier

Front line, evening, November 7 Front line, evening, November 19 Front line, evening, December 2

LUXEMBOURG

Grevenmacher

Arlon

Front line, evening, December 19 Encirclement of Metz: Axis of attack

XX

83

Maginot line

Saarburg

Luxembourg

West wall

GERMANY

XX

Remich

10km

XX

3 X

X

Sierckles-Bains

XX

XX

Merzig

10

XX

Koenigsmacker

Blies

719

XX

X X 90

Thionville TF Polk XX

19 VG

Dillingen

X

XX

Bouzonville

347

XX

95

Nied

Moselle

Saarbrücken

XX

XX

6

Boulay-Moselle Conflans

5

Les Étangs

XX

Sarreguemines

XX

6 XX

Metz

35

XX

XX

Arnaville XX

5

44

Sarralbe

XX

Sarre-Union XX

Seille

Pont-àMousson

Morhange

Delme

Nomény

26 XX

XX

4 XX

XX

Dieulouard

44

80 XX

Mo

se

XX

100

Château-Salins

FRANCE lle

87

XX XX

35

XX XXX XII

XX

XX

6

Faulquemont

XX

XX

XX

10

XX

80

Sanrysur-Nied

XX

17.SS 25

St-Avoid

XX XX

XX

36 VG

X

XX

X

Maizièreslès-Metz

XX

559 VG

Saarlautern

X

Metzervisse

XX

XX

90

XX

10 miles

0

416

First XXXX Third

95

0

Dieuze

XX

35

XX

XX

6

XX

4

Toul

Moyenvic

Sa

Donnelay

rre

Sarrebourg

XX

26

rne -Rh i n e Can a l Ma

Nancy XX

45

Forêt de Parroy

St-Nicolas Blâmont

Lunéville

XX

2 Fr

Me

12 XX X XX 6

Bayon

urt

Ve z

ous

e

XX

he

Badonviller

Mort

Baccarat

agne

N V X XX X VI

Charmes

Rambervillers Mirecourt

Châtel

St-Dié-desVosges

187

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 187

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MAP 86: 6th ARMY GROUP’S ADVANCE ON THE RHINE – NOVEMBER 14 TO DECEMBER 16, 1944 The Allied supply crisis in late September 1944 halted Devers’ 6th Army Group and gave Heeresgruppe G a short lull to rebuild its defenses in Alsace. The 6th Army Group consisted of the Seventh US Army and the French 1re Armée (1st Army), and their offensive resumed in early October once supplies began to flow through the Mediterranean port of Marseilles. The French IIe Corps attempted to skirt the main German defenses in the Belfort Gap with a penetration of the mountain passes on its northern shoulder, but the attack was not entirely successful owing to a vigorous German counterattack. The US VI Corps conducted Operation Dogface, an attempt to push through the German defenses in the foothills of the Vosges approaching Bruyères before they could solidify. A punishing battle of attrition ensued in the forested mountains. The 6th Army Group resumed its offensive on November 13 in conjunction with Patton’s Third US Army operation to the north. In the south, the French Ier Corps attacked over the lowlands of the Belfort Gap toward Mulhouse, and into the face of some of the stiffest German defenses of LVXXXV.Armee-Korps. The French IIe Corps went over the Vosges against IV.Luftwaffen-Feld-Korps toward Colmar. Heeresgruppe G was uncertain about French plans and the German defenders in the Belfort Gap were surprised by the ferocity of the French attack that came on November 14, a day after a major snowstorm. The tanks of the 1re Division Blindée began racing for the Rhine near the Swiss border, and patrols reached the river on November 19, the first Allied troops to do so. German counterattacks on November 22 and 23 failed to halt the French advance. The French attack continued until November 28, falling somewhat short of its goals but with the Belfort Gap in French hands and the cities of Mulhouse and Belfort liberated. In the center, the US VI Corps penetrated the High Vosges via the Saales Pass as well as a second penetration toward Strasbourg through the Hantz Pass. In less than two weeks of fighting, the infantry succeeded in overwhelming the German mountain defenses, debouching on the eastern side of the mountain range. In the north, Haislip’s XV Corps penetrated into the Saverne Gap and pushed through substantial 188

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German defenses. On reaching Saverne on November 22, Haislip unleashed his exploitation force, the French 2e Division Blindée, which aggressively raced for Strasbourg. The boldness of the French tank attack found the Strasbourg defenses unprepared and the Alsatian capital fell on November 23. The Wehrmacht attempted to counterattack by striking XV Corps in the flank using the Panzer-Lehr-Division, but this effort was stymied by a prompt intervention from Patton’s neighboring Third US Army. Following the loss of Strasbourg on November 23, the focal point of German actions in late November and early December was the defense of the Colmar Pocket, which was the last major German foothold on the west bank of the Rhine in Alsace. On November 24, von Rundstedt and Balck recommended that 19.Armee be withdrawn over the Rhine to a new defense line in the Black Forest; Hitler was infuriated by the idea that a major portion of Alsace would be handed back to the French without a fight and grimly instructed that the forces trapped around Colmar would fight or die on the Alsatian Plains. With the High Vosges barrier penetrated, Devers began Rhine crossing preparations, but was denied permission to do so by Eisenhower, who felt the time and place were not right. The brutal mountain offensives continued into mid-December. The US XV Corps’ attack north toward the Saar faced a heavy concentration of Maginot Line defenses around the old fortress city of Bitche, while VI Corps to the east faced the Haguenau Forest followed by the Westwall. The penetration of the Haguenau Forest was successful enough for VI Corps to commit their mechanized exploitation force, the 14th Armored Division. In contrast, XV Corps had a hard time on the approaches to Bitche, and had not captured the city by the third week of December when operations were halted by the Ardennes Offensive. Farther south, the Colmar Pocket was assaulted on three sides, but the Wehrmacht retained firm control through the end of December. Any further progress on this front was halted when Eisenhower accepted Patton’s offer to rush a corps north to the Ardennes to relieve Bastogne. Patch’s Seventh US Army was forced to cover the gap, making it ripe for a German counteroffensive at the beginning of 1945.

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L O W

XX

12 XX

XX

XX

103

44 Dec 16

381

Bitche

V O S G E S

XX

XX

100

XX

79 Dec 16

45 Dec 16

12 X XX XX 6

XX

Dec 16 14

Dec 16

Haguenau

Dec 16

Saverne XX XX

44

553

Nancy

XX XX

708

Strasbourg Dec 16

tz Han s Pas

E

XX

79

G

XX

2 Fr

716

I

100 XX

103

XX

Selestat

TIA

16

XX

SA

36

AL

Bruyères

Saales Pass

H

XX

3

Dec 16

N P LA

G

XX

INS

H

XX

XV X XXVI

XX

e

XXX

LXIV

Rhin

V

O

S

2 Fr

3

S

Lunéville

XX

GERMANY

XX

198

36

Colmar

Dec 16 XXX

IV Luft

US nth Seve XXX h X renc tF Firs

3 Fr

XX

CO L M AR

XX

269 3 Fr

FRANCE

P O CKE T

XX

Dec 16

2 Fr 1 Fr

Freiburg

XX

XX

Dec 16

XX

1 Fr

159

II Fr XXX I Fr

Belfort LXXXV

XXX

XX

Dec 16

BELF

9 Fr

ORT

XX

Mulhouse

Dec 16

GAP

XX

2 Fr

XX

189

Basel XX

SWITZERLAND

338 9 Fr

XX

German fortified lines

N

Front line

Vor-Vogesenstellung

November 14, 1944

Vogesenstellung

November 25, 1944

Colmar Line

December 1, 1944

Mulhouse Line

December 5, 1944

Belfort Line

December 16, 1944

0 0

20 miles 20km

189

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 189

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MAP 87: OPENING THE SCHELDT – OCTOBER 6 TO NOVEMBER 3, 1944 Following the conclusion of Operation Market-Garden at the end of September 1944, the focus of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group shifted to its left flank. The First Canadian Army was assigned to open the passageway to the port of Antwerp by clearing either side of the Scheldt Estuary. Antwerp offered the largest port closest to the Allied front lines, but its capture in September 1944 was of no value until German control over the areas on either side of the Scheldt was overcome. In September, Hitler designated the Breskens Pocket on the south bank as Festung Schelde Süd while the islands of Walcheren and South Beveland to the north were designated as Festung Schelde Nord. This change in designation had little to do with any reinforcement of the fortifications, rather it was a symbolic gesture because Hitler had ordered all Festungen to be held to the last man. On September 15, the 70.Infanterie-Division took over the defense of Walcheren and South Beveland while by September 18, the 64.Infanterie-Division took up positions in the Breskens Pocket. The 64.Infanterie-Division had fought on the Eastern Front and was by far the more stubborn foe; the 70.Infanterie-Division was a so-called “stomach” division filled out with troops with medical problems and designated as a static division for coastal defense tasks. The defense of the Breskens Pocket was aided considerably by the barriers presented by the Canal de la Lys and the Leopold Canal, as well as flooded areas associated with them. There had been some efforts made in 1944 to create a Landfront south of Breskens consisting of some pillboxes. Although there were five major coastal artillery batteries in the Breskens Pocket, they had a limited role in the subsequent fighting as their casemates kept the guns pointed out to sea. The 3rd Canadian Division was assigned the task of clearing the Breskens Pocket, an arduous process owing to the low-lying and often flooded polder terrain. Operation Switchback began on October 6, when the 7th Infantry Brigade crossed the Leopold Canal using assault boats against the southern defense line of the 64.Infanterie-Division. Once the crossing was secure, a Bailey bridge was erected to permit a flow of reinforcements and supplies. The 7th Infantry Brigade was reinforced by a British brigade from the 52nd Lowland Division in mid-October. 190

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The second phase of Operation Switchback was an assault on the eastern side of the Breskens Pocket. Access from the Terneuzen area to the Breskens Pocket was complicated by the numerous water obstructions, most notably the Ghent–Terneuzen Canal followed by the Braakman tidal inlet. Rather than attempt to make two difficult water crossings, the 9th Infantry Brigade made a bold amphibious attack from Terneuzen, landing behind the German front lines. This was undertaken using Buffalo LVT (Landing Vehicle, Tracked) amphibious tractors manned by the 5th Assault Regiment of the 79th Armoured Division. The operation was delayed owing to the difficulties in getting the Buffalos into place. Two Canadian infantry battalions set off on a 5-mile voyage from Terneuzen around midnight on October 8/9, arriving on the opposite shore two hours later. The amphibious end run completely surprised the German defenders. The terrain in this sector proved better than the flooded area near the Leopold Canal, and so the 8th Infantry Brigade was shifted to this sector to continue the operations against the Breskens Pocket. The town of Breskens fell on October 22, but Fort Frederik Hendrik held out for three more days. The divisional headquarters of the 64.Infanterie-Division was captured on November 1, and resistance in the pocket ended by November 3. Operation Vitality I, the campaign to clear South Beveland as a precursor to Walcheren, was started on October 7 by the 2nd Canadian Division. This was a slow process owing to the flooded terrain, and the division did not reach the Beveland Canal until October 27. To speed the process, Operation Vitality II was launched by two brigades of the 52nd Lowland Division on October 26 using the amphibious tactics demonstrated earlier in the month with Buffalo amphibious tractors. The German defense of South Beveland was quickly overcome by a twopronged advance, putting the two divisions opposite Walcheren. By the end of the month, the British and Canadian forces were along the Sloe Channel facing Walcheren. Access to the peninsula and island was treacherous owing to the water obstructions, and an elaborate set of operations were planned to overcome this fortified area in November 1944.

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 191

N

Allied operations preceding main assault Main assault

0

5 miles

0

SCHOUWEN

5km

North Sea Vrouwenpolder

II

NORTH BEVELAND

210

Naval Force ‘T’

X

Westkapelle

WALCHEREN

Operation Infatuate II Nov 1

X

4 SS

Goes

XX

Walch e Canalren

70 810

Vlissingen

Operation Infatuate I Nov 1 Wielingen Channel Breskens

XX

Oct 29

Slo

h eC

an

Zeebrugge

Oct 22

155 156

X

155

Oct 26

Bra

pol

dC

Operation Vitality I

Oct 7

Westerschelde

Operation Vitality II

an

3 Can

Oct 27

Terneuzen XX

NETHERLANDS XX

52 2 Can

Hulst ana

l

Leopold Ca

Oct 6

XXX

7 Can

II Can Bruges

X

nal

Up

pe

r Sc heldt

Antwerp

XXXX

First Can

akm

South Beveland Ship Canal

Oct 26

Oct 9 Operation Switchback

Bergen op Zoom

Oosterschelde

X

Westerschelde (Western Scheldt)

Zeeuwsch Vlaanderen (Breskens Pocket) Leo

n

Oct 31 Operation Nov 2/3 Mallard SOUTH BEVELAND el

Oct 22

64

Knokke

Roosendaal

Sloedam Causeway

Middelburg

II

Ostend 14 miles (22km)

Oosterschelde (Eastern Scheldt)

Veere

BELGIUM

XX

191

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MAP 88: CLEARING THE SCHELDT: OPERATION INFATUATE The original scheme to take Walcheren involved the use of airborne troops, a plan that was quickly rejected by the First Allied Airborne Army. Once it became evident that the First Canadian Army would be given the task, the acting commander, Lieutenant-General Guy Simonds, recommended that the campaign begin by breaching the dikes to completely all parts of Walcheren below high-water level. This would submerge German artillery positions outside the dunes, and isolate their infantry units, making it impossible for them to launch their customary counterattacks. The bombing would create new beaches, not covered by existing defences, and allow the attackers to sail through the gaps in the dyke to attack the German batteries from the rear. This was approved on October 1, and RAF Bomber Command conducted four daylight raids on October 3–11, turning Walcheren into a soggy atoll with the entire center of the island under water. Simonds hoped that concentrated bombing of the remaining dry parts of the island would persuade the defenders to surrender, but the 70. Infanterie-Division did not budge. The amphibious assault to capture Walcheren was a two-pronged operation consisting of Operation Infatuate I, another crossing of the Scheldt by the 52nd Lowland Division against Vlissingen using the amphibious equipment of the 79th Armoured Division; and Infatuate II by the 4th Special Service Brigade landing by sea against Westkapelle. The town of Vlissingen had been heavily fortified as Marine-KüstenBatterie (Naval Coastal Battery) Kernwerk Vlissingen and included the 9./Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 battery. The decision to stage the landing in the predawn hours of November 1, 1944 substantially reduced casualties during the landing phase, but the fighting for the town proved more difficult owing to the numerous bunkers and pillboxes. The Westkapelle landing zone was imperiled by the presence of three coastal artillery batteries of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202. The 6./Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 was armed with four British 3.7in. antiaircraft guns captured at Dunkirk, supported by two 75mm guns in gun pits. This battery was part of Stützpunkt Tiefland defended by 5./ Grenadier-Regiment.1018. The neighboring 7./Marine-ArtillerieAbteilung.202 was armed with four 150mm TbtsK C/36 naval guns in concrete casemates reinforced by two 75mm guns. It was part of Stützpunkt Rheingold held by 5./Grenadier-Regiment.1018. Besides the coastal batteries in the landing zone, the 5./Marine-Artillerie192

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Abteilung.202 (W17) near Zoutelande had four French 220mm guns in open pits which were in easy reach of the landing area. Although there had been some RAF strikes against the batteries, the main guns were functional at the time of the British landings. The British amphibious force heading toward Westkapelle on the morning of November 1 included gun- and rocket-firing support craft as well as the battleship HMS Warspite and the monitors Erebus and Roberts. The gun battle between the Royal Navy and Marine-ArtillerieAbteilung.202 began shortly after 0800hrs with Warspite bombarding 5./Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202, Roberts versus 7./Marine-ArtillerieAbteilung.202, and Erebus versus 6./Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202. In the event, Erebus suffered a failure of its turret traverse, and so Roberts was obliged to engage two gun batteries. The Royal Navy Close Support Squadron had its gun and rocket craft split into two groups, planning to distract the German gunners from the vulnerable infantry landing craft. Two LCT(R) rocket craft of the Southern Group were hit by 7./ Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 but managed to retire after firing most of their rockets. The group’s nine gun-support craft attempted to engage the German bunkers, but most were severely damaged in a very unequal duel. The situation facing the Northern Group was not much better, and an accident with one of the rocket craft resulted in several rockets striking two of the gun craft. Once again, the heavily protected 6./ Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 had the better of the gun duels, severely damaging most of the gun support craft. Of 27 support craft taking place in the operation, ten were sunk and six were severely damaged; 172 sailors were killed or missing, and 125 wounded. The sacrifice of the gun-support craft had not been in vain, as the 4th Special Service Brigade landed at Westkapelle largely intact starting at 0957hrs. By the time the landing craft went ashore, 7./Marine-ArtillerieAbteilung.202 had run out of ammunition. The 6./Marine-ArtillerieAbteilung.202 continued to fire and damaged two more tank landing craft; the battery was finally cleared by 41 Royal Marine Commando around noon, while 7./Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 was overrun by 48 Royal Marine Commando in the early afternoon. Although MarineArtillerie-Abteilung.202 had failed to stop the landings, these two units were arguably the most destructive of any Atlantic Wall gun batteries during the war. With troops ashore, the Royal Marine Commandos pushed along the dunes north and south, eliminating the remaining German strongpoints.

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 193

N

North Sea I

4

Bombardment Squadron

202

10 Cdo m

10

HMS Erebus

HMS Kingsmill

Naval Force ‘T’ 4 SS

III

I

HMS Warspite

0725hrs

W19

I

D-Day am

Motor launch

202

II

Botkil Bank

X II

Motor launch

41 (RM) Cdo

‘N’ LCT

II

SSEF

lank ern F

North 0845hrs II

47 (RM) Cdo ‘Floating reserve’ 1000–1200hrs

4m

LCG(L)

LCF LCS

LCT(R) LCH 269

5

II

1020

202 1815hrs W17 1745hrs Domburg

II

1300hrs

I

6

Oostkapelle

W A L C H E R E N

202

W15 Westkapelle

Red 0958hrs

White 1010–1025hrs II

Sou

ther

48 (RM) Cdo 1140–1830hrs

Green

n Fl

ank

LCF LCS

LCT(R)

LCT(L)

10m

I

7 4m

F l o o d e d

a r e a

W13

202

Zoutelande D+1 1100hrs

10

Groote Valkenisse

m

47 (RM) Cdo D+1 1700hrs

II

Koudekerke

W11

R a a n

I

B a n k

8

I

202

2

II

810 I

Westerschelde (Western Scheldt)

3

W4 W3 810

0 0

2 miles 2km

Nolledij Vlissingen III

1019 Lighthouses

810

D+2 1610hrs

193

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MAP 89: THE FALL OF WALCHEREN NOVEMBER 3–8, 1944 Operation Infatuate marked the start of the reduction of the Walcheren fortress, but it took nearly a week of fighting to bring it completely under control. Much of this effort was spent dealing with the unusual geography of the island following the October flooding of its center. Besides the two amphibious landings on Walcheren on November 1, the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division began an effort to cross the Sloe Channel causeway between South Beveland and Walcheren starting on October 31. This narrow connection was extremely exposed to German gunfire, but by November 2, a small bridgehead had been established on the west bank. At this point, units of the 52nd Lowland Division began relieving the Canadians. The vulnerability of the causeway led to a decision to conduct another amphibious assault farther south across the marsh and mudflats near Nieuwdorp on the South Beveland side to Walcheren, called Operation Mallard. The 6th Cameronians with Royal Engineer support crossed the water in the early hours of November 3. The battalion was isolated for a day, but momentum gradually built up and the bridgehead enlarged toward the town of Middleburg. The Festung Walcheren commander, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Daser, was in Middleburg along with a large portion of the remaining German garrison. In view of the shrinking perimeter, the Middleburg garrison could see the eventual outcome and few of the overage troops were keen on Hitler’s admonition to fight “to the last bullet.” Believing that a solid show of force would lead to a surrender, the 11th Royal Tank Regiment sent 11 Buffalos from Vlissingen toward Middleburg on November 6 with troops of A Company, 7th/9th Royal Scots aboard. By late afternoon, a column of eight Buffalos reached the main square of the town without encountering any Germans. The vehicles were met by ecstatic Dutch crowds, since most of the population of Walcheren had been forced into the town by the October flooding. Daser eventually agreed to surrender, and 2,000 German prisoners were taken. A small number of German troops later escaped by boat on the morning of November 7 from Veere, but this was no easy matter as by then North Beveland was in the hands of the Dutch resistance, and some of the neighboring Kriegsmarine garrisons farther up the coast had been instructed to turn away “deserters” from the Walcheren 194

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garrison owing to Hitler’s “last stand” orders. Following the liberation of Middleburg, all that remained of the German defenses was Grenadier-Regiment.1020 and two remaining strongpoints of Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202 on the far northern portion of the island. The troops of 10 Commando and 41 Royal Marine Commando had been pushing up the northwestern coast of the island since the Operation Infatuate landings. All that remained of the coast above water was the line of dunes, and the area was infested with mines, bunkers, and concrete strongpoints. Domburg and the strongpoint to the northeast were secured by November 5, and RAF Typhoons began conducting attacks against German strongpoints farther up the coast, including the W19 (4./ Marine-Artillerie-Abteilung.202) naval gun battery. By November 8, the area around Middleburg was firmly under British control and the 52nd Lowland Division had brought up the divisional 25-pdrs to provide fire support in the final battles to the north. The plan for the final attack was an infiltration in the dark by the Commandos while a few tanks took up an overwatch position on the dunes northeast of Domburg. During the early morning actions, troops of 4 Commando encountered several German troops who indicated that the remainder of Grenadier-Regiment.1020 wished to discuss surrender. Oberst Veigle was reached over a field telephone line and, after an exchange of pleasantries, direct negotiations followed at the regimental command post. In the event, the remainder of the garrison agreed to surrender. The liberation of Walcheren ensured the opening of the port of Antwerp, but not before the waters and shores were cleared of naval mines and obstructions. Even before the German coastal batteries nearest the Scheldt Estuary were silenced, Operation Calendar began with the arrival of the first minesweepers under the cover of darkness on the night of November 3/4. The original estimate was that it would take four weeks to clear the mines, but Antwerp was declared safe on November 26. The first coasters entered the harbor on November 26 followed by the first large cargo ships on November 28. Antwerp quickly became the major port for Allied operations in Northwest Europe, handling 60 percent of supplies by April 1945. It was the supplies being delivered through Antwerp that allowed the Allies to resume offensive operations on a full scale into Germany in the late-winter months of early 1945.

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N

I

4

202

German escape route to Schouwen

W19

North Sea

Nov 7

Pumping station

BH

4 Cdo

Nov 8

II

Overduin

W18 III

1020

X

4 SS

41 (RM) Cdo

4 Cdo 48 (RM) Cdo

NORTH BEVELAND

Vrouwenpolder

Nov 5 II

Domburg 10 Cdo

II

1300hrs Nov 8

Oostkapelle

II

0720hrs Nov 7

Oostwatering

Nov 6 Veere

Serooskerke

W A L C H E R E N Westkapelle

F l o o d e d

a r e a

na

l

XX

er

en

Ca

70

lch

4/5 RSF

Wa

Nov 6

Zoutelande

Middelburg

Arnemuiden

Westerschelde (Western Scheldt)

47 (RM) Cdo

Nov 6

II

Nov 4–8

I

A

Nov 6 Surrender date

5 KOSB

Lighthouses

Nolledijk

British regrouping

0 0

2 miles 2km

Vlissingen X

155

X III

156

79

1

Nov 5

6 HLI

186

X

157

II

5 HLI

II

4 KOSB

Sloedam Causeway

III

Nieuwland

7/9 Royal Scots (+)

II

II

1 GH III

Nov 7

Koudekerke

Dishoek

British attacks

Nov 7

LVT mined

Groote Valkenisse

7 CAM

II

Nov 5

II

II

Ritthem

Sloe Channel

SOUTH BEVELAND

195

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MAP 90: RED BALL EXPRESS – SEPTEMBER 1944 TO FEBRUARY 1945 The Allied air campaign against the French railroad network prior to D-Day helped to cripple German logistical support during the Normandy campaign. However, it also impeded the delivery of supplies for the Allied armies once the breakout from Normandy had occurred. Pending the repair of the French railroad network, the Allies needed various means to move critical supplies forward. Bradley’s 12th Army Group used a system dubbed the “Red Ball Express,” a truck convoy system that began operating on August 25, 1944 to move critical supplies from the docks in Cherbourg and the Mulberry artificial harbor at Arromanches to units in the front lines. The name “Red Ball Express” stems from a priority freight service instituted by the Santa Fe Railroad in 1892; it later became popular as a slang expression for expedited shipments. The Red Ball Express used roads that were closed to civilian traffic, and it was also granted priority use of other roads by military police. In autumn 1944, each of the roughly 30 divisions in the Allied order of battle needed about 750 tons of supplies per day, or around 20,000 tons daily. The Red Ball Express at its peak operated about 6,000 trucks and was capable of delivering about 12,500 tons daily. The remainder of the supplies were delivered by other means, including limited rail traffic, and expedited air deliveries. The Red Ball Express was manned primarily by segregated African-American troops, who totaled about three-quarters of the personnel involved, and was operated by the US Army Motor Transport Service. The Red Ball Express began as a limited operation to deliver 75,000 tons of supplies to the Chartres–La Loupe–Dreux triangle south of Paris to support elements of Hodge’s First US Army in the Paris area and Patton’s Third US Army toward Lorraine. By the end of September 1944, it was operating 5,400 trucks and delivering 8,200 tons daily with the average road trip taking about 70 hours. By the end of September, the rail system began taking over some of the burden as more and more of the rail lines were put back into service. Instead of delivering supplies directly to depots near the front line, Red Ball Express covered the route from the Normandy ports across regions with damaged rail lines, to railheads in the Paris area, where the supplies were then transferred to trains for forward shipment. The Red Ball Express formally ended on November 16, 1944, having delivered 412,193 tons of supplies and travelled some 122 million miles. By this 196

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time, forward ports, including Antwerp, were functioning and the Normandy ports no longer played the major role. It was much more expensive to ship heavy cargo long distances by truck than by railroad, so truck delivery was reserved for short-haul delivery and specialized requirements. The Red Ball Express inspired several other programs. The Red Lion Route was organized in September 1944 specifically to supply the Operation Market-Garden airborne effort. Its mission was to deliver 500 tons, mainly fuel and oil, from Bayeux to Brussels. The US Army supplied the trucks and crews while the British provided the administrative infrastructure. The Red Lion Route exceeded its requirements by delivering about 650 tons per day, totaling 18,000 tons when the program was halted on October 12, 1944. The White Ball Route was designed to take advantage of the newly opened ports of Le Havre and Rouen, transferring supplies to the railheads in the Paris area for forward delivery. The Green Diamond Route was designed to move supplies from ports in the Cotentin Peninsula, especially Cherbourg, to newly created railheads at Granville and Dol. One of the last networks to be established was the ABC Route, so named because it was operated by American, British, and Canadian personnel. This system was designed to expedite shipments out of the newly opened port of Antwerp, the main Allied supply port after the Scheldt Estuary had been cleared in midNovember 1944. The main aim of the ABC Route, also called the ABC Haul, was to transfer supplies quickly from ships at the Antwerp docks to the existing depots and supply centers in the Liège–Mons– Charleroi area. This network was given priority for the US Army’s 4and 5-ton truck-tractors that could haul 10-ton semi-trailers. The ABC Haul started at the end of November 1944 and through to March 26, 1945 delivered 245,000 tons. The last of the “Color Routes” to be organized was the Little Red Ball, which was organized in mid-December 1944 to deliver specialized cargos (primarily medical, signal, and chemical corps supplies) from Carentan to railheads in the Paris area. It averaged about 106 tons per day and lasted only about a month. By November 1944, the US Army’s Military Railway Service was delivering 23,000 tons of supplies daily east of the Seine River, substantially diminishing the need for long-haul truck deliveries.

