Assessing Burma's Ceasefire Accords 9789812304964

Table of contents :
Contents
List of Acronyms
Executive Summary
Introduction
Background of Ethnic Conflicts in Burma
Past Peace Talks: Managing Ethnic Conflicts before 1988
Brief Background of the Current Ceasefire Agreements
Factors Influencing the Contemporary Ceasefires
Nature of the Ceasefires
Consequences of the Ceasefires
Conclusion
Endnotes
Bibliography
Project Information: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia
List of Reviewers 2006–07
Policy Studies: Previous Publications

Citation preview

Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords

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Policy Studies 39

Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords Zaw Oo and Win Min

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Copyright © 2007 by the East-West Center Washington Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords by Zaw Oo and Win Min East-West Center Washington 1819 L Street, NW, Suite 200 Washington, D.C. 20036 Tel: (202) 293-3995 Fax: (202) 293-1402 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications The Policy Studies series contributes to the East-West Center’s role as a forum for discussion of key contemporary domestic and international political, economic, and strategic issues affecting Asia. The views expressed are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Center. The publication is a product of the East-Wesr Center Washington project on Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia. For details, see pages 67–86. The project and this publication are supported by a generous grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York. First co-published in Singapore in 2007 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Road Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Zaw Oo. Assessing Burma’s ceasefire accords / Zaw Oo and Win Min. (East-West Center Washington policy studies, 1547-1349 ; PS39) 1. Ethnic conflict—Burma. 2. Armistices—Politics aspects—Burma. 3. Burma—Politics and government—1948I. Win Min. II. Title III. Series: Policy studies (East-West Center Washington) ; 39. DS1 E13P no. 39 2007 ISBN 978-981-230-495-7 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-230-496-4 (PDF) ISSN 1547-1349 (soft cover) ISSN 1547-1330 (PDF) Typeset in Singapore by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

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Contents Lists of Acronyms

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Executive Summary

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Introduction

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Background of Ethnic Conflicts in Burma

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Past Peace Talks: Managing Ethnic Conflicts before 1988

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Brief Background of the Current Ceasefire Agreements

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Factors Influencing the Contemporary Ceasefires

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Mutually Hurting Stalemate?

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Incentives for the Armed Ethnic Groups: Permission to Keep Arms, Territory, and Activities

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Offering Development Assistance

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Hope for Political Settlement

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Rising Grassroots Pressures

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Offering Business Incentives

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Changing Geo-Strategic Conditions

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The Architects of Ceasefires: The Role of Military Intelligence

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Role of the Go-Between Mediators: Insiders Only

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Nature of the Ceasefires

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Offer for Peace Talks

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Issues Discussed at the Talks

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Types of Ceasefire Agreements

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Content of the Ceasefire Agreements

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Consequences of the Ceasefires

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Impact on the Military Government

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Impact on the Ethnic Resistance Movement and Groups

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Impact on the Pro-Democracy Movement and Groups

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Impact on Human Security

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Impact on Civil Society

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National Convention: A Bargain from Within?

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Assessment for the Future

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Conclusion

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Endnotes

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Bibliography

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Project Information: Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia

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• Project Purpose and Outline

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• Project Participants List

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• Background on Burma/Myanmar’s Ethnic Conflicts

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• Pre-1989 and Post-1989 Names

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• Map of Burma/Myanmar: Ethnic Groups with Ceasefire Arrangements

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Policy Studies: List of Reviewers 2006–07

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Policy Studies: Previous Publications

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List of Acronyms ABSDF BSPP CPB DAB DKBA IDP KBC KNG KDA KIO KNDO KNLP KNPLF KNPP KNU LID MAS MI MPF MTA NDAK

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All Burma Students’ Democratic Front Burma Socialist Programme Party Communist Party of Burma Democratic Alliance of Burma Democratic Karen Buddhist Army internally-displaced person Kachin Baptist Church Kayan National Guard Kachin Defense Army Kachin Independence Organization Karen National Defense Organization Kayan New Land Party Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front Karenni National Progressive Party Karen National Union Light Infantry Division Military Affairs Security Military Intelligence Mon People’s Front Mong Tai Army New Democratic Army—Kachin

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Zaw Oo and Win Min National Democratic Front National League for Democracy New Mon State Party Pao National Organization Pao People’s Liberation Organization Palung State Liberation Party Revolutionary Council State Law and Order Restoration Council Shan National League for Democracy Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization State Peace and Development Council Shan State Army Shan State National Army Shan State Progress Party Shan United Revolutionary Army Thailand Burma Border Consortium United Wa State Army

NDF NLD NMSP PNO PPLO PSLP RC SLORC SNLD SNPLO SPDC SSA SSNA SSPP SURA TBBC UWSA

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Executive Summary The Burmese military government, initially called the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) and later the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), began making ceasefire offers to many ethnic armed groups within a year of its military take-over in 1988, creating an opportunity to end the ethnic conflicts that have endured since 1948. Instead of being an interim step, the ceasefires have lasted for more than 17 years. This study investigates the reasons for entering into ceasefires, the nature of the agreements and the consequences of these accords, as well as why the ceasefires have not brought enduring peace or led to a political settlement. Previous peace talks which occurred during the decades of the 1940s, 1960s, and 1980s mostly failed due to the central government’s condition that the ethnic armed groups surrender arms, the government’s refusal to grant greater autonomy, and the armed opposition’s perception that the government was weak. Despite this shaky past, a total of seventeen ceasefires were agreed to between 1989 and 1997. Former Military Intelligence chief General Khin Nyunt was instrumental in developing and negotiating the ceasefire deals, hoping to neutralize certain ethnic resistance groups and to weaken the armed ethnic movement over time, without having to agree to a political settlement. Only later did he allow ceasefire leaders to join the constitution drafting process.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Many armed ethnic groups entered ceasefires because of battle fatigue, military pressure from the junta, permission to continue to retain arms and control areas, incentives for local development, economic interests (including drug dealing and resource extraction in some cases), pressures from neighboring countries and from the local populations, and the hope of reaching a political settlement later. Other armed ethnic groups have not made ceasefire agreements mainly because of the absence of a political settlement. The ceasefire accords were mainly military in nature, placing many restrictions on the ceasefire groups to prevent them from strengthening their forces and entering alliances, although many groups circumvented these restrictions. Agreements also provided opportunities for local development and business with the early comers receiving better deals. The accords were mostly verbal agreements and did not include international monitoring or dispute-settlement mechanisms. Their lack of specificity has resulted in plenty of room for different interpretations and perceived violations. The main reason the regime has not negotiated political settlements is that they have not felt obligated to make any significant concessions. The military government is able to absorb its battle losses and has felt throughout the process that it maintained the upper hand. By contrast, the ethnic armies were suffering from mounting battle losses and other pressures and many felt compelled to rethink their armed struggles. Moreover, the SLORC and SPDC perceived the ethnic groups’ demand for greater autonomy as the beginning of national disintegration. Since the ceasefires, the military government has enjoyed greater control over the country by building up its forces, expanding its bases to previously contested borderlands, weakening the armed opposition, and isolating the pro-democracy movement. It has also gained huge economic benefits by extending its control over border trade with neighboring China and Thailand. The regime could also compensate for its lack of electoral legitimacy by maintaining and extending ceasefires and raising hope for the end of civil war. For the armed ethnic forces, there have been both positive and negative consequences. The ceasefire groups generally could continue to administer all or some of their areas, and many of them have maintained or increased their troop strength, developed their areas and improved their economic opportunities, placing them ahead of non-ceasefire groups. Ceasefire groups have increased contact with ethnic political parties and other ceasefire

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords

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groups through access to central Burma and participation in the constitutional drafting process. They were also able to maintain communication and develop some degree of understanding, albeit at a personal level, with the SPDC generals. However, the demands of ceasefire groups for greater autonomy at the constitutional convention have been resisted by the junta. Several large groups such as the Kachin Independence Organization and the New Mon State Party were previously part of an alliance of ethnic resistance groups. That alliance splintered when some of them made individual ceasefires with the junta. This reduced their collective bargaining power. Factionalism emerged among many ceasefire groups over business interests. Inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts increased, with different groups competing over land and resources under the influence of the SPDC’s divide-and-rule policy. The ceasefires have also had a mixed impact on the democracy movement. The junta’s restrictions against contacting political parties has made effective coordination with the democracy groups difficult. Although ceasefire groups also urged the SPDC to include the National League for Democracy in the constitution drafting process, the SPDC ignored the request. Their call for tripartite dialogue, which has been supported by the United Nations, has also been ignored. The local ethnic population has benefited from the return of normalcy, allowing people to live, work, and move with relative safety. With the reduction of serious forms of human rights abuses, ethnic populations have been able to rebuild their lives. Their livelihoods have improved as a result of infrastructure development and extensions of health, education, and transport services. Importantly, ceasefires have allowed civil society to revive and provided economic opportunities in ethnic regions, although economic growth has favored the elite and has been accompanied by extensive environmental destruction in some areas. At the same time, other forms of human rights abuses continue or, in some cases, have increased. Given the military nature of the agreements, the ceasefires contributed little to peacebuilding and democratization. Nevertheless, the SPDC expected that peace would result after the ceasefire groups gave up their weapons. Though many groups still seek to pursue their demands through political means, the purge of ceasefire architect General Khin Nyunt combined with the SPDC’s recent attempts to restrict economic opportunities to the ceasefire groups and forced disarming of smaller ceasefire groups, are now undermining the stability of the accords, raising doubts for lasting peace.

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords

Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords Despite occasional peace talks, the ongoing civil war in Burma has raged since independence in 1948.1 The Burmese military government has offered a series of ceasefire agreements since 1989, a strategy initiated after the countrywide pro-democracy uprising in 1988, resulting in no less than seventeen ethnic groups accepting the deal. This study analyzes the underlying reasons for the ceasefires, explores the nature of the accords, and investigates their consequences. Furthermore, it identifies how the accords are related to the peacebuilding, political settlement, and state-building processes. The study argues that ceasefires are a significant first step in solving the decades-long ethnic conflict; however after more than 17 years they have not produced peace or a durable political settlement. This is because the military government initiated battlefield-oriented ceasefires, primarily to reduce military operational threats and to gain better control over the porous and resource-rich borderlands, rather than to achieve genuine peace. In addition, the military government viewed the ethnic demands for autonomy as a threat to national integration; therefore, no political ceasefires are a significant concessions were offered. Nevertheless, the accords have allowed many ceasefire first step groups to maintain or increase their strength and engage in development tasks within their areas. More importantly, ceasefires have resulted in the local ethnic population having relatively better lives.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min The first section, “Background of the Ethnic Conflicts in Burma,” provides background on the ethnic conflict, explaining the root causes of the war—ethnic grievances, political discrimination, policy neglect, economic disparity and human rights abuses. The second section, “Past Peace Talks: Managing Ethnic Conflicts before 1988,” discusses why most of the past peace talks failed—in large part because of the government’s unrealistic demand that the armed groups give up their arms before a political settlement, its unwillingness to address the root causes of conflict, and the opposition groups’ misperception that the government was weaker than it actually was. The third section, “Brief Background of the Current Ceasefire Agreements,” examines the most recent wave of ceasefires (1989–95) to show how they emerged and how they differed from past ceasefires. Most deals have been secret verbal agreements with no political settlement, allowing ceasefire groups to keep their arms and territories, engage in development and business activities, and participate in drafting a future constitution. The fourth section, “Factors Influencing the Contemporary Ceasefires,” explores the complex dynamics of the ceasefire process, the role of different actors and the reasons why many armed ethnic groups reached ceasefires while others did not. The military government sought to reduce internal security threats by dividing the pro-democracy movement from the ethnic armed opposition groups and by creating splits within the ethnic armies. The government’s goal was to maintain its power, not to negotiate a political settlement. Many ethnic armies were battle-fatigued and under pressure from the Burma Army, neighboring countries, and local populations. With the offer that they could keep their arms, develop their areas, and extend their businesses, they sought to engage with the government as an alternative way to achieve their goals. Nevertheless, some armed ethnic groups have yet to make ceasefires because they cannot accept the regime’s refusal to discuss political issues, in addition to being at a disadvantage as latecomers. The fifth section, “Nature of the Ceasefires,” looks at the nature of the ceasefire agreements, including how the ceasefire talks were initiated, what is in the agreements, and what has transpired since. The agreements, which have no international monitoring or dispute settlement mechanisms, place restrictions on the groups by preventing them from recruiting or cooperating

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords with other groups, especially pro-democracy organizations. However, many groups have ignored these restrictions and have sought greater cooperation between groups. The sixth section, “Consequences of the Ceasefires,” discusses the consequences of the ceasefires for key stakeholders. The government has benefited from ceasefires. It succeeded in weakening the ethnic armed movement and strengthening its ability to deal with the opposition, as well as gaining enormous financial benefit from the border trade, rebuilding its legitimacy, and strengthening ties with neighboring countries. Although some ceasefire groups have benefited from the relative peace by being able to increase the size of their armies and pursue development in their areas, their former alliance organization has been divided and weakened, and as a result their collective bargaining power has greatly diminished. Meanwhile, disunity arose in many ethnic groups as some leaders were being perceived as focusing more on business interests than political goals. More inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts have arisen since the ceasefires due to competition over land and resources and the regime’s use of divide-and-rule tactics. The link between pro-democracy and ethnic groups has been largely symbolic as the government’s restrictions on their contacts have hindered their ability to coordinate and collaborate on joint actions. However, the ceasefire groups have had more contact with ethnic political parties and developed some degree of understanding, at least personally, with the Burmese generals. Meanwhile, the non-ceasefire groups have suffered harsher military attacks by the Burma Army which have resulted in lost territory, battle deaths, and the forced relocation of large numbers of civilians. Importantly, the return to normalcy after the ceasefires has benefited the local population as their lives, their ability to travel, and their work have become relatively safer. The most serious forms of human rights abuses have been significantly reduced, though other forms of human rights abuses continue or have increased. Infrastructure has been rebuilt and expanded, although Burmese authorities have used forced labor to do so in a number of cases. Residents in ceasefire areas enjoy better health care, education, and transport and more economic opportunities, even though economic development has been uneven and environmental destruction has been a problem in some areas. In many areas, ethnic civilian organizations and civic groups have emerged, engaging in various tasks of community development.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min The ceasefires have endured because the armed ethnic groups are weaker today in relation to the Burma Army. Fighting has not resumed despite the fact that the possibility of reaching a political settlement appears less and less likely. The government has also refused to incorporate most of the ethnic minorities’ demands in the new constitution, and the forced disarmament of two smaller ceasefire groups has caused some alarm. Many armed ethnic groups and ethnic minority citizens in general will continue to pursue their goals through political means and civil society organizations, but ultimately if they are unable to achieve at least some of their objectives, a resumption of violence cannot be ruled out.

Background of Ethnic Conflicts in Burma Burma is one of the world’s most ethnically diverse countries, with ethnic minorities comprising over one third of the population and ethnic states covering half the land. Since independence from Britain in 1948, various ethnic minority and ideological groups have Burma is one of the world’s most launched armed struggles against the majority, ethnically diverse countries Burman-dominated governments. Grievances over political discrimination, policy neglect, economic disparity, and human rights abuses fueled the onset of these conflicts, resulting in one of the longest civil wars in Asia. Burma’s population is about 55 million. The country comprises seven states and seven divisions.2 Each state draws its name from the dominant ethnic national group in the area—Kachin, Shan, Kayah, Karen, Mon, Arakan (Rakhine), and Chin—while the divisions are largely populated by Burmans. Buddhists comprise over eighty percent of the population while the rest are Christians, Hindu and Muslims. The government recognizes Burmese as the only official language. Despite of such diversity, postindependence governments have practiced centralized administration, thus alienating diverse ethnic groups. Burma is a resource-rich country, and seventy percent of the population are farmers. However, successive military governments have squandered Burma’s post-independence potential, and the United Nations designated Burma as a least-developed country in 1987. The lack of equitable revenue sharing also exacerbated the ethnic grievances.

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords The diversity in the region of modern-day Burma goes back over a thousand years, with kings, princes, and chiefs of different ethnicities consistently battling for control over land and the right to collect taxes. British colonial rule (1842–1948) further exacerbated ethnic divisions by creating two separate administrative areas—Burma Proper where Burmans predominated, and the Frontier Areas where non-Burmans were concentrated. The British also recruited only non-Burmans (Karen, Kachin, and Chin) into the colonial army and used them in suppressing Burman nationalist movements. During World War II, Burman nationalists who joined Japanese troops in driving the British out of the country took revenge and killed hundreds of Karen villagers, who also responded with revenge killing. When the British re-established control in Burma in 1945, they integrated both Burman and ethnic armed units under a combined force in spite of ethnic tensions within the ranks.3 Burman soldiers viewed themselves as patriotic soldiers and non-Burmans as mercenaries. Non-Burman soldiers saw themselves as loyal professionals and the Burman soldiers as politicians and rebels. Meanwhile, there were 30,000–50,000 weapons in the hands of various forces. The Burman troops’ leader, Gen. Aung San, set up a volunteer organization to fight against the British if necessary. Karen nationalists also set up their own local militia, the Karen National Defense Organization (KNDO) in 1947, and Mon nationalists followed suit, setting the stage for civil war. With limited resources to rebuild Burma’s infrastructure and control Burman nationalist demonstrations, Britain granted independence in early 1948 on the condition that the residents of the Frontier Areas could freely choose whether to join Burma. In February 1947, Burman leaders led by Aung San met Chin, Kachin and Shan leaders at Panglong and agreed to form a federal union, giving the ethnic states full autonomy, and exclusive rights to the Shan and Karenni states to secede after 10 years. The Karen leaders, Britain granted desiring to secure an independent state, rejected the invitation and refused to independence in early participate in the Panglong Agreement, while Mon and Arakanese leaders were not invited. Six months before independence, the charismatic Aung San, who had earned the trust of both non-Burman leaders and Burman political groups,

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1948

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Zaw Oo and Win Min was assassinated. His successor, U Nu, became the first elected prime minister but was not as skillful a negotiator. The Communist Party of Burma (CPB), a wartime alliance and the second largest political party, became the first group to take up arms against the newly independent but weak state. The Karen National Union (KNU) then took up arms in 1949 because of disagreement over the terms of autonomy, the boundaries of Karen state, and the Burma Army’s killings and abuses. Top Karen officers in the Burma Army were forced to resign, and Burman leader Gen. Ne Win became the military chief. Armed movements rapidly spread to other small groups—Mon and Arakan fighting for their territorial demands, Karenni fighting because of the assassination of their leader, and the Pao fighting against the continuation of Shan princely rule in their area. A second wave of civil war began ten years after independence when the Shan began considering the secession option under Panglong Agreement. Unlike the first wave of civil war, the main groups taking up arms were signatories of the Panglong Agreement, frustrated over the U Nu government’s deviation from the federal spirit of the agreement. Power in the Union was increasingly centralized and Burmanized with more Burmans dominating high positions in the government. Almost all development projects took place in central Burma. Shan youth, upset with abuses at the hands of Burman soldiers who were deployed to drive out Kuomintang soldiers from China, took up arms in 1958 and established the Shan State Army (SSA), under the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) in 1965, claiming their rights to secession. The Kachin formed the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and initiated armed resistance in 1961 due to growing frustration over inequality and discrimination, including the U Nu government’s attempt to make Buddhism the state religion. After 1958, other ethnic groups, including Palaung, Lahu, Wa, Chin, and Naga, also took up arms. Although new ethnic insurgent forces were gathering strength, many non-Burman political leaders and the civilian government of U Nu were about to reach a major breakthrough at the 1962 Federal Seminar that considered substantial amendments to the independence constitution to delegate more autonomy in the ethnic regions. Fearing a political solution that could marginalize the armed forces, Gen. Ne Win staged a coup in March 1962, claiming that the country was on the verge of disintegration, citing U Nu’s concessions to federalism. After the coup, Ne Win revoked

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords the constitution, established a one-party socialist government, and jailed many political leaders, Burman and ethnic minority alike. The media and school curricula became propaganda tools for the regime, restricting the teaching of ethnic minority languages and claiming federalism could breakup the country. The regime, claiming to be defenders of Burma, then launched an all-out military offensive. By the early 1970s, all armed groups, the KNU and CPB in particular, retreated to the borderlands and fought to defend their administrative areas. Eleven ethnic armed groups formed the National Democratic Front (NDF) alliance in 1976. The ethnic armies earned revenue mainly by taxing the local populations and through border trade with Thailand and China, while groups such as Khun Sa’s Mong Tai Army (MTA) and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) in Shan State benefited from the opium trade. During the 1970s and 1980s Thailand quietly supported ethnic armies along the Thai-Burma border, using them as a buffer against the threat from the Burma Army and of Burmese communists linking up with the Thai communists. The CPB also received military equipment and financial assistance from China in the 1960s–1970s. There have been an estimated 10,000 combined battle deaths per year since independence (Smith 1999: 101). Despite the loss of the troops on all sides, the civil war continued throughout the Ne Win rule.

