Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, Volume 2: The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument [2] 9004124675, 9789004124677

This study intends to show that the ascription of many shortcomings or obscurities to Aristotle is due to the persistent

620 73 30MB

English Pages 510 [513] Year 2002

Report DMCA / Copyright

DOWNLOAD FILE

Polecaj historie

Aristotle: Semantics and Ontology, Volume 2: The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument [2]
 9004124675, 9789004124677

Table of contents :
ARISTOTLE: SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY, Volume 2: The Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument......Page 4
Table of Contents......Page 6
7. Preliminaries to Metaphysical Enquiry......Page 14
7.1 How to tackle 'scientific' problems......Page 15
7.11 The predecessors observed and criticized......Page 16
7.12 Wisdom and the knowledge of causes and principles......Page 17
7.13 The general introduction presented in Met. α......Page 20
7.14 Three methodological hints......Page 23
7.15 An infinite chain of causes rejected......Page 24
7.16 How to frame a persuasive argument......Page 25
7.2 The scope and proper method of metaphysics (Met. B)......Page 27
7.21 The proper scope of metaphysical investigation......Page 28
7.22 How to zoom in on causes and principles......Page 30
7.23 Summary of Met. A, α, and Β......Page 34
7.3 Metaphysics assessed among the disciplines (Γ, chs. 1-3)......Page 35
(a) Ἐπιστήμη......Page 36
(c) The phrase τὸ ὄv ἧ ὄv......Page 37
(d) The use of συμβεβηκός ('coincidental')......Page 39
7.32 The unity of metaphysics......Page 40
7.33 The convertibility of 'being' and 'one'......Page 43
7.4 The semantic strategy revisited......Page 46
7.41 Categorization and using the qua-locution......Page 47
7.42 On the use of the phrase καθ' ὅλου......Page 49
7.51 The logico-ontological nature, of LNC and LEM......Page 52
7.52 The framing of the two firmest principles......Page 54
7.6 The truth of LNC vindicated elenctically......Page 56
7.7 The eight arguments in favour of LNC......Page 60
7.71 First argument (1006a28-31)......Page 61
7.72 Second argument (1006a31-1007b18). 'To signify one thing'......Page 62
7.73 Third argument (1007b18-1008a2)......Page 75
7.74 Fourth argument (1008a2-7)......Page 77
7.75 Fifth argument (1008a7-34)......Page 78
7.76 Sixth argument (1008a34-b2)......Page 80
7.77 Seventh argument (1008b2-31)......Page 81
7.78 Eighth argument (1008b31-1009a5)......Page 82
7.79 A corollary on the failures of the Protagorean doctrine......Page 84
7.81 Aristotle's strategy of argument......Page 89
7.82 On the relationship between 'real thing' and 'thing perceived'......Page 91
7.83 The refutation of the Protagorean thesis completed......Page 93
7.84 Aristotle's summary of chs. 3, 1005b8 to 6, 1011b12......Page 98
7.9 The arguments in favour of LEΜ. How to assess them......Page 99
7.91 The seven arguments in support of LEΜ......Page 102
7.93 On some erroneous vieius about things......Page 107
7.94 Recapitulation......Page 109
8.1 The assessment of metaphysics among the theoretical disciplines......Page 111
8.21 The differentiation of 'what is' (τὸ ὄv)......Page 120
8.22 Some basic misunderstandings concerning Met. Δ 7......Page 121
8.23 Met. Δ 7 taken from the semantic point of view......Page 123
8.31 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. Δ 30......Page 130
8.32 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. E, chs. 2-3......Page 134
8.41 Falsehood in Met. Δ 29......Page 139
8.42 Antisthenes's erroneous semantic position countered......Page 143
8.43 The role of the λόγος-πρᾶγμα issue in the present discussion......Page 146
8.5 'What-is' taken as 'what-is-qua-true' in Met. Ε 4......Page 148
8.51 On the notions 'is-true' and 'is-not-true' in Met. A 7......Page 149
8.52 The anatomy of the apophantic expressions instanced......Page 150
8.53 On the purport of chapter Ε 4......Page 152
8.54 'What-is-qua-true' as basically being a mental construct......Page 153
8.55 The 'what-is-qua-true' dismissed......Page 155
9.1 Οὐσία as the primary sense of 'what is'......Page 161
9.11 What is 'primary being'?......Page 166
9.12 Finding one's way among the common-sense opinions about ούσία......Page 170
9.2 Is the substratum (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) the οὐσία ?......Page 171
9.21 Can the form be called an 'underlying thing'?......Page 174
9.22 Matter's credentials put to the test......Page 175
9.23 Can 'substance' be 'predicated' of matter"?......Page 177
9.24 Matter's credentials nullified......Page 179
9.31 The role of the καθ' αὐτό appellation......Page 180
9.32 On using the ἱμάτιον device......Page 183
9.33 On the definiens as expressing a thing's quiddity......Page 187
9.34 An appendix on the notion of 'being-one' as discussed elsewhere......Page 190
9.35 The discussion of oneness in Met. I, chs. 1-2. Connotative 'one'......Page 195
9.41 On one-word expressions including an intrinsic determinant......Page 199
9.42 Does a thing's quiddity coincide with the particular itselß......Page 201
9.43 The special position of τα καθ' αὑτὰ λεγόμενα......Page 203
9.44 On the phrase κατ' ἄλλο λέγεσθαι......Page 205
9.45 To deny the question of 9.42 leads to an infinite regress......Page 207
9.46 On the sameness of a thing and its particular form......Page 208
9.5 An intermezzo on the ontological implications of becoming......Page 210
9.51 On the composite of matter and form......Page 211
9.52 Should matter be included in the definiens ?......Page 212
9.53 The composite is produced, neither matter nor form by themselves......Page 213
9.6 How to overcome some problems of definition......Page 216
9.61 The 'thing itself = quiddity' thesis discussed from another angle......Page 217
9.62 On the mental status of 'universal forms'......Page 219
9.63 On the particular status of the immanent form......Page 220
9.64 Again, should matter be included in the definiens ?......Page 223
9.65 The status of 'non-sensible' objects like 'mathematicals'......Page 229
9.66 Aristotle's summary of the foregoing discussions......Page 235
9.67 The 'first' or 'immediate' οὐσία......Page 236
9.68 What makes a definiens one definite thing?......Page 239
9.7 No universal is οὐσία......Page 242
9.71 Aristotle's key problem concerning particular forms......Page 243
9.72 The case of the universal dismissed......Page 244
9.73 On the communion of forms......Page 248
9.74 No particular can be properly defined......Page 249
9.75 On commonness as alien to true ousia......Page 253
10.1 The οὐσία = εἶδος thesis corroborated once more......Page 257
10.2 A further assessment of matter as 'material constitution'......Page 262
10.3 On form, differentia, and actuality......Page 265
10.4 Again, the problem of defining things properly......Page 267
10.5 Some observations on the identification of material constituents......Page 276
10.6 The unity of the definiens finally stated......Page 279
10.7 An excursus on three controversial issues in Met. Z-H......Page 285
10.71 Again, the particular status of the immanent form......Page 286
10.72 The enmattered form as the principle of individuation......Page 293
10.73 The adoption of form and matter in the definiens......Page 295
10.74 Is a composite, indefinable?......Page 296
10.75 Two kinds of definiens to be distinguished......Page 298
10.76 The role οf γένος in the constitution of natural things......Page 300
10.8 Ancient and Medieval commentators on these issues......Page 301
10.81 The Ancient commentators......Page 302
10.82 The Arab commentators Avicenna and, Averroes......Page 304
10.83 Thomas Aquinas......Page 305
10.84 John Buridan......Page 310
11. Actual and Potential Being. The Mathematicals......Page 315
11.11 Actuality and potentiality assessed......Page 317
11.12 When can what is actually [x] be named 'a potential [y]'?......Page 319
11.13 On a similar use of the ἐκεῖνο-ἐκείνινον device in Met. Ζ 7......Page 322
11.14 On naming something after its potential status......Page 326
11.15 On naming something after its material constitution......Page 327
11.16 The actual thing's priority over its potential counterpart......Page 332
11.17 Some additional remarks about potentiality and actuality......Page 336
11.2 True and false as ontic properties......Page 337
11.21 The proper subject of Θ 10......Page 338
11.22 The ontic truth of σύνθετα......Page 341
11.23 The ontic truth of ἀσύνθετα......Page 342
11.24 A summary of the two kinds of truth......Page 346
11.3 The main outcome of Books ΖΗΘ......Page 347
11.4 An excursus on ontic, truth and non-propositional thought......Page 350
11.5 Some relevant passages from Met. M and Ν......Page 352
11.51 Do eternal immaterial Substances exist ?......Page 353
11.52 On the status of mathematical entities......Page 354
11.53 Aristotle's own view of the status of mathematicals......Page 356
11.54 No separate existence should be assigned to universals......Page 358
11.55 The problem of universals......Page 359
11.56 Can eternal things be composed of elementary parts ?......Page 363
12.1 Status quaestionis......Page 367
12.2 The gamut of arguments used in the works on living nature......Page 371
12.3 The works on natural philosophy......Page 377
12.31 The discussions concerning Time in Phys. IV......Page 380
12.32 Aristotle's definition of χρqoνος. Its elliptic semantic area......Page 384
12.33 The exceptionally complex semantics of χρόνος......Page 387
12.34 The ontological connotation of χρόνος. The use of the ὅ ποτε ὄv clause......Page 388
12.35 The nature of Time itself. The epistemological connotation......Page 392
12.36 Further observations about Time in chs. 12-14......Page 394
12.37 The problem of 'Prime matter' in Aristotle......Page 397
12.38 [X]'s being [y]'s matter' taken as [x]'s special mode of being......Page 399
12.39 The putative main witness for 'prime matter' in GC 13......Page 405
13.0 Introductory......Page 409
13.1 The unity of metaphysics......Page 411
13.11 The unicity of hyparxis......Page 412
13.12 Ontological unity vs. logico-semantic diversity......Page 414
13.2 The method: focalization and categorization......Page 416
13.21 The usual apophantic approach......Page 417
13.22 Does the onomastic approach salvage unitary being?......Page 418
13.3 Focalization and categorization in practiceIs Aristotle an 'astonishing man'?......Page 424
Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca edita consilio et auctoritate Academiae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae (CAG)......Page 430
After 1600......Page 431
Index Locorum......Page 445
Index Nominum......Page 481
Index Verborum et Rerum......Page 490
Back Matter......Page 512

Citation preview

Aristotle SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY VOLUME TWO

L. M. DE RIJK

ARISTOTLE SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY VOLUME TWO

PHILOSOPHIA ANTIQUA A SERIES OF STUDIES ON ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY F O U N D E D BY J. H. WASZINKf A N D W.J. V E R D E N I U S | EDITED BY

J. MANSFELD, D.T. RUNIA J.C.M. VAN WINDEN

VOLUME XCI/II L.M. D E RIJK

' '6 8 V

ARISTOTLE SEMANTICS AND ONTOLOGY VOLUME II! T H E METAPHYSICS. SEMANTICS IN ARISTOTLE'S STRATEGY OF ARGUMENT BY

L.M. DE RIJK

BRILL LEIDEN · B O S T O N · KÖLN 2002

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rijk, Lambertus Marie de (1924-) Aristotle : semantics and ontology / by L.M. de Rijk. ρ cm.—(Philosophia antiqua, ISSN 0079-1687; v. 91) Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: v. 1. General introduction, the works on logic. ISBN 9004123245 (alk. paper) 1. Aristode—Language. 2. Aristotle—Organon. 3. Logic, Ancient. 4. Aristotle. Metaphysics. 5. Metaphysics. I. Title. II. Series. B491.L3 .R45 2002 185—dc21

2002018326

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Rijk, L a m b e r t M a r i e d e : Aristotle : semantics and ontology / by L.M. de Rijk. - Leiden ; Boston ; Köln : Brill (Philosophia antiqua ; Vol. 91/11) Vol. 2. T h e Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument. 2002 ISBN 9 0 - 0 4 - 1 2 4 6 7 - 5

ISSN ISBN

0079-1687 90 04 12467 5

© Copyright 2002 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Cover illustration: Alje Olthof Cover design: Cédilles/Studio Cursief, Amsterdam All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in anyform or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy itemsfor internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriatefees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN T H E NETHERLANDS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME TWO: T h e Metaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's Strategy of Argument Chapter Seven: Preliminaries to Metaphysical Enquiry 7.1 How to tackle 'scientific' problems 7.11 T h e predecessors observed and criticized 7.12 Wisdom and the knowledge of causes and principles 7.13 T h e general introduction presented in Met. a 7.14 Three methodological hints 7.15 An infinite chain of causes rejected 7.16 How to frame a persuasive argument 7.2 T h e scope and proper method of metaphysics (Met. B) ... 7.21 T h e proper scope of metaphysical investigation 7.22 How to zoom in on causes and principles 7.23 Summary of Met. A, a, and Β 7.3 Metaphysics assessed among the disciplines (Met. Γ, chs. 1-3) 7.31 Preliminary: Aristotle's method and strategy. T h e key terms: (a) Επιστήμη (b) Είναι and its cognates (c) The phrase τό öv ή öv (d) The use of συμβεβηκός ('coincidental') (e) The phrases καθ' αυτό and κατά συμβεβηκός 7.32 The unity of metaphysics 7.33 The convertibility of 'being' and 'one' 7.4 T h e semantic strategy revisited 7.41 Categorization and using the ^Mö-locution 7.42 On the use of the phrase καθ' όλου 7.5 T h e axioms LNC and LEM codified 7.51 The logico-ontological nature of LNC and LEM 7.52 The framing of the two firmest principles 7.6 The truth of LNC vindicated elenctically

1 2 3 4 7 10 11 12 14 15 17 21 22 23 23 24 24 25 27 27 30 33 34 36 39 39 41 43

7.7

7.8

7.9

The eight arguments in favour of LNC 7.71 First argument (1006a28-31) 7.72 Second argument (1006a31-1007b18). 'To signify one thing' 7.73 Third argument (1007b18-1008a2) 7.74 Fourth argument (1008a2-7) 7.75 Fifth argument (1008a7-34) 7.76 Sixth argument (1008a34-b2) 7.77 Seventh argument (1008b2-31) 7.78 Eighth argument (1008b31-1009a5) 7.79 A corollary on the failures of the Protagorean doctrine T h e complete correlation between 'being' and 'being thought' censured 7.81 Aristotle's strategy of argument 7.82 On the relationship between 'real thing' and 'thing perceived' 7.83 The refutation of the Protagorean thesis completed 7.84 Aristotle's summary of chs. 3, 1005b8 to 6, 1011b12 The arguments in favour of LEM. How to assess them 7.91 The seven arguments in support of LEM 7.92 Two additional remarks ( 1012al 7-28) 7.93 Some erroneous views about things 7.94 Recapitulation

Chapter Eight: The Proper Subject of Metaphysics 8.1 T h e assessment of metaphysics among the theoretical disciplines 8.2 Two of the four senses of 'what is' should be cast aside 8.21 The differentiation o f ' w h a t is' (τό öv) 8.22 Some basic misunderstandings concerning Met. Δ 7 8.23 Met. A 7 taken from the semantic point of view 8.3 'What is coincidentally' should be ruled out 8.31 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. Δ 30 8.32 Συμβεβηκός as defined in Met. E, chs. 2-3

47 48 49 62 64 65 67 68 69 71 76 76 78 80 85 86 89 94 94 96 98 98 107 107 108 110 117 117 121

8.4

8.5

'What is qua true' should also be discarded 8.41 Falsehood in Met. Δ 29 8.42 Antisthenes's erroneous semantic position countered 8.43 The role of the λόγος-πράγμα issue in the present discussion 8.44 The exposition of ψεΰδος continued 'What is' taken as 'what is qua true' in Met. Ε 4 8.51 On the notions 'is-true' and 'is-not-true' in Met. Δ 7 8.52 The anatomy of the apophantic expressions instanced 8.53 The purport of chapter Ε 4 8.54 'What-w-qua-true' as basically being a mental construct 8.55 The 'what-w-qua-true' issue dismissed

Chapter Nine: The Claimants for the Title 'true ousia' Examined 9.1 Ούσία as the primary sense of 'what is' 9.11 What is 'primary being'? 9.12 Finding one's way among the common-sense opinions about ούσία 9.2 Is the substratum (τό ύποκείμενον) the ousia? 9.21 Can the form be called an 'underlying thing'? 9.22 Matter's credentials put to the test 9.23 Can 'substance' be 'predicated' of matter? 9.24 Matter's credentials nullified 9.3 Ούσία taken as essence or quiddity (Z, chs 4-6) 9.31 T h e role of the κ α θ ' α ύ τ ό appellation 9.32 On using the ίμάτιον device 9.33 On the definiens as expressing a thing's quiddity 9.34 An appendix on the notion of 'being-one' as discussed elsewhere 9.35 T h e discussion of oneness in Met. I, chs. 1-2. Connotative'one' 9.4 How to grasp a thing's ούσία properly 9.41 On one-word expressions including an intrinsic determinant

126 126 130 133 135 135 136 137 139 140 142

148 148 153 157 158 161 162 164 166 167 167 170 174 177 182 186 186

9.5

9.6

9.7

9.42 Does a thing's quiddity coincide with the particular itself? 9.43 The special position of τά καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα 9.44 O n the phrase κατ' άλλο λέγεσθαι 9.45 To deny the question of 9.42 leads to an infinite regress 9.46 On the sameness of a thing and its particular form An intermezzo on the ontological implications of becoming 9.51 On the composite of matter and form 9.52 Should matter be included in the definiens? 9.53 The composite is produced, neither matter nor form by themselves 9.54 The summary of Z, chs. 7-9 found in Ζ 9 How to overcome some problems of definition 9.61 T h e 'thing-itself = quiddity' thesis discussed from another angle 9.62 On the mental status of 'universal forms' 9.63 On the particular status of the immanent form 9.64 Again, should matter be included in the definiens? 9.65 On the status of 'non-sensible' objects like 'mathematicals' 9.66 Aristotle's summary of the foregoing discussions .... 9.67 T h e 'first' or 'immediate' ούσία 9.68 What makes a definiens one definite thing? No universal is ούσία 9.71 Aristotle's key problem concerning particular forms 9.72 The case of the universal dismissed 9.73 On the communion of forms 9.74 No particular can be properly defined 9.75 On commonness as alien to true ousia

Chapter Ten : True ούσία Finally Defined as the Enmattered Form 10.1 The ούσία = είδος thesis corroborated once more 10.2 A further assessment of matter as'material constitution' 10.3 On form, differentia, and actuality

188 190 192 194 195 197 198 199 200 203 203 204 206 207 210 216 222 223 226 229 230 231 235 236 240

244 244 249 252

10.4 Again, the problem of defining things properly 10.5 Some observations on the identification of material constituents 10.6 T h e unity of the definiens finally stated 10.7 An excursus on three controversial issues in Met. Z-H 10.71 Again, the particular status of the immanent form 10.72 The enmattered form as the principle of individuation 10.73 The adoption of form and matter in the definiens 10.74 Is a composite indefinable? 10.75 Two kinds of definiens to be distinguished 10.76 The role of γένος in the constitution of natural things 10.8 Ancient and Medieval commentators on these issues 10.81 The Ancient commentators 10.82 T h e Arab commentators Avicenna and Averroes.... 10.83 Thomas Aquinas 10.84 John Buridan Chapter Eleven : Actual and Potential Being. T h e Mathematicals 11.1 On actuality and potentiality 11.11 Actuality and potentiality assessed 11.12 When can what is actually [x] be named 'a potential [y]'? 11.13 On a similar use of the έκεΐνο-έκείνινον device in Met. Ζ 7 11.14 On naming something after its potential status 11.15 On naming something after its material constitution 11.16 T h e actual thing's priority over its potential counterpart 11.17 Some additional remarks about potentiality and actuality 11.2 True and false as ontic properties 11.21 The proper subject of Θ 10 11.22 The ontic truth of σύνθετα 11.23 The ontic truth of άσύνθετα

254 263 266 272 273 280 282 283 285 287 288 289 291 292 297

302 304 304 306 309 313 314 319 323 324 325 328 329

11.24 A summary of the two kinds of truth 11.25 O u r thinking about unchangeable beings (ακίνητα) 11.3 The main outcome of Books ΖΗΘ 11.4 An excursus on ontic truth and non-propositional thought 11.5 Some relevant passages from Met. M and Ν 11.51 Do eternal immaterial Substances exist? 11.52 The status of mathematical entities 11.53 Aristotle's own view of the status of mathematicals 11.54 No separate existence should be assigned to universals 11.55 The problem of universals 11.56 Can eternal things be composed of elementary parts? Chapter Twelve : T h e Unity of Aristotle's Thought: T h e O t h e r Works 12.1 Status quaestionis 12.2 The gamut of arguments used in the works on living nature 12.3 The works on natural philosophy 12.31 T h e discussions concerning Time in Phys. IV, 10-14 12.32 Aristotle's definition of χρόνος. Its elliptic semantic area 12.33 The exceptionally complex semantics of χρόνος 12.34 The ontological connotation of χρόνος. The use of the ποτε öv clause 12.35 T h e nature of Time itself. T h e epistemological connotation 12.36 Further observations about Time in Phys. IV, 12-14 12.37 The problem o f ' P r i m e matter' in Aristotle 12.38 [X] 's being [y] 's matter taken as [x] 's special mode of being 12.39 The putative main witness for 'Prime matter' in GCI3

333 334 334 337 339 340 341 343 345 346 350

354 354 358 364 367 371 374 375 379 381 384 386 392

Epilogue: Making u p the Balance 13.0 Introductory 13.1 T h e unity of metaphysics 13.11 T h e unicity of hyparxis 13.12 Ontological unity vs. logico-semantic diversity 13.2 T h e method: focalization and categorization 13.21 The usual apophantic approach 13.22 Does the onomastic approach salvage unitary being? 13.3 Focalization and categorization practised. Is Aristotle an 'astonishing man'?

396 396 398 399 401 403 404

Bibliography

417

Indexes Index Locorum Index Nominum Index Verborum et Rerum

432 432 468 477

405 411

CHAPTER SEVEN

PRELIMINARIES T O METAPHYSICAL ENQUIRY

It is commonly held that the structure of the work handed down to us as Aristotle's Metaphysics (Met.) is a result of the a r r a n g e m e n t of several Aristotelian treatises executed by his editors after the Master's death. 1 T h e work was never read in its present form until the time of the Greek Commentators and their Western colleagues in the Middle Ages, who in the framework of the university curriculum lectured on Books I II, IV-X, and XII. 2 Roughly speaking, the work falls into three main parts: (a) the group ΑΒΓΕ (I, III IV, and V); (b) the group ΖΗΘΜΝΙ, the first three books of which are commonly regarded as the backbone of the Metaphysics. This g r o u p deals with the main subject of any metaphysical investigation, ousia — perceptible ousia in Books ΖΗΘ, imperceptible ousia in MN-while I, which is clearly connected with B, is concerned with the nature of unity and of kindred conceptions;

1

Ackrill (1981), 3f. Alexander of Aphrodisias's suggestion (CAG I, p. 515 20 ; cf. Asclepius CAG Vl-2, p. 4 4-15 ) that Eudemus may have done some editorial work on the metaphysical and ethical treatises is commonly held as the most probable. The story connecting Book A or α with Aristotle's pupil and Eudemus' nephew, Pasicles of Rhodos, (in Scholia 589a41 ed. Brandis) fits in well with Alexander's suggestion, as far as Met. is concerned. See Ross I Introd., XXXII, n. 1. However, Barnes ( 2 1999, 62ff.) may be right in questioning the story of a Eudemian edition. D. Harlfinger describes the history of textual criticism concerning Met in Aubenque (1979), 7-36. Kahn (1985, 311) remarks that "even if we exclude three of the 14 books (namely α as having no organic links with the rest, Κ as probably inauthentic, Δ as hors série) the remaining eleven are far from providing a continuous exposition". He is of the opinion (338), however, that "attention to the kind of rhetorical clues and terminological variation [...] may help us see that there is more compositional art and more literary continuity in the treatises of the Metaphysics than is usually recognized". We owe to Kahn (ibid.) a pertinent discussion of all the evidence found in the Metaphysics which may elucidate what kind of content and doctrinal unity First Philosophy was intended by the author himself to have. 2 From about 1200 the Medieval masters had access to several versions of the Aristoteles latinus. Their selection of ten books for teaching metaphysics at the universities (I-II, IV-X, XII) does not exactly correspond with the ten-book Metaphysics (ΑΒΓΕΖΗΘΜΝΙ) that is mentioned in the list of Aristotle's works in the Anonymus Menagii·, Ross I, XXIII.

(c) the outlying books, which are apparent editorial insertions of (for the greater part) authentic treatises, a, Δ, K, and A.3 T h e introductory books (A, a , Β and Γ), then, discuss matters of 'scientific' method in general, and the requirements of metaphysical enquiry in particular. T h e topics vary from general remarks about how to tackle problems to t h o r o u g h g o i n g observations about the most fundamental laws of thinking. Most important for our purposes are the additional pieces of information about his own semantics which Aristotle implicitly provides us with. T h e aim of the present c h a p t e r is to highlight whatever o n e needs to know in o r d e r to understand the ins and outs of Aristotle's search for T r u e Being.

7. 1 How to tackle 'scientific'problems In his fine chapter on "The mind of Aristotle", Guthrie (1981, 89) argues that the internal tendencies of a philosopher's own ideas are themselves a product of existing philosophy and the impact on it of his own personality and cast of mind. In Aristotle's case, this impact comes a b o u t as the m a n ' s basic outlook, which colours all his writings, and chiefly determines the direction in which he modifies the achievements of his predecessors. Thus, Guthrie claims, observation and previous philosophy afford the material of Aristotle's thoughts. T h e o p e n i n g book of the Metaphysics shows that Aristotle might have p u t things this way himself, as far as previous thinking is concerned. In observing, criticizing, and countering his predecessors' philosophic tenets, Aristotle develops his own a p p r o a c h to the problems, his own strategy of a r g u m e n t , that is, including his favourite devices and tools, to master any puzzles and riddles the true metaphysician inevitably stumbles upon, particularly that "everlasting question", 'What precisely is that which is ?' (Met. Ζ 1, 1028b2-4).

3 For a thorough discussion of the structure of the Metaphysics (including a critical account o f j a e g e r ' s (1923) thesis about Aristotle's development) see Ross I Introd.., XIII-XXXI, and his Introduction to J. Warrington, Aristotle's Metaphysics (tr. London-New York, 1956), XXI-XXVII. For detailed information about the composition of the Metaphysics and the arrangement of the several treatises making up the text as handed down to us see Ross ibid., XV-XXXIII; Frede & Patzig, I and II; Burnyeat (1979), 93ff.; (1984), 45; Bostock (1994), 66ff.; 119f.; 176.

7. 11 The predecessors observed and criticized As in several of his other works, a main feature of Aristotle's strategy of a r g u m e n t in Met. is to begin his discussion of the proper subject with a survey of his predecessors' views of the matter, in which he aims at assessing his own investigations as complementary to, and above all corrective of, what previous thinkers had put forward on the doctrine of being and becoming. 4 As a matter of fact, in the opening lines of Book a, Aristotle (1, 993b2ff.) recommends us to pay serious attention to even the most superficial opinions, since "a combination of all conjectures results in something considerable". It is essential, he says (B 1, 995a24ff.) before starting his survey of the perplexities (άπορίαι), to have a clear view of the difficulties of the subject and impartially consider the pros and cons (brought forward by previous thinkers) with regard to each of the main questions. Mansfeld (1994, 148-61) has convincingly pointed out that Aristotle's attitude to the doctrines and sayings of his predecessors, and of poets as well, is surely not an isolated p h e n o m e n o n in the developm e n t of Ancient thought. W h e t h e r this stance was based on the conviction that earlier authors used to covert language for a reason, or were just being vague, the Ancient interpreters were basically of the opinion that a more p r o f o u n d sense could be gathered from the earlier writings and sayings. While he was not so sure about how to deal with poets, 5 Aristotle believed that, where in matters of metaphysics the early philosophers had expressed themselves in an unclear way, one could discover what they intended to say (διάνοια) by carefully scrutinizing their texts. 6

4

Embarking upon the delicate problem whether Platonists are right in assuming non-sensible substances that are immovable and eternal, Aristotle acknowledges that one "must first consider what is said by others, so that [...] if there is any doctrine (δόγμα) common to them and us, we shall have no private grievance against ourselves on that account; for one must be content to state some points better than one's predecessors, and others no worse". (Met. M 1, 1076a 12-16); also A 8, 1074b1ff; Guthrie VI, 91. Of course, not all opinions are worthwhile, for example those of children, the sick, and the mad (EE I 3, 1214b27ff.; Lloyd (1996), 19. 5 Met. A 3, 984a3; Mansfeld (1994) 155. 6 E.g. Met. A 10, 993all-16, where Aristotle deals with the four causes as inarticulately present in the infancy of philosophy. Some more evidence is given in Mansfeld (1990), 41 and 51. Patzig (1979, 39f.) has poignantly expressed the situation thus: "To be interestingly in the wrong is, philosophically speaking, more important and more fruitful for others than to be trivially and narrow-mindedly right. It goes without saying that to be interestingly in the right is still much better".

In line with the afterthought which seems to underly this m a n n e r of tackling problems throughout, viz. that truth is to be disclosed by an aporetical method of trial and testing, 7 is Aristotle's preference for the aporematic method: more than once, after discussing an intricate question without any really satisfactory result, the author proceeds to discuss the initial problem from another point of view, with the intro "Let us try a fresh start". Ross (I, Introd., LXXVII) aptly characterizes the strategy and general m e t h o d of Met. by saying that this work "as a whole expresses not a dogmatic system but the adventures of a mind in its search for truth". The argumentaüve procedure Aristode applies in order to advance his own views most of the time does not lead him to deduce them from some tenable premisses commonly held. Instead he sets out to discredit the opposite views, which he skilfully u n d e r m i n e s in a reductio ad absurdum of their inevitable consequences — which are usually presented in the form of their very contradictories, thus making a claim for the plausibility of his own alternatives. In o r d e r to fully c o m p r e h e n d Aristotle's metaphysical views, one has to recall his recommendation 8 to try first to grasp what precisely is the proper way of tackling the problems u n d e r discussion, because "it is unfeasible (άτοπον) to seek at the same time for knowledge and for the m a n n e r in which it has been arrived at". Indeed, the listener or reader must "have already been trained how to take each kind of argument" before he can begin to c o m p r e h e n d the doctrine at hand. In what is referred to as "our prefatory remarks" (Β 1, 995b5) and "our first discussions" (B 2, 997b4), Aristotle presents us with explicit hints to observe quite closely his idea of a p p r o a c h i n g intricate matters successfully. These hints will bring us into the nucleus of Aristotle's semantic approach. 7 . 1 2 Wisdom and the knowledge of causes and principles Of the first three of the introductory books, the cluster A, a , and B, the first o p e n s with an assessment of the whole u n d e r t a k i n g of 7

O n e should notice Aristotle's use of the ού μή formula (Frede & Patzig II, 142). The aporetic method in Met. and the cosmological works is highlighted in Cleary (1995), esp. 199ff. On the special function of άπορίαι in Aristotle see also Goldin (1996), 79f.; likewise the particle ή often introduces in Aristotle a tentative or alternative solution to the difficulty at hand; Ross (1961), 204 (to An. Ill 4, 429a29). 8 In his fine psychological observations on how to obtain the maximum effect with a lecture, which conclude Book a (3, 994b32-995a14).

seeking the truth about the things-there-are (τά δντα), which should be seen in the context of removing the surprise and perplexity about the initial 'chaos' any u n e d u c a t e d observer of the outside world is b o u n d to experience. T h e opening section traces the development of how the mind proceeds from sense-perception to genuine knowledge (έπιστήμη) through memory, experience, and art. The focal problem of philosophizing in general is clearly put before the listener's (reader's) mind at A 1: Met. A 1, 981b10-13: We d o n o t r e g a r d any of the sense p e r c e p t i o n s as w i s d o m ( ' t r u e k n o w l e d g e ' ) ; yet surely t h e s e n s e s a r e t h e m o s t a u t h o r i t a t i v e m e a n s of g e t t i n g a c q u a i n t e d with particulars. However, they d o n o t tell us the 'why' of a n y t h i n g , e.g. xuhy fire is hot; they only say that it is hot. 9

To attain true knowledge (έπιστήμη, called σοφία in the opening part of Met.) about things of the outside world, what is strictly required is to know their 'why', i.e. their primary causes and principles. 10 Next, seven commonly accepted characteristics of the wise man (or philosopher) 1 1 and his knowledge are listed (2, 982a8-19): (a) the philosopher knows everything, without knowing each of the particulars individually; (b) he is capable of learning things that are difficult for h u m a n s to comprehend; (c-d) he excels in exactness and the capacity to teach the causes of things; (e) the knowledge he is striving after is pursued for its own sake, rather than for its practical results; (f-g) his discipline governs the other (subordinate) disciplines, and he is the one who gives orders and should be obeyed by the rest. All these characteristics, then, tend to make us apply the n a m e 'wisdom' to the knowledge of the primary causes and principles of things (982b7-10). Now that the p r o p e r object of the investigation has been clearly stated, it is necessary to see in what senses the words 'cause' and ' p r i n c i p l e ' are used, a m o n g o t h e r s by the predecessors. After 9

For this important opposition see APo. passim, and ENV I 3, 1139b14-1141b8. See also Ross's comments on Met. A 2, 982b2. 10 Met. A 1, 981a28-29; 2, 982a4-6. The juxtaposition of 'primary or original causes' (πρώτη αιτία, έξ άρχής αιτία) and 'principles' or 'starting-points' (άρχαί) is so frequently found in Aristotle that they should be taken as referentially identical. 11 For this identification, which was well observed by the Medieval commentators, see A 2, 982b11-21.

repeating his view of the philosopher's task, Aristotle presents four senses in which causes are spoken of: Met. A 3, 983a24-b4: S i n c e we have to a c q u i r e k n o w l e d g e of t h e original causes — f o r we say to know e a c h t h i n g only w h e n we t h i n k to b e c o m e a c q u a i n t e d with its first cause — < o n e s h o u l d k n o w that> causes a r e s p o k e n of in f o u r senses. In o n e of t h e s e we m e a n t h e ousia, i.e. q u i d d i t y (την ο ύ σ ί α ν καί το τί ήν είναι), f o r t h e 'why' is ultimately r e d u c i b l e to t h e d e f i n i e n s , a n d the first 1 2 'why' is cause a n d principle; in a n o t h e r t h e m a t t e r o r s u b s t r a t u m ; in a t h i r d t h e s o u r c e of t h e c h a n g e , a n d in a f o u r t h t h e c a u s e t h a t is its c o u n t e r p a r t , n a m e l y t h e p u r p o s e o r t h e g o o d , f o r this is t h e e n d of all g e n e r a t i o n a n d c h a n g e . We have s t u d i e d these causes sufficiently in o u r work o n n a t u r e [Phys. II 3, 7], b u t let us call to o u r aid t h o s e w h o h a v e a t t a c k e d t h e investigation of t h e things-that-are a n d p h i l o s o p h i z e d a b o u t reality b e f o r e us. For clearly they, too, s p e a k of certain principles a n d causes; a n d so to g o over t h e i r views will b e a d v a n t a g e o u s to the p r e s e n t inquiry. 1 3

In the epilogue to Book A (10, 993a11-16), the author agrees that all his predecessors were seeking the four causes listed above, and that the extensive discussion of their various views did not yield any additional kind of cause. By seeking and describing the four causes that vaguely, however, — which is natural in the infancy of philosophy, Aristotle generously admits —, the best thing to do is to first review the difficulties that might be raised on account of the four causes before undertaking one's proper investigations. Book B, then, will outline such a set of 'perplexities' (άπορίαι). The editor's (?Eudemus) a r r a n g e m e n t of the Aristotelian metaphysical treatises, however, has presented us first with the short treatise n u m b e r e d a, interspersed between A and B, which aims to give a general introduction useful to all those listeners or readers of lectures on theoretical knowledge. 14 T h o u g h it appears to be an introduction to lectures on physics rather than a course on metaphysics (as is clear f r o m its concluding words), this short treatise contains several useful clues to uncover Aristotle's way of tackling and teaching the subject matter of the Metaphysics as well. 12

Met. a 1, 993b27. The same four causes are mentioned in the Physics (II 3, 194b16-195b30 and 7, 198al4-b9). 14 For its assessment in the whole of the Metaphysics see Ross I, 213, and Introd., XXIVf. Neither the ancient nor the modern commentators have any doubt about the authenticity of the treatise, because both the thought and the language are thoroughly Aristotelian. Jaeger may be right in taking it as Pasicles's somewhat fragmentary notes of a discourse by Aristotle. 13

7. 13 The general introduction presented in Met. a Book α opens with general observations about the study of the nature of things. T h e object of philosophy, which is rightly called the knowledge of truth, the author says (1, 993bl9-24) — for the end of any theoretical search is truth — is to seek a thing's causes, since there is no knowledge of anything which truly is without knowing its cause. In the very beginning of the treatise (993a30-b4) the study of truth is said to be both a difficult and an easy undertaking, meaning that nobody is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other h a n d , we c a n n o t all be wide of the mark. So the modest results reached by each thinker may all add u p to something considerable. T h e difficulty of the study of reality is due to the fact that, although we may have general access to an object taken as a whole, we are unable to grasp the precise part of it we are aiming at (993b6-7). Perhaps our failing should not so much be attributed to the objects of o u r study, the author adds (993b7-l 1), as to ourselves, because just as bats' eyes are blinded by the daylight, likewise o u r intellect is dazzled by that which is by nature most obvious. Having learnt f r o m the vicissitudes and f o r t u n e s of previous thinkers, 1 5 we should now focus more purposefully on that which is the i m m a n e n t cause and principle within the things studied in our search for truth. To really have an eye for causes and principles in things boils down to being aware that some causes should be given special attention, seeing that they possess a causative quality in a higher degree than other things of the kind, such as e.g. fire, which proves to be the hottest of hot things, and must be regarded as the cause of the heat of other things. By proceeding along this line of thought, the philosopher comes to generally understand that there are some causes and principles par excellence. T h e author eventually speaks (993b27) of "the most true cause which causes all subsequent things to be true". At the outset o n e should notice the clear association between άληθής-άλήθεια and φύσις. T h e term αλήθεια is used in this context in the same sense as elsewhere (e.g. at A 3, 983b2 and 7, 988a20), meaning that which really is in the outside world. By τό αληθές, then, that specific character should be u n d e r s t o o d which pre-eminently causes a thing to be.16 15 16

Cf. Sens. 7, 448a20ff. My sections 8.4 and 11.22-11.23.

This interpretation is strongly supported by the o p e n i n g lines of the chapter, where αλήθεια and φύσις (in the sense of 'the nature of things') are plainly correlated, so that the particular feature indicated by τό αληθές is to be taken as a particular thing's true nature. When claiming (at α 1, 993b23-24) that we do not know a thing's nature without knowing its cause, Aristotle must mean to say, not that there is a cause or principle outside the particular, which causes it to be, but that a thing's particular i m m a n e n t n a t u r e should be grasped (cf. θιγειν at 993b1, and Θ 10, 1051b24; Λ 7, 1072b21) as its cause. The only way to grasp a thing's n a t u r e is in terms of causality. By remarking that, quite naturally, the nature of eternal beings is 'most true' and does n o t itself d e p e n d on a prior cause, Aristotle only means to point out how different they are from the transitory natures of changeable things, which only continue to exist in so far as they inform newly generated things. However, whether eternal or not, all things owe their being to a principle or cause: Met. α 1, 993b24-31: We a r e n o t f a m i l i a r with what-is-true w i t h o u t k n o w i n g the cause. O f e a c h t h i n g it h o l d s 1 7 that this [i.e t h e cause] is itself in t h e h i g h e s t d e g r e e t h a t a f t e r w h i c h a f e a t u r e of t h e s a m e n a m e b e l o n g s to o t h e r things. For instance, fire is t h e h o t t e s t , f o r it is t h e cause of h e a t f o r everything else. H e n c e that is m o s t t r u e which causes things arising f r o m it to b e true. T h e r e f o r e in e a c h case [first άεί at b28] t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e things that always a r e m u s t b e the most t r u e , f o r they are n o t merely sometimes true, n o r is t h e r e any cause of thdr b e i n g , b u t they themselves are t h e cause of t h e b e i n g of o t h e r things. A n d that is why as e a c h t h i n g is in r e s p e c t of being, so it is in respect of t r u t h .

T h e question now comes u p what kind of principle and cause exactly Aristotle is talking about. Ross seems to understand our passage in terms of propositional truth. 1 8 In my view, however, the cause looked for is something different. Aristotle said in the opening lines of the present treatise (993b4ff.) that truth is like the proverbial d o o r 1 9 which one can hardly miss, but, on the other hand, it is difficult to know it thoroughly owing to the fact that although we have some grasp of the whole (the concrete thing as a whole, that is), we cannot

17

Note the emphatic position of εκαστον. " [...] so that that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true" (Oxford Transladon, 993b26-27). 19 Schwegler (Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles I. Tübingen 1847) assumed [ad loc) that doors or gates were used to fix a target even bad archers cannot miss. I owe this information to my late friend, Professor Cornells Verhoeven. 18

grasp 'the part .2" What he is saying in our passage is that, dazzled as it is by the obviousness of the things outside, as presented by the senses as s o m e t h i n g whole (ολον τι, 993b6), o u r m i n d fails to recognize that particular element in those things the philosopher is after when he seeks the concrete things' cause and explanation. Clearly enough, therefore, these true principles are not something propositional, such as the well-known logical maxim 'the whole is always greater than any part of it'. Rather, in this context the truth is ontological truth, i.e. intelligibility, which in Ancient and Medieval thought counts as a thing's susceptibility of being perceived by the mind. It is the metaphysical condition of each and every entity, and as such convertible with 'be-ing'. With Aristotle's predecessors, Parmenides and Plato in particular, intelligibility is precisely that which preserves a thing from the abyss of non-being. 2 1 So the most true cause is that which most truly causes things to truly be. T h a t this must be the cause m e a n t h e r e also appears from the broader context. Aristotle's examples of what he means by ' t r u t h ' and 'cause' contain some unmistakable semantic clues that it is the causality of particular forms ('instantiations') immanent in things (as their 'instances') he has in mind. Right after the claim that 'true' and 'cause' are closely connected, he explains his identification of the two by showing that what causes other things to be so-and-so must itself have this feature in the highest degree of all the things bearing a feature of the same name, and, qua synomymous, can be called u p by the same appellation (name). 2 2 This is, for instance, the case with heat (fire) and the hot ('fiery') nature i n h e r e n t in hot things. It is the cause of the heat of the other things that can be n a m e d by the same appellation 'hot'; both the i m m a n e n t heat and the thing it inheres in can be indicated by the phrase 'the hot'. Again, it is the immanent cause which is u n d e r consideration, since to Aristotle, the

20 In the final analysis, this 'part' is identified as the object's immanent είδος. See end of my next section, and in general the outcome of Met. Z. 21 See De Rijk (1986), 84-90; 164-73. In Met. Θ 10, ontic truth is opposed to propositional truth; my section 11.2. For connotative be-ing and one see my sections 1.64 and 9.34-9.35. 22 The expression τό συνώνυμον at 993b25, which is plainly of Platonic lineage, is commonly (Ross, Tredennick, Tricot, Reale) rendered too loosely "the similar quality", and should rather be interpreted semantically as 'the feature whose name they all have in common'. See Aristotle, Met. M 4, 1079a4 and a31-b3, where Annas (1979, 155) seems to think that to Aristotle, merely the names are shared. For a similar semantic relationship between Forms and things in Plato see Phaedo 78E, 102B1-2 and 107B8-9; Rep. 596A; Parm. 130E and 133D; Tim. 52A.

word τό πυρ cannot possibly stand for some Platonic entity, Fire, nor should it be taken to refer to some extrinsic fire actually heating the hot things, because why should this particular fire be more hot than the hot things? O n e does not have to be a pyromaniac to know better. In the next sentence the author phrases his claim in general terms: that which causes things arising from it to be true (or 'truly be) must possess this feature in the highest degree. As will be shown in the next section, we must not be misled by Aristotle's use of τοις ΰστέροις at 993b27 to think of a chronologically prior extrinsic cause. 7 . 1 4 Three methodological hints T h e text as h a n d e d down to us contains three precious clues for understanding Aristotle's m e t h o d of tracking down "the particular part we are aiming at", instead of going n o f u r t h e r than vaguely examining things. This m e t h o d consists in using linguistic devices. As we were told at 993b24-25, each thing to which o t h e r things owe some c o m m o n 'ontic quality', is such itself in a higher degree than the other things of the same name. I have already drawn attention to the semantic hint that the ' c o m m o n thing' one should focus upon in particular is designated as τό συνώνυμον, i.e. 'that which has the same name'. According to Aristotle, to have the same name implies possessing the same nature and definiens. 2 3 In the present context this means that when we are looking for e.g. the cause of the sun, or water, or logs, or fire being-hot, we should focus on the entity 'heat' as the c o m m o n ontic quality owing to which all these things are hot (and fire the hottest of all) and, accordingly, are synonymous (i.e. qualify for the c o m m o n n a m e 'hot-thing', which is a one-word expression in Greek). Thus when investigating the 'why' of various hot things, we should pinpoint the c o m m o n quality 'heat' owing to which they are all (named) 'hot': by approaching the matter in this way we are able to find their cause and the desired explanation. This 'cause and principle' in point of fact is a thing's i m m a n e n t cause, which before long will be identified as its formal cause. A n o t h e r clue is f o u n d in Aristotle's use of the expression 'subsequent things' (τοις ΰστέροις at 993b27) to designate the things 23 Cat. 1, 1a6; 5, 3a34; Top. IV 3, 123a28; VI 10, 148a24; ÏÏVV4,1130a33; Met. A 6, 987b10. The last passage shows Aristotle's indebtedness to Plato in this respect. See also De Rijk (1986), 317.

caused by the principle or cause. Surely, this 'subsequent' should not be taken in its temporal sense. Rather it is m e a n t to point to the relation of causal posteriority; in a similar way a cause can be called the πρότερον of its result, without any connotation of pre-existence e i t h e r . 2 4 But there is more to say about the causal priority u n d e r examination. T h e next chapter of his small treatise, which thoroughly deals with Aristotle's efforts to ride out any infinite chain of causes (both in the upward and the downward direction) — which would completely frustrate our analysis of things in o r d e r to trace 'the particular part we are aiming at' — shows that causal priority and posteriority are substantial in the procedure of analysing things. We will find some more hints of the kind elsewhere. A third suggestion of how to i n t e r p r e t Aristotle's m e t h o d of searching 'some particular part' of something is f o u n d at Met. a 1, 993b6. When he complains that the p h e n o m e n o n that we are unable to grasp "the particular part we are aiming at", but only have some grasp of the thing as a whole (ολον τι), Aristotle's dissatisfaction concerns our inability to combine the two approaches, that is to say 'to have s o m e t h i n g as a whole and a part'. T h u s what Aristotle is r e c o m m e n d i n g is to consider not only the whole but also the part as immanent in that whole. In doing so, he, as so often, testifies to what Guthrie (1981, 103) has called Aristotle's inviolable common-sense postulate of the primacy of the particular, to the effect that all things a n d everything, including the ontic causes (forms) which the particular things share with other instances of the same name, are strictly individual. 25 7. 15 An infinite chain of causes rejected In the second chapter, the author stresses how important it is to see that the causes and principles — regardless of whether they are material, efficient, final or formal — do not form an infinite chain, neither in the upward nor in the downward direction, and are not of an infinite n u m b e r of kinds either. T h e greater part of this chapter concerns physical investigation, as is patently clear from the examples given by Aristotle. However, his discussion (2, 994b 16-31) of the formal cause is of a somewhat wider scope, it seems, and again alludes to 24

APo. II 16, 98b17. Most translations wrongly suggest Aristotle is saying that it is better to have the particular part than the whole. 25

the logical analysis the author has in mind when it comes to acquiring epistemonic knowledge. O n e has to notice, first, that the formal cause is designated by the expression τό τί ήν είναι or the what-it-is-to be. Seeking a thing's formal cause, then, is seeking its fundamental 'what-it-is' or 'essence', which is appropriately presented in its definiens (λόγος). This 'whatthe-thing-is' as explained in the initial (έμπροσθεν) definiens of, say, 'man', viz. 'rational animal', is always closer, Aristotle claims, to what an appropriate description of the essence ought to be than a posterior definiens — which only makes the previous one more explicit — would be, e.g. 'rational sensitive living substance', which merely presents a definition of (part of) the initial definiens. 2 6 Therefore in cases in which the initial definiens will not do, neither will the subsequent one; and so it is useless to f r a m e an infinite series of definientia made out of the initial one. In addition, those who speak in such terms destroy epistemonic knowledge ( έ π ί σ τ α σ θ α ι ) , and every-day knowledge 2 7 as well, since to acquire the former you must e n d u p with terms that can no longer be analysed into genus and differentia, 2 8 while everyday knowledge would be ruled out if infinite things were to be conceived of. 7.16 How to frame a persuasive argument Aristotle's small treatise winds u p with a short chapter containing some pertinent psychological observations about the methodological r e q u i r e m e n t s for an effective lecture ( ά κ ρ ό α σ ι ς ) , such as the different parts of the Physics and Metaphysics are meant to be. 29 In fact, the tenor of this chapter is to argue for the adequacy of the Aristotelian m e t h o d of epistemonic research in the field of physics and metaphysics. 30 26 This interpretation, which is found in Alexander of Aphrodisias, is rightly recommended by Ross, ad loc. It is also in keeping with Aristotle's later expositions of a thing's είδος ('infima species') and primary ούσία; see my sections 9.6-9.7. 27 Γιγνώσκειν = 'to become familiar with something'. 28 For this use of άτομος see Ross ad loc. 29 The full title of the Physics is Φυσική άκρόασις ('Lecture-course on nature'). The 'acroatic' character of the Metaphysics seems to be alluded to in Β 2, 996b8: "from our discussions some time ago". Incidentally, the significance of the viva vox for teaching and learning is implied in what Aristotle says (Sens. 1, 437a3-13) about hearing (ακοή) as the superior sense, taking precedence over sight (όψις), because it develops intellectual activity and intelligence (cf. a4-5: κρείττων πρός δε νουν ή άκοή; al 1-12: πρός φρόνησιν ή ακοή πλείστον συμβάλλεται μέρος). 30 A comparison of these requirements with those discussed in Galen, On

T h e author first remarks (a 3, 994b32-995a6) that the effect lectures have upon an audience are related to the habits of the listener, for they are only effective if the listener is addressed in a language he is accustomed to. That which is beyond the customary appears not to be equally familiar, but somewhat unintelligible and strange because of its unwontedness; for it is the customary that is intelligible. 31 As he often does, Aristotle clarifies his intentions by making a comparison. T h e force of the customary comes to the fore in the case of laws, he says, in which legendary and childish elements tend to prevail 32 over our perception of the laws themselves, because of the familiarity of these extraneous elements. Ross refers to Met. A 8, 1074bIff, where Aristotle speaks of the tradition o u r forefathers h a n d e d down to posterity in a mythical form with a view to persuade the multitude "and to its legal and utilitarian expediency". On this interpretation, what Aristotle means to say is that, owing to their being familiar, the mythological a n d childish context in which lawgivers sometimes promulgate their laws can prevent people from being aware of the serious matters the laws are about. Next, the various attitudes and d e m a n d s of listeners are mentioned (995a6-17). Some people d e m a n d mathematical proof, others examples, others the witness of a poet. Some require accuracy in every argument, while others are annoyed by it, either because they are unable to follow the reasoning or because they regard it as pettifoggery. 33 This much is certain, o n e needs to have been trained in various m e t h o d s required for different domains of learning before embarking on the actual study: 34 for it is unfeasible, Aristotle warns, to simultaneously seek for knowledge a n d learn the m e t h o d to acquire it, leaving aside that even only o n e of the two is difficult enough to acquire. 35 Exegesis, is pertinent, as is clear from their assessment in Mansfeld (1994), 148-69. 31 What is familiar contains, so to speak, the potential higher knowledge which teachers are supposed to actualize in their pupils; Met. Θ 8, 1050al7-19. 32 Taking ισχύει (995a5) as praesens de conatu. 33 That different disciplines demand different degrees of accuracy is more than once emphasized or implied by Aristotle. E.g. APo. I 24, 86a16ff; 27, 87a31ff.; Met. Ε 1; M 3, 1078a9-14; Cael. III 7, 306a27; PA I 1; GA IV 10, 778a4-9; ENI 3, 1094b1127; III 5, 1112bl-9; VI 7, 1141a16-18. 34 Aulus Gellius, Nodes Atticae XX,5: "In the Lyceum he (Aristotle) devoted the morning to the acroatic subjects, and he did not allow anyone to attend them without assuring himself of their ability, educational grounding, keenness to learn and willingness to work"; Guthrie (1981), 41. 35 The concluding part of the treatise (3, 995al5-19) again clearly concerns the study of physical matters.

In a n o t h e r passage of the central part of the Metaphysics (Z 3), Aristotle draws our attention to what he considers the golden rule for all kinds of learning and investigation. We should start from what is familiar to us by sense perception, i.e more knowable relative to us, in o r d e r to attain that which is more knowable in itself, without any relational qualification. It should not come as a surprise that this passage is f o u n d in Aristotle's discussion about how to grasp true Being, seeing that a thing's beingness (ούσία) is an outstanding example of what escapes sense-perception: Met. Ζ 3, 1029a33-b12: It is generally admitted that some ousiai are possessed by sensible things, so that we must look first among these. For it is of advantage to proceed by stages towards that which is more intelligible. All learning proceeds in this way, through that which is less knowable by nature towards what is more knowable. And just as in matters of conduct someone's task is to start from what is good for each and make what is entirely good also good for oneself, so here the task is to start from what is more knowable to oneself and make what is more knowable by nature knowable to oneself. It is true, what is knowable and first to each individual is often knowable to a very small extent, and has in it litde or nothing of what is. None the less we must start from that which is scarcely knowable but knowable to oneself, and try to know what is entirely knowable, advancing, in the aforementioned way,36 by way of those very things one does know. In the course of the subsequent metaphysical investigations, as in many others in Aristotle, it will appear that the first attempts to grasp the n a t u r e of the outside things usually consist in linguistic approaches, by analysing the distinct appellations by means of which we are accustomed to call u p things for scientific consideration as well as for practical purposes.

7. 2 The scope and proper method of metaphysics (Met. B) In the last Book of the introductory cluster B, Aristotle outlines (ch. 1) a n d explains (chs. 2-6) a set of problems (άπορίαι) that should be primarily raised with a view to the knowledge he is looking for. They are fifteen in n u m b e r , most of which will actually come u p

36

Quite often in Greek the phrase ώσπερ είρήται pregnantly means to refer to the manner in which something is explained, rather than just conveying a textual reference ('as has been said'). E.g. Top. Ill 4, 119al-2; III 6, 120a35. Cf. Phys. I 7, 190a14: ώσπερ λέγομεν = 'in the way we suggest'. See our Index s.v. λέγειν.

for discussion, more or less directly, in the remaining part of the Metaphysics,37 7 . 2 1 The proper scope of metaphysical investigation Four problems (1-3, and 5) regard the scope of metaphysical investigation and will be discussed in the next Book (Γ), chs. 1-3. The first one, whether it is the task of one discipline to study all the kinds of cause, leads to an interesting remark on method. After having recognized (B 2, 996b8-13) that every cause but the material has some claim to being the object of Wisdom (First Philosophy) 3 8 , Aristotle continues: "But inasmuch as it [the study of Wisdom] was described (A 2, 982a30-b2) as dealing with the first causes and that which in the highest sense is the object of knowledge, the knowledge of the ousia must be such knowledge". 3 9 T h e n he goes on to characterize the specific method of the metaphysical investigation he has in mind, by opposing it to some other ways of u n d e r s t a n d i n g 'things'. From Aristotle's words it is plain that he is anticipating what will be the main o u t c o m e of Book Z, viz. the equation of 'first cause and principle' with είδος ('infima species'), which is theobject of proper knowledge. Notice that in this connection a thing's ούσία is clearly opposed to its affections signified by the non-substantial categories: Met. Β 2, 996b 14-22: For while there are many ways of understanding the same object (τό αύτό), we say that the man who tries to find out what the thing is (τί τό πράγμα) by its being so-and-so comes to know it better than by its not being so-and-so. And in the former case one way40 is more informative than another, and most of all the one that 37

See Ross I, 221-4. Note that I am following in the present sections the order of the 15 apories as they are listed in Β 1, 995b4-996a17. An alternative order is followed in Madigan's translation (1999, 3-18) of B, chs. 2-6. See also Madigan, Introd.., XXXIII-XXXVIII. — A thoughtful discussion of Met. Β (and the parallel text in Κ 1-2) is found in Madigan (1999), Introd. XIII-XL and his detailed comments on the text (1-159). Cleary (1995, 199-225) extensively assesses the aporetic method of Met. B. 38 Met. a 1, 993b20-21: "It is right also that philosophy should be called 'knowledge of truth'; for the end of theoretical knowledge is truth." 39 As often in Greek, the word τοιούτος ('of that nature') is used to refer to some property or feature mentioned before, merely to prevent repeating an adjective or appellative noun, and without any connotation of resemblance. So Tredennick's translation "will resemble Wisdom" is somewhat confusing. 40 I think we had better substitute the different 'persons understanding' by the different 'ways of understanding', the more so because participial construals such as τον γνωρίζοντα more often refer to the act involved than to the acting subject. Cf. τωόρύττοντι at Δ 30, 1025a 16, and my note thereto.

focusses o n its 'what-it-is', n o t those t h a t spotlight its size o r quality o r n a t u r a l capacity f o r a c t i n g o r b e i n g acted u p o n . 4 1 A n d f u r t h e r in all o t h e r cases as well, a n d especially s p e a k i n g a b o u t t h i n g s c o n c e r n i n g which e p i s t e m o n i c p r o o f s (αποδείξεις) are in o r d e r , we t h i n k t h a t t h e g e t t i n g familiar (τό ε ί δ έ ν α ι ) with e a c h p a r t i c u l a r ' t h i n g ' only o c c u r s w h e n we s e e 4 2 w h a t s o m e t h i n g is, f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t to s q u a r e a rectangle is t h e f i n d i n g of a m e a n p r o p o r t i o n a l to its sides; a n d likewise in o t h e r cases.

It is plain from the last sentence that the special objects of άπόδειξις ('epistemonic p r o o f ) , i.e. states and states of affairs (propositional contents or dictums) are included as well. Aristotle is clearly singling out that special metaphysical way of understanding things which aims at discovering the quiddity of something — regardless of whether they are subsistent things of the outside world (covered by the category of 'substance'), or merely i m m a n e n t 'things' (various states, including operations, such as squaring a rectangle, falling u n d e r the category of 'action'), or states of affairs (like 'to-square-being-to-find etc.'). This m e t h o d equally concerns the precise nature of ' m a n ' , 'tree', 'stone' and 'whiteness', 'size' or 'drawing conclusions'. 4 3 T h e second aporia as such clearly bears u p o n m e t h o d , asking (995b6-10) whether the investigation u n d e r consideration should survey only the first principles of being-ness (τής ουσίας), or should also include the demonstrative principles on which all people ground their proofs, e.g. whether or not it is possible at the same time to assert and deny one and the same thing, and other principles of the kind. Various answers to this problem are presented in the next chapter, 2, 996b26-997a15, and Aristotle's solution will be found in Γ, 3. T h e third problem is a b o u t the p r o p e r scope of metaphysics, asking whether one science, or m o r e than one, deal with all substances, and if they are more than one whether they all are kinds of Wisdom (995b10-13; 997a15-25). Although apparently a question about the extension of the province of metaphysics, this question, which was to be a highly controversial item with Aristotle's Greek,

41

Cf. Cat. 5, 2b34-37. The Greek text has είδώμεν (from είδέναι = 'to know'), which is of the same root 'id-' found in ίδείν, which serves as the aorist to όράν = 'to see'. 43 Ross ad loc. aptly refers to APo. II 10, 94a11ff. in which the first nondemonstrative way concerning the quiddity of substances (λόγος του τί έστιν άναπόδεικτος) is discussed as opposed to the demonstrative way concerning that of attributes and operations (called συλλογισμός του τί έστι πτώσει διαφέρων τής αποδείξεως). Compare the use of ούσία and τί έστι for the quiddities of nonsubstantial beings, too; my section 4.23. 42

Arab, and Latin Commentators, properly concerns the formal nature of the object of metaphysics. T h e fourth aporia bears on o n e of the most tricky problems of metaphysics: should we hold that only sensible ousiai exist, or that there are others besides? And should we hold that there is only one class of non-sensibles, or more than one? — as do those who posit the Forms a n d the mathematical objects as intermediate between the Forms and sensible things (995b13-18; 997b34-998a19). T h e fifth problem concerns the essential attributes of ousiai, asking whether they are discussed by the same science as the ousiai themselves (995b 18-27; 997a25-34). This problem too touches on the proper scope and method of metaphysics. It will be solved in Γ 2, by showing that, owing to the semantic p r o c e d u r e applied in any metaphysical investigation, its p r o p e r object comes into the picture, which, referentially speaking, is each and every being, but, formally, those beings qua being only, so that ontic attributes qua talia will not be ruled out. 7. 22 How to zoom in on causes and principles T h e remaining apories are basically all about how to assess the ontic principles and causes properly, and thus all concern epistemonic analysis. The sixth and seventh apories are about how to identify the principles, asking whether we should assume that the ontic classes or their primary constitutive parts are the principles of things (995b2729; 998b20-b14); if the former are the principles of things, whether it is the highest genera, or rather the infimae species that should be looked for (995b29-31; 998b14-999a23). These problems will be solved in Z, 10 and 12-13, where it will be stated that the primary object of metaphysical investigation is a thing's είδος ('infima species'), but this qua enmattered. The semantic impact of the problems comes to the fore at 998b5ff., where naming and definition are in the centre of the argument: Met. Β 3, 998b4-8: F r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t t h a t we g e t to k n o w e a c h p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g by its d e f i n i e n s a n d t h a t t h e g e n e r a are t h e startingp o i n t s of d e f i n i t i o n , t h e g e n e r a m u s t also b e t h e p r i n c i p l e s of t h e t h i n g s to b e d e f i n e d ( d e f i n i e n d a ) . A n d if to gain t r u e k n o w l e d g e of t h e things-there-are a m o u n t s to g a i n i n g it of t h e species a f t e r which they are s p o k e n of (λέγονται), it is at least (γε) 4 4 of the species that t h e g e n e r a are t h e principles. 44

Thus the enclitic particle γε may also be used to single out a stronger case.

Along a similar line of thought, the question of how to focus u p o n the infimae spedes immanent in individuals leads to an inquiry into the p r o p e r nature of universality. As it turns out, universality takes its origin from the logical operation of abstraction and assignment: Ibid. 3, 999al4-21: F r o m t h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , t h e n , it a p p e a r s that it is t h e a p p e l l a t i o n s [i.e of t h e εϊδη] a p p l i e d to t h e individual things t h a t a r e t h e principles, r a t h e r t h a n t h e g e n e r a . But o n c e again, it is n o t easy to say h o w t h e s e 4 5 are to b e taken to act as principles. For the p r i n c i p l e o r cause m u s t b e a p a r t f r o m t h e t h i n g s of which it is t h e principle, a n d b e c a p a b l e of b e i n g isolated 4 6 f r o m t h e m . But f o r what r e a s o n s h o i d d o n e a s s u m e any such t h i n g to b e alongside t h e particular, e x c e p t in that it is said h o l d i n g convertibly 4 7 a n d in all cases?

What according to Aristotle is not easy to say is not in what sense to take 'principle' in this context (which is suggested by the manuscripts reading ταύτας), but rather how to conceive of the things n a m e d after their lowest species. T h e difficulties, he explains, come up if one considers what it would entail to take things in their capacity of lowest species as principles. What is at stake here is the problem of universality and abstraction. Whereas to acquire knowledge of causes we are indeed required to take the είδος apart from the particular it inheres in, we should certainly not give in to hypostatizing it as a

For γε giving emphasis to the word or words which it follows see Liddell & Scott, s.v.·, Van Raalte (1993), 258. 45 Reading ταΰτα instead of ταύτας. The form ταΰτα seems to give a more pregnant sense; moreover, ταύτας αρχάς (without a definite article) is less acceptable from the grammatical point of view. It should be noticed finally that our best manuscript (codex Parisinus 1853), as well as some of the Greek commentators and William of Moerbeke, read α ρ χ ά ς after the verb ύ π ο λ α β ε ΐ ν ; see Ross, critical apparatus ad loc. 46 I.e the principle can be taken apart logically, because it is formally different from the thing or its matter; see our discussion of the eighth aporia. At Β 4, 1001a25, also the word κεχωρισμένη means 'formally discernible'. For this logical sense of χωρίζειν see Phys. II 2, 193b33-34, and Bonitz, Index, s.v. 47 Reading καθ' ολου instead of καθόλου (Note that the phrase is juxtaposed to κατά πάντων). For the epistemonic requirement of καθ' ολου as put beside καθ' αυτό in APo., see my sections 6.34 and 6.7. The same sense of καθ' ολου occurs at 1001a28-29: "For they [viz. 'oneness' and 'be-ingness'] are convertibly said , not being something else, but just themselves."; cf. Δ 18, 1022a35 en Ross ad loc. What Aristotle tries to say is that each and every particular thing is something one-and-be-ing, and to qualify for these predicates a thing's not-being-somethingelse is required, unlike other kinds of attributes, such as 'educated' (μουσικός), which cannot apply to any being unless this is something else, viz. 'man'. In Phys. II 3 the formula ού καθ' ετερον τι άλλά καθ' αύτό and its like play a key role in the discussion of the τρόποι τών αιτίων; Bemelmans (1995), 87-95. The translators of this passage, commonly opposing at 1001a28-29 ετερόν τι to ταΰτα (instead of αυτά), are inevitably stuck with a senseless αυτά.

Platonic Form. To do so wotdd be a serious offence against the postulate of the primacy of individual being. This problem, which is once more touched u p o n in the next aporia, will be thoroughly discussed in Book Z. 48 T h e eighth problem is closely related to the previous ones, asking how individuals, which are infinite in number, can be epistemonically known, considering once again that there is nothing real apart from individual being. Without the existence of c o m m o n characteristics over and above individual being any such knowledge will be out of the question (995b31-36; 999a24-b24). This problem is called "the hardest of all and the most necessary of all to examine". O n c e again, the principles' 'being isolated from the principiata' is u n d e r discussion. T h e exposition of this problem is interesting in that it clarifies what is m e a n t by expressions that signify the isolation of the principles (χωριζομένην, 999a19; παρά, 999a26, 30, 31, 33, 34 etc.). O n e of the arguments runs (B 4, 999b 12-14): "Since matter exists apart from the concrete thing (τό σύνολον), because it is ungenerated, it is by far more reasonable that ούσία, i.e. that which the matter is at any particular time, should exist." 49 Thus the 'being isolated' or 'by itself clearly refers to the matter's formal difference from the concrete whole and the latter's cause or principle. This formal difference will be discussed in Met. Ζ in terms of the concrete c o m p o u n d ' s material constitution or condition of'materiality'. 5 0 T h e apories nine and ten have no special bearing on method. The eleventh (996a4-9; 1001a4-b25) is regarded by Aristotle as "the hardest of all and the most indispensable", when it comes to discovering what truly is. It bears on the precise m e a n i n g s of the key terms 'being' and ' o n e ' and aims at assessing their mutual relationships, and, by the same token, is c o n c e r n e d with the semantic analysis of things-that-are: Ibid. 4, 1001a4-8: The inquiry that is both the hardest of all as well as the most indispensable for the discovery of what truly is, is whether

48

Failing to see that the 'isolation' is meant by Aristotle in the context of logic and does not bear on any kind of physical (or metaphysical) independence, Madigan thinks (1999, 79f.) that "the argument assumes that something predicated of a plurality of things is alongside those things and exists independently of them"; he thus seems to miss Aristotle's anti-Platonic point. 49 Again, Aristotle is anticipating the discussion of Book Z. 50 T h e decisive difference between Plato and Aristotle is that unlike Plato, Aristotle does not hypostatize this formal difference.

what-is (το öv) and what-is-one51 (τό εν) are the ousiai of the thingsthat-are (and it is not by being something different that they are, the one of them 'one', and the other 'being'), or whether we must inquire what being-ness and one-ness are, on the assumption that they should have some other nature underlying them (υποκείμενης άλλης φύσεως). Should the latter be the case, beingness a n d oneness will not be ousiai themselves, but attributes of some o t h e r underlying ousia, which must then be the main object of o u r inquiry instead of beingness and oneness. 5 2 T h e problem will be solved later on in Met. (Z 16, 1040b 16-24, a n d I, 2, juncto M 8, 1083a20-1085a2) to the effect that Being becomes the focal concept, which is to be applied analogically to all kinds of beings, both essential a n d coincidental, whereas the concept of oneness is convertibly associated with 'being'. 5 3 T h e twelfth aporia, which is closely akin to the ninth, again concerns the nature of the ontic principles: are they universal or should they be taken in the same way as individual things? (996a9-10). 54 Its e x p l a n a t i o n (B 6, 1003a7-17) again c e n t r e s on the c o n c e p t of universality, which is supposed to rule out the notion of 'being ousia' i m m a n e n t in a particular, whereas the identification of an ontic principle with s o m e t h i n g individual would make it unknowable, because epistemonic knowledge of the individual is impossible. T h e passage contains some valuable hints about the nature of semantic analysis: Ibid. 6, 1003a7-17: If they are universal, they will not be ousiai, for no common thing (ούθέν γάρ τών κοινών) signifies a 'this' (τόδε τι) but rather a 'such-and-such' (τοιόνδε), while the ousia is a 'this'. If, however, we are allowed to posit (θέσθαι) what is universally assigned (τό κοινή κατηγορούμενον) as a self-contained 'this' (τόδε τι καί εν), Socrates will be several living beings: himself, and 'man', and 'animal', assuming that each of these common things signifies a selfcontained 'this'. These then are the consequences if the principles are universals. If on the other hand they are not universals but of the

51

I take the notion 'one' to refer to 'the state of being-one'. This is the key notion in the expression εν σημαίνειν, which is of p a r a m o u n t significance in Aristotle's semantics of terms. 52 For this connotative use of 'be-ing' and 'one' see my secdons 1.64; 7.33 and 9.34-9.35. 53 The 11th aporia is extensively discussed in Berd (1979), 89-129, and Madigan (1999), 107-18. 54 Ross's translation "universal or what we call individuals" seems to be beside the point, because the way we bring up the individuals for discussion is in order, not our use of the name 'individual'.

n a t u r e of p a r t i c u l a r s (ώς τά κ α θ ' έ κ α σ τ α ) , they will n o t b e k n o w a b l e (έπιστηταί); f o r t r u e k n o w l e d g e of a n y t h i n g is universal. H e n c e if t h e r e is to b e any g e n u i n e k n o w l e d g e of t h e p r i n c i p l e s t h e r e will b e o t h e r p r i n c i p l e s p r i o r to t h e m which a r e said of t h e latter universally (καθόλου κατηγορούμεναι).

This exposition of the problem of the universals, which also contains an allusion to what, from the thirteenth century onwards, features as the problem of the 'pluralitas f o r m a r u m ' , will be solved in Z, chs. 1315, juncto M, ch. 10. T h e t h i r t e e n t h a p o r i a stated at 9 9 6 a l 0 - l l a n d e x p l a i n e d at 1002b32-1003a5 is about the potentiality and actuality of the ontic principles. It will be solved in Θ, chs. 1-9, juncto A, chs. 6-7, in which the indispensable actuality of the First Mover is u n d e r examination. T h e f o u r t e e n t h a n d Final aporia, stated at 996al2-15 a n d explained at 1001b26-1002b11, asks whether or not mathematical entities (numbers, lines, figures, and points) are a kind of ousia, a n d if so, whether they are separate from the sensible things or inherent in them. These questions will be solved in M, chs. 1-3; 6-9, and N, chs. 13; 5 and 6, where it is argued that the belief in the subsistence of n u m b e r s and other mathematical entities is untenable. In point of fact, this problem too is about correct semantic analysis. For looking for ousia we find that the various candidates a m o n g the things that constitute particular things — such as, apart f r o m n u m b e r s etc., affections, motions, relations, states, a n d ratios — are equally unqualified to carry off the palm, the latter because they are all said of a substratum, but are not a 'this' themselves. T h e claims of the candidates are put to the test semantically: Do they signify ousia?, which is ^ r e q u i r e m e n t for which is to be a 'this', and not to be itself said of a substratum.

7. 23 Summary of Met. A, a, and Β Recollecting now the many clues to Aristotle's m e t h o d and the main tenets f o u n d in the introductory cluster, Books A, a , a n d B, the following points can be stated: (1) In o r d e r to obtain genuine knowledge (επιστήμη) of the outside things you have to search for their 'why', i.e. their 'cause a n d principle' (A, chs. 1-2). (2) T h e causes and principles of things par excellence are their ontic principles, which are called their ' t r u t h ' (τό άληθές), a n d will be

identified later on (particularly in Z) as their είδος or 'infima species' (A, chs. 3-10). (3) T h e nature of the ontic principle is explained in terms of 'truth' a n d φ ύ σ ι ς (α, ch. 1). This ' t r u t h ' or 'what-is-true' in things (τό αληθές) is what scholastic authors called 'ontological truth' ('veritas ontologica'), or 'transcendent truth' ('verum transcendens'). 5 5 It will be discussed in Θ, ch. 10, and, pace Ross, should be well distinguished from the r e f e r e n t of propositional (or 'statemental') truth ('veritas logica'). 5 6 T h e latter will be discussed by Aristotle u n d e r the label 'what is qua true' (τό ώς άληθές δν) a n d dismissed as a candidate for being the true ousia, in Ε 4. (4) To correctly pinpoint a thing's 'why' or 'ontic principle' you have to disclose the specific ontic feature it shares with other things of the same n a m e (τά συνώνυμα), a n d call it u p precisely u n d e r this c o m m o n name (B 2, 996b 13ff.). (5) As early as in Met. α 1, 993b6ff., Aristotle highlights the almost insuperable difficulty of grasping a particular's true being (ούσία). When the particular is taken as a whole, i.e. as a c o m p o u n d of form and matter, its ontic cause c a n n o t be equated with the 'thing itself (αύτό). T h e difficulty can only be tackled satisfactorily by considering the thing 'as a whole and a part', which boils down to taking the 'part' (viz. its είδος or ontic cause) qua immanent in the whole which is i n f o r m e d and given its specific being by this very part (B 3, 998b4999a21). (6) T h e p r o p e r scope and m e t h o d of the discipline of metaphysics is clarified by showing how we should focus on a thing's ontic causes (ibid.).

7. 3 Metaphysics assessed among the disciplines (F, chs. 1-3) In the traditional ordering of Aristotle's lectures on metaphysics (in Aristotle's words, 'first philosophy'), Book Γ stands at the beginning of his main discussion. It consists of three parts. In the o p e n i n g 55

Gredt II, p. 11 , nr. 621. It is mostly defined from the epistemological angle, as on p. 48, nr. 660: " [...] veritas quae inest in simplici apprehensione intellectus et in cognitione sensitiva, est veritas ontologica". 56 Gredt, ibid., II, p. 45, nr. 658: "Veritas logica seu cognitionis est adaequatio intellectus cum re". Gredt rightly refers to Aristotle, Met. Ε 4, 1027b27, Θ 10, and An. III, 6. In EE I 8, transcendent good and its convertibility with transcendent 'be' are discussed. On these and the other 'termini transcendentes', my section 9.35.

chapter, the a u t h o r briefly states the n a t u r e of the philosophical investigation of 'what-is' he is after, and defines it as the discipline that investigates that which is qua be-ing, as well as that which belongs to it 'in its own right' (καθ'αυτό), i.e. qua be-ing. T h e whole of ch. 2 and part of ch. 3 (up to 1005b8) deal with the status and the universal claims of this discipline as the single one covering all the relevant aspects of being as such. T h e remainder of ch. 3, and chs. 48 extensively discuss the two most f u n d a m e n t a l axioms, the law of non-contradiction (LNC) and the law of excluded middle (LEM), the discussion of which is regarded as an integral part of the discipline of metaphysics. 7. 31 Preliminary: Aristotle's method and strategy. The key terms As always, in order to understand Aristotle's m e t h o d and strategy it is of vital importance to study his coining and use of key terms. T h e concepts and devices that play a key role in Aristotle's expositions on the subject matter of metaphysics, all occur in the o p e n i n g lines of Book Γ ( italics mine) : Met. Γ 1, 1003a21-32: There is a discipline which studies that-which-is qua thing-that-is and those things that hold good of this in its own right. Now this is not the same of any of the so-called 'partial' disciplines. For none of the others examine universally that-which-is qua thingthat-is, but all cutting off some part of it study the attribute of this part; as for example the mathematical disciplines. Now, since we are seeking principles and the highest causes, clearly these must be a particular's nature in its own right. If then those who sought the elements of the things-that-are were seeking the same principles, it would be necessary that the elements too are of that-which-is qua thing-thatis, not coincidentally. Hence it is of that-which-is qua thing-that-is that we also have to find the first causes.

(a)

Επιστήμη

T h e kind of investigation u n d e r consideration is called a kind of επιστήμη. In this context, the r e n d e r i n g 'discipline' is preferred to the traditional r e n d e r i n g 'science' 5 7 because of the nowadays too specialized connotation of 'science', while elsewhere the r e n d e r i n g 'genuine, or epistemonic knowledge' (plural: 'pieces of genuine, or epistemonic knowledge') will do most of the time. 57

Cf. Kirwan (1971), 76.

