Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa [1st ed.] 978-3-030-16821-6;978-3-030-16822-3

Table of contents :
Front Matter ....Pages i-x
Introduction (Brian Chama)....Pages 1-17
Front Matter ....Pages 19-19
Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Zambia (Brian Chama)....Pages 21-37
Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Angola (Brian Chama)....Pages 39-54
Front Matter ....Pages 55-55
Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Algeria (Brian Chama)....Pages 57-73
Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Morocco (Brian Chama)....Pages 75-90
Front Matter ....Pages 91-91
Tabloid Journalism Against Corruption in Ghana (Brian Chama)....Pages 93-108
Nigerian Tabloid Journalism and Corruption Practices (Brian Chama)....Pages 109-125
Front Matter ....Pages 127-127
Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Uganda (Brian Chama)....Pages 129-145
Tabloid Journalism and Anti-corruption Crusade in Kenya (Brian Chama)....Pages 147-163
Front Matter ....Pages 165-165
Anti-corruption Tabloids in Democratic Republic of Congo (Brian Chama)....Pages 167-182
Corruption and Tabloid Journalism in Cameroon (Brian Chama)....Pages 183-197
The Final Word (Brian Chama)....Pages 199-208
Back Matter ....Pages 209-219

Citation preview

Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa Brian Chama

Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa

Brian Chama

Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa

Brian Chama The Sheridan Institute of Technology and Advanced Learning Mississauga, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-030-16821-6 ISBN 978-3-030-16822-3  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: Sean Gladwell/Getty images Cover design by eStudioCalamar This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgements

This book was first discussed with Cecil Nsambila Mbolela who works for America Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Graeme Mutantabowa, the Principal Budget Officer at African Development Bank in Cote D’Ivoire. I also discussed this book with Mwamba Peni, the Public Policy Specialist in the Presidency at Cabinet Office, Lusaka, Zambia. The idea for this book was to investigate how far sensational tabloid journalism in Africa can go to hold abusers of public finances to account. I am also particularly grateful to Heloise Harding, the Editorial Assistant—Journalism, Media and Communication, at Palgrave Macmillan, Macmillan Publishers for having been very supportive and helpful in having this work getting published. I am also grateful for the support of many tabloid journalists I have had the opportunity to meet around the African continent currently working with tabloid newspapers in Africa. I further extend my special thanks to Bruce Mutsvairo who is an Associate Professor at the University of Technology Sydney’s School of Communication, Australia, for his regular support. Besides, I would also like to thank Professor Anita Biressi and Professor Heather Nunn at the University of Roehampton, in the UK for inputs on global tabloid journalism practice. I am grateful for Mwansa Yaasika Chama and Afua Ofosu—Appiah for supporting this book project.

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Contents

1 Introduction 1 Tabloid Journalism Practice 2 Situating Tabloid Journalism 4 Investigative Tabloid Journalism 6 Corruption and Tabloids 8 Corruption Stories and Agenda Setting 10 Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa: Outline 12 Bibliography 15 Part I  2

Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Zambia 21 Anti-corruption Tabloids 22 Copper Shipment 24 Slash Fund 26 Zamtel 28 Political Patronage 30 Corruption Impunity 33 Conclusion 35 Bibliography 36

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Contents

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Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Angola 39 Corruption in Angola 40 Isabel dos Santos 41 Angolagate 44 Gustavo Costa 47 Rafael Marques de Morais 48 Conclusion 52 Bibliography 53

Part II  4

Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Algeria 57 Corruption in Government Institutions 58 Struggles of Tabloids 60 El Watan 63 East-West Highway 65 Sonatrach 67 Conclusion 70 Bibliography 71

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Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Morocco 75 Tabloid Journalism in Morocco 76 Patronage and Nepotism 78 Corruption in Government Institutions 81 King Mohammed VI and the Royal Family 83 Harassments of Tabloids 86 Conclusion 88 Bibliography 89

Part III  6

Tabloid Journalism Against Corruption in Ghana 93 Phenomenon of Corruption 94 Anti-corruption Tabloids 97 Scancem 99

Contents   

United Bank of Africa Conclusion Bibliography 7

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102 106 107

Nigerian Tabloid Journalism and Corruption Practices 109 Corruption in Nigeria 110 Anti-corruption Tabloids 112 Lamido Sanusi 115 BMW Scandal 119 Conclusion 122 Bibliography 123

Part IV  8

Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Uganda 129 Corruption in Uganda 130 Corruption in the First Family 132 Anti-corruption Tabloids 134 Global Funds Diversion 137 Red Pepper Tabloid 140 Conclusion 142 Bibliography 143

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Tabloid Journalism and Anti-corruption Crusade in Kenya 147 Anti-corruption Tabloids 148 Corruption and Bribery 150 Goldenberg 153 Anglo Leasing 155 Triton Oil 158 Conclusion 160 Bibliography 161

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Contents

Part V  10 Anti-corruption Tabloids in Democratic Republic of Congo 167 Corruption in Government Institutions 168 Tabloid Journalism and Corruption 171 Kabila Regimes 175 Glencore 177 Conclusion 180 Bibliography 181 11 Corruption and Tabloid Journalism in Cameroon 183 Corruption in Cameroon 184 Anti-corruption Tabloids 186 Albatross Affair 190 SNH Scandal 193 Conclusion 195 Bibliography 196 12 The Final Word 199 Anti-corruption Tabloids in Africa 200 Lessons for Africa 202 Back to the Future 204 Conclusion 207 Bibliography 207 Author Index 209 Subject Index 213 Anti-corruption Tabloid Newspapers in Africa Index 217 African Countries Index 219

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The goal of this book is to use Africa’s case studies to gain a clear understanding of the evolution of anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and derive insights into the relationship between the anti-corruption actions of the state, and the anti-corruption reporting by the tabloids and tabloid journalists focusing on major corruption scandals. Basically, a tabloid newspaper is traditionally a half the size of a broadsheet newspaper. However, in recent years, tabloids now encompass content dominated by screaming headlines, sensational pictures, and sensational stories. In fact, the origin of tabloids is very dubious and it is very difficult to point out the actual date in time when tabloid newspapers emerged. For instance, Biressi and Nunn (2008) note that they refer not only to changing formats in shifting historical contexts, but also to values and attitudes attached to these format. For example, Wasserman (2008) points out that the tabloids in South Africa peddle sensationalism and articulate politics of everyday lives of readers who seem to live on the periphery of society. It is this articulation of the politics of everyday lives that has contributed to the popularity of tabloid newspapers in Africa. Furthermore, in the comparative study of tabloids and quality newspapers in Kenya, Ongowo (2011) notes that tabloids use salacious and sensational news accompanied by colourful pictures which are attractive to people with limited reading abilities. Similarly, a study by Opolot (2005: 33) explains that the fact that the tabloids in Uganda continue to attract readers is a clear testimony that people love them and it is the main reason why many readers actually buy them regularly and find them useful. © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_1

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2  B. CHAMA

However, debates continue to emerge on how far tabloids in Africa can go in exposing corruption and hold those who abuse public resources to account. For instance, Phiri (2008: 13) while discussing the evolution of anti-corruption journalism in Africa looking at lessons from Zambia explains that tabloids have now taken the muckraking model in exposing corruption by breaking corruption scandals and producing reports that bring unethical behaviour to public attention. Besides, Paletz (1996) notes that the muckraking model drawn from the history of American journalism exhibits great promise in providing a framework that captures what is now going on in anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa. The idea behind the muckraking model is simple, as the imagery implies that the muckrakers, who are generally investigative tabloid journalists, now unearth and expose corruption through their tabloids. Indeed, this book provides evidence of the successes and struggles of anti-corruption tabloid journalism practice in Africa. It goes at length by looking at different countries and analysing the role of tabloids in exposing corruption and the actions of the states and government agencies entrusted with the role of fighting corruption.

Tabloid Journalism Practice The practice of tabloid journalism continues to attract scholarly debates. Many arguments are centred on the quality of information and style of writing often provided by the tabloids in comparison with traditional broadsheets. Since this book is on anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and uses the continent’s cases to derive insights into the relationship between the anti-corruption actions of the state, and the anti-corruption reporting by the tabloids, it is very important to discuss the field of tabloid journalism as a practice and also look at relevant scholarly debates. It is vital to note that tabloid journalism generally focuses on human interest stories with heavy in pictures and short stories that are graphically told. The term ‘tabloidization’ is associated with news content that focus on scandals (Bird, 1992). It is these content which attract critics to view tabloids as a form of journalism which is a complete departure from what is traditionally seen as the role of journalism which is to provide information vital for the readers to make informed decisions (Esser, 1999).

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Furthermore, tabloids are often criticized for being sensational with news stories. It is this attachment to sensationalism of every news content by tabloids which has led to accusations that these newspapers play with readers’ emotions (Sparks, 2000). Moreover, Bird (1992) notes that apart from using emotive language, there remains confusion on what exactly constitute the key contents in tabloids and that it is a basically a news medium in which every thing goes to attract readers’ attention. Despite the sustained criticism of tabloids, other scholars have come to their defence arguing that they are relevant in human affairs. For instance, Ongowo (2011) explains that readers buy tabloids because they find them useful to their lives and are proud to read them in the streets, in the public transport, and even in the living rooms. It is because tabloids provide content which they cannot access from other news media. Similarly, Wasserman (2008: 2–7) argues that tabloids continue to enjoy popularity because they communicate ‘politics of everyday’ especially for readers who feel far more removed from formal politics through their daily lived experiences. It is within this context that tabloids can be read and seen as containing a political message even though not in the same way associated with public sphere of official media. Furthermore, Fiske (1989) notes that tabloids provide very important escape routes from the news content which is often dominated by the elites and especially the politicians with their failed promises and policies. In fact, tabloids have the ability through their sensational language to question the dominant social standards. In addition, tabloids are able to offer an index of extent of dissatisfactions in society especially among those who feel powerless to change their current situations. Moreover, Johansson (2007) argues that the practice of journalism is not merely about transmitting information on public issues to help the citizens gain knowledge to arrive at responsible judgements. It is this wrong view of journalism practice which has contributed to unfairly treating tabloids as insignificance side of news. Instead of generally regarding journalism as exclusively to convey information, there is need to engage in cultural discourses and acknowledge that people can connect with news through many ways. Moreover, the relationship between journalism and society is more complex than merely the transmitting of dry information (Johansson, 2007: 440).

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Situating Tabloid Journalism This book uses Africa’s cases to understand the evolution of the anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and to gain insights into the relationship between the anti-corruption actions of the state, and the anti-corruption reporting by the tabloids and the tabloid journalists. Therefore, it is very important to situate the tabloid journalism practice within the African context. The practice of tabloid journalism in Africa is very unique. This is largely because of various limitations often placed on press freedom in many countries. In fact, many tabloids that tend to adopt the Western view of tabloid journalism practice usually ends up having a limited life span. This is because such tabloids often face many cultural, legal, financial, and political problems. However, this does not mean that there are no success stories of tabloids becoming popular and attracting massive readership. For example, Opolot (2005: 33) argues that tabloids have been in and out of Uganda for quite a while. However, it was not until 2002 that tabloid journalism took on a different meaning. In fact, up until then, each entrant had come with puff and pomp but often never lived to see its first anniversary. However, the Red Pepper tabloid newspaper has managed to shame the prophets who predicted its doom from the day it was registered in the country in 2002. Its longevity has been due to its raunchy and sensational stories in a country that has been dominated by ‘serious’ newspapers that kept away from sensational in favour of ‘serious’ content. This is not because they did not believe that the tabloid approach would bring new readers and an extra dollar, it was more the media law and the cultural environment that dictated their content. Similarly, Ongowo (2011: 22) citing the tabloid Weekly Citizen explains that since its inception in 1997 in Nairobi Kenya, its owners and journalists have worked to grow its circulation. It often dwells mainly on sensational stories of Kenya and concentrates on publishing stories on corruption scandals taking place in private and public. For example, it concentrates on stories touching on politicians and very often breaks and publishes stories which are later picked up by the so-called quality newspapers. Moreover, the tabloid has since established itself as a voice of the ordinary people.

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Furthermore, Wasserman (2008: 1) explains that the tabloids in South Africa have enjoyed unprecedented popularity with the Daily Sun now the biggest newspaper in the country, with around four million readers. It was established as a colourful downmarket publication by Deon du Plessis. ln 2000, the first copy of the tabloid was printed, and within three years, the circulation was close to 500,000. It has since become known for attention-grabbing headlines and pictures, with sales which have kept rising becoming the best-selling and widest read daily newspaper in sub-Saharan Africa. Basically, tabloids in many African countries are generally known for hard-hitting headlines. It is within this context that that they play an important role in the curbing of corruption using sensational headlines on corruption to pressure government to act in the public interest. Tabloids headlines also draw the attention to behaviours that are generally perceived as unacceptable and raise public awareness (Phiri, 2008). However, access to information is a major challenge faced by many tabloids in Africa which is at the heart of transparency and public accountability. The lack of access to information makes it hard for tabloids to hold public officials accountable. For example, the notorious ‘Official Secret Acts’ in many African countries limit tabloids access to information on grounds of national security. Moreover, the government in many countries has the discretion to define what constitutes national security and often abused by political leaders to prevent tabloids that venture to expose corruption. Besides, to silence tabloids that dare to expose corruption, criminal defamation, libel, and sedition are used and justified as necessary to safeguard national security. These laws limit tabloids freedom in accessing and publishing information (Nogara, 2009). Furthermore, the government in many African countries often exercise considerable control and usually put pressure on critical tabloids. For example, in countries where the state is the main source of advertising, critical tabloids are sometimes deprived of advertising revenues. Moreover, the fear of being put in jail, the threat of expensive libel suits, the risk of the licence being revoked, and even the loss of advertising revenue and other financial resources, all impose a burden on tabloid journalists and their newspapers, encouraging a culture of silence (Eigen, 1999).

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Investigative Tabloid Journalism Since this book is on the evolution of anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and the relationship between the anti-corruption actions of the state, and the anti-corruption reporting by the tabloids, it is therefore critical and important to explore what actually encompasses investigative tabloid journalism and investigative tabloid journalists. Investigative tabloid journalism is generally a style of journalism that goes beyond the usual coverage of news and seeks to unearth hidden information behind the news and expose the malpractices. Basically, this form of journalism exposes actions that have the power to injure society and uses sensational language accompanied by sensational pictures to expose wrongdoing (Ongowo, 2011). Investigative tabloid journalists go beyond routine reporting to bring to light clandestine schemes calculated to benefit the plotters and to disadvantage the great majority (Kantumoya, 2004). For instance, Horrie (2008) explains that investigative tabloid journalism starts after a suspicion of wrongdoing. Then, rather than simply reporting in a more passive way, tabloids go deeper to expose the truth and realities behind the news stories. It is important to acknowledge that although this brand of tabloid journalism is still relatively new and undeveloped in many countries in Africa, it is fast gaining recognition as a valuable tool for monitoring public accountability using sensational news reports. Basically, investigative tabloid journalism involves not simply casting the light on a subject, but making a more prosecutorial case that something is actually wrong. Generally, this type of tabloid journalism often results in official public investigations about the subject and activity being exposed. Similarly, de Burgh (2000) argues that in most occasions, it results in legislation that outlaw certain forms of wrongdoing. However, Kantumoya (2004) notes that this type of reporting requires tabloid journalists having an entrenched culture of hard-nosed muckraking journalism. Unfortunately, many tabloids have no existing frame of reference to serve as a guide when it comes to undertaking this kind of enterprise. Furthermore, reporters usually grope in the dark and learn the nuts and bolts of the trade by trial and error in the field. It is this situation that leads to reporting half-baked stories, and quite often, with serious legal consequences for the tabloid newspapers (Kantumoya, 2004).

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On the other hand, tabloids that engage investigation genre often focus on common wrongs that include personal scandals, financial wrongdoing, corruption, and enrichment in public office. Furthermore, the best investigative tabloid journalists do not only expose individuals, but also the systemic failures that contribute to wrongdoing (Coronel, 2010). Moreover, such reporters are able to show how individual wrongs are part of a larger pattern of negligence and abuse, and the systems that make these patterns and failures possible. Furthermore, they are able to examine what went wrong and show who suffered from the mistakes. These talented tabloid journalists are able to probe not just what is criminal and illegal, but also what may be legal but nonetheless harmful and are also able to start the debate and even provoke political action over some issue that might be officially closed or not publicly known (Horrie, 2008). Similarly, Ongowo (2011) argues that investigative tabloid journalism has evolved into three forms; original investigative tabloid journalism reporting, interpretative investigative tabloid journalism reporting, and reporting on investigations by investigative tabloid journalists. Original investigative tabloid journalism reporting involves tactics similar to the ones used by the police of uncovering information never before gathered by others in order to inform the public of events and circumstances that might affect their lives. Interpretative investigative tabloid journalism reporting involves careful analysis of ‘facts’ to provide deeper public understanding. Reporting on investigations develops from the discovery of information and can be even from the leak that is obtained from an official investigation underway (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). The nature of investigative tabloid journalists to comfort the afflicted and afflict the comfortable with often sensational exposure often puts the reporters in conflict with the power elites, the rich, and even the corrupt who seek to conceal the information. For example, de Burgh (2000) points out that there are times where the flow of information is suppressed by the power elites, and investigators sometimes have to use tactics such as hiding their identity and invasion of privacy. Sometimes it can also involve buying of information from the whistle-blowers so as to expose wrongdoing (Ongowo, 2011). Despite the challenges facing investigative tabloid journalism in Africa especially with regard to often serious gaps in the quality of the reports, and usually lack depth and accuracy of facts (Mbeke, 2010), on the other hand, Kiai (2010) explains that this new form of tabloid journalism reporting has emerged because of the growing public disgust with

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corruption in many countries in Africa. For example, there is evidence in many countries, of the continued rise of corruption cases being investigated, not only by law enforcement agencies, but also being reported by the tabloid newspapers. Henceforth, the tabloid journalists continue to play a very important role in the fight against graft in public offices and misdemeanour in society (Ongowo, 2011).

Corruption and Tabloids The African countries with functioning states often express a strong desire to curb corruption and to work with stakeholders including the media. However, studies that examine exactly how far tabloids influence the decisions of public actors in Africa’s anti-corruption agenda are still very few (Chama, 2017). Besides, there is generally an agreement in the studies, that tabloids play a significant role in anti-corruption campaigns (Phiri, 2008). It is important to stress that tabloids reports often give legitimacy to anti-corruption fight. For example, when citizens read in the tabloids that the official bodies entrusted to deal with corruption are actually preventing corruption before it occurs and that, when it is reported, they investigate and prosecute the culprits, this stirs a feeling among the readers that these entities are doing their work. But tabloids are only able to do this if indeed the anti-corruption agencies are doing their work (Stapenhurst, 2000). Generally, there is a direct correlation between corruption and the mediocre performance of many public services and business enterprises in Africa. Moreover, the African Union which is a continental organization consisting of 55 countries on the African continent is also concerned with the negative effects of corruption and impact on political and economic stability of Africa. It has even adopted an anti-corruption convention since 2003. It is for this reason that corruption is a big story in Africa and tabloids are able to play a major role in fighting the scourge (Phiri, 2008). Therefore, in African countries with proper functioning bodies and freedom of the press, the apparatus and organizations fighting corruption cannot succeed effectively and efficiently without the power of the media as partners. Indeed, tabloids are an important partner in combating corruption and exposing inefficiency. In fact, tabloids are crucial players in the combat against graft and are able to play a crucial role in fighting corruption by producing reports that bring unethical behaviour

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to public attention using sensational language accompanied by sensational pictures. Tabloid news because of its sensational nature is an important motivation for official bodies charged with investigating and prosecuting corrupt acts to act and often prompt the resignation of public officials (Anassi, 2005). The sensational reporting by tabloids often leads to public debate and heighten the sense of accountability. In fact, there are many examples across the continent in this book in which tabloids have been aggressive in exposing corruption which has led to arrests and even the prosecutions of the corrupt officials. The most spectacular among them is when corrupt public office holders are prosecuted and even forced to resign after their misdeeds are exposed to public light (Stapenhurst, 2000). Moreover, there is also evidence in countries covered in this book to show that the hard-hitting sensational news on corruption by tabloids can very often provide the initial seed that can prompt the official bodies to launch their formal investigations. Even though at times, the official anti-corruption bodies might be reluctant to investigate because of conflict of interests for example, or maybe either because they are incompetent and lack the capacity to investigate and prosecute, but the persistent sensational reporting has the power to force them to take actions. This often happens when the general public become aware of the regular and persistent reporting and start to question their leaders’ commitment to the fight against corruption (Phiri, 2008). Arguably, in many countries in Africa, there exists a culture tolerance for corruption and when individuals and official office holders find an opportunity to have access to public funds, there is a belief that bettering their economic situation is important, and sometimes this happens at the expense of corrupt means. Moreover, there is also a cultural acceptance of corruption, even at times admiration, and envy of corrupt individuals. It is within this context that tabloids create an awareness of the corrosive effects of corruption on the economic and political well-being of the country. Furthermore, tabloids exposure of corruption through sensational naming and shaming can actually lead to attitude change beginning from cognitive level to induced behavioural change (Stapenhurst, 2000: 2). Moreover, tabloids with more resources are actually able to undertake solid investigations that force state actors to take early actions. However, it is important to acknowledge that anti-corruption tabloid journalism is a high calling. In pursuing and fighting corruption, tabloids themselves face strong possibility of being caught up in scandals. For example, in

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many African countries, the so-called brown envelop journalism which is the accepting of financial benefits for certain actions is the corruption destroying the image of journalism profession in general. It is also deepening the cynicism about journalists and making them part of the problem. Therefore, it is vital for tabloid journalists who investigate corruption to have an ethical obligation to their readers who expect them to be honesty as they demand it from others (Phiri, 2008).

Corruption Stories and Agenda Setting Anti-corruption tabloids’ hard-hitting front-page headlines with sensational pictures can have effective reactions from readers and can set the agenda which can lead to agencies that fight corruption to react and force those involved in corruption to either resign or be forced out of their positions. In fact, there is a relationship between government’s anti-corruption campaign and anti-corruption tabloid journalism. This is because, tabloids can influence public opinion and decision-making of public officials (Ayodele, 2012). For instance, the agenda setting in the anti-corruption tabloid journalism practice generally describes the ability of the tabloids to influence important topics on the public agenda. That is, if a news item is covered frequently and prominently, the readers will regard the issue as more important. For example, when tabloids engage in relentless corruption exposure with regular screaming headlines and sensational pictures on the evils of corruption, and how it is destroying the country and making many people suffer, the readers start to view the issue of corruption as very important, and this helps them to consider it as more important than any other issue (McCombs, 2005). In fact, agenda setting can create public opinion and awareness that corruption fight is an important issue by tabloids. It can lead to tabloids influencing ideas of readers and establishing that the corruption fight is not only a major issue, but a very important daily news item that affect all citizens. The two basic assumptions that can help in setting the agenda when it comes to anti-corruption tabloid journalism are that: the tabloids can filter and shape perception of corruption reality; tabloids by concentrating on anti-corruption fight and corruption exposure can lead to the public to perceive corruption as an important subject which require attention (Rogers & Dearing, 1988).

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Generally, the more frequently and prominently the tabloids are able to cover an issue of corruption fight, the more instances of that issue becoming accessible in readers’ memories. It is in this regard that when the tabloids readers are asked about the most important problem facing the country; are likely to answer with the most accessible news in memory, which is typically issue tabloids focus on the most. The agenda-setting effect in anti-corruption tabloid journalism is not about the result of receiving one or a few anti-corruption tabloid news items, but is due to the aggregate impact of a very large number of corruption messages, each of which have a different content but all of which deal with the same general issue (Iyengar, 1990). The tabloids coverage in general can have a very powerful impact on what readers think about corruption and its exposure. The readers can allocate more importance to issues of corruption if extensively covered by tabloids. For instance, if tabloids are able to cover stories of corruption regularly, and run impactful headlines and sensational pictures, readers start to realize the importance of the subject. Moreover, the very nature of tabloids format which operates on big colourful pictures can attract attention. Furthermore, the continuous exposure of corruption stories to the readers can lead to awareness among readers to see the news as the most important issue facing the country. This is because the tabloids are able to put corruption coverage at the centre of their stories and treat news item on corruption as more prominent (Noelle-Neumann, 1977). The ability of tabloids to predetermine what issues to give prominent importance provides an edge to fight corruption. For example, Folarin (2002) explains that agenda setting does not ascribe to tabloids the power of determining what readers actually think, but does ascribe to the power to determine what readers are thinking about. Therefore, the fight against corruption by tabloids can be effective through increased frequency of reportage of corruption activities in the country. For instance, by giving prominence to corruption activities through headlines display, pictures, and layout in newspapers, tabloids can go a long way in reducing financial mismanagement and bribery in the country. Moreover, if the public officials come to the realization that that their corrupt activities will be given a lot of publicity, they are likely to rethink their action before engaging in corruption and financial mismanagement (Ayodele, 2012).

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Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa: Outline This book is on anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa. It uses the continent’s case studies that uncover corruption and the role of watchdog journalism. It explores and analyses the emerging patterns and lessons for the future. For example, Woldeamanuel (2012) while looking at perceptions of Ethiopian journalists notes that watchdog journalism basically involves activities of journalism genres that monitors the daily activities of the public institutions in order to help the people assess their performance. It is for this reason that African journalists generally believe that they have a responsibility to serve the general public by watchdogging over the government. Moreover, watchdog journalists also believe that the government holds a lot of power which has the capacity to affect the lives of the ordinary citizens and thus needs to be monitored and activities exposed. The overall perception is that watchdog journalism’s aim in Africa is to check the abuses of leaders who hold a lot power and enjoy massive wealth. Its genre involves exposing not only their wrongdoing and how that could be redressed, but also hold them to account for the immoral and often illegal activities. Besides, Kasoma (2000) while looking at the press in multiparty politics in Africa explains that watchdog role of the press in Africa involves the press’s duty to promote transparency, accountability, and good governance by revealing to the public things that the government is doing or not doing, and which deserve public attention. Moreover, the press has the responsibility to make sure that it is able to explain government activities and actions, or even the lack of it, to the people clearly and coherently. In addition, the press has the responsibility to inform the masses about any abuse of power by the ruling authorities. However, the press needs to be a constructive critic to the government and not be an enemy. It should help the government and its leadership to pay attention to the welfare of the general public. Indeed, the watchdog of the press involves helping the government to work in the best interest of the people and not to inflict injury on the government and its political leaders. But watchdog journalism should not be a free rein, it should be accompanied by observing professional responsibilities. Similarly, Karikari (2007) in discussing African media since Ghana’s independence explains that generally watchdog journalism can help to put a check and balance on government institutions and its leadership, monitor the misuse and abuse of power, guard the public interest, and

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generally contribute in nurturing democracy. Moreover, watchdog journalism basically involves the press vigorously and daringly reporting on issues of national concern that captures the attention of the readers, and at times stands at loggerheads with the government. Besides, the press by their watchdog role are able to identify wrongdoing in public service delivery and expose corruption and abuse of power. It is therefore of vital importance for the press to be efficient and professional in order to satisfy the public and discharge their watchdog role. While looking at corruption clean-up in Africa, Mbaku (2008) explains that watchdog journalism involves educating the general public about corruption and its negative effects on development. It also gives the citizens the ability to determine the behaviour considered corrupt and to report individuals involved in corruption to relevant authorities for further action. Indeed, watchdog journalism plays an important role in cleaning up the corruption through investigation and exposure of embezzlement, which also paves way for the law enforcement agencies to gather more information needed in order to prosecute the wrongdoing and bring about accountability. Furthermore, watchdog journalism is critical in the exposure of corruption in Africa partly because there exists widespread corruption in almost every area of governance and leadership. Even though the common argument is that the low salaries among the public service employees are the major reason for massive corruption and looting, even those in good paying positions are also regularly implicated in corruption and embezzlement. In fact, the higher paid employees actually tend to ask for high bribery charges to get things done and tend to use their positions as opportunities to make money quickly and easily. Moreover, Agbo (2017) provides a critic of the influence of the watchdog role of the press in Nigeria noting that it involves investigating ‘facts behind the facts’ particularly in governance and political leaders. It is meant to hold leaders accountable and responsible to the people. Its role is to check on government activities and warn the public when officials are doing something wrong. It is about informing citizens about the errors and wrongdoings by the government and hold its officials accountable. Basically, watchdog journalism is important in many African countries whose legislature and judiciary seem to have neglected their oversight functions. Indeed, the press are often left as the only check against the abuse of power and corruption, with a view to bring about transparency and accountability, through the monitoring of the actions of the government, and informing the masses about what their leaders are doing in secrecy.

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Indeed, this book is structured in twelve chapters of five parts offering case studies from 10 African countries using the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index as a guide. In every part, there is one heavily corrupt and one fairly corrupt country at the centre of the discussion. Generally, in global comparison, majority of African countries ranks poorly on Transparency International Corruption Perception Index. Part I presents one English and one Portuguese-speaking country from Southern Africa, Part II presents two Arabic-speaking countries from North Africa, Part III presents two English-speaking countries from West Africa, Part IV presents two English-speaking countries from East Africa, and Part V presents two French-speaking countries from Central Africa. This book’s opening chapter offers an introduction to anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa. Chapter 2 is on anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Zambia focusing on the copper shipment scandal, the slash fund scandal, the Zamtel scandal, the culture of political patronage, and the culture of corruption impunity. Chapter 3 looks at tabloid journalism and corruption in Angola focusing on Isabel dos Santos, the Angolagate, the Gustavo Costa and the Rafael Marques de Morais corruption investigations. Chapter 4 is on anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Algeria discussing El Watan, East-West Highway and Sonatrach scandal. Chapter 5 is on tabloid journalism and corruption in Morocco looking at King Mohammed VI and royal family. Chapter 6 looks at anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Ghana focusing at Scancem and United Bank of Africa scandals. Chapter 7 explores the Nigerian tabloid journalism and corruption practices looking at Sanusi Lamido and BMW scandals. Chapter 8 discusses tabloid journalism and corruption in Uganda looking at the first family, the Global Funds scandal, and the Red Pepper. Chapter 9 looks at tabloid journalism and anti-corruption crusade in Kenya discussing the Goldenberg, Anglo Leasing, and Triton Oil scandals. Chapter 10 is on anti-corruption tabloids in the Democratic Republic of Congo looking at Kabila regimes and Glencore mining scandal. Chapter 11 is on corruption and tabloid journalism in Cameroon focusing on Albatross affair and the SNH scandals. Chapter 12 provides the final word reflecting on anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and looking to the future.

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Bibliography Agbo, B. (2017). Influence of the new media on the watchdog role of the press in Nigeria. Retrieved from https://eujournal.org/index.php/esj/article/ viewFile/8715/8328. Annasi, P. (2005). Corruption in Africa: The Kenyan experience. Victoria: Trafford Publishing. Ayodele, E. (2012). Media and anti-corruption crusade in Nigeria. Retrieved from https://odinakadotnet.wordpress.com/tag/agenda-setting-theory/. Berger, G. (2004). Headline—Grabbing tabloids: Are they journalism? Retrieved from http://mg.co.za/article/2004-12-08-headlinegrabbingtabloids-are-they-journalism. Bird, S. E. (1992). For enquiring minds: A cultural study of supermarket tabloids. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. Biressi, A., & Nunn, H. (2008). The tabloid culture reader. Berkshire: Open University Press. Chama, B. (2015). Tabloid media and philosophical discourses surrounding right to privacy and press freedom. International Journal of Media & Cultural Politics, 1(11), 105–111. Chama, B. (2017). Tabloid journalism in Africa. London: Palgrave. Connell, I. (1998). Mistaken identities: Tabloid and broadsheet news discourse. Javnost: The Public, 5(3), 11–31. Coronel, S. (2010). Corruption and the watchdog role of the news media. In P. Norris (Ed.), Public sentinel: News media and governance reform (pp. 111–137). Washington: World Bank. de Burgh, H. (2000). Investigative journalism: Context and practice. London: Routledge. DeFleur, M., & Dennis, E. (1994). Understanding mass communication: A liberal arts perspective. Houghton Mifflin: Princeton. Eigen, P. (1999). The media and the fight against corruption. San Juan: Transparency International. Esser, F. (1999). ‘Tabloidization’ of new: A comparative analysis of AngloAmerican and German press journalism. European Journal of Communication, 14(3), 291–324. Fiske, J. (1989). Understanding popular culture. Boston: Unwyn Hyman. Folarin, B. (2002). Theory of mass communication: An introduction text. Abeokuta: Link Publications. Horrie, C. (2008). Investigative journalism and English law. In H. de Burgh (Ed.), Investigative journalism (pp. 114–129). London: Routledge. Iyengar, S. (1990). The accessibility bias in politics: Television news and public opinion. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 2, 1–15.

16  B. CHAMA Johansson, S. (2007). Reading tabloids: Tabloid newspapers and their readers. Stockholm: Sodertons. Kantumoya, L. (2004). Investigatory reporting in Zambia: A practitioner’s handbook. Retrieved from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/sambia/50013.pdf. Karikari, K. (2007). African media since Ghana’s independence. Retrieved from www.highwayafrica.com/images/50years.pdf. Kasoma, F. (2000). The press and multiparty politics in Africa. Retrieved from http://www.acta.uta.fi./pdf/951-44-4968-1.pdf. Kiai, M. (2010). The media in Kenya: A human rights context. In C. Mwita & L. Franceschi (Eds.), Media and the common good: Perspectives on media, democracy and responsibility (pp. 103–110). Nairobi: Law Africa Publishing. Kovach, B., & Rosenstiel, T. (2007). The elements of journalism: What newspeople should know and the public should expect. New York: Three Rivers Press. Mbaku, J. (2008). Corruption clean ups in Africa. Retrieved from https://www. researchgate.net/publication/240728089_Corruption_Cleanups_in_Africa_ Lessons_From_Public_Choice_Theory. Mbeke, P. (2010). Mass media in Kenya: Systems and practice. Nairobi: JomoKenyatta Foundation. McCombs, M. (2005). A look at agenda-setting: Past, present and future. Journalism Studies, 6(4), 543–557. Noelle-Neumann, E. (1977). Turbulences in the climate of opinion: Methodological applications of the spiral of silence theory. Public Opinion Quarterly, 41(2), 143–158. Nogara, M. (2009). Role of media in curbing corruption: The case of Uganda under President Yoweri K. Museveni during the “no-party” system. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2009/wp72_2009.pdf. Ongowo, J. O. (2011). Ethics of investigative journalism: A study of a tabloid and a quality newspaper in Kenya. Retrieved from http://www.media.leeds.ac.uk/ files/2011/12/Jim-Ongowo.pdf. Opolot, B. (2005). Red and raunchy. Retrieve from http://www.rjr.ru.ac.za/ rjrpdf/rjr_no25/Red_and_raunchy.pdf. Örnebring, H., & Jönsson, A. M. (2008). Tabloid journalism and the public sphere: A historical perspective on tabloid journalism. In A. Biressi & H. Nunn (Eds.), The tabloid culture reader (pp. 23–33). Maidenhead: Open University Press. Paletz, R. (1996). Political research: Approaches, studies and assessments. Norwood, NJ: Alex Publishing Cooperation. Phiri, I. (2008). Evolution of anti-corruption journalism in Africa-lessons from Zambia. Global Media Journal—African Edition, 2(1), 15–31.

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Rhodes, T., & Derrick, C. (2011). Murder in remote Kenya reverberates across nation, world. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-thepress-in-2011-a-killing-and-a-cover.php#more. Rogers, E., & Dearing, J. (1988). Agenda-setting research: Where has it been, where is it going? Communication Yearbook, 11, 555–594. Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999). Corruption and governance: Causes, consequences and reform. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Spark, D. (1999). Investigative reporting: A study in technique. Oxford: Focal Press. Sparks, C. (2000). The panic over tabloid news. In C. Sparks & J. Tulloch (Eds.), Tabloid tales: Global debate over media standards (pp. 1–40). Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield. Stapenhurst, R. (2000). The media’s role in curbing corruption. New York: World Bank Institute. Wasserman, H. (2008). Telling stories: South African tabloids and post-apartheid politics. Retrieved from http://www.eprints.lse.ac.uk/21584/1/ WassermanLSE30paper(LSEROversion).pdf. Woldeamanuel, B. (2012). The watchdog role of journalism: A study of the perception of Ethiopian journalists. Retrieved from http://etd.aau.edu. et/bitstream/handle/123456789/3696/Befrdu%20Woldeamanuel. pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y.

Part I

CHAPTER 2

Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Zambia

There exists widespread corruption in Zambia largely because of a weak institutional framework. For example, the judiciary, the police officers, and the government procurement are always accused of corruption by tabloid newspapers and civil society organizations. In addition, international trade is impeded by pervasive corruption and crime in customs. Furthermore, companies regularly pay kickbacks and bribes in the tendering process for government contracts. Even though the Anti-Corruption Act prohibits corruption, extortion, bribery, abuse of office, and money laundering, the country’s legislation actually does not address facilitation payments and the maximum allowable value of gifts and hospitality is not clearly regulated. Moreover, the enforcement of the anti-corruption legislation is lacking (GAN Integrity, 2017). Besides, anti-corruption tabloid journalists operate in an environment designed to shut them down. Linked it this, is the reality that repressive media laws exist that continue to hang over journalists’ work. Moreover, there is also a widespread culture of silence in many government institutions and fear of those in positions of authority who often issue threats to potential whistle-blowers. Tabloid journalists that expose corruption are regularly exposed to threats of arrest and imprisonment meant to limit their work on corruption activities of those in power. There also exists a belief among many politicians that political leadership is ‘an easy route to riches’. Basically, working as an anti-corruption tabloid journalist takes extraordinary courage—the kind that is underpinned by a deep caring © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_2

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for the plight of the powerless. For instance, the 2017 Transparency International Corruption Index ranks Zambia at 87 out of 176 countries and gives the country a score of 38 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2017). This chapter looks at corruption in Zambia focusing on the copper shipment scandal, the slush fund scandal, the Zamtel scandal, the culture of political patronage, and the culture of corruption impunity. It concludes that exposing corruption in Zambia by tabloid newspapers is generally a serious risk that often and regularly results not only in arrests and imprisonment, but in the closure of the tabloid newspapers.

Anti-corruption Tabloids Anti-corruption tabloid news coverage in Zambia can best be understood by looking at the various periods of leadership and presidencies since the country became independent from the British colonial rule in 1964. For instance, anti-corruption tabloid news during the reign of President Kenneth Kaunda who ruled the Southern African state from independence in 1964 until 1991 was very subtle. Just after independence, the country for the first 10 years enjoyed relative prosperity, thanks to copper exports. In these early years, public leaders were expected to work within an ethical regime called a ‘Leadership Code’ that forbade illegal wealth acquisition. For example, Lungu (1986) explains that from 1964 to the early 1970s, leadership was ‘strongly against corruption’. The tabloid newspapers in the early years after independence were largely owned by the private sector. There were several instances in which tabloids sensational exposure of corruption prompted government to act to rectify the scandals. For example, the Commission of Inquiry into corruption at the Zambia Railways in 1977, the Commission of Inquiry into corruption at the University of Zambia in 1981, and the Commission of Inquiry into corruption at National Provident Fund in 1984 were all appointed after sensational tabloid coverage. In addition to sensational news coverage, the tabloids also employed political satire as a form of criticism (Chama, 2012). For example, tabloids used satire to pose direct corruption questions and comments on corrupt practices of the day. For instance, it was sensational satire that prompted the government to introduce measures in early 1980 to clamp down on illegal Mandrax deals in which top

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government officials were involved. Of course, it is difficult to attribute government actions entirely to tabloids, but these seemed to carry a lot of weight on policy makers who were part of the growing critical tradition in the country (Hall, 1984). The corruption scandals started to emerge rapidly in the 1980s with sensational tabloid stories of missing public funds and unexplained acquisition of personal wealth. Besides, the country’s economy also started to collapse which put a squeeze on the population causing greater temptation for public officials to abuse public resources they had exclusive access to. The situation became so serious that the government introduced legislation against ‘corrupt practices’ in parliament such as the Corrupt Practices Act No. 14 which was passed in 1982 leading also to the creation of the Anti-Corruption Commission which was mandated to combat graft. However, it was toothless as its director general was a presidential appointee and reported directly to the head of state. It remained generally ineffective and the instances of corruption among public officials continued to increase somewhat unabated (Phiri, 2008). Besides, many tabloids that were registered in the 1980s and that took a hard line in exposing corruption often failed miserably and had a short lifespan. For example, the Sunday Post which commenced on 31 August 1982, published only for a few months before it was forced to close. The same day its first 12-page edition came out; it showed early signs of trouble. The second edition was forced to reduce its size to eight pages because of ‘powerful forces’ which withdrew the newsprint from Printpak, the printers of the tabloid in Ndola. Its last edition was dated 16 January 1983 and never said goodbye to its regular readers. The tabloid despite having a circulation of 10,000 copies weekly, lasted for only 12 weekly editions (Mungonge, 2007). Generally, there exist colonial laws in the country that hinder tabloids freedom such as the Penal Code, the State Security Act, the Public Order Act, and the Emergency Powers Act. Tabloids are often caught in a web of unfriendly media laws. Linked to this is the fact that the management of public finance is itself shrouded in secrecy. The fact that the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee can sometimes hold its hearings ‘in-camera’ suggests that the government is not ready to ‘wash dirty linen in public’. Therefore, anti-corruption news coverage is more about what elites do, rather than about what citizens say about those elites (Banda, 2007: 2–4).

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Copper Shipment The copper shipment scandal was revealed by tabloid journalist Jowie Mwinga whose investigative reporting exposed how the country was swindled millions of dollars that involved the shipment of copper abroad by top-ranking government officials. The copper was traded by the staterun Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines. The copper revenue swindling took place over the period of several years as early as 1981. The Metal Marketing Corporation, a government organization was a major player in the transactions that involved copper shipments through South Africa’s Marcol, a ‘briefcase company’ set up by officials to inflate freight charges on shipments (Mwinga, 1991). The Metal Marketing Corporation used Marcol as an irregular broker on all copper shipments. The proceeds from the scam were deposited in a Brussels-based Bank in Belgium. Marcol was contracted to handle shipments of over US$1 million tonnes over five years. Senior public officials were heavily connected in this corruption racket and were paying inflated freight charges for copper exports to Marcol, their joint company which was based in Johannesburg, South Africa. The joint company made at least US$20 million over the years and was holding an average of 250,000 tonnes of copper annually. The proceeds from the copper scam were shared among government officials in Zambia and in South Africa through an account in Belgium (Chama, 2017). Besides, Sea-Cargo, a company formed jointly with Metal Marketing Corporation, was given absolute power by government to place cargos outside the conference line arrangement with whatever ship-over operator or broker it chose (Mwinga, 1991). The firm used its absolute discretion to appoint Marcol to subcontract the shipment of millions of tonnes of copper. In the shipment racket, whenever shipment of copper was required, Sea-Cargo requested Marcol to provide freight and a vessel. Marcol then floated shipment to other brokers and ship operators to find a vessel and offer a rate. One example of dubious dealings exposed by the tabloid journalist was between Sea-Cargo and Marcol which involved the shipment in May 1987 of 9004 tonnes of copper in which Metal Marketing Corporation paid US$11.68 dollars more per tonne to Marcol than the standard rate. The tabloid journalist who exposed the scandal claimed to have talked to some insiders who questioned the reasons behind hiring Marcol arguing it reflected either a lack of shipping expertise or ‘a conspiracy to steal’.

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It was further noted that insiders revealed that the efforts to break the arrangement with Marcol which was neither a ship-over nor a ship operator were resisted by officials (Chama, 2017). In the copper shipment scandal, irregularities in shipping arrangements were first detected by officials connected to East Africa shipping conference who informed government. The government then launched an investigation in 1985, and several officials were linked to the scam. The tabloid journalist claimed to have contacted a public relations official in the police who confirmed investigation but could not provide details. However, it was further reported that the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines officials were not willing to offer more information. It was further claimed that the tabloid spoke to two former employees of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines who were living in London, in the UK at a time, and who argued were fired for objecting to the inflated charges by Marcol for copper shipment. The journalist further argued that the former employees were willing to assist with investigations in the shipment scandal provided they were given indemnity by government (Mwinga, 1991). After the exposure, a parliamentary row developed. Some members of parliament further provided additional details to the scandal arguing that it was widely known since 1987. For example, Kabwata Member of Parliament Michael Sata disclosed that the mines were swindled more than US$40 million. It was further revealed that the government authorities refused a British firm to audit accounts of the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines arguing that it was capable of doing its own business affairs. It was also noted that the government officials who resisted Marcol arrangement were either fired or transferred. It further noted that the initial source of information came from the transaction that involved copper transportation in a ship named ‘Al Razak’ from Tanzania to the USA totalling more than US$113,000 in which the Metal Marketing Corporation was charged US$56.88 instead of US$38.95 per tonne of copper shipment. In other deals, the Metal Marketing Corporation lost more than US$107,000 in copper shipment from Tanzania to Japan on a ship named ‘Conman’ and more than US$137,000 on a ship named ‘Trout Banik’ (Chama, 2017). The Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines and Metal Marketing Corporation threatened legal actions against The Post tabloid arguing that it fabricated the information accusing it of sensationalism and speculations. For example, Prime Minister Malimba Masheke denied the

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allegations and gave copper shipment figures from 1987 to 1991 in parliament. However, Kabwata Member of Parliament Michael Sata revealed details and names of officials who were involved and noted that some were already fired, the news that the police also later confirmed to the tabloid (Mwinga, 1991). The copper shipment story opened a ‘Pandora Box’ of corrupt activities which resulted in arrests and imprisonment of ruling government officials. The tabloid journalist Jowie Mwinga who scooped the story shed more light on the ‘dark world’ of corrupt government officials in a scandal that was transnational in nature (Chama, 2017).

Slash Fund The slush fund scandal involved the dishing out of money by President Frederick Chiluba’s regime, the second President of Zambia from 1991 to 2002. Chiluba’s political style was fuelled by ‘brown envelopes’ popularly known as ‘slush fund’. An editorial from The Post tabloid titled ‘Cheap demagogy’ on 22 September 2006 illustrates this graphically indicating how vanity and buying of political support intermingled noting that everything with Chiluba started and ended with money. The Church was corrupted with cash handouts. Some pastors hired themselves out to him simply because of money. Chiluba himself once said that he was making cash payments to buy his way to heaven and set a despicable culture of theft that is today extremely difficult to remove. Chiluba prided himself for bribing people and is on record of having said that there is nothing wrong with ‘brown envelopes’ at the time his government was struggling to fund public services, but there was always money in the ‘brown envelopes’ (Van Donge, 2008). The slush fund was not only a predatory plundering of the country’s resources, but was also basically designed to buy votes, favours, and popularity. President Frederick Chiluba’s political approach was characterized by a clientelist form of governance in which supporters obtained access to state resources and to public office. Chiluba and mostly his small inner circle shared the money mainly from the donor aid which started flowing in the country just after 1991 in order to resuscitate the struggling economy which was in free fall. Moreover, there was also a culture of secrecy around the inner circle that had access to public funds and difficult to penetrate (Phiri, 2008).