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N

NETHERLANDS

Red Ball Express after mid-October, 1944 Red Lion Route, September 16–October 12, 1944 White Ball Route, October 6 1944–January 10, 1945 Green Diamond Route, October 10–November 1, 1944 ABC Route, November 30 1944– March 26, 1945 Little Red Ball, December 15 1944–January 17, 1945

0

Bruges

0

Antwerp

Ostend

50 miles 50km

Calais

Ghent

Dunkirk

Scheld

t

Mechelen

Brussels

Tienen

Boulogne Tournai

Lille

Meu

Namur Mons

English Channel Arras Som

Cherbourg

S

Hirson Mézières

FRANCE Rouen

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Gisors

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Alençon Chartres Nogent

n Yon e

Rennes

Fontainebleu Troyes

Neufchâteau

Liège

197

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MAP 91: AUTUMN FRUSTRATIONS SEPTEMBER 15 TO DECEMBER 15, 1944 From the Allied perspective, the autumn 1944 campaign had been a bloody slog with modest rewards. In Montgomery’s 21st Army Group sector, the Scheldt Estuary had been cleared to free access to the port of Antwerp. The port was finally opened to traffic by the end of November 1944. In addition, the narrow corridor created by Operation MarketGarden had been widened, making it less vulnerable to German counterattack. In the center, Bradley’s 12th Army Group was split by the Ardennes, with the Ninth and First US Armies fighting in the Aachen–Stolberg Corridor, largely disconnected from Patton’s Third US Army and its actions in the Metz area. These distinct campaigns had mixed results. The First US Army became bogged down trying to clear the Hürtgen Forest, an effort connected to a belated recognition that the Roer River dams needed to be breached or captured before the 12th Army Group could maneuver over the Roer floodplains toward the Rhine. To end the stalemate, Bradley hoped that Operation Queen in mid-November would enable the First US Army finally to break out of the AachenStolberg region as Operation Cobra had accomplished in Normandy. This offensive was frustrated by the weather, terrain, and stiff German defenses. Patton’s attack against the Metz fortress complex finally succeeded in late 1944, and this pushed the Third US Army up against the formidable reinforced Westwall defenses in the Saar. The most successful of the three Allied army groups in the autumn was Devers’ often-ignored 6th Army Group, which was assigned the daunting task of reaching the Rhine plains around Strasbourg over the Vosges Mountains. The Vosges had not been conquered in modern times, but the Italian front veterans of the Seventh US Army and French 1re Armée penetrated the Vosges passes and the Belfort Gap in November. This was the first Allied army group to achieve a firm foothold on the Rhine, reaching the river on November 19 and seizing the Alsatian capital of Strasbourg by a bold tank attack on November 23. Devers wanted to bounce the Rhine in December and advance northward, undermining the German defenses in the Saar facing Patton’s Third US Army. Eisenhower was not convinced that the 6th Army Group had the capabilities to conduct operations on the eastern bank of the Rhine in the Black Forest area, and instead instructed Devers to support Patton’s planned December 19 offensive toward Frankfurt, Operation Tink, by driving northward through the 198

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Haguenau Gap into the Saar-Palatinate. By early December 1944, with Antwerp open and the supply situation improving, Eisenhower began to refine plans for the 1945 offensive operations. Instead, the Germans struck with their Ardennes Offensive on December 16, thereby diverting Allied intentions for more than a month. From the German perspective, the autumn 1944 campaign had been a nerve-racking escape from imminent disaster. After the rout from France in August 1944, the fate of the German Army of the West seemed on the verge of collapse. The “miracle of the Westwall” in late September 1944 had revived the Army enough to hold back the Allied advance along the Roer River. This was not due to German defensive prowess alone. The Allies on both the Western and the Eastern fronts were exhausted from their successful summer offensives and severely limited by logistical shortfalls. This gave the Wehrmacht temporary relief. Hitler insisted that a defensive stalemate was not enough, and he demanded that the Wehrmacht retrieve the operational initiative through a major offensive. The dwindling German resources were not sufficient to create a credible offensive on the Eastern Front. In September 1944, he had selected the Ardennes as the site for the attack. After the failure of the Vosges Panzer Offensive of September 1944, Hitler established several criteria. The attack would be conducted in the late autumn or early winter on the assumption that the typical overcast weather would restrict Allied air support. After seeing the Panzer reserves prematurely frittered away in Lorraine, he insisted that the Panzer divisions be rebuilt and hoarded. Only under the most extreme pressure were the Panzer reserves to be used, for example, the shortterm commitment of the 9.Panzer-Division on the Roer in November to prevent the success of Operation Queen, or the temporary commitment of Panzer-Lehr-Division in the Saar to frustrate the Third US Army and Seventh US Army advances. Hitler was unwilling to contemplate a strategic reshuffle that might have created a more viable final defense of Germany. The Wehrmacht was stretched across Norway, the Balkans, and Italy. Withdrawal from a peripheral sector could have provided much-needed resources. Retreat was anathema to Hitler, and these options were discarded without any serious debate on their merits.

The Battles Along the German Frontier

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N

Amsterdam

NETHERLANDS

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Front line, September 15, 1944 Front line, December 15, 1944 Westwall

0

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Belfort

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Basle

SWITZERLAND

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CHAPTER 4

THE ARDENNES CAMPAIGN, DECEMBER 1944 TO JANUARY 1945

A Panther tank disabled near Bovigny, Belgium is inspected by US troops on January 17, 1945 during the concluding phase of the Battle of the Bulge. (NARA) 201

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MAP 92: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION DECEMBER 16, 1944 From a strategic perspective, Germany’s prospects in the autumn of 1944 looked grim: the enemy on Germany’s doorstep, the armed forces gravely weakened and unlikely to recover, and the military industries collapsing under bombing attack. Unfortunately for Germany, strategic decision-making had been completely taken over by Hitler, and he was in no mood for any talk of surrender or compromise. Hitler and other members of Germany’s Great War generation had their strategic perspective profoundly warped by one of the great myths of that conflict, that Germany’s defeat had been a “stab in the back” by spineless politicians and that the Army had not been defeated in the field. This myth had been one of the propelling forces of the early Nazi movement. For Hitler, it was inconceivable that Germany would accept unconditional surrender while there was a chance that victory could be wrested from the jaws of defeat. Hitler grasped at illusive miracles to justify the last-ditch defense of the Reich. The Ardennes Offensive was an echo of the last-ditch offensive of World War I, the German 1918 Spring Offensive, variously called the Michael Offensive, the Ludendorff Offensive, or the Kaiserschlacht. As in the case of the Ardennes Offensive, the 1918 Spring Offensive was intended to gain control of the Channel ports supplying the British Army; it was a final attempt to turn the tide of the war before the balance tipped in favor of France and Britain as more and more American troops arrived in 1918. The most critical difference between the 1918 offensive and its 1944 echo in the Ardennes was the matter of the Eastern Front; this alone helps explain its poor chances of success. In 1918, Russia had been knocked out of the war; the German Army in the West experienced a sudden surge in power as units were transferred from east to west. In spite of this sudden influx of resources, the 1918 offensive did not succeed. In 1944, there was no such influx of reinforcements. Furthermore, there was an overwhelming threat that the Red Army’s main front in Poland would become active again and begin its inexorable march on Berlin. Given Germany’s desperate circumstances, Hitler convinced himself that a success in the West could change the course of the war. In his fevered mind, the alliance between Britain and the United States was fragile, and if their forces could be separated by an assault to the North Sea, the Allied front would collapse. Hitler dreamed that 202

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a third to a half of the Allied divisions on the Western Front could be destroyed. The Ardennes Offensive was a final gamble concocted out of desperation and delusion. Hitler’s selection of the Ardennes sector for the late autumn offensive proved prescient so far as Allied dispositions were concerned. As he had surmised, Allied deployments in the Ardennes region were very thin. From Monschau in the north to Diekirch in the south, there were only four infantry divisions. Two of these, the 4th and 28th divisions, were exhausted from their bloody operations in the Hürtgen Forest and were in the Ardennes to recuperate. Two others, the 99th and the 106th divisions, were green and inexperienced and were in the Ardennes to acquire a little seasoning before being deployed to a more active front. Not surprisingly, the First US Army referred to the Ardennes sector as “the kindergarten and old-agehome” for the infantry. The early successes of the German Ardennes Offensive were due to a major Allied intelligence failure. Eisenhower and his subordinate commanders had become so accustomed to the value of the Ultra signals intelligence bonanzas that they ignored the signs of an impending attack that had been obtained through more traditional means. There was a tendency to mirror-image German intentions and to assume that the German build-up in the Eifel was a preparatory action by the Wehrmacht to create a counterattack force to deal with the anticipated Allied lunge for the Rhine in January and February 1945. Hitler was far more desperate than Eisenhower or Bradley imagined, and far more ready to take foolhardy risks. Although the German attack caught Eisenhower and Bradley off guard, Bradley’s instinctive belief that the Ardennes was a poor tactical avenue in the winter months proved essentially correct. Eisenhower was able to mobilize SHAEF’s prodigious infrastructure to move reinforcements rapidly into the Ardennes. At the same time, the Allied air forces were able to isolate the battlefield, first by bombing German marshalling yards in the Eifel, and then, once the weather cleared, to conduct tactical interdiction with fighters and light bombers. The German attack was halted before Christmas far from its main objective of Antwerp, and the next three weeks saw a bloody battle of attrition as the “bulge” was reduced. Attritional warfare favored the Allies.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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NETHERLANDS

Duisburg

Venlo

Ru

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Krefeld First Can

Escaut-M euse Canal

Ma

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H

Roermond

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7.Armee objective Sedan

Allied front, December 15

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XXX

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XX

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Trois Ponts 9

Werbomont

Schleiden

99

Bütgenbach

Remagen

6

XX

Malmedy Stavelot XX

B

Rh

rthe

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XXXXX

Euskirchen XXXX

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6

XX

Actual German advances into the Ardennes 5.Panzer-Armee objective

XX

XX

XX

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Bonn Roer Dams

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Namur

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203

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MAP 93: INITIAL ATTACKS OF 6.PANZER-ARMEE DECEMBER 16–19, 1944 SS-Oberst-Gruppenführer Josef “Sepp” Dietrich’s 6.Panzer-Armee was the Schwerpunkt (focal point) of the German Ardennes Offensive. Its sector contained the shortest and best routes to the Meuse River via Malmedy and Spa to the bridges near Liège. The initial tactics were conventional. The offensive started with a heavy artillery barrage in the predawn hours of December 16 along the front line aimed at weakening the forward US infantry positions, and disrupting communication and command networks. This was followed by an initial assault by German infantry divisions, intended to create a tactical breakthrough. It was expected that this breakthrough would occur quickly, since the German infantry enjoyed a substantial advantage in numbers against their American adversaries, essentially two divisions against two regiments. Furthermore, the southern area of this sector, the Losheim Gap, was especially weak, defended by only a mechanized cavalry group. Once the breakthrough was accomplished, the two Panzer divisions, the 1.SSPanzer-Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” and 12.SS-Panzer-Division “Hitlerjugend,” would be committed to conduct the exploitation mission to reach the Meuse River. At this point, II.SS-Panzer-Korps would inject two more Panzer divisions, adding to the momentum of the offensive in order to reach the main objective of Antwerp. The plans went awry almost immediately. Dietrich followed Hitler’s instructions to the letter. As will be described below, von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee had doubts about the efficacy of the artillery bombardment since previous fighting in the Hürtgen Forest had demonstrated that enemy infantry troops were difficult to dislodge with artillery. The artillery rounds tended to explode in the trees above, which was highly lethal to exposed infantry, but not to infantry huddled in logprotected dugouts. The artillery barrage did little to dislodge the two regiments of the 99th Division, the 393rd Infantry Regiment in the north, and the 394th Infantry Regiment in the center. The subsequent German infantry attack largely failed in its mission of executing a quick breakthrough. The three divisions in this section – the 277.Volksgrenadier-Division, 12.Volksgrenadier-Division, and 204

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3.Fallschirmjäger-Division –  had all been decimated in the Normandy and Roer fighting. Even after rebuilding, they were rated only at Kampfwert (Combat Value) III: suitable for defense. In the northern sector, the regiments of the 99th Division managed to hold their positions for most of the first day of fighting, and the 12.SS-Panzer-Division was obliged to prematurely commit its own Panzergrenadier troops later in the day to push out of the forests to the towns in the foothills of the Elsenborn Ridge. Likewise, the performance of the 3.Fallschirmjäger-Division was so poor that Kampfgruppe Peiper, the spearhead of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division, took matters into its own hands and pushed through the border defense to Honsfeld and Büllingen. Of the two breakthroughs, the 1.SS-PanzerDivision advance was the quicker and deeper, largely owing to its operations against a weak mechanized cavalry screening force, rather than the more solid infantry defense facing the 12.SS-Panzer-Division. The 12.SS-Panzer-Division attack began to falter almost immediately. SS-Panzergrenadier-Regiment.25 was not able to fight its way out of the Krinkelt Forest until the evening of December 17. The commander of the 2nd Infantry Division to the north had sent one of its regiments, the 38th Infantry, to back up the 99th Division. They established a defense position in the twin villages of Krinkelt–Rocherath. These defenses were attacked, beginning on the night of December 17/18, but the 38th Regiment held the 12.SS-Panzer-Division at bay through December 19. Already far behind schedule, the division’s advance was finally halted by the defense of Dom Bütgenbach by the 26th Infantry of the 1st Division on December 19–21. Not only had the 12.SS-Panzer-Division failed to make a penetration, but it had also been decimated in the process of trying. Against negligible resistance, Kampfgruppe Peiper of the 1.SS-PanzerDivision made a far deeper penetration, reaching Stoumont by December 18. This caused a great deal of anxiety to senior US commanders, since it was down the road from First US Army headquarters in Spa. But according to the original plans, Peiper should have been on the Meuse River already, and his Panzers were running out of fuel.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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N Ramscheid III

991 Gr XX

ELSENBORN RIDGE

XX

XX

2

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XX

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US defense line December 16, 1944

XX

III

Merlscheid

US defense line, December 19, 1944 US reinforcements

II

9 XX

3

801

US retreats Initial German attacks, December 16, 1944 German attacks, December 17–19, 1944

0 0

1 mile 1km

205

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MAP 94: KAMPFGRUPPE PEIPER DECEMBER 20–25, 1944 The spearhead of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division “Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler” was Kampfgruppe Peiper, commanded by the ruthless and charismatic SS-Obersturmbannführer Jochen Peiper. After two days of fighting, Kampfgruppe Peiper was well behind the unrealistic schedule and well short of the Meuse River. The battle group reached Stavelot by the evening of December 17, but was unable to capture the town until the next morning. Peiper was in a hurry to capture the three bridges in Trois Ponts, but American engineers blew up both the Amblève Bridge and one of the two bridges over the Salm River. Prevented from using the main route to Werbomont and having left his tactical bridging behind, Peiper redirected his columns along the more circuitous route up the Amblève Valley through La Gleize. More bridges were blown, limiting Peiper’s options. More alarmingly, First US Army had begun to reinforce the sector. The first of the reinforcements to arrive on December 17 and 18 was the experienced 30th Infantry Division, which deployed its 120th Infantry Regiment in the east around Malmedy, the 117th Infantry in the center near Stavelot, and the 119th to the west near La Gleize. Peiper had expected that the bulk of the 3.Fallschirmjäger-Division would close up behind his columns and occupy Stavelot. But the 1/117th Infantry launched an attack on the town in the late afternoon of December 18. The fighting continued through the night and Stavelot was back in US hands. The recapture of Stavelot cut Peiper off from the rest of his division. With his rear now threatened, Peiper frantically tried to find other routes to the west. Peiper tried the road toward Stoumont, but the town was occupied by 119th Infantry after dark. On the morning of December 19, Kampfgruppe Peiper pushed the American defenders out of Stoumont with heavy losses. A few Panzers reached the village of Târgnon where a bridge led to the southwest and the Werbomont road junction. As tempting as this was, Peiper was unable to exploit this opportunity because of fuel shortages. Whether he realized it at the time or not, this was his battle group’s high water mark. Peiper was 28 miles from Liège, and 40 miles from his initial objective on the Meuse River at Huy, which he had hoped to reach on the first day of the offensive. 206

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By late on December 19, additional forces were closing in on Peiper from the north and west. The 82nd Airborne Division had already arrived at Werbomont and was moving toward the Amblève Valley from the west. A combat command of the 3rd Armored Division advanced down the road from Liège and its three task forces approached La Gleize down three separate roads to prevent Peiper from moving toward the First US Army headquarters in Spa. The Americans reinforced their hold on Stavelot, ending any hope of reinforcement. Task Force Lovelady from the 3rd Armored Division seized control of the road from La Gleize to Stavelot on December 20 and engaged Kampfgruppe Knittel from 1.SS-Panzer-Division near Trois Ponts, which controlled the only remaining access to La Gleize from the German side. The Americans rebuffed several violent attacks against Stavelot by 1.SS-Panzer-Division. After retreating back into La Gleize, Kampfgruppe Peiper had been reduced to less than a third of its starting strength – some 1,500 troops and only 25 tanks. Late on December 22, Peiper asked permission to attempt a breakout. Initially, this was refused. After it became clear that available forces could not save the trapped force, Peiper was given permission to break out at 1400hrs on December 23. The retreat out of La Gleize began around 0200hrs on December 24, and 770 survivors reached German lines 12 miles away about 36 hours later, having had only brief encounters with paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division. US troops occupied La Gleize in the early morning hours of Christmas Eve. The 1st SS-Panzer-Division had failed in its mission and had suffered heavy casualties. Personnel casualties through Christmas were about 2,000 men, of which more than 300 were prisoners. Equipment losses through Christmas were far heavier and amounted to about 65 percent of the division’s initial tank and tank destroyer strength; a significant fraction of the remainder broke down or were trapped in the mud. The failure of both of the spearhead divisions the I.SS-Panzer-Korps along the northern shoulder of the Ardennes salient doomed Hitler’s plans. There would be successes in the neighboring 5.Panzer-Armee sector, but time was now on the side of the US Army.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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Theux

N

US forward positions, evening December 19 KG Peiper defense positions, December 21–24, 1944

X

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Solwaster

3

US armored attacks

Dec 20

US infantry attacks

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German attacks German retreats

0

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Basse Bodeux

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Dec 21

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MAP 95: DESTRUCTION OF 106th INFANTRY DIVISION – DECEMBER 16–19, 1944 Dietrich’s 6.Panzer-Armee on the northern side of the Ardennes Offensive received both of the SS.Panzer-Korps, yet failed to make an operational penetration of the American defense line. The 5.Panzer-Armee, with fewer resources, made the most substantial inroads into the American defenses. This was due to more prudent tactics. The 5.Panzer-Armee commander, Hasso von Manteuffel, felt that the stereotypical tactics proposed by Hitler would fail in the Ardennes conditions. He favored a revival of 1918 infiltration tactics, with the initial assault battalions “infiltrating rapidly into the American front like rain drops.” The inexperienced 106th Infantry Division had arrived in Europe only on December 10 and was assigned an extended frontline about 15 miles wide. Two of its regiments, the 422nd and 423rd Infantry, were positioned in a vulnerable salient on the Schnee Eifel, a wooded ridgeline protruding off the Eifel Plateau. It was flanked on either side by two good roads, from Roth to Auw, and Sellerich to Bleialf. The previous tenants, the 2nd Infantry Division, felt the position was poorly situated for defense, and, in the event of an attack, planned to withdraw off the Schnee Eifel to a more defensible line along the Auw–Bleialf Ridge. Although these plans were outlined to the 106th Infantry Division commander, Major-General Alan Jones, his staff had been in position for too short a period of time to appreciate their predicament. On the right flank, the isolated 424th Infantry was hit by the 62. Volksgrenadier-Division. A neighboring regiment of the 18. Volksgrenadier-Division fought its way into Bleialf by late in the day, but at significant cost. Von Manteuffel’s infiltration tactics were moderately successful, and by nightfall the attack had made progress, even if not as rapidly as hoped. On the southern side of the Schnee Eifel the penetration was not as deep, but significant progress had been made along the Bleialf road. Von Manteuffel prodded the commanders to complete their missions even if it took all night. The situation on the Schnee Eifel had become dangerous during the night of December 16/17 as the two battle groups of the 18. Volksgrenadier-Division continued their push around the flanks of the two American regiments. On the southern flank, the town of Bleialf was hit hard at 0530hrs and was overrun shortly after dawn. GrenadierRegiment.293 of the 18.Volksgrenadier-Division continued to move rapidly to the northwest against little opposition, aiming for the town of 208

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Schönberg. The US defense was further weakened by the lack of communications between divisional headquarters in St-Vith and the two regiments, owing in no small measure to the success of the German infantry in ripping up field telephone wires. The first inkling that the two wings of the 18.Volksgrenadier-Division were about to link up behind the Schnee Eifel came in the early morning, when US artillery battalions attempting to retreat near Schönberg began to run into advancing German columns. By 0900hrs, the German encirclement of the two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division on the Schnee Eifel was complete, though it was by no means secure. The leading German battalions were instructed to continue to move west, and there were no efforts to establish a firm cordon around the trapped American units. The two trapped regiments set up a perimeter defense and attempted to contact divisional headquarters in St-Vith for further instructions. At 0730hrs on December 18, further instructions arrived indicating that the two regiments should break out toward St-Vith, bypassing the heaviest German concentrations around Schönberg. The 422nd Infantry moved out on the morning of December 19 across the Bleialf– Auw road near Oberlascheid but was brought under heavy small-arms fire from German infantry in the woods west of the road. The 422nd Infantry had little success in advancing any farther, and, around 1400hrs, the tanks of the Führer-Begleit-Brigade suddenly moved down the road on their way toward St-Vith. This trapped a portion of the regiment between the tanks on the road and the German infantry in the woods. Some of the regiment surrendered at 1430hrs, and most of the rest followed suit around 1600hrs. As the 423rd Infantry formed for its attack shortly after dawn on December 19, it was hit hard by the German artillery, followed by an infantry assault. Two rifle companies reached the outskirts of Schönberg, but by mid-afternoon, the attacks had collapsed, and the US infantrymen were down to fewer than a dozen rounds per rifle. The regimental commander gave the order to surrender around 1630hrs. The surrender of the two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division, over 7,000 men, was the US Army’s single greatest defeat of the campaign in Europe. This failure created the first serious inroad into the US defense line in the Ardennes.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 209

Lanzerath Holzheim

BELGIUM

Afst

Manderfeld Born

XXXX

Krewinkel

6

XXXX

Meyerode

Ormont Eimerscheid Herresbach

Wischeid

Verschneid

XX

Roth

Nieder-Emmels Wischeid

Kobscheid Laudesfeld

Schönberg

7

Heuem

St-Vith

7

am Dec 17

536

Dec 18–19

III

422

106

Dec 17

III

Radscheid Oberlascheid

Schlierbach

XX

Dec 18–19

II

L

106 Dec 17

FE

III

106

II

423

Weppier

9

18VG

SC

I

CCB

Repl.

EI

III

EE

XX

Schlausenbach

612

Our

Setz

HN

XX

X

FB

III

Wallerode

Hünningen

II

(-)

Auw

Andler

CCB

18VG

XXXX

5

Buchet

Lommersweiler

Bleialf Steinebrück II

I

Elcherath Hemmeres

Grosslangenfeld III

Winterspelt

293

18VG

III

424

106

Eigelscheid

Burg Reuland

Weissenhof

Weaelen

Prüm

GERMANY

US forward position, night, December 15

Habscheid

US forward position, night, December 19

N

West Wall XX

Heckhuscheid

62VG

to Sellerich

0 0

2 miles 2km

209

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MAP 96: THE DEFENSE OF ST-VITH St-Vith had been the headquarters of the hapless 106th Infantry Division. Recognizing the importance of this sector, Bradley ordered elements of two US armored divisions into the area to stem the German advance. By December 17, Brigadier-General William Hoge’s Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division had begun to arrive and reinforced the surviving 424th Infantry Regiment of the 106th Division. At the same time, Brigadier-General Bruce Clarke’s Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division began arriving in St-Vith. German troops began appearing on the eastern fringes of St-Vith by the late afternoon of December 17. German attacks were uncoordinated owing to the rush to move westward. Elements of Kampfgruppe Hansen of 1.SS-PanzerDivision bumped into the western defenses near Poteau, while infantry forces from the 18.VGD probed along the eastern edges of the town. The bitterest fighting on December 18 took place around Poteau as Combat Command A, 7th Armored Division attempted to seize the town, which was essential to keep open supply lines to the rear. The town of St-Vith posed a variety of problems to von Manteuffel: it split the 5.Panzer-Armee in two, and it controlled the best roads through the area between 5.Panzer-Armee and 6.Panzer-Armee, including the only decent east–west rail line, vital to resupply the offensive once the Meuse was reached. On the night of December 17/18, von Manteuffel commited his main reserve, the Führer-BegleitBrigade, to destroy the St-Vith pocket. Von Manteuffel’s plan called for the brigade to attack the town from the north, the 18.VolksgrenadierDivision from the east, and the 62.Volksgrenadier-Division from the south. Although the initial attack was scheduled for December 19, the continued delays in moving the Führer-Begleit-Brigade into position made this impossible. The first serious attack against St-Vith developed around midnight on December 19/20, when the Führer-Begleit-Brigade began to arrive. It was quickly repulsed, but the attacks substantially intensified on December 21 as more elements of the brigade appeared. The most significant change from the previous days’ fighting was the more extensive use of German artillery, which had finally escaped from the traffic jams. The defensive line of Combat Command B, 7th Armored Division was penetrated in at least three places by evening. By 2200hrs, Clarke realized that the current positions were not tenable and decided to pull his forces out of the town, to the high ground to the southwest. The town was occupied by the 18.Volksgrenadier-Division the night of December 21/22. Clarke estimated that he had lost almost half his 210

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strength in the day’s fighting. The American resistance in the St-Vith salient was substantially delaying the German advance westward, since it prevented the 6. Panzer-Armee from supporting the rapid advance of the 5.PanzerArmee farther south. Berlin ordered the pocket crushed and directed Dietrich to commit elements of II.SS-Panzer-Korps to assist in the task. The early morning fighting of December 22 took place in the midst of a heavy snowfall, and began at 0200hrs with a major attack by the Führer-Begleit-Brigade against Rodt, to the west of St-Vith. The fighting lasted for nine hours, and separated Clarke’s Combat Command B from the rest of the 7th Armored Division. The 62.VolksgrenadierDivision also succeeded in pushing back the Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division, further compressing the St-Vith pocket. Major-General Matthew Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Command headquarters was sent to this sector to organize the defense. Ridgway proposed that 7th Armored Division remain in place, even though surrounded, in several “fortified goose-eggs” that would be supplied by air. Clarke remarked that it looked more like “Custer’s last stand.” As part of the sector reorganization, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was placed in overall command of the northern sector, and Montgomery sent a message to the 7th Armored Division, “You have accomplished your mission – a mission well-done – It is time to withdraw,” having rejected Ridgway’s risky plan. The 82nd Airborne Division pushed forward to Vielsalm to create an escape corridor for the forces inside the St-Vith salient. The plan was to withdraw the Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division first but this proved impossible owing to the intensity of the contact with the 62.Volksgrenadier-Division and the muddy condition of the roads. Hoge was seriously concerned that they would have to abandon all their vehicles and retreat on foot because the mud was so deep. The withdrawal time was reset for 0600hrs on the morning of December 23. The temperature dropped abruptly on the night of December 22/23, freezing the ground rock hard along the one road out of the salient. The withdrawal was successfully executed, with German forces close on the heels of the retreating US forces. The prolonged defense of St-Vith had been “a thumb down the Germans’ throat,” delaying the exploitation of the penetration that had been made possible by the destruction of the 106th Infantry Division. It was one more setback to the critical German timetable for the Ardennes Offensive, and yet another reason for its ultimate failure.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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N

Ligneuville

Front line, December 17 Front line, December 17–21 Front line, dawn, December 22 Front line, evening, December 22 Front line, dawn, December 23

