ASEAN in a Changing World 3631848579, 9783631848579

Table of contents :
Contents
Agata W. Ziętek and Grzegorz Gil / ASEAN in a Changing World. Introduction
Adam Daniel Rotfeld / Anticipating a New International Order
Marcin Grabowski / ASEAN: An Organization in the Making
Anna Grzywacz / Singapore’s Approaches toward ASEAN Integration
Paweł Pasierbiak / Merchandise Trade Development in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Since the Asian Financial Crisis
Agata Ziętek / The Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: ASEAN-China Cooperation
Łukasz Stach / The Road to Destabilization? The Problem of Militarization in the South China Sea Region
Karol Żakowski / From the Fukuda Doctrine to the Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Policy toward ASEAN under the Second Abe Cabinet
Jessica C. Liao / Confronting China’s and the United States’ ASEAN Policies
Grzegorz Gil / ASEAN and the EU: From Pupil to Strategic Partner?
Andrzej Jaroszyński / The Asia-Pacific Community: An Australian Integration Project

Citation preview

ASEAN in a Changing World

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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN ASIA, AFRICA AND THE AMERICAS The series International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas is edited by the Centre for International Studies and Development of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. Edited by Andrzej Mania & Marcin Grabowski

Vol. 10



Agata Wiktoria Ziętek / Grzegorz Gil (eds.)

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Bibliographic Information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data is available in the internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A CIP catalog record for this book has been applied for at the Library of Congress This publication was financially supported by Polish Academy of Sciences, Lublin Branch and Institute of Political Science and Administration at Maria Curie-Skłodowska University. Cover illustration: Courtesy of Benjamin Ben Chaim

ISSN 2511-588X ISBN 978-3-631-84857-9 (Print) E-ISBN 978-3-631-84928-6 (E-PDF) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85098-5 (EPUB) E-ISBN 978-3-631-85099-2 (MOBI) DOI 10.3726/b18211 © Peter Lang GmbH Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften Berlin 2021 All rights reserved. Peter Lang – Berlin ∙ Bern ∙ Bruxelles ∙ New York ∙ Oxford ∙ Warszawa ∙ Wien All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without the permission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in electronic retrieval systems. This publication has been peer reviewed. www.peterlang.com

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CONTENTS Agata W. Ziętek and Grzegorz Gil ASEAN in a Changing World. Introduction ����������������������������������������������������    7 Adam Daniel Rotfeld Anticipating a New International Order �����������������������������������������������������������   23 Marcin Grabowski ASEAN: An Organization in the Making ����������������������������������������������������������  31 Anna Grzywacz Singapore’s Approaches toward ASEAN Integration ��������������������������������������   77 Paweł Pasierbiak Merchandise Trade Development in ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Since the Asian Financial Crisis ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 103 Agata Ziętek The Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: ASEAN-​China Cooperation �����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  129 Łukasz Stach The Road to Destabilization? The Problem of Militarization in the South China Sea Region ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 153 Karol Żakowski From the Fukuda Doctrine to the Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Policy toward ASEAN under the Second Abe Cabinet ������������������������������������������������������������� 181 Jessica C. Liao Confronting China’s and the United States’ ASEAN Policies �����������������������  199 Grzegorz Gil ASEAN and the EU: From Pupil to Strategic Partner? ������������������������������������ 219 Andrzej Jaroszyński The Asia-​Pacific Community: An Australian Integration Project ����������������  245

Agata W. Ziętek http://​orcid.org/​000-​0003-​2534-​3950 Grzegorz Gil https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​6444-​9574 Maria Curie-​Skłodowska University in Lublin

ASEAN in a Changing World. Introduction Introduction Southeast Asia is a unique region in many ways. Given its panoply of peoples, cultures, religions, and customs, it is the most diverse place on Earth in civilizational terms. From a geopolitical perspective, it retains both a mainland and maritime character while hosting diverse political systems and varying economic conditions. With so many dichotomies its integration is puzzling. The region’s centuries-​long exposure to foreign impacts shaped its regional kaleidoscope and stole its political stamina. However, such diversity and historical complexity did not prevent Southeast Asian polities from pursuing an integrationist project, as expressed in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 at the height of the Cold War, when, in the words of Prime Minister of Thailand, one of the founding members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), noted that the founding members “identified more with [the colonial powers] than ourselves of the region.”1 In 1967 it would have been difficult to find a more troubled region than Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asia represents the ‘Balkans of Asia,’ its divisions should lead to regional pessimism rather than triumphalism.2 In a way, ASEAN was born to fail, not to work. This partially explains why ASEAN’s founding members  –​Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand –​started with the premise of humility, in line with one Thai saying (“the fewer the plans, the fewer the disappointments”). Despite these shortcomings and occasional spite, since its inception, the grouping has grown both in quantity (from five to ten) and quality as a rare species of non-​European regional success during the Cold War. Consequently, ASEAN has brought peace 1 Retrieved 14.04.2020, from https://​w ww.eria.org/​asean50-​vol.1-​9.leaders-​quotes.pdf. 2 Fisher, Charles: “Southeast Asia: The Balkans of the Orient? A Study in Continuity and Change.” Geography 47(4), 1962, pp. 347–​367.

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and prosperity to a region that has seen remarkable progress over the course of more than 50 years, with a population of more than 600 million people. Fifty-​three years from the birth of ASEAN, community-​building efforts in Southeast Asia are ongoing, with the development of a three-​pillar structure: the Political-​Security Community, the Economic Community, and the Socio-​Cultural Community. The Association has even developed the ‘ASEAN Way,’ which prioritizes informal and consensus-​based decision-​making over legally binding procedures outlined in treaties. This is its most intrinsic value added, which makes it a centerpiece of the region’s architecture –​one whose many offspring include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF, 1994), the Asia –​Europe Meeting (AEM, 1996), ASEAN Plus Three (APT, 1997), the East Asia Summit (EAS, 2005), and the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership3). The ‘ASEAN Way’ certainly has its weaknesses, as national leaders may try to advance short-​term national interests without realizing that the prospects for success grow exponentially if interests are aligned and considered on a regional level. Nevertheless, we cannot exclude the possibility that the ‘ASEAN Way’ will become a more universal formula in international politics in the future –​a formula that is not too intrusive but also remains productive enough to be replicated in more troubled regions (e.g., the Middle East). Thus, it is no surprise that Kishore Mahbubani and Jeffery Sng have called ASEAN a ‘miracle’4 whose characteristics include many civilizations (Hindu, Buddhist, Muslim, and Christian) living in coexistence and experiencing notable economic growth. Finally, these developments have enabled the region to create an indispensable diplomatic platform that helps to bring global and regional powers together. In the past two decades, ASEAN has been accelerating its integration by adopting the ASEAN Charter in 2007 and establishing the ASEAN Community eight years later. However, it still needs to be given substance. At the same time, with ASEAN’s competitiveness on the rise, its unity is not crystal clear. The changing world we live in poses challenges to regionalism as economic and political protectionism gains a foothold. The ‘authoritarian moment’ in politics, combined with climate change and COVID-​19, represents a series of serious setbacks for regional integration.5 Consequently, ASEAN is at a turning 3 RCEP was the result of a negotiation process between ASEAN and five partners (India opted out in 2019) that had previously signed free trade agreements (FTAs) with the bloc. It was signed in November 2020. 4 Mahbubani, Kishore /​Sng, Jeffrey: The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace, Ridge Books, NUS Press: Singapore 2017. 5 For an expanded analysis of new authoritarianism, see:  Wiatr, Jerzy (ed.):  New Authoritarianism: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century, Barbara Budrich

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point in both an internal and external sense. Unsurprisingly, the average score of ten ASEAN countries in the 2019 edition of the Democracy Index is symptomatic (4.99), with four of them (namely CLMV6) deemed “authoritarian regimes” and five labelled “flawed democracies.”7 In a way, the ‘ASEAN Miracle’ also seems to presuppose successful cooperation between contrasting types of regimes, as the issue of rule of law is absent or at best set aside in the regional agenda. Of course, such global rankings should be viewed with a degree of skepticism, as they interpret rather than explain reality. Furthermore, a detailed analysis (e.g., by the Center for Systemic Peace8) of the previous seven decades shows that the proportion of autocracies, anocracies, and democracies changes over time due to regional idiosyncrasies. However, the global crisis (or redefinition) of democracy is a big issue today. As ASEAN neighbors with China, which falls well short of being democratic, a former role model for the world of liberal democracy promotes isolationist slogans like “America First” and “Make America Great Again.” As the center of gravity in international relations pivots to Asia, along with waning Western internationalism, Southeast Asia is once again emerging as an arena of international competition. In such a changing world, ASEAN’s centrality is vital for its member states, while negative externalities may undercut it. A hundred years after the open-​door policy was first formulated by the White House, Southeast Asia is at the center of the interregional logistical scramble encapsulated in the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the American Free and Open Indo-​Pacific (FOIP9), both of which build on the region’s demographic, economic, and geostrategic potential. Consequently, Southeast Asia (ASEAN) is being put on a collision course between the People’s Republic of China and the U.S.  and their respective like-​minded countries (including Australia, India, and Japan). ASEAN’s members are split, with some of them, such as Singapore, looking to the

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Publishers:  Opladen, Berlin & Toronto 2019; Applebaum, Anne:  Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism, Doubleday: New York 2020. The acronym stands for Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. The report is prepared by the Economist Intelligence Unit on a yearly basis (as regards Southeast Asia, it does not include Brunei Darussalam). Democracy Index 2019. A year of Democratic Setbacks and Popular Protest, a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, London, New York, Hong Kong 2020, p. 26. Retrieved 17.09.2020, from http://​w ww.systemicpeace.org/​polityproject.html. U.S. Department of State: A Free and Open Indo-​Pacific. Advancing a Shared Vision, 4 November 2019, retrieved 14.04.2020, from https://​w ww.state.gov/​w p-​content/​ uploads/​2019/​11/​Free-​a nd-​Open-​Indo-​Pacific-​4Nov2019.pdf. The term “ASEAN” appears about 40 times in this document.

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U.S., while others, such as Cambodia, reaching out to the PRC. We argue that the ASEAN region can serve as a litmus test for global primacy in the coming years.10 The year 2017 marked the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community, and the 50th anniversary of the Bangkok Declaration, which established the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). EU integration has been a successful long-​term project over many decades –​the number of member states increased over the course of half a century from the initial grouping of six countries to 28 countries. However, 2016 became a watershed year in its history, as the United Kingdom held a referendum on continued EU membership and a narrow majority voted in favor of leaving the EU. For the first time in the history of EU integration, a majority within a member country had opted to relinquish EU membership, which shook the region and shocked the global community. Some said that this demonstrated the weakness of the EU itself. At the same time, thousands of miles away from Europe, we observe ASEAN as a rather dynamic and increasingly integrated group, partly inspired by the history of Europe’s integration. There is no doubt that ASEAN is currently less advanced than the EU in institutional terms; however, the growing group of ASEAN countries also stands tall as a regional integration success story. The near future will probably tell if ASEAN is able to maintain a low-​profile institutional setting in the rising economic and political rivalry between the U.S. and China. Both the EU and ASEAN serve as examples of regional integration processes. The latter is believed to be the only non-​European integration success, while the former (the EEC and the EU) beats world records in advancing integration with supranational elements. This was the reason why the Department of International Relations and the Faculty of Political Science at Maria Curie-​ Skłodowska University (UMCS) in Lublin, Poland, decided to organize a conference titled EU  –​ASEAN:  Models of Integration (September 18–​20, 2017), which brought together academics and practitioners focused on integration processes in the EU and ASEAN. The conference started with a keynote speech by Professor Adam Daniel Rotfeld, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland, titled “Shaping a New Global Order.” The conference began with a roundtable debate featuring the Ambassador of Japan to Poland, Shigeo Matsutomi, the Ambassador of Philippines to Poland, Patricia Ann V.  Paez, representatives of the European Commission to Poland, representatives of the Asia-​Pacific Department of the Ministry of

10 “The United States is and always will be an Indo-​Pacific nation.” Ibid., p. 5.

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Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, and several former Ambassadors of Poland:  Tomasz Łukaszuk (Indonesia), Andrzej Jaroszyński (Australia), Xawery Burski (Malaysia, China), and Dr. Stanisław Kozłowski, former ministerial Counselor to Singapore. The roundtable was chaired by Professor Marek Pietraś, Deputy Dean of the UMCS Faculty of Political Science and Director of the International Relations Department. It is ASEAN rather than the EU that has become a vital platform for great-​ power competition in a changing world. In light of this, we decided to look inside ASEAN and examine some external powers’ strategies toward the region. In this vein, the book is both an artifact of the conference and an attempt to explore Asia’s growing role in the world.

Literature on ASEAN A brief literature review on ASEAN reveals many volumes and studies on its origins, functions, intra-​ASEAN relations, and finally the Association’s external relations. For decades, in comparative studies, ASEAN has been presented as a surprising non-​European regional success given both the internal and external challenges it has faced.11 Scholars have underlined its distinctive culture of dialogue, which it inherited from the Indonesian musyawarah and mufakat (consultation and consensus) as the lowest common denominator that has effectively put the organization forward. Since then, the ‘ASEAN Way’ has even started to spill over to the Asia-​Pacific region. The literature reflects the three-​ pillar structure of the organization, exploring its political-​security, economic, and socio-​cultural dimensions. An important part of this research treats ASEAN as a dependant variable, focusing on the “making of” the Association or approaches “toward” it. Major works have been generally published on the occasion of anniversaries celebrating ASEAN at 30, 40, and recently 50.12 This approach to ASEAN opens endless questions on its significance for members13,

1 1 Mahbubani, Kishore /​Sng, Jeffrey, passim. 12 For a broader analysis of ASEAN as a dependant variable, see Koh, Tommy /​Seah, Sharon /​Li-​Lin, Chang (eds.): 50 years of ASEAN and Singapore, World Scientific Publishing:  Heckensack, London 2017; Snitwongse, Kusuma:  “Thailand and ASEAN: Thirty Years On.” Asian Journal of Political Science 5(1), 1997, pp. 87–​101. 13 Cf. Tan, See Seng:  “Indonesia among the Powers:  Will ASEAN Sill Matter to Indonesia?.” In:  Roberts, Christopher /​Dabir, Ahmad /​Sebastian, Leonard (eds.):  Indonesia’s Ascent. Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015, pp. 287–​307.

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relations with ASEAN, its role in the region, and the prospects for regionalism in Southeast and East Asia.14 In the 1990s, as the ‘ASEAN Way’ started to emanate outside the region, the organization was perceived as a regional hub, which is the only viable multilateral structure in East Asia. Some prominent research looks at ASEAN through the lens of its informal institutions (such as APT and ARF) as a gap filler on the road to regionalism in the Asia-​Pacific.15 In a way, ASEAN also seems to serve as an independent variable that helps to explain regional affairs in the broader sense. After 2000, numerous books have adopted this premise to report on ASEAN’s relations with the outside world.16 With an emerging Southeast Asia and the ‘ASEAN Miracle’ itself, Western scholars also started to take interest in the Association.17 A vast part of this body of research refers chiefly to trade-​related issues and understands ASEAN as a ‘trade broker’ given the many free trade agreements it has made since 2000.18 Its thrifty diplomacy usually prioritizes trade and economic cooperation as the most promising (neutral) agenda given the complexity of intra-​and interregional political affairs.19 But trade is often followed by political issues. As ASEAN is a centerpiece of multilateralism in the Asia-​Pacific, the literature also discussed the impact of

14 Broinowski, Alison:  ASEAN into the 1990s, Palgrave Macmillan:  London 1990; Severino, Rodolfo:  “ASEAN Beyond Forty:  Towards Political and Economic Integration.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29(3) 1997, pp. 406–​423. 15 Cf. Severino, Rodolfo: The ASEAN Regional Forum, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2009. 16 See more Swee-​Hock, Saw /​Lijun, Sheng /​Kin Wah, Chin (eds.): ASEAN-​China Relations: Realities and Prospects, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005; Shiraishi, Takashi /​Kojima, Takaaki (eds.): ASEAN-​Japan Relations, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2013. 17 The European Institute for Asian Studies was founded in 1989 and explores intrerregional trade and economic relations. With the institutionalization of the Asia –​Europe (ASEM) format in 1996, comparative studies of these two regionalisms and their interactions became more common. See, e.g., Murray, Philomena: Europe and Asia. Regions in Flux, Palgrave Macmillan: London 2008. 18 Cf. Ing, Lili Yan /​Richardson, Martin /​Urata, Shujiro: East Asian Integration. Goods, Services and Investment. Routledge: London 2019; Sarin, Vishal: India –​ ASEAN Trade and Economic Relations, New Century Publications 2016. 19 For an analysis of ASEAN’s strong and weak sides in promoting pan-​regional integration, see e.g. Mikic, Mia /​Jetin, Bruno:  ASEAN Economic Community. A Model for Asia-​wide Regional Integration?, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2016.

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Chinese and the U.S. policy toward the region as a whole.20 Finally, Southeast Asia and ASEAN are present in security studies as a regional security complex and the core element of regional order, respectively.21 Some part of the literature also applies formal modeling and theories in the ASEAN context, aiming to better explain and (de)value the organization.22 However, it needs to be noted that the theoretical debate over ASEAN and Southeast Asian security did not start until the end of the Cold War. ASEAN itself (or particular ASEAN countries) has also become a subject of regional studies for Polish researchers. Just a sample of these scholars includes Bogusława Drelich-​ Skulska, Łukasz Fijałkowski, Krzysztof Gawlikowski, Marcin Grabowski, Edward Haliżak, Adam Jelonek, Małgorzata Pietrasiak, Anna Grzywacz, Agata Ziętek, and Katarzyna Nawrot. Some of these scholars have been of special importance in the development of Asian studies in Poland. Edward Haliżak, a political scientist and one of the initiators of Asia-​Pacific studies in Poland, authored a number of titles on the regionalization processes that have taken place there. The most well-​k nown of these are the volumes Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku [International Relations in the Asia-​Pacific, Scholar: Warszawa 1999] and Wspólnota Pacyfiku a Wspólnota Wschodnio-​Azjatycka [The Pacific Community versus the East Asian Community, Scholar: Warszawa 2006]. Bogusława Drelich-​Skulska looks at ASEAN’s regionalism through an economic lens in several books. In Regionalizm ekonomiczny w Azji Wschodniej. Jedno spojrzenie  –​różne wymiary [Economic Regionalism in East Asia:  One View  –​Different Dimensions, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego:  Wrocław  2012], she presents the integration process from a broad perspective and tries to find the answers to the following questions: How has Asian economic regionalism evolved? What factors had a dominant influence on the shape of the new regionalism in East Asia? And how did the development of regionalism in East Asia allow countries located in other regions of the world to draw positive lessons for themselves in the future? As 20 Tan, See Seng: “ASEAN and Multilateralism 2.0: Locating ASEAN Centrality within the FOIP and the BRI.” In: Kai, He (ed.): Contested Multiculturalism 2.0 and Asian Security Dynamics, Abingdon –​New York, Routledge: 2020, pp. 147–​160. 21 See Acharya, Amitav: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 3rd edition, Routledge: London 2014; Emmers, Ralf:  Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, Routledge: London 2003. 22 He, Kai:  “Does ASEAN Matter? International Relation Theories, Institutional Realism, and ASEAN.” Asian Security 2(3), 2006, pp. 189–​214.

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the author focused on Asian values, which are influential in the advancement of economic cooperation, she also makes a substantive contribution to Asian studies in other publications such as Azja-​Pacyfik. Obraz gospodarczy regionu [Asia-​Pacific: An Economic Portrait of the Region, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego:  Wrocław  2007]. Katarzyna Nawrot also prefers this economic approach to regional integration in several publications, including Determinanty rozwoju gospodarczego państw ASEAN [Economic Determinants of Development in ASEAN, Scholar: Warszawa 2008]. Integration in Asia Pacific is also a subject of analysis for Marcin Grabowski, who presents an institutional approach in his book Rywalizacja czy integracja?: Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku [Cooperation or Competition: Integration Processes and Organizations in the Asia-​Pacific at the Turn of 20th and 21st Centuries, Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015]. As he compares and contrasts two organizations –​APEC and ASEAN –​he also depicts these institutions against a larger framework of the increasing geopolitical rivalry between China and the U.S. In contrast, Adam Jelonek has focused more on the social and cultural determinants of integration. In his publications, which are largely based on his personal experience as the Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines (2010–​2014), he discusses the situation in specific ASEAN countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia. His publications include Separatyzm, wielokulturowość i budowa państwa narodowego w Tajlandii [Separatism, Multiculturalism, and the Building of a Nation State in Thailand, WUJ: Kraków 2011], Dylematy konsocjonalizmu. Przypadek Malezji [Dilemmas of Consociationalism: A Case Study of Malaysia, Scholar: Warszawa 2004], and Historia Kambodży [The History of Cambodia, Trio: Warszawa 2008]. There is a group of Polish authors that focus their research on individual ASEAN countries rather than ASEAN itself. However, the latter is a critical focal point in such approaches since it provides a strong framing for much of the discussion. For example, Anna Grzywacz analyzes Singapore from this perspective in her recent book Polityka zagraniczna Singapuru w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku [Singapore’s Foreign Policy in the Asia-​Pacific, Asian Century/​Instytut Boyma:  Warszawa  2019]. She shows how a small country like Singapore can effectively influence Southeast Asian relations and advance good relations with the U.S. and China at the same time. Małgorzata Pietrasiak looks at ASEAN’s integration process from the Vietnamese perspective in Środowiskowe wyznaczniki polityki zagranicznej Wietnamu w obliczu procesów integracji z gospodarka światową [Vietnam’s Foreign Policy Determinants in the Process of Global Economic Integration, Adam Marszałek:  Toruń  2010]. In more recent

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publications, she has focused on the modern stage of Vietnamese-​American relations and documented Vietnam’s great pragmatism toward the U.S. when the two countries decided to abandon hostilities and mutual accusations from the Indo-​China Wars and develop diplomatic relations. Pietrasiak stipulates that the American presence in the Southeast Asian region is important to Vietnam because it can counterbalance China’s growing position. A more regional and non-​economic approach can be found in the works of Łukasz Fijałkowski, who analyzes ASEAN in terms of regional security in Regionalny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w Azji Południowo-​ Wschodniej. Normy  –​instytucje  –​ład regionalny [The Regional Dimension of Security in Southeast Asia:  Norms, Institutions, and the Regional Order, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego:  Wrocław  2010]. More recently, Fijałkowski, together with Jarosław Jarząbek, have studied the security dilemma and securitization in two ASEAN member countries, Indonesia and Singapore, in Dylematy bezpieczeństwa militarnego państw azjatyckich. Wewnętrzne uwarunkowania sekurytyzacji [The Military Security Dilemmas of Asian States:  Internal Determinants of Securitization, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego: Warszawa 2018]. Regional security issues have also been the focus of work by Agata Ziętek, who analyzes the situation in the South China Sea (SCS) as a source of tensions in Southeast Asia (e.g., in “The South China Sea: A Place of Rivalry and Power Management.” TEKA of the Commission of Political Science and International Affairs 11(1), 2016). Ziętek frames her study in the realist theory of international relations and perceives the SCS as a hotbed of rivalry among ASEAN countries with the engagement of the U.S. and China as well as an arena of balancing between them. In this approach, the SCS is all but a theater that represents the fractures within ASEAN, as the region is very divided on territorial claims. While some countries prefer a strategy of joining forces with stronger actors (bandwagoning) –​either the U.S. (Vietnam, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia) or China (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar)  –​ others try to remain neutral (Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore). Though these publications only partially illustrate the state of research on ASEAN in Poland, they have planted the seed for more in-​depth and comprehensive Asia-​Pacific studies that reflect key trends in East Asia and international research on ASEAN.

Structure and content of this volume The composition of this book is not accidental. The editors intend to structure it as a compilation of domestic dynamics with the externalities that stem from

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ASEAN. The book is not meant to constitute a lexicon on ASEAN; rather, its purpose is to present the empirics of ASEAN from different angles. Thus, the focus is on depicting specific and essential stories as a region that began to coalescence half a century ago continues to find its place in the changing international order. On the other hand, ASEAN seems to be a litmus test for changes in regional and world politics, from the Asian financial crisis to the latest rivalry between the U.S. and China. The book is a synthesis of knowledge on ASEAN, with a specific accent on hot-​button issues. The editors hope that this perspective can be of practical value in the pedagogical process, furthering the traction that Asian studies have gained in academia in recent years. Of course, ASEAN is an unfinished story riddled with imperfections. Its integrity is not sacrosanct; this book is an attempt to explore it with eleven chapters on ASEAN’s characteristics, its external relations, and contextual phenomena of vital importance for its future. We believe that this book also reflects the evolution of ASEAN studies, which have largely shifted from a purely economic and developmental approach to one signaling the Association’s impact on high politics. This includes geopolitical competition between world powers and the hypothetical balance-​of-​power role of ASEAN itself. The opening chapter by Adam Daniel Rotfeld is an excerpt from his essay published in 2017.23 In a changing world, the author ventures to predict the essence of the new international order, arguing that it cannot be imposed and “should be formed in the process of the mutual adaptations.” What is more, the main purpose and sense of the new order is to manage change, not to maintain the status quo.24 As the pivot to Asia symbolizes such change, the challenge of “change management” will inevitably apply to East Asia and ASEAN as well. Despite some evident success in the process of integration, ASEAN still faces important challenges. Marcin Grabowski focuses on the development of ASEAN in the context of its institutional design as well as the historical development of the organization. He bases his analysis on both neoliberal and constructivist IR theories, and draws on concepts connected with institutional design. His narrative is based on three approaches. First, as states play a dominant role in the formation of ASEAN as an institution, and they lack interest in reinforcing the organization (which they treat as a secondary goal),

23 Rotfeld, Adam Daniel: “The International Order: In Search for New Rules,” The Polish Guild of Gutenberg Knights: Warsaw 2017. 24 Ibid., p. 44.

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rendering ASEAN observably weak. Second, building a genuine ASEAN community requires an ASEAN identity, which is needed among both ASEAN elites and regular people, but is missing at both levels due to a lack of funds to broaden integration and cooperation programs. Third, as the institutionalization of ASEAN matters to both elites and people, strong institutions (in terms of money, mandates, and personnel) are crucial to further develop the organization itself and its identity, but this empowerment is secondary to member states’ policies. Singapore has been one of the strongest members of ASEAN, as the initiator or supporter of many institutional and non-​institutional initiatives and changes. Bolstering the development of the organization is a key goal of Singapore’s foreign policy. In the next chapter, Anna Grzywacz attempts to reconstruct Singapore’s approaches toward the ASEAN Community and its three pillars:  the Political-​ Security Community (APC), the Economic Community (EC), and the Socio-​Cultural Community (SCC). Her analysis of Singapore’s foreign policy toward the ASEAN Community’s pillars shows that Singapore presents three different approaches: (1) moderate (although restrained) support for the Political and Security Community; (2) active (and ambiguous) support for the Economic Community; and (3) passive support for the Socio-​Cultural Community. Paweł Pasierbiak’s chapter presents developments in merchandise trade in the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) format since the Asian financial crisis. He stipules that, despite the Asian financial crisis and its global counterpart, trade links among the APT countries have been strengthened between 1998 and 2016. The relative value of intra-​trade to total APT trade shows the strength of intra-​APT trade, which can pave the way for further economic integration, as noted by author, despite many political roadblocks. Territorial disputes in the South China Sea seem to be the most burning issue holding this process back. Agata Ziętek’s chapter focuses on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as an informal dispute settlement mechanism. Her article presents a situational analysis of the geopolitical state of play in the South China Sea, revolving around two questions. First, are the instruments and rules of conduct employed in the region effective in conflict management? Will they enable all sides to achieve common ground –​or will the conflict simmer in perpetuity? Second, will the countries involved in the disputes respect international law and act following the accepted rules and regulations or will they take an instrumental, ad-​hoc approach to the tools provided by international law, abusing them at their whim and fancy? After analyzing the Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT), the author concludes that, at first glance,

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the SDNT looks like old wine in a new bottle. However, it is an important next procedural step because, for the first time in many years, an effective diplomatic mechanism to manage the South China Sea disputes seems achievable. Nevertheless, significant questions remain as to whether and how the SDNT will help regulate the behavior of China and the ASEAN countries in the South China Sea. In the next chapter, Łukasz Stach presents the situation in the South China Sea from a military perspective. He describes the development of naval forces in the South China Sea basin and tries to find the answers to several questions: Does the modernization of maritime forces and naval capabilities by China and the ASEAN countries amount to regular modernization, saber-​rattling, or a full-​scale naval arms race? Could the development of maritime forces lead to military incidents or even full-​scale conflicts? In what way could the militarization of the South China Sea influence the current geopolitical situation? Who is winning and who is losing the race to gain control over the South China Sea? He concludes that the development of naval forces in the South China Sea region cannot be labelled an arms race for one simple reason: China is far ahead of the other countries involved in the SCS territorial disputes. Nevertheless, a full-​scale naval arms race has begun between the PRC and the United States. However, so far, the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy) is still inferior to the U.S. Navy, especially on the high seas. With the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977, Japan’s traditional ASEAN policy was based on a maintaining a low-​profile posture aimed at economic cooperation. However, as Karol Żakowski argues, with the Abe Doctrine, Southeast Asia became a strategically important partner for Japan, particularly in the security sphere. Through changes in the interpretation of the Constitution that facilitate collective self-​defense, continued reference to the need to uphold the law of the sea, and by modifying the rules of providing Official Development Assistance (ODA), Tokyo is assuming a more assertive stance toward Beijing. In this light, according to the author, the Japanese government perceives ASEAN as a valuable counterweight against a rising China. Jessica Liao’s chapter is focused on China’s economic diplomacy toward Southeast Asian states in recent years. By elucidating the difference between China’s “Go Out” strategy and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), she outlines the ASEAN countries’ general approach to China’s economic offensive in Southeast Asia, where such geoeconomics of development takes place. As she points out, its beneficiaries have tried to use a ‘hedging’ attitude toward China with other players ‘enmeshed’ (e.g., Japan and the EU). Thanks to this economic hedging, Southeast Asia has become a challenging playing field for both China

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and the U.S. government under both Barack Obama and Donald Trump. She ultimately shows the “inadequate understanding or consideration of ASEAN states on the part of the United States,” which has grappled with a leadership problem in the region. A rebalanced policy and an upgrade to the wording of the Indo-​Pacific strategy may not be enough to alter these dynamics. The next chapter by Grzegorz Gil brings in the European context as he exposes the antecedents and prospects for ASEAN-​EU relations. The two organizations started an institutional dialogue in the 1970s that then took the form of an asymmetric relationship. The following decades paved the way for the eventual declaration of a strategic partnership (2019). As the EU-​ASEAN record features institutional mimicry, their relationship could even lead to a bi-​ regional free trade agreement, which is on the table. Such an agreement could ‘enmesh’ the EU as an external economic power in the regional architecture, which is already marked by China’s massive BRI project and several U.S.-​driven programs (e.g., the Blue Dot Network). If a distant Europe wants to define its place in Southeast Asia, it needs to change the rules by offering more for less, not less for more. Finally, Andrzej Jaroszyński –​Poland’s former Ambassador to Australia –​ discusses Kevin Rudd’s concept of the Asia Pacific Community (APC) as a panacea for inadequate regional multilateral institutions in the Asia-​Pacific. Consistent with the general engagement of Australians in the Asia-​Pacific rhetoric (the ‘Asia-​Pacific Way’), Prime Minister Rudd had started to promote his idea of the APC in 2008 but lacked a convincing form, clarity, and proper timing. The author emphasizes the shortcomings and three specific problematic aspects of Rudd’s initiative. With its rather mixed regional reception, the extravagant concept of the APC finally perished with the replacement of Rudd as Prime Minister in 2010. Either way, as Jaroszyński argues, Rudd’s APC plan was aimed at adapting Australia to a rising China, a mighty America, and a faltering Europe. A decade later, the geostrategic situation in East Asia is not radically different. Collectively, the chapters in this volume convey an increasingly clear message:  ASEAN matters. The Association seems to be on track to becoming the fourth-​largest economy in the world by 2050, and its economic success may translate into a political one. In 2018, the inaugural ASEAN Prize was announced as a regional award to recognize the achievements of both ASEAN citizens and ASEAN-​based organizations. Let’s imagine that ASEAN would be awarded a Nobel Peace Prize for mitigating the conflict between the U.S. and China. Nobody can easily disavow such a scenario in light of the growing tensions between Beijing and Washington.

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The editors would like to thank the scholars who agreed to participate in this publication to make it a more comprehensive study. It is said that ASEAN’s success was made of fear, luck, and leadership. We hope that this book is less about fear and more about luck and leadership. The two are at a premium in a changing world. Enjoy your reading.

References Acharya, Amitav: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 3rd edition, Routledge: London 2014. Applebaum, Anne: Twilight of Democracy: The Seductive Lure of Authoritarianism, Doubleday: New York 2020. Broinowski, Alison: ASEAN into the 1990s, Palgrave Macmillan: London 1990. Emmers, Ralf: Cooperative Security and the Balance of Power in ASEAN and the ARF, Routledge: London 2003. Fisher, Charles:  “Southeast Asia:  The Balkans of the Orient? A  Study in Continuity and Change.” Geography 47(4), 1962. He, Kai: “Does ASEAN Matter? International Relation Theories, Institutional Realism, and ASEAN.” Asian Security 2(3), 2006. Ing, Lili Yan /​Richardson, Martin /​Urata, Shujiro:  East Asian Integration. Goods, Services and Investment. Routledge: London 2019. Koh, Tommy /​Seah, Sharon /​Li-​Lin, Chang (eds.):  50  years of ASEAN and Singapore, World Scientific Publishing: Heckensack, London 2017. Mahbubani, Kishore /​Sng, Jeffrey: The ASEAN Miracle: A Catalyst for Peace, Ridge Books, NUS Press: Singapore 2017. Mikic, Mia /​Jetin, Bruno:  ASEAN Economic Community. A  Model for Asia-​ wide Regional Integration?, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2016. Murray, Philomena:  Europe and Asia. Regions in Flux, Palgrave Mcmillan: London 2008. Sarin, Vishal:  India  –​ASEAN Trade and Economic Relations, New Century Publications 2016. Severino, Rodolfo:  “ASEAN Beyond Forty:  Towards Political and Economic Integration.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 29(3) 1997. Severino, Rodolfo:  The ASEAN Regional Forum, Institute  of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2009. Shiraishi, Takashi /​Kojima, Takaaki (eds.): ASEAN-​Japan Relations, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2013.

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Snitwongse, Kusuma: “Thailand and ASEAN: Thirty Years On.” Asian Journal of Political Science 5(1), 1997. Swee-​Hock, Saw /​Lijun, Sheng /​Kin Wah, Chin (eds.): ASEAN-​China Relations: Realities and Prospects, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005. Tan, See Seng: “ASEAN and Multilateralism 2.0: Locating ASEAN Centrality within the FOIP and the BRI.” In: Kai, He (ed.): Contested Multiculturalism 2.0 and Asian Security Dynamics, Abingdon –​New York, Routledge: 2020, pp. 147–​160. Tan, See Seng:  “Indonesia among the Powers:  Will ASEAN Sill Matter to Indonesia?.” In: Roberts, Christopher /​Dabir, Ahmad /​Sebastian, Leonard (eds.): Indonesia’s Ascent. Power, Leadership, and the Regional Order, Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2015. Wiatr, Jerzy (ed.): New Authoritarianism: Challenges to Democracy in the 21st century, Barbara Budrich Publishers: Opladen, Berlin & Toronto 2019.

Acknowledgements We would like to thank the Lublin branch of the Polish Academy of Science and the Institute of Political Science and Public Administration at Maria Curie-​Skłodowska University for their financial support, which helped the editors complete this project. We are delighted that the series on International Relations in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, edited by Andrzej Mania and Marcin Grabowski, decided to help us in this publication. We would also like to thank Jan Rydzak of Saguaro Language Labs, who did a great job as language editor. Agata Ziętek, Grzegorz Gil Lublin, 2020

Adam Daniel Rotfeld https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​6149-​1312

Anticipating a New International Order25 Abstract The search for an organizing principle to consider the foundations of a new political and legal order is not limited to the trans-​Atlantic region or the sub-​region of Eastern Europe, but encompasses the entire world. This is due to the strategic reorientation of the United States towards Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and the so-​called ‘easternization’ of world politics. Parallelly, in the second decade of the 21st century, the main threats to international security are of an unconventional nature. They are born within states, not between them, and stem from social inequalities on the global scale. Thus, the primary purpose of the desired international order in this period of accelerated changes and domestic turbulence is not to maintain the status quo and stability, but to manage these changes. Keywords: international order, fragmentation, anocrasy, change management

The dictatorship of particularism The collapse of the present international order is reflected in the series violations of the principles of inviolability of frontiers and non-​use of force both in the relations between Russia and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia over Karabakh, and many other conflicts in different regions of the world. It is manifested by the return to the policy of force and in the threat to use it as well as in diminishing the stabilizing role of such multilateral security institutions as NATO and the OSCE and in the weakening of the European Union. Such a tendency was also reflected in the outcome of the British referendum to leave the Union (Brexit), in the electoral victory of the U.S. President Donald Trump who announced the return of the United States to the policy of unilateralism and who questioned the organizing principle of the post-​cold war international system based on the concepts of liberal democracy. One of the primary causes of the rising threat, which is accompanied by a sense of uncertainty, ambiguity, instability and unpredictability, is the challenge 25 This text is based on “The International Order: In Search for New Rules,” The Polish Guild of Gutenberg Knights: Warszawa 2017, with the Author’s permission (headings added by Grzegorz Gil).

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to the values which include respect for democratic principles based on political pluralism, the rule of law, the market economy, freedom of speech, respect for rights and liberties, respect for human rights in all spheres of activity, tolerance, openness and shared responsibility. In any considerations concerning the fundamental significance of universal values reference should be made to the four rules of primacies which Pope Francis presented in his reflections on contemporary social life. These are the primacy of time over space; of reality over ideas; of peace over conflict; and of the whole over the part. The adoption of such an interpretative perspective more aptly explains the complexity of contemporary problems, in which time and change play a much more important role than the simplified recourse to the so-​called geopolitics and attempts to restore the status quo ante by the use of force. Meanwhile, the debate on the international system of the future usually focuses on the search for the ideal balance of states’ interests and potentials. Rarely referred to in this context are the values which govern states in the implementation of their national strategies. In the contemporary international system, values are defined in the fundamental instruments of international law as agreed within the framework of the United Nations, as well as regional organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the preamble to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (February 7, 1992) the member states confirmed their commitment to “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.” These principles, and other values referenced in the EU Treaty, have a long history in international relations, and in Europe their origins can be traced back to both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment. The new element which the Union introduced to the international order is that the ethical, moral and political dimension of the principles and values upon which the Union is founded became an international legal obligation. The European Union has, in fact, created not only the legal but also the material conditions for effectively eliminating the likelihood of the outbreak of war between the member states and preventing armed conflicts between the countries of the Union. There is a common wisdom that the Union was primarily a form and structure for economic integration. The human being has become a subject, and not an object. This is a new solution –​not only in the context of politics and morality but also of law. The security of the individual has gained a level of importance which poses a challenge to the current position of the state, which had hitherto been the only legal subject of international law. The tension between the individual and the state is

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probably the most important process undermining the existing international system. It concerns the tension between the people and the state on the one hand, and between the community and society (including the international community) on the other. Politics is faced with new dilemmas: how can we respect the subjectivity of individuals without prejudice to collective security? How can we, in the new reality, effectively combat organized crime and terrorism at the national and international levels, while still respecting the human being and its new role in the international community? Things are different in the undemocratic states. The governments of these countries take various measures to control the circulation of information, both within the territories under their sovereignty, as well as the cross-​border flow of information. This is an area where the free world is confronted with the outdated image that whoever is able to control the circulation of information can in fact determine the mindset of their subjects. The analysts in the 1990s quite rightly believed that under the conditions of accelerating globalization, universal global standards would become necessary for the international system to operate. The flaw of that reasoning, however, was the fact that they primarily sought solutions in the regulations between states, and failed to observe that the main problems of the modern world and their potential conflicts are generated within states, and not between them. On both the regional and global scale, a phenomenon occurred where the boundary between the external and what ‘by its nature’ falls within the competence of the internal is blurred, and thus may not formally be the subject of intervention by the United Nations or any other member states. The range of matters which belong to the discretionary power of the state has shrunk significantly over the last 30 years. Matters which in the past were ‘by their nature’ regarded as internal and outside of the external control and jurisdiction are currently subject to a number of international regulations, on the universal scale by the United Nations, and on the regional scale in Europe, within the framework of the political and legal commitments adopted in Euro-​Atlantic structures such as the European Union, the Council of Europe and the OSCE. As one of the leading American analysts rightly noted, the consequence of such a fundamental change is that the world entered into the qualitatively new age. After the victory of 1945, the conviction that the end of the Second World War opened the process aimed at the end of all wars became prevalent. And after the end of the Cold War (1989), we are witnessing the wars that never end. The search for an organizing principle to consider the foundations of a new political and legal order is not limited to the trans-​Atlantic region or the sub-​region of Eastern Europe, but encompasses the entire world. This is due

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to the strategic reorientation of the United States, for which in the 21st century, Southeast Asia and the Pacific, and not Europe and the Atlantic, have become the main areas posing a potential risk and immediate danger to US national interests. A major challenge for the international order was posed by the awakening of the Arab world, where for many years the national and international political elites considered stagnation to be equivalent to stability. The revolts which swept through Egypt and the countries of the Maghreb cleared away their political classes, but did not bring the expected economic and social solutions. Bloody fighting erupted in Libya and civil war broke out in Syria, where religious fanaticisms clashed with the interests of various groups which undermined the legitimacy of Assad’s criminal misrule. The American interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan did not lead to stability or establish peace for their people who, after the withdrawal of the US, are now threatened with the return to the rule of the Taliban (Afghanistan) or the total disintegration of the country (Iraq). The removal of the dictators from power has not led to the establishment of the rule of law and democracy in any of these states, but has changed the political map around them. The blind response to the wave of modernization that accompanies globalization is fragmentation, a return to traditionalisms and a defensive attitude, which are often expressed in Asia and Africa by religious fanatics and al-​Qaeda-​t ype organizations. A by-​product of these conflicts and civil wars is the upsurge of international terrorism, and the displacement of a multi-​million wave of refugees. Both these phenomena are destabilizing international governance on a global scale. In the Western world, nationalists and racists are gaining popularity by drawing upon national selfishness and hostility to strangers, especially to the ‘Other,’ who is distinguished by his culture, religion or skin color. The effect of both these phenomena is a rise in fear and insecurity, which is paving the way to power for extreme conservative and ultra-​nationalist groups.

An anocratic and nonpolar order The foundation of the system which formed after the end of the Cold War, on the principle of opposition to an order based on mutual deterrence, appealed to common liberal-​democratic values –​to rules and standards such as a democratic constitution, the rule of law, political pluralism, market economy, freedom of speech, respect for rights and liberties, tolerance, and respect for dignity and human rights in all spheres of its activity. It was assumed that in place of a bipolar system based on the balance of power and the philosophy

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of ‘exclusiveness,’ we would see a new order based on interdependence, the harmonization of interests and ‘inclusiveness.’ The determining factors were to be not so much military power and economic strength, but rather moral-​ ethical values and the rule of law. In other words, the new international order would be based –​unlike in the bipolar period –​not on the law of force, but on the force of law. Institutionalizing support for the development of democracy is of particular importance. However, its essence is based not so much on verbal declarations and successive agreements, as much as on applying the rules and standards in practice. Among democratic-​liberal thinkers and decision-​makers, a belief sometimes predominates that agreements and normative regulations will suffice to build a new international order thereon. However, this is not the case. The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the revolt in the Arab world, clearly demonstrate that in many regions of the world the liberal Western values of democracy have not been accepted as the foundation of a global security system. Hence the demands, in both research and practical terms, that –​while taking into consideration the heterogeneous nature of the modern world –​the Western states of the trans-​Atlantic community (Europe, the United States and Canada) should make an effort and, together with other countries—​including undemocratic ones –​develop a normative consensus on which the new rules of the international order can be based. All in all, out of a total of 193 UN member states, only one-​t hird acknowledges and practices a liberal democratic way of governance. In other words, the demand to negotiate new rules and a code of conduct for the states in matters of international security is entirely justified. However, it must be assumed that not all the members of such a system will be guided by the values of the liberal democratic community. We are witnesses to and participants in such a historical stage. We live in a world which does not correspond to the concepts of polarity often referenced by both politicians and researchers. We live in a world in which international governance is not managed by a single hegemon (the unipolar model). Nor is this an order the rules of which recognize the right of global powers to have their own ‘zones of influence’ or ‘zones of privileged interests’ (the multipolar model). The collapse of the bipolar system has led to a situation where a new type of order is being formed, to which —​strength and power are distributed polycentrically. Meanwhile, the rules and standards agreed upon in the past are being partly adapted to a world which is already a thing of the past. Some of the global players on the world stage are seeking to take advantage of the

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specific ‘vacuum.’ They are attempting to unilaterally impose their own rules of conduct. The priority task which the trans-​Atlantic community of the democratic states is confronted with is to develop a new code and system of standards and procedures that could effectively protect the foundations of their liberal democratic system. However, we cannot ignore the fact that a significant proportion of the actors on the global stage do not recognize the fundamental values of the Western world as universal. The governments of these countries refuse to respect the principles of political pluralism and the democratic legitimacy of exercised power. Nor do they fully acknowledge the rights and freedoms of the individual. They place greater importance on the collective rights than on individual human rights, as interpreted by the Euro-​Atlantic community. This, in turn, means that there is a need to develop new rules, which arises from the political diversity of the international community in the second decade of the 21st century, and to achieve a consensus on these rules. This new order is therefore more likely to be of a functional and dispersed nature, and to be based on many determinants of the power of states in the 21st century, and not merely on economic and military strength, as was the case in the past. The post-​Cold War order was based on the assumptions that all the states would respect the arrangements agreed in the international legal and political documents. This order was to have been founded on a community of both values and interests. However, these assumptions were inherently illusory. There were divergent causes of the dysfunctionality of the post-​Cold War order. First, some members of the Council of Europe and the OSCE are not really a part of the community of States governed by Law—​even though they retain some forms of the rule of law. Treaties and political commitments serve in those countries merely as a façade and verbal declarations; the multilateral international institutions (including the OSCE and the Council of Europe) are seen as instruments and mechanisms aimed at changing undemocratic regimes and establishing rules and orders favorable to the United States and its allies. Second, new communication technologies render many past solutions obsolete in the modern world. One must be aware of the forms and ways of the policy effective in the past, however, there is an urgent need to find the new political instruments aimed at preventing the possible future war. And third, the new international order has to respond the expectations and needs of new generations who are neither motivated nor determined by the old factors which inspired the Founding Fathers of the present system.

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From status quo to change management Reflections on the question of principles and values leads us to a number of conclusions. We live in a time when the boundary between domestic and foreign policy has become blurred; the internal pervades the external. It is not only the concepts and strategies which count but also the ways of governance within the states. One of the reasons for the weakness of the global order is the weakness of leadership in today’s world. What is more, foreign policy is losing importance; it is ceasing to be a function of domestic policy, but is more and more commonly becoming its instrument and tool. In the politics of democratic states, the values essential for human dignity and freedom are of key importance. This requires a re-​evaluation of our way of thinking about the foreign policy, as well as changes to our approach both to formulating objectives, and to the means which may be used for achieving such objectives, in order to carry them out. In this context, we must seek answers to the question:  what should be the essence of the new international order? The starting point for such new arrangements could be adopting the following common objectives. The great powers would have to renounce their right to exclusivity in determining the new order. Indeed, the new order cannot be imposed; it should be negotiated or—​more importantly and more likely—​formed in the process of the mutual adaptations by those states which collectively face new regional challenges and risks. The primary purpose and meaning of the desired international order in this period of accelerated changes is not only, or simply, to maintain the status quo and stability but also change management. The agenda is defined by the question: How to manage the change? How to create the conditions for the effective prevention of a new Great War with the possible involvement of nuclear powers? Knowledge of history is useful in practical endeavors in order to avert a global catastrophe, but the desired new world order will not be functional if we accept the premise that it is the past—​and not the present or the future –​which will determine its framework and mechanisms. The academia is not created with the aim to devise a political strategy. However, it can propose certain minimum boundary conditions. The conditions which could be used in negotiations among the main actors of the regional and global arena. The models proposed by scholars and thinkers are generally rational, consistent, logical and elegant in presentation. The problem is that the historical process is often contradictory, irrational, illogical and far from the

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elegant designs of the theorists. The new world order need not necessarily be enticing, yet it should be effective. In the second decade of the 21st century, the main threats to international security are of an unconventional nature. They are born within states, not between them. The source of these threats is generated by social inequality on the global scale—​not regional and local or within the State only. There are some problems related to the tensions between the impoverished South and the rich North. The problems which breed national egoism, xenophobia and –​last but not least  –​dictatorships, despotism and other undemocratic ways of governance as well as trampling on universal values are becoming prevalent again. Thus the search for an unconventional strategy should neither be aimed at creating a Paradise on Earth nor to follow the concept of Eternal Peace as elaborated by the philosopher from Königsberg. The new rules of the international order should be adequately suited to the needs and expectations of the present and coming generations. * Adam Daniel Rotfeld is a scholar; his research is focused on the theory and practice of international security and human rights, conflict solution, arms control and disarmament. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Member of the United Nations Secretary General’s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters (2006–​2011, chaired the ABDM in 2008)  and the NATO Group of Experts (Wisemen Group) on a new Strategic Concept of Alliance (2009–​2010). Co-​Chairman of the Polish-​Russian Group on Difficult Matters (2008–​2015) and member of the OSCE Panel of Eminent Persons on European Security as a Common Project.

Marcin Grabowski https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0003-​1447-​1818

ASEAN: An Organization in the Making Abstract Despite its relatively long existence (which turned 50 in 2017), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations still faces important challenges, stemming from the unwillingness of member states to transfer part of their sovereignty at the international or supranational level, the lack of an ASEAN identity (both among ASEAN elites and the citizens of ASEAN countries), and the lack of a proper institutional structure, mainly due to the resistance of member states to reinforce the organization, resulting in lack of funds, cadres, and proper legitimacy. This chapter draws on neoliberal institutional theory and constructivist theory, arguing that ASEAN member states do not have sufficient interest in the creation of a more cohesive and developed organization, and the lack of a broadly understood ASEAN identity does not allow for the creation of a community despite declarations to this effect in official ASEAN documents. Keywords: ASEAN, neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, institutional design, ASEAN history, ASEAN Charter

Introduction The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which turned 50 in 2017, was created in 1967 in a completely different international reality. It has developed since then, becoming a multidimensional de jure regional organization (encompassing spheres of economic, social, and limited political-​security cooperation) as well as a driving force and a core platform for regional integration in what is broadly understood as East Asia. Nevertheless, ASEAN is still in the process of maturing, despite its long and successful history. There is a range of reasons for this, including the reluctance of ASEAN member states to reinforce the organization institutionally and transfer their sovereignty at the international/​supranational level, the lack of a regional identity, and a lack of a proper institutional structure (in its broad sense). The main goal of this chapter is to analyze and assess the development of ASEAN in the context of its institutional design, as well as the historical development of the organization. The analysis will be based on both neoliberal and constructivist IR theories, and draw on concepts connected with institutional design. The main assumption of the text builds on those three approaches.

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First, I argue that states play a dominant role in formation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an institution, and their lack of interest in reinforcing the organization (which they treat as a secondary goal) results in ASEAN’s observed weakness. This argument is rooted in neoliberal institutionalism. Second, I  argue that building a genuine ASEAN community requires an ASEAN identity, which is needed among ASEAN elites and people, but is actually missing in both of these categories due to a lack of funds for broad integration and cooperation programs. This argument is rooted in constructivism. Third, I  posit that the institutionalization of ASEAN matters at both levels, as strong institutions (in terms of money, mandate, and personnel) are crucial for the further development of the organization itself and of the ASEAN identity, but this institutionalization is secondary to member states’ policies and identity creation. This chapter is mostly based on historical analysis, supported by institutional analysis, document analysis, and discourse analysis.

Theoretical approach This paper draws on two theoretical paradigms that have high explanatory power in terms of Southeast Asian regional integration, namely neoliberal institutionalism and constructivism. As realism in its different forms is broadly applied in IR analyses focused on Asia, it is omitted from this analysis. Additionally, I take into consideration institutional design according to Amitav Acharya’s framing in assessing the structure and operation of ASEAN. A brief theoretical introduction is followed by an analysis based on theories and empirical data, which can be found in the conclusions to this chapter. Neoliberal institutionalism.26 Neoliberal institutionalism draws on two traditions in IR, namely liberalism (or neoliberalism) and institutionalism. We can identify a certain shift from liberal to realist traditions over the course of IR’s development as a field, as neoliberal theory is based on the following features:  states are leading actors; states are rational actors; states operate in international anarchy, but cooperation in an anarchic system is possible, with a

26 The section on neoliberal institutionalism is based on Grabowski, Marcin /​ Stefanowski, Jakub:  “Regional Integration in Central Asia in the Shadow of Sino-​Russian Rivalry.” In:  Mania, Andrzej /​Grabowski, Marcin /​Pugacewicz, Tomasz:  Global Politics in the 21st Century:  Between Regional Cooperation and Conflict. Peter Lang Verlag: Berlin 2019, pp. 75–​76.

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generally increasing level of cooperation at the regional and global level. Finally, absolute gains are more important for states than relative gains.27 We can even find scholars locating neoliberal institutionalism close to neorealism, as game theory has shown that cooperation and conflict can be possible at the same time. Robert Keohane, the principal scholar of this theory, juxtaposes international institutions and state interests,28 providing sets of theories of cooperation and international regimes (referring to rational-​ choice, functional explanations, functional theory, and bounded rationality redefining self-​interest).29 Having presumed that states play a crucial role in neoliberalism, one often perceives different types of institutions (organizations, regimes) as tools in acquiring relative gains (states cooperate if their relative power increases). Cooperation within the organization can in some ways be coercive, as bargaining strength differs among countries that form an international regime or institution. Finally, there are some club goods involved in building an international organization, as weaker countries join the group in order not to be excluded.30 Constructivism. Constructivism has gained significant traction in Southeast Asia as well as in Asia in general, especially in the 21st century. Scholars connected with constructivism, such as Alexander Wendt or Peter Katzenstein, presume a lack of an objectively existing social reality. The world is perceived as a set of norms, thoughts, ideas, and values, created by people in a certain time and place. Ideas create the interests and identities of people and other actors in international relations. Therefore, state identity results from policies as well as interactions among states. The international system is the result of the way it is perceived and created by actors; thus, they decide about the shape of anarchy, whether it will be maintained or an international society will

27 Daddow, Olivier:  International Relations Theory:  The Essentials. Sage:  London-​ Thousand Roads-​New Delhi-​Singapore 2013, pp. 134–​135. 28 This approach (calling neoliberal institutionalism a perspective, but not a theory) is presented by Jorgensen, Knud: International Relations Theory: A New Introduction. Palgrave: London 2018, pp. 74–​75. 29 Keohane, Robert: After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1984, pp. 49–​132. 30 Stein, Arthur:  “Neoliberal Institutionalism.” In:  Reus-​Smit, Christian /​Sindal, Duncan (eds.): The Oxford Handbook of International Relations. Oxford University Press: Oxford-​New York 2008, pp. 201–​210.

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be created. Based on such an understanding of the structure of international relations, constructivists focus more on interpretation than explanation.31 As mentioned earlier, Asian International Relations have been greatly influenced by constructivism,32 a trend that dates back to the 1990s and was initially concentrated on Japanese IR. This trend has included the works of scholars like Peter Katzenstein and Nobuko Okawara33 (later developed by Peter Katzenstein into the book Cultural Norms and National Security:  Police and Military in Postwar Japan in 199634), Alastair Iain Johnston and his analyses of the influence of Chinese culture on China’s international relations, 35 or Jae-​ Jung Suh, who represents the Korean constructivist approach to IR.36 Looking

31 Constructivism is not a homogeneous school, and perceptions on it in international research differ. Broadly, it assumes that the world, as an ideational construct, can be researched in order to understand the interests and identities forming it. Cf.: Jackson, Robert /​Sorensen, Georg:  Introduction to International Relations:  Theories and Approaches. Oxford University Press:  Oxford 2016, pp.  205–​228; Czaputowicz, Jacek: Teorie stosunków międzynarodowych: Krytyka i systematyzacja. Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa 2007, pp. 291–​326. K. E Jorgensen distinguishes four understandings of constructivism at the philosophical, meta-​theoretical, theoretical, and empirical-​a nalytical levels. Jorgensen, Knud, International Relations Theory: A New Introduction, pp. 171–​175. This chapter focuses mainly on the theoretical approach, but –​to some extent –​it also deals with the empirical approach. For more extensive and in-​depth analysis of the international system understood as a social construct and the role of Alexander Wendt in constructivism, see Copeland, Dave: “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism: A Review Essay,” pp. 1–​20; Guzzini, Stefano /​Leander Anna: “Wendt’s Constructivism: A Relentless Quest for Synthesis,” pp. 73–​91. Both in: Guzzini, Stefano /​Leander Anna (eds.): Constructivism and International Relations: Alexander Wendt and His Critics. Routledge: London-​New York  2005. 32 This section of the text is based on Grabowski, Marcin /​Pugacewicz, Tomasz: “Ways of Application of Western IR Theories in Asia and Africa.” In: Grabowski, Marcin /​ Pugacewicz, Tomasz: Application of International Relations Theories in Asia and Africa. Peter Lang Verlag: Berlin 2019, pp. 69–​74. 33 Katzenstein, Peter /​Okawara, Nobuko:  “Japan’s National Security:  Structures, Norms, and Policies.” International Security 17 (4), 1993, pp. 84–​118. 34 Cf.: Katzenstein, Peter: Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan. Cornell University Press: Ithaca-​London 1996, pp. 17–​58. 35 Johnston, Alastair Iain: Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton University Press: Princeton 1995. 36 Leheny, David: “Constructivism and International Relations in Asia.” In: Pekanen, Sadia /​Ravenhill, John /​Foot, Rosemary: The Oxford Handbook of the International

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at Southeast Asian problems and issues, we can also find prominent studies published in the 1990s and focusing on cultural norms that shaped regional IR.37 This was developed by Amitav Acharya into the book Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia (2001, 2009, 2014), focusing on the role of ASEAN in building a regional security community and identity (including theoretical and historical analysis), based on a set of norms and values connected to the so-​called ASEAN Way, including non-​use of force and peaceful settlement of disputes, regional autonomy in problem solving, the non-​interference doctrine, and the absence of military pacts.38 Other scholars also support this line of thinking, which demonstrates the influence of ASEAN on norms regulating regional cooperation.39 In contrast, there is also a set of works contesting the idea of regional identity formation, including those of Donald Emmerson, David Jones and Michael Smith, and Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs.40 Institutional Design. The final part of this introduction should reflect the institutional design of ASEAN, as analyzed by Amitav Acharya and Alistair Iain Johnston. These authors analyzed a set of variables in order to assess the efficiency of the institution, including the number of actors involved. Generally, Relations of Asia. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2014, p. 73. Cf. Suh, Jae-​Jung: Power, Interest, and Identity in Military Alliances. Palgrave Macmillan: New York 2007. 37 Acharya, Amitav:  “Ideas, Identity and Institution-​Building:  From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-​Pacific way’.” The Pacific Review 10 (3), 1997: pp. 319–​346; Busse, Nikolas: “Constructivism and Southeast Asian Security.” The Pacific Review 12 (1), 1999, pp. 39–​60. 38 Acharya, Amitav: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. Routledge: Oxon-​New York 2014 (first published 2001), pp. 43–​78. See also: Johnston, Alastair Iain: “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory.” In: Mastanduno, Michael /​Ikenberry, John (eds.): International Relations Theory and the Asia-​Pacific. Columbia University Press: New York 2003, pp. 107–​162. 39 Cf.:  Ba, Alice:  “Regional Security in East Asia:  ASEAN’s Value Added and Limitations.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 29 (3), 2010, pp. 115–​30; Acharya, Amitav:  “Do Norms and Identity Matter? Community and Power in Southeast Asia’s Regional Order.” The Pacific Review 18 (1), 2005; Narine, Shaun: “The English School and ASEAN.” The Pacific Review 19 (2), 2006. 40 Cf.: Emmerson, Donald: “What Do the Blind-​Sided See? Reproaching Regionalism in Southeast Asia.” The Pacific Review 18 (1), 2005, pp. 1–​21; Jones, David /​Smith, Michael:  “Making Process, Not Progress:  ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order.” International Security 32 (1), 2007, pp.  148–​84; Eaton, Sarah /​ Stubbs, Richard: “Is ASEAN Powerful? Neo-​Realist versus Constructivist Approaches to Power in Southeast Asia.” The Pacific Review 19 (2), 2006, pp. 135–​155.