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Tabloid headlines that tied the slush fund to corruption became a regular feature in the daily publications. For instance, in April 2000, The Post quoted Edith Nawakwi, a former Minister of Energy in President Frederick Chiluba’s government that he was involved with the disappearance of 763 tankers of petrol destined for Zambian National Oil Corporation and declared in the same article that he was a thief (Van Donge, 2008). The Post also implicated high-profile government officials in the Ministry of Finance for making slush funds available for the president to distribute. It exposed Stella Chibanda, the Director in the Department of Loans and Investment explaining how money was being stolen and channelled in two directions: in Zambia, it was first going to Access Financial Services Limited through Executive Directors Aaron Chungu and Faustin Kabwe. It was then routed to Zamtrop Account in London in the UK through the Director of Security Services Xavier Chungu who was making transactions on behalf of President Frederick Chiluba: The other channel was through Meer Care & Desai, a law firm in London in the UK, whose lawyers Iqbal Meer and Naynesh Desai were receiving million for their services. Zambian High Commissioner to the UK Atan Shansonga was alleged to be a pivotal person in the distribution of money sign-off to private individuals and companies (Chama, 2017). For instance, on 10 October 2004, The Post revealed that Industrial Equipment Limited registered in Zambia made payment to Access Financial Services Limited via Cave Malik and Company in London which was transferred to Irene Kabwe in New York, the wife of Faustin Kabwe, an Executive Director at Access Financial Services Limited under his instruction. It also revealed that Andrew Sardanis, a Zambian national of Greek Cypriot origin, was steering the looting process of public funds. He was profiting from the liberalization of the banking sector having set up in Zambia the Meridien BIAO Bank as part of an international merchant bank based in the Bahamas but controlled by a company in Luxemburg which collapsed in 1995 at great cost to Zambian taxpayers and depositors. It pointed out that Aaron Chungu and Faustin Kabwe worked for the bank, and that Iqbal Meer and Naynesh Desai were the bank’s lawyers in London. It also noted that Aaron Chungu was a relative of Xavier Chungu the Director of Security Services in the Zambia Intelligence Services (Van Donge, 2008).

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The Post on 29 March 2002 revealed that President Frederick Chiluba was using the Democratic Republic of Congo through his close family links to Katebe Katoto as a conduit route for corrupt financial transactions. Chiluba was alleged to have paid over US$20 million to Katoto for military equipment that was never delivered and maize that was bought by the Zambian government but diverted to finance his family member Katoto’s company Chani Fisheries. It pointed out that Katoto’s brother Moses Katumbi who lives in the resource-rich Katanga Province continued to provide shelter and receive deals from the inner circle of President Frederick Chiluba (Van Donge, 2008). After leaving office, President Frederick Chiluba fought many criminal charges. Among many cases and ruling, in 2007, the London civil court brought by Zambia’s Attorney General ruled by Justice Peter Smith of the High Court that Chiluba owed the Zambian people over US$57 million for expenditures from just one of the many secret Zambia Intelligence Agency bank accounts in London. The judge felt that the account was set up primarily to steal government money. In Zambia, his wife Regina Chiluba was sentenced to three and a half years in prison. However, Chiluba denied stealing public funds arguing that he had spent money donated in political campaigns by corporate interests and other well-wishers. The identity of these contributors he argued was a secret because of what he called ‘the golden rule of anonymity’ (Smith, 2009).

Zamtel The Zamtel corruption scandal took place during President Rupiah Banda’s reign from 2008 to 2011. On 6 February 2009, The Post revealed that President Banda’s son Henry Banda was involved in the fraudulent valuation and sale of the country’s public telecommunication company, Zamtel (Mzyece, 2009). It called for a tribunal to investigate the role played by the Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya in hiring RP Capital Partners Limited of Cayman Island to value Zamtel assets, noting that the Parliamentary and Ministerial Code of Conduct was breached (Katulwende, 2009). Following The Post revelations, President Rupiah Banda and Vice President George Kunda publicly defended the Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya threatening legal action against the tabloid while arguing that the minister was more intelligent than the tabloid in doing business. The officials noted that there was nothing wrong

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in engaging RP Capital Partners Limited. However, pressure mounted on the government when the tabloid exposed more revelations leading to the setting up of the Dennis Chirwa tribunal by Chief Justice Ernest Sakala on 2 March 2009. But still, the government argued that the tribunal would vindicate the minister (Kalaluka, 2009). On the contrary, the Dennis Chirwa tribunal (from 2 March 2009 to 16 April 2009) found that the engagement of RP Capital Partners Limited to value Zamtel assets before partial privatization was full of irregularities. For example, Article 54 sub-Article 3 of the Constitution was breached by the minister when RP Capital Partners Limited was selected by ignoring legal advice from the Attorney General concerning Memorandum of Understanding. Observance of the legal advice of the Attorney General was a ministerial requirement. Appointing valuators after Cabinet approval was too the responsibility of Zambia Development Agency. Irregularities in Memorandum of Understanding with RP Capital Partners Limited were found in which the minister committed the government to pay US$2 million as a valuation fee (Chanda, 2013). Following the tribunal findings, The Post criticized Vice President George Kunda’s reaction to the findings who maintained that the minister was innocent. Kunda was accused of being a liar when he argued that the Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya followed tender procedures as required by law. He was shamed by the tabloid for alleging that the minister followed the advice from the Solicitor General on behalf of the Attorney General who sanctioned the minister’s action (Katulwende, 2009). Furthermore, The Post reported that the Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya was applying for judicial review challenging the tribunal powers to invoke Constitutional provisions as a preserve of the High Court. The Lusaka High Court set 26 and 27 May 2009 as dates for the judicial review into the Denis Chirwa tribunal. After the judicial review, High Court Judge Phillip Musonda quashed the tribunal findings leading to the tabloid’s sustained sensational campaign with screaming headlines claiming that the judicial review was corrupt (Kalaluka, 2009). It was also critical of Judge Phillip Musonda’s arguments in quashing the findings of Supreme Court Judge Dennis Chirwa’s tribunal and accused the judge of being corrupt (Katulwende, 2009). The editorials in the tabloid were characterized by the allegations of corruption in the judiciary and questioned the credibility of many judgements. It kept pressure on the case of Zamtel leading to another tribunal

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which was later set up and chaired by Justice Minister Sebastian Zulu. The second tribunal made similar findings to that of Denis Chirwa of the Communications and Transport Minister Dora Siliya’s disregard for legal advice of the Attorney General’s chambers. It also exposed Siliya’s antics in chasing top government officials who resisted the valuation process and found that Vice President George Kunda’s law firm received financial kickbacks (Silwamba, 2013). It was further noted that RP Capital Partners Limited was connected to Henry Banda, the son of President Rupiah Banda, and there were clandestine collaborations with the Communication and Transport Minister Dora Siliya. It also revealed that RP Capital Partners Limited was single-sourced to valuate Zamtel and subsequently hired as transaction advisors for Zambia Development Agency (Chanda, 2013). The background to the valuation before the sale of Zamtel was that in 2008, the government under President Rupiah Banda made the decision to privatize Zamtel due to poor management. The Minister of Communication and Transport Dora Siliya contracted RP Capital Partners Limited of Cayman Island to value the assets. In June 2010, seventy-five per cent of shares in Zamtel were sold for US$257 million but the government only recovered US$15 million. The Post then exposed the Zamtel scandal arguing that it was fraudulently transacted implicating many politicians (Chanda, 2013).

Political Patronage There exists a culture of political patronage in the country in which the state resources are often used to reward individuals and groups for their electoral support. In many cases, the ruling president appoints people who have provided political support to the ruling party especially during its campaign. The appointments are very often corrupt and borders on favouritism. Moreover, at times, the party in power rewards groups, families, and ethnicities for their electoral support using illegal gifts, political appointments including government contracts without tendering (Chama, 2017). The culture of political patronage makes the fight against corruption difficult especially when the agencies that are supposed to partner in the fight against corruption get entangled in the political affairs. The situation becomes even more troubling when the tabloid journalists and owners of the tabloids join forces with the ruling elites as was the case during

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the reign of President Michael Sata from 23 September 2011 until his death on 28 October 2014. Shortly after coming to power, President Sata promised to clean the government institutions of deep-rooted corruption. He campaigned on the need to appoint individuals on merit to bring about efficiency in public service delivery. However, after coming into office, he couldn’t honour his campaign promises and went on to give political positions to the tabloid journalists who worked for The Post which supported his political views during the election campaign (Adam, 2012). Among those that received political appointments included tabloid journalist George Mwenya Chellah who became a Press Officer to the President at State House. Amos Malupenga became permanent secretary at the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Mutembo Nchito, a lawyer who often defended the tabloid, became Director of Public Prosecution. Musa Mwenye became the Solicitor General. Mumba Malila became Attorney General. Patrick Matibini became the Speaker of the National Assembly. Majority of First Secretaries in Zambia’s foreign embassies were also filled by the tabloid journalists. These appointments affected the fight against corruption in the ruling government by The Post as many corruption stories often went unreported. The tabloid’s editorial comments shifted drastically and became political in nature attacking opposition groups and concentrating on covering corruption in opposition political groups and those that were not in the ruling government. Even though the tabloid carried out a number of investigatory stories, few were connected to the ruling government. Moreover, it also commenced a sustained campaigned to discredit other tabloids in the country which became prolific in the fight against corruption in President Michael Sata’s government. Furthermore, opposition tabloids were subjected to crackdown (Amsterdam, 2012). The Post tabloid engaged in selective exposure of corruption in the ruling government as its President Michael Sata’s health continued to deteriorate. On 2 October 2012, it revealed through its tabloid journalist Mwala Kalaluka that the Minister of Defence Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba who was popularly known by his name initials as GBM abused his authority and solicited Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation for a contract to supply wooden poles for overhead electrification of households. It noted that the minister attempted to influence the awarding of the contracts to his companies for one year. It even published information that was obtained from the Patents and Companies Registration Agency listing his

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companies that included Arizona Marketing & Distribution whose contact bid price was more than US$7 million dollars. It also published the company registration document (Kalaluka, 2012). Further revealed by The Post were documents that were obtained from the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation with details of the contract to supply materials for one year with tendered companies that were connected to the minister’s family members Bwalya Chama and Mwamba Sibongile that included Premia Supplies Limited with bid price of US$330,000 and Astro Holdings with bid price of US$400,000. The documents exposed showed notification of award for the tender that indicated the preliminary contracts but clarified that there was right of appeal against the intention before the notice period expired on 19 September 2012. It maintained that the minister influenced the awarding of the contracts and produced details of physical pressure on the electricity supply utility management arguing that it contacted the minister who merely laughed off the allegations describing them as ‘nonsense’ (Kalaluka, 2012). The tabloid story was sensational in pictures and headlines. For example, on 23 October 2012, it published a front-page headline titled ‘Engilex denies links with GBM’, arguing that Engilex one of the six preliminary companies the Zambia Electricity Supply Corporation awarded contracts was distancing itself from the ‘corrupt defence minister’. The tabloid article was accompanied by the picture of Geoffrey Bwalya Mwamba standing next to his silver Mercedes Benz registration number GBM50 and challenged the Anti-Corruption Commission to inform the nation about the allegations. On 17 October 2012, the tabloid reported that the AntiCorruption Commission found sufficient grounds to start normal investigations including solicitation documents for the tender award. On 24 October 2012, it revealed that the contracts award was suspended and under investigation for suspicion of corruption (Kalaluka, 2012). The corruption exposure revealed double standards because it came at the time another Minister of Justice Wynter Kabimba, a close friend of The Post owner Fred M’membe was facing corruption allegation in the oil procurement in the country. However, the tabloid ignored the Wynter Kabimba scandal which was heavily covered in other tabloids but killed in The Post newspaper. It is not farfetched to conclude that political patronage can make the fight against corruption difficult and vindictive especially when the agencies such as tabloids which are supposed to be effective partners in the fight become entangled in political games (Chama, 2017).

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Corruption Impunity The fight against corruption in the country is very difficult especially when the culture of corruption impunity exists among political leaders and ruling authorities. Basically, corruption impunity exists overwhelmingly in almost all sectors of governance. There also exists a culture in which politicians who have accumulated millions of money through embezzlement and bribery are usually admired by many citizens (Van Donge, 2008). Even though over the years the country has experienced general looting and banditry by its previous rulers, during the reign of Presidency of Edgar Lungu who came into office on January 2015, the situation has worsened with agencies entrusted to fight corruption becoming crippled. Just after coming into office, he commenced a heavy crackdown on tabloids that expose corruption shutting them down. Lungu’s government has been characterized by front-page headlines of corruption and bribery. Talking about Lungu is talking about corruption as one of the tabloid Zambian Watchdog banned in the country and now operating ‘underground’ regularly argues (Dawood, 2016). For instance, in February 2017, Malawian Joint Committee of Parliament tasked to probe the maize scandal which made front-page tabloid news in Zambia revealed that Zambia’s Agriculture Minister Dora Siliya flouted legal procedures when she instructed her Permanent Secretary Julius Shawa to issue a maize export permit to Transglobe Export Produce Limited when the firm did not legally qualify (ChadantiMalunga, 2017). The tabloid News Diggers revealed that Transglobe Export Produce Limited did not qualify for an export permit because it was not a registered taxpayer in Zambia. It however fraudulently involved Malawian Minister of Agriculture George Chaponda to get it the business to supply 50,000 metric tonnes to Malawi. In this corrupt arrangement, the Minister of Agriculture in Malawi George Chaponda was aided by Zambia’s Agriculture Minister Dora Siliya who instructed her permanent secretary to issue a maize export permit illegally. After careful investigation, the Malawian President Peter Mutharika fired George Chaponda for his illegal involvement in the procurement of the maize from Zambia to benefit Transglobe. The Anti-Corruption Bureau who went to search the minister’s home in Lilongwe Malawi also found about US$58,000 in cash stashed inside the suitcases that were hidden in his bedroom (Mukosha, 2017).

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The scandal was heavily reported in neighbouring Malawi implicating Zambia’s Agriculture Minister Dora Siliya. However, the Zambian government did not bother to pursue the allegations. For example, the tabloids reported that George Chaponda, the Malawian Minister of Agriculture revealed in Malawi that he held meetings with President Edgar Lungu and Dora Siliya to facilitate the export of around 100,000 metric tons of maize from Zambia into Malawi at the cost of US$34 million. Siliya despite being at the centre of corruption allegation continued to operate with impunity (Lusaka Times, 2017). This was not the only incident the government of President Edgar Lungu has acted with impunity at whistle-blowers against corruption since coming to power. The tabloids in the country have relentlessly questioned his commitment to the fight against corruption with screaming headlines. The banned tabloid Zambian Watchdog (2016) has accused regularly President Lungu of being a thief with a criminal history arguing that his criminality dates back to September 2009, when the Zambia Legal Practitioners Committee proved in the Lusaka High Court that he stole US$30,000 from his client and widow Wendy Kanyanta. It regularly alleges that his personal finances have more than doubled since his presidency began from below US$10 million in 2015, to over US$50 million in merely 18 months. It has further accused the State House of being a den of thieves arguing that the country is being run by crooks and criminals drowning in corruption while masquerading as political leaders (Zambian Watchdog, 2016). Since President Edgar Lungu coming to power, exposing corruption by tabloid newspapers has become a very dangerous business venture. President Lungu has since closed many tabloid newspapers including The Post using the Zambia Revenue Authority to pounce on its over US$5 million tax in arrears with critics arguing that the moves are meant to silence critical voices towards his government (Reuters, 2016). However, the closure of The Post has attracted mixed reactions in the country since it was placed under compulsory liquidation by the Lusaka High Court which appointed Lewis Mosho of Lewis Nathan Advocates as provisional liquidator in respect of all the assets of the Post Newspapers Limited. It has since been revealed that the tabloid had a debt of over US$35 million. Over the years, its owner has expanded his business beyond news operations by investing in an airline, radio, television, telecom, courier, and trucking investments among other general

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businesses. The weight of this expansion landed it into bank loans and overdrafts. This resulted in failure to pay taxes and statutory fees. Even though over the years the Zambia Revenue Authority entered into numerous payment arrangements, on many occasions and times, these agreements were breached. The debt continued to balloon beyond its own marginal assets. The Post Newspaper Limited closure, some argue, was largely because of its own poor business practices and ambitious but irresponsible expansion ventures (Siame, 2016).

Conclusion The drive against corruption by the tabloids in Zambia is indeed a powerful tool. However, the exposure can only make a strong impact if the government law enforcement agencies and corruption investigation teams are able to pick up these stories and investigate further. Besides, there is also a need for political willpower to encourage corruption exposure. The problem, however, is that the political authorities are supposed to show this willpower to fight corruption and they themselves tend to be entangled in corrupt practices. Moreover, the tabloids which too are supposed to be partners in the fight against corruption sometimes also get entangled in political affairs with government authorities as well. A review of anti-corruption agencies in the country shows a lack of political commitment and a high level of political resistance that results in the ring fencing of corrupt practices and targeting low-level bribes (Phiri, 2008). Despite the various challenges facing the country, Banda (2007) advises that all journalists should take time to familiarise themselves with the existing government mechanisms for monitoring public finance and expenditure. For instance, the knowledge of the Public Finance Act is useful in investigative reporting. Moreover, the knowledge of the Zambia National Tender Board Act is also a vital tool. Besides, the Auditor General’s Annual Audits are a useful starting point for understanding patterns of expenditure. Even though it may be hard to understand accounting jargon, tabloid journalists can engage the services of experts to help analyse technical language. Journalists, for example, need to develop greater interaction with the civil society organizations that monitor public accountability such as the Transparency International, Parliamentary Oversight Committees, and the Anti-Corruption Commission.

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Bibliography Adam, P. (2012). MISA headquarters in Namibia backs Zambia’s online publications. Retrieved from http://zambiareports.com/2012/10/05/ misa-headquarters-in-namibia-backs-zambias-online-publications/. Amsterdam, R. (2012). Warning: Reading Fred M’membe’s Post is bad for your health. Retrieved from http://www.zambianwatchdog.com/2012/11/13/ warning-reading-fred-mmembes-post-is-bad-for-your-health/. Banda, F. (2007). The media in Zambia: Contributions to and challenges for greater public finance transparency and accountability to citizens. Retrieved from https://www.oecd.org/site/oecdgfd/39365076.pdf. Chadanti-Malunga, J. (2017). Final report of the joint parliamentary committee on agriculture. Retrieved from https://www.lusakatimes.com/wp-content/ uploads/2017/02/Final-Report-of-the-Joint-Parliamentary-Committee-onAgriculture.pdf. Chama, B. (2012). Satirical censorship in press practice in Zambia: A case of newspaper journalist Roy Clarke. Africa Today, 59, 2. Chama, B. (2017). Tabloid journalism in Africa. London: Palgrave. Chanda, E. (2013). Probe team warns, cautions Dora. Retrieved from http:// www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=30314. Dawood, S. (2016). Zambia’s president Lungu to be inaugurated next week. Retrieved from http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/zambias-presidentlungu-to-be-inaugurated-next-week-20160905. GAN Integrity. (2017). Zambia corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/zambia. Hall, R. (1984). Africa’s crucible, Zambia: The first twenty years. Observer Magazine, 13. Kalaluka, M. (2009). Judge Musonda clears Dora. Retrieved from http://maravi. blogspot.co.uk/2009/06/judge-musonda-clears-dora.html. Kalaluka, M. (2012). GBM solicits ZESCO poles contracts. Retrieved from http:// www.postzambia.com/post-read_article.php?articleId=29046. Katulwende, M. (2009). The Dora-Siliya tribunal presents its report. Retrieved from http://ukzambians.co.uk/home/2009/04/17/the-dorasiliya-tribunal-presents-its-report/. Lungu, F. (1986). The church, labour and the press in Zambia: The role of critical observers in a one-party state. African Affairs, 85(340), 385–410. Lusaka Times. (2017). President Lungu, Dora Siliya identified as the key players in the Malawi maize deal. Retrieved from https://www.lusakatimes. com/2017/01/05/president-lungu-dora-siliya-identified-key-playersmalawi-maize-deal/. Mukosha, F. (2017). Mutharika fires agriculture minister over maize-gate scandal. Retrieved from https://diggers.news/local/2017/02/22/ mutharika-fires-agriculture-minister-over-maize-gate-scandal/.

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Mungonge, G. (2007). A case study of strategic leadership in the creation and development of a privately owned newspaper in Zambia. Retrieved from https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/145045316.pdf. Mwinga, J. (1991, July 26–August 1). Copper shipment scandal exposed. Weekly Post, p. 1. Mzyece, M. (2009). Why to privatise Zambia’s Zamtel and how. Retrieved from http://www.lusakatimes.com/2009/02/23/why-to-privatise-zambiaszamtel-and-how/. Phiri, I. (2008). Evolution of anti-corruption journalism in Africa-lessons from Zambia. Global Media Journal—African Edition, 2(1), 15–31. Reuters. (2016). Zambia accused of attacking press freedom as newspaper is closed and editor jailed. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/2016/06/28/zambia-accused-of-attacking-press-freedom-as-newspaper-is-closed/. Siame, N. (2016). The Post under liquidation. Retrieved from https://www.daily-mail.co.zm/the-post-under-liquidation/. Silwamba, C. (2013). Kunda’s law firm received K190m from Zamtel Zulu. Retrieved from http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article. php?articleId=23809. Smith, D. (2009). Former Zambian president faces jail in unprecedented corruption trial. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/ aug/13/zambia-frederick-chiluba-corruption-trial. Transparency International. (2017). Zambia. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/ZMB. Van Donge, K. (2008). The plundering of Zambian resources by Chiluba and his friends. African Affairs, 108(43), 69–90. Zambia Online. (2012). Kabimba reports lawyer Kelvin Bwalya to police for swindling party and donors $300,000. Retrieved from https://zambia.co.zm/ news/headlines/2012/10/24/kabimba-reports-lawyer-kelvin-bwalya-to-police-for-swindling-party-and-donors-300-000/. Zambian Watchdog. (2016). Lungu makes K20 billion in 16 months. Retrieved from https://www.zambiawatchdog.com/lungu-makes-k20-billion-in-16-months/.

CHAPTER 3

Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Angola

Angola ranked at 157 out of 174 countries measured by Transparency International Corruption Perception Index faces serious corruption problems across every level of society after roughly thirty years of instability and violence (Transparency International, 2012). Within this context, anti-corruption tabloid journalists regularly expose corruption mainly prevalent in the extractive industries and in the presidency’s office. However, many tabloids tend to be very reluctant to provide checks and balance in fear of state-sponsored victimization. Moreover, corruption exposure is a dangerous business and many anti-corruption tabloid journalists have been killed over the years. Besides, there exist in the country insufficient institutional capacity not only to protect journalists that expose corruption but also to curb corruption. Furthermore, there also exists a widespread culture of impunity among political leaders (Regan-Sachs, 2013). This chapter focuses on Isabel dos Santos, the daughter of President José Eduardo dos Santos, arguing that she has been at the centre of many corruption scandals now currently considered Africa’s richest woman (Forbes, 2018). It also discusses the Angolagate which involved an illegal arms sale to Angola despite a United Nations embargo and explains how tabloids reported the scandal that involved Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the son of France President Francois Mitterrand, regarding illegal arms trading, tax fraud, embezzlement, and money laundering. It further explores anti-corruption tabloid journalist Gustavo Costa and the exposure of José Leitāo, the chief presidential advisor of embezzling © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_3

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government revenue. It discusses the tabloid journalist’s arrest and the country’s Supreme Court guilty sentencing to eight months in prison. It also discusses anti-corruption tabloid journalist Rafael Marques de Morais and how the regular exposure of corruption has led to frequent arrests. It concludes that anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Angola presents stories of publications with a short lifespan and that many tabloid journalists continue to put their lives in danger for exposing corruption. It notes that despite the country having many natural resources, corruption is a major cancer that continues to destroy the country from inside.

Corruption in Angola Corruption remains widespread in Angola due to a lack of checks and balances, insufficient institutional capacity, and a culture of impunity. Moreover, practices of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage pervade especially the procurement sector, rendering its process corrupt. Besides, the oil and mining sectors are considered the high-risk areas for corruption. In addition, the clientelistic networks generally govern the way business is conducted with many companies functioning as front organizations for government officials whose accountability is frequently questioned by many tabloid journalists and their newspapers (Maka Angola, 2018). On the other hand, this is despite bribery, illicit enrichment, and conflict of interest being criminalized by the Angolan Probity Law. However, many of the corruption offences are rarely prosecuted by the law enforcement agencies. Besides, gifts and facilitation payments are a common part of doing business in the country (GAN Integrity Report, 2016). For instance, the World Economic Forum (2014) explains that what makes corruption exposure dangerous for anti-corruption tabloids is that it is also rooted in the judiciary. For example, rich politicians frequently pay irregular payments to influence judicial decisions. Moreover, the courts are not efficient and are subject to political influence by members of government. In addition, the judiciary is also perceived by many journalists as weak when it comes to settling disputes and challenging corruption in government. For example, it is often considered a share waste of time for many journalists to take disputes to court. Besides, many municipalities lack prosecutors and judges. Moreover, many journalists frequently turn to informal courts to resolve civil conflicts in the country considered among the highly corrupt in Africa.

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Tabloids that expose corruption regularly face intimidation from the police officers who are also not free from corruption. For instance, the United States Department of State (2015) explains that corruption remains widespread within the police whose officers frequently supplement their poor income through extortion and solicitation of bribes from the public. It is this scenario which makes it very difficult to fight corruption and lack of confidence in the reliability of the police to enforce law and order. Favouritism in the country is generally and basically commonly shown to well-connected firms and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts. Moreover, even when the government awards contracts to cronies and families, this happens with a high level of impunity. Furthermore, this is despite the fact that legally, public servants may not be involved in the contracting process if a relative has a financial interest in the contracting process. However, such contracting law is routinely violated and basically, there exists an oligopoly of enterprises, all of which are connected to the ruling elites, and dominates the country’s economy and its most profitable sectors. For example, the daughter of President José Eduardo dos Santos, Madam Isabel dos Santos, owns shares in energy, telecoms, and financial companies and is often cited as symbolic of grand corruption in Angola (Global Integrity Report, 2016).

Isabel dos Santos Isabel dos Santos considered Africa’s richest woman is the eldest child of President Jose’ Eduardo dos Santos and his first Russian-born wife Tatiana Kukanova. The 2013 research by Forbes puts her net worth at more than US$3 billion making her Africa’s first billionaire woman. She has acquired her riches by taking stakes in companies doing business in Angola and using her family power and connection (Dolan & Morais, 2013). For instance, the GAN Integrity Report (2016) explains that corruption is a very high risk for companies operating in Angola’s natural resource sector. This is because there exists a culture of nepotism, cronyism, and patronage which pervade the oil industry. Illustrative of this culture is the appointment of President Jose’ Eduardo dos Santos’ daughter Isabel dos Santos in June 2016 as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the state oil giant Sonangol, an act that was deemed unconstitutional by anti-corruption activists in the country and even the tabloid journalists (Verde, 2016).

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Similarly, President Jose’ Eduardo dos Santos while acting with impunity had already appointed her half-brother José Filomeno dos Santos in 2012 as Chairperson of the Board of the Angola’s Sovereign Wealth Fund which meant the country’s sovereign fund and the state’s main source of income were now both in the hands of the children of the President. This is despite Angola’s Constitution stating in Article 165 that the National Assembly shall have relative competence for legislating on the basic elements of the scope and rules governing the basic elements of the status of public companies, institutions, and associations. Indeed, such matters include natural resource exploration concessions— the definition and regulation of public assets (Verde, 2016). The lack of transparency in the accounting of oil revenue makes it very difficult to eliminate corruption in the oil sector. For example, in 2012, the International Monetary Fund reported that billions have disappeared in the past years from the state-owned company (Reuters, 2012). The shareholding percentages are that Sonangol by law holds 51% of any oil concession, and the rest of the shares in exploration and production are publicly tendered. However, the shareholder structure often includes a ‘silent’ Angolan minority partner who usually holds around 10–15% of the concession. Moreover, these companies have questionable track records and are held by politically connected individuals (GAN Integrity Report, 2016). Furthermore, Reuters (2012) explains that over US$27 billion has been detected in the accounting discrepancies in public funds linked to state-owned oil firm Sonangol and over $4 billion has gone missing recently. The International Monetary Fund first highlighted the financial discrepancy in Angola’s fiscal accounts on 27 October 2007 report on the country’s economic performance. However, the staff report said the discrepancy in public funds was caused by spending by Sonangol on behalf of the state that was not recorded in fiscal accounts. Moreover, the government has denied that the funds are missing and has said that the problem is due to insufficient record keeping of Sonangol spending on housing, railways, and other infrastructure. Furthermore, the government has argued that these infrastructure operations are financed by Sonangol retaining oil revenues due to the budget, but are not properly recorded in fiscal accounts. In fact, Angola is Africa’s second-biggest oil producer after Nigeria and depends on crude sales for over 95% of its export revenues (Reuters, 2012).

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Isabel dos Santos as the Chairperson of the Board of Directors of the state oil giant Sonangol has been at the centre of many corruption scandals that have involved millions of US dollars. The Forbes (2018) reveals that she has major stakes in the oil company through its mutual European holding Esperanza based in Holland. Furthermore, oil and mining assets worth over US$4 billion have been allocated to companies whose ownership is obscure. Lucrative oil and mining licences are often awarded to companies with hidden owners who divert vast resource revenues to unknown private pockets. Many companies’ beneficiaries remain connected to high-ranking public officials. These deals deprive the state of revenue that should be spent on education, health care, and basic services for the people (Global Witness, 2015). Besides, the Global Integrity Report (2016) details an ongoing investigation of the US Company Cobalt Energy by the US regulatory authorities which demonstrates the risks of doing business with anonymous companies. It has so far revealed that when Cobalt Energy received oil exploration licenses, stakes were also awarded to mysterious local companies connected to Vice-President (then Sonangol Chief Executive Officer) Manuel Vicente and Generals Manuel Hélder Vieira Dias and Leopoldino Fragoso Nascimento of the president’s security cabinet. The international companies are advised to be cautious when seeking to do business with local partners, where beneficial ownership information has not been disclosed (Global Witness, 2015). Many anti-corruption tabloid journalists have continued to expose corruption at the heart of the first family despite the threat to their own lives and freedom. For example, Angolan investigative and sensational journalist Rafael Marques de Morais has often been arrested and accused of being an activist with a political agenda. For instance, the Angolan government jailed the journalist in 1999 over a series of articles that were critical of the regime. Moreover, in recent years, criminal defamation charges have also been brought against him over his 2011 book titled ‘Blood Diamonds: Corruption and Torture in Angola’. Furthermore, in December 2012, he was threatened and intimidated with arrests for defamation after exposing how Isabel dos Santos was living a lavish lifestyle and how she commemorated her tenth wedding anniversary to Congolese businessman Sindika Dokolo with a party. He noted that she jetted in dozens of friends and relatives from as far as Germany and Brazil who joined with hundreds of local guests in

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Angola for three days of lavishness, including a bash at the Fortress of Sao Miguel in the capital city of Luanda and a beachside Sunday brunch on the posh Mussulo peninsula. He further noted that the invitation, according to one attendee, came in a sleek white box, promising a celebration of ‘a decade of passion/ a decade of friendship/ a decade worth a hundred years’ (Dolan & Morais, 2013).

Angolagate The Angolagate corruption scandal took place between 1993 and 2000. It was heavily covered by tabloids and tabloid journalists in Angola. It was exposed by law enforcement agencies in France. The government in Angola made several attempts to silence its coverage through intimidations and frequent arrests of tabloid journalists. The government was also reluctant to prosecute many of the individuals who were already facing charges in France. The coverage was widespread mainly in critical tabloid newspapers than in the government-owned mainstream media (The Economist, 2008). In 1993, the Angolan government was facing civil war against the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola rebel group. It then reached out to Jean-Bernard Curiel, a contact in the French Socialist Party of then President Francois Mitterrand. The purpose was to obtain arms despite a United Nations embargo on the country. Curiel in turn reached out to Jean-Christophe Mitterrand who was not only the president’s son, but his Chief Advisor for Africa who managed to secure the services of arms broker French businessman Pierre Falcone, who brought in the Israeli arms dealer Arcadi Gaydamak as a partner. Falcone and Gaydamak then established a front company in Eastern Europe for channelling arms from various Eastern European countries (Russia, Bulgaria, Slovakia) to Angola. In France, the two used another company Brenco based in Paris to handle the contracts and finances. Brenco also facilitated a transfer of large volumes of arms and other military equipment which included six warships, 12 helicopters, 420 tanks, 150,000 shells, and 170,000 anti-personnel mines valued at US$790 million and bribes of about US$56 million (Pedro-Freeman, 2017). The scandal came to light in 1999 following a raid by French police into an unrelated affair. It led to the uncovering of a dossier on Israeli arms dealer Arcadi Gaydamak who shared a lawyer Allain Guilloux with

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one of the parties in the case the police officers were investigating in the raid. This then led to an investigation by the police and prosecutors. It revealed how a ‘sophisticated’ plot was carried out to circumvent United Nations arms embargo. It exposed senior government officials and politicians in Angola and France who covertly bought and supplied arms to Angola for use in its war against rebels. It also exposed how military officials and intelligence officers were given bribes to facilitate the process (Forrest & Cabeche, 2013). The trial commenced in 2009 in the French capital Paris. There were more than 40 individuals accused of involvement in illegal arms trafficking (The Economist, 2008). The well-known figures included JeanChristophe Mitterrand, the son of the former French President François Mitterrand, popularly known as ‘Monsieur Afrique’ due to his extensive dealings with African leaders and advisor on African affairs. He was accused of facilitating contacts between arms dealers and Angolan government (Pedro-Freeman, 2017). Moreover, a former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua was accused of using his influence to shield Brenco from French authorities and receiving election funding in return. Furthermore, Jacques Attali, a former adviser to President Mitterrand who also worked for French President Nicolas Sarkozy was accused of facilitating the deals (Nkala, 2013). In addition, Jean-Bernard Curial a French Socialist Party official was accused of being an intermediary with the Angolan government. Furthermore, Jean-Charles Marchiani, a former member of the French secret service, was accused of being an intermediary between the Angolan President Jose Eduardo Dos Santos and the former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua. He was also accused of receiving donations from the French businessman Pierre Falcone for his European Parliament campaign in 1999. Furthermore, Allain Guilloux a lawyer for the French businessman Pierre Falcone and his associate arms dealer Arcady Gaydamak were accused of assisting the French company Brenco in constructing financial structures for the military deals and finances using tax havens (Estelle, 2009). The long-running investigation contributed to a disastrous period in France-Angola relations. Outraged at the steady stream of embarrassing tabloid revelations and frustrated by the French government’s inability to keep a lid on investigation, the Angolan government showed its displeasure by threatening the interests of the largest French company in Angola, the oil multinational Total. In 2004, the government refused to

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renew Total’s licence for shallow-water Block 3/80. In 2005, it forced the company to relinquish unexplored acreages in its prolific ultra-deepwater Block 17, where the company made some of the richest discoveries in the region. It was forced to rebid for the block and relinquish some of its Angolan assets in return (The Economist, 2008). The trial led to the conviction of 36 individuals to prison terms on charges ranging from arms trafficking, complicity with arms trafficking, influence peddling, bribery, abuse of corporate assets, abuse of public assets, money laundering, and tax fraud. In the ruling, the judges made it clear that the French Presidency was aware of the illegal arms deals. For instance, French businessman Pierre Falcone was convicted of arms trafficking and bribery. He was given a sentenced of six years in prison. Furthermore, Israeli arms dealer Arcadi Gaydamak was convicted in absentia in France on arms trafficking, tax fraud, bribery, and money laundering for six years in prison. Besides, the former French Interior Minister Charles Pasqua was convicted of influence peddling and misuse of public assets for three years in prison. Moreover, Jean-Christophe Mitterrand, the son of the former French President François Mitterrand, was convicted of arms trafficking and misuse of corporate assets for two years suspended prison. In addition, JeanBernard Curial, a French Socialist Party official who was an intermediary with the Angolan government was convicted of complicity with arms trafficking and misuse of corporate assets for two years of probation. Furthermore, Jean-Charles Marchiani, a former member of the French secret service, and former aide to Charles Pasqua, associate of Arcadi Gaydamak, was convicted of complicity in influence peddling and misuse of corporate assets and was given three years in prison (Pedro-Freeman, 2017). Angolan officials implicated included President José Eduardo dos Santos, as well as key figures from his administration such as his chief of military affairs General Helder Vieira Dias, the former Angolan ambassador to Paris Elísio de Figueiredo, and the former cabinet director José Leitão da Costa. However, the Angolan government’s lawyers demanded for the case in France to be dismissed arguing that the trial could reveal sensitive military and diplomatic secrets which would constitute an attack on Angola’s sovereignty. The demands by lawyers were ignored (The Economist, 2008).

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Gustavo Costa In April 1999, Angolan tabloid journalist Gustavo Costa who was also a correspondent for the Portuguese weekly newspaper Expresso was informed by the presidency office of José Eduardo dos Santos that charges of defamation and slander were to be brought against him for writing about corruption within the cabinet. This followed his sensational article titled ‘Corruption Makes Victims’ which accused the Chief of the Civil Office of the President Jose Leitao of embezzling government revenue (Academic, 2010). The police finally arrested Gustavo Costa and charged him with defamation and injury against Jose Leitao in connection with an article. It was also revealed by the tabloid newspapers that on the day he was arrested, he was also questioned on another article he wrote which alleged that President Jose Eduardo dos Santos complained in a meeting that officials in the presidency were involved in corruption, and that as a result, Leitao had some of his powers curtailed. It was further noted that during the police interrogation, pressure was put on him by the National Criminal Investigation Department to reveal the sources of information. It was pointed out that the interrogation techniques were in violation of Article 6 (4) of the Press Law which states that a journalist may not be obliged to reveal the sources of their information, nor may their silence be subject to any direct or indirect sanction (Amnesty International, 2000). The trial by tabloid journalist Gustavo Costa began on Monday 13 December 2000. However, at the request of the prosecution and despite a protest by the defence for the tabloid journalist, the judge ordered the trial be held in camera (behind closed doors). The action by the prosecution and the court denied the defendant his right under Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights to a fair trial (Human Rights Watch, 2000). Furthermore, at a second session on Tuesday 21 December 2000, Costa maintained that the Luanda Provincial Court had not listened impartially to the evidence produced in his defence. It was reported that the evidence was a proof that corruption had actually occurred and that it was true that the powers of the Head of the Presidential Office had been very much reduced (Academic, 2010).

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However, on 24 December 2000, the Luanda Tribunal announced its verdict. It argued that it considered Gustavo Costa had attributed acts of corruption to the Chief of the Civil Office of the President Jose Leitao. It also noted that some of the terms used in the tabloid article were actually injurious. He was given a suspended sentence and fined US$20,000 as compensation for defamation (Amnesty International, 2000). Following the Luanda Tribunal verdict, the lawyer for Gustavo Costa lodged an appeal against the judgment with the Supreme Court. However, in its own appeal ruling, the Supreme Court found Costa guilty and was sentenced to 12 months in prison for defamation and nine months for causing injury to reputation. The sentences were to run concurrently (i.e., for a total of 12 months) and suspended for five years. The Supreme Court upheld the Luanda Tribunal verdict to pay the Chief of the Civil Office of the President Jose Leitao a fine of US$20,000 as compensation (Academic, 2010). The exposure of corruption in Angola by tabloid journalists is a very dangerous business. It often puts tabloids in confrontation with law enforcement agencies and government operatives whose aim is often intended to shut them down (Maka Angola, 2018). There have been instances in which tabloid journalists have been arrested by the police following the exposure of corruption and detained without charge. In many occasions, the detentions tend to take place at the high-security detention centre at the Central Forensic Laboratory in the capital Luanda (Amnesty International, 2000).

Rafael Marques de Morais The fight against corruption very often puts the whistle-blowers in regular confrontations with law enforcement agencies and political operatives in Angola. The hostile confrontations are even more worse than those who are at the centre of corruption allegations. For example, Rafael Marques de Morais coverage of corruption regularly exposes him to frequent arrests. For instance, on 16 October 1999, he was arrested at his home in Luanda in connection with an article published in the tabloid Agora on 3 July 1999. It was titled O baton da ditadura translated literally: ‘The big stick of dictatorship’ which is a play on words based on the Portuguese term for a police baton which translates the title as: ‘The Lipstick of Dictatorship’ (Regan-Sachs, 2013).

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Rafael Marques de Morais is not only an Angolan sensational journalist who regularly reports on the Government of Angola corruption, but also heads an anti-corruption watchdog Maka Angola. In the sensational tabloid article, the tabloid journalist actually criticized Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos calling him a dictator and charged him with destroying Angola while at the same time promoting ‘incompetence, embezzlement and corruption as political and social values’. The tabloid journalist also criticized the president for what he claimed promoting widespread corruption in the state institutions and for generally using the war as an excuse for the government’s failings and incompetence (Civil Courage Price, 2006). The tabloid journalist Rafael Marques de Morais was arrested following the sensational publication of the article at pistol-point by over 20 police officers. The arresting team included the riot police officers carrying Kalashnikov rifles. The journalist was arrested on suspicions of having committed a crime of calumny, defamation, and injury. He was taken to the high-security detention centre at the Central Forensic Laboratory in the capital Luanda following the arrest where he was held for 10 days. He was then moved to Viana Prison outside the city. He later told his tabloid Agora that during his detention, he was not physically tortured but he spoke of other prisoners having been beaten and of inhumane prison conditions (Regan-Sachs, 2013). Even though by the country’s Press Law the tabloid journalist Rafael Marques de Morais should have been charged within 15 days stipulated following the arrest, he was only formally charged on 18 November 1999 with defaming President Jose Eduardo dos Santos more than one month after the arrest. The other charges also related to another article in the tabloid which claimed that the president’s management of the country’s affairs left gaps in which suspect dealings in oil revenues and arms purchases took place. The police charge and indictment cited several sentences from the article but without specifying what made them defamatory (Amnesty International, 2000). Rafael Marques de Morais was held for more than a month at Viana Prison outside the capital city Luanda. The tabloid journalist while in detention was also not permitted to contact his family and to have access to a lawyer. He later revealed to the tabloid Agora that at night the police would burst in, wake him up, and try to force him to sign blank documents that could later be doctored against him. He noted that

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every time he refused, they denied him food and water. He stated that he later went on a hunger strike that went public. He was then transferred to another prison, where he was given food, but where his prison cell was so crowded that the prisoners slept leaning up against the walls which were crawling with lice (Regan-Sachs, 2013). On 25 November 1999, having been earlier denied the right to be heard by the Procurator General’s Office, following his lawyer’s request for him to be released pending trial, Rafael Marques de Morais’ lawyer entered a habeas corpus petition to test the legality of his client’s continuing detention. The tabloid journalist was finally provisionally released by the judge. The terms of his release under Article 270 of the Code of Penal Procedure forbade him to travel abroad and to actually ‘engage in activities related to the crime’ and not to speak to journalists and make public statements. The ‘activities’ were not further specified. It appeared that he was actually prevented from practising his profession as a journalist (Chama, 2017). On 15 December, without explanation, the Luanda Provincial Court transferred Rafael Marques de Morais case to the Supreme Court of Angola. On the other hand, on 19 January 2000, during a parliamentary debate on press freedom, a member of parliament for the ruling party Mendes de Carvalho issued a death threat against de Morais. He was quoted by the tabloid Agora arguing that if the young man continues to write critical articles about President José Eduardo dos Santos and keep criticizing, he would not reach the age of 40 years (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012). The trial for Rafael Marques de Morais resumed on 9 March 2000. On the same day, the judge ruled against a request of the prosecution for the trial to be conducted in camera. However, it was adjourned to 21 March 2000 pending the resolution of various procedural questions. Besides, the defence counsel submitted a claim that there was inadequate time to prepare the case. Moreover, the defence team also submitted a request that the court should admit proof of the facts of the alleged defamation. However, about 30 minutes while deliberating, the judge ordered the public, including national and international journalists, and diplomatic delegations, to leave the court. The reason given for this decision was that someone named as a ‘reporter-photographer’ had taken a photograph in defiance of a court order forbidding photography or sound recordings. The journalists said they had never heard of the ‘reporter-photographer’ whom they described as an impostor (Amnesty International, 2000).

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The judge refused the request that the court should admit proof of the facts of the alleged defamation. Besides, the law states that the judge must decide whether the request is admissible, then notify the defence of the decision. However, the defence may appeal against the decision to the Supreme Court. In this regard, the lawyer noted that this refusal to respond interfered with his duty to defend his client and left the court on 23 March 2000. The lawyer also argued that there was no need to remain in court if the judge continued to ignore the defence counsel. After Luís do Nascimento, the lawyer for Rafael Marques de Morais departed the court and the trial, the judge then ruled that the lawyer be disbarred for six months, apparently basing this action on a 1931 law which was already revoked in 1982 (Amnesty International, 2000). The judge following the lawyer’s departure from the court ordered an official of the procurator’s office attached to the Luanda Provincial Court, who was not a trained advocate, to take over the defence of Rafael Marques de Morais’ case. Even though de Morais as defendant declined the offer, the only intervention this appointee made in court was to ask for justice to be done. However, on 25 March 2000, de Morais’ lawyer returned to court and submitted that the judge did not have the power to suspend him but was overruled and the case was adjourned (Amnesty International, 2000). The trial resumed on 28 March 2000 after an adjournment. During the deliberations in court, Rafael Marques de Morais’ defence witness was however ordered to leave the court during testimony. The defence witness angered the judge for claiming that Article 46 of the Press Law was unconstitutional. Furthermore, the court then refused to allow the defence team for de Morais to further present two witnesses in court they prepared. However, the prosecution presented two witnesses who claimed that de Morais humiliated the government and that he tarnished the honour of President Jose Eduardo dos Santos and demoralized the Angolan army (Regan-Sachs, 2013). The court on 31 March 2000 finally convicted tabloid journalist Rafael Marques de Morais for defaming and causing injury and shame to President José Eduardo dos Santos. He was sentenced to six months in prison. He was also ordered by the court to pay the plaintiff a large sum as an indemnity (Amnesty International, 2000).

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Conclusion Anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Angola presents stories of enduring tabloid journalists who are regularly intimidated, arrested, detained, and very often imprisoned. There is sufficient evidence to suggest that even though the civil war is now over after more than 30 years of instability and violence, corruption is a major cancer destroying the country from inside. This is despite the country having many natural resources which are sadly poorly managed. Moreover, there also exists a political system of prebendalism whereby elected officials and their families, including close government workers, feel they have a right to a share of government revenues, and use them to benefit themselves, their supporters, and their ethnic group (Global Witness, 2015). Even though the GAN Integrity Report (2016) notes that freedom of the press is guaranteed by the Constitution, in practice, it is severely restricted. Moreover, despite the freedom of information law, it is difficult for anti-corruption tabloid journalists without government connections to access government-generated documents. Besides, self-censorship is common in private outlets especially tabloids that expose corruption. Very often, the government uses criminal charges of defamation and libel to intimidate independent reporters and outlets (Freedom House, 2015). Despite the government putting a comprehensive legal anti-corruption framework in place, implementation remains poor. For example, the United States Department of State (2015) explains that even though the corruption offences are addressed in the Penal Code, corruptions continue to take place with impunity by those in leadership. Similarly, despite the Public Probity Law addressing general principles related to public service and criminalizing conflict of interest, active and passive bribery, and more generally unlawful enrichment, the corruption scandals in public service delivery continue to be exposed by tabloids. Furthermore, despite proclaiming a ‘zero tolerance’ policy on corruption by the government, cases of abuse of office are rarely prosecuted in the high echelons of power. There is also no legal protection for whistle-blowers reporting on matters of corruption and embezzlement (Global Integrity Report, 2016). Furthermore, the Public Contracting Law contains a chapter on ethics in the procurement process which aims to safeguard transparency and fair and equal competition. It also addresses the public and private sector by criminalizing not only the request and acceptance of bribes by public

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officials but also solicitation, and offer of undue benefits by private sector agents. However, in practice, political leaders continue to receive bribes, especially the presidency continue to violate ethical principles with impunity in the management and appointment of family members in public institutions. Moreover, the law on Criminalization of Infractions Related to Money Laundering criminalizes the receipt or solicitation of undue advantages, influence peddling and illicit actions to obtain, maintain, or alter an international contract or business. However, in practice, doing business in Angola is basically impossible without connections especially among politicians and the presidency who have the power to influence and alter contracts and business transactions and uses front companies (Nadorff, 2015).

