Argentina Confronts Politics: Political Culture and Public Opinion in the Argentine Transition to Democracy 9781685852313

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
1 Political Culture and Democratic Transition
2 Individualism and Statism
3 Expectations, Transition, and Democracy in Argentina
4 Attitudes Toward Democracy During the Transition
5 The Transition and the Political Party System
6 The Left and Right in Public Opinion
7 The October 30,1983, Elections: The Emergence of a New Electoral Configuration
8 The Presidential Elections, May 14, 1989: The Road to Normality
9 Conclusion: Democratic Stability and Political Orientations During the Transition
Appendix 1. The Surveys and the Data
Appendix 2: The Scale of Social Stratification
Selected Bibliography
Index
About the Book and the Author

Citation preview

ARGENTINA CONFRONTS POLITICS

ARGENTINA CONFRONTS POLITICS Political Culture and Public Opinion in the Argentine Transition to Democracy Edgardo Catterberg

Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Boulder & London

Published in the United States of America in 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 1991 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Catterberg, Edgardo R. [Argentina frente a la politica. English] Argentina confronts politics : political culture and public opinion in the transition to democracy / by Edgardo Catterberg. Includes bibliographical references and index. Translation of: Argentina frente a la politica. ISBN 1-55587-248-4 1. Political participation—Argentina—Public opinion. 2. Political culture—Argentina—Public opinion. 3. Public opinion— Argentina. 4. Argentina—Politics and government—1943- —Public o p i n i o n . I. T i t l e . J L 2 0 8 3 . C 3 8 1 3 1990 306.2'0982—dc20 90-42450 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To the memory of my grandparents, immigrants who, surely without knowing it, worked to attain an open society

Contents

Preface

ix

1

Political Culture and Democratic Transition

2

Individualism and Statism

11

3

Expectations, Transition, and Democracy in Argentina

21

4

Attitudes Toward Democracy During the Transition

39

5

The Transition and the Political Party System

49

6

The Left and Right in Public Opinion

63

7

The October 30, 1983, Elections: The Emergence of a New Electoral Configuration

75

The Presidential Elections, May 14, 1989: The Road to Normality

89

8 9

1

Conclusion: Democratic Stability and Political Orientations During the Transition

107

Appendix 1 : The Surveys and the Data

111

Appendix 2: The Scale of Social Stratification

113

Selected Bibliography Index About the Book and the Author

115 120 123

vii

Preface

This book is a study of Argentina's transition to democracy, which began in 1982, from the perspective of the nation's political culture. After Argentine society's long compulsory absence from politics, citizens assumed a fundamental role in the transition, in terms of party participation, mobilization, electoral behavior, expectations, support, and demands. This work is an attempt to analyze systematically Argentines' attitudes and orientations in the development of a democratic regime. Data was collected through the old and unsurpassed method of the social sciences: opinion polls. The special feature of this study is that it brings together a series of surveys implemented during the transition that, although they do not have precisely the same design, have a common group of questions. Several chapters are revised versions of papers published previously as "Individualismo y estatismo: análisis de la cultura política argentina," in Ideas en Ciencias Sociales, 2, April-June 1984; "Las elecciones del 30 de octubre de 1983. El surgimiento de una convergencia electoral," in Desarrollo Económico, 68, 1985; "La Transición y el sistema de partidos políticos en la Argentina," in Revista Plural, 10-11, 1988; "¿Izquierda y derecha en la opinión pública argentina?" (with María Braun), Crítica y Utopía, 18, 1989; "Las elecciones presidenciales argentinas del 14 de mayo de 1989: la ruta a la normalidad," (with María Braun), Desarrollo Económico, 115, 1989; and "Attitudes Towards Democracy in Argentina During The Transition Period," International Journal Of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 2, 2, 1990. The book reflects my professional work since 1980 with several private and public organizations that conduct opinion polls. My involvement in this activity would never have begun without the enthusiasm of Carmen Zayuelas, vice-president of IPSA Institute, who accepted the risky task of carrying out opinion surveys at an extremely unfavorable moment. To her I owe much appreciation.

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Politics

I would also like to thank the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which showed interest in and financed this project. I want to give special thanks to Lars Schoultz, who has read and commented on the draft of the book. I am also grateful to Nora Vanoli, whose efficient collaboration helped this project advance in spite of the data's initial disorder, and to Maria Braun, Nélida Archenti, and Luis Aznar, with whom I repeatedly discussed many of the problems addressed in the book. Finally, I want to express my gratitude to Kristin Wiederholt, who translated the Spanish version into English, to Josie McNeil, who helped me review the translation, and to Iris Colombo, who patiently typed the original manuscript.

Edgardo Catterberg

In democracy the demand is easy and the answer is difficult. —Norberto Bobbio, El Futuro de la Democracia

Political Culture and Democratic Transition

The relationship of political culture to political regime is a recurring theme among classic thinkers. For some, as for Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Tocqueville, the diffusion of certain cultural standards throughout society is the basis for developing attitudes and behaviors that sustain political regimes. In this sense, the stability of any political regime would be highly conditioned by the presence of a political culture consistent with its own institutions. Montesquieu emphasized this link between political institutions and cultural norms in his tendency to subordinate the former to dominant cultural practices: "We have said that laws were the particular and precise institutions of a legislator, and manners and customs the institutions of a nation in general."1 To reinforce this idea, Montesquieu cites Solon, who, when asked whether the laws he had given Athens were the best, responded: "I have given them the best they were able to bear."2 Rousseau also postulated a close relationship between the institutional regime and prevalent social norms: "Just as an architect observes and examines the ground before putting up a large building, to see if it will withstand the weight, a wise legislator does not begin by writing laws that are inherently good but rather tries to judge whether the populace, at which these laws are aimed, will be able to tolerate them." 3 On the other hand, Rousseau was extremely pessimistic about the possibility of inducing a change in customs once they had been diffused: "The populace, just as the individual, is flexible only in its youth; it becomes incorrigible as it ages. Once customs are established and prejudices rooted, it is a dangerous and vain endeavor to try to reform them; the populace cannot even tolerate its evils being touched in order to get rid of them, just like those stupid and cowardly sick people who tremble at the mere sight of a doctor."4 Agreeing with Montesquieu and Rousseau, Tocqueville noted in reference to the relationship between institutions and political culture that "the most

1

2

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Politics

fortunate situation combined with the best laws cannot maintain a constitution notwithstanding customs, in that these customs continue to back the most unfavorable positions and the worst laws."5 Classic authors dealt more specifically with this subject when discussing the causal relationship that might exist between political culture and democratic institutions, maintaining that democratic stability cannot be guaranteed without values and attitudes compatible with the basis of the regime. Montesquieu, for example, affirmed that "liberty itself has appeared intolerable to those nations who have not been accustomed to enjoying it."6 Rousseau strongly disbelieved in the possibility that a political system characterized by freedom can acquire stability based on previous political events that work against that freedom. In this sense, he clearly asserts that a populace "can become free only while it is still barbaric, but cannot once the civil nerve is worn out." He emphatically states: "Free people, remember this maxim: Freedom can be obtained but never recovered."7 Tocqueville also accentuates political culture's role in the stability of democratic order: "It is precisely their customs that make Americans able to tolerate democratic rule."8 These classical authors, especially Tocqueville, have exercised a great deal of influence on the study of empirical political theory over the last thirty years. Almond and Verba, for example, postulate the necessity of enforcing a civic culture in order to maintain a stable democratic system. According to them, the content of a civic culture is fundamentally represented by society's adhesion to basic principles of the democratic creed, mutual confidence, cooperation between the population and elites, and the diffusion of a feeling of moderation on the part of public and political classes. These authors maintain that "the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political process—upon the political culture. Unless the political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim."9 As has already been stated, the original position of classical thinkers, especially Tocqueville, and the later studies of Almond and Verba imply the presence of a causal relationship between, on the one hand, the existing political culture and the development of democratic political institutions and, on the other, attitudes and orientations that tend to protect this political culture. From this perspective, societies that do not have a strong tradition of cultural norms favoring democracy would have difficulty developing a democratic political system. Nevertheless, the establishment of democratic regimes, beginning in the postwar period, shows that the transition to democracy is a process of making profound changes in the political structure and in other areas of

Political

Culture

and Democratic

Transition

3

society. This implies that, while believing—as in classic literature—that in the long run a political culture compatible with democracy is necessary for its maintenance, it is also possible to stimulate the diffusion of prodemocratic cultural norms. The act of weakening or replacing authoritarian structures with democratic institutions by itself can encourage significant changes in the population's political beliefs.10 As Schmitter avers: "Much of what literature emphasizes as a precondition for democracy can be better conceived of as a product of it." He adds: "Only by exposure to practices can institutional capabilities and citizen virtues emerge, and moreover in this way increase political viability of this type of political regime."11 At the same time, Rustow maintains that new cultural norms, and especially attachment to fundamental democratic procedures, appear after democratic structures have been established, in what is called the stage of "habituation" to the new democratic regime: "The acceptance of those rules is logically a part of the transition process rather than its prerequisite." 12 Rustow's position presupposes a bidirectional relationship between political culture and political structure: Not only would the political culture condition the political structure, but the latter would also actively work on the former. The German case is a good example for relating changes in political culture with the process of democratization. Germany shows a long cultural tradition of norms that are incompatible with a democratic regime. Moreover, the development of Nazism and its ideology is attributed to characteristics present in the German culture.13 On the other hand, there has definitely been no case of deliberate democratization that is more important than the German one. This process, initiated by the occupation forces and continued by the new regime in Bonn, included profound changes in education and in the means of communication designed to promote democratic attitudes in German society.14 As Verba says: "The study of Germany becomes a case study of the possibilities of the conscious manipulative change of fundamental political attitudes, in particular of change in the direction of more democratic attitudes."15 The German case shows an important diffusion of democratic attitudes over time: "Since the formation of the Bonn Republic the numbers favoring a democratic form of government or a multi-party system over a single-party system have steadily increased."16 At the same time, these developments are tied to the German economic miracle. For many Germans, democracy was fundamentally the system that accompanied rapid economic recovery. Nevertheless, the persistence of economic well-being permitted a merely pragmatic perception of democracy to be transformed into a deeper acceptance of the democratic system. 17 After beginning at notoriously low levels, the legitimacy of the new Federal Republic and its institutions developed continuously during a period of more than twenty years. In 1951 almost 90% of the German population thought that the country was better off during the