(b) Είναι and its cognates τό öv and ούσία T h e expressions 'what-is' a n d ' t h e things-there-are' translate the Greek phrases τό öv and τά οντα, respectively. Obviously the rendering 'exist(s)' is out of order. In any demonstrative investigation the 'quia est' is presupposed, 5 8 a n d although metaphysics is about existing things, the metaphysician is as such interested in the conditions of be-ing — including, of course, the preconditions of existence — rather than the thing's actual existence itself. To be sure, throughout his discussions Aristotle is a d a m a n t about identifying the domain of particular existents as the p r o p e r object of his inquiries, but they are taken in virtue of their i m m a n e n t forms, and the latter can even be e x a m i n e d irrespective of their actually b e i n g e n m a t t e r e d . In questions of fact, any metaphyical investigation, including Plato's, starts from particular beings of the outside world as its objects. What is distinctive of Aristotle's metaphysics is the coalescence of two f o r m s of metaphysical abstraction. O n e is merely formal, by which a thing's being (form or ontic cause) is taken apart f r o m its actually i n h e r i n g in a particular; the o t h e r represents a d e g r e e of abstraction in which this i m m a n e n t f o r m (ontic cause) is taken including its i n h e r e n c e in matter, as a result of which the outside particulars appear to include their 'material constitution' (Ackrill) or 'condition of materiality'. 5 9 O n the whole, Aristotle's metaphysical investigation aims to arrive at that special focalization that will enable us to a p p r e h e n d the outside particulars qua beings, that is to say, u n d e r the specific aspects of /Aarmode(s) of being. 6 0 (c) T h e phrase τό öv f| öv As early as in Ancient times there was a dispute about the p r o p e r domain of metaphysics. T h e question was whether the phrase τό öv ή öv ('being qua being') should comprise everything whatsoever, or only some a m o n g the things-that-are (τών όντων). 61 T h e adherents of the latter view believe they can find some support at Ε 1, 1026a23-32, juncto Κ 7, 1064a28-33, where the f o r m e r passage is paraphrased by 58

My section 6.51. Compare the semantic Main Rules RMA and RSC; my section 1.71. 60 T h e notions of είναι and its cognates, τό öv and ούσία are extensively discussed in my section 1.6. 61 It has also been a hot question in the Middle Ages; see Zimmermann (1965; 2 1998) passim. 59

the a u t h o r of Book Κ (epitomizing E). However, it is patently clear from Aristotle's own words in 1026a23ff. that he regards the view that metaphysics comprises only a certain province of the 'things-that-are' as merely an aporetical alternative, an idea he will cast aside in unequivocal terms at the end of the passage: "And it will fall to this [viz. first philosophy] to study that which is qua thing-that-is, i.e. both what it is and the things that hold good of it qua thing-that-is". In this passage Aristotle is contrasting first philosophy with the 'partial' disciplines which all c o n f i n e themselves to the study of a special province of beings ("a particular thing-that-is"; 1025b8). T h e r e f o r e Ross is indisputably right when he points out (I Introd,., XIX) that Met. Ε itself combines the view that metaphysics studies u n c h a n g e a b l e being with the view that there are no limits to the domain of things it studies. T h e central books ΖΗΘ are in the main c o n c e r n e d with ούσία qua formal entity, which is c o m m o n to both sensible a n d non-sensible ( ' u n c h a n g e a b l e ' ) being, and is thus the "principle a n d highest cause" of 'that-which-is' that his inquiry is looking for. You might still object that there is something telling in Guthrie's j u d g e m e n t that the answer given by Aristotle — "this astonishing man", as Guthrie calls (VI, 216, n . l ) him — to what he has himself called t h e eternal question of the n a t u r e of b e i n g may have contained inconsistencies and may prove hard to explain. 6 2 However, when we weigh Aristotle's words carefully from the viewpoint of his own semantics, what is regarded by Ross as two complementary views combined proves to be in fact just o n e single view. Considering the principle of categorization including the (/««-operator, what Aristotle tries to make clear is that the philosopher is solely interested in the formal cause of that-which-is. Anything whatsoever can be the object of his study, but only 'inasmuch as' (ή, 'qua') it is affected by that formal cause. 63 It is precisely Aristotle's claim that by approaching the 62

Guthrie (1981), 203f. See the excellent discussion of the proper sense of 'being qua being' in Leszl (1975), 145-76, and H a f e m a n n (1998), 17-20. Kirwan (1971: 77f.) fails to understand this and keeps regarding the 'both-and' as a 'first-secondly', concerning "truths that hold good of every-thing-that-is", and "truths that hold good of concepts [sic! De R.] that hold good of every-thing-that-is" (78). Ross too (I, 252f.) keeps on speaking of Aristotle having "in the main two ways of stating the subjectmatter of metaphysics", which he opposes as the broader and the narrower views; he assumes them to be subjected to an attempt to be reconciled in Book E. Paul Natorp even went so far as to regard them as irreconcilable and made this a ground for splitting up the Metaphysics into two different works (Philos. Monatsheft XXIV 63

things in the outside world in this way o n e is able to explain them satisfactorily. 64 (d) T h e use of συμβεβηκός ('coincidental') Taken in its technical sense, the term συμβεβηκός c o n c e r n s the counterpart of what is at stake in the previous section. Kirwan (1971, 76f.) rightly argues for the rendering 'coincidental'. T h e Greek word is the perfect participle of the verb σ υ μ β α ί ν ε ι ν , litterally 'to come together', 'to meet'. It either means 'to coincide', and is said of two (or more) things that by the act of meeting come to have a symmetrical relationship, or 'fall to o n e ' s lot', 'come to', said of two things one of which joins the other, owing to which the two come to stand in an asymmetrical relationship. 6 5 In the latter case, what is συμβεβηκός is an attribute of something else underlying it. Also in c o m m o n Greek the perfect infinitive συμβεβηκέναι sometimes m e a n s 'to be an attribute or characteristic'. 66 Thus the plural participle συμβεβηκότα came to signify things which have come to something else, most of the time with the connotation that they could well have been missing. 67 T h e current translation in m o d e r n languages, 'accident', fails to make people recognize this etymology, because a c o r r e s p o n d i n g verb is lacking. 6 8 Anyway, the asymmetrical relation implied in the Greek σ υ μ β α ί ν ε ι ν and συμβεβηκός is better preserved in 'to coincide' and 'coincidental' than in '(to be an) accident'. 6 9 (1887), 37-65, 540-574). 64 My section 13. Aristotle's use of the (/«a-functor is extensively discussed in my sections 2.73-2.76. 65 Also Gômez-Lobo ( 1966), 55-8. 66 Liddell & Scott report Thucydides II, 15: "This was a characteristic (συνεβεβήκει) of the Athenians". For Aristotle's frequent use of συμβαίνειν in its other tenses see Bonitz, 713al5-b43 ('turn out', 'result', 'follow', esp. logically). 67 Pace Kirwan, Aristotle also knows of necessary, or even eternal, accidents, which are defined (Met. A 30, 1025a30-31) as 'all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not included in its quiddity', e.g. "having its interior angles equal to two right angles attached to the triangle". It is this kind of συμβεβηκός that plays an important role in the doctrine of APo., as well as in practical argument elsewhere; see Bonitz, Index, 713b49-71419, who precisely presents the passages in which Aristotle applies what I have called the devices of 'focalization' and 'categorization'. 68 Unlike English, French and German, Dutch has preserved the Ladn etymological connection ('accidens-accidere') in its corresponding words ('bijkomstig', which is a cognate of the verb 'komen bij' = 'to fall to'). 69 Cf. Met. Δ 18 and Δ 30; Top. I 5, 102b4-7; APo. I 4, 73a34ff; Pol. I 9, 1257a9-13;

(e) T h e phrases καθ' αύτό and κατά συμβεβηκός These phrases serve for singling out special modes of being possessed by an object u n d e r examination. T h e f o r m e r aims to focus on the object's essential m o d e of being, the latter o n a coincidental one. It is pertinent to realize, however, that the essential character of a m o d e of being ultimately d e p e n d s on the investigator's focus of attention, r a t h e r than just the object's n a t u r e as such. Thus, say, Coriscus's being a man can on occasion be taken to be coincidental, and his being a master essential, if, that is, his relationship to his slave Callias is u n d e r consideration (e.g. Cat. 7, 7a28-b7). In point of fact, the two phrases serve as adverbial expressions indicating the special ways in which objects are addressed, either with r e f e r e n c e to an essential aspect ( κ α θ ' αύτό) or a c o i n c i d e n t a l o n e (κατά συμβεβηκός), essential or coincidental, that is, with regard to the point of view taken in a certain discussion or investigation. 70 7. 32 The unity of metaphysics T h e unity of metaphysics could be called into question, owing to the fact that the expression designating its p r o p e r subject matter, 'whatis' is not used in one single sense. In fact, Aristotle had already raised an objection to that effect in the Eudemian Ethics, where he deals with the various senses of ' g o o d ' and, by the same token, of 'being' or 'what-is'. Recalling the division of both 'being' and 'good' over the ten categories, he infers (I 8, 1217b33-35) that just as what-« is not o n e in all things, neither is what-is-good, so that there is not o n e discipline either of what-is or of what-is-good.

£EIII 4, 1232a1. Bonitz 713b43-714a3; De Rijk (1980), 26-33; Kirwan, 180f. Also iny section 8.32. 70 Kirwan (1971), 76-8; 200; De Rijk (1980), 26-33. Also Barnes (1971), 94; Wedin (1978), 181-88 and my sections 8.23; 8.31-8.32. It is pertinent to realize that these labels are not intended by Aristotle to mark off two separate ontological domains. It is all a matter of how we focus on the different modes of being belonging to the object under examination. Gomez-Lobo (1966, 65ff.) rightly stresses that κατά συμβεβηκός primarily concerns a respect (κατά; "eine Perspektive") after which a mode of being can be assigned to an object. However, in the customary fashion, he continually (esp. 88ff.) takes the use of the labels καθ' αύτό and κατά συμβεβηκός in the context of statement-making instead of naming, and to refer to two separate ontological domains (esp. 140ff.). In addition, his view of 'predication' is, like Tugendhat's (1958) charged with Heideggerian obscurity.

In the opening lines of the present chapter, Aristotle takes the edge off this objection by pointing out that the phrase 'what-« ' is used in m o r e than o n e sense — in his words: "that-which-is is worded in different ways" — but always "with reference to o n e thing, i.e. o n e particular nature", just as the designation 'what-is-healthy' has more than one sense, but in such a way that all referents somehow relate to the c o m m o n nature 'health'. Similarly, 'what-«' belongs to a class of expressions which are neither synonymous n o r merely equivocal, but r e p r e s e n t various relationships to o n e focal m e a n i n g which is representative of the c o m m o n nature f o u n d in some way or a n o t h e r in all things entitled to the c o m m o n name, 'be-ing'. Thus with reference to one starting-point, some things are said to 'be' because they are substances, others as affections of subsistent things, others as representing a progress towards substance or destructions, privations, or qualities of substance, and so on; others even while being negations of these things (viz. affections etc.) — or of subsistent being itself, so that even of non-being we say that it is n o n - b e i n g (2, 1003a33-b10). T h e first sentence (1003a33) calls for a general remark from the viewpoint of semantics. Kirwan rejects any r e n d e r i n g that takes the phrase τό öv to be autonymously used to stand for the expression 'thatwhich-is'. It is things, not words that λέγεται πολλαχώς, that is, 'are w o r d e d ' or 'so called' (Kirwan), or ' b r o u g h t u p for discussion in different ways'. As we have stated above, things can be brought u p for discussion in d i f f e r e n t ways by using various categorizations. This does not rule out, however, the fact that the concrete things of the outside world are all subsistent entities, but for the sake of a r g u m e n t they may be b r o u g h t u p for discussion in various ways, according to their subsistent nature or ousia, or one of their non-substantial attributes. T h u s a courageous man's, say, Socrates's, being-a-man is of a d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e f r o m his being-courageous, but they are n o t h i n g other than two different modes of be-ing of o n e and the same entity, Socrates. Kirwan (1971, 79f.) asks w h e t h e r this d i f f e r e n c e is "enough to justify the thesis that 'exist' has different senses in the two cases". 71 He believes that the question is not easy to answer because there is no clear criterion for the difference in senses. He even goes so far as to find this difficulty strong e n o u g h to support the objection of EE that 71

Kirwan implicitly admits (and rightly so) a rendering like: "'be' is used in several ways".

n o discipline can have all existing (sic!) things as its subject matter. I am afraid his remarks are entirely beside the point. First, the 'is' in 'what-«' should not be narrowed down to 'exists', as we have seen before, so that any talk a b o u t two d i f f e r e n t senses of 'existence' is b o u n d to confuse the issue. Taking Kirwan's example, the only 'existent' is the particular courageous man, who possesses o n e subsistent m o d e of being underlying manifold attributes (coincidental modes of being), a m o n g which his being-courageous. More importantly, to discern a thing's d i f f e r e n t m o d e s of b e i n g does n o t a m o u n t to discovering conflicting ways of being in it, but merely concerns o u r mutually opposing various aspects of its being ('modes of b e i n g ' ) . T h a t is what categorization is all about. In addition, Guthrie (VI, 207) seems to be right in evaluating the objection f o u n d in the EE by pointing out that in the present context Aristotle is concerned with all what-is simply qua being, rather than, as in the objection, roughly with things being or being-good in various ways. Kirwan (80f.) also raises a problem about the inclusion at 1003b910 of denials a m o n g the things-that-are. He has rightly observed that when speaking of negations (αποφάσεις), Aristotle does not have negative statements in mind, but negative states (of affairs) or incomplete dictums, like 'not-being-white', which may be said of something. However, I am at a loss when it comes to making anything out of Kirwan's explanation (81) of the supposed difficulty — that the lines b9-10 suggest that denials are a m o n g the things-that-are — not to mention the fact that he continues to confuse 'being' and 'existing'. Aristotle's words are merely an addition: "that is why to assert that even what-is-not is a thing-that-is-not", and so are merely a prelude to his recognizing 'being as truth' 'and 'non-being as falsity'. T h e latter is in fact the m o d e of being of 'things' ('statable things' or 'states of affairs') asserted, and therefore must not be excluded from our investigations in advance. His saying 'even' anticipates the subsequent dismissal (in Met. Ε 4) of this m o d e of being. 7 2 At 1003b 11-16 Aristotle explicitly infers f r o m the foregoing that, just as everything that is healthy is covered by o n e discipline, it is also o n e discipline that covers the things-that-are qua things-that-are. Kirwan (81) thinks that the analogy is not appropriate to substantiate Aristotle's claim about the status of metaphysics as the one discipline dealing with the that-it-is of all things t h e r e are, because "the 72

See Met. Ε 2, 1026a35 and 4, t027b18-1028a4.

metaphysician, even though he knows about substance, and though every existing thing is somehow c o n n e c t e d to substance, c a n n o t p r o n o u n c e on the question 'What exists?' which is a j o b for many specialists". It n e e d not come as a surprise that once again his confusion of ' b e i n g ' a n d 'existing' is responsible f o r Kirwan's difficulty. For Aristotle, the metaphysician's claim does not concern a thing's actual existence as such, but its ontic n a t u r e , including, admittedly, its existential (pre) conditions. H e readily leaves the question of τό ότι ('quia est') to the specialists, just as the latter leave whatever concerns the τί έστι ( ' q u i d est') of their p r o p e r subjects, including their attributes, u p to the p h i l o s o p h e r , a n d c o n f i n e themselves to the assumption of the quiddity of these p r o p e r t i e s a n d p r o c e e d to examine their application from there, each in their own discipline. 73 That this is what Aristotle has in mind may also appear from 1003b 1622, in which the a u t h o r argues that in every case a discipline chiefly deals with that which is primarily, i.e. that which the o t h e r things d e p e n d u p o n a n d in virtue of which they get their designations ('appellations'). 7 4 T h u s metaphysics has to generically 7 5 study of all species of 'what is' the object's causes and principles, while its parts have to study the specific parts of the d o m a i n of metaphysics, all focussing on what-it-is q u a thing-that-is. At 1004a2-9 these subdomains are referred to as the parts of philosophy that are as many as there are ousiai, and the division a n d specialization of first philosophy is c o m p a r e d to mathematics, which also has a primary a n d a secondary discipline, and others successively, within its domain. 7. 33 The convertibility of 'being' and 'one' T h e subsequent paragraph (1003b22-1004a2) is commonly supposed to flatly interrupt 7 6 the run of argument. Kirwan (82) takes it as an 73

See Met. Γ 2, 1005a11-13 and Ε 1, 1025b11-14. For the m e a n i n g and significance of designation see our Index, s.v. 'categorization'. The natural philosopher, too, studies the outside things in view of their ousia, so physics is itself an important branch of ontology. See Mel. Ζ 11, 1037a 15-20. 75 w h e n he speaks of γένος and εϊδη in this context, Aristotle has a class and its sub-classes in mind, rather than genus and species in the technical sense; for this non-technical sense of γένος see Bonitz, Index, 152a21-37. 76 That there is a digression inserted may also be gathered from the apparently seamless linking up of 1004a3ff. with 1003bl9-22. On the other hand, Alexander's proposal (CAG I, p. 246 13 ) to insert 1004a2-9 right after 1003b22, and that of 74

insertion made by Aristotle or his editor to show that things-that-areone divide in the same way as things-that-are. However, his assumption ignores the corollary f o u n d at 1003b34-36 to the effect that there are as many kinds of one-ness as there are of being-ness. This thesis leads Aristotle to discuss the various a p p u r t e n a n c e s of oneness, a n d so gives him the opportunity to solve the problem raised earlier (at Β 1, 995b19-25). T h e question was whether our metaphysical investigation is concerned only with ousiai or with their essential attributes as well, a m o n g which those designated by notions such as 'the same' a n d 'other', 'like' and 'unlike', and 'contrariety', which are all more easily opposed to 'one-ness' than to 'being-ness'. 7 7 In Aristotle's a r g u m e n t we find a short discussion of a metaphysical issue which has been of p a r a m o u n t importance in Ancient and Medieval metaphysics since Parmenides' days, viz. the convertibility o f ' b e i n g ' and 'one'. 7 8 In his discussion Aristotle first brings u p the thesis of the convertibility of the notions 'being' and ' o n e ' — which obtains despite their being formally different, as clearly a p p e a r s f r o m their respective d e f i n i t i o n s 7 9 — introduced by the phrase εί δή, which, like Latin 'siquidem', is frequently employed for 'if, t h e n ' , used equivalently with 'since', or 'granted it is true, then'. T h e convertibility of the two notions is semantically supported in a twofold way: (a) when added to

Schwegler and Natorp, who are followed by Ross, to insert it after 1003b19 should also be taken into consideration. Anyway, either 1003b22-1004a2 or f004a2-9 seems to occur in the wrong place in the text handed down. 77 At Met. Δ 15, 1021a9-12 it is said that the Equal, the Like, and the Same are defined in terms of the One. See also Met. 1 3, Î054a29-32: ' T o the O n e belong (as we have indicated graphically in our distinction of the contraries) the Same, the Like, and the Equal, and to the Many belong the Other, the Unlike, and the Unequal". Cf. Alexander, CAG I, p. 250 1 7 1 9 : "For the proof that practically all contraries are referred to the O n e and the Many as their first principle, Aristotle sends us to the Selection of Contraries, where he has treated expressly of the subject" (Oxford Translation XII, 122). Cf. ibid., 26218"26; ps.-Alexander CAG I, pp. 61514"17; 642 38 -643 3 ; 69523"26· Asclepius CAG VI-2, pp. 237' 1 1 4 and 247 1719 ; also Syrianus CAG VI-1, p. 6112"17 quoted n. 83 below. 78 In the Middle Ages the terms 'ens' and ' u n u m ' together with 'verum', 'bonum', 'res', and 'aliquid' were called 'termini transcendentes' (never 'transcendentalia' by the way, as became customary in Late Scholasticism), meaning terms that can be said of things when taken apart from their predicamental ordering, i.e. prior to their being differentiated by the ten categories ('praedicamenta'); see my section 9.35. For the intimate association of oneness and beingness see ibid. 79 Section 9.35. What is denoted by τό öv is extensionally or referentially the same as what is denoted by τό εν and their sameness guarantees the convertibility of these notions. Alexander aptly glosses (CAG I, p. 246 31 ) the phrase τω άκολουθεΐν ά λ λ ή λ ο ι ς ('by mutual implication') by κατά τό ΰποκείμενον ('according to the material substratum').

a c o m m o n n o u n , such as ' m a n ' , the elements ' o n e ' and 'being' do not act as a significative s e m e m e supervening the m e a n i n g of the c o m m o n n o u n , 8 0 a n d (b) n e i t h e r of t h e m adds something to the other, when both are added to a c o m m o n noun. In Aristotle's words: Met. Γ 2, 1003b26-1004a2: Indeed 'one-man' and 'man', as well as 'being-a-man' and 'man', are the same thing; and the doubling of these words in 'one-man' and 'man-being-one' does not bring about any difference; and clearly, in the case of coming-to-be or of ceasingto-be, 'thing' and 'be' go together, as also holds of 'thing' and 'one'. Hence it is obvious that (a) the addition in these cases does not alter the , evidently not all and everything will be relative to opinion. This a r g u m e n t can, of course, only be effective if o n e takes f o r g r a n t e d that the o p p o n e n t shares with Aristotle the 'realistic' ontological conviction that t h e r e are things i n d e p e n d e n t of the h u m a n mind. To be sure, it was quite c o m m o n in Ancient days to start f r o m this unreflected conviction, and so the Protagorean doctrine bears no resemblance to anything like "Bewusztseinsphilosophie".

190 f h g Greek has the negation 'not' before 'true' (and in the common translations it is left there), but logic requires the prolepsis of the negative particle.

T h e o t h e r a r g u m e n t Aristotle (1011b7-12) puts forward to show that the Protagorean doctrine is untenable owing to self-refutation, is surely n o t of a similar transparency a n d has been given various interpretations. As a matter of fact, Aristotle's way of expression is once again "dangerously elliptic". H e r e is the text: Ibid., 1011b7-11: ετι εί εν, προς εν ή πρός ώρισμένον· καί εί τό αύτό καί ήμισυ καί ϊσον, άλλ' ού πρός τό διπλάσιόν γε τό ϊσον. πρός δή τό δοξάζον εί ταύτό άνθρωπος και τό δοξαζόμενον, ούκ εσται άνθρωπος τό δοξάζον άλλα τό δοξαζόμενον. Ross (I, 279; 282f.) takes this a r g u m e n t to lead to two d i f f e r e n t unacceptable conclusions, both inferred f r o m the statement f o u n d at b7-9, which is r e n d e r e d thus: "Further, if a thing is one, it is relative to o n e thing or to some d e t e r m i n a t e n u m b e r of things; a n d if the same thing is both half a n d equal, still the equal as such is n o t relative to the double to which the half as such is relative." T h e first unacceptable conclusion is, on Ross's interpretation (b9-l 1 ): "If, in relation to the thinking subject, m a n a n d the object of t h o u g h t be the same, man will not be the thinking subject but the object of thought". H e paraphrases the reasoning thus (282f.): "If man is man simply because h e is t h o u g h t to be so, his being is comprised in a relation to a thinking subject. In this relation h e can only be that which is relative to the thinking subject, viz., an object of thought; and since the relation is his whole being h e cannot also be a thinking subject. I.e. if the esse of man be percipi, he c a n n o t percipere. Which is absurd". I c a n n o t see, however, why these premisses should rule o u t the view that man, quite apart f r o m being the object of thought, is also the thinking subject. Ross's presumption, that, in the context of this argument, m a n ' s relation to a thinking subject "is his whole being" so that "he cannot also be a thinking subject", does not find any support in the text and, what is worse, perhaps, his anachronistic interpretation supposes Aristotle to consider the Protagorean a Lockean avant la lettre.191 Aristotle's previous statement (b7-9) — w h i c h , incidentally, only acts as an intermediary step to the final conclusion of b l 1-12 — is to the effect that, in the framework of his own focal argumentation which merely bears on ' m a n ' qua related to the thinking subject, 191

T h e Protagorean thesis claims that all our perceptions are merely subjective and cannot, accordingly, guarantee reliable knowledge of the outside world, but it does by n o means imply that there is n o outside world i n d e p e n d e n t of o u r perceptions.

' m a n ' is to be taken only as representing the object of thought, not as being, in a d d i t i o n , the t h i n k i n g subject. Well, this is a harmless s t a t e m e n t , which would surely n o t e m b a r r a s s his P r o t a g o r e a n opponents. What Ross regards as the second a r g u m e n t runs as follows (on his reading) : Ibid., 101 l b l 1-12: εί δ' εκαστον εσται πρός τό δοξάζον, πρός άπειρα εσται τφ εϊδει τό δοξάζον. Ross translates ( O x f o r d Translation): "And if each thing is to be relative to that which thinks, that which thinks will be relative to an infinity of specifically d i f f e r e n t things". In his commentary, Ross (I, 283) c o m m e n t s : "The s e c o n d a r g u m e n t may b e p u t thus: 'If everything is relative to the thinking subject, the thinking subject is relative to an infinite n u m b e r of specifically d i f f e r e n t things', and t h e r e f o r e , since each relative term has a correlative d i f f e r e n t f r o m that of any o t h e r relative term (lines 7-9), the thinking subject will have to include in it an infinite n u m b e r of specifically d i f f e r e n t aspects, so that definition of it will be impossible. Which is absurd." 1 9 2 So far, so good, but, the reader may now ask, So what? As so often, 'infinite n u m b e r ' indicates an indefinite n u m b e r , or a countless multitude; 1 9 3 anyway, it involves a potential infinitude, not an actual o n e . Now t h e r e is n o m i s f o r t u n e at all in c o n c l u d i n g that the thinking subject includes in it an infinite n u m b e r of things. O n the contrary, this would b e in p e r f e c t a c c o r d a n c e with the f a m o u s Aristotelian adage 'anima q u o d a m m o d o omnia'. 1 9 4 Kirwan (115f.) is of the opinion that "compression and inadequate terminology o b f u s c a t e the a r g u m e n t " . C o m p r e s s e d this concise a r g u m e n t surely is, but I c a n n o t find any inadequate terminology in it. For that matter, Kirwan's hesitant paraphrase of the a r g u m e n t is based u p o n his own analysis, splitting u p the a r g u m e n t into five steps, of which he thinks the fifth o n e does not follow from the fourth. This analysis, however, is not convincing at all since, like Ross, Kirwan apparently ignores the illative force of Aristotle's m a n n e r of reasoning by analogy. 192

Tricot ad loc. follows Ross slavishly: "... le sujet pensant étant, en fait, relatif à u n e infinité d'objets pensés, il se dissoudra en u n e poussière d'objets, et sa définition sera impossible, ce qui est également absurde". T h e r e is a similar interpretation in Reale I, 315 and 352, note 8 thereto. 193 See Liddell & Scott, s.v. 194 An. Ill 8, 431b21.

In fact, for the sake of the a r g u m e n t Aristotle starts by assuming the Protagorean thesis ("Everything that is t h o u g h t or imagined is real") and taking it to imply that 'real' things are o n e and the same as 'things o p i n e d ' . In a first step it is stated, then, that 'being o n e and the same' is a property that is relative to something definite; or to put it differently, something o n e or definite is required for acting as the point of reference of equality: Ibid., 1011b7-8: If a thing is one, it is so relative to something one or definite. Putting this first step differently, by way of paraphrase: "If ' t h i n g o p i n e d ' is o n e and the same as 'real thing', then this being o n e and the same is relative to something o n e and definite". Of course, by this ' s o m e t h i n g o n e a n d definite' o n e has to u n d e r s t a n d the o p i n i n g subject, as will also be clear from lines b9ff. In the next step, the notion 'being o n e and the same' is put to the test. In fact, Aristotle sets out to u n d e r m i n e the concept of identity used by the Protagoreans and thus to qualify the Protagorean identification o f ' r e a l thing' and 'thing o p i n e d ' . This step is accomplished by means of a mathematical rule specifying the notion of relational property: Ibid., 1011b8-9: And if the same thing is both a half and an equal, yet it is not equal relative to the double, [relative to which it is a half]. What Aristotle tries to make clear is that if [x], say 10, is both a half, viz. of 20, and an equal, e.g. to [7+3], then its being both a half and an equal does not imply that in both capacities it has the same relationship of equality, because our [x] is really an equal (viz. to [7+3], but is not by the same token 20's equal. Putting it formally: "If [x] is both ['/2 [20]}, and equal to [7+3], then not: [x] qua equal is equal to [20]". In the third step, this rule is analogically applied to the key elements of the next sentence, viz. the opining subject (το δοξοιζον), the thing o p i n e d (τό δοξαζόμενον) and ' m a n ' (άνθρωπος). T h e following analogata may now be observed: (a) t h e 'real t h i n g a n d t h i n g o p i n e d b e i n g o n e a n d the same' corresponds to 'the o n e ' (εν) f o u n d in the prodosis of 1011b7; (b) the phrase προς δή τό δοξάζον at b9-10 corresponds to 'relative to something one or definite' (πρός εν ή πρός ώρισμένον) at b7-8; (c) τό δοξάστον (='the o p i n i n g subject') at b9-10 and b l l a n d 12 corresponds to 'the double' (τό διπλάσιον) at b9;

(d) ' m a n a n d thing o p i n e d ' (άνθρωπος καί τό δοξαζόμενον) at b10 corresponds to the phrase ' both a half and an equal' (ήμισυ και ϊσον) at b8, whereby ' m a n ' corresponds to the infinitely variable property 'a h a l f , and 'thing o p i n e d ' to 'equal'. 1 9 5 This analysis of the a r g u m e n t leads us to the following translation of the subsequent two steps: Ibid., 1011b9-12: Clearly then (δή), if in respect to the opining subject a man is identical with the thing opined, then man will not be the opining subject, but the thing opined. Now if each thing [i.e. not only 'man', but also 'tree', 'stone', and so on] will have the relation of equality to the opining subject, the opining subject will be an infinity of specifically different things. 196 What Aristotle means to say is that if ' m a n ' is both a real thing and a thing o p i n e d , then it possesses the relational property of equality only r e g a r d i n g the thing o p i n e d , n o t with respect to the o p i n i n g subject. In other words: Just like [x] qua being a half of [20] does not have its relational p r o p e r t y of b e i n g an equal (viz. of [7+3]) regarding [20], quite so ' m a n ' , in its capacity o f ' b e i n g an equal' (viz. regarding the thing o p i n e d ) does not have the property of equality with respect to the o p i n i n g subject. T h e r e f o r e the o p i n i n g subject can only be o n e and the same as the different things opined — which the Protagorean thesis claims is the case — if it is, apart from being a m a n , an infinite n u m b e r of specifically d i f f e r e n t things, such as horse, tree, stone, a n d so on. This is, by itself, not unacceptable, in view of the 'anima q u o d a m m o d o o m n i a ' thesis, but it contradicts the r e q u i r e m e n t assumed at the outset (viz. in the apodosis of b7-8), that each relationship of being-one-and-the-same should be relative to what is o n e or d e f i n i t e . J u s t as ' d o u b l e ' by itself is s o m e t h i n g indefinite (because it is infinitely variable, viz. double of 1, 2, 3, a n d so on ad infinitum), so ' o p i n i n g subject' is s o m e t h i n g indefinite (because opining what?); a n d thus, in virtue of the rule of 1011b7-8, it c a n n o t act as a point of r e f e r e n c e for the relationship of equality ('being-one-and-the-same') assumed by the P r o t a g o r e a n s to exist between real thing and things opined, n o matter what things. 197 195

This precisely is the opponents' thesis, one should bear in mind. I think our two oldest MSS (the Parisinus and the Vindobonensis) should be followed in omitting at b l 2 πρός before άπειρα, since the balance of logical consistency is in favour of their reading. Ross (I, 283) who, because of the balance of authority (the Laurentianus and the Greek Commentators) maintains πρός άπειρα, agrees that "evidently άπειρα would give a good sense". Reale (ad loc.) rightly follows Schwegler (Met. Ill, 182) in cancelling πρός. 197 The whole argumentation of 101 lb7-12 offers a nice example of what I have 196

7. 84 Aristotle's summary of chs. 3, 1005b8 to 6, 1011b12 In the r e m a i n d e r of the chapter (6, 1011b13-22) Aristotle summarises the contents of 3, 1005b8 - 6, 1011b12. He is fully convinced that his various a r g u m e n t s against the a d h e r e n t s of the anti-LNC thesis are successful, and that the consequences of this thesis as well as of the cognate Protagorean thesis are fatal for his o p p o n e n t s . Both contradictory a n d contrary states of affairs ('statables') c a n n o t simultaneously hold good of the same thing. T h e phrase τάς άντικειμένας φάσεις at 1011b14 is commonly taken to m e a n contradictory statements (e.g. 'Socrates is pale' vs. ' n o t : Socrates is pale'), as by τ ά ν α ν τ ί α (b17ff.) contrary statements (e.g. 'Socrates is pale' vs. 'Socrates is black') are understood. In fact, these φάσεις 1 9 8 are c o n t r a d i c t o r y a n d c o n t r a r y 'states of b e i n g ' (or i n c o m p l e t e 'dictums' or r a t h e r 'assertibles'), such as ' [ x ] ' s being pale' vs. ' n o t being pale', a n d ' [ x ] ' s being pale' vs. ' b e i n g black', r e s p e c t i v e l y . 1 9 9 In this c o n t e x t it should be b o r n e in m i n d that Aristotle (rightly) puts contrary a n d contradictory statables in o n e box, since, as far as LNC is c o n c e r n e d , they both concern particular things, such as 'Socrates', 'this m a n ' etc. (my section 7.79). T h e way in which he explains (1011b18-20) why contraries too are involved in LNC is interesting: "for o n e of a pair of contraries is a privation n o less than it is a contrary, a privation of ousia, that is; and a privation is the negation that affects some definite genus". This explanation should be completed by what is said at Met. I 4, 1055a33-b8, where Aristotle claims that the primary contrariety is that between a positive state or m o d e of being (εξις) and privation (στέρησις), which is called a kind of contradictory state, because, h e says (1055b4-8), "what suffers privation, either in general or in some d e t e r m i n a t e way, is either that which is quite incapable of having , or that which, being of such a nature to have it, does not actually possess it; [...] privation, therefore, is a contradictory state or o r i g i n of t h e f o r t u i t o u s , t h e n , will b e this, a n d of its o c c u r r i n g n o t h i n g else will b e t h e cause.

It is sufficiently plain now that 'what-zs-coincidentally' will n o t d o as the p r o p e r object of metaphysics.

8. 4 'What is-qua-true'should also be discarded After having r e j e c t e d c o i n c i d e n t a l b e i n g as a c a n d i d a t e f o r the p r o p e r subject of metaphysics, in Ε 4 Aristotle proceeds to deal with a n o t h e r claimant a m o n g the f o u r senses of 'be', viz. 'being-qua-true'. This applicant is considered together with its c o u n t e r p a r t , 'not-being as falsehood'. It will be of great use in o u r discussion of this chapter, which is of utmost i m p o r t a n c e for o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the a u t h o r ' s semantic modus operandi, to start with the exposition of the different uses of the term ψεύδος f o u n d in the Lexicon, Δ 29. 8. 41 Falsehood in Met. Δ 29 Kirwan (199) claims that in Δ 29 — unlike elsewhere, especially in De Interpretatione — "things, n o t t h o u g h t s " are u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . Consequently h e regards Aristotle's classification of the various uses of ' f a l s e h o o d ' a n d the c o g n a t e 'false' as surprising, 7 1 because "we should expect the main distinction to be between false objects or events (i.e. things that are n o t as they seem, like d r e a m s , stage scenery, a n d false beards) a n d false statements a n d beliefs; instead, he ignores statements a n d beliefs in favour of states of affairs [...], which he groups, together with things that are n o t as they seem, as false 'actual things"'(178). Owing, for the g r e a t e r part, to his misinterpretation of the text, which culminates in mistaking πράγμα for 'actual thing', Kirwan arrives at his verdict that Aristotle's t r e a t m e n t of false states of affairs is not adequate. However, why should we expect Aristotle to deal with the outside 'things' r a t h e r than ' t h o u g h t s ' ? Why should we not, instead, follow the a u t h o r ' s exposition step by step, without confusing ourselves by taking "our" (whose, for that matter?) expectations as a touchstone? 71

Cf. Wolff (1999), who speaks (46ff.) of "les vraies surprises de Met. Δ 29".

Aristotle distinguishes three senses of 'false': first the focal m e a n ing expressed by the substantive n o u n ψεΰδος ('falsehood'); then two cognate applications of the focal m e a n i n g f o u n d in phrases containing the adjective n o u n ψευδής ('false account' a n d 'false m a n ' ) . T h e focal m e a n i n g is indicated by the phrase 'falsehood-as-a-state' (ψεΰδος-πράγμα). Two uses are distinguished (cf. Cael. I 12, 281b9-14): Met. Δ 29, 1 0 2 4 b 17-26: T o b e g i n with, f a l s e h o o d is said (a) as 'falseh o o d as a s t a t e ' ( π ρ ά γ μ α - ψ ε ΰ δ ο ς ) ; a n d this s o m e t i m e s b e c a u s e of a c e r t a i n state n o t actually b e i n g p u t t o g e t h e r , o r i n c a p a b e of b e i n g p u t t o g e t h e r ( f o r i n s t a n c e , ' t h e - d i a g o n a l ' s - b e i n g - c o m m e n s u r a t e ' o r ' y o u r - b e i n g - s e a t e d ' ; ( a j ) o n e of t h e s e is a f a l s e h o o d always, (a2) t h e o t h e r s o m e t i m e s ; it is in this way t h a t t h e s e states a r e n o t things-that-are); a n d (b) < t h e t e r m s t a n d s f o r > a n y t h i n g w h i c h , while b e i n g a thing-that-is, n o n e t h e less, by n a t u r e , a p p e a r s e i t h e r n o t s u c h as it is, o r things-that-are-not, e.g. a c h i a r o s c u r o a n d d r e a m s ; f o r t h e s e are s o m e t h i n g , b u t n o t t h a t of w h i c h they c r e a t e t h e a p p e a r a n c e . T h u s t h e r e is talk of false states in this first s e n s e e i t h e r b e c a u s e they a r e n o t t h e case, o r b e c a u s e t h e a p p e a r a n c e r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e s e states is t h a t of s o m e t h i n g t h a t is n o t t h e case.

Let us take the second g r o u p (b) first. It is instanced by such things as d r e a m s a n d a certain kind of sketch. 7 2 We have to recall at the outset o n e of the semantic Main Rules stated b e f o r e (my section 1.71): that significative tools are indiscriminately used to stand for (1) what they a r e by themselves q u a signs, a n d , in fact far m o r e frequently: (2) the entities signified by t h e m . O u r passage offers a nice example: the sketch or d r e a m is s o m e t h i n g existent, the f o r m e r as a physical entity, the latter as a mental one; but their contents, i.e. that which they primarily represent, either does not represent a real state of affairs in a precise m a n n e r , or even does not obtain at all in the outside world, a n d to d o so precisely is their natural disposition (1024b22: πέφυκε φαίνεσθαι), we are told. It is easily seen, then, that their b e i n g a falsehood does not concern their real o c c u r r e n c e as a sign, but that which they are referring to (or claiming to refer to). T h e i n t e r p r e t e r should avail himself of this precious h i n t for correctly grasping the p u r p o r t of this chapter: a falsehood is a mental state of affairs that is not actually the case in the outside world. Let us now look at the first group, (aj) a n d (a2) Quite in line with t h e items of the second g r o u p , its m e m b e r s are equally states of 72

Greek σκιαγραφία is used for "a rough sketch in light and shade, which produces its effect best at a distance" (Ross ad loc.).

affairs not obtaining in the o u t e r world, as is patently clear f r o m the examples used:' 'the-diagonal-of-a-square's-being-commensurate-withits-side', a n d 'your-being-seated', o n e an everlasting falsehood, the o t h e r a c o n t i n g e n t state, now false, but possibly true ('obtaining') at a n o t h e r time. But all the same, qua instances of false states they both refer to what is actually not the case in the outside world. T h e r e is, however, an i m p o r t a n t d i f f e r e n c e between the two. Unlike the cases of the (a2) type, in those of the (ai) g r o u p the notion 'what-is-not' n o t only refers to what is actually n o t the case, but also implies the connotation of logical a n d ontological impossibility. This twofold use of the phrase τό μή öv parallels Plato's use of that expression in the Sophist, w h e r e it is f o u n d b o t h in the sense of 'what-isabsolutely-not' (τό μηδαμώς öv: 237B7ff.) a n d of ' n o t - b e i n g q u a o t h e r n e s s ' (ούκ έναντίον τι του οντος ά λ λ ' ετερον μόνον; ibid., 257B3ff.). 7 3 T h e p r e g n a n t m e a n i n g (ai) is f o u n d in Aristotle at APo. I 2, 71b25, w h e r e it is claimed that f o r t h e r e to be an e p i s t e m o n i c proof of 'things' ('states of affairs'), the statements must be true in the first place, "because o n e c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d what is not, e.g. thediagonal's-being-commensurate". Aristotle's instancing the diagonal's incommensurability instead of s o m e t h i n g that is incidentally n o t the case, is significant. Some m o r e observations can be m a d e . Quite in line with the basic d o c t r i n e e x p o u n d e d in the o p e n i n g lines of De interpretatione, what t h e sign-entity (in this case, the false state as p h r a s e d in a set of words) in the first place is a sign of, is "an affection of the soul" (παθήμα τής ψυχής) i.e. the m i n d ' s being actually affected by this or that complex notion. And what, in turn, this affection is a likeness of, is a state of affairs, the c o n t e n t of this mental entity, that is. By itself, a state of affairs, when taken as the c o n t e n t of some act of thinking, n e i t h e r obtains n o r does n o t obtain; in point of fact, it is n o t until it is applied to some state of affairs of the outside world it claims to bear u p o n , that it may turn o u t to be, or not to be, the case. However, of any false state of affairs it holds that its (incorrectly) being applied is entailed in its being false, n o matter that some of t h e m (viz. those of the 'diagonal's-being-commensurate' type) will never be truly applied to some entity of the outside world. 7 4

73

De Rijk (1986), 84-92; 164-73. For the association with 'false speech', ibid., 206-12. 74 Cf. Phys. TV 12, 222a2-7.

T h e use of π ρ ά γ μ α in this context a n d the like, especially in the Categories a n d De interpretatione, is pivotal. T h e r e n d e r i n g 'actual t h i n g ' 7 5 is confusing a n d in most cases even incorrect, because the phrase 'actual thing' is explicitly restricted to (possible) referents the word has in the outside world, a n d , what is m o r e i m p o r t a n t , it precludes us f r o m a p p r e h e n d i n g the specific use πράγμα has in the contexts which are of o u r c o n c e r n now. In philosophical texts, the Greek π ρ ά γ μ α has t h e focal sense of ' t h i n g i n c l u d i n g how it is, affected as it is by the actual circumstances i n h e r i n g in it'; h e n c e ' t h i n g i n c l u d i n g its a p p u r t e n a n c e s ' as cognized by sense perception. 7 6 Quite in line with the g e n e r a l rules of semantics, the word πράγμα signifies such a thing either (a) as merely conceived of, or (b) as (truly or falsely) applied to the outside world. Both (a) a n d (b) signify a thing as it stands or, to say it m o r e philosophically, as its f o r m is actualized. 7 7 T h e r e will be an o p p o r t u n i t y to r e t u r n to the precise m e a n i n g of πράγμα in d u e course (my section 8.43). In the second and third paragraphs (1024b26-1025a1, a n d 1025a213) two entities are discussed that, each in their own way, are affected by f a l s e h o o d a n d , accordingly, are a c c o m p a n i e d by the adjective

75

Ackrill and Kirwan in their translations. Warrington has 'fact'; but in modern ears his rendering "that which is false as a fact" (Warrington's italics, p. 44) might sound a bit awkward, but when taken indiscriminately to stand for either 'something known to be true', or 'something accepted or claimed to be true' (as in "The facts given by the witness are highly questionable"), Warrington's rendering will surely do. For the mental status of 'fact' see De Rijk (1979), 21-8. O n the other hand, the rendering 'thing' (Ross; 'chose', Tricot; 'cosa', Reale), which is ambiguous in a way similar to the Greek πράγμα, is attractive for the faithful translator. However, like Kirwan, Ross (I, 344f.) fell victim to a misunderstanding (which is not u n c o m m o n , for that matter) concerning the precise meaning of πράγμα (likewise Wolff 199, 48ff.), to the effect that they charge Aristotle with contradicting himself and being confused on this score. Ross even goes so far as to exculpate Aristotle by regarding the Lexicon of Book Δ as Aristotle's attempt at merely classifying the c u r r e n t usages of terms "rather than at stating a t h o r o u g h g o i n g metaphysic", which, to Ross's mind, is somewhat in conflict with what he says in the Lexicon and elsewhere only to be expected (cf. Wolff, 49; 62). On this assumption, Ross comes to the entirely erroneous surmise that Aristotle should have adapted the terminology of Antisthenes, with its opposition of πράγμα to ονομα and λόγος. In fact both Aristotle and Plato make use of this most profitable contradistinction in their semantics. See for Plato, De Rijk (1986), 217-34. O n c e again, the interpreter's confusion is not Aristotle's. 76 In this respect the Greek πράγμα may be compared to English 'affair' in the sense of "thing, matter, applied to anything made or existing, usually with a descriptive or qualifying term", Random House Dictionary, 24b. 77 A form's 'actualization' should be well distinguished from its 'factualization' in the outside world. For the distinction between 'actual' and 'factual' see De Rijk (1981a), 38-40.

n o u n ψευδής ('false'), viz. false λόγος a n d false m a n . It is in the interests of o u r investigation to observe how these two uses of the adjective are related to the focal notion πράγμα-ψεΰδος ('falsehoodas-a-state'). Roughly speaking, λόγος is the verbal c o u n t e r p a r t of πράγμα. Just as the latter is not merely ' t h i n g ' , but ' t h i n g including its a p p u r t e n ances perceived by sense p e r c e p t i o n ' , so — unlike όνομα ( ' n o u n ' , ' n a m e ' ) , which is always a one-word expression used to merely bring u p a thing for discussion — λόγος is always a more-than-one-word expression ( ' p h r a s e ' , ' a c c o u n t ' ) , a n d is used to stand for a state in which a thing is or a-thing's-being-in-a-certain-position. As for a false account, it is d e f i n e d as ' t h e o n e that, qua false, is of things being n o t the case', which implies that every account is false when applied to some thing o t h e r than that of which it is true. T h e r e are two kinds of account: (1) a thing's p r o p e r account or definiens; and (2) any account assignable to a multitude of things. T h e latter feature requires some explanation in so far as an expression's representative n a t u r e is c o n c e r n e d . For if two or m o r e expressions are representative of o n e a n d the same thing, say, Socrates, the question may arise w h e t h e r these expressions are identical, or to put it m o r e properly, w h e t h e r the alternative non-quidditative accounts are semantically the same as the p r o p e r account or definiens, seeing that Socrates-being-educated a n d Socrates are o n e a n d the same person: Met. A 29, 1024b26-32: A false account is the one that, qua false, is of things that are not the case, and that is why every account is false of some thing other than that of which it is true, e.g. the account of a circle is false of a triangle. Each thing has, in a sense, only one account, viz. of what it is for the thing to be [i.e. the thing's quiddity]; in another way it has many accounts [all of them representative of it], since the thing by itself (αύτό) and the thing-somehow-affected (αύτό πεπονθός), e.g. Socrates and educatedSocrates are in a way the same thing. 78 8. 42 Antisthenes's erroneous semantic position countered Aristotle aims to attack Antisthenes's naïve view that it is impossible to assign to a thing an account other than its n a m e or p r o p e r account

'H Focalization and categorization are precisely based on the view that the-thingby-itself and the-thing-somehow-affected (αύτό πεπονθός) are referentially the same.

consisting of the n a m e s of its simple constituents. 7 9 His discussion of the Antisthenean view is i n t r o d u c e d by the r e m a r k that each thing's p r o p e r account is, in a way, also applicable to some different thing, as we were told just now; whereas the false account, which, as such, was d e f i n e d as r e f e r r i n g to n o t h i n g b e i n g the case (1024b26-27), is, strictly speaking, the account of nothing. Now owing to his ignoring t h e q u a l i f i c a t i o n s m a d e c o n c e r n i n g t h e applicability of n o n quidditative accounts, Antisthenes was led astray: Met. A 29, 1024b32-34: T h a t is why A n t i s t h e n e s naively t h o u g h t t h a t n o t h i n g c a n legitimately b e b r o u g h t u p f o r d i s c u s s i o n e x c e p t by its o w n p r o p e r a c c o u n t , o n e to o n e ; f r o m w h i c h t h e c o n c l u s i o n u s e d to b e d r a w n t h a t t h e r e is n o s u c h t h i n g as c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d a l m o s t t h a t t h e r e even c o u l d b e n o falsity.

Kirwan (179f.) thinks that Aristotle is wrong in seeing a logico-causal c o n n e c t i o n between the above A n t i s t h e n e a n view a n d the o p i n i o n that contradiction is entirely impossible, a n d falsity nearly impossible; a n d Ross (I, 347f.) seems to overshoot the mark by reconstructing Antisthenes's supposed a r g u m e n t such that falsity too turns out to be entirely impossible. 8 0 A simple explication of Aristotle's r e m a r k is that, in point of fact, to Antisthenes, contradiction is entirely o u t of the question, even if a p r o p e r (i.e. quidditative) account is involved: f o r if p e r s o n Β s h o u l d i n t e n d to ' c o n t r a d i c t ' A, who (correctly) designates Socrates by either the n a m e (ονομα) ' m a n ' or the phrase (λόγος) 'twofooted-rational-animal', by designating him by 'not-man' or 'not-twofooted etc.', they are not bringing u p the same subject, so that there c a n n o t be any contradiction at all. 81 And in case of nonquidditative accounts (for instance A designating Socrates as ' t h e thing-being-seated', when 'contradicted' by Β designating him by the a c c o u n t ' t h e thing-being-walking'), b o t h A a n d Β fail to b r i n g u p Socrates properly, a n d in fact are talking a b o u t n o b o d y , so that contradiction is completely o u t of the question. So m u c h for the impossibility of contradicting somebody. As for falsehood ('speaking

79

See Plato, Sophist 251 A, and De Rijk (1986) ad loc.·, Theaet. 201Eff. (and McDowell, ad loc.), and the useful comments found in Ross I, 346-7, and Reale I, 483-5. 80 T h e various observations made in Burnyeat (1989, 18f.) are not very conducive to a clear understanding of the passage either, I am afraid. 81 O n e should be aware that to Antisthenes, λέγειν and άντίλεγειν are primarily about naming and bringing u p some thing for discussion. T h e gist of any objection of this Cynic to his interlocutor is 'what are you talking about, man?', rather than Ί am afraid, in stating this you are wrong, sir'. It may be recalled ad nauseam. categorization is not statement-making.

falsely'), this is, still on Antisthenes's assumption, almost ruled out, for its o c c u r r e n c e is restricted to making a wrong designation ('appellat i o n ' ) ; for instance, when indicating Socrates by a non-quidditative a c c o u n t (e.g. by calling him ' t h e pale'), the speaker, still on Antistenes's assumption, uses a false designation, and, accordingly, fails to bring him up. 8 2 O n c e Antistenes's i n c o r r e c t view has b e e n discarded, Aristotle advances the correct position: Ibid. 29, 1024b34-1025a1: B u t with r e s p e c t to e a c h t h i n g , it is possible to b r i n g it u p n o t o n l y by its p r o p e r a c c o u n t , b u t also by a n o t h e r t h i n g ' s q u i d d i t a t i v e a c c o u n t ; this m a y b e d o n e falsely, i.e. w h e n t a k i n g it [viz. this a c c o u n t ] in its p e r f e c t i o n ; b u t also in a way truly, e.g. t h i n g s e i g h t in n u m b e r m a y b e called 'two t h i n g s ' , u s i n g t h e p r o p e r a c c o u n t of 'two'.

What Aristotle intends to make clear is not a matter for doubt, yet the precise m e a n i n g of his words may raise some questions. First, his use of the word παντελώς 8 3 alongside ψευδώς ('falsely') may give rise to a bit of a problem. T h e adverb is c o m m o n l y taken h e r e as 'altogether', which leads to r e n d e r i n g ( i g n o r i n g the c o n j u n c t i o n καί, for that matter) "this (i.e. using a n o t h e r ' s thing quidditative account) may be d o n e a l t o g e t h e r falsely". However, taking t h e adverb in the sense c o g n a t e to the adjective, a n d καί explicatively, we should instead r e n d e r Aristotle's words "this may be d o n e falsely, that is (καί), when taking this a c c o u n t in its u n a d u l t e r a t e d sense". O n this r e n d e r i n g , Aristotle's words are m o r e in keeping with his previous exposition. A n o t h e r point at issue is Aristotle's example c o n c e r n i n g the application of a thing's (viz. the n u m b e r '2') p r o p e r a c c o u n t to describe a n o t h e r thing (viz. the n u m b e r ' e i g h t ' ) . This s e n t e n c e is commonly taken for an arithmetical statement: "eight is a double". I would prefer to take Aristotle to speak a b o u t things that are eight in n u m b e r , which in a way can be described by using the p r o p e r account of 'two'. T h e eight things i n d e e d can be designated as 'two things' ( m e a n i n g 'two sets of f o u r things') 8 4 by using an account that, as its definiens, only falls to 'two', which admittedly is properly d e f i n e d as ' t h e double', i.e. of the principle a n d measure of any counting — of unity. 85 82 In Met. Η 3, 1043b23-32, a cognate view held by the followers of Antisthenes "and similarly uneducated people" will be under examination. See my section 10.4. 83 Which is the adverb to the adjective π α ν τ ε λ ή ς = 'all-complete', 'in p u r e perfection', used in the sense of its later form παντελειος. 84 So correcdy Kirwan ( 180). 85 For 'one' not being itself a n u m b e r see my section 12.32.

8. 43 The role of the λόγος- πράγμα issue in the present discussion Before e m b a r k i n g on Aristotle's discussion of 'false m a n ' , s o m e r e m a r k s s h o u l d be m a d e a b o u t t h e precise n a t u r e of λόγος and πράγμα both of which came to o u r attention in the foregoing texts. 86 (1) T h e λόγος u n d e r examination h e r e ('account', ' p h r a s e ' ) 8 7 is a set of words which is used either as a definiens (in its capacity of being a p r o p e r or quidditative account), or as a describens (qua non-quidditative a c c o u n t ) . T h e r e f o r e t h e c o m m o n r e n d e r i n g ' d e f i n i t i o n 'or 'statement' is i n a p p r o p r i a t e and b o u n d to lead us astray. In fact, the λόγος as ' a c c o u n t ' or ' p h r a s e ' should be taken either as a 'state' 8 8 of t h e 'man's-being-pale' (or 'Socrates's-being-educated') type, or a 'state of affairs' of the 'that-a-man-is-pale' type; see my next item (2). (2) Accordingly, λόγος is f o u n d in two verbal forms: (a) as the complete 'dictum' ('assertible') of a statement, signifying a state of affairs, i.e. some subject including its b e i n g s o m e h o w affected (1024b31: αύτό πεπονθός); for example, 'Socrates's-being-seated' (or 'the-diagonal's-being-(in)commensurate'), a n d (b) as a complex designation or p h r a s e of the ' b e i n g - e d u c a t e d ' type, to wit, a m o r e t h a n one-word designation ('appellation') n o t including the substantive n o u n it is assigned to. Type (a) is i n s t a n c e d at 1024b30-31 ('Socratese d u c a t e d ' ) ; c o m p a r e 1015b17ff. a n d Ε 2, 1026b17ff., where the same question a b o u t d e n o t a t i o n ('Does "Socrates" equal "Socrates-educated"?') is in order; see my item (5). An e x a m p l e of type (b) is f o u n d at 1025a1 'being d o u b l e ' (διπλασία), taken as an account (λόγος) of what is eight (τά όκτώ). (3) T h e c o n t e n t of the λόγος is the πράγμα ('state' or 'state of affairs', expressed by an i n c o m p l e t e or c o m p l e t e ' d i c t u m ' ('assertible'), respectively) of which the λόγος is the verbal representation. While π ρ ά γ μ α may be used to stand for b o t h the thing-somehow-affected present in the outside world a n d the mental entity (called 'state' or 'state of affairs') referring (truly or allegedly) to this thing-thus-affected, the term λόγος exclusively signifies the m e n t a l entity, n o t the thing of the outside world as such (i.e. irrespective of its being somehow conceived of), as clearly a p p e a r s f r o m the well-known Aristotelian definition of the truth-value of the λόγος: "It is because the state

86

For a broader assessment of this issue see my sections 2.22-2.24. For the other senses of λόγος see my section 3.41. 88 I use this term in the sense of 'the condition of a person or thing, as with respect to circumstances or attributes', Random House Dictionary, 1388b. 87

of affairs is, or is not, the case that an account is said to be a true o n e or a false one". 8 9 In the definition of αληθής λόγος, λόγος is the ' d i c t u m ' ('assertible') a n d π ρ ά γ μ α the state of affairs e x p r e s s e d by it. T h u s Aristotle can say (Cat. 12, 14bl9-20) that πράγμα in a way (πως) is the cause of the λόγος being true or false, to wit in so far as its c o n t e n t (πράγμα) is applicable to the outer world. (4) W h e n claiming (1024b29-31) that each thing's p r o p e r a c c o u n t can be applied to o t h e r things, Aristotle is speaking of a (poly-assignable) account of the incomplete assertible (or semantically, of the incomplete 'state' type (my (b)), while his claim that false accounts are always a b o u t 'things-that-are-not' (1024b26-27 a n d 31-32) c o n c e r n s accounts of the c o m p l e t e assertible or state of affairs type (my (a)). T h u s if Socrates is walking, the false λόγος of type (a): 'Socrates'sbeing-seated' is about something that is altogether not the case, while that of type (b), 'being-seated' is, in principle, applicable to o t h e r things as well. (5) Not recognizing the possibility of poly-assignable accounts, Antist h e n e s h a d i g n o r e d the fact that t h e designation of s o m e t h i n g ('Socrates') and that of the same thing somehow affected ('educatedSocrates') equally d e n o t e the same ' t h i n g ' , so that the two designations "in a sense are the same" (ταύτό πως, 1024b30). In m o d e r n terminology, t h o u g h formally different, they are the same referentially (or: by themselves, they 'signify' or c o n n o t e different things, but when used in a certain context they actually d e n o t e o n e and the same thing). (6) O p p o s i n g his view of t h e a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of non-quidditative accounts to Antisthenes's radical rejection of that idea, Aristotle says (1024b34-36) that each thing can be called u p for discussion not only by its own p r o p e r account, but also by that of a n o t h e r thing. T h e example he gives us shows that we should not u n d e r s t a n d by ' a n o t h e r thing' some o t h e r physical thing, but a n o t h e r quiddity, i n h e r i n g in o t h e r things as their quidditative constituent, on the proviso that the thing to be called u p actually possesses this quiddity as a coincidental o n e . T h u s a house-building poet may not only be designated by his own p r o p e r description saying 'this two-footed rational animal', but also, by using that of o t h e r entities like 'house-building' or 'poetry', be called 'this expert in the art of rhythmical composition', a n d even 'this expert in the art of house-building'.

89

Cat., 5, 4b8-10; 12, 14b21-22.

T o p r o f f e r this semantic view in the present context is not to be r e g a r d e d as j u s t a r a n d o m argumentative move against Antisthenes. Just as in his Sophist, Plato c o u n t e r e d Antisthenes's a n d o t h e r o p p o nents' misconceptions a b o u t language a n d speech by u n f o l d i n g his own semantics, so does Aristotle in facing those people. 9 0 As a matter of fact, it is precisely this semantic rule of his that is of p a r a m o u n t importance in Aristotle's standard lore of focalization a n d categorization, which we will Find successfully applied in the central part of the Metaphysics, as well as in his expositions of the m a j o r t h e m e s of Physics.91 8. 44 The exposition of ψεΰδος continued Let us now r e t u r n to Aristotle's exposition of ψ ε ΰ δ ο ς . In t h e last paragraph (1025al-13) Aristotle comes to speak about a n o t h e r use of the adjective ψευδής o c c u r r i n g in the phrase 'false m a n ' . Aristotle describes him, as may be expected in this context — in c o n n e c t i o n with the foregoing discussion of the false λόγος — by saying that h e is a m a n who "uses such accounts recklessly a n d deliberately, for n o o t h e r reason b u t for their own sake". In the second p a r t of his description, there is a clear link with the section on false πράγματα. T h e false m a n is said to be "one who makes such accounts arise in o t h e r people; in quite the same m a n n e r as we say states (πράγματα) are false which create a false appearance". T h e p a r a g r a p h winds u p with a short discussion of Plato's deviant use of the phrase 'false m a n ' in the Hippias minor,92

8. 5 'What-is' taken as 'what-is-qua-true' in Met. Ε 4 'What-is' in the sense of 'what-is-qua-true' (τό ώς άληθές öv) is dealt with together with its counterpart, 'what-is-not' qua 'falsehood' (τό μή öv ώς ψεΰδος). What must strike the r e a d e r in the first place is that 90

For Plato see De Rijk (1986), 254-354. See my sections 12.31-12.39. 92 365A-371E. This discussion is c o m m e n t e d upon by Ross and Kirwan ad loc. Incidentally, at 1025a11 the p r o p e r m e a n i n g of μιμεΐσθαι is clearly evidenced, being 'to represent', rather than 'to imitate', because the action of limping is represented, not imitated. See Kardaun (1993) a n d (2000), 137-43. For the massive impact of a correct (or incorrect, for that matter) interpretation of μίμησις and cognate terms upon our view of Plato's attitude towards art and artists see Kardaun (2000), 143-63. 91

while, as in Δ 29, 'what-is-not' is characterized by Aristotle by an expression containing the substantive n o u n ψεύδος ('falsehood'), the o p p o s i t e n o t i o n 'what-is' is indicated by using the substantivated n e u t e r adjective αληθές ( ' s o m e t h i n g t r u e ' ) . Why should not 'what-isn o t ' , when o p p o s e d to 'what-is' in the sense of'what-is-qua-true' be designated as 'what-is-not-qua-false', instead of 'what-is-not-qua-falsehood? For o n e thing, in Aristotle a n d in Plato as well (e.g. Cratylus, 385C16; Politicus, 281A13), the substantive τό ψεύδος is so o f t e n o p p o s e d to the substantivated adjective τό αληθές that it makes the f o r m e r seem to be used as an adjective; in p o i n t of fact, t h e r e is n o o c c u r r e n c e of the substantivated adjective τό ψευδές in Plato a n d Aristotle, or in any of the o t h e r a u t h o r s of the classical period. 9 3 I think the question could surely be put the o t h e r way r o u n d : why does Aristotle n o t use the substantive α λ ή θ ε ι α ? It is best to answer this question at the e n d of o u r discussion. 8. 51 On the notions 'is-true' and 'is-not-true' in Met. A 7 It is profitable to take into consideration what the Lexicon (Met. Δ 7) tells us a b o u t this sense of 'what-is-in-the-unqualified-sense'. T h e few lines devoted to this third sense, viz. ' b e ' a n d 'is' q u a 'is-true', are noteworthy: Met. Δ 7, 1017a31-35: Again, 'be' and 'is' have the meaning 'it is true', and 'not be' 'it is not true, but a falsehood', and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation. For instance, 'Is: [(Socrates&educated)'s be-ing]' means that this is true; or 'Is: [(Socrates¬-pale)'s be-ing]' means that it is true. And as for 'Is not: [(diagonal&«commensurate)'s be-ing]', this means that it is a falsehood, or 'Is not: [ (diagonal¬» incommensurate] 's be-ing', that it is a falsehood. This r a t h e r cryptic passage requires some philological c o m m e n t s . It must draw the r e a d e r ' s attention to the fact that the case of ' b e i n g q u a t r u t h ' ('is') is i n s t a n c e d by two e x a m p l e s — o n e with an affirmative assertible, the o t h e r with a negative o n e — while in o r d e r to illustrate the case of ' n o n - b e i n g q u a f a l s e h o o d ' ('is-not'), the Greek text, as it is c o m m o n l y read, offers only an e x a m p l e concerning the affirmative assertible, a n d fails to give an e x a m p l e of the negative one. As a matter of fact, all o u r manuscripts (including the lost o n e that was used by William of M o e r b e k e ) read ούκ έστιν ή διάμετρος άσύμμετρος, meaning: 'is n o t that the diagonal 93

Liddell & Scott s.v.

is i n c o m m e n s u r a t e ' . Because of the inadequacy of this sentence, all m o d e r n e d i t o r s a n d c o m m e n t a t o r s r e a d , in the wake of Bonitz ( s u p p o r t e d by Alexander ad loc.), σύμμετρος instead of ασύμμετρος, a n d take Aristotle to have left t h e f o u r t h case ( ' n o n - b e i n g q u a falsehood' c o n c e r n i n g a negative assertible) uninstanced. However, t h e logical b a l a n c e of t h e text a n d the u n a n i m o u s m a n u s c r i p t readings can be a d d u c e d in s u p p o r t of the assumption that the extant Greek text has suffered f r o m haplography caused by the twofold occurrence of (ά)σύμμετρος, a n d should be read τό δ' ούκ εστίν ή διάμετρος (σύμμετρος οτι ψεύδος, ή οτι ούκ έστιν ή διάμετρος ούκ) άσύμμετρος οτι ψεύδος. T h e surmise that, as a result of haplography, there is something wrong with the text as h a n d e d down finds s o m e additional s u p p o r t f r o m the r e a d i n g f o u n d in the so-called Translatio anonymat* In my translation a n d p r e s e n t a t i o n I have e m e n d e d the supposed haplography. 9 5 8. 52 The anatomy of the apophantic expressions instanced Apart f r o m this philological deficiency, o u r passage calls for some r e m a r k s c o n c e r n i n g its doctrinal c o n t e n t . First, there is the use of εστίν emphatically placed at the b e g i n n i n g of the sentence to draw o u r a t t e n t i o n ; f u r t h e r , what could be m e a n t by t h e c o n c l u d i n g sentence: "And this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation" (1017a32-33)?

94

T h e 'translatio anonyma sive media' was edited from a n u m b e r of thirteenthcentury MSS by G u d r u n Vuillemin-Diem, who forwarded some good reasons to date it as early as before the end of the twelfth century (Praefatio, p. XXII-XXIV). At 1017a34-35 it has (p. 95 s ): "non est autem diametrum non commensurabile quia falsum" (where the second ' n o n ' has only been omitted by o n e MS, Vatican, Pal. tat. 1063), which suggests that, unlike our MSS and William of Moerbeke's, the Greek text the author of this Latin translation had at his elbow left out the third example, not the fourth, as the other MSS did. Interestingly enough, Thomas Aquinas (In Arist. Met. expos., sect. 895) comments upon the sentence u n d e r discussion: "Et similiter dicimus quod ' n o n est diameter incommensurabilis lateri quadrati' quia hoc est falsum, scilicet non esse ipsum non commensurabilem" (ed. Spiazzi; punctuation mine). 95 Things are f u r t h e r complicated though, because at Θ 10, 1051b20-21, the affirmative expression 'the-diagonal's-being-incommensurable' seems to be an instance of separation, not combination. At An. Ill 6, 430bl-4 it is claimed that "falsehood always lies in the process of combination: for the formula 'the-whitebeing-not-white' has combined 'the-not-white' t h i n g , o r a m a g n i t u d e , o r a n y t h i n g else d e s i g n a t e d by o n e of t h e o t h e r a p p e l l a t i o n s by w h i c h t h a t w h i c h is is d e t e r m i n e d . T h e r e is i n d e e d s o m e t h i n g of w h i c h e a c h of t h e s e a p p e l l a t i o n s a r e said, w h o s e b e i n g is d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t c o n v e y e d by e a c h of t h e c a t e g o r i e s : f o r all t h e o t h e r s [i.e. t h e n o n - s u b s t a n t i a l c a t e g o r i e s ] a r e said of t h e ousia, a n d t h e l a t t e r of t h e m a t t e r in q u e s t i o n . 4 7 H e n c e a t h i n g ' s u l t i m a t e < m a t e r i a l > e l e m e n t is n o t in its own r i g h t a < d e t e r m i n a t e > t h i n g n o r a m a g n i t u d e n o r a n y o t h e r < d e t e r m i n a t e > t h i n g ; n o r , of c o u r s e (δή) t h e n e g a t i o n s of these, f o r t h e s e fall to t h e m only c o i n c i d e n t a l l y .

T h e p u r p o r t of the a r g u m e n t is that each a n d every appellation by which we may designate a particular entity in the outside world, including the substantial appellation ('this F', say 'this m a n ' , 'this tree'), is b o u n d to contain a d e t e r m i n a t i o n which as such is beyond the basic notion o f ' b e i n g (there)', and, consequently, is dispensable a n d disposable when it c o m e s to f o u n d i n g a thing's being t h e r e .

44

This passage is extensively commented npon by Frede & Patzig II, 42-5. Of course, the powers of something particular are intended, not such a thing as the potentiality of matter itself. 46 Cf. Phys. IV 2, 209b6-l 1: "When the limit and the attributes of a sphere have been taken away, nothing is left but its matter". 47 Note the use of the definite article, which makes it clear that there is talk of a certain thing's (ultimate) material element, not just 'matter'. Of this passage too, any interpretation in terms of sentential predication leads to difficulties. See Frede & Patzig II, 48 and 51. 45

Matter a l o n e is not. O n e m i g h t suggest, Aristotle continues, that, given that these appellations should be stripped off, p e r h a p s their negations ('a not-this', 'a not-magnitude', a n d the like) will do. Such appellations, however, merely d e t e r m i n e a thing coincidentally, for to designate e.g. a m a n with the n e g a t e d appellation 'not-tree' is coincidental, because, when d o i n g so, any o t h e r negated appellation can be substituted for 'not-tree', so that the use of any of t h e m is a m e r e coincidence. 4 8 9. 23 Can 'substance'be 'predicated' of matter"? T h r o u g h o u t the last few decades, Aristotle's words have evoked an i m m e n s e l i t e r a t u r e o n t h e vexed q u e s t i o n 4 9 "Can Substance be Predicated of Matter?" which, as most of the i n t e r p r e t e r s take it, seems to be answered by Aristotle in the affirmative. We find here, I am afraid, o n e of the most r e m a r k a b l e instances of p e o p l e b e i n g misled by their confusion of semantics with syntax: they mistake the verbs λέγεσθαι a n d κατηγορεισθαι = 'to be said o f for 'being (apophantically) predicated o f ; or, in o t h e r words, they confuse appellation a n d predication, a n d the onomastic a n d a p o p h a n t i c levels. 50 In point of fact, Aristotle does not at all claim or imply that h e allows for a statement like 'Matter is Substance', m e a n i n g (taken intensionally) that matter is essentially or accidentally substance, or (extensionally) that matter belongs to the class of substances. In o r d e r to point out the position of ' m a t t e r ' — which is taken h e r e as an equivalent of h y p o k e i m e n o n , with which it shares the property of being ' t h a t of which o t h e r things are said of, while it is itself said of n o t h i n g else' 5 1 — what h e is really claiming is that h y p o k e i m e n o n a n d its equivalent, matter, are that which a t h i n g is when it is deprived of any of its determinations, whether essential or coincidental, so that they can be used to call up the outside things even if any of their d e t e r m i n a t i o n s are t h o u g h t to have b e e n s t r i p p e d off, indicating, f o r instance, Socrates, or this beautiful tree, just 'it', or ['*'], period. 5 2 48 The lines 1029a20-36 are interpreted by Bostock (78-80), as usual, in terms of sentence predication, instead of naming ('naming'). This forces him to assume a special case o f ' i s ' to be involved, the 'is' of constitution. 49 See Bäck (2000), 87-97, including the literature mentioned there. 50 My sections 4.1-4.2; 4.32. 51 See 1028b36-37 jundo 1029a8-9 and a21-24. 52 Here one meets with a similar misunderstanding to that found in the learned question whether there is in Plato 'self-predication' of Forms, as though, by his claiming that the transcendent Form, Beautifulness, is primarily entitled to bear

Using m o d e r n phraseology, we could say that when evaluating the g o o d c h a n c e s of the h y p o k e i m e n o n , Aristotle r e d u c e s the latter notion to indicating a thing whatsoever as j u s t an entirely u n d e t e r m i n e d ['x'], or its m e r e 'being t h e r e ' , a n d n o t h i n g else. Any d e t e r m i n a t i o n is lacking t h e n , even a negative o n e like 'not-stone', because of its equivalence to a m e t a t h e t i c affirmation ' b e i n g s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m s t o n e ' . W h a t a f t e r t h e r i g o r o u s c o n c e p t u a l d i s m a n t l i n g of a t h i n g still r e m a i n s is s o m e t h i n g extremely i m p o r t a n t , viz. its really being given in the outside world. Any s t u d e n t of Plato's Timaeus will be r e m i n d e d of what Plato says a b o u t the Receptacle. T o refrain f r o m a d u l t e r a t i n g the receptacle's peculiar n a t u r e , viz. its b e i n g entirely formless (51A8), Plato makes use of what I have called (1986, 269) 'merely deictic references', such as are conveyed by syncategorematic expressions, like 'this' or 'that', which d o n o t affect the Receptacle's absolute lack of any d e f i n i t e mode of being, a n d convey n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n indexicals like ' h e r e ' a n d 'now' do. This m u c h seems to be certain: any puzzling 5 3 a b o u t the question w h e t h e r this m a t t e r is ' u l t i m a t e m a t t e r ' o r ' p r i m e m a t t e r ' in t h e senses in which these labels m i g h t b e used in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e Physics is beside t h e p o i n t . T h e p r e s e n t ΰ λ η or ΰποκείμενον is ' u l t i m a t e ' only in terms of semantic analysis, as it is the appellation that suits a thing in its b a r e ' b e i n g t h e r e ' . And that is precisely why o u r f o c u s i n g on a t h i n g ' s b a r e subsistence c o u l d possibly result in grasping it in its most true being, which it surely has in c o m m o n with

the n a m e 'beautiful', Plato admits of such oddities as ' T h e Beautifulness is beautiful'. T h e only thing Plato means to say is that the n a m e 'the beautiful' has its highest titular ('prime referent') in the domain of Forms, while outside things may b e entitled to bear this n a m e only because of their p a r t a k i n g in the transcendent Form, Beautifulness. See De Rijk (1986), 55-63; 214-53; 316-26. For this o d d issue (and the peculiar role G. Vlastos played in the discussions) see Guthrie IV, 119f.; 223; 360; 551ff.; V, 42-50, esp. 42, n. 1; VI, 119ff. Guthrie was, I take it, unduly impressed by the ' p r o b l e m ' , but n o n e the less ironically remarked (V, 42) about this 'battlefield for c o m m e n t a t o r s ' : "Every possible view has been both asserted and denied by scholars modifying not only the views of others but also their own". A nice sample of it is f o u n d in Guthrie VI, 223, n.3 (on Vlastos's 'Pauline predication'). 53 Bostock (73; cf. 250f.), who adheres to the prime matter thesis, offers (73) a short report about this puzzling, including the protagonists, King, Charlton, Jones, answered respectively by Solmsen, Robinson, and Code, who all d e f e n d e d the prime matter thesis; at a second stage, the controversy went between Stahl, Furth, and Gill, who were c o u n t e r e d by the o r t h o d o x Williams, C o h e n a n d Graham. Bemelmans (1995) has convincingly shown how to deal with this pseudo-problem by using my categorization thesis; see also my sections 12.37-12.39.

all things a n d everything. T h u s matter could easily make an excellent candidate for being true ousia. 9. 24 Matter's credentials nullified At first glance, t h e n , the h y p o k e i m e n o n is an o u t s t a n d i n g candidate for b e i n g the t r u e ousia Aristotle is l o o k i n g f o r in the Metaphysics. Unfortunately, the very idiosyncrasy of m a t t e r is fatal to its application. Matter is n o t capable of separate, i n d e p e n d e n t existence n o r is it a definite this. T h u s it fails in the two features that mark true ousia, its i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d its this-ness. (1029a27-28). Given the inadequacy of matter, the two o t h e r candidates will be in a b e t t e r position to carry off the palm; f o r the f o r m (called this time by its favourite n a m e , τό είδος) a n d the c o m p o u n d would seem to b e m o r e ousia t h a n m a t t e r is. As f o r the c h a n c e s of the f o r m e r applicant, o n e has to be aware that o n e of the two main features of ousia is 'being-ness', a n d the c o m p o u n d h e r e is auspiciously n a m e d τό έξ άμφοιν ούσία. N o n e the less, Aristotle removes the c o m p o u n d w i t h o u t hesitation, for, h e says, "it is p o s t e r i o r a n d too obvious" (1029a29-32). 5 4 W h a t r e m a i n s to be d o n e is to investigate the credentials of t h e o t h e r c l a i m a n t — t h e f o r m . "The m o s t p e r p l e x i n g indeed", Aristotle adds, presumably because of its Platonic flavour. Regarding o u r search for the τό τί ήν είναι, Aristotle wants to make absolutely sure that h e will not catch us p o a c h i n g on Plato's territory. Small w o n d e r t h e n that h e 5 5 takes his starting-point f r o m sensible ousia. His expression of this aim is a c c o m p a n i e d by an elaboration of the idea alluded to earlier (1029a32) that, t h o u g h the primary ontic c o n d i t i o n s or first principles of things are n o t what is immediately familiar to us, all l e a r n i n g has to p r o c e e d by i n d u c t i o n f r o m that which is familiar to us to that which is intelligible in itself. 5 6 T h u s Aristotle can easily p r o p o s e to p r o c e e d now by m e a n s of what is by

54

No doubt Aristotle's standard lore is h e r e alluded to, viz. that what is m o r e familiar to us is not a principle by nature. 55 O r the r e d a c t o r of Met. For the position of this passage and J a e g e r ' s suggestions see Ross II, 166. 56 Cf. Phys. I 1, 184al4-t8: "Plainly (in all branches of study), our primary task will be to try to determine what element relates to its principles. T h e natural way of doing this is to start from the things that are more familiar and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and m o r e knowable by nature; for the same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable in an unqualified sense"; cf. EN II 5, 1106a 28 and 6, 1107a1.

n a t u r e less intelligible towards what is m o r e intelligible, however little g e n u i n e 'being-ness' that which is first familiar to us embodies.