Bibliography Academic. (2010). Corruption in Angola. Retrieved from http://enacademic. com/dic.nsf/enwiki/8652296. Amnesty International. (2000). Angola: Freedom of expression on trial. Retrieved from https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/132000/afr120082000en.pdf. BBC. (2000). Journalist convicted of defaming Angolan President. Retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/697643.stm. Caminada, C. (2017). Sonangol’s fired boss said she leaves $2 billion in reserves. Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-16/ sonangol-s-fired-boss-said-she-leaves-2-billion-in-reserves. Chama, B. (2017). Tabloid journalism in Africa. London: Palgrave. Civil Courage Price. (2006). Rafael Marques de Morais. Retrieved from http:// www.civilcourageprize.org/honoree-2006.htm. Committee to Protect Journalists. (2012). Rafael Marques trial. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/reports/2000/03/angola-marques-00.php. Dolan, K., & Morais, R. (2013). Daddy’s girl: How an African ‘Princes’ banked $3 billion in a country living on $2 per day. Retrieved from https://www. forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/08/14/how-isabel-dos-santos-tookthe-short-route-to-become-africas-richest-woman/#86e16945f50d. Estelle, S. (2009). French power brokers convicted over arms in Angola. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLR440868. Forbes. (2018). Isabel dos Santo. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/ profile/isabel-dos-santos/. Forrest, D., & Cabeche, A. (2013). Swiss release ‘Angolagate’ fugitive. Retrieved from https://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-12-swiss-release-angolagate-fugitive-1. Freedom House. (2015). Freedom of the press 2015. Retrieved from https:// fr eedomhouse.org/r epor t/fr eedom-pr ess/fr eedom-pr ess-2015#. WmZMk6inE2x.

54  B. CHAMA GAN Integrity Report. (2016). Angola corruption report. Retrieved from http://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/angola. Global Integrity Report. (2016). Transparency and accountability 2016. Retrieved from  http://aii.globalintegrity.org/scores-map?stringId=transparency_ accountability&year=2016. Global Witness. (2015). How to lose $4 billion. Retrieved from https://www. globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/oil-gas-and-mining/how-lose-4-billion/. Human Rights Watch. (2000). The International Monetary Fund’s staff monitoring program for Angola: The human rights implications. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2000/05/31/international-monetary-fundsstaff-monitoring-program-angola-human-rights. Maka Angola. (2018). Supporting democracy, fighting corruption. Retrieved from http://www.makaangola.org/en/?lang=en. Nadorff, N. (2015). How we made it in Africa: Angola’s probity laws: The will to combat corruption. Retrieved from https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/ angolas-probity-laws-the-will-to-combat-corruption/52841/. Nkala, O. (2013). Israeli-Russian businessman arrested in Switzerland over Angolagate arms deal. Retrieved from http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option= com_content&view=article&id=32907:israeli-russian-businessman-arrested-in-switzerland-over-angolagate-arms-scandal-&catid=56:Diplomacy%20&%20 Peace&Itemid=111. Pedro-Freeman, S. (2017). Angolagate. Retrieved from https://sites.tufts.edu/ corruptarmsdeals/2017/05/05/angolagate/. Regan-Sachs, R. (2013). Angola: Marques in Angola—The perils of speaking truth to power. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201205280747.html. Reuters. (2012). Angola explains $27.2 billion of missing funds—IMF. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/angola-imf/angola-explains-27-2-billion-of-missing-funds-imf-idUSL5E8GAEPJ20120510. Samuel, H. (2008). Angolagate ‘arms for oil’ trial opens in Paris. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/3146113/ Angolagate-arms-for-oil-trial-opens-in-Paris.html. The Economist. (2008). Angola-gate. Retrieved from http://www.economist. com/node/12630028. Transparency International. (2012). Corruption Perception Index 2012. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/cpi2012/results. United States Department of State. (2015). County report on human rights practices 2015. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. Verde, R. (2016). Angola: Supersonic nepotism—Illegalities at the speed of light. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201606050134.html. World Economic Forum. (2014). Global competitiveness report 2014–2015. Retrieved from https://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitivenessreport-2014-2015/.

Part II

CHAPTER 4

Anti-corruption Tabloid Journalism in Algeria

Algeria faces rampant corruption which has been on the rise in recent years. For instance, Transparency International (2017) Corruption Perception Index ranks the country at 108 out of 176 countries measured. Widespread corruption in the country especially within the government institutions impacts negatively on the economic development and delays many of the development projects and initiatives. Besides, corruption whistle-blower agencies and various watchdogs such as tabloids continue to play an important role in exposing financial mismanagement and embezzlement of public funds. This is despite regular government harassment of tabloid journalists. Moreover, political leaders very often react to corruption exposure by subjecting reporters who dare to expose corruption to rough questioning even threats (Cheref, 2016). This chapter focuses on corruption in government institutions looking at struggles of tabloid journalists and their newspapers in exposing corruption. It discusses El Watan tabloid and the East-West Highway scandal which was initially estimated to cost around US$7 billion but swallowed over US$20 billion with a sizeable amount going into bribes. Further discussions are centred on the Sonatrach corruption scandal which shook Algeria’s state-owned oil and gas company leading to its Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Meziane and his senior management team being forced out, and subjected to a trial following investigations that they awarded contracts without competition, after receiving millions of dollars in bribes and kickbacks to win contracts. It concludes that corruption in Algeria will continue to thrive without the vigilance © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_4

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of the prolific anti-corruption institutions and agencies including government commitment. It notes that there is a need for authorities to exercise their duty to be transparent and promote good governance in public affairs. It also stresses that since the country is a leader in the ambitious New Partnership for Africa’s Development initiative, it needs to pay attention to good governance and provides conditions that will allow anti-corruption journalism and tabloids to excel. It also points out that the government need to sign and ratify the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption and to allow the fight against corruption to be carried out by all concerned partners including tabloids without undue pressure from the ruling political authorities (Achy, 2013a).

Corruption in Government Institutions Corruption runs deep in government institutions in the country. For example, in 2015, Louisa Hanoune, the leader of the Workers’ Party, a combatant who doesn’t mince her words, shamed the government institutions arguing that it is literally difficult to do business in the country unless one is able to offer bribes. She accused the Minister for Culture Nadia Labidi of being involved in deep-rooted corruption in the management of her department and her ownership of a television company. Similar attacks and accusations were made on the Minister for Mines Abdeslam Bouchareb and the Minister for Health Abdeslam Boudiaf. Furthermore, accusations were labelled against Algeria’s ‘economic baron’ Ali Haddad, the main financial backer for President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s 2014 reelection campaign. He was accused of holding considerable influence in the Mouradiyya, the presidential palace in Algiers, and was also accused of being able to demand contracts he wants (The New Arab, 2015). The corruption scandals continue to rock the government institutions. In 2012, Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal revealed that more than 2000 corruption cases were investigated by the end of the year (Cheref, 2016). The problem is that many of these investigations rarely lead to convictions. This is partly because of so many accusations of bribery which have also infiltrated the security wings which investigate the corruption allegations and even the judiciary. For instance, the World Economic Forum’s global competitiveness study notes that the Algerian judicial system is under the influence of officials and influential

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individuals and companies. The study ranks Algeria at 123 out of 144 countries measured on the independence of the judiciary, behind all other countries in the Middle East and North Africa except for Lebanon (Achy, 2013a). Since becoming independent from France in 1962, with the new government promises to root out corruption, it continues to thrive exploding in the 1980s. For instance, in 1985, former Prime Minister Abdelhamid Brahimi declared that corruption had costed the country over US$26 billion since 1975. It did not come as a surprise when many citizens rallied behind the Islamic Salvation Front whose battle cry was that the system was ‘corrupt and un-Islamic’. Indeed, in December 1991, it won parliamentary elections. However, in January 1992, the army toppled the president and declared a state of emergency. The army brought back Mohammed Boudiaf from exile in Morocco to become president who made the fight against corruption his top priority. However, he was assassinated in June 1992, plunging the country into a period of conflict until Abdelaziz Bouteflika won the presidency in April 1999. He too jumped on the anti-corruption bandwagon which continued to persist (Cheref, 2016). Many corruption scandals have emerged during President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s reign. For example, in 2002, a major scandal rocked Algeria when the business empire of Rafik Khalifa, a billionaire tycoon, and the son of a former intelligence chief and minister collapsed which included a bank, an airline, and television stations. It also cost the Algerian state and individual investors over US$5 billion (The North Africa Post, 2013). The scandal started in early 2002, when the operations of Khalifa Bank were frozen over allegations of misconduct. In 2003, his associates were arrested at Algiers airport attempting to smuggle out a briefcase containing over US$2 million. In the same year, Khalifa fled to the UK and took refuge. In 2007, the Supreme Court in Algeria convicted him in absentia of criminal involvement and fraud and has given life imprisonment. He was later arrested by the UK authorities following a French extradition request on fraud and embezzlement charges. He remained in the UK fighting against extradition. However, he was finally extradited to Algeria to face a trial after more than 10 years in exile (Middle East Institute, 2014). During the reign of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the country’s corruption record has deteriorated. For instance, the Open Budget Initiative opinion poll in 2010, which evaluates whether governments

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give the public access to budget information, gave the country a score of one out of 100 for the Middle East and North Africa. Even though Algeria’s Constitution provides that the parliament oversees the state budget, over the last three decades, budget laws have been enacted without parliamentary scrutiny. In addition, when parliament fails to adopt a budget within 75 days, as stipulated in the Constitution, it is issued by a presidential decree. Moreover, the Algerian Court of Audit in charge of auditing the government’s budget and financial accounts of stateowned companies, and submitting an annual report to the president, rarely completes and publishes audits. Besides, it doesn’t examine the oil and gas companies’ tax records. Furthermore, the Revenue Watch Index report for 2011 which assesses revenue transparency ranks Algeria at 38 out of 41 resource-rich countries behind all other oil-rich countries in the region. Even though in 2004, Algeria ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption, in 2006, it adopted a law to prevent corruption, and set up the National Commission for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption, and its seven members were not appointed by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika until 2010. Moreover, most of the commitments to fight corruption have remained empty and have not received the necessary support from the state (Achy, 2013b). Within this corruption background in government institutions, the country’s popular tabloids continue to play an important role in exposing mismanagement of public funds. However, the government continue to relentlessly harass tabloid journalists and their newspapers. Moreover, political leaders often react to corruption exposure by subjecting anti-corruption tabloid journalists to rough questioning and threats. For example, on 6 August 2003, the government adopted a decree on imports and exports with the critics arguing that the aim was actually to control the import on the publications which was accompanied by censorships (Cheref, 2016).

Struggles of Tabloids The Constitution of Algeria provides for press freedom. However, the government restricts these rights in practice through informal pressure on publishers, editors, and journalists. For example, defamation remains a criminal offence. The journalists have continued to struggle since the 1990s. For example, between 1993 and 1996, there were 57 journalists killed mainly for investigating corruption. Even though many deaths

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were blamed on the armed Islamist groups, some cases do leave unanswered questions. Similarly, several tabloid journalists think they were murdered by forces close to the government to ‘get rid of trouble-makers’, and demonize the terrorists while at the same time to intimidate the critical journalists (Reporters Without Borders, 2003). There are many laws that make it very difficult for tabloid journalists to expose corruption in the country. For example, the 2001 amendment to the information code criminalizes content that insults and offends the president, the parliament, the judiciary, and even the armed forces. Moreover, the 2009 cybercrime law gives authorities the right to block online content contrary to public order and decency (Freedom House, 2017). The statement ‘contrary to public order and decency’ remains vague and often abused. For instance, Omar Belhouchet of tabloid El Watan notes that in the face of Islamist protest, they use it to brainwash citizens in the name of Islam (BBC, 2006). Besides, journalists are required to obtain a press card issued by a Commission established by the Ministry of Information in 2014. An Algerian journalist who applies for accreditation as a correspondent for foreign media is vetted by the Central Directorate for Army Security, which investigates also his or her private life (Freedom House, 2017). Moreover, the state of emergency decree, introduced in 1992, gives the government broad authority to restrict and take legal action against what it considers to be a threat to the state. In addition, the 2006 presidential decree continues to criminalize content about the conduct of the security forces. The authorities continue to invoke restrictive laws against critical tabloid journalists (United States Department of State, 2011). The country has made very little progress in curbing corruption despite setting up the National Commission for the Prevention and Fight Against Corruption and the 2004 ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (Achy, 2013a). Many tabloid journalists face intimidations, and those that regularly expose corruption are often subjected to government crackdown. Moreover, the country lacks legislation that enshrines the right to access official information. Even the 2012 information law imposes limitations on coverage on a variety of subjects including criminal investigations and state security and fines of up to US$5000 for related offences. The journalists who fail to pay the fines can face jail time (Freedom House, 2017). For instance, in May 2010, the mayor of Ain Boudinar filed a complaint against Belkacem Belhamideche, the managing director of

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La Reflexion newspaper, following a June 2009 article that quoted an entrepreneur denouncing corruption. He was sentenced to six months in prison (United States Department of State, 2011). Similarly, in September 1995, tabloid journalist Saïd Tazrout of the daily Le Matin in Tizi-Ouzou was murdered one week after publishing an article on a ‘property scandal’ referred to as ‘property sharks’ that implicated ‘high level’ individuals and ending: ‘In the next issue, we will name names’. It was later revealed that the killers arrived in a taxi and confronted the tabloid journalist. He was then shot in the leg forcing him to collapse. He was finished off with two shots to the head. Since then, nobody dared to write anything about the ‘property sharks’ in Tizi-Ouzou (Reporters Without Borders, 2003). The Algerian tabloid journalists regularly face hostile rhetoric and even threats from the government officials. For example, in March 2015, a presidential adviser declared in a public address on a national holiday that the opposition newspapers were unethical and aimed ‘to frighten and demoralize the people’ (Freedom House, 2017). Since the 1990s, tabloid journalists around the country have continued to suffer suspicious threats and others have lost their lives in the line of duty. For example, on 28 February 1994, Mohamed Hassaïne, a journalist for the daily Alger Républicain, was kidnapped as he left his home in Larbatache on his way to work. He was later found murdered. Similarly, on 12 April 1997, Aziz Bouabdallah, a journalist with the Arabic El-Alam Es-Siyassi newspaper, was taken from his Algiers home by several ‘well-dressed men in plain-clothes’ who looked like members of the military security. He was forced into a white car. It was then later revealed that the abduction was in relation to ‘a libellous article’ that he authored (Reporters Without Borders, 2003). Furthermore, in February 2009, Layadi El-Amine Yahia, a journalist for Le Carrefour d’Algerie, was sentenced to one year in prison and fined US$271 for libel in an article that implicated Mascara’s commerce director in corruption (United States Department of State, 2011). Similarly, in 2015, a number of journalists were charged under various laws in connection with criticism of public officials. For example, in February 2015, Mohamed Chergui was sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay US$2000 for blasphemy after featuring an article that contained non-traditional theories about the origin of the Koran. Moreover, in April 2015, Tahar Dehejiche was arrested after depicting a cartoon about the exploitation of shale gas, which authorities deemed insulting

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to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Besides, in October 2015, Hassan Bouras was arrested for ‘insulting’ the state and for ‘taking actions’ aimed at displacing the regime. In addition, in November 2015, Mahda Okasha was arrested and detained for four days for posting photographs criticizing state bodies (Freedom House, 2017).

El Watan The tabloid El Watan (The Nation) newspaper was founded in 1990 after the government allowed independent newspapers. Omar Belhouchet and nineteen colleagues founded the daily newspaper now with a circulation of over 130,000. In July 2007, the newspaper started the first weekend edition. In 2008, it launched a trilingual—Arabic, English, and French—website as most significant competition originated from Arabic-language and English-language news sites (Ibrahim, 1991). The tabloid largely depends on advertising revenues for financial security. However, the country’s public advertising is controlled by the state-run National Institute for Publishing and Advertising. It provides a significant source of income for most publications. On the other hand, it tends to favour pro-government content. Moreover, privately owned newspapers regularly call for a legal framework to govern the advertising sector. Even though the private advertising has increased in recent years, it still faces criticism for issuing contracts according to political biases. For example, in February 2015, the head of Ooredoo, a Qatari mobile phone operator, threatened to cut off advertising to media outlets that attack Algeria or Qatar (Freedom House, 2017). El Watan founder Omar Belhouchet is known for his investigative reporting and exposure of corruption. During the civil war of the 1990s, which put enormous pressure on the independent tabloid newspapers, he was prosecuted numerous times by his government. He survived two assassination attempts. One attempt occurred in 1993, when assailants fired a machine gun at his car while driving his children to school. He escaped by dropping low in the seat and putting on the accelerator. Between 1993 and 1997, he faced thirty legal actions initiated by the Algerian officials, and sometimes requiring him to appear in court for two or three times a week (Ibrahim, 1995). The tabloid is known for groundbreaking stories which at times exposes it to regular government crackdown. For example, in 1997, El Watan published an investigation into the suffocation to death of 32

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prisoners during the tenure of Justice Minister Muhammad Adami who resigned few weeks after the article’s publication. In November of the same year, its founder Omar Belhouchet was convicted of ‘harming state institutions’ and sentenced to one year in prison for a 1995 remark which he made to the French television stations that there were journalists that were embarrassing the authorities, and that he would not be surprised if the following day it was found out that some of his colleagues were murdered by ‘the men in power’ (Ibrahim, 1991). Similarly, in 2006, Omar Belhouchet and his tabloid protested the banning of the Star Academy based on the Pop Idol global concept shown on Algerian television. The Islamists protested the content of the show. However, the tabloid argued that there was a need to be aware of the protests and their intentions. It noted that banning television shows was leading to brainwashing of the population in the name of Islam (BBC, 2006). Since the tabloid inception, its founder Omar Belhouchet has regularly been arrested, intimidated, and even convicted for exposing corruption scandals. For example, in 2008, he lost a defamation case to a faith healer that he and reporter Salima Tlemçani had accused to be a fraud. The tabloid news report exposed the activities of the alleged healers who claimed to cure illness in Algiers despite not having any medical qualifications. Tlemçani was able to substantiate her report by visiting the alleged healer’s surgery posing as a patient. After the tabloid article, the alleged healer subsequently launched a defamation suit against the tabloid journalists and won the case. The journalists were both imprisoned for three months and fined about US$600 each leading to the International Federation of Journalists to issue a press release protesting what the organization argued was another attempt to silence investigative journalism by means of judicial interference. Moreover, in 2009, Belhouchet was summoned by the judicial police for interrogation on defamation charges fourteen times in the space of only few weeks (International Federation of Journalists, 2008). The tabloid has been an outspoken voice against corruption and has been suspended several times by the Algerian government. Its journalists and editors have been jailed for various offences. Moreover, its reporters have also been targeted by both government forces and Islamist insurgents (Reporters Without Borders, 2003). For example, in 2002, its journalist Abdelhaï Beliardouh in Tébessa suffered harassment, physical attacks, and prosecution. This was after Saâd Garboussi, the Chairman

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of the Chamber of Trade and Industry of Nememchas, turned up on 20 July 2002, with three Chamber of Commerce officials at his home. The tabloid journalist was then severely beaten in front of his family before being dragged through the streets of the town where they continued to beat and insult him. He was finally driven to the cellar of the home of Garboussi where he was interrogated about an article that had appeared that day headlined: ‘Arrest of the Chairman of the Chamber’ which noted that Garboussi was implicated by a former terrorist for bankrolling terrorism. It was further noted that he was involved in money laundering and extortion which cast a tragic shadow over the Médéa and Jijel regions. It was later revealed that shortly before the attack, Garboussi had phoned the tabloid’s acting editor, Faisal Metaoui, to demand that he print his response to the article in the next day’s paper. But when he was told it would not be possible until the day after, he threatened to deal with the author of the tabloid article. The author of the article was then confronted suffering heavy beating. He was released few hours later. On 19 October, he attempted suicide by swallowing acid. He was hospitalized in Algiers. He finally died overnight on 20 November from serious internal injuries to his oesophagus and stomach (Reporters Without Borders, 2003).

East-West Highway The East-West Highway project was launched by President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in March 2007 financed by the government as part of a US$60 billion national economic and social recovery programme started in 2005. Its cost was to be covered by Algerian oil revenues. It was to cut travel times and provide better and safer access to the north of the country. It was also meant to be a six-lane toll highway. It was to be developed along Algeria’s borders with Morocco and Tunisia and was to connect Algiers, Constantine, Oran, Annaba, Tlemcen, and Setif. It was intended to employ over 100,000 workers to work on the road development that was to have 12 tunnels, 70 viaducts, 60 interchanges, service stations, and maintenance facilities (Road Traffic, 2006). There were over 60 major international companies that submitted applications for the road construction mainly from Japan, Germany, China, France, Portugal, Italy, and the USA. Of the total 1216 kilometres, the Algerian Ministry of Public Works contracted 528 kilometres to a consortium of China Rail Construction Corporation and China

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International Trust and Investment Corporation worth about US$6.2 billion of an overall US$11.4 billion projected cost. The Japanese consortium COJAAL which was made up of Kajima Corporation, Nishimatsu Construction Company, Itochu Corporation, Hazama Corporation, and Taisei Corporation, was allotted 399 kilometres. The rest of the kilometres were contracted to local enterprises in Algeria (Martin, 2010). However, the road project became a major scandal. It ran into repeated delays because of corruption (Ahmed, 2015). Many of the tabloids reports said that the bribes worth over US$5 billion were paid before and during the construction (Middle East Eye, 2015). According to El Watan tabloid, about 16% of the total amount went to bribes (Middle East Institute, 2014). For example, in 2009, an article by Zouheir Ait Mouhoub in El Watan revealed that the highway workers employed by a consortium of China Rail Construction Corporation and China International Trust and Investment Corporation in Bouira were not being paid and lamented unsafe working conditions and abuse from Chinese employers. Even after alerting local authorities, and the local union submitting a letter to President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, nothing was done (Martin, 2010). Allegations started to emerge among many tabloids that a consortium of China Rail Construction Corporation and China International Trust and Investment Corporation was implicated in a network of bribes and illegal commissions involving their contract. For example, China International Trust and Investment Corporation’s representative in Algeria, Chani Medjdoub, and six other persons, including Algeria’s Secretary General of the Ministry of Public Works, were finally detained after a third-party intelligence alerted the Algerian officials to irregular activity in Algerian accounts at Spanish banks. The tabloids sensational allegations then prompted the Chinese ambassador to Algeria Liu Yuhe, to confront the press regarding the ‘so called unnamed foreign intelligence’ involved in the allegations arguing that the people behind the campaign against China and its enterprises only wanted to tarnish the image of China because they were bitter and were operating with a colonialist mentality (Martin, 2010). The official corruption investigations started in September 2009. It revealed illegal commissions linked to Algeria’s security services, and senior directors in the Public Works Ministry. This led to the state prosecutors to order arrests into the road construction companies and European middlemen (Middle East Institute, 2014).

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The corruption investigations finally went to trial which was dubbed by the tabloids as a ‘scandal of the century’ (Ahmed, 2015). In May 2015, an Algerian court jailed 14 people including former officials and businessmen. The conviction included a 10-year prison term and a fine for Chani Medjdoub, an adviser to a Chinese firm. Moreover, Mohamed Khelladi, a former public director of highway programmes, was also convicted and ordered to pay a fine as well (Middle East Eye, 2015). Judge Tayeb Hallali’s ruling found the defendants guilty of corruption, money laundering, and embezzlement of public funds in connection with the construction of the highway. Furthermore, seven international firms which included COJAAL, Pizarroti, a consortium of China Rail Construction Corporation and China International Trust and Investment Corporation, Isolux Corsan, Coba, SMI, and Caraventa were all found guilty of corruption and were all ordered to pay US$56.4 million each (Middle East Eye, 2015). The East-West Highway projected completion time was not achieved. In 2014, the Ministry for Public Works announced that the Japanese Consortium COJAAL firm had lost its contract to construct the remaining 84 km of the eastern section of the East-West highway. At the time, the company and the government were in discussion about compensation levels and a possible arbitration process. The Japanese company and the Algerian Ministry for Public Works were yet to agree on compensation levels for the contract having been terminated, and the arbitration procedure was to be carried out in Algeria, as the contract did not provide for international arbitration. However, the Japanese joint venture which included Kajima and Taisei asked a French-based international arbitration body in June 2014 to settle the dispute and was asking for unpaid fees totalling over US$910 million to be paid by Algeria (World Highways, 2014).

Sonatrach Sonatrach is Algeria’s state-owned oil and gas company and employs about 120,000 people. It accounts for 98% of the country’s foreign currency receipts and makes much of the country’s wealth (Saleh, 2010). It was founded just after the country gained independence from France in 1962. Many tabloids claim that it loses US$3 billion to US$6 billion annually to corruption in oil sector alone mainly by the ruling government authorities and politicians. It has operations in Africa, Europe,

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Latin America, and the USA and an annual turnover of US$56 billion (Middle East Online, 2013). In 2009, Algeria’s feared and powerful intelligence service, the Department of Intelligence and Security, commonly known as ‘military security’, attached to the Ministry of Defence started to investigate corruption allegations in Sonatrach (Saleh, 2010). Authorities investigation of corruption in the state-owned oil firm followed allegations in a number of tabloids against Mohamed Meziane, the then Chief Executive of Sonatrach and members of his management. It was alleged by the papers that some contracts were awarded to the company’s suppliers without competition after receiving millions of dollars in bribes and kickbacks to win contracts (Associated Press, 2015). The corruption revelations led to the Oil Minister Chakib Khelil temporarily replacing its Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Meziane by his deputy Abdelhafid Feghouli, the vice-president of Sonatrach for downstream operations. Moreover, all senior executives were placed under investigation in the awarding of contracts to suppliers (Saleh, 2010). However, in 2010, Mohamed Meziane was finally sacked over allegations of corruption after further shameful revelations (Middle East Online, 2013). The corruption scandals often referred to as ‘Sonatrach I’ and ‘Sonatrach II’ by some tabloids in the country due to their international complexity touch on France, Italy, and Switzerland (Market & Chikhi, 2016). For instance, the 2010 scandal mainly focused on corruption allegations in Algeria. However, in 2013, Italian prosecutors brought in charges of international nature involving millions of bribes. In their case, Paolo Scaroni, chief executive of the Italian state-owned energy company Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Hydrocarbons Authority), was alleged to have paid US$265 million in bribes to win contracts with Sonatrach (Achy, 2013b). However, following the findings by Algeria’s Department of Intelligence and Security (Saleh, 2010), Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika ordered a freeze on all contracts signed by Sonatrach between December 2009 and February 2010 on fraud suspicions (Achy, 2013a). In January 2010, El Watan tabloid reported that Sonatrach investigation reflected military intelligence faction close to the president. It noted that the investigations by the Security Department were intended to deprive ‘a group in power’ from obtaining funds (Saleh, 2010). Furthermore, it was stated that the investigation was the military’s attempt to regain

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its influence on Algerian affairs. It was also seen as part of a score-settling between intelligence agency and President Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who had close ties to many of the accused individuals (Associated Press, 2015). The Sonatrach scandal led to charges that also targeted the Energy Minister Chakib Khelil, a close associate of the president (Market & Chikhi, 2016). He was quickly sacked as energy minister in May 2010 amid accusations of corruption within his team. He had held the post for 10 years and was previously head of Sonatrach (Middle East Online, 2013). He fled Algeria in 2013, and despite an international arrest warrant for him, his wife, their two children, his right-hand man Farid Bedjaoui, and the former head of his office Redha Hamche, he remained at large (Middle East Online, 2013). In March 2015, charges were brought by Algerian prosecutors for 19 defendants for granting privileges to third parties, hiking prices of contracts with a state company, embezzlement, money laundering, and corruption. More than 40 lawyers and 108 witnesses took part. At the trial, the state argued that corruption was centred on major contracts. For instance, it was revealed that Sonatrach contract with a local unit of a German company Contel Funkwerk that involved monitoring equipment and electronic protection services was full of bribery and irregularities (Chikhi, 2016). Moreover, the Algerian representative of the German firm was accused of receiving privileges during the bidding process for contracts. It was noted that in exchange, some representatives were given shares in the company. In a separate investigation, Italian prosecutors asked Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Hydrocarbons Authority) and its subsidiary Saipem to be put on trial on charges that Saipem paid bribes to win contracts in Algeria. Other allegations were that the oil service company paid intermediaries US$207 million to bag contracts worth about US$8 billion with Sonatrach (Chikhi, 2016). In May 2011, the former Chief Executive Officer Mohamed Meziane received a two-year prison sentence for misusing public funds and for awarding contracts to companies without competition (Achy, 2013b). However, in March 2015, Meziane told El Watan newspaper that he was innocent and that the charges were part of a plot against him. The charges included influence peddling, inflating contract prices, money laundering, and generally skimming off millions of dollars in bribes (Associated Press, 2015). None of the defendants has yet entered a formal plea to the court (Chikhi, 2016).

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Another trial was scheduled for Sonatrach in Milan Italy. It involved the employees of Saipem, the Italian oil services company, who were accused of being instrumental in the payment of over US$200 million in bribes to obtain contracts in Algeria which were allegedly to be worth over US$8.4 billion. It was also revealed by the local tabloids that the Italian prosecutors argued that millions of dollars in bribes were paid by Saipem to Algerian officials as middlemen and women (The New Arab, 2015). The Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Hydrocarbons Authority) owns most of Saipem and is Europe’s biggest oil service group (Market & Chikhi, 2016). In the case which was investigated in Italy, the Italian prosecutors were also seeking the former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil in connection with bribes paid to high-ranking Algerian officials to obtain markets in Algeria for Italian oil service group Saipem. Moreover, it was also revealed that the Italian justice authorities discovered that millions of dollars were deposited in bank accounts in Singapore and Hong Kong managed by Farid Bedjaoui, the former head of the former Energy Minister Chakib Khelil’s office. It was also noted that Bedjaoui was based in Dubai and was also holding a French passport. He was suspected of being the middleman who paid the commissions in return for oil contracts granted to Saipem, a subsidiary of Italian energy giant Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi (National Hydrocarbons Authority). Furthermore, it was revealed that Saipem won eight contracts in Algeria. In return, it paid over US$200 million in bribes which it declared as intermediary fees placed with the Hong Kong-based Pearl Partners Limited company controlled by Farid Bedjaoui (Middle East Online, 2013).

Conclusion Algeria has an endemic corruption, nepotism, and privileges which are unfairly captured by a small clique of high-ranking officials and their connections in the business sector at the expense of ordinary citizens (Carnegie, 2013). Ordinary people suffer from corruption in which leaders at high levels of government abuse their power to benefit themselves at the public’s expense. The country also faces corruption in everyday low- and mid-level bureaucrats among both the central administration and local authorities. Besides, corruption manifests itself through crony awards of public-works contracts. The accusations are rife in the tabloids

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that foreign companies pay massive bribes to politicians and highly ranking bureaucrats to secure contracts (Achy, 2013a). The major problem is that the country’s judicial system also shows evidence of corruption. For example, the World Economic Forum survey on global competitiveness notes that it is subjected to interference and influence from members of the executive branch and powerful individuals and companies (World Economic Forum, 2012). On the other hand, tabloids play an important role in exposing corruption in the country. For example, in 2007, Algeria Telecom, the national telecommunications company, was prosecuted for squandering public funds. In 2009, leaders of the Department of Fish and Fisheries came under fire for influence peddling and illegal fishing. In the same year, the National Bank was accused of granting ‘sweetheart loans’ without sufficient collateral and enough background checks (Carnegie, 2013). Basically, there is a common theme that links the exposure of corruption together which is basically the phenomenon of political system that actually runs the country, in which a constant tussle exists between the presidency, the army, and the security services. Indeed, corruption scandals in the country are the visible sign of this constant battle. Until this power struggle ends and Algeria becomes properly governed by a Constitution, it will continue to be engulfed by corruption (The New Arab, 2015).

Bibliography Achy, L. (2013a). Algeria held back by corruption, poor planning. Retrieved from https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/business/2013/04/algeria-corruption-growth-effect.html. Achy, L. (2013b). The price of stability in Algeria. Retrieved from http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/04/25/price-of-stability-in-algeria-pub-51629. Ahmed, O. H. (2015). Algeria jails ex-officials, fines foreign firms in highway graft case. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/algeria-corruption-trial/algeria-jails-ex-officials-fines-foreign-firms-in-highway-graft-caseidUSL5N0XY56320150507. Associated Press. (2015). Algeria’s enormous oil corruption scandal finally goes to trial 5 years after discovery. Retrieved from http://www.foxbusiness.com/ markets/2015/03/15/algeria-enormous-oil-corruption-scandal-finally-goesto-trial-5-years-after.html.

72  B. CHAMA BBC. (2006). Pop idol pulled from Algerian TV. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4696866.stm. Carnegie. (2013). The price of stability in Algeria. Retrieved from http://carnegie-mec.org/2013/04/25/price-of-stability-in-algeria-pub-51629. Cheref, A. (2016). In Algeria, corruption bedevils the economy. Retrieved from https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/in-algeria-corruption-bedevils-theeconomy-1.93648. Chikhi, L. (2016). Algerian ex-oil boss on trial on corruption charges. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/algeria-trial/update-1-algerian-ex-oilexecutives-on-trial-on-corruption-charges-idUSL6N0WH0TN20150315. Freedom House. (2017). Algeria: Freedom of the press 2017. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/algeria. Ibrahim, M. Y. (1991). Algeria in ferment. Retrieved from http://www. nytimes.com/1991/07/26/world/algeria-ferment-special-report-algeria-hope-for-democracy-but-not-economy.html. Ibrahim, M. Y. (1995). With 46th Algerian journalist slain, it’s a furtive vocation. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/1995/05/31/world/with-46thalgerian-journalist-slain-it-s-a-furtive-vocation.html. International Federation of Journalists. (2008). Court hands down three month sentences to two journalists in defamation case. Retrieved from https://ifex. org//algeria/2008/12/23/court_hands_down_three_month_sentences/. Market, P., & Chikhi, L. (2016). Return of Algerian ex-oil boss hints at revival of reforms. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-algeria-politics/ return-of-algerian-ex-oil-boss-hints-at-revival-of-reforms-idUSKCN0X006B. Martin, M. (2010). The East-West highway. Retrieved from http://eng.majalla. com/2010/12/article55217659/the-east-west-highway. Middle East Eye. (2015). 14 jailed and foreign firms fined $390mn in Algeria’s ‘scandal of the century’. Retrieved from http://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/14-jailed-and-foreign-firms-fined-390m-algeria-s-corruption-scandalcentury-812542563. Middle East Institute. (2014). Reign of Algeria’s Bouteflika marred by graft scandals. Retrieved from http://www.mei.edu/content/reign-algerias-bouteflikamarred-graft-scandals. Middle East Online. (2013). Sonatrach scandal grips Algeria ex-energy minister. Retrieved from http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=60683. Reporters Without Borders. (2003). Algeria—2003 report. Retrieved from https://web.archive.org/web/20071031090456/, http://www.rsf.org/ print.php3?id_article=6686. Road Traffic. (2006). East-West highway. Retrieved from https://www.roadtraffic-technology.com/projects/eastwesthighway/. Saleh, H. (2010). Algeria starts Sonatrach corruption probe. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/content/84ba2c36-037a-11df-a601-00144feabdc0.

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The New Arab. (2015). The political roots of Algeria’s corruption scandals. Retrieved from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/english/politics/2015/5/18/ the-political-roots-of-algerias-corruption-scandals. The North Africa Post. (2013). Algeria’s disgraced ex-tycoon Khalifa extradited home from the UK. Retrieved from http://northafricapost.com/4792-algerias-disgraced-ex-tycoon-khalifa-extradited-home-from-the-uk.html. Transparency International. (2017). Algeria. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/DZA. United States Department of State. (2011). Algeria: 2010 country report on human rights. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 2010/nea/154458.htm. World Economic Forum. (2012). Global competitiveness report: 2012–2013. Geneva: World Economic Forum. World Highways. (2014). Contract problem for Algeria’s East-West highway. Retrieved from http://www.worldhighways.com/categories/auctions-equipment-supply-ser vicing-finance/news/contract-problem-for-algeriaseast-west-highway/.

CHAPTER 5

Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Morocco

Anti-corruption tabloid journalism is on the rise in Morocco partly because of an improvement in democracy and good governance. Even though tabloid journalism plays a very important role in the fight against corruption, many critics argue that the only problem is that many tabloid newspapers are controlled by the political groups. Moreover, the country continues to be plagued by massive corruption in all sectors of government with the 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranking the country at 90 out of 176 (Transparency International, 2017). Basically, corruption is a serious problem in the country, and many citizens suffer from rampant culture of patronage, nepotism, and wasta (the use of connections). Moreover, anti-corruption laws are not enforced effectively, and the government prosecutions often target petty corruption while companies owned by highly influential persons are rarely disciplined. Furthermore, the judiciary is perceived to be corrupt with reports of irregular payments in return for favourable court decisions. Similarly, the police sector is also rife with corruption and abuse their authority with impunity. For example, in 2015, two highway policemen were sentenced to one month in prison and fined US$200 after being caught on tape accepting a bribe from a tourist. Besides, corruption is also rampant in the royal family. For example, in 2015, a tabloid newspaper Goud was fined over US$50,000 for exposing corruption in the King’s office (GAN Integrity, 2016).

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This chapter focuses on corruption in King Mohammed VI and the royal family and the companies owned by the King, now the richest monarchy in Africa with his personal fortune estimated at around US$6 billion by Forbes. It discusses intimidations and harassments of tabloid journalists that expose corruption. It concludes that even though the country criminalizes corruption, anti-corruption laws are not effectively enforced. It notes that the government officials engage in corruption with impunity. It points out that even though the country’s anti-corruption legislation provides for the compulsory disclosure of assets by government officials, it does not provide for criminal and administrative sanctions for non-compliance (GAN Integrity, 2016).

Tabloid Journalism in Morocco Morocco continues to be plagued by massive corruption in all sectors of government (Freedom House, 2017b). Since its independence in 1956 from France, the country has remained deeply rooted in the French cultural influence in terms of political systems and journalism traditions. For example, French newspapers have a history of reflecting political and social agendas and viewpoints which have also continued in the country’s newspapers even today. Moreover, press freedom has also been tailored around the demands of the authoritarian regimes over the years, and government mainly accepts only a mild form of criticism and tolerates not direct attack on the monarch or Islam. Journalists are considered to be professionals who must report news and be educated citizens who also are expected to be patriotic. If the tabloid newspapers want to remain in business, they are expected to agree to exercise some form of restraint and to practice self-censorship. For example, the government grants a subsidy of about US$6 million to the press and this also guarantees that criticism of the official policies remains within the appropriate boundaries. Since advertising and sales of the tabloids only provide a slim operating budget, the government subsidy provides an effective means to prevent the press from operating with total autonomy (du Plessis, 1999). The country also enjoys a diversity of tabloid newspapers published in French, Arabic, and even English. Even though French has been often used in higher echelons of society, with French language tabloid Le Matin enjoying largest circulation in the early 1980 with circulation of over 50,000 copies, Arabic has remained the language of the masses. Since the 1970s, it has gained considerable popularity and

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Arabic-speaking tabloid newspapers have flourished. For example, since 2002, Arabic language newspaper Al Ittihad Al Ichtiraki has enjoyed a daily circulation of around 110,000. In the same period, Arabic dailies have attracted a readership in excess of 260,000, while French-language newspapers have reached about 200,000 readers. The country has nearly 20 daily and more than 80 weekly publications. It is estimated that more than 70% are privately owned with an aggregate circulation of 704,000. Many new dailies have appeared since 1990, and their number continues to increase. However, only one per cent of the population buys newspapers. And only a few newspapers such as Tel Quel and Le Journal hebdomadaire are really independent (du Plessis, 1999). The tabloids face many legal challenges when it comes to covering issues of corruption especially in the monarch that is entangled in political affairs. For example, tabloid newspapers can be suspended and banned for ‘embarrassing’ the monarchy who possesses so much unchecked executive powers. This situation prevents even constructive criticism of the royal family by the tabloid newspapers. The first press code was instituted in 1963 by King Mohammed V on the framework of the laws in force under the French rule between 1912 and 1956. The press code was later strengthened by the successor King Hassan II. In 1999, King Mohammed VI instituted some liberal radical reforms in press laws. On 8 February 2002, the Parliamentary Commission for Foreign Affairs and National Defense adopted a new national press code more lenient and contains fewer criminal penalties for libel. However, the press code still maintains sentences of three to five years’ imprisonment for defaming the King and the royal family as compared with five to twenty years’ imprisonment in the previous code. Moreover, Article 29 also gives the government the right to shut down any publication ‘prejudicial to Islam, the monarchy, territorial integrity, or public order’. Basically, King Mohammed VI and his ministers find themselves in the awkward position of moving the country into the modern world of being politically pro-Western while exemplifying the values of a moderate Islamic nation (du Plessis, 1999). The country’s Constitution guarantees press freedom, but is severely restricted in practice. Its vague language enables wide interpretation and hinders protection. For instance, journalists cannot report in certain areas especially the Western Sahara and even on certain political issues. The government often responds to accusations of corruption with defamation which is a criminal offence punishable by up to one year in prison

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and sometimes with a fine of up to US$12,000. For example, in 2015, prosecutions resulted in heavy fines and suspended jail sentences for several journalists and publications. Moreover, authorities arrested and deported French, Dutch, and Italian reporters and placed travel bans on several local journalists, forbidding them from leaving the country and impeding their professional work (Freedom House, 2017a). In recent years, Internet is becoming increasingly used as a platform for tabloid journalists to disseminate corruption information. However, the government continues to exert control over online platforms through the press law as well as censoring content on news sites. Besides, the state occasionally cracks down on critical online content on issues about the monarchy and corruption. For example, in May 2015, British watchdog Privacy International released a report documenting extensive monitoring of journalists by the Moroccan intelligence services. Currently, there are hundreds of online tabloid newspapers that offer different viewpoints on corruption issues. The Internet use by tabloids that have struggled to operate in print format continues to grow at a fast rate. Moreover, approximately 57% of the population regularly access the Internet. By June 2012, there were 16.5 million Internet users (Internetworldstats.com). Even though there is no policy of widespread site filtering, online tabloid newspapers generally avoid sensitive topics such as Western Sahara and the royal family (BBC, 2017). However, high level of illiteracy in many parts of the country and the limited access to high-speed Internet limit the reach of online tabloids as news sources (Freedom House, 2017b).

Patronage and Nepotism Corruption is a serious problem in the country which suffers from widespread culture of patronage, nepotism, and wasta—which is basically the use of connections to get favours. Moreover, anti-corruption laws are not enforced effectively, and the government prosecutions often target petty corruption while companies owned by highly influential persons are rarely disciplined (Lhomme, Benchemsi, & Davet, 2015). According to Chtatou (2014), in Morocco, ‘it is not what you know that matters, it is who you know’. Moreover, individuals in the country are not very often recognized for their knowledge, experience, and even contribution, but for their tribal identity, to which big and influential family they belong. Indeed, when one meets people for the first time, in

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many instances, they will ask about identity in terms of names, and if one provides the first name only, they will look disappointed and dismayed because one is not able to satisfy their curiosity about tribal position in the Moroccan social cartography. Besides, there also exists a widespread culture of wasta loosely translated in Arabic as nepotism, which is basically favours granted to relatives in various fields, including business, politics, entertainment, sports, religion, and other activities, or ‘who you know’. It generally refers to using one’s connections and influence to get things done, including government transactions such as the quick renewal of a passport, waiving of traffic fines, and getting hired for, or promoted in a job. In other words, this involves getting something through favouritism rather than merit. It also involves getting unfair advantage when it comes to jobs and contracts. Moreover, the advantages are also extended to friends, family relatives, trusted colleagues, especially in politics and between politicians and supportive organizations. In addition, this includes appointing ‘cronies’ to positions of authority, regardless of their qualifications (Alaref, 2014). Furthermore, companies in Morocco rarely have a ‘no-nepotism’ policy in place. Many times, it is easy to find workplaces full of friends and relatives who may or may not even be qualified. This takes place in both the public and private sectors. The wasta often affects the hiring and promotion decisions. It is also practised by expatriates who use their connections. The culture of using connections to get favours triggers embezzlement, bribery, and abuse of power with total impunity. Besides, many people do not consider using connections to get what they want as wrongdoing and as criminal acts but rather as privileges that go with their official office (Chtatou, 2017). The royal family also uses connection with King Mohammed VI considered by many critics as the most corrupt monarch in the world who uses wasta to enrich himself and his royal family. For example, he is alleged to own 80% of the country’s economy. For instance, he owns the biggest Moroccan bank Attijari wafabank, the biggest grocery store Marjane, the biggest car dealerships, the biggest mining company Managem, the most fertile lands, among others (Lebon, 2017). Besides, Lhomme et al. (2015) explain that the King uses the power of connections arguing that on 11 October 2006, opened his account in Geneva co-owned with his personal secretary Mounir El Majidi at HSBC Private Bank under the name of ‘His Majesty King Mohammed VI’. Over US$8 million was available in the count with the monarchy identity

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concealed which in principle is illegal for citizens residing in Morocco to own a bank account abroad. Only the Office Des Changes can grant special exemptions. Even though the amount in the account looks modest considering the monarch’s personal net worth which is in billions, it raises questions on the double standards of the financial laws that they can always bend to gratify those in positions of power. Besides, King Mohammed VI’s young brother Prince Moulay Rachid and his older sister Princes Lalla Meryem were also listed as HSBC Private Bank’s clients in Geneva, without the indication of the amounts in their accounts. Basically, since King Mohammed VI came to power on 23 July 1999, many tabloid journalists have been convicted and a lot of tabloid newspapers have suffered fined for criticizing the royal family and for corruption exposure in the royal family. However, tabloid newspapers that publish content favourable to the monarchy and its achievements suffer few problems and tend to have a long lifespan (Ian, 2010). In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of lawsuits against tabloid newspapers editors. Moreover, there has been a connected legal suit suggesting that there exists a cartel within the ruling government and the royal family to silence all opposing tabloids. The lawsuits have resulted in the imposition of disproportionate and exorbitant fines designed to stifle the targeted tabloids. For example, tabloid newspaper Al-Massae and its editor Rachid Nini were fined about US$600,000 in October 2008 for allegedly defaming several prosecutors in the Ksar El Kébir region. In addition, the courts and the police rarely respect the principle that journalists’ sources should be regarded as confidential. Furthermore, foreign publications are still sometimes banned which often provides corruption leads and content that usually upset the authorities. For example, the distribution of the 30 October 2008 issue of the French weekly L’Express was banned under the Article 29 of the press code which basically outlaw the attacks on ‘Islam, the monarchy, territorial integrity, and due respect for the King and public order’ (Reporters Without Borders, 2009). Patronage and nepotism continue to hinder economic development in the country leading to only few well-connected individuals to enjoy access to job opportunities, government contracts, and even political positions. Moreover, tabloid journalists that venture to question the ruling government and especially the deep-rooted corruption in the royal family are subjected to arrests and lawsuits. Furthermore, there exist disproportionate fines to cases of defamation against tabloids. Moreover,

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some media laws such as Article 41 are so vague and need clearer wording to avoid room for arbitrary decisions by the courts. For instance, the provisions in the press code concerning ‘offensive or insulting comments about the monarchy, Islam or territorial integrity, false information, disturbing public order’ should be more realistic and clearer, and the penalties need to also be reduced. It doesn’t make sense for the royal family to enjoy so much power which allows abuse while being insulated by the same laws from being questioned regarding their corrupt behaviour (Reporters Without Borders, 2009).

Corruption in Government Institutions There exists massive corruption in all government institutions and inefficient government bureaucracy. However, there is a legal framework to deal with corruption, transparency, integrity, and regulatory system. Even though the country’s Criminal Code makes it illegal for actions such as bribery, extortion, influence peddling, and abuse of office, but these anti-corruption laws are not enforced effectively by the government. In addition, the prosecutions of corruption often target petty corruption, but companies owned by highly influential persons are rarely disciplined. Besides, there exists a widespread culture of facilitation of payments and giving and receiving of gifts. Despite being criminalized under Moroccan law, these practices are widespread and officials often do it with impunity (GAN Integrity, 2016). The judiciary is also perceived to be corrupt with reports of irregular payments in return for favourable court decisions. It is often perceived to lack independence with accusations of bribes and irregular payments in exchange for favourable cases outcome. More than two-thirds of households in Morocco have paid a bribe to the courts (World Economic Forum, 2016). Furthermore, many citizens believe that the judiciary is subjected to influence from the executive and do not have confidence in its ability to settle disputes and challenge the government regulations. In addition, there exists a lack of professionalism among judges on commercial matters which constitutes an obstacle to effective dispute resolution. Many journalists also complain about inefficiency and lack of transparency in judicial matters (US Department of State, 2016). Similarly, the police sector is rife with corruption and abuse of authority. This has resulted in limited police effectiveness and lack of respect for the rule of law. For example, Transparency International (2013) global

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corruption barometer tracking worldwide public opinion on corruption explains that almost four in every ten households surveyed reported to have paid a bribe to the police officer. Moreover, there are regular reports of abuse of law and corruption impunity among the ranks of police officers. Furthermore, in many instances, even if the investigations are carried out in the police system, they rarely result in criminal proceedings or even disciplinary action. The majority of citizens not only perceive the police to be corrupt, but almost one-third of Moroccans do not trust them (Transparency International, 2013). For example, in 2015, a police officer was videotaped taking a bribe from a driver in Casablanca and stood trial in October 2016. Corruption among the ranks of police officers has since triggered the national security authorities to equip police officer’s helmets with small video cameras, and the members of the royal guard in Rabat have also followed suit (GAN Integrity, 2016). Besides, the personnel in the public services administration are also engaged in corruption. It is difficult to navigate high corruption risks in public services. Basic administrations are generally undermined by a lack of resources, low-skilled employees, and pervasive corruption. There is often a widespread culture of bribes and irregular payments which are usually exchanged in return for obtaining public utilities (World Economic Forum, 2016). It is often considered normal to give gifts to government officials to simply ‘get things done’ and many citizens report having paid a bribe to obtain a document or even a permit. Moreover, the majority of citizens believe that the public services sector suffers from massive corruption (Transparency International, 2013). The land administration is also not transparent, and corruption is widespread. For example, it is possible to pay ‘under the table’ money to government officials to get plots of state-owned land for a fraction of the official market price. Furthermore, even in the tax administration, there exist high corruption levels. Moreover, it is often considered normal to give gifts to tax officials. In addition, bribery is sometimes exchanged in meetings with tax officials. Furthermore, basically many citizens believe that most tax officials are very corrupt. However, in recent years, the country has improved its business environment through reforms that include changes to the tax payments. The government has also improved the electronic platform for filing and paying corporate income taxes and labour taxes. Currently, paying the taxes is less time-consuming compared to the neighbouring countries and the region (Transparency International, 2013).

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The public procurement in the country is also heavily corrupt. Bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged in return for obtaining public contracts and licenses (World Economic Forum, 2016). Moreover, public funds are sometimes diverted to companies, individuals, and even groups due to corruption. Furthermore, government officials also tend to show favouritism when deciding policies and contracts. Besides, the procurement sector is also plagued by widespread culture of patronage. In addition, market competition is distorted by interference especially from the royal family and the country’s elites that control much of the country’s economy. Basically, companies controlled by these groups tend to be easily awarded government contracts. However, the government often recommends the businesses to use a specialized public procurement due diligence tool to reduce corruption risks related to public procurement. In practice, well-connected individuals are able to violate the laws (GAN Integrity, 2018). Even though Morocco is the world’s largest exporter of phosphate, this mineral industry is largely controlled by the royal family and elites who monopolize large multi-sector industries with close links to the monarch. These influential families enjoy massive advantages and are able to win public bids and contracts. Moreover, they also enjoy immunity for corrupt practices which is also rampant in sand-quarrying industry generally controlled by well-connected people with privileged access to natural resources. The government is often criticized by watchdogs for its lack of effective resource governance which is mainly linked to an incomplete regulatory framework and insufficient disclosure policies (Natural Resource Governance Institute, 2016).

King Mohammed VI and the Royal Family On 23 July 1999, King Mohammed VI succeeded his father King Hassan II. Since coming to power, he has tried to clean up the royal family’s corruption practices which were rampant during the reign of King Hassan II. However, critics argue that he has rather made corruption much more institutionalized. There now exists massive corruption in King Mohammed VI and the royal family currently which is also heavily protected in the press law. For instance, it is prohibited to criticize the monarchy and the royal family. Moreover, the King and his government maintains considerable control over the press and the authorities regularly ban publications deemed offending and even jail and fine tabloid journalists accused of defamation (Ian, 2010).

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For example, in 2003, Ali Lmrabet, the editor of the publication Demain and Douman, was given a three-year jail sentence on the charges of attacking the monarchy, insulting the King, and for endangering the country’s territorial integrity. The case became a front-page tabloid newspapers story leading to the editor being given a royal pardon on 7 January 2004. On 12 April 2005, he was forbidden to work as a journalist for 10 years as well as banning the publication. Similarly, in June 2007, the Economie et Entreprises was ordered to pay about US$600,000 in damages for supposedly libelling a holding company owned by the royal family (Reporters Without Borders, 2009). There exists a widespread perception in the country that King Mohammed VI and the royal family are corrupt. For example, Omnium Nord Africain (ONA), a holding company, is owned by the King and used to coerce and solicit bribes. The King is not only the leading businessman in Africa but also the richest monarch with his personal fortune estimated at around US$6 billion by Forbes magazine (Ian, 2010). The royal family has one of the largest fortunes in the world (Pendleton, Serafin, & Von Zeppelin, 2009). The family also holds the majority stakes in the Société Nationale d’Investissement (SNI), originally state owned, but merged in 2013 with Omnium Nord Africain (ONA Group), to form a single holding company with a diverse portfolio consisting of many important businesses in the country and operating in various sectors such as Attijariwafa Bank (banking), Managem (mining), Somed (tourism, real estate, and exclusive distributor of Maserati), Wafa Assurance (insurance), Marjane (hypermarketchain), Wana-Inwi (telecommunication), Sonasid (siderurgy), Lafarge Maroc (cement manufacturing), Sopriam (exclusive distributor of Peugeot-Citroën in the country), Renault Maroc (exclusive distributor of Renault in the country) and Nareva (energy), and own stakes in Brasseries du Maroc, the largest alcoholic beverages manufacturer and distributor of brands such as Heineken in the country (Pendleton et al., 2009). Moreover, King Mohammed VI is also a leading agricultural producer and land owner in the country, where agriculture is exempted from taxes. His holding company Siger has shares in the large agricultural group Les domaines agricoles which was originally called Les domaines royaux, now commonly known as Les domaines, which was founded by King Hassan II (Tounassi, 2008). In 2008, it was estimated that it had revenue of US$157 million, with 170,000 tons of citrus exported in that

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year. The company officially owns 12,000 hectares of agricultural lands. Moreover, Chergui, a manufacturer of dairy products, is the most recognizable brand of the group. For example, between 1994 and 2004, the group was managed by King Mohammed VI’s brother-in-law Khalid Benharbit, the husband of Princess Lalla Hasna (Tounassi, 2008). It also owns the Royal Golf de Marrakech, which originally belonged to Thami El Glaoui. His palace’s daily operating budget is reported by Forbes to be US$960,000 which is paid by the Moroccan state as part of its annual budget as of 2014 (Ahmed, 2013). Furthermore, the royal family is always at the centre of corruption allegations, and King Mohammed VI involvement in business is a major topic in the country, but public discussion of it is sensitive. Besides, corruption is prevalent at all levels of the monarchy, and King Mohammed VI and his advisors hold influence in many major businesses. Basically, refusing to join forces linked with the royal family businesses makes the work very difficult and can lead to many challenges. Moreover, the decisions on big investments in the country are generally taken by three people linked to the royal family, namely the King, his secretary Mounir Majidi who is the monarch’s close friend, an adviser and former classmate Fouad Ali Himma. The corruption in the royal family also affects the housing sector and housing projects. Mounir Majidi, the personal secretary of King Mohammed VI, is the major link in many corruption scandals between the royal family, the King, and the businesses interest groups (Ian, 2010). The royal family also uses the institutions of the state to coerce and solicit bribes especially in the country’s lucrative real estate sector. Besides, there also exists appalling greed of those close to King Mohammed VI (Pendleton et al., 2009). For example, institutions linked to the royal family since are one of the largest in the country and also widespread are used to get contracts Ian (2010). For instance, in 2008, the Chief Executive Officer Saad Bendidi for one of the royal family companies Wana was dismissed for ‘mismanaging’ the telecommunications subsidiary and for not doing ‘good enough’, a move that drew public attention to the King’s business activities. Despite the intrigue that surrounded his firing, it was not particularly unusual when one works for the royal family. His predecessor also did not last long at the helm. The tabloids gossip is that the palace can be very demanding. If the palace calls, and one is not able to pick the phone on the first ring, then that is asking for trouble (Pendleton et al., 2009).

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Many tabloid newspapers and journalists especially those who are currently operating outside the country operate in fear of intimidations and arrests, have called on the King to exit the business world, and have often cited the inherent conflict between his role as ultimate arbiter of the country’s system and leading businessman and banker within it. There are also many doubts about his transparency when it comes for business affairs at a time when citizens in the country are facing rising prices for goods whose production and distribution is often done by the King’s own companies. Besides, there has long been hushed debate of these issues in the tabloid circles, but few expect the royal role conflict of interests to change anytime soon (Ian, 2010).

Harassments of Tabloids Tabloid newspapers face many challenges in the country. However, harassment of tabloid journalists is very common with many often imprisoned on trumped-up criminal charges that are often not explicitly press related. Moreover, arrests, threats, and physical attacks occur regularly. Besides, there is also evidence of tabloid journalists often being subjected to restrictions on their movement (du Plessis, 1999). There exist massive intimidations of tabloid journalists that expose corruption in the country. For example, in March 2015, Hicham Mansouri was sentenced to 10 months in prison for charges of ‘adultery and starting a brothel’, a conviction critics saw as an effort to intimidate journalists that dare to expose corruption in the government and the royal family. At the time of his arrest, he was working on a story about electronic surveillance scandals of human rights activists (Freedom House, 2017a). Similarly, in June 2015, journalist Hamid el-Mehdaoui was handed a four-month prison sentence and heavy fine for an article he wrote that attributed the death of an imprisoned activist to custodial torture. Moreover, in July 2015, journalist Rachid Niny, and director of the Al-Akhbar newspaper, was ordered to pay more than US$40,000 to Transportation Minister Aziz Rebbah and his associates over an article in which Niny alleged that a contractor working for the Transportation Ministry had used substandard materials on a highway construction project. Besides, in August 2015, a reporter and member of the Moroccan Association for Investigative Journalism was detained and informally accused of a variety of offences before being placed under a travel ban.

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Moreover, in November 2015, Taoufik Bouachrine, editorial director of the Akhbar Al-Yaoum, was given to a two-month prison sentence and fined U$150,000 after he alleged that a Finance Ministry official had improperly advocated for a certain piece of legislation which was not in public interest (Freedom House, 2017a). Furthermore, the country’s 2003 anti-terrorism law provides for heavy criminal penalties, fines, and jail time for vaguely worded offences that include advocacy, support, or incitement of terrorism. For example, in 2013, journalist Ali Anouzla was arrested and detained for two months after he wrote an article that included a link to a YouTube video in which an extremist group criticized Morocco’s King Mohamed VI and called for the Moroccan youth to wage jihad (Freedom House, 2017a). Moreover, in July 2015, the police disrupted a training session for citizen journalists that was being given by the senior journalists and activists, confiscating their equipment. In November 2015, seven of the trainers were put on trial on charges of threatening the national security and for failing to disclose foreign funding in connection with the programme, which was alleged sponsored by the Dutch press freedom organization Free Press Unlimited (Freedom House, 2017a). Furthermore, the regime uses advertising, subsidies, and aggressive financial harassment, to intimidate critical tabloid coverage and harass the tabloid newspapers. For example, in October 2015, Aziz Akhannouch, the agriculture minister, cancelled his ministry’s advertising contract with the newspaper Akhbar Al-Yaoum after it revealed that he allegedly exercised undue control over state funds intended for rural development. Even though general subsidy allocation is controlled by the Information Ministry, it is criticized as non-transparent and discriminatory against smaller publications. However, in 2015, the dispersal process was reformed, and publications can now receive money with few red tapes in subsidies annually than before. Despite heavy reliance on state advertising subsidies, the market for printing and distribution of newspapers is largely free and features a number of private and competitive companies. However, many newspapers are heavily indebted to these companies (Freedom House, 2017a). Although tabloid journalists continue to practice self-censorship, opposition dailies have begun to explore social and political issues traditionally considered out of bounds but with great caution when discussing government corruption, human rights, and Morocco’s policy towards Western Sahara. For example, on 20 December 2006, the

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Moroccan Prime Minister Driss Jettou banned Nichane publication, the action taken in retaliation for publishing ‘provocative jokes’ related to religion. Its website was also shut down. It is this widespread crackdown of the tabloid newspapers in the country which has led to a number of daily and weekly newspapers to dramatically cease out of operations (Reporters Without Borders, 2009). However, the privately owned tabloid newspapers have actually succeeded in breaking taboos over some sensitive topics, including allegations of high-level corruption. This is despite operating in an environment in which the King and the monarchy is heavily protected by the law even from legitimate criticism. Moreover, the law prohibits questioning the country’s territorial integrity. For example, in 2011, the editor of Al-Massae newspaper was jailed for one year for stories about widespread corruption among the security services and law enforcement agencies (BBC, 2017). Besides, the policemen continue to assault tabloid reporters and photographers to the extent of confiscating their equipment. For example, on 10 February 2002, about 20 police officers raided Al Ayam newspaper for publishing photo of a member of the royal family which it had requested permission to print in the newspaper. In fact, attacking the honour of the King often carries length prison sentences. Moreover, Article 41 extends defamation to Islam and Morocco’s territorial integrity, while the courts, in addition to the executive, are also given the power and authority to suspend and even close down the newspapers (Reporters Without Borders, 2009).

Conclusion The Moroccan Criminal Code criminalizes corruption and money laundering which covers concealing and altering goods originating from trafficking, extortion, influence peddling, and misappropriation of public and private property. However, the anti-corruption laws are not effectively enforced in the country, and the government officials engage in corruption with impunity. Even though the country’s anti-corruption legislation provides for the compulsory disclosure of assets by government officials, it does not provide for criminal or administrative sanctions for non-compliance. Moreover, despite the country ratifying the United Nations Convention against Corruption, it is the only African country not to have signed the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (GAN Integrity, 2016).

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Basically, there exists widespread corruption in the country and the tabloid newspapers regularly face legal challenges. Moreover, the media and the government are also locked in a mutually dependent relationship that creates both encouraging opportunities and disturbing issues involving journalists’ need to report the news in an impartial and unhindered manner. However, tabloids when one looks at the region are growing in the country and have made great strides since the 1960s. On the other hand, the government still keeps control of the press through generous subsidies and repeated censorship. Besides, the government also fosters a climate of subtle intimidation that seriously impairs the country’s newspapers from openly questioning government policies and established societal traditions. Moreover, the government justifies this attitude by maintaining that it must moderately manage the press carefully in order to survive and succeed as a pro-Western, and moderate Islamic nation in a region where fanaticism is a constant menace to civil liberties (du Plessis, 1999).

Bibliography Ahmed, B. (2013). Benkirane a bien augmenté le budget royal de ‘Sidna’. Retrieved from https://ahmedbenseddik.wordpress.com/2013/11/12/ budget-du-palais-royal-dans-la-loi-de-finances-2014/. Alaref, J. (2014). Wasta once again hampering Arab youth chances for a dignified life. Retrieved from http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/ wasta-hampering-arab-youth-chances-dignified-life. BBC. (2017). Morocco profile-media. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-africa-14123019. Chtatou, M. (2014). In Morocco, it is not about what you know but who you know. Retrieved from http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinion/in-morocco-it-isnot-about-what-you-know-but-who-you-know_26731. Chtatou, M. (2017). Political accountability in Morocco. Retrieved from https:// www.africanexponent.com/bpost/4866-political-accountability-in-morocco. du Plessis, E. H. (1999) Press reference: Morocco. Retrieved from http://www. pressreference.com/Ma-No/Morocco.html. Freedom House. (2017a). Freedom of the press 2014. Retrieved from https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2014. Freedom House. (2017b). Morocco: Freedom of the press 2016. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/morocco. GAN Integrity. (2016). Morocco corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/morocco. GAN Integrity. (2018). Due diligence tools. Retrieved from https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/tools/due-diligence-tools.

90  B. CHAMA Ian, B. (2010). WikiLeaks cables accuse Moroccan royals of corruption. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-cablesmorocco-royals-corruption. Lebon, A. (2017). Is the King of Morocco corrupt? Retrieved from https://www. quora.com/Is-the-King-of-Morocco-corrupt. Lhomme, F., Benchemsi, A., & Davet, G. (2015). His majesty Mohammed VI, client number 5090190103. Retrieved from http://www.lemonde.fr/evasion-fiscale/article/2015/02/10/his-majesty-mohammed-vi-client-number-5090190103_4573825_4862750.html. Natural Resource Governance Institute. (2016). Morocco. Retrieved from https://resourcegovernance.org/our-work/country/morocco. Pendleton, D., Serafin, T., & Von Zeppelin, C. (2009). In pictures: World’s richest royals. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/2009/06/17/ monarchs-wealth-scandal-business-billionaires-richest-royals_slide_8. html#6924cd0944b3. Reporters Without Borders. (2009). Advances and reverses for press freedom during King Mohammed’s first decade. Retrieved from https:// swap.stanfor d.edu/20090728155834/http://www.rsf.org/spip. php?page=article&id_article=33950. Tounassi, F. (2008). Enquête. Les jardins du roi. Retrieved from https://web. archive.org/web/20131207081715/http://www.telquel-online.com/ archives/350/couverture_350.shtml. Transparency International. (2013). The global corruption barometer 2013 tracking world-wide public opinion on corruption. Retrieved from https://www. transparency.org/gcb2013. Transparency International. (2017). Morocco. Retrieved from https://www. transparency.org/country/MAR. US Department of State. (2016). Investment climate statement for 2017. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrapper. World Economic Forum. (2016). The global competitive report 2015–2016. Retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitivenessreport-2015-2016/.

Part III

CHAPTER 6

Tabloid Journalism Against Corruption in Ghana

Tabloid newspapers in Ghana are critical players in exposing corruption. However, in recent years, the phenomenon of corruption in the country has become so pervasive that it continues to weaken its moral fibre. On the other hand, many tabloid newspapers continue to name and shame corrupt individuals, especially among ruling politicians. Even though the country has taken steps to amend laws on public financial administration and public procurement to overcome corruption, scandals continue to dominate tabloids with regular sensational headlines that often make allegations of bribery for financial favours, in return for facilitating transactions. Since official salaries are generally poor especially among low-level government employees, such employees are also known to ask for a ‘dash’ which is basically a tip in return for assistance with public services. The 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranks the country at 70 out of 176 measured (Transparency International, 2017). This chapter looks at the phenomenon of corruption in the country. It then discusses the anti-corruption tabloids. It further explores the Scancem scandal in which Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, the wife of the then Ghanaian President Jerry John Rawlings, received over US$17 million in bribes for sold shares to the new Norwegian cement manufacturing company that took over Ghacem. It also discusses another corruption scandal in which the Finance Minister Seth Terkper transferred US$250 million of proceeds from the US$1 billion Eurobond that was issued in 2015 into a private account at United Bank of Africa without © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_6

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reasonable justification. It concludes that corruption is rampant in the country. It notes that the tabloid newspapers continue to run hard-hitting front-page headlines that expose corruption. It stresses that this is despite the government having a strong anti-corruption legal framework.

Phenomenon of Corruption The fight against corruption has existed over successive governments in the country which have made different efforts to curb the scourge. For instance, the first President, Kwame Nkrumah started with the slogan ‘one man, one car’. Similarly, Jerry John Rawlings crafted the ‘one man, one house’ slogan in the days of his military rule. In late 1970s, eight senior military officers, including three former heads of state, were executed for corrupt deals. In early 1980s, people suspected of corruption were investigated by the Citizen’s Vetting Committee, the National Investigations Committee, and the public tribunals. President John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor in the early 2000 coined the ‘zero tolerance for corruption’ cliché. All these measures did not eliminate corruption in the system. In recent years, legislations have been enacted and institutions established to investigate and punish corrupt officials such as the Serious Fraud Office, now the Economic and Organized Crime Office, the Office of Public Accountability, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, as well as the passage of the Public Procurement Law. However, despite the existence of these laws and institutions, the rate of corruption in the country continues to soar (Asah-Asante & Brako, 2014). There exists corruption in the country across all sectors of public service delivery. For example, the judiciary is highly corrupt. The poorly paid judges hamper the integrity of the institution and result in high levels of bribery within the courts (GAN Integrity, 2016). Tabloids often report of irregular payments which are exchanged in return for favourable judicial decisions (World Economic Forum, 2016). Courts are generally slow in ruling on high-level corruption cases. Even though the government established the ‘fast-track’ courts to resolve cases that can be concluded within six months; these courts regularly fail to meet deadlines. Besides, high-level corruption cases are often lengthy, and convictions are slow in coming. In September 2015, 180 judicial officials were implicated in bribery including 34 judges and several state attorneys and prosecutors. A five-member committee was set up headed by a Supreme

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Court to investigate the allegations. It led to 22 circuit and magistrate judges being suspended, and 12 High Court judges investigated (United States Department of State, 2016). Similarly, there exists corruption among the police officers seen by many citizens as the most corrupt institution in the country. Extortion and bribery are widespread among police officers known to carry out arrests as a means to extort irregular payments from citizens. Even though the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice is charged with investigating corruption among the ranks of police officers, and the government also set up the internal investigative unit, which is the Police Intelligence and Professional Standards Unit, in many instances, the complainants are not convinced when reporting corruption; this is because the Unit mostly comprises of police officers who shield colleagues from investigation (GAN Integrity, 2016). Many public institutions are engulfed in corruption practices. Irregular payments are often exchanged in return for obtaining public utilities. There is a wide belief that in order to get things done, one is expected to present officials with irregular payments (The World Bank, 2017). Tax administration also carries high corruption risks for many citizens. Bribes are widespread in meetings with officials. Furthermore, corruption at the borders is common to avoid time-consuming paperwork to clear goods. For example, demands for bribes are high at Tema port exit (Hanouz, Geiger, & Doherty, 2014). The public procurement system is also not spared when it comes to corruption. Very often, bribes are exchanged in return for obtaining government contracts. Furthermore, there exist expectations to give gifts to procurement officials who favour well-connected individuals and companies when awarding public contracts. Some of the reasons that fuel high corruption include a weak government administration. There also exists limited transparency in public funded contracts and in the tender process. There are instances when the government has previously set aside tender awards in the name of national interest. Moreover, some contracts are awarded through single sourcing by selecting one supplier through non-competitive bidding (GAN Integrity, 2016). For example, President John Dramani Mahama who served as President of Ghana from 24 July 2012 to 7 January 2017 was involved in the allegations of bribery after the president received a car from a construction firm from Burkina Faso bidding on a lucrative government contract in Ghana. The firm later secured the road-building contract.

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The president denied the corruption allegations claiming that the vehicle was a gift and that it was added to the government car pool (World Economic Forum, 2016). Another area of heavy corruption is when dealing with the natural resources sector. There exists commercial corruption, especially in gold and diamond dealings. Moreover, buyers are often advised to deal directly with the Precious Minerals Marketing Company, the sole authority through which gold and diamonds can be legally exported. The prices are based solely on the London Exchange price on the day of export, and no discounting or negotiation of prices prior to export by the Precious Minerals Marketing Company is considered valid. Furthermore, there also exists a lack of transparency in the management of oil revenue and in the handling of cash influx. However, in an effort to build its image, the government now regularly publishes records on total cost and revenues. Nonetheless, these efforts lag behind when it comes to disclosure of financial records on mining and logging (Hanouz et al., 2014). Despite the government having a strong anti-corruption legal framework, it faces enforcement challenges. For example, the Criminal Code criminalizes corruption in the form of bribery, extortion, use of public office for private gain, and bribery of foreign public officials. Besides, corruption is generally illegal in the country, and both agent and principal are liable; the nationality of the person who is bribing or being bribed is irrelevant. Moreover, the Anti-Money Laundering Act 2008 criminalizes money laundering. The Code of Conduct for Public Officers and the Civil Service Act provide guidelines on conflict of interest for civil servants. Nonetheless, cronyism, nepotism, and patronage are not addressed (United States Department of State, 2016). Furthermore, civil servants are not prohibited from entering the private sector after leaving office. According to the Code of Conduct Officers Bill, civil servants are not allowed to accept gifts, unless these have no apparent influence on the performance of their duty. Besides, the Public Procurement Act, the Financial Administration Act, and the Internal Audit Agency Act promote public sector accountability. Furthermore, companies found guilty of corruption are prohibited from participating in future bidding for up to five years. However, implementation of these provisions is weak. Moreover, citizens are generally scared to blow the whistle on corruption for fear of retribution and job security despite being protected under the Whistleblowers Act 720 (GAN Integrity, 2016).

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Anti-corruption Tabloids Anti-corruption tabloid journalism continues to play a crucial role in bringing to light issues of bribery and embezzlement. Tabloid newspapers are critical players in exposing corruption and financial mismanagement in the country. Moreover, the country’s Constitution guarantees press freedom, and the government respects these rights in practice. According to the National Media Commission, many of the tabloid newspapers have emerged recently. However, many tabloids tend to have a short lifespan. Others are basically set up primarily to act as mouthpieces for their owners’ political views. Tabloids also face many challenges which range from changing trends in advertising to rising costs which has led to a decline in circulation (Kent Dairies, 2009). The country is yet to pass legislation to protect freedom of information. Moreover, the public requests to access government information only rely on the goodwill of public institutions (Freedom House, 2017b). The stories of corruption scandals are a regular feature in many tabloid newspapers and continue to dominate the headlines in the country. Over the years, stories of corruption have continued to shock many readers. For example, the 2012 ‘Woyome scandal’ is a classical example of general banditry with impunity in which businessman Alfred Agbesi Woyome, a powerful supporter and financier of the National Democratic Congress, was exposed and charged with corrupting public officials over a multimillion-dollar payment he had claimed illegally (Goushe, 2012). The scandal was with regard to the 2005 multimillion dollar bid for the rehabilitation of three different sports stadium in Accra, Sekondi-Takoradi, and Tamale towns for the 2008 Africa Cup of Nations tournament that was to be hosted by Ghana. The bid was won by Waterville Holding. On 19 December 2005, it engaged M-powapak led by businessman Alfred Agbesi Woyome to provide ‘services’ to the projects. However, the formal contract between the government and Waterville Holding was terminated in the light of cheaper bid offers from Chinese companies. The breach of contract led to payment by the government of a substantial amount of money to Waterville Holding. However, Waterville Holding on its part paid M-powapak of Alfred Agbesi Woyome for services it was contracted to provide to the projects. In August 2009, Woyome, taking advantage of the change in government from President John Kofi Agyekum Kufuor who was President of Ghana from 7 January 2001 to 7 January 2009, misrepresented the facts

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on the stadiums constructions and claimed the old government owed his company M-powapak money for losses incurred when the government terminated the contract with Waterville Holding. He managed to get the new government to pay him about US$34 million. It was not exactly clear how the businessman was able to defraud the state millions of dollars in payments he was not entitled to receive. However, the corruption scandal which started as merely a tabloid gossip was later at the centre of government inquiry and investigation (Goushe, 2012). Many tabloids called for the arrest of the perpetrators and bring them to justice. The massive sensational coverage finally led to the resignation of Education Minister Betty Mould-Iddrisu who was the former Attorney General, and who was linked to the decision to pay Alfred Agbesi Woyome. Besides, following an indictment for fraud by the country’s Economic and Organised Crime Office, Woyome was arrested and charged for corrupting public officials. In February 2012, the Chief Attorney Samuel Nerquaye-Tetteh along with his wife Gifty NeequayeTetteh and the Director at the Legal Department of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning Paul Asimenu were charged with ‘aiding and abetting’ a crime (Caldwell, 2012). Another tabloid newspaper critical in exposing corruption in the country is the Daily Guide owned by Georgina Blay. It is regarded as the most circulated independent newspaper in the country with a circulation of about 22,000 copies a day. Its editor Fortune Alimi heavily covers the corruption scandal in the country (Owusu 2016). For instance, it regularly criticized President John Atta Mills for being soft on corruption, especially among his inner circle. It often argued that he needed to push his record against corruption more and not just because of the 2012 presidential election in which he ordered the government inquiry and investigation into illegal payments which found that Alfred Agbesi Woyome made false financial claims. It also exposed deep-rooted corruption in the ruling National Democratic Congress party in which a number of its high-level officials and major supporters were charged with corruption which seriously dented the party’s reputation and credibility (Goushe, 2012). The tabloid newspapers coverage and exposure of corruption continue to divide not only tabloid newspapers, but also their readers, their owners and financiers, and above all, the Media Foundation for West Africa and Ghana Journalists Association. For example, on 3 September 2017, the Media Foundation for West Africa cautioned the Ghana Journalists

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Association against attempts to undermine anti-corruption journalism in the country. This was after Ghana Journalists Association cautioned journalists to refrain from destroying local businesses in the name of investigative journalism through ‘smear campaign’ of those contributing to the growth of the economy. This call came in the wake of the Jospong Group, owners of Zoomlion and other subsidiaries denial of claims, that it inflated the cost of a contract it had with the President John Dramani Mahama’s government who ruled the country from 24 July 2012 to 7 January 2017 to supply waste bins. However, the Media Foundation for West Africa wondered why the Ghana Journalists Association gave such a directive, without providing context that could warrant the caution. The Media Foundation for West Africa criticized the Ghana Journalists Association for issuing cautions without context and urged the reporters to remain committed to the true values of journalism and to remain unwavering in their fight against corruption. It declared its support for reporters interested in exposing corruption arguing that it encouraged all journalists to remain committed to supporting the few honest, dedicated, and selfless anti-corruption journalists who continue to risk their lives and work tirelessly to expose corrupt personalities and businesses who perpetrate fraud. It added that corrupt personalities must be exposed by the journalists and punished by the state whether they are Ghanaian or foreigners (Ansah, 2017).

Scancem The Scancem scandal took place between 1993 and 1998 in which millions of US dollars were transferred to Barclays Bank and Unibank account as bribery. In this corruption scandal, Nana Konadu AgyemanRawlings the wife of President Jerry John Rawlings is allegedly to have received over US$17 million as bribery. The payment was in relation to sold shares to Scancem, the Norwegian cement manufacturing company that took over from Ghacem. The background to the corruption and bribery scandal is that in 1992, the government started selling its 75% stake in Ghacem, founded by the Government of Ghana on 30 August 1967 in collaboration with Norcem AS of Norway becoming the largest producer of cement in Ghana (The Statesman, 2007b). The bribery scandal was first authored by two Norwegian journalists Geir Imset and Harald Vanvik who published it in Norwegian magazine Dagens Naeringlsiv Magasinet of 21 and 22 April 2007.

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In an article titled ‘Gray Cement - Black Money’, it was revealed that between 1993 and 1998, high-level bribery was involved by Tor Egil Kjelsaas, then Director of Africa for Scancem in which he paid huge sums of money to some African leaders in order to sustain Scancem’s monopoly over the supply of cement (Asare, 2007). The money was paid into Unibank account in Luxemburg and Barclays Bank account in Switzerland by Scancem earmarked ‘Ghana’. It further noted that the management knew that the money deposited at Barclays Bank went to Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings, and the money deposited at Unibank went to President Jerry John Rawlings special advisor Paul Victor Obeng. It was further revealed that Gerhard Heiberg, a Scancem official based in Ghana at the time, confirmed that President Rawlings and his wife Agyeman-Rawlings were among those who received money from Scancem. It was further revealed that Per Jacobsen, the former Scancem Head of Finance, also confirmed the bribery scandal in Ghana. It was further added that Tor Nygaard, a management staff of Scancem, confirmed to have paid money to politicians, the port officials, and the National Democratic Congress political party. It further noted that 14 coded forms were used with the date and amount for each recipient which was recorded in Ghanaian cedis as well as in US dollars. It further claimed to have interviewed Paul Victor Obeng who acknowledged receiving the payment from Scancem for ‘consultancy services’ (Asare, 2007). It revealed that the bribes payments were meant to influence the sale of shares in Ghacem. It challenged the Norwegian government to explain the seeming contradiction between its international political image as a champion of ethical politics and historical inaction against the corrupt practices of its multinational companies (The Statesman, 2007a). The revelations prompted two Ghanaian journalists Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko, the managing editor of the Statesman Newspaper, and Kweku Baako, the managing editor of the Crusading Guide newspaper to travel to Norway to investigate. One of the two Norwegian journalists Harald Vanvik who broke the story told Darko in Oslo that he and Geir Imset were in Accra in April 2006 to speak to President Jerry John Rawlings and his wife to get their side of the story but rebuffed all attempts made through the National Democratic Congress’s Kokomlemle headquarters (Asare, 2007). Besides, Gabby Asare Otchere-Darko refuted allegations by some tabloid newspapers that their trip was sponsored by the government to find stuff to nail former President Jerry John Rawlings and his wife

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Nana Konadu Agyeman-Rawlings. He noted that it was his responsibility to take the initiative to acquaint himself with first-hand information than relying on uncertified English translation from Norwegian newspaper. He wondered why people were comfortable to call Kweku Baako whom he travelled with to Norway, and the managing editor of the Crusading Guide newspaper, and a one-time journalist of the year as ‘Mr. Documents’ but find it hard to understand the trip intended to get to the bottom of the story that was in national interest. He gave an example of journalist Anas Aremeyaw Anas of the Crusading Guide who disguised himself to travel to a Thai jail to bring the raw facts to Ghanaians, and Raymond Archer of The Enquirer who went to Vienna, Austria, to investigate a visa fraud involving Alhaji Moctar Bamba when he was the Deputy Minister for Presidential Affairs (Ghanaian Observer, 2007). The Ghanaian journalists who travelled to Norway reported that the silence of the Norwegian authorities on the Scancem scandal was surprising and accused the government of double standards. It was also revealed that the investigations by the Auditor General in Ghana noted that there were underhand dealings in payments totalling over US$22 million. Besides, Ghana’s ambassador to Norway who once worked for Ghacem which Scancem bought into was mentioned in the Scancem bribery scandal as one of the officials responsible for making payments to government officials in the bribery allegations involving Scancem (The Statesman, 2007a). The Scancem court case trial in Norway on which the Norwegian journalists drew a lot of facts started in October 2005. Tor Egil Kjelsaas, who was at the time of the illegal payment and scandals as Director of Africa for Scancem, was sued by his employers Scancem of Norway who bought shares in Ghacem in Ghana. This was in relation to an alleged bribery of some West African Heads of State involving huge sums of dollars. He was accused by his employers of theft when he was stationed in Africa to represent Scancem’s interests. Accusations mainly centred on his dealings in Ghana. His witnesses, all former executives of Scancem, included Gerhard Heiberg the Chief Executive Officer and Chairman of Aker, the former owners of Scancem, Per Jacobsen the Head of Finance at Scancem, and Tor Nygaard the Head of Ghana Operations at Scancem. All were accused of being instrumental in masterminding and implementing bribery schemes dubbed the ‘slush fund’. It was noted that all allegedly offered Scancem US$5 million settlement to halt

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the continuation of the case against Tor Egil Kjelsaas which was at the Appeal Court stage (Asare, 2007). The background to the scandal is that since the 1960s, Scancem controlled the cement production in Ghana, Liberia, Togo, and SierraLeone often as a monopoly (The Statesman, 2007b). In 2000, its in-house lawyer Arne-Jorg Selen discovered financial irregularities into the accounts’ owners at Unibank in Luxembourg and at Barclays in Switzerland which showed financial mismanagement by Tor Egil Kjelsaas from 1993 to 1998. The money transactions left a trail that went to Ghana (The Statesman, 2007a). In October 2009, the special aide to former President Jerry John Rawlings, Kofi Adams revealed to the Chronicle tabloid newspaper that a number of international lawyers were to defend his boss in the bribery allegation made against him by some top officials of Scancem, and that the decision by the lawyers followed a press conference he organized in Norway to officially deny that he and his wife were paid various sums of money by Scancem officials to aid their business interest in Ghana (AllAfrica, 2009). However, the Norwegian court found that top people at the National Democratic Congress political party in Ghana and some government officials received bribes in millions of US dollars from Scancem. The core purpose of bribers was to consolidate the Norwegian-owned firm’s hold in the local cement industry. Besides, Judge Trine Standal’s court ruling held that the two parties in the case agreed that the bribery had been contrary to Norwegian and Ghanaian law in which bribery is a crime and shameful. This was on the civil case brought against Tor Egil Kjelsaas, a former Scancem Director for Africa, for the recovery of the allegedly stolen ‘slush fund’ by him meant to bribe top African officials (The Statesman, 2007b). The Judge held that the two parties in the case agreed that the bribery had been contrary to Norwegian and Ghanaian law in which bribery is a crime and was shameful (The Statesman, 2007b).

United Bank of Africa During the reign of President John Dramani Mahama from 24 July 2012 to 7 January 2017, the country experienced what some tabloid newspapers noted to be the ‘golden age of corruption’. In 2015, a US$1 billion Eurobond was issued to the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund. However, out of it, Finance Minister Seth Terkper transferred US$250 million into a private account at United Bank of Africa. The money

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borrowed at a high interest rate was secretly and illegally lodged without any competitive bid and behind parliament as demanded by the Bank of Ghana Act. There was no legitimate paper trail that was found at the time of revelations to follow this transaction. There were also allegations of President Mahama’s Chief of Staff involvement in this transaction which was curiously deposited (Akomea, 2016). The tabloids quoted Mahamudu Bawumia in May 2016 who was the running mate to Nana Akuffo-Addo of the New Patriotic Party who confirmed that the money was put into a private account in a private bank for election campaigns ahead of the November 2016 polls. For example, The Announcer Newspaper noted that the government transferred US$250 million of Eurobond proceeds secured at an unbelievably high rate to a private bank. It turned around to borrow back that amount through treasury bills, thus, paying interests again on the same money to the private bank. It accused the government of reckless borrowing and improper management of Ghana’s debt stock. It was further revealed that the funds were initially deposited at Bank of Ghana where it should be, knowing that the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund was not operational and there were no projects for the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund to implement at the time. It was further revealed that with no project to execute, these funds were then lent to the government through the purchase of treasury bills which was a case of high-level corruption and unbelievable. It was further explained that Bawumia, who himself was the former Deputy Governor of the Bank of Ghana, was puzzled at how government could go and borrow funds on the international market at an unbelievably high rate and then give those funds to a third party so it can borrow it back on the domestic market. It was noted that it did not make sense on how government can go and borrow funds from the international capital market at high interest, then give the funds to another private party, and then borrow those same funds at another high interest. It noted that it did not only cause financial loss to the state, but was an example of incompetent economic management (The Announcer Newspaper, 2016). The tabloids further revealed that the scheme was not only fishy but another way of siphoning money ahead of the anticipated change in government. For example, many newspapers wanted to know the truthfulness of the allegations. Others wanted to know who authorized the movement of the money from the Bank of Ghana to the private bank, and who the interest was accruing to, and if the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund was not operational, why was this transfer done, and

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whether the government understood that the money supply would increase, and whether this was a secret way to steal money meant for public service delivery (The Announcer Newspaper, 2016). Following extensive tabloid newspapers revelations accompanied by sensational headlines, the government was forced to come clean on the allegations. For instance, the government through the Finance Minister Seth Terkper addressed the media on 9 May 2016. He assured the citizens that the US$250 million seed money to Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund was safe and bearing interest to the idle fund. He noted that the passage of the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund Act 2014 under Act 877 established a fund which is owned by the Republic of Ghana to mobilize, manage, coordinate, and provide financial resources for investment in a diversified portfolio of infrastructure projects in Ghana for national development. He explained that the government allocated the money in line with the law. He added that under the same law, the Board has the powers under Section 3 of the Act to manage and invest contributions made to the fund and to reinvest into the fund to generate returns. It can also put the money in a commercial bank for the sole purpose of investment. Besides, Section 21(2) of the Financial Administration Act makes provision for the investment of public money in securities. He noted that the money cannot be misapplied. He further noted that any idle fund will earn interest to support infrastructure development of the country, and that the public funds do not only reside in the Bank of Ghana, but in commercial banks and international financial institutions where necessary, acting as agents for the Bank of Ghana. He added that the country also now sources its financing from the international capital market which has stringent rules and international law backing the transactions. He pointed out that the misinformation creates uncertainty in the minds of investors and that such misinformation needed to cease. He further explained that there was need to cross-check the facts to ensure that the best interest for the nation was maintained at all times (The Announcer Newspaper, 2016). However, following the Finance Minister Seth Terkper address to the media, further questions arose among many tabloid newspapers who wanted to know why the minister diverted $250 million when the country needed cash flow in investment. Other questions were on why did the Ministry of Finance go to the international capital market to borrow such a huge amount of money with high yearly interest when it had no

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work to be done with it. There were also other questions on why the government used the sovereignty of the people of Ghana to acquire a loan for no purpose only to be diverted into private accounts at United Bank for Africa when this money was to be paid by Ghana for the next 15 years. Furthermore, some tabloid newspapers concluded that the Eurobond was only acquired to help boost the deposits of United Bank for Africa for the selfish interest of President John Dramani Mahama and his closest associates, who were serving on the Board of the United Bank for Africa, to finance his campaign for the November 2016 polls. Other questions were also on why was this transfer done in secrecy, and on what was the main reason why Henry Kofi Wampah was forced to resign as Governor of the Bank of Ghana ahead of his retirement (Akomea, 2016). The tabloid newspapers kept pressure on government with countless accusations over its mishandling of the economy. For example, many tabloid newspapers revealed that the placement of the money into a private bank by the Minister of Finance was a violation of the law as well as imprudent financial management. It was also noted that the Ministry of Finance along with the Bank of Ghana is supposed to enforce the Bank of Ghana Act and not to be party to breaking the financial laws. It was further noted that under the current International Monetary Fund programme, there is supposed to be a new Bank of Ghana Act as the existing one was being violated with impunity by the very sponsors of the new Act. Moreover, there was also a call for a parliamentary inquiry in the light of the confirmation of this transaction from the Ministry of Finance and the transaction to be reversed (Citi, 2016). The tabloids finally revealed that the directive to transfer the money was given by President John Dramani Mahama. It was noted that there was no proper justification for the transfer of the money. It was further revealed that the Ghana Infrastructure Investment Fund was chaired by Professor Kwamena Ahwoi, a close associate of President John Dramani Mahama, a member of the National Democratic Congress political party, and a financier of the party. Professor Ahwoi was the same man who mobilized funds for National Democratic Congress’s campaign. He was also a member of the Board of Governors of the United Bank for Africa. It was also revealed that another financial kingpin of the National Democratic Congress and Chief Executive Officer of the Ghana National Petroleum Cooperation Alexander Mould, the brother of Betty Mould of the infamous ‘Woyome scandal’ and also a first Vice Chairperson of

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the National Democratic Congress’s, was also a member of the Board of Directors of the United Bank for Africa. It was further noted that this was just another case of a scam visited on unsuspecting Ghanaians by President Mahama who was walking freely on the streets of Accra and shamelessly mocking Ghanaians that he has never taken a bribe. It was also revealed from the sources in the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Ghana, who confirmed the transfer of US$250m out of the US$1billion into the United Bank for Africa, a Nigerian owned commercial bank operating in Ghana. Even though this money was meant to refinance the country’s suffocating domestic debts and its deepening infrastructure deficit, it ended up being mismanaged (Adorye, 2016).

Conclusion Corruption in Ghana has become a household word on the lips of almost everybody. The stories of corruption are regular features in the country’s major tabloids. At times, the newspapers’ exposure of corrupt officials forces the law enforcement agencies to arrest and prosecute culprits which also serves as a deterrent to other would-be offenders. However, over the years, the corruption menace has had serious and adverse effects on the development of the country and has become of great concern to many people. Basically, in their efforts to combat corruption, successive Ghanaian governments have resorted to various means, including confiscation of property, imprisonment, and even execution of convicted corrupt public officials. However, these measures, in spite of their punitive nature, have failed to deter citizens from indulging in corrupt practices. In the light of the crucial role of the tabloid newspapers in the fight against corruption, and coupled with the expansion of the frontiers of press freedom and the repeal of the obnoxious criminal libel and seditions laws, one would have thought the stage was set for an effective tabloids crusade against corruption in the country. Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Corruption scandals are rampant in the country and the tabloids tend to run hard-hitting front-page headlines that expose embezzlement. This is despite the government having a strong anti-corruption legal framework even though implementation still remains a challenge making the fight against corruption a difficult one. Moreover, there still exist cronyism, nepotism, and patronage which are not adequately addressed in the laws (Brako, 2014).

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Bibliography Adorye, H. (2016). $250m saga: Mahama modernising ‘419’—Group. Retrieved from https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/250msaga-Mahama-modernising-419-Group-438512. Akomea, N. (2016). President Mahama lied on corruption and bribery. Retrieved from http://www.ghanadot.com/Commentary.release.npp.presmahamalied.051616.html. AllAfrica. (2009). Ghana: Rawlings hires international lawyers for defense in Scancem bribery scandal. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/200910070859.html. Ansah, M. (2017). Stop undermining anti-corruption journalism—MFWA warns GJA. Retrieved from http://citifmonline.com/2017/09/03/stopundermining-anti-corruption-journalism-mfwa-warns-gja/. Asare, K. (2007). Former Prez Rawlings cited in bribery case. Retrieved from http://www.ghanadot.com/social_scene.feature.asare.rawlingsbribery.072307.html. Asah-Asante, K., & Brako, I. (2014). Media crusade against corruption in Ghana’s fourth republic (2004–2012). International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences, 7(2), 1–10. Retrieved from https:// raadaa.com/entries/international-journal-of-research-in-arts-and-socialsciences-172?rdr=1. BBC. (2015). Ghana country reports. Retrieved from http://downloads.bbc. co.uk/worldservice/trust/pdf/AMDI/ghana/amdi_ghana7_newspapers.pdf. Brako, I. (2014). Media crusade against corruption in Ghana’s fourth republic (2004–2012). International Journal of Research in Arts and Social Sciences, 76(2). Retrieved from https://raadaa.com/entries/ international-journal-of-research-in-arts-and-social-sciences-172?rdr=1. Caldwell, M. (2012). Ghanaian government financier faces corruption charges. Retrieved from http://www.dw.com/en/ghanaian-governmentfinancier-faces-corruption-charges/a-15741964. Citi. (2016). $250m deposit at UBA reckless- Bawumia replies Terkper. Retrieved from http://citifmonline.com/2016/05/10/250m-deposit-at-uba-recklessbawumia-replies-terkper/. Freedom House. (2017a). Freedom for press 2015. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2015#.WnetOKinE2x. Freedom House. (2017b). Ghana. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/ report/freedom-world/2014/ghana#.VLUKvivF9pt. GAN Integrity. (2016). Ghana corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/ghana. Ghanaian Observer. (2007). Rawlings dodged us-Norwegians. Retrieved from https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/RawlingsDodged-Us-Norwegians-128644.

108  B. CHAMA Goushe, Y. (2012). Ghana democracy. Retrieved from http://addisstandard. com/ghanas-democracy-trying-time-for-probity-and-accountability-2/. Hanouz, D. M., Geiger, T., & Doherty, S. E. (2014). The global enabling trade report. Retrieved from http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_ GlobalEnablingTrade_Report_2014.pdf. Kent Dairies. (2009). Financial crisis crumpling Ghana newspapers. Retrieved from https://kentgh.wordpress.com/2009/03/05/ financial-crisis-crumpling-ghana-newspapers/. Owusu, W. Y. (2016). Woyome in GH¢35m fresh scandal. Retrieved from http:// dailyguideafrica.com/woyome-gh%C2%A235m-fresh-scandal/. The Announcer Newspaper. (2016). Diverting US$250m into a private account. Retrieved from http://announcernewsonline.com/diverting-us-m-into-a-private-acctgovt-replies-bawumia-p18162-233.htm. The Statesman. (2007a). Scancem bribery: Norwegian minister ‘sad’. Retrieved from https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/ Scancem-Bribery-Norwegian-Minister-sad-128683. The Statesman. (2007b). Scancem reject US$5 million to kill the court case. Retrieved from http://iloveafrica2.blogspot.ca/2009/09/scancem-rejects5m-offer-to-kill-court.html. The World Bank. (2017). Doing business. Retrieved from http://www.doingbusiness.org/. Transparency International. (2017). Ghana. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/GHA. United States Department of State. (2016). Country report on human rights practice. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper. World Economic Forum. (2016). The global competitiveness report. Retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-20152016/.

CHAPTER 7

Nigerian Tabloid Journalism and Corruption Practices

Corruption affects the socio-economic fabric of Nigeria. It also threatens the existence of the country as a political entity. In combating corruption, the tabloids in the country use sensational headlines as watchdogs that monitor actions and inactions of those in power. Corruption in the country is rooted in the history of military rulers who often subdued the rule of law and facilitated looting of public funds. Over the years, the military dictators who once ruled the West African state promoted a culture of corruption difficult to remove even today. However, as the country transitioned to multiparty democracy, instruments to fight corruption have improved. Anti-corruption tabloids have flourished in the country now ranked at 136 out of 176 by the 2016 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (2017). This chapter discusses anti-corruption tabloid journalism and how the tabloid newspapers play their role in covering and exposing corruption. It looks at the Lamido Sanusi scandal and the disappearance of US$20 billion in the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation in revenues. It also explores the BMW scandal by the aviation minister. It concludes that anti-corruption tabloid newspapers are critical in the fight against corruption but need to ensure that they appraise corruption information in an independent manner, use it meaningfully, and disseminate it to the general public. It further adds that in addition to independence, the credibility of tabloids critical functions depends on their ability to digest corruption allegation materials and make it accessible to the public. © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_7

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It also notes that tabloid journalism that exposes corruption requires a high degree of responsibility, and involves editorial and gatekeeping exercises in which the journalists and their newspapers decide which information to report and which to leave out which enhances or damages the fight against corruption.

Corruption in Nigeria Corruption in Nigeria is a significant obstacle to the development of the country. Generally, there exists a widespread culture of bribery which is pervasive in all institutions, especially in the oil sector. Moreover, despite corruption being criminalized by the Criminal Code and the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, in practice this is not the case. For example, payment facilitation is illegal and individuals can be penalized for up to seven years in prison. However, enforcement of anti-corruption legislation remains weak (GAN Integrity, 2017). For example, in October 2016, law enforcement seized US$800,000 in a raid targeting several judges over corruption. Supreme Court Justice Sylvester Ngwuta was charged in court in the capital Abuja with fifteen counts of fraud and money laundering amounting to nearly US$1.5 million. He was also found with several passports. He appeared along with seven other judges. The National Judicial Council which is a judicial regulatory body suspended the judges (BBC News, 2016). Corruption is rampant in the judiciary characterized by bribes to obtain favourable judgments. Even though the Constitution provides for independence of the judiciary, it is also plagued by poorly paid staff which encourages embezzlement (Freedom House, 2017a). Similarly, the police are also engulfed in corruption and officers continue to operate with impunity. For example, on 14 October 2016, the Nigerian Monitor newspaper revealed on how the Complaint Response Unit of the Nigeria Police Force recovered millions of US dollars as bribe from a serving Assistant Commissioner of Police in its attempt to resolve 405 complaints made against the police by members of the public between 1 July and 30 September 2016 (Temitayo, 2016). Similarly, former Inspector General of Police Tafa Balogun was imprisoned for stealing and laundering about US$100 million. In addition, Inspector General of Police, Sunday Ehindero appointed to replace him, was also charged for laundering over US$20 million belonging to the police cooperative into secret accounts (Bakre, 2013).

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Besides, the public service suffers widespread corruption and culture of patronage. For example, on 28 December 2016, the Vanguard newspaper revealed that the Federal Government Payroll removed over 50,000 ‘ghost workers’ saving the country over US$636 million. It noted that 11 main suspects were referred to the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Nwabughiogu, 2016). Similarly, The Nation newspaper reported on 15 February 2018 that former Oyo State Governor Chief Rasheed Ladoja was charged in the Federal High Court in Lagos and re-arraigned by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission for converting millions of US dollars from the state treasury into his personal use. He was charged along with Waheed Akanbi on eight counts of money laundering and unlawful conversion of public funds (Jibueze, 2018). Furthermore, tax administration faces massive corruption. For example, on 23 September 2016, the Naija Observer newspaper reported that the government identified 700,000 firms that never paid taxes. It further noted that the government was struggling to fund a record US$18.6 billion 2016 budget that aimed to stimulate growth by tripling capital expenditure (Babatunde Fowler, 2016). Moreover, tax collection is full of bribery which is handled exclusively by the Nigerian Customs Service and the Nigerian Ports Authority. For example, on 20 October 2016, the Pulse newspaper reported that 29 top officers of the Nigerian Customs Service were sacked by the agency for offences which bordered on drugs abuse, bribery, and forgery (Bada, 2016). The public procurement sector experiences payment expectations to secure a government contract. Even though the country has taken efforts to reform public procurement policies such as the Public Procurement Act 2007 which aims to minimize the abuse, in practice, public servants continue to be involved in corruption with impunity. For example, on 8 April 2017, Sahara Reporters newspaper revealed that over US$15 billion was stolen from the state coffers through fraudulent arms procurement deals. The revelation came after the investigations by a Presidential Committee Panel following a directive by President Goodluck Jonathan. The Panel was constituted to look into the procurement of hardware for the Armed Forces and into 15 retired and serving military officers as well as 22 companies (Alli, 2017). Similarly, on 6 March 2017, the Daily Post newspaper revealed that Bala Ngilari, the former governor of Adamawa State, was sentenced by the High Court in Yola to five years in prison for

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failing to adhere to procedures for awarding a contract to supply 25 vehicles in line with the procurement laws. In a 75-minute ruling, the Justice Nathan Musa found former governor guilty of four charges and was sentenced to prison (Jannah, 2017). Another area of massive corruption is in natural resources sector where there is a general lack of transparency (Malden, 2017). For instance, the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative Act provides for the establishment of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative which monitors transparency and accountability in the reporting and financial disclosure of extractive companies (GAN Integrity, 2017). For example, on 5 April 2017, the Vanguard newspaper revealed that the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative wanted the government to recover over US$21 billion from the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and investigate non-transparent contracts and transactions. It also called for a probe into over US$15 billion related to dividend and loan repayments by Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas from 2000 to 2014 (Eboh, 2017). Similarly, on 3 May 2017, the Premium Times newspaper called on government to investigate the deal between the Nigerian government and the Royal Dutch Shell worth over US$1.3 billion for Nigeria’s richest offshore exploration oil block OPL 245 licence. It further revealed that majority of the over US$1 billion paid by two of the world’s largest oil companies the Royal Dutch Shell and ENI (Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi) an Italian company, into a Nigerian government account ended up in private pockets. It noted that high-ranking executives for the two multinational companies were aware that part of the money would be used to enrich the Oil Minister Dan Etete and former Minister Mohammed Adoke as well as former President Goodluck Jonathan. The news came at the time when the two companies were facing investigations in Nigeria, Italy, and the Netherlands after controversial contract awards (Premium Times, 2017).

Anti-corruption Tabloids Tabloid newspapers play a major role in covering corruption in Nigeria. Even though the Constitution protects press freedom, in practice, challenges still exist. For instance, Sharia law, which is an Islamic statute, is in effect in 12 northern states and imposes severe penalties for press offences. Moreover, there are other laws that punish various offences such as sedition, criminal defamation, and publication of false news.

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Besides, a Frivolous Petitions Bill, which passed its second reading in the Senate in December 2015, would mandate a two-year prison sentence and or a fine of US$10,000 for ‘statements’ against a person, a group, or government institution, and it is likely to encroach on the practice of tabloid newspapers. However, the 2011 Freedom of Information Act guarantees tabloid journalists’ right to public information. It also puts pressure on government agencies to release records in response to petitions. However, some state governors are unwilling at complying with the law arguing that the federal legislation is not applicable to the states. For instance, a study in October 2015 found that none of the 39 government institutions assessed had complied with the legal obligation to disclose information from 2012 to 2013 (Freedom House, 2017b). Moreover, due to widespread corruption in the judiciary, the courts do not always judge fairly in cases involving journalists. Besides, tabloid journalists sometimes face interference from the judiciary and public officials when reporting on high-level corruption. On the other hand, tabloid newspapers in the country continue to venture forward in the fight against corruption. For example, the Daily Post newspaper on 31 August 2012 revealed that over US$400 billion of the nation’s oil revenue has been stolen since Nigeria gained independence in 1960. It noted that this was disclosed by the former World Bank Vice-President for Africa Oby Ezekwesili while presenting a paper titled ‘Corruption, National Development, The Bar and The Judiciary’ at the 52nd Annual General Meeting of the Nigerian Bar Association in Abuja (Okoye, 2012). Generally, the country has relatively free press by the standards of the region, and authorities usually tolerate vitriolic criticism of the president. However, journalists are sometimes targeted and harassed by security forces and ruling party thugs, especially in the build-up to elections. Besides, tabloid journalists continue to face physical assaults and intimidation with impunity which still remains a major concern. Moreover, reporters are routinely put under surveillance by secret service (Eboh, 2013). For example, in 2014, the Premium Times newspaper based in Abuja known for its investigative journalism suffered a denial-of-service attack, and its online users received a ‘website blocked’ message. Similarly, on Sunday 22 January 2017, its newsroom was raided by the plain-clothes police. Its publisher Dapo Olorunyomi and reporter Evelyn Okakwu were arrested and slapped with criminal charges including defamation. Among the serious charges included inciting mutiny within the military and undermining military operations against terrorists in northern Nigeria (Kaplan, 2017).

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Besides, on 16 April 2013, authorities charged two journalists Tony Amokeodo and Chibuzor Ukaibe of the daily Leadership with forgery after publishing a memo alleged to have been written by President Goodluck Jonathan and accused him of launching a dirty campaign against the opposition and plans to disrupt the merger of opposition political parties. The reporters noted that the president issued orders to frustrate a newly potent opposition by any means including surveillance ahead of 2015 presidential elections. The memo did not say to whom the directive was addressed, but noted that it was a directive from the president. A court in the capital Abuja read out the 11 criminal charges which included forgery, conspiracy to commit a felony, and incitement of public disaffection against the president which carries a maximum of seven years in prison and a minimum of three (Freedom House, 2017b). Similarly, in June 2015, journalists Yomi Olomofe of Prime publication and McDominic Nkpemenyie of the Tide Newspaper were seriously assaulted near the Nigeria Customs Service office along the border with Benin. At the time, the two journalists were investigating smuggling activities within the customs service. Similarly, on 12 November 2015, about 10 members of the Nigerian Prison Service assaulted and handcuffed journalist Emmanuel Elebeke of the Vanguard newspaper while taking photographs of six murder suspects in a murder case on the premises of the Federal Capital Territory High Court in the Maitama District of Abuja seizing his camera. The prison officials asked the journalist to hand over his camera, and when he refused to do so, they started beating him up. He was handcuffed by one prison official and hit by another with the butt of his gun. He suffered injuries on both his legs and other parts of his body. The prison officers insisted the journalist had no right to take pictures of the suspects on court grounds and refused to return the camera (Hang, 2015). Since President Muhammadu Buhari came to power on 29 May 2015, tabloid newspapers have become vibrant in exposing corruption, especially in his predecessor Goodluck Jonathan who is a former President of Nigeria having served from 2010 to 2015, and also having served as the Vice-President of Nigeria from 2007 to 2010 and as former Governor of Bayelsa State from 2005 to 2007 (Ani, 2010). President Muhammadu Buhari has carried out a serious crackdown on corruption on which the tabloids have provided sensational headlines and pictures to bring the scandals into public domain. Even though the tabloids have become vibrant and outspoken in their condemnation of

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corruption and bribery, however, they continue to face regular interference from public officials. Some tabloid journalists now self-censor on sensitive corruption issues as a result of verbal threats and assaults, as well as due to reluctance to displease tabloid newspapers’ owners and sponsors. The police officers and the militia groups still remain the most common perpetrators of attacks against tabloid journalists in the country. For instance, tabloids’ distributions are sometimes disrupted by the military’s crackdown on delivery vehicles and printing sites, which are usually coordinated across multiple states and regions. For example, in 2015, reports emerged that the Federal Government discreetly provided financial compensation to most of the newspapers affected by the disruption and paid over US$763,000 in total through the Newspaper Proprietors’ Association of Nigeria (Freedom House, 2017a). The fight against corruption is also affected by small-scale bribes and gifts to tabloid journalists which are common. However, journalists themselves do not consider them a problem which calls their independence into question (GAN Integrity, 2017). Bribery remains a problem in the tabloid newspaper industry particularly in the form of small cash gifts that sources give to journalists. For example, a 2009 survey of 184 media professionals in Lagos found that 61% of them habitually received such gifts while on reporting assignments. However, 74% of the respondents disagreed that the gifts led to biased coverage (Freedom House, 2017b).

Lamido Sanusi The reign of President Goodluck Jonathan from 5 May 2010 to 29 May 2015 was engulfed in massive corruption scandals. In February 2014, Lamido Sanusi, the Governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria appointed on 3 June 2009 for a five-year term, told a Senate Committee that out of the US$67 billion of oil sold between January 2012 and July 2013, US$20 billion was missing at the state-run Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (Ross, 2014). Since his appointment in 2009, he was widely respected after undertaking reforms to the banking sector and was even named the Central Bank Governor of the Year for 2010 by the Banker magazine (BBC News, 2014). However, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation refuted the allegations arguing that the governor demonstrated little understanding of the technicalities of the oil industry. On 20 February 2014, Lamido Sanusi was suspended by President Goodluck Jonathan for

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‘financial recklessness and misconduct’ (BBC News, 2014). He was suspended while in Niger attending a meeting of top officials and left immediately while his deputy, Sarah Alade who travelled with him, was asked to fill in until a new governor was appointed. The presidential statement announced by Reuben Abati mentioned that he was suspended due to deep irregularities under his watch pending ‘investigations into breaches of enabling laws’ of the Central Bank of Nigeria and that his tenure was characterized by financial recklessness and misconduct (Ross, 2014a). The Senate Committee on Finance in February 2014 ordered an independent audit into missing money allegedly amounted to US$20 billion. However, the Finance Ministry revealed that the missing receipts were finally recovered in an audit and the allegedly missing money was accounted for altogether (Al Jazeera, 2014). However, the scandal continued to explode with sensational headlines and reports in the tabloid newspapers both online and in print format. For example, the Punch newspaper noted that Lamido Sanusi revelations in the oil sector were a strike at the heart of the vested interests that control the Nigerian state and who ever does that should be ready for the consequences. It was noted that he was fired because he refused to stop the investigations over the financial mismanagement and corruption (Yusuf, 2015). On 26 February 2014, Lamido Sanusi filed a suit in the High Court against President Goodluck Jonathan authority to suspend him (Bright, 2014). He claimed to have spearheaded the country’s bank reforms after taking office in 2009 that created powerful enemies with vested interests in a country. He also revealed to have received death threats and frequent warnings that he would be fired after he took on the bank Chief Executive Officers who stole billions in deposits and had bought political protection, or were themselves politicians. He argued that the decision for bank reforms pitched him against powerful economic and political forces. He noted that corrupt vested interests were keeping what should be a wealthy country impoverished and were at the heart of 90% of the problems that were confronting the country (Faul, 2014). However, Lamido Sanusi’s critics questioned whether he was using his job to harm President Goodluck Jonathan’s chances of re-election because the controversy came ahead of the 2015 elections when the governing party was split over whether President Jonathan should contest. He was also accused by some tabloids of having become ‘a mosquito on the president’s testicles, and the dilemma was whether to ignore or

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to smash it’ (Ross, 2014b). On the other hand, his supporters thought that the president chose to suspend the whistle-blower rather than focus on stopping fraud. It was noted that it was clear that when one fights corruption, corruption fights back. For example, the opposition All Progressives Congress coalition noted that President Jonathan’s move was sending a signal to all Nigerians that his administration was not tolerating any exposure of corruption in the country (Faul, 2014). However, when President Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in on 29 May 2015, he vowed to tackle inherent corruption in Nigeria. He launched investigations and prosecution of those suspected of misappropriating the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation’s revenue under the past administrations. On 26 September 2015, the Punch newspaper revealed that Diezani Alison-Madueke, the former Minister of Petroleum Resources, was arrested in London by the United Kingdom National Crime Agency. She served as a minister between 2010 and May 2015 under President Goodluck Jonathan. She was arrested in connection with offences bordering on fraud and bribery. It was further added that along with her cronies, she was believed to have embezzled billions of dollars from the state-owned oil company (Nsehe, 2015). Similarly, in June 2015, Sahara Reporters revealed details of the corrupt deals by the former Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke. It reported that the former minister defrauded the country several billions of dollars through a controversial strategic alliance agreement between the state-owned oil company and some private oil companies involving key prolific oil blocks. It further added that Lamido Sanusi was fired because he wanted to stop the financial looting after he noted that tens of billions of dollars in oil revenues were not remitted to state coffers by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation between January 2011 and July 2014 (Yusuf, 2015). The newspaper further revealed that the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company entered into corrupt alliances with companies with political connections. It pointed out that the former Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke was at the centre of corrupt deals involving important oil blocks. It named and shamed individuals in what it claimed to be an unholy arrangement between Alison-Madueke a government official, Kola Aluko her business ally, Jide Omokore a business mogul and Peoples Democratic Party financier and kingmaker to some governors as well as many senators and members in the House of Representatives (Faul, 2014).

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The Sahara Reporters revealed that on 19 July 2010, Atlantic Energy was incorporated as a portfolio company three months after the former Minister of Petroleum Resources Diezani Alison-Madueke assumed office. In April 2011, it entered into a strategic alliance agreement with the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company which allowed it to operate some oil blocks. Atlantic Energy embarked on a massive recruitment poaching experts in the oil industry to compete effectively in the sector. It was granted without following procurement laws to cover four oil blocks all sold by Shell/Agip and Total in which the Federal Government owns 55% (Faul, 2014). In this clandestine arrangement, the Atlantic Energy was expected to fund the operations and provide technical support so that it can be reimbursed directly from the production in subsequent periods. This arrangement led to massive looting of public funds. Atlantic Energy could not provide the money it was supposed to pay regularly called ‘signature bonuses’ after lifting the oil as time went on in this arrangement. In 2011, it approached two Nigerian banks for loans to pay signature bonuses. It was then forced to take a loan from First Bank of $370 million and Skye Bank of $120 million to pay the signature bonus. In 2012, it obtained another loan of US$168 million instead of the required US$350 million. In 2013, it paid US$68 million instead of the required US$240 million. In 2014, it paid nothing instead of the required US$54 million (Yusuf, 2015). After President Goodluck Jonathan left office, Atlantic Energy was asked by the Nigerian Petroleum Development Company on 6 May 2015 to pay its outstanding US$574 million. For instance, the Sahara Reporters revealed that it actually owed US$1.2 billion and also defaulted on the bank loans. For example, the First Bank on 20 February 2015 refused a request to restructure the loan facility citing stringent conditions. Similarly, the Skye Bank on 10 April 2015 requested to be paid its outstanding loan facility it took. Atlantic Energy also owed workers millions of US dollars whom it could not pay for more than one year, and equally defaulted in the payment of workers’ pensions. It ended up destroying peoples’ lives and that of several businesses (Nsehe, 2015). The Lamido Sanusi scandal was heavily covered by the tabloid newspapers in the country and the subsequent investigation by the corruption and law enforcement agencies opened a Pandora’s box of deeply rooted corruption in the country (Ross, 2014b).

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BMW Scandal On 15 October 2013, the Punch newspaper revealed that the cashstrapped Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority agency of the Ministry of Aviation purchased two armoured BMW 760 Li cars for the private use of the Aviation Minister Stella Oduah (Oladimeji, 2015). It was further revealed that the agency paid approximately US$1.6 million to buy the two cars from Coscharis Motors Limited in Lagos with each costing close to U$800,000. It noted that following its own investigations with the car sale companies, the agency could have got even eight, and not only two cars of the same make for their money. It stated that several automobile sales companies contacted indicated that the cars were massively overpriced. It gave an example of Vista BMW car dealer in Coconut Creek in Florida, that explained that a fully assembled car of that make able to withstand the AK-47, officially known also as the Kalashnikov, which is a gas-operated 7.62 × 39 mm assault rifle developed in the Soviet Union by Mikhail Kalashnikov costs only US$162,000. It also stressed that a quote provided by the car ballistic division of the International Armoring Corporation in Centerville, Utah, revealed that each of the cars could have been provided for US$200,000 plus the cost of shipping to Nigeria. It further claimed to have contacted other automobile sales companies in Europe who quoted even slightly lower prices for the model cars purchased for personal use (Sahara Reporters, 2013). The Aviation Minister Stella Oduah was part of President Goodluck Jonathan’s inner circle. She was his campaign director of administration and finance during the 2011 presidential elections. Her critics charged that the cost was inflated, and that there was no provision for such a purchase in the budget, nor did their acquisition process comply with public procurement policy (Campbell, 2014). After initially denying the corruption allegations by the Aviation Ministry and the national civil aviation authority, the minister’s spokesperson Joe Obi finally admitted the transaction which he claimed was justified because of the threats to the minister’s life. Similarly, an official of the civil aviation authority Fola Akinkuotu spoke to the media and defended the purchase of the cars, arguing that the cars were for the ministry’s protocol pool for use in transporting foreign aviation dignitaries when they visit the country. However, what was not clear is why the aviation authority paid a price tag that is far more than the price of the

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auto dealers in the USA and in the UK. Moreover, it was also not clear why the minister’s spokesperson justification basically conflicted with that of the official from the civil aviation authority (Owete, 2013). The tabloid newspapers further gave details about the purchased cars. Among the information provided in some of the newspapers included the colours of the cars which were said to be black, the chases numbers, and that they were manufactured in Germany in 2008. It was also revealed that several officials of the aviation authority were dismayed within the small and inadequate operating budget. It was also noted that some senior sources in the agency wondered how money was being mismanaged when the agency was not even able to send its staff to critical training sessions. It was also revealed that the purchase came at the time when the authority was struggling to update their equipment, needed to employ more staff, and dogged by air crashes. It was also noted that it was a case of misplaced priorities (Emmanuel, 2014). On 17 October 2013, the Punch newspaper revealed that Aviation Minister Stella Oduah admitted that she used the funds of the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority to buy two armoured cars for her personal use citing an official from her ministry. Its reporter Udeme Ekwere noted that she confirmed the vehicles were worth US$1.6 million. It was further revealed that the minister argued that when she was appointed, she inherited a lot of baggage in terms of concessions and lease agreements in the aviation sector, which were clearly not in the interest of the government and the people of Nigeria. It also noted that she decided to take bold steps by reviewing agreements and terminating some contracts. She began to receive imminent threats to her life which required safe armoured vehicles to be purchased for her personal use (Oladimeji, 2015). On 23 October 2013, the Vanguard newspaper reported that President Goodluck Jonathan queried the minister over the car scandal involving her and some agencies. It was also revealed that the minister was asked to explain her role in the scandal which was attracting widespread news coverage in the country. It was further revealed that she was asked by the House of Representatives to appear before it for questioning. It also noted that a statement from the Chairman, House Committee on Aviation, Nkeiruka Onyejeocha indicated that other officials and representatives expected to appear included Director

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General Nigerian Civil Aviation, Coscharis Motors Controller-General, Nigerian Customs Service, Bureau of Public Procurement, First Bank, Federal Ministry of Finance, and members of the general public (Ndiribe et al. 2013). On 12 February 2014, the Premium Times newspaper revealed that President Goodluck Jonathan accepted the resignation of four cabinet ministers. It noted that they were Minister of Aviation Stella Oduah, Minister of Police Affairs Caleb Olubolade, Minister of Niger Delta Affairs Godsday Orubebe, and Minister of State for Finance Yerima Ngama. It pointed out that they were asked to resign to save them the humiliation of being sacked. It further noted that it was not clear why the other three were asked to resign and leave office. However, it noted that it was clear for the aviation minister as she was engulfed in the corruption scandals (Emmanuel, 2014). On the same day, Sahara Reporters newspaper also revealed that its sources confirmed in the Nigerian Civil Aviation Authority who disclosed that the two cars were never delivered to the Aviation Minister and that the US$1.6 million was split with Cosmas Maduka, the Chief Executive Officer of Coscharis (Sahara Reporters, 2014). On 26 August 2015, the Punch newspaper further reported that the former Aviation Minister Stella Oduah obtained an interim injunction from Justice Mohammed Yunusa of a Federal High Court in Lagos barring the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission and its agents from taking any action against her as regards to the purchase of the two armoured cars in 2013. She was at the time in the Senate representing Anambra North Senatorial District. She claimed that the All Progressives Congress government was humiliating prominent members of the Peoples Democratic Party including herself under the guise of fighting corruption (Oladimeji, 2015). Generally, the Minister of Aviation oversees six agencies in charge of aviation matters, namely the Nigerian Airspace Management Agency, Accident Investigation Bureau, Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority, Nigerian Meteorological Agency, Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria, and Nigerian College of Aviation Technology in Zaria. Of the six agencies, the Federal Airport Authority of Nigeria and Nigeria Civil Aviation Authority are the most corrupt and serve as the minister’s cash cow (Sahara Reporters, 2013).

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Conclusion Tabloid newspapers play an important role in Nigeria which has largely a well-developed anti-corruption legal framework even though enforcement is very weak. For example, the Criminal Code criminalizes corruption and the abuse of office. Moreover, the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act also criminalize bribery including corruption practices, fraud, money laundering, and extortion. Besides, there exist penalties and fines for perpetrators which carry sometimes up to seven years in prison upon conviction. Furthermore, facilitation payment is illegal and there are guidelines and requirements in the Constitution for assets disclosure and when it comes to giving and receiving gifts to the members of the executive, legislature, and parliament. Moreover, the Advance Fee Fraud and other fraud-related offences laws deal with fraudulent activities and carry a jail term of up to 15 years in prison upon conviction. Besides, the Money Laundering Act regulates making and accepting cash payments. However, Independent Corrupt Practices Commission and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission established to combat corruption are not effective largely because of lack of political support and incompetent leadership compounded by lack of sufficient funding and limited capacity to deal with overwhelming corruption in the country. For example, Economic and Financial Crimes Commission is so incompetent that its prosecutors are not able to regularly provide evidence beyond reasonable doubt for charges, and this allows defenders to be regularly acquitted on technicalities. On the other hand, the whistleblowing policy allows individuals to anonymously provide tips online; and if these lead to successful recovery of funds, the whistle-blower is entitled to two to five per cent of proceeds. It recovered over US$180 million within the first three months the policy was implemented. It is evident that the country is making an effort in the fight against corruption and tabloid newspapers are playing their role as partners even though more needs to be done to overcome it (GAN Integrity, 2017).

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Bibliography Al Jazeera (2014). Nigeria fires official who uncovered billions in missing oil money. Retrieved from http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2014/2/20/ nigeria-fires-officialwhouncoveredbillionsinmissingoilmoney.html. Alli, Y. (2017). USD 15 billion arms deals: Panel members seek protection from Buhari. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/2017/04/08/15bnarms-deal-panel-members-seek-protection-buhari. Ani, S. (2010). The man Goodluck Ebele Jonathan. Retrieved from https://web. archive.org/web/20130513095246/http://www.gbooza.com/group/ nigeriapolitics/forum/topics/the-man-goodluck-ebele#axzz2PIsF6bif. Babatunde-Fowler, W. (2016). Nigeria hunts down 700,000 companies over tax evasion. Retrieved from http://news.naijaobserver.com/view/43116/ nigeria-hunts-down-700000-companies-over-tax-evasion. Bada, G. (2016). Agency sacks 29 senior officers for alleged corrupt practices. Retrieved from http://www.pulse.ng/news/local/nigeria-customs-serviceagency-sacks-29-senior-officers-for-alleged-corrupt-practices-id5636191.html. Bakre, O. M. (2013). Crony capitalism, money laundering and the complicity of the accounting profession in Nigeria. Retrieved from https://www.escholar. manchester.ac.uk/api/datastream?publicationPid=uk-ac-man-scw:194899&datastreamId=FULL-TEXT.PDF. Bright, J. (2014). $20 billion and an ousted whistleblower threaten Nigeria’s fragile, carefully crafter success story. Retrieved from https:// qz.com/182271/20-billion-and-an-ousted-whistleblower-threaten-nigerias-fragile-carefully-crafted-success-story/. BBC News. (2014). Nigeria central bank head Lamido Sanusi ousted. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26270561. BBC News. (2016). Nigerian Supreme Court judge charged with corruption. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-38053755. Campbell, J. (2014). Nigeria Minister of Aviation Stella Oduah is in trouble. Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigerian-minister-aviationstella-oduah-trouble. Eboh, C. (2013). Nigerian journalists charged over president story. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nigeria-journalists/nigerian-journalists-charged-over-president-story-idUSBRE93F1DU20130416. Eboh, E. (2017). NEITI to FG: Don’t borrow, recover N7.2trn unremitted revenue to fund budget. Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2017/04/ neiti-fg-dont-borrow-recover-n7-2trn-unremitted-revenue-fund-budget/. Emmanuel, O. (2014). Jonathan drops corrupt Aviation Minister, Stella Oduah, 3 others. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng.com/ news/155031-breaking-jonathan-drops-corrupt-aviation-minister-stella-oduah-3-others.html.

124  B. CHAMA Faul, M. (2014). Lamido Sanusi. Retrieved from http://www.independent. co.uk/news/world/africa/lamido-sanusi-brave-nigerian-bank-governor-whofought-corruption-is-pushed-out-9145381.html. Freedom House. (2017a). Freedom of the world 2016. Retrieved from https:// freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2016. Freedom House. (2017b). Nigeria: Freedom of the press 2016. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2016/nigeria. GAN Integrity. (2017). Nigeria corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/nigeria/. Hang, Z. (2015). Nigerian journalist beaten by prison officials for photographs. Retrieved from http://globaljournalist.org/2015/11/nigerianjournalist-beaten-by-prison-officials-for-photographs/. Jannah, C. (2017). Former Governor, Bala James Ngilari sentenced to 5 years in prison. Retrieved from http://dailypost.ng/2017/03/06/breaking-efccsecures-conviction-former-adamawa-governor-bala-ngilari/. Jibueze, J. (2018). Ladoja’s trial adjourned to March 19. Retrieved from http:// thenationonlineng.net/ladojas-trial-adjourned-march-19/. Kaplan, E. D. (2017). GIJN joins calls for end to harassment of Premium Times by Nigerian military. Retrieved from https://gijn.org/2017/01/23/ gijn-joins-calls-to-end-harassment-of-premium-times-by-nigerian-military/. Malden, A. (2017). Nigeria’s oil and gas revenues. Retrieved from https:// resourcegover nance.org/analysis-tools/publications/nigerias-oiland-gas-revenues-insights-new-company-disclosures. Ndiribe, O., Ovuakporie, E., & Nwabuhiogu, L. (2013). N225m cars scam. Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2013/10/n225m-carsscam-jonathan-queries-oduah/. Nsehe, M. (2015). Nigeria’s former petroleum minister arrested in London on corruption charge. Retrieved from https://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2015/10/02/nigerias-former-petroleum-minister-arrested-in-london-on-corruption-charge/#5e79d5e236ae. Nwabughiogu, L. (2016). FG removes 50,000 ghost workers from payroll. Retrieved from https://www.vanguardngr.com/2016/12/fg-removes50000-ghost-workers-payroll/. Okoye, R. (2012). Nigeria has lost $400bn oil revenue to corruption since Independence – Ezekwesili. Retrieved from http://dailypost.ng/2012/08/31/ nigeria-lost-400bn-oil-revenue-corruption-since-independence-ezekwesili/. Oladimeji, R. (2015). BMW car scandal: EFCC tells court to dismiss former Aviation Minister Stella Oduah’s lawsuit. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/2015/09/04/bmw-car-scandal-efcc-tells-court-dismiss-former-aviation-minister-stella-oduah%E2%80%99s-lawsuit.

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Owete, F. (2013). Armoured cars scandal: Outrage as Nigerians demand Minister Stella Oduah’s sack, probe. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng. com/news/146789-armoured-cars-scandal-outrage-nigerians-demand-minister-stella-oduahs-sack-probe.html. Premium Times. (2017). Despite Malabu scandal, Shell, ENI will continue to operate OPL 245 - Nigerian govt. Retrieved from https://www.premiumtimesng. com/news/headlines/230288-despite-malabu-scandal-shell-eni-will-continue-operate-opl-245-nigerian-govt.html. Ross, W. (2014a). Is Nigeria serious about tackling corruption. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26535530. Ross, W. (2014b). Nigeria central bank head Lamido Sanusi ousted. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26270561. Sahara Reporters. (2013). Nigeria’s minister of aviation armored BMW car scandal. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/2013/10/16/nigerias-minister-aviation-armored-bmw-car-scandal-car-sells-only-170k-europeand-america. Sahara Reporters. (2014). Nigeria’s Aviation Minister, Stella Oduah, sacked. Retrieved from http://saharareporters.com/2014/02/12/ nigeria%E2%80%99s-aviation-minister-stella-oduah-sacked. Temitayo. (2016). How police recovered N2.75m bribe from serving Assistant Commissioner of Police. Retrieved from http://www.nigerianmonitor.com/ police-recovers-n2-75m-bribe-from-assistant-commissioner-of-police/. Transparency International. (2017). Corruption Perception Index 2016. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/NGA. Yusuf, A. (2015). Between Diezani, Jide Omokore and Kola Aluko: Inside the oil deals that cost Nigeria billions. Retrieved from http://saharareporters. com/2015/07/27/between-diezani-jide-omokore-and-kola-aluko-inside-oildeals-cost-nigeria-billions.

Part IV

CHAPTER 8

Tabloid Journalism and Corruption in Uganda

Uganda continues to struggle with corruption within the various levels of governance while at the same time tabloid newspapers regularly play a critical role in exposing financial mismanagement. Besides, there exist several high-level corruption areas in the country such as the police, the judiciary, and the procurement. In these areas, many citizens are vulnerable and are often subjected to non-transparent transactions. Moreover, officials continue to engage in corrupt practices despite laws that punish corruption in a country ranked at 151 out of 180 by Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index 2017 (Transparency International, 2017). This chapter looks at corruption in the first family. It focuses on the disappearance of over US$13 million donor funds from Office of the Prime Minister in 2012 earmarked for rebuilding the northern part of the country ravaged by a 20-year civil war. It looks at the Global Funds diversion scandal in which millions of dollars were diverted from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation, and from the Global Fund to Fight Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Tuberculosis and Malaria. It further discusses the Red Pepper tabloid newspaper that dominates the tabloid journalism print section in the country. It concludes that despite increased level of tabloid journalism that expose corruption, there exists institutional, political, and legislative failure to prosecute grand corruption. It gives an example of the culture of connections in the © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_8

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government that is heavily dominated by the ruling party members and often protected when it comes to investigating and exposing corruption (GAN Integrity, 2017).

Corruption in Uganda Corruption in Uganda is an open secret. It is widely discussed in tabloid newspapers regularly with sensational headlines. Even though the country’s Constitution provides for press freedom, the government often restricts the freedom in practice. For example, tabloid journalists face harassment from political operatives. Despite tabloids generally being critical, they still struggle to keep good relations with the government which is the leading advertising client. Besides, due to escalating censorship from the government, tabloid journalists’ ability to criticize the government is limited (Freedom House, 2017). There exist legal mechanisms in the country to fight corruption such as the Leadership Code Act 2002 which criminalizes corruption including abuse of office. Moreover, the Penal Code deals with various corruption offences including embezzlement and fraud. Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Act, the Inspectorate of Government Act 2002, and the Public Finance Management Act 2015 are all designed to root out corruption. However, there exist major challenges when it comes to implementations of these laws (GAN Integrity, 2017). For instance, on 1 April 2017, Uganda Today newspaper revealed that the Chief Justice Bart Katureebe acknowledged the extent of corruption in the country and that it also infiltrates the judiciary. It was further revealed that there are indications that in several cases, the judicial officers have been compromised. It pointed out that the judiciary is not sufficiently independent and bribes are often exchanged in return for favourable judicial decisions. It was also revealed that bribery and political influence in the judiciary is prevalent in the courts and that the administration of justice is hampered by inadequate funding and poor staffing (Uganda Today, 2017). Similarly, on 22 February 2018, the Red Pepper tabloid newspaper revealed that Buyende District Police Commander Muhammad Kirumira was charged by police tribunal at Police Headquarters in Naguru with extortion, torture, bribery, unlawful arrests, and unlawful exercise of authority, corruption and excessive use of force. He was put in detention since his arrest on 1 February 2018 from his home in Bulenga, Wakiso

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District by the police’s flying squad unit and tried by a Police tribunal. He was granted bail by a court which seats at Naguru at the Police Headquarters after he presented former Kampala Metropolitan Police operations commander, Assistant Commissioner of Police Sam Omala as surety. It was also reported that earlier in the day the police whipped journalists who attempted to cover the court proceedings. The Buyende District Police Commander Kirumira before being charged with corruption scandals which followed his career came into spotlight after carrying out operations in Nansana cracking down hard-core criminals that terrorized Kampala. He was later deployed in Kasese, old Kampala police station and later Buyende District (Staff Writer, 2018). The country’s police officers are very corrupt, and it is often considered safe to pay for private security than rely on them on matters of curbing crime and disorder. Besides, the police institution’s members rarely face investigations. Moreover, the mechanism for reporting police misconduct is ineffective. According to a May 2015 survey by research network Afrobarometer, 63% of respondents noted that the police officials are corrupt in the country. For instance, in 2016, the top police official, Inspector General Kale Kayihura was summoned to court to answer charges after criminal proceedings were initiated against him and seven other senior police officers by private lawyers (Gaffey, 2016). Besides, corruption is widespread in the public services sector. For instance, recruiting personnel is driven more by personal and political preferences than qualifications and efficiency. For example, on 8 December 2016, Newsweek revealed that the government removed ‘ghost workers’ from its payroll in 2016 as the country attempted to crack down on corruption. The Minister for Public Service Muruli Mukasa pointed out that 5586 government employees were removed from a total of 308,393. President Yoweri Museveni ordered the use of biometric data to validate employees, vowing to tackle corruption in public institutions that delayed decision-making (Gaffey, 2016). The public procurement sector is also highly corrupt. Despite legal instruments, officials favour well-connected companies and individuals when awarding contracts. There are also often expectations of gifts to secure contracts. Furthermore, the sector is often criticized in the bidding process for lack of transparency of certain transactions. In addition, several high-profile tenders have been over the years suspended due to allegations of corruption and ‘under-the-table’ cash payments (GAN Integrity, 2017).

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For example, on 5 March 2014, the Red Pepper newspaper revealed that the Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Authority were given more powers to investigate procurement processes. It noted that the ‘toothless barking dog’ was given further powers by law to act in instances where fraud was suspected. It also noted that Uganda’s tax administration and collection lacks transparency, and there exist widespread irregular payments when making tax payments. It quoted its Executive Director Cornelius Sabiiti that some government entities were protecting some firms involved in fraudulent acquisition of contracts. It also quoted Finance Minister Maria Kiwanuka that there was need for transparency in the procurement process to revive the confidence of the public regarding the award of contracts (Staff Reporter, 2014).

Corruption in the First Family President Yoweri Museveni has been in power since 1986 after being involved in the rebellions that toppled Ugandan former leaders Idi Amin and Milton Obote. He married Janet Kataaha Museveni in 1973, and together they have four influential children. His wife who is also a politician previously served as Minister for Karamoja Affairs in the Cabinet from 27 May 2011 to 6 June 2016. She was also an elected Member of Parliament for Ruhaama County in Ntungamo District between 2011 and 2016. The Museveni family are heavily inserted in the country’s political affairs. For example, on 10 January 2017, the president appointed his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba as the Senior Presidential Adviser for Special Operations. Similarly, on 6 June 2016, he went on to appoint his wife as the minister of education and sports. Moreover, Museveni’s brother Salim Saleh is also a presidential adviser (Biryabarema, 2017). Since coming to power in 1986, President Yoweri Museveni’s family has been rocked by allegations of corruption and bribery scandals. For example, on 11 November 2010, the tabloid newspapers accused the president of ‘conflict of interest’ and ‘personalisation’ of oil exploration activities in Western Uganda and using relatives and the military to control oil and gas sectors (Mugerwa, 2010). Similarly, on 20 May 2013, the newspapers published a private letter by the head of internal security General David Sejusa which called for an investigation into allegations of a plot ‘to assassinate’ people who disagree with the family project of holding onto power in perpetuity sparking public debate. The tabloid

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newspapers that published the letter were later raided by the police after the publication and disabled their printing and websites (Jorgic, 2013). The reports of corruption in the first family are a common vibe on the streets, bars, and salons, and many people are tired of hearing (Wacha, 2012). For example, on 15 November 2012, it was revealed by tabloids that the Attorney General’s report noted that Janet Kataaha Museveni, the wife of the President and the Minister for Karamoja Affairs had squandered donor money that should have been used to eradicate poverty in the semi-arid Karamoja northern region of the country ravaged by a 20-year war and slowly recovering. The money it was alleged in millions of dollars was spent by the first lady on several trips to Israel within only a short period of time. It was also mocked that she would have practically served better as an ambassador to Israel than being a minister. It was also revealed that the Attorney General’s report noted that over US$12.7 million in donor funds was embezzled from Uganda’s Office of the Prime Minister, the news which hit tabloid headlines in late 2012, prompting serious questions about Uganda’s commitment to fight corruption. It was also claimed that the money was funnelled into private accounts, leading to the European Union, UK, Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and Norway to suspend aid (Human Rights Watch, 2013). Similarly, on 18 February 2014, The Black Star News revealed that the first family was implicated in a systematic looting involving millions of dollars. It noted that in an exclusive interview, Uganda’s former cabinet minister in charge of Gender, Labor and Social Development from 2001 to 2006, Zoe Bakoko Bakoru discovered that US$5 million was being siphoned every month from the country’s National Social Security Fund which is basically remittances by Ugandan workers towards their retirement. It further noted that she learned the money was being channelled to the Marshall Islands through an associate of President Yoweri Museveni’s brother. It noted that she found that a businessman named Emma Kato worked closely with General Salim Saleh the brother of Museveni to do the deals. It further revealed that after she was appointed minister, she was summoned by the president for a meeting also attended by the late Attorney General Francis Ayume. It was at this meeting that the president told her that his intelligence services had found that money from the country’s National Social Security Fund was stolen to finance the opposition candidates and parties in Uganda’s 2001 elections. She was told to investigate what happened to the money. After the meeting, she was seriously warned by the Attorney General to be extremely very

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careful because ‘all investigations will actually be traced back to the boss’ referring to President Yoweri Museveni, and that her actions will come to haunt and bite her (Allimadi, 2014). The newspaper further noted that with President Yoweri Museveni’s approval, she launched a forensic audit of the fund and started ‘cleaning house’ suspending top managers who included the Board Chair, the Corporation Secretary, and the Managing Director. Within three months, the money ‘hemorrhage’ stopped and monthly remittances to the fund went up. The suspended fund executives lobbied the country’s then Prime Minister Apolo Nsibambi and the then Vice-President Gilbert Bukenya to bring pressure on her in the country’s National Parliament. As the fund grew, she started getting ‘chits’ from the Office of the President and from the Office of the First Lady, Janet Kataaha Museveni asking for money from the fund. She was then invited by the president’s brother General Salim Saleh together with the former National Social Security Fund Board Chairman Geoffrey Onegi-Obel to his home on several occasions to ask her for money from the National Social Security Fund. She was told that she was running a ministry with a lot money and that she was asked by the president’s brother to share. When she visited the USA in 2007 to attend a meeting on Women at the United Nations, Uganda’s then Permanent Representative to the United Nations Ambassador Francis Butagira warned her not to return to Uganda because she would be made the ‘sacrificial lamb’. She later applied for asylum and informed USA authorities about corruption at the National Social Security Fund in Uganda (Allimadi, 2014).

Anti-corruption Tabloids The anti-corruption tabloid journalism plays a critical role in exposing corruption and embezzlement in the country. Despite the various legal and political challenges, sensational headlines on corruption are generally regular features in the streets of Kampala. On the other hand, the tabloid journalists also continue to face arrests and charge on the regular basis when it comes to the coverage of scandals and exposure of corruption activities in the country. For example, on 27 November 2017, the Buganda Road Court charged eight senior employees of the Kampala-based Red Pepper tabloid newspaper with seven counts including libel and offensive communication and endangering state security.

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The charges came after they were arrested on 21 November 2017 on the same day the newspaper was closed down (Ifex, 2017). The police conducted a raid on the tabloid’s headquarters were directors Patrick Mugumya, Arinaitwe Rugyendo, James Mujuni, and Johnson Musinguzi Byarabaha, financial manager Richard Tusiime and editors Ben Byarabaha, Richard Kintu, and Tumusiime Francis Tinywana were arrested and held at Nalufenya Detention Centre in Jinja, a city of about 85 kilometres east of Kampala. The Centre is known for the use of brutal interrogation methods. The arrests followed a 20 November 2017 article headlined ‘M7 plots to remove Kagame’ which claimed that the Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni nicknamed ‘M7’ was plotting against his Rwandan counterpart, Paul Kagame. The anti-terrorist police arrived at the Red Pepper’s headquarters with a search warrant and surrounded the building. In the course of the search, they examined all computers and electronic equipment and other documents used by the tabloid journalists. The police spokesman Emilian Kayima referred to the newspaper’s headquarters as a ‘crime scene’ and closed it until further notice (Ifex, 2017). Similarly, on 26 June 2017, the tabloid revealed that President Yoweri Museveni cancelled a US$175 million mining project after it emerged that a former minister pocketed US$1 million in bribes from the Chinese company that was granted the licence for a multi-billion copper mining project at Kilembe Mines, Kasese District. It was noted that the minister received money to influence the award of the contract. It was stated that the Chinese investors who won the venture bribed senior officials in the ministries of Finance, Energy, and the Attorney General’s Chambers. It was further noted that Tibet Hima Mining Company, a Uganda registered company and a subsidiary of Tibet Automobile of China, won the 25-year mining contract and was supposed to extract at least 5000,000 tonnes of copper. It was also revealed that the winning company didn’t deserve the contract because it ‘compromised government officials’ and that the contract was awarded in total disregard of the advice of the Chinese ambassador to Uganda. It was also noted that before the contract was awarded in June 2013, the ambassador warned that the company was incompetent (Mugerwa, 2017). The revelations led to President Yoweri Museveni instructing the Privatisation and Investment Minister Evelyn Anite to terminate the contract with Tibet Hima Mining Company. It was also later revealed

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that the company failed to provide a satisfactory written assurance that all the consortium members and shareholders Shanghai Baosteel Group and Chinalco Luoyang Copper who were to participate in the project as promised in the concession agreement signed. It was further revealed that the termination was finally made and confirmed by the company (Matsiko, 2017). The background to the mining contract scandal is that in 2013, the government decided to revamp the Kilembe Copper Mines Limited which was established in 1908, and a once vibrant manufacturer and smelter of copper, which later became unproductive for close to 30 years. Even though the Ministry of Finance proposed ‘single-sourcing’ for the project revamping, the idea was rejected and a Cabinet subcommittee on privatization shortlisted five bidders to proceed to the final stage who were Sino-Steel (China), Tibet-Hima Group (China), Konkola Copper Mines (Zambia), Shree Minerals (Australia), and Gingko Energy Investments Company (China). Tibet Hima Mining Company won the deal after bribing their way without proper due diligence and without having the financial capacity and experience (Mugerwa, 2017). The natural resources sector is full of corruption and irregularities, and even when it is tapped, it is at risk from corruption and mismanagement. Moreover, poorly qualified companies are able to win licenses based on connections and at the expense of well-qualified companies. Furthermore, the underpayment and complete failure to pay taxes, mineral rents, and royalties by many of those operating in the sector deprive the public coffers of millions of dollars a year. This affects the provision of basic services for ordinary Ugandans and obstructs proper regulation of the industry (Matsiko, 2017). Similarly, on 17 July 2017, the Independent newspaper revealed that Moses Kamuntu a dealer in minerals paid US$10,000 to a third party to get a meeting with President Yoweri Museveni, then circumvented a presidential ban on iron ore exports. He avoided taxes and royalties by exporting minerals as samples. He dodged regulations in order to re-export Congolese minerals labelled as Ugandan. It also revealed that a small group of Belgian and Ugandan businessmen, with close ties to President Museveni were found to be shipping hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of gold from Uganda, barely paying any taxes and failing to disclose the origins of the gold. It noted that Barnabas Taremwa, a brother-in-law to Museveni’s brother General Salim Saleh revealed that some of the gold refined in Uganda comes from the Democratic

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Republic Congo and that in the past he had helped to negotiate the company’s huge tax breaks with the government. It further noted that African Gold Refinery processed in excess of US$200 million worth of gold from Uganda while failing to disclose the origins of the gold. The company paid only half a million dollars in tax and didn’t publish information about where it came from. It revealed that President Museveni’s brother General Saleh, his wife Jovia Saleh, Barnabas Taremwa a brotherin-law to Museveni’s brother General Saleh, former Energy Permanent Secretary Kabagambe Kaliisa, and former Energy Minister Richard Kaijuka were some of the main players in the financial looting and corruption. Other players included some international investors, politicians, and technocrats at the Directorate of Geological Survey and Mines (Matsiko, 2017).

Global Funds Diversion In February 2003, the country started receiving financial support from the Global Fund to Fight Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, Tuberculosis and Malaria. The initial grant was US$36.3 million and by 2005, it had five successful grant proposals of about US$201 million (Reliefweb, 2013). The main recipient on behalf of the government was the Ministry of Health. In turn, it established the Programme Management Unit to coordinate the implementation of the Programme. The categorization for implementation was split between the public which comprised central and local governments as well as other government bodies and the private sector which covered both the civil society and the private sector (Walulya, 2008). The corruption scandal came to light when the Global Fund appointed an auditing firm PricewaterhouseCoopers Limited to review the grant. The audit found irregularities in the management of funds. The tabloids were not initially active in reporting and only made a follow up on the subsequent issues that arose from the scandal. As time went on, many politicians got implicated, and then the tabloids got heavily involved with sensational headlines and pictures (Walulya, 2008). The fund was temporary suspension in August 2005, and only got lifted after the government appointed a commission of inquiry to investigate the mismanagement of the project. The probe commission headed by the Principal Judge Justice James Ogoola implicated among others,

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three ministers who headed the Ministry of Health Jim Muhwezi and his two deputies Mike Mukula and Alex Kamugisha, senior civil servants in the ministry, and the key managers of the Project Management Unit that coordinated the project was also implicated in the multimillion-dollar corruption scandal. In May 2006, the commission released a report and the recommendations to be implemented. It was only on 10 April 2007 that the government released a White Paper on the commission’s report and ordered the police to open investigations against individuals mentioned in the commission’s report with a view of prosecuting them (Jurist, 2007). The tabloids revealed that the Ministry of Health under Minister Jim Muhwezi failed to properly account for millions of dollars which were intended to help mainly poor Ugandans. Among the corruption scandals in the mismanagement of the funds included the rates at which the Project Management Unit, the body in charge of the implementation of the Global Fund projects in Uganda translated foreign exchange into Uganda shillings which were lower than the market rates communicated to auditors by banks who received the funds resulting in shortfalls. There were also numerous expenses that were not allocated to any expenditure category and some expense items posted to the balance sheet accounts. Some of the expenditure was not supported by third-party documents like invoices, receipts, and contracts. Besides, the Project Management Unit staff received allowances that were not in line with the Government of Uganda standing instructions on allowances. Moreover, the auditors received confirmation that some staff that were part of the Project Management Unit requested for ‘kickbacks’ from some sub-recipient organizations in order to get funding from the Global Fund. In addition, some organizations accessed funding on recommendation of high-ranking government officials without due diligence (Walulya, 2008). For example, on 22 May 2007, it was revealed that a report by the Inspector General of Government charged with the responsibility of eliminating corruption noted that Health Minister Jim Muhwezi and his two deputies Mike Mukula and Alex Kamugisha, including Alice Koboyo who was an employee of State House and a Private Secretary to the President in Charge of Political Affairs and Mobilization, were heavily implicated in the mismanagement of millions of dollars meant for the immunization and other health-related activities in the country. It was also noted that the probe commission headed by the Principal Judge, Justice James Ogoola accused the government officials of abuse of office

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that led to the loss of millions of dollars. The judge also noted that the money was not only embezzled and stolen, but careers and personal reputations were damaged, and above all, the greatest losers were the people of Uganda (Vision Reporter, 2007). The tabloid newspapers that covered the scandal also revealed that Jim Muhwezi was a very powerful man in the president inner circles. He was not only a lawyer and a former police officer by profession, but was also involved in crafting the Constitution. He held extensive power in the political affairs of the country since the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986. He was Director General Internal Security Organisation, then Member of Parliament for Rujumbura since 1996. He was in 2001 made Minister of Health. Similarly, Mike Mukula had tremendous power in the inner circles of the presidency. He was the Vice Chairman of National Resistance Movement in Charge of the eastern region. He was the pillar for the party in the east following the death of the Minister of Foreign Affairs James Francis Wambogo Wapakhabulo. He became active in politics starting at the lower levels of the local council system. He quickly rose through the system becoming the Councillor for Nakawa Division. He was also a successful businessman having owned Soroti Hotel and Voice of Teso. He was in 2001 appointed State Minister for Health. He was Member of Parliament for Soroti Municipality. Besides, Alex Kamugisha was very influential man within the corridors of power. He was Minister of State for Primary Healthcare and had inner circle connections (Vision Reporter, 2007). The pressure following the extensive tabloid coverage of the scandal continued to increase in the presidency inner circle. On 29 April 2007, President Yoweri Museveni was forced to order for the arrest and the prosecution of all the accused individuals and civil servants in the Global Fund scandal. It was further revealed on 21 May 2007, that Mike Mukula and Alex Kamugisha were picked up and taken to remand in Luzira. However, at the time of the arrests, Jim Muhwezi was in Europe on medical treatment but later returned to Uganda. On 15 July 2007, Muhwezi went to trial with others on charges of embezzlement and abuse of office. However, after a lengthy trial, none of the high-ranking government officials close to the presidency inner circle implicated faced jail time. In fact, many of them remained free working the streets of Uganda and untouched, while individuals working at the lower-ranking technical level faced prosecution and in many cases lengthy jail time. Even when ministers were forced to resign from office, the resignations

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were often temporary and were eventually reappointed into other key positions in government institutions (Jurist, 2007).

Red Pepper Tabloid The Red Pepper tabloid newspaper started on 19 June 2001 owned by five individuals as a weekly paper, moved on to a bi-weekly, and finally to daily. Since its inception, it dominates the tabloid print section gaining strength while aligning itself more with sensational stories. It tends to expose corruption often with sensational undertones and soft erotica. Its sales range from 25,000 to 30,000 copies daily (Walulya, 2008). For example, on 5 April 2004, it became the first tabloid to break Africa’s biggest taboo by revealing that the country’s foreign affairs Minister James Wapakhabulo died of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. The storm was stirred by an obituary in the tabloid. Even though the article did not refer explicitly to Human Immunodeficiency Virus which is a lentivirus that causes the infection and over time lead to Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, its title spelled out its intention and noted in its headline: ‘What really robbed us of James Wapakhabulo’ before cataloguing a string of alleged sexual exploits and claimed that while the minister ‘talked diplomacy during the day, he spoke the language of love and sex in the evening’ (Abedine & Landau, 2014). Its article drew a furious reaction from the Information Minister Nsaba Buturo, who described the tabloid’s brand of journalism as a danger to the country’s democratic gains. Even though no other newspapers and mainstream papers followed suit and accepted the government’s refusal to state the cause of the minster’s death, and reported that he died after a long illness which is the usual code for an Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome related infection, the tabloid noted that by the time he died, he was spending most of his time with one of his secretaries. However, it was accused by the conservative newspapers of taking a cowardly swipe at a man who could not defend himself and corrupting the morals of the youth, who enjoy the paper’s mix of raunchy gossip and topless models (Abedine & Landau, 2014). Despite its delight in detailing the infidelities of public figures, the tabloid is radical in its attitude to Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. At the top of every page is a banner warning readers to use a condom or abstain. It adds a caption and advises that ‘the life you save might be your own’. Besides, its editor in chief Richard Tusiime

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argues that when the tabloid talks about sex, mainly its intention is to embarrass the offenders, it is not meant to win someone accolades. It is in this regard that the tabloid sees itself as fighting Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Vasagar, 2004). Over the years, the tabloid newspaper has been at the centre of many moral controversies. For example, in August 2006, it published 45 first names and professions of what it called prominent Ugandan men whom it asserted were gay. Its decision was sharply criticized by its critics who argued that the publishing of names exposed the men to government harassment because homosexuality in the country remains illegal. Similarly, in September 2006, it published a similar list of 13 women whom it claimed were lesbians. Its editor justified its action noting that it is one of the interesting things for people to read in a tabloid because in African societies homosexuality is still seen as something strange. It further justified that in the past, it has also printed a list of cheats and people unfaithful to their partners including their first names (BBC, 2006). The tabloid newspaper editor Ben Byarabaha in an interview on 11 May 2009, vowed to continue its campaign against alleged homosexuals by publishing their names, photographs, and addresses for as long as the conduct remains illegal in the country. In fact, the tabloid is no stranger to controversy regarding its reports. In 2009, two of its editors were tried on charges of defaming Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi on its 5 February 2009 story titled ‘Gadaffi, Toro Queen in love’ which alleged that he was actually having an affair with a Ugandan Royal. In response to the allegation, about 30 Muslim sheikhs and imams burned copies of the tabloid in a protest in Kampala on 17 February 2009. Similarly, in April 2004, the tabloid was sent to the Media Council of Uganda by Pastor Martin Ssempa for publishing his number without his knowledge on its classifieds section, as someone who was looking for a partner (Mhlambiso, 2009). Furthermore, on 20 May 2013, the police raided the premises of the tabloid after it published a letter allegedly written by Army General David Sejusa threatening that those who opposed Muhoozi Kainerugaba the son of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni for presidency risked their lives. It was noted that there were arguments among army generals on whether the president’s son was to succeed him. The police closed the tabloid for ten consecutive days, until the siege was lifted on 30 May 2013 after the government ordered police to leave its offices that sparked widespread criticism. During the closure, armed security operatives were deployed at the headquarters of the tabloid,

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blocking staff from entering the premises. It was also stopped from publishing while police searched for the leaked confidential documents that were quoted in the tabloid newspaper (Onyango, 2013). Similarly, on 16 October 2017, its journalist Richard Kintu was interrogated for several hours at the Criminal Investigations Directorate about the coverage of expenses reportedly allocated for parliamentarians so that they could consult with the public about the controversial bill to abolish a Constitutional limit on the president’s age. Its editor was summoned and questioned by what the police called a charge of ‘libel and offensive communication’ in connection with news stories published on 12 October 2017. The complaint against the tabloid was brought by parliamentarians who argued that ever since the stories appeared, they were hounded on social networks by voters demanding that they return any money. The Constitution states that a presidential candidate cannot be older than 75. The bill to abolish age limit was supported by President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni who was 73 at the time. It became controversial among the parliamentarians some of whom even came to blows. Its coverage led to imposition of restrictions on the media in September 2017 (Reporters, 2017). That tabloid newspaper in recent years now largely concentrates on politics and corruption exposure. However, its critics argue that it is bankrolled by powerful politicians from the ruling party to publish propaganda and smear campaigns against government opponents. Moreover, its sources of its political reports are usually anonymous and sometimes referenced as ‘highly placed sources’ (Opolot, 2005).

Conclusion There exists a lack of genuine political backing for anti-corruption efforts in Uganda. Moreover, many institutions designed to fight corruption remain understaffed and underfinanced (Anti-corruption, 2009). In addition, the corruption challenges are made worse by weak law enforcement, which fuels a culture of impunity, particularly with regard to high-ranking officials accused of corruption schemes. However, since the National Resistance Movement came to power in 1986, the country has undertaken an ambitious set of economic and political reforms. These reforms have led to the establishment of a solid legal, administrative, and institutional framework to fight corruption. On the other hand, in spite of initial success, widely heralded by the international community,

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corruption remains widespread at all level of society. Besides, the country also faces major implementation challenges (Martini, 2013). There also exists an increased level of tabloid journalism that exposes corruption in the country. However, the word of caution is that there is need for more action from government such as reforming media laws that will allow a window of opportunity for the tabloids to work as effective partners in the fight against corruption. Moreover, there is need to confront the culture of corruption impunity in institutions, politics, and legislation that make it difficult to prosecute grand embezzlement. One way of doing this is starting with the first family who is heavily insulated (Biryabarema, 2017). The fact that the number of tabloids has grown in terms of variety and quality over the past two decades in the country, and several newspapers have opened and substantially improved content, there is need to intensify the exposure of corruption (Walulya, 2008).

Bibliography Abedine, S., & Landau, E. (2014). Ugandan tabloid prints list of ‘homosexuals’. Retrieved from https://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/25/world/africa/uganda-anti-gay-law/index.html. Allimadi, M. (2014). Former Museveni minister alleges $5 million was stolen monthly from country’s national social security fund; implicates first family. Retrieved from http://www.blackstarnews.com/global-politics/africa/former-museveni-minister-alleges-5-million-was-stolen-monthly-from-countrys. Anti-corruption. (2009). Overview of corruption in Uganda. Retrieved from https://www.u4.no/publications/overview-of-corruption-in-uganda/. BBC. (2006). Ugandan ‘gay’ name list condemned. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5326930.stm. Biryabarema, E. (2017). Ugandan leader makes son his adviser, critics see succession plan. Retrieved from https://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/ idAFKBN14U10F?sp=true. Freedom House. (2017). Freedom of the press 2016. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/freedom-press-2016. Gaffey, C. (2016). Uganda wipes out 5,500 ghost workers in corruption crackdown. Retrieved from https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/ uganda. GAN Integrity. (2017). Uganda corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/uganda/. Human Rights Watch. (2013). Letting the big fish swim. Retrieved from https://www.hr w.org/repor t/2013/10/21/letting-big-fish-swim/ failures-prosecute-high-level-corruption-uganda.

144  B. CHAMA Ifex. (2017). ‘Red Pepper’ staff arrested in Uganda. Retrieved from https:// www.ifex.org/uganda/2017/11/24/red-pepper-arrests/. Jorgic, D. (2013). Ugandan police raid newspaper over Museveni succession letter. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-politics/ ugandan-police-raid-newspaper-over-museveni-succession-letter-idUSBRE94J0F420130520?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews. Jurist. (2007). Former Uganda health minister faces embezzlement trial. Retrieved from http://www.jurist.org/paperchase/2007/07/former-uganda-health-minister-faces.php. Martini, M. (2013). Uganda: Overview of corruption and anti-corruption. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/ uganda_overview_of_corruption_and_anti_corruption. Matsiko, H. (2017). Analysis: Messing with Uganda minerals. Retrieved from https://www.independent.co.ug/analysis-messing-ugandas-minerals/. Mhlambiso, N. (2009). Question & Answers with Red Pepper editor on outing alleged homosexual. Retrieved from https://web.archive. o r g / w e b / 2 0 0 9 1 0 2 9 2 1 0 0 5 1 / h t t p : / / w w w. m a s k . o r g . z a / a r t i c l e . php?cat=uganda&id=2126. Mugerwa, Y. (2010). Uganda: First family ‘too close’ to oil sector. Retrieved from http://allafrica.com/stories/201011110090.html. Mugerwa, Y. (2017). President cancels Shs600b mining project. Retrieved from http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/President-cancels-Shs600bmining-project/688334-3987370-13mo365z/index.html. Onyango, L. (2013). Monitor reopens after 10-day siege by police. Retrieved from https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Monitor-reopens-after-10-day-siege-bypolice-/-/1056/1867628/-/view/printVersion/-/w3a31tz/-/index.html. Opolot, B. (2005). Red and raunchy. Retrieved from http://www.rjr.ru.ac.za/ rjrpdf/rjr_no25/Red_and_raunchy.pdf. Reliefweb. (2013). ‘Letting the big fish swim’: Failures to prosecute high-level corruption in Uganda. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/report/ uganda/%E2%80%9Cletting-big-fish-swim%E2%80%9D-failures-prosecutehigh-level-corruption-uganda. Reporters. (2017). Uganda: Police harass newspapers over stories about parliamentary expenses. Retrieved from https://rsf.org/en/news/ uganda-police-harass-newspapers-over-stories-about-parliamentary-expenses. Staff Reporter. (2014). Govt moves to curb fraud. Retrieved from https://redpepper.co.ug/govt-moves-to-curb-fraud/. Staff Writer. (2018). Police court releases Kirumira on bail. Retrieved from https://redpepper.co.ug/police-court-releases-kirumira-on-bail/. Transparency International. (2017). Corruption Perception Index 2017. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/UGA.

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Uganda Today. (2017). Fighting corruption in the judiciary requires strong will—Chief Justice. Retrieved from http://www.theugandatoday.com/ news/2017/04/fighting-corruption-in-the-judiciary-requires-strong-willchief-justice/. Vasagar, J. (2004). Ugandan tabloid breaks Aids taboo. Retrieved from https:// www.theguardian.com/media/2004/apr/05/pressandpublishing.aids. Vision Reporter. (2007). The actors in the immunization fund scandal. Retrieved from https://www.newvision.co.ug/new_vision/news/1164582/ actors-immunisation-fund-scandal. Wacha, J. (2012). The familiar faces of corruption. Retrieved from https://ugandaradionetwork.com/s/the-familiar-faces-of-corruption/. Walulya, G. (2008). Reporting corruption and media ownership: A comparative study of government and privately owned media report on corruption in Uganda. Retrieved from https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/ handle/10852/27708/copymal.pdf%3Fsequence%3D1.

CHAPTER 9

Tabloid Journalism and Anti-corruption Crusade in Kenya

Corruption in Kenya has a historical dimension which spans from the era of the first President Jomo Kenyatta who was a Kenyan anti-colonial activist and politician. He governed the country as its Prime Minister from 1963 to 1964 and then as its first President from 1964 to 1978. Over the years, different presidents have come and gone leaving different legacies on their fight against widespread corruption in the country. Indeed, corruption is a serious problem which continues to impact on the economic development of the country. For example, Transparency International Corruption Perception Index 2017 ranks Kenya at 148 out of 180 countries for corruption with least corrupt countries being at the top of the list (Transparency International, 2018). The corrupt practices are widespread in the country ranging from fairly small to large bribes. Despite legal reforms, ordinary citizens and companies frequently encounter demands for informal payments to get things done. Within this backdrop, tabloid newspapers regularly expose corruption scandals especially in the corridors of power with generally regular eye-catching sensational headlines often accompanied by sensational pictures that trigger discussions in public domain (GAN Integrity, 2017). This chapter focuses on the Goldenberg scandal in which the government ended up paying millions of dollars on what was supposed to be subsidized exports of gold over their foreign currency earnings which were smuggled from Congo. It also discusses the Anglo Leasing scandal in which plans to buy a sophisticated passport equipment system from France to replace its passport printing system which was originally © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_9

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quoted at about US$6 million ended up in corruption transactions leading to over US$30 million. It discusses the Triton Oil scandal in which there was unauthorized releasing of oil by the Kenya Pipeline Company without informing financiers, and how the company that was tasked to supply oil was connected to corrupt politicians and how back-door transactions were exposed by the tabloid newspapers. It concludes that the tabloid newspapers in Kenya continue to play a critical role in exposing corruption. It also notes that tabloid newspapers despite experiencing regular harassments continue to play a crucial role in creating awareness as well as in putting the government in check and pressuring it to prosecute corruption cases through sensational headlines.

Anti-corruption Tabloids The Constitution of Kenya guarantees press freedom even though in practice, the government does not completely respect these rights. For instance, tabloid journalists face increasing pressure from authorities, and there are always new laws that challenge their ability to report freely. Besides, in recent years, self-censorship has been on the rise among tabloid journalists who continue to experience harassment from authorities that try to prevent critical work that expose corruption from being published. However, a variety of critical reporting is sometimes published by the privately owned tabloid newspapers. Moreover, within this backdrop, the Information and Communication Act provides excessive government control of the media and allows government-controlled board to impose fines on media houses and reporters for violations of a code of conduct created by the board. Besides, journalists continue to be arrested under the Act for causing ‘public anxiety’ even when reporting on corruption (Freedom House, 2017). The tabloid newspapers are generally popular. For instance, one tabloid newspaper is typically read by over fourteen people, and those who can’t afford to buy a paper, sometimes share or ‘rent’ one. The continuing popularity of tabloid newspapers undoubtedly also has something to do with the fact that most Kenyans can’t obsessively check the Internet (Karen, 2010). Besides, there are also a number of tabloid newspapers that have emerged over the years even though many have had a short life span due to market forces, legal challenges, and lack of advertising platforms. Other tabloids over the years have also resorted to operate underground such as the Weekly Citizen among others. Furthermore, The

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Nairobian tabloid newspaper for example often exposes corruption using sensational language accompanied by pictures. In addition, The Star tabloid newspaper launched in July 2007 regularly exposes corruption using sensational language. Since its inception by Patrick Quarcoo, a Ghanaian entrepreneur, in partnership with William Pike, a British editor who previously runs a Ugandan paper, it has continued to attract many readers. Even though it is heavy on entertainment and lifestyle, along with large servings of politics, its owner argues that print media is significant in Africa and has the power to shape its destiny (Karen, 2010). The tabloid newspapers have been critical in exposing corruption over the years (Harden, 1992). For example, the corruption in the Turkwel Hydroelectric Power Station construction became public knowledge in the country after local tabloids picked up the stories in March 1986. The stories of corruption scandals became public knowledge in tabloids following the internal memo leak that revealed that European Commission delegate to Kenya Achim Kratz stated that the construction site was ‘extremely disadvantageous for Kenya’. It was noted that because of the corrupt personal interests of President Daniel arap Moi and Energy Minister Nicholas Biwott, nevertheless accepted the construction. The deep-rooted corruption between 1986 and 1991 was detailed by the tabloids in which the dam was built at two times the estimated cost and ended-up producing electric energy that was significantly below capacity (Hawley, 2003). The allegations of bribery in the Turkwel Hydroelectric Power Station construction were consistently reported in the Kenyan tabloid newspapers. For example, journalist Blaine Harden estimated that the corruption kickback was about US$27 million (Harden, 1992). It was also noted that the Turkwel Gorge Dam eventually cost US$450 million to build, more than twice the contract price. Moreover, it was revealed that soon after it was completed in October 1993, it produced far less electricity than what was announced because of low water levels. By 1998, the river Turkwel’s flow had fallen by 13%. The dam construction continued to be dogged by allegations of corruption and financial mismanagement which included illegal contracts, failure to account for expenditure, and overpayment of contractors by the parastatal Kerio Valley Development Authority company that was responsible for the dam. For example, in 2001, the Kenyan Parliament’s Public Investment Committee questioned President Daniel arap Moi’s son Jonathan Kipkemboi arap Toroitich regarding allegations of pressure

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that was exerted on Kerio Valley Development Authority to award one contract to Kenyan consulting company Meacom Consultants Limited in 1996 (Hawley, 2003). The background to the scandal is that the Turkwel Gorge project was conceived in the 1960s and from the beginning, concerns were raised that it was problematic. The dam was to be built on a major earthquake fault, even though other suitable and cheaper sites were identified. Besides, consultants involved in the feasibility study between 1960 and 1984 noted that the Kenyan government repeatedly postponed carrying out a study funded by the Norwegian government into the effects of the dam on the Turkana people living in the area. In January 1986, the Kenyan government awarded the contract to build the dam to the French company Spie Batignolles without any international competitive bidding procedure twice more than an original estimate (Harden, 1992).

Corruption and Bribery Corruption penetrates every sector of the government and demands for bribes by public officials are common which impacts on the country’s long-term economic growth. This is despite the fact that the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 criminalizes corruption and abuse of office. In addition, the Bribery Act 2016 criminalizes facilitation payments and provides guidelines for what types of gifts public officials are allowed to accept. However, adequate enforcement of the country’s anti-corruption framework is problematic because of weak and corrupt public institutions (GAN Integrity, 2017). The judiciary is heavily corrupt for example with regular report of bribes in return for favourable decisions. For instance, on 16 March 2016, allegations emerged that the Supreme Court Judge Philip Tunoi took a bribe worth US$2 million from Governor Evans Kidero in order to influence the decision of an election petition filed against him by Kabete Member of Parliament Ferdinard Waititu. It was further revealed that investigators told a Nairobi court that Kidero’s bank account statement showed large cash deposits suspected to be proceeds of corruption. Moreover, the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Investigation Officer Mulki Umar argued that the evidence uncovered aroused reasonable suspicion that the governor was involved in corrupt conduct. It was also revealed that it was evident from the account transactions that the petitioner could easily afford the money equivalent to the bribe he was

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alleged to have given. This led to a tribunal that was set-up to investigate the veracity of the claims (Karanja, 2016). However, the judge was not investigated on the grounds that the prosecution lacked a legal mandate after he retired at the legally mandated age of 70. The reality is that even though the judiciary is established as an independent body by the Constitution, it is undermined by allegations of corruption. For example, in 2011, many judges were removed for incompetence (World Economic Forum, 2016). Similarly, the Kenya National Police Service is a very corrupt institution in the country. Bribery is reported by tabloids to be the only way to expedite services. Besides, the police relentlessly engage in fabrication of charges to extort bribes. Furthermore, corrupt police officers are rarely arrested and prosecuted (GAN Integrity, 2017). For example, on 7 December 2016, The Star newspaper reported that the Kenya’s National Police Service Commission fired 127 traffic police officers after they found evidence of large suspicious money transfers between officers that could not be explained. The information was revealed by the Deputy Inspector of Police John Kitili with National Police Service Commission Chairperson Johnston Kavuludi during the release of the vetting results at their headquarters. It was further revealed that the corrupt officers failed the vetting process. The Chairperson Kavuludi was quoted that the majority of the officers were those involved in the ‘matatu’ business. It was also noted that unexplained financial transactions, sending and receiving money from fellow police officers in the traffic department, were among the reasons that informed their removal. It was also revealed that some officers received money from transporters and breakdown business operators, while others had professional misconduct. The fact that so many officers were removed attests to the endemic corruption in the police (Vidija, 2016). The East African Bribery Index 2017 notes that the country is overrun by massive corruption. For example, the tax administration carries a high risk of corruption with irregular payments and bribes to tax officials in the processing of tax payments which are very common (Transparency International Kenya, 2017). Furthermore, customs administration faces massive corruption, especially at border points. There are expectations of irregular payments and bribes, and what makes matters even worse is the lack of transparency in the customs administration. The widespread bribery of border officials has in recent years contributed to an influx of Al-Shabaab fighters into the country easily to organize terrorist attacks

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that fuel instability. The tabloid newspapers often make allegations of the country’s army being involved in a sugar-smuggling racket with the Islamist group Al-Shabaab worth over US$400 million a year (Dixon, 2015). For example, the Port of Mombasa has regularly been named in the tabloid newspapers as a major hub in the illicit ivory trade (GAN Integrity, 2017). The public procurement is heavily corrupt too. Bribery is a daily talk among players in the business. For instance, tendering fraud is the fastest growing crime. Besides, a number of contracts are awarded to firms without complying with public procurement laws. For example, on 17 December 2016, it was revealed by The Star that the Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited was accused of procurement fraud over handing a contract to a Chinese firm that was in existence for only 11 months. It was also revealed that the firm did not meet the requirement of having audited reports for the last 18 months. It was also noted that the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board raised the alarm when it nullified the contract for the supply of single-phase prepaid meters between  Kenya  Power  and Lighting Company Limited and Chinese firm Hexing Technologies Limited. The newspaper also noted that the records from the registrar of companies showed that the firm had only three shareholders and directors who were listed as Dai Yingpen, Chem Yuejiao, and Shamir Dharamshi Radia (Ogemba, 2016). Despite the country having many corruption laws, general banditry of public funds and financial looting continues to excel. For example, on 29 April 2017, The Star tabloid newspaper revealed that Kenya and Switzerland signed a deal to trace and recover stolen funds stashed in Swiss accounts. The Swiss prosecutors have been trying to recover funds stashed away in Swiss bank accounts. The agreement between the Attorney General’s office and the Swiss Federal Office was to facilitate the cooperation in investigating and prosecuting individuals involved in trans-border economic crimes between the two states. It was also noted that Switzerland was a preferred haven for corruptly acquired funds and assets by the Kenyan government officials and business people dealing in illegal activities. It was further noted that many top politicians continue to face corruption charges from Kenya’s Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission and from Swiss authorities linked to extensive bribery schemes involving a number of inflated state contracts worth over US$700 million that have been awarded to phantom vendors in which many necessary infrastructure projects have not been delivered (Wanjala, 2017).

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Goldenberg Kenya encourages international trade by granting tax-free status to commercial enterprises involved in the export of goods and sometimes subsidizes these exports. The Goldenberg scandal involved the subsidized exports of gold far beyond standard arrangements. It involved the payment to Goldenberg International 35% more than their foreign currency earnings. In the scandal, the country lost over US$600 million between 1990 and 1993 in compensation scheme designed to promote the exports of gold and diamonds and paid to Goldenberg International (BBC, 2004a). At the time of the scandal, gold mining represented a tiny portion of Kenya’s Gross Domestic Product. There was only one operational gold mine at Kakamega. The Goldenberg International owned by Kamlesh Pattni developed a scheme of smuggling gold into Kenya from the Democratic Republic of Congo so that it could legally export it at the higher export price offered by the Kenyan government (Hawley, 2003). The scheme was exposed by a whistleblower David Munyakei who worked at Central Bank of Kenya after realizing that he was processing payment for the export of diamonds and gold which did not exist in Kenya and grew suspicious. He sneaked out copies of sensitive documents and presented them to then opposition Members of Parliament Paul Muite and Peter Anyang’ Nyong’o who later present the papers in parliament causing an uproar across the whole country. Munyakei was arrested and spent several days in jail before a judge ruled that he had no case to answer. He was fired from his position. After being told by a friend that his life might be in danger, he moved to Mombasa. He spent the next decade of his life poor and largely unemployed. He died in August 2006, leaving behind three daughters and his wife (Kahola, 2009). The exposure of the corruption scandal led to the commission of inquiry. On 24 February 2003, a three-man panel led by Appeals Court Judge Samuel Bosire was appointed by President Mwai Kibaki to investigate the Goldenberg International scandal and to get to the root of the complex web of transactions (Chepkemei, 2012). However, on 27 January 2004, it was suspended after allegations that linked senior investigators to corruption. For example, the Weekly Citizen revealed that bribes were being offered by people who were anxious to influence the outcome of the scandal (BBC, 2004b).

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The Commission of Inquiry after regrouping revealed that the former head of the civil service Phillip Mbithi was asked by President Daniel arap Moi in September 1992 to organize a transfer of US$76 million to Goldenberg International. Furthermore, on 17 February 2004, it was revealed that President Moi ordered payments worth another US$76 million to Goldenberg International over fictitious exports. In addition, a civil servant Wilfred Koinange who was finance ministry permanent secretary at the time of corrupt transactions told a hearing that President Moi gave him instructions over the phone to make the payment. He told the Commission that he was first told to make the payment by Phillip Mbithi but decided to telephone the president. It was further revealed that the president agreed to the payment and gave him authority (BBC, 2004a). The Commission of Inquiry report by Justice Samuel Bosire on 3 February 2006, recommended that the Education Minister at that time George Saitoti face criminal charges for his actions when he was both vice-president and finance minister under President Daniel arap Moi in the early 1990s. It was also recommended that the former President Moi needed to be investigated. The report noted that Goldenberg International transacted millions of dollars with 487 companies and individuals. The Commission put Goldenberg International at the top of the primary recipients of the money. The report also named the directors of Goldenberg International who were connected to intelligence unit of the Kenya Police, now known as National Intelligence Services, and First American Bank. President Daniel arap Moi was named by Goldenberg International owner Kamlesh Pattni as a shareholder by nominee. However, President Moi himself was never called to present evidence despite this alleged link (Chepkemei, 2012). Over 20 individuals implicated were prohibited from leaving the country and ordered to surrender any weapons they possessed. Others implicated included President Daniel arap Moi’s sons Gideon Moi and Philip Moi, the president’s lawyer Mutula Kilonzo, the president’s former personal assistant Joshua Kulei, former Central Bank of Kenya Governor Eric Kotut, former Director of Public Prosecutions Philip Murgor, Goldenberg International owner Kamlesh Pattni, former Special Branch Chief James Kanyotu, and former Commissioner of Mines and Geology Collins Owayo (Standing, 2012). Despite the Goldenberg International corruption scandal attracting massive tabloid coverage with sensational headlines especially by

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the Weekly Citizen, attempts to bring those that were deeply involved to justice proved difficult. For example, cases dragged on through the courts with no one convicted among the high-profile politicians and figures (BBC, 2004a). For instance, in August 2006, a Constitutional Court ruled that former Minister of Education George Saitoti could not be charged. It claimed to have found much of the contents of the Presidential Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry Report known as the Bosire Report flawed. It also granted immunity to Saitoti from being prosecuted by the Attorney General. Moreover, after the ruling, another former top government official implicated in the scandal Karuga Koinange asked the court to quash findings about him (Rice, 2006). However, several legal experts argued that the ruling relied on weak evidence. The Constitutional Court had no legal right in attacking the Bosire Report as the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry was not a court of law. Moreover, critics argued that the Court was compromised by political considerations (Standing, 2012). In April 2012, Justice Samuel Bosire was sacked after the Judges and Magistrates Vetting Board declared him unfit. The complaints were on the manner he handled the Goldenberg Commission of Inquiry in 2004. The Board noted that Justice Bosire, as the Chairman of the Goldenberg Commission, ignored a High Court order to summon the retired President Daniel arap Moi to be questioned and to call George Saitoti, Musalia Mudavadi and Nicholas Biwott as witnesses (Chepkemei, 2012).

Anglo Leasing The Anglo Leasing scandal came to light when the Kenyan government wanted to replace its passport printing system with a sophisticated one in 1997. Its transaction was originally quoted at about US$8 million by a French firm. However, in mysterious turn of events it was awarded to a British registered company Anglo Leasing and Finance Company at about US$50 million. The tender was not actually publicly advertised as stipulated by the tendering and procurement guidelines. The details were leaked to the tabloid Weekly Citizen by a junior civil servant in 2002. It was revealed that its sales agent was Sudha Ruparell, the daughter of Chamanlal Kamani and sister of Rashmikant Chamanlal Kamani and Deepak Kamani who were involved in various security supplies scandals to the government in the past. It was a corruption scandal which saw President Mwai Kibaki’s key pillars crumble (Kenyan Pundit, 2006).

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President Mwai Kibaki was elected in 2002 on a pledge to clean up Kenya. Shortly afterwards, he appointed in January 2003 John Githongo, a former head of the Kenyan branch of Transparency International to the position of Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics. He had spent years leading the campaign against the corruption under former President Daniel arap Moi. Githongo took on an official governmental position to fight corruption. He pursued the Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited business dealings with the government regarding the buying and deliveries of government military and forensic laboratory equipment (BBC, 2006a). On 7 February 2005, John Githongo surprisingly resigned just days after the government was accused of ‘massive looting’. He argued that he was no longer able to continue serving the government (Wrong, 2009). However, he left behind his corruption report that named top politicians as having links to a huge contract given to Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited to print new high-technology passports. He named Vice-President Arthur Moody Awori, Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi, Finance Minister David Mwiraria, and Transport Minister Christopher Ndarathi Murungaru. He accused them of being involved in scams worth over US$600 million. He also claimed that the president was complicit in the affair. He further revealed that Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited was a ‘phantom entity’ that was used in fraud through non-delivery of goods and services and massive overpricing (BBC, 2006b). The tabloids revealed on 9 February 2006 that John Githongo claimed to have taped evidence of Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi attempting to impede a corruption inquiry. It was noted that he made the tape secretly during a meeting with him. It was revealed that the tape was made at the time Murungi was Justice Minister. Githongo was quoted by the tabloid newspapers arguing that the minister tried to pressure him using the issue of a loan owed by his father to a businessman Anura Pereira. The papers noted that he was told to ease off the inquiries, for his father’s loan matter to go away. It was further revealed that at the end of his investigations, he came to the conclusion that the Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited went all the way to the top, and as a consequence, his life was in danger. It was noted that he told President Mwai Kibaki about the corruption, but the president failed to act (BBC, 2006a).

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The Weekly Citizen tabloid newspaper further revealed that Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited had inner circle political connections. Since 2004, the company was refunding millions of dollars to the Government of Kenya in relation to the contracts signed and payments made but equipment never delivered. It was noted that the company had so much connections in the echelons of political power. The tabloid further revealed that Acting Treasury Permanent Secretary Joseph Oyula was directly involved in repayments and was able to directly call Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited regarding the repayment of funds. Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited had informers in senior government who leaked information that prompted the company to repay money whenever there was pressure from anti-corruption investigators. The government was not able to disclose the full amount refunded. Moreover, it also refused to name the person behind the company who was refunding the money. This information was also revealed to the former Ethics Permanent Secretary John Githongo at a 14 June 2004 meeting. It was not exactly clear to who in government the company was making the repayment and who was acting on behalf of the company. The Weekly Citizen further noted that the government consistently refused when contacted to reveal when the Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited repayments started (Africa Files, 2006). It was finally noted by the tabloid newspaper that the company made the first repayment through a telegraphic transfer on 17 May 2004. The next payment was on 7 June 2004 for US$4.7 million. It identified itself as a UK company with an address in Liverpool. The paper noted that the address could not be traced by the corruption investigators who were assigned to the case. The tabloid also stated that the government asked Interpol to help in tracking down Merlyn Kettering, a USA citizen who acted as consultant for Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited in many of its controversial projects. Moreover, the Kenya AntiCorruption Commission and detectives were very slow in investigating the scandal (Africa Files, 2006). The Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Limited corruption scandal led to the international donors urging Kenya’s president to take tough action against any cabinet ministers found to be corrupt. Moreover, the World Bank also delayed the release of US$260 million in loans to the country because of corruption allegations (BBC, 2006a).

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Triton Oil The Triton Oil scandal involved unauthorized release of oil by the Kenya Pipeline Company without informing financiers amounting to US$98.7 million. It became public knowledge in January 2009 (Kisia, 2015). The revelations by the Weekly Citizen tabloid newspaper prompted the Kenya Pipeline Company to order an internal audit of oil stocks in its systems. The audit then revealed that the stocks amounting to 126.4 million litres were illegally released to Triton Petroleum Limited which was owned by Kenyan business tycoon Yagnesh Devani. The oil stocks were released between November 2007 and November 2008. It was also revealed that Triton Petroleum Limited company collapsed shortly after withdrawing the oil and selling it to the market (Kisero, 2009). On 13 January 2009, the Weekly Citizen tabloid revealed that between 28 December 2008 and 29 December 2008, most filling stations upcountry had no fuel. Kenyans were forced to grapple with an unreliable supply and artificial rise in its pricing. The Managing Director of Kenya Pipeline Company George Okungu gave televised interviews to reassure Kenyans that there was no fuel shortage in the country. During the same period, a medium-size oil firm Triton Petroleum Limited, despite its limited experience in the oil industry, secured a government tender to purchase national oil supplies for a six-month quota. It was tasked to supply oil through connection to high-profile politicians and back-door translations (Nairobi Chronicle, 2009). Triton Petroleum Limited beat all seasoned firms to deliver huge consignments of oil to the nation. It immediately after securing the tender, commenced sub-contracting its rivals at a profit. For example, Afri Global Limited, a firm belonging to Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s elder brother Oburu Odinga but run by his son Elijah Abonyo Oburu was one of the key beneficiaries. Another firm African Oils Limited belonging to Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s son Fidel Castro Odinga also profited from the scandal. Moreover, Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s company Bakri Limited operated by Mike Njeru benefited. Furthermore, Prime Minister Raila Odinga’s young sister Adhiambo Odinga of Petro Plus was involved in bulk oil sales. The first family was so entrenched in the oil industry that major players advised that it was practically impossible to do serious oil business in Kenya without roping in a family member (Nairobi Chronicle, 2009).

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The Kenya Pipeline Company and oil companies’ arrangements are done through what is called Collateral Financing Agreement. The company that wants to bring oil into Kenya must first advise the Kenya Pipeline Company of the grade, quantity, and the financier. The product is then collected from Kenya Pipeline Company on written authorization of financiers, which gives names of its authorized signatories. However, how Triton Petroleum Limited managed to collude with insiders to breach what was regarded as a fairly secure system was perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the saga (Kisero, 2009). The Weekly Citizen noted that Yagnesh Devani on behalf of Triton Petroleum Limited signed a Collateral Finance Agreement while Shem Ochuodho the former managing director signed on Kenya Pipeline Company’s behalf on 4 July 2004. However, the alarm bells rang in November 2008 when Kenya Pipeline Company was bombarded with letters from financiers demanding updated statements on stock inventories held in trust on their behalf. It was at this stage that it emerged that Triton Petroleum Limited had fallen back in payments to financiers. The top management at Kenya Pipeline Company was ordered to conduct an audit of stocks and reconciliation of what was held in trust for respective financiers. The audit revealed that all stocks, which ought to have been held in trust, were clandestinely released to Triton Petroleum Limited at the total of US$98.7 million between November 2007 and November 2008 (Kisero, 2009). The Energy Minister Kiraitu Murungi then ordered Kenya Pipeline Company managing director George Okungu to prepare a report and to convene an urgent board meeting to deliberate on the matter. On 10 January 2009, Okungu was dramatically sacked. The Kenya AntiCorruption Commission was also ordered to investigate circumstances under which millions of litres of petroleum held in trust on behalf of financiers and international traders were released to Triton Petroleum Limited (Kisero, 2009). The Attorney General Amos Wako few days later submitted the arrest warrant to Chief Public Prosecutor Keriako Tobiko after noting that Yagnesh Devani, the owner of Triton Petroleum Limited had fled the country. The warrant was meant to start the extradition process following the oil scandal. The government also sought the help of Interpol to track him down. On 26 May 2011, it was revealed that Devani, the proprietor of Triton Petroleum Limited was arrested in London (Mayoyo, 2011). On 19 December 2015, it was noted that Devani was returning

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to Kenya to stand trial on counts of fraud having exhausted all appeal avenues in the UK where he was fighting extradition. It was also revealed that the Queen’s Bench Division Administrative Court directed him to pay Kenya the costs of the appeal by Lord Justice Richard Aikens and Justice George Leggat on 11 December 2015 after a protracted court battle (Menya, 2015). The Triton Petroleum Limited court case took many years. At the time, its owner Yagnesh Devani was eventually put on trial, his senior managers that included Peter Kimathi, William Mundia, and Sunil Somai were already charged with criminal offences relating to the oil scandal (Mayoyo, 2011). Others charged with defrauding the Kenya Pipeline Company included Julius Kilonzo, Collins Otieno, Mahendra Pathak, and Benedict Mutua. Moreover, in September 2014, an Assistant Director of Public Prosecutions Victor Mule told the court that the trial needed to proceed (Kisia, 2015). The political connections and background to the scandal were articulated very well in the Weekly Citizen tabloid newspaper on 13 January 2009 that Yagnesh Devani enjoyed high-level political connections. He was a close friend of Raila Odinga, Moody Awori, and Uhuru Kenyatta. It was also noted that his 2006 ceremony to open the Triton Petroleum Limited depot was attended by Moody Awori, Raila Odinga, Uhuru Kenyatta, several cabinet ministers, and several permanent secretaries. It was also revealed that his ties with President Daniel arap Moi led to Triton Petroleum Limited clinching a lucrative contract to supply petroleum products to the Kenya Power and Lighting Company several times. The tabloid newspaper also revealed that Devani’s brother Harish Devani was actually the owner of the multimillion complex Simmers Plaza in Nairobi’s Westlands who is alleged to have committed suicide after swindling close associates of former President Daniel arap Moi millions of dollars in tender scams to supply Kenyan Ports Authority and Kenya Power and Lighting Company (Weekly Citizen, 2009). It was also alleged that Devani heavily funded the 2007 general campaign for the Orange Democratic Movement team (Nairobi Chronicle, 2009).

Conclusion Tabloid newspapers in Kenya continue to play a critical role in exposing corruption. In recent years, the tabloids and investigative journalists have demonstrated greater editorial independence. Moreover, the

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number of press freedom abuses has declined. On the other hand, some media policies and incidents continue to inhibit anti-corruption journalism. Indeed, the war against corruption cannot be won without the involvement of the tabloid newspapers which play a crucial role in creating awareness and in putting the government in check and pressuring it to prosecute corruption cases. Despite the country putting anti-corruption legislation in place to fight embezzlement scandals, there still exist weak judicial system and institutions. For example, even though there are laws such as the AntiCorruption and Economic Crimes Act 2003 and the Penal Code which criminalize corruption, challenges still remain when it comes to the actual implementations in practice. Besides, money laundering, abuse of office, extortion, conflict of interest, and bribery involving agents remain serious offences in the country, but still, corruption incidents remain widespread. Moreover, the Bribery Act of 2016 criminalizes bribery which includes facilitation payments. In addition, it imposes a duty on public and private entities to have appropriate anti-bribery procedures in place, and if convicted one is barred from doing business with the government for 10 years. Furthermore, the Public Officers Ethics Act 2003 provides rules for transparency and accountability. For example, high-level politicians are required to declare their income and assets. Moreover, the Public Procurement and Disposal Act prohibits corruption in public tendering. In addition, the Finance Act 2006 provides guidelines on tax administration. Besides, the Service Commissions Act requires meritocratic recruitment and promotion of public officials. The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act and the Witness Protection Act also protect whistleblowers and forbid disciplinary action against any employee who assists in disclosing information for the investigation. However, the Witness Protection Agency is underfunded, and questions about its independence remain (GAN Integrity, 2017).

Bibliography Africa Files. (2006). When bogus firms wired back Sh1bn. Retrieved from http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=10731&ThisURL=./kenya. asp&URLName=Kenya. BBC. (2004a). Moi ‘ordered’ Goldenberg payment. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3495689.stm.

162  B. CHAMA BBC. (2004b). ‘Bribery’ halts Kenya graft probe. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3433047.stm. BBC. (2006a). Kenyan ‘graft’ minister resigns. Retrieved from http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/africa/4670120.stm. BBC. (2006b). ‘Taped evidence’ in Kenya scandal. Retrieved from http://news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4695354.stm. Chepkemei, P. (2012). Bosire fights to keep his job. Retrieved from https://www. nation.co.ke/news/politics/Bosire-fights-to-keep-his-job-/1064-139777610qmlck/index.html. Clark, J. F. (2014). The African stakes of the Congo war. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dixon, R. (2015). Kenya massacre points up country’s weakness against Somali militants. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/world/africa/la-fg-kenya-violence-shabab-20150403-story.html. Freedom House. (2017). Anxious dictators, wavering democracies: Global freedom under pressure. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/ freedom-world/freedom-world-2016. GAN Integrity. (2017). Kenya corruption report. Retrieved from https://www. business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/kenya/. Harden, B. (1992). Africa: Dispatches from a fragile continent. London: Fontana. Hawley, S. (2003). Turning a blind eye. Retrieved from http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk/resource/turning-blind-eye#index-02-03-01-00. Kahola, B. (2009). The true story of David Munyakei: Goldenberg whistleblower. Nairobi: Kwani Trust. Karen, R. (2010). A passion for print. Retrieved from https://archives.cjr.org/ feature/a_passion_for_print.php?page=all. Karanja, F. (2016). EACC found huge amounts of cash in Nairobi Governor Evans Kidero’s account suspicious. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia. co.ke/article/2000195080/eacc-found-huge-amounts-of-cash-in-nairobigovernor-evans-kidero-s-account-suspicious. Kenyan Pundit. (2006). Weekly Citizen articles. Retrieved from http://www.kenyanpundit.com/2006/03/06/weekly-citizen-articles/. Kisero, J. (2009). KACC asked to probe $98.7 million Triton oil theft at Kenya pipeline. Retrieved from http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/news//2558/512818/-/rliqydz/-/index.html. Kisia, A. (2015). Sh7.6b Triton oil scandal still remains unresolved. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000149258/sh7-6b-triton-oilscandal-still-remains-unresolved. Mayoyo, P. (2011). Kenyan tycoon in Sh7 billion Triton fraud arrested. Retrieved from https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Kenyan-tycoon-in-Sh7-billion-Tritonfraud-arrested-/1056-1170212-p9ctbnz/index.html.

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Menya, W. (2015). Devani to be extradited over Sh7.6 billion Triton oil scam. Retrieved from https://www.nation.co.ke/news/Devani-to-beextradited/1056-3003332-12o5bk4z/index.html. Nairobi Chronicle. (2009). Odinga family in corrupt deals. Retrieved from https://nairobichronicle.wordpress.com/2009/01/13/%EF%BB%B Fodinga-family-in-corrupt-deals/. Ogemba, P. (2016). How Kenya power bosses ‘fixed’ Sh6b tender for Chinese firm. Retrieved from https://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000227083/ how-kenya-power-bosses-fixed-sh6b-tender-for-chinese-firm. Rice, X. (2006). Former vice-president escapes graft charges. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2006/aug/03/kenya.mainsection. Standing, A. (2012). Goldenberg. Retrieved from. https://web.archive. o r g / w e b / 2 0 0 7 0 9 2 7 1 9 2 4 4 7 / h t t p : / / w w w. i s s a f r i c a . o r g / i n d e x . php?link_id=5&slink_id=3050&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3. Transparency International Kenya. (2017). East African bribery index 2017. Retrieved from https://tikenya.org/east-african-bribery-index/. Transparency International. (2018). Kenya: Corruption perception index 2017. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/KEN. Vidija, P. (2016). NPSC sacks 127 vetted traffic cops. Retrieved from https:// www.the-star.co.ke/news/2016/12/07/npsc-sacks-127-vetted-traffic-cops_ c1469124. Wanjala, E. (2017). Switzerland, Kenya sign pact to trace stolen funds. Retrieved from https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/04/29/switzerland-kenyasign-pact-to-trace-stolen-funds_c1551836. Weekly Citizen. (2009). Weekly Citizen’s take on KPC-Triton scam. Retrieved from http://coldtusker.blogspot.ca/2009/01/blog-post_13.html. World Economic Forum. (2016). The global competitiveness report 2015–2016. Retrieved from http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report2015-2016/. Wrong, M. (2009). Its our turn to eat: The story of a Kenyan whistle-blower. London: Harper.

Part V

CHAPTER 10

Anti-corruption Tabloids in Democratic Republic of Congo

The Democratic Republic of Congo despite embracing democracy from colonialism has been engulfed in civil war and dictatorships making the fight against corruption difficult to achieve. In its transition from years of civil war to democracy, tabloid journalism practice has taken time to flourish. Moreover, many tabloid journalists continue to live in fear when it comes to exposing corruption. Besides, the country continues to struggle with repeated political crises, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and entrenched corruption. Furthermore, there is an on-going fighting over the control of the considerable mineral wealth sustaining a climate of violence, insecurity and public discontent especially in the eastern provinces, fuelling persistent governance crisis and undermining its capacity to escape the trap of conflict and poverty. In addition, the practice of using the state for private purposes has over the years become deeply entrenched. For instance, the anti-corruption agenda has often been manipulated for political reasons. Besides, the 2017 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranks the Democratic Republic of Congo at 161 out of 180 countries measured (Transparency International, 2017). This chapter focuses on the Kabila regimes noting that even though on numerous occasions they declared their commitment to fighting corruption, their anti-corruption agendas were often manipulated for political reasons. It discusses the Glencore mining scandal which revealed toxic combination of corruption and mismanagement in the country’s revenues agencies and state mining companies’ revenues for the state © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_10

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budget amounting to at least US$750 million which went missing over three years from 2013 to 2016; money that should have been used on vital public services for the Congolese people. It concludes that even though the tabloid newspapers and journalists regularly expose embezzlement and financial mismanagement, corruption is deeply rooted and is not so much an affliction of the Congolese system as it is the system itself, deeply entrenched in the history of the Congolese state. It further notes that the value of illegal natural resources exploitation in the eastern part of the country for example runs in billions of dollars per year, but almost everything in terms of net profits are from illegal and corrupt natural resource exploitations mainly gold, charcoal, and timber which go to transnational organized criminal networks with international connections (Clark, 2014).

Corruption in Government Institutions Corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo is a problem that seriously hinders economic development of the country. It permeates all levels of government and all sectors of the economy, making it very difficult for the country to develop and damaging the delivery of social services. Furthermore, corruption impedes efforts to increase the transparency of government institutions. For example, the ruling elites have a direct stake in the country’s economy, and often steer economic activities in accordance with their personal opportunities. Even though the Penal Code makes up the country’s anti-corruption legislation, the relevant laws are very poorly implemented, and government officials engage in corruption with total impunity. It is this dysfunctional institutional framework that has contributed to the spread of corruption, as well as inflating the country’s informal economy, further impairing competitiveness. Moreover, there exists a culture of bribery in the country, to the extent that the general population considers it normal when it comes to daily interactions (GAN Integrity, 2016). Besides, corruption exists in the judicial institutions severely under-financed and lacks basic infrastructure. The courts are inefficient, often subjected to political influence, and restricted to only a few major cities. For example, even though the country’s business contracts usually provide external arbitration clauses; nonetheless, these are not useful in resolving the day-to-day business problems, and this is largely due to cost and time constraints. Moreover, the tabloid journalists and their

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newspapers that expose corruption are often subjected to selective application of a complex legal code, and when obtained, court orders are often not respected (Enterprise Surveys, 2013). The security apparatus is heavily corrupt and especially among the state security forces: the national police and the national army. For example, the police impunity is reinforced by the reshuffling of the security forces, and the replacement of officers with notoriously corrupt ones who have close ties with the president. The private security firms are actually more reliable for the provision of security, and many firms and individuals pay for security mainly from private firms in order to avoid organized crime which is rampant among the government security forces (GAN Integrity, 2016). In the public services sector, citizens are aware of the fact that in order to get things done quickly, offering gifts to officials is part of the process. There exist demands for bribes disguised as fees. The petty corruption is attributed to a weak administrative capacity and a shortage of resources, combined with low-salaries and often unpaid staff (Transparency International, 2014). Indeed, petty corruption is often the only means of survival for employees of the public administration. The state administration is almost non-existent outside major cities. Several parts of the country are subjected to two parallel administrations; one is operated by the state, the other by armed groups. These major dysfunctionalities in the public administration serve as a breeding ground for corruption and criminal activities with international transactions (World Bank, 2016). The tax administration is also full of corrupt tax officials. The complexity of the tax system has resulted in frequent practices of bribery. Many citizens are expected to give bribes masquerading as gifts when meeting with tax officials. At times, whistleblowers within the national tax agency are dismissed for denouncing tax evasion schemes by multinational companies operating in the country (GAN Integrity, 2016). Furthermore, trading across borders is heavily corrupt and costlier compared to regional average. For instance, documentary compliance in connection to exports costs about US$2500 compared to the sub-Saharan Africa average of US$246. In an effort to curb corruption in the customs sector, the government initiated in 2014, a new single-window declaration system on the Zambian border, which automatically transmits forms electronically to the capital Kinshasa. However, despite this initiative, nonetheless, enforcement remains dependent on the integrity of local officials (World Bank, 2016).

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The public procurement sector is not transparency when it comes to government decisions and accountability when public contracting. Generally, the public procurement decisions and privatization deals are based on political considerations, rather than economic ones. Moreover, business executives are expected to give gifts to officials to secure government contracts. Furthermore, monopolies and cartels dominate the market and are generally associated with people from the president’s inner circle, rendering fair competition non-existent (Enterprise Surveys, 2013). The natural resources sector is plagued by corruption. The government’s management of the natural wealth is shrouded in secrecy (Transparency International, 2014). For example, state-owned companies dominate the extractive industries. The process of allocating exploration and exploitation licences lacks transparency. Moreover, the revenue from the natural resources is often siphoned by ruling elites to the detriment of the general population and the environment. Heavy corruption exists in the oil sector which allows embezzlement of public resources. Illegal logging accounts for almost 90% of all logging activities. For example, 94% of licences for forest land were illegally issued between 2010 and 2012 (Assembe-Mvondo, 2015). Secrecy in the mining contracts has led to banks cancelling loans given to state-owned mining companies by the African Development Bank and the World Bank. For example, in 2013, the International Monetary Fund completely withdrew a loan worth US$532 million. At the time, the government refused to disclose details of dubious sale of 25% of a state-owned copper project. The government was also between 2008 and 2011 accused of selling mining concessions for US$5 billion under market price in return for kickbacks. Besides, the National Assembly Commission found that the government officials pocketed US$23 million in kickbacks from a US$6 billion mining-for-infrastructure deal with China (Transparency International, 2014). The government has now established a legal anti-corruption framework even though its enforcement is very weak. For example, the Penal Code criminalizes abuse of office, an offence punishable by up to 15 years in prison. Money laundering is also criminalized under the Money Laundering Act. The president and government officials are subjected to financial disclosure laws of their assets. Even though the information is not often made public. Whistleblowers are basically not protected under the law. There are no mechanisms to monitor the public administration

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which has contributed to the continuous degradation of the institutions. Audits and tracking of government expenditure almost never take place. Recruitment is plagued by high levels of patronage and governmental positions are offered on the basis of networks. Programmes that have been initiated to curb corruption such as the ‘Zero Tolerance against Corruption’ mainly serve as a tool to secure foreign funding (GAN Integrity, 2016).

Tabloid Journalism and Corruption The exposure of corruption by tabloids is often done using the window of opportunity in the 2005 Constitution which also provides laws for press freedom and freedom of expression. However, these rights are limited in practice by President Joseph Kabila’s government and various non-state actors. Criminal defamation and libel laws are regularly used to detain and intimidate tabloid journalists. For example, in February 2013, the editor of La Colombe, Joachim Diana, was imprisoned for defamation after publishing an investigative piece on a hospital run by a Chinese entrepreneur. Similarly, in June 2013, Nicaise Kibel’Bel Oka, editor of Les Coulisses, was imprisoned for libel after an article that implicated a customs official in fraud (Freedom House, 2014). The public takes tabloid newspapers seriously and is popular among the affluent and educated citizens. However, since many downmarket tabloids cost at least US$1 each, they are generally out of reach of many ordinary citizens. The Congolese people who have no purchasing power do not buy tabloid newspapers, but prefer to read them on the floor as they are being displayed and sold (Internews, 2012). However, critics argue that tabloid newspapers in the country are not credible sources of information. This is because many of the articles in the tabloids are bought. Basically, tabloid journalists are paid to write articles on behalf of persons who are the article’s actual subject, a practice known as coupage (taking a cutting) making them vulnerable to publish unverified information. This makes tabloids independence limited. Moreover, it is difficult for tabloid journalists to earn a living from legitimate tabloid journalism alone. Generally, most tabloid journalists receive very low salaries and are not paid regularly. This financial situation actually forces many tabloid journalists to indulge in improper behaviour which affects the quality and the nature of reporting. Besides, this also makes it easier to bribe tabloid journalists (Kabemba, 2005).

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Another criticism is that many tabloids lack balance and objectivity and rarely check the information they are given. Moreover, official statements and press releases are often accepted at face value and reported as factual accounts. Besides, the news reports are often heavily loaded with editorial comment, making it difficult to distinguish them from pure opinion pieces. Tabloids brave enough to undertake investigative reporting often get strongly sanctioned formally or informally. In addition, many tabloids do not have the financial capacity to finance in-depth reporting and often focuses on the day-to-day events usually biased and factually incorrect. The lack of resources and fear of being arrested prevents investigative tabloid journalism (Internews, 2012). Many major tabloid newspapers in the country actually have political connections, and their stories have political inclination undertones. For example, Le Potentiel, owned by veteran journalist Modeste Mutinga, has a ruling party inclination. For instance, it supported President Joseph Kabila in the 2006 elections. The Kinshasa tabloid often reflects the view of the government. Besides, L’Avenir another Kinshasa based tabloid is owned by Pius Muabilu, a pro-Kabila publication. Furthermore, Le Palmarès is owned by veteran journalist Michel Ladi Luya and is a pro-Kabila newspaper (Internews, 2012). The political allegiances of most tabloid newspapers in the country reflect their owners’ interests. At times, tabloids attempt to remain politically neutral. But the fact that the papers often run stories clearly sponsored by interest parties makes it very difficult to remain neutral. Moreover, since many tabloid newspapers have chronic shortage of cash, it becomes very difficult to remain independent and fair. Even at times when certain tabloid newspapers run critical articles and openly criticize government actions and the behaviour of individual ministers, the editorials are often written in juxtaposition. For instance, tabloid newspapers editorials tend to balance criticism with laudatory coverage of other aspects of government action. Generally, the government does not react to every critical report in the tabloids, but crackdowns are very frequent. Critical tabloid journalists and those working for opposition outlets are often harassed, intimidated, and arrested. Over the years, several tabloid journalists have been arrested and detained even killed in mysterious circumstances after publishing reports critical of the government, and their murderers are rarely tried and convicted (Internews, 2012).

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Tabloid journalists and their newspapers regularly face censorship and harassment from multiple sources, including national and local government officials, members of the security forces and non-state actors. For example, detentions, extrajudicial questioning, threats, and kidnapping are common in the conflict-plagued eastern regions of the country. This is largely because of the tense situation between the March 23 Movement (M23) rebel group and the Congolese army. Both parties to the conflict attempt to monitor and control what is reported (Freedom House, 2014). Basically, tabloid journalists’ rights are frequently violated by the authorities’ despite being guaranteed in the Constitution. Many tabloid reporters often distance themselves from engaging in anti-corruption activities for fear of reprisal (Transparency International, 2014). Even though the country is slowly emerging from a long period of violence and instability, it continues to struggle with repeated political crises, weak governance, mismanagement of natural resources, and entrenched corruption. There is also an on-going fighting over the control of the country’s considerable mineral wealth sustaining a climate of violence especially in the eastern provinces, fuelling persistent governance crisis and undermining its capacity to escape the trap of conflict and poverty which all impacts on the security of tabloid journalists that venture to expose corrupt practices among the various factions in the country (Assembe-Mvondo, 2015). Almost all tabloid newspapers despite having some sort of company structure have a number of professional and financial challenges. Moreover, the fact that almost all tabloids have political connections, they also exhibit very poor quality in terms of professionalism. Similarly, the tabloid newspapers in other parts of the country face even greater critical challenges, and most of the papers do not actually appear on a regular basis. This is largely because of regular instability in the country and generally poor and often unsafe channels of tabloid newspapers distribution. In addition, many tabloid newspapers also have a very limited coverage. Henceforth, many tabloid journalists are therefore tied to a region or city, essentially Kinshasa (Internews, 2012). The tabloids reporting on issues of corruption often result in reprisal, particularly on behalf of the Congolese National Intelligence Agency. Furthermore, tabloid journalists criticizing the government are

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frequently killed especially during times of political unrest. However, papers that support government interests tend to have a long lifespan, but those that relentlessly criticize government are often shut down by authorities. For example, in 2014, the press was prohibited from initiating and sharing information about mining companies operating in the country without prior approval. Corruption reporting by tabloid journalists is a very big risk. Moreover, there are no laws that allow the public to access the government held information (GAN Integrity, 2016). However, at times tabloid newspapers expose corruption especially on individuals who have broken their alliances with the government authorities. This is often done by tabloids that support government interests and usually with the ‘blessings’ of the government and the tabloid owners. For example, on 25 October 2013, the Chief Executive Officer Ludjwera Birindwa of the state-owned petroleum company Cohydro was arrested on charges of embezzlement. He was alleged to have stolen US$10 million allocated to pay for a shipment of oil from a South African company Labohlano Trading Investment. It was revealed by the tabloids on how the perpetrator threatened the newspapers who exposed the scandal with lawsuits. Cohydro is involved in the import, export, and distribution of hydrocarbons derived from crude oil and commercial and industrial uses. It was established on 9 August 1999 by government to create petroleum independence for the country. However, Cohydro has been at the centre of massive allegations especially by the tabloid newspapers based in the capital Kinshasa of corruption, financial mismanagement, and embezzlement (Global Security, 2015). Even though the country has some of the best tabloid journalists in Central Africa coming from training schools in the country, the poor quality of reporting is the result of many issues such as the fragile political situation, poor salaries for tabloid journalists, adoption of negative values by tabloid journalists and their tabloid newspapers such as being paid to write articles that are at times poorly sourced, the fear to hold accountable those who have massive power due to threats of arrests and torture, and generally the lack of financial resources and the lack of legal protection (Kabemba, 2005). Besides, there is a very small pool of advertisers which makes it extremely difficult for tabloid newspapers to sustain themselves financially through commercial advertising. Basically, the advertising market is dominated by the mobile phone companies and the breweries. Since there is not enough advertising to go round, the tabloid newspapers are

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vulnerable to the influence and patronage of politicians and business people. Moreover, another related problem is that most tabloid newspapers lack good financial management and marketing skills including basic equipment for them to be able to conduct their corruption investigations effectively (Internews, 2012).

Kabila Regimes The Democratic Republic of Congo has extremely poor governance that has plagued the country. Soon after independence from Belgium on 30 June 1960, with Joseph Kasa-Vubu as the first President, the country collapsed into chaos and internal divisions along the various ethnic lines and militia groups. The chaos and ethnic divisions are one of the reasons that contributed to a coup d’état on 24 November 1965, and an authoritarian military regime headed by Mobutu Sese Seko emerged which went on to control and rule the country for over 30 years. When Sese Seko took over the government, he introduced a one-party state with both the print media falling under state control (Kabemba, 2005). His regime was characterized by neo-patrimonial management, with the country’s riches controlled and belonging largely to him and his family, and a bourgeois minority protected by the regime. This situation resulted in billions of dollars being siphoned from the country by him and his allies for their personal use. He established a one-party state with a Constitution that banned multiparty politics. He took direct command of the state’s military and security machinery, which was made up of special brigades that controlled the country and all citizens (AssembeMvondo, 2015). President Mobutu Sese Seko’s dictatorial regime and the drying up of financial resources to distribute through patrimonial networks triggered a full-scale civil war in the mid-1990s, along with the eruption of many smaller armed conflicts throughout the country particularly in the eastern region (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004). In fact, in early 1990, the liberalization of political activities was followed by an explosion in privately owned newspapers including tabloids in the country. However, his regime continued to suppress journalists and restrict the number of newspapers. The situation for journalists especially tabloids continued to deteriorate. Even though a number of tabloid newspapers continued to emerge and increase that were generally critical of the government, their reporters continued to suffer intimidations and at times assassinations (Kabemba, 2005). For

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example, in early 1991, two directors of Elima, an evening daily tabloid, were detained by the government after publishing pieces alleging official corruption. In the same year, a bomb was planted that destroyed the tabloid newspaper offices. In the late 1993, the government decided to finally shut down the tabloid newspaper and arrested its tabloid journalists. However, the situation started to improve slowly in the country with regard to press freedom and freedom of expression, and by early 1995, there were nine daily tabloid newspapers with a combined circulation of 120,000. Furthermore, daily French-language tabloid newspapers continued to increase which published in major cities during the late 1990s and which included among others the daily Salongo in Kinshasa, the daily Mjumbe in Lubumbashi, the daily Boyoma in Kisangani, and Le Passeport Africain which was a weekly tabloid (Graves, 2009). In 1997, President Mobutu Sese Seko was ousted from power following a sustained internal rebellion and rebel leader Laurent-Desire Kabila assumed power on 17 May of the same year. However, he too continued the crackdown on tabloid newspapers and journalists leading to neighbouring states to challenge his style of leadership. In 1998, war re-erupted in the country leading to his assassination on 16 January 2001 by one of his bodyguards. He was quickly succeeded by his son eight days later Joseph Kabila (Kabemba, 2005). In 2005, the country adopted a new Constitution, and in 2006, it held elections following discussions between the country’s political forces, united under the banner of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. He won the first election and was re-elected in November 2011 after completing his first term in office, despite a fragmented political opposition contesting the results (Githaiga 2012). However, during the reign of President Joseph Kabila, the pattern of suppressing tabloid journalists and restriction of the number of tabloid newspapers common during the Mobutu’s regime has continued. For example, in February 2001, just after coming to power, the national agents arrested tabloid journalist Guy Kasongo Kilembwe for caricaturing President Joseph Kabila and his group of ministers. Similarly, in December of the same year, the police arrested tabloid journalist Freddy Embumba who worked for the Kinshasa daily L’Avenir tabloid newspaper. The police also seized two editors of the PotPourri newspaper which had published an article satirizing him. Similarly, in February 2002, the government officials arrested twenty-six Congolese journalists, a situation which has continued to deteriorate and remain unstable (Graves, 2009).

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The practice of using the state for private purposes has continued to be deeply entrenched in the presidency. Moreover, the eastern part of the country regularly experience wars and internal rebel forces (Clark, 2014). The country also continues to rank low when it comes to corruption. It is widely considered to be among the most corrupt countries in the world. For example, the 2014 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance lists the country at 47 out of 52 countries. Basically, the pervasive and systemic corruption is mainly the result of years of poor governance by the political elites and their regimes that continue to leave the general population to fend for themselves. The former President Mobutu Sese Seko’s famous expression that ‘everything in Congo is for sale’ can help to understand the mentality towards governance. This mentality can also help to explain the logic behind the way the government has entered into arrangements with individuals and international corporations with questionable and criminal background (Assembe-Mvondo, 2015). The deep-rooted corruption in the country has also led to the gradual erosion of the state’s authority which has further ingrained its political circles. For instance, the office of the presidency continues to be perceived in the country as the most corrupt institution. Furthermore, despite the promises made by the country’s President Joseph Kabila during his investiture speech after the 2006 presidential election, corruption has remained institutionalized and has become a social cancer that continues to affect all political and socio-economic activities threatening the foundation of the emerging state and the advent of democratic governance (DeGregory, 2013). It is clear that the reign of the two Kabila regimes has resulted in the natural resources sectors becoming most affected by corruption with mining and forestry ranking among the top. Other sectors with massive corruption include taxation, customs administration, and public enterprises. The contract awards for mining and oil assets, land allocations, and resource-based revenue flows remain non-transparent. Fraudulent practices and embezzlement continue to exist with impunity (Chêne 2010).

Glencore On 21 July 2017, it was revealed by a number of local tabloid newspapers in Kinshasa that a toxic combination of corruption and mismanagement in the country’s revenue agencies and state mining companies contributed to missing mining revenues from the state budget amounting to US$750 million over three years from 2013 and 2016. The money that should have

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been used on vital public services for the Congolese people. The revelations came during the political unrest as embattled President Joseph Kabila was clinging to power. The country is Africa’s top copper producer and the world’s biggest supplier of cobalt, which is used in the lithium-ion batteries that power electric cars and in the midst of a price boom. The other revelations were that millions of payments by mining companies to Congo’s tax agencies and state mining companies never reached national treasury, the figure that rose to over US$1.3 billion, when other state bodies and provincial tax bodies were included (Jones, 2017a). The tabloids further revealed that the Katanga Mining, a company that is partly owned by mining giant Glencore and Dan Gertler, an Israeli mining tycoon, actually received US$440 million in discounts on the payments to the country’s state-owned Gécamines mining company. It was noted that the heavy discounts which other international mining companies operating in the country did not have the luxury to receive, came after negotiations by the mining magnate Gertler who is also a friend of President Joseph Kabila and linked to numerous mining bribery scandals in the country. It was noted that the massive discounts from the government known as ‘signature bonus’ was given to Glencore following its 2009 acquisition of Katanga Mining which owned a huge copper and cobalt operation in the country. The tabloids also quoting foreign sources revealed that Glencore had teamed up with Gertler to take over Katanga Mining who personally negotiated the mining licences in Katanga Mining’s favour, while taking advantage of his close relationship with President Joseph Kabila (Jones, 2017c). In reaction to corruption revelations, mining giant Glencore noted that the ‘signature bonus’ it paid was ‘legally required’. However, what was not clear was on how it got a discount of 98% on the amount it was initially requested to pay despite other mining companies paying in full. Besides, it was not clear why Dan Gertler was central to all of Glencore’s operations in the country, at the time, when he was the centre of Glencore’s bribery investigation into its business in the country (Burgis, 2017). The tabloids noted that the key culprit in this diversion of funds was the main state-owned mining company Gécamines. The company receives more than a hundred million dollars annually from private companies operating in the country’s mining sector, but pass on just a tiny percentage of that to the state coffers. Gécamines’ most important and lucrative business relationships are with major international mining companies, which often have Western investors and pensions tied up in their profits and risks. Even though Gécamines contributions to the country’s

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public purse are small, it found money during 2013 and 2016 to pay off huge loans it got from Dan Gertler’s companies in the same period Gécamines’ staff went unpaid (Jones, 2017b). The mining giant Glencore was also accused by tabloids that during 2013 and 2016, it paid over US$75 million to Dan Gertler’s Africa Horizons company registered in the Cayman Islands. Gertler was also accused of bribing senior officials in the country to advance his mining interests. Tabloids further noted that Glencore paid Gertler money which was meant for state-owned Gécamines under the original contract. The revelations led to Glencore admitting to its shareholders that it was unfortunate that it did not disclose in company filings that it was making payments to Africa Horizons company owned by Gertler and a very close friend of President Joseph Kabila. It also came to light that Gertler was also a focus of a major foreign bribery investigation in the USA and in the UK by the Serious Fraud Office (Burgis, 2017). The tabloids also revealed that Glencore admitted that the payments that indicated ‘payable to Gécamines’ on its Katanga Mining company filings to the Toronto Stock Exchange for 2013 and 2016 in royalty and signature bonus, actually went to Dan Gertler’s Africa Horizons company. The tabloids noted that Glencore’s filings discrepancy of the real recipient was not only misleading but a corruption risk in the country’s mining sector. The papers noted that it was an open secret that Gécamines was not transparent. The tabloids challenged Glencore investors to ask why it felt so comfortable making misleading payments, and why it didn’t disclose that Gertler was the recipient of the money that was meant for state-owned Gécamines (Jones, 2017a). In March 2017, the tabloids revealed that Glencore had paid Dan Gertler out of the jointly owned Katanga Mining US$534 million to buy him out from their shared assets in the giant copper mine. The newspapers alleged that the arrangement was actually designed to insulate Glencore from the fallout of widening corruption investigations globally. It was noted that the decision by its Chief Executive Officer Ivan Glasenberg to buy Gertler out, highlighted the risks of doing business in the resource-rich, war-torn country, where Gertler wielded influence by virtue of his close friendship with President Joseph Kabila. It was further noted by some of the tabloids friendly to the ruling government that Gertler denied wrongdoing arguing that his efforts to bring billions of dollars in investment to the war-torn country which many international investors and donor community shunned deserved to be applauded (Burgis, 2017).

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Basically, the background to Glencore and Dan Gertler’s Africa Horizons company arrangement goes back to 2008 when Toronto-listed Katanga Mining was on its knees. It controlled the planet’s highest-grade copper deposits in the country’s Katanga province. However, the prices for the metal at the time had tumbled. However, Glencore under its Chief Executive Officer Ivan Glasenberg gave US$265 million loans to the Katanga Mining company in January 2009. The Katanga Mining’s share price when it did collapse, Glencore then converted the loan into equity, the scenario which resulted into a take-over. All shareholders were wiped out except Dan Gertler who had a significant minority stake. Glencore’s ‘loan-to-own’ arrangement would have diluted his shareholding but Glencore issued him a loan of US$45 million in February 2009 to preserve his shareholding. However, Glencore made no such loan to other shareholders. This information only became public knowledge when the paperwork was finally leaked to the general public by a whistleblower. By then, Gertler and Glencore were already in joint ownership of the Katanga Mining company (Jones, 2017c). Besides, as far back as 2001, the United Nations investigators on role of mining industry in funding civil war in the country pointed at Dan Gertler. He was accused of having supplied President Laurent Kabila with funds to buy weapons, in exchange for a monopoly on trading the country’s diamonds. Kabila was later assassinated in the same year. He was succeeded by his son Joseph Kabila. Gertler struck a friendship with his son and embarked on secretive mining deals. The 2013 Report by Africa Progress Panel, chaired by Kofi Annan, the former United Nations Secretary General notes that Gertler used offshore companies to amass his interests in the country (Burgis, 2017).

Conclusion Anti-corruption tabloid newspapers in the Democratic Republic of Congo play an important role in the exposure of financial mismanagement, despite the various challenges that range from professional practice, to intimidations, including limited advertising opportunities. In fact, the country presents a story of enduring tabloid publications in an environment engulfed in civil war and criminal activities that have deprived its citizens of resources that would have funded public service delivery. However, even though tabloids and tabloid journalists in the

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country take risks to expose corruption, many end up being arrested, imprisoned, and even assassinated with very often perpetrators not held accountable (Freedom House, 2014). Besides, the on-going civil war in the country has contributed to widespread corruption. For example, there exists massive looting in the natural resources sector and rivalries over the control of resources which have escalated, as warring groups use natural wealth to consolidate economic bases and trading networks. Even though the country is now accepted back as a candidate for the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative since 2008, it has failed to accomplish all validation requirements, particularly the full disclosure and reliability of figures. However, the government has stepped up its efforts on reporting in the mining and oil industries which have gained the country compliant status since 2014. Besides, despite the tabloids and journalists regularly exposing embezzlement and financial mismanagement, corruption is deeply rooted in the history of the Congolese state making it difficult to eliminate (GAN Integrity, 2016).

Bibliography Assembe-Mvondo, S. (2015). National-level corruption risks and mitigation strategies in the implementation of REDD+ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo: An overview of the current situation. Retrieved from http://www.redd-monitor.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/U4-Issue-2015-09-WEB.pdf. Burgis, T. (2017). Why Glencore bought out tycoon in Congo. Retrieved from https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/corruption-investigation_why-glencorebought-out-tycoon-in-congo/43027318. Chêne, M. (2010). Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from http://www.u4.no/publications/ overview-of-corruption-and-anti-corruption-in-the-drc/. Clark, J. F. (2014). The African stakes of the Congo war. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. DeGregory, P. (2013). Rebuilding failed states: A case study of the DRC. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1C4aOxB. Enterprise Surveys. (2013). Democratic Republic of the Congo 2013. Retrieved from http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/. Freedom House. (2014). Congo, Democratic Republic of (Kinshasa). Retrieved from https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2014/ congo-democratic-republic-kinshasa.

182  B. CHAMA GAN Integrity. (2016). DR Congo corruption report. Retrieved from h t t p s : / / w w w. b u s i n e s s - a n t i - c o r r u p t i o n . c o m / c o u n t r y - p r o f i l e s / democratic-republic-of-the-congo. Githaiga, N. (2012). The 2011 DRC election polls and beyond. Retrieved from http://www.issafrica.org/uploads/SitRep2012-21Jun.pdf. Global Security. (2015). DR Congo-corruption. Retrieved from https://www. globalsecurity.org/military/world/congo/corruption.htm. Graves, R. N. (2009). Democratic Congo. Retrieved from http://www.pressreference.com/Co-Fa/Democratic-Congo.html#Comments_1. Internews. (2012). Democratic Republic of Congo media and telecoms landscape guide. Retrieved from https://www.internews.org/resource/ democratic-republic-congo-media-and-telecoms-landscape-guide. Jones, P. (2017a). Glencore redirected over $75 million in mining payments to scandal-hit friend of Congolese President, Global Witness reveals. Retrieved from https://www.globalwitness.org/fr/press-releases/glencore-redirected-over-75-million-mining-payments-scandal-hit-friend-president-global-witness-reveals/. Jones, P. (2017b). $750 million in mining revenues fails to reach treasury in Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/750-million-mining-revenues-fails-reach-treasury-democratic-republic-congo/. Jones, P. (2017c). Global Witness calls for Glencore’s business partner to explain mining discount in Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from https:// www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/global-witness-calls-glencores-business-partner-explain-mining-discount-democratic-republic-congo/. Kabemba, C. (2005). The state of the media in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from https://www.africaportal.org/documents/2106/OP30.pdf. Mo Ibrahim Foundation. (2014). Index of African Governance 2014. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/RbX2bf. Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2004). From Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from http://bit.ly/1MTYaeX. Transparency International. (2014). Overview of corruption and anti-corruption in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Retrieved from https:// www.transparency.org/whatwedo/answer/overview_of_corruption_and_ anti_corruption_in_the_democratic_republic_. Transparency International. (2017). Democratic Republic of Congo. Retrieved from https://www.transparency.org/country/COD. World Bank. (2016). Doing business: Measuring business regulations. Retrieved from http://www.doingbusiness.org/.

CHAPTER 11

Corruption and Tabloid Journalism in Cameroon

Anti-corruption tabloid journalism has evolved over time and is now widespread in Cameroon. At the same time, agencies entrusted to fight corruption have become compromised and undermined by the ruling elites. Tabloids have become major voices that expose financial mismanagement and bribery. However, this often comes at high risk for the lives of some tabloid journalists especially when hard-hitting front-page headlines on corruption are provided (Jacinto, 2016). Generally, there exists financial mismanagement at almost every level of governance. For instance, the 2017 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranks the country at 153 out of 180 with a score of 25 out of 100 (Transparency International, 2018). This chapter starts by discussing corruption in Cameroon arguing that it is deeply rooted in government institutions. It notes that tabloids are often filled with stories of fraud and complaints by ordinary citizens towards civil servants and private-sector workers who regularly demand bribes. It notes that many people are willing to tell their stories to tabloid newspapers on how corruption has affected them and their families, even though few are prepared to take legal action. It discusses the anti-corruption tabloid journalism noting that the tabloid newspapers are critical platforms in discussing the culture of impunity when it comes to corruption. It explores the Albatross affair in which former Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni was sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2013 for embezzlement following the purchase at great expense a presidential © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_11

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aircraft with serious mechanical flaws on its maiden flight with the presidential couple from the Douala International Airport to Paris in 2004. It discusses the SNH scandal and the death of tabloid journalist Germain Cyrille Ngota also known as Bibi Ngota, the editor of Cameroon Express who died in his cell in Kondengui Prison while being held on charges of ‘falsifying’ a government document. It notes that at the time of his death on 22 April 2010, he was following a scandal in which US$2.6 million was improperly paid to three SNH managers as ‘commissions’ in purchase of an offshore service ship. It concludes that corruption is endemic in the country and increases poverty levels. It notes that it is within this context that tabloid newspapers play a very critical role.

Corruption in Cameroon Corruption significantly runs through all public institutions in the country. For example, bribery and nepotism are rampant in all sectors of the government. The most prevalent areas of deep-rooted corruption and bribery are the judiciary, public services, and customs. For instance, the legal and regulatory systems are non-transparent and difficult to navigate. In addition, there exists also a lack of effective regulations, insufficient law enforcement, and significant delays in courts (GAN Integrity, 2017). The judiciary has high frequency of bribes in exchange for favourable judgement. There are regular reports in tabloids of judicial officials accepting bribes in exchange for dropping charges, a reduction in prison sentences, and even for release from prison. Besides, the judges are subjected to executive influence and often delay judicial proceedings when pressured. Furthermore, there are also regular reports of judges and lawyers being subjected to frequent harassments including arrest and detention by government forces. The judiciary lacks adequate resources in tracking system of cases which results in lengthy court delays (Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 2017). Furthermore, the police officers are corrupt, inefficient, and poorly trained. It is very common for people to easily bribe police officers who regularly demand payments at checkpoints and in exchange for granting unlawful freedom to detainees. In addition, corrupt police officials often arrest and abuse individuals in exchange for monetary rewards from influential entities and individuals. Even though in recent years, the government has taken some steps to hold police officers accountable for abuse of their office, the reality is that bribery has continued in the ranks

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of police officers often with impunity and still remains rampant in the institution. The police officers cannot be relied upon to enforce law and order effectively in the country (GAN Integrity, 2017). Another area of heavy corruption is the public sector. The government officials regularly engage in corruption in the public administration. There exists among many citizens the expectations to give gifts to public servants to ‘get things done’ quickly. Moreover, irregular payments are common when applying for public utilities. Besides, public administrative positions are usually appointed based on personal and business connections as well as political allegiance instead of merit (World Bank Group, 2016). The land administration has deep-rooted corruption. Moreover, there exists inconsistent application of legislation. It is largely expected to give gifts to public servants to get, for example, a construction permits or land titles easily. Furthermore, citizens frequently pay bribes to land administration officials for a variety of procedures. In some instances, the land administration officials embezzle expropriation compensation. The country is placed among the worst in the world for dealing with land authorities (Transparency International, 2017). The tax administration has expectation to give gifts when meeting with tax officials. Moreover, individuals are often able to provide irregular payments and bribes to tax officials. The majority of financial crimes often committed in the country are in the area of tax evasion, corruption, and embezzlement (Doing Business, 2017). There exist burdensome import and export procedures at the boarder entries with bribery being problematic. For example, the tabloid newspapers regularly report on a lack of transparency and frequent demands of irregular payments when importing and exporting goods across the borders. For instance, the common allegations are that the government authorities are complicit in the illicit diamond trade. In this diamond scheme, authorities issue ‘Kimberly Process’ certificates which are supposed to prove that the diamonds are not ‘conflict diamonds’ such as being smuggled in from the Central African Republic. However, there are regular reports of smugglers bribing airport security officials to take the diamonds out of the country (Impact, 2016). Similarly, the public procurement is plagued by bribery and fraud at every step of the process. There are expectations to give gifts to secure government contracts. Moreover, bribes and irregular payments are often exchanged in return for obtaining contracts and licenses.

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In addition, corruption and embezzlement are pervasive in the sector largely due to its weak supervision. Even though the law requires government tenders to be subjected to competitive bidding, but the process is often breached due to corruption. Moreover, diversion of public funds is common and favouritism in decisions of government officials frequently occur (Transparency International, 2017). The public servants working at the high level of the procurement mainly consist of political appointees and are often connected individuals. The high-level connected officials often provide preferential treatment when it comes to the awarding of procurement contracts. Even though in 2015, the National Procurement Regulation Agency set up the Cameroon Online E-Procurement Systems, intended to reduce direct contact with public servants, and the government also publishes a Public Procurement Code with foreign companies being recommended to use a public procurement due diligence tool to mitigate corruption risks related to public procurement, in practice, the challenges still remain and corruption continue to exist (Enterprise Surveys, 2016). The natural resource sector is worse with corruption due to non-transparent revenue collecting system and non-transparent licensing processes for extractive industries. For instance, there exists bribery among civil servants and companies in return for logging permits. The government officials collect more than US$50 million in bribes per year from illegal logging practices (Centre for International Forestry Research, 2013). Moreover, the mining sector is rife with corruption and a string of failed mining projects in which investors in conjunction with powerful politicians make millions of money, despite the fact that no minerals being extracted (KPMG, 2014).

Anti-corruption Tabloids The country is ranked as one of the worst jailers of anti-corruption tabloid journalists in Africa with reports of several tabloid journalists regularly being put on trial and often charged with possessing government confidential documents. There also exists arbitrary arrests and criminal prosecution of tabloid journalists in the country. Moreover, there are regular tabloid newspapers reports of torture of journalists which have become routine forms of abuse against press freedom, inflicting damage to any confidence in the rule of law and democracy in the country (Federation of African Journalists, 2010).

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The Liberty Laws passed in 1990 and the 1996 Constitution guarantee press freedom. However, even though the Constitution provides for press freedom, government restricts these rights in practice. Generally, the government financially supports newspapers supportive of its interests. Besides, officials use criminal libel and defamation laws to intimidate tabloids that report on corruption. Moreover, critical tabloid journalists face threats, harassment, and even arrests. Furthermore, freedom of information and access to official sources is limited. Tabloid journalists extensively practice self-censorship and withhold criticizing officials (GAN Integrity, 2017). Even though the 1990 Law on Social Communication ended prepublication censorship, but Article 17 of the 1996 amended law gives officials the power to ban newspapers that are deemed a threat to public order. Besides, the National Communications Council, which is a media regulator created by a presidential decree of 1991, has powers to arbitrate on libel and defamation cases and to impose sanctions including bans on media outlets. Moreover, in 2014, President Paul Biya promulgated a new anti-terrorism law that limits press freedom. Tabloid journalists convicted of ‘defending terrorism’, can face up to 20 years in prison and a fine of about US$42,000 to US$84,000. Moreover, defendants can be tried in military courts. Besides, the 2010 Cybersecurity and Cybercriminality Law allow the immediate identification of Internet users which affects online tabloid journalists and their sources. Furthermore, there is no specific law on freedom of information. Even though the 1990 Law on Social Communication provides for the right to know, the government does not make documents and statistics freely available to the public and to tabloids in practice (Freedom House, 2016). The legal environment in which tabloid newspapers operate is not favourable and government uses the Penal Code to criminalize what authorities deem as ‘media offenses’. Besides, the police arrest journalists without warrants required by the law. For example, law enforcement bodies detain journalists more than the legally required period of 24 hours. There are times tabloid journalists are detained for more days in any police or gendarmerie station before being sent to jail. Some of the detained journalists are deprived of legal counsel and visit by family members, and, in most cases, see their court cases postponed several times (Federation of African Journalists, 2010).

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However, there is a rise in the number of tabloid newspapers being registered in the country since the Liberty Laws were passed in 1990 and in the 1996 Constitution which guarantee press freedom. For example, as of 2012, there were about 400 privately owned newspapers operating mainly in urban areas of Douala and Yaoundé. There are now five privately owned daily French-language newspapers notably Le Messager, Le Jour, Mutations, Le Quotidien de l’economie, and La Nouvelle Expression. There are currently two bi-weekly English newspapers namely The Post and Eden newspapers. Furthermore, the rest are generally weekly and others published when finances are available due to high cost of importing print materials for production making it prohibitive for some tabloid newspapers (Amabo, 2015). Tabloid newspapers often publish stories filled with scandals, fraud, embezzlement, and complaints by ordinary citizens towards civil servants who regularly demand bribes. Even though there are a number of tabloid newspapers that report critically about the government, and often feature strong criticism of the administration and individual officials, many operate under the constant threat of prosecution and regulatory sanctions. For instance, on 29 December 2009, Judge Ibrahim Ba sentenced Jean-Bosco Talla, the managing editor of Germinal newspaper to one-year, after publishing an excerpt from a 2001 book alleging sexual activities between President Paul Biya and his late predecessor Ahmadou Ahidjo during the transition of power in 1982. The brief item was part of a special package to mark the 20th anniversary of Ahidjo’s death in exile, a date widely covered by the local press. The article led to the arrest and sparked a national debate on press freedom and journalism ethics. For example, the Presidential Deputy Chief of Staff Joseph Anderson Le accused the journalist of ‘undermining the honour and dignity’ of the president. Similarly, the government also imprisoned Lewis Medjo, the editor of another controversial downmarket tabloid La Détente Libre for three-years on charges of publishing ‘false news’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2009). Furthermore, in 2014, Félix Ebolé Bola, the President of Cameroon’s National Union of Journalists and a senior reporter at Mutations newspaper and Rodrigue Tongue of Le Messager newspaper were charged with possessing national security information concerning an insurgent from the Central African Republic and were called before a military tribunal judge after being accused of having failed to notify the government and particularly the military authorities as stipulated by the country’s law. In addition, in April 2014, the car of Denis Nkwebo, an editor at Le Jour newspaper, was destroyed in an explosion outside his Douala residence.

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The journalist attack came after he scrutinized security forces’ efforts to curb attacks by Boko Haram in the north. He later revealed that before the attack, he was warned by acquaintances in the government to be careful in his reporting of the country’s security forces (Amabo, 2015). Generally, the tabloid journalists reporting on sensitive issues risk police questioning, lawsuits, and extrajudicial detention. In fact, the increased level of violence in the far Northern Province of the country due to the terrorist activities of the militia group Boko Haram has resulted in the government focusing its scrutiny on journalists covering the region making reporting very difficult for tabloids (Kindzeka, 2016). For instance, in 2015, Amungwa Tanyi Nicodemus the publisher of The Monitor and Zacharie Ndiomo the publisher of Zenith tabloid newspaper were jailed for criminal defamation and libel after first being held before the Yaoundé military tribunal. The tabloid journalists were accused of withholding information that could threaten state security. The government claimed to have information that there was a plot to destabilize the country and that the journalists failed to disclose the information to the government (Amabo, 2015). Furthermore, in August 2015, tabloid journalist Simon Ateba was arrested for entering the Minawao refugee camp without ‘official permission’ that provides shelter and houses roughly 50,000 Nigerian refugees who fled from Boko Haram in the far Northern Province. The journalist was also charged on suspicion of spying on behalf of the militia group Boko Haram (Freedom House, 2016). The tabloid stories of embezzlement are a regular front-page feature especially in the opposition tabloid newspapers. For example, on 17 May 2016, the tabloids revealed that fourteen officials were arrested on charges of embezzling US$9 million that was supposed to be paid as compensation to the owners of the land that made way for the construction of a deep-sea port in Kribi (Kindzeka, 2016). Similarly, in January 2015, Olivier Mbelle, the publisher of Le Courrier tabloid newspaper was arrested after revealing widespread embezzlement by senior government officials. The journalist was forced to appear before the government’s media regulatory body, the National Communication Council. In February 2015, the tabloid journalist was accused of unethical journalism and request by the head of police to reveal sources of information. Furthermore, in July 2015, Xavier Messe, the editor of the daily Mutations newspaper was detained for six hours and interrogated about an article in the newspaper about tensions between members of the Cameroon’s ruling party (Amabo, 2015).

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Generally, the critics of the government often argue that the frequent arrest of tabloid journalists is at least in part motivated by President Paul Biya’s drive to silence his opponents and hang on to power (GAN Integrity, 2017). However, those critical of tabloid journalists in the country often argue that the major challenge facing journalists when it comes to exposing corruption is corruption itself in its own ranks. It is no surprise that recent midcareer training for journalists in the country has focused on corruption within the media. Increasingly under scrutiny is the practice of ‘gombo’ a metaphor for various forms of kickbacks, freebies, and rewards solicited by journalists and provided by various news actors to journalists. In fact, ‘gombo’ exposes the contradictions of exposing corruption by the tabloid newspapers as a practice resulting from journalists’ attempt to combine individual interests to eat and survive and collective notions of personal responsibility to society and the journalism profession, in an environment of economic hardship and rampant corruption (Ndangam, 2010). Furthermore, journalists in Cameroon have a precarious existence. The monthly salaries for journalists in general in the country are low and many journalists get about US$80 per month even after serving a year’s probation. Moreover, many of the journalists work without a contract. In addition, many journalists also struggle to obtain equipment such as recorders, cameras, headphones, and desktop computers. Besides, the Internet facilities are a luxury in most newsrooms and smartphones a rarity. It is also important to stress here that a majority of journalists are not affiliated with the National Social Insurance Fund and, therefore, are not entitled to any pension under the social security program. Although the private media owners are generally expected to make such provisions for their staff, many of them fail to do so (Amabo, 2015).

Albatross Affair The presidential planes are one of the perks of holding a country’s top post in many countries globally. In Africa, the relationship between some leaders and their aerial fleets can serve as a manual on how power is wielded and often abused. Moreover, the fleet of presidential planes is diverse, as one might expect. For example, Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara, for instance, had no less than ten airplanes in his presidential fleet. On the other hand, some African leaders such as Cameroon’s President Paul Biya prefer to charter luxury planes. The acquisition of

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pricey presidential planes in a continent dogged by poverty and corruption is bound to kick off an occasional stir. However, few aerial controversies come close to the Cameroonian experience in terms of sheer intrigue, greed, paranoia, and retribution (Jacinto, 2016). In 2001, President Paul Biya announced that he wanted a new plane for his personal and official trips. He informed his close entourage including Marafa Hamidou Yaya, who as Secretary General of the presidency was the second man of Cameroon at the time, and they decided on a Boeing Business Jet. Unfortunately, at that time, Cameroon was trying to reduce its debt under a World Bank and International Monetary Fund programme, due to its status as a highly indebted poor country. The decision was then reportedly made to set up a financial package and buy the plane through what was then the national airline company, Camair, to avoid suspicion from financial institutions on the purchase of such a luxury item (Owono, 2012). The money came from the account of the state-owned National Hydrocarbons Corporation, which transferred by wire the US$31 million for the purchase to the USA-based company GIA which acted as an intermediary for Camair. The negotiation with Boeing was handled by a US law firm Zuckert, Scoutt, & Rasenberger which specializes in aircraft transactions, airworthiness, and registration, on behalf of the Cameroonian state (Owono, 2012). However, a brand new jet was never delivered to Cameroon, and instead, it was agreed that a pre-owned Boeing 767-216—the Albatross—would be leased by the US aircraft company. The jet was finally leased and delivered to the country. On 24 April 2004, during its inaugural flight to Geneva while carrying the president with his wife and children, the Albatross had to return to Douala International Airport after the pilot noticed a flap failure on wings of the machine. The mechanical failure and the sudden forced landing led to many speculations and accusations of an attempt to kill President Paul Biya and his close family. It also triggered arrests and imprisonments (Jacinto, 2016). This episode, along with the fact that the US$31 million marked to buy the plane never delivered a brand new jet, led to politicians in the president’s entourage to be arrested. Indeed, a darker chapter began shortly after that doomed ‘inaugural’ flight. There were unanswered questions on whether acquisition of the faulty aircraft was part of a grand plot to overthrow the president, and where money actually went, and who benefitted from transactions. The reality that President Paul Biya’s plane was reportedly issued a certificate of airworthiness by the

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US’s Federal Aviation Administration and yet had mechanical problem that nearly cost the lives of the president and his entire family during its ‘inaugural flight’ needed clear answers (Owono, 2012). The botched attempt to buy a new presidential jet led to President Paul Biya dare not to buy a new luxury plane and since then, the Cameroonian strongman instead relies on luxury private charter jets to ferry him back and forth from Cameroon to Europe. This happens often since the leader spends extended periods living in a Swiss hotel, earning him the moniker ‘the absentee landlord’ in diplomatic circles (Jacinto, 2016). It was later discovered that the plane was at least 15 years old before it was even delivered to the Cameroonians, and it had flown for several other companies. Besides, the vanished US$31 million was alleged to have been paid to Oregon-based GIA which later filed for bankruptcy after being sued by the Indian Airlines for alleged fraud. Moreover, Boeing argued that it returned whatever funds it had received to GIA. The financial implications pushed the US embassy officials to suggest that an investigation needed to be conducted by the US law enforcement officers. However, despite this suggestion, neither the technical aspect of the incident nor the diversion of the US$31 million appear to have been examined (Owono, 2012). The scandal became one of the biggest in the country’s recent history. It had an effect on local politics. Just after the flight incident, the president decided to change the Constitution to stay in power. The Special Criminal Court was launched in 2006 as part of an anti-corruption campaign called Operation Sparrowhawk. It sent many senior cabinet ministers from the time into prison. For example, in 2013, former Prime Minister Ephraim Inoni was sentenced to 20 years in prison for embezzlement following the ‘purchase’ of the presidential aircraft. On 16 April 2016, Marafa Hamidou Yaya, who held several senior government positions before holding the powerful interior ministry portfolio was sentenced to 20 years in prison. On 22 July 2016, former Secretary General of the office of the president and minister of state Jean-Marie Atangana Mebara was sentenced to 25 years in prison for embezzlement. Besides, several politicians convicted under Operation Sparrowhawk included former director of public airline formerly known as Camair YvesMichel Fotso to life. Moreover, former ambassador to the USA Jerome Mendouga was in detention at Kondengui Prison for five years until his death on 15 November 2014 due to prolonged sickness (Akwei, 2016).

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There was actually a popular joke among many tabloid journalists and opposition newspapers that a parallel government was formed in Kondengui Prison were all top-level politicians were held following investigations and the convictions. Indeed, this affair whether or not one sees conspiracy, or simply corruption behind the Albatross incident, one thing is certain: Cameroonians continue to suffer both from other countries’ opportunism and the disinterest and corruption of its own leaders (Owono, 2012).

SNH Scandal The National Hydrocarbons Corporation of Cameroon (SNH) is a public industrial and commercial company with financial autonomy. It was created on 12 March 1980 and has its head office in Yaoundé. Its mission is to manage State interests in the oil sector and gas sector. It promotes and monitors oil and gas activities throughout the national territory. It works in association with international oil companies. It ensures compliance with all regulatory as well as control of production costs. It sells the share of national crude oil production accruing to the State on the international market, through contracts, as well as its own share as an investor. It also carries out trading activities on behalf of its partners at their request. The selling prices of Cameroonian crude oil grades are set in relation to Dated Brent, which is the reference crude oil of the London market. Depending on the market conditions, the prices feature discounts or premiums, which reflect the difference in quality compared to Brent, the cost of transport to target markets, the cyclical demand for this type of crude oil. The income derived from sales is transferred to the Public Treasury after deducting production costs (SNH, 2018). The Hydrocarbons National Company is often used by government in corrupt dealings. Often times, the government officials become jittery whenever there are elements of corruption exposure and financial embezzlement by the tabloid journalists and newspapers. For example, the period between 2006 and 2007, when Marafa Hamidou Yaya chaired its board, it boosted its exploration in the region in the disputed Bakassi Peninsula which the International Court of Justice ruled in a territorial dispute that it was part of Cameroon. It is believed to be rich in oil, even though no formal commercial discovery has yet been made. It represents a hope for the Cameroonian government to increase its oil production. Indeed, with the precious help of foreign private companies, most

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of them based in the USA, investment in exploration doubled reaching about $245 million. President Paul Biya’s inner circle uses the National Hydrocarbons Corporation to wire millions of dollars often in corrupt practices. Furthermore, those who dare to investigate are often subjected to frequent intimidations including threats of arrests especially among investigative journalists (Owono, 2012). For example, on 9 February 2010, Germain Cyrille Ngota also known as Bibi Ngota, editor of the Cameroon Express was arrested with colleagues Harrys Mintya of Le Devoir and Serge Sabouang of La Nation after a complaint by Laurent Esso, the state minister in charge of the secretariat of the presidential services and chairman of the board of National Hydrocarbons Corporation. The three journalists were investigating Esso’s alleged involvement in a corruption scandal about the purchase of a luxury boat with the intention of entertaining potential investors at the state oil company. It was noted that as the chairman of the board, directed in the memo to subordinate to disburse US$2.6 million in ‘commissions’ to three officials who were involved in the boat’s purchase. It was noted that the boat type and its costs remained a mystery and its relevance as mainly for entertainment did not make sense when the country was struggling financially (Federation of African Journalists, 2010). The security agents of the Cameroon’s Directorate-General of External Intelligence interrogated the three journalists in an apparent effort to learn the source of a purported memo from the chairman of the state oil company about the purchase of a luxury boat and ‘commissions’. The agents also seized documents from Harrys Mintya’s home who had earlier sent interview questions to the top presidential aide Laurent Esso and to the National Hydrocarbons Corporation Administrator Director General Adolphe Moudiki in preparation for the story. Furthermore, journalist Serge Sabouang had also raised questions on the boat purchase based on an alleged June 2008 memo which directed a subordinate to give money in ‘commissions’. The agents also arrested journalist Simon Hervé Nko’o of the Bebela newspaper after searching his home who was also investigating the memo (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010). The agents detained the journalists at the Intelligence headquarters in the capital Yaoundé. Few days later, editor Hilaire Medjo of the Nouvelle Vision newspaper and editor François Fogno Fotso of the Génération Libre newspaper revealed that Germain Cyrille Ngota’s health was deteriorating while he was being detained in the Kosovo Ward of Kondengui Prison where hard-core felons are held. It was further revealed that he was complaining of fatigue, gout, joint pain, high blood pressure, and a hernia.

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Moreover, it was also noted in the tabloid newspapers that his father was making several requests to the prison authorities to have him transferred to a hospital to receive medical care for his acute hypertension but the requests were being denied despite paying the security of about US$60 by the family members (Federation of African Journalists, 2010). He eventually died in jail on 22 April 2010, two months after the arrest. It was revealed by tabloids that he succumbed to death due to a lack of medical attention quoting journalist Simon Hervé Nko’o who was locked with him arguing that the security agents used ‘psychological and physical torture’ to force them to reveal the source of the document on which the allegations were based (Amabo, 2015). The journalist Germain Cyrille Ngota was described by his colleagues as ‘talented’ and well-known locally for his investigations on public corruption in the oil sector. He launched the Cameroon Express in 2002 after freelancing for several other publications. He was a 15-year press veteran and was the first Cameroonian journalist to lose his life in relation to his work at the age of 38 years. He was survived by his wife Angela Collette Ngota and two children (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2010). After Germain Cyrille Ngota’s death, the Minister of Communications issued a statement that he died of Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and that he died an offender. The minister further noted that an autopsy was to be done ‘in the presence of independent personalities’. However, it was later revealed that an autopsy was done without the agreement and the presence of his family. Due to the national and international outcry over his death, President Paul Biya ordered setting up a judiciary inquest to find out exactly what led to his death in pre-trial detention centre (Federation of African Journalists, 2010).

Conclusion Tabloid journalists and their newspapers play a very important role in exposing corruption in Cameroon even though the legal and political situation is generally not conducive in the country. Moreover, politicians are generally not comfortable with tabloids that venture to expose corruption in the corridors of power. Besides, the country continues to experience widespread corruption with public servants engaging in bribery and illegal payments often with impunity. Even though there exists corruption among the ranks of journalists in the country as well, there are success stories in which tabloid journalists have exposed corruption scandals often at the expense of their own freedom.

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Corruption in the country significantly increases the poverty levels and is generally rife in all public services. For instance, the legal and regulatory systems are non-transparent and are difficult to navigate. Besides, there is a lack of effective regulations, insufficient law enforcement, and significant delays in courts. Moreover, there is insufficient implementation of anti-corruption legislation coupled with impunity among public officials which leads to very high corruption risks across all sectors. In addition, civil servants and private-sector employees are not legally protected for negative consequences when they report cases of corruption. However, there are a number of positives to curb corruption as the country’s Penal Code criminalizes bribery by a prison term of five years to life, a fine of up to US$4,000, including asset seizure. Moreover, in cases of theft and embezzlement of the public funds, corruption charges can be dropped if the money is repaid to the government. Besides, Article 66 of the Constitution requires the government officials and the civil servants to declare their assets. Furthermore, the Code of Ethics addresses conflicts of interest and regulations for the ethical conduct of civil servants in all public institutions. Finally, the Public Contract Code regulates public procurement and any company found guilty of corruption in the process of government procurement can be banned for two years. The country has also ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption. However, implementation of these laws and guidelines, in practice, still remains a challenge (GAN Integrity, 2017).

Bibliography Akwei, I. (2016). Former ally of President Biya sentenced to 25 years for corruption. Retrieved from http://www.africanews.com/2016/06/22/ former-ally-of-president-biya-sentenced-to-25-years-for-corruption/. Amabo, S. (2015). In Cameroon, press struggles with financial and official constraints. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/blog/2015/05/in-cameroon-pressstruggle-with-financial-and-offi.php. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. (2017). Investment climate statement for 2017. Retrieved from https://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/investmentclimatestatements/index.htm#wrapper. Centre for International Forestry Research. (2013). Cameroon’s hidden harvest: Commercial chainsaw logging, corruption, and livelihoods. Retrieved from http://www.cifor.org/library/3911/cameroons-hidden-harvest-commercial-chainsaw-logging-corruption-and-livelihoods/.

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Committee to Protect Journalists. (2009). In Cameroon, jailed editor sentenced for ‘insulting’ Biya. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2009/12/in-cameroon-jailed-editor-sentenced-for-insulting.php. Committee to Protect Journalists. (2010). Cameroonian security agents detain 2 journalists. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2010/02/cameroonian-security-agents-detain-2-journalists.php. Doing Business. (2017). Measuring business regulations. Retrieved from http:// www.doingbusiness.org/. Enterprise Surveys. (2016). What businesses experience. Retrieved from http:// www.enterprisesurveys.org/. Federation of African Journalists. (2010). Journalists under fire. Retrieved from https:// www.nuj.org.uk/documents/faj-journalists-under-fire-cameroon/faj-report.pdf. Freedom House. (2016). Cameroon. Retrieved from https://freedomhouse. org/report/freedom-press/2016/cameroon. GAN Integrity. (2017). Cameroon corruption report. Retrieved from https:// www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/cameroon/. Impact. (2016). Transforming natural resource management empowering communities. Retrieved from https://impacttransform.org/en/. Jacinto, L. (2016). Abuse of power: African leaders and their flying machines. Retrieved from http://www.france24.com/en/20160422-africa-presidentialplanes-power-prestige-corruption. Kindzeka, M. (2016). Corruption probe nabs 14 more Cameroon officials. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-corruption-probearrests/3332488.html. KPMG. (2014). KPMG global mining institute: Cameroon country mining guide. Retrieved from https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/ pdf/2014/06/cameroon-mining-guide.pdf. Ndangam, L. (2010). ‘Gombo’: Bribery and the corruption of journalism ethics in Cameroon. Ecquid Novi: Africa Journalism Studies, 27(2), 179–199. Retrieved from https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02560054 .2006.9653350?needAccess=true&journalCode=recq20. Owono, J. (2012). Paranoia and despair rule Cameroon. Retrieved from https:// www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/06/2012625131523261361.html. SNH. (2018). SNH: A development catalyst for Cameroon. Retrieved from http://www.snh.cm/index.php/en/. Transparency International. (2017). Land corruption in Africa—Finding evidence, triggering change. Retrieved from https://www.conftool.com/landandpoverty2017/index.php?page=browseSessions&print=head&form_session=686. Transparency International. (2018). Cameroon. Retrieved from https://www. transparency.org/country/CMR. World Bank Group. (2016). Enterprise surveys: What businesses experience. Retrieved from http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.

CHAPTER 12

The Final Word

This chapter provides a final word while looking to the future of the continent with the lens of anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa and in relation to the actions of the state, and the anti-corruption reporting by the tabloids, and the tabloid journalists. Basically, the goal of this book was to use the continent’s cases to gain a clearer understanding of the evolution of anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa. The cases were meant to explore tabloid journalism and its role in exposing corruption and embezzlement and were intended to understand how tabloid journalism of short crisp stories accompanied by screaming headlines and sensational pictures bring about corruption exposure. The main focus of this book was actually to understand how far the sensational journalism that exposes corruption go in triggering law enforcement agencies and political leaders to take actions against corruption scandals in Africa. This book has found an emerging pattern from the cases and countries analysed that in the African countries covered where there is actually a proper functioning of governance, the countries’ political leaders actually show a desire to curb corruption, even though in practice, serious challenges still remain. It has also noted that the African Union, which is a continental union consisting of all 55 countries on the African continent, extending slightly into geographical Asia via the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, has even a Convention to prevent and combat corruption and is concerned with its negative effects. It is also alarmed by its devastating impact on the economic and social development of Africa and its © The Author(s) 2019 B. Chama, Anti-Corruption Tabloid Journalism in Africa, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-16822-3_12

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people. This book has further discovered a pattern in all the countries investigated that show a culture of impunity by public servants when it comes to corruption. It is evident that individuals at the centre of corruption throughout all the chapters covered in this book tend to steal public resources with impunity often in millions of dollars which usually cripple public service delivery and which makes life even more miserable for ordinary citizens who depend on these public resources such as medicine, education, and infrastructure development. Furthermore, this book has discovered another pattern in all countries covered that show a saddening reality pointing to the fact that all corruption whistle-blowers are not protected in practice. Even though some laws exist in some countries to protect whistle-blowers, they are often vague, and repercussions for those who dare to expose corruption such as tabloid journalists and other civil society organizations are often serious. Very often, anti-corruption tabloid journalists are usually harassed, intimidated, and even arrested and imprisoned with the intention to silence them in the end. Moreover, there is also evidence of investigative tabloid journalists who have died in the line of duty and their death have been so brutal that one can only conclude that the nature of the killing has been intended to send a clear message to whistle-blowers. This book has in addition discovered an emerging pattern of torture to force investigative tabloid journalists in many countries to reveal their source of corruption information. There is evidence of investigative journalists suffering increased harassment and abuse at the hands of the authorities in many countries covered, and the continued abuses are very often perpetrated by the security forces who often get directions from the ruling politicians and who usually use criminal legislation to cripple critical tabloids especially those that venture to expose corruption scandals.

Anti-corruption Tabloids in Africa This book concludes that Africa faces serious corruption problems across every level of society marked by instability and violence in many countries. It has found a very sad picture of how corruption and bribery is deeply rooted in the fabric of the African lifestyle in which many politicians tend to use their positions of power as instruments to accumulate public resources leaving many ordinary citizens to fend for themselves. Besides, there is a lot of evidence in all countries covered in this book that the tabloid journalists who investigate corruption in Africa are

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actually considered more dangerous than even the perpetrators of corruption themselves. One can look at tabloid journalist Carlos Cardoso, the editor of the tabloid Metical newspaper in Mozambique who was gunned down on 22 November 2000 after revealing corruption at the Mozambique Commercial Bank. The journalist had just left his newspaper’s office before being gunned down. It was later revealed by the tabloid that before his death, he was threatened by the ruling politicians to stop ‘talking too much’. His attackers also slashed his tongue. Cardoso’s killing was not an isolated incident in Africa were journalists who dare to speak truth to power often find themselves in trouble. Similarly, journalist Nobert Zongo of Burkina Faso was burnt alive in his car on 13 December 1998 about 100 kilometres from the capital Ouagadougou after refusing large sums of money to stop the investigation and remain silent about the killing of David Quedraogo who was before his death employed at the home of Francois Compaore, the young brother of President Blaise Campaoré. It was revealed by the tabloid journalist in the series of news stories that Ouedraogo was accused of stealing money from his workplace before being tortured and killed in a fire that also burnt the president’s infirmary (Ansell, Serino, Djokotoe, & Mwamba, 2002). Furthermore, Nigerian journalist Dele Giwa of Newswatch was killed on 19 October 1986 by a parcel bomb delivered to his family while investigating a story involving the First Lady Mariam Babangida. It was later reported by the newspaper that two days before he was killed, he was summoned to the headquarters of Nigeria’s State Security Services after being accused of planning revolution and arms-smuggling. It was also revealed that before his death, he received a phone call asking for directions to his home with the caller claiming to be ‘a government official’ that needed to deliver an ‘official invitation’ to his home. Similarly, on 29 January 2009, Kenyan tabloid journalist Francis Nyaruri’s body was found decapitated by the edge of Kodero Forest about 30 kilometres from his home in Nyamira two weeks after going missing while investigating corruption in the police department. His body was found grotesquely disfigured while his hands were tied behind his back and eyes were gouged out and his lower jaw was also missing. At the time of his murder, he had just finished a story accusing a police official of corruption in the construction of housing facilities in Nyamira in an article published in a Weekly Citizen tabloid on 19 January 2009 which also questioned the performance and integrity of national police officials and named senior police officers of being heavily involved in rampant corruption (Rhodes & Derrick, 2011).

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Lessons for Africa This book has discovered lessons that tabloid newspapers are a crucial player in the fight against corruption in Africa and notes that tabloid journalists play an important role in fighting corruption by breaking corruption scandals or producing reports that bring unethical behaviour into public attention. Generally, the corruption exposure news tends to be an important motivation for official bodies charged with investigating and prosecuting corrupt acts and often prompt prosecution and imprisonment. Furthermore, tabloids in many African countries play an important role in investigating and reporting corruption, its causes, its consequences, possible remedies, and informing the public about corrupt activities, both within the government and among public officials, as well as within the private sector. Moreover, tabloids also play a very important role in promoting anti-corruption efforts of civil groups as well as action by official bodies in charge of investigating and prosecuting corrupt acts (Wasswa & Kakooza, 2011). The tabloids news on corruption often tends to influence policy decisions especially of those entrusted with power, and usually prompt debates that lead to changes in law and even hold those responsible to account (Phiri, 2008). Furthermore, tabloids exposure of corruption often brings about change in attitude due to their ‘accumulated’ and ‘persistent’ corruption news on corruption and its fight. Basically, tabloids by focusing repeatedly on the issue of corruption and being consistent in presenting uniform corruption news through corroboration with other parallel reports on corruption issues leads to increased awareness of corruption which also bring about transformation of the beliefs and attitudes towards corruption resulting in behaviour change. The tabloids at times gang up on corruption issues and continuously report aggressively and sensationally leading to behaviour changes towards corruption in African countries with some windows of media freedom (DeFleur & Dennis, 1994: 573). Furthermore, another lesson is that tabloids by joining together in the gang while making corruption scandals front-page headlines stir public opinion on corrupt public officials which often force the government to act. However, at times government turn a blind eye on corruption scandals initially, but tabloids relentless coverage that makes corruption scandals major front-page stories, usually leads to agencies entrusted with the fight against corruption to take decisive actions to avoid public outcry

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as not doing enough. It is in so doing that the tabloids create public awareness and a call for action against corruption. The tabloids persistent coverage also forces passive governments to act through relentless questioning of government actions and hypocrisy (Phiri, 2008). Basically, tabloids are often effective partners in the fight against corruption in countries with laws that provide access to information provided by legal protection. It is for this reason that members of the public need to demand a more transparent, accountable, and better government, as well as easily access to sharing of information to hold corrupt individuals accountable (Wasswa & Kakooza, 2011). Furthermore, tabloids investigations yield good results in fighting corruption especially in countries that are able to share information on the policies, expenditure plans, and implementation of programme activities. However, it is important to stress here that only tabloids able to understand public accountability jargon monitor incidents of corruption effectively and investigate the actions of those who are granted public trust and who abuse their office for private gain properly (Eigen, 1999). The tabloids coverage of corruption around the continent contribute to shaping public hostility towards corrupt behaviour, and sometimes even leads to the electoral defeat of individual politicians or an entire government. Generally, the exposure of corruption by the tabloids also leads very often to public pressure to reform policies and laws that otherwise create the conditions for corrupt behaviour. Moreover, tabloids also help to expose flaws that lead to corruption in institutions such as courts, police, and anti-corruption agencies and the need to reform these institutions (Nogara, 2009). In many countries covered in this book, another lesson learned is that tabloids aggressive reporting on corruption sometimes prompt pre-emptive responses by authorities eager to protect their reputation and public image of their institution before any further allegations are published. In these contexts, aggressive reporting on corruption acts as an indirect check on corruption that would otherwise flourish in the absence of political competition. By simply informing the public and presenting a variety of points of view, tabloids promote public debate and enhance political and economic competition which often enhance accountability, open up alternatives to dealing with corrupt networks, and create incentives for political leaders to move against corruption. Furthermore, there is also evidence that tabloids encourage public participation and inform the debate by taking the lead in pressing for enhanced civil liberties such

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as freedom of expression. Besides, by disseminating knowledge about public decisions and procedures beyond a small elite group of decision-makers, the tabloids are able to play a major role in undermining a precondition to corruption, which is the ‘shared knowledge’ among a restricted circle of beneficiaries of corruption (Stapenhurst, 2000). The other lesson is that in many countries in Africa, the government uses a broad range of laws and actions towards tabloid newspapers and tabloid journalists that venture to expose corruption aside from coercion, to censure tabloid journalists, close publications, hamstring finances, and even just simply encourage a culture of self-censorship among tabloid journalists and their publications (Nogara, 2009). In countries with widespread family connections to political power covered in this book and despite the legal, political, and economical challenges, the other lesson learned is that the tabloid newspapers are able to expose prebendalism in which politicians elected in positions of power often feel they have a right to share government revenues, and tend to use them to benefit themselves, their families and their supporters. Moreover, tabloids are also able to question kleptocratic governments covered in this book which are basically countries ruled by ‘thieves’ who often times masquerade as political leaders while stealing with impunity (Van Donge, 2008).

Back to the Future There are many ways of what could be done to reduce vulnerability of tabloid journalists and tabloid newspapers. However, the question with difficulty to provide one answer is as to why African leaders continue to behave this way and steel with impunity when the people they are supposed to serve are literally starving. There exists an ancient proverb whose origin is not clear even though many countries and tribes lay claim to it but usually with no evidence to support the claims. It notes that ‘a fish rots from the head down’, which can help to explain why many citizens in many African countries after the realization that their leaders continue to loot public coffers and steal money meant for the public service delivery with impunity, develop an ‘I don’t care attitude’ and see corruption as part of the modern everyday life and engage in corrupt practices without any shame nor fear of law enforcement agencies knowing that after all their president is also doing it which worsen

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the situation. Therefore, looking to the future, there is need to start fighting corruption from the top level of government to be able to send a clear message to those on the bottom which is theoretically possible but difficult to achieve in practice because of invested interests by those in the high levels of power who often get entangled in corrupt practices. The fact that there exist high levels of ignorance in many countries covered in this book with many people unable to read and write especially in rural areas, makes it difficult to educate the masses using tabloids as communication platforms to expose corruption. Indeed, many African leaders have taken advantage of their peoples’ ignorance and treated their countries as personal properties, a behaviour that has resulted in billions of dollars being siphoned from their countries for personal and family, including by bourgeois minorities protected by their regimes. It is such reckless mentality and approach to leadership that have made the fight against corruption very difficult to change behaviour. However, moving forward, there is need for countries to realize that the worst form of poverty is actually ignorance of the masses and investment in literacy education can help to educate the people on corruption. Looking to the future, eliminating corruption will require deeply rooted behaviour change among many African leaders. In fact, one can actually speculate that maybe, in the race to power after the devastation of colonialism, the lack of checks and balances just after independence of many African countries allowed unethical leaders to exploit the situation together with criminals. This book has found that in majority of countries covered, the ‘elites’ have, to some extent, morphed into the very colonialist plunder structures that they replaced. It is also worrying to note that in many countries in Africa, the looting has been so devastating that few individuals have ended up accumulating riches that can actually feed the entire country. It is mind-boggling if one considers the fact that in Africa, majority of citizens live below a dollar a day and because of long-running civil wars in some countries, many public services in need of finances are still poorly funded. Ordinary citizens continue to struggle to get access to good medicines in the continent heavily devastated by Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection and Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (Dolan & Morais, 2013).

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The reality is that it is very problematic to find ways of moving forward in order to overcome corruption because in the same countries which are covered in this book as case studies because of having massive corruption and ranking poorly under Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, there exist mechanisms to curb corruption. However, the problem is not much to do with the implementations, but countless selective anti-corruption fights. For instance, the individuals with close links to the high echelons of power tend to be given a free pass by corruption investigation agencies. It is this ‘blind loyalty’ that makes those with more connection to power to continue accumulating riches at supersonic speed and with impunity. Besides, authorities regularly ban publications deemed offending and even jail and fine tabloid journalists accused of defamation. In many African countries, for example, it is much easier to do business using connections and to remain protected by law (Ian, 2010). The selective anti-corruption fight makes many people to think that the detention of corrupt officials, for example, has political undertones because corruption continues in the high echelons of power. This is despite the mass arrests and detention of suspects. Besides, many of the people tend to be indifferent about the arrests even if might be genuinely intended to discourage the theft of public funds. It is for this reason that generally, one cannot talk of anti-corruption fight without talking about good governance able to guarantee press freedom and freedom of expression. In fact, without these conditions, it becomes very difficult to expose corruption effectively and overcome the culture of secrecy which hinders public service delivery (Kindzeka, 2016). Finally, moving forward, there is need for all African governments, not only those covered in this book, to work with international organizations and track down embezzlers who tend to steal millions of dollars and deposit them in foreign accounts in countries such as Switzerland and the British Virgin Islands. The reason for this cooperation is to follow the looted money and make sure that the corrupt politicians are held accountable and money is traced and brought back to looted countries. For instance, on a positive note, this book has found that in some African countries, the leaders are now signing memorandum of understanding with international agencies to track finances as a result of corruption, alleged to be deposited in foreign accounts linked to politicians and schemes involving millions of looted funds (Wanjala, 2017).

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Conclusion This book has discussed anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa in considerable depth. In all countries covered, the overall goal was to use the continent’s cases to gain a clear understanding of anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa to derive insights into the relationship between the anti-corruption actions of the state and anti-corruption reporting by the tabloid newspapers. This book concludes that there is need for Africa’s governments to provide conditions suitable for investigative tabloid journalism that is able to expose corruption. In fact, the starting point would be to make the freedom of information laws available that will compel the political authorities to release information to the general public and provide monitoring mechanisms able to track authorities’ compliance with requests from the journalists. Furthermore, there is need to develop laws to protect anti-corruption tabloid journalists in practice especially from attacks by politicians and political cadres and make strong and explicit political commitment to press freedom. In addition, there is need to guarantee the independence of judiciary system that tabloid journalists and other ordinary citizens can have confidence in their ruling. Moreover, the tabloids need to work in solidarity with other continent’s tabloid journalists and pay close attention to the situations of other tabloid journalists in other African countries especially those going through harassment. Finally, there is need to provide support to the victims of press freedom that dare to expose corruption and speak truth to power in Africa.

Bibliography Ansell, G., Serino, T., Djokotoe, E., & Mwamba, E. (2002). Investigative journalism in Africa: Walking through a minefield at midnight. Retrieved from http://sand-kas-ten.org/ijm/Introduction.pdf. DeFleur, M., & Dennis, E. (1994). Understanding mass communication: A liberal arts perspective. Houghton Mifflin: Princeton. Dolan, K., & Morais, R. (2013). Daddy’s girl: How an African ‘Princes’ banked $3 billion in a country living on $2 per day. Retrieved from https://www. forbes.com/sites/kerryadolan/2013/08/14/how-isabel-dos-santos-tookthe-short-route-to-become-africas-richest-woman/#86e16945f50d. Eigen, P. (1999). The media and the fight against corruption. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Transparency International.

208  B. CHAMA Ian, B. (2010). WikiLeaks cables accuse Moroccan royals of corruption. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-cablesmorocco-royals-corruption. Kindzeka, M. (2016). Corruption probe nabs 14 more Cameroon officials. Retrieved from https://www.voanews.com/a/cameroon-corruption-probe-arrests/3332488.html. Nogara, M. (2009). Role of media in curbing corruption: The case of Uganda under President Yoweri K. Museveni during the ‘no-party’ system. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2009/wp72_2009.pdf. Phiri, I. (2008). Evolution of anti-corruption journalism in Africa-lessons from Zambia. Global Media Journal—African Edition, 2(1), 15–31. Rhodes, T., & Derrick, C. (2011). Murder in remote Kenya reverberates across nation, World. Retrieved from https://cpj.org/2012/02/attacks-on-thepress-in-2011-a-killing-and-a-cover.php#more. Stapenhurst, R. (2000). The media’s role in curbing corruption. New York: World Bank Institute. Van Donge, K. (2008). The plundering of Zambian resources by Chiluba and his friends. African Affairs, 108(43), 69–90. Wanjala, E. (2017). Switzerland, Kenya sign pact to trace stolen funds. Retrieved from https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2017/04/29/switzerland-kenyasign-pact-to-trace-stolen-funds_c1551836. Wasswa, J., & Kakooza, M. (2011). Uganda media review. Retrieved from http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_29507-1522-1-30.pdf?11112809443.

Author Index

A Abedine, S., 140 Achy, L., 58–61, 68, 69, 71 Adam, P., 31, 102 Adorye, H., 106 Agbo, B., 13 Ahmed, B., 85 Ahmed, O.H., 66, 67 Akomea, N., 103, 105 Akwei, I., 192 Alaref, J., 79 Alli, Y., 111 Allimadi, M., 134 Amabo, S., 188–190, 195 Amsterdam, R., 31 Ani, S., 114 Ansah, M., 99 Ansell, G., 201 Asah-Asante, K., 94 Asare, K., 100, 102 Assembe-Mvondo, S., 170, 173, 175, 177 Ayodele, E., 10, 11

B Babatunde-Fowler, W., 111 Bada, G., 111 Bakre, O.M., 110 Banda, F., 23, 35 Benchemsi, A., 78 Bird, S.E., 2, 3 Biressi, A., 1 Biryabarema, E., 132, 143 Brako, I., 94 Bright, J., 116 Burgis, T., 178–180 C Cabeche, A., 45 Caldwell, M., 98 Campbell, J., 119 Carnegie, 70, 71 Chama, B., 8, 22, 24–27, 30, 32, 50 Chanda, E., 29, 30 Chêne, M., 177 Chepkemei, P., 153–155

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210  Author Index Cheref, A., 57–60 Chidanti-Malunga, J., 33 Chikhi, L., 68–70 Chtatou, M., 78, 79 Clark, J.F., 168, 177 Coronel, S., 7 D Davet, G., 78 Dearing, J., 10 de Burgh, H., 6, 7 DeFleur, M., 202 DeGregory, P., 177 Dennis, E., 202 Derrick, C., 201 Dixon, R., 152 Djokotoe, E., 201 Doherty, S.E., 95 Dolan, K., 41, 44, 205 du Plessis, E.H., 76, 77, 86 E Eboh, C., 113 Eboh, E., 112 Eigen, P., 5, 203 Emmanuel, O., 120, 121 Esser, F., 2 Estelle, S., 45 F Faul, M., 116–118 Fiske, J., 3 Folarin, B., 11 Forrest, D., 45 G Gaffey, C., 131 Geiger, T., 95

Githaiga, N., 176 Goushe, Y., 97, 98 Graves, R.N., 176 H Hall, R., 23 Hang, Z., 114 Hanouz, D.M., 95, 96 Harden, B., 149, 150 Hawley, S., 149, 150, 153 Horrie, C., 6, 7 I Ian, B., 80, 83–86, 206 Ibrahim, M.Y., 63, 64 Iyengar, S., 11 J Jacinto, L., 183, 191, 192 Jannah, C., 112 Jibueze, J., 111 Johansson, S., 3 Jones, P., 178–180 Jorgic, D., 133 K Kabemba, C., 171, 174–176 Kahola, B., 153 Kakooza, M., 202, 203 Kalaluka, M., 29, 31, 32 Kantumoya, L., 6 Kaplan, E.D., 113 Karanja, F., 151 Karen, R., 148, 149 Karikari, K., 12 Kasoma, F., 12 Katulwende, M., 28, 29 Kiai, M., 7

Author Index

Kindzeka, M., 189, 206 Kisero, J., 158, 159 Kisia, A., 158, 160 Kovach, B., 7 L Landau, E., 140 Lebon, A., 79 Lhomme, F., 78, 79 Lungu, F., 22 M Malden, A., 112 Market, P., 68–70 Martin, M., 66 Martini, M., 143 Matsiko, H., 136, 137 Mayoyo, P., 159, 160 Mbaku, J., 13 Mbeke, P., 7 McCombs, M., 10 Menya, W., 160 Mhlambiso, N., 141 Morais, R., 41, 44, 205 Mugerwa, Y., 132, 135, 136 Mukosha, F., 33 Mungonge, G., 23 Mwamba, E., 201 Mwinga, J., 24–26 Mzyece, M., 28 N Nadorff, N., 53 Ndangam, L., 190 Ndiribe, O., 121 Nkala, O., 45 Noelle-Neumann, E., 11 Nogara, M., 5, 203, 204 Nsehe, M., 117, 118

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Nunn, H., 1 Nwabughiogu, L., 111 Nzongola-Ntalaja, G., 175 O Ogemba, P., 152 Okoye, R., 113 Oladimeji, R., 119–121 Ongowo, J.O., 1, 3, 4, 6–8 Onyango, L., 142 Opolot, B., 1, 4, 142 Owete, F., 120 Owono, J., 191–194 Owusu, W.Y., 98 P Paletz, R., 2 Pedro-Freeman, S., 44–46 Pendleton, D., 84, 85 Phiri, I., 2, 5, 8–10, 23, 26, 35, 202 R Regan-Sachs, R., 39, 48–51 Rhodes, T., 201 Rice, X., 155 Rogers, E., 10 Rosenstiel, T., 7 Ross, W., 115–118 S Saleh, H., 67, 68 Serafin, T., 84 Serino, T., 201 Siame, N., 35 Silwamba, C., 30 Sparks, C., 3 Standing, A., 154, 155 Stapenhurst, R., 8, 9, 204

212  Author Index T Tounassi, F., 84, 85 V Van Donge, K., 26–28, 33, 204 Vasagar, J., 141 Verde, R., 41, 42 Vidija, P., 151 Von Zeppelin, C., 84 W Wacha, J., 133 Walulya, G., 137, 138, 140, 143 Wanjala, E., 152, 206

Wasserman, H., 1, 3, 5 Wasswa, J., 202, 203 Woldeamanuel, B., 12 Wrong, M., 156 Y Yusuf, A., 116–118

Subject Index

A Academic, 47, 48 Africa Files, 157 Albatross affair, 14, 183, 190 Al Jazeera, 116 AllAfrica, 102 Amnesty International, 47–51 Anglo-Leasing scandal, 147, 155 Angolagate scandal, 44 The Announcer Newspaper, 103, 104 Anti-corruption, 1, 2, 4, 6, 8–10, 14, 21–23, 35, 39–41, 43, 49, 52, 58–60, 75, 76, 78, 81, 88, 93, 94, 96, 99, 106, 109, 110, 122, 130, 142, 150, 157, 161, 167, 168, 170, 173, 180, 186, 196, 200, 202, 203, 206, 207 Anti-corruption tabloid journalism, 2, 9–11, 14, 40, 52, 75, 97, 109, 134, 183 Anti-corruption tabloid journalism in Africa, 1, 2, 4, 6, 12, 14, 199, 207 Associated Press, 68, 69

B BBC, 61, 64, 78, 88, 141, 153–157 BBC News, 110, 115, 116 Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, 184 C Centre for International Forestry Research, 186 Citi, 105 Civil Courage Price, 49 Committee to Protect Journalists, 50, 188, 194, 195 Copper shipment scandal, 14, 22, 24, 25 Corruption and tabloids in Africa, 2 Corruption impunity in Africa, 14 Corruption in Africa, 13, 200, 202 Corruption in Algeria, 57 Corruption in Angola, 14, 41, 48 Corruption in Cameroon, 183, 195 Corruption in Ghana, 106 Corruption in Kenya, 147

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214  Subject Index Corruption in Morocco, 14 Corruption in Nigeria, 110, 112, 117 Corruption in Uganda, 14, 130 Corruption in Zambia, 21, 22 D Doing business, 28, 40, 41, 43, 53, 161, 179, 185 E East-West Highway scandal, 14, 57 The Economist, 44–46 Enterprise Surveys, 169, 170, 186 F Federation of African Journalists, 186, 187, 194, 195 Forbes, 39, 41, 43, 76, 84, 85 Freedom House, 52, 61–63, 76, 78, 86, 87, 97, 110, 113–115, 130, 148, 171, 173, 181, 187, 189 G GAN Integrity, 21, 75, 76, 81–83, 88, 94–96, 110, 112, 115, 122, 130, 131, 147, 150–152, 168, 169, 171, 174, 181, 184, 185, 187, 190, 196 Ghanaian Observer, 101 Glencore scandal in Congo, 14 Global Integrity Report, 41, 43 Global Security, 174 Global Witness, 43, 52 Goldenberg scandal, 147, 153 Gustavo Costa, 14, 39, 47, 48 H Harassments of tabloids in Africa, 76, 86 Human Rights Watch, 47, 133

I Ifex, 135 Impact, 8, 11, 35, 57, 147, 150, 173, 185, 199 International Federation of Journalists, 64 Internews, 171–173, 175 Investigative tabloid journalism in Africa, 7 Isabel dos Santos, 14, 39, 41, 43 J Jurist, 138, 140 K Kabila regimes, 14, 167, 177 Kent Dairies, 97 Kenyan Pundit, 155 King Mohammed VI and the royal family, 14, 76, 83, 84 KPMG, 186 L Lamido Sanusi scandal, 109, 118 Lusaka Times, 34 M Maka Angola, 40, 48, 49 Middle East Eye, 66, 67 Middle East Institute, 59, 66 Middle East Online, 68–70 Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 177 N Nairobi Chronicle, 158, 160 National Hydrocarbons Corporation of Cameroon (SNH), 184, 193 Natural Resource Governance Institute, 83

Subject Index

The New Arab, 58, 70, 71 The North Africa Post, 59 P Patronage and nepotism in Africa, 80 Political patronage in Africa, 14, 22, 30 Premium Times, 112 R Rafael Marques de Morais, 14, 40, 43, 48–51 Reliefweb, 137 Reporters, 6, 7, 52, 57, 64, 78, 88, 99, 113, 114, 142, 148, 173, 175 Reporters Without Borders, 61, 62, 64, 65, 80, 81, 84, 88 Reuters, 34, 42 Road Traffic, 65 S Sahara Reporters, 117–119, 121 Scancem scandal, 93, 99, 101 Slash fund scandal, 14 SNH scandal, 14, 184, 193 Sonatrach scandal, 14, 69 Staff Reporter, 132 Staff Writer, 131 The Statesman, 99–102 Struggles of tabloids in Africa, 60 T Tabloid journalism in Africa, 4

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Temitayo, 110 Transparency International, 14, 22, 35, 39, 57, 75, 81, 82, 93, 109, 129, 147, 156, 167, 169, 170, 173, 183, 185, 186, 206 Transparency International Kenya, 151 Triton Oil scandal, 14, 148, 158 U Uganda global funds diversion, 129 Uganda Today, 130 United Bank of Africa scandal, 14 United States Department of State, 41, 52, 61, 62, 81, 95, 96 V Vision Reporter, 139 W Watchdog journalism, 12, 13 The World Bank, 95, 157, 170 World Bank Group, 185 World Economic Forum, 40, 58, 71, 81–83, 94, 96, 151 World Highways, 67 Z Zambian Watchdog, 34 Zamtel scandal, 14, 22, 30

Anti-corruption Tabloid Newspapers Africa Index

A Accra Daily Mail, 97, 100, 106 Agora, 48–50 Akhbar Al-Yaoum, 87 Al-Akhbar, 86 Al Ayam, 88 Alger Républicain, 62 Al Ittihad Al Ichtiraki, 77 Al Massae, 80, 88 The Announcer, 103 B The Black Star News, 133 Boyoma, 176 C Cameroon Express, 184, 194, 195 Chronicle, 102 Crusading Guide, 100, 101 D Daily Guide, 98 Daily Post, 111, 113

in

Daily Sun, 5 Demain, 84 Douman, 84 E Economie et Entreprises, 84 Eden, 188 El-Alam Es-Siyassi, 62 Elima, 176 El Watan, 14, 57, 61, 63, 66, 68, 69 The Enquirer, 101 Expresso, 47 G Génération Libre, 194 Germinal, 188 Goud, 75 I Independent, 136

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218  Anti-corruption Tabloid Newspapers in Africa Index L La Colombe, 171 La Détente Libre, 188 La Nation, 194 La Nouvelle Expression, 188 La Reflexion, 62 L’Avenir, 172, 176 Leadership, 114 Le Carrefour d’Algerie, 62 Le Courrier, 189 Le Jour, 188 Le Journal hebdomadaire, 77 Le Matin, 62, 76 Le Messager, 188 Le Palmarès, 172 Le Passeport Africain, 176 Le Potentiel, 172 Le Quotidien de l’economie, 188 Les Coulisses, 171 L’Express, 80 M Mjumbe, 176 The Monitor, 189 Mutations, 188, 189 N Naija Observer, 111 The Nairobian, 148 The Nation, 111 Newsweek, 131 Nichane, 88 Nigerian Monitor, 110 P The Post, 25–32, 34, 35, 188 Pot-Pourri, 176 Premium Times, 112, 113, 121

Pulse, 111 Punch, 116, 117, 119–121 R Red Pepper, 4, 14, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135, 140 S Sahara Reporters, 111, 121 Statesman, 100 The Star, 149, 151, 152 Sunday Post, 23 T Tel Quel, 77 Tide Newspaper, 114 U Uganda Today, 130 V Vanguard, 111, 112, 114, 120 W Weekly Citizen, 4, 148, 153, 155, 157–160, 201 Z Zambian Watchdog, 33, 34 Zenith, 189

African Countries Index

A Algeria, 14, 57–60, 63, 65–71 Angola, 39–46, 48–50, 52, 53

M Morocco, 59, 65, 75, 76, 78–81, 83, 87, 88

C Cameroon, 14, 183, 186, 189–194

N Nigeria, 13, 42, 109, 110, 112–116, 119–122, 201

D Democratic Republic of Congo, 14, 28, 153, 167, 168, 175, 180

U Uganda, 129, 132–139, 141, 142

G Ghana, 12, 14, 93, 95, 97–106

Z Zambia, 2, 14, 22, 24–35

K Kenya, 147–149, 151–154, 156–160

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