Past Peace Talks: Managing Ethnic Conflicts before 1988 During the periods of civilian rule (1948–58, 1960–62) and military rule (1962–88) five major sets of peace talks took place. However, most of the earlier peace talks failed, particularly under the military governments, because many armed groups felt as if they were being forced to surrender as a condition of negotiation. In addition, successive military governments rejected ethnic demands for autonomy and offered no political concessions. The armed groups also misinterpreted the peace offers as a sign of the successive...governments government’s weakness. rejected ethnic demands The first set of talks came more than 100 days after the Karen rebellion autonomy in early 1949 and failed quickly. U Nu wrote a letter to KNU chairman Saw Ba U Gyi and convinced him to give up arms in exchange for setting up an

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Zaw Oo and Win Min investigative commission for a Karen state. However, the KNU’s armed wing, the KNDO, refused to endorse it and the subsequent negotiations between U Nu and KNDO chief Mahn Ba Zan broke down as the KNDO perceived the deal as the abandonment of its original Karen demand for an independent state.4 The fighting resumed soon after the KNDO left the talks. In early 1958, the U Nu government made another attempt to settle the ethnic conflicts after a massive demonstration in Rangoon calling for peace. The government offered an “arms for democracy” program that would allow ethnic armies to form political parties and run in the coming elections after giving up their arms. According to the New Mon State Party (NMSP) secretary-general, this marked the first time U Nu had opened up democratic space to solve the ethnic problems (Thar 2006: 52). Except for the communists and the KNU, many armed ethnic groups including the Arakan People’s Liberation Party (APLP), the Pao National (Liberation) Organization (PNO) and the Mon People’s Front (MPF) exchanged their arms for the establishment of political parties (Smith 1999: 168). Over 5,500 troops, including some CPB members, were demobilized. Although the civilian government worried that the peace deal would legitimize the armed ethnic groups, they agreed to make political concessions because of the citizens’ desire for peace. Unfortunately, the return of former enemies into the political limelight upset the Burma Army. The increasing cooperation between former rebels and the parliamentary opposition caused the military to worry that their former enemies might win the elections (Ibid.: 175). Consequently, the military interrupted this process, which might have led to the beginning of the end of Burma’s civil war, by staging its first coup in late 1958 after a split emerged in the ruling party. The third round of negotiations happened in 1960 when the caretaker military government (1958–60) offered secret talks to the KNU. The junta appeared to be concerned about a new alliance between the KNU and the CPB and a possible KNU troop build-up (Ibid.: 184–85). However, there was no serious attempt to bridge political differences, as the negotiators were low ranking officials. Regarding the KNU’s demand for an autonomous Karen state, the government negotiator replied that such a decision could only be made by the next government once the KNU entered the legal fold. Instead, the KNU was asked to join the government-controlled Karen Rifles and police force and to hand over a few arms as a symbolic gesture

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords towards reconciliation. The KNU rejected the offer because, according to Saw Ba U Gyi’s policy, it was tantamount to surrender. The fourth set of peace talks took place in 1963–64 under the Revolutionary Council (RC) led by the 1962 coup leader, Gen. Ne Win, and followed a split in the KNU. Ne Win personally wrote to armed opposition group leaders and declared a general amnesty. The widely scattered opposition troops were allowed to hold meetings before the negotiations, and three armed ethnic groups were allowed to join together with the CPB into an alliance during the negotiations. Armed opposition groups’ leaders were also granted access to the media and allowed to visit their constituencies. The general population was aware of the talks and there were widespread grassroots meetings and demonstrations for peace. Although the procedures for the talks were fair, discussion of political issues was not extensive enough. Ne Win appeared to initiate the talks to see if the armed groups could be persuaded to come under socialist rule. Many of the armed groups sought a tactical advantage by joining the talks, assuming that Ne Win was in a weaker position because of the coup (Ibid.: 208). In reality, Ne Win saw the peace talks as a means to gain some political legitimacy for his new government by winning over some rebel leaders. Except for the surrender of a small Karen group and a number of communist leaders, the talks did not succeed. During the talks, the RC rejected the armed groups’ demand for a nationwide ceasefire.5 Conversely, the RC set out its own conditions for ceasefires which included stopping all organizational work, concentrating the armed groups in designated areas, requiring armed groups to receive permission to leave these areas, discontinuing fundraising and restricting disturbance of government work and people.6 Both the CPB and the threeethnic-party alliance—the KNU, NMSP and the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP)—rejected the conditions as constituting virtual surrender. In other negotiations with the SSA, the KIO, and the Communist Party of Arakan, the political perspectives were too far apart. The ethnic groups demanded self-determination based on the Panglong Agreement, but the RC replied that it would not accept a federal system which it feared could lead to the break-up of the country. When the junta did not take their demands seriously, the ethnic armed groups were not surprised, but they appeared to focus more on gaining publicity than on achieving results from the negotiations.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min After the talks, strong rhetoric on both sides led to the escalation of the civil war. The RC claimed that the armed opposition groups were insincere during the negotiations and warned them to discontinue their political war by exploiting the media.7 The state media praised those ethnic leaders who had surrendered as true revolutionaries and patriots, but discredited the rest as bandits, opium smugglers, racist saboteurs, and separatists who should be eliminated. Meanwhile, the armed groups called Ne Win a fascist leader. The fifth initiative for peace was undertaken in 1980 when Ne Win, as head of the constitutional socialist government, declared a general amnesty following a failed 1979 major offensive against the armed groups in northern Burma. During 1980–81, the KIO chairman, Brang Seng, engaged in strong rhetoric...led to the negotiations with Ne Win in Rangoon and with local commanders in escalation of the civil war Myitkyina, the capital of Kachin state. This time, the government did not allow media access to the armed opposition. Although the KIO achieved a temporary ceasefire and the government offered support to rehabilitate KIO troops, the ceasefire did not last, as the government refused to consider political concessions. Even though the KIO reduced its demands and asked only for autonomy for Kachin state under a one-party system,8 the government rejected this, saying it would need to change the constitution through a referendum. Instead, the government insisted that the KIO first make peace in Kachin state and discuss autonomy later. The regime offered to allow the KIO to continue to hold arms temporarily, but when needed, the KIO members would have to join the people’s militia or police and cooperate with the government on development work in Kachin state. Though the KIO welcomed the government’s offer, it regarded the offer as procedural and insisted on a political agreement before making peace. Later, the KIO asked the government to set up a committee and a ministry for ethnic states’ affairs, to allow fair representation of ethnic groups in the government, to give the Kachin state council more power to run its civil departments, to appoint more Kachin as heads of state-level civil departments, and to allow the learning and use of the Kachin language. The government rejected all the demands except for the use of Kachin language, claiming that the others were against the constitution or were already covered by government policies.9

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords During 1980–81, the CPB also held two rounds of secret peace talks with the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), most likely due to Chinese pressure and battle fatigue. The first round was held in China between Ne Win and CPB head Ba Thein Tin. A second meeting between the vice-chairman of the CPB and BSPP central executive committee members was held in Lashio, Shan state. The CPB’s demand for a ceasefire like the one offered to the KIO was rejected by the government, which worried about giving legitimacy to the CPB and restricted its military movement.10 The talks were quickly aborted during the second round when the government asked CPB to abolish the party, its army, and its controlled area, claiming that the constitution allowed only one party in the country. Instead, the government offered the CPB members the opportunity to join its party, to run in party elections, and to enter the police force.11 After the talks, the CPB accused the government of using a divide-and-rule strategy by offering a ceasefire to the KIO but not to the CPB.

Brief Background of the Current Ceasefire Agreements The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), which took power in 1988 following a brutal crackdown on nationwide pro-democracy uprisings, initiated ceasefire talks in 1989. Unlike previous peace talks, these talks were extended only to the ethnic resistance groups. Although these ceasefire offers are not identical from one group to another, they all focus on military issues and local administration in designated ceasefire zones, rather than political settlements. Unlike before, they allow the ethnic armed groups to continue their activities, hold arms, and maintain territory until the new constitution is the ceasefires have not drafted. The deals also include local produced any political development assistance and allow economic activities in exchange for settlement giving up the armed struggle in principle, but not giving up arms in real terms. Today, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC)—the renamed SLORC—has officially maintained ceasefires with seventeen armed ethnic groups since 1997. However, about a dozen ethnic armies, including three major groups, have continued to fight. Generally, there has been a significant

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Zaw Oo and Win Min reduction of major combat since the mid-1990s. The most serious forms of war-related human rights abuses, like killings, rapes, and the destruction of villages, have been greatly reduced in the ceasefire areas, while the level of violence against the civilian populations in non-ceasefire areas has increased. However, after more than 17 years, the ceasefires have not produced any political settlement. Before the regime changed its title from the SLORC to the SPDC in 1997, there were several waves of ceasefires. The first wave started in 1989 in the northeast of the country, bordering China, at the time of the mutiny of five ethnic army units within the CPB. The SLORC was thus prompted to capitalize on the growing wedge emerging between the CPB’s ideologues and ethnic commanders. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang), the United Wa State Army (UWSA), National Democratic Alliance Army (Shan/Akha group) and the New Democratic Army— Kachin (NDAK), who were all former members of the CPB, made individual ceasefires one after another. In the same year, a former NDF member in northern Shan state, the SSA, followed suit. This first wave of ceasefire groups garnered the best deals. Because of the size of the groups, and in hopes of attracting more ethnic groups into negotiations, the agreements came with more rewards and fewer restrictions than were given in later waves. The second wave of ceasefires came in 1991–92 for five armed ethnic groups from northeast Burma. A breakaway faction of the KIO, officially known as the Kachin Defense Army (KDA, former KIO 4th Brigade), a main faction of the PNO in southwest Shan state, another main faction of the Palaung State Liberation Party (PSLP), and the Kayan National Guard (a breakaway group from the left-leaning Kayan New Land Party) in Kayah state all made ceasefires. These groups had smaller numbers of forces than most of the first wave groups, and as such, they received relatively less accommodating deals with more restrictions. During the third wave of ceasefires (1994–95), two larger organizations from the NDF (the KIO and NMSP), and three smaller left-leaning ethnic armies (the Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front (KNPLF), the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and the Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization (SNPLO)), negotiated ceasefires with the SLORC. The KNPP also negotiated a ceasefire in 1995, but the agreement was breached within three months and fighting resumed. In 1995, a Karen break-away faction known as the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA)

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords and the Shan State National Army (SSNA, a splinter group from drug lord Khun Sa’s MTA) entered into ceasefires. This time the groups were mixed in terms of their size and locations. Most of them agreed to ceasefires which offered even less, and with more restrictions, than those in the first and second waves. Finally in 1996–97, Khun Sa and his MTA with 10,000 troops surrendered. Some splinter groups from larger ethnic armies also surrendered, each with approximately 100–200 troops.12 Today, only three large ethnic armies—the KNU, the Shan State Army-South (SSA-South) which left the MTA when it surrendered, and the KNPP—continue to fight with sizeable forces. Seven smaller ethnic armies, most of which have fewer than 100 troops, have also continued to fight.13

Factors Influencing the Contemporary Ceasefires Different factors led the SLORC and the armed ethnic groups to consider and enter ceasefire agreements. For the SLORC, the ceasefire policy appears to have been initiated by a pragmatic group led by former Military Intelligence (MI) chief Gen. Khin Nyunt. After the 1988 pro-democracy uprising, Khin Nyunt saw an urgent need to minimize the internal security threat by weakening the pro-democracy movement, to prevent a repeat of the uprising. The SLORC seemed to be worried that urban protesters and the armed opposition might coordinate and jointly attempt to overthrow it (Selth 2002: 34). The breakup of the CPB provided Khin Nyunt with a plan to neutralize breakaway ethnic armies while still fighting others, especially those allied with pro-democracy groups. He seems to have followed a long-term strategy of weakening the overall armed ethnic movement by extending ceasefires to different groups, while at the same time strengthening the Burmese military with new weapons and recruitment to gain an upper hand. Khin Nyunt may have also viewed the ceasefires as necessary for better control over the borderlands, reducing black-market activities and shifting trade revenues from the armed groups to the state coffers. Khin Nyunt was also motivated to bring development aid to the border areas as part of the ceasefires, which can enhance the state-building process through the official policy of “national reconsolidation,” rather than national reconciliation through politically negotiated settlement.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Many ethnic groups agreed to the ceasefires because of battle fatigue, military pressure, permission to continue to hold arms and existing areas for some time, incentives for local development, economic interests over drug trafficking and natural resource extractions in some cases and border trade, pressure from neighboring countries, pressure from the local population, and the hope that a political settlement would later be reached. Other ethnic groups have not made ceasefire agreements mainly because of the lack of a political settlement in the agreement, latecomer’s disadvantage, and the regime’s condition that they disarm.

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Mutually Hurting Stalemate? Unlike ceasefires ending conflict in other countries, Burma’s ceasefires were not necessitated by a mutually hurting stalemate. Although the SLORC faced temporary vulnerability at the border in late 1988, there was no sense that the stalemate was painful for its leadership. Most of the generals did not show any concern over the civil war, although most of the middle and lower level officers who had experience on the battlefields appeared battlefatigued. While the Burmese governments wanted to eradicate the armed ethnic groups, four decades of war had proven that a total military victory was not realistic. From the perspective of the ethnic groups, they suffered from battle total military victory fatigue and were far from realizing their goal of resistance, although their morale was not realistic and desire to achieve ethnic rights was still very high and the local population’s sympathy for the ethnic cause increased as a result of continuing human rights abuses. First Wave of Ceasefires (1989) With the first wave of ceasefires, the SLORC appeared to aim for ending its largest military threat to date—the CPB. The SLORC was shocked to see the massive urban protests in 1988 and gave priority to securing the urban centers rather than attacking the armed opposition in the borderlands. After thousands of Burmese troops were sent from the borderlands to the urban centers, the SLORC experienced a temporary vulnerability. Taking advantage of this, the KNU and CPB attacked and occupied two of the Burmese military’s main tactical bases—in Karen State and northern Burma

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords respectively. However, by making ceasefires with the CPB break-away troops, the SLORC would also be able to transfer the forces it deployed to combat the CPB to other areas which demanded greater attention. The military situation on the frontline was further complicated for the SLORC by the exodus of thousands of pro-democracy student activists to various border areas where they joined armed ethnic groups who were aligned under the NDF. The Democratic Alliance of Burma (DAB) was established in November 1988, combining both pro-democracy groups and the ethnic armies of the NDF. The pro-democracy students’ group, the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) declared its support for a federal union, and in return the DAB announced that ethnic armies would never break away from the country. By the late 1980s the armed groups began to suffer from battle fatigue and isolation in the borderlands. The CPB was largely confined to the remote hills of northeastern Burma. Although the CPB made alliances with other ethnic armies in the Kachin and Shan States, it still suffered heavy military losses. In early 1987, the CPB lost its most important commercial and trading center and largest town, Panghsai. The ethnic groups working under the Burman-dominated CPB suffered the most during these battles and became concerned about further military losses, causing morale problems and escalating tensions between Burman leaders in the central committee and local ethnic leaders in the field. Combined with their frustration over leaders’ mismanagement, the Kokang and Wa groups (the biggest force of the CPB) mutinied in March and April 1989 respectively, and took over the CPB headquarters in Panghsang. However, the breakaway groups faced shortages of food and, unsure whether or not the Chinese government would provide support, became desperate to make ceasefires. Taking advantage of the split within the CPB, the SLORC sent out MI officers to initiate separate ceasefire talks (Zaw 1999). Khin Nyunt traveled to the town of Kunlone in Shan state and struck a ceasefire deal with Kokang leaders in March 1989 (Smith 1999: 378). Unlike previous peace talks, there were no political discussions, but the Kokang armed group was allowed to keep its arms and control of all its territory for some time. The SLORC also provided the 2,000-man Kokang army with 500,000 kyat, two cars and fresh food supplies. The Kokang leaders also claimed that Khin Nyunt allowed them to increase opium growing to solve their financial problems (Ibid.: 379).

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Zaw Oo and Win Min After achieving a ceasefire with the Kokang army, Khin Nyunt also struck a ceasefire deal with the UWSA in early September 1989. During negotiations, the UWSA demanded the holding of multi-party elections and the granting of an autonomous Wa state (Ibid.). The SLORC replied that it was just a caretaker government and could only make militaryrelated decisions, and so the UWSA would have to hold off demanding political rights until the next government was in place. The SLORC provided the UWSA with food, fuel and money. As early comers to ceasefires, at a time when the SLORC was desperate, the breakaway CPB ethnic armies got favorable deals. The groups were also allowed to continue with drugs businesses and natural resource extraction. By mid-1989, ceasefire agreements had been made with three breakaway ethnic armies of the CPB and the military balance tilted back in favor of the SLORC. The MI was very proud of this success, which they considered something that the past governments could not accomplish.14 In areas where fighting continued, the SLORC transferred troops from ceasefire areas, strengthening its force and putting significant military pressure on the other armed ethnic groups, especially in the northeast. Although it was a former member of the NDF, the SSA became isolated and was surrounded by the three ceasefire groups. Peer pressure more than any other factor made the SSA decide to accept the ceasefire.15 The SSA, with its 1,500 troops, rushed into a ceasefire in November 1989 under the leadership of Gen. Hso Ten, even without a decision from its leader Sai Lek who was traveling in Thai-Burma border area. After their headquarters was captured by Wa troops, the CPB central committee members retreated to their 101 military region in Panwa, Kachin state. Feeling increased military pressure, regional leader Zahkung Ting Ying requested ceasefire talks in September 1989. However, the SLORC set conditions with the 700-troop 101 region that compelled it to split from the CPB and set up the New Democratic Army—Kachin (NDAK) prior to entering a ceasefire in December 1989. Subsequently, the remaining CPB leadership asked for ceasefire talks, but after being rejected by the SLORC, the CPB central committee leaders took refuge in China. Soon after securing ceasefires with five armed groups in northern and eastern Shan state, the SLORC launched a major offensive against one of the main NDF members—the KIO—at Kutkai region (Kachin state) in December 1989. The SLORC also launched another major offensive against another key NDF member—the NMSP—overrunning their headquarters

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords at Three Pagodas Pass. These two forces, along with the KNU, had welcomed large numbers of urban pro-democracy student activists. In 1990, Gen. Bo Mya, chairman of the KNU, which had received the largest numbers of urban student activists, sent a letter to Gen. Saw Maung, Chairman of the SLORC (1988–92). Bo Mya wrote that 40 years of civil war had proven that the ethnic conflicts could not be solved by military means and required a political solution. However, Saw Maung rejected the idea of political discussion (Ibid.: 413). The SLORC felt no need to make any concessions to the KNU since it already had the military upper hand in the attention was growing with borderlands following the CPB arrival of...pro-democracy collapse and re-establishment of its control in the urban centers. activists Conversely, the KNU did not feel pressure to make any concession since international attention was growing with the arrival of thousands of pro-democracy activists in its area.