0

1 mile

0

1km

Recht

Born

XX

9.SS

X

CCA

7

NiederEmmels

III

82

X

FBB

Ober-Emmels

Wallerode

Vielsalm Hünningen

St-Vith

Rodt X

CCR

XX

18VG

7 X

CCB

7 XX

62VG

Crombach X

CCB

9

III

112

28 III

424

106

Lommersweiler

211

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MAP 97: ATTACK IN THE CENTER: 5.PANZER-ARMEE vs. THE 28th DIVISION The center of gravity of von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee was XXXXVII. and LVIII.Panzer-Korps, which were aimed at the Meuse River via the critical road junction of Bastogne. Standing in their way was the badly depleted 28th Infantry Division, covering the approaches to Bastogne and Houfallize. As in the 106th Infantry Division sector, von Manteuffel used infiltration tactics to conduct the initial penetration of American lines. These tactics had mixed results, some units being observed prematurely and brought under heavy fire. The only real success on December 16 for the 116.Panzer-Division occurred at the boundary between the 112th and 110th Infantry regiments of the 28th Division, when Panzergrenadier-Regiment.112 managed to seize a bridge over the Our River near Heinerscheid. In conjunction with the 560.Volksgrenadier-Division, the bridgehead at Heinerscheid was reinforced and expanded through December 17/18, exploiting the gap between the 112th and 110th Infantry. The hardest hit of the 28th Division’s regiments was Colonel Hurley Fuller’s 110th Infantry. At a reduced strength of only two battalions, the 110th Infantry was hit by elements of three Panzer divisions and two infantry divisions, roughly 2,000 Americans against 31,000 German troops. The 110th Infantry attempted to hold a string of small villages against the onslaught of the 2.Panzer-Division and Oberst Heinz Kokott’s 26.Volksgrenadier-Division on December 16. Kokott wanted to start the offensive with his forces over the Our River, so he moved two entire regiments across prior to the start of the attack. The defenses of the 110th Infantry were so thinly held that this premature deployment was hardly noticed. By the end December 16, the situation facing the two forward deployed battalions of the 110th Infantry was grim. They were running low on ammunition, and, as darkness fell, the German infantry was flowing past them in increasing numbers. Several companies called in artillery on their own positions as they were overrun in the darkness. Although XXXXVII.PanzerKorps failed to reach its first day objective of the Clerf River, American resistance was obviously weakening as the 110th Infantry was being overwhelmed by forces many times its size. The 28th Division commander, Major-General Norman Cota radioed to the 110th Infantry that they were to hold “at all costs,” knowing full well that the regiment guarded the only hard-surface road to Bastogne, the route through Clerf (Clervaux). When the defense of Marnach proved impossible, on December 17 the 110th Regiment attempted to halt the German advance at Clerf. 212

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The 2.Panzer-Division overwhelmed the defenders by early evening, but some US infantry continued to hold out in the stone château in the town, sniping at German columns through December 18 as the Panzer columns raced on toward Bastogne. By the second day of combat, the 110th Infantry had been overwhelmed in its unequal struggle. But its two-day battle had cost the Germans precious time. The corps commander later lauded the regiment’s determined reistance: “had not your boys done the job they did, the 101st Airborne could not have reached Bastogne in time.” The 28th Division’s third regiment, the 109th Infantry, was in the attack sector of the German 7.Armee. The 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division assaulted its northernmost companies on December 17. The inexperienced Luftwaffe troops did not advance as quickly as their neighbors from 5.Panzer-Armee to the north, but, by December 18, were on their way through the American defenses and approaching the divisional headquarters at Wiltz. By this time, the lead elements of the Panzer-Lehr-Division had gained access to the roads, and headed toward Wiltz along the northern route. On the morning of December 19, Cota transferred the headquarters of the 28th Division from Wiltz to Sibret, leaving behind a provisional battalion formed from the headquarters staff and divisional support personnel. The 26. Volksgrenadier-Division began an attack on Wiltz from the north on the afternoon of December 19, while the Fallschirmjager-Regiment.15 from 5.Fallschirmjäger-Division began attacking the town from the south. By nightfall, the US defenses were on the verge of collapse and a confused withdrawal ensued. The provisional battalion ran a gauntlet of German formations on the way to Bastogne, losing many troops in the process. But some troops did manage to reach the town. By December 20, the 5.Panzer-Army overcame the principal centers of resistance held by the 28th Division, and the roads were open toward Houfallize and Bastogne. But the determined defense by the heavily outnumbered 28th Division had cost precious time, and by the time that Wiltz was finally taken, Bastogne had already been reinforced. It is worth comparing the performance of the veteran 28th Division against that of the inexperienced regiments of the neighboring 106th Division. While the 106th Division was quickly surrounded and forced to surrender by a force roughly their own size, the battered but experienced regiments of the 28th Division were able to hold off much larger German forces for two days before finally being overwhelmed in desperate combat.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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US forward positions on night of December 15 US outposts unoccupied at night

III

XX

Gouvy

US forward positions on night of December 19

Heckhuscheid

German infantry attacks, December 16–19

Huldange

German armored attacks, December 16–19 Siegfried Line/West Wall

0

Beiler

Malscheid

112

Steinbach

Sevenig

(Dec 16–17)

560VG

XX

XX

28

116

Kolborn

(Dec 18–19)

I

A

Tenneville Bertogne

Ortheuville

110

Bourcy Salle

III

Flamierge

506

Mande-St-Etienne

Luzery

Bastogne

Monty

Eschweiler

XX

Weidingen

3

Holzthum

Lutremange

I

Consthum

I

110

Kautenbach

Stolzembourg

Weiler

XX

5

III

Hoscheid

Nocher

Sainlez

Su

Hollange

109

XXX

LUXEMBOURG

Lipperscheid

Roth

III

109

Brandenburg XXXX

Su re

N

Walsdorf

LXXX

Bourscheid

re

Vianden

I

F

Harlange

Lehr

Gemünd

Wahlhausen

110 (+)

Wiltz

Remichampagne

XX

26VG

XXXX

Lutrebois

Vaux-lezRosières

r

Hosingen

Lellingen

Erpeldange II

Hompré

110

Bockholz

NiederWampach

Assenois

Jodenville

Ou

I

K

rf

Sibret

28

Wilwerwiltz Bras

GERMANY

XXX

XXXXVII

Drauffelt

Wardin

Marvie

Dasburg

Cle

Neffe

Oberwampach

326

II

110

III

110

iltz

Morhet

TF Caraway

E

B

2

Roder

I

Munshausen

W

Magerotte

9

II

Chenogne

Longvilly Mageret Benonchamps

X

Clerf

Allerborn Chifontaine

Arloncourt

501 10 CCR III

Senonchamps

Houmont

Bizory III

X

CCB

Dahnen

Fishbach

Marnach

Oubourcy

III III

327G

III

Sprimont

Lullange

Reuler

Donnange

Michamps

Foy

III

502

5

XX

Noville

158

XXXX

XXX

Urspelt E

Heinerscheid

Grindhausen

Hardigny

II

XX

116

XX

III

BELGIUM

II

705

Lützkampen Horspelt Leidenborn

Leiler

Troisvierges

I

129 Maint (+)

Ouren

Weiswampach

Houfallize

Ortho

LVIII

Oberhausen

112

5km

C

XXX

XX III

28

Berg

Welchenhausen

Leithum

III

the Our

5 miles

0

Lascheid

424

106

7

Tandel Bastendorf

Bettel

Führen

I

E

109

Gentingen Longsdorf XX

352VG

Eschdorf

I

I

109

Bettendorf X

Warnach

XX

Diekirch

213

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MAP 98: ATTACK IN THE SOUTH: 7.ARMEE vs. XII CORPS The third of the attacking German armies was General Erich Brandenberger’s 7.Armee, located on the southern flank in the Luxembourg area. This army had the least ambitious objectives of the three, but also had the most modest resources with which to achieve them, and some of the most difficult terrain. The initial artillery barrage that started the offensive was not particularly effective, as the 7.Armee had poor intelligence on US dispositions. The shock companies leading the attack were generally successful in infiltrating past the forward US outposts owing to the huge gaps in the US lines. The mountainous terrain and the porous defenses permitted the initial German assault battalions to slip through the positions of the 109th Infantry Regiment for most of the morning with only sporadic contact with US platoons in the villages. By noon, the 352.Volksgrenadier-Division had scouts well behind the forward US positions, with assault companies not far behind. By nightfall, the 109th Infantry commander, LieutenantColonel James Rudder, thought his situation was reasonably secure except for an encircled company at Führen, not realizing that his positions had been thoroughly penetrated. Rudder had been the commander of the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc on D-Day. On December 17, the two divisions on the right wing of the 7. Armee attack continued to move units over the Our River, but their advance was frequently frustrated by small US garrisons, and by accurate artillery fire delivered against their columns from forward observers on the hills above. By late in the day, the vital artillery positions were coming under direct attack as small groups of German troops infiltrated deep behind the forward US positions. The renewed vigor of the reinforced German attacks on December 18 undermined the 109th Infantry defenses. In the early afternoon, Rudder received permission to withdraw the regiment back toward the high ground around Diekirch. The 352.Volksgrenadier-Division reached the 109th Infantry defenses around Diekirch on the afternoon of December 19, forcing the 109th Infantry withdrawal to Ettelbruck. Farther to the south, the 7.Armee attacks did not progress as well. The 276.Volksgrenadier-Division had crossed the Sauer River opposite the defenses of the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion of Combat Command A, 9th Armored Division. Although the division was able to gain a foothold all along the western bank of the river, it had been unable to overcome the US positions on the high ground. On December 17, the German infantry managed to infiltrate into the 60th Armored 214

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Infantry Battalion’s positions via a deep, wooded gorge. After dark, the Grenadier-Regiment.988 managed to infiltrate behind the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion and capture the town of Beaufort, in spite of a determined stand by a cavalry troop. General Brandenberger was extremely unhappy with the poor performance of the division, and he relieved the commander. By the end of December 18, the 276. Volksgrenadier-Division had made so many penetrations past the forward defenses of Combat Command A, 9th Armored Division, that a new defensive line was established away from the Sauer River. The attacks farther south by the 212.Volksgrenadier-Division against the 12th Infantry, 4th Division were even less successful. German intelligence in this sector was better and the 12th Infantry positions had been accurately spotted. The mountainous terrain in this sector, known as “Little Switzerland,” was a major challenge. Two regiments led the German attack over the Sauer River using rubber boats. The main opposition to the crossing proved to be the river itself. Attempts to land the Grenadier-Regiment.320 near the main objective of Echternach failed owing to the swift current, and the regiment had to be landed 3 miles downstream, delaying the attack. Although radio warnings went out to the widely dispersed 12th Infantry Regiment outposts in the early morning, many US units did not receive them, and were unaware of the German attack until German patrols appeared in mid-morning. US artillery was less effective in this sector than farther north. The 12th Infantry headquarters responded by sending small task groups down the road, consisting of a few tanks from the badly understrength 70th Tank Battalion carrying a small number of infantry reinforcements. While the Germans had significantly more infantry troops than the 12th Infantry in this sector, the Americans held an advantage in tanks. This was further reinforced on December 17 with a company from the 19th Tank Battalion, 9th Armored Division. In addition, the US forces still had markedly better artillery support, since the absence of a bridge had prevented the Germans from bringing any significant artillery across the Sauer. The Grenadier-Regiment.987 made a deep penetration along the Schwarz Erntz Gorge, but was unable to fight its way out of the gorge after a pummeling by American artillery. GrenadierRegiment.320 had more success by circling around Echternach, but none of these was serious enough to undermine the US defense line. In general, the advance of the 7.Armee was largely contained after a few days of fighting.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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Weiler

N

I

I

Stolzembourg

110

US forward positions on night of December 15

XX

US forward positions on night of December 19

5

III

German infantry attacks, December 16–19 Siegfried Line/West Wall

0

I

F

109

Vianden

2 miles

0

XXX

2km

LXXXV Roth

Walsdorf III

Lipperscheid

109

Bettel

Führen

Brandenburg

I

E

109

Tandel

XX

Longsdorf

352VG

Gentingen

GERMANY

Alz ett e

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I

Bastendorf

28

I

109

Hosdorf XXXX

Pr üm

II

XX

Bettendorf

Wallendorf

I

X

XX

L

109

7

276VG

Reisdorf

Diekirch

XXX

Bigelbach II

60

Eppeldorf

Ettelbruck

Bollendorf

Sauer

Dillingen

LXXX

Berens

II

109

Beaufort

XX

Ermsdorf 19

(-)

II

(-)

60

(+)

Savelborn

B

Medernach

Birkelt Farm

12

2

XXX

109

(-)

Echternach

I

II

E

I

A, C

II

89 Rcn

Edingen

Berdorf

TF Standish II

212VG

12

I

Schw

90 Rcn

Haller

II

rntz

Stegen II

XX

I

F

arz E

1

12

Lauterborn

Waldbillig

L

TF Luckett

I

Breitweiler

LUXEMBOURG XX

Colbette

AT

Consdorf

Mersch

4

I

12

Dickweiler I

I

Scheidgen

12

B

C

70

12

Girst

I

II

M

Geyershof

TF Chamberlain

Sch

Bech XX

12

I

Osweiler

III

Bissen

X

XX

I

Müllerthal

IX

Ralingen

12

Alttrier

I

B

159

lam

mB

ach

I

K

12

XXX

Mompach Herborn 12

I

K

II

I

8 I

L

8

LII

215

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MAP 99: BASTOGNE – DECEMBER 19–23, 1944 By the morning of December 18, von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee had opened the roads to Bastogne, a major crossroads town leading to the Meuse, and considered vital by both sides. The delaying actions by the 28th Division gave Major-General Troy Middleton’s VIII Corps some breathing space to prepare to defend Bastogne. While waiting for the 101st Airborne Division and the 10th Armored Division to arrive, Middleton blocked the main road into Bastogne using Combat Command R, 9th Armored Division. This was reorganized into Task Force Rose on the road from Clerf, and Task Force Harper near Allerborn. The fighting broke out on December 18 when reconnaissance elements of General Heinrich von Lüttwitz’s 2.Panzer-Division encountered Task Force Rose at the Lullange roadblock. By midnight, both task forces were overwhelmed or surrounded. Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division arrived in Bastogne on December 18 and divided into three task forces to cover Longvilly, Wardin, and Noville. The plans to defend this corridor quickly went awry. Von Manteuffel assigned the capture of Bastogne to Bayerlein’s Panzer-Lehr-Division. On December 18, Bayerlein deployed Kampfgruppe Poschinger (Panzergrenadier-Regiment.902) on the road behind the southern wing of 2.Panzer-Division heading toward Oberwampach, and Kampfgruppe Hauser (PanzergrenadierRegiment.901) to the south. The lead elements of Panzer-Lehr-Division began bumping into the eastern defenses of Bastogne on the night of December 18. The Kampfgruppe of 2.Panzer-Division that had overwhelmed Combat Command R, 9th Armored Division veered off northward toward Noville in an effort to reach the Meuse River. The 101st Airborne Division, temporarily under the command of its divisional artillery officer, Brigadier-General Anthony McAuliffe, arrived in Bastogne by truck on the night of December 18. Lieutenant-Colonel Julian Ewell’s 501st Parachute Infantry Regiment was the first into Bastogne, and deployed a combat team to probe along the road to Mageret. On the morning of December 19, Bayerlein ordered Kampfgruppe Fallois to push through Neffe, encountering Ewell’s combat team. A pugnacious sally by the paratroopers derailed Bayerlein’s long-delayed attack into Bastogne. Kampfgruppe Fallois continued toward Wardin, forcing Team O’Hara of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division back toward Marvie on the afternoon of December 19. To clear the advance of the 26.Volksgrenadier-Division, Bayerlein coordinated an attack against Team Cherry of the 10th Armored Division in Longvilly. The attack began in the early afternoon and bumped into an enormous traffic jam of US vehicles consisting of advancing elements of Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division; 216

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retreating elements of Combat Command R, 9th Armored Division; and various and sundry other US units. Elements of three German divisions began to descend on the trapped American column, systematically destroying it, but distracting the Panzer-Lehr-Division from its main assignment of Bastogne. While Panzer-Lehr and the 26.Volksgrenadier-Division were conducting their fruitless attacks on the southeastern edge of Bastogne, the 2.Panzer-Division raced to the northeast outskirts with the intention of heading to the Meuse. Around 0430hrs, reconnaissance units bumped into Team Desobry, the third outpost of the Combat Command B, 10th Armored Division. The 2.Panzer-Division tried to bypass the roadblocks near Bourcy and Noville in order to head west to the Meuse River. Noville was reinforced by the 1/506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, leading to two days of fighting. The bulk of the 2.Panzer-Division continued its race east, and captured a bridge over the Ourthe River. Bayerlein resumed his attempts to crack through the Bastogne defenses near Bizory on the morning of December 20, with little success. When the road to Neufchâteau was cut on that night, Bastogne was effectively surrounded, even if the Germans did not control the western sector in any force. By December 21, it was becoming obvious that Panzer-Lehr-Division was being wasted in costly attacks against the Bastogne defenses. The 2.Panzer-Division had already skirted around Bastogne to the north, and finally von Lüttwitz gave Bayerlein permission to try the same to the south, leaving Kampfgruppe Hauser behind to reinforce the attacks of the 26.Volksgrenadier-Division. Under von Lüttwitz’s instructions, two Panzer-Lehr officers walked up the road from Remonfosse under a white flag on December 22 to offer the Bastogne defenders surrender terms. McAuliffe’s famously terse reply was, “Nuts!” After two days of skirmishing, significant German attacks resumed on December 23. A sudden change in the weather had a dramatic effect on the course of the fighting. The arrival of a cold high-pressure front on the night of December 22/23 froze the ground and cleared the skies. On the morning of the 23rd, a wave of C-47 transports appeared over Bastogne, dropping 441 tons of supplies by the end of the day. Allied fighter-bomber attacks on the German columns resumed as well. Von Manteuffel shifted the next main attack (early on Christmas morning) to the northwest, where he suspected the Americans were weakest, using the newly arrived 15.Panzergrenadier-Division. The attack was eventually beaten back by paratroopers supported by M18 tank destroyers. This was the last major German assault until Patton’s relief column arrived.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 217

N

II

US unit locations, morning, December 9

116

Rcn

US front line, December 21–23 German attacks, December 19–23 Axis of other German movements

0

Hardigny

2 miles

0

Dec 19

Bertogne

2km

Dec 19

XX

2

(-)

Team Desobry

Noville II

Rcn

Solle

Bourcy

Givry

2 (+)

Recogne Longchamps III

502 39

Team Booth

Foy ngr Bn 158 E

III

Champs

26 VG

Rolley III

506

Flamizoulle

3

XX

(-)

Chifontaine

Morning Dec 19

CCB Hemroulle

10 X

Mande-St-Etienne

Savy

CCR

9

Luzery

327 II

E

II

326

2

Villeroux II

Lehr (+) III

901

Sibret Assenois

Dec 19

Niederwampach

Wardin

327

Marvie

Rcn

(-)

Benonchamp

gr Bn (-) 3 5th En

Chenogne

II

1

(-)

Neffe

Senonchamps

26 VG

Lehr

Bastogne

II

Remonfosse

26VG Oberwampach

XX

Lehr

XX

501

II

III

77 Dec 19

Mageret Dec 21

Longvilly

Team Cherry

Bizory

III

Team Brown

9

CCR (-)

X

101

Rcn

(-) Dec 19

101

XX

327

2

26VG

XX

II

XX

(-)

Flamierge

Lehr

Team O’Hara

Bras

217

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MAP 100: PATTON’S RELIEF OF BASTOGNE DECEMBER 22–26, 1944 The success of von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee in overcoming the 28th Division permitted a fast exploitation toward the Meuse in this sector. Standing in the way was Bastogne, athwart the main road and rail networks in the area. The 101st Airborne Division was trucked in to defend Bastogne, and the town became a collection point for a number of American units. Although surrounded, it was by no means defenseless. Its relief came from an unexpected direction: the forces of Patton’s Third US Army many miles away on the Saar border. Earlier in December, Patton had been planning a winter offensive, codenamed Operation Tink, aimed at Frankfurt and the Rhine. Patton’s intelligence chief, Brigadier-General Oscar Koch, had noted suspicious German activity in Luxembourg and the Ardennes – an unusually heavy amount of rail traffic, and, most ominous of all, radio silence had been imposed on German units in the area. On December 9, Koch warned Patton that the Wehrmacht had amassed sufficient forces in the Ardennes to conduct a large spoiling offensive against the left flank of Operation Tink. Patton warned both Bradley and Eisenhower of the German build-up, but he was ignored. After the start of the Ardennes attack, Patton ordered his staff to plan for contingency operations against the flank of the German offensive. At a December 19 conference in Verdun, Eisenhower suggested a flank attack and asked which of the field armies could conduct such a maneuver. Patton was the only one to volunteer an option in the short run; he claimed he could begin on December 21 with three divisions. Eisenhower was taken aback, but had overlooked the fact that Patton’s G-2 had already warned of the offensive, and that the Third US Army was already geared up for an offensive on December 18; Patton had already assumed that he would be called on to execute precisely such a mission and had told his staff to prepare for it. Patton calmly convinced Ike that he was in deadly earnest in his estimate and fully confident that his well-trained units could turn 90 degrees, execute a movement to contact, and then stage a meeting engagement against the Germans somewhere near Bastogne. In his usual colorful fashion, he observed: “The Kraut’s stuck his head in a meat-grinder and this time I’ve got a hold of the handle.” Amid the gloom and chill of the Verdun meeting, Patton’s optimistic presentation stood out for its brevity, and foresight. Two of Patton’s three corps would be committed to the Ardennes and Patch’s Seventh 218

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US Army to the south would be obliged to extend northward to cover Patton’s sector in the Saar. What remained to be seen was whether Patton could indeed engineer such a miracle during the atrocious early winter weather. The Third US Army began moving Major-General John Millikin’s III Corps towards Arlon on December 19. The mobile spearhead of the attack was the exhausted 4th Armored Division along with the 26th and 80th divisions, reinforced by three field artillery groups. The attack was launched in the late afternoon of December 21 by all three divisions. The following day, the 4th Armored Division reached Martelange 13 miles south of Bastogne, the 26th Division moved up alongside it to the east, and the 80th Division took Heiderscheid. As III Corps approached Bastogne, German resistance intensified. By December 23, elements from Brandenberger’s 7.Armee were finally approaching the southern outskirts of Bastogne, and the 5. Fallschirmjäger-Division was assigned to cover the main road from Arlon to Bastogne. The 4th Armored Division responded to the escalating resistance by deploying all three combat commands in hope of finding a weakness in the German defenses. By the morning of December 26, Combat Command R was the closest of the three to Bastogne, and, by mid-afternoon, fought its way to within a short distance of the Bastogne defense. A task force was formed under Captain William Dwight consisting of Company C, 37th Tank Battalion, and Company C, 53rd Armored Infantry Battalion, which set off for Assenois at 1610hrs after a preliminary artillery strike. After fighting their way through the village, Dwight was greeted by the commander of the 101st Airborne Division, BrigadierGeneral McAuliffe, in the outskirts of Bastogne late in the afternoon. While Combat Command R had managed to break into Bastogne, it would take several more days of hard fighting to secure and widen the corridor. However, German forces in this sector were the weakest of the siege force, and the corridor was never seriously threatened. Combined with a strong push by “Lightning Joe” Collins’ VII Corps from the opposite direction, the tide had been turned. The Battle of the Bulge was by no means over, but the Wehrmacht had failed to reach the Meuse River and the momentum was clearly in favor of the US Army. The fighting in the Ardennes would go on for several more weeks in appalling winter weather.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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N

Line of departure US positions, evening, December 21, 1944

Noville

III

US positions, evening, December 26, 1944

77

Salle

26VG 502

0

200 miles

0

506

III

115

Mande-St-Etienne

Tillet

26VG

Longvilly

Benonchamp

Neffe

Jodenville

26VG

Dec 26, 1944 901

Assenois

15

Clochimont

Dec 26, 1944 Remichampagne

(-)

Cobreville

Vaux-lez-Rosières

Nives

4(+)

Harlange

XX

Sainlez

LUXEMBOURG

5 Livârchamps

Dec 24, Remoiville 1944 Hollange

Surré

X

CCR

4 Burnon

am, Dec 25, 1944

Boulaide

II

CCA

Sure

6

Tintange

X

Dec 26, 1944

4 (+)

Bilsdorf

Warnach Bigonville

II

178

XXXX

7

Lutremange Villers-la-Bonne-Eau

X

CCB

XX

(-) Tarchamps

Hompré

Bercheux

Lehr

XX

(-)

26

III

Remonfosse Lutrebois

Morhet

III

6

III

39

Marvie

R.

Rondu

R.