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with a growing number of members, the likelihood of cooperation decreases, especially when consensus is required. Also, the ideology and identity of member states matter, as either grouping countries with similar ideologies (like democratic states) or –​even better –​showing that the uniqueness of a region’s ideology (epitomized in the case of ASEAN by the processes of consultation and consensus, or musjawarah and mufukat) may encourage or discourage deeper integration. Systemic power distribution, which indicates the role of dominant powers in shaping the organization, may be crucial in ensuring the stability of the institution and its effectiveness; the same applies to domestic politics, with strong and legitimate states generally supporting stronger institutions. The role of extra-​regional institutions and non-​state actors is perceived as positive in the formation of regional institutions, as the former may serve as templates or positive examples, while the latter are useful in building transnational links. Finally, history as well as the development of the region and the regional organization also play a prominent role. Thus, the authors look at indicators such as membership, including the problem of the inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the institution, the scope of issues a given institution is addressing (whether it’s narrow or broad, intrusive or non-​intrusive), formal rules (mostly pertaining to decision making –​consensus versus majority of votes), the ideology and norms of the institution, and finally the mandate of the institution, understood as its overall purpose.41

History of ASEAN42 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations was created on August 8, 1967 in Bangkok, replacing the Association of Southeast Asia,43 which initially grouped 41 Cf.: Acharya, Amitav /​Johnston, Alistair Iain: “Comparing Regional Institutions: An Introduction.” In: Acharya, Amitav /​Johnston, Alistair Iain: Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2007, pp. 17–​22. 42 ASEAN’s history and institutional structure up to 2015 is translated and adapted from:  Grabowski, Marcin:  Rywalizacja czy integracja:  Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX i XXI wieku. Księgarnia Akademicka: Kraków 2015, pp. 197–​243. 43 The Association of Southeast Asia was created in 1961 by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, and ceased to exist in the aftermath of the conflict between Malaysia and the Philippines that resulted from the inclusion of Sabah in Malaysia (although a small secretariat continued to operate). The creation of Malaysia also resulted in the dissolution of MAPHILINDO, as Indonesia and the Philippines had not recognized

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Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The Bangkok Declaration focused on the following goals of ASEAN, among others:  acceleration of economic growth, social progress and cultural development of the region; promotion of regional peace and stability; promotion of active cooperation in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific, and administrative spheres; and close and beneficial relations with regional and international organizations with similar goals.44 Elimination of territorial disputes and tensions among the organization’s members was one of its key goals in its incipient phase, and Thailand was perceived as a possible broker in conflicts between Malaysia and Indonesia and the Philippines.45 Additional reasons that underlay the creation of the organization included the withdrawal of colonial powers from the region, the inefficiency of post-​World War Two organizations that comprised intra-​and extra-​regional powers (SEATO –​Southeast Asian Treaty Organization), the reinforcement of the Southeast Asian region in its relations with external powers, as well as the aspiration to improve the region’s potential in order to achieve goals that were unachievable by individual ASEAN members.46 Finally, the organization aimed to resist guerillas supported by the People’s Republic of China and the closer cooperation that resulted from the victory of communist movements in Vietnam, Laos and, Cambodia/​Kampuchea. Thus, the organization was strongly anti-​communist.47 ASEAN was not very active following its inception, mostly due to internal conflicts among its members. In 1971, the five ASEAN countries signed a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration in Southeast Asia, declaring it free

Malaysia due to territorial disputes over Borneo. Cf.: Palmer, Norman: “SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASPAC.” In: Sandhu, K.S. et al. (eds.): The New ASEAN Reader. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 1992, p. 29. 44 Cf.:  The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration), Bangkok, 8  August  1967, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​t he-​asean-​declaration-​bangkok-​ declaration-​bangkok-​8-​august-​1967/​. 45 Cf.: Flores, Jamil Maidan /​Abad, Jun: The Founding of ASEAN, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=the-​founding-​of-​asean. 46 This list was presented by Thanat Khoman, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Thailand at the time (1967) and one of the founding fathers of ASEAN. Cf.: Khoman, Thanat: ASEAN Conception and Evolution, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean. org/​?static_​post=asean-​conception-​a nd-​evolution-​by-​t hanat-​k homan. 47 Cf.:  Hagiwara, Yoshiyuki:  “Formation and Development of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.” The Developing Economies IX (4), 1973, pp. 443–​465.

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from external interference.48 This was followed by the first ASEAN Summit, organized in Bali in 1976, which became a milestone for the organization’s development. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, which regulated the rules of cooperation in the political and economic spheres,49 and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, which set the stage for subsequent cooperation with dialogue partners and stipulated mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; freedom from external interference, coercion and subversion; non-​interference; peaceful settlement of disputes; the renunciation of threats and the use of force; and effective cooperation among the parties.50 The following year (1977) marked the establishment of the Post-​Ministerial Conferences in order to consult with dialogue partners (initially Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Japan, and the United States).

Changes and Challenges in the 1990s After the end of the Cold War, the regional system in Southeast Asia become more stable, positively influencing ASEAN’s development. Important regional changes included the end of the war in Cambodia and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, gradually paving the way for the enlargement of ASEAN to include Vietnam (1995), Laos (1997), Myanmar (1997), and Cambodia (1999); the reduction of the American military presence in the region (withdrawal from bases in the Philippines), which resulted in the need for member states to take greater responsibility for their self-​defense; and the growing power of China, which gradually morphed into both a rival and regional hegemon (a role that was especially apparent in the South China Sea). The rise of China, perhaps unexpectedly, encouraged a higher level of cooperation and dialogue between ASEAN and China.51 48 Cf.: Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27 November 1971. In: Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2003, pp. 7–​10. 49 Cf.: Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Indonesia, 24 February 1976, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=declaration-​of-​asean-​concord-​indonesia-​24-​ february-​1976. 50 Cf.: Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, retrieved 24.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​treaty-​a mity-​cooperation-​southeast-​asia-​indonesia-​24-​february-​ 1976/​. 51 Cf.: Haliżak, Edward: Stosunki międzynarodowe w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku. Scholar: Warszawa 1999, pp. 412–​416.

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The beginning of the 1990s also brought important changes in the international economic environment as well as in the ASEAN countries, liberalizing their economies, promoting exports, and increasing their participation in international markets. In addition, given the need to increase the ASEAN economies’ global competitiveness in light of the growing role of regional economic organizations, the member states decided to increase the level of regional economic integration.52 The business community also played an important role in accelerating the integration process.53 At the same time, most of the countries involved (apart from Singapore and Brunei) expressed their concerns regarding the trade diversion effect, loss of markets, and structural adjustment in their economies.54 Despite these challenges, the pro-​integration group prevailed and the fourth ASEAN Summit in Singapore (January 1992) ended with the decision to create an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008.55 The most important ambitions underlying the creation of AFTA included responding to external pressure (e.g., problems with finalizing the GATT Uruguay Round, regional integration in North America and Europe); strengthening the negotiating position of ASEAN in the international system (against a system of regional integration blocks); limiting Chinese economic expansion, as China was becoming a more important competitor to ASEAN countries in export sectors; further developing economic links within ASEAN due to limitation of existing barriers to

52 Cf.: Naya, Seiji /​Plummer, Michael: “ASEAN Economic Co-​operation in the New International Economic Environment.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 7 (3), 1991, pp. 261–​276. 53 Cf.: Bowles, Paul: “ASEAN, AFTA and the ‘New Regionalism’.” Pacific Affairs 70 (2), 1997, pp. 219–​233. 54 Cf.: Menon, Jayant: “Intra-​Industry Trade and the ASEAN Free Trade Area.” Pacific Economic Papers 251, Jan. 1996. 55 Simultaneously, the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) on 15 groups of products was established. Cf.: Singapore Declaration of the 1992 ASEAN Summit, Singapore, 28 January 1992, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​ post=singapore-​declaration-​of-​1992-​singapore-​28-​january-​1992; Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation, Singapore, 28 January 1992 retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=framework-​agreement-​on-​ enhancing-​asean-​economic-​cooperation-​singapore-​28-​january-​1992; Agreement on the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) Scheme for the ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28  January  1992, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​ ?static_​post=agreement-​on-​t he-​common-​effective-​preferential-​tariff-​cept-​scheme-​ for-​t he-​asean-​free-​trade-​area-​a fta.

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industrial internationalization.56 A limited AFTA with tariffs up to 5 % for the six founding members of ASEAN (others have additional time for adjustment) was introduced in 2002. In January 2002, the average tariff rate for those six members (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) was 3.2 %, and intra-​regional trade increased between 1993 and 2000 from 44.2 billion USD to 97.8 billion USD. The lack of liberalization of the agricultural market and the automotive market was a clear disadvantage to the implementation of AFTA.57 Several other factors posed additional problems in the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area. These included asymmetric tariffs or other forms of market protection (depending on the level of economic development and political issues), a relatively low proportion of intra-​regional trade to total trade flows (ca. 22 %), the impact of the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–​1998, and the nature of AFTA itself, which was a simplified model of the free trade area based on reduction of tariffs (whereas other, advanced FTAs focused much more on non-​ tariff barriers, which are crucial in the contemporary world).58 Hence, we can observe on the one hand that, when the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) was introduced in 2015, the average tariff rate for the ASEAN-​6 and the inclusion list was 0.03 %, while for the whole of ASEAN, it stood at 0.23 %.59 On the other hand, the problems of non-​tariff barriers and the Rules of Origin had not yet been resolved.60

56 Cf.: Dent, Christopher: East Asian Regionalism. Routledge: London-​New York 2008, pp. 92–​93. 57 Cf.: Severino, Rodolfo C: “The ASEAN Free Trade Area: Reaching Its Target, Opening Remarks of H.E. Rodolfo C.  Severino, Secretary-​General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at the AFTA 2002 Symposium, Jakarta, 31 January 2002.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 19 (2), 2002, pp. 211–​212. 58 Cf.: Dent, Christopher: East Asian Regionalism, pp. 97–​99. 59 Products were classified into an inclusion list, a temporary exclusion list, a sensitive list, and a general exception list. Cf.: ASEAN Free Trade AREA (AFTA): An Update, retrieved 19.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=asean-​free-​trade-​area-​a fta-​ an-​update. Data on tariffs: Average CEPT/​ATIGA Tariff Rates, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​images/​2015/​april/​information_​ on_ ​average_​tariffs/​average%20CEPT-​ATIGA%20tariff%20rates%201993-​2015_​ 1.pdf. 60 Cf.: References and Other Documents on ASEAN Free Trade Area, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​asean-​economic-​community/​asean-​free-​trade-​area-​a fta-​ council/​other-​documents/​.

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Even though ASEAN was initially conceived as an organization focused more on strategic and political issues, the 1990s let to a gradual drift from those. Some areas were dealt with, however, including the crucial problem of the South China Sea. In 1992, the Declaration of the South China Sea was adopted, calling for a peaceful resolution of the problem based on the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC).61 Regional security required a broader approach, so in 1993, the decision was made to deal with those issues at post-​ministerial conferences, and the process was institutionalized in the framework of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The first ARF meeting took place in Bangkok in July 1994, ending with only some general declarations on the ASEAN Regional Forum’s mandate and operations.62 In 1993, controversies with the United States arose around human rights issues in the region as well as around the proposal (initiated by Malaysia) to create an East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC). This proposal, by Mahathir bin Mohammad (the Malaysian prime minister), was harshly opposed by the U.S. administration, as it had the capacity to weaken the U.S. position in the region. Finally, in July 1993, the decision was made that EAEC would be subsumed under APEC. This virtually killed off the idea, at least until the Asian Economic Crisis, which has initiated cooperation among the countries of ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN plus China, Japan, South Korea) that developed into the East Asia Summit in 2005.63 In 1995, the decision was made to make Southeast Asia a Nuclear-​Weapon-​Free-​Zone.64 The 1990s were also marked by the ASEAN enlargement of 1995–​1999 (Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999). This enlargement remains controversial, as the low level of development (as well as the political problems) of the newly accepted members have brought additional

61 Cf.: ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992. In: Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 1998, pp. 35–​38. 62 Cf.: Chairman’s Statement, The First ASEAN Regional Forum, Bangkok, Thailand, 25  July  1994. In:  ASEAN Regional Forum Document Series 1994–​2006, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2007, pp. 3–​4. 63 Cf.: Nanto, Dick: APEC, EAEC, and Free Trade Area in the Asia Pacific, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington 1994. 64 Cf.: Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-​Free Zone, Bangkok, Thailand, 15  December  1995, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​ post=treaty-​on-​t he-​southeast-​asia-​nuclear-​weapon-​free-​zone.

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challenges to deepening integration within ASEAN.65 ASEAN member countries have certainly benefited from the increased importance of the organization in the world, its strategic credibility, the ASEAN internal market, and the regional division of labor. For the newly joining CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam), credibility and legitimation in the global system seemed crucial.66 The weakness within ASEAN was illustrated starkly by the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–​1998. ASEAN was inefficient and ineffective in coping with the crisis, and its policy, based on the Statement on Bold Measures,67 proved to be rather contrary to previously declared approaches. On the other hand, ASEAN’s activity in comparison to other international organizations was the most adequate, and the lack of effective outcomes resulted from the fact that the whole region was contaminated by the crisis and the countries affected lacked the proper resources to deal with the contagion.68 ASEAN’s ministers of foreign affairs called for the promotion of intra-​ASEAN trade utilizing local currencies

65 The problem of regional economic differences and development gaps naturally runs much deeper. Cf.: Severino, Rodolfo C.: “The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 24 (1), 2007, pp. 35–​4 4; Green, David: “Bridging the ASEAN Development Divide: A Regional Overview.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 24, (1), 2007, pp. 15–​34. 66 Cf.: Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: The New ASEANs: Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Barton 1997; Than, Mya /​Gates, Carolyn (eds.): ASEAN Enlargement: Impacts and Implications. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2001, pp. 2–​11; Emmers, Ralph: “The Indochinese Enlargement of ASEAN:  Security Expectations and Outcomes.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59 (1), 2005, pp. 71–​88. 67 Cf.: 6th ASEAN Summit Statement on Bold Measures, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=statement-​on-​bold-​measures- ​6th-​asean-​summit-​ hanoi-​16-​december-​1998. 68 At the national level, the ASEAN countries aimed to increase the supervision of banks and transparency of financial transactions; at the bilateral level, they bolstered support for the most affected countries, especially Indonesia; and at the international level, they made appeals to maintain market openness in developed countries, protect the poor, and restructure debts. Cf.: Soesastro, Hadi: “ASEAN During the Crisis,” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 15 (3), 1998, pp. 373–​381. As for the contagion mechanism, cf.: Grabowski, Marcin /​Wyciślak, Sławomir: “The Impact of the Asian Economic Crises 1997–​1998 and 2008–​2009 on Regional Security and Development.” In: Grabowski, Marcin /​Laidler, Paweł: Global Development Policy in the 21st century: New Challenges. Peter Lang Verlag: Berlin 2018, pp. 37–​61.

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during an informal ASEAN Summit in December 1997, and committed to accelerating trade within AFTA at the Hanoi Summit in 1998.69 Surprisingly, the crisis did not lead to a serious slowdown in regional integration, but on the contrary, accelerated trade liberalization within AFTA. This additionally led to closer cooperation with dialogue partners in Northeast Asia, namely China, Japan, and South Korea –​especially in financial matters, including the Economic Review and Policy Dialogue, the Chiang Mai Initiative on bilateral currency swap agreements, and the Asian Bond Market Initiative.70 The Asian Economic Crisis was also an important contributor to the weakening of the U.S. position in the region, as the United States was perceived as the country that had blocked economic assistance to the region (collaborating with international financial institutions, especially the International Monetary Fund), whereas it was the People’s Republic of China that decided not to devaluate the yuan, and supported the region with a cheap loans, which were important in reducing the scale of the crisis.71

ASEAN in the 21st Century The development of ASEAN in the 21st century has been geared toward the creation of an international organization modeled after the European Union and based on three communities (the ASEAN Political and Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community). At the same time, efforts to institutionalize ASEAN were torn between the declared goal of closer integration and the strong commitment to national sovereignty. Hence, this development was less efficient than expected.

69 The region was also supported by the Asian Development Bank, which increased its loans to the region from 5.5 billion USD in 1996 to 9.5 billion USD in 1997. Cf.:  Wesley, Michael:  “Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21 (1), 1999, pp. 54–​73. 70 Cf.: Severino, Rodolfo C: The ASEAN Free Trade Area: Moving Ahead on Regional Integration, Address by H.  E. Rodolfo C.  Severino, Secretary-​General of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, at the AFTA Roundtable Discussion, Bangkok, 21 November 2000, ASEAN Economic Bulletin 18 (2), 2001, pp. 218–​221. 71 China provided loans under the IMF to Thailand (1 billion USD) and preferential loans to Myanmar, Vietnam, and Laos, further providing economic assistance to Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Indonesia. Cf. Ku, Samuel:  “China’s Changing Political Economy with Southeast Asia: Starting a New Page of Accord.” Asian Perspective 30, (4), 2006, pp. 113–​140.

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One notable trend in the political sphere was the ever-​closer engagement of China with Southeast Asian countries, reinforced by the Asian Economic Crisis. This was one of the reasons for the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea between the People’s Republic of China and the ASEAN countries.72 The South China Sea dispute, being the most important divisive issue for ASEAN countries and China was not definitely solved by the Declaration, though an agreement on a joint survey on possible oil deposits in the area was signed by the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC), and the Vietnam Oil and Gas Corporation (PetroVietnam) three years later (2005).73 Tensions were aggravated by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s emphasis on protecting American national interests in the South China Sea, underscoring the need to solve the dispute without coercion.74 Despite the fact that the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DoC) were finalized and adopted in 2011 at the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference with China and confirmed at the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting on Bali in July 2011,75 tensions escalated in the 2010s.76

72 The South China Sea (especially the Spratly and Paracel islands) is often perceived as a starting point for future regional or global conflict; hence, this agreement could be viewed as a success of both ASEAN diplomacy and the Chinese ‘charm offensive’ in Southeast Asia. Cf.: Kurlantzick, Joshua: “China’s Charm Offensive in Southeast Asia.” Current History 105 (692), 2006, pp. 270–​276; Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​ post=declaration-​on-​t he-​conduct-​of-​parties-​in-​t he-​south-​china-​sea-​2. 73 Cf.:  Radio Free Asia:  “China, Philippines, Vietnam Sign Joint South China Sea Oil Search Accord,” retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​w ww.rfa.org/​english/​news/​ business/​china_​v ietnam_​spratlys-​20050314.html. 74 Cf.: Clinton, Hilary: Remarks at Press Availability. Hanoi, Vietnam, July 23, 2010., retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​2009-​2017.state.gov/​secretary/​20092013clinton/​ rm/​2010/​07/​145095.htm. 75 Cf.: Natalegawa, Marty M.: 2011 Chair’s Statement 18th ASEAN Regional Forum 23  July  2011 Bali, Indonesia, retrieved 23.10.2019, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​ wp-​c ontent/​uploads/​i mages/​a rchive/​d ocuments/​4 4thAMM-​PMC-​18thARF/​ 18thARF-​CS.pdf. 76 Cf.: Buszynski, Leszek: “The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and U.S.—​ China Strategic Rivalry.” The Washington Quarterly 35 (2), 2012, pp. 139–​156; Fravel, Taylor: “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast 33 (3), 2011, pp. 292–​319.

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As the dispute intensified and China backed its claims with purported historical rights, in 2013, the Philippines took the case to arbitration at the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Permanent Court of Arbitration (the case was rejected by China).77 Finally, in July 2016, the UNCLOS Permanent Court of Arbitration decided in favor of the Philippines, stating that China had no historical rights to the disputed area based on the so called nine-​dash-​line.78 The end of the 2010s brought all parties closer to the binding Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, as a single draft of the Code of Conduct was finalized in August 2018, followed by a November 2018 agreement stating that negotiations on the Code of Conduct would be finalized by 2021.79 The effectiveness of ASEAN’s activities surrounding the South China Sea dispute have been dubious at best, as the organization clearly lacked unity and confidence in its relations with the People’s Republic of China. On the other hand, ASEAN as an organization was undoubtedly a point of leverage in its ability to stand behind the interests of individual members of the Association. The ASEAN Community has been by far the most important endeavor of the organization, together with its formal institutionalization into the regional organization. The ninth ASEAN Summit on Bali in 2003 was a breakthrough in this process, as the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II –​Bali Concord II was signed at the summit, committing the signatories to the creation of the ASEAN Community by 2020.80 The ASEAN Community was to

77 Cf.: Zietek, Agata: “The South China Sea: A Place of Rivalry and Power Management.” Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych 11 (1), 2016, pp. 25–​4 4. 78 Cf.: Permanent Court of Arbitration: PCA Case Nº 2013–​19 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between The Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Republic Of China, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​pca-​c pa.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​sites/​6/​2016/​07/​PH-​CN-​20160712-​ Award.pdf. 79 Cf.: Nguyen, Minh Quang: “Saving the China-​ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct.” The Diplomat, June 29, 2019, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​t hediplomat. com/​2019/​06/​saving-​t he-​china-​asean-​south-​china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​. 80 Cf.: Pramudwinai, Don: Press Statement by the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN+3 Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 7  October  2003, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​a sean.org/​?static_​post=press-​statement-​by-​ the-​chairperson-​of-​t he-​9 th-​a sean-​summit-​a nd-​t he-​7th-​a sean-​3 -​summit-​bali-​ indonesia-​7-​october-​2003. This declaration was rested on tenuous foundations, especially in the security sphere, as at the same summit, an Indonesian proposal for the creation of an ASEAN peacekeeping force and the consolidation of ASEAN’s

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be composed of three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community.81 The Bali Summit was also important due to the fact that, in the sphere of economic integration, it yielded a recommendation that included a dispute settlement mechanism, which came with its own enforcement mechanism. Such a development could have been an important waypoint on the path of progress in the institutionalization of ASEAN’s development.82 Even though the planned date of the creation of the ASEAN Community was quite remote, analysts were skeptical about the feasibility of implementing the declaration, as ASEAN’s emphasis on voluntary action as well as the actual conceptualization phase of the ASEAN Community itself made this target a challenging one.83 Despite these doubts, the participants of the 12th ASEAN Summit in Cebu in 2007 decided to accelerate the process and create the ASEAN Community by 2015. Such a short period seemed to be entirely insufficient to reach the stated goals, but at the same time, the proximity of the goal could accelerate progress toward it.84 The ASEAN Charter was adopted in November 2007 in Singapore and entered into force on December 15, 2008). It was a definitive milestone in ASEAN’s evolution, setting out the framework of ASEAN activities and future development.

efforts in international affairs was rejected. Cf.:  Smith, Anthony:  “ASEAN’s Ninth Summit: Solidifying Regional Cohesion, Advancing External Linkages.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (3), 2004, pp. 416–​433. 81 Cf.: Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II), retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=declaration-​of-​asean-​concord-​ii-​bali-​concord-​ii. 82 Cf.: Recommendations of the High-​Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=recommendations-​of-​t he-​ high-​level-​task-​force-​on-​asean-​economic-​integration. 83 The dispute settlement mechanism in the ASEAN Economic Community was an exception stemming from the economic interests of Thailand and Singapore. Generally, each ASEAN member state may engage in this newly created community to the extent that its capabilities allow. Cf.: Ferguson, James: “ASEAN Concord II: Policy Prospects for Participant Regional ‘Development’.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (3), 2004, pp. 393–​415. 84 Cf.: Cebu Declaration on the Blueprint of the ASEAN Charter, Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007 and Cebu Declaration on the Acceleration of the Establishment of an ASEAN Community by 2015, Cebu, Philippines, 13 January 2007, both retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=cebu-​declaration-​on-​t he-​blueprint-​ of-​t he-​asean-​charter-​cebu-​philippines-​13-​january-​2007.

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As a result of the Charter, ASEAN acquired a legal personality.85 There is no doubt that the ASEAN Charter was a sign of progress, as the principle of consensual decision making was somewhat weakened (the ASEAN Summit had the right to decide about decision-​making mechanisms where consensus was lacking). Additionally, the so-​called ASEAN minus X formula was included in the Charter, providing a mechanism for tailoring solutions that were not applicable to those who had opted out, to be adopted in the economic sphere.86 In order to make ASEAN’s structure more efficient, the Committee of Permanent Representatives was created to coordinate ASEAN politics internally (with a Secretariat and member states) and externally (with ASEAN partners).87 The Committee established its in Jakarta in ASEAN headquarters. With respect to external relations, the centrality of ASEAN in regional cooperation is a notable and recurring topic. Such an approach is commensurate with the policy of building a regional institution with ASEAN ‘in the driver’s seat,’ as in ASEAN Plus Three (institutionalized since 1999), the East Asian Summit (since 2005), the negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (since 2012), or the ASEAN Regional Forum (since 1994).88 Analysts stress the fact that ASEAN centrality would be possible only if

85 Regarding the process that led to the adoption of the ASEAN Charter, cf.: Soesastro, Hadi: Finally, a Charter for ASEAN .” Bulletin of East Asia Bureau of Economic Research Oct. 2006. 86 Such a procedure (as well as the 2 plus X procedure) had been applied before, but its institutionalization greatly facilitates ASEAN’s operations. Cf.: The ASEAN Charter, The ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2007. For more on the challenges that stemmed from this crucial ASEAN document, including the procedures to be followed in case of violation of the Charter itself by ASEAN member states (decided in a consensual way by the ASEAN Summit) and the ineffective dispute settlement mechanism, cf.: Caballero-​Anthony, Mely: “The ASEAN Charter: An Opportunity Missed or One that Cannot Be Missed?” In: Singh, Daljit /​Than, Tin Maung Maung (eds.): Southeast Asian Affairs 2008. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2008, pp. 71–​85. 87 Cf.: ASEAN Charter for ASEAN Peoples, Chairman’s Statement of the 14th ASEAN Summit, Cha-​a m, 28 February –​1 March 2009, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​ asean.org/​?static_​post=chairman-​s-​statement-​of-​t he-​14th-​asean-​summit-​asean-​ charter-​for-​asean-​peoples. 88 Cf. Ba, Alice:  “The Institutionalization of Southeast Asia:  ASEAN and ASEAN Centrality.” In: Ba, Alice /​Kuik, Cheng-​Chwee /​Sudo, Sueo (eds.): Institutionalizing East Asia: Mapping and Reconfigurating Regional Cooperation. Routledge: London-​ New  York 2017, pp.  11–​34; Narine, Shaun:  The New ASEAN in Asia-​Pacific and Beyond. Lynne Rienner: Boulder-​London 2018, pp. 85–​116.

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ASEAN itself were to be more integrated, which will not be possible in light of the provisions of the ASEAN Charter.89 Finally, the document also stipulated the creation of a human rights body, without defining it. Subsequently, the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was created and began operations in 2009. In 2012, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration was adopted, incorporating a vast catalogue of human rights (political and civil rights, economic rights, social and cultural rights, as well as the right to development and peace).90 On the one hand, the creation of the AICHR seemed to be a breakthrough in ASEAN’s operations and the implementation of its principles; on the other, the Commission itself, as well as the Declaration, were created in a way that raised criticism, solidifying an illiberal understanding of human rights and reducing their protection vis-​à-​v is universal declarations.91 The ineffectiveness of the ASEAN human rights protection mechanism has been especially apparent in the context of the latest Rohingya crisis.92 The most important ASEAN documents and developments in its 50-​year history are briefly presented in Table 1.

89 Cf.: Wanandi, Jusuf: The ASEAN Charter and Remodeling Regional Architecture, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​w ww.eastasiaforum.org/​2008/​11/​09/​t he-​asean-​ charter-​a nd-​remodeling-​regional-​architecture/​. 90 Cf.: ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference), ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2009 and ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Phnom Penh Statement on the Adoption of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration (AHRD), ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2013. 91 Cf.: Wahyuningrum, Yuyun: “AICHR After Five Years: Progress, Challenges and Opportunities.” Focus 76, 2014, Asia-​Pacific Human Rights Information Center, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​w ww.hurights.or.jp/​archives/​focus/​section3/​ 2014/​06/​aichr-​a fter-​five-​years-​progress-​challenges-​a nd-​opportunities.html; Jones, William: “Universalizing Human Rights The ASEAN Way.” International Journal of Social Sciences III (3), 2014, pp. 72–​89. 92 Limsiritong, Nattapat: “Why ASEAN Fails to Play a Role in the Rohingya Situation from the Perspective of the ASEAN Charter.” Asian Political Science Review 1 (2), 2017, pp. 73–​79.

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Table 1:  ASEAN Chronology Year and Location 1967 –​ Bangkok, Thailand 1971 –​ Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1976 –​ Bali, Indonesia 1992 –​ Singapore 1995 –​ Bangkok, Thailand 1997 –​ Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 1998 –​ Hanoi, Vietnam 2001 –​Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei 2002 –​ Phnom Penh, Cambodia 2003 –​ Bali, Indonesia

2004 –​ Vientiane, Laos 2005 –​ Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 2007 –​Cebu, The Philippines 2007 –​ Singapore

Selected ASEAN Developments and Documents ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok Declaration) –​foundation of ASEAN (five members states) Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration –​freedom from third-​party intervention in the region First ASEAN Summit –​Declaration of ASEAN Concord –​ regulating general rules of cooperation; Treaty of Amity and Cooperation –​including peaceful dispute settlement and non-​ intervention of third parties Decision on the creation of the ASEAN Free Trade Area; ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-​Free Zone ASEAN Vision 2020 –​different dimensions of economic integration, as well as other areas for integration; creation of the ASEAN Foundation; ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services Hanoi Action Plan –​closer economic cooperation, including macroeconomic and financial integration Report of the East Asia Vision Group: Towards an East Asian Community: Region of Peace, Prosperity, and Progress Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea; final report of the East Asia Study Group (EASG) on East Asian integration (in ASEAN+3 formula) Declaration of ASEAN Concord II –​Bali Concord II –​ commitment to the creation of an ASEAN Community by 2020 (based on three pillars: the ASEAN Security Community, the ASEAN Economic Community, and the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community) Vientiane Action Program –​further regional integration and reduction of development gap (based on the Initiative for ASEAN Integration of 2000) Decision to begin preparation of the ASEAN Charter and creation of the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to lead the project; First East Asia Summit EPG report on the ASEAN Charter; decision to establish the ASEAN Community by 2015 (instead of 2020); Energy security declaration Adoption of the ASEAN Charter –​making ASEAN an international organization; ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (continued on next page)

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Table 1: Continued Year and Location 2009 –​ Cha-​am, Thailand

2010 –​ Hanoi, Vietnam 2011 –​ Bali, Indonesia

Selected ASEAN Developments and Documents Cha-​am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community 2009–​2015; ASEAN Political-​Security Community Blueprint; Blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community, IAI Initiative for ASEAN Integration; ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity Framework agreement on RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership); Declaration on ASEAN in the Global Community of Nations –​Bali Concord III Launch of negotiations

2012 –​ Phnom Penh, Cambodia 2014 –​Nay Pyi Taw, Nay Pyi Taw Declaration on the ASEAN Community’s Post-​2015 Myanmar Vision; Declaration on Strengthening ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN Reviewing the ASEAN Organs 2015 –​ Kuala 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the Lumpur, ASEAN Community; The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN Malaysia (two 2025: Forging Ahead Together summits: April, November) 2016 –​ Vientiane, Vientiane Declaration on the Adoption of the Initiative for Laos ASEAN Integration Work Plan III; Vientiane Declaration on the Adoption of the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025 2017 –​Manila, The 50th Anniversary of ASEAN, Commemorative publications Philippines (two and analyses by both the ASEAN Secretariat and the Economic summits: April, Research Institute of ASEAN and East Asia (ASEAN @50) November) 2018 –​ ASEAN Leaders’ Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN; Singapore (two declaration of consular assistance to ASEAN citizens in third summits: April, countries; ASEAN Smart Cities Framework November) 2019 –​ Bangkok, ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-​Pacific; Sustainable Development Thailand (two (including role of education) summits: June, November) Source: own work based on official ASEAN documents

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The ASEAN Community The creation of the ASEAN Community by 2015 (initially by 2020)  was undoubtedly the top priority for the organization in the 2010s. Despite the declarations made during the Bali Summit (2003) and the Vientiane Summit (2004), analysts have focused on a series of challenges that render the creation of the ASEAN Community itself risky and doubtful. These challenges include (1)  lack of proper legitimacy; (2)  overburdening ASEAN’s agenda with regional initiatives; (3) soft mechanisms of implementation of regional initiatives, leading to a path of soft integration; (4) the domination of national bureaucrats in the integration process; (5) the diversification of ASEAN, especially since the accession of CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam).93 The 2007 decision to accelerate the creation of the ASEAN Community (from 2020 to 2015) was followed by a set of blueprints for the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC; 2007)  as well as the ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC; 2009)  and the ASEAN Socio-​ Cultural Community (ASCC; 2009). In March 2009, ASEAN leaders decided to substitute the Vientiane Action Program with the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community 2009–​2015 (including blueprints for AEC, APSC, ASCC, and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Workplan 2).94 The idea of an ASEAN Economic Community was conceived in connection with the diminishing competitive advantage of the organization. ASEAN was losing its competitive edge in labor costs, as well as in foreign direct investment, where it was challenged by China and India. At the same time, the diversification of the ASEAN economies favored integration due to their complementary nature.95 Based on past initiatives, including the ASEAN Free Trade Area (finalized in 1992), the ASEAN Investment Area (1998), as well as the ASEAN

93 Cf.: Hew, Denis /​Wah, Chin Kin /​Guan, Lee Hock (eds.): Towards Realizing an ASEAN Community: A Brief Report on the ASEAN Community Roundtable. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2004, pp. 4–​5. This report also states that regional institutions should not have any supranational features (p. 18). 94 Cf.: Cha-​am Hua Hin Declaration on the Roadmap for the ASEAN Community (2009–​2015), retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=cha-​a m-​hua-​ hin-​declaration-​on-​t he-​roadmap-​for-​t he-​asean-​community-​2009-​2015. 95 Hew, Denis: “Introduction.” In: Hew, Denis (ed.): Brick by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2007, pp. 2–​3.

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Framework on Services (1995), the leaders of the organization decided to build an integrated economic area.96 The details of this concept have become a subject of debate, with three basic approaches emerging:  the Free Trade Area Plus (promoted by the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore),97 the Common Market Minus (promoted by the ASEAN-​ISIS),98 and the Customs Union Plus, based

96 Ibid., pp.  5–​7. Regarding the baseline conditions for the creation of the AEC, cf.: Tongzon, Jose /​Khan, Habibullah: “The Challenge of Economic Integration for Transitional Economies of Southeast Asia”; Oktaviani, Rina /​Rifin, Amzul /​ Reinhard, Henny: “A Review of Regional Tariffs and Trade in the ASEAN Priority Goods Sectors”; Dios, Loreli: “Non-​Tariff Barriers to Trade in the ASEAN Priority Goods Sectors” All in: Hew, Denis (ed.): Brick by Brick: The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies:  Singapore 2007, pp. 36–​115. 97 According to this approach, ASEAN was to be a Free Trade Area enriched by selected features, such as free flows of capital and skilled workers. Detailed recommendations included (1) free flow of goods, services, investments, and capital (thanks to a zero tariff rate and the elimination of non-​tariff barriers); (2) creating a regional production platform to attract FDI; (3) free flow of skilled workers; (4) free flow of tourists from all ASEAN member states; (5) harmonization and minimization of customs procedures; (6) harmonization of standards in accordance with international standards; (7)  development of institutional and legal infrastructure that would enable economic integration. Cf.: Hew, Denis /​Soesastro, Hadi: “Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community by 2020: ISEAS and ASEAN-​ISIS Approaches.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 20 (3), 2003, pp. 292–​296. 98 This approach was supported by the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies network (ASEAN-​ISIS), while the Common Market Minus was understood as fully free flows of goods, services, capital, but also workers and capital, including the right to establish a company in any ASEAN country. The proposal included an option to postpone integration in certain sectors in certain countries. Detailed recommendations included: (1) coherent implementation of AFTA and AIA; (2) removal of all non-​tariff barriers; (3) harmonization of external tariffs; (4) harmonization of custom procedures and standards; (5) creation of a credible dispute settlement mechanism; (6) implementation of a two-​speed integration mechanism; (7) creation of ‘regional units’ responsible for specific integration sectors and operated by international personnel, independent from member states’ governments; (8)  creation of regional security mechanisms administered by ‘regional units’; (9) ‘regional units’ should also be responsible for joint policies, including development cooperation and progress monitoring. Cf.: Soesastro, Hadi: “ASEAN Economic Community: Concept, Costs, and Benefits.” In: Hew, Denis (ed.): Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005, pp. 13–​30.

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on European patterns (promoted by Michael Plummer).99 In the project approved in November 2007 in Singapore by ASEAN leaders, the decision was made to turn the AEC into a single market and a production base, accelerating existing economic initiatives, integrating priority sectors, facilitating the movement of businesspeople and skilled labor, improving institutional mechanisms in ASEAN, and contributing to the development of equality as well as the integration of the region with the global economy.100 In order to monitor progress in the implementation of the community initiatives, the so-​ called ASEAN Economic Community Scorecard mechanism was created. In December 2014, according to the scorecard, 83.4 % of the tasks scheduled had already been implemented in four basic areas.101 At the same time, even though the removal of tariff barriers was relatively smooth, non-​tariff barriers and greater integration in the areas of services and investment continued to pose considerable challenges.102 The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025 was adopted at the 2015 ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, largely focusing on the same goals that had driven ASEAN integration until then, without going beyond the common

99 Michael Plummer proposed the creation of a Customs Union Plus, based on European precedent and open regionalism, with minimal or zero external tariffs. Cf.: Plummer, Michael: “Creating an ASEAN Economic Community: Lessons from the EU and Reflections on the Roadmap.” In: Hew, Denis (ed.): Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, pp. 31–​59. 100 It is worth mentioning that none of these proposals created a genuine common market in the region, for obvious reasons. Cf.:  Lloyd, Peter:  “What Is a Single Market? An Application to the Case of ASEAN.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 22 (3), 2005, pp. 251–​265. 101 AEC Scorecard Key Deliverables. Data based on official ASEAN presentation. ASEAN: A Community of Opportunities, retrieved 25.07.2015, from http://​w ww. asean.org/​i mages/​ASEAN_​RTK_​2014/​ASEAN%20-​%20A%20Community%20 of%20Opportunities%20(Overview%20PPT)_​March2015.pptx.zip. 102 Cf.: Siow Yue, Chia: “The ASEAN Economic Community: Progress, Challenges, and Prospects.” ADBI Working Paper Series 440, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo 2013, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​w ww.adb.org/​sites/​default/​fi les/​publication/​156295/​adbi-​w p440.pdf. Challenges in other pillars of integration are analyzed in: Menon, Jayant /​Melendez, Anna: “Realizing an ASEAN Community: Progress and Challenges.” ADB Economic Working Paper Series 432, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo 2015, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​w ww.adb.org/​sites/​ default/​fi les/​publication/​160067/​ewp-​432.pdf.

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market minus approach (in reality, one should still assess it as FTA plus).103 This relatively comprehensive document outlined a broad set of goals, including a highly integrated and cohesive economy (with simplified and strengthened rules of origin, intensified implementation of trade facilitation measures, minimized non-​tariff barriers to reduce obstacles to free trade, consolidated standards and conformity, trade in services, financial integration, and even lowered barriers to the movement of skilled labor); a competitive, innovative, and dynamic ASEAN (including competition policy, consumer protection, protection of intellectual property rights, as well as cooperation on R&D and even taxation); enhanced connectivity and sectoral cooperation; a resilient, inclusive, people-​oriented, people-​centered ASEAN, as well as well as a so-​called global ASEAN, focusing on cooperation with third parties.104 This extensive list corresponds with other ASEAN documents in terms of their ambitious goals, though these are often non-​achievable, largely due to a lack of political will;, hence, one can expect a lack of success in this endeavor. Estimations of the role of the ASEAN Economic Community in the regional economy vary, but Computable General Equilibrium (CGD) models, based on the assumption that all tariffs and non-​tariff barriers will be eliminated, the service sector will be liberalized, reforms will take place in foreign direct investment, and trade costs will be reduced (by 5 %), suggest that GDP should rise by 5.3  % (unequally across various ASEAN countries), or six times the growth that the regional economy would experience if only AFTA were to be implemented.105 Without doubt, the AEC faces serious challenges that derive from the slow implementation of even the basic components of the project (like the free flow of goods), let alone more difficult ones, such as skilled labor migration.106 Despite numerous doubts concerning the effectiveness of ASEAN, especially in the political and security spheres, both analysts and people connected with ASEAN stress the fact that there have been virtually no military conflicts 103 Cf.: ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2015, pp. 3–​36. 104 Cf.: The ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint 2025. The ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2015, pp. 3–​36. 105 Cf.:  Chia, Siow Yue /​Plummer, Michael:  ASEAN Economic Cooperation and Integration:  Progress, Challenges and Future Directions. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2015, pp. 82–​87. 106 Cf.: Das, Sanchita Basu: The ASEAN Economic Community and Beyond: Myths and Realities. The ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute, Singapore 2016, pp. 11–​92.

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among its members since ASEAN’s inception. Even though the political and security dimensions were crucial for the organization in its early stages, ASEAN seems inefficient in dispute settlement due to its non-​interference principle. In the post-​Cold War environment, and especially in the 21st century, when non-​ inter-​state conflicts have become incontestably prevalent in the world, such a principle should be properly adapted in order to maintain ASEAN’s effectiveness and efficiency. The ASEAN Political and Security Community (APSC), conceptualized in the APSC Blueprint of 2009, was based on a previous set of treaties, including the Bangkok Declaration (1967), the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration (Kuala Lumpur 1971), the Declaration of ASEAN Concord (Bali 1976), the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Manila 1992), the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Bangkok 1995/​1997), the ASEAN Vision 2020 (Kuala Lumpur 1997), and Bali Concord II (2003).107 The 2009 APSC Blueprint comprised three basic dimensions of the Community, specifically (1) a rules-​based community with shared norms and values (including political development, reinforcing the rule of law, good governance, promotion of human rights, democracy, peace and stability, and an anchoring in the aforementioned treaties); (2) a resilient and stable region of shared responsibility for comprehensive security (including conflict prevention and confidence building measures, dispute settlement, consolidation of peace, joint mitigation of non-​ traditional security threats, cooperation in natural disaster prevention and assistance, and efficient response to crisis situations in ASEAN); (3) a dynamic and outward-​looking region in an interdependent world (including a focus on ASEAN centrality in regional organizations, cooperation with external partners, as well as cooperation and consultation on international issues).108 In December 2014, the ASEAN Political and Security Community Blueprint was estimated to have been 86 % implemented.109 In 2015, the ASEAN Political-​ Security Community Blueprint 2025 was adopted. A fourth dimension was added to the three areas above, which were themselves slightly updated:  strengthening the institutional capacity and 107 Cf.: Factsheet on ASEAN Political-​Security Community, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2019/​01/​32.-​November-​2018-​Fact-​Sheet-​on-​APSC1.pdf, pp. 1–​4. 108 Cf.:  ASEAN Political-​ Security Community Blueprint, Cha-​ a m, Thailand, 1 March 2009, pp. 2–​15, retrieved 17.11.2019, from http://​w ww.asean.org/​archive/​ 5187-​18.pdf. 109 Data based on official ASEAN presentation: ASEAN: A Community of Opportunities.

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presence of ASEAN.110 The construction of the ASEAN Political and Security Community is undoubtedly a challenging task, as certain sensitive topics that by the project addresses can be very difficult to implement given the document’s declaratory nature, as can the realization of the so-​called ASEAN-​Way, especially given that the aforementioned program documents (blueprints) describe their implementation mechanisms in less than half a page.111 The creation of a people-​centered organization was declared as the main goal of the third pillar of the ASEAN Community, namely the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community (ASCC). Additionally, the ASCC should be socially responsible, focusing especially on marginalized groups, aiming at the same time to achieve solidarity and unity among the ASEAN nations, and the creation of an ASEAN identity. Such ambitions are without a doubt extremely important, but at the same embody long-​term goals; hence, they could be thought of as part of a two-​ generation (or forty-​years) approach. The fact that ASEAN leaders have decided to implement these goals should be appreciated. The ASCC project is surprisingly extensive but difficult to properly implement based on its multitude of components:  human development (including education, decent work, ICT, science and technology, civil service, and support for disadvantaged groups, among others); social welfare (including poverty alleviation, social security, food security, development of health care systems, and drug alleviation); social justice and social rights (including protection of women, the elderly, disabled, and migrant populations, as well as promotion of corporate social responsibility); environmental sustainability writ large; creation of an ASEAN identity; and the so-​called narrowing of the development gap within ASEAN.112 Such a broad agenda is certainly important for the Association, as these activities are vital for community creation. On the other hand, however, we have a multidimensional agenda, including development priorities, extremely expensive

110 The updated focus areas were phrased in the following way: “Rules-​Based, People-​ Oriented, People-​Centred Community; Peaceful, Secure and Stable Region; ASEAN Centrality in a Dynamic and Outward-​Looking Region; Strengthened ASEAN Institutional Capacity and Presence.” Cf.: ASEAN Political-​Security Community Blueprint 2025. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2016, pp. 2–​35. 111 For current developments in the APSC, cf.: “ASEAN’s Journey as a Political and Security Community: A Snapshot of 2018 and a Preview of 2019.” APSC Outlook 1 (1), 2019, pp. 5–​15. 112 Cf.:  Blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community (2009–​2015),Cha-​a m, Thailand, 1 March 2009, pp. 2–​26, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​ content/​uploads/​archive/​5187-​19.pdf.

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social security goals, and, finally, the reduction of the development gap, all of which require expenditure from the richer ASEAN member states (supported by external revenues).113 One should certainly stress the role of the creation of an ASEAN identity, though in reality one should rather approach it from a multi-​generational perspective, as it constitutes arguably the most challenging task and the real tool to make ASEAN not only an institution but also a community. This goal, while long-​term, requires substantial resources and strong institutions, but first and foremost, a real aspiration on the part of the ASEAN member states to create such an identity.114 As for the implementation of the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community Blueprint, in December 2014, it was estimated at 97 %.115 Despite this declared high degree of implementation, ASEAN prepared a substantially reviewed ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community Blueprint 2025 in 2015, adapting the previous Blueprint’s assumptions into five categories, including engagement and benefits for people (with a focus on stakeholders and strengthened institutions), inclusiveness (including human rights protections), sustainability, and resilience and dynamism in ASEAN.116 It is worth mentioning that this new document addresses crucial issues related to the long-​term development of ASEAN into a community, while still lacking the resources to implement this goal.

113 The ASCC project drew on the following sources of financing: (1) ASEAN member states; (2)  dialogue partners, sectoral and developmental partners; (3)  regional and international institutions, especially the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank (International Financial Corporation); (4) regional and international foundations; (5) the private sector. Cf.: Blueprint for the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community (2009–​2015), p. 28. 114 Cf.: Jones, Michael: “Forging an ASEAN Identity: The Challenge to Construct a Shared Destiny.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 26 (1), 2004, pp. 140–​154; Morada, Noel: “ASEAN at 40: Prospects for Community Building in Southeast Asia.” Asia-​ Pacific Review 15 (1), 2008, pp. 36–​55. 115 Data based on official ASEAN presentation: ASEAN: A Community of Opportunities. Cf.: Midterm Review of the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community Blueprint (2009–​ 2015), Regional Assessment, Adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 23rd ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta 2014. 116 Cf.: ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community Blueprint 2025. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2016, pp. 4–​20.

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Recent Developments The ASEAN Community was formally created at the 27th ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur,117 and the development path for ASEAN to complete by 2025 was outlined in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025: Forging Ahead Together.118 This formally succeeded the Roadmap for an ASEAN Community, bringing rather minor changes to the elements of the previous documents. Initially, the Kuala Lumpur Declaration was composed was composed of the Declaration itself, the ASEAN Community Vision 2025, and three blueprints for three communities (AEC, APSC, ASCC). In 2016, two documents were added, namely the Initiative for ASEAN Integration Work Plan and the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2025. All of these documents formed a cohesive vision for ASEAN’s development for the forthcoming decade, while at the same time promising more than ASEAN could achieve.119 Additionally, the Vientiane Summits in 2016 (held together on September 6 and 7, 2016) focused on issues connected with disaster response, decent work, cultural cooperation, climate change, and the elimination of HIV/​AIDS in the region. It is also worth mentioning that the ASEAN leaders focused also on institutional strengthening, which referred both to the Secretariat itself and other ASEAN bodies.120 In 2017, ASEAN celebrated its 50th anniversary with a series of celebrations and commemorative publications, including the statistical publication Celebrating ASEAN:  50 Years of Evolution and Progress  –​A  Statistical Publication, providing an overview of the achievements of the organization between 1967 and 2017. There is no doubt that the progress that has taken place within ASEAN is tremendous (in economic and social terms as well as in the narrowing of 117 Cf.: 2015 Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the Establishment of the ASEAN Community, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​images/​ 2015/​November/​27th-​summit/​statement/​Final-​Chairmans%20Statement%20of%20 27th%20ASEAN%20Summit-​25%20November%202015.pdf. 118 Cf.:  The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025:  Forging Ahead Together, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​images/​2015/​ November/​K L-​Declaration/​K L%20Declaration%20on%20ASEAN%202025%20 Forging%20Ahead%20Together.pdf. 119 Cf.: Celebrating ASEAN: 50 Years of Evolution and Progress: A Statistical Publication. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2017, pp. 68–​69. 120 Cf.: Turning Vision into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN Community: Chairman’s Statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits. Vientiane, 6–​7 September 2016, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2016/​08/​Final-​ Chairmans-​Statement-​of-​t he-​28th-​a nd-​29th-​ASEAN-​Summits-​rev-​fin.pdf.

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the connectivity and development gap), but on the other hand, in certain dimensions, the publication compares the ASEAN of 1967, which comprised 5 member states, with the ASEAN of 2017, which comprised 10 member states.121 A  monumental, five-​volume publication titled ASEAN @50 (ca. 2000 pages) was also published by the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) in October 2017, focusing on leaders and officials (vol. 1), peoples (vol. 2), member states (vol. 3), and the aforementioned communities, i.e. the ASEAN Political-​Security and Socio-​Cultural Communities (vol.  4) and the ASEAN Economic Community (vol. 5).122 As Singapore was hosting the ASEAN summits in 2018, ASEAN leaders focused on not only on the smart cities framework but also on consular assistance for ASEAN citizens in third countries and the broad Leaders’ Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN.123 In 2019, ASEAN focused on sustainable development, including the role of education in the future of ASEAN, but on the other hand, joined the broad efforts to integrate the Indo-​Pacific region, declaring cooperation with the Asia-​Pacific region and the Indian Ocean area while retaining the centrality of ASEAN.124 121 Cf.: Celebrating ASEAN: 50 Years of Evolution and Progress: A Statistical Publication, pp. 2–​67. 122 Cf.: ASEAN @50. Vol. 1: Pitsuwan, Surin /​Nishimura, Hidetoshi /​Intal, Ponciano, Chongkittavorn, Kavi /​Maramis, Larry (eds.): The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials; Vol. 2: Intal, Ponciano /​Ruddy, Ludia (eds.): Voices of ASEAN: What Does ASEAN Mean to ASEAN Peoples?; Vol. 3: Intal, Ponciano /​ Lurong, Chen (eds.): ASEAN and Member States: Transformation and Integration; Vol. 4: Baviera, Aileen /​Maramis, Larry (eds.): Building ASEAN Community: Political-​ Security and Socio-​Cultural Reflections; Vol. 5: Maria, Rebecca /​Urata, Shujiro /​ Intal, Ponciano: The ASEAN Economic Community Into 2025 and Beyond. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia: Jakarta 2017. 123 Cf.:  ASEAN Smart Cities Framework, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean. org/​storage/​2012/​05/​ASEAN-​Smart-​Cities-​Framework.pdf; Declaration on the Guidelines on Consular Assistance by ASEAN Member States’ Missions in Third Countries to Nationals of Other ASEAN Member States, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2018/​11/​Declaration-​on-​TCCA-​Adopted.pdf; ASEAN Leaders’ Vision for a Resilient and Innovative ASEAN, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​a sean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2 018/​0 4/​A SEAN-​L eaders-​Vision-​for-​a-​ Resilient-​a nd-​Innovative-​ASEAN.pdf. 124 Cf.: ASEAN Leaders’ Vision Statement on Partnership for Sustainability, 23 June 2019, Bangkok, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2019/​06/​1.-​ASEAN-​ Leaders-​Vision-​Statement_​FINAL.pdf; ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-​ Pacific, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2019/​06/​ASEAN-​Outlook-​on-​ the-​Indo-​Pacific_​FINAL_​22062019.pdf.

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The future of ASEAN is promising, but there are clear challenges to address. In 2019, the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) published a report titled ASEAN Vision 2040:  Towards a Bolder and Stronger ASEAN Community. Its four volumes address different dimensions of ASEAN’s development, but the most important areas deal with the necessity of maintaining open and inclusive development based on a multilateral trade regime and an economic order based on rules, as well as maintaining the centrality of ASEAN in Asian affairs, including Asian economic integration (with a crucial role for the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership –​RCEP). In order to achieve this, ASEAN should create national ASEAN institutions supporting the organization, coordinate work across ASEAN communities, reform the ASEAN Secretariat, establish a new Policy Review and Analysis Mechanism, cooperate more closely with regional think tanks, and finally ensure that ASEAN peoples understand and internalize the ASEAN vision and mission.125

Conclusions ASEAN has hitherto operated on a set of ambivalent principles, initially accepted at the Treaty on Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) as an embodiment of the so-​called ASEAN Way, which is commonly perceived as the source of the success of ASEAN, but also highly criticized in light of the fact that ASEAN is not able to deal with relatively simple regional problems.126 These principles and the ASEAN Way itself are rooted in the peculiarity of international relations in the region as well as the member states’ approach to integration, raising fears of limiting their relatively recent sovereignty. In this context, the non-​intervention principle seems crucial, as it virtually precludes 125 Intal, Ponciano /​Pangestu, Mari (project coordinators): ASEAN Vision 2040: Towards a Bolder and Stronger ASEAN Community, vol. 1. Economic Research Institute for East Asia (ERIA): Jakarta 2019, pp. 1–​12. 126 David Joens and Michael Smith prove in their analysis –​which focuses on the ASEAN Economic Community and failures of integrating ASEAN markets, the ASEAN Security Community and non-​traditional security threats (with a general lack of success), and problems related to the South China Sea and ASEAN-​China relations (with the norms depending more on China than on ASEAN) –​that ASEAN’s norms, especially non-​interference and non-​binding consensus, have prevented closer integration between ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three. Cf.: Jones, David /​ Smith, Michael: “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order.” International Security 32 (1), 2007, pp. 148–​184.

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the creation and especially the enforcement of binding norms. This problem is fundamental in the context of democracy, human rights, and especially in the evolving doctrine of humanitarian intervention, even though certain changes have already manifested themselves in ASEAN diplomacy in the early 21st century.127 At the same time, ASEAN’s devotion to a protracted decision making procedure on the basis of consultations and consensus (based on the Malayan concepts of musjawarah and mufukat, which underpin the ASEAN Way) makes ASEAN highly inefficient.128 Moreover, the ASEAN Way is sometimes simply understood as inefficient by design, as problems are not meant to be solved. On the other hand, such an approach is crucial for ASEAN members, as it provides them with a way to socialize and create an ASEAN identity.129 As mentioned earlier, the ASEAN Way may be understood twofold –​on the one hand, it may be perceived as a set of values and an organization representing them, which acts as a stepping stone toward community in Southeast Asia; on the other, it results from the narrow interests of the ASEAN member states.130 Somewhat paradoxically, both approaches are correct, and an unequivocal assessment of ASEAN is impossible, as all the aforementioned elements matter and ASEAN has an indisputable set of achievements in regional integration, being one of the few institutions created during the Cold War that adapted to the post-​Cold War international system and developed into a de jure international organization. ASEAN development may be understood in light of the theories applied in this chapter, including neoliberal institutionalism, constructivism, as well as an analysis of the institutional design of ASEAN.

127 Cf.: Katsumata, Hiro: “Why Is ASEAN Diplomacy Changing? From “Non-​Interference” to “Open and Frank Discussions.” Asian Survey 44 (2), 2004, pp. 237–​254. 128 Cf.: Solidum, Estrella: The Politics of ASEAN: An Introduction to Southeast Asian Regionalism. Eastern Universities Press: Singapore 2003, pp. 7–​99. 129 Cf.: Johnston, Alastair: “Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Way and International Relations Theory.” In: Ikenberry, John /​Mastanduno, Michael (eds.): International Relations Theory and the Asia-​Pacific. Columbia University Press: New York 2003, pp. 107–​162. Explanation of Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary General, explaining the ASEAN Way as the best solution for ASEAN, cf.: Severino, Rodolfo: “Will There Be a New ASEAN in the 21st Century?.” Asia Europe Journal 2, 2004, pp. 179–​184. 130 A complex analysis of the ASEAN Way based on constructivism is presented in Acharya, Amitav: Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order, 2014, pp. 43–​78.

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Neoliberal institutionalism explains the role of ASEAN member states in terms of organizational development. First, ASEAN may be understood as a tool for nation states (both ASEAN member states and global powers like the United States or People’s Republic of China) to increase their power in addition to jointly protecting their political and security interests (initially connected with the spread of communism in Southeast Asia). Second, as for the rational choice approach –​it is better to participate in the institution and shape it than to remain outside, as there is leverage power within international organizations, both for middle-​ranking powers and small countries (both of which can obtain relative gains deriving from cooperation). Third, there is set of club goods that are created within ASEAN, including a free trade area and closer economic integration, that may play an important role for the economic development of those countries, while not compelling countries to integrate too deeply. Fourth, in regional relations, ASEAN plays the dominant role (at least declaratively), and certainly a more important one than any individual ASEAN member state could. The constructivist understanding of ASEAN provides us with an additional, useful analytical framework. Culture and traditional values have clearly played a dominant role in the creation and operations of ASEAN, including the aforementioned ASEAN Way, building on the norms of non-​interference and consensual decision making. The ASEAN Way is even the title of the official anthem of the organization. This set of values was also used to create an identity that somewhat deliberately opposes so-​called Western values by supporting Asian values (especially popular within the Singapore school, with Malaysian leader Mahathir bin Mohammad and Singaporean leader Lee Kwan Yew as its most important promoters). Additionally, lack of coercion and opposition toward military cooperation have resulted in the weakness of ASEAN in relation to individual member states. We should note, however, that the most important issue for the development of ASEAN, as perceived through a constructivist paradigm, is the creation of an ASEAN identity. Such an identity would require ASEAN elites to internalize the primacy of the ASEAN paradigm, thus overcoming the primacy of state sovereignty, which is difficult at both the theoretical and practical levels. Theoretical developments in Southeast Asia (internal) are usually connected with self-​determination movements. The practical dimension refers to the decision to limit one’s own influence (usually political leaders want to keep it at the highest possible level) and grant it to an international or supranational organization. Second, this would require changing the mentality of the citizens of ASEAN member states. This is usually a long-​term process, conducted both domestically (via education systems, the

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media, etc.) and internationally (via international exchanges such as student exchanges, tourism, intermarriage, intermigration, etc.). The latter requires substantial financial contributions (like the European Erasmus program) and openness to large migration flows. Both are difficult for ASEAN member states. The institutional design of ASEAN results largely from the aforementioned developments at the level of member states, peoples, and leaders of ASEAN, but may also be broken down according to the theoretical paradigms elaborated by Amitav Acharya and Alistair Iain Johnston. Looking at their criteria, we can assess ASEAN as an institution with limited membership (currently ten member states), and hence with feasible cooperation. As for ideology, even though the organization espouses some shared norms (as mentioned above), there are important differences in the values of individual member states, including different religions, political systems, and ideologies. The ASEAN Way may be perceived as a lowest common denominator for those countries in terms of identity. Systemic power distribution is disputable, as on the one hand, ASEAN has traditionally featured Indonesia in a strong role, and on the other, the organization’s integration initiatives have enjoyed support by Singapore, and Malaysian support, particularly with respect to building a regional identity. In addition, extra-​systemic powers, including the United States and the People’s Republic of China, have played a substantial role in determining the power distribution in the region. As for external players, we have observed the positive influence of the European Union (for instance in its support for building ASEAN’s statistical capacity), Japan, and the Asian Development Bank Institute (which sees ASEAN as a counterbalance to rising Chinese influence), and periodically of China (supporting ASEAN Plus Three, especially after the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–​1998) and the United States (which was especially visible until the mid-​1990s). As for the integration factors analyzed by Acharya and Johnston, ASEAN is an exclusive institution, grouping ten member states, with a high likelihood of admitting a new one (Timor Leste) in the coming years. On the other hand, it has been cooperating within broader formats (like ASEAN Plus Three, the East Asia Summit, and the ASEAN Regional Forum) with formal ASEAN centrality, as well as with numerous dialogue partners. The scope of the issues covered by ASEAN seems rather broad, especially within the three ASEAN Communities, but at the same time, ASEAN is undeniably a non-​ intrusive organization due to its own principles and member states’ insistence on non-​interference. The decision-​making mechanism in ASEAN is generally consensual (even though other forms are possible, especially since the ASEAN Charter came into force), so reaching a decision is difficult. Moreover, its implementation is generally non-​binding. Nevertheless, its mandate is undeniably

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weak, which consequently renders ASEAN as an institution weak. Its institutional design may be characterized as overambitious, as the formal institutions that comprise it are actually weak or even powerless (including the Secretariat in Jakarta and Committee of Permanent Representatives). Overall, we can conclude that the weakness of ASEAN can be explained by both neoliberal institutionalist and constructivist theories. In the neoliberal paradigm, we should stress the dominant role of ASEAN nation states, which aspire to protecting their relatively young sovereignties, and thus tend to eschew efforts to strengthen the institution. From the constructivist standpoint, the ASEAN Way constitutes a lowest common denominator by doubling as a method of slowing down process of closer integration through its built-​in adherence to non-​interference and non-​binding, consensual decision making. On the other hand, the lack of an ASEAN identity, both among elites and the citizens of the member states, is an important challenge for the organization. The weak institutional structure of ASEAN results largely from the aforementioned factors, but this may be overcome if there is political will to reinforce the organization. Finally, despite all these challenges, ASEAN has been gradually progressing toward a more cohesive and developed international organization whose progress in the 21st century has been unequivocally impressive.