9. 3 Ούσία taken as essence or quiddity (Z, chs. 4-6) C h a p t e r 4 o p e n s by recalling the earlier distinction of the various characteristics by which we d e t e r m i n e subsistent entities, o n e of which was t h o u g h t to be το τί ήν είναι ('what-it-is-to-be' or 'quiddity'). Now that the claims of its competitors have b e e n enervated, we have to investigate its own credentials. 9. 31 The role of the καθ ' αυτό appellation Aristotle p r o p o s e s to begin with certain semantic observations o n a c c o u n t of the notion 'essence'. In the p r e s e n t analysis the formulas τό σοί είναι, τό άνθρώπφ είναι, τό μουσικώ είναι are key phrases. They seem to be of Aristotle's own invention. It may be asked what precisely is indicated by the use of the dative case. It is c o m m o n l y taken as a possessive dative (and rightly so), m e a n i n g the 'what-it-is-for-a-thingto-be'. But sometimes, at least, t h e r e seems to be an additional connotation of what g r a m m a r i a n s indicate as clativus causae, as to m a k e e.g. τό μουσικφ είναι stand for t h e being-ness caused by t h e f o r m ' e d u c a t e d ' . T h e latter interpretation finds some s u p p o r t in Aristotle's view of t h e e m p t y n o t i o n of c o n n o t a t i v e ' b e ' d e t e r m i n e d by a substantial or non-substantial f o r m , a n d in the ' f o r m a dat esse' device of An. II 4, 415b8-28 as well. O n this alternative (additional) exegesis, τό μουσικώ είναι could be nicely taken to be s o m e t h i n g like the kind of b e i n g conveyed by the f o r m ' e d u c a t e d ' . But to i n t e r p r e t τό σοί είναι along the same lines w o u l d b e awkward. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , Bostock's r e n d e r i n g of 1029b 14-15 "being for you is n o t the same as b e i n g for an e d u c a t e d thing" is n o t satisfactory either, because it d o e s n o t show that your being b r o u g h t u p by the appellation ' t h e e d u c a t e d thing' is at issue, a n d n o t merely the abstractly o p p o s i n g of two r a n d o m forms, 'beingyou' a n d ' b e i n g - e d u c a t e d ' . T h e r e f o r e o n e m i g h t reasonably assume that the use of the dative is o p e n to either interpretation. Anyway, the r e n d e r i n g s 'to be a m a n ' , 'to be e d u c a t e d ' will always do. 5 7 57

T h e r e f o r e in the context of the (anachronistic) distinction between sorts of dative cases, we should speak of an ambivalent use, covering both the use of cause

T h e o p e n i n g few lines of t h e c h a p t e r leave n o d o u b t that t h e p r e s e n t discussion is all a b o u t n a m i n g of the outside things, a n d the skill to distinguish between a thing's privileged appellations that hit the mark by precisely grasping it in its substantial being (καθ' αύτό), a n d those which only call it u p by using n a m e s referring to o n e of its coincidental features (κατάσυμβεβηκός): Met. Ζ 4, 1 0 2 9 b l 3 - 1 5 : A n d first l e t u s m a k e s o m e s e m a n t i c 5 8 r e m a r k s . T h e q u i d d i t y o f e a c h t h i n g 5 9 is w h a t t h e t h i n g is n a m e d by in its o w n r i g h t . F o r < y o u r > b e i n g - y o u is n o t y o u r b e i n g - a n - e d u c a t e d - t h i n g , s i n c e y o u a r e n o t by y o u r very n a t u r e e d u c a t e d . 6 0

What Aristotle seems to have in m i n d h e r e is the use of an expression ( ' n a m e ' , 'appellation', o f t e n called κατηγορία or προσηγορία) that is t h o u g h t to stand for the very quiddity of an outside entity, because the entity u n d e r consideration in virtue of itself (καθ' αύτό) possesses the attribute signified by this expression. This expression may feature — in the surface structure — as the predicate expression of a copula construction c o n c e r n i n g this entity, as it does for instance in 'Socrates (this m a n ) is a rational animal'; or a n o t h e r predicative d e t e r m i n a tion, like in Ί call Socrates (this m a n ) a rational animal'; or it can merely serve as a tool to b r i n g u p this entity in a quidditative way, as in 'this rational a n i m a l ' . For this r e a s o n , to exclusively i n t e r p r e t Aristotle's words a n d e x a m p l e s in terms of statements of the copula construction type, as is c o m m o n l y d o n e by the interpreters, obscures t h e p u r p o r t of these e x p r e s s i o n s a n d o f t e n causes u n n e c e s s a r y p r o b l e m s a n d drawbacks. 6 1 A similar observation applies to Aristotle's use of ' d e f i n i t i o n ' . W h e n h e claims in the o p e n i n g few lines of this c h a p t e r (1029bl-3) 6 2

a n d property. T o speak of an a m b i g u o u s use of this dative is only d u e to the gramm a r i a n ' s (pedantically) splitting u p the senses of the ambivalent focal m e a n i n g . 58 For this sense of λογικώς see Ross, F r e d e & Patzig, a n d Bostock (ad be.). 59 My r e n d e r i n g follows G r e e k idiom, which o f t e n has a d o m i n a n t use of the word έκαστος; my Index s.v. 60 Most MSS a d d the words ο ά ρ α κατά σαυτόν, m e a n i n g 'that a p p a r e n d y is the sense of the p h r a s e κατά σ α υ τ ό ν ' . I think that the c o d e x L a u r e n t i a n u s is right in omitting these words, which really s o u n d like a marginal gloss slipped into the text. 61 T h e crucial d i f f e r e n c e between predication a n d n a m i n g ( ' a p p e l l a t i o n ' ) has b e e n discussed in my sections 2.11-2.16 a n d 4.2. T h e r e are s t r o n g reasons f o r a s s u m i n g Aristotle to p o i n t o u t a m o n a d i c d e e p s t r u c t u r e a n a t o m y of t h e basic statement-making utterance, according to which a copula-less assertion, r a t h e r t h a n the later 'S is P' construal, is at the focus of Aristotle's attention. My sections 1.51; 2.12-2.16. 62 For J a e g e r ' s c o m m o n l y a d o p t e d view o n the position of these lines see Ross II, 166.

that the search for the true ousia s h o u l d be m a d e by p r o c e e d i n g a l o n g the lines of the καθ' αυτό distinction of 'what is', which is to b r i n g categorial b e i n g into the focus of interest, Aristotle indicates the m a n n e r of searching the ούσία as 'to d e f i n e (describe)' it. Again, this d e f i n i n g or describing should n o t be taken as the f r a m i n g of definitions (descriptions) of the statemental type ('x is F'), but r a t h e r in terms of using a set of quidditative attributes, so that the appellations in question are to be taken as d e f i n i e n t i a (not d e f i n i t i o n s ) , which, admittedly, may, but n e e d n o t exclusively, be used in copula constructions. R e t u r n i n g now to Aristotle's r e c o m m e n d a t i o n (at 1029bl3-16) to f r a m e a καθ' αύτό f o r m u l a in o r d e r to arrive at a thing's quiddity, the a u t h o r d e e m s it worthwhile to p r e c l u d e the possible m i s u n d e r s t a n d ing that the whole οϊ what a thing is in its own right is its quiddity. H e clarifies what h e m e a n s to say by s o m e h o w qualifying the criterion καθ' αυτό ('in virtue of itself, 'by its own right'). A distinction should be m a d e between the n o t i o n s 'primarily falling to some thing' a n d ' b e l o n g i n g to a thing's quiddity'. This is m a d e clear by analysing the ontic relationship between 'surface' a n d the attribute 'whiteness'. 6 3 Aristotle claims that to be coloured primarily falls to surfaces (and so in their own right in a way), a n d that this f e a t u r e should, t h e r e f o r e , occur in the d e f i n i e n s of any surface. But this sense of ' b e i n g in its own right' should be discarded here; for, properly speaking, it is n o t in its own right q u a b e i n g white, b u t q u a b e i n g c o l o u r e d that the surface may be called white in virtue of itself: Ibid., 1029bl6-18: But not the whole of this is a thing's quiddity. For the 'in virtue of itself manner in which white falls to surface will not do, because being a surface does not imply being white.''4 T h e r e is still a n o t h e r exception to the rule that a thing's quiddity is that by which it is n a m e d in its own right, viz. if o n e i n t e n d s to quidditatively designate a white thing by calling it 'white s u r f a c e ' . Such expressions will n o t h e l p us find a t h i n g ' s quiddity e i t h e r , because of the o c c u r r e n c e of the d e f i n i e n d u m in the definiens. T o obtain a thing's quiddity, o n e should correctly focalize a n d categorize 63

T h e passage is extensively c o m m e n t e d upon by Burnyeat (1979), 18-21, and Frede & Patzig II, 59-61. 64 So the third of the five senses of καθ' αυτό distinguished in Met. Δ 18, 1022a29-32 is ruled out: "Whatever attribute a thing receives itself immediately or in o n e of its parts; e.g. a surface is white in virtue of itself, and a man is alive in virtue of himself; for the soul, in which life immediately resides, is a m a n ' s part". T h e same problem is discussed in APo. II, 5-6.

the thing u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n , by using an appellation that precisely expresses its 'what-it-is-to-be'. H e n c e a d e f i n i e n s is r e q u i r e d in which the t e r m by which the t h i n g is initially b r o u g h t u p d o e s n o t itself feature; it should only express the m e a n i n g of the initial term m o r e explicitly: 65 Ibid. 4, 1 0 2 9 b 18-20: N o r a g a i n d o e s t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f b o t h < e l e m e n t s , viz. t h e t h i n g a n d its κ α θ ' α ύ τ ό a t t r i b u t e > p r e s e n t a t h i n g ' s [e.g. s u r f a c e ] q u i d d i t y , ' b e i n g a w h i t e s u r f a c e ' , b e c a u s e ' s u r f a c e ' itself is a d d e d . H e n c e t h e d e f i n i e n s in w h i c h t h e t h i n g itself is e x p r e s s e d w i t h o u t it [i.e. t h e t h i n g ' s n a m e ] b e i n g itself c o n t a i n e d in it [ d e f i n i e n s ] , this is t h e f o r m u l a o f e a c h 6 6 t h i n g ' s quiddity.

Next follows (b21-22) a r e m a r k on account of Democritus's theory of colour. If o n e follows Democritus in defining an object's colour as an impression conveyed to o u r eyes f r o m its superficial texture, 6 7 the p r o c e d u r e of d e f i n i n g surface, then, as ' b e i n g a s m o o t h surface' will only boil down to e q u a t i n g 'white' a n d ' s m o o t h ' , so that the two aforesaid censures can still be m a d e , viz. that the wrong sense of καθ' αυτό is involved ( s m o o t h n e s s p r o p e r l y falling to c o l o u r , n o t to whiteness), a n d that the d e f i n i e n d u m is a d o p t e d in the definiens. So far c o m p o u n d s c o n c e r n i n g subsistent entities that are designated by m e a n s of a substantive n o u n (or a p r o n o u n like 'you') have b e e n t i n d e r discussion. A successful grasp of their quiddity can be j e o p a r d i z e d , as we have seen, if the substantive is a c c o m p a n i e d by an adjectival attribute like ' e d u c a t e d ' or 'white', so as to suggest that the actual a t t r i b u t e s of t h e t h i n g u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n are p a r t of its quiddity. 9. 32 On using the ίμάτιον device In the next few lines Aristotle goes o n to pay a t t e n t i o n to a n o t h e r type of c o m p o u n d , viz. those f r o m the categories o t h e r than 'substance'. In these cases too t h e r e is always talk of c o m p o u n d s (called

65

For a n u m b e r of alternative interpretations of this baffling passage see the discussions ad loc. in Frede & Patzig and Bostock. 66 Of course, Aristotle does not say that the quiddity thus tracked down is c o m m o n to each and everything, but that for each thing it holds good that the formula f o u n d by this procedure is its quiddity. For this dominant use of έκαστος in Greek see my Index s.v. 67 Aristotle, Sens. 4, 442b11-12; cf. GC I 2, 316a1; Theophrastus, De sensu, capp. 73-75.

this time σύνθετα), because the things n a m e d after o n e of the nonsubstantial categories are always c o m p o s e d of the feature d e n o t e d by this categorial appellation a n d the u n d e r l y i n g thing it i n h e r e s in. This case is usually instanced by the c o m p o u n d 'pale m a n ' . T h e difference between a c o m p o u n d of this kind a n d the cases discussed in the previous p a r a g r a p h ('your-being-educated') is that Aristotle now focusses on c o m p o u n d things n a m e d after a f o r m f r o m a nonsubstantial category (quantity, quality) that is given subsistence ('substantiated') owing to its i n h e r e n c e in an underlying thing. T h e sample used is, at first glance, a bit problematic in that it is grammatically expressed by the p h r a s e 'pale m a n ' instead of the substantivated adjectival expression τό λευκόν ('*the pale). T h e reason is, I think, that Aristotle wants to speak of a pale h u m a n being, not just a white thing. 6 8 However, if the expression 'pale m a n ' is used, the r e a d e r is p u t on the wrong track, so that Aristotle is forced to e m p l o y a s e m a n t i c artifice. 6 9 T h u s h e substitutes t h e two-word expression 'pale m a n ' by the one-word expression ίμάτιον, in o r d e r to obtain o n e single notion, ' * p a l e m a n ' , in the sense of, say, something like 'paleface' or milksop', notions in which the paleness is n o t j u s t a coincidental attribute, but, as it were, an essential, or, at least, quite distinctive one, as e.g. in Ί d o n ' t like this paleface' (speaking, say, of Alcibiades), which semantically differs f r o m Ί d o n ' t like

68

Like English (but unlike G e r m a n and Dutch), Greek does not allow the masculine and feminine forms 6 λευκός, ή λευκή, loosely used as substantivated expressions, to stand for the pale man and woman, respectively. (They may be used, of course, to contextually refer back to a masculine or feminine noun previously used). 69 The artifice consisting in assigning a new meaning to a word already in use — which is in keeping with Aristotle's view of words signifying by convention {Int. 1, 16a19) — is applied several other times (Int. 8, 18a19 and Met. Η 6, 1045a26, each time by using ίμάτιον as the magic word; in PA, this procedure is applied twice, once by attaching a single n a m e to hot water and hot iron (II 2, 649a16), once by calling u p the composite notion, 'boiling water' by a single term (3, 649b22), each time without instancing such a term; for the context see my section 12.3). — Like ειμα, of which it is the diminutive, ίμάτιον is mostly used for 'over-garment'. So it can be used to stand for a cover or camouflage disguising one's identity ('cloak'). In his book on barbarian customs, the grammarian Athenaeus (II d -III d cent. A.D.) cites (Epitome I, p. 23 D ed. Schweighäuser, Strassburg 1800) Aristotle's report that the Tyrrhenians (Etruscans) used to take their principal meal lying at the table together with the wives "cloaked by [lit. 'dressed u p or disguised u n d e r ' ] the same [i.e. female] garment" (άνακείμενοι υπό τω αύτφ ίματίω), with the result, indeed, that the convivers all passed for women, and could attend a dinner party which was only accessible to women. See Fragmenta VI 11 Historien, L„ Nomima, 565, in A ristotelis Opera V, p. 1571 ed. Bekker (Berlin 1870). Plainly, the word ίμάτιον is most appropriately employed for applying this semantic move.

Alcibiades' or 'this m a n ' . At this point the question what precisely the quiddity of *paleman is starts to make sense: Ibid. 4, 1029b22-28: Now there are compounds indicated after the other categories, for there is a substratum for each of these compounds, e.g. those indicated by means of a qualitative appellation, 70 or a quantitative, or temporal, or local, or an appellation concerning its action or undergoing. 71 We must see, therefore, whether there is a formula of the quiddity of each of them, that is, whether to these compounds, too there belongs a quiddity; take for instance 'pale man'. Let, now, 'cloak' be the name for this compound. What, then, is 'being-a-cloak'? Bostock (88), who c o m p l a i n s t h a t this section is in m a n y ways obscure, fails to see the advantage of having a single word for 'pale m a n ' a n d needlessly asks why the question 'What is the essence of a pale m a n ? ' could n o t have b e e n raised directly. T h u s h e has completely missed the p o i n t , namely t h e substitution of a two-word expression consisting of a substantive a n d an incidental attribute by a one-word expression, in o r d e r to e x a m i n e w h e t h e r in analysing the one-word expression, the n o t i o n of the attribute necessarily comes out. 7 2 This, t h e n , turns o u t n o t to be the case, so that in fact this artifice shows the two-word expressions of the 'pale m a n ' type to be indefinable, unlike those containing an attribute that is constitutive of a thing's essence, as in 'two-footed animal', which is a quidditative definiens of ' m a n ' . Aristotle (b28-29) has to acknowledge, t h e n , that despite this semantic move the coincidental c o m p o u n d ' p a l e - m a n ' is still n o t n a m e d in its own right. T h e unity designated by the newly chosen one-word appellation ίμάτιον is still n o t a quidditative unity. 73 In the next few lines (1029b29-1030a3) the s h o r t c o m i n g will be explained by distinguishing two ways in which an expression may fail to grasp a

70 T h e c o m m o n rendering (Ross, Kirwan among others) of τό ποιόν, τό ποσόν etc. 'quality', 'quantity' etc. is somewhat misleading. These words should be taken to refer to that which is affected by these properties, rather than the properties themselves. See De Rijk (1980), 27-9; also my section 1.71. 71 For this sense of κίνησις see Ross ad loc. 72 In G e r m a n and Dutch there is a one-word expression for 'white horse' ('schimmel'), so that our problem could be rephrased this way: "Does the notion 'schimmel' admit of a quidditative definiens?". 73 Ross (ad loc), who thinks that Aristotle "arbitrarily enough" assumes that only something that is intrinsically one qualifies for a καθ' αυτό appellation, fails to see that for Aristotle, the condition of a thing's quidditative unity plays an important role in his metaphysical investigations.

thing in what it is in its own right or quidditatively. O n e of t h e m is a failure by addition, the o t h e r by omission. In o n e case the e r r o r arises because the intension of the definiend u m is unduly amplified by a d d i n g a d e t e r m i n a n t . For instance, if, in defining the quiddity of *'the pale', o n e were to state the account of 'pale m a n ' , evidently an i m p r o p e r e l e m e n t would be b r o u g h t in by d e t e r m i n i n g 7 4 the u n d e r l y i n g ' t h i n g ' as ' m a n ' a n d , accordingly, adulterating the quidditative notion 'pale', since paleness does not as such include m a n h o o d . T h e failure by omission goes the o t h e r way r o u n d , in that with respect to the expression ί μ ά τ ι ο ν , if used for 'pale-man', o n e erroneously zooms in on the constituent 'pale' a n d omits the o t h e r constituent ' m a n ' , so that 'pale-man' is intensionally narrowed down to 'pale-thing'. It should be n o t e d that both shortcomings are almost inevitably d u e to the application of the semantic device of substituting the two-word expression 'pale m a n ' by the oneword expression Ι μ ά τ ι ο ν , which readily suggests that t h e r e is one quidditative unity at issue: Ibid. 4, 1029b29-1030a3: It may be said that this quiddity [viz. being-acloak] is still not among the appellations designating a thing in its own right. We may reply that a thing not being named in its own right happens in two ways, one of them being from addition, the other by omission. In one case the definiendum itself is appellated by its being combined with something else, as for instance will happen if in defining 'being a *pale' you give the account of 'pale man; in the other case it is the other way round, 7 5 as, for instance, if 'cloak' signifies 'pale man', but someone defines it as a 'pale' . Clearly enough, a pale man is a *pale, but none the less, being a pale man is not being a pale .76 This passage refers to the i m p o r t a n t semantic tool, 'addition' (πρόσθεσις), which plays a role in some of Aristotle's conceptual analyses. By the logical process of π ρ ό σ θ ε σ ι ς the addition is i n t e n d e d of a substrate (e.g. ' m a n ' ) which is n o t the primary substrate of the property in question (e.g. paleness), in a similar fashion to that in which 'nose' is the primary substrate of snubness. In the case of terms like ' s n u b ' , t h e primary substrate is disclosed by abstraction, by analysing, that is, the definiens of 'snub', viz. 'curved nose, whereas in 74

From the intensional point of view this determination is an amplification of the notion 'thing', which leads to narrowing down its extension. 75 Inserting ούχ before oiov; Frede & Patzig II, 63. 76 What Aristotle means to say is that, even supposing that *'the pale' should refer to a pale man, say, Coriscus, yet, though being referentially one and the same, they are not formally so.

the case of ' a d d i t i o n ' , the same process of analysis of e.g. 'pale' is b o u n d to lead you to the complex notion of j u s t 'pale thing', leaving the empty container 'thing' hollow. 77 These observations bring Aristotle to the question if 'being-a-cloak' (τό ίματίω είναι) is a quiddity at all. H e goes on to d e t e r m i n e the notion 'quiddity' by operationally d e f i n i n g it, viz. by showing what condition an appellation (account or definiens) has to m e e t in o r d e r to qualify for precisely grasping a thing's quiddity. It should designate, h e claims, the thing u n d e r consideration by an a c c o u n t that does not exceed the categorial demarcations. 7 8 Note that this passage anticipates the i m p o r t a n t Aristotelian identification of quiddity a n d particular definite thing i n f o r m e d by it, which will be dealt with f r o m Ζ 6 onwards: 7 9 Ibid. 4, 1 0 3 0 a l - 6 : But is b e i n g a cloak a q u i d d i t y at all? Surely n o t . A t h i n g ' s q u i d d i t y is w h a t precisely it is. But w h e n e v e r a n a p p e l l a t i o n f r o m a d i f f e r e n t c a t e g o r y is u s e d , 8 0 we d o n o t h a v e w h a t precisely this p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g 8 1 is. F o r i n s t a n c e , this p a r t i c u l a r pale m a n is n o t w h a t precisely t h e p a r t i c u l a r is, 8 2 a s s u m i n g , t h a t is, 8 3 t h a t thisness falls only to s u b s t a n c e s ( τ α ΐ ς ο ύ σ ί α ι ς ) .

9. 33 On the definiens as expressing a thing's quiddity In fact, the notion of quiddity signified by the phrase όπερ τόδε τι ('what precisely the particular as such is') is identified as that in default of which the thing is not at all. T h e r e f o r e the ίμάτιον trick will n o t do, since it is b o u n d to p r o d u c e two categorially heterog e n e o u s elements united, o n e of which is not indispensable for there being the particular.

' ' T h e πρόσθεσις tool is also important when it comes to identifying the diverse proper objects of the theoretical disciplines: physics, mathematics, metaphysics. It is also used to solve the cognate problem of the role of matter, when it comes to properly defining material things. 78 This transgression from one category to another is called κατ' άλλο λέγεσθαι; see my sections 9.44, and 2.3. 79 Also Met. Η 6, 1045b7-16. 80 For the precise sense of άλλο καθ' άλλου λέγεσθαι see 1030a 1 Off. and my comments to APo. 73b35 (pare Ross ad loc.). See also De Rijk (1980), 28. 81 By speaking h e r e of the particular thing as being quidditatively defined, Aristotle anticipates the discussion of chapter 6: "Is the particular in fact identical with its quiddity?" 82 Understand: by calling a particular h u m a n being 'this pale m a n ' you will not grasp his or her quiddity. 8S T h e subsequent claim will be qualified from 1030a17 onwards.

Next, t h e r e b e i n g a quiddity is conceived of t o g e t h e r with t h e n a m i n g of a thing by an a c c o u n t that meets the strict conditions of a definiens. O n c e these conditions have b e e n d e t e r m i n e d , it a p p e a r s that only expressions that d o not contain e l e m e n t s that are categorially h e t e r o g e n e o u s (such as in 'pale m a n ' ) will do. A n d this in fact a m o u n t s to restricting quidditative accounts or definientia to genera, species, a n d differentiae: Met. Ζ 4, 1030a6-17: Hence there is a quiddity only of those things whose account is a definiens. But not wherever there is a name and an account referring to the same thing, do we have a definiens — otherwise each account would be a definiens; for there will be some name for any sets of words whatsoever, so that even the Iliad would be a definiens 84 —, rather if the account concerns some primary thing; and primary things are all those that are named by a procedure in which not of something a different thing is said. And this means that a quiddity falls to nothing but the forms of the category in question, and these alone. For these seem to be named not in terms of participation 85 and attribution, and not in terms of coincidence either. But as for an account, of everything else if only it has a name, there will be one, indicating what this name means and stating that this attribute falls to this subject. Or instead of a simple account a more detailed one will be given, 86 but there will still not be a definiens nor a quiddity. In the previous lines the possession of a quiddity was suggested as b e i n g restricted to t h e category of s u b s t a n c e (subsistent entity), which in point of fact has simplified the p r o b l e m area. Now Aristotle is g o i n g to qualify this claim, by a d m i t t i n g a secondary sense of the notions of definiens a n d quiddity, which applies to the non-substance categories: Ibid. 4, 1030al7-27: Or perhaps is it that one speaks of definiens, like quiddity ('whatness'), in many ways? For indeed what a thing is signifies in one sense a thing's being-ness including this-ness, while in another each of the names from the categories quantity, quality etc. For just as 'is' falls to everything, but not in the same way — to one primarily and secondarily to the others — so quiddity too applies in an unqualified way to substance, and to

84 I.e. those 24 books would be the formula answering the question 'What is the quiddity of the Homeric poem Iliad?'. 85 Participation is defined inTop. IV I, 121a11-14 as "admitting the definiens of that which is partaken, so that, clearly, the species partake of their genera, while the genera do not partake of the species; for the species admits the definiens of the genus, but the genus does not admit the definiens of the species". 86 T h e m o r e precise (ακριβέστερος) account may f u r t h e r analyse the components of the simple account, even if a name of the ίμάτιον type is involved.

the other things in a qualified sense. For indeed even of a certain quality we may ask iuhat it is, and so quality belongs to the quiddities, albeit not without qualification; but just as in the case of what-is-not some people say,87 playing up the linguistic form, that what-is-not is, not in an unqualified sense, but is what-is-not, so too with the category 'quality'. So c o n c e r n i n g each particular thing which presents itself to us we m u s t c o n s i d e r how to express ourselves w h e n n a m i n g it; but, of course, the q u e s t i o n of how things are r e m a i n s equally i m p o r t a n t (a27-28). With this r e m a r k Aristotle is g o i n g to z o o m in o n the significative f u n c t i o n of t h e linguistic tools used (1030a27-b3). Having stated that the n o t i o n of quiddity is used in m o r e than o n e sense, it is useful to d e t e r m i n e the interrelationships between these senses a n d , by the same token, the d i f f e r e n t kinds of b e i n g they represent. T h e a u t h o r emphasizes that the secondary senses representative of the diverse f o r m s of non-substantial b e i n g are analogically related to those signifying substantial being, as is also the relationship between non-substantial a n d substantial b e i n g ( n e s s ) . As usual 8 8 the analogical use of the term ' h e a l t h ' is taken as an illustrative example. As in 1030a21-26, at a30-32 too the use of the 'is' d e t e r m i n e d by a f o r m f r o m a non-substantial category ( ' « s o - a n d - s o ' , ' « r e l a t e d to', a n d the like) 8 9 is e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of o n e or a n o t h e r categorial 'being t h e r e ' . N o m a t t e r how we would like to p i n p o i n t t h e ontic situation, evidently quiddity a n d definiens in the primary a n d unqualified sense b e l o n g to subsistent entity, even t h o u g h in a qualified sense they b e l o n g to non-substances (1030b3-7). Anyway, the o u t c o m e of o u r observations is certain, to wit, t h a t any c o m p o u n d a p p e l l a t i o n by which we d e n o t e a thing has to m e e t the c o n d i t i o n of b e i n g representative of an intrinsic ontic unity, n o t o n e that spans m o r e than o n e category (whether or n o t a substantial category). It is worthwhile n o t i n g that Aristotle summarises the u p s h o t of this c h a p t e r in terms of ' b e i n g o n e ' : Ibid. 4, 1030b4-13: This point at least is clear, that the primary and unqualified kind of definiens and quiddity applies to subsistent entities. Still it similarly applies to the other things as well. But not 87

Plato, Sophist, 236Eff.; 256Dff.; De Rijk (1986), 164-73. E.g. Met. Γ 2,1003a33ff. 89 Which is commonly (though quite anachronistically) labelled 'copulative' being, instead of an instance of 'hyparctic being' which is categorially determined; my sections 1.51 and 2.15. 88

primarily; for on this assumption, it does not follow that there will be a definiens of anything expressed by a corresponding account. 90 The account must be of a certain sort, in fact an account of something one, not by continuity like the Iliad, or what is bound together, but something one in one of the main senses of 'one'. Now these senses answer to those of 'be', and 'be' in one sense signifies a being-this, in another a being-of-what-magnitude, in another of-what-quality. And so there will be an account and a definiens even of 'pale man', but not in the same way as there is of paleness or of substance. Let us briefly look into the discussion of o n e n e s s (unity) f o u n d in the Lexicon, Δ 6, in Met. I 1, 1052a15ff. a n d Phys. I 2, 185b5ff. (9.34-9.35). 9. 34 An appendix on the notion of 'being-one' as discussed elsewhere In Met. Δ 6, Aristotle (1015bl6-17) starts by his favourite distinction between ' c o i n c i d e n t a l ' (κατά συμβεβηκός) a n d 'in its own r i g h t ' (καθ' αυτό). W h a t is o n e coincidentally is called so either because of its having non-subsistent c o m p o n e n t s , which coincide owing to their i n h e r e n c e in o n e subsistent entity, or since o n e (or m o r e ) 9 1 nonsubsistent c o m p o n e n t ( s ) c o i n c i d e ( s ) , i n h e r i n g in a n o t h e r , t h i r d c o m p o n e n t , which is a subsistent entity: Met. A 6, 1015bl7-36: Coincidentally one is for instance 'Coriscus' and *'the educated' and 'educated Coriscus'; for to say 'Coriscus' and *'the educated' and 'educated Coriscus' comes to the same; and equally so in *'the educated', and '*the upright', and 'educated and upright Coriscus'. For all these are called one coincidentally, '*the upright' and *'the educated' because they coincide with one substance, *'the educated' and 'Coriscus' because one coincides with the other. Equally 'the educated Coriscus' is in a way one with 'Coriscus', because one of the portions figuring in the account coincides with the other, I mean *'the educated' with 'Coriscus'. And 'the educated Coriscus' is the same as 'upright Coriscus', because a part of each is coincidentally one with one and the same thing. The case is similar if what is coincidental concerns a generic or some universal name. 9 2 So for instance 'man' and 'educated man' is the same; for it is either

90

Owing to the ambivalent m e a n i n g of the verb σημαίνειν (used of both the expressions and their significates; see my section 1.71), the Greek text is somewhat confusing, literally m e a n i n g "a definiens of whatever signifies the same as an account ". For the ambivalent m e a n i n g of σημαίνειν see also Sluiter (1997), 152. 91 As exemplified at bl9-20. 92 T h e broader notion καθόλου also comprises differentiae and propria (essential properties), and possibly also (at times) the connotative features 'being' and 'one', the 'termini transcendentes' of Medieval thought.

because 'what is educated' coincides with 'the man', being one and the same subsistent entity, or because both coincide with a certain particular thing, as for instance Coriscus — except that the two do not fall to him in the same manner, but one doubtless as an appellation in the category of substance, 93 the other as a state or affection of the substance. All things called one coincidentally, then, are so called in this way. Clearly, Aristotle is s p e a k i n g a b o u t the d i f f e r e n t a p p e l l a t i o n s by which o n e a n d the same t h i n g , viz. t h e e d u c a t e d , u p r i g h t m a n , Coriscus, may be designated. 9 4 In fact, the m a n may be called u p — n o matter if the n a m e will be used as a subject or predicate term of a s t a t e m e n t a b o u t him, o r just for m e n t i o n i n g or s u m m o n i n g him — by several expressions: 'Coriscus', ' t h e e d u c a t e d Coriscus', '(this) e d u c a t e d ' , '(this) u p r i g h t ' , '(this) e d u c a t e d m a n ' , ' t h e e d u c a t e d , u p r i g h t Coriscus', a n d so on. What is at the focus of interest h e r e is the logical f e a t u r e that these (and similar) expressions semantically (or r a t h e r 'referentially') coincide, n o t the ways in which that which is d e n o t e d by the diverse n a m e s ontologically forms a unity in Coriscus. Despite the fact that the latter are diverse ways of d e n o t a t i o n (as is meticulously explained in b21-34), f r o m the logicosemantical p o i n t of view they are all coincidental appellations (b2021; 34-36). 9 5 Of course, t h e semantic Main Rule, RSC (my section 93 My r e n d e r i n g of ώς γένος καί έν τή ούσία, in which γένος must have the broader sense of 'category' ( ' m a n ' being a species, not a genus), and καί should be taken explicatively. 94 Matthews (1982, 225f.), against the hard evidence of Top. I 7, 103a32-39, endorses the opposite view and takes Aristotle to consider 'accidental unities' (like 'seated m a n ' , 'walking m a n ' ) as things (baptized by him 'kooky objects'), instead of alternative descriptions, meant to simply pick out o n e and the same subsistent thing, say, Coriscus. He (226) challenges "anyone who thinks that, according to Aristotle, ' t h e man who is sitting' a n d ' t h e musical o n e ' simply pick out Socrates", (to) explain why Aristotle distinguishes the sense of 'same' in which one says 'The man who is sitting and Socrates are the same' from the sense of 'same' (that of 'its most literal and primary use') in which o n e says 'The man and the animal that walks on two feet are the same'." Matthews's question ignores the crucial difference between 'coincidental unit' and 'quidditative unit' (e. g. 'two-footed animal' as the p r o p e r definiens of man). T h u s the staggering implications (225: "When the man rises, the seated man ceases to be; when the woman awakens, the sleeping woman passes away; when the baby cries, the silent baby perishes") d o not concern Aristotle's view, and rather resemble the Sophists' attacks on Plato and Aristotle. Incidentally, Aristotle's view of the m a t t e r should be assessed in the b r o a d e r c o n t e x t so convincingly established by Owen (1961) of Aristotle's interpretation of φαινόμενα, which "must be understood to be o u r beliefs and interpretations, often as revealed in linguistic usage". Likewise, the 'accidental unities' are not belief-free things, but testify to our usage and the structure of thought and belief which usage displays. 95

T h e problems raised by Kirwan (133-135) seem to be d u e to ignoring this. Ross too (II, 301) interprets this passage in terms of ontic unity, and t h e r e f o r e

1.71) s h o u l d n o t be f o r g o t t e n : t h e p h r a s e 'what is n a m e d coincidentally' is used to stand for n e i t h e r the appellation as linguistic tool n o r the things referred to as such, but the things as called up by this or that appellation. Next, the opposite g r o u p is addressed, viz. what is called o n e in its own right, which again should be taken to refer to 'things as d e n o t e d by a p p e l l a t i o n s that they are e n t i t l e d to in their own right'. T h e appellations involved are divided as follows: (a) those d e n o t i n g things q u a b e i n g o n e f r o m b e i n g c o n t i n u o u s , either naturally or artificially (1015b36-1016a17); (b) those d e n o t i n g things whose substratum (either the proximate or t h e ultimate) is specifically u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d , i.e. those things t h e f o r m of which is perceptually indiscernible. In this sense wine a n d water a n d meltables are called o n e (1016al7-24). T h e o t h e r two kinds are philosophically of greater concern: (c) those d e n o t i n g things whose g e n u s is o n e , being differentiated by o p p o s i t e d i f f e r e n t i a e . G e n e r i c unity is e x p l a i n e d in t e r m s of t h e g e n u s acting as the substratum of the differentiae: Ibid. 6, 1016a24-32: Things are also called one whose genus is one, being differentiated by opposite differentiae; and these are all called one, because the genus, which is the substratum of the differentiae is one, as for instance a horse, a man, and a dog are something one in that they are all animals, in much the same way indeed in which things are whose matter is one. 9 6 The things called generically one are sometimes called so in the above way, but sometimes their higher genus is called the same (if they are the infimae species of the genus); I mean the genus above the proximate genera, as for instance the isosceles and the equilateral are one and the same figure, because both are triangles, but they are not the same kind of triangles. Either way, these things are called o n e because, of (and after indeed) an essential likeness, which, however, only c o n c e r n s the generic level, either that of the p r o x i m a t e g e n u s or that of a h i g h e r genus. N o n e t h e less, they can all be called u p a f t e r t h a t c o m m o n g e n e r i c appellation in their own right. T h u s Socrates may be called u p by 'this animal', 'this living being', a n d so on.

seems to miss the point. 96 T h e Greek text has the brachylogical expression "in which matter is one". A similar brachylogical construction is f o u n d at a29-30. Note that in this context, in which 'genus' = 'matter', generic formal identity, rather peculiarly indeed, is put on a par with referential (= material) identity.

(d) T h e f o u r t h g r o u p c o n c e r n s specific unity. If anywhere, h e r e it b e c o m e s patently clear that Aristotle is dealing not with ontic situations as such, b u t as those called u p by d i f f e r e n t appellations, which implies one and the same thing (πράγμα) being designated differently. Of course, in this case it is of p a r a m o u n t i m p o r t a n c e to recognize the unity of what is d e n o t e d in d i f f e r e n t ways, instead of being misled by the diverse appellations. It will n o t c o m e as a surprise t h e n that in Aristotle's e x p o s i t i o n of this sense of o n e n e s s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between a significative a c c o u n t a n d what is signified or d e n o t e d by it is at the focus of interest; in a way the two are o n e , in a n o t h e r they may (or even should) be distinguished. They are o n e q u a referring to what is really o n e a n d the same thing; they are not in so far as the a c c o u n t as such can b e m a r k e d off f r o m what is signified or r e f e r r e d to by it. Along these lines (viz. of referential vs. formal identity) the next passage should be understood: 9 7 Ibid. 6, 1016a32-b3: Again, there is talk about one thing when the account indicating a thing's quiddity 1 0 3 ; a n d in case of a s i m i l a r u s e o f t h e a p p e l l a t i o n s ' a n i m a l ' o r ' m a g n i t u d e ' , t h e r e is o n e a n i m a l a n d o n e m a g n i t u d e .

T h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t of the c h a p t e r c o n t a i n s s o m e loose additional observations. Firstly ( 1 0 1 6 b 6 - l l ) , t h e r e is a r e m a r k a b o u t the differe n t g r o u n d s on which things are called o n e ( a m o n g which the role of substance is given the place of h o n o u r o n c e m o r e ) . Next ( b l l - 1 7 ) , the role of having c o n t i n u o u s parts is discussed, a n d the relationship of unity, n u m b e r a n d measure. Finally, prior to its brief discussion of the notion ' m a n y ' (10l7a3-6), the Lexicon summarizes the d i f f e r e n t senses o f ' o n e ' , this time f r o m the ontological point of view: Ibid. 6, 1016b31-1017a3: S o m e t h i n g s a r e o n e with r e s p e c t t o n u m b e r , o t h e r s to species, o t h e r s to g e n u s , o t h e r s analogically. Numerically t h e t h i n g s w h o s e m a t t e r is o n e , specifically t h o s e w h o s e d e f i n i e n s is o n e , g e n e r i c a l l y t h o s e w h o s e f i g u r e of a p p e l l a t i o n is o n e , analogically t h o s e w h i c h a r e r e l a t e d as a t h i r d t h i n g to a f o u r t h . In every case t h e l a t t e r types of o n e n e s s a r e i m p l i e d in t h e f o r m e r , as f o r i n s t a n c e w h a t is n u m e r i c a l l y o n e is also specifically o n e ( b u t w h a t is specifically o n e is n o t all n u m e r i c a l l y o n e ) ; a n d w h a t is s p e c i f i c a l l y o n e is a l s o g e n e r i c a l l y o n e ( b u t w h a t is g e n e r i c a l l y o n e is n o t all specifically o n e ) ; it is, h o w e v e r , analogically o n e ; a n d w h a t is a n a l o g i c a l l y o n e is n o t all generically o n e .

102

Ross (ad loc.) has rightly observed that Aristotle means to say that since the other categories are d e p e n d e n t on substance, the unity of things in them d e p e n d s on the unity of substance. 103 Unlike T r e d e n n i c k and Kirwan, Ross, Warrington and Tricot all take Aristode to be speaking of specific and generic unity.

9. 35 The discussion of oneness in Met. I, chs. 1-2. Connotative 'one' In the o p e n i n g c h a p t e r of Metaphysics I, Aristotle begins his discussion of o n e n e s s by recalling (1052a34-bl) the d i f f e r e n t senses of ' o n e ' as dealt with in Δ 6. H e c o n f i n e s himself this time to the καθ' α υ τ ά λεγόμενα a n d summarizes t h e m u n d e r these f o u r headings. They are p r e s e n t e d in two pairs ((a) + (b) a n d (c) + ( d ) ) , the elements of which in a way overlap: (a) that which is c o n t i n u o u s , e i t h e r in g e n e r a l or by n a t u r e a n d not by contact n o r by being tied together (al9-21); (b) that which is a c o n t i n u o u s whole a n d has a certain s h a p e a n d f o r m (μορφήν καί είδος), especially if it has in itself the cause of its continuity (a22-25). As in Δ 6, natural unity is d e f i n e d in terms of being αδιαίρετος: Met. I 1, 1052a25-28: Such are things because their movement is undivided in place and time. Hence it is clear that if a thing has by nature a principle of local and circular movement, this is primarily one extended thing. T h e r e m a i n i n g two types are linked t o g e t h e r a n d c o m p r i s e d tinder the h e a d i n g 'those whose definiens is o n e ' . They concern: (c) what is numerically one; (d) what is specifically one. Ibid. 1, 1052a29-34: Some things, then, are one in the above way, qua continuous and whole, and the other those the apprehension of which is undivided; undivided, that is, because it is an apprehension of what is specifically or numerically undivided; numerically, then, the particular is undivided, and specifically, that which in apprehensibility and in knowledge is undivided. Hence that which causes substances to be one [i.e. the infima species] must be one in the primary sense. At the e n d of this survey the f o u r senses are p r e s e n t e d o n c e again as two pairs: Ibid. 1, 1052a34-bl: What is one, then, is called so in all these senses: what is naturally continuous and what is naturally a whole, and what is particular and what is universal. And all these are one because of undividedness, in the former cases the undividedness of the movement, in the latter ones that of the apprehension and the definiens. Ross failed to observe the pairing off of the f o u r senses, a n d so thinks (II, 182) it is r a t h e r surprising to find t h e f o u r t h kind of unity described as τό καθόλου, because what Aristotle says a b o u t it at a31 suggests only the infima species, which is the least universal of universals.

As b e f o r e at Met. Δ 6, 1016a35, Ross u n d e r s t a n d s by αδιαίρετος s o m e t h i n g like 'incapable of being logically analysed', a n d denies this f e a t u r e to g e n e r a a n d species, since they can be analysed into a (higher) g e n u s a n d a differentia. However, the word has a different m e a n i n g in all these contexts a n d , in the present context in particular, it refers to the u n d i v i d e d n e s s a n d indissolubility of a t h i n g ' s quiddity f r o m the particular as a whole. 1 0 4 T h e r e f o r e the m e m b e r s of the second pair are so closely related as to be both subsumable u n d e r the h e a d i n g ' t h a t which is o n e by a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d d e f i n i t i o n ' . What is a p p r e h e n d e d is a certain essence as immanent in a particular, or, to p u t it the o t h e r way r o u n d , a certain particular is a p p r e h e n d e d after its quiddity. We have to be aware time a n d again that for Aristotle what is universal only has existence qua e n m a t t e r e d in a particular being. O n this view, o n e a n d the same particular can be called numerically o n e q u a differing, owing to its own i m m a n e n t quiddity, f r o m a n o t h e r particular having the same quiddity. By t h e same token, t h e n , in its being a p p r e h e n d e d a n d known this particular quiddity is still undivided, b u t it is given a universal status to be shared by the quiddity of o t h e r particulars. In a similar vein, Aristotle can assert (Met. I 2, 1054a9-19) that in a sense o n e n e s s is the same as beingness, because like beingness, it is f o u n d in all the categories, a n d it adds n o t h i n g to a t e r m ' s m e a n i n g , n o m o r e than its twin n o t i o n , 'being' (which too, semantically, is an e m p t y c o n t a i n e r ) does. A n d b e i n g n e s s a n d o n e n e s s are o n a par since for a thing to be o n e is to be a definite particular. 1 0 5 This brings us to say a few words a b o u t 'connotative o n e ' . At Met. Γ 2, 1003b22-24, the n o t i o n s ' b e i n g ' a n d ' o n e ' are said to be co-implicative, a l t h o u g h they are formally d i f f e r e n t : what is is one, a n d the o t h e r way r o u n d , but 'being-ness' is n o t the same as 'one-ness'. T h e i r being exchangeable rests on their being grammatically parathetic: i.e. being attached to whatever f o r m (είδος) they d o not add semantically anything to its m e a n i n g . In Aristotle's words (ibid.): "The expression

104

See my section 9.44. Cf. Phys. I 2, 185b6. This point of comparison between ' o n e ' and 'be' is alluded to at An. II 1, 412b8-9. T h e conceptual emptiness o f ' o n e ' and its implementation by the different categorial modes of being is discussed in Phys. V 4. T h e fact that the bare notions, 'be' and ' o n e ' are implied in any categorial designation (and therefore need not be 'added to' it) is lucidly explained at Met. H 6, 1045a36b7 (my section 10.6). Ultimately, this is why άνθρωπος is conceptually the same thing as εις άνθρωπος and ών άνθρωπος (Met. Γ 2, 1003b26-32; my section 1.64). 105

' o n e - m a n ' equals ' m a n ' j u s t as ' m a n - b e i n g ' equals ' m a n ' , a n d that is why ' b e i n g ' a n d ' o n e ' can b e p u t on a par". 1 0 6 At Met. H 6, 1045a36b7, this idea is worked out by Aristotle claiming that b o t h parathetic 'attributes' c o n c e r n individual subsistent being, including its coincidental m o d e s of being. T h e i r parathetic character is indicated by him saying that n e i t h e r the one-element n o r the ^ - e l e m e n t is expressed in the definiens of subsistent or coincidental being, a n d the quiddity of each of t h e m eo ipso (εύθύς) is by its very n a t u r e a kind of one-ness in t h e s a m e way as it is a k i n d of being-ness. T h i n g s possess these ' a t t r i b u t e s ' w i t h o u t t h e r e b e i n g any cause (αϊτιον) outside t h e m selves. T h u s one-ness a n d being-ness are intensionally c o n n e c t e d by their semantic emptiness (my section 10.6), a n d so have their being connotative in c o m m o n (my section 1.64). In t h e p r e s e n t c h a p t e r , as we j u s t saw, c o n n o t a t i v e one-ness is identified as conveyed by the second main sense of 'undivided-ness': the undivided-ness, that is, which c o n c e r n s ' a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d definition' ( 1 0 5 2 a 3 4 - b l ) . In this sense, a t h i n g ' s b e i n g - o n e bears o n its b e i n g essentially a 'this' a n d 'capable of being isolated either in place or in f o r m or in thought'. 1 0 7 It is this connotative o n e which, f r o m the b e g i n n i n g of the 13th century onwards, t o g e t h e r with connotative 'being', c a m e to b e l o n g to the six 'termini t r a n s c e n d e n t e s ' , 'ens', ' u n u m ' , 'verum', ' b o n u m ' , 'res', 'aliquid'. 1 0 8 H a l p e r (213f.) rightly opposes the interpretation of 106

Also Met. Ζ 16, 1040bl6-24 (my section 9.75); Η 6, 1045a36-b7 discussed presently, and in my section 10.6. Cf. Phys. I 2, 185b6; V 4, 227b3. Halper rightly addresses (1985, 217; 227) the relationship between ' o n e ' and 'being' in terms of what he calls 'intensional connection', thus avoiding the less informative designation 'co-extensiveness'. Note that all the same this connection is a relationship of being co-implicative rather than formal identity. 107 Lexicon, Met. Δ 6, 1016b31-33. At 1016b8-9 it is said that "what is called 'one' in the primary sense is that whose ousia is o n e κατ' είδος" or (1016b31-33) "whose definiens is one". Although Aristotle indicates (Met. I 1, 1052bl8-24) the quantitative aspect of 'measure' as the semantic origin of the term ' o n e ' as it is used in its metaphysical sense, Cleary (1995, 370ff.) unduly presses this remark to deny (contra Morrison, 1983) that the whole passage shows that 'being indivisible' is really the essence of unity (Cf. Met I 1, 1053b7-8). To my mind, Aristotle's remark is primarily grammatical. κι« x h e f i r s t systematic account of these six notions is f o u n d in Philip the Chancellor's Summa de bono (c. 1225-28), who calls them 'communissima' (see J.A. Aertsen, " T r a n s c e n d e n s - Transcendentalis. T h e Genealogy of a Philosophical T e r m " in: J. Hamesse & C. Steel (eds.), L'élaboration du vocabulaire philosophique au moyen âge. Brepols T u r n h o u t , 241-55). In the Dialectica Monacensis (first quarter of the 13th cent.) the term ' t r a n s c e n d e n s ' is used to indicate n o u n s or principles c o m m o n to things from any category, and thus transcending the predicamental order or 'linea predicamentalis' of universal terms. See De Rijk (1967) II, 556 1 7 1 9

Met. Γ 2, 1003b22-23, given by Medieval a u t h o r s f r o m Philip t h e C h a n c e l l o r (d. 1236) onwards, as c o n c e r n i n g two convertible transc e n d e n t terms, to the view held by "most Anglo-American c o m m e n tators a n d also Alexander of Aphrodisias, who all reject the passage as expressing the identity of the extensions of two terms". T h e dispute is, h e says, w h e t h e r these two terms are c o n n e c t e d intensionally, or extensionally. His rejection of t h e label ' t r a n s c e n d e n t ' 1 0 9 as far as Aristotle is c o n c e r n e d is surely correct. However, his a r g u m e n t s for the rejection of the c o m m o n view of Aristotle's ' b e i n g ' a n d ' o n e ' as merely m e a n t as two terms of universal co-extension are beside the point, I am a f r a i d . T h e c o m m o n view that Met. Γ 2, 1003b22-23 characterizes O n e a n d Being as j u s t coextensive is i n a p p r o p r i a t e for quite a d i f f e r e n t reason. What Aristotle tries to say is (as also a p p e a r s f r o m t h e n u m e r o u s parallel passages) t h a t as a result of t h e i r c o m m o n character of merely b e i n g connotative, they have the same universal (the most general i n d e e d ) applicability, which, u n d e r s t a n d ably, can be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of coextensivity. 1 1 0 This coextensivity, however, is d u e to their c o m m o n semantic character as categorically 'empty container'. T h e association of Aristotle's ' o n e ' a n d 'be-ing' with the Medieval n o t i o n ' t r a n s c e n d e n s ' is misleading e n o u g h . Firstly, because in its logical use this label also applies to n o t i o n s such as 'universale', 'possibile', ' c o n t i n g e n s ' , a n d o t h e r s that are ' t r a n s p r e d i c a m e n t a l ' . Secondly, a n d m o r e importantly, in its metaphysical use it is quite alien to Aristotelian thought, in which, unlike with Plato, the concept of ' b e ' is empty, because it is the f o r m which yields a thing's being, thus i m p l e m e n t i n g its hyparxis ( ' f o r m a dat esse'). In o t h e r words: Aristotelian metaphysics is a metaphysics of f o r m s , n o t a 'Seinsmetaphysik'.

and 560 34 -561': "[...] nomina transcendentia. Qualia sunt haec: 'res', 'ens', ' u n u m ' , 'universale', 'possibile', 'contingens', 'idem', 'diversum'"; cf. ibid, 607 19 " 24 . 109 In fact, Halper uses the anachronistic term 'transcendental', which is utterly i n a p p r o p r i a t e (1) because of its Kantian c o n n o t a t i o n , a n d (2) since it is also historically inaccurate, given that the Medieval metaphysicians never spoke of 'transcendentalis', a n d this term did not a p p e a r until Suarez, Disputationes metaphysicae (1597). In Medieval Latin, when used as a technical term, the word 'transcendens' always signifies 'beyond the predicamental order'. 110 Cf. Met. Κ 3, 1061al5-18 and Top. IV 1, 121b7-8.

9. 4 How to grasp a thing's ousia properly In c h a p t e r Ζ 5, t h e ambivalence of the term ο ύ σ ί α , which m e a n s 'subsistent entity' ('substance') a n d 'quiddity' ('essence') at the same time, raises an intriguing question. T h e f o r m a l d i f f e r e n c e between the two is beyond all d o u b t : a particular thing of the outside world is surely n o t the ontic cause i n h e r i n g in it. If they were completely the same, empirical knowledge (however unreliable it is, t h o u g h ) would be the only kind of cognition t h e r e is a n d , by the same token, the Greek ideal of steadfast, g e n u i n e knowledge (έπιστήμη) would be delusive. So to properly evaluate the d i f f e r e n c e between substance a n d quiddity is of decisive i m p o r t a n c e to any Greek philosopher. T o Aristotle, this task boils down to forwarding his alternative for Plato's strict separation of these two. Given his linguistical a p p r o a c h to the metaphysical questions at stake, his search f o r t h e t r u e ο ύ σ ί α in p a r t i c u l a r , it is all b u t u n e x p e c t e d that Aristotle now p r o c e e d s to ask if to p r o p e r l y (or definitorially) conceive or speak of a particular s h o u l d c o m e to conceiving o r speaking of its quiddity. In light of the f o r e g o i n g discussions t h e p r e l i m i n a r y reaction to this q u e s t i o n m u s t be an a t t e m p t to certify by what n a m e or phrase the particular u n d e r consideration is b r o u g h t up. 9. 41 On one-word expressions including an intrinsic

determinant

T h e investigation starts by r e f i n i n g t h e p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g c o m p o u n d entities which was addressed earlier. In fact, c o m p o u n d entities of the ' p a l e - m a n ' type (i.e. those which are called u p a f t e r o n e of their coincidental features: τά κατά συμβεβηκός λεγόμενα) have already b e e n discarded in the previous c h a p t e r . At this point, what n e e d s to be c o n s i d e r e d are those designations a m o n g the o n e s which call u p their r e f e r e n t s a f t e r their essential f e a t u r e (τά κ α θ ' α υ τ ά λεγόμενα), which include an intrinsic d e t e r m i n a n t . T h e problem, t h e n , is that such d e t e r m i n a n t s may r e m a i n h i d d e n , because they are d e s i g n a t e d by a one-word expression. 1 1 1 For instance, τό 111 T h e one-word expressions meant here refer to things including an intrinsic determinant, unlike the tricky expression ίμάτιον, used earlier to replace the twoword expression λευκός άνθρωπος ('pale m a n ' ) , which contains an extrinsic determinant. Note that the phrase έκ προσθέσεως here (as at 1031a4-5, where it will be defined) concerns intrinsic determinants, while at 1029b3f (as well as elsewhere, e.g. Top. If f t , Ît5a26; III 3, 118b10; 119a23) extrinsic determinations are

σιμόν ( ' s n u b ' ) , τό άρρεν ( ' t h e m a l e ' ) , which both contain an intrinsic d e t e r m i n a n t , 'nose' a n d 'animal', respectively: Met. Ζ 5, 1030b 14-28: If one denies that an account framed from an addition is not a definiens, there is a difficulty, viz. which of the cthings that are named by> coupled terms and not simple ones will be definable. For these must be disclosed by adding something. For instance, supposing we have to do with a nose and concavity, and with snubness as that which results from the combination of these two by the presence of the one in the other. And it is not coincidentally that concavity or snubness is an attribute of the nose, but they are so in virtue of themselves, and not in the way in which paleness falls to Callias, or to man, viz. because Callias, who happens to be a man, is pale, but rather in the way that masculinity falls to an animal, and equality to what is a magnitude, and generally in the way that anything may be said to fall in virtue of itself. These are the attributes in which either the account or the name of that which they are attributes of occurs, and which cannot be disclosed without this attribute. Thus the appellation *'the pale' 1 1 2 can be disclosed without reference to man, but femininity not without reference to animal. Therefore either none of these appellations have a quiddity and a definiens, or, if they do, it must be in another way, as explained before. An additional p r o b l e m arises in this m a t t e r (1030b28-1031a1), since sometimes the c o m p o u n d n o t i o n may be equivalently signified by a one-word expression (being a n e u t e r substantivated adjective) like τό σιμόν ( ' t h e s n u b ' ) a n d by the same adjective used adjectivally to refer to the intrinsic attribute of the substance, viz. σιμή ρίς ( ' s n u b n o s e ' ) . If, then, a s n u b nose is the same as a concave nose, 'snub', o n e might infer, is the same as 'concave', b u t this is n o t true, because ' s n u b ' implies a r e f e r e n c e to 'nose', while 'concave' does not. And if ' s n u b ' = ' s n u b nose', an infinite regress is unavoidable, Aristotle asserts, viz. s n u b nose nose etc., which is not an attractive perspective to s o m e o n e who tries to d e f i n e the snub. So the f o r m e r p r o b l e m suggests that the definiens should include the specific substratum, a n d the latter that it must suffer f r o m a pleonasm. 1 1 3

involved. At Int. 12, 21b27-30, 'connotative being' included in assertibles is called an 'addition' (πρόσθεσις). 112 T i m e and again o n e should realize that the Greek expression does not contain such a d u m m y term as '', which in fact would often trivialize Aristotle's claims; see my Index s.w. 'thing' and ' s u b s t a n t i a t i o n ' . 113 Ross (II, 173f.) has aptly elaborated and c o m m e n t e d upon this passage, and rightly observed that re .SE 31, 182a4-6, the infinite regress argument is refuted. See also Frede & Patzig II, 82-5, and Bostock, 98-100.

It does n o t c o m e as a surprise, t h e r e f o r e , that in the c o n c l u d i n g section of t h e c h a p t e r ( 1 0 3 1 a l - 1 4 ) Aristotle claims t h a t t h i n g s designated by c o u p l e d terms, including those containing an intrinsic d e t e r m i n a n t , c a n n o t be properly d e f i n e d , since they always involve the a d d i t i o n of a substratum, which is alien in a way to the n o t i o n expressed by t h e term d e t e r m i n e d ; or, in o t h e r words, they always involve a transgression of the categorial b o u n d a r i e s (1031a2-5). If they d o have a definition, then either it must be in a d i f f e r e n t way, or the terms ' d e f i n i e n s ' a n d 'quiddity' are to be taken in an i m p r o p e r sense. Anyway, only that which is precisely b r o u g h t u p as a subsistent being is properly definable, Aristotle keeps claiming. From t h e a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l p o i n t of view, an interesting corollary may be drawn on Aristotle's behalf, that if a m a n or w o m a n are distinctly called u p as τό άρρεν ( ' t h e male') a n d τό θήλυ ( ' t h e f e m a l e ' ) , g e n d e r should be c o n s i d e r e d an incidental feature, n o t an essential o n e , because their most quidditative property is ' b e i n g h u m a n ' , j u s t as the quidditative n a t u r e of s n u b merely is 'being a nose'. 9. 42 Does a thing's quiddity coincide with the particular

itselß

O n c e the substance has b e e n given the exclusive privilege of definability, any anti-Platonist is f o r c e d to answer the question w h e t h e r a t h i n g ' s quiddity as i n d i c a t e d by t h e d e f i n i e n s coincides with t h e particular itself. In Aristotle's view, the only way a quiddity can exist at all is i n d e e d if it is e m b o d i e d in this or that particular of the outside world. It will b e clear, t h e r e f o r e , that in c h a p t e r six t h e s e m a n t i c ambivalence of the word ούσία is at the focus of interest: Met. Ζ 6, 1 0 3 1 a l 5 - 1 8 : W e m u s t c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r it h o l d s of e a c h t h i n g 1 1 4 t h a t it is t h e s a m e as, o r d i f f e r e n t f r o m , its q u i d d i t y . T h i s is u s e f u l f o r o u r i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h e ousia; f o r e a c h t h i n g is t h o u g h t n o t to d i f f e r f r o m its o w n o u s i a [i.e. s u b s t a n c e ] , a n d a t h i n g ' s q u i d d i t y is said to b e its o u s i a [i.e. e s s e n c e ] .

T h r o u g h o u t the discussions of this chapter, the semantic a p p r o a c h to the m a t t e r is p r e d o m i n a n t . 1 1 5 N a m i n g 1 1 6 things a n d , by the same token, things qua named in diverse ways, are focussed u p o n , n o t the

114

Again, εκαστον is dominantly used; my Index s.v. De Rijk (1980), 29-33. 116 Both one-word expressions (names) and many-word expressions (phrases, accounts) may be used. T h e r e f o r e , I use the generic terms ' n a m e ' , 'appellation' (said both of the act and the product). 115

things as such, irrespective of the way in which they may be b r o u g h t u p for discussion. T o Aristotle, all things are particular things which are referentially identical with their essence ('quiddity'), since each essence is an i m m a n e n t eidos. So far t h e r e is n o p r o b l e m , at least f r o m the doctrinal angle. Problems may arise, however, as soon as things are called up by all sorts of names, a n d thus d i f f e r e n t formal aspects of these things come to the fore. As long as the appellations call u p the thing in its e n t i r e n a t u r e (when f o r instance, we d e s i g n a t e Callias by 'this m a n ' ) , or an expression is used that signifies a thing's essential c o m p o n e n t ('this a n i m a l ' , 'this rational b e i n g ' ) , t h e r e is n o p r o b l e m either. T h i n g s thus n a m e d are labelled by Aristotle τα κ α θ ' α ΰ τ ό λεγόμενα, not to be r e n d e r e d 'so-called self-subsistent things' (Ross a n d others), 1 1 7 as if the things by themselves were meant, but 'things named in their own right' or rather 'things named after a quidditative m o d e of being'. T h e c o u n t e r p a r t of this m a n n e r of appellation occurs whenever things are called u p after some of their coincidental m o d e s of being, e.g. when Callias is designated as *'the pale', or *'the musical', a n d so o n . Again, n o t the thing by itself is u n d e r consideration, b u t the t h i n g q u a d e s i g n a t e d by a c o i n c i d e n t a l a p p e l l a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e r e n d e r i n g s such as 'accidental things' 1 1 8 miss the point completely. Clearly, *'the pale' (τό λευκόν) said of Callias does refer to a selfsubsistent entity. However, whenever the subsistent entity, Callias is designated by the appellation * ' t h e pale', h e is given a n a m e on account of a coincidental m o d e of being of his. And this, as Aristotle never tires of arguing, is n o t a p r o m i s i n g start for discovering a thing's true substance. Returning now to the initial problem of the relationship between a particular a n d its quiddity, we see Aristotle tackling it precisely f r o m the angle of naming:

117

"Etres appellés êtres par soi" (Tricot); "cose che sono per sé" (Reale I, 582). "Cose che sono per accidente" (Reale I, 582). Tricot has "l'être dit par accident', Ross, "accidental unities", Tredennick and Warrington, "accidental predications". Bostock correctly renders "things spoken of coincidentally" as opposed to "things spoken of in their own right", but thinks it is not entirely clear how we should take this distinction. As may be expected, Bostock has blocked the way to understanding the importance of this distinction by his continuously confusing semantics and syntax and explaining any way of calling up in terms of sentence predication, including its multifarious (modern, ««Aristotelian) diversifications. See especially his comments at 104-7 and his Epilogue to Ζ 4-6 at 116-8. Several other interpreters keep speaking of 'accidental objects', e.g. Matthews (1991): 'cooky objects'. 118

Ibid. 6, 1 0 3 1 a l 9 - 2 4 : I n t h e c a s e of t h i n g s w h i c h a r e c a l l e d u p a f t e r a c o i n c i d e n t a l m o d e of b e i n g , t h e two w o u l d s e e m t o b e n o t t h e s a m e , as f o r i n s t a n c e p a l e m a n is n o t t h e s a m e as t h e q u i d d i t y of p a l e m a n . If t h e y w e r e t h e s a m e , t h e n t h e q u i d d i t y o f m a n a n d o f p a l e m a n w o u l d a l s o b e t h e s a m e ; f o r a m a n a n d a p a l e m a n a r e t h e s a m e , as t h e y s a y , 1 1 9 a n d , t h e r e f o r e , t h e q u i d d i t y of m a n a n d p a l e m a n w o u l d be the same.

Aristotle t h e n questions (a24-25) the validity of this r e d u c t i o n ad absurdum by r e m a r k i n g that the syllogistic framework underlying it is n o t valid, because the premisses j u m p f r o m formal to extensional identity. An alternative reduction is suggested a n d rejected (1031a2528).120

9. 43 The special position of τα καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα Next, the case of τά καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα is submitted to an extensive discussion. W h e n a r g u i n g for his own position, that in the case of things that are b r o u g h t u p by n a m i n g t h e m a f t e r their essential nature, there really is a relationship of sameness between particular thing a n d its ontic cause, the essence, Aristotle finds his first piece of evidence in Platonic d o c t r i n e (1031a30-bl 1). Even on the assumption that there are such things as the Platonic Forms, h e argues, his own thesis turns out to be mandatory. 1 2 1 T h e existence of transcende n t Platonic Forms i n d e e d can only be i n t e r p r e t e d by its adherents, Aristotle claims, on the footing of the sameness of their quiddity a n d substance. For if Goodness-Itself a n d t h e quiddity of ' g o o d ' are different, t h e n t h e r e must be a n o t h e r substance over a n d above it, which will be prior to it; a n d the same will hold for Animality-Itself a n d even for Being-Itself; 122 in a word, t h e r e would be ontic causes 119

I.e. in n o r m a l usage, the designations ' m a n ' a n d 'pale m a n ' refer to the same substance. 120 Both a r g u m e n t s are aptly explained by Ross, Frede & Patzig, a n d Bostock ad loc. 121 Cf. F r e d e & Patzig (96), w h o rightly take an additional a r g u m e n t to r u n from 1031b7 to 10. T h e p r o c e d u r e of s u p p o r t i n g his own view in the light of Plato's metaphysics of T r a n s c e n d e n t Being has caused some c o n f u s i o n a m o n g interpreters. Ross (II, 177) thinks it is not obvious why Aristotle should have chosen "a class of καθ' αύτό terms which h e d o e s n o t believe in, the Ideas" to illustrate his own thesis, a n d ascribes his choice to his intention to make "a covert criticism" of the theory of Forms. Bostock (107) even suggests that "perhaps Aristotle chooses these examples h e r e because h e d o e s n o t feel it a p p r o p r i a t e to offer his own examples yet". Your a r g u m e n t gains some extra weight indeed, if your o p p o n e n t turns out to have a similar view, mutatis mutandis, of course. 122 1 031a32-bl a n d b7-8. N o t e at b7-8 t h e idiomatic c o n s t r u c t i o n r u n n i n g

prior to t h e Forms. In a d d i t i o n , if the two are separated f r o m o n e a n o t h e r , the Forms will be u n k n o w a b l e (since the 'what-is-it?' question c a n n o t b u t remain unanswered, for we only know a thing when we are familiar with its quiddity). 1 2 3 T h e separation works out, t h e n , in either direction: the Forms fail to possess quiddities a n d thus are themselves devoid of the p r o p e r t i e s they are supposed to c o m m u n i cate to t h e outside things, a n d , on the o t h e r h a n d , the quiddities 'goodness', 'beingness', ' o n e n e s s ' d o n o t find themselves a m o n g the things that are, are good, are one. T h e new a r g u m e n t p r o m p t e d at 1031b11-18 starts with drawing an absurd conclusion f r o m the opposite thesis ( r u n n i n g that in case of τά καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα, the thing a n d its quiddity do not coincide), to wit t h a t what the quiddity of ' g o o d ' d o e s n o t fall to, is itself n o t s o m e t h i n g g o o d (bl 1). T o be sure, for Aristotle this conclusion is just as u n a c c e p t a b l e as it is f o r Plato. In Aristotle's view, to be such-orsuch c o m e s down to possessing a certain quiddity as an i m m a n e n t p r o p e r t y . 1 2 4 It would be, of course, n o less destructive to Plato's f u n d a m e n t a l thesis, to the effect that the outside thing partaking in some Form is entitled to bear this F o r m ' s name. 1 2 5 Anyway, irrespective of your ontological p r e f e r e n c e , you s h o u l d infer that what is g o o d (what is G o o d , respectively) a n d its quiddity are o n e a n d the same, a n d likewise what is beautiful a n d its quiddity. A n d this h o l d s f o r a n y t h i n g t h a t is n o t n a m e d a f t e r s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m its p r o p e r n a t u r e , b u t in its own right a n d primarily. And, Aristotle concludes, this is conclusive e n o u g h if there are Forms as well as if there are not; but even m o r e p e r h a p s if there are, h e adds (bl 1-15). 126 literally: "what holds for the other things holds also for 'good'", but meaning to say "what holds for 'good' holds also for other things". T h e sentence is aptly r e n d e r e d by Bostock "the case of goodness is n o different f r o m any other". For this construction, even f o u n d in phrases like Α ού μάλλον ή Β, meaning, not 'Β as much as A', but Ά as much as B', see De Rijk (1950). 123 Note the correlation between 'quid?' and 'quiddity'. 124 I cannot understand why Frede & Patzig (98) are of another opinion. 125 See De Rijk (1986), s.v. ονομα. Of course, this does not mean that the c o m m o n name is a c o m m o n sentence predicate, such as to justify a statement like ' T h e Beautiful is beautiful". On the non-problem of the "self-predication" of Forms (including "Pauline predication"), De Rijk (1986), 316-26; on the absence of any theory of sentence predication in Plato, ibid., 74-6; 146-53; 296-300, and passim. Also my Index s.v. 126 A footnote-like remark (103îb15-18) follows that if the Forms are such as some people hold, the substratum partaking in them will not be ούσία, since the Forms must certainly be ούσίαι (subsistent entities), but not owing to something underlying them; for if that were so, they would not be subsistent by themselves,

9. 44 On the phrase κατ' άλλο λέγεσθαι Before discussing Aristotle's f u r t h e r elucidation of the main thesis of this c h a p t e r ( ' t h i n g ' = its quiddity), it is worthwhile dwelling on the basic condition r e q u i r e d for its being true, viz. that the things u n d e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h o u l d b e n a m e d in their own right o r a f t e r their p r o p e r nature, a n d n o t in virtue of o n e of their incidental features or concomitants. T h e negative f o r m u l a of this basic r e q u i r e m e n t , which earlier (1031a18ff.) was c o u c h e d in terms of n o t ' b e i n g n a m e d after s o m e c o n c o m i t a n t f e a t u r e ' ( κ α τ ά σ υ μ β ε β η κ ό ς λ έ γ ε σ θ α ι ) is now (1031b13-14) p a r a p h r a s e d as n o t ' b e i n g n a m e d after s o m e t h i n g else' (κατ' ά λ λ ο λέγεσθαι). T h e r e q u i r e m e n t thus p h r a s e d m e a n s that in n a m i n g o u t s i d e things, you s h o u l d n o t transgress t h e categorial b o u n d a r i e s , e i t h e r by n a m i n g s o m e t h i n g f r o m the category of substance after a non-substantial category (e.g. calling u p Callias as *'the p a l e ' ) , or the o t h e r way r o u n d , as w h e n , for instance, a pale m a n is u n d e r discussion, o n e takes the i m m a n e n t quiddity 'paleness' to be formally identical with the pale m a n or the man. 1 2 7 T h a t also things f r o m non-substantial categories can b e n a m e d in virtue of themselves, in terms, that is, of the a p p r o p r i a t e category, b e c o m e s clear in t h e n e x t p a r a g r a p h of this c h a p t e r . T h e r e t h e g e n e r a l conclusion will be drawn a n d i m p l e m e n t e d , a n d an important distinction will b e drawn between two o p p o s i t e senses of t h e phrase τό κατά συμβεβηκός λεγόμενον. 1 2 8 Aristotle now r e s u m e s the f o r e g o i n g discussion in his own ontological perspective, leaving o u t Plato's d o c t r i n e on the subject. It is a r g u e d t h a t while to know a t h i n g is to know its quiddity, e a c h instance of obtaining knowledge of some [x] or [y] boils down to the factual identification of that thing with its quiddity; otherwise i n d e e d

but solely owing to their being partaken in by some substratum. 127 De Rijk (1980), 30f., with the notes 30 a n d 31. See also Ζ 11, 1037bl-4, below. Ross (re 1031b13) has well observed that in principle not only terms f r o m the category of substance are involved, but also those f r o m the non-substantial categories, "in fact presumably all terms except c o m p o u n d s of terms in two categories (1029b23) like 'white m a n ' (1031a20)". I would prefer, though, not to speak of 'terms' from a category but 'things n a m e d ' after a category. Frede & Patzig (98) claim that, when speaking of κατ' άλλο λέγεσθαι, Aristotle has cases in mind like saying of Socrates that he is blond, while in fact only something coincidental such as the fair colour of his hair is involved; but their example rather runs in terms of the generic notion of κατά συμβεβηκός λέγεσθαι. 128 -phis i s s u e should be linked u p with the τί έστι question, when asked with reference to items from non-substantial categories. See Top. I 9.

you would have to say that you are familiar only with the i n h e r e n t quiddity of a thing, not the thing itself: Met. Ζ 6, 1 0 3 1 b l 8 - 2 8 : W h a t b e i n g is f o r a t h i n g (τό τί ήν ε ί ν α ι ) , t h e n , a n d t h e t h i n g itself ( α ύ τ ό ε κ α σ τ ο ν ) a r e o n e a n d t h e s a m e , a n d n o t c o i n c i d e n t a l l y so, as is c l e a r f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g a r g u m e n t s . M o r e o v e r , s e e i n g t h a t f o r e a c h t h i n g it h o l d s t h a t to know 1 2 9 it c o m e s d o w n to j u s t k n o w i n g its q u i d d i t y , it m u s t f o l l o w also by e x h i b i t i o n of cases ( κ α τ ά τήν ε κ θ ε σ ι ν ) t h a t t h e two a r e s o m e o n e t h i n g . N o w as f o r t h e t h i n g n a m e d a f t e r a c o i n c i d e n t a l m o d e of b e i n g , f o r i n s t a n c e t h e e d u c a t e d o r t h e p a l e , it is n o t t r u e to say t h a t t h e t h i n g itself is t h e s a m e as its q u i d d i t y , o n a c c o u n t of its d o u b l e m e a n i n g . F o r t h a t to w h i c h t h e c o i n c i d e n t a l a t t r i b u t e falls a n d t h e a t t r i b u t e itself a r e b o t h n a m e d * ' < t h e > p a l e ' . 1 3 0 H e n c e in o n e way t h e t h i n g itself a n d its q u i d d i t y a r e t h e s a m e , a n d in a n o t h e r way t h e y a r e n o t . F o r ' p a l e ' is n o t t h e s a m e as ' m a n ' o r ' p a l e m a n ' , b u t it is t h e s a m e as t h e attribute.

O n e thing Aristotle is pointing out in this passage is the relationship of material (or extensional or referential) identity (b25-26: "in o n e way they are the same") which exists between that to which the pale attaches (e.g. Callias) a n d the particular f o r m 'paleness' i n h e r i n g in him. This referential identity is based u p o n the fact that in Aristotle's view, this particular paleness, which is a strictly individual form, 1 3 1 is f o u n d n o w h e r e else but in this p e r s o n , Callias. F u r t h e r m o r e , h e shows their formal diversity in that this particular pale man, Callias, is f o r m a l l y distinct f r o m t h e p a r t i c u l a r i n s t a n t i a t i o n of p a l e n e s s i n h e r i n g in him. From the viewpoint of m o d e r n semantics, speaking of Callias for instance, the referential force of the phrase ' t h e pale' equals that of ' t h e pale m a n ' ; their descriptive forces expressed by their respective definitions, however, are quite different; for being a pale m a n is n o t t h e same as b e i n g pale, as we have seen at the b e g i n n i n g of this section.

129

Emphasis is laid on 'know' by the particle γε singling out a special aspect or property (at 1031b20); also Van Raalte (1993), 225; 477. 130 This sentence unmistakably reveals the need to explain Aristotle's intention in terms of appellation rather than sentence predication, and not (with Ross and Bostock) to make him oddly assert that the quality (attribute) 'pale' is pale. Tricot rightly has "il [i.e. the n a m e 'le blanc'] signifie, en effet, ce d o n t le blanc est accident et l'accident lui-même". Frege 8c Patzig have (ad loc.) "Denn 'das Weisze' ist einmal das, d e m das Weisze zukommt, zum a n d e r e n aber auch das, was ihm zukommt". Compare our rejection of'self-predication' of Platonic Forms. 131 De Rijk (1980), 31. T h e Final clause makes it clear that the things that are called u p after their essential nature also include things from non-substantial categories. Of course, these things are immanent forms, and particular ones, as all Aristotelian forms are. See Frede & Patzig I, 48-57, and my secdon 9.63.

In his e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e ontological status of m a t h e m a t i c a l objects in Book M, Aristotle opposes what we have labelled 'extensional identity' a n d 'formal diversity' along similar lines. In c h a p t e r two the a u t h o r tries to s u p p o r t his claim that mathematical objects are n e i t h e r i m m a n e n t in sensible entities n o r beyond the sensible domain. Discussing the status of points, lines, a n d surfaces, h e argues that their logical or formal priority does n o t entail their priority in subsistence (i.e. privileged beingness: ούσία): Met. M 2, 1077bl-l 1 : Not everything that is prior in definition (τω λόγω) is also prior in beingness (τή ούσία). For those things are prior in beingness which surpass others in the power of independent existence, but things are prior in definition to those the definiens of which is compounded out of their definiens. Now these properties do not coincide. For if attributes do not exist apart from their substances (παρά τάς ούσίας), for instance 'mobile' or 'pale', 'pale' is prior in definition [i.e. formally prior] to 'pale man'. But not in subsistence (κατά την ούσίαν) [i.e. extensionally], for it cannot exist separately, but is always along with the concretum; and by the concretum (τό σύνολον) I understand the pale man. Hence it is plain that neither is the product of abstraction the prior thing, nor that which is produced by adding determinants the posterior thing. objective content (πράγμα) is something one; but what makes it so? For clearly it has parts. T h i s passage c o n t a i n s an implicit admission by Aristotle that t h e c o n c e p t i o n of mathematical objects as having a form-matter structure a n a l o g o u s to that of physical objects n e e d s f u r t h e r examination. 1 8 9 This e x a m i n a t i o n is p o s t p o n e d to Books M a n d N. In the o p e n i n g c h a p t e r of Metaphysics M, the general p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g the status of mathematical objects is phrased thus (1076a32-36): "If the objects of mathematics exist, they must exist either in sensibles, as some say, or separate f r o m sensibles (this is also said by s o m e p e o p l e ) ; a n d if they exist in n e i t h e r of these ways, either they d o not exist at all, or they exist only in s o m e special sense. H e n c e the t h e m e of o u r discussion will not be w h e t h e r they exist b u t how they exist". In M 2 the position t h a t m a t h e m a t i c a l objects s h o u l d exist as ousiai of a h i g h e r d e g r e e than bodies is rejected (1077b 12-17). They a r e p r i o r to sensibles only in d e f i n i t i o n , a n d they c a n n o t exist s o m e w h e r e apart. T h a t is to say, they only possess a logical status in the mathematician's mind, who, focussing on the quantitative aspects of t h e sensibles' being, goes o n to grasp these a n d state t h e m in a p p r o p r i a t e definientia. But, as was already shown earlier (1076a38b l l ) , it is not possible for t h e m to exist in sensibles either, a n d so it is a p p a r e n t that they e i t h e r d o n o t exist at all, or merely in a specal sense; a n d , accordingly, with r e g a r d to m a t h e m a t i c a l objects t h e notion ' b e ' is applied in a qualified way (ούχ άπλώς); for we use the term ' b e ' in many ways. T h e priority in definition was explained before, mainly by opposing it to priority in subsistence. T h e passage is the m o r e interesting as it c o n t a i n s t h e s e m a n t i c tool, ' a d d i t i o n ' ( π ρ ό σ θ ε σ ι ς ) . 1 9 ° Aristotle claims that some thing's logical (formal) priority, such as the priority of the d e f i n i e n s of a certain ontic aspect i n h e r i n g in a particular

Greek where we may use the singular indicating the referent qua type see KūhnerGerth II, 16. 189 Cleary (1995), 455. 190 Met. M 2, 1077bl-11, discussed in my section 11.52.

c o n c r e t u m , over the concrete particular (τό συνόλον) does n o t entail its priority in subsistence ( ο ύ σ ί α ) . This is e x p l a i n e d with regard to the p r o p e r object of mathematics, say, the mathematicals: j u s t as in the sensible c o n c r e t u m 'pale m a n ' , a l t h o u g h the property, 'pale' has logical priority over the c o n c r e t u m 'pale m a n ' , it does n o t exist apart f r o m it, i.e is n o t prior in subsistence. Likewise, Aristotle m e a n s to say, you have to be aware that even t h o u g h the quantitative features of sensibles have logical priority over t h e sensible c o n c r e t u m they i n h e r e in, they are posterior w h e n it c o m e s to b e i n g subsistent. T o arrive at subsistence, these features n e e d to dwell in a sensible conc r e t u m (σύνολον), or, p u t t i n g it logico-semantically, the concepts of mathematicals n e e d the addition (πρόσθεσις) of the concepts of their h y p o k e i m e n a , t h e sensibles, to m a k e u p t h e n o t i o n of subsistent being. So Aristotle concludes ( 1 0 7 7 b 9 - l l ) : "Hence it is plain that the p r o d u c t of abstraction is n o t the prior thing, n o r is that which is p r o d u c e d by a d d i n g d e t e r m i n a n t s , for ...". For this use see 1039a28-29, and my Index s.v. 220 O r should we read πρώτη ούσία ('immediate ousia'), with o u r two oldest MSS (Parisinus and Vindobonensis) instead of πρώτον, which, corresponding to ετι at b l 5 , surely makes sense as well ('firstly' ... ' f u r t h e r ' ) .

logical applicability: any c o m m o n a p p e l l a t i o n implies a c e r t a i n n a t u r e (feature) shared in by the referents. 2 2 1 A n o t h e r a r g u m e n t (1038bl5-16) says that the distinctive property of t h e universal, viz. that it is always said of a h y p o k e i m e n o n , is i n c o m p a t i b l e with the most distinctive p r o p e r t y of ousia — that it c a n n o t be said of an u n d e r l y i n g thing. A n d this leaves us precisely with the second possibility, that the universal is no thing's ousia. Quod erat demonstrandum. T h e a r g u m e n t seems to c o u n t a m o n g the elenctical proofs, mainly i n t e n d e d to embarrass the o p p o n e n t . T h e a u t h o r n e x t p r o c e e d s (1038b16-23) to look into the alternative, in which it is suggested that the universal could be a c o m m o n constituent of the particular. This is n o t the same as the status of the thing's c o m p l e t e quiddity or i m m e d i a t e substance, because now it is taken as being present itself in the quiddity as a constitutive e l e m e n t , as for instance 'animal' in ' m a n ' a n d 'horse'. In this case there is, n o d o u b t , a d e f i n i e n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e s u p p o s e d l y universal ' a n i m a l ' which is n o less r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e t h i n g t h a n t h e c o m p l e t e quiddities ' m a n ' a n d ' h o r s e ' are. However, like the c o m p l e t e ones, such an i n c o m p l e t e quiddity too will always b e l o n g to this particular m a n or horse, so that the status of the particularness of the universal r e m a i n s all in o n e piece. T h e n e x t a r g u m e n t (1038b23-29) starts f r o m the fact that comm o n properties should be regarded as a quale (ποιόν) rather than as a 'subsistent this' (τό τόδε καί ούσία), a n d claims that it would be a b s u r d that a subsistent this s h o u l d have a qualitative c o n s t i t u e n t instead of o n e bearing on the thing's subsistence. For in that case, it is a r g u e d , what is a quale a n d an attribute would be prior to the subsistent this, which is impossible, since then they would be separable. In addition, sticking to the e r r o n e o u s position that the universal is n o t a ποιόν b u t a real subsistent being, you have to a d m i t that in the case of the particular thing, Socrates, there will be an ousia present in a n o t h e r ousia, so that the f o r m e r o n e will be the ousia of two things (1038b29-30). These a r g u m e n t s are now summarized: Ibid. 13, 1038b30-34: In general it follows that if a man [e.g. Socrates] and the other things named in this way [i.e. after their being precisely what they are] are ousiai, then nothing in [i.e. being part of] their 221

Bostock is forced to reject the a r g u m e n t of 1038b9-15 (see also his problems with harmonizing 1038bl6-34), because "it will allow as substance only (his italics) the particular forms or essences that belong to o n e object and n o m o r e " (193). T h u s he rejects a sound argument only because he does not like the conclusion.

d e f i n i e n s c a n b e d i e o u s i a of a n y t h i n g , n o r c a n it exist a p a r t f r o m t h e m o r in a n y t h i n g else. I m e a n , f o r i n s t a n c e , t h a t n o ' a n i m a l ' exists a p a r t f r o m t h e p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g s . A n d t h e s a m e h o l d s g o o d of o t h e r e l e m e n t s p r e s e n t in t h e d e f i n i e n s of t h i n g s .