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Politics

Third Reich (42%) or the Empire (45%) than at that moment. On the other hand, affirmations of the Federal Republic's legitimacy grew from 2% in 1951 to 81% in 1970.18 Commenting on the evolution of German society with regard to the political system, Conradt concludes that "By the mid1970s, Germans had greater feelings of trust in government and were more supportive of their political system than the people of Britain."19 Just as interesting is the case of Spain, which is highly instructive because its democratic transition was preceded by an authoritarian regime that lasted for forty years. It would be hard to assume that some liberal tendencies present in other instances of Spanish political life were massively widespread. The climate that existed before Franco's death was made up, on the one hand, of society's indifference to politics—more than authoritarian inclinations—and, on the other hand, of a generalized fear of how Spanish political life would evolve after Franco. The image of the Civil War had a strong influence on the perception of future politics. Nevertheless, the democratic effect of the transition was massive and remarkably rapid. The people quickly began to adhere to principles that sustain democratic legitimacy. 2 0 In May 1976, 78% of the population already accepted democratic norms; this segment of Spanish society, in the 1960s, was not greater than 35%.21 That is to say that the political indifference predominant before Franco's death was transformed into support for democracy. To this end the political elites contributed enormously by promoting a change of political regime: During the first government of the monarchy, and especially during the second, led by Adolfo Suárez, more than sufficient signals were produced to indicate that the democratic alternative was the road to follow: signs from high positions within the state, from the old system's political class, and from the leaders of the opposition. Surveys from that moment clearly show how the public aligned itself with democracy, confident that the representative system would be the alternative to Franco's regime. When, at the end of 1976, political reform was being discussed in the "Cortes Franquistas," the majority of Spaniards appeared to have already seen the direction in which the new system would go. 2 2

Some important studies on recent transitions do not mention political culture as one of the determining elements in a democratic consolidation: Values, attitudes, political practices and beliefs would, for some authors, be a dispensable part of this process. Their reflections, on the other hand, usually do emphasize the importance of such factors as the institutional scheme, economic structure and level of development, the social coalitions that support the new regime, and the behavior of elites and their various configurations. 23 In short, just as Rustow suggests, a pertinent question is

Political Culture and Democratic Transition

5

whether political culture is a cause or effect of democracy, both at the same time, or neither. 24 The hypothesis that links political culture with democratic stability, not as a cause but as an effect of democratic institutions, greatly interests students of political systems lacking a long democratic tradition and now experiencing transition. This hypothesis offers an optimistic vision of democratization, since it foresees a significant expansion of the new democratic culture. As Barry and Lijphart propose, to be tested this second hypothesis requires, first a change of regime, and second, evidence relating to the characteristics of the political culture in both new and old political regimes.25 In Argentina, a new political transition began in 1982; multiple, empirical evidence about political orientations in the population were collected as early as 1980—that is to say, before and during the transition.26 Consequently, the Argentine case brings together the conditions necessary to determine the relationship between culture, and institutions on one side and democratic political structures on the other. It is important to consider the characteristics of the Argentine transition because they constitute the context in which political attitudes and opinions throughout this process will develop and evolve. The transition operated as a stimulus and reference for the development of political orientations and, simultaneously, as a socializing agent of these attitudes and opinions. The Argentine transition arose, fundamentally, as a consequence of the military defeat in the Malvinas Islands in June 1982. This defeat created a deep crisis in the military institution, whose only available political option was to terminate and disassemble the authoritarian regime, allowing for a rapid political opening. This stage of Argentine political life shares its origin with that of the transitions that took place in those countries militarily defeated in World War II—Germany, Italy and Japan—or with countries that began their transition in the 1970s after military defeats and crises—Portugal and Greece, for example.27 Nevertheless, in Argentina, unlike in the countries first mentioned, there has been no external guarantor of the transition; nor was there an international context to exert an important "demonstration effect," as was the case in Western Europe with the transitions in Spain, Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s. Thus, the first important aspect of the Argentine case is the fragile situation engendered by the lack of a guarantor or nearby models that could have had a strong impact in helping Argentina along the road to democracy. The Argentine transition wavered between a complete break with the previous regime and a certain continuity. In this sense, Argentina also stands out from both countries that broke from their previous regime, such as Germany, and other countries, such as Spain and Brazil, in which the

6

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Politics

transition was carried out through legal modifications that were established within and transformed the authoritarian regime. From this point of view, the Argentine transition constitutes a hybrid: There was no legal continuity with the previous regime nor was there a sharp break from it. As a matter of fact, within the structure of both the armed forces and the state bureaucracy, changes were produced only at high levels. Some transitions base their development on political pacts between parties, in which they agree on constitutive bases that lead to consensus support of the new political process that is under way. This was the case of Punto Fijo in Venezuela or the Pacts of Moncloa in Spain. Others depend on cooperation between the previous regime and some parties, as did the Pacto del Club Naval in Uruguay. In Argentina, not only was there no agreement between the parties that would increase consensus, but once the transition had begun the "multi-party" group of political forces was abandoned—a group that had served since approximately one year before the transition began as an entity to press the military regime to permit a political opening. Consequently, a central characteristic of the Argentine transition consists of strong competition among parties, with no frame for consensus that would limit competition (which at times appeared confrontational). The absence of pacts in the Argentine transition then led to a situation in which no interest or political sector could attain any guarantee for the period following the inauguration of the new government. The result of the first elections also shows a greater disposition in the majority of the Argentine electorate to support the party whose position seemed to be most opposite to that of the authoritarian regime. This collective disposition contrasts with other transitions in which the electorate favored the most moderate parties with respect to the previous regime, as was the case of the Unión del Centro Democrático in Spain or the Colorado party in Uruguay. In this context of great fragility—caused by the absence of guarantors for the transition—and of strong competition, the Argentine transition had to face a series of questions common to all processes of democratic opening, and others that were specific to the Argentine case. The transition had first to face the problem of legitimacy and acceptance of political structures and institutions, not only on the part of the population, but also with respect to the elites and the power structures. Second, it had to look for a reasonable, civilian way to control the military. This is not only a precondition for every democratic system, but also for every stable political system. And, third, it had to stimulate democratic procedures and a party system that would give order to competition and political participation, and that would serve as a mediator between distinct social sectors and political structures. Likewise, the new regime was obliged to work toward both inserting

Political

Culture

and Democratic

Transition

7

private business corporations into political structures and limiting their political power, since, as in most of the regimes preceding the transition, corporations held enormous power. In many cases, they substituted for mechanisms of political mediation. The transition agenda also included a resolution concerning some aspects linked to political efficiency, tied to international, economic, and social modernization questions. The authoritarian regime's legacy in Argentina, as in other cases, included important, unresolved international matters, which were still aggravated by the actions of that regime. Also, the transition was initiated in an economic context characterized by stagnation, unemployment, high inflation, and a large foreign debt. Moreover, the transition needed to carry out policies of social modernization and secularization, since the previous regime had been characterized by strong social conservatism. In spite of the Argentine transition's great fragility, stemming from emergency conditions and the difficulty of its agenda, it did not have to face problems that could have complicated development even more. There was, first, the absence of conflicts related to the legitimacy of the state throughout the national territory, and this was due to the absence of centrifugal forces tied to regional conflicts and demands for autonomy. In Spain, by contrast, transition was made more difficult by the issue of regional autonomy, which was one of the main obstacles to democratization. Argentina also escaped the constitutional question, and in this it differs from the majority of transitions in which the creation of a new constitutional order was indubitably necessary because authoritarian or totalitarian constitutions are incompatible with the functioning of a democratic regime (Germany, for example, or Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Brazil, among others). In Argentina the liberal Constitution of 1853 was not replaced by an authoritarian constitution but was simply suspended in its application during the authoritarian regime. Consequently, the creation of a new constitution was not a fundamental problem facing the recently formed democratic regime. The Argentine transition, then, was characterized more by competition and confrontation than by consensus; and by such supremely hard-tohandle situations as the conflict with Chile over the Beagle Channel, the economic question, foreign debt, the union issue, and relation with the military. Given this institutional change, I will describe some dimensions of Argentine political culture that were active in the transition's dynamic. Orientations rooted in the political culture—such as individual and statist attitudes, the level of social expectations, adhesion to democratic principles, the perception of political parties, and the attitudes behind electoral behavior—will be analyzed.