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Naya, Seiji /​Plummer, Michael:  “ASEAN Economic Co-​ operation in the New International Economic Environment.” ASEAN Economic Bulletin 7 (3), 1991. Nguyen, Minh Quang:  “Saving the China-​ASEAN South China Sea Code of Conduct.” The Diplomat, June 29, 2019, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​ thediplomat.com/​2019/​06/​saving-​t he-​china-​asean-​south-​china-​sea-​code-​ of-​conduct/​. Oktaviani, Rina /​Rifin, Amzul /​Reinhard, Henny:  “A Review of Regional Tariffs and Trade in the ASEAN Priority Goods Sectors.” In:  Hew, Denis (ed.):  Brick by Brick:  The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2007. Palmer, Norman:  “SEATO, ASA, MAPHILINDO and ASPAC.” In:  Sandhu, K.S.  et  al. (eds.):  The New ASEAN Reader. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 1992. Permanent Court of Arbitration: PCA Case Nº 2013–​19 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration before An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea between The Republic of the Philippines and The People’s Republic Of China, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​pca-​cpa.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​ sites/​6/​2016/​07/​PH-​CN-​20160712-​Award.pdf. Pitsuwan, Surin /​Nishimura, Hidetoshi /​Intal, Ponciano, Chongkittavorn, Kavi /​Maramis, Larry (eds.): ASEAN @50. Vol. 1: The ASEAN Journey: Reflections of ASEAN Leaders and Officials. Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia: Jakarta 2017. Plummer, Michael: “Creating an ASEAN Economic Community: Lessons from the EU and Reflections on the Roadmap.” In:  Hew, Denis (ed.):  Roadmap to an ASEAN Economic Community, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2005. Pramudwinai, Don:  Press Statement by the Chairperson of the 9th ASEAN Summit and the 7th ASEAN+3 Summit, Bali, Indonesia, 7  October  2003, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​post=press-​statement-​ by-​ t he-​ c hairperson-​ o f-​ t he-​ 9 th-​ a sean-​ s ummit-​ a nd-​ t he-​ 7th-​ a sean-​ 3 -​ summit-​bali-​indonesia-​7-​october-​2003. Radio Free Asia:  “China, Philippines, Vietnam Sign Joint South China Sea Oil Search Accord,” retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​w ww.rfa.org/​ingapo/​ news/​business/​china_​v ietnam_​spratlys-​20050314.html. Recommendations of the High-​ Level Task Force on ASEAN Economic Integration, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​ post=recommendations-​of-​t he-​high-​level-​task-​force-​on-​asean-​economic-​ integration.

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Than, Mya /​Gates, Carolyn (eds.):  ASEAN Enlargement:  Impacts and Implications. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2001. The Kuala Lumpur Declaration on ASEAN 2025:  Forging Ahead Together, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​ images/​2 015/ ​November/​K L-​D eclaration/​K L%20Declaration%20on%20 ASEAN%202025%20Forging%20Ahead%20Together.pdf. Tongzon, Jose /​Khan, Habibullah:  “The Challenge of Economic Integration for Transitional Economies of Southeast Asia.” In: Hew, Denis (ed.): Brick by Brick:  The Building of an ASEAN Economic Community. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies: Singapore 2007. Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, retrieved 24.11.2019, from https://​a sean.org/​t reaty-​a mity-​cooperation-​southeast-​a sia-​i ndonesia-​24-​ february-​1976/​. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-​Free Zone, Bangkok, Thailand, 15  December  1995, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​?static_​ post=treaty-​on-​t he-​southeast-​asia-​nuclear-​weapon-​free-​zone. Turning Vision into Reality for a Dynamic ASEAN Community: Chairman’s Statement of the 28th and 29th ASEAN Summits. Vientiane, 6–​7 September 2016, retrieved 15.11.2019, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2016/​ 08/​Final-​Chairmans-​Statement-​of-​t he-​28th-​a nd-​29th-​ASEAN-​Summits-​ rev-​fin.pdf. Wahyuningrum, Yuyun:  “AICHR After Five Years:  Progress, Challenges and Opportunities.” Focus 76, 2014, Asia-​Pacific Human Rights Information Center, retrieved 25.10.2019, from https://​w ww.hurights.or.jp/​archives/​ focus/​s ection3/​2 014/​0 6/​a ichr-​a fter-​f ive-​years-​progress-​challenges-​a nd-​ opportunities.html. Wanandi, Jusuf: The ASEAN Charter and Remodeling Regional Architecture, retrieved 17.11.2019, from https://​w ww.eastasiaforum.org/​2008/​11/​09/​t he-​ asean-​charter-​and-​remodeling-​regional-​architecture/​. Wesley, Michael:  “Asian Crisis and the Adequacy of Regional Institutions,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21 (1), 1999. Zietek, Agata: “The South China Sea: A Place of Rivalry and Power Management.” Teka Komisji Politologii i Stosunków Międzynarodowych 11 (1), 2016.. Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration, Malaysia, 27  November 1971. In:  Handbook on Selected ASEAN Political Documents. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2003. *

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Marcin Grabowski, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Jagiellonian University of Krakow and the Director of International Security and Development Program at the JU. His research interests focus on the Asia-​Pacific Rim, especially institutional arrangements in the region (APEC, ASEM, ASEAN, EAS, ARF, and SAARC), American and Chinese foreign policy, theories of IR and International Economics. Marcin graduated in International Relations from the Jagiellonian University in Krakow. He studied at Columbia University in the City of New  York (School of International and Public Affairs), George Washington University in Washington (Sigur Center for Asian Studies), and University of California, San Diego, where he completed the Global Leadership Institute program. He conducted his research, among others, at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy in Seoul, the Institute of Asia-​Pacific Studies of the Waseda University in Tokyo, the East Asian Bureau of Economic Research (EABER) in Canberra, the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies in Copenhagen and at Berkeley APEC Study Center. He has authored two monographs: Rywalizacja czy integracja: Procesy i organizacje integracyjne w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku na przełomie XX I XXI wieku [Cooperation or Competition: Integration Processes and Organizations in the Asia-​Pacific at the Turn of the 20th and the 21st Centuries], Księgarnia Akademicka, Kraków 2015, and Wiek Pacyfiku: Polityka Stanów Zjednoczonych wobec Azji i Pacyfiku po 1989 r. [The Pacific Century: U.S. Policy in the Asia-​ Pacific Region since  1989], Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Kraków 2012. He has edited five other volumes and authored numerous scholarly articles. He has also co-​edited (together with Professor Andrzej Mania) a series:  International Relations in Asia, Africa and the Americas:  Politics, Economy, Society –​Transdisciplinary Perspectives at Peter Lang Verlag.

Anna Grzywacz https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​2214-​7199

Singapore’s Approaches toward ASEAN Integration Abstract  Singapore has been one of the strongest members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the initiator or supporter of many institutional and non-​institutional initiatives and changes. Bolstering the development of the organization is a key goal of Singapore’s foreign policy. ASEAN is composed of three pillars: the Political-​Security Community, the Economic Community, and the Socio-​Cultural Community. Strengthening the association requires a balanced approach toward all three pillars; however, it is questionable whether Singapore’s policy is fully aligned with this goal. Thus, the research question of this paper is, “What are Singapore’s approaches toward the ASEAN Community and its pillars?” The argument is that, due to domestic constraints and its own national interests, the Singaporean government has three different approaches toward the ASEAN Community: (1) moderate support for the Political-​ Security Community; (2) active support for the Economic Community; and (3) passive support for the Socio-​Cultural Community. Keywords:  Singapore, foreign policy, ASEAN, ASEAN Community, balanced foreign policy

Introduction Singapore is a founding member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and one of its most powerful and influential actors. It has initiated numerous changes in the organization. Bolstering the development of the association is a key goal of Singapore’s foreign policy. ASEAN is composed of three pillars: the Political-​Security Community (APC), the Economic Community (EC), Socio-​Cultural Community (SCC). As suggested by the scholarly literature, the organization’s development requires a balanced approach to all three pillars. However, it is questionable whether Singapore’s policy is fully aligned with this goal. Thus, the research question of this paper is, “What are Singapore’s approaches toward the ASEAN Community and its pillars?” Singapore’s domestic constraints and preferences as well as the government’s national interests influence its foreign policy; as a result, Singapore presents different approaches toward each pillar. This paper argues that Singapore’s policy

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can be classified into three categories: (1) moderate support for the Political-​ Security Community; (2)  active support for the Economic Community; and (3) passive support for the Socio-​Cultural Community. The chapter is divided into several parts. The first section  –​this introduction  –​is followed by a literature review. In the third section, I provide an overview of Singapore’s foreign policy interests and its place in ASEAN. The fourth section outlines the main goals of the ASEAN Community and analyzes Singapore’s foreign policy toward each pillar. The paper ends with some concluding remarks and a brief discussion.

Literature review and balance in foreign policy The development of ASEAN has been widely analyzed in the scholarly literature. These analyses can be divided into at least two groups: (1) those focusing on the development of ASEAN from the regional (supranational) perspective, including the great powers’ impact on the region;131and (2) those focusing on the impact of ASEAN’s members on the organization’s evolution.132 The literature in the latter group is less abundant than the former. Among the scholarly approaches to the engagement of ASEAN’s members in the organization’s development, the discussion focuses on different aspects of the topic(mainly institutions, security, and norms) or the foreign policy of its members. Scholars

131 See recently published, including:  Yates, Robert:  “ASEAN as the ‘Regional Conductor’:  Understanding ASEAN’s Role in Asia-​Pacific Order.”The Pacific Review 30(4), 2017, pp. 443–​461; Jones, Catherine: “Great Powers, ASEAN, and Security:  Reason for Optimism?.” The Pacific Review, 2015, 28(2), pp.  259–​280; Jones, David Martin: “ASEAN and the Limits of Regionalism in Pacific Asia.”EUI Working Paper. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: Florence, 2015. Jones, David Martin /​Jenne, Nicole: “Weak States’ Regionalism: ASEAN and the Limits of Security Cooperation in Pacific Asia.” International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific, 16, 2016, pp. 209–​240. See also Jones, David Martin /​Smith, Michael: “Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order.”International Security, 32(1), 2007, pp.  148–​ 184; Fijałkowski, Łukasz:  Regionalny wymiar bezpieczeństwa w Azji Południowo-​Wschodniej. Normy-​instytucje-​ład regionalny. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego: Wrocław 2010. 132 Dobkowska, Joanna:  ASEAN jako platforma realizacji interesów państw Azji Południowo-​Wschodniej wobec Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej. (University of Warsaw). (doctoral thesis). Warsaw 2018. The author applied comparative analysis to analyze the foreign policy of all ten members of ASEAN, but also separately investigates the foreign policy of Indonesia and Singapore.

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concentrate on the most influential states:  Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, and, to some extent, the Philippines and Vietnam. The literature that analyzes the foreign policy of Singapore includes works that primarily investigate the topic from a security or economic standpoint.133 The literature applies realism and elements of realism, with rare reference to liberalism or the English School, to analyze and explain Singaporean foreign policy. Other frameworks are not used as often as theories of international relations, despite the findings of Alan Chong, who concludes that Singapore’s policy falls into the confluence between realism and liberalism in what he calls ‘abridged realism.’134 To address this weaknesses and develop the discussion on Singapore’s policy toward ASEAN, this paper proposes to analyze Singaporean politics toward all three community pillars through the adoption of another lens: the notion of balance in foreign policy and the means of achieving it. The inclusion of this aspect provides more detailed information on Singapore’s foreign policy and its impact on the ASEAN’s development. Balance is a popular concept in both international relations and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA), and is tightly connected with the concept of power. However, in FPA, balance is understood differently. The majority of scholarly works focuses on the ‘balanced foreign policy’ of a country toward another state actor, most often a great power. This approach is closely connected with the security (in both the traditional and non-​traditional sense) of a state. To provide a wider understanding and utilize the advantages of the notion of balance in FPA, this chapter proposes to analyze balance in foreign policy toward not an actor, but pillars of an organization. Balanced foreign policy is most often defined as the notion that a successful foreign policy should employ a

133 Koh, Tommy /​Seah, Sharon /​Chang, Li Lin (eds): 50 years of ASEAN and Singapore. World Scientific: Singapore 2017; Li-​Lian /​Sharon Seah:“Narrowing the Development Gap: Singapore and the Initiative for ASEAN Integration.” In Koh, Tommy /​Li-​ Lian, Sharon Seah/​Chang, Li Lin (eds): 50 years of ASEAN and Singapore. World Scientific: Singapore 2017, pp. 79–​84; Nawrot, Katarzyna A.: “Państwa ASEAN wobec procesów globalizacji.” In Deszczyński, Przemysław (ed.):  Globalizacja gospodarki. Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej: Poznań 2004, pp. 45–​63. 134 Chong, Alan: “Singapore’s foreign policy beliefs as ‘Abridged Realism’: Pragmatic and liberal prefixes in the foreign policy thought of Rajaratnam, Lee, Koh, and Mahbubani.” International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific6(2), 2006, pp. 269–​306.

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balance of economic, diplomatic, and military tools to reach its goals,”135 or a variation of this notion. This is a very broad definition, and what is characteristic of literature on balanced foreign policy is that conclusions are drawn on the basis of U.S.  and European experience. Moreover, it does not emphasize social and cultural factors in foreign policy. This understanding does not fit the Singaporean experience, nor does it align with Southeast Asian patterns of political behavior. This is not only a matter of different histories, political systems, or mechanisms of integration, to name a few aspects, but also (and more importantly), the fact that Singapore (and other ASEAN members) are not great powers engaged in the military operations (as in the case of the United States) and follow a different set of rules (as in the case of European countries). One of the statements underlying this analysis is that “ASEAN is determined to accelerate the full implementation of the ASEAN Community’s program areas, measures and principles, with appropriate flexibility and at the same time recognizes the importance for ASEAN member states to adopt a balanced approach toward achieving all the pillars of the ASEAN Community.”136 However, studies do not explain what a “balanced approach” is and how to analyze it. This chapter proposes to look at foreign policy and the role of balance within it from different perspective –​one that involves investigating the different approaches a country takes to the pillars of the organization in order to determine whether their approach as a whole is balanced. The Singaporean case shows that the country takes a distinct approach toward each of the three pillars; thus, its policy cannot be considered balanced. I draw this conclusion on the assumption that a country should provide the tools to meet all the declared goals; however, I do not suggest a country should allocate the same amount of effort or dedicate the same number of political initiatives to meet the goals of all three pillars.137

135 Press, Daryl/​Valentino, Benjamin:“A Balanced Foreign Policy.” In van Evera, Stephen (ed.): How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security. The Tobin Project: Cambridge 2006, pp. 39–​45. 136 Idris, Nor Azizan /​Othman, Zarina:  “Malaysia and the development of Asian regionalism.” In Lai To, Lee /​Othman, Zarina (ed.): Regional Community Building in East Asia. Countries in Focus. Routledge: London and New York 2017, p. 107. 137 That said, it must be noted that the effectiveness of the community-​building process is not only the result of a single member’s foreign policy, but also that of other members, as well as an agreement between the members on individual and collective responsibility.

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Singapore’s foreign policy goals, internal constraints, and its role in ASEAN Singapore is most commonly viewed as a ‘small state.’ Singapore has been an independent country since 1965. Due to its territorial size, population potential, and historical relations with its neighbors, Singapore’s policy is most often portrayed as an ‘ideology of survival.’138 Another concept associated with Singapore and its economic development is that of the ‘global city,’ a term coined by Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, Singapore’s minister for foreign affairs between 1965 and 1980.139 Suppiah Dhanabalan, minister for foreign affairs between 1980 and 1988, identified several basic features of Singapore’s foreign policy. According to the politician, they are:  (1) “we will be friends with all who wish to be friends;” (2) “we will trade with any state for mutual benefit, regardless of ideology or system of government;” (3) “we will remain non-​a ligned with regard to the rivalries of great-​power blocs;” (4) “we will cooperate closely with ASEAN members to achieve regional cohesion, stability and progress.”140 Despite ongoing changes on the international and national level, those main features are still the core components of Singapore’s contemporary foreign policy landscape. See Seng Tan writes that Singapore understands its limitations –​geographical location and size –​and therefore formulates a realistic and pragmatic outlook on foreign policy. Other main features of Singapore’s approach include the creation of a “political, diplomatic and economic space”141 that strengthens and helps to develop the country, and the idea that “Singapore promotes a balance of power in the belief that small states like it can survive and possibly thrive only in the interstices created by big powers.”142 Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister of Singapore (1959–​1990), contributed significantly to the contemporary understanding of the country’s foreign 138 Chan, Heng Chee: Singapore: the Politics of Survival, 1965–​1967. Oxford University Press: Oxford 1971. 139 A Singapore Government Agency Website:  Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby: “Singapore: Global City,” 1972, retrieved 7.4.2020, from http://​w ww.nap.gov.sg/​ archivesonline/​data/​pdfdoc/​PressR19720206a.pdf. 140 Lee, Boon Hiok: “Constraints on Singapore’s Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey 22(6), 1982, p. 527. 141 Tan, See Seng: “America the Indispensable: Singapore’s View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia-​Pacific.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38(3), 2011, p. 161. 142 Tan, p. 162.

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policy principles. Lee’s legacy was summarized by Tommy Koh, a Singaporean lawyer and diplomat, who concluded that Singapore’s foreign policy: (1) is pragmatic, which translates into a preference for security and economic development over ideology, doctrines, or values; (2) is independent, meaning that it is particularly important not to be dependent on more powerful actors; (3) is realistic, meaning that, while realism is associated with pragmatism, Singapore’s perception of the international system and its actors fits into the mold of realist theory in international relations; (4) is focused on ASEAN’s development while strengthening cooperation with Singapore’s closest neighbors, with special regard to Indonesia and Malaysia; (5) is focused on economic relations, especially at the regional level, which Singapore has demonstrated by supporting the Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC), Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC),143 and other initiatives; (6) promotes international norms and law, meaning that Singapore complies and with the principles of international law and supports the United Nations (UN) principles and a security system centered around the UN and the UN Security Council; (7)  promotes stability and evolutionary changes, with special regard to policy that helps to maintain the balance of power; consequently, good relations with the United States are considered to be essential for Singaporean and regional security.144 Goh Chok Tong, the second prime minister of Singapore (1990–​2004), also contributed to the development of the country’s foreign policy, basic principles developed by Lee Kuan Yew were preserved. Strengthening ASEAN and other regional institutions was one of his main objectives. Minister Rajaratnam considered ASEAN a platform of cooperation, where both national and regional interests can be reconciled; however, Singapore looked at ASEAN through the lens of its own development.145 Wong Kan Seng, minister of foreign affairs between 1988 and 1994, believed that regional cooperation under ASEAN and its acceleration were essential and considered it to be one of Singapore’s most important goals.146 We may therefore conclude that the Singaporean government considers regional development and support 1 43 The Secretariats of both APEC and PECC are located in Singapore. 144 Koh, Tommy:  The Tommy Koh Reader. Favourite Essays and Lectures. World Scientific: Singapore 2013. 145 Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby /​Chong, Gua Kwa: S. Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas to Reality. World Scientific: Singapore 2006. 146 The other two were protection of sovereignty and balance of power in Southeast Asia. See Acharya, Amitav: Asia Rising. Who is Leading?. World Scientific: Singapore 2008, p. 112.

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for regional institutions essential to national development and stability, especially in terms of its security and economy. ASEAN is therefore fundamental for Singapore, although other aspects are considered as important as the development of the association. These include resilience (understood as non-​ interference) as well as compliance with and promotion of international law. The main objectives of Singapore’s foreign policy ignore the social and cultural aspects of policy and integration processes. Singapore is considered to be a small state.147 The main criteria used to classify Singapore into this category are its size and population (Singapore is a ‘city state’ with 5.6 million residents).148 Singapore was founded as a trading port, as it is located in a strategic geographic area between Malaysia and Indonesia. However, being located between two larger countries with different cultures and religions has been considered a challenge to Singapore and its autonomy.149 Singapore is the most developed country among all ASEAN members in economic terms, but also in terms of social and cultural issues. Singapore has the best result in the adult literacy index, the lowest infant mortality rate, and the highest life expectancy,150 in addition to excellent results on corruption indices, quality of education, and technological innovation, to name but a few areas.151 Its economy has cemented its status as the most developed country in ASEAN (GDP per capita in 2017 was 57,722 USD, followed by Brunei with 28,986 USD and Malaysia with 9,899 USD). However, Singapore’s economy is based on services and investments, it has a limited agricultural sector, and suffers from difficulties with access to drinking water. Singapore is also the most important

147 However, this assessment is questionable due to the vague definition of a ‘small state’; see, for example,Koh, Tommy: “Is Singapore a Small Country?.” The Straits Times 5.8.2017. 148 Almost 40 % of Singapore’s residents are non-​Singaporeans. 149 For the last several years, Islamic radicalism and terrorism have been seen as the primary security threats facing the region. 150 ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2018. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2019. 151 See, for example: Transparency International: Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, retrieved 7.4.2020, from https://​w ww.transparency.org/​fi les/​content/​pages/​2018_​ CPI_​Executive_​Summary.pdf; OECD: Lessons from PISA for the United States, Strong Performers and Successful Reformers in Education. OECD Publishing 2011, pp. 159–​176, retrieved 7.4.2020, from http://​d x.doi.org/​10.1787/​9789264096660-​en, WIPO: The Global Innovation Index 2018. Energizing the World with Innovation, p. xx, retrieved 7.4.2020, from https://​w ww.wipo.int/​edocs/​pubdocs/​en/​w ipo_​pub_​ gii_​2018.pdf.

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trading partner and investor within ASEAN.152 While Singapore is powerful in economic terms, there is more doubt about its political influence.153 However, according to the Asia Power Index, Singapore is classified as a middle power, retaining the highest score among all ASEAN countries,154 followed by Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore ranks 8th (out of 25 analyzed countries) in terms of its power in the Asia-​Pacific region.155 Singapore is the strongest ASEAN country in the areas of:  (1) economic resources (and 7th in the Asia-​Pacific region); (2) military capability (and 10th in the region); (3) diplomatic influence (and 8th in the region); (4) economic relationships (and 4th in the region); and (5) defense networks (and 5th in the region). However, Singapore’s score is worse in several areas: (6) resilience (5th in ASEAN,156 14th in the region); (7) future trends (6th in ASEAN,157 17th in the region); and (8) cultural influence (3rd in ASEAN,158 9th in the region). Singapore’s priority is to strengthen and develop ASEAN, but also other regional institutions, in addition to its own resilience, security and economy. The country has a strong position in Southeast Asia and Asia-​Pacific, but does not have enough capabilities to be a leader in ASEAN. Domestic factors and constraints have contributed the country’s moderate political ambitions, ambitious economic plans, and non-​priority treatment of socio-​cultural aspects in its foreign policy toward ASEAN.

The ASEAN Community: Goals and pillars Fundamental changes in the institutional architecture of ASEAN began in 2003, when Indonesia chaired the organization and proposed the creation of the ASEAN Security Community. During the Bali Summit in 2003, the members decided to implement a community-​building initiative by adopting three pillars: (1) the ASEAN Security Community, later renamed the ASEAN Political Security Community; (2)  the ASEAN Economic Community; and

1 52 ASEAN Statistical Yearbook 2018, ­chapter 5, 6 and 7. 153 Dobkowska 2018, pp. 292–​295. 154 Lowy Institute:  Asia Power Index 2018, retrieved 7.4.2020, from https://​power. lowyinstitute.org/​downloads/​LowyInstitute_​AsiaPowerIndex_​2018-​Summary_​ Report.pdf. 155 The Index is calculated on the basis of 8 thematic criteria (and 114 indicators). 156 After Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. 157 After Indonesia, Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia. 158 After Malaysia and Thailand.

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(3) the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community. The first pillar aims to strengthen stability and peace as well as promote democracy and human rights; the goal of the second is to accelerate economic development; and the third aims to strengthen social cohesion and human development. All of these goals are intended to be achieved through comprehensive cooperation.159 ASEAN aspired to meet its goals by 2015. However, it is commonly recognized that this is a work-​ in-​progress and plans for further developing the organization were presented in a document titled ASEAN Community Vision 2025. Most of the ASEAN Community’s 2015 goals were met160 and are compatible with Vision 2025. In its external relations, ASEAN focuses on maintaining its own centrality, but within the organization, the members should focus on establishing a comprehensive and complementary policy toward its pillars in order to strengthen the organization.161 Regional and internal weaknesses undermine the political influence of the organization on its members and other actors. ASEAN is a governmental association with a specific set of rules that protects the national interests of its members. The organization does not provide any effective supranational instruments that would grant it decision-​making power over its members.162 As a result, ASEAN is criticized for its ineffectiveness or partial effectiveness in solving regional problems. Another important aspect is that the ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community is often regarded as an ‘addition’ to the two more important community pillars that concern politics, security, and the economy.163

159 Pennisi, di Floristella, Angela: The ASEAN Regional Security Partnership Strengths and Limits of a Cooperative System. Palgrave MacMillan: UK 2015, pp. 44–​45. 160 Based on ASEAN’s documents and reports. The scholarly literature is far more skeptical about the ASEAN Community’s current stage of development. 161 Idris/​Othman, p. 107. 162 Dobkowska, Joanna: “Mimicking of Integration: At the Sources of Under Utilization of Intra-​ASEAN Institutions.” In Mierzejewski, Dominik /​Bywalec, Grzegorz (eds): Regionalism in East Asia. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego: Łódź 2016, pp. 37–​56. 163 See Maramis, Larry: “ASEAN’s Socio-​cultural Community.” In: Baviera, Aileen /​ Maramis, Larry (eds): Building ASEAN Community: Political–​Security and Socio-​ Cultural Reflections, p. 179, retrieved 4.4.2020, from http://​w ww.eria.org/​ASEAN_​ at_​50_​Vol_​4 _​Full_​Report.pdf.

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Singapore’s approach to the Political-​Security Community The ASEAN Political-​Security Community consists of nine general goals: (1) respect for ASEAN’s values and norms and the principles of international law; (2) human rights, democracy, and good governance; (3) tolerance and opposition to extremism; (4)a comprehensive approach to security (including non-​ traditional security); (5)  peaceful settlement of disputes; (6)establishing a neutral region (no nuclear weapons) that contributes to international efforts toward disarmament; (7)  maritime security and cooperation; (8)  ASEAN Centrality; (9)  cooperation with external powers and organizations.164 These goals can be summarized as follows:  promotion of ASEAN principles and international norms; promotion of human rights, democracy, and good governance; promotion of stability and a comprehensive approach to security; and maintaining ASEAN’s Centrality. Singapore has a very strong and firm stance on the issue of the ‘ASEAN Way’165and its relationship with international law. The ASEAN Way has been the primary and most important set of rules that prevent member states’ interference with the domestic affairs of fellow member states. The framing of ASEAN’s norms and values is variable and variously interpreted,166 but not to the extent that would allow for such interference to occur. Singapore has been a vocal supporter of maintaining ASEAN’s norms, with a firm stance against any possibility of changing them, including through activity that would limit external influence on Burmese politics, especially after 2007 and the Saffron Revolution. International law is another aspect that Singapore firmly promotes and protects, which is also clearly stated in its foreign policy goals. Singapore

164 ASEAN Political-​ Security Community Blueprint. ASEAN Secretariat:  Jakarta 2009, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​images/​archive/​5187-​18.pdf; and ASEAN Community Vision 2015. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2015, retrieved 2.4.2020, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​storage/​images/​2015/​November/​aec-​page/​ ASEAN-​Community-​Vision-​2025.pdf. 165 There is no consensus on what the ASEAN Way is, but most scholars refer to Amitav Acharya’s definition, according to which it is a consensus-​based process that elevates non-​interference as one of its key principles. The ASEAN Way can be also understood as a set of norms: consensus, consultation, informality, and inter-​governmentality. The ASEAN Way has been institutionalized by the ASEAN Charter, adopted in 2007. See Acharya, Amitav: “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-​building: From the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-​Pacific Way’?.” Pacific Review 10(3), 1997, pp. 319–​346. 166 Yukawa, Taku: “The ASEAN Way as a Symbol: An Analysis of Discourses on the ASEAN Norms.” The Pacific Review 31(3), 2018, pp. 298–​314.

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perceives international law as a way to secure its interests. As Tommy Koh argues, “Singapore has sought to use international law as a sword to advance our aggressive interests and as a shield to protect our defensive interests.”167 Singapore operates with anon-​democratic political system and the issue of human rights has been a mainstay of criticism of the country, albeit with varying degrees of intensity; for example, the United States minimized its criticism of Singapore in the 21st century, and the European Union has refrained from open and direct criticism. Singapore was one of the biggest promoters of what it called ’Asian values’ in the 1990s, but the debate on this issue is viewed today as a series of unnecessary populist actions, with no meaning in the 21st century.168 In terms of democracy and human rights, Singapore maintained a ‘wait-​and-​see’ position in its policy, but it backed the Indonesia’s initiatives to include human rights and democratic rules in the Political-​Security Community and in the ASEAN Charter, adopted in November 2007. Singapore did not object to ASEAN’s work on a mechanism that would ensure the effective protection of human rights and democracy.169 Additionally, Singapore did not object to the foundation of the ASEAN Inter-​governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009,170 even if it did nothing to ensure its effectiveness. It adopted a similar policy toward the creation and acceptance of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration.171 Singapore is a country that is concerned with extremism and terrorism, especially terrorism connected with religion in Malaysia and Indonesia. Singapore is involved in activities that aim to prevent and minimize these threats by, among 167 Koh, Tommy: “Singapore and International Law: A 50 Year Review,” p. 4, retrieved 3.4.2020, from https://​cil.nus.edu.sg/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2015/​10/​Tommy-​Koh-​ Speech-​Singapore-​a nd-​International-​Law-​A-​50-​Year-​Review.pdf. 168 Interview with a Singaporean researcher, January 2016. 169 However, it is most likely a result of the CLMV countries’ decision to object to the creation of a mechanism that would have a real impact on human rights and democracy. See Koh, Tommy: “The Negotiating Process.” In Koh, Tommy /​Manalo, Rosario G. /​Woon, Walter (eds): The Making of the ASEAN Charter. World Scientific Publishing: Singapore, pp. 58–​62. 170 However, according to a Singaporean academic, “Singapore does not have to be afraid, as it is not the only country in ASEAN that has difficulties with human rights protection.”See Grzywacz, Anna: Polityka zagraniczna Singapuru w regionie Azji i Pacyfiku. Asian Century: Warsaw 2019, pp. 184–​185. 171 See Davies, Mathew:  “An Agreement to Disagree:  The ASEAN Human Rights Declaration and the Absence of Regional Identity in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 33(3), 2014, pp. 107–​129.

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others, implementing programs against violent extremism. In 2017, Singapore declared that extremism was at an all-​time high and had been escalating in the preceding years, not only in Singapore but also in neighboring countries.172 Its programs to address this include the promotion of counter-​ideology as well as racial and religious harmony. As part of its ASEAN chairmanship in 2018, Singapore organized the 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-​Terrorism Symposium, with the tagline A Collective Approach, as an extension of previous efforts to strengthen security in the organization. Earlier, counter-​terrorism was already a part of the discussion at the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting (ADMM) and the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime.173 Singapore is not the only country dealing with this issue, and therefore it cooperates with other countries –​especially Indonesia, which is considered a key player in counter-​terrorism and its religious dimension.174 Singapore is an active supporter of extending and developing regional thinking about security and the inclusion of non-​traditional security as an important component of regional security. Singapore has been also promoting non-​traditional security in ASEAN and ASEAN-​linked arrangements, chiefly through ADMM, ADMM+, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), but also the ASEAN-​led mechanism on maritime security. However, the Singaporean government does not support all changes and is reluctant to address some of the challenges in the area of security. Accepting and strengthening ASEAN’s capability to provide peacekeeping forces is particularly problematic. As noted by some scholars, Singapore long believed it was too early to cooperate on that issue.175 172 Hussin,Sabariah: “Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism: The Singapore Approach.” In Echle, Christian /​Gunaratna, Rohan /​Rueppel, Patrick /​Sarmah, Megha (eds): Combatting Violent Extremism and Terrorism in Asia and Europe From Cooperation to Collaboration. Konrad-​Adenauer-​Stiftung Ltd:  Singapore 2018, pp. 171–​182, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​w ww.kas.de/​documents/​288143/​ 288192/​Terrorism_​Hussin.pdf/​6011defa-​efb0-​b368-​87cf-​baefa815a87b. 173 The 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-​Terrorism Symposium: A Collective Approach. News release 4.10.2018, retrieved 3.4.2020, from https://​w ww.rsis.edu.sg/​media-​ highlights/​news-​releases-​speeches/​t he-​2018-​southeast-​asia-​counter-​terrorism-​ symposium-​a-​collective-​approach/​#.XKCCm5gzY2w. 174 Zhang, Lim Min: “Singapore seeks support for regional anti-​terror platform.” The Straits Times 5.10.2018, retrieved 4.4.2020, fromhttps://​w ww.straitstimes.com/​singapore/​singapore-​seeks-​support-​for-​regional-​a nti-​terror-​platform. 175 See, for example, Borchers, Henning: “ASEAN’s environmental challenges and non-​ traditional security cooperation: Towards a regional peacekeeping force?.” ASEAS –​ Austrian Journal of South-​East Asian Studies 7(1), 2014, pp. 5–​20.

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Singapore has maintained and protected most existing peace and security agreements, including the most important: the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation from 1976 and the  Southeast Asian  Nuclear-​Weapon-​Free Zone  Treaty from 1995. However, Singapore is a country that protects its security through cooperation with other powers in the Asia-​Pacific region and beyond, especially via the Five Power Defense Arrangements and cooperation with the United States.176 In other words, it retains a two-​track policy: cooperation within ASEAN on the one hand and with other powers on the other in order to improve the effectiveness of security cooperation. However, Singapore’s outlook is also a result of the fact that ASEAN as an organization is not able to address the security challenges posed by the great powers, especially China. ASEAN has been an important platform for Singapore, but not critical to Singapore’s security. During the Cold War, Singapore cooperated with the U.S. and the UN to minimize the communist threat, including by promoting institutional changes, such as the initiation of the Ministerial Meetings in 1979. After the end of the Cold War and related changes in the world’s security architecture as well as its own, Singapore became an initiator of ARF and strongly supported its creation in 1994. Singapore also proposed the creation of the Shangri-​la Dialogue and provides academic and scientific support through the Centre for Non-​Traditional Security Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Peaceful settlement of disputes is an essential part of conflict resolution. However, it is a problematic issue and reveals conflicts of interests between the members of an organization. The most complicated and greatest challenge is the South China Sea dispute, as some ASEAN members have territorial disputes not only with China but also with each other. For many researches, this is where China projects its power and shows its dominance over the ASEAN countries.177 Vietnam and the Philippines remain the most active claimants in the dispute and strive to settle the conflict in line with their own political interests. Other claimants, such as Malaysia and Brunei, are more peacefully oriented. Singapore is a neutral party in the conflict and is not directly involved in the dispute, but itis vividly interested in its resolution. Not all ASEAN members perceive China as a threat; this makes it even harder to work on ASEAN’s

1 76 Tan, pp. 1–​16. 177 See, for example, Zhang, Feng: “China’s long March at sea: explaining Beijing’s Sou th China Sea strategy, 2009–​2016.” The Pacific Review, 2019, pp. 306–​314, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09512748.2019.1587497.

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united voice regarding the South China Sea dispute, its consequences, and possible solutions.178 Singapore has been trying to engage China in multilateral dialogue, which has been slowly proven more effective. Nevertheless, Singapore has long been hesitant to openly criticize China or other claimants, and its formal stance includes the peaceful settlement of the dispute and promotion of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, signed in 2002 by China and ASEAN.179 ASEAN Centrality is another key issue that ensures the importance of ASEAN, but also constitutes a way to further secure the region. One characteristic feature of the literature on the topic is the twofold treatment of the ASEAN states and ASEAN as an organization in its relations with the great powers. The first approach treats the organization as a platform that is able to influence and change regional relations (as suggested, for example, by Laura Allison-​Reumann,180 Catherine Jones,181 Min-​ hyung Kim,182 and to some 183 extent by Evelyn Goh ).The second approach views ASEAN as a platform where the great powers pursue their goals (as argued, for example, by Joanna Dobkowska,184 David M.  Jones and Nicole Jenne,185 and especially by David

1 78 Dobkowska 2018. 179 Singaporean politicians question the idea of naming China a regional hegemon in this matter. See Li, Mingjiang /​Zhang, Hongzhou: “Singapore’s South China Sea Policy: Implications for Freedom and Safety of Navigation.” In: Wu, Shicun /​Zou, Keyuan (eds): Securing the Safety of Navigation in East Asia. Oxford University Press: Oxford 2013, pp. 171–​188. 180 Allison-​Reumann, Laura: “The Norm-​Diffusion Capacity of ASEAN: Evidence and Challenges.” Pacific Focus, 32(1), 2017, pp. 5–​29. 181 Jones, Catherine: “Great Powers, ASEAN, and Security: Reason for Optimism?.” The Pacific Review 28(2), pp. 259–​280. 182 Kim, Min-​hyung: “Why Does a Small Power Lead? ASEAN Leadership in Asia–​ Pacific Regionalism.” Pacific Focus, 27(1), 2012, pp. 111–​134. 183 Goh, Evelyn: “Institutions and the Great Power Bargain in East Asia: ASEAN’s Limited ‘Brokerage’ Role.” International Relations of the Asia-​Pacific11, 2011, pp. 373–​401; Goh, Evelyn: “East Asia as Regional International Society: The Problem of Great Power Management.” In Buzan, Barry /​Zhang, Yongjin (eds). Contesting International Society in East Asia. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2014, pp. 167–​187. 184 Dobkowska 2018. 185 Jones, David Martin /​Jenne, Nicole: “Weak States’ Regionalism: ASEAN and the Limits of Security Cooperation in Pacific Asia.” International Relations of the Asia-​ Pacific 16, 2016, pp. 209–​240.

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M. Jones and Michael Smith186). Robert Yates writes that ASEAN plays the role of a ‘regional conductor’ “vis-​à-​v is the U.S. ‘offshore great power guarantor’ role and China’s ‘responsible regional great power’ role.” As he suggests, the strength of ASEAN is that the organization is able to play a significant role “within bargains with the great powers.”187 ASEAN Centrality is centered around its institutions:  ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, ADMM-​Plus, the East Asia Summit, and ARF.188 All of these initiatives were proposed, negotiated, or supported by Singapore. However, the power of ASEAN and its political influence have been the subject of debate.189 Singapore also promoted cooperation between ASEAN and other regional and international institutions and organizations, especially the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation, and was an initiator of the Asia-​Europe Meeting in 1994.

Singapore’s approach to the Economic Community The ASEAN Economic Community’s main goals are: (1) an integrated regional economy (high growth, advancement of a single market, integration, movement of investment, labor, and capital); (2) an innovative community and promotion of good governance and transparency; (3)  sectoral cooperation and strategic sectoral policies; (4) narrowing development gaps, subregional cooperation, and poverty eradication; (5) external cooperation and acting as a driver of regional integration in East Asia.190 Singapore proposed the creation of Economic Community in 2002 and it was formally established a year later. The economy and economic relations are especially important to Singapore and have been treated as a priority in its foreign policy. Singapore is the most economically developed and influential country among all the members of ASEAN. The differences between Singapore’s pace 186 Jones, David Martin /​Smith, Michael: Making Process, Not Progress: ASEAN and the Evolving East Asian Regional Order.” International Security 32, 2007, pp. 148–​  184. 187 Yates, Robert: “ASEAN as the ‘Regional Conductor’: Understanding ASEAN’s Role in Asia-​Pacific Order.” The Pacific Review 30(4), 2017, p. 444. 188 Caballero-​Anthony, Melly: “Understanding ASEAN’s centrality: bases and prospects in an evolving regional architecture.” The Pacific Review, 27(4), 2014, pp. 563–​584. 189 See Acharya, Amitav: “The Myth of ASEAN Centrality?.” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs 39(2), 2017, pp. 273–​279. 190 ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2008, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​archive/​5187-​10.pdf; and ASEAN Community Vision 2015.

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of development and economic structure and those of other member states result in Singapore’s disappointment with the pace of economic integration in Southeast Asia. At least two aspects of Singaporean politics are important with regard to this matter. First of all, Singapore decided to act on its own by negotiating bilateral free trade agreements with the ASEAN countries, but also outside ASEAN. This has been a bone of contention between Singapore and other ASEAN members, especially Malaysia and Thailand. Other members have criticized Singapore for obstructing the negotiations on the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and have expressed doubts as to whether Singapore’s decisions facilitate the establishment of ASEAN common market.191 While Singapore has attempted to convince others that its intentions were not competitive in nature, these arguments have not convinced the ASEAN states. The second relevant feature of Singapore’s politics is that Singapore suggested reinterpreting the principle of consensus as encompassing the rule of ‘less-​t han-​total-​unanimity,’ but only in the area of economic relations. The Singaporean government believed that consensus was a constraint, and if a state is able to enhance its economic development, it should be able to do it. This stance was also criticized by other members. From the ASEAN perspective, Singapore should provide support and help other members to overcome economic problems while contributing to their development. Putting the country’s national economic interests ahead of regional interests contributes to an even greater development gap between the members. However, Singapore supports some initiatives that address certain economic challenges that the ASEAN members have to tackle. Specifically, it contributes to initiatives to reduce the development gap between the members and overcome the division between the ‘old’ members (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei) of the organization and the ‘new’ members (Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, collectively called CLMV).Bridging the differences between old and new members is accomplished through several programs: most importantly, the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI), but also the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services and the ASEAN Investment Area. The IAI was formed in 2000. The program was restricted to the CLMV countries following a proposition by Singaporean minister Goh Chok Tong, who believed that this delimitation was necessary to limit IAI support to CLMV. The IAI implemented two six-​year programs (2002 to 2008 and

191 Grzywacz, Anna: “Singapore’s Foreign Policy toward Regional and Inter-​regional Institutions.” Asian Perspective 43(4), 2019, pp. 647–​671.

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2009 to 2015). In both cases, Singapore was the main financial supporter of the program. Singapore covered more than 70 % of the overall costs of the IAI’s first plan (more than 24 million USD), followed by Malaysia (more than 5 million USD).192 Singapore was also a key supporter of IAI Work Plans II and III (implemented from 2016 to 2020). The effectiveness of these programs has been questionable. Singaporean prime minister Lee Hsien Loong announced in 2018 that Singapore would provide more support to narrow the development gap, but did not substantiate this declaration in any way.193 Another aspect of Singapore’s involvement with ASEAN’s economic activity is its support of ‘growth triangles.’ Singapore is an initiator of subregional cooperation between its two closest neighbors, Indonesia (Batam and Riau) and Malaysia (Johor), and promotes the integration based on market-​driven regionalism, part of which entails subregional cooperation. Since the pace of integration is unsatisfactory, the concept of growth triangles was introduced to enhance and improve economic relations among the three countries. The idea was presented in 1989 by Singaporean prime minister Goh Chok Tong.194 The cooperation is based on the exchange of services and manpower capabilities. Singapore offers financial services, while Malaysia and Indonesia provide a relatively cheap workforce.195 Singapore has capacity to ensure its own system is transparent in the sense that principles of good governance and rule of law are upheld, both of which are exemplified by the absence of corruption (Singapore is one of the highest-​ ranking countries in the area of corruption-​free markets). However, it does not provide the necessary support to solve these problems at the regional level.

192 Status Update of the IAI Work Plan I (2002–​2008). ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2009, retrieved 2.4.2020, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​storage/​images/​archive/​documents/​ Status-​Update-​IAI-​WP-​2002-​2008.pdf. 193 Lee, Hsien Loong: Transcript of Remarks by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the Joint Press Statement with Indonesian President Joko Widodo at the ASEAN Leaders’ Gathering, 11.0.2018, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​w ww.pmo.gov.sg/​ Newsroom/​pm-​lee-​hsien-​loong-​joint-​press-​statement-​president-​joko-​w idodo-​ asean-​leaders-​gathering. 194 “S’pore, Batam and Johor can form a ‘triangle of growth’.” The Straits Times 21.12. 1989, p. 3. 195 See Hutchinson, Francis E. /​van Grunsven, Leo: “Industry dynamics in Growth Triangles: the E&E industry in SIJORI 25 years on.” Asia-​Pacific Economic Literature 32(2), 2018, pp. 42–​63.

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Indonesia and Malaysia are the countries with low scores in the region in terms of corruption, but the same problem is a challenge in the case of the smaller economies of Southeast Asia.196 External cooperation, playing the role of the region’s center of economic integration, and making ASEAN an important market at the international level, depends on many factors. Regionally, one of the most important issues is bolstering integration by adopting a comprehensive approach to free trade agreements. This is a problematic issue, as the creation of a single market requires the adoption of common rules as well as the eradication of tariffs and other barriers. While Singapore is a great supporter of liberalization, this is not the case for other members, which has become a source of intra-​ASEAN tensions. This is one of the reasons why it is harder for ASEAN to speak with one voice, but it also explains why some of its members, including Singapore, prefer to negotiate trade and other economic agreements bilaterally. Singapore does not declare itself a leader of ASEAN or even a leader or active and visible contributor to the Political and Security Community. However, it has expressed the willingness to be a center of economic development within the organization. As stated by former minister for foreign affairs K. Shanmugam, Singapore has the capabilities and resources needed to be such a hub, and to set the course for greater economic development.197

Singapore’s approach to the Socio-​Cultural Community The ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community’s main goals are: (1) building a community that promotes social responsibility and good governance; (2)  protection of human rights; (3) social development and protection of environment; (4)  building capacity and capability  –​disasters, climate change, vulnerabilities; and (5) developing identity, culture, and heritage.198 Social responsibility, good governance, human rights, and social development are the common goals shared between the PSC, the EC, and the SCC. As they have been discussed in the previous sections, this part investigates Singapore’s policy in the areas

1 96 See Transparency International, p. 8. 197 In Tan, Weizhen: “S’pore can play bigger role in ASEAN.” Today 19.7.2013. retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​www.todayonline.com/​singapore/​spore-​can-​play-​bigger-​role-​ asean. 198 ASEAN Socio-​Cultural Community Blueprint. ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2009, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​archive/​5187-​19.pdf; and ASEAN Community Vision 2015.

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of climate change, identity, and others that are not considered to be part of PSC or EC. Singapore does not focus on this pillar as strongly as it does on the first two. The Singaporean government promotes initiatives that fall within the scope of the SCC, but its efforts to address socio-​cultural challenges and meet the goals of this pillar are not considered priorities unless they have a direct impact on the economy and security. Singapore focuses much more on issues that are relevant to its own development, especially climate change and environmental protection, while human rights and identity do not seem to be priorities. This approach, however, has been slowly changing. Climate change has been a key issue to be addressed by ASEAN, especially for Singapore. For a long time, Singapore has been trying to tackle specific problems (for instance, haze pollution), but also the more general aspects of environmental protection. In 2007, the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment was adopted in and promoted by Singapore. Recently, Singapore has offered climate change support (2018 to 2020) for ASEAN. The climate action package is provided by the Ministry for the Environment and Water Resources and, according to the head of this institution, “aims to develop capacity in ASEAN in key areas such as disaster risk reduction, climate science, climate finance, flood management, and long-​ term mitigation and adaptation strategies, through programs and courses.”199 The Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Climate Action (SAMCA), and Expanded-​SAMCA, initiated by Singapore in 2018, constitute another step toward enhancing collaboration in this area. Singaporean politicians also offer support for the expansion of cooperation by promoting the Southeast Asia Disaster Risk Insurance Facility (located in Singapore) and the Meteorological Service Singapore, which invests in the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Centre. Singapore has never framed itself as a normative power and avoids characterizing itself as a leader of ASEAN. However, recently, the Singaporean government has noted the need to discuss and strengthen the ASEAN identity. In 2015, Lee Hsien Loong made a speech in which he stated that a common ASEAN identity should be a priority and the lack thereof is an obstacle in the

199 Press Release: Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Climate Action (SAMCA) and Expanded SAMCA (E-​SAMCA). National Climate Change Secretariat, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​w ww.nccs.gov.sg/​media/​news/​articles/​detail/​special-​asean-​ ministerial-​meeting-​on-​climate-​action-​(samca)-​a nd-​expanded-​samca-​(e-​samca).

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integration progress.200 However, the ASEAN Way has been the main principle followed by the organization and is not considered to be a part of any changes that would alter the significance of a state while giving more competence to the organization. According to Joanna Dobkowska, ASEAN’s political elites have not provided a vision on an ASEAN identity, and analyses of attempts to create a regional identity show that ASEAN members treat it instrumentally in their foreign policy toward the West, with ASEAN “heading toward a paradoxical trap of building a regional community based on a non-​existent identity.”201 Beyond broad declarations, Singapore has not provided any instruments with which to form a common identity, and according to Aileen Baviera, there are “shared interests,” but not necessarily a “shared identity.”202 Singapore’s contribution to the development of the SCC also includes the creation of the Singapore-​ASEAN Youth Fund. This program aims to provide financial support for intra-​regional projects and enhance cooperation and student exchange, in addition to raising awareness about the importance of an ASEAN identity and culture.

Conclusions Singapore has been an active player in shaping the changes and architecture of ASEAN and the way it operates. Despite the assumption that all three pillars should be developed equally, Singapore pays more attention to the Political-​ Security and Economic Community pillars. Both aspects  –​security and the economy  –​have been treated as interconnected and equally important, but Singapore’s internal constraints and capabilities result in the community pillars receiving a different treatment. Singapore is more ‘visible’ in the economic domain than in the domain of security. Therefore, Singapore’s approaches toward the ASEAN Community can be described as a twofold. First, in the areas of politics and security as well as economic affairs, Singapore conducts a 200 Lim, Yan Liang: “Asean Summit: Forging shared Asean identity a top priority: PM Lee.” The Straits Times 23.11.2015. 201 Dobkowska, Joanna: “Wspólnota bez tożsamości? Paradoks integracji regionalnej ASEAN.” In Michałowska, Grażyna /​Nakonieczna, Justyna /​Schreiber, Hanna: Kultura w stosunkach międzynarodowych. PułapkiKultury. Wydawnictw aUniwersytetuWarszawskiego: Warsaw 2014, pp. 260–​261. 202 Baviera, Aileen: “Preventing War, Building a Rules-​based Order: Challenges Facing the ASEAN Political–​Security Community.” In Baviera, Aileen /​Maramis, Larry (eds): Building ASEAN Community: Political–​Security and Socio-​Cultural Reflections, retrieved 4.4.2020, from http://​w ww.eria.org/​ASEAN_​at_​50_​Vol_​4 _​Full_​Report. pdf, p. 7.

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two-​track policy: it cooperates within ASEAN and external powers to ensure the achievement of its goals, but in the case of the EC, the country frames itself as a leader, what is not of the case for the PSC. Second, another feature of Singapore’s foreign policy is its unbalanced approach toward the community pillars. Singapore focuses more on its economy and politics than the socio-​ cultural pillar. This analysis of Singapore’s foreign policy toward the ASEAN Community pillars shows that Singapore presents three different approaches: (1) moderate (though dubious) support for the Political and Security Community; (2) active (and ambiguous) support for the Economic Community; and (3) passive support for the Socio-​Cultural Community.

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Press Release: Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Climate Action (SAMCA) and Expanded SAMCA (E-​SAMCA). National Climate Change Secretariat, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​w ww.nccs.gov.sg/​media/​news/​articles/​ detail/​special-​asean-​ministerial-​meeting-​on-​climate-​action-​(samca)-​a nd-​ expanded-​samca-​(e-​samca). Press, Daryl/​Valentino, Benjamin: “A Balanced Foreign Policy.” In: van Evera, Stephen (eds.): How to Make America Safe: New Policies for National Security. The Tobin Project: Cambridge 2006. Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby /​Chong, Gua Kwa: S. Rajaratnam on Singapore: From Ideas to Reality. World Scientific: Singapore 2006. Status Update of the IAI Work Plan I (2002–​2008). ASEAN Secretariat: Jakarta 2009, retrieved 2.4.2020, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​storage/​images/​ archive/​documents/​Status-​Update-​IAI-​WP-​2002-​2008.pdf. Tan, See Seng:  “America the Indispensable:  Singapore’s View of the United States’ Engagement in the Asia-​Pacific.” Asian Affairs: An American Review 38(3), 2011. The 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-​ Terrorism Symposium:  A Collective Approach. News release 4.10.2018, retrieved 3.4.2020, from https://​w ww.rsis. edu.sg/​media-​highlights/​news-​releases-​speeches/​t he-​2018-​southeast-​asia-​ counter-​terrorism-​symposium-​a-​collective-​approach/​#.XKCCm5gzY2w. Transparency International:  Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, retrieved 7.4.2020, from https://​w ww.transparency.org/​fi les/​content/​pages/​2018_​ CPI_​Executive_​Summary.pdf. WIPO: The Global Innovation Index 2018. Energizing the World with Innovation, p.  Xx, retrieved 7.4.2020, from https://​w ww.wipo.int/​edocs/​pubdocs/​en/​ wipo_​pub_​gii_​2018.pdf. Yates, Robert: “ASEAN as the ‘Regional Conductor’: Understanding ASEAN’s Role in Asia-​Pacific Order.” The Pacific Review 30(4), 2017. Yukawa, Taku: “The ASEAN Way as a Symbol: An Analysis of Discourses on the ASEAN Norms.” The Pacific Review 31(3), 2018. Zhang, Feng: “China’s long March at sea: explaining Beijing’s South China se a  strategy, 2009–​2016.” The Pacific Review, 2019, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​doi.org/​10.1080/​09512748.2019.1587497. Zhang, Lim Min: “Singapore seeks support for regional anti-​terror platform.” The Straits Times 5.10.2018, retrieved 4.4.2020, from https://​w ww.straitstimes. com/​singapore-​seeks-​support-​for-​regional-​anti-​terror-​platform. *

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Anna Grzywacz

Anna Grzywacz holds a PhD in Political Science. She graduated with a degree in International Relations from the Institute of International Relations (specialization: East Asian Studies), University of Warsaw. Her research interests include international relations in Southeast Asia, the foreign policy of Indonesia and Singapore, middle powers and discursive politics. Recent publications: Polityka zagraniczna Singapuru w regionie Azjii Pacyfiku, Warsaw 2019; Indonesia’s (Inter)national Role as a Muslim Democracy Model: Effectiveness and Conflict Between the Conception and Prescription Roles, The Pacific Review, 2019, doi: 10.1080/​09512748.2019.1585387 E-​mail: [email protected]

Funding This work was financed by a grant from the Polish Ministry of Science and Higher Education to the Faculty of Business and International Relations of the Vistula University to maintain its research potential; decision no.  218919/​E-​ 656/​S/​2018, 26 June 2018; and no. 1/​E-​656/​S/​2018, 27 December 2018.

Paweł Pasierbiak https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​0885-​1462

Merchandise Trade Development in  ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Since the Asian Financial Crisis Abstract This study focuses on a real side of the East Asian economy, namely merchandise trade. The main objective is to identify the most important trends in merchandise trade between ASEAN Plus Three (APT) countries and to indicate the conditions under which they developed. The article will attempt to verify the hypothesis that, despite the Asian Financial Crisis and global financial crisis, trade links among the APT countries have been strengthened. The applied research methods include: the descriptive method, analysis, interpretation, and inference based on statistical data. The time span of the research covers the years 1997–​2016. Keywords: APT, China, Japan, Korea, economic regionalization, foreign trade

Introduction The Asian Financial Crisis, which took place at the end of the 20th century (1997–​1998), had a significant impact on the intensification of regional economic integration processes in East Asia, at least on the financial side. In the face of economic challenges, the countries of the region became more aware that the lack of cooperation in the region was an unfavorable factor leading to slower economic development. As a result, initiatives that focused on regional economic cooperation became more popular. In 1997, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) –​a forum of cooperation comprising East Asian countries exclusively –​was established.203 This initiative is said to be the most suitable one for conducting regional economic integration in Asia.204

203 ASEAN Plus Three (APT) is an initiative of 13 East Asian countries (ten ASEAN member states, China, Japan, and South Korea). The name APT entered into wider use in 1999. 204 Retrieved from https://​w ww.adb.org/​sites/​default/​fi les/​publication/​159353/​adbi-​ emerging-​asian-​regionalism.pdf.

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The achievements of APT are mainly reflected in the financial sphere, as the effects of the Asian Financial Crisis have prompted countries, above all, to secure themselves against similar crises in the future. Nevertheless, studies show that integration in Asia is not just about financial issues.205 Since the 1997 crisis, cooperation has increased in such areas as trade, FDI, trade policy, tourism, and macroeconomics. Thus, one can argue that in East Asia, there is potential for further development in the area of regional economic integration. This study focuses on a real side of the East Asian economy, namely merchandise trade. The main objective is to identify the most important trends in that economic field among the APT countries and to indicate the circumstances under which they developed. The article will attempt to verify the hypothesis that, despite the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) in 1997 and the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2008, trade links among the APT countries have been strengthened. The applied research methods include the descriptive method, analysis, interpretation, and inference based on statistical data. The time span covers the years 1997–​2016, although data for 1995 will be used as a baseline for comparison. For simplicity and ease of interpretation, ASEAN will be treated as a single group, although it is a grouping of ten significantly diverse economies.

Conditions of merchandise trade development in APT State of the world economy. Economic relations between countries take place in more or less favorable conditions. At every stage of the development of trade relations, we can identify the most significant factors that underlie the process. For the group of thirteen APT countries, after 1997, the key issues were: 1) the economic situation in the world, in the region, and in individual countries, 2) trends in world trade, and 3) the foreign economic policies they were pursuing. Against this background, we will discuss the determinants of the development of trade in East Asia from 1997 to 2016. The 1997–​2016 period is long enough to notice significant change in the global economy. Those years featured relatively good economic periods (e.g., 2002–​07), but also years of economic downturn in individual countries or regions (1997–​98, 2000–​01, 2012) and even global crises (2007–​09). Under such conditions, trade relations between countries were developing, simultaneously affecting the world economy.

205 Ibid., p. 43.

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Figure 1.  GDP growth in world economy, 1995–​2016, % Source: Own work based on UNCTAD, 2017, UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from http://​u nctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

In the years analyzed here, the dynamics of economic growth in the world and in its most important economic centers underwent a clear transformation (see Figure 1). By 1998, the dynamics of economic growth in the world and in all major economic centers of the world was positive. The highest GDP growth was recorded by China (11 % in 1995) and ASEAN (7.9 %), while the world average and that of other countries depicted on the chart hovered around 3 %. In mid-​1997, the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) began, negatively influencing the dynamics of economic growth in the region and, to some extent, in the world economy. The crisis began in Thailand, then spread rapidly into other countries in the region mainly to South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, and to a lesser extent to the Philippines and Hong Kong.206 The decline in foreign private capital, the large depreciation of local currencies, and a fall in asset values ​​drastically reduced domestic demand in the countries most affected by the crisis.207 As can be seen in Table 1, all East Asian countries were affected, except China. 206 Yusuf, Shahid: “The East Asian Miracle at the Millennium.” In: Stiglitz, Joseph E. /​ Yusuf, Shahid. (eds.): Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. World Bank and Oxford University Press: Washington and Ney York 2001, p. 1, retrieved 6.8.2018, from https://​openknowledge.worldbank.org/​handle/​10986/​13969. 207 IMF: World Economic Outlook. Financial Crises: Causes and Indicators, Washington D.C. 1998, p. 1, retrieved 6.8.2017, from https://​w ww.imf.org/​en/​Publications/​WEO/​ Issues/​2016/​12/​31/​Financial-​Crises-​Causes-​a nd-​Indicators.

1999 7.7 -​0.3 11.3 3.7 3.3

2000 8.5 2.8 8.9 6.1 4.3

2001 8.3 0.4 4.5 2.7 1.9

2002 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 9.1 11.4 14.2 9.7 9.4 10.6 9.5 0.1 1.7 1.7 -​1.1 -​5.4 4.2 -​0.1 7.4 3.9 5.5 2.8 0.7 6.5 3.7 5.1 5.7 6.7 4.2 1.7 8.0 4.8 2.1 3.6 3.9 1.4 -​2.1 4.1 2.9

2012 7.9 1.5 2.3 5.8 2.2

2013 7.8 2.0 2.9 5.0 2.3

2014 7.3 0.3 3.3 4.4 2.5

2015 6.9 1.2 2.6 4.4 2.6

Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.08.2017, from http://​u nctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​ reportFolders.aspx.