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Second Wave of Ceasefires (1991–92) In early 1991, the SLORC reinitiated efforts to arrange ceasefires with ethnic groups from the KNU-led NDF/DAB. The 1990 election win for the pro-democracy National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Nobel Peace laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, seriously challenged the SLORC’s hold on power even though the SLORC had greatly strengthened its military power with the purchase of $1.2 billion worth of arms from China. After the arrest of the senior NLD leaders and declaration of the convening of the constitutiondrafting convention—a signal that power would not be transferred to The 1990 election win for the elected parties—a numbers of the...NLD...seriously challenged elected MPs fled to the border and formed a coalition government at the SLORC the then KNU headquarters, Manerplaw. This created a new political alliance between the pro-democracy groups and the ethnic armies, seriously challenging the legitimacy of the SLORC.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Subsequent to their denial of the 1990 election results, Khin Nyunt seemed to believe that the SLORC could repair their legitimacy deficit by maintaining previous ceasefires and conducting ceasefires with other armed ethnic groups of the NDF. He also appeared to have more confidence after successfully managing the first wave of ceasefires, which had earned him a reputation as the top negotiator. He also had backing from Ne Win, whose behind-the-scenes power was still strong at that time. He began to make ceasefire offers to other ethnic groups after the elections. The combination of the ceasefires and major military offensives in NDF members’ areas made the KIO’s 4th Brigade vulnerable. In 1990 when the neighboring Kokang army joined the fight against the KIO, the KIO was particularly worried. The Kokang worked with the SLORC because the SLORC promised them control over part of the northern border. However, after suffering many losses, Kokang troops made their own ceasefire agreement with the KIO. The UWSA rejected the SLORC’s encouragement to join the fight against KIO and even tried mediating between the KIO and Kokang troops (Ibid.: 380–81). Caught between ceasefire groups, more than 1,000 troops of the KIO 4th brigade split from the KIO and entered a ceasefire in January 1991, changing their name to the Kachin Defense Army (KDA). A smaller NDF member in southern Shan state, the PNO, also agreed to a ceasefire in February 1991. The PNO had already suffered military losses in 1984 when Khun Sa’s MTA occupied its border camp in Koong Neing. Yet another small NDF member, the PSLP, also became isolated and felt military pressure after many other armed groups in northern Shan state reached ceasefires. The PSLP had already suffered from the SLORC’s military offensives and many Palaung villages were suffering under the “four cuts” military campaign throughout 1990.16 The “four cuts” campaign is the strategy of cutting food, finances, information, and recruits to armed opposition groups. Experiencing a disadvantageous stalemate, the PSLP was compelled to enter into a ceasefire in April 1991. After achieving ceasefires in northeastern Burma, the SLORC concentrated its offensives in the southeast against the largest NDF member, the KNU. The KNU had resisted individual ceasefire talks, instead insisting on nationwide ceasefires to be negotiated under the umbrella groups of the NDF or DAB. The SLORC responded by deploying over 20,000 troops and staging a major offensive against the KNU headquarters in January

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords 1992. Although the SLORC’s troops seized a strategic mountain, they suffered very heavy casualties and could not capture Manerplaw. Meanwhile, SLORC top leader Gen. Saw Maung was replaced by his deputy Gen. Than Shwe who immediately announced unilateral suspension of the offensive against the KNU in April 1992. Third Wave of Ceasefires (1994–95) Having failed to achieve a major victory over the KNU, Khin Nyunt attempted to further weaken and isolate the KNU by making ceasefires with the bigger NDF members such as the KIO and NMSP and leftleaning ethnic parties, all of which fought alongside KNU troops during the 1992 offensive. The SLORC later took advantage of a split in the KNU to take over the KNU headquarters, thus weakening its second largest military threat and the biggest armed alliance of pro-democracy groups. Worried about facing a similar offensive against its new headquarters and concerned with the morale of its troops following the defection of Brigade 4, the KIO started ceasefire talks in October 1992. Even though other SLORC commanders were reluctant to negotiate given their military upper hand, Khin Nyunt appeared to favor the talks with the KIO. Consequently, four meetings were conducted between the SLORC and the KIO during 1992–93, during which the KIO broke away from the traditional DAB strategy of not discussing individual ceasefires, thus increasing tensions and divisions within the NDF and DAB. The KIO’s request that the DAB change its policy on negotiating ceasefires was rejected by the DAB.17 At the same time, the SLORC also asked the KIO to split from the NDF/DAB as a condition of continuing the talks. Conversely, the KIO asked the SLORC to accept the DAB’s policies of announcing nationwide ceasefires and negotiation with the NDF under international mediation. Although the SLORC had repeatedly rejected the KIO’s request, a compromise solution was finally reached under which the SLORC would talk to a joint delegation of the NDF main members (KNU, KIO, NMSP, and KNPP). Eventually all NDF members agreed to accept negotiation with the NDF delegation, but with two conditions: invite the NDF delegation publicly, and hold the talks in a third country. However, when the KIO meeting with Khin Nyunt in September 1993 was televised, the DAB, having not received a report from the KIO, assumed that the KIO had already made a ceasefire and expelled the KIO. Angered

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Zaw Oo and Win Min

by the move, the KIO, with over 7,000 troops, finally completed a ceasefire agreement in February 1994, isolating and weakening the KNU and the NDF/DAB. After almost the whole northeast region came under various ceasefire the KIO...finally completed a agreements, three left-leaning armed ethnic groups in Kayah and southern ceasefire agreement in...1994 Shan state came under increasing military pressure. Their cooperation with the KNU and the NDF/DAB did not offer any political advantages. Khin Nyunt, during his visit to the Kayah capital in November 1993, made a radio announcement inviting all armed groups in Kayah state to start ceasefire talks. The three ethnic armies decided to accept the SLORC’s offer in late 1993.18 After a series of negotiations, the 150-member KNPLF reached a ceasefire agreement in May, the 200-member KNLP in July and the 500-member SNPLO in October, 1994. Even though military offensives were unilaterally halted by the SLORC in the KNU area in 1992, no negotiations were conducted. Both sides seemed intent on regrouping and strengthening their positions for a new fight as they engaged in positional bargaining on how to start talks. In April 1993, Bo Mya wrote an open letter to Than Shwe asking for a countrywide ceasefire and the release of political prisoners as preconditions; the SLORC rejected the conditions.19 Two months later, Bo Mya again asked for political negotiations to be conducted with the DAB in a third country and with UN participation. The SLORC again refused the overture and insisted on individual military talks inside the country. In 1994, a KNU working group prepared a new plan to talk in Rangoon about two points: political issues (equal rights and self-determination) and military issues. However, the top KNU leadership rejected the plan in late 1994 when its ally, the exiled government, convinced the KNU that the plan might undermine efforts for increasing international action against the SLORC.20 In late 1994, an increase in long-standing tensions between Buddhist Karen troops and the Christian-dominated KNU leadership led to the mutiny of over 1,000 Buddhist Karen troops. Taking advantage of the split, as it did with the CPB split, the SLORC immediately offered military and financial assistance to the KNU breakaway faction, the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). Together with the DKBA, who knew the secret

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords routes of the terrain very well, the SLORC launched a major offensive against the KNU headquarters and occupied it in January 1995. The fall of Manerplaw was a tremendous psychological and military blow to the KNU and the remaining NDF/DAB members. The KNU announced a unilateral ceasefire in March, 1995. This time, the SLORC was in a position of power and did not respond immediately to the KNU offer. After the fall of Manerplaw, the remaining NDF members, KNPP and NMSP, were faced with a grim choice between military defeat and agreeing to ceasefires. After the KNPLF and KNLP reached ceasefires with the SLORC in late 1994, the KNPP was the only armed group still fighting in Kayah state. The KNPP worried that the KNPLF, which had broken away from the KNPP in 1978, might engage in a joint attack with the Burma Army against its headquarters, similar to the SLORC-DKBA attack on Manerplaw. Increased battle fatigue, isolation and military pressure forced the KNPP, with 500 troops, to enter into a ceasefire in March 1995.21 However, the ceasefire broke down within three months over a logging dispute. Meanwhile, the SLORC attacked many NMSP outposts in early 1995. The NMSP, which also had internal factions (pro-ceasefire and anti-ceasefire) was at its weakest since the 1970s and was running out of ammunitions and money (South 2003: 222). The NMSP, with 2000 troops, finally relented and agreed to a ceasefire in June 1995. Surrender Wave (1996–97) Surrounded by ceasefire groups, pressure was mounting on drug lord Khun Sa’s MTA in Shan state. The MTA, which had been fighting against the UWSA over territorial control of the drugs trade, engaged in major battles against the SLORC in 1994–95 while the unilateral ceasefire was imposed in Karen state. In June 1995, a Shan faction within the MTA broke away over increasing tensions with Khun Sa’s Chinese officers and set up a new Shan State National Army (SSNA), with 2,000 troops led by Gun Ywad. The SLORC seized this new opportunity by making a ceasefire agreement with the SSNA. This defection weakened the MTA at a time when Khun Sa’s health was failing. In January 1996, the MTA conceded to the SLORC’s demand for total surrender in exchange for freedom for Khun Sa, his family, and close aides inside the country (Smith 1999: 447). After Khun Sa’s surrender in 1996, 2,000 troops in southern Shan state broke away from the MTA and organized the Shan United Revolutionary

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Army (SURA). Although the SURA asked the SLORC for a ceasefire, the SLORC was more focused on forcing the surrender of the remaining smaller groups. The SURA fought back immediately and the junta responded with one of its largest military operations including the use of massive forced relocation. In September 1996, the SURA strengthened itself by making alliances with two ceasefire groups—SSA and SSNA. The alliance expressed its support to the Shan political party the Shan National League for Democracy (SNLD), the second largest party after the NLD. In 1998, the SURA changed its name to SSA-South and has continued fighting to this day. Although the SSA-South has repeatedly asked for ceasefire talks, the SPDC has so far refused, insisting that the only option for the SSA is to surrender, since it is a breakaway group of the surrendered MTA. KNU Remains a Non-Ceasefire Group The KNU has been the longest running and strongest resistance group to not reach a ceasefire agreement. After losing its headquarters and fighting with the DKBA, the KNU was compelled to engage in negotiations with the SLORC. Through Karen mediators, the KNU and SLORC met on nine occasions between 1995 and 1996. However, at the final meeting in November 1996, the KNU still maintained the long-standing DAB policy of making ceasefires contingent on a commitment to future political dialogue. Not surprisingly, the SLORC rejected the KNU demand. Given the weakened military position of the KNU, the SLORC asked the KNU to denounce its armed struggle and “enter the legal fold,” before starting new ceasefire talks. The KNU rejected this demand, saying that giving up the armed struggle was unacceptable.22 Since then, the talks have broken down with both sides accusing the other of not having a genuine desire for peace. Consequently, the Burmese army launched a major offensive against the KNU and occupied headquarters of the 6th and 4th Brigades, prompting more than 10,000 Karen refugees to flee into Thailand. After increasing international pressure on the SPDC following the bloody May 2003 Depayin attack on Aung San Suu Kyi and her entourage in northern Burma, the SPDC offered to re-start the ceasefire talks with the KNU. This resulted in a surprise visit by Gen. Bo Mya to Rangoon in December, 2003, where he made a gentleman’s agreement for a temporary ceasefire with then Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. Bo Mya’s change of heart may have reflected a realistic assessment of his weakened military positions and the understanding that a military ceasefire was the only offer available.

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords The SPDC appeared to be negotiating from a position of greater strength than at any time before, with no need to make concessions. At the same time, some KNU leaders opposed a purely military ceasefire.23 Although two more meetings were held after Bo Mya’s visit, there was little progress, and the informal ceasefire was not consummated into a formal agreement. Although Khin Nyunt was sacked and his whole MI structure dismantled in October 2004, talks continued between the regime and a KNU delegation. The new intelligence branch, officially known as Military Affairs Security (MAS), has kept in communication with the KNU since late 2004, but the SPDC has taken a hard-line approach. In 2005, the SPDC launched its four cuts operations in Karen villages, resulting in thousands of new refugees. In July 2006, a MAS officer met an aging Gen. Bo Mya and a proceasefire faction of the KNU (7th Brigade) in Thailand to discuss a ceasefire, but Bo Mya rejected the offer, concerned it would have split the KNU. Finally, at the last meeting between the KNU and the SPDC in October 2006, MAS chief Lt. Gen. Ye Myint said that the 2004 “gentleman’s agreement” for Khin Nyunt was sacked and his ceasefires was no longer valid whole MI structure dismantled and asked the KNU to restart negotiations.24 A few in...2004 months after Bo Mya passed away in late 2006, proceasefire brigadier Maj. Gen. Htein Maung made a separate ceasefire with the SPDC, further disrupting the KNU. Incentives for the Armed Ethnic Groups: Permission to Keep Arms, Territory, and Activities Although military pressure was the main reason for most ceasefire agreements, Khin Nyunt also made attractive offers which allowed groups to keep their arms, territory and activities for some time, while asking most of them to give up their armed struggle in principle first. This tactic removed or deferred the problems of disarming, banning activities and political discussion that had caused the breakdown of past peace talks. In this way, Khin Nyunt prolonged the timeframe for possible disarmament or reorganizing under the SLORC’s forces until after the drafting of the new constitution. The SLORC deferred sensitive political issues to the next government or the constitution drafting process.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min These offers made the armed ethnic groups feel they could maintain their strength and fight back if necessary. MI even suggested to ethnic armies’ leaders that they could always resume fighting, since they would still keep their weapons and territory.25 Many groups considered the permission to keep arms, territories, and administrations as the best “noloss guarantee” for the personal security of their members and dependent populations; it was a major selling point for the deals. For many armed ethnic leaders of battle-hardened groups, a ceasefire under these terms was a better alternative to losing troops and territory in impending offensives. Not only did these terms allow the ethnic armies’ members to feel secure, but they ensured that they did not lose face with the communities which relied on them for protection. In the rallies, older villagers recalled their memories of former PNO leaders being arrested with the breakdown of ceasefires in 1963–64 after they exchanged their arms for democracy under the U Nu government.26 The ethnic armies’ leaders explained to their people that a ceasefire was not surrender since they maintained their weapons and territories. Some armed ethnic groups saw opportunities to quietly capitalize on the ceasefires to replenish resources and strengthen their troops. The SSA thought it possible to purchase better military hardware in lieu of replenishing their ammunition.27 In fact, ceasefires did help some ethnic armies to grow, with the KIO increasing from 7,000 troops at the beginning of the ceasefire to over 10,000 today and the UWSA from 12,000 to over 20,000. The Burma Army also took advantage of ceasefires to increase its troop size, more than doubling from 180,000 in 1989 to 400,000 in 2005. With no political settlement, this increase has caused a security dilemma for the armed ethnic groups. Offering Development Assistance The Burma Army appeared to believe that development initiatives in the borderlands would not only allow them greater penetration into these areas, but would also win the hearts and minds of the ethnic populations and eventually end the ethnic rebellion. The regime appears to view underdevelopment in the border areas as both the primary cause of ethnic grievances and the result of the civil war which destroyed infrastructure and limited the government’s access. At the same time, many armed ethnic leaders felt that it was important to start bringing development to their communities rather than just “waiting

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords for a political settlement” (Raw 2001: 161–62). The ethnic population in the borderlands had indeed been frustrated with underdevelopment and destruction of infrastructure, especially in comparison to other parts of Burma. Many communities had little or no access to schools, health care, or roads. As promised by the terms of the agreements, the Burma Army designated seventeen “special regions” where ethnic ceasefire armies maintain autonomous administrations. The PNO chairman Aung Kham Hti, a former monk and a devoted Buddhist, saw a great opportunity to repair and construct Pao religious buildings, which then became tourist attractions in Shan state. Khin Nyunt also promised Aung Kham Hti that he would make the Pao area a model of development.28 The PSLP leaders were also thrilled when promised that their key village, Mantong, would be upgraded into a town and the government would provide assistance.29 The development offers had a significant impact on the KNPP after their ceasefire ended. Karenni leaders admitted that the villagers’ demand for development projects similar to those in other ethnic ceasefire areas was a major reason for considering a ceasefire.30 The development incentive also had an effect on the KNU. The local Karen population was aware that many other ethnic ceasefire groups, such as the DKBA, thrived under ceasefires. This led local communities in Karen areas, especially those with better access to trading routes, to urge the KNU leadership to agree to a ceasefire.31 Some larger ethnic groups, such as the KIO, had high hopes for more international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and UN agencies to support development projects in their areas and have set up local NGOs. With a development offer, the KIO and its population were looking forward to big infrastructure projects like roads, bridges, schools, hospitals, and hydropower plants. Likewise, the NMSP, which has close relations with the KIO, expected similar development projects as well as the right to teach its language—a key dimension of the Mon national struggle (South 2003: 227). Both the KIO and NMSP leaders hoped that international agencies’ involvement in the ceasefire areas would also be helpful to them as an indirect monitoring mechanism for the ceasefires. Hope for Political Settlement Though the regime avoided political discussion, it offered ethnic leaders the option to discuss political issues, including the future status of ethnic areas, at the National Convention. The SLORC/SPDC disdained ethnic

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demands for greater autonomy and federalism as leading to the future disintegration of the Union. Designating a majority of their hand-picked participants and tight procedures at the convention, the military government appeared to believe that ceasefire leaders would have little bargaining power. Yet by having ceasefire leaders at the convention, the SLORC/ SPDC hoped to earn legitimacy through the appearance of ethnic participation at the convention. However, many ceasefire leaders hoped that by engaging with the SLORC/SPDC hoped to SLORC/SPDC in every possible way, they could build up a relationship with earn legitimacy the generals that would promote the understanding and confidence required for a political settlement. Although federalism is a normal practice for many countries, including Burma’s neighbor India, the term “federalism” has become taboo in Burma. Many ceasefire leaders avoid this word when they talk to the generals, instead choosing to use the phrase “genuine union.” The majority of ceasefire leaders considered themselves to be in a better position for future negotiations in a “tripartite dialogue.” The main political opposition, as well as the international community, has repeatedly called on the regime to hold a tripartite dialogue, which would include the military government, elected parties and armed ethnic groups, to solve the country’s political problems. However, given the reality of the regime’s total resistance to such dialogue, many ceasefire leaders were willing to try participating in the convention. Although the military government tightly controls the composition and direction of the convention, many ethnic ceasefire leaders still considered their participation in the convention as a better option for presenting their interests than staying away.32 Former KIO chairman Brang Seng argued that the KIO should be part of the mainstream political process since the past jungle life had left them forgotten or branded as terrorists and separatists (Smith 1999: 443). Thinking along the same lines, many NMSP leaders held some optimism that they could achieve step-by-step compromises to solve their political problems.33 Even the KNU has been under pressure from Karen community leaders in central Burma who feel that by not agreeing to a ceasefire and attending the convention, they were missing another opportunity.