Sibret

ltz

Wardin

Bras

Villeroux Magerotte

Niederwampach

XX

XX

Wi

327

Lavaselle

Remagne

Oberwampach

Magaret

Chenogne

Moircy

Allerborn Chifontaine

Arloncourt

26VG

501

III

Senonchamps

Houmont

Oubourcy

Bizory

III

Luzery

Bastogne

III

Pinsamont

III

78

15

Hubermont Bonnerue

Michamps

Foy

III

Flamierge

200km

5

26VG

III

Roadblocks

XXXX

Bourcy

II

US armored attack

Dec 24, 1944

(-)

Dec 23, 1944 Rambrouch

Martelange X

BELGIUM

CCR

4

Dec 23, 1944

XXX

VIII

XXX

III XX

XX

4

XX

Léglise

26

X

XX

Rodenhof

Colpach III

178

(-)

TF Lion, Dec 22, 1944

Rossignol

X

CCB

4

am, Dec 22, 1944

Habayla-Neuve

II

TF Alanis

X

CCA

4

am, Dec 22, 1944

TF Oden

II

Arlon

219

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 219

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MAP 101: ELIMINATING THE BULGE JANUARY 3–28, 1945 By late December, even Hitler had given up hope of anything more than a token victory in the Ardennes. Perhaps Bastogne could be taken. Yet Hitler refused to face the obvious. The Red Army had been quiescent on the Polish Front nearest Berlin since late August 1944. It should have been evident to even the most distracted strategist that the Red Army was building up its forces for an explosive surge into Germany by the shortest route available over the Vistula and Oder rivers. Instead of giving up his paltry gains in Belgium and redirecting his increasingly meager Panzer armies eastward to face the Red Army, Hitler procrastinated. On December 27, Dietrich’s 6.Panzer-Armee was ordered to go over to the defensive. Hitler’s enthusiasms turned in another direction, to Alsace, hoping to exploit the overextended defensive lines of the US 6th Army Group there, which had been stretched to cover part of the line formerly held by Patton’s Third US Army. Operation Nordwind was launched on January 1, 1945, gaining few successes. The resources for Nordwind were a few emaciated divisions, and the rewards of the attack were as threadbare. Nordwind had no strategic consequences, and little impact in the Ardennes beyond placing even more stringent limits on German reinforcements and supplies. On January 2, von Manteuffel asked Heeresgruppe B commander Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model to authorize a general withdrawal from the Bastogne vicinity to a more defensible line hinged on Houfallize. Model knew of Hitler’s opposition to any withdrawal and so refused. Hitler instead ordered another attack on Bastogne for January 4, which fizzled after only minor gains. The First US Army began its offensive operations to join up with Patton’s Third US Army on January 3. On the 5th, Model was forced to pull out two of the Panzer divisions from the Bastogne sector to reinforce the badly pressed 6.Panzer-Armee, ending any further attempts against Bastogne. From the American perspective, the early January fighting was as much against the weather as against the Germans. The snowy conditions grew progressively worse, and the struggles for the many small road junctions between Bastogne and Houfallize were bitter and costly for 220

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both sides. On January 8, Hitler recognized the obvious, and authorized a withdrawal to prevent German units from being trapped by the slow but steady American advance. But the withdrawal did not proceed as planned, and La Roche was captured sooner than anticipated. Hitler planned to gradually have von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee take over the 6.Panzer-Armee sector, with the latter serving as a reserve to counter an anticipated Allied attack at the base of the Bulge, the type of operation proposed by Patton that was not in fact in the works. However, other events intervened. The fighting in the Ardennes became irrelevant on January 12, 1945 when the Red Army launched its long-expected winter offensive on the Vistula and Oder rivers in Poland, aimed at Berlin. With the Red Army on Germany’s doorstep, there were no longer any resources for Hitler’s foolish gambles in the West. On January 14, von Rundstedt himself pleaded with Hitler to permit a withdrawal in stages all the way to the Rhine, but Hitler would only countenance a withdrawal to the Westwall. On January 16, the Third and First US armies met at Houfallize, marking the end of the first phase of erasing the Bulge. It would take until January 28 to recapture all of the territory lost to the German offensive. Losses in the Ardennes fighting were heavy on both sides. US casualties totaled 75,482, of which there were 8,407 killed, 46,170 wounded and 20,905 missing through the end of January. The British XXX Corps lost 1,408, including 200 killed, 239 wounded and 969 missing. Estimates of German losses vary from about 68,760 to 98,025 casualties depending on the parameters. In the case of the lower of the figures, this included 11,171 killed, 34,439 wounded and 23,150 missing. The Wehrmacht lost about 610 tanks and assault guns in the Ardennes, or about 45 percent of their original strength, compared to about 730 US tanks and tank destroyers. The Ardennes cost the Wehrmacht most of its remaining fuel and ammunition reserves. The forthcoming campaigns of 1945 promised to bring encounter misery to Germany as the ground war reached deep into Germany.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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XX

30

84

116 XX

51 Br (Jan 11) X X X X

246VG

TA I L L E S P L AT E A U

First US

XXXX

XX

18VG

Salm

II.SS

XX XXThird

XXXX

O

BELGIUM

5

urthe XX

167VG

Houfallize

XX

XXXX

GERMANY

5 XX

XX

26VG

XXX

XXX

X

XXXXVII

XXXXX

12

XX

26VG

X

15

3

FB

Tillet XX

X

X

XX

Bourcy

XX

12.SS

Oubourcy XX

XX

26VG

Longvilly

6

XX

17

9.SS

Foy

101

XX

11

XX

XX

Wardin 16VG

87

Bras

Marvie XX

1.SS

Front line, January 3 Fluid front line, January 3 Front line, January 28 Axis of advance German units, January 3

XX

X

X

35

XX

5

X

X

H

9VG

G

I

A

H

R

D

E

N

N

E

Clerf

S

XX

0

5km

LVIII

7

XXXX

7

X

XX

276

Fuhrer

X

XX

XXX

LIII

Wiltz

XX

Wiltz

Lehr

XXX

LIII XX

XX XX

XX

90 (Jan 10)

9VG

Dahl

26

Sure

XXX

Vianden

LXXXV XX

76VG

XX XX

German units, January 28

5 miles

XXX

5

XXXX

XXX

Front line, January 16

XXX

Mageret 340VG

Bastogne

E I F E L

XXXX

XX

Noville Longchamp

XX

St-Hubert Lehr

I.SS

rf

XX

Cle

X

XX

XX

LUXEMBOURG

XX

352VG

Diekirch Sauer

80

Ettelbruck

XX

9

80

352VG Ou

X

XXX

0

LXVI

326VG

La Roche

2 LVIII

6 Br

XXX

XX

XXXX

US

XX

29 Br

r

Salmchâteau

XXX

9

XXXXX

Ou XX

XX

XX

XX

St-Vith

560VG

XX

XX

33 Br

XXX

Vielsalm

2.SS

XX

Marche

XX

XXXX

XXX

53 Br

LXVII

75 (Jan 11)

6

2

XXX

XX

7 (Jan 20)

XX

21

X

XXX Br

15 XX

XX

XX

62VG

XX

XX

Hotton

XXXX

XX

3 3

18VG

83

X

89

XX

Bra

XX

3

XX

XX

VII

82

1

89

XII

106 (-) (Jan 11)

XX

X

XXX

XX

XX

XXXXX

e

nne

W

rth

XX

Waimes

lève

XXX

XX

Ou

(-)

XX

Amb

Trois Ponts XX

O

R

S

(-)

Stavalot

XVIII

Lie

L

A

N

E

D

E

N

XXX

XX

30

XX

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 221

Malmedy

N

r

XXX

LXXX

XX

4

XX

212VG

221

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MAP 102: OPERATION NORDWIND  DECEMBER 31, 1944 The diversion of a part of Patton’s Third US Army to the relief of Bastogne forced Lieutenant-General Patch’s Seventh US Army to take over an extended sector on the Saar front. Hitler saw this as an opportunity for a spoiling offensive, codenamed Nordwind (North Wind). In contrast to the Ardennes Offensive, little was done to reinforce the attacking General Blaskowitz’s Heeresgruppe G prior to the offensive. The Nordwind offensive began on New Year’s Eve, a half-hour before midnight. With the ground covered in most areas with a foot of snow, it took the German units some time to move up to the front lines, and so most attacks did not begin until midnight. The main assault by Sturmgruppe 1 was based on Obergruppenführer Max Simon’s XIII. SS-Armee-Korps and included the 17.SS-Panzergrenadier-Division and the 36.Volksgrenadier-Division. This attack ran into the deep defenses of the 44th and 100th Infantry divisions in the Saar Valley. A narrow penetration was made toward Rimling and Achen, but, in general, the attack in this sector was stopped dead in its tracks with heavy casualties. Sturmgruppe 1 had very little success in bringing up its armored support owing to the poor road conditions and the weather. On the night of January 3, the offensive in this sector was halted. More success was gained by Sturmgruppe 2, the four divisions of General der Flieger Erich Petersen’s XC.Armee Korps and General Gustav Höhne’s LXXXIX.Armee-Korps, out of the Bitche fortified area. This section of the Low Vosges was mountainous and forested, and so poorly suited to attack that Patch had left it screened by the entirely inadequate Task Force Hudelson. As a result, the German advance confronted little or no opposition. Having been forbidden to conduct reconnaissance before the attack, several of the newly arrived divisions stumbled around in the difficult terrain. The 361. Volksgrenadier-Division showed the most progress, as it had retreated through the area weeks before and so at least had some sense of the terrain. These corps ploddingly advanced about 10 miles during the course of the next four days. As it became clear that the Germans were making a major attempt to push through the Lower Vosges, Major-General Edward Brooks’ VI Corps began to shuffle forces to cover the yawning gap left by Task Force Hudelson. Brooks tried to plug up various exits out of the mountains along the Moder River by filling the narrow mountain passes with infantry regiments stripped from other sectors of the front. This created a confusing checkerboard of different units; the 45th 222

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Division pushed two of its regiments into the gap, reinforced with a regiment from Task Force Herren (70th Division) and a regiment from the 79th Division. Within a few days, Major-General Robert Frederick of the 45th Division was commanding eight regiments instead of his usual three, half of which had never seen combat. Realizing that the Saar assault by Sturmgruppe 1 had failed, Blaskowitz and von Obstfelder decided to reinforce success and try to continue the momentum in the Bitche sector instead. While Patch and Brooks were hastily reinforcing the Vosges mountain defenses, Blaskowitz was trying to push new units south from Bitche into the mountains. The most important source of German reinforcements was the 6.SS-Gebirgs-Division “Nord,” a mountain infantry unit, which began arriving in bits and pieces in the days after New Year. This division was undoubtedly the best in the theater and was well accustomed to winter mountain warfare. The first of its regiments to arrive was SS-Gebirgs-Regiment.12, which proceeded south toward the hamlets of Wingen-sur-Moder and Wimmenau around midnight of January 2/3. Two of its battalions managed to infiltrate through scattered elements of the 179th Infantry and stormed into Wingen-surModer on the morning of January 4, capturing the battalion headquarters of 1/179th Infantry. The 45th Division’s infantry companies began counterattacks against Wingen-sur-Moder that afternoon, but the attacks were far too small to rout the 725 sturdy troops in the town. The US commanders were under the mistaken impression that it had been occupied by only 50 Germans. Although Wingen-sur-Moder was the deepest penetration made during Operation Nordwind, the German troops were out of touch with headquarters after losing their radio truck. The 45th Division was conducting counterattacks all around Wingen-sur-Moder, which made reinforcement or relief impossible, even if Blaskowitz and von Obstfelder had a better appreciation of the situation. An attack on Wingen-sur-Moder by the inexperienced 276th Infantry on January 5 failed to recapture the town, but the German troops by now were surrounded with little hope of relief. The surviving German forces were authorized to withdraw and did so after dark on the night of January 6/7, with only 205 out of the original 800-strong force escaping. The recapture of Wingen-sur-Moder marked the end of the first phase of Nordwind. LXXXIX.Armee-Korps estimated it had suffered about 2,500 casualties in the fighting, and casualties in the neighboring corps were probably worse.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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N

GERMANY

103 XX 44

XV XXX XXI

Sturmgruppe 1

XX

19 XX

Sturmgruppe 2

XIII.SS XXX XC

XX

103

XC X LXXXX XIX

36VG

XX

17.SS

Folpersviller Bliesbruck Sarreguemines

XX

XX

Rimling

uar

559

Jan

Gros-Réderching

44 4 19

Bitche XX

5

y1

3,

Sa

Achen

rre

257

XX

Rohrbach

361VG

XX

256

Y

ua r Jan

45

, 19

y 10

XV XXX VI

XX 44

Maronviller Farm

Éguelshardt

E

VA

L

L

E

XX

100

A

R

R

100 XX 36 , 1945 0 ry 1 nua

S

Rahling

Mouterhouse Goetzenbruck

Philippsbourg

Sarreinsberg

Baerenthal

44 XX 100

Meisenthal XX X

Althorn

Obermuhlthal 3 10 45 XX5 , 19 4 17 y ar

TF Hudelson

Niederbronnles-Bains

nu

Ja

(Jan 10)

Dambach

Bannstein

Lemberg

Ja

36

Neunhoffen

Wildengut Sarre-Union Wingensur-Moder

Reipertswiller

Zinswiller

Offwiller

Lichtenberg Wimmenau

XX

Rothbach

45 X XX V VI X

Front line, January 1, 1945 Front line, January 4, 1945

0 0

5 miles 5km

Mühlhausen

(Jan 4)

Drulingen

Front line, January 20, 1945

Bischoltz

FRANCE

Ingwiller Schillersdorf

Bitschhoffen Kindwiller La Walck

Uberach

223

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MAP 103: OPERATION SONNENWENDE JANUARY 5–12, 1945 The poor performance of the initial phase of Operation Nordwind left the Heeresgruppe G commander General Blaskowitz in a quandary about what to do next. The plan had been to exploit the anticipated breakthrough in the Saar Valley with Operation Zahnarzt, a thrust by the Panzer reserve into the relatively open country west of the Low Vosges. In view of the failure of Simon’s XIII.SS-Armee-Korps even to dent the heavy US defenses, Zahnarzt was abandoned. Since the terrain south of Bitche was so unfavorable for Panzers, by January 9, Blaskowitz urged a shift of the Schwerpunkt (main effort) to the east, with 21.Panzer-Division and the 25.Panzergrenadier-Division debouching out of the Vosges near Rothbach and into the open country east of Haguenau. The new attack was codenamed Sonnenwende (Solstice). Other developments along the Rhine complicated this plan. By this stage, Reichsführer-SS Heinrich Himmler had maneuvered to take over a field command, the newly created Heeresgruppe Oberrhein. This army group took over the Heeresgruppe G forces on its southern wing, including the 19.Armee, which had been assigned the Sonnenwende mission. Himmler saw the weaknesses in the Allied defenses around the Alsatian capital of Strasbourg as an opportunity to carry out the promised supporting mission for Operation Nordwind. Forces on the east bank of the Rhine under SS-Obergruppenführer Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski’s XIV.SS-Armee-Korps were assigned to the mission north of Strasbourg, in support of the 19.Armee’s Sonnenwende attack south of city. The aim of both attacks was to recapture Strasbourg, which Himmler intended as a present for Hitler on the 12th anniversary of his accession to power on January 30. In the event, the attacks around Strasbourg were weak and badly coordinated and led in unexpected directions. Rather than wait for the anticipated Sonnenwende attack out of the Colmar Pocket, on January 4, Berlin ordered an immediate river crossing operation by XIV.SS-Armee-Korps. The forces used for the operation were an incredible ragtag assortment, even by 1945 Wehrmacht standards. Bach-Zelewski was well aware that his corps had no offensive power, and, using Himmler’s influence, he scraped together an improvised Panzer formation, Jagdpanzer-Abteilung von Lüttichau. A bridgehead was established near Gambsheim in the early morning hours of January 5 against little opposition. The initial landings were conducted by infantry using rubber assault boats, and 224

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once the bridgehead was secured, they were followed by 8-ton ferries and eventually a 70-ton Rhine ferry for the armored vehicles. After establishing a perimeter around Gambsheim, Hauptmann Hannibal von Lüttichau’s battle group began sending Panzers out to the neighboring towns of Herrlisheim and Offendorf. The towns were then secured with infantry troops and an assortment of police and Volksturm militia units while the Panzer force moved south toward Kilstett. Although Patch’s Seventh US Army became aware of the bridgehead almost from its inception, it was judged too minor a threat in view of problems elsewhere in the VI Corps sector. No serious efforts to contain the bridgehead occurred for several days. Operation Sonnenwende kicked off three days later on January 8, primarily by the 198.Infanterie Division, which managed to push back weak French forces southeast of Erstein until the French reestablished firm defenses on the Ill River and its subsidiary canals by January 12. Sonnenwende proved to be the least successful of all the Sylwester Offensives, so called from the central European term “Sylwester” for the New Year’s holiday. The Sonnenwende attacks pushed the Colmar Pocket a few miles northward toward Strasbourg, but only exacerbated the overextension of 19.Armee. The success in expanding the Gambsheim bridgehead north of Strasbourg led Himmler to interfere with Blaskowitz’s planning. With Sonnenwende a failure, Himmler promoted an opportunistic shift in tactics, refocusing the bridgehead’s mission from the capture of Strasbourg to a plan to cut off the US VI Corps in the Haguenau area. Instead of Blaskowitz’s plan to deploy the Heergesgruppe G Panzer units east of Haguenau, Himmler proposed that they be directed farther northeast around Wissembourg with an objective of pushing through the open country between the Bienwald and the Haguenau Forest, and down along the Rhine, where it could join up with his Gambsheim bridgehead. Heeresgruppe G was not happy with this scheme, expecting that the area would be heavily mined and fortified and that the area east of Haguenau did not provide enough maneuver room. Furthermore, the US defenses, although thin, were anchored in a number of Maginot Line fortifications. Regardless of these objections, Berlin ordered the stalled attack by LXXXIX.ArmeeKorps from the Bitche area to be suspended in favor of shifting the focus of Nordwind farther east to the Haguenau sector. This set the stage for the most violent battles of the Sylwester Offensives, the tank fighting around Hatten and Rittershoffen.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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N

Haguenau

Schirrhein

Stattmatten

Sessenheim

Kaltenhouse

Dengolsheim

Oberhoffen-sur-Mode Zor

Hochfelden

n

Dalhunden

Rohrwiller

Drusenheim

Kurtzenhausen X

TF Linden

Herrlisheim

Weyersheim

ine Rh

Hoerdt 79 XX 3Fr 1945 nuary 5,

Seventh US XXXX First French January 5, 1945

XX

533

FRANCE

Gambsheim

III

3 Fr

III

ObR 15

Bischwiller

Brumath

Fort Louis

Kilstett

II

GERMANY

VS 3

La Wantzeneu

Ja

III

LS ObR 2

Souffelweyersheim

III

1133 III

ObR 10

4 Fr

Strasbourg

III II

XXX

LS 406

XIV.SS III

ObR 14

Molsheim Alsace-Lorraine Fr

XX

3 Fr

X II

Z3

Jan 30

POL

Rosheim Offenburg 3 Fr XX 1 Fr

Z2

1 Fr

II

Erstein

XX

e

BM21 Fr

POL

Krafft

Rhin

Obernai

II

II

BM11 Fr

Z6

II

AlsaceLorraine Fr

POL

X

Gerstheim

Ill

Benfeld

13DBLE Fr II

(January 5, 1945)

X

BM24 Fr

II

Rhinau

German units: LS: Landes Schützen (regional militia) ObR: Oberrhein (upper Rhine provisional infantry) VS: Bodenstandige Volkssturm (non-mobile militia) Z: Zoll Polizei (customs police)

III

ObR 4

XX X II

198

II

VS 5

French units: BM: Battaillon de Marche BIMP: Battaillon d’Infanterie de Marche Pacifique DBLE: Demi-Brigade de Légion étrangère (Foreign Legion)

AL

SA

TIA

N P L

ne

AIN

S

Selestat

Can

al

106

Rhi

BM5 Fr

II

ne-

XX

BIMP Fr

Rhô

2 Fr

BM4 Fr

4 Fr

II

Ettenheim Front line, January 5, 1945 Front line, January 12, 1945

0 0

5 miles 5km

225

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MAP 104: THE BATTLE OF HAGUENAU JANUARY 6–21, 1945 General Karl Decker’s XXXIX.Panzer-Korps was put in charge of the Haguenau attack. The understrength 21.Panzer-Division and 25. Panzergrenadier-Division were combined as Kampfgruppe Feuchtinger and began the attack in the early hours of January 6 with an aim of seizing several Maginot forts by surprise. The attack proceeded quickly against very light opposition, but the advance columns eventually ran into minefields, slowing their progress. The push resumed on January 7, in the midst of a snowstorm, and eventually came to a halt in the Maginot Line defenses near Obermodern, held by the 3/313th Infantry (79th Division). The 21.Panzer-Division continued its attacks on the scattered Maginot fortifications with engineer and tank support, finally penetrating the defenses north of Obermodern on January 8. That evening, the 25. Panzergrenadier-Division moved into position farther south to penetrate the Maginot Line defenses towards Hatten and Rittershoffen. These two neighboring towns would earn a very grim reputation over the next week amongst both German and American troops. The initial attack began around midnight, attempting to overcome the substantial barbed-wire and minefield defenses. By sunrise, Panzergrenadier-Regiment.119 reached the eastern outskirts of Hatten. By this time, Combat Command A, 14th Armored Division had begun to arrive in the Hatten–Rittershoffen sector. Its lead element, a platoon of four tanks, encountered the spearhead of the German columns in a blinding snowstorm. These were the opening moves in a weeklong series of seesaw battles. Both sides repeatedly attacked and counterattacked each other in the rubble of the two towns, gained a momentary advantage, only to be pushed back by another round of attacks. Decker attempted to circumvent the vicious stalemate inside Hatten by directing the 21.Panzer-Division to swing wide of the town and take Rittershoffen farther west. This attack took place on January 11 amidst a considerable amount of confusion on both sides. The flat area between the two towns became a killing ground whenever the weather was clear enough to pick out targets in the open fields. Both sides pushed reinforcements into the fray. On January 14, the Red Army launched its long-anticipated Oder offensive towards Berlin, and Hitler ordered all available mechanized forces shifted from the west to the east; Decker began substituting the 47.Volksgrenadier-Division for the Panzergrenadier units on January 16. Meanwhile, an equally violent confrontation had erupted to the south of Haguenau. Late on January 6, Patch had ordered the “Gambsheim cancer” eradicated, allotting the green Combat Command B, 12th 226

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Armored Division from the reserve for this mission. At the time, the German bridgehead around Gambsheim contained about 3,330 troops from the 553.Volksgrenadier-Division. The VI Corps seriously underestimated the size of the force in Herrlisheim as only 500–800 “disorganized” infantry and so struck at the town in a weak and piecemeal fashion. After failing to overcome the German defenses in the first attacks, Brooks realized that a single combat command was inadequate to deal with the Gambsheim bridgehead. On January 13, the entire 12th Armored Division was assigned to the mission. The second phase of the attack began early on the morning of January 16, but, after gaining a foothold in the town, the German infantry counterattacked, and pushed the US force out. In the meantime, Decker’s XXXIX-Panzer-Korps had been allocated the 10.SS-Panzer-Division to spearhead a breakout from the Gambsheim bridgehead. The Panzer attacks began before dawn on January 17, and the battle did not go well for either side. In the early morning fog, the German tank column took heavy losses to US tank guns on the approach to Herrlisheim. Repeated attacks finally overwhelmed the 43rd Tank Battalion and the 17th Armored Infantry Battalion positions on January 18. The 10.SS-Panzer-Division tried to exploit their initial success, but the advance toward Kilstett on January 18–19 cost 29 tanks before coming to a bloody halt. The impasse around Haguenau finally broke on January 20. Eisenhower had been pushing Devers’ 6th Army Group to eliminate the Colmar Pocket. The bloody stalemates at Hatten–Rittershoffen and Herrlisheim convinced Devers and Patch that it was time to fall back to a more defensible position rather than waste more troops north of the Haguenau Forest. As a result, Brooks’ VI Corps ordered a withdrawal to the Moder River line south of the Haguenau Forest, starting after dark on January 20–21. In the end, the Sylwester Offensives had completely failed to achieve their operational objectives. They gained the Wehrmacht a little ground on the Alsatian Plains around Haguenau, but at enormous cost. As a battle of attrition, the balance sheet was largely in favor of the US Army, with total combat casualties being around 14,000 in the Seventh US Army compared to about 23,000 German casualties in Heeresgruppe G. These losses, combined with the drain of forces out of Alsace to the Eastern Front in late January and early February, left Heeresgruppe G very vulnerable to future Allied operations in this sector, as would become clear at Colmar.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 227

N

Hu de X lson

Bitche

Ja

Philippsbourg

III

III

XX

I

275

256

36

315

222 II

Niederbronnles-Bains

45 III

6.SS

III

Offwiller

Wimmenau

45 XX 3 10

36

Bischoltz

Jan 21

Ingwiller

Kindwiller

274

Obermodern

Schweighausen

25 Jan 21

XX

7

Neubourg Dauendorf

III

409

Uhlwiller

Zor

n

242

Forstfeld Beinheim Kauffenheim III

III

232

314

Hochfelden

III

314

79 XX 36

Bischwiller III

X

B

142

12 II

Kurtzenhausen

XX

12

Brumath

(-) XX

92

FRANCE XXX

VI

(-)

II

(-)

Seventh Weyersheim XXXX First French

Hoerdt 232

79 XX r 3F

Rohrwiller XX

242

XX

Fort Louis

XX

Witzleben

Dengolsheim 10 Dalhunden XX

Drusenheim 9

Jan 21 XX

10.SS XX

553VG

II

79

Herrlisheim

II

2

Stattmatten

21

714

56

II

117

Sessenheim

Oberhoffensur-Mode

III

315

232

Schirrhein

III

Kaltenhouse

III

Roeschwoog II

242

III

XXX

XIV.SS

Offendorf

III

Gambsheim Front line, January 6, 1945

Kilstett

Front line, January 21, 1945 Initial attacks, January 6–17, 1945

La Wantzeneu XXX

Souffelweyersheim

0 Rhine

II Fr

Rastatt

Soufflenheim

Haguenau 313

232

XX

21

14

Jan 21

Niedermörmter 3 10 X X 9 7

Bühl

X

10.SS

Jan 21

222

XX

Hatten

Rittershoffen

XX

III

Pfaffenhaffen

14

Stundwiller

III

Uberach

La Walck

III

II

79

R XX

Bitschhoffen

Schillersdorf

III

411

47VG Jan 21

14

Kuhlendorf

45 X X 9 7

XX

Mühlhausen

B

14

XC X X XX XI , X 1 LX Jan 2 5) ( 94 1

XX

Rothbach

XXX

Aschbach XXI

X

313

X

Zinswiller

LX X X X XI Ja XX XX X n 2 IX 1, Pz 19 45

XX

45

79 X X 4 1

III

315

XX

Jan 21

Wingensur-Moder

Lauterbourg

III

Jan 21

274

ter

ne

X

TF Hudson

Lau

Drachenbronn

III

Rhi

Meisenthal

XX 45

Bannstein

257 (Jan 21)

XX X XX IX X Ja IV X Pz n 2 .SS 1, 19 45

XX

LX XXXX XC X IV n2 1, 19 45

Éguelshardt

GERMANY

Wissembourg

TF

V X XX X VI

0

5 miles 5km

227

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MAP 105: OPERATION CHEERFUL: STRANGLING THE COLMAR POCKET – JANUARY 19 TO FEBRUARY 9, 1945 Eisenhower had been urging 6th Army Group commander Devers to eliminate the Colmar Pocket since December 1944, when de Lattre’s 1re Armée had run out of steam. Plans to restart the attacks were delayed owing to Operation Nordwind and the related shift of French resources to defend Strasbourg. Planning resumed on January 11, and Devers allotted the recently formed XXI Corps under Major-General Frank Milburn to reinforce the French units. The plan called for the French to begin the assault in the southern Mulhouse sector to draw away German reserves. Once this was under way, the main offensive punch provided by Milburn’s corps would be aimed directly against Colmar, aimed at rapidly penetrating the pocket and seizing the main river crossing at the fortified city of Neuf-Brisach. Tactical planning aside, the real issue was the substantial logistical difficulties of conducting the operation in the dead of winter. The German garrison in the Colmar Pocket was under the command of Himmler’s Heeresgruppe Oberrhein and consisted of General Siegfried Rasp’s 19.Armee with two corps: LXIII.Armee-Korps in the south facing the French Ier Corps, and LXIV.Armee-Korps in the north facing Milburn’s XXI Corps and the French IIe Corps. Operation Cheerful started on schedule on January 20 in the midst of a heavy snowstorm. The weather helped mask the attack by the French Ier Corps out of the Mulhouse area. The attack stalled, but accomplished its mission of distracting the Germans. The next phase of Cheerful was an attack on January 22 by Général de Monsabert’s IIe Corps, aimed at eliminating the Erstein Bulge created by the aborted Operation Sonnenwende a few weeks before. At the same time, Milburn’s XXI Corps launched Operation Grandslam, the American portion of Cheerful. The initial objective, the Colmar Canal, was reached on the night of January 29/30. The collapse of the Sylvester Offensives led to German command changes, with Himmler leaving the theater in disgrace and SS-General Hausser taking over Heeresgruppe G from Blaskowitz. The staff of Heeresgruppe G had already concluded that the Colmar Pocket was doomed and that it would be prudent to withdraw forces over the Rhine to bolster the defense of the Black Forest across the river in Germany. Hitler partially agreed to a pullout in the north, but wanted the main portion of the pocket held as long as possible; Rundstedt also 228

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wanted the pocket held, as a means to divert Allied forces from an anticipated offensive against the Saar. The weakness of the units within the pocket prevented Rasp’s 19.Armee from creating a plausible defense against the Franco-American offensive. On February 1, Rasp began pulling German units out of the Vosges Mountains front in spite of orders from Berlin, in hope that 19.Armee would be authorized to withdraw over the Rhine while there was still time. Instead, at 1719hrs that night, he received instructions from Hitler to hold fast. On February 2, the US 28th Division began clearing the suburbs of Colmar and, the next day, tanks of the French 5e Division Blindée began moving into the heart of the city against weak opposition. By February 5, the fortress city of Neuf-Brisach on the Rhine had been reached by the US 3rd Division, cutting off the main ferry and bridge site. That day, French and US forces joined hands in Rouffach, encircling the western half of the pocket, and trapping the remnants of four German divisions. Without permission from Berlin, Rasp continued moving forces over the Rhine, and instructed units to try to fall back to the bridge at Chalampé, which was still in German hands. The French 1re Armée spent the next several days clearing out the pocket of numerous German holdouts. By the end of the first week of February, 19.Armee no longer had any coherent defenses left in the pocket except for isolated battle groups. On February 8 at 1445hrs, Hitler finally gave permission to withdraw the remnants of 19.Armee over the river, but by that stage the final pocket was only 7 miles wide and 2 miles deep and was on the verge of annihilation. On February 9, Leclerc’s 2e Division Blindée from the north met elements of the 9e Division d’Infanterie Algérienne from the south at the final Rhine bridge at Chalampé, and the German demolition of this bridge at 0800hrs marked the symbolic end of the Colmar Pocket. The German Sylwester Offensives were the death rattle of the Wehrmacht in the West. After these misguided attacks, the Wehrmacht would never again be able to conduct anything but local counterattacks in the West because all of its operational reserves had been spent or shipped off to the East. As an attritional struggle, the Sylwester Offensives cost the Wehrmacht far more than it cost the Allies. The fighting in Alsace in January deprived the Wehrmacht of the time and the resources to prepare for the inevitable battle for Germany.