China Japan Korea ASEAN World

1998 7.8 -​1.1 -​5.5 -​7.3 2.6

2016 6.7 1.0 2.7 4.5 2.2

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1997 9.2 1.1 5.9 4.1 3.6

Table 1.  GDP growth in East Asia and in the world, 1997–​2016, %

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In 1998, economic growth in ASEAN was negative (-​7.3 %) and the situation was similar in Korea and Japan (-​5.5  % and -​1.1  %, respectively). China witnessed a decline in GDP growth between 1998 and 1999, but the situation in that country was relatively good. At the same time, in East Asia, inflationary processes emerged on a larger scale. In 1998, the inflation rate in ASEAN was recorded at 28.4 % and Korea’s stood 7.5 %.208 However, this was likely a one-​ off consequence of the crisis, because in the following years, the inflation rate dropped significantly, and even deflation occurred in some cases. The Asian crisis, while severely affecting the countries involved, had little impact on the world economy. This was due to the relatively good economic situation in the United States and the European Union.209 At the turn of the century, the so-​called ‘dot-​com’ crisis came, bound by the speculative bubble on the ICT market. This time, however, the decline in growth dynamics affected developed countries (United States, the EU, and Japan). ASEAN countries and Korea, after a short slowdown in 2001, experienced dynamic economic growth since 2002. At that time, China was experiencing an increasing economic growth rate—​ from 7.6 % in 1999 to 14.2 % in 2007. At that time, the inflation and unemployment situation was relatively stable (below 5 %), although in ASEAN countries, these indicators fluctuated more after 2004, standing at 4.7  % and 8.5  % in 2006, respectively.210 In 2007, the situation in the world economy became much more complex. The U.S. real estate crisis began to transform into a global economic crisis, affecting not only the financial side of the economy but also its real side. Limited access to credit, declining global trade, and weakening economic activity contributed to a slowdown in economic growth, despite significant government involvement.211 Already in 2008, the GDP of the United States (-​0.3 %) and Japan (-​1.1 %) experienced an absolute decline. However, this was only a prelude to the events of the following year. The collapse of international trade and the reduction of foreign direct investments contributed to a drastic drop in GDP in such important economic centers as the United States (-​2.8 %), EU28 (-​4.4 %), and Japan (-​5.4 %). Unlike during the Asian crisis, the situation 208 IMF: World Economic Outlook Database April 2017, retrieved 30.8.2017, from https://​ www.imf.org/​external/​pubs/​ft /​weo/​2017/​01/​weodata/​index.aspx. 209 IMF: World Economic Outlook. Financial Crises: Causes and Indicators, Web, p. 2; Yusuf, p. 3. 210 IMF: World Economic Outlook Database April 2017, Web. 211 IMF: World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery, Washington D.C., April 2009, p. 1, retrieved 30.8.2017, from https://​w ww.imf.org/​en/​Publications/​WEO/​Issues/​ 2016/​12/​31/​World-​Economic-​Outlook-​April-​2009-​Crisis-​a nd-​Recovery-​22575.

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in 2008 was much better in East Asia. In the case of China, the growth rate was 9.4 % in 2009 and 1.7 % for ASEAN. In the following years, the economic condition of Asian countries transformed them into the engine of economic growth in the world. After 2010, there was a noticeable decline in growth, but for China and ASEAN, economic indicators were high compared to Europe or the United States. The prolonged debt crisis in the Eurozone kept the growth rate in that region low: in 2012, its GDP fell by 0.4 %, while in the same year, China grew by 7.9 %, ASEAN by 5.8 %, Korea by 2.3 %, and Japan by 1.5 %. From 2012 to 2015, global economic growth increased from 2.2 % to 2.6 %, and fell again to 2.2 % in 2016. That year featured several phenomena and momentous events that limited economic growth, including the UK’s decision to exit the European Union (Brexit), adjustment in China and among exporters of raw materials to lower terms of trade, and generalized political and geopolitical uncertainty.212 According to the IMF, in the second half of 2016, the economic climate improved, mainly in developed countries.213 Growing global demand, especially in investment, contributed to the growth of industrial output and trade, which was very weak at the end of 2015 and early 2016. Main tendencies in world merchandise trade. The years 1997–​2016 were a period of dynamic changes in international trade. In general, trade in this period was developing quite well, but there were also periods of strong decline. Figure 2 illustrates the most important changes, presenting the value of world exports together with the shares of selected groups of countries in this absolute figure. In 1995, the value of global exports was 5.2 trillion USD, and it grew rapidly in the following years. In 2008, world exports reached 16.2 USD trillion, but the next year saw the greatest collapse of trade in the postwar period. In 2009, the value of exports was 22.3 % lower than in the previous year. This collapse was connected with the crisis that had begun in the United States. International trade and investment flows were drastically reduced.214 From 2010, exports 212 IMF:  World Economic Outlook:  Subdued Demand-​ Symptoms and Remedies, Washington D.C., October 2016, p. 1, retrieved 8.7.2017, from https://​w ww.imf. org/​en/​Publications/​WEO/​Issues/​2016/​12/​31/​Subdued-​Demand-​Symptoms-​a nd-​ Remedies. 213 IMF: World Economic Outlook: Gaining Momentum?, Washington D.C., April 2017, p. 1, retrieved 9.7.2017, from https://​w ww.imf.org/​en/​Publications/​WEO/​Issues/​ 2017/​04/​04/​world-​economic-​outlook-​april-​2017. 214 UNCTAD: World Investment Report 2017. Investment and the Digital Economy, Geneva 2017, p. 2, retrieved 7.8.2017, from https://​unctad.org/​en/​PublicationsLibrary/​ wir2017_​en.pdf.

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18000,0

Europe

North America

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16000,0 14000,0 12000,0 10000,0 8000,0 6000,0 4000,0

2016

2015

2014

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2008

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Figure 2.  World merchandise exports since 1995, billion USD Source: Own preparation based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.08.2017, from http://​u nctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

rebounded, and their value grew up to 2014 (reaching a record 19 trillion USD). However, the dynamics of growth gradually decreased. Exports in value terms decreased by 13.2 % compared to the previous year, despite a positive increase in volume (+2.7 %).215 In the following year, the value of exports decreased by 3.2 %, falling below 16 trillion USD. The main reasons behind the decline in exports in 2015 and 2016 were an economic slowdown in China, a severe recession in Brazil, falling prices for oil and other commodities, and exchange rate volatility.216 Figure 2 also presents the overall geographical structure of world exports. While Europe’s share of exports fell from 45.2 % in 1995 to 37.2 % in 2016 and North America’s declined from 16.6 to 13.9  %, Asia’s share rose from 28 to 36.1 %. The increase in Asia’s share was mainly attributable to East Asian countries (ASEAN, China, Japan, and South Korea). This group of countries clearly increased their share in world exports, from 20.1 % to 27.4 %.217 The changes in the area of imports were similar to those observed in exports, but with certain modifications. Much like in the case of exports, Europe’s share of world exports shrank, and Asia’s increased. However, Asia’s share was lower in imports

215 WTO: World Trade Statistical Review 2017, Geneva 2017, p. 16, retrieved 8.8.2017, from https://​w ww.wto.org/​english/​res_​e/​statis_​e/​w ts2017_​e/​w ts17_​toc_​e.htm. 216 Ibid. 217 UNCTAD:  UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from https://​unctadstat. unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

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(32.1 %) than in exports (36.1 %). Among others, this was due to the fact that East Asian countries increased their share of world imports less dynamically (from 18.1 % in 1995 to 22.7 % in 2016), more willingly using regional markets as a source of supply. North America maintained its share of global imports (19.2 % in 1995 compared to 18.9 % in 2016), mainly due to high U.S. demand, and the highest rate (25 %) was recorded in 2000. The changes taking place in international trade were related to the economic situation in the global economy, which on the one hand determined world trade and, on the other, was determined by trade. In addition, world trade has evolved as a result of the economic policies pursued on a national level. This will be the focus of the next part of this study. Economic policy. From the point of view of trade development within APT, trade policy in the 1997–​2016 period should be considered at three levels: global, regional, and national. At the global level, trade policy was mainly implemented under the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. After the successful Uruguay Round of GATT (1994), when the liberalization of world trade accelerated, another round of multilateral negotiations began in 2001—​the Doha Development Round. The degree of complexity of issues that have not always fallen within the WTO’s scope of interest as well as the changing balance of power within the organization—​the latter of which manifested itself in the growing emancipation of developing countries—​led to an impasse in talks on multilateral trade liberalization. For example, the first multilateral Trade Facilitation Agreement was reached only 21 years after WTO began operations.218 One consequence of the stagnation of multilateral talks was the increased popularity of bilateral or regional agreements. The processes of regional economic integration have intensified throughout almost the entire world, including in East Asia. Ever closer integration in Europe (through the creation of the Single European Market) and North America (NAFTA) has prompted Asian countries to increase their engagement in regional integration.219 The East Asia Economic Caucus emerged at the beginning of the 1990s,220 the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established 218 WTO: WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement Enters Into Force, retrieved 4.9.2017, from https://​w ww.wto.org/​english/​news_​e/​news17_​e/​fac_​31jan17_​e.htm. 219 Ahn, Choong Yong /​Cheong, Inkyo: “A Search for Closer Economic Relations in East Asia.” Japanese Economic Review 58(2), 2007, p.  174; Klecha-​ Tylec, Karolina: Regionalizm w teorii i praktyce państw Azji Wschodniej, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN: Warszawa 2013, p. 86. 220 Pasierbiak, Paweł: “Institutional Economic Integration in East Asia - Evolution, Assessment and Prospects”. International Business and Global Economy 35(1),

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in 1992,221 and integration processes in East Asia intensified at the end of the 1990s. All of these developments led to the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) concept of East Asian cooperation.222 Collaboration intensified after the Asian Financial Crisis, especially in the area of finance. In addition, individual countries have begun to embrace bilateral cooperation on a larger scale. Even Japan, traditionally reluctant to engage in regional arrangements, has intensively sought partners. Table 2 lists data on regional economic agreements concluded by East Asian countries. Table 2.  FTA Status by Country as of May 2017 COUNTRY/​ ECONOMY

Under Negotiation Signed but Framework Negotiations not yet in effect agreement signed launched Brunei Darussalam 0 2 1 Cambodia 0 2 0 China, People’s 0 7 1 Republic of Indonesia 0 7 1 Japan 0 8 1 Korea, Republic of 0 10 0 Lao PDR 0 2 0 Malaysia 1 5 2 Myanmar 1 3 0 Philippines 0 3 1 Singapore 0 9 2 Thailand 1 9 0 Viet Nam 0 5 1 TOTAL 3 72 10

Signed TOTAL and in effect 8 6 16

11 8 24

9 15 16 8 14 6 7 20 13 10 148

17 24 26 10 22 10 11 31 23 16 233

Source: Own work based on ADB: Asia Regional Integration Center, Tracking Asian Integration, retrieved 4.9.2017, from https://​a ric.adb.org/​database/​fta.

2016, p. 149; Dent, Christopher M.: “Organizing the Wider East Asia Region”, ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration, 2010, p. 5, retrieved 3.9.2017, from https://think-asia.org/bitstream/handle/11540/1574/wp62-dentorganizing-wider-east-asia-region.pdf?sequence=1. 221 Ahn / Cheong, p. 181. 222 Chia, Siow Yue: “Economic Cooperation and Integration in East Asia.” Asia-​Pacific Review 11(1), 2004, p. 13; Terada, Takashi: “ASEAN Plus Three. Becoming More Like a Normal Regionalism?.” In: Beeson, Mark /​Stubbs, Richard (eds.): Routledge Handbook of Asian Regionalism. Routledge: London and New York 2012, p. 364.

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The data presented above show that East Asian countries are very active in establishing regional economic co-​operation. The total number of agreements (in the process of negotiation or already in force) has reached 233. The leaders in securing free trade agreements are Singapore (31), Korea (26), Japan (24) and China (24). It can therefore be said that East Asian countries, by behaving pragmatically, are trying to create favorable conditions for their development by promoting trade and investment links within the framework of FTAs. If most of these initiatives involve Asian countries, such a large number of agreements leads to over-​complication of trade and institutional relations in the region. This phenomenon has been called the ‘noodle bowl’223 and illustrates the problems stemming from overlapping agreements in various national configurations. This is perceived as a serious barrier to trade development and institutional cooperation in East Asia due to the existence of obligations to meet a wide variety of conditions imposed by existing agreements (e.g., stemming from significantly different rules of origin). On the other hand, there are also suggestions that one opportunity to overcome this barrier may be to replace a large number of existing agreements by a wider one.224 Apart from the aforementioned, as yet unmaterialized concept of interoperability within APT, other initiatives have emerged, including the TPP (Trans-​Pacific Partnership) or the RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). These two concepts differ in national composition, including on whether and how countries from the Pacific region are included (e.g., Australia and New Zealand for RCEP). The foreign economic policy pursued by individual countries in the region is also a factor that influences the development of trade within East Asia. Apart from the growing tendency of countries to enter into regional agreements, several important national initiatives can be identified without further discussion. With regard to China, they include the Belt and Road Initiative (2013), a proposal for the creation of an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (2014), and its eventual creation (2016). At the same time, it is worth remembering that China does not aspire to solely regional-​level leadership. Its target area of economic and political influence is the whole world, which also affects its will to develop commercial cooperation in East Asia. In turn, Japan has been struggling with economic problems since the early 1990s. With periods of economic recovery ranging from long to short, however, 223 Baldwin, Richard E.: The Spoke Trap: Hub and Spoke Bilateralism in East Asia, CNAEC Research Series 04/​02, 2004, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, p. 10, retrieved 7.9.2017, from http://​w ww.kiep.go.kr/​index.do. 224 Chia, p. 15.

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the country is slowly losing its economic position in the world and the region. One of the concepts implemented to maintain a relatively strong position in the country is the promotion of bilateral and regional cooperation, which the country is also trying to do. An example of this is the completion of the free trade agreement with the European Union in July 2017. Similarly, South Korea, which is pursuing a free and open market-​based economy, is also actively involved in multilateral and regional initiatives.225 An example of this is the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, in operation since mid-​2011. The above-​mentioned processes and phenomena were the most important determinants of the development of trade between the countries of East Asia. It is worth remembering them while analyzing trends in the merchandise trade of these economies.

Merchandise trade within APT The dynamically developing East Asian region owes its success largely to the development of trade. This is not limited to external exports (Asia as a world factory) and global trade, but also increasingly intensive ties among East Asian countries. To a certain extent, internal trade has correlated with the global situation, as East Asian countries are not only recipients of external impulses, but are increasingly influencing global flows due to their growing importance in international trade. During periods of economic prosperity, one could observe the dynamic growth of merchandise trade in APT, and in periods of global economic crises, the countries of East Asia also experienced downturns. The export value of APT is illustrated in Figure 3. Figure 3 clearly shows the general growth tendency in the value of exports, together with periodic breakdowns occurring during periods of crisis. In 1995–​ 1997, the value of exports was stabilized at a level of about 370 billion USD. In 1998, the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis is clearly visible in the form of a contracting effect on APT trade. The value of exports fell by 22.2  % to 291.7 billion USD, while world exports reported only a small decline of 1.6 % (see Figure 2). In the next two years, trade value increased, but in 2001, as a result of the economic slowdown and the dot-​com crisis, the turnover again decreased by 8.7 %. Since 2002, exports continued to grow steadily until 2008, with internal turnover almost tripling. It was not until 2009, with the global downturn, that turnover also fell within APT. However, the decline in exports 225 WTO: Trade Policy Review: Republic of Korea, Geneva 2016, p. 28, retrieved 7.7.2017, from https://​w ww.wto.org/​english/​tratop_​e/​tpr_​e/​tp446_​e.htm.

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Figure 3.  Merchandise exports among APT countries in the years 1995–​2016, billion USD Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from http://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

(by 16.6 %) was lower than the corresponding drop in world trade (22.3 %). The already considerable importance of the APT countries in world trade (23.6 % of world exports) helped to mitigate the freefall of world trade to some extent. In 2010, turnover rebounded and increased by more than 30  %. The highest export value in APT was reported in 2014, when it reached 1,718.7 billion USD. The years 2015–​2016 witnessed a fall in turnover, which partly reflected the broader phenomenon in global trade. This time, however, greater declines in East Asia adversely affected global trends due to the importance of APT countries in world trade. The relative value of intra-​trade to total APT trade shows the strength of intra-​regional trade in this group of countries (Figure 4). Asian economies are much more connected with external markets than regional markets. The share of intra-​trade in APT is lower than in the case of the European Union or even NAFTA. However, it is worth noting that in spite of the lack of institutionalization, the internal linkages in APT are much higher than in the case of MERCOSUR or even ASEAN. Additionally, APT’s share of East Asia’s total turnover is larger on the import side. Before the global financial crisis, APT’s share of total imports increased from 39.6 % in 1995 to 46.3 % in 2007. This was due to the increasing complementarity of countries in the region and the development of regional production chains that promoted the export of semi-​ finished products and components. Interestingly, the 1998 Asian crisis did not reduce APT’s share of the region’s internal imports. This meant that the decline in

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Figure 4.  Intra-​and extra-​trade of APT countries, % Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from http://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

intra-​imports was in proportion to the decline in total imports. Post-​2008, limitations to the financing of trade transactions have had a negative impact on exports, which, coupled with relatively well-​developed regional fragmentation of production, has reduced the importance of internal turnover. By 2014, APT’s share fell to 42.4 %. Since 2015, APT’s share of domestic imports has increased again. On the other hand, it is evident that the AFC has strongly rattled internal exports. It can be illustrated first and foremost in the drop in demand and the concomitant drop in intra-​regional export among Asian countries that experienced the crisis. In 1998 the share of intra-​APT exports fell to 28.2 % from 34.3 % in the previous year. In the following years, the share of internal exports increased steadily until 2012 (36.2 %). From that year on, it decreased gradually to 34.6 % in 2016. In attempting to assess the process of regional trade integration on the basis of the intra-​trade indicators, we can state that, while there are no major changes on the export side (apart from the temporary decline in 1998 and slight fluctuations in the remaining years), on the import side, the importance of intra-​trade indicators for APT has grown significantly in the period in question. Another indicator that shows the level of trade integration in the region is the trade intensity index (TII), which gives a more precise picture of the importance of intra-​regional trade. It refers to the share of intra-​exports (or imports) to the region’s share in world exports (or imports). If the value of the indicator is greater than 1, then the internal turnover is greater than one would expect

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from the region’s share in world turnover. Table 3 shows the calculated TII for the APT region since 1995. Looking at the data of Table 3, one can see that the trade intensity ratios are higher than 1, but they are higher on the import side than on the export side. Additionally, import TII increased until 2004, while export TII fell continually. This is the result of two dynamics: first, the higher share of domestic imports in APT, and second, the APT region’s lower share in world imports. On the other hand, the share of domestic exports was almost constant (and lower than imports), as was and the region’s share in world exports. If one was to assess the degree of integration of APT countries based on the TII, one would say that it is relatively higher in imports and lower in exports, but there is a clear downward trend in both areas. The simple conclusion of this analysis is that trade intensity within APT is declining. Nevertheless, the value of the indicator is still higher than 1, and it is reasonable to consider that the large and growing role of the region in global trade leads to an overall decrease in this metric. Apart from internal trade, a more comprehensive analysis of the tendencies in trade should also cover other elements. One of the most important ones is structural transformation of trade (broken down by product and geography). An analysis of the geographical structure of trade within APT shows that there were quite significant changes in this period (see Table 4). Between 1997 and 2016, China’s contribution to APT’s domestic trade significantly increased, while the significance of Japan declined. The share of the former more than doubled, from 14.3 % (1997) to 31.8 % (2016) in exports and from 14.2 % to 33.2 % in imports. Japan’s share declined from 31.4 % to 16.9 % in exports and from 26.9 % to 16.7 % in imports. It can therefore be argued that these countries have switched positions in APT’s internal trade. In the case of South Korea, the changes were not as spectacular. On the export side, there was an increase of 1.7 percentage points (to 14.7 %), while imports recorded a decrease of 1.9 percentage points (to 10.9 %). ASEAN remained the largest exporter and importer during this period, but its share in exports and imports declined (to 36.6 % in exports and 39.3 % in imports). The changes described above illustrate trends in the economic balance of power in the region. As almost all countries based their growth on trade, and the dynamics of GDP growth was linked to changes in the value of exports and imports. In 2010, China replaced Japan as a regional leader in terms of GDP value, becoming the world’s second-​largest economy (with the U.S. as first and Japan as third).226 South Korea, with a relatively stable share of world GDP in the 1.5–​2 % range, demonstrated similar stability in APT trade. 226 The World Bank data bank, retrieved 23.8.2017, from https://​databank.worldbank. org/​home.aspx.

1.9 2.1

1997

1.7 2.2

1998

1.5 2.8

1999

1.6 2.7

2000 1.6 2.5

2001 1.7 2.5

2002 1.7 2.6

1.7 2.6

2004 1.6 2.6

2005 1.6 2.5

2006 1.5 2.4

2007 1.5 2.4

2008 1.5 2.2

2009 1.5 2.2

2012

2011

2010 1.4 1.5 1.4 2.0 1.9 1.8

2013 1.4 1.8

2014 1.4 1.8

1.2 2.0

2015

1995

19.2 % 27.6 % 12.8 % 40.4 %

15.7 % 29.0 % 13.2 % 42.1 %

2000

32.2 % 21.5 % 11.8 % 34.5 %

21.6 % 25.1 % 14.1 % 39.2 %

2005

36.6 % 17.9 % 11.4 % 34.1 %

23.8 % 23.6 % 14.4 % 38.1 %

2010

33.2 % 16.7 % 10.9 % 39.3 %

31.8 % 16.9 % 14.7 % 36.6 %

2016

Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from http://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

China Japan Korea ASEAN

China Japan Korea ASEAN

1997 Exports 14.3 % 31.4 % 13.0 % 41.3 % Imports 14.2 % 26.9 % 12.8 % 46.1 %

Table 4.  Geographical breakdown of exports and imports in East Asia, %

Source: Own calculations based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, http://​u nctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx, 7.8.2017.

1996

Exports 1.8 Imports 2.2

2003

Table 3.  Trade Intensity Index (TII) for APT since 1995 2016 1.3 2.0

newgenrtpdf

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The evolution of the geographical structure of exports and imports within APT has also been accompanied by changes in the importance of the APT market for individual countries in the region. The increase of China’s share and Japan’s decline in internal turnover did not mean that the APT partner countries’ share of China’s total exports/​imports increased or that their share of Japan’s total trade decreased. Instead, the changes were multidirectional, and more detailed analysis is possible based on data shown in Figure 5. For both exports and imports, the importance of APT as a sales and buying market increased for both ASEAN and Japan. For ASEAN, East Asia was the leading market, with its share rising to around 50 % in exports and 60 % in imports. For ASEAN, the most important destination of export and the most important source of imports was ASEAN itself, but China became increasingly

Figure 5.  Trade significance of APT for ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea, % Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from https://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx.

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important, while Japan’s significance waned. South Korea had a stable share of 7–​8 % as an export market for ASEAN, and as an import market, its share increased from 10 % (1997) to 12.2 % (2016).227 For Japan, trade with APT countries is becoming increasingly important. In export, the APT market raised its share from 28 % (1997) to 39.6 % (2016) and registered the same trend in imports, from 31.5 % to 45.1 %. More and more of Japan’s exports to APT are directed toward China (up from 18.5 % to 44.5 %) while less and less is routed to ASEAN (37.4 % in 2016 versus 59.4 % in 1998), and the least goes to South Korea (down from 22.1 % to 18.1 %).228 On the import side, Japan buys the largest share of its imports from China (57.1 % in 2016), then ASEAN (33.7 %), and finally Korea (9.1 %). South Korea reported slightly different trends. In exports, it mirrors the trend observed for ASEAN and Japan, namely the increasing importance of the APT market. In 2016, the share of APT in total Korean exports reached 45.1 %, demonstrating the extraordinary importance of cooperation of Korea with its nearest neighbors. More and more Korean exports are destined for East Asia. On the import side, one can note that the importance of APT countries fluctuated. From 1997 to 2004, it increased from 35 % to 43.7 %, only to decrease later (37.5 % in 2014) and then to increase again to 44 % (2016). The most important partner in East Asian trade for Korea was China, with an upward trend (55.7 % of total Korean exports to APT were sent to this country in 2016), ASEAN (33.4  %), and Japan, with declining trend (10.9  % in 2016 versus 30.3 % in 1997). In imports, the general trends were similar, although in 2016 the shares looked slightly different than in exports: 48.7 % China, 26.6 % Japan, and 24.8 % ASEAN. The importance of the APT market for China has been significantly different. China, as a resilient economic center with great potential, attracts the rest of the region very strongly. This increases the importance of the Chinese market for export and import partners. On the other hand, China is a country with global aspirations. Its area of interest encompasses the whole world, not only East Asia. This is largely reflected in the APT region’s declining share of Chinese exports. Between 1997 and 2016, it decreased from 29.4 % to 22.9 %. Imports experienced different dynamics, as APT’s share increased until 2005 (to 46.6 %), but later declined (34.3 % in 2016). This may be due, first, to the presence of important sources of supply other than East Asian states, and

2 27 UNCTAD: UNCTADStat Database, Web. 228 Ibid.

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second, to the relocation of production to other countries. In both flows of Chinese trade (export and import), ASEAN’s share of the total value of flows increased and Japan’s share decreased, while Korea’s share remained at a stable level. Changes in the value of exports and imports and internal transformations of the product structure were two factors that influenced the changes in the trade effects of ASEAN Plus Three, as measured by the balance of trade. In this area, too, there have been certain transformations (see Figure 6). In 1995, ASEAN and Japan reported relatively large imbalances in their trade relations with other APT countries, with a deficit for ASEAN (-​29 billion USD) and a surplus for Japan (+29.5 billion USD). In the following years, up to the outbreak of the global economic crisis, the trade balances of all APT partners, except China, became relatively balanced. The biggest changes have occurred in the case of China. It appears that China’s greater involvement in East Asian trade (increasing share in APT’s exports and imports) has not necessarily been reflected in an improving trade balance with these countries. IMF data show that, from 2002 to 2011, China’s trade deficit with APT countries deepened. Initially standing at -​25.7 billion USD, in 2011 it reached 148.5 billion USD. In the years 2008–​2009, the deficit narrowed, which resulted from a more-​t han-​proportional reduction of imports over exports from partner countries. This was linked to expanded regional

Figure 6.  Trade balances of ASEAN, China, Japan, and Korea with APT countries, 1995–​2016, billion USD Source: Own work based on IMF: Direction of Trade Statistics, retrieved 30.8.2017, from https://​ data.imf.org/​.

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production chains in Asia.229 In the context of the global economic crisis and the decline in demand for finished products, it also contributed to the decline in Chinese demand for parts and components. Since 2002, China’s growing deficit has been the result of its deepening negative balance of trade with ASEAN, Korea, and Japan. Since 2012, due to the diminishing deficit with Korea and Japan, China’s negative balance with the APT countries has improved rapidly, and in 2015 it even recorded a surplus of 12.8 billion USD. In 2016, China again registered a small deficit of 11 USD billion. After the GFC, interesting changes have also occurred in the trade balances of Korea, Japan, and ASEAN. By 2010, Japan showed an upward trend in its trade surplus with APT countries (41.7 billion USD). By contrast, from 2011 to 2014, this surplus turned into a deficit of nearly 50 billion USD. In the years 201516, the situation improved slightly (the deficit fell to -​18.3 billion USD). In turn, the changes for Korea consisted of an increase in surplus from 2009 (11.7 billion USD) to 2013 (66.1 billion USD). In the following years, the surplus slightly decreased, but was still high (45.5 USD billion) in 2016. In the case of ASEAN, the situation deteriorated after 2012. In 2016, ASEAN registered a deficit of nearly 52 billion USD. Structural transformations in trade affect not only the geographical structure but also the product structure of an exchange. This becomes particularly important in terms of the evolution of the nature of international trade, the emergence of cooperation in production (value chains), and the development of intra-​industry trade. East Asian countries are particularly involved in these processes. This geographical area is one of the world’s most important producers and exporters and an area where strong cross-​border production links have developed.230 Figure 7 below shows the product structure of APT trade. It is easy to see that exchange among APT countries focuses on manufactured products. The SITC 7 (Machinery and transport equipment) group had the largest share (43.8 % in 2016), while its significance was relatively stable over the period considered. The SITC 6 (Manufactured goods) group was the second most important, but its share has fallen since 1997 by 1.7  percentage points, to 14.6 %. The third largest groups was SITC 8 (Miscellaneous manufactured

229 ASEAN & UNCTAD: ASEAN Investment Report 2013–​2014. FDI Development and Regional Value Chains, Jakarta 2014, retrieved 8.8.2017, from https://​unctad.org/​en/​ PublicationsLibrary/​unctad_​asean_​air2014d1.pdf. 230 Retrieved from https://​w ww.nber.org/​papers/​w10167.

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100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

0%

Commodities and transactions. n.e.s. (SITC 9) Miscellaneous manufactured articles (SITC 8) Machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7) Manufactured goods (SITC 6) Chemicals and related products n.e.s. (SITC 5) Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes (SITC 4) Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials (SITC 3) Crude materials, inedible, except fuels (SITC 2) Beverages and tobacco (SITC 1) Food and live animals (SITC 0)

Figure 7.  Product breakdown of exports among APT countries, % Source: Own work based on UNCTAD: UNCTAD Stat Database, retrieved 7.8.2017, from https://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx

articles), whose share in the whole period grew to 13.6 % in 2016. The sum of these three commodity groups was around ¾ of the total intra-​APT turnover. Until 1998 (AFC), the largest exporter of SITC 7 products was Japan (42.8 %), but by 2016 its importance had dropped significantly (to 18.9 %). At the same time, the importance of China increased (from 6.9 % in 1998 to 31.6 % in 2016). By 2011, ASEAN’s share had increased to 43.3 %, only to invert into a downward trend since then (32.7 % in 2016). Korea had the lowest share of exports of these products, but its share gradually increased (from 10.7 % to 16.8 %). In the second most important commodity group (SITC 6), the changes consisted of an increase in China’s share (from 19.1 % to 43.9 % in 1997–​2016) and Japan’s decline (from 35.9 to 17.9 %). Korea’s share also fell from 20.8 % to 13.2 %, while ASEAN’s share was stable and ranged between 25 and 28 %. The situation was quite different for non-​industrial products. In the most important commodity group (SITC  3), the ASEAN countries reported the highest share (73.5  % in 1997 and 73.9  % in 2016). In 2016, the remaining partners distributed their contributions as follows: 13.6 % for Korea, 7.9 % for China, and 4.6 % for Japan. Unlike in groups such as SITC  3 (Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials) or SITC 2 (Crude materials, inedible, except fuels), some products from SITC 6–​8 are well suited for intra-​industry trade. This phenomenon has developed in East Asia quite strongly, as evidenced by the prominent role of foreign value added (FVA) in the total exports of its economies. According to the data presented in Table  5, we can conclude that, among the APT countries, ASEAN and South Korea have been the most involved in

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Merchandise Trade Development in APT Table 5.  Foreign value added in total trade of selected exporters, % 1995 1997 2000 2005 2009 2010 2011 2012

World 25.6 % 26.3 % 27.6 % 29.3 % 29.0 % 30.0 % 30.5 % 29.9 %

ASEAN 40.3 % 38.6 % 39.5 % 40.2 % 37.6 % 38.3 % 38.5 % 42.0 %

China 13.1 % 13.9 % 16.0 % 19.0 % 15.9 % 18.7 % 19.7 % 18.3 %

Japan 8.9 % 11.0 % 10.7 % 14.9 % 15.1 % 16.1 % 17.6 % 18.4 %

Korea 30.4 % 32.0 % 34.4 % 33.8 % 39.0 % 40.1 % 41.6 % 40.3 %

APT 20.9 % 22.3 % 22.8 % 25.3 % 24.6 % 26.1 % 27.1 % 27.7 %

Source: Own work based on EORA Database, retrieved 10.8.2017, from https://​worldmrio.com/​.

international production chains. While in the case of ASEAN, the share of foreign value added in total exports remained in the 38–​42 % range between 1995 and 2012, South Korea experienced a steady increase from 30.4 % to 40.3 %. South Korea has grown into the position of a regional leader in international production networks. In turn, China and Japan have been less involved in these processes. In the case of China, the share of foreign value added in the country’s exports increased from 13.1 % (1995) to 19.7 % (2011) and 18.3 % (2012). Japan’s share increased from a low of 8.9 % (1995) to 18.4 % (2012). In the case of China, its relatively low but growing share was because of the fact that a large number of foreign companies have located their entire manufacturing process in that country, but also because Chinese corporations are in the process of developing their own production chains in the region. Japan, on the other hand, was traditionally a major exporter of production capital to other countries in the region and, while producing locally, treated host countries as export platforms. In addition, in Japan, there was a reluctance to import parts and components, and then assemble final products for subsequent export.

Conclusions Analyzing the development of merchandise trade within ASEAN Plus Three in the years 1997–​2016, as outlined in this paper, allows us to indicate several main tendencies and their respective determinants. 1) APT’s merchandise trade grew dynamically, and its value increased from 375.2 billion USD (1997) to 1,718.7 billion USD (2014), but subsequently fell to 1,515.6 USD billion (2016).

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2) The importance of internal trade for APT countries is relatively high. Two general indicators confirm this: the share of APT’s internal trade in total trade and the trade intensity index (TII). It is also corroborated by APT’s share in the exports and imports of individual countries. i) The share of domestic imports in total APT import is on an upward trend (from 39.4 % to 44.7 %), while exports are stable at around 34 %. ii) Export intensity indices decreased during the period examined here (from 1.7 to 1.3), while imports ranged from 1.8 to 2.6. This means that internal trade flows were higher than expected if judging only by APT’s share in global flows. iii) For all individual APT economies except China, the importance of the APT market is growing. China is an exception because, despite the increase in its share of intra-​trade, the importance of the APT market for this country has fallen, especially on the export side. 3) The geographic structure of internal trade has undergone profound transformations. Major changes include the increase of China’s share and the decline of Japan’s. These countries have, in fact, switched positions. 4) Despite China’s growing importance in APT’s internal trade, the country’s trade balance has been reporting a large deficit for many years. Only since 2012 has the situation changed for the better. 5) The trade of APT countries focuses on industrial goods, which account for about ¾ of total exchange. China is the leading trader here, gaining importance while Japan loses. 6) Due to the high share of manufactured products in internal trade, there are possibilities for the development of production chains in the region. The highest shares of foreign value added in exports belong to Korea and ASEAN, and to a lesser extent, to China and Japan. The same indicator for the entire APT showed an upward trend (from 20.9  % in 1995 to 27.7  % in 2012). These changes occurring within intra-​East Asian trade have been determined by various factors. The most important of these are the economic situation in the world, factors related to global trade, and economic policy. 1) Periods of economic crises (AFC, dot-​com, GFC) did not favor the development of internal trade flows, but on the other hand, periods of positive economic fortunes intensified internal relations. The share of APT’s internal turnover in global turnover also increased (from 6.7  % in 1997 to 9.5  % in 2016).

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2) Trade within APT has developed substantially in correlation with world trade. The exception is the Asian Financial Crisis, when internal flows fell far more than those of the world. During the global crisis, internal trade fell less proportionately. 3) The economic policy pursued by the countries analyzed here was not conducive to the development of trade links in APT, as the individual countries formed their relationships on a bilateral basis. There were no real coordinated actions aimed at promoting intra-​East Asian trade. In conclusion, we can say that there is a high potential for the development of internal trade in East Asia. Increasing the importance of mutual trade for each individual partner should be treated as a positive sign. The exception to this rule is China, whose point of reference is the whole world rather than East Asia alone. It seems that China’s attitude is the key to developing internal links in APT. If they decide to be more involved in the region, East Asia will be able to deepen the processes of regional economic integration. We can find signs of this (such as preferential trade agreements, the Belt and Road Initiative, or the creation of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank). The question, however, is whether this series of actions is aimed only at achieving individual benefits or whether it signals the will to cooperate within the region. If a strong institutional framework could be created, even in a loose form, then intra-​trade would have better conditions to increase.

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UNCTAD:  World Investment Report 2017. Investment and the Digital Economy, Geneva 2017, retrieved 07.08.2017, from https://​unctad.org/​en/​ PublicationsLibrary/​w ir2017_​en.pdf. UNCTAD:  UNCTADStat Database, retrieved 07.08.2017, from http://​ unctadstat.unctad.org/​wds/​ReportFolders/​reportFolders.aspx. WTO: Trade Policy Review: Republic of Korea, Geneva 2016, retrieved 07.70.2017, from https://​w ww.wto.org/​english/​tratop_​e/​tpr_​e/​tp446_​e.htm. WTO:  World Trade Statistical Review 2017, Geneva 2017, retrieved 08.08.2017, from https://​www.wto.org/​english/​res_​e/​statis_​e/​wts2017_​e/​wts17_​toc_​e.htm. WTO: WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement Enters Into Force, retrieved 04.09.2017, from https://​w ww.wto.org/​english/​news_​e/​news17_​e/​fac_​31jan17_​e.htm. Yusuf, Shahid: “The East Asian Miracle at the Millennium.” In: Stiglitz, Joseph E.  /​Yusuf, Shahid. (eds.):  Rethinking the East Asian Miracle. World Bank and Oxford University Press:  Washington and Ney York 2001, retrieved 0 6.08.2018, from https://​openknowledge.worldbank.org/​handle/​10986/​13969. * Pawel Pasierbiak, Ph.D., is an economist and works in the Department of World Economy and European Integration at the Faculty of Economics of Maria Curie-​Sklodowska University in Lublin, Poland. His main scientific interest lies in international economics with a focus on regional economic integration (in Asia and Europe), as well as on the European-​Asian interregional relations. He has experience in lecturing at Polish and foreign universities (e.g., in Germany, Japan, South Korea, Spain, and the United States). He was a visiting professor at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP) in 2019. Currently, since September 2019, he participates in the Jean Monnet Network Project on strategies for promoting connectivity between Europe and Asia (SPEAC).

Agata Ziętek http://​orcid.org/​000-​0003-​2534-​3950

The Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: ASEAN-​China Cooperation Abstract: This article presents a situational analysis of the geopolitical state of play in the South China Sea, revolving around two questions: First, are the instruments and rules of conduct employed in the region effective in conflict management and will they enable the sides to achieve common ground –​or will the conflict simmer in perpetuity? Second, will the countries involved in the disputes respect international law and act in accordance with the accepted rules and regulations or will they take an instrumental, ad-​ hoc approach to the tools provided by international law, abusing them at their whim and fancy? The main objective of this article is to discuss how the conflict in the SCS had been managed and how it is likely to be managed in the future. Specifically, here I will analyze the negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN. Keywords: South China Sea, Declaration on the Conduct of Parties, Code of Conduct, China, ASEAN, UNCLOS

Introduction The situation in the South China Sea has been quite stable for many years. The countries that have had long-​standing, active involvement in the dispute have turned their attention to domestic problems. The presence of the U.S. Navy in the area has also been an important stabilizing factor. Moreover, the People’s Republic of China, unable to successfully push for its own claims on a wider scale, was not very active on the issue for a number of years. Recently, however, the situation has changed –​a fact that cannot be separated from recent changes in China’s perception of its own security. Even a cursory situational analysis of the state of affairs in the South China Sea brings up two key questions. First, are the instruments and rules of conduct employed in the region effective in conflict management and will they enable the sides to achieve common ground –​or will the conflict simmer in perpetuity? Second, will the countries involved in the disputes respect international law and act in accordance with the accepted rules and regulations or will they take an instrumental, ad-​hoc approach to the tools provided by international law, abusing them at their whim and fancy?

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The main objective of this article is to discuss how the conflict in the SCS had been managed and how it is likely to be managed in the future. Specifically, here I will analyze the negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct between China and ASEAN.

Subject of the Dispute The South China Sea is a marginal sea in East Asia that forms part of the western Pacific Ocean, covering a total area of over 3.5  million km2. The sea borders directly with the People’s Republic of China (China), Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Vietnam, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). Within the South China Sea itself, we can distinguish several areas of sensitivity. The first is the Gulf of Thailand, where conflicts arise between Malaysia and Thailand (regarding the status of the islands of Ko Kra and Ko Losin), and Cambodia and Vietnam (surrounding the island of Phú Quốc). Another nerve point is the Gulf of Tonkin, where two countries are involved  –​China and Vietnam. While most of these disputes were resolved through the 2000 Tonkin Gulf Agreement, there are still certain inconsistencies and a degree of friction regarding the Fishery Agreement. The third sensitive area lies to the north of the Natuna Islands, a regency belonging to Indonesia, and the discord here stems from the overlap of the Chinese ‘nine-​ dotted line’ and Indonesia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The fourth sensitive area is a triangle whose extreme points are formed by (1) the Pratas (Dongsha) Islands, controlled in practice by Taiwan but claimed by the People’s Republic of China; (2) Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), controlled by China but claimed by Taiwan, the Philippines, and Vietnam; and (3)  Scarborough Shoal, controlled by China but claimed by Taiwan and the Philippines. The fifth contentious archipelago is made up of the Paracel (Xisha) islands, which are at present effectively occupied by China but remain the object of a dispute between China, Taiwan, and Vietnam. Finally, the sixth and most hotly disputed area is that of the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, a six-​way clash between the claims of sovereignty of China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei. Those are the immediate claimant states that have formulated various maritime and territorial claims. A distinction may be drawn between China and Taiwan on the one hand, both of whom make the most ambitious and comprehensive claims, and the remaining four countries on the other hand. All of them are members of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). However, they also vary significantly in how they have chosen to approach the SCS disputes and manage the recent intensification of tensions. The

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vocal positions of the Philippines and Vietnam typically grab the headlines, whereas Malaysia and Brunei have been quiet. Maritime territorial disputes and the sometimes belligerent behavior of the countries involved are often perceived as a set of risk factors or threats and encourage observers to define the region in terms of international security. Some of the most pressing issues include the negative feedback brought on by: (1) the exploitation of oil and natural gas reserves as well as the distribution of concessions for exploration and development among international corporations; (2) territorial disputes resulting from the actions of governments and national militaries, such as the appropriation of islands, reefs, and atolls; (3) shows of force, use of force, or threats to use force (military exercises and movements of naval units usually associated with embarking on a war footing, takeovers of fishing and commercial vessels and their crews, piracy); (4) the relations between China and the United States, including the issue of Taiwan; and (5) differing interpretations of international maritime law. This demonstrates that there are many different dimensions to the problem. Given the lack of compelling evidence and legal foundations to resolve the problem of the islands’ ownership, for many years, the parties involved have acted according to the res nullius/​terra nullius principle in international law. The most palpable consequence of this is the occupation of individual islands and the building of infrastructure on their land, which is later used to reinforce the case for sovereignty of the country responsible. China applies this approach with great consistency. This strategy, previously described as the ‘silkworm tactic’ 231 and today as ‘salami slicing,’ consists of gradual encroachment on the territory of successive islands. Today it has taken on an additional form –​the recreation or simply the construction of artificial islands. Inseparable from this overarching tactic is the firm rejection of the notion that this geopolitical problem is up for debate while at the same time assuring all parties that the Chinese government wishes to resolve the dispute peacefully. China uses the terra nullius principle in arguing for the legitimacy of the U-​shaped line. In 2009, the Chinese government appended a map that included the U-​shaped 231 Haliżak, Edward: „Spór o archipelagi na Morzu Południowochińskim. Znaczenie dla międzynarodowego prawa morza i bezpieczeństwa w regionie” [“South China Sea Disputes: Consequences for Interantional Security and Law of the Sea”]. In: Haliżak Edward/​Kuźniar, Roman (ed(s).): Prawo, instytucje i polityka w procesie globalizacji, [Law, Institutions and Politics in the Globalization Processes]. Scholar: Warszawa 2003, p. 182.

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line to a submission to the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. This marked the first time that the line was used in an international setting.232 It was also a response to the joint motion made by Vietnam and Malaysia, as well as a separate one by Vietnam, regarding the extension of the continental shelf beyond the 200-​nautical mile zone. Other principles of international law that China employs in its toolkit include uti possidetis233 and the estoppel doctrine,234 particularly in disputes with Vietnam and with respect to the position of North Vietnam before 1975, when the North officially supported China’s claims to the Spratly Islands. In a letter sent to the Chinese leadership, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam wrote that it recognizes and approves the declaration made by the PRC in September 1958 with respect to “China’s territorial sea.”235 China also emphasizes that illegal acts do not generate rights, connecting its position to the country’s grievances following the Second World War and the Cold War –​two periods in which, as the government argues, other states took advantage of the weakness of the relatively young People’s Republic to occupy territories that, in China’s view, were part of its sovereign territory.236 In the debate on the sovereignty of the islands and the sea in which they are situated, the different countries refer to the points outlined in the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco and the 1952 Treaty of Taipei. Article 2 of the first of these documents states that “Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Spratly Islands and to the Paracel Islands.”237 What is lacking is any indication of the party to whose benefit Japan is renouncing this right. Moreover, neither China 232 Hayton, Bill: The South China Sea. The Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press: New Haven, London 2014, p. 59. 233 A principle of international law stipulating that both sides involved in an armed conflict agree to end it, with all property and territory belonging to a given side up to that point remaining in their hands, unless otherwise provided for by a treaty. 234 Estoppel –​broadly “not contradicting oneself,” a rule that precludes a person or entity from making claims and assertions that contradict what they have previously stated or what has been previously established as fact. 235 Hayton, Bill: The South China Sea. The Struggle for Power in Asia, p. 96. 236 Hao, Su: China’s Position and Interest in the South China Sea: A Rational Choice in Its Cooperative Policies, Center for Strategic and International Studies, retrieved 10.11.2018, from https://​w ww.csis.org/​a nalysis/​china%E2%80%99s-​positions-​a nd-​ interests-​south-​china-​sea-​rational-​choices-​its-​cooperative-​policies. 237 Cf.: Treaty of Peace with Japan. Signed at San Francisco, On 8 September 1951, retrieved 10.11.2018, from https://​treaties.un.org/​doc/​Publication/​U NTS/​Volume%20136/​ volume-​136-​I-​1832-​English.pdf.

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(People’s Republic of China) nor Taiwan (Republic of China) was a party to the treaty due to lack of agreement between the United States and Great Britain regarding who should represent Chinese interests. As such, the Treaty is not binding for either China or Taiwan. The following year, however, the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) signed the Treaty of Taipei with Japan; Article 2 asserts that “[i]‌t is recognized that under Article 2 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the city of San Francisco in the United States of America on September 8, 1951 (…), Japan has renounced all right, title and claim to Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) as well as the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.”238 This is one of Taiwan’s chief arguments in making its jurisdictional claims to the disputed territory. The weakness of these arguments is that the terms of agreement ceased to be in force after the 1972 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China. The legal dimension of the dispute also encompasses the international legal regime  –​the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed on December 10, 1982 and ratified on November 16, 1994. Among other breakthroughs, the Convention created a classification system for territorial seas and related marine areas. It provides countries with the legal foundations to claim their right to marine territory, including the coastline, territorial seas, contiguous zones, Exclusive Economic Zones, and the continental shelf. The provisions of UNCLOS determine that coastal states could claim a territorial sea 12 nautical miles wide, an EEZ of 200 nautical miles, and an extended continental shelf beyond that. The provisions of UNCLOS were the cornerstone for the creation of the International Seabed Authority (ISA), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLS), and the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS). All of the countries directly taking part in the territorial disputes in the South China Sea are parties to the Convention. While the Convention regulates many issues, it remains uncertain whether it is possible to trace marine zones around islands. According to Article 121 of the Convention, “[a]‌n island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide.”239 Furthermore, the island should be habitable. Therefore, rocks that do not fulfill the criterion of habitability by

238 Cf.: Treaty of Peace between the Republic of China and Japan (Treaty of Taipei) 1952, retrieved 10.11.2018, from http://​w ww.taiwandocuments.org/​taipei01.html. 239 Cf.: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay on December 10, 1982, retrieved 10.11.2018, from, http://​w ww.abc.com.pl/​du-​a kt/​-​/​a kt/​ dz-​u-​2002-​59-​543.

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humans or provide adequate conditions for independent economic activity are not islands, and thus it is not possible to delineate an EEZ and continental shelf around them.240 In this context, should islands where army garrisons are stationed be treated as islands or as rocks? This seemingly simply semantic quandary pertains to most of the Spratly archipelago.241 Another problem is that of each party’s jurisdiction over the islands and the sea. The Convention refers to delimiting the territorial sea between countries whose coastlines lie opposite each other or which neighbor each other (Article 15), delimiting the Exclusive Economic Zone (Article 74), and delimiting the continental shelf (Article 83). However, it does not regulate actual sovereignty. It follows that the Convention is effective as long as the territorial sovereignty of the islands does not elicit controversy. In the event that this condition is not fulfilled, the actions of any country in the area under dispute will generate diplomatic opposition, and in extreme cases, a show of force or even an actual confrontation.242 It is evident that the belligerent behavior of the countries involved has the effect of escalating existing disputes  –​especially those of Vietnam and the Philippines with China. In May 2011, Vietnam and China accused each other of cutting seismic cables used for scientific measurements. In June 2011, Vietnam carried out military exercises in the region –​a move that was harshly criticized and protested by China. 2012 saw further escalation of tensions. The subject of this face-​off was Scarborough Shoal, which is being claimed by the Philippines, China, and Taiwan. The Philippines took a three-​pronged approach consisting of legal, political, and diplomatic measures. On the one hand, the country intended to present the case in an international tribunal while seeking support for its position among fellow ASEAN countries and engaging in negotiations with China. For its part, China adopted a tactic that relied on imposing restrictions such as canceling tourist trips from China to the Philippines, suspending chartered flights, throttling the import of bananas from the Philippines, and negative

2 40 Ibid. 241 Emmers, Ralf: “Maritime disputes in the South China Sea. Strategic and diplomatic status quo.” In: Kwa, Chong Guan/​Skogan, John K. (ed(s).): Maritime Security in the Southeast Asia. Routledge: London, New York 2007, p. 51. 242 Smith, Robert W.: “Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality and Challenges.” In: Hu, Nien-​Tsu, Alfred/​McDorman Ted L. (ed(s).): Maritime Issues in the South China Sea: Troubled Waters or A Sea of Opportunity. Routledge: London, New York 2013, pp. 17–​23.

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PR campaigns.243 As a result, in January 2013, the Philippines submitted the case to arbitral proceedings in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Due to the fact that UNCLOS clearly does not deal with reviewing individual claims to sovereign jurisdiction, resolving border disputes on the high seas, or ruling on the historical rights of any nation to any territory, the justices are also unable to delineate maritime borders themselves. The government of the Philippines was not able to formally challenge the jurisdiction of any country over the Spratly Islands.244 As such, in its Notification and Statement of Claims, the Philippines raised four main issues: (1) that the Chinese nine-​ dotted line lacks legal foundations, (2) that China can only claim ownership of a handful of rocks, but certainly not the islands scattered around Scarborough Reef, (3) that Chinese construction on shallow underwater sands is illegal, and (4) that China flouts international law by harassing citizens of the Philippines on the high seas.245 In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC published a statement titled Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration, which asserted that UNCLOS does not apply in this case. Consequently, the Chinese government determined that it would neither acknowledge nor take part in the arbitral proceedings, arguing that China is within its right to select peaceful means of resolving disputes, which is in accordance with the 2006 declaration on the ratification of UNCLOS.246 Although the Chinese government originally ignored the activities and submission of its Filipino counterpart completely, the published position paper was certainly an assertion of its viewpoint, informal though it may have been. Experts point out that this publication was meant to soften international views of China, which is intent on chiseling out the image of a responsible state that

243 Kao, Shawn Shaw-​fawn: “Scarborough Shoal Dispute, China’s Assertiveness, and Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy.” International Journal of China Studies vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, p. 158. 244 Cf.: United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and: China’s declaration on the ratification of UNCLOS, retrieved 6.06.2015, from http://​w ww.un.org/​depts/​los/​ convention_​agreements/​convention_​declarations.htm. 245 Dutton, Peter A.: “The Sino-​Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and the South China Sea.” East and South China Sea Bulletin March 2013, retrieved 6.11.2019, from https://​w ww.files.ethz.ch/​isn/​162590/​CNAS_​Bulletin_​Dutton_​ TheSinoPhilippineMaritimeRow_​0.pdf. 246 Cf.: Position Paper on the Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated by the Republic of the Philippines, retriever 6.06.2015, from http://​w ww. fmprc.gov.cn/​mfa_​eng/​w jdt_​665385/​2649_​665393/​t1217147.shtml.

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respects the principles of international law and remains open to negotiation.247 Nevertheless, in the same Position Paper, China stated that the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to resolve the case, as it cannot judge on issues of sovereignty. If it dismisses concerns about jurisdiction, the tribunal will only then begin to hear the meat of the Philippines’ argument regarding the validity of China’s nine-​dotted line and the question of the status of certain marine features in the SCS.248 The Philippines has emphasized that the case is important not only for the country, but for the entire international community, as well as for the protection of the rule of law in international relations.249 China did not send any representatives to participate in or observe the hearing. According to China, the Philippines arbitration case is itself a violation of previous agreements, including the Declaration on the Code of Conduct on the South China Sea. In China’s opinion, it was legally entitled to refuse to participate in the arbitration and ignore its judgement.250 For years, Taiwan has also been issuing statements that reiterated its position on the SCS. Its government also took note of the Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility issued by the Arbitral Tribunal in the Philippines v. China arbitration case. In July 2015, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs clearly stated its position that “whether from the perspectives of history, geography, or international law, the Nansha (Spratly）Islands, Shisha（Paracel） Islands, Chungsha Islands（Macclesfield Bank), and Tungsha（Pratas） Islands, as well as their surrounding waters, are an inherent part of ROC territory and waters. As the ROC enjoys all rights to these island groups and their surrounding waters in accordance with international law, the ROC government does not recognize any claim to sovereignty over, or occupation of, these areas by other

247 Waxman, Matthieu: “Legal Posturing and Power Relations in the South China Sea.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, January 21, 2015, retrieved 11.06.2015, from http://​a mti.csis.org/​legal-​posturing-​a nd-​power-​relations-​in-​t he-​south-​china-​sea/​. 248 Tiezzi, Shannon: “In the Philippines’ South China Sea Case, Is International Law on Trial?.” The Diplomat, July 14, 2015, retrieved 14.06.2015 from http://​t hediplomat. com/​2015/​07/​i n-​t he-​philippines-​south-​china-​sea-​case-​is-​i nternational-​law-​on-​ trial/​. 249 Parameswaran, Prashanth: “Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Metter?.” The Diplomat, July 8, 2015, retrieved 10.07.2015, from http://​ thediplomat.com/​2015/​07/​does-​t he-​philippines-​south-​china-​sea-​c ase-​against-​ china-​really-​matter/​. 250 China opposed Philippines arbitration case, retrieved 20.07.2015, from http://​ english.cntv.cn/​2015/​07/​07/​VIDE1436267888563988.shtml.

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countries, irrespective of the reasons put forward or methods used for such claim or occupation.”251 The award was issued on July 12, 2016, firmly supporting nearly all of the 15 submissions made by the Philippines, and represented a major advancement in interpreting and clarifying the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).252

China’s position on the South China Sea Although the PRC’s current position on the South China Sea can be described as proactive and assertive, it has for years been consistently anchored in four elements: 1) South China Sea disputes should be resolved through peaceful means, with bilateral negotiations between the parties directly involved. 2) China has indisputable sovereignty over the territorial features of the South China Sea, which is supported by historical evidence. 3) Pending a resolution to the disputes, claimant countries could follow the principle of “setting aside disputes and pursuing join development.”253 This 251 Cf.: Statement on the South China Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China, retrieved 30.09.2018, from https://​w ww.mofa.gov.tw/​en/​News_​Content.asp x?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&s=EDEBCA08C7F51C98. 252 Cf.: PCA Case Nº 2013–​19 In the Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration –​before –​ An Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under Annex Vii To The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea –​between –​The Republic of The Philippines –​ and  –​The People’s Republic of China, retrieved 30.09.2018, from https://​w ww. pcacases.com/​pcadocs/​PH-​CN%20-​%2020160712%20-​%20Award.pdf. 253 This was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in the 1970s. When China entered into diplomatic relations with the Southeast Asian countries in the 1970s and 1980s, during talks with the leaders of these countries, Deng Xiaoping made the following proposal for resolving ongoing disputes over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands: “The Nansha Islands have been an integral part of China’s territory since the ancient times. But disputes have occurred over the islands since the 1970s. Considering the fact that China has good relations with the countries concerned, we would like to set aside this issue now and explore later a solution acceptable to both sides. We should avoid military conflict over this and should pursue an approach of joint development.” In June 1986, Deng said to visiting Filipino Vice President Laurel: “We should leave aside the issue of the Nansha Islands for a while. We should not let this issue stand in the way of China’s friendship with the Philippines and with other countries.” Deng Xiaoping once again brought up this idea when he met visiting Filipino President Aquino in April 1988. On that occasion, Deng said: “In view of the friendly relations

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principle has been based on four components. First, the sovereignty of the territories concerned belongs to China. Second, when conditions are not ripe to bring about a comprehensive solution to the territorial dispute, the discussion on the issue of sovereignty may be postponed so that the dispute is set aside. This does not mean giving up sovereignty, but rather leaving the dispute aside for the time being. Third, the territories under dispute may be developed in a joint way. And fourth, the purpose of joint development is to enhance mutual understanding through cooperation and create conditions for the eventual resolution of the question of territorial ownership.254 4) China is committed to preserving freedom of navigation and overflight and has never interfered with such activities.255 China continually argues that it wants to resolve the disputes through negotiations and dialogue, but at the same time it maintains that it is determined to protect its maritime interest and security. As a result, the government has been modernizing and expanding its navy, including through the deployment of aircraft carriers and large-​scale warships in the region. The PRC has successfully implemented its ‘Trojan Horse’ tactic to break the consensus within ASEAN, dividing the organization into countries that have territorial disputes with China  –​the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Malaysia  –​and other members that do not –​Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Singapore. The divided stance of ASEAN with respect to the South China Sea issue was apparent at the 19th ARF Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in Phnom Penh in 2012. As a consequence of this lack of common ground, the ASEAN member states did not issue their customary Joint Statement at the conclusion of the Summit. The Philippines and Vietnam wanted the dispute with China over the Paracel and Spratly Islands to be recognized and reflected in this document. However, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen refused to include any

between our two countries, we can set aside this issue for the time being and take the approach of pursuing joint development.” Retrieved 15.01.2019, from https://​w ww. fmprc.gov.cn/​mfa_​eng/​ziliao_​665539/​3602_​665543/​3604_​665547/​t18023.shtml. 254 Cf.: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Peoples Republic of China, retrieved 20.01.2019, from https://​w ww.fmprc.gov.cn/​mfa_​eng/​ziliao_​665539/​3602_​665543/​3604_​ 665547/​t18023.shtml. 255 Yan, Yan: “China’s Diplomatic Policy Options and Future Prospects.” In: Liu Fu-​Kuo/​ Wu Keyuan Zou Shicun/​Spangler Jonathan (eds.): South China Sea Lawfare: Post-​ Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects. South China Sea Think Tank/​ Taiwan Center for Security Studies: Taipei 2017, p. 37.

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reference to these disputes in the text, arguing that they were bilateral in nature and could not be portrayed as a problem between China and ASEAN as a bloc.256 China’s line of action involves a dual strategy of upgrading its naval capabilities in view of its territorial claims and seeking to direct cooperation along the lines of its new ‘Maritime Silk Road’ initiative. On the former front, China has continued to carry out naval exercises in the SCS. This makes it clear that China is reinforcing its capacity to patrol and protect the contested territorial areas it claims and is not afraid of demonstrating its hard power capabilities toward territorial rivals. At the same time, President Xi Jinping has made numerous diplomatic visits to Southeast Asian states. On the latter front, China’s most recent strategy is centered around political engagements on its own terms. Through the Maritime Silk Road initiative, China seeks to engage ASEAN member states in an attractive scheme of development cooperation and investment.257

ASEAN’s position on the South China Sea It is important to note that there is a variety of overlapping and competing interests within the group of ASEAN claimant states. ASEAN’s unprecedented failure to produce a joint communiqué at their regular foreign ministers’ meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012 is a clear illustration of this. The event dramatically revealed the differences and conflicting interests among the ASEAN states as much as between China and the claimant states that are part of ASEAN.258 ASEAN’s four claimant states vary significantly in how they have chosen to approach the SCS disputes and manage the recent intensification of tension. The evidence seems to indicate that these interests will continue to be contentious in both the short term and the long term. There are several major implications of the aforementioned Award, including for the sovereignty disputes with the 256 Clement, Nicolas: “China Trumps ASEAN in the South China Sea.” Atlantic Sentinel, July 2012, retrieved 30.01.2019, from https://​atlanticsentinel.com/​2012/​07/​china-​ trumps-​asean-​in-​t he-​south-​china-​sea/​. 257 Hörhager, Elisa I.: “China-​ASEAN Relations and the South China Sea: Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning?.” In: Fels, Enrico/​Vu, Truong-​Minh (eds.): Power politics in Asian’s Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Springer: New York, London 2016, p. 381. 258 Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory (eds.): Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimension of the Disputes. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto 2014, retrieved 10.10. 2015, from https://​c sis-​prod.s3.amazonaws.com/​s3fs-​public/​legacy_​fi les/​fi les/​publication/​ 140930_​Hiebert_​PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_​Web.pdf.

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Philippines. The Tribunal’s conclusions, by identifying all the features in the Spratly Islands as “rocks,” could increase tension with the Philippines, as some of the features that Vietnam claims in the area could become points of contention between Vietnam and the Philippines in the future.259 ASEAN does not take a position on the merits of the SCS claims. This is a point of confusion and discord between ASEAN and China, as Beijing would prefer that the SCS be removed from ASEAN’s Agenda entirely. China prefers to engage with each country bilaterally on the SCS issue. The Chinese government believes ASEAN’s involvement will only internationalize the individual disputes. Collectively, ASEAN has generally been reluctant to insert itself into the territorial quarrels. When it does, its position has generally been quite measured and respectful of Chinese sensitivities (ASEAN statements generally do not call out China by name). Generally speaking, the organization has spoken on the disputes when it felt that not doing so would reflect negatively on it or have a damaging impact.260 ASEAN’s approach to the SCS disputes is rooted in four key interests:  a) regional stability and peace, b) freedom of navigation and overflight, c) peaceful dispute resolution, and d) respect for international law. As a security organization, it focuses more on conflict management than on conflict resolution. It should also be added that ASEAN’s role as an institution in the South China Sea disputes is relatively new. ASEAN has therefore placed greater emphasis on preempting or avoiding conflict than on responding to it.261 The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) is the instrument that most explicitly identifies ASEAN’s role in managing interstate conflict –​especially since 1986, when several non-​Southeast Asian states acceded to the treaty (Papua New Guinea  –​1989; India and China  –​2003; Japan, Pakistan, and South Korea, Russia  –​2004; New Zealand, Mongolia, and Australia  –​2006; East Timor, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka –​2007; North Korea –​2008; US –​2009; Canada and Turkey  –​2010; Brazil  –​2012; the EU  –​2012; Chile, Egypt, and Morocco –​2016; Iran –​2018). However, the role of the TAC is relatively limited. 259 Vu, Truong-​Minh, Trung, Nguyen Thanh: “Vietnam’s Policy Options and Future Prospects.” In: Liu Fu-​Kuo/​Wu Keyuan Zou Shicun/​Spangler Jonathan (eds.): South China Sea Lawfare: Post-​Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects. South China Sea Think Tank/​Taiwan Center for Security Studies: Taipei 2017, p. 159. 260 Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory (eds.): Perspectives on the South China Sea… 261 Ba, Alice:  “Managing the South China Sea Disputes:  What Can ASEAN Do?.” In: Hiebert Murray, Nguyen Phuong, Poling Gregory (eds.), p. 3.

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For example, the TAC’s key mechanism is the High Council, but ultimately, states’ participation is voluntary.

Rules of conduct in the South China Sea ASEAN’s first initiative of note on the topic discussed here was the issuing of the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. The ASEAN countries were the initiators of the declaration in response to a law passed by the PRC’s National People’s Congress in 1992 (the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone). The Declaration stated that the South China Sea is sensitive to issues of sovereignty, and that any changes in the overall situation that run counter to the interests of ASEAN may create direct threats to peace and stability.262 The Declaration was an unprecedented instance of a joint position being presented by the Association’s member states, which turned out to be especially meaningful once Vietnam, which is heavily embroiled in territorial disputes with the PRC, joined ASEAN as a full member. The Southeast Asian countries realized that multilateralism offered the best prospects for reducing tensions in the region. They also welcomed China into multilateral groups like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), whose operations date back to 1994. China used this access very effectively by trying to convince its Asian partners that it was a responsible country rather than one aiming to destabilize the region.263 For a long time, both the ASEAN countries and the PRC stood behind their commitments and stressed that disputes in the region should be resolved by peaceful means. In November 2002, at the end of the 6th China-​ASEAN Summit, China signed the ‘Code of Conduct’ for the South China Sea. This Code has been seen as the first political document between ASEAN and China over the South China Sea issue. The document has two major purposes:  first, to foster trust and confidence among the claimants; and second, to lead to the establishment of a regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.264 However, since each 262 Cf.: ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, retrieved 30.09.2018, from https://​ cil.nus.edu.sg/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2017/​07/​1992-​ASEAN-​Declaration-​on-​t he-​ South-​China-​Sea.pdf. 263 Astarita, Claudia:  “China’s Role in the Evolution of Southeast Asian Regional Organizations.” China Perspectives 3/​2008, retrieved 30.09.2018, from DOI: 10.4000/​ chinaperspectives.4103. 264 Chakrabrti, Tridib:  “China and Vietnam in the South China Sea Disputes:  A Creeping ‘Conflict-​Peace Trepidation’ Syndrome.” China Report 48/​32012, p. 289, retrieved 10.10.2019, from DOI: 10.1177/​0 009445512462313.

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signatory state interprets the Code differently, the implementation of this document has been very ineffective. China subsequently signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DoC) in the South China Sea with the regional organization in 2002. This was another milestone that essentially confirmed the will of all parties to bring an end to the conflict based on international law and cooperate further in the future. Aside from the Philippines, most of the claimant countries have welcomed this document. Its outcome is also only partly satisfactory, as China refused to sign any binding normative instrument. In 2003, China and ASEAN signed the Joint Declaration of Strategic Partnership. Later that year, China  –​a non-​member of ASEAN  –​acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a document that had defined the framework of cooperation in the region since 1976. This kind of action demonstrated China’s desire to project the external image of a friendly ‘gentle giant’ in response to the growing concern with the ‘China threat.’ Consequently, China founded the Information Office of the Ministry of National Defense to give more regular press conferences and issue statements to strength its image of a responsive, responsible, and predictable actor. The measures taken by China in the region also focused on economic bridgebuilding, epitomized by the signing of the China-​ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement in 2002. The ASEAN-​China Free Trade Agreement has been in force since January 1, 2010. In 2004, a Joint Working Group was set up for the purpose of bringing to fruition the 2002 Declaration of Conduct (DOC). Its goal was to formulate guidelines and recommendations regarding joint operations. The first session took place in August 2005 in Manila. ASEAN presented its own project for guidelines that would aid in the realization of the 2002 DOC’s goals. In the course of formulating these guidelines, the ASEAN countries conducted negotiations and dialogue with China as a collective and tried to present a cohesive, homogenous position. This was in line with the practice already in place between ASEAN and their dialogue partners. China, on the other hand, preferred consulting with individual countries and followed the bilateral route by foregoing ASEAN and negotiating separate, individual agreements with countries like Vietnam and the Philippines. Despite these positive signals, tensions have grown in the region –​first, as a consequence of China’s more assertive approach toward the South China Sea, and second, due to growing U.S. activity in the region. The increasing presence of the U.S. is one of the outcomes of ex-​President Barack Obama’s ‘Asian Pivot’ strategy, which was informally adopted after then-​Secretary of State Hillary

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Clinton published an article titled “America’s Pacific Century” in Foreign Policy (2010). She wrote that “open markets in Asia provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-​ edge technology. Our economic recovery at home will depend on exports and the ability of American firms to tap into the vast and growing consumer base of Asia. Strategically, maintaining peace and security across the Asia-​Pacific is increasingly crucial to global progress, whether through defending freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, countering the nuclear proliferation efforts of North Korea, or ensuring transparency in the military activities of the region’s key players.”265 Several months earlier, in March 2010, China’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cui Tiankai, told visiting Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg and the US National Security Council’s Jeffrey Bader that China viewed the South China Sea as part of China’s “core interests,” on par with Taiwan and Tibet. As Edward Wong has observed, this probably implied that China was not ruling out the use of force or the threat of force to defend its sovereignty in the area.266 Aside from official platforms and channels, there are other initiatives, such as the ASEAN-​China Dialogue, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-​Pacific (CSCAP), and the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-​ISIS). These informal processes provide forums for debate that have become the preferred form of discussion among the countries of the region, and have come to shape the region’s security mechanisms in what has been dubbed the ‘ASEAN Way.’267 Despite the dialogues and consultation processes, tensions and escalating disputes were still commonplace after 2002. In 2007, China created the prefecture-​level city of Sansha to administer the Paracel and Spratly islands. This was met with harsh criticism from the government of Vietnam, accompanied by anti-​Chinese unrest. In January 2010, China went even further, creating local governance structures on the Paracel Islands and kickstarting tourism 265 Clinton, Hilary:  “America’s Pacific Century.” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011, retrieved 10.10.2015, from https://​foreignpolicy.com/​2011/​10/​11/​a mericas-​pacific-​ century/​. 266 Wong, Edward: “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power.” New York Times, April 23 2010, retrieved 1.19.2016, from https://​w ww.nytimes.com/​2010/​04/​ 24/​world/​asia/​24navy.html. 267 To a large extent, the method relies on solving problems through diplomatic means heavily favoring consultation and consensus, as well as finding solutions through personal contact between heads of state.

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in the region. Chinese officials presented a Grand Plan for Construction and Development for the International Tourism Islands of Hainan for 2010–​2020, according to which both the Paracels and the Spratlys were to become part of a sprawling tourism complex. The government in Hanoi reacted with severe indignation, decrying a violation of Vietnam’s sovereignty and emphasizing that such rash decisions are also in violation of the 2002 Declaration (DOC).268 Even still, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in July 2011, the parties continued to highlight the need to keep calm in the interest of stability in the South China Sea as well as the importance of the 2002 DOC and the pressing need to implement its provisions. The Ministers also pointed out the importance of adopting a Regional Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea.269 During the ASEAN meeting that took place in Cambodia (July 20, 2012), the foreign ministers of the member states agreed to issue the Six-​Point Principles on the South China Sea, even if they did not have a unified stance on all of the points. These principles included a reaffirmation of the signatories’ commitment to: 1) fully implementing the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2002); 2) following the Guidelines for the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (2011); 3) rapidly finalizing a Regional Code of Conduct in the South China Sea; 4)  fully respecting the universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 5) continued self-​restraint and non-​use of force by all parties; 6)  the peaceful resolution of disputes, in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, including the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).270

268 Thuy, Tran Truang: “Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implication for Regional Security and Cooperation.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, p. 7, retrieved 30.06.2015, from http://​csis.org/​fi les/​publication/​110912_​Hao_​South_​ China_ ​Sea.pdf. 269 Cf.: Joint Communiqué of the 44th ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting, Bali Indonesia, 19, July 2011, retrieved 30.08.2011, from http://​w ww.asean.org/​documents/​ JC44thAMM19JUL2011.pdf. 270 Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, Phnom Penh, Cambodia, 20 July 2012, retrieved 30.08.2012, from https://​w ww.asean.org/​storage/​images/​AFMs%20State​ ment%20on%206%20Principles%20on%20SCS.pdf, Thayer, Carlyle A.: “ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea: A Litmus Test for Community-​Building?.” The Asia-​Pacific Journal vol. 10, Issue 34, No. 4.2012.

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The most important of these goals was to work on a Code of Conduct  –​ potentially an important mechanism under which China would be willing to hold discussions with ASEAN on a multilateral basis. China committed to starting the discussion on the COC at the ASEAN Regional Forum in July 2013. However, since that time, there has not been much visible progress. It was not until after the Arbitral Tribunal at the Hague had issued its historic ruling on July 12, 2016 that China resolved to accelerate the talks. Ian Storey provided two possible explanations for this pivot. First, Beijing wanted to deflect criticism of its rejection of the Tribunal’s award and instead project the image of a cooperative partner. Second, a change of policy took place in in the Philippines in 2016, when newly elected president Rodrigo Duterte decided to set the dispute aside and prioritize strengthening economic ties with China. This approach led to a significant reduction of Sino-​Philippine tensions in the South China Sea. The warming of relations was especially clear after Beijing lifted its blockade of Scarborough Shoal in October 2016, which had prevented Filipino fishermen from fishing at the reef since May 2012.271 Bilateral conversations became increasingly frequent in 2017. ASEAN and Chinese officials met three times in the first half of the 2017 to discuss the COC. On March 8, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced that the first draft of framework for the COC had been completed. On August 6, in Manila, the foreign ministers of China and the ASEAN member states endorsed a framework on the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. This agreement was very symbolic, as it was adopted after 15 years and on the Association’s 50th anniversary. What does the so-​called ASEAN-​China draft framework on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea actually mean, and to what extent does it matter? The document was slightly over a page long and was divided into three parts: 1) Preambular Provisions, 2) General Provisions, and 3) Final Clauses. It proposed three main objectives: 1) “To establish a rules-​based framework containing a set of norms to guide the conduct of parties and promote maritime cooperation in the SCS” (with no mention of the Code as legally binding); 2) “to promote mutual trust, cooperation and confidence, prevent incidents, manage incidents should they occur, and create a favorable environment for the peaceful settlement of the disputes”; and 3) “to ensure maritime security

271 Storey, Ian: “Assessing the ASEAN-​China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.” Prospective 62/​2017, retrieved 30.06.2018, from https://​w ww. iseas.edu.sg/​images/​pdf/​ISEAS_​Perspective_​2017_​62.pdf.

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and safety and freedom of navigation and overflight.” The framework also proposed four principles. These are:  1) the COC is “not an instrument to settle territorial disputes or maritime delimitation issues”; 2) a commitment to a set of “purposes and principles” (of the UN Charter, UNCLOS etc.); 3) a commitment to facilitate the “full and effective implementation of DOC”; 4) “respect for each other’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity in accordance with international law, and principles of non-​interference in the internal affairs of others states.” The third part of the Framework outlines basic undertakings such as: the duty to cooperate (an obligation under UNCLOS), promotion of practical maritime cooperation (in search and rescue, maritime scientific research, environmental protection, etc.), self-​restraint (not defined), and prevention of incidents. The final part of the framework includes clauses on encouraging other states to respect the principles contained in the COC, the necessary mechanisms to monitor its implementation, review of the COC, its nature, and entry into force. In August 2018, the foreign ministers of the ten member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and their Chinese counterpart announced an agreement on a Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT) that will serve as the basis for the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. It is structured according to the previous draft framework adopted in 2017. It still does not clearly define the geographic scope of the South China Sea. A very large portion of the SDNT is devoted to the prevention, management, and settlement of disputes in the South China Sea among the parties. The SDNT, however, does not contain any specific reference to the binding dispute resolution mechanisms included in UNCLOS Annex VII (Arbitration). The SDNT contains two options for monitoring the implementation of the COC. The first option, supported by Brunei, Cambodia, China, Malaysia, and Singapore, places this responsibility on the ASEAN-​China Senior Officials’ Meeting. The second option, proposed by Vietnam, calls for a Commission led by foreign ministers or their representatives. The SDNT draws from provisions in UNCLOS that state that signatories have a duty to cooperate to protect the marine environment in a semi-​enclosed sea and, pending settlement of disputes, state signatories should enter into arrangements of a practical nature. There is no reference in the SDNT to accession to the COC by third parties. The SDNT also does not include a reference to the COC as a treaty under international law. The Negotiating Text is a work in progress that is slated to go through at least three readings before the

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creation of a definitive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.272 All this shows that significant hurdles remain in reaching a consensus on the most sensitive issues.273 To conclude: at first glance, the SDNT looks like old wine in a new bottle. First, there is no real breakthrough between China and ASEAN states on the South China Sea. The phrase “legally binding” is absent. It does not mention the geographical scope of the COC, including whether it applies to both the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands or only to certain areas. There is no mention of enforcement measures or arbitration mechanisms. These shortcomings will undoubtedly weaken the effectiveness of the final version of the COC. However, leaving aside skepticism regarding the implementation of the COC, the agreement –​the Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiating Text (SDNT) –​is an important next procedural step. As some experts emphasize, for the first time in many years, an effective diplomatic mechanism to manage the South China Sea disputes seems achievable. However, significant questions remain as to whether and how it will help regulate the behavior of China and ASEAN countries in the South China Sea. To find the answer, we will need to wait for future developments.

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272 Thayer, Carl: “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-​China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct.” The Diplomat, August 3 2018, retrieved 10.03.2019, from https://​ thediplomat.com/​2018/​08/​a-​closer-​look-​at-​t he-​asean-​china-​single-​d raft-​south-​ china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​. 273 Cf.: A Blueprint for a South China Sea Code of Conduct, retrieved 10.03.2019, from https://​a mti.csis.org/​blueprint-​for-​south-​china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​.

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Clement, Nicolas:  “China Trumps ASEAN in the South China Sea.” Atlantic Sentinel, July 2012, retrieved 30.01.2019, from https://​atlanticsentinel.com/​ 2012/​07/​china-​trumps-​asean-​in-​t he-​south-​china-​sea/​. Clinton, Hilary: “America’s Pacific Century.” Foreign Policy October 11, 2011, retrieved 10.10.2015, from https://​foreignpolicy.com/​2011/​10/​11/​americas-​ pacific-​century/​. Dutton, Peter A.: “The Sino-​Philippine Maritime Row: International Arbitration and the South China Sea.” East and South China Sea Bulletin March 2013, retrieved 6.11.2019, from https://​w ww.files.ethz.ch/​isn/​162590/​CNAS_​ Bulletin_​Dutton_​TheSinoPhilippineMaritimeRow_​0.pdf. Emmers, Ralf: “Maritime disputes in the South China Sea: Strategic and diplomatic status quo.” In: Kwa, Chong Guan/​Skogan, John K. (ed(s).): Maritime Security in the Southeast Asia. Routledge: London, New York 2007. Haliżak, Edward:  „Spór o archipelagi na Morzu Południowochińskim. Znaczenie dla międzynarodowego prawa morza i bezpieczeństwa w regionie” [“South China Sea Disputes:  Consequences for Interantional Security and Law of the Sea”]. In:  Haliżak Edward/​ Kuźniar, Roman (ed(s).):  Prawo, instytucje i polityka w procesie globalizacji, [Law, Institutions, and Politics in the Globalization Process]. Scholar: Warszawa 2003. Hao, Su: China’s Position and Interest in the South China Sea: A Rational Choice in Its Cooperative Policies, Center for Strategic an International Studies, retrieved 10.11.2018, from https://​w ww.csis.org/​analysis/​china%E2%80%99s-​ positions-​a nd-​i nterests-​south-​china-​sea-​rational-​choices-​its-​cooperative-​ policies. Hayton, Bill: The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press: New Haven, London 2014. Hiebert, Murray, Nguyen, Phuong, Poling, Gregory (eds.): Perspectives on the South China Sea: Diplomatic, Legal and Security Dimension of the Disputes. Rowman & Littlefield: Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto 2014, retrieved 10.10. 2015, from https://​csis-​prod.s3.amazonaws.com/​s3fs-​public/​legacy_​ files/​fi les/​publication/​140930_​Hiebert_​PerspectivesSouthChinaSea_​Web. pdf. Hörhager, Elisa I.: “China-​ASEAN Relations and the South China Sea: Beyond Balancing and Bandwagoning?.” In:  Fels, Enrico/​ Vu, Truong-​ Minh (eds.): Power politics in Asian’s Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea. Springer: New York, London 2016. Kao, Shawn Shaw-​fawn:  “Scarborough Shoal Dispute, China’s Assertiveness, and Taiwan’s South China Sea Policy.” International Journal of China Studies vol. 5, no. 1, 2014.

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Parameswaran, Prashanth: “Does the Philippines’ South China Sea Case Against China Really Metter?.” The Diplomat, July 8, 2015, retrieved 10.07.2015, from http://​t hediplomat.com/​2 015/​07/​does-​t he-​philippines-​s outh-​china-​s ea-​ case-​against-​china-​really-​matter/​. Smith, Robert W.: “Maritime Delimitation in the South China Sea: Potentiality and Challenges.” In: Hu, Nien-​Tsu, Alfred/​McDorman Ted L. (ed(s).): Maritime Issues in the South China Sea: Troubled Waters or a Sea of Opportunity. Routledge: London, New York 2013. Storey, Ian: “Assessing the ASEAN-​China Framework for the Code of Conduct for the South China Sea.” Prospective 62/​2017, retrieved 30.06.2018, from https://​w ww.iseas.edu.sg/​images/​pdf/​ISEAS_​Perspective_​2017_​62.pdf. Thayer, Carl: “A Closer Look at the ASEAN-​China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct.” The Diplomat, August 3 2018, retrieved 10.03.2019, from https://​t hediplomat.com/​2018/​08/​a-​closer-​look-​at-​t he-​asean-​china-​ single-​draft-​south-​china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​. Thayer, Carlyle A.:  “ASEAN’S Code of Conduct in the South China Sea:  A Litmus Test for Community-​Building?.” The Asia-​Pacific Journal vol.  10, Issue 34, No. 4.2012. Thuy, Tran Truang: “Recent Development in the South China Sea: Implication for Regional Security and Cooperation.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, p.  7, retrieved 30.06.2015, from http://​csis.org/​fi les/​publication/​ 110912_​Hao_​South_​China_​Sea.pdf. Tiezzi, Shannon:  “In the Philippines’ South China Sea Case, Is International Law on Trial?.” The Diplomat, July 14, 2015, retrieved 14.06.2015 from http://​ thediplomat.com/​2 015/​0 7/​i n-​t he-​philippines-​s outh-​c hina-​s ea-​c ase-​i s-​ international-​law-​on-​trial/​. Vu, Truong-​Minh, Trung, Nguyen Thanh:  “Vietnam’s Policy Options and Future Prospects.” In:  Liu Fu-​Kuo/​Wu Keyuan Zou Shicun/​Spangler Jonathan (eds.): South China Sea Lawfare: Post-​Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects. South China Sea Think Tank/​Taiwan Center for Security Studies: Taipei 2017. Waxman, Matthieu: “Legal Posturing and Power Relations in the South China Sea.” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, January 21 2015, retrieved 11.06.2015, from http://​amti.csis.org/​legal-​posturing-​and-​power-​relations-​ in-​t he-​south-​china-​sea/​. Wong, Edward: “Chinese Military Seeks to Extend Its Naval Power.” New York Times, April 23 2010, retrieved 1.19.2016, from https://​w ww.nytimes.com/​ 2010/​04/​24/​world/​asia/​24navy.html.

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Yan, Yan: “China’s Diplomatic Policy Options and Future Prospects.” In: Liu Fu-​Kuo/​Wu Keyuan Zou Shicun/​Spangler Jonathan (eds.): South China Sea Lawfare: Post-​Arbitration Policy Options and Future Prospects. South China Sea Think Tank/​Taiwan Center for Security Studies: Taipei 2017.

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United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and: China’s declaration on the ratification of UNCLOS, retriever 6.06.2015, from http://​w ww.un.org/​depts/​ los/​convention_​agreements/​convention_​declarations.htm. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed in Montego Bay on December 10, 1982, retrieved 10.11.2018, from, http://​w ww.abc.com.pl/​du-​ akt/​-​/​a kt/​dz-​u-​2002-​59-​543. * Agata Ziętek, PhD, is an Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations (Institute of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Political Science and Journalism) at the Maria Curie-​Skłodowska University in Lublin, and the Director of the Doctoral School of Social Sciences at the UMCS. She is the author of publications on international cultural relations, public diplomacy, and international political relations in East Asia and the Indo-​Pacific. She is also a member and chairwoman of the Lublin branch of the Polish Society for International Studies as well as a member of the Polish Society for Political Sciences, the European International Studies Association (EISA), the Central & Eastern European Schools Association (CEESA), and, since 2009, president of the International Research Foundation.

Łukasz Stach https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0001-​9931-​981X

The Road to Destabilization? The Problem of Militarization in the South China Sea Region Abstract: The situation in Southeast Asia attracts the attention not only of the countries of the region but also of great powers. In particular, the growing economy and military potential of the People’s Republic of China poses a concern to the stability of the whole of Southeast Asia. Smaller Southeast Asian countries may be overwhelmed by the Chinese, and the South China Sea may truly become a ‘Chinese’ sea. This article attempts to elucidate the contemporary situation in the South China Sea basin, focusing in particular on the militarization of the whole region. The text is divided into two main parts. The first touches upon the problem of the importance of the South China Sea, and the second analyzes the process of the militarization of the SCS, particularly in the fields of naval modernization and military infrastructure. Key words: South China Sea, militarization, territorial disputes, claimant states

Introduction The South China Sea (SCS) has become one of the most dangerous hotspots of tension in the world. Territorial claims, struggles for power, tensions between powers and regional countries, fossil fuels (oil and gas), nationalism, ambitions, money, trade, economic competition, a strategically located sea line of communication, national interests, arms and armies –​all these elements are present in the region and create a potentially dangerous mixture. Could it explode? So far, since 1945, the South China Sea basin has faced two small-​scale military clashes (the Battle of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and the Johnson South Reef Skirmish in 1988)  and a series of incidents that led to tensions between the states involved. A  full-​scale war or large military conflict, though? Admiral Harry Harris said that the United States must be prepared for a war against the People’s Republic of China (PRC), mostly due to the situation in the South China Sea (the SCS), where China has constructed bases on several disputed islands. “China’s intent is crystal clear. We ignore it at our peril,” he said. “I’m concerned China will now work to undermine the international rules-​based

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order.”274 On the other hand, Chinese general He Lei emphasizes the need to militarize the disputed islands to reinforce China’s claim over the South China Sea. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Hi blamed the United States for destabilizing the region. “Some outside forces are not happy with the prevailing calm and try to stir up trouble and muddle the waters. Their frequent show of force with fully armed aircraft and naval vessels is the most destabilizing factor in the region.”275 The Chinese response to this so-​called U.S. provocation is to enhance the PRC’s military presence in the region, and the U.S. counters Chinese efforts to dominate the South China Sea by being prepared for a military conflict with continental China. This kind of rhetoric and action may increase tensions between the two powers. It may have serious consequences not only for the SCS region, but for the whole world. The South China Sea basin is strategically important not only for the surrounding countries but also for middle powers such as India, Japan, or South Korea. Territorial disputes and conflicts of national interests in the region may have severe global ramifications. Today, the countries involved in the South China Sea territorial disputes are making a significant effort to modernize their maritime forces and improve their naval capabilities. Is this just the product of regular modernization, saber-​rattling, or a full-​scale naval arms race? Could the development of maritime forces lead to military incidents or even full-​scale conflicts? In what way could the militarization of the South China Sea influence the current geopolitical situation? Who is winning and who is losing the race to gain control over the South China Sea? This article describes the development of naval forces in the South China Sea basin and aims to answer all of these questions. The article is divided into two main sections. The first describes the significance of the South China Sea region and the territorial disputes that have occurred there, mostly those over the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The second focuses on the problem of the militarization of the SCS basin. The term ‘militarization’ is understood as placing military resources, equipment, or supplies in a given area. The second part of the article also illustrates the development 274 Dohetry, Ben: “Admiral warns US must prepare for possibility of war with China.” The Guardian 16.2.2018, retrieved 12.03.2018, from https://​w ww.theguardian.com/​world/​ 2018/​feb/​16/​admiral-​warns-​us-​must-​prepare-​for-​possibility-​of-​war-​w ith-​china. 275 Brennan, David: “China’s South Sea Islands need to be militarised to deter U.S. ‘trouble,’ general says.” Newsweek 8.03.2018, retrieved 12.03.2018, form: http://​w ww. newsweek.com/​chinas-​south-​sea-​islands-​should-​be-​militarized-​deter-​us-​trouble-​ general-​says-​836814.

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of the claimant states’ naval forces and military infrastructure in the disputed areas, especially in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. The article ends with a conclusion and brief discussion. Analyzing the problems that stem from the development of naval forces and military infrastructure in the South China Sea region is a challenging task. Every country involved in the SCS’s territorial disputes maintains peaceful rhetoric or accuses its opponents and rivals of launching provocations, destabilizing the region, or raising tensions. Their real intentions are often concealed behind slogans and every side tries to enhance its position. Moreover, part of the infrastructure located in the disputed areas may be used both for military and civilian purposes. For instance, China underlines the fact that all the facilities built on artificial islands in the disputed areas are for civilian use and will not affect freedom of navigation.276. Meanwhile, David Brunnstrom, an expert from the Center for Strategic and International Studies (a U.S.-​based think tank) has said that China militarized those artificial islands.277 Additionally, military issues are partly or entirely treated as a secret, especially when they are connected to the latest technologies. Misinformation, propaganda, or simple silence are all part of state policy with respect to the military. This causes difficulties in analyzing military issues in places such as the South China Sea. However, it is possible to analyze the situation in the region, try to answer questions, and disprove or corroborate hypotheses.

Is it worth a war? The importance of the South China Sea The SCS area is treated as a hotspot of hostility mostly due to the numerous territorial disputes that take place there between six fully recognized countries:  Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the People’s Republic of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Map 1). Taiwan (which enjoys limited recognition) is also engaged in the conflicts, but its position is similar to that of the PRC. In the disputed area, the attention of experts and analysts is mostly concentrated

276 “South China Sea islands are only for civilian use, says Chinese general.” The Guardian, retrieved 18.03.2018, from: https://​w ww.theguardian.com/​world/​2015/​ oct/​17/​south-​china-​sea-​islands-​are-​only-​for-​civilian-​use-​says-​chinese-​general. 277 Brunnstrom, David: “China continue South China Sea reclamation despite halt claim: expert.” Reuters, retrieved 19.03.2018, from https://​w ww.reuters.com/​article/​ us-​china-​southchinasea-​dredging/​china-​continued-​south-​china-​sea-​reclamation-​ despite-​halt-​claim-​expert-​idUSKCN0RF2XQ20150916.

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Map 1.  Territorial claims in the South China Sea region Source: Own elaboration based on actual claims.

on the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands, but the conflict is over a major part of the SCS basin. The most important player in the South China Sea territorial disputes is the People’s Republic of China. China’s U-​shaped claim line covers the majority of the South China Sea. The problem is that the PRC’s claim overlaps with the Bruneian, Indonesian, Malaysian, Philippine, and Vietnamese claims. Moreover, Chinese demands are seen by some Southeast Asian countries (especially Vietnam) as a threat to their territorial integrity . Some of the territories claimed by the PRC are already occupied by troops or citizens of other states involved in the disputes.278 Today, according to Richard J.  Heydarian, the SCS is starting to resemble a maritime battlefield. Military garrisons, naval fortifications, and military exercises are all part of the process of militarization in the region.279 In fact, the territorial disputes and the growing militarization

278 Heydarian, Richard J.: Asia’s New Battlefield: The USA, China and the struggle for the Western Pacific. Zet Books: London 2015, pp. 107–​108. 279 Ibid., p. 107.

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of the South China Sea pose a real challenge to regional security and threaten the freedom of navigation along a global artery of trade.280 China in particular is commonly described as a threat to the ‘status quo’ in the region.281 Despite the fact that China is not the sole claimant, it “is the principal source of worry, which in not in the least surprising given its size and power vis-​à-​v is the other claimants.”282 Other countries involved in the dispute (including members of the Association of South-​East Asian Nations (ASEAN)), face the problem of possessing relatively limited economic and military potential compared to that of the PRC. Their political and military leaders may find a powerful ally (the United States), try to solve problems through bilateral talks with China, or cooperate with each other, e.g., within the ASEAN. Formidable maritime forces can also be a trump card, and this is why the Southeast Asian countries involved in the SCS have developed their naval capabilities. The question is: it all of this only muscle flexing or is there a genuine risk of military conflict? Is the SCS worth a war, and is it worth dying for? The importance of the South China Sea may be analyzed from an economic perspective or a strategic one. The economic significance of the SCS derives mostly from its status as a sea line of communication (SLOC), fossil fuels (oil and gas fields), and fisheries. The South China Sea is a very significant SLOC between the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. The total value of commercial goods transiting through the South China Sea on an annual basis is the subject of some controversy. It has been regularly estimated at 5.3 trillion USD since 2010. However, the value of world trade has changed since 2010, and therefore this rigid figure may be inadequate. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (China Power Project), the 5.3 trillion USD figure overestimates reality, and the real value of the commercial goods transiting through the South China Sea is estimated at 3.4 trillion USD.283 Even if that value is 36 % lower than 5.3 trillion USD, it is still an enormous amount, and many regional and global economies are dependent on the South China Sea as a SLOC. For instance, 39 % of the PRC’s trade relies on the South China Sea. The respective figures for the other 2 80 Ibid., p. 108. 281 Guang, Ang Chen: “The South China Sea Dispute Revisited.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 54(2), 2000, p. 211. 282 Ibid. 283 Center for Strategic and International studies: How much trade transits the South China Sea?, retrieved 12.03.2018, from: https://​chinapower.csis.org/​much-​trade-​ transits-​south-​china-​sea/​.

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Table 1.  Value of import and export carried via South China Sea Country People’s Republic of China South Korea Singapore Thailand Vietnam Japan Hong Kong Indonesia Germany Malaysia

Export value (billion USD) 879

Import value (billion USD) 598

Percentage of all trade 39

249 214 171 158 141 140 121 117 106

174 187 134 161 -​-​ 230 118 -​-​ -​-​

47 66 74 86 19 37 85 9 58

Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies, retrieved 15.03.2018, from https://​ chinapower.csis.org/​much-​t rade-​t ransits-​south-​china-​sea/​.

countries are: 86 % for Vietnam, 85 % for Indonesia, 74 % for Thailand, 66 % for Singapore, and 58 % for Malaysia (Table 1). Vietnam and Malaysia are involved in the SCS territorial claims and Indonesia maintains an exclusive economic zone dispute with China.284 Moreover, the South China Sea is extremely important for oil-​hungry Asian countries. Oil transported through the Strait of Malacca, en route to East Asia through the South China Sea, is vital for Asian economies such as China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, or Taiwan. Almost 60 % of Japan’s and Taiwan’s energy supplies, 80 % of China’s crude oil imports, and two-​t hirds of those of South Korea go through the South China Sea.285 To sum up, the South China Sea is an essential waterway for Far East economies, including China, Japan, South Korea, and smaller countries such as Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Any disruptions or a military clash in the basin may inflict serious damage, not only on all these economies but also on their global counterpart. 284 Panda Ankit: “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? Not $5.3 Trillion a year.” The Diplomat., retrieved 12.03.2018, from: https://​t hediplomat.com/​2017/​08/​ how-​much-​trade-​transits-​t he-​south-​china-​sea-​not-​5-​3-​trillion-​a-​year/​. 285 Business Insider Australia:  Why the South China Sea is so crucial?,” retrieved 18.03.2018, form: https://​w ww.businessinsider.com.au/​why-​t he-​south-​china-​sea-​ is-​so-​crucial-​2015-​2.

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The second factor that raises the importance of the SCS is its oil and gas reserves. Large presumed offshore oil and gas fields make this area even more important from the perspective of energy security and the economy. Much like in the case of the value of goods transported through the SCS, there are some controversies over estimations of the total oil and gas reserves in that basin. According to China National Offshore Oil Corporation, the South China Sea reserves are estimated to be 125 billion of barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Conversely, the U.S. Energy Administration Information estimates that the South China Sea contains around 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.286 The differences between the U.S. and PRC sources have led to speculation that China has purposely exaggerated the oil and natural gas reserves in the South China Sea to justify its activities in the region.287 According to Tony Reagan, a former Shell executive, “the region has never been of significance to the oil majors and they do not believe that it is the next big thing now. There are far more attractive areas out there –​Western Australia and East Africa for example and of course unconventional gas from coal seams and shale.”288 This means that China is capable of feeding its hunger for oil using sources other than the SCS basin. Oil and natural gas from the South China Sea could help poorer economies, such as those of Vietnam or the Philippines. For the PRC, a country with an annual consumption of 3 billion barrels of oil and around 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, oil and gas in the South China Sea are not available in sufficiently large amounts.289 Access to oil and natural gas is important from an economic and political point of view, but food safety is even more vital. The total population of the countries involved in the SCS disputes has been growing significantly for the last two decades (Table 2), so providing enough access to food is essential for social development. Fisheries are an important branch of the economies of Brunei, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. All of them rank among the top fish-​producing and fish-​consuming countries. Many people depend on 286 Umbah, Frank: “The South China Sea Disputes: The Energy Dimensions.” RSIS Commentary (085) 4.5.2017, retrieved 20.2.2018, from https://​w ww.rsis.edu.sg/​w p-​ content/​uploads/​2017/​05/​CO17085.pdf. 287 Johnson Nicole:  “Small State Hydrocarbon Exploration in South China Sea.” Canadian Naval Review IX No. 2, 2013, p. 37. 288 Hayton, Bill: The South China Sea: A Struggle for Power in Asia. Yale University Press: Yale 2014, p. 149–​150. 289 Ibid., p. 149.

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Table 2.  Population of countries involved in SCS territorial disputes Country China P.R. Brunei Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Vietnam Total

1995 1,239,940,004 297,192 196,957,849 20,495,597 69,835,715 75,198,977 1,602,725,334

2015 1,397,028,533 417,542 258,162,113 30,723,155 101,716,359 93,571,567 1,881,619,269

change + 157,088,529 + 120,350 + 61,204,264 + 10,227,558 + 31,880,644 + 18,372,590 + 278,893,935

Source: United Nations Population Division.

the fishing industry (marine catch and aquaculture) for food security (especially access to protein) and income. A  growing population, climate change, and overfishing are all posing serious threats to fishing in the SCS basin. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council Report, “the ability of South China Sea fisheries to accommodate mounting demand is questionable. Most rich fishing environments, such as shallow reefs and shoals, have already been exploited to their limits or beyond, leaving few relatively underexploited areas.”290 The Australian National Security College (Australian National University) underlines the fact that “as fish become scarcer, the risk of increased ‘fishing nationalism’ in the region rises. Domestic political pressure from disenfranchised fishermen or industries provides one of the greatest potential sources of pressure to governments in the region, which could lead to conflict.”291 As has been shown above, the South China Sea is important from an economic point of view, especially as a SLOC. Its oil and natural gas reserves are questionable, and the fishing industry may face growing problems connected with depleting fish stocks (which increase the possibility of conflict over

290 National Intelligence Council Report: The Future of Indian Ocean and South China Sea Fisheries: Implication for the United States 30th July 2013, retrieved 21.3.2018, from https://​w ww.dni.gov/​fi les/​documents/​nic/​NICR%202013-​38%20Fisheries%20 Report%20FINAL.pdf. 291 Tsirbas, Marina:  Saving the South China Sea fishery:  Time to internationalise. National Security College: Australian National University, retrieved 21.3.2018, from https://​nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/​sites/​default/​fi les/​publication/​nsc_​crawford_​anu_​ edu_​au/​2017-​07/​policy_​option_​3_​v3.pdf.

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access to scarce fish resources). However, all these problems, including access to fishing environments and oil or natural gas fields, are negotiable. All the countries involved in the territorial disputes, including the PRC, highlight the fact that they respect and will continue to respect freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. Obviously, total control over the disputed areas of the SCS could give significant economic benefits to a dominant state, but the risk of conflict (and its potential costs) is far greater than profits from oil and natural gas fields whose exact reserves are unconfirmed, and from the overexploitation of fisheries in the South China Sea. Controlling the strategically important SLOC provides the dominant state with an advantage, but any presumption that it may violate freedom of navigation in the SCS could be more dangerous for its economy than for those of its potential enemies. In fact, currently, there is only one claimant state that may dominate the South China Sea, and it is the People’s Republic of China. China is a country whose economy depends on maritime trade, so even if the PRC dominates the SCS region, the risk that this area will be closed for maritime traffic is almost non-​existent. The importance of the South China Sea can be also analyzed from a strategic and geopolitical point of view. This is especially important for the PRC. China faces the so-​called ‘Malacca Dilemma’ –​the possibility that rival navies may blockade the Strait of Malacca, or other SLOCs that are vital for China, in the event of a conflict. For China, controlling the South China Sea would result in some strategic advantages. First, it would significantly reduce the ‘Malacca Dilemma.’ Any risk of imposing a naval blockade by any hostile navy would be far lower if the South China Sea was really a ‘Chinese’ basin. Second, China would benefit from the possibility of entering the Indian Ocean more easily. Third, control over the SCS would also secure Chinese littoral cities and industry located in the southern part of China’s long coast; domination over maritime approaches to Chinese coasts would increase the country’s security. Last but not least, it reduces the possibility of U.S. support for the Southeast Asian states in case of any conflict with China. For the other claimant states (especially Malaysia, whose territory is divided into Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah), the SCS is also important from a strategic point of view, but these countries do not have enough potential to counterbalance the growing power of China. Despite that, all of the claimant states attempt to enhance their positions in the disputed areas, including through the use of military tools.

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Militarization of the South China Sea region The balance of power theory suggests that national security is enhanced when military potential is so dispersed that no state has enough power to dominate others. If a state becomes a power, the temptation to dominate its weaker neighbors leads to conflicts. Less powerful countries may build a defensive coalition or find a powerful ally in order to counterbalance the most powerful state. Currently, in the SCS, one country has become a leader in military expenditures and building up its military potential. Unsurprisingly, it is the People’s Republic of China. During the last decade, the imbalance between the PRC and its adversaries became particularly significant, to the benefit of China. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the PRC is widening the gap between its military spending and that of its neighbors in the Asia-​Pacific region.292 In 2016, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimated the PRC’s military expenditure at 225.7 billion USD. In 2016, China spent about four times more on defense than India did, and the Chinese military budget is bigger than the combined military expenditures of India, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Australia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. The PRC was able to double its military spending in 6 years, from 113 billion USD in 2008 to 225.7 billion USD in 2016, as mentioned above (Table 3).293 The rapid rise in China’s military spending, combined with a more assertive diplomatic posture, is causing greater and greater concern throughout Asia.294 China’s growing military budget is combined with a more assertive foreign policy and a new military strategy. In May 2015, the Ministry of National Defense of the PRC released a white paper on “China’s Military Strategy.” This paper emphasizes the need to “follow the path of peaceful development, pursue an independent foreign policy of peace and a national defense policy that is defensive in nature, oppose hegemonism and power politics in all form,” and

292 Keck, Zachary:  “China’s Military Spending VS Asia’s Military Spending.” The Diplomat, retrieved 16.12.2017, from:  https://​t hediplomat.com/​2014/​02/​chinas-​ military-​spending-​vs-​asias-​military-​spending/​. 293 SIPRI 2017:  Military expenditure by country, in constant US$ (2015), retrieved 16.12.2017, from https://​w ww.sipri.org/​sites/​default/​fi les/​Milex-​constant-​2015-​USD. pdf. 294 Keck, Zachary: “China’s Military Spending VS Asia’s Military Spending.”

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Table 3.  Military spending in constant USD (% of GDP) 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 387 380 396 381 373 484 424 405 403 (2.5) (3.3) (3.2) (2.5) (2.4) (2.6) (3.1) (3.3) (3.8) PRC 113,542 137,152 144,499 156,009 169,382 185,152 200,915 214,093 225,713 (1.9) (2.1) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) (1.9) Indonesia 3,413 3,567 4,189 4,802 5,514 7,413 6,531 7,639 7,783 (0.6) (0.6) (0.6) (0.7) (0.7) (0.9) (0.8) (0.9) (0.9) Japan 40,167 40,919 41,063 41,616 41,114 40,940 41,159 41,103 41,563 (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) (1.0) Malaysia 4,349 4,105 3,586 4,019 3,833 4,177 4,208 4,532 4,295 (1.9) (2.0) (1.5) (1.6) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) (1.5) Philippines 2,810 2,702 2,838 2,886 2,926 3,326 3,071 3,336 3,990 (1.3) (1.3) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.2) (1.1) (1.1) (1.3) South Korea 29,510 31,365 31,620 32,062 32,876 33,912 34,454 36,433 37,265 (2.6) (2.7) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.6) (2.7) Singapore 8,981 9,281 9,104 8,779 8,578 8,549 8,800 9,394 9,986 (3.9) (3.9) (3.4) (3.2) (3.2) (3.1) (3.1) (3.2) (3.4) Taiwan 9,312 10,030 9,479 9,570 9,907 9,356 9,302 9,803 9,962 (2.3) (2.1) (2.0) (2.1) (2.1) (1.9) (1.8) (1.9) (1.9) Thailand 4,908 5,475 5,066 5,218 5,143 5,346 5,385 5,733 6,047 (1.6) (1.8) (1.6) (1.6) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.5) (1.5) Vietnam 2,712 2,979 3,322 3,101 3,611 3,776 4,184 4,563 5,005 (2.2) (2.3) (2.3) (2.0) (2.2) (2.2) (2.3) (2.4) (2.4) Brunei

Source: SIPRI, Military expenditure by country, in constant (2015) USD.

states that the country “will never seek hegemony or expansion. China’s armed forces will remain a staunch force in maintaining world peace.”295 The strategy insists on building a strong military force and implement the strategic military guideline of active defense. “China’s Military Strategy” points to some hotspot issues such as territorial disputes, terrorism, and ethnic or religious tensions. In the paper, China also states:  “On the issues concerning China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, some of its offshore neighbors take provocative actions and reinforce their military presence on China’s reefs and islands that they have illegally occupied. Some external countries are also busy meddling in South China Sea affairs; a tiny few maintain constant close-​in

295 Ministry of National Defense (MND) of the People’s Republic of China: Chinas Military Strategy, retrieved 3.5.2017, from: http://​eng.mod.gov.cn/​Press/​2015-​05/​ 26/​content_​4586805.htm.

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air and sea surveillance and reconnaissance against China.”296 Additionally, the paper underlines the importance of securing China’s overseas interests concerning resources, energy, and sea line of communications. Despite its self-​proclaimed ‘peaceful rise’ and ‘peaceful development,’ the People’s Republic of China sometimes flexes its muscles. The declaration that the South China Sea is a ‘core interest,’ on par with Taiwan and Tibet, accompanied by increasing maritime military exercises in the region, is of concern to many Asian states. Rather than increasing stability throughout disputed areas and the whole region, these incidents have created strategic mistrust and have led to suspicion about China’s true intentions, especially given the fact that the PRC is getting stronger in the disputed area.297 China, as a key player in the SCS region, is gradually enhancing its position, in accordance with its naval strategy. As one military analyst notes, “[t]‌his naval strategy delineated three stages. In the first stage, from 2000 to 2010, China was to establish control of waters within the first island chain that links Okinawa Prefecture, Taiwan and the Philippines. In the second stage, from 2010 to 2020, China would seek to establish control of waters within the second island chain that links the Osagawara island chain, Guam and Indonesia. [In t]he final stage, from 2020 until 2040, China would put an end to U.S. military dominance in the Pacific and Indian Oceans, using aircraft carriers as a key component of their military force.”298 This plan, presented in 1982, was more than ambitious, and China currently does not fully control even the waters within the first island chain. However, Beijing is gradually enhancing its position by using a mixture of economic, diplomatic, and military strategies. In this last case, China is developing its military capabilities, especially the People’s Liberation Army Navy (the PLAN). The South China Sea is an example of building up the PRC’s power, which is regarded with concern not only among the states directly involved in the SCS territorial disputes. China’s efforts to achieve its goals in the South China Sea with the help of military tools may be divided into three categories. The first is the development of the People’s Liberation Army Navy. The second is building up military infrastructure (e.g., a submarine base on the Hainan island) or facilities that may

2 96 Ibid. 297 Council of Foreign Relations: Pedrozo, Stacy A.: “China’s Active Defence Strategy and its Regional Impact,” retrieved 21.3.2018, from https://​w ww.uscc.gov/​sites/​ default/​fi les/​1.27.11Pedrozo.pdf. 298 Ibid.

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be used for military purposes (e.g., artificial islands). The third is developing Anti-​Access/​Area Denial capabilities (A2AD). with the last of these emerged from the fact that despite the impressive growth of its military budget and the military potential, the PRC still cannot compete with the U.S.  armed forces, including in terms of naval power. Nonetheless, China may achieve its goals in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific not by building up its naval forces, which would be able to crush the United States Pacific Fleet, but by developing Anti-​Access/​Area Denial capabilities. The A2AD idea is not new. For ages, protecting the homeland was the most important task for an army. Armies tried to prevent their adversaries from occupying or traversing certain areas –​first on the ground, later at sea, then (and for more than a century) in the air, and today –​in cyberspace, likely soon to be followed by space. An enemy should be stopped or slowed down, or otherwise be imbued with the perpetual feeling of being threatened. Even the risk that the potential losses would be too high may stop a potential enemy from taking an action. The ways to achieve these goals were also shaped by technology. Nowadays, modern military technologies provide a wide range of tools that are useful in building an effective A2AD environment. China also has built up its A2AD capabilities. The PRC has already made significant efforts toward denying the U.S. military easy access to the Western Pacific waters, especially around the South China Sea. Beijing is continually increasing its ability to push the U.S.  forces further away from Chinese shores. The new generation of anti-​ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), anti-​ship cruise missiles (ASCM), ships, submarines, and bombers all pose a growing threat, especially for the U.S. Navy.299 Despite the fact that the new Chinese ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and submarines have some deficiencies, the U.S. cannot disregard Beijing’s strike capabilities. Some sources and analysts highlight the fact that China may threat Guam, the most important U.S. base in the Western Pacific. According to Eric Heginbotham, the new DF-​26 missile is purpose-​built to attack Guam, and Chinese defense analysts have referred to this weapon as a “Guam-​k iller.”300 “China’s anti-​access envelope is still densest over parts of the first island chain. But, as China’s reach extends to the second island chain, the fear is that Guam’s sanctuary status could erode over the

299 Johnson, Keith: “China’s ‘Guam Killers’ Threaten U.S. Anchor Base in Pacific.” Foreign Policy 11.5.2016, retrieved 28.3.2018, from: http://​foreignpolicy.com/​2016/​ 05/​11/​chinas-​g uam-​k illers-​t hreaten-​u-​s-​a nchor-​base-​in-​pacific/​. 300 Ibid.

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time,” according to Yoshihara Toshi, professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College.301 China’s A2AD capacities protect the PRC’s homeland and littoral region, but, if improved (e.g., by building up military installations in the Chinese outposts in the South China Sea region), may cover the entirety of the disputed areas of the SCS (Map 2). Artificial islands, advanced sea mines, underwater sensors, improved antisubmarine weapons (ASW) capabilities, and long range ASBMs and ASCMs pose a threat to the U.S.  forces in the Pacific and limit U.S. access to the Chinese littoral region as well as the broader disputed areas.302 In 2014, China started reclaiming land, building artificial islands in the South China Sea, and enhancing its infrastructure in the Spratly Islands. China will be able to use these islands as civil-​military bases, which will significantly strengthen its positions in the disputed areas.303 According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), China has created seven new islands in the Spratlys.304 Chinese HQ-​9 SAM and YJ-​62 ASCM missiles are already positioned on the Woody Island in the Paracels. If the PRC deploys these missiles in Chinese outposts in the Spratlys (e.g., Fiery Cross or Subi), almost the entire SCS region will be covered by China’s anti-​aircraft and anti-​ship missiles. Long-​range systems such as DF-​21D (known as the ‘carrier-​k iller’) and CJ-​10 may strike U.S. (or other) military assets from the island of Sumatra to the Philippines. It may prevent foreign armies from intervening in the South China Sea region or even in the whole Western Pacific.305 Without the United States’ presence, Southeast Asian countries involved in the SCS territorial claims have little chance of countering Chinese demands. 3 01 Ibid. 302 Cowan, Christopher: “A2/​AD Anti-​Access/​Area Denial.” The Strategist 13.8.2016, retrieved 30.3.2019, from: https://​w ww.aspistrategist.org.au/​anti-​accessarea-​denial-​ not-​new-​might-​t hink/​. 303 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, p. 1. Retrieved 29.3.2018, from: https://​w ww.defense.gov/​ Portals/​1/​Documents/​pubs/​2015_​China_​Military_​Power_​Report.pdf. 304 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative:  A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building, retrieved 18.4.2018, from https://​a mti.csis.org/​constructive-​year-​chinese-​ building/​. 305 Hale, Austin, Hoffman, Frank G.: “Implications of Emerging Chinese Surveillance and Strike Complexes.” Foreign Policy Research Institute, retrieved 19.3.2018, from https://​w ww.fpri.org/​article/​2016/​11/​implications-​emerging-​chinese-​surveillance-​ strike-​complexes/​.

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Map 2.  Potential range of Chinese missile systems (It refers to Surface-​to-​Air Missile (SAM), Anti-​Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM), ASBM (Anti-​Ship Ballistic Missile), and Land Attack Cruise Missile (LACM).) if located on the disputed islands in the South China Sea Map legend: Potential range: 1–​200 km (HQ-​9 SAM); 2–​400 km (YJ-​62 ASCM), 3–​1,550 km (DF-​21 MRBM), and 2,200 km (CJ-​10  LACM). Source: map based on Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), https://​w ww.fpri.org/​a rticle/​ 2016/​11/​implications-​emerging-​chinese-​surveillance-​strike-​complexes/​.

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China is enhancing its position by reclaiming land and building artificial islands in the disputed areas. Satellite images have shown impressive construction work. Analysts have recognized an airstrip and a harbor; however, the latest images show a base nearing completion, equipped with radars, hangars, and shelters. As mentioned previously, Fiery Cross Reef is not China’s only construction project in the SCS region, even just in the Spratlys, which have been the setting for intensive build-​up of infrastructure. Six artificial islands in that archipelago (Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef, Subi Reef, Johnston South Reef, Cuarteron Reef, and Gaven Reef), as well as Wooden Island in the Paracels, have been transformed into outposts.306 Some Australian experts describe them as fortresses.307 Infrastructure such as airstrips or harbors may be used for both military and civilian purposes, but many analysts have recognized purely military infrastructure such as anti-​aircraft sites, missile shelters, naval guns, and supply storages. High-​frequency radars and communication equipment have also been observed in these outposts. At the end of October 2017, People’s Liberation Army Air Force F-​11B fighters were deployed to Woody Island for a military exercise. One month later, a Y-​8 transport aircraft appeared on the island.308 According to international law, creating an artificial island does not give a state the right to territorial waters within 12 nautical miles of the shores or an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). According to Article 60(8) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), “artificial islands, installations and structures do not possess the status of islands. They have no territorial sea of their own, and their presence does not affect the delimitation of the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf.”309 However, as some

306 South China Sea Research:  China’s artificial island building:  Fiery Cross Reef, retrieved 30.3.2018, from: https://​seasresearch.wordpress.com/​2014/​11/​10/​chinas-​ land-​reclamation-​fiery-​cross-​reef/​. 307 Siedel, Jamie: Photos reveal China’s South China Sea island fortresses are complete, retrieved 3.4.2018, from http://​w ww.news.com.au/​technology/​innovation/​photos-​ reveal-​chinas-​south-​china-​sea-​island-​fortresses-​are-​complete/​news-​story/​776e1a6 95fb41ccb7e47a436594c1530. 308 Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative:  A Constructive Year for Chinese Base Building, retrieved 18.4.2018, from https://​a mti.csis.org/​constructive-​year-​chinese-​ building/​. 309 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, p. 41, retrieved 4.4.2018, from http://​ www.un.org/​depts/​los/​convention_​agreements/​texts/​unclos/​unclos_​e.pdf.

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news reports have noted, “possession is, after all, nine-​tenths of the law.”310 The PRC ignores protests and creates faits accomplis. Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines also possess airstrips and outposts in the disputed areas (as does Taiwan); however, these states do not have enough resources to compete with China’s projects. This is exacerbated by the fact that the PRC is gaining another advantage in the form of the rapid development of its naval forces. China’s naval modernization has many targets to achieve. Some of them are strictly connected to the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The PLAN’s modernization is oriented toward asserting or defending China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea, empowering Beijing to regulate foreign military activities in China’s 200-​mile maritime EEZ. Additionally, a modern and powerful navy will defend China’s commercial sea lines of communication and reduce the U.S. Navy’s presence in the Western Pacific. The Chinese A2AD force may deter a U.S. intervention in a conflict located close to Chinese territory (such as Taiwan or the Spratly Islands) or simply delay the arrival and reduce the effectiveness of the U.S.  forces in such military circumstances.311 The People’s Liberation Army Navy has made impressive progress since the end of the 1970s, transforming itself from a brown-​water to a blue-​water navy. The PLAN has put into service the Type 001 Liaoning (ex-​Soviet Kuznetsov-​ class) aircraft carrier and built a Type 001A carrier (in reality, a modified Type 001). In 2016 (or 2015, according to other sources), China started to build its third aircraft carrier  –​Type 002, which is a significant leap forward compared to previous units. It will be larger, with a larger air wing than Type 001 and Type 001A. The availability of other equipment (e.g., an electromagnetic aircraft launching system) as well as the propulsion, defense systems, and countermeasures of the carrier are still subject to speculation, but the PLAN is entering the world of carrier-​based aviation,312 which may disturb the balance of power in both the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. China’s carrier

3 10 Siedel, Jamie: Photos reveal China’s South China Sea island fortresses are complete. 311 O’Rourke, Ronald:  China’s Naval Modernization:  Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities –​Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 17.7.2016, p. 7, retrieved 11.4.2018, from: https://​fas.org/​sgp/​crs/​row/​R L33153.pdf. 312 Mizokami, Kyle: China’s Next Aircraft Carrier Will Be a Massive Leap Forward, retrieved 13.3.2018, from https://​w ww.popularmechanics.com/​military/​navy-​ships/​ a15392390/​chinas-​next-​aircraft-​carrier-​0 02/​.

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groups, with support from land-​based aircraft and covered by anti-​aircraft and anti-​ship missiles, may be an effective tool of projecting power in the South China Sea. Aircraft carriers are not the only symbol of China’s growing naval power. The PLAN has developed its submarine and surface forces, including amphibious ones. In 2015, the Chinese navy possessed around 27 destroyers, 45 frigates, 24 corvettes, 94 guided missile boats, and over 70 amphibious crafts, including the large and modern Type 071 (Yuzhao-​class) landing platform docks (LPDs). 313 Some of these warships, especially the newly built destroyers and frigates, employ stealth technology, and Type 052C (Lyuang II-​class) destroyers’ radars resemble the U.S. SPY-​1 radar, used in the Aegis naval weapons system. 314 China’s submarine forces are also undergoing extensive development and a modernization process. Very numerous, but completely obsolete diesel-​electric Type 033 (Romeo-​class) submarines have been replaced by modern Russian Project 877 EKM and Project 636 (Kilo-​ class) units. Moreover, the PLAN introduced indigenously built submarines into service, including Type 039A and Type 041 (Yuan-​class). Modern PLAN submarines are equipped with torpedoes and anti-​ship missiles, relatively modern electronics, and countermeasures. Today, China possesses between 47 and 51 diesel-​electric attack submarines. China’s nuclear submarine forces followed the same path. The obsolete Type 092 (Xia-​class) and Type 091 (Han-​ class) units were decommissioned or put into reserve. New Type 094 (Jin-​class) nuclear-​powered ballistic missile submarines and Type 093 (Shang-​class) nuclear-​powered attack submarines have entered into service, and by 2020, the PLAN will probably have 15 nuclear-​powered submarines, including 7 Jin-​class models, equipped with submarine-​launched ballistic missiles. 315

313 Global Security:  Chinese Warships, retrieved 18.4.2018, from https://​w ww. globalsecurity.org/​military/​world/​china/​navy.htm. 314 Thanh Ho, Łukasz, Behrendt, Paweł:  “Zbrojenia morskie a mocarstwowość państw Azji i Pacyfiku.” In:  Marszałek-​Kawa Joanna (eds.) Azjatyckie strategie bezpieczeństwa u progu XXI wieku. Adam Marszałek: Toruń 2014, p.18. 315 Chinese Warships, Global Security; Łukasz Stach, Paulina Sacharczuk, Morze Południowochińskie jako miejsce rywalizacji geopolitycznej i wyścigu zbrojeń morskich w Azji Południowo-​Wschodniej, Rocznik Geopolityczny, No. 20, 2017, pp. 143–​146; Ronald O’Rourke, China’s Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities –​Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service Report, 2016.

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A significant part of this military potential is located in the southern part of China. According to an Annual Report to Congress entitled “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2017.” the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet possesses 4 nuclear-​powered ballistic missile submarines, 2 nuclear-​powered attack submarines, 16 diesel-​powered attack submarines, 7 destroyers, 22 frigates, 12 corvettes, 3 amphibious transport docks, 11 tank landing ships, 8 medium landing ships, and 35 missile patrol crafts. 316 Compared to this force, the navies of other claimant states appear modest, even after undergoing a process of modernization. The Philippine Navy is, on the whole, obsolete and has little combat capability.317 Vietnam, which claims both the Spratlys and the Paracels, purchased from Russia 6 modern Project 636 submarines (Kilo-​class), though it needs time to put them into service, build an infrastructure, and train the crews properly. Moreover, Russia has delivered frigates (8 units) and corvettes (13 vessels), which have significantly enhanced Vietnam’s naval capabilities. Vietnam has also invested in A2AD, installing land-​ based anti-​ ship missiles. Malaysia bought two Scorpene-​class submarines from France, and a newly build submarine base in Sepanggar is located in Sabah, close to the disputed areas. The surface forces have also been modernized by introducing into service 6 large Kebah-​class offshore patrol vessels and 2 Leiku-​class frigates; moreover, by 2023, 6 Second Generation patrol vessels based on French Govind-​class frigates will have been purchased. Moreover, the Royal Malaysian Navy cooperates with the PRC and up to 18 littoral mission ships may be built in Chinese and Malaysian shipyards. The smallest claimant state, Brunei, possesses a small but modern navy, including 4 modern patrol vessels (Darussalam-​class) armed with MM40 Exocet missiles.318 The Indonesian navy has also built up its potential, introducing new submarines into service (in cooperation with South Korea), in addition to frigates and corvettes.

316 Annual Report to Congress 2017, Office of Secretary of Defence:  Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, p.  19, retrieved 18.3.2018, from https://​w ww.defense.gov/​Portals/​1/​Documents/​pubs/​2017_​China_​ Military_​Power_​Report.PDF. 317 Stach Łukasz, Sacharczuk Paulina, Morze Południowochińskie jako miejsce rywalizacji…, pp. 150–​152. 318 Stach, Łukasz: “Małe, ale czy niegroźne? Floty wojenne mniejszych krajów Azji Południowo-​Wschodniej.” In:  Marszałek-​Kawa, Joanna (eds.):  Bezpieczeństwo Współczesnej Azji, Adam Marszałek: Toruń: 2015, pp. 93–​110.

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Despite the SCS claimant states’ efforts to develop their naval forces, the PLAN has a significant advantage over every potential opponent in the South China Sea. In fact, as a high-​ranking official said, off-​the-​record, to Robert D. Kaplan, “[a]‌n American military presence is needed to countervail China, but we won’t vocalize that.”319 The question is whether the U.S. will risk a confrontation with the PRC given that it is maneuvering in China’s playground (inside the first island chain), far away from the main U.S. naval and air bases, but close to the Chinese ones.

Conclusions A strategically located region always draws the attention of powers, and this is precisely what we observe in the South China Sea. Every claimant state tries to maintain or expand its position, which includes developing its military potential and infrastructure. The militarization of the SCS basin is a fact, especially if China (and other states involved in the disputes) will indeed locate military assets on the disputed islands. The newly built Chinese artificial islands seem to be ready to receive military equipment such as jet fighters, SAM sites, cruise missiles, or missile attack crafts. Moreover, all the states involved in the SCS territorial dispute are developing their naval forces. But is this a naval arms race or classic modernization? The development of the naval forces in the South China Sea region cannot be called an arms race for one simple reason –​China is far ahead of the other countries involved in the SCS territorial claims. The Vietnamese, Malaysian, or Bruneian navies are no match for the PLAN (despite undergoing an impressive overhaul of their own), and the condition of the Philippine navy is weak. A full-​scale naval arms race has begun between the PRC and the United States; however, so far, the PLAN is still inferior to the U.S. Navy, especially on the high seas. Economic growth enables the PRC to enhance its military power and enforce a global policy. For China, the South China Sea is a gateway to the Indian Ocean, and control over the U-​shaped line will secure the PRC’s position in the disputed areas. Beijing continues to state that it will not use force to execute its

319 Kaplan, Robert D.:  The South China Sea will be a battleground of the future, Business Insider, retrieved 26.4.2018, from http://​w ww.businessinsider.com/​ why-​t he-​south-​china-​sea-​is-​so-​crucial-​2015-​2?IR=T.

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claims.320 However, China’s growing military potential and the widening gap between the military capabilities of China and other claimant states disrupts the balance in the region. Chinese policy has become more assertive, too, which is cause for concern not only for the countries involved in the SCS territorial disputes. In fact, the Southeast Asian countries involved in the SCS territorial dispute have to depend on the U.S. presence in the region to balance the PRC. According to Guang Ang Chen, “[t]‌his ‘balance of power’ strategy has so far been successful in the grand strategic sense; but it may not be sufficient to deal with the disputes in the South China Sea.”321 Currently, China is reluctant to use its military power in the South China Sea. However, enhancing its military potential in the SCS is advantageous for Beijing. No state involved in the SCS disputes may compete with the Chinese military expenditures or with the PLAN. Only the United States possesses military capabilities strong enough to support counties such as Vietnam or Malaysia, but the strong Chinese military presence in the SCS increases the risk for the U.S. Geography favors China, and operating within the Chinese A2AD environment may be too hazardous for the United States. Cost-​effectiveness analysis favors China as well. Anti-​ship cruise missiles and anti-​ship ballistic missiles are cheaper than aircraft carriers. Questions still abound regarding the effectiveness of the U.S. ballistic missile defense systems and on the U.S. air-​sea battle concept. So far, tensions between the United States and China have been rising; this is due to the fact that the South China Sea dispute is important not only for the claimant states but also for the United States. Every analysis of the situation in the region must take into consideration Washington’s policy toward China. Despite the fact that five ASEAN member states are involved in the SCS territorial dispute (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam), they “have been unable so far to present an integrated approach due to a variety of reasons ranging from narrow national interests to different foreign policy orientations.”322 Agus Rustandi underlines the fact, that “it will be difficult to find a single, unified solution if it depends on current ASEAN dispute resolution mechanisms, as ASEAN is a grouping of states with individual national interests. That is not intended as a criticism but simply highlights that, as a 3 20 Guang, Ang Chen: “The South China Sea Dispute Revisited,” p. 212. 321 Ibid., p. 201. 322 Vinod Anand: ASEAN’s Centrality and the South China Sea dispute Institute for Transnational Studies, retrieved 30.5.2018, from https://​rieas.gr/​images/​asia/​ asiapol102.pdf

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regional organization, ASEAN is neither structurally nor functionally organized to resolve such issues.”323 In 1992, ASEAN drafted a Declaration on the South China Sea, but this is an example of ASEAN’s internal diplomacy rather than a legally binding agreement.324 Moreover, tensions and territorial disputes among the ASEAN member states render any common position on the topic within ASEAN unlikely. The ASEAN countries involved in the SCS disputes are modernizing their military forces and bolstering their outposts in the region. Nonetheless, their military potential is very limited compared to that of the PRC. China has significantly reinforced its naval capabilities (including amphibious warfare) and constructed artificial islands in the disputed areas of the SCS on a wide scale. Additionally, even if combined, the military potential of ASEAN member states is no match for the PRC. Additionally, as mentioned previously, ASEAN member states have disparate national interests and  –​as a consequence  –​their approach toward China’s activity in the SCS region is different. For instance, Malaysia tries to avoid exacerbating the conflict with China, mostly for economic reasons. The PRC happens to be Malaysia’s main economic partner in terms of trade as well as a key source of foreign direct investment.325 Moreover, in 2016, Malaysia decided to sign an agreement with China on the purchase of Littoral Mission Ships, which signaled the strengthening of the Sino-​Malaysian relationship, also in the field of security.326 In return, Beijing ‘tolerates’ Malaysia’s natural gas fields in the areas tat fall under the PRC’s maritime claims.327 Given these circumstances (different national interests, tensions between member 323 Agus Rustandi: The South China Sea Dispute: Opportunities for ASEAN to enhance its policies in order to achieve resolution, The Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, retrieved 30.05.2019, from https://​w ww.defence.gov.au/​ADC/​Publications/​ IndoPac/​Rustandi_​IPSP.pdf. 324 Ibid. 325 Jennings, Ralph: Why Malaysia Stays Quiet about its Claim in the South China Sea. Forbes, 2.6.2016, retrieved 8.3.2018, from https://​w ww.forbes.com/​sites/​ ralphjennings/​2 016/​0 6/​02/​w hy-​m alaysia-​s taysquiet-​a bout-​its-​c laims-​i n-​t he-​ disputed-​south-​china-​sea/​#50ef179461b0. 326 Stach, Łukasz: “Malaysia’s Maritime Security Challenges and the Development of the Royal Malaysian Navy: Old Problems and New Threats.” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 30(3), 2018, 431. 327 Jennings, Ralph: Why Malaysia Stays Quiet about its Claim in the South China Sea. Forbes, 2.6.2016, retrieved 8.3.2018, from https://​w ww.forbes.com/​sites/​ ralphjennings/​2 016/​0 6/​02/​w hy-​m alaysia-​s taysquiet-​a bout-​its-​c laims-​i n-​t he-​ disputed-​south-​china-​sea/​#50ef179461b0.

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states), ASEAN have played limited role to date in solving the SCS dispute. As an example, for more than two decades, the ASEAN members and China have been struggling to formulate a potential code of conduct (COC) to manage the SCS maritime and territorial disputes.328 Progress is slow, but in August 2018, ten ASEAN foreign ministers and their Chinese counterpart announced an agreement on an ASEAN-​China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct (COC). This document will serve as a basis for the COC in South China Sea.329 Despite this, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative analysts underline the fact that, even if the COC will ultimately be signed, its usefulness may be limited.330 Overall, the PRC’s growing economic and military potential, combined with a more assertive Chinese policy, is gradually changing the status quo in the disputed areas. Neither the countries involved in SCS territorial claims nor ASEAN have a good answer on how to restrain China’s growing capabilities and resolve this complicated dispute.

List of abbreviations: A2AD ASBM ASCM ASEAN AMTI ASW EEZ LACM PLAN PRC

Anti-​Access/​Area Denial Anti-​Ship Ballistic Missile Anti-​Ship Cruise Missile Association of South-​East Asian Nations Asia Transparency Maritime Initiative Anti-​Submarine Weapon Exclusive Economic Zone Land Attack Cruise Missile People’s Liberation Army Navy People’s Republic of China

328 A Blueprint for a South China Sea Code of Conduct. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 11.10.2018, retrieved 5.3.2019, from: https://​a mti.csis.org/​blueprint-​for-​ south-​china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​ 329 Thayer, Carl: A Closer Look at the ASEAN-​China Single Draft South China Sea Code of Conduct. The Diplomat, 3.8.2018, retrieved 11.3.2019, from: https://​t hediplomat. com/​2018/​08/​a-​closer-​look-​at-​t he-​asean-​china-​single-​draft-​south-​china-​sea-​code-​ of-​conduct/​. 330 A Blueprint for a South China Sea Code of Conduct. Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 11.10.2018, retrieved 5.3.2019, from: https://​amti.csis.org/​blueprint-​for-​south-​ china-​sea-​code-​of-​conduct/​

176 SAM SCS SIPRI SLOC UNCLOS U.S.

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Surface to Air Missile South China Sea Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Sea Line of Communication United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United States

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Mizokami, Kyle: China’s Next Aircraft Carrier Will Be a Massive Leap Forward, retrieved 13.3.2018, from https://​w ww.popularmechanics.com/​military/​ navy-​ships/​a15392390/​chinas-​next-​aircraft-​carrier-​002/​. National Intelligence Council Report:  The Future of Indian Ocean and South China Sea Fisheries:  Implication for the United States, 2013, retrieved 21.3.2018, from https://​w ww.dni.gov/​fi les/​documents/​nic/​NICR%202013-​ 38%20Fisheries%20Report%20FINAL.pdf. O’Rourke, Ronald:  China’s Naval Modernization:  Implication for U.S. Navy Capabilities –​Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 17.7.2016, p. 7, retrieved 11.4.2018, from: https://​fas.org/​sgp/​crs/​row/​ RL33153.pdf. Panda Ankit: “How Much Trade Transits the South China Sea? Not $5.3 Trillion a year.” The Diplomat., retrieved 12.03.2018, from: https://​t hediplomat.com/​ 2017/​08/​how-​much-​t rade-​t ransits-​t he-​south-​china-​sea-​not-​5-​3-​t rillion-​a-​ year/​.. Siedel, Jamie:  Photos reveal China’s South China Sea island fortresses are complete, retrieved 3.4.2018, from http://​w ww.news.com.au/​technology/​ innovation/​photos-​reveal-​chinas-​south-​china-​sea-​island-​fortresses-​a re-​ complete/​news-​story/​776e1a695fb41ccb7e47a436594c1530. SIPRI 2017: Military expenditure by country, in constant US$ (2015), retrieved 16.12.2017, from https://​w ww.sipri.org/​sites/​default/​fi les/​Milex-​constant-​ 2015-​USD.pdf. South China Sea Research: China’s artificial island building: Fiery Cross Reef, retrieved 30.3.2018, from:https://​seasresearch.wordpress.com/​2014/​11/​10/​ chinas-​land-​reclamation-​fiery-​cross-​reef/​. Stach, Łukasz: “Małe, ale czy niegroźne? Floty wojenne mniejszych krajów Azji Południowo-​Wschodniej.” In: Marszałek-​Kawa, Joanna (eds.): Bezpieczeństwo Współczesnej Azji, Adam Marszałek: Toruń: 2015, pp. 93–​110. Thanh Ho, Łukasz, Behrendt, Paweł:  “Zbrojenia morskie a mocarstwowość państw Azji i Pacyfiku.” In: Marszałek-​Kawa Joanna (eds.) Azjatyckie strategie bezpieczeństwa u progu XXI wieku. Adam Marszałek: Toruń 2014, p.18. Tsirbas, Marina:  Saving the South China Sea fishery:  time to internationalise. National Security College:  Australian National University, retrieved 21.3.2018, from https://​nsc.crawford.anu.edu.au/​sites/​default/​fi les/​publication/​nsc_​crawford_​anu_​edu_​au/​2017-​07/​policy_​option_​3_​v3.pdf. Umbah, Frank: “The South China Sea Disputes: The Energy Dimensions.” RSIS Commentary

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United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea, p. 41, retrieved 4.4.2018, from http://​w ww.un.org/​depts/​los/​convention_​agreements/​texts/​unclos/​unclos_​ e.pdf. * Lukasz Stach (Ph.D., Pedagogical University of Cracow) is an assistant professor at the Pedagogical University of Cracow, Institute of Political Science. He is the author and co-​author of over 30 scholarly articles and monographs, and author or editor of five books. His current research interests have focused on security threats in Southeast Asia.

Karol Żakowski https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0003-​2715-​570X

From the Fukuda Doctrine to the Abe Doctrine: Japan’s Policy toward ASEAN under the Second Abe Cabinet Abstract  The article presents a comparative analysis of the new approach toward Southeast Asia under the Abe administration since 2012 in relation to the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. I argue that while Japan’s traditional ASEAN policy was based on assuming a low-​profile posture aimed at economic cooperation, the Abe Doctrine treats Southeast Asia as a strategically important partner against a rising China. Keywords: Japan, ASEAN, foreign policy, Fukuda Doctrine, Proactive Contribution to Peace

Since regaining power in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has emphasized the importance of relations with countries that belong to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Japan’s diplomatic strategy. As early as January 2013, he paid a visit to Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia, after which he announced the Five Principles of Japan’s ASEAN Diplomacy. The aim of this article is to compare the new approach toward Southeast Asia with the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977. I argue that while Japan’s traditional ASEAN policy was based on assuming a low-​profile posture aimed at economic cooperation, the Abe Doctrine treats Southeast Asia as a strategically important partner, particularly in the security sphere. Through changes in the interpretation of the Constitution to allow collective self-​defense, constant reference to the need to uphold the law of the sea, and by modifying the rules of providing Official Development Assistance (ODA), Tokyo is assuming a more assertive posture toward Beijing. In this light, the Japanese government perceives ASEAN as a valuable counterweight against a rising China.

Historical Determinants of Japan’s Policy toward Southeast Asia Southeast Asia has played an important role in Japan’s foreign policy since the beginning of the postwar period. Due to existence of communist regimes in

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continental China and North Korea, during the early years of the Cold War, Tokyo’s relations with neighboring countries had to be limited to the pro-​ American South Korea and Taiwan. For that reason, Southeast Asia became a natural region of interest for Japan. However, in order to establish mutually beneficial cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, Japan first had to cope with the problems of war reparations and anti-​Japanese sentiment in the region. Historical issues constituted a considerable obstacle for Japanese diplomacy. At the turn of 1941 and 1942, Japan established control over almost the entire territory of Southeast Asia. After defeating American and British forces, Tokyo implanted puppet regimes in most of the countries of the region. While Japanese propaganda maintained that the aim of the empire was to repulse Western powers and give freedom to the Asian nations within the newly established Greater East Asia Co-​prosperity Sphere, the Japanese occupation was more brutal than that of European or American forces. The Treaty of San Francisco of 1951 left the problem of reparations to bilateral talks between Japan and the individual countries concerned. In the 1950s and 1960s, Japan normalized its diplomatic relations with most of the Southeast Asian states. Tokyo paid 200  million USD in war reparations and development grants to Burma in 1954 (with additional 140 million USD in 1963), 550 million USD to the Philippines in 1956, 223 million USD to Indonesia in 1958, and 39 million USD to South Vietnam in 1959.331 When ASEAN was established in August 1967, Japan had been already involved in cooperation with the region as one of the initiators of the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia in 1966. However, despite the fact that Tokyo had paid war reparations, anti-​Japanese sentiments in the region were still strong. They were caused not only by the memory of war atrocities but also by the fear of Japanese economic domination, as exemplified by the boycott movement against Japanese products in Thailand in 1972.332 Anti-​Japanese sentiment erupted during Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei’s visit to the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in January 1974. Tanaka was met with violent riots and demonstrations in cities like Jakarta and Bangkok. Both Southeast Asian societies and governments rejected

331 Kuriyama, Takakazu: Sengo Nihon Gaikō. Kiseki to Kadai [Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan: Trajectories and Issues]. Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo 2016, p. 36. 332 Sueo, Sudo: “Japan–​ASEAN Relations: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey 28(5), 1988, p. 511.

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the possibility of Japan’s participation in the political affairs of ASEAN for fear of a potential revival of Japanese militarism.333

The Fukuda Doctrine In August 1977, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo attended the first ASEAN–​Japan meeting in Kuala Lumpur, organized on the sidelines of the second ASEAN summit. As he wrapped up his visits to all ASEAN member states in Manila, Fukuda delivered a famous speech that can be summarized in three points. First, he emphasized that Japan had no intention of becoming a military power. Second, he called for the creation of a “heart-​to-​heart” relationship between Japan and ASEAN based on mutual confidence. Third, he stressed that both sides would be equal partners and that Japan would “walk hand-​in-​hand with ASEAN” in contributing to stability and prosperity in the region.334 In order to promote relations with Southeast Asia, the Japanese prime minister promised to double financial aid to the region in five years as well as to increase trade volume with and investments in ASEAN.335 While none of the principles announced by Fukuda were really new, his ‘doctrine’ came to be considered as a turning point in Japanese diplomacy. First, it was the first time since the Second World War that Tokyo seemed to formulate a coherent strategy in its foreign policy. Undoubtedly, it was the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 that enabled Japan to pursue a more independent policy toward Southeast Asia while generally adhering to the global strategy pursued by the United States. For Tokyo, ASEAN could not only offer access to a vast market but also become the first playground in an attempt at displaying political leadership on the international arena. As Sueo Sudo points out, “ASEAN needed Japan’s economic assistance to reinforce regional cooperation, and Japan needed ASEAN to play its political role in the region and to develop multilateral economic relations.”336

333 Singh, Bhubhindar: “ASEAN’s Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity.” Asian Survey 42(2), 2002, p. 282. 334 Haddad, William W.: “Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 2(1), 1980, p. 10. 335 Hellmann, Donald C.: “Japan and Southeast Asia: Continuity Amidst Change.” Asian Survey 19(12), 1979, p. 1196. 336 Sueo, p. 514.

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Nevertheless, the implementation of all the principles of the Fukuda Doctrine was far from automatic. Despite promises of establishing “heart-​to-​ heart” relationships with the ASEAN nations, in 1978, Tokyo refused to accept any significant number of Vietnamese immigrants from overcrowded refugee camps in Thailand and other countries in the region. Moreover, unlike European states, Tokyo failed to impose economic sanctions on Hanoi for violation of human rights.337 This accommodating posture toward Vietnam resulted from Japan’s ambition to play the role of a mediator between ASEAN and Indochina, which was in line with the third principle stipulated by Fukuda. The main author of this policy, Japanese Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao, hoped that economic assistance to Hanoi would be used to buy goods from ASEAN states, and thus serve the purpose of overcoming mutual enmity. Nevertheless, Tokyo’s diplomatic efforts to stabilize the situation in post-​Vietnam War Southeast Asia ended in failure. After Vietnam’s attack on the Thai border, Japan suspended economic assistance to Hanoi and, since 1980, has started to support ASEAN’s stance in the conflict more decisively.338 Gradually, Japan’s cooperation with ASEAN became institutionalized. The Japan–​ASEAN Forum was formed in March 1977, even before the proclamation of the Fukuda Doctrine. During the second meeting of the Forum in Tokyo in November 1977, the Fukuda administration offered 1 billion USD to ASEAN industrial projects, conceded to reduce barriers on trade, and promised to establish bilateral cultural exchange programs. The annual Japan–​ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Conference was launched in 1978, followed by the Japan–​ ASEAN Economic Ministers’ Meeting one year later and the Japan–​ASEAN Economic Council in 1983.339 Meanwhile, the Fukuda Doctrine was continuously reaffirmed in Japan by successive heads of state. In July 1981, Prime Minister Suzuki Zenkō chose five ASEAN states for his first official visit abroad. In a speech delivered in Bangkok, he recommitted to the Fukuda Doctrine and announced that Japan would contribute to world peace in a way which corresponds to its international status. In addition, he stressed that Tokyo would place emphasis on four areas of economic cooperation with ASEAN, that is, the promotion and development of: 1) agriculture, 2)  energy sources, 3)  human resources, as well as 4)  small and medium-​sized enterprises. Unlike Suzuki, his successor Nakasone Yasuhiro

3 37 Hellmann, pp. 1196–​1197. 338 Sueo, pp. 515–​516. 339 Ibid., pp. 517–​522.

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represented the right wing of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), but he was equally determined to maintain the pacifist Fukuda Doctrine. During his trip to the ASEAN countries and Brunei in April and May 1983, Nakasone explained that the protection of sea lanes by Japan was purely defensive in nature. He also announced further facilitations in trade and invited 150 representatives of ASEAN youth to visit Japan for short stays on an annual basis. Importantly, in his Jakarta speech, Nakasone directly linked Japan’s prosperity with the prosperity of the ASEAN states.340 Abe Shintarō, foreign minister from 1982 to 1986 and father of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō, stressed that the Southeast Asian countries were expecting Japan to play a more active role in the region in such spheres as economic cooperation, trade, transfer of technology, or investments. He also emphasized the importance of ASEAN for Japan as an exporter of natural resources and a guardian of the Malacca and Lombok Straits, which facilitated the flow of approximately 30 % of Japan’s export and 40 % of its import.341 The Japanese contribution to the development of Southeast Asia was most visible in the magnitude of its ODA, which rose steadily until mid-​1990s. For example, in 1990, Japanese assistance to ASEAN countries totaled 2.299 billion USD, which constituted 33.1 % of Japan’s entire ODA fund. With the exception of Malaysia, in 1996, Japan was the largest source of ODA to all of the ASEAN states.342 Thanks to these efforts, Japan’s negative image in Southeast Asia changed significantly. Instead of dwelling on historical problems, in the 1980s, some of the ASEAN member governments even started openly admitting that Japan’s economic policy should become a model for their own countries, which was exemplified by the Learn from Japan movement in Singapore and the Look East Policy in Malaysia.343 While contributing to economic stability in Southeast Asia, Japan avoided establishing formal military exchange with ASEAN members. Despite requests from countries such as Indonesia or Thailand, Tokyo refused to sell arms or military technology to them. The only sign of cooperation in the military field revolved around providing education for Thai and Singaporean military 3 40 Ibid., pp. 518–​519. 341 Abe, Shintarō:  Nihon Gaikō no Shishin [Guidelines of Japan’s Diplomacy]. Shintarōkai: Tokyo 1984, pp. 79–​81. 342 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  Relationship between Japan and ASEAN, December 1998, retrieved 21.7.2017, from: http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​region/​asia-​paci/​ asean/​pmv9812/​relation.html. 343 Sueo, p. 521.

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personnel in Japanese schools.344 In the 1990s, however, Japan started to assume a more proactive posture in stabilizing the political situation in Southeast Asia. In 1992–​1993, Tokyo not only sent its Self-​Defense Forces to Cambodia but also successfully facilitated the appointment of a Japanese diplomat, Akashi Yasushi, as head of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Moreover, it was the Japanese government who mediated between the conflicting sides and managed to avert a civil war in that country in 1997. In addition, Japan participated in the peacekeeping operation in East Timor in 2002 and in the disaster relief operation after the tsunami in the Indonesian province of Aceh in 2004. What is more, at the beginning of the 21st century, Japan became involved in peace-​building efforts in Mindanao in the southern Philippines, plagued by a secessionist movement called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.345 After the end of the Cold War, ASEAN became a focal point of regionalization initiatives not only in Southeast Asia but also on a much broader geographical scale. Japan began participating in the ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994, in ASEAN+3 (with China and South Korea) in 1997, and in the East Asia Summit in 2005. All three institutions became important forums for political and security dialogue. Still, the economic dimension of Japan’s cooperation with Southeast Asia was dominant in its policy toward the region. In a speech delivered in Singapore in January 1997, Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō outlined the framework for Japan–​ASEAN cooperation in the era of globalization. He appealed for the liberalization of trade, the intensification of top-​level political contacts, deepened cultural exchange, as well as involvement in joint actions to tackle such problems as terrorism, environmental pollution, health and welfare issues, population growth, food and energy shortages, AIDS, and narcotics. Importantly, he argued that Japan and ASEAN should welcome the rise “of a politically stable, economically prosperous China, bound by ties of trust with the rest of the world.”346 In the following years, Tokyo started difficult 344 Khamchoo, Chaiwat: “Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Security: ‘Plus ca Change ...’.” Pacific Affairs 64(1), 1991, p. 12. 345 Lam, Peng Er: “The Fukuda Doctrine. Origins, Ideas, and Praxis.” In: Lam Peng Er (ed.): Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia. The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond. Routledge: London and New York 2013, pp. 14–​16. 346 ASEAN Secretariat: Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN: For a Broader and Deeper Partnership by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, January 14, 1997, retrieved on 21.7.2017, from http://​worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/​documents/​texts/​asean/​ 19970114.S1E.html.

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negotiations with various Southeast Asian governments, aimed at gradual liberalization of investment regulations as well as stimulating trade in goods and services. This resulted in the signing of the Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Partnership among Member States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and Japan in April 2008. It is worth noting that the Japanese prime minister at the time was Fukuda Takeo’s son, Fukuda Yasuo. As we can see, the Fukuda Doctrine contributed to intensification of exchange between Japan and the ASEAN countries in all areas, the promotion of peace and stability in the region, and, as a result, to overcoming anti-​Japanese sentiments among Southeast Asian nations. While the mission in Cambodia became the first test of the Self-​Defense Forces’ ability to successfully participate in a peacekeeping operation, it is the economic dimension that dominated the Japan–​ASEAN relationship in this period. Tokyo perceived Southeast Asian countries as important trade partners rather than as potential allies in regional or global power politics.

The Abe Doctrine When Abe Shinzō returned to the post of prime minister in December 2012, he started implementing profound changes in Japan’s security policy, aimed at displaying more assertiveness on the international stage. The reforms included relaxing the ban on the exportation of military technologies, overhauling the rules of providing ODA, and, most significantly, altering the interpretation of the Constitution to allow Japan’s participation in collective self-​defense pacts. Southeast Asia, along with the U.S., India, and Australia, played an important role in this new approach to foreign policy. As a result, the pacifist dimension of the Fukuda Doctrine ceased to be emphasized to the same extent as earlier. It is interesting to note that Southeast Asia was not the main point of interest for the first Abe administration in 2006–​2007. In his bestseller Towards a Beautiful Country, published in 2006, Abe only briefly mentioned ASEAN when appealing for the promotion of economic partnership agreements with the countries from the region.347 Instead, he placed greater emphasis on resolving the North Korean issue and making a breakthrough in relations with China, which he visited in October 2006, soon after forming a government. Southeast Asia played a more pronounced role in the foreign policy vision of

347 Abe, Shinzō: Utsukushii Kuni e [Towards a Beautiful Country]. Bungei Shunjū: Tokyo 2006, pp. 157–​160.

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Asō Tarō, who was foreign minister under the first Abe administration. The main components of the ‘Asō Doctrine’ were the concepts of ‘value-​oriented diplomacy,’ the ‘arc of freedom and prosperity,’ and the notion of Japan as a ‘thought leader.’ According to Asō, Japan should promote the universal values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and the free-​market economy in the geopolitical arc stretching from Southeast Asia up to Central and Eastern Europe. The Japanese foreign minister, who became prime minister in September 2008, appreciated the Fukuda Doctrine’s positive impact on ASEAN countries’ level of economic and social development. He perceived Tokyo’s role in the region as that of a ‘thought leader’ and ‘built-​in stabilizer.’ The former signified that Japan had much to offer to other Asian countries due to its successes in overcoming narrow nationalism, building a democratic political system, or being the first state in the region to resolve certain environmental problems. The latter term, in turn, referred to Tokyo’s long-​lasting contribution to economic and security stability in Asia through financial assistance.348 Nevertheless, Asō did not have enough time to fully elaborate his vision before the LDP lost power in August/​ September 2009. It is symptomatic that Abe chose Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia as the destinations of his first visit abroad after returning to power in December 2012. During his trip to the ASEAN countries in January 2013, the Japanese prime minister announced his ‘Five Principles to Build the Future,’ which became a foundation of the ‘Abe Doctrine’ toward Southeast Asia: 1) “protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this region where two oceans meet;” 2) “ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might;” 3) “pursuing free, open, interconnected economies as part of Japan’s diplomacy;” 4) “bringing about ever more fruitful intercultural ties among the peoples of Japan and this region;” 5) “promoting exchange among the younger generations who will carry our nations into the future.”349

348 Asō, Tarō: Totetsumonai Nihon [Incredible Japan]. Shinchōsha: Tokyo 2007, pp. 21–​ 34, 153–​171. 349 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy, Jakarta, 18 January 2013, retrieved 9.7.2017, from http://​ www.mofa.go.jp/​a nnounce/​pm/​abe/​abe_​0118e.html.

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Abe emphasized that, by promoting equal and peaceful dialogue with ASEAN, Japan had faithfully adhered to the principles of the Fukuda Doctrine. He mentioned the Southern Economic Corridor in the Mekong region as an example of Japan’s contribution to enhancing connectivity in Indochina. He also lauded the emergence of an economic middle class as well as progress in the fields of human rights, rule of law, and democracy in the ASEAN countries. In order to illustrate the development of the “heart-​to-​heart” relationship with Southeast Asia, Abe brought up the example of Ms. Suwarti, a young Indonesian who, soon after passing a difficult Japanese nursing license exam, participated with devotion in disaster relief activities following a large-​scale earthquake and tsunami in the Tōhoku region in March 2011. He also admitted that he was deeply moved by the Japanese song “Persevere, Japan, bloom proudly in the heart of the world like the cherry tree,” which was composed at that difficult time by Teater Enjuku in Jakarta. Abe stressed that it was through examples such as these that he could truly call the Indonesian people “Friends of the Heart.”350 Nevertheless, Abe emphasized that there was still a need for further development of mutual relations. One the one hand, he announced the continuation of previous projects, such as the Japan–​East Asia Network of Exchange for Students and Youths (JENESYS) program. More than 14,000 young people had visited Japan thanks to JENESYS since 2007, and 30,000 more were scheduled to come to Japan under the JENESYS 2.0 framework. On the other hand, Abe stressed that the time had come “to go side by side out into the world” in all spheres of cooperation. This new, strategic dimension of the two parties’ relationship implied joint activities on the broader international arena. The Japanese prime minister placed particular emphasis on the necessity of upholding the law of the sea. He welcomed the shift in United States’ focus to the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans and expressed hope that Japan would strengthen its ties with maritime initiatives in Asia. Abe underscored that both Japan and many ASEAN states derive their sustenance from the ocean and thus have a common interest in protecting the safety of the seas.351 Prime Minister Abe did not hide that Japan’s pursuit of strengthened cooperation with ASEAN was aimed at forming a common front against a rising China. His ‘Five Principles to Build the Future’ should be interpreted as a complementary instrument to Japan’s vision of ‘Asia’s democratic security diamond,’ announced by Abe in December 2012. The Japanese prime minister argued that

3 50 Ibid. 351 Ibid.

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Japan, India, Australia, and the U.S. state of Hawaii, who formed this geopolitical diamond, should “safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.”352 Abe warned: Peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Pacific Ocean are inseparable from peace, stability, and freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean. Developments affecting each are more closely connected than ever. Japan, as one of the oldest sea-​ faring democracies in Asia, should play a greater role in preserving the common good in both regions. Yet, increasingly, the South China Sea seems set to become a “Lake Beijing,” which analysts say will be to China what the Sea of Okhotsk was to Soviet Russia:  a sea deep enough for the People’s Liberation Army’s navy to base their nuclear-​powered attack submarines, capable of launching missiles with nuclear warheads. Soon, the PLA Navy’s newly built aircraft carrier will be a common sight –​more than sufficient to scare China’s neighbors.353

For Abe, the situation in the South China Sea was a sinister prognosis of what could happen in the East China Sea if the PRC grew strong enough to challenge Japan. He assumed the post of prime minister soon after a severe diplomatic crisis caused by the nationalization of three of the Senkaku Islands by the Noda government in September 2012. This uninhabited archipelago, situated northeast of Taiwan, is administered by Japan, but it has been disputed with China since abundant resources of gas and oil were discovered in its vicinity in the late 1960s. The dispute was shelved when the PRC entered on the path of economic reforms in 1978, but it re-​emerged in the 1990s. The territorial dispute in the East China Sea is only one of the dimensions of the broader Sino-​Japanese confrontation. The balance of power in East Asia changed dramatically at the beginning of the 21st century. When the Fukuda Doctrine was announced in 1977, China’s GDP constituted only a fraction of Japan’s, but by 2010, it had already exceeded it, and in 2016 it was more than two times larger (four times larger in terms of purchasing power parity). This abrupt rise in the PRC’s international position prompted Tokyo to search for counterweighing measures against Beijing. Some ASEAN states seemed to be ideal partners in opposing Chinese hegemony. Before the colonial period, Indochina belonged to a Sinocentric order, which raised fears that Beijing would

352 Abe, Shinzō: Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, retrieved 23.1.2015, from http://​w ww.project-​syndicate.org/​print/​ a-​strategic-​a lliance-​for-​japan-​a nd-​india-​by-​shinzo-​abe. 353 Abe: Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, Web.

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try to return to its traditional position as the Middle Kingdom. Resentment of the Chinese has been particularly strong in Vietnam due to historical issues and territorial disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands, but Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei also claim sovereignty over the latter archipelago. On the other hand, some of the ASEAN countries, such as Singapore, have been predominantly pro-​Chinese. Bureaucrats from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs tried to counterbalance China through ASEAN even before the Abe Doctrine was announced. Yachi Shōtarō, who was Administrative Vice-​Minister for Foreign Affairs from 2005 to 2008, admitted that he felt uneasy about China’s dominant position during the meetings of ASEAN+3. Because only Japan was powerful enough to speak with the PRC on equal footing in that group, other members often expected Tokyo to represent their interests in talks with Beijing. In order to dilute China’s supremacy, Japan proposed the formation of the East Asia Summit, with the additional participation of India, Australia, and New Zealand; the Summit was launched in 2005.354 Another influential MOFA bureaucrat, Kanehara Nobukatsu, stressed that Japan needed to shift its foreign policy from the pacifist idealism of the 20th century to the realistic approach of the 21st century. He warned against the threat of the “Finlandization” of ASEAN states and other countries in the vicinity of a rising China. He also emphasized that a strong alliance with the U.S. offered the best guarantee of security in the region. After all, China conquered the Paracel Islands in 1974, which was causally linked to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. Similarly, it intensified its occupation of the Spratly Islands not long after the liquidation of the U.S. military base in the Philippines in 1992.355 In December 2013, the Abe administration announced a National Security Strategy that included the concept of ‘Proactive Contribution to Peace’ (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi). It was aimed at enhancing Japan’s deterrence capabilities, strengthening its alliance with the U.S., and improving stability on a global level, based on universal values. The strategy underscored that ASEAN was situated in an area crisscrossed by sea lanes that were critical for Japan’s security. Due to the importance of the Southeast Asian countries’ active 354 Yachi, Shōtarō /​Takahashi, Masayuki: Gaikō no Senryaku to Kokorozashi. Zen Gaimu Jimujikan Yachi Shōtarō wa Kataru [Strategy and Ambition in Diplomacy: Narrated by Former Foreign Administrative Vice Minister Yachi Shōtarō]. Sankei Shinbun Shuppan: Tokyo 2009, pp. 146–​147. 355 Kanehara, Nobukatsu: Senryaku Gaikō Genron [A Grand Strategy of Japan for the 21st Century]. Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha: Tokyo 2011, pp. 50–​57, 240–​241.

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engagement for prosperity, peace, and stability in the region, Tokyo promised to “provide further assistance to their efforts toward maintaining and strengthening the unity of ASEAN.”356 In order to achieve this aim, the Abe administration implemented profound changes in Japan’s security policy. In July 2014, the government passed a cabinet decision that revised its interpretation of the Constitution to allow participation in collective self-​defense initiatives. The new regulation was confirmed by a set of security bills passed in the Diet in the summer of 2015. Even earlier, in April 2015, Japan announced new guidelines for its alliance with the U.S. While they did not refer explicitly to cooperation regarding crisis situations in Southeast Asia, they lifted the geographical limitation that had been included in the previous 1997 guidelines. The new version claimed: The Self-​Defense Forces will conduct appropriate operations involving the use of force to respond to situations where an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result, threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to overturn fundamentally its people’s right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, to ensure Japan’s survival, and to protect its people.357

One may surmise that the ASEAN states, whose security is closely linked to Japan’s, would fall within the scope of U.S.–​Japanese military assistance in case of an attack by a third country such as China. In fact, under the Abe administration, Tokyo lifted the legal constraints on establishing genuine military cooperation with some of Southeast Asian countries for the first time. In April 2014, the government significantly relaxed the ban on arms exports that had been introduced in the 1960s and 1970s. The new Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology allowed arms export provided “the transfer contributes to active promotion of peace contribution [sic] and international cooperation” or “[the transfer contributes to] Japan’s security.”358 As the ban was lifted for communist regimes and countries that are likely to be involved in international conflicts, the new regulation enabled a strengthened security exchange with strategic partners from ASEAN 356 Cabinet Secretariat:  National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.cas.go.jp/​jp/​siryou/​131217anzenhoshou/​nss-​e.pdf. 357 Ministry of Defense:  The Guidelines for Japan-​U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mod.go.jp/​e/​d _​act/​a npo/​shishin_​ 20150427e.html. 358 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, April 6, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa. go.jp/​f p/​nsp/​page1we_​0 00083.html.

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such as Vietnam. Moreover, in February 2015, the government replaced the ODA Charter with the Development Cooperation Charter. While the new document confirmed that assistance should not be used for military purposes, it did not exclude the possibility of financing projects in which “the armed forces or members of the armed forces in recipient countries are involved in development cooperation for non-​military purposes such as public welfare or disaster-​ relief purposes.”359 This change made it possible to strategically use ODA to bolster the defense capabilities of Japan’s potential allies. Regarding Southeast Asia, the Charter stated that “Japan will support the establishment of the ASEAN Community as well as the comprehensive and sustained development of ASEAN as a whole.”360 The new regulations facilitated cooperation in the security field with the ASEAN states. Anticipating the transformation of the ODA Charter, during his visit to the Philippines in July 2013, Abe promised to equip the Philippine Coast Guard with ten patrol vessels. A contract on shipbuilding was signed two years later by the Japan Marine United Corporation. Furthermore, in June 2015, Japanese Maritime Self-​Defense Force P-​3C surveillance aircraft participated in joint drills with the Philippine Navy off the coast of Palawan Island near the disputed Spratly archipelago.361 The close relationship with the Philippines was maintained, even when the relatively pro-​Chinese Rodrigo Duterte assumed the post of president of that country in June 2016. During ASEAN-​related summits in Vientiane in September 2016, the Japanese prime minister announced his decision to provide the Philippines with two additional large patrol ships through a yen loan, lease the Maritime Self-​Defense Force’s TC-​90 training aircraft to the Philippines, and assist in training Philippine Navy pilots. Regarding the South China Sea issue, Abe stressed that the dispute should be resolved peacefully based on the ruling of the arbitral tribunal between the Philippines and China. He also expressed his intention to contribute to Mindanao’s peace process through the Agribusiness Promotion Program for Mindanao.362 359 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, February 10, 2015, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa. go.jp/​fi les/​0 00067701.pdf, pp. 10–​11. 360 Ibid., p. 7. 361 Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu: Abe Kantei vs. Shū Kinpei. Gekika Suru Nicchū Gaikō Sensō [Abe’s Residence vs. Xi Jinping: The Intensifying Sino-​Japanese Diplomatic War]. Shinchōsha: Tokyo 2015, pp. 78–​80. 362 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-​Philippines Summit Meeting, September 6, 2016, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea2/​ph/​page3e_​ 000568.html.

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Moreover, when President Duterte visited Japan in his capacity as ASEAN chairperson in January 2017, Abe announced an agreement for the provision of small speed boats to the Philippine Coast Guard.363 In parallel, the Abe administration developed the country’s security cooperation with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. At the Japan–​ASEAN summit in Tokyo in December 2013, Prime Minister Abe started negotiations with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Tan Dung, concerning the transfer of six used patrol vessels, free of charge. The procedures were finalized during Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio’s visit to Hanoi in August 2014.364 Moreover, when President Truong Tan Sang visited Tokyo in March 2014, Abe expressed his intention to elevate bilateral relations to a higher level, which he called “Extensive Strategic Partnership.”365 One of the signs that contacts were being extended in the security sphere between Tokyo and Vietnam was Abe’s decision to provide six new patrol ships to Vietnamese maritime law enforcement entities, announced during the Japanese prime minister’s visit to Hanoi in January 2017.366 While security cooperation was conducted mainly between Japan and individual Southeast Asian countries, Japan placed emphasis on developing its relationship with ASEAN as a whole as well. In 2013, both sides celebrated the 40th anniversary of mutual contacts by carrying out a wide range of exchange projects in such fields as economic affairs, political dialogue, culture, youth, and tourism.367 At the ASEAN–​Japan Commemorative Summit in Tokyo in December 2013, both sides announced the Vision Statement on ASEAN–​Japan Friendship and Cooperation, subtitled “Shared Vision, Shared Identity, Shared Future.” The Implementation Plan of the Vision enumerated 12 kinds of joint activities in the area of peace and stability, 26 toward increasing

363 Id.: Japan-​Philippines Summit Meeting, January 12, 2017, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea2/​ph/​page3e_​0 00646.html. 364 Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu, p. 81. 365 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-​Viet Nam Summit Meeting, March 18, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea1/​v n/​page3e_​0 00163. html. 366 Id.: Japan-​Viet Nam Summit Meeting, January 16, 2017, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea1/​v n/​page4e_​0 00577.html. 367 Id.: 40th Year of ASEAN-​Japan Friendship and Cooperation, May 7, 2014, retrieved 20.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​region/​asia-​paci/​asean/​relation/​ja40/​index. html.

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prosperity, 24 aimed at improving quality of life, and 9 in conducting “heart-​ to-​heart exchange.”368 During the 17th Japan–​ASEAN Summit Meeting, held in Naypyidaw, Myanmar in November 2014, both sides signed the ASEAN–​Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat Terrorism and Transnational Crime.369 Moreover, since 2012, Tokyo has participated in difficult negotiations on the creation of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) between ASEAN and its free trade agreement partners (besides Japan: Australia, China, India, South Korea, and New Zealand). The RCEP may be an alternative to the Trans-​Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement that was signed in February 2016, but did not enter into force in its original form due to the shift in U.S. policy under the Trump administration. All the initiatives mentioned above attest to the differences between the Fukuda Doctrine and the Abe Doctrine. While the former placed particular emphasis on the promise that Japan would never again become a military power, the latter is aimed at strengthening Japan’s deterrence capabilities vis-​à-​ vis China. Tokyo has not only stopped rejecting ASEAN countries’ requests for the institutionalization of military exchange but also started eagerly promoting joint security endeavors.

Conclusions Japan’s relationship with ASEAN has played an exceptional role in the country’s postwar foreign policy. It is toward this region that Tokyo formulated its first coherent international strategy during the Cold War. While the Fukuda Doctrine only summarized the principles that had already been present in Japanese diplomacy, it indicated Japan’s rising ambition to play the role of a leader in East Asia. Similarly, the inauguration of the “Five Principles to Build the Future” by Prime Minister Abe demonstrated his intention to actively participate in the process of forming the rules of the international order in the region.

368 ASEAN: Implementation Plan of the Vision Statement on ASEAN-​Japan Friendship and Cooperation:  Shared Vision, Shared Identity, Shared Future, December 14, 2013, retrieved 20.7.2017, from http://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​images/​2013/​ resources/​4 0thASEAN-​Japan/​fi nalimplementation%20plan%20for%20the%20 vision%20statement.pdf. 369 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: 17th Japan-​ASEAN Summit Meeting, November 12, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​a _​o/​r p/​page3e_​0 00260. html.

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Nevertheless, the two ‘doctrines’ were formulated under different circumstances. It was the end of the Vietnam War and Japan’s rising international position that prompted Tokyo to try to fill the political vacuum that emerged after the withdrawal of American forces from Indochina in 1975. In order to overcome anti-​Japanese sentiments in Southeast Asia, Tokyo promised to never again become a military power as well as to contribute toward stability and prosperity in the region. The formulation of the Abe Doctrine in 2013, in turn, was a response to the gradual loss of Japan’s economic and military advantage over a rising China. While the “Five Principles to Build the Future” stressed the need to strengthen exchanges with ASEAN in all spheres to the same extent as the Fukuda Doctrine, instead of reassuring the Southeast Asian countries that Japan would not return to militaristic policies, they focused on promoting bilateral security cooperation. As such, they are geared more toward reacting to common threats than toward developing a “heart-​to-​heart” relationship.

Acknowledgements This article is the result of research conducted as part of the project “Evolution of the Core Executive under Prime Minister Abe’s Government in Japan,” financed by the National Science Centre, Poland (DEC-​2016/​23/​B/​HS5/​00059). In 2017, the author received the prize of the University of Lodz Foundation.

References Abe, Shintarō:  Nihon Gaikō no Shishin [Guidelines of Japan’s Diplomacy]. Shintarōkai: Tokyo 1984. Abe, Shinzō: Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond, Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, retrieved 23.1.2015, from http://​w ww.project-​syndicate.org/​print/​ a-​strategic-​a lliance-​for-​japan-​and-​india-​by-​shinzo-​abe. Abe, Shinzō:  Utsukushii Kuni e [Towards a Beautiful Country]. Bungei Shunjū: Tokyo 2006. ASEAN: Implementation Plan of the Vision Statement on ASEAN-​Japan Friendship and Cooperation: Shared Vision, Shared Identity, Shared Future, December 14, 2013, retrieved 20.7.2017, from http://​asean.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​ images/​ 2 013/​ r esources/​ 4 0thASEAN-​ J apan/​ f inalimplementation%20 plan%20for%20the%20vision%20statement.pdf. ASEAN Secretariat: Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN: For a Broader and Deeper Partnership by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, January 14, 1997, retrieved on 21.7.2017, from http://​worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/​documents/​ texts/​asean/​19970114.S1E.html.

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Asō, Tarō: Totetsumonai Nihon [Incredible Japan]. Shinchōsha: Tokyo 2007. Cabinet Secretariat:  National Security Strategy, December 17, 2013, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.cas.go.jp/​jp/​siryou/​131217anzenhoshou/​nss-​e.pdf. Haddad, William W.: “Japan, the Fukuda Doctrine, and ASEAN.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 2(1), 1980, pp. 10–​29. Hellmann, Donald C.: “Japan and Southeast Asia: Continuity Amidst Change.” Asian Survey 19(12), 1979, pp. 1189–​1198. Kanehara, Nobukatsu: Senryaku Gaikō Genron [A Grand Strategy of Japan for the 21st Century]. Nihon Keizai Shinbun Shuppansha: Tokyo 2011. Khamchoo, Chaiwat: “Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Security: ‘Plus ca Change ...’.” Pacific Affairs 64(1), 1991, pp. 7–​22. Kuriyama, Takakazu:  Sengo Nihon Gaikō. Kiseki to Kadai [Foreign Policy of Postwar Japan: Trajectories and Issues]. Iwanami Shoten: Tokyo 2016. Lam, Peng Er:  “The Fukuda Doctrine. Origins, Ideas, and Praxis.” In:  Lam Peng Er (ed.):  Japan’s Relations with Southeast Asia:  The Fukuda Doctrine and Beyond. Routledge: London and New York 2013. Ministry of Defense: The Guidelines for Japan-​U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mod.go.jp/​e/​d _​act/​anpo/​ shishin_​20150427e.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Relationship between Japan and ASEAN, December 1998, retrieved 21.7.2017, from:  http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​region/​ asia-​paci/​asean/​pmv9812/​relation.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  The Bounty of the Open Seas:  Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy, Jakarta, January 18, 2013, retrieved 9.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​announce/​pm/​abe/​abe_​0118e.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-​Viet Nam Summit Meeting, March 18, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea1/​v n/​ page3e_​000163.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, April 6, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​ www.mofa.go.jp/​f p/​nsp/​page1we_​000083.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: 40th Year of ASEAN-​Japan Friendship and Cooperation, May 7, 2014, retrieved 20.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​ region/​asia-​paci/​asean/​relation/​ja40/​index.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  17th Japan-​ASEAN Summit Meeting, November 12, 2014, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​a _​o/​rp/​ page3e_​000260.html.

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, February 10, 2015, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​ www.mofa.go.jp/​fi les/​000067701.pdf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-​Philippines Summit Meeting, September 6, 2016, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea2/​ ph/​page3e_​000568.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan:  Japan-​ Philippines Summit Meeting, January 12, 2017, retrieved 18.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea2/​ ph/​page3e_​000646.html. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: Japan-​Viet Nam Summit Meeting, January 16, 2017, retrieved 19.7.2017, from http://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​s _​sa/​sea1/​v n/​ page4e_​000577.html. Singh, Bhubhindar: “ASEAN’s Perceptions of Japan: Change and Continuity.” Asian Survey 42(2), 2002, pp. 276–​296. Sueo, Sudo:  “Japan–​ASEAN Relations:  New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy.” Asian Survey 28(5), 1988, pp. 509–​525. Yachi, Shōtarō /​Takahashi, Masayuki:  Gaikō no Senryaku to Kokorozashi. Zen Gaimu Jimujikan Yachi Shōtarō wa Kataru [Strategy and Ambition in Diplomacy:  Narrated by Former Foreign Administrative Vice Minister Yachi Shōtarō]. Sankei Shinbun Shuppan: Tokyo 2009. Yomiuri Shinbun Seijibu:  Abe Kantei vs. Shū Kinpei. Gekika Suru Nicchū Gaikō Sensō [Abe’s Residence vs. Xi Jinping: The Intensifying Sino-​Japanese Diplomatic War]. Shinchōsha: Tokyo 2015. * Karol Żakowski, PhD and habilitation in political science, is an Associate Professor at the Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz. His research focuses on decision-​ making process and the foreign policy of Japan. His recent books include Decision-​Making Reform in Japan:  The DPJ’s Failed Attempt at a Politician-​ Led Government (Routledge, London  –​New  York 2015)  and Japan’s Foreign Policy Making:  Central Government Reforms, Decision-​ Making Processes, and Diplomacy (co-​authors:  Beata Bochorodycz and Marcin Socha, Springer, Cham 2018).

Jessica C. Liao https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​8691-​3163

Confronting China’s and the United States’ ASEAN Policies Abstract This chapter shows how ASEAN states have responded to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the United States’ Indo-​Pacific Strategy. It shows that while individual ASEAN states have adopted somewhat different strategies to China’s Southeast Asia policy under BRI, their calculation and policy choices share a trait commonly recognized as hedging, aiming at maximizing benefits and minimizing risks amid the escalating great power competition. It also shows the mismatch between ASEAN’s response to BRI and Washington’s Southeast Asia policy, and explains how Washington since the Trump administration has adopted a policy that is pushing ASEAN states away from the sphere of American influence. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the future of U.S.-​ASEAN relations. Key words: ASEAN, BRI, China, hedging, U.S. Indo-​Pacific Strategy

Since its launching in 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has morphed into China’s premier policy framework, both domestically and internationally. China’s top economic planning agency, the National Development and Reform Commission, released its first BRI action plan in 2015, and it has since updated and expanded BRI’s geographic and financial scope. In 2017, during the 19th National Party Congress, promotion of BRI was formally adopted into the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) constitution. In these official documents, BRI envisions an overarching infrastructure plan that links China with over sixty countries in Europe, Africa, and Asia at a cost of nearly $8 trillion. Given its strategic implications  –​which some compare to those of the Marshall Plan  –​BRI has provoked a wave of China-​threat sentiments in Washington, with some calling it Beijing’s game changer, and others urging policymakers to aggressively counter BRI-​engendered strategic and security challenges.370 370 For a related discussion, see the testimony of Ashley Tellis, senior fellow of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, before the United States Senate Armed Services Committee, April 25, 2017, and the testimony of Matthew Goodman, senior advisor for Asian economics of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, before the

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Along similar lines, a discourse has recently emerged to characterize BRI as ‘debt trap’ diplomacy. Namely, Beijing extends credits at a level beyond debtor countries’ ability to repay with the “malign” intent of extracting economic and political concessions. However, these discussions have obstructed Washington’s understanding of how countries that Beijing aims to woo perceive BRI, and they fail to realize that countries in Southeast Asia fit this profile. This chapter shows how ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) has responded to BRI in a way that is more complex than what the mainstream view in Washington suggests. The chapter comprises three parts. It begins with an introduction of China’s Southeast Asia policy, explaining how China’s economic diplomacy in the region has evolved from the ‘Go Out’ phase in the 2000s to the BRI phase in the 2010s. The second part discusses ASEAN’s response to China throughout the two phases at both the multilateral and bilateral levels. It shows that, while different ASEAN states had adopted somewhat different response strategies to China’s economic diplomacy, their calculation and policy choices share a trait commonly characterized as hedging, aiming at maximizing benefits and minimizing risks. It then explains ASEAN’s hedging behavior in the face of BRI and how foreign relations and domestic factors have affected this hedging logic in the case of individual ASEAN states. The third part discusses the mismatch between ASEAN’s response to BRI and Washington’s Southeast Asia policy. It shows how Washington has neglected ASEAN’s hedging position and its associated intents, and how Washington since the Trump administration has adopted a policy that is pushing ASEAN states away from the sphere of American influence. This chapter concludes with a discussion on the future of U.S.-​ASEAN relations.

China’s economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia: From “Go Out” to BRI To discuss how BRI shapes China-​ASEAN relations, one must first understand China’s Southeast Asia policy under the precursor of BRI. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Beijing embarked on a campaign-​style policy known as ‘Go U.S.-​China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 31, 2016. Nadège, Rolland: “China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-​Changer?” The Washington Quarterly 40(1): p. 136; Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby: “China’s Great Game: Road to a New Empire.” Financial Times, 2015. Retrieved 11.10.2019, from https://​w ww.ft.com/​content/​6e098274-​587a-​11e5-​a 28b-​50226830d644.

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Out,’ aiming to promote China’s global influence in both economic and strategic terms. Since then, economic policy has become integral to China’s foreign policy, particularly with respect to developing countries. In Southeast Asia in particular, the Go Out policy was closely tied to China’s regional policy, known as the Good Neighbor policy. Beginning at the first ASEAN Plus Three Summit in 1997, China and ASEAN vowed to develop a friendly relationship through striving for comprehensive and multi-​faceted cooperation. The linkage of the Go Out and Good Neighbor policies made Beijing increasingly rely on economic instruments, such as foreign aid, foreign financing, and outbound investments, to achieve its Southeast Asia policy objective.371 Following the 2008–​2009 global financial crisis –​during which Beijing injected a $600 billion stimulus package into its economy, including Chinese banks and companies that sought overseas business expansion –​China’s economic diplomacy intensified, and Chinese firms’ footprints expanded rapidly in Southeast Asia, particularly in the resource extraction and infrastructure sectors.372 However, Beijing’s stimulus package caused over-​supply problems in China, which from 2011 onward became severe and caused immense pressure on the growth of the Chinese economy. Meanwhile, resurging maritime territorial conflicts prompted neighboring countries as well as the United States to take increasingly balancing postures against China. The Chinese Communist Party (CPP), in turn, reassessed its strategic environment and foreign policy goals as it prepared for the transition to the fifth generation of leadership.373 In 2013, the newly inaugurated president Xi Jinping unveiled BRI as China’s grand strategy and premier foreign policy framework. At many levels, BRI is a continuation of the decade-​long Go Out policy, but it carries two distinct traits. The first trait is that, compared to Go Out, Beijing made a massive financial commitment to BRI, with a primary focus on big-​ticket infrastructure projects. The second trait is the enmeshment of economic and strategic considerations in the panorama

371 Wang, Gungwu: “China and Southeast Asia: The Context of a New Beginning.” In: David Shambaugh (ed.): Power Shift. China and Asia’s New Dynamics, University of California Press: Berkeley 2005. pp. 187–​204. Luo, Yadong et al.: “How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: experience from China.” Journal of World Business 45(1) (2010), pp. 68–​79. 372 Liao, Jessica C.: “A Good Neighbor of Bad Governance? China’s Energy and Mining Development in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Contemporary China 28(118), 2019, pp. 575–​591. 373 Wang, Yong: “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” The Pacific Review 29(3), 2016, pp. 455–​463.

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of national interests in those projects.374 As a result, BRI envisions a grand strategy-​like development plan, with a web of trade routes linking China with more than sixty countries across Eurasia through infrastructure, commercial, and other development projects, at a cost of nearly $8 trillion. Southeast Asia as a region is charted into three routes in the envisioned BRI map. The first of these is the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Plan, which aims at connecting ports and cities of the Chinese provinces of Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. The Philippines was added after Rodrigo Duterte became president and showed interest in participating. The proposed projects covered both infrastructure and commercial development, such as seaport construction/​renovation and the creation of special economic zones. Second, the China-​Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor aims to be a modern commercial and transport network between China and Mainland Southeast Asia. It includes the Pan-​Asian Rail Network, wherein all three rail lines, totaling 15,000 kilometers, would connect Kunming—​t he capital of China’s Yunnan Province—​w ith all countries of mainland Southeast Asia. Finally, the Bangladesh-​China-​India-​Myanmar Economic Corridor would be a comprehensive transport system, including rails, roads, and waterways linking Yunnan with participating countries. BRI has continued to emphasize development in various sectors prioritized during the Go Out policy, such as power supply in Indonesia, Vietnam, Laos, the Philippines, and Myanmar; mining and other resource extraction in Indonesia and the Philippines; manufacturing in Cambodia, Myanmar, and Malaysia; and telecommunications in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar. To realize these plans, China—​and others in the broader BRI map—​launched a new multilateral development bank: the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), with a stated base asset worth $10 billion. In addition, China has pledged another $40 billion to the Silk Road Fund, aimed at aggregating public-​private partnerships for BRI projects. Further, the China-​ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund, funded in 2012, was expanded with pledged funding totaling $3 billion to foster maritime cooperation with ASEAN states. Through BRI, Beijing vowed to expand China-​ASEAN economic integration and boost the region’s economic prosperity. Nonetheless, the BRI plans, while undergirded by economic logic, also reflect Beijing’s strategic reckoning.375 In Southeast Asia, the 21st Century Maritime 374 Beeson, Mark: “Geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics: the BRI and China’s evolving grand strategy.” Economic and Political Studies 6(3), 2018, pp. 240–​256. 375 For more discussion, see Rolland.

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Silk Road may prove especially helpful in developing and renovating ports and upgrading Southeast Asia’s maritime logistics capacity, but the plan—​often compared to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s ‘String of Pearls’—​may also advance China’s strategic maritime superiority in the region and beyond while enhancing China’s energy security. Likewise, the Pan-​Asian Rail Links and the development of the Bangladesh-​ China-​ India-​ Myanmar Economic Corridor may help countries in South and Southeast Asia acquire a much-​ needed modern land transportation system. But to China, they may stimulate growth and improve stability in poor provinces in Southwest China, including Tibet. Moreover, the Links may build a ‘land bridge’ between China’s landlocked provinces and its maritime neighboring countries, which may arguably strengthen China’s capacity in warfare logistics as well. It is important to note that both the Go Out and BRI policies were launched against the backdrop of increased tensions between China and its neighboring countries over maritime territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas. After the clash with the Philippines over the Spratly islands in 1994, China adhered to Deng Xiaoping’s dictum, “hide your strength, bide your time.” It softened its stance on the dispute through undertakings such as joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and signing the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), and later the Declaration on the Conduct (DOC) of Parties in the South China Sea (SCS). A reconciliatory posture on the SCS dispute was an essential part of China’s Good Neighbor policy toward Southeast Asia.376 However, unlike a decade ago, China showed increased assertiveness over its territorial claims in the late 2000s, due in part to its enhanced naval capacity and increased fishing activities in the disputed waters, as well as the self-​confidence derived from its newfound status as the region’s new power following its quick recovery from the 2008 global financial crisis. Specifically, China began openly challenging mainstream understandings of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and asserting an ambiguous claim based on the Nine-​ Dash Lines. It also demanded that other claimants must get its permission for conducting economic activities in the portions of their exclusive economic zones (EEZs) that overlapped with the EEZs claimed by China. Chinese vessel patrols in the SCS expanded and intensified, leading to increased occurrence of incidents, including harassment of U.S. surveillance ships, and intervention with Southeast Asian countries’ oil exploration and fishing activities in the

376 Shambaugh, David:  “China Engages Asia:  Reshaping the Regional Order.” International Security 29(3), 2004/​2005, pp. 64–​99.

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SCS. This new assertiveness has persisted, if not intensified, since Xi Jinping came into power and launched BRI in 2013. Since then, China has actively reclaimed and militarized islets in the Spratly and Paracel groups. While this development is far from being sufficient to compete in full-​blown warfare with the United States, the region’s military superpower, China is increasingly gaining military superiority and de facto control over the SCS.377 In 2013, China established the fully armed China Coast Guard, which was then transferred from civilian to military authority, and in 2016, it dismissed an international tribunal’s ruling that backed the Philippines and rejected China’s SCS claims. China subsequently sought cooperation by reaching out to ASEAN to reopen negotiations on the SCS code of conduct (CDC). While a general framework on the CDC was reached, it continued to lack binding force and, under China’s insistence, did not mention the duty of state parties to UNCLOS to comply with the tribunal’s ruling. During this time, China did not back down from its Nine-​Dash Lines claim, naval exercises in SCS, or reclaiming and militarizing the SCS islets.

ASEAN’s response: pragmatism, economic hedging, and domestic factors At the turn of the 21st century, Southeast Asia as a region began witnessing a power shift caused by decreased U.S. hegemony and rising Chinese economic and military power. This change, coupled with territorial disputes, historical complexity, and power asymmetry vis-​à-​v is their giant northern neighbor, have perplexed Southeast Asian countries. Nonetheless, these countries also see opportunities to capitalize on the China boom in helping their own economic development while at the same time fostering a cooperative China through such economic relations. As such, they formulate their China policies through a strategy commonly known as ‘hedging.’ Hedging, according to ASEAN expert Evelyn Goh, means to “cultivate a middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side at the obvious expense of another.”378 Goh further explains the hedging strategy comprises three policy elements: economically, politically, 377 Benedicter, Roland /​Notwotny, Verena: China’s Road Ahead: Problems, Questions, and Perspectives. Spring: New York and Heidelberg, p. 80. 378 Goh, Evelyn: “Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies.” Policy Studies 16, 2015, p. 3, retrieved 12.12.2019, from https://​ www.jstor.org/​stable/​pdf/​resrep06541.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad65001880d9e34 9649639588ebc5e8b4.

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and strategically engaging China for socializing its international behavior; ‘enmeshing’ other powers into regional affairs in order to create interlocking interests toward regional stability; and ‘soft’ balancing via establishing security cooperation with regional great powers, particularly the United States, all as contingencies against China’s military aggression.379 Nonetheless, Southeast Asia as a region consists of many countries, of which none possesses particular influence. It is also a region of countries with heterogeneous interests, a contentious history, and conflicts among each other. Through the multilateral platform of ASEAN, Southeast Asian countries have succeeded in building collective action, such as by mitigating intramural conflicts and securing their sovereignty during the Cold War or by gaining foreign policy leverage in the post-​Cold War age. However, given the region’s characteristics, ASEAN as a political entity has been far from effective and its foreign policy—​ known as the ‘ASEAN way’—​has been based upon the lowest common denominator among member states.380 In the same vein, individual Southeast Asian countries may adopt their own foreign policies that differ from, if not outright contradict, the stance represented by ASEAN. How Southeast Asian countries interpret and practice the ‘hedging’ rule may vary widely, depending on how individual countries perceive the ‘China threat,’ and how they balance between economic and security interests when handling their China relations. As a result, in addition to fostering political ties with all major powers and building security partnerships with many of them through multilateral and bilateral channels, Southeast Asia in general has responded positively to China’s Go Out campaign. Since the 2002 ASEAN-​China Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, almost all ASEAN countries have signed bilateral economic cooperation agreements with China, with the latter pledging millions, or even billions of dollars in Chinese aid, loans, or investments in their economies. ASEAN and China also inked a bilateral investment agreement in 2009 and, a year later, created a $10 billion-​pledged joint investment fund in hopes of boosting Southeast Asia’s infrastructure development. Throughout the 2000s, economic exchanges between Southeast Asia and China exploded and the latter became the former’s largest trading partner. While not all of the pledged fund was put to use, the region has seen the rise of China-​backed development projects, particularly in the infrastructure and

3 79 Ibid. 380 Simon, Sheldon W. /​Ravenhill, John: “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing?.” Review of International Studies 35, 2009, pp. 215–​35.

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natural resource extraction sectors. Still, economic diplomacy did not quell the ‘China threat’ sentiment in Southeast Asia, especially in light of China’s new assertiveness over its maritime territories, as described above. Nonetheless, notable differences exist among ASEAN states in this regard. Countries that have ongoing territorial disputes with China, like the Philippines and Vietnam, have been cautious, if not reluctant, in accepting China’s ‘charm offensive.’ Countries that were poor and small and had no territorial disputes with China, like Cambodia and Laos, have embraced Chinese capital. Incongruity among the interests of Southeast Asian countries has prevented ASEAN from taking a stronger balancing posture against China, as exemplified by the 2012 ASEAN Summit fallout, where the members failed to agree on the South China Sea issue due to Cambodia’s siding with China. So, how have ASEAN states responded to China’s BRI plan? How do they perceive the economic opportunities as well as the strategic challenges that China has brought to the region since BRI? Two factors have influenced Southeast Asia’s calculation. The first is China’s new territorial activism over the SCS since the launch of BRI, which, as described previously, has provoked anxiety among ASEAN states, particularly the SCS claimants. The second, which this article argues is more pressing, is the economic reality. The 2008 global financial crisis struck Southeast Asian economies, which in the following year experienced the worst downturn since the 1997 Asian financial crisis. It also pushed the region closer to China’s economic orbit, as at this time China became Southeast Asia’s most important export market as well as a major creditor and investor. While the region’s economy rebounded in the immediate aftermath of the crisis, its recovery remained fragile and continued to require stimulation from major economies such as China. Moreover, since the late 1990s, Southeast Asia has suffered from a capital gap in its infrastructure sector. The need for an infrastructure upgrade was best illustrated by the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) estimate, according to which the region would need $26 trillion in infrastructure investment from 2016–​2030—​far more than the combined assets of the ADB and the World Bank.381 Considering these two accounts, in the early 2010s, almost all Southeast Asian governments launched major development plans, and at the multilateral level, they instigated a region-​w ide development agenda centered in infrastructure, namely the Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity. However, fundraising issues have slowed this plan, given the region’s political

381 Asian Development Bank. Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs. Mandaluyong: Asian Development Bank Press 2017.

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risks, weak regulatory environments, and bureaucratic bottlenecks. The issue was also worsened by the fact that western financiers—​ both private and public—​tightened their belts following the 2008 financial crisis while at the same time attaching additional environmental and social conditions to their lending practices.382 This situation made Chinese capital increasingly important to Southeast Asia’s infrastructural development. As such, Southeast Asian states have generally approached BRI with economic pragmatism and cooperation. At the 2014 ASEAN Summit, Southeast Asian officials made a unanimous remark in support of AIIB, the Silk Road Fund, and the expansion of the China-​ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund, emphasizing their concurrence with China’s call for more infrastructure investment in the region. All ASEAN states—​including the Philippines, after some initial reservations—​have joined AIIB as its founding members. Shortly after the BRI announcement, Thailand, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar agreed to the Chinese-​proposed high-​speed rail plans; Malaysia, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Brunei reached deals with Chinese state-​owned firms to renovate and develop seaports and industrial parks. Along with these deals, these countries and China also signed numerous agreements in the areas of mining, power supply, and manufacturing development, while Singapore, the region’s financial hub, vowed to position itself as a facilitator of BRI projects in the region. The effects of BRI have been most striking in Laos, Cambodia, and, to a less extent, Myanmar, as their economies have become largely dependent on Chinese trade, financing, and investment. Even Vietnam and the Philippines have adhered to the rule of economic pragmatism. After high tensions over a 2014 SCS incident, Hanoi made significant efforts toward restoring trade relations with China and reassuring Chinese investors. More dramatically, Filipino President Duterte, soon after taking office, downplayed the SCS dispute, praised Beijing as well as BRI, and signed a $24 billion investment agreement with Beijing in hopes to realize his ‘Build, Build, Build’ economic strategy. Nevertheless, ASEAN states have practiced economic cooperation with the hedging rule in mind at various degrees—​a strategy this article has called economic hedging. Economic hedging refers to a behavior in which a country aims to prevent itself from veering toward the economic influence of another country that poses security risks. This behavior stems from the former’s belief that the latter always maintains a willingness and ability to use economic coercion in

382 Moser, Helen: Barriers to Bankable Infrastructure: Incentivizing Private Investment to Fill the Global Infrastructure Gap. Rowman & Littlefield: New York 2016.

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pursuit of their interests.383 It comprises two types of policy actions, namely soft economic hedging through diversification and hard economic hedging through resistance. Diversification is essentially a part of ASEAN’s enmeshing strategy, as mentioned above, which is aimed at building the web of foreign economic relationships. Specifically, ASEAN states have welcomed BRI to the same extent as other infrastructure initiatives proposed by other major powers, particularly Japan. For decades, Japan was a major donor in Southeast Asia and the Japanese Official Development Assistance (ODA) was a staple of the region’s infrastructure development.384 Yet under the pressure of an economic bubble and recession, coupled with a foreign aid reform, Japanese ODA to the region fell sharply and became less infrastructure-​oriented in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s. Upon his return to power in 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe vowed to reverse this trend, as he made both ODA and ASEAN relations his policy priorities. Shortly after BRI’s launch, Japan announced a package comprising ¥13.2 trillion (approximately $110 billion) toward ‘quality infrastructure’ in Asia.385 In turn, ASEAN states actively expanded collaboration with Japan by developing a variety of megaprojects ranging from transportation to the power-​supply sector, prompting a surge of Japanese capital—​both ODA and investments—​ into the region. In 2016, Japan was the top foreign aid donor to Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Cambodia, and among the top three foreign direct investors in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.386 Interestingly, the act of economic diversification has guided ASEAN to include Japan—​which, under Prime Minister Abe, has actively sought strategic cooperation in the region—​as a part of their soft military balancing actions against China. This strategy is evident, as Japan has become increasingly active in recent

383 Jessica C.  Liao/​ Ngoc-​ Tram Dang:  “The nexus of security and economic hedging: Vietnam’s strategic response to Japan–​China infrastructure financing competition,” The Pacific Review, 23 April 2019, published online at https://​w ww. tandfonline.com/​doi/​f ull/​10.1080/​09512748.2019.1599997. 384 Trinidad, Dennis D.: “Japan’s ODA at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan’s Development Assistance to Southeast Asia.” Asian Perspective 31(2), 2007, pp. 95–​125. 385 Katada Saori /​Jessica Liao: “China and Japan in pursuit of Infrastructure Investment Leadership: Competition or Convergence?” Global Governance 26 (3), 2020. 386 Japan’s International Cooperation Agency: “The 2017 White Paper on Development Cooperation,” retrieved 10.05.2019, from https://​w ww.mofa.go.jp/​policy/​oda/​ page22e_​0 00860.html.

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ASEAN Regional Forums and Defense Ministers Meetings.387 At the bilateral level, almost all ASEAN states have recently strengthened their security cooperation with Japan, including enhanced exchanges between their high-​level defense officials. In particular, Vietnam and the Philippines have held joint naval exercises with Japan Self-​Defense Forces (SDF) and received Japan’s controversial military aid. Malaysia and Thailand also agreed to the transfer of military technology and training provided by SDF. Still, as Kuik explains, for ASEAN states, a big part of economic diversification is to maximize economic options and benefits.388 For example, Indonesian president Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo picked China over Japan to develop the Jakarta-​Bandung high-​speed rail for the former’s better contract offer but later granted Japan the Jakarta-​Surabaya rail project. Both China and Japan have contributed a significant amount of capital to Jokowi’s more than two hundred National Strategic Projects (NSPs). After locking in a lucrative deal with Beijing, Filipino President Duterte assured Tokyo of their strong bilateral ties and asked for more infrastructure assistance (and Abe, in response, dazzled Duterte with a ¥1 trillion—​approximately $8.7 billion—​aid package). The development of infrastructure partnerships has also become a new focal point at ASEAN summits and ministerial meetings with South Korea and the European Union (EU), which have also created similar infrastructure initiatives. Notably, this move toward diversification is a part of ASEAN’s enmeshing strategy and thus not bound to infrastructure collaboration. ASEAN states have also sought to build comprehensive economic relations with other countries in the region and beyond by signing trade and investment pacts, including the ongoing Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). A more explicit economic hedging action is resistance. On the multilateral front, SCS claimant states have held back from joining the China-​ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund due to the fear that it would weaken their sovereignty claims. Similarly, it was not until recently that ASEAN issued an official statement to deepen infrastructure collaboration with China, with the acknowledgement of BRI.389 More explicitly, certain ASEAN states have also resisted BRI projects deemed strategically salient. To name a few, in 2014, Vietnam 387 Yuzawa Takeshi: “From a Decentering to Recentering Imperative: Japan’s Approach to Asian Security Multilateralism.” The Pacific Review 31(4), 2018, pp. 460–​479. 388 Kuik, Cheng-​Chwee: “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment behavior toward China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25(100), 2016, pp. 500–​514. 389 ASEAN:  Joint Statement between ASEAN and China on Further Deepening the Cooperation on Infrastructure Connectivity, retrieved 12.12.2019, from

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awarded Japan a major thermal power project that was long under negotiations with China and recently cancelled the tender of the North-​South Expressway to prevent domination by Chinese bidders. In spite of the recent rapprochement with Beijing, Manila has been seeking options to prevent Chinese firms from taking over the bankrupted shipyard at the strategic Subic Bay. Strategic considerations have cast a shadow over the development of the China-​Myanmar high-​speed rail and the port of Kyaukpyu, both of which have been pending since the respective deals were signed. It is worth noting that ASEAN states’ resistance against BRI projects is determined not only by their relations with China but also by the public opinion on such relations in their respective societies. Put differently, political elites in each Southeast Asian country consider the political benefits a BRI project may produce, and such benefits may diminish, if not become a liability, when the public perceives a project as threatening to national security, sovereignty, or the national identity. Nationalism or anti-​Chinese sentiment have persisted in all three societies—​in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Myanmar. The above-​ mentioned decisions to pivot away from certain BRI projects are, in a sense, meant to quell public anxiety over China’s domination. This nationalism-​driven anxiety is also on the rise in Indonesia, where entrenched antipathy toward the Chinese ethnicity in society, religious fundamentalist movements, the influx of Chinese laborers, and increased tensions with China over the water north of Natuna Island have fueled sentiments against Chinese investment and complicated BRI projects in Indonesia, including the Jakarta-​Bandung high-​speed rail.390 Moreover, as Chinese banks hold lower standards in their lending assessments, BRI projects are prone to corruption, socio-​environmental problems, and other issues that may negatively affect public perception in the host countries. Public perception may worsen further as the governments of these countries accumulate BRI debt but fail to generate enough revenue, as shown in Sri Lanka, where the government handed the port of Hambantota over to a Chinese developer under a debt-​for-​equity swap. The shifting public perception has in part contributed to Malaysia’s reconsideration, or even cancellation, of several https://​ a sean.org/​ s torage/​ 2 017/​ 11/​ C hina-​ a nd-​ A SEAN-​ o n-​ C ooperation-​ Connectivity-​CN-​ASEAN_​adopted.pdf. 390 Charmila, Winda /​Ramadhani, Nurul: “Indonesian immigration office continues to hunt illegal foreign workers.” The Jakarta Post, 9.01.2017, retrieved 5.12.2019, from https://​w ww.thejakartapost.com/​news/​2017/​01/​09/​indonesian-​immigration-​office-​ continues-​to-​hunt-​i llegal-​foreign-​workers.html.

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BRI-​labeled projects, which were fraught with scandals related to former Prime Minister Najib Razak. In short, ASEAN states have deepened economic collaboration with China since BRI, but with a host of external and domestic factors at play, they reserve or resist this collaboration to various degrees.

From Obama to Trump: Shortcomings of the United States’ ASEAN policy Over the past two decades, the world—​and Asia in particular—​has witnessed a shift in the global order caused by the United States’ reduced power and China’s concurrent rise. This change became salient in 2009, when the United States confronted the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression, combined with an unprecedented debt burden resulting largely from protracted wars in the Middle East. That same year, China became Asia’s largest export market as well as the world’s largest exporter and second largest economy. Nonetheless, the United States remained the de facto military hegemon and the sole provider of security to Asian states in the event of armed conflicts—​most likely with China given its involvement with the region’s most contentious territorial disputes. Yet in light of China’s rapid military buildup, the extent of the U.S.  security commitment is largely unknown. Asia’s regional order, as international relations theorist John Ikenberry observes, is increasingly taking shape along the lines traced by this ‘dual hierarchy,’ with the economic one centered on China and the security one centered on the United States. Given this emerging dynamic, Washington has been grappling with its fluctuating leadership role in Asia, including Southeast Asia. However, voluntarily or involuntarily, Washington has made policy that lacks proper recognition of Southeast Asian states’ interests in this dual hierarchy, making it hard to achieve its policy goals. The problem has manifested itself in both the Obama and Trump administrations—​and in different ways, as a result of the differences in their respective Asia policies. Upon assuming office, Barack Obama attempted to change the thrust of American foreign policy to reflect the new world order, which he saw (perhaps due to his family background in Hawaii and, briefly, Indonesia) was gravitating toward Asia-​Pacific due to its rising influence in the world economy. Obama attempted to achieve this using both liberal and realist means. Unlike his predecessor, Obama showed less interest in a unilateral foreign policy, especially with regard to promotion of democracy. He also vowed to seek ‘common interests’ on a host of issues by engaging and cooperating with America’s security allies and partners as well as major players in Asia. However, in reality, solving the financial crisis and the wars in the Middle East remained

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most critical to Obama during his first term, which not only limited his policy preferences but also made China indispensable for delivering a new policy. His 2009 visit to Beijing—​often referred to as the G2 Summit, where Obama sought to bring China on board to solve major global issues, particularly the financial crisis—​demonstrated the importance of China. However, prioritizing good relations with China, together with other issues within and beyond the region, made Southeast Asia less of a priority for the United States. Granted, the region’s lower priority was no different from Washington’s longstanding Asia policy since the Vietnam war. Still, this tendency allowed China to deepen its influence in Southeast Asia. As mentioned earlier, in 2008–​09, China—​either as an export market or capital provider—​ became especially critical to Southeast Asia; meanwhile, Beijing actively expanded the Go Out campaign and initiated dozens of multilateral economic arrangements with ASEAN states. It is true that Obama made certain efforts to lead or engage. For example, his Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, called upon Asian states to forge a pan-​Asian institution based upon the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, which had nonetheless received lukewarm responses given its failure in tackling the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The United States signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and pledged to organize frequent official visits to the region, including routine attendance of ARF meetings. Still, China’s military buildup and encroachment over the disputed maritime territories remained the major issues of concern for Southeast Asian states. In turn, the United States unveiled the policy of ‘pivoting’ or ‘rebalancing’ to Asia, prescribing both an expansion of military and diplomatic presence in the region, and the creation of a U.S.-​centric trade bloc under the Trans-​Pacific Partnership (TPP). Nonetheless, a ‘rebalancing’ policy faced two challenges in Southeast Asia:  the region’s heterogeneity and its preference toward a hedging posture in foreign policy. Specifically, Vietnam and the Philippines (under the Aquino presidency) had a rather positive outlook on enhancing military collaboration with the United States. Others, like Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, while reassured, felt uneasy about the China-​containment connotation inherent in this policy, especially considering Secretary Clinton’s remarks on U.S. national interests in the South China Sea. Still others with strong economic ties to China, including Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, showed little interest. In addition, the Obama administration’s frosty relations with the Thai military government and Najib’s Malaysia added another barrier to the intended goal of engaging the region. Deeper challenges still came from the United States itself. Continued resource constraints and

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troubles in other regions, coupled with domestic political opposition, made it difficult for Obama to deliver a policy to compete with China’s expanded economic statecraft in the region. This constraint, along with the country’s waning global influence, was on full display in the United States’ response to China’s BRI announcement, which was commonly interpreted in Washington as China’s strategic counteraction to the ‘rebalancing’ policy. The Obama administration, which fully endorsed this view, was wary about BRI’s strategic impact and cautioned its allies, security partners, and others to refrain from engaging with it. As part of their hedging maneuvering, all ASEAN states eventually joined AIIB and, as previously illustrated, expanded collaboration with China in infrastructure development and other sectors. In contrast, after the completion of negotiations, Obama’s signature economic statecraft strategy, TPP, suffered a congressional setback and unpopularity among the American public under the anti-​g lobalization trend, which in turn brought Donald Trump into the presidency. China continued to be the focal point of the Trump administration’s Asia policy, which underwent a sea change from the Obama era. Before entering office, Trump already expressed blatant hostility toward China because of his ‘America First’ stance as well as his single-​minded focus on the U.S. trade deficit. On the other hand, his populist persona and downplaying of human rights and corruption issues brought unexpected opportunities to bond with Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines under Duterte. As of the end of 2019, a hawkish China policy and the prolonged trade war with China were the centerpieces of Trump’s foreign policy. However, the Trump administration had neither properly recognized the relevance of Southeast Asia nor formed a strategy effective enough to address expanded Chinese influence in the region since BRI. The mistakes began with Trump’s withdrawal from TPP on his third day in office, which effectively handicapped the already weakening U.S. power in the region as ASEAN quickly moved to negotiating the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—​where China rose as a leading figure—​as a new policy priority. Instead, Trump unveiled the Indo-​ Pacific Strategy, which, according to remarks by Trump and his defense advisors in 2017–​18, envisioned three components, i.e. provide Asian states with alternatives to BRI, pursue “free, fair, and reciprocal trade,” and ensure freedom of the seas in the Indo-​Pacific. So far, only the third component has led to clear policy actions, with the release of the Department of Defense’s Indo-​Pacific Strategy Report at the 2019 Shangri-​La Summit. To support it, ASEAN promptly issued its own policy, titled Outlook on the Indo-​Pacific. However, Trump decided to skip the

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latest East Asia Summit and sent a low-​ranking official to lead the U.S.  delegation, which was met by three instead of ten ASEAN leaders, in a show of disappointment.391 Further, with his administration’s inward-​looking and protectionist worldview, Trump has not been able to form an economic statecraft plan to rival BRI. This is made clear by the Department of State’s latest release of A Free and Open Indo-​Pacific Report, which, compared to the Defense report, is far from comprehensive and provides few concrete guidelines for achieving the other two components of Indo-​Pacific Strategy.392 To be sure, there were positive signs of U.S. economic statecraft in the report, including legislation on creating the International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) and the recently announced Blue Dot Network to improve cooperation with Australia and Japan on high-​quality infrastructure projects. Still, these initiatives have remained in their early stages and the extent to which they will be implemented remains to be seen. In addition, another campaign began by calling BRI an example of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ and warning Asian countries to avoid Chinese lending. The BRI debt trap recently became a talking point for high-​ranking officials in the Trump administration when meeting with state leaders from the developing world, from Africa to Asia. ASEAN’s response to this talking point has been inconsistent at best. On the one hand, they made positive remarks at the latest Summit on the recent U.S. infrastructure financing efforts, and on the other hand, they signed joint documents with China to synergize infrastructure cooperation. This move was driven by the fact that the ‘debt trap’ discourse not only carried a patronizing tone from Uncle Sam but also failed to address the pragmatic matter of the ‘infrastructure gap’ facing Southeast Asia. More importantly, as the previous section illustrates, most ASEAN states have been deliberate in choosing Chinese loans and BRI projects, and this attitude perfectly illustrates their ‘hedging’ approach to China.

391 Heijmans, Phillip: “No Trump or Pence in Bangkok Has Asia Questioning U.S. Strategy,” Bloomberg, 31.10.2019, retrieved 1.11.2019, from https://​w ww.bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2019-​11-​01/​no-​trump-​or-​pence-​in-​bangkok-​has-​asia-​questioning-​u-​s-​strategy. 392 Poling, Gregory B.: For Lack of a Strategy: The Free and Open Indo-​Pacific, retrieved 25.11.2019, from https://​warontherocks.com/​2019/​11/​for-​lack-​of-​a-​strategy-​t he-​ free-​a nd-​open-​indo-​pacific/​.

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Conclusions This chapter explains the evolution of China’s economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia, ASEAN states’ response particularly in the context of BRI, and how the United States competes with China with its own Southeast Asia policy. It demonstrates the expansion of China’s economic statecraft since BRI, with tangible accomplishments and under-​accomplishments in Southeast Asia. It also shows ASEAN’s pragmatic hedging approach to BRI and the variety of challenges brought by BRI, especially in light of China’s new territorial activism. Moreover, it shows the inadequate understanding or consideration of ASEAN states on the part of the United States, which has grappled with a leadership problem in the region. Still, as Evelyn Goh candidly argues, three key undesirable outcomes for Southeast Asian states are “Chinese domination or hegemony, American withdrawal from the region, and an unstable regional order.”393 In this sense, it remains viable for the United States to assert leadership in Southeast Asia. Several steps are essential for this direction to come to fruition. While the Indo-​Pacific strategy is unlikely to take shape as a NATO-​like collective security mechanism, the United States should strengthen and expand bilateral security cooperation, particularly with Asian maritime stakeholders in the region. In addition, the United States needs to adopt a more comprehensive economic statecraft policy to deepen the relationship between itself and Southeast Asia. IDFC and the Blue Dot Network are a good starting point, as they have the potential to provide Southeast Asia with quality and accountable infrastructural assistance. Such initiatives, however, will not bear fruit without consistent long-​term political support. Third, the United States needs to continue seeking ways to engage Southeast Asia at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. This is indeed not easy for a Washington that is occupied with global issues and confronted by challenges at home and in the region. However, Trump’s fickleness, unilateral worldview, anti-​Muslim position, and constant demands for other countries to pay for U.S. security protection under threat of withdrawal certainly drives a deeper wedge between the United States and Southeast Asia. Regardless of these factors, Washington needs to give higher priority to a region with strategic significance to the United States but increasingly falling under the influence of a rising China.

393 Cf.: Goh, p. 4.

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References ASEAN:  Joint Statement between ASEAN and China on Further Deepening the Cooperation on Infrastructure Connectivity, retrieved 12.12.2019, from https://​a sean.org/​s torage/​2 017/​11/​C hina-​a nd-​A SEAN-​on-​C ooperation-​ Connectivity-​CN-​ASEAN_​adopted.pdf. Asian Development Bank:  “Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia.” Asian Development Bank, 2009, retrieved 10.05.2019, from https://​w ww.adb.org/​ sites/​default/​fi les/​publication/​159348/​adbi-​infrastructure-​seamless-​asia.pdf. Beeson, Mark:  “Geoeconomics with Chinese characteristics:  the BRI and China’s evolving grand strategy.” Economic and Political Studies 6(3), 2018. Benedicter, Roland/​ Notwotny, Verena:  China’s Road Ahead:  Problems, Questions, and Perspectives. Spring: New York and Heidelberg. Charmila, Winda /​Ramadhani, Nurul: “Indonesian immigration office continues to hunt illegal foreign workers.” The Jakarta Post, retrieved 5.12.2019, from https://​w ww.thejakartapost.com/​news/​2017/​01/​09/​indonesian-​immigration-​ office-​continues-​to-​hunt-​illegal-​foreign-​workers.html. Goh, Evelyn:  “Meeting the China Challenge:  The U.S.  in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies.” Policy Studies 16, 2015, retrieved 12.12.2019, from https://​w ww.jstor.org/​stable/​pdf/​resrep06541.pdf?refreqid=excelsior% 3Ad65001880d9e349649639588ebc5e8b4. Heijmans, Phillip:  “No Trump or Pence in Bangkok Has Asia Questioning U.S. Strategy,” Bloomberg, 31.10.2019, retrieved 1.11.2019, from https://​w ww. bloomberg.com/​news/​articles/​2019-​11-​01/​no-​trump-​or-​pence-​in-​bangkok-​ has-​asia-​questioning-​u-​s-​strategy. Japan’s International Cooperation Agency:  “The 2017 White Paper on Development Cooperation,” retrieved 10.05.2019, from https://​w ww.mofa. go.jp/​policy/​oda/​page22e_​000860.html. Katada Saori/​Liao, Jessica:  “China and Japan in pursuit of Infrastructure Investment Leadership: Competition or Convergence?” Global Governance Global Governance 26(3), 2020. Kuik, Cheng-​Chwee:  “How Do Weaker States Hedge? Unpacking ASEAN states’ alignment behavior toward China,” Journal of Contemporary China 25(100), 2016. Liao, Jessica C.:  “A Good Neighbor of Bad Governance? China’s Energy and Mining Development in Southeast Asia.” Journal of Contemporary China 28(118), 2019. Liao, Jessica C./​Dang, Ngoc-​Tram, “The nexus of security and economic hedging:  Vietnam’s strategic response to Japan–​ China infrastructure

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financing competition,” The Pacific Review, 23 April 2019, published online at https://​w ww.tandfonline.com/​doi/​f ull/​10.1080/​09512748.2019.1599997. Luo, Yadong/​et  al.:  “How emerging market governments promote outward FDI: experience from China.” Journal of World Business 45(1) (2010). Moser, Helen:  Barriers to Bankable Infrastructure:  Incentivizing Private Investment to Fill the Global Infrastructure Gap. Rowman & Littlefield: New York 2016. Nadège, Rolland: “China’s “Belt and Road Initiative”: Underwhelming or Game-​ Changer?” The Washington Quarterly 40(1): p. 136; Charles Clover and Lucy Hornby:  “China’s Great Game:  Road to a New Empire.” Financial Times, 2015. https://​w ww.ft.com/​content/​6e098274-​587a-​11e5-​a28b-​50226830d644. Poling, Gregory B.:  For Lack of a Strategy:  The Free and Open Indo-​Pacific, retrieved 25.11.2019, from https://​warontherocks.com/​2019/​11/​for-​lack-​of-​a-​ strategy-​t he-​free-​and-​open-​indo-​pacific/​. Shambaugh, David:  “China Engages Asia:  Reshaping the Regional Order.” International Security 29(3), 2004/​2005. Simon, Sheldon W./​Ravenhill, John: “East Asian Regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing?.” Review of International Studies 35, 2009. Trinidad, Dennis D.: “Japan’s ODA at the Crossroads: Disbursement Patterns of Japan’s Development Assistance to Southeast Asia.” Asian Perspective 31(2), 2007. Wang, Gungwu: China and Southeast Asia: The Context of a New Beginning. in David Shambaugh (ed.), Power Shift. China and Asia’s New Dynamics, University of California Press: Berkeley 2005. pp. 187–​204. Wang, Yong: “Offensive for Defensive: the Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” the Pacific Review 29(3), 2016. Yuzawa Takeshi:  “From a Decentering to Recentering Imperative:  Japan’s Approach to Asian Security Multilateralism.” The Pacific Review 31(4), 2018. * Jessica C. Liao is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at North Carolina State University and the Wilson China Fellow 2020–​21. Her research focuses on the international political economy of East Asia. She is the author of Developmental States and Business Activism (Palgrave 2016) and her publications appear in journals including The Pacific Review, Journal of Contemporary China, and Asian Survey. She holds a PhD degree in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Southern California, the United States.

Grzegorz Gil https://​orcid.org/​0000-​0002-​6444-​9574

ASEAN and the EU: From Pupil to Strategic Partner? Abstract It is widely believed that “Europe’s past could become Asia’s future.” This chapter aims to present ASEAN-​EU relations as an example of North-​South cooperation and interregionalism. Since their inauguration in the 1970s, they have grown to encompass a broad spectrum of political-​security, economic, and socio-​cultural issues. However, it took almost half a century for ASEAN to navigate its status from EU’s pupil (1980) to a strategic partner (2019). As the 1990s had seen meeting-​driven cooperation between ASEAN and the EU, the following decade witnessed a project-​oriented approach focused on trade and non-​trade areas with the EU as a midwife of ASEAN integration. By doing so, the EU aims to have a benign effect on Southeast Asia as a civilian power. Apart from constituting a purely economic calculation driven by market access, the ASEAN-​EU Strategic Partnership has responded to the recent US-​China rivalry and US-​EU contention, aiming to eliminate regional hegemony in the multiplex world order. Such a descending liberal order, once encapsulated in the EU, crosscuts if not competes with other moral and commercial orders impacting the ASEAN region. Keywords: ASEAN, the EU, strategic partnership, trade liberalization, multiplex order

Introduction Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was designed on the foundation set by the European Communities.394 The goal of this chapter is to trace back the history and dynamics of region-​to-​region relations with their elevation to a strategic partnership (2019). Toutes proportions

394 All three Communities, i.e. the European Coal and Steel Community (1950), the EUROATOM, and the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957, preceded such attempts in Southeast Asia, where some nations and peoples were still under colonial jurisdiction at the time. While Europe and Europeans have never been colonized, they conquered almost the entirety of Southeast Asia (with the exception of Siam), with the first conquests taking place in the 16th century. The EEC was renamed the European Community (EC) in 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty, which formed the European Union (EU).

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gardées, the creation of these organizations may be widely viewed as a series of turning points in Southeast Asia and Europe, respectively. While the European Communities were aimed at uniting Western Europe and securing lasting peace, the Association aspired to block further regional destabilization amid the Vietnam War. Despite the shifted timing and completely different historical contexts and social fabrics, both integrations began to evolve in a unique but interlinked way. Even though many regional problems persist, these groupings have successfully started to mitigate them in structured intraregional cooperation and finally worked out an interregional ASEAN-​EU format.395 Chronologically, a period of economic growth in Europe coincided with the establishment of ASEAN. The EU’s first enlargement in the 1970s dovetailed with the adoption of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia (1976). Finally, a decade of the EU’s record-​setting Eastern enlargements, institutional reform, and the Eurozone crisis occurred almost in tandem with the adoption of the ASEAN Charter (2007) and the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) two years later. While the EU is often presented as an exceptionally supranational (not merely international) integration project, ASEAN is probably one of the most successful intergovernmental organizations in the developing world.396 In spite of their varying provenance and differing trajectories, both organizations intend to cooperate in a changing world, which has started to stigmatize multilateralism and highlight bilateral ties. The question is whether an ASEAN-​EU format can become a truly bilateral formula of interregional cooperation in a multipolar and multiplex world.

ASEAN and the EU: Origins and contrasts The reason for community-​building in Western Europe in the 1950s is apparent, with Franco-​German reconciliation on top of agenda. Similarly, the reconciliation in Southeast Asia between Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines was a prerequisite for community-​building in a broader sense.397 Consequently, the ASEAN founding fathers’ main concern was to

395 This chapter is not about the EU and its institutions, which are discussed only in the ASEAN context. 396 ASEAN success was due to fear, luck, and leadership. Cf. Mahbubani, Kishore /​Sng, Jeffrey: The ASEAN Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace, Singapore: Ridge Books, NUS Press, 2017 (chapter two). 397 See more Pollard, Vincent K.:  “ASA and ASEAN, 1961–​1967. Southeast Asian Regionalism.” Asian Survey 10(3), 1970, pp. 244–​246.

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supersede national sentiments with a regional identity, building on the words of S. Rajaratnam, Singapore’s first foreign minister, who raised the question of whether it was better to “hang together or hang separately.”398 Much like the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was a major step toward regional cohesion in Southeast Asia, so was the analogous Benelux Union (1948) in Western Europe. However, the process of integration in Southeast Asia was slowed down by both Western imperialism and bad-​tempered nationalism. The newness of most states and arbitrarily drawn borders generated conflict and division, as four out of five ASEAN founders have at least one ongoing dispute with another member state.399 Paradoxically, despite all such contests, the ASEAN Bangkok Declaration (1967) has since been expanded from five to fifty-​five articles in the form of the ASEAN Charter, which came into effect in 2008.400 Not only has ASEAN cooperation increased, but the organization has also survived geopolitical shocks (especially the British withdrawal from the east of Suez and the Nixon Doctrine) and domestic politics. Given existing antagonisms in Southeast Asia, extremely distinct cultures, and (at best) unconsolidated democracies as building blocks of cooperation, the question of ASEAN’s viability and the ASEANization (the ‘ASEAN Way’401) it promotes is puzzling. As the end of the Vietnam War brought economic growth to Southeast Asia, ASEAN geared up for deeper collaboration. This took the form of an ASEAN Secretariat (1974) as well as the first ASEAN summit (1976).402 Three years later, 398 Apart from Singapore, a founding declaration was signed by the Foreign Ministries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. ASEAN was preceded by the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), formed in 1961 by the Philippines, Thailand, and the former Federation of Malaya. 399 Suffice it to say that Indonesia pursued a “crush Malaysia” campaign and Singapore was forced to separate from Malaysia in 1965. Ba, Alice D.: (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Stanford 2009, p. 2. Indonesia restored its diplomatic relations with Malaysia and Singapore on the eve of the Bangkok Declaration. 400 Texts available online, retrieved 11.02.2019, from https://​asean.org/​t he-​asean-​ declaration-​bangkok-​declaration-​bangkok-​8-​august-​1967/​ and https://​asean.org/​ asean/​asean-​charter/​charter-​of-​t he-​association-​of-​southeast-​asian-​nations/​. 401 The ASEAN Way can be epitomized by the concepts of musyawarah (consultation) and mufukat (consensus) as the primary mechanisms of cooperation. 402 The first meeting of ASEAN senior officials took place in Bali, where five member-​ states adopted the Bali Declaration of ASEAN Concord along with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), which put ASEAN on a political and security-​related footing.

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the organization adopted a unified response to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1979. With more autonomy in the post-​Cold War era, the Association decided to liberalize intraregional trade and establish a free trade area, which is crucial for cooperation of this kind.403 Since the de-​escalation of conflict in mainland Southeast Asia, the number of ASEAN countries has stabilized at ten, with Cambodia as the newest one (1999). The organization is open to aspiring countries, and Timor Leste and Papua New Guinea are waiting in the queue. The EU is also open to further enlargement toward the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The Bangkok Declaration ostensibly differs from the EU’s demanding convergence criteria for accession. Even though ASEAN falls short of the EU metrics of integration, its positive effects are crystal clear. However, various regional surveys show that the grouping has not yet tangibly met people’s needs.404 Of course, due to their different political histories and cultures, ASEAN and the EU are incomparable in many ways. Even though ASEAN stands for a lot more than the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), it only imitates the spill-​ over effect observed in the European Economic Community, the European Community, and finally the European Union, with all their consecutive enlargements and institutional reforms. These led to the EU’s near-​threefold expansion as well as the creation of a single market and monetary union.405 The Lisbon Treaty (2009) explicitly conferred legal personality on the European Union as a separate entity (Article 47 of TEU) that is

403 A scheme for an ASEAN Free Trade Area was adopted in 1992 by six member states. Today, intra-​ASEAN trade accounts for about 24 % of total trade in Southeast Asia, with an upward trend. 404 As reported by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-​Yusof Ishak Institute (The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report), nearly three-​quarters of ASEAN respondents express their disappointment that “the tangible benefits of ASEAN are not felt” (question 11, p. 12), retrieved 19.02.2019, from https://​w ww.iseas.edu.sg/​images/​pdf/​ TheStateofSEASurveyReport_​2019.pdf. Conversely, in the Eurobarometer survey, only 7 % of respondents state that none of the items on a list formulated for the survey constitute “positive results” (QD4T), while the main personal concern (QA4a, QA5) for them is rising prices/​inflation/​cost of living (29 %). For 38 % of respondents, immigration is the most important issue at the EU level. Standard Eurobarometer 89, Spring 2018, report retrieved 19.02.2019, from http://​ec.europa.eu/​commfrontoffice/​ publicopinion/​i ndex.cfm/​Survey/​getSurveyDetail/​i nstruments/​STANDARD/​ surveyKy/​2180. 405 As intra-​EU trade ranged from 37 to 80 % in 2019, data retrieved 10.09.2020, from https://​ec.europa.eu/​eurostat/​statistics-​explained/​index.php?title=Intra-​EU_​trade_​ in_​goods_​-​_​main_​features.

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able to negotiate and enter into international agreements, in addition to joining international organizations. Conversely, as Rodolfo Severino, the former Secretary-​General of ASEAN, quipped in the wake of the Asian economic crisis, ASEAN “is not and was not meant to be a supranational entity acting independently of its members.” Finally, like its European counterpart, the Association provided for its legal personality under the ASEAN Charter.406 Both ASEAN (2006) and the EU (1974) have observer status at the United Nations, but the latter has obtained the right to address the General Assembly on behalf of the EU-​28 (2011). The Union is also a full voting member of three UN bodies and the only non-​state party to more than 50 UN conventions. This contrasts with ASEAN (specifically its member countries), whose modus operandi generally involves signing Memoranda of Understanding (MOU).407 This appears likely to continue under the ASEAN Charter. Generally speaking, the three ASEAN pillars introduced in 2003 (Political and Security Community, Economic Community, and Socio-​Cultural Community) reflected a European precedent (the European Economic Community, the European Political Cooperation, and the Maastricht Treaty with the three-​pillar structure it introduced). As ASEAN’s external relations are also organized under three pillars, ASEAN-​EU cooperation falls in line with the broader pattern.408 While both organizations were established to promote peace and economic growth, the movement of labor is not free in ASEAN’s case, as the Charter obliges the member states only to facilitate the free flow of skilled labor. Paradoxically, while the EU is multilingual with its 24 official languages, the sole lingua franca in ASEAN is English. In terms of institutional structure, the EU has a parliament with legislative powers, while the ASEAN Inter-​Parliamentary Assembly is more of a figurehead than a body with substantive powers. With no regional court and a rather modest Secretariat, ASEAN falls short of the supranational criteria that the EU fulfils. Majority voting in ASEAN decision-​making is still extremely rare, whereas some 80 % of EU legislation should be formally adopted

4 06 For a more nuanced test of ASEAN’s legal personality, see Chesterman, Simon: “Does ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person,” Singapore Year Book of International Law 12 2008, pp. 204–​211. 407 A database of ASEAN agreements can be found at http://​agreement.asean.org. 408 Cf. EU-​ASEAN Cooperation. Blue Book 2018, EU mission to ASEAN, retrieved 1.01.2019, from https://​ec.europa.eu/​europeaid/​sites/​devco/​fi les/​eu-​asean-​bluebook-​ 2018_​en_​1.pdf.

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by the Council of the EU with a qualified majority.409 Conversely, there is some resemblance between the ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula of economic cooperation and ‘enhanced cooperation’ in the EU –​in both cases, selected countries may be respectively opted out of or opted into a specific area of integration.410 Finally, the financing of the ASEAN budget (only 16 million USD per year) is based on equal contributions from every ASEAN member state, which would be unsustainable for EU members. However, it is the EU that is more equal in terms of developmental indicators, as the per capita gross national income of the EU’s richest country is 4 times that of the poorest (in ASEAN, this ratio is 1:26). Apart from these distinctions, no less surprising is the story of how this Southeast Asian organization of medium and small powers came to play a crucial role as an institutional linchpin in a region that includes much bigger powers than its member states. Among the most prominent are the ASEAN Regional Forum (inaugurated in 1994), the ASEAN Plus Three meetings (1997), the East Asia Summit (2005), and most recently the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (2012). In a way, ASEAN’s formation and existence as one regional grouping has provided the ASEAN region with an upgrade of sorts to its international role. It is worth noting that, as of 2019, the organization has nine strategic partners, including the European Union, which is the newest among them.411 However, for years, ASEAN seemed to have been underestimated  –​its ministerial meetings with the EU were often attended by full ministers on the ASEAN side, but not on the EU side. In the same vein, the first regionwide informal platform for security dialogue in the Asia-​Pacific –​the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) –​ has not always received special treatment from the US. Both the EU and ASEAN represent an important slice of the world. They have a similar land area as well as comparable populations –​about 512 million EU citizens and 635 million people in Southeast Asia. Reciprocal opportunities

409 The possibility of majority voting in ASEAN was considered in the Protocol on Dispute Settlement Mechanism for ASEAN economic agreements (1996) but never implemented. A second area with a majority-​like system is SEANWFZ (the Southeast Asia Nuclear-​Weapon-​Free Zone Treaty), adopted in 1995; the Commission that was established by the treaty provided for decisions to be made by a two-​t hirds majority in cases where consensus could not be achieved [Article 8(8)]. 410 The ‘ASEAN minus X’ formula is referred to in Article 21(2) of the ASEAN Charter. 411 Apart from Canada (which is a dialogue partner), ASEAN’s external relations with the following countries were elevated to strategic partnerships (in chronological order): China (2003), Republic of Korea (2010), Japan (2011), India (2012), Australia (2014), the US (2015), New Zealand (2016), Russia (2018), and most recently, the EU.

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for international trade have emerged, as these regions are different in terms of demographic profiles and developmental characteristics (North-​South cooperation). While the EU is ageing, ASEAN populations are very young, with three-​quarters of their citizens aged between 5 and 54.412 Second, ASEAN’s international trade amounts to 44 % of the EU-​28, but both regions recorded a trade surplus in 2015. Generally, ASEAN as a whole represents the EU’s third-​ largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China), while the EU comprises 13 % of ASEAN’s trade (the second largest volume after China).413 Moreover, the EU is by far the largest investor in  ASEAN  economies, as it has built an investment stock of over €263 million in the region. Even though (unsurprisingly) the EU still appears to be exotic in the eyes of ASEAN nations, their overall view of the EU is positive.414

Interregional dialogue and institutions The relationship between the two entities started with the EU’s predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC). The informal dialogue between ASEAN and the EEC dates back to 1972, when the ASEAN Brussels Committee was established. This was followed by the adoption of the first interregional cooperation agreement that Western Europe as a whole ever entered into with another foreign regional body (1973). In 1977, the EEC became the ASEAN’s first ever formal dialogue partner.415 Since then, region-​to-​region relations

412 Data retrieved 19.02.2019, from https://​w ww.aseanstats.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​ 2018/​10/​ASEAN-​Statistical-​Highlights-​2018.pdf. 413 For more information, see the report EU-​ASEAN cooperation  –​key trade and investment statistics, retrieved 20.02.2019, from https://​ec.europa.eu/​eurostat/​ statistics-​explained/​index.php?title=EU-​ASEAN_​cooperation_​-​_ ​key_​trade_​a nd_​ investment_​statistics&oldid=409881. 414 Suffice it to say that less than 2 % of ASEAN’s population perceive the EU as the biggest player in economic terms (almost two-​t hirds and 8 % think so about China and the US, respectively) and the political and strategic importance of the EU is nothing but illusory (0.7 %) when compared with China (45.2 %) and the US (30.5 %). Some 41.3 % of Southeast Asians are confident or very confident in the EU as a global promoter of peace and prosperity (question 26), which is more than for the US (27.3 %) and China (19.6 %) but less than for Japan (two-​t hirds). ASEAN Studies Centre, The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report, pp. 21–​30, Web. 415 Today, ASEAN’s official website discloses external relations with 15 non-​ASEAN partners (apart from strategic ones, it also names Canada, Germany, Norway, Pakistan, Switzerland, and Turkey).

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have had their ups and downs. The dialogue started with an initial focus on trade and market access, but has been steadily broadened to encompass political affairs. According to Lay Hwee Yeo, as of 2009, bilateral relations between ASEAN and the EC (European Communities) can be divided into four phases.416 The first phase lasted from the early 1970s to 1980, while the second and the third ended in 1990 and 2000, respectively. It is said that the fourth stage terminated in 2014 and morphed into the current one, which can be encapsulated as a track to a strategic partnership (all stages are presented in Table 1). The profile of each phase tends to aggregate and build upon the previous one. An ASEAN-​ECC Joint Study Group was established in 1975, following a few informal annual meetings. The Joint Study Group aimed to foster commercial and financial cooperation between the two sides. By the end of 1975, the Association had succeeded in obtaining EEC’s recognition of ASEAN as one region and preferential treatment of certain commodities under the EEC’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). In 1978, the inaugural ASEAN-​EEC Ministerial Meeting (AEMM) took place in Brussels. The AEMM meets every two or three years. Even though EC ministers attended it occasionally, the AEMM paved the way to the signing of the EC-​ASEAN Trade and Cooperation Agreement on March 7, 1980, which institutionalized the commercial, economic and development relations between ASEAN and the EC. The text of the Agreement was short (9 articles) and the standard it established translated into an asymmetric (donor versus beneficiary) relationship with respect to development cooperation (Article 3).417 Although the Agreement was important, it was not a game changer in region-​to-​region cooperation. With the implementation of the Agreement, political contacts between ASEAN and the EEC also began to look more promising in the 1980s. As Vietnam invaded Cambodia and the USSR intervened in Afghanistan, the EEC and ASEAN drew closer to each other in geostrategic terms. The common stance 416 Yeo, Lay Hwee: “Political Cooperation Between the EU and ASEAN: Searching for a Long-​Term Agenda and Joint Projects.” In: Welfens, Paul J.J. /​Ryan, Cillian /​ Chirathivat, Suthiphand /​Knipping, Franz (eds.): EU –​ASEAN. Facing Economic Globalisation. Springer: Berlin Heidelberg 2009, pp. 46–​53. 417 The Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was established to monitor region-​to-​ region economic cooperation; the agreement extended the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to the contracting parties (Article 1), but ASEAN was not on top of the EEC agenda, which instead prioritized ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) and Latin American countries at the time. The ASEAN-​EU JCC meats annually.

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Table 1.  Stages of ASEAN-​EU cooperation Period Instruments and institutions 1972–​ –​ informal dialogue 1980 –​ ASEAN Brussels Committee (1972) –​ ASEAN-​ECC Joint Study Group (1975) –​ AEMM  (1978) –​ ECC-​ASEAN Cooperation Agreement (1980) –​ Joint Cooperation Committee (1980) 1981–​ –​ common stance on conflicts 1990 (Vietnam, Afghanistan) –​ ministerial and parliamentary dialogue 1991–​ –​ the EU’s “Towards a new Asia 2000 strategy” (1994) –​ broader Asia-​Europe dialogue (ASEM, 1996) 2001–​ –​ senior economic official level 2014 –​ TREATI, READI (2003) –​ APRIS (2003), APRIS II (2006) –​ Nuremberg Declaration (2007) –​ Asia Investment Facility (2010) –​ ASEAN-​EU Business Summit (2011) –​ ARISE  (2012) –​ the EU acceded to TAC (2012) –​ ECAP III (2013) Since –​ EU Mission to ASEAN (2015) 2015 –​ SHARE  (2015) –​ pilot ACTS (2016) –​ E-​R EADI  (2017) –​ ARISE PLUS (2017) –​ Strategic Partnership (2019)

Agenda –​ trade, development, investments –​ structured asymmetry

–​ donor/​recipient relationship –​ elements of political dialogue –​ meeting-​driven approach –​ stagnation of cooperation (Asian financial crisis, the Myanmar issue) –​ comprehensive agenda (scientific cooperation, intellectual property rights, others) –​ enhanced partnership –​ ASEAN Centrality –​ project-​driven approach –​ facilitating investment –​ ASEAN-​EU FTA stop-​and-​go negotiations –​ business diplomacy –​ intensified (diplomatic) contacts –​ high-​level dialogue on human rights, sustainable development, and maritime security –​ ASEAN Connectivity (CATA) –​ restarted negotiations on region-​ to-​region FTA (2017) –​ toward symmetric relations

Source: Own study.

of the EEC and ASEAN against these interventions (chiseled out at the AEMM) was regularly presented in the United Nations General Assembly. In the early 1990s, EC-​ASEAN political relations took a blow due to the East Timor incident

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(the Santa Cruz massacre by Indonesia) and civil strife in Burma, where the ruling junta suppressed democratic movements. As democracy appeared to be on the rise in Central Europe and elsewhere, the EC started to require greater democratization in Southeast Asia. Subsequently, the European side introduced a conditional policy by linking trade and aid to human rights issues, democracy, and environmental protection. However, as of the early 1990s, such politicization of EC-​ASEAN relations had not diminished their bilateral contacts, as ASEAN had already improved its international economic footing and had begun to spread its wings in Asia. Despite their differing views, both sides had good cooperation on peace in Cambodia. In the 1990s, the EU took a more pragmatic course toward Southeast Asia, heralding its “Towards a new Asia strategy,” which proved that Europe would look for partners in Asia.418 This resulted in a friendlier AEMM, starting from the Karlsruhe meeting (1994), which revealed that ASEAN had gained a greater role in agenda-​setting. To develop relations, the ASEAN-​EU Eminent Persons Group was also commissioned. Finally, the EU approached ASEAN as a linchpin for its wider Europe-​Asia relations, which took the form of the biannual Asia-​Europe Meetings (ASEM) beginning in 1996.419 As in the case of ASEAN’s structure, the ASEM rests on three pillars and currently involves 51 countries plus two regional organizations that these countries comprise. The format is characterized by its informality, multi-​ dimensionality, and an amalgamation of high-​ level and people-​ centered approaches.420 However, in the late 1990s, EU-​ASEAN relations failed to gain substance due to the Asian financial crisis and enlargements on both sides.421 In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, ASEAN even began to think big (as the EU appeared to be resistant to such shocks and still expanding), but ultimately it clung on to its default, coordinative approach. As regards the interregional political agenda, since 1997, there was also contention on the Myanmar junta’s assault on democracy as a roadblock to ASEAN’s intensified cooperation with the EU as a democratic community. Thus, the meeting-​driven agenda of the 1990s was

418 “Towards a new Asia strategy,” Communication of the Commission, retrieved 25.02.2019, from http://​aei.pitt.edu/​2949/​1/​2949.pdf. 419 Aside from organizing the ASEM Summits (ASEM 13 is due to be held in Phnom Penh in 2020), it also operates at nine ministerial levels. 420 ASEM website: https://​w ww.aseminfoboard.org/​. 421 Yeo, p. 49.

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to be replaced by more project-​driven cooperation after 2000. The stagnation in ASEAN-​EU relations ended in 2001, when the EU reiterated its objectives toward Asia in a European Commission Communication entitled “Europe and Asia: A strategic framework for enhanced partnerships.” After 9/​11, both sides appeared to be on the same page regarding the ‘War on Terror.’422 Two years later, the EU continued the process with the publication of “A new partnership in South-​East Asia” with six priority areas, under which region-​to-​region relations were to be strengthened or intensified.423 Nevertheless, ASEAN-​EU cooperation remained focused on trade and investments, with new mechanisms reflecting ASEAN’s enthusiasm to build the three-​pillar community by 2020. For instance, in 2003, the EU launched the Trans-​regional EU-​ASEAN Trade Initiative (TREATI), aiming to enable multi-​speed developmental cooperation between the EU and two ASEAN countries engaging in a project, which other ASEAN members could join later. With regard to trade-​related issues, the EU and its Asian counterparts ultimately agreed that TREATI would relate primarily to the process of ASEAN economic community-​building through sectoral and cross-​sectoral cooperation.424 The formula was later expanded to include non-​trade dialogue in transport, justice/​home affairs, and environmental protection, known as READI (Regional EC-​ASEAN Dialogue Instrument). These initiatives reflected the EU’s stance that “most EC development assistance shall be implemented through bilateral channels,” as stressed in the recent European Commission Communication, while a region-​to-​region approach should be the default approach only when economies of scale can be achieved. The former approach allows for policy dialogue and reform in social sectors. However, the EU remained committed to supporting ASEAN integration. In 2003, this took the form of a framework program known as APRIS

422 For instance, during the 14th AEMM in January 2003 in Brussels, they signed the Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism. 423 These six priority areas encompass (a) supporting regional stability, (b) promoting human rights and democratic principles, (c) mainstreaming justice/​home affairs issues, (d)  revitalizing regional trade and investment relations (e.g., TREATI), (e) supporting the development of less developed countries, (f) and intensifying dialogue in specific sectors. “A new partnership in South-​East Asia,” European Commission Communication, document retrieved 1.04.2019, from http://​eeas. europa.eu/​archives/​docs/​library/​publications/​2004_​seasia_​en.pdf. 424 TREATI was outlined in Annex II of the above-​mentioned Communication of the European Commission.

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(ASEAN-​EC Program on Regional Integration Support). The program was aimed at addressing development gaps between ASEAN members toward the implementation of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and consequently advancing region-​to-​region dialogue.425 Apparently, amidst its most sweeping enlargement (2004) and internal discords, the EU did not consider ASEAN as pivotal to European strategic interests at the time, but the Joint Cooperation Committee, held in 2005, and the 15th AEMM that followed confirmed the commitment of both groupings to enhancing interregional cooperation toward a more comprehensive agenda. To support the implementation of the AEC, the two sides inaugurated the APRIS II Program (2006–​2010), which was focused on trade facilitation and removal of non-​tariff barriers.426 However, the adoption of the Nuremberg Declaration on an EU-​ASEAN Enhanced Partnership by the 16th AEMM in 2007 made dialogue relations more symmetrical. The EU has since started to perceive ASEAN as pivotal to regional agenda-​setting. The Association formally ceased to be relegated to the status of the EU’s protégé and became a valuable partner in many sectors. For instance, apart from the geostrategic context, the Declaration fostered region-​to-​region scientific cooperation.427 For the 2007–​2013 period, the EU had earmarked around €70  million for ASEAN countries, which stands for about 10  % of the overall regional Asia envelope. In 2012, the EU launched the ARISE program (ASEAN Regional Integration Support by the EU) as a technical cooperation mechanism aiming to support the implementation of key regional initiatives toward the ASEAN single market.428 Under the EU’s ARISE program, the pilot ASEAN Common Transit System (ACTS) has been developed to support the AEC’s 2025 vision of ASEAN as an integrated and cohesive economy.429 In 2010, the EU initiated 4 25 Yeo, p. 54. 426 The budget of APRIS I and II was €10 million and its third phase (€15 million) was attached to the creation of a single market. 427 Collaborative regional S&T activities are developed mainly through the ASEAN-​ EU Dialogue on Science and Technology at the senior official level between the ASEAN Committee of Science and Technology (COST) and the EU, represented by the European Commission. ASEAN’s APASTI program is similar to the EU’s Horizon 2020, as both tackle global issues. 428 It was funded by the European Development Fund (EDF) with a budget of €7.7 million (2012–​2016), data retrieved 20.03.2019, from https://​ec.europa.eu/​europeaid/​ projects/​asean-​regional-​integration-​support-​eu-​arise_​en. 429 ACTS is a computerized customs transit management  system that harmonizes regional customs procedures. Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore participated in

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the Asia Investment Facility (AIF) to provide its support through investment grants, technical assistance, and risk-​sharing instruments, with a priority focus on projects relevant to the climate change mitigation and the improvement of social services and infrastructure (eight ASEAN economies are eligible to use this EU blending facility).430 It has since become evident that the EU sees itself as a midwife of ASEAN’s economic integration. Their region-​to-​region partnership has since grown further with the adoption of the Brunei Plan of Action (2013–​2017) in 2012, which aimed to strengthen the ASEAN-​EU enhanced partnership. In the same year, the EU also acceded to the ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), while EU-​ASEAN high-​level visits became a norm. Such transactions were designed to give interregional cooperation a more strategic quality in a wide range of areas –​political/​security issues, economic/​trade issues, and socio-​cultural issues. It also included the protection of intellectual rights as part and parcel of the ECAP III project (2013–​2017), which was implemented by the EU in ASEAN countries. The project is focused on the protection of trademarks, industrial designs, and geographical indications.431 With the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) established in 2015, the EU’s Joint Communication (“The EU and ASEAN: A partnership with a strategic purpose”) put forward concrete ideas for taking EU-​ASEAN relations to a new level by providing a more cohesive framework for sectoral cooperation and more room for dialogue on political issues.432 In 2015, a first EU-​ASEAN Policy Dialogue on Human Rights took place (a second was held two years later). It was supported by the READI Human Rights program. The EU and ASEAN have also organized High-​Level Dialogues (HLD) on Maritime Security since 2013. As the EU has attended ARF Ministerial Meetings since 2012, it has also the pilot stage of ACTS’s implementation (which ran from November 2016 until April 2017). 430 AIF sets up partnerships with European Finance Institutions and Regional Development Banks. For the 2010–​2015 period,  18 projects  were approved for grant financing with a total value of €89 million. Retrieved 30.03.2019, from https://​ ec.europa.eu/​europeaid/​regions/​asia/​asian-​investment-​facility-​aif_​en. 431 More than 270 officials from the IP offices of the ASEAN member states took part in various seminars, training sessions, and workshops that were carried out over the four-​year duration of the project (retrieved 30.04.2019, from https://​euipo.europa. eu/​ohimportal/​pl/​news/​-​/​action/​v iew/​3480631). 432 Document retrieved 1.04.2019, from https://​eur-​lex.europa.eu/​legal-​content/​EN/​ TXT/​PDF/​?uri=JOIN:2015:22:FIN&from=EN. Sectoral dialogues cover the automotive industry, health and medicine; satellite navigation and space issues; the defense-​ related industrial sector; and information and communication technologies.

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co-​chaired Meetings on Counter-​Terrorism and Transnational Crime as well as the Defence Officials Dialogue. Given the many territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the EU is also a strong supporter of ASEAN’s and China’s ongoing efforts to agree on a Code of Conduct (COC). EU-​ASEAN interregional relations gained momentum when the EU delegated a mission to ASEAN on August 8, 2015 (ASEAN Day).433 It also has delegations operating in all ASEAN member states. The Association, in turn, has designated an official coordinator for ASEAN-​EU relations. The following year, the two sides issued the Bangkok Declaration, taking them a step closer toward a strategic partnership. In 2017, on the 40th anniversary of EU-​ASEAN contacts, the second EU-​ ASEAN Plan of Action (2018–​ 2022) was adopted at the Post-​ Ministerial Conference in Manila. It is especially focused on sustainable development. In doing so, both organizations reaffirmed their shared commitment to climate change mitigation and fully supported the Paris Agreement.434 A  first ASEAN-​EU High-​Level Dialogue on the implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was convened on November 17, 2017 in Bangkok. EU-​ASEAN cooperation has since also expanded to soft security issues. For example, the ASEAN Centre for Humanitarian Assistance (AHA) has been supported by the EU (€10 million) as part of a wider collaboration aiming to enhance crisis response in disaster-​prone Southeast Asia.435 In 2017, to adjust to the finalization of the AEC, the EU and ASEAN launched two initiatives on policy dialogue and development cooperation with a total budget of €61 million. After the success of its first edition, ARISE Plus (2017–​ 2022) was designed to support ASEAN trade and economic connectivity in the areas of trade facilitation, customs and transport, quality standards in food safety, civil aviation, and intellectual property rights. E-​R EADI (Enhanced Regional EU-​ASEAN Dialogue Investment), by contrast, aims to further

433 Since 2016, the EU mission to ASEAN has had an official Twitter account (https://​ twitter.com/​euinasean). Apart from that, as of November 15, 2018, 26 EU member states have their Ambassadors accredited to ASEAN (out of 91 non-​ASEAN states represented there), retrieved 20.02.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2018/​11/​ List-​of-​NAAAs-​as-​of-​15-​Nov-​2018-​rev2.pdf. 434 Retrieved 3.03.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2017/​08/​Final-​ASEAN-​EU-​ Statement-​on-​t he-​Paris-​Agreement.pdf. 435 Such ongoing capacity-​building programs include Institutional Capacity Building for ASEAN Monitoring and Statistics (COMPASS), the EU-​ASEAN Migration and Border Management Program II (EA-​MBMP II), and the ASEAN-​EU Emergency Management Program (AEEMP).

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ASEAN integration through experience sharing in all the pillars of ASEAN Community.436 ARISE Plus follows a two-​level approach, as its regional program is complemented by national activities, which address country-​specific needs. Special attention was given to Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam (CLMV), and the EU promised to steadily increase its bilateral aid to the Lower Mekong region. Such EU technical assistance to ASEAN has been instrumental in deepening regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. In sum, the EU funds (€170  million) earmarked to ASEAN (2014–​2020) have doubled when compared with the previous financial framework (2007–​ 2013). It is worth noting that half of the EU’s current development cooperation funding has been allocated to ASEAN’s economic integration (€42  million). The EU perceives it as a priority to maintain and buttress EU-​ASEAN relations. Encouraged by the promising outcomes of ASEAN economic integration, the EU-​ASEAN Business Summit has taken place regularly since 2015. Its seventh edition was held in September 2019 in Bangkok alongside the ASEAN Economic Ministerial Meetings. Formally established in 2014, the EU-​ASEAN Business Council (EU-​ABC) helps to promote European business within the ASEAN region by representing a diverse range of industries with over 40 large European multinational corporations and all regional European Chambers of Commerce.437 As intra-​ASEAN trade remains low, the EU-​ABC acts to preserve the ASEAN’s 2017 goal of doubling intra-​ASEAN trade by 2025. Aside from EU-​sponsored capacity-​building programs within the political-​ security and economic agendas, socio-​cultural cooperation between the two entities aims to promote people-​to-​people contacts. This includes the EU SHARE (Support to Higher Education) grant-​f unded project, which primarily aims to supplement the people-​centered ASEAN Community with an Erasmus-​ like scholarship scheme and a series of policy dialogue exercises at universities in Southeast Asia.438 436 Retrieved 3.03.2019, from https://​eeas.europa.eu/​delegations/​t hailand/​43068/​eu-​ and-​asean-​launch-​t wo-​flagship-​programmes-​arise-​plus-​a nd-​e-​readi_​en. 437 Apart from its EU-​ABC advocacy groups and publication activity, the Council conducts its flagship EU-​ASEAN Business Sentiment Survey. More at the website: https://​w ww.eu-​asean.eu/​. 438 On behalf of ASEAN and the EU, this has been implemented by a consortium led by British Council and comprising the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Nuffic (the Netherlands), Campus France, the European Association for Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), and the European University Association (EUA). The project is valued at €10 million and its was in operation from January 2015 to October 2019. More at SHARE website: https://​w ww.share-​asean.eu/​.

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Region-​to-​region  FTA Before 1992 and the adoption of ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) by its then six members, ASEAN was almost exclusively set on regional cooperation, not on integration. But since then, the latter term has gained a foothold in the ASEAN vocabulary. In 2006, in its communication entitled “Global Europe: Competing in the world,” the European Commission identified ASEAN as a potential interregional FTA (free trade agreement) partner. A year later, talks to facilitate this began. If ASEAN were a single economy, it would already be the fifth largest in the world. Though the notion of ASEAN as a true single market is currently little more than a dream, EU trade with the ASEAN countries has more than doubled between 2000 and 2017 (from €100 million to €226 million), with a regular trade deficit on the side of the EU. It is worth noting that bilateral merchandise trade tends to concentrate on a relatively narrow cohort of countries. Germany itself accounts for 27 % of the EU’s merchandise imports (€25.2 billion) of goods from ASEAN countries, while France is the second-​largest importer (17 %). On the other hand, Singapore and Vietnam are the most prominent merchandise trade partners for Europe, accounting for nearly €54 billion and €47 billion, respectively. While the former is the largest ASEAN destination for EU exports (€33 billion), the latter is the biggest partner for EU imports (€37 billion).439 Even though TREATI served as a precursor to a broader preferential agreement, region-​to-​region trade negotiations were paused in 2009 due to what some even called “insurmountable economic and political differences.”440 Later that year, the EU member states agreed that the European Commission would pursue negotiations on bilateral FTAs with the ASEAN economies. To date, the EU has already concluded such bilateral FTA negotiations with its key trade partners from ASEAN, i.e. Singapore (2012) and Vietnam (2015).441 It is also negotiating FTAs with other ASEAN countries (Indonesia and the 439 Data retrieved 1.05.2019, from https://​ec.europa.eu/​eurostat/​statistics-​explained/​ index.php?title=ASEAN-​EU_​-​_​international_​trade_​in_​goods_​statistics. 440 Loc, Doan X.: Opportunities and Challenges in EU-​ASEAN Trade Relations, EU-​ ASIA Centre, Brussels, retrieved 1.05.2019, from: http://​w ww.eu-​asiacentre.eu/​pub_​ details.php?pub_​id=60. 441 The agreement between the EU and Singapore (EUSFTA) entered into force in November 2019. A FTA between the EU and Vietnam was finally signed on June 30, 2019, and Cecilia Malmstrom, the EU’s chief trade negotiator, wrote on Twitter, “Good morning Vietnam.” In 2020, the European Parliament (in February) and Vietnam’s National Assembly (June) have finally ratified the agreement.

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Philippines), while discussions with Malaysia, Myanmar/​Burma, and Thailand have been put on hold. These bilateral Agreements are seen as building blocks toward a fully-​fledged, interregional ASEAN-​EU FTA. However, the ASEAN region is not monolithic given its vanguard  –​ASEAN 6 (high-​and middle-​ income countries, e.g. Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand)  –​on the one hand and CMLV (Cambodia, Myanmar/​Burma, Lao PDR, and Vietnam) on the other. Therefore, to date, the EU continues to treat ASEAN countries in line with its GSP regulations.442 Finally, ASEAN and the EU resumed negotiations on a region-​to-​region FTA in March 2017 in a coordinated push after the US withdrew from the Trans-​ Pacific Partnership (TPP). Both sides continue to convene regular consultations between ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) and the EU Trade Commissioner as well as regular meetings of the ASEAN-​EU Senior Economic Officials (SEOM-​EU). This appears to be a demand-​driven strategy, as almost nine out of ten EU businesses support such a region-​to-​region FTA (87  %), while even more (98 %) believe that the EU should accelerate the negotiation on FTAs with the ASEAN region.443 ASEAN and the EU are currently negotiating a region-​to-​region Comprehensive Air Transport Agreement (CATA), which aims to improve air connections between these two regions. This bi-​ regional cooperation strengthens the belief that the EU is currently seeking to increase its influence in Southeast Asia and to counter the positions of China and Japan, which have already concluded their FTAs with ASEAN. Given that the ASEAN-​Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) entered into force (2008), Japan is ASEAN’s third-​largest trading partner (after China and the EU) and the second-​largest source of FDI (after the EU). At the same time, aside from Lao PDR, all ASEAN countries take part in the Chinese One Road project.

4 42 The current GSP regulation of the European Commission covers the years 2014–​2023 and allows vulnerable developing countries to pay fewer or no duties on exports to the EU. The EU’s GSP system involves three sorts of beneficiaries from the region: 1) GSP (Indonesia, Vietnam); 2) GSP+ (the Philippines) and 3) EBA (Everything But Arms) status, which applies to Cambodia, Myanmar/​Burma, and Lao PDR. Data retrieved 30.03.2019, from http://​ec.europa.eu/​trade/​policy/​countries-​a nd-​regions/​ development/​generalised-​scheme-​of-​preferences/​. 4 43 See EU-​ASEAN Business Sentiment Survey 2018, the EU-​ASEAN Business Council, retrieved 2.04.2019, from https://​docs.wixstatic.com/​ugd/​63371b_​a8124d48d53747 039e143e04d187d2d1.pdf.

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The prospects for ASEAN-​EU trade relations can be estimated as likely to fall within one of three scenarios. The most probable one entails the replacement of an interregional agreement with a set of bilateral FTAs. This would certainly constitute a handicap for the EU in individual negotiations with smaller ASEAN economies. Second, politically speaking, this would allow European states not only to abandon countries with considerable human rights concerns (e.g. Myanmar/​ Burma) but also to address the economic heterogeneity among ASEAN countries. Also, due to the contrasting nature of integration, the ASEAN economies had a common position on matters concerning merchandise trade, but not on services and all regulatory issues of importance to the EU.444 Such a set of FTAs could be replaced by a comprehensive ASEAN-​EU agreement in the medium term, as the bilateral and regional approaches are complementary.445 However, even though the EU has successfully concluded FTAs with Korea, Canada, or Chile, given the total size of the EU economy, only an agreement with the world’s largest economies (such as South Korea, Canada, or Japan) or another regional bloc could make an impact on EU economic output. The second scenario presumes the conclusion of an interregional FTA, which is less probable in the near future. However, the EU favors FTAs with regional blocs, as this grants EU corporate actors access to larger markets in a single stroke and in a more comprehensive manner.446 Such a region-​to-​ region FTA would only fill up the Strategic Partnership (2019) with economic initiatives. But this option is problematic due to EU procedures, which require that all ASEAN members sign a Partnership Cooperation Agreement (PCA) –​a prerequisite to an FTA –​containing a commitment to human rights and democratic principles. On the other hand, as ASEAN competes with other blocks like MERCOSUR on the agricultural market, it needs to keep a close watch on the EU. Should an EU-​MERCOSUR FTA be established, ASEAN would be the only large developing region in the world facing EU tariffs in the agricultural

4 44 Meissner, Katharina L.: “A case of failed interregionalism? Asia Europe Journal 14(3), 2016, p. 332. 445 For instance, prior to the adoption of the AJCEP, Japan had concluded such Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with all ASEAN states. 4 46 Either way, the EU would probably remain isolated from the prospective Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which has been discussed since 2012 between ASEAN-​10 and their 6 FTA partners.

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sector.447 Conversely, this is also true for the EU, as it contends with other developed regions for the same resources. When it comes to the impact of an EU-​ASEAN FTA, the Institute for International and Development Economics (IIDE) concluded that an EU-​ ASEAN FTA would result in “positive effects on the economic output for most of ASEAN under all scenarios, and small but positive effects over the long-​run for the European Union.”448 However, as the EU’s GSP scheme is prone to change due to economic development and political disagreements, the ASEAN countries would secure permanent preferences through a region-​to-​region FTA. However, in the case of Cambodia and Myanmar (which both currently have their EBA status under review), the same political concerns would also complicate such an interregional FTA. As of 2017, if GSP treatment did not apply, the MFN tariff cost of agriculture exports would amount to some $1.4 billion (nearly $9 billion on non-​agriculture exports).449 Both the EU and ASEAN appear to gain from the elimination of tariffs. Apart from these savings, such an EU-​ASEAN FTA could also entail the elimination of non-​ tariff measures (NTMs), including technical barriers and sanitary and phytosanitary measures, which would significantly reduce the cost and complexity of trade. Given the high compliance costs imposed by the ASEAN countries, it is important for the EU to reduce NTMs for its exports to Southeast Asia.450 From ASEAN’s perspective, the EU also imposes significant technical barriers to trade. Finally, even though the EU is the largest source of FDI into ASEAN, the latter is incongruously at the top of the OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index. Further liberalization of investment policies across ASEAN through an EU-​ASEAN FTA would increase opportunities for EU investors in ASEAN and facilitate greater trade in services. Investment restrictions for EU firms are most significant in the service sectors (with foreign ownership restrictions as the most common) and public procurement.451 4 47 After 20 years of negotiations, the EU reached a free trade pact with MERCOSUR in June 2019. 448 Menon, Jayant /​Todd, Laurence /​Arujunan, Darmashakthini: EU-​ASEAN FTA Report. API Report No. 2, December 2018, p. 7, retrieved 25.04.2019, from http://​ www.ideas.org.my/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2018/​12/​EU-​Asean-​Report_​V3.pdf. 4 49 Menon et al., pp. 8–​9. 450 For instance, this refers to food-​labelling requirements and Halal certification in Indonesia. Cf. Ing, Lily Yan /​Cadot, Oliver: Facilitating ASEAN Trade in Goods, ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2017–​07, December 2017. Retrieved 25.04.2019, from http://​ www.eria.org/​ERIA-​PB-​2017-​07.pdf. 451 Menon et al., pp. 11–​16.

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The third option for trade relations between the two regional blocks is a deadlock in both region-​to-​region and the EU’s bilateral negotiations with ASEAN countries. Negotiations are prone to stalemate due to different levels of development and divergent regional interpretations of sustainability. The prolonged RCEP negotiations between ASEAN and its FTA partners show that building a consolidated and broader deal is always difficult. Finally, the EU’s decision to restrict palm oil has already enraged Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand.452 This issue can derail bilateral FTA negotiations with these countries and probably endanger negotiations on a region-​to-​region FTA.453 Given existing jurisprudence in the case of anti-​dumping duties imposed by the EU, such differentiated treatment or selective exclusion of one crop would not comply with WTO law and would thus expose the EU to further time-​consuming disputes.454 Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have already warned that they would retaliate against EU exports on milk powder, defense contracts, and aircraft.455 Given that the Council of the EU recently (2019) adopted the EU-​Singapore trade and investment agreements, this scenario is even more probable in the short run. Generally speaking, the problem with a bi-​regional FTA is that the EU is demanding more while offering less since it has been weakened politically for the last few years. Other challenges to an interregional FTA also include the role of the state in state-​led development (state-​owned enterprises) in Southeast Asia, which contrasts with the EU’s market-​oriented approach. The last contrasting aspect is that Southeast Asian countries have signed more than twenty FTAs with different partners ranging from China and the Gulf Cooperation Council to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-​Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) –​all driven by a pragmatic focus on doable tasks. Conversely, the EU thinks big in trying to reshape the Asia-​Pacific in political terms, which is not welcomed in a post-​liberal world.456 On the contrary, amid stalled interregional 4 52 Indonesia and Malaysia account for around 85 % of global palm oil production. 453 This diplomatic row emerged as some EU members and the European Parliament decided to phase out the use of palm oil starting in 2023, with an all-​out ban in 2030, due to the deforestation it causes (as per the ongoing revision of RED-​II). Retrieved 15.04.2019, from https://​t heaseanpost.com/​article/​banning-​palm-​oil-​dangerous. 454 Deringer, Hanna /​Lee-​Makiyama Hosuk: Europe and South-​East Asia: An Exercise in Diplomatic Patience. ECIPE POLICY BRIEF, 5/​2018, pp. 6–​7. Retrieved 1.05.2019, from https://​ecipe.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2018/​04/​PB1805_​ASEAN-​7.pdf. 455 Retrieved 25.04.2019, from https://​w ww.reuters.com/​article/​indonesia-​palmoil-​ eu-​dairy/​indonesia-​warns-​may-​bar-​eu-​milk-​powder-​if-​palm-​oil-​sales-​restricted-​ idUSL4N1N91F1. 456 Deringer /​ Lee-​Makiyama, pp. 2–​3.

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negotiations with the EU, some ASEAN countries might conclude that holding individual talks with separate EU member states –​as Thailand did in 2018 –​ will have a detrimental effect on region-​to-​region dialogue.

ASEAN-​EU strategic partnership in a multiplex world The unresolved issue of Brexit and the rise of Euroskeptic voices in the EU have been an excellent excuse to implement a less ambitious EU external policy. It is clear that region-​to-​region relations are the corollary to the current intra-​ regional situation. Aside from this, the EU adopted its global strategy (EUGS) in 2016, which finally took a new approach toward Southeast Asia. The strategic significance of the South China Sea is crystal clear, as almost 50  % of world shipping (by tonnage) passes through the South China Sea. The last two years have laid the groundwork for the climax of EU-​ASEAN relations, as they appear to need each other more than ever. The new North-​South relationships did in many ways move away from the donor-​recipient relationship into a more symmetrical one, with shared decision-​making. On January 21, 2019 ASEAN and the EU agreed to elevate their relations to the status of a Strategic Partnership.457 In doing so, ASEAN can create some strategic space between itself, Beijing, and Washington.458 Today, the EU, belittled by Trump administration, views ASEAN as a valuable partner in the Indo-​Pacific region. From the ASEAN perspective, having such strategic partners is aimed at preventing other states from achieving regional hegemony (e.g., Vietnam wishing to avoid dependence on China). It is worth noting that ASEAN has only recently (June 2019) released its brief, five-​page document on the Indo-​Pacific concept (ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-​Pacific, AOIP). It enumerates four areas of cooperation with external actors: maritime cooperation, connectivity, sustainable development, and the economy. The EU appears to fit this pattern. Regardless of the vagueness of the AOIP, it proves that ASEAN wants to actively shape the region’s future and

457 The decision was made by the EU and ASEAN countries’ Foreign Ministers at the EU-​ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on that day. The “EU in ASEAN” Twitter account tweeted about a “landmark decision in a world that needs international cooperation more than ever!” (retrieved 20.02.2019, from https://​t witter.com/​EUinASEAN/​ status/​1087411733826662405). 458 68.4 % of ASEAN respondents recognize China and the US as strategic competitors; a similar percentage perceive the Indo-​Pacific concept as vague (question 24). ASEAN Studies Centre, The State of Southeast Asia: 2019 Survey Report (p. 24–​25), Web.

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preserve ASEAN’s centrality.459 For ASEAN, it also means that giving substance to the AOIP will be extremely complicated in the years to come. North-​South linkages are part of Amitav Acharya’s concept of a ‘multiplex world’ that is free from a global hegemon but implies a plethora of major actors.460 The EU’s liberal outreach in Southeast Asia could be a component of such a multiplex setting amid China’s state capitalism and revisionism on the one hand and the protectionism of the US on the other. It is ironic that, while the founders of the liberal order are on the wane, it is China that appears to offer support to it as a promoter of globalization. Nevertheless, territorial disputes in the East and the South China Sea undermine China’s legitimacy in its neighborhoods, constraining its potential to take on a greater role in the international order. This shortage of legitimacy can compel them to accept some kind of co-​existence with the elements of the liberal order as driven by the West in the short term. Acharya stipulates that such a ‘multiplex world’ will be different from simple multipolarity as a set of powers and their colonies that originated in pre-​war Europe. Neither the EU nor ASEAN are great powers in the traditional sense. EU-​ASEAN relations are not limited to trade but rather reflect economic and financial interdependence within global value chains (the EU’s investment in ASEAN). ASEAN itself is possibly the most successful organization in the developing world. Finally, as traditional interstate conflicts wane, tariffs or the lack thereof (FTAs) are crucial diplomatic tools that impact politics and security. The above features correspond with Acharya’s five characteristics of ‘multiplexity.’461 Regardless of geographic distances and distinct backgrounds, the EU-​ ASEAN strategic partnership seems to be a win-​w in solution in the context of comprehensive competition between the US and China in the Indo-​Pacific. There are some things that the EU and ASEAN have in common. Firs, they are committed to a multi-​polar world based on strong multilateral institutions. The EU and ASEAN have broadly supported such rules-​based systems (e.g., the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) to counter potential regional 459 Statement retrieved 27.06.2019, from https://​asean.org/​storage/​2019/​06/​ASEAN-​ Outlook-​on-​t he-​Indo-​Pacific_​FINAL_​22062019.pdf. 460 Acharya, Amitav:  “After Liberal Hegemony:  The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” Ethics & International Affairs 31(3), 2017, pp. 271–​285. The author itself perceives South-​South cooperation is vital for the so-​called “new globalization.” 461 Acharya, pp. 276–​277. Cf. Mazaar, Michael: This Is Not a Great-​Power Competition. Why the Term Doesn’t Capture Today’s Reality, retrieved 29.05.2019, from https://​ www.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​2019-​05-​29/​not-​great-​power-​competition.

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hegemony. What is more, the adoption of an interregional FTA engaging economies that cross-​cut the North-​South divide would send a positive signal on the strength of the rules-​based international trading system. Second, a real EU-​ ASEAN Partnership would improve the economic resilience of both parties at a time of global uncertainty. Thus, trade facilitation between ASEAN and the EU should be seen as a strategic issue, as the bilateral or multilateral ‘no deal’ scenario leads to a loss of comparative advantage for the EU vis-​à-​v is regional players like China, Japan, or the US.462

Conclusions During the first three decades of EU-​ASEAN cooperation, trade volumes and investment increased considerably, which created space for new areas of political dialogue. Today, the EU is a dedicated and major development partner for ASEAN.463 After years of prioritizing a meeting-​driven approach to inter-​ regional cooperation, the two parties entered the new millennium with a more nuanced and project-​oriented approach. The EU adapts to ASEAN’s needs through the formulation of its two-​track approach. While the first track relates to trade (e.g., TREATI, APRIS, ARISE), the second is multisectoral and refers to capacity building in non-​trade areas (e.g., READI, ECAP III, EU SHARE). However, there are some tensions between the two, as Europe engages with the ASEAN countries to promote WTO rules, human rights, and sustainability. They can only be reduced by EU’s diplomacy of patience toward the ASEAN region in the long run. Since the conclusion of the EU-​Japan FTA in 2019, the EU has been left with only two ways to magnify its outreach in East Asia. However, given a relatively dubious trade agreement which China, it should focus on the ASEAN region. With the stop-​and-​go negotiations on an EU-​ASEAN FTA re-​launched in 2017, the question of the strategic value of the Partnership remains to be answered. As the current international order moves away from a classic pattern of great-​power competition, EU trade policy toward Southeast Asia may interfere with China’s ‘string of pearls’ concept. Finally, engaging the ASEAN countries is a complex endeavor for many reasons. First, they are not monolithic, with nominal GDP per capita ranging from $65,000 to $1,200 (a ratio of fifty-​four to 4 62 Deringer /​Lee-​Makiyama, p. 5. 463 In 2014–​2020, the EU has already allocated €200 million of grant funding for the ASEAN Secretariat, and ASEAN members have received some €2 billion in bilateral support.

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one).464 Second, EU environmental standards have already caused diplomatic spats over the use of palm oil (Indonesia, Malaysia), which could block further negotiations with both ASEAN and its constituent countries. Third, the EU’s long-​standing criticism of detrimental developments in political systems and human and labor rights violations in the ASEAN region (Cambodia, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Thailand) will potentially mute trade talks with the EU and make the ASEAN-​EU Partnership a non-​starter. Either way, substantial cooperation toward a region-​to-​region FTA could be a game changer in a changing world.

References “A new partnership in South-​East Asia,” European Commission Communication, http://​eeas.europa.eu/​archives/​docs/​library/​publications/​2004_​seasia_​ en.pdf. “Towards a new Asia strategy,” Communication of the Commission, http://​aei. pitt.edu/​2949/​1/​2949.pdf. Acharya, Amitav: “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World Order,” Ethics & International Affairs 31(3), 2017. Ba, Alice D.: (Re)Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Stanford 2009. Chesterman, Simon: “Does ASEAN Exist? The Association of Southeast Asian Nations as an International Legal Person,” Singapore Year Book of International Law 12 2008. Deringer, Hanna /​Lee-​Makiyama Hosuk:  Europe and South-​East Asia:  An Exercise in Diplomatic Patience. ECIPE POLICY BRIEF, 5/​2018, https://​ ecipe.org/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2018/​04/​PB1805_​ASEAN-​7.pdf. EU-​ASEAN Business Sentiment Survey 2018, the EU-​ASEAN Business Council, https://​docs.wixstatic.com/​u gd/​63371b_ ​a8124d48d53747039e143e04d187 d2d1.pdf. EU-​ASEAN cooperation –​key trade and investment statistics, https://​ec.europa. eu/​eurostat/​statistics-​explained/​index.php?title=EU-​ASEAN_​cooperation_​ -​_ ​key_​trade_​and_​investment_​statistics&oldid=409881. EU-​ASEAN Cooperation. Blue Book 2018, EU mission to ASEAN, https://​ ec.europa.eu/​europeaid/​sites/​devco/​fi les/​eu-​asean-​bluebook-​2018_​en_​1.pdf.

464 Data from International Monetary Fund, 2019, retrieved 1.05.2019, from https://​ www.imf.org/​external/​pubs/​ft /​weo/​2019/​01/​weodata/​index.aspx.

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Ing, Lily Yan /​Cadot, Oliver: Facilitating ASEAN Trade in Goods, ERIA Policy Brief, No. 2017–​ 07, December 2017, http://​w ww.eria.org/​ERIA-​PB-​2017-​ 07.pdf. Loc, Doan X.: Opportunities and Challenges in EU-​ASEAN Trade Relations, EU-​ ASIA Centre, Brussels, http://​w ww.eu-​asiacentre.eu/​pub_​details.php?pub_​ id=60. Mahbubani, Kishore /​Sng, Jeffrey: The ASEAN Miracle. A Catalyst for Peace, Singapore: Ridge Books, NUS Press, 2017. Mazaar, Michael: This Is Not a Great-​Power Competition. Why the Term Doesn’t Capture Today’s Reality, https://​w ww.foreignaffairs.com/​articles/​2019-​05-​ 29/​not-​great-​power-​competition. Meissner, Katharina L.: “A case of failed interregionalism? Asia Europe Journal 14(3), 2016. Menon, Jayant /​Todd, Laurence /​Arujunan, Darmashakthini:  EU-​ASEAN FTA Report. API Report No. 2, December 2018, http://​w ww.ideas.org.my/​ wp-​content/​uploads/​2018/​12/​EU-​Asean-​Report_​V3.pdf. Pollard, Vincent K.:  “ASA and ASEAN, 1961–​1967. Southeast Asian Regionalism.” Asian Survey 10(3), 1970. The State of Southeast Asia:  2019 Survey Report, ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-​Yusof Ishak Institute, https://​w ww.iseas.edu.sg/​images/​pdf/​TheStateof​ SEASurveyReport_​2019.pdf. Yeo, Lay Hwee: “Political Cooperation Between the EU and ASEAN: Searching for a Long-​Term Agenda and Joint Projects.” In: Welfens, Paul J.J. /​Ryan, Cillian /​Chirathivat, Suthiphand /​Knipping, Franz (eds.):  EU  –​ ASEAN. Facing Economic Globalisation. Springer: Berlin Heidelberg 2009. * Grzegorz Gil holds a PhD in Political Science. He graduated with a degree in International Relations from the Maria Curie-​ Skłodowska University in Lublin. He is a Team Europe member at the European Commission. His interests encompass a range of topics, from state-​building and international security architecture to the external relations of the EU. E-​mail: [email protected]

Andrzej Jaroszyński

The Asia-​Pacific Community: An Australian Integration Project Abstract Since the 1960s, Australia has recognized the need to establish friendly relations with Asian countries as equally important as the country’s alliance with the U.S. In global terms, Australian foreign policy has introduced the notion of middle power niche diplomacy. This deliberate positioning has yielded some interesting initiatives (e.g., APEC or the Responsibility to Protect doctrine). One of them is the effort to reinvigorate the integration of two distant realities: Asia and the Pacific. Kevin Rudd’s flagship proposal to formalize existing international relationships into a community has become a notable illustration of these trends. After initially setting out a different rhetorical vision for this prospective Asia Pacific Community, Australia finally shifted from the concept of a security-​driven Community to a conversation-​driven one, as pioneered by ASEAN. In fact, Rudd’s APC project lacked geographical consistency and clarity and was destined to perish as the short-​lived political extravaganza that it was. Keywords: Asia-​Pacific, community, Australia, Kevin Rudd

Introduction Contemporary political leaders are often accused of lacking vision and grand ideas. Instead, they practice the modern interpretation of prudence, understood as caution, restraint, and a general aversion to risk and action. There have been a few exceptions to this, but hardly anyone would expect to find them in Australia. The case in question is one such exception:  Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd’s proposal of an ‘Asia-​Pacific Community.’ In the distant past, Australian foreign policy was known for its pragmatic and balanced approach and the long period of dependency that formed its historical underpinnings. It has even been described as “not just stable, but reassuringly boring.” For the first half of the 20th century, Australia remained under the umbrella of Great Britain, and after WWII –​under that of the United States. The alliance with the United States remains the bedrock of Australian strategic policy to this day, and traditional links of kinship with the United Kingdom continue to permeate its political culture. However, since the 1960s, the need to establish friendly relations with Asian countries has been recognized as equally

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important, which has resulted in, among other things, generous contributions under the Colombo Plan. The end of the bilateral world –​and, above all, changes in Asia and the rise of China –​have shifted foreign policy priorities toward a more active engagement with Asia. Australia’s geographical isolation and cultural distinctiveness from neighboring Asian countries have created fears of exclusion and irrelevance, both globally and among the great powers. This challenge has yielded different responses from Canberra’s political elites. Following the lines of liberal internationalism, Labour Party leaders have welcomed the current dynamic transformations in Asia and perceived them as an opportunity for Australia to play a facilitating role in regional integration. The Australian Labour governments played an instrumental role in the formation of APEC and a variety of cooperative dialogues, both multilaterally and bilaterally. Thus, the Labour tradition has long aspired for Australia to be the ‘odd man in.’ On the other hand, Australian conservatives have recognized the discrepancy between the political aims of Asia as a geopolitical region and a cultural framework that draws on traditions drawn from Europe (or rather the Anglosphere). They have also emphasized Australia’s reliance on deep bilateral relationships with major allies, especially the United States. Asia has been treated first and foremost as a successful and prosperous partner in the regional economy. In global terms, Australian foreign policy has introduced the notion of middle power niche diplomacy, which is associated with foreign minister Gareth Evans, often known as the godfather of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine. He suggested concentrating resources in specific areas rather than trying to cover the whole field and saw Australia’s role as that of an intermediary, mediator, or provider of stability. Thus, in foreign policy, Canberra promoted continuity combined with small scale innovations.

The ‘Asia-​Pacific Way’? Rudd’s APC plan After eleven years of successive Liberal Party governments, Kevin Rudd became Prime Minister in 2007 in a new Labour Party administration. He brought “a different perspective about Asia from any of his predecessors” as the first Prime Minister whose views were defined by the idea of the rapid pace of change in China.465 Furthermore, Rudd spoke Mandarin and had served as an Australian

465 Gyngell, Allan: Ambition: The Emerging Foreign Policy of the Rudd Government, Sydney: Lowy Institute for International Policy, December 2009, p. 5.

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diplomat in Beijing. He seemed to combine a belief in what he called “creative middle power diplomacy” with an almost religious conviction that Australia could actually make a difference in determining the outcomes of major international initiatives. He thought that middle powers really could “punch above their weight.” Allan Gyngell associates this position with Australia’s anti-​isolationist strand in foreign policy, “a belief that it is preferable to try to shape outcomes in the world rather than wait to be shaped by them.”466 Thus, then-​PM Rudd tried to reconcile the two strands that have always been present within his own Labour Party, i.e. interest-​driven realism and values-​driven liberal internationalism. He inaugurated his foreign policy platform by announcing Australia’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol, withdrawing combat troops from Iraq, working out the logistics of the G20 summit, and proposing that Australia sit on the UN Security Council. Rudd’s first step toward engagement with Asia was an unsuccessful attempt to include Australia in the Six Party Talks (China, US, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia).467 Kevin Rudd announced his proposal for a new Asia-​Pacific Community on June 4, 2008, to the Asia Society Australia in Sydney.468 He enumerated three pillars of the Government’s foreign policy: the alliance with the United States, the United Nations, and the comprehensive engagement in the Asia-​Pacific region, emphasizing the third one as increasingly important in the ‘Asian century.’ Rudd argued that it was desirable to review the long-​term vision for the architecture of the Asia Pacific region. He recognized and praised the importance and records of regional structures, emphasizing that “a debate [on the APC] does not in itself mean the diminution of any of the existing regional bodies:  APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Plus Three and ASEAN itself.” However, he argued that these structures are inadequate to cope with the challenges Asia faces. These include: “enhancing a sense of security community; developing a capacity to deal with terrorism, natural disasters and disease problems; (...) enhancing non-​discriminatory open 4 66 Ibid., p. 3 467 Rudd, Kevin: Australia, the United States and the Asia Pacific region. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 31 March 2008, retrieved 23.07.2017, from https://​w ww. brookings.edu/​w p-​content/​uploads/​2012/​04/​20080331_​australia.pdf. 4 68 Rudd, Kevin: It is time to build an Asia-​Pacific Community: Address to the Asia Society Australasia Centre, 4 June 2008, retrieved 22.07.2017, from https://​pmtranscripts. pmc.gov.au/​release/​transcript-​15947.

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trading regimes and providing long-​term energy resource and food security.” He added that “[we] need to have a vision for an Asia Pacific Community, a vision that embraces: a regional institution which spans the entire Asia-​Pacific region  –​including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia and the other states of the region; a regional institution which is able to engage in the full spectrum of dialogue, cooperation and action on economic and political matters and future challenges related to security.”469 He argued that strong and effective regional institutions are needed that will underpin an open, peaceful, stable, and prosperous region. Regional institutions are important in addressing common challenges that no one country can address alone. PM Rudd also referred to the experience of Europe and the EU. Speaking on the question of security, he said that “we have something to learn from Europe where centuries of animosity have been transformed into an unparalleled degree of transnational cooperation.” At the same time, “the European Union of course does not represent an identikit model of what we would seek to develop in the Asia Pacific. But what we can learn from Europe is that it is necessary to take the first step. In the 1950s, skeptics saw European integration as unrealistic. But most people would now agree that the goal of the visionaries in Europe (...) to build prosperity and a common sense of a security community has been achieved. It is that spirit we need to capture in our hemisphere.”470 Rudd announced that this vision for an Asia Pacific Community should be achieved by 2020. This regional institution, he suggested, should span the entire Asia-​Pacific region, including the United States, Japan, China, India, Indonesia, and the other states of the region. Rudd proposed a debate on the full spectrum of cooperation on economic and political issues as well as future challenges related to security.

Domestic and international reception The announcement about this prospective Asia Pacific Community came unexpectedly because Kevin Rudd had not consulted it with his government, the opposition, or, and above all, with any of the countries involved. Not surprisingly, the initial response at home was critical and came both from the Labour Party and the parliamentary opposition. Bob Hawke and Paul Keating, both former Prime Ministers from Rudd’s own party, disapproved of the references

4 69 Ibid. 470 Ibid.

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to the EU, which left the impression that Kevin Rudd was suggesting the creation of an ‘Asia Pacific Union’ similar to the European Union. The Australian Parliamentary Opposition was much more negative, criticizing the proposal as hasty, prepared with no consultation, and above all, based on Labour’s view that Australia’s interests are best pursued through rule-​based international systems that are obvious and should be followed by all nations.471 Similarly, some initial international reactions flowing in from some Asian political analysts were clearly critical, except for some expert voices from Indonesia and Malaysia. The response given by Head of the School of International Studies from Singapore –​that the proposal “is dead in the water right from the very beginning”  –​became an oft-​quoted, almost proverbial statement.472 Official reactions from the U.S., China, Japan, and India were lukewarm. Rudd misjudged the potential U.S.  response. The initial response from the Bush administration was non-​committal. Then, Kurt Campbell, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs in the Obama administration, said that “it would ultimately be the U.S. and not Australia who would be taking on the role of harnessing and directing any large new institution that involved China and Japan.”473 China’s response was equally categorical. Assistant Foreign Minister Hu Zhengyne said that “the conditions aren’t ripe to put this [APC] mechanism on the agenda.” He added that the Australian initiative is worth considering, but should be anchored in Asian principles.474 However, as is usually the case, the true official line of thinking in Beijing was presented in an essay by Jia Qingguo, which will be discussed further below.

471 Frost, Frank:  Australia’s proposal for an ‘Asia Pacific Community’:  Issues and prospects. Canberra:  Parliament of Australia, Department of Parliamentary Services, 1 December 2009, retrieved 12.02.2017, from https://​w ww.aph.gov.au/​ binaries/​library/​pubs/​r p/​2009-​10/​10rp13.pdf, p. 10. 472 See, for example:  Dobbell, Greame:  Asia-​ Pacific Community; An Idea, and Envoy and ASEA, The Lowy Institute for International Policy, 15 October 2008, retrieved 12.02.2017, from https://​archive.lowyinstitute.org/​t he-​interpreter/​ asia-​pacific-​community-​idea-​envoy-​a nd-​asean. 473 Norington, Brad: “Barack Obama’s Man Kurt Campbell Junks Kevin Rudd’s Asia-​ Pacific Plan,” retrieved 13.02.2017, from https://​tinyurl.com/​ybjresvu. 474 Liow, Joseph Chinyong: “Southeast Asia in 2009: A Year fraught with challenges.” In: Singh, Daljit (ed.): Southeast Asia Affairs 2010, ISEAS Publishing: Singapore 2010, p. 17.

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Japan ignored the Rudd initiative, especially since its announcement took place just before Rudd’s postponed visit to Tokyo. Later, in October 2009, Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama presented a counter-​proposal in the form of an East Asia Community, which was to include ASEAN members, China, Japan, and South Korea, without the United States  –​and, of course, without Australia.475 Japan’s proposal appeared to have been designed as not compatible but rather competitive with Australia’s conception. Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee expressed the view that he “would watch with interest Rudd’s move” but remained non-​committal on the APC.476 In spite of some support that initially came from Thailand, South Korea, and Vietnam, the APC was viewed within ASEAN as a direct threat to the association’s pivotal role in regional initiatives. PM Abdullah Badawi of Malaysia maintained that “[we] already have a forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum. We can continue with the existing institutions.”477 The Vice President of Indonesia argued that “it’s not necessary to make a new body. We already have ASEAN and APEC.”478 In July 2008, the official spokesman for ASEAN’s ministerial meetings in Singapore commented that the region is rather complex, so another regional process “has to take into account the region’s view as well as regional sensitivities and regional circumstances.”479 Faced with limited regional backing for the creation of the APC and an overall response fraught with critical voices, Rudd advanced his proposal by trying to explain that APC was to be neither an economic union nor a monetary one, let  alone a political union; that ASEAN’s contribution to regional cooperation is crucial; and that the APC could also include countries such as 475 Hatoyama, Yukio: “A New Path for Japan,” The New York Times, 26 August 2009, retrieved 12.07.2017, from https://​w ww.nytimes.com/​2009/​08/​27/​opinion/​27iht-​ edhatoyama.html. 476 Parashar, Sachin: “Despite Snub, India Backs Oz ‘Community’ Plan with China,” The Times of India, 24 June 2008, retrieved 17.07.2017, from https://​timesofindia. indiatimes.com/​india/​Despite-​snub-​India-​backs-​Oz-​community-​plan-​w ith-​China/​ articleshow/​3158450.cms. 477 Frost, Frank:  Engaging the Neighbours:  Australia and ASEAN since 1974. Canberra: ANU Press 2016, p. 152. 478 Grigg, Angus: “Blow to Rudd’s Asia Plan,” Australian Financial Review, 23 July 2008, retrieved 16.07.2017, from https://​w ww.afr.com/​companies/​manufacturing/​ blow-​to-​rudds-​asia-​plan-​20080723-​jcns9. 479 Nicholas, Katrina: “Smith Still Keen on New Regional Group,” Australian Financial Review, 24  July  2008, retrieved 16.07.2017, from https://​w ww.afr.com/​politics/​ smith-​still-​keen-​on-​new-​regional-​group-​20080724-​jkg9b.

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South Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore. In 2008 and 2009, Richard Woolcott, a Special Envoy of the APC, conducted a series of consultations in 21 countries on behalf of the Australian Government, at a cost of 300,000 AUD, to explore attitudes about the grand plan. The concept paper prepared by Woolcott concluded that: “First, there has been broad agreement on the value of a focused discussion about how regional architecture can best serve all of our interests in the future (…) Second, there is widespread recognition that our current structures do not provide a single forum (…) to discuss the full range of political, economic, and security challenges we face in the future. Third, it is clear no one wants more meetings. There is no appetite for additional institutions.”480 However, Rudd did not give up and continued outlining his vision throughout 2009 to senior officials and heads of states. In an address to the Shangri-​la Dialogue in Singapore, he seemed to admit defeat on his APC project, but at the same time contemplated a glorious future for the Asia Pacific community, symbolically switching out the “large C” of Community to a “small c.” The use of a capital “C” was discounted in part because there was a widespread feeling that it might produce some confusion between Rudd’s concept and cooperation patterns in Europe. It was, as one expert observed, “an excellent example of how a politician cuts his or her losses while moving on to proclaim progress.” Rudd also finally admitted that ASEAN must be at the core of any future APC(c).481 Thus, Australia had shifted from a Community concept to a community conversation conducted by ASEAN. The last attempt to convince Asian leaders was the ‘one-​and-​a-​half track’ meeting in Sydney in December 2009. Rudd sought to reassure a broad audience that Australia’s ambition has been “to open paths to dialogue rather than to close them, to listen as much as to speak, to encourage conversation rather than to dominate it.” However, the Sydney meeting produced a final blow to the Rudd’s plan. The meeting did not arrive at a consensus. Even the proposed formation of an eminent persons’ group capable of devising a concrete plan for the eventual creation of an Asia Pacific community met with controversy and never materialized.482

480 Woolcott, Richard: “Towards an Asia Pacific Community.” Asialink Essays 9, 2009, retrieved 14.07.2017, from https://​asialink.unimelb.edu.au/​asialink-​dialogues-​a nd-​ applied-​research/​commentary-​and-​analysis/​toward-​an-​asia-​pacific-​community; cf. Frost (2009), pp. 11–​12. 481 Frost (2009), pp. 9–​10. 482 Frost (2016), p. 155.

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The end of the APC occurred not in the midst of international activities but at home. Rudd was ousted as PM by his deputy in an intra-​party coup in June 2010. Since Rudd finally left Australian politics in 2013, he has held a number of research positions on China-​U.S.  relations and served as chair of the UN Commission on Multilateralism. In 2016, Rudd put himself forward for the role of UN Secretary General but was not appointed by the Australian government. However, the patent indifference surrounding his project and his marginalized position have not distracted him from trying to further promote the APC.483 A range of theoretical issues can be flagged. Most of them have been mentioned above and can be grouped in the way described below.

The membership question and regional relationships “Who’s in and who’s not” has always been a sensitive issue in the course of establishing regional institutions. In terms of membership, no existing forum covered all the major countries with deep interest in the Asia Pacific. One major problem is that there has been no consensus on how to best define the geographical region in which cooperation should be implemented and how to reconcile the great historical, cultural, and political diversity of the states in East Asia and the Asia Pacific region. Rudd was right that none of the existing regional multilateral forums will help to build a new regional order. APEC is too wide and diverse, and Taiwan’s involvement is a major liability; EAS and ASEAN+3 exclude the U.S. One of the ways to resolve this quandary would be to expand existing institutions, e.g., by widening APEC to include India or the East Asia Summit to include Russia and the United States. This, however, would not resolve the matter of cross-​membership. There would still be countries that are members of one of the existing regional forums, but not of others. Another option would be to create a cooperative body on major strategic and security issues consisting of a relatively small group of states that might constitute an Asian G8 or G10.484 483 Rudd has never stopped promoting his grand project. He joined the Asia Society Policy Institute as its inaugural President in 2015. He also established the Asia Pacific Community Foundation to promote the cause of regional collaboration. In addition, he has delivered numerous papers on this question, including, “Russia’s Role in Asia-​Pacific Security Architecture. Towards an Asia-​Pacific Security Community,” 17 June 2016, retrieved 17.07.2017, from https://​eng.globalaffairs.ru/​articles/​russias-​ role-​in-​asia-​pacific-​security-​architecture/​. 484 Wanandi, Jususf:  “Remodelling regional architecture,” PacNet Newsletter, Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, 18  February  2009, retrieved 15.07.2017, from

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This kind of arrangement, however, would exclude all the members of ASEAN, thus reducing its support for any activities pursued. Another issue is to what extent, if any, the smaller states of the Southwest Pacific may be represented in the proposed forum. Related to the question of membership is the matter of the relationship between the APC and existing regional institutions. Australia has been promoting its Asia Pacific concept for decades  –​going back to the Asia-​Pacific Economic Cooperation (commenced in 1989), the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (1980), the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (advocated for throughout the 1970s), and the Asian and Pacific Council (founded in 1966). However, advancing the Asia Pacific architecture has often been a tough task. It must compete with the narrower East Asian (or sometimes Asian) form of regionalism, which is notably present in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Thus, one of the fundamental problems has been the lack of consensus on how best to define the geographical region in which cooperation should be pursued. The two core terms –​‘Asia-​Pacific’ and ‘East Asia’ –​overlap but are at odds with each other. Two other terms –​‘Pacificism’ and ‘Asianism’ –​offer different approaches to the regional order and vary in scope, boundaries, and directions.485 In this sense, the APC project lacks geographical consistency and clarity, which in turn erodes the sense of community it aims to create. Another major issue is that many states have longstanding historical and territorial disputes as well as political rivalries, which have also had impact on the development of regional institutions. The Rudd plan is ambiguous as to whether the intention is for the APC to supplement or replace the existing institutions. The ARF remains the indispensable forum for security dialogue in the region. The creation of the APC would dilute it, a situation that many ASEAN states view with concern. Discussions following the presentation of the APC concept indicated that there was little support for, if not outright rejection of, the creation of any distinctly new institution.486 Thus, several suggestions were advanced concerning the development or extension of existing groupings, as has been outlined above. However, further

https://​csis-​prod.s3.amazonaws.com/​s3fs-​public/​legacy_​fi les/​fi les/​media/​csis/​pubs/​ pac0913.pdf. 485 Wesley, Michael: “Asia, America and Australia: The art of keeping (each other at) a safe distance.” American Review, 1, 2009, pp. 53–​62. 486 Frost (2016), pp. 156–​157.

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steps in this direction –​mainly the enlargement of the EAS –​seemed to occur not because of the APC concept but due to independent political decisions in ASEAN, Russia, and the United States. Institutional challenges go in tandem with the question of leadership and decision-​making mechanisms. Again, the ACP is unclear as to who should sit in the driver’s seat in a body operated by big powers such as China, the United States, and Russia. Nor does it suggest a mechanism that is both efficient and receptive of the views of smaller states concerned that they would be ignored by their larger counterparts . It leads to questions on the extent to which the major powers will be willing and able to cooperate in an Asia Pacific Community on sensitive issues.

The security question and the cultural context Rudd’s assessment of the inadequacy of multilateral cooperation in Asia was especially valid regarding the matter of security. The region has not been able to build up a body similar to the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-​ operation in Europe), leaving the area to bilateral relations and particular groupings, with the ARF being only a loosely composed, consultative institution. This issue has not been extensively discussed, with the notable exception of a paper written by a Chinese professor of International Relations, Qingguo Jia, whose views were subsequently supported by Carlyle Thayer.487 Pointing out the fact that Rudd had often stressed the importance of the United States as an Australian ally, Jia asks the following: “Does he [Rudd] envisage an APC replacing [the alliance of Australia with USA]? If not, how can one build a viable APC when some of its members are allies and others are not? (…) Does Rudd envisage [the] phasing out [of the existing organizations] to make space for the APC in the future? It is not clear how he can persuade countries, especially those with vested interests in these institutions, that the APC would not undermine their national interests.”488 Thus, military alliances constitute a major problem. Jia seems to suggest that it would be difficult to create a new

487 Thayer, Carlyle: “Kevin Rudd’s multi-​layered Asia Pacific Community initiative,” retrieved 15.07.2017, from https://​w ww.eastasiaforum.org/​2009/​06/​22/​kevin-​rudds-​ multi-​layered-​asia-​pacific-​community-​initiative/​. 488 Jia, Qingguo: “Realizing the Asia Pacific Community: Geographic, Institutional and Leadership Challenges,” East Asia Forum Quarterly, 28 July 2009, retrieved 15.07.2020, from https://​w ww.eastasiaforum.org/​2009/​07/​28/​realizing-​t he-​asia-​ pacific-​community-​geographic-​institutional-​a nd-​leadership-​challenges/​.

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multilateral security community without disbanding the existing U.S. military alliances. However, from the Australian point of view, any new broad regional institution that embraces future challenges related to security without the United States is simply unacceptable. Generally speaking, the greatest challenge posed by the concept of ‘security architecture’ is how much its alleged proponents genuinely wish to fulfill this vision and to work collectively in confidence to overcome the inherent challenges of realizing it. Recalling the famous phrase coined by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright –​“No decoupling, no duplication, and no discrimination”  –​which was originally applied to the emergence of an autonomous EU security and defense policy, one may characterize most of the doubts concerning membership, institutional interdependence, and security as a whole in a similar way. Opponents of the grand idea asserted that it was necessary to avoid the decoupling of the existing order, predicted a duplication of functions and tasks by a new organization in relation to the existing structures, and were afraid of discriminating against the smaller and mid-​size countries by big powers. In other words, if the APC plan was meant to serve as food for thought, it was a thought that produced inedible food. Another aspect of the Australian proposal was presented in Practical vs. identity regionalism:  Australia’s APC initiative  –​A  case study by Sheryn Lee and Anthony Milner from Australian National University in 2014. The study suggests that the use of the term ‘community’ was ambiguous and problematic because there was no agreed-​upon concept of how a regional community should be defined –​that is, whether it should revolve and evolve around East Asia or the Asia-​Pacific. The authors suggest that the grouping proposed by Rudd would be an entirely new community, one based not on any historical and cultural unity, but formed around a common theme of practical (especially security) concerns. The Australian proposal paid little attention, however, to the influence of cognitive and emotive factors in community planning:  it neglected ‘identity’ regionalism, which in Asia is fundamental to the task of region building. In particular, it did not seem to take seriously the possible role of non-​Western perspectives in shaping the development of post-​colonial inter-​ state relations. Through an investigation of key Asian-​language terms related to the English terms for ‘region’ and ‘community,’ the article seeks to demonstrate different understandings of these terms in Asian and Australian political cultures. The authors conclude that “[It is] this stress on identity regionalism –​ not any body of ideas about what specific norms and values might contribute to or flow from an East Asian or Asian identity –​which we see as vital. What is more, it is (…) [an assumption that is] embedded in the languages and longue

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duree political cultures in most of Asia.”489 Thus, Australia’s APC seems not to have been viewed as a true community  –​one encompassing concerns about emotive ties and identity, and able to tackle sensitive tasks. This approach seems to agree with the informal remarks of an Asian colleague I  heard while in Canberra. He said, half-​jokingly:  “How can a post-​ European country (without nuclear weapons) situated on the periphery of the region tell us how we should manage our own affairs? It is as if Turkey would propose a grand plan for Europe.”

The hidden agenda and power relations Many cautious and negative comments touched upon the real intentions of the APC concept as emerging from the national interests of the Commonwealth of Australia. Australia was trying to find its place between a might America, a rising Asia, and a faltering Europe. The APC proposal was aimed at resolving the central conundrum confronting Australian foreign policy –​that is, how to respond to the growing rivalry between China, the country’s largest trading partner, and the United States, its longstanding strategic ally. Rudd hoped to maintain Canberra’s balancing act between the two powers, both of which are vital to the economic and geo-​political interests of middle-​power Australia. Thus, his APC proposal aimed to manage a transformation of Asia’s international system to accommodate the growing power of China and India with the help of an American presence and a European-​like pool of norms and procedures. At the same time, the Australian leader wanted to provide for his country a stable and important place in a new institution, a place that Australia was not able to have in ASEAN and other Asian groupings, and a place that would make it a truly Asian country. One view states that because Australia is seen as an Asian outsider, Rudd’s initiative was merely to “secure a seat at the table.”490 The following passage from his speech inaugurating the APC seem to confirm this opinion: “we believe that we need to anticipate historic changes in our region and seek to shape them; rather than simply react to them.”491 Another view 489 Lee, Sheryn /​Milner, Anthony: “Practical vs. identity regionalism: Australia’s APC initiative –​A case study.” Contemporary Politics 20(2), 2014, p. 224. 490 Heseltine, Colin:  “Asia Pacific:  Reinventing the Wheel,” retrieved 15.07.2020, from https://​asialink.unimelb.edu.au/​asialink-​dialogues-​a nd-​applied-​research/​ commentary-​a nd-​a nalysis/​asia-​pacific-​community-​reinventing-​t he-​wheel. 491 Rudd (2008), Web.

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suggests that, in the eyes of policymakers in Asia, Australia is an “awkward partner” that is neither here or there.492 Rudd’s project favors the Asia Pacific version of regionalism (Pacificism), which competes with a Pan-​Asian version that excludes outsiders such as the United States and Australia. Caught between greater powers in the region, Australia seems to be constrained by its position, not only because Canberra is an inadequate supplier of the vision but also because these are predominantly big powers that must choose between those two versions of regionalism. Another aspect of the rejection of the APC proposal by Asian countries is the potential challenge of shared sovereignty, which is implicated particularly clearly in the project’s approach to security issues. This idea, which often leads to the formation of transnational structures, is alien and unacceptable to Asian strategic culture. It has been observed that there is some similarity between the idea of Hugh White’s Concert of Asia and Rudd’s APC plan. Hugh White is a leading Australian expert on strategic and defence policy, Asia-​Pacific security issues, and global strategic affairs. White argued that the United States should accommodate China and peacefully give up its strategic primacy in Asia, thus creating a concert of the two powers, sharing power and deescalating rivalry for leadership in Asia.493 White himself noted that Rudd’s analysis of the situation and the need for a regional multilateral forum are well-​founded and timely. However, he contested the assumption that this new order could be negotiated between all states in the region. According to White, new institutions are established when big powers reach a clear understanding about future relationships, hammered out in closed conferences away “from the glare of big meetings.” New institutions and a new order are the result of some painful political processes in which each major power remodels its policy to meet emerging realities. Therefore, White concluded that Rudd was wrong in believing that an international order is created by institutions that merely reflect it. Instead, the

492 He, Baogang: “The awkwardness of Australian engagement with Asia: The dilemmas of Australian idea of regionalism,” Japanese Journal of Political Science 12(2), 2011, p. 57. 493 White’s ideas found the most exposure in his later book The China Choice: Why We Should Share Power. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013. Cf. He, Baogang: “A concert of powers and hybrid regionalism in Asia.” Australian Journal of Political Science 47(4), 2012, pp. 677–​690.

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international order is built by big powers.494 Naturally, White’s assumption seems to be confirmed by voices coming from said big powers. For example, Sun Zhe sees the emergence of a new security dilemma in the Asia-​Pacific, as geopolitical friction increases due to escalating crises. He claims that the future way out of the Asia-​Pacific region’s current security dilemma depends heavily on how the U.S., China, and Japan can work together.495

Failure or success As Baogang He argues, “Despite the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s claim that the inclusion of the US and India in the EAS is a sign of the practical success of the idea of the APC,” Rudd’s APC has failed.496 The opinion of Australian civil servants has been supported by Marcin Grabowski, a Polish scholar of Asian affairs, who noted that the enlargement of the East Asia Summit (EAS18) could be perceived as a kind of heritage of the Australian Prime Minister’s idea.497 Rudd’s failure was largely due to three factors.498 First, he made a unilateral announcement without consulting with any Asian leaders or the U.S. administration. Second, he presented a mental framework that was alien to Asian recipients. Third, and most importantly, he presented a fundamental challenge to ASEAN countries, and his pressure on major powers like China and the

494 White, Hugh: “The Asia Pacific Community concept: Right task, wrong tool?,” retrieved 15.07.2017, from https://​w ww.eastasiaforum.org/​2009/​04/​26/​t he-​asia-​ pacific-​community-​concept-​right-​task-​w rong-​tool/​. 495 Zhe, Sun: “Building a security community in Asia-​Pacific Region: Can China contribute?.” American Foreign Policy Interests 37(5/​6), 2015, pp. 279–​287. 496 He (2011), p. 62. 497 Grabowski, Marcin: “Regional integration in the Asia-​Pacific: Is there anything left from Asia-​Pacific Community proposal?.” In: Pożarlik, Grzegorz (ed.): Europe in the Visegrad Perspective: On-​line Reader, Kraków 2014, retrieved 18.07.2017, from https://​v isegradstudies.files.wordpress.com/​2015/​01/​v isegrad-​reader-​2014_​pr.pdf. Cf. Woolcott, Richard: “Asia-​Pacific Community could be Rudd’s golden legacy.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 January 2011, retrieved 16.07.2017, from https://​ www.smh.com.au/​politics/​federal/​asia-​pacific-​community-​could-​be-​rudds-​golden-​ legacy-​20110119-​19wj1.html. 498 Callick, Rowan: “Rudd’s Asian vision quietly buried,” The Australian, 21 June 2010, retrieved 15.07.2017, from https://​w ww.theaustralian.com.au/​news/​world/​kevin-​ rudds-​a isan-​v ision-​quietly-​buried/​news-​story/​b71287f897bada23b27ec7cbd51 59f70.

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United States to make a premature commitment backfired and fostered distrust. In addition, he represented a midsized power with global ambitions but without the resources and leverage to be taken seriously in the region. Therefore, even if Rudd had discussed his proposal in advance with countries affected, it would have been rejected on its merits. One of the factors that explain Rudd’s political idealism and his over-​ enthusiastic approach to his APC project might be his religious beliefs. Raised as a Roman Catholic, he converted to the Anglican Church and has been vocal about his Christianity. Domestically, for example, one of the first items that he checked off his list of campaign promises was to formally apologize to Australian aborigines for the abuses they suffered in the past, which Rudd did in February 2008. However, religious faith combined with self-​confidence in one’s ambitious international political vision rarely brings about practical results.

Conclusions The story of the APC(c) is illustrative in that it lays bare the mistakes that governments should not make in handling foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, all of them are fairly obvious: (1) Never surprise your allies, and if you do, never trust in their good will and in their readiness to neglect their own national interests; (2) If you are not the autocratic leader of a powerful country, never propose a bold vision without domestic and foreign support; (3) Never believe that your true intentions –​the so-​called hidden agenda –​w ill not be revealed by both your friends and opponents; (4) If you propose an innovative ‘grand idea’ to leaders of different cultures in your own mental language, fully expect that they will translate it into their own political culture, to your disadvantage; (5) Never allow your personal ambition and faith in your unique intellectual power to dominate the ideas you propose. Whatever history ultimately makes of Rudd, he cannot be faulted for lack of ambition. At a time when one of the principal criticisms of contemporary political leaders is that they fail to tackle important issues, at least he tried. It is worth asking what we want our foreign policymakers to do –​especially when they come from modestly credentialed countries, such as Australia. But, in any case, there is not much purpose in being a leader if one does not have some sort of vision. As no less a foreign policy expert than Oscar Wilde famously observed, a map of the world without Utopia on it is not worth looking at.

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Woolcott, Richard: “Asia-​Pacific Community could be Rudd’s golden legacy.” The Sydney Morning Herald, 20  January  2011, retrieved 16.07.2017, from https://​w ww.smh.com.au/​politics/​federal/​a sia-​pacific-​community-​could-​ be-​rudds-​golden-​legacy-​20110119-​19wj1.html. Zhe, Sun: “Building a security community in Asia-​Pacific Region: Can China contribute?.” American Foreign Policy Interests 37(5/​6), 2015. * Andrzej Jaroszyński was Deputy Consul General of Poland in Chicago, Deputy Head of Mission in Washington D.C., Director of Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Polish Ambassador to Norway and Australia. He is currently a visiting lecturer at the John Paul Catholic University of Lublin and Maria Curie-​Skłodowska University in Lublin. He has authored over a hundred articles and essays on international relations, English literature, culture and politics.

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