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords Rising Grassroots Pressures For some ethnic armed groups, like the PSLP, it was grassroots pressure that partly drove them into ceasefires. When the military applied a “four cuts counterinsurgency campaign” against the local Palaung population, the villagers could not stand the harsh conditions. There were no refugee camps they could access, and they had nowhere to run. Thus, the villagers, including monks, pressured the PSLP to enter into ceasefire talks.34 The local Pao population also put the same pressure on the PNO, but for different reasons. Before the ceasefire, they were suffering more from attacks by Khun Sa’s MTA than by Burma Army troops. The PNO was pressured into entering a ceasefire by Pao villagers who felt that the Burma Army could provide a guarantee of security from future MTA attacks.35 For the KIO, grassroots pressure came from traditional community leaders and the Kachin Baptist Church (KBC), which has a commanding influence over the community. The KBC acted as a go-between for the initial confidence-building talks and also served as a witness to the signing of the ceasefire agreement between the SLORC and KIO. The KBC was worried that without a ceasefire, the KIO would be left out of possible negotiations at the national level, when the SLORC began to convene the constitutional convention (Ibid.: 445). The NMSP agreed to a ceasefire after facing a different kind of grassroots pressure when its refugee population came under pressure from Thailand to move back to Burma. Thai authorities sent 8,000 Mon refugees back across the border in response to the Burmese government’s request to close the camps. According to a Mon NGO worker, double pressure from both Thai and Burmese authorities convinced many Mon refugees of the significant risks of being repatriated without a ceasefire.36 Likewise, the KNPP also faced pressure from its refugees on the Thai border as the Thais pressured the refugees to return to Burma (Ibid.: 446). Offering Business Incentives The SLORC rewarded the first wave ceasefire groups with business opportunities and hoped that ceasefire leaders would be more interested in doing business than engaging in politics and ethnic affairs. This could also serve the divide-and-rule goals of the Burma Army in wedging the factionalism within the ethnic groups as well as between the leaders and the grassroots. In the past, the armed opposition had benefited from the black market economy which had grown to 40% of Burma’s gross domestic

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Zaw Oo and Win Min product by the 1980s (Global Witness 2003: 19). However, in the late 1980s, the SLORC established an open-door policy creating official trade gates, making the armed opposition’s unofficial gates less profitable. This changing situation made it difficult for the armed opposition to rely on the taxing of the border trade alone,37 making the SLORC’s ceasefire offers to freely conduct business an attractive incentive. The first wave of ceasefire groups were the most attracted by the business opportunities. When the Chinese cut assistance to the CPB (25 percent of its total annual budget) in the early 1980s, the CPB’s ethnic battalions tried to compensate for the loss by becoming involved in the drug trade. The ceasefires The SLORC rewarded the first allowed the Kokang and Wa armies wave ceasefire groups with to continue their drug business and invest their laundered profits in new business opportunities businesses in major cities, including Rangoon and Mandalay. Permission was also granted for the extraction of natural resources in the ceasefire areas, and both the UWSA and Kokang army were awarded the highly profitable business of jade mining at Phar Kant township, Kachin state, which also serves to launder drug money. The SSA became more interested in a ceasefire after seeing the benefits. They thought that this opportunity would help them fill their coffers, while saving money for military hardware and allowing them to strengthen their army.38 The NDAK also received permission to undertake logging, jade mining, and gold mining, while the KDA was allowed to undertake logging, and probably drug production, as economic incentives. The second wave ceasefire groups also saw the opportunity to expand businesses, even though they were not as desperate for money as were the CPB splinter groups. A business committee was set up under the PNO and was given a fairly large set of business deals including logging and jade and ruby mining as well as tourism. Since Khin Nyunt wanted to make the Pao area a model to showcase how ceasefires could be a success, he promised to expand the Pao’s market with an extension of the train route to their areas. In return, the Pao chairman became very loyal to the regime and even avoided secretly communicating with his former ethnic colleagues since he was worried it would make Khin Nyunt unhappy.39

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The latecomers to ceasefire agreements received the fewest business incentives; however the inclusion of business deals was still an important factor. Although the KIO was not allowed to continue its traditional and profitable jade businesses, it was allowed to conduct other businesses like logging, mining, and taxing the border trade. The KIO set up the Buga Company Limited a year after the ceasefire and was granted the former government sugar factory in Namtee Township and other businesses.40 The SNPLO, KNLP, and KNPLF were also interested in exploring business opportunities and were granted some import and export licenses, some smaller concessions for logging, mining, and highway transportation, and were probably allowed to participate in the drug trade.41 Pro-business leaders in the NMSP were provided the opportunity to establish a few lucrative commercial activities, including the Rehmonya International Company which was granted an import-export license, and ground and sea transportation (Moulmein-Singapore-Penang) businesses. Ethnic non-ceasefire leaders considered the business incentives given to some ethnic ceasefire groups as bribes as well as a way to divert the groups’ interests away from political rights. Some feel the ceasefire groups are now more interested in maintaining their businesses than demanding their rights.42 In a secret meeting with some members of a ceasefire group, Aung San Suu Kyi said that they should not forgo their political China and Thailand…[pressured] objectives for business interests. She also suggested to them that the government and the armed business profits should be spent opposition to end the military on social welfare and organizational development conflict rather than kept as personal wealth.43 Changing Geo-Strategic Conditions Geopolitical changes in the region also pushed opposing sides toward ceasefires. Both China and Thailand took concrete steps to pressure the government and the armed opposition to end the military conflict. China played an important role in leveraging the ceasefire deals between Rangoon and the armed groups along the China-Burma border after signing a border trade agreement with Burma in August 1988 (Lintner 1993). By then,

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Chinese interests in Burma included security and strategic interests including obtaining access to the Indian Ocean. Although not acknowledged, the KIO seemed to be under pressure from the Chinese, who were seeking to open the China-Burma border region as a marketplace to stimulate economic development in the southwestern province of Yunnan. Thailand’s role was also significant in pressuring many armed ethnic groups on the Thai border into ceasefire agreements. Then Thai Army chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh was the first high ranking foreign leader to visit Burma after the 1988 coup. The sixty-member Thai delegation that accompanied Chavalit Yongchaiyudh came back with 20 concession areas along the Thai-Burma border to export 160,000 tons of teak logs, worth U.S.$112 million a year (McDonald 1993). Thailand’s long-term stance on keeping Burma’s ethnic armies as a buffer against its historical enemy changed dramatically when the country needed to find alternative sources of timber after a logging ban was introduced to prevent severe deforestation. Thailand, in making fast-paying deals with the SLORC’s sell-off of immediately available resources such as timber, gems, fish, and later gas, urged the ethnic armies based along the border to agree to ceasefires. Refugees along the border felt the pressure as many were moved from one place to another and a number were pushed back into Burma. The Architects of Ceasefires: The Role of Military Intelligence Khin Nyunt, the then MI chief and Secretary-1 of the SLORC, designed and implemented the ceasefire strategy. The MI was successful in part because they had information about tensions within the armed ethnic groups.44 In the case of the CPB, many of the ethnic leaders had not been ideologically committed to communism in the first place. Skillful manipulation by the MI and their intermediaries, with tacit cooperation from Chinese actors, appears to have helped bring about the mutiny of the Kokang ethnic group against the CPB leadership.45 After achieving a ceasefire with the Kokang army, the regime quickly made offers of ceasefires to other ethnic units under the CPB. A former MI officer admitted that the SLORC’s strategy was to end its most serious military threat—the CPB—at a time when they were facing a serious internal political threat from the prodemocracy movement.46 Although ceasefire agreements involved the identification of the areas to remain under ethnic armies’ control, MI officers handled most of the negotiations. This appeared helpful in securing the deals. It was easier for

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords the ethnic leaders to talk to MI officers than to field commanders. MI officers tried to listen to the other side and when both sides could not agree, they replied that they would try to develop some creative compromises. In contrast, the field commanders were very tough during the negotiations and appeared to favor a take-it-or-leave-it strategy.47 A consensus on the ceasefire strategy with all the ethnic armed groups, initiated and supervised by Khin Nyunt, may not have been reached among the military leadership (Lintner 2004). Some officers, particularly the field commanders, seemed reluctant to accept the strategy and adopted a wait-and-see attitude, as many of them felt that they were capable of wiping out all the armed groups.48 Clearly Khin Nyunt’s role was essential to the ceasefires. He was the first senior leader from the SLORC ever to visit the armed opposition’s controlled areas and their headquarters. His bold outreach to the armed ethnic groups won trust from them to seal the deals. According to a well-placed Shan source, this was true in the case of the SSA ceasefire.49 A UN officer who has dealt with ceasefire groups also agreed with this point, saying that some ceasefire leaders trusted Khin Nyunt even more than they trusted their own members.50 The ceasefires presented an opportunity for the MI faction to build a network of clients while outmaneuvering the combat officers whose importance was no doubt more critical during military operations. Khin Nyunt understood very well that keeping ceasefire groups under his influence gave him an edge against his rivals within the regime. He may also have felt that achieving ceasefires would help him remain in power since the more powerful combat faction would find it difficult to purge him. However, when the rivalry between the MI and regional command officers dealing with ceasefire groups and border trade escalated, the entire MI faction was The military regime insists purged in 2004.51 With the demise of Khin Nyunt, the future commitment that internal conflicts are of the SPDC to the terms of ceasefires strictly a domestic issue is now questionable and new signs of tension have emerged. Role of the Go-Between Mediators: Insiders Only Unlike the Aceh and Sri Lanka ceasefire agreements, ceasefire negotiations in Burma do not have international mediation or support. The military regime insists that internal conflicts are strictly a domestic issue, denying

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Zaw Oo and Win Min any role for international mediators or monitoring mechanisms. On the other hand, many ethnic nationality groups wanted to have international mediators; the DAB and NDF both called for international mediation from the very beginning (Smith 1999: 445). However, the regime has used peace brokers to set up initial talks with ethnic groups. Peace brokers are usually ethnic religious and community leaders, but some are businessmen with extensive contacts with both the regime and the armed ethnic groups.52 Although peace negotiators had no formal power or influence to enforce any agreements, they played an important role in convincing the ethnic resistance groups that the terms of the agreements would be respected. Coming from the same ethnic group, though not living in the civil war area, most peace brokers have seemed to be genuinely interested in negotiating ceasefires and ensuring that both parties upheld the agreements. The vested business interests of some intermediaries played a key role in making the ceasefires. Lo Hsing-han, a former drug lord from Shan State, was one of the most prominent peace negotiators, cutting deals in northeastern Burma. He played a crucial role in bringing the largest armed group, UWSA, into a ceasefire with the SLORC while persuading another drug lord, Khun Sa, and his MTA to surrender. In return, he received lucrative business deals from the government, including a huge project to build an industrial estate and a modern port on the outskirts of Rangoon.53 Although peace brokers tried to ensure commitment to the ceasefires through personal and business ties, they are no substitute for institutional guarantees which would make the ceasefires permanent. The military regime is not a constitutional government and does not appear obligated to honor any long-lasting commitment to the terms of the ceasefires. After the fall of Khin Nyunt, senior Shan leader Gen. Hso Ten (SSPP president who was close to Khin Nyunt) was arrested in early 2005 and two ethnic armed groups, the SSNA and PSLP, were forced to disarm. This alarmed other ceasefire leaders who now worry they may face similar treatment.

Nature of the Ceasefires Unlike past peace talks, the latest talks were initiated, arranged and mainly conducted by the MI faction of the military government, who first targeted breakaway factions. Although regional commanders sometimes participated in the talks, their role in the discussions appeared symbolic. Recent ceasefires

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords differed from past peace talks mainly in that the ceasefire groups were allowed to keep their arms, territories and administrations, and undertake business and development. Political issues were not allowed to be discussed, but were deferred to the next government or the constitutional convention. Only military and development issues were included in the talks and the agreements, with the exception of the accord negotiated with the KIO which appeared to secure an agreement for political negotiations.54 Furthermore, the ceasefires allowed some groups to maintain illegal drug businesses. Despite the regime’s pressure, several groups, which are more politically oriented or bigger, did not agree to the term “entering into the legal fold,” although the military government has used it unilaterally since. While invitations to the first and second waves to discuss ceasefires were made secretly, invitations for the third wave of ceasefire talks were made public. After the ceasefire agreements were made, the terms of the agreements were not made public. Except for the KIO, all the accords between the regime and the ethnic groups have been verbal agreements, not signed written accords. Offer for Peace Talks Talks were offered to specific break-away factions or individual armed groups in different areas at different periods. Unlike past pre-arrangements, the regime’s top leader did not write to the armed ethnic leaders. During the first wave of ceasefires, Khin Nyunt offered talks mainly to break-away ethnic armed groups from the CPB through warlord-turned-businessman Lo Hsing-han. The armed groups that he targeted for the first wave were from eastern and northern Shan state bordering China. During the second wave, Khin Nyunt targeted two smaller groups of the NDF, in southwestern and northern Shan state, and a faction of the NDF-member KIO in Kachin state. He offered talks to the PNO through another Shan statebased businessman. Before the third wave of ceasefires (1994–95), Khin Nyunt made an offer for the first time through the media during visits to ethnic state capitals and towns. He appeared to have confidence in making public announcements because the previous ceasefires went well, and perhaps in response to the NDF/DAB members who had asked the SLORC for such a public announcement. Khin Nyunt also communicated with armed groups though community leaders, including priests. He targeted areas in

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Zaw Oo and Win Min southeastern Burma where the Kayah, Karen and Mon states are located. The first announcement came at his visit to Loikaw, Kayah state capital, on November 18, 2003: On behalf of the SLORC, I would like to call on ethnic minority rebels who have been fighting fruitlessly for the past 40 years to have peace talks with the government…. Even if the talks fail to bring about a peaceful solution, we will fly you home safely by helicopter…55

One week later, on November 25, Khin Nyunt made another call for peace talks at Ye, a town close to the NMSP, in Mon state. We invite armed organisations in the jungle to return quickly to the legal fold after considering the good will of the government… Please respond as soon as possible. 56

On November 28, he renewed the call at Pa-an, Karen state’s capital. He offered to talk to the armed groups in Karen state with sincere goodwill and asked them to respond for the benefit of the whole country before it was too late. However, this made many ethnic leaders feel as though the regime was using its classic divide-and-rule policy by offering different groups in different areas an opportunity to enter into ceasefire agreements at different times. They also felt the regime’s mindset of asking them to enter into the legal fold reflected the Burma’s army’s old idea that the armed struggle for ethnic rights was illegitimate. However, they were compelled to accept the offers as a result of military pressure and certain incentives.57 Western diplomats in Burma at that time also shared the view that the regime had successfully exercised its usual divide-and-rule tactic.

the

Issues Discussed at the Talks Unlike the past talks, the latest talks did not cover political issues at all. Although the armed ethnic groups wanted some political current regime has remained settlement, the regime, as in the 1958 talks, justified itself as a in power for over 18 years caretaker government that could only make military agreements. However, unlike in 1958 when the junta transferred power

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords shortly after the elections, the current regime has remained in power for over 18 years with no sign of leaving any time soon. The National Convention where the SLORC/SPDC said political issues could be discussed has been ongoing for 14 years. The main topics discussed at the talks were detailed identification of troops’ positions, with military points, where ceasefire groups could continue to control. The first and second wave groups retained all of their controlled areas, while the third wave groups lost some of their areas. The Kokang army and the UWSA were awarded all the areas of former CPB’s northern command in northern Shan state that it controlled at the time. However, unlike the Kokang, whose agreement was more oriented towards business interests and had fewer troops, the UWSA received more security benefits. As part of the agreement, the UWSA restricted access of the Burmese troops to its areas. The PNO and PSLP were also allowed to maintain all of their previously held base areas. The KIO, although a third wave group, is a larger organization and was able to retain most of its controlled areas including its Brigade 4. But the smaller NMSP lost some of its area, keeping only twelve positions in Mon state and losing eight positions, particularly in Tenessarim division (South 2003: 225). Likewise, the smaller left-leaning ethnic groups lost some of their areas. For instance, the SNPLO lost four of its smaller bases near Kayah state, maintaining only its headquarters area. In order to move ceasefire troops from one place to another, ethnic leaders needed permission from the Burma Army’s regional commands, conditions similar to those set out in the 1963–64 talks. To facilitate regular communication with the regional commands for troop movements and business activities, all groups opened liaison offices in capitals and towns of ethnic states and later in Rangoon and Mandalay. Through these offices, ethnic ceasefire groups have been able to communicate with each other more easily than before and they have also managed to interact with ethnic political parties that ran in the 1990 elections, helping to build greater understanding among ethnic political parties and armed groups. Types of Ceasefire Agreements Except for the ceasefire agreements with the KIO, there have been no actual signed agreements. A KIO leader confirmed that he signed the accord along with three representatives from the regime, the KIO, and mediators.58 All

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Zaw Oo and Win Min other ceasefire agreements have been verbal agreements. Although many ethnic leaders demanded written agreements, the MI responded that it was not appropriate since they are not the legal government. Although most ethnic armed leaders could take notes during their previous talks, according to David Taw, a senior KNU leader, in recent years the regime told the KNU not to take notes during ceasefire talks and the Burmese side would later provide the KNU the meeting minutes as they interpreted them. He said the regime was worried about use of terms that would have international implication; for example, they refused to use the word “internally displaced persons.”59 Without international monitoring mechanisms, unwritten agreements left many openings for different interpretations. Content of the Ceasefire Agreements Since the ceasefire agreements have not been made public, there are different understandings of the agreements between the military government and ceasefire groups. However, there are three main types of ceasefire accords: 1. Agreements between the government and first wave groups. 2. Agreements with second and third wave groups. 3. Signed agreement with the KIO. During the first ceasefire wave, the SLORC’s representative, Maj. Tin Win, quickly agreed to allow breakaway CPB groups to keep their arms, areas, and local administration intact, to provide food assistance, and to allow total freedom to operate business activities including drug trade and natural resource extractions.60 First wave agreements had almost no restrictions, while second and third wave groups were restricted. For example, while second and third wave groups were not to hold guns when their members visit towns and cities outside of their controlled areas, UWSA members were found with weapons even in Mandalay, the second largest city in Burma.61 The most common restriction imposed upon the first wave groups was not to contact non-ceasefire ethnic armed groups and the above-ground political parties, especially the NLD.62 Starting with the second wave of ceasefires, the military government included restrictions in the agreements since military power had shifted in its favor after the first wave. Except for the KIO, groups appeared to be prohibited from purchasing new arms, recruiting new troops, and conducting new military training. They also were given limitations on their travel and

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords taxing. Agreements were also made with second and third wave groups to eventually transfer rebel groups to policing forces under the control of the government. Although the ceasefire agreements are varied, the main body of the agreements appears to have some consistency. The SPDC has implemented the following common provisions since the fall of Gen. Khin Nyunt in late 2004: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