O n that account, any c h a n c e that the universal might be the successful a p p l i c a n t f o r the title ' t r u e ousia' has g o n e down the d r a i n . It should be b o r n e in m i n d , however, that, as often, Aristotle's strategic m a n o e u v r e s against his o p p o n e n t s have an elenctical flavour. Many times his a r g u m e n t s are actually i n t e n d e d to u n d e r m i n e o p p o s i n g views r a t h e r t h a n that they express s o m e well-considered, m a t u r e position of his own. T h i s way of a r g u i n g is also well in k e e p i n g with the aporetic a p p r o a c h that c o m e s to the f o r e in many of Aristotle's investigations, particularly in Met. Z. Anyway, we would be making too m u c h of these oscillating discussions if we e x p e c t e d t h e m to shed m u c h light o n Aristotle's own position. T h e only t h i n g we can c o n c l u d e f r o m t h e m is that n o universal attribute is an ousia, which will suffice for the time b e i n g in o r d e r to discard the universal as a rival. Next, t h e a u t h o r a d d s two m o r e a r g u m e n t s (1039al-14) in s u p p o r t of his own position: (a) N o c o m m o n attribute signifies a such-and-such thing (τοιόνδε), n o r a this (τόδε Tt); if this is d e n i e d , the difficulty of the ' T h i r d M a n ' arises, 222 a n d many others. (b) An ousia c a n n o t be c o m p o u n d e d of ousiai that are present in it in actuality, t h o u g h if they are potentially two, they can be one. T h e latter o u t c o m e contains a difficulty, Aristotle (1039a 14-23) has to c o n c e d e . For if n o ousia can be a c o m p o u n d of universals (owing to the fact that a universal signifies a such-and-such thing, n o t a this) a n d if n o ousia can be a c o m p o u n d of actual ousiai, every ousia must be incomposite a n d so indefinable. Yet all p e o p l e are convinced, a n d we have stated it long ago (Z 5, 1031a11-14), h e says, that it is either only, o r primarily, ousia that can be d e f i n e d . This would m e a n that t h e r e c a n n o t be a definition of anything. Evidently, this conclusion is devastating to any metaphysical investigation. In Ζ 15 a n d Η 6 considerable effort will be put into solving this problem. In view of the fact that Aristotle associates the Platonic conception of Forms with the idea that, q u a ontic causes c o m m o n to all things a n d everything p a r t a k i n g of t h e m , universals are ousiai, it is quite natural that h e should now go on to direct his arrows against Plato's doctrine. 222

Cf. Met. A 9, 990b 17; SE 22, 178b36-179a10.

9. 73 On the communion of forms In c h a p t e r 14, Aristotle sets o u t to criticize the Platonic d o c t r i n e of Forms, by pointing out that its a d h e r e n t s regard the Forms (ίδέαι) as ousiai 2 2 3 possessing separate existence in a t r a n s c e n d e n t Domain, but at the same time (αμα) hold that the infima species (τό είδος) is a c o m p o u n d of g e n u s a n d d i f f e r e n t i a e . F r o m Aristotle's words — notice the plural τών διαφορών at 1039a26) — it appears at the outset that h e is dealing with the f a m o u s p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g the C o m m u nion of Forms. 2 2 4 If t h e r e is such a t h i n g as Man-itself, h e a r g u e s (1039a30-b4), which exists by itself as a separate this, t h e n what it is c o m p o s e d of, namely animality a n d two-footedness, must also each signify a this a n d be a separate ousia. If t h e n t h e r e is numerically 2 2 5 o n e a n d the same animality in m a n a n d horse, how will that o n e thing, present as it is in two separate things, be o n e thing? T h e n again, this animality c a n n o t p a r t a k e of two c o n t r a r y t h i n g s like t w o - f o o t e d n e s s a n d manyfootedness. In a word, what is o n e asserting when o n e says that the animal is two-footed or terrestrial? We must infer f r o m this aporia that the animality in each is some d i f f e r e n t thing. But this conclusion leads to a lot of absurdities — a m o n g others, that each o n e of the animalities in the various animals must be Animality-itself, a n d if not, the question must arise how these animalities can exist apart f r o m Animality-itself? (1039b7-16). Finally, t h e s e u n f o r t u n a t e c o n s e q u e n c e s a r e n o t t h e only o n e s to b e e n c o u n t e r e d in the case of the sensible world; there are others, which are even m o r e absurd. So t h e r e are n o t f o r m s of sensible things in the way that some hold there are (bl6-19). 2 2 6

223

Met. Η 1, 1042al5-16. If Frede & Patzig (II, 264) are right in thinking that u p to the final part of the chapter (1039bl7-19) Aristotle is dealing exclusively with the Forms in their transcendent status, he would quite wrongly have taken their c o m m u n i o n to concern their transcendent status, since to Plato this c o m m u n i o n takes place between the Forms as partaken of, i.e. in their i m m a n e n t status as instantiations. Anyway, Aristotle's objection (at 1039a33-b4) that, for Plato, the Forms 'two-footed' and 'many-footed' seem to b e l o n g to the same Form is questionable. See De Rijk (1986), 113-25; 134-9; 144-6; 260-5. Aristotle's objection against Plato is also criticized by Bostock ( 2 1 9 f ) . 225 Aristotle explains (a34): "the same in the way that you are the same as yourself'. 226 T h e discussions of 1039b7-19 are extensively (and variously) c o m m e n t e d u p o n by Ross II, 212f.), Frede & Patzig (II, 272-9), and Bostock (210-4). 224

9. 74 No particular can be properly defined What c h a p t e r 15 is all a b o u t is definition. It especially c o n c e n t r a t e s on the indefinability of particulars, i n c l u d i n g the Platonic Forms, which Aristotle c o n s i d e r e d to b e (putatively) t r a n s c e n d e n t particulars. At t h e e n d of ch. 13, t h e a p o r e t i c discussion h a d led to the impossible position that t h e r e c a n n o t b e a d e f i n i t i o n of a n y t h i n g (1039al4-19). T h i s s t a t e m e n t was a c c o m p a n i e d by the alternative thesis that "perhaps in a way there can, while in a way there c a n n o t be a thing's definition", a n d the a n n o u n c e m e n t of a later discussion of the question. This c h a p t e r sets out to elaborate the alternative thesis. T h e position f o u n d in the c o m m o n stream of Greek t h o u g h t , that true knowledge (επιστήμη) is only of universal, u n c h a n g e a b l e things is at the basis of the discussion t h r o u g h o u t this c h a p t e r . It also has a c o n n e c t i o n (at 1039b27-29) with the Posterior Analytics, w h e r e the links between true knowledge, d e f i n i t i o n , e p i s t e m o n i c p r o o f , with universality is explicitly b r o u g h t up, as well as the indefinability of the particular, which features so p r o m i n e n t l y in t h e p r e s e n t chapter. 2 2 7 First t h e p e r c e p t i b l e particulars of the o u t s i d e world are d e n i e d definability, a n d t h e n the idea of indefinability is e x t e n d e d to the Platonic Forms, which are a class of particulars sui generis. Finally the special class of perceptible b u t indestructible particulars, such as the heavenly bodies, are taken into consideration. T h e c h a p t e r starts off with s o m e items t h a t have already b e e n given d u e attention in Ζ 7-9. T h e main claim c o n c e r n s the distinction between two senses of ούσία (1039b20-22): (a) the c o m p o u n d whole (τό σύνολον), which is the quiddity taken together with its matter; a n d (b) the quiddity taken by itself, i.e. conceived of irrespective of its actually b e i n g e n m a t t e r e d , not, of course, as t h o u g h it were really divorced f r o m m a t t e r , let a l o n e that it s h o u l d b e a Platonic F o r m having separate existence. T h e crucial d i f f e r e n c e between (a) a n d (b) is that t h e f o r m e r c o n t a i n s m a t t e r a n d thus a d e s t r u c t i b l e c o m p o n e n t , w h e r e a s t h e latter does n o t (1039b22-27). 2 2 8 T h a t is why particular sensible ousiai c a n n o t be d e f i n e d , n o r can they be the subject of epistemonic proof, since m a t t e r naturally is capable b o t h of b e i n g a n d of n o t being. 227

APo. I, chs. 8 and 33; II, chs. 3-8; II 13, 97b26. My section 1.71. C o m p a r e the Medieval distinction between 'significatum materiale' and 'significatum formale'; my Index s.v. 228

H e n c e all particular c o m p o u n d e d wholes are destructible, a n d eo ipso there can be n o definition or d e m o n s t r a t i o n of such a thing: Met. Ζ 15, 1039b20-1040a7: Since the compounded whole and the quiddity are not ousia in the same sense — I mean to say that one is an ousia in that it is the quiddity stated by the definiens 2 2 9 taken together with its matter, while the other is the quiddity taken in general 230 — therefore the compounded whole may pass away, for it may as well come to be. There is, however, no passing away of the quiddity in the sense that it is ever in the process of passing away. For there is no process of coming to be either, since the quiddity of being-a-house cannot come to be; only that of being-thisparticular-house can. Rather, such quiddities are, or are not, in existence without any process of coming to be or passing away; for as we have proved [Z 8, 1033a29ff.], one cannot create or produce them. That is also why particular sensible ousiai cannot be defined, or be the subject of epistemonic proof (άπόδειξις), because they contain matter, whose nature it is to be capable both of being and not being; for this very reason all of them that are particular are destructible. Now epistemonic proof concerns what is necessary, and definition pertains to epistemonic proof. And just as knowledge cannot be knowledge at one time and ignorance at another (such a way of cognizing would be opinion (δόξα), so also epistemonic proof and definition cannot apply at one time while not at another, and of what is capable of being otherwise there can only be opinion, [1041a1] Hence it is plain that there can be neither definition nor epistemonic proof of such a thing. For the things submitted to destruction are unclear to those who try 231 to have knowledge of them, as soon as they are no longer perceived, and even though the same accounts 232 are retained in the soul there is no longer any definition or epistemonic proof. That is why, when one who is concerned with definition tries to define any particular, he must be aware that it is always possible to refute it; for particulars cannot be defined. At 1039b24-25 t h e p h r a s e ' t h e q u i d d i t y of b e i n g - t h i s - h o u s e ' is o p p o s e d to ' t h e quiddity of being-a-house'. This phrase is c o m m o n l y taken e x c e p t i o n to by m o d e r n c o m m e n t a t o r s . 2 3 3 Bostock (217) 229

For this rendering of λόγος see my Index, s.v. I.e. 'not specifically d e t e r m i n e d as the o n e e n m a t t e r e d in this particular'. For the use of ολως at 1039b22, where many interpreters are inclined to conjecture άπλως, see Frede & Patzig II, 132f. (re Ζ 8, 1033a31). 231 I take the present participle εχουσι at 1040a3 de conalu. By doing so o n e is not compelled to take (with Frede & Patzig II, 286) the key-term έπιστήμην used loosely to stand for just any kind of cognition, which would be unfitting in this context. Similarly, the όρίζηται at 1040a6 need to be taken de conalu, meaning "one cannot succeed in defining particulars" (1040a7). 232 O r should we r e n d e r "the definientia" ? Frede & Patzig: "Formeln bzw. Argumente". 233 Burnyeat, 142f.; Frede & Patzig II, 281f.; Bostock, 216f., who, following Heinaman (1979, 253, n. 8) aptly refers to Gael. I, 9, where two similar phrases are 230

rightly takes Aristotle to focus o n t h e f o r m as e n m a t t e r e d in this particular thing, b u t n o n e the less, quite remarkably, keeps o p p o s i n g it to the 'particular f o r m s ' thesis, a n d asserts that the passage "does n o t m e a n to m e n t i o n particular f o r m s or essences at all". H e even infers f r o m it that "when h e wrote this passage in Ζ 15, Aristotle did n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e r e were such t h i n g s as p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s . For otherwise h e must have realized that they were highly relevant to his a r g u m e n t in this c h a p t e r , a n d yet in fact the c h a p t e r ignores t h e m a l t o g e t h e r , despite the suggestive p h r a s e ' b e i n g f o r this particular h o u s e ' . " Quae volumus ea libenter credimusl I c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d either that even Frede a n d Patzig, who are c h a m p i o n s of the 'particular f o r m s ' thesis, are of the o p i n i o n that the distinction between the two (viz. 'das ein Haus zu sein' a n d 'das dieses H a u s zu sein') is b o u n d to pose difficulties. 2 3 4 However, in Aristotle's view, (a) particular things as such have particular (substantial a n d coincidental) forms, which precisely invest t h e m with individuality; a n d (b) this particular f o r m qua e n m a t t e r e d in this p a r t i c u l a r parcel of m a t t e r semantically (or referentially) coincides with the whole of the composite, so that we may speak of t h e m in t e r m s of c o m i n g to b e a n d passing away. T h a t Aristotle so easily asserts (e.g. at Ζ 11, 1037a25-30) that particulars are indefinable, b u t in a way can b e d e f i n e d , to wit in so far as they possess particular forms, is s o m e t h i n g that can readily be q u e s t i o n e d by the m o d e r n m i n d . But we as m o d e r n s have to a c c e p t , n o t a d o p t , Aristotle's firm metaphysical convictions a b o u t the coincidence of the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m a n d the individual, 2 3 5 taking t h e m , if you like, as f o u n d (278a8-9: 'being this circle', and al2-13: 'being this world'), but he regards them as expressing "just the familiar contrast between the form by itself and the c o m p o u n d of that form in this or that particular parcel of matter". Likewise, Barnes (1994, 83) is wrong in d e e m i n g Aristotle to "muff the distinction between universal/singular and generic/specific". Pace Barnes, in Aristotle the phrase τό καθ' εκαστον is not "systematically ambiguous between 'the individual' and 'the specific'". In Aristotle's ontology, 'individual' and 'specific' are two sides of the same coin. O n e should always be aware of the role of ambivalent usage in Aristotle's strategy of argument; my section 1.72. 234 Cf. their remarks on p. 284 (re Ζ 15, 1039b28). 235 In the final analysis, I think, Aristotle's t h o u g h t did not admit of a p r o p e r assessment of individuality, because his metaphysical universe (as Plato's) ends u p in the domain of the infimae species (for Aristotle 'atomic' entities i n d e e d ) . For subtle evaluations of this problem area in Aristotle see Guthrie (1978, 414f.) and (1981), 144; 186, n. 4; 273; 304; Ackrill (1981), 122-6. For Plato's view of the individual see De Rijk (1986), 327-30 and 332-47. A genuinely philosophical assessm e n t of the individual qua individual is not f o u n d until the e n d of the thirteenth century with the Franciscan theologian-philosophers. (De Rijk 1995a, esp. 483-7).

u n w a r r a n t e d prejudices. What s h o u l d really b o t h e r us is Aristotle's view of the m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n of abstraction, which is just as mysterious as Plato's ' l o o k i n g u p to the Ideas' (βλέπειν εις τά εϊδη), 2 3 6 a p r o c e d u r e Aristotle so energetically rejected, t o g e t h e r with Platonic a n a m n e s i s . His own theory of abstraction, which is m e a n t as t h e revelation of f o r m , 2 3 7 can hardly be c o n s i d e r e d an entirely satisfactory solution to what Aristotle himself calls (Met. Β 4, 999a24-25) the "most intractable of all p r o b l e m s as well as the o n e most n e e d i n g examination". T h e r e can be n o abstraction i n d e e d without a previous intuitive knowledge of what is essential. T h e s u b s e q u e n t discussion of t h e Platonic F o r m s (1040a8-27) clearly testifies to Aristotle's usual semantic a p p r o a c h . Since the definiens of the Form, it is a r g u e d , consists of n a m e s (ονόματα), which must be n o t newly coined but established appellations applying to all instances d e n o t e d (κοινά), 2 3 8 t h e r e f o r e they must also fall to something o t h e r than the Form. For instance, if a n y o n e wants to d e f i n e you, he would call you an animal which is lean, or pale, or s o m e t h i n g else which will also apply to o t h e r s than you. This even holds, Aristotle argues, in case of a (what we m o d e r n s call Russellian) 'definite description', since even the c o m p o n e n t s of the definite description a r e e a c h c o m m o n to o t h e r things. Anyway, every F o r m can be partaken in by a plurality of particulars. In the n e x t p a r a g r a p h (1040a27-b2) s o m e u n i q u e , eternal things are spoken of. Despite the fact that t h e r e is only o n e sun a n d only o n e m o o n , it would seem that they n e e d not be affected by the main r e a s o n f o r n o t b e i n g d e f i n a b l e , viz. t h e c o m m o n n e s s of n a m e . However, they still are u n d e f i n a b l e , for a n o t h e r reason. People easily m a k e t h e mistake of assigning non-essential a t t r i b u t e s to t h e m , which, by virtue of their b e i n g merely coincidental, d o n o t fit in a p r o p e r definiens. In addition, essential a n d even p r o p e r attributes of the sun or the m o o n can in principle fall to a n o t h e r entity which may c o m e into existence. T h e c h a p t e r winds u p with a question which is i n t r o d u c e d by the c o n j u n c t i o n έπεί elliptically used in the sense of 'by the way', to insert

236

Cf. Plato, Rep. Χ, 596B7; 611D7; Theaet. 175A2; Sophist 232A5; 247D3; Laws I, 632E6 and XII, 965C3. 237 Guthrie VI, 100-5. 238 phrase κοινά πάσιν at 1040a11 does not refer to the names being in c o m m o n usage (Bostock), but their being applicable to all m e m b e r s of the class involved. T h e idea of c o m m o n usage is expressed by κείμενα.

a p e r t i n e n t r e m a r k as an aside. 2 3 9 Why, it is asked, d o e s n o o n e p r o d u c e a definition of u n i q u e particulars like the sun or the m o o n (and Cleon or Socrates?). 2 4 0 9. 75 On commonness as alien to true ousia In t h e final c h a p t e r of this cluster (Z 16), Aristotle goes o n to u n d e r m i n e the credentials of some o t h e r claimants for the title ' t r u e ousia'. This time, some p o p u l a r views a b o u t ousia, which were already listed in the o p e n i n g lines of Ζ 2 (1028b8-15), are u n d e r consideration, especially the claims of the parts of living things, a n d the f o u r elements, e a r t h , water, fire, a n d air. 241 Aristotle (1040b5-16) argues t h a t they are all only potentially subsistent entities ( ο ύ σ ί α ι ) . T h e basic idea in the rejection of these claims is that the parts of animals are n o t beings o n their own a n d separately, a n d like the instances of the f o u r e l e m e n t s ( this fire, this piece of earth etc.), they d o not f o r m s o m e d e f i n i t e o n e t h i n g , a n d t h u s all lack actual o n e n e s s a n d subsistence. Subsequently, the discussion b e c o m e s m o r e serious, leading u p to a scrutiny of the idea of o n e n e s s t o g e t h e r with its twin n o t i o n 'being'. 2 4 2 T h e reason f o r this shift of a t t e n t i o n may be that a l t h o u g h their lack of o n e n e s s a n d definiteness nullifies the claims of the parts of animals as well as those of the f o u r elements, at first glance this may seem to c o r r o b o r a t e t h e c h a n c e s of o n e n e s s itself, a n d in its wake its twin p a r t n e r , being-ness. Incidentally, the latter seems to be the t r u e a p p l i c a n t par excellence, seeing that ο ύ σ ί α , which is u n d e r investigation t h r o u g h o u t the Metaphysics, is ousia taken in t h e sense of a t h i n g ' s ontic cause o r p r i n c i p l e ( ' b e i n g n e s s ' ) . However, the 239 p o r ^ j g u s e Q f £ π ε ( s e e m y j n d e X t s v Frede & Patzig (II, 296) wrongly propose to c h a n g e έπεί into ετι. Ross rightly says (ad loc.) that the question is tackled loosely, and renders (Oxf. Transi.) έπεί 'after all'. Van Raalte (460f.) rightly refers to HA V 5, 541a32 and VII 11, 587b31. 240 p o r particulars indicated by p r o p e r names put on a par with 'this bronzen sphere' and opposed to the merely logical entities, ' m a n ' , 'animal' and 'bronzen s p h e r e ' see Ζ 8, 1033b24-26. Following Bostock (ad loc.), I delete ιδέας f r o m 1040b3. O r should we maintain it a n d take the question to mean "After all, why does not o n e present a definition of what it is to be a Form?". If so, there is a parallel in Aristotle's blaming (at Ζ 16, 1040b30-32) the Platonists for their "incapability of telling us what precisely are the ousiai of this kind, those imperishable ousiai, which exist over and above the particular sensible ones". 241 For them being put on a par see Ζ 2, 1028b9-10, and Ross II, 219. 242 For the twin notions ' o n e ' and 'be' see my sections 1.64 and 9.35.

c o m m o n n e s s of these two claimants turns out to be a s h o r t c o m i n g . Like ' b e i n g an e l e m e n t ' a n d ' b e i n g a principle', they are b o t h too universal a n d , t h e r e f o r e , unspecific, so that we always have to be m o r e specific a n d to i m p l e m e n t the vague notions ' o n e ' , 'being', a n d ' e l e m e n t ' by specifying t h e respective k i n d s of o n e , b e i n g , o r e l e m e n t . In this context, we have to r e m e m b e r time a n d again that t h e t r u e ousia looked for m u s t be πρώτη ούσία ( ' i m m e d i a t e ontic f o r m ' ) , a n d πρώτον αίτιον ( ' i m m e d i a t e c a u s e ' ) of t h e c o n c r e t e outside thing (πράγμα), instead of j u s t some r e m o t e essence: Met. Ζ 16, 1040bl6-24: Since the appellation 'one' is assigned to things on the same footing as 'being', and the ousia of what is one is one, and things whose substance is numerically one are themselves numerically one, evidently neither oneness nor beingness (ούτε τό έν ούτε τό όν) can be the ctrue, i.e. immediate> ousia of the concrete things (τών πραγμάτων), just as being an element or being a principle cannot be either; rather we seek what the principle is so as to reduce to something more knowable. 243 It is true, beingness and oneness have a better claim to be the true ousia than do principle or element or cause, yet not even these are true ousia, since nothing else either that is common to many things is true ousia; for true ousia falls 244 to nothing but itself as enmattered 2 4 5 in the thing possessing it. T h e final statement calls for some c o m m e n t . Bostock (229) questions the claim that anything c o m m o n to many things c a n n o t be a thing's true ousia, a n d supposes that this claim dates back to an earlier version, o r at least is o u t of place h e r e . However, what Aristotle is h e r e a l l u d i n g to is a t h i n g ' s true ousia b e i n g a strictly particular f o r m , unlike, for that matter, its universal namesake, which is n o t h i n g but a logico-semantic tool to s t a n d f o r c o m p r i s i n g t h i n g s possessing formally the same ousia. Plainly, the r e m o t e a n d even categorially e m p t y twin f o r m s ' b e i n g ' a n d ' o n e ' m u s t be n o t h i n g b u t logico-

243

Note the allusion to the fact that these notions are 'empty containers'. Frede & Patzig {ad toc., as at Ζ 2, 1028b8) are right in explaining the use of ύπάρχειν as indicating that o n e term applies to a n o t h e r and, accordingly, can be used as a n a m e to stand for it. In other words, the verb should be understood on the onomastic level, so that any idea of sentence predication is out of the question. In fact, Aristotle asserts h e r e that the e n m a t t e r e d form is the true ousia. So the particular status of the form is again hinted at, which really explains Bostock's (229f.) uneasy feelings about this passage. 245 T h e c o n j u n c t i o n τε καί refers to the factual identity of the two things combined. To say that the ousia 'falls to itself sounds rather odd indeed, but the expression seems to be used as a polar r e i n f o r c e m e n t of the preceding 'falls to nothing'. 244

s e m a n t i c tools — m e r e c o n t a i n e r s , so to speak, for i m p l e m e n t i n g forms. 2 4 6 A n o t h e r brief 2 4 7 a r g u m e n t is a d d e d , which emphasizes o n c e m o r e the o p p o s i t i o n between the particular t r u e ousia i m m a n e n t in the outside things a n d the most c o m m o n f o r m s 'being' a n d ' o n e ' : Ibid. 16, 1040b25-26: What is one cannot be in many places simultaneously, but what is common is present in many places simultaneously. T h e c h a p t e r winds u p with a fresh attack on the a d h e r e n t s of Platonic Forms, which c o n c e n t r a t e s on the closely related ideas of c o m m o n ness, universality, a n d separateness. Aristotle begins by g r a n t i n g his o p p o n e n t s that they rightly m a k e the Forms separate, b u t are wrong in s u p p o s i n g that what is c o m m o n is a f o r m , since a f o r m is n o t in m a n y p l a c e s s i m u l t a n e o u s l y , a n d n o t h i n g t h a t is universally assignable can have real existence apart f r o m the outside particulars. H e goes on to give short shrift to their habit of establishing Forms by merely a d d i n g 'itself to the perceptible particular f o r m s i m m a n e n t in the outside things: Ibid. 16, 1040b26-34: It clearly follows that nothing universally assignable (ούδέν τών καθόλου) exists apart from the particulars. But those who believe in the Forms, though they are right in making them separate — providing that they are subsistent entities (ούσίαι) —wrongly assume that the 'one over many' is a form [other than just a logical tool]. The cause for their mistake is their inability to tell us what are the ousiai of this kind, those imperishable ousiai which exist over and above the particular sensible ones. They make them, then, 2 4 8 the same in kind as the sensible ones (for this kind of ousia is familiar to us), adding the epitheton 2 4 9 'itself', as in 'Man-itself and 'Horse-itself. T h e a r g u m e n t is r o u n d e d off (1040b34-1041a5) with the r e m a r k that such a p r o c e d u r e of simply d o u b l i n g a n d sublimating the quiddities 246 j j . l e categorial emptiness of the notions 'be' and ' o n e ' also appears from their n o t being g e n e r a (Met. Β 3, 998b22-27; I 2, 1053b22-24). For είναι as a categorially empty notion see also Int. 3, 16b24-25, and my sections 1.64 and 3.37. T h e particular status of i m m a n e n t forms is extensively discussed in my sections 9.63 and 10.71. 247 In the c o m m o n view, this a r g u m e n t runs u p to 1040b30. I cannot see that b26-27 can be inferred from the preceding lines, and take b26-27 to be the opening lines of the next stage of the discussion about the Platonic Forms. 248 Supply "so to speak for better or worse". 249 Ross and others are wrong in saying that ρημα here simply stands for 'word'. As nearly always in Aristotle, this term is used in the sense of 'attributive appellation'. See my section 3.28.

abstracted f r o m the particulars in the sensible world instead of trying to identify t h e m in their own right, is quite inferior to the way in which we a t t e m p t to disclose t h e essential n a t u r e of eternal, n o n sensible substances, the existence of which we have g o o d reason to assume. In this way we would know of the stars, even if we h a d never seen t h e m . Finally, it is c o n c l u d e d f r o m the f o r e g o i n g discussions in chs. 13-16 that clearly (1) n o t h i n g that is universally assigned is a subsistent entity (ούσία), a n d (2) n o subsistent entity is a c o m p o u n d of ούσίαι.

T R U E OUSIA FINALLY IDENTIFIED AS T H E ENMATTERED FORM

Book H, which, as it stands in the extant tradition of the text of the Metaphysics, is closely linked u p with Book Z, takes u p the latter b o o k ' s loose ends, as it were, f o r a final discussion, the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r of Ζ (17) m o r e specifically. It o n c e m o r e c o n s i d e r s t h e credentials of είδος for b e i n g the true ούσία that is b e i n g looked for t h r o u g h o u t the Metaphysics.

10. 1 The ούσία = είδος thesis corroborated once more In the final c h a p t e r of Book Z, Aristotle u n d e r t a k e s to c o r r o b o r a t e t h e conclusion already arrived at in the previous chapters, to t h e effect t h a t a t h i n g ' s ousia is its f o r m . T h e f r e s h a p p r o a c h to t h e overall question of what precisely ο ύ σ ί α is this time starts f r o m its b e i n g a t h i n g ' s ' p r i n c i p l e a n d cause of s o m e sort' (άρχή καί α ι τ ί α τις). 1 This leads to a r e p h r a s i n g of the g e n e r a l question in terms of asking for an explanation of a thing's being in terms of 'Why-[x]-?s?' a n d 'How-[x]-is-constituted?'. As o f t e n Aristotle claims that you must be sure b e f o r e h a n d that t h e r e is an [x] at all, or ' that-[x]-to-be' (or ' [x] 's-being') is a fact (1041a15; a24-25; b4-5). 2 Firstly, t h e 'why-question' is a r t i c u l a t e d in o r d e r to avoid a senseless asking why [x] is [x]. It b e c o m e s clear that the question should be p u t in terms of 'Why does F b e l o n g to [x] (or 'to [x]-being[x])?'. T h u s the question why it t h u n d e r s is to be r e p h r a s e d into why there-being-a-noise befalls to the clouds:

1 Cf. Met. Δ 8, 1017b15 and Η 2, 1043a2. At Γ 2, 1003b22-24 and Δ 1, 1013a17, 'cause' and 'principle' are equated. Their relationship naturally plays a role in the discussion of epistemonic proof in APo. T h e results of the foregoing discussions are surely not dismissed. Frede & Patzig refer (308) to parallells in Phys. VIII 7, 260a2021, ENVI 3, 1139b 14; VII 1, 1145a15; EEU 1, 1218b31; II 6, 1222b15. 2 In APo. II, 10 this claim was about identifying the object [x] of your epistemonic proof as satisfying a certain definiens. My sections 6.53-6.58.

Met. Ζ 17, 1 0 4 1 a l 0 - 2 0 : T h e ' w h y q u e s t i o n ' is always p u t in t h i s f o r m : ' w h y d o e s o n e t h i n g fall t o a n o t h e r ? ' F o r t o ask w h y a n e d u c a t e d m a n is a n e d u c a t e d m a n is e i t h e r t o r e p e a t t h e i n a r t i c u l a t e d s u b j e c t m a t t e r , 3 n a m e l y to ask w h y t h e e d u c a t e d - m a n zs,4 o r it is s o m e t h i n g else. Now, 'why a t h i n g is i t s e l f , is a senseless i n q u i r y ; f o r t h a t t h e r e actually is a c e r t a i n state of a f f a i r s (το οτι και τό ε ί ν α ι ) m u s t be clear b e f o r e h a n d (ύπάρχειν δ ή λ α όντα)5 — I m e a n , for instance, that t h e m o o n is e c l i p s e d — b u t that-a-thing-is-itself, s u c h a n exp l a n a t o r y s t a t e m e n t is a passe partout f o r all cases, viz. why a m a n is a m a n , o r why a n e d u c a t e d - p e r s o n is e d u c a t e d — u n l e s s p e r h a p s s o m e o n e will a s s e r t t h a t e a c h t h i n g is i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m itself, w h i c h m e a n s , as we h a v e c a l l e d it, its b e i n g o n e ; this e x p l a n a t i o n , h o w e v e r , a p p l i e s to e v e r y t h i n g alike, a n d is t o o easy a way to d e a l with t h e question.

Bostock (238) t h i n k s Aristotle o f f e r s a very o d d e x p l a n a t i o n of why questions a b o u t a thing b e i n g itself would be pointless, namely t h a t b e f o r e o n e c a n ask why s o m e t h i n g is t h e case o n e m u s t already know that it is the case. However, h e seems to i g n o r e t h e i m p o r t a n t role of the distinction m a d e by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics (II 1, 89b24ff.) b e t w e e n t h e οτι εστι a n d t h e εί εστι questions. Aristotle's e x p l a n a t i o n of this distinction is not, as Bostock takes it, "for b e f o r e we can ask why s o m e t h i n g is the case o n e must already know that it is the case". Aristotle actually m e a n s that if we try to explain a certain state of affairs (indicated by the phrase τό οτι, i.e. a substrate having a certain attribute) that we are familiar with by sense-perception, we m u s t know w h e t h e r (εί εστι) the substrate can b e d e f i n e d as satisfying a certain intermediary d e f i n i e n s which will serve f o r ' m i d d l e ' . H e n c e to u n d e r s t a n d Aristotle's intention is surely n o t a matter of c o n j e c t u r e , as Bostock holds it to be. 6

3

My (interpretative) r e n d e r i n g of τό είρημένον ζητεΐν. T h e r e n d e r i n g (Ross, Frede & Patzig; Bostock) "to ask, as we have just said," (where?) is beside the point, it seems. Aristotle is offering his readers the choice between two options, either to analyse the thing spoken of (τό είρημένον), or to refrain from articulating it into [x] and F. For this use of είρημένον cf. τό ζητούμενον = 'the thing searched' at a26 a n d 33, a n d τό λεγόμενον (at APo. II 7, 92b23), m e a n i n g ' t h e c o n t e n t of a definiens'. This is also the interpretation suggested by ps.-Alexander and Bonitz; see Ross ad loc. For such renderings in general see my section 1.71. 4 Joachim's supplying {ad loc.) μουσικός άνθρωπος is quite understandable. 5 For this rendering of ύπάρχειν see my section 1.53. 6 Likewise, Bostock's (242-4) comments on 1041a32 seem to miss the point. For an analogous misunderstanding on his part of APo. II 8 see ibid., 218.

Ibid. 17, 1041a20-26: B u t o n e c o u l d also ask 7 why a m a n is s u c h a k i n d of a n i m a l ; clearly, this d i f f e r s f r o m m e r e l y a s k i n g why o n e w h o is a m a n is a m a n . So w h a t o n e asks is why it is t h a t o n e t h i n g b e l o n g s t o a n o t h e r . ( T h a t it d o e s b e l o n g is e v i d e n t ; o t h e r w i s e t h e i n q u i r y is a b o u t n o t h i n g ) . T h u s o n e m a y ask why it t h u n d e r s , f o r < t h i s b o i l s d o w n to a s k i n g > why a n o i s e is p r o d u c e d in t h e c l o u d s , i.e. t h e t h i n g u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n is a case of ' o n e t h i n g said of a n o t h e r ' ( ά λ λ ο κ α τ ' άλλου).

T h u s Aristotle believes that two of the f o u r questions that, according to APo. II 1, are vital to any e p i s t e m o n i c p r o o f , are settled: the that question a n d the whether q u e s t i o n . T h e two o t h e r s r e m a i n to be answered: the 'what-it-is' (τό τί έστι) a n d t h e 'why-it-is' (τό διότι). T h e y are u n d e r discussion now. 8 W h a t o n e is a f t e r is the cause or e x p l a n a t o r y a c c o u n t of a t h i n g ' s b e i n g so-and-so, a n d that is its quiddity, expressed by its definiens, to say it in abstract terms (a 28: ώς ειπείν λογικώς). It is u n d e r s c o r e d again that t h e o b j e c t u n d e r inquiry is most easily overlooked in cases in which it is n o t analysed, a n d we k e e p designating it by a single term, like ' m a n ' , instead of indicating that it is in fact a whole m a d e u p of certain constituents. T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s for analysing the object into its essential constituents by f r a m i n g its definiens, instead of j u s t n a m i n g it by a single term a n d leaving it at that, clearly parallels the discussion f o u n d in APo. II 1-2: t h e r e the distinction between an unanalysed object a n d the object q u a split u p into t h e o b j e c t q u a taken by itself a n d its a t t r i b u t e likewise c o m e s to the f o r e as i m p o r t a n t f o r f r a m i n g t h e correct e p i s t e m o n i c p r o c e d u r e . Notice that the term άπλώς significantly occurs in o u r passage as well as in APo II, 1-2, where it is f o u n d n o less than n i n e times, a n d explicitly explained in terms of the object's simple designation (άπλώς) by m e a n s of a single term referring to the m e r e ΰποκείμενον (90a12-13). In Ζ 17 the text r u n s as follows: Ibid., 17, 1041a32-b4: T h e t h i n g u n d e r i n q u i r y m o s t easily e s c a p e s o u r n o t i c e in cases in w h i c h n o t o n e t h i n g is said of a n o t h e r , 9 e.g. w h e n it ' This is the o t h e r option alluded to by the phrase ή άλλο (at 1041a14), in which the object u n d e r examination is analysed into its constituents. Frede & Patzig athetize this phrase which is f o u n d in all o u r MSS., as well as in Asclepius (CAG VI2, p. 449 25 ) and ps.-Alexander (CAG 1, p. 539 12 ). Owen's (1978-9, 15) conjecture ή άλλως instead of the manuscripts reading ή άλλο, which grammatically nicely matches είρημένον, is unnecessary. 8 Frede & Patzig II, 31 If. For my interpretation of the phrase τό ότι καί τό είναι (at 1041a15) see my comments on APo. II, 1-2, where the two items are also closely related, in a similar way as the two others are which bear on a thing's cause and quiddity; my sections 6.51-6.52. 9 I.e. in which there is n o expression composed of a n a m e and an attribute. For

is asked 'What is a man?', owing to the fact that the question is using a simple term (άπλώς), instead of itemizing it in terms of that-and-thaC 10 (οτι τάδε τόδε). But we must ask the question articulated f o r m , " otherwise we shall have something which the character of what is both a genuine and a pointless inquiry.

put by 'this is in an shares

Next, the 'this-is-that' ('this-belongs-to-that') f o r m u l a is i m p l e m e n t e d by explaining the precondition of facticity, i.e. of there actually being s o m e t h i n g to which s o m e t h i n g else belongs, in terms of some matter receiving a ( f u r t h e r ) d e t e r m i n a t i o n , which is the form. And as in the previous chapters, this f o r m (είδος) is identified as the true ousia: Ilnd. 17, 1041b4-9: Since we must safely know 12 that to actually be falls to the thing, clearly it is the matter 13 of which one asks owing to what it is some definite thing. For instance, the question may be 'Owing to what are these things here a house?' (and the answer is 'Because what is the definiens of house 1 4 belongs to them'); or it may be 'Owing to what is this thing here a man?', or 'Owing to what is this body thus 1 5 affected a man?' So what is sought is the cause, 16 being the form, owing to which the matter is so-and-so. Now this is the ousia. the phrase κατ' αλλήλων in the sense of ' o n e of a n o t h e r (instead of 'of o n e another') see my Index , s.v. 10 This phrase is emphasized by the word order in Greek. Note that in Aristotle the demonstrative n o u n s τόδε and τοΰτο are often used to indicate (as a dummy term) mere determinateness or individuality, rather than to d e n o t e this or that actual thing; e.g. Met. M 3, í077b22 and 35. Bonitz, Index, 495b33-43. 11 T h e idea that a n o t i o n ' s articulation is r e q u i r e d for o u r having a clear concept of s o m e t h i n g is also f o u n d at Met. A 5, 986b5-7; 8, 989a32, and Β 6, 1002b27. Note also Aristotle's famous remark at the e n d of Phys. I t , (t84a23) that to have real knowledge of something, o n e should first bring u p that thing u n d e r an articulated expression (such as a definiens), instead of a general, unspecific name. If not, we are like children, who call every man ' f a t h e r ' (and every woman ' m o t h e r ' ) , until they learn to analyse these concepts and see that the d e t e r m i n a n t 'who-has-generated-me' a d d e d to ' m a n ' should be substracted f r o m ' f a t h e r ' (= 'man who ... etc.'), so as to leave only the notion ' m a n ' applying to other men. T h e requirement of conceptual articulation finds its counterpart in Aristotle's view that where the required articulation is lacking, o n e is able (and obliged in a way) to gather the sensus plenior out of what is actually said, by means o f ' c r e a t i v e interpretation'. How Ancient authors dealt with creative interpretation is put by Mansfeld in a broader context (1994), 149-61. 12 My r e n d e r i n g of εχειν, reading, with Asclepius and the Laurentianus, καί instead of the odd reading τε καί. 13 Pace Ross (Oxford Translation), τήν ϋλην is laid emphasis upon (by prolepsis), not the why-question. 14 Lit. 'what it was for a house to be'; for the use of the imperfectum philosophicum see my Index, s.v. 15 Reading (at b7), with Frede & Patzig (317), who are also followed by Bostock, ώδί instead of τοδί found in the MSS. 16 T h e r e are good reasons to delete the subsequent words τοΰτο δ' έστί τό είδος (at 1041b8) as a gloss; Frede & Patzig, II, 317f.

This o n c e again brings Aristotle to speak of the i m p o r t a n c e of ruling o u t the use of simple terms like ' m a n ' instead of the m o r e informative articulated p h r a s e s such as 'two-footed a n i m a l ' . By t h e same t o k e n , t h e n a t u r e of t h e c o m p o u n d t h i n g as e x p r e s s e d by such phrases, which serve as t h e d e f i n i e n s of the things indicated by the simple terms, comes u p for discussion. T h e subject of c h o o s i n g c o r r e c t labels ( ' c o r r e c t categorization') for t h e things u n d e r investigation is now a d d r e s s e d in a somewhat b r o a d e r c o n t e x t . It is i n f e r r e d f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g discussion ( 1 0 4 1 b 9 - l l ) that in the case of simple things (έπί τών άπλών) any inquiry a n d explanation are impossible — that is to say, any inquiry which could lead to a g e n u i n e epistemonic proof a n d its exposition in the shape of a syllogism c a n n o t be accomplished, a n d , t h e r e f o r e , an alternative p r o c e d u r e should be u n d e r t a k e n . Aristotle's shift f r o m speaking of t h e c o r r e c t s e m a n t i c way in which the object is to b e called u p for examination a n d epistemonic proof, to his dealing with the things as signified by t h e r e q u i r e d d e s i g n a t i o n s (viz. t h e o n e using c o m p l e x expressions of t h e 'subject plus attributes' type) is invested in the ambivalent m e a n i n g of the phrase έπί τών άπλών. T h e ά π λ ά still are things called u p by simple expressions (διά τό άπλώς λέγεσθαι) a n d , accordingly, o p p o s e d to the things which s o m e t h i n g else is attributed to; but by the same token, they are now considered as an o n t i c c o m p o u n d . A f t e r merely r e f e r r i n g to an alternative m e t h o d r e q u i r e d for adressing the unanalysed things as signified by single terms, 1 7 Aristotle i m m e d i a t e l y c o n t i n u e s t h e discussion of c o m p o u n d articulated things a n d the way in which these c o m p o u n d s f o r m a g e n u i n e (quidditative) unity. By d o i n g so, h e takes u p the previous discussion (in Z, 12) of the unity of a thing's definiens. 1 8 Now the c o m p o u n d s i n t e n d e d in this c o n t e x t — things, that is, that f o r m a g e n u i n e unity, a n d n o t an aggregate — are such things 17

T h e discussions f o u n d in Met. E, 4, Θ 10, 1051b17-1052a4, and An. Ill, 6 are here alluded to. In APo. II 19, Aristotle explains how to gain knowledge of 'simple things'. 18 I purposely say (as I always do) 'definiens', not 'definition'. Bostock has rightly observed (244) that it is more probable that Aristotle is thinking (at 1041b912) of simple and complex items, not of propositions. To u n d e r s t a n d Aristotle's semantic approach we should have in the f o r e f r o n t of our attention that 'appellation', not sentence predication is in order, and that, accordingly, complex expressions are composite terms (incomplete assertibles), not sentences. See also my interpretation of Aristotle's apophantics dealing with statement-making utterances taken as assertions of monadic expressions, n o t ' S is P' construals; my sections 1.51 and 2.12-2.16.

whose matter is not j u s t a c o m b i n a t i o n of d i f f e r e n t materials. Unlike aggregates, g e n u i n e unities n e e d a c o m b i n i n g agent, which is of an o r d e r d i f f e r e n t f r o m the things c o m b i n e d ; f o r otherwise an infinite regress of factors of the same o r d e r c a n n o t be avoided. Now this a g e n t is the form. T h u s Aristotle again arrives at the f o r m as primary cause of a t h i n g ' s b e i n g precisely this or that. T h e p r e s e n t section (1041b9-33) o n c e m o r e assesses t h e u n i q u e p o s i t i o n of ' t h i s s o m e t h i n g else', identified as the thing's είδος = ούσία a n d the causeand-principle b e i n g active in the essential constitution of things, by o p p o s i n g it to material elements: Ibid. 17, 1041b25-27: It w o u l d s e e m , t h e n , t h a t this ' s o m e t h i n g else' is s o m e d e f i n i t e t h i n g , n o t m e r e l y a n e l e m e n t ; a n d t h a t it at least ( γ ε ) 1 9 is t h e c a u s e of this t h i n g h e r e b e i n g flesh a n d t h a t t h i n g t h e r e b e i n g a syllable; a n d similarly in o t h e r cases. A n d this is t h e o u s i a of e a c h t h i n g , b e c a u s e it is t h e p r i m a r y c a u s e of its b e i n g .

T h e s e lines clearly d o m o r e t h a n j u s t s u m m a r i z e t h e f o r e g o i n g discussion. They also seem to imply that for the respective e l e m e n t s too, to be, the είδος is the primary cause, so that s o m e parcel of m a t t e r b e i n g flesh is also d u e to t h e είδος 'flesh' b e i n g active as an i m m a n e n t principle in it. 20 We should n o t e in passing that the f o r m q u a (ontic) c o m b i n i n g a g e n t of the material c o m p o n e n t s is at t h e same time at the basis of the (logical) unity of the definiens. T h e c o n c l u d i n g section of this c h a p t e r (1041b28-33) expressly affirms the causative role of the eidos for natural subsistent beings, i.e. things that are constituted by a natural process a n d in accordance with their n a t u r e . T h e i r n a t u r e , it is said, is their true ousia, 2 1 n o t merely o n e of their constitutive e l e m e n t s , b u t their principle; the e l e m e n t s are only f o u n d on the material level.

10. 2 A further assessment of matter as 'material constitution' T h e o p e n i n g c h a p t e r of book H (1042a4-24) begins by a summary of the c o n t e n t s of Book Z, which makes n o r e f e r e n c e to Ζ 7-9. For the rest, the summary is actually o n e ad sensum. 22 It winds u p with the 19

For the emphasis expressed by γε in terms of limitation see Van Raalte (1993), 178; 339; 551. 20 T h e primary ousia being a thing's primary cause is also f o u n d at Met. A 8, 1017b15-16, and Η 2, 1043a2-3. 21 Frede & Patzig II, 323. 22 For the composition and contents of the summary see Ross II, 226f.; Bostock,

proposal to f u r t h e r investigate the "agreed ousiai, which are those t h a t a r e p e r c e p t i b l e ; a n d all p e r c e p t i b l e ousiai have m a t t e r " (1042a24-26). In t h e previous discussions, the identification of ο ύ σ ί α with a thing's f o r m (είδος) h a d forced matter (ϋλη) into the b a c k g r o u n d , b e c a u s e it c o u l d n o t m e e t t h e m a i n r e q u i r e m e n t f o r truly b e i n g ousia, viz. the capability of separate existence a n d being a 'this' (Z 3). T h e p u r p o r t of t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e c h a p t e r is to r e t u r n o u r attention to an aspect of true ousia that was already highlighted in Ζ 3 (1029al-5), but b o u n d to vanish into the b a c k g r o u n d owing to o u r p r e f e r e n c e for the f o r m , to wit, its being 'underlying thing' (ύποκείμενον). T h e c o u n t e r b a l a n c e is achieved by a renewed investigation of matter, which may be c o n s i d e r e d the u n d e r l y i n g thing par excellence. However, as in Ζ 3, the h y p o k e i m e n o n character is n o t d e n i e d to the o t h e r f o r m e r claimants f o r the place of h o n o u r , namely the f o r m (είδος) a n d the composite of f o r m a n d m a t t e r (τό σύνολον). Notice that the subsequent statements are m a d e f r o m the angle of 'this-ness' a n d the capability of separate existence, a n d that, unlike the discussions in Z, the credentials of matter are somewhat u p g r a d e d now by i n t r o d u c i n g the notion of 'at least potentially being a this: Met. Η 1, 1042a24-31: Let us now resume the examination of the agreed ousiai. These are the perceptible ones; and they all have matter. What underlies is ousia. 23 In one way this is the matter (and by 'matter' I mean that which is not a this in actuality, but potentially); in another way it is the form expressed by the definiens (ό λόγος καί ή μορφή), which, while being a this, is logically separable; and in a third way it is the compound of these two. The last alone can come to be and cease to be, and is capable of separate existence without qualification (χωριστόν άπλώς); for of the ousiai expressed in a definiens some are separable, others are not. Ross (II, 227) thinks that by the "others that are n o t separable" in the last sentence only νοϋς can be i n t e n d e d , a n d h e refers to Met. A 7 a n d 9, a n d An. II 2, 413b24, III 4, 429b5 a n d 5, 430a22. O n that interpretation, this s e n t e n c e is merely a loose r e m a r k . It seems better to take it as a r e f e r e n c e to Ζ 11, w h e r e t h e p r o b l e m was discussed w h e t h e r or n o t the m a t t e r of natural things should be i n c l u d e d in their definiens. In o u r discussion of this passage, we c a m e to infer

248-50; Burnyeat (1984),If. 23 T h e notion of hyparxis is here predominant.

that Aristotle recognizes two types of d e f i n i e n s , o n e p r e s e n t i n g a 'formal significate' a n d r e f e r r i n g to the thing's f o r m or quiddity, the o t h e r indicating this f o r m t o g e t h e r with its material constitution taken generally, i.e. its 'material' or 'total' significate. 2 4 For the same reason, Bostock's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n should be rejected. H e claims (250f.) that since Aristotle (1042a30) says that it is only the c o m p o u n d t h a t is s u b m i t t e d to g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n , t h e matter that h e is talking of should be p r i m e matter ('materia p r i m a ' ) . H e p r e s u m e s some s u p p o r t for his surmise in the next p a r a g r a p h , in which it is stressed that m a t t e r u n d e r l i e s by persisting t h r o u g h change. However, what persists, formally, is the general condition of material constitution a n d , physically, the successive parcels of matter in which this general condition of 'materiality' takes shape. 2 5 O t h e r interpreters have hardly m a d e a stronger case on this score. In the collective notes to Ζ a n d H, the g r e m i u m of L o n d o n scholars 2 6 rightly c o m p l a i n a b o u t the n e g l i g e n t a n d somewhat o b s c u r e composition of the s u m m a r y in Η 1. However, to suggest that the h a r d work on essence (of Ζ 13ff.) has now d i s a p p e a r e d f r o m Aristotle's memory, a n d likewise the conclusion of Ζ 17, is carrying things a bit too far. 2 7 O n the assumption that, f r o m Ζ 11 onwards, m a t t e r ' s case h a d b e c o m e the case of 'material constitution', which is susceptible of b e i n g included in a p r o p e r definiens, t h e r e is n o good reason to think that t h e i m p o r t a n t o u t c o m e of Ζ has f a d e d away f r o m the a u t h o r ' s memory. In the r e m a i n d e r of the c h a p t e r (1042a32-b8), matter's case, that is to say, t h e case of the c o n d i t i o n of materiality falling to natural things, is c o r r o b o r a t e d . Since in all c h a n g e s (local, qualitative, a n d even substantial) f r o m o n e opposite to the o t h e r there is s o m e t h i n g which u n d e r l i e s the c h a n g e , Aristotle observes, it is evident that m a t t e r too is ο ύ σ ί α . As for a c h a n g e of substance, the vital role of matter is obvious, because matter is that which now underlies as a this a n d later underlies by way of privation, m e a n i n g that what underlies

24

For these terms see my Index, s.v. 'significate'. T h a t the tradition of ascribing to Aristotle the notion of an utterly formless matter, called ' p r i m e matter', is mistaken has b e e n a r g u e d for successfully by Bemelmans (1995), who offers an alternative interpretation of the phrase πρώτη ϋλη (in so far as it occurs in Aristotle at all) in terms of a 'formal entity', and in the context of focalization and categorization. See my sections 12.37-12.39. 26 T h e i r t h o r o u g h study of these Books has b e e n published by Burnyeat (1984). 27 Burnyeat (1984), 1. 25

or u n d e r g o e s destruction is matter qualified by a positive f o r m , while what underlies generation is matter qualified by a privation. 2 8

10. 3 On form, differentia, and actuality T h e next two chapters aim to assess the position of matter's counterpart. It must strike the r e a d e r that this c o u n t e r p a r t is n o t identified straightforwardly as t h e f o r m ( ε ί δ ο ς ) until 1043al9-21, b u t first b r o u g h t u p as s o m e t h i n g that actualizes matter, which has j u s t b e e n described (1, 1042a27-28) as that which is only a 'this' potentially. Notice that, unlike the first six c h a p t e r s of Z, the claimants ' m a t t e r ' a n d ' f o r m ' are n o longer played off against o n e a n o t h e r , b u t in line with the o u t c o m e of Ζ 12-17, a n d are now dealt with as t h e comp o u n d ' s constituents in their own right. First, Aristotle links u p the p r e s e n t discussion with the foregoing, saying (1042b8-10) that since the (potential) c o m p o n e n t 'materiality' is now sufficiently recognized, we have to explain the n a t u r e of that which is the ousia of perceptible things in the sense of actuality (την ώς ένέργειαν ο ύ σ ί α ν ) . In t h e wake of D e m o c r i t u s , t h e actualizing a g e n t is i n t r o d u c e d as d i f f e r e n t i a ( δ ι ά φ ο ρ α ) , b u t while D e m o c r i t u s (thinking of atoms) only knew of t h r e e geometrical d i f f e r e n t i a e — shape, position, o r d e r 2 9 — Aristotle accepts n o such limitation on the kinds of d i f f e r e n t i a e a n d claims that their n u m b e r is far greater. As Bostock (254) has well observed, the a u t h o r o p e n s with a list of the several ways in which a t h i n g ' s material i n g r e d i e n t s may b e comb i n e d , which has s o m e t h i n g in c o m m o n with t h e idea of Ζ 17 (1041b9ff.), t h a t a c o m p o u n d ' s f o r m is t h e way in which its constituents are a r r a n g e d so as to m a k e a (coincidental o r essential) unity o u t of t h e m ( 1 0 4 2 b l l - 2 4 ) . Aristotle's e x t e n d e d list of d i f f e r e n t i a e itemizes a lot of physical ways in which things may b e c o n s t i t u t e d . Again, the list is hardly exhaustive. T h e next p a r a g r a p h is i n t e n d e d to draw o u r attention to what should be viewed as the principles of things' being, as we will be told at 1042b32-33, a n d so it raises the subject to the metaphysical level by r e d u c i n g the p r o b l e m of the identification of the m a n i f o l d 'differentiae' (διάφοραι) to distinguishing the d i f f e r e n t ways in which

28 29

Ross II, 227. Cf. Aristotle's report in Met. A 4, 985b4-20.

t h e n o t i o n ' b e ' o r 'is' is i m p l e m e n t e d . Owing to this move t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e will t u r n out to be the distinctive 'somehows' owing to which beings are 3 0 a this or a that. It is stated (1042b25-31), then, that ' b e ' (τό εστι, τό είναι) assignable to a thing is used in as many senses as t h e r e are d i f f e r e n t i a e , s o m e h o w actualizing t h e c o n d i t i o n of materiality, w h e t h e r this h a p p e n s by positioning (threshold), solidification (ice), or a mix or blend of t h e m ( h a n d or foot). Aristotle's a c c o u n t of t h e b e i n g of d i f f e r e n t things s h o u l d be considered bearing in m i n d that such differentiae are each αίτιον του είναι (1043a3) of things. This will enable us to uncover the structure which, when transferred to real ousiai, can p u t us on the track of the differentiae, in the p r o p e r sense, that are the object of o u r search. 3 1 It a p p e a r s that where matter a n d potentiality are different, the actuality a n d the f o r m expressed by the definiens likewise vary. T h a t is why s o m e d e f i n e a h o u s e f r o m the a n g l e of its material c o n s t i t u t i o n , saying that it is stones, bricks, a n d timber, which materials disclose what is potentially a house. Others, focussing on the actuality of the h o u s e , call it a receptacle to shelter p e o p l e a n d their p r o p e r t y in, while o t h e r s again c o m b i n e these two d e s c r i p t i o n s a n d d e f i n e a h o u s e as a c o m b i n a t i o n of these p r o p e r t i e s (1043a2-19). Aristotle t h e n p r o c e e d s to assess the various ways of d e f i n i n g things f r o m the angle of the distinction between potential a n d actual ousia, which is p r e d o m i n a n t t h r o u g h o u t the p r e s e n t chapter: Met. Η 2, 1 0 4 3 a l 9 - 2 8 : T h e d e f i n i e n s f r a m e d f r o m t h e d i f f e r e n t i a e a p p e a r s to b e a d e f i n i e n s of t h e f o r m a n d t h e actuality (τού ε ί δ ο υ ς καί τής ε ν ε ρ γ ε ί α ς ) , 3 2 w h i l e t h e d e f i n i e n s of t h e i m m a n e n t c o n s t i t u e n t s is r a t h e r a d e f i n i e n s of t h e m a t e r i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . [...].· 33 F r o m w h a t h a s b e e n said, t h e n , it is p l a i n w h a t p e r c e p t i b l e ousia is, a n d in w h a t way it is, o n e k i n d o f it as m a t t e r , a n o t h e r as f o r m a n d actuality (μορφή καί ε ν έ ρ γ ε ι α ) , while t h e t h i r d is t h e c o m p o u n d of t h e s e two.

30

Bostock (255-7) gets himself into quite a bit of trouble by taking the 'is' specifically as the 'is' of existence. Cf. Owen (1965), 82. 31 See Burnyeat (1984), 6-8, who rightly remarks (8) that, methodologically, the whole chapter is an example of Aristotle progressing from things familiar to us (γνώριμα ήμίν) to things known by nature (γνώριμα τή φύσει). 32 T h e καί should be taken to be an explicative connective so as to make the rendering 'the actualizing form' most appropriate. 33 In an aside omitted h e r e Aristotle remarks that the definitions which Archytas, a famous m e m b e r of the Pythagorean school a n d a contemporary of Plato's, used to approve, were of the latter sort.

10. 4 Again, the problem of defining things properly C h a p t e r 3 is usually r e g a r d e d as c o n t a i n i n g t h r e e ill-connected parts. 3 4 In my view t h e r e is a reasonable line of a r g u m e n t , which, as o f t e n , is only i n t e r r u p t e d by a footnote-like aside (1043bl4-23). Its general subject m a t t e r is the p r o b l e m of definition b r o a c h e d earlier ( f r o m Ζ 10 o n w a r d s ) , i n c l u d i n g the u n a v o i d a b l e suggestion that t h e r e m i g h t be two kinds of d e f i n i e n s , o n e signifying the t h i n g ' s f o r m , the o t h e r indicating the c o m p o u n d including its material constitution. This is now applied to the 'matter-potentiality' versus 'formactuality' thesis. T h e discussion begins with an i m p o r t a n t s e m a n t i c exposition, which in fact is an application of o n e of t h e semantic Main Rules f r e q u e n t l y at work before. 3 5 T h e a u t h o r r e m i n d s us (1043a29-37) of the ambivalent m e a n i n g s of names, because they may stand either for the c o m p o u n d (την σύνθετον ούσίαν), or for the f o r m a n d actuality (την ένέργειαν και την μορφήν). For instance, you have to establish w h e t h e r by ' h o u s e ' a 'shelter m a d e f r o m bricks a n d stones placed thus' (i.e. the c o m p o u n d thing) is i n t e n d e d , or just the actualizing f o r m ' s h e l t e r - h o o d ' ; a n d w h e t h e r 'line' stands for a c o n c r e t e 'twod i m e n s i o n a l quantity', or the f o r m , 'two-dimensionality'. 3 6 Likewise, ' a n i m a l ' may b e used b o t h in the sense of ' c o n c r e t e animal' a n d in the sense of the f o r m , ' a n i m a l - h o o d ' , a l t h o u g h n o t q u a s o m e t h i n g n a m e d by o n e a n d the same definiens, but in its b e i n g related to o n e focal m e a n i n g . Aristotle is obviously alluding to the two kinds of definiens, o n e indicating a t h i n g ' s quiddity without the m a t t e r it i n h e r e s in, t h e o t h e r the quiddity including its material constitution. 3 7 Remarkably, his recalling t h e ambivalent m e a n i n g of n a m e s is followed by the r e m a r k (1043a37-b4) that, t h o u g h an a p p r o p r i a t e telling a p a r t of these m e a n i n g s is of i m p o r t a n c e for o t h e r purposes, it is n o t relevant for the e x a m i n a t i o n of perceptible ousia: because when seeking the f o r m as such of a composite thing (as we are actually d o i n g now), we eo ipso are focussing on the quiddity without matter. For instance, to 34 Ross (II, 231) calls this chapter "a collection of ill-connected remarks on various topics relating to essence and definition". T h o u g h Bostock speaks of "three quite u n c o n n e c t e d parts" (261), yet he recognizes (267) "the overall structure of this chapter (from 1043b4, and omitting b14-23)". 35 Namely, RMA (my section 1.71). 36 Cf. Ζ, 11, 1036b 14-17. 37 Cf. Ζ, 10, 1035a6-9 and 16-25.

establish what precisely m a n ' s f o r m — soul — is comes to identifying 'soul' a n d 'soul's essence'. T h e p r o b l e m of ambivalence only lurks w h e r e the c o m p o s i t e ' s n a m e , ' m a n ' , is c o n c e r n e d ; for ' m a n ' a n d ' m a n ' s essence are not the same. Next, the question c o n c e r n i n g the f o r m dwelling in c o m p o u n d things will be dealt with in terms of the old p r o b l e m (Z 10-12; 17) of the unity of the definiens. Aristotle first refers to the e x a m p l e of the syllable BA, used b e f o r e (Z 17), where it was said that it is not just two letters Β a n d A, but also ' s o m e t h i n g m o r e ' , referring to their arrangem e n t , which is n o t itself a f u r t h e r c o m p o n e n t of the syllable, as an a g e n t of the same o r d e r as the two letters. H e now goes on to state that this a r r a n g e m e n t , w h e t h e r it is ' c o m b i n a t i o n ' (σύνθεσις) 3 8 or ' m i x t u r e ' (μίξις), q u a second-order agent, is so special that it should be contrasted with the material c o m p o n e n t s , which are taken toget h e r as if they were merely o n e ingredient. This boils down to stating that t h e s e c o n d - o r d e r a g e n t ' s j o b goes b e y o n d j u s t c o m b i n i n g or mixing t h e i n g r e d i e n t s a n d is actually the ontic cause or principle owing to which a t h i n g (syllable or t h r e s h o l d , using Aristotle's examples) is. It c a n n o t c o m e as a surprise that the syllable-threshold e x a m p l e is readily e x t e n d e d to Aristotle's favourite e x a m p l e of the quidditative unit, 'two-footed animal': Met. Η 3, 1043b4-14: On investigation, it appears that a syllable is not composed of the letters plus their combination, as a house is not bricks plus combination. And correctly so; for the combination and the mixture do not themselves follow from the things being mixed or combined, and the same holds of all other cases. For instance, if the threshold is characterized by its position, the position is not caused 39 by the threshold; it would be better to say that the threshold is caused by the position. Nor, clearly (δή), is a man animal plus two-footed. If these are the matter, 4 0 there must be something over and above them, something which is not an element and not a product of elements, but the ousia; and when people eliminate this they speak only of material constitution. If, then, this is the cause of man's being, and this is the ousia, they will be failing to state of all things the ousia!

38 Cf. Aeschylus, Prometheus, 459-60, where Prometheus says that he has invented for mankind "counting, the primary skill, and how to set down characters in writing (γραμμάτων τε συνθέσεις) ". 39 For this sense of έκ see Liddell & Scott, s.v. Ill, 6. Notice the use of αίτιον at 1043b13. Both the puzzle raised by Burnyeat (13f.) and the o n e discussed by Bostock (263) are d u e to their failing to observe this. 40 For indicating the counterpart of the differentia or form as 'matter' cf. Met. Δ 28, 1024b8; Ζ 12, 1038a6 and 19.

Notice that the subtle i m p o r t a n c e of the f o r m is emphasized by using t h e cases of syllable a n d t h r e s h o l d as illustrations. T h e world of difference, so to speak, between BA a n d AB entirely d e p e n d s on the a r r a n g e m e n t of these letters, a n d w h e t h e r a piece of stone is a threshold or a lintel hinges on its being p u t u n d e r or above the door. 4 1 In the s u b s e q u e n t p a r e n t h e t i c a l p a r a g r a p h , the eternal n a t u r e of the f o r m as ontic principle is discussed (1043b 14-23). T h e position of this p a r a g r a p h in H 3 is somewhat bewildering, b u t should be j u d g e d in the framework of the general a r r a n g e m e n t of the treatises making u p o u r text of the Metaphysics,42 Anyhow, it also offers a controversial item f r o m t h e d o c t r i n a l p o i n t of view. T h e crucial q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r or n o t the Aristotelian eidos is imperishable. Speaking a b o u t the f o r m s of artefacts like ' h o u s e ' , Aristotle asserts that they are n o t capable of separate existence a n d , accordingly, are never f o u n d apart f r o m their particular instances (b20: παρά τά τ ι ν ά ) . Aristotle starts by stating this alternative: the ousia-form must nther be eternal or c o m e to be a n d cease to b e without ever actually being itself involved in the process of g e n e r a t i o n o r c o r r u p t i o n . Bostock (264) aptly paraphrases: "What Aristotle m e a n s is that the present tense 'it is c o m i n g to b e ' or 'it is ceasing to b e ' is never applicable to it, t h o u g h the perfect tense 'it has c o m e to b e ' o r 'it has ceased to be' is so applicable"; a n d refers to Met. Β 5, 1002a32-bll; Η 5, 1044b2122, a n d Cael. I 11, 280b26, w h e r e contacts, points, a n d t e m p o r a l instants are m e n t i o n e d as also meriting this description, since, while b e i n g indivisible, their c o m i n g to be a n d ceasing to be c a n n o t take time. Cf. Phys. VI 5, 235b30-236a7 juncto 4, 234b 10-12. Analogously, a f o r m has n o material parts, as may be g a t h e r e d f r o m Ζ 8, a n d so it is n o t itself a matter-form c o m p o u n d . O n the o t h e r h a n d , as has b e e n m a d e clear a n d explained earlier (Z 8), n o o n e creates or p r o d u c e s the form; it is the individual that is m a d e , a n d so it is this c o m p o u n d of f o r m a n d m a t t e r that is involved in the process of c o m i n g to be (1043bl4-18). So m u c h for g e n e r a t i o n . As for the closely related issue of the f o r m ' s imperishability, it surely does n o t follow that because they are n o t involved, h e r e a n d now, in any actual process of g e n e r a t i o n or

41

Otherwise Latin 'limen', which is also used to stand for both 'threshold' and 'lintel' (hence 'sublimis' = 'situated high u p ' ) . Elsewhere too Aristotle claims that in defining composite things, the kind of composition should be clearly observed. E.g. Top. VI 13, 150b22-26; 14, 151a20-32; Phys. I 5, 188b9-21. 42 Ross II, 232; Burnyeat (1984), 15-7; Bostock, 265f.

c o r r u p t i o n , the ousiai of p e r i s h a b l e t h i n g s s h o u l d themselves be i m p e r i s h a b l e a n d c a p a b l e of s e p a r a t e existence ( i n d e p e n d e n t of matter, that is). T h e only thing that is clear, Aristotle asserts, is that s o m e of t h e m are n o t capable of separate existence, which is exemplified by an unmistakable case, viz. that of the artefact ' h o u s e ' . But p e r h a p s , h e goes o n , such artefacts 4 3 are n o t even entitled to the n a m e ούσία, as n o t h i n g is which is n o t f o r m e d by nature. O n e might well hold that the only ousia to be f o u n d in perishable things is their n a t u r e (1043b 18-23). T h i s raises the q u e s t i o n what to t h i n k of the f o r m s of n a t u r a l things. T h e passage is n o t explicit on this score. T h e answer largely d e p e n d s o n what t h e status is of e n m a t t e r e d f o r m s . If they are particular (individual), it is most reasonable to assume that they are perishable. O r r a t h e r , they may b e assigned what is called ' H e r a clitean eternity', because o n Aristotelian d o c t r i n e , "one (particular) m a n begets a n o t h e r " (Phys. II 1, 193b8): t h a t is to say, o n e m a n succeeds a n o t h e r w i t h o u t any single entity, w h e t h e r f o r m or comp o u n d , e n d u r i n g . Apart f r o m this, t h e r e are solid reasons to a r g u e for the particular status of e n m a t t e r e d forms. 4 4 T h e next p a r a g r a p h (1043b23-32), which is i n t r o d u c e d by 'consequently' (ώστε), takes u p the p r o b l e m of definition f r o m 1043b3-14. It first discusses the o p i n i o n of the followers of Antisthenes that any use of a p r o p e r definiens, grasping a t h i n g as what it precisely is, is impossible. We s h o u l d b e r e m i n d e d of what Aristotle said in the Lexicon, Δ 29, with regard to A n t i s t h e n e s himself: as we have seen b e f o r e (8. 42), Aristotle attacked his naïve view that it is impossible to assign to a thing an a c c o u n t o t h e r t h a n its n a m e or p r o p e r a c c o u n t consisting of the n a m e s of its simple constituents. T h e Antisthenians, t h e n , c o n c l u d e d f r o m this that any d e f i n i e n s c a n n o t be b u t a ' l o n g rigmarole' (μακρός λόγος), 4 5 owing to the fact that to describe a thing 43 Bostock (265) is certainly wrong in claiming that Aristotle tentatively suggests that we should not count the form of a house as an ousia; for Aristotle is speaking of artificial c o m p o u n d s , not of their forms. This is patently clear from the use of the verb συνέστηκεν at 1043b22, which can only be used of a c o m p o u n d . Cf. at Ζ 17, 1041b29-30, where likewise t h e r e is talk a b o u t ousiai that are c o m p o s e d naturally and in accordance with their nature (κατά φύσιν καί φύσει συνεστήκασι). T h e r e are f r e q u e n t allusions in Aristotle to the privileged position of natural things when it comes to philosophical investigation. See my Index, s.v. 'natural'. 44 My sections 9.63 and 10.71. 45 This is an allusion to Simonides, fragm. 189 Bergk, where the phrase is used for an evasive story such as slaves are accustomed to tell their masters in order to cover u p their failure in some duty.

by a p e r t i n e n t expression, which is n o t j u s t the t h i n g ' s n a m e , o n e could only take r e f u g e in qualifying an alternative expression (which, in principle, is applicable to o t h e r things, too), by so many determinations that it precisely d e n o t e s this thing, e.g. by calling Socrates ' t h e bald, b e a r d e d , h e n p e c k e d h u s b a n d ' etc. Since this would be an endless enterprise, you can only explain the thing by saying what it is like, e.g. by calling silver ' s o m e t h i n g like tin'. Burnyeat rightly takes this p r o c e d u r e in terms of n a m i n g a n d elucidates it by r e m a r k i n g (1984, 18) that the 'like tin' designation "could be an (imperfect) i n s t r u m e n t f o r getting s o m e o n e to attach the n a m e 'silver' to the right thing". T o u n d e r s t a n d Aristotle's n e x t r e m a r k that, in a way, the Antist h e n i a n s "have a point h e r e " o n e has to go back to the last s e n t e n c e of the p a r a g r a p h j u s t b e f o r e the parenthesis of bl4-23. At 1043b10-14 it was stated that if a n i m a l h o o d a n d two-footedness were to b e the g e n e r i c ' m a t t e r ' , 4 6 t h e r e must be s o m e t h i n g over a n d above t h e m , s o m e t h i n g which is the a g e n t 'ousia-form'. A n d when p e o p l e eliminate this agent, they state only the material constitution, a n d will thus fail to state the thing's ousia. Now this failure readily r e m i n d s us of the Antisthenian attack on o u r c o m m o n practice of defining, which they are in t h e h a b i t of d e e m i n g a 'mission impossible'. O n the Antisthenian line of t h o u g h t , o n e could really say scornfully that, by leaving o u t the u n i f y i n g a g e n t — t h e f o r m — those p e o p l e o f f e r n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a collection of ineffectual, u n a r r a n g e d single words, which c o m e s close to an i m p e r t i n e n t , insubstantial, so to speak, rigmarole. Of course, Aristotle's r e m a r k a b o u t the f r a m e r s of inefficient definientia holds a great deal of mockery, m e a n i n g somet h i n g like: "fancy having t h a t f l u n g at you, that those u n e d u c a t e d p e o p l e could make a p o i n t against your malpractice, when it comes to properly d e f i n i n g a n d designating things." Next h e proceeds to draw the helpful conclusion: Ibid., 3, 1043b28-32: S o of o n e type of o u s i a , n a m e l y t h e c o m p o u n d o n e , a d e f i n i t o r i a l a c c o u n t (όρον κ α ι λόγον) c a n b e given — w h e t h e r t h e y b e p e r c e p t i b l e o r i n t e l l i g i b l e — b u t of t h e i r e l e m e n t a r y 4 7 c o n s t i t u e n t s this c a n n o t b e d o n e , s i n c e a d e f i n i t o r i a l a c c o u n t (ό όρος οριστικός) expresses an attributive relationship b e t w e e n s o m e t h i n g

46

For this use of ϋλη see my Index, s.v. For the sense of πρώτος with the c o n n o t a t i o n of άρχή see Bonitz, Index, 652b35-40. 47

and

something

one of

else,48

one

of which

playing the part of matter,

and

form.

Bostock (267) has correctly observed that in this passage Aristotle draws a moral, apparently b o t h f r o m this Anthisthenian-like puzzle a n d f r o m his own puzzle a b o u t m a n b e i n g two-footed plus animal ( 1043b 10-14), that a d e f i n i e n s must always have t h e ' t h i n g plus a t t r i b u t e ' f o r m . However, Bostock is of the o p i n i o n that the thesis that it is only t h e c o m p o u n d of f o r m in m a t t e r that is d e f i n a b l e , n e i t h e r f o r m taken by itself, n o r m a t t e r alone, is quite at o d d s with the bulk of Ζ 10, with Ζ 6 as s u m m a r i z e d at Ζ 11, 1037a33-b7, a n d with Ζ 4, 1030a7-14, t h o u g h it is entirely in a c c o r d a n c e with what was claimed in Η 2. For unlike, or r a t h e r opposite to Η 2-3, it was claimed in Ζ that it is only the f o r m that is definable, a n d that the c o m p o u n d is not. T h e discrepancy envisioned by Bostock disappears, o n c e we rem e m b e r the i m p o r t a n t distinction we have been arguing for between two kinds of d e f i n i e n s , o n e of the sole f o r m , o n e of the f o r m as e n m a t t e r e d . W h e n e v e r Aristotle opposes a thing's f o r m to its m a t t e r a n d leaves the thing taken as c o m p o u n d of f o r m a n d matter o u t of consideration (as is often the case in the Ζ passages), h e eo ipso thinks of d e f i n i n g a t h i n g ' s q u i d d i t y irrespective of its actually b e i n g e n m a t t e r e d , while in H, on the contrary, the f o r m q u a e n m a t t e r e d , i.e. i n c l u d i n g its material constitution, is u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n . This shift of attention n e e d not surprise us. T h e lengthy consideration of all the ins a n d outs of the f o r m - m a t t e r relationship has, as early as in the c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r of Ζ (17), resulted in a hard-won o u t c o m e : if the f o r m (είδος) is the claimant for the title ' t r u e ousia', any Platonic t h o u g h t of t r a n s c e n d e n c e can only b e expelled precisely by taking the eidos as the enmattered f o r m , a n d , consequently, by recognizing that a d e f i n i e n s of the thing the f o r m i n h e r e s in m u s t i n c l u d e the thing's material constitution. 4 9 In the last p a r a g r a p h ( p r e c e d i n g the c o n c l u d i n g statement of the c h a p t e r , 1 0 4 4 a l l - 1 4 ) , Aristotle presents a n o t h e r illustration of t h e peculiar position of ousia being, at t h e same time, some o n e thing a n d a u n i t of a plurality (duality) of constituents. T o b r i n g out this

48 Literally, "means (or indicates) something about something" (τί κατά τινός σημαίνει). For this procedure, my section 2.11. 49 As early as at Ζ 7, 1033al-5 and 8, 1033b24-26, a n d even in Ε 1, 1025b301026a6, the second kind of definiens, the o n e including material constitution, is found.

ambivalent f e a t u r e the comparison of ousia with αριθμός is, Aristotle takes it, most suitable. But his exposition seems to be a bit obscured as a result of t h e i n t e r m i n g l e d criticism of P y t h a g o r e a n s a n d Platonists. A correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Aristotle's view of αριθμός is a preliminary requisite. After discarding (1043b32-34) any i n c o r r e c t way of placing ο ύ σ ί α (taken as the c o m p o u n d thing or σύνολον, as in t h e previous paragraphs) a n d αριθμός on a par, f o u r points of analogy between the two are listed (1043b35-1044a1l): 5 0 (a) both are divisible until o n e arrives at indivisibles (b35-36); (b) b o t h lose their identity if a n y t h i n g is substracted f r o m or a d d e d to it (1043b36-1044a2); (c) both stand in n e e d of a unifying unity, some a g e n t in virtue of which it is έν έκ π ο λ λ ώ ν (1044a2-9); (d) n e i t h e r a d m i t of variations in d e g r e e ( 1 0 4 4 a 9 - l l ; t h e f a m o u s ' m o r e a n d less' p r i n c i p l e of t h e Platonists is h e r e alluded to. Let us start with the full text: Ibid. 3, 1043b32-1044a11: If ousiai are in a sense numbers, 51 it is in the previous sense, 52 and not, as some maintain, as series of units. A definiens, sure enough (γάρ), is a sort of number, since (a) it is divisible into indivisibles (every definiens being finite), and the same is true of number. And (b) just as, if you add or subtract anything (however small) from the things of which a counted quantity 53 consists, it is no longer the same number but a different one, so too a definiens expressing a thing's quiddity will no longer remain once anything has been added or subtracted. Further, (c) a number must be something in virtue of which it forms a unity 54 — they [i.e. our opponents] cannot, on their present assumption (νΰν), say owing to what it forms a unity — that is, if it is a unity at all. For either it is not, but is like a heap, or it really is a unity, and then it should be explained what it is that makes it one out of many. Likewise a definiens is a unity, and again they cannot explain this either. And this is a natural result; for the same ratio applies to both. And so ousiai are one in this way, not by being a kind of unit or indivisible point, as some say, but because each of them is a certain nature in actuality (έντελέχεια και φύσις τις εκάστη). Also (d) just as no number admits of being more or less, so 50

Ross II, 231; Burnyeat I, 20f. Ross's paraphrase (II, 231): "if n u m b e r s are substances", where (unlike in his r e n d e r i n g in the Oxford Translation) the definite article before ούσίαι is ignored, must be a slip of the pen. 52 Pace Burnyeat (22), ούτως refers back to what is said in 1043b4-14, n o t forward to what follows. (On p. 21 Burnyeat takes the adverb to refer back). 53 For the concrete sense of αριθμός ('applied n u m b e r ' ) see my section 12.33.^ 54 I have chosen the rendering 'forms a unit' on purpose, since the Greek φ είς is equally ambivalent, expressing not so much that by which the αριθμός is itself a unit as that owing to which the things taken together by it are a unit. 51

n e i t h e r d o e s t h e o u s i a t a k e n as f o r m (ή κ α τ ά τό ε ί δ ο ς ο ύ σ ί α ) , b u t if any ousia d o e s , it is t h e e n m a t t e r e d ousia.