The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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XX

2 Fr

XX

Rhi

ne

Can

al

PLA

XX

e

1 Fr

Rhin

5km

AT I

0

Selestat

AN

I X IF X XX r X I

5 miles

ALS

0

Ill

2 X Fr 1 X Fr

Front line, February 9, 1945

INS

Front line, February 5, 1945

St-Diédes-Vosges Front line, February 7, 1945

ne-

Front line, February 3, 1945

XX

198

Rhô

Front line, February 1, 1945

708

Ribeauville Marckolsheim Elsenheim

Ostheim 5 Fr

12

XX

XX

28

Colm 16

ar Ca

Colmar c Fe

Jebsheim

nal

Muntzenheim

Horbourg

ht

75 X X 3

XXI XXX I Fr

XX

XX

75

Holtzwihr

189 XX

XX

3 XX

10 Fr

Riedwihr

28 XX 3

XX

Andolsheim

XXX

2

Münster Sundhoffen

XXX

LXIV

Breisach Neuf-Brisach

Metzeral

Va u

ban

Can

al

XXX

XVIII.SS

Rouffach 75 XX 28 XXX

Guebwiller

Thu

LXIII

r

28 XX LX XX IV LX X III

C OLMA R P OC K ET

Ensisheim XX

159

Chalampé

Cernay

4 Fr

XX

e

2 Fr

XX

Rhin

Thann

4 XX 2

10 XX 4

X 2 X 9

Mulhouse 1 Fr

9 Fr

XX

N

XX

229

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The Ardennes Campaign, December 1944 to January 1945

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CHAPTER 5

BATTLES FOR THE ROER AND RHINE, FEBRUARY–MARCH 1945

The capture of the Ludendorff railroad bridge over the Rhine at Remagen changed the dynamics of the final battles for western Germany in March and April 1945. This is a view of the bridge on March 15, 1945, from the Erpeler Ley looking westward towards the town of Remagen on the other side of the river. (NARA) 231

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MAP 106: ALLIED PLANS FOLLOWING THE BATTLE OF THE BULGE – FEBRUARY 1945 Following the Battle of the Bulge, Eisenhower intended to conduct a three-phase operation to trap and destroy as much of the German Army as possible on the west bank of the Rhine prior to the major river-crossing operations. The first phase of the plan was to close on the Rhine north of Düsseldorf in anticipation of Operation Plunder, the main Rhine crossing in Montgomery’s 21st Army Group sector. The second phase was to close on the Rhine from Düsseldorf south, in anticipation of a secondary operation by Devers’ 6th Army Group on the Upper Rhine. The third phase would be the advance into the plains of northern Germany and into central-southern Germany along with Bradley’s 12th Army Group once the Rhine was breached. Eisenhower’s plans were again contested by Montgomery and the British Chiefs of Staff who continued to favor a single thrust by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, reinforced with US corps, with an objective of Berlin. Eisenhower repeated his opposition to this approach, judging that a single thrust offered the Germans an opportunity to concentrate their reduced resources. Even if Eisenhower decided on a single bold thrust to Berlin, it is doubtful that Montgomery would have been his choice to conduct such an operation, given his cautious and methodical tactical style. During the debate over the Rhine plans, Eisenhower was taken aside by the the US Army Chief of Staff, General George Marshall, and assured that his plans would be accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff regardless of the complaints by the British Chiefs of Staff. Nevertheless, in deference to Brooke and Montgomery, Eisenhower’s statements continued to favor a northern focus in the final assault into Germany. The first phase of the Allied offensive began on February 8 with two operations aimed at closing on the Rhine in the northern sector. Operation Veritable was Montgomery’s effort to push the 21st Army Group through the Reichswald to the west bank of the Rhine prior to Operation Plunder. Operation Grenade was a supporting effort by the Ninth US Army to finally clear the Roer River. Operation Veritable proved more difficult than anticipated owing to the forested terrain and the Westwall fortifications, but the Ninth US Army reached the Rhine on March 2, followed by the First Canadian Army. The Ninth 232

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US Army proposed to use nine of its 12 divisions to conduct a surprise crossing of the Rhine, but Eisenhower again deferred to the British plan to wait for Operation Plunder, later in the month. The land campaign was supported by a major air initiative, Operation Clarion. This was a massive single-day strike by 9,000 Allied aircraft directed against the German railroad network. Hopes that this would lead to a complete collapse of the German railroad system proved in vain, and Clarion added simply one more burden to an already debilitated Wehrmacht. Clarion was followed in March by Operation Bugle, a more focused attempt to isolate the Ruhr by cutting critical bridges, viaducts, and rail links to isolate its industry and weaken its defenses against the upcoming Allied ground onslaught. With the initial phase of the Allied offensive complete, Operation Lumberjack began on March 1, 1945 with the First US Army clearing the west bank of the Rhine from the Cologne area south, linking up with Patton’s Third Army on the Ahr River near Koblenz. On March 7, the 9th Armored Division discovered that the Ludendorff Bridge over the Rhine at Remagen had not been demolished like all the other major Rhine bridges, and quickly captured it to everyone’s surprise. This sudden windfall called for another reconsideration of operations into Germany. Bradley proposed a new scheme, Operation Voyage, which aimed at linking up the First and Third US armies on the eastern bank of the Rhine, then driving to the northeast to create a southern pincer around the Ruhr to complement Montgomery’s attack from the north. In the meantime, Devers’ 6th Army Group had already initiated Operation Undertone, an attack up along the west bank of the Rhine to undermine German defenses in front of Patton’s Third US Army. This also succeeded more quickly than expected, and Patton launched the Third US Army attack into the Saar-Palatinate, which collapsed the German defenses so quickly that it was dubbed the “Rhine rat race.” Patton put a division across the Rhine at Oppenheim on the night of March 22/23. This was followed in quick succession by the main Rhine crossings, Montgomery’s Operation Plunder on March 24, and Bradley’s Operation Voyage on March 25.

Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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Ijmuiden

N

Zwolle

IJsselmeer

Amsterdam IJs

North Sea

sel

NETHERLANDS

Zutphen

Utrecht Rotterdam

Arnhem

Lek

Dordrecht

First Can Grave

Waal Maas

Breda

NO

XXXX

February 7, 1945

XXXXX

Tilburg

21 Br Montgomery

RT

R GE

H

M

AIN Osnabrück

Ems

Münster

Plunder Veritable

Second Br

Wesel

XXXX

R U HR

Dortmund

Essen

Ruh

Duisburg

Maas

The Hague

PL AN

Lippe

Hamm

Paderborn

r

Hagen Roermond

Düsseldorf

l

Rh

January 15–28, 1945

Düren

First US

se

XXXX

December 26, 1944

December 16, 1944 to January 30, 1945

Dinant

NE

S

Euskirchen

Ardennes Offensive December 16, 1944

Prüm

L IFE

Arlon

Mo XXXX

se

lle

HU

Trier

Luxembourg

Rethel

PA L

ne

ar

use

Seventh US

Verdun

Marne

SAAR

Sa

Me

Reims

Metz

XXXX

Marn

e–

Rh

St-Dizier

ine

na

XXXXX

INE

E

Undertone

Worms Mannheim Kaiserslautern

Bitche

Heilbronn

Wissembourg

Karlsruhe

Haguenau Baden-Baden Stuttgart Strasbourg First Fr

Mo

Neufchâteau

Kehl Nec

XXXX

St-Die

se

FRANCE

Colmar

Freiburg

Saô

May 1, 1945

Rhine

Basle

50 miles 50km

Mulhouse

Belfort

Date of capture by Allied forces

0 0

ne

kar

BLACK

VO

SG

ES

lle

January 20–February 9, 1945 Westwall

Heidelberg

Operation Nordwind January 1, 1945

Sarrebourg

Devers

Troyes

AT AT I N

Lunéville

6

Oppenheim

Bad Kreuznach

Sarreguemines

Nancy

Toul

l

Frankfurt

Mainz Undertone

January 1–30, 1945 Ca

S

Wiesbaden

K

Saarbrücken

LORRA

Châlonssur-Marne

NS

C RÜ

NU

in

Sedan

Third US

TA U

Ma

LUX.

Mézières

Koblenz Mayen

Lumberjack

Bastogne Bradley

Giessen

Lahn

ine

E

Remagen

Rh

AR

XXXXX

N DE

Bonn

Lumberjack

St-Vith

Siegen Sieg

ST

bre

12 US

er

Meu

Namur

Mons Sam

Ro

Liège

Cologne

Lumberjack

Aachen

BELGIUM

GERMANY

ine

XXXX

Ninth Maastricht US

Brussels

Ais

Grenade

FORE

nal

DT

Cana

Meu s e Ca

AR

Scheldt

Esc aut-

HA

Ghent

Antwerp Alb ert

Besançon

SWITZERLAND

Zurich

233

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MAP 107: WEST-STELLUNG – FEBRUARY 1945 In the autumn and early winter of 1944–45, the Wehrmacht conducted an extensive fortification effort in the foreground to the Rhine, consisting of the rejuvenation of the derelict Westwall fortifications, incorporation of parts of the Maginot Line, and the construction of numerous new defense lines. This was known as the West-Stellung (Western Position). This defense system has been surrounded by confusion and obscurity. It is often confused with the Westwall, the German fortification effort of 1936–40. While large parts of the Westwall were incorporated into the new fortification scheme, the new defense lines covered areas not previously reached by the Westwall, and considerably amplified the depth of the defenses. Another source of confusion is the nickname “Siegfried Line,” which has been loosely used over the years to refer both to the 1940 Westwall as well as the far more extensive West-Stellung defenses of 1944–45. The 1944–45 West-Stellung program differed considerably from the earlier Westwall. Owing to the poor weather of the autumn and winter of 1944–45, as well as the lack of material and skilled labor, few new concrete bunkers were constructed. The old Westwall served as the concrete spine of the new West-Stellung, and additional defense lines were layered around it using fieldworks reinforced with obstacles and gun emplacements. Special emphasis was placed on antitank defense in the form of numerous antitank obstacles as well as dense antitank gun positions. Construction of the West-Stellung came mainly from labor drafts in the cities along the Rhine. It was an enormous civic undertaking, exceeding 400,000 laborers by October 1944. The West-Stellung amplified the original core provided by the Westwall to provide defense in depth. While the Westwall covered about 535 miles of frontier, the West-Stellung lines were nearly three times as long, around 1,550 miles with more than 6,000 miles of new trenches. The construction program added about 22,000 new bunkers and gun positions to the remaining 8,000 Westwall bunkers, as well as over 80,000 machine-gun pits and other combat positions. The West-Stellung was a crutch to help keep the Wehrmacht on its feet after the crippling losses in the summer and autumn of 1944. The 234

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tenacious defense of the western German frontier in the autumn of 1944 was substantially buttressed by the West-Stellung. Many British and American accounts of the fighting praise German defensive prowess in these campaigns, but few recognize the significant role of the WestStellung. The value of the West-Stellung declined after the defeat of the Ardennes Offensive, owing in part to the drastic decline in the combat effectiveness of remaining German formations, but also owing to an increasing rigidity in defensive tactics foisted on the Army by Hitler. The Führer Directive No. 69 of January 21, 1945 demanded that “Any plan to give up a position, a local strongpoint, or a fortress” must be reported directly to him. The West-Stellung contained innumerable miles of unnamed trenches and weapon pits, but each and every bunker on the old Westwall had been carefully numbered. Berlin had detailed maps. Retreat from West-Stellung fieldworks attracted little attention in Berlin, but, as ludicrous as it sounds, German tactical commanders were obliged to report every time they wished to withdraw from each single Westwall bunker and to report each time a bunker was lost. Failing to do so could result in court martial and summary execution. Hitler’s growing fatalism led to the curse of the Westwall: Den Westwall halten oder mit dem Westwall untergehen (Hold the Westwall or perish on the Westwall.) The Hitler directive stripped away the German Army’s tactical flexibility and substituted ominous threats. It inadvertently diminished the value of the West-Stellung, since German commanders quickly learned methods to avoid the consequences. Instead of basing their defenses on the bunkers, they would garrison the pillboxes with as few troops as possible. When the bunkers were quickly overwhelmed or outflanked by Allied attacks, the commanders could honestly report to Berlin that the bunkers had succumbed to the enemy in combat and had not been abandoned. The West-Stellung was the site of the last great defensive battles of the war in the West in February and March 1945. By the end of March, the West-Stellung had been comprehensively breached by the Allies along its length as the Wehrmacht was routed in a great Götterdämmerung.

Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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N

Front line, February 9, 1945 Westwall

IJsselmeer

West-Stellung

1

Amsterdam

Arnhem

Nijmegen

Rh

Wesel

21 Br

Brussels

BELGIUM Namur

er

First US XXXXX

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B

11

B

14

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17

16

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sell

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Mainz

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22

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1

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23

use

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25

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Mannheim

26

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31

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Karlsruhe

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B X XX XX G

Stuttgart Strasbourg

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34

Nec

se lle

35

37

36

FRANCE

XXXX

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38

19

39

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LUXEMBOURG

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19

5 Pz X XXX 7

5

XXXX

12 West-Stellung US 1. Ljessel ES 2. Löwe ENN 3. Westfalen ARD 4. Panther Semois 5. Brabant 6. Maas XXXX 7. Niers-Rur Third 8. Maas-Rur US 9. Erft 10. Autobahn 11. Rur (Schlieffen) 12. C 13. Artillerie-Schutz 14. Alf-Ahr 15. Prüm 29 16. Kyll 17. Wittlich 18. Sieg 19. Rhein-Main-Odenwald 20. Wetterau-Taube 21. Vogelsberg-Sinn-Main 22. Olemens 23. Benno 24. Westmark 25. Albe 26. Neckar-Enz 27. Hilgenbach 28. Saar-Höhen 29. Metz 30. Maginot 31. Nied 32. Delmar-Höhen 33. Brumain 34. Vor-Vogesen 35. Vogesen 36. Schwarzwald Randstellung 37. Schwarzwald Kammstellung 38. Donau-Neckar Westwall 39. Riegel A. Scharnhorst 40. Kolmar B. Schill 41. Mühlhausen C. Orschloz-Reigel 42. Altkirch D. Spichern 43. Larg E. Fishbach 44. Belfort F. Ettlinger-Riegel

Sieg

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13

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15 X XXX 5 Pz

18 12

A

21 XXXXX 12

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GERMANY

10 Cologne

XX th Nin Aachen

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r

15

9

d

Meu

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Ro

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Dortmund

Düsseldorf

Maastricht Secon X X Ninth US

50km

Münster

DT

Second Br

0

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8

XXXX

R

H XX XXX B

Duisburg

s aa

na l

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t

Meu se Ca

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R

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1

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ine

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Antwerp Albert Ca n

NO

l

XXXX

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sel

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Festung Artillerie

2

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North Sea

Freiburg

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Neuenberg

42 44

43

Rhine

Basel

SWITZERLAND

235

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MAP 108: OPERATION VERITABLE FEBRUARY 8, 1945 Montgomery’s 21st Army Group began to close on the Rhine starting with Operation Veritable. This mission was assigned to LieutenantGeneral Henry Crerar’s First Canadian Army consisting of Simond’s II Canadian Corps and Horrocks’ British XXX Corps. The attack was launched from the east side of the Maas (Meuse) River toward the Reichswald. The terrain was forested in the center, but the northern flank consisted of flooded Düffel-Kellener marshlands along the Rhine. The Wehrmacht had breached some of the dikes in this sector, flooding the area. The campaign’s objective was to reach the open dry ground opposite the city of Wesel, which was intended as the start point for the 21st Army Group’s main Rhine offensive. Facing the First Canadian Army was General Alfred Schlemm’s 1.Fallshirmjäger-Armee with the 84.Infanterie-Division holding the forward defense zone in the forested Reichswald. This area was part of the West-Stellung defense zone with a forward outpost line running from the Maas River to the edge of the Düffel-Kellener flood plain near Kranenburg, followed by the main defense line based on old Westwall bunkers running through the Reichswald. The newly arrived 15.Armee commander, General Blaskowitz, had been demoted from command of Heeresgruppe G. He felt that the main Allied blow would come farther south and he forbade Schlemm from reinforcing this sector. Operation Veritable kicked off with bombing attacks on the towns of Kleve and Goch, followed by artillery barrages on the morning of February 8. II Canadian Corps made steady progress in spite of the muddy conditions along the front. The emphasis was placed on key roads through the sector owing to the waterlogged conditions. In the XXX Corps sector, specialized armor, including Churchill Crocodile flamethrower tanks, were provided by the 79th Armoured Division to assist in attacking the Westwall bunkers located in the Reichswald. That evening, the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division mounted up on Buffalo amphibious tractors to cross the Düffel-Kellener flood plain. After dark, the waterborne force conducted amphibious assaults against several isolated villages, made islands by the flooding. By February 9, Operation Veritable was not only facing growing German reinforcements, but also a precarious logistical situation as the main roads from Nijmegen to the front were becoming inundated both by breached dikes and by unusually heavy rainfall. The 15th Scottish Division closed in on Kleve by February 10, but they were slowed by 236

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the devastation in the town caused by the bombing attack as well as troops of the newly arrived 6.Fallschirmjäger-Division. By February 11, the amphibious 3rd Canadian Infantry began to approach the town from the north along the Spoy Canal while the German forces to the south were tied down by the 43rd Wessex Division. The town was captured later in the day by the 15th Scottish Division. With the XXX Corps still heavily engaged in the Reichswald, the 43rd Wessex Division was instructed to turn south toward the town of Goch on February 13. After a series of sharp encounters with German battle groups, the division took advantage of Ram Kangaroo armoured infantry transporters and launched the 5th Duke of Cornwall Light Infantry on a mechanized charge toward the northern outskirts of Goch. This charge overwhelmed the German defenses and advanced about 6,000 yards. It was followed by a night advance by the 4th Somerset Light Infantry, putting the division on the Goch escarpment overlooking the town. This breakthrough was accompanied by good progress in the XXX Corps sector with 51st Highland, 52nd Lowland and 53rd Welsh divisions making free of the forest and enveloping Goch from the west. A reorganization of the First Canadian Army led to a transfer of the 15th Scottish Division to this sector, and they were assigned to the final capture of Goch along with the 51st Highland Division. This took several days of intense fighting, with Goch finally falling on February 22. While the fighting for Goch was taking place, the 2nd and 3rd Canadian Infantry divisions had pushed out of Kleve down the main road, aiming for Kalkar. By this stage, significant German reinforcements had arrived including Kampfgruppen of the PanzerLehr-Division and the 116.Panzer Division. Their counterattack caused heavy losses to the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division, but Canadian armoured reinforcements stabilized the situation. By the third week of February, the First Canadian Army had pushed out of the Reichswald, but had not reached its objectives. This was in no small measure due to the muddy quagmire and the German determination to prevent a breakthrough in this sector. In two weeks of fighting, the Anglo-Canadian force had suffered about 8,500 casualties with losses falling most heavily on the British battalions. However, German losses had been far more severe, with 11,000 captured and a further 12,000 dead and wounded. On February 20, Montgomery laid out plans for a follow-on assault, Operation Blockbuster.

Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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3 Can

Advance Defensive Line

XX

Siegfried Defensive Line

Zyfflich

Spry (water borne)

Niel

0

1 mile

0 Mehr XX

1km

Mehrdamshof

Wyler

2 Can Matthews

Kleyen

Rindern

X

227

XX

15 X

15 Scot

227

Kranenburg

Barber

15

Kleve

Nütterden

X

46

X

15

XX

43 Wessex

X

Groesbeek

44

XX

15

71

53

Ross

Brandenberg

51 Highland

6

152

Plocher

53

51

XX

158

84

Bedburg

53

GERMANY

Fiebig

XXX Br

Hau

51

Waldenburg

X

160

X

XXX

154

51

XX

116

Geldenberg

X

153

43

Materborn

X

X

Rennie

160

43 Qualburg

214

XX

X

XX

129 X

Stoppelberg

Frasselt

3

X

Thomas

Wolfsberg

X

53 Welsh

46

REICHSWALD

53

X

71

53 X

First Can

158

XXXX

XX

Crerar

15

NETHERLANDS Maa

Kleve Forest

53

Maucke

X

Hekkens

154

51 Asperberg

s Niers

Nie

N

rs

X

Kessel

152

51 to Goch

237

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MAP 109: OPERATION BLOCKBUSTER FEBRUARY 1945 After two weeks of fighting on the approaches to the Rhine, Montgomery realized that the ambitious goals of Operation Veritable would not be met. Operation Grenade, a supporting attack by the Ninth US Army farther south, was supposed to start shortly after the initial Veritable attack. However, on February 10, the Germans breached the Schwammenauel and Urft dams, flooding the battlefield and delaying the start of Operation Grenade until February 23. Under the circumstances, Montgomery realized that Schlemm’s 1.FallshirmArmee had suffered grievous casualties in the two weeks of fighting and that a combined attack by the First Canadian Army and the Ninth US Army would have greater prospects of success in reaching the Rhine near Wesel. The mission for the follow-on operation, codenamed Blockbuster, was to push the First Canadian Army through the Hochwald Gap and on to the Rhine city of Xanten. Both the 4th Canadian Armoured Division and British 11th Armoured Division were committed to the operation. Opposing the Canadian attack were the 6.FallschirmjägerDivision, Kampfgruppe von Waldenburg of the 116.Panzer-Division, and Kampfgruppe Hauser of the Panzer-Lehr-Division. As in the case of Operation Veritable, II Canadian Corps formed the left (northern) flank of Blockbuster while the British XXX Corps formed the right (southern) flank. However, the brunt of the Blockbuster fighting would fall on the Canadian divisions. Blockbuster started on February 26 in the freezing rain. Canadian casualties on the first day of the attack were the heaviest suffered on a single day in the Northwest Europe campaign, but progress at first was good. As II Canadian Corps ground through the German defenses towards the Hochwald, on the night of February 26/27, Simonds alerted both the British 11th Armoured Division and 4th Canadian Armoured Division to be ready for commitment. The fighting reached the eastern side of the forested Hochwald with the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division north of the Hochwald Gap, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division in the center, and the 3rd Canadian Infantry Division to the south opposite the Balbergerwald. The forest edge had been heavily fortified and it was stoutly defended. Although 1.FallshirmArmee was very weak in infantry, it had maintained an extremely large artillery force. In addition, it could count on a substantial number of Flak batteries deployed in the area for urban and industrial defense, and 238

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employed in a ground role. As a result, relatively small numbers of German infantry could hold down the Canadian advances by bringing to bear substantial artillery barrages. It took nearly five days of fighting to push through the Hochwald, with II Canadian Corps finally emerging from the woods on March 2. Farther south and disconnected from the Hochwald fighting, the 53rd Welsh Division of XXX Corps met up with US troops of the Ninth US Army, making the first link-up of operations Blockbuster and Grenade. The American campaign had progressed much more quickly against less effective resistance. By March 5, Schlemm’s 1.Fallshirm-Armee had been forced back to a pocket along the Rhine River with Xanten at the northern edge of the pocket. Against orders, on March 6, Schlemm began evacuating noncombatant troops and administrative personnel to the eastern side of the Rhine, along with most of the hospital staff and wounded. The attack on Xanten began on the morning of March 6, and the city fell to Canadian troops on March 8. While the Canadians were attacking the northern side of the Wesel bridgehead, the Ninth US Army was grinding down the perimeter from the southwest. Schlemm had repeatedly recommended that the remaining forces of 1.FallshirmArmee be withdrawn over the Rhine since the pocket had become so shrunken that all sectors were within range of Allied artillery. On March 7, the OKW headquarters in Berlin dispatched a staff officer to examine the situation in the Rhine Pocket opposite Wesel. The situation was obviously hopeless, and on March 9, Berlin eventually gave permission for a final withdrawal over the Rhine. This was undertaken using the two surviving bridges. Schlemm personally witnessed the demolition of the two remaining Rhine bridges at 0700hrs on the morning of March 10, and a small rearguard was ferried over the river. The Rhineland Campaign had been very costly for both sides. British and Canadian casualties in Veritable–Blockbuster had been about 15,500; German casualties had been about 22,000, with an equal number taken as prisoners. In conjunction with the 45,000 casualties during the fighting, with the Ninth US Army in Operation Grenade, total German casualties in the Rhineland Campaign had topped 90,000. The intensity of the German defense of the Rhine in February and March 1945 was the main reason that Montgomery planned such an elaborate Rhine crossing operation against Wesel later in the month.

Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 239

Kleve

XXX

Qualburg

II Can Simonds XX

N

Hasselt

Bedburg XX

15 Scot

Hau

Barber

Moyland Woods

Wissel

116 Waldenburg

XX

Moyland

Feb 14–16 XXX

XXX Br Horrocks

REICHSWALD

Thomas

XX

6

XX

Kl e v e F o re s t

Rhine

43 Wessex

2 Can Matthews

Plocher Kalkarberg

Feb 18–24

Kalkarberg XX

2 Can Matthews

Asperberg

XX

n Ca II XX r X XB XX

3 Can

XX

Spry

Battle Group XX Hauser 2 Can Matthews

4 Can

XX

116 Waldenburg

Appeldorn

Kehrum

XX

Marienbaum

XX

Vokes

43 Wessex Thomas

Keppeln

HOCHWALD

Goch

XX

2 Can Matthews

XX

116

Uedem

Lüttingen

Waldenburg

Xanten

XX

11 Roberts

4 Can

XX

8

XX

XX

6 Plocher

Vokes

Wadehn

BALBERGERWALD 0 0

1 mile 1km

Weeze

Kervenheim

3 Can

XX

XX

180 Spry

Klosterkämpen

239

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MAP 110: OPERATION GRENADE – FEBRUARY 23 TO MARCH 10, 1945 In February 1945, Eisenhower agreed to loan Lieutenant-General William Simpson’s Ninth US Army to Montgomery’s 21st Army Group to assist in the campaign to push to the Rhine in preparation for an eventual river crossing operation. The initial phase comprised the crossing of the Roer River, a significant challenge owing to the unusually wet conditions in early February as well as with the threat posed by the Roer Dams to the south. The Schwammenauel Reservoir and associated dams were located south near Schmidt in the Hürtgen Forest. Bradley had come to realize the threat the dams posed since any US field army crossing the Roer could be trapped if the Germans opened up the dams and flooded the Roer downstream. The First US Army had been fighting since the autumn to reach the dams, including the notorious Hürtgen Forest campaign. Operation Grenade was scheduled to start on February 10 in conjunction with Operation Veritable to the north, but before this occurred, the Germans opened up the discharge valves on the dams, flooding the Roer Plains and preventing the launch of the attack. It took nearly two weeks for the water to subside sufficiently to start Operation Grenade. Owing to the swollen state of the river, the crossing was accomplished using assault boats supported by DUKW amphibious trucks, LVT amtracs, and ferries. Operation Grenade started in the predawn hours of February 23. German resistance to the landing was spotty, with artillery being the main threat. Several of the cities along the Roer, notably the fortified city of Jülich and the major city of Düren, proved troublesome. Nevertheless, by the end of the first day, six divisions had gained solid bridgeheads over the river and the 84th Division had pushed inland as far as Baal. Facing the Ninth US Army was the 15.Armee with elements of the 5.Panzer-Armee recuperating farther east. Operation Veritable had drained Heeresgruppe B of most of its meager reserves, and the German response to Operation Grenade was surprisingly weak. The Germans did not completely understand its operational intent, and believed that the main focus would be eastward toward Cologne, when in fact it had a more northerly focus to assist the 21st Army Group in securing the Rhine landing sites near Wesel. As a result, reinforcements tended to be directed against XIII and XIX Corps in the south, including both the 9. and the 11.Panzer divisions. By February 26, OB West commander von Rundstedt began to appreciate the northern orientation of the American thrust and 240

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asked permission from Berlin to withdraw elements of the 1. Fallshirm-Armee that were likely to become trapped in a pocket near Roermond. Although this was belatedly granted, no other withdrawals were permitted. By this time, the American momentum had begun to increase. The southern wing of the Ninth US Army as well as the neighboring VII Corps of the First US Army made a surge forward to the Erft Canal and River. Simpson began committing his armored divisions for the exploitation phase on February 27 with 2nd Armored Division sent toward the Rhine at Neuss into the western suburbs of Düsseldorf. With the 15.Armee on the verge of being routed, German forces in the sector were switched to the command of von Manteuffel’s 5.Panzer-Armee. Von Manteuffel hoped to commit some of his battered Panzer divisions to the fray, but a plan to use Panzer-Lehr-Division to defend the city of München-Gladbach was stillborn when the Ninth US Army captured the city. Simpson and his corps commanders began discussing the possibility of seizing a Rhine bridge. Although they knew full well that the Germans were likely to blow any bridge before the arrival of American troops, there was a feeling that any such thrust might lead to premature bridge demolitions that would trap pockets of German troops on the western bank of the Rhine. So for example, the 83rd Division was tasked with capturing one of four bridges near Neuss and Oberkassel on the northern side of Düsseldorf. None of these bridge attempts succeeded, but they did assist in the destruction of several German units on the western banks of the Rhine. The progress of the Ninth US Army on the northern flank as well as the difficulties facing the Canadians led to a meeting between Montgomery and Simpson on March 1, with Simpson offering to push as far north as Xanten. Montgomery agreed to shift the field army boundaries to Rheinberg, but he left Xanten as a Canadian objective for the Blockbuster attack. Simpson also proposed a hasty Rhine crossing between Uerdingen and Düsseldorf, but Montgomery refused. The Ninth US Army staff was bitterly disappointed with the refusal. By the beginning of March, Operation Grenade had achieved its objectives. Nevertheless, the slow pace of Operation Blockbuster to the north led to the commitment of the Ninth US Army to help reduce the Wesel Pocket through March 10.

Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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N

XX

XX

Front line, night, February 22

6

15

Initial penetration, night, February 23 Front line, night, February 26

XX XX

XX

XX

51

52

116 XX

53

Ma

Front line, March 1

15

XX

Front line, 21 Army Group March 5

84

Xanten

XX

as

8 XX

German front line, night, March 11

Wesel

XXX

II C X an XX XX XB r

Feb 26

7

Rhine

Crossing sites

II

0

10 miles

0

XX

180

Rheinburg

Mar 5

Fi rs Se XX t Ca co XX n nd Br

XX

35

Geldern XX

Hamborn

ar

1

5

M

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NETHERLANDS

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XX

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XX

84

XX

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XX

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183VG

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Neuss

29 XX

XX

Rheydt

176

XX

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83

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Solingen

338

338

XX

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XX

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XX

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XX

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XX

XX

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XX

XX

8

XX

Feb 26

353

Stockheim 15 XXXX 5 Pz

5 Pz XXXX 15

XX

353 Feb 26

Bonn

Euskirchen

241

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MAP 111: CLOSING ON THE RHINE FEBRUARY 8 TO MARCH 10, 1945 Eisenhower’s plans in February 1945 saw little potential for a Rhine crossing in the sector of the First US Army east of the Ardennes, and instead focused on possibilities in Patton’s Third US Army sector near Mainz–Mannheim with an eventual objective of Frankfurt. The main objective of the first phase of the Rhine operation was to destroy as much of the Wehrmacht as possible on the west bank of the Rhine, exploiting Hitler’s tendency to issue “no retreat” orders. In the wake of the completion of operations Veritable, Blockbuster, and Grenade in February and early March by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, Bradley’s 12th Army Group received Eisenhower’s permission to launch the First US Army advance on the Rhine. Operation Lumberjack began on March 1 with an aim to clear the west bank of the Rhine from the Cologne area south, linking up with Patton’s Third Army on the Ahr River near Koblenz. Eisenhower supported Patton’s drive with Operation Undertone, an attack by Devers’ 6th Army Group north through the Wissembourg Gap from Alsace along the Rhine, greatly weakening the German opposition in the Saar-Palatinate that faced Patton. The spearhead for First US Army, Collins’ VII Corps, began its attack across the Erft River on March 1, and proceeded on schedule against ineffective resistance. A cavalry reconnaissance patrol reached the Rhine north of Cologne on March 3, and the main assault into Cologne began on March 5, led by the tanks of the 3rd Armored Division and followed closely by the infantry of the 104th Division. Millikin’s III Corps exited the gloom and the mud of the Eifel Forest, out into the Cologne Plains. The Germans expected Millikin to head for Bonn, but instead the corps began barreling down the undefended Rheinbach Valley heading toward Remagen. The early March fighting made it clear that the Wehrmacht had suffered lethal blows in the Ardennes fighting. The Allied campaign to reach the Rhine in February and March 1945 cost the Wehrmacht about 400,000 casualties, including 280,000 prisoners. Besides these tangible losses, there was a palpable collapse in German morale and discipline as more and more officers and soldiers reached the conclusion that defeat was imminent. Luck strikes when opportunity meets preparation, and First US Army showed itself ready on March 7, when an artillery spotter plane noticed that the Germans had not demolished the Ludendorff railroad 242

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bridge at Remagen. A task force from the 9th Armored Division raced to the bridge and was moving across when the Germans set off the demolition charges. The charges weakened the bridge but failed to drop it into the Rhine. The US Army had unexpectedly captured a major bridge over the Rhine, weeks before Montgomery’s planned Rhine crossing, Operation Plunder. The Remagen windfall prompted Bradley to dust off a plan he had conceived the previous autumn to exploit Patton’s progress in Lorraine. Dubbed Operation Voyage, the scheme would encircle the Ruhr industrial zone with a northern pincer of Simpson’s Ninth US Army, supported by a major advance by both First and Third US armies along the southern side. While Eisenhower would not immediately commit to Operation Voyage, Bradley’s proposal convinced him to back away from an unlimited commitment to Montgomery’s offensive. When Montgomery again pressed him with the extravagant demand for another ten US divisions for the already bloated Operation Plunder, Eisenhower cleverly conceded the point but on the condition that Bradley’s 12th Army Group be given back control of all the Ninth and First US Army units scheduled to participate in Plunder. With his bluff called, Montgomery backed off, preferring to have only the Ninth US Army under his control than to have double the US reinforcements but all under Bradley’s command. In the early hours of March 13, two of Patton’s corps began their lightning advance into the Saar-Palatinate. The campaign in the two middle weeks of March was dubbed the “Rhine Rat Race” by the GIs of the Third US Army, after the German units in the area collapsed and began racing back to the Rhine. The German main line of resistance from Trier to Koblenz was pushed all the way back to a line from Mannheim to Mainz on the Rhine, and most of the German 7.Armee was destroyed in the process. Third US Army estimated that the opposing German forces had lost 113,000 men in two weeks of fighting, including 68,000 prisoners, compared to US casualties of only 5,220. During Operation Undertone, Seventh US Army and attached French units captured 22,000 Germans and estimated that the opposing German formations had lost 75–80 percent of their infantry. These operations concluded the opening phase of the Rhine Campaign, having inflicted massive casualties on the Wehrmacht and positioned Allied forces all along the Rhine.

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Battles for the Roer and Rhine, February–March 1945

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CHAPTER 6

ENDGAME AGAINST THE THIRD REICH, APRIL–MAY 1945

Russian and North American troops greet one another on April 27, 1945 at Torgau in Germany on a destroyed train bridge above the Elbe River. General F. E. Reinhardt, commander of the US 69th Infantry Division shakes hands with a Soviet general from the Russian guard. (Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images) 245

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MAP 112: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE WEST – MARCH 1945 By the third week of March 1945, the Allied armies were lined up along the Rhine for a planned attack over Germany’s last substantial geographic barrier. Eisenhower’s SHAEF controlled three army groups: Montgomery’s British/Canadian 21st Army Group in the north, Bradley’s US 12th Army Group in the center, and Devers’ US/French 6th Army Group in the south. Allied strength totalled two British/ Canadian field armies, four American field armies, and one French field army, comprising 89 divisions, including 25 armored divisions and 64 infantry and airborne. The British Army in Northwest Europe shrank from the time of the Normandy landings to the final campaigns of 1945 on account of manpower shortages and overseas commitments in Italy, the Middle East, and the Burma–India theater. In 1945, it totaled four armoured divisions, seven infantry divisions and two airborne divisions. Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was filled out by other formations, with Canada providing two armoured divisions and three infantry divisions; one Polish armoured division also served with the Canadians. By the end of March 1945, the US Army in the ETO included 15 armored divisions, 42 infantry divisions and four airborne divisions. The French 1re Armée was raised and equipped by the US Army and unit organization generally followed the US pattern. There were six infantry and three armored divisions committed to the campaign in Germany. The Wehrmacht in the West had fallen from 73 divisions in January 1945 to 58 divisions at the end of March, owing to the heavy losses suffered in the fighting on the western side of the Rhine in the first three months of the year. This included five Panzer divisions, three Panzergrenadier divisions and 48 infantry divisions. Aside from their drop in numbers, the quality of the remaining divisions had declined badly. For example, total operational German tank and assault gun strength in the West on March 15, 1945 was only 193 armored fighting vehicles, falling to 178 on April 10. In comparison, there were about 16,500 Allied tanks and tank destroyers in service by the end of March. On March 10, von Rundstedt had been relieved yet again from command of OB West, and replaced by Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, a Luftwaffe commander formerly in charge of German forces in Italy. The OB West controlled three army groups: Blaskowitz’s Heeresgruppe H in northern Germany and the Netherlands facing Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, Model’s Heeresgruppe B in central 246

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Germany facing the First US Army, and Hausser’s Heeresgruppe G in southern Germany facing the Third US Army and 6th Army Group; in total, there were seven field armies. The German strategic predicament was that it was fighting a war on several fronts, and not only had to deal with the western Allies on the Western Front and Italian Front, but also the Red Army in the East, which was only a short distance from Berlin on the Oder River by this time. Allied planning since 1944 had largely presumed that the endgame against Germany would have focused on the Ruhr industrial area, with Montgomery’s 21st Army Group conducting the main Rhine River crossing: Operation Plunder, north of the Ruhr. There would be a secondary thrust over the Ruhr, either by First or Third US Army at some point south of the Ruhr. Operation Plunder would involve the two British–Canadian field armies, and Eisenhower left the Ninth US Army under Montgomery’s 21st Army Group for the duration of the mission. The dynamics of the Rhine crossing campaign shifted significantly in March 1945 with the capture of the Remagen Bridge in the First US Army sector. Its capture had given Eisenhower new confidence in his operational approach of a broad-front campaign to dilute the strength of the Wehrmacht. As a result, he no longer depended on a single thrust by Montgomery as the basis for future actions in Germany, but took a more opportunistic approach. All of the army groups would conduct Rhine crossing operations, and the future course of operations into Germany would depend on their outcomes. On March 15, Eisenhower approved Bradley’s plan for Operation Voyage, a companion operation following Montgomery’s Operation Plunder. This would thrust First US Army along the southern periphery of the Ruhr industrial zone while Patton’s Third US Army enveloped the Saar industrial zone and covered the First US Army southern flank. Devers’ 6th Army Group began to clamor for a more prominent role in the final advance into Germany, and became a major proponent of the “National Redoubt” threat. This intelligence assessment concluded that the Wehrmacht would gradually retreat into the foothills of the Alps in Bavaria, and after the defeat of the field armies, would conduct a longterm partisan war in the Nazi heartland. As a result, 6th Army Group was given the mission to cross the Rhine into the Black Forest to preempt this threat.

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MAP 113: THE RHINE RAT RACE MARCH 12–21, 1945 As a consequence of the ill-conceived Sylwester Offensives around the New Year of 1945, Heeresgruppe G was in a particularly weakened state by late winter. Priority for reinforcements had tended to go to Heeresgruppe B farther to the north. In addition, this sector was relatively quiet in February 1945, as Patton’s Third US Army returned from its campaign in the Ardennes and re-established its defenses alongside Patch’s Seventh US Army. As part of the preparatory campaigns prior to the Rhine crossing, on February 15, Eisenhower approved Operation Undertone by Devers’ 6th Army Group to push through the southern end of the Westwall and West-Stellung defenses in anticipation of an eventual Rhine crossing. The original scheme placed the emphasis on Simpson’s Seventh US Army, and Eisenhower proposed that Patton’s neighboring Third US Army shed a corps to Simpson to assist in Undertone. This plan meant that Patton’s Third US Army would remain on the defensive indefinitely, a situation that prompted the ever-aggressive Patton to come up with his own plan. He suggested to Bradley that the Westwall defenses in the Saar could be outflanked if his Third US Army bounced the Moselle and Saar rivers and raced for the Rhine in conjunction with Devers’ Operation Undertone, effectively cutting off Heeresgruppe G from the rear. Although some senior US commanders dismissed the promised offensive as Patton’s usual bravado, Bradley saw the merit of the plan and pushed for it hard with Eisenhower. As a result, Eisenhower, with Devers’ concurrence, changed the plans to extend the original Undertone to include Patton’s northern thrust. The timing of the offensive was conditional on Montgomery’s 21st Army Group reaching the Rhine. Eisenhower, in spite of his disagreements with Montgomery, still felt that the focus of the Allied advance should be in the north around the Ruhr industrial belt. Far less emphasis was given to the formations that Eisenhower dubbed the “Southern Group of Armies.” Given the configuration of the Allied forces in the late winter, it might have been expected that Patton’s Third US Army would have been transferred from Bradley’s bloated 12th Army Group to Devers’ 6th Army Group. Third US Army fought alongside Seventh US Army for the remainder of the war. The reasons were more personal than professional. Eisenhower bore a grudge against Devers in the wake of several 248

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controversies during the war. He tended to favor Bradley and to disparage Devers, in spite of the significant accomplishments of the 6th Army Group. Early on March 13, two of Patton’s corps began their preliminary bombardment. Although German resistance was stubborn on the first day of the Third US Army offensive, within a couple of days, both of Patton’s corps were advancing over the Moselle against crumbling resistance. After the 90th Division and 5th Infantry Division had advanced 6 miles beyond the Moselle on March 15, Patton pushed the 4th Armored Division through them to exploit a yawning gap developing in the German line. Supported by intensive air operations by Weyland’s XIX Tactical Air Command, one of the 4th Armored Division combat commands raced 16 miles in five hours, and the roving US fighter-bombers kept the Germans from moving reinforcements into the sector. Patton repeated the performance the following day, passing the 10th Armored Division through the 80th and 94th divisions to exploit the German predicament. The attack was building up so much momentum that Eisenhower agreed to give Patton another armored division, the 12th, from the neighboring Seventh US Army, to bolster the attack. The 4th Armored Division raced 48 miles in two days, reaching the banks of the Rhine near Worms, presaging the total collapse of German defense in the Saar-Palatinate triangle in a short one-week campaign. The lightning advance into the SaarPalatinate was dubbed the “Rhine Rat Race” by the GIs of the Third US Army after the German units in the area collapsed and began racing back to the Rhine. The German main line of resistance from Trier to Koblenz was pushed all the way back to a line from Mannheim to Mainz on the Rhine, and most of the German 7.Armee was destroyed in the process. Patton estimated that the opposing German forces had lost 113,000 men in two weeks of fighting, including 68,000 prisoners, compared to US casualties of only 5,220. Progress in the Seventh US Army sector was significantly slower owing to the need to deal with the fortified Westwall defenses. Nevertheless, a solid breakthrough was made into the 19.Armee defenses. Seventh US Army and attached French units captured 22,000 Germans and estimated that the opposing German formations had lost 75–80 percent of their infantry.

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MAP 114: THE RHINE CROSSINGS IN THE SOUTH – MARCH 22–28, 1945 The destruction of 19.Armee in January 1945 and 7.Armee in March 1945 left southern Germany completely exposed to the advance of Patton’s Third Army and Patch’s Seventh Army. So it is little surprise that the deepest and fastest Allied advances in April and May that year were in southern Germany. The German dispositions shown on this map are somewhat deceptive, since the German divisions indicated were in a perilous state and significantly understrength. By March 21, Patton’s Third US Army was on the brink of reaching the Rhine. Patton craved a Rhine crossing of his own, all the better if accomplished before Montgomery or Patch’s Seventh US Army on his right flank. He planned to leap the Rhine on the run without major preparation, and he received permission from Bradley. Two crossing sites were the most likely options. The better of the two was south of Mainz since sites closer to the city involved the crossing of both the Rhine and Main rivers. The Germans recognized this, and their defenses around Mainz were better prepared. As a result, Patton opted for surprise, and planned the crossing near Oppenheim with a feint at Mainz. On March 22, engineer equipment boats were moved forward to carry the 11th Infantry Regiment of the 5th Division across that night near Nierstein. German defenses along the Rhine in this sector were meager, as the German 7.Armee was still retreating over the Rhine after their rout in the Saar-Palatinate. The 11th Infantry set off across the Rhine around 2200hrs, encountering modest German resistance that was quickly overwhelmed. By dawn on March 23, the 5th Infantry Division had two of its regiments across, followed by a third in the morning and a regiment from the 90th Division in the evening. The original engineer contingent swelled with DUKW amphibious truck units, Navy LCVPs, and a ferry for tanks. A 40-ton Treadway bridge was erected by afternoon. The 7.Armee attempted to counterattack, but could scrape up only an improvised battle group from the officer candidate school at Wiesbaden, which was brushed off. Patton telephoned Bradley to inform him: “Brad, we’re across!” A muffled voice on the other end of the line exclaimed: “Across what, George?” Patton replied: “The Rhine … and you can tell the world Third Army made it before Monty.” To needle Montgomery, Patton 250

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announced the success of the crossing the day before Montgomery’s planned Operation Plunder, boasting that his Third US Army could cross the Rhine even without artillery preparation, never mind a fullblown airborne assault. Later in the day, Patton traversed the Rhine Bridge, and, in his usual theatrical fashion, he faked a stumble, ending up with both hands full of dirt. “Thus William the Conqueror!” he exclaimed, recalling William’s remark nine centuries before: “See! I have taken England with both hands!” By the end of the month, Third US Army had taken Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. One of the more important consequences was the exploitation of the breakthrough by its armored units. The 4th Armored Division circled around Frankfurt before heading north. This was part of Bradley’s aim to use Patton’s Third US Army to shield the advance of the First US Army out of the Remagen bridgehead. The 6th Army Group had been the first Allied force to reach the Rhine near Rastatt in November 1944. Seventh US Army was convinced it could take and hold a bridgehead over the Rhine at the time, but permission was categorically denied by Eisenhower in one of his more controversial decisions of the war. Patch’s Seventh US Army, instead of jumping the Rhine at Rastatt as planned in November 1944, finally crossed the Rhine near Worms on March 26 to the south of Patton’s troops. To accelerate a breakthrough in this sector, plans were under way to conduct an airborne operation in front of the Seventh US Army near Mainz using the fresh 13th Airborne Division, a revival of the Choker concept. In the event, progress in this sector was so speedy that Choker II was called off on April 4. The French 1re Armée established its Rhine bridgehead and then set about the task of clearing the Black Forest. Lacking sufficient engineer assault equipment, IIe Corps avoided the heavily fortified bridgehead defenses around Karlsruhe and crossed the Rhine instead between Mannheim and Karlsruhe starting on March 30. The defensive belt shielding Karlsruhe was avoided and the city attacked from the north; its Volkssturm garrison was routed on April 4. The objective of this advance was to strike farther to the southeast toward Stuttgart, and to clear the right bank of the Rhine as far south as the Swiss border.

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MAP 115: OPERATION PLUNDER MARCH 23–24, 1945 The plans for Operation Plunder were released on March 9, 1945. The operation was to be staged primarily by two divisions of the British Second Army along a stretch of the Rhine from Rees to Wesel. Owing to the width of the river at these points, the initial assault crossing was to be conducted using Buffalos (the British name for American LVT amphibious tractors), as well as assault boats and other craft. There was also a separate operation by the 1 Commando Brigade against Wesel. In addition, there was an associated airborne operation, Operation Varsity, conducted by the US 17th Airborne Division in the center of the battle zone intended to disrupt the forward defenses and communication lines. Much to the irritation of the attached Ninth US Army, there was no role assigned to their formations in the original plan. Under pressure from Simpson, Operation Flashpoint was added farther to the south. Operation Plunder began with intense bombing attacks on the major towns and cities along this sector of the Rhine. Before midnight, the amphibious crossing operation began. On the left flank, Operation Turnscrew was the assault by the 51st Highland Division against Rees. The 153rd and 154th brigades each sent two battalions across the river, reinforcing them with additional troops once the Buffalos returned. The remainder of the division crossed the river by morning, with the division pushing inland against light resistance. In the center, Operation Torchlight was conducted by the 15th Scottish Division. Artillery preparation concentrated on counterbattery fire on the presumption that German artillery would be the main threat in the opening phases of the engagement. As in the case of the 51st Division, the initial amphibious operation involved two brigades with additional units being fed over the river as Buffalos returned from their initial deliveries. The landings in the Xanten sector had mixed results, with some units landing in the wrong sector because of the dark and chaotic conditions, and there was some scattered fighting with elements of the 7. Fallschirmjäger-Division that was eventually pushed aside with the support of amphibious Sherman DD tanks. On the right flank, the 1 Commando Brigade launched Operation Widgeon before midnight, crossing to the northwest of Wesel. The town of Wesel had been largely destroyed by a major heavy bomber attack at 2230hrs that had delivered 1,100 tons of high-explosive. The town was defended by elements of 252

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the 180.Infanterie-Division. By midnight, the Commando troops were heavily engaged in clearing Wesel. Operation Varsity, the airborne landings, were conducted in the daylight starting around 1000hrs. These landings are covered in more detail in the following map. The heavy artillery bombardment and artillery preparation in the area northwest of Wesel on the night of March 23 made it clear to the Germans that a major operation was in progress. General Blaskowitz decided to commit his reserve 15.Panzergrenadier-Division against the landings near Rees, while the 7.Fallschirmjäger-Division dealt with the Xanten crossing. The 116.Panzer-Division, still weak after its mauling in the Ardennes, was sent to recapture the Issel bridges from the 6th Airborne Division. By the end of the day, the 15.Panzergrenadier Division managed to slow the exit of the 51st Highland Division out of Rees. The attacks against the Issel bridges failed to recapture any, but one was blown by British forces when the Germans came dangerously close to capturing it. Operation Plunder had provided Montgomery’s 21st Army Group with a solid foothold over the Rhine with four divisions firmly in place. A substantial bridging effort followed to ensure a steady flow of additional divisions into the bridgeheads to begin exploitation efforts out of the bridgehead and farther into Germany. Casualties in the British Second Army up to March 27, 1945 were 3,968 men, but in contrast, some 11,161 prisoners had been captured. Within a few days, the Wesel bridgehead was 35 miles wide and 20 miles deep. German resistance opposite Rees was finally overcome and a major breakout operation by XXX Corps began on March 30. Operation Plunder has come in for some criticism over the years on account of its extravagant use of resources, everything from heavy bomber raids, extensive amphibious support, and the supplementary airborne operation. The contrast with Operation Flashpoint by the Ninth US Army farther south on the river makes this point clearer. However, Plunder was planned earlier in March 1945 amidst the mud and carnage of the Rhineland fighting. Plunder succeeded so quickly not only because of its generous resources, but also because of the declining strength of Heeresgruppe H in this sector, brought about in no small measure by the previous month of fighting.

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XX

Empel

0

15

XX

2 miles

0

6

2km

Mittelburg Speldrop

Kleinesserden

X

XX

152

Groin

8

Haldern Iss

XXX

Esserden

el

II

Rees Alter

Rhine

Rh ine

X

X

154

Niedermörmter

XX

153

Bellinger Meer

7

Haffen

Ringenberg Mehrhoog

US XVIII Airborne Corps Drop Zone (Op Varsity)

Mehrbruch XX

51 Br

X

46

Mehr

Langer Renne

Hamminkeln

XXX

LXXXVI XXX Br

Overkamp

XXX

X

Rh

Vynen

X

Bergerfurth

X

X

Lohr

X

X

ine

X

Jöckern

227

Marienbaum Schüttwick Diersfordt 3 Br

XX XX

84 15 Br

XII Br N

XXX

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Lüttingen X

Bislich Fluren

44

Loh Xanten

Second Br

Wesel

XXXX

1 Cdo Br

X

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MAP 116: OPERATION VARSITY – MARCH 24, 1945 Operation Varsity was the airborne element of the Operation Plunder Rhine crossing. The commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, Lieutenant-General Lewis Brereton, did not want a repeat of the staggered landings of Operation Market, but instead preferred a fast, hard punch, with the main airdrops lasting only four hours instead of several days. Since the troop carrier force had a limited capacity, this meant landing only two divisions, the British 6th and the US 17th Airborne divisions. The USAAF IX Troop Carrier Command provided all the airlift of the 17th Airborne Division as well as the paratroopers of the British 6th Airborne Division, while RAF squadrons towed the British gliders. To speed the drop further, the mission included a few technical innovations, including the first use of double-tow gliders in Northwest Europe, the debut of the larger C-46 Commando transport, and the first glider landings conducted without preliminary paratrooper drops on the glider landing zones to secure them before the arrival of the gliders. Overall control of the operation once on the ground was entrusted to Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps headquarters. The US 17th Airborne Division landed in the southern half of the landing area closer to Wesel, while the British 6th Airborne Division landed farther north. The proximity of First Allied Airborne Army airfields in nearby France and Belgium allowed the largest single airborne assault to date, with 699 transports and 429 gliders carrying the British 6th Airborne Division from the UK and 903 transports and 897 gliders carrying the US 17th Airborne Division from France and Belgium. The mission also included a massive aerial support operation, including fighter sweeps of 1,253 fighters of the US Eighth Air Force and 900 of the RAF Second Tactical Air Force, with a further 213 RAF fighters escorting the transports from the UK and 676 fighters escorting the US airlift from France. Operation Varsity began at 0600hrs on March 24, but, in spite of an ample preinvasion bombardment, the heavy German Flak concentrations in the area accounted for 54 US transports and gliders shot down and 440 damaged. German troops in the area were mainly from the 84. Infanterie-Division, which had been badly beaten up by the British XXX Corps in the February fighting in the Reichswald. 254

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In the US 17th Airborne Division sector, the 507th Parachute Infantry Regiment landed in Drop Zone W, the 513th Parachute Infantry Regiment in Drop Zone X, the 194th Glider Infantry Regiment in Landing Zone S, and the divisional support troops in Landing Zone N. There was some dispersion owing to poor visibility on the ground, caused by smoke pots along the Rhine being used to shield the British amphibious assault, mingling with a pall of smoke from nearby Wesel. All three regiments took their objectives by the end of the day, inflicting significant casualties on the German forces in the area. The drops by the British 6th Airborne Division took place simultaneously with the American drops, starting around 0945hrs. The 3rd Parachute Brigade landed in Drop Zone A, and the 5th Airborne Brigade in Drop Zone B. The divisional HQ landed in Landing Zone P. The 6th Air-Landing Brigade delivered their units by glider, the 2nd Ox and Bucks Light Infantry at Landing Zone O, the 1st Royal Ulster Rifles at Landing Zone U, and the 12th Devonshire Regiment at Landing Zone R. The glider infantry had some of the more challenging missions of the day, assigned to take several bridges over the Issel (IJssel) River. These positions were hit by a German counterattack later in the day, and one bridge was demolished to prevent its recapture by the Germans. The paratroop and glider missions were completed by 1300hrs and were followed by a mission by 240 B-24 bombers dropping a further 582 tons of supplies. Operation Varsity as a whole had involved 17,000 airborne troops delivered into an area of about 25 square miles in four hours. Although Operation Varsity was by far the best organized and best executed of the wartime airborne operations, it was the least ambitious. By this stage of the war, the German Army was in serious decline and the operation was conducted against a German force already decimated in previous fighting. The airborne force was landed so close to Allied lines that the first link-ups occurred within hours of landing. It is by no means clear that such an elaborate operation was actually needed, as similar river-crossing operations were conducted along the US Army fronts farther to the south without the need for airborne missions.