8

Argentina Confronts Politics

Notes 1. Charles-Louis, Baron Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, book 19, pt. 2 (New York: Hafner Press, 1949), pp. 298-299. 2. Ibid., p. 305. 3. Jean Jacques Rousseau, Del contrato social (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1982), pp. 49-50. 4. Ibid., p. 50. 5. Alexis de Tocqueville, La democracia en América (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1963), p. 304. 6. Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws, p. 292. 7. Rousseau, Del contrato social, p. 51. 8. Tocqueville, Democracia en América, p. 304. 9. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 366. 10. Raúl Alfonsín shares this conception. In a speech of strongly doctrinal character given before the convention of the Unión Cívica Radical in December 1985, he stated: "All of these inclinations and attitudes form the frame of a collective mentality that is hardly receptive to democracy. It is there, also, that the weakness of democracy in Argentina, the precariousness and the fleeting nature of the efforts that have been made up to now to consolidate it, is rooted, less in the institutions than in our subjective mode of adopting them. It has to do with a cultural problem more than an institutional one." Later he added: "The effort to create a stable basis for democratic life in Argentina needs to go through a cultural reform that upsets the cumulus of distortions established in the collective mentality of the country as a heritage of a past marked by disintegration." 11. Philippe Schmitter, "The Transition from Authoritarian Rule to Democracy in Modernizing Societies: Can Germany's Proposition (and Pessimism) Be Reserved?" (mimeo). 12. Dankward Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 362. 13. Theodore Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York: Norton Harper, 1950). 14. John H. Herz, ed., From Dictatorship to Democracy (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). 15. Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965), p. 133. 16. Ibid., p. 139. 17. Ibid., pp. 140, 142. 18. David P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). 19. Ibid., p. 264. 20. Rafael López Pintor, La opinión pública española: Del franquísimo a la democracia (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1982).

Political

Culture

and Democratic

Transition

9

21. Ibid., p. 84. 22. Ibid., p. 101. 23. Leonardo Morlino, "Consolidación democrática: Definición, modelos, hipótesis," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 35 (July/September 1986); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986). 24. Rustow, "Transition to Democracy." 25. Brian Barry, Los sociólogos, los economistas y la democracia (Buenos Aires: Amorrortu, 1974); Arend Lijphart, "The Structure of Inference," in Almond and Verba, Civic Culture Revisited. 26. For more-detailed information concerning data about political beliefs and attitudes, see Appendix 1, "The Surveys and the Data." 27. For an analysis of the transition from a comparative perspective, see Morlino, "Consolidación democrática"; Herz, From Dictatorship to Democracy, O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Julián Santamaría, ed., Transición a la democracia en el Sur de Europa y América Latina (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 1982); and Carlos Huneeus, comp.. Para vivir la democracia: Dilemas de su consolidación (Santiago de Chile: CERC/Editorial Andante, 1987).

Individualism and Statism

One of the most salient characteristics of Argentina's political culture is the simultaneous presence of individualistic and statist attitudes in the population. In terms of the classical ideologies this characterization seems almost paradoxical, since, generally, individualism and achievement orientations are regarded as dispositions distant from a pro-statist stance. Nevertheless, Argentine society has, on the one hand, a strong adhesion to individual goals and, on the other, support for the state's active intervention in different social and economic areas. This configuration originated through social processes that have profoundly marked Argentina since the turn of the century, such as internal and external migratory flows, the politics of industrialization in the 1940s and 1950s, the generalized advance of social modernization, and the Peronist regime. These social and political phenomena served as powerful contexts for socialization, facilitating new individual and group life experiences that, in turn, generated values, beliefs, and attitudes that became not only extensively diffused in the population, but also attained permanence.1 In this chapter I present empirical evidence concerning the mixed character of the Argentine political culture.

Individual Goals and Expectations Argentines show a strong orientation to personal achievement. 2 This tendency especially emphasizes the search for material goals and the disposition to struggle for their achievement.3 Orientations to achievement are defined more precisely as dispositions geared toward obtaining personal well-being by means impregnated by individualism. The goal is to "make it" or "to be someone in life," to succeed in attaining personal goals by one's own devices, with the belief that this is possible only as a product of effort.

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Politics

To this trait we should add optimism and perseverance in facing mishaps and frustrations. 4 As is shown in Table 2.1, the consensus on questions referring to these dimensions is extremely high. By contrast, these deeply rooted orientations to achievement have declined in highly industrialized countries. According to Inglehart, in postindustrial societies an intergenerational change occurred, starting with a modification of the hierarchy of values in upper middle-class youth. Instrumental values (material success, economic progress, personal gain) were no longer priorities. In this social segment, nonmaterial values (intellectual development, aestheticism, freedom, solidarity, and ecological concerns) dominated. This new situation responded to a substantial variation in the conditions of life in those countries that experienced growing prosperity after World War II. The young who were socialized in this context had a consolidated economic security; for them, material well-being did not constitute an imperative and they oriented themselves to other needs.5 The dispositions toward achievement in Argentine society are accompanied by strong expectations of social mobility. An important indicator of these orientations is the recognition of upward mobility from the previous generation; around 60% of the people interviewed believed that their social condition in 1982 was better than that of their parents when they were children. This suggests that, independent of objective occupational mobility and real changes in relative social positions, a vivid image of improvement in the conditions of life, compared with those of the previous generation, predominates. Past experiences are carried through to the present and projected into the future; the majority of people interviewed foresee economic and social progress during their own lives and expect that their children will reach levels even higher than their own. As the data indicate, expectations of social mobility in relation to children diminished after the beginning of the democratic transition. Nevertheless, until 1986, this descent was moderate. In 1988, however, a significant decline in expectations occurred. Levels of optimism were much lower than those registered at the beginning of the democratic transition. The perception of material progress relates principally to the personal (or domestic) situation in absolute terms, as well as to actual changes in occupational categories. Members of all the occupational sectors perceive a personal material advance. Although the greater proportion of those people belongs to the segment that moved from manual to nonmanual occupations, those who did the opposite also felt they had advanced. The same can be said in relation to expectations for an improved social and economic status in the near future. This means that, although in many cases an improvement of life's circumstances was the product of a change from manual to nonmanual activities, also, and independently, there was a sustained increase in the general population's standard of living for many years (until the 1960s) in

Individualism

and Statism

13

Table 2.1 Indicators of Attitudes and Orientations to Achievement 1980 %

1981 %

1982 %

"It is very important to be someone in life." (agreement)

95

96

95

"Every effort is justified if it allows one to reach a better social or economic situation." (agreement)

93

91

' T h e fulfillment of difficult goals makes me feel very satisfied." (agreement)

89

90

"I push myself to reach the goals I have set by all possible means." (agreement)

96

"An effort in studies or at work is not justified although it may help to reach a better situation." (disagreement)

83

71

"I enjoy something only if it takes an effort." (agreement)

76

61

96

87

Source: Surveys carried out by IPSA in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980 and July 1981) and in greater urban centers (May 1982).

Table 2.2 Attitudes and Orientations Toward Social M o b i l i t y 1980 %

1982 %

63 25 11 1

58 22 18 2

81 13 6

80 10 10

"How would you say your social and economic situation is with respect to that of your father when you were a child?" Better Same Worse No answer "Do you expect to improve socially and economically in the next few years?" Yes No No answer

Source: Surveys carried out by IPSA in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980) and in greater urban centers (May 1982).

Argentina. Moreover, the fact that the majority of those interviewed think that they are going to prosper, independent of general social conditions, shows that the belief in a progressively better existence is deeply rooted in the population.

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Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 2.3 Attitudes and Orientations to Children's Social Mobility November May 1980 1984 % %

April 1985 %

August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

April 1988 %

June 1988 %

54 16 18 12

67 12 10 11

64 10 15 11

57 14 17 12

42 15 22 21

49 18 15 8

"How do you think your children's economic and social situation will be in comparison with yours?" Better Same Worse No answer

79 8 4 9

70 11 8 11

Source: Surveys carried out in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires by IPSA (November 1980), SIP (May 1984 and September 1986), and ESTUDIOS (April and June 1988).

Table 2.4 Perceptions of Personal Progress in Relation to the Previous and Future Generation, According to Type of Activity Activity of the father of the interviewee Activity of the head of the family

Manual

Nonmanual

Manual

Nonmanual

Nonmanual Nonmanual % %

Manual %

Manual %

Improvement of the personal situation compared with the economic situation of the father perceived

83

59

67

53

Individual hopes to better his or her social-economic situation in the near future

80

78

77

64

Source: Survey carried out by IPSA in November 1980 in Buenos Aires. Note: N = 550. In order to identify the attitudes of that part of the population who experienced some sort of occupational mobility with relation to the previous generation, only the occupation of the head of the family was taken into account, so that this mobility can also pertain to housewives. That is to say, the occupation of the head of the family (the interviewed person or his/her spouse) was compared with thatof the father of the interviewee. People under 25 years old were excluded in order to measure the occupational status of two generations and to avoid the head of the family's being also the father of the interviewee.

The dispositions and orientations toward social mobility imply a considerable legitimation of social structure. This supposes the acceptance of conditions that govern access to goods and services as well as of the mechanism for assigning social positions. There is a tendency to endorse change, not by means of questioning the norms that regulate the distribution of social rewards and punishments, but rather in relation to changes in an individual's position in society.

Individualism

and Statism

15

Not only is the degree of diffusion of the belief in upward social mobility striking; also notable is the fact that the population selects "legitimate" means, based on individual effort, as the most suitable way to attain their goals. Among these, work stands out, with education in second place. Only three out of every ten people opt for methods not based on personal fulfillment, such as marriage or luck. Nevertheless, if we compare the most recent data on these dimensions with those analyzed by Germani twenty years ago, we observe that if attainment is still the preferred means for reaching better social positions, certain ascribed elements have since acquired growing importance. The strong value placed on social incentives of an individualistic character is another indicator of the existence of a considerable legitimacy for the social order. This tendency is even more evident in the lower sectors, which, more often than in other sectors, choose the category "hard work" (61% instead of 50% in the rest of the population in 1982) as the most important means of rising socially. The root of these tendencies stands out in the face of the reiterated economic and political crises experienced since the 1970s. Clearly, the creed of individual progress continues in spite of years of economic stagnation. On the other hand, it seems that it is not the circumstances that either impede or propel social mobility that, themselves, produce an immediate impact on social behavior, but rather, as Lipset and Bendix maintain, the existing beliefs about them.6 Considering, moreover, the usual association between the legitimation of social order and expectations of prosperity in this order, it is plausible that an important obstacle to political radicalization and to the politicization of discontent in Argentina is the persistent belief in social mobility, relatively independent of prevalent objective conditions. This hypothesis is strengthened by the dominant perception of what changes are most desirable for society. Preferred social changes are associated with moderation and gradualism, while changes that signify a substantial alteration of effective social structure are practically rejected.

Orientations to the State In addition to a pronounced individualistic inclination, Argentine political culture also shows strong signs of statism, reflected in the population's support for protectionist policies on the part of the state, and in the decided backing of state action in areas perceived as close to daily life, such as controlling prices, freezing rents, and providing jobs. That is to say, the positive view of state intervention is maintained by its image as an agency whose function and responsibility is to contribute to the well-being of the

16

Argentina

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Figure 2.1 Perception of Appropriate M e a n s of Social Advancement

W h a t is most i m p o r t a n t for social arid economic betterment?

37% Personal effort: I Work hard I Study

\ \ 1990

November 1980

Socially ascribed means? I \ CT Good luck b ^ j l Marriage Cleverness

May 1982

Source: IPSA surveys in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980) and greater urban centers (May 1982). Note: 1980 responses from Gino Germani, "La movilidad social en la Argentina," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhart Bendix, Movilidad social en la sociedad industrial (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1963), p. 338.

Table 2.5 Desired Changes for Society % Social changes without an alteration of actual lifestyle Gradual social changes Accelerated social changes Revolutionary social changes No answer

37 31 16 6 10

Source: IPSA survey in greater urban centers (1983).

population. Nevertheless, this attachment to the state is not of a predominantly ideological character; it is pragmatic and centered on demands for the state to act concretely, in a way directly tied to individual needs. On the other hand, support for state intervention, as it is characterized, surely has its origin in past experiences, when the state was seen by most social sectors as a means to rise in society. For this reason, attitudes to the state do not go against the belief in achievement. The perception of the state as protector and guarantor of individual goals arose from historical experience, especially during the political periods in which interventionist tools, such as price controls on goods and services, were utilized. From this perspective, the population tends to orient itself toward the state, fundamentally looking for decisions and policies that facilitate the individual's access to material goods, services, well-being, and work.

Individualism

and Statism

1980

1981

1982

1986

17

Table 2.6 Indicators of Statism 1988

' T h e state intervenes so much that it takes away people's free initiative." (disagreement)

—

25

31

31

—

"It is not beneficial that the state control unions' and political parties' activities." (disagreement)

—

—

41

—

—

' T h e state solves social problems better than other institutions." (agreement)

—

—

52

49

—

' T h e state should provide public services without worrying about losses." (agreement)

—

63

56

58

—

"It is better if the state does not control prices." (disagreement)

66

69

66

83

—

' T o help solve the problem of housing, the government should freeze rents." (agreement)

56

64

73

75

58

' T h e state should give work to everyone who wants to work." (agreement)

89

89

92

83

76

Source: Surveys by IPSA in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980 and July 1981) and greater urban centers (April 1986), and by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (June 1988).

This type of perception implies incongruities between abstract beliefs regarding the role of the state and their concrete formulations. The latter suggest a greater attachment to the state in the areas most immediately tied to daily life, while, at the same time, people moderate this support when the generic role of the state is involved, as the data reveal. These orientations to the state were maintained with similar intensity during the transition to democracy. The analysis of the available data from this period reveals a strong correlation between the consensus on state intervention and socioeconomic and educational level. More precisely, the lower the position on the socioeconomic scale (and consequently the lower the level of education), the greater the support for the state to guarantee work and to maintain low-priced public services, price controls on consumer goods, and easy access to housing. In the upper sectors the disposition to favor state intervention is weaker. Aside from the differing tendencies of one social group or another, Argentines undoubtedly expect individual well-being more than general wellbeing. What attracts attention is that they do not demand action from the state as a substitute for, but rather as a reinforcement of, individual action.

18

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 2.7 Indicators of Statism by Socioeconomic Level

Total %

Upper %

Lower Lower (unstructured Middle (structured) or marginal) % % %

'The state should give work to everyone who wants to work." (agreement)

83

57

76

83

92

"It is better if the state does not control prices." (disagreement)

83

66

75

83

93

'The government should freeze the price of rents." (agreement)

75

56

61

76

88

'The state should provide moderately priced public services without worrying about possible losses." (agreement)

58

44

51

57

67

'The state solves social problems better than other institutions." (agreement)

49

45

41

49

57

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (April 1986). Note: With regard to the scale of social stratification used see Appendix 2.

Public Orientations and the Political Regime Images of the state should be related to the perception of recurring situations that stimulate the disposition toward social mobility (at least to the extent that this is tied to the improvement of life conditions) and, likewise, to the perception that the most appropriate way to attain mobility is by personal effort. These attitudes and beliefs, apparently contradictory, create a fundamental core for Argentine political culture: its individualistic and statist character. It is individualistic inasmuch as the image of an open society with wide possibilities for individual fulfillment is quite extensive. It is statist to the extent that fulfillment should be facilitated and supported by protectionist state policies. This cultural conjunction surely inhibited the emergence of both pluralist orientations and tendencies of a revolutionary character for many decades. In fact, the statist component would have inhibited the growth of more-autonomous dispositions that serve as prerequisites for democratic

Individualism

and Statism

19

perspectives, and, in complement, beliefs associated with mobility and individualism most likely constituted a barrier to the expansion of revolutionary ideologies that contradicted them. The beliefs that arose out of decisive social experiences (that, as has already been mentioned, arose at the end of the last century and the beginning of this one with external migration, and continued in the politics of industrialization of the 1940s and 1950s, in the extension of social modernization, and in the Peronist regime) have shown considerable inertia over time and have not been substantially modified by the democratic transition. They do, however, constitute a solid support for social integration and for the existing social order. In relation to this last aspect—the legitimacy of social order—in spite of the adverse economic situation starting in the 1970s, the population continued to believe in individual progress, in the existence of an abundance of opportunities, and in the fact that making an effort represents the best road to achieving one's proposed goals.

Notes 1. See Gino Germani, "La movilidad social en la Argentina," in Seymour Martin Lipset and Reinhart Bendix, Movilidad social en la sociedad industrial (Buenos Aires: EUDEBA, 1963), pp. 363-364; Germani, Sociología de la modernización (Buenos Aires: Paidós, 1969); Germani, Authoritarianism, Fascism and National Populism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1978); Ezequiel Martinez Estrada; Radiografia de la pampa (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1969); and Arturo Jauretche, El medio pelo en la sociedad argentina (Buenos Aires: Peña Lillo Editor, 1982). 2. Some Argentine writers, such as Lucas Ayarragaray, have emphasized the tie between individualism and an ethic of achievement. It has been suggested that "Argentina was and is a country of workers, and success by way of effort is the only qualification that gives, in an improvised society, prestige and position." Ayarragaray, Cuestiones y problemas argentinos contemporáneos, 3d ed., (Buenos Aires: Ed. Rosso, 1937), vol. 1, p. 31. Other authors express themselves in similar terms; see, e.g., Carlos Octavio Bunge, Nuestra América (social psychological essay) (Buenos Aires: Author's edition, 1918); Joaquín V. González, El juicio del siglo (Buenos Aires: Centro Editor de América Latina, 1979); and José Ingenieros, Sociología argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Losada, 1946). 3. McClelland assigns an important role to the motivations for achievement in human behavior. According to this idea, every goal that one reaches in the long run is conditioned by this type of drive. McClelland concludes that it is legitimate to expect that, given certain experiences, people with strong motivation to achieve will involve themselves in situations in which they can satisfy these desires. That is to say, these people find their own methods instead of falling back on external stimulus, and they make an effort to fulfil them.

20

Argentina Confronts

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Such dispositions, according to this theory, also play a strong role in the economic development of societies. Economic growth, then, is not pushed only by an eagerness for gain or other rational goals, as the classical economic theories maintain, but by other factors with a psychological and social origin. In this hypothesis, there is a close association between a personal necessity for achievement and the economic development of nations. In an important comparative study of thirty countries, McClelland points to Argentina's strong orientation to achievement, demonstrated by its position in eighth place in 1925, and in first place in 1950, ahead of the United States, Australia, and Canada. But, simultaneously, it was observed that the limited level of economic growth exhibited by Argentina thereafter—significantly less than that expected from its orientation to achievement—makes it a deviate case. It is interesting to note, however, that McClelland's research reaffirms the broad diffusion of the orientation to achievement in Argentine society, starting with data from 1925, and tracking notable growth until 1950. See David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society (New York: Free Press, 1967), p. 90. 4. The tie between life histories and these types of values is narrated by Arturo Silvestre, Cómo se ¡lega (nuestros "self-made men") (Buenos Aires: Author's edition, 1931). One can also consult Nicolás Ciria on this same theme: España en mi corazón (Bumaby, Canada: Editorial Campo Soriano, 1977). 5. Ronald Inglehart, "The Silent Revolution in Europe: Intergenerational Change in Post Industrial Societies," The American Political Science Review 65 no. 4 (December 1971), pp. 991-1017. 6. Lipset and Bendix, Movilidad social en la sociedad industrial, p. 94.

Expectations, Transition, and Democracy in Argentina

The relationship between economic development and democracy has been repeatedly debated in sociopolitical literature. Many studies maintain that there is a marked association between these phenomena, since material prosperity would create a strong stimulus for the social conditions that a democratic society requires.1 The association between these two dimensions is historically verified, in the sense that those countries that have seen successful growth have also generated democratic structures more frequently than have countries with a low level of development. Nevertheless, this association has been questioned in the argument that the relationship is more complex than originally posited, and that one must differentiate between economic development and social modernization levels. Although, in contemporary times, the most prosperous countries tend to show high levels of social modernization and political democracy, the situation has been very different in the case of countries with acceptable or high levels of social modernization, but without high levels of economic development. Democratic regimes are not necessarily found in these countries. Moreover, those societies with a considerable gap between economic development and social modernization, where social processes were generated by high expectations and significant processes of social and political mobilization, developed difficulties in establishing and maintaining democratic regimes. In countries that experienced late industrialization, dispositions toward a greater participation in consumption, in labor unions, and in the political sphere are tied to the existence of a deep and intense disparity between these social demands and the material capacity to satisfy them. The gap that is set up in this way between modernization and growth, not foreseen in the theories discussed above, stimulated strong social and political conflicts that impeded or made more difficult the establishment of democracy in these countries. In other words, in less-developed societies, modernization—far

21

22

Argentina

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Politics

from encouraging the emergence of democracy—facilitated political instability and the appearance of authoritarian regimes.2 In contrast, consolidation and stability in democratic systems are related to a closer fit between expectations and economic development. Such a model was present in the formation of democracies in Europe and the United States, where there were relatively low levels of expectations because of the absence of alternative referents of wealth and social mobility.3 Consequently, those democracies evolved together with material development. Conversely, when the underdeveloped or late-industrializing countries established their institutions, several factors—among them the effect of seeing industrial democracies—contributed to a starting point characterized by such strong demands for participation and well-being that they greatly surpassed any actual possibility of satisfaction. The incompatibility of desire and reality surely contributed to the difficulties of sustaining democratic legitimacy. In short, a stable democracy needs a level of expectations that is congruent with economic capacity.4 Growing mobilization of expectations becomes even more relevant in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy; this transition, which by definition involves a change in political regimes, is characterized by fragile institutions, democratic cultures with weak roots, generally precarious social coalitions, and the new regime's lack of complete legitimacy.5 The fate of the transition depends, to a great extent, on the political system's aptitude for processing these expectations. Obviously, the economic situation of societies that are going through transition influences the possibility of satisfying expectations. In the postwar period, in countries such as Germany and Italy, for example, rapid material growth paralleled the legitimation of political systems and the evolution of a new political culture with democratic characteristics. It is equally apparent that the economic efficiency both these cases exhibited greatly contributed to legitimacy for the democratic regime.6 Other countries also experienced rapid prosperity during the establishment of democracy, the result of easy access to economic resources, as in Venezuela where petroleum provided ample resources. 7 In Spain, although the transition occurred during an economic crisis, the pretransition took place in a decade marked by strong growth and considerable distribution.8 At the beginning of 1982, after the Malvinas War, Argentina had an economic picture that conditioned the new political transition. It was characterized by a considerable gap between modernization and development, and at the same time by a pronounced tendency toward economic deterioration (present for the past fifty years) and (in the last fifteen years) toward stagnation and reversal of growth. Argentine economic decay began to become evident in the 1950s. From that moment on, a progressive decrease in the rate of growth began, while other Latin American and European

Expectations, Transition, and Democracy

23

Table 3.1 Argentine GDP per Capita Compared to Other Countries' GDP

Canada Australia Great Britain Switzerland Sweden France Austria Italy Japan Chile Mexico Brazil

1913

1929

1937

1957

1965

1978

1982

0.48 0.49 0.51 0.99 1.09 1.18 1.38 2.09 7.23

0.52 0.49 0.59 0.75 0.82 0.89 1.42 1.96 3.72 2.20

0.57 0.47 0.48 0.72 0.61 0.94 1.38 1.96 2.76 1.34 2.22 3.52

0.38 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.43 0.60 0.88 1.16 2.75 1.92 2.37 2.47

0.31 0.38 0.42 0.33 0.30 0.40 0.60 0.70 0.89 1.36 1.69 2.88

0.21 0.24 0.38 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.27 0.50 0.26 1.35 1.48 1.22

0.22 0.23 0.26 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.37 0.25 1.14 1.11 1.13

— —

—

—

5.14

Source: From Carlos H. Waisman, The Reversal ofDevelopment in Argentina: Postwar Counter Revolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), p. 6.

countries had sustained growth. Some of these countries thus shortened the distance that had separated them from Argentina since the end of the last century, while others surpassed Argentina's level of development. In reality, economic development in Argentina almost completely stopped after World War II. While between 1900 and 1914 the gross domestic product (GDP) rose an average of 6.3% annually, in the 1950s the rate was 0.9%; in 1960, 2.8%; and in 1970, 2.3%. GDP growth rate stalled at 0.3% for the rest of that decade, and had become negative toward 1980. The country did not stagnate permanently after the war, but the economy began to fluctuate: Periods of more or less progress and intervals of reversal finally canceled each other out. The annual rate of growth between 1950 and 1983 was 1%.9 The economic crisis prior to the beginning of the constitutional government was dramatically expressed by the penultimate economic minister of the military government, Dagnino Pastore, who in his first message pointed out the economic outcomes from the last decade. He affirmed that while between 1974 and 1982 the gross national product (GNP) had grown 2%, the number of industrial workers had decreased 23%. He added that only 63% of industrial capacity was being used, that the number of bankruptcies in 1981 had been six times greater than in 1977, and that the foreign debt that was at $8 billion in 1975 had reached $40 billion by 1982.10 Thus, the transition began immersed in deep economic difficulties. In addition, there were high social expectations. The latter concept is a generic term that involves three principal dimensions: (1) concrete demands made on

24

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 3.2 GDP per Capita and Added Value in Manufacturing in Argentina and Other Countries GDP per capita

Added value in manufacturing activity (millions of 1984 dollars)

Average annual growth rate (%)

Canada Australia Great Britain Switzerland Sweden France Austria Italy Japan Chile Mexico Brazil Argentina

Dollars-1985

1965-1985

1970

1984

13.680 10.830 8.460 16.370 11.890 9.540 9.120 6.520 11.300 1.430 2.080 1.640 2.130

2.4 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.8 2.8 3.5 2.6 4.7 -0.2 2.7 4.3 0.2

34.285 21.725 130.154

50.007 25.026 124.809

—

23.355 119.708 14.555 —

157.344 5.275 21.533 26.963 10.192

—

29.213 175.519 22.642 —

412.667 5.422 43.331 56.878 11.044

Source: From the World Bank, World Development Report 1987 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 202,215.

the government, generally referring to decisions that will affect the daily life of the demanders—the government "output"; (2) visions for the future, bound to perceptions of the country, society, or personal and familial circumstances; and (3) expressions of discontent that also refer to the country, to individual or familial circumstances, or to some combination of these. We will now try to analyze how expectations of the Argentine transition evolved, using these dimensions. Demands Made on the Government The Argentine population has tended to center its demands on the national goverment on economic topics such as inflation, salaries, and unemployment. Over the period 1984-1986, more than 60% of those interviewed referred to these as priority problems. Social issues gave rise to less concern. In contrast to economic issues, political demands, such as democratic stability, human rights, or the relationship with the military, were not given priority in these years. The issue of security and violence in the streets obtained increasing attention between 1984 and 1988.

Expectations,

Transition,

and Democracy

25

An important aspect of the nature of the distribution of demands is that if one of them is satisfied, expectations tend to become concentrated in other dimensions. For example, in April 1985, when inflation reached more than 20% monthly, protests over the problem reached their height for the period being analyzed (44%). Four months later, in August 1985, when the effects of the Austral Plan 11 caused a pronounced decrease in the rate of inflation, the calls for resolving this problem strongly receded. But, at the same time, calls for reactivating the economy became more widespread. In April 1986, once a perceptible expansion of the economy was produced, demands tied to salaries, which until that moment had remained fairly weak, began gradually to advance. Finally, to the extent that another increase in inflation negatively conditioned the rest of the economy, demands were reinforced in this area (from the end of 1986 on). These oscillations reflect changes in perceptions with respect to distinct economic policies, but at the same time they show the population's disposition to generate new demands when relatively satisfied in an earlier demand. At the same time economic demands were being made, a grace period was granted to governmental policies in this area, even at times when the efficiency of those very policies was being questioned. It is important to note that though this type of support was gradually lessening, its decrease was slow, until March 1988, and extended beyond the period corresponding to the governmental mandate. This residual of confidence can be seen as an indicator of moderation in the population's expectations.

Perceptions of the Future The second dimension of expectations—ideas about one's personal future and the country's future—have shown a particular dynamic in the Argentine transition: They tend to diminish when objective conditions get worse. Thus, faced with significant inflation rates, optimism in relation to the future tended to decline; this correlates with the way in which positive personal expectations resurface when anti-inflationary policies are successful. A similar thing happened with respect to the country's future position. It is worth observing that perceptions of the near and distant future (in terms of respondents' children's future situation) tend to adjust themselves according to an evaluation of the present compared to the immediate past. That is, the more positive the evaluation of the present situation—compared to the past—the greater the optimism about the future, and vice versa; that is, comparing the present to the past has an influence on the image of the future. Likewise, the more idealized the perception of the past—assuming a constant evaluation of the present—the more pessimistic is the perception of the future.

26

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 3.3 Most-Important Problems that the National Government Should Solve May 1984 %

April 1985 %

August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

April 1987 %

June 1988 %

24 10 12 10

44 12 11 6

24 14 18 7

16 24 16 8

21 23 14 3

18 27 14 4

23 16 10 5

10

5

12

8

7

4

8

16

10

14

14

14

11

11

1 3 5 2

1 4 3 1

—

3 6 2 1

9 6 1 1

7 6 3 1

12 8 1 1

—

1

1

1

1

Inflation Salaries Unemployment Foreign debt Stagnation of industry and commerce Social problems: health and housing Violence and security in the streets Education Democratic stability Human rights Relationship with the military

—

—

5 5

—

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 to September 1986); ESTUDIOS surveys in Greater Buenos Aires (April 1987) and in greater urban centers (June 1988). Table 3.4 Solution of Economic Problems May 1984 %

April 1985 %

August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

March 1988 %

3

3

5

4

3

2

'This government is capable, but it needs more time."

76

62

65

59

58

22

'This government cannot solve the economic problems."

10

18

14

21

20

44

"Neither this nor any government can solve the economic 9 problems."

14

13

14

16

26

3

3

2

3

6

'This government is solving the economic problems."

No answer

2

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 and September 1986), ESTUDIOS surveys in greater urban centers (March 1988).

Expressions of Discontent Discontent is a generic notion that involves general irritation and frustration related to past and present life experiences. An analysis of discontent is

Expectations,

Transition, and Democracy

27

Table 3.5 Individual Economic Situation over t h e Next T w o Years May 1984 %

April 1985 %

August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

Will improve a lot/ a little

65

Will stay the same

45

60

53

20

26

17

Will get much worse/ a little worse 9

18

No answer

11

6

April 1988 %

June 1988 %

48

30

32

21

24

33

36

15

20

19

24

21

8

6

9

13

11

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 to September 1986) and ESTUDIOS surveys (April and June 1988). Table 3.6 Expectations of the Country's Future over the Next T w o Years May 1984 %

April 1985 %

August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

Will improve (a lot/a little)

74

Will stay the same

April 1988 %

June 1988 %

48

60

53

43

26

31

10

19

17

20

22

27

29

Will get worse (a lot/a little)

9

23

15

21

26

36

29

No answer

7

10

8

6

9

11

11

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 to September 1986) and ESTUDIOS surveys (April and June 1988).

Table 3.7 Children's Future Social and Economic Position August 1985 %

April 1986 %

September 1986 %

April 1988 %

June 1988 %

56

68

60

59

42

47

12

15

12

13

13

15

17

4

8

15

10

14

17

22

17

9

11

14

10

13

11

21

19

November 1980 %

May 1984 %

April 1985 %

Better

79

69

Same

8

Worse No answer

Source: Surveys by IPSA in greater urban centers, Buenos Aires, and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980); by SIP (May 1984 to September 1986) ; and by ESTUDIOS (April and June 1988).

28

Argentina

Confronts

Politics

Table 3.8 Personal Economic Situation Compared to Last Year

%

April 1985 %

Much better/ a little better

31

18

27

22

24

10

10

Same

43

39

39

43

36

28

28

A little worse/ much worse

26

42

33

34

40

61

62

May 1984

August 1985

April 1986

%

%

September 1986

%

April 1988 %

June 1988 %

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 to September 1986) and ESTUDIOS surveys (April and June 1988).

Figure 3.1 Positive Evaluation of the Present (Compared to the Past) and the Future Personal economic si tu« bor compared to last year (better) Personal economic situation In the next two years (bette) Situation of the country in the next two yean (better) Childroi's future soda] and economic situation compared to interviewee's present situation (better)

May 1984

April 1985

August 1985

April 1986

September 1986 March 1988

June 1988

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 and September 1986) and by ESTUDIOS (April and June 1988).

significant because it is considered a necessary or sufficient, or necessary and sufficient, condition for bringing about social and political violence. In other words, discontent would indicate an important level of social dissent and would represent—together with such other factors as appropriate leaders and ideologies—a potentially destabilizing power for any political regime. 12

Expectations,

Transition, and Democracy

29

Some theories assign even more importance to discontent, construing it as the principal cause of violent conflicts in society. According to this postulate, discontent stems from a combination of individual processes and daily practices based on frustration and is eventually expressed in different types of aggression. 13 With the purpose of evaluating the levels of conformity and discontent in the Argentine transition, some questions indicative of the level of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in two areas were used: (1) personal situation, associated more specifically to economic level; and (2) the state of things in the country, or the overall situation. Analysis of the data makes it possible to say that individual discontent rose sharply beginning in 1984. The indicators taken into account wavered between 50% and 70% for dissatisfaction in 1988. It might be thought that this lack of conformity is associated with an image of growing deterioration in individual economic situations; and in fact, people did perceive that their level of life had become progressively worse, and this belief acted as a motor of discontent. Nevertheless, it is interesting to analyze some economic data that refer to the stage in question (1983-1988); to observe that, although positive and negative variations were seen in some macroeconomic variables (as in the gross industrial product) and in some economic dimensions that affect people's well-being (unemployment and real wage, for example), the average for this period is more or less equal to that of the onset of the constitutional phase. 14 This suggests that in a context of high expectations, an equivalent economic situation is perceived as worse on an individual level and is an important source of discontent. Discontent with respect to the overall situation, bound to a negative image of the country, presents an evolution quite a bit different from the dynamic of personal discontent and responds fundamentally to sociotropic characteristics; that is to say, it is conditioned by the perception of moregeneral situations. In accordance with the data, the major peaks of global discontent were registered during the last years of the military regime, overall in 1982 (coinciding with the Malvinas defeat, the regime's political deterioration, and increasing inflation), and at the beginning of 1988 (high inflation rates). At these two moments, the level of discontent wavered between 70% and 85%. Likewise, in April 1985 a high level (at 60% still lower than the previously mentioned levels) of discontent was observed, probably associated with the pronounced level of inflation that the country was experiencing before the implementation of the Austral Plan. At the same time, the lowest levels of discontent coincided with the beginning of the constitutional government and with a relatively stable economy during the two years following the Austral Plan, both periods that saw considerable social approval. In sum, the pessimistic perception of the country's situation is closely

30

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 3.9 Discontent with Personal Situation November June 1980 1981 % % "Fortunately, I can give myself small pleasures in life." (disagreement)

8

"I am content with the way my life is going." (disagreement)

17

"I am satisfied with my present level of life." (disagreement)

37

20

Mav 1982 %

May April 1984 1986 % %

September March April 1986 1988 1988 % % %

June 1988 %

14

25

30

—

50

56

49

24

—

36

35

—

—

53

35

48

51

52

—

71

69

Source: Surveys by IPSA in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980 and June 1981) and in greater urban centers (May-June 1982); by SIP in greater urban centers (1984 to 1986); and by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (April and June 1988).

Table 3.10 Discontent with the Country's Situation November May 1980 1982 % %

May 1983 %

'There is no reason for people to complain so much." (disagreement)

—

62

85

'Things are getting better little by little in this country." (disagreement)

39

58

84

May April August April March April 1984 1985 1985 1986 1988 1988 % % % % % %

June 1988 %

77

76

73

74

62

34

60

35

40

83

Source'. Surveys by IPSA in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980 and June 1981) and in greater urban centers (May-June 1982); by SIP in greater urban centers (1984 to 1986); and by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (April and June 1988).

related to climates of prevailing opinion coming from diverse sociopolitical backgrounds, while individual discontent evolves relatively independently of this type of circumstance and seems to be strongly tied to the sensation of personal economic deterioration. The data evaluated to this point demonstrate that Argentine society

Expectations, Transition, and Democracy

31

Figure 3.2 Evolution of Personal Diacontent, Diacontent with the Country's Situation, and Levels of Inflation "I am satisfied with my present level of life." (disagree) ~Tlilnp are getting better little by little in thb country." (disagree)

Nov I960 J

"Klayljia

\ Mayl9«3

May 19M

Aprtj 1985

^ ^ '

August 1985

June 1988 Aprill98t

Sept 1986

Aprilj968

|

Source: SIP surveys in greater urban centers (May 1984 to September 1986) and by ESTUDIOS (April and June 1988); IPSA surveys in Buenos Aires and Greater Buenos Aires (November 1980) and in greater urban centers (May 1982 and 1983).

shows a significant level of discontent, as much in the personal realm as in relation to the country. In other countries, nevertheless, a different tendency has been observed. In the United States, for example, Lipset points out the strong discrepancy that has existed for long periods of time in the evaluation of both causes of discontent: In 1979 surveys showed satisfaction with private life to be very high, while the opposite was observed regarding the country. 15 In the same way, in Spain and Chile the population has a much more positive evaluation of their personal context in relation to general circumstances; consequently, both countries register high overall discontent contrasted with moderate individual dissatisfaction. 16 In summary, what differentiates these three countries from Argentina, and makes the latter an atypical case, is that in Spain, Chile, and the United States the index of personal discontent is lower, in spite of elevated levels of global discontent. Usually, lower levels of individual discontent are explained on the basis of the populace's accommodation of their expectations and demands to the actual possibilities for satisfying them. In consequence, even when the population has a very negative image of the country, the evaluation of personal context is reasonably favorable. 17 Following up this hypothesis, it is plausible that the great magnitude of individual dissatisfaction in Argentina is the result of lower adjustment between expectations and the perception of satisfaction. A

32

Argentina

Confronts

Politics

persistently high level of desires and demands, and objective difficulties in obtaining appropriate responses to them, would generate feelings of frustration and, consequently, high levels of personal discontent. Seen in perspective, it is evident that after almost five years with the constitutional regime, society showed levels of individual discontent that practically doubled those from the authoritarian period, when dissatisfaction reflected economic crisis, political anomie, coercive political practices, and the humiliation of losing the Malvinas War; and levels of general discontent that were not much lower, either. At the end of the first constitutional government of the transition, discontent was reflected fundamentally by economic dissatisfaction, but this alone is enough to produce levels of dissatisfaction as great or greater than those seen at the end of the military government, when it was due to a multiplicity of causes. It is important again to point out that individual discontent has shown sustained growth since the beginning of the civilian government, while greater or lesser discontent with respect to the country is more closely tied to general climates of opinion that are fornied by key events such as the authoritarian regime's crisis or the initial success or failure of the Austral Plan.

The Impact of Discontent If discontent produces consequences that affect individual and social behavior, as most theories postulate, then it should be reflected in attitudes associated with certain political behavior, such as protest or violence. With the objective of outlining the effects of discontent on diverse political attitudes, a typology was constructed (see Figure 3.3) using the combination of an indicator of individual discontent and one of overall discontent. This leads to four types: (1) total discontent (61%); (2) individual satisfaction and overall discontent (14%); (3) individual discontent and overall satisfaction (11%); and (4) satisfaction (13%).18 Available data allow some conclusions to be drawn about those people who show diverse types of discontent. In such areas as personal economic situation and that of the children, both looking to the future, the most optimistic people are the most satisfied, and the most pessimistic, the most discontent. Likewise, discontent is positively associated with the belief that military governments are more efficient than civilian ones. People who show greater discontent maintain this position to a larger extent than do those who are satisfied. In relation to support for general strikes, a considerable correlation is observed with discontent: Those who are more discontent are the ones who most strongly support this type of action.

Expectations,

Transition,

and Democracy

33

Figure 3.3 Typology of Discontent Individual Discontent Yes

No

Total discontent

Yes

Individual satisfaction and overall discontent

61%

14%

Overall Discontent Satisfaction

Individual discontent and overall satisfaction

11%

No

13%

Source: Survey by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (April 1988).

Table 3.11 Impact of Discontent on Expectations for Children's Future

Children's future situation

Better

Total % 42

Conformity %

Individual discontent and overall satisfaction %

Individual satisfaction and overall discontent %

59

53

40

38

Total discontent %

-< Same

15

13

16

15

14

Worse

22

9

17

22

26

No answer

21

19

14

23

22

Source: ESTUDIOS surveys in greater urban centers (April 1988).

In summary, the analysis of data about the different types of discontent shows that it promotes more-pessimistic dispositions in relation to personal economic situation and that of the children, a greater adherence to general strikes as a mechanism, and a greater belief in military governments' efficiency. As will be pointed out in Chapter 4, discontent is also associated with less-democratic attitudes, especially in the libertarian area. Mixed

34

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 3.12 Impact of Discontent on Expectations for Future Personal Economic Situation

Future personal economic situation

Total %

Conformity %

Individual discontent and overall satisfaction %

Individual satisfaction and overall discontent %

Total discontent %

Better

29

45

43

33

25

Same

33

36

35

37

31

Worse

24

12

13

19

30

No answer

14

7

9

11

14

Source: ESTUDIOS surveys in greater urban centers (April 1988). Table 3.13 Impact of Discontent on O p i n i o n s of Military G o v e r n m e n t Efficiency "Military governments are more efficient than civil ones."

Total %

Conformity %

Individual discontent and overall satisfaction %

Individual satisfaction and overall discontent %

Total discontent %

Agreement

25

13

15

24

30

Disagreement

62

76

73

66

57

No answer

13

11

12

10

13

Source: ESTUDIOS surveys in greater urban centers (April 1988). Table 3.14 Impact of Discontent on O p i n i o n s of General Strikes

Would support general strikes

Total %

Conformity %

Individual discontent and overall satisfaction %

Individual satisfaction and overall discontent %

Total discontent %

Agreement

32

19

31

32

35

Disagreement

64

79

66

65

60

4

2

3

3

5

No answer

Source: ESTUDIOS surveys in greater urban centers (April 1988).

Expectations,

Transition, and Democracy

35

types—individual discontent and overall satisfaction; individual satisfaction and overall discontent—show an intermediate impact between conformity and total discontent, although the latter type—which has as a distinctive characteristic a negative perception of the country's reality—tends to get closer to attitudes of total discontent. This fact indicates that there would be greater political consequences from exclusively general discontent than from just individual discontent. The perception of how the country and society are going indicates a greater mobilizing potential than does the image of the personal situation.

Expectations and the Transition The transition began at a time of great expectations, but also of considerable confidence and optimism. On the other hand, the transition's agenda was diverse and complex, obviously including economic matters but also containing issues such as human rights, relations with the military, the union question, and some relevant points of international politics (the Beagle Channel conflict with Chile, the problem of the Malvinas, and even the external debt can be included in this category). Although the constitutional government progressed in resolving noneconomic issues, the population concentrated on economic demands, which it perceived as barely resolved problems. Furthermore, the perception of the successful resolution of noneconomic problems made demands centering on economic questions more salient. In the period 1984-1988, optimism deteriorated as much with respect to the personal situation as to that of the country, and there was a parallel growth of discontent, until both reached higher levels than before the inauguration of the constitutional government. The impact of the Austral Plan, launched in June 1985, caused the indicators of optimism and overall discontent, which had rapidly deteriorated in eighteen months, to revert to levels similar to those at the beginning of the constitutional government (since the former increased and the latter decreased). Nevertheless, from the beginning of 1986, optimism began slowly to fall again, and discontent grew. A strong association between discontent and deteriorating optimism was verified. Those people who showed greater personal and general satisfaction were the most optimistic with respect to their personal future and that of the country. Without a doubt, this acts to moderate demands. When expectations for the future decrease, discontent grows; and when discontent decreases, expectations for the future increase. That demands and expectations express themselves as discontent, and vice versa, is a mechanism that the new political system of the transition must process in order to survive. Success in certain areas creates new expectations; if these are not satisfied,

36

Argentina

Confronts

Politics

demonstrations of discontent arise anew. We can, then, say with some certainty that the successes of today are the discontents of tomorrow, because of this renewal of expectations. At the same time, discontent fosters mobilization, deterioration of belief in democracy, and idealization of the past military regime—although, to date, only moderately. Even though there are many other causes, beyond discontent, that might influence the delegitimization of democracy, it must be noted that 45% of those who are discontent consider democracy dangerous, and 30% think that military governments have been more efficient than civilian ones. In order to attain a constitutionally stable situation in the long run, the challenge is not only to lower discontent through successful government action, but also to try to reduce the expectations that put pressure on that discontent. This seems very difficult given the social and cultural backgrounds of the Argentine population and the constant presence of stimuli that promote expectations, such as the influence of mass communication and the actions of the political opposition. This is, beyond a doubt, the principal problem that the transition must solve if it is to succeed, and the greatest task the political class has to face.

Notes 1. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1963); and more recently, Seymour Martin Lipset and Frederick Turner, "Economic Growth and Democratization: The Continuing Search for Theory" (paper presented at a seminar on Political Culture in New Democracies, ICI/CIS, Madrid, April 1986). Also see Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 46; and Donald McCrone and Charles F. Cnudde, "Toward a Communications Theory of Democratic Political Development: A Causal Model," The American Political Science Review 61, no. 1 (March 1967). 2. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973). 3. Dankward Rustow, "Transition to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970). 4. Lipset, Political Man, ch. 2. 5. Leonardo Morlino, "Consolidación democrática: Definición, modelos, hipótesis," Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas 35 (July/ September 1986). 6. David. P. Conradt, "Changing German Political Culture," and Giacomo Sani, "The Political Culture of Italy," both in Gabriel A. Almond, and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture Revisited (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

Expectations, Transition, and Democracy

37

7. Daniel H. Levine, "Venezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics," in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes, Latin America (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1978); Terry Lynn Karl, "Petroleum and Political Pacts: The Transition to Democracy in Venezuela," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986). 8. José María Mara vail and Julián Santamaría, "Political Change in Spain and the Prospects for Democracy," in O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule; Gregorio Marañón and Bertrán de Lis: "Una economía para la democracia," in Juan María Laboa et al., Diez años en la vida de los españoles (Barcelona: Plaza y Janes Editores, 1986). 9. Carlos H. Waisman, Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counter Revolutionary Policies and Their Structural Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 6 - 9 . 10. See the newspaper La Nación (Buenos Aires), July 6, 1982. 11. T h e Plan for Economic Reforms, known as the Austral Plan, was implemented by the Radical government in June 1985. Its principal objective was to lower the very high inflation rate. Severe steps were taken, including freezing prices and salaries, a financial reform, and attempts to control the fiscal deficit. 12. Good examples of these theories can be found in the works of some classic thinkers; Niccolò Machiavelli commented: "Experience shows that there have been many conspiracies, but few have been successful because the conspirator cannot act alone, and can find comrades only among those who are discontent." El príncipe (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1981), ch. 19. In relation to the French Revolution, Alexis de Tocqueville maintained: "The general public became more and more hostile to every ancient institution, more and more discontented; indeed, it was increasingly obvious that the nation was heading for a revolution." The Old Regime and the French Revolution (Garden City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955), p. 175. 13. Ted Robert Gurr, "The Revolution-Social Change Nexus: Some Old Theories and New Hypotheses," Comparative Politics 5, no. 3 (April 1973); Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971); and James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," American Sociological Review 6 (1962). 14. CEPAL, Panorama económico de América Latina 1988 (Santiago de Chile: CEPAL, September 1988). 15. Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider, The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor and Government in the Public Mind (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), pp. 126-127. 16. Carlos Huneeus, Los chilenos y la política: Cambio y continuidad en el autoritarismo (Santiago de Chile: CERC/ICHEH, 1987), eh. 1. 17. I b i d . 18. The indicators used were: "Things are getting better little by little in this country" (overall discontent); and "I am satisfied with my present level of life" (individual discontent).

Attitudes Toward Democracy During the Transition

The idea of democracy has historically included two main streams of thought: One, mainly English in origin, stresses the libertarian ideal; the other, with continental roots, emphasizes egalitarianism.1 The libertarian view, appearing alongside the Puritan revolution with demands for greater religious tolerance, associates freedom with tolerance and the recognition of political minorities. A number of political institutions (Parliament and the judiciary, for example) were developed in order to secure those liberties. This viewpoint has stressed the separation of church and state and has underscored the difference between public and private interests, which has led to a clearly protective stance, mainly in connection with coercion wielded from a position of political power.2 On the other hand, the egalitarian doctrine has stressed the notion of citizenship, which regulates the rights and duties of individuals vis-à-vis political power in a uniform manner. The extension of citizenship has basically meant the denial of ascriptive privileges. The concept of political egalitarianism reached its greatest institutional expression in universal suffrage. From a historical standpoint, political democracy has combined both traditions. Extending universal suffrage and citizenship has been strongly linked to freedom of association, development of political parties, and respect for minorities and their different types of expression. As a political regime, democracy is characterized by those two dimensions. According to Dahl, polyarchies are political regimes in which competitive politics and inclusiveness are both strongly built-in devices and institutionalized phenomena.3 Beliefs linked to these dimensions have been seen as relevant factors for the endurance of a democratic system.4 People's ideas about democracy are hardly irrelevant to the stability of a political regime based upon democratic institutions. Undoubtedly, a complex set of routines and norms comes

39

40

Argentina Confronts

Politics

between people's beliefs and the traits of the political regime, but it is difficult to conceive that an actively antidemocratic society could coexist with a democratic regime. As Dahl points out: "It seems evident that individuals' beliefs influence collective actions, and hence the structure and functioning of institutions and systems." 5 Dahl also states that "to believe in the institutions of polyarchy means to believe, at the very least, in the legitimacy of both public contestation and participation. In practice, these two dimensions of polyarchy are somewhat independent not only historically, but also as beliefs."6

Empirical Evidence of the Argentine Case In Argentina there is a difference in the degree of support bestowed on participative and libertarian values, with a greater attachment to the former. The extensive attachment to participative values is clearly reflected in the fact that three-fourths of the population support the universal vote and periodic elections as bases for the political system. These attitudes—which according to our data existed prior to the transition—became stronger in 1983, when political life opened during the final stages of the military regime. In contrast, libertarian aspects of democracy receive a lower level of support from society as a whole. Actually, agreement with indicators such as tolerance for democracy, opposition to a one-party system, rejection of government control over the press, and respect for minorities, hardly exceed, on the average, 50% of replies. In these cases, an increase in prodemocratic attitudes during the opening of the authoritarian regime was also verified. However, between 1984 and 1988, a regression to pretransition levels took place—as occurs when a multi-party system is accepted—which led to levels even lower than those observed in pretransition years; attitudes to "respect for minorities" and "democratic tolerance," for example, exemplify this reversal. In short, the population's support for participatory aspects of democracy is not only greater than support for liberties but also proves to be more stable over time. Analyzing how proparticipative attitudes were distributed in recent years shows how wide support of these dimensions is in every social strata. This trend has not changed significantly over time. In contrast, when indicators of pluralism and tolerance are involved, there is a clear association between socioeconomic levels and prodemocratic attitudes. Lower sectors of the population show higher levels of undemocratic attitudes than do the middle and higher sectors. This association persists throughout the transition period without significant changes. However, some indicators of nonlibertarian attitudes seem to have increased in lower and marginal sectors of the population. Regarding respect for political minorities, after a wide consensus

Attitudes

Toward Democracy

41

Table 4.1 Participative Prodemocratic Attitudes May 1982 %

May 1983 %

May 1984 %

70

79

83

—

—

84

82

80

79

"In Argentina only educated people should be allowed to vote." (disagreement) —

—

77

76

76

72

71

—

77

"The best political system is one based on periodic elections." (agreement)

April August April September May 1985 1985 1986 1986 1988 % % % % %

June 1988 %

Source: Surveys carried out in greater urban centers by IPSA (1982-1983), SIP(1984-1986), and ESTUDIOS (1988).

Table 4.2 Libertarian Prodemocratic Attitudes May 1982 %

May 1983 %

"Democracy is dangerous because it may bring about disorder and disorganization." (disagreement) "Majorities are entitled to deny the rights of minorities." (disagreement)

May 1984 %

69

58

63

81

"The government has the right to control the press." (disagreement) 42

57

48

' T h e country would be better off with a oneparty political system." (disagreement)

64

58

April August April September May 1985 1985 1986 1986 1988 % % % % %

67

54

65

51

67

63

51

50

57

52

67

59

June 1988 %

54

52

—

60

Source: Surveys carriedout in greater urban centers by IPSA (1982-1983), SIP (1984-1986), and ESTUDIOS (1988).

was observed in all social sectors at the beginning of the transition, a less supportive disposition gained strength in those strata toward 1986. When the education factor is introduced and the socioeconomic level controlled, the former has a strong effect on the pro- or antidemocratic

42

Argentina Confronts Politics

Table 4.3 Socioeconomic Level and Attitudes Toward Democracy

Upper %

Middle %

Lower (unstructured or Lower (structured) marginal) % %

'The best political system is the one based on periodic elections." (April 1988) Democratic Antidemocratic

87 11

89 7

80 11

73 16

82 15

68 29

53 43

38 54

85 13

77 20

60 32

39 49

"Democracy is dangerous because it may bring about disorder and disorganization." (April 1988) Democratic Antidemocratic "The country would be better off with a one-party political system." (June 1988) Democratic Antidemocratic

Source: Surveys by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (1988).

attitudes of the libertarian dimension. This means that not only are the most educated people within each social stratum more democratic, but also that attitudinal differences resulting from social conditions decline significantly given similar levels of education. The strong association between democratic attitudes and educational level reaches its peak when indicators of tolerance and pluralism are considered. However, that correlation may also be verified regarding participative attitudes, although in this case it is not as strong as in the first. Evidence gathered from the Argentine case parallels associations described by Lipset and Germani, linking authoritarian attitudes to socioeconomic level: According to these authors, those attitudes become more frequent as the socioeconomic condition of the population declines. Lipset also contends: "The degree of formal education, itself closely correlated with social and economic status, is also highly correlated with undemocratic attitudes."7 Attachment to democratic values is also affected by discontent: People expressing a stronger disappointment with the overall situation tend to

Attitudes

Toward Democracy

43

Table 4.4 Socioeconomic and Educational Levels and Attitudes Toward Democracy "Democracy is dangerous because it may bring about disorder and disorganization." (agreement = antidemocratic attitude)

Educational level

Upper % 16

Primary Incomplete secondary Complete secondary Incomplete university Complete university

—

30 16 12

Middle %

Lower (unstructured or Lower (structured) marginal) % %

27

32

42

47 30 33 18

35 37 31 15

42 49 39 25

—

—

—

' T h e country would be better off with a one-party political system." (agreement = antidemocratic attitude)

Educational level

Upper % 8

Primary Incomplete secondary Complete secondary Incomplete university Complete university

25 10 8 5

Middle

%

Lower (unstructured or Lower (structured) marginal)

%

%

23

30

45

40 39 26 13

38 34 25 17

45 49 45

—

—

—

—

Source: Surveys by ESTUDIOS in greater urban centers (April 1988).

exhibit weaker democratic attitudes than do those who are satisfied. The link between discontent and weaker democratic commitments is stronger when tolerance is involved than when participative attitudes are considered. On the other hand, democratic intolerance seems to be more determined by discontent with the country's situation as a whole than by personal dissatisfaction. This relationship becomes relevant when we consider the strong increase of discontent throughout the transition period, which might contribute to the delegitimization of democratic institutions. The uneven support given to participative and libertarian dimensions clearly shows that in the Argentine political culture, different types of people can be found with regard to their attachment to those dimensions of democracy. Those people who support both dimensions would have attitudes reflecting a deeper commitment to democracy, at least in the participative and

44

Argentina Confronts

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