Not to contact any anti-government organizations. To give up the armed struggle. Not to recruit any new troops, apart from the existing troops. Not to undertake military exercises or conduct training. To submit a detailed report on force structure of manpower and ammunition for facilitating the assistance of food and cash. Not to collect tax and opium taxes. Not to rob, confiscate, and abuse the people. Not to travel without government permission. Apart from traveling inside designated ceasefire areas, traveling outside of the ceasefire areas requires that the respective military stations be informed and guns left at home. To stay away from above-ground political parties. Not to interfere in the government’s administrative and judicial affairs. To identify the area for development, regardless of its location. The state will provide food aid and support for living. To transform the ceasefire troops into armed groups that will safeguard public and local interests under the state. To effectively assist the anti-narcotics campaigns of the state. 63

Initially, MI did not provide the above secret document to ethnic armed groups after the ceasefires were agreed upon. It was only after the fall of Khin Nyunt in late 2004 that some ethnic armed groups received the documents sent from then northeastern regional commander Maj. Gen. Myint Hlaing.64 In 2003, some ceasefire groups in Kayah state received a similar printed accord from another regional commander, who was surprised that MI had not distributed them before.65 From the outset of ceasefire discussions, disagreements started partly as a result of the secretive nature of the negotiations and lack of a written record. Many first wave ceasefire

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Zaw Oo and Win Min groups said they did not discuss these points before making an agreement, although the regime pressured them to follow one rule after another along the way.66 Many others who have reached ceasefires since 1991 accepted that they verbally agreed to some of the points in principle during the negotiations. A KIO leader denied that the KIO had made the above-mentioned agreement, although he thought that other smaller and latecomer groups may have agreed to them. The KIO leader claimed that they had a written agreement which he remembered contained the following: 1. Stop the fighting (and give up the armed struggle) between the KIO and the SLORC. 2. Keep control of the existing territories. 3. Open liaison offices. 4. Inform each other beforehand for traveling into the other’s areas. 5. Implement local development projects. 6. Both sides will undertake efforts to achieve a nationwide ceasefire. 7. Once the situation has improved, the next step is to try to find a political solution which includes establishing a constitution. 67 Ethnic armed groups had to make a major strategic concession by agreeing to military ceasefires which did not guarantee greater autonomy. Many ceasefire accords contained administrative, military, and political restrictions against the ethnic armies. Ethnic groups could not garner any concession from the Burmese army with regard to preventing the army from strengthening their position throughout the country, especially in formerly contested areas. The agreements do not include any guarantee from the Burma Army to refrain from expanding their military activities or continuing human rights abuses. No monitoring or dispute-settlement mechanisms are built into the ceasefires. Interestingly, business deals did not appear in the regime’s ceasefire notes, which may be due to the regime’s tacit approval of illegal businesses such as drug production. By not having the business offers recorded, the junta has maintained a loophole whereby the business concessions can be taken away at a later date. This position permits the regime to pressure and threaten the ceasefire groups with the possible loss of business, and further allows the regime to force the ceasefire groups to remain in line with the regime’s interests.

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords Although ethnic ceasefire groups are restricted from contacting antigovernment organizations, in reality there have been meetings between some ceasefire and non-ceasefire groups. One of these meetings was exposed to the public in early 1997 when the Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement was signed at a KNU-controlled area. Senior representatives from the KIO, NMSP, UWSA, and KNLP joined a meeting that was attended by most of the non-ceasefire groups.68 The Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement denounced the military government’s National Convention as a sham and called for a tripartite dialogue. The regime was angered by the agreement and exerted serious pressure on the ceasefire groups’ representatives to withdraw their support and denounce the agreement. For example, the regime revoked certain business licenses of the NMSP as a punishment for signing the agreement.69 The ceasefire accords also stated that ceasefire groups were to give up armed struggle and announce it publicly. Some ceasefire groups’ leaders, when giving speeches at the ceasefire ceremonies, were pressured to read statements prepared by the MI. The junta’s statements said the ceasefire groups had entered into the legal fold understanding the good intentions of the government. This signaled that the Burma Army is still under the old mindset of getting the ethnic groups to surrender in principle, rather than solving the underlying problems of the ethnic conflict. However, some ceasefire groups issued their own statements immediately after the ceremonies countering the SLORC’s claim. For example, the NMSP stated that “…to unify the Mon populace and to further develop the fruits of armed resistance, acceptance of dialogue with representatives of the military government was made.”70 The NMSP also stated that they would continue to fight for selfdetermination though legal means. The Burma Army’s conditions for the agreements also restricted the ceasefire groups from recruiting new soldiers. However, some ethnic groups The Burma Army’s such as the PNO provided training and increased their troop numbers after the conditions...restricted the ceasefires. The Burma Army has known ceasefire groups from about the recruitments and has warned the ceasefire groups from time to time, recruiting new soldiers but has not taken action against them. In his meeting with Kachin state officials, northern commander Maj Gen. Ohn Myint showed his concern by revealing

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Zaw Oo and Win Min that the KIO forces grew from 3,993 at the time of the ceasefires to about 15,000.71 However, one of the KIO leaders said the KIO never agreed to any restrictions on the recruitment of new soldiers.72 The military government’s ceasefire agreements also required the ceasefire groups to submit reports on troop numbers and weapons in exchange for food and living assistance. Many ceasefire groups complied with this condition, mainly to receive assistance from the government, but their reports always reflect more troops and weapons than actually existed. This strategy is employed by the ceasefire groups to get more food rations, which are calculated using the numbers submitted by the ceasefire groups. The ethnic groups also want to project the image that they have sizeable military strength in order to dissuade the junta from future attacks or forced disarming. The regime appeared to know that the numbers were inflated, but they so far have not complained about this practice. The agreement also contains a condition which restricts the collection of tax by the ceasefire groups. However, as in 1963–64, the armed groups believe they must collect taxes in order to survive with little assistance from the government, and justify their actions on the grounds that the people voluntarily support their struggle. The regime has taken some action to prevent this from occurring. Some ceasefire groups’ members were arrested for either organizing the villagers or receiving money from them. In June 2004, eight NMSP members, accused of taxing the people, were arrested by the SPDC. On the condition of prohibiting the armed ethnic groups from bringing arms when they travel outside of their designated areas, certain troops did not comply. Some UWSA members, when visiting cities like Mandalay, normally keep their guns with them. Having lived in a gun culture for many years, ethnic armed groups’ members are accustomed to keeping guns with them at all times. The former MI who was dealing with the Wa troops before 2004 allowed their first wave ceasefire counterparts to carry their guns when they came to cities, perhaps because they did not discuss this issue during the ceasefire talks. The regime has tried to impose this restriction from time to time. In some cases, the SPDC took action by arresting several ceasefire members from the SSA in July 2005 for bringing arms when traveling between Muse and Lashio towns in Shan state, but they were later released.73 One condition set out in the mostly security-oriented agreements is the political restriction on ceasefire groups’ meeting with political parties. This

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords is a clear indication of the Burma Army’s divide-and-rule policy to keep separate the political parties in the cities and ethnic ceasefire groups in the borderlands. Though many ethnic groups do not dare to see Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, they have managed to see their own ethnic political parties. The government did not object when PNO leaders met leaders from the Union Pao National Organization (UPNO), possibly because the UPNO is locally confined and did not involve itself in any other political activities such as attending the Mae Tha Raw Hta meeting. Shan ceasefire leaders, such as Gen. Sao Ten, have met Shan National League for Democracy leaders including Khun Htun Oo. Given the high profile of the SNLD and the strong connections of Khun Htun Oo to pro-democracy groups, they were both arrested after a meeting in Taunggyi in February 2005. With the condition of prohibiting ethnic armed groups from interfering in its administrative and judicial affairs, the regime wanted to maintain control over all of the country including the armed ethnic groups’ control areas. Burmese military officials have always believed that they are the government and were concerned that the other groups would act as a parallel government and divide the country. The junta believes that their government control would principally reach all over the country even though their administration physically does not exist in remote areas. Based on the provision in the ethnic ceasefires not to intervene in its administration, the regime can arrest ceasefire groups’ members and can continue with its military expansion activities and human rights abuses. The government offered food and living assistance to compensate the ceasefire groups for their lost tax revenues. However, the assistance normally lasted only a few years after the agreement. For the SNPLO, the government provided food and petrol for only four years. Food and cash assistance to the NMSP has been sporadic, depending on the Mon’s policy shifts and actions. Some Mon observers felt that giving up tax and receiving The government offered... assistance from the government could make the NMSP dependent assistance to compensate the on the regime, eventually leading ceasefire groups the NMSP to become the junta’s client, and assistance did appear to become a mechanism for the regime to persuade ceasefire groups to follow its dictates. Normally, the NMSP received two million kyat (around U.S.$13,000) and 30,000

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Zaw Oo and Win Min kilograms of poor quality rice each month (South 2003: 227). After the NMSP criticized the National Convention and downgraded its representation at the convention from the participant level to observer level, food and cash assistance were cut.74 By securing an agreement from ceasefire groups that one day they would be reorganized under its control, the government has the advantage of integrating them into local police or militias or, as has happened to the SSNA and PSLP, taking away their arms. The regime has already asked some ceasefire groups to stay on as the local police force, going as far as offering salaries. However, many ceasefire groups worried that their political status would be compromised and they would be under more pressure to fight against former ethnic allies. For example, the UWSA has been asked to fight against the KIO, and the PNO was pressured to fight the SNPLO, although both of them rejected the junta’s request. As part of the agreements, the ceasefire groups are required to effectively help the Burmese military undertake a drug eradication plan. This appears to have focused specifically on forcing certain groups, particularly the UWSA and the PNO, to help the Burma Army fight the MTA. In fact, drug eradication seems to be more a show than a real policy. Last year, the junta troops, Regiment 65, worked with the UWSA’s No. 171 military unit in burning an opium field near Mong Ton township in Shan state. In the past, the junta reacted to China’s call to take action against an opium factory in UWSA area by pressuring the Wa ceasefire leaders to hand over the people who were working for the factory. The UWSA complied with the demand. However, a former MI officer said that these people were not the real culprits, but rather people who had been arrested in the Wa area for committing crimes under Wa law.75

Consequences of the Ceasefires Impact on the Military Government The government has profited from the ceasefires more than any other group. Ceasefires not only helped the SLORC to effectively contain the most significant threat of a pro-democracy uprising, but also ended its main military threat, the CPB, and weakened the military threat of the KNU. Ceasefires freed up military forces previously engaged in the former CPB areas, redeploying them to urban centers to control democracy activists and to the other borderlands, especially the KNU area. The SLORC was

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords also able to weaken the DAB, the alliances of the NDF and pro-democracy groups, by getting many NDF members to reach ceasefires without making major political concessions. This led to the gradual disintegration of the NDF and isolation of the KNU. In some cases, the regime used certain ceasefire groups, like the DKBA, UWSA, and KNPLF to fight against their rival non-ceasefires groups such as the KNU, SSA-South, and KNPP. After the ceasefires, the military government earned enormous income through the border trade, which had previously been controlled by the armed opposition through the black market. The regime also enjoyed support from China and Thailand, who provided not just major infrastructure projects, but also helped it to resist Western pressure for democratic changes. China, who previously had helped the CPB, switched its support to the SLORC. China promised to equip a new Burmese military division and sell the regime enough military equipment to outfit over 70 new battalions, setting the stage for the Burma Army to double its size over 10 years (Selth 2002: 165). In Kachin state, the number of Burma Army battalions tripled after the ceasefires, with 50 battalions currently stationed in the area (Kachin Women’s Association, Thailand 2005: 6). Importantly, the military has now more strength than in 1988 to deal with both urban uprising and armed opposition. After losing the 1990 elections to the NLD, the government thought it could compensate for its loss of legitimacy by maintaining ceasefires with first wave groups and making new ceasefires with other ethnic groups. This strategy gave them hope that the ceasefire movement was the beginning of the end of the civil war. Although the legitimacy of the junta’s constitutional convention was weakened by the NLD boycott in 1995, it was to a certain extent restored by the participation of ceasefire groups when the regime reactivated the convention in 2004. Impact on the Ethnic Resistance Movement and Groups Ceasefires weakened the ethnic alliance, the NDF, although some ceasefire groups were able to strengthen their forces individually. Ethnic groups were divided over the different tactics of making ceasefires individually or collectively. While the KNU insisted that the ceasefires should be discussed under the collective leadership of the DAB, many ethnic groups did not take that advice. As a result, the individual groups had little bargaining power at the table and had to make major strategic concessions in securing ceasefires, even though they were unsure of ever attaining greater autonomy.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min However, some individual ceasefire groups benefited from the ceasefires. The newly set up UWSA became the strongest ethnic army. The KIO also increased its troop and member size after the ceasefire, offering regular military and political training. The PNO re-contacted and recruited their old members, bypassing the Burma Army’s restriction on new recruits to increase their strength. It has also achieved enormous support from the Pao community by increasing social and religious development work and making contact with a Pao political party. Likewise, the NMSP has also gained greater access to Mon community groups, gathered tremendous public support, and enjoyed contacts with Mon political parties. Many of the ceasefire groups raised funds though business opportunities to improve their towns and organizations. The headquarter towns of the Kokang army, UWSA, NDAK, KDA, and KIO on the Chinese border developed rapidly, although the local businesses relied on Chinese investments and mostly focused on casinos. Their headquarters towns have 24-hour electricity and internet access. However, the headquarters of some other ceasefire groups (SNPLO, KNPLF, KNLP, and NMSP) have had fewer business opportunities and a slower rate of development. The KIO has been undertaking capacity-building training for its members to improve their skills.76 However, like many other organizations in Burma, hierarchical structures still remain within many ceasefire groups, providing little space for real discussion and debate (International Crisis Group 2003: 13). Over time, the ceasefire groups have also had a better chance to meet each other through their offices in towns and cities, although they are prohibited from setting up an alliance. As a result, thirteen ceasefire groups have pooled their collective demands at the National Convention, although their demands have been so far rejected. The KIO and NMSP have taken an initiating role in coordinating activities together with most of the exNDF members, creating a group of six (South 2004: 241). The group has developed good relations with ethnic political parties and their alliance, the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA), despite the junta’s restrictions. The other ex-NDF member and second wave ceasefire group, the PNO, has taken a different approach by not involving itself in such political coordination or raising political issues. The PNO primarily focuses on business and development issues in their own community, which has earned them the favor of the government. As such, many international and foreign aid workers can freely cooperate with the PNO.77 The UWSA has

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords occasionally raised political issues together with other first wave groups, but mostly it has focused on its local business and development work. Ceasefire leaders have also built up good personal relations with certain Burmese generals after the ceasefires. Although there is a big gap to bridge, personal relations have built up understanding and trust over time with the Burmese military officers.78 For instance, the PSLP has nurtured good relations with the northeastern commander and other high-level military officers, who have even come and slept at the PSLP’s chairman’s house from time to time. Unfortunately, the ceasefires have resulted in an increase in inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts, challenging the peace in the ceasefire areas. First, in Shan state, Khun Sa’s MTA and the UWSA clashed for control of the Doi Larng border mountain, killing over a thousand people. Pheung and Yang factional fights in the Kokang army in 1991 splintered the Kokang armed group with a further split in 1995 of Mong Hsala’s Mongko Region Defense Army. In Kachin state, the KDA, NDAK, and KIO have often competed over control of territory and resources, with the regime playing one side against the other. The intra-ethnic fight of the KNPLF and KNPP over an ideological divide regarding communism was also heightened after the ceasefires have resulted ceasefires, with the regime giving tacit support to the ceasefire KNPLF against an increase in inter- and non-ceasefire KNPP. In an internal intra-ethnic conflicts faction fight, the KIO Chairman General Zau Mai and two other senior leaders were ousted by younger officers, resulting from widespread dissatisfaction among the ranks over Zau Mai’s autocratic leadership and his family’s business dealings (International Crisis Group 2003: 10). Competing for control over lucrative jade mines and trade, the NDAK experienced several military clashes between the factions led by Zahkung Ting Ying and Layawk Ze Lum.79 The SNPLO also broke up into two factions fighting against each other. Some ceasefire groups have had a difficult time maintaining organizational strength and morale after the ceasefires as many members went back to their farms. This was particularly prominent among the leftleaning ethnic alliance members, the KNPLF, SNPLO, and KNLP. Although new recruits replaced older ones, the morale and experience of the new

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Zaw Oo and Win Min recruits was not as high as those they replaced. Instead, those who have joined after the ceasefires were more interested in enjoying a normal job and life. New recruits also lack battlefield experience, raising the question of whether they can stand if fighting resumes.80 Some ceasefire leaders have become corrupt and divided over business opportunities. Many ceasefire leaders were offered land to build houses in towns and cities, creating a gap between leaders and the grassroots. Some ethnic leaders appeared to be more occupied with their personal business interests than with organizational interest or development work (Ibid.: 13). Through better personal relations with the Burmese military commanders, some ceasefire leaders engaged in the drug trade, while others were against it. For example, a family member of a PSLP leader got involved in the drug trade only after having a good relationship with a Burma Army regional commander.81 On the other hand, all non-ceasefire armed groups have suffered tremendously during this period. The historically strong KNU has ended up struggling to survive after losing its central and regional headquarters and the loss of members and troops into breakaway factions. One of the break-away groups, the DKBA, fought against the KNU, and the tensions still continued between the factions. The breakdown of negotiations led to a major operation against the KNU-controlled areas in northern Karen state in 2006.82 The offensive generated the largest exodus since 1997, resulting in more than 15,000 IDPs (internally-displaced persons) and over 1,800 refugees settling in Thailand. 83 Likewise, the SSAmost see [Aung San Suu Kyi] South came under regular military attack against their camps, with only as a Burman leader 200,000 IDPs both in hiding and relocation camps and 200,000 refuges fleeing to the unofficial Shan refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border since 1996.84 Impact on the Pro-Democracy Movement and Groups After the agreements, the ceasefire groups continued to express their support and solidarity for the democracy movement on many occasions by issuing statements. For instance, in 1997, some of the ceasefire groups joined nonceasefire groups in calling for a tripartite dialogue. Also, on the Union Day

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords of 2002, eight ethnic groups, including the KIO, issued a statement that reiterated that the ethnic ceasefire groups are still committed to achieve peace, ethnic causes, regional development and democracy.85 In many agreements, the military government prohibited the ceasefire groups’ leaders from meeting the registered political parties, resulting in a lack of effective coordination between the pro-democracy movement and ceasefire groups. Only a few ceasefire groups have managed to see Aung San Suu Kyi a few times either secretly or at social gatherings. Although Aung San Suu Kyi wanted to visit the KIO’s military headquarters in Laiza and the KIO leaders wanted to fulfill her desire, her trip was blocked by the SPDC.86 Many ceasefire leaders have faith in Aung San Suu Kyi because of her promises for ethnic rights, while a few were not very satisfied with the NLD’s lack of concern for ethnic causes. Nevertheless, most of them see her only as a Burman leader not representing all the groups (Ibid.: 13). By entering into ceasefires, ethnic groups have inadvertently hurt some pro-democracy groups in the borderlands. For instance, the KIO had to arrange the departure of the pro-democracy students’ group the All Burma Students’ Democratic Front (ABSDF) from its area at the urging of the SLORC, which refused to allow the KIO to implement development projects and business deals if they continued to host the ABSDF in their area. Likewise, the NMSP, KNPLF, SNPLO, and the KNLP had to persuade the ABSDF members and other pro-democracy groups in their areas to maintain low profiles and eventually to leave. Impact on Human Security After the ceasefires, there has been a return of normalcy. The ethnic villages became relatively calm and relaxing places whereas before, the villagers had to be ready to run from battles at a moment’s notice.87 Permanent houses made from timber or brick and zinc plates have now replaced the makeshift huts of bamboo and thatch roofs. This situation has allowed ethnic villagers to work and move relatively safely and freely with less hassle at the checkpoints, providing a better chance for travel and trade. Many farmers in the villages can work regularly in their fields and many are now even wearing military clothes, which are cheap and durable, to work in the fields, no longer worried about being accused of being spies for different armed groups.88 There has been an increase in trade between China and Burma since the ceasefires, with some individuals trading motorbikes from China on a personal basis.89 In the

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Zaw Oo and Win Min

Pao area, there has been rapid development in agriculture works and a new railroad to the area. In addition, there has been an increase in trade and tourism, creating many jobs for the local population.90 Although the ceasefires brought normalcy for villagers inside Burma, refugees and IDPs tell a different story. Attempts to reduce the difficulties of war-affected people in their resettlements have been hindered by the government’s restrictions on NGOs and UN agencies. From the outset, the junta was not interested in refugee repatriation or even complying with ILO’s demand on forced labor (South 2003: 228). The regime does not recognize refugees as villagers, but regards them as supporters of armed opposition who incrementally would resettle in western countries.91 Following ceasefire agreements and under mounting pressure from the host countries, China and Thailand, refugee repatriations were conducted hastily by NGOs, churches and local refugee committees organized by the ceasefire groups, with little help from the international community. 70,000 Kachin IDPs and refugees, and 10,000 Mon refugees were repatriated back to the Burma side after the KIO and NMSP ceasefires. The relief efforts of the KBC ensured the return of many Kachin refugees back to their villages. However, Mon refugees remain as IDPs in the NMSP’s area, still waiting for proper resettlement and reintegration programs that can only be undertaken with the cooperation of the government and with the aid of UN agencies. Following the ceasefires, there was a reduction in serious forms of human rights abuse. Although abuse against villagers by the military continues in ceasefire areas, war-related abuses such as extrajudicial killings, burning villages, forced relocations, portering, and rape have declined (Human Rights Watch 2005: 24). The ceasefire groups could inform the Burma Army if human rights abuses occurred and sometimes the perpetrators were punished. Following the ceasefires, there was Villagers in ceasefire areas a reduction in serious forms of welcome the agreements and are happier than before and do not human rights abuse want conflict to return. According to Human Rights Watch’s 2005 report, even the short-lived unofficial ceasefire agreement between the SPDC and KNU (2003–04) brought better human rights conditions in some areas of Karen state (Ibid.: 10).