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N

XII XXX XVIII

Drop zone B Mehrhoog

Objective B1

Objective B2 Landing zone P

Drop zone A

Landing zone O

Hamminkeln

Landing zone R

Ringenberg

Brünen

Landing zone U 6 Br XX S 17 U

Bergerfurth

Iss

Landing zone N

Objective A1

el

Drop zone X

Objective F

Landing zone S

Objective E

Schüttwick

Diersfordt XVIII XXX XII

Iss

Drop zone W

Wesel

Objectives Landing zones and drop zones

0 0

200 miles 200km

el C

ana

l

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MAP 117: OPERATION FLASHPOINT MARCH 24, 1945 Operation Flashpoint was the Ninth US Army Rhine crossing located to the south of the British Operation Plunder. The operation was conducted by Major-General John Anderson’s XVI Corps using two experienced infantry divisions, the 30th and 79th, for the initial amphibious landings. These were to be followed by the 35th and 75th Infantry divisions and the 8th Armored Division once the bridgehead was secured. The assault force was backed by the 34th Field Artillery Brigade with 13 battalions of heavy artillery, and the divisional artillery of the two infantry divisions was reinforced. A preliminary air campaign was conducted by the XXIX Tactical Air Command owing to the presence of a significant number of Luftwaffe fighter bases nearby. The German forces on the eastern bank of the Rhine were under the command of General Erich Straube’s LXXXVI.Armee-Korps, consisting principally of the 180.Infanterie-Division and the improvised Hamburg Division. The assault began at 0100hrs on May 24 with a massive artillery preparation by 2,070 cannon, eventually totaling over 130,000 rounds (4,000 tons). The initial predawn landings around 0300hrs were conducted by an infantry battalion from each of the five attacking infantry regiments at the landing sites using stormboats (carrying seven riflemen and a crew of two per boat) and some of the larger but slower assault boats. In the darkness, navigational directions were provided by machine-gun tracer fired overhead. The assault sites were covered by smoke from smoke pots and artillery. Once the stormboats returned, the following waves used the same stormboats, reinforced by larger, and more vulnerable assault boats and LVT amtracs. The US Navy had delivered LCVPs and LCMs for carrying vehicles and other heavy equipment. Armored support came from M4 DD amphibious tanks. There was modest resistance against the first landing waves, but subsequent waves encountered little German fire. Within the first two hours, the villages along the river had been secured and two battalions from each of the regiments were across the Rhine. In the wake of the overwhelming artillery preparation, German defenses in the 79th Division sector were weak and resistance very spotty. Armored support did not arrive until mid-afternoon, but was not really needed. Although the division had fighter-bombers on call for air support, none was requested. By nightfall, the 79th Division had pushed 3 miles inland on a front 3 miles wide with canals covering both 256

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flanks, and had secured the town of Dinslaken. Divisional casualties were under a hundred, and about 700 prisoners were captured. The 30th Division encountered much stronger resistance from the 180.Infanterie-Division. The area had two rail lines running through it, and the road underpasses at several points had been set up as defense points. In addition, Flak installations, common in the Ruhr area, were used against the assault force. They were a particular problem to the engineers along the Rhine River trying to erect bridges. As a quick means to deliver armored support over the river, several rafts were constructed using pontoons and sections of Treadway bridge. In the afternoon, a company of light tanks and two platoons of tank destroyers were ferried over the river, where they joined a battalion of the 120th Infantry to conduct a deep penetration past the second rail line into open farm country. By day’s end, the 30th Division had captured about 1,500 prisoners and had advanced 6 miles from the river’s edge. Total US casualties on March 24 were just under 500 men, with 2,100 German prisoners captured. Both the 30th and 79th divisions had all of their infantry battalions across the river as well as two tank battalions, one tank destroyer battalion, and two light field artillery battalions. Bridging operations were essential to further exploitation out of the bridgehead. In the 79th Division sector, a Treadway bridge was started on the morning of March 24, but, besides being hampered by German artillery fire, the incomplete bridge was damaged when three runaway LCMs careened into it. As a result, this bridge was not completed until March 26. The 30th Division sites were less vulnerable to German artillery fire, and a 25-ton pontoon bridge was completed at 0100hrs on March 25. This was followed by two 1,100ft Treadway bridges. The Germans had anticipated the construction of the bridges, and 43 raids, mostly by single fighter aircraft, were staged againt the bridge sites on the night of March 24/25. The sites were heavily protected by antiaircraft units and none of the bridges was damaged by the Luftwaffe. These night raids against the bridges continued for four nights, and of the 82 attacking aircraft, 22 were shot down. Substantial German resistance did not emerge until March 27, with the arrival of the 116.Panzer-Division. Although Ninth US Army’s 35th Infantry and 8th Armored divisions had been sent across the Rhine, the bridge capacity limited further reinforcements for the time being.

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N

Büderich X

119

Friedrichsfeld XXX

LXXXVI

Spellen XX

30 US

XX

180

Voerde

Wallach X

117

Löhnen

Möllen

Rhine

XXX

XVI US

XX

Mehrum

X

315

XX

X

Dinslaken

120

79 US

X

XX

314

Eversael

Rheinberg

X

Overbruch

313

Hamburg Division

Ninth US

XXXX

XX

Walsum Budberg Aldenrade Orsoy

0 0

2 miles 2km

257

GNM.Atlas of European Front.Layout.v14.indd 257

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MAP 118: BREAKOUT FROM REMAGEN MARCH 25–28, 1945 The spectacular success of Operation Undertone reinforced Eisenhower’s preference for a broad-front strategy in the endgame against Germany, and undermined his commitment to Montgomery’s Operation Plunder as the primary Allied thrust. The collapse of the Wehrmacht in the SaarPalatinate was evidence that the Wehrmacht was in crisis and could not hold such an extended front. On March 19, he gave Bradley the green light for Operation Voyage, the breakout from the Remagen bridgehead. Operation Voyage began a day after Operation Plunder on March 25. The pace of the attack was significantly aided by the configuration of German defenses around the Remagen bridgehead. Both Heeresgruppe B commander Model and 15.Armee commander von Zangen expected a breakout. Model was convinced that it would come at the northern shoulder to permit the First US Army to roll up the Rhine and meet up with the Ninth US Army before pressing an attack against the Ruhr industrial zone. Von Zangen did not think that Bradley would be that cautious, and instead expected that the breakout would originate from the center of the Remagen bridgehead and push to the northeast, encircling the Ruhr. Model had the last word, and Bayerlein’s LIII.Armee-Korps, with the bulk of the Army’s operational Panzers, was positioned to resist an expected northern breakout. The southern bridgehead area, and the real target of American attack, was defended by the weakest of the forces, General Otto Hitzfeld’s LXVII. Armee-Korps, which consisted of beaten-up infantry divisions with little armored support. Operation Voyage started in the predawn hours of March 25, with five infantry and two armored divisions. Not unexpectedly, the toughest fighting took place in the north opposite Collins’ VII Corps, with resistance from both the remnants of the Panzer-Lehr-Division and the elements of the 11.Panzer-Division. Nevertheless, the excellent weather permitted extensive close-air support from the XIX Tactical Air Command, and VII Corps penetrated the German main line of resistance by the early afternoon. Major-General James Van Fleet’s III Corps followed doctrine and led with the infantry, reserving its armor for the second day to start the exploitation phase once the main line of resistance had been overcome. The 9.Panzer-Division was the only source of resistance in the sector, but was so battered that it could impose little delay on the 9th and 99th Infantry divisions, which 258

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advanced more than 5 miles. Gerow’s V Corps pushed the 9th Armored Division and 2nd Infantry Division to the southeast with an aim toward linking up with Patton’s Third US Army near Limburg along the Lahn River, crunching through the weak LXVII.Armee-Korps front with little difficulty. By March 26, it was becoming evident that the German defenses were disintegrating. The 4th Armored Division from Patton’s Third Army had broken out of the Oppenheim bridgehead to the south, had cleared the Main River, and was heading north for the link-up. Collins’ VII Corps was making excellent progress in spite of a limited counterattack by Panzer-Lehr-Division. III Corps passed the 7th Armored Division through its infantry divisions and it set off on a race for the intermediate objective, the town of Giessen, which was intended as the hinge for the northward strike behind the Ruhr industrial region. General Carl Püchler’s LXIV.Armee-Korps had been completely routed and posed little resistance. Höhne’s LXXXIV.Armee-Korps became trapped between the First and Third US armies, and its collapse in the face of the sequential attacks left a gaping hole between Heeresgruppe B and Heeresgruppe G. Von Zangen’s 15.Armee headquarters had lost touch with all three of its corps, and only Bayerlein’s LIII.Armee-Korps had much substance by the end of March 26. Model directly contacted Bayerlein and ordered him to relinquish defense of the Sieg River line to the 5.Panzer-Armee and concentrate instead on a counterattack across the three US corps to Limburg. Bayerlein later called the order “impossible, entirely hopeless, and insane.” By March 28, the progress opposite the Remagen bridgehead had been so impressive that Bradley began refining the movements of Operation Voyage. Hodges’ First US Army was directed to begin the swing northward, with the objective being Paderborn, while Patton’s Third US Army would take the right flank and advance alongside to the northeast, aiming at Kassel. The spearhead of the First Army advance was Collins’ VII Corps, led by the 3rd Armored Division and the 104th Division. On March 29, they raced over 45 miles, ending up south of Paderborn by midnight. Casualties were light and no significant German resistance was encountered. The success of the first phase of Operation Voyage created the conditions for the encirclement of the Ruhr.

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Cologne Biedenkopf

(replacing 8th Inf Div March 28)

Rh

ine

Mar 26

Bonn

Mar 26 r 28 III

X

Hudel

II LI X XX XIV 4 LX ar 2 M

XX

363VG

1

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340VG

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(-)

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XXX

Wetzlar

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hn

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Brauback

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76

N Mo

ll se

e

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Boppard

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XX

89 Front line, midnight Mar 24 Front line, midnight, Mar 28

St Goar

St Goarhausen

Oberwesen

Armored axis of attack

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Mainz

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80

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Mar 26

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(-)

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MAP 119: THE STRATEGIC SITUATION MARCH 28, 1945 The Allied operations along the Rhine in the last week of March 1945 had overcome most of the remaining resources available to Kesselring’s OB West. Hausser’s Heeresgruppe G had been overrun by the combined actions of Patton’s Third US Army and Devers’ 6th Army Group. Model’s Heeresgruppe B, the strongest of the German forces in the West, had been severely battered. The 1.Fallschirm-Armee facing Montgomery’s 21st Army Group had taken heavy losses and was being forced back from the remainder of Heeresgruppe B by the relentless Allied advance. The 5.Panzer-Armee in the center had been the only field army to escape the Allied onslaught, but it had transferred much of its strength to other sectors and was down to only six understrength divisions with a density of only about 24 soldiers per mile. Von Zangen’s 15.Armee originally had 14 divisions with a frontal density of about 130 troops per mile, but after the Remagen breakout, contact had been lost with three of its corps and only Bayerlein’s emaciated LIII.ArmeeKorps had any combat value. Heeresgruppe G still had 1.Armee intact in the Black Forest in southern Germany, but it was irrelevant in the coming debacle in the Ruhr and North German Plains. By this stage of the war, the Wehrmacht no longer had any real options. Its military industries were on the verge of collapse, and it was running out of fuel, equipment, and ammunition. Hitler refused nearly all requests for tactical retreats, no matter how prudent. German commanders had no tactical flexibility, and division after division was lost when withdrawals were denied. Curiously enough, the overall strength of OB West increased from 58 divisions on March 31 to 65 divisions on April 12. But this was sheer fantasy. The Wehrmacht order of battle consisted of hollow divisions gutted by the previous fighting and paper divisions created without any resources. As the military situation became more dire, Hitler had abandoned any rational strategic planning and had fallen back on half-baked ideological panaceas such as the Volkssturm militia. Regional party officials were assigned as Reich Defense Commissars (Reichs Verteidigungs Kommissare) responsible for homeland defense, commanding the Volkssturm in the area behind the front lines. The Alpenfestung (Alpine Fortress) Plan was another product of the Nazi party officials, a German equivalent of the Soviet partisan war. Bavaria had been the birthplace of the Nazi Party, and so it emerged as the 260

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center of a Wagnerian fantasy of a last-ditch stand in the Alpine fastness by diehard Nazi fanatics. From Eisenhower’s perspective, the outcome of the Rhine crossing operations changed the strategic focus of future operations into central Germany. Since D-Day, it was presumed that the focus of the Allied operations beyond the Rhine would be an advance along the northern axis conducted by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, and that Montgomery’s forces would be responsible for the encirclement of the Ruhr. The outcome of the Rhine crossings now suggested otherwise. The success of Operation Voyage south of the Ruhr, and the slow progress of Montgomery’s forces out of the Wesel bridgehead, prompted Eisenhower to reconsider the focus of Allied operations into Germany with a focus in the center using Bradley’s field armies rather than in the north with Montgomery’s. This was further reinforced by Patton’s explosive performance in the Saar-Palatinate and the drive out of the Oppenheim bridgehead. Eisenhower’s broad-front approach was essentially opportunistic; the success of the field armies determined future operations. Bradley had already begun to exploit Operation Voyage by pushing Hodges’ First US Army toward the Lippe River at Paderborn, with Patton’s Third US Army providing flank security to the east. This would conclude the process of cutting off the Ruhr and most of Heeresgruppe B from the south. From the north, Simpson’s Ninth US Army had penetrated as far as Haltern on March 28. Two days later, it began pushing eastward, forming the northern pincer for an encirclement of the Ruhr. On Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945, elements of 2nd Armored Division from Ninth US Army met the spearhead of the 3rd Armored Division from First US Army, encircling the Ruhr Valley. Simpson’s Ninth US Army was returned to Bradley’s command on April 4. One of Eisenhower’s principal aims since D-Day had been to avoid alienating the senior British commanders. The change in operational focus at the end of March 1945 initiated another round of debates. With the backing of US Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Eisenhower considered the matter settled for the time being. This did not end the debates about the role of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group. The next controversy would revolve around whether Berlin would be SHAEF’s final objective.

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Front line, March 23 Front line, March 25

IJsselmeer

Zwolle

Front line, March 28 XXXXX

NETHERLANDS

0

H IJs

Blaskowitz

sel

Rheine

XXXX

25

Zutphen

Blumentritt Arnhem

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Escau t - M

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Landau

AINE

Mar 25

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X

Sarreguemines

Darmstadt

Worms

Seventh US

Saarbrücken

LORR

Aschaffenburg

Mar 22

X XX

Metz

in

Oppenheim

Bad Kreuznach

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X

Hanau

Mar 25

SAAR Verdun

Frankfurt am Main Ma

Mainz

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Third US

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Wiesbaden

ine

XXX

LUXEMBOURG

US UN TA

Boppard

12

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Limburg

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L

E

Marburg

Giessen

Lahn

Mar 25

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S F

Mar 28

Lauterbach

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Rh

A

R

D

Mar 28

Bonn

XXXX

Mar 7

E

Siegen

Sieg

Aachen

N

GERMANY

15

Cologne

Maastricht

BELGIUM

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Model XXXX

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Mar 25

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NO

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AR

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Maas

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AN

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Lek

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RM

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25 miles

Heidelberg

Germarsheim XXXX

Mar 22

Bitche Wissembourg

Heilbronn

1

Karlsruhe

Foertsch

Pforzheim

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MAP 120: ENCIRCLING THE RUHR MARCH–APRIL 1945 The Allied offensives on March 24–25 began to isolate Heeresgruppe B from Heeresgruppe H to the north and Heeresgruppe G to the south. Heeresgruppe B commander Generalfeldmarschall Walter Model, was fully aware that Hitler would not countenance any retreat so he carefully phrased a request to Kesselring’s OB West headquarters asking for a “new mission,” a euphemism which he hoped would provide a pretext for a withdrawal. While awaiting a response, he reconfigured the Ruhr defenses. The sector along the Rhine was not threatened by the American forces and could be held by a light screening force. The sector in the north, especially the northwest, was a dense agglomeration of industrial cities such as Düsseldorf and Essen that could be held with modest infantry forces backed by extensive Flak positions. The sector to the south and east was rural and forested, and would be the most vulnerable to American attack. This sector would be vital for any attempt to connect with German forces outside the Ruhr, or for any breakout attempt. Not surprisingly, Model decided to focus his defensive efforts with von Zangen’s 15.Armee along the Sieg and Lahn rivers facing south and east. However, communications with 15.Armee headquarters proved nearly impossible for several days. About the only coherent force still left in this sector was Bayerlein’s battered LIII. Armee-Korps. On March 26, Model instructed Bayerlein to prepare a counterattack against the northern flank of the First US Army advance. Bayerlein protested that he had no mobile forces to conduct such a mission; Model responded with an abusive tirade. The confrontation convinced Bayerlein that it was pointless to try to discuss issues with Model; in the future he would simply agree with Model’s directives whether he intended to carry them out or not. Model eventually realized the futility of any counterattack southward, and instead ordered Bayerlein to join the defense line on the Sieg River. The OB West refused Model’s request for “a new mission” after they learned that Hitler had declared it to be the Festung Ruhr (Fortress Ruhr) to be defended to the last bullet with no option for retreat. On March 29, Model recommended a counterattack by Bayerlein’s LIII.Armee-Korps from the eastern sector around Winterberg with an aim of blunting the drive by Collins’ VII Corps toward Paderborn. The resulting fighting on March 30–31 was 262

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the first serious resistance encountered by First US Army that week, but it was quickly crushed. Impatient with the delays around Paderborn, Collins skirted official channels and directly contacted LieutenantGeneral Simpson of the Ninth US Army with the proposal that they each dispatch an armored task force toward Lippstadt to link up and complete the encirclement. Combat Command B, 2nd Armored Division met Task Force Kane from the 3rd Armored Division around 1530hrs, on Easter Sunday, April 1, 1945 encircling the Ruhr Pocket. While the Ruhr drama was being played out in the center, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group was continuing its advance. The Netherlands had endured a “starvation winter,” and First Canadian Army was assigned to complete the liberation (see Map 122). The British Second Army pushed northeast to Hannover. In the south, Patton’s Third US Army pushed through the Fulda Gap into Thuringia reaching Gotha by early April. Devers’ 6th Army Group was sent to deal with the remnants of Heeresgruppe G in southern Germany. These two operations are covered in Map 125. With the reduction of the Ruhr Pocket about to begin, the next issue to be resolved was the focus of the final endgame against Germany. Montgomery continued to urge a concentration of Allied resources in the north with an ultimate aim to make a dash for Berlin. Eisenhower had originally supported Berlin as the ultimate Allied objective, but the Yalta Conference placed Berlin within the Soviet occupation zone. By late March 1945, the Red Army was significantly closer to Berlin than the nearest US and British forces. Eisenhower was skeptical of Montgomery’s depiction of a lightning thrust toward Berlin, in view of Montgomery’s preference for carefully staged offensive operations. A simple glance at the map suggested that the Allied field armies most likely to be employed toward Berlin would be the Ninth US Army in the center, and the First US Army in the south. Eisenhower was also aware that significant portions of the US units in the ETO were earmarked for transfer to the Pacific for an eventual amphibious invasion of Japan. Eisenhower asked Bradley about the cost of a thrust from the Elbe to Berlin, and he estimated 100,000 casualties, “a pretty stiff price for a prestige objective.” Berlin was no longer SHAEF’s objective.

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North Sea

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MAP 121: REDUCTION OF THE RUHR POCKET – APRIL 1–18, 1945 Once Operation Voyage had encircled the Ruhr, the newly arrived Fifteenth US Army was assigned to patrol the Rhine sector until it was strong enough to free the First US Army and Ninth US Army to continue to advance eastward. Bradley assumed that a significant number of German troops were encircled, but the expectation was that most of Heeresgruppe B would have escaped and that only about 70,000 troops would be left in the pocket. Bradley had not anticipated Hitler’s stand-fast orders, and in fact the pocket contained about 370,000 German troops. On paper at least, Heeresgruppe B was still a formidable force. It contained three field armies and seven corps: 5.Panzer-Armee (XII.SS, LXXI., and LVIII.Panzer-Korps); 15.Armee (LXXIV. and LIII.ArmeeKorps), and Armee-Abteilung von Lüttwitz (XXXXVII. and LXIII. Armee-Korps). Berlin was under the delusion that Festung Ruhr could hold out for months. The actual combat value of the forces within the Ruhr was much less than these numbers would suggest. The pocket contained large numbers of rear-service troops and Luftwaffe Flak crews. Only 20 percent of the troops had infantry weapons, a further 20 percent had only pistols. On April 10, OB West had only 47 operational tanks in all of its army groups. Requests for airlift of supplies into the Ruhr was denied, knowing full well that any such attempt would evaporate in the face of overwhelming Allied airpower. Model’s headquarters estimated that food and supplies would last for only about three weeks, since there was a large civilian population to consider. Hitler had promised to relieve the pocket using the battered 11. Armee and the embryonic 12.Armee. General Walter Lucht’s 11.Armee was a field army in name only. It had the headquarter staffs of two corps, but its strength was only the decimated 166.Infanterie-Division recently arrived from occupation duty in Denmark, the remnants of SS-Panzer-Brigade Westfalen, an assault gun battalion, and a rag-tag assortment of replacement battalions. The 12.Armee was in the process of forming in the Dessau area using newly formed “children’s” divisions created with the barrel scrapings of the manpower and equipment pool. By April 2, Model had lost contact with Heeresgruppe H to the north, since it had been pushed back by the British offensives. The city of Kassel was enveloped by the Third US Army and fell on April 4, effectively ending any hope of relief from the east. On April 5, Model 264

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reported to Berlin that Heeresgruppe B had two weeks of supplies left, and the situation was critical with regard to fuel and ammunition. Another request to authorize withdrawal was rejected. The Ruhr defenses centered around towns and villages, with an especially vigorous defense at the eastern end of the pocket. After the first few days, German resistance began to decrease sharply and the number of prisoners of war increased. The average US advance into the pocket was 4–6 miles per day. After a week of fighting, the Ruhr defenses began to disintegrate. The Ninth US Army had a tough time penetrating the industrial wasteland on the north side of the pocket, not only because of its dense urban infrastructure, but also because of the enormous damaged caused by over a year of intense heavy bombing raids by the RAF. Progress was far better in the First US Army sector to the south. On April 9, over 9,700 prisoners were taken by First US Army; XVI Corps took a further 10,000. On April 14, the 8th Infantry Division of the First US Army reached the Ruhr River at Hattingen; across the river was the 75th Division of the Ninth US Army. The junction of these forces broke the Ruhr Pocket in half. The dissection of the Ruhr Pocket convinced Model that any further organized resistance was futile. Von Zangen and the remaining staff of the 15.Armee surrendered on April 13, Panzer-Lehr-Division on April 15. Model refused to surrender Heeresgruppe B, but euphemistically referred to its “dissolution.” Underage and overage troops were issued formal discharge papers on April 15; on the 17th, remaining soldiers were allowed to surrender of their own volition or try to fight their way out in groups. The pocket largely collapsed by April 18. In total, some 317,000 German troops surrendered in the Ruhr, a greater total even than at Stalingrad or in Tunisia. Model told his staff that “a field marshal does not surrender,” and he reflected, “I sincerely believe that I have served a criminal. I led my soldiers in good conscience but for a criminal government.” On April 21, he went alone into the woods and shot himself. The destruction of Heeresgruppe B, the largest German force in the West, left an enormous gap in the German defenses. It marked the end of large-scale operations by the Wehrmacht in the West, leading to what the new OB West commander, Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring called the “makeshift campaign.”

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MAP 122: THE LIBERATION OF THE NETHERLANDS – APRIL–MAY, 1945 The First Canadian Army spent much of the final month of the war in the final liberation of the Netherlands. This had assumed some urgency, as food shortages caused by German Army requisitions and the chaotic conditions had created a “hunger winter” through much of the country. An important addition to the Canadian contingent in Northwest Europe was I Corps, which had arrived from the Italian theater. On April 5, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group headquarters released its directive on the final campaign, with First Canadian Army assigned the task of liberating the remainder of the Netherlands and securing the German coast as far as the mouth of the Weser River. The deployment positioned I Canadian Corps on the left flank inside the Netherlands, with II Canadian Corps on the right along the German frontier. German defenses in the Netherlands were extremely spotty, with some areas bitterly defended and other areas overseen by modest occupation forces with little will for a prolonged fight. II Canadian Corps had a rapid advance to the North Sea coast. The 3rd Canadian Infantry Division was on the left flank along the IJsselmeer, taking about two weeks to reach the coast. In the center, the pathway for the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division was assisted by the French Special Air Service (SAS), who were dropped behind German lines near Meppel and Assen on the night of April 7/8. They were later joined by other British and Belgian elements of the SAS. Their main task was to prevent the demolition of bridges in front of the advancing Canadian forces. Four days later, the Canadian 8th Reconaissance Regiment of the 2nd Canadian Infantry Division joined up with the SAS, having advanced 50 miles from the Twente Canal. There was strong German resistance in Groningen, but it was eventually overcome. A number of German garrisons held out in a pocket around Delfzijl. The Polish 1st Armoured Division remained a part of II Canadian Corps and served on the right wing. Its advance took it quickly outside of the Netherlands and onto the North German Plains, heading for Emden and Wilhelmshaven. It was joined on the far right flank by the 4th Canadian Armoured Division, which crossed the Küsten Canal on April 16–17 and reached Bad Zwischenahn in early May. The advance was complicated by the marshy terrain, reminiscent of many areas of the Netherlands. Operations by I Canadian Corps in the western Netherlands were politically charged owing to pressure from the Dutch government in 266

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exile to liberate the main cities that were still under German control. However, Major-General Charles Foulkes, the corps commander, was well aware that excessively aggressive actions could turn the Netherlands into a devastated battleground. There was some hope that the German garrisons in the Netherlands would surrender once they had been cut off from Germany by II Canadian Corps farther to the east. In the event, Foulkes was determined to concentrate on specific military tasks. On April 11, the 1st Canadian Infantry Division, recently arrived from Italy, conducted Operation Cannonshot across the IJssel River south of Deventer. The next objective was finally to liberate Arnhem, which had remained in German hands since the failed Operation Market-Garden in September 1944. On April 12, I Canadian Corps launched Operation Quick Anger, which put an engineer bridge across the IJssel River, allowing the deployment of tanks directly into Arnhem. After some fighting, the city was liberated on April 14. With Canadian forces over the rivers, Operation Cleanser was conducted by the 5th Canadian Armoured Division starting on April 15, which raced all the way up the IJsselmeer, cutting off a substantial German force and leading to a chaotic retreat. Opposing I Canadian Corps in the western Netherlands were the remnants of Blaskowitz’s 25.Armee, ensconced behind the Grebbe Line. This was a defensive line using the numerous waterways and other terrain obstructions in the area. At a meeting of senior commanders on April 12, Montgomery made it clear that no large force would be made available to deal with the trapped 25.Armee, since the end of the war was evidently weeks away and there were more important operational objectives. By the third week of April, the Reichskommissar of the Netherlands, Arthur Seyss-Inquart, put out feelers to the Allies via the Dutch Resistance. While he would not surrender, he attempted to come to an armistice agreement. On April 28, Allied and German representatives came to a surreptitious truce agreement. This permitted an airdrop of 510 tons of food by Allied heavy bombers on April 29. After further negotiations, food convoys began, eventually totaling about 1,000 tons per day. On May 5, General Blaskowitz surrendered the remnants of the 25.Armee to I Canadian Corps. In the II Canadian Corps zone in northern Germany, Armee-Abteilung Straube, an improvised force created from the leftovers of Heeresgrupe H in early May, surrendered at Bad Zwischenahn.