N o t e first that, unlike in t h e cases (a), (b), a n d (c), the f o u r t h analogy bears on ousia taken as the sole f o r m a n d the a g e n t of unity, n o t the c o m p o u n d unity itself. Understandably, Bostock (269) takes lines 1044a9-ll to be s o m e t h i n g of an a f t e r t h o u g h t . It is o f t e n 5 5 asserted that these lines are at variance with Cat. 5, 3b33-4a9, where it is supposedly implied that n o t even the ousia taken together with its m a t t e r (ή μετά τής ύλης) can to a h i g h e r or lesser e x t e n t ( ' m o r e or less') be the ousia it actually is. However, it is wrongly assumed that t h e p h r a s e ή μετά τής ϋλης m e a n s the c o n c r e t e individual or σύνολον; it actually refers to the f o r m taken qua inhering in s o m e t h i n g . What Aristotle is trying to say is that even the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m q u a f o r m is not susceptible of being intensified or diminished, t h o u g h , of course, the c o m p o u n d is. For instance, Callias can b e c o m e m o r e a n d m o r e a h u m a n being, b u t the m a n h o o d i n h e r i n g in him c a n n o t be intensified. This d e v e l o p m e n t as a m a n d e p e n d s on his matter which increasingly gives in to the f o r m , m a n h o o d . Likewise, s o m e o n e may be m o r e a c o b b l e r than s o m e o n e else, but this does n o t m e a n that the f o r m e r ' s ' c o b b l e r h o o d ' is greater than the latter's. 5 6 O u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the general p u r p o r t of Aristotle's exposition mainly d e p e n d s on grasping the exact sense of αριθμός as o p p o s e d to ' o n e ' . Basically, άριθμός is o n e of the two c o u n t e r p a r t s of ' o n e ' . T h e e l e m e n t a r y n o t i o n ' o n e n e s s ' — which because of its close relationship to 'beingness' a n d 'definiteness' (and ' f i n i t u d e ' ) , plays a crucial role in Ancient t h o u g h t — is always used in a twofold opposition. O n t h e o n e h a n d it was o p p o s e d to chaotic, i m m e a s u r a b l e , abysmal plurality, which was b o u n d to p r o v o k e t h e well-known A n c i e n t s ' ' h o r r o r infmiti'. O n the o t h e r , it was the c o u n t e r p a r t of surveyable, orderly a n d c o u n t a b l e plurality. This is where the notion of αριθμός comes in. This word, which is never used to stand for what we call the ' n u m b e r ' one, 5 7 is basically associated with orderliness, a r r a n g e m e n t a n d countability. So it has the peculiar capability of bearing on (and a r r a n g i n g ) a plurality ( ' s o m e t h i n g m o r e - t h a n - o n e ' ) , a n d unifying that plurality; a n d , by the same token, m a k i n g it ' o n e ' in a way. For 55

Ross II, 234; Tredennick, ad loc.·, Burnyeat, 23. Pace Ackrill (1963), 89 re Cat. 5, 3b33ff. T h e correct explanation of this passage is found in Bostock, 270. 57 Greek εις, μία, εν (like Latin ' u n u s ' , ' u n a ' , ' u n u m ' ) are not themselves an άριθμός ( ' n u m e r u s ' ) , but the principle of counting; my sections 12.32-12.33. 56

instance, in the phrase ' t h r e e horses', the n u m b e r ' t h r e e ' c o n f i r m s the plurality of these horses, b u t at the same time it makes s o m e t h i n g o n e o u t of t h e m , viz. o n e trio, which, in turn, can serve as a m e a n s or principle of c o u n t i n g , e.g. c o u n t i n g thirty horses as ten trios. 5 8 In addition, a n d quite in line with Aristotle's semantics, the word, by way of metonymy, is also used for the things unified by the αριθμός as a unifying agent, so that, like English ' n u m b e r ' , Greek αριθμός may be b o t h n u m e r a l (Dutch 'getal') a n d series of things c o u n t e d (Dutch 'aantal'); see my section 12.32. O n this u n d e r s t a n d i n g , the t h r e e analogies (a), (b), a n d (c) are n o t only fully c o m p r e h e n s i b l e , but also a p p e a r to be well-chosen to illustrate the position of ο ύ σ ί α as sketched in 1 0 4 3 a l 9 - b l 4 a n d b2332. First, (a) the divisibility u p to a certain point, a n d n o f u r t h e r : this f e a t u r e brings a b o u t the situation that, j u s t like a unified series, each ousia is a c o m p o u n d , b u t s o m e t h i n g d e f i n i t e all the same, n o t an u n c o u n t a b l e plurality. T h e n , (b) t h e d e m a n d of integrity: j u s t as n u m b e r ( t h e n u m e r a l as well as t h e series) is b o u n d to lose its identity if s o m e t h i n g is a d d e d or substracted, ousia inevitably changes f r o m o n e thing to a n o t h e r if constituents are a d d e d or substracted. Finally, (c) j u s t as n u m b e r (the n u m e r a l as well as the series) requires a unifying a g e n t to be this n u m e r a l , say '8' c o m p o s e d of 8 'ones' 5 9 — a n d so the series in o r d e r to be this series is m a d e o u t of [x] entities — likewise ousia taken as c o m p o u n d (σύνολον) n e e d s an ontic agent, the f o r m , to b e a g e n u i n e unity c o m p o s e d of t h e plurality of its constituents. Bostock (268f.) does n o t seem very impressed by the comparison, the third analogy in particular. We may p e r h a p s think of Aristotle, h e surmises, "as h o l d i n g that we have t h r e e horses only w h e r e the three f o r m a group, n o t necessarily in any particular pattern, b u t at least so situated that they are all close to o n e a n o t h e r . Of course, such a view is mistaken, f o r t h r e e h o r s e s r e m a i n t h r e e however they may be scattered, but it would n o t be too surprising if Aristotle had failed to grasp this p o i n t " (268). This way of i n t e r p r e t i n g texts is astonishing: first assuming Aristotle to hold ' p e r h a p s ' such a view, next d e e m i n g it

58

Pace Burnyeat (22), who fails to see this and thinks be odd to say that the n u m b e r seven (e.g.) was a pnndple it numbered". 59 This is Aristotle's reply to the question he asked r e f e r e n c e to Plato's d o c t r i n e of n u m b e r s ("Why is a together, one?"). Cf. M 7, 1082a15-20.

that "it would in any case of unity a m o n g the things at Met. A 9, 992a1, with n u m b e r , when taken all

an o d d o n e , a n d winding u p by saying that Aristotle is inconsiderate e n o u g h to fail to grasp the oddity. 6 0 T h e c h a p t e r e n d s with a r o u g h o u t l i n e of what for the a u t h o r (Aristotle or his editor?) may have s e e m e d the main subjects of this chapter. 6 1

10. 5 Some observations on the identification of material constituents C h a p t e r 4 o p e n s (1044al5-32) with the observation that things may have d i f f e r e n t a p p r o p r i a t e material, as well as the same. So t h e matter a p p r o p r i a t e to phlegm is the sweet or the viscous (τά γλυκέα ή λ ι π α ρ ά ) , a n d for bile the bitter (τά πικρά). O n the o t h e r h a n d , it is possible f o r d i f f e r e n t things to c o m e f r o m the same m a t t e r if the cause which brings a b o u t the c h a n g e is d i f f e r e n t : thus f r o m wood b o t h a chest a n d a b e d may be m a d e . A third possibility is that the same thing is m a d e f r o m d i f f e r e n t matter; in these cases the skill a n d the efficient principle must be the same. T h e passage has raised some discussion in that the text also speaks of 'ultimate m a t t e r ' , which has b e e n mistaken by some (Ross II, 235, a n d Bostock, 272; cf. 73, a m o n g o t h e r interpreters) for the f a m o u s ' p r i m e m a t t e r ' . Bonitz was t h e first to reject that idea. 6 2 Burnyeat refrains f r o m putting Aristotle's exposition in terms of ' p r i m e matter' a n d rightly takes Aristotle's main c o n c e r n in this c h a p t e r to be to insist that you should not answer the τί έστι question (e.g. 'What is bile?') in a Presocratic style, by saying: 'Like everything else, it is e a r t h , water, etc.', b u t you s h o u l d give t h e specific or p r o x i m a t e matter, as is explicitly said in 1044b2-3 ( " O n e must give the nearest causes"). T h e m a i n p u r p o r t of the i n t r o d u c t o r y p a r a g r a p h is, I take it, to make clear that when we are d e f i n i n g a natural thing's essence, a n d looking for its material cause as P o n t i c principle, we should not be led astray by focussing on s o m e r e m o t e cause, but go straight for its 60 Bostock's distinction between abstract a n d applied n u m b e r s (267) is not conducive to a clear interpretation either. T h e given analogies equally apply to numerals and collections tbey are applied to. This is also ignored by Burnyeat: I, 21f. 61 Bostock's criticism of the summarizing sentence, which h e takes to be the work of a somewhat careless editor, is partly based on his mistaking the o p p o n e n t s ' "reduction of ούσίαι to numbers" (1044a13) for Aristotle's own view. Cf. Burnyeat II, 24. 62 See also Bemelmans (1995), 2If.

nearest cause (1044a32-b3). Some additional observations are m a d e o n the correct p r o c e d u r e as far as n a t u r a l ousiai (whether corruptible or eternal), a n d natural things that are n o t ousia, are c o n c e r n e d (1044b3-21). In this c o n t e x t , the d e f i n i t i o n of non-substantial things such as eclipses is of c o n c e r n . As is well known, the eclipse is a favourite e x a m p l e in Aristotle's doctrine of epistemonic proof. T h e pivotal role coincidental f o r m s may have as formal cause-and-principle of things' having attributes comes to the fore: Met. H 4, 1044b8-15: Things which are by nature, but are not themselves ousiai, do not have matter; what underlies them is the ousia. For instance, what is the cause of an eclipse?, what acts as its matter? It has none. Rather, the moon is that which is affected. And what is the efficient cause of the extinction of the light? The earth. The final cause does perhaps not exist. The formal cause (τό δ' ώς είδος) is that which is expressed by the definiens, but this is obscure if it does not include the cause. Thuscwe get the following procedure:»: What is an eclipse? A deprivation of light. And if one adds 'due to the earth coming in between', there you have the definiens including the cause. In the final p a r a g r a p h (bl5-20), Aristotle remarks that in the case of sleep it is difficult to d e t e r m i n e what precisely is primarily affected, i.e. what precisely is the underlying thing. Is it the animal? But if so, in virtue of what primarily? T h e heart, or s o m e t h i n g else. 6 3 As for the efficient cause, by what is sleep effected? F u r t h e r , what is the affection, speaking formally, that is to say, what is the affection of that part of the animal which is primarily affected? Is it a sort of immobility? No d o u b t , b u t to what process in the primary subject is this due? 6 4 W h a t this c h a p t e r has m a d e clear, t h e n , is t h a t t h e process of d e f i n i n g things, i n c l u d i n g c h a n g e s which they u n d e r g o by n a t u r e ('natural events'), requires p e o p l e to sharply discriminate the differe n t causes a n d the specific h y p o k e i m e n o n underlying these changes. T h e fifth c h a p t e r (1044b21-26) o p e n s with a r e m a r k o n t h e c o n t i n g e n t existence of certain entities, f o r m s a n d shapes (τά είδη καί αί μορφαί) 6 5 in particular, which at o n e time are a n d at a n o t h e r 63

In Somn. 2, 455a20-b25; 456a2-6, sleep is described as an affection of the heart qua primary seat of all perception (το αίσθητικόν πάντων) Its occurrence is explained in III, 457a33-458a10 (cf. PA II 7, 653a10-20); its final cause is relaxation, which is necessary for all animals. 64 T h e epistemonic p r o c e d u r e of this paragraph is a nice example of Aristode using the devices of focalization and categorization. 65 Following the reading of the Laurentianus and William of Moerbeke's exem-

time are not, a n d c a n n o t ever b e c a p t u r e d as b e i n g involved in a process of b e c o m i n g or passing away. 66 T h u s it is n o t the f o r m 'white' or 'whiteness' (τό λευκόν) that c o m e s to be, b u t the white piece of wood, supposing, that is, that everything that c o m e s to be c o m e s f r o m s o m e t h i n g a n d comes to be s o m e t h i n g . For this reason, to say that all opposites c o m e to be f r o m o n e a n o t h e r is an a m b i g u o u s way of p u t t i n g things. It is true, a pale m a n c o m e s f r o m a dark m a n as o n e opposite f r o m a n o t h e r . But when we say 'pale comes f r o m d a r k ' as o n e o p p o s i t e f r o m a n o t h e r , we m e a n s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t : the terminus a quo a n d the terminus ad quern in the latter expression are n o t the attributive f e a t u r e s — 'pale(ness) a n d dark(ness), respectively — b u t the things they i n h e r e in as their underlying things. 6 7 T h i s leads t h e a u t h o r to observe (b27-29) that, re ' u n d e r l y i n g thing', n o t all things have matter as an underlying thing, but only the things susceptible of g e n e r a t i o n a n d reciprocal transformation. T h e things j u s t m e n t i o n e d , which at o n e time are a n d at a n o t h e r are n o t without actually being involved in a process of g e n e r a t i o n or c o r r u p tion, have n o matter. Two p r o b l e m s c o n c e r n i n g the position of m a t t e r in reciprocal t r a n s f o r m a t i o n are raised, a n d tentatively solved. O n e bears o n the relationship of the opposites to a thing's matter. Supposing the body is potentially healthy, a n d disease is the opposite of health, must the body be potentially b o t h healthy a n d sick? And is water potentially both wine a n d vinegar? O r is it r a t h e r the matter of the o n e in virtue of its state a n d f o r m , a n d of the o t h e r in virtue of the privation of t h a t state a n d a decay t h a t is c o n t r a r y to its n a t u r e (b29-34)?. Apparently, Aristotle m e a n s to say that the body qua h y p o k e i m e n o n r e m a i n s the same, b u t s h o u l d be r e g a r d e d f r o m d i f f e r e n t angles, c o r r e s p o n d i n g to the process of the (incidental) transformation; a n d the same holds for the water-wine-vinegar e x a m p l e . Notice that in p o i n t of fact it is i n f o r m e d matter that is u n d e r consideration, as also e n m a t t e r e d forms that are involved in the process of change.

plar. For μορφή as formal principle and its juxtaposition to είδος see Bonitz, Index, 474a28-56, and a57-b7 (μορφή as dynamic internal power). 66 Met. Η 3, 1043bl4-16. At Ε 3, 1027a29-30, principles and causes are claimed to be of this kind. Cf. Met. Β 5, 1002a32-35, where there is talk of mathematical entities ("Points, lines, and planes, though they are at o n e time and at another are not, cannot be in process of being either generated or destroyed"); notice that in the present chapter points are also instantiated (at 1044b22). 67 See the semantic Main Rules; my section 1.71.

T h e o t h e r p r o b l e m is closely related to the previous one. Why is wine n o t the matter of vinegar, n o r potentially vinegar, a l t h o u g h vinegar comes f r o m wine? T h e same holds for the transformation f r o m living body to corpse. These questions, too are only tentatively answered. Perhaps, Aristotle suggests, the reason is that the decay is s o m e t h i n g coincidental. Along this line of t h o u g h t , it is n o t the animal itself, b u t its m a t t e r that is also, by decay, the matter a n d potentiality of the corpse. Likewise, it is not the wine but the water that is the matter of the vinegar. Their occurrence may be c o m p a r e d to the way night comes f r o m day. 68 Matter always acts as an intermediate thing between animal a n d corpse, a n d between wine and vinegar (1044b34-1045a6). 69 Burnyeat (37) has rightly observed that the t h e m e of opposites changing into o n e a n o t h e r provides the somewhat t e n u o u s connection with the first half of the c h a p t e r . H e may also be right in d e e m i n g H 5 "a bitty and unsatisfactory c h a p t e r containing n o new material of any great interest". N o n e the less, it continues, in its own peculiar way, the stream of t h o u g h t of the previous chapters, dealing with the b r o a d e r p r o b l e m of f r a m i n g a definiens including that of matter. What H 5 is c o n c e r n e d with is the position of matter, not, this time, in the case of things being, b u t in their becoming. T h u s o n e can understand the editor's motive for putting this text into Book H.

10. 6 The unity of the definiens finally stated T h e concluding c h a p t e r of Book H o p e n s (1045a8-14) with a clear exposition of the p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g the unity of the definiens by 68

T h e c o m m o n substratum of day and night may be the air (cf. Met. Λ 4,

1070b21). 69

I agree with Burnyeat (II, 38) that, pace Ross, at 1045a3-4 (μεταβάλλει εις ά λ λ ή λ α ) n o m e n t i o n is m a d e of reciprocal transformation as far as wine a n d vinegar, or animal and corpse are concerned, but only that from vinegar to wine or corpse to living thing ( m e n t i o n e d at a4-6). For the unilateral use of άλλήλων see Thucydides III, 81: "Most of the suppliants [...] set about destroying o n e a n o t h e r (διεφθείρον άλλήλους) [...]; for father slew son (...)"; Theophrast, Metaph. 5b25 (εις άλλήλας τάς μεταβολάς), where the particular instances of changes of o n e element into the other are discussed (Van Raalte, 1993, 235); Arist. Cat. 3, lbl6-17: ' T h e differentiae of genera which are different and not subordinate o n e to the other ....", where the subordination is not mutual (as usually happens with subordination, for that matter). In this connection Bostock (278) raises a fascinating, but irrelevant question: "It seems very probable that Aristotle did believe that animals, such as maggots, may come from corpses. Did he also believe that wine may come from vinegar?".

putting it in the b r o a d e r context of the previous discussions of Z, chs. 10ff., a n d H, chs. 1-3. In the case of all things which have several parts a n d in which the whole (τό ολον) is s o m e t h i n g over a n d above their parts, a n d n o t just the sum of t h e m all, like a heap, there must always be s o m e cause of their unity. O f f e r i n g an evident e x a m p l e of what I have in m i n d , 7 0 Aristotle i n t e n d s to say, t h e r e is the case of bodies, where the cause is sometimes contact, sometimes stickiness, or some o t h e r affection of this sort. T h e unity of a d e f i n i e n s , however, is special, since it is an account that is o n e not by being b o u n d together (ού σ υ ν δ έ σ μ φ ) , as for instance the Iliad is, b u t by expressing something that already is by itself a unity. In o t h e r words, in the case of quidditative units, it is n o t the act of defining, but the d e f i n i e n d u m itself that f o u n d s the unity of the definiens. 7 1 This raises the question what it is that has m a d e this s o m e t h i n g a unity r a t h e r than a plurality; e.g. what makes a m a n a unity r a t h e r than a plurality consisting o f ' a n i m a l ' a n d 'two-footed'? This p r o b l e m is especially a c u t e to t h e Platonists, w h o claim that t h e r e are a n 'Animal-itself a n d a 'Two-footed-itself ; for why does m a n participate, n o t in o n e single Form, 'Man-itself, but in two, ' A n i m a l h o o d ' a n d 'Two-footedness'? T o p u t it generally, m a n ( n o m a t t e r w h e t h e r the particular or the Platonic Form, Man is m e a n t ) 7 2 would be not o n e , but a c o m b i n a t i o n consisting in ' a n i m a l ' plus 'two-footed' (1045a1420). Alluding to his exposition in Η 2-3, Aristotle p r o c e e d s (1045a2033) to claim that any p r o b l e m will vanish if we explain the unity in terms of actuality (form) a n d potentiality (matter). Next h e goes on to illustrate this by his favourite semantic ί μ ά τ ι ο ν device, this time a p p l i e d to t h e case of the b r o n z e n s p h e r e . 7 3 S u p p o s i n g that this 70 Burnyeat (II, 39) rightly claims that probably καί is used to i n t r o d u c e a striking example, rather than to suggest that bodies are the weakest examples of unity (Ross, and Bostock ad loc.). 71 Cf. Ζ 12, 1037b24-27, where it is explicitly stated that a thing's p r o p e r definiens must express something that is one. 72 I think we need not be puzzled (with Burnyeat II, 39f.) about what is meant by ' m a n ' here, either the particular or the Platonic Form, because for Plato too, the c o m m u n i o n of Forms takes place in their i m m a n e n t status, not in the transcendent Realm; De Rijk (1986), 122-5; 134-9. 73 My section 9.32. That in speaking of ' r o u n d bronze', Aristotle has 'bronzen sphere' in mind — or is h e actually pointing to some particular sphere in the class room? — a p p e a r s f r o m a32-33; cf. Burnyeat II, 41. O n this assumption, the problem raised by Bostock (282) disappears. He points out that ' r o u n d bronze' is merely a coincidental c o m p o u n d , like pale man. But if there is talk of a sphere (or ball) the roundness is an essential property.

single n a m e , ί μ ά τ ι ο ν , w h e n used to stand f o r the d e f i n i e n s of the c o m p o u n d entity ' r o u n d b r o n z e ' , is apt to r e p r e s e n t the unity of this entity, t h e n what we are looking for (τό ζητούμενον) when it comes to explaining the unity will be the cause of the r o u n d n e s s a n d the bronze b e i n g s o m e o n e thing. If we p u t things this way, the p r o b l e m disappears, because evidently o n e c o m p o n e n t is the c o m p o u n d ' s matter or potentiality, the o t h e r its f o r m (μορφή) or actuality. T h u s the question b e c o m e s : 'What is the cause of what is potentially now being in actuality, alongside the efficient cause in the case of things that are g e n e r a t e d ? ' 7 4 Now t h e r e is n o o t h e r cause of the potential s p h e r e ' s b e i n g an actual s p h e r e b u t the essences of b o t h constituents, t h e b r o n z e a n d the s p h e r e ; f o r the essence of b r o n z e entails its b e i n g potentially a sphere, while the s p h e r e ' s essence allows its potency to be materialized in bronze. 7 5 By thus explaining the cause of unity, the a u t h o r has taken u p the previous issue (Z, chs. 12 a n d 17) of the d e f i n i e n s including matter, a n d h e r e m i n d s us of the distinction between intelligible a n d sensible m a t t e r m a d e b e f o r e , at Ζ 10, 1 0 3 6 a 9 - l l . 7 6 As we have stated when c o m m e n t i n g o n these lines, by 'intelligible m a t t e r ' (ϋλη νοητή) Aristotle u n d e r s t a n d s the g e n e r a l condition of material constitution falling to all material things, a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g c o n d i t i o n of extensionality which belongs to objects in mathematical abstraction. Although in the p r e s e n t illustration of intelligible matter ("a circle is a plane figure"; 1045a35) the material e l e m e n t of the circle — which is c o m m o n to o t h e r circles, w h e t h e r of the same or of d i f f e r e n t size), as well as o t h e r planimetral figures — is at the same time the generic e l e m e n t , t h e r e is n o t h i n g to c o m p e l us to assume, with Ross a n d some others, that 'intelligible m a t t e r ' has h e r e a somewhat different, 74

Deleting at 1045a31 (with Burnyeat II, 40f., Bostock, 39, a n d Ross, in the Oxford Translation) the comma after ποίησαν. 75 T h e c o m m o n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n (Alexander CAG I, p. 562 1 0 ; Ross II, 238; Tredennick, 424, note a; Burnyeat II, 41), to the effect that it is the essence of the potential s p h e r e to b e c o m e the actual sphere, a n d of the actual s p h e r e to be generated f r o m the potential sphere, is rightly rejected by Bostock (284); in line with this a r g u m e n t , the constituents, bronze (matter or potentiality) and sphere (form or actuality), are intended. However, Bostock fails to see the point at issue, it seems, saying that "it is not part of the essence of the bronze that it should be a sphere". Surely, to be potentially a sphere is part of its essence. 76 In my view, the lines 45a33-35 should be immediately connected with the previous lines on matter and potentiality as the essential ingredients for there to be an ontic unity made up, which is to be adequately expressed in a p r o p e r definiens. At a36 a fresh start is made by embarking on the problem how to conceive of the unity of what is without any matter.

analogous m e a n i n g , namely genus. I think Bostock (284f.) is right in taking the lines 1045a33-35 to m e a n that after Aristotle has j u s t been talking of d e f i n i n g a spherical piece of bronze, he is r e m i n d e d that the d e f i n i e n s of a m a t h e m a t i c a l entity too includes matter. O n the unitary i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of 'intelligible m a t t e r ' in Ζ a n d H, t h e n , the illustration that a circle is a p l a n e figure aims to indicate that the plane is the intelligible matter of which spheres are m a d e . "Different circles differ f r o m o n e a n o t h e r by b e i n g ' m a d e o f d i f f e r e n t parts of the plane" (Bostock, 284). Next, by shifting attention f r o m the logical unity of the d e f i n i e n s to t h e ontic unity of things that c o n t a i n n o m a t t e r whatsoever, a difficult p r o b l e m is addressed. T o p u t this p r o b l e m differently, what use would there be in g u a r a n t e e i n g the unity of f o r m a n d matter of things if you d o n o t know how the f o r m by itself — to Aristotle, the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m taken in abstraction f r o m its sensible matter, a n d even f r o m its condition o f ' m a t e r i a l i t y ' ('intelligible m a t t e r ' ) , to the Platonists, the transcendent Forms — is a unity? This is a major philosophical p r o b l e m . 7 7 Aristotle's exposition c o n t a i n s s o m e valuable indications c o n c e r n i n g his basic ontological tenets. Let us give the floor to Aristotle, first: Met. Η 6, 1045a36-b7: But things that have no matter, either sensible or intelligible, are at once (εύθύς) 78 something one, without qualification (οπερ εν τι), each of them, just like they are also some what-itprecisely-is-to-fe (δπερ öv τι)· I mean precisely to be a subsistent entity, or be a quality, or be a quantity. That is why neither the ^ e l e m e n t nor the one-element occurs in the definiens, and also a what-being-is is at once something one, as something be-ing too. That is also why, for any of them, there is no further cause of their being some one thing, or of their being something be-ing. Each is at once something 6e-ing and something one, and not because fe?-ing or one should be their genus, nor because they should be separable from particulars. What Aristotle means to say is: (a) T h e various f o r m s of be-ing a n d being-one, as they are classified in the ten categories of ie-ing — a n d being-one, we may a d d — are by their own n a t u r e a unity, without r e q u i r i n g an outside agent. Pace 77

I am afraid that Burnyeat's diametrically different approach to this paragraph would put us, as it has d o n e him, on the wrong track. By directly linking u p this paragraph with the previous arguments, he says (II, 42): "There is even less of a problem about the unity of items which do not have a material c o m p o n e n t to be unified with an actuality. They are immediately one". I have to agree that Aristotle brings u p the issue by solving the problem at the outset. 78 I.e. by their own nature, without anything else effective of the unification.

Ross (II, 238), the categories as summa genera are n o t i n t e n d e d , b u t any particular categorized according to o n e or m o r e of the categories of being. Consequently, it is m o d e s of being, taken in abstracto, that are meant. This position entails three corollaries: (b) Since each categorial m o d e of be-ing comprises t h e ôe-element a n d t h e orae-element in itself, these e l e m e n t s are n o t explicitly expressed in a t h i n g ' s definiens. T h u s m a n is d e f i n e d as 'two-footed a n i m a l ' , n o t as 'two-footed-being animal-being', o r 'two-footed-one animal-one', in spite of the fact, as has b e e n said m o r e t h a n once, 7 9 t h a t ' m a n ' e q u a l s ' m a n - b e i n g ' , ' a n i m a l ' ' a n i m a l - b e i n g ' etc., a n d ' m a n ' equals 'man-being-one' etc. (c) N o formal ontic e l e m e n t of the particular things requires a cause f o r their o n e n e s s o r beingness. Such an e l e m e n t is itself be-ing a n d one, a n d a l t h o u g h its be-mg is a special m o d e of be-ing a n d being-one, this d o e s n o t m e a n t h a t ' b e ' a n d ' o n e ' s h o u l d be t h e i r g e n e r i c elements (which they definitely are not, since ' b e ' a n d ' o n e ' are not a genus). 8 0 (d) J u s t like ' b e ' a n d ' o n e ' c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d f r o m t h e f o r m a l m o d e s of be-ing, they are n o t separable f r o m the particular things. 8 1 T h e p r o b l e m of the ' b a r e f o r m ' as against its f u n d a m e n t a l relationship to matter a n d being e n m a t t e r e d , which presents itself to any metaphysician, n o m a t t e r of what school, has led to various unsatisfactory answers (1045b7-16). S o m e c a m e to talk of ' p a r t i c i p a t i o n ' (μέθεξις), but they are at a loss w h e n asked what participation is or what its cause is. O t h e r s have spoken of ' c o m m u n i o n ' (συνουσία), for instance the sophist L y c o p h r o n , who says that knowledge is the c o m m u n i o n of the act of knowing with the soul; o t h e r s again call b e i n g alive ' t h e composition or tying t o g e t h e r (σύνθεσιν ή σύνδεσμον) of soul with body'. In fact, the same a c c o u n t applies in all cases. E.g. b e i n g h e a l t h y will b e t h e c o m m u n i o n , tying t o g e t h e r , o r composition of a soul a n d health; that the b r o n z e is a triangle will be

79

My section 1.64. APo. II 7, 92b14; Met. Β 3, 998b22, Δ 28, 1024b9-16, I 2, 1053b22-24. Elsewhere Aristotle has n o worries about seemingly contradicting himself by using in similar contexts the term γένος in a slightly different sense. Guthrie (VI, 205, n . l ) is right in observing that it is typical of Aristotle that at An. II 1, 412a6, h e is speaking of ο ύ σ ί α as γένος εν τι τών όντων (cf. Phys. I 6, 189a14: ή δ' ούσία εν τι γένος), whereas at Met. Ζ 1, 1028a30, it is 'not some being but being primarily and simply'; and o n e can see, Guthrie correctly adds, what he means in either case. 81 This ontological assessment is at the b a c k g r o u n d of Aristotle's favourite conceptual analysis throughout. 80

the composition of" b r o n z e a n d triangle, as b e i n g white will be the composition of whiteness a n d a surface. Aristotle d o e s n o t hesitate to give the diagnosis, a n d o f f e r the r e m e d y (1045b 16-23). All these p e o p l e fail to see the pivotal role of potentiality a n d actuality, a n d h e n c e are u n a b l e to explain the o n e ness in things, which should be expressed in their p r o p e r definiens, b e c a u s e they a r e looking f o r such mutually exclusive things as a 'unifying g r o u n d ' c o n c e r n i n g potentiality a n d actuality, as well as the contrast between t h e m . T h u s they miss the decisive point, namely that the ultimate (or proximate) matter a n d the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m are o n e a n d the same thing, the o n e b e i n g it potentially, the o t h e r in actuality. H e n c e it is as if they were asking what the cause is of o n e n e s s a n d b e i n g o n e ; but, as we have j u s t seen, this is senseless, because each thing is o n e , a n d the potential a n d the actual are in a way o n e . T h e r e f o r e t h e r e is n o o t h e r cause, except, of course, the efficient cause r e q u i r e d for b r i n g i n g a b o u t the c h a n g e f r o m p o t e n tiality to actuality. But, as has b e e n sufficiently e x p l a i n e d in t h e previous p a r a g r a p h s , all things which have n o m a t t e r are, without f u r t h e r qualification, j u s t s o m e o n e t h i n g (άπλώς οπερ έν τι). In o t h e r words, b e i n g o n e is the metaphysical feature that precedes any categorial modification. This conclusion of the Z-H discussion signals Aristotle's tenacity in f o r w a r d i n g his own ontological position. Ross (II, 238) has well observed that the certain a m o u n t of repetition, 8 2 which must strike the reader, even within Η 6 itself, is for the sake of emphasis. T h e a u t h o r takes great pains to make clear that the o t h e r thinkers were n o t u p to solving the "hardest a n d most u r g e n t of all p r o b l e m s " (Met. Β 4, 999a24), which bears on the r e l a t i o n s h i p in the things outside between what is the (unknowable) strictly individual a n d what is knowable, a relationship which, as f o u n d e d u p o n their complementarity, must n o t jeopardize the thing's oneness. Since n o n e of his competitors h a d the right view of f o r m as actuality a n d matter as potentiality, they inevitably got stuck in unsatisfactory a t t e m p t s a n d would-be solutions, such as 'participation', ' c o m p o s i t i o n ' , or 'tying t o g e t h e r ' . T h e y failed to see that o n e d o e s n o t n e e d an e x p l a n a t i o n for the o n e n e s s of the potential a n d the actual (1045b 16-17), a n d by missing this crucial p o i n t , they s o u g h t b o n d s to h o l d the two ontic constituents together, and, in the logical d o m a i n , to g u a r a n t e e the unity 82

E.g. Aristotle's previous rejection of participation as effective of unity in Z, 12, 1037b 18-24; Ζ 14, 1039b2-6.

of the definiens. 8 3 But r a t h e r than o p t i n g for some mysterious unifying cause, o n e should look instead, as Aristotle never ties of insisting, for the i m m a n e n t cause in thing [*], which is a potential [y], which causes [x]'s potency to be actualized — to t u r n into [y]. This cause, then, is o n e aspect of [x]'s dynamic eidos. 8 4 Before pursuing Aristotle's expositions of the final book (Θ) of the c e n t r a l p a r t of t h e Metaphysics, it seems worthwhile to insert an excursus on some controversial issues c o n c e r n i n g the books Ζ a n d H.

10. 7 An excursus on three controversial issues in Met. Z-H As we have r e m a r k e d u p o n b e f o r e , f o r Aristotle t h e m a i n metaphysical p r o b l e m is how to explain true knowledge (έπιστήμη), given (a) his u n s h a k e a b l e metaphysical p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e r e is n o real universal entity, a n d (b) his loyalty to the basic Ancient conviction that t h e r e is n o true knowledge or definition of the particular, since t h e r e can be n e i t h e r knowledge n o r definition of the ever-changing. F r o m as early as Socrates's days, t r u e knowledge was substantially

83 Burnyeat II, 43f. Bostock (286f.) wrongly reduces the whole issue to "just ordinary predication", and refers to Lycophron's peculiar "concern with the 'is' of predication" criticized by Aristotle at Phys. I 2, 185b27-28. But, firstly, this merely bears on the logical aspect of what is essentially a metaphysical problem; and, secondly, from the viewpoint of logic, it is not sentence predication and statement that are involved, but the broader issue of attribution and appellation (naming). So his blaming (287) Aristotle for not having made clear that "these remarks on predication are at all relevant to his topic in this chapter, the problem of the unity of the definition", is ill-founded, and is yet a n o t h e r reason to abandon the commentators' persistent habit of explaining Aristotle's statement-making utterances in terms of sentence predication of the 'S is P' form, and his definitorial phrases ('definientia' in their capacity of incomplete assertibles) as fully-fledged definitions. For the important, and often decisive role of (complete and incomplete) assertibles, as opposed to assertions, in Aristotle see my section 2.16. Remarkably e n o u g h , Bostock seems to have been quite close to the correct understanding of the semantic issue when continuing (ibid.): "The answer can only be that he is presuming that the unity of the proposition 'the bronze is r o u n d ' [there is at 1045a26-28 no talk at all of a proposition, but merely of naming, De Ä.] carries with it the item referred to by 'the r o u n d bronze', and that this in turn carries with it the unity of the proposed definition [read 'definiens'] 'a r o u n d bronze'. [...]. T h e phrase 'a r o u n d bronze' is regarded as itself a phrase in which a form (signified by ' r o u n d ' ) is predicated [not as a sentential predicate, clearly, but as an attributive appellation; De R.] of matter (signified by ' b r o n z e ' ) . So we may generalize a n d say that any definition [read 'definiens'; De Ä.] which predicates form of matter in this way will define a unity". In point of fact, Bostock's 'revised' Aristotle comes very close to the genuine one. 84 At Ζ 13, 1038b5-7 the hypokeimenon is significantly described in terms of potentiality.

associated with d e f i n i n g a thing's eidos, a n d , so to speak, discarding or neutralizing the thing's matter. T h e metaphysical p r o b l e m , t h e n , in principle c o n c e r n s the position of matter. It is b r a n c h e d o u t in t h r e e o v e r l a p p i n g p r o b l e m a t i c issues: (1) Is t h e i m m a n e n t f o r m universal or particular?, (2) Is m a t t e r the principle of individuation?, a n d (3) Should matter be included in the definiens? A m o n g m o d e r n interpreters these t h r e e issues are highly controversial. Small w o n d e r i n d e e d because o n e ' s answers to these questions are representative of the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s personal view c o n c e r n i n g the main subject matter of the central books of the Metaphysics.

10. 71 Again, the particular status of the immanent form F r e d e & Patzig rightly p r e f a c e their t r e a t m e n t of the first question with e m p h a s i z i n g that Aristotle uses t h e t e r m ε ί δ ο ς in two m a i n senses, o n e the ontic f o r m which intrinsically causes a thing to b e precisely what it is, the o t h e r the species that is c o m m o n to whatever possesses t h e same f o r m . 8 5 T h e a m b i v a l e n c e 8 6 of the term clearly c o m e s to the f o r e in a s t a t e m e n t in Book A, in which the two senses occur side by side without offering any difficulty to the reader: Met. A 5, 1071a27-29: These things [i.e. the causes and principles of things] in the same species are different, not specifically (εϊδει), but in the sense that the causes and principles of the particulars (τών καθ' εκαστον) are something different, your matter and form (είδος) and moving cause being different from mine, while in their universal definiens (τω καθόλου δε λόγω) they are the same. Many o t h e r passages can be a d d u c e d in s u p p o r t of the thesis that each thing's i m m a n e n t f o r m is some particular f o r m p r o p e r to it a n d to n o t h i n g else. 87 All this evidence should be evaluated in the context 85 Frede & Patzig I, 48f. I am much indebted for the present paragraph to the excellent discussions they have devoted to this problem throughout their commentary on Book Ζ: I, 48-57; II, 12-5; 147f.; 177; 189-91; 202; 241; 244-7; 283; 303, all in all providing us with a wealth of evidence for the position argued for here. 86 I prefer 'ambivalence' to Frede & Patzig's 'equivocity' ('Mehrdeutigkeit'); my section 1.72. I cannot therefore go the whole way with them, when they ask why Aristotle made no attempt to avoid the 'equivocity'. T h e ambivalence, for that matter, is a good thing in that it associates, rather than confuses two closely related features, 'possessing a specific form' and 'sharing this feature with other particulars'. My section 1.72. 87 First and foremost the evidence put forward by Heinaman (1973, 297-303) should be referred to in support of Aristotle's assuming the existence of individual instances of properties, outside Cat. : Top. I 9, 103b29-37; IV 6, 127a20-25; Phys. V 4, 228a3-12; VII 1, 242al6-b41; Long. vit. 2, 465al9-26; EN I 6, 1097a! 1-13; see also

of what G u t h r i e (VI, 103) has t e r m e d "Aristotle's inviolable c o m m o n sense postulate, the primacy of the particular" (his italics). G u t h r i e has well observed (ibid.) that with this postulate "goes the picture of the p h i l o s o p h e r e x a m i n i n g the things a r o u n d him in o r d e r to abstract, by m e a n s of a logical analysis, certain c o m m o n features which exist — in the things b u t n o t otherwise — which can n o n e the less be r e g a r d e d in abstraction f r o m t h e m by the m i n d a n d will explain their nature". T h e cognitional p r o c e d u r e involved is h i n t e d at by Aristotle m o r e than o n c e . At Met. Ζ 10, 1036a5-8, h e claims that particulars are n o t d e f i n e d , b u t a p p r e h e n d e d by sensation a c c o m p a n i e d by ' i n t u i t i o n ' (νους), a n d also s p o k e n of ( ' a p p e l l a t e d ' ) a n d known t h r o u g h the t h i n g ' s (universal) definiens. Elsewhere (APo. II 19, 100al6-b3) h e tells us that sensation of the particular directly puts us in touch with what is universal a n d c o m m o n ; for seeing the particular, Callias, we obtain o u r first awareness of ' m a n ' . 8 8 However, o n e may still c h a r g e Aristotle with failing to clarify the n a t u r e of the act of abstracting the universal f r o m what is particular, a n d the role of intuitive cognition which seems so indispensable for the process of abstraction, b u t we should n o t ignore the n u m e r o u s hints at the forms' particular status, which are to be f o u n d in what h e is actually asserting. H e r e a r e s o m e m o r e a r g u m e n t s in s u p p o r t of t h e ' p a r t i c u l a r f o r m s ' thesis. 8 9 Aristotle o f t e n 9 0 calls the i m m a n e n t f o r m a τόδε τι, which implies that it is s o m e t h i n g particular, as has b e e n s t a n d a r d lore for Aristotle f r o m as early as the Categories (5, 3bl0-14). T h e f o r m

Met. Ν 2, 1089b20-32, where the issue of individual, non-substantial instances is addressed in the context of Aristotle's polemic with Plato. As is well known, in Cat. Aristotle admits individual instances of non-substantial modes of being as well, e.g. 5, 2a34-b5 and b37-3a6; 3a29-32 and 4a 10-16; 6, 5a33-35; 8, 10b26-29. See also the clear discussion of this issue in Wedin (1978), and H a f e m a n n (1998), 225; 233f.. 88 Also EN VI 12, 1143b4-5. Cf. the use ofGiyvaveiv ('to touch') at Met. Θ 10, 1051b24-25; Λ 7, 1072b20-21. 89 Sellars (1967), 118ff.; Frede & Patzig I, 52-4; also their discussions of a great n u m b e r of passages of Met. Z. Cf. Heinaman (1973), whose argument is unhappily obscured, though, by his sticking to the inappropriate idea of sentence predication, instead of using the generic device o f ' a p p e l l a d o n ' or 'designation'. 90 Met. A 8, 1017b25; Ζ 3, 1029a28-29; Η 1, 1042a29; Θ 7, 1049a35; Λ 3, 1070a1113 (cf. a31-33: "Causes and principles are in a sense different for different things, but in a n o t h e r sense, speaking generally a n d analogically, they are the same for all"); GA I 3, 318b32. Ross I, 310 re 1017b25: T h e form is said to be τόδε τι. It is more often the concrete unity of matter and form that is so described, but form is the element that gives individual character, and so the form is sometimes called τόδε τι. (Cf. H 1042a29, Θ 1049a35, Λ 1070a11, 13-15, GC 318b32).

is sometimes 9 1 designated as ΰποκείμενον, which again implies particularness. F u r t h e r m o r e , his claim 9 2 that it is possible for a f o r m to exist at o n e time, a n d n o t at a n o t h e r , can only be u n d e r s t o o d as h o l d i n g of particular forms, which are destructible as such, whereas the preservation of t h e species is d u e to r e p r o d u c t i o n . 9 3 In this context, the lines Ζ 7, 1032a24-25, should be i n t e r p r e t e d as stating "that f r o m which they (i.e. c h a n g e a b l e things) c o m e into being is a n a t u r e ( φ ύ σ ι ς ) a n d so, too is that in a c c o r d a n c e with which they c o m e to be — since what c o m e s into b e i n g possesses a n a t u r e , for instance a plant or an animal — a n d so too is that by which they are b r o u g h t into being". 9 4 Moreover, Aristotle o f t e n speaks of the f o r m taken universally, which implies that prior to this logical m a n i p u l a tion, it lacks universality. Again, on several o t h e r occasions, the f o r m is explicitly called the t h i n g ' s own a n d p r o p e r f o r m , e.g. at Ζ 13, 1038b10: "the ousia of a thing is peculiar to it". In the same c h a p t e r Aristotle claims that n o ousia can be c o m p o s e d of universals, because a universal signifies a quale, not a this. Obviously this claim should be viewed as linked u p with the thesis that n o n e ousia is itself universal either. Likewise at Met. M 2, 1977b12-27, t h e r e is talk of particular i m m a n e n t εϊδη; Cleary (1995), 305. Any c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t against t h e above thesis plays o n t h e A n c i e n t r e q u i r e m e n t also a d h e r e d to by Aristotle, that the p r o p e r object of any definition a n d g e n u i n e knowledge is what is universal; 91

Met. Ζ 3, 1029a3; Η 1, 1042a28-29. Met. Ζ 8, 1033b6; 15, 1039b23-26; cf. H 5, 1044b21f.; Λ 3, 1070a15-17. 93 An. II 4, 415a26-b8: "Life's functions are reproduction and the assimilation of food [...] viz. to reproduce a n o t h e r like itself, an animal producing an animal, and a plant a plant, in order that, as far as its nature allows, they may have a share in the immortal and the divine; all things, then, strive for this. [...] Since, then, they cannot share in the immortal and the divine by continuity of existence, because n o perishable thing can forever remain numerically o n e and the same, they try to achieve that end in the only way they can. [...] What persists is not the thing itself, but s o m e t h i n g like itself, numerically not o n e , but specifically one". "Form is eternal only by virtue of the never-failing succession of its embodiments:", as Ross (1949, 175) puts it; cf. Met Ζ 15, 1039b20-27. In particular, the biological works offer overwhelming evidence for the particular status of i m m a n e n t είδος. See e.g. Balme (1987), 291-306; (1990), 49-54. However, Balme (1987, 20) is wrong in saying that in HA Aristotle had to solve a grave problem arising in Met. Z, in particular the "paradox of [...] the snub nose, of the indefinable individual". In actual fact, if there were any paradox in Met Ζ it already collapsed there. What the biological works provide us with is a corroboration of what can be gathered from the observations in Met. Ζ on account of the metaphysical status of i m m a n e n t forms. For some related doctrinal concordance see Cooper (1990), 55-84, and Frede (1990), 113-29. 92

94

Forms d o not come into being (γίγνεσθαι), but rather 'make their appearance' (έπιγίγνεσθαι); see Frede & Patzig II, 136f.; 202f.

a n d that the thing's eidos, which is such an object when it comes to genuinely knowing a thing, must, therefore, be universal, n o t particular. I c a n n o t u n d e r s t a n d why even F r e d e Sc Patzig (I, 55f.) see a baffling p r o b l e m lurking here. 9 5 Again, the sole intricate p r o b l e m is how to explain the ins a n d outs of the abstraction process of p r o d u c ing a universal f o r m o u t of a particular, which is j u s t as mystifying as Plato's 'fixing o n e ' s eyes on t h e Idea or F o r m ' (as e.g. in Rep. X, 596B7). But however u n c l e a r all this may be, as far as the particular status of t h e i m m a n e n t f o r m s is c o n c e r n e d , it suffices to stress the distinction between t h e logical a n d ontological d o m a i n s . It is n o t surprising that as soon as the logical d o m a i n of defining a n d knowing is b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , the eidos taken universally, as a purely logical tool, that is, c o m e s into focus. T o d e f i n e a thing a n d to take it o n e way or a n o t h e r are m e n t a l actions, which as such d o n o t necessarily d e p e n d on t h e various ways in which t h e (putative) objects a r e ( t h o u g h t to be) in existence. It is a l o n g these lines that we should u n d e r s t a n d Aristotle's speaking of ' f o r m s taken generally or universally', a n d 'universal forms'. 9 6 95 In their account of the supposed counter-arguments, they rightly assess them as concerning Aristotle's philosophic tenets themselves. In point of fact, the opponents of the above thesis intend to d e f e n d Aristotle against himself, and even go so far as to ignore unmistakable textual evidence. See e.g. Bostock, 185-90; 217f. In a "Note" to Burnyeat II, 26-31, R.W. Sharpies understandably reduces the 'Whether particular or universal' controversy to o n e of terminology rather than of substance. He discusses "the claim that we may represent Aristotle's thought more accurately by speaking not of form as universal, possessed by all members of a given natural kind, but rather of individual forms in each m e m b e r of a natural kind, forms identical in kind and differing only numerically". He meets the objections made by Lloyd (1970, 522) in particular, in which the confusion between logic and ontology is most explicit. For the general issue see also Heinaman (1979), and Burnyeat II, 15-7 and 24-6. Matthen too presents (1988a, 155-66; 174-6) an impressive defence of particular forms in Aristotle. 96

G. H u g h e s (in Burnyeat I, 112) unconvincingly claims that the distinction between 'individual' and 'universal' is not simply o n e of language or logic, but is rooted in Aristotle's theory of potentiality and actuality. He is of the opinion that this "can be drawn clearly e n o u g h on the basis of what Aristode says, despite the fact that h e has elaborated n o special terminology in which to say it". All things considered, the sting should be taken out of the controversy 'whether universal or individual' by well marking off the two levels terminologically: the (ontic) form inhering in some [x] or [y] is individual, while the (logical) species is assigned to several instantiations. T h e r e f o r e , to talk of a species being individual is a terminological abusio, which can only confuse the discussion (my sections 1.73 and 12.1). In his defence of universal forms in Aristotle, Woods (1991) too continually muddles the logical and ontological levels. Although he cleary sees (45f.) that in Aristotle καθόλου = καθόλου λεγόμενον, he keeps taking commonness in terms of ontology. O n e may w o n d e r w h e t h e r the a d h e r e n t s to the view that Aristotle knows of universal forms would believe that in saying 'Michael and his brother share a rare

In an excellent discussion of the i n h e r e n c e of individual f o r m s in things in the c o n t e x t of the 'being-in b u t n o t said-of item (Cat. 2, 1a23-24), Daniel Devereux (1992, 124f.) points o u t that the fact that the particular whiteness in Socrates c a n n o t exist a p a r t f r o m him, in s o m e o t h e r individual, is not a c o n s e q u e n c e of its being in him, b u t actually a c o n s e q u e n c e of t h e p a r t i c u l a r kind of entity t h a t this whiteness is: non-substantial particulars are entities that can be said of n o m o r e than o n e particular. It follows f r o m Socrates' particular whiteness being in him that it c a n n o t exist on its own, separated f r o m him (χωρίς). N o t e that Aristotle's view of the particular f o r m fits in well with those of his main predecessors, Socrates a n d Plato. Aristotle has well observed that Socrates f o u n d e d universal definition a n d true knowle d g e o n the p r e s e n c e of a ' c o m m o n f e a t u r e ' in particular things. Aristotle makes a clear distinction between Plato's t h o u g h t a b o u t Forms a n d the Socratic eidos in terms of t r a n s c e n d e n c e a n d separation (χωρισμός). From what h e tells us a b o u t his predecessors it is plain that what h e u n d e r s t a n d s by ' s e p a r a t i o n ' is what is sometimes called the 'existential assumption or postulation', to the effect that t h e o b j e c t of a real d e f i n i t i o n m u s t exist a p a r t f r o m its sensible instantiations as an entity of a different, i.e. non-sensible sort. H e has always insisted that Socrates kept locating his eidos, being a specific entity (called 'essence'; τό τί έστι, in Aristotle's words) as a universal (i.e. 'universally assignable') immanent cause. At t h e s a m e time Socrates took the eidos as a definitorial ' c o m m o n thing'. 9 7 R e p o r t i n g Socrates's c o n t r i b u t i o n to philosophy, as distinct f r o m Plato's, Aristotle says that t h e r e are two things which may fairly be credited to Socrates — inductive a r g u m e n t a n d universal definition — both of which are c o n c e r n e d with the starting-point of true knowle d g e ; a n d h e immediately a d d s "But Socrates did n o t m a k e t h e universals or the d e f i n i e n t i a exist apart". 9 8 A n d when d e s c r i b i n g inductive a r g u m e n t in theTopics as the progress f r o m the particular sense of h u m o u r ' the two b r e t h e r n are d e n i e d each their own sense of h u m o u r . Matthen defines (1988a, 171) the problem o f ' u n i v e r s a l vs. individual f o r m ' thus: "[...] because a universal predicated of an individual results in an individual attribute, the form predicated of matter results in an individual form. It is these individual forms that Aristotle identifies with individual substances. Note that these are not individual forms in the sense of forms that vary qualitatively from individual to individual. They are individual only in the sense that they are distinct instances [read: instantiations, De R.] of a universal: they are only numerically distinct". 97 Met. A 6, 987b 1-9; M 9, 1086a32-bll; see De Rijk (1986), 33-7; 47-51. 98 Met. M 4, 1078b27-31.

to the universal, Aristotle illustrates this with an e x a m p l e of Socratic flavour: if the best navigator is the e x p e r t ('the o n e with knowledge'), a n d the best driver the expert, a n d so o n , we can infer the general conclusion that the e x p e r t (the 'knowledgeable') in every occupation is the b e s t . " I n d u c t i o n , then, is accomplished when the m i n d is 'led o n ' f r o m the observation of particular instances (and instantiations, i.e. particular forms) to grasp a g e n e r a l f e a t u r e s h a r e d by all the m e m b e r s of a class. 100 T h a t Socrates could n o t possibly think of some universal ontic f e a t u r e p r e s e n t in the particulars also a p p e a r s f r o m the fact that, in t h e earliest d i a l o g u e s at least, h e is r e p o r t e d to recognize bad ontic features as well, which are explained in terms of a particular deficient ontic status ('vice') caused by the privation of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g good feature ('virtue'). 1 0 1 Likewise, even Plato c o n s i d e r e d the Socratic είδη to be particular forms. T h a t is precisely why, in Guthrie's words (IV, 212), Plato, while giving "an a f f e c t i o n a t e b u t c a n d i d portrait of Socrates as h e knew him, a n d his way of going to work [...] at the same time shows himself puzzled, or n o t fully satisfied, by the philosophical implications of s o m e Socratic tenets a n d takes a few tentative steps f u r t h e r , thus foreshadowing some of the p r o b l e m s which will c o n c e r n him deeply later on". T h e d e v e l o p m e n t of the Socratic d o c t r i n e of the particular e n m a t t e r e d eidos into the Platonic d o c t r i n e of t r a n s c e n d e n t Forms p a r t a k e n by particulars has to be e x p l a i n e d in terms of the shortc o m i n g s which Plato m u s t have envisaged in Socrates's particular forms, which, to Plato's m i n d , could n o t possibly m e e t the requirem e n t of being stable objective realities. 102 As f o r Plato himself, G e r o l d Prauss has convincingly shown (against s o m e scholars who h a d a r g u e d that, since only true Being can b e the object of g e n u i n e knowledge, this knowledge only conc e r n s t r a n s c e n d e n t Forms, n o t the outside particulars), that even t h o u g h , f o r Plato, the t r a n s c e n d e n t F o r m s are ultimately the t r u e objects of g e n u i n e knowledge (έπιστήμη), it is the particular's δ υ ν ά μεις (or i m m a n e n t f o r m s ) which in fact are t h e p r o p e r o b j e c t of knowledge. 1 0 3 T h e forms as partaken of by the outside particulars are 99

Top. I 12, 105al3-16. See Guthrie (1969), 426. Top. I 18, 108bl0-l 1. Guthrie, ibid., and Ross (1949), 481-3. 101 So m o r e than once in Plato, Euthyphro, e.g. at 5D1-5; see De Rijk ( 1980), 38f. 102 De Rijk (1986), 52-5; 234-53. 103 Prauss (1965), 105-10; De Rijk (1986), 332-8. See also the fine pages in Guthrie V, 412-7 on Plato's view of the knowledge of the particular. Plato's cognitive p r o c e d u r e is analysed in De Rijk (1986), 338-47. 100

n o t h i n g but the Platonic Forms taken in their i m m a n e n t status; whilst in their capacity of b e i n g known by the p h i l o s o p h e r their m e n t a l status is in question, which, it s h o u l d be stressed, is not their trans c e n d e n t status. 104 In the later dialogues, Plato too uses the n a m e of a f o r m (taken in its i m m a n e n t status, of course) in o r d e r to indiscriminately designate the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m (or 'instantiation of Fness') a n d the particular thing ('instance') partaking in the transcend e n t Form of the same n a m e . For instance, at Sophist, 257D11-12, the phrase τής του καλού φύσεως indiscriminately stands for the particular f o r m 'beautiful' (or instantiation of Beautifulness) a n d the beautiful thing partaking in the t r a n s c e n d e n t Form, Beautifulness. 1 0 5 T h u s Aristotle's view of the f o r m s as particular entities (non-subsiste n t ones, of course) i m m a n e n t in partictdar subsistent things as their dynamic ontic causes, fits in very well with the Ancient philosophic m a i n s t r e a m . O n c e we recognize t h e similarity we can u n d e r s t a n d m o r e fully to what e x t e n t h e disagreed with his master. For like any dispute, the most eager philosophic disputes are likely to be the ones between p e o p l e who for the most part are on speaking terms. 1 0 6 In the next section it will a p p e a r that the question c o n c e r n i n g the p a r t i c u l a r status of t h e f o r m is closely c o n n e c t e d with t h e o n e c o n c e r n i n g the principle of individuation.

104 T h e threefold status of the Forms is discussed in De Rijk (1986), 18-21; 5565; 103-9; 140-3; 180-3; 327-30. 105 De Rijk (1986), 174, pace Frede (1967, 88f.) 106 Without taking sides with either the 'universalists' or the 'particularists' (cf. Gill 1991, 32-4) Madigan (1999, 80) hints at the o n g o i n g dispute: "Critics dispute whether Aristotelian substantial form is individual, as the texts witnessing to its i n d e p e n d e n c e , substantiality, and causal function would suggest, or universal, as the texts witnessing to its being the basis of definition and science would suggest". O n this controversy, see e.g. the 'universalists' Owens (1978, 386-9, 426-34), Bostock (1994, 185-90) and Scaltsas (1994, 229-51), who only speaks οϊ substantial forms, and while ignoring the peculiar tool of logical universal applicability, worries how Aristotelian forms (including substantial and accidental ones) can be universal without being separate. Steinfath (1991, 212-333) continually confuses ontological individuality and logical universality. A m o n g the 'particularists' are, alongside Frede & Patzig I, 48-57, Witt (1989) 143-79, who rightly deals (176ff.; cf. 126-42 on Nature and Function of Essence) with our question in the context of the doubtful claim that matter is Aristotle's principle of individuation. Spellmann aptly deals (1995, 21-99) with the problem w h e t h e r ' t h i n g ' a n d 'essence' are the same in Aristotle, in terms of referential opacity (21-39), and takes (40-99) Aristotelian ousiai (she has 'substances') as specimens of natural kinds, which are "numerically the same but not identical with sensible objects".

10. 72 The enmattered form as the principle of

individuation

T h e few allusions f o u n d in Aristotle to the role of m a t t e r in n u m e r i cally d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g the particulars that possess t h e same f o r m are o f t e n taken as u n e q u i v o c a l claims t h a t m a t t e r is the p r i n c i p l e of individuation, m e a n i n g that it is only d u e to m a t t e r that the outside things are numerically d i f f e r e n t particulars (individuals) in spite of the fact that they possess the same universal f o r m , m a n , tree, stone, a n d so on. Ross, for instance, describes the role of m a t t e r in the process of individuation re Met. Ζ 8, 1034a2ff. (II, 187), thus: "The individual is 'such a f o r m in this m a t t e r ' , m a t t e r b e i n g what differentiates individuals identical in form". However, in his standard work on Aristotle, Ross m o r e cautiously speaks (170) of "Aristotle's tendency to find in m a t t e r the principle of individuality", which "is d u e to the d o m i n a n c e in his m i n d of t h e idea of the infima species, t h e n o t i o n that t h e r e are fixed c o m b i n a t i o n s of characteristics which f o r m the core of the n a t u r e of all the individuals in which they are p r e s e n t , a n d that these a l o n e are what n a t u r e seeks to secure a n d p e r p e t u a t e " . O t h e r s , like G u t h r i e (VI, 145), qualify this claim by restricting m a t t e r to " m a t t e r i n f o r m e d at so low a level as to b e stripped of all t h e qualities which m e m b e r s of the species have in common".107 T h e r e is e n o u g h reason, t h e n , to seriously question the validity of the u n q u a l i f i e d a d a g e t h a t f o r Aristotle, m a t t e r is the principle of individuation. For o n e thing, G u t h r i e ' s speaking o f ' i n f o r m e d matter' implies recognizing the f o r m ' s role in d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g k i n d r e d particulars. F u r t h e r m o r e , on closer inspection, the spare testimonials which have usually b e e n a d d u c e d in s u p p o r t of t h e u n q u a l i f i e d adage, are n o t convincing at all. T o begin with, the main s u p p o s e d witness at Ζ 8, 1033b29-1034a8 d o e s n o t o f f e r t h e a p p r o p r i a t e evid e n c e , as we have seen earlier. Bostock, who considers the unqualified adage ("Matter is ^ p r i n ciple of individuation") as Aristotle's s t a n d a r d lore, refers to t h r e e o t h e r passages of the Metaphysics. N o n e of them, however, seem to be conclusive. In the Lexicon, Δ 6, 1016b31-35, Aristotle only says that things are numerically o n e whose m a t t e r is o n e , a n d formally o n e if

107

Cf. Owens (1978), 199f. It is interesting to note that the qualification of matter as 'informed matter' is not only (rightly) d u e to Aristotle's f r e q u e n t evaluation of matter as being entirely 'indeterminate', but to the usual mistaken idea that 'prime matter' is a kind of mysterious stuff. See my sections 12.37-12.39.

the a c c o u n t expressing their f o r m is o n e . In I 3, 1054a32-35, t h e r e is a similar exposition of the n o t i o n ' t h e s a m e ' , in which a t h i n g is called the same "if it is o n e both in definiens a n d in n u m b e r " , which is exemplified thus: "you are o n e with yourself b o t h in f o r m a n d in matter". In A 8, 1074a33-34, it is only n o t e d that all things that are many in n u m b e r have matter. Remarkably e n o u g h , Bostock fails to a d d u c e a passage f r o m the same book which clearly u n d e r m i n e s the p u r p o r t of the u n q u a l i f i e d adage. In A 5, 1071a27-29, Aristotle says t h a t t h e causes a n d e l e m e n t s of t h i n g s in t h e s a m e species a r e different, n o t specifically, but in the sense that the causes of d i f f e r e n t particulars are n o t t h e same, "your m a t t e r a n d f o r m a n d moving cause b e i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m m i n e , while in their universal d e f i n i e n s they are the same". W h e n asserting that your ' m a t t e r a n d f o r m ' (a28) differ f r o m mine, the a u t h o r n o d o u b t thinks of what was elsewhere called t h e ' e n m a t t e r e d f o r m ' . O n e s h o u l d never f o r g e t that any 'universal definiens' is of the logician's making. T h e second of the two metaphysical questions — (1) What are the basic realities of the world?, a n d (2) W h a t makes t h e m t h e things they are? — John Ackrill has selected for his discussion of Aristotle's g e n e r a l metaphysics c o n c e r n s m a t t e r , f o r m , a n d essence. W h e n asking what explains the substantiality of particular things a n d their b e i n g t h e d i f f e r e n t individuals they are, Ackrill (1981, 122) aptly remarks that "it might seem that it is d i f f e r e n c e in matter or material constitution - what they are m a d e of - that explains o u r being able to recognize a n d c o u n t d i f f e r e n t individuals". After q u o t i n g the crucial passage, Met. Ζ 8, 1034a5-8, in which the u n q u a l i f i e d a d a g e a b o u t matter as the principle of individuation has b e e n read over the years, Ackrill c o n t i n u e s by p a r a p h r a s i n g (122) Ζ 17, 1041a9-b9: "Yet to count Callias and Socrates as two depends on counting them as men, and to speak of them as men is to refer to their form. [...] Only of a composite thing (form plus matter) can the question 'What makes it a so-and-so?' be asked, and always in the sense 'What makes such and such matter a so-and-so?'. The answer will be an account of the form (shape, structure or function) that defines so-and-so's. [...], and to be a so-and-so is to be a composite, matter with a certain form. It is qua having the form that matter is a so-and-so; possession of the form explains the thing's being the individual substance it is". H e points o u t (124) that Aristotle holds in the Metaphysics that it is a f o r m or an essence ('what it is to b e a so-and-so'), a n d n o t matter, that gives identity a n d individuality to substances. And quite right h e is. So t h e r e are many g o o d reasons for rejecting the maxim a b o u t

m a t t e r as the principle of individuation, a n d to ascribe, instead, this f u n c t i o n to the f o r m qua enmattered.108 As for the related issue of the particular status of the f o r m , it can hardly c o m e as a surprise that Ackrill's lucid e x a m i n a t i o n of the main items of general metaphysics leads him to make a suggestion on this score (127f.): "Secondly, one may suggest that Aristotle does or should accept the idea of individual essences (so that man no longer counts as Callias's essence). There are several passages in which Aristotle uses the terms 'soul' and 'body' in discussing men and their essence. In these passages it is soul rather than man that appears as the individuating form of Callias - not his species but his life. Since 'soul' has a plural and often works as a count-noun, it is quite easy to suppose that Callias has one soul and Socrates another, and that these souls are individual essences". In t h e previous section we have seen that Ackrill's suggestion is realistic, a n d s h o u l d n o t only b e a r o n t h e special case of m a n ' s substantial f o r m . Any Aristotelian f o r m , w h e t h e r substantial or nonsubstantial, is best viewed as an ontic cause ( c o m p a r a b l e to Plato's i m m a n e n t δύναμις) p r o p e r to the o n e thing it i n h e r e s in, a n d n o t as b e l o n g i n g to any o t h e r instance. T h e i r b e i n g c o m m o n to o t h e r kindred instances is a matter of logic, n o t metaphysics. T h e fact that a f o r m is p a r t a k e n of by o t h e r particulars d e p e n d s o n our habit of c o m p a r i n g things with regard to certain of their features, which they possess each as their p r o p e r ones, b u t all the same have in c o m m o n . Aristotle was himself well aware that o u r m i n d is able to conceive of the s u n ' s a n d m o o n ' s (theoretical) universality, in spite of the fact that there is only o n e single instance of t h e m in reality.

10. 73 The adoption of form and matter in the definiens It m u s t strike the r e a d e r that when dealing (Met. Ζ 11, 1036b24-28) with the c o m p a r i s o n drawn by Socrates the Younger between an animal a n d a circle, saying that both can be without their parts, m a n w i t h o u t his usual flesh a n d b o n e s , the circle w i t h o u t its b r o n z e , Aristotle a p p e a r s to hesitate a b o u t his own position. A l t h o u g h h e rejects this e q u a t i o n as misleading, h e d o e s n o t throw away t h e u n d e r l y i n g idea that a t h i n g ' s m a t t e r is n o t p a r t of its f o r m (my section 9.64). T h e ambivalence of Aristotle's attitude is aptly sketched

108

See also Frede & Patzig I, 43-8, and 56; II, 145; 147; 189.

by Bostock (149-50): t h e r e a r e m a n y places in Ζ 10-11 w h e r e it s e e m s to b e a s s u m e d that only t h e f o r m has a d e f i n i e n s , of which t h e claim at 1035b34 that "only t h e parts of t h e f o r m a r e parts of t h e d e f i n i e n s " is p e r h a p s t h e m o s t explicit. F r o m this it c o u l d b e i n f e r r e d , as is actually d o n e by F r e d e & Patzig, t h a t t h e r e is n o such t h i n g as t h e d e f i n i e n s of a composite. 1 0 9 10. 74 Is a composite, indefinable? Bostock (150) is surely right in rejecting t h e position held by F r e d e 8c Patzig, since it r e q u i r e s o n e to m a i n t a i n t h a t t h e c o m p o u n d t h i n g s which are said to b e destroyed into their m a t e r i a l parts at 1035a25-27, n a m e l y a s n u b n o s e a n d a b r o n z e n circle, have n o d e f i n i e n s at all. But Aristotle goes o n (1035a28-29) to c o n t r a s t t h e m with things n o t c o m p o u n d e d f r o m m a t t e r , a n d h e d e s c r i b e s t h e s e latter as "things w h o s e d e f i n i e n s is a d e f i n i e n s of t h e f o r m a l o n e " . Bostock rightly t h i n k s t h e s e lines w o u l d b e q u i t e pointless if we a s s u m e with F r e d e a n d Patzig that any d e f i n i e n s is a d e f i n i e n s of t h e f o r m alone. T h e r e are also m a n y places o u t s i d e Met. Ζ 10-11 in which Aristotle is r e a d y to s p e a k of t h e d e f i n i e n s of c o m p o u n d s . Bostock rightly refers, a p a r t f r o m Ε 1, 1025b28-1025a6, discussed earlier, to several o t h e r passages. First Met. Κ 7, 1064a23-28, w h e r e it is explicitly stated t h a t t h e d e f i n i e n s of s n u b (του σ ι μ ο ΰ ) i n c l u d e s t h e m a t t e r of t h e t h i n g (του πράγματος) while t h a t of ' c o n c a v e ' (του κοίλου) is f r e e f r o m m a t t e r . For s n u b n e s s is f o u n d in a nose, so t h a t we look f o r its d e f i n i e n s w i t h o u t d o i n g away with t h e n o s e , f o r w h a t is s n u b is a concave nose. Evidently, t h e n , also t h e d e f i n i e n s of flesh a n d of t h e eye, a n d of t h e o t h e r p a r t s as well m u s t always b e stated w i t h o u t d o i n g away with t h e m a t t e r . In t h e s e c o n d b o o k of t h e Physics, which mainly deals with n a t u r e as t h e p r o p e r o b j e c t of t h e physicist, t h e position of t h e m a t t e r of n a t u r a l t h i n g s c o m e s u p f o r d i s c u s s i o n . At II 2, 1 9 4 a l 2 - 1 5 , t h e e x a m p l e of s n u b n e s s is r e f e r r e d to; cf. 194al-7. Since n a t u r e , it is said, i n c l u d e s two e l e m e n t s , f o r m a n d m a t t e r , we m u s t study it as if we w e r e s t u d y i n g s n u b n e s s , w h i c h c a n n o t b e d e f i n e d a p a r t f r o m m a t t e r . T h i n g s of t h e k i n d a r e n e i t h e r i n d e p e n d e n t of m a t t e r n o r entirely c o n s t i t u t e d by m a t t e r . T h e c o m p a r i s o n clearly suggests t h a t

109

Frede & Patzig I, 40f.; II, 113; 122f.; 166-198 (passim); 203-20, esp. 211-3, re 1036b29.

in such cases the m a t t e r should be i n c l u d e d in their d e f i n i e n s a n d , accordingly, in e x a m i n i n g their nature. 1 1 0 W h e n in An. I 1 the relations between soul a n d body are u n d e r examination, o n e of the difficult questions is a b o u t whether the affections of the soul can exist a p a r t f r o m the body. It is claimed (403a625), that anger, courage, desire, a n d sensation generally cannot, a n d even t h i n k i n g c a n n o t either, s u p p o s i n g that it is a kind of imagination, or at least d e p e n d s u p o n i m a g i n a t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m is illustrated by p r e s e n t i n g an e x a m p l e f r o m mathematics (403al3-16): "It will b e like what is straight, to which, q u a straight, many p r o p e r t i e s befall, as, for instance, that it touches a b r o n z e n s p h e r e at a point, yet if taken by itself, it c a n n o t act as a tangent. It is in fact n o t j u s t by itself, since it is always f o u n d in s o m e body". 1 1 1 Likewise, all t h e affections of the soul involve a body, viz. anger, gentleness, fear, pity, c o u r a g e , joy, love a n d h a t r e d , because in all these t h e r e is a conc u r r e n t affection of the body. Aristotle concludes that f r o m all this it is clear that the affections of the soul are, as such, 'manifestations with a material c o m p o n e n t ' (λόγοι ένυλοι). Frede & Patzig (II, 21 If.) too have to admit that Met. Ε 1, 1025b281026a6 a n d Κ 7, 1064a23-28, can b e e x p l a i n e d as showing that the definition of n a t u r a l things c a n n o t d o without matter. They insist, however, that in the summary at the e n d of c h a p t e r 11 ( 1 0 3 7 a 2 1 f f ) , Aristotle (a24-26) clearly asserts that a thing's material parts are alien f r o m its definiens.

110

At the end of Phys. II (9, 200a30-b4), the important position of the material c o m p o n e n t of natural things and artefacts is discussed. If we define the function of a saw as being a certain kind of dividing, then this cannot come about unless the saw has teeth of a certain type. Now these must be of iron. Hence its definiens must contain some parts that are, as it were, its matter. 111 Aristotle means to say that 'what is straight', when taken in abstracto, does not imply 'being a t a n g e n t ' ( * ' t a n g e n t - h o o d \ so to speak). T o be a tangent, ' t h e straight' should be taken as 'straight line', 'particularized' either as part of a particular geometrical construct ('this line here construed together with a sphere'), or as, say, an architectonic construction, e.g. in a d e c o r a t e d tympanum. In o t h e r words, that 'straightness' will coincide with 'tangency' d e p e n d s on its being enmattered and, accordingly, particularized. Cleary's remark (1995, 317, and 106) that, in view of the familiar ambiguity about 'body', it is difficult to d e t e r m i n e whether Aristotle means that the very notion of 'contact' implies sensible body or merely mathematical body seems to miss Aristotle's point. What Aristotle has in mind is to clarify when o u r conceptualization involves 'material constitution', and when not. W h e t h e r or not the material constitution concerns real or merely mathematical body is not Aristotle's point in this passage. O n c e again, the distinction between 'ambiguity' and 'ambivalence' is useful; my section 1.72. Note that for Aristotle, τό ευθύ is to be interpreted along the same lines as τό σιμόν; my section 9.32.

I think t h e r e is m o r e to Aristotle's attitude towards Socrates the Younger in the above passage. Like Socrates, h e rejects any inclusion of m a t t e r in a t h i n g ' s f o r m ( ε ί δ ο ς ) , b u t d o e s n o t go so far as to straightforwardly reject the a d o p t i o n of a composite thing's material c o m p o n e n t s in its d e f i n i e n s . T h e c o n c l u s i o n of t h e s u m m a r y (1037b4-7) should be u n d e r s t o o d along similar lines, m e a n i n g that a n a t u r a l t h i n g q u a c o m p o s e d of f o r m and m a t t e r s h o u l d n o t b e r e g a r d e d as a c o i n c i d e n t a l c o m p o u n d of t h e ' e d u c a t e d Socrates' type, which c a n n o t be d e f i n e d at all, since the inclusion of matter in natural things (as in artificial things as well) is surely n o t incidental, a n d the f o r m is an enmattered f o r m (1037a28-29). 1 1 2 10. 75 Two kinds of definiens to be distinguished T h e passages m e n t i o n e d above strongly suggest that two kinds of definition should be carefully distinguished. O n e c o n c e r n s the f o r m taken by itself a n d presents a thing's quiddity (είδος); the o t h e r is a b o u t t h e c o m p o s i t e of f o r m a n d m a t t e r , or r a t h e r the f o r m as e n m a t t e r e d . 1 1 3 In Met. Η 2, w h e r e t h e constitution of natural comp o u n d s is u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n , we f i n d this suggestion c o n f i r m e d . H e r e Aristotle clearly opposes formal definitions to material ones, viz. t h o s e t h a t f o c u s o n t h e f o r m o r actuality (του είδους καί τής ένεργείας) to the definitions covering the whole of the composite. (1043a12ff.) It should be b o r n e in m i n d that m a t t e r is never included in the definiens of είδος taken in the sense of the ontic f o r m , as is claimed by Aristotle m o r e than once; t h e r e f o r e a composite's material part is n e i t h e r p a r t of the eidos ( f o r m ) n o r of the d e f i n i e n s of the composite's quiddity. However, t h e r e is in Aristotle also an idea of matter so closely (if n o t essentially, yet at least in a stronger sense than j u s t coincidentally, as we have seen) related to the f o r m s of natural things that its inclusion in the d e f i n i e n s of the c o m p o s i t e is most a p p r o priate. In these cases, however, m a t t e r is still n o t the things' p r o p e r particular m a t t e r ( ' c h u n k s of m a t t e r ' ) f o u n d in each of t h e m , but r a t h e r t h e g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n of what Ackrill has happily called

112

Also Met. Ε 1, 1025b30-1026a6; Ζ 7, 1033a 1-5 and b24-26; Z, chs 10-11; Η 2, 1043al4-18; Gael. I 9, 277b30-278a6 and 23-25; An. I 1, 403a29-bl6; PA I 4, 644a2324: "Since the ο ύ σ ί α ι are the ultimate forms (τά έσχατα είδη), and these are specifically indiscernible, such as Socrates, Coriscus ... etc.". 113 For the semantic ambivalence of είδος see my section 1.71.

' m a t e r i a l c o n s t i t u t i o n ' ('materiality', i.e. a t h i n g ' s ' b e i n g somehow e n m a t t e r e d ' ) , which may b e associated with each k i n d ' s specific m a t t e r (such as the g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n of having flesh a n d b o n e s for h u m a n a n d animal beings). Now this condition of 'materiality' is part of t h e d e f i n i e n s of t h e c o m p o s i t e , t h o u g h still n o t of its f o r m , formally speaking. T h u s to Aristotle, for t h e r e to be both a particular m a n or a particular s p h e r e , the g e n e r a l c o n d i t i o n of material constitution should be i m p l e m e n t e d by some particular parcel of matter. T h e d i f f e r e n c e between these two is only that m a n a n d s p h e r e have u n e q u a l options, because in fact the particular m a n ' s matter is always flesh a n d bones, while the particular s p h e r e ' s matter is either bronze, or iron, stone or wood etc. In fact i n d e e d , b u t in principle t h e r e could be o t h e r implem e n t a t i o n s of a m a n ' s material c o n s t i t u t i o n . As may be g a t h e r e d f r o m 1036b28ff., any sort of m a t t e r that m a t c h e s m a n ' s s e n t i e n t n a t u r e can b e admitted, providing, that is, it enables him to exercise the basic f u n c t i o n implied in its b e i n g an αίσθητικόν, viz. the ability to move itself. T h e s e two kinds of definition — o n e of the quiddity or f o r m taken by itself, the o t h e r of t h e c o m p o s i t e of f o r m a n d m a t t e r (which to Aristotle, equals ' t h e e n m a t t e r e d f o r m ' ) — tally with two d i f f e r e n t m o d e s of a b s t r a c t i o n . T h e first is what was later called ' f o r m a l abstraction' ('abstractio formalis'), i.e. the mental operation by which all material constituents, including the material constitution as such ('materiality'), are s t r i p p e d off f r o m the t h i n g (e.g. m a n ) , so as to p r o d u c e the f o r m (forma) by itself ( ' m a n h o o d ' ) . By its c o u n t e r p a r t , total abstraction ('abstractio totalis'), o n the o t h e r h a n d , a thing's particular matter, but n o t its materiality as such, is stripped off, resulting in the n o t i o n of the whole of the c o m p o s i t e ( t o t u m ) , e.g. the significate ' m a n ' , as the logical tool that can be applied to all m e m bers of t h e class. From the semantic p o i n t of view, the distinction c o n c e r n s the formal a n d material significates. 114 114 In Medieval semantics the distinction between 'significatum formale' and 'significatum materiale' is usually drawn c o n c e r n i n g connotative terms (e.g. ' a l b u m - a l b e d o ' ) , not in cases like ' h o m o - h u m a n i t a s ' . E.g. Marsilius of I n g h e n (born near Nijmegen, in the Netherlands, and the first Rector of the University of Heidelberg, where he died in 1396) in his tract De appellationibus, 1302"16 ed. E.P. Bos: "Significatum materiale dicitur res p r o q u o talis t e r m i n u s connotativus supponit ("stands for"), ut Ii 'albus' pro h o m i n e habente albedinem supponit. [...]. Hoc autem videtur esse d e intentione Aristotelis quinto Metaphysice [Δ 6, 1016b3233] dicends 'Eodem n u m é r o sunt q u o r u m materia u n a est', idest que s u p p o n u n t p r o e a d e m re. Ecce qualiter Philosophus s e c u n d u m talem expositionem saltern,

10. 76 The role ο/γένος in the constitution of natural things Besides c o m i n g u p in c o n n e c t i o n with a t h i n g ' s particularness, the inclusion o f matter in the d e f i n i e n s is also discussed f r o m a n o t h e r angle, viz. that o f the role o f g e n u s in the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f n a t u r a l things. As we have already seen, at Ζ 12, 1037b27-1038a8, Aristotle deals with the sort o f d e f i n i t i o n which consists only o f what is called the primary genus a n d the differentiae; for instance, m a n is d e f i n e d as 'two-footed a n i m a l ' , which phrase consists o f the u l t i m a t e g e n u s ' a n i m a l ' a n d the differentia 'two-footed'. I n such cases, Aristotle claims, the g e n u s does n o t in an u n q u a l i f i e d sense ( ά π λ ώ ς ) exist apart f r o m the genus, or exist only as matter. T h e u n d e r l y i n g idea is that specific things, such as e.g. the various kinds o f s o u n d (vowel, sibilant, guttural) can be regarded as ' m a d e o f s o u n d as well as b e i n g different species o f the generic concept 'sound'. 1 1 5 So o n e c o u l d look at things either way; b u t there is still a difference in that the genus viewed as 'matter' is the t h i n g ' s o n t i c constituent, while the genus taken as superior to its different inferior species is only a logical tool. For this reason, there is a way in which the essential constituent o f a n a t u r a l t h i n g may be seen as its m a t e r i a l , w h i c h entails that the t h i n g ' s d e f i n i e n s c o n t a i n s the g e n e r a l n o t i o n o f m a t e r i a l constitution. I n the Lexicon too, at Met. Δ 28, 1024b8-9, a thing's genus is called the m a t t e r or s u b s t r a t u m o f its d i f f e r e n t i a , "for w h a t q u a l i f y i n g differentiae are of is their substratum, which we call their matter". Elsewhere in the Metaphysics,

the constitutive position o f the genus is

described a l o n g similar lines: Met. I 8, 1 0 5 7 b 3 5 - 1 0 5 8 a 8 a n d a21-25: A t h i n g ' s p r o p e r t y of b e i n g specifically d i f f e r e n t < f r o m s o m e t h i n g else> lies in t h e d i f f e r e n c e that falls to s o m e < t h i r d > entity, a n d this entity m u s t b e l o n g to b o t h . For que vocatur vera, capit 'materiam' pro isto pro q u o supponit terminus. [...]. 'Significatum autem formale' dicitur res connotata per huiusmodi terminum. Unde significatum materiale huius termini 'album' dicitur res habens albedinem, puta [= i.e.] ipsum subiectum albedinis. Sed significatum formale est istud quod iste terminus connotat, puta ipsa albedo; ibid., 132 4 e: "... terminus pro isto significato quod appellat, non supponit, u n d e ('since') terminus supponit pro suo significato materiali, et appellat suum significatum formale". Another fourteenthcentury philosopher, John Buridan (born presumably in Sint Omaars in the Southern Netherlands — nowadays St. Omer, France — who was professor at the Parisian Faculty of Arts, and died about 1361) distinguishes between the form and matter of terms (De suppositionibus 81 14-25 ed. R. van der Lecq). 115 Bostock (182), who aptly refers to Met. Β 3, 998a20-25 (where φωνή is called a genus), and C,A V 7, 786b21, where it is called 'matter'.

instance, if there is talk of an animal that is specifically different , then both are animals. The things, thus, that are specifically different must be in the same genus. For by 'genus' I mean that one identical thing which is said of both and is differentiated in no merely incidental way, whether conceived as matter or otherwise. Not only, then, must what is common attach to the different things (e.g. not only must both be animals), but this very animalhood (τοΰτο αύτό τό ζώον) must also be different for each (e.g. in the one case equinity, in the other manhood), and so this common nature is specifically different for each from what it is for the other. One, then, will be in virtue of itself one sort of animal, and the other another, e.g. one a horse and the other a man. Now this difference must be a differentiation of the genus. For I call 'differentiation of the genus' the sort of otherness that makes the genus itself other. [...]. Evidently, therefore, with regard to that which is called the genus, none of the species-of-a-genus is either identical with it or specifically different; and this is fitting, for the matter is indicated by means of an elimination (άποφάσει) , and the genus is called the matter of that of which it is the genus [...] in the sense in which the genus is an element of the thing's nature. As we have seen earlier, in Met. H, chs. 3 a n d 6, the discussion of the g e n u s as a natural thing's material constituent, a n d , in k e e p i n g with this, t h e inclusion of t h e g e n e r i c n o t i o n of 'materiality' in t h e definiens is on the same footing. 1 1 6

10. 8 Ancient and Medieval commentators on these issues W h e n we r e a d what is r e m a r k e d u p o n by A n c i e n t a n d Medieval c o m m e n t a t o r s with regard to the three issues that are so controversial nowadays a m o n g Aristotle's i n t e r p r e t e r s , two things must strike us. Firstly, these issues were n o t t h e n a m a t t e r of controversy, so we c a n n o t b u t gather the implicit hints occurring at r a n d o m in the texts. Secondly, the implicit hints f o u n d in their c o m m e n t s o n the passages we have b e e n discussing in the previous sections, clearly suggest that their u n d e r s t a n d i n g of these passages fits in well, or is at least never at variance with the position we have a r g u e d for in the above discussions. W h a t should also catch the r e a d e r ' s attention is that in these i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s the t h r e e t h e m e s — (1) the particular status of t h e e n m a t t e r e d f o r m , (2) t h e e n m a t t e r e d f o r m as the p r i n c i p l e of individuation, a n d (3) the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m b e i n g i n c l u d e d in the definiens of the composite — are closely interwoven. 116

Pace Bostock (182; 267; 281-4; 287-90).

10. 81 The Ancient commentators P o r p h y r y d o e s n o t discuss t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r t h e e n m a t t e r e d substantial f o r m is particular or universal. As for the related question c o n c e r n i n g the principle of individuation, we only find a few words a b o u t what role p r o p e r t i e s have w h e n it c o m e s to i n d i v i d u a t i n g Socrates, who is a u n i q u e individual owing to a collection of p r o p e r ties that as such is n o t f o u n d in any o t h e r individual. T h e s e particular p r o p e r t i e s are contrasted with those which are f o u n d in o t h e r individuals too, a n d so befall to m a n taken universally, b e c a u s e they b e l o n g to him in virtue of his b e i n g a m a n . T h e last s e n t e n c e m i g h t be explained as c o n c e r n i n g m a n ' s essential properties, b u t it seems p l a u s i b l e to take P o r p h y r y c l a i m i n g t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r m a n ' s coincidental p r o p e r t y of, say, whiteness or blackness is o p p o s e d to the general condition of being somehow coloured, which falls to m a n in general. 1 1 7 Anyhow, when c o m m e n t i n g on this passage, Boethius makes t h e m refer to a particular's coincidental properties: In Isag. comm., p. 2359-2366 ed. Brandt: Ilia vero in quae commune dividitur, communi natura participant proprietasque communis rei his quibus communis est convenit. At vero individuorum proprietas nulli communis est. Socratis enim proprietas, si fuit calvus, simus, propenso alvo ceterisque corporis lineamentis aut morum institutione aut forma vocis, non conveniebat in alterum. Hae enim proprietates, quae ex accidentibus ei obvenerant et eius formam figuramque coniunxerant, in nullum alium conveniebant. Cuius autem proprietates in nullum alium conveniunt, eius proprietates nulli poterunt esse communes; cuius autem proprietas nulli communis est, nihil est quod eius proprietate participet. [...]Recte igitur haec quorum proprietas in alium non convenit, individua nuncupantur. At vero hominis proprietas, idest specialis, convenit et in Socratem et in Platonem et in ceteros, quorum proprietates ex accidentibus venientes in quemlibet alium singularem nulla ratione conveniunt. 117 Porphyry CAG IV-1, p. 721"27: άτομα ούν λέγεται τά τοιαύτα, οτι έξ ιδιοτήτων συνέστηκεν έκαστον, ών τό άθροισμα ούκ άν έπ' άλλου ποτέ τό αύτό γένοιτο- αί γάρ Σωκράτους ιδιότητες ούκ άν έπ' άλλου τινός τών κατά μέρος γένοιντο άν αί αύται, αί μέντοι του άνθρώπου, λέγω δή του κοινού, ιδιότητες γένοιντ' άν αί αύται έπί πλειόνων, μάλλον δέ έπί πάντων τών κατά μέρος άνθρώπων, καθό άνθρωποι. This view became c o m m o n doctrine in the Middle Ages through Boethius's translation (Aristoteles latinus, p. 13 24 -14 6 ): "Individua ergo d i c u n t u r huiusmodi q u o n i a m ex proprietatibus consistit u n u m q u o d q u e e o r u m q u o r u m collectio n u m q u a m in alio e a d e m erit; Socratis e n i m p r o p r i e t a t e s n u m q u a m in alio q u o l i b e t e r u n t particularium; hae vero quae sunt hominis (dico autem eius qui est communis) proprietates e r u n t eaedem in pluribus, magis autem et in omnibus particularibus hominibus in eo quod homines sunt".

Discussing (CAG IV-1, p. 129 4 ff.) the d i f f e r e n c e between εξις a n d διάθεσις, Porphyry c o m e s also to speak a b o u t the n u m e r i c a l differe n c e between Socrates a n d Plato, saying (129 9 1 0 ) that this d i f f e r e n c e is n o t caused by their 'differentiae specificae' (εΐδοποιοίς διαφοραις), b u t by t h e individual c h a r a c t e r resulting f r o m t h e c o n c u r r e n c e of certain qualities (ίδιότητι δέ συνδρομής ποιοτήτων). 1 1 8 T h u s it is plain (as it is i n d e e d most likely) that it is the c o n c u r r e n c e of coincidental p r o p e r t i e s which individuates, r a t h e r t h a n t h e c o m b i n a t i o n of a t h i n g ' s essential c o m p o n e n t s m a k i n g u p t h e c o m p l e t e ousia (τά συμπληρούντα). We may g a t h e r f r o m these texts, which can b e viewed as fairly representative of the A n c i e n t C o m m e n t a t o r s ' tradition, that it was c o m m o n d o c t r i n e to take n o t m a t t e r , b u t non-substantial f o r m s as the principles of individuation, a n d that these f o r m s are particular forms. It is hardly possible, to say t h e least, that they should have c o n s i d e r e d the substantial f o r m s to be universal. T h e s e c o m m e n t a tors were fully aware, I take it, that o n e has to distinguish between the particular m a n , Socrates, a n d t h e logical tool ' m a n ' which can be a p p l i e d to e a c h m e m b e r of t h e class, a n d , accordingly, between Socrates's individual u n i q u e collection of (coincidental) p r o p e r t i e s a n d the general p r o p e r t i e s of b e i n g affected in such-and-such a way, which may b e s h a r e d universally, i.e. by all m e m b e r s of a class. Finally, we s h o u l d take i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t n o collection of p r o p e r t i e s can possibly be viewed as u n i q u e unless they are taken as strictly individual f o r m s b e l o n g i n g to this o r that particular, a n d to n o b o d y else.

118 CAG IV-1, p. 129 ,v10 : Ώ ς μέν εϊδη αλλήλων ού διενήνοχεν ώσπερ 6 άνθρωπος τοΰ βοός· ού γάρ διαφέρει αλλήλων είδοποιοΐς διαφοραΐς ώσπερ 6 ϊππος τοΰ άνθρωπου, άριθμω δέ αλλήλων διενήνοχεν ώσπερ Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος- είδοποιοΐς μέν γάρ διαφοραΐς ού διενήνοχεν Σωκράτης Πλάτωνος, ίδιότητι δέ συνδρομής ποιοτήτων, καθ' ήν είκότως [my guess; ειδοποιώ Mss.] διενήνοχεν Πλάτων Σωκράτους. Cf. ibid., p. 1112"17: τών γάρ πραγμάτων έξ ύλης καί είδους συνεστώτων ή άνάλογόν γε ϋλη καί εϊδει την σύστασιν εχόντων, ώσπερ ό άνδριάς έξ ϋλης μεν τοΰ χαλκοΰ, είδους δέ τοΰ σχήματος, οϋτως καί ό άνθρωπος 6 κοινός τε καί ειδικός έξ ΰλης μέν άναλόγου συνέστηκεν τοΰ γένους, έκ μορφής δέ τής διαφοράς, τό δέ ολον τοΰτο, ζώον λογικόν θνητόν, 6 άνθρωπος, ώς έκεΐ ό άνδριάς. In Boethius's translation (op. cit., p. 189"15): Rebus enim ex materia et f o r m a constantibus vel ad similitudin e m materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus: q u e m a d m o d u m statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura, sic et h o m o communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit g e n e r e , ex f o r m a autem differentia, totum autem hoc, animal rationale, h o m o est, q u e m a d m o d u m illic statua. Matthen convincingly argues (1988a, 156f.) that Aristotle is "embracing a version of the view that individual substances are 'bundles' of individual attributes".

T R U E O U S I A F I N A L L Y I D E N T I F I E D AS T H E E N M A T T E R E D F O R M

291

10. 82 The Arab commentators Avicenna and, Averroes Avicenna (Ibn Sina, 980-1037) distinguishes t h r e e d i f f e r e n t statuses of the form, viz. (1) the f o r m taken by itself, quite apart f r o m either its b e i n g e n m a t t e r e d in this or that particular or its b e i n g taken as a universal applicable to d i f f e r e n t particulars, (2) the particular f o r m taken as e n m a t t e r e d in this or that particular, a n d (3) the f o r m taken w h e n it is a b s t r a c t e d f r o m p a r t i c u l a r s a n d t h u s e n d o w e d with universality. 119 Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126-98), who because of his great merits as a c o m m e n t a t o r of Aristotle was a n t o n o m a s t i c a l l y called by t h e Medieval a u t h o r s ' T h e C o m m e n t a t o r ' , clearly took the i m m a n e n t f o r m s as p a r t i c u l a r , d e n y i n g all 'universalia' any real existence outside the m i n d , as we can see f r o m some unmistakable quotations f r o m the Latin version of his works. Dealing with f a m o u s metaphysical errors at the b e g i n n i n g of his c o m m e n t a r y on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Averroes qualifies the universal's m o d e of b e i n g as solely ' b e i n g k n o w n ' : "Universale e n i m n o n h a b e t esse nisi s e c u n d u m q u o d est seientia". And Aristotle claiming in t h e p r o e m i u m to De anima (I 1, 402b7-8) that a n i m a l taken universally e i t h e r is n o t h i n g or is posterior is c o m m e n t e d u p o n by Averroes as showing that Aristotle is of the opinion that universality is entirely d u e to the intellect ("intellectus est qui agit universalitatem in eis"). 1 2 0 His c o m m e n t s on Met. Ζ 6, 1031al8-19, testify to his clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g that it is precisely the i m m a n e n t f o r m being strictly individual that makes Aristotle claim the real coincidence of Socrates a n d his quiddity: InArist. VII Metaph. cap. 20, comm. 18, fol. 169 F: singulare nihil aliud est quam substantia cuius est, scilicet quidditas eius; et etiam econverso, scilicet quod substantia quae est quidditas, est substantia singularis. Verbi gratia, Socrates est animal rationale; Socrates enim nihil aliud est quam animalias et rationalitas quae sunt quidditas eius, nec animalitas et rationalitas sunt quidditas alicuius nisi Socratis et Piatonis. T h e s e texts clearly show that the Arab c o m m e n t a t o r s too viewed the i m m a n e n t f o r m s as particular, a n d , in spite of the fact that their likes 119 See the various references to Avicenna in J e a n Paulus, Henri de (Wind, Essai sur les tendances de sa métaphysique, Paris 1938, where the Avicennian distinctions are discussed (esp. 220-42) as coming to the fore in Henry of Ghent. 120 Quoted from the Latin version, In Arist. IDe anima comm., ch. 8, Sup. II, fol. 4 C. For Buridan's vivid comments u p o n this statement see my section 10.84.

may be f o u n d in o t h e r instances — to each of which they b e l o n g as equally strictly individual — their possible c o m m o n n e s s is entirely d u e to the m i n d ' s consideration of their similitudes. Incidentally, as f o r m a t t e r ' s indefinability, Averroes h o l d s a r i g o r o u s view, which comes r a t h e r close to the position m a i n t a i n e d by Frede a n d Patzig. 1 0 . 8 3 Thomas

Aquinas

In his c o m m e n t s o n Met. Ζ 10, T h o m a s Aquinas (1225-74), who is o n e of the most reliable Medieval c o m m e n t a t o r s on Aristotle, points o u t that we speak of t h e c o m p o s i t e ' m a n ' in two senses, taking it either as a universal concept, or as a particular thing. And that is why, h e says, Aristotle claims that ' m a n ' a n d ' h o r s e ' a n d the like, which are p r e s e n t in the particulars, are (if they are taken universally) n o t 'substantiae' in the sense of ' f o r m a e ' , but certain wholes c o m p o s e d of a d e t e r m i n e d m a t t e r a n d a d e t e r m i n e d f o r m ; in that case, however, these constituents are n o t taken in their singularity, b u t q u a universally applicable. For ' m a n ' signifies s o m e t h i n g that is c o m p o s e d of soul a n d body, b u t n o t of this soul a n d this body. But speaking of a 'singular' we m e a n s o m e t h i n g which is c o m p o s e d of t h e ultimate matter, individual matter, that is; for Socrates is s o m e t h i n g c o m p o s e d of iÄwsoul a n d this matter. 1 2 1 H e n c e m a t t e r is p a r t of t h e 'species', by which t e r m a t h i n g ' s c o m p l e t e essence o r q u i d d i t y c o m p o s e d of f o r m and m a t t e r is u n d e r s t o o d , n o t the f o r m o n its own. 1 2 2 Next, Ζ 10, 1035b31-1036a12, is c o m m e n t e d u p o n a l o n g the same lines. It is t h e material constit u t i o n o r materiality as such ( " m a t e r i a c o m m u n i t e r s u m p t a " o r "materia communis") that should be included in the definiens:

121

In Arist. Metaph. VII, nr. 1490 ed. Marietti: "Sciendum tamen q u o d hoc compositum quod est animal, vel h o m o , potest dupliciter sumi: vel sicut universale, vel sicut singulare. Sicut universale quidem sicut h o m o et animal, sicut singulare ut Socrates et Callias. Et ideo dicit q u o d h o m o et equus et q u a e ita sunt in singularibus, sed universaliter dicta (sicut ' h o m o ' et ' e q u u s ' ) "non sunt substantia" [1035b29], idest n o n sunt solum forma, sed sunt simul totum q u o d d a m compositum ex determinata materia et determinata forma; n o n quidem ut singulariter, sed universaliter. ' H o m o ' enim dicit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, non autem ex hac anima et hoc corpore. Sed 'singulare' dicit aliquid compositum "ex ultima materia" [1035b30], idest materia individuali. Est enim Socrates aliquid compositum ex hac anima et hoc corpore. Et similiter est in aliis singularibus". 122 Ibid., nr.1491:"Sic igitur patet q u o d materia est pars speciei. Speciem autem hic intelligimus n o n f o r m a m tantum, sed q u o d quid erat esse". For the twofold meaning of 'είδος-species' see Frede & Patzig II, 236f.

In Arist. Metaph. VII, nr. 1492: Ostendit [sc. Aristoteles] quae partes debeant poni in definitione. Cum enim ostensum sit quae partes sunt speciei et quae partes individui, quia materia communiter sumpta est pars speciei, haec autem materia determinata est pars individui, — manifestum est quod solum illae partes sunt partes rationis [= 'of the definiens'] quae sunt partes speciei, non autem quae sunt partes individui. In definitione enim hominis ponitur caro et os, sed non haec caro et hoc os. Et hoc ideo quia ratio definitiva non assignatur nisi universaliter. A q u i n a s ' s c o m m e n t s o n t h e passage wind u p by e m p h a s i z i n g two things. First, n o individual material parts can ever be parts of t h e c o m p l e t e essence, let alone of the f o r m itself. Second, the parts of a thing's matter taken universally (as the general condition of materiality, that is) are parts of the c o m p l e t e essence a n d , consequently, of the d e f i n i e n s of the composite thing, b u t are surely n o t parts of the f o r m by itself: Ibid,., 1497: [...] Partes enim materiae individuae sunt partes compositi singularis, non autem speciei nec formae. Partes autem materiae universalis sunt partes speciei, sed non formae. Et quia universale definitur et non singulare, ideo partes materiae individualis non ponuntur in definitione, sed solum partes materiae communis simul cum forma vel partibus formae. In his theological Summa, A q u i n a s rejects t h e position h e l d by Averroes, who claimed that matter is n o t part of a thing's essence, n o t even of its c o m p l e t e essence; it is only part of the particular thing. In his answer T h o m a s has a n o t h e r o p p o r t u n i t y to explain what h e u n d e r s t a n d s by ' m a t t e r taken universally'. H e sets it off f r o m the ' m a r k e d o r a d o r n e d m a t t e r ' ( ' m a t e r i a s i g n a t a ' ) , which is t h e principle of individuation: Summa theologiae I, q. 75, art. 4 c: [...] quidam posuerunt [e.g. Averroes, In VIIMetaph., comm. 34] solam formam esse de ratione speciei, materiam vero esse partem individui, et non speciei. Quod quidem non potest esse verum. Nam ad naturam speciei pertinet id quod significat definitio. Definitio autem in rebus naturalibus non significat formam tantum, sed formam et materiam, unde [= 'because'] materia est pars speciei in rebus naturalibus. Non quidem materia signata, quae est principium individuationis, sed materia communis. Sicut enim de ratione huius hominis est quod sit ex hac anima et his carnibus et his ossibus, ita de ratione hominis est quod sit ex anima et carnibus et ossibus. Elsewhere in the Summa, the d i f f e r e n c e between the c o m p l e t e essence a n d the composite ( h e r e called ' s u p p o s i t u m ' , i.e. the c o n c r e t e thing itself) i n f o r m e d by the f o r m or essence is explained in terms of

the role m a t t e r has in natural things c o m p o s e d of f o r m a n d matter. T h e r e is also an allusion to the later distinction between formal a n d material significate: Ibid. I, q. 3, art. 3 c: [...] in rebus compositis ex materia et forma necesse est quod différant natura (vel essentia) et suppositum, quia essentia vel natura comprehendit in se ilia tantum quae cadunt in definitione speciei, sicut humanitas comprehendit in se ea quae cadunt in definitione hominis; his enim homo est homo; et hoc significat 'humanitas', hoc scilicet quo homo est homo. Sed materia individualis cum accidentibus omnibus individuantibus ipsam, 123 non cadit in definitione speciei; non enim cadunt in definitione hominis hae carnes et haec ossa, aut albedo vel nigredo, vel aliquid huiusmodi, unde hae carnes et haec ossa et accidentia designantia hanc materiam, non includuntur in humanitate. Et tarnen, in eo quod est homo includuntur, unde id quod est homo habet in se aliquid quod non habet humanitas. Et propter hoc non est totaliter idem homo et humanitas, sed humanitas significatur ut pars formalis hominis, quia principia definientia habent se formaliter respectu materiae individuantis. In quaestio I, 85 of t h e same work, in which t h e o p e r a t i o n of the intellect is e x a m i n e d , T h o m a s relates an objection to the effect that t h e m e n t a l o p e r a t i o n of abstraction s h o u l d strip off any material constituent of a natural thing, so that the sole f o r m is left. In keeping with the previous e x p o s i t i o n , A q u i n a s e x p l a i n s how t h e intellect m a n a g e s to properly d e f i n e sensible things by abstracting the thing's c o m p l e t e essence, stripping off its particular materials, but including the general condition of materiality in its definiens: Ibid., I, q. 85, art. 1, ad 2 u m : [...] quidam putaverunt quod species rei naturalis sit forma solum et quod materia non sit pars speciei. Sed secundum hoc, in definitionibus rerum naturalium non poneretur materia. Et ideo aliter dicendum est quod materia est duplex, scilicet communis, et signata vel individualis; communis quidem, ut caro et os; individualis autem, ut hae carnes et haec ossa. Intellectus igitur abstrahlt speciem rei naturalis a materia sensibili individuali, non autem a materia sensibili communi; sicut speciem hominis abstrahlt ab his carnibus et his ossibus, quae non sunt de ratione speciei, sed sunt partes individui, ut dicitur in VII Metaphysicae [Z 10, 1035b331036a13], et ideo sine eis considerari potest. Sed species hominis non potest abstrahi per intellectum a carnibus et ossibus [i.e. from its being enmattered in flesh and bones].

123 This sentence implies that a thing's matter is individuated by its accidental forms, not that matter as such is the principle of individuation. Cf. also Thomas's speaking of 'marked matter' ('materia signata'), i.e. matter a d o r n e d by substantial and accidental forms, as the principle of individuation.

In the same quaestio the a u t h o r explains that the universal p r o d u c e d by the mental o p e r a t i o n of abstraction, in point of fact contains two elements. It d e n o t e s first a thing's real n a t u r e , which is the p r o p e r object of the mental operation, but by the same token, there is also a r e f e r e n c e to the abstract status in which the real n a t u r e is p r e s e n t e d to the (possible) intellect. 1 2 4 H e claims that t h e t h i n g ' s n a t u r e or f o r m only exists in the outside particulars, whilst universality is in the intellect only. From this e x p l a n a t i o n we may infer that to Aquinas, t h e e n m a t t e r e d f o r m is particular, n o t universal. T h e ontic f o r m , m a n h o o d ( h u m a n i t a s ) , which f r o m the semantic point of view is the r e f e r e n t of the formal significate of the abstract term ' h u m a n i t a s ' , is only f o u n d in this or that individual h u m a n being, w h e r e a s t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g 'universal' is merely an abstract logical tool p r o d u c e d by the intellect: Ibid,., art. 2, ad 2 u m : [...] cum dicitur 'universale abstractum', duo intelliguntur, scilicet ipsa natura rei, et abstractio seu universalitas. Ipsa igitur natura, cui accidit vel intelligi vel abstrahi (vel intentio universalitatis), non est nisi in singularibus, sed hoc ipsum quod est intelligi vel abstrahi (vel intentio universalitatis) est in intellectu. [...]. Similiter humanitas, quae intelligitur, non est nisi in hoc vel illo homine. Sed quod humanitas apprehendatur sine individualibus conditionibus (quod est ipsam abstrahi, ad quod sequitur intentio universalitatis), accidit humanitati secundum quod percipitur ab intellectu, in quo est similitudo naturae speciei, et non individualium principiorum. In his metaphysical tract De ente et essentia, Aquinas explains that the principle of individuation is n o t just matter, b u t the materia signata or t h e m a t t e r already s o m e h o w m a r k e d , by substantial o r coincid e n t a l forms, that is. At the same time h e implicitly shows that h e views the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m as a particular f o r m or c o m p l e t e essence, a n d h e claims that it also has a universal status, i.e. as a logical tool, being the thing's definiens, in which the 'materia signata' (and thus e n m a t t e r e d forms somehow acting) is the principle of individuation: De ente et essentia, cap. 2, nr. 7 ed. Marietti: Sed quia individuationis principium est materia, ex hoc forte videtur sequi quod essentia, quae 124

T h e abstraction is accomplished by the active intellect; see Aquinas, Summa theol. I, q.12, art.13c, and q. 85, art. 1, as l " m , 3 u m , 4 u m , 5 u m . In point of fact, the young Thomas, at least, and especially his contemporary, Henry of Ghent, as well as most philosophers from the Franciscan School, followed Avicenna in distinguishing three statuses of the form: (a) taken by itself, it is neither universal nor individual; (b) as enmattered, it is individual; and (c) when abstracted from the particulars, it is universal; see my previous section.

in se materiam complectitur simul et formam, sit tantum particularis, et non universalis. [...]. Et ideo sciendum est quod materia non quolibet modo accepta est individuationis principium, sed solum materia signata; et dico materiam signatam quae sub determinatis dimensionibus consideratur. Haec autem materia in definitione hominis inquantum est homo non ponitur (sed poneretur in definitione Socratis, si Socrates definitionem haberet). In definitione autem hominis ponitur materia non-signata; non enim in definitione hominis ponitur hoc os et haec caro, sed os et caro absolute, quae sunt materia hominis non-signata. Meanwhile it should be recognized that sometimes the claim that the forms, even t h o u g h they only exist q u a particulars, are susceptible to what Aquinas calls the ' i n t e n t i o universalitatis', goes t o g e t h e r with r e g a r d i n g m a t t e r as the p r i n c i p l e of individuation. However, it is clear f r o m the context that the individual matter as m a r k e d by formal individuating e l e m e n t s ( ' p r i n c i p i a i n d i v i d u a n t i a ' ) is m e a n t . It becomes clear, time a n d again, that, somewhat confusingly, the particular i m m a n e n t f o r m is called a 'universale'. However, it e a r n s this label only because it can be s u b m i t t e d to abstraction, whereas in so far as it is e n m a t t e r e d h e r e a n d now, it is not susceptible to abstraction: In Arist. II De anima comm., nrs. 378-380 [ad De anima II 5, 417b20ff.]: [...] considerandum est quod universale potest accipi dupliciter. Uno modo potest dici universale ipsa natura communis, prout subiacet intentioni universalitatis, alio modo secundum se. [...]. Ista autem natura cui advenit intentio universalitatis, puta natura hominis, habet duplex esse: unum quidem materiale, secundum quod est in materia naturali, aliud autem immateiale, secundum quod est in intellectu. Secundum igitur quod habet esse in materia naturali, non potest ei advenire intentio universalitatis, quia per materiam individuatur. Advenit igitur ei universalitatis intentio secundum quod abstrahitur 125 a materia individuali. Non est autem possibile quod abstrahatur a materia individuali realiter, sicut Platonici posuerunt. Non enim est homo naturalis, idest realis, nisi in his carnibus et in his ossibus, sicut probat Philosophus in VII° Metaphysicae. Relinquitur ergo quod natura humana non habet esse praeter principia individuantia nisi tantum in intellectu. [379] [...] Non [...] apprehendit [...] intellectus [...] quod natura communis sit sine principiis individuantibus, sed apprehendit naturam communem, non apprehendendo principia individuantia. [380]. Sic igitur patet quod naturae communi non potest attribui intentio universalitatis nisi secundum esse quod habet in intellectu. [...] Et propter hoc nomina communia significantia naturas ipsas praedicantur de individuis, non autem nomina significantia

125

T h e subject is the particular form, not the particular thing.

intentiones. Socrates enim est homo, sed non est species, quamvis homo sit species. U n l i k e m o s t m o d e r n c o m m e n t a t o r s o n Aristotle, A q u i n a s q u i t e remarkably maintains a clear distinction between the particular f o r m q u a e n m a t t e r e d (and, as such alien to universality a n d irrespective of t h e i n c i d e n t a l c i r c u m s t a n c e that it is, o r may be, f o u n d in o t h e r instances) on the o n e h a n d , a n d the same f o r m after its individuating principles have been stripped away by abstraction, on the other. 10. 84 John Buridan T h e f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y Parisian university professor, J o h n Buridan (d. about 1361), who wrote extensive c o m m e n t a r i e s (most of t h e m in several versions as a result of his longstanding practice as a university t e a c h e r ) o n the g r e a t e r p a r t of Aristotle's works, has also left two c o m m e n t a r i e s on t h e Metaphysics, o n e in t h e f o r m of a r u n n i n g c o m m e n t a r y (Expositio), the o t h e r as a collection of quaestiones o n selected t h e m e s a n d problems. O n account of the question whether a t h i n g ' s m a t t e r s h o u l d b e i n c l u d e d in its d e f i n i e n s , we r e a d in B u r i d a n ' s Expositio (which has n o t b e e n edited so far) re Met. Ζ 10, 1036a1ff. his view of the subject-matter, which, as is usual with Burid a n , is p r e s e n t e d in terms of his own semantics a n d epistemology. As a terminist logician, Buridan is in the c o n s t a n t habit of r e d u c i n g q u e s t i o n s f o u n d in Aristotle a n d m o s t of his c o m m e n t a t o r s to semantic issues. First, h e states that particulars c a n n o t be d e f i n e d , even if we were to f r a m e , using the Russellian label, 'definite descriptions', since they are useful for d e n o t i n g things, b u t c a n n o t offer a p r o p e r definition required for true knowledge: Expos, in Arist. Metaph. (quoted from Ms. Erfurt F. 322, fo1.125vb): Hic ostendit quod partes ipsius singularis non ponuntur in diffinitione totius, hoc est dictu quod nomina significantia singulariter partes alicuius totius non ponuntur in diffinitione nominis significantis totum. [...] Et Aristotiles hoc intendit probare, scilicet quod singularium non sunt diffinitiones. Primo quia [= 'First with this argument']: Res significate per terminos singulares eiusdem speciei non possunt cognosci diffinitive nisi per extranea illis singularibus; quibus circumscriptis [= 'these being taken away'], non minus illi termini significarent ea que significant. Ergo oporteret in diffinitione singularium, ad differentiam unius ab altero, ponere extranea. Quibus ablatis, non auferretur terminus singularis, nec eius significatio vel suppositio. Igitur. Secundo quia: Non possunt res singulariter cognosci nisi

cognoscantur per modum existends in prospectu cognoscentis. Ideo, si non sensi Sortem, 1 2 6 non diceres michi, nec posses dicere, quid debeam intelligere per 'Sortem' nisi per terminos communes, quorum cognitio sive significatio ita bene convenit alteri sicut Sorti, si alter generaret ut in omnibus circumstantiis ipsi Sorti. Ideo haec non esset diffinitio Sortis, quia non esset propria nec convertibilis. C o n c e r n i n g the passus 1036a26ff. Buridan rephrases (fol. 126ra) the p r o b l e m a b o u t material parts as follows: "Cum dictum sit q u o d partes materiales n o n p o n u n t u r in diffinitione totius, sed formales, et q u o d etiam speciei est diffinitio, et n o n ipsius singularis — restât dubitatio q u e sint partes speciei, et q u e singularis; similiter et q u e sint partes materiales et q u e formales". H e first states (fol. 126rb) that the rigorous discarding of any material constituent f r o m a thing's definiens will n o t do, because in the case of natural substances sensation does not perceive the f o r m alone, b u t r a t h e r the composite of matter a n d f o r m : so b o t h pertain to the p r o p e r d e f i n i e n s of the species. T h e c o m p a r i s o n drawn by Socrates the Younger, — who, incidentally, is i d e n t i f i e d as Plato himself ("Socrates j u n i o r , idest Plato, qui sic vocabatur, quia erat discipulus Socratis") — is rejected; but, n o n e the less, b o t h m a n a n d circle are said to be d e f i n e d in a c c o r d a n c e with their g e n e r a l condition of 'materiality', which may be i m p l e m e n t e d by any a d e q u a t e materials. Of course, Buridan 's statement is f r a m e d semantically, in terms of terminist logic: Ibid., fol. 126rb: [...] sed oportet tales termini diffmiri per materiam secundum talem conceptum communem, secundum quod iste conceptus sit communis omnibus materiis ex quibus potest fieri circulus, vel ex quibus potest fieri homo. C o m m e n t i n g u p o n 1037a5, Buridan rephrases Aristotle's conclusion in his own vocabulary, saying that m a t t e r e n t e r s b o t h the t h i n g ' s d e f i n i e n s a n d the significate of c o m m o n terms. So b o t h f o r m and matter are signified as well as the composite, to wit both in the way in which particulars ('singtilaria') are signified a n d in that which is used to designate t h e m logically, as universals. It is only in their universal status that the particular things are definable: Ibid., fol. 126va: PALAM AUTEM. Hic ex dictis infert principalem intentionem, scilicet quod termini communes non solum significant formam, ymo etiam compositum, unde (= 'because') tam materia quam forma quam etiam compositum significantur, et singulariter et 1L>1

' From the thirteenth century onwards, the Medieval authors use the n a m e 'Sortes' as a fictive person only appearing in examples, where earlier commentators used the name of the historical Socrates.

universaliter. Et secundum significationes singulares non diffiniuntur nec ponuntur in diffinitionibus, sed bene secundum universales. In a special tract o n the d i f f e r e n c e between the universal a n d t h e individual, Buridan clearly distinguishes between the particular status of the real e n m a t t e r e d form a n d its universal status in o u r m i n d as a logical tool. O n e of his n u m e r o u s a r g u m e n t s refers to the De caelo passage discussed above, which is all the m o r e interesting because the Medievals believed t h e r e in fact existed, a n d could exist, only o n e sun, o n e m o o n , o n e universe — so that the universal status could not possibly be seen as real: Tractatus de differentia universalis ad Individuum, pars secunda, p. 151 ed. Szyller (in classical orthography): [...] universale ut distinguitur ab individuis est aptum natum praedicari de pluribus sive reperiri in pluribus, sed non est aptum natum reperiri in pluribus praeter animam. [...] sol, luna, mundus, deus et huiusmodi sunt universalia; differt enim 'caelum' et 'hoc caelum' sicut differt universale et individuum, ut patet 1° Caeli [9, 278al3-15], et ibi capitur 'celum' pro mundo. [...] constat quod sol non est natus praeter animam esse in pluribus, quia talis potentia vel aptitudo esset frustra, cum numquam reduci posset ad actum. [...] sed forte diceres quod non est ibi aptitudo vel potentia positiva, sed non repugnantia. Sed hoc non valet, quia oporteret istam non-repugnantiam nihil esse praeter animam omnino. [...] Et credo quod ibi est repugnantia, cum impossibile sit esse plures soles aut plures mundos, et specialiter nullus debet dubitare quin in re répugnât esse plures deos. In his c o m m e n t s o n Averroes's d i c t u m "intellectus est qui agit universalitatern", Buridan goes on to deal with p e o p l e — y o u n g a n d possibly even elderly m e n , h e ironically adds — who have difficulties with it. However, it is not any d o u b t a b o u t the particular status of the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m which heavily troubles t h e m , b u t what Aristotle has himself called (Met. Β 4, 999a24-25), B u r i d a n remarks, t h e most i n t r a c t a b l e a n d u r g e n t of all p r o b l e m s , viz. how to o b t a i n t r u e knowledge of what is individual a n d thus indefinite. Buridan is ready to solve t h e i r p r o b l e m , which h e first sketches, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r arguments: Ibid., p. 166: Haec sunt verba Commentatoris. Sed multi iuvenes, vel forte senes, valde dubitant in hoc loco, non considérantes modum per quem intelligimus res ipsas. Quando enim dico 'homo est animal rationale', ipsa res singulariter existens quae definitur non est determinate Socrates vel Plato, quia, istis corruptis, remanet adhuc definitio, 127 nec ilia res est omnes homines qui nunc sunt quidem, quia 127

Ista definitio, i.e. that which is signified by the definiens.

post omnium istorum corruptionem adhuc remanebit ista definitio propter aliorum generationem; etiam, solo homine existente, ista definitio salvaretur. Nec ilia res est omnes homines qui nunc sunt et qui erunt, quia illi qui erunt non sunt. Et sic ibi definiretur indifferenter ens et non ens; quod est irrationabile. Dicendum est quod intellectus non intelligit res habendo eas in prospectu, sed intelligit eas per signum manens post rei absentiam, vel omnino post rei corruptionem, scilicet per phantasma vel per speciem intelligibilem. Ideo per huiusmodi phantasma potest idem conceptus causari in anima, sive res sit, sive non sit. [...] Si ergo conceptus fuerit per speciem praecisam ab extraneis [i.e. 'abstracted' from the extraneous material appurtenances], tunc non magis significabit individuum a quo causabatur quam quodlibet aliorum, sed indifferenter significabit quodlibet individuorum. Buridan m o r e than o n c e points out that even t h o u g h two individuals, like Socrates a n d Plato, are specifically the same, they nevertheless d i f f e r 'essentialiter' 1 2 8 o r 'seipsis', i.e. q u a distinct c o n c r e t e beings; this distinction seems to i n c l u d e b o t h their substantial a n d coincidental forms: Ibid., p. 174: [...] forma Socratis non est forma Platonis essentialiter, quia forma Socratis essentialiter corrumpitur vel generatur, forma Platonis non corrupta vel generata. Ergo illae duae formae essentialiter distinguuntur. [...] istae formae diversificantur in re: aut ergo essentialiter, aut solum accidentaliter. Si dicas: essentialiter, tunc habebo propositum ['then I will have made my point, viz. that they differ 'essentialiter']. Si dicas quod accidentaliter solum, tu non dicis hoc nisi quia sunt eiusdem speciei. Sed tunc pono ['assume, for the sake of argument'] quod Socrates et Plato sint omnino similes in accidentibus, ita quod omnia accidentia unius sint eiusdem speciei cum omnibus accidentibus alterius, et sint in eisdem locis secundum speciem. Tunc quero de primis accidentibus 129 quibus isti primo sint accidentaliter diversi, quomodo ipsa sunt diversa. Et oportet dicere quod seipsis, et hoc est dicere: essentialiter; et tarnen sunt eiusdem speciei (per positum). Ergo similiter, si Socrates et Plato sint eiusdem speciei, boc non obstat quin sint essentialiter diversi. Et sicut dico de formis istis, sic etiam verum est de omnibus quae sunt in Socrate et in Platone. De quolibet enim quod est in Socrate verum est dicere quod non est essentialiter aliquid de eis quae sunt in Platone. Immo, si Socrates omnino annihilaretur, adhuc remaneret Plato, et omnia quae in eo sunt, saltern absoluta.

128 p r o m the twelfth century onwards, the term 'essentia' is used to indicate an individual in its being this or that concretum, in its own factual esse, but this taken together with a strong c o n n o t a t i o n of its complete being, including its essential nature. See De Rijk (1981), 19-24. 129 I.e. their quantity and quality.

In conclusion, Buridan deals with a final objection to the effect that the d i f f e r e n c e between Socrates a n d Plato is only numerical, a n d the unity following f r o m their n o t differing specifically is to be explained in terms of specific indivisibility. This objection is nullified by showing that the specific similitude, even if it is u n d e r s t o o d as f o u n d e d in reality, still does n o t imply that they are i n f o r m e d by numerically the same (universal) form. Rather the specific unity admits of a n u m e r i cal d i f f e r e n c e between their i m m a n e n t f o r m s which is n o t surpassed by that between the individuals, Socrates a n d Plato themselves: Ibid., p. 176: Sed tu diceres statim quod ilia unitas est bene divisa numeraliter in Socrate et Platone, sed est in eis omnino indivisa secundum speciem. Illud nihil est, quoniam: Ly 'secundum speciem' vel dicit aliquid animae, vel dicit aliquid praeter animam in Socrate et Platone. Si dicit aliquid animae, hoc est quod ego volo. Si dicit aliquid praeter animam in Socrate et Platone, tunc oportet, ut prius, quod illud 'secundum speciem' sit aliud in Socrate et aliud in Platone secundum numerum. Et sic habebo quod ista unitas et illud 'secundum speciem' habebit tantam distinctionem in Socrate et Platone quantam habent inter se Socrates et Plato, et quaecumque alia quae numéro distincta sunt, et non specifice. Plainly, the fact that t h e r e is a n u m e r i c a l d i f f e r e n c e between their respective e n m a t t e r e d f o r m s of m a n h o o d , whiteness, fairness, a n d so o n , entails that these f o r m s are particular forms, not universal ones.

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL BEING. T H E MATHEMATICALS

In the o p e n i n g lines (1045b27-1046a4) of the first c h a p t e r of Book Θ, Aristotle makes clear for what p u r p o s e the issue of potentiality a n d actuality will now be addressed, a n d h e a n n o u n c e s the modus procedendi. First we are r e m i n d e d of the primary sense of ' b e ' f o u n d in the ten categorial m o d e s , a n d t h e p r e d o m i n a n t position of 'subsistent entity' a m o n g t h e m . Next, the a u t h o r states that o n e way to divide things is by m a k i n g use of the distinctive m o d e s of ' b e ' according to t h e s c h e m e of the ten categories, a n d a n o t h e r is by employing the n o t i o n s of 'actual' a n d ' p o t e n t i a l ' . H e t h e n p r o p o s e s to deal with potentiality a n d act by e x p l a i n i n g what is m e a n t by δ ύ ν α μ ι ς in the c o n v e n t i o n a l sense, which is mainly f o u n d in daily usage, 1 namely ' p o w e r ' taken as t h e a g e n t of processes of c h a n g e . After having treated (chs. 1-5) the several uses of δ ύ ν α μ ι ς as c o r r e s p o n d i n g to κίνησις ( ' m o t i o n ' , ' c h a n g e ' ) , a l t h o u g h they are n o t "the most useful for o u r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e " (b36-al), 2 the discussion of actuality will throw light on precisely what s h o u l d be u n d e r s t o o d by the sort of δύναμις ('potentiality') that does serve o u r p r e s e n t purpose. E n u m e r a t i n g the d i f f e r e n t senses of ' b e ' ( ' c o i n c i d e n t a l ' , ' t r u e ' , a n d ' p o t e n t i a l - a c t u a l ' ) in Ε 2, 1026a33ff., Aristotle h a d already properly assessed actuality a n d potentiality by clearly suggesting that these n o t i o n s all cover, a n d modify, as it were, the o t h e r ways in which the outside things can be said to ber. Met. Ε 2, 1026a33-b2: Since that which is, in the precise sense of 'what is , is addressed as 'be-ing coincidentally', 'be-ing as true' [...] and,

1

I think this to be the m e a n i n g of ή λέγεται μέν μάλιστα κυρίως (1045b35-36), rather than a reference to the word's strictest sense. 2 T h e chapters 1-5 are c o m m e n t e d u p o n by Ross (II, 240-9), Reale (II, 62-75), and quite extensively in Burnyeat II, 46-124, including some p e r t i n e n t notes on important details, including G.E.L. Owen (46-8) on δυνατόν and δύναμις, and (524) on λόγος as δύναμις τών έναντίων, on the Megarians (58-61); Sarah Waterlow on T i m e a n d Modality in Cael. I, 12 (69-92), esp. 92-6 (incidentally, Waterlow's interpretation is also discussed by Van Rijen (1989), 82-7, in the context of his own interpretation of Cael. I, 12; ibid., 73-102); and Richard Sorabji: "Five Philosophical Issues Arising from Met. Θ, chs. 4 & 5", 118-24.

a p a r t f r o m t h e s e two, ' b e - i n g in t h e c a t e g o r i a l m o d e s [...] a g a i n , a p a r t f r o m all t h e s e ( π α ρ ά τ α ΰ τ α π ά ν τ α ) , ' b e - i n g p o t e n t i a l l y a n d actually'.

It is quite natural, then, that, o n c e the true ousia has been identified (in Z-H) as the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m ( ε ί δ ο ς ) , which is f o u n d in t h e c o m p o u n d s as n a m e d ( ' a p p e l l a t e d ' ) a f t e r the categories, Aristotle should now p r o c e e d to e x a m i n e categorial b e i n g u n d e r the aspect 'potential-actual'. 3 And this is precisely what h e is going to u n d e r t a k e in chapters 6-9 of book Θ. But what a b o u t 0 10? As will be shown presently, the link both with Θ, chs. 6-9, a n d Z-H is obvious. By analogy with the o n e a b o u t act a n d potentiality, t h e r e s h o u l d be a discussion c o n c e r n i n g t h e n o t i o n ' t r u e ' with r e f e r e n c e to the diverse categorial m o d e s of ' b e ' , subsistent b e i n g in particular. In Ε 4, the claim of 'be-ing q u a stated as t r u e ' for the d e n o m i n a t i o n ' t r u e ousia' was u n d e r m i n e d a n d rejected, since it is merely a mental construal a b o u t real things. But it was recognized at the same time that, with r e g a r d to 'simples', i.e. the 'what-things-are', in reality, there is n o t s o m e t h i n g of the ' q u a stated as t r u e ' type, because the latter type c o n c e r n s c o m p o u n d s , viz. of f o r m a n d matter, not 'simples'. In the case o f ' s i m p l e s ' there is ' t r u e ' (and 'false') in a n o t h e r sense. Now "whatever we have to study with r e g a r d to 'what is a n d 'what is not' in the m a n n e r of the 'simples', will have to be studied later", Aristotle a n n o u n c e d (1027b27-29). This promise, then, will be r e d e e m e d in Θ 10, where the two types of truth, 'ontic truth', a n d the foregoing 'truth qua stated in m i n d ' or ' a p o p h a n t i c t r u t h ' , are contrasted. And, because ontic t r u t h lacks a p r o p e r c o u n t e r p a r t (*ontic falsehood, as it were), it is obvious that it must be s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m a p o p h a n t i c truth, whose n a t u r e is notably disclosed by contrasting it with its c o u n t e r p a r t , statemental falsehood. In o t h e r words, ontic t r u t h is a real f e a t u r e of 'what is', a n d whenever the simple 'what is' of things — w h e t h e r focussed on in its subsistency or after any coincidental m o d e of being — is u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n , we eo ipso are t o u c h i n g (grasping) the real thing, a n d e r r o r is o u t of the question. It is the observations of this ontic aspect of 'what is', including its cognitional sequel, that Aristotle's discussions of t r u e ousia f o u n d in the central p a r t of t h e Metaphysics (ΕΖΗΘ) will wind u p with. 3

T h e investigation of the pair 'actual-potential' is all the more important as in the course of the previous observations (in H, chs. 2 and 6), the role of είδος as (the active cause of) actualization (ενέργεια) has come to the fore as f u n d a m e n t a l for Aristotle's own metaphysical position against that held by Plato and others.

11.1

On actuality and potentiality

In c h a p t e r 6, actuality will be m a r k e d off f r o m potentiality a n d first a n d f o r e m o s t f r o m m o t i o n . T h u s we will discover t h e o t h e r sense, which has led Aristotle (chs. 1-5) to study t h e previous senses of δύναμις, which are n o t p e r t i n e n t to the present investigations. 4 11.11

Actuality and potentiality assessed

Actuality or 'being-in-complete-realization' is explained as the count e r p a r t of ' b e i n g potentially', a n d accordingly counter-instanced, so to speak: Met. Θ 6, 1048a30-35: Actuality, then, is the presence of the thing (τό ύπάρχειν τό πράγμα), not in the sense in which we call it 'potential'. For instance, we speak of a potential Hermes in the block of wood, and of the half-line in the whole, because it may be taken from it; and we even call the man who is not studying a scholar, if he is capable of studying. Well, the thing that is in the opposite way, that is in actuality (ένεργεία). 5 W h a t all these e x a m p l e s have in c o m m o n is their illustrating that s o m e t h i n g may be [x] in two ways or modalities, either by b e i n g it actually or by b e i n g it in i n c o m p l e t e reality, which boils down to possessing the capability of b e c o m i n g it. T h u s o n the restriction of being [x] only potentially, H e r m e s is really there (ύπάρχει) if the wood is p r e s e n t , as well as t h e half-line is really there if a line is given; likewise, the scholar is really there even if s o m e o n e who is only capable of studying is present. From the semantic point of view, when you ask m e f o r a statue of H e r m e s , I can truly say: "Well, h e r e you are", offering you a block of wood. This passage (1048a35-b9) also contains an interesting r e m a r k on scientific m e t h o d . Aristotle m e a n s to say: we s o m e t i m e s go a b o u t discussing ' b e ' in actuality by way of induction (επαγωγή). For it is n o t always necessary to d e f i n e everything; you are sometimes entitled to c o n f i n e yourself to grasping the a n a l o g o u s e l e m e n t in all the cases you have b e f o r e you (τό άνάλογον συνοράν). For instance, when you can p r o c e e d by observing in t h e particular case at h a n d a certain a n a l o g o n , e.g. as that which is actually b u i l d i n g to that which is 4

Kosman (1984), esp. 121-34. A lucid exegesis of the 'actual vs. potential' issue is found in Guthrie VI, 121-4. For a b r o a d e r assessment of ένέργεια and related terms as used in the context of action and activity see Van Ophuijsen (1993), 752-5. 5

c a p a b l e of building, a n d t h e waking to t h e sleeping; a n d as that which is actually seeing is to that which has its eyes shut but has sight; a n d as that which has b e e n s h a p e d out of m a t t e r to the matter. Now let actuality be d e f i n e d , Aristotle continues, by o n e m e m b e r of this antithesis, a n d the potential by the other. But you should notice that n o t all things are said to be in actuality in the same sense; the analogy only applies to the diverse ways in which e a c h of t h e m is to its potential state, seeing that the m a n n e r in which e.g. A is in Β or to B, is on the same footing as that in which C is in D or to D. For some are so related as activity to power (ώς κίνησις πρός δ ύ ν α μ ι ν ) , o t h e r s as essence to some sort of matter (ώς ούσία πρός τίνα ϋλην). 6 N e x t , this variety is e x p l a i n e d , a n d o n c e m o r e t h e s e m a n t i c c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y of the respective types of potentiality a n d actuality comes to the fore: (a) 1048b9-17: T h e potential entities, infinity (τό άπειρον) a n d void (τό κενόν), a n d their likes have n o actuality, properly speaking, since their p o t e n t i a l state of b e i n g infinite a n d void etc. will never b e properly actualized. T h e r e f o r e the expression ' T h e void exists p o t e n tially' is an i m p r o p e r o n e , a n d ' T h e void will be actually' is false. 7 Notice that the counter-instance of the potentially seeing or walking is p r e s e n t e d in s e m a n t i c terms: t h i n g s can truly be said w i t h o u t qualification either to potentially see a n d walk, or to be d o i n g so in complete reality. (b) 1048bl8-35, where actuality is the c o u n t e r p a r t o f ' m o t i o n ' in the sense of ' t h e d o i n g (πραξις) leading to it'. An interesting opposition 6

'As A is in B' answers to 'as form in matter', while 'as A is to D' answers to 'as activity to power' (Ross II, 251). Aristotle instancing the 'being-in' relationship with that between form and matter may remind us of his treatment of matter in Mel Z; see also Kosman (1984), 135ff. Ross has drawn o u r attention to the variations of language connected with the opposition a n d juxtaposition of κίνησις and δύναμις t h r o u g h o u t Aristotle's work (Met. Θ 6, 1048bÌ8-35; Rhet. III 11, 1412a9; Phys. III 2, 201b31, An. III 7, 431 a6, Ε N Vil 14, I154b27; Χ 2, 1173b2; Met. Κ 9, 1065b141066a7, 1066a17-26), and rightly explained them as linguistic variations without doctrinal impact. ' Nor will t h e r e ever be an actual infinitude as s o m e t h i n g separate (bl4-15, where the use of χωριστόν is noticeable). From the Aristotelian point of view, this is peculiar, because in Aristotle's view, any p r o p e r potentiality should at some time be actualized. This kind of i m p r o p e r potentiality is also of a remarkable n a t u r e because in the other cases it is things that are actually [x] and potentially [γ], while in the case of infinity and void, their 'being-themselves', or 'existence' is in order. In the f o r m e r cases, the potentiality of being is the potentiality possessed by, say, [x] of being [y], owing to which [x] may be n a m e d a δυνάμει δν. See the pertinent discussion of potentiality and actuality in Guthrie VI, 119-29, esp. 120, and Kosman (1984).

is m a d e between activities ( ' d o i n g s ' ) which are in themselves complete actualizations, such as seeing, which eo ipso a n d f r o m the outset includes the fact that the object is seen in full actuality, and, on the o t h e r h a n d , activities such as t h e r e m o v i n g of fat ( ' t h i n n i n g ' , ί σ χ ν α ί ν ε ι ν ) , which, q u a tentative actions, d o n o t include the reaching of their e n d (τέλος), viz. that e.g. the object is t h i n n e d in the sense of ' t h i n ' (so that the action has immediately r e a c h e d its e n d ) , t h o u g h it may have b e c o m e slightly t h i n n e r than b e f o r e . Many actions are of t h e latter type, like the processes of l e a r n i n g , walking, building, which all, instead of b e i n g activities that reach their e n d s f r o m the outset, take time a n d are j u s t on their way to their ends, namely to have learnt a n d b e i n g l e a r n e d now, to have r e a c h e d a certain p o i n t by walking, 8 a n d to have finished building·' a n d now be the builder of [x].io Of course, c o n c e r n i n g l e a r n i n g , walking, a n d b u i l d i n g too, t h e r e is an i m m e d i a t e transition f r o m the potentiality consisting in the capabilities of l e a r n i n g etc. to t h e actualization of these capabilities. 1 1 . 1 2 When can what is actually [x] be named 'a potential [y]'f C o n s i d e r i n g the idea that actuality a n d potentiality are o p p o s i t e states of things which are, or are not yet b u t may b e c o m e , s o m e t h i n g else, the question comes tip when some [ x] is to be called 'a potential [y]'. For instance, can t h e e l e m e n t e a r t h (or r a t h e r ' s o m e t h i n g e a r t h e n ' ) be properly called 'a potential statue', or should this n a m e be reserved f o r wood o r s t o n e (or r a t h e r ' s o m e t h i n g w o o d e n ' or ' s o m e t h i n g * ' s t o n e n ' ) ? This is discussed in the first part of c h a p t e r 7 (1048b37-1049a24). T h e r e m a i n d e r of the c h a p t e r will deal with a cognate question c o n c e r n i n g the n a m i n g n o t of the material [x] after its b e i n g potential [y], but, precisely the o t h e r way r o u n d , of [y] as having [x] as its m a t t e r . "

8

For βαδίζειν = βαδίζειν πόθεν ποί ('to go from one place to a n o t h e r ' ) see EN X 4, 1174a29-34. 9 See E N X 4, 1174al9-21: "For every motion, e.g. that of building, takes time and is for the sake of an end, and is complete when it has accomplished what it is after". 10 Note the grammatical function of the Greek perfectum, which, unlike the imperfect and the aorist, indicates the completion of an action in the past. E.g. διαβέβηκα τόν ποταμόν = Ί am at the other side of the river', rather than Ί crossed the river'. 11 Burnyeat's division ( 130ff.) of the chapter is less appropriate, it would seem.

As for the first question, 1 2 we should be aware f r o m the outset that it is n o t so m u c h a b o u t [x] having a capacity (δύναμις) to be [y], b u t a b o u t what it m e a n s to say that what is actually [x] may be given the n a m e ( a p p e l l a t i o n ) 1 3 'a potential [y]'. T h e first issue is merely an ontological o n e a n d , so to speak, a de facto question, the second is a semantic o n e a n d actually a de jure question. T h u s in Aristotle's view, an element, like earth, surely possesses the capacity to b e c o m e a m a n , b u t a piece of earth is n o t entitled, t h o u g h , to be addressed as 'this p o t e n t i a l m a n ' , since, in t e r m s of g e n e r a t i o n , t h e r e is t o o m u c h between ' e a r t h ' a n d ' m a n ' . 1 4 Before e m b a r k i n g u p o n the issue of n a m i n g a n d appellation as f o u n d in this c h a p t e r , it is useful to assess t h e discussions of this s e m a n t i c topic in t h e totality of t h e metaphysical investigations carried out in the central books ΖΗΘ. In his search for the true ousia of the outside things (in Aristotle's words, τό öv or 'that which is), Aristotle inquires into the various ways of expression in which we may call t h e m u p for e x a m i n a t i o n . First, two i m p r o p e r ways of n a m i n g (appellation) have b e e n discarded: to wit, in Met. Ε 2-3; the o n e in which they are b r o u g h t u p in their capacity of coincidental being (τό öv τό κατά συμβεβηκός), a n d , in Ε 4, the way in which we use the phrase τό öv to refer to states of affairs in which the outside things are involved owing to o u r f r a m i n g s t a t e m e n t s a b o u t πράγματα, i.e the o u t s i d e things, i n c l u d i n g t h e i r a p p u r t e n a n c e s ; in o t h e r words, a p o p h a n t i c being (τό öv ώς άληθές). O n c e the road has b e e n cleared for testing the credentials of the only veritable claimant, the test discloses (in Z-H) the fact that it is the e n m a t t e r e d f o r m (είδος) that is the true ousia, so that if by o u r n a m i n g things we zoom in on their eidos we eo ipso take hold of their true being, n o m a t t e r w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s the substantial or a n o n substantial eidos. 1 5 Finally, book Θ carries o u t what r e m a i n s to be d o n e , viz. to scrutinize two alternative ways in which the various categorial m o d e s of being may be expressed, i.e. using terms r e f e r r i n g to 12

For the second question see my section 11. 14. Notice the recurrent instances of the verb λέγειν; see section 11.15. 14 At An. II 5, 417a21-b28 Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of potentiality and actuality. E.g. a new-born child possesses knowledge in first potentiality, and when it has grown up it may actually acquire some special knowledge in first actuality; the latter state of knowledge includes the second potentiality of actually contemplating or applying the previous knowledge. See De Haas (2000), 166ff.; 177ff. 15 For είδος as m a t c h i n g the τί έστι question also with items f r o m nonsubstantial categories, see Top. I 9. 13

a t h i n g ' s p o t e n t i a l being, a n d those e x p r e s s i n g its ontic t r u t h o r intelligibility. R e t u r n i n g now to the discussions of Θ 7, it is p o i n t e d o u t in the first p a r t of t h e first section (1049al-18) t h a t e a r t h has first to b e c o m e seed, a n d p e r h a p s n o t even t h e n — this reservation is m a d e explicit s o m e lines f u r t h e r on (al4-15: "for it must be deposited in s o m e t h i n g o t h e r than itself a n d u n d e r g o a c h a n g e " ) 1 6 — b e f o r e you can call it a potential m a n . It is only when t h r o u g h its own motive principle s o m e t h i n g (like s e m e n in the a p p r o p r i a t e m e d i u m ) has already acquired such a n d such attributes, that it is potentially some o t h e r thing (a m a n ) . Likewise, e a r t h has to b e c o m e b r o n z e or wood by u n d e r g o i n g a c h a n g e b e f o r e we may call it a potential statue. T h e r e m a i n i n g p a r t of the first section (1049al8-24) has b e e n characterized as "a linguistic test of the potential m a t t e r of a thing" (Ross, II, 256). Because of the semantic a p p r o a c h t h r o u g h o u t t h e c h a p t e r it is b e t t e r to say that this c h a p t e r sets o u t to develop the general semantic issue. This is also clear f r o m the fact that the appellation ' p o t e n t i a l ' includes an o p e n spot to b e filled in by a variable [y], [z], or, in Aristotle's c o n c e p t i o n , ' b e i n g potential' is assigned to s o m e [x] with reference to s o m e t h i n g else, [y] o r [z]. T h i s is why Aristotle tries to clarify his intention by offering a series of stages, say, Μ» [s]. [d etc., f o u n d in a process of actualization, which p r e c e d e the final p r o d u c t , [y] or [z]. In point of fact, the appellations may be assigned to the p r e c e d i n g things, [r], [5] etc. with r e f e r e n c e to [y] or [z]. Two devices d e t e r m i n e t h e line of a r g u m e n t in al8-24. First you should obseive the series of stages in any process of becoming, which goes f r o m a thing's, say [y], initial m a t t e r to its b e i n g [y] in full actuality, a n d be aware, t h e n , that [x] may be called a 'potential [y]' if a n d only if it is [y] 's p r o x i m a t e matter, i. e. it immediately precedes [y] in the series of i n t e r m e d i a t e stages. T h e o t h e r pivotal device is a lexical tool for picking o u t a thing [y]'s p r o x i m a t e matter, [x], the latter n o t taken in its capacity of b e i n g a d e f i n i t e t h i n g (a 'this', έκεινο) itself in its own right, e.g. a piece of wood, but as that which it is m a d e of ( ' w o o d e n ' ) , i.e. its material quality (έκείνινον). 1 7

16

T h e (male) semen has first to be mixed u p with the (female) catamenia; GA I 20, 729a32-33. 17 It is along this line of t h o u g h t that the ' p r i m e m a t t e r ' issue is to be addressed; Bemelmans (1995), 95-119; my sections 12.37-12.39.

Aristotle's general p u r p o s e seems reasonably clear. T h e difficulties arise when we a t t e m p t to give a detailed interpretation of the έκεΐνοέ κ ε ί ν ι ν ο ν device. Clearly, it is m e a n t to focus the a t t e n t i o n on the material constitution of the objects (έκεΐνα) m a k i n g u p the series of successive stages involved in the process of c h a n g e , by disregarding the fact that this material is diversified in the c o r r e s p o n d i n g successive shapes. T h u s taking t h e generative process of a statue as an example, the series m a d e u p by the physical objects [r], [λ], [ t h a t of w h i c h s o m e t h i n g is said of, viz. t h e u n d e r l y i n g t h i n g , 3 8 is d i f f e r e n t i a t e d by b e i n g a 'this' or n o t b e i n g a 'this'. For instance, the underlying thing f o r p r o p e r t i e s ( π ά θ ε σ ι ) 3 9 is m a n , b o d y , soul, while e d u c a t e d a n d p a l e are the properties. Now the substrate, when educatedness has c o m e to b e p r e s e n t in it, is called, n o t ' e d u c a t e d n e s s ' , b u t * ' a n e d u c a t e d ' , as also m a n is n o t called ' p a l e n e s s ' , b u t * ' a p a l e ' ; n o r is h e called ' a m b u l a t i o n ' o r ' m o t i o n ' , b u t * ' a w a l k i n g ' o r * ' a m o v i n g ' , all a k i n t o t h e p r e v i o u s e x p r e s s i o n ' t h a t - e n ' ( ' m a d e of t h a t ' ) . W h e r e v e r this is so, t h e u l t i m a t e t h i n g e i n t h e a s c e n d i n g analytical series> is c b r o u g h t u p as> a s u b s i s t e n t t h i n g ( ο ύ σ ί α ) c m o d i f i e d by t h e m a t e r i a l o r a p r o p e r t y , respectively.

T h u s statues are b r o u g h t u p as, in the final analysis, 'earthen clods', n o t ' e a r t h ' , in the same m a n n e r as m e n are called ' t h e pale' or ' t h e walking', not 'palenesses' or 'ambulations'. Subsequently, Aristotle brings u p t h e peculiar c h a r a c t e r of the cases in which the material analysis c a r r i e d o u t in the a s c e n d i n g reductive series e n d s in a material e l e m e n t that is b r o u g h t u p as s o m e t h i n g b e i n g t h e r e in virtue of itself ('fire', ' e a r t h ' etc.). This f e a t u r e is disclosed by showing that in these cases the above analogy is entirely o u t of the question. T h e r e is n o talk now of appellations assigned to s o m e t h i n g in virtue of which it may b e b r o u g h t u p as έκείνινον, s o m e t h i n g m o d i f i e d , that is, by a material or a property.

37

Aristotle often says, as here, that we describe things παρωνύμως by words derived from the names of qualities; see Cat. 1, la 12; 7, 6b 13; 8, 10a28; Top. II 4, I l l a 3 3 - b 4 . Instead of meaning grammatical derivation, Aristotle actually means to say that when naming a man 'pale' or 'cultured', we use a secondary appellation derived from the primary ones, 'paleness' and 'educatedness'. Along this semantic line of thought, 'paleness' is simpler than, and prior to, 'pale', which implies the complex notion 'being-affected-by-paleness'. Ross II, 257. 38 To καθ' ού καί τό ΰποκείμενον. In this hendiadys the thing is indicated first logically, then ontologically. For the exclusive use of ΰποκείμενον to indicate a thing ontologically, i.e. 'underlying thing' or 'substrate', not 'logical subject', see my section 2.18. 39 In the Greek text, the attributes assigned to a thing are indicated by the ontological term πάθος ('property'), being the counterpart of ΰποκείμενον, while in the m o d e r n languages 'attribute' is (felicitously) ambivalent. In Greek, the logical attribute is indicated by κατηγορούμενον (1049a35).

Quite to the contrary, the modifying material e l e m e n t , in spite of its i n h e r e n c e in the thing it constitutes, is now taken as s o m e t h i n g on its own, a n d the thing u n d e r discussion is straightforwardly designated by the n a m e of the material itself, n o t έκείνινον, b u t έ κ ε ΐ ν ο ( n o t 'earthen', b u t ' e a r t h ' ) . Evidently, t h e above parallel is missing now, since on n o a c c o u n t can a m a n be b r o u g h t u p as 'an e d u c a t e d n e s s ' or 'an a m b u l a t i o n ' . In the cases in which the t e r m i n u s of the analysis is n o t taken in its capacity of the thing's material constituent, b u t as a specific 'this' of its own (είδος τι καί τόδε τι), 4 0 this t e r m i n u s is matter, i.e. material substance (1049a34-37). 4 1 Along this line, t h e n , you may bring u p a wooden statue as 'this (clod of) e a r t h ' . Next a short r e m a r k is m a d e a b o u t the twofold case of έκείνινον: their b e i n g p u t on a par is j u s t i f i e d , a n d , by the same token, the peculiar n a t u r e of the opposite έκεΐνο case is clarified: Ibid. 7, 1049a37-b2: It is quite proper that the έκείνινον device should apply both with reference to the material and the qualitative constituents, since these appellations are both indefinite (αόριστα). It is stated, first, that appellations such as ' t h e e a r t h e n ' or ' t h e pale' are ' i n d e f i n i t e ' . In fact, they d o n o t o f f e r distinctive i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t the things they are said of, n o r d o they grasp these things in what they specifically are, since various kinds of things may be m a d e of the same specific material or modified by the same properties. O n the o t h e r h a n d , in the analysis of a thing's material constitution a n d so arriving at its 'primary material e l e m e n t ' — in fact, o n e of the f o u r elements, fire, air, earth, water — o n e can also take this e l e m e n t as s o m e t h i n g in its own right a n d , accordingly, describe the thing which has a certain material constitution as ' ( a n instance of) this e l e m e n t ' , as a ' t h a t ' ( έ κ ε ΐ ν ο ) , that is, a n d n o t j u s t as a 'that-en' ( έ κ ε ί ν ι ν ο ν ) . W h e r e a s the έ κ ε ί ν ι ν ο ν device only presents us with a coincidental, indefinite appellation, the έκεΐνο device captures s o m e t h i n g a p p r o priately, to such an e x t e n t i n d e e d that it may serve to p r o p e r l y r e p r e s e n t its nature. For instance, by calling s o m e t h i n g 'an e a r t h e n , fiery, or w o o d e n ', you fail, owing to the indefiniteness of the n e u t e r substantivatum (the makeweight, ' t h i n g ' in English), to offer

40

For the juxtaposition of the notions είδος and τόδε τι cf. Met. Δ 8, 1017b25. At Met. Δ 8, 1017b24, the ultimate substratum is called ο ύ σ ί α , because it precedes the reductive series of attributes assignable to something, and is not itself an attribute. 41

relevant i n f o r m a t i o n a b o u t it, while by b r i n g i n g it u p as ' e a r t h ' , ' f i r e ' 3 etc., it is identified as a 'this' in its own right. You may say, This is just a m a t t e r of appraisal, because in b o t h cases t h e specific n a t u r e of the c o n c r e t e particular r e m a i n s in the dark. However, this objection misses the point, since it is precisely this o r that coincidental f e a t u r e that is essential with respect to a certain investigation. W h e n b r i n g i n g u p s o m e t h i n g as 'this or that e l e m e n t ' , o n e is focussing on s o m e t h i n g a b o u t the thing that o n e thinks to be of i m p o r t a n c e with respect to a certain discussion. For instance, w h e n i n t e n d i n g to d e m o n s t r a t e that a certain object (in fact, a statue m a d e of ice) is easy to destroy, you have to call it u p as 'this water', n o t as 'this thing m a d e of ice', let a l o n e 'this statue of Pericles', since for the special p u r p o s e of your d e m o n s t r a t i o n your focussing on the e l e m e n t , water, is decisive, a n d as fas as your argum e n t is c o n c e r n e d , the (supposedly) vague appellation 'instance of water' presents us with m o r e relevant i n f o r m a t i o n than the appellations 'ice', 'statue', 'of Pericles'. 4 2 This brings us to a n o t h e r worthwhile point of attention. Like the previous ones, this discussion should be assessed in the framework of Aristotle's metaphysical investigations. T h e leading question t h r o u g h o u t b o o k Θ is ' C a n s o m e t h i n g b e i n d i c a t e d p r o p e r l y by a n a m e b e a r i n g on what it potentially is, or, t h e o t h e r way r o u n d , a n a m e indicating its material (matter)?' T h e second part of this question is u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n in the p r e s e n t c h a p t e r . Aristotle states that only e l e m e n t a r y matter, viz. fire, air, e a r t h , water, which can all be taken in their capacity of being some 'this', meets the semantic conditions for this purpose, precisely because of its being a definite 'this'. 4 3 11.16

The actual thing's priority over its potential counterpart

Clearly, the priority of actuality over potentiality has s o m e b e a r i n g u p o n the representative power of n a m i n g on the basis of any kind of potentiality f o u n d in things; a n d this goes either way, both calling [x] a potential [y], a n d [y] an actual [x], So the discussion of c h a p t e r 8 does n o t c o m e u n e x p e c t e d . T h e general idea is that actuality is prior to potentiality. 4 4 42

For this use of the (/««-procedure see my sections 2.6-2.7. Ross's c o m m e n t (II, 257f.) on 1049b1 seems to miss the point in that he fails to recognize that the opposition between the έ κ ε ΐ ν ο a n d έκείνινον devices is relative to (our bringing u p of) a thing's matter. 44 Burnyeat (II, 133ff.) contains two interesting notes, o n e by Owen on priority 43

First a b r o a d d e f i n i t i o n of δ ύ ν α μ ι ς ('potentiality' or ' p o w e r ' ) is given (1049b5-8), which is necessary in o r d e r to arrive at a full description of its c o u n t e r p a r t , ένέργεια. T h e term δ ύ ν α μ ι ς is used to stand n o t only for any principle of c h a n g e in a n o t h e r thing or in the t h i n g itself r e g a r d e d as a n o t h e r , b u t in g e n e r a l any p r i n c i p l e of m o t i o n or of rest. O n this account, by δ ύ ν α μ ι ς the dynamic power of things is u n d e r s t o o d , including the o n e that causes their own natural development, so that Aristotle's s u b s e q u e n t r e m a r k a b o u t n a t u r e cann o t c o m e as a surprise. In k e e p i n g with the Lexicon (Δ 4, 1014b17), where n a t u r e is d e f i n e d as "the i m m a n e n t part of a growing thing out of which its growth first proceeds", n a t u r e is now said to b e "in the same g e n u s as potentiality, since it is a principle of motion, although n o t in s o m e o t h e r thing, b u t in the thing itself q u a itself'. T h e last clause serves to emphasize that the d e v e l o p m e n t of s o m e t h i n g does n o t e n t a i l t h a t it c h a n g e s i n t o s o m e t h i n g else, b u t s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d in terms of its own natural d e v e l o p m e n t o u t of its p r o p e r i m m a n e n t eidos. Taking δύναμις in this b r o a d sense, its being second to actuality is evident. Actuality, t h e n , is said to b e p r i o r to potentiality b o t h in definition a n d beingness (λόγω και τή ούσία); in time it is p r i o r in o n e sense, a n d in a n o t h e r n o t (1049bl0-12). This is explained in the next few lines, in which it will a p p e a r in the first place that Aristotle is speaking of things which are potentially s o m e t h i n g else, a n d their actualizations, r a t h e r than potentialities a n d actualities in abstracto. T h e definitorial priority u n d e r discussion clearly comes to the f o r e f r o m the fact that anything that is potentially s o m e t h i n g else should, q u a b e i n g potential, b e d e f i n e d in t e r m s of its actualization. For instance, that which is potentially constructive ( οίκοδομικόν) — is q u a being potential 4 5 d e f i n e d in terms of 'construing' a n d 'building' (οικοδομειν), as what is visible (όρατόν) can only be essentially defined using the notion 'be seen' (όράσθαι). What applies to properly d e f i n i n g applies to knowledge (γνώσις), so that to d e f i n e a n d know a t h i n g in actuality must logically p r e c e d e d e f i n i n g a n d knowing its status according to its c o r r e s p o n d i n g potentiality (1049bl0-17).

in Θ 8 c o m p a r e d to Met. Δ 11 a n d Ζ 1, 1028a31-b2; the o t h e r by R. H e i n a m a n analyzing what is said in An. II 5, 417a30-bl6 about potential and actual sensation. 45 Aristotle is speaking of τό πρώτως δυνατόν, i.e. the thing, say egg, in so far as it is primarily addressed in its capacity of being potentially something else, viz. not as 'egg', but as 'potential bird', or the dog not as dog, but as 'visible thing'.

T h e temporal priority of the actual to the potential is discussed in 1049b17-1050a3. However, this priority is n o t unconditional. O n e has to distinguish between specific a n d numerical identity. T h e concrete p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g , e.g. t h e seed, which is potentially s o m e o t h e r particular thing, corn, is specifically posterior to the i n t e n d e d actual thing, t h o u g h it is prior to it in terms of numerical identity. However, as far as n u m e r i c a l identity is c o n c e r n e d , the potential entity is itself posterior to the actual thing that has g e n e r a t e d it, so that its priority over its i n t e n d e d actual t h i n g is c o u n t e r b a l a n c e d n o t only by its posteriority to the actual in terms of specific sameness, but also by its posteriority to its own actual cause in terms of n u m e r i c a l identity. This even goes for learning, i.e. the g e n e r a t i o n of artistic skill, since, in spite of your rejection of the well-known sophists' quibble that an a p p r e n t i c e who is not familiar with a certain skill will n o n e the less be exercising it, you have to recognize that that which is c o m i n g to be, m u s t have already c o m e to be — the p e r s o n who is l e a r n i n g an art m u s t already partially have it. So Aristotle can c o n c l u d e that, all things c o n s i d e r e d , the actual thing is prior to its potential c o u n t e r part in respect of generation a n d time (1049b18-1050a1). T h e r e m a i n d e r of the c h a p t e r is devoted to what in the context of metaphysics is the main kind of the actual's priority over the p o t e n tial, viz. priority in being-ness ( ο ύ σ ί α ) . 4 6 This ontic priority is elucid a t e d in a twofold way: (a) in terms of generative potentialities a n d g e n e r a t i o n , or actualization of o t h e r powers a n d faculties (1050a4b6); a n d (b) in the d e e p e r sense of the priority that eternal things have over perishable things (1050b6-1051a2). Both discussions contain some digressions on cognate subjects. T h e first kind of priority bears on the fact that in any generative process the actual (generated) things, a l t h o u g h they are posterior in g e n e r a t i o n , a r e p r i o r "in f o r m a n d being-ness (τω ε'ιδει καί τή ο ύ σ ί α ) " . This is e x p l a i n e d by stressing the pivotal role of a t h i n g ' s i m m a n e n t ontic principle, the eidos, which has been identified in ZH as its t r u e ousia. T h e hendiadys τό είδος καί ή ούσία o n c e again refers to the form-communicating-beingness, i.e. the diverse m o d e s of categorial being. T h i s idea is e l a b o r a t e d , this time, in t e r m s of teleology. In any process of g e n e r a t i o n , actualization o r developm e n t , it is the eidos acting as the e n d a n d the p e r f e c t i o n (τέλος). Actualization is in fact n o t h i n g but a ( f u r t h e r ) realization of the eidos

46

Kosman (1984, 145-7) aptly takes ενέργεια in terms of being-qua-being.

c o u n t e r b a l a n c i n g matter, a n d it is for the sake of that realization that a thing's eidos includes a n u m b e r of potentialities. Now potentialities a n d potentiality d o n o t m e a n anything except in light of their actualities, a n d n o t the o t h e r way r o u n d , for "animals d o n o t see in o r d e r that they may have sight, b u t they have sight t h a t they may see", Aristotle explains ( 1050a 10-11). F u r t h e r , m a t t e r ' s b e i n g is b e i n g in a potential state which has its bearings on the f o r m , "just because, in the n o r m a l course of events, m a t t e r attains to the ( i n t e n d e d ) f o r m " (1050a15). 4 7 T h u s its b e i n g in actuality c o m e s d o w n to b e i n g in t h e f o r m c o r r e s p o n d i n g to its potentiality (τότε έν τω εϊδει έστίν), there b e i n g a definite f o r m which ϋλη is p r o g r a m m e d to acquire. 4 8 Activity is the e n d , a n d the actualization is n o t h i n g b u t t h e p r o g r a m m e d activity. H e n c e t h e t e r m 'actuality' (ένέργεια) is derived f r o m 'activity' (έργον), a n d points to t h e c o m p l e t e reality of the thing u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n (έντελέχεια). Regardless of w h e t h e r the exercise is itself the ultimate e n d (e.g. in t h e activity of seeing), or t h e r e is a separate result (e.g. in houseb u i l d i n g ) , t h e actualization always b e a r s on the e n d , to a h i g h e r extent at least than potentiality does (1050a23-29). T h e conclusion following f r o m the whole section 1050a4-b2 r u n s parallel to the o u t c o m e of Z-H, that a t h i n g ' s ο ύ σ ί α as f o u n d a n d identified in its dynamic είδος (ή ούσία καί τό είδος) is its actualization (ένέργεια), a n d that along this line of a r g u m e n t (κατά τε δή τούτον τόν λόγον) a thing's b e i n g in actuality is prior to its b e i n g in potentiality (1050b3-4). Next, the ontological priority of actuality in a still stricter sense is discussed ( 1050b6-1051a2). Sub specie aeternitatis, it is actuality that is in question, a n d definitely n o t potentiality. A n d given that e t e r n a l things are prior to perishable ones, a n d n o eternal thing exists potentially, since any potentiality includes the possibility of the opposite state of affairs (τής ά ν τ ι φ ά σ ε ω ς ) , 4 9 you have a n o t h e r , m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l a r g u m e n t in s u p p o r t of actuality's priority over potentiality. This a r g u m e n t also holds g o o d for the e l e m e n t s that are involved in c h a n g e , to wit, the earth a n d fire constitutive of the heavenly bodies, which are ever active a n d have their m o t i o n by themselves a n d in

47

Burnyeat (II, 142) aptly refers for this use of the optative ελθοι αν ("would normally come, except in odd cases") to the treatment of τύχη and αύτόματον in Phys. II, 5-6 (5, 196b22; 197a35; 6, 197b32; 198a6). 48 Burnyeat, ibid. 49 Same sense of άντίφασις at 1050b25 and 34.

themselves. In fact, they have the a p p e a r a n c e of imperishable things (μιμείται τά άφθαρτα). T h e c h a p t e r c o n c l u d e s (1050b34-1051a3) by applying t h e principle of t h e p r e c e d i n g a r g u m e n t to t h e d o c t r i n e of the Platonic Forms. It is o b j e c t e d to the a d h e r e n t s of this d o c t r i n e that 'Knowle d g e Itself is, p r o p e r l y speaking, a t h i n g in a potential state, n o t s o m e t h i n g actual, so that t h e r e m u s t be s o m e t h i n g m u c h m o r e epistemonic (πολυ μάλλον έπιστήμον) — the c o r r e s p o n d i n g particular activity, that is — than this T r a n s c e n d e n t Form. 11.17

Some additional remarks about potentiality and actuality

C h a p t e r 9 contains first (1051a4-21) some r e m a r k s on actuality a n d potentiality in terms of g o o d a n d bad, a n d next (a21-33) the actualization of potential geometrical constructions disclosing geometrical propositions (διαγράμματα) is e x a m i n e d . A g o o d actuality is said to be better a n d ' m o r e worth having' than the c o r r e s p o n d i n g good potentiality, because what is potentially [x] is m o r e liable to b e i n g ( b e c o m i n g ) [not-x] t h a n what is actually [x]. Everything we may b r i n g u p as ' c a p a b l e of b e i n g [x]' is likewise capable of being the contrary of [x]. For instance, the same thing we call ' c a p a b l e of b e i n g healthy' is likewise c a p a b l e of b e i n g ill — m e a n i n g , I take it, that o u r n a m i n g s o m e t h i n g ' c a p a b l e of b e i n g healthy' logically equals n a m i n g it 'capable of being ill'. T h e a r g u m e n t also holds the o t h e r way r o u n d . Also in the case of evils the e n d or actuality m u s t be worse than the potential state, because the latter includes the capability of working o u t well. 50 A n o t h e r instance is t h e capability of ( t h e materials of) a h o u s e to e i t h e r actually b e c o m e a house, or, d u r i n g the process of hous-building, to collapse. 5 1 . We should refrain, however, f r o m attributing in the case of evil things some priority — in the sense of "better a n d m o r e worth

50

O n this assumption, both n a m e s are logical equivalents of the n a m e 'animal'. 51 For the peculiarity of the house-building example see the note by Owen in Burnyeat (II, 146-9), 146. T h e i n t e n d e d twofold potentiality must concern the materials, not the house; otherwise the opposition would oddly be between the εναντία 'potential house' and 'actual house'. An alternative interpretation could be given from the idea that the house-builder's capability of construing houses implies his skill of properly demolishing them. For the favourite idea that he who is an expert of doing well eo ipso possesses the skill for the worse, i.e. of eminently doing the opposite, see Plato's Socratic dialogues.

having" (1051a4) — to potentialities over actualities, since it is the evil actual thing that is by n a t u r e posterior to potentiality, n o t the i n t e n d e d actualization as such, the b a d thing b e i n g j u s t a deviation f r o m what is normally p r o g r a m m e d . In actuality as such t h e r e is n o trace of evil or e r r o r . T h a t is why in t h e things that are f r o m t h e beginning, i.e. in eternal things, t h e r e is n o t h i n g bad, n o t h i n g defective, n o t h i n g perverted; for perversion is s o m e t h i n g bad. 5 2 As f o r geometrical constructions, which are i n t e n d e d to disclose a n d prove geometrical propositions (1051a21fF.), in their case, too, it is by a sort of actualization (by the process of 'dividing', that is) that they are accomplished. After having o f f e r e d s o m e instances of proving g e o m e t r i c a l theses by m e a n s of certain constructions, Aristotle infers that evidently, what is potentially the case (τά δυνάμει δντα) is disclosed by b e i n g b r o u g h t to actuality. W h a t is disclosed (ευρίσκεται), properly speaking, is n o t the construction, but a certain geometrical proposition, or r a t h e r its b e i n g epistemonically true, whereas the process of actualization c o n c e r n s the potential c o n s t r u c t i o n serving f o r t h e e p i s t e m o n i c p r o o f of t h e thesis involved. Aristotle evidently plays o n the ambivalence of t h e word δ ι ά γ ρ α μ μ α , which may be used to stand indiscriminately for both the geometrical figure or construction a n d the geometrical thesis or proposition disclosed by it. 53

11.2

True and false as ontic properties

In Θ, chs. 6-9, a special f e a t u r e of the primary or categorial sense of ' b e ' has b e e n dealt with, namely t h e ten categorial m o d e s of b e i n g taken with r e f e r e n c e to actuality a n d potentiality. In the final c h a p t e r of b o o k Θ, Aristotle p r o c e e d s to discuss categorial b e i n g u n d e r yet a n o t h e r aspect, viz. that of truth a n d falsehood. T h e o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h (1051a34-b6) has t h r o u g h o u t t h e years raised many puzzles. 54 They may be r e d u c e d to t h r e e main problems: (a) what is the place of c h a p t e r 10 in the whole of book 0 ? ( b ) how is ' b e ' q u a t r u e r e l a t e d to ' b e ' as said with r e f e r e n c e to the ten 52

This paragraph is commonly assumed to be directed against Plato, Rep. II, 402 C; V, 476 A, Theaet. 176E, and LauisX, 896E; 898C. 53 EN III 3, 1112b22. Cf. Asclepius CAG VI-2, p.174 9 · a n d Scholia, 89b11: διαγράμματα καλοΰσιν oi γεωμέτραι αύτά τα θεωρήματα. Bonitz, Index, 178a6-7. 54 Ross II, 274; Reale II, 95f.; Burnyeat II, 164-6.

categories dealt with in Z-H? a n d (c) how is the exposition in Θ 10 c o n n e c t e d with what has been said a b o u t truth a n d falsehood in Ε 4? Let us first discuss these q u e s t i o n s — which will turn o u t to be m o s t closely i n t e r r e l a t e d — in s o m e m o r e detail. T h e y all have b e a r i n g on the p r o p e r subject of Θ 10. 11.21

The proper subject of Θ 10

Ross (II, 274) is of the o p i n i o n that this c h a p t e r has little to d o with t h e r e m a i n d e r of b o o k Θ, which treats of potentiality a n d actuality, a n d m e n t i o n s that o t h e r s (A. Schwegler a n d W. Christ) r e g a r d e d it as the work of an editor. W e r n e r J a e g e r t h o u g h t that the c h a p t e r is by Aristotle, but was inserted h e r e simply because some r o o m was left at the e n d of the roll on which Ζ 1-Θ 9 was written. Burnyeat (164f.) feels that to link Θ10 as a whole to the t h e m e of potentiality a n d actuality f o u n d in Θ 1-9 is implausible, involving picking o u t particular passages a n d p h r a s e s in s u p p o r t of such an a t t e m p t . H e would r a t h e r assess Θ as a whole in the b r o a d e r f r a m e work of EZH, in which the f o u r uses of ' b e ' (the accidental, the categories, t r u t h a n d falsity, potentiality a n d actuality) have b e e n dealt with, in which Ε 4 introduces ' b e ' as truth a n d falsehood, with a r e f e r e n c e (at1027b27: τα ά π λ α καί τά τί έστιν) forward to the discussion o f ' s i m p l e s ' a n d the 'what-things-are' in Θ 10. His conclusion "that the whole of ΕΖΗΘ f o r m a systematically a r r a n g e d discussion of t h e senses of b e i n g — at whatever stage in their d e v e l o p m e n t t h e a r r a n g e m e n t took place", however a c c e p t a b l e in itself, is n o t conducive e n o u g h to clarify the position of Θ10. Bonitz h a d b e e n most explicit on this score, by p o i n t i n g out (ad loc.) that in view of the e n u m e r a t i o n of the senses of ' b e ' in Δ 7 it is only natural that after discussing the chief category, substance, a n d t h e distinction m a d e between potentiality a n d actuality, Aristotle should go on to discuss truth a n d falsehood. H e regards Θ10 in particular as n o t o u t of place here, because Θ 8 has i n t r o d u c e d us to the simple a n d eternal ousiai, i.e. ένέργειαι άνευ δυνάμεως, a n d these will now be described (1051b27ff.) as the objects with which o n e kind of truth is c o n c e r n e d . All things c o n s i d e r e d , Ross hesitates between J a e g e r ' s view a n d that of Bonitz, but t h e r e is n o d o u b t in his m i n d as to Aristotle's authorship, since at Ε 4, 1027b28, the a u t h o r had himself a n n o u n c e d to us that we would find such a discussion in the Metaphysics.

O u r s e c o n d main question ( a b o u t the relationship between ' b e ' q u a true a n d the ten categorial m o d e s of being) chiefly hinges on what to d o with the words κυριώτατα öv at 1051b1. Unfortunately, the m a n u s c r i p t s ' evidence is a bit irresolute on this p o i n t . 5 5 Ross, followed by o t h e r s (Tricot, Reale, ad loc.), takes e x c e p t i o n to these words (when, as would be most obvious, they are taken with öv), b e c a u s e they seem to flatly c o n t r a d i c t the earlier claim (at Ε 4, 1027b31) that ' b e ' q u a t r u e "is a d i f f e r e n t thing-that-is f r o m those which are in the full sense" (ετερον δν τών κυρίως). For that reason, Ross thinks these words are probably a gloss, or should go after μέν at 1051a34. Anyway, if r e t a i n e d , h e suggests, the p h r a s e must go with αληθές ή ψεΰδος, m e a n i n g ' t h a t which is true or false in t h e most p r o p e r sense of those terms', which should be taken, h e thinks, in contrast to truth a n d falsehood c o n c e r n i n g t h e 'simples' dealt with later on (1051b17-1052a4). In his edition Ross has deleted the words, a n d in t h e Oxford Translation they a r e i g n o r e d . J a e g e r m a d e an a t t e m p t to solve the p r o b l e m by postulating, a n d filling up, a lacuna, r e a d i n g κυριώτατα öv (ή ούσία, λείπεται δέ έπισκοπειν τό öv) άληθές κτλ. 5 6 Unlike Ross's i n t e r f e r e n c e in the text, J a e g e r ' s proposal was not a d o p t e d by the editors. 5 7 T h e t h i r d m a i n p r o b l e m , viz. what the link c o u l d be b e t w e e n c h a p t e r 10 a n d chs. 1-9, has m u c h to d o with the previous ones. T o my m i n d , t h e t h r e e p r o b l e m s a r e closely i n t e r r e l a t e d a n d t h e i r solution d e p e n d s entirely o n the correct interpretation of the phrase τό δέ κυριώτατα öv. Let us start with t h e g r a m m a t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e lines 1051b34-1052a6. T h e s e lines f o r m o n e sentence, which, i n t r o d u c e d by έπεί ('since'), consists, as so often in Aristotle, of a long prodosis to recapitulate the u p s h o t of f o r e g o i n g discussions, the apodosis beginn i n g at a5 in the shape of a question which arises in light of what has b e e n said in t h e r e c a p i t u l a t i o n . As usual, m o d e r n r e n d e r i n g s are liable to split u p the Greek c o n s t r u c t i o n . D o i n g so, the s c h e m e of

55

T h e Laurentianus reads κυριώτατα δν, as d o the Greek commentators. T h e Parisinus has κυριώτατον εί, while the Vindobonensis reads κυριώτατα ή and the translatio Moerbekiana has "maxime proprie aut", which may support the readings of the Vindobonensis or the Parisinus. All in all, the manuscripts' evidence against the usual reading κυριώτατα δν is not very impressive, and does not seem to substantiate Ross's observation that there is a good deal of divergence a m o n g the manuscripts at this point. >h Reale, ad loc. 57 Burnyeat II, 156. For my view see pp. 329-32.

Aristotle's initial exposition will be s o m e t h i n g like this: 'Be' a n d ' n o t b e ' are used in three senses: (1) with r e f e r e n c e to the categories, (2) with r e f e r e n c e to t h e categories taken in a c c o r d a n c e with their potentiality or actuality, a n d (3) q u a true a n d false being, taken this time (unlike Ε 4) also — j u s t as we have d o n e in the case of actuality a n d potentiality — in the primary sense, that of categorial 'be, that is. Now, to speak of truth a n d f a l s e h o o d in the case of πράγματα has t u r n e d o u t (in Ε 4) to d e p e n d on t h i n g s b e i n g c o m b i n e d a n d divided. So what we have to ask now is: When is t h e r e question of truth a n d falsehood in the aforesaid sense, i.e. true a n d false taken with r e f e r e n c e to the categorial m o d e s o f ' b e ' ? O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e above scholarly questions (a)-(c) (in section 1 1 . 2 ) vanish, seeing that, j u s t as in Θ, chs. 1-9, the categorial m o d e s of being, which in Z-H have t u r n e d o u t to be representative of the sense of ' b e ' that should be at the focus of the metaphysician's interest, have b e e n studied in t e r m s of potentiality a n d actuality. Likewise Θ 1 0 will discuss t h e m u n d e r t h e a s p e c t of t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d , a f t e r they have b e e n discussed in Ε 4 in the sense of statemental truth a n d falsehood. O n this surmise, there is n o reason at all to h a r b o u r suspicions a b o u t the phrase κυριώτατα öv. Quite to the contrary, these words are indispensable to make clear that, unlike Ε 4, t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d will now c o m e u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n q u a f e a t u r e s of ' b e ' in the primary sense (τό δέ κυριώτατα öv άληθές ή ψευδός), the discussion of which was p o s t p o n e d and a n n o u n c e d in Ε 4. O u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the text also offers a better r e n d e r i n g of the words τό άληθές λεγόμενον ή ψευδός at a5-6, which are c o m m o n l y taken to r a t h e r pointlessly stand f o r 'what we call truth a n d falseh o o d ' , instead of ' t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d (1051bl-2, τό δέ κυριώτατα öv κτλ.) sense of truth a n d f a l s e h o o d ' . Similarly, the demonstrative τοΰτο (b6) r e f e r s to that special sense of t r u e a n d false. Pressing the d i f f e r e n c e with the t r e a t m e n t of a p o p h a n t i c truth a n d falsehood (or t r u e a n d false b e i n g as stated in a f f i r m a t i o n s a n d n e g a t i o n s , respectively) in Ε 4, we can say that t h e m a i n subject in Θ 10 is t r u t h a n d falsehood a t t r i b u t e d n o t to statements, b u t to things. In o t h e r words, u n l i k e Ε 4, the p r e s e n t c h a p t e r d o e s n o t deal with claims of t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d i n c l u d e d in any s t a t e m e n t - m a k i n g , b u t o n t i c t r u t h , a n d its c o u n t e r p a r t , ' o n t i c f a l s e h o o d ' , viz. n o n being. O n the p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the o p e n i n g lines of this c h a p t e r may be r e n d e r e d thus:

Met. Θ 10, 1051a34-b6: What-is and what-is-not are said (1) with reference to the types of appellation, (2) with reference to the categories after their (τούτων) potentiality in contradistinction to their actuality, or the other way round, and (3) qua true and false being in the primary sense [i.e. as categorial modes of being]. To speak of truth and falsehood in the case of states of affairs (έπί τών πράγματων) depends [as we have seen in Ε 4] on things being combined or divided, so that he who thinks what is separated to be separated and what is combined to be combined is right, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to the state of affairs is in error. Now when is there true and false in the above sense present, and when is there not? We must consider what we mean by that type of true and false. Pace Burnyeat (II, 156), t h e r e is n o contrast to Int. 1, 16a9-18, An. Ill 8, 4 3 2 a l l - 1 2 , or Cat. 4, 2a4-10, since, in all these passages, combination a n d separation are treated as circumstances of the things such as conceived of by t h o u g h t , n o t as restricted to their occurrences in the outside things irrespective of their being perceived. 11.22 The ontic truth of σύνθετα In t h e n e x t few p a r a g r a p h s , t h e distinction b e t w e e n o n t i c a n d statemental truth a n d falsehood is explained in several ways. It is first stated that true a n d false taken as ontic p r o p e r t i e s of things should n o t be r e g a r d e d as d e p e n d i n g on o u r cognitive acts, in a similar m a n n e r to that in which statemental truth a n d falsehood d e p e n d o n thinking. Quite the opposite, o u r being right in thinking that you are pale is the e x t r a m e n t a l fact that you are pale (1051b6-9). From this angle, t h e n , this alethic f e a t u r e of categorial ' b e ' is to b e characterized: Met. Θ 10, 1051b9-l7: If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated, while others admit of combination and separation, to be comes down to being combined, i.e. being one, and not to be comes down to being not combined, but a plurality. Therefore, as regards the things that admit of combination as well as separation, the same opinion and the same account comes to be false and true, and it is possible for that opinion at one time to be right and at another erroneous; but regarding things that cannot be otherwise the same opinion is not at one time true and at another erroneous, but the same opinions are always true and always false, respectively. Since ontic truth a n d falsehood are described f r o m the viewpoint of the a p o p h a n t i c truth a n d falsehood, which they are the basis of (as has b e e n j u s t e m p h a s i z e d ) , their characteristics are given in terms of o p i n i o n a n d its verbal expression. W h e n speaking, t h e n , of things

that can (or c a n n o t ) be c o m b i n e d or s e p a r a t e d , subsistent things ( w h e t h e r n a m e d by substantive n o u n s or substantivated adjectives f r o m non-substantial categories) a n d their admissible or inadmissible (essential or coincidental) attributes are i n t e n d e d . 5 8 T h u s assertibles m a d e u p of ' m a n ' plus 'pale', or 'pale' plus ' e d u c a t e d ' , or 'wood' plus 'white' will be admissible combinations, while ' m a n ' plus 'irrational' or ' p a l e ' plus ' i n c o r p o r e a l ' , or ' d i a g o n a l ' plus ' c o m m e n s u r a t e ' will n o t do; a n d so on f o r the c o n t i n g e n t , necessary, a n d impossible separations, too. We have to realize that Aristotle is dealing t h r o u g h o u t with c o m b i n e d states of affairs which can b e (or actually are) f o u n d in the outside world, or are d e n i e d actual existence. T h e ontic c o m b i n a t i o n s involved ( ' p a l e - m a n ' , ' r a t i o n a l - m a n ' , etc.) are said to be s o m e o n e thing (εν είναι, 1051b12). And, it is o f t e n stated, being s o m e o n e a n d d e f i n i t e t h i n g is the i n d i s p e n s a b l e c o n d i t i o n f o r individual existence (my section 4.45).

11. 23 The ontic truth of άσύνθετα Next, a n o t h e r kind of ontic o n e n e s s , namely that of i n c o m p o s i t e things (άσύνθετα) or simples ( ά π λ ά ) c o m e s u p for discussion. T h e question is, then, what in their case the true-aspect of 'be' is. Aristotle emphasizes first that in this case any parallel with truth a n d falsehood in terms of c o m b i n a t i o n a n d separation is o u t of the question. This m e a n s that, if truth a n d falsehood are s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t f r o m the previous kind, its c o u n t e r p a r t 'be' must be, too: Met. Θ 10, 1051bl7-22: But with regard to incomposites, what is being and not being in the true-false variant? 59 It is not something composite, such as 'be' was in the case of combination, and 'not be' in case of separation — in the manner 'the-log's-being-white; 60 or 'the· 58

Burnyeat (II, 158) seems to assume that a form such as 'righteousness' is not an ούσία, as if there are n o ούσίαι apart from substances. T h e labels ούσία and τί έστι are also used for non-substantial quiddities; see Top. I 9. 59 Note the hendiadys το είναι ή μή είναι καί τό άληθές καί τό ψεύδος (where the first καί is epexegetic and the second produces the hendiadys), and the subsequent singular έστι. T h e examples are commonly explained as statements ('the log is white'), instead of expressions indicating states of affairs, for n o good reason. As a matter of fact, Ross's worries (II, 275-9) on the lines 1051b17-1052a4, which in his view contain much obscurity concerning the notions 'incomposite', 'simple', and 'inseparable', are mainly d u e to his mistaking 'simple a p p r e h e n s i o n ' and ' n a m i n g ' for ' j u d g e m e n t ' and 'statement'. T h e way in which Owen (1965, passim), and Sorabji (1982, 298) speak of 'identity statement' is confusing; see my section 11. 4. Pace Ross, Bywater's supplying τό before ξύλον (analogously to the definite article την

diagonal's-being-incommensurate' 61 are — and so truth and falsehood will no longer apply as in the previous cases either. After all these negative a p p r o a c h e s to the m a t t e r it is time to make a positive s t a t e m e n t a b o u t how we have to view ontic truth in the case of i n c o m p o s i t e s . Aristotle p r o c e e d s by f o r w a r d i n g a r e a s o n a b l e s u g g e s t i o n . 6 2 Two things m u s t strike t h e r e a d e r now. First, ' b e ' as ontic truth, a n d ' n o t b e ' as ontic falsehood, are o n c e again described in terms of o u r cognitive operations; second, truth, n o t falsehood, is at the focus of his interest, whereas falsehood is actually described in terms of a lack of successful cognitive activity: Ibid. 10, 1051b22-28: Should we say that, just as truth is not the same in these cases, so 'be' is not either? But that truth and falsehood are as follows: to accomplish contact 63 and to voice it (το μέν θιγείν καί φάναι) equals truth — I say voidng, for there is a difference between voicing and asserting (κατάφασις και φάσις) — and to fail to make contact is nothing but ignorance. 64 For to be in error with respect to a thing's what-it-is (τό τί έστιν) is impossible, save in an incidental sense (κατά συμβεβηκός). And the same applies to incomposite ousiai; to be in error about them is out of the question. T h a t t h e i n c o m p o s i t e s are p u t on a p a r with the quiddities is of i m p o r t a n c e . This makes clear that by the incomposites the quiddities without m a t t e r 6 5 — e n m a t t e r e d forms, actually, that are stripped of their m a t t e r by abstraction ('subtraction') — should be u n d e r s t o o d , such as ' m a n h o o d ' a n d ' p a l e n e s s ' , or, in the m a t h e m a t i c i a n ' s domain, 'line' a n d 'curvature'. As will be clear presently, the inclusion of m a t t e r — by taking, f o r instance, the f o r m 'white(ness)' t o g e t h e r with t h e m a t t e r it actually i n h e r e s in — may lead us to take the i m m a t e r i a l f o r m * ' t h e w h i t e ' (τό λευκόν) as d e n o t i n g a n y t h i n g whatsoever, a n d thus expose us as being mistaken.

before διάμετρον in the next example) is not necessary, because there is talk of the diagonal, and a piece of wood. 61 T h e affirmative assertible containing a privative attribute is regarded as a case of separation. 62 Introduced by ή in the sense of 'or should we say that"; see my Index. 63 N o t e the contrast between the aorist θ ι γ ε ι ν used resultatively a n d the infinitivus praesentis θιγγάνειν at b25, which goes with a de conatu (or repetitious) overtone. 64 In the Greek text, there is a different word-order (so as to make 'ignorance' the subject term), which seems to be the result of stressing the notion 'ignorance' by anticipation. Hence my rendering 'nothing but ignorance'. T o stress this makes good sense, because of Aristotle's intention to show that in this case there is n o proper falsehood or error (άπατηθηναι), but rather mere ignorance. 65 Sorabji (1982), 297.

T h e restriction 'save in an incidental sense' ( α λ λ ' ή κατά συμβεβηκός) has led to some discussion. 6 6 Ross rightly rejects A l e x a n d e r ' s (600 l 6 ff.) suggestion (followed by Bonitz), that the p h r a s e s h o u l d qualify the use of the notion 'to be in e r r o r ' a n d make us take it for ' b e i n g i g n o r a n t ' . In light of An. Ill 6, 430b26-31, what is said in the p r e s e n t passage can be b e t t e r e x p l a i n e d as follows. W h e n e v e r t h e m i n d thinks of s o m e t h i n g in t e r m s of its d e f i n i e n s applying to its quiddity, t h e r e is i m m e d i a t e knowledge of the quiddity as b e l o n g i n g to this p a r t i c u l a r t h i n g . However, if o n e takes τό λευκόν ( * ' t h e w h i t e ' ) f o r t h e particular s u b s t a n c e d e n o t e d by this p h r a s e , t h e possibility of truth a n d e r r o r comes in — coincidentally, that is, since o n e still has perfect knowledge of the quiddity 'whiteness' itself. This issue aptly exhibits the i m p o r t a n c e of the distinction between simple a p p r e h e n s i o n a n d n a m i n g , on the o n e h a n d , a n d j u d g e m e n t a n d f r a m i n g statements, on the o t h e r . T h e above use of the p h r a s e 'coincidentally' is c o m m o n l y e x p l a i n e d at t h e level of s t a t e m e n t m a k i n g , 6 7 m e a n i n g that t h e possibility of e r r o r c o m e s in if o n e attributes a quiddity to a subject by f r a m i n g a statement ' [x] is what is white' etc. WTioever takes things this way fails to see the μετάβασις εις ά λ λ ο γένος, since, by d o i n g so, ontic t r u t h b e c o m e s a case of statem e n t a l truth, so that the distinction between the two kinds of truth, which is the main subject of this chapter, completely disappears f r o m sight. For this r e a s o n , any idea of s t a t e m e n t - m a k i n g s h o u l d b e a b a n d o n e d , to make way for a p p r e h e n s i o n ('grasping') a n d n a m e giving. S u b s e q u e n t l y , t h e c o h e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e various discussions f o u n d in Θ 1-9 a n d those of Θ 10 comes clearly to the fore in that the o t h e r f e a t u r e of the categorial m o d e s of b e i n g , viz. t h e actuality/potentiality item, is e x a m i n e d to f u r t h e r elucidate the n a t u r e s of the forms-without-matter. They must be p u r e actuality, a n d not subj e c t to c o m i n g to be a n d passing away. 68 T h e ontic, alethic f o r m s are i n c o r r u p t i b l e a n d u n g e n e r a b l e , as b e i n g is itself beyond g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n . As far as the p u r e (abstract, that is) f o r m s are conc e r n e d , t h e r e is n o question of being mistaken, but only of touching, or n o t touching, them:

66

Reale II, 94; Ross II, 277; Burnyeat (1984), who offers three unsatisfactory suggestions (159). Ross, Tricot, Tredennick, and also Reale, who refers to the comments made by Thomas Aquinas, and the Renaissance commentator, Sylvester Maurus, ad loc. 68 For the perpetuity of the Aristotelian form see above, re Ζ 8, 1033b 17.

Ibid. 10, 1051b28-32: And they all are in actuality, not potentially; otherwise they would have come to be and ceased to be. But, as it is, be-ing as such [i.e. unqualified] 69 is not generated (or destroyed); if it were, it would be generated out of something. 70 Now with respect to whatever is precisely be-ing, and this in actuality, it is not possible to be in error; it is merely a question of grasping it or failing to grasp it. This p a r a g r a p h winds u p with a s e n t e n c e (1051b32-33) which has caused s o m e c o n f u s i o n : ά λ λ α τό τί έστι ζητείται [...] ή μή. Ross (II, 277f.) suggests an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n in light of Η 3, 1043b23-28, w h e r e Aristotle refers to the theory of Antisthenes a c c o r d i n g to which o n e c a n n o t d e f i n e a thing's τί έστι, b u t only, say, ποιόν τι έστιν, e.g. by saying of silver that it is like tin. So h e r e Aristotle m i g h t possibly m e a n , h e thinks, that inquiry a b o u t the what of simple entities takes the f o r m of asking w h e t h e r they are 'such-like' or not. Apart f r o m the fact that it is d o u b t f u l (as Ross recognizes himself) w h e t h e r this can b e r e a d into the d e m o n s t r a t i v e τ ο ι α ύ τ α , this line of i n t e r p r e t i n g Aristotle's final r e m a r k does n o t get us anywhere, because it suggests some c o m m i t m e n t to Antisthenes on Aristotle's part. Bonitz c o n j e c t u r e s an insertion of ούκ b e f o r e ει τοιαύτα (which A l e x a n d e r may have r e a d , f o r t h a t m a t t e r ) . O n this c o n j e c t u r e , Aristotle's negative r e m a r k will hold the r e a d e r in suspense as to the question of what the inquiry does b e a r on. Eventually, Ross prefers to k e e p the traditional text, a n d to i n t e r p r e t the r e m a r k in light of the earlier reservation ' n o t b u t incidentally' of 1051b26. But t h e n we are back to square o n e . T h e sentence, I take it, contains an additional r e m a r k a b o u t the possibility of g o i n g b e y o n d t h e basic level of u n q u a l i f i e d be-ing, which was discussed in the previous lines, a n d the proposal of now inquiring into the incomposites' diversity qua d i f f e r e n t f o r m s conveying d i f f e r e n t m o d e s of being: "Yet, we d o i n q u i r e a b o u t what they [the i n c o m p o s i t e s ] are, viz. w h e t h e r they a r e of such-and-such a n a t u r e or not". Such an inquiry, then, will b r i n g a b o u t the d i f f e r e n t m o d e s of being, without the material constitution they possess in the material things they i n h e r e in. And as l o n g as we k e e p abstracting f r o m this material constitution, a n d are n o t led astray by — incidentally (κατά συμβεβηκός) — mistaking these f o r m s for their e n m a t t e r e d 69

T h e phrase τό δν αύτό does not stand for any sublime 'being itself, let alone 'Being itself (Tredennick), n o r 'the p u r e f o r m ' (Ross II, 278): it merely refers to the basic sense of 'be' as contrasted with various modes of being as diversified over the ten categories. 70 And this something is something, so that it entails the presence of being-assuch.

status, we will n o t assign t h e m any d e n o t a t i o n , so that t h e r e is n o question of error either. 11. 24 A summary of the two kinds of truth T h e n follows a p a r a g r a p h ( 1051b33-1052a4) which, at first glance at least, does n o t seem to develop the discussion any further. 7 1 I think Ross (II, 278) is perfectly right in observing that after the question of truth has been discussed (in 1051b22-33), in the present p a r a g r a p h Aristotle treats the question of being. However, Aristotle's careless way of expressing himself has m a d e his m e a n i n g seem m o r e obscure than it really is, Ross rightly complains. Let us start with the text as it stands: Met. Θ 10, 1 0 5 1 b 3 3 - 1 0 5 2 a 4 : As f o r b e - i n g in t h e s e n s e of t r u t h , a n d n o t b e - i n g in t h e s e n s e of f a l s e h o o d , (a) t h e r e is ( a j ) t r u t h in case of c o m b i n a t i o n , a n d (a t h e r e is n o f a l s e h o o d o r e r r o r , but rather ignorance; not, however, an ignorance which resembles b l i n d n e s s , f o r b l i n d n e s s is a k i n to a t o t a l a b s e n c e of t h e p o w e r of thinking.

Remarkably e n o u g h , this passage is obscured by what, on the face of it, may b e s u p p o s e d to have b e e n said in o r d e r to clarify its syntax. T h e έν μέν of 1051b34 is, Ross assumes, n o t answered by a έν δέ, as is f o u n d elsewhere to indicate an e n u m e r a t i o n ('first ... next'), 7 2 but by the phrase τό δέ εν. However, this m a n n e r of balancing the construction, which is a r g u e d for by Ross (II, 278), would be r a t h e r o d d . We should instead assume that the έν μέν of b34 is answered by τό δ' right in b34-35, so that the result is n o m o r e than an e n u m e r a t i o n of ' t r u e ' (εν μέν) a n d its c o u n t e r p a r t 'false' (τό δ'). In that case we should take the s u b s e q u e n t το δε έν substantively, m e a n i n g ' t h e unity, on t h e other hand'. O n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , item (a) bears o n statemental truth (ai), a n d f a l s e h o o d (a2), while (b) is c o n c e r n e d with ontic truth ( b j ) , which has i g n o r a n c e (b^) as its second-rank c o u n t e r p a r t . As b e f o r e , ontic t r u t h as well as its c o u n t e r p a r t , i g n o r a n c e , are described in 71

Burnyeat (1984), 161. For Aristotle, ENVI 2, 1139a6-8; Pol. Ill 15, 1285b38-1286a1. Cf. Pol. IV 15, 1300a12-13 : (εν μέν ... δεύτερον δ' ... λοιπόν δέ ("first... secondly ... thirdly"). 72

terms of cognition, b u t this by n o m e a n s makes t h e m a p o p h a n t i c . It is p e r t i n e n t to distinguish b e t w e e n p r o p o s i t i o n a l ( ' a p o p h a n t i c ' ) knowledge a n d knowledge by acquaintance (my section 11.4). 11. 25 Our thinking about unchangeable beings

(άκίνητα)

T h e c h a p t e r e n d s with a p a r a g r a p h on the u n c h a n g e a b l e (τά άκίνητ α ) , picking u p t h e f o r m a l idea of ' b e i n g in e r r o r ' f r o m 1051 b 171052a4, but, materially, developing the discussion of the last part of 1051b2-l7. 7 3 Aristotle points o u t that with r e g a r d to u n c h a n g e a b l e things there is only r o o m for e r r o r if we d o n o t start f r o m the correct d e f i n i e n s of a thing's quiddity, as a result of which we are n o t fully aware of the extension of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g notion. In o t h e r words, if we have the right insight into a thing's quiddity, any e r r o r is o u t of the question; if we fail to realize that s o m e t h i n g is a m e m b e r of the class whose q u i d d i t y we a r e familiar with, e r r o r is possible. For instance, if we s u p p o s e that the triangle is i m m u t a b l e we shall n o t think that at o n e time its angles are equal to two right angles while at a n o t h e r time they are not, f o r this would imply that it changes. But we may s u p p o s e t h a t o n e m e m b e r of such a class has a certain attribute, a n d a n o t h e r does not. For instance, owing to o u r defective n o t i o n of what the d e f i n i e n s of p r i m e n u m b e r is, we may ( a l b e i t erroneously) think that n o even n u m b e r is prime, or that some are primes a n d o t h e r s are not; but r e g a r d i n g any single n u m b e r it holds that we c a n n o t be in error, thinking e.g. that this instance of n u m b e r 17 is prime, a n d a n o t h e r is not. This holds irrespective of o u r actual (right or wrong) o p i n i o n . If e.g. we wrongly o p i n e that 57 is prime, we c a n n o t think at the same time that it at o n e time is prime, while at a n o t h e r it is not. We must regard its (putative) truth as eternal.

1 1 . 3 The main outcome of Books ΖΗΘ Let us now summarize the main doctrinal tenets of Books ΖΗΘ; the n u m b e r s indicate my above sections. (1) As early as in the o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h of Ζ 1 (1028a10ff.), the hendiadys f o r m u l a s τό μεν τί έστι και τόδε τι ( a l l - 1 2 ) 7 4 a n d ή ούσία 73

This is the view of ps.-Alexander CAG I, p. 601 16 ff., followed by Ross. Others (Sylvester Maurus, Bonitz, and Reale) assume that the section 1051b17-1052a4 is continued. See Reale II, 94. 74 Also found elsewhere, e.g. GC I 3, 318b32.

καί τό καθ' εκαστον (a27) refer to the complex idea o f ' p a r t i c u l a r qua possessing this or that particular f o r m ' . T h e definitive solution to the true ousia p r o b l e m d e v e l o p e d in Ζ 10-16 is h e r e a n t i c i p a t e d (my section 8.1). (2) T h e core of the p r o b l e m is c o u n t e r e d later on (9. 46) by introd u c i n g the device 'primitive appellation' (1032a5: τά πρώτα καί καθ' αυτά λεγόμενα), which refers to the ' i m m e d i a t e ' or ' c o m p r e h e n s i v e ' ousia, i.e. t h e specific f o r m which e n c o m p a s s e s t h e whole of t h e essential features making u p a thing's quiddity (9.66). (3) By the n o t i o n of ' c o m p r e h e n s i v e ousia' the c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n f o u n d in the Categories between πρώτη a n d δευτέρα ούσία is surpassed (9.11). (4) From now on, the label πρώτη ούσία (or τό πρώτως öv) is used to stand f o r the ' i m m e d i a t e ' or 'first n a m e d ' specific f o r m as e n m a t t e r e d in this or that particular; by t h e same token, the particular possessing this particular f o r m is r e f e r r e d to (which must r e m i n d us of the d o c t r i n e of Cat., ch. 5). T h e πρώτη ούσία of the Metaphysics is first both in the o r d e r of existence (like it is in the Categories), as well as in the o r d e r of logico-semantic analysis (9.11 a n d 9.66). (5) Matter can be called ousia to the e x t e n t that when s o m e t h i n g is conceived of as deprived of all its d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , its ' b e i n g t h e r e ' ('hyparxis') still r e m a i n s as an u n d e r l y i n g thing (ΰποκείμενον). This should n o t be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of s e n t e n c e predication (saying e.g. 'Matter is substance', let a l o n e ' S u b s t a n c e is m a t t e r ' ) , b u t of n a m i n g a n d appellation. For instance, when they are deprived of any of their d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , Socrates or this tree or whatever o t h e r subsistent entity can be called u p by the expression 'this < c h u n k of> m a t t e r ' . T h a t is why, in o u r metaphysical search for true being, the claim m a d e by m a t t e r a n d h y p o k e i m e n o n for b e i n g the true ousia must n o t be rejected without f u r t h e r a d o (9.23). N o n e the less, its credentials are eventually nullified (9.24). (6) Using the n o t i o n of ' c o m p r e h e n s i v e ' ousia must n o t m a k e us blind to the p r o b l e m of acquiring true (epistemonic) knowledge, for which to grasp the 'universal' is r e q u i r e d (9.4-9.5). T h e r e q u i r e m e n t s are stated for o b t a i n i n g true knowledge: the particular s h o u l d be b r o u g h t u p by its 'primitive a p p e l l a t i o n ' , that is to say, the designation after the first class it essentially belongs to (9.6-9.7). (7) T h e p r o b l e m of w h e t h e r matter should be included in a c o m p o site's definiens is solved by distinguishing two kinds of definition, o n e focussing on a thing's material c o m p o n e n t , the o t h e r on its 'material

constitution', i.e. its general condition of materiality or extensionality (9.53; 10.2; 10.4-10.5; 10.73; 11.12-11.15). (8) T h e f o r m s in the particulars are strictly particular (individual), n o t universal. T h e i r universal status is merely a logical construct, prod u c e d by subtraction a n d serving for the sake of true (epistemonic) knowledge as a r g u e d f o r in the Posterior Analytics Met. Z, chs. 13-16 firmly state that n o universal is ousia (9.72 a n d 9.75). This does n o t alter the fact, however, that n o particular can be properly d e f i n e d qua particular (9.53-9.54; 9.71-9.72; 9.74; 10.71). (9) In Ζ 17 a n d Η 1-6, the true ousia so eagerly looked for t h r o u g h o u t t h e Metaphysics is finally identified as the e n m a t t e r e d particular f o r m . T h e notion of c o m p r e h e n s i v e ousia o n c e again leads Aristotle to assess matter as 'material constitution' (10.2), as well as the eidos in its capacity of b e i n g the dynamic f o r c e actualizing this or that particular c h u n k of matter (10.3). (10) T h e e n m a t t e r e d f o r m is t h e principle of individuation, r a t h e r than j u s t matter (10.72). (11) 'Actuality' is d e f i n e d as a thing's 'being-in-complete-realization', a n d so o p p o s e d to 'potentiality', which is a thing [x]'s state of b e i n g that includes the possibility of b e c o m i n g (being) s o m e t h i n g else, [y]. In the c o n t e x t of the search f o r the true ousia, t h e discussion must c e n t r e on n a m i n g a n d appellation: ' W h e n can what is actually an [x] be called u p as a potential [y]?' This investigation boils down to linguistically p u t t i n g the ontic status of a thing's material to the test; in this context, 'material constitution' is e x a m i n e d in terms of m a t t e r ' s potentiality (11.11-11.15). (12) Matter a n d f o r m — now taken as potentiality a n d actuality — are intimately related; in particular m a t t e r is d i r e c t e d towards t h e i n t e n d e d f o r m (11.12). (13) Θ 10 discusses truth a n d f a l s e h o o d q u a features of ' b e ' in the primary sense. T h u s its main object is truth a n d falsehood attributed to things, that is to say, it deals n o t with truth claims (as does Ε 4), b u t with t r u t h as an ontic p r o p e r t y in things d e s i g n a t e d a f t e r the various m o d e s of categorial being; in this c o n t e x t , n o n - b e i n g q u a 'ontic falsehood' is e x a m i n e d (11.21). (14) In spite of the fact that the ontic properties, truth a n d falseh o o d , are baptized in terms of true a n d false o p i n i o n , they surely d o n o t themselves d e p e n d on cognitive acts in a similar m a n n e r to that in w h i c h s t a t e m e n t a l t r u t h a n d f a l s e h o o d d e p e n d o n t h o u g h t (11.21).

(15) Along this line of t h o u g h t , 'to b e ' equals 'to be c o m b i n e d , or, o n e ' , while ' n o t to be' boils down to ' b e i n g n o t o n e , b u t a plurality'. T h i s o n t i c unity is f o u n d b o t h in σ ύ ν θ ε τ α , i.e. things necessarily c o m b i n e d or s e p a r a t e d , as well as in i n c o m p o s i t e s ( ά σ ύ ν θ ε τ α ) or simples (άπλά), i.e. quiddities without matter, that is to say, e n m a t tered f o r m s stripped of their matter by subtraction (11.22-11.23). (16) In terms of the potentiality/actuality opposition the n a t u r e of the forms-without-matter is described as ' p u r e actuality', n o t subject as such to c o m i n g to be or passing away (11. 23). (17) H a v i n g g r a s p e d a t h i n g ' s quiddity, any e r r o r is o u t of t h e q u e s t i o n . Only if we fail to b e aware of a t h i n g ' s m e m b e r s h i p of a class whose quiddity we are familiar with is e r r o r possible (11.25). (18) T h r o u g h o u t the discussions f o u n d in ΖΗΘ Aristotle's semantic a p p r o a c h comes to the fore. T h e r e is only subsistent being, which is e n d o w e d with a plurality of m o d e s of being. Different 'beings' only c o m e into the picture when (and in so far as) o n e a n d the same subsistent thing is called u p o n e time by a n a m e (appellation) signifying an item f r o m the first category, a n o t h e r time by n a m e s (appellations) conveying items f r o m o n e or m o r e non-substantial categories (9.1; 9.31; 9.42; 10.4; 11.12).

11.4

An excursus on ontic, truth and non-propositional thought

In a fascinating p a p e r Richard Sorabji (1982) exposed what he baptized "myths a b o u t non-propositional thought". It aims to u n d e r m i n e the c o m m o n idea that non-discursive thinking does not involve entertaining propositions, that is to say, it does n o t involve thinking that s o m e t h i n g is t h e case, a n d , instead, o n e c o n t e m p l a t e s c o n c e p t s in isolation f r o m each o t h e r , a n d does n o t string t h e m t o g e t h e r in the way they are strung together in ^«/-clauses. It is c o m m o n l y held that Plato a n d Aristotle anticipated Plotinus in postulating this kind of non-propositional thinking. As for Aristotle, Sorabji (1982, 296ff.) argues for the position that Aristotle's view of thinking the 'incomposites', 7 5 despite their b e i n g non-discursive t h o u g h t , is propositional. 7 6 Following A.C. Lloyd's exposition 7 7 of the c u r r e n t idea, it is stated that non-discursive t h o u g h t 75

T h e άσύνθετα of Θ 10, and the άδιαίρετα of An. Ill, 6. In Sorabji (1983), 137-56, the s u p p o s e d myth a b o u t non-propositional thinking is discussed in a historical perspective (Plato to Plotinus). 77 (1969-70), 261-74, w h e r e the idea of non-discursive t h o u g h t , as it is 76

involves c o n t e m p l a t i n g things in isolation without thinking anything about t h e m . O n this description of non-discursive thinking, the question may arise why it should be supposed that, when speaking of o u r thinking of incomposites — in which, admittedly, t h e r e is n o assertion at all (Met. Θ 10, 1051b24; cf. An. III 6, 430b28) —, Aristotle must have the c o n t e m p l a t i o n of isolated concepts in m i n d . Sorabji is of the opinion that there is n o g o o d reason for it, a n d thinks a better interpretation is available. I can fully agree with Sorabji (297f.) that Aristotle's 'incomposites' a r e f o r m s - w i t h o u t - m a t t e r . Likewise, I can only w e l c o m e his f i n e observations (301-6) a b o u t Aristotle's general theory of thinking. But o n his m a i n point, which is r e p r e s e n t e d in the title of his p a p e r , I c a n n o t go t h e whole way with h i m , in so far as h e identifies the t h i n k i n g of composites as ' p r o p o s i t i o n a l t h o u g h t ' . In fact, Sorabji regards Aristotle's non-discursive thinking as involving the definitions of incomposites. In a similar vein, h e uses ' p r o p o s i t i o n ' a n d ' p r o p o sitional' as equivalents o f ' s t a t e m e n t ' ('assertion') a n d 'statemental', j u s t as h e fails to take ' d e f i n i t i o n ' in the sense of 'definiens'. O n this interpretation, h e seems to find d u e s u p p o r t in the texts, which really contain clear r e f e r e n c e s to o u r knowing the quiddities78 of the incomposites as they are grasped by definitions. Sorabji infers f r o m this that t h e r e f o r e this thinking m u s t be propositional, since, still in his view, it boils down to t h i n k i n g that such-and-such an essence belongs to such-and-such a subject. H e has to explain, now, how this can be squared with Aristotle's explicit claim that t h e r e is n o asserting, n o r predicating s o m e t h i n g of something. Sorabji (298) answers this question by identifying Aristotle's definitions n o t as simple d e f i n i e n t i a , b u t as ' s t a t e m e n t s of identity', a n d explaining the p r o c e d u r e of thinking incomposites in terms of such statements, joining O w e n ' s o p i n i o n that Aristotle s o m e t i m e s views statements that bring u p the essence of s o m e t h i n g , or part of its essence, as 'identity statements'. E.g. at Met. Ζ 11, 1037a33-b7, Aristotle is talking of a subject which is n o t a c o m p o u n d of f o r m plus matter; h e r e at least, h e says, the subject-substrate is identical with its essence. Such statements, then, "do n o t r e q u i r e us to predicate o n e thing of a n o t h e r , but involve simply r e f e r r i n g to the same thing twice", which is n o t assertion or predication as Aristotle usually u n d e r s t a n d s it. commonly understood, is criticized as incoherent. 78 Met. Θ 10, t 0 5 f b 2 6 and 32; An. Ill 6, 430b28.

T h u s the core of Sorabji's solution to the intricate question "Why propositional, although n o t in the m a n n e r of asserting?" is his r e f u g e to 'identity statements', "which d o n o t r e q u i r e us to predicate o n e thing of a n o t h e r " — of s o m e t h i n g else, that is - b u t merely "involve simply r e f e r r i n g to the same thing twice"(298). I am afraid Sorabji is c o m p l e t e l y mistaken o n this score. For o n e thing, h e c o n f u s e s ' r e f e r r i n g ' a n d 'asserting', as a result of his p u t t i n g ' d e f i n i e n s ' a n d 'definition' on a par. T o begin with, it is i m p o r t a n t to have a clear view of these items. In the definition ' m a n is a two-footed a n i m a l ' , ' m a n ' is the d e f i n i e n d u m , a n d 'two-footed a n i m a l ' the d e f i n i e n s . W h e n a t t e m p t i n g to d e f i n e ' m a n ' , we are n o t in search of its definition, b u t its definiens. T o properly d e f i n e s o m e t h i n g is a non-propositional p r o c e d u r e which consists in analysing the n o t i o n conveyed by the term signifying the object u n d e r discussion (e.g. into g e n u s a n d differentia). Admittedly, this stage can b e ( a n d nearly always is) followed by f r a m i n g a definitorial statement a b o u t them, but this is not f u n d a m e n t a l to the p r o c e d u r e of defining. T h r o u g h o u t the present study we have experie n c e d the i m p o r t a n c e of the d i f f e r e n c e between statement-making a n d n a m i n g and, correspondingly, between assertion a n d assertible. 7 9 In p o i n t of fact, what Aristotle is d o i n g in the Metaphysics, a n d elsewhere as well, is d e n o t i n g ( ' n a m i n g ' , 'appellating') outside things by their p r o p e r definiens to find their true ousia. After identifying t h e m by d e n o t a t i o n (i.e. by using their p r o p e r definiens as d e n o t a n s ) , not by a s t a t e m e n t ( ' a s s e r t i n g ' ) , h e goes o n to f u r t h e r analyse this definiens, a n d , eventually, f r a m e s conclusions (which, admittedly, are statements). 8 0

11.5

Some relevan t passages from Met. M and Ν

T h e last two books (M a n d N) of Met. present Aristotle's views a b o u t the n a t u r e a n d status of m a t h e m a t i c a l entities. 8 1 T h e s e views are 79

My section 2.16. Besides, 'referring to the same thing twice' is still something different from a propositional procedure; and the latter is, by definition, subject to truth-values. 80 Of course, the interesting problem of what to understand by animal φρόνησις and σύνεσις in Aristotle (see J.-L. Labarrière in Devereux & Pellegrin (1980), 40528) should also be solved in terms of non-propositional awareness. 81 For impressive assessments see e.g. Annas (1976), 26-77; Cleary (1995), passim.

s t a m p e d by Aristotle's clear a n d unwavering hostility towards Platonism, a n d his dislike f o r subsistent eternal entities in particular, an attitude h e displays in his o t h e r works as well. His strategy basically consists in exposing the absurdity a n d superfluity of such entities. It will n o t c o m e as a surprise, then, that Books M a n d Ν contain many r e f e r e n c e s to the a u t h o r ' s own down-to-earth ontology as the most effective remedy against any idea of transcendency. T h u s these books a r e m o s t w e l c o m e in o r d e r to s u p p l e m e n t o u r k n o w l e d g e of Aristotle's ontology of the sublunar world. 8 2 11.51

Do eternal immaterial Substances exist ?

In the o p e n i n g c h a p t e r of Book M Aristotle r e m i n d s us of his treatm e n t of the perceptible entities, a n d i n t r o d u c e s the p r e s e n t subject of inquiry as t h e search f o r t h e status of u n c h a n g i n g a n d eternal entities, if t h e r e are any such things over a n d above the perceptible o n e s (πότερον εστι τις παρά τάς αίσθητάς ούσίας ακίνητος και άίδιος). In his usual way h e p r o p o s e s to start off with the views of his p r e d e cessors, "so as to avoid any of their mistakes, a n d also without fear of b e i n g secretly a n n o y e d with ourselves if we a p p e a r to s h a r e any o p i n i o n with t h e m ; f o r o n e m u s t b e c o n t e n t to state s o m e things better a n d o t h e r s n o worse" (1076a8-16). T h e possible c a n d i d a t e s for b e i n g t h e aforesaid i m p e r c e p t i b l e , eternal entities are the mathematical entities a n d the Platonic Forms. Some p e o p l e identify the Forms with the mathematicals, while others posit t h e m as distinct kinds (γένη). C h a p t e r 2 presents Aristotle's criticisms of the Platonist c o n c e p t i o n of the status of the m a t h e m a t i cals, which is followed by the a u t h o r ' s own alternative a c c o u n t in c h a p t e r 3; c h a p t e r s 4 a n d 5 are devoted to Aristotle's criticism of the T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms (taken over, with m i n o r alterations f r o m Book A, c h a p t e r s 6 a n d 9). C h a p t e r s 6-9 deal with c o g n a t e p r o b l e m s , particularly the d i f f e r e n t views of Form N u m b e r s , a n d c h a p t e r 10 with the g e n e r a l p r o b l e m of individuality a n d knowability that was raised as the twelfth aporia in Book Β (6, 1003a5-17), in c o n j u n c t i o n with the n i n t h aporia (ibid., 4, 999b24-1000a4).

82

Annas gives (1976, 78-88) a clear account of the structure of Books M and N, including pertinent criticism of Werner Jaeger's theory about it.

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL BEING. T H E MATHEMATICALS

341

11. 52 On the status of mathematical entities In his criticism o f Platonism in c h a p t e r 2 (1076b11- 1077b11), Aristotle tries to show that Plato's c o n c e p t i o n o f m a t h e m a t i c a l entities is u n t e n a b l e , a n d that Platonists wrongly regard abstract entities as m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l f r o m the viewpoint o f ontology than concrete particulars. Small w o n d e r then that, like the Forms, the mathematicals, in so far as they are more platonico

conceived are d e e m e d by Aristotle

to be idle r e d u p l i c a t i o n s o f the concrete particulars o c c u r r i n g in t h e w o r l d outside. F r o m

1076b39 o n w a r d s Aristotle's strategy o f

a r g u m e n t is o f general p h i l o s o p h i c interest. 8 3 If m a t h e m a t i c a l s are separate entities in themselves, t h e n t h e disciplines c o g n a t e

to

m a t h e m a t i c s , like a s t r o n o m y , optics, a n d h a r m o n i c s , m u s t also be a b o u t ideal objects which are separated f r o m concrete, perceptible things, in o r d e r to meet the general c o n d i t i o n s for true knowledge. T h e core o f his a r g u m e n t is that the Platonists seem to characterize the diverse disciplines in terms o f their different objects instead o f the different m e t h o d each o f t h e m use to address the same objects, to wit the concrete particulars. I n p r i n c i p l e , to Aristotle it is all a matter o f different ways o f focalization a n d categorization c o n c e r n i n g o n e a n d the same outside particular. I n 1077a36-bll Aristotle's a r g u m e n t takes a clearly semantic t u r n by d r a w i n g attention to the conceptualization o f mathematicals, thus addressing "the n u b o f his dispute with the Platonists a b o u t mathematical objects". 84 Even if m a t h e m a t i c a l properties may be semantically p r i o r to the particulars they i n h e r e in, Aristotle argues, it does n o t follow that a m a t h e m a t i c a l , say, a n u m b e r or line, ontologically surpasses the concrete particular w h i c h possesses the property o f b e i n g c o u n t a b l e or having lines ( ' b e i n g * l i n e d ' ) . H e warns us that semantic priority does n o t always c o i n c i d e with ontological priority. W h a t he m e a n s to say is that whenever with reference to conceptualization a certain c o m p o n e n t is p r e d o m i n a n t , it is only in cases in which that c o m p o n e n t signifies a m o d e o f subsistent b e i n g that it will refer to s o m e t h i n g existing in its own right. I n o t h e r words, g r a n t i n g that the m a t h e m a t i c i a n ' s conceptualization focusses o n a particular's properties ( ' m o d e s o f b e i n g ' ) like countability, this does n o t alter the fact that such a m o d e o f b e i n g ontologically is still c o i n c i d e n t a l a n d t h u s posterior to the particular's subsistent m o d e o f b e i n g ; a n d , 83 84

Annas (1976), 142f.; Cleary (1995), 288-307. Cleary (1995), 301.

accordingly, t h e use of such d e s i g n a t i o n s d o e s n o t r e q u i r e t h e existence of subsistent N u m b e r , Line, a n d so on. T o m a k e his i n t e n t i o n clear Aristotle goes on to use his favourite e x a m p l e of the c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n of a p a l e - c o m p l e x i o n e d p e r s o n , who is designated by the composite expression, 'pale m a n ' , consisting of a substrate-term plus attribute. 8 5 Whoever wants to refer to someo n e , e.g. Socrates, not in his capacity of being wise or bald or Sophroniscus's son, b u t j u s t q u a pale, will call him 'pale m a n ' , thus giving the coincidental property, paleness, semantic p r e d o m i n a n c e over the c o n c e p t ' m a n ' . 8 6 However, this by n o m e a n s implies that his paleness is ontologically prior to his m a n h o o d , a n d thus must be e n d o w e d with subsistency over a n d above his b e i n g a particular m a n , a n d the particular paleness i n h e r e n t in h i m . Q u i t e to the contrary, it still r e m a i n s natural to m o d e s of b e i n g that are signified by attributive t e r m s that they c a n n o t have s e p a r a t e existence in t h e same way subsistent m o d e s can. Paleness, wisdom, baldness a n d their like can only exist in an underlying subsistent thing or h y p o k e i m e n o n , so that the use of this sort of term implies that t h e r e is s o m e a p p r o p r i a t e underlying thing, while, f r o m the semantic point of view, o u r use of substantive terms does n o t entail the existence of anything whatsoever to underly them; what these terms refer to is self-supporting: Met. M 2, 1077a36-bl 1: Let it be granted that they [i.e. the mathematicals] are prior in designation [sc. to the particular they inhere in]. But not everything prior in designation is also prior in beingness (τή ούσία πρότερα). Things are prior in beingness if they surpass them in existing separately, and prior in designation to things whose designations contain theirs as a part. But these two priorities do not fall to the same thing together. For given that properties, e.g. in case of something cbeing designated as> 'moving' or 'pale', do not exist apart from their substances (παρά τάς ούσίας), then *'the pale' is prior in designation (κατά τόν λόγον) to 'pale man', but not in beingness and subsistence (κατά την ούσίαν), since 87 it [i.e. *'the pale'] cannot exist separately (κεχωρισμένον) but exists always together with the compound (τω συνόλω); by compound I mean the man who is pale (τόν ανθρωπον τόν λευκόν). Hence it is clear that the property resulting from subtraction (τό έξ αφαιρέσεως) is not prior, nor that 85

When she spoke (1976, 147) of Aristotle's example of priority in definition as "disappointingly simplistic", Annas failed to see Aristotle's point, I think. In a later publication (1987) she acknowledges the special semantic point of Aristotle's argument. For the 'pale m a n ' issue see my section 9.32. 8( ' Unlike English, the Greek idiom even allows to call him u p as τό λευκόν = *'the pale', period. 87 For the need of this kind of suppletion see my section 1.71.

resulting from

addition

(τό έκ π ρ ο σ θ έ σ ε ω ς )

posterior;

for

cspeaking

o f a d d i t i o n > it is b y a d d i t i o n t o t h e d e s i g n a t i o n , * ' t h e p a l e ' t h a t is t a l k o f ' t h e p a l e

there

man'.

T h e same view is f o u n d in the Lexicon where the various meanings of ' p r i o r ' a n d 'posterior' are listed {Met. Δ 11); "With r e f e r e n c e to designation (κατά τόν λόγον) the coincidental is prior to the whole thing (του ολου), as for instance * ' t h e e d u c a t e d ' to ' t h e e d u c a t e d m a n ' . For without the part [i.e. ' e d u c a t e d ' ] t h e r e will not b e a c o m p l e t e designation. A n d yet the p r o p e r t y of b e i n g e d u c a t e d c a n n o t o c c u r without there being an e d u c a t e d something". Again, if o n e of a particular's coincidental m o d e s of b e i n g is semantically focussed on this s h o u l d n o t lead us to t h i n k that this m o d e of b e i n g has eo ipso o n t o l o g i c a l priority, too. T h i s distinction b e t w e e n s e m a n t i c a n d ontological priority plays the key role in the search for true b e i n g in Met. Z, particularly chs. 1 a n d 4-5. It is claimed t h e r e that in any d e s i g n a t i o n , w h e t h e r a d e f i n i e n s or just a describens, that of an u n d e r l y i n g thing s u p p o r t i n g the f o r m ( ' m o d e of b e i n g ' ) expressed by the designation is i n c l u d e d . As at M 2, 1077b2ff., the ontological posteriority of the coincidental m o d e s of being is explained in terms of t h e incapability of b e i n g in their own right o r b e i n g s e p a r a t e d f r o m their h y p o k e i m e n o n , i.e. the particular as possessing this m o d e of being (ή ούσία και τό καθ εκαστον). 8 8 11. 53 Aristotle's oum vino of the status of mathematicals In c h a p t e r 3 Aristotle presents his own alternative a c c o u n t of the ontological status of mathematical entities. 8 9 His solution to the problem turns out to consist in minutely employing modified designations of the object u n d e r examination by m e a n s of the ^ « - l o c u t i o n . 9 0 Just 88

Met. Ζ 1, 1028a20-31; my sections 9. 11 and 9.31-9.33; ibid., 1028a35-36: "For any thing it holds that in its account its be-ing is included" (my section 1.64). Cleary (1994, 304) seems to have a blind eye to the semantic p u r p o r t a n d force of Aristotle's a r g u m e n t against the Platonists' claims about the ontological status of mathematicals. 89 See for this issue also Van Rijen (1989), 150-62. 90 Cleary (1995, 312-18) has well observed that "the key to Aristotle's answer lies in the çua-Iocution and in a related method of subtraction, both of which are to be found in the Posterior Analytics (I, 5)". Wolfgang Wieland (1962, 197ff.) was the first to draw our attention to Aristotle's use of the qua-locution to escape the danger of hypostatizing attributes as Plato did. He rightly pointed out that this device permitted Aristotle to consider them as just aspects of a substrate. To Wieland (ibid., 213) the use of the (///«-device involves a radical and decisive critique of Plato for confusing things and their qualitative aspects. Cleary (1995), 315, n. 104.

as g e n e r a l a p p r o a c h e s in m a t h e m a t i c s , h e argues (1077b17-22), d o n o t c o n c e r n separate entities over a n d above m a g n i t u d e s a n d n u m bers, but are a b o u t these, only n o t q u a b e i n g such (ούχ ή δε τοιαύτα) as to have m a g n i t u d e or b e divisible ( ' c o u n t a b l e ' ) , evidently it is also possible f o r t h e r e to b e a c c o u n t s a n d p r o o f s a b o u t p e r c e p t i b l e m a g n i t u d e s , b u t taken n o t q u a perceptibles b u t in their capacity of b e i n g s u c h - a n d - s u c h 9 1 (μή ή δέ α ι σ θ η τ ά ά λ λ ' η τοιαδί). N e x t the diverse ways of b r i n g i n g u p t h i n g s are d e v e l o p e d in a b r o a d e r semantic context: Ibid. M 3, 1077b22-30: For just as there are many modi operandi (λόγοι) 92 about things merely qua moving, irrespective of the quiddity of them in such a capacity (τών τοιούτων) and of their coincidental modes of being, and this does not mean that therefore there must be either some moving entity separate from the perceptibles, or some such determinate nature in them - so also in the case of moving things there will be theses and branches of knowledge about them, not taken qua moving, but only qua bodies, or only qua planes or qua lengths, or qua divisible, and indivisible but with position, and just qua divisible. 1077b34-1078a9: And just as it is true to say in an unqualified sense of other disciplines that they are about this or that, not taken in a coincidental mode of being (for instance about paleness if the healthy thing is pale, while it [i.e. the discipline in question] is about health), but about that which each discipline has as its proper object: if it is about its object qua healthy, then it is about health, whereas if it is about its object qua man, then it is about man —so it is true to speak in a like manner of geometry. I do not mean that, 93 given that the mathematical disciplines are about what happens to be perceptible but not qua perceptible, they are not about perceptibles; but I do not mean that they are about other separate entities over and above these perceptibles either. Many a property falls to things in their own right (συμβέβηκε καθ' αύτά τοις πράγμασιν), i.e. qua being, each of them, of this or that nature (ή έκαστον ύπάρχει τών τοιούτων). For instance, proper attributes fall to the animal qua female or qua male, but none the less there does not exist some female or some male [i.e. some femaleness or maleness] separate from the animals in question. 94

91

I.e. those things being taken in o n e of their m o r e generic capacities as envisaged in the general modus operandi. 92 T h e word is here used, I take it, to stand for intellectual approaches covering both statements, theses, and proofs. 93 T h e negative particle ούκ at 1078a2, which is counterbalanced by ού μέντοι ούδέ at a4, is pregnantly used, m e a n i n g 'it is not the case that' or Ί d o not mean that', while its counterpart stands for 'but I do not mean either'. 94 My rendering of the definite article; see Verdenius (1981), 351, and Kühner-

Aristotle goes on to draw a g e n e r a l conclusion (1078a 17-21) that if o n e posits m o d e s of b e i n g taken a p a r t f r o m what is coincidental to t h e m 9 5 a n d studies t h e m as such (ή τοιαύτα) o n e will n o t for this reason assert a falsehood, any m o r e t h a n if o n e draws s o m e t h i n g in the sand a n d calls it a f o o t l o n g when it is n o t a f o o t long; f o r the f a l s e h o o d is n o t that which is p u t f o r w a r d (έν τ α ΐ ς π ρ ο τ ά σ ε σ ι ) . Presumably, Aristotle m e a n s that mathematical propositions are true regardless of w h e t h e r or not the sensible diagrams that are m e a n t to illustrate those propositions perfectly r e p r e s e n t them. 9 6

11. 54 No separate existence should be assigned to universals In the c o n c l u d i n g part of c h a p t e r 9 (1086a21-b13) Aristotle sets o u t to deal with the views of p e o p l e w h o assert that t h e r e a r e o t h e r subsistent entities over a n d above the p e r c e p t i b l e o n e s (παρά τάς αίσθητάς έτέρας ουσίας). O n e position a m o n g t h e m is given special attention, viz. that of the believers in Forms. T h e p r o b l e m is that, at o n e a n d the same time, they posit the Forms (τάς ιδέας) as universal a n d again treat t h e m as separate a n d individual; that this is u n t e n a b l e has b e e n a r g u e d before (B 6, 1003a7-17). T h e reason the believers in subsistent universal entities c o m b i n e d these properties into o n e thing is that they took subsistent entities as non-identical with perceptible things. They were of the o p i n i o n that t h e individual things in the sensible world are in a state of flux a n d n o n e of t h e m persists, b u t

Gerth I, 593. T h e r e is an interesting passage in ENW 8 where Aristotle (1142a1120) ascribes youngsters' ability to b e c o m e a mathematician and their inability to operate in practical matters to the fact that they easily take mathematicals apart f r o m the physical objects they i n h e r e in, — a p r o c e d u r e , however, that is not feasible in practical matters. 95 This formula covers everything coinciding with the m o d e of being u n d e r consideration, not only 'fellow-attributes' (Ross, ad loc.), but also, on occasion, the thing's subsistent m o d e of being, which can also be said to 'go together with' the thing's aspect in question. In mathematics in particular there may be the possibility of attributes themselves underlying other attributes. 96 Cleary (1995), 330. Cf. Gael. Ill 1, 299al3-17; APo. I 10, 76b39-77a3; An I 1, 403bl4-15; III 4, 429bl8-20; 7, 431bl2-16; 8, 432a2-ΙΟ; Met. Κ 3, 1061a28-b3; Ν 2, 1089a22-23. T h e c o m m o n r e n d e r i n g 'in the premisses' is odd. Rather, what is m e a n t is: 'that which is put before you as a concrete figure or drawing or sketch'. Likewise {pace Annas 1979, 203) at Met. Ν 2, 1089a24-25, Aristotle does not mean to say: ' T h e enunciation is extraneous to the inference" (Oxford Translation), let alone s o m e t h i n g o d d like "The premiss is not part of the syllogism", but that the particular drawing is extraneous to the reasoning. C o m p a r e Plato's view of the use of drawing mathematical figures; Rep. VI, 510D.

that the universal both exists over a n d above t h e m a n d is of a differe n t n a t u r e (έ'τερόν τι είναι). Aristotle then recalls his discussion in c h a p t e r 4 a b o u t how Socrates gave the impulse to this theory t h r o u g h his definitions, but at least did n o t separate the universal d e f i n i e n t i a f r o m the individuals, a n d also how in this respect h e was right in n o t separating t h e m . This is clear f r o m the results: f o r w i t h o u t t h e universal it is impossible to obtain true knowledge; b u t s e p a r a t i n g t h e m f r o m t h e individuals causes the difficulties that arise with regard to the Forms. T h e thing is that because his successors — o n c e given that (ειπερ) there must be 9 7 s o m e subsistent entities over a n d above the p e r c e p t i b l e o n e s a n d those in flux — took it to be necessary that these should be separate. A n d since they h a d n o o t h e r s available, they elevated (εξέθεσαν) 9 8 these universally assignable m o d e s of b e i n g (ταύτας δέ τάς καθόλου λεγομένας, sc. ο ύ σ ί α ς ) . And f r o m this it followed that universals a n d individuals were almost t h e same sort of t h i n g (τάς α ύ τ ά ς φύσεις ε ί ν α ι ) . This in itself would b e a p r o b l e m f o r the Platonists' view (1086b2-13). 11. 55 The problem of universals However, Aristotle agrees that the aforesaid p r o b l e m may be raised in m o r e g e n e r a l t e r m s . In t h e c o n c l u d i n g c h a p t e r of Book M, t h e r e f o r e , h e sets o u t to deal with the u n d e r l y i n g p r o b l e m which m u s t also be the c o n c e r n of those who d o n o t believe in Platonic Forms. 9 9 In its b r o a d e r c o n t e x t the previous p r o b l e m is in fact what we know as t h e everlasting p r o b l e m of universals. In t h e twelfth a p o r i a of Β 6 Aristotle raised the question w h e t h e r the ontic principles a r e universal or such as we d e s c r i b e p a r t i c u l a r s as b e i n g (1003a5-7). In that passage the gist of the p r o b l e m was disclosed in terms of the p r o b l e m of the plurality of f o r m s r e q u i r i n g a unifying factor: if ontic principles are Platonic Forms which are not only ontic causes b u t also t h e principles of t r u e knowledge, t h e n these two features will require that they should both be individual (a 'this' as is

97

For the future tense as expressing necessity or at least what is surely going to h a p p e n see Patzig (1969), 18; Van Raalte (1993), 335. 98 Ecthesis is discussed in my sections 6.23-6.25. 99 T h e twelfth aporia of Met. Β 6, 1003a5-17; cf. the ninth o n e at 4, 999b241000a4; my section 7.22. T h e r e is a pertinent discussion of 1086b 14-1087a25 in Leszl (1972), 286-98, and also in Madigan (1999), 92-7; 119-31.

every ousia) a n d universal at the same time. But these f e a t u r e s are mutually incompatible. In the c h a p t e r u n d e r consideration, the p r o b l e m is stated not in t e r m s of their m u t u a l incompatibility b u t by showing t h a t e i t h e r f e a t u r e as assigned to the Forms conflicts with the idea of their separate existence. First their b e i n g individual is shown (1086b20-37) to b e u n t e n a b l e , since (1) t h e r e will b e a plurality of subsistent ontic c o m p o n e n t s (the later issue of pluralitas formarum ) a n d (2) these c o m p o n e n t s will be, q u a individual, not knowable. T h e second item is worded thus: Met. M 10, 1086b32-37: Further, the elementary components (τά στοιχεία) will not be knowable, because they are not universal, while true knowledge is of universals. This is clear from epistemonic proofs (άποδείξων) and the procedure of defining (ορισμών). For there cannot be a real deduction that this triangle at hand is 2R, nor that this man here is an animal, unless every man an animal. If on the o t h e r h a n d ontic principles ( a m o n g which the supposedly t r a n s c e n d e n t Forms) are universal, t h e n e i t h e r the subsistent things (ούσίαι) that c o m e f r o m t h e m are also universal, o r t h e r e will be s o m e non-ousia (μή ούσία) prior to the t h e subsistent thing (πρότεpov ο ύ σ ί α ς ) . For a universal is n o t a subsistent thing (ούκ ούσία), while an elementary c o m p o n e n t or ontic principle is universal, a n d a thing's c o m p o n e n t or principle is prior to the thing whose c o m p o n e n t or principle it is (1086b37-1087a4). Of course, this p r o b l e m area deserves any p h i l o s o p h e r ' s attention, as was said in the o p e n i n g lines of the present chapter. Aristotle had already solved it in Book Z 100 by p o i n t i n g o u t that a thing's p r o p e r ontic principle or eidos is an individual dynamic principle i m m a n e n t in it, while its universality merely c o m e s down to the fact that the n a m e expressing this eidos is (in principle) universally assignable to o t h e r instances possessing a k i n d r e d (equally individual) instantiation. In the next few lines Aristotle applies what h e has p u t forward in 1086b20-1087a4 in o r d e r to a r g u e against Plato's d o c t r i n e of the separate T r a n s c e n d e n t Forms. H e points o u t (1087a4-9) that all the aforesaid difficulties are inevitable f o r those who m a k e the F o r m s (τάς ιδέας) b e c o m p o s e d of elementary c o m p o n e n t s a n d at the same time (τε ... καί) postulate that t h e r e is a single separate entity over

100

My sections 9.4; 9.6-9.7.

a n d above the subsistent things posssessing the same eidos (παρά τάς τό αύτό είδος έχουσας ούσίας). Such a p r o c e d u r e is b o u n d to lead to infinity, because there is n o t h i n g to stop the series. Aristotle concludes the c h a p t e r by showing that t h e r e is a way out of the aforesaid difficulties (1087al0-25) . 101 T h e thesis, h e argues, that any t r u e k n o w l e d g e is universal, so that the principles of t h e things there are (τάς τών όντων αρχάς) — the familiarity with which is at the very basis of g e n u i n e knowledge — must also be universal, a n d that at the same time 1 0 2 they are n o t separate entities, i n d e e d contains the greatest p r o b l e m a m o n g those m e n t i o n e d . Ross (II 466, ad loc.) well observed t h a t Aristotle m e a n s to say that this position presents the greatest difficulty, n o t only to the Platonists but to everyo n e , whatever his views a b o u t F o r m s may be (cf. 1086b15), a n d t h e r e f o r e proceeds to modify what h e has said (τό λεγόμενον), i.e. the first p a r t of the thesis, viz. that any knowledge is universal (which was explicitly stated at 1086b33). 1 0 3 T h e c o r r e c t u n d e r s t a n d i n g of this position will take away the p a r a d o x c o n t a i n e d in the second part of t h e thesis ( ' t h a t the ontic principles nevertheless are n o t separate entities'). T h e p a r a d o x disappears if the thesis is u n d e r s t o o d in the correct way (1087al4-15: "The thesis is true in o n e way b u t n o t in a n o t h e r " ) . T h e gist of the p r o b l e m is: can particular entities ('individuals') be truly known? In o r d e r to c o m e u p with the correct answer, we should make sure to i n t e r p r e t the term έπιστήμη in the right way. In the next few lines Aristotle tries to make it clear that there is a sense in which there is true knowledge of individuals, namely, in the sense in which the individual entity is known q u a actualization of the f e a t u r e (property) in question, which as such, i.e. taken formally, is universally applicable. It is c o m m o n d o c t r i n e in Aristotle that particulars are knowable a n d thus can be objects of e p i s t e m o n i c proof if they are taken q u a possessing t h e particular instantiation indicated by t h e universal term. 1 0 4 What is peculiar in Aristotle's present exposition is

101

Annas (1979), 190f. For καί expressing simultaneity see Liddell & Scott, s.v. Ill, 3. In our text it is important to take heed of the simultaneity because it may be u n e x p e c t e d ('and yet'). 103 And frequently elsewhere, e.g. APo. I 31, 87b31; An. II 5, 417b23; Met. B6, 1003a15; Κ 1, 1059b26; 2, 1060b20; M9, 1086b5; ENVI 6, 1140b31; X9, 1180b15. C o m p a r e the places where true knowledge and epistemonic proof are denied to perceptible things; Bonitz, Index, 20b25-52. 104 My sections 2.71; 9.71; 9.74; 10.4; 10.71-10.75. 102

only (/»ace Ross) 1 0 5 that it is p r e s e n t e d in terms of the contradistinction ' p o t e n t i a l / a c t u a l ' : Ibid. 10, 1 0 8 7 a l 5 - 1 8 : K n o w l e d g e , like k n o w i n g , is of two k i n d s , o n e p o t e n t i a l , o n e a c t u a l . Potentiality, w h i c h is, q u a m a t t e r - l i k e , u n i v e r s a l a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e , is < a c c o r d i n g l y > of w h a t is u n i v e r s a l a n d i n d e t e r m i n a t e ; b u t actuality, w h i c h is d e t e r m i n a t e , is of s o m e t h i n g d e t e r m i n a t e , a n d b e i n g a ' t h i s ' (τόδε τ ι ) it c o n c e r n s a ' t h i s ' (τοΰδέ τ ί ν ο ς ) .

Potential knowledge of s o m e t h i n g , I take it, must be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of the object (to be) known. Just as m a t t e r as such is indeterm i n a t e a n d d o e s n o t actually exist, b u t may t h r o u g h actualization arrive at b e i n g 'this' or 'that', so knowledge of a universal f o r m can only be actualized if t h e r e is an actual knowing of this f o r m qua enmattered (as a particular instantiation) in a particular. O n this view, actual knowledge is always of a particular instantiation of a universal (i.e. universally assignable) property. O n e should realize, time a n d again, that to Aristotle, t h e p h r a s e 'universal p r o p e r t y ' b e a r s o n particular p r o p e r t i e s viewed in their capacity of b e i n g (in principle) universally applicable. T h e significance of t h e pivotal n o t i o n of 'viewed in its universal applicability' is t h e n developed. It is a r g u e d that the universal applicability of s o m e t h i n g ' s ontic property is only coincidental to the thing's p r o p e r being, a n d to make this t h o r o u g h ly clear Aristotle gives e x a m p l e s of sensation a n d of a study of a particular syllable, Ά ' : Ibid. 1 0 8 7 a l 9 - 2 1 : It is o n l y 1 0 6 c o i n c i d e n t a l l y ( κ α τ ά σ υ μ β ε β η κ ό ς ) t h a t s i g h t sees u n i v e r s a l c o l o u r in t h e s e n s e t h a t ( ό τ ι ) 1 0 7 this c o l o u r w h i c h it sees is ' c o l o u r ' , a n d t h a t t h e g r a m m a r i a n ' s o b j e c t of study, viz. this A is a n A.

Finally, Aristotle (1087a21-23) p o i n t s o u t that, given that the ontic principles must be universal (read 'universally o c c u r r i n g ' ) , it is also 105

Ross (II, 466) thinks that the modification of the notion of έπιστήμη which is the core of the solution to the 'individual/universal' problem as presented here, is contrary to Aristotle's usual view, which is that actual knowledge is of universals. O n e should realize, however, that here, as elsewhere, it is argued that the actual knowledge of a particular concerns the thing's particular property taken as universally applicable to other instances possessing it. In o t h e r words, the particular is truly known qua satisfying the universal property. 10b p o r t h e omission of μόνον see Verdenius (1981), 348; 351. 107 This explicative sense of οτι (indicating not the reason for what precedes but its content, something like 'consisting in the fact that') should be regarded as a mixture of its two main senses, 'that', introducing an object clause (Liddell & Scott, s.v. A I-V) and the explicative 'because' (ibid., s.v. B2). C o m p a r e my discussion of οτι in section 2.7.

necessary that what comes f r o m t h e m should be necessary, as is also the case with epistemonic proofs. As elsewhere, Aristotle's m a n n e r of expressing his i n t e n t i o n is h e r e r a t h e r elliptical. T h e c o m p a r i s o n with άπόδειξις suggests that j u s t as in epistemonic proof the particular is b r o u g h t u p as satisfying the definiens of a universal property [x] or [y], b u t is still itself o n e of its particular instances, likewise t h e (logical or f o r m a l ) universality r e q u i r e d f o r t h e r e actually b e i n g g e n u i n e knowledge is only to be f o u n d in particular beings taken as e n m a t t e r i n g the universal f o r m by possessing its particular instantiation; in this sense, i n d e e d , t h e r e can b e talk of universal o n t i c principles. H e n c e Aristotle can c o n c l u d e his exposition by stating (1087a23-24) that t h e r e f o r e t h e r e n e e d n o t be any talk of a separate a n d subsistent entity, as far as such properties are c o n c e r n e d . Ross's o p p o s i n g (II, 466) t h e d o c t r i n e as e x p o u n d e d h e r e to Aristotle's usual view seems beside the mark. T h r o u g h o u t his works Aristotle argues that it is the particular instantiation in the particular (being, it is true, universally applicable) which, u n d e r the aspect of its formal poly-applicability, is the p r o p e r object of true knowledge. Ross refers to two clear passages in Aristotle w h e r e this position comes to the fore. In APo. 131, 87b28-29, the a u t h o r claims that even sensation is of the universal in the particular, i.e. in so far as the latter is taken according to its being 'such-and-such' (τοιόνδε) 1 0 8 , n o t in its capacity of j u s t b e i n g this particular (τόδε τι). Likewise, at An. II 12, 424a2324, it is said that in every case of sensation sense is affected by that which possesses colour, o r flavour, o r s o u n d , b u t this affection by such a t h i n g is n o t taken a c c o r d i n g to the (substantive) n a m e by which each such t h i n g is b r o u g h t u p (calling it e.g. * ' t h e g o l d e n ' or *'the c o l o u r e d ' ), b u t to its being of a certain kind (ή τοιονδί) a n d a c c o r d i n g to its (universally applicable) d e f i n i e n s ( κ α τ ά τ ό ν λόγον). 1 1 . 5 6 Can eternal things he composed of elementary parts ? In the examination of the general question w h e t h e r it is possible for eternal things (τά ά ί δ ι α ) to b e c o m p o s e d of e l e m e n t a r y parts, it is 108 Thjs term refers not to a coincidental quality, such as being wise or pale, but to a thing's (whether essential or accidental) quiddity which causes it be of suchand-such a nature; e.g. at Pol. I 7, 1255b20-22: "The master is called a master [...] because he is of a certain kind (τω τοιόνδ' είναι), and the same applies to the slave and the freeman". Compare the use of ποιόν τι to characterize the δευτέρα ούσία at Cat. 5, 3b 15.

first a r g u e d (N2, 1088b14-28) that if this is the case they will contain (εξει) 1 0 9 matter, a n d that things c o n t a i n i n g material elements c a n n o t b e e t e r n a l , since what can fail to exist is n o t e t e r n a l ; a n d so n o eternal ούσία can have elementary parts present in it. T h e chief o n e a m o n g the many reasons why the Platonists are led astray is t h e i r o l d - f a s h i o n e d way of p u t t i n g t h e p r o b l e m . T h e y t h o u g h t they h a d to prove (against P a r m e n i d e s ) that n o t merely Being Itself is, but also what is n o t is (τό μή öv οτι έστιν); for only in this way, i.e. f r o m b e i n g a n d s o m e t h i n g else, would it be possible, they t h o u g h t , f o r t h e r e to b e a plurality of t h i n g s (1088b351089a6). 1 1 0 Next Aristotle goes on to show that the Platonists' misconceptions all go back to a categorial mistake, so to speak. First of all, 'what is' (τό öv) has m a n y senses: s o m e t i m e s it m e a n s subsistent entity (ούσίαν); sometimes s o m e t h i n g in a qualitative or quantitative m o d e of being; a n d at o t h e r times obviously (δή) s o m e t h i n g a c c o r d i n g to a n o t h e r m o d e of categorial b e i n g (τάς ά λ λ α ς δή κατηγορίας). T h e issue is now addressed f r o m the semantic point of view: Met. Ν 2, 1089a9-19: So unless what-is-not will be, what kind of one will the things there are altogether be? Will it make up a totality of the subsistent beings, or of the attributive modes of being, and so on? Or will they all together be one, i.e. the 'this' and the 'such-and-such' and what is of such-and-such a magnitude or number (τό τόδε και τό τοιόνδε καί τό τοσόνδε), and so on for the remaining modes of categorial being which signify some one mode of being? 111 But it is absurd, or rather impossible that the coming into play of one single kind of thing (μίαν φύσιν τινά γενομένην) should be responsible for the fact that of what is, one thing is a 'this', another a 'such-and-such' thing, another a 'so much', another a 'there-and-there' thing. Further, what kind of not-being plus being do the things there are come from? 'Notbeing' too has many senses, because 'being' has: 'not being a man' means not being this type of subsistent being (τό μή είναι τοδί); 'not being straight' not being of this quality (τοιονδί); and 'not being three cubits long' not being of this size (τοσονδί). So from what kind of being plus not-being do the things there are come to be many? He [Plato] m e a n s f a l s e h o o d a n d that kind of thing by 'what is n o t ' , Aristotle c o n t i n u e s , f r o m which in c o m b i n a t i o n with b e i n g things

109

See my note 97, p. 346. Cf. εσεσθαι at 1089a2 and 6. Ross (ad loc.) may be right that Aristotle has Plato's Sophist in mind, e.g. 237A and 256E; De Rijk (1986), 82-92; 110-7; 164-82; 206-12; 302-5. 111 Being signified by terms transgressing the borderlines between the categories are, qua coincidental unities, ruled out. 110

b e c o m e many. T h a t is why it used to b e said that we are f o r c e d to start f r o m s o m e t h i n g false ( ' i n a c c u r a t e ' ) , like g e o m e t e r s when they draw a line in the sand a n d assume it to be a foot long while it is n o t a f o o t long. But this is a m i s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . G e o m e t e r s d o n o t m a k e false a s s u m p t i o n s in t h e i r r e a s o n i n g s (1089a20-25). Cleary aptly refers 1 1 2 to t h e so-called 'ecthesis' of a E u c l i d e a n t h e o r e m . For instance, the g e o m e t e r says "Let ABC b e a right-angled triangle", a n d t h e n seems to use this d i a g r a m to prove s o m e a t t r i b u t e of ABC, although the diagram as it actually stands may n o t have b e e n perfectly right-angled. However, it is the universal right-angled triangle — t h e f o r m a l instantiation of '2R-ness', t h a t is — which is the geom e t e r ' s p r o p e r object. T h u s the p r o o f s validity d o e s n o t d e p e n d u p o n t h e c o r r e c t n e s s of t h e d i a g r a m drawn in t h e sand (which is b o u n d to r e p r e s e n t the universal right-angled triangle quite inadequately). And this m e a n s that for f r a m i n g s o u n d reasoning o n e does n o t n e e d the a s s u m p t i o n of any ' n o n - b e i n g ' ( ' f a l s e h o o d ' ) . W h e n claiming (1089a24-25) that g e o m e t e r s d o not use false assumptions as conclusive starting-points, "for t h e f i g u r e (drawn in the sand) is e x t r a n e o u s to the reasoning", Aristotle m e a n s to say that it is n o t the figure as materialized in the sand or otherwise which serves as a logical assumption, b u t that which, however inadequately, is r e p r e s e n t e d by it. 113 In a similar vein, Aristotle rejects n o n - b e i n g taken as Platonic f a l s e h o o d as c o n t r i b u t i n g to t h e plurality of things. Rather, n o n b e i n g should be taken in terms of 'potentiality', which is o n e of the many senses in which we may speak of 'non-being': 1 1 4 Met. Ν 2, 1089a25-31: And it is not this kind of non-being from which the things-there-are come into being or pass away into. Since nonbeing in its different cases has as many senses as there are categorial modes of being, and in addition to these, it is used to stand for what is stated as false (τό ώς ψεΰδος λέγεται μή öv), and also for what is potential, it is from this last that coming to be takes place. A man

112

(1995), 387; cf. Ross II, 476. Cf. APr. I 41, 49b33-50a4, where it is likewise said that the geometer does not use the diagrams in the sense that h e reasons f r o m them. Similarly at APo. I 10, 76b39-77a3, Aristotle claims that the geometer does not draw any conclusion from the fact that the particular line of which he himself is speaking is such-and-such, but f r o m what his diagrams disclose (τά δια τούτων δηλούμενα). I c a n n o t see why Annas can speak (1979, 203) of the premiss as a 'postulate': "What the geometer is doing is to set u p an initial postulate, and the proof is conditional on this, but does not itself assert the truth of the postulate". Cf. Plato, Rep. VI, 510D. 114 Compare Met. Ε 4. 113

c o m e s to b e f r o m w h a t is n o t m a n b u t is p o t e n t i a l l y m a n , a n d p a l e c o m e s to b e f r o m w h a t is n o t p a l e b u t is p o t e n t i a l l y p a l e ; a n d in a similar way w h e t h e r it c o n c e r n s o n e t h i n g o r a plurality of t h i n g s .

In the subsequent lines (1089a31-1090a2) Aristotle proceeds to argue that the Platonists i n t r o d u c e the wrong principles of plurality because they take mathematical entities, such as n u m b e r s , planes, a n d bodies, as the subsistent entities that are multiplied by a principle, viz. the I n f i n i t e Dyad or t h e G r e a t a n d Small, which, it s h o u l d b e well n o t i c e d , is clearly c o n f i n e d to o n e c a t e g o r i a l m o d e of b e i n g , Quantity. 1 1 5

115 Cleary (1995), 387-9. At Met. Ν 2, 1089b20-32, Aristotle discusses the issue of individual non-substantial instantiations in a polemic with Platonism.

CHAPTER TWELVE

T H E UNITY O F ARISTOTLE'S T H O U G H T : T H E O T H E R WORKS

12.1

Status quaestionis

It was n o t until a b o u t 25 years ago that, after a long period of neglect, the zoological treatises, 1 particularly HA, PA, a n d GA were taken into serious c o n s i d e r a t i o n to test t h e o r i e s a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of basic tenets of Aristotelian t h o u g h t . T h e scholarly o p i n i o n s a b o u t the relationship between, say, Aristotle's logic a n d metaphysics on the o n e h a n d , a n d the works on natural philosophy a n d biology on the other, seem to be ultimately based on the i n t e r p r e t e r ' s p o i n t of view regarding the idea of unity of Aristotelian t h o u g h t . First a n d f o r e m o s t this idea is rejected by the developmentalists, who assume d i f f e r e n t stages of doctrinal d e v e l o p m e n t in Aristotle, even including radical changes a n d inconsistencies. 2 Besides this, t h e r e are scholars, w h e t h e r or n o t in the wake of the d e v e l o p m e n t m o v e m e n t , who see serious conflicts between the a c c o u n t of scientific explanation a n d inquiry described in the Posterior Analytics a n d practised in the Metaphysics a n d those carried out in the zoological treatises; 3 they ascribed the conflicts to t h e diversity of t h e a u t h o r ' s d i s p a r a t e interests in t h e respective g r o u p s of works. 4 Still others, a m o n g w h o m some of the Greek comm e n t a t o r s , tried to force a syllogistic structure u p o n texts o c c u r r i n g elsewhere in the Corpus.5 Many others, especially to b e f o u n d a m o n g 1

This label is h e r e used loosely. Of course, o n e should refrain f r o m using present-day categories for these works, classifying the HA as 'natural history', PA as 'comparative anatomy', and GA as 'embriology'. Not even the terms 'biological' or 'zoological' are f o u n d in Aristotle, who speaks of the general study of nature (ή φυσική), and within it, the study of plants, or of animals, and so on. All these works, and the Physics, as well as the De Anima and the ethical treatises, share the c o m m o n charasteristic of all of Aristotle's works: they are philosophy. 2 My sections 1.11 and 1.12. 3 Lloyd (1996, 7) aptly characterizes this problem as 'a hoary old chestnut'. 4 E.g. Patzig (1979, 37) is of the o p i n i o n that Aristotle's writings were n o t written as attempts to reach the ideal of a deductive science as defined in the Posterior Analytics. For that matter, Patzig seems to share the usual over-estimation of the role of prioristic syllogistics in the doctrine of the Posterior Analytics. My section 2.75. 5 For the inadequacy of such attempts see my sections 2.73-2.75.

those specializing o n Aristotle's works on living n a t u r e , have e n e r getically a r g u e d for the view that those works p r e s e n t rich material f o r testing o u r theories a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Aristotle's t h o u g h t , a n d even that many a (supposedly) obscure or paradoxical point in his lore on m a t t e r s of metaphysics, p h i l o s o p h y of science, a n d psychology can be cleared u p by studying his zoological works. 6 T h e initial position Barnes was holding 7 with r e f e r e n c e to what h e called "a classical p r o b l e m in Aristotelian exegesis" was to the effect that άπόδειξις is n o t a m e t h o d of research but only serves educational purposes: it offers a formal m o d e l n o t for acquiring knowledge, b u t for p r e s e n t i n g a n d imparting knowledge already acquired (cf. Patzig 1979, 37). T h u s o u r original p r o b l e m reduces to the intriguing question why Aristotle s h o u l d lay so m u c h e m p h a s i s on a pedagogicdidactic m e t h o d without paying any attention to what the pedagogic i n t e n t i o n s are all a b o u t . 8 Later on, Barnes convincingly argued 9 (in the wake of Friedrich Solmsen) for the view that Posterior Analytics was initially i n n o c e n t of syllogistics as formally elaborated in Prior Analytics, which was t h e n g r a f t e d on to it after its discovery. Even so, this can hardly affect the issue of t h e r e b e i n g or not b e i n g substantial affinities between the lore of the Posterior Analytics a n d the scientific practice of the zoological treatises, since the prioristic syllogistics is by n o m e a n s representative of Aristotle's epistemonic procedure. 1 0 T h r e e decades of lively o n g o i n g d e b a t e have p r o d u c e d m o r e than r e a s o n a b l e e v i d e n c e f o r setting a p a r t Aristotle's logic a n d metaphysics f r o m his zoological works in matters of practical p r o c e d u r e . It would be a mistake, however, to r e a d into t h e m f u n d a m e n t a l l y disparate a p p r o a c h e s on Aristotle's part, or quite a d i f f e r e n t strategy of a r g u m e n t , let a l o n e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s o r any radical d o c t r i n a l p e r m u t a t i o n s . C o n f i n i n g myself to some of the chief publications on this score, Balme, Pellegrin, Gotthelf, a n d L e n n o x have convincingly shown b o t h t e r m i n o l o g i c a l (such as t h e use of the logico6

Detel (1993, 263-90) presents a well-documented overview of leading interpretations of the purport of the Posterior Analytics. ' In Phronesis 14 (1969). For anticipation by others see Guthrie VI, 170, n . l , and Barnes's sketch (1981, 58f). Lloyd (1996, 7-37) offers a well-balanced discussion of the subject. 8 For p e r t i n e n t criticism of Barnes's solution to the problem see Guthrie VI, 170ff.; cf. Lennox (1987), 118. 9 Cf. Lennox (1987), 118; Gotthelf (1987), 195. 10 Lear (1980); my sections 2.72-2.76. Cf. Gotthelf (1987), 194-7, who rightly questions the idea that the syllogistic form should be explicit for there to be a 'demonstrative' argument.

metaphysical tools γένος a n d είδος etc.) 1 1 a n d doctrinal a g r e e m e n t a n d concordance. 1 2 T h e array of d i f f e r e n t views held by d i f f e r e n t c o m m e n t a t o r s is neit h e r surprising n o r in itself a m a t t e r of c o n c e r n . But t h e r e is quite a lot of truth in Lloyd's c o m p l a i n t 1 3 that the c u r r e n t situation in some areas of t h e study of zoology b o r d e r s o n a state of interpretative anarchy. It seems to be de rigueur in this field, as h e puts it, n o t j u s t to revise o p i n i o n s m a i n t a i n e d some time ago, b u t to d o so with regard to positions published n o m o r e than a c o u p l e of years back — even, at t h e limit, of positions in works as yet u n p u b l i s h e d b u t f o r t h c o m i n g . 1 4 Flexibility, tentativeness, anti-dogmatism are all laudable qualities, h e continues; b u t w h e n , as so o f t e n in this area at the present time, we are faced with a bewildering variety of hypotheses, the u r g e n t n e e d is to spell out a n d explore their implications. 1 5 11

Balme 1987a; 1987b; Pellegrin 1982; 1985; 1987; Gotthelf 1985a; 1987; Lennox 1987; 1990; 1991; cf. Boylan (1983), 50-9. 12 Balme 1987c and 1990; Pellegrin 1982; 1985; 1987; Gotthelf 1985a; 1987a; Lennox 1985, 1987; 1990; 1991. Also Freeland (1990); Frede 1990; Cooper 1990. T h e various aspects of the discussions are critically assessed in Lloyd (1996), 8ff. Quite a different view is found in Boylan (1983), whose book is meant for readers who want to understand and evaluate Aristotle's philosophy of biology and his actual biological investigations. Boylan concentrates his theoretical discussion on what he calls the teleological explanation, incorporating the formal and final causes, and the mechanical explanation, covering material and efficient causes. They are developed under the broad concept of Necessity (87-139). Boylan deals (18-29) with the 'concordance problem' (Lloyd's 'hoary old chestnut') in terms of Aristotle's 'theory of critical empiricism', and in effect confines his attention to the significance of Aristotle as a philosopher of biology and as a biologist, at the expense of the question of whether Aristotle's philosophical and 'scientific' thought from the viewpoint of methodology is consistent. 13 G.E.R. Lloyd (1990), 7; 9. 14 Lloyd in particular has David Balme in mind, on questions of authenticity (at Balme 1987a, p. 16), and on teleology (at Balme in Gotthelf & Lennox 1987, 285, η 33, in his 'Teleology and Necessity", ibid. , 275-90); also the different formulations used in different versions of Balme's influential contribution in Mansion (1961, 195-212: "Aristode's use of differentiae in zoology"); see Lloyd (1990), 9, n. 4. 15 I fully agree with Lloyd's criticism of Pellegrin's 'moriology' ("The μόρια constitute the cardinal level of Aristotelian biology", and it is to μόρια alone that the correct division of γένος-είδος can be applied), but consider his arguments against Balme's view of the individual immanent form as not to the point. Lloyd shares with the 'universalists' the common confusion of the logical and ontological domains (cf. Lennox's confounding of ontological 'form' with logical 'species' in 1985, 89). In point of fact, to Aristotle, the mind 'universalizes' the individual immanent forms (εϊδη), making them 'species', without implying that the logical 'universals' should as such be found in the real world, the decisive thing merely being that to state their similarity is considered by him to have what the Medievals called a ' f u n d a m e n t u m in re'. Note that no things are as such similar: our mind states their similarity by comparing them one with another. The only (but utterly

A similar critical a t t i t u d e is r e q u i r e d as far as s o m e chief persuasions cherished by those specializing o n the zoological works are c o n c e r n e d . A persistent idea is that we n e e d the study of these works to clear u p obscure or even (supposedly) paradoxical issues f o u n d in Aristotle's o t h e r works. This is overstating the value of the zoological works, a n d p e r h a p s also betrays an i n a d e q u a t e c o m p e t e n c e in the field of logic a n d metaphysics on the part of these scholars, 1 6 a n d at most testifies to the laudable a t t e m p t to rehabilitate Aristotle as a natural historian. 1 7 In a similar vein, when they argue for his offering a g e n u i n e επιστήμη of animals, full of α π ο δ ε ί ξ ε ι ς , the s t u d e n t s of 'Aristotle the natural historian' too readily use labels such as 'axiomatic structure' f o r the theoretical u n d e r p i n n i n g s of these works. 1 8 O n e should be aware that pace Barnes 1 9 m o d e r n labels like this o n e are also entirely o u t the of question when it comes to characterizing the lore of the Posterior Analytics. T h e initial r e d u c t i o n of ' t h e classical p r o b l e m in Aristotelian exegesis' to t h e p r o b l e m c o n c e r n i n g t h e ( s u p p o s e d ) d o c t r i n a l or terminological a r g u m e n t a t i v e divergencies between t h e 'scientific works' a n d the Posterior Analytics u n d u l y b u r d e n e d the controversy by d i s r e g a r d i n g Aristotle's strategy of a r g u m e n t as e x p o u n d e d in the Topics, including e.g. epagogical a r g u m e n t s (έπακτικοί λόγοι). Just as posterioristic proof (basically resting on the ^wa-procedure) must n o t be identified with prioristic syllogistics, so to Aristotle, proof is of a larger scale t h a n e p i s t e m o n i c p r o o f . 2 0 H e n c e t h e ins a n d outs of A r i s t o t l e ' s strategy of exegesis a n d a r g u m e n t call f o r f u r t h e r examination. 2 1 basic) difference f r o m , say, the Kantians is that to realists like Aristotle (and the Medievals), the mind states similarities, but is not by itself constitutive of them, because the logical move of stating the similarities is supposed to find support in the real individuals' being so-and-so. Now for the logical p r o c e d u r e of proof the aspects of universal applicability of the species suffice. 16 Balme (1987a, 20), for instance, wrongly thinks that only in HA does t h e paradoxes of Met. Z, of the 'snub nose', and of the indefinable individual come to collapse. T h e semantic 'snub nose' issue, however, becomes perfectly clear in the context of the Metaphysics. 17 See Balme's eloquent peroration (1987a, 20): "It may be that, if this picture of Aristotle is right, we lose a clumsy natural historian and a confused encyclopedist; but we gain a greater philosopher of living nature". 18 E.g. Gotthelf & Lennox (1987), 66; 68; Gotthelf (1987a), 169; 179; 194. 19 Barnes (1971), Introd., XI; XVI; also in his Aristotle (Oxford 1982), 37-9. 20 My sections 2.71-2.75 and 2.54-2.55; for elenctical a r g u m e n t see my section 7.6. 21 T h e next section can happily draw on the bulk of special studies on the subject made in the last few decades.

12.2

The gamut of arguments used in the works on living nature

In a well-known passage in the last c h a p t e r of PA I (5, 645a 1-36), Aristotle r e c o m m e n d s the study of plants a n d animals as an έπιστήμη that in c e r t i t u d e a n d in fullness has an advantage over the study of the heavens. It d o e s n o t search things at r a n d o m , b u t what is for s o m e t h i n g ' s sake (τό ου ένεκα), a n d thus offers an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of final causes. Moreover, it deals with the unity of matter a n d f o r m in whole substances (τής ολης ούσίας) , 22 In his study on first principles in PA (1987a), Gotthelf convincingly shows that such principles are at t h e basis of that work's c o m p l e x explanatory structure. H e particularly refers to the above-mentioned passage of I 5. T h e enterprise is i n t r o d u c e d a n d characterized in the o p e n i n g lines of I 1 as έπιστήμη (639a3); a n d a l t h o u g h the m o d e of proof c a n n o t be that used by the theoretical disciplines, it embraces a knowledge of causes that is not inferior to that obtained in the strictly theoretical disciplines (639b21-640a9, c o m m e n t e d u p o n by Gotthelf (197f.). H e is quite right (194-7) in questioning the n e e d of explicit syllogistic f o r m s of a r g u m e n t , b u t fails to see that the p r o p e r device of epistemonic proof is the ^wo-procedure of Posterior Analytics. Looking for the use of the basic epistemonic p r o c e d u r e in the socalled 'scientific works', a n d thus testing Aristotle's achievements in that field of research, is easily j e o p a r d i z e d by two misconceptions: (a) in that o n e fails to recognize the special n a t u r e of Aristotle's scientific inquiry as practised in the zoological works, viz. that of 'fact-finding' par excellence·,23 a n d (b) by taking t h e ^«a-procedure (of APo. I) in isolation f r o m the extensive t r e a t m e n t (in APo. II) of d e f i n i n g the object u n d e r demonstration. 2 4 Lloyd (1987, 53-5) aptly draws o u r attention to Aristotle's caution in his evaluations of all t h e s e c o n d a r y e v i d e n c e drawn f r o m the

22 Boylan (1983, 41-50) presents an assessment of this passage in the framework of what he calls (41) "the most important repository of methodological theory for Aristotle's biology". Cf. Lloyd (1996), 28-33. 23 Lloyd (1987, 53) rightly makes mention of the way in which the data were collected: "It is abundantly clear from repeated references in the text that h e and his helpers consulted hunters, fishermen, horse-rearers, pig-breeders, bee-keepers, eel-breeders, doctors, veterinary surgeons, midwives, a n d many o t h e r s with specialized knowledge of animals. But a second major source of information is what he has read, ranging from H o m e r and other poets, through Ctesias and Herodotus to many of the Hippocratic authors". 24 My sections 6.51-6.59.

diverse specialists, or literature. 2 5 T h e chief way in which d i f f e r e n t ( p o p u l a r or alternatively scholarly) views are evaluated by Aristotle is t h e use of ' i n d i c a t i o n s ' ( τ ε κ μ ή ρ ι α ) . At APr. II 27, 70b2-3 the very word τεκμήριον provides the characterization of the ' g e n u i n e middle' r e q u i r e d f o r t h e r e to be a g e n u i n e p r o o f (my section 2.76). N o d o u b t , in the zoological works the word is used in a similar b r o a d sense in which άπόδειξις a n d επιστήμη are applied to proofs that are not strictly epistemonic (the same type of proofs is r e f e r r e d to in the passage f r o m PA I q u o t e d above); 2 6 but the 'indications' play a pivotal role in the strategy of a r g u m e n t f o u n d in the scientific treatises. In general, the i n f l u e n c e of Aristotle's theoretical p r e o c c u p a t i o n s a n d p r e c o n c e p t i o n s on his observational work is unmistakable, n o t only a p r o p o s the questions h e asked, b u t also the results h e arrives at. 2 7 Lloyd (58) rightly emphasizes that as in the physical treatises, so too in his biology, Aristotle o f t e n constructs a g e n e r a l theory largely by e x t r a p o l a t i o n f r o m a slight ( a n d s o m e t i m e s insufficiently secure) empirical f o u n d a t i o n . T h a t is w h e r e n o t only the topical character of his way of a r g u m e n t comes to the fore, b u t also, in a way, the basic intention of winning his case against the ancients. 2 8 This by n o means justifies saying that on this topical level t h e a r g u m e n t s are those of what Bolton (1990, 188ff.) has labelled 'gymnastic dialectic', which is n o t c o n c e r n e d with the truth of e i t h e r the premisses or the conclusions of a r g u m e n t s . Rather, t h e a r g u m e n t s are a f o r m of serious 25 Lloyd refers to GA III 5, 756a33; 756b3-8; HA I 15, 493b14-16; V 19, 552b1517; VI 11, 566a6-8; 18, 573al3-14; 20, 574bl6-17; 31, 579b2-4; 35, 580a19-22; VIII 12, 597a32-bl; IX 28, 606a8; PA III 10, 673al0-31. Cf. Lloyd (1979), 200-25. 26 C o m p a r e its use in rhetoric; Rhet. I 2, 1357b4-7; 3, 1359a7; II 25, 1402b141403a16. Lloyd (1996, 8-35) has a pertinent discussion of the 'topic of d e m o n stration' throughout the Corpus, and makes it clear that we have every reason to be wary of talking of the theory and the practice of demonstration, as if there were just the o n e of each. Unfortunately enough, Lloyd fails, as do others as well, to put the syllogism (of whatever type or stringency) in the right perspective of merely being the (highly artificial) formal p a t t e r n e x p a n d i n g the c o m m o n ' p r o o f by ^Mapropositions' (my section 2.75). Incidentally, the c o m m o n r e n d e r i n g ' p r o o f is inappropriate, τεκμήρια being of an instrumental nature, just as 'middles' are. 27 Lloyd (1987), 56. 28 In a similar flavour of competitiveness, I take it, o n e should put Aristotle's remarkable f r a m e of mind as a researcher (observed by Lloyd 1987, 62) which comes about where Aristotle speaks (e.g. at Resp. 1, 470b8-9) about other writers' inexperience of internal anatomy, or charges (as in GA II 8, 747b5-6; 748a8-9; IV1, 765b4-5) them with neglecting obvious evidence, or (as in PA IV 2, 676b33ff.; GA III 5, 756a2ff.; 6, 756b16ff; V8, 788b9-20) j u m p i n g to conclusions on inadequate evidence, or (as in GA IV1, 765a25-29) merely speculating on the result of a test, without actually executing it. In fact, similar criticisms could, on occasion, be made of Aristotle himself.

dialectic — a m o n g which so-called 'peirastic logic', which is c o n c e r n e d with truth. 2 9 T a k e , f o r instance, t h e way in which at GA I 17-18 t h e f o u r ' i n d i c a t i o n s ' f o r t h e so-called p a n g e n e s i s view that t h e s e m e n (τό σπέρμα) comes f r o m each a n d every part of the body (721b13-722a1) are b a l a n c e d against those s u p p o r t i n g t h e o p p o s i t e view (722a1726a25). 3 0 Part of t h e c o u n t e r - b a l a n c i n g a r g u m e n t is t h e s t a t e m e n t "that t h e s t a r t i n g p o i n t ( ά ρ χ ή ) of this investigation t o o is to u n d e r s t a n d what s e m e n is, for t h e n it will be easier to inquire into its specific f u n c t i o n s (τών έργων) a n d the p h e n o m e n a c o n n e c t e d with it" ( 7 2 4 a l 4 - l 7 ) . T o this e n d , a n o m i n a l d e f i n i t i o n is p u t forward: "The ambition of s e m e n is to be of such a n a t u r e that f r o m it as their origin c o m e into b e i n g those things which are naturally f o r m e d , n o t in the sense that there is any a g e n t which makes t h e m f r o m it, such as m a n ; ; for p r o c e e d s f r o m it simply b e c a u s e it is s e m e n " ( 7 2 4 a l 7 - 2 0 ) . Next, t h e type of causality is established m o r e precisely by scrutinizing (724a20-b19) the d i f f e r e n t senses of the p h r a s e ' a n y t h i n g p r o c e e d s f r o m s o m e t h i n g else'. This results in the s t a t e m e n t (724bl4-19) that "semen is that which has in it t h e primary f e a t u r e s (τάς α ρ χ ά ς ) of the two copulating partners, b e i n g t h e p r i m a r y m i x t u r e arising f r o m the u n i o n of m a l e a n d female, be it a foetus or an ovum; for these already have in t h e m that which p r o c e e d s f r o m both". O n c e again, the q u e s t i o n what t h e p r i m a r y n a t u r e of s e m e n is m u s t b e taken u p (724b21ff.). An extensive discussion a b o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s between 'waste-product' ( σ ύ ν τ η γ μ α ) a n d s e c r e t i o n or excretion (περίττωμα) results in t h e rejection of the o p i n i o n of the ancients (e.g. Hippocrates) that s e m e n is a waste-product. T h e resulting p h e n o m e n a (τά σ υ μ β α ί ν ο ν τ α ) are evidence that s e m e n is secretion (725b4ff.). T h e conclusion can b e drawn f r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g discussion (726a26-27) that semen is a secretion of useful n u t r i m e n t , a n d this in its last stage (τροφής καί τής έσχάτης). In the next c h a p t e r (I 19) the differences between male a n d female s e m e n are e x a m i n e d , which leads to the conclusion (727b31-33) that t h e f e m a l e contrib u t e s the material f o r g e n e r a t i o n , a n d that this is in the s t r u c t u r e

29

Top. VIII. For o n e I d o not agree with Bolton's opposing (199ff.; 234ff.) peirastic arguments to ordinary dialectical arguments in terms of their different amounts of plausibility or truthworthiness. 30 For criticism of details of Aristotle's arguments see Lloyd (1987), 59-62, and also the comments in Bolton (1987), 155-64.

(σύστασις) of the c a t a m e n i a , a n d that they are a secretion, their seminal c h a r a c t e r consisting in their c o n t a i n i n g the e l e m e n t the female contributes to generation. C h a p t e r 20 t h e n goes o n to qualify this conclusion, a n d comes to the s t a t e m e n t (729a20-22) that, properly speaking, the female does n o t c o n t r i b u t e semen to g e n e r a t i o n , but does c o n t r i b u t e something, to wit t h e s t r u c t u r e (σύστασις) of t h e c a t a m e n i a . This conclusion, Aristotle remarks (a23-24), is n o t only g a t h e r e d f r o m what has b e e n said, b u t also f r o m e x a m i n i n g things f r o m the universal point of view (κατά τόν λόγον καθόλου σκοπουμένοις). 3 1 T h e theoretical a r g u m e n t is based on the formal distinction between 'that which generates' a n d ' t h a t f r o m which is g e n e r a t e d ' (τό γεννών καί εξ ου), b o t h b e i n g indispensable (a23-24). But even if they f o r m s o m e t h i n g o n e , they must differ specifically (τώ γε εϊδει διαφέρειν) — by the fact, that is, that their quiddity is distinct (καί τώ τόν λόγον αυτών είναι ετερον). A n d in those animals that have these powers separate in two sexes (like h u m a n beings) the body a n d n a t u r e of the active a n d the passive must also differ. In the final conclusion, the semantic qua-proc e d u r e is applied in o r d e r to clarify the p r o p e r d i f f e r e n c e between the male a n d the female seminal c o n t r i b u t i o n s to generation, a n d by the same token that between male a n d female semen: GA I 20, 729a28-33: Given, then, that the male (τό άρρεν) is taken for the effective and active, and the female qua female (τό θήλυ ή θήλυ) for the passive, it follows that what the female will contribute to the male's engendering material (του άρρενος γονήν) is not engendering material but matter (ού γονήν άλλ' ϋλην). This also appears to tally with qua s o m e t h i n g w h i c h is n o t ' (ή μή öv).

T h e earlier thinkers' mistake of supposing that absolutely n o t h i n g can c o m e to be is d u e to their i g n o r i n g the aforesaid distinction. T h u s Aristotle's position (191bl3-15) is: n o t h i n g comes to be simply (άπλώς) out of what is not, but things come to be in a way (πώς) out of what is not, viz. by coincidence (κατά συμβεβηκός), of attributes, that is. H e repeats (191b25-26): "We have already said what it m e a n s

to say that something comes to be out of what is not: it m e a n s o u t of what is n o t qua s o m e t h i n g which is not (ή μή öv)". Further, there is n o violation of the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). In a similar vein, the notions of matter a n d privation (στέρησις) are treated (Phys. I 9) in terms of relational m o d e s of being. In any particular case of coming-to-be, what is called the matter is a particular in so far as , although it does not actually possess a certain form, it is capable of a d o p t i n g it, while the same particular is entitled to the term 'privation' in so far as it is devoid of this form. W h e n we say that coming-to-be proceeds f r o m privation, we do not mean to say that [y] p r o c e e d s f r o m some non-existent [x], but merely that while actually being [x] it is only potentially [y]. It is precisely [x]'s not-being-[y] that is b r o u g h t into focus w h e n e v e r a process of coming-to-be or c h a n g e is u n d e r consideration. 1 0 3 T h u s unlike the traditional notion ' p r i m e matter' (in either version) as an utterly i n d e t e r m i n a t e ' o u t of which', Aristotle's c o n c e p t i o n of m a t t e r in the sense a r g u e d for is fully in keeping with his view of potentiality (esp. in Met. Θ 7). Moreover, Aristotle's analysis of coming-to-be as presented in Phys. I 7 makes it clear that (1) ϋποκεΐσθαι, instead of indicating the logical subject of predication, is always used to stand for 'to underly something to yield it the opportunity of being' or 'to be the substrate to an attributive m o d e of being'; (2) the relationship (implied by the terms ΰποκεΐσθαι a n d ΰποκείμενον) between what u n d e r l i e s a n d what is supported should be taken in terms of relational m o d e s of being; a n d (3) there is a formal distinction between what is without being something else (ούχ ετερόν τι öv), namely substance or subsistent being, a n d that which merely is (e.g. paleness) owing to s o m e t h i n g subsiste n t (e.g. Socrates). 1 0 4 It is of special interest to notice that in Aristotle's view of comingto-be (as in 'an u n e d u c a t e d m a n b e c o m e s e d u c a t e d ' ) o n e a n d the same object (say, the m a n , Callias) is r e f e r r e d to by two d i f f e r e n t n a m e s ( ' m a n ' a n d ' u n e d u c a t e d ' ) ; whereas it persists in the m o d e of being signified by o n e n a m e ( ' m a n ' ) , it disappears in the m o d e of being signified by the o t h e r ( ' u n e d u c a t e d ' ) . O n c e more, what counts is accurate focalization a n d categorization: Ibid. I 7, 189b32-190a13: W h e n we say ' o n e t h i n g c o m e s to b e o u t of a n o t h e r ' (γίνεσθοα έ ξ ά λ λ ο υ άλλο) o r ' s o m e t h i n g c o m e s to b e o u t of 103

Phys. Ill 1, 201a9-15; 201a27-34; Met. Ζ 3, 1029a20-23; Θ 10, 1048b37-1049a3; Λ 10, 1075b 1-6; Ν 2, 1089a26-31; Cael. III 2,302a3-9; GCI 7, 324b18. 104 Bemelmans, 122-33; my sections 2.17 and 4.23.

s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t ' ( έ ξ ε τ έ ρ ο υ έ τ ε ρ ο ν ) , we m a y b e t a l k i n g e i t h e r a b o u t w h a t is s i m p l e ( τ ά ά π λ α ) o r a b o u t w h a t is c o m p o u n d (τά σ υ γ κ ε ί μ ε ν α ) . I m e a n t h a t we c a n say: 'it is t h e case ( έ σ τ ι ) 1 0 5 t h a t a m a n b e c o m e s e d u c a t e d ' , a n d also ' w h a t is n o n - e d u c a t e d b e c o m e s educated', or 'the non-educated m a n b e c o m e s an educated m a n ' . I i n d i c a t e t h e m a n involved in t h e p r o c e s s o f b e c o m i n g , a n d t h e state of b e i n g u n e d u c a t e d , a n d also w h a t c o m e s a b o u t , n a m e l y t h e state of b e i n g e d u c a t e d , with ' t h e s i m p l e ' ( ά π λ ο ύ ν ) . W h e n we say ' t h e n o n educated m a n becomes an educated m a n ' , both that which comes a b o u t a n d w h a t is involved in b e c o m i n g a r e a c o m p o u n d (συγκείμεν ο ν ) . 1 0 0 N o w in s o m e of t h e s e cases we say, n o t j u s t ' t h i s c o m e s to b e ' , b u t ' t h i s c o m e s t o b e o u t of this' (e.g. t h e e d u c a t e d o u t of t h e n o n e d u c a t e d ) . B u t this m a n n e r of e x p r e s s i o n is n o t u s e d in all cases (τό δ ' ού λ έ γ ε τ α ι έπί π ά ν τ ω ν ) : we d o n o t say ' t h e e d u c a t e d c a m e to b e o u t of a m a n ' , b u t 'a m a n b e c a m e e d u c a t e d ' . O f t h e s i m p l e c o m i n g - t o - b e t h i n g s we s p e a k of c o m i n g - t o - b e o n e r e m a i n s in t h e p r o c e s s , a n d t h e o t h e r does not. For the m a n remains when he b e c o m e s an educated m a n , a n d p e r s i s t s ( έ σ τ ι ) , b u t t h e s t a t e of b e i n g n o n - e d u c a t e d , i.e. u n e d u c a t e d , d o e s n o t r e m a i n , e i t h e r in t h e s i m p l e d e s i g n a t i o n [i.e. ' t h e n o n - e d u c a t e d ' o r ' t h e u n e d u c a t e d ' ] o r in t h e c o m p o u n d o n e [i.e. ' t h e n o n - e d u c a t e d ( u n e d u c a t e d ) m a n ' ] .

If t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s a r e p r o p e r l y o b s e r v e d , Aristotle c o n t i n u e s (190al3-21), it will be clear that t h e r e must always be an underlying thing (τι άεί ύποκεισθαι) which is the coming-to-be thing (τό γινόμεvov), a n d that this is numerically (or referentially) o n e t h r o u g h o u t the process, b u t n o t with r e f e r e n c e to the f o r m (εϊδει); 'with refere n c e to the f o r m ' is the same as 'with r e f e r e n c e to the definiens' (τό γάρ ε'ίδει λέγω και λόγω ταύτόν), h e adds, for what it is to be a m a n (τό άνθρώπφ είναι) is n o t the same as what it is to be u n e d u c a t e d (τό άμούσω είναι). T h a t which is n o t o n e of the contrary states remains, namely t h e m a n , b u t the state of b e i n g n o n - e d u c a t e d a n d u n e d u cated does n o t remain, a n d n e i t h e r does the c o m p o u n d of these two, namely the u n e d u c a t e d m a n . Also in cases of substantial coming-to-be t h e r e must be an u n d e r lying thing (190bl-10). It is in the next c h a p t e r (I 8), as we saw, that Aristotle d e m o n s t r a t e s that w h e n you fail to m a k e the a p p r o p r i a t e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e m o d e of b e i n g q u a h y p o k e i m e n o n in g e n e r a l a n d q u a h y p o k e i m e n o n taken as the b e a r e r of this or t h a t f o r m , fatal mistakes are b o u n d to occur.

105 106

My section 2.14. Cf. Phys. I 7, 190b20-23.

12. 39 The putative main witness for 'prime matter' in GC 13 In GC I 3 Aristotle deals with the material cause of substantial coraing-to-be. 107 T h e first question Aristotle raises (317a32-bl) is w h e t h e r t h e r e is anything that c o m e s to be a n d passes away in an unqualified sense (άπλώς), o r w h e t h e r n o t h i n g c o m e s to b e in t h e strict sense (κυρίως) b u t everything c o m e s to be ' s o m e t h i n g a n d o u t of something' (εκ τίνος και τι), e.g. comes to b e healthy o u t of being ill, a n d ill o u t of b e i n g healthy. In t h e f o r m e r case, Aristotle (317bl-5) argues, t h e r e is simply g e n e r a t i o n o u t of what-is-not (έκ μή όντος) in the unqualified sense; a n d this m e a n s that it would be true to say that s o m e things have the p r o p e r t y of b e i n g n o t h i n g (υπάρχει τισί τό μή όν).

' T o p r o c e e d o u t of n o t h i n g ' is t h e n qualified (317bl5-18) by applying t h e basic distinction 'potential-actual'. In o n e way things simply c o m e to be o u t of what has n o being, in a n o t h e r they always c o m e to b e o u t of w h a t is: t h e r e m u s t always b e a pre-existent s o m e t h i n g which potentially is but actually is not. And this something can b e n a m e d in b o t h ways (λεγόμενον άμφοτέρως), 1 0 8 i.e [x] can be categorized both as being [y] a n d as not being [y]. T h e latter remark c o m p r i s e s an u n m i s t a k a b l e clue to t h e role of focalization a n d categorization. 1 0 9 T h e q u e s t i o n discussed n e x t (317bl8-33) is w h e t h e r t h e r e is a coming-to-be of individual substance (ουσίας καί του τοΰδε) which m u s t n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of a coming-to-be o u t of what is modified by a certain categorial m o d e of being. What h e is trying to say, Aristotle clarifies, is this: Will that which is merely potentially a subsistent 'this' (τό δυνάμει μόνον τόδε και όν), a n d is n o t 'this' in an u n q u a l i f i e d sense, possess size or quality o r position? T o o rash an answer will lead to i n s u r m o u n t a b l e difficulties. H e n c e it is of m a j o r i m p o r t a n c e to scrutinize the 'that out of which' notion. This is where the idea of material cause comes in. 107

A thorough discussion of this chapter is f o u n d in Bemelmans, 167-213; cf. Algra (forthcoming). 108 Bemelmans rightly refers to Met. Ν 2, 1089a28-30 and 1088bl7-19. Cf. Phys. I 7, 190b25, where ϋλη αριθμητή is used in a similar sense (my secdon 12.32, p. 371, n. 57). 109 Algra ( f o r t h c o m i n g ) aptly emphasizes that the crucial e l e m e n t in the description λεγόμενον άμφοτέρως is that it makes clear that we are dealing with things which may be called a μή όν. He thinks that it is legidmate to assume that the m a n n e r of expression Aristotle chooses here betrays his approach to the problem as a whole.

An a p o r i a which brings us to t h e c r u x of t h e m a t t e r ( α π ο ρ ί α ικανή) concerns the cause of the c o n t i n u o u s process of coming-to-be, given that what passes away vanishes into what is not, a n d what is n o t is n o t h i n g ; for what is n o t c a n n o t have any m o d e of categorial being. Aristotle (317b34-318a25) a r g u e s that this continuity can only b e u n d e r s t o o d if what passes away d o e s n o t pass away i n t o what is absolutely n o t h i n g , a n d that what comes-to-be materially p r o c e e d s f r o m what passes away, a n d that the passing-away of o n e thing is the coming-to-be of a n o t h e r . This answer o n c e m o r e brings the initial p r o b l e m into focus: what precisely s h o u l d b e u n d e r s t o o d by the expressions 'to come-to-be simply' a n d 'to pass-away simply'? O n e answer pivots a r o u n d the d i f f e r e n c e s between the various categorial m o d e s of b e i n g (ταΐς κατηγορίαις) : f o r s o m e expressions d e n o t e things according to their subsistent m o d e of being as a 'this'; o t h e r s b r i n g t h e m u p according to their qualitative m o d e of being; a n d still o t h e r s after their quantitative m o d e of being. Now in so far as things are n o t called u p a c c o r d i n g to their subsistent m o d e of b e i n g (οσα ούν μή ούσίαν σ η μ α ί ν ε ι ) , 1 1 0 they are n o t said to come-to-be in an u n q u a l i f i e d sense b u t only to be involved in a process of b e c o m i n g something (319a3-14). With r e f e r e n c e to this g r o u p , two pivotal items previously discussed are re-examined: (1) the a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s of the a f o r e - m e n t i o n e d opposition between actually b e i n g s o m e t h i n g a n d n o t (actually) b e i n g s o m e t h i n g b u t only potentially; a n d (2) t h e thesis that t h e r e is never coming-to-be o u t of, or passing-away into, what is absolutely n o t h i n g . This time, the indispensability should be stressed of s o m e t h i n g postulated to be u n d e r l y i n g each a n d every p r o c e s s of coming-to-be a n d passing-away — s o m e t h i n g clearly m a r k e d off f r o m t h e c o n t r a r y m o d e s of b e i n g involved in every process of coming-to-be a n d passing-away: GC I 3, 3 1 9 a l 7 - 2 2 : T h u s it h a s b e e n s t a t e d h o w s o m e t h i n g s c o m e - t o b e in a n u n q u a l i f i e d s e n s e a n d o t h e r s d o n o t , b o t h in cases in w h i c h g e n e r i c d e s i g n a t i o n s a r e u s e d ( κ α ί ό λ ω ς ) , as well as w h e n t h e o b j e c t s a r e d e n o t e d in w h a t t h e y p r e c i s e l y a r e (έν τ α ι ς ο ύ σ ί α ι ς α ύ τ α ι ς ) , 1 1 1 a n d t h a t t h e s u b s t r a t e is t h e m a t e r i a l c a u s e why c o m i n g - t o - b e is a c o n t i n u o u s p r o c e s s in t h e s e n s e t h a t it is s u b j e c t to c h a n g e i n t o t h e

no p o r t j j e ambivalent use of σημαίνειν see my Index. 111

T h e two classes were mentioned in reverse order at I 3, 317b5-7: τό δ' άπλώς ήτοι τό πρώτον σημαίνει καθ' έκαστην κατηγορίαν τού όντος, ή τό καθόλου καί τό πάντα περιέχον.

c o n t r a r y states; a n d t h a t in t h e case of s u b s t a n c e s , t h e c o m i n g - t o - b e of o n e t h i n g is always a passing-away of a n o t h e r , a n d t h e passing-away of o n e thing a n o t h e r ' s coming-to-be.

In this b r o a d e r doctrinal c o n t e x t , t h e q u e s t i o n of the ontological status of m a t t e r - h y p o k e i m e n o n s h o u l d r u n : Is t h e h y p o k e i m e n o n ultimately s o m e t h i n g which possesses n o actual b e i n g whatsoever in itself, a n d , accordingly, is m e r e potentiality 1 1 2 — or should the entire process of g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n , including the position of the h y p o k e i m e n o n , be assessed in terms of relational being, a n d focalization a n d categorization, m e a n i n g that, properly speaking, b e i n g the underlying thing a n d the ' t h a t o u t of which' is j u s t a m o d e of being qua related to a process of g e n e r a t i o n or corruption? 1 1 3 T h u s taking the process p r o c e e d i n g f r o m [x] to [y], 114 given that the h y p o k e i m e n o n r e m a i n s o n e a n d the same, 1 1 5 the p r o b l e m will arise, W h a t does this process consists in ? This question is u n m a s k e d as a p s e u d o - p r o b l e m by m a k i n g the a p p r o p r i a t e distinction. N o t e that this process a m o u n t s to distinguishing between two m o d e s of b e i n g falling to o n e a n d the same substrate, namely its successive m o d e s of b e i n g b e f o r e a n d a f t e r the c h a n g e . It will n o t c o m e as a surprise that the ö ποτε öv device 116 is applied in o r d e r to mark off the substrate f r o m the contrary states of being: Ibid., 3 1 9 a 3 3 - b 4 : A n d is t h e m a t t e r of e a c h < e l e m e n t > d i f f e r e n t , o r else t h e y w o u l d n o t c o m e - t o - b e o u t of o n e a n o t h e r , t h a t is, c o n t r a r i e s o u t of c o n t r a r i e s ? F o r t h e c o n t r a r i e s r e s i d e t h e r e i n , viz. f i r e , e a r t h , w a t e r , a n d air. O r is t h e m a t t e r in o n e way t h e s a m e , b u t d i f f e r e n t in a n o t h e r ? F o r in t h e state in w h i c h it [i.e. t h e m a t t e r ] is u n d e r l y i n g at

112

Either as the h y p o k e i m e n o n involved in any kind of coming-to-be a n d passing-away (according to the older version of the traditional interpretation, d e f e n d e d by Clemens Baumker and a m o n g others Owen; see Bemelmans, 34-40), or only in so far as the g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n of the f o u r e l e m e n t s is concerned (among others Graham, 1987; see Bemelmans, 40-7). 113 In a similar vein, the unity of proximate matter (έσχατη ϋλη) and f o r m (μορφή) is expressed in terms of act and potentiality at Met. Η 6, 1045bl7-24 (my section 10.6); cf. An. II 1, 412b6-9: ' T h e matter of each thing is the same as that of which it is the matter". 114 In fact Aristotle has in this context the generation and corruption of the four elements in mind. 115 Phys. IV 9, 217a21-26; G C I 1, 314b26-315a3; 7, 324b6-7 (cf. II 5, 332a35); Cael. II 3, 286a25; Met. I 4, 1055a30. 116 Note that the relative p r o n o u n ö is to be taken as a predicate n o u n to the participle öv, and thus implements the empty container 'connotative being'. T h e subject should be taken from 319a33, as at 319b2-3; Bemelmans 203f.

d i s t i n c t m o m e n t s [i.e. as s u b s t r a t e ] 1 1 7 it is t h e s a m e , b u t in its a c t u a l b e i n g (τό ε ί ν α ι ) it is n o t t h e s a m e . 1 1 8

T h u s the discussion in GC I 3, instead of b e i n g the main s u p p o r t for ' p r i m e m a t t e r ' in Aristotle, instead s u p p o r t s the view of m a t t e r as a relational m o d e of being, which is treated by Aristotle in the usual context of focalization a n d categorization.

117

Lit.: 'for being what at certain m o m e n t s it underlies' (δ μέν γάρ ποτε öv υπόκειται). For the attraction (the neuter participle referring to the feminine ϋλη) see my section 12.36, p. 383, n. 90. Bragues (114) renders: "Ce qu'étant à un m o m e n t d o n n é elle (se. la matière] gît-au-fondement, c'est la m ê m e chose". Cf. Bemelmans, 203. 118 T h e nature of the substrate is also highlighted at Met. Ζ 3, 1029al6-26; my section 9.22.

EPILOGUE

MAKING UP T H E BALANCE

13. 0 Introductory In his desire to uncover the essence of g e n u i n e , u n s h a k a b l e knowle d g e ( έ π ι σ τ ή μ η ) , in particular how to find the way that leads to k n o w l e d g e of b e i n g qua b e i n g (το öv ή öv), Aristotle d o e s n o t a t t e m p t , like his m a s t e r Plato b e f o r e h i m did, to lay t h e basis of h u m a n knowledge in a t r a n s c e n d e n t d o m a i n of u n c h a n g i n g Forms (είδη). Rather, h e positions it in this very world. However, as Guthrie (VI, 102) puts it, how can we bring within the c o m p a s s of g e n u i n e k n o w l e d g e a world of u n s t a b l e p h e n o m e n a , always changing, c o m i n g into being a n d passing away, never the same f o r two instants in a row? Every s t u d e n t of Aristotelian philosophy knows that in Aristotle's view, the trained m i n d is able to a p p r e h e n d what presents itself to sense-perception a n d find in it, however unstable it is in itself, certain basic principles (άρχαί) which are n o t subj e c t to change. T o Aristotle, these principles are present in this world, q u a as many i m m a n e n t dynamic principles owing to which things are what they are. T h e y can be t h o u g h t of, however, in separation, a n d thus be m a d e universal devices, a n d in that capacity (λόγω χωριστά) they are u n c h a n g i n g a n d as such the p r o p e r objects of knowledge. T h u s the very core of Aristotelian philosophizing is to look for certainty in the necessary causes of c o n t i n g e n t beings, a n d at the same time n o t to give in to the temptation of placing t h e m (with Plato) as universals outside the c o n t i n g e n t world, a c c o r d i n g t h e m separate existence, a n d precisely t h e r e f o r e the privilege of b e i n g unshakable. T o Aristotle, all b e i n g is particular, in a c c o r d a n c e with what Guthrie (VI, 103) has aptly called "Aristotle's inviolable c o m m o n s e n s e postulate, the pnmacy of the particular". Along this firm line of t h o u g h t , which f o r m s the basic view t h r o u g h o u t Aristotle's works, the existe n c e of necessary ontic causes is entirely d e p e n d e n t on that of the particulars in which they are e n m a t t e r e d . 1 1

Cat. 5, 2a34-b6 (De Rijk 1980, 40; my section 4.43; Met. Δ 11, 1018b36-37: "educatedness cannot exist unless there exists some thing educated".

A bold p r o n o u n c e m e n t i n d e e d , b u t is Aristotle as g o o d as his word? Given that the Aristotelian postulate of the primacy of t h e p a r t i c u l a r m u s t o p e r a t e in t h e c o n t e x t of t h e c o m m o n A n c i e n t c o n c e r n of seeking a solid basis for g e n u i n e knowledge (επιστήμη), it is u n d e r s t a n d a b l e that a stand like Aristotle's should suffer f r o m an i n n e r tension caused by his retaining for the ontic cause the requirem e n t of being somehow necessary a n d universal, and, n o n e the less, sticking to the ontological primacy of t h e particular (my section 2.71). Could Aristotle resist the t e m p t a t i o n to u p g r a d e the status of the basic ontic principles, in a way similar to Plato's? T o his interpreters Aristotle might m o r e than o n c e seem hesitant: his own language is s o m e t i m e s i m p r e c i s e o r i n c o n s i s t e n t e n o u g h , as G u t h r i e says {ibid.), to suggest irresolution when it comes to speaking up. Many an i n t e r p r e t e r of Aristotle will allow G u t h r i e to b e his m o u t h p i e c e in voicing his own experiences on this account. But Guthrie is far f r o m despairing. S o m e lines f u r t h e r , h e says that Aristotle's ontological postulate can s o m e t i m e s provide the key to what would otherwise seem a difficulty or inconsistency in his t h o u g h t . How should we u n d e r s t a n d G u t h r i e ' s position? Is Aristotle's headstrong insistence on the primacy of the particular p e r h a p s sufficient f o r us to kindly i g n o r e his i m p r e c i s e o r i n c o n s i s t e n t l a n g u a g e ? G u t h r i e ' s observation c o n c e r n i n g the interpretive helpfulness of the postulate, however enigmatic his r e m a r k m i g h t seem at first glance, c a n n o t be d e n i e d p e r t i n e n c e in a way. O n e should be m o r e precise, however. It is n o t so m u c h Aristotle's u p h o l d i n g the postulate itself, b u t r a t h e r his taking advantage of all the possibilities of the Greek language to vindicate it which provides the key to solving p r o b l e m s of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; it is n o t only Aristotle's firm convictions that c o u n t b u t his language as well. His language a n d linguistic views are even of primary importance, because it is language which is the indispensable m e d i u m — for Aristotle to f o r m u l a t e his philosophical i n t e n t i o n s a n d for us to lay hold of them. In the c o n c l u d i n g sections of the p r e s e n t study I will c o n c e n t r a t e on the main p r o b l e m s resulting f r o m the above-mentioned tension in Aristotle's philosophical attitude. This will lead us to focus on t h r e e items: (1) Aristotle's view of the task a n d the p r o p e r object of metaphysics, (2) the linguistic devices h e has at his disposal to argue for his own metaphysical stand, particularly his rejection of Platonism, a n d , m o r e importantly, (3) how to evaluate t h e ways in which h e actually applies t h e m to make his points.

13.1

The unity of metaphysics

Aristotle's ontology is based on the idea of the unity of being, owing to which a single discipline c o n c e r n i n g being qua being (τό öv ή öv) is possible. Unlike the o t h e r disciplines, which each with their own άρχή deal with d i f f e r e n t kinds of b e i n g (APo. I 28), the object of metaphysics is not sowi^kind of being but 'being' primarily a n d simply (Met. Ζ 1, 1028a30). Along this line of t h o u g h t , the eternal question a b o u t the n a t u r e of b e i n g (Met. Ζ 1, 1028b2-4: "What is ' t h a t which is', that is to say, what is being-ness (ούσία)?") is the central question of the Metaphysics. Accordingly, Aristotle must hold on to the unity of 'beingness'. In p o i n t of fact, however, h e seems to seriously u n d e r m i n e his own position by repeatedly claiming that what is is s p o k e n of in many ways, albeit "with r e f e r e n c e to o n e focal n a t u r e , n o t as merely by h o m o n o m y " . 2 T h e question r e m a i n s what precisely this focal n a t u r e consists in, which is so special as to unify the diverse meanings. As far as t h e diversity involved in Aristotle's d e f i n i t i o n of t h e notion of ' b e ' is c o n c e r n e d , o n e should primarily have in m i n d the two d i f f e r e n t d o m a i n s covered by what Aristotle calls 'first philosophy'. G u t h r i e rightly speaks (VI, 132f.) of two b r a n c h e s of Aristotle's first philosophy. (1) First p h i l o s o p h y tries to discover what in the world a r o u n d us can properly be called ' b e i n g ' . In k e e p i n g with the basic line of t h o u g h t p r e s e n t e d in Cat. 5, in Met. Ζ 2 too beingness in t h e sense of 'subsistence' is a t t r i b u t e d to all kinds of c o r p o r e a l , physical objects like plants a n d animals a n d their natural parts, the f o u r e l e m e n t s a n d their productions, including the heavenly bodies. All these objects are in virtue of their beingness. (2) Apart f r o m the aforesaid kinds of objects, which all contain a material c o m p o n e n t , i.e. unrealized potentiality, first philosophy also has to find out, Aristotle knows (Met. Ε 1, 1026a10-13; 27-32), w h e t h e r any being exists that is p u r e actuality, u n e n c u m b e r e d with matter. If there is, incorporeal entities will b e the p r o p e r objects of first philosophy, since they will b e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e par excellence of beingness. Given that first p h i l o s o p h y has t h e p u r e b e i n g n e s s of the i n c o r p o r e a l , u n m o v e d objects as its primary object, it c a n n o t c o m e as a surprise that as far as the c o r p o r e a l , mobile d o m a i n is c o n c e r n e d , it is beingness as such,

2

Met. Γ 1, 1003a33-34; Ε 2, 1026a33-34; 4, 1028a5-6. Cf. A 9, 992bt8-t9; Κ 8, 1064b 15; Ν 2, 1089a7 and 16; Δ 8, 1017b23-26 (about ούσία).

u n e n c u m b e r e d with the matter in which it is in fact invested, that will be at the focus of the metaphysician's interest. T h u s the close relationship between the two provinces of first philosophy is in principle clear e n o u g h . N o n e the less it r e m a i n s to be seen w h e t h e r Aristotle has g o o d reason to speak of ontology as o n e single discipline. Ackrill (1981, 119) is of the o p i n i o n that Aristotle's a t t e m p t to bring t o g e t h e r two d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n s of first philosophy does n o t seem successful. For a l t h o u g h God may i n d e e d be the ultimate cause or e x p l a n a t i o n of all natural objects a n d changes, it does n o t follow that knowledge of god will include knowledge of such objects a n d changes, or that it is u p to theology itself to study t h e attributes of being qua being. Ackrill has surely m a d e his point in so far as t h e clarity of Aristotle's a r g u m e n t is c o n c e r n e d . 3 I think, however, that the only thing Aristotle has in m i n d is the formal issue of the universal n a t u r e of beingness. It is i n d e e d beingness (ούσία) that t u r n s o u t to be the focal p o i n t with r e f e r e n c e to which everything, w h e t h e r corporeal or incorporeal, is said to be.4 As we saw b e f o r e (my sections 1.5-1.6), Aristotle's n o t i o n of ' b e ' (είναι) is, in a c c o r d a n c e with c o m m o n Greek, one: every instance of ' b e ' is au fond what we have t e r m e d 'hyparctic', that is to say, in all its c o n c e p t u a l differentiations, ' b e ' m e a n s ' b e i n g given', ' s o m e h o w being t h e r e ' . It is true that beingness is c a p t u r e d in its purest f o r m in the theological d o m a i n in which it is f o u n d — as it were, in vitro a n d par excellence. T h a t makes it beneficial to take a special interest in beingness as invested in the theological d o m a i n . But this observation should n o t lead us astray as far as the unity of metaphysics is conc e r n e d ; for a l t h o u g h the theological d o m a i n can be viewed as privileged, this very privilege is c o n c e r n e d with what the two d o m a i n s have in c o m m o n , 'being-ness', which is p u r e i n d e e d in the theological area, a n d can be mentally purified or logically 'universalized' as occurring in the sublunary world.

13. 11 The unicity of hyparxis So far we have established the u n i q u e focal m e a n i n g of ' b e ' ('beingness') as hyparxis. However, the notion ' b e ' is diversified in Aristotle 3 In fact, the question of where the p r o p e r object of metaphysics should be f o u n d was a hot issue a m o n g the Latin and Arab thinkers of the Middle Ages. See A. Z i m m e r m a n n (1965; 2 1998), passim. 4 Bäck (2000), 270.

in several ways, which at face value may seem to t h r e a t e n its unicity a n d the unity of metaphysics as well. Firstly, the g e n e r a l n o t i o n of hyparxis can f e a t u r e in e i t h e r an intensional or an extensional context. From the intensional p o i n t of view, hyparxis bears on a thing's i m m a n e n t cause of ' b e i n g t h e r e ' . In this capacity, beingness is i m p l e m e n t e d — empty as it is by itself — by f o r m s of categorial being, a n d is, accordingly, c o n n o t e d by a categorial modification; h e n c e intensional ' b e ' can also be called ' c o n n o t a tive' (my section 1.64). T a k e n in this intensional sense, the empty c o n t a i n e r ' b e ' is c o n s i d e r e d by Aristotle t h e basic e l e m e n t t h a t underlies any m o d e of categorial being, coincidental m o d e s as well as the substantial o n e , which enables t h e m to exist. But the notion ' b e ' does n o t by itself include factual 5 existence in the o u t e r world; h e n c e I speak, in the case of connotative (or intensional) being, of weak hyparxis. 6 W h e n taken extensionally, o r in its referential capacity, hyparctic ' b e ' refers to particular instantiations of categorial beingness, including t h e particular instances in which they are e n m a t t e r e d . 7 In this referential capacity, ' b e ' is c o n c e r n e d with the factual (or supposedly factual) existence of the categorial m o d e s of being ('instantiations'), including the particulars (instances) factually satisfying t h e m . Particularly as far as the latter are c o n c e r n e d , I speak of strong hyparxis. T h e r e is yet a n o t h e r diversification m o r e p r o m i n e n t in Aristotle's philosophy. It is effected by the well-known distinctions 'essential' vs. 'accidental b e i n g ' , ' b e i n g q u a t r u e ' vs. ' n o n - b e i n g q u a f a l s e h o o d ' , ' b e i n g a c c o r d i n g to t h e d i f f e r e n t figures of a p p e l l a t i o n ' , 8 'actual vs. p o t e n t i a l b e i n g ' — t h e distinctions, that is, by which Aristotle 5

For my contrasting 'factual' with 'actual' see my Index, s.w. I prefer the term 'hyparxis' to 'existence', because by extending the latter term to apply to intensional entities in their capacity of psychic entities as well, one could be easily led astray by merely taking them according to their factual presence in our minds, like feelings of fear or joy, instead of examining them in their significative capacity, ft should be recalled that, in the o p e n i n g chapter of De interpretatione, it is precisely because of their significative nature that the "affections of the soul" are contrasted with their merely being psychic things, which are the subjectmatter of Aristotle's book On the souL 7 See the semantic Main Rules discussed in my sections 1.71-1.73. 8 Bäck (2000, 270f.) explains the Aristotelian p r o c e d u r e of dealing with the problem "how there may be a single science of being if being is said in many ways" in terms of his aspect theory of predication, adopting 'predication' in the customary sense of sentence predication. As we shall see presently, any idea of 'sentence predication' can only lead us into difficulties quite alien to Aristotle's view of the matter, like those caused by the ««Aristotelian distinction between 'natural vs. unnatural predication'. 6

i m p l e m e n t s his adage a b o u t the multiple senses of ' b e ' . If these distinctions should imply the existence of different kinds of being objectively r e p r e s e n t e d by the inhabitants of the Aristotelian ontological d o m a i n , there can n o longer be any question of the unity of being at all, n o r of the possibility of metaphysics as o n e u n i q u e discipline, so eagerly argued for by Aristotle in Met. Ε 2 (my section 7.32). 13. 12 Ontological unity vs. logico-semantic diversity In point of fact, however, unicity is salvaged, because the aforesaid distinctions primarily concern our d i f f e r e n t logical a p p r o a c h e s to the multiple ways in which unitary things can be r e g a r d e d to possess beingness. T h u s the λέγεται ('is said) in the f o r m u l a πολλαχώς λέγεται should be taken very seriously, to the letter indeed. N o d o u b t , to the 'realist' p h i l o s o p h e r Aristotle was, the several differentiations of b e i n g signified by o u r distinctions m a t c h ontological articulations f o u n d in the objects a p p r e h e n d e d by sense-perception; they are, as it was said later o n , ' c u m f u n d a m e n t o in r e ' . N o n e the less, any differentiation as actually m a d e by us d e p e n d s on mental operations, consequential as this process is to o u r i n b o r n habit of sensorily or intellectually differentiating what is ontologically undivided. Whenever, in his search for true ousia, Aristotle gives p r e f e r e n c e to the categorial m o d e s of being over the lower types of being which are discussed a n d dismissed in Met. Ε 2-4, it is the first category of substantial being which is at the focus of interest, simply because it is the o n e representative of beingness par excellence, namely subsistence a n d self-containedness. 9 However, even when you give p r e f e r e n c e to the object's subsistent m o d e of being over the non-substantial ones, your a p p r o a c h is n o less interfering in Reality than when o n e of its non-subtantial m o d e s is focussed u p o n . Aristotle too is fully aware of this, because he is familiar with the condition humaine, which involves o u r fragmentary m a n n e r of perceiving things. 1 0 At the same time he never tires of h a m m e r i n g into his a u d i e n c e that whatever is exists as 9

E.g. Met. Ζ 1, 1028al0-20; my section 9.1. In particular, the expositions in An. II 6, which is about the three types of sensible object, — two perceived per se, and o n e coincidentally — testify to Aristotle's awareness of our fragmented m a n n e r of perceiving things. Despite the unitary character of the material objects of the outer world, there are different formal objects of the five senses (colour, sound, flavour etc.), alongside common objects of sense (the coincidental ones), which too c o n c e r n specific aspects of things (movement, number, shape etc.); see also An, III, 1. 10

s o m e t h i n g o n e , s o m e t h i n g self-contained, b e a r i n g its ontic causes within itself, namely, i m m a n e n t particular forms which together make u p this or that individual. 11 All things considered, it is precisely the o n e n e s s a n d self-containedness of anything existent which is m i r r o r e d by the u n i q u e notion of ' b e ' — the o n e , that is, which we have t e r m e d 'hyparxis'. This unicity is not e n d a n g e r e d at all by the multiple ways in which ' b e ' is brought up — i.e. in which we are accustomed to bring u p whatever presents itself to the senses. T h e same applies to the aforesaid s e m a n t i c b i f u r c a t i o n 'intensional vs. extensional', because this distinction equally d e p e n d s on mental operations, to wit, the twofold way in which we can bring the object's beingness into focus. T h a t this differentiation too is merely a m a t t e r of o u r way of regarding things is plain f r o m the fact that it pervades the whole range of compartmentalizations conveyed by the aforesaid distinctions i m p l e m e n t i n g the πολλαχώς λέγεται adage: — 'Categorial being': In the m a n , Callias we can (1) intensionally focus on the substantial m o d e of being, namely, the instantiation of ' m a n h o o d ' in virtue of which h e is this individual man, or (2) focus on it extensionally, taking it as i n f o r m i n g the subsistent instance, m a n . T h e same holds for non-substantial m o d e s of categorial being, such as c o n s i d e r i n g (a) the f o r m paleness i n h e r i n g in Callias, or taking (b) the instance Callias qua i n f o r m e d by paleness. — 'Essential vs. coincidental being': Note that in the previous items a n d the distinction κ α θ ' αυτό vs. κ α τ ά σ υ μ β ε β η κ ό ς is invested, a distinction which is entirely a m a t t e r of appellation or ' b r i n g i n g things u p ' . For instance, we can take the same m a n , Callias, either as a subsistent being by calling him ' m a n ' , 'animal', ' b i p e d ' , a n d so on, or in his capacity of instancing, say, the coincidental m o d e of being, paleness, calling him τό λευκόν. 1 2 — 'Being qua being true' (as o p p o s e d to 'non-being qua falsehood'): As we saw in the sections 8.4-8.5, these types of b e i n g are, q u a c o m p o u n d significates ('states of affairs'), merely mental constructs c o n c e r n i n g real being as signified by expressions of categorial being. T h e s e states of affairs (πράγματα), then, can be taken either inten-

11

This 'intensional' oneness, which perfectly matches beingness, is discussed in my sections 9.34-9.35. 12 It c a n n o t be overstressed that the usual way the interpreters talk about Aristotle distinguishing between 'essential' and 'accidental' being as though there is talk of two ontological domains is utterly confusing. See my next section.

sionally, to wit as the semantic values of the c o m p o u n d expressions, or extensionally, r e f e r r i n g to the real states of affairs the significates apply to. Non-being q u a falsehood is the mental construct signifying a state of affairs that does not apply to the o u t e r world. A false state of affairs can be d e n i e d of a real one, a n d the latter, accordingly, can be r e f e r r e d to as an instance n o t satisfying the false state of affairs, in a way similar to how a m a n can be r e f e r r e d to as an instance of ' n o n s t o n e ' or by any o t h e r infinitated expression, which, by definition, may d e n o t e a wildly various range of objects (my section 3.25). — 'Actual vs. potential being': Plainly this distinction is c o n c e r n e d with m o d e s of categorial being. Intensionally, any ( c h u n k of) stone can be taken to satisfy actual ' s t o n e h o o d ' a n d potential ' s t a t u e h o o d ' ; extensionally, this or that ( c h u n k of) stone can be referred to as e.g. a potential statue of, say, Caesar. T h e q u e s t i o n r e m a i n s w h e t h e r in actual p r a c t i c e Aristotle's expositions are u p to the task of respecting the integrity of the selfc o n t a i n e d , subsistent entity. T h i s q u e s t i o n divides into two subquestions: (1) Can his m e t h o d , his s e m a n t i c tools a n d devices in particular, as such d o the j o b ? a n d , m o r e importantly, (2) Does Aristotle apply t h e m convincingly?

13. 2 The method: focalization and categorization Bäck (2000, 270) is right that Aristotle has a c o m p a r t m e n t a l i z e d a p p r o a c h where h e deals with the various aspects in which s o m e t h i n g is said to be, "and with aspects of those aspects, a n d even with aspects of the aspects of those aspects". In all this multiplicity, h e continues, we might w o n d e r where to find the unity of science, j u s t as we might worry w h e r e to find the unity of predication when statements assert that the subject is in various f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t ways. This m u c h is certain, o u r speaking a b o u t the things-there-are (τά οντα), focussing on still d i f f e r e n t m o d e s of b e i n g of objects u n d e r e x a m i n a t i o n , must raise the question w h e t h e r language is well-equipped to express o u r t h o u g h t s a b o u t what-is (τό öv) adequately, without j e o p a r d i z i n g , that is, the unitary n a t u r e of the self-contained things. Bäck rightly takes this question to basically c o n c e r n the unity of (in his words) 'science' a n d 'predication'. T o answer this pivotal question requires a clear u n d e r s t a n d i n g of what we should u n d e r s t a n d by 'speaking a b o u t things'. In line with

o n e of the f u n d a m e n t a l positions e n d o r s e d in the p r e s e n t study, I shall argue that the basic mental activity involved o n this score should b e taken in t e r m s of o n o m a s t i c s ( ' n a m i n g ' , ' a p p e l l a t i n g ' ) , r a t h e r t h a n , as is c o m m o n l y d o n e , in t e r m s of a p o p h a n t i c s ( ' s e n t e n c e predication' a n d 'statement-making'). 13.21

The usual apophantic approach

Bäck is of t h e o p i n i o n t h a t at any rate Aristotle himself d o e s n o t worry a b o u t the p r o b l e m where, in all this multiplicity, to find the unity in speaking a b o u t things, a n d believes that Aristotle's a p p r o a c h follows, or p e r h a p s mirrors, his d o c t r i n e a b o u t the unity of 'predicat i o n ' . Even t h o u g h t h e c a t e g o r i e s r e p r e s e n t ten f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f f e r e n t types of predication (in Bäck's terminology), there is still a unity of predication, since — especially on Bäck's view of Aristotelian statement-making — any affirmative predication of b e i n g καθ' αυτό m a k e s a f u n d a m e n t a l assertion of real p r e s e n c e , which can b e specified by o n e of the categories, "the figures of predication" (ibid.). As can b e expected, Bäck has s e n t e n c e predication in m i n d , n o t n a m i n g (or a p p e l l a t i o n ) . Explaining the actual p r o c e d u r e of Aristotle's ontological investigations in a c c o r d a n c e with the (supposed) s t r u c t u r e of p r e d i c a t i o n , Bäck needlessly c o m p l i c a t e s matters, it would seem. Aristotle's a p p r o a c h has n o t h i n g to d o with 'predication' in the sense in which we use the expression today; a n d m o d e r n i n t e r p r e t e r s ' devices like 'accidental p r e d i c a t i o n ' a n d ' ( u n ) n a t u r a l p r e d i c a t i o n ' — which, admittedly, seem to be at variance with the unitary n a t u r e of things — are completely alien to what Aristotle has in m i n d w h e n h e discusses the p r o b l e m s s u r r o u n d i n g the unity of being a n d the unicity of beingness. 1 3 T h e impact of Bäck's a p p r o a c h to the m a t t e r b e c o m e s clear f r o m his c o m m e n t s (2000, 186) o n APo. I 18, 81b22-29, in which h e h a d already e x p o u n d e d the p r o b l e m of multiple ' p r e d i c a t i o n ' . It is interesting to see that t h e r e h e in effect comes close to explaining things 13

It is most significant that various discussions of these m o d e r n tools with respect to Aristode are of n o help at all, and often lead to accusing Aristotle of being disorganized. E.g. Lewis (1991, 108ff.) speaks of "some troublesome principles in the Topics". Weidemann (Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie ed. J. Ritter & K. G r u n d e r VII [Basel 1989], 1107 s.v. 'Prädikation') holds that Aristotle confuses essential and accidental predication with natural and u n n a t u r a l predication. In point of fact, it is the interpreters who are confusing things, viz. naming and predicating, and semantics and syntax.

in t e r m s of denotative appellation ( ' n a m i n g ' ) , instead of s e n t e n c e predication: '"The man is white' is a case of accidental predication; 'the white is a man' is a case of something else. I shall call it 'predication per accidens', which in any case is a caique of κατά συμβεβηκός, or 'unnatural predication', in line with Aristotle's remark. As in On Interpretation 7, it is not clear whether Aristotle himself is allowing predications of singular expressions. He does state that singulars are not predicated "truly and universally" [43a26]. Well, they are not predicated universally, i.e. of more than one subject. Hence they cannot be predicated both truly and universally. But can they be predicated truly? He does say that singulars may not be predicated of others [43a40]. Well sure, for then they would be predicated of more than one subject and be universal. But may they be predicated of one subject, that is, of one name and one object, regardless of how many expressions give the name? Aristotle gives no reason to suppose otherwise. He does say that a singular term is not predicated of anything "naturally", 14 but only per accidens. So Aristotle does not in general reject the predication of a singular term of a singular subject". In point of fact, there is n o n e e d to worry a b o u t such things: singular expressions can be used to indicate objects; a n d if they do, they d o n o t apply to o t h e r things. In o t h e r words, like o t h e r texts, APo. I 18, 81b22-29, should be i n t e r p r e t e d in terms of (semantic) appellation, n o t (syntactical) predication. It is p e r t i n e n t to notice that pace Bäck a n d others, Aristotle himself never uses such labels as ' n a t u r a l ' o r ' u n n a t u r a l ' with r e f e r e n c e to the attribution of terms. 1 5 13. 22 Does the onomastic approach salvage unitary being? W h a t to say a b o u t focalization a n d categorization in this respect; d o they n o t affect the ontic integrity of the objects they refer to in a way similar to how s e n t e n c e p r e d i c a t i o n does? Let us recall first what focalization a n d categorization are all a b o u t . T o Aristotle, the selfc o n t a i n i n g unity each particular subsistent b e i n g is, is m a d e u p of various m o d e s of being, viz. the subsistent m o d e a c c o m p a n i e d by a 14

Note that this term is not f o u n d in Aristotle's text. Back's remark (2000, 186) that "Aristotle reaffirms the doctrine of unnatural predication in discussing substance" in Cat. 2, lb3-5 and Met. Ζ 1, 1028b36-37, finds n o support in the texts. As always, the discussions there concern the use of categorial expressions taken qua names, rather than predicates. It is pertinent that the terms 'essential vs. accidental predication', and ' ( u n ) n a t u r a l predication' did not come into use until the Ancient and Medieval commentary tradition, and in fact imposed themselves, once the semantic p r o c e d u r e of n a m i n g was m u d d l e d with the syntactical device of predication. 15

n u m b e r of coincidental, non-substantial modes. Given the m o d e of b e i n g that is pivotal to the discussion at h a n d , the investigator focusses o n this particular m o d e , a n d p r o c e e d s to categorize the object accordingly, in o r d e r to m a k e his point, by adhibiting the