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords However, other forms of human rights abuses still exist or have increased. In Kachin and Mon states, land confiscation and displacement has occurred not by war, but as a result of resource extraction, such as logging, jade and gold mining, infrastructure development, and expansion of the Burma Army into previously contested areas (South 2004: 239). Although the NMSP leaders asked the SLORC to end the use of forced labor during the ceasefire talks, the SLORC replied that if villagers are contributing their labor for their local development it would not consider this to be a rights violation.92 To prevent forced labor and the government’s military expansion into the Mon area, the NMSP has discouraged some road construction projects.93 In the Palaung area, villagers were forced to construct other forms of human rights barracks for the Burmese soldiers.94 Although forced labor and land abuses still exist or have confiscation were widespread in Pao increased areas during railroad construction and expansion of the Burma Army during the first few years of the ceasefire, they have since been significantly reduced.95 In many ceasefire areas, especially in Kachin state, there has been wide-scale environmental damage resulting from logging and mining (Global Witness 2003: 19–20). Both the Burma Army and ceasefire groups, desperate for financial resources to fund their armies, have increased their logging and mining of timber, gold, jade, and rubies for export without consultation with the local population who suffer the environmental destruction. Both the PNO and SNPLO are engaged in logging, destroying the forest on the border of Pao and Shan areas in the northern part of Si Sai Township.96 There has been some development work in the ceasefire areas that has improved the daily lives of the people, especially in transportation. The SLORC set up the Border Area and Development program in 1989 with an initial investment of one billion kyat, later upgrading it to a full ministry in 1992. However, there were doubts that the regime would continue with this assistance due to budget constraints. The development plan has focused more on infrastructure development, including roads, dams, and hydropower projects, than on education and health. From 1989 to 2003, the government built about 300 new miles of paved roads, 42 big bridges, and 640 small bridges in the border areas (Information Ministry of the SPDC 2003: 247).

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Zaw Oo and Win Min With many new bridges and roads in Kachin state, travel is much quicker, taking less than a day to travel from Laiza to Myitkyina, a trip which used to take several days.97 Improved transportation also has strategic benefits for government troops, who now have greater access to ethnic areas. Though the state is less focused on health and education, 52 hospitals with over 100 clinics as well as 62 high schools, 61 middle schools, and 627 primary schools were built in the ethnic areas from 1989 to 2003, providing the people in the borderlands with better access to health and education than they had during periods of conflict. Eight hydropower plants were also constructed between 1989 and 2003 in the borderlands (Ibid.). These development projects are positive outcomes of the ceasefires for the ethnic population. Along with government efforts, ethnic ceasefire groups, especially the KIO and NMSP, have also focused on constructing schools and hospitals in their areas, mainly with international assistance. After the ceasefires, many ethnic groups have promoted their own education systems or worked within the government education system. The NMSP has developed Mon language curricula and managed over 186 Mon national schools and mixed schools, which they share with the government system and where 70 percent of students are from government-controlled areas, despite a serious setback in 2002–03 (South 2004: 240). The KIO-administered schools in its areas are now recognized by the government, and students who pass these high school exams now can join universities in the cities.98 Although there have been more employment and business opportunities for local populations since the ceasefires, some leaders of the ceasefire groups and their cronies profited much more than ordinary people. More importantly, the local populations have little capital and skill to compete with rich people from central Burma, drug traffickers, and foreign investors from neighboring countries, especially China. Many businesses still conduct illegal businesses such as illegal logging and mining, drug smuggling, the sex industry, and casinos (International Crisis Group 2003: 13). Impact on Civil Society Ceasefires have opened up a space for community-based sociocultural and religious activities that have the potential to support the development of civil society in ethnic areas. Many ethnic minority language classes for Mon, Shan, Karen, Kachin, and others have been conducted outside the

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords government education system. Mon monks can now take most of their Buddhist exams in their own language (Ibid.: 21). Two main Kachin religious-based NGOs, the Metta Development Foundation and the Shalom Foundation, were set up in the late 1990s and early 2000 to help build up the war-torn society with assistance from foreign donors. The Metta Ceasefires have opened...a Development Foundation had received U.S.$500,000 by 2003, space for...sociocultural and hiring 13 full time staff, and has religious activities conducted participatory development training and projects such as health worker training and water and sanitation projects in Shan, Karenni, Karen, and Mon states. The Shalom Foundation has also been involved in capacity building and conflict resolution projects (South 2004: 248). Pao monks have increased their activities teaching Pao languages at monasteries, and there has been vocational training such as sewing and agricultural training.99 In the Kayan area, the Kayan Literature and Cultural Committee, which was founded by leaders from the KNLP, the KNPLF, the Kayan National Guard, community leaders, and religious leaders, has organized Kayan New Year Day, Kayan National Day, and other significant events.100 National Convention: A Bargain from Within? Ceasefire leaders accepted the convention as a rare opportunity to discuss autonomy issues, while the NLD and ethnic political parties, frustrated by the restrictions and controls set by the regime, have boycotted it. Since then, ethnic groups have become the only substantial group of delegates not handpicked by the junta and their role is becoming critical in pushing the reform agenda within the convention. Regardless of all the restrictions, the convention provided a significant opportunity for ethnic ceasefire groups to discuss their common aspirations, debate their collective visions, and coordinate their policy positions. During the suspension of the convention (1997–2004), ethnic groups tried different collective efforts to achieve a political settlement. One strategy was to issue collective statements whenever possible. In March 2001, seven ethnic ceasefire groups asked the SPDC to hold a more comprehensive political negotiation for national unity, emergence of a genuine union, and the

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Zaw Oo and Win Min development of democracy. The statement, issued by the SSA, SSNA, NMSP, KNPLF, SNPLO, KNLP, and PSLO, claimed that in the 10 years since the ceasefires, significant peace and stability was achieved, but the lack of political negotiation resulted in a delay of progress in national unity affairs.101 When the regime announced a seven-point road map to democracy in 2003, with its first step to re-convene the National Convention, many ceasefire groups welcomed it and agreed to attend the convention. As a result, the ceasefire groups collectively received over 100 seats, or 10% of the total delegates at the convention. Taking advantage of their participation as delegates, many ethnic groups made a significant effort by joining together and submitting a joint proposal before and during the convention. Three days before the resumption of the convention in May 2004, in response to the convention head Gen. Thein Sein’s announcement that all six main objectives and 104 principles previously established would be used as basic guidelines for the convention, eight ethnic ceasefire groups—KIO, PSLO, NMSP, SSA, SSNA, KNLP, SNPLO, and KNPLF—asked for the following:102 1.

2. 3.

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5. 6.

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The right to discuss No. 6 objective (military’s leading role over politics in the future) again and revise it, since it does not fit with democratic principles and does not reflect the wishes of the people. The right to re-discuss and revise the points which are not in line with democratic procedures and principles. The right to hold consultation with anybody and any organizations that can provide good advice for the sake of the union while attending the National Convention. The right of delegates to freely communicate with their mother organizations and to seek advice for discussion while attending the convention. The right of the elected representatives of the people in the 1990 election to participate in the convention. The right of ceasefire organizations, which really represent the ethnic people and non-ceasefire organizations after entering into ceasefires, to join the National Convention. To revoke order No. 5/96 that was announced in June 1997 to protect the former National Convention (1993–96).103

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords On June 9, 2004, the 13 ethnic groups—KIO, PSLO, NMSP, SSA, KNLP, SNPLO, KNPLF, KDA, NDAK, KNG, KNPP (Hoya splinter group), and Mon Armed Peace Group (Chaungchi)—also collectively asked for a clear distribution of power to the states in their proposal submitted to the National Convention, including: 1. To include a list of concurrent legislative powers for the states. 2. To give residual powers to the states. 3. To add a separate section on ethnic affairs in the union legislative list. 4. To include a defense and security planning section in each state legislation. 5. To include a literature/language section in each state legislation. 6. To include a section for ethnic minority tradition in each state legislation. 7. To let the states draft their own constitutions. 8. To let the states make specific foreign policies in dealing with neighboring countries regarding various issues such as issuing border passes and border trade. 9. To let the states collect local taxes and finance.104

However, the SPDC refused the proposal and replied that concurrent legislative power should not be practiced for the sake of the country, and that it is better that the union hold residual power, so that the union can change the laws quickly when needed for the states.105 Irrespective of the regime’s persistence on a unitary-style constitution, the ethnic groups continued to discuss issues that are critical to the question of ethnic rights and autonomy. Although the convention represents the “only game in the town” for the ethnic representatives to socialize and network among themselves, their opportunity to discuss and debate substantive issues is severely limited. The Convention Commission The Convention Commission has has rejected every reasonable rejected every reasonable proposal put forward by the ethnic representatives. proposal As a result, the constitutional draft thus far completed seriously lacks any provisions for diverse ethnic populations to enjoy autonomy under a

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Zaw Oo and Win Min genuine federal structure. In fact, some of these principles are quite problematic for any ethnic group hoping to achieve its political aspirations under the draft constitution. For instance, Item 2 of the draft constitution chapter on “Formation of the State” stipulates that there would continue to be seven states and seven divisions with equal status as before. In contrast, many ethnic political parties including the SNLD, who boycotted the convention, have made a claim for eight states with equal status. Although nominal autonomy would be given to these seven states, which are designated for seven major ethnic populations, the President of the Union will have immense influence in selecting the Chief Ministers of the respective states. Another problematic provision is a stipulation that unelected military representatives will form one third of the respective state assemblies, thus providing a huge veto bloc in the functioning of state assemblies—a condition even worse than the twenty-five percent of seats reserved for the military in the National Parliament. In addition, a more convoluted approach to the proposed constitution is the vision of “three step unity,” consisting of a third level of administrative structure called autonomous zones, in addition to the first national structure of parliaments and the second structure of state and regional assemblies. These autonomous zones will be created within the second-tier structure of states, enabling the central government to control them directly. The General Administration Department of the central government will run the day-to-day functions of the autonomous zones, creating pockets of “untouchable” areas of which the respective state assemblies or their chief ministers have no power to govern. This reflects the “divide-and-rule” attitude of the junta in handling ethnic conflicts, where it attempts to create divisions among tribal groups of major ethnic populations. Assessment for the Future This study suggests that the ceasefires, which many considered a first step in solving the political problem, appear to be becoming less and less promising. With little indication of progress toward a political settlement between the SPDC and pro-democracy groups, the option of a larger peacebuilding process and a political settlement is gradually fading. The lack of progress and decreasing possibilities at the convention for solving underlying problems for greater autonomy of ethnic states show that the SPDC has no intention of accommodating ethnic demands. It appears that the SPDC continues to believe in consolidating its power under a unitary

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords state, rather than devolving some powers to ethnic minority states under a federal structure. The SPDC continues to believe that a federal system would lead to the disintegration of the country. With the fall of the intelligence chief Khin Nyunt and the possible completion of the draft constitution in the near future, SPDC has The SPDC...believe[s] that become less committed to the earlier agreements. Instead, it began federal system would lead to disarm two ceasefire armies, and to...disintegration arrested a top Shan ceasefire leader with whom Khin Nyunt had good relations. The SPDC has also imposed restrictions on the businesses of many ceasefire groups that had previously been protected by Khin Nyunt. The ceasefire groups who did join together to raise their collective demands at the convention in 2004 have not been allowed to try again since, reducing hope for political negotiations. With concerns over possibly being disarmed without getting even a minimum degree of autonomy in the draft constitution, ceasefire groups are now facing the dilemma of what to do next to maintain and advance their interests. There are two precedents which groups, especially smaller ones, may have to follow. One is to surrender as the PSLP was forced to do. Another possibility is that the group divides, with one group surrendering and the other group resuming fighting. This strategy was undertaken by the SSNA, with one faction joining the non-ceasefire Shan State Army. However, neither option is very appealing. The PSLP members are now largely ignored by the SPDC, since they no longer have military power and the faction from the former SSNA which joined the SSA faces military pressure. Another possibility is that ceasefire groups, as a whole, may decide to resume fighting in order to keep their arms and organization by making a military alliance with the ethnic non-ceasefire groups. However, nonceasefire groups have been suffering attacks by the Burma Army, causing an increasing flow of refugees into Thailand. Therefore, as a result of mass dislocation and a reduction in the number of possible recruits there is not much hope that non-ceasefire groups will be able to help their former allies, although they will sympathize with them and encourage them to continue to fight. Although some ceasefire armies have new recruits and weapons,

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Zaw Oo and Win Min their morale and capabilities may not be enough to sustain the fighting, since many of the recruits do not actually want to fight and lack battlefield experience. Neighboring countries will not be in favor of the resumption of fighting on their borders and pressure will likely be exerted on the rebels to maintain the peace. Moreover, after failing to come anywhere near victory after five decades of armed struggle, going back to war does not seem like an attractive option. Although the groups may feel they have to fight for their ethnic causes, the costs will be very high. There is the risk that more hard-line splinter groups may form and return to armed struggle no matter the costs. This possibility looms largely because the frustrated younger generation, which never really experienced the tragedy of war, might be willing to take up arms. Alternatively, disgruntled groups might secretly attempt to create terror by setting off bombs in urban areas. There is also no guarantee in the long run that the whole group or a faction would not go back to the jungle if the situation deteriorates further or if the ceasefire groups sense there is significant weakness in the Burma Army. Another further possibility is for ethnic groups to make some form of compromise on the SPDC’s demand to transform the ethnic armies into militias or local police forces. This would give the ethnic resistance groups a chance to continue to hold their arms and push for another opportunity to discuss constitutional change. One final, though less likely, option would be to allow all ethnic armed groups to transform into political parties and run in elections in the later stages of SPDC’s seven-point roadmap. This opportunity would arise only if the ceasefire groups were to agree to disarm, and would be similar to the past proposal agreed to by U Nu and many ethnic leaders. There will be at least some generals in the Burmese military who will share the past concerns about former enemies winning the elections, making this option less likely. In a similar vein, it may be possible to split the armed ethnic groups into political parties and militias or police to serve under the government forces. It should be noted that the pro-democracy movement has demonstrated greater understanding of ethnic minority concerns than has the SPDC. The NLD and other political party members outside Burma have joined together with representatives from several ethnic minority organizations to write their own draft constitution for Burma. Unlike the regime’s constitution, it enshrines a democratic and federal system of government. Aung San Suu Kyi has made repeated efforts to reach out to the ethnic

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords minorities, and her party has a close relationship with the ethnic political parties that contested the 1990 election. In addition, the NLD has spoken about the need for equality and self-determination in Burma. Nevertheless, only if the government, whether military or democratically elected, devolves power to the ethnic states can there be genuine and lasting peace in Burma.

