Arctic Governance Through Conferencing: Actors, Agendas and Arenas 303123331X, 9783031233319

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Contents
Abbreviations
List of Figures
Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing
1.2 Studying Arctic Governance
1.3 Outline of the Book
References
Chapter 2: Analytical Framework and Cases
2.1 A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing
2.1.1 The Neorealist Perspective on International Relations and Actors in the Arctic Conference Sphere
2.1.2 The Multiple Streams Framework and Agenda-Setting at Conferences
2.1.3 Regime Theory and the Arctic Governance Architecture
2.2 Central Developments in the Arctic Conference Sphere
2.3 The Ideal Model of a Conference
2.4 Arctic Frontiers
2.4.1 The Structure and Organization of the Arctic Frontiers
2.4.2 Participants and Partners of the Arctic Frontiers
2.4.3 The Arctic Frontiers´ International Outreach: Seminars Abroad
2.4.4 The Value of the Arctic Frontiers for Norway
2.4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Frontiers
2.5 Arctic Circle Assembly
2.5.1 Structure and Organization of the Arctic Circle Assembly
2.5.2 Participants and Partners of the Arctic Circle
2.5.3 The Arctic Circle´s International Outreach: Arctic Circle Forums
2.5.4 The Value of the Arctic Circle Assembly for Iceland
2.5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Circle Assembly
2.6 Two Different Models for Conference Organizing?
References
Chapter 3: Arctic Governance: Actors, Processes, and Structures
3.1 Arctic States and Their Interests in the Region
3.2 Emerging Non-Arctic Stakeholders
3.3 Non-governmental Organizations in Arctic Governance
3.4 The History and Structure of the Arctic Council
3.5 Arctic Governance Arrangements
3.5.1 The Arctic Five and the Law of the Sea
3.5.2 Barents Cooperation
3.5.3 Nordic Cooperation
3.5.4 The Arctic Economic Council
3.5.5 The Arctic Science Ministerial
3.6 Concluding Remarks
References
Chapter 4: Actors
4.1 The Functions of Conferences for Arctic State Representatives
4.2 The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives
4.3 The Epistemic Community in the Arctic Conference Sphere
4.4 Business Representatives at Arctic Conferences
4.5 The Functions of Conferences for Institutions and Non-governmental Organizations
4.6 Indigenous Peoples at Arctic Conferences
4.7 Local and Regional Representatives at Arctic Conferences
4.8 Conferences as Tools of Statecraft, Innovative Instruments, and Arenas for Expanding the Arctic Community
References
Chapter 5: Agenda-Setting
5.1 The Arctic Frontiers: Keeping the Arctic Ocean on the Agenda
5.2 The Arctic Circle Assembly: Agenda-Setting Through the Mission Councils
5.3 The Problem Stream: Globalizing Arctic Issues
5.4 The Policy Stream: Developing and Selling Ideas at Arctic Conferences
5.5 The Political Stream: Conferences as Arenas for Coalition Building
5.6 Conferences as Agenda-Setting Arenas
References
Chapter 6: The Arctic Governance Architecture
6.1 Geopolitics: Conferences in a Changing World Order
6.2 Conferences as Supplements to the Arctic Council
6.2.1 Expanding the Arctic Agenda
6.2.2 Broadening Stakeholder Involvement in Arctic Affairs
6.3 The Arctic Governance Regime Complex
6.4 Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture
References
Chapter 7: Governance by Conference
7.1 Two Different Models for Conference Organizing
7.2 The Functions of Conferences for Actors in Arctic Governance
7.3 The Agenda-Setting Function of Conferences
7.4 Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture
7.5 Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Research
References
Index

Citation preview

Frontiers in International Relations

Beate Steinveg

Arctic Governance Through Conferencing Actors, Agendas and Arenas

Frontiers in International Relations Series Editors Benjamin Tallis, Institute of International Relations, Prague, Czech Republic Maren Hofius, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany Elke Schwarz, Queen Mary University of London, London, UK Kristin Haugevik, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway

This book series pushes the boundaries of International Relations (IR) and breaks new ground by thinking and writing from the limits of the discipline and beyond. Frontiers in International Relations (FIR) welcomes original scholarship that expands and challenges our understanding of IR by exploring new subfields, offering innovative perspectives on pressing problems, or enquiring into IR’s analytical and normative premises. To that end, it explicitly seeks works that engage in crossdisciplinary dialogue with related disciplines and develop innovative ways to analyse and approach the subject matter.

*** The series welcomes standard monographs and edited volumes, as well as handbooks. It particularly encourages early-career scholars and innovative projects to submit manuscripts, and provides rapid and constructive feedback. All titles in the series are peer-reviewed.

Beate Steinveg

Arctic Governance Through Conferencing Actors, Agendas and Arenas

Beate Steinveg Faculty of Social Sciences Nord University Bodø, Norway

ISSN 2662-9429 ISSN 2662-9437 (electronic) Frontiers in International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-23331-9 ISBN 978-3-031-23332-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This book would not exist without the help and contributions of others. I am most grateful to all the interviewees who contributed to the study with their time, insight, and perspectives on conferences in the Arctic. I am also thankful to all those who have taken time to discuss my research at conferences, and to those who have provided comments and feedbacks at seminars and workshops. Particularly, I am obliged to the devoted group of Arctic social science scholars who have included me in this academic community as a young researcher. This has been most inspiring and encouraging. The opponents at my PhD defense, Professor Elana Wilson Rowe and Professor Klaus Dodds, deserve much thanks. Both for making me stretch the boundaries and explore new frontiers of my research and for encouraging me to view the Arctic conference sphere also in the broader context of international relations. Their input has been invaluable for this book. Professor Dodds also contributed to my thinking around conferences related to the “ideal model” applied in this book. I would also like to thank the anonymous reviewer of the book manuscript, for the very constructive comments and suggestions for improvement, and the editors of the book, for their patience and excellent advice. I owe a deep debt of gratitude to former colleagues at UiT—The Arctic University of Norway, who always offered their advice. Especially my PhD supervisors, Professor Knut Mikalsen and Professor Hans-Kristian Hernes. I was so fortunate as to receive a grant from the Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education at UiT—The Arctic University of Norway in the fall of 2021. Writing this book would not have been possible without this financial support.

v

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Studying Arctic Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Outline of the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

1 3 7 11 12

2

Analytical Framework and Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 The Neorealist Perspective on International Relations and Actors in the Arctic Conference Sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 The Multiple Streams Framework and Agenda-Setting at Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Regime Theory and the Arctic Governance Architecture . . . 2.2 Central Developments in the Arctic Conference Sphere . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Ideal Model of a Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Arctic Frontiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 The Structure and Organization of the Arctic Frontiers . . . . 2.4.2 Participants and Partners of the Arctic Frontiers . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 The Arctic Frontiers’ International Outreach: Seminars Abroad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.4 The Value of the Arctic Frontiers for Norway . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Frontiers . . . . . . . 2.5 Arctic Circle Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Structure and Organization of the Arctic Circle Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Participants and Partners of the Arctic Circle . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 The Arctic Circle’s International Outreach: Arctic Circle Forums . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.4 The Value of the Arctic Circle Assembly for Iceland . . . . .

15 16 16 19 20 24 26 28 29 31 32 33 35 37 40 41 42 43

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Contents

2.5.5 Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Circle Assembly . . 2.6 Two Different Models for Conference Organizing? . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45 48 50

3

Arctic Governance: Actors, Processes, and Structures . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Arctic States and Their Interests in the Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Emerging Non-Arctic Stakeholders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Non-governmental Organizations in Arctic Governance . . . . . . . . . 3.4 The History and Structure of the Arctic Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Arctic Governance Arrangements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.1 The Arctic Five and the Law of the Sea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.2 Barents Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.3 Nordic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.4 The Arctic Economic Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5.5 The Arctic Science Ministerial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 56 62 66 67 69 69 71 71 72 73 74 75

4

Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 4.1 The Functions of Conferences for Arctic State Representatives . . . 80 4.2 The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 4.3 The Epistemic Community in the Arctic Conference Sphere . . . . . 91 4.4 Business Representatives at Arctic Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 4.5 The Functions of Conferences for Institutions and Non-governmental Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 4.6 Indigenous Peoples at Arctic Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4.7 Local and Regional Representatives at Arctic Conferences . . . . . . 100 4.8 Conferences as Tools of Statecraft, Innovative Instruments, and Arenas for Expanding the Arctic Community . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

5

Agenda-Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Arctic Frontiers: Keeping the Arctic Ocean on the Agenda . . . 5.2 The Arctic Circle Assembly: Agenda-Setting Through the Mission Councils . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 The Problem Stream: Globalizing Arctic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 The Policy Stream: Developing and Selling Ideas at Arctic Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 The Political Stream: Conferences as Arenas for Coalition Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Conferences as Agenda-Setting Arenas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

107 108 110 112 117 119 122 123

Contents

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6

The Arctic Governance Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Geopolitics: Conferences in a Changing World Order . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Conferences as Supplements to the Arctic Council . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Expanding the Arctic Agenda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Broadening Stakeholder Involvement in Arctic Affairs . . . . 6.3 The Arctic Governance Regime Complex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125 126 133 134 136 140 145 147

7

Governance by Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Two Different Models for Conference Organizing . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Functions of Conferences for Actors in Arctic Governance . . . 7.3 The Agenda-Setting Function of Conferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture . . . . . . . . 7.5 Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Research . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

151 152 154 158 160 162 165

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Abbreviations

AC ACA ACGF ACIA AEC AEPS AF AIP AMAP ASSW ASM BEAC BRC CAFF DoD EEZ EPPR EU IAF IASC IASSA ICASS IMO IPCC MoU MSF NATO NF NGO NRF

Arctic Council Arctic Circle Assembly Arctic Coast Guard Forum Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Arctic Economic Council Arctic Environment Protection Strategy Arctic Frontiers Arctic Investment Protocol Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme Arctic Science Summit Week Arctic Science Ministerial Barents Euro-Arctic Council Barents Regional Council Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna Department of Defense Exclusive Economic Zone Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response European Union International Arctic Forum International Arctic Science Committee International Arctic Social Science Association International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences International Maritime Organization Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Memorandum of Understanding Multiple Streams Framework North Atlantic Treaty Organization Northern Forum Non-Governmental Organization Northern Research Forum xi

xii

PAME SAO SAR SDG SDWG UN UNCLOS WWF

Abbreviations

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment Senior Arctic Official Search and Rescue Sustainable Development Goals (UN) Sustainable Development Working Group United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea World Wildlife Foundation

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2

Number of Arctic conferences established and arranged annually . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . . .. . . . .. . . The Harpa Concert Hall, Reykjavik. Photo: Beate Steinveg . . . . . . . . . Arctic state policies and strategies . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. . . .. . .. . . Agreements negotiated under the Arctic Council . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25 48 57 68

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Chapter 1

Introduction

The Arctic1 region has attracted increasing interest from states, international institutions, and organizations since the end of the Cold War, which has contributed to the forming of a complex picture of transnational collaboration in the region (Young, 2005, p. 10). The Arctic Council was established in 1996 as an intergovernmental forum for cooperation between the eight Arctic states and Indigenous peoples, in addition to non-Arctic states and non-state entities as observers. The institutional framework in the Arctic additionally comprises, among others, the International Arctic Science Committee (1990), the Northern Forum (1991), the Barents EuroArctic Council (1993), Barents Regional Council (1993), the Conference of Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region (1993), and the Arctic Economic Council (2014). The Arctic is characterized by the prevalence of peace and stability, despite tensions in other areas of international affairs, and the aforementioned low-level forums for interaction have contributed to low tension at the regional level (Byers, 2017; Wilson Rowe, 2020; Østhagen, 2021). Since the establishment of these bodies for regional cooperation, the boundaries of the Arctic have been stretched—both in terms of the number of actors who are seeking engagement in the region, and the scope of issues on the agenda. Thus, the growing international interest towards the region means that the Arctic governance system must adapt—not only to manage the biophysical transformations from climate change—but also to a broader agenda and a growing number of stakeholders. Yet, it is not evident how to balance the interests of non-Arctic actors with those of Arctic rights-holders (Ingimundarson, 2014; Young, 2014). In recent years, there has been a significant growth in the establishment of conferences attending to Arctic issues along with increased international attention 1

The Arctic is defined as including all oceans and territories to the north of the Arctic Circle, adjacent territories in Siberia and North America, and more southern ocean regions in the Atlantic and Bering Strait. States with territories within this area are the United States (Alaska), the Russian Federation, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark/Greenland (Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme, 1998). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_1

1

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1 Introduction

towards the region (Steinveg, 2021). This book asks: What are the functions of conferences such as Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly within Arctic governance, operating in a system of sovereign state interests and cooperative arrangements? The argument put forward is that conferences can contribute to ameliorating some of the governance challenges in the Arctic. This is founded in how Arctic conferences are central meeting places not only for cooperation and the exchange of ideas, but also for deliberating the geopolitical structure of the region (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 145). Much scholarly work on Arctic governance and in studies of International Relations (IR) has focused on the organizational capacity and future of the Arctic Council (Koivurova, 2009; Graczyk & Koivurova, 2013; Wilson, 2016), crossboundary relations and the institutional interplay of the Arctic (Young, 2005; Stokke & Hønneland, 2006; Wilson Rowe, 2018), and governance and security challenges in the region (Humrich, 2013; Wegge, 2020; Depledge & Lackenbauer, 2021). However, the significance of conferences remains relatively understudied in the literature. While this may reflect a fixation within International Relations theory with state actors, state-based institutions, intergovernmental forums, and sub-governmental organizations (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 145), this book holds that the diversified participant pool at Arctic conferences constitutes a unique global setting where the formal and informal collide. The conference sphere of international affairs should be of interest not only for the Arctic community, but also for scholars of IR. This book aims to fill the knowledge gap through an in-depth case study of the two largest conferences for international dialogue in the Arctic: The Arctic Frontiers (Tromsø, Norway) and the Arctic Circle Assembly (Reykjavik, Iceland). To this end, the study draws on IR theories and theory of policy processes for the examination of actors in the conference sphere, conferences as agenda-setting arenas, and conferences within the Arctic governance architecture. This book makes three contributions to the scholarly literature. First, it contributes to broadening the dependent variable—Arctic governance—through examining gatherings of state and non-state representatives and how conferences fit within the Arctic regime complex. From this, the book elucidates whether and how conferences can be supplements to the workings of states, institutions, and organizations in the Arctic region and in the international system. Second, the book examines conferences as relevant units for scholars to include in analysis of international relations, and how IR-scholarship can benefit from taking conferences into consideration as arenas where policy can occur. From this, the book contributes to broader debates concerning governance, democracy, and diplomacy. Finally, the book makes a contribution to the literature on global conferencing. Rittberger notes: “conference diplomacy has become a more or less permanent mechanism for achieving policy co-ordination at the international level in a variety of settings” (Rittberger, 1983, p. 169). This transferred into a growing body of literature on conferencing and internationalism, and how conferences, as political theaters, are staged and performed (e.g., Death, 2011; Craggs & Mahony, 2014; Hodder, 2015), as well as research on conferences as different spaces for diplomacy

1.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

3

where “the international” is realized (McConnell et al., 2012; Shimazu, 2014). Conferences can in the same way as international organizations be considered arenas for diplomacy on the margins and as diplomatic atmospheres (McConnell, 2017). However, despite these contributions and others, Hodder (2015) calls for an “empirical broadening of the range of conferences under consideration,” beyond traditional spaces of high summitry (pp. 41–42). This book seeks to unravel the nature of Arctic conferences by proposing a novel theoretical framework for the study of such events, and by expanding our empirical knowledge about the function of conferences within governance systems. While conferences are arenas for the exercise of influence without formal authority, they also blur the line between governance and dialogue (Depledge & Dodds, 2017). Conferences are not intergovernmental institutions or government forums but can be parallel arenas for discussions, and they can be instrumental for people doing governance (Babin & Lasserre, 2019, p. 5). In the Arctic, conferences are platforms for government officials to promote their interests in a favorable light. For example, to accentuate the primacy of Arctic states and peoples, or for outsiders to demonstrate their legitimate interests as stakeholders in the region (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 157). There is not only bargaining taking place between actors at conferences, but also competition between these gatherings that are neglected aspects of Arctic governance (Ibid.). This book examines conferences not only as platforms for international cooperation, but also for the promotion of state interests and political games.

1.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

The debate about Arctic security relations began around 2005–2007, spurred by the impact of climate change, high oil prices, positive estimates of the region’s hydrocarbon resources, and prospects for a northern sea route “shortcut” to Asia (Østhagen, 2021, p. 6). The Arctic governance literature was in the following years characterized by a “conflict or cooperation dichotomy,” represented by the neorealist and the neoliberal institutionalists paradigms (Young, 2013). Neorealists subordinate geography to the purposes of power-, security-, and welfare-seeking governments and argue that a “gold rush” in the Arctic might lead to tension or even military conflict (Keil & Knecht, 2013, p. 179). Neorealist scholars accentuate hardpolicy features of Arctic governance, such as the likelihood of military friction and disputes over resources and downplay cooperative efforts in the region (Ibid.). Neoliberal institutionalists take a different stance on the driving forces behind Arctic international affairs. These scholars emphasize economic interests and assign a significant role to institutions in facilitating state cooperation (Keil & Knecht, 2013, p. 179). Neoliberal institutionalists focus on why cooperation emerges and prevails in the region, e.g., through soft-policy issues such as environmental protection, research and development, and local governance for Indigenous peoples. They

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1 Introduction

further contend that institutions can be drivers for region building by connecting sovereign states through a shared history and future (Keil & Knecht, 2013, p. 184). The neorealist paradigm dominated popular writing and media accounts, with an emphasis on the “race to the North Pole.” This narrative prevailed despite thin evidence in support of a resource war, a “scramble” or “battle” for the Arctic, or justification of a great game perspective on the changes taking place in the region (Young, 2013, p. 130). The conflict/cooperation debate has later been settled in favor of those arguing for the Arctic being a cooperative region. Scholars have produced more balanced descriptions of the dynamics among states engaged in the Arctic, and foreign ministries actively emphasize the cooperative and peaceful features of the region (Østhagen, 2021; Wilson Rowe, 2020; Heininen et al., 2020). Studies of global conferencing have applied different theoretical perspectives, depending on the purpose of the inquiry (e.g., Haas, 2002; Death, 2011; Elias, 2013; Craggs & Mahony, 2014; Silver et al., 2015). This book approaches conferences through a framework combining neorealism, the multiple streams framework for agenda-setting, and regime theory. It also finds support in the Earth System Governance literature on governance architectures and regime complexes (Biermann, 2014; Biermann & Kim, 2020). Through this framework, the book situates Arctic conferences within the larger universe of comparable phenomena. It also explores whether conferences can be relevant entities to include when inquiring into “who and what matters in international relations?” The empirical Chaps. 4–6 are structured around the three mechanisms—actors, agenda-setting, and the governance architecture—to bring to light the space occupied by the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly within Arctic governance. The overarching framework is neorealism, which is applied for studying the functions of conferences for actors. For this purpose, conferences are considered in the same manner as institutions in Jervis’ (1999) typology, which is elaborated in Chap. 2. In short, Jervis distinguishes between three types of institutions according to how autonomous they are. The first kind is binding and self-binding alliances and trade agreements, which are traditional tools of statecraft and reflect states’ pre-existing interests (Jervis, 1999, p. 55). These are not autonomous and do not shape the preference of those who established them (Jervis, 1999, p. 57). The second kind is institutions as innovative instruments, which are outside the realm of normal statecraft and covers an area of unrealized common interest and potential for increased cooperation (Jervis, 1999, p. 58). The third kind is autonomous in the sense that these institutions have “life of their own” and can shape the interests of participating actors (Jervis, 1999, p. 59). States and national governments are no longer the essential underpinnings of how the world is organized, and to that point, Rosenau (2006) highlights some limitations to mainstream IR-theories, which has a principal focus towards an anarchical world order and sovereign states, in comprehending governance in a globalized space (p. 111). To amend the shortcoming of neorealism’s state-centric focus, the theoretical framework also consists of multiple streams framework—to examine the

1.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

5

agenda-setting impact of conferences—and regime theory—for the examination of how conferences fit within the overall Arctic governance architecture. These three dimensions—the mechanisms and the accompanying theoretical perspectives—structure the book as they lay the foundation for the analysis in the empirical Chaps. 4–6. The mechanisms were also central in the formulation of the interview guide, and data collection and analysis processes. The overarching question this book answers is: What are the functions of conferences such as Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly within Arctic governance, operating in a system of sovereign state interests and cooperative arrangements? In addition, the following questions are asked and answered in the empirical chapters, to operationalize the mechanisms and examine them as points of influence for conferences within Arctic governance. • What are the main functions of conferences for various actor groups, and do conference engagement contribute to advancing their agency in the region? • Do conferences contribute to expanding the community of relevant and legitimate stakeholders in the Arctic? • Do conference organizers contribute to define central issues and elevate them on to the broader agenda in the region? • Is conference participation a means to successfully promote issues and make them pertinent in other forums or processes? • What are key components of the Arctic governance system, and can conferences contribute to incorporate emerging issues and interested stakeholders? • What are the main contributions of conferences within the Arctic governance architecture? The first two questions concern the actor mechanism, and it is assumed that participants attend conferences with a purpose. In this regard, a function of a conference is understood as an outcome that actors can gain from attending conferences that serves in their self-interests. For example, it is expected that conferences are beneficial for promoting state policies to a large audience, for networking, to develop new projects, and to promote a business or an institution. Considering the variety of actors that attend conferences, these arenas are likely to challenge the state-centric view of international affairs, and thus, it is expected that they can be beneficial spaces for a variety of actors to have their voices heard. The second question—of whether conferences contribute to expanding the community of relevant and legitimate stakeholders in Arctic affairs—particularly touches upon the emergence of new actors interested in the region, such as non-Arctic states. Chapter 4 draws on the neorealist perspective and applies Jervis’ typology to examine the functions of conferences for actors in pursuit of their interests in the Arctic, and the nature of conferences along this specter of potential outcomes. From this, the book makes aims to be conductive to IR-scholarship. First, by examining whether conference participation is a fruitful undertaking for different actors in pursuit of their interests, to obtain power, increased legitimacy, or advance their position within a region or issue area. Second, the book contributes to IR-scholarship

6

1 Introduction

by inquiring whether conferences can add something to the workings of sovereign states and institutions, and as such be relevant arenas to include in analysis of international affairs, as spaces where governance occur. The third and fourth research questions are analyzed through the multiple streams framework for agenda-setting. The agenda-setting literature considers policy processes as independent “streams” of problem definitions, solutions, and the politics involved in selecting alternative options (Cohen et al., 1972). In the multiple streams framework, processes deemed relevant for agenda-setting are found in the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream (Kingdon, 2011). The central question for this book is whether these can be identified at conferences, and thus, whether conferences can contribute to agenda change. In the problem stream, conditions that derive from citizens’ ideal state are identified as problems. The expectation from the theoretical framework is that the epistemic community can use conferences to identify and frame central issues as problems and bring them to the attention of people in government. The policy stream consists of ideas generated by politicians, experts, and analysts, which flow around in a policy “primeval soup” (Kingdon, 2011, p. 166). These ideas thereafter go through a process of “softening up,” where members of the policy community discuss and modify ideas before they agree on an alternative that is supported by a substantial part of the community (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 127–130). Conferences are expected to be particularly important for this stream in the agenda-setting process. The political stream consists of factors that influence politics, such as swings in the national mood, the public opinion, election results, changes in administration, partisan or ideological shifts, and interest groups’ campaigns (Herweg et al., 2018, pp. 24–25). Pertaining to this stream, the expectation from the theoretical framework is that conferences are central arenas for coalition building, for the implementation of the policy, science, business interplay, and for interest groups and the media to influence the public opinion and political discourse. The question of whether conference organizers can contribute to defining central issues and elevate them onto the broader agenda in the region is operationalized by looking at the conferences’ programs and initiatives launched by conference organizers and inquiring whether these have been advanced through other processes or contributed to define the broader agenda in the region. Here, the conferences’ function for the host states is also of interest, and the book examines whether the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are instrumental for the interests and positions of Norway and Iceland within Arctic and international affairs. The fourth question is operationalized in like manner but focuses on conference participants rather than the organizers. Both these questions are addressed when analyzing conferences as agenda-setting instruments in Chap. 5. The last element in the theoretical framework is regime theory, which holds a more optimistic view on the prospects for cooperation and role of institutions within the international system than neorealism. Regime theory is therefore applied to address the last two questions, which are asked to unravel the key components of

1.2

Studying Arctic Governance

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the Arctic governance system and inquire into the main contributions of conferences within the governance architecture. From the premises of regime theory, it is expected that conferences can contribute to reducing barriers to cooperation by facilitating information sharing among participants and thus contribute to collaboration in the absence of a government like authority (Young, 1999). Moreover, this analysis draws on the governance literature, and the shift from government to governance, which entails that political authority has become more multileveled and operating through network configurations, and that private actors and sub-national groups are just as important as traditional centers of authority (Walters, 2004). Thus, it is expected that conferences—as arenas where the formal and informal collide—can serve as such spaces for networking, interaction among sub-government entities and non-state actors, for informal diplomatic relations and soft-power influence (Nye, 2008). From this, the book inquires whether conferences are arenas where policy and governance occur. To establish the functions of conferences within the Arctic regime complex, the book accounts for other governance arrangements, and which purposes they do and do not serve. The objective is to answer whether conferences are viable supplements to these entities, from the goals of maintaining the Arctic a peaceful region, incentivize cooperation, and to include a broader range of stakeholders in regional affairs. The overall aim of the architecture mechanisms is unraveling whether, how, and to what extent conferences influence or shape the governance landscape in which they are situated. For this purpose, Chap. 6 inquires into whether and how conferences can create synergies among other entities, contribute to information sharing, role clarification, and be instrumental in negotiation processes. Particular attention is devoted to the Arctic Council, and whether conferences can contribute to a broader agenda and the involvement of more stakeholders in the dialogue about the future of the region.

1.2

Studying Arctic Governance

Blatter and Haverland (2012) describe four characteristics of case study research: there are few cases; several empirical observations for each case; a large diversity of empirical observations; and an intensive reflection in the relationship between concrete empirical observations and abstract theoretical concepts (p. 19). This book examines and compares two cases as “an instance of a class of events” (Bennett & George, 2005, p. 17), where conferences within a governance system is the class of events. The book thus follows Gerring’s view of the objective of a case study. Namely, from this in-depth analysis of two cases to be able to say something about the broader population of interdisciplinary and intersectional conferences (Gerring, 2004). Seeing how there is limited knowledge about the functions of conferences within the Arctic governance system, the in-depth insight one can obtain through a case study is an asset.

8

1 Introduction

Case study research implies accepting complexity and multiple causations (Peters, 2013, p. 149). It is necessary to be open to the fact that social outcomes can result from a combination of causal factors, that there can be different pathways to similar outcomes, and that the effect of the same causal factor can be different in diverse contexts (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, p. 81). Conferences are dynamic arrangements that involve a variety of actors with diverse backgrounds and interests, so these are central aspects of the research design. Other strongpoints of a case study are the opportunity to explore causal mechanisms in detail within a small number of cases, to look at numerous intervening variables, and to identify which conditions of the case that activate the causal mechanism (Bennett & George, 2005, p. 21). Such detailed assessments are useful for the examination of how conferences function within governance structures. While a case study holds merits with regard to the in-depth knowledge one can acquire from a small number of cases, the methods also has some shortcomings. One weak point when studying social phenomena is the issue of limited diversity. It is not possible to observe all potential combinations of attributes in the real world, and thus, one cannot establish with absolute certainty which variables contribute, or not, to the outcome (Ragin & Sonnett, 2005). The case study approach is also less robust at determining how much a variable mattered (Bennett & George, 2005, p. 25). Furthermore, when using case study methods, one must consider the trade-off between the goal of theoretical parsimony, establishing explanatory richness, and keeping the number of cases manageable (Bennett & George, 2005, p. 31). This is a factor in the analysis in this book, where explanatory richness is the key focus. The inquiry into the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly reveals features and conditions present at these arenas, which may not be characteristics of conferences with different qualities or arranged in different settings. Still, while it is challenging to generalize from small-N studies, it is possible to provide for an understanding of conferences that potentially can be transferable to similar contexts. The universe of potential cases, Arctic conferences, was identified by using online calendars of events, such as that of the Arctic Research Consortium of the United States, the Arctic Portal, the International Arctic Science Committee, and websites of Arctic institutions and institutes. From this, an extensive database of existing (and past) conferences on Arctic issues was constructed (see also Steinveg, 2021). This initial mapping distinguished between international and regional conferences, meetings, seminars, and workshops, and five criteria were guiding the selection of the two cases. The first criterium was size, where the study focuses on large international conferences rather than smaller, local seminars and workshops. The second criterium was sector and issue area, and the conferences selected as the main cases had to combine policy, science, and business. To examine the democratizing function of conferences, the third criterium was that the conference had to be open for all interested parties to attend granted they have the necessary financial resources. The fourth criterium was related to the participant pool, and the conferences had to draw attendees from a variety of sectors: politics, science, academia, institutes, organizations, business, local communities, and Indigenous peoples. The

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Studying Arctic Governance

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fifth and final criterium was recurrence, and the primary interest for the study was conferences held annually over a period of years. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly fulfill these five criteria, and these cases were selected in particular because of their hybrid nature, and how they include both policy, science, and business topics and international participants. Furthermore, the conferences are appealing by being competing arenas, and while sharing several practical characteristics, the cases are founded in different philosophies. This enables the inquiry into whether different models for organizing a conference causes different outcomes on the dependent variable: Arctic governance. The main data collection technique was semi-structured individual interviews with key informants. The data material includes 24 formal interviews, in addition to informal talks with people participating at the conferences and people involved with institutions or organizations dealing with Arctic issues. Interviews were the primary source of information about actors’ motives, intensions, and ambitions of engagement in the Arctic conference sphere, and for inquiring about organizers’ overall objectives and expected outcomes of the conferences. In addition, the interviews provided insight into how participants view the prospect of agenda-setting through conferences, and how they view these arenas within the broader governance architecture in the Arctic. Informants were contacted by virtue of their direct affiliation to one of the two cases, as initiators, organizers, members of the secretariat, or representatives from the board of advisors/steering committee. Other informants were chosen because of their academic, governmental, institutional, or organizational affiliation, in addition to being frequent conference participants who could contribute to insight about these arenas. It was deemed constructive to elucidate the perceptions and perspectives of Arctic state actors regarding how newcomers utilize conferences. Therefore, the interview material gathered for this book centers around Arctic state actors. Participants to the study are categorized by nationality and according to five categories of affiliation to ensure anonymity: conference organizers; policy/government; science/ academia; business; and media/civil society/others. The interviews were transcribed and statements from informants were coded into themes using “nodes.” The coding scheme was refined into subcategories within each mechanism after the data collection process was finalized. Central questions considered in this phase of the data analysis process included: Why did the informant prioritize to attend conferences? What did the informant say that was relevant for uncovering the functions of conferences for different stakeholder groups in the region? How did the informant assess conferences as arenas for agenda-setting, and as arenas for actors to elevate issues onto the regional or international agenda? How did informants describe the role of conferences in relation to other elements within the Arctic governance structure? A weakness when depending on interviews is that results are shaped by the perceptions of participants (Peters, 2013, pp. 164–165). To amend this shortcoming, statements by informants were linked to other sources, such as official documents, press releases, and media stories, to falsify or verify claims made in the interviews.

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Introduction

The interviews were also linked to events on the international arena, which was a useful undertaking to connect what takes place in the conference sphere to developments within Arctic governance and international relations. This mapping is presented in Chap. 2, which portrays central developments in the Arctic conference sphere. The second data collecting technique applied was participant observation at the Arctic Frontiers in 2017, 2018, and 2019, and the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2016, 2017, 2018, and 2019. This to obtain first-hand insight into what takes place at the conferences, see how they are orchestrated, and what image the organizers wanted to portray to the public. This image could later be contrasted with how the conferences are perceived in the media, and how informants describe the conferences, contrast them with each other, or different arenas. Participant observation also provided a shared experience with the informants, and thus a better understanding of the meaning of the data. In addition, participant observation provided information from speeches and practical details about the venue, exhibitors, sponsors, and networking events that were useful for the analysis of the outcomes of the two cases. Following the conferences over a period of years allowed for observing recurring presenters and issues that remained salient on the agenda, who were recurrent attendees, as well as new actors becoming engaged in the conference sphere and new priorities introduced through the programs. It provided insight into which states, and other actors, were most visible and who had the best speaking time. Participant observation further allowed for being “embedded in the action and context of a social setting,” which made it possible to capture unwritten rules or norms taken for granted by experienced participants and insiders (Guest et al., 2013, p. 76). Lastly, participant observation made it possible to note how people moved around at the venues, which sessions were prioritized, and activities taking place outside the program—such as side meetings and networking. The third means for data gathering was document analysis. First, this was useful to obtain an overview of the field—the Arctic governance literature and the literature on conferences—in which to situate the study. This included searching for conferences online and examining websites of conferences, workshops, seminars, and meetings attending to Arctic issues, to determine which to include in research (see also Steinveg, 2021). It further included a review of conference programs, the Arctic Frontiers from 2007 and the Arctic Circle Assembly from 2013, as well as postconference publications. Second, document analysis was applied to map out and categorize recurrent and high-agenda topics addressed at the two cases and at conferences in general. Third, it was a means to identify overlaps between conference topics and states’ priorities and interests in the region. Fourthly, the document analysis allowed for checking statements from the interviews with official communications. The review of conference programs revealed four categories of central topics: the impacts of climate change and the environment; recourse development and management; Northern communities and indigenous peoples; maritime issues and the Arctic Ocean. These issues were contextualized in a review of the Arctic policies of the Arctic states, in addition to non-Arctic states who have produced strategies. These

1.3

Outline of the Book

11

have been collected from Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ websites (see also Heininen et al., 2020). Governmental documents, such as white papers, reports, and political speeches have been analyzed to shed light on Arctic state policies and approaches to regional cooperation. Lastly, media coverage and the social media accounts and websites of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly were useful sources to disclose the official imagery of the conferences. The websites were also a source of information about the organizations, number of participants, partners and sponsors, the steering committee and advisory board, and the Arctic Circle Forums and the Seminars Abroad arranged by the Arctic Frontiers. These sources further contributed to the examination of the public attention devoted to the conferences and which issues are brought forward to the public sphere.

1.3

Outline of the Book

The remainder of this book is structured as follows: Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework applied for the analysis of the three mechanisms—actors, agenda-setting, and the Arctic governance architecture. Subsequently, the chapter explores connections between the Arctic conference realm and Arctic and international events and processes. This is followed by the outline of an ideal model of a conference, which is applied to the two cases throughout the remainder of the book. The last part of Chap. 2 is devoted to an in-depth account of the two cases: the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly. Chapter 3 familiarizes readers with the dependent variable, Arctic governance, by conceptualizing what is understood by governance and by accounting for central actors, entities, and arrangements that operate in the region. Chapter 2 thus sets the stage for the analysis of conferences within this system in the subsequent chapters. Chapter 4 looks at the first mechanism: actors engaged in the Arctic conference sphere. The chapter is structured around seven participant groups: Arctic state representatives, non-Arctic actors, the epistemic community, business representatives, institutions and non-governmental organizations, Indigenous peoples, and local and regional representatives. The primary objectives are inquiring into the main functions of conferences for each participant group, and to examine whether conferences contribute to broadening the community of Arctic stakeholders. Chapter 5 focuses on the second mechanism—agenda-setting—through the multiple streams framework. The chapter asks whether what happens at conferences is a mirror reflection of what takes place in other processes in Arctic governance, or whether conference activities affect these processes. Chapter 6 analyzes the third mechanism: the Arctic governance architecture. The foremost intention is to examine whether, how, and to what extent conferences influence and shape the architectural landscape in which they are situated.

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Introduction

Chapter 7 returns to the ideal model of a conference and discusses the extent to which its characteristics are present at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly and summarizes the different outcomes the two cases produce on the dependent variable: Arctic governance. The chapter also draws a connection between this book to studies of international relations, Arctic governance, and conference research. Lastly, the concluding chapter discusses how attention to conferences as arenas that can produce governance effects can contribute to studies of governance and diplomacy.

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Wegge, N. (2020). Arctic security strategies and the North Atlantic states. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 11, 360–382. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v11.2401 Wilson, P. (2016). Society, steward, or security actor? Three visions of the Arctic Council. Cooperation and Conflict, 51(1), 55–74. https://doi.org/10.1177/2F0010836715591711 Wilson Rowe, E. (2018). Arctic governance: Power in cross-border cooperation. Manchester University Press. Wilson Rowe, E. (2020). Analyzing frenemies: An Arctic repertoire of cooperation and rivalry. Political Geography, 76, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102072 Young, O. R. (1999). Governance in world affairs. Cornell University Press. Young, O. R. (2005). Governing the Arctic: From cold war theater to mosaic of cooperation. Global Governance, 11(1), 9–15. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800550 Young, O. R. (2013). Arctic futures: The power of ideas. In P. A. Berkman & A. Vylegzhanin (Eds.), Environmental security in the Arctic Ocean. NATO science for peace and security series C: Environmental security (pp. 123–136). Springer. Young, O. R. (2014). Navigating the interface. In O. Young, J. D. Kim, & Y. H. Kim (Eds.), The Arctic in world affairs. A North pacific dialogue on international cooperation in a changing Arctic (pp. 225–250). Korea Maritime Institute Press. Østhagen, A. (2021). The Arctic security region: Misconceptions and contradictions. Polar Geography, 44, 55–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/1088937X.2021.1881645

Chapter 2

Analytical Framework and Cases

To situate conferences within Arctic governance, to inquire into their functions for actors and potential as agenda-setting instruments, and to examine whether conferences are spaces where governance occur, it is necessary to conceptualize these arenas within existing theoretical frames about the international system and public policy. Thus, this chapter commences with elaborating on the theoretical framework applied for the analysis, which was introduced in the introductory chapter. The perspectives of neorealism, the multiple streams framework, and regime theory are connected to the three mechanisms of interest: actors in the conference sphere, agenda-setting, and the Arctic governance architecture. Moreover, for conferences to have a broader impact on Arctic and international affairs, it is necessary to consider their development in relation to other processes and events. Accordingly, the chapter subsequently introduces central developments within the Arctic conference sphere, which are connected to developments within Arctic affairs and international relations. The chapter also cast light on how a window of opportunity opened around 2007 for the establishment of the hybrid type of conferences at the center of this book, i.e. arenas that combine policy, science, and business. Following this overview, the chapter portrays an ideal model of a conference, which is applied throughout the remainder of the book for the examination of whether the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly fulfill its characteristics. The overall purpose of this ideal model of what a conference should accomplish is to connect the analysis of the two cases in this study to the literatures on Arctic governance, international relations, and global conferencing. The last part of the chapter is devoted to an in-depth presentation of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly. The chapter presents central characteristics of the conferences, including their background and purpose, how they are structured and organized, who participates at these arenas, and who are partners and sponsors. In addition, the international outreach of the two conferences is devoted attention: The Seminars Abroad arranged by the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Forums. Lastly, the chapter discusses the significance of the conference for its host state, and the strengths and weaknesses of the two different models of organizing a conference. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_2

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Analytical Framework and Cases

The chapter concludes on how the diverging philosophies behind the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly entails that these conferences occupy distinct spaces within Arctic governance and fulfill different functions for actors and as agenda-setting instruments.

2.1 2.1.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing The Neorealist Perspective on International Relations and Actors in the Arctic Conference Sphere

Neorealism, or structural realism, is the overarching framework applied for the analysis throughout this book, in particular for the actor mechanism. The actor mechanism is particularly central, because without organizers or participants, there would be no outcomes of these arenas, and the functions conferences can serve for various actor groups is of particular interest. By revealing why people attend conferences and what they can gain from participation, it is possible to disclose whether including these arenas in analysis within International Relations (IR) scholarship can add something to analysis of policymaking, governance, democracy, and diplomacy. Moreover, by examining conferences in the same way as neorealism view institutions, the book inquires into whether conferences can be supplements to the workings of states, institutions, and organizations. Neorealism falls under the same rationalist paradigm as neoliberal institutionalism from which regime theory derives, and these perspectives hold similar assumptions about the international system. Both neorealists and neoliberals perceive of the international system as characterized by anarchy—there is no “government over governments” (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 10). However, the liberal tradition holds that international institutions, or regimes, can affect the behavior of states and other actors, and contribute to weaken the international anarchy by being instances of international cooperation (Krasner, 1983). Realism holds five core assumptions about the international system (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 11). The first being that the international system is anarchic, understood as an ordering principle of a system comprising of independent political units (states) with no central authority above them. The second is that states possess offensive military capability and are potentially dangerous to each other. The third assumption is that states can never be certain about the intentions of other states, that they will not use offensive military capabilities against them. The fourth is that the most basic motive driving states is survival, as they want to maintain their sovereignty, and the fifth is that states think strategically about how to survive in the international system—they are rational (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 11). For the question of “who and what matters in international relations?” the neorealist answer would be that sovereign, self-interested states are the main actors within the international system (Grieco, 1988, p. 497). States can enter temporary

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A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

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alliances in the pursuit of common interests, but from the relative gains problem for cooperation, they must always bear in mind that a current ally can become a future foe (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 30-33; 52–53). States are not only concerned with whether cooperation provides them with gains, but also with the relative distribution of these gains and what potential adversaries might obtain (Grieco, 1988, p. 487). Relative-gains considerations and concerns about cheating are the two main factors inhibiting cooperation from a realist perspective. Still, cooperation between states does occur in a realist world, although it is “sometimes difficult to achieve” and “always difficult to sustain” (Mearsheimer, 1995, p. 12). Neorealists also recognize that states sometimes operate through institutions (Schweller & Priess, 1997, p. 3), and this book examines conferences through neorealism in the same way as the perspective conceives of international institutions. Waltz (1979) asserts that international institutions that can act effectively either acquire some of the attributes or capabilities of states or need the support of the principal states concerned with the issues in question (Waltz, 1979, p. 88). In like manner, Mearsheimer (1995) defines an institution as “a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other” (p. 8). The book applies Jervis’ typology of three types of institutions for the examination of conferences as arenas that can serve the interests of sovereign states. The first kind of institutions are binding and self-binding alliances and trade agreements, which are well-known tools of statecraft, and considered to reflect states’ pre-existing interests (Jervis, 1999, p. 55). What is important is that these arrangements are institutionalized because national leaders want them to have binding effects, and they are not autonomous in the sense of overriding or shaping the preference of those who established them (Ibid., p. 57). Thus, they reflect the realist view of international relations. The second kind is institutions as innovative instruments, which are outside the realm of normal statecraft and covers an area of unrealized common interest and potential for increased cooperation. Jervis points to the discussion of whether these fall in the category of devices that states have neglected, or whether they are not appreciated by scholars within the range of devices in fact utilized by states (1999, p. 58). This question is addressed throughout the book, which examines whether and how conferences are utilized by states and other actors, and explores conferences as an under-researched area within IR and Arctic governance scholarship. The third kind is institutions that have “life of their own,” which can cause changes in preferences, change beliefs about what is possible and desirable, and shape interests (Jervis, 1999, p. 59). It is when institutions are autonomous in this sense that neoliberal analysis makes its most distinctive contribution, according to Jervis. Lastly, an interesting argument by Jervis is that the importance of the dynamic effects of institutions has been underestimated, and that the unintended consequences of institutions are both the most interesting and powerful. This book inquires whether conferences can produce unintended consequences, and whether IR-scholarship can benefit from including these arenas as empirical entities.

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Analytical Framework and Cases

The book further examines whether conferences are advantageous for actors to advance their power, interests, legitimacy, and position. Commencing with power, Mearsheimer (2001) states that “power is the currency of great-power politics” and that calculations about power are the quintessence of how states think about the world (p. 12). Yet, there is considerable disagreement about how to define and measure this concept (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 55). In general, IR theories consider power as an attribute that is possessed by an actor to be used to coerce someone else. Of primary interest here is not the offensive realist definition of power in terms of material assets and military resources (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 57; Waltz, 1979, pp. 131–139). Rather, it is power as a relational concept, understood as influence, and the ability to change the outcome of a situation in the direction of one’s interests through shaping the preferences of others (Lukes, 2005, p. 19; Dahl, 1961, p. 164). Lukes (2005) argues power best is viewed in three dimensions. The first dimension is decision-making power that aligns with the traditional understanding of power—as getting someone to do something they otherwise would not do by using force. If you exercise power over someone else, you have exercised power in the first dimension. The second dimension of power is most relevant for in this book, particularly in Chap. 5, where the central question is who controls the agenda and decides what gets decided. Power in the second dimension can also be controlling what choices people make, which alternatives people face, and what issues are up for discussion. In addition, Lukes (2005) argues for a third dimension of power that entails a focus on how peoples’ ideas and preferences get shaped and formed. Realism considers that power is the key to states’ survival, and that survival is the state’s primary interest (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 21). This book takes a broader approach to the concept when examining whether conferences can be arenas for actors to advance their interests in the region. When looking at state actors, the emphasis is on the articulated interests and priorities as expressed in Arctic policy and strategy documents and inquires whether conferences can be arenas for states to advance these. Pertaining to non-state actors, interests are understood as the main objectives they seek to achieve within Arctic governance, related either to the purpose of their affiliation or the group they belong to. Suchman (1995) defines legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (p. 574). This recognizes the evaluative, cognitive, and socially constructed nature of legitimacy and implies it is a socially desired good. The “socially constructed system” considered in this book is Arctic governance, and the Arctic states, northerners, and Indigenous peoples are the main actors within this system. The book inquires into whether conference engagement is a means for other actors to advance their claims as legitimate stakeholders in the region, and for actors to acquire a higher position in the Arctic governance system.

2.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

2.1.2

19

The Multiple Streams Framework and Agenda-Setting at Conferences

The Arctic has become a region of global interest, which is evident not only by the expanding group of stakeholders, but also through the broadened agenda. From the definition of agenda-setting as “the process of raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors” (Livingston, 1992), an interesting question is whether conferences have contributed to the globalization of Arctic issues. The book draws on the multiple streams framework (MSF) for the agenda-setting mechanism, which was developed through an in-depth study of the US government in 1984 by John W. Kingdon. Central questions to be examined in Chap. 5 are whether and how conferences are arenas for problem definition, for deliberating solutions to challenges in the region, and for coalition groups to push their issues. The choice of employing the multiple streams framework for the examination of agenda-setting through conferences builds on the argument of Carter et al. (2011). They note how political processes at conferences and larger summits resemble the “garbage can” model of Cohen et al. (1972), where problems, policies, and politics sometimes convene, but often attach themselves randomly and independently of each other. The multiple streams framework was inspired by the “garbage can” model and is structured around the notion that processes relevant for agenda-setting are found in the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream (Kingdon, 2011; Béland, 2016). In the problem stream, problem recognition occurs when unfavorable conditions capture the attention of people on the inside and outside of government. Because problems are considered social constructs, someone must frame a problem in a certain way for it to receive the attention of policymakers. This makes policy entrepreneurs key actors within the multiple streams framework (Herweg et al., 2018). Policy entrepreneurs display many resemblances to the epistemic community, which is one of the identified participant groups at conferences. This book enhances our knowledge about whether and how conferences can be efficient arenas for the Arctic’s policy entrepreneurs to bring problems to policymakers’ attention and elevate their prioritized issues on the agenda. The policy stream is made up of alternatives, proposals, and solutions generated by a community of policy specialists (Kingdon, 2011). Here, agenda change can also come from path dependency—the extent to which an idea deviates from previous policy paths—or spill-over from policy in other issue areas with implications through institutional mechanisms (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 24). The main interest for the analysis in Chap. 5 is whether conferences are advantageous arenas for the flow of ideas, alternatives, proposals, and solutions to defined problems generated by policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2011, p. 127). Specifically, conferences are examined as arenas for the epistemic community to sell their ideas, and as arenas for the diffusion of norms and values within the Arctic community. Lastly, the political stream consists of swings in the national mood, the public opinion, election results, changes in administration, partisan or ideological shifts,

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Analytical Framework and Cases

and interest groups’ campaigns (Herweg et al., 2018, pp. 24-25). There is a dynamic element in this stream, as all these elements are subject to change over time and across state borders. The attention devoted to Arctic challenges can vary depending on the party in power in key states. For the inquiry into the functions of conferences within the political stream, the focus is shifted from national features towards transnational coalition groups, environmental groups’ campaigns, and the media. Chapter 5 examines the purposefulness of conferences for these actors to shape the discourse and influence the agenda. The key to understanding agenda-setting and policy change is the coupling of the three streams: when and how they come together at critical times. Proposals from the policy stream are elevated to the governmental agenda when the political stream opens a window of opportunity, and the timing for an issue becomes favorable (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 172-173). An example from the Arctic is found in the argument of Young (2009), that a state-change took place in Arctic affairs in the 1980s and the 1990s, which arose from socio-political developments and contributed to problem definition. Challenges related to pollution, nuclear safety, and environmental protection were a window of opportunity to elevate Arctic challenges on the international agenda and led to the development of collaborative initiatives in the region. For example, changes in the political stream coupled with increased concern for the environment and climate change paved way for the first ministerial meeting of the Arctic states in Finland in 1991. This commenced the Rovaniemi Process that resulted in the signing of the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) in 1991, and the establishment of the Arctic Council in 1996 (Koivurova, 2009). A problem in the MSF is defined as “conditions that deviate from policymakers’ or citizens’ ideal states and that are seen as public in a sense that government action is needed to resolve them” (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 222). However, not all such conditions automatically receive political attention, and decisive factors in the agenda-setting process include indicators, feedback, and focusing events. The latter is a situation where devoted advocates frame specific conditions in ways that draws the attention of policymakers (Herweg et al., 2018). The 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA) can be considered such a focusing event that contributed to agenda change. It was the symbol of what Young (2009) labeled a second statechange in Arctic affairs, which contributed to tighten the links between the Arctic and the planetary systems. Underlying drivers for this change were a combination of biophysical developments (the impacts of climate change) and socioeconomic events (the spread of the effects of globalization to the Arctic). The main interest for the forthcoming analysis is whether conferences can be windows of opportunities for advocates to push their solutions or draw attention to specific problems.

2.1.3

Regime Theory and the Arctic Governance Architecture

The central research puzzle in regime theory has been explaining how states can cooperate effectively in the absence of a political authority resembling a government

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A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

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that can prevent others from cheating (Young, 1999). The proposed solution is that states succeed in cooperating when and to the extent they can form institutional arrangements or sets of roles, rules, and relationships—a regime (Young, 1999). The literature distinguishes between an elemental regime and an international regime. An elemental regime is explicit international legal arrangements (Raustiala & Victor, 2004, p. 279). An international regime is defined by Levy et al. (1995) as “social institutions that consist of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas” (p. 274). These are different from international organizations, the broader structure of international society, and from the world order, the latter which “encompasses the sum of all institutional arrangements operative at the international level” (Levy et al., 1995, p. 274). Regime theory poses the argument that regimes affect the behavior of actors by functioning as social institutions with recognized patterns of practice around which expectations converge. This book examines whether engagement through conferences can contribute to explaining how actors engaged in Arctic affairs manage to cooperate. Or, whether conferences should be viewed through the neorealist perspective on international relations as tools of statecraft. For the examination of conferences within the Arctic governance architecture, it is necessary to clarify some additional concepts. Specifically, what is understood by governance, an architecture, and a regime complex. Commencing with governance, this phenomenon encompasses multiple dimensions and has diverse meanings. Rhodes (1996) summarizes characteristics of governance as: 1) interdependence between organizations, including non-state actors, 2) continuing interactions between network members, caused by the need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes, 3) relationships rooted in trust and regulated by rules negotiated and agreed upon by participants in the network, and 4) a significant degree of autonomy from the state (p. 660). Governance often arises a matter of public concern whenever the members of a social group find that they are interdependent (Young, 1997, p. 3). This is central for the analysis of Arctic governance, where the impacts of climate change, shipping, search and rescue, and resource extraction are examples of issues states cannot deal with unilaterally. Significant changes in the governance literature followed the end of the Cold War, as scholars reexamined the global order and governance processes. Dealing with environmental concerns contributed to the idea of a global civil society and to systematic consideration of institutional linkages and the ways individual regimes are embedded in larger institutional structures (Rosenau et al., 1992; Lipschutz, 1996; Young, 1997). The notion of governance without government developed in the 1990s, as an alternative to the top-down governmental control through authoritative decisions with claims to legitimacy. Thus, government is activities backed by formal (state) authority, while governance includes activities backed by shared goals. The key issue in distinguishing between government and governance is the weight attributed to social institutions in ameliorating or solving collective action problems in governance (Rhodes, 1996; Rosenau, 1992; Young, 1997).

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The theoretical and analytical focus from government to governance entails a shift from structures to processes, and that political authority has become multileveled and operating through network configurations. From this, private actors and sub-national groups are just as important as traditional centers of authority, which blurs the line between public and private (Walters, 2004). However, a noteworthy weak spot in the governance literature is that of responsibility and accountability (Peters & Pierre, 1998, p. 228). The new governance model seeks to replace political power derived from legal mandates or elected office with an entrepreneurial style of leadership, which diffuses the linkage between control and accountability. Form this, Arctic governance is understood as follows. It is a dynamic network configuration of interdependent members who interact regularly to manage common affairs and solve collective problems that emerge as new issues are introduced to the agenda. Arctic governance comprises a broad scope of actors, state and non-state, and is evolved around shared norms, agreed upon rules of conduct, and social institutions. To embark on the examination of whether conferences can contribute as valuable entities within Arctic governance, it is necessary to elaborate on what is understood by a governance architecture, which is a concept found within the Earth System Governance literature. The underlying conviction of these scholars is that international institutions do not exist in a void and cannot be analyzed without considering the complex web they operate within (Biermann & Kim, 2020, pp. 1-2). These complex institutional settings have become referred to as governance architectures (Biermann & Kim, 2020, p. 7. See also Hurrell, 2007; Young, 2008; Biermann, 2014). A global governance architecture consists of building blocks (e.g., international institutions, regimes, transnational institutions, and networks), structural features (e.g., interlinkages between institutions, regime complexes, and degrees of fragmentation), and policy responses (Biermann & Kim, 2020, p. 7). In this book, special attention is devoted to one of the structural features: regime complexes. A regime complex is “a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively” (Orsini et al., 2013, p. 29). It can be conceptualized as an open system that is sufficiently held together to be recognizable, but that is not completely detached from the rest of global governance (Gómez-Mera et al., 2020, p. 138). Mapping a regime complex requires identifying its units—regimes—and characterizing the connections among these units. Connections emerge from partial overlaps over a given issue area, which can be at the normative or the impact level, and they can be conflicting or synergic (Gómez-Mera et al., 2020, p. 139). Partially overlapping membership makes regime complexes particularly dynamic (GómezMera et al., 2020, p. 140). For example, the Arctic regime complex comprises treaties, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations,

2.1

A Theoretical Framework for Global Conferencing

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non-governmental organizations, and transnational networks. Many of these entities exhibit overlapping membership and deal with overlapping issue areas. There are several treaty regimes, with the Arctic states and non-Arctic states as members, within the Arctic regime complex that cover various issue areas. Treaties on flora and fauna include the Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, and the UN Convention on Biological Diversity. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the UN Fish Stocks Convention, the International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters, and the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling address the oceans, shipping, and fishing. The UN Convention on Climate Change, and the UN Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants are relevant treaties on climate change and the environment. The ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, and the UN International Convention on Civil and Political Rights concern civil, political, and social rights, and lastly, the Svalbard Treaty: sovereignty. Moreover, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations within the Arctic regime complex include the Standing Committee of the Parliamentarians of the Arctic Region, the Nordic Council of Ministers, the West Nordic Council, the International Maritime Organization, the UN Environmental Programme, and the UN Development Programme. These are also observers to the Arctic Council. In addition, the Arctic regime complex comprises non-state actors and non-governmental organizations, such as the International Arctic Science Committee, the International Arctic Social Sciences Association, the International Union for Circumpolar Health, and the Northern Forum. This book sheds light on the implications of conferences as an added dimension to the Arctic governance architecture, and as potential points for connections among the units outlined above. Another issue of interest is the emphasis on the increased importance of private actors, which raises questions of legitimacy. In modern democracy, legitimacy relies on input-oriented arguments (government by the people)—linked to democratic procedures and formalized arrangements, and output-oriented arguments (government for the people)—the effectiveness of institutions (Kalfagianni et al., 2020, p. 86). In evaluating the legitimacy of transnational governance, the literature shows that there are obstacles to provision for equal opportunities for participation, and that there is a lack of accountability to the public (Kalfagianni et al., 2020, p. 88). If conferences function as arenas for governance processes, these issues are expected to be central concerns. Lastly, a relevant question is whether private actors are democratizing global governance through the involvement of civil society organizations and citizen initiatives, thus providing a space for previously marginalized actors. Specifically, do the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle provide such a space in the region, or do they contribute to promoting already dominant actors within Arctic governance? A related issue is that of accountability, and consequences for the democratic process if deliberation is moved out of formal forums comprised of elected officials and into informal meetings on the sidelines of conferences.

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2.2

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Analytical Framework and Cases

Central Developments in the Arctic Conference Sphere

From the 1960s until the 1980s, Arctic conferences were mostly in the form of science unions’ meetings and issue-specific science conferences (Steinveg, 2021, p. 138). Issues related to the oceans were prevalent during the 1970s and the 1980s and—seeing how the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) was negotiated from 1973 to 1982—this is one example of how conferences reflect general international developments (Ibid.). Concerning participants, conferences established before the 1990s gathered scientists, experts, and specialists, but made no significant effort to involve or communicate to policymakers or the industry (Ibid., p. 139). This however changed after the end of the Cold War. Several international science conferences emerged in the 1990s, including the International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP), the International Conference on Environmental Radioactivity in the Arctic, and the International Congress of Arctic Social Sciences (ICASS). The ICASS has been arranged every 3 years since 1992 and is still attended by Indigenous peoples, northerners, decisionmakers, politicians, and academics. Furthermore, the Calotte Academy was established in 1991, as a symposium intended to promote interdisciplinary, academic, and policy-oriented dialogue between actors from both academia and policy (Calotte Academy, 2021). The Arctic Science Summit Week (ASSW) was initiated by the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) in 1999, aiming to provide opportunities for coordination, cooperation, and collaboration among the various scientific organizations involved in Arctic research (Steinveg, 2021, p. 140). Accordingly, there are notable changes in the Arctic conference sphere in the 1990s. Conference agendas incorporated a broader range of issues, and conferences became tuned towards broader stakeholder involvement and collaboration through interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral, and multinational initiatives. Specifically, conferences established in the 1990s aimed not only to engage the scientific community, but also to involve policymakers and the industry and have an impact on political processes. Two factors contributed to this development. First, the growing concern for pollution and nuclear safety in the Arctic, and a recognition of the need for joint efforts to address global challenges. Second, changes in the geopolitical landscape following the end of the Cold War and opening of collaborative relations between the East and the West (Steinveg, 2021, p. 156). From this, a window of opportunity opened for Arctic issues to rise on the international agenda. The Arctic Ocean and topics related to shipping continued to dominate the conference agenda in the early 2000s, in addition to climate change and energyrelated issues. The number of conferences attending to Arctic issues continued to steadily increase, and there was a notable peak around 2005 (see Fig. 2.1). This corresponds with Young’s description of a “second state change” in Arctic affairs brought about by developments that opened the Arctic to global concerns (2009, p. 427). These were the impacts of climate change and the spread of the socioeconomic effects of globalization to the Arctic (Young, 2009, p. 427). As such, a second window of opportunity—for Arctic conferences to expand in number and

2.2

Central Developments in the Arctic Conference Sphere

25

Fig. 2.1 Number of Arctic conferences established and arranged annually

popularity—opened around 2007. This must also be seen in relation to the geopolitical situation among the Arctic states at the time. In August 2007, a Russian science expedition descended two mini submarines down to the underwater Lomonosov ridge and planted a Russian flag on the seabed of the North Pole—which led to changes in the political climate among the Arctic states (Dodds, 2010). The dive was called “an openly choreographed publicity stunt,” and “a symbolic move to enhance the government’s disputed claim to nearly half of the floor of the Arctic Ocean and potential oil or other resources there” (New York Times, 2007). The event was interpreted as a direct claim to the North Pole, and the discourse about the Arctic became increasingly centered around sovereignty issues (Gerhardt et al., 2010; Dodds & Nuttall, 2015). Yet, while this incident sparked controversy and renewed attention to national military capacity in the region, it also intensified diplomatic efforts, exemplified by the Ilulissat Declaration signed by the USA, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark/Greenland in 2008 (Wilson Rowe, 2020). Changes in the political landscape also spurred changes in the Arctic conference sphere. Specifically, the need for bringing scientific knowledge into the policymaking process became a central objective of conference organizers. This was considered a means to promote knowledge-based business and community development and was the main intention behind the establishment of the Arctic

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Frontiers. Arctic conferences established from the mid-2000s were both interdisciplinary—as different Arctic issue areas became more interlinked—and cross-sectoral—as the need for information exchange and communication among various stakeholders became more pressing. There was another peak in the number of established Arctic conferences around 2013 (see Fig. 2.1), which was also the time when the interdisciplinary and intersectoral character of Arctic conferences was truly materialized, and the Arctic Circle Assembly was launched. As global industries and non-Arctic states were pushing for involvement in the region, it was recognized that these actors needed to be included in the debate to foster a sense of responsibility and balance between economic development and sustainable communities. Accordingly, the chosen cases can be considered a new, hybrid form of conferences. By bringing stakeholders together and fostering interdisciplinary and cross-sectoral dialogue on the Arctic, these types of conferences have greater potential to contribute to the science, policy, business interplay in the region.

2.3

The Ideal Model of a Conference

The ideal model of a conference applied in this book primarily derives from the interview material and has been identified inductively throughout the study. However, it also finds support in the theoretical framework and draws on the literature on global conferencing. Specifically, central concepts from the theoretical framework included in the model are relationship building and dealmaking (from regime theory), government leadership and legitimacy (from neorealism), agenda-setting and the promotion of ideas (from the multiple streams framework). The general purpose of a conference can be summarized quite simply: bringing together people. Yet, this underlying objective produces a variety of additional outcomes for people who engage at these gatherings where the formal and informal converge. The following accounts for eight characteristics of what a conference do—beyond bringing together people. First, and related to a conference’s general purpose: it contributes to relationship building. A conference is an arena for networking, for developing new connections, and maintaining established relations. This is a central premise within regime theory, founded in the assumption that international institutions (i.e., regimes) can affect the behavior of actors by constructing norms and rules of conduct. From this, institutions are assumed to reduce barriers to cooperation—such as distrust and cheating— among participating actors by facilitating frequent interaction and information sharing (see Keohane, 1982). Second, a conference is a space for dealmaking among participants. Policymakers can learn about the priority areas of other states, scientists can discuss their work in relation to others, and business representatives can find customers and partners. This is also related to assumptions within regime theory, as well as two of the types of institutions identified by Jervis (1999). First, institutions as innovative instruments

2.3

The Ideal Model of a Conference

27

that covers an area of unrealized common interest and potential for increased cooperation (Jervis, 1999, p. 58). Second, conferences can produce outcomes that were not indented by the organizers, and thus resemble the third kind of institutions: those with “a life of their own” that can shape the interests and preferences of participating actors (Ibid., p. 59). Third, a conference can be an arena for bolstering government leadership: to promote the interests of states and assert state dominance within a territory or issue area. Conferences in this way reflect the power distribution in other areas of international affairs and reinforce the hierarchical and state-centric model of politics (Death, 2011). This aligns with the neorealist perspective on institutions, as being created and upheld in the interests of the most powerful states in the system, and as entities with no noteworthy influence on outcomes within international relations. At the same time, the fourth characteristic of a conference is that is can be a marketplace for the promotion of ideas among a variety of different stakeholders. Thus, conferences can also challenge the state-centric understanding of global power relations and contribute to influencing governance structures through promoting different perspectives and broadening the ways in which an issue is perceived (Hodder, 2015; Depledge & Dodds, 2017). Moreover, an academic conference contributes to legitimize new paradigms, for example reinforcing new ideas and directions in research, which can contribute to drive a discipline in a particular direction (Gross & Fleming, 2021). These are all functions of conferences that aligns with the multiple streams framework of agenda-setting, particularly the work of policy entrepreneurs in the policy stream. The fifth characteristic is that a conference is a performance space for democratic values, such as opportunities for equal participation, social equity, transparency, and openness. These are also central issues within a governance system. Moreover, a conference can itself serve a democratizing function, through the involvement of actors that do not have access to formal arrangements, organizations, or institutions (Haas, 2002). As Chap. 4 discusses, this particularly concerns non-Arctic state representatives, but also citizens of Arctic states, sub-national, regional, and local participants. The sixth characteristic of a conference, as also argued by Craggs and Mahony (2014), is that it is a space for agenda-setting through presentations from the stage, conference proceedings, and media attention. This makes it pertinent to inquire into the Arctic conference sphere from the multiple streams framework. Particularly, whether conferences are arenas for problem definition, for the flow of proposed solutions to challenges in the region, and whether they are arenas for media or engaged citizens to influence the public debate and broader regional agenda. The seventh characteristic of a conference, which is a particularly important one, is that it is more than what takes place at the main stage. A conference serves as a magnate for side events and side meetings among participants. Thus, conferences are central arenas for unofficial, or track two, diplomacy (McConnell et al., 2012). This characteristic is examined related to the epistemic community (i.e., academics, scientist, and institution affiliated participants), who are expected to attend conferences due to this function. However, founded in regime theory, this characteristic

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can also potentially be significant for representatives from lower levels of government, sub-national and sub-regional participants. Lastly, a conference can be a legitimizing tool for participants who seek to establish themselves as experts within a field or as relevant stakeholders within a domain (Craggs & Mahony, 2014). This is a central feature for the analysis in Chap. 4, concerning the questions of whether conferences can function as a “backdoor” into the Arctic governance system for non-Arctic states, and whether conferences contribute to expanding the pool of legitimate stakeholders. This analysis draws on the neorealist view on institutions and the literature on regime complexes. The characteristics of the ideal model are applied in the empirical chapters for the examination of the functions of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly.

2.4

Arctic Frontiers

The Arctic Frontiers was established in 2006 by the research company Akvaplan Niva. The first conference took place in 2007, and the Arctic Frontiers has since then been arranged every January in Tromsø, Norway. Up until 2017, the Arctic Frontiers was hosted at UiT—The Arctic University of Norway, and from 2018 at Clarion Hotel the Edge. The stated purpose of the Arctic Frontiers is to function as an international arena that contributes to setting the agenda for responsible and sustainable development of the Arctic. The conference brings together representatives from government, business, academia, and the local community. The Arctic Frontiers was created to fulfill two necessities within Arctic governance. First, the need for an arena to disseminate scientific knowledge and research to policymakers. Second, the need for an arena to advance knowledge-based decision-making and social, economic, and business development. Thus, the Arctic Frontiers was intended to fill the demand for a mechanism for bringing knowledge into political processes and facilitate information exchange across disciplines. This initiative coincided with the Norwegian government’s aim of pursuing an active High North strategy, and to position itself in the post-Cold War international arena. The Norwegian government’s primary goals were to ensure political stability and sustainable development of the region, safeguarding Norwegian interests, involve Norwegian businesses in cooperation with Russia, and ensure that the Indigenous peoples take part in decision-making processes concerning them (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). These objectives have all been supported through the Arctic Frontiers platform. The 2005 High North policy further highlighted the necessity of presenting a coherent picture of High North issues at national and international levels. To that end, the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers emphasize that contributing to shaping the narrative about the Arctic and how the region is perceived internationally are essential components of the conference. This endeavor is something the organizers have been successful with, and there has been a notable development towards more balanced views and a more realistic understanding of the region among non-Arctic actors over the years. Having

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Arctic Frontiers

29

international delegates travel to Tromsø and see the Arctic for themselves has had a positive impact in this regard. This success of the Arctic Frontiers has been aided by the Norwegian government’s interest in using the conference as a platform, and a senior advisor from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs working in the secretariat from 2015 to 2018, which contributed to professionalizing the conference and to attract high-level delegates.

2.4.1

The Structure and Organization of the Arctic Frontiers

The multiple streams framework for examining the agenda-setting processes distinguishes between actors on the inside and outside of government, a divide that can usefully be applied to conferences. The initiators, secretariat, and steering committee are on the inside. The secretariat is responsible for day-to-day operations, organizing the annual conference, and reporting to the steering committee. The steering committee comprise people from the partners of the conference. They convene in advance of each year’s conference, where they evaluate and discuss previous experiences, future topics, and the general profile of the conference. However, while the steering committee provides guidance and recommendations it does not have decision-making authority. Having a say in who are invited as speakers gives the secretariat agenda-setting influence. However, this process is conducted in close cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which must also be considered a central agenda setter at the conference. The Arctic Frontiers has been organized around five pillars: Policy, Science, Business, Arena, and Young. The policy and science sections have been part of the conference since the beginning. When examining the Arctic Frontiers’ programs from the initial years, there is a strong discernment of two separate conferences. The science part supersedes the policy days and is quite technical: it is science for scientists, and not science for policy. At its creation, the Arctic Frontiers therefore resembled an issue-specific science conference, with policy and business representatives convening on separate days of the conference week rather than being integrated in the science sessions. The business pillar was included at the 2014 conference, because of the industry aspect of Arctic affairs becoming more prominent. One of the organizers described how a Finnish delegation from Oulu visiting Tromsø drew attention to the need for a business-to-business arena. The initiative was brought forward to the Troms County Council, a senior partner of the Arctic Frontiers, who then got involved with the Arctic Frontiers in arranging the business pillar. This was first included as an opening of the science section but has since 2018 been incorporated in the plenary policy and arena arrangements. This was a positive development towards the objective of enabling the policy, science, business interplay. The young pillar was added in 2016 and was intended to bring together an international community of students, early-career scientists, and professionals to share knowledge and new perspectives on Arctic development. This program has

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expanded to include an Arctic Career Seminar arranged at UiT and Emerging Leaders, which facilitates meetings between young professionals, PhD students, post docs, and representatives from academia, business, and the public sector. Young Ambassadors is a program where a selected group of Norwegian and international students are invited to participate and communicate their experience from the conference. Lastly, the Youth Science and Exploration Convention, Science for Schools, and Science for Kids initiatives have been added to the young pillar. The arena pillar was also added to the format in 2016, and consists of workshops, panel discussions, networking sessions, open forums, and cultural and social events. According to one of the organizers, the rationale behind this pillar was threefold. First, it developed from the acknowledgement that delegates come to the conference not only for the sessions, but also to meet colleagues, and to establish and maintain networks. Thus, the conference needs to facilitate such activities to be attractive. Second, and related, Tromsø is a remote location, and it is easier for delegates to legitimize traveling to the conference if it also provides opportunities to host side events and use the arena for their own meetings. This aligns with a central characteristic of the aforementioned ideal model: a conference being a magnate for side events and side meetings. Third, the growing partner network, which consists of national and international bodies, can benefit from coming together in the informal setting provided by the arena pillar. The Open Arctic arrangements were also initiated as part of the arena pillar in 2016, and the organizers have since worked to incorporate these events into the broader production. Open Arctic arrangements are open for everyone to attend with no cost. They are held in Tromsø during the conference week, and in Tromsø and other Norwegian cities throughout the year. The stated purpose is to create a public interest for international relations, business development, and environmental issues in the Arctic. The arrangements aim to make the Arctic thematic more understandable and relatable, and to make the Arctic Frontiers more accessible for the public. Since 2016, the Open Arctic arrangements have become more integrated in the city of Tromsø and have become part of the policy pillar through cooperation with Tromsø Municipality and Troms County Council. This is related to the Municipality’s Arctic Capital project, and the County Council’s Urban Arctic project. Open Arctic is an attempt to engage those living in the Arctic in the discussion about the future of the region. Still, one research institution affiliated informant argues the Open Arctic arrangements has not been a successful effort to make the conference more accessible, which is signified by the low media coverage and that most people in Tromsø have a weak connection to the conference. From the 2020 Arctic Frontiers, titled Power of Knowledge, the organizers adopted a new strategy that entailed removing the pillar format. Rather, the program and other activities, including the workings of the steering committee, are structured around four tracks. First, the emphasis on ocean issues is continued, both as a priority in the North and in a broader international perspective. The second focus area is society, which is a large category comprising governance, technology, and culture. The third category is sustainable business/industry development. The fourth

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category returns to the founding idea of the Arctic Frontiers: science diplomacy and knowledge-based decision-making. The primary objective of the latter is to develop the conference into a more professional arena with more academic content, and to keep advancing and strengthening the connection between science and governance. Following the Covid-19 pandemic, from the 2021 conference Building Bridges and the 2022 conference Pathways, the Arctic Frontiers offers what they call a “hybrid conference solution,” with an in-person conference in Tromsø and the option of digital participation. As the chapter later discusses, the Arctic Circle organization chose a different course. The 2021 Assembly was cancelled and replaced by free online webinars throughout the fall, and the 2022 Assembly was arranged with in-person attendance only.

2.4.2

Participants and Partners of the Arctic Frontiers

Members of government, ministers, state secretaries, civil servants, academics, scientists, students, members from the business community, and Indigenous representatives are all included in the participant pool at the Arctic Frontiers. The organizers aim to attract high-level politicians, as well as representatives from the business community, and allocate resources towards getting relevant speakers and delegates. This is achieved by utilizing the partner network, and through close cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organizers seek to attract delegates from Russia, the EU, Northern America, as well as the Nordic countries. The pool of participants has grown from the approximately 500 at the first conference in 2007. In 2017, 1449 participants were registered, of which 1193, or 82%, came from Arctic states. The participation list from the 2018 conference contained 1337 participants. However, the cost of participation at the Arctic Frontiers is a frustration brought up by the bulk part of the interviewed informants. The cost of attending all 4 days of the 2020 conference was approximately USD 850 (and USD 700 for students). One Canadian academic participant describes the participation fee as “ridiculously expensive—probably the most expensive Arctic conference there is.” The science community is particularly affected, as this group has limited funding and must justify expenses for conference participation to their institution. This challenge is known to the organizers, but who point to the cost of arranging the conference compared to the low sponsor contributions. The Arctic Frontiers’ sponsor network is an extensive group of national and international partners, who are members of the steering committee. They contribute not only financially to the conference, but also with their competence, input, and connections. Senior partners, who have been involved since the beginning, are Troms County Council, UiT—The Arctic University of Norway, ConocoPhillips, The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ARCTOS research network, the Research Council of Norway, and Akvaplan Niva. Other partners include Tromsø Municipality, the Institute of Marine Research, several Norwegian universities, the

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University Centre in Svalbard, Innovation Norway, the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, and Equinor. In addition, there are associated partners and “friends of the conference.” According to the organizers, the decision of which partners to team up with has been founded in the initial objective of contributing to community and business development, and to provide a solid knowledge base for decision-making. In addition to associating partners from various sectors, the governmental aspect has been important, as much of the activities of the Arctic Frontiers necessitates involvement of regional or national governmental bodies.

2.4.3

The Arctic Frontiers’ International Outreach: Seminars Abroad

Since 2014, as part of the arena pillar, the Arctic Frontiers has arranged Seminars Abroad at various international locations, including in the Nordic countries, the USA, Russia, Canada, and southern Europe. The aim of these seminars is primarily networking: to promote the Arctic Frontiers internationally, make connections to the conference, and networking for the partner institutions. The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been involved in these arrangements since 2015. The Arctic Frontiers work with embassies in countries where they host the Seminars Abroad, with the aim of promoting Norwegian Arctic policy, interests, and priorities. All Norwegian Embassies are intended to work with High North issues. Thus, Seminars Abroad is described by a government employee as serving a dual function, where the Norwegian government gets an international platform for its Arctic policy and the embassies get a pre-designed package on Arctic issues. Seminars Abroad are also useful arenas for the communication of Arctic issues to non-Arctic state actors. For example, regarding best practices for sustainable development, and the necessity of balancing between environmental protection and business development seeing how there are humans living in the region. Seminars Abroad are also arenas for advancing the primary focus area pushed through the Arctic Frontiers: The Arctic Ocean (see also Chap. 5). This is exemplified by participation at other international arenas and conferences. The Arctic Frontiers arranged the Blue Knowledge for Blue Growth seminar in cooperation with the Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Our Ocean conference in Bali in 2018. The Arctic Frontiers arranged the session Arctic Ocean and Blue economy at the 8th Symposium on the Impacts of an Ice-Diminishing Arctic on Naval and Maritime Operations conference in Washington in 2019. Also, the Knowledge for Ocean Sustainability seminar was organized in Singapore in 2019 by the Arctic Frontiers, the Norwegian Embassy, National University of Singapore, and Innovation Norway. In addition to the functions of educating non-Arctic actors and advancing thematic priorities, Seminars Abroad has also served the objective of maintaining and

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improving relations with Russia. There were two Seminars Abroad in Russia in 2015, and one organizer points to the impact for the 2016 Arctic Frontiers, where the number of Russian participants was doubled. This illustrates the function conferences serve for interaction between states in the Arctic, even when relations are tense in other areas of international relations, as they were in the aftermath of the 2014 Crimea-crisis.

2.4.4

The Value of the Arctic Frontiers for Norway

The Arctic Frontiers has been centered around the Norwegian government’s priorities in the Arctic. International cooperation is one of the five identified priority areas of the Norwegian government, which was first put forward in Norway’s Arctic Policy from 2014. Norway’s Arctic Strategy—between geopolitics and social development from 2017 further underlines international cooperation as “crucial for development in the Arctic” (p. 15). The 2017 Arctic strategy also states that the Norwegian government actively utilizes the Arctic Frontiers to engage in dialogue about the High North, and to set the agenda regionally, nationally, and internationally (p. 14). The Arctic Frontiers is considered supportive for the “vision of a peaceful, innovative and sustainable north” (Norwegian Ministries, 2017). One policy informant describes collaboration with the Arctic Frontiers in this way: Tromsø is important in an Arctic perspective. It is in Norway’s interest to strengthen the Arctic Frontiers because it is an important platform. That is how it [the engagement of a senior advisor in the secretariat] begun—an effort to strengthen the secretariat, professionalize the conference and work closely with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are in competition, over sponsors, speakers, participants, and prominence. This mirrors the rivalry between Tromsø and Reykjavik to grab the title as the “Arctic capital.” The informant cited above asserts there is a misconceived war between the conferences, and that it is productive with more arenas promoting important topics. Even so, the interviewee goes on to say that “there is a reason for why Norway does not send delegations at the highest level to the Arctic Circle.” This underlines the Norwegian government’s priority towards the Arctic Frontiers and unwillingness to participate at the Icelandic counterpart. Furthermore, the Norwegian Arctic strategy from 2017 reads that the Norwegian government is concerned with the Arctic Council keeping its status as the central meeting place on Arctic issues, and that parallel forums do not emerge. To that end, another policy informant points to the difference between the two conferences in their support of the Arctic Council, and the informant declares the Arctic Frontiers a clear winner. The Arctic Frontier’s connection to the Arctic Council was strengthened with the opening of the Arctic Council secretariat in Tromsø in 2013. The governance structure surrounding the Arctic Frontiers was further enhanced with the

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allocation of the Arctic Economic Council secretariat to Tromsø in 2015, and the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in 2016 (see Chap. 6). The competitive element between the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly is evident from how the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became deeper involved in the Arctic Frontiers after the launch of Icelandic counterpart, with a senior advisor appointed to the secretariat in 2015. The senior advisor worked with Seminars Abroad and with strengthening the policy section by attracting high-level delegates. International delegates are paid to attend the Arctic Frontiers, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranges media trips for international journalists to have them write about the conference. Accordingly, the Arctic Frontiers is a platform through which the Norwegian government can promote Norwegian Arctic policy and advance and safeguard its interests in front of an international audience. It is an arena to display Norway as a leading Arctic state and display Norway’s accomplishments in a high-technological, well-developed society—“the Arctic capital.” The Arctic Frontiers’ function for the Norwegian government is expressed by the informant cited below: It is in Norway’s interest to balance the debate regarding environmental protection and resource development. Not everyone know people are living in the Arctic. So, they make propositions to ban shipping, or for strict environmental protection, which makes business activities and infrastructure development near impossible. This is not in Norway’s interest. So, the Arctic Frontiers is a platform to correct these impressions, and to promote Norwegian interests.

The salient function the Arctic Frontiers plays for the Norwegian government is substantiated by the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister attending every year, and how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs works to attract high-level politicians to Tromsø. Second, this notion is underpinned by examining the participation lists. 61% of participants at the 2017 conference were Norwegian, and 59% of participants at the 2018 conference were Norwegian. Third, the statements from three informants cited below, an American institute director, a German institute director, and a Norwegian university associate, illustrate how the promotion of Norwegian interests and priorities do not pass unnoticed by international delegates. They consider the conference a display window for the Norwegian government’s interests. Arctic Frontiers is very thematically focused on Norway’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs priorities. It is useful in that you get an in-depth look at Norwegian, or even Nordic, perspectives. You get an in-depth look at policies relating to the Arctic, business development, and science. The audience at Arctic Frontiers is Norwegian dominated, very Scandinavian dominated. The Arctic Frontiers still follows a bit more of the Arctic Council’s structure of members and observers. It is understandable. Because it is Norwegian Foreign Affairs behind it, and they are of course a member of the Arctic Council, so from that point I can understand. The Arctic Frontiers has a distinct “Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs ownership” but should attempt to be more than a Norwegian event. The problem is the need to promote one’s visions and world view of what is important, which is something all conferences suffer from. Regarding the Arctic Frontiers, it is a shame that this Norwegian image has manifested itself internationally. The conference has a problem in its reputation for being expensive. The

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participation fee is so high that only Norwegians can attend. I do not think the intention was to be so provincial.

However, although the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a central contributor and agenda setter, the Arctic Frontiers is not a conference by or for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The organizers have stated they do not want the Arctic Frontiers to become a mouthpiece for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so it is important to keep the conference an independent structure and to listen to a variety of voices and input regarding the direction of the conference. While the Arctic Frontiers would never go against Norwegian policy, the secretariat and chairperson still have the final word in decisions. The Ministry’s apparatus is a support system for the conference, with no formal ownership beyond the financial sponsor contribution, according to the organizers.

2.4.5

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Frontiers

The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers aim for the conference to be “the largest and most important Arctic arena” and aspire to have an impact on policy. The organizers contend that the Arctic Frontiers has contributed to more awareness around the Norwegian Arctic both regionally, nationally, and internationally. This merit has been advanced through the extensive partner network, which has contributed to connecting actors within Norway and across the region. The Arctic Frontiers, as a cross-sectoral and interdisciplinary arena, also contributes to connecting issue areas. An example is the advancement of the link between the Arctic and the ocean. It has been an overarching topic of the Arctic Frontiers since the beginning, and the continuing emphasis on this issue has contributed to elevating it on the international agenda. Still, the Arctic Frontiers has also been criticized for over-emphasizing non-renewable energy development in support of Norwegian state interests—and as such can be understood as a tool of statecraft for the Norwegian government. On the local level, the Arctic Frontiers has made efforts to increase participation on Arctic issues through the Open Arctic arrangements. These are a positive addition to the format, which over some years can contribute to making the conference more accessible. Having people engage in matters impacting their living conditions fulfills a democratizing function. Examples of topics from 2018 are the significance of the ocean for people living in the North, the dichotomy between the commitments through the Paris-Agreement and the continued demand for fossil energy, and the problem of plastic waste. Open Arctic arrangements in 2019 addressed the new green economy, and how to reduce unnecessary plastic in society. On the regional level, the Arctic Frontiers has been the venue for meetings among the members of the Arctic Mayors Forum, which illustrates the function of conferences for people to convene for multiple purposes, as outlined in the ideal model. A frequent critique against the Arctic Frontiers has been towards the structure of distinct policy, science, and business days. Policy topics, intermixed with business,

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dominate the first 2 days of the conference, followed by 2 days devoted to science presentations. One government affiliated informant asserts that this way of organizing the Arctic Frontiers makes it like three separate conferences. Other informants have pointed out how it is counterproductive for facilitating interactions among participants from different affiliations and creating cross-sectoral synergies. Moreover, the neglect of the science part contributes to attracting fewer academics, because, as pointed out by a European research institute affiliated informant, they do not expect to get the latest in science at this conference. This is not in line with the objective of providing policymakers with knowledge to promote responsible social, economic, and business development. In this way, the initial intention of connecting policy and science seems forsaken, and it appears that the organizers have put more work into legitimizing the conference than improving its quality. Such legitimizing efforts are found on three levels: the local, the national, and international. First, within the local community through Open Arctic arrangements. Second, towards the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by stressing the high-level part. Third, by promoting the conference and Norwegian interests internationally through Seminars Abroad. Nonetheless, there have been improvements over the years, with the panels in the policy plenary sessions becoming more diverse. This is also something the organizers changed from the 2020 conference with a new structure revolved around four focus areas: the ocean, society, sustainable business/industry development, and the science-policy connection. It [the registration fee] excludes scientists. So, scientists are not coming here, with very few exceptions: high level, directors of institutes, invited speakers—because they do not have to pay. But if they had to pay, they would not go.

A related critique is the perceived elitist character of the conference, as illustrated by the institute director cited above. The Arctic Frontiers is constructed partly from a state-centered way of thinking, which emphasizes the primacy of the Arctic Eight and Norway’s national agenda. Several participants interviewed for this study describe the conference as exclusive or excluding. The evident projection of the Norwegian government’s interests is particularly accentuated by international delegates, who perceive it as a platform for Norway. This stands in contrast to the Arctic Circle Assembly, which is regarded as a global arena. The cost of participation contributes to the elitist character of the conference by limiting the pool of participants. Especially the number of scientists, students, young researchers, and locals who can attend. Related, however not something the organizers can control, is flight connections to Tromsø and the cost of accommodation. On the one side, the critique towards the Arctic Frontiers as being too expensive must be weighed against contributions from the sponsors, which are low in comparison to the Arctic Circle Assembly. On the other side, according to an informant with insight into these processes: To the extent I have insight into the budgets, the Arctic Circle is arranged at one third of the cost of the Arctic Frontiers. They do it much cheaper, with less planning, and less people working year-round. It has been too low however, so it will increase. Yet, in both cases, the registration fee is nothing of the total cost. Especially at Arctic Frontiers, it is about 15% of

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the budget. So, if they saved 15% of expenses, they could have the conference free. Arctic Circle has done the opposite—they have increased the participation fee, because they see people are willing to pay. Arctic Frontiers started out extremely expensive, then they reduced the price, but no one noticed.

This illustrates the difference in business model of the two conferences, and how the registration fee impacts the participant composition of the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly. The former is attended by people from Norwegian public institutions, who can have their fee covered, while the Arctic Circle Assembly has a larger pool of participants from the business community and a broader range of international delegates.

2.5

Arctic Circle Assembly

The Arctic Circle Assembly was established in 2013 by then president of Iceland (1996–2016) Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson, who is now the chairman. It has since been arranged over 3 days every October at the Harpa Concert Hall and Conference Centre in Reykjavik. Mr. Grímsson first spoke of a new model for Arctic cooperation at a celebration of the University of Lapland in Rovaniemi, Finland in 1999, where he emphasized the need for bringing together politicians, scientists, and regional leaders. He also contributed to creating the Northern Research Forum (NRF), which held Open Assemblies from 2000 to 2011. The initiative of the Arctic Circle came from the apprehension that as the Arctic was becoming increasingly central in global affairs, so there was need for a platform gathering all Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders interested in the development of the region (Einarsdóttir, 2018). Mr. Grímsson did not want to create “yet another Arctic forum” where formal state representatives monopolized the dialogue, but a model where people from different sectors and strands of society could participate as equal partners (Einarsdóttir, 2018). It has been important for the organizers to brand the Arctic Circle as an assembly and not a conference. The latter implies that the organizers control the agenda, while the Arctic Circle Assembly is intended to be a democratic platform where participants contribute to forming the agenda. This is also why there is no overarching theme for each year, as with the Arctic Frontiers. Mr. Grímsson has stated that: “We create the platform, participants create the dialogue. That is the basic formula for the Arctic Circle” (Einarsdóttir, 2018). The Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy issued in 2011 was at the time the only Arctic policy that explicitly mentioned conferencing through the priority area: “Advancing Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland abroad as a venue for meetings, conferences, and discussions on the Arctic region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011). Thus, a political window of opportunity opened for Mr. Grímsson’s initiative, which was supported by an economic alliance with Alaskan partners, including Alice Rogoff—an American philanthropist who at the time was the publisher of the Alaska Dispatch and who became a member of the Arctic Circle’s advisory board.

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Mr. Grímsson announced the Arctic Circle Assembly at the Washington Press Club in April 2013, which was well-timed with Iceland’s changing position on the global arena. The USA withdrew its military forces from the Keflavik airbase in 2006, which, coupled with Russia resuming its long-range military aviation in 2007 and encircling Icelandic airspace in 2008, forced the Icelandic government to rethink its strategic options (Ingimundarson, 2015; Wegge & Keil, 2018). The 2008 financial crisis also added the need for economic revitalization, and these factors combined with the effects of climate change made the Arctic a key component of Iceland’s foreign policy. Evoking the “new frontier” narrative enabled Iceland to draw attention to its strategic location as a hub in the North Atlantic, and economic viability in areas such as natural resources and shipping (Ingimundarson, 2015, p. 84). The Icelandic government started paying attention to the political, economic, and legal dimensions of Arctic governance, as well as the growing interests of Asian states in the region. In 2012, China and Iceland signed a bilateral Framework Agreement on Arctic Cooperation, a new Chinese embassy building was opened in Reykjavik, and a Chinese icebreaker visited Reykjavik on its way back from an Arctic science expedition through the Northeast Passage (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 143). The most essential element in the bilateral relationship came in 2013, when Iceland became the first European state to sign a Free Trade Agreement with China (Ingimundarson, 2015, p. 91). The process of deepening economic relations with China was promoted by Mr. Grímsson, and the Arctic Circle initiative was considered by some as an attempt to force the inclusion of the Asian states that Iceland wanted to do business with into Arctic affairs. In fact, 2 months after the Arctic Circle Assembly was announced in April 2013, the Icelandic firm Eykon Energy partnered with China’s National Offshore Oil Corporation to explore the area around Jan Mayen (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 143). The philosophy behind the Arctic Circle Assembly and the close involvement of China and other non-Arctic states made Arctic state politicians concerned about this addition to the Arctic governance system. Mr. Grímsson saw the need for including states that were geographically outside the Arctic in the dialogue, because they too are affected by changes in the region. Accordingly, the goal of the Arctic Circle Assembly was to create a platform where countries with observer status or no status in the Arctic Council could meet on an equal basis with the member states. Thus, the initiative was also perceived by some as intended to compete with the Arctic Council. This is described by an informant cited below. The Arctic Circle was established in 2013, and surely it was skepticism from some of the Arctic states. In the beginning, people were not sure what it was, and some felt it might be competing with the Arctic Council.

The Norwegian government was particularly dissatisfied with the establishment of what it considered to be a direct competitor to the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic

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Council. This has been noted by informants associated with the Norwegian government, but also by international participants. The uncertainties within Arctic governance around the time of the Arctic Circle’s establishment is described by an American informant working in the policy–science interface: The Arctic Circle really began to take flight at a time when the Arctic Council was deadlocked over the question of whether to admit a bunch of new observers, in particular from Asia. And the President of Iceland, Grímsson, was very adept at saying to China, Japan, Korea, and others, who were waiting to see if they would be admitted as observers: “Come to the Arctic Circle. You are welcome. You will be treated as equals.” And they did. Of course, they were also invited to the Arctic Frontiers, and several other places. Soon thereafter, China, Japan, South-Korea, and others were in fact admitted as observers.

It is important to note, however, that while the establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly might have been a means to advance the geopolitical and economic interests of Iceland, it was not by itself instrumental in the acceptance of the six Asian states as observers to the Arctic Council in 2013. The pressure rather originated from concerns among the Arctic states that the Asian states would create an Arctic forum of their own if they were not allowed to participate in the Arctic Council. The Arctic states therefore considered it more advantageous to involve non-Arctic states in established structures. As stated by then Foreign Minister of Norway, Espen Barth Eide, in his opening speech at the Arctic Frontiers in January 2013: “We are happy that more people want to join our club, because this means that they are not starting another club, and that gives us some influence on what topics are discussed in relation to the Arctic” (Eide, 2013). This is described by three informants who took part in the processes before and during the 2013 Arctic Council ministerial meeting, one Arctic university affiliated informant, one associated with an Arctic Council working group, and one American diplomat. If the Arctic Council could not incorporate the pending observers, they would create their own council. That is why they had to do it then. The press conference to launch the Arctic Circle in April 2013 was one month before the Kiruna ministerial meeting—to attract attention. That was the pressure on the Arctic states: make the decision now. As they did. If the Arctic Council did not include the outsiders, there was a risk of the establishment of a new forum. This was discussed at great lengths, when some of the member states were so critical towards including China and the others. They could have just gone to the United Nations and claimed the need for an Arctic Treaty. Then, the Arctic Eight would be in minority. Before Kiruna, this was a legitimate concern. When they were accepted as observers, the pressure was reduced from China and other states. I do not think it had much to do with what might have been said by the president of Iceland. Each of the members of the Arctic Council decided to admit these countries for their own reasons. I was there at that meeting. I can tell you honestly, it had nothing to do with what was going on outside of Kiruna at the time.

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Analytical Framework and Cases

Structure and Organization of the Arctic Circle Assembly

The Arctic Circle, a non-profit organization, is run by a secretariat, has an advisory board consisting of representatives from the partners, and an honorary board. The honorary board is comprised of chairman Grímsson, Prince Albert II of Monaco, US Senator to Alaska, Lisa Murkowski, and Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber. The advisory board comprises a variety of people from different nations working within governments, the university sector, research institutes, the private sector, and NGOs. The advisory board is not involved in constructing the program but focuses on strategical thinking around how to develop the Assembly. The chairman, Mr. Grímsson, has veto power in decisions about the program and conduct of the Arctic Circle Assembly. The open democratic rhetoric primarily applies to the breakout sessions, for which anyone can sign up. The plenary sessions on the other side, are perceived by informants as designed by Mr. Grímsson, and strategically rigged to attend to his geopolitical interests. Reviewing the programs for the Assembly supports this understanding of the Arctic Circle. Speakers in plenary sessions have included country sessions by Britain (2014), France (2014), Japan (2014), China (2015), Germany (2015), and Switzerland (2016). These states are all looking to assert themselves as Arctic players. In addition, the plenary program has promoted Iceland’s key economic interests, such as shipping, resource development, and tourism. Thus, while the Icelandic government is not as close to the Arctic Circle organization as the Norwegian government is involved with the Arctic Frontiers, there is a national strategic element behind the conduct of the Arctic Circle Assembly as well: advancing Iceland’s geopolitical and economic interests. The structure of the conferences is one of the fundamental differences between the two cases. In the initial years of the Arctic Circle Assembly, the program was devoted to country sessions: long presentations of states’ Arctic visions with no time for discussions or questions from the audience. This format was criticized and later altered to shorter and more dynamic plenary sessions that include unfiltered questions from the audience. In addition to the plenary sessions, the Arctic Circle Assembly provides for numerous breakout sessions that anyone can sign up for. In contrast to the Arctic Frontiers, there is no sector label attached to days or sessions, and policy, science, and business are mixed throughout the three-day Assembly. The Arctic Circle organizers made several changes and additions to the structure of the organization following the Covid-19 pandemic that deserve attention. In contrast to the Arctic Frontiers, the Arctic Circle postponed the 2021 Assembly and arranged an in-person Assembly in Reykjavik in October 2022 with no option for digital panels. However, the organizers held several webinars throughout the fall of 2021, and expanded the repertoire of products offered by the organization by creating the Arctic Circle Journal, a podcast, webcast sessions, and the Arctic Circle Virtual: an online media platform that offers leaders in politics, science, business, and other fields related to the Arctic to present their views to a global audience. In

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addition, three new Mission Councils were launched in 2021, which are discussed in further detail in Chap. 5. As such, despite keeping the October Assembly reserved for in-person attendances only, the outreach of the Arctic Circle organization has expanded quite extensively since its establishment in 2013.

2.5.2

Participants and Partners of the Arctic Circle

The Arctic Circle Assembly is attended by heads of states, government representatives, ministers, members of parliaments, experts, scientists, academics, students, entrepreneurs, business leaders, Indigenous peoples, and activists from the growing international community interested in the future of the Arctic. There were approximately 1200 participants from 35 countries attending the first Arctic Circle Assembly in 2013. The number has grown from 1500 participants from over 40 countries in 2014, more than 2000 participants from over 50 countries at the 2015 and 2016 Assemblies, to more than 2000 participants from over 60 countries represented at the 2017, 2018, and 2019 Assemblies. The Arctic Circle Assembly, as the Arctic Frontiers, has been successful at promoting young researchers and students. Several universities are partners of the Arctic Circle, and young researchers are free to submit proposals on the same conditions as everyone else. Informants describe the dynamic format as beneficial for early-career scientists because discussions and questions from the audience provide valuable feedback for their work. Also, the Arctic Circle’s attraction and reputation within the scientific community contributes to the audience at breakout sessions being interested and active. Informants from the epistemic community describe these features as important for driving the dialogue about the region forward. The cost of participation for the Arctic Circle Assembly started out as a symbolic sum that was significantly lower than at the Arctic Frontiers. Two factors were instrumental for the low cost of participation in the initial years of the Assembly. One is the underlying aim of providing a democratic platform feasible to attend for as many stakeholders as possible. The other is how Mr. Grímsson utilized his position as president to advance Iceland’s role in international relation and has been successful in attracting strong financial sponsors. However, the participation fee has increased annually, and the cost of participating at the 2022 Arctic Circle Assembly can no longer be considered a symbolic sum. The cost of attending is 450 Euro for breakout session speakers, 500 Euro for academics/scientists, and 600 Euro for business/government/organization representatives. Citizens pay 300 Euro and students 150 Euro. Looking back at the founding years of the Arctic Circle Assembly, informants point to the admission fee as contributing to its initial success, because it was affordable to attend the Assembly and see what kind of arena it was. The fact that people continue to attend despite the increased cost of participation from year to year speaks to the virtue of the business

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model. The Arctic Circle Assembly is established as a central conference for those who want to engage in Arctic affairs. The Arctic Circle has an extensive association of global partners, including foundations, philanthropies, investment funds, and banks. There are also North– Atlantic strategic partners that illustrate the importance of the Assembly for Iceland’s positioning in the Arctic region, and for Iceland’s business and economic interests. These include the Prime Minister’s Office, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, Iceland Air, seafood companies, tourist actors, Icelandic financial institutions, and power and engineering companies. The Arctic Circle further has an extensive list of other partners, including universities, the International Arctic Science Committee, the Institute of the North, media outlets, Indigenous peoples’ organizations, and organizations focusing on sustainable development and preserving the environment.

2.5.3

The Arctic Circle’s International Outreach: Arctic Circle Forums

The Arctic Circle organization has arranged Forums on specific areas of Arctic cooperation at different international locations since 2015. Through these activities, the organization has extended its outreach to several major Asian and European cities. The first Arctic Circle Forum, on shipping and ports, was held in Anchorage, Alaska in August 2015. It was attended by over 200 political leaders, experts, business representatives, and representatives from Indigenous communities. The goal was to articulate plans and facilitate partnerships for developing safe, secure, and reliable shipping through the Arctic. In November 2015, the Arctic Circle and Singapore Maritime Institute, with the support of the Singapore Government, convened a forum where discussions focused on shipping, infrastructure financing, ocean science and research, and global collaboration on Arctic affairs. In May 2016, the Arctic Circle organized a Forum in Nuuk, Greenland. This Forum focused on economic development for the people of the Arctic, tourism, shipping, natural resources, fisheries, and the empowerment of Indigenous peoples. The second Forum in 2016 was arranged in December in Quebec City, which addressed the sustainable development of northern regions, regional planning and governance, investments, socioeconomic development, and the impacts of climate change. In June 2017, a Forum titled “The United States and Russia in the Arctic” was co-hosted with the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington DC. The main questions addressed were the policies and plans of the USA and Russia in the Arctic, and relations with other states in the Arctic and the Asian and European countries seeking an increasing role in the region. In December 2017, an Arctic Circle Forum titled “Scotland and the New North” was held in Edinburg in cooperation with the Scottish government. This Forum addressed areas of common interest between Scotland and the Arctic, including how to build resilient communities, young people

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in remote communities and community empowerment, shipping and aviation connections, Arctic seas and blue growth, energy innovations, and tourism. In May 2018, a Forum titled “Arctic Hubs: Building Dynamic Economies and Sustainable Communities in the North” was held in Tórshavn in cooperation with the Government of the Faroe Islands. It gathered more than 300 participants from 20 countries, which made it the largest international conference in the Faroe Islands. The agenda centered around Arctic fisheries and responsible use of ocean resources, ocean and air transport, tourism, science and research, and the policies of Asian states. The forum further addressed cooperation between North Atlantic states— Greenland, Iceland, Faroe Islands, Norway, and Scotland. The second Forum in 2018 was hosted in Seoul, Korea in December, with the Korea Maritime Institute, the Korea Polar Research Institute, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea. The event titled “Asia meets the Arctic: science, connectivity and partnership” centered around Arctic science, connectivity and sustainability, energy, shipping, transport, the role of Asian states and companies in the Arctic Ocean, and cooperation between Asian and Arctic states. In May 2019, the Arctic Circle China Forum was hosted in Shanghai by the Ministry of Natural Resources of the People’s Republic of China, in cooperation with the Polar Research Institute of China, the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, and Shanghai Science & Technology Museum. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China also supported the Forum. It addressed China’s involvement in the Arctic through the Belt and Road Initiative, ocean and marine science, transport and infrastructure, renewable energy, socioeconomic development and stewardship, and Arctic governance. In August 2022 the Arctic Circle organization hosted its second Forum in Nuuk, Greenland, titled “Greenland in the Global Arctic”, which focused on climate and prosperity and geopolitics and progress. In January 2023, the Arctic Circle Abu Dabi Forum was hosted in association with the United Arab Emirates Ministry of Climate Change and Environment in conjunction with the Abu Dhabi Sustainability Week. The locations of the Arctic Circle Forums, e.g. in Korea, Shanghai and Abu Dabi, illustrates the global ambitions of Mr. Grímsson and the organizers, and the attempt to create a space for Arctic dialogue that extends way beyond the Circumpolar North and that includes a much broader actor group than the Arctic state stakeholders.

2.5.4

The Value of the Arctic Circle Assembly for Iceland

Iceland do not use the Arctic Circle platform to the same extent as Norway uses the Arctic Frontiers. You do not hear a lot about Iceland at this conference. It is a significant difference. It was more a personal quest, for Mr. Grímsson. And you can see, it was not even him representing the government of Iceland, because he has continued with it after his presidency ended. It was his personal desire.

While the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs engages in outlining the Arctic Frontiers’ program and in inviting high-level delegates to the conference, the

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Icelandic government does not have the same function in the Arctic Circle organization. This distinction is also noted by participants, as the Canadian academic informant cited above. Other informants also point to how Mr. Grímsson’s personal agenda and geopolitical interests are evident through way the Arctic Circle Assembly is designed. The former president’s connections and network have undoubtedly contributed not only to the extensive partner network, but also to attract attention and international high-level delegates to the annually Assembly. This has contributed to the branding of Reykjavik as an “Arctic Hub” that connects North America, Europe, and Asia, which can be considered an attempt to strengthen Iceland’s geopolitical position and promote Iceland’s economic interests. I do not think the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been very much involved in setting the agenda or the program. It started as an initiative from the president, without consultation with the government. But there is good cooperation. The Foreign Minister and the Prime Minister were both speaking at the last conference. There is some sort of support.

Still, while not formally engaged in the conduct of the Arctic Circle Assembly, the Prime Minister’s Office and the Icelandic Ministry for Foreign Affairs are partners. Their presence is observed by participants, as the Arctic Council affiliated informant cited above. The partnership supports the principle in Iceland’s Arctic Policy that states: “Advancing Icelanders’ knowledge of Arctic issues and promoting Iceland abroad as a venue for meetings, conferences, and discussions on the Arctic region” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011). Thus, Mr. Grímsson’s initiative has provided the Icelandic government an arena for promoting Iceland internationally, which has been brought forward also after he left the President’s Office. The global, open tent approach of the Arctic Circle Assembly has attracted a wide range of international participants to Reykjavik, including investors and tourists, and it has contributed to substantiate Iceland’s position as a central Arctic state within the international structure. The West-Nordic coalition, through which Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands have joined forces to establish themselves as “small but still important” states, is an example of states using the Arctic Circle to position themselves in the region. Iceland’s Arctic Policy emphasizes the importance of West-Nordic cooperation, which is described as a means to “strengthen their international and economic position as well as their politico-security dimension” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011). Trade, energy, resource utilization, environmental issues, and tourism are areas where the Icelandic government aspires to increase cooperation with Greenland and the Faroe Islands. From this, the launch of an “energy triangle” became part of Iceland’s natural resource policy (Ingimundarson, 2015, p. 91). Depledge and Dodds (2017) discuss whether the establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly was an attempt to ally with small-scale partners and position Iceland “geopolitically as a gateway for the expression of global and marginalized interests in the Arctic” (p. 145). As such, the Arctic Circle Assembly can be considered a tool of statecraft that contributes to advancing the national interests and priorities of Iceland and its allies.

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Arctic Circle Assembly

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A review of conference programs and participation at the Arctic Circle Assembly substantiates the above interpretation. Alaska and Greenland held country presentations at the initial Assembly. The 2014 plenary program included a West-Nordic Arctic Cooperation session, involving Iceland, Greenland, the Faroe Islands, and representatives from the West Nordic Council. These smaller states are further represented annually in the program. In 2015, Prime Minister of the Faroe Islands, Aksel V. Johannesen, presented how the Faroe Islands has moved from the periphery to being a central hub in energy and economic development, and in 2016, he addressed future visions for the Arctic. At the 2018 Assembly, the Faroe Islands had a plenary session with the foreign minister and several breakout sessions, including one with Greenland and Iceland on growth and infrastructure. The Premier of Greenland spoke in the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly opening session, the government of Greenland organized two other plenary sessions, and several breakout sessions were arranged by Greenlandic institutions, organizations, universities, and municipalities. In the plenary session “Greenland on the world stage,” Mr. Grímsson pointed out the historical moment of having heads of representation for Greenland to Reykjavik, Copenhagen, Brussels, and Washington DC gathered on the same stage. It has been important for Greenland to establish representation abroad, to have a voice in international affairs. Mr. Grímsson also emphasized the significance for the history of global empowerment of Indigenous peoples, and how other countries come to the Arctic Circle Assembly to learn about how this process has transpired in the Arctic. Accordingly, while under control of the former president, the Arctic Circle is of geopolitical and economic importance for the smaller of the Arctic states. It is an arena for Iceland to consolidate the West-Nordic dimension of Arctic governance together with the Faroe Islands and Greenland, and the subsequent chapter discusses how also Scotland has expressed an interest in joining this coalition. The Arctic Circle Assembly attracts global attention to Reykjavik, and by expanding the organization’s outreach through the Forums, the Arctic Circle contributes both to extending an Arctic identity to non-Arctic states and to strengthening Iceland’s position internationally.

2.5.5

Strengths and Weaknesses of the Arctic Circle Assembly

The Arctic Circle organization has contributed with three major additions to the Arctic governance structure, according to Mr. Grímsson. First, non-Arctic states have been provided an international platform to present their visions, policies, and plans for the Arctic through the country sessions. Second, sub-national and regional entities have been given a platform to present their perspective and interests, and to act independently of their central governments. Third, the Forums have brought the Arctic dialogue and cooperation into focus outside the region, which contributes to making non-Arctic state actors constructive and responsible partners. The following

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discusses some of the strengths and weaknesses of the Arctic Circle organization founded in these three elements. The primary objective of the Arctic Circle Assembly’s organizers is creating a global and democratic platform that attracts all relevant stakeholders and facilitate that these different actors can have their voices heard and express their interests. The Arctic Circle Assembly is attended by a wide variety of state representatives, institutions, organizations, and individuals and is considered the most important arena for networking among like-minded people in the Arctic. Thus, the organizers have been successful in achieving this goal. The intention of establishing an “assembly and not a conference” is also well preserved, which is illustrated by the growing interests in signing up for breakout sessions and the relaxed atmosphere at the venue, as is described by participants. Nonetheless, this characteristic has both strengths and weaknesses. This philosophy holds merit in that it includes all interested stakeholders and encompasses different perspectives in the dialogue. Thus, the Arctic Circle Assembly fulfills criterium from the ideal model of a conference in that it is a performance space for democratic values and a marketplace for the promotion of ideas. The inclusiveness of the Assembly is pointed out by an academic participant as essential for its success and popularity in terms of the number and variety of people attending. The Arctic Circle Assembly attracts “the elite” from different sectors, or as described by an informant from the business community: “the right people.” The Arctic Circle Assembly provides the epistemic community with an opportunity to engage with their peers and facilitates the establishment of business connections—it contributes to relationship building, as outlined in the ideal model. The Arctic Circle Assembly also includes non-Arctic state actors who are on the outside of formal cooperative arrangements in the region, which is an asset of the conference because it serves an educational function for those unfamiliar with the region. This is not only advanced through the main Assembly in Reykjavik, but also by extending the organization globally through arranging Forums in cooperation with other states and relevant institutions at different international locations. If you listen to Grímsson speak at receptions, he talks about an open and democratic arena. There is another side to this open tent approach. The plenary part is not open and democratic, it is controlled. Grímsson has personally designed it, down to single sessions, to maintain his geopolitical agenda.

Nonetheless, there are also critical voices towards the vision of Mr. Grímsson, as illustrated by the quote from the Arctic state institute director cited above. One flaw of the open tent philosophy is that by promoting newcomers it downplays the prominence of the Arctic Eight. According to informants from Arctic state-based institutions, this is not always welcomed by “those who know best” how to govern Arctic affairs. Moreover, since “anybody can say anything,” the Assembly gives a voice to perspectives that can be disconnected from Arctic sovereigns, local communities, and Indigenous peoples. The problematic aspect of having non-Arctic states present about the region is that information can be misleading and advance misconceptions about the Arctic. The contradiction between Arctic states and

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Arctic Circle Assembly

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non-Arctic states at the Arctic Circle Assembly is also illustrated by the Arctic institute affiliated informant cited below. I see Arctic Circle as a projection of Iceland’s economic interests in the Arctic—as a geopolitical interest of Grímsson, in connecting subnational governments and non-Arctic states to Arctic in a way that at some point has the potential to displace the Arctic Council and national Arctic sovereignty.

Another factor of the open tent approach is that often results in overlapping themes for breakout sessions, because as pointed out by an informant from the science community: “everyone thinks they need to present their work, and everyone has the opportunity to do so.” Additionally, when convened under the umbrella created by the Arctic Circle, the notion of a bazaar as expressed by Depledge and Dodds (2017) is evident. There is competition for visibility, and the Arctic Circle Assembly is undoubtedly an exhibition stage for stakeholders looking to achieve something within Arctic affairs. So, while being a democratic platform, the Arctic Circle Assembly is also a global forum where non-Arctic states and the business community can pay to promote their interests through the plenary sessions. As such, the Arctic Circle Assembly has been criticized for not accentuating the quality of the proposal, but the ability to pay for the best speaking time in plenary sessions. This was particularly noteworthy in the initial years of the conference, when country sessions by non-Arctic states dominated the plenary programs. While the number of the country sessions has been reduced after pressure from the advisory board, the sponsors are still highly visible in the program and at the venue. This supports the impression of the Arctic Circle Assembly as a marketplace. The frustration towards the plenary sessions is particularly found within the academic community, as expressed by the two informants cited below. When Grímsson was still president, and he wanted to attract certain actors. He was making a bit too many promises, which resulted in many country sessions in the initial years. Of course, it helped that he was standing Head of State at the time. That helped a lot in that the conference got attention. I do not find the plenary sessions particularly informative. The country sessions, they are rarely Arctic countries, I always thought was waste of time. All the video messages—who wants to listen to that? They do not have much to add to the discussion. So, I find the plenaries to be a waste of time.

The Arctic Circle’s location, venue, and format are all strong points of the conference—as illustrated by the Arctic state business representative cited below. At the Arctic Circle, it is the people who are here. After participating every year, I know many of the attendants, and it becomes easier to pick up previous ideas. This is an efficient arena, due to the considerable number of participants, because it is compact, and the building is ideal for mingling and networking.

Reykjavik is an advantageous location for bringing together people from North America, Europe, and Asia. The Harpa concert hall and conference center venue (Fig. 2.2) provide good opportunities for socializing and networking. As such, the Arctic Circle Assembly fulfills the criteria from the ideal model of a conference as being a magnate for side events and side meetings. It further relates to the goal of the

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Fig. 2.2 The Harpa Concert Hall, Reykjavik. Photo: Beate Steinveg

organizers: to create a platform for the policy-science interplay and for implementing the social relevance of science. To advance these ambitions, it is necessary to attract different stakeholder groups and to promote knowledge sharing and the exchange of perspectives through dynamic discussions. To that end, the format of the Arctic Circle Assembly is a strength. First, the three-day program means that it is more likely that people will stay for the entire conference. Second, shorter presentations in the plenary sessions followed by questions from the audience do contribute to more interesting and fruitful debates. The structure with a mix of all affiliations in every session is also an asset, as it enables engagement across sectors. However, for the policy-science interplay to manifest itself, it is essential to present scientific findings for the broader audience, not only in the breakout sessions. It also requires that governmental, institutional, and organizational participants are open to learning and committed to bringing initiatives back to their work.

2.6

Two Different Models for Conference Organizing?

This chapter has presented the theoretical framework applied for the analysis of conferences within Arctic governance, it has provided an overview of central developments in the Arctic conference sphere, and it has portrayed the ideal model of a conference that has been discovered throughout this study. The theoretical

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Two Different Models for Conference Organizing?

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framework and ideal model are applied in the empirical chapters—on actors, agenda-setting, and the Arctic governance architecture—to aid the overall objectives of this book. The book inquires whether conferences can contribute to ameliorating some of the governance challenges in the Arctic region, and it contributes to broaden the dependent variable—Arctic governance—through the examination of conferences within the Arctic regime complex. Furthermore, Arctic conferences are central meeting places not only for cooperation and the exchange of ideas, but also platforms for the promotion of state interests and for government officials to promote their interests in a favorable light—either to promote the primacy of Arctic states, or for non-Arctic states to obtain stakeholder status (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 157). Thus, it is interesting to inquire into whether conferences can be arenas for political games and where policy occur. For this purpose, conferences are examined as the three kinds of institutions identified by Jervis (1999): as tools of statecraft, innovative instruments, or arenas that develop “a life of their own.” From this, the book contributes to IR-scholarship by inquiring into whether being attentive to conferences is a productive choice for scholars and policymakers, and to the broader debates concerning governance, democracy, and diplomacy. The chapter has further provided insight into the objectives of the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly and has begun casting light on how the two conferences have developed into central pieces within Arctic governance. The chapter has illustrated how the establishment of the Arctic Frontiers in 2007 and the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2013 should not be considered arbitrary, but as initiatives designed to fill specific demands. The Arctic Frontiers was established from the realization that there was need for a mechanism to bring scientific knowledge into the decision-making process, to ensure knowledge-based social, economic, and business development. This was at a time when the Arctic region was drawing increased international attention from various global actors. Politically, the region attracted attention due to the processes conducted by individual states to submit claims for their extended continental shelves, which in turn must be seen in relation to sovereignty concerns, territorial issues, and resource management. Within the science community: the rapid changes taking place in the Arctic caused by global factors were thoroughly documented, and the severity to act was becoming pressing. On that account, a window of opportunity for the Arctic Frontiers was open on the international stage, and the initiative was supported by the Norwegian government’s advancement towards an active High North strategy. Likewise, the Arctic Circle initiative was well-timed with Iceland’s resurgence on the international arena after the 2008 financial crisis. This chapter has shown how the Arctic Circle Assembly has become a platform for advancing Iceland’s geopolitical position and West–Nordic and North Atlantic cooperation. The creation of the Arctic Circle Assembly was also expedient in relation to the growing interest in the region from non-Arctic states and became a platform for deepening economic relations with China. The establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly contributed to substantiate the notion that it was necessary to involve non-Arctic states in a meaningful way before they created an Arctic council of their own or found a “backdoor” into Arctic

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governance. Accepting the pending Asian observer states into established structures meant the Arctic Eight could remain in control and steer the framework for debate about the region. To a significant extent now, Iceland and Norway are competing to be capitals in the Arctic via their Arctic conferences. So, it is very much an Arctic Frontiers versus Arctic Circle. We have this competition for numbers of participants and numbers of sessions, when we should have competition for meaning, impact, and outcomes.

The above quote from an institute affiliated informant illustrates how there is competition between the two conferences. Nonetheless, a central finding from the portrayal of the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly is that they should be considered two different models for arranging a conference—organized, respectively, top-down versus bottom-up. The former gives primacy to Arctic actors and state representatives, the program is designed by the organizers and proposals are approved in conformity with the overarching theme of that year’s conference. By contrast, the Arctic Circle Assembly is more of an open tent and democratic platform, although the plenaries are designed by Mr. Grímsson. The organizers provide a space for participants to fill with their own agenda, and the breakout sessions are constructed around submitted proposals. The Arctic Circle organization is also more global and has provided a platform that is particularly useful for non-Arctic states and entities through the country sessions and Forums. The distinct underlying philosophies of the conferences have implications for understanding the Arctic as a region for international cooperation, and for the broader functions of these conferences within Arctic governance.

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Chapter 3

Arctic Governance: Actors, Processes, and Structures

The two conferences at the center of this study are not arranged in a vacuum, but these arenas, as well as other conferences, are rather part of a constant flow of processes and events in Arctic governance and in international relations. This flow includes the actions of international institutions and organizations such as the Arctic Council, the European Union (EU), the United Nations, and NATO. It entails bi- and multilateral relationships, science cooperation, negotiations, task forces, agreements, joint military exercises, and people-to-people cooperation. The chain of events within Arctic affairs and international relations is also susceptible to changes in national political administrations, state policies and strategies, unilateral actions, and sometimes the actions of individuals. From the premise that it is necessary to understand the whole governance system to grasp its individual components (Biermann & Kim, 2020), the purpose of this chapter is to portray the Arctic governance landscape, including central actors and entities, in which conferences are analyzed. First, the chapter presents the eight Arctic states who hold sovereign rights and jurisdictions in the region. The chapter accounts for their main interests and priorities in the Arctic as derived from policy and strategy documents. Second, the chapter turns to non-Arctic states who have expressed interest in partaking in Arctic affairs by applying to be observers to the Arctic Council, and/or by issuing a strategy on the Arctic region. Third, the chapter looks at non-governmental entities that are engaged in the Arctic. These are relevant both to portray the full picture of the Arctic governance landscape, and as central participants at Arctic conferences, and the subsequent chapter accounts for the utility of conferences for these entities. This chapter thereafter presents the Arctic Council, to which the eight Arctic states are members, and which is the salient intergovernmental forum for Arctic cooperation. This account focuses on the structure and work of the Arctic Council, its merits and shortcomings, and frictions related to the role of the observers, However, the Arctic Council does not have the mandate nor the membership to manage the totality of issues and actors engaged in the region (Young, 2019, pp. 8–9). Therefore, the chapter also accounts for other arrangements that are © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_3

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relevant to situate conferences within the governance structure of the region. The chapter looks at the Arctic Five grouping, bodies for Barents and Nordic cooperation, as well as two more recent additions to the Arctic governance structure: the Arctic Economic Council and the Arctic Science Ministerial. The purpose of this mapping is to present the objectives of these arrangements, as well as issues they do not address or actors they do not involve. This lays the foundation for the analysis of whether conferences can function as supplements to established governance arrangements, and whether conferences can contribute to influence the Arctic governance landscape. It also sets the stage for the analysis of conferences through the actor, agenda-setting, and architecture mechanisms in Chaps. 4–6. Specifically, whether the dynamic and multidimensional platform provided by conferences has contributed to expanding the pool of engaged and legitimate stakeholders, and to a broader and refocused agenda that connects the Arctic to global affairs.

3.1

Arctic States and Their Interests in the Region

The Arctic states, or Arctic Eight, are the United States, the Russian Federation, Canada, Iceland, Norway, Finland, Sweden, and the Kingdom of Denmark/Greenland. While the Arctic Eight are linked through their membership in the Arctic Council, they vary in territorial size, population, economic and military capabilities, society, culture, and values. They also differ in level of development of their northern regions, concerning issues such as opportunities for education, work, and health services, infrastructure, connectivity, and relations to the federal or national state level. The following provides an overview of the Arctic states and their main interests in the region, which is significant for further inquiry into both actors and agenda-setting within Arctic governance. The Arctic strategies of these states are presented in Fig. 3.1, which also accounts for the biannually rotations in the Arctic Council chairmanships and the priority areas of the chair. Russia, which is a key player in Arctic politics, holds the largest Arctic coastline, has the largest oil and gas deposits, and has been expanding its military power in the region (Hønneland, 2020, p. 19; Wegge, 2020, p. 363). Arctic resources and maritime transport are key elements in the future of the Russian economy, and socioeconomic development is a core priority in the region (Jensen & Skedsmo, 2010; Solli et al., 2013). The weight attributed to resource development, combined with the need for foreign investments, expertise, and access to markets, has made Russia interested in preserving the Arctic as a “zone of peace” (Exner-Pirot & Murray, 2017, p. 59)—at least prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine from February 2022. Russia’s Arctic policy has however been pursued through two incompatible tracks: committing to international cooperation and expanding military activities (Baev, 2019). The decade-long Russian rearmament program in the Arctic has not gone unnoticed by NATO and North Atlantic states, and new military capabilities

3.1 Arctic States and Their Interests in the Region

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Fig. 3.1 Arctic state policies and strategies

and bases, in addition to a significant increase in the level of training and military exercises, have been reasons for concern (Wegge, 2020, pp. 363–365). Nonetheless, through framing the Arctic as a special zone, Russia has been able to maintain positive relations with Western states in the Arctic, despite challenges in other areas of international relations (Wilson Rowe & Blakkisrud, 2014, p. 82).

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Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, combined with the investments in military installations and the increased number of military exercises in the Arctic, sparked media and public debates about whether and how Arctic cooperation would continue (Wilson Rowe, 2020). Still, the political discourse was one of the continued peaceful management around shared interests in the region, and the relationship between Russia and its Arctic neighbors has remained at least civil in all areas, except from military relations (Østhagen, 2021, p. 86). From a neorealist perspective, the assumption is that Russia would use military might to secure its national interests and sovereignty also in the Arctic. However, Byers (2017) analyzes international relations of the Arctic before and after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and finds explanation for continued cooperation in the liberalist concept of “complex interdependence.” In short, Byers (2017) demonstrates that while most military and economic cooperation between Russia and the West was suspended, the Crimea crisis did not affect other aspects of regional cooperation due to a pre-existing state of complex interdependence around issues of shared interest among states operating in the region (see also Chap. 6). However, this dramatically changed following Russia’s war on Ukraine in 2022, where all formal cooperation and interactions between Russia and the West were put on hold. The Arctic Council also announced on 3 March 2022 that the member states are “temporarily pausing participation in all meetings of the Council and its subsidiary bodies” (US Department of State, 2022). International dynamics such as great power competition and cooperation have always been instrumental in the United States’ approach to Arctic policy (Weingartner & Orttung, 2020). Yet, the US was long considered a “reluctant Arctic player” and paid modest attention towards the region (Huebert, 2011). Exner-Pirot and Murray (2017) argue that the limited role of the US in the emerging Arctic society is a result of environmental and scientific cooperation taking shape through guidelines rather than binding agreements, with no economic or political costs and no territorial or economic competition. However, the US became more active in regional governance when other states published Arctic policies, and as climate change and the growing interest for the region begun having greater impact on US domestic policy decisions (Weingartner & Orttung, 2020). The US issued its National Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2013, which emphasizes three lines of effort: advance the US’ security interests, pursue responsible Arctic region stewardship, and strengthen international cooperation (United States Government, 2013). The Department of Defense (DoD) Arctic Strategy was published in June 2019, which outlined three strategies: building Arctic awareness; enhancing Arctic operations; and strengthening the rules-based order in the Arctic (US Department of Defense, 2019). American foreign policy discourse has mainly been in the language of liberalism and American academics have promoted liberal thinking in the marketplace of ideas, while the US has acted in the international system according to realist logic (Mearsheimer, 2001, p. 25). Thus, there has been a discrepancy between rhetoric and conduct of American foreign policy (Ibid.). Still, the 2019 DoD strategy can be read through the realist perspective, as it focuses on national interests, sovereignty,

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and security. The DoD strategy singles out “competition with China and Russia as the principal challenge to long-term US security and prosperity” (p. 2), it argues that “China and Russia (. . .) are also pursuing activities and capabilities in the Arctic that may present risks to the homeland” (p. 6), and that these states “are challenging the rules-based order in the Arctic” (p. 6). Russia is criticized for violating international law with respect to regulating maritime traffic through the Northern Sea Route, and for its military activity. “Russia has gradually strengthened its presence by creating new Arctic units, refurbishing old airfields and infrastructure in the Arctic, and establishing new military bases along its Arctic coastline” (US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 4). The DoD strategy further condemns China’s Arctic policy white paper of January 2018, stating: “Despite China’s claim of being a ‘near-Arctic state,’ the United States does not recognize any such status” (US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 3). Accordingly, the US is becoming more explicit in pronouncing its Arctic identity and is moving towards a more zero-sum approach to Arctic security. This has implications for non-Arctic states and their urgency to assert their status as legitimate stakeholders before the window of opportunity closes. This book examines whether conferences can be arenas for non-Arctic states to achieve stakeholder status in the region. The Canadian government published its Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future in 2009, building on four priorities to safeguard the region’s position within a strong and sovereign Canada. The four pillars are: exercising Arctic sovereignty; promoting social and economic development; protecting environmental heritage; and improving and devolving northern governance (Government of Canada, 2009, p. 2). In 2010, the Canadian government issued an Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada’s Northern Strategy Abroad. This document stated: “Given our extensive Arctic coastline, our Northern energy and natural resource potential, and the 40 percent of our land mass situated in the North, Canada is an Arctic power” (Government of Canada, 2010, p. 4). Overall, Canada’s Arctic policy has a strong emphasis on sovereignty preservation and strengthening and is inward-looking (Keil & Knecht, 2013, p. 194). This can be related not only to fears of Russian encroachment, but the focus on territorial boundaries and sovereignty can also be linked to the disputes over the Lomonosov Ridge, the boundary line with the US in the Beaufort Sea, and the legal status of the Northwest Passage. Canada, Denmark, and Russia contend the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of their continental shelf, while the US argues it is an oceanic ridge, and thus disproves any claim to its ownership (Stimson, 2013). Regarding the Northwest Passage, Canada holds that it is part of its internal waters and subject to full Canadian sovereignty. The US argues it fulfills the legal criteria of an international strait by connecting two expanses of high seas, the Atlantic and Arctic oceans, and because it is being used for international navigation (Byers, 2009, p. 42). While Canada and the US have a long-standing precedence of “agreeing to disagree” on the legal status of the Northwest Passage, increased international interest and activity in the region may

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force the states to settle the dispute for security and environmental regulations in the North American Arctic. Norway issued a High North strategy in 2006 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), followed by New Building Blocks in the North in 2009 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009), Norway’s Arctic Policy in 2014 (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014), and Norway’s Arctic Strategy—between geopolitics and social development in 2017 (Norwegian Ministries, 2017). New Growth, Proud History—The Norwegian Government’s Ocean Strategy was also published in 2017 (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017), which was Norway’s first ocean strategy. In addition, the Norwegian government has issued several White Papers on the Arctic in the period from 2003 to 2020. These documents illustrate the significance of the Arctic for Norway, in which governments across the political spectrum have invested significant political and economic capital. The Conservative led Norwegian government (2013–2021) expressed ambitions for the North to become one of Norway’s most sustainable and innovative regions. At the same time, the Arctic has been and is Norway’s most important foreign policy interest area. Norway’s approach to the Arctic is thus an expressed interplay between foreign and domestic policy. Geopolitically, Arctic issues are important for Norwegian cooperation with Russia, and economically, the region holds potential in terms of extracting fish, oil, and gas. From a security policy perspective, it is key for Norway to balance its relationship with Russia with having a strong foot in NATO, while at the same time nurturing cooperation with Russia on Arctic specific matters (Bekkevold & Offerdal, 2014, p. 826). In addition to the bridge-building function Norway has played towards Russia, it was also one of the more forthcoming Arctic Council members in the process of including Asian states as observers in 2013. Norway can be considered an important gatekeeper and facilitator for these states, opening for positive spin-offs in other bilateral, regional, and international settings (Solli et al., 2013, p. 262). The robust presence of Norway in the Arctic illustrates how small states are the main beneficiaries of the multipolar and peaceful Arctic region characterized by strong international regimes (Wegge, 2011). Iceland is situated between the US and Russia and functioned as a buffer between the Soviet Union and NATO during the Cold War (Ingimundarson, 2014). The Parliamentary Resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Policy (2011) encompasses 12 principles aiming to secure Icelandic interests in the region. The first is “Promoting and strengthening the Arctic Council as the most important consultative forum on Arctic issues and working towards having international decisions on Arctic issues made there.” This must be seen in relation to how Iceland has been critical towards the Arctic Five and consider this grouping not only to undermine the Arctic Council, but also threatening Iceland’s interests in the region. Thus, another key priority for Iceland is securing its position as a coastal state, which could give it more influence and power in regional affairs. Iceland’s Arctic Policy further emphasizes that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) should form the basis for settling disputes over jurisdiction and rights in the Arctic, the strengthening of general security and prevention of militarization of the region. Other focus areas

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include climate change, the well-being of Indigenous peoples, economic development, education, and research (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011). As for the remaining Nordic countries, international cooperation in the Arctic has been a main priority for Finland since the end of the Cold War. Finland’s Strategy for the Arctic Region was first published in 2010 and updated in 2013. The strategy focuses on security and stability, which is considered key to economic development and the welfare of northern people in the region (Prime Minister’s Office Finland, 2013, p. 40). Finland was one of the initiators of the Arctic Council along with Canada and has actively pursued efforts to strengthen the forum. Up until Russia’s war on Ukraine, Finland and Sweden were not members of NATO. However, the upheaval of European security relations, and implications for Nordic security cooperation, led to both states submitting their applications to join the alliance on 18 May 2022 (NATO, 2022). Sweden issued its Strategy for the Arctic Region in 2011, which lays forth three priorities for the region: climate and the environment, economic development, and the human dimension. Sweden has no coastline bordering the Arctic Ocean, so it is excluded from participating in the Arctic Five, and the Swedish government, like the Icelandic, emphasizes the Arctic Council as the primary arena for Arctic issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 2011, p. 19). In contrast to the strategies of the Arctic Five, the Swedish strategy does not address sovereignty, and it barely mentions security and military engagement in the region. Accordingly, Sweden’s national interests in the region are on a lower political level, primarily related to climate change and the environment, than those of the Arctic coastal states. Lastly, although the Faroe Islands achieved home rule in 1948 and Greenland in 1979, they belong to the Danish Realm—which makes the Kingdom of Denmark an Arctic state. The Kingdom of Denmark’s Strategy for the Arctic 2011–2020 was issued in 2011, through which Denmark aspires to play a key role in shaping the future of international agreements and cooperation in the region. The Danish strategy places strong emphasis on cooperation through the Arctic Five forum, which is considered not only important, but also a justified channel for addressing Arctic Ocean issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark, 2011). In addition to the strategies issued by the Arctic states, four of the six Indigenous peoples’ organizations who hold a position as Permanent Participants in the Arctic Council have also issued policies and declarations. These are the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Heininen et al., 2020). Emerging trends among these groups include an emphasis on international treaties on Indigenous rights as central within Arctic politics, the right to self-determination and self-government, and a focus on science (Heininen et al., 2020, p. 252). The Arctic states and the Indigenous peoples’ organizations, holding sovereign rights in the region, can promote their interests and gain traction for their priorities through the Arctic Council.

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Emerging Non-Arctic Stakeholders

Changes in the Arctic have contributed to transforming the region in ways with implications for governance (Young, 2014, pp. 225–226). Thus, it is necessary to also consider non-Arctic state actors when making up an inventory of actors and entities within the Arctic governance system. As opposed to the Arctic states and Indigenous peoples, these actors are not Arctic rights-holders and do not have the same opportunity to advance their interests through the Arctic Council. Thus, conferences are expected to play a significant role for non-Arctic state actors in pursuing their interests and strengthening their position in the Arctic. Several non-Arctic states describe themselves as an “Arctic neighbor” or “near-Arctic state,” which can be interpreted as means for seeking stakeholder status in the region. Insight into why non-Arctic states want to partake in Arctic affairs can be gained from their Arctic policies and strategies. In analyzing these documents, Heininen, Everett, Padrtová, and Reissell find that the most quoted issue is “science and education,” which is followed by “international cooperation” (Heininen et al., 2020, p. 241). The latter is not surprising, seeing how arguing that the Arctic is a region of global concern that should be open for international cooperation is an opportunity for non-Arctic states to engage in Arctic affairs. The least quoted issue is tourism, and other issues that are mentioned less frequently than expected are “environmental protection” and “climate change,” while “economy” scores high (Heininen et al., 2020, p. 241). This is interpreted as an ambivalence of Arctic development in balancing between environmental protection and climate change mitigation vis-à-vis economic development (Ibid., p. 253). Lastly, another interesting trend is the interrelationship between state domination based on geopolitical stability, which is advocated for by the Arctic states, globalization based on international treaties, which is promoted by non-Arctic stakeholders, and UN declarations regarding Indigenous rights and self-determination (Heininen et al., 2020, p. 253). This potentially competitive relationship between different stakeholders’ interest is analyzed through this book, especially that between Arctic and non-Arctic states (see also Keil & Knecht, 2017). The Republic of Korea, Singapore, Japan, and China became observers to the Arctic Council in 2013. The Republic of Korea issued the Arctic Policy of the Republic of Korea in 2013 and emphasizes how being involved in the Arctic is a way to enhance their position in global governance (Solli et al., 2013, pp. 258–259). The primary focus is on environmental concerns and economic opportunities, and Korea seeks to demonstrate how it can contribute with resources within Polar research. As such, Arctic engagement can be considered a diplomatic tool for broader international influence, and conference engagement could be a means towards this end. Singapore, as a low-lying island state, is particularly concerned about rising sea levels from the impacts of climate change. Moreover, its position as a maritime hub was central for its Arctic Council observer application, where it emphasized scientific research contributions, experience in maritime traffic management, offshore and vessel construction, and oil spill management (Solli et al., 2013, p. 259).

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Japan has a long history of Polar engagement through research expeditions and perceive itself has having a responsibility to protect the environment of the Arctic as a member of the international community (Tonami, 2014, pp. 120–122). Japan appointed an Arctic Ambassador prior to the 2013 Arctic Council ministerial meeting when its observer application was up for review, which adds a political dimension to Japan’s engagement in the region (Solli et al., 2013, p. 258). Japan issued its Arctic policy in 2015, which promotes Japan’s strengths in science and technology, but also underlines how Japan will ensure the rule of law, including legal issues related to the Arctic Ocean, to be addressed within the existing legal framework (Japan Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 2015). The Arctic policy further emphasizes that Japan will promote international cooperation, respect the rights of Indigenous peoples, and pay attention to security developments in the region. Noteworthy, the policy states: “Japan will participate actively in discussions of expanding the role of observers in the Arctic Council”, which indicates that Japan is not satisfied with this position. Another initiative worth mentioning is “Enhance Japan’s presence by actively participating in the Arctic Circle, Arctic Frontiers, and other international forums related to the Arctic, to communicate Japan’s viewpoint and observation and research results” (Japan Headquarters for Ocean Policy, 2015). This indicates that these conferences are considered beneficial arenas for states to communicate their priorities and advance their interests, especially states that are on the outside of formalized organizations for regional cooperation. Lastly, China is seeking legitimacy as a regional stakeholder in the Arctic through two mutually reinforcing narratives. One territorial, which emphasizes China’s northern latitudes, vulnerability to climate change, and involvement in Arctic research through state-funded expeditions. The other is a globalist narrative, which highlights the Arctic as a maritime, global commons, and the environmental implications of Arctic change (Bennett, 2015, p. 464). The Chinese government published an official white paper in January 2018, which outlined its Arctic policy along four principles: respect, cooperation, win–win results, and sustainability. The white paper is pronounced in positioning China in the Arctic while at the same time expressing commitment to upholding an institutional and legal framework for Arctic governance, to participate actively in international cooperation, and to maintain a peaceful, secure, and stable Arctic order, respecting the Arctic states sovereign rights (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). The white paper asserts that China is an important stakeholder with a right to participate in Arctic affairs under international law, and that governance and use of the region requires participation and contribution of all stakeholders. The emphasis on international law is important for China, which benefits from promoting a framework where it has a stronger position than granted by the observer status in the Arctic Council (Koivurova, 2018). The white paper emphasizes Arctic science and the importance of protecting the environment and ecosystems. As such, the policy can be a key step in the direction of getting the largest growing industry on board with important measures necessary to address the impacts of climate change. Yet, the white paper also explicitly articulates commercial ambitions and proposes

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building a “Polar Silk Road” to facilitate connectivity and sustainable social and economic development. Turning the Northern Sea Route into a global and competitive transport route is also a high priority for the Russian government, as it is considered key for bringing economic prosperity to Russia’s Arctic territories (Putin, 2018). The joint interest of China and Russia in the Arctic is of concern for the US, as articulated in the 2019 DoD Arctic strategy. The Norwegian government began working to get the European Union (EU) engaged in the Arctic through “High North Dialogues” in the early 2000s (Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005). These dialogues aimed at informing the EU about the importance of the Norwegian High North, and how petroleum from the Norwegian shelf could provide energy security for the EU (Wegge & Keil, 2018, p. 100). However, when the EU did develop an interest for the Arctic, its approach to the region was not appreciated by the Arctic states. The European Parliament started debating the need for an Arctic Treaty, questioning aspects of the Norwegian government’s interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty, and challenging Norway and Canada’s practice of seal hunting (Wegge & Keil, 2018, p. 100). The EU’s observer application to the Arctic Council was denied in 2009 due to the anticipated ban on seal products. It was further put on hold in 2013, but the EU was then allowed to observe Arctic Council proceedings. From this, Wegge and Keil (2018) argue that the rise of the Arctic on the EU’s agenda, despite issue-specific controversies, contributed to empowering the member states of the Arctic Council. The EU has since developed an extensive Arctic policy framework. In 2008, the European Commission issued The European Union and the Arctic Region (European Commission, 2008), and in 2012, the communication Developing a European Union Policy towards the Arctic Region. The EU has ambitions to establish itself as an Arctic player, expressed by emphasizing the member states with territories in the region (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland), and strategic partnerships with the US, Canada, and Russia (European Commission, 2008). In 2016, An integrated European Union policy for the Arctic was adopted to guide the EU’s actions in the Arctic (European Commission, 2016). The policy focused on climate change, sustainable development, and international cooperation on Arctic matters, but a weakness is that it does not address the geopolitical situation in the Arctic. Thus, at the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly, Finland’s Ambassador Jari Vilen, who was also a senior advisor in the European Political Strategy Centre at the time, signaled there was need for stronger EU involvement in the region and a new Arctic policy due to emerging challenges. The interests of European states in the Arctic are demonstrated through a desire to become Arctic Council observers, through Arctic policies and strategies, and collaborative science and research projects. France issued The Great Challenge of the Arctic: National Roadmap for the Arctic in 2015 and became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2020. France has had scientific research teams in the Arctic since the 1960s and has two research centers—the Jean Corbel Camp and the Charles Rabot Station—in the region. The French Polar Institute also runs a permanent joint research station in Ny-Ålesund on Svalbard with German partners. In addition, France has a high diplomatic polar profile with an ambassador for Arctic and Antarctic negotiations.

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Germany pursues a more discrete approach to its Arctic engagement than France, and focuses on scientific research, technical expertise, and commercial interests. Germany became an observer to the Arctic Council in 1998. In 2013, the German Foreign Office issued Germany’s Arctic Policy Guidelines, which emphasizes how Germany will assume responsibility and seize opportunities in the region. Other states who obtained their observer status to the Arctic Council in 1998 were the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom. The Netherlands published a Strategy for the Netherlands Polar Programme 2016–2020 in 2014, while Poland has yet to issue a strategy for the Arctic region. The United Kingdom has historical ties to the polar regions through the contributions of explorers, companies, and scientists, and the UK considers itself an Arctic neighbor (Depledge, 2012). The United Kingdom published Adapting to Change: UK Policy Towards the Arctic in 2013, and Beyond the Ice: UK Policy Towards the Arctic in 2018. The British government intends to “work towards an Arctic that is safe and secure; well governed in conjunction with Indigenous peoples and in line with international law; where policies are developed on the basis of sound science with full regard to the environment; and where only responsible development takes place” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013). The 2013 Arctic policy focuses on the role of science, an area in which the UK “excels and has an outstanding international reputation,” in addition to defense and the human, environmental, and commercial dimensions of British Arctic engagement (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2013). Scotland issued its Arctic strategy in 2019—Arctic Connections: Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework, which is devoted attention in Chap. 4 when discussing the functions of conferences for sub-national and regional entities. Spain became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2006, and the Spanish government published Guidelines for a Spanish Polar Strategy in 2016. Italy published Towards an Italian Strategy for the Arctic: National Guidelines in 2015 and has been an observer to the Arctic Council since 2013. Lastly, Switzerland became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2017 and introduced its Swiss Polar Policy at the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly (Stünzi & Zogg, 2020). This overview shows how the interest of non-Arctic European states to take part in Arctic developments got a more formalized expression in the mid-2010s. This was also the time when the number of Arctic conferences reached a peak. The expression of more formalized engagement in the Arctic through regional policies and strategies can be understood through the neorealist perspective, in that states have increasingly come to view the Arctic as a region to pursue their interests, to achieve economic and political gains, and as a region of importance for the international security landscape. Central issues include the extraction and governance of natural resources, rearmament, military exercises, and shipping. At the same time, increased attention towards the Arctic is also an expression of how states realize they cannot deal with all emerging challenges unilaterally. Issues with a global reach, such as climate change, pollution, Coast Guard cooperation, and search and rescue, must be dealt with through international institutions and organizations.

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Non-governmental Organizations in Arctic Governance

There are also many non-state actors engaged in the Arctic, and these entities are a vital component in forming the complex and multileveled Arctic governance system. In fact, part of the governance innovation in the region is the significant opportunities for a broad variety of actors to exercise influence over several issues, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can function as useful avenues of engagement (Young, 2009). Specifically, public–private relationships can prove helpful in addressing a range of international or transnational issues and are also significant when examining the relationship between Arctic and non-Arctic entities (Young, 2014). Non-governmental organizations have been created in the Arctic to serve various purposes. The Northern Forum was created in 1991 as a league of sub-national actors gathered in pursuit of common interests that differs from those of national governments, and the International Arctic Science Committee established in 1990 to address specific Arctic issues and communicate their significance to the world at large (Young, 2005, p. 9). Moreover, the different purposes of NGOs include acting as advocacy organizations, such as Greenpeace, facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation, such as the International Council of Science, or performing tasks that advance common interests (Young, 2014, p. 237). Climate change is a particularly prevailing issue for NGOs in the Arctic, and institutions dealing with this issue include the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the Arctic Institute, the Northern Research Forum, and the Arctic Portal. The Arctic Council has granted observer status to 12 non-governmental organizations. The World Wide Fund for Nature Arctic Programme, the International Union for Circumpolar Health, the International Arctic Science Committee, and the Northern Forum became observers in 1998. In 2000, the International Arctic Social Sciences Association, the Circumpolar Conservation Union, the Association of World Reindeer Herders, and the Advisory Committee on Protection of the Sea became observers, joined by the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs and the University of the Arctic in 2002, and the Arctic Institute of North America in 2004. Lastly, Oceana, an international advocacy organization that focuses on the oceans, became an observer to the Arctic Council in 2017. NGOs working on Arctic issues, such as science, environmental protection, climate change, and the oceans, have overlapping interests and goals in the region. Thus, they are in competition for recognition of their work, media attention, funding, and employees. This book inquires into whether conferences function as a performance space also for non-state actors to promote themselves, and whether conferences are advantageous arenas for the development of collaboration among entities working on overlapping issues.

3.4 The History and Structure of the Arctic Council

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The History and Structure of the Arctic Council

The Arctic Council was created in 1996 with the objective of providing a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction on common Arctic issues, in particular sustainable development and environmental protection. The Arctic Council is frequently praised for its inclusion of six Indigenous peoples’ groups—the Aleut International Association, the Arctic Athabaskan Council, the Gwich’in Council International, the Inuit Circumpolar Council, the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North, and the Saami Council—as permanent participants. This category was created to provide for “active participation and full consultation with the Arctic indigenous representatives within the Arctic Council” (Arctic Council, 1996). Decision-making is the exclusive right and responsibility of the member states with the involvement of permanent participants, and all decisions are made by consensus. The Arctic Council’s leadership is based on a bi-annual rotating chairmanship between the eight member states, and its permanent secretariat was established at the Nuuk ministerial meeting in 2011, and became operational in Tromsø, Norway in 2013. The Arctic Council’s activities are conducted through knowledge-production entities: working groups, task forces, and expert groups. Through the work of these entities, the Arctic Council provides support for other international institutions in the governance complex. Specifically, by contributing to knowledge-building, raising capacity to implement international commitments, and by catalyzing stronger regulatory provisions in broader institutions (Stokke, 2014, pp. 778–779). Observer status can be granted to non-arctic states, intergovernmental, interparliamentary, and non-governmental organizations. Observers have no say in decision-making, and while they can propose statements, these are rarely prioritized due to time constraints (Arctic Council, 2013; Knecht, 2015). Despite the trivial formal role, the issue of the observers has become politicized, and observer applications have at times created debates between the member states (Young, 2012, p. 176). This position can also be a source of frustration for the observers. Especially at high level meetings of the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs), where observers are treated as marginal participants (Young, 2014, pp. 229–231). Yet, there are variations within the hierarchy of the Arctic Council, and observers are more included in the working groups and task forces, which are dealing with issues that require non-Arctic engagement (e.g., black carbon, science cooperation, and dialogue with the business community). While they are not involved in decision-making processes, these entities can influence the agenda by drawing attention to central issues through reports and recommendations (Young, 2014, pp. 230–231). The Arctic Council has many merits, and engagement through this organization is a way for member states to consolidate alliances and partnerships. This contributes positively to the security situation in the Arctic, seeing how states are less likely to engage in conflict with their collaborators (Wegge, 2011, p. 173). However, the Arctic Council also has shortcomings. First, it is a soft-law regime with a limited mandate that cannot discuss issues related to military security. The Arctic is no

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Fig. 3.2 Agreements negotiated under the Arctic Council

longer a peripheral region where environmental protection and sustainable development are the only issues on the agenda. Therefore, some have argued it is necessary to revisit the scope of the Arctic Council, either by broadening its constitutive provisions, or by enabling it to play a coordinating role in managing the other arrangements within the regime complex (Young, 2019). Second, the Arctic Council lacks the effective mechanisms to consider the interests of and incorporate all non-Arctic states and non-state actors. There are major non-Arctic states and intergovernmental organizations who are dissatisfied with just being observers in pursuit of their interests in the region (Young, 2019). These shortcomings of the Arctic

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Council are addressed in Chap. 6, when analyzing the potential of conferences as supplements within the regional governance system. The purpose of cooperation through the Arctic Council is partly about pooling resources and joining efforts, which is reflected in the nature of the Arctic Council agreements; on search and rescue, marine oil pollution, and science cooperation (see Fig. 3.2). It is important to note that these agreements are not mandated by the Arctic Council but have been negotiated by the sovereign Arctic states under the auspices of the Arctic Council. An interesting aspect of the SAR agreement is that it involves the coast guards, so while the Arctic Council shall not engage in military security this agreement can be considered within the category of “soft security.” Moreover, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum (ACGF) was established in 2015 under the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council. This consensus-based group focuses on issues of common interest in the Arctic, such as search and rescue, emergency response, and icebreaking, and is considered an important organization when discussing Arctic maritime safety. In 2017, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum held its first operative SAR exercise in Iceland, which was a key step towards closer cooperation between the member states within an area that the Arctic Council is not intended to engage in.

3.5

Arctic Governance Arrangements

This book aims not only at inquiring into the function of conferences as supplements to the Arctic Council, but also conferences as connections between different components in the Arctic governance regime complex. To that end, the following addresses arrangements that adds to the workings of the Arctic Council. The purpose is to outline the architectural landscape in which conferences operate. Because as noted by Gómez-Mera et al. (2020): it is necessary to consider the broader institutional environment of any institution one aspires to understand the creation, evolution, implementation, or effectiveness of (p. 137).

3.5.1

The Arctic Five and the Law of the Sea

Among the Arctic Eight, geography divides the “Ocean Five”—the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark/Greenland—from the “Non-Littoral Three”—Iceland, Finland, and Sweden (Griffiths, 2011, p. 191). Much of Arctic waters fall under the exclusive maritime jurisdiction of the Arctic states, who have resolved their maritime boundary disputes peacefully through negotiations, conciliation, and juridical procedures (Koivurova et al., 2015, p. 290). All the Arctic states except for the US are party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This is a key treaty in providing for the orderly conduct among coastal

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states worldwide, and a central framework in outlining interdependencies among the Arctic states. The UNCLOS defines three zones of maritime control of particular interest for Arctic sovereignty: the territorial sea, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and the extended continental shelf (Huebert, 2011). After acceding to the treaty, a state has ten years to submit its claim for an extended continental shelf to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. It is in a state’s interest to provide data supporting its continental shelf to be as wide-reaching as possible, as the coastal state has sovereign rights to explore and exploit the continental shelf’s natural resources (UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 1982). One unresolved territorial dispute is the Lomonosov Ridge, an 1800 km underwater ridge of continental crust that separates the Eurasian Basin from the Amerasian Basin (Cochran et al., 2006). It ranges from Ellesmere Island on the continental shelf of North America, extends to a point near the North Pole, and continues south to a point near the continental shelf of the New Siberian Islands. Russia, Canada, and Denmark all argue the Lomonosov Ridge is an extension of their continental shelf. This dispute, as well as expeditions to gather evidence for a state’s application to the Shelf Commission, is often referred to in the media as “claims to the North Pole” (Hønneland, 2020, p. 46). The foremost reason for the interest in this area is the appraisal that large parts of the world’s undiscovered oil and gas reserves are located there (Brid et al., 2008). Following the Russian flag planting on the seabed of the North Pole in August 2007, the Arctic Five met in Ilulissat, Greenland in 2008. The main purpose of the meeting was to outline the sovereign rights of the coastal states and to affirm the role of the UNCLOS in the process of delineating the outer limits of the continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean. The meeting produced a statement of common purpose: the Ilulissat Declaration (2008). The remaining Arctic Council member states and Indigenous peoples were excluded, which led to diplomatic protests from Sweden, Finland, and Iceland. In 2010, the Arctic Five held another exclusive meeting in Quebec, which also led to critique of the Canadian government for not inviting all stakeholders with legitimate interests in the region. The Arctic Five further issued the Declaration to Prevent Unregulated Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean in July 2015. Negotiations for this declaration took place outside the Arctic Council for two reasons: to ensure the involvement of Russia, and because Sweden and Finland, as EU members, are not in control of their fisheries policies (Byers, 2017, p. 17). However, Iceland, the most outspoken critic of the Arctic Five, saw this as an unacceptable action and summoned the ambassadors of the Arctic Five for an explanation for why Iceland had been excluded. Following Iceland’s complaint, the negotiations expanded to include Iceland, China, the EU, Japan, and South Korea (Exner-Pirot & Murray, 2017, p. 55). The declaration was intended as part of the 10-year anniversary meeting for the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration in 2018, but tensions between Russia and the other signatories prevented it from being addressed.

3.5 Arctic Governance Arrangements

3.5.2

71

Barents Cooperation

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and opening of relations between Russia and the West catalyzed intensified cooperation in the Barents region (Hønneland, 2020, p. 14). The Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC) was established in 1993 at the initiative of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, with the signing of the Kirkenes Declaration (Barents Euro-Arctic Council, 1993). A new Kirkenes declaration was signed at the 20th anniversary of the Barents cooperation in Kirkenes on 3–4 June 2013, which described new goals for further cooperation between Norway and Russia in the north (Norwegian Government, 2022). The BEAC—a forum for intergovernmental cooperation at the foreign minister level—was supplemented by a cooperation protocol establishing the Barents Regional Council (BRC). This protocol was signed by representatives from 13 regional entities in Russia, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, as well as Indigenous peoples: the Sami, Nenets, and Veps. The BEAC and BRC gather regional sub-state governments, indigenous organizations, and engaged academics at the Nordic/Russian Arctic level. The main objective of the two councils is to contribute to stability and prosperity in the region through supporting and promoting cooperation and sustainable development (Wilson Rowe, 2020, p. 2). The chairmanship of the BEAC rotates biannually between the four member states. Norway took over the chairmanship from Sweden in 2019 and was followed by Finland from 2021 to 2023. The Norwegian chairmanship had three focus areas: health, people-to-people contact, and knowledge. Just as the Arctic Council, both the BEAC and the BRC have working groups and task forces that are intended to contribute to deepen cooperation on issues relevant to the Barents region. In addition, the International Barents Secretariat was established in Kirkenes in 2008, with the purpose of supporting multilateral activities within the two councils. Other relevant institutions for Barents cooperation are the Norwegian Barents Secretariat, which aims to support Norwegian-Russian projects, and the Kolarctic financing programme.

3.5.3

Nordic Cooperation

There are three bodies that are particularly central for Nordic cooperation. The Nordic Council was formed in 1952 by Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Finland became a member in 1955, the Faroe Islands and Åland in 1970, and Greenland in 1984. The Nordic Council consists of 87 elected members of national parliaments, which are nominated by the party groups (Nordic Council, 2019). The Nordic Council of Ministers was created in 1971 and is the official body for formal inter-parliamentary cooperation in the region. The Nordic Council of Ministers is not one unit but consists of 11 ministerial councils and the Ministers for Nordic Cooperation. The presidency is held for 1 year and rotates between the five Nordic

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states, and in addition to the members, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland also have a vote (Nordic Council of Ministers, 2019). Lastly, the West Nordic Council was established in 1985 as parliamentary cooperation between Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands. It was founded based on the realization of the shared interests and challenges of these states. The main objectives of the West Nordic Council are promoting the common interests of the West Nordics, preserving the natural resources and culture of the North Atlantic, and strengthening cooperation between the West Nordic governments (West Nordic Council, 2019). The West Nordic Council cooperates closely with the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers and became an observer to the Arctic Council in May 2017. The West Nordic Council is of interest, because of the promotion of the close relationship between Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands through the Arctic Circle Assembly.

3.5.4

The Arctic Economic Council

The Arctic Economic Council (AEC) was established under the Canadian Arctic Council chairmanship (2013–2015). The AEC held its inaugural meeting in Nunavut in September 2014 and adopted its foundational documents in 2016. The Arctic Economic Council’s secretariat was allocated from Canada to Tromsø in 2015. The purpose was to realize the potential for cooperation by locating it in the same city as the Arctic Council’s secretariat and Indigenous people’s secretariat. The Arctic Economic Council is a more recent addition to the Arctic governance system, which needs to find its place among the other elements. The AEC contributes to the Arctic regime complex by being an organization that is devoted to facilitating business development in the Arctic, and business-tobusiness activities among Arctic and non-Arctic members. To that end, one of the Arctic Economic Council’s goals is to “Provide advice and a business perspective to the work of the Arctic Council.” The two organizations signed a Memorandum of Understanding in May 2019, which provides a framework for cooperation and facilitates collaboration (Arctic Economic Council, 2019). The other goals of the AEC are facilitating responsible business and economic development of the Arctic and its communities; share and advocate for best practices, technological solutions, and standards; and support market accessibility (Arctic Council, 2014). The AEC has a five-member Executive Committee, and a Governance Committee comprised of one business representative from each of the Arctic states and the permanent participant organizations. Membership is open to corporations, partnerships, and indigenous groups with an economic interest in the Arctic. In addition, other stakeholders can participate as nonvoting members. Accordingly, the AEC follows Arctic Council structure of Arctic state membership and a secondary option for non-Arctic entities, who have no say in decision-making procedures. Access to the global market and international investors is essential to realize the Arctic’s business potential, seeing how the region’s economic base is narrow. At the same

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time, the AEC is an organization where Arctic people and businesses are in charge— just as the Arctic states are in control of the Arctic Council.

3.5.5

The Arctic Science Ministerial

The Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM) was established in 2016 and is interesting for the inquiry of this book because it, as a closed meeting, uses other conferences for communication. The first ASM gathered science ministers from 25 countries, the EU, and representatives from Arctic Indigenous peoples’ organizations in Washington DC in September 2016. The purpose was to discuss collective efforts to increase international scientific collaboration in the Arctic, and the meeting resulted in a report titled Supporting Arctic Science: A Summary of the White House Arctic Science Ministerial Meeting (United States Arctic Research Commission, 2016). The European Commission, Finland, and Germany arranged the second Arctic Ministerial (ASM2) in Berlin in October 2018, coordinated through the Finnish Arctic Council chairmanship. The ASM2 commenced with a science forum to discuss achievements in Arctic science, followed by a meeting of 26 science ministers. The aim was to discuss how to shape the future course of Arctic research, not only generating knowledge and new insight, but also how to translate scientific findings into political initiatives and actions. As with the first ASM, it produced a Joint Statement of Ministers, and a substantial report. The ASM2 meeting titled Co-operation in Arctic Science—Challenges and Joint Actions intended to enhance and develop cooperation under three themes. First, strengthening, integrating, and sustaining Arctic observations; facilitating access to Arctic data; sharing Arctic research infrastructure. This corresponds with the purpose of the Arctic Council Science Agreement: facilitating data sharing and access to research areas across state borders. Second, understanding regional and global dynamics of Arctic change. Third, assessing vulnerability and building resilience of Arctic environments and societies (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2019, 46). The involvement of Arctic and non-Arctic states, political representatives, the science community, Indigenous peoples, and the local community through a process of coproduction of knowledge was considered the main reason for the success of the ASM2. The third Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM3) was prior to the Covid-19 pandemic scheduled to be co-hosted by Japan and Iceland in Tokyo in November 2020. The Arctic Science Ministerial initiative can be read as expression of the increasingly vital role science and technology is acknowledged to play in informing decisions concerning the Arctic region.

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3 Arctic Governance: Actors, Processes, and Structures

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has presented central stakeholders within the Arctic governance architecture: the Arctic states, non-Arctic states, and non-state actors. The chapter has illustrated how the end of the Cold War and opening of relations between the East and the West catalyzed the creation of soft-law initiatives in the Arctic—most prominently, the Arctic Council. There are several other indicators of the growing importance of the Arctic region since the end of the Cold War. These include Arctic policies and strategies issued by both Arctic and non-Arctic states, the increased volume of research on Arctic issues, a growing number of businesses that are interested in establishing themselves in the region, the work of NGOs and advocacy groups, university programs and courses focusing on the Arctic, and media attention towards Arctic challenges and opportunities. Accordingly, the Arctic governance architecture should not be considered a fixed structure, but a changing and dynamic landscape. Besides, the chapter has cast light on the complexity of this system, specifically concerning the diversity of stakeholders and entities involved in Arctic affairs. These are not only states and state-based instruments, but also non-governmental arrangements and transnational networks that contribute to shape the Arctic governance architecture. Adding conferences to this structure allows for conceptualizing Arctic governance as a triangle of sovereign states, hard- and soft-law arrangements—and conferences. The three following empirical chapters inquire into the specific functions of conferences within this triangle, with the objective of answering whether what takes place at conferences is a mirror reflection of other processes in the region, or whether it affects these processes and general developments. The pool of stakeholders engaged in Arctic affairs is an heterogenous constellation with diverging interests, and different motivations for partaking at conferences. Central questions to be addressed in Chap. 4 are: Why do different actor groups participate at conferences and which purposes do conferences serve for these groups? Can conferences influence the interplay between Arctic rights-holders and non-Arctic states that are asserting stakeholder status in the region? Also paying attention to the dissatisfaction among non-Arctic states with the observer role in the Arctic Council, Chap. 4 asks whether activities taking place through conferences contribute to altering the actor composition of the Arctic by involving non-Arctic actors. This analysis explores the notion that conferences function as a “backdoor” into Arctic governance for actors sidelined in formalized cooperation. The Arctic agenda has expanded from evolving around environmental protection, conservation, sustainable use of natural resources, and community well-being to encompass a multitude of issues of global interest and concern. Chapter 5 examines the extent to which conferences are arenas for agenda-setting, both by looking at the organizers’ agenda-setting efforts and at participants who bring with them their own topics of interest to conferences. The architecture mechanism examines how conferences relates to the proliferation of arrangements in the Arctic, to expand our knowledge about the space for conferences within broader governance structures.

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Chapter 6 addresses how conferences can supplement the Arctic Council in terms of broadening the agenda and expanding the stakeholder pool. This chapter also inquires into whether and how conferences can create synergies among other entities, contribute to information sharing, role clarification, and be instrumental in negotiation processes.

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Chapter 4

Actors

The underlying premise of this chapter is that people attend conferences with an intention to fulfill self-interests, advance their position, or acquire power. Thus, by inquiring into the first empirical mechanism—actors engaged in the Arctic conference sphere—this chapter seeks to answer which functions the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly serve for different stakeholder groups. In addition, the chapter examines the extent to which conferences contribute to changes in the overall actor composition of Arctic governance, and the implications that a potential broader stakeholder pool can have for the region’s rights-holders. The chapter is structured around seven identified groups of conference participants: Arctic state representatives, non-Arctic state actors, the epistemic community, business representatives, representatives from institutions/non-governmental organizations, Indigenous peoples, and local/regional representatives. The analysis of how conferences function for actors in the region touches upon several characteristics from the ideal model portrayed in Chap. 2. Particularly, how a conference should contribute to relationship building, be a space for dealmaking among participants, a marketplace for the promotion of ideas, and a performance space for democratic values. Moreover, how a conference should function as a magnate for side events and side meetings is an important characteristic when looking at the epistemic community. In addition, the characteristic of a conference as contributing to bolstering government leadership is especially relevant when examining the function of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly for Arctic state representatives. The characteristic of a conference being a legitimizing tool for stakeholders is equally pertinent for the inquiry into the functions of conferences for non-Arctic states. Thus, this chapter addresses the question of whether conferences can influence the interplay between Arctic and non-Arctic state representatives, and particularly whether conferences function as a “backdoor” into Arctic governance for actors sidelined in formal cooperation. The analysis of actors in the Arctic conference sphere is founded in statements from informants regarding their motives, strategies, and expected outcomes when attending conferences, as well as how they perceive the usefulness of conferences for © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_4

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others. The analysis finds support in the theoretical framework and Jervis’ (1999) typology of institutions, and the chapter inquires whether conferences are tools of statecraft—as put forward in the neorealist perspective—and thus arenas for the Arctic states to promote their interests. However, the chapter also inquires whether conferences are arenas for other actors that states to promote their interests and perspectives, expand their power, advance their position, and argue for their legitimacy as stakeholders in the Arctic. In addition, the chapter examines conferences as innovative instruments, which are outside the realm of conventional statecraft and can contribute to cooperative initiatives on areas where participants have shared interests. Conferences are expected to be beneficial arenas in this regard, as they gather a variety of actors from different sectors and affiliations and facilitate open dialogue and information sharing. The difference in organization of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly highlighted in Chap. 2 is central for the analysis in this chapter. Specifically, how the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers adheres to the notion that Arctic state actors should hold exclusive control over Arctic affairs, while the Arctic Circle organization is more open to non-Arctic, non-state, and sub-national actors also being involved in discussion about the region’s future.

4.1

The Functions of Conferences for Arctic State Representatives

Arctic state participants comprise definitive rights-holders in the region, as sovereigns through international law. The Arctic states constitute the members of the Arctic Council and are the most privileged actors in the region in terms of pursuing their interests through formalized arrangements. From the neorealist perspective, conferences are assumed to be created and upheld if they serve in the pre-existing interests of these states. As such, conference participation is expected to be a supplement for the Arctic states to exert their dominance and further increase their influence over regional matters. The assumption of conferences as tools of statecraft is examined by accentuating two functions that conferences serve for Arctic state actors. First, conferences as arenas for the promotion of policies and to gain recognition for national priorities. Second, conferences as arenas for Arctic states to educate non-Arctic actors seeking to engage in regional developments and to pay attention to their interests and visions. States do not seem to come to conferences for a bi-directional conversation, they are coming for an audience. When you develop a policy, it needs an audience. Arctic states can use conferences to communicate or announce the creation of a policy, which does not have the same effect if it is just on paper. On a general basis, the main purpose [of attending Arctic conferences] is to create understanding for Norwegian High North policy and priorities, and to gain acceptance for the same priorities.

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The above remarks, by one informant from academia and one government affiliated informant, indicate a central reason for why state leaders, ministers, and other government officials attend Arctic conferences: to promote national interests, policies, and priorities, and to advance their visions for the region. There is a noteworthy presence of states—Arctic and non-Arctic—presenting recently published Arctic policies or strategies at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly. This supports the notion of conferences as a tool of statecraft and arenas for the reinforcement of states’ interests, which they can communicate to a broader audience. You have high level officials or ministers coming from Arctic states to these conferences, talking about what the Arctic Council is doing. So, the Arctic states are using both the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle to communicate.

The Arctic Council affiliated informant cited above notes how also the upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council uses conferences to announce its program. For example, the Finnish chairmanship (2017–2019) focused on connectivity and education, which are also focus areas found in Finland’s Arctic policy (Prime Minister’s Office Finland, 2013). The Icelandic Arctic Council chairmanship (2019–2021) emphasized climate and green energy solutions, the Arctic marine environment, and people and communities of the Arctic. This aligns with Iceland’s national priority as a front-runner in the use of geothermal power and supports the objective of securing Iceland’s position as a coastal state and profit from trans-Arctic shipping (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland, 2011; Ingimundarson, 2015). Thus, conferences function as arenas to communicate national priority areas to a broader audience. Looking outside the two cases in this book, the Russian International Arctic Forum (IAF) provides an interesting example of the promotional function of conferences for state representatives. The IAF was established in 2010, as Russia’s first high-level international platform for discussion on Arctic issues. It is arranged by the Roscongress Foundation with the support of the State Commission for Arctic Development (Steinveg, 2021, pp. 143–144). The stated objectives of the conference are in line with Russia’s Arctic policy—aiming to develop international cooperation, maintain the Arctic as a zone of peace, consolidate efforts to ensure the sustainable development of the Arctic, and raise the standard of living for inhabitants of the Arctic (Jensen & Skedsmo, 2010). While Russia is interested in a stable and cooperative region, this vision has been challenged by Western media’s portrayal of Russian rearmament in the Arctic. Thus, the Russian government can utilize the IAF as a platform to provide an alternative narrative, emphasize Russia’s peaceful visions, and boost its legitimacy as a collaborative participant in Arctic affairs. This is noted by the governmental and the academic affiliated informants cited below. President Putin hosts the International Arctic Forum. I would say it is a good opportunity for Russia to display its Arctic policy to an audience willing to listen. He uses it as a communication channel, about Russian Arctic policy and what his plans are going forward. Russian shipping, oil and gas are issue areas promoted at such conferences. It is a way to show a larger media, or general, audience.

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In addition to promoting policies, conference participation is a means for Arctic state representatives to protect the primacy of the Arctic Eight. They can sustain their position as leaders in the region and maintain control over the discourse about the future of the Arctic. The inclination to assert “Arctic state supremacy” is founded in the argument that Arctic governance is historically, geographically, and legally bound by interactions among states who are privileged by their possession of territory above the Arctic Circle (Keil & Knecht, 2017). Accordingly, Arctic rights-holders are connected through a geographical belonging to the region, and shared historical and cultural ties. Highlighting the divide between Arctic states and non-Arctic actors to protect the sovereignty and entitled rights of the region’s inhabitants can have both geopolitical and economic underlying drivers. One academic informant describes how the Arctic states do not want others telling them how to govern. The informant asserts: “Outsiders are welcome to do science, but the notion that ‘this is our area’ is strongly established among the Arctic states.” However, forces of globalization challenge a political order in the Arctic that is centered exclusively around the Arctic states. This development can potentially reinforce Arctic states’ use of conferences as platforms to argue for their sovereignty, and it can amplify the importance of conferences for Arctic states. One government affiliated informant describes how it is important for the debate that the Arctic states participate at conferences. Thus, there is a sense of responsibility, which the informant also describes as concern over what can happen if they do not participate, and outsiders get to control the discussion. As such, the first function of conferences for Arctic state representatives, founded in determination of asserting dominance and maintaining control, leads to the second reason for conference engagement: creating responsible stakeholders. I sometimes hate how we use the word stakeholder so much, but it is the best word, because a stakeholder is not from that place, but they care. They are engaged, passionate, and working to promote something for the good. So, I guess we are trying to create stakeholders by inspiring them to gain a new perspective, or change their mind about a community, people, or place.

The description of stakeholders by the conference organizer quoted above is fitting for how to perceive this concept in the Arctic and through the conference sphere. The responsibility for security and sustainability in the Arctic has become institutionalized, and climate change has led to increased human activity in the region. This implies that when asking what it means to be responsible for the Arctic, one must consider the intention to ensure sovereignty, on the one hand, and supporting humanity on the other (Hansen-Magnusson, 2019, p. 152). In other words: considerations of state sovereignty must be weighed alongside responsibility for sustainable human development, which entails a broader range of actors. Conferences can be potential arenas for a sense of responsibility to emerge through a process of interaction and social learning. This particularly pertains to non-Arctic states’ sense of responsibility towards the region and concerns the balancing of economic and political interests with community and environmental well-being.

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From the absence of an overarching authority within the international system, compliance rests on actors adhering to shared norms and agreed upon rules of conduct. From this characteristic, responsibility in and for the Arctic becomes diffused. One way of looking at it would be to argue that Arctic governance is the right, privilege, and responsibility of states that possess territory above the Arctic Circle. On the other side, Young (2014) contends it is necessary to acknowledge the responsibility that outsiders have for the Arctic’s biophysical and socioeconomic systems. The impacts of climate change materializing in the Arctic are caused by actions from the global south and cannot be mitigated by the Arctic states alone. Still, while recognizing this responsibility, Young (2014) argues it is possible to simultaneously reason for the legitimacy of non-Arctic stakeholders’ economic interests in areas such as resource extraction, shipping, and tourism in the Arctic. Accordingly: “any constructive consideration of avenues of engagement between Arctic and non-Arctic states (and various non-state actors) must therefore start from the proposition that we need to think of this as a two-way street” (Young, 2014, p. 228). Large conferences that attract international participants from a variety of sectors and affiliations should be reckoned as advantageous for advancing the two-way street interaction as advocated for by Young (2014). On the one side, the Norwegian government finds it important to engage with new stakeholders at an early stage, to promote a common understanding of developments in the Arctic (Bekkevold & Offerdal, 2014). To that end, the Arctic Frontiers decisively serves as a purposeful arena for the Norwegian government. On the other side, Mr. Grímsson argues that the Arctic Circle Assembly creates pressure on countries that are seeking involvement in Arctic affairs to perform as responsible partners, in exchange for utilizing the platform to promote themselves. The other side of the coin of inviting China, Japan, Korea, France, Germany, and others to have a country session, is that they agree to be accountable, to take questions, and present their case in an open international platform. They know, that if they do not behave responsibly in the Arctic, it is addressed at the next Assembly. In a completely open way, in front of the global media, and an international audience.

Conferences do provide the opportunity for outsiders to demonstrate their interests and argue for their legitimacy, while at the same time creating a space for Arctic states to supply the “Arctic-101” to newcomers. Consequently, conferences can contribute to create responsible stakeholders, and to balance the interest in partaking in Arctic science and economic developments with a sense of responsibility towards the region’s environment and local communities. This is achieved by promoting the voices, opinions, and perspectives of the region’s inhabitants, something the organizers of both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly aim for, while also allowing non-Arctic state actors the opportunity to display themselves, which is better facilitated through the Arctic Circle Assembly. Nonetheless, caution should be applied when estimating the potential of conferences in altering state interests and priorities. While Arctic states are provided a platform to educate the uneducated and advance more balanced views, there is

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limited evidence of states changing their policies because of pressure applied at conferences. This corresponds with what Haas (2002) finds in his examination of the role of UN conferences in constructing efforts at global environmental governance (p. 74). Still, it is not possible to know whether non-Arctic states or business representatives would have pursued a more aggressive advancement towards the region had they not been included in the Arctic community through conferences. It is also possible that time is a factor, and that changes in state policies can be observable beyond the span of the empirical material gathered for this book. As pointed out by a conference organizer: “if you visit a place, you care about the place.” Conferences can contribute to extending the Arctic neighborhood, by providing non-Arctic actors the opportunity to develop a connection to the region. Therefore, conferences should be included in analysis of international relations as one of several diplomatic tracks through which actors can develop a mutual understanding of challenges and opportunities and realize mutual benefits in areas of common interest. Conferences can serve in the interests of Arctic states through the involvement of non-Arctic state actors, which is exemplified by the establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly. On the one side, the growing interest among Asian states to participate in Arctic affairs was part of the reason for the skepticism towards the launch of the Arctic Circle Assembly, which was described as an open tent involving all interested stakeholders. From this, the Assembly was by some perceived as an intended alternative, or even threat, to the Arctic Council. At the same time, having non-Arctic states participate at conferences hosted by Arctic states gives them a say in which issues should dominate the agenda. Conferences can thus be significant supplements to the Arctic Council in terms of broadening stakeholder participation in the region.

4.2

The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives

Non-Arctic states are sidelined political processes and decision-making concerning the region and do not have the same opportunities to express themselves through formalized forums, such as the Arctic Council. Many of the non-Arctic states that are seeking further engagement in the region are economically powerful. They also hold capacities within areas that are becoming increasingly important for the Arctic, such as shipbuilding, transportation, infrastructure development, maritime navigation, and satellite communication. Yet, the aspirations of non-Arctic states to engage in development projects in the Arctic are often hampered by Arctic state governments who are skeptic towards foreign investments and the prospects that economic influence can lead to political influence. Thus, despite the cooperative and peaceful character of the Arctic, it is interesting to visit the neorealist premise that international relations consist of sovereign self-interested states and apply this proposition to the analysis of how conferences function within Arctic governance. Specifically,

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The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives

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the premise that conferences can serve in the interest of states is particularly interesting to apply for the non-Arctic state stakeholder group. To that end, two functions of conferences for non-Arctic state participants stand out from the empirical material, and these are discussed below. The first is conferences as platforms for non-Arctic states to argue for their stakeholder claims, promote their capabilities, advance their interests, and increase their power in the region. The second function is conferences as educational platforms and information channels for those sidelined in formalized regional cooperation. Here, the analysis also sheds light on the difference between the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly in terms of non-Arctic state involvement. While Arctic states subscribe to a restricted view on who can claim stakeholder status in the region, non-Arctic states advance the discourse of the Arctic as a “global commons” (Keil & Knecht, 2017). One example is China, which describe itself as a “near-Arctic state” to justify its legitimate position in Arctic affairs (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). According to Biermann (2014), being legitimate is “being in accord with established legal forms and requirements, or of confirming to recognized principles or accepted rules and standards of behavior” (p. 124). From this definition, non-Arctic state actors can become legitimate by following legal jurisdictions and adhering to the standards of behavior set by Arctic rights-holders. At the same time, legitimacy is also a social construct, which rests upon a perception that the actions of an actor or entity are appropriate with a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Thus, legitimacy is about more than following established legal requirements or confirming to the rules of conduct. It is about participation, engagement, and assimilation within a socially constructed system. In other words: not only must non-Arctic states follow rules and standards of behavior in the region, but the legitimacy claims of non-Arctic states must be recognized and accepted by the Arctic states. To that end, the primary impact conferences have on the composition of actors within Arctic governance is contributing to legitimizing non-Arctic state actors as stakeholders. Conferences provide unfiltered stages to declare, as China did at the 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly, to be a “very important Arctic stakeholder.” Conferences do not discriminate in terms of membership, so after recurrently attending the same arenas over several years the distinction between Arctic and non-Arctic can become less clear-cut. In addition to the legitimizing function, there is an element of publicity to conference participation, which provides the opportunity for non-Arctic states to advance their interests in the region. One university affiliated participant describes how non-Arctic actors “can actually showcase themselves: show their interest, ambitions, and capacities” at conferences. Another informant portrays a dual function of conferences. On the one side, as a “door into the Arctic for Asian stakeholders” and on the other side, “contributing to attracting financial investments to the region”. In summary, the value of conferences for actors sidelined in formalized cooperative arrangements is described accurately by an informant working in the intersection between policy and science in the Arctic:

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I think when countries come forward and describe what they are doing in the Arctic, it helps Arctic states see the potential of partnering with non-Arctic states for projects. So, does that help them? Absolutely! Because they are sharing information in a way that is very specifically tailored to something an Arctic state is listening for, to see if someone would be a good partner. So, could they do that in another way? Probably. But what you get at a conference is the condensed version.

Non-Arctic states are however not a homogenous group, and different states have different capabilities they seek to promote. For example, Asian states are largely engaged at conferences for business, while European states are primarily interested in participating in Arctic science and research. Germany is an example of a state actively taking advantage of the space provided by the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly to promote its contributions to Arctic research. The German government had a country session at the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2015 that addressed science cooperation and economic opportunities, followed by a session in 2017 on the establishment and mission of the German Arctic Office. The head of the German Arctic Office was present at the 2018 Arctic Frontiers, and the European Commission, the Finnish Ministry for Education and Culture, and the German Ministry for Education and Research co-hosted a session on the second Arctic Science Ministerial at the 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly. Germany’s rationale for conference participation is expressed by the informant cited below: We are not an Arctic nation, but we are investing more finances into Arctic research than most Arctic states. Germany is one of the biggest Arctic research nations in the world. That is the main interest. But, the environment, shipping, fisheries, marine and polar technology are also of interest. Things the German industry has to offer and contribute with. Using conferences as marketplaces is important for Germany. Making connections to Arctic countries, Arctic companies.

One strategy that is applied by non-Arctic states at the Arctic Circle Assembly for publicity and to promote their capabilities is having a country presentation followed by a “report session” the next year. The Republic of Korea did this in 2013 and 2014, completed by a “Korean Night” in 2015. Others who have used this model are the United Kingdom, France, and Japan. Moreover, hosting evening receptions is a branding opportunity provided by the Arctic Circle Assembly, which is available for those who are willing to pay for it. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged a “Japan Night” in 2017, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China hosted a “China Night” in 2018. In this regard, the Arctic Circle Assembly is considered distinct from the Arctic Frontiers in that Mr. Grímsson has put special efforts towards “promoting the new states,” as described by a research institute affiliated informant. Mr. Grímsson provides a platform for newcomers and contributes to promote their competence on Arctic issues—and to endorse their presence. Conference participation is as such a means for non-Arctic states to obtain legitimacy, to promote capabilities, and to acquire skills and build expertise for further engagement through other channels. Looking closer at the potential function of conferences for states to increase their power in the region, non-Arctic actors can take advantage of international conferences to form transnational coalitions based on their interests. Moreover, the

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The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives

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expansion of the Arctic Circle organization to Forums hosted in China, Japan, and Korea is an example of non-Arctic states, through their foreign ministries and research institutes, being enabled to intertwine themselves more in Arctic affairs. This approach is not always welcomed by Arctic states, and the fear of spill-over effects from conference engagement to other areas of Arctic governance is an indicator of how it indeed can be a means to acquire power for non-Arctic states. Inquiring into how conferences can be utilized for states to strengthen their position in the region, Switzerland serves as an interesting case. Switzerland’s Arctic Council observer candidature was up for review at the 2017 ministerial meeting in Fairbanks. An informant associated with the Swiss ministry of foreign affairs described how it was deemed important to display Swiss’ interests, work, and engagement in the Arctic prior to the Arctic Council ministerial meeting. The Arctic Circle Assembly in October 2016 was considered a good opportunity to explain the link between Switzerland and the Arctic, which was founded in Swiss polar science and the impacts of climate change, and why Switzerland should be considered a relevant stakeholder. Switzerland held a country presentation in the plenary program, a breakout session, and a large exhibition. In addition, the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended the 2017 Arctic Frontiers. A Senior Arctic Official described how: “The Swiss Arctic Circle Assembly presentation in 2016 demonstrated to some who were not necessarily convinced that Switzerland was actually serious about this and might have something to contribute to the Arctic Council.” Switzerland became an observer to the Arctic Council in May 2017. What the Koreans are doing, what Scotland is doing—they are bolstering their reputation. Demonstrating they have the expertise, they have the capability, demonstrating they are worth the investment.

Scotland is another example of how conference engagement can be a means for a state to advance its position in the region. Scotland, as part of the United Kingdom, had to leave the European Union (EU) following the “Brexit-referendum” in June 2016—despite that most Scottish voters did not want to leave the EU. Scotland was then seeking new partnerships and to position itself in the European community, and the Arctic region was considered one that Scotland could form closer ties to. As noted by an academic informant: “Scotland sees the opportunity to emerge as, and be perceived as, a ‘North-Atlantic country.’ In the same way as the Faroe Islands, and Greenland.” The uncertainty following the UK vote to leave the EU is addressed in a 2017 update of the Scottish Government’s Nordic-Baltic Policy, first published in 2014. The importance of continuing to develop bilateral relations is underlined, and with regard to Iceland, the statement reads: To promote our relationship with Iceland, we will: continue to work with the Arctic Circle Secretariat based in Reykjavik to bring together Scottish strands of work related to the Arctic, including Ministerial participation at the Arctic Circle Assembly and the hosting of an Arctic Forum in Edinburgh in 2017. (Scottish Government, 2017)

In 2016, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, held a keynote speech at the Arctic Circle Assembly, in which she was distancing Scotland from the prevalent anti-globalizing forces within the UK, and called for closer cooperation with

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Scotland’s neighbors in the North Sea. The First Minister returned to the 2017 Assembly for a plenary Dialogue with Chairman Grímsson and hosted an Arctic Circle Forum in Edinburg in November 2017. The Scotland and the New North Forum addressed common interests between Scotland and the Arctic. The Scottish Arctic strategy was launched on September 23rd, 2019, and states: Scotland is the closest neighbor to the Arctic States and we have many shared interests and challenges, from renewable energy and climate change targets to social policies and improving connectivity. With the threat of a hard Brexit still possible, it is important we continue to work with our northern neighbors to build strong relationships. Our involvement with the Arctic Circle organization is an excellent opportunity to do this.

Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework emphasizes connections between Scotland and the Arctic, not only geographically, but also cultural and social links, similar challenges, and outlooks. The strategy reads: “Scotland is ready to build bridges that can reinforce our role as a European gateway to the Arctic” (Scottish Government, 2019, p. 5). The closing section lists what Scotland has to offer the Arctic, including establishing an Arctic unit within the Scottish Government’s Directorate for External Affairs. There is no mention of neither the Arctic Council nor the Arctic Economic Council in the strategy, but there is an emphasis on conferences: “Ministerial participation in Arctic conferences such as the Arctic Circle Assembly in Reykjavík and Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø, has contributed to promoting Scottish expertise and emphasizing Scotland’s appetite for international exchanges” (Scottish Government, 2019). At the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly plenary session New and emerging Arctic policies, Paul Wheelhouse, the Scottish Minister for Energy, Connectivity and the Islands, presented highlights from Scotland’s Arctic Policy Framework. The Scottish government also hosted two breakout sessions at the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly, one titled Empowering rural and islands communities: a dialogue between Scotland and the Arctic, and one titled A Scottish perspective on climate change, climate justice and human rights. In the plenary session, Minister Wheelhouse described Scotland as the closest European state to the Arctic and “the European gateway to the Arctic.” He further underlined geographic, economic, cultural, and social links between Scotland and the region. The Minister made two additional remarks of particular interest. First, how “Arctic commitment is not a geopolitical statement.” Scotland did not vote for Brexit, and the Scottish government is ready to commit to cooperation with the Arctic states and the rest of Europe, to learn and contribute. Second, the Minister referred to Scotland’s long engagement with the Arctic Circle. On a question from the audience about Scotland’s room to maneuver outside the UK and EU, the Minister answered that the Arctic Circle Assembly is not a political arena, which makes it an opportunity for Scotland to act independently. In broader terms, Scotland’s activities through the Arctic Circle illustrates a general function of the organization, which is also described by Mr. Grímsson. Namely, providing sub-national and sub-regional entities the opportunity to participate in Arctic cooperation and promote their interest independently of the state or federal government.

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The Functions of Conferences for Non-Arctic State Representatives

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The audience at Arctic Frontiers is Norwegian dominated, very Scandinavian. At the Arctic Circle, there are more people from non-Arctic countries. From the beginning, it was open to non-Arctic countries. The distinction between Arctic and non-Arctic is not made there—it does not matter which country you come from. Arctic Frontiers still follows a bit more like Arctic Council structures—members and observers. It is understandable. Because it is Norwegian Foreign Affairs behind it, and they are a member of the Arctic Council. On Iceland, it is not the Foreign Office, it is the president behind it, who is independent. Arctic Circle is a bit more anarchy.

As noted by the institute director cited above, there is a significant difference between the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly in terms of Arctic and non-Arctic actor involvement. The contrasting functions of the two conferences in legitimizing the presence of non-Arctic actors as stakeholders are traceable back to their origins. The Arctic Frontiers was established to provide for knowledge-based decision-making and is therefore founded on the idea that Arctic actors should conduct Arctic affairs—“those with the know-how.” Still, there is no official strategy against non-Arctic actor involvement, and the conference has launched initiatives (e.g., the Arctic Frontiers Plus) to engage the Arctic Council observers. The Arctic Circle’s philosophy, grounded in being a democratic platform that involves all stakeholders—also those without territorial belonging to the region— encourages international dialogue between those living in the Arctic and those who seek to participate in Arctic affairs. Mr. Grímsson’s vision is that to promote development in the Arctic, the rest of the world must be included in discussions about the region. The Arctic Circle Assembly is as such an arena where different actors, sources of authority, principles, and ideas are welcomed. The second primary function conferences serve for non-Arctic states is being arenas for information gathering and platforms through which they can educate themselves about the region. This function of conferences is not only related to the interests of non-Arctic states but is also beneficial for Arctic states when seeking to create responsible stakeholders in the region. Three issues have been identified as central in this regard. First, non-Arctic states can draw lessons from the Arctic in dealing with climate change in their own regions. Second, they can acquire knowledge about potential markets for their industry. Third, non-Arctic states can obtain a more accurate understanding of Arctic communities and living conditions. Looking at the first issue, informants describe how non-Arctic actors tend to view the Arctic through the lens of climate change, as an issue of global concern. The visible effects of climate change are no longer contained to the Arctic region, and the whole world is experiencing more extreme weather, forest fires, floods, and rising sea levels. Accordingly, non-Arctic states are interested in insight about adaptation and mitigation strategies from the Arctic, to acquire the latest information on developments, and to take part in joint international efforts. Conferences function as purposeful arenas in this regard, which is exemplified by the series titled Arctic Lessons for the Himalayan/Third Pole Region arranged at the 2013, 2017, and 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly. The second aspect of conferences as listening posts is connected to the national interests of non-Arctic states, as they can use conferences to position themselves in

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the Arctic market. For example, a Norwegian journalist described an interesting encounter with a Korean representative he met at the Arctic Frontiers. Korea was building a researcher icebreaker, and the representative participated at conferences to learn about potential markets, and to appraise whether the icebreaker should operate in the Arctic or Antarctica. Singapore is frequently mentioned as another example of a state that is sending delegates to conferences to identify markets where they can sell materials from their shipping industry. This signifies the function conferences serve as magnates for side meetings, as portrayed in the ideal model from Chap. 2, and how conferences can serve in the broader (economic) interests of states, as according to the neorealist perspective. The third element is participating at conference to become responsible stakeholders. While many non-Arctic states have extensive polar research track-records and capacities in relevant industries, their knowledge about Arctic living conditions, local communities, traditional livelihoods, and Indigenous culture might be limited. The message from Arctic state representatives at conferences is repeatedly: “we have to listen to those who live in the Arctic”—i.e., the Indigenous population and northerners. Conferences are advantageous forums for such interactions, and for the two-way street communication that is necessary for balancing the interests of non-Arctic actors with the well-being of Arctic communities (Young, 2014). I have lost count of the times myself and X and X have attended an Arctic conference to hold the same speech, concerning the same issues: “remember that states own the Arctic,” “there are Indigenous peoples living there,” “the Arctic is not only snow, ice, and polar bears,” and things like that. As well as explaining that if the ice on Greenland melts, it is in fact worse for those living in the south. These stories, that it is those in the south polluting, not those in the north, needs to be repeated. It is an educational activity.

The above quote is from an academic affiliated informant, who describes efforts to create responsible stakeholders through conferences. It illustrates the necessity of participation by experienced actors for educational purposes. First, to promote an accurate representation of the region as one with people in need of livelihood, and not an empty space to be protected from all social and economic development. Second, to devaluate misperceptions of the kind that climate change is coming from the Arctic. This function is also relevant on the individual level, as newly employed people in institutions and organizations, whether Arctic or non-Arctic, working on Arctic issues need information and insights about the region. Conferences have been described as useful arenas to meet relevant people and to learn about the field, as illustrated by the policy affiliated informant cited below. I remember when I was someone new to the issues, you can read all you like, but until you actually go and hear people talking, and you figure out how much people actually care about certain things, and who care about what—that is a very valuable thing conferences can contribute to teach.

In summary, the analysis of the ways in which Arctic states and non-Arctic states use conferences, and the functions of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly for these actor groups substantiate the notion of conferences as tools of statecraft. The Arctic Frontiers is founded in a philosophy that supports the Norwegian

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The Epistemic Community in the Arctic Conference Sphere

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government’s pre-existing interests in the region, and the activities of the Arctic Frontiers contribute to promote Norwegian perspectives and priorities and the position of Norway and the Arctic Eight. The Arctic Circle Assembly contributes to elevate Iceland’s geopolitical and economic interests in the Arctic, while at the same time providing a space for non-Arctic states and marginalized actors to participate on equal basis as Arctic state representatives. The latter is also in the interest of Iceland, as it contributes to promoting Reykjavik as an Arctic Hub and boost Iceland’s tourism industry. However, the open tent philosophy of the Arctic Circle Assembly also cast light on how conferences can produce unintended consequences, through the legitimizing function it has for non-Arctic states. Nonetheless, Arctic and non-Arctic states are not the only actors engaged at conferences in the region. Thus, it is pertinent to examine whether these gatherings can be more than tools of statecraft. Specifically, to return to the other kinds of institutions identified by Jervis (1999), and to consider conferences through the lens of regime theory. The following examines conferences as innovative instruments that can hold unrealized common interests and potential for increased cooperation and inquire whether conferences can change preferences and outcomes.

4.3

The Epistemic Community in the Arctic Conference Sphere

The epistemic community is defined as a “network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policyrelevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Haas, 1992, p. 3). At Arctic conferences, this group comprises scientists, academics, professionals, and experts working on Arctic issues, and who are established and legitimate stakeholders in the region. Haas (1992) argue that the diffusion of innovative ideas and information can change the behavior of actors and be an important determinant of international policy coordination (pp. 2–3). He further argues that control over information and knowledge is an important dimension of power, and that this power lies within the epistemic community (Haas, 1992, p. 3). The following inquires whether conferences provide arenas for the epistemic community to advance this power through focusing on two functions. First, whether conferences, in addition to providing arenas for networking, gives the epistemic community a stage to promote themselves as credible experts. Second, whether conferences are arenas for the epistemic community to push their issues and sell their solutions to identified problems, thus contributing to agenda-setting and to determine the framework for the debate about the future of the region. Three of the characteristics from the ideal model of a conference presented in Chap. 2 are relevant for the epistemic community: a conference should contribute to relationship building among participants, be a marketplace for the promotion of

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ideas, and serve as a magnate for side meetings. To that point, networking is emphasized by informants across from different affiliations and nationalities as the strongest motivating factor for attending conferences. This is in line with the objective of the organizers: to create multifaceted meeting places. This function is particularly significant for the epistemic community, which is a network of experts from different states working within the same field. This finding is supported by Skelton (1997) who maintains that academics go to conferences to be seen and make contacts, and Hickson (2006) who argues networking at conferences contributes to developing an epistemic community. Thus, what happens on the margins of the conference—the side meetings and side events—is particularly important for this actor group. The weight attributed to the networking aspect of conferences for the epistemic community is illustrated by three statements. One from a university employee, one from an informant associated with an Arctic Council working group, and one from a research institute director. Everything directs academics to conferences: the funding, the system, it goes on your CV. Why do I keep coming to the Arctic Circle? It is the biggest and best attended— everyone comes. There are 10-20 people in the world that wants to have the conversation I want to have. Networking is important. But why do I care about the networking? I can get co-authors—conferences are the only place where we would ever meet face to face. So, that does make it valuable: you can put a face to a name. You can say that the most important part of the Arctic Circle is the mingling and networking in between. The same is with the Arctic Frontiers: what happens between the sessions and the side meetings. The side meetings are often what is most important. The conference becomes an excuse to meet. What happens on the side-line of the sessions is the important thing. So, in the same way I do not go to sessions at the Arctic Circle, this last Arctic Frontiers, I barely went to any sessions. It was all going to other peoples’ meetings. So, out of those activities, it was a meaningful experience. I do not know what happened at the conference, but I was able to do a lot of different things, find value, and see outcomes in a way the conference does not produce. There is an elite of the elite that has always been doing this. They do not need the basics, they do not need the added information, they are getting it. What they need is connections, that chance to talk to each other.

An academic informant describes how networking at conferences is important to meet the “right people for your niche” and for maintaining and developing relationships. To that point, there is a professional interest related to conference participation for the epistemic community: the quest for co-authors for papers, funding, partners for projects, or new employment. As such, conference engagement is a means for this actor group to promote their interests at the professional level and to advance their position within a field or discipline as a credible contributor that possess knowledge, expertise, and integrity. This aligns with the characteristics of the ideal model that a conference should contribute to relationship building, as well as a marketplace for ideas. It further aligns with the argument put forward by Hickson’s (2006), that networking at conferences is valuable because it “provides ‘new’ colleagues for coauthoring papers and books and organizing convention programs” (p. 467). Conferences provide opportunities to hear experts from various disciplines talk about their latest research.

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The Epistemic Community in the Arctic Conference Sphere

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These conversations can be stimulating for academics’ future work and is a chance to discover other people working on similar projects (Hickson, 2006, pp. 465–466). In addition to the professional assets conference participation provides for the epistemic community, the empirical material gathered for this book brings to light that one should not underestimate the value of “hallway chats” at Arctic conferences—i.e., conferences as magnates for side meetings and informal encounters, as portrayed in the ideal model. These elements are especially important for the epistemic community and relates to an argument by Leon and de Leon and McQuillin (2018): despite how the Internet has provided new opportunities for academics to access each other’s work and correspond across state borders, faceto-face interaction still matters for influencing the flow of academic understanding. Moreover, in a comparative study of virtual and face-to-face conferencing, Sá et al. (2019) find that networking, detailed discussions, interactions in the margins of a conference, and conferring with fellow participants are impossible or difficult to achieve through virtual conferences (pp. 43–44). The second function conferences serve for the epistemic community is providing arenas for this group to contribute to agenda-setting, which is also one of the characteristics of the ideal model presented in Chap. 2. On that note, Cross (2013) makes the argument that authoritative knowledge is a product of social context and rests on being socially recognized, rather than proven (p. 158). Thus, if an epistemic community is socially recognized, it can persuade others and shape their world views (Ibid.). This aligns with the relational conceptualization of power: the ability to change the outcome of a situation in the direction of one’s interests through shaping the preferences of others (Dahl, 1961; Lukes, 2005). Thus, an interesting function of conferences for the epistemic community is providing arenas for this group to contribute to determining the framework for debate and to agenda-setting, also beyond the conference itself. This relates to the personal-professional interests of scientists and academics: if they can persuade others that the topic of their research is deserving of attention, it can lead to increased interest in and funding for their work. One research institute affiliated informant describes that attending conferences is useful for the promotion of the work that the institution does and to “protect your space in the sandbox.” As such, conference participation is a means for the epistemic community to uphold their main source of power: control over information and knowledge. This in turn contributes to endorsing their position within the region. Moreover, conferences create a space for the epistemic community to develop research ideas with likeminded people, and to consolidate their shared beliefs and knowledge. From this, experts develop a consensus around which issues are important and can formulate solutions to defined problems to which policymakers can respond. Two informants, both from academia, describe this process: In the Arctic, there is a huge epistemic community that has the expertise, and not necessarily government. And influence has become very decentralized. Maybe it is a chicken-or-the-egg question: is it because of conferences? Which came first: the conferences or the epistemic community?

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We are all just a bunch of bees, beating against this ball of inertia. And it takes a lot of bees pushing on this big ball to get it to move. Because it is so much inertia in each of our own government. And when you talk about the disconnect between other governments, it takes a lot of time and a lot of effort to get that momentum going, to make a move.

The agenda-setting function of conferences for the epistemic community further supports the external social responsibility of this group: contribute to societal relevant research and knowledge-based policymaking. Enabling experts to elevate salient issues and set the framework for debate therefore has broader social and political consequences. However, this is not a one-time endeavor, and expert contributions need to be an ongoing process. Not only because political administrations change and new people acquire positions related to Arctic issues, but because of inertia in governance processes, as noted by the second informant cited above. These challenges make recurrent conferences valuable for the epistemic community in efforts to influence the agenda, as they provide for the continuous pushing of issues over time. While this finding derives from the two cases, this function of Arctic conferences could also be applicable for other arenas and areas where expert input is necessary to provide for knowledge-based policy, societal, and business development. As such, conferences can be considered as the second type of institutions as described by Jervis (1999): innovative instruments that remain outside the realm of conventional statecraft and that cover an area of unrealized common interest and potential for greater cooperation through increased information and knowledge. Jervis further argues that while instruments of diplomacy can realize some degree of cooperation, they are fragile and must be accompanied by deeper changes in what actors want and how they conceive of their interests (Jervis, 1999, p. 61). Thus, the dynamic effects of institutions, which were not expected at the time because states rarely consciously seek to alter their values and preferences over outcomes, must not be underestimated (Jervis, 1999, pp. 61–62). Applying the same logic to conferences, they can be considered elements in an iterative process of changing the values and preferences of actors within the international system.

4.4

Business Representatives at Arctic Conferences

Business representatives is another group that is well-versed in the conference sphere, and there are several industry specific conferences in the Arctic. Before looking at whether conferences can serve purposefully for these actors to advance their legitimacy, interests, and position in the region, it is necessary to recognize how the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council (AEC) in 2014 contributed to changing the business element within Arctic governance. The AEC has since its establishment worked with both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, contributing with input to the programs and offered their network to make the programs more business friendly. The following inquires into how business representatives operate through the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly, and

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Business Representatives at Arctic Conferences

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in turn, how the conferences function for this actor group. Two issues are devoted particular attention: conferences as arenas for business delegates to identify market opportunities, and conferences as spaces for marketing and branding of the company. Some businesses are clearly here to do business. They are looking for clients, they are looking for customers, they are looking for investors, they are looking for ideas that they might translate into business opportunities.

International cooperation in the Arctic region really began to gain momentum following the end of the Cold War. Industry development and business activities are even more recent phenomena, which have surged with the impacts of climate change making the region more accessible and open for resource extraction. For that reason, the Arctic can be an unfamiliar region for international business representatives. Conferences are in this regard, as pointed out by the informant from the science community cited above, important arenas for acquiring knowledge about investment opportunities in this market. Conferences are also valuable arenas for business representatives to acquire a better understanding of Arctic societies and living conditions. An informant associated with the Arctic Economic Council describes how actors who see the opportunity to do business in the region often start out with attending a large conference. In this way, conferences function as ports of entry through which business representatives can familiarize themselves with central political actors, potential partners, local conditions, and specific investment projects. It is particularly noted that Asian business representatives treat conferences as business networks, which is reflected in their country presentations and the size of their delegations at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly. In parallel, Lövbrand et al. (2017) concludes that the UN climate change conferences have turned into a business fair for corporate actors, providing a space for product marketing, benchmarking, and for establishing new contacts with clients and competitors (p. 593). Moreover, as noted by the informant working in the policy-science interface cited below, the fact that the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly attract business representatives from Asia, North America, and Southern Europe is also advantageous for the host state and for local companies. For a Chinese delegation visiting Reykjavik, participating at the Arctic Circle, it is likely they will stick around for a few days and talk with people in Iceland who might be interested in investments from China or a Chinese company, right? So, the conference can be an excuse to do other business.

Conferences are not only valuable for business representatives for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with the market and identifying business opportunities, but also the other way around: to familiarize others with their company through marketing and branding. People-to-people contact is valuable for outreach and extending the company brand, and this function is described by the business representative cited below. The last conference I attended, after a panel I had a gentleman approaching, who was a potential customer. Most probably, if I had not given the speech, not taken the time to go

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over, that contact would never have been established. Creating long-term revenue for the company. That is the motivation. Also, to be the voice of business.

Conferences are an opportunity for such engagement, and thus fulfill a branding function for this stakeholder group. This is in line with the characteristic of the ideal model, of a conference being a space for dealmaking. As the business representative describes, conferences are arenas for promoting the company through presentations or panel participation and familiarize a broader customer pool with the service or product offered by the company. Business representatives can create a name for themselves internationally, by advocating what they have to offer in terms of technology and capabilities, which can lead to new contacts and generate revenue. Simultaneously, business representatives can not only brand the company’s name, but also promote the company as a “responsible and good citizen.” Conferences provide stages from which businesses can build a reputation as a credible actor that is sensitive to sustainable development and the well-being of local communities. This is illustrated by one informant from the business community and one policy affiliated informant cited below. Some companies feel they must participate to give a contribution to the community. This is true partly for X for example, that they feel they must show up—it is related to being a good citizen. X wants to participate at the Arctic Frontiers’ Environmental Forum. Why? Because they want to promote their “renewable profile.”

The marketing function of conferences for business representatives is further illustrated by two examples, where the first combines Finland’s national and industry interests. At the 2014 Arctic Circle Assembly, Finland had a country session attended by the President of Finland and Tero Vauraste. Mr. Vauraste is president and CEO of the Arctia group, and at the time (2015–2017) also vice president of the Arctic Economic Council. Mr. Vauraste further served as the Arctic Economic Council’s chairman during Finland’s chairmanship from 2017 to 2019. Arctia Ltd. operates eight icebreakers, and the utilization rate for these is around 30–40% annually. Thus, Mr. Vauraste was a strong advocate for the sharing of icebreakers— an “Uber system”—to maximize utility and enhance security in the Arctic. This initiative has been particularly directed towards the US, which has an outdated icebreaker fleet. At the 2017 Arctic Circle Assembly, Arctia brought the Nordica icebreaker on its way from the Arctic 100 expedition, which was conducted as part of the celebration of Finland’s 100 years independence. One reason for the detour to Iceland was to demonstrate collaboration between research and the business, and another was to promote the idea of sharing icebreakers. Accordingly, the Finnish company was provided a platform for exposure, and to get more governments, businesses, and researchers who need icebreakers to reflect on the concept they were advancing. Mr. Vauraste described the value of bringing the Nordica to the Arctic Circle Assembly in this manner:

The Functions of Conferences for Institutions and Non-governmental. . .

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The meaning and importance of being here in a marketing sense, bringing the Arctia name to the conference has a meaning and value. That people remember “that was the company that brought the icebreaker.”

The US state of Maine’s conference engagement is the second example where the business sector is heavily involved, and the economic element is a powerful motivator for participation. In 2013, the Icelandic steamship company Eimskip made Portland its logistical hub in North America, which spurred Maine’s Arctic interest (Bell, 2016). Government and business representatives from Maine—the northernmost and easternmost US state—have been frequently present at the Arctic Circle Assembly and using the platform to brand the capital Portland as a “gateway to the Arctic.” Senator Angus King held an opening speech at the 2015 Arctic Circle Assembly, where he argued that Maine is a relevant Arctic stakeholder, because the state is has the port in the US that is closest to Asia when sailing through the Northern Route. At the 2017 Arctic Circle Assembly, the Department of Transportation hosted two breakout sessions, and the Governor and the CEO of Eimskip participated in a plenary session The Arctic: A New Territory for Business with the Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade. The 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly was attended by Governor Janet Mills, who spoke in a plenary session titled Dialogue with regional leaders: US and Russia. She described Maine as part of the Arctic Circle—as a “port to the Arctic”—emphasizing the interdependence among states in a globalized world. The purpose of renewing and reinforcing trade relations with Greenland and the Nordic countries was a major reason behind the largest delegation from Maine in the history of the Arctic Circle Assembly.

4.5

The Functions of Conferences for Institutions and Non-governmental Organizations

The discussion concerning the epistemic community addressed the motivations for and outcomes of conference participation for individual academics and scientists, as well as for this community to consolidate efforts at agenda-setting through conferences. However, institutions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can be considered a separate group, in that they utilize conferences in a different manner from the professional–personal undertakings of those within the epistemic community. Two main functions of conferences are discussed for this group of actors. First, conferences as stages to communicate and promote the work of the institution or organization. Second, the value of conferences for institutions or organizations to obtain insights into central developments in the region and connect back to the affiliation and the local community. Conferences provide an arena for speakers from all stakeholder groups to communicate their visions and promote their work to a broad audience. Yet, this function is emphasized by informants as being particularly useful for institutions and

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organizations, seeing how dissemination of their work can be a challenge. They have limited resources for outreach activities and are dependent on people actively seeking information through reports, websites, newsletters, or social media. Conferences provide a cost-effective space for institutions and organizations to make themselves known, draw attention to their accomplishments, and emphasize prioritized issue areas in their work. This finding relates to the conclusion of Lövbrand et al. (2017), that one of the main reasons for why representatives of organizations attend the UN climate change conferences is to highlight their work through exhibits and by arranging side events (p. 593). It also aligns with the characteristic of a conference as a magnate for side events and side meetings, as portrayed in the ideal model. The value of this function of Arctic conferences for university and research institute representatives is illustrated by two informants cited below. In general, I go to Arctic conferences to promote cooperation and the interests of those I am representing: universities and colleges in the Arctic. This means I go to quite a lot of conferences I personally do not have any need or interest in attending, because I know what takes place there. But you must participate to speak and show yourself, or, not yourself, but what you represent. I do not think we can ignore that this is a competitive space. Just like any issue-area or region is going to be competitive. I do think we see more cooperative kind of elements in this space than others do. But we are still searching for where collaboration make sense for mutual benefit, and where collaboration is not just driven by one power structure over a subsidiary.

Furthermore, as an increasing number of entities are becoming involved in the Arctic, the competition among research institutions for the best employees, visibility, projects, and funding intensifies. Non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace and the WWF, compete for attention and influence. Thus, these entities can benefit from attending conferences to promote themselves as thought leaders and active participants in the Arctic. In a broader sense, participating at the larger international arenas is a way to influence the societal agenda, and the perception of how things should be organized in the region. Informants have also emphasized activists as being particularly successful in utilizing conferences to promote their issues. Specifically, by making use of the conference is to get media attention and as such become visible in the public debate. One example of this is the Nature and Youth protest of the Norwegian government’s climate policy that was set up outside the entrance to the 2019 Arctic Frontiers, which attracted media attention both locally and nationally. This further illustrates how conferences can produce unintended consequences that are not in the interests of the organizers or the state, and, as such be more than tools of statecraft. The second important function conferences have for institutions and non-governmental organizations is providing information channels, which is also related to the dealmaking characteristic of the ideal model. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly gather large delegations and facilitate the opportunity for institutional and organizational participants to acquire insight about processes and developments that are relevant for their work. Connecting what takes place at the conference to the organizational level and local community contributes to the

4.6

Indigenous Peoples at Arctic Conferences

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societal responsibility of institutes and organizations, which was described as “a check on elitism” by an institute affiliated informant. Moreover, the informant goes on to describe that if people with competence on Arctic issues refrain from participating at conferences, those filling their gap might not have the right knowledge and might introduce things that are not connected back to communities. As such, the way in which institutional and organizational representatives utilize conferences is connected to the agenda-setting characteristic of the ideal model and how conferences can be purposeful for actors seeking to control the narrative and framework for debate. In closing, there is also a responsibility aspect of conference participation by Arctic state affiliated entities, as described by the institute director cited below. I come to Arctic conferences because you must if you want to do things in the Arctic. Unless there is some decision that we all opt-out, we must keep coming to these things just because other people are.

4.6

Indigenous Peoples at Arctic Conferences

Indigenous peoples in the North have influence through the Arctic Council, structures the Arctic states have constructed. Indigenous peoples are not interested in being used as a symbol, hanging in front of oil platforms, by environmental organizations. On the other side, they are not interested in being overrun by international industry. They also benefit from conferences arranged by people of the North, because Indigenous people are more included than at those organized in Brussels.

This statement, by an informant from the science community, illustrates several aspects of Indigenous peoples’ position in Arctic governance and the conference sphere: their position in the Arctic Council, challenges regarding inclusion, and conflicting interests with other stakeholder groups. Compared to other actors, Indigenous peoples are not those who benefit the strongest from conference participation relative to their engagement in the Arctic Council, where they hold a privileged position with voting power as permanent participants. Conferences, by contrast, are described by informants as struggling with incorporating Indigenous peoples in a meaningful way. Their legitimacy in the region is acknowledged, but involvement at conferences is not always optimal. As underlined by a conference organizer: “Indigenous peoples should have a voice, not to check of a box for ‘involvement,’ but because they are stakeholders more than anyone.” Yet, informants also emphasize how there has been advancement in the inclusion of Indigenous peoples at conferences. However, this is not only attributed to organizers, but also a result of Indigenous peoples working to become more involved and to have a voice in the regional dialogue from the conference stage. From this, the main functions of conferences for Indigenous peoples are providing an arena for them to have their voices heard, promote their perspectives, and advocate for the protection of northern communities in scientific research and business development. At the same time, it should be noted how the space provided for Indigenous peoples is equally important for those on the receiving end of their

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message. While Indigenous peoples’ primary platform for influence and decisionmaking power is through the Arctic Council, the broader outreach from this organization is limited. Thus, conferences are useful supplements for communication, to reach the non-Arctic audience. One informant asserts that when attempting to change peoples’ minds the true value of a story lies in personal connections and emotions. To hear from someone who lives in the Arctic gives more powerful insight and better understanding of the region than to hear from a government representative that reads a pre-prepared script. This is where the power of Indigenous peoples comes in. To hear from someone who lives there, and it is a part of who they are—it makes it hard to forget that speech. That is where the true value is.

Still, conference participation is not only a question about being given speaking time in the program, but also a financial issue. Indigenous peoples’ organizations must choose which delegates to send, and to which conferences. Traveling to Reykjavik or Tromsø can be very costly for international participants. Thus, as pointed out by an informant from a governmental organization, conferences are not always as representative for Arctic Indigenous peoples as the Arctic Council must be. This also raises the question of who are given the opportunity to participate at conferences, and whether they are representative for the whole community. Sending representatives to conferences is not a democratic election process, and delegates that are speaking on behalf of a group do not necessarily share all the same values. While conferences do not have decision-making authority, or produce legally binding outcomes, this still raises the question of their elitist character.

4.7

Local and Regional Representatives at Arctic Conferences

Lastly, local and regional representatives are also Arctic rights-holders who are legitimate participants in regional affairs. This group can however benefit more from conference participation than activities through the Arctic Council compared to Indigenous peoples. While Indigenous peoples have a protected position in the Arctic Council, a point of critique towards the organization is that there is no room for local or regional representatives, despite how most of the region’s inhabitants are not Indigenous. Conferences therefore provide a decisive supplementary role for this actor group to have their voices heard. Specifically, one of the guiding principles of the Arctic Circle structure is the importance given to sub-levels of government, who participate on equal standing with the same scope and importance given to state representatives (Einarsdóttir, 2018). Examples of sub-federal or sub-national entities that are using conferences to speak independently and promote their interests autonomous of the central government have been discussed throughout the chapter. These include Scotland, the city of Portland in Maine, as well as Greenland and the Faroe Islands.

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Local and Regional Representatives at Arctic Conferences

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The US state of Alaska is another example of a regional entity taking advantage of the space provided by conferences within Arctic governance, for the purpose of advancing regional interests at the federal level. Barack Obama was the first US president to visit the northernmost state in 2015, which is symptomatic of how the federal government has neglected Alaska. Nonetheless, considering the growing international importance of and attention towards the Arctic, the United States federal government would be well-advised to pay more notice to the territory that makes the US one of the Arctic Eight. Alaskan senators, governors, mayors, institute and university representatives, and Indigenous peoples’ delegates have recurrently participated at the Arctic Circle Assembly and Arctic Frontiers, which have provided the opportunity to speak for Alaskans’ interests in the region. For example, Alaskan Senator Liza Murkowski has been involved with the Arctic Circle organization since the beginning, and uses the Assembly to emphasize how Arctic issues, such as climate research, defense, and innovations in transportation, are of concern for the entire US population. Related to the space provided for regional actors to promote their interests on the national level is the opportunity to connect with other regional entities across national state borders through conferences. Informants describe how the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are valuable for local and regional representatives to meet colleagues from other circumpolar communities with similar challenges, to share experiences and best practices. Conferences are also important arenas for sub-levels of government to gain information about what goes on in other states with regard to practical experiences and developments, as pointed out by a governmental affiliated informant: This is an important aspect, I have seen. To use this as a meeting place to discuss how the mining industry behaves in Canada versus how they behave in Finish Lapland. So, there is a benefit in bringing experiences and best-practices back home, because the Arctic communities are so small.

At the same time, the previously mentioned elitist character of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly is also relevant for this stakeholder group. The two conferences are dominated by those with the most resources, strategic positions, and most extensive networks in the region. Thus, while Indigenous peoples and locals are provided a stage, they are also challenged by the elitist Arctic Frontiers, talking about the North and not with the North, and Arctic Circle’s philosophy of giving anyone the opportunity to speak. The Arctic Circle’s approach entails that the perspectives presented from the conference stage can be disconnected from Arctic sovereigns and rights-holders, local communities, and Indigenous peoples. As such, the elite in the south and non-Arctic actors are moving their attention and activities to the north, while not always being attuned to local and regional concerns. Lastly, there is a difference between local levels of government and local communities. As one informant noted about conferences: “it’s not like anybody of the street can just walk in.” The Arctic Frontiers has attempted to make the conference more accessible to the public through the Open Arctic arrangements. Still, while this may serve the interest of the organizers in terms of more people

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developing an understanding of the purpose of the conference and to reduce the elitist perspective, getting people to engage in Arctic issues and disseminate the significance of this endeavor to the public is challenging. The solution could be to start with the youth, which is something which both conferences have implemented in their activities. The Arctic Frontiers with the youth pillar of the organization and by having the conference free for students from the university in the host city, and the Arctic Circle’s explicit emphasis on involving students in the program and audience.

4.8

Conferences as Tools of Statecraft, Innovative Instruments, and Arenas for Expanding the Arctic Community

This book asks whether conferences are advantageous arenas for actors to advance their interests, position, legitimacy, and power in the region. This chapter has illustrated how the seven participant groups who engage in Arctic affairs and participate at conferences have both distinct and overlapping interests. They have different motives for conference participation, and conferences in turn serve varying functions for them. In conclusion, it is interesting to look closer at conflicting interests among participant groups at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly, which is followed by a summary of the main functions of conferences for different actors. These concluding remarks are founded in the theory discussion, e.g., whether conferences are tools of statecraft or innovative instruments, and it incorporates the characteristics of the ideal model to conclude on whether the two cases fulfill these criteria. Specifically, whether they serve as magnates for side events and side meetings, contribute to relationship building and dealmaking among participants, whether they contribute to bolstering Arctic government leadership, or can be legitimizing tools for stakeholders. The main dividing question between Arctic states and non-Arctic state actors is: who should be considered entitled to participate in the development of the region with regard to resource extraction, investment projects, and governance structures? On the one side is the state-centric view and the perception that Arctic affairs should be in the hands of Arctic right holders. As Chap. 2 illustrated, this perspective is supported by the philosophy and structure of the Arctic Frontiers, which is an arena for established actors and interests: those on the inside of regional governance arrangements. The Arctic Frontiers creates a space for Norway to display its Arctic policy and interests, it is used as a platform by the Arctic Council and is dominated by Arctic state actors. “Outsiders” are invited in, but the conference program is much aligned with the Norwegian government’s priorities. On the other side, the organizers of the Arctic Circle Assembly do not consider stakeholder legitimacy to be geographically bound. Rather, all with self-proclaimed stakes in the Arctic should be able to participate in deliberating the future of the

4.8

Conferences as Tools of Statecraft, Innovative Instruments, and Arenas. . .

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region. The open tent provided by the organizers is especially utilized by non-Arctic actors to promote their interests and boost their legitimacy by arguing for their connection to the region and stakeholder claims. This is exemplified by China’s claim to be a “near Arctic state,” as Chinese delegates also repeat from the conference stage. Moreover, the Arctic Circle organizers strive to create a platform for sub-national and regional entities and is well-attended by this participant group. The chapter has further validated how non-Arctic state actors can obtain increased power and standing in the Arctic through conference participation. With the US moving towards a more protectionist position in the Arctic, the window of opportunity for non-Arctic states to become legitimate stakeholders could be closing. Seeing how non-Arctic states are dissatisfied with their role as observers in the Arctic Council, it is expected that these actors will increase their conference engagement to argue for the urgency to their claims, especially related to security concerns and climate change issues. It is evident that the Arctic Frontiers to a large extent fulfills the ideal model’s characteristic of a being a space for bolstering government leadership—especially that of Norway and the other Arctic Eight. While the Arctic Frontiers was established by a research institute, the conference it has still been arranged and upheld in the interests of Norway, with close involvement of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Arctic Circle Assembly was established by then president of Iceland and is an arena for promoting Iceland’s geopolitical and economic interests. These findings align with neorealism’s view on the (limited) role of institutions within international relations and the perception of conferences as tools of statecraft. Yet, the primary function of the Arctic Circle Assembly is providing a space for non-Arctic states to argue for their legitimate claims as stakeholders in the region. These actors can promote their interests and perspectives to a large audience—often including several Arctic heads of state and other central government representatives—which a feature provided by the Arctic Circle Assembly that these actors are not given through other forums. Furthermore, non-Arctic states can use conferences to position themselves in the Arctic market by connecting with local business and industry representatives—as these arenas do serve as magnates for side meeting, as portrayed in the ideal model. From the divergent philosophies of the two conferences concerning legitimate stakeholders and interests, the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly create complementary spaces within Arctic governance, in particular for actors. Arctic states and non-Arctic states do have diverging interests in the region, so the two conferences combined thus embody the interests of the totality of stakeholders. From this, the two conferences have different impacts on the actor composition of Arctic governance. Additionally, as these two conferences are attended by participants from both camps, they create a meeting place for dialogue and the opportunity to develop more balanced views. The latter point supports the view of conferences as innovative instruments for realizing common interests and establish cooperation through increasing information and knowledge—the second kind of institution identified by Jervis (1999). Thus, conferences are more than simply tools of statecraft. States should pay more

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attention to the activities unfolding at conferences, as they can be arenas where policy can occur, and where international cooperation can develop. Conferences should also be recognized by scholars as relevant entities to add to analysis of international relations. State representatives are central participants at the two conferences, and their interest in attending speaks to their relevance in Arctic affairs. Thus, conferences should not be overlooked as potential arenas for shaping the international political discourse. Looking at business representatives, this group partake at conferences for reasons of self-promoting and marketing: to boost their legitimacy and sustainable activities in the region. This group also attends to advance their interests, such as promoting the company name and acquiring access to new markets, customers, partners, and investment opportunities. These findings align with the ideal model’s portrayal of how a conference should be a space for dealmaking among participants. This is relevant in the Arctic concerning the need for balancing between economic and social development and environmental protection, and the need for balancing between stakeholders on each side with different priorities. Thus, conferences can be arenas for constructive discussions of such challenges—which is also an issue brought forward in the next chapter. Furthermore, the chapter has illustrated how the epistemic community, institutions, organizations, local and regional representatives can take advantage of conferences for personal–professional interests—to “protect their space in the sandbox.” For actors seeking to influence the broader agenda in the region, conferences are a means to obtain power, understood as making others want what you want or through controlling information and knowledge. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are also central meeting places for these groups of actors, and thus fulfills the relationship building characteristic of the ideal model, as well as the characteristics of being a marketplace for the promotion of ideas and a magnate for side events and side meetings. Thus, while conferences in some ways are tools of statecraft, they are also key meeting places for other non-state actors and create a dynamic space in the region that can contribute to driving processes forward. Lastly however, the chapter has drawn attention to how Indigenous peoples are not necessarily those who advantage the most from conference participation relative to engagement through the Arctic Council, where they hold a protected position as permanent participants. This stands in contrast to the local and regional levels of governance, which are not represented in the Arctic Council but can convene, interact, and have their voices heard through conferences. In conclusion, the analysis of this chapter has demonstrated how the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly fulfills several of the characteristics of the ideal model of a conference. However, because of their difference in philosophy and organization the two conferences also score different on some of the characteristics. Most noteworthy, the Arctic Circle Assembly is particularly important as a legitimizing tool, in particular for non-Arctic states, while the Arctic Frontiers is more prominent for bolstering government leadership, especially that of the Arctic states. Pertaining to the theoretical framework, the discussion has cast light on how

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conferences can function as tools of statecraft while at the same time covering an area of unrealized common interest and potential for increased cooperation.

References Bekkevold, J. I., & Offerdal, K. (2014). Norway’s high north policy and new Asian stakeholders. Strategic Analysis, 38(6), 825–840.b. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2014.952934 Bell, T. (2016). How Maine is turning itself into an Arctic player. Arctic today. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.arctictoday.com/how-maine-is-turning-itself-into-an-arctic-player Biermann, F. (2014). Earth system governance: World politics in the Anthropocene. MIT Press. Cross, M. K. D. (2013). Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later. Review of International Studies, 39, 137–160. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23355680 Dahl, R. A. (1961). Who governs? Democracy and power in an American City. Yale University Press. Einarsdóttir, V. (2018). A new model of Arctic cooperation for the 21st century. Journal of the North Atlantic and Arctic. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.jonaa.org/content/201 8/10/19/a-new-model Haas, P. M. (1992). Epistemic communities and international policy coordination. International Organization, 46(1), 1–35. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2706951 Haas, P. M. (2002). UN conferences and constructivist governance of the environment. Global Governance, 2, 73–91. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800328 Hansen-Magnusson, H. (2019). The web of responsibility in and for the Arctic. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 32(2), 132–158. https://doi.org/10.1080/09557571.2019.1573805 Hickson, M. (2006). Raising the question Nr. 4 why bother attending conferences? Communication Education, 55(4), 464–468. https://doi.org/10.1080/03634520600917632 Ingimundarson, V. (2015). Framing the national interest: The political uses of the Arctic in Iceland’s foreign and national policies. Polar Journal, 5(1), 82–100. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X. 2015.1025492 Jensen, L. C., & Skedsmo, P. W. (2010). Approaching the north: Norwegian and Russian foreign policy discourses on the European Arctic. Polar Research, 29, 439–450. https://doi.org/10. 1111/j.1751-8369.2010.00165.x Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism and cooperation. Understanding the debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560040 Keil, K., & Knecht, S. (2017). Introduction: The Arctic as a globally embedded space. In K. Keil & S. Knecht (Eds.), Governing arctic change. Global perspectives (pp. 1–18). Palgrave Macmillan. de Leon, F. L., & McQuillin, B. (2018). The role of conferences on the pathway to academic impact: Evidence from a natural experiment. The Journal of Human Resources, 1–49. https://doi.org/10. 2139/ssrn.2507361 Lövbrand, E., Hjerpe, M., & Linnér, B.-O. (2017). Making climate governance global: How UN climate summitry comes to matter in a complex climate regime. Environmental Politics, 26(4), 580–599. https://doi.org/10.1080/09644016.2017.1319019 Lukes, S. (2005). Power. A radical view (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Iceland. (2011). Parliamentary resolution on Iceland’s Arctic Foreign policy. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from http://library.arcticportal.org/1889/1/AParliamentaryResolution-on-ICE-Arctic-Policy-approved-by-Althingi.pdf Prime Minister’s Office Finland. (2013). Finland’s strategy for the Arctic region. Government resolution on August 23 2013. Prime Minister’s Office Publications 16/2013. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://vnk.fi/en/arctic-issues/finland-s-strategy-for-arctic-policy

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Sá, M. J., Ferreira, C. M., & Serpa, S. (2019). Virtual and face-to-face academic conferences: Comparison and potentials. Journal of Educational and Social Research, 9(2), 35–47. https:// doi.org/10.2478/jesr-2019-0011 Scottish Government. (2017). All points North: The Scottish Government’s Nordic Baltic policy statement. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.gov.scot/publications/points-northscottish-governments-nordic-baltic-policy-statement/ Scottish Government. (2019). Arctic connections: Scotland’s Arctic policy framework. Scottish government. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.gov.scot/publications/arcticconnections-scotlands-arctic-policy-framework/ Skelton, A. (1997). Conferences, conferences, conferences. Teaching in Higher Education, 2(1), 69–72. https://doi.org/10.1080/1356251970020106 State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China. (2018). China’s Arctic policy. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/ content_281476026660336.htm Steinveg, B. (2021). Exponential growth and new agendas–a comprehensive review of the Arctic conference sphere. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 12, 134–160. https://doi.org/10.23865/ arctic.v12.3049 Suchman, M. C. (1995). Managing legitimacy: Strategic and institutional approaches. The Academy of Management Review, 20(3), 571–610. https://doi.org/10.2307/258788 Young, O. R. (2014). Navigating the interface. In O. Young, J. D. Kim, & Y. H. Kim (Eds.), The Arctic in world affairs. A North Pacific dialogue on international cooperation in a changing Arctic (pp. 225–250). Korea Maritime Institute Press.

Chapter 5

Agenda-Setting

Everyone has a different agenda. Some want to prevent the ice from melting, while others hope it melts as soon as possible.—Conference participant

The Arctic agenda comprises a range of different, but intertwined, issues deemed important by central actors within Arctic governance. These have been identified through a review of Arctic state policies, strategies, and political speeches, and there is a noticeable convergence around key priorities among the Arctic states (see also Heininen et al., 2020; Wilson Rowe, 2020). Shared priorities in the region are international cooperation, governance, climate change, environmental protection, sustainable social and economic development, resource extraction, fisheries, shipping, security and safety, search and rescue, the human dimension, Indigenous peoples’ rights, science, research, education, tourism, and infrastructure. These are also issues that frequently are addressed at conferences, and central questions to be answered in this chapter are how agenda-setting works in a conference setting and whether conference activities can impact the broader agenda in the region. Agenda-setting is at its most basic “about the recognition of a problem on the part of the government” (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, pp. 120–121). It is further defined as “the process of raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors” (Livingston, 1992, p. 313). In the following analysis, “the relevant community of actors” (those subject to influence) are the actors that comprise the Arctic governance system. Both conference organizers and participants can be those attempting to “raise issues to salience” and influence the agenda. This chapter considers agenda-setting as a dynamic process and inquiries into whether the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly fulfill the agenda-setting characteristic of the ideal model of a conference outlined in Chap. 2, and as such whether these arenas can contribute to agenda change within Arctic governance. In addition, other central characteristics of the ideal model to be addressed in this chapter are conferences as spaces for dealmaking among participants, as marketplaces for the promotion of ideas, and as performance spaces for democratic values.

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The analysis in this chapter finds support in the multiple streams framework (see Kingdon, 2011). The main idea of this framework is that processes relevant to agenda-setting are found in three streams. Problem recognition occurs in the problem stream when unsatisfactory conditions capture the attention of people inside and outside of government (Béland & Howlett, 2016, p. 222). Problems are considered social constructs and must therefore be framed in a certain way by policy entrepreneurs to attract the attention of decision makers (Kingdon, 2011, p. 179), and these policy entrepreneurs resemble the epistemic community presented in the previous chapter. Alternatives, proposals, and solutions to the identified problems formulated by policy entrepreneurs flow through the policy stream (Kingdon, 2011, p. 166). Should this stream be present at conferences, it aligns with the ideal model’s characteristic of a conference being a marketplace for ideas. The political stream is located at the level of the political system and is dominated by bargaining between three main elements: the national mood, interest group campaigns, and governments and legislators (Herweg et al., 2018, pp. 24–25). As such, it connects to how a conference should be a space for dealmaking among participants, as portrayed in the ideal model. This chapter examines the extent to which conferences are arenas for coalition building and for interest groups and the media to influence the political and public agenda. Thus, it focuses not only on the agenda as formulated by the organizers through conference programs, but also on whether participants can use conferences to influence broader processes and debates in the region. Commencing with the agenda-setting efforts of the organizers, this chapter first presents the Arctic Frontiers’ focus on the Arctic Ocean and the Arctic Circle’s Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports. These efforts are linked to broader debates and processes taking place on the international arena at the time, such as the adaptation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the development of the International Code of Safety for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code) within the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The chapter illustrates how these events opened a window of opportunity for the conference organizers’ initiatives. The subsequent sections discuss the agenda-setting impact of conferences through the three streams of multiple streams framework, before concluding on whether conferences can be considered agenda-setting instruments.

5.1

The Arctic Frontiers: Keeping the Arctic Ocean on the Agenda

The titles of the Arctic Frontiers provides insight into which issues the organizers consider important to promote through the conference. Societal and human aspects were promoted through Geopolitics in the High North (2013) and Humans in the North (2014). The Arctic Frontiers entered a more industrial and ocean-oriented period, with the Climate and Energy (2015), Industry and Environment (2016), and

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White Space—Blue Future (2017) conferences. Connecting the Arctic (2018), Smart Arctic (2019), Power and Knowledge (2020), Building Bridges (2021), and Pathways (2022) are situated under the overarching themes connectivity and knowledge, which aim to promote the Arctic as a connected part of global structures rather than a remote uninhibited area, according to the organizers. The following analysis focuses on the promotion of ocean-related issues through the Arctic Frontiers, which has been advanced as a dominant theme both domestically and internationally by the conference organizers since the beginning, in close cooperation with the Norwegian government. Norway considers itself a leading ocean state, and the government’s interest in the oceans was intensified with the turn to the Blue Economy. Norway’s first ocean strategy, New Growth, Proud History, was published in 2017 and emphasizes promoting the sustainable use of ocean resources; clean and healthy oceans; and strengthening the role of the blue economy in development policy (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017). Steinberg and Kristoffersen (2018) argue Norway is attempting to position itself as the Arctic Ocean’s rightful steward, by bringing its geographical location, cultural-economic history, capacity, and expertise to the fore. The adaptation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) by the UN member states in 2015 was a window of opportunity for the Norwegian government to promote its ocean strategy. Specifically, the wedding of the Blue Economy focus with the SDG 14—“Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas, and marine resources for sustainable development”—is a way for the Norwegian government to promote commitment to ocean development as evidence for its environmentalist credentials (Steinberg & Kristoffersen, 2018, p. 142). One example of activities aimed at assuming a dominant position within international ocean management is the launch of a High-Level Panel on Building a Sustainable Ocean Economy by the Norwegian Prime Minister at the World Economic Forum in 2018. The goal of the panel is to share Norway’s experience of combining conservation and use of marine resources and to assume a leading role in international efforts to achieve the UN Sustainable Development Goals (Norwegian Government, 2018). Another example is found at the fifth Our Ocean conference in Bali in October 2018, where the Arctic Frontiers, together with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Fisheries, hosted a Blue Knowledge for Blue Growth side-event. The event focused on sustainable ocean activities in meeting the objectives of the SDG 14, as well as economic growth balanced with conservation of the ocean environment. Both the Arctic Frontiers conference and the Seminars Abroad arrangements support the Norwegian government’s ambition to strengthen the ocean industries domestically and to assume a leading conservationist role internationally. Oceanrelated issues have been the main theme for the Arctic Frontiers in 2007, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017. Other examples include how the Arctic Frontiers Plus in 2017 was dedicated to the Arctic Council’s work on oceans, and in 2019, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs organized a session on The Blue Economy and the Arctic Council. The Center for the Ocean and the Arctic was appointed by the Norwegian government in 2018, to strengthen the knowledge about the blue economy in the

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North and to help realize SDG 14. It hosted an open event at the 2019 Arctic Frontiers, on exporting Norwegian competence in conservation and use of marine resources. Open Arctic arrangements on The century of the oceans were held in 2017, 2018, and 2019, aiming to engage the public in Norway’s primary competitive advantage in the global economy. The ocean has been the predominant theme of the Arctic Frontiers since its inauguration, but ocean-related issues have also prevailed in the (Arctic) conference sphere since the 1970 (see Steinveg, 2021) and have been a main priority in several Arctic Council chairmanships. Nonetheless, while the Arctic Frontiers has not been a sufficient element for the establishment of a connection between the Arctic and the ocean, it has provided a necessary platform for strengthening the link and advancing the Norwegian government’s principal interest. Furthermore, a central position of the Norwegian government is that there is no legal vacuum in the Arctic and that “the Law of the Sea provides the basic architecture underpinning all ocean governance in the Arctic” (Søreide, 2020). The Norwegian Foreign Minister stated the above qoute in her speech at the 2020 Arctic Frontiers, which has functioning as an arena supporting the Norwegian government in communicating this message. The conference has further contributed to promoting Norway’s expertise internationally. For example, by bringing Norwegian experts to Seminars Abroad and through Arctic Frontiers events focusing on the broad range of ocean-related activities conducted by Norwegian institutions and organizations. This attribute has been remarked both by the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and by other informants. Lastly, this can also be considered a legitimizing tool for the Norwegian government, in that focusing on the ocean in broad terms draws attention away from oil and gas exploration, towards sustainable marine resource development (Steinberg & Kristoffersen, 2018).

5.2

The Arctic Circle Assembly: Agenda-Setting Through the Mission Councils

The Arctic Circle organization has established four Mission Councils since 2015, which serve as another illustration of agenda-setting efforts by conference organizers. The first was the Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports, which was launched at The Alaskan Arctic—a summit on shipping and ports Arctic Circle Forum in 2015. This came timely with the development of the Guidelines for Ships Operating in Polar Waters by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Assembly in 2009, which resulted in the adoption of the Polar Code in 2014. The focus on shipping and ports accentuates the Arctic Circle’s economic alliance with Alaska and serves to advance Iceland’s relationship with China, which has expressed interest in port development in the Russian Arctic (Chun, 2020). The Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports is chaired by Mead Treadwell, who was the Lieutenant Governor of Alaska from 2010 to 2014 (see also Steinveg,

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2022). Mr. Treadwell presented the initiative at the 2016 Arctic Circle Greenland Forum, at the 2016 Arctic Circle Assembly, and at the 2017 Arctic Circle Assembly. A central idea behind the Mission Council was to build a business model for return on investment in Arctic shipping, while also reducing the risk of accidents and harm on societies and the environment, through delivering safety, security, and reliability functions. To that end, the initiators aimed to establish a League of Arctic Ports and an Arctic Seaway Regime. These initiatives exceed the scope of what a conference organization is expected to engage in and fuels the arguments of those who are skeptical towards the role the Arctic Circle organizers are aspiring to assume within Arctic governance. Most significant of the Mission Council’s activities is engagement with legislators and parliamentarians across the world on the idea of commissioning an Arctic Seaway Authority, which includes proposed legislation to create a US Arctic Seaway Infrastructure Development Corporation—the SEAL-Act. Mr. Treadwell spoke before a Committee in the US Congress House of Representatives in a hearing titled The Cost of Doing Nothing: Maritime Infrastructure Vulnerabilities in an Emerging Arctic. He outlined three measures to fill the USA’s infrastructure gaps. First, appropriate capital funds for infrastructure, justified by security or economic development. Second, create an Arctic Seaway Development Corporation, bringing together states to offer a dependable, voluntary, tariff-based service that will attract and justify infrastructure investment. Third, Mr. Treadwell argued the USA can sell more resources and induce more private capital to invest in the American Arctic, to compete with Russia, which is described as “cleaning our clock in serving global LNG markets from Yamal” (Treadwell, 2019). Looking at the agenda-setting process through the multiple streams framework, this is an example of a problem, increased shipping activity that gives rise to economic challenges, safety, and security concerns, being linked to a solution: a global Mission Council. The linkage is pushed by policy entrepreneurs working to attract the attention of people in government by bringing the initiative to states with interests in shipping or ports development. The engaged actors were successful in taking advantage of the window of opportunity opening in 2009, with the IMO’s move to develop a mandatory code for shipping in polar waters and the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report. The policy entrepreneurs pushed the initiative through the platform provided by the Arctic Circle organization. Seeing how the Mission Council’s proposals depend on public–private partnerships, the Arctic Circle Assembly was an ideal arena for this endeavor, considering the range of participants attending this conference. In addition, three other Arctic Circle Mission Councils were launched in 2021. The Mission Council on Greenland in the Arctic was established to “facilitate dialogue on the important role of Greenland in the Arctic and it’s economic and political development.” It accentuates the close alliance between Iceland and Greenland, and the “energy triangle” between Iceland, Greenland and the Faroe Islands launched following the financial crisis in 2008. It also reflects how the Arctic Circle can be considered an attempt to ally with small-scale partners and position Iceland “geopolitically as a gateway for the expression of global and marginalized interests in the Arctic” (Depledge & Dodds, 2017, p. 145).

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The Mission Council on Global Arctic formalizes what has been at the heart of the Arctic Circle organization all along: bringing the global to the Arctic through the Assembly and bringing the Arctic to the global through the Forums. Promoting this vision through the Arctic Circle contributes to the manifestation of Iceland as an “Arctic hub,” connecting North America, Europe, and Asia in Reykjavik. This narrative in turn holds promise for Iceland’s economic interests. The Mission Council on Global-Arctic Indigenous Dialogue aims to examine aspects related to indigenous knowledge and stewardship of the Arctic and the planet in an increasingly globalized world. As such, this initiative supports the Arctic Circle organization’s goal of serving as a platform for marginalized voices. Taken together, these initiatives have resulted in a year-round outreach for the Arctic Circle organization, which is able to reach a larger audience than those who travel to the annual Assembly in Reykjavik. It therefore appears that the organizers are seeking a position within Arctic governance that goes beyond conferencing. Specifically, the Mission Council resembles the operations and activities of the Arctic Council, such as the Working Groups and Task Forces. In summary, the Mission Council signifies how conferences can have an influence on the agenda, through the process of raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors. Moreover, returning to the three kinds of institutions accounted for by Jervis (1999), the Arctic Circle’s Mission Councils can be considered tools of statecraft that reflects states’ pre-existing interests. The Mission Council attends to priority issues for the Icelandic government in the Arctic, as well as matters of relevance for central allies and partners to both Iceland and the Arctic Circle organization. At the same time, these initiatives can spur collaborative efforts and have a coordinating function by creating synergies among various actors and entities.

5.3

The Problem Stream: Globalizing Arctic Issues

Applying the multiple streams framework (MSF) in the analysis of the agendasetting process at conferences entails certain modifications. Primarily, it is necessary to expand the framework beyond national governments to the Arctic governance architecture. Thus, the most relevant question regarding the problem stream at conferences is not which conditions have been defined as problems to grab the attention of national policymakers in government. Rather, the interesting question is how issues are identified as problems in the Arctic and framed as something deserving of attention from the international community, and the role conferences play in this process. Specifically, the following discussion builds an argument for how conferences contribute to globalizing Arctic issues and to bringing global actors to the Arctic. Central for this analysis is the understanding of problems as social constructs rather than objective facts, and the weight attributed to agency and policy entrepreneurs, because someone must frame a problem in a specific way for it to receive attention (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 22).

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The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly aspire to create international arenas that are attractive to participants from different sector affiliations. Thus, both conferences are designed to be more than local/regional meeting places—something which implies that the organizers have high ambitions regarding agenda influencing. This is also evident through their social media profiles and websites. The Arctic Frontiers is branded as “an international arena on sustainable development in the Arctic,” taking place in Tromsø, known as “the Gateway to the Arctic.” The Arctic Circle Assembly is described as “the largest network of international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the Arctic.” Still, the internationalization aspect is articulated differently, which reflects the distinct philosophies behind the conferences. When I have talked to the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, their vision is for the Arctic Frontiers to be very international. An arena to display Norway as a leading Arctic state, and Tromsø as the Arctic capital.

The above quote is from a Norwegian informant from the science community. In a similar fashion, the Arctic Frontiers is described by informants from various affiliations and nationalities as “a Norwegian arena” that is “centered around the priorities of the Arctic Eight,” and as “mirroring the members and observers of the Arctic Council.” While the international dimension is central, the agenda still reflects the interests of the organizers and the Norwegian government. According to the organizers, the theme chosen for each year’s conference is intended to address a broad issue of universal interest. Even so, the organizers also emphasize that drawing attention to Norwegian priorities in the region is equally important. These aspirations were boosted with the senior advisor from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assigned to the Arctic Frontiers’ secretariat in 2015. She was working to extend the conference’s international outreach and to frame the Arctic as a globally connected region. The global interest in the Arctic was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly. The organizers have been focused on bringing the global to the Arctic and expanding the regional agenda with the issues that participants bring to the Assembly. The following discussion accounts for these features of the conferences in detail. First, through portraying how the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and the Norwegian government have contributed to “problem definition” by influencing the Arctic agenda of the European Union (EU) in a direction more in line with Norwegian interests. Second, by casting light on how the Arctic Circle has contributed to expanding the Arctic agenda through the inclusion of global voices, while simultaneously bringing the Arctic to the global through the Forums. The Arctic is unfamiliar territory for many of the actors who are now seeking to engage in Arctic affairs, and there are many myths and misconceptions about the region. For example, related to demography, living conditions, and the prospects for resource extraction. The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers acknowledge this challenge and aim to contribute to correct misunderstandings about northern societies. A central undertaking towards this objective is actively promoting more balanced views concerning environmental protection and economic development.

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The Arctic policy of the European Union serves to illustrate how the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers were conductive to agenda-setting and contributed to steering the EU’s policy on the Arctic. Norwegian diplomates proactively started lobbying to get the EU engaged in Arctic affairs around 2005 (Offerdal, 2011, p. 876). These efforts were successful, and the 2007 Blue Book An integrated maritime policy for the European Union was overall in accordance with Norwegian views and preferences and expressed a recognition of the importance of the EU in developing its relationship to the Arctic. The 2008 report The European Union and the Arctic region had also been prepared in close cooperation with the Norwegian government (Wegge, 2011a, 2011b). However, one university affiliated informant recounts a challenge following the EU developing an interest in the Arctic. Namely, environmental organizations lobbying towards the European Parliament to terminate all forms of business activities in the Arctic. The informant goes on to argue that it is not in the interests of the Arctic states or northern inhabitants if power structures in the south have a perception of the region as one in need of protection from all economic activities. To that end, one academic informant calls attention to how conferences play an important contribution to devaluating myths and telling stories about actual living conditions in the Arctic. Conferences hosted in Arctic states are described by informants as particularly valuable, because they are better at including the perspectives of local communities and voices of Indigenous peoples. Conferences hosted in non-Arctic states are regarded as being based on a more immature understanding of the region, which is not advantageous for the Arctic states or inhabitants. These statements substantiate the notion on Arctic conferences as tools of statecraft that contribute to support the interests and position of the Arctic states—and the views of the Arctic states of how the region should be governed and developed. This is described by an Arctic state research institute director cited below. The conference serves as kind of an optics. Beyond optics: it serves a purpose in educating the uninitiated or uneducated. It provides a better platform for broadening public awareness on Arctic issues, and those are good things.

In line with this argumentation, the organizers of Arctic Frontiers have over the years influenced the debate about the future of the region. The organizers have worked systematically to bring representatives from the European Union to the Arctic Frontiers in Tromsø. The conference has provided a platform for demonstrating that there are people in need of a livelihood living in the Arctic, as opposed to Antarctica. This has contributed to a change of perception within EU Arctic policy, according to people familiar with this process. It is no longer the EU’s stance that the entire Arctic region must be protected from economic development. Accordingly, the conference has contributed positively to the debate by providing a more uniform knowledge-based among actors, as noted by an academic conference participant: If you listen to speeches by leaders from non-Arctic states now, they have noticed these issues. Conferences are an expensive form of adult education.

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The Arctic Frontiers organization has employed several mechanisms in their efforts to steer the agenda, including bringing international journalists to the conference, hosting Seminars Abroad, and contributing to other international arrangements. For example, in October 2018, the Norwegian King and Queen visited China, accompanied by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Trade and Industry, as well as the largest Norwegian business delegation ever on a state visit. The Arctic Frontiers hosted an Arctic session, where they promoted the balanced view of business and shipping together with science and societal development. It is an arena to show and promote your issue and try to gain acceptance for your cause. This is also true for Norway. [. . .] Perhaps deep down, a sense of understanding develops. That is the aim: to have people develop more nuanced point of views. Greenpeace, who think Norway is vacuuming the ocean for all fish can participate at the Arctic Frontiers and get a more nuanced image.

The agenda-setting function of the Arctic Frontiers for the Norwegian government is ably summarized by the governmental affiliated informant cited above. The other side of this function is that the Arctic Frontiers serves is an information channel for Norwegian representatives to learn about the visions and interests of other states for the Arctic. It is also an opportunity for the local private sectors and businesses in Tromsø to learn about international companies and their perspectives on development of the region. As such, through facilitating recurrent interaction over time, conferences can contribute to reduce barriers to cooperation. Returning to the ideal model of a conference portrayed in Chap. 2, and how a conference should contribute to relationship building, dealmaking, and agenda-setting, this analysis has cast light on how the Arctic Frontiers fulfills these criteria. The Arctic Circle is really a global platform. In that way, the scope is big, the scope is global. Therefore, it can be argued that it plays a global role. This aim—the scope—is also where you can have the impact.

The organizers of the Arctic Circle approach the problem definition component of agenda-setting somewhat differently, which is also noted by participants—as the one cited above. The main vision of the Arctic Circle is to extend the discussion about the Arctic to the international community and to welcome the input form whomever consider themselves stakeholders in the region. As such, it is not about promoting one perspective, but to include the global community in formulating the agenda. This is described by one informant associated with the organizing of the Arctic Circle Assembly: When dealing with a part of the world that is going to be absolutely essential in terms of shipping and transportation, and as a thermometer for the effects of climate changes, who are to say Asian states don’t have as much to say as the Arctic states?

The ways in which the Arctic Circle provides a stage for global players to participate in the Arctic dialogue are illustrated by the expansion of new dimensions to the Assembly’s program. Over the years, the program has come to include the Middle East—with the United Arab Emirates in 2017—religious leaders at the 2017, 2018, and 2019 Assemblies, and royals, with the Swedish Crown Princess speaking

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at the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly. Also, Mr. Grímsson has put effort into including the new and small states in the region. For example, according to an informant following this process, Mr. Grimsson met with the Swiss government at the 2017 Assembly—after Switzerland’s country presentation in 2016—to discuss how to develop the Third Pole Perspective (the Arctic, Antarctic, and Himalaya) through the Arctic Circle platform. This exemplifies how globalization is a key component of problem definition in the agenda-setting process for the Arctic. The impacts of climate change are experienced worldwide, and other regions have similar problems as the Arctic. Glaciers are melting in Switzerland and the in Himalayans, and sea level rise is a severe problem for small island states in the Pacific. Thus, engaging in Arctic issues through conferences is a way for non-Arctic states to partake in the international dialogue on shared challenges and viable solutions. The Arctic Circle Forums, hosted at locations such as Singapore, Korea, Abu Dabi and Tokyo, are particularly significant for the mission of bringing the Arctic to the global. They are perceived by people in the Arctic community as a strategic component of Mr. Grímsson’s vision for the Arctic. By extending the Arctic Circle organization abroad and providing his services and competence to new players, Mr. Grímsson can engage a broader range of actors. These non-Arctic state actors in turn become part of his outreach, influence, and global expansion of the Arctic agenda to other areas of international relations. This in turn is a key example of how conferences are more than merely meeting places—they can serve as significant additions within a governance system, as both tools of statecraft and innovative instruments to promote collaboration. An example of how the Arctic Circle Forums, as an addition to the regional governance structure, have political impact stems from the Faroe Islands Forum in 2018. Mr. Grímsson describes how the newly appointed EU Arctic Ambassador, Marie-Anne Coninsx, asked for a meeting with the organization where she suggested a formalized cooperation between the European Union and the Arctic Circle. This was welcomed by the organizers, and the EU Commissioner of Fisheries spoke in the opening session of the 2018 Assembly in October. The different approaches towards the European Union adopted by the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle testify to the top-down and bottom-up philosophies of the conferences. The Arctic Frontiers, and Norway, is looking to control and influence the EU’s Arctic Policy, while the Arctic Circle intends to create a platform that is open and accessible, also for the EU. As stated by Mr. Grimsson: Of course, some might classify it as a policy to be open to including the European Union in this dialogue even though it has not so far been accepted as an observer at the Arctic Council. But we realize that the European Union, like China, Singapore, Korea, and others is an important player, partner, and stakeholder in the Arctic (Einarsdóttir, 2018).

Mr. Grímsson has also worked actively to influence problem definition in other international forums and to promote Arctic issues through institutions and organizations outside the region. One example is his work through the Munich Security Conference (MSC), which is the foremost security network in the West. Mr. Grímsson has worked to ensure that the Arctic got a special regional focus,

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and events dedicated to the Arctic security series have been arranged ever since the MSC Arctic Security Roundtable was hosted jointly with the Wilson Center’s Polar Initiative and the Arctic Circle in Washington DC in May 2017. Before the 2017 Arctic Circle Assembly, Mr. Grímsson also hosted the Munich Security Conference to discuss the state of Arctic governance, cooperation between the West and Russia, and contemporary security challenges in the Arctic (Munich Security Roundtable, 2017). In summary, the end of the Cold War accelerated the political opportunities for cooperation in the Arctic region, and collaborative initiatives concerning environmental protection and pollution were spurred by the visible physical transformations resulting from climate change and the growing number of challenges states could not manage unilaterally. By the 2010s, governments, NGOs, industries, scientists, and academics have all developed an interest in engaging in the Arctic. Throughout this process, conferences have contributed to the problem stream, as arenas to define central challenges and frame Arctic issues as something deserving global attention. This argument is supported by how the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers, working in cooperation with the Norwegian government, were successful in coupling the EU’s growing interest for the Arctic with their own perception of the most pressing challenges. In this way, the Arctic Frontiers contributed to control salient agenda issues. The Arctic Circle organization has contributed within the problem stream in the region by attracting the attention of a broader range of actors and promoting Arctic issues through international institutions and organizations. Conferences have as such contributed to a broader and refocused globalized agenda in the Arctic.

5.4

The Policy Stream: Developing and Selling Ideas at Arctic Conferences

The way in which conferences have contributed to globalizing the Arctic agenda and bringing the global to the Arctic is linked to their functions for Arctic state and non-Arctic state stakeholders. In like manner, the second stream is particularly relevant to the epistemic community at conferences, who resemble policy entrepreneurs in the multiple streams framework. These are “advocates who are willing to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, money—to promote a position in return for anticipated future gain in the form of material, purposive, or solidary benefits” (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 28). Policy entrepreneurs can be civil servants, interest groups, academics, researchers, and consultants—the so-called hidden participants—who engage in working out alternatives to problems within a specific field in the policy stream (Herweg et al., 2018, p. 22). This section therefore asks whether conferences can be instrumental for developing ideas in the policy stream, where communities of experts are trying to sell their alternatives, proposals, and solutions to identified problems (Kingdon, 2011).

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The key position of the epistemic community in the Arctic is important for the policy stream at conferences. Informants have argued that governments usually hold the expertise and decisions are made by bureaucrats in more developed policy areas, while in the Arctic, there is an extensive epistemic community possessing the expertise. This is evident from the central contributions of the Arctic Council’s working groups in producing assessments and reports to guide developments in the region. Another indicator is the number of actors and nationalities that participate in collaborative entities working on polar research, such as the International Arctic Science Committee (IASC), the International Arctic Social Sciences Association (IASSA), and the Fulbright Arctic Initiative. The number of members of the IASC has almost tripled since established in 1990, and the Arctic Science Summit Week hit a record number of 2500 participants in 2018 (Pedersen, 2019). The Arctic’s epistemic community makes use of international gatherings to draw attention to problems they seek to elevate on the agenda, and the policy stream is therefore particularly visible in the conference sphere. Still, one governance affiliated informant describes how conferences are not “about actual governance.” Rather, they are described as an opportunity for people “to talk quietly on the margins, to get some new ideas, which can be brought to where people actually make decisions, like the Arctic Council.” A business representative has a similar description: “maybe it is not the role of the conference to execute something, but rather point towards a direction.” However, while this points to the informal side of the nature of conferences, they can still be arenas for agenda-setting and where policy occurs. One academic informant emphasizes how it takes the joint effort of the larger scientific community to produce change. The informant describes the agenda-setting process at conferences as: “People come together and ideas stew, and if the idea is good, it digests for a while and come back in another forum until it reaches proliferation. Sometimes, people can pick up an idea and run with it, but often, it is just these incremental steps.” Substantiating this line of reasoning, a conference organizer points out how even universally supported policy ideas need pushing out in detail of how different actors are going to work with them. The informant goes on to say that “giving people an organized way to develop those thoughts is always going to be a good thing.” Thus, meeting the critique of conferences as not being governing arenas or producing binding outcomes, the argument put forward here is that conferences still contribute to the broader structure of Arctic governance. The analysis has cast light on how Arctic conferences are arenas for problem definition by the epistemic community, and for the flow of alternatives, proposals, and solutions to the defined challenges. These ideas and proposals are then considered and modified by the larger group of specialists during and after a conference. As such, conferences serve as platforms to assess different ways of framing issues and contribute to boost collaboration and advance a joint agenda. This relates to the characteristic in the ideal model of a conference as a marketplace for the promotion of ideas—a characteristic that both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly fulfill.

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The Political Stream: Conferences as Arenas for Coalition Building

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This iterative process has been described by informants from the science community as contributing to creating momentum and producing consensus around priority issues. Through such an incremental process, the science community can indirectly affect policy participants’ beliefs about causes of problems and preferred solutions. This aligns with what Lukes (2005) describe as the second dimension of power: controlling the agenda and deciding what gets decided. Power is therefore not only getting someone to do what you want in an observable conflict of interests, as in the first dimension of power, but can also be controlling which alternatives people face and which issues are up for discussion. In this way, conferences contribute to the empowerment of policy entrepreneurs in the Arctic by providing them with arenas through which they can raise their issues and persuade others to care about these issues.

5.5

The Political Stream: Conferences as Arenas for Coalition Building

The political stream is located at the level of the political system and is dominated by bargaining and power. The political stream consists of three core elements: the national mood, interest groups, governments, and legislators (Herweg et al., 2018). When examining the political stream at conferences, it is useful to consider them as transnational networks (see Kalfagianni et al., 2020). These can be used by actors, especially interest groups, as part of the structures that provide them opportunities to shape outcomes. Dominant interest groups, who can influence agenda-setting by promoting new items, advocating proposals, or through negative blocking, are usually found within the business sector (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 47–49). Business representatives can launch projects and advocate their visions from the conference stage, which can contribute to advancing public–private partnerships. One policy informant illustrates this process through two examples. First, the informant describes how representatives from shipping companies can meet with people from the Arctic Coast Guard Forum at conferences, to initiate cooperation concerning how or where to house charting data. Second, the informant draws attention to how telecommunication companies trying to expand in the Arctic can meet with relevant governmental representatives at conferences for discussions about the development of necessary infrastructure. There is no room for this kind of lobbying through the Arctic Council, so conferences serve as a useful supplement for business representatives in this regard. The second most important set of non-governmental actors, according to Kingdon (2011), consists of academics, researchers, and consultants. As previously discussed, they have significant impact on agenda alternatives, proposals, and solutions, and politicians therefore commonly turn to this group for ideas on how to deal with problems (Kingdon, 2011, p. 55). Another dominant interest group worth noting in the Arctic is environmental organizations, who have increased urgency to their

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claims resulting from the impacts of climate change. Also, these groups can utilize conferences for communication, information sharing, and lobbying. This illustrates two of the characteristics from the ideal model: conferences as spaces for relationship building and arenas for dealmaking among participants. The media also is significant in the political stream because it has the power to influence the public opinion. Also, the media can indirectly impact the political agenda by acting as a communicator, through magnifying movements, and by challenging the status quo (Kingdon, 2011, pp. 57–61). The power of the media is not overlooked by conference organizers. The Arctic Frontiers invites and covers the participation fee for international journalists. The Arctic Circle is partner with journals, magazines, and newspapers and is also attended by a large press corp. However, journalists recount how the occurrence of a conference itself is not of high news value. Journalists primarily attend conferences looking for stories about Arctic or international events, or people who can provide them with information about interesting developments. Accordingly, the agenda-setting impact of the media through conferences is related to utilizing the platform to tell other stories, and the media becomes a tool for those who able to draw attention to their work. Beyond these actor groups, there is another point of influence for conferences in the political stream. Namely, the desired outcome of the organizers to advance the policy, science, business interplay. The multiple streams framework postulates that the national mood (influenced by the media) and interest groups’ campaigns (including commercial organizations) can influence the political stream. This entails that advancing the link between policy, science, and business could be a means to influence policymaking. Looking at the attendance of these three participant groups, it has been shown how the science community is represented in large numbers at both the Arctic Frontiers and at the Arctic Circle Assembly. With regard to political representatives, the position of former president Grímsson has attracted state leaders and central government officials to the Arctic Circle. The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers have worked to attract more high-level delegates but have not reached the same level of presidential and prime minister attendance. Lastly, while neither the Arctic Frontiers nor the Arctic Circle Assembly are industry conferences, business representatives are present. In this way, both conferences have accomplished the shared objective of being attractive international arenas that gathers stakeholders from various affiliations. Participants also note the potential conferences have for advancing the policy, science, business interplay: Have conferences contributed to implementing the policy-science-business interplay in the Arctic? I would say yes, it brings it closer. It is one element. I have seen it work well. Typically, it is the meetings that take place at the margins of these conferences that I think do the most to advance this kind of partnerships we all talk about: public–private partnerships.

To measure how and the extent to which conferences are successful at promoting synergies between sectors is challenging. Had the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly not existed, there would be other ways for actors to associate and collaborate within Arctic affairs. Yet, after their establishment, the conferences

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have fulfilled a function in connecting actors that would not necessarily have met outside these annual gatherings. Especially having policymakers and business representatives engage with the science community or giving company executives the opportunity to meet decision makers is described as useful by informants. Proving these actors an opportunity to meet through an informal setting can be instrumental for driving processes forward. Notably, the two informants from academia, who are also members of the board of advisors and steering committee of the conferences, cited below express a central difference among the two cases. Namely, despite the shared objectives of the organizers, there is a difference in execution of the conferences that impacts the promotion of cross-sectoral synergies. A fundamental difference between the two conferences is the structure. The Arctic Frontiers separates science and policy, while at the Arctic Circle, there is a mixture. Why the Arctic Frontiers separates these two sections is not clear. But it is up to them, their philosophy, and aims. At this point, the Arctic Circle is extremely more successful at than the Arctic Frontiers, because they do not control the breakout sessions. The Arctic Circle facilitates a “tent,” under which people can do what they want. While at Arctic Frontiers, they spend a lot of efforts to control, plan, and decide. I cannot see this has contributed to anything positive, as opposed to let the chaos flow the system, if you aim for synergies. Arctic Frontiers almost seems like they are trying to avoid synergies.

The Arctic Circle Assembly appears to be a more advantageous arena for the creation of cross-sectoral synergies than the Arctic Frontiers. Mr. Grímsson describes the Harpa building as ideal for “locking people in,” and the compactness of the three-day conference increases the likelihood of people staying for the whole event. By contrast, with the format of the Arctic Frontiers and the science sessions congregated at the end of the conference week, policy representatives are less likely to attend these presentations. The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers have improved the quality of the policy and business sessions, and there have been more scientists in the policy panels. Nonetheless, informants from both science and policy contend that the integration of the science pillar is not ideal, and the format is described as “more like three different conferences.” In summary, the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly have contributed to attract global attention to the Arctic in the problem stream and are central playing grounds for the flow of ideas from the epistemic community in the policy stream. Establishing the functions of conferences in the political stream is more challenging, as it entails having policymakers respond to the consensus developed by the epistemic community and producing coordinated changes within several governments. This is also emphasized by Haas (2002), who through an examination of governance through the UN environmental conferences show that international conferences “seldom have direct causal influences on member states’ behavior” (p. 74). Still, Haas (2002) also argues global environmental conferences can have indirect effects causing changes in national policies over time, through functions such as placing new issues on the agenda, popularizing issue, and raising consciousness, generating new information and identifying new challenges, and promoting mass

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involvement of new actors (pp. 81–85). Thus, Arctic conferences hold potential to influence the political stream through interest groups formed around transnational business coalitions, environmental groups’ campaigns, or through the media. These elements can in turn have an impact on the public opinion, which issues are considered pertinent and which alternatives are perceived as possible.

5.6

Conferences as Agenda-Setting Arenas

This chapter has examined the agenda-setting process at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle through the multiple streams framework. Two examples were put forward to cast light on how the conference organizations have been successful at elevating issues on the international agenda—efforts that were aided by the “coupling of the streams” that opened a window of opportunity for the issues. The chapter has also shown how the three streams of the multiple streams framework come into play in different ways at conferences. First, conferences function as arenas for actors to draw attention to challenges and identify these as problems that deserve attention in the problem stream. Here, there is a distinct difference between the two cases. For the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic state participants, conference engagement is a means to defining the “right challenges” and to control which issues are up for discussion about the region. The organizers of the Arctic Circle on their end contribute to problem definition by inviting all interested stakeholders to the Assembly, by highlighting connections between the Arctic and other regions with similar challenges and by expanding the organization globally through the Forums. Second, alternatives, proposals, and solutions to defined challenges flow through hundreds of annual sessions at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly in the policy stream. The analysis supports the assumption of conferences as purposeful arenas for policy entrepreneurs to bring conditions to policymakers’ attention. While it is not possible to trace a large stream of direct causal links from what takes place at conferences to policy outcomes, the two cases fulfill the characteristic of the ideal model as marketplaces for ideas. They also support an iterative agenda-setting process through which policy entrepreneurs can create momentum and produce consensus around agenda priorities. Third, in the political stream, which is influenced by domestic elements such as the national mood, interest groups, administrations, and legislatures, the impact of conferences is indirect. Still, non-governmental actors, interest groups, business organizations, academics, the media, and civil society representatives can make transnational connections and use conferences in pursuit of their desired outcome. As such, the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly can be said to act as performance spaces for democratic values, such as opportunities for equal participation, transparency, and openness, as according to the ideal model. Lastly, it is worth noting that while the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are similar in many ways, they differ in how they are organized and arranged. This in turn impacts their agenda-setting function, and the top-down

References

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opposed to the bottom-up approach to program design is especially significant. The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers decide the program, in cooperation with partners in the steering committee, which means there is less leeway for outside actors to push issues that are not associated with the overarching theme of the conference. The Arctic Circle’s plenary sessions are structured in somewhat like manner, where the country presentations reflect Mr. Grímsson’s personal connections and those who are willing and able to pay for visibility at the Assembly. The breakout sessions, on the other hand, are more democratic and available for anyone to submit proposals. The Arctic Frontiers therefore to a larger extent promotes the agenda and interests of the Arctic coalition of actors, while the Arctic Circle Assembly is a platform for a broader network of international stakeholders, their interests, and perspectives. Returning to the question of whether what occurs at conferences is a mirror reflection of other processes in Arctic governance or whether it affects these processes, the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are instrumental for raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors. Conferences provide a space for problem definition and for the flow of ideas from the epistemic community. Yet, conferences themselves do not contribute to agenda-setting, and there is need for agency in the form of transnational advocacy coalitions and individuals—e.g., interest groups, environmental organizations, local community representatives, or businesses—that are pushing for change. Conferences are such arenas for the unfolding of the second dimension of power: non-decision-making power in the form setting the agenda for discussions, controlling which alternatives people face, and as a result, outcomes. Conference activities can therefore advantageously be included in analysis of agenda-setting in the Arctic and in international affairs.

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Howlett, M., & Ramesh, M. (2003). Agenda-setting: Policy determinants, policy ideas, and policy windows. In M. Howlett & M. Ramesh (Eds.), Studying public policy. Policy cycles and policy subsystems (pp. 120–142). Oxford University Press. Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism and cooperation. Understanding the Debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560040 Kalfagianni, A., Partzsch, L., & Widerberg, O. (2020). Transnational institutions and networks. In F. Biermann & R. E. Kim (Eds.), Architectures of earth system governance. Institutional complexity and structural transformation (pp. 75–96). Cambridge University Press. Kingdon, J. W. (2011). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (2nd ed.). Pearson Education Limited. Livingston, S. G. (1992). The politics of international agenda-setting: Reagan and north-south relations. International Studies Quarterly, 36, 313–330. https://doi.org/10.2307/2600775 Lukes, S. (2005). Power. A radical view (2nd ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. Munich Security Roundtable. (2017). A “posterchild” for cooperation? Report from the MSC Arctic security roundtable Reykjavik. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https:// securityconference.org/en/news/full/a-posterchild-for-cooperation-report-from-the-msc-arcticsecurity-roundtable-reykjavik/ Norwegian Government. (2018). Norway establishes international high-level panel on sustainable ocean economy. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/ norwayestablishes-international-high-level-panel-on-sustainable-ocean-economy/id2587691 Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. (2017). New growth, proud history. The Norwegian Government’s ocean strategy. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www. regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-norwegian-governments-oceanstrategy/id2552610 Offerdal, K. (2011). The EU in the Arctic: In pursuit of legitimacy and influence. International Journal, 66(4), 861–877. https://doi.org/10.1177/002070201106600414 Pedersen, T. (2019). Polar research and the secrets of the Arctic. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 10, 103–129. https://doi.org/10.23865/arctic.v10.1501 Søreide, I. E. (2020). Statement at Arctic Frontiers. Speeches and statements by the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs Ine Eriksen Søreide. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www. regjeringen.no/en/historical-archive/solbergs-government/Ministries/ud/Speeches-and-articles/ imes_speeches/2020/arctic_statement/id2688675/ Steinberg, P. E., & Kristoffersen, B. (2018). Building a blue economy in the Arctic Ocean: Sustaining the sea or sustaining the state? In U. P. Gad & J. Strandsbjerg (Eds.), Politics of sustainability in the Arctic: Reconfiguring identity, space, and time (pp. 136–148). Routledge. Steinveg, B. (2021). Exponential growth and new agendas – A comprehensive review of the Arctic conference sphere. Arctic Review on Law and Politics, 12, 134–160. https://doi.org/10.23865/ arctic.v12.3049 Steinveg, B. (2022). Arctic conferences as arenas for power games and collaboration in international relations. The Polar Journal, 12(2), 240–260. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2022. 2137086 Treadwell, M. (2019). The cost of doing nothing: Maritime infrastructure vulnerabilities in an emerging Arctic. Statement for the record by Mead Treadwell before the Congress of the United States House of Representatives, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation. Washington, DC. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://transportation.house.gov/download/treadwell-testimony Wegge, N. (2011a). The political order in the Arctic: Power structures, regimes, and influence. Polar Record, 47(241), 165–176. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0032247410000331 Wegge, N. (2011b). Small state, maritime great power? Norway’s strategies for influencing the maritime policy of the European Union. Marine Policy, 35, 335–342. https://doi.org/10.1016/j. marpol.2010.10.013 Wilson Rowe, E. (2020). Analyzing frenemies: An Arctic repertoire of cooperation and rivalry. Political Geography, 76, 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2019.102072

Chapter 6

The Arctic Governance Architecture

Cooperation in the Arctic is a complex picture described as a “mosaic of issuespecific arrangements” rather than a single comprehensive and integrated regime (Young, 2005, p. 10). Arctic governance can thus be comprehended as a patchwork of formal and informal arrangements operating on different levels (Stokke, 2011) and with a set of interlinked and overlapping policy fields (Wilson Rowe, 2020). This chapter situates conferences within this structure, asking what their functions are within the broader governance architecture. There are two governance challenges in the region that are particularly relevant in this regard. First, the Arctic agenda has expanded as a consequence of emerging global challenges, but it is not evident how to address these new issues through existing arrangements. Second, it is not clear how to constructively include the growing number of actors seeking to engage in Arctic affairs, or how to balance their interests in the region with the interests of Arctic rightsholders (Ingimundarson, 2014; Knecht, 2016; Rossi, 2015; Young, 2011). This chapter examines whether conferences can be suitable forums for addressing these questions. In doing so, the chapter draws on regime theory, research on regime complexes and finds support in the Earth Systems Governance literature. A governance architecture describes the overall institutional framework of governance and is a system of institutions, organizations, principles, norms, regulations, and decision-making procedures that are valid or active in an area of global governance (Biermann, 2014). It consists of building blocks, structural features, and policy responses (Biermann & Kim, 2020, p. 7). This chapter narrows in on one of the structural features of the larger architecture: regime complexes. A regime complex is understood as larger sets of interrelated and interdependent institutions (Raustiala & Victor, 2004; Keohane & Victor, 2011). Specifically, a network of three or more international regimes that relate on a common subject matter, exhibit overlapping membership, and generate interaction (Orsini et al., 2013). In addition, the chapter returns to the neorealist perspective on institutions for the examination of whether conferences mirror the interests of states (i.e., Norway and Iceland) and function as tools of statecraft.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_6

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The chapter commences with accounting for the geopolitical situation in the Arctic, focusing on Russia and China. Complex interdependence among states— i.e., a web of reciprocal interactions—entails that military security does not dominate the political agenda, states do not monopolize contact between societies, and governments use force less often (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 270). The expectation from the regime theory perspective is thus that a state of complex interdependence in the Arctic reduces the chance for spill-over from tensions in other areas of international affairs to this realm. The discussion about Russia in the Arctic inquiries into the potential function of conferences for upholding regional cooperation and shielding the Arctic from geopolitical spill-over. China is interesting as an emerging “nearArctic state,” and this chapter applies the neorealist perspective to ask whether conferences are arenas where the economic engagement of newcomers in the region can develop into political influence. Following the discussion about Arctic geopolitics, the chapter turns to the position of Norway and Iceland among the Arctic Eight and in relation to non-Arctic states. The purpose of this inquiry is to further elaborate the discussion from Chap. 2 of how the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly serve in the interests of their host states. Subsequently, the chapter looks at conferences as potential supplements to existing governance arrangements in the region. This discussion devotes particular attention to the Arctic Council, as the main pillar within the Arctic governance architecture. The chapter asks whether conferences can contribute to amending two of the Arctic Council’s shortcomings: the restricted agenda and limited stakeholder involvement. However, the chapter is also interested in the functions of conferences for other elements in the Arctic governance regime complex and examines how conferences contribute to the creation of synergies in the region, support negotiation processes, and contribute to role clarification among entities working on overlapping issues. This discussion connects to characteristics of the ideal model presented in Chap. 2. Particularly whether the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly serve as magnates for side events and side meetings—which is a necessary requisite if they should function as purposeful gatherings for other elements in the Arctic regime complex.

6.1

Geopolitics: Conferences in a Changing World Order

The Arctic as a “zone of peace” where actors show outstanding dedication to cooperation has been a prevailing narrative about the region since the 1990s. However, looking at the macrolevel of the international system, the global order is shifting (Young, 2019). The United States (US) is the lead nation in NATO and carries the backbone of the alliance’s military capabilities while at the same time recognizing the value of its partners and allies for the US strategic interests towards ensuring a rules-based order in the Arctic region (Wegge, 2020). However, Trump’s presidency departed from his predecessors with regard to the US’ role in the world, the willingness to assume international responsibility, and the approach to the Arctic

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(Weingartner & Orttung, 2020). Concerning the latter, the Trump administration commonly challenged previously established norms, policies, and institutions affecting the region, and several key Arctic positions were either not filled for some time or remain unfilled (Weingartner & Orttung, 2020). Also, there is a growing tendency in the US to consider the activities of others in the Arctic as hostile initiatives that are threatening American interests (Young, 2019). Russia is seeking to reclaim its status as a great power and is strengthening its military assets in the Arctic (Young, 2019). This has not gone unnoticed by NATO members, and the Russian re-armament program in the Arctic has implications for Circumpolar relations and NATO activities and presence in the region (Wegge, 2020). China is emerging as a powerful actor, ready to fill the vacuum in the international system left by the US. While Chinese investments in the Arctic are still limited compared to other parts of the world, there is an indirect military and security dimension following China’s economic interest in the region that can also have political effects. For example, the US has concerns about China as potentially posing a risk through “attempts to alter Arctic governance through economic leverage” (US Department of Defense, 2019, p. 4). Accordingly, regardless of how the Arctic has remained peaceful and cooperative, the region is not isolated from global developments and international geopolitical changes have implications for Arctic affairs. On the alarmist side, some informants have argued the geopolitical situation is changing in the direction of the old “block-way of thinking” between the East and the West. This is also an angle that is frequently subscribed to in the media. Thus far, stability in the region has rested on the complex interdependence among the Arctic states. However, for how long can the region remain shielded from tensions elsewhere in international affairs? Russia holds a position of military superiority in the Barents region and considers the Arctic a space in international relations where it can affirm its status as a great power. This impacts relations with the other Arctic Eight, who nonetheless are also scaling up their military presence in the North. The Russian military doctrine from 2014 places the buildup of NATO military capabilities on the top of the list of external dangers. An interesting feature of Russia’s Arctic Policy is the exaggeration and inflated threat assessment, especially concerning the intensity of external military threats to Russia’s interests in the Arctic (Baev, 2019). Yet, this discourse is incompatible with the official rhetoric about Russia’s commitment to international cooperation in the Arctic, which is “no place for geopolitical games of military alliances,” as stated by President Vladimir Putin at the 2017 International Arctic Forum (Baev, 2019, p. 26). Following Russia’s annexation Crimea in 2014, the European Union (EU), the United States, Canada, and other NATO allies responded with economic sanctions. Yet, the crisis did not impact relations in the Arctic noteworthy, except for Canada boycotting an Arctic Council task force meeting in Moscow, and Russian officials not being invited to a pre-meeting to the North-Atlantic Coast Guard Forum. However, Russia did participate in the Senior Arctic Official meeting in Yellowknife in March 2014 (Østhagen, 2014). Research collaboration is an important area that was upheld after the Crimea-crisis, and informants from the US and Norway

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described how this was aided by conferences providing the opportunity interaction across state borders. Norway and Russia further upheld practical cooperation on issues of mutual interest, such as search and rescue, fisheries, and nuclear protection. While there were mechanisms in place for these areas, a governmental affiliated informant recounts how conferences played a supplementing role as cooperative tracks. For example, the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs’ participation at the 2017 International Arctic Forum in Arkhangelsk was described as part of the efforts to soften relations with Russia following the Crimea-crisis. Another academic informant who participated at the Forum noted: “My impression is how willingly, or desirably, Russia wants to engage in the Arctic and invites all eight states—and usually all eight states are represented at some level.” The main explanation for the cooperative spirit in the Arctic, and robustness towards spill-over from conflicts in other areas of international affairs, is found in the concept complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2001, 2012). Complex interdependence is characterized by an absence of hierarchy among issues, which means the political agenda is not dominated by military security, and military force is not the only relevant factor. Moreover, the state does not monopolize contact between societies, due to the existence of transgovernmental and transnational channels of contact (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 270). These characteristics give rise to three political processes. First, issue areas are often separated, so that one issue area is less affected by tensions or breakdowns in other areas. Second, agenda-setting is not driven by threats to security, but by mutual problems and opportunities. Third, international institutions are significant as agenda setters, arenas for coalition formation, and for actions by weak states (Keohane & Nye, 2012, p. 144). From this, Byers (2017) finds that international relations of the Arctic had achieved a state of complex interdependence by 2014, which contributes to explain why the region was not notably affected by Russia’s annexation of Crimea. The Arctic states were too dependent on each other and interwoven in other areas of regional affairs. The Arctic’s resistance to spill-over from the Crimea-crisis and overall cooperative relations support the notion of the Arctic as a “zone of peace.” To that end, conferences contribute as arenas for interaction and dialogue, and from this, to reduce barriers to cooperation. This is especially important between Russia and the other Arctic states. One conference organizer notes how Russian participation at conferences is quite remarkable, and that neighborly relations in the Arctic is a unique phenomenon within international relations (prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine as of February 2022). Given these points, what the media frequently describes as a “new Cold War” has yet to materialize-even after the outbreak of war on the European continent in 2022. This suggests that states can overcome barriers to cooperation, despite their underlying appetite for power and drive for survival as presupposed by neorealists. Specifically, states involved in Arctic affairs can remain cooperative because this too is in everybody’s interest. This includes Russia, which, at least up until the war on Ukraine, has been interested in a stable and rules-based Arctic where it can pursue socioeconomic development. In practice, Russia’s interests in the Arctic are not

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threatened by the other Arctic states, even if they are NATO members. Thus, the Arctic’s resistance to spill-over from conflicts elsewhere largely rests on common interests among engaged actors, the ability to separate issue areas, and the role of institutions. Conferences can be added to the latter, fulfilling a function within the regime complex as meeting places for dialogue and trust building, for the advancement of multilateral collaboration, and for amending geopolitical tensions. The previous discussion casts light on the state of complex interdependence characterizing the Arctic and relations among the Arctic Eight and how this condition has prevented military issues from dominating the agenda and damaging cooperation in other issue areas. It was further indicated how conferences can contribute within this setting, especially for the involvement of Russia in constructive discussions with the other Arctic states. However, it is necessary to also consider non-Arctic states and their interests, as well as other matters than military provocations and security concerns, to fully portray the geopolitical situation impacting Arctic governance. To that end, the following inquiries into the economic interests of China for engagement in the Arctic. There is need for outside economic investments in the Arctic and the region depends on resource export and access to the global market, which is expedient for China. China’s Arctic Policy emphasizes the development of joint ventures on resource extraction as a central component of its expanding interest in the Arctic (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2018). One example is the China-Russia Yamal liquefied natural gas project. This was the first large-scale energy cooperation between the two states after China launched the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. Another example is found on Greenland, which is emerging as a key component of the Polar Silk Road part of the Belt and Road Initiative as opportunities for mining are opening because of the eroding Greenland ice sheet. On the one side, this holds economic opportunities for Greenland. On the other side, the prospect for Chinese economic diplomacy to expand is unsettling for the Danish government and the United States. The US Air Force has a base on Thule, which holds vital strategic assets for the US’s homeland defense. The concern of the Danish and the US governments is that China could use economic investments to pressure the Greenlandic government to ask the Americans to leave or to allow for a Chinese military presence (Mehta, 2018). The Danish government’s unease culminated in the spring of 2018, during the process of acquiring procurement bids for the upgrading of the airports in Ilulissat and Nuuk and for the construction of a new airport in Qaqortoq. The self-rule government in Nuuk shortlisted the state-controlled China Communication Construction Company Ltd. to bid on the project. The Self Rule Act of 2009, which is the foundation of Greenland’s autonomy, states that matters of security are to be managed by the government in Copenhagen. However, it gives no definition of security (Breum, 2018). The Danish government took advantage of this lack of conceptual precision in the Self Rule Act, declared that the airport project as a matter of national security, and intercepted the Chinese bid with their own (Lanteigne & Shi, 2019). There has been a similar situation on Svalbard in 2014, when the Chinese investor Huang Nubo wanted to by a privately owned property (Pettersen, 2014). Hoverer,

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the Norwegian government bought the land, which made up only 0.35% of Svalbard’s total area, for 300 million NOK (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017). A third example is found on Iceland, where Mr. Nubo bid on a 300 km2 land in 2011 for the purpose of building a resort. The bid was blocked by the Icelandic government, and the justification provided by the interior minister was that it would set a dangerous precedent to make an exception to the law on investments by non-European companies (Jackson & Hook, 2011). In this way, the political and national security implications of Chinese economic interests and activities in the Arctic are related to the future of Greenlandic independence (Lanteigne & Shi, 2019). Greenland depends on outside contributions to boost its economy, in areas such as mineral extraction and airports and ports development. This was emphasized by the Greenlandic delegation to the Arctic Circle Assembly in 2019, through the plenary sessions Greenland is open to business and Greenland on the world stage. The message was that Greenland do not discriminate between actors in terms of trade if they follow Greenlandic laws and regulations. It was also emphasized, however, that the government of Greenland has a good relationship with authorities in Copenhagen should there be any security issues. The European Union and China provided other examples of geopolitical statements expressed from the conference stage at the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly. In the plenary session Towards a New Arctic Policy for the EU, the delegation stated that China is a systematic rival for the EU, that the geopolitical importance of the Arctic demonstrated by the remilitarization of the Russian Arctic, and that the EU is aware of the growing interest from China in the region. This necessitates a stronger EU and NATO presence in the Arctic, according to Senator Jean Bizet, President of the European Affairs Committee, and Ambassador Jari Vilen, senior adviser for Arctic policy, European Political Strategy Center. Mr. Gao Feng, Special Representative for Arctic Affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China stated in the plenary session Asia and the Arctic that “far or close, we all have to take action to combat the effects of climate change.” China is close to the Arctic and does not intend to rebrand itself, but commits to the “nearArctic state” identity. This was Mr. Gao Feng’s answer to a question from the audience about China’s response to US Secretary of State, Michael Pompeo’s speech at the Arctic Council ministerial meeting in Rovaniemi May 2019, where he denounced the use of the “near-Arctic state” identity. From the neorealist perspective on international relations, conferences are not expected to have any influence on outcomes, and states can never be certain about the motives or intentions of others, despite what is communicated from the conference stage. Nonetheless, these examples illustrate how conferences are used for political messaging, and by states seeking to advance their position and economic and geopolitical strategical interests. Despite the gloomy expectations concerning conferences from the neorealist perspective, the conference sphere is not isolated from developments within the international system. Looking at Arctic governance through the lens of regime theory however, the political implications of the economic interests of non-Arctic states in the Arctic open a space for conferences.

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Arctic issues have a global dimension, and how the Circumpolar community involves China and other non-Arctic states can prove essential for diplomatic relations and balanced social and economic development. Seeing how the inclusion of new stakeholders is one of the most pivotal functions of Arctic conferences, these gatherings can play a vital role in the future of the region as platforms for dialogue, trust building, and to reduce barriers to cooperation. On the other side, conferences can provide a stage for non-Arctic state actors to advocate for their contributions to Arctic governance, and the necessity of their presence in the region, as the EU example showed. Or non-Arctic states can argue for their closeness to the region and legitimate Arctic identity, as exemplified by China. Once again however, it is necessary to highlight an observable difference between the two cases. The Arctic Frontiers has a more skeptical outlook on China, in line with Norwegian foreign policy. Mr. Grímsson by contrast has embraced the broad stakeholder inclusion to the fullest with the Arctic Circle organization, openly welcoming non-Arctic states and business interests. Non-Arctic states (and non-state actors) are provided a platform as equals at the Assembly, and the Forums are an important addition to the governance structure in this regard. Singapore (2015), Korea (2018), China (2019), and Japan (2020) have been hosts for Forums and have been provided the opportunity to address shared interests between Asia and the Arctic through these arrangements. According to Mr. Grímsson, these activities give countries outside the Arctic the opportunity to be more constructive partners in the region, because to use the Arctic Circle platform, they must be transparent and willing to answer questions from the audience. This is a more optimistic view on the potential impacts of conferences that neorealism would hold. It agrees with the belief found within the literature on regime complexes, concerning how institutions can contribute to shaping the behavior of actors in the international system. Iceland is an historical geopolitical meeting point between the East and the West. When the international conflict level increase, utilizing Iceland’s strategic position becomes important also in the future. Tromsø is important in an Arctic perspective. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs created the position of the senior advisor to the secretariat of the Arctic Frontiers because they wanted to strengthen the focus on Tromsø in an international Arctic context. It is in Norway’s interest to strengthen the Arctic Frontiers because it is an important platform.

These quotes from a Norwegian journalist and a Norwegian government affiliated informant illustrate how the East–West dimension still features in Arctic affairs and point to the significant position of Norway and Iceland in this regard. Thus, beyond shifts in the global order and international developments, it is interesting to look at the host states of the conferences when seeking to situate these arenas within the Arctic governance system. Norway shares a land border with Russia but is also a training ground for NATO. Iceland was a strategic cornerstone in the North Atlantic during the Cold War and is today an international air-transport hub, connecting North America, Europe, and Asia. The Arctic Circle Assembly is an important arena for the promotion of Iceland’s economic interests and for promoting Reykjavik as an Arctic Hub. The Arctic Frontiers is an important platform for the Norwegian

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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for the promotion of Tromsø as an international meeting place and Arctic Capital. The following discussion inquiries into the role of the two conferences for their hosts states in Arctic geopolitics. In addition to providing a platform for non-Arctic states, the organizers of the Arctic Circle have worked to improve the position of sub-national and regional entities through the Assembly. This priority area advances Iceland’s geopolitical position in the Arctic and North Atlantic and serves to promote Iceland’s economic interests, as exemplified with the Iceland–Greenland–Faroe Islands energy triangle. The priority given to sub-national and regional entities is also something other states can take advantage of. Chapter 4 showed how the Scottish government saw the opportunity to emerge as a North-Atlantic state and Arctic neighbor and how the Arctic Circle platform was used for geopolitical repositioning. More broadly, Mr. Grímsson describes how the Arctic Circle’s philosophy has contributed to the self-awareness and empowerment of non-state and regional actors: The even importance given to regional and national stakeholders has transformed visions within regional territories. Through its structure, the Arctic Circle is changing the landscape of geopolitical involvement of these territories, which is accepted by representatives of national states and federal structures.

Looking at the Arctic Frontiers, the primary geopolitical relevance of the conference has been to facilitate cooperation between Norwegian and Russian entities. The research institute that initiated the Arctic Frontiers, Akvaplan Niva, has longstanding science cooperation with Russian institutions, and the conference organizers recognize the importance of Russia from a Barents perspective. The organizers also recognize that Russian delegates appreciate that the conference is hosted by a research institute and not a public government structure. The organizers work with the Russian embassy when designing the program and to attract Russian participants to the conference. This has been a successful endeavor, as the Russian delegation usually is the second largest after the Norwegian. Specifically, the large number of academic and student participants from Russia illustrates the importance of peopleto-people contact, which is a central element in the overall peaceful relations between Russia and the West. To that end, a government official recounts how Norway and Russia have continuous bilateral Arctic dialogues and describe that conference participation is something all states consider from time to time as a means of diplomacy. A related remark is made by the conference organizer cited below. Some say it is important, to keep the process going. Of course, in a time with political difficulties with Russia, it is important to have arenas where you can meet and talk to the Russians, even if the conference addresses a different topic. Then, it has a function: the faceto-face and informal aspect.

In the neorealist understanding of interstate relations, where military capabilities and economic might dominate, conferences cannot be counted as significant entities. However, with regard to diplomatic relations, soft power influence, and at lower levels of government, conferences are one of several points of contact among engaged actors. Conferences contribute to keeping processes going within the epistemic community from different states, distanced from tense governmental

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relationships within international affairs. Conferences can also reduce barriers to cooperation between states and institutions by facilitating frequent interaction and information sharing. As such, conferences are innovative instruments that cover an area of unrealized common interest and potential for increased cooperation. At the same time, conferences are also arenas where policy can occur, and their geopolitical significance cannot be dismissed. Form this, such gatherings where the formal and informal collide should be considered relevant when examining how states position themselves in the international system.

6.2

Conferences as Supplements to the Arctic Council

There are many positive things to say about the Arctic Council. At the same time, it is also true that while it is necessary, it is not sufficient. Not everything can be done through the Arctic Council, because it is a consensus body. Thus, it is particularly important to have conferences, as arenas for discussions and as meeting places. But, regarding the outcome of conferences, whether people just talk or if they result in something—conferences do not always lead to concrete cooperation. It is easy to see that both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle are only for supporting and strengthening the work of the Arctic Council. These conferences are not governing bodies and cannot make decisions. They are only for dialogue and information sharing. So, they will never be able to compete with the Arctic Council in that sense.

These remarks, from a Norwegian governmental employee and an Arctic Council associated informant, highlight central differences between conferences and cooperation through the Arctic Council. First, there is a line of caution concerning the outcomes of conferences, as they lack decision-making authority and are not governing bodies. Yet, the Arctic Council is neither a policymaking instrument nor has political authority but is rather a soft-law body that builds on legally non-binding consensus. Second, the informants cited above note how conferences are not without value. Rather, conferences are considered important meeting places for dialogue and information sharing, which by the one informant is considered a characteristic that makes conferences an important supplement to the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council has had many successes years within the Arctic governance architecture since its establishment in 1996. It has contributed to regional peace and stability by advancing cooperation between the member states, Indigenous peoples’ organizations, and a growing number of observers. The working groups and task forces have also produced important scientific research throughout the years. However, the primary interest here is not the Arctic Council’s achievements, but a gap in the Arctic governance architecture: the inadequacy of the Arctic Council to deal with all relevant agenda issues and consider all stakeholders in the region. This is a space for conferences to fill within the Arctic governance architecture.

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Expanding the Arctic Agenda

The Arctic Council was established to “provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination, and interaction [---] in particular on issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic” (Arctic Council, 1996). The Ottawa Declaration further states in a footnote that: “The Arctic Council should not deal with matters related to military security” (Arctic Council, 1996). One government affiliated informant describes how a lot of the Arctic Council’s success as a stability promoting organization rests on keeping military and security matters off the agenda, which has facilitated constructive cooperation between the US and Russia. At the same time, there is need for discussions about military and security issues in the region, but the Arctic states are divided regarding the question of whether this should take place through the Arctic Council. On the one side, Iceland and Finland are open for deliberating whether the Arctic Council also should be a forum for deliberation on hard security, considering geopolitical tensions in the region (Tømmerbakke, 2019). The EU also supports this vision and argues for a stronger EU and NATO security presence in the region. On the other side, Norway contends there are good reasons for the Arctic Council to keep security off its agenda, and Canada fears that more NATO involvement in the region may provoke Russia (Tømmerbakke, 2019). Accordingly, conferences fill a requirement within the Arctic governance structure as arenas for deliberating military and security issues. The Arctic Frontiers has been thematically oriented towards the Norwegian government’s priorities, and that ocean and energy-related issues have been dominant in the program since the Arctic Frontiers was established. With regard to security, this issue has been reserved to the science days of the Arctic Frontiers, and security is commonly understood in the broad sense of environmental, food, energy, and human security. Still, the review of the Arctic Frontiers programs revealed a growing number of sessions with the word “security” in the title from the 2013 conference and onwards. For example, the session Geopolitics in a changing Arctic in the science part of the 2013 Arctic Frontiers addressed security in a global context, new stakeholder and governance in the Arctic, and the Arctic in a global energy picture. Noteworthy, this session focused on the way in which the Arctic states are redefining their priorities and interests in the region and the potential security implications of these processes. The increased emphasis on security from the 2013 Arctic Frontiers can as such be seen in relation to regional developments and the issuing of Arctic state strategies, which emphasized “emerging security challenges in the region” (Åtland, 2014). Developments on the international arena in the following years included the Crimeacrisis in 2014, a growing number of NATO exercises (e.g., Cold Response in Norway in 2014 and Joint Viking in Norway in 2015), as well as the increased emphasis on the severity of the impacts of climate change following the 2015 COP-21 meeting in Paris. The Arctic Human Development Report was published in 2014, which drew attention to declining food and energy security in the Arctic. In

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the aftermath of this report, the 2015 and 2016 Arctic Frontiers addressed security in the context of energy. Specifically, the global energy supply, renewable energy, oil and gas exploration, and the societal aspects of energy activities in the Arctic region. At the 2019 Arctic Frontiers, a session titled Science Diplomacy and Security in the Arctic dealt with the interplay between global geopolitics and developments in the Arctic. This included security in the East–West dimension and the US–China rivalry in the region, as well as deliberations on how to implement the Arctic Council’s Science Agreement and the importance of science collaboration for trust building among states. This illustrates how the Arctic Frontiers provides a function within Arctic governance that cannot be filled by the Arctic Council. Especially with regard to addressing tensions between the US and China, and Russia and the West. At the same time, through linking “security” with “energy,” at the 2015 and 2016 conferences, it is noteworthy how the Arctic Frontiers’ agenda reflects Norway’s pre-existing interests. This substantiates the neorealist view of institutions as tools of statecraft, but also that conferences can be of significance for states in international affairs, as platforms to pursue their interests and promote issues to their advantage. Looking at how security is addressed through the Arctic Circle Assembly, Johannsdottir and Cook (2017) found that there has been an increased number of plenary and breakout sessions with energy, science, research, and security in their titles from 2013 to 2016. These sessions address a variety of security dimensions, including geopolitics, military security, social security, human security, and environmental security. In 2014, after Russia’s annexation of Crimea, there was a session in the plenary program of the Arctic Circle Assembly titled Military strategies and defense policies in, and impacts of recent crisis on, security of the Arctic. Other topics related to security at the 2014 Arctic Circle Assembly included geopolitics and regional dynamics in a global world, local and regional security, state sovereignty, and new security actors. As such, there is a clear presence of “hard security” issues on the agenda. This was also evident at the 2015 and 2016 Assemblies, where the Thematic Network on Geopolitics and Security arranged breakout sessions on military, security, and defense-related topics. Furthermore, the Munich Security Conference arranged a Roundtable for invited participants only in Reykjavik before the 2017 Arctic Circle Assembly. Topics on the agenda included China’s economic investments in the Arctic and how to interpret Russia’s upscaling of military infrastructure (Munich Security Roundtable, 2017). The 2017 Assembly included a breakout session that illustrates a debate that the Arctic Council cannot raise: Arms race, arms control, and disarmament in the Arctic-Russian-US dialogue. Another example is found in a session in 2018 addressing Arctic security trends and emerging issues and the impact of great power politics. In sum, there is need for forums through which states and other actors can discuss military and security issues pertaining to the Arctic region. This is indicated by the interest in bringing these topics to the conference stage. The way in which security is addressed through the Arctic Frontiers also illustrates how conferences can not only expand the agenda, but also be used purposefully by states to link agenda issues in their interest, such as “security” and “energy.” The Arctic Circle Assembly shows

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that, when participants can bring with them topics to the open tent provided by the organizers, security-related issues are something the Arctic community have an interest in deliberating. As such, conferences contribute within Arctic governance as arenas for mitigating the challenge of incorporating the growing number of issues on the Arctic agenda and for addressing topics that cannot be raised through the Arctic Council. This further illustrates the value of conferences for states to promote their interests, also related to matters of military and security in the Arctic. At the same time, conferences contribute to keeping tensions low, through providing actors more information about others interests and intentions in the region. An example in this regard, as described by an academic informant, is how conferences contribute to de-securitizing issues by providing actors an arena to discuss potential disputes. The informant recounts how this was a particularly noteworthy feature in the conference sphere following Russia’s flag planting on the seabed of the North Pole in 2007, and the unwariness within the Arctic community that followed.

6.2.2

Broadening Stakeholder Involvement in Arctic Affairs

The other way in which conferences contribute as supplements to the Arctic Council is related to the functions that conferences serve for those on the outside of formalized cooperative arrangements in the region. The number of actors who want to partake in regional affairs has expanded far beyond the creators of the Arctic Council (Graczyk & Koivurova, 2013). On the one side, it is evident that the Arctic Council needs to follow certain structures and cannot incorporate the observers in the same way as member states and permanent participants. In a study of participation in Arctic Council meetings, Knecht (2016) finds that the participation quotas of observers are much lower than for the member states and permanent participants. Observers have no voice in Arctic Council, and no say in decision-making processes or outcomes. This interpretation aligns with what Babin and Lasserre (2019) find in an analysis of Asian states’ participation in the Arctic Council’s activities, where they conclude that they are “extremely weak and limited by a very restricted status” (p. 10). On the other side, the activities of non-Arctic actors affect the Arctic region, and there are also several issues the Arctic states cannot deal with among themselves, including pollutants, regulating commercial shipping, and fisheries (Young, 2014, p. 234). From this, an interesting question is that posed by Rossi (2015): can an alternative form of Arctic governance emerge due to the inability of existing arrangements to satisfy the expanding stakeholder pool and their interests? This touches upon a sensitive topic within Arctic governance: who should be able to participate in regional affairs, and through which channels? Chapter 2 discussed how some Arctic states expressed skepticism when the Arctic Circle Assembly was launched in 2013 and did not appreciate the open tent it provided to all who considered themselves stakeholders in the region. Arctic states

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were especially concerned because the Arctic Circle initiative was so clearly linked to the growing interests of Asian states in the Arctic, and there was uncertainty regarding what this new forum would mean for the regional governance structure overall, and the interests of Arctic states and rights-holders more specifically. While the criticism towards the Arctic Circle Assembly has mostly silenced, there are still some who are concerned about this global platform and the way in which the organizers have accepted in and prioritized non-Arctic states. This derives from the nature of the observer role in the Arctic Council, which clearly is not satisfactory for non-Arctic states. One Arctic state research institute director describes how: “Those claiming to be near-Arctic states have been incorporated in the Arctic Council, and while it is better to be an observer than not, it is a different role from the full worthy members.” This indicates that non-Arctic states still need additional forums to advance their interests in the region. Another indicator is that non-Arctic states have issued Arctic policies and strategies, which demonstrates an interest in engaging in Arctic affairs beyond being observers to the activities of the member states of the Arctic Council. There have however been made some efforts to enhance the participation of observers in the Arctic Council. For example, a new session was introduced under the Finnish chairmanship (2015–2017), where the observers could talk for five minutes each about a chosen topic. One informant from academia describes the session as consisting of impressive comments, demonstrating that the observer states are active in working with environmental challenges in the Arctic. The informant goes on to say: “If they get the opportunity to talk there, conferences might assume a different role.” Still, five minutes is only a fraction of the speaking time non-Arctic states get at conferences, where they can promote themselves and display their interests, capacities, and ambitions in the region. Conferences should therefore be considered not as a supplement to the Arctic Council for non-Arctic actors, but currently as their main option. The shortcoming regarding stakeholder involvement does not only concern non-Arctic state actors. As previously discussed, local and regional governments have no formal association with the Arctic Council and are not provided the same opportunities as Indigenous peoples’ organizations. One informant describes how the regional level used to be more involved in the Arctic Council, but that the Senior Arctic Officials (SAOs) are now commonly appointed from ministries in the capital. This results in the Arctic Council’s meetings becoming very generic, and reports from the Arctic Council’s knowledge producing entities are not always disseminated to those with competence on specific issues such as health, education, housing, or infrastructure. The most significant function of conferences as supplements to the Arctic Council is therefore providing a platform for non-Arctic states and non-state actors. This is not to say that outsiders should have the same rights and decision-making power as sovereign Arctic states, locals, and Indigenous peoples, nor that conferences could provide them with such. The argument is that conferences, being indifferent to membership, give a broader range of actors a voice, and as such impact the Arctic

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governance structure by democratizing the dialogue. Conferences allow for network building between national, sub-national, sub-regional, and non-governmental actors. An Arctic Council associated informant noted how: “there are certainly some who express concern about the number of observers the Arctic Council has today.” Therefore, this outcome is not only beneficial for the frustrated observers who “just have to sit and observe, without anything useful to do,” as described by an informant from academia, but should also be welcomed by the Arctic states. Of the two cases, the Arctic Circle Assembly is superior in providing a platform for non-Arctic states to promote and legitimize themselves as stakeholders. This is expressed by the two participants cited below. Grímsson has been politically in opposition to the founding philosophy of the Arctic Council that “we [the Arctic states] are themselves enough.” “He allows non-elite, non-Arctic actors to talk about the Arctic.” I see it as a geopolitical interest of Grímsson’s, in connecting subnational governments and non-Arctic states to the Arctic in a way that at some point has the potential to displace the Arctic Council and national Arctic sovereignty.

It is once again worth noting a difference between the two conferences, namely how informants assess the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly in relation to the Arctic Council. The conferences are described as the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Council, and the Arctic Circle Assembly opposed to the Arctic Council. This is also something the organizers reflect on, and one of the Arctic Frontiers organizers stated: “We are much closer to the Arctic Council way of thinking—the inner circle and the interests of the Arctic Eight—while Grímsson is more open.” Accordingly, significant differences shape how the two cases are situated within their surrounding system. This is also noted by participants, as illustrated by this quote from a non-Arctic science institute director: Arctic Frontiers is close to the Arctic Council. The close involvement of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains why the Arctic Council use it to display its work, to discuss things, and to meet. The Arctic Circle has a quite different approach. The Arctic Circle is not Arctic Council. It was, when it started, seen as competition.

There are four factors that are particularly central for how the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are perceived within, and exerts influence on, Arctic governance. These are: the philosophy behind the establishment of the conference; the organizers and their strategy; the social media profile of the conference; and external activities. Concerning the philosophy behind and establishment of the conference, the Arctic Frontiers started out as a science-oriented forum and has always been viewed very positively within the Arctic Council, according to associated informants. Cooperation with the Arctic Council has always been in the Arctic Frontiers strategy, and the organizers aim to develop synergies between the secretariats. This is noted by two Norwegian governmental informants: The Arctic Council is the foremost forum for cooperation in the High North. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is genuinely concerned about talking positive about and increase the status of this forum.

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The difference between the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle, seen from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is who best support the Arctic Council—and here, there is a clear winner.

An important aspect of the Arctic Frontiers is gathering all the SAOs in Tromsø, which not only allows them to meet, but also provides non-Arctic representatives the opportunity to engage with these actors. It contributes to promoting Norway as a driving force in Arctic cooperation, as underlined by an American governmental informant. It is further a means for consolidating the image of Tromsø as the Arctic Capital, as pointed out by a Norwegian government affiliated informant. The Arctic Frontiers’ format gives less space for country sessions, and thus less leeway for non-Arctic states to promote their interests. As follows, the conference portrays a closeness to the Arctic Council and is described by a science institute affiliated informant as mirroring the Arctic Council’s structure of “members and observers.” Looking at the Arctic Frontiers’ social media profile, the conference is described on Twitter as: “Independent Pan-Arctic network on policy, business, and science in the Arctic.” The Arctic Frontiers’ Facebook page states that the conference aims at: “Supporting independent dialogue, building partnerships, and contributing to discussion on pan-arctic strategies for sustainable development in the Arctic.” Thus, in contrast to the international emphasis of the Arctic Circle Assembly, the Arctic Frontiers accentuates being a pan-Arctic forum, giving primacy to the communities and actors located throughout the region. Lastly, the activities of the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers are conducted in cooperation with a Norwegian ministry, and in support of Norwegian interests abroad. The Arctic Circle was openly established as an alternative, a philosophy the [Norwegian] Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not like. Although, it is not necessarily the impression that the Icelandic government is behind Grímsson’s vision. They are supportive of the Arctic Council, and less pleased with the Arctic Five.

The establishment of the Arctic Circle Assembly was received with more skepticism by regional actors, as described by the government affiliated informant cited above. This can be seen related to how the initiative was mostly an individual effort of then president Grímsson, and how the format with country sessions gives a platform to powerful non-Arctic states. Because of wariness towards the nature of this addition to the regional governance structure, Norway and the US sent limited delegations to the first Assembly, and other states refrained from sending their SAOs. Yet, those involved in the process of establishing the Arctic Circle state that there was no intent of developing an alternative to the Arctic Council, and that the Assembly is nothing more than a supplementing body. The continued skepticism towards the Icelandic conference from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is related to two factors: the Arctic Circle’s social media profile and external activities. Informants have argued the social media profile of the Arctic Circle gives the impression of it being a political gathering rather than a conference. It is described as “the largest international gathering on Arctic issues” on Twitter, and its Facebook page states: “The Arctic Circle is the largest network of

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international dialogue and cooperation on the future of the Arctic. It is an open, democratic platform.” Lastly, the Arctic Circle organization has established task forces and Mission Councils (see Chap. 5), which are activities that resemble those of the Arctic Council. Some informants have argued this is beyond the scope of what a conference organization should engage with, which illustrates some of the unintended consequences that can emerge from these arenas.

6.3

The Arctic Governance Regime Complex

Through the examination of the nature and functions of Arctic conferences, this book particularly focuses on a structure feature of the larger governance architecture: the Arctic regime complex. From the definition by Orsini et al. (2013), a regime complex is a network of three or more international regimes that relate on a common subject matter, exhibit overlapping membership, and generate interaction (p. 29). As such, the institutions that comprise a regime complex, while independent of each other, are also interrelated through a joint agenda, the same member entities, and they interact with each other. Looking at the Arctic regime complex, it consists of treaties, intergovernmental and inter-parliamentary organizations, non-state actors, international non-governmental organizations, transnational networks, bilateral initiatives. The interesting question for the remainder of this chapter is how conferences can be situated within these elements. Three issues are devoted particular attention to the inquiry into whether conferences can function as linkages among the other entities. First, how conferences contribute to creating synergies among other units. This is exemplified with the Arctic Frontiers, and the secretariats of the Arctic Council and Arctic Economic Council (AEC) and the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in Tromsø. Second, how conferences contribute as communication and information channels in the negotiation and implementation phases of a multinational agreement. Lastly, this chapter looks closer at the Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM), which is a more recent addition to the governance architecture that is interesting in that it utilizes conferences to affirm its role among the other units. A common characteristic of global architectures is that they have high degree of fragmentation (e.g., Biermann et al., 2009, 2020; Biermann, 2014). Biermann et al. (2009) identify three degrees of fragmentation: synergistic, cooperative, and conflictive fragmentation. Humrich (2013) concludes the Arctic governance architecture exhibits a benign degree of cooperative fragmentation, which is characterized by loosely integrated core institutions, core norms that neither conflict nor are fully integrated, and by some actors remaining outside the core institutions while maintaining cooperative relationship (p. 82). This description of the Arctic governance system is supported by findings presented in this book. Yet, there are still governance challenges within an architecture that exhibits medium degree of fragmentation (Humrich, 2013). From this, it would be beneficial to create more

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synergies among units in the Arctic governance architecture, to harmonize norms, and to include more actors in central institutions. One initiative to promote synergies among entities in the Arctic is the joint locality of the Arctic Council’s secretariat, the Arctic Economic Council’s secretariat, and the Indigenous Peoples Secretariat in Tromsø, Norway, and the Arctic Frontiers has been supportive in this process. The standing secretariat of the Arctic Council was opened in Tromsø in June 2013, and the Arctic Economic Council secretariat in September 2015. The Indigenous Peoples Secretariat, which was established in Copenhagen in 1994, was relocated to Tromsø in January 2016. The process of basing the Arctic Economic Council secretariat in Tromsø was driven by Norwegian business interests and motivated by the potential for synergies with the Arctic Council’s secretariat. It underlines the intention of the Arctic Economic Council of supporting the Arctic Council in ensuring sustainable development and the objective of providing business advice and perspectives to the work of the Arctic Council. These objectives were formalized with a MoU signed at the Rovaniemi Arctic Council meeting in May 2019, which provided a platform for collaboration between the Arctic Council and Arctic Economic Council. According to Tero Vauraste, the outgoing AEC chair when Iceland took over the chairmanship from Finland in 2019, the MoU “strengthens the AEC’s position as the Arctic Council’s preferred partner in issues related to responsible economic development” (Arctic Economic Council, 2019). To that end, having the secretariats in the same city provides for information sharing, ongoing contact, and dialogue among the engaged states and actors. The Arctic Frontiers also serves as a purposeful addition in this regard. A Norwegian government affiliated informant describes how the prominence and support given to the Arctic Frontiers by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is party founded in the location of the three secretariats in Tromsø, which enables the creation of desired synergies between these organizations and the Arctic Frontiers. The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers have in turn worked to promote Tromsø as an institutional knowledge-hub in the region. They have worked to advance Tromsø as a competence-hub and center of Arctic development, which is an identity the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs wants to consolidate, in addition to the image of Tromsø as an Arctic Capital. The Arctic Frontiers further serves as a cost-efficient meeting place for Arctic institutions to present their work to a broader audience and for participants to engage with these entities. Thus, looking broadly at the institutional landscape of Arctic governance, the joint location of these three secretariats in Tromsø is an advantage for the Norwegian government. The Norwegian government seeks to promote Tromsø as an important center for growth and development in the High North and to position itself as a leading Arctic state through emphasizing Norway’s strategic location in the region (Norwegian Ministries, 2020). The Arctic Frontiers is described in the Arctic Policy from 2020 as “one of the most important international platforms to promote Norwegian positions in the Arctic”, as an important arena for knowledge production and an important meeting place for dialogue among Norwegian and international actors (Norwegian Ministries, 2020). Accordingly, while the Arctic Frontiers contributes to

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creating synergies among different entities in the overall governance architecture, it is at the same time worth noting how the Arctic Frontiers enables the Norwegian government to advance its interests and priorities. As such, the conference is not only a contribution within the Arctic regime complex, but also a tool of statecraft for the Norwegian government. The second contribution of conferences within the Arctic governance architecture is their function in processes preceding and succeeding the implementation of multinational agreements. One example is the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code), which was negotiated from 2009 and entered into force in January 2017. During this period, both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly were used to build momentum around the agreement. Examples of sessions from the Arctic Circle include a breakout session in the United Kingdom’s delegation at the 2014 Assembly, which addressed developments of the Polar Code in relation to financial, legal, insurance issues, and international regulations. In 2015, the international and interdisciplinary Arctic Options project arranged a breakout session on the Arctic High Seas: Building Common Interests in the Arctic Ocean. In 2016, three breakout sessions at the Arctic Circle Assembly addressed the legal aspects of the Polar Code, the future of Arctic marine operations under IPCC climate scenarios, and the Polar Code and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Polar Code has featured in the Arctic Frontiers’ science part since 2010, when the question was raised of how to meet the growing demand for governance of human activities affecting the Arctic Ocean. In 2011, key aspects of developments within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) were on the agenda, including the relationship between the envisaged Polar Code and existing IMO conventions, and issues falling outside the IMO’s mandate. In 2013, there was a presentation on the adequacy of the Law of the Sea and international environmental law to the Arctic Ocean, and one on challenges in the negotiation process of the Polar Code, including how to resolve conflictual environmental standards. Here it is worth noting that the Norwegian government considers the Law of the Sea to the basic architecture underpinning all ocean governance in the Arctic and is opposed to the idea of developing an additional Arctic Treaty. One of the 2014 Arctic Frontiers’ four parallel science sessions was Shipping and offshore in the Arctic, including the sub-session Technological challenges and IMO Polar Code. It contained presentations on the institutional interplay in Arctic shipping, developments in the IMO, and safety and maintenance management of marine operations in the Arctic. The 2016 Arctic Frontiers program included the role of Russia in the decisionmaking process of the Polar Code, the IMO’s work to construct ways to mitigate environmental and human maritime disasters, and requirements imposed on cruise ships by the Polar Code. In 2018, the role of the Arctic Council in facilitating institutional interplay for Arctic shipping was addressed in a science presentation at the Arctic Frontiers. The last topic points to a general challenge within the Arctic governance system, namely how there are overlapping institutions and organizations that need to coordinate their work. As previously mentioned, this is a consequence of the cooperative fragmentation that characterizes the governance architecture. The

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Arctic Council can provide useful contributions as a tool in international diplomacy and negotiations. However, this overview also illustrates the role of conferences as purposeful arenas in the development and negotiation phase of the Polar Code to keep a larger audience in the loop about the process. Conference presentation is also a way for other actors to express their concerns of the agreement under negotiation, exemplified with the critique of the Polar Code in relation to environmental issues. As such, conferences can in this setting be considered innovative instruments that contribute to increased cooperation through facilitating information sharing among actors. Conferences also play a central role after the signing of an agreement. For example, if there are challenges related to how to implement and administrate the agreement or practical obstacles between states, as with the Arctic Council Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Science Cooperation. The aim of the agreement was to facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge in the Arctic. Nonetheless, the agreement was no quick fix for removing barriers for science collaboration related to visas for traveling across borders, in particularly between the US and Russia. The agreement should therefore be regarded as a new platform for long-term discussions, where science as an advocacy coalition can play a role in creating cooperative institutions and establishing first contact. However, the challenges of implementing the Science Agreement signifies that science diplomacy is at best a supplement, but not a substitute, for official diplomacy or bureaucratic procedures. Both the Arctic Circle Assembly and the Arctic Frontiers have been used as platforms to deliberate the way forward after the agreement was implemented. At the 2018 Arctic Circle Assembly, there was a breakout session on Supporting the implementation of the Arctic science agreement, organized by the UArctic, the IASSA, and the Science Diplomacy Center at Tufts University. Denmark is the depository government of the agreement, and the Danish SAO was present for the discussion of barriers to enforcing the agreement. The need for trust building, challenges related to cooperation with Russia, and clashes of perceptions between the East and West were further addressed by Frej Sorento Dichmann from the Danish ministry of education and research in an all-day event on Science diplomacy and security in the Arctic at the 2019 Arctic Frontiers. In addition to contributing to creating synergies among other entities in the region and facilitating communication during the negotiation and implementation processes of international agreements, conferences can contribute to role clarification among entities working on similar issues in the region. One example of this is the Arctic Science Ministerial, which is a conference of science ministers, EU representatives, and delegates from Indigenous peoples’ organizations. It was first arranged in 2016 by the US White House to enhance collective efforts towards international scientific cooperation in the Arctic. This is an interesting addition to the Arctic governance architecture. While it is a gathering of ministers that resembles many of the features of the Arctic Council, it is at the same time a closed conference that utilizes other conferences for communication.

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The shared objectives with the Arctic Council are evident from the second Arctic Science Ministerial arranged in Berlin in 2018. The purpose was to enhance and develop cooperation under three themes: Strengthening, integrating, and sustaining Arctic observations; facilitating access to Arctic data; sharing Arctic research infrastructure (German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, 2019). The purpose of the Arctic Council Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Science Cooperation is “to enhance cooperation in Scientific Activities in order to increase effectiveness and efficiency in the development of scientific knowledge about the Arctic” (Arctic Council, 2017). The Science Agreement’s articles five to seven address access to research infrastructure and activities, access to research areas, and access to data. In other words, the precise aims of the second ASM. Looking at the other interesting feature of the Arctic Science Ministerial is that this arrangement is itself a conference, but as described by an informant associated with the ASM: other conferences are considered useful for introducing new initiatives within the Arctic community. The Arctic Science Ministerial is a closed meeting among science ministers from the 26 participating governments but did however also invite representatives from around 30 governments, six Indigenous peoples’ organizations, and ten select international organizations to give presentations on their priority topics at the second Arctic Science Ministerial. Therefore, the Arctic Science Ministerial has taken advantage of the platforms provided by the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly much in the same way as the Arctic Council: to broaden its outreach and communicate the work of this members-only forum in the region. In 2017, the EU Commission DG of Research and Innovation, the Ministry for Education and Culture of Finland, the Ministry for Education and Research of Germany, and the US Arctic Research Commission hosted a breakout session at the Arctic Circle Assembly titled Increasing international cooperation on Arctic science via Ministerial Meetings, and the same group of actors hosted a session at the 2018 Assembly. The Arctic Science Ministerial was also presented in the policy section at the 2018 Arctic Frontiers, as one of several processes engaging diplomatic considerations about the changing circumstances of the Arctic. At the 2019 Arctic Circle Assembly, the breakout session From the Second Arctic Science Ministerial to the Third Arctic Science Ministerial was hosted by the European Commission, with speakers from ministries in Finland, Germany, Iceland, and Japan. The purpose of the session was to present the accomplishments from the second ASM in Berlin, hosted by Germany and Finland, and to lay forth the plans for the third Arctic Science Ministerial, to be co-hosted between Japan and Iceland. The Arctic Science Ministerial highlights a key function of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly within the architecture of the region. These conferences are arenas that connect and contribute to synergies among other elements. While it at times can be necessary with closed gatherings, conferences fulfill an important role as arenas for including a broader audience and democratizing the dialogue.

6.4

6.4

Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture

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Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture

The Arctic has become an increasingly important arena for foreign, economic, and security policy. The region is affected by global developments and power structures and reflects central features of international relations. The globalization of Arctic affairs entails that more actors are seeking engagement in the region, and powerful states are intensifying efforts to safeguard their interests. This chapter has cast light on how the economic interests of new stakeholders to the region clash with the political and sovereignty concerns of the Arctic states and rights-holders. The growing number of engaged actors and their interests in the region makes the Arctic governance architecture more complex, which in turn makes governing more demanding. Arctic cooperation has thus far proved resistant to spill-over from tensions in other areas of international relations, thus far even after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Yet, the impacts of climate change are causing transformations that open the region for more activity and opportunities for resource extraction. This entails that the geopolitical situation and tensions among powerful actors could intensify, and there is need for a strong and collaborative governance structure to meet more future challenges. In this regard, conferences are valuable additions to the governance structure and contribute to keeping tensions low through providing arenas for discussions and the initiation of collaborative efforts. Mr. Grímsson argues that the new model of bringing together actors from the international community provided by the Arctic Circle Assembly creates results, boost cooperation forward, and helps the Arctic be a constructive part of the world. Also, that the Arctic Circle is proof of a reasonable alternative to the current intergovernmental model, and that what the Arctic community has achieved in recent years is a core example of what can be done in the twenty-first century in terms of solving some of the challenges of our time. While partisan in judging the successes of the Arctic Circle Assembly, Mr. Grímsson has an important point concerning the limitations of the traditional model for intergovernmental cooperation. Therefore, thinking about novel ways of interaction, dialogue, and negotiations among actors within the international system is an appealing idea. Whether conferences are necessary is a contested issue, and conferences are often faulted for being elite gatherings that do not produce significant outcomes. Their potential usefulness is deliberated against the financial costs of the arrangements and the environmental footprint of participants traveling to the events. Yet, conferences are established entities within the Arctic governance architecture, and the two cases at the center of this study are attended by a significant number of international participants from different levels of government, in addition to other sectors and strands of society. Thus, while conferences do not have decision-making authority or produce binding outcomes, they fill different functions within the Arctic. One research institute affiliated informant describes conferences as “intensive seminars on a wide variety of topics, from technology to policy, where people can expand

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their understanding of issues that might be relevant for their work.” As such, while conferences do not necessarily change governance structures, the informant goes on to state that “conference participation probably helps governing.” Central functions of conferences within the Arctic governance architecture are being connections among other elements in the regime complex, expanding the agenda, and broadening participation. At the Arctic Circle Assembly and the Arctic Frontiers, everyone is given right to participate, speak, and ask questions regardless of their formal position - granted they have the resources to attend the conference. Conferences can be added to institutions and organizations as one of the multiple channels of contact and dialogue in a system characterized by complex interdependence. Conferences fit well within the Arctic as a “zone of peace” and can reinforce existing structures by providing an informal atmosphere where people can talk without binding mandates. Conferences contribute to keeping momentum going by facilitating recurrent interaction among actors, as well as the development of a coherent agenda, a common discourse, and the reinforcement of social practices, and norms of behavior. These are necessary elements for the continued governance of the region, and conferences expand the structure of Arctic governance, if defined as a structure of cooperation and dialogue. Chapter 2 discussed democratizing effects of conferences, exemplified by the Arctic Frontiers’ Open Arctic arrangements, and the Arctic Circle’s explicit involvement of non-Arctic and non-state stakeholders. Still, it is important to note that conferences are not town meetings, and as pointed out by a government affiliated informant: “It is not like anybody of the street can just walk in. It is not completely democratic or transparent.” Additionally, the marketplace functions of conferences must be recognized, which is described by the three informants cited below: a business representative, a non-Arctic foreign ministry employee, and a journalist. I think, actually, for the moment, the problem is there is just too much, and you have to be quite picky where you go and where you don’t, because you can spend your life at Arctic conferences. With so many Arctic conferences, there also seems to be a competition between various arenas—for participants, size, and relevance. Is this a necessary development? Everyone agrees on the issues being addressed at these events, so why are they in competition? Rovaniemi and the Arctic conferences there. They are working hard to become a fourth actor in the conference market—in addition to Arkhangelsk [The International Arctic Forum], Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle.

Accordingly, the two conferences at the center of this book create a competitive space in the region. The Arctic Circle Assembly has accurately been described as a bazaar where information is traded, certain kinds of knowledge are privileged, and there is competition for attention and visibility (Depledge & Dodds, 2017). The description is applicable for the Arctic Frontiers as well, however with a more expensive ticket into the marketplace. In addition, there is competition between the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle, for partners, sponsors, participants, visibility, and outreach. Despite this competitive factor—or precisely because of it—both conferences are constructive elements within the Arctic governance architecture.

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While fulfilling many of the same purposes, the two cases occupy distinct spaces and can be viewed as complementing entities within Arctic governance. The main function of the Arctic Frontiers is to preserve the established: research collaboration and connecting science with policy. Within the zone of peace, it is necessary to have an arena where actors can gather to develop the conversation, to maintain collaboration and stability. Equally important for driving developments forward is the primary function of the Arctic Circle Assembly: providing a platform for new stakeholders. The Arctic Circle organization gives non-Arctic and non-state actors a voice and the opportunity to gain experience about the region. In this way, it contributes to create responsible stakeholders—which is beneficial for the Arctic states and local communities. In conclusion, if conferences were of no significance, representatives of government, behaving as rational actors, would not attend these gatherings. Therefore, conferences can constructively be added to analysis of international relations as arenas that can produce governance effects, as channels for diplomacy, and arenas where policy can occur. Moreover, conferences should not be excluded when trying to produce new ways of solving central challenges within international affairs.

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Chapter 7

Governance by Conference

The Arctic has been characterized by peaceful relations and stability, and actors engaged in the region have vested interests in collaboration on issues of mutual concern. The Arctic Council, as a consensus soft-law body, has been successful at promoting cooperation between the member states and permanent participants. Much of the Arctic Council’s successes have been assigned to the fact that it does not deal with military and security issues—which has enabled constructive dialogue between the United States (US) and Russia. Yet, the Arctic has attracted increased interest from beyond the region, and there is a growing number of issues on the Arctic’s agenda, as the region is being transformed from the impacts of climate change. Considering these challenges, this book set out to examine the functions of conferences in the Arctic and to shed light on whether conferences contribute as constructive elements within the governance system. Additionally, the book aspired to expand our knowledge about how conferences can serve various functions within the international system more broadly. It was expected that Arctic conferences did not operate in a vacuum, and both the Arctic governance architecture as a whole and elements within the Arctic regime complex were of interest in the analysis. The relational element is also an argument for the value of a study like this. Arenas for deliberating challenges and for coordinating joint activities are becoming increasingly significant, considering developments and changes in the Arctic, and there is a need for research on how conferences can function as such arenas. Still, while most elements of the Arctic governance system have been subject to analysis, previous studies have not provided insight into the functions of conferences in the region. To that end, this book set out to make three contributions to the scholarly literature. First, to broaden the dependent variable—Arctic governance—through examining conferences establishing how these gatherings fit within the Arctic regime complex. Second, to contribute to IR scholarship by examining whether conferences are relevant units to include in studies of international affairs. To that point, the book has cast light on how analysis of international relations can benefit from taking conferences into account as arenas that are relevant for policy and for the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6_7

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unfolding of governing, democracy, and diplomacy. Third, the book aimed to be conducive to the literature on global conferencing by broadening the empirical range of conferences under consideration, and by providing a novel framework through which to elucidate different elements of the Arctic conference realm. The analysis has been structured around three analytical mechanisms chosen to uncover various aspects of Arctic conferences. The first mechanism analyzed the main functions of conferences for various actor groups and cast light on whether conference engagement can contribute to advancing actors’ agency in the region. For the agenda-setting mechanism, questions of interest were whether conference organizers contribute to defining central issues and elevate them on to the broader agenda in the region and whether conference engagement is a means for participants to successfully promote the issues of their concern. For the architecture mechanism, the book has presented key components of Arctic governance and has discussed the functions of conferences within this system. From this, central differences between the two, seemingly similar, cases have been discovered through the analysis of the empirical material gathered for this book. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly produce different outcomes on the mechanisms, and therefore also contribute to different outcomes on the dependent variable, Arctic governance. Thus, before summarizing the three mechanisms, the following reviews the characteristics of the ideal model of a conference discussed in Chap. 2, and the extent to which these characteristics are present at the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly.

7.1

Two Different Models for Conference Organizing

The ideal model of a conference includes both the functions the organizers seek to fill, and the outcomes conferences are expected to produce. To summarize its characteristics, a conference contributes to relationship-building and dealmaking among participants. It is an arena for bolstering government leadership and promoting the interests of states and asserting state dominance, but also a marketplace for the promotion of ideas and a performance space for democratic values. A conference should be a space for agenda-setting and serve as a magnate for side events and side meetings. Lastly, a conference can be a legitimizing tool for participants who seek to establish themselves as relevant stakeholders within a territorial or issue area. The Arctic Frontiers was initiated by a research institute and founded on the ideal of providing for knowledge-based decision-making and social and economic development. The close involvement of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the Arctic Frontiers has contributed to the conference being constructed around Norwegian interests and priorities in the Arctic. The Arctic Frontiers is a platform for the Norwegian government to display Tromsø as the ‘Arctic Capital’ and to position Norway as a leading Arctic state through emphasizing the country’s strategic location. As such, the Arctic Frontiers fulfills the criterium of a conference as an arena for reinforcing government leadership, to promote the interests of states and

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assert state dominance. To that point, the Arctic Frontiers has been described as resembling the Arctic Council’s structure of “members and observers.” The conference draws a distinction between those “on the inside” and “those on the outside” of Arctic governance and benefits the Arctic states in supporting their claims in the region based on sovereignty and jurisdiction. The conference is consequently not ideal as a legitimizing tool for non-Arctic state participants who seek to strengthen their stakeholder status. The Arctic Frontiers do contribute as an arena for relationship building and dealmaking among participants. It has been demonstrated how the Arctic Frontiers has contributed to outside actors, e.g., the European Union (EU), developing a more balanced view of environmental protection and economic development in the Arctic, and that the conference can serve as an arena for the negotiation of narratives and the discourse about the region. The Arctic Frontiers also contributes to agenda-setting, which has been illustrated by how the conference organizers have been successful at pushing the priority issues of the Norwegian government onto the broader regional agenda. Specifically matters related to ocean governance, energy, and societal and business development. Moreover, by gathering scientists and academics, the conference is a marketplace for the promotion of ideas. Still, this characteristic is not as pronounced, seeing how the conference is expensive and that the organizers control the program. Informants have described how they do not attend the Arctic Frontiers expecting to acquire the latest in science. This can be seen as an unintended consequence of creating a hybrid conference format that gathers different sectors, professions, and fields. Moreover, is not sufficient to attract participants from different affiliations to advance the policy-science-business interplay. It is also necessary to foster meaningful discussions, which makes the characteristic of a conference as serving as a magnate for meetings on the sideline and side events valuable. The Arctic Frontiers fulfills this characteristic, especially for regional and local governmental leaders. It has also been illustrated how the Arctic Frontiers contributes to synergies among other entities in the region, exemplified by the relationship to the Arctic Council’s secretariat and support of the Arctic Economic Council’s secretariat and Indigenous people’s secretariat located in Tromsø. The Arctic Circle Assembly, which is an undertaking of former Icelandic president Olafur Ragnar Grímsson, is a global arena intended to be an open and democratic tent. It was established when the Arctic became increasingly central in global affairs, as a platform gathering all Arctic and non-Arctic stakeholders interested in the development of the region. Non-Arctic actors are given an equal platform as Arctic state representatives, and the organizers work actively to promote sub-national and regional voices, such as the West-Nordic focus, and Iceland, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands economic triangle. Founded in the philosophy of the organizers, the Arctic Circle Assembly fulfills the criterium of being a legitimizing tool for outsiders seeking a place at the discussion table and for non-Arctic state representatives to argue for and justify their presence in the region. However, the Arctic Circle is, like the Arctic Frontiers, an arena for the reinforcement of government leadership, and the Assembly and the Forums reflect the

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national economic and geopolitical interests of Iceland. The launch of the Arctic Circle Assembly came timely for the Icelandic government’s attempt to reposition itself on the international arena following the 2008 financial crisis. It became a platform for Iceland to promote its economic potential in areas such as renewable energy, natural resource extraction, shipping, and tourism. The profile of the Assembly and the Forums reflect both Icelandic domestic and global interests. As such, while the Arctic Circle may not be as pronounced as the Arctic Frontiers in asserting Arctic state dominance, it is still very much an arena for the promotion of state interests. Mr. Grímsson has aspired to create a geopolitical Arctic Hub on Iceland, which has been a successful endeavor. The Arctic Circle Assembly attracts around 3000 participants from more than 60 countries to Reykjavik every October, which makes this the largest international Arctic conference there is. The Harpa building, where the Assembly is arranged, facilitates the Arctic Circle functioning as a magnate for side events and side meetings. People travel to Reykjavik not only to listen to the plenary presentations, but also to meet international colleagues, network, and make new connections. As such, the Arctic Circle Assembly functions as a platform for relationship building. In addition, the Arctic Circle’s open philosophy and large number of breakout sessions speak both to the Arctic Circle Assembly as a performance space for democratic values and practices, and as a marketplace for the promotion of ideas. Lastly, Chap. 5 indicated how the organizers of the Arctic Circle in association with central partners have been successful at agenda-setting in the region, through the Mission Council initiatives.

7.2

The Functions of Conferences for Actors in Arctic Governance

The main purpose of the actor mechanism was to uncover the functions conferences serve for different participant groups engaged in the Arctic conference sphere. The hypothesis was that conferences can serve as advantageous arenas for actors to advance their power, interests, legitimacy, and position in the region. In turn, that conferences can contribute to alter the actor composition of Arctic governance. This brings to the fore the dynamic element of conference engagement, and how conferences should not be considered isolated events with no implications for participating actors or surrounding structures. As such, the book has shown how conferences purposefully can be included in the analysis of governance systems. This section concludes with the actor mechanism and summarizes the functions of conferences for each participant group. Conferences serve as stages for Arctic state representatives to assert their sovereignty and control the discussion in the region. This was an expected finding, which fits within the neorealist view of conferences as tools of statecraft that reflect states’ pre-existing interests. The way in which the Norwegian and Icelandic governments

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use the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly to their advantage also supports this notion of conferences within the international system. Conferences are created and upheld in the interests of states and are arenas for government officials to promote their national interests in a positive light. Informants have described how the Arctic elite has an obligation to attend conferences and promote Arctic state sovereignty, Indigenous peoples’ rights, environmental protection, social and economic development, and to explain that climate change is not coming from the Arctic. Keeping these issues on the agenda is advantageous for the region’s rights-holders, and targeting such information toward new stakeholders makes conferences, as described by an informant, “a very expensive form of adult education.” Thus, conferences are not only tools of statecraft in the sense that they are arenas for states to promote their interests and priorities, but in the way they function as arenas for states to influence the perceptions and priorities of others. Conference participation can in this way be considered a means to execute power within the Arctic region, understood as the ability to shape outcomes in the direction of one’s advantage. At the same time, conferences can also be considered through regime theory as an element in the growing interdependence among states in the Arctic. Conferences facilitate communication and information sharing, they reduce barriers to cooperation, and can activate collaborative initiatives and mutually beneficial coalitions. Conclusively, the fact that state representatives pay attention to conference delegations entails that these gatherings should not be overlooked in the analysis of international relations but included as relevant arenas for both political games and international cooperation. A key function of conferences for non-Arctic states is serving as arenas for these actors to promote themselves as legitimate stakeholders. The way in which non-Arctic state actors and those sidelined in formalized cooperation are provided a platform to express their perspectives and to display their interests and capabilities was exemplified by China, which has taken advantage of the conference stage to promote its self-defined status as a “near-Arctic state.” Other examples that illustrate how conferences are valuable arenas for states both to reposition themselves in the Arctic region and to fulfill their interests in other processes are Scotland and Switzerland. Scotland, seeking to emerge as a “North-Atlantic state” and a “European gateway to the Arctic” following Brexit, was successful in utilizing conferences to argue for its legitimate position, and to increase its power through forming alliances. Switzerland, promoting itself as a “vertical Arctic nation,” utilized conferences actively pending its Arctic Council observer candidature in 2017, and from this obtained more power and legitimacy in the region. Additionally, the EU is urgently advocating for more EU and NATO security presence in the Arctic from the conference stage—thus seeking to increase both its power and legitimacy. Under these circumstances, do conferences function as a backdoor into Arctic governance for actors sidelined in formal organizations? Conferences are arenas for new actors to promote their interests and are constructive arenas in the quest for increased stakeholder salience, but this does not automatically transfer into political

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influence. Yet, there is a question of whether economic investments and strengthened relationships in other areas (e.g., research or business) of Arctic affairs can provide outsiders leverage in political decision-making processes over time. The functions of conferences for non-Arctic states also cast light on how these arenas can produce unintended consequences and be used for other purposes than those they were created to fulfill. Conferences are not only platforms for the Arctic states to advance knowledge-based decision-making, promote their sovereign rights, and control the discourse in the region. Conferences are also legitimizing tools for non-Arctic states to strengthen their position, promote their capabilities, and acquire knowledge and build expertise for further engagement through other channels. Turning to the epistemic community, conferences primarily function as arenas for networking, searching for partners, co-authors, projects, or other career opportunities. With the Arctic becoming more intertwined in global systems, decision-makers are becoming increasingly dependent on expert advice. To that end, conference participation was confirmed to be a source of power for the epistemic community, through strengthening control over information and knowledge. Conference engagement was shown to be a means for providing advice to policymakers, and thus contribute to agenda-setting. From this, conferences are instruments outside the realm of conventional statecraft, that cover an area of unrealized common interest and promote cooperation. Conferences are also elements in an iterative process of changing the values and preferences of actors within the international system. Business representatives can advantageously use conferences as platforms to promote the company, in search for customers, investors, or business opportunities. Conference engagement is further a means for business representatives to obtain legitimacy, in that it provides an opportunity to argue for the “sustainable activity” and “renewable profile” of the company. Non-Arctic business delegations can learn about local conditions and the market in the Arctic, which can help them target their products and services toward specific circumstances and requirements. The marketing function conferences serve for business representatives and also attest to the broader implications of conferences for processes and events that take place outside the gathering itself. Representatives from institutes, institutions, and NGOs attend conferences for the purpose of promoting their work and discovering initiatives they can bring back to their affiliation. Conferences provide an efficient space for institutions and organizations to draw attention to their accomplishments and emphasize prioritized issue areas for their affiliation. In this way, there is an element of self-promotion and branding of conference participation for this group. At the same time, their presence at conferences has been described as a necessary “check on elitism,” which entails connecting what takes place at these arenas to the local and institutional levels. The lion’s share of these actors are legitimate stakeholders in the region, but conference participation can be a means for them to obtain power, increased visibility, and to contribute to agenda-setting. To that point, informants describe how NGOs utilize conferences in attempts to influence the debate, promote their issues, and to get attention by creating media campaigns. This in turn can produce unintended

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consequences that are not necessarily in the interest of the organizers or advantageous for the host state. Local and regional government representatives partake at conferences to share experiences and best practices with similar communities, and to establish connections with other community leaders. In particular, the Arctic Circle organizers aim to provide a platform where non-state, sub-regional and sub-national actors can participate with equal standing as state government representatives. Both the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are arenas for meetings on the sideline among local and regional leaders, and thus provide an important supplement to the Arctic Council where locals do not have a voice. Conference participation is further a chance to attract media attention toward local challenges, which can contribute to raising awareness within power structures at the national level. Indigenous peoples hold a prominent position in the Arctic Council, which is not mirrored in the conference sphere because conferences are not as representative as the Arctic Council must be. Kalfagianni et al. (2020) argue legitimacy needs to be examined more systematically in relation to power, and how these concepts intersect regarding discrimination against vulnerable groups and the privileged position of some interest groups over others in the transnational arena (p. 90). This book has followed this suggestion, and the function, or lack of, conferences have for Indigenous peoples is notable in this regard. Looking at the interplay between Arctic rights-holders and emerging stakeholders, this book has drawn attention to a tendency of conferences to privilege and promote the voices of the elite—those with the most power, resources, and influence—over local communities and Indigenous peoples. Accordingly, northern residents who are most impacted by decisions about the region are not necessarily those who are best represented at conferences. Rather, it is those who are willing and able to pay for visibility and speaking time. Conferences are not accessible and inclusive for everyone, and financial and human resources often prevent Indigenous peoples from attending. Traveling is expensive in the Arctic, which introduces a challenge for communities or groups with limited resources, and those given the opportunity to participate are not necessarily representative for the whole community. These features of conferences relate to broader issues within governance systems such as transparency, accountability, legitimacy, and opportunities for equal participation and influence in transnational networks. The different ways of thinking around who, what, and partially how to govern the Arctic region is relevant to the question of whether conferences contribute to expanding the association of legitimate stakeholders in the Arctic. Within the debate concerning who to govern, Arctic state representatives argue that Arctic governance is historically, geographically, and legally bound by interactions between states with territory above the Arctic circle. Others challenge this view and argue for a greater role for non-Arctic states, sub-national entities, and non-state actors. These two opposing views have been shown to also concern participation in the dialogue about the state and future of the region taking place at conferences. As such, this element from the governance system has been transferred to the conference sphere and is also being upheld by these arenas. Arctic state sovereignty is

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particularly featured through the Arctic Frontiers, which gives precedence to the Arctic Eight. The Arctic Circle Assembly is at the opposite side, and the open door policy that aims to provide a democratic platform for all stakeholders benefits non-Arctic states and non-state actors. In summary, the motivations for attending conferences are as manifold as the array of organizations and actors present, and most participants attend the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly with an aspiration to advance their interests. While conferences are created and upheld in the interests of states, they at the same time contribute to building a sense of community among a broader range of actors and facilitate interactions among the growing actor network in the region. The conferences analyzed in this book are arenas where non-Arctic states can participate alongside the Arctic states, and where the state is not necessarily the primary unit. However prestigious in design, the fact that there is no membership to conferences contributes to a democratizing effect as more people can partake in discussions. This points to an interesting duality of conferences, as arenas that cater to state-centric and elitist models of politics, while at the same time open for mass involvement of new actors and participation of NGOs that can apply pressure on governments. Thus, in answering the question of whether an alternative form of Arctic governance will emerge from the inability of the status quo to satisfy expanding interests (Rossi, 2015), the role of conferences within this system points to an affirmative answer. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly contribute to broadening the collective of relevant stakeholders and thus shape the actor composition of the Arctic region. From this, conferences fulfill an important role in regional governance architecture and can be a model for cooperation for the broader international community.

7.3

The Agenda-Setting Function of Conferences

Chapter 5 examined the agenda-setting process at conferences through the multiple streams framework (MSF) developed by Kingdon (2011). The MSF gives insight into the dynamics of the three streams in the agenda-setting process, and the actors that populate these streams (Béland, 2016). The book has illustrated that conferences are advantageous arenas for problem definition by policy entrepreneurs. Conferences are opportunities for these actors to draw attention to issues that should be identified as problems. The policy stream is particularly evident at conferences, where alternatives, proposals, and solutions to the defined problems flow. Through an incremental process at conferences, the epistemic community and policy entrepreneurs can indirectly affect policy participants’ beliefs with regard to the causes of problems and preferred solutions. Within the political stream, interest-based coalition groups, transnational networks, and the media are central for agenda influencing at conferences. They can in the same way as policy entrepreneurs utilize conferences as windows of opportunities to draw attention toward their issues.

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The Agenda-Setting Function of Conferences

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The organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly have several shared agenda-setting ambitions. First, both conferences strive to draw international attention and participants from different nationalities and sectors. Second, both conferences aim to draw attention to and support the national economic and geopolitical interests of Norway and Iceland. Third, the organizers seek to contribute to balancing the debate and correct misperceptions about the Arctic, which is also in the interest of the Arctic states and inhabitants. Chapter 5 provided two examples of agenda-setting efforts by the conference organizers, it cast light on how conference activities can be linked to the three streams of the multiple streams framework and demonstrated that issues promoted through conferences can be elevated on the agenda in other processes. The Arctic Frontiers has promoted issues related to the Arctic Ocean and ocean governance since its establishment. This is a key priority of the Norwegian government, who seeks to promote Norway as a world-leading ocean state in the forefront of marine research and responsible management of marine resources through the emphasis on historical traditions and the importance of shipping and fisheries for the Norwegian industry (Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, 2017). These efforts have been supported through the Arctic Frontiers. The emphasis on the oceans over the span of several years is an example of “agenda nudging,” and how conferences can contribute to an issue remaining salient on the agenda. The agenda-setting efforts of the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers were supported by policy entrepreneurs in the Norwegian government and other Norwegian institutions and organizations working on ocean-related issues. These efforts were also aided by events in the political stream and developments on the international arena, such as the adaptation of the UN Agenda for Sustainable Development and the turn to the blue-green economy. Thus, the agenda-setting process through the Arctic Frontiers was favorable due to the “coupling of the streams,” which opened a window of opportunity for the organizers. The Arctic Circle organizations advances both the interests of Iceland and of central allies (e.g., Alaska and Asian states) through the Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports. The identified problem was increased shipping activity that gave rise to economic challenges and safety and security concerns in the Arctic. The proposed solution came from a coalition of policy entrepreneurs from different positions and nationalities with a shared belief of how Arctic shipping should be governed. These policy entrepreneurs were successful at lobbying national legislation in the United States (resulting in the SEAL-Act), and at attracting the attention of states interested in Arctic shipping and ports development. The endeavors of the organizers and partners of the Arctic Circle were aided by windows of opportunity provided from international developments, specifically the drafting and implementing of the International Maritme Organization’s Polar Code and the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Report. Conference organizers can contribute to defining issues and elevating them on the agenda, and conferences can be utilized by policy entrepreneurs to advance issues within national processes and to catalyze international collaboration. There is also evidence to support how conference participation is a means to successfully promote

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issues and make them pertinent in other forums or processes. One example was provided from the state of Alaska, where Senator Murkowski is working to attract the attention of the federal government toward Arctic living conditions and how other states are developing their northern region. At the same time, the organizers of the Arctic Frontiers and the Arctic Circle Assembly are not the main agenda-setters in the region. Nor are conferences sufficient platforms for participants who seek to promote their issues to salience. When looking at how the agenda on Arctic issues is set, one must therefore also take in consideration the multitude of other arrangements within the regime complex, specifically the Arctic Council and its individual member states. Conferences can nonetheless contribute to the agenda-setting process, as advantageous arenas for actors to reach a broader audience with their message, and for the Arctic community to formulate and assess new ideas and deliberate alternatives to emerging challenges. This book has therefore revealed both the contributions and the shortcomings of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly as agenda-setting instruments. One limiting factor is how most governmental representatives attend conferences primarily to promote their own interests and priorities, and often leave the conference shortly after their own speech. Related, there is no authoritative agency associated with conferences, which means that the agenda-setting impact of conferences is dependent on the will of actors to oblige to soft-law, norms, and agreed-upon rules of conduct. To that end, there is need for strong advocacy coalitions and coordinated interest group campaigns, as well as media attention to push issues of importance from the conference stage and onto the broader agenda.

7.4

Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture

The architecture mechanism inquired into the broader governance structure in the Arctic, and the functions of conferences within this web of actors, entities, and arrangements. To set the stage for deliberating conferences in connection to geopolitics and global developments, Chap. 6 began by discussing Russia’s position in the region and relations to the other Arctic states. The cooperative spirit in the Arctic and how the region has been isolated from conflicts elsewhere such as the 2014 Ukraine crisis was explained from the concept of complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 2012; Byers, 2017). Neorealism and the neoliberal tradition of IR-theorizing share the assumption of the international system as characterized by anarchy, and states who seek to secure their own survival are considered the main actors within this system. Yet, interstate relations in the Arctic substantiates the neoliberal view of how the web of interdependence among states can contribute to overcome the anarchic selfhelp system, as economic values also matter alongside or above security and selfassertion (Jervis, 1999). Evidence of complex interdependence in the Arctic are

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Conferences Within the Arctic Governance Architecture

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found in relation to issues areas such as transboundary fisheries, search and rescue, shipping safety, and navigation (Byers, 2017). Accordingly, supported in regime theory and contributing to the literature on regime complexes, a central finding of this book is that conferences are salient forums for dialogue and interaction in the Arctic, which are distanced from tensions in other processes of international affairs. By contributing to information sharing and trust building among engaged actors, conferences play a role in maintaining the Arctic as a zone of peace. Nonetheless, forces of globalization also introduce an interesting tension to the Arctic governance system: the economic interests of outsiders clashing with the strategic sovereignty concerns of Arctic states. The Arctic and the global agenda have merged regarding political economy and the effects of climate change, and thus, Arctic issues have developed a global dimension (Young, 2019). The involvement of non-Arctic states can therefore prove central for diplomatic relations, and balanced social and economic development in the region. From this, the political implications of economic interests in the Arctic open a space for conferences, which are central arenas for the inclusion and involvement of new stakeholders in constructive discussions. Conferences were further shown to mirror developments and power structures within the Arctic governance regime complex and to provide actors an opportunity to exercise influence in a globalized world. To that point, the workings of Mr. Grímsson through the Arctic Circle organization influence Arctic affairs and international cooperation beyond the annual Assembly in Reykjavik. One example is the way in which the organization has expanded globally through the Arctic Circle Forums since 2015. Another example is the substantial outreach of the organization during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the launch of three new Mission Councils, the Arctic Circle Virtual, the Arctic Circle Journal, and a podcast. The second main issue discussed in Chap. 6 was the limitations of the Arctic Council. While the Arctic Council is an important piece of the Arctic governance regime complex, it is not sufficient to incorporate all relevant agenda items and to include the span of actors that are now seeking engagement in the region. The Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly can constructively be considered supplements to the Arctic Council. First, with regard to expanding the agenda and providing arenas for discussions of security and military issues. Second, through providing the observers to the Arctic Council a platform for constructive engagement in regional affairs. Turning to the question of how the Arctic governance architecture can develop to incorporate emerging issues and interested stakeholders, this book has examined and presented the spread of elements comprising the regime complex and outlined the need for coordination among these arrangements. In approaching the main challenges of the Arctic governance structure—of managing the growing number of agenda issues and arrangements and balance the interests and activities of newcomers with those of sovereign Arctic rights-holders—interaction through conferences is a viable solution. Conferences draw attention toward salient issues, and from the necessity of involving non-Arctic states, institutions, organizations, and

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civil society groups in deliberating the region’s future, there is a space for conferences to fill within the Arctic governance architecture. Lastly, the marketplace function of the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly is also important when situating these arenas within Arctic governance. The competitive element between the conferences contributes to both being necessary arenas within the Arctic regime complex. The main function of the Arctic Frontiers is preserving science and research collaboration and aiming to connect science with policy to promote knowledge-based decision-making. This is necessary for maintaining collaboration and stability. The Arctic Circle organization aims to combine local and global perspectives by interpreting the global Arctic as a new geopolitical context, and to situate Arctic issues within the global context. Moreover, the organizers seek to promote open discussion among relevant stakeholders and to advance policy-relevant research. From this, the function of the Arctic Circle Assembly is equally important for maintaining stability and for driving developments forward in the region. The way in which Mr. Grímsson contributes to connecting central actors and facilitating the engagement of newcomers and smaller states also supports the argument that the effect of conferences goes beyond just being meeting places. This book has cast light on the purposefulness of conferences within the broader Arctic governance landscape. Conferences add to the soft-law dimension of Arctic governance by providing the opportunity for dialogue and cooperation. As such, conferences can be considered innovative instruments that can catalyze unrealized common interests and increased cooperation. These international gatherings should therefore be taken seriously both by states and by scholars who are interested in the range of devices available for states and other actors within the international system. Conferences also function as tools of statecraft for sovereign Arctic states, who can utilize these arenas to assert their dominance, advance their interests, and control the discourse. The weight attributed to conference engagement by state representatives signifies that these arenas are considered purposeful for the advancement of national interests and priories, and to exert influence and power within a territory or issue area. Lastly, the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly also produce unintended consequences in that they function as legitimization tools for non-Arctic states to advance their claims as stakeholders and legitimate participants in the region—which may or may not be in the interests of the Arctic states.

7.5

Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Research

The number and scope of conferences attending to Arctic issues have expanded along with the Arctic acquiring an increasingly central role in global affairs. Yet, the insight into the functions of conferences within Arctic governance has been limited, and these arenas have been neglected elements within the literature on Arctic governance and International Relations scholarship. Accordingly, by analyzing actor relations and the agenda-setting process at conferences, and by positioning

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Concluding Remarks and Areas for Further Research

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conferences within the Arctic regime complex, this book has provided a deeper understanding of an under-examined phenomenon. Issues such as the future of Arctic governance, geopolitical developments, and the capabilities of existing governance arrangements have been analyzed in relation to the outcomes of conferences. From this, the book has positioned conferences as valuable elements in what has been described as a fragmented governance architecture, as arenas for promoting salient agenda issues, and to include multiple voices and perspectives. The findings presented in this book indicate that conferences are more than networking arenas and meeting places. Through the examination of how conferences operate in the intersection between sovereign states and cooperative arrangements in the Arctic governance architecture, the analysis has attested to conferences being arenas that blur the line between governance and dialogue. The analysis has also supported the notion that conferences can function as parallel arenas for discussions to official diplomatic channels. Conferences are platforms for government officials to promote their interests in a favorable light, and the premise that conferences contribute to reinforce and reaffirm state-centric constellations of global power relations holds validity. At the same time, conferences contribute to challenging the state-centric view of international relations by being arenas for a variety of other actors to pursue their interests, advance their position, and increase their influence and power. The argument put forward is not that the same rights and privileges that northerners and Indigenous peoples hold in the region should be given to outsiders, but that it is necessary for non-Arctic states and non-state actors to be included in the dialogue. To that end, the book has indicated how the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly are arenas for balancing the interests and sovereignty concerns of Arctic state rights-holders with the interests of non-Arctic stakeholders. From this, conferences are a constructive supplement to formalized cooperative arrangements and can play a significant role in the future of the region as arenas for information sharing and cooperation. At the same time, the book has revealed how a potential pitfall of conferences is that they can advantage the loudest voices and privileged interest coalitions over marginalized or vulnerable groups. Conferences are not decision-making arenas, but it is still necessary to be aware of their shortcomings regarding issues of accountability and representation. While some conclusions are specific to the two cases, others are can be transferred to other realms of international relations. Thus, conferences can advantageously be included in the analysis of international relations, as arenas in the intersection of state and non-state and official and unofficial diplomacy. This book has also sought to contribute not only to the Arctic governance literature and IR analysis but also to the literature on global conferencing through a novel theoretical framework for analyzing conferences. Applying neorealism to the Arctic conference sphere allowed for inquiring into whether conferences are created and maintained to serve the interests of sovereign states, and to cast light on how conferences are advantageous arenas for states to realize their ambitions and priorities. The book has moreover discussed the different ways in which conferences are valuable arenas for the performance of global governance and diplomacy.

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The multiple streams framework, which is commonly used for studies of national governments, also proved feasible for the examination of conferences. While it has been shown that conferences are not the main agenda-setting arenas in the region, they can still contribute to relevant processes for agenda change. In particular, the significance of policy entrepreneurs for regional development was underscored. Conferences can usefully be considered windows of opportunities for these actors, and as arenas for strengthening transnational relationships, promoting arrangements and international agreements, and for the linking of issue areas. From this, the book has broadened the application of existing frameworks and concepts, by signifying how conferences should be added to the analysis of international relations and considered as a third avenue for influence alongside the workings of states and institutions. This is significant when examining the actions and leeway of smaller states or non-state actors in the system. The Arctic has been described as a geopolitical playing field, and great powers’ interests and ambitions in the Arctic are rising. Accordingly, the traditional geopolitical understanding of the Arctic is increasingly superseded by the view of the global Arctic. Still, the Arctic has thus far been shielded from spillover from conflicts elsewhere. Regime theory proposes that the explanation for how states can cooperate effectively under conditions of interactive decision-making without a political authority is the formation of institutional arrangements, sets of roles, rules, and relationships. Conferences have been shown to facilitate international cooperation in the regional governance architecture, characterized by complex interdependence. They are one of multiple transnational channels connecting various entities, and where states are not the only engaged units. Conferences contribute to making cooperation more likely, by establishing connections that otherwise would not have been developed. They also contribute to norm-setting, to clarify roles and relationships, and to establishing expectations of behavior, despite the lack of an overarching authority within the Arctic regime complex. In closing, it is worth visiting some areas for further research. First, this comparative case study has cast light on two similar yet in many ways different conferences, and the spaces these gatherings occupy within the Arctic governance structure. To elaborate on this inquiry, a larger-N analysis would be compelling and could result in interesting research. One could differentiate between hybrid conferences, as those in this book, and science, policy, and/or business arenas. This could result in more information about the impacts of conferences, and which type of conference is most likely to have broader effects. Another area for further research, which would be highly compelling, is to obtain the participation lists from the Arctic Frontiers and Arctic Circle Assembly for a period of several years and do a network analysis of people attending these arenas. What is their nationality, affiliation, and how are they connected to in other ways than through the conferences? This would provide for interesting insight into power structures in the region and the role of conferences for network building among influential actors, which this book has not expanded on. It would also be a means to further trace the broader outcomes of conferences, through initiatives and projects conducted by participants outside of the conference.

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The narrative of the Arctic and the significance of conferences for developing a regional identity is something this book has left unexamined. However, conferences are clearly arenas for the unfolding of different stories and competing truths. It would be interesting to pursue this by conducting a narrative analysis of conference programs, speeches, and the expressions of organizers and participants in the context of governmental documents and foreign policy perspectives. Building on the agendasetting findings presented in this book, it would cast more light on how actors utilize conferences for positioning on the international arena, and to shape others’ realities and perceptions, through constructing and promoting narratives that reflect their aims and values. Lastly, following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, conference research should further inquire into the effects of digitalization and the implications of conferences going viral for their functions and outcomes. When conferences are held online, what are the implications of their function as meeting places for initiating new contacts, for the conduct of side meetings, arenas to reduce barriers to cooperation, and to balance the debate?

References Béland, D. (2016). Kingdon reconsidered: Ideas, interests and institutions in comparative policy analysis. Journal of Comparative Political Analysis, 18(3), 228–242. Byers, M. (2017). Crises and international cooperation: An Arctic case study. International Relations, 31(4), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117817735680 Jervis, R. (1999). Realism, neoliberalism and cooperation. Understanding the debate. International Security, 24(1), 42–63. https://doi.org/10.1162/016228899560040 Kalfagianni, A., Partzsch, L., & Widerberg, O. (2020). Transnational institutions and networks. In F. Biermann & R. E. Kim (Eds.), Architectures of earth system governance. Institutional complexity and structural transformation (pp. 75–96). Cambridge University Press. Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (2012). Power and interdependence (4th ed.). Little Brown. Kingdon, J. W. (2011). Agendas, alternatives, and public policies (2nd ed.). Pearson Education. Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries. (2017). New growth, proud history. The Norwegian government’s ocean strategy. Retrieved August 12, 2022, from https://www. regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/the-norwegian-governments-oceanstrategy/id2552610 Rossi, C. R. (2015). The club within the club: The challenge of a soft law framework in a global Arctic context. Polar Journal, 5(1), 8–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/2154896X.2015.1025490 Young, O. R. (2019). Is it time for a reset in arctic governance? Sustainability, 11(4497), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.3390/su11164497

Index

A Actor composition, 79, 158 Actor mechanism, 154 Agenda-setting, 6, 93, 94, 107, 122, 158, 160 Agenda-setting process, 118 Architecture mechanism, 160 Arctic, 1 Arctic agenda, 107 Arctic capital, 33, 132, 139 Arctic Circle, 115 Arctic Circle Assembly, 9, 37, 111, 153 Arctic Circle Forums, 42–43, 116 Arctic conferences, 2, 8 Arctic conference sphere, 24–26 Arctic Council, 33, 39, 67, 133–140, 161 Arctic Council agreements, 69 Arctic Economic Council (AEC), 72, 95, 141 Arctic Five, 69–70 Arctic Frontiers, 9, 28–37, 108, 114, 152 Arctic governance, 5, 22, 55 Arctic governance architecture, 74, 133, 145, 151 Arctic hub, 44, 131 Arctic Ocean, 32, 109, 159 Arctic regime complex, 22, 140 Arctic Science Ministerial (ASM), 73, 143 Arctic state representatives, 154 Arctic states, 56 Arctic state sovereignty, 157

B Barents cooperation, 71 Business representatives, 94, 95

C Canada, 59 Case study, 7 China, 38, 59, 63, 129 Climate change, 89 Competitive space, 146 Complex interdependence, 58, 128, 146 Conference programs, 10 Country sessions, 47

D Democratic platform, 37, 46, 50, 89 Democratizing, 27, 146, 158 Denmark, 61 Diplomacy, 143 Diplomatic tracks, 84 Document analysis, 10

E Earth System Governance (ESG), 22 Economic interests, 129 Elitist character, 36, 100, 101 Epistemic community, 91, 118, 123, 156 European Union (EU), 64, 114

F Faroe Islands, 45 Finland, 61 France, 64

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 B. Steinveg, Arctic Governance Through Conferencing, Frontiers in International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-23332-6

167

168 G Geopolitical, 45, 49, 132, 133, 145 Geopolitical interests, 40 Geopolitics, 126–133 Germany, 65 Global conferencing, 2, 4 Global dimension, 131 Global governance, 23 Global interest, 113 Globalization, 161 Global order, 126 Global platform, 115, 137 Governance, 21 Governance architectures, 22 Government leadership, 27 Greenland, 45, 130

I Iceland, 60 Icelandic government, 38, 44, 112 Ideal model, 26–28, 35, 91, 102, 104, 107, 115, 152 Ilulissat Declaration, 70 Indigenous peoples, 61, 99, 157 Information channels, 98 Innovative instruments, 4, 17, 26, 80, 91, 94, 103, 143, 162 Institutions, 97 Interest groups, 119 Interests, 18, 102 International arenas, 113 International attention, 49 International institutions, 17 International interest, 1 International relations, 2, 151 Interviews, 9

J Japan, 63

L Legitimacy, 18, 85, 86, 103, 156 Local and regional representatives, 101

M Marketing function, 96 Marketplace, 47, 162 Marketplaces for ideas, 122 Mechanisms, 152 Media, 120

Index Mission Council on Arctic Shipping and Ports, 110, 159 Multiple streams framework (MSF), 19, 108

N National interests, 44, 81 Near-Arctic state, 59, 62, 85 Neorealism, 4, 16 Neorealist, 80, 130 Networking, 92 Non-Arctic, 89 Non-Arctic states, 46, 62, 84, 131, 155 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 66, 97 Nordic cooperation, 71 Norway, 60 Norwegian government, 28, 33, 34, 109, 110, 141 Norwegian interests, 139

O Observers, 39, 67, 136 Ocean, 109 Open Arctic, 30, 35, 101

P Participant observation, 10 Participants, 31, 41 Participation fee, 41 Partners, 31, 42 Pillars, 29 Polar Code, 142 Polar Silk Road, 63 Policy entrepreneurs, 19, 117 Policy stream, 19, 117–119 Political games, 49 Political order, 82 Political stream, 19, 119–122 Power, 18, 93 Problem stream, 19, 112–117

R Regime complex, 125 Regime complexes, 22 Regimes, 22 Regime theory, 20, 125 Republic of Korea, 62 Responsibility, 82 Responsible stakeholders, 83, 90, 147 Russia, 56, 127

Index S Scotland, 65, 87, 88 Second dimension of power, 119, 123 Security, 134, 135 Seminars Abroad, 32, 109 Singapore, 62 Social media, 139 Sovereignty, 82 Spill-over, 128 States, 16 Sweden, 61 Switzerland, 87

T Tools of statecraft, 4, 17, 81, 90, 98, 103, 105, 112, 114, 155, 162

169 U Unintended consequences, 156 United Kingdom, 65 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 69 United States, 1, 58

W West-Nordic cooperation, 44 Window of opportunity, 20, 24, 122

Z Zone of peace, 56, 81, 128, 146, 161