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MAP 123: ADVANCE INTO NORTHERN GERMANY – APRIL–MAY 1945 Following the successful Plunder/Varsity crossing of the Rhine in late March 1945, Montgomery’s 21st Army Group proceeded to the northeast. As described earlier, the First Canadian Army was assigned to liberate the remainder of the Netherlands. The British Second Army moved toward Hamburg with the aim of rapidly capturing the Northern German Plains. Facing the 21st Army Group was Heeresgruppe H, which had defended the North Sea coast since the summer campaign. It was gradually trapped by the Canadians west of the IJsselmeer in the Netherlands. On April 6, the defense of northern Germany was reconfigured under the new Oberbefehlshaber Nordwest (OB Nordwest – Northwest High Command) under Generalfeldmarschall Ernst Busch, and the remnants of Heeresgruppe H was subordinated to it as OB Niederlande. Aside from the two corps trapped in the Netherlands, the only other major formation in northwestern Germany was Student’s 1.Fallschirm-Armee, with two corps. In the face of the British advance into Germany, Berlin tried to reinforce OB Nordwest with the new Armee-Blumentritt, but this was a hollow formation made up of staffs and replacement units of neighboring military districts plus various improvised naval units from around the Bremen naval base. The British advance was quite brisk, but there were numerous occasions when a significant German strongpoint would be encountered, such as along the Dortmund–Ems Canal. On April 10, Montgomery accelerated the pace of the advance to the Elbe, deciding to skirt the congested and heavily defended port of Bremen in favor of concentrating on a fast advance to the Elbe. In the first two weeks of April, the British Second Army suffered 7,665 casualties, but took over 78,100 prisoners. On April 14, the right wing of the British Second Army began to encounter elements of the newly formed 12.Armee trying to reach the Festung Harz in the Harz Mountains, but these forces were quickly subdued and pushed southward into the American sector. The Elbe was reached on April 19, and steps were taken to subdue Bremen. Armee Blumentritt attempted to defend Bremen using a variety of ad hoc formations, but this defense was overcome by XXX Corps late on April 26. Churchill was keen that Denmark be liberated by the Western Allies 268

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and not by the Red Army, since it controlled access to the Baltic. Following the envelopment of the Ruhr, Montgomery and Eisenhower came to an agreement to free the 21st Army Group from the need to clear the Elbe in Lower Saxony south of Wittenberge. Instead, the focus of the British Second Army would be Schleswig-Holstein, reaching the Baltic, and preventing a Soviet occupation of Denmark. During a meeting with Eisenhower on April 20, Montgomery expressed concern about a shortage of forces, since Ninth US Army had been returned to Bradley, so Eisenhower transferred Ridgway’s XVIII Airborne Corps to his command. The campaign to reach the Baltic, codenamed Operation Enterprise, was launched in the early morning hours of April 29, with crossings over the Elbe by VIII Corps near Lauenburg, XII Corps over the Elbe near Hamburg, and XXX Corps over the Weser near Bremen. Ridgway’s XVIII Corps launched its advance a day later owing to its prolonged road march into this sector, and its advance was aimed at Wismar and the Baltic. The last major German defensive concentration in northern Germany was the 1.Fallschirm-Armee around Hamburg, reinforced by a hodgepodge of other units. The British XII Corps began its assault on the city on April 28, and fighting concluded in five days. Operation Enterprise proved to be a far less costly mission than originally feared. After word of Hitler’s suicide was broadcast on May 1, most German soldiers and sailors showed little enthusiasm to continue fighting. The British 5th and 11th Armoured divisions raced to Lübeck against little opposition to seal off Denmark. In Ridgway’s sector, General Kurt von Tippelskirch surrendered the entire 21.Armee, about 150,000 troops. In total, the corps accepted the surrender of 359,960 German troops. From the east, Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky’s 2nd Belorussian Front spearheaded by the 3rd Guards Tank Corps, raced for the Baltic and met the British Second Army near Wismar, while the Soviet 49th Army met British forces farther south on the Elbe. The new head of the Kriegsmarine, Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, signed surrender documents at Montgomery’s headquarters at 1800hrs on May 4, establishing a ceasefire in the Netherlands, northern Germany, and Denmark.

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MAP 124: ADVANCE TO THE ELBE – APRIL 1945 By the middle of April, Bradley’s 12th Army Group became the largest field command in US Army history with four field armies, 12 corps, and 48 divisions totaling 1.3 million troops. The newly arrived Fifteenth US Army was left behind in the Ruhr Pocket while the other three armies raced east. Simpson’s Ninth US Army remained on the northern flank, also covering the right flank of the British advance, while advancing north of the forested Harz Mountains. Hodges’ First US Army was in the center, skirting along the southern side of the Harz Mountains and aimed at Leipzig. Patton’s Third US Army aimed for the Elbe around Chemnitz. German defenses at this stage of the war were entirely unpredictable. The civilians in most towns and villages were anxious for the war to end, and white flags popped up prior to the arrival of US forces. But this could be dangerous if diehard German troops were nearby, and numerous German soldiers and civilians were executed for defeatism even in the last weeks of the war. Many German cities had heavy Flak batteries deployed around them, and these often formed the basis of a vigorous if short-lived defense effort. The First US Army reached the Weser River on April 7 while facing the remnants of the 11.Armee. On April 8, Kesselring informed 11.Armee that they were to withdraw into Festung Harz and create an impregnable defense in the forested mountain region in anticipation of the arrival of the new 12.Armee. The last effort to establish a new defense west of Berlin was the creation of 12.Armee under General Walter Wenck. On paper, the field army consisted of three corps headquarters, a Panzer division, a Panzergrenadier division, and five or more infantry divisions. Since none of these divisions had been formed at the time of the army’s activation, Wenck never possessed a real field army, but simply a scattering of slapdash units. Panzer-Division Clausewitz was created from the Panzer training school at Putlos. The infantry units, quickly dubbed the “children’s’ divisions,” were formed using teenage conscripts of the RAD. As the newly formed divisions arrived, the 12.Armee gradually deployed them along the Elbe front. Kesselring’s OB West headquarters had assessed the Ninth US Army as the main threat and the focal point of the Allied advance. The expectation was that the Ninth US Army would send an armored spearhead to the western suburbs of Berlin, while the rest of the American forces waited along the Elbe. As a result, 270

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the 12.Armee was sent to confront the Ninth US Army around the Elbe bridgeheads south of Magdeburg. The weakness of the German defenses along the Elbe convinced the Ninth US Army that Berlin was within easy reach. The staff had come up with a plan “to enlarge the bridgeheads over the Elbe to include Potsdam,” a transparent attempt to obfuscate the real goal. Simpson visited Bradley’s headquarters on April 15, who in turn radioed Eisenhower. His response was unequivocal: no advance on Berlin. The 12.Armee still held the city of Magdeburg, and, after preliminary air bombardment on April 17, the city fell to the 30th Division on April 18. Kesselring ordered 12.Armee to continue its mission of reaching the Harz Mountains, and the assignment was given to Generalleutnant Karl Arndt’s XXXIX.Panzer-Korps, consisting mainly of PanzerDivision Clausewitz supported by some elements of the partially formed Panzergrenadier-Division “Schlageter” z.b.V.1. Panzer-Division Clausewitz was deployed in three Kampfgruppen, the northernmost of which bumped into the British 15th Division near Uelzen on April 14, and was sharply rebuffed. The other Kampfgruppen attempted to infiltrate through XIII Corps lines farther south. The 5th Armored Division was sent to finish off the division, and it was largely destroyed by April 21. The 11.Armee held a dwindling refuge in the Harz Pocket. Although Lucht’s command included about 70,000 troops, they had little artillery and few tanks. US infantry operations against the pocket began on April 11, encountering numerous roadblocks on the mountain roads. On April 18, the 1st Infantry Division captured the highest point in the mountains at Brocken and by April 20, some 18,000 troops had surrendered. Lucht and his headquarters were captured on April 23, bringing Festung Harz to an end. There was little coordination between the Red Army and the US Army beyond the understanding that the Elbe represented the demarcation line. The Red Army reached the Elbe on April 23, when a battalion of the 173rd Guards Rifle Regiment, 58th Guards Rifle Division reached Torgau and set up a defense near one of the bridges. On April 25, the 2/273rd Infantry, 69th Division sent jeep patrols toward the Elbe. Soviet and American troops met near Strehla and Torgau in the late afternoon – the first of a string of encounters between US, British, and Soviet forces in the coming week.

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N

21 XX X XX 12 20 pr of A as

Wittenberg

XX

XX

Meyer

Apr 12

st dwe Nor X OB XXX X XX XX 2 1

Clausewitz

XXX

21 XX X XX 12

XXXIX XXX

XIII

XIII XXX XIX

Tangermünde

Apr 12

XXXX

12 XX

Hanover Braunschweig

Ninth US

Schill

XXX

X XX III XI X X

XIX as of Apr 21

XXXX

Magdeburg

GERMANY

XX

Scharnhorst

Dessau Ninth XXXX First

XXXX

XXXX

Hutten

Bitterfeld Mu

First US

e

lde

Duserstadt

Göttingen

XX

VII

(Surrenders Apr 10–23)

VII XXX V

Köthen

XXX

11

Elb

Northeim

Nordhausen

XXX

Hälle

XLVIII

Sangerhausen

Münden

II

rra

Elst

We

First XXXX Third

er

69

sse

XXX

We i

V Mühlhausen XXX

Ful

XX

da

Saa

le

Zeitz

XX XXX VIII

Erfürt

Eisenach

Weimar

II

58 Gds

Leipzig

Junction of American and Soviet troops April 25 1945 V XXX VIII

1200 Apr 22

12 XX XX XX X XX West OB

Gotha XXX

Jena

Gera

VII

VIII XXX XII

Torgau

Ohrdruf

Third US

Disconti nued 1200 Ap r 22

XXXX

Chemnitz

XXXX

7 12 XXXXX 6

Fulda

Meiningen

XXX

XII

Approximate front, April 4

Di s 12 con 00 tin Ap ue r2 d 2 22 First 1200 Apr XXXX Third

II VI XX X XII

Approximate front, April 9 Approximate front, April 13 Elbe–Mulde front, April 24 Armored thusts, date indicated

0 0

Coburg

25 miles 25km

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

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MAP 125: ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH APRIL 24 TO MAY 11, 1945 While the First US Army and Ninth US Army remained idle having reached the demarcation line along the Elbe, Eisenhower ordered Devers’ 6th Army Group and Patton’s Third US Army to push southward through Bavaria and into Austria to pre-empt a last-ditch defense in the Alpine stronghold. The French were assigned the clearance of the Black Forest area, while the Seventh US Army headed for Munich and the Austrian frontier. Opposing it was Heeresgruppe G (critically weakened and lacking significant reserves), now commanded by General Friedrich Schulz. The supply situation was so hopeless that the army group headquarters was unable to make its planned move to the Nuremberg area owing to a lack of fuel. To create a mobile counterattack force, the army group combed the Grafenwöhr training grounds and nearby factories, locating only 35 operational tanks. Together with two battalions of infantry, these were used to create Gruppe Grafenwöhr. This ragtag formation was assigned to defend Nuremberg on April 16, but was overrun by the 14th Armored Division. The main defense of the city was its belt of heavy Flak guns. The collapse of the German defenses in Nuremberg on April 19 removed the entire right wing of 1.Armee and opened the door for the Seventh US Army to advance nearly 50 miles to the Danube, with XXI Corps crossing the river on April 21 near Dillingen. The collapse of 1.Armee was also exploited by Patton’s Third US Army, which advanced southeast in the final week of April, reaching the Danube near Regensburg on April 24. De Lattre’s 1re Armée trapped the 19.Armee to the east of the Rhine in the Black Forest. Although Stuttgart had been assigned to the Seventh US Army, the French captured it on April 22 following instructions from Paris. Devers faced growing problems in controlling de Lattre’s force, since de Gaulle’s government wanted to create a French occupation zone within Germany before it had been sanctioned by Britain and the United States. After the capture of Stuttgart, the 1re Armée pushed on to Ulm, where the collaborationist Vichy French government had set up a puppet government in exile. Patch’s Seventh and Patton’s Third US Army continued their mechanized advance beyond the Danube during the final week of April 1945. A Seventh US Army report described the German defenses as “that of isolated groups, scattered and without organization, fighting 272

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with varying degrees of resistance. Inadequate distribution of what remained of his troops and scarcity of transport forced the enemy to defend fiercely at points where he could organize, leaving other and sometimes more important points lightly held. The result was armored spearheads slashing deep into the enemy’s rear … At time the pursuit seemed more like a fantasy of violence, speed and extravagant incident. Armored columns were rolling 20 and 30 miles a day. Weakly held strongpoints were destroyed by fire and huge enemy groups were shipped to the rear in bulk prisoner formations.” A handful of fresh German divisions attempted to stem the tide, but were crushed. The new 38.SS-Grenadier-Division Nibelungen was deployed against the US III Corps near Ingolstadt on April 27, and was destroyed in three days of fighting. The fighting in Bavaria also revealed the first faint signs of an antiNazi resistance. Civilian groups attempted to stage a coup in Augsburg shortly before the surrender of the city. Civilian groups did revolt in Munich, but it took street fighting by the US 3rd and 45th divisions to overcome a Waffen-SS garrison there on April 29–30. After clearing Bavaria to the Alps by the end of April, Eisenhower instructed Dever’s 6th Army Group to capture all Alpine passes into Italy, while Patton’s Third Army was directed to Salzburg in Austria to capture the passes into the Austrian Tyrol. As it transpired, Patton’s attention was distracted farther east, and Patch’s Seventh US Army took Salzburg on May 4. As the US and Soviet armies approached one another, the flow of German troops turned into a flood, as entire divisions and corps raced to avoid Soviet capture. Patton’s Third US Army was inundated with German prisoners. From the renewal of the offensive on April 22 to the end of the war on May 8, Patton’s Third US Army took an astonishing 765,483 prisoners. The collapse of the German 7.Armee prompted the Third US Army to continue over the German border into the Czech lands. Eisenhower had come to an agreement with the Red Army about moving into the western portion of the country as far as Pilsen and Ceské Budějovice. On May 5, the Czech resistance staged an uprising in Prague and asked for outside assistance. Patton requested permission to move as far as Prague, but Eisenhower refused on the grounds that it was in the Soviet zone.

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N XXXX

GERMANY XXX

Coburg

XXXX

5 Gds

May First 4 X XXX d Thir

XXXX

4 Gds

3 Gds

Elb

XXXX

3 Gds

XXXXX

Mitte

V XXXX

Frankfurt

Moving Apr 28

Main

LXXXV

XXX

1st U X kra 4th XXX inian Uk X rain ian

XXXX

3 Gds

XXX

a

LXXXV

Würzburg

Prague

7

XXX

XII

e

Nürnberg

Rhin

Vit

Pilsen

XXX

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

XII First As of XXXX Apr 28 Third

O DENWALD

K ÄN F RXXX

H ISC

L EA

B

XXXX

7 Gds

XXX

XXX

XX

XXXX

XXX

9 Gds

XXX

Regensburg

XII

XXX

XV

LXXXII

XXXX

46

Stuttgart XXX

Strasbourg

ALD ARZW SCHW

XXI

XXX

XV

Munich

XXX

LXXX I Fr

(-)

XXX XXX

XXX

LXIV

XXXX

XIII

XXX

VI

XXXX

XXX

Oberammergau

Lake Constance

LICHTENSTEIN

Berchtesgaden XXX

Bregenz

SWITZERLAND

Salzburg

XXXXX

G

h

(-)

Lec

LXX

1

XXI

XXX

(-)

8

XXX

LXIV

4 Gds 2–

XXIII.SS (-)

(-)

be

Inn

Dachau

XIII.SS

XIII

nu

ay

XXX

XXX

XXX

XX

M

I Fr

Augsburg

XXX

Da

XXX

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XXX

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be anu

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12 XX X XX F

B AÄ

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XXX

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h nt ve X r Se XX t F X irs F

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Ingolstadt

XXI

XXX

Iser

II Fr

XXXX

53

XII

III

FRANCE

av

XXX

V

Karlsruhe

e

XXI

XXXX

(-)

Enns

AUSTRIA

19

XXXX

XXX

24

XXI

V ORALBERG St Anton

(-)

Front line, evening, April 24

Innsbruck

Front line, evening, April 28 Final position, evening, May 8 Soviet front line, May 10–11

0

ITALY

0

25 miles 25km

273

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MAP 126: THE FINAL CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY APRIL–MAY 1945 The Yalta agreements had stipulated that Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would refrain from reaching any separate peace treaty with Germany, but several regional armistices took place in early May 1945, including an armistice in Italy on May 2. Hitler’s death did not lead to an immediate surrender. His appointed successor, Grossadmiral Karl Dönitz, hoped to negotiate more favorable terms than unconditional surrender. Dönitz’s new government had few military options. His objective was to end the war with Britain and the United States as quickly as possible, but to continue to fight the Soviet Union and to permit more German civilians and soldiers to flee Soviet captivity. There was still a sizable contingent of troops in the Courland Pocket who were being evacuated across the Baltic, and there were hundreds of thousands of Germans fleeing westward every day. Dönitz and the OKW had already been forced to relocate on the night of May 2/3 owing to British advances, and they ended up at the Marineschule Mürwik naval academy near Flensberg. Owing to the chaotic conditions in northern Germany, Reichspräsident Dönitz did not create his new government until May 5. The likelihood increased daily that his government would be captured by approaching British troops. Dönitz’s only effort with any consequence was the deliberate delay of the war’s end in May 1945 to minimize the number of German troops and civilians falling into Red Army hands. This succeeded as well as could be expected under the circumstances. Of the 11.1 million German prisoners of war, 7.7 million fell into American, British, or French hands compared to 3.3 million in Soviet custody. In 1945, the Red Army accepted the surrender of only 1.9 million German troops compared to the Western Allies who captured about 6 million, three times as many. About half of these troops fled into US and British zones to avoid the Red Army. Finally recognizing the hopelessness of the situation, Dönitz dispatched his Kriegsmarine successor, Admiral Hans-Georg von Friedeburg, to negotiate with the British. Montgomery made it clear that surrender was “necessary and not negotiable.” As a result, von Friedeburg signed surrender documents at 1800hrs on May 4 at Montgomery’s headquarters, establishing a ceasefire in the Netherlands, northern Germany, and Denmark. Von Friedeburg was then obliged to 274

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fly to the SHAEF headquarters at Reims to meet Eisenhower in an attempt to secure a similar ceasefire in the American sectors on the Rhine and in southern Germany. Eisenhower briskly rebuffed this ploy and made it clear that the only acceptable agreement was an unconditional surrender in both the West and the East. To buy time, Dönitz insisted on dispatching the head of the OKW, General Alfred Jodl, to Reims on May 6. Jodl again tried to win a separate surrender agreement with the Western Allies, but Eisenhower threatened that if the Germans did not immediately agree to an unconditional surrender, he would authorize the resumption of bomber attacks on German cities and would also instruct all field commanders to shut off any further transit of German soldiers and civilians into areas under British and American control. At 0241hrs on May 7, Jodl signed the instrument of surrender at SHAEF headquarters in Reims, ending the war at midnight on May 8/9. The Soviet representative at SHAEF, General Ivan Susloparov, did not have clear instructions from Moscow, but signed the document with the caveat that the Soviet Union had the right to renegotiate the terms at a later date. Moments later, he received a telegram from Moscow instructing him not to sign. To paper over the matter, a second ceremony was staged at Marshal Georgi Zhukov’s headquarters in the Karlshorst area of Berlin at 0016hrs, on May 9. Dönitz announced the surrender by radio on May 8, with the ceasefire to take place at 2300hrs. Owing to the chaos, fighting dragged on for several days in the more distant theaters. The most intense fighting continued around Prague, lasting well into May 11. A ceasefire did not occur until May 15 in Yugoslavia, and, even then, fighting continued between Yugoslav partisans and various other insurgent groups. Curiously enough, one of the last battles was fought in the Netherlands. Georgian troops serving in the Wehrmacht on Texel Island mutinied against their German officers on the night of April 5/6. Heeresgruppe H sent reinforcements from the mainland, and a series of violent battles broke out between the Georgian troops and Allied Dutch Resistance fighters against Wehrmacht units. Canadian troops did not arrive on the island until May 20, bringing an end to the last battle in Western Europe.

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Goteborg

N

Allied advance to April 1, 1945

SWEDEN

Allied advance to April 15, 1945 Allied advance to May 1, 1945

Aalborg

Allied advance to May 15, 1945 Inter-Army Boundary May 15, 1945

0

Randers

150 miles

0

150km

Karlskrona

DENMARK

Copenhagen

Baltic Sea

North Sea

Danzig

Kiel XXXXX

2 Bel Rokossovkiy

21

NETHERLANDS

Bremen

XXXXX

Wittenburg

Montgomery

XXXXX

The Hague

Münster

GERMANY

Duisburg

Kassel

Antwerp

Torgau

XXXXX

Dresden

Rhi

Bradley

POLAND

1 Bel Zhukov

1 Ukr

Leipzig

12

Cologne

Brussels

Posen

Ode

XXXXX

r

Konev

Breslau

Chemnitz

ne

BELGIUM

XX

XXX

Elbe

We s

er

Berlin X XX XX

Amsterdam

la

Stettin

Vis

XXXXX

tu

Hamburg

Liège

Remagen lle se Mo

Reims

Luxembourg

XX X

Se

ine

X

XXXXX

XX

4 Ukr Brunn Yeremenko

X

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Regensburg

Metz

XXXX XX

Pilsen

Nurnberg

XX

LUX.

Prague

Mainz

XXXXX

Strasbourg

6

Troyes

2 Ukr Malinovskiy

XXXXX

Stuttgart

Dan

Devers

Munich

XXXX

ube

X

Vienna

Linz

XXXXX

Dijon

Zurich

Innsbruck

Berne

FRANCE

SWITZERLAND

AUSTRIA

3 Ukr Tolbukhin

Lake Balaton

XXXXX

15

Geneva

Clark

Lyon Milan Turin

Trieste

Verona

Zagreb

Venice

Po

Brod

Rhône

Ferrara Genoa Bologna

Ravenna

La Spezia

YUGOSLAVIA

ITALY Marseilles

HUNGARY

Graz

A dri a ti c Sea

Ligurian S ea

Split

Perugia

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MAP 127: HITLER’S LAST DEFENSES IN FRANCE 1944–45 One of the most obscure campaigns of the final months of the war took place on the Atlantic coast of France, far from the main battlefields. In August 1944, Hitler authorized the retreat of the 1.Armee from southwestern France following the Operation Dragoon landings on the Mediterranean coast in Provence. However, Hitler explicitly forbade the surrender of any of the heavily fortified ports in Brittany, such as Lorient or St-Nazaire, one of the fortified ports near the mouth of the Loire on the approaches to Bordeaux. These were designated as Festungen (Fortresses), which to Hitler meant that they would fight to the last man. These garrisons, numbering about a quarter-million personnel, remained isolated until the end of the war. Two other areas also fell into this category, but lie beyond the borders of this map: the Channel Islands and Dunkirk. The ports in Brittany at Lorient and St-Nazaire came under siege in August, when Patton’s Third US Army raced to Brest. Until early August, the capture of the Breton ports had been high on the list of Allied priorities owing to the need for ports for logistical support. Two developments changed these priorities. The Allied breakout in August and September 1944 suggested that other ports nearer the front lines would soon be available, including Le Havre, Boulogne, and Antwerp. Any cargo unloaded in Brittany would have to be trucked hundreds of miles to the German border, wasting precious time and fuel. Secondly, the Germans demonstrated at Cherbourg in late June 1944 that they would demolish any port before their surrender. This meant that even after a port was captured, it would not be functional for several months while repairs were undertaken. Brest was already under siege, and would finally fall in late September. However, Eisenhower began to consider whether it was worthwhile expending valuable time and casualties to liberate these ports. The answer was that the ports were no longer valuable enough for costly attacks. Instead, SHAEF decided to let them rot on the vine. In September 1944, Patton’s Third US Army left Brittany for missions deeper in France. To deal with the Breton ports of Lorient and St-Nazaire, the newly arrived 94th Infantry Division was assigned to 276

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contain the two ports. Some artillery bombardment and patrolling took place, but there were no plans for a full-scale assault on either port. The Festung ports farther south saw some combat with the French FFI resistance forces. The matter of containing these ports was left to de Gaulle’s new government. The Free French Army did not want to waste regular army divisions containing the ports. Aside from this issue, de Gaulle also had to deal with the problem posed by the nearly 400,000 members of the Resistance on hand in September 1944. These units were not adequately trained or equipped to send into battle, but they posed both a political and security problem. The units were not under cohesive military direction, and local militias were taking part in retribution against collaborators and other mayhem without government control. Furthermore, de Gaulle was worried about the revolutionary potential of the leftist militias. The solution was to disband the Resistance and absorb the men into the regular army. Aside from being used to provide replacements for de Lattre’s 1re Armée, three new divisions were formed: the 19e, 23e, and 25e divisions. Two of these were dispatched to the Festung ports on the Bay of Biscay, where they absorbed local Resistance groups. They then took over the containment of the ports. De Gaulle’s government was not happy about the inaction on the Festung ports, and as early as November 1944, began to plan Operation Indépendance to liberate Festung Royan. This was delayed owing to the Ardennes fighting. In January 1945, the green US 66th Division arrived in Brittany to take over the containment of the Breton ports, and about 29,000 former French Resistance fighters were attached to the US unit for this mission. Operation Indépendance was resurrected on April 15, 1945, by which point it had been renamed Operation Vénérable. Once the Royan garrison surrendered on April 18, the fighting continued as Operation Jupiter against the island of Oléron. It was supposed to be followed by Operation Musketeer against the La Rochelle pocket, but this was canceled when the level of civilian casualties in Royan was fully appreciated. In early May, the US Army planned a major offensive against the Breton ports, but, in the event, the end of the war led to the gradual surrender of the remaining Festung garrisons.

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N

English Channel Paimpol

Avranches

St-Malo Morlaix St-Brieuc

Brest

Dinan

Crozon

Audierne

Rennes Pontivy

Quimper Concarneau

Hennebont Lorient

Port-Louis Étel

ÎLE DE GROIX

Vannes

Redon La RocheBernard

May 10 Quiberon BELLE-ÎLE

Le Palais

Sévérac

Angers

Bouvron

Piriac La Baule

Loire

St-Nazaire St-Brévin

May 11

Pornic

Nantes

ÎLE DE NOIRMOUTIER

La Roche-sur-Yon

ÎLE D’YEU

Les Sables d’Olonne La Sèvre-Niortaise

May 7 ÎLE DE RÉ

St-Martin-de-Ré La Pallice La Rochelle

May 1 St-Pierre

Ba y

of

Bisca y

ÎLE D’OLÉRON

Rochefort Marennes

April 18 La C

Royan

hare

nte

Le Verdon Gir

April 20

on de

LesparreMédoc

Bordeaux

0 0

50 miles 50km

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FURTHER READING This book was prepared primarily through the use of maps presented in the Osprey Campaign series of books. Additional maps were prepared to address subjects not yet covered by the series. The Osprey Campaign books used in this project are listed below. These books contain full bibliographies, detailed lists of sources, and further detail on each battle or operation. Badsey, Stephen, Arnhem 1944: Operation ‘Market Garden’ (Campaign 24), 1993 Brooks, Richard, Walcheren 1944: Storming Hitler’s Island Fortress (Campaign 235), 2011 Ford, Ken, The Rhineland 1945: The Last Killing Ground in the West (Campaign 74), 2000 ——, D-Day 1944 (3): Sword Beach & the British Airborne Landings (Campaign 105), 2002 ——, D-Day 1944 (4): Gold & Juno Beaches (Campaign 112), 2002 ——, Caen 1944: Montgomery’s Break-out Attempt (Campaign 143), 2004 ——, Falaise 1944: Death of an Army (Campaign 149), 2005 ——, The Rhine Crossings 1945 (Campaign 178), 2007 ——, Operation Neptune 1944: D-Day’s Seaborne Armada (Campaign 268), 2014 ——, Operation Market-Garden 1944 (2): The British Airborne Missions (Campaign 301), 2016 Hart, Stephen A., Operation Totalize 1944: The Allied Drive South from Caen (Campaign 294), 2016 Steven J. Zaloga, Lorraine 1944: Patton vs Manteuffel (Campaign 75), 2000 ——, Operation Cobra 1944: Breakout from Normandy (Campaign 88), 2001 ——, Battle of the Bulge 1944 (1): St Vith and the Northern Shoulder (Campaign 115), 2003 ——, D-Day 1944 (1): Omaha Beach (Campaign 100), 2003, ——, Battle of the Bulge 1944 (2): Bastogne (Campaign 145), 2004 ——, D-Day 1944 (2): Utah Beach & the US Airborne Landings (Campaign 104), 2004 ——, Remagen 1945: Endgame against the Third Reich (Campaign 175), 2006 ——, The Siegfried Line 1944–45: Battles on the German Frontier (Campaign 181), 2007 ——, Liberation of Paris 1944: Patton’s Race for the Seine (Campaign 194), 2008 ——, Operation Dragoon 1944: France’s Other D-Day (Campaign 210), 2009 ——, Operation Nordwind 1945: Hitler’s Last Offensive in the West (Campaign 223), 2010 ——, Metz 1944: Patton’s Fortified Nemesis (Campaign 242), 2012 ——, Operation Market-Garden 1944 (1): The American Airborne Missions (Campaign 270), 2014 ——, Cherbourg 1944: The First Allied Victory in Normandy (Campaign 278), 2015 ——, Downfall 1945: The Fall of Hitler’s Third Reich (Campaign 293), 2016 ——, St Lô 1944: The Battle of the Hedgerows (Campaign 308), 2017

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FURTHER READING

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AUTHOR BIOGRAPHY Steven J. Zaloga received his BA in History from Union College, and his MA from Columbia University. He also did graduate research and language study at Uniwersitet Jagiellonski in Kraków. He has worked as a defense analyst in the aerospace industry for four decades, covering missile systems, drones, and the international arms trade. He has served with the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses, a federal think tank, for over two decades. He is the author of numerous books on military history, with an accent on the US Army in World War II, as well as Russia and the former Soviet Union.

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