Conclusion After more than 17 years of ceasefires, the ethnic ceasefire groups have enjoyed a degree of normalcy, though not peace. There has been a reduction of serious conflict-related human rights abuses as well as improvements in education, health care, trade, and travel, although other human rights abuses continue. The ceasefires also allowed for the beginning of civil organization development in ethnic areas, which may over time contribute to a solution to Burma’s ethnic conflict. Ceasefires have also made some ethnic armies stronger and some weaker. Likewise, the ceasefires have had mixed effects on the local economies. However, perhaps most importantly, the ceasefires have not brought any political settlement to the decades-long ethnic conflict in Burma that remains Ceasefires have also made one of Burma’s biggest problems today. some ethnic armies stronger To date, the SPDC has not indicated any willingness to initiate any and some weaker political discussion to address the underlying ethnic autonomy issue. From the outset, ceasefire negotiations were not initiated by the SLORC to address ethnic political issues but to reduce the significant threat from the pro-democracy uprising by dividing pro-democracy groups and the ethnic armed movement, as well as causing divisions within the ethnic armed movement. At a time of heightened political threats from the urban centers, the regime was solely concerned with maintaining its power. Since making the ceasefire agreements, the Burmese military does not appear to feel that it needs to negotiate or make significant concessions to ethnic demands. Ceasefires were not necessitated by a mutually hurting stalemate in the armed conflict. On the ethnic army side, they suffered battle losses and fatigue that compelled them to rethink their armed struggles and to temporarily set aside their insistence on making a nationwide ceasefire or solving political problems first. By contrast, the Burma Army, which was much larger, was able to absorb its battle losses more easily and

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Zaw Oo and Win Min continued to believe that it was in the process of winning. This removed all doubt from the SPDC about using military force to solve its political problems, though they recognized that they could not eliminate all the ethnic resistance armies at the same time by purely military means. Also, the Burmese military does not believe that ethnic autonomy under a federal union can solve the ethnic problem. Instead the regime considers federalism a threat to the cohesion of the union that the military has been preserving. Khin Nyunt apparently believed that ceasefires with some ethnic resistance armies were needed to weaken the Burma Army’s two main historical threats, the CPB and KNU, and their possible cooperation with pro-democracy groups. Khin Nyunt realized that the time was ripe to propose the ceasefires without the government having to make any significant concessions. In order to sweeten the deal, he allowed the ethnic armies to continue to hold their arms and to administer their territories for an unspecified period of time, learning this lesson from the breakdown of previous ceasefire agreements. The ethnic resistance groups were also granted business opportunities and gained some benefits, while the secure border trade has benefited the Burmese military tremendously. Meanwhile, the ceasefire groups had to make the major strategic concession of giving up the armed struggle without a guarantee for greater autonomy. Although the ethnic minority areas benefited from the development of infrastructure, especially with regard to transportation, the Burma Army also achieved better access to these areas, increasing their ability to assert their control. With many restrictions designed to weaken the ceasefire groups and divide them from the non-ceasefire groups such as the KNU and the above-ground political parties such as the NLD, ethnic ceasefire groups have little room to maneuver or make alliances. Consequently, the ethnic movement has become divided between those who are pro-business and those who are the ethnic armed pro-struggle as well as between those who are pro-ceasefire and those who are anti-ceasefire, struggle[s continue] despite a common goal of greater autonomy. So far, cooperation between the above-ground political parties and ceasefire groups has not been very effective. The SPDC appears to think that the ceasefire groups became relatively weaker after the ceasefires and that by disarming and transforming them, there will be peace. Although the regime has been able to manage the conflict in a way to reduce the casualties and to show that the country is

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Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords under its control, this policy is unlikely to guarantee ethnic harmony or a lasting peace. The root causes of the ethnic armed struggle are still strong and have not been solved, while new grievances are growing among younger ethnic populations. Merely providing some economic incentives and development projects will not be enough. If ethnic minority aspirations are not met at some point, rising frustration over ethnic discrimination and the denial of autonomy may lead a new generation of ethnic minorities to take up arms.

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Endnotes 1.

Thanks to Muthiah Alagappa, Tom Kramer, Morten Pedersen, Mary Callahan, Tyler Crosby, Patrick Pierce, Christina Fink, Aung Thu Nyein, Aung Naing Oo, Toe Zaw Latt, an anonymous discussant and three anonymous reviewers for their comments and assistance. 2. Martin Smith, Ethnic Groups in Burma (London: Anti-Slavery International, 1994, p. 34) estimates the current ethnic make-up of the country to be around 68% Burman, 9% Shan, 7% Karen, 4% Arakanese, 2% Mon, 1.7% Indian, 1.5% Chin, 1.5 % Rohinga, 1% Kachin, 1% Pao, 0.6% Palaung, 0.4% Kayah (Karenni), 0.35% Lahu, 0.2% Wa, 0.15% Kokang, and all others comprise 1.6%. Population estimates by the government and the ethnic groups differ dramatically. 3. The integrated military force comprised four Burman battalions, two Karen battalions, two Kachin battalions, and two Chin battalions. 4. Meeting notes between the KNU and the Burmese government first talk, April 4, 1949 (Burmese). 5. Meeting minutes of the second preparatory talks between the RC and the CPB, October 3, 1963 (Burmese). 6. Statement of the CPB pre-negotiation team, November 15, 1963 (Burmese). 7. Letter from the RC to the CPB, signed by Ne Win, August 19, 1963 (Burmese). 8. KIO Chairman Brang Seng’s letter to Ne Win, October 21, 1980 (Burmese). 9. Peace Agreement Record of the Kachin Regional Party Committee, BSPP, March 8, 1981 (No. 1/9/org 1) (Burmese). 10. CPB Chairman Ba Thein Tin’s statement to the public on peace talks, June 14, 1981 (Burmese). 11. Ibid. 12. The Karenni National Defense Army (splinter faction from KNPP), the Karen Peace Force (ex-KNU 16 battalion), Mon Mergui Army (splinter faction from the NMSP), and the KNU Special Region Group (Taungoo). In 1997, the CPB (Arakan province) also surrendered.

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Zaw Oo and Win Min 13. Chin National Front (CNF), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA), Rohinga National Alliance, Lahu National Organization (LNO) and Wa National Organization (WNO). 14. Interview with a former MI officer, November 5, 2006. 15. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyen, former SSA member and editor of the Shan Herald Agency for News. June 2, 2006. 16. Interview with Mai Phone Kyaw, former PSLP Central Committee member, June 2, 2006. 17. Interviewee with Moe Thee Zun, former DAB leader, June 17, 2006. 18. Interview with Htay Aung, a member of an alliance of left-leaning ethnic groups, December 6, 2006. 19. Open letter to Gen. Than Shwe from the DAB chairman Gen. Bo Mya, April 23, 1993. 20. Interview with David Taw, the KNU Foreign Secretary, June 2, 2006. 21. Interview with Rimond Htoo, the KNPP Secretary-1, May 30, 2006. 22. Interview with David Taw, June 2, 2006. 23. Ibid. 24. Paung, Shah. 2006. “Junta Cancels Gentleman Agreement with KNU,” Irrawaddy, October 9 (online). 25. Interview with Rimond Htoo, May 30, 2006. 26. Interview with Htay Aung, December 6, 2006. 27. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyan, June 2, 2006. 28. Interview with Hkun Okker, former PNO leader and current PPLO Chairman, December 7, 2006. 29. Interview with Mai Phone Kyaw, June 2, 2006. 30. Interview with Rimond Htoo, May 30, 2006. 31. Interview with David Taw, June 6, 2006. 32. Interview with a KIO leader, April 10, 2007. 33. Interview with an NMSP leader, June 3, 2006. 34. Interview with Mai Phone Kyaw, June 2, 2006. 35. Interview with Hkun Okker, December 7, 2006. 36. Interview with Nai Kasauh Mon, Editor of the Independent Mon News Agency, June 9, 2006. 37. Interview with Rimond Htoo, May 30, 2006. 38. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyen, June 2, 2006. 39. Interview with Hkun Okker, December 7, 2006. 40. Interview with Nawdin Lahpai, Editor of the Kachin News, November 20, 2006. 41. Interview with a former KNPLF member, November 15 2006. 42. Interview with Rimond Htoo, May 30, 2006. 43. Interview with an ethnic ceasefire leader who secretly met Aung San Suu Kyi, November 20, 2006. 44. Interview with Htay Aung, December 7, 2006. 45. Both Bertil Lintner and Martin Smith attribute the fall of the CPB to the internal division between ageing communist leaders who traditionally occupied the politburo seats and ethnic Kokang and Wa leaders who actually commanded the troops. However, a pro-government publication credited the secret mission of military intelligence and their intermediary, Lo Hsing-han, former drug lord and a

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46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53.

54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.

64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.

Kokang himself, with capitalizing on the CPB’s divisions. See Efforts of Tatmadaw Government in National Reconsolidation. 1999. Interview with a former MI officer, November 1, 2006. Interview with David Taw, June 2, 2006. Interview with a foreign businessman who had close relations with former military intelligence, December 1, 2005. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyen, June 2, 2006. Interview with a UN officer, November 27, 2006. Gen. Thura Shwe Mann gave a detailed explanation of the purge on October 25, 2004, citing irregularities and misappropriations at the border checkpoints commanded by military intelligence officers. Confidential meeting minutes of the Northern Command meeting in October 2005 also include remarks by the commander criticizing the corrupt deals between MI officers and the ceasefire groups. Seng, Naw. 2004. “Brothers-in-Peace,” Irrawaddy. February 1 (online). Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein. 1998. “The Burma-Singapore Axis: Globalizing the Heroin Trade,” Covert Action Quarterly, Spring. According to this article, Lo’s businesses, run under his son’s company Asia World, include a deep-water port in Rangoon, the Leo Express bus line between central and northern Burma, a $33 million toll highway from the heart of Burma’s poppy-growing region to the China border, and a wharf with freight handling, storage, and a customs yard for ships carrying up to 15,000 tons—one of the largest operations ever run by a local company. Interview with a KIO leader, June 2, 2006. Burmese television broadcast, November 19, 2003. Broadcast on Burmese state television on November 26, 1993, and printed in The Nation (Bangkok), November 27, 1993. Interview with Rimond Htoo, May 30, 2006. Interview with a KIO leader, June 2, 2006. Interview with David Taw, June 8, 2006. Interview with a former CPB member, April 6, 2007. Interview with a Mandalay resident, April 1, 2007. Interview with a non-ceasefire leader who visited the UWSA camp, April 8, 2006. Confidential meeting minutes of the second quarterly meeting of the Kachin State Peace and Development Council, Myitkyina, October 24–25, 2005, p. 5–6 (Burmese). Shan Herald Agency for News, “Junta Serves Notice to Ceasefire Groups,” November 14, 2004. Interview with Htay Aung, April, 7, 2007. Interview with Khuensai Jaiyen, November 12, 2006. Interview with a KIO leader, June 2, 2006. Mae Tha Raw Hta agreement, January 14, 1997. International Crisis Group. 2003. Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics. Asia Report No. 53, May 7, p. 11. NMSP Statement on the ceasefire between the state Law and Order Restoration Council and the New Mon State Party, July 13, 1995. Confidential meeting minutes of the second quarterly meeting of the Kachin State Peace and Development Council, Myitkyina, October 24–25, 2005, p. 6 (Burmese).

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Bibliography Global Witness. 2003. A Conflict of Interests: The Uncertain Future of Burma’s Forests. London: Global Witness Ltd. October. Human Rights Watch. 2005. They Came and Destroyed our Village Again: The right of Internally Displaced Persons in Karen State. Vol. 17(4-C), June. International Crisis Group. 2003. Myanmar Backgrounder: Ethnic Minority Politics. Asia Report No. 53. May 7. Kachin Women’s Association, Thailand. 2005. Driven Away: Trafficking of Kachin Women on the China-Burma Border, Chiang Mai: KWAT. Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein. 1998. “The Burma-Singapore Axis: Globalizing the Heroin Trade,” Covert Action Quarterly, Spring. Lintner, Bertil. 1990. The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma. New York: Cornell Southeast Asia Program Publications. ———. 1993. “Neighbors’ interests: China and Thailand to Mediate in Burma’s Civil War,” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 1. ———. 2004 “Burma: Conflict of Interests,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 19. McDonald, Hamish. 1993. “Partner in Plunder: Thailand’s Timber Shortage Gives Rangoon Its Opening.” Far Eastern Economic Review, April 13. Ministry of Information. 2003. Developed and Prosperous Burma: 1988–2003. Yangoon: State Peace and Development Council (Burmese). Selth, Andrew. 2002. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk (CT): EastBridge. Smith, Martin. 1994. Ethnic Groups in Burma. London: Anti-Slavery International. ———.1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed Books. South, Ashley. 2003. Mon Nationalism and Civil War in Burma: The Golden Sheldrake. London: MPG Books Ltd. ———. 2004 “Political Transition in Myanmar: A New Model for Democratization.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26(2).

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Zaw Oo and Win Min Raw, Seng. “Views From Myanmar: An Ethnic Minority Perspective.” In Robert H. Taylor, ed. 2001. Burma: Political Economy Under Military Rule. New York: Palgrave. Thar, Nai Han. 2006. Peaceful Co-Existence: Towards Federal Union in Burma. Chiang Mai: UNLD Press (Burmese). Zaw, U Aung. 1999. Efforts of Tatmadaw Government in National Reconsolidation. Rangoon (Burmese).

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Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia Project Information

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Project Rationale, Purpose, and Outline Project Director: Muthiah Alagappa Principal Researchers: Morten Pedersen (Burma/Myanmar) Saroja Dorairajoo (southern Thailand) Mahendra Lawoti (Nepal) Samir Kumar Das (northeast India) Neil DeVotta (Sri Lanka) Rationale Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia is part of a larger East-West Center project on state building and governance in Asia that investigates political legitimacy of governments, the relationship of the military to the state, the development of political and civil societies and their roles in democratic development, the role of military force in state formation, and the dynamics and management of internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes. An earlier project investigating internal conflicts arising from nation- and state-building processes focused on conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in China (Tibet and Xinjiang), Indonesia (Aceh and Papua), and southern Philippines (the Moro Muslims). Funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York, that highly successful project was completed in March 2005. The present project, which began in July 2005, investigates the causes and consequences of internal conflicts arising from state- and nation-building processes in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, Nepal, northeast India, and Sri Lanka, and explores strategies and solutions for their peaceful management and eventual settlement. Internal conflicts have been a prominent feature of the Asian political landscape since 1945. Asia has witnessed numerous civil wars, armed insurgencies, coups d’état, regional rebellions, and revolutions. Many have been protracted; several have far-reaching domestic and international consequences. The civil war in Pakistan led to the break up of that country in 1971; separatist struggles challenge the political and territorial integrity of China, India, Indonesia, Burma, the Philippines, Thailand, and Sri Lanka; political uprisings in Thailand (1973 and 1991), the Philippines (1986), South Korea (1986), Taiwan (1991) Bangladesh (1991), and Indonesia (1998) resulted in dramatic political change in those countries.

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70 Although the political uprisings in Burma (1988) and China (1989) were suppressed, the political systems in those countries, as well as in Vietnam, continue to confront problems of legitimacy that could become acute; and radical Islam poses serious challenges to stability in Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. The Thai military ousted the democratically-elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006. In all, millions of people have been killed in the internal conflicts, and tens of millions have been displaced. Moreover, the involvement of external powers in a competitive manner (especially during the Cold War) in several of these conflicts had negative consequences for domestic and regional security. Internal conflicts in Asia can be traced to contestations over political legitimacy (the title to rule), national identity, state building, and distributive justice––that are often interconnected. With the bankruptcy of the socialist model and transitions to democracy in several countries, the number of internal conflicts over political legitimacy has declined in Asia. However, the legitimacy of certain governments continues to be contested from time to time, and the remaining communist and authoritarian systems are likely to confront challenges to their legitimacy in due course. Internal conflicts also arise from the process of constructing modern nation-states, and the unequal distribution of material and status benefits. Although many Asian states have made considerable progress in constructing national communities and viable states, several countries, including some major ones, still confront serious problems that have degenerated into violent conflict. By affecting the political and territorial integrity of the state as well as the physical, cultural, economic, and political security of individuals and groups, these conflicts have great potential to affect domestic and international stability. Purpose Internal Conflicts and State-Building Challenges in Asia examines internal conflicts arising from the political consciousness of minority communities in Burma/Myanmar, southern Thailand, northeast India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Except for Nepal, these states are not in danger of collapse. However, they do face serious challenges at the regional and local levels which, if not addressed, can negatively affect the vitality of the national state in these countries. Specifically, the project has a threefold purpose: (1) to develop an in-depth understanding of the domestic, transnational, and international dynamics of internal conflicts in these countries in the context of nationand state-building strategies; (2) to examine how such conflicts have affected

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71 the vitality of the state; and (3) to explore strategies and solutions for the peaceful management and eventual settlement of these conflicts. Design A study group has been organized for each of the five conflicts investigated in the study. With a principal researcher for each, the study groups comprise practitioners and scholars from the respective Asian countries, including the region or province that is the focus of the conflict, as well as from Australia, Britain, Belgium, Sweden, and the United States. The participants list that follows shows the composition of the study groups. All five study groups met jointly for the first time in Washington, D.C., on October 30–November 3, 2005. Over a period of five days, participants engaged in intensive discussion of a wide range of issues pertaining to the conflicts investigated in the project. In addition to identifying key issues for research and publication, the meeting facilitated the development of cross-country perspectives and interaction among scholars who had not previously worked together. Based on discussion at the meeting, twenty-five policy papers were commissioned. The study groups met separately in the summer of 2006 for the second set of meetings, which were organized in collaboration with respected policy-oriented think tanks in each host country. The Burma and southern Thailand study group meetings were held in Bangkok July 10–11 and July 12–13, respectively. These meetings were cosponsored by The Institute of Security and International Studies, Chulalongkorn University. The Nepal study group was held in Kathmandu, Nepal, July 17–19, and was cosponsored by the Social Science Baha. The northeast India study group met in New Delhi, India, August 9–10. This meeting was cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Research. The Sri Lanka meeting was held in Colombo, Sri Lanka, August 14–16, and cosponsored by the Centre for Policy Alternatives. In each of these meetings, scholars and practitioners reviewed and critiqued papers produced for the meetings and made suggestions for revision. Publications This project will result in twenty to twenty-five policy papers providing a detailed examination of particular aspects of each conflict. Subject to satisfactory peer review, these 18,000- to 24,000-word essays will be published in the East-West Center Washington Policy Studies series, and

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72 will be circulated widely to key personnel and institutions in the policy and intellectual communities and the media in the respective Asian countries, the United States, and other relevant countries. Some studies will be published in the East-West Center Washington Working Papers series. Public Forums To engage the informed public and to disseminate the findings of the project to a wide audience, public forums have been organized in conjunction with study group meetings. Five public forums were organized in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the first study group meeting. The first forum, cosponsored by The Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, discussed the conflict in southern Thailand. The second, cosponsored by The Sigur Center for Asian Studies of The George Washington University, discussed the conflict in Burma. The conflicts in Nepal were the focus of the third forum, which was cosponsored by the Asia Program at The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The fourth public meeting, cosponsored by the Foreign Policy Studies program at The Brookings Institution, discussed the conflicts in northeast India. The fifth forum, cosponsored by the South Asia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, focused on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Funding Support The Carnegie Corporation of New York is once again providing generous funding support for the project.

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Project Participants Project Director Muthiah Alagappa Director, East-West Center Washington (from February 2001 to January 2007) Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center (from February 1, 2007)

Burma/Myanmar Study Group Morten Pedersen United Nations University Principal Researcher

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London David I. Steinberg Georgetown University

Mary Callahan University of Washington Christina Fink Chiang Mai University

David Tegenfeldt Hope International Development Agency, Yangon

Saboi Jum Shalom Foundation, Yangon

Mya Than Chulalongkorn University

Kyi May Kaung Freelance Writer/Analyst, Washington, D.C.

