Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View 052185556X, 9780521855563, 0521671655, 9780521671651

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C.L\IBRIDGE TEXTS 1:" TJ1E IIISTORY OF PIIILOSOPHY

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h.ARL :\\\ERIKS l'm/l'ssor o/1'/u/o.wpltv a/ lite l ·nil-erst()' o/.Yo/re Oame

DES\10:'\D \1. CLARKE Pmji:ssor o/Piulosoplty ttl l ninT,il)' Collegt' CorJ: The main ohjccti'c of Cambridge Texts in the llