Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan: Hopeful Beginning, Hopeless End? 9781138486591, 9781351045117

Table of contents :
Cover
Title
Copyright
Contents
List of tables
List of figures
List of contributors
Introduction: mapping the Ma Ying-jiu Era
Part I Domestic Politics
1 The KMT’s China policy: gains and failures
2 The DPP’s China policy before and during the Ma Ying-jiu era
3 Taiwanese nationalism in the age of cross-Strait integration: predominance and pragmatism in the Ma Ying-jiu era
4 Economic interests or national sovereignty: public opinion on the cross-Strait dilemma during the Ma Ying-jiu era
5 The rise of civil society activism in the Ma Ying-jiu era: the genesis and outcomes of the Sunflower Movement
6 Desirability and accountability in the governance of immigration under the Ma administration
Part II Cross-Strait Political Economy
7 Opportunities and pitfalls of cross-Strait economic integration during the Ma Ying-jiu era: Taiwan after the ECFA
8 Chinese investment in Taiwan in the Ma Ying-jiu era: the opportunities and the risks
9 The drift: industrial policy under President Ma
10 The political economy of the cross-Strait rapprochement: anatomy of a hegemonic project
Part III International Relations
11 More international space for Taiwan or less?
12 Taiwan’s soft power and public diplomacy under Ma Ying-jiu
13 Cross-Strait détente? The evolution of the US-Taiwan-China triangle in the Ma Ying-jiu era
14 Managing territorial nationalism in the East and South China Seas: the Ma administration’s approach
Index

Citation preview

Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan

The years of the Ma Ying-jiu presidency in Taiwan were controversial from the beginning. When he came to power in 2008, Ma was considered the strongest and most popular KMT presidential candidate since Lee Teng-hui. However, his rapprochement towards China met with increasing resistance and by the time he stepped down in 2016, he enjoyed the lowest support rates of any incumbent president. What happened in between? This book undertakes a balanced empirical assessment of the achievements and failures of the Ma Ying-jiu era. Renowned Taiwan scholars analyse the changing political environment that shaped the Ma presidency, covering important topics such as Taiwan’s evolving nationalism and rising civil societal activism, crossStrait economic integration and migration, and the factors determining its ‘international space’. As the first comprehensive scholarly work on the Ma Ying-jiu presidency, this books is a must read for students and scholars of Taiwanese politics and society, cross-Strait relations and East Asian politics in general. André Beckershoff is a Resident Fellow at the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen, Germany. Gunter Schubert is Professor and Chair of Greater China Studies and Director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan at Eberhard Karls University Tübingen.

Routledge Research on Taiwan Series Series Editor: Dafydd Fell, SOAS, UK

The Routledge Research on Taiwan Series seeks to publish quality research on all aspects of Taiwan studies. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, the books will cover topics such as politics, economic development, culture, society, anthropology and history. This new book series will include the best possible scholarship from the social sciences and the humanities and welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from younger authors. In addition to research monographs and edited volumes general works or textbooks with a broader appeal will be considered. The Series is advised by an international Editorial Board and edited by Dafydd Fell of the Centre of Taiwan Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies. Changing Taiwanese Identities Edited by J. Bruce Jacobs and Peter Kang Government and Politics in Taiwan, 2nd Edition Dafydd Fell Connecting Taiwan Participation – Integration – Impacts Edited by Carsten Storm Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan Hopeful Beginning, Hopeless End? Edited by André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert A New Era in Democratic Taiwan Trajectories and turning points in politics and cross-Strait relations Edited by Jonathan Sullivan and Chun-yi Lee For more information about this series, please visit: www.routledge.com/ asianstudies/series/RRTAIWAN

Assessing the Presidency of Ma Ying-jiu in Taiwan Hopeful Beginning, Hopeless End? Edited by André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert; individual chapters, the contributors The right of André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-48659-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-351-04511-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Apex CoVantage, LLC

Contents

List of tablesvii List of figuresix List of contributorsx

Introduction: mapping the Ma Ying-jiu Era

1

ANDRÉ BECKERSHOFF AND GUNTER SCHUBERT

PART I

Domestic Politics

15

  1 The KMT’s China policy: gains and failures

17

JONATHAN SULLIVAN AND JAMES SMYTH

  2 The DPP’s China policy before and during the Ma Ying-jiu era

37

GUNTER SCHUBERT

  3 Taiwanese nationalism in the age of cross-Strait integration: predominance and pragmatism in the Ma Ying-jiu era

59

LIAO DA-CHI, LIU CHENG-SHAN, CHEN BO-YU

  4 Economic interests or national sovereignty: public opinion on the cross-Strait dilemma during the Ma Ying-jiu era

90

CHEN CHIH-JOU JAY

  5 The rise of civil society activism in the Ma Ying-jiu era: the genesis and outcomes of the Sunflower Movement HO MING-SHO

109

vi  Contents   6 Desirability and accountability in the governance of immigration under the Ma administration

132

ISABELLE CHENG

PART II

Cross-Strait Political Economy

159

  7 Opportunities and pitfalls of cross-Strait economic integration during the Ma Ying-jiu era: Taiwan after the ECFA

161

TUNG CHEN-YUAN

  8 Chinese investment in Taiwan in the Ma Ying-jiu era: the opportunities and the risks

192

LEE CHUN-YI

  9 The drift: industrial policy under President Ma

208

DOUGLAS B. FULLER

10 The political economy of the cross-Strait rapprochement: anatomy of a hegemonic project

224

ANDRÉ BECKERSHOFF

PART III

International Relations247 11 More international space for Taiwan or less?

249

HUANG KWEI-BO

12 Taiwan’s soft power and public diplomacy under Ma Ying-jiu

276

GARY D. RAWNSLEY

13 Cross-Strait détente? The evolution of the US-Taiwan-China triangle in the Ma Ying-jiu era

295

LIN CHENG-YI

14 Managing territorial nationalism in the East and South China Seas: the Ma administration’s approach

317

CHEN MUMIN

Index

334

Tables

3.1 Typology of Taiwanese nationalism  3.2 Four types of Taiwanese nationalists  3.3 Level of TN and Taiwanese/Chinese/both options  3.4 Level of TN and unification/independence preferences  3.5 Profile of four types of Taiwanese nationalists  3.6 Overall trends for Taiwanese consciousness  3.7 Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwanese consciousness  3.8 Pragmatic orientation  3.9 Taiwanese nationalists and pragmatic orientation  3.10 Method of recording answers to six questions on Taiwanese consciousness  3.11 Coding scheme for pragmatic tendencies  4.1 Public opinion on choices between economic interests and national sovereignty in cross-Strait relations, 2010–2015  4.2 Distribution of explanatory variables, 2011–2015  4.3 Logistic regressions of respondents who regard economic interests as more important than national sovereignty  4.4 Logistic regressions of respondents who regard national sovereignty as highly important in cross-Strait relations  4.5 Public opinion on choices between economic interests and national sovereignty in cross-Strait relations, 2013 and 2015  5.1 Social, political and NIMBY protests in Taiwan (2006–2013)  7.1 List of cross-Strait agreements: 2008–2015  7.2 The Early Harvest List under the ECFA between Taiwan and China  7.3 Direct investments across the Taiwan Strait  7.4 The effects of the ECFA Early Harvest Program: 2011–2013  7.5 FDI in Taiwan: 2000–2014  7.6 The ratio of FDI inflows to Asian economies to global FDI: 2000–2012  7.7 Net international investments in Taiwan: 1990–2014  7.8 The free trade share of Asian economies by mid-2014 

67 69 71 72 73 75 76 78 79 83 84 97 99 101 102 103 111 164 166 168 169 171 171 171 173

viii  Tables 7.9 The attitude of the Taiwan public on the cross-Strait Trade Agreement in Services: Polls of Mainland Affairs Council  7.10 The attitude of the Taiwan public to the cross-Strait Trade Agreement in Services: Polls of TVBS  7.11 The attitude of the Taiwan public on the cross-Strait Trade Agreement in Services: Polls of TISR and GRI  7.12 The costs and benefits of the cross-Strait Trade Agreement in Services as perceived by the Taiwanese public  7.13 The Taiwan public’s perception on cross-Strait economic integration: July 2014  9.1 Taiwan’s trade surpluses with Mainland China and the world  11.1 Taiwan’s participation in international governmental organisations as a full member  11.2 Taiwan’s participation in international governmental organisations as an observer  13.1 Cross-Strait agreements, June 2008–August 2015 

175 175 176 177 183 210 269 270 297

Figures



2.1 7.1 7.2 7.3

7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 10.1 14.1 14.2

The three conceptual pillars of the DPP’s China Policy  Trend in Asian economic integration agreements: 1975–2014  Taiwan’s real investment rate: 1981–2015  The effects of the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Agreement as perceived by the Taiwanese public  Benefit distribution between Taiwan and China stemming from cross-Strait economic exchange  Distribution of benefits and costs among Taiwan’s various groups stemming from cross-Strait economic exchange  The effects of cross-Strait economic policy perceived by the Taiwan public  Taiwanese public perception of the transparency and supervision of cross-Strait policy decision-making  Taiwan’s imports, exports, and total trade with PRC Mainland  Manufacturing workers in 2001–2015  Taiwan’s Gini and GDP growth 1995–2015  2008 household Gini across countries  The ideological structure of the cross-Strait rapprochement  Location of Taiping and Dongsha islands  Taiwan-Japan Fishery Agreement of 2013 

41 162 170 178 179 181 182 184 209 211 213 213 235 321 324

Contributors

André Beckershoff is Research Assistant at the Chair of Greater China Studies and Research Fellow at the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT), University of Tübingen. His current research focuses on the political economy of cross-Strait relations and Taiwan’s cross-Strait related social movements. His recent publications include ‘The Sunflower Movement: Origins, structures, and strategies of Taiwan’s resistance against the ‘Black Box’’ (in Taiwan’s Social Movements under Ma Ying-jiu: From the Wild Strawberries to the Sunflowers, edited by Dafydd Fell. London & New York: Routledge, 2017) and ‘The KMT-CCP Forum: securing consent for cross-Strait rapprochement’ (in Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43(1): 2014, pp. 213–241). Boyu Chen, PhD, is Lecturer at the Department of International Studies and Regional Development at the University of Niigata Prefecture. His research focuses on internet politics and international relations of East Asia. He has co-edited the book Technology and Political Behavior: Voting Advice Applications in East Asia published by Palgrave Macmillan. His articles have appeared in  East Asia, Pacific Focus, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, and Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Chih-Jou Jay Chen, PhD, is Deputy Director and Research Fellow at the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica. He is also a jointly appointed Professor at National Tsing-Hua University, and an adjunct Professor at National Taiwan University. He is the President of the Taiwanese Sociological Association for the 2018–2019 term. He served as Director of the Center for Contemporary China, National Tsing-Hua University in 2007–2012, and was a visiting scholar at Harvard-Yenching Institute in 2014–2015. His current research focuses on popular protests and changing state-society relations in China, labor relations in Taiwanese companies in China, and China’s growing impacts on Taiwanese society. He is the author of Transforming Rural China: How Local Institutions Shape Property Rights in China (Routledge, 2004), and the co-editor of Social Capital and Its Institutional Contingency: A Study of the United States, China and Taiwan (Routledge, 2014).

Contributors xi Mumin Chen is Associate Professor and Chair at the Graduate Institute of International Politics, and director of the Center for Strategic Studies on South Asia and the Middle East, National Chung Hsing University, Taichung, Taiwan. Chen has published five books: International Security Theory: Power, State and Threat (in Chinese, Wu-Nan, Taipei: 2009), Prosperity but Insecurity: Globalization and China’s National Security 1979–2000 (Germany: 2010), International Relations Illustrated (in Chinese, co-author with Chen Wan-yu, Wu-Nan, Taipei: 2012), and Movies and International Relations (in Chinese, co-author with Chen Fong-yu, Wu-Nan, Taipei: 2014); as well as India: an Uncertain Rising Power (in Chinese, Wu-Nan, Taipei: 2016). His researches focus on international security theory, Chinese foreign policy, Taiwan-China relations, and regional politics and security in South Asia. Isabelle Cheng, PhD, is a Senior Lecturer in East Asian and International Development Studies at the School of Languages and Area Studies of the University of Portsmouth. She also serves on the Executive Board of the European Association of Taiwan Studies. Her research focuses on migration in East Asia with a reference to marriage migration, citizenship legislation, everyday multiculturalism, and political participation. Her latest research interest is the Cold War in the Taiwan Strait, focusing on Chiang Kai-shek’s war plans for recovering China. Her research is published by Asian Ethnicity and Journal of Current Chinese Affairs and is also included in Migration to and from Taiwan (edited), Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Taiwan (edited), Taiwan’s Social Movement under Ma Ying-jiu: From the Wild Strawberries to the Sunflowers (edited), and Gender, Migration and Citizenship: Revisiting Southeast Asian International Marriages (edited). Douglas B. Fuller is a Professor in the Department of Innovation, Entrepreneurship and Strategy of Zhejiang University’s School of Management. He previously taught at King’s College London, Chinese University of Hong Kong and American University. His research spans the political economy of development, technology policy and strategy, and comparative capitalism with a geographic focus on East Asia. He has written Paper Tigers, Hidden Dragons: Firms and the Political Economy of China’s Technological Development (2016) in addition to two edited volumes on Hong Kong’s technology policy and technology transfer between the US, China and Taiwan, and a number of academic journal articles. Ming-sho Ho is Professor in the Department of Sociology, National Taiwan University, and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute of Nottingham University. He published Working Class Formation in Taiwan (2014, Palgrave Macmillan) and Challenging Beijing’s Mandate of Heaven: Taiwan’s Sunflowers Movement and Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement (forthcoming, Temple University Press). Kwei-Bo Huang, Ph.D. (University of Maryland), is Vice Dean at College of International Affairs and Associate Professor of Diplomacy, National Chengchi

xii  Contributors University (NCCU), Taiwan, ROC; and Secretary General of the Taiwan-based Association of Foreign Relations (AFR). He served as the founding director of the International Master’s Program in International Studies (IMPIS) at NCCU, and as Chairman of the Research and Planning Committee at ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009–2011). He was a Fulbright visiting scholar at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University, and a visiting fellow at the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, Brookings Institute. His research interests include conflict management, public diplomacy, US foreign policy and decision-making toward the Asian Pacific, as well as ASEAN security. His most recent publication is ‘The politics of Mainland China‘s economic statecraft in relation to current cross-Strait relations’, in Mingjiang Li, ed., China‘s Economic Statecraft: Co-optation, Cooperation, and Coercion (Singapore: 2017). Chun-Yi Lee, PhD, is Associate Professor and director of the Taiwan Studies Program at the School of Politics and International Relations (SPIR) at the University of Nottingham. Her current research project is ‘Chinese investment in Taiwan: opportunities or challenges to Taiwan’s industrial development?’ This project aims to investigate bilateral cross-Strait economic activities and their impact on both societies. Chun-Yi has also done researches in national transformation and workers’ rights, analysing Chinese labour within the global economy, working with Andreas Bieler at SPIR. This project investigated the influence of different foreign investors on Chinese workers and labour rights. Using interviews, participant observation, and case studies, this project examined the emergence of civil society in this dynamic interaction among the state, foreign capital, and workers in China. Da-chi Liao is a Senior Professor at the Graduate Institute of Political Science of the National Sun-Yat-sen University (NSYSU). She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1990. She has long been focusing on legislative studies, constitutional design, identity problems, and internet and politics. From 2004 to 2006, she served as the president of the Taiwanese Political Science Association. She has published more than 60 refereed journal articles since 1990, and edited two books: American Policy in Asia Pacific Region After 9–11 (2002), and Democratization, Globalization, and the Role of Parliaments (2006, in Chinese). In the past ten years, she has been devoting significant time to study how to utilize ICTs (Information and Communication Technologies) as tools to analyze politics as well as to improve the quality of democracy in Taiwan. She has been working with information technologists to employ text-mining techniques to do content analyses either on legislative documents or on social media, such as Facebook or Taiwan’s BBS. She has also cooperated with the European University Institute (Florence, Italy) to set up the iVoter website (http://ivoternet.org/) as a communication platform between Taiwanese voters and legislative candidates for the 2012 and 2016 elections. The results of this effort were then published in two books: iVoter: A Record of Taiwan’s Internet Democracy (2013, in Chinese) and Political Behavior and Technology: Voting Advice Applications in East Asia (2016, Palgrave Macmillan).

Contributors xiii Cheng-yi Lin, PhD, is a Research Fellow at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He has conducted extensive studies on Sino-American relations and Taiwan’s national security policy. His articles have been published in journals including American Foreign Policy Interests, Asian Affairs, Asian Survey, China Quarterly, and Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. He co-edited Rise of China: Beijing’s Strategies and Implications for the Asia-Pacific (Routledge, 2009), The Future of United States, China, and Taiwan Relations (2011), and The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions (2016). Frank Cheng-shan Liu is a Professor at the Institute of Political Science at National Sun Yat-Sen University (NSYSU), Kaohsiung City, Taiwan (ROC). Dr. Liu received his Ph.D. in Political Science at the University of Kansas in 2006, majoring in the fields of American politics and public policy. His teaching and research interests include Taiwan politics, research methods and methodology, public opinion and political behavior, political psychology and political communication. His works have appeared in Journal of East Asian Studies, Asian Survey, Advances in Complex Systems, International Political Science Review, and International Public Opinion Research. His most recent publication titles include ‘Taiwanese voters’ political identification profile, 2013–2014: Becoming one China or creating a new country?’, ‘Generation matters: Taiwan’s perceptions of Mainland China and attitudes towards crossStrait trade talks’,and ‘Declining news media viewership and the survival of political disagreement’. Gary D. Rawnsley is Professor of Public Diplomacy in the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, UK. A specialist on international political communication, Professor Rawnsley has published extensively on how propaganda, public diplomacy, cultural diplomacy and so-called Soft Power contribute to the shape and conduct of foreign policy. While he researches and writes on these subjects with a broad-brush approach, he tends to focus on East Asia and South East, especially Taiwan, China, Vietnam, and South Korea. He is the co-editor of the Routledge Handbook of Chinese Media (2015) and the Routledge Handbook of Soft Power (2016), and his articles have appeared in The China Quarterly, Politics, and the Journal of International Communication. Gunter Schubert, PhD, is Professor of Greater China Studies at the Institute of Asian and Oriental Studies (AOI), University of Tübingen. He is also the founder and director of the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at that university. His current research focuses on state-business relations and policy implementation in China’s local state, cross-Strait relations, Taiwanese entrepreneurs as a strategic group in the cross-Strait political economy, and political steering theory applied to the Chinese policy process. Recent publications include The Routledge Handbook on Contemporary Taiwan (edited), London-New York: Routledge; Taiwan and the ‘China Impact’: Challenges and Opportunities (edited), London-New York: Routledge, 2015;

xiv  Contributors Participation and Empowerment at the Grassroots – Chinese Village Elections in Perspective, Lanham: 2013 (co-authored by Anna L. Ahlers); Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century. Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives, London-New York: Routledge, 2011 (co-edited by Jens Damm). James Smyth is a graduate student at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He previously worked for four years as a translator and editor for the Taiwanese government. Jonathan Sullivan, PhD, is Director of the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, UK, where he is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations. Dr Sullivan is founding editor of China Policy Institute: Analysis, a popular online magazine featuring academic commentary on contemporary China. His papers, essays and op-eds are all available at jonlsullivan.com and he tweets @jonlsullivan. Chen-yuan Tung is currently Taiwan’s representative to Thailand and Distinguished Professor at the Graduate Institute of Development Studies, National Chengchi University (Taiwan). He received his PhD degree majoring in international affairs from the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. From September 2006 to May 2008, he was Vice Chairman (Vice Minister) of the Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan, Republic of China (Taiwan). In 2008, he was awarded the Excellent Young Scholarship, National Science Council, Executive Yuan; in 2012, he was awarded the Award for Special Outstanding Research, National Chengchi University. From May to September 2016, he was Spokesman of the Executive Yuan; from October 2016 to July 2017, he was senior advisor in the National Security Council (Taiwan). His expertise focuses on international political economy, Chinese economic development, and prediction markets.

Introduction Mapping the Ma Ying-jiu Era André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert

When Ma Ying-jiu was elected president of the Republic of China in March 2008, the Taiwanese people – no matter whether they supported the KMT leader at the time or not – could expect change. The country had frequently been paralysed politically during the two terms in office of the DPP incumbent, Chen Shui-bian, who had led a minority government. Chen was deeply entangled in several corruption scandals when he had to step down for constitutional reasons, frustrating his party and his supporters, who faced a severe blow at the ballot box. At the same time, Ma Ying-jiu had successfully created a personal image of honesty and righteousness. A Harvard-trained lawyer who had served as personal assistant to the late KMT leader, Chiang Ching-kuo, in the early stages of his career, and had later served as justice minister and mayor of the capital city of Taipei, Ma was certainly as much a product of the KMT party apparatus as everybody else who had qualified for top positions in the party and the state. Nevertheless, Ma had managed to gain a reputation for professionalism and sincerity among the ordinary Taiwanese people that made him stand out among the KMT’s other potential leaders, and the fact that he was good-looking and elegant in his outward appearance helped as well. Most important, in addition to focusing on his personal characteristics in the 2008 electoral campaign, he had a policy issue to sell: a policy change in cross-Strait relations. Under Chen Shui-bian, whose unexpected success in the elections in 2000 had brought an end to the era of uninterrupted KMT rule since 1945, Taiwan had taken a road that China’s leaders abhorred. Having been mistrusted and ignored by the Beijing government from the very beginning of his first term in office and following his razor-thin win in the presidential election of 2004, Chen eventually embarked on a political course that was quickly branded as ‘Taiwanisation’ by domestic and international observers.1 His policies promoted Taiwan nationalism and the consolidation of a Taiwan national identity that had been crystallising since the beginning of the democratic era, and he seemed to become increasingly nationalist towards the end of his second and last term (Schubert and Braig 2011). Conversely, Ma was insisting on Taiwan’s Chinese identity, embodied in Taiwan’s official designation as the Republic of China, and was promising a radical shift in the government’s China policy once he was elected. This promise was founded on the communication channels to the Chinese Communist Party that the KMT had

2  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert maintained since the early 2000s and then institutionalized in 2005 as a dialogue platform that soon became known as the cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Cultural Forum (Beckershoff 2014). The Forum’s annual meetings between political and economic elites from both sides of the Taiwan Strait served to prepare the groundwork for the cross-Strait rapprochement after the 2008 presidential elections.2 The future president promised that he would quickly establish direct trade, transport and communication ties between Taiwan and China and, in his public speeches, he reiterated that Taiwan’s economic future and wellbeing, as well as its security, depended on good relations with Beijing based on the 1992 Consensus (Muyard 2008). A so-called mainlander (waishengren) himself, Ma claimed that he was ‘a new Taiwanese’, that is, a ROC citizen raised in Taiwan who loved Taiwan and would never harm its interests, and that he was the man Taiwan now needed to resolve the country’s many problems (Kaeding 2009). The public, particularly the many voters who were not attached to any political party, tended to believe him. Ma’s victory in the 2008 presidential elections was overwhelming, and the defeat of the DPP’s candidate, Frank C. T. Hsieh, devastating. The new president had a strong mandate to ‘turn the wheel’, and he immediately made good on his promises pertaining to cross-Strait policy. At the end of 2008, after only a few months of negotiations, Ma’s administration was ready to sign the first bilateral agreement with China. Since cross-Strait relations are not considered state-to-state relations by the two sides, the Ma government continued the practice established by the former KMT president, Lee Teng-hui (1988–2000), conducting negotiations through two semi-official bodies, Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China’s Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). Throughout the first Ma administration period (2008–2012), cross-Strait relations were stabilised by continuous dialogue across the Taiwan Strait and an increasing number of bilateral accords.3 Everybody seemed to be happy: the KMT and its supporters, the Chinese government and, not least, the US, Taiwan’s major ally and protector, which had a strong interest in a peaceful cross-Strait relationship so that there was at least less to worry about in that part of the world. In fact, however, everybody was not happy. To begin with, the KMT’s new approach to China, which emphasized the ROC’s constitutional legacy of representing the whole of China and strictly rejected the idea of a Taiwanese nation, went against a trend that has been well documented in many surveys: the increasing self-perception of the island’s population as Taiwanese, not Chinese (Hughes 2014). Despite the fact that most Taiwanese people welcomed the rapprochement between the two sides, there were arguably just as many who strictly opposed any intrusion on Taiwan’s de facto independence, if not sovereignty. Resistance to cross-Strait economic integration, or against the way in which this was being negotiated, was already visible during the first Ma administration, most notably in 2008 when Chen Yunlin, who headed the Taiwan Affairs Office at the PRC State Council and was one of China’s top negotiators, visited Taiwan. This provoked the sudden emergence of the Wild Strawberry Movement – a loosely organized protest movement that led to the first political crisis of Ma Ying-jiu’s

Introduction  3 government (Gold 2009). This movement did not succeed in bringing about a change of course, but it indicated that there was more resistance to Ma’s China policy within the civil society than was apparent from the outside. These alarm signals were dismissed by the government, however.4 In the years that followed, the feeling within Taiwan’s vibrant civil society of being unduly exposed to a cartel of cross-Strait business and political elites that was selling out the island to China gained momentum (Cheung 2010). Ma Ying-jiu and the people surrounding him remained unperturbed, however, and defended the official line in crossStrait relations as Taiwan’s only option. The 2012 presidential elections proved to be a much tougher race than the incumbent might have expected. Even right up to the end of the hard-fought campaign, it seemed that his challenger, the DPP’s Tsai Ing-wen, would win. Eventually, however, Ma prevailed, and – with 51.6 percent against Tsai’s 45.6 percent – quite comfortably too. Despite the apparent uneasiness on the part of many Taiwanese who could not foresee what the next step in Ma’s China approach would be or where the president was heading in political terms, the ‘winds of change’ had not yet gathered force (Schubert 2012). Most of Taiwan’s middle-of-the-road voters could not see what kind of alternative policies the DPP had to offer when it came to cross-Strait relations, since Tsai had built her campaign strategy on domestic issues and Ma’s incompetence in solving bread-and-butter issues at home, intentionally sidestepping the ‘China complex’. Tsai’s strategy failed, however, not least because Ma Ying-jiu was still able to maintain an image of personal integrity among many of the Taiwanese. What happened next is still hard to grasp, for many KMT members as well as for many long-term observers of the rough-and-tumble world of Taiwan politics. Within the space of only two years, the KMT government found itself in a full-scale crisis that ended in defeat. Pivotal to this development was the signing of a cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA) in June 2013. This agreement embodied the president’s unchanging stance that economic integration across the Taiwan Strait must be pushed forward. The ensuing legislative battle to ratify the agreement gave rise to the greatest public turmoil since the early days of democratization some 25 years previously. The Sunflower Movement, which erupted in 2014 and led to student occupation of the Legislative Yuan and adjacent streets for three weeks between 18 March and 10 April of that year, destroyed the government’s argument that its China policy enjoyed the unanimous support of Taiwanese citizens (Beckershoff 2017). Against a background of increasing strife and bickering within the KMT over the best way to deal with the public discontent and the way in which Taiwan conducted negotiations with China, not only did Ma Ying-jiu’s approval ratings drop to historic lows for an incumbent president, but the unity of the KMT was also destroyed. The party suffered a devastating defeat in local elections in November 2014 and even more crushing losses in the January 2016 legislative and presidential elections. The time between these two events was plagued by chaos within the KMT as the party struggled with the nomination of a presidential candidate to replace Ma Ying-jiu, as well as with the question of how to adapt its China policy in order to win back the people’s trust. Ma himself

4  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert had become a burden to the party because he represented a KMT that was stubbornly adhering to its position, and telling the people that the current government knew best regarding what was good for them. Obviously, the KMT did not stand any chance at the ballot box, no matter who was nominated or what the party said. In contrast to the situation in 2012, the ‘winds of change’ had now gathered sufficient strength to force the KMT off the stage. Throughout these stormy months, Ma himself remained unperturbed. He insisted that his China policy was necessary and wise, and he went out of his way to organize a meeting with the Communist Party Secretary and PRC president Xi Jinping. For tactical reasons, the Chinese eventually agreed and Xi met Ma in Singapore in November 2015, only weeks before the general elections. In retrospect, this move was probably the final blow that sealed the KMT’s political fate at the end of the Ma Ying-jiu era. In Taiwan, very few people were able to understand how such a visit could benefit Taiwan, and all the more so because the ROC president seemed to want to evoke the impression that demonstrating unity with the Chinese was more important to him than ascertaining Taiwan’s sovereignty. As was widely reported in a press release after his meeting with Xi, Ma had not emphasized Taiwan’s viewpoint on the 1992 Consensus, i.e., a consensus on a single China that was interpreted differently on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Even if Ma had not intended to send out the message that ‘one China’ was more important to him than ROC sovereignty, his failure to mention the second part of the formula was a major public relations disaster, which the opposition were well able to exploit. Although Ma Ying-jiu did not stand for re-election in 2016 and Eric Chu ran as the KMT candidate, most observers agreed that Ma was responsible for the KMT’s rapid decline in such a short time, and that the KMT had not been defeated because the DPP had fought a brilliant campaign that offered convincing policy alternatives. Feelings of betrayal, mistrust and imminent danger were evident, particularly among the Taiwanese in the younger cohorts. More important, a sense of disappointment with the KMT prevailed among Taiwan’s middle-of-the-road voters. The president had lost his credibility; unable to resolve the crisis, he had nevertheless attempted to reinforce his position by acting arrogantly and even illegally.5 He had also shown that he was unable to learn from past mistakes. When he stepped down in May 2016, all bets were off as to whether Ma would be politically persecuted and legally prosecuted for corruption, as Chen Shui-bian had been. However, at the time of writing, the DPP government has chosen to use its new parliamentary majority to bring on track legislation targeting the KMT’s contested party assets and to remain steadfast in its rejection of the 1992 Consensus.6 The DPP’s position of ‘leniency’ towards Ma Ying-jiu would appear to stem from the fact that the former ruling party is in disarray and that the KMT’s chances of making a political comeback before 2020 are negligible. So what is the legacy of the Ma Ying-jiu era? Although a legacy, in this sense, is a moving target that can change its content and meaning over time, it makes sense to conduct a preliminary assessment of the two KMT administrations led by Ma and the way in which they contributed to the shaping of contemporary Taiwan.

Introduction  5 First of all, such an analysis will help to answer the question of why Ma’s government fell from grace in its final years. This question is particularly puzzling when seen against the background of the general enthusiasm for the government during its early years. Second, this analysis will allow us to measure the achievements of the two Ma administrations against their own claims and pretensions, not only in the field of cross-Strait relations but also in the context of the domestic political (including legal) and economic reforms that were carried out. And third, a baseline will be drawn for a later assessment of the Tsai Ing-wen era – which will certainly be undertaken by Taiwan scholars in due course. The contributions to this edited volume derive from a two-day workshop held at the European Research Center on Contemporary Taiwan (ERCCT) at the University of Tübingen in December 2015. The intensively revised chapters present critical reflections on the achievements and failures of the Ma Ying-jiu era in various policy fields, which are basically structured into three sections: domestic politics, political economy and international relations. The complex issue of the cross-Strait relationship has not been confined to a separate chapter, but forms an integral part of each chapter, hence is considered from many different perspectives. Certainly, more policy fields could have been dealt with, but we believe that the selection presented here provides a fairly accurate picture of what was achieved during Ma Ying-jiu’s terms in office, of where his government succeeded and where it failed. The remainder of this introduction summarizes the content of the different chapters that have been selected for this volume. Jon Sullivan and James Smyth deliver a balanced account of the successes and failures of the Ma Ying-jiu era. Depending on the perspective, of course, these can be defined in very different ways, but the authors agree that Ma’s greatest achievements consisted in a substantial reduction in cross-Strait tensions and the institutionalization of the cross-Strait relationship. These came with increased economic interaction between the two sides, which helped Taiwan’s economy, and with an increase in the international participation of the Republic of China. Ma’s policies did not lead to the demilitarization of the Taiwan Strait, however. The economic benefits were distributed unequally across Taiwan’s society, and a feeling that privileges were being unfairly granted to Taiwan’s conglomerates emerged, which contributed substantially to a rise in anti-China sentiment. These feelings were exacerbated by Ma Ying-jiu’s revitalization of Chinese nationalism at a time when Taiwanese identity formation was being consolidated. Public discontent culminated in the 2014 Sunflower Movement, the starting point of a dramatic defeat for the KMT, which was eventually destroyed at the polls in the 2016 presidential and legislative elections. Taiwan had never been more economically dependent on China than it was at the end of the Ma Ying-jiu era, but this has to be seen against a background of stable cross-Strait relations. The 1992 Consensus has lost its appeal among the Taiwanese public and the new DPP government will not continue along Ma’s path toward cross-Strait integration. Consequently, Taiwan faces an uncertain future, but is able to act with more self-confidence. Gunter Schubert looks back at the DPP’s China policy since the party was established in 1986, and traces policy changes during the Ma Ying-jiu era,

6  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert particularly after Tsai Ing-wen’s election defeat in 2012, when she tried to focus on domestic issues and invoked an abstract ‘Taiwan consensus’ as a substitute for a clear-cut approach to China. The conceptual basis of the DPP’s China policy has not changed since the party’s 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Striving for an ‘independent’ Taiwan on the one hand, and pragmatically accepting the ‘Republic of China’ as the official signifier of a sovereign Taiwanese state on the other, have remained solid pillars of the DPP’s China policy edifice, despite isolated and futile attempts from within the party to scrap the ‘independence clause’. While Ma Ying-jiu was able to marginalize the DPP in 2008 and to win a convincing mandate in 2012 with an agenda that was focused on cross-Strait rapprochement and continuing economic integration, his party failed miserably in 2016. Generational change and national identity formation, as Schubert argues, had undergirded a process of accelerating alienation between the pro-Chinese KMT government and Taiwan’s youth, a process that culminated in the 2014 Sunflower Movement. The political environment changed profoundly, and has made the DPP a strong ruling party that has not been forced to modify the essence of its political credo concerning Taiwan’s relationship with China. Meanwhile, the KMT is facing a bleak future. The party’s One China narrative has lost, and continues to lose, its appeal in Taiwan and the party seems unable to find a more convincing narrative that not only attracts voters but also satisfies China’s uncompromising quest for sovereignty over Taiwan. Liao Da-chi, Liu Cheng-shan and Chen Bo-yu discuss the ever-controversial issue of Taiwanese nationalism and identity as this evolved during the Ma Yingjiu era. Combining primordialism with constructivism, they investigate various forms of Taiwanese nationalism and their relationship to the concepts of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ and ‘Taiwanese pragmatism’. Building on existing survey studies and a comprehensive set of self-gathered data, they find that the Taiwanese people display similar levels of Taiwanese consciousness and, to a certain extent, even pragmatism, regardless of their Taiwanese nationalist sentiments. This means that even the Taiwanese people who do not support Taiwanese independence and regard the Mainland Chinese as their compatriots still feel more Taiwanese than Chinese, and also that even the Taiwanese people who are strong supporters of Taiwanese independence and do not regard the Mainland Chinese as their compatriots would still be in favour of continuing economic and trade ties across the Taiwan Strait and would reject the idea of going to war with China in order to safeguard Taiwan’s sovereignty. Concurrently, younger people below the age of 30 are more inclined to be strong Taiwanese nationalists than those in the older cohorts. Nevertheless, younger people are also more pragmatic, as are people with higher levels of education. All in all, the authors’ research confirms what has been claimed by other recent studies: Taiwanese nationalism, in terms of Taiwanese consciousness, has decoupled from the old identity divide within Taiwanese society and is firmly entrenched in all the constituencies of the latter. At the same time, Taiwanese nationalism does not preclude having a pragmatic outlook on cross-Strait relations: the Taiwanese can be nationalistic while still advocating economic interaction and integration across the Taiwan Strait.

Introduction 7 Somewhat counter-intuitively, the Ma Ying-jiu era has reinforced these long-term trends instead of changing them, but some uncertainty remains as to whether such changes were ever considered by the Ma administration. Chen Chih-jou, in his chapter, reports on a number of national surveys that were conducted by Academia Sinica’s Institute of Sociology in order to clarify whether the Taiwanese people placed a greater value on ‘economic interests’ or on ‘national sovereignty’ when asked to choose the major factors that determined their perspective on cross-Strait relations and negotiations. Towards the end of the Ma Ying-jiu era, the percentage of those who valued national sovereignty more than economic interests clearly increased, although those who considered that bilateral negotiations should be given priority, in view of Taiwan’s economic interests, remained more numerous. Particularly during the years from 2013 to 2015, Taiwan’s young people became more nationalistic, no matter what their educational background. This was reflected in the declining support for the Ma administration in its final years in office and in the catalytic effect of the Sunflower Movement in 2014 on the people’s nationalist sentiments. Overall, independently of their economic background, respondents showed an increasing inclination towards choosing national sovereignty over economic interests, and middle-of-the-road voters displayed the steepest rise, compared with ‘pan blue’ and ‘pan green’ supporters. Chen’s study also points at a causal link between the Taiwanese people’s assessment of the state of China’s economy: the more pessimistic they were, the more they tended to support national sovereignty. Chen suggests that nationalism, as an ‘affective commitment’, weighs more heavily than economic pragmatism, but his findings are conditioned by the juxtaposition of the preferences for ‘national sovereignty’ and ‘economic interests’ in the set-up of his survey. He does not explore the extent to which Taiwanese people support both Taiwanese sovereignty and close cross-Strait economic interaction, which certainly constitutes an enthralling question for further research. Ho Ming-sho’s chapter revisits the Sunflower Movement, which emerged at the end of the Ma Ying-jiu era and epitomized the resistance of much of Taiwan’s vibrant civil society to the KMT’s high-handedness in pushing for cross-Strait integration. Civil society activism, as Ho notes, was rising long before the Sunflower Movement’s three-week occupation of the national legislature in the spring of 2014, and had begun with the Wild Strawberry Movement in 2008. The driving force behind the social activism during Ma’s second term in office was certainly the ‘China factor’, that is, the rising impact of China on Taiwan’s political and social fabric that was so wilfully embraced by the Ma administration. Numerous new civil society organisations were set up to counter Ma’s policies. Arguably, they were fighting for what has been called a ‘third imagination of China’, meaning a policy line that went beyond what the KMT and the DPP had to offer for engaging with China. The ruling party’s attempt to railroad the cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA) through the Legislative Yuan in March 2014 served as a catalyst to trigger a large-scale protest movement that wrought significant changes in Taiwan’s political landscape. Ma was forced to backtrack on the CSTSA and to use legislative procedures to ensure better legislative oversight of

8  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert cross-Strait agreements, although he remained committed to his course of increasing integration across the Taiwan Strait. The Sunflower Movement, for its part, lived on in a period of increased movement activism. This activism was not only focused on opposing nuclear power and school curriculum supervision, but also on increasing the political participation of civil society. Ho concludes that, with hindsight, the Ma Ying-jiu era could be called Taiwan’s ‘revolutionary sixties’, an era of rising movement activism and youth participation nurtured by government policies which, arguably, increasingly failed to resonate with broad sections of Taiwanese society. Isabelle Cheng looks at immigration governance and policies during the Ma Ying-jiu era, which, as a general principle, differentiated between foreign spouses and Chinese spouses on the one hand and high-skilled and low-skilled contract labour on the other. The author ponders the reasons for the changes in immigration policies after the KMT came to power in 2008, which strengthened the legal status of foreign spouses and Chinese spouses and blue-collar workers from Southeast Asia, three constituencies that evoked negative images among the majority of the Taiwanese people. As the author’s analysis shows, the KMT’s policies were partly driven by their electoral strategy. For example, the migrant spouses were expected to support the KMT because they were thought to believe that the party had contributed to their social wellbeing. The policy changes aimed at foreign contract labour, however, were a result of the political pressure that was exerted by the United States to remind Taiwan of its self-created Nationhood of Human Rights narrative, rather than the result of a domestically driven agenda. In its systematic attempts to attract global talent to boost Taiwan’s economy, the KMT clearly displayed a bias towards highly skilled foreign labour, most notably by legalising the homemaking services provided by Southeast Asian women to meet the demand of foreign professionals and their families. This chapter highlights the fact that, in addition to the impact of civic organizations, which advocated for the rights of migrants in Taiwan, the Ma administration’s willingness to launch new legal initiatives in the realm of migration governance was also driven by electoral considerations, foreign (US) influence and the vision of making Taiwan a hub for global talent. Tung Chen-yuan takes stock of cross-Strait economic integration during the Ma Ying-jiu era and provides a critical assessment of the promise made by President Ma that deepening cross-Strait relations, most notably by establishing a number of important trade agreements, would be most helpful to Taiwan’s economy and to Taiwan’s incorporation in the process of East Asian economic integration. However, a thorough examination of trade and investment figures showed that the ECFA signed in mid-2010 had only a minimal positive effect, at best, on the Taiwanese economy. The agreement did little if anything to stop the decline in domestic and foreign investment, and did not help Taiwan to gain better access to free trade regimes in the region. Moreover, the Taiwanese public had developed a sceptical, if not outright negative, attitude towards the China policies of the Ma administration and the promise that these policies would contribute to the economic well-being of the people while helping Taiwan to manage the ‘China

Introduction 9 threat’. By the end of Ma’s mandate, public confidence in the government was at its lowest level since the return of the KMT to power in 2008, and the Sunflower Movement epitomized the public quest for greater transparency and stricter oversight of any new step towards cross-Strait economic integration. This chapter then discusses the different approaches that could be taken towards reforming the economy in order to master the challenges of globalization. As Tung points out, Taiwan must face the fact that it cannot shy away from the Chinese market and must promote structural changes in the domestic economy in order to be fit for it. Finally, Tung suggests that the new DPP administration cannot deviate too much from the approach to cross-Strait economic relations that was adopted by Ma, but that some changes would be needed to put the necessary structural reforms on track and to deal with public concerns regarding Taiwan’s relationship with China. Lee Chun-yi tackles a controversial topic that was hotly debated in the Ma Ying-jiu era: Chinese investment in Taiwan’s economy, particularly in Taiwan’s high-tech industries. The Taiwanese government lifted the ban on such investment in 2009 and then opened further sectors, in succession, for Chinese investors over the next seven years. Today, almost the entire manufacturing sector and half the service sector are accessible to Chinese investors. The cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement signed in June 2013 would have pushed the liberalization process even further, although that agreement has been stalled in the legislature since the eruption of the Sunflower Movement in early 2014. The author focuses on Chinese investment in Taiwan’s high-tech sector, which constitutes the backbone of Taiwan’s export economy and is most important for profit generation through industrial innovation. Furthermore, the Taiwanese IT sector has substantial security ramifications for Taiwan, so that Chinese investment here is a very sensitive issue. Investment figures have been low up to now due to Taiwan’s strict investment regulation regime (which targets Chinese investment in particular), but Lee makes clear that the high-tech sector is nevertheless interesting for Chinese companies because of the quality of Taiwan’s human capital and R&D capabilities. In other words, Chinese investors are primarily interested in making good use of Taiwan’s innovation resources. Against this background, Taiwanese high-tech companies have to do their best to be integrated in the Chinese domestic market and to become a part of the rising ‘red supply chain’ in order to maintain their regional and international competitiveness. Douglas B. Fuller provides a critical account of Taiwan’s industrial policy during the rule of Ma Ying-jiu. He underlines the fact that Taiwan’s manufacturing and service sectors have not at any point been ‘hollowed out’ by Taiwan’s capital investment in China since the early 2000s, and also that Taiwan’s economy, at least in terms of employment, remained robust throughout the Ma era. There has been a significant rise in inequality on the island, but that trend set in long before Ma Ying-jiu came to power. Taiwan under Ma was unable to make a breakthrough in developing its high technology sectors, which are critical for industrial upgrading, and the state’s influence on the economy declined continuously. Yet again, however, since these developments had already been observed much earlier

10  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert on, they cannot be attributed to failed policies during the Ma era. Certainly, Ma failed to resolve Taiwan’s economic problems by intensifying cross-Strait economic interaction. However, the fears of Taiwan’s selling out to China were much inflated, given the limited scope of economic cooperation between the two sides, which was mainly due to the fact that Taiwan had very little to offer China and that Chinese investments in Taiwan remained strictly regulated and restricted throughout the Ma era. Finally, Fuller shows that the domestic concern that was aroused by the cross-Straits Service Trade Agreement, based on the alleged selling out of Taiwan’s economic interests, was out of all proportion to reality, as a close look at the details of the agreement reveals. However, Fuller also notes that societal resistance against the agreement was an almost unavoidable consequence, given the poor handling of the legislative review by the ruling party in early 2014. In the end, the Ma administration did not leave Taiwan’s economy in good shape, but whether Tsai Ing-wen’s new government can do any better remains to be seen, and Fuller is quite pessimistic about the DPP’s chances of success in this direction. André Beckershoff concludes the section on the political economy of crossStrait relations with a critical reading of the so-called cross-Strait rapprochement during the Ma Ying-jiu era. He argues that the framing of the rapprochement as ‘natural’, ‘normal’ and ‘necessary’ was the result of an organized effort made by the KMT government and Taiwan’s big business to portray the normalization of economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait as being in Taiwan’s general interest. The author unveils the hegemonic project behind the rapprochement which has been pursued by capitalist forces in conjunction with political elites with the aim of opening up the Chinese market as a solution for Taiwan’s enterprises, because these have been facing fierce global competition since the end of the neo-mercantilist developmental state era in the mid-1980s. They rallied around the 1992 Consensus as an ideological narrative that suggested a possible separation between economics and politics, with politics left untouched by economic exchanges across the Taiwan Strait, and set up an institutional network of lobby groups that promoted this narrative in Taiwan’s domestic discourse. The hegemonic project was successful in gaining the acquiescence of critical forces, to some extent, since the subaltern passivity of Taiwan’s farmers was secured; however, the project failed to convince Taiwan’s youth, who felt that they had been betrayed by Ma Ying-jiu’s promised ‘rapprochement dividend’, and who joined forces in the Sunflower Movement. As a consequence, the KMT was ousted from power. While the Sunflower Movement was able to politicize the particular interests behind the rapprochement, Beckershoff points at the ‘vast hegemonic apparatus’ that has been built up over the years, which is now targeting the young Taiwanese and is still powerful enough to impose constraints on the new DPP government as well. Huang Kwei-bo deals with the tricky question of whether Ma Ying-jiu’s China and foreign policy gained more or less international space for Taiwan. This ‘international space’ is measured by the number and quality of Taiwan’s bilateral relations with other ‘sovereign actors in the world’ and by the extent of the freedom that Taiwan has to participate in international non-governmental organizations and

Introduction 11 other multilateral fora. As Huang concedes, differentiating between more or less is a subjective process and the result is necessarily dependent on plausible argument because it cannot, of course, be measured objectively. He goes on to argue that Ma’s low-profile approach to gaining ‘meaningful’ participation in international settings was quite successful. Ma did fairly well in achieving ‘some more’ international space for Taiwan; he secured a tacit understanding from Beijing that no diplomatic allies of Taiwan should be lured to the Chinese side, was granted access to a number of IGOs as observer or guest, and signed at least two free trade agreements in the aftermath of the ECFA (with New Zealand and Singapore). This achievement, as Huang admits, is seen differently by those who are striving for Taiwan’s independence, but corresponds to what Taiwan could realistically hope to achieve under the circumstances. In comparison to the previous administration under Chen Shui-bian, the Ma government expanded Taiwan’s international space, a trajectory which Tsai Ing-wen’s administration is bound to follow. In this sense, Ma arguably created the best of all worlds available for Taiwan in terms of international space, although this assessment will be challenged continuously by those who claim that such space should not be a dependent variable of cross-Strait and US-China relations. Gary D. Rawnsley assesses Taiwan’s public diplomacy during the Ma Yingjiu era. Ma believed strongly in Taiwan’s soft power and the contribution that public diplomacy can make to attaining more international visibility and influence. Rawnsley’s core argument is that Taiwan has substantial soft power, but needs to improve its public diplomacy efforts in order to make good use of it. More precisely, the dissolution of the Government Information Office in 2012 with the concomitant transfer of responsibilities to the conservative Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the newly established Ministry of Culture were major political errors that resulted in a number of public diplomacy setbacks and limited Taiwan’s potential to unlock its ‘disabling environment’. Since then, no central government authority has been successful in developing a consistent method for Taiwan to send its message out into the world. As a matter of fact, Taiwan’s public diplomacy has been reduced to projecting an image of Taiwan as the preserver of traditional Chinese culture to global audiences, and intentionally renouncing the notion of bringing home the narrative of Taiwan’s democratic values and good governance. Instead, however, as the author emphasizes, this narrative has been rescued by Taiwan’s vibrant civil society and NGOs. To sum up, the Ma era undersold Taiwan’s soft power and therefore failed to increase the attention that was being paid to the island republic in the liberal-democratic world. While Rawnsley stops short of saying that the Ma administration decapitated Taiwan’s public diplomacy, his findings seem to suggest that Ma Ying-jiu’s failure to utilize the full potential of Taiwan’s soft power worked against his efforts to enhance Taiwan’s security, notwithstanding the government’s other contributions towards the easing of cross-Strait tensions. Lin Cheng-yi assesses the triangular relationship between the US, China and Taiwan during the Ma Ying-jiu era. Overall, Washington welcomed the crossStrait détente because it reduced the danger of US military involvement in the

12  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert Asia-Pacific region and helped to stabilize the relationship of the Obama administration with China. For this reason, Washington also exercised caution in the selling of advanced weapons systems to Taiwan, an issue of continuous contention between the US and China. On the other hand, the Obama administration did not agree to trade their willingness to provide Taiwan with military equipment for the reduced deployment of Chinese missiles targeting Taiwan. Ma Ying-jiu was oscillating between China and the US, trying to reassure each of the two sides about his reliability and trust in their respective bilateral relationships with Taiwan. Although he succeeded in substantially reducing political and military tensions in the Taiwan Strait, his policy arguably implied reduced political autonomy for Taiwan vis-à-vis China. It also nurtured a debate in the US on whether ‘abandoning Taiwan’ was becoming an option for US diplomacy in order to further strengthen US-China relations. The triangular relationship was therefore maintained in a sensitive balance that was constantly threatened by China’s rising military power as well as by access and denial capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region. The author questions whether this sensitive balance can be sustained after the end of the Ma Ying-jiu era, with a new government in place that is clearly more critical of crossStrait rapprochement than its predecessor, and is more inclined to seek US support to contain the ‘China threat’. Washington, for its part, must come to terms with the fact that the military balance in the Taiwan Strait has tilted towards China, which reduces US influence on cross-Strait political negotiations and makes military interference in the Taiwan Strait, if this should be considered necessary, increasingly costly. At the end of the Ma era, therefore, the triangular relationship faced many challenges, probably even more than at the beginning of the Ma regime. Chen Mumin discusses Taiwan’s difficult position during the Ma Ying-jiu era in maintaining its sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas. In both the Diaoyutai/Senkaku and Spratly territorial conflicts, the Ma administration upheld a stance of undisputed sovereignty on the part of the Republic of China. In the case of the Diaoyu islands, Ma compromised by signalling to Japan, an important political ally, that his administration did not have any interest in a serious confrontation. Consequently, he negotiated a fishery agreement with Japan and put sovereignty on the back burner, which served to de-escalate political tensions with Japan significantly. In the South China Sea case, however, he eventually chose to assert Taiwan’s claims to Taiping Island (Itu Aba) by reinforcing military installations, intensifying the deployment of armed forces, and making a symbolic visit there at the end of his incumbency. Although Ma Ying-jiu presented peace initiatives to the international community that were aimed at resolving both the Diaoyutai/ Senkaku and Spratly territorial disputes, these suggestions were widely ignored, which underlined Taiwan’s weak position in East Asian power politics. The new DPP government has continued with Ma’s policy up to now, and even rejected the International Court of Final Arbitration’s ruling on the case brought by the Philippines against the PRC in July 2016. Obviously, Taiwan’s territorial claims are something even an independence-leaning Taiwan government cannot easily disregard, since this would inevitably complicate Taiwan’s relationship with China.

Introduction  13

Notes 1 Chen Shui-bian seemed to hope that he would be able to convince the Chinese government of his sincerity when he proclaimed, in his 2000 inauguration speech, what would quickly become known as his ‘Four Noes and One Without’, i.e., no declaration of Taiwan’s independence, no change in the national title ‘Republic of China’ to ‘Republic of Taiwan’, no inclusion of Lee Teng-hui’s ‘special state-to-state relations’ in the ROC constitution, no promotion of a referendum on Taiwanese independence, and no abolition of the National Unification Council (which ‘ceased to function’ after February 2006, however). Beijing failed to respond to Chen’s early overtures. When Chen spoke publicly of ‘one country on both sides’ (yibian yiguo) in August 2002, he was quickly accused of being a traitor and ‘splittist’ by China’s leaders and was not able to proceed any further in developing cross-Strait relations after setting up the ‘three small links’: direct trade, transport, and communication links between Taiwan and Kinmen/Mazu. 2 Eleven such fora have been held since 2005. The latest – now named the Cross-Strait Peaceful Development forum – took place in November 2016. 3 At the end of the Ma Ying-jeou era, more than 20 cross-Strait agreements had been signed by both sides, represented by their unofficial contact organisations, the Taiwanese Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Chinese Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS). For an official overview, see Mainland Affairs Council, www. mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145&CtNode=5710&mp=1. 4 The 2008 protests met with heavy-handed police action that stirred up strong feelings and even triggered a debate on political regression to authoritarianism in Taiwan. Interestingly enough, the protestors used ROC flags to show their opposition to Chen Yunlin, not the green flag that symbolizes Taiwan’s independence. These flags were distributed by the movement’s organizers shortly before Chen Yunlin’s arrival, in an apparent attempt to focus on Taiwan’s sovereignty as the ROC. 5 Many deemed it illegal that, in September 2013, Ma Ying-jeou, in a personal vendetta against his long-time opponent, the president of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-pyng, encouraged the general prosecutor Huang Shy-ming to leak classified information on wiretapped phone calls between Wang and the DPP caucus whip, Ker Chien-ming (which suggested the intended lobbying of senior justice officials in a case against Ker) and then tried to strip Wang of his party membership. However, this move was thrown out by the courts and Wang took revenge during the Sunflower Movement when he promised the students that he would not call in the police to clear the parliament building, and would not push for any decision on the CSTSA before a law on overseeing cross-Strait legislation, one of the central demands of the protesters, had been formally promulgated. 6 In August  2016, the Executive Yuan launched the Ill-Gotten Party Assets Settlement Committee in order to uncover assets that had been illegally or unfairly obtained by the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) during the authoritarian rule period and to have these assets returned to their rightful owners or the national treasury. Needless to say, the KMT has fiercely contested the constitutional legality of this measure ever since it was launched.

References Beckershoff, A., 2014. The KMT-CCP Forum: Securing Consent for Cross-Strait Rapprochement. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 43 (1), 213–241. Beckershoff, A., 2017. The Sunflower Movement. Origins, Structures, and Strategies of Taiwan’s Resistance Against the ‘Black Box’. In: Fell, D., ed. Taiwan’s Social Movements

14  André Beckershoff and Gunter Schubert Under Ma Ying-jeou. From the Wild Strawberries to the Sunflowers. London: Routledge, 113–133. Cheung, G. C., 2010. New Approaches to Cross-Strait Integration and Its Impacts on Taiwan’s Domestic Economy: An Emerging ‘Chaiwan’? Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 39 (1), 11–36. Gold, T. B., 2009. Taiwan in 2008: My Kingdom for a Horse. Asian Survey, 49 (1), 88–97. Hughes, C. R., 2014. Revisiting Identity Politics Under Ma Ying-jeou. In: Cabestan, J. P., and deLisle, J., eds. Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges. London: Routledge, 120–136. Kaeding, M. P., 2009. Taiwanized ‘New Taiwanese’: The Effect of Taiwanization on the 2008 Presidential Election Campaign of Ma Ying-jeou. Asia-Pacific Social Science Review, 9 (2), 19–34. Muyard, F., 2008. Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou’s Victory and the KMT’s Return to Power. China Perspectives, 1, 79–94. Schubert, G., 2012. No Winds of Change: Taiwan’s 2012 National Elections and the PostElection Fallout. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41 (3), 143–161. Schubert, G., and Braig, S., 2011. How to Face an Embracing China? The DPP’s Identity Politics and Cross-Strait Relations During and After the Chen Shui-bian Era. In: Schubert, G., and Damm, J., eds. Taiwanese Identity in the Twenty-first Century. Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives. London: Routledge, 72–94.

Part I

Domestic Politics

1 The KMT’s China policy Gains and failures Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth

Introduction The KMT’s China policy under President Ma Ying-jiu was based on four overarching aims. First, to stabilize cross-Strait relations, which effectively came to a halt at the semi-official level during the tenure of his predecessor, Chen Shui-bian. Second, to revive Taiwan’s economic fortunes through closer integration with the Chinese economy.1 Third, to balance the imperative of economic development with the maintenance of ‘national dignity’. Fourth, to roll back the de-Sinicization elements of Chen’s Taiwanization program by emphasizing elements of Taiwan’s Chinese cultural heritage and situating Taiwan within the framework of the greater Chinese nation. The underlying device used to pursue these aims was the 1992 Consensus, a rhetorical position regarding Taiwan’s status vis-à-vis China that has been characterized by Taipei as ‘One China, separate interpretations’. The 1992 Consensus is controversial in Taiwan,2 but its ambiguities created space for the two sides to develop a workable platform and a new level of momentum. During Ma’s tenure, this platform yielded a number of practical agreements across several socioeconomic sectors, including a limited free trade agreement and the crossStraits Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). When Ma Yingjiu stood down at the end of his second term on 20 May 2016, he left cross-Strait relations in significantly better shape than when he had begun his presidency in 2008. In this sense, his China policy can be considered a success. However, such is the complicated and multifaceted nature of Taiwan’s engagement with China that Ma’s China policy cannot be measured by the tone of cross-Strait relations alone, by the tenor of particular leaders’ personal interactions, or by KMT-CCP relations. Taiwan’s China policy has implications for its economy, society, foreign relations, and many other policy sectors, and remains one of the most contested arenas for domestic political competition, often but not exclusively refracted through the prism of national identity. Adjusting the angle of our analytical lens to include these other arenas reveals that the KMT’s China policy under Ma produced mixed results that can be interpreted as successes or failures depending on one’s point of view. The landslide losses for the KMT in the legislative elections in January 2016, and the comfortable victory of the DPP candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, in the presidential election, suggest a ‘change election’ where voters rejected the

18  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth policies pursued by Ma and/or the outcomes of his policies. While accepting this judgement, this chapter aims to provide a balanced assessment of Ma’s China policy, incorporating multiple perspectives and covering multiple policy sectors.

Gains Judged against the overarching goals noted above, the KMT’s China policy under Ma made gains in a number of ways. First, the tenor of cross-Strait relations reached an all-time high, manifested in the absence of the periodic tensions and diplomatic gridlock that characterised the tenures of Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui. The reinvigoration of the SEF-ARATS and TAO-MAC frameworks3 and the institutionalization of party-to-party talks culminated in the first ever meeting of sitting PRC and ROC presidents in Singapore toward the end of Ma’s second term. Observing Taiwan from the outside, from the perspective of the US government, for example, the KMT’s China policy was a resounding success, decreasing the likelihood of conflict at a time when tensions were rising in the region due to emergent territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas. The stability of cross-Strait relations during this period of increasing friction between China and Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other territorial claimants, was a development warmly welcomed by global leaders, particularly in Washington. The foreign policy behaviour of Taiwan, as a claimant of disputed territories itself, was conciliatory and responsible, with gains made not only in cross-Strait relations but also in resolving points of contention with Tokyo and Manila, including a landmark fishing agreement covering territories that were disputed with Japan. Despite the negative public opinion and low approval ratings of President Ma, his efforts to maintain stable and peaceful cross-Strait relations enjoyed widespread support in Taiwan. And while there were heated debates in Taiwan about the level of the ‘concessions’ needed to achieve it, the Ma administration demonstrated that it was possible to cooperate with China in a productive way, reversing the trajectory of his presidential predecessors. Second, the incremental opening up of the Taiwanese economy to the mainland and the expansion and deepening of economic integration led to positive results for parts of the Taiwanese economy, particularly large corporations and individuals with the capital and skills required to exploit new opportunities. However, the promised results of opening Taiwan’s economy up to China were hampered by the global financial crisis and subsequent recession that negatively affected Taiwan’s export markets, especially in the US and Eurozone. Most economic indicators rebounded impressively in 2010, although the effects of this recovery were felt less in the population at large than in specific sectors. Taiwan’s exports grew robustly during President Ma’s first term despite the global financial crisis. Total annual exports grew by 20 per cent from 2008 to 2011, with one third of that rise coming from exports to Mainland China, which totalled US$557  billion in the first seven and a half years of Ma’s tenure. This was more than double the US$257  billion of China-bound exports in the equivalent period of the Chen Shui-bian administration (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2015). While there were

The KMT’s China policy 19 numerically more Taiwanese investments in China during the Chen administration, the value per investment rose significantly under Ma. As a result, according to the Mainland Affairs Council statistics, the top five years in terms of the monetary amounts invested in China by Taiwanese businesses all occurred during Ma’s tenure (Mainland Affairs Council 2015a). Remittances to and from China also increased (Mainland Affairs Council 2015b). It should be pointed out, in defence of the economic consequences of Ma’s China policy, that many of the serious issues faced by ordinary Taiwanese people (wage stagnation, rising cost of living, an increasing sense of relative deprivation) were a consequence of more general globalization processes faced by other economies, which Taiwan will have to confront in the course of the needed economic reforms. Third, although still circumscribed and subject to various obstacles, mainly emanating from Beijing’s direct pressure and global influence, Taiwan’s participation in international society increased during Ma’s tenure. The extent of this participation remains incommensurate with an economy of Taiwan’s size and a liberal democracy that is a global trading power, but Taiwan’s group of diplomatic allies remained stable and Ma could point to a number of successes. For instance, the number of countries and territories that granted ROC citizens visa-free entry, landing-visa privileges, and other entry facilitation programs increased to 153, including the US and EU (Bureau of Consular Affairs 2009).4 The number of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) or their subsidiary bodies in which Taiwan enjoys full membership increased to 37 during Ma’s presidency (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). Taiwan gained membership in (in chronological order) the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, International Council for Information Technology in Government Administration, Standards and Trade Development Facility, South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation, Association of World Election Bodies, Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network of Asia/Pacific, and North Pacific Fisheries Commission. Taipei now has observership or other status in 22 other IGOs or their subsidiary bodies, a modest increase on the situation in 2008. Notably, in 2009, Taiwan became a signatory to the World Trade Organization Agreement on Government Procurement and the World Health Organization’s health alert system, the International Health Regulations. President Ma was keen to emphasise these successes as indicators that he had acted with great resolve to uphold Taiwan’s ‘dignity’ and ‘respect’ (zunyan). Within Taiwan, there is longstanding controversy over what constitutes ‘dignity’ and the means to achieve it, but the scope of Taiwan’s international participation and the way in which Taiwan was perceived by outsiders5 improved under Ma compared with the situation during the Chen Shui-bian and Lee Teng-hui administrations. Fourth, the policies pursued by President Ma established a proven platform for engaging with China, including the institutionalization of Track II, party-to-party, city-to-city and other sub-national fora, in addition to practical arrangements for handling increasingly diverse, intense and complex socio-economic interactions between the two sides. Ma’s embrace of the ‘1992 Consensus’, while emphasizing

20  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth the ‘different interpretations’ qualifier to ‘One China’, and the consistent discursive positioning of Taiwan within a one China (the Republic of China) framework, provided the demonstration of ‘sincerity’ demanded by Beijing as a condition for cooperation. Informal interactions, particularly Taiwanese business people (Taishang) operating in China, burgeoned in the decade prior to Ma’s ascension to the presidency in 2008, coinciding with the progressive moves of Presidents Lee and Chen toward a ‘two state’ position that effectively halted semi-official cooperation between the two sides, creating numerous difficulties for individuals and inefficiencies for businesses. While Beijing periodically voiced frustration over Ma’s inability to push formal interactions forward on the Taiwanese side, his ‘sincerity’ removed a major obstacle to cooperation across a number of sectors including transportation, crime, education, tourism, investment and the protection of Taishang interests. The re-invigoration of the relationship between the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Mainland Affairs Council allowed the two sides to cooperate on the management of intensifying people-to-people and commercial relations.6 The institution of Track II dialogues provided a framework, and the much-needed momentum, for both dialogue and practical measures. Although many problems remain, for example, in the implementation of practical economic agreements, the lack of consular services, and unilateral decisions, such as Beijing’s plan to require Taiwanese visitors to use IC cards,7 the management of Taiwan-China interactions became significantly more effective under Ma (Chin 2015; Chung 2015).

Failures There are a number of areas where the KMT’s China policies under Ma failed to achieve the desired outcome. First, while the temperature of cross-Strait relations had in many ways never been better, the underlying militarization of the Strait, manifest most obviously in the approximately 1,800 Chinese missiles stationed in Fujian, remained unchanged. Despite Ma’s China-friendly orientation, which was as friendly as Taiwanese domestic politics would allow any president to be, China’s military posture and rhetoric signalled an undiminished threat to Taiwan’s national security. In January  2015, Beijing rattled Taipei by declaring new air routes just off the centreline of the Taiwan Strait and ROC Air Force training areas (Cole 2015). President Xi’s reported remark during his meeting with Ma in Singapore8 that missiles were not directed at Taiwan and that the Taiwanese should therefore not be alarmed was at best disingenuous and at worst a highprofile dismissal of genuine concerns that the superficially friendly relations were underpinned by a threatening military stance (Formosa News 2015). Furthermore, the détente in cross-Strait relations did not apply to cyberspace, where Taiwan is a frequent target of cyber-attacks and hacking attempts (Kovacs 2012). The vice premier at that time, Chang San-cheng, told Reuters in January  2015 that the percentage of attacks originating in China was ‘very high’ and many hacks into government systems were traced to sites belonging to the PLA (Gold and Wu 2015). The Age reported that Taiwan’s executive branch experienced nearly 2,000

The KMT’s China policy 21 attacks per week in 2013 (Zappone 2014), and Chang described Taiwan as a ‘testing ground’ for Chinese hackers. For all the gains made under Ma, the passage of the PRC’s Anti-Secession Law (albeit three years before Ma assumed the presidency), China’s growing military capacity and modernization, the changing military balance in the Taiwan Strait, and the undiminished pressures of hawks within the broader CCP leadership (including the PLA) invoking popular nationalism, meant that Taiwan’s underlying security environment did not significantly change under Ma. While it is unfair to expect President Ma alone to have effected major changes in this area, critics pointed to China’s military posture as a reason to be more cautious in embracing an obvious potential threat, and to maintain Taiwan’s military preparedness via an appropriate level of defence spending, the pro-active procurement of weapons from the US and the professionalization of the Taiwanese armed services. These tasks stalled during Ma’s tenure. Other observers noted the reduction in morale among the Taiwanese defence forces, manifest in the defection of senior military personnel and numerous successful Chinese espionage operations targeting the Taiwanese military (Enav 2014; Stanton 2013). While Ma pointed to the dramatic increase in group and individual tourism to Taiwan from China as having economic benefits, the increase also raised security concerns. For instance, in November 2015 ROC military officials stated that Chinese intelligence operatives were posing as tourists to take photographs and gather information about Jioupeng Military Base (Pan 2015a). According to Taipei prosecutors, the former PLA officer Zhen Xiaojiang, who led a Chinese spy ring that recruited ROC military officers for espionage, entered Taiwan on tourist and business visas (Pan, 17 January 2015b). Meanwhile, domestic and overseas confidence in the ROC military was damaged by repeated security breaches, such as civilians taking photos inside AH-64E Apache helicopters (Pan 2015c), an Air Force officer wearing a NT$2  million helmet to a Halloween party (Tsao 2015), and a woman gaining entry to the Ministry of National Defence headquarters by pretending to be the Minister’s wife (Cole 2014). While Ma was not directly responsible for these incidents, the extent to which he prioritised Taiwan’s national security, in the face of continuing outside threats, was questionable. Second, although numerous economic agreements were signed, there were significant obstacles to implementation. Furthermore, the intended keystone policy of Ma’s second term, a follow-up agreement to ECFA, the cross-Strait Service and Trade Agreement (CSSTA), failed to achieve ratification in the legislature. In attempting to push through the CSSTA, Ma overplayed his hand, causing rifts between different branches of the government and within his own party, as well as an explosion of discontent dramatically manifested in the Sunflower Movement and occupation of the Legislature. The protests against Ma’s modus operandi (an alleged penchant for authoritarian and opaque decision-making) marked a watershed in his second term, prompting landslide losses in local elections in November 2014 and handing the political initiative to the opposition. The CSSTA would have granted Taiwanese businesses access to 80 service sectors in China, while Taiwan would have opened 64 sectors to Chinese businesses (Shih 2013).

22  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth Ma argued that the pact would increase Taiwan’s international competitiveness, and framed it as a response to the FTAs signed by Taiwan’s regional competitors rather than in terms of economic integration with China. Rather than the content of the agreement, which many people struggled to understand, it was Ma’s seemingly undemocratic behaviour that aroused the greatest alarm. With a DPP victory in presidential and legislative elections in January 2016, the probability of the CSSTA being passed is low, limiting Ma’s legacy on cross-Strait economic integration. Third, the calibration of Ma’s presidential discourse, featuring an emphasis on Chinese identity and downplaying Taiwanese identity (Sullivan and Sapir 2012), positioned Ma and his party on the margins of a significant trend in public opinion. During his tenure, the proportion of Taiwanese people identifying as ‘Taiwanese only’ increased from 45 percent to over 60 percent (Election Study Center 2016). President Ma’s development and frequent references to his and Taiwan’s Chinese origins signalled a personal commitment to the idea of the centrality of the Chinese nation to Taiwan that was incompatible with Ma’s previous rhetorical position as Lee Teng-hui’s ‘new Taiwanese’. It was also out of sync with the lived reality and national identity preferences of a majority of the Taiwanese, particularly younger people for whom Ma’s pet notion of being descended from the Yellow Emperor was incongruous. Despite instrumentally appealing to a sense of Taiwanese identity during his election campaigns, Ma increasingly identified with the Chinese nation, to the detriment of the specificity of Taiwan’s contemporary experience (Sullivan and Sapir 2013). As a result of Ma’s discursive behaviour and the deliberate marginalization of the ‘Taiwanese wing’ of the party embodied by Wang Jin-pyng, the KMT aligned with ‘Chinese-ness’ at a time when the appeal of ‘Chinese-ness’ was waning. Although political fortunes are cyclical and national identity is one of a range of contested areas in Taiwanese politics, by returning the KMT to its roots as the party of Chinese nationalism and moving it away from a centrist position with broad instrumental appeal, Ma must take responsibility for diminishing the party’s electoral prospects in the near-to-midterm. Indeed, having lost control of the presidency and legislature in January 2016 the KMT could face a period of significant decline. As one of the major driving forces in the KMT during his tenure as President, Ma is culpable for poisoning the well for his party. Fourth, while Ma’s China policy yielded numerous economic integration initiatives, the benefits were unevenly felt across Taiwanese society. To a certain extent, difficulties, particularly among the young, are a common growing pain for liberalizing economies. However, Ma’s China initiatives led to specific consequences. Taiwan’s trade became heavily dependent on China, with trade with Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau accounting for around one-third of the total volume (Bureau of Foreign Trade 2015); Taiwanese companies’ outsourcing of investment and production to China depressed the job market and wages (Dou and Hsu 2012). Chinese investment contributed to the real estate bubble started by Taiwanese capital that made it difficult for ordinary people to buy a house (Lee and Hung 2014). The DPP argued that over-dependence on the Chinese market

The KMT’s China policy  23 threatened Taiwan’s economic and political autonomy (Democratic Progressive Party 2008); US presidential candidate Hillary Clinton argued this as well (Pan 2014). Foreign direct investment in Taiwan has paled in comparison to Taiwanese investment abroad: according to Ministry of Economic Affairs Investment Commission statistics, outbound investment outstripped inbound investment by US$22 billion from 2000 to 2007 and by US$56 billion from 2008 to 2014 (Investment Commission 2015). Since 1991 61 percent of Taiwanese businesses’ overseas investment has gone to Mainland China (Mainland Affairs Council 2015c). Taiwanese banks have built up significant exposure to China according to the central bank; as of the second quarter of 2015, outstanding international claims by Taiwanese banks to China on a direct risk basis totalled US$48.5 billion (Tsai and Huang 2015). Average disposable income rose just 1.6 percent for the Taiwanese from 2008 to 2014 and actually decreased 6.7 percent for those with a university education over those six years (Directorate-General 2009, 2015). Meanwhile, according to Taiwan’s Consumer Price Index, the cost of living rose 7.9  percent from May 2008 to October  2015 (Statistical Information Network 2016). Property prices increased substantially. The Ministry of the Interior (MOI) (2015a) estimated in the first quarter of 2015 that the price of a Taipei home was 16 times the average annual income; for Taiwan as a whole, it was 8.5 times the average annual income. The MOI’s national housing price index estimated that prices nationwide rose 45 percent from 31 March 2008 to 31 March 2015 (2015b). From 2009 to 2013, gross fixed capital formation doubled in residential property, from NT$168 billion to NT$344 billion, and increased by roughly half for nonresidential property, showing how lucrative the market had become (Statistical Information Network 2015). The range of livelihood issues was not solely due to Ma’s China policy, but there is little doubt that his policy exacerbated them.

The emergence of Ma Ying-jiu’s China policy Under the former presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, Taipei moved progressively towards a ‘two-state theory’ of ‘special state-to-state relations’ or ‘one country on each side’ (Sullivan and Lowe 2010). This position on ROC sovereignty and an emerging consensus on Taiwanese national identity undermined Taipei’s once-firm commitment to the ‘One China’ principle under KMT authoritarian rule (Schubert 2004). Consequently, rapidly growing informal socioeconomic connections across the Strait were accompanied by political relations that were essentially deadlocked during Lee’s term as elected president and during Chen’s two terms. The ‘pro-independence’ tendencies of Presidents Lee and Chen, and a cyclical pattern of ‘working silences’ punctuated by ‘provocative statements’ (Ditmer 2004), created an atmosphere of mistrust and antagonism that hindered the formalization of economic interactions carried out by Taiwanese businesses exploiting economic complementarities. Ma entered office with a significant popular mandate (58  percent of the vote), having campaigned on improving cross-Strait relations and reinvigorating the economy. With a glowing personal reputation and sufficient acknowledgement of ‘Taiwan identity’ to

24  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth remind voters of Lee Teng-hui’s previous endorsement of him as a ‘new Taiwanese’, Ma enjoyed popular support as an antidote to Chen’s overemphasis on ideology, his corruption scandals, and a stillborn China policy. In his inaugural address, Ma pledged adherence to ‘no unification, no independence and no use of force’, to the framework of the ROC Constitution, and to the ‘1992 Consensus’ of ‘one China, respective interpretations’. He called for the ‘normalization of economic and cultural relations [as] the first step to a win-win solution’ (Ma 2008). Early in Ma’s first term, the semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Beijing’s Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) resumed dialogue for the first time since the mid-1990s. Focusing on ‘easy’ economic issues, regulating practices that were already a reality and smoothing economic interactions that did not impinge on security or sovereignty issues, they quickly endorsed an agreement to allow regular weekend charter flights across the Taiwan Strait, soon followed by agreements to allow mainland tourists to visit Taiwan, direct shipping links, daily cross-Strait flights and improved postal services. A year later, further initiatives on food safety, crime, and financial cooperation were quickly passed by the KMT majority in the Legislative Yuan. These practical successes paved the way for the more ambitious and, within Taiwan, politically contested Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Despite domestic opposition, the ECFA was passed in June 2010, removing tariffs on hundreds of products and becoming the centrepiece policy of Ma’s first term. Between 2011 and 2013, the two sides reached agreements on currency clearing cooperation, financial supervisory platforms, and allowing individual tourists and more Chinese students to visit Taiwan. Overall, the two sides had held ten rounds of talks, producing twenty-one formal agreements, three memoranda of understanding (MOU), and two joint statements (Executive Yuan 2015). In return for the entente cordiale ushered in by the Ma administration, Beijing made concessions on Taiwan’s participation in international organizations (a key issue for Ma’s domestic opponents and public opinion). The two sides reached an understanding that would enable Taiwanese representatives to attend the World Health Assembly (WHA) meeting in 2009 under the Chinese Taipei designation (DeLisle 2009). Participation in the WHA had been a reasonable goal for Taipei since the SARS crisis in 2003, but it was unattainable under the name ‘Taiwan’ that the Chen administration had insisted on. In September 2013, after years of efforts, Taiwan received an invitation to attend the ICAO Assembly9 for the first time since 1971 (Yeh 2013). In January 2014, the Seoul-based Asset Recovery Interagency Network–Asia Pacific10 admitted Taiwan (Ministry of Justice 2014). Since signing the ECFA, Taiwan has signed free trade agreements with New Zealand and Singapore (Gao 2014). A tacit agreement was reached to suspend competition for diplomatic allies (waijiao xiubing). The two sides had been competing for diplomatic recognition for many years since the ROC had lost its UN seat in the 1970s. In some cases, various forms of ‘dollar diplomacy’ had destabilizing impacts on the mainly small and easily unbalanced countries that recognise Taiwan. The number of ROC allies declined progressively through the 2000s as China sought to leverage its

The KMT’s China policy  25 increasing economic power to isolate the ‘independence-seeking’ Chen administration. When Ma took power, only 23 allies remained, but the ROC’s relationships with these countries remained stable. The only diplomatic ally that Taiwan lost during the Ma administration was the Gambia, which severed ties in November 2013. By contrast, during Chen Shui-bian’s final year in office, the ROC lost two allies, Costa Rica and Malawi (Government Information Office 2008). At the time, China professed to be unaware of the Gambia’s plans and did not take the opportunity to formally establish diplomatic relations with the country, a move that observers considered to be a gesture of goodwill toward Taiwan (Atkinson 2013). Subsequent to Tsai Ing-wen’s election victory, the PRC established diplomatic relations with the Gambia, which many have interpreted as a warning to Tsai (Bush 2016). Ma’s tenure saw a series of face-to-face meetings between ROC and PRC officials of increasingly high rank. In November 2008, the ARATS chairman, Chen Yunlin, visited Taiwan for a meeting with the SEF head, Chiang Pin-kung (CCTV 2008). At the time, this was the highest-level meeting between PRC and ROC officials that had ever been held in Taiwan. Then, in February  2014, the ROC Mainland Affairs Council Minister, Wang Yu-chi, met the PRC State Council Taiwan Affairs Office Director, Zhang Zhijun, in Nanjing, the first face-to-face meeting between high-level officials of the two governments since the 1940s civil war (Wang 2014). They referred to each other by their ministerial titles, agreed to establish a mechanism for regular communication, and affirmed exchanges under the ‘1992 Consensus’. Zhang went on to visit Taiwan that June, becoming the highest-level PRC official to do so. Finally, the first-ever meeting between the presidents of the two governments took place in November 2015, when Ma and Xi Jinping met in Singapore. They referred to each other as ‘the Taiwan leader’ and ‘the mainland leader’ and as ‘mister’ rather than ‘president’. After a long handshake for the cameras, they each gave public addresses, then held a private meeting attended by seven officials from each side. Afterwards, Zhang Zhijun gave a press conference, followed separately by Ma Ying-jiu. Ma stated that the meeting had established a precedent and protocol for future talks between leaders of the two sides. At the meeting, each side affirmed the ‘1992 Consensus’. The variance of their definitions of the consensus became the subject of intense discussion in Taiwan. Beijing has always defined the consensus as ‘the 1992 Consensus of one China’ without acknowledging that each side has its own interpretation. During the Ma-Xi meeting, Beijing continued to define the consensus solely as ‘one China’. At his press conference, Ma said that he had affirmed the consensus as ‘one China, with respective interpretations’ in his private meeting with Xi. In his public remarks to Xi, however, Ma defined it as ‘the 1992 Consensus of one China’, without mentioning the ‘respective interpretations’ qualifier (Ma 2015). These landmark official meetings sit alongside the normalization of party-toparty talks, building on the establishment of the KMT think tank, the National Policy Foundation, and Lien Chan’s unofficial visit to Beijing in 2005. With Lien working as intermediary, the two parties established a KMT – CCP Forum,

26  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth also known as the cross-Strait Economic, Trade and Culture Forum, with large delegations meeting annually in China (Beckershoff 2014). On the sidelines of the most recent meeting in Shanghai in May  2015, Eric Chu, the KMT Chairman at the time, met Xi Jinping in his capacity as Chairman of the CCP (BBC News 2015). Throughout the Ma administration, there were regular lower-level meetings between officials of the KMT and the CCP, with periodic higher-level contact, such as the meeting in 2008 between Wu Po-hsiung, who was then the KMT Chairman, and Hu Jintao, at which both sides affirmed the development of relations under the ‘1992 Consensus’ framework (Mainland Affairs Information and Research Center 2008). Taiwanese and Chinese representatives have also met on the sidelines of international gatherings, such as APEC and the Boao Forum (Taiwan Today 2015).

Discontent with Ma’s China policy President Ma’s policies, performance and personal modus operandi were the cause of discontent within his own party, across branches of government, and within society at large. Despite a relatively comfortable re-election campaign, Ma’s approval ratings dropped precipitously early on in his second term of office, and barely reached 20  percent afterwards (Taiwan Indicators Survey Research 2015a). Although the KMT won by a comfortable majority in the legislature in both 2008 and 2012, Ma’s relationship with the KMT’s legislative caucus was not straightforward. The most obvious example was the reaction to Ma’s CSSTA policy. Passage stalled in the Legislature when several lawmakers, including the KMT Speaker, Wang Jin-pyng, one of Ma’s old adversaries, raised concerns over inadequate communication from the government (Tang, Kuan, and Cheng 2013). That KMT legislators were unaware of the content and extent of the pact spoke volumes about the breakdown of communication between Ma and the legislative caucus. Wang’s support for the DPP argument that the CSSTA should be passed line by line, rather than as a whole on an up-or-down vote, was a source of frustration for Ma. The crisis escalated when Ma clumsily tried but failed to expel Wang from the party and, by extension, from the Legislature. While Wang was abroad attending his daughter’s wedding, the Special Investigation Division (SID) of the Supreme Prosecutors’ Office accused him of meddling in a legal case to assist the opposition legislative caucus leader (Wang 2013). Soon after this, Ma made a statement calling it ‘the most shameful day in the development of Taiwan’s democracy’ (BBC News 2013). The KMT stripped Wang of his party membership. According to legislative bylaws, since Wang was a party list legislator, his seat would have to be vacated and Ma could arrange for a more malleable politician to replace him at the head of the chamber. Rather than accepting his ouster, however, Wang appealed against the KMT’s decision. The courts ruled in Wang’s favour and the SID case fell apart on the grounds of the flimsy evidence that had been gathered by illegally wiretapping the Legislature’s phone system (Taipei Times 2013). Ma was forced to backtrack, with KMT power brokers appearing to support Wang.

The KMT’s China policy 27 Soon after this debacle, Ma’s popular approval sank to 9 percent (Liberty Times 2013). Refusing to give up on the ill-fated CSSTA, Ma then attempted to force the bill through the Legislature without the promised review. During a meeting on 17 March 2014, the legislative committee reviewed the agreement. The committee chairman, Chang Ching-chung of the KMT, declared that because the review process had already exceeded the allotted three months, the review was over and the agreement was to be sent to the floor of the Legislature for a direct vote, skipping the line-by-line review promised to the DPP in earlier negotiations (Wung 2014). The Executive Yuan then issued a press release praising Chang for getting the bill out of committee (Executive Yuan 2014). But on the night of 18 March, student protesters and social activists, outraged by Chang’s actions, stormed the Legislature and began a three-week occupation of the site. The official with the right to decide whether to request the police to forcibly evict these activists was none other than Wang Jin-pyng, who demurred. A significant proportion of Taiwanese public opinion appeared supportive of the students throughout the ensuing standoff – most visibly in a 30 March demonstration in which the National Police Agency claimed that there had been 116,000 participants (ETtoday 2014) and the organisers claimed the figure of 500,000 (Liu 2014). While a plurality of citizens did oppose approval of the CSSTA, a larger majority was against the Ma administration’s heavy-handed methods. In a 20–21 March TVBS poll (2015), 70 percent said that the agreement should be reviewed line by line, while just 8 percent agreed with Chang Ching-chung that it be voted on as a package. In a 31 March TVBS poll (2014), 59 percent agreed with the protestors’ position that the agreement be shelved and a monitoring bill for crossStrait agreements be passed first. Following weeks of failed attempts by the Ma administration to persuade the occupiers and society of the economic necessity of passing the bill, Wang Jin-pyng resolved the impasse by promising the students – who were by then known as the Sunflower Movement – that the Legislature would not enter into further negotiations on the agreement until it had approved a bill for monitoring cross-Strait agreements (Tiezzi 2014). The students agreed and went home. A DPP draft monitoring bill has subsequently passed first reading. Days after the students vacated the Legislature, a hunger strike by the former DPP chairman, Lin I-hsiung, inspired huge anti-nuclear protests that forced the government to mothball the fourth nuclear power plant. New corruption scandals implicated companies that were suspected of having received the president’s protection, such as the disgraced food manufacturer, Ting Hsin (Ramzy 2014), which Next Magazine alleged had received Ma’s help in securing cross-Strait trade deals for agricultural products (Hsiao 2014). Netizens widely shared a video of Ma, in a nationally televised 2010 debate with Tsai Ing-wen, calling Ting Hsin a ‘tonic’ that the ECFA had brought back to Taiwan (YouTube 2014). An October TVBS poll (2014a) found that 77 percent of citizens were dissatisfied with the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s handling of the Ting Hsin cooking oil scandal, that 73 percent did not have confidence in the safety of Taiwan-manufactured food, and that 45 percent believed the premier should resign due to the scandal.

28  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth The Sunflower-inspired backlash handed the momentum to the DPP, and in the 9-in-1 local elections in November  2014, the KMT suffered losses of historical proportions. In the mayoral elections, the KMT ran a traditional slate of faction leaders and princelings promising greater prosperity through economic integration with China. Standard examples were the Taoyuan County Magistrate John Wu, son of Wu Po-hsiung, who pledged to continue rezoning thousands of hectares of the county into a giant business park (Shan 2014) open to Chinese investment (Chang 2012), and the Taipei City candidate Sean Lien, son of the KMT grandee Lien Chan. But it appeared that Taiwanese voters had lost confidence in this message, believing that such projects would not benefit them and that the KMT had become greedy. Polls showed majorities agreed that the Taiwanese economy was too dependent on China and that the benefits of cross-Strait trade development had been monopolised by the few (Taiwan Thinktank 2014). During one debate, the independent Taipei mayoral candidate Ko Wen-je memorably called KMT politicians ‘no more than cross-Strait compradors’ (Apple Daily 2015). Ko defeated Lien by 16 percent, and Wu was deposed by a DPP challenger. Overall, the KMT lost more than half the counties and special municipalities that it had formerly administrated. Following this performance, President Ma stepped down as KMT chairman. His replacement, the New Taipei City Mayor, Eric Chu, was unable to chart a new course for the party during his short time in office. In cross-Strait relations, he held to the Ma formula of ‘one China, respective interpretations’ and the ‘1992 Consensus’ even as an October 2015 poll showed that their support had eroded to just 36.2 percent and 27.4 percent, respectively (Taiwan Indicators Survey Research 2015b). The KMT’s first presidential candidate of the 2016 campaign, Hung Hsiuchu, even proposed a ‘one China, same interpretation’ formula that was supported by just 12 percent of citizens. Throughout the 2016 presidential campaign, Tsai Ing-wen led her challengers by double digits, her lead rising to as much as 30 percentage points in October 2015 (Taiwan Indicators Survey Research 2015c). She ultimately won the election in January 2016 with 56 percent of the vote, a stunning victory for the DPP, which had never exceeded 50.2 percent in a national election. Furthermore, the DPP won a majority in the Legislative Yuan for the first time. By the time Ma left office in May 2016, the political landscape in Taiwan had changed substantially, with the KMT now a minority party facing a period of uncertainty. As Chair of the KMT for much of the preceding period, Ma leaves a legacy that includes a party in disarray. During their meeting in Singapore, Presidents Ma and Xi each emphasised the fact that the residents of China and Taiwan were members of the Zhonghua minzu, or of Chinese ethnicity, and were all descendants of the mythical Yan and Yellow Emperors. This shared DNA was implicitly considered a basis for political unity. However, the National Chengchi University Election Study Center’s Taiwanese/ Chinese Identity Survey Results revealed that the number of Taiwanese identifying as ‘Taiwanese only’ rose from 43.7  percent in 2007 (the year before Ma’s election) to 60 percent in 2015, and the number identifying as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’ fell commensurately, from 44.7 percent in 2007 to 33.7 percent in

The KMT’s China policy 29 2015 (Election Study Center 2016). The number of citizens identifying as ‘Chinese only’ held steady at 4 percent. It is of little surprise that, in a November TISR poll, 56 percent of citizens said that President Ma was unable to represent their opinions at his meeting with Xi (2015d). Likewise, in a Taiwan Indicators Survey Research tracking poll asking the question, ‘If Taiwan’s and Mainland China’s central governments could give each other recognition, should they move toward forming an alliance or even a union as a new country in the future?’ the No responses increased from 43 percent in October 2013 to 56 percent in May 2015, while the number of Yes responses slid from 31 percent to 25 percent (2015e). In 2006, the number of people who agreed and disagreed with the statement ‘Taiwan should become a new independent country someday no matter what’ were roughly even at about 40 percent. Currently, 50 percent support eventual independence unconditionally and 30 percent oppose it (Taiwan Indicators Survey Research 2015f). Perceiving and hoping to capitalise on concerns about the scale of Ma’s crossStrait policies, the DPP presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, advocated prudence and patience in dealing with China. She has consistently stated that she supports the status quo in cross-Strait relations, and ‘maintaining the status quo’ was the cornerstone of her cross-Strait policy platform. In her 2012 presidential bid, she supported an alternative ‘Taiwan Consensus’ to establish a bipartisan agreement within Taiwan as a prerequisite for further interactions with China (Sullivan 2013). She proposed deceleration rather than negation of already enacted cross-Strait policies, while senior DPP figures pointed to Beijing’s leverage over Taiwanese business interests, its commercial leverage in Taiwan, and the manipulation of tourist visits as important vulnerabilities that require redress. In a speech at the Legislative Yuan press club in February 2015, the former President, Lee Teng-hui, warned: For more than a decade, Taiwan’s capital, technology, and industry have flowed out to China in large quantities. The only thing the government has kept its sights on during this period is the interests of business conglomerates. Large enterprises have ceaselessly beaten the drum for opening up crossStrait trade, and as a result a cartel of cross-Strait political and business elites has emerged. (Lee Teng-hui 2015) The failure to deliver generalised benefits was a major cause of discontent with Ma’s China policy. Big businesses were the major benefactor, while the middle classes and blue and green collar workers did not make commensurate gains. A  November  2015 TISR poll found that just 8  percent of Taiwanese believed their economy was in good shape, while 86 percent believed it was in bad shape (2015d). Three months before the 2012 presidential election, Ma was forced to apologise for the failure of one of his major 2008 campaign pledges, the ’6–3–3’ targets: 6 percent annual growth, per capita GDP of US$30,000, and an unemployment rate of less than 3 percent. In fact, GDP growth, which reached double

30  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth digits in 2010, fell to almost zero in 2015 as China’s slowing economy dragged down Taiwanese exports (South China Morning Post 2015). Economic inequalities increased markedly during Ma’s tenure, creating a fusion of social justice and quality of life issues that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP harnessed effectively in the 2016 elections.

Conclusion and prospects When Ma Ying-jiu was re-elected in 2012, it was the fifth time that the ROC president had been directly elected. Nearly two decades of democratically elected leadership in Taiwan provide a comparative context across time by which to evaluate Ma’s China policy. This perspective helps reveal the areas in which Ma’s policy was comparatively successful and where it was found wanting. The one area where Ma made significant strides compared with his predecessors was the tone of cross-Strait relations. From the missile crisis during Lee’s tenure to the gridlock, ‘dollar diplomacy’, and international isolation characteristic of the Chen era, cross-Strait relations had never been as friendly as they were under Ma. Apart from the early breakthroughs made during Lee’s time as unelected President, the institutionalisation of cross-Strait interactions fostered by Ma’s China policy were by far the most impressive. Ma oversaw a substantial increase in trade and the economic value of cross-Strait interactions. On the other hand, by the end of Ma’s rule, Taiwanese society was more unequal, with a greater sense of widespread relative deprivation than ever before. Taiwan’s dependence on and exposure to the Chinese economy is greater than at any point in history, with concomitant vulnerabilities for Taiwan’s national security. Ma Ying-jiu’s successor as President of the ROC, Tsai Ing-wen, faces a relationship that is more intense and multifaceted than any of Ma’s predecessors had to deal with. Managing the vast scale of interactions has implications for virtually every policy sector in Taiwan, touching on the most basic elements in Taiwanese life, from education and housing to employment opportunities and the cost of living. The processes that Ma initiated will, to a certain extent, constrain Tsai’s policy alternatives: acceptance of the ‘1992 Consensus’, for instance, has solidified as a necessary condition for cooperation with China. The momentum in economic interactions is such that Taiwan will be unable to halt the pull of economic forces. And as China’s global influence continues to grow, Tsai has to balance domestic constraints with the reality of China’s preferences and power. The DPP’s victory in presidential and legislative elections is a reflection of the issues outlined in this chapter, and represents a new dynamic for cross-Strait relations. Tsai Ing-wen has consistently evinced a moderate position on cross-Strait relations, insisting that she will uphold the status quo, recognizing the diplomatic and economic constraints that Taiwan faces. However, Tsai rejects the notion of a ‘1992 Consensus’ and Beijing views her with great suspicion, particularly concerning her ability to control the factions within the DPP that support Taiwan independence. Despite the justified domestic opposition to Ma’s China policy, his tenure can be characterised

The KMT’s China policy  31 as having successfully overseen the management of the cross-Strait relationship, a challenge that Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP now have to take up.

Notes 1 Throughout this paper, ‘Taiwan’ is used as shorthand for the Republic of China on Taiwan. 2 The DPP points out that the ‘1992 consensus’ terminology was invented much later, prior to the 2000 presidential election, a fact that the former KMT official Su Chi, who coined the term, has acknowledged. Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s president in 1992, denies that such a consensus was reached. Others have argued that there is no consensus because Taiwan should not be constrained by agreements between an unelected KMT and the Chinese leadership, or that since the PRC itself does not acknowledge the ‘separate interpretations’ qualifier, there is no consensus. 3 The Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) are semi-official organizations established by Taiwan and China, respectively, to conduct cross-Strait relations on their respective governments’ behalf. The Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) is Taiwan’s official China affairs agency, and the Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) is China’s official Taiwan affairs agency. While the MAC and TAO frequently state official government positions on cross-Strait relations, the lion’s share of the cross-Strait negotiations and agreements have been conducted by the SEF and ARATS, owing in large part to the theoretical sensitivity of government-to-government talks between two governments that do not officially recognize each other. Exchanges within both frameworks stalled during the Chen administration. 4 Granted, a major contributor to the expansion in visa waiver rights was the introduction of Taiwan’s e-passport on 29 December 2008, initiated by President Chen’s administration, which increased the security of the ROC passport. 5 Consider, for instance, that the single major frame employed by the Western media throughout Ma’s tenure has been to juxtapose the stability of cross-Strait relations under Ma with Chen-era turbulence. 6 Including the semi-permanent population of more than one million Taiwanese business people in China. 7 Without consulting Taiwan, Beijing in the summer of 2015 announced that it would replace its Mainland Travel Permit for Taiwan Residents with an IC card allowing automatic entry (Chung 2015), and that fall began issuing such cards. The DPP warned the Ma administration of the new policy’s similarity to Beijing’s treatment of Hong Kong and Macau residents. 8 Ma and Xi met during the afternoon and evening of 7 November  2015 at the Four Seasons Hotel in Singapore. After shaking hands, posing for photos, and making official statements for their respective sides in front of the press, the two leaders and their delegations convened for private talks. Afterwards, the TAO Director, Zhang Zhijun, and President Ma conducted separate press conferences about the private discussion, and the two delegations attended a banquet. The negotiations and preparations for the meeting were conducted in secret, with the Liberty Times breaking the story and Taiwan’s Presidential Office confirming it the night of 3 November. 9 The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a United Nations specialized agency dedicated to managing the administration and governance of the Convention on International Civil Aviation as well as establishing relevant international standards and practices. Taiwan has long sought to attend the Assembly in order to improve its aviation safety and standards; China’s resistance to Taiwan’s participation was one front of the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute.

32  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth 10 An international organization devoted to the exchange of information and best practices for the purpose of facilitating the pursuit and recovery of the proceeds of all crimes.

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34  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth Liu, K. Y., 2014. Renmin zuo ziji zhuren: 330 Kaidao 50 wan ren chongxian ‘yin shizi’ guangmang (Citizens Become their Own Masters: 3/30 on Ketagalan Rd. 500,000 People Recreate the Radiant ‘silver cross’). ET today [online], 31 March. Available from: http://bit.ly/1Q2eslg [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ma, Y. J., 2008. Inaugural Address. The China Post [online], 21 May. Available from: http://bit.ly/1OkcMUz [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ma, Y. J., 2015. Public Remarks at the Ma-Xi Meeting [online]. Central News Agency. Available from: http://bit.ly/1MIhp8j [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, 2015a. Taiwan Investment in Mainland China [online]. Available from: www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/270_7.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, 2015b. Taiwan Remittance to and From Mainland China [online]. Available from: www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/270_13.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Mainland Affairs Council, Taiwan, 2015c. Taiwan Approved Outward Investment by Country (Area) [online]. Available from: www.mac.gov.tw/public/MMO/MAC/271_10.pdf [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Mainland Affairs Information and Research Center, 2008. Di’er pian: Zhonggong duitai zhengce ziliao’ (Article 2: Information about Communist China’s Taiwan Policy) [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1lNY4K6 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan, 2015. Guoji zuzhi canyu xianzhuang: Gaikuang (The State of Participation in International Organizations: Overview [online]. Available from: http://goo.gl/K95aPH [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ministry of Justice, Taiwan, 2014. Our Country Becomes a Member of the Asset Recovery Inter-Agency Network of Asia/ Pacific (ARIN-AP) [online].Available from: http://bit. ly/1NfYB1I [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan, 2015a. Fangjia fudan nengli tongji: Zuixin diaocha baogao (Statistics on Capability to Bear Home Price Burden: Latest Survey Report) [online]. Available from: http://pip.moi.gov.tw/V2/E/SCRE0105.aspx [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan, 2015b. Dushi dijia zhishu: Zuixin diaocha baogao’ (City Land Price Index: Latest Survey Report) [online]. Available from: http://pip.moi.gov.tw/ V2/E/SCRE0102.aspx [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Pan, J., 2014. Reliance on China makes Taiwan vulnerable: Clinton. Taipei Times [online], 25 June. Available from: http://bit.ly/1lNdf2w [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Pan, J., 2015a. Chinese espionage at military bases increasing [online]. Taipei Times, 11 November. Available from: http://bit.ly/1YxARdk [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Pan, J., 2015b. Six indicted in Chinese espionage ring case. Taipei Times [online], 17 January. Available from: http://bit.ly/1SnAAWM [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Pan, J., 2015c. Military’s VIP tour scandal grows. Taipei Times [online], 10 April. Available from: http://bit.ly/1LDdZjm [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Ramzy, A., 2014. Taiwan Reels from Gutter Oil Scandal. The New York Times [online], 8 September. Available from: http://nyti.ms/1ImveVY [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Schubert, G., 2004. Taiwan’s Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus. Asian Survey, 44 (4), 534–554. Shan, S., 2014. Officials Vow to Complete the Taoyuan Aerotropolis. Taipei Times [online], 17 April. Available from: http://bit.ly/1Ieel5a [Accessed 27 November 2015].

The KMT’s China policy  35 Shih, H. C., 2013. SERVICES PACT: TSU Knocks Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement. Taipei Times [online], 23 June. Available from: http://bit.ly/1MIg55B [Accessed 27 November 2015]. South China Morning Post, 2015. Taiwan Narrowly Avoids Recession as Exports Slump to Mainland China’s Slowing Economy. South China Morning Post [online], 30 October. Available from: http://bit.ly/1jnqd9e [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Stanton, W., 2013. National Security and Taiwan’s Future. Remarks at the World Taiwanese Congress in Taipei, Taiwan on March 15 [online]. Available from: http://bit. ly/21jDBNN [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Statistical Information Network of the Republic of China, 2015. Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) by Type of Capital Goods (At Current Prices). Available from: http:// eng.stat.gov.tw/fp.asp?xItem=33339&ctNode=3570 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Statistical Information Network of the Republic of China, 2016. Latest Indicators [online]. Available from: http://eng.stat.gov.tw/point.asp?index=2 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Sullivan, J., 2013. Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential Election. Political Studies Review, 11 (1), 65–74. Sullivan, J., and Lowe, W., 2010. Chen Shui-bian: On Independence. The China Quarterly, 203, 619–638. Sullivan, J., and Sapir, E., 2012. Ma Ying-jiu’s Presidential Discourse. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, (3), 1–34. Sullivan, J., and Sapir, E., 2013. Strategic Cross-Strait Discourse: Comparing Three Presidential Terms. China Information, 27 (1), 11–30. Taipei Times, 2013. Committee to Summon Wang Jin-Pyng as Witness. Taipei Times [online], 21 October. Available from: http://bit.ly/1MVcLll [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015a. Poll Conducted November 24–25 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1SnBa6O [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015b. Poll Conducted October 12–13 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1OuPXvn [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015c. Poll Conducted October 26–27 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1Ny8J8a [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015d. Poll Conducted November 8–10 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1IeesO8 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015e. Poll Conducted May 11–12 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1PS0HqP [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Indicators Survey Research, 2015f. Poll Conducted August 25–26 [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1lNZ2pJ [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Thinktank, 2014. 2014/06/27 Ma zhengfu duizhong zhengce mindiao jizhehui, huizhou xinwengao (2014/06/27 Press Release Following Press Conference on Poll Regarding Ma Administration’s China Policy) [online]. Available from: http://bit. ly/1SnBxhH [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Taiwan Today, 2015. Siew, Xi Meet at Boao Forum for Asia. Taiwan Today [online], 30 March. Available from: http://bit.ly/1llaGb4 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Tang, H. T., Kuan, W. Y., and Cheng, M. S., 2013. Guohui huoda: Xiang fumao xieyi zhutiao shen (Legislature Furious: Calls for Line-by-line Review of Services Pact). The China Times [online], 23 June. Available from: http://bit.ly/1ThAgtd [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Tiezzi, S., 2014. Protestors to Leave Taiwan’s Legislature on Thursday. The Diplomat [online], 8 April. Available from: http://bit.ly/1qeW9eH [Accessed 27 November 2015].

36  Jonathan Sullivan and James Smyth Tsai, Y. C., and Huang, F., 2015. Taiwan Banks’ Exposure to China Fall [online]. Central News Agency. Available from: http://bit.ly/1Ta8QF6 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Tsao, S., 2015. NT$2m Headgear Worn to Party. Taipei Times [online], 5 April. Available from: http://bit.ly/1YxAYFT [Accessed 27 November 2015].TVBS Poll Center, 2014a. 330 heishanjun Kaidao jihui hou fan fumao xueyun mindiao (Poll on the Anti-services Pact Student Movement Post-3/30 Black Shirt Army Ketagalan Rd. Demonstration) [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1Q2etWs [Accessed 27 November 2015]. TVBS Poll Center, 2014b. Ting Hsin heixin shiyong youpin shijian mindiao (han Ma zongtong, Jiang kui manyidu) Poll on Ting Hsin back-hearted Food Oil Incident (Including President Ma’s and Premier Jiang’s Approval Ratings) [online]. Available from: http:// bit.ly/1NSpRj6 [Accessed 27 November 2015]. TVBS Poll Center, 2015. Liang’an fuwu maoyi xieyi ji xuesheng zhanling Liyuan shijian mindiao (Poll on the Cross-Strait Services Agreement and Student Occupation of the Legislative Yuan) [online]. Available from: http://bit.ly/1NfZs2u [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Wang, C., 2013. DPP’s Ker Chien-ming Sues Ma, Huang. Taipei Times [online], 4 October. Available from: http://bit.ly/1llaOaG [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Wang, C., 2014. MAC Minister Wang in historic meeting. Taipei Times [online], 12 February. Available from: http://bit.ly/1SnB5zS [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Wung, J. H., 2014. Lan dangtuan xuanbu: Fumao shi wei yi shencha song yuanhui (Blue Party Caucus Announces Services Pact Already Considered to Have Been Reviewed and Will be Send to Legislative Floor). New Talk [online], 17 March. Available from: http:// bit.ly/1Ieeeqj [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Yeh, K. S., 2013. Taiwan Seeks Meaningful Participation in the International Civil Aviation Organization [online]. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Available from: http://bit.ly/1ImtE6u [Accessed 27 November 2015]. YouTube, 2014. Ma Ying-jiu shuo Ting Hsin shi Taiwan de buyao wo!!!!!’ (Ma Ying-jiu says Ting Hsin is Taiwan’s Tonic!!!!!) [online].Available from: https://goo.gl/vtKRMF [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Zappone, C., 2014. Taiwan a Canary in the Coalmine of Cyber Warfare. The Age [online], 8 December. Available from: http://bit.ly/21jDvFO [Accessed 27 November 2015].

2 The DPP’s China policy before and during the Ma Ying-jiu era Gunter Schubert

Introduction After the DPP’s rather unexpected setback in the 2012 presidential elections, in which the DPP contender, Tsai Ing-wen, lost against the KMT incumbent, Ma Ying-jiu, by 45.63 percent against 51.60 percent of all votes cast, Taiwan’s largest opposition party seemed to be standing at a crossroads. The economic and social interaction was intensifying across the Taiwan Strait and the majority of voters obviously supported the Ma administration’s China policies, with the result that the DPP’s stance on independence, a focal point in the party’s history and identity, seemed to have become a serious obstacle blocking the path to future electoral success. Most Taiwanese, as it seemed at the time, could live with the 1992 Consensus subscribing to ‘one China with different interpretations’. Consequently, party leaders promised to engage in serious soul-searching to bring the DPP back on track. A number of DPP politicians flatly demanded the removal of the Taiwan Independence Clause from the party charter and the adoption of the ‘One China principle’. They argued that the modification of the DPP’s China policy was important to reassure both China and the Taiwanese people that the DPP, on becoming a ruling party again, could talk to and make deals with the Beijing government. This viewpoint was directly connected to the conventional wisdom in Taiwan that, in order to win a national election, a party must make credible offers to Taiwan’s middle-of-the-road voters, who constituted between 25 percent and 35 percent of the electorate. Other DPP leaders rejected this view, advocating for rebuilding the party from the grassroots, reactivating its links with civil society, and rejuvenating the DPP’s democratic values in order to regain power. In the opinion of this group, any change that brought the position of the DPP closer to that of the KMT would render the DPP’s China policy barely distinguishable from that of the ruling party and would eventually cost the DPP its core supporters.1 This controversial debate lingered on, laying bare much internal bickering and strife, until the DPP National Congress on 20 July 20 2014, and, in the end, did not result in any substantial change in the DPP’s China policy approach, which was eventually placed on the back burner.2 On the eve of the 2016 presidential elections, it seemed that the changing political environment triggered by the 2014 Sunflower Student Movement, the

38  Gunter Schubert subsequent erosion of KMT internal unity, and the crushing defeat of the KMT in the November 2014 nine-in-one local elections, would allow the DPP to take presidential office with little more than the rhetoric of maintaining the status quo in cross-Strait relations (see below). The question, therefore, on election day was this: after the upcoming change in government, would that rhetoric suffice to maintain cross-Strait dialogue? Would China’s leaders, who had reiterated time and time again the indispensability of the 1992 Consensus as a precondition for any bilateral talks, be willing to show some flexibility in dealing with a DPP government? To some observers, the meeting between Xi Jinping and Ma Ying-jiu in Singapore on 7 November 2015, indicated that such flexibility did indeed exist. The Chinese government, it was argued, simply could not afford to backtrack on what had been achieved in cross-Strait negotiations over the previous eight years and written into more than twenty bilateral agreements. However, other observers interpreted the meeting as a Chinese effort to limit the options that might be available to a future DPP government for leaving the common ground of the 1992 Consensus and negotiating a new formula for cross-Strait relations.3 As will be argued in this chapter, the DPP’s China strategy displayed in the 2016 presidential campaign was in tune with long-term developments within Taiwan that were now affecting cross-Strait relations, most notably national identity formation driven forward by generational change in Taiwanese society. These developments restricted the leeway for the grand narrative of ‘One China’ as the normative and ideological basis for building understanding and trust across the Taiwan Strait. A new narrative would therefore have to be found. This is the harsh reality that the KMT and the Chinese government have both had to face since the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen’s administration in May 2016. In the remaining sections, this paper first retraces the DPP’s China policy since the foundation of the party, taking into consideration the party’s China strategy as well as the underlying driving forces in the 2012 and 2016 presidential campaigns, before explaining, in conclusion, why the DPP’s China policy has gained support among broad sectors of Taiwan’s voters and will therefore probably not be changed even under the combined pressure of the Chinese government and the KMT. The spell of the China narrative is vanishing on the island as fewer and fewer Taiwanese can be bought off by promises of economic gains and peace resulting from cross-Strait economic integration.

A brief review of the DPP’s China policy until 2012 Contrary to the often-held belief of political observers, the DPP has never shown inflexibility in its mainland policy.4 The integration of a Taiwan Independence Clause in the party platform in 19915 was contested from the very beginning and the party’s leadership has constantly disagreed about the necessity of a statebuilding project for a de jure independent Taiwanese republic ever since.6 Facing electoral setbacks in response to its radical party platform, the DPP became more moderate during the 1990s, a process that culminated in the adoption of the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future at the 8th Party Congress.7 Clearly meant to

The DPP’s China policy  39 push the DPP’s chances in the 2000 presidential elections, this document was the first to address the problem of developing a conceptual framework for peaceful and stable cross-Strait relations. The text, which was soon included in the party platform, marks a significant modification to the 1991 formula for an independent Taiwanese republic in that it accepts – for the time being – the Republic of China as an existing entity: Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country. In accordance with international laws, Taiwan’s jurisdiction covers Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, Matsu, its affiliated islands and territorial waters. Taiwan, although named the Republic of China under its current constitution, is not subject to the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China. Any change in the independent status quo must be decided by all residents of Taiwan by means of plebiscite.8 Although the DPP was accommodating Taiwan’s official state name, this did not mean that the party was making a U-turn concerning its ideology. The resolution emphasizes the ‘forward-looking nature of the 1991 platform revision’ and flatly rejects the ‘One China principle’ ‘to avoid international confusion and to prevent the position’s use by China as a pretext for forceful annexation’. So even if the DPP accepted the ‘Republic of China’ terminology, the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future clearly stands in opposition to the official KMT position, which holds that the Republic of China’s jurisdiction currently covers Taiwan and its adjacent islands only, but claims rightful authority over the Chinese mainland on the basis of the 1947 ROC constitution. Nevertheless, the 1999 resolution indicated a new kind of pragmatism on the part of the DPP in dealing with China and introduced a new rhetoric that was thought to be helpful in establishing a working relationship across the Taiwan Strait (Schubert 2004): The ultimate goal of the DPP’s China policy is to establish a cross-Strait relationship that is mutually beneficial rather than discriminatory, peaceful rather than confrontational, and equal rather than subordinate to each other. The DPP asks the Chinese government to respect the will of the Taiwanese people and to accept the fact of Taiwan’s independent sovereignty. Furthermore, we hope that China can abandon the outdated framework of nationalism and respect the Taiwanese people’s pursuit of independence, autonomy, and prosperous development under a free and democratic system. The DPP also hopes that in the coming century, China and Taiwan can abandon mutual suspicion and antagonism. Based on historical and cultural origins, and for the sake of geopolitical, regional stability and economic interests, both sides should work together toward a future of co-existence, co-prosperity, mutual trust and mutual benefits.9 After Chen Shui-bian’s victory in the 2000 presidential elections, Chen and a number of DPP politicians pleaded that the Taiwan Independence Clause be scratched from the party platform, obviously for the sake of opening up

40  Gunter Schubert communication channels between the new DPP government and Beijing.10 This resulted in a heated intra-party debate, at the end of which the clause was indeed not abolished but ‘constrained’ by a decision at the 9th DPP National Congress in October 2001 to lift the significance of party resolutions to the level of the party platform by making the former part of the latter. Since then, the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future must be considered at least equal in importance and validity to the Taiwan Independence Clause.11 However, intra-party opinion remains controversial on this question since the DPP’s more radical factions and support groups do not subscribe to such a view. This rhetorical move to the political center to attract more voters among the status-quo-oriented majority within Taiwan’s populace was undone by Chen Shui-bian’s campaign in the run-up to the 2004 presidential elections when he pursued a ‘Taiwanization’ agenda, calling for a new constitution and engaging in a strategy of identity politics in order to mobilize his base constituency to the fullest extent possible.12 His strategy worked, since he was able, against all odds, to secure a razor-thin victory, but at the same time, the DPP’s image as the major force behind Taiwan’s independence and nationalism was revitalized in the eyes of many domestic and international observers.13 This image was further sharpened when the DPP was preparing for the 2008 presidential elections and for that purpose drafted a new resolution to advocate a Taiwanese nation-state. After much intra-party bickering, which eventually led to the resignation of the party chairman, Yu Shyi-kun, the 12th DPP National Congress adopted the Normal Country Resolution on 30 September 2007. The brawl preceding the final vote on this document highlighted again the struggle between the radicals and the moderates – or the ideologists and the pragmatists – within the party leadership. Yu Shyi-kun, backed by the party’s radical factions, proposed a draft that demanded an immediate change in the country’s official name to Taiwan, other delegates led by President Chen Shui-bian pleaded for a more cautious formula. In the end, their ‘consensus version’, as it was called, prevailed.14 The resolution’s central article reads as follows: Departing from Taiwan’s felt identification as a ‘community of fate’, in order to deepen Taiwan’s democratic values and strengthen Taiwanese consciousness, while perceiving that the country’s name ‘Republic of China’ now is difficult to apply in the international community, we must thus use the name ‘Taiwan’ to enter the United Nations, the WTO and other international organizations, complete Taiwan’s name rectification at an early date, adopt a new constitution, hold a referendum at an appropriate time and make manifest that Taiwan is a sovereign and independent country.15 This resolution reinforced the intriguing juxtaposition of ideology and pragmatism that pervades the DPP party platform. In ideological terms, the ultimate goal inscribed in the platform is the establishing of a sovereign state called Taiwan, i.e. Taiwan independence as defined by the Taiwan Independence Clause and affirmed by the Normal Country Resolution. However, in strategic terms, this

The DPP’s China policy 41 goal has been temporarily postponed by the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, in order to enable the DPP to operate on the grounds of the 1947 ROC constitution, although this constitution is meant to subscribe to a Republic of China framework that is limited to the territory of Taiwan. This complicated conceptual triangle (see graph) is certainly not without tensions and reflects the conflict between ideological rigor and pragmatism that has shaped the DPP’s internal dynamics since the foundation of the party. However, the triangle also safeguards the DPP’s unity because it unites all party factions and provides for a critical consensus, even if this is rather shaky.

The DPP’s China strategy in the 2012 campaign Tsai Ing-wen’s China policy approach in the 2012 presidential campaign was as much shaped by factional politics as by tactical considerations. From the outset, she tried to remain as ambiguous as possible. Her close advisors urged her to abstain from expressing clearly how she, if elected, would deal with China’s focus on the ‘One China principle’ as a precondition for any cross-Strait talks. She also shifted her political position over time, most notably in the case of the DPP’s dealing with the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in June 2010. Although she fiercely opposed this trade pact before it was signed, she later accepted its existence, only emphasizing that the DPP would closely watch the long-term repercussions of the agreement’s consequences for Taiwan’s economy and, if necessary, renegotiate its content (Taipei Times 2011a). In late 2010, she publicly declared that she would ‘continue the cross-Strait policies implemented by the former government if the DPP regained power in 2012’ (Taipei Times 2011b). This confirmed a pragmatic policy line that was obviously aimed at impressing the median voters who would eventually decide the election outcome. In conceptual (or ideological) terms, however, Tsai consistently rejected the 1992 Consensus, which she called invented and non-existent, throughout her campaign. Instead she invoked a so-called Taiwan consensus to be built within

Taiwan Independence Clause

The three conceptual pillars of the DPP’s China Policy

1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future

2007 Normal Country Resolution

Figure 2.1  The three conceptual pillars of the DPP’s China policy

42  Gunter Schubert Taiwanese society and across party lines as a ‘mechanism’ and solid foundation for dealing with China.16 For most observers, this rhetoric remained opaque, and so it may have been for many Taiwanese voters. In her few explanatory comments on the Taiwan consensus, Tsai was circumspect, pointing out that it should be ‘based on majority opinion through open dialogue’, that it ‘means people in Taiwan have to get together and form a consensus of their own and that they would then turn around and talk to the Chinese to form a cross-Strait consensus so we can build a relationship on that consensus’(Taipei Times 2012a). Earlier in her campaign, she had declared that a Taiwan consensus would be carved out by a democratic process, that this ‘would involve the participation of all Taiwanese’, and that the KMT would be part of that process. During her US visit in September  2011, Tsai also stated that ‘the inclusion of unification as one option was democratic common sense’ (Taipei Times 2011c), although she emphasised that this was not her option. The DPP’s ten-year policy platform, published with great fanfare in August 2011 as sort of a New Deal between the DPP and the Taiwan people, was declared the most comprehensive undertaking of Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP to explain what the Taiwan consensus should be. However, this 99-page document looked rather more like a new party program than a systematic collection of policy guidelines, and said nothing about cross-Strait relations.17 All in all, Tsai Ing-wen’s Taiwan consensus sounded rather more like an election appeal than a concept encapsulating a political stance and a policy line. Her alternative semantic attempt to capture the DPP’s position towards China was not any more specific: ‘Pursuing peace but preserving differences, advancing harmony and seeking common ground’. When she announced this formula in early 2011, she gave the following explanation: ‘Peace’ means ‘peaceful development’. Taiwan and China differ on their historical memories, beliefs and values, political system, and social identity. But China and Taiwan do also have common responsibilities and interests. So they must strive for peaceful and stable relations and get control of the momentum of prosperous development. This is the true placing of ‘pursuing peace but preserving differences, advancing harmony and seeking common ground’ between both sides. (Liberty Times 2011) This impression of vagueness was gradually rendered even more opaque in many speeches and press releases during Tsai’s campaign. For example, during her visit to the US in September 2011, she elaborated: We acknowledge that Beijing insists on the ‘One China principle’ as its fundamental position toward Taiwan. However, Beijing must also understand the reality that the Taiwan people, having gone through the historical processes of liberating themselves from foreign rule and seeking democratization, are opposed to a one-party system and committed to upholding the independence of their sovereignty. The distinct positions, however, should not prevent

The DPP’s China policy  43 the two sides from reaching a mutually beneficial arrangement where we can also pursue common interests, mainly, common interests in peace and development. We believe that reaching a strategic understanding of our existing differences, and agreeing to engage based on a desire to achieve common interests and mutual benefits, is the most realistic way forward. This is what I mean by peaceful but recognizing differences, peaceful and seeking commonalities. (Romberg 2012, p. 5) In fact, Tsai Ing-wen and her advisors had decided to disconnect the presidential campaign from the DPP’s future dealings with the Chinese government in order to focus on domestic issues related to the state of the economy and social inequality in Taiwan. Although such a strategy conflicted with the DPP’s traditional profile as a middle-class party as well as Taiwan’s most important pro-independence force, the DPP leadership could not see that they had any other choice: there was obvious support among major parts of the populace for President Ma Ying-jiu’s China policy of increasing cross-Strait economic interaction, if not integration, although the long-term effects of this policy were uncertain and involved considerable political risk.18 Given the limited opportunities to score against the KMT by challenging its proactive China approach and to bring into question what had been achieved in cross-Strait relations over the previous four years in terms of both (alleged) economic gain and (tangible) national security, the only reasonable option available to Tsai was to look for another area where the ruling party was arguably in more trouble: uneven income distribution, low wages, an inflated real estate market, judicial reform and – not least – recuperation of the KMT’s ill-gotten party assets. The rare occasions when Tsai Ing-wen spoke out on ideology during her campaign were hardly noticed and did not arouse much public debate. Most notably, on the eve of the ROC’s Double Ten National Day centennial celebrations in October 2011, she publicly stated that ‘Taiwan is the ROC, and the ROC is Taiwan’, a position fully in accordance with the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future and well-suited to counter President Ma Ying-jiu’s ambiguous phrasing of ‘The ROC is our country, and Taiwan is our home’ (Taipei Times 2011d).19 However, this point was not pushed home by Tsai and the DPP for the reasons given above. Tsai clung to her Taiwan consensus and limited all China-related prose to assurances that a new DPP government would accept existing cross-Strait agreements and be ready to engage China in dialogue and negotiations in a ‘normal framework’ that fits with ‘international obligations in a multilateral system’ – while subjecting any result or future accord to agreement by both sides under the scrutiny and close examination of Taiwan’s democratic institutions (Taipei Times 2011e). The fact that Tsai Ing-wen did not force but only insinuated an explicit linkage between her ‘Taiwan consensus’ and the ‘ROC-Taiwan nexus’20 was intentional and obviously related to her strategy to write ideology as small as possible in her campaign. However, this strategy may, at least to a great extent, have caused her stunning defeat in the presidential race (Schubert 2012a). 21 Although intra-party

44  Gunter Schubert explanations of the causes diverged strongly after the elections, many party members and observers found that her approach to China was out of touch with the changing realities in the Taiwan Strait.22 Even a number of party leaders noted that the time had come for the DPP to rethink (and redefine) its position on the 1992 Consensus and the ‘One China Principle’, while others strictly rejected this view and argued for intensive communication with the public to make the DPP’s stance better understood. This internal debate was temporarily brought to a halt by the 2012 DPP party congress, but the party’s ‘right’ China policy approach remained a controversial issue until the 2016 presidential campaign appeared on the horizon.

Digesting the 2012 election disaster Whether or not Tsai Ing-wen’s China policy approach in the 2012 election campaign could be considered a failure was certainly a matter of perspective. As mentioned above, most DPP party leaders did not find any fault with Tsai’s strategy. What had to be done in the future, according to their main post-election narrative, was to reconnect with grassroots supporters and civil society to mobilize more votes for the DPP. Growing economic and social inequality in Taiwan were important issues and party leaders opposing any change of party ideology vis-à-vis China announced that social fairness was among the most important issues that the DPP must push in the future. A number of party leaders and public figures, however, reiterated that the DPP’s major weakness was its approach to China, and that a ‘no change’ attitude would compromise the party’s future opportunities to regain power. They claimed that Tsai’s strategy of being elusive on the DPP’s future China approach and her simplistic appeal to pragmatism in cross-Strait relations did not find favour with the median voter or with many DPP-leaning supporters in central and southern Taiwan. Her so-called Taiwan consensus, it was argued, had remained an empty shell during the entire presidential campaign and Tsai had been unable to win enough trust to convince voters that the DPP would not rock the boat of cross-Strait relations. Hence, these voices pleaded for adjustments to the DPP’s China policy approach, but not to its party ideology.23 Among the voices that did demand an overhaul of the DPP party ideology was that of the former premier, Frank Hsieh, who had already pleaded for a ‘constitutional consensus’ in 2011 in order to strike a compromise between the status quo majority and the supporters of Taiwan independence: When I mention that we should have a ‘constitutional consensus’, it encompasses ideas including an ‘overlapping consensus’ and ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’, which I  believe should replace the ‘one China, with each side having its own interpretation’. . . . The way I see it, the ‘constitutional consensus’ is an alternative to the ’1992 consensus’, while the ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’ idea is an alternative to the ‘one China with each side having its own interpretation’. The plan is to use ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’ externally [against China], and to use the ‘overlapping consensus’ [and the ‘constitutional consensus’] internally within Taiwan. (Taipei Times 2011f)

The DPP’s China policy  45 Hsieh argued, at the time, that the main objective of his initiative was to create a minimal common ground for the majority of Taiwanese from which China’s claim to a unified state could be more effectively confronted. A ‘constitutional consensus’—full acceptance of or identification with the ROC constitution as the constitution of a sovereign Taiwan—would not subscribe to the 1992 Consensus but would actually take ‘Taiwan out of the one China framework’, at least as spelled out by the Beijing government (ibid.). Accepting the constitution along the lines of the suggested wording would mean, Hsieh argued, that ‘the ROC is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC’ (2011g). He claimed, following a rather odd line of reasoning, that such a consensus would force the Chinese government to respond positively to Taiwan’s quest for more international space, because otherwise there would be the risk that ‘the Taiwanese people will see clearly that our national title is no longer useful. Then, we may turn around and say that we need a new national designation’ (Taipei Times 2011h). He also emphasized the fact that it was not important for him whether or not the Chinese government accepted the ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’ formula, since his formula was primarily a matter of domestic consensus-building and not an attempt to find common ground with Beijing (!). However, when he summarized his concept in a book published in early 2012, Hsieh explicitly addressed China as well: Taiwan and the PRC each possess a constitution that sufficiently honours their countries’ sovereignty. Even if they do not fully accept the constitution’s context, both can affirm their sovereignty on the basis of this constitution; to put it differently, they can use ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’ to replace the ’1992 consensus’. Under the condition of ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’, both sides mutually recognize each other as sovereign countries, and they approach each other as a nation of brothers who are continuing the expansion of economic and cultural exchange under the conditions of mutual non-subjugation and mutual respect of their sovereignty. Based on this, we publicly demand that the People’s Republic of China recognizes the Republic of China’s international position and does not hinder our country’s international participation. (Hsieh 2012, p. 120; author’s translation). The extent to which Hsieh’s proposal actually deviated from the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future was unclear, but the DPP response to ‘one Constitution, two interpretations’ was lukewarm at best when it was spelled out for the first time.24 Soon after the 2012 presidential ballot, Hsieh promoted his concept again, although slightly revised. While also belonging to those who supported the freeze of the Taiwan Independence Clause in the DPP’s party charter, Hsieh now spoke of ‘two Constitutions, different interpretations’ to avoid being labelled as an advocate of ‘One China’. His objective of making the ROC Constitution the focal reference point in the DPP’s future China policy, however, remained the same. The DPP, he argued, should acknowledge the legitimacy of the ROC constitution and not only engage with it awkwardly because of its Chinese heritage. In the end, Taiwan’s democratic achievements had been written into this Constitution

46  Gunter Schubert via amendments so that this document had evolved into Taiwan’s property. At the same time, Hsieh contended that his concept would help the DPP to talk to China because the Chinese government would not be willing to engage with the DPP until an explicit link had been established between the mainland and Taiwan, and this would be provided by the ROC Constitution (Taipei Times 2012b, Taipei Times 2012c, Taipei Times 2012d, Taipei Times 2013).25 Hsieh’s approach found favor with those in the party who believed that the DPP must strike some sort of conceptual compromise with Beijing. Along the same lines, other DPP ‘pragmatists’ have pleaded for a revision of the wording of the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future in order to make the temporary recognition of the ROC permanent. These voices have also demanded that the 1999 Resolution be made the ideological centrepiece of a new DPP China policy approach, for that matter superseding the Taiwan Independence Clause. Some DPP ‘pragmatists’ even suggested, in the 2012 post-election debate, that the DPP could accept the ’1992 Consensus’ and the ‘One China principle’ if both sides of the Taiwan Strait were able to offer a definition of the 1992 Consensus and ‘One China’.26 However, the party mainstream did not agree to this conceptual realignment and insisted on maintaining the ‘ideological triangle’ described above. In any case, the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future has remained the DPP’s bottom line.

Tsai Ing-wen’s China strategy in the 2016 campaign When Tsai Ing-wen was nominated on 15 April 2015 to run again as a candidate for the DPP in the 2016 presidential elections, the party’s opportunity structure had changed considerably compared with that of the 2012 campaign. At that time, the incumbent, Ma Ying-jiu, thought that he could make a strong argument for his re-election by pointing at a visible reduction in cross-Strait tensions and, arguably, more economic opportunities for Taiwan due to the increased bilateral cooperation and numerous cross-Strait agreements resulting from his pro-China policies. Moreover, the Taiwanese economy had recuperated since the 2008–2009 global financial crisis and was doing quite well. There was little reason, it seemed, for the median voter to abandon the incumbent government, and although Tsai Ing-wen was reported to be leading the polls during most of late 2011, her winning margin narrowed during the final weeks before election day. Defeat nevertheless came as a shock to the pan-green27 camp, since most DPP supporters ignored the fact that there were actually no winds of change in Taiwan and strongly believed that most Taiwanese were opposed to Ma’s China policy (Schubert 2012b). The final result, however, did not suggest that there was unconditional support for Ma Ying-jiu either. It indicated that voters had more reservations about the incumbent than had been the case four years earlier. In fact, things were quite different at the time of Tsai’s second nomination. In a way, the Sunflower Movement, which erupted in March 2014, was the endpoint of a development that went back to the early days of the first Ma administration when thousands of students demonstrated island-wide against the Chinese envoy, Chen Yunlin, who was visiting Taiwan in December 2008.28 Taiwan’s younger

The DPP’s China policy 47 generation, particularly those in their twenties, were displaying increasing dissatisfaction with Ma’s pro-China policies. To some extent, their attitude reflected the general dynamic trend towards strong Taiwanese identity formation, which had not been interrupted by the KMT’s return to power in 2008 (Huang and Patrick 2014).29 At the same time, young people in particular did not have much reason to believe in the president’s promise of economic gains from cross-Strait relations when few jobs were available, wages were low and the chances of their ever being able to afford to buy an apartment on the totally overpriced real estate market were almost non-existent. The belief was strong among many people that crossStrait economic integration only benefitted Taiwan’s big conglomerates (caituan) which, according to a powerful discourse in the later years of the Ma Ying-jiu era, had allied with KMT and CCP elites to create a new class of cross-Strait capitalists ready to sell out Taiwan (Wu 2016). As a result, when inter-party negotiations on the second reading of the (already signed) cross-Strait Trade in Services Agreement (CSTSA) had been cut short by the ruling KMT, which pushed the trade pact on to the legislative floor for the final plenary review, students began to gather in the streets around the Legislative Yuan. Their protest was backed up by the 24-day occupation of the parliament’s assembly hall that made history in Taiwan and beyond (Ho 2015; Rowan 2015). What ensued in the following months was political paralysis on the part of the government and the breakdown of KMT internal unity, while the DPP was able to rally its forces in the slipstream of a movement whose leaders promised to continue fighting the Ma administration when the occupation ended in midApril 2014.30 After the devastating defeat of the KMT in the 9-in-1 local elections of November 2014, the failed candidacy of Hung Hsiu-chu as a KMT contender for the presidency, and the continuous infighting in the party’s top echelons during the entire pre-election year, during which the DPP was almost able to adopt the position of an unconcerned bystander, the unanimous opinion of all observers was that Tsai Ing-wen would win the presidential race smoothly and would probably be able to secure her party a first-ever absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan. Against this background, Tsai’s China policy approach focused on two major strategies: first, to refuse any adjustment of the DPP’s party ideology, which some called a prerequisite for being accepted as a possible ruling party by the median voter in Taiwan and as a trustworthy partner by China.31 And second, to signal to China and the Taiwanese that the DPP was ready to maintain friendly relations and continue cooperation across the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the existing ROC Constitution. However, there would be no change in the party’s position of not accepting the 1992 Consensus and, for that matter, the ‘One China principle’. ‘Maintaining the status quo’, ‘preserving peace in the Taiwan Strait’ and the ‘stable development of cross-Strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwan people and the existing ROC constitutional order’,32 repeated in various constellations and on numerous occasions, became the magic spells of the Tsai campaign, buffered by only a few additional remarks which did little to clarify her eventual stance on Taiwan independence or to identify the detailed action plan for cross-Strait relations that Tsai’s opponents were constantly demanding from her.33

48  Gunter Schubert This was, of course, intentional. Tsai did not intend to position herself in the ‘dark green’34 camp or to announce that she would simply follow the KMT’s China policy, since she did not want to run the risk of losing the crucial support of Taiwan’s middle-of-the road voters, who, despite being focused on cross-Strait stability, were still willing to maintain the KMT’s pro-China orientation. Criticism from the ‘dark green’ camp, although outspoken, was cancelled out by the party’s pragmatists, with Tsai occupying the middle ground. With regard to the KMT’s attacks, as has been said, Tsai did not feel under any pressure to justify or explain her China-speak because she could see that the winds of change were blowing strongly in the face of the ruling party. The most far-reaching aspect of Tsai’s China strategy was her reference to the existing ROC constitutional order. In the Q&A session following her widely reported speech at the Washingtonbased Center of Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) during a US trip in June 2015, Tsai clarified what she meant by saying that this order included the provisions of the constitution, subsequent amendments, interpretations, court decisions, and practices by the government and different sectors of the population. Anything that is related to the constitution, the interpretation, and practices are part of this constitutional order. (Romberg 2015, pp. 2–3)35 This sounded more like an analytical definition than a political statement aimed at finding common ground with Beijing (or the KMT) for an innovative interpretation of the ‘One China principle’. Invoking Frank Hsieh’s earlier proposal of ‘different Constitutions, different interpretations’, Tsai Ing-wen conveyed the message that, as president, she would not touch the ROC Constitution and, by implication, would not overtly work against ‘One China’ in the way that Chen Shui-bian had done – probably the smallest workable compromise that she was willing and able to offer to Beijing. At the same time, she was consistent throughout her campaign in claiming that any exchange with the mainland must be based on the principles of ‘sovereignty, reciprocity, and democracy’ (Romberg 2015, p. 4), making clear that she adhered to a ‘Taiwan first’ attitude which would not be shaken by any future dealings with China. Therefore, by mid-2015, all that could be said about the DPP’s China policy had been said and Tsai Ing-wen did not add anything substantial to her China strategy for the rest of the year. She restricted herself to criticizing the KMT’s desperate attempts to bring home over and over again the argument that the level of cross-Strait détente and cooperation achieved by the Ma administration was due to both sides subscribing to the 1992 Consensus on ‘one China with different interpretations’, and that any move to abrogate this consensus would lead to disaster. In this sense, Tsai effectively countered the accusation of being nebulous and lofty concerning her China policy approach: in contrast to her 2012 campaign, she made it clear from the very beginning that talks on the basis of the 1992 Consensus would not work with a DPP government, and she displayed a level of self-confidence in conveying this message that could not be seen four years

The DPP’s China policy 49 earlier. Her growing self-confidence was also shown in her second message: that domestic affairs were more important than cross-Strait relations and that these should be considered the real challenges faced by the nation: We all know that playing the cross-Strait card cannot solve all the problems in Taiwan; we need to shift our attention back to domestic economic and social issues that truly concern us. (Taipei Times 2015, p. 3) Tsai certainly did not want to say that the importance assigned to cross-Strait relations was out of proportion, but her appeal to shift attention to the manifold domestic problems that would be attended to by a new DPP government sounded more convincing than it had been four years previously, when she first embarked on a domestic political agenda. At that time, Tsai’s political opponents were able to denigrate her strategy as a cheap move to avoid inconvenient questions about her China policy, whereas now she could even afford to appear naïve when playing domestic issues against the importance of cross-Strait relations. The tactical element in Tsai’s statements was clear for all to see, but it was difficult to criticize her stance as political cowardice: having said all that could be said on cross-Strait relations (this was the message that Tsai Ing-wen sent out to her audiences) it was now time to deal with those issues that really concerned the people in their everyday lives. This was articulated self-confidence displayed by a presidential contender who claimed to represent a nation, who knew where that nation stood and where it wanted to go. In the end, her stance was confirmed by an overwhelming victory which pushed the DPP back into power.

Conclusion and outlook Looking back at the DPP’s China policy approach during the first and second Ma administrations, it is difficult to say whether there had been much change in comparison to the founding years of the party and, later on, to the Chen Shui-bian era. The basic architecture of the DPP’s China policy has not actually been modified since the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Tactical moves within a field of force delimited by the party’s ideology to strive for an ‘independent’ Taiwan on the one hand and its pragmatism in accepting the ‘Republic of China’ as the signifier of a sovereign Taiwanese state on the other, still form the conceptual basis on which the DPP faces China. Ideology and pragmatism have remained in a state of tension since the founding of the DPP. However, this tension seems to be declining. The reason for this is not the rise of a new consensus between the contending DPP factions on the relevance of the independence clause in the party’s charter, but rather the fact that Taiwanese society changed a great deal during the Ma Ying-jiu era. Generational change made itself increasingly felt in the social and political fabric of Taiwan after Ma took office. Taiwan’s Sunflower generation stands far apart from the historical experiences of their parents’ generation, who were socialized under an authoritarian regime that pursued a ‘One

50  Gunter Schubert China’ ideology from which nobody could escape. The younger generation has been born into a democratic Taiwan that has steadily grown out of its authoritarian past and formed a firm Taiwanese national identity on that trajectory. Many young Taiwanese reject the ‘One China principle’ as a remnant of a long-gone past that is no longer applicable to the reality of contemporary Taiwan, and they perceive any attempt to force the idea of ‘One China’ upon them as an attack on their freedom and dignity. It is safe to say that this attitude will not change, and will become increasingly entrenched in the social psychology of the Taiwanese people. It is also safe to say that this development serves the DPP (and renders intraparty ideological strife less important) while it seriously hampers the election comeback of the KMT. Nevertheless, the DPP was on the defensive, politically, during most of the Ma Ying-jiu years. When Chen Shui-bian stepped down in 2008, amidst loud accusations of corruption, many Taiwanese constituencies felt that it was time for Taiwan to embark on a new China policy. They wanted to see the stabilization of cross-Strait relations and hoped for rising opportunities on the Chinese market in the new era of economic and political interaction across the Taiwan Strait. The DPP was hardly able to do more than stand by and watch during the years of the first and early second Ma administrations. Many in the party demanded policy adjustments, if not an ideological overhaul, after the 2012 election defeat. The controversial debate on a new China policy that followed remained inconclusive since the DPP was unable to agree on an interpretation of the relationship between the Taiwan Independence Clause and the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future. Eventually, a tricky pragmatist consensus emerged according to which the 1999 Resolution was defined as the DPP’s bottom line and the validity of the Taiwan Independence Clause (and the claim of being a ‘normal country’) was not called into question. Until spring 2014, it was more than uncertain whether such a position would enable the DPP to regain presidential office. Only when the KMT suddenly met stern resistance on the streets, manifested in the 2014 Sunflower Movement underpinned by national identity formation and generational change, did the political tide begin to turn for the DPP. The movement was catalytic in the sense that it clearly revealed the latent uneasiness and fears of many Taiwanese which had accumulated during the Ma Ying-jiu years because of China’s increasing impact on Taiwan (Schubert 2016). The DPP did not lead the Sunflower Movement but was its natural political ally. After eight years of cross-Strait political interaction and steered economic integration, the Taiwan people were now in a better position to appreciate the opportunities and risks of ‘appeasing the dragon’. At a critical juncture, marked by the reading of the CSTSA in the Legislative Yuan, the KMT’s China edifice finally collapsed. Taiwan’s young generation was no longer able to accept their government’s attitude of knowing best how to deal with China. Ma Ying-jiu was the embodiment of this attitude. He was increasingly perceived as arrogant and as not being accountable to the public for his China policies. The ensuing demise of the KMT’s internal unity in the aftermath of the Sunflower Movement unveiled the profound problems of a party for which the politics of

The DPP’s China policy  51 cross-Strait relations had become self-referential and which was also apparently unable to address the serious concerns and anxieties among the populace concerning Taiwan’s sovereignty and internal peace. In her 2016 campaign, Tsai Ing-wen pursued a strategy that conspicuously abstained from theorizing on Taiwan’s relationship with China. She did not respond to those who demanded that she make the DPP’s ideological commitment to Taiwan independence compatible with the 1992 Consensus, the centrepiece of KMT cross-Strait rationality during the Ma Ying-jiu years. For one thing, this would certainly have been extremely difficult given the shaky relationship that existed between the contending factions in her party. For another, it was not necessary since the KMT was in disarray and too badly injured to recoup the loss of electoral support that it had suffered since early 2014, according to most surveys.36 Still, Tsai did not place the China policy issue on the back burner by restricting her campaign to a domestic agenda of promoting social justice and economic redistribution, as she did in 2012 – a strategy that had failed, at the time, since it gave the KMT uncontested space to claim that it was the only political force that could talk to and make a deal with China. Time and time again, during the 2016 campaign, Tsai reiterated her cross-Strait magic spells, conjuring up the status quo, the existing ROC constitutional order, and the will of the people of Taiwan. This was not meant to outline a substantial policy but to assure domestic and foreign audiences that the DPP ‘was ready’ for China. Tsai highlighted Taiwan as an independent variable in cross-Strait relations. If she won, so the message ran, the future of cross-Strait relations would primarily depend on how China was going to deal with a DPP government. She would not run the risk of rocking the boat by using provocative language vis-à-vis Beijing, would adhere to all existing cross-Strait agreements, uphold the ROC Constitution, and refrain from any Chen Shui-bian-like behaviour, even if the Chinese side did ignore her. Her government would not, however, subscribe to the ‘One China principle’ and the 1992 Consensus. Today, China’s sovereignty claim over Taiwan is not Tsai’s biggest problem, although Beijing’s way of dealing with her government certainly is. Officially, the Chinese government has ignored Tsai since her inauguration. It is, in this way, repeating its approach to the former president, Chen Shui-bian. China has ‘punished’ the Tsai administration by shutting down (semi-)official communication channels, reducing the number of Chinese tourists allowed to visit Taiwan, starting a new offensive to lure away Taiwan’s diplomatic partners and once more hindering the island republic’s efforts to participate in international events (The Economist 2016; Taipei Times 2016). Naturally, the Chinese government talks to the KMT. Although Taiwan cannot escape China’s economic orbit and many Taiwanese aspire to develop professional careers on the mainland, it is more than doubtful that this strategy will pay off. It will rather deepen the rising tide of critical thinking on – if not the outright rejection of – cross-Strait economic integration in Taiwan. Permanently shunning a democratically elected government that is led by a president who does not turn out to be a ‘maverick’ but proves to be reliable and consistent in her cross-Strait policy approach will make it difficult for

52  Gunter Schubert Beijing to win over the ‘hearts and minds of the Taiwan people’, China’s political mantra since the days of Deng Xiaoping. On the other hand, tolerating the DPP’s refusal to accept the 1992 Consensus or even allowing a new formula on the issue of ‘One China’ would require a full-fledged revision of Beijing’s Taiwan policy, a potentially dangerous and risky strategy that no Chinese leader has yet dared to employ. This poses a real dilemma for Beijing, which up to now has chosen to dig in its heels. If this interpretation is correct, the DPP stands a fair chance of holding on to government in Taiwan, particularly if the KMT is unable to ‘invent’ a new language to conceptualize the cross-Strait relationship while seeming to prefer to adhere to the old ‘One China’ narrative. The KMT did well enough with this narrative during most of the Ma Ying-jiu years, but failed to take note of the increasing gap between the party’s ideological claims and growing public concern in Taiwan. For the time being, therefore, the KMT’s only hope is that the DPP will meet with failure and defeat on the domestic politics front; in cross-Strait relations, the KMT is running the risk of becoming an anachronistic party.

Notes 1 See, e.g., Hsu 2012. DPP Should Update Cross-Strait Policy. Taipei Times, 19 January. Taipei Times 2012. DPP Soul-Searching on Taiwan, ‘1992 Consensus’. Taipei Times, 30 January. Taipei Times 2012. Three Easy Steps to Get DPP, CCP Conversing. Taipei Times, 9 April. Taipei Times 2012. DPP Has No Need to Formulate New China Policy. Taipei Times, 19 April. China Post 2012. DPP Split on Party’s Taiwan Independence Clause. China Post, 21 October. China Post 2012. DPP Members Quarrel Over China Affairs. China Post, 18 November. China Post 2013. No Market for Independence Speech Draws DPP Backlash. China Post, 25 April. Taipei Times 2013. DPP Must Reach China Consensus. Taipei Times, 13 July. Taipei Times 2013. DPP Meeting on PRC Policy Fails to Reach a Consensus. Taipei Times, 27 September. Taipei Times 2013. Ker Tells DPP to Freeze its Carter on Independence. Taipei Times, 27 December. China Post 2013. Ker’s Charter Proposal ‘immature’: Koo Kuan-min. China Post, 31 December. Taipei Times 2014. No Independence Clause Revision: Su. Taipei Times, 26 January. Taipei Times 2014. Ex-DPP Legislator Seeks Independence Clause Freezing. Taipei Times, 20 June. Taipei Times 2014. DPP Mulls Independence Clause. Taipei Times, 17 July. Taipei Times 2014. Tsai, Su Condemn Movement to Freeze Fundamental Clause. Taipei Times, 20 July. 2 After a provisional review of the party’s China policy, the DPP’s China Affairs Committee concluded that it was not necessary to make any adjustments. A final effort by those DPP members who had made the suggestion to ‘freeze’ the Taiwan independence clause, meaning to abolish it, failed at the congress when the DPP chairperson, Tsai Ing-wen, declared the debate on this issue postponed for the time being. See Taipei Times 2014. DPP’s Review of its China Policy Lacks Major Change. Taipei Times, 10 January. Taipei Times 2014. DPP Defends its China Policy Review. Taipei Times, 11 January. Taipei Times 2014. Initiators of Independence Clause Hail Tsai’s Decision. Taipei Times, 22 July. 3 See, e.g. Jon Sullivan 2015. The Strategic Intentions Behind Xi Jinping’s Meeting with Ma Ying-jeou. The South China Morning Post [online], 6 November. Available from: www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1876209/strategic-intentionsbehind-xi-jinpings-meeting-ma-ying-jeou [Accessed 28 December 2016].

The DPP’s China policy  53 4 For an overview of the DPP’s China policy in the 1990s, see, e.g. Liu 1998; Yan 2003; Schubert and Braig 2011. For an overview of the DPP’s China policy from the perspective of different party politicians and DPP-leaning intellectuals, see Tung and Li 2015. 5 The so-called Taiwan Independence Clause is written into the first part of the platform, introducing the party’s ‘basic viewpoints’. The core sentence reads: ‘On the basis of the principle of the people’s sovereignty, the position on which to establish a sovereign, independent and autonomous Republic of Taiwan and to draw up a new constitution shall be decided by all Taiwan people in a referendum’. The Chinese text of the party platform is available on the DPP’s official website. See www.dpp.org.tw/history. php. [Accessed 4 April 2017] 6 The 5th Central Committee of the DPP elected in that year was dominated by proindependence factions which forced the Independence Clause upon the moderate Formosa Faction, obviously in exchange for the party chairmanship secured by the latter; see Cheng and Hsu 1996. 7 The Chinese original of the resolution text is accessible via www.dpp.org.tw/history. php (20160728102252_link.pdf.) [Accessed 4 April 2017] 8 Quote from the resolution’s English translation, see www.taiwandc.org/nws-9920.htm (accessed 28 December 2016). 9 Ibid. In a personal conversation with the author some years ago (16 April 2012), the DPP legislator, Bi-khim Hsiao, who has been involved in drafting the DPP’s China policy since the 1990s, said that the 1999 resolution signified a ‘revolutionary change’ in the party’s basic stance, since the DPP no longer claimed that Taiwan independence was a goal that had to be achieved, but that Taiwan was already independent – even if called the ‘Republic of China’. Hsiao also emphasized the fact that the 1999 resolution was the most authoritative written document on the DPP’s China policy, and that it superseded the earlier ‘Taiwan Independence Clause’ in the party Charter. However, there is no official DPP document (to my knowledge) that would confirm this interpretation and, as a matter of fact, Hsiao’s position is contested within the party leadership and rank-and-file to this very day. 10 Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to do away with the clause at the time were confirmed to me in a conversation with the former DPP lawmaker, Lin Cho-shui, on 9 March 2012. 11 At the time this decision was made, Frank Hsieh, who was premier at the time, stated that if there were a conflict between the Taiwan Independence Clause and the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future, the latter would supersede the former, a viewpoint which, as has already been mentioned, was never ‘canonized’ and has remained contested ever since. See Taipei Times 2013. DPP Makes Minor Revisions to Stance on Independence. Taipei Times, 21 October, p. 3. Taipei Times 2001. DPP Shuffling to the Center. Taipei Times, 30 October. 12 For a more recent study on Chen Shui-bian’s promotion of Taiwanese nationalism, see Lin, Yu and Hsieh 2010. See also Schubert and Braig 2011. 13 This was made most obvious when President George Bush strongly reprimanded Chen Shui-bian during a state visit by the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, to the US in December 2003. 14 The resolution was approved by an overwhelming majority of 328 against 43 delegate votes, with another 30 votes in support of a ‘compromise version’ proposed by a DPP legislator that asked for the rectification of the name ‘Taiwan’ to be accomplished ‘as soon as possible’ and for the writing of a new constitution. The resolution also highlights the need for the nation to hold a referendum to ‘emphasize Taiwan’s independent statehood at an appropriate time’. See Taipei Times 2007. DPP Passes ‘Normal Country’ Resolution. Taipei Times, 1 October. 15 Author’s translation. The Normal Country Resolution constitutes section VI of the party charter whereas the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s future has been included as the Charter’s section III.

54  Gunter Schubert 16 It was the former premier, Su Tseng-cheng, who first proposed a ‘Taiwan consensus’, obviously as part of his warm-up before running for the DDP candidacy in the 2012 presidential elections. However, he did as little as Tsai to translate this notion into a policy line and only explained that the consensus would be ‘firmly based on the two major principles of ‘existence is the top priority and democracy is the cornerstone’. See China Post 2012. Consensus Cannot Focus on One-China Issue. China Post, 18 February. 17 The Chinese version can be downloaded via http://iing10.blogspot.de/ [Accessed 28 December 2016]. 18 It should be noted that Ma Ying-jeou has never explicitly promoted unification. He cautiously circumvented the issue throughout his first and second periods in office, emphasising repeatedly his ‘three noes’ approach to China, i.e., no unification, no independence, no use of force. When Xi Jinping demanded more determination from both sides to tackle the political problems in cross-Strait relations, Ma remained elusive. When he met Xi in Singapore on 7 November  2015, Ma reiterated the ‘One China principle’ and spoke of revitalizing the Chinese nation, but did not mention unification. Moreover, the KMT removed the term ‘unification’ from its party charter in 2007, replacing it with the formula that Taiwan’s future should be determined by its 23 million citizens. 19 Ambiguity has, of course, been intentional in the KMT’s China policy approach for a long time. To domestic audiences, party leaders including Ma Ying-jeou at the time, have often laid emphasis on the identity of the ROC and Taiwan, especially in preelection times. However, towards China, the KMT has emphasized the ‘One China principle’ in the sense that the ROC is representing the whole of China, i.e., Taiwan and the mainland. 20 For example, the former DPP legislator, Lin Cho-shui, an outspoken advocate of the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future’ as the cornerstone of the DPP’s China policy approach, complained after the election that ‘Tsai could easily have said that the content of the “Taiwan consensus” means “The Republic of China [ROC] is Taiwan and Taiwan is the ROC” – one of her major statements in the campaign. I have no idea why she did not make this connection’; see Taipei Times 2012. DPP Soul-searching on Taiwan, ’1992 Consensus. Taipei Times, 30 January. 21 Tsai’s disappointing showing in the presidential race was attributed to a number of reasons by the DPP in post-election analyses. An internal report pointed at ‘technical issues’ in an obvious attempt to put a hold on the rising debate within the DPP on the future direction of its China policy. Among other reasons, it was claimed that many DPP supporters had not been able to return to their hometown because of the unhappy timing of the election which had been scheduled just one week before the Lunar New Year holiday; that a lower-than-expected turnout rate and tactical voting by pan-blue supporters, who chose to ‘abandon’ the PFP candidate, James Soong, at the very last moment in favour of the incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou, did damage to the DPP; and that the ruling party was helped by some 200,000 Taiwanese businessmen who had returned from China to cast their votes. In addition, it was claimed that the KMT had abused its access to government and administrative resources as campaign tools; that KMT vote-buying had been rampant; that Taiwanese farmers had been deceived by China’s politically-motivated buying of domestic agricultural and aquatic products; and that the KMT had conspired with the Chinese Communist Party to stigmatize the DPP as an anti-trade party which would make the cross-Strait economy suffer from a change of government. At a more general level, the report stated that the DPP was unable to convince voters of its capabilities as a ruling party. See Taipei Times 2012‘.Consensus’ Not Key to Loss: DPP, Taipei Times, 14 February. Taipei Times 2015. Forum Examines DPP’s Failings. Taipei Times, 15 February. Taipei Times 2012. DPP Cites Six Main Reasons For Loss. Taipei Times, 16 February. See also Li 2012a, 2012b.

The DPP’s China policy  55 22 A number of forums organized by pro-independence or DPP-leaning organisations or think tanks – e.g., Taiwan Brain Trust, Taiwan Thinktank, and the Taiwan Association of University Professors – in the weeks after the January 2012 elections supported this assessment. However, other voices denied that the election outcome mirrored the people’s support for the KMT’s pro-China policies and tried to shift more attention to the party’s internal problems, which would have to be tackled in the future. For example, the former DPP legislator, Kuo Cheng-liang, claimed that Ma Ying-jeou had not been elected because Taiwanese voters recognized the legitimacy of the 1992 Consensus but because he and the KMT ‘brilliantly connected the consensus with Taiwan’s economic future and the voters bought the theory’. See Taipei Times 2012.Forum Examines DPP’s Failings. Taipei Times, 15 February. 23 Concerning the different arguments articulated in this debate, see, e.g., Taipei Times 2012. DPP Must Get Serious about China. Taipei Times, 27 February. Taipei Times 2012. DPP Should Shift Focus, Re-engage Beijing. Taipei Times, 28 February. ‘Taipei Times 2012. DPP Happy to Talk to China, But with No Preconditions. Taipei Times, 2 March. Taipei Times 2012. Cross-strait Issue Needs a Modern Fix. Taipei Times, 7 March. Taipei Times 2012. ‘Taiwan Consensus’ Not Workable, Ex-DPP Chief Shih Says. Taipei Times, 13 March. Taipei Times 2012.Panel Calls on DPP to Rediscover Roots. Taipei Times, 7 March. Taipei Times 2012. DPP Has No Need to Formulate New China Policy: Wu. Taipei Times, 19 April. One of the most persistent critics of the DPP’s ambiguous China policy was the political science professor, Tung Chen-yuan, who had served as a deputy-head of the Mainland Affairs Council for two years at the end of the second Chen Shui-bian administration (2006–2008). He repeatedly urged the party leadership to revise or scrap the Independence Clause in the party Charter and get ‘real’ on cross-Strait relations. See, e.g., Taipei Times 2012. Three Easy Steps to get DPP, CCP Conversing. Taipei Times, 9 April. Taipei Times 2008. DPP Must Change its China Policy. Taipei Times, 1 May. 24 Hsieh’s proposal to forge a ‘constitutional consensus’ was flatly rejected by Taiwan’s largest pro-independence organizations. Other DPP leaders refused to give the ROC constitution more credit than the 1999 Resolution on Taiwan’s Future had already done, emphasizing instead that a constitutional consensus was already inscribed in that document. See Taipei Times 2011. Pro-independence Groups Rebuke Hsieh Constitution Proposal. Taipei Times, 12 January. China Post 2011. Consensus Cannot Focus on One China Issue: Su. China Post, 18 February. 25 Again, Hsieh’s ideas were rejected by ‘deep green’ DPP leaders; see Taipei Times 2012. Hsieh’s China Platform Has No Chance: Su Huan-chih. Taipei Times, 22 October. Taipei Times 2012. Ex-premier Says Independence Is Key Goal. Taipei Times, 6 November. 26 Here, I refer to remarks made by Lin Chia-lung in a personal conversation with the author (17 April 2012). He added that words change their meanings in dialogue and that this implies that things can gradually become acceptable to China and Taiwan which were not acceptable at the beginning of such a dialogue. 27 ‘Pan-green’ refers to the DPP and those political parties ideologically close to it, most notably the New Power Party, the Taiwan Solidarity Union and the Taiwan Independence Party. 28 Chen visited Taiwan in his capacity as head of the Association of Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS), the semi-official counterpart of Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in early November 2008, triggering massive street protests by students that lasted until January 2009 in what quickly became known as the Wild Strawberry Movement (yecaomei yundong). 29 According to the survey figures regularly published by the Election Studies Center at National Chengchi University in Taipei, the number of islanders holding an exclusive Taiwanese identity constantly increased during the Ma Ying-jeou era and stood

56  Gunter Schubert

30

31

32

33

34 35

36

at 59.3 percent in mid-2016. At the same time, only 3 percent claim to be ‘Chinese’ whereas 33.6 percent think of themselves as ‘both Taiwanese and Chinese’. See http:// esc.nccu.edu.tw/course/news.php?Sn=166 [accessed 28 December 2016]. The former head of the DPP China Affairs Department, Lai I-chung, a few days before the end of the Sunflower Movement, stated that the DPP had obviously been working on incorrect assumptions concerning the public’s thinking on the party’s China policy as too radical. The former DPP legislator, Julian Kuo, even stated that the efforts of the party’s pragmatists for policy adjustments ‘collapsed in an instant’ as the movement ‘shocked the DPP back to its original pro-independence state of mind’. See Taipei Times, 2014. SIEGE AFTERMATH: Sunflowers Prompt China Policy Debate. Taipei Times, 12 August. Tung Chen-yuan again was one of those demanding a ‘freeze’ of the Taiwan Independence Clause although he did not argue that the DPP must accept the 1992 Consensus instead. In line with his previous suggestions, he demanded that the DPP acknowledge the Republic of China as the embodiment of an independent Taiwan and stop its attempts to achieve a name change, most probably to ‘Republic of Taiwan’. See Taipei Times 2015. How to Fix DPP’s Cross-Strait Policy. Taipei Times, 11 January. Taipei Times 2015. Academic Advises DPP on Adjusting its China Policy. Taipei Times, 20 January. Taipei Times 2015. China Must Change Tack with DPP. Taipei Times, 14 March. See, e.g., DPP 2015. DPP China Affairs Committee: Maintaining Cross-Strait Status Quo [online]. Availble from: http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-china-affairs-committee/ [Accessed 27 November 2015]. Center for Strategic and International Studies 2015. Taiwan Meeting the Challenges: Crafting a Model for New Asian Value [online]. Available from: http://english.dpp.org.tw/dr-tsai-ing-wen-speaks-at-center-for-strate gic-and-international-studies/ [Accessed 27 November 2015]. In January 2015, the DPP’s China Affairs Committee had announced a number of ground rules for developing cross-Strait relations summarized as the ‘three benefits and three commitments’. More precisely, to benefit ‘national development of freedom and democracy’, ‘regional peace and stability’, and a ‘mutually advantageous’ cross-Strait relationship, the DPP’s China policies would be committed to democratic and transparent decision-making, inclusive and fair cross-Strait interaction, and bringing about tangible benefits for the public. See PaCNet 2015. No. 51, 19 August. Thinking Taiwan 2015. Cai Yingwen chenggong fangmei dui Taiwan de yiyi (I) – sinian kugong huanhu shouzhi (Tsai Ing-wen’s successful trip to the US and its significance for Taiwan  – celebrating the harvest of four years of hard work) [online], 6, Available from: www.thinkingtaiwan.com/content/4175 [Accessed December 1 2015]. ‘Dark green’ refers to a strong ideological commitment to Taiwan independence, in contrast to more moderate approaches within the ‘green camp’ that rather focus on maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. For the Chinese wording, see Thinking Taiwan 2015.Cai Ying-wen chenggong fangmei dui Taiwan de yiyi (II) – cong jige shijian kan meiguo taidu yu guoji shiwu jingying (Tsai Ing-wen’s successful trip to the US and its significance for Taiwan – looking at the US attitudes toward and management of international affairs in the context of several incidents) [online]. Available from: www.thinkingtaiwan.com/content/4178 [Accessed 1 December 2015]. For instance, according to a Taiwan Indicators Survey Research poll conducted between 8–10 November, Tsai Ing-wen maintained a comfortable 26-point lead (46.2 percent) over the KMT’s Chu Li-lun (20.4 percent) and the PFP’s Song Chu-yu (10.4. percent). See Taiwan Security Research 2015. Taiwan Mood Barometer Survey, First Half of November 2015 [online]. Available from: www.taiwansecurity.org/app/ news.php?Sn=7912 [Accessed 1 December 2015].

The DPP’s China policy  57

References Cheng, T. J., and Hsu, Y. M., 1996. Issue Structure, DPP’s Factionalism and Party Realignment. In: Tien H. M., ed. Taiwan’s Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 139–140. The Economist, 2016. China Restricting Tourism to Taiwan After Elections. ‘Great stonewall’. The Economist [online], 2 July, 50. Available from: www.upi.com/ Top_News/World-News/2016/02/23/China-restricting-tourism-to-Taiwan-after-elec tions/1471456255035/ [Accessed 28 December 2016]. Ho, M. S., 2015. Occupy Congress in Taiwan: Political Opportunity, Threat, and the Sunflower Movement. Journal of East Asian Studies, 15, 69–97. Hsieh, C. T., 2012. Bu yiyang de Taiwan (Taiwan Next). Taipei: Xin wenhua jiaoshi. Huang, C. H., and Patrick, J., 2014. Blue, Green or Aquamarine? Taiwan and the Status Quo Preference in Cross-Strait Relations. China Quarterly, 219, 670–692. Li, C. M., 2012a. Xiaoying jingxuan tuandui you wenti, haishi xiaozhu yundongliang bu gou (Did Ying-wen’s Campaign Team Have Problems, Or Was the ‘little pigs’ Movement Not Strong Enough?). Xin Xinwen (The Journalist), 1297A, 17–19. Li, C. M., 2012b. Xiao daoge houzhan, Ma Ying-jiu bian tiegui (The War of the Little Knife Cutting Throats, Ma Ying-jiu Turns into an Iron Tortoise). Xin Xinwen (The Journalist), 1300, 26–29. Liberty Times, 2011. Tsai ti liang’an lunshu: he er bu tong, he er qiu tong’ (Tsai Raises Cross-strait Discourse: Pursuing Peace but Preserving Differences, Advancing Harmony and Seeking Common Ground). Liberty Times [online], 24 February. Available from: http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/471136 [Accessed 28 November 2015]. Lin, C. S., Yu, Y. C., and Hsieh, C. T., 2010. Minjindang zhizheng shiqi zhi Taiwan minzu zhuyi fazhan zhengce: 2000–2008 (The Politics of Developing Taiwanese Nationalism in the DPP’s Reign: 2000–2008). Chia-Nan Annual Bulletin, 36, 493–513. Liu, C. T., 1998. Dadan xijin? Jieji yongren? Minjindang dalu zhengce (Audaciously Going West? No Haste, Be Patient? The DPP’s China Policy), Taipei: Shiying. Romberg, A. D., 2012. Taiwan Elections Head to the Finish: Concerns, Cautions, and Challenges. China Leadership Monitor, 36, 1–33. Romberg, A. D., 2015. Squaring the Circle: Adhering to Principle, Embracing Ambiguity. China Leadership Monitor, 47, 1–23. Rowan, I., 2015. Inside Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement: Twenty-Four Days in a StudentOccupied Parliament, and the Future of the Region. Journal of Asian Studies, 74 (1), 5–21. Schubert, G., 2004. Taiwan’s Political Parties and National Identity: The Rise of an Overarching Consensus. Asian Survey, 44 (4), 534–545. Schubert, G., 2012a. No Winds of Change: Taiwan’s 2012 National Elections and the PostElection Fallout. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41 (3), 143–161. Schubert, G., 2012b. Between Strategic Change and Ideological Adjustment: The DPP’s China Policy Debate in the Aftermath of the 2012 National Elections. Taiwan Political Science Review, 16 (2), 233–270.Schubert, G., ed., 2016. Taiwan and the ‘China Impact’. Challenges and Opportunities. London: Routledge. Schubert, G., and Braig, S., 2011. How to Face an Embracing China: The DPP’s Identity Politics and Cross-Strait Relations During and After the Chen Shui-bian Era. In: Schubert, G., and Damm, J., eds. Taiwanese Identity in the 21st Century: Domestic, Regional and Global Perspectives. London: Routledge, 72–94. Taipei Times, 2011a. Tsai Details DPP’s Cross-Strait Policies. Taipei Times, 24 August.

58  Gunter Schubert Taipei Times, 2011b. DPP Must Seek Unity at Congress. Taipei Times, 18 January. Taipei Times, 2011c. Tsai Clarifies ‘unification’ Comments. Taipei Times, 19 September, p. 1. Taipei Times, 2011d. A ‘Taiwan Consensus’ Is Brewing. Taipei Times, 22 October, p. 8. Taipei Times, 2011e. Tsai Says DPP Now Moderate, Reformist. Taipei Times, 21 July. Taipei Times, 2011f. Interview: Frank Hsieh Explains His ‘Constitutional Consensus’ Proposal (Part I). Taipei Times, 30 January. Taipei Times, 2011g. Interview: Frank Hsieh Explains His ‘Constitutional Consensus’ Proposal (Part II). Taipei Times, 31 January. Taipei Times, 2011h. Interview: Frank Hsieh Explains His ‘Constitutional Consensus’ Proposal (Part I). Taipei Times, 30 January. Taipei Times, 2012a. Tsai Speaks to ‘NYT’ About the ‘Taiwan’ Consensus. Taipei Times, 7 January. Taipei Times, 2012b. Frank Hsieh Defends Constitutions Initiative. Taipei Times, 13 October. Taipei Times, 2012c. Hsieh Defends His Initiative on ‘Constitutions’ Platform. Taipei Times, 17 October. Taipei Times, 2012d. Former Premier Calls for Change in China Approach. Taipei Times, 27 October. Taipei Times, 2013. Frank Hsieh Expounds on Constitution, China. Taipei Times, 21 July. Taipei Times, 2015. Tsai Looks Ahead as Chu Attacks Cross-Strait Views. Taipei Times, 7 May, p. 3. Taipei Times, 2016. Sao Tome and Principe Cuts Taipei Ties. Taipei Times, 22 December. Tung, C. Y., and Li, X., 2015. Miandui Minjindang jingying de liang’an weilai (Facing the Future of the DPP’s Elites on Both Sides of the Taiwan Strait). Taipei: Shibao wenhua. Wu, J. M., 2016. The China Factor in Taiwan: Impact and Response. In: Schubert, G., ed. Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. London: Routledge, 426–446. Yan, W. C., 2003. Zaiye shiqi Minjindang dalu zhengce (The DPP’s Mainland Policy in the Opposition Years). Zhonghe: Xinwenjing.

3 Taiwanese nationalism in the age of cross-Strait integration Predominance and pragmatism in the Ma Ying-jiu era Liao Da-chi, Liu Cheng-shan, Chen Bo-yu Introduction Cross-Strait relations are generally believed to have progressed greatly during the eight years of Ma Ying-jiu’s presidency (2008–2016), and Ma is extremely proud of the more than twenty agreements he signed during his term in office. In particular, because of the agreement between China and Taiwan to ease tensions created by diplomatic competition, Taiwan was not only able to maintain diplomatic relations with 22 countries, but also concluded visa waver agreements with 163 nations, which made Taiwanese passports a hotly desired item on the black market. However, despite the outward appearance of amicability, peace and close ties between the two regions, the people of Taiwan do not appear to be grateful, since surveys indicate that they seem to support ‘indefinitely maintaining the status quo’ or ‘future independence’ more than they have done in the past.1 They also believe more strongly than before that they are Taiwanese and not Chinese.2 What is more, the Sunflower Movement’s protest against the cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement made the signing of further agreements with the Mainland Chinese government practically impossible during Ma’s term in office.3 The assessments of scholars who have interpreted these developments have pointed at three causal factors: the first is the formation of economic nationalism within Taiwan. The economic dividends of cross-Strait interactions have not benefitted the majority of Taiwanese; on the contrary, young Taiwanese, the lower middle class, and those in central and southern Taiwan feel that these interactions have worsened their economic situation. This has solidified anti-Chinese nationalist sentiment (Qi 2013, Li 2014). The second causal factor is the fact that Taiwan is a politically free and democratic society with a lifestyle and established institutions completely distinct to those of Mainland China. In addition, the younger generation is better educated, and has a greater sense of autonomy.4 The textbooks used in history and civics courses for the young cohort convey the theme of Taiwanese consciousness.5 Education, which is geared toward the individual student, takes the creation of a collective Taiwanese identity as its goal. As a result, scholars have claimed that the greater democratization of Taiwan, as well as its broader autonomy, have created a clear distinction between Taiwan’s political system and that of Mainland China and that this has led to political nationalism (Qi 2013;

60  Liao Da-chi et al. The Economist 2011). The third factor concerns the large number of Mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan,6 since their direct contact with the Taiwanese public has created tension. For example, in a 2009 poll, when asked about their overall impressions concerning Mainland tourists coming to Taiwan, 40 percent of Taiwanese said that they had formed an unfavorable impression, while 42 percent said that they had formed a positive impression (Taiwan Public Opinion Studies Association 2009). When asked the same question in 2013, the number of respondents who viewed Mainland tourists unfavorably had increased to 65 percent, while only 14 percent viewed them favorably. A high number, 90 percent, of respondents between the ages of 20 and 29 had an unfavorable view of Mainland tourists (TVBS 2013). This consciousness of a distinction being made between the ‘we group’ and ‘the other’ derived through everyday interaction may be described as cultural nationalism (Huntington 2004; Anderson 1991). One common focal point of these three factors is the younger generation of Taiwanese under 30 years of age, who are described as being ‘natural advocates of Taiwanese independence’ (Liao 2015). During the Sunflower Movement, they sang Dao yu tian guang [Island’s Sunrise] and chanted the slogan ‘our country, our destiny’. These students utilized crowdsourcing to occupy the Legislative Yuan for 24 days (Liao et al. 2014). Not only did they put a halt to the signing of cross-Strait agreements and cause the defeat of the KMT in the 2014 local elections, but, to add insult to injury, they also made the KMT a lame-duck party before the 2016 presidential election. These phenomena seem to indicate that Taiwanese identity, and/or nationalism, has become even more prominent within the trend towards cross-Strait integration witnessed during the Ma Ying-jiu administration. However, Tsai Ying-wen, who won the 2016 presidential election, broke with the DPP’s tradition and participated in the last National Day of the Republic of China ceremony of Ma Ying-jiu’s presidency (10 October 2015). She also called for maintaining the status quo and has avoided themes related to the island’s autonomy (such as whether Taiwan is a country, whether the Republic of China is a foreign government, etc.). If Taiwanese identity/nationalism has become truly prominent, why has not Tsai, the winner of the election, been strongly asserting Taiwan’s status as a sovereign nation? This study is focuses on Taiwanese nationalism, not in order to pursue its causes or to explain its apparent thriving, but rather to investigate its theoretical underpinnings and existence, both in terms of predominance and preservation. The very notion of Taiwanese nationalism is ambiguous. It has often been used interchangeably with Taiwanese identity, but its meaning has not been seriously discussed and empirically tested in academic studies. To help to fill this gap, this study employs two theoretical perspectives to shed light on and provide insights into Taiwanese nationalism. The first is so-called primordialism, in which nationality is determined by identification with a common ancestry. In the case of Taiwan, a prevalent survey question that asks respondents whether they consider themselves Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, exemplifies a primordial perspective or way of thinking. Respondents are divided into categories of Taiwanese/Chinese identity based on how they respond to this question. However, with regard to

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration 61 nationalism, some schools of thought prefer a relatively complex constructivist view, which produces imagined communities (economic, political, and cultural, as previously mentioned). From this theoretical perspective, a question such as ‘who are you?’ which may refer to one’s primordial origin, can be answered according to the subject’s socialization background or politically constructed identity. In other words, primordialism can be socially constructed and does not necessarily mean that there is an objectively verifiable kinship tie. Furthermore, the so-called imagined community cannot grow in a social vacuum. That is, the emergence of an imagined ‘we-group’ definitely needs some social and political topsoil. However, an acknowledgement of certain kinship ties is still central to many forms of nationalism. Some scholars insist that ethnic concerns are fundamental in order to consolidate nationalism (Connor 1994). This suggests that although primordialism cannot deny its constructive components, it is, first and foremost, based on an emotional attachment to the state. Actually, Taiwanese independence advocates were fully aware of the significance of primordialism in forming Taiwanese nationalism and, from the beginning, made great efforts to prove that the ethnic origins of Taiwanese were diverse and different from Mainland Chinese (Shih Ming 1992, 1993; Shih Cheng-feng 1998, 1999). Only then did they move on and begin to advocate a political nationalism that promotes identification with Taiwan’s democracy (Shih Cheng-feng 2000, 2003, 2005; Lin 2006). These two theoretical discourses have often been discussed and employed to promote the assertion of Taiwanese independence, as well as nationalism,7 but few academic works8 have attempted to apply these two theoretical perspectives to provide insights into so-called Taiwanese nationalism (TN, hereafter) or to make a detailed conceptual distinction between Taiwanese identity and nationalism. Furthermore, due to the lack of any serious discussion of TN’s substance, the academic examination of the TN concept at the empirical level has not yet been undertaken. In this study, we start by constructing and operationalizing the theoretical concept of Taiwanese nationalism. We then assess the validity of the new TN theoretical construct by examining empirical data stemming from a recent survey9 and try to ascertain whether the developments witnessed during the final year of Ma Ying-jiu’s presidency correspond with our general impression that the young have been nurturing a growing feeling toward Taiwanese independence or whether, as the mayor of Tainan, William Lai (Lai Ching-te), more bluntly stated, ‘Taiwanese independence is a social consensus’.10 The implied meaning of ‘Taiwanese independence’ in this statement is unclear, but the use of the term indicates that a form of Taiwanese nationalism or consciousness is on the rise and has become predominant. The first hypothesis presented in this study builds on this phenomenon and is aimed at gauging the extent to which this commonly held impression exists in most people’s minds. The second hypothesis put forward in this study is related to so-called Taiwanese pragmatism, the question being whether Taiwanese nationalists are extremists who pursue the exclusive goal of establishing a Taiwanese state that enjoys de jure independence. If they do not pursue such a goal, can they be pragmatic

62  Liao Da-chi et al. concerning the reality of Taiwan? Can they be flexible enough to avoid extremism in an international environment that is mainly dominated by the United States and China (Wu 2004)? Although this question has received attention in previous research (Rigger 2006; Lin et al. 2004), neither empirical nor theoretical evidence has yet been produced to confirm the existence of pragmatism among ardent nationalists.11 This study therefore attempts to utilize empirical data to analyze the pragmatic tendencies of Taiwanese nationalists. This chapter is structured in five parts. Following this introduction, the second part gives an overview of the relevant literature and explains the research design of this study, including the construction of the concept of Taiwanese nationalism. This takes the consanguinity of primordialism and combines it with political nationalism that emphasizes the construction of an identification with a political domain or the state (Tan and Chen 2013). By utilizing these two theoretical constructs, this study distinguishes among four groups with progressively higher levels of Taiwanese nationalism (see the next part below). The concepts of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ and ‘pragmatism’, the dependent variables of this study, as well as its data, will be introduced together. The third part presents the validity test for the construction of the four types representing different levels of nationalism, and provides a profile of these groups based on gender, age, educational level and political position. In the fourth part, we delve into Taiwanese nationalism in its existing form, asking, in particular, whether it is possible that the type classified as having the lowest level of TN still possesses Taiwanese consciousness to a certain extent, and whether this consciousness is vastly different to that possessed by the other types which display higher levels of TN. Next, we examine the question as to whether Taiwanese nationalists are sufficiently pragmatic in dealing with certain situations and would accept the ‘Republic of China’ instead of pursuing de jure Taiwanese independence or creating a ‘Republic of Taiwan’. Particular attention is paid to discovering whether those with the strongest TN levels are really completely different from the others with respect to their views on pragmatism. The fifth part, the conclusion, summarizes our findings and explains the implications for future research.

Literature review and research design Taiwanese identity and nationalism A great deal of research has been focused on the topics of Taiwanese identity and nationalism. However, the distinction between the two has not yet been clearly defined in the literature. For instance, Wu Yu-shan’s conception of Taiwanese nationalism is that it ‘treats China as an alien entity and asserts that there is nothing essentially Chinese about Taiwan’. (Wu 2004, pp.  614–615). In the same article, he often intermingles the term of ‘Taiwanese identity’ with that of ‘Taiwanese nationalism’, but does not attempt to conduct an empirical examination of the two terms (Wu 2004, pp.  614–625). Wu Nai-teh (2005) explores Taiwan’s national identity through empirical data, but does not directly tackle the

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration  63 issue of Taiwanese nationalism and seems to suggest that ‘identity’ is more culturally and ethnically based. Nationalism, however, involves ethnic (or cultural) and political aspects (Wu 2005, pp. 5–39). There would therefore seem to be a quite acceptable distinction between the two terms. Other research that has focused primarily on issues related to Taiwanese/Chinese identity approaches the question of ‘identity’, or ‘who we are’ (i.e., Taiwanese, Chinese, or both) from an ethnic perspective (Ho and Liu 2002; Huang 2006; Liu and Ho 1999; Wu 2001; Liao et al. 2013. Research that discusses the issue of Taiwanese national identity also treats the question of who we are as one of its main building blocks (Wu 2005; Liao 2015; Chang 2012; Lynch 2004; Hsu 2010). This approach often includes an issue dimension, with the choice of supporting the unification of China or Taiwanese independence, in constructing the concept of national identity. The question remains, however, whether Taiwanese nationalism can be said to be based on the unification vs. independence spectrum. This has not yet been confirmed by any theoretical and related empirical studies. Theoretically, nationalism can be generally divided into two schools of thought. One is primordialism, or essentialism, which considers kinship ties as the nexus of nationalism (Shih 2003). The other, however, derives from a constructed perspective and emphasizes some common political or social experiences that give rise to a ‘we-group’ sentiment or identity, in contrast to feelings or perceptions of ‘the other’ (Shih 2003). One frequently cited definition of the nation is the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991). From this viewpoint, all kinds of nationalism can be derived from a sense of community that has been inculcated through education or experience. Therefore, economic class distinctions, politics as defined by regimes, and lifestyles delineated by culture may all be sources of different imagined communities. However, among these plausible sources, politics may be more fundamental than the other two in framing people’s imagination of the community to which they belong, since the government has legitimate power over educational or communication channels in a regime. Politics, then, is often soundly conceptualized as a ‘state’ or a ‘political regime’ in the current literature regarding the identity components of nationalism (Harris 1997; Tan and Chen 2013; Shih 2003; Checkel et al. 2009; Brubaker 2006). Choices made on the unification/independence spectrum may indicate a policy preference or desire for a future direction, but do not shed much light on the current state of Taiwanese nationalism. It seems that the concept of Taiwanese nationalism (TN) has not been sufficiently addressed empirically in the previous literature. In particular, the measurement of TN in existing studies does not follow the theoretical logic outlined above. For instance, in defining TN, Qi (2013) states that it is both political and economic: ‘Political nationalism aims at Taiwan’s de jure independence from China, in which the objective of economic nationalism is to protect the welfare of less affluent or less-advantaged Taiwanese through a restrained China policy’. (p. 1026). However, Qi still uses subjects’ recognition of themselves as Taiwanese and/or the strength of their tendency to choose policies favoring Taiwanese independence as variables in operationalizing TN (p. 1029). He does not give further consideration to, or link the rationale of nationalism with, the logic underlying

64  Liao Da-chi et al. the construction of indicators. On the other hand, Rigger (2006) provides a broad definition, stating that Taiwanese nationalism consists in Taiwanese identity, support for independence, and antipathy toward the PRC (p. viii). She does not, however, attempt to quantitatively measure this concept, but primarily explores variations and changes in Taiwanese identity, as well as other issues, spanning different generations. This study aims to fill the gap found in the existing literature concerning the measurement of TN and, for this purpose, brings together the implicit concepts of primordialism and constructivism to develop measurement indicators and TN types (see below). Although primordialism can also be constructed, the individual’s perception of kinship connections should be independent of the politically constructed perception of statehood. Taiwanese consciousness Simply put, ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ refers to a Taiwanese perspective or point of view (Lin Yang-min 1988, p. 55), or ‘consciousness through which someone feels he or she is Taiwanese’ (Shih Cheng-feng 1999). This was initially proposed at some time in the 1980s after the commencement of the debate between the ‘Taiwan Complex’ and the ‘China Complex’ (Wang Fu-chang 1996). The notion of Taiwan as an autonomous entity did not exist during the period of authoritarian rule under the KMT. However, the topic of Taiwanese consciousness started to emerge in the debates of the 1980s (Shih Min-hui 1985; Chen Shu-hong 1985; Tsai Du-jian 1996). The participants in these debates critically examined identification as ‘Chinese’, as well as the Chinese national identity and history presented in KMT education policies. They explored Taiwan’s history, geography, political experiences and the view of Taiwan as an entity, while also promoting the idea of a discernible and autonomous Taiwan. It could be said that there was only a thin dividing line between their notions of Taiwanese consciousness and notions of Taiwanese nationalism. Because of the many impediments which hampered the direct promotion of de jure independence for Taiwan, the advocates of independence used Taiwanese consciousness indirectly to construct a sentiment of belonging to a community which attempted to connect the future fate of Taiwan’s geographical area and people with its present democratic institutions. Taiwanese consciousness was promoted over many years and became a standard subject on school curricula to inculcate the sense of being Taiwanese. According to a survey conducted by National Chengchi University’s Election Study Center in 2015, almost 60  percent of respondents stated that they identified as Taiwanese, while 34 percent stated that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese, and a mere 3 percent stated that they identified as only Chinese.12 From this, we can conclude that Taiwanese consciousness may have attained a dominant position. (Liao et al. 2013). However, a political perspective that involves both the understanding of Taiwan’s political experience and acceptance of Taiwan as a political entity is seldom addressed in the literature or in empirical studies. Therefore, in addition to utilizing primordialism and constructivism in creating our measurement indicators and types of TN, we also take Taiwanese consciousness

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration  65 as a dependent variable to assess the prevalence of Taiwanese consciousness. We develop a scale for measuring Taiwanese consciousness based on perceptions of political experience and on Taiwan as a polity in order to ascertain whether those with the lowest level of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment possess little Taiwanese consciousness or whether they, like the other types, have also been subject to influences in their daily lives which have led them to develop quite high levels of Taiwanese consciousness. Taiwanese pragmatism The view that the Taiwanese people tend to be pragmatic is supported by much of the existing literature (Taiwan Competitiveness Forum 2014; Rigger 2006; Hsu Tsung-mao 1995; Keng et al. 2009; Niou 2004; Lin et al. 2004; Wu 2005b). Here, pragmatism refers to the willingness to compromise on the issue of a nationalist identity if the conditions are such that one’s vested interests are perceived to be under threat (Taiwan Competitiveness Forum 2014; Keng et al. 2009). For example, regarding engaging in business with China as most important (Rigger 2006; Hsu Tsung-mao 1995) and believing that it is not necessary to fight a war in order to pursue de jure Taiwan independence (Niou 2004; Wu 2005b) may be called pragmatist stances. Only some 15  percent of the public stated that they would be willing to fight a war in order to gain independence for Taiwan, a stance that has been seen as symbolic politics in earlier research (Lin Tse-min et al. 2004). In recent years, however, National Chengchi University Election Study Center surveys have produced results which differ from those of the past. For example, a 2013 poll asked respondents the following conditional question concerning Taiwanese independence: should the Taiwanese establish their own country even if a declaration of independence would cause Mainland China to attack? The results showed that 38.9 percent (N=795) of respondents would support a declaration of independence, while 61.1 percent (N=1240, total N=2044) would be opposed to such an act.13 An unprecedentedly high number of respondents, almost 40 percent, believed that Taiwan should declare independence even if this did lead to China’s launching an attack on the island. Has the fervor surrounding Taiwanese nationalism made Taiwan’s people less pragmatic and more willing to go to war? The same survey also revealed, however, that 60 percent of respondents would not approve of going to war, which shows that pragmatism may still be prevalent among the Taiwanese people. Nevertheless, we must ask whether those with the strongest Taiwanese nationalist sentiment adopt extreme views. Is pragmatism still pervasive, as this study suggests? In the next section, we explain the operationalization of our variables, the methods we employ to develop measurement indicators and the sources of our data. Research design In addressing primordialism, one of the two aspects of Taiwanese nationalism utilized for developing measurement indicators in this study, we do not employ the traditional identity choices of Taiwanese/Chinese/both. These choices are often

66  Liao Da-chi et al. circumstantial, in that the respondent may change his or her answer according to a specific situation. This is also referred to as strategic identity (Gao 2004; Lin Rui-hua and Keng Shu 2008; Ke 2014). Our investigation, however, is based on the notion of primordialism as applied by proponents of Taiwanese nationalism, such as Shih Ming (1993), Wu Nai-teh (1996, 2005), and Shih Cheng-feng (1998, 2000, 2003, 2005) and we pose indirect survey questions such as ‘Some people say that the people of Mainland China are our compatriots. Do you agree with this statement?’ During the period of single-party authoritarian rule (1949–1987), the Kuomintang (KMT), through the education system, disseminated the belief that the people of Mainland China were natural compatriots of the Taiwanese, a concept that was often referred to as the Greater China doctrine. In contrast, fundamentalist proponents of Taiwan independence, such as Shih Ming, argued that the ancestry of the Taiwanese people was distinct from the ancestry of the Mainland Chinese (1992). And later proponents of independence, such as Wu Nai teh, emphasized the fact that since Taiwan’s people were born and raised on the island, they shared a common way of life and culture different to that of Mainland China, and they were therefore Taiwanese and not Mainland Chinese. Since these different notions went through an interdiscursive process within Taiwanese society.,14 it is possible, from a primordialist perspective, to compare the number of respondents who believe that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots with the number of those who do not; those who answer ‘yes’ will be considered as possessing lower levels of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment, while those who respond with ‘no’ will be considered as possessing higher levels of Taiwanese nationalist sentiment. As previously mentioned, from the perspective of constructivism, we primarily focus on the political domain of nationalism, which provides discourses on the concept of the state. We then ask: ‘In your opinion, does Taiwan’s status quo constitute independence?’ Proponents of Taiwanese nationalism (Shih, Wu, Shih, etc.) have all stated that Taiwan should establish itself as an independent country (Shih Cheng-feng 2003, p. 3). However, China is firmly opposed to any claim of de jure independence for Taiwan, and the United States, in view of its own national interests, is not willing to support independence for Taiwan either. For these reasons, politicians such as Lin Cho-shui, Hsieh Chang-ting, and Chen Shui-bian (DPP), have implicitly or explicitly stated that Taiwan is an independent country. Tsai Ying-wen currently seems to be more inclined to make statements such as ‘the name of this country is the Republic of China (ROC)’. However, traditional members of the Taiwan independence movement, such as Shih Ming, do not accept the ROC as the name of Taiwan; they believe that present-day Taiwan is not yet independent and insist on pursuing de jure independence. They are still working toward the birth of a new independent country under a different name, for example, not the ROC, but the Republic of Taiwan. This dispute provides another facet for assessing the depth of Taiwanese nationalism from a political perspective. This facet is nevertheless not as simple as that of primordialism. Theoretically and empirically, it is indisputable that responding positively to the statement ‘the Mainland Chinese are compatriots’ indicates a weakening of Taiwanese nationalism. However, the use of the question ‘Is Taiwan independent in your opinion?’ is

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration 67 complex from an empirical point of view. As previously stated, several important proponents of Taiwanese nationalism would now claim that Taiwan is independent although they have previously stated that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. We may conclude from this that those who ‘consider that Taiwan is independent’ adopt a softer stance with regard to Taiwanese nationalism than those who do not, such as Shih Ming. On the other hand, the educational system that existed during the period of authoritarian rule under the KMT did not promulgate the idea that Taiwan was an independent country. Ma Ying-jiu implicitly attempted to uphold the legitimacy of the Republic of China by stating that Taiwan ‘would not reunite, declare independence, or fight’ in his declarations on cross-Strait policy, and also by advocating the 1992 Consensus. This seemed to signal that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. If, according to KMT standards, a respondent ‘considers that Taiwan is not independent’, he or she is likely to possess a low level of TN. This is because the reasons for which a respondent with this background would choose such a response differ greatly from the reasons that someone such as Shih Ming would have for stating emphatically that ‘Taiwan is not an independent country’. How can we distinguish between people representing two different types who choose the same answer, but in fact seem to possess TN levels at opposite ends of the spectrum? After assessing the differences between the theoretical intent of primordialism and political constructivism as well as the practical development of Taiwanese nationalism,15 we decided to weight perception that is derived from primordialism more heavily than that which derives from political constructivism for measuring the level of TN. In other words, we follow the line described by ethno-nationalism that views the kinship concern as the core element of nationalism (Connor 1994; O’Leary 1997). Below we present a cross-table analysis of the two questions and the four types of TN that we developed, with primordialism weighted more heavily as a determining factor. This study, guided by primordialism, orders the types sequentially from I  to IV in Table  3.1, according to ascending levels of Taiwanese nationalism (TN). Those in type I believe that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots and consider that Taiwan is not independent; they are assumed to possess the lowest level of TN sentiment. We may also say that they do not possess a Taiwanese nationalist identity. Type II has a higher level of TN than type I; those in type II believe that the

Table 3.1  Typology of Taiwanese nationalism Constructivism

Primordialism

(Considers that) Taiwan is not independent (Considers that) Taiwan is Independent Source: the authors.

Mainland Chinese are compatriots

Mainland Chinese not compatriots

I

IV

II

III

68  Liao Da-chi et al. Mainland Chinese are compatriots, but consider that Taiwan is independent. Since these two types accept that the ‘Mainland Chinese are compatriots’, their level of TN sentiment is evaluated as being lower than that of the next two types. Since we weight ‘the Mainland Chinese are compatriots’ factor more heavily than the ‘Taiwan is independent’ factor, the sequential order of the four types is decided by the former. Those in type III, as Table 3.1 shows, do not acknowledge the Mainland Chinese as compatriots but consider that Taiwan is an independent country. They are assumed to possess the third highest level of TN sentiment. Finally, those in type IV, who do not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and do not believe Taiwan is independent, are assumed to possess the highest level of TN sentiment and closely resemble the most fundamentalist supporters of Taiwanese independence. These four TN level types, based on the two theoretical aspects mentioned previously, were created with the aim of filling the gap in existing literature concerning the empirical measurement of TN. We now proceed to conduct a more empirically based investigation into the apparent rise of Taiwanese nationalism during the eight years of Ma’s presidency and to seek answers to the following questions: is it the case that those who show the lowest level of TN (type I) do not possess any Taiwanese consciousness (for example, do not want the official name of the country to be Taiwan)? If this is not the case, then is this group (type I), which may have been imbued with a strong desire for Taiwan to be the master of its own destiny, so very different from the other three? In addition, as previously stated, we would like, through this study, to develop our understanding of the pragmatism of Taiwanese nationalists. Are those in type IV, with the highest level of TN sentiment, completely opposed to cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges as well as to the use of ‘Republic of China’ as the country’s name? The operationalization of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’ focuses on the cognition and recognition of ‘Taiwan’s own political experience and Taiwan as a political entity’. Drawing on these concepts, Professor Liu Cheng-shan created a questionnaire with six questions suitable for the operationalization of ‘Taiwanese consciousness’: 1 2 3 4 5

Do you believe a trip to Shanghai constitutes travel abroad? Do you agree that the official name of our country should be ‘Taiwan?’ In your opinion, do the people of Taiwan already have their own country? Do you believe ‘Taiwan’ is the name of a region, or the name of both a region and our country? Which view do you tend toward? 1) 2) 3) 4)

6

China and Taiwan are part of one China China and Taiwan constitute two Chinas (PRC and ROC) there are two different countries on each side of the Strait (PRC, Taiwan) do not know/no opinion/no response

Would you like our country to be officially referred to as Taiwan?

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration 69 This study takes into consideration cross-Strait economic and trade exchanges and the desire to avoid war, drawing on the operationalization process used by Rigger (2006), Lin et al. (2004), and Niou (2004) to measure pragmatism. In addition, we refer to Tsai Ying-wen’s willingness to use the name ‘Republic of China’ as expressing a pragmatist stance. We selected the following three questions from Liu Cheng-shan’s questionnaire. 1. Do you believe our government should be more proactive in pursuing economic and trade relations with Mainland China, or have fewer interactions? 2. According to some people, avoiding war is the most important issue in crossStrait relations, but everything else can be discussed. Do you agree with this statement? 3. Do you want the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to acknowledge the ROC? The data utilized for analysis in this study was taken from the results of a telephone survey that was commissioned by Professor Liu Cheng-shan and carried out in April 2015 by Taiwan Indicators Survey Research Poll.16

Validity test and profile of Taiwanese nationalists Validity test The concept of Taiwanese nationalism that we are utilizing is derived from the theoretical perspectives of primordialism and political constructivism. We present two beliefs held by respondents: whether or not the Mainland Chinese are compatriots, and whether or not they consider that Taiwan is independent. We perform a cross-table analysis to create four types (I, II, III, IV) that display progressively higher levels of TN. We then examine the validity of these four types. In order to examine the validity of these four types, this study first analyzes the two variables mentioned above through a χ2 examination in order to make sure that the two are not correlated. As Table 3.2 (below) shows, the significance level Table 3.2  Four types of Taiwanese nationalists Are Mainland Chinese compatriots?

Compatriots

Not compatriots

Total

Type

Type

N*

percent

320 596 916

34.9 65.1 100

N/ percent

N/ percent

Is Taiwan independent? Not Independent Independent Total

I 165/18 II 333/36.4 498/54.4

IV 155/16.9 III 263/28.7 418/45.6

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). χ2=0.212 d.f. =1 p>0.05 N: Missing data, such as ‘Do not know/no opinion/no response’, is excluded.

*

70  Liao Da-chi et al. is p>0.05. This means that the two variables that are used to classify the types of TN are effective, since they are not correlated. Table 3.2 shows that more than half of the Taiwanese public believes that the Mainland Chinese are compatriots (54.4 percent) while as many as six out of ten consider that Taiwan is independent. The levels of TN for the four types we have constructed are ordered as follows: 1. The group with the lowest level of TN, which sees the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and does not consider Taiwan to be independent, comprises 18 percent of the sample group.17 2. The group with a slightly higher level of TN, which sees the Mainland Chinese as compatriots, but considers Taiwan to be independent, comprises 36.4 percent of the sample group, twice the percentage of those in type I. 3. The group with the third highest level of TN, which does not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and considers Taiwan to be independent, comprises 28.7 percent, slightly less than the percentage of members in type II. 4. According to our definition, this group possesses the highest level of TN. Those in this group do not see the Mainland Chinese as compatriots and consider Taiwan to be not (yet?) independent. They represent close to 17 percent of the sample group, the smallest percentage of the four. This is just an initial examination of the validity of the four types. We can make inferences concerning the TN levels of these four types based on theory, logic, and practical experience. As the next step, we now ask whether the differences between these types are as we anticipated. Or is it the case that the real world is much more complicated than our simple theoretical inferences, and that the TN internalized by these four groups manifests itself in different forms and cannot be captured by quantified sequencing? In order to further confirm the validity of the four TN types, this study utilizes the following variables: identification as ‘Taiwanese/Chinese/both’ and preference concerning the ‘unification/independence choice spectrum’, to perform cross-table analyses. Drawing on the explanations and classification practices found in the existing literature, it is assumed that the types with high levels of TN will choose ‘Taiwanese’, while those with lower levels will choose ‘Chinese’ and those with median levels will choose ‘both’. We can surmise that it is possible to test the validity of the four types in ascending order of TN strength, by asking our respondents about their preferences concerning the unification/independence issue. In particular, we expected respondents with higher levels of TN to be more likely to choose ‘Taiwanese independence’. The results presented in Table 3.4 will show whether or not this is the case. Table  3.3 clearly shows that type I  has the smallest percentage of members who identify as Taiwanese (only 35.2 percent). The percentages for types II, III, and IV ascend uniformly in order (43 percent, 79.9 percent, and 85.4 percent), while the percentages for those who identify as Chinese descend in order, at 6.8 percent, 3.7 percent, 0.4 percent and 0 percent respectively. More specifically, the questions we ask, (i.e., are the Mainland Chinese compatriots or not, and is

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration 71 Table 3.3  Level of TN and Taiwanese/Chinese/both options Identity Taiwanese selection N Percent

Chinese

Both

Total

N

percent

N

percent

N*

Percent

11 12 1 0 24

6.8 3.7 0.4 0 2.7

94 172 51 22 339

58 53.3 19.7 14.6 37.9

162 323 259 151 895

100 100 100 100 100

Level of TN I II III IV Total

57 139 207 129 532

35.2 43 79.9 85.4 59.4

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). χ2=170.369 d.f. =9 p=.000 (two tails)  N: Missing data, such as ‘Do not know/no opinion/no response’, is excluded.

*

Taiwan considered to be independent or not), effectively reflect the progressive levels of Taiwanese nationalist consciousness from the perspective of Taiwanese identification. The six items shown in Table 3.4 present a complex picture. Since our goal is to further confirm the validity of the four Taiwanese nationalist types, we have chosen to primarily observe the two choices of ‘independence’ and ‘unification’ from among the six options. The percentages of those who support ‘independence’ for types I, II, III and IV are 13.6 percent, 10.2 percent, 40.5 percent and 42.4 percent respectively. There is no significant difference between I and II per the Scheffe test. Similarly, while the order of types III and IV matches our expectations, the difference between them is not significant. In contrast, the difference between types I, II, and III, IV is approximately 30 percent, an extremely clear significant difference (Table 3.4 χ2, p=.000). However, this does not essentially disprove the view that there is a difference in the order of the four different TN level types. This becomes more evident when we examine the percentages for ‘unification’, which are as follows for type I through type IV: 11 percent, 6.5 percent, 1.5 percent and 0.7 percent. Based on the assumptions derived from our definitions of these types, those with lower TN levels (such as type I) will be more likely to choose ‘unification’ (11 percent), and vice versa for the types with higher TN levels. Table 3.4 confirms the validity of the differences in the order of the four TN level types we have constructed. From the trends presented in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 we can confidently assert that the deductions we made while creating the four TN level types (derived from primordialism and political constructivism) are valid. We shall therefore proceed to examine who has the highest and lowest levels of TN. An analysis of the Taiwanese nationalists is presented below. Profile of Taiwanese nationalists This study utilizes four sociodemographic variables of gender, age, education, and political position to examine the background distribution of the four types

21 33 105 64 223

I II III IV Total

13.6 10.2 40.5 42.4 25.2

percent

6 28 37 22 93

N 3.9 8.7 14.3 14.6 10.5

percent

Status Quo, Future Ind.

55 135 75 41 306

N

*

N: Missing data, such as ‘Do not know/no opinion/no response’, is excluded.

35.7 41.9 29 27.2 34.5

percent

Status Quo, Future depends.

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). χ2=162.886 d.f. =15 p=.000 (two tails)

N

Level of TN

Uni./Ind. Ind.

Table 3.4  Level of TN and unification/independence preferences

38 69 32 18 157

N 24.7 21.4 12.4 11.9 17.7

Percent

Permanent Status Quo

17 36 6 5 64

N 11 11.2 2.3 3.3 7.2

percent

Status Quo, Future Uni.

17 21 4 1 43

N

Uni.

11 6.5 1.5 0.7 4.9

percent

154 322 259 151 886

N*

Total

100 100 100 100 100

percent

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration  73 with varying TN levels. We utilize only these four variables, since the relevant literature indicates that they have a substantial impact on political attitudes. Age is one of the variables to which this study pays special attention (Rigger 2006, 2016; Liao et al. 2013). Other variables that are often used to gauge political attitudes, such as province of origin or occupation, are not important to our analysis, because the central focus of this study is on the predominance and pragmatism of Taiwanese nationalism, and not on how the background of the individual can influence voting and national identity (Huang 2006; Ho and Liu 2002; Chang 2012).We treat each sociodemographic variable as a category: gender is divided into male and female, into age groups of 20–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–59, 60–69, and over 70; education is divided into elementary and lower, middle school, high school and vocational high school, junior college and tertiary education (university); political position is divided into pan-blue, pan-green, and neutral or other. We carried out an χ2 examination for our four TN types on gender, age, education level and political position respectively. The results all revealed statistically significant levels of difference.18 Among the four sociodemographic variables, age and political position have more influence than gender and education on the TN types, Table  3.5 presents a summarized profile for each TN type, showing the exact differences among the four TN types in their composition of the four background variables. Table 3.5 indicates that each of the four TN level types demonstrates a unique profile with respect to the four background variables. To sum up, types I and II have more males, senior citizens, and pan-blue supporters, but they differ in their educational backgrounds: type II has a higher number of people educated to university level and type I  has more people educated to elementary school level. Table 3.5  Profile of four types of Taiwanese nationalists Type I

Type II

Type III

Type IV

1. no major difference with respect to gender 2. the largest age group is 50–59 3. education level: most fall into the category of ‘elementary school or lower 4. more ‘neutral’ or ‘Pan-Blue’ with respect to political position 1. a much higher ratio of males 2. the largest age group is ‘40–49’ 3. most have attended ‘junior college’ or ‘university or higher’ 4. more ‘neutral’ or ‘Pan-Blue’ for political position 1. males and females are similarly represented; 2. the largest number are in the ‘30–39’ age group; the second largest group of respondents is found in the18–29 age group; 3. most have attended high school, or higher; 4. more ‘Pan-Green’ supporters for political position. 1. a higher percentage of females 2. most are in the age group ‘18–29’ 3. educational level is evenly distributed with the exception of the ‘junior college’ group, which comprises only a few respondents 4. more ‘Pan-Green’ supporters with respect to political position

Source: Authors.

74  Liao Da-chi et al. Types III and IV have more females, more members of the younger generation, especially those under 30, and more pan-green supporters. These groups also differ in their educational levels; in type III, more people attended high school and in type IV, fewer people attended junior college. Is there a clear difference between these four types with varying levels of TN and unique profiles with respect to Taiwanese consciousness and pragmatism? As explained in our previous descriptions and hypotheses, Taiwanese consciousness increased dramatically during Ma Ying-jiu’s eight years in office. The mayor of Tainan, William Lai, even asserted that ‘Taiwanese independence is the consensus’.19 If this is the case, do those with both lower and higher levels of TN possess Taiwanese consciousness? Furthermore, the literature has identified pragmatist tendencies among the Taiwanese, so is there a correlation between levels of TN and pragmatism? Are the most ardent Taiwanese nationalists radical enough to be willing to sever economic and trade ties with Mainland China? And are they willing to go to war with China?

Predominant phenomena and pragmatic orientation Predominant phenomena of Taiwanese consciousness This chapter attempts to assess how common Taiwanese consciousness is and the extent to which it has emerged among groups displaying different levels of TN. In order to test for correlation between strength of Taiwanese consciousness and level of TN, this study quantitatively measures the responses to the selected six questions (see the second part). For example, the coding for the responses to the question ‘In your opinion, does travelling to Shanghai constitute a trip abroad?’ is 1 for ‘yes’, -1 for ‘no’, and 0 for ‘do not know/no opinion/no response’. This method is also used for recording the responses to the other five questions. For a detailed account of the recorded values, see appendix 1.20 We divide the following analysis into two parts. The first part presents overall frequency and percentages for the six questions. This gives us an initial explanation of the predominant phenomena of Taiwanese consciousness. The second part takes the quantitative measurements of Taiwanese consciousness provided by these six questions and the four types representing different levels of TN to perform a linear regression analysis. The effects of this analysis are examined both with and without background variables in order to verify the first hypothesis put forward in this study, concerning the predominance of Taiwanese consciousness: in fact, the results showed that there is little difference between type I, which has the lowest level of TN, and type IV, which has the highest, with regard to the inculcation of Taiwanese consciousness. Comprehensive results for the responses to the six questions on Taiwanese consciousness are presented below, in Table 3.6. Table 3.6 indicates that the responses to the six questions all show high levels of support for Taiwanese consciousness: even the lowest level of support stands at 70.6 percent. This result provides further confirmation that Taiwanese

Taiwanese nationalism, cross-Strait integration  75 Table 3.6  Overall trends for Taiwanese consciousness

1. 2. 3. 4.

5.

6.

Questions

Options

N

percent Total N

In your opinion, does travel to Shanghai constitute a trip abroad? Should the official name of our nation be Taiwan?

Yes No Unknown* Agree Disagree Unknown* Yes No Unknown* Name of a region Name of region and of country Unknown* One China Two Chinas One China, One Taiwan Unknown* Yes No Unknown*

935 117 48 800 195 104 852 170 78 173 796

85.0 10.6 4.4 72.8 17.7 9.5 77.5 15.4 7.1 15.8 72.4

130 75 114 822

11.8 6.8 10.4 74.7

89 777 214 109

8.1 70.6 19.4 9.9

In your opinion, do the people of Taiwan have their own country? Do you consider ‘Taiwan’ to be the name of a region, or the name of both a region and a country? Which of the following statements below are you more inclined to agree with? Taiwan and Mainland China can best be described as Should the official name of our country be ‘Taiwan’?

1100 1100 1100 1100

1100

1100

Source: Liu Cheng-shan (2015). *: ‘unknown’ includes ‘no opinions’ and ‘no responses’.

consciousness was clearly a predominant feature of cross-Strait integration during the Ma presidency. However, the question remains as to whether the predominance of Taiwanese consciousness also strongly affects the least nationalistic type, that is, type I. This study converts the responses to the six questions into scores (see appendix 1) and performs calculations to produce a Taiwanese consciousness scale ranging from 7 to – 6. The overall average is 4.5, which is high (average of scope is 0.5).21 The averages for the four TN types in order are 3.5, 4.0, 5.7 and 4.5. While types III and IV are clearly higher than types I and II, type IV is much lower than type III. With regard to the strength of Taiwanese consciousness, the type IV respondents, the most nationalistic, seem to possess a lower level of Taiwanese consciousness than we had anticipated. In the TN group background profile presented above, we indicate that age, educational level, gender and political position are all strongly correlated to TN. Age and political position are of particular significance. This study now undertakes a further analysis of the correlation between levels of TN and strength of Taiwanese consciousness. We perform a linear regression analysis first, without the background variables in model I, to examine the difference between type I, with the lowest level of TN, and the other three types with higher levels of TN. Then, in model II, we add the four background factors as control variables to observe the difference between type I  and the other three types with regard to

76  Liao Da-chi et al. Taiwanese consciousness. The results of the two regression analyses are presented in Table 3.7. Model I in Table 3.7 clearly shows that, before background variables are added, a significant difference is apparent when we compare the lowest level of TN in type I  with the levels of TN in types II, III, and IV, which have progressively higher levels of TN with regard to Taiwanese consciousness (at least p