Tin Maung Maung Than Institute for Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Tom Kramer Transnational Institute, Amsterdam

Ardeth Thawnghmung University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Curtis Lambrecht Yale University

Meredith Weiss East-West Center Washington

David Scott Mathieson Australian National University

Khin Zaw Win Independent Researcher, Yangon

Win Min Chiang Mai University

Harn Yawnghwe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

Zaw Oo American University

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Southern Thailand Study Group Saroja Dorairajoo National University of Singapore Principal Researcher

Chandra-nuj Mahakanjana National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok

Thanet Aphornsuvan Thammasat University

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Marc Askew Victoria University, Melbourne

Celakhan (Don) Pathan The Nation Newspaper, Bangkok

Suchit Bunbongkarn Chulalongkorn University

Surin Pitsuwan MP, Thai House of Representatives

Kavi Chongkittavorn Nation Multimedia Group, Bangkok

Thitinan Pongsudhirak Chulalongkorn University

Neil John Funston Australian National University

Chaiwat Satha-Anand Thammasat University

Surat Horachaikul Chulalongkorn University

Vaipot Srinual Supreme Command Headquarters, Thailand

Srisompob Jitpiromsri Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Joseph Chinyong Liow Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

Wattana Sugunnasil Prince of Songkla University, Pattani Campus Panitan Wattanayagorn Chulalongkorn University Imtiyaz Yusuf Assumption University, Bangkok

Nepal Study Group Mahendra Lawoti Western Michigan University Principal Researcher

Lok Raj Baral Nepal Center for Contemporary Studies, Kathmandu

Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Surendra Raj Bhandari Law Associates Nepal, Kathmandu

Meena Acharya Tanka Prasad Acharya Memorial Foundation, Kathmandu

Chandra Dev Bhatta London School of Economics

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Krishna Bhattachan Tribhuvan University

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75 Sumitra Manandhar-Gurung Lumanthi and National Coalition Against Racial Discrimination, Kathmandu Harka Gurung (deceased) Transparency International, Nepal Dipak Gyawali Royal Nepal Academy of Science and Technology, Kathmandu Krishna Hacchethu Tribhuvan University Susan Hangen Ramapo College, New Jersey Lauren Leve University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Prakash Chandra Lohani Former Finance Minister, Nepal

Anup Pahari Foreign Service Institute, Arlington Rajendra Pradhan Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Shree Govind Shah Environmental Resources Planning and Monitoring/Academy of Social Justice & Human Rights, Kathmandu Saubhagya Shah Tribhuvan University Hari Sharma Social Science Baha, Kathmandu Sudhindra Sharma Interdisciplinary Analyst (IDA), Kathmandu Dhruba Kumar Shrestha Tribhuvan University

Pancha Narayan Maharjan Tribhuvan University, Kirtipur

Seira Tamang Centre for Social Research and Development, Kathmandu

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bishnu Raj Upreti National Centre of Competence in Research, Kathmandu

Northeast India Study Group Samir Kumar Das University of Calcutta Principal Researcher

Dipankar Banerjee Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Sanjay Barbara North Eastern Social Research Centre, Assam

Kalyan Barooah Assam Tribune

Sanjib Baruah Center for Policy Research, New Delhi Bard College, New York

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M.P. Bezbaruah UN – WTO (World Tourism Organization), New Delhi Pinaki Bhattacharya The Mathrubhumi, Kerala

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76 Subir Bhaumik British Broadcasting Corporation, Kolkata

Sukh Deo Muni Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Bejoy Das Gupta Institute of International Finance, Inc., Washington, D.C.

Bhagat Oinam Jawaharlal Nehru University

Partha S. Ghosh Jawaharlal Nehru University Uddipana Goswami Center for Studies in Social Science, Kolkata Sanjoy Hazarika Centre for North East Studies and Policy Research, New Delhi Anil Kamboj Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi Bengt Karlsson Uppsala University, Sweden Dolly Kikon Stanford University Ved Marwah Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi Pratap Bhanu Mehta Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Pradip Phanjoubam Imphal Free Press, Manipur V.R. Raghavan Delhi Policy Group Rajesh Rajagopalan Jawaharlal Nehru University Swarna Rajagopalan Chaitanya––The Policy Consultancy, Chennai E.N. Rammohan National Security Council, New Delhi Bibhu Prasad Routray Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi Ronojoy Sen The Times of India, New Delhi Prakash Singh Border Security Force (Ret’d.) George Verghese Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi

Sri Lanka Study Group Neil DeVotta Hartwick College Principal Researcher

Sunanda Deshapriya Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Ravinatha P. Aryasinha American University

Rohan Edrisinha Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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77 Nimalka Fernando International Movement Against All Forms of Discrimination & Racism, Colombo Bhavani Fonseka Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Mario Gomez Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Air Vice Marshall Harry Goonetileke Colombo Anberiya Hanifa Muslim Women’s Research and Action Forum, Colombo Dayan Jayatilleka University of Colombo N. Kandasamy Center for Human Rights and Development in Colombo S.I. Keethaponcalan University of Colombo

Darini Rajasingham Centre for Poverty Analysis, Colombo John Richardson, Jr. American University Norbert Ropers Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Colombo Kanchana N. Ruwanpura Hobart and William Smith Colleges, New York P. Sahadevan Jawaharlal Nehru University Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo Muttukrishna Sarvananthan Point Pedro Institute of Development, Sri Lanka Peter Schalk Uppsala University, Sweden Asanga Tilakaratne University of Kelaniya

N. Manoharan Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Jayadeva Uyangoda University of Colombo

Dennis McGilvray University of Colorado at Boulder

Asanga Welikala Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

Jehan Perera National Peace Council of Sri Lanka, Colombo Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam MP, Sri Lanka

Jayampathy Wickramaratne Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, Sri Lanka Javid Yusuf Attorney-at-Law, Colombo

Mirak Raheem Centre for Policy Alternatives, Colombo

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Background on Burma/Myanmar’s Ethnic Conflicts One of the ethnically most diverse countries in the world, Burma (Myanmar) has suffered continuous armed ethnic conflict since independence in 1948. A series of ceasefires since the late 1980s has significantly reduced the levels of fighting across the country, but the legacies of hostility run deep, and the achievement of sustainable peace remains a major challenge in the twentyfirst century. The lands constituting the modern union-state of Burma have a turbulent history. From the foundation of Anawrahta’s empire at Pagan in the eleventh century, political authority often fluctuated in wars between different Burman, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan rulers in Buddhist city-states on the plains. Meanwhile Chin, Kachin, Karen, and other ethnic groups in the hills were only nominally brought under control of the various dynasties and kingdoms. On a major crossroads in Asia, a diversity of cultures proliferated and survived. Colonization by the British in the nineteenth century temporarily imposed external authority over this complex ethnic mosaic, but at the same time exacerbated existing ethnic cleavages. While Central Burma was subjected to British administrative and legal institutions, the non-Burman Frontier Areas were mostly left under the traditional rulers. This division compounded political and economic differences during a time of rapid social change. The British policy of recruiting hill peoples into the colonial army and the conversion of many to Christianity only fuelled interethnic suspicions. During the Second World War, Burman nationalist forces in the Burma Independence Army initially fought on the side of Imperial Japan, but eventually turned against the Japanese and cooperated with the returning British Army. However, atrocities committed during the early months of the war by Burmans against Karen and other minority groups loyal to the British had dangerously increased ethnic tensions. At the 1947 Panglong Conference, Chin, Kachin, and Shan representatives agreed to join a new Union of Burma in return for the promise of full autonomy. However the leaders of other ethnic groups were not included in these discussions, and the Karen national union boycotted the 1947 elections. Burma’s first constitution deepened these emerging

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80 fault lines by granting unequal rights to different ethnic groups and territories. During the hurried British departure, conditions were being created for conflicts that would endure for decades to come. The first major group to take up arms against the government after independence was the Communist Party of Burma in March 1948. As violence escalated, armed struggle rapidly spread to the Karen, Mon, Karenni, Pao, Rakhine, and other nationality groups. The invasion by Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang remnants into the Shan State in late 1949 aggravated the breakdown of the embattled central government. By the late 1950s, the mood of rebellion had spread to the Shan, Kachin, and other ethnic groups, frustrated by what they perceived as governmental neglect. In 1960, Shan and other nationality leaders organized a Federal Movement that sought, by constitutional reform, to replace the centralized system of government with a genuinely federal structure. Their efforts were aborted though, when the national armed forces under General Ne Win seized power in March 1962. Parliamentary democracy was brought to a complete end. For a quarter of a century, Ne Win attempted to impose his isolationist “Burmese Way to Socialism” on the country. Confronting intensive counterinsurgency operations, armed opposition groups were gradually pushed out of the central plains into the surrounding borderlands. Here, however, insurgent forces were able to maintain control of their own “liberated zones,” financing their struggles out of taxes on Burma’s flourishing black markets that included illicit opium. Against this unending backdrop of war, Burma became one of the world’s poorest countries. The post-Cold War period has brought major changes to Burma, but no definitive solutions. The new military government, which took power after quelling pro-democracy protests in 1988, refused to hand over power to the newly-formed National League for Democracy (NLD) that won the 1990 general election by a landslide. Instead, following the collapse of the insurgent CPB, the regime forged ceasefires with a relatively large number of armed ethnic opposition groups, while massively expanding the national armed forces. In these endeavors, the military government was helped by neighboring countries that change their policies of de facto support for opposition groups to close economic relations with the post-Ne Win regime. This decisively shifted the military balance in favor of the central government,

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81 which continued to be largely boycotted by Western nations. New infrastructure and economic projects were started in many areas previously contested by insurgent groups, with central government authority extending further than ever before. In contrast, opposition groups became steadily weakened, divided over tactics between militant forces, ceasefire groups, pro-electoral organizations, and those that sought broader alliances. In the twenty-first century, Burma’s future remains delicately poised. A few insurgent groups have continued largely defensive guerilla warfare, but with little apparent hope of reasserting their authority by military means. However, the ceasefire groups similarly fear that the country’s new constitution will provide few concessions to ethnic aspirations. Additionally, ethnic parties that stood in the 1990 election have been excluded—like the NLD—from constitutional discussions. Against this backdrop, conflict and human rights abuses have continued in several border regions, sustaining ethnic anger and resentment. The desire is widespread for peace through dialogue. But the sentiment that future generations will take up arms again to continue the cycles of political violence cannot be discounted.

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Pre- and Post-1989 Names

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State/Division Names Pre-1989

State/Division Names Post-1989

Chin State Irrawady Division Kachin State Karen State Karenni State (pre-1951) Magwe Division Mandalay Division Mon State Pegu Division Arakan Division Rangoon Division Sagaing Division Shan State Tenasserim Division

Same Ayeyarwady Division Same Kayin State Kayah State Magway Division Same Same Bago Division Rakhine Division Yangon Division Same Same Tanintharyi Division

City/Town Names Pre-1989

City/Town Names Post-1989

Bassein Myitkyina Bhamo Paan Pagan Moulmein Taungoo Prome Pegu Akyab Rangoon Lashio Taunggyi Pangsang Tavoy Mergui

Pathein Same Same Hpa-an Bagan Mawlamyine Toungoo Pyay Bago Sittwe Yangon Same Same Panghsang Dawei Myeik

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Map of Burma/Myanmar

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Ethnic Groups with Ceasefire Arrangements (2006)* 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20.

Communist Party of Burma (Arakan) New Democratic Army––Kachin Kachin Independence Organization Palaung State Liberation Party Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (Kokang) Kachin Defense Army United Wa State Army National Democratic Alliance Army (eastern Shan state) Shan State Army Shan State National Army Pao National Organization Shan State Nationalities People’s Liberation Organization Mong Tai Army Kayan National Guard Karenni National Democratic Party (Dragon Group) Kayan New Land Party Karenni Nationalities People’s Liberation Front Democratic Karen Buddhist Army New Mon State Party Mon Peace Group Chaungchi Region

*The locations marked are the headquarter bases of the main ceasefire groups recognized by the government. However there are great differences in the sizes and territories of the various organizations. Some forces are organized in extensive rural areas (e.g. the Kachin Independence Organization, Pao National Organization, and United Wa State Army), whereas a number of smaller breakaway factions exist in only a few villages (e.g. Kayan National Guard).

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List of Reviewers 2006–07 The East-West Center Washington would like to acknowledge the following, who have offered reviews of manuscripts for Policy Studies. Itty Abraham East-West Center Washington

Sunil Dasgupta Georgetown University

Jaya Raj Acharya United States Institute of Peace

Chandra R. de Silva Old Dominion University

Vinod K. Aggarwal University of California, Berkeley

Neil DeVotta Hartwick College

Muthiah Alagappa East-West Center Washington

Dieter Ernst East-West Center

Walter Anderson The Johns Hopkins University

Greg Fealy Australian National University

Edward Aspinall Australian National University

David Finkelstein The CNA Corporation

Marc Askew Victoria University, Melbourne

Michael Foley The Catholic University of America

Dipankar Banerjee Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Sumit Ganguly Indiana University, Bloomington

Sanjay Barbora Panos South Asia, Guwahati

Brigham Golden Columbia University

Upendra Baxi University of Warwick

Michael J. Green Center for Strategic and International Studies Georgetown University

Apurba K. Baruah North Eastern Hill University, Shillong

Stephan Haggard University of California, San Diego

Sanjib Baruah Bard College

Natasha Hamilton National University of Singapore

Thomas Berger Boston University

Farzana Haniffa University of Colombo

Ikrar Nusa Bhakti Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), Jakarta

Rana Hasan Asian Development Bank

C. Raja Mohan Nanyang Technological University

M. Sajjad Hassan London School of Economics

Mary P. Callahan University of Washington

Eric Heginbotham RAND Corporation

Richard Chauvel Victoria University, Melbourne

Donald Horowitz Duke University

T.J. Cheng The College of William and Mary

Chinnaiah Jangam Wagner College

Chu Yun-han Academia Sinica

S. Kalyanaraman Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi

Ralph A. Cossa Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu

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88 Brian Joseph National Endowment for Democracy

Danilyn Rutherford University of Chicago

Bengt Karlsson Uppsala University

Kanchana N. Ruwanpura University of Southampton

Damien Kingsbury Deakin University

James Scott Yale University

Mahendra Lawoti Western Michigan University

Amita Shastri San Francisco State University

R. William Liddle The Ohio State University

Emile C.J. Sheng Soochow University

Satu P. Limaye Institute for Defense Analyses

John Sidel London School of Economics

Joseph Chinyong Liow Nanyang Technological University

Martin Smith Independent Analyst, London

Owen M. Lynch New York University

Selma Sonntag Humboldt State University

Gurpreet Mahajan Jawaharlal Nehru University

Ashley South Independent Consultant

Onkar S. Marwah Independent Consultant, Geneva

David I. Steinberg Georgetown University

Bruce Matthews Acadia University

Robert H. Taylor University of London

Duncan McCargo University of Leeds

Tin Maung Maung Than Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Donald McFetridge Former U.S. Defense Attaché, Jakarta

Willem van Schendel Amsterdam School for Social science Research

Udayon Misra Dibrugarh University

Jayadeva Uyangoda University of Colombo

Pratyoush Onta Martin Chautari

Meredith Weiss East-West Center Washington

Andrew Oros Washington College

Thongchai Winichakul University of Wisconsin, Madison

Morten Pedersen United Nations University, Tokyo

Wu Xinbo Fudan University

Steven Rood The Asia Foundation, Philippines

Harn Yawnghe Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

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Policy Studies Previous Publications Policy Studies 38

Policy Studies 29

The United Wa State Party: Narco-Army or Ethnic Nationalist Party?

Conspiracy, Politics, and a Disorderly Border: The Struggle to Comprehend Insurgency in Thailand’s Deep South

Tom Kramer, Transnational Institute, Amsterdam

Marc Askew, Victoria University, Melbourne

Policy Studies 37 The Islamist Threat in Southeast Asia: A Reassessment John T. Sidel, London School of Economics and Political Science

2006 Policy Studies 28 Counterterrorism Legislation in Sri Lanka: Evaluating Efficacy N. Manoharan, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi

Policy Studies 36 State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma Martin Smith, Independent Analyst, London

Policy Studies 35 Rebellion in Southern Thailand: Contending Histories

Policy Studies 27 Japanese Public Opinion and the War on Terrorism: Implications for Japan’s Security Strategy

Thanet Aphornsuvan, Thammasat University

Paul Midford, Norwegian University for Science and Technology, Trondheim

Policy Studies 34

Policy Studies 26

Creating a “New Nepal”: The Ethnic Dimension

Taiwan’s Rising Rationalism: Generations, Politics, and “Taiwanese Nationalism”

Susan Hangen, Ramapo College of New Jersey

Shelley Rigger, Davidson College

Policy Studies 33

Policy Studies 25

Postfrontier Blues: Toward a New Policy Framework for Northeast India Sanjib Baruah, Bard College

Initiating a Peace Process in Papua: Actors, Issues, Process, and the Role of the International Community

Policy Studies 32

Timo Kivimäki, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen

Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka: Changing Dynamics

Policy Studies 24

Jayadeva Uyangoda, University of Colombo

Policy Studies 31 Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence

Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics Joseph Chinyong Liow, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Mary P. Callahan, University of Washington

Policy Studies 23

Policy Studies 30

The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism, and Institutional Resistance

Legalizing Religion: The Indian Supreme Court and Secularism

Marcus Mietzner, Political Analyst

Ronojoy Sen, The Times of India, New Delhi

(continued next page)

These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

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Policy Studies Previous Publications continued Policy Studies 22

Policy Studies 14

India’s Globalization: Evaluating the Economic Consequences

Constructing Papuan Nationalism: History, Ethnicity, and Adaptation

Baldev Raj Nayar, McGill University

Richard Chauvel, Victoria University, Melbourne

Policy Studies 21

2004

China’s Rise: Implications for U.S. Leadership in Asia

Policy Studies 13

Robert G. Sutter, Georgetown University

Plural Society in Peril: Migration, Economic Change, and the Papua Conflict

2005

Rodd McGibbon, USAID, Jakarta

Policy Studies 20

Policy Studies 12

The Helsinki Agreement: A More Promising Basis for Peace in Aceh?

Sino-Tibetan Dialogue in the Post-Mao Era: Lessons and Prospects

Edward Aspinall, Australian National University

Tashi Rabgey, Harvard University Tseten Wangchuk Sharlho, Independent Journalist

Policy Studies 19 Nine Lives?: The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan J. Patrick Boyd, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Richard J. Samuels, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Policy Studies 18 Islamic Radicalism and Anti-Americanism in Indonesia: The Role of the Internet

Policy Studies 11 Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur Discontent Gardner Bovingdon, Indiana University, Bloomington

Policy Studies 10 Secessionist Challenges in Aceh and Papua: Is Special Autonomy the Solution? Rodd McGibbon, USAID, Jakarta

Merlyna Lim, Bandung Institute of Technology, Indonesia

Policy Studies 9

Policy Studies 17

The HDC in Aceh: Promises and Pitfalls of NGO Mediation and Implementation

Forging Sustainable Peace in Mindanao: The Role of Civil Society

Konrad Huber, Council on Foreign Relations

Steven Rood, The Asia Foundation, Philippines

Policy Studies 8

Policy Studies 16

The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies

Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies Evelyn Goh, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Eric Gutierrez, WaterAid, U.K. Saturnino Borras, Jr., Institute of Social Studies, The Hague

Policy Studies 7

Policy Studies 15

The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics

The Xinjiang Conflict: Uyghur Identity, Language Policy, and Political Discourse

Elliot Sperling, Indiana University, Bloomington

(continued next page)

Arienne M. Dwyer, The University of Kansas

These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

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Policy Studies Previous Publications continued Policy Studies 6 Violent Separatism in Xinjiang: A Critical Assessment James Millward, Georgetown University

Policy Studies 5 The Papua Conflict: Jakarta’s Perceptions and Policies Richard Chauvel, Victoria University, Melbourne Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta

Policy Studies 4 Beijing’s Tibet Policy: Securing Sovereignty and Legitimacy Allen Carlson, Cornell University

Policy Studies 3 Security Operations in Aceh: Goals, Consequences, and Lessons Rizal Sukma, Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Jakarta

Policy Studies 2 The Free Aceh Movement (GAM): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization Kirsten E. Schulze, London School of Economics

2003 Policy Studies 1 The Aceh Peace Process: Why it Failed Edward Aspinall, University of Sydney Harold Crouch, Australian National University

These issues of Policy Studies are presently available in print and PDF. Hardcopies are available through Amazon.com. In Asia, hardcopies of all titles, and electronic copies of Southeast Asia titles are available through the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore at 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Road, Singapore 119614. Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg/ Online at: www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/publications

07 EWC PS39 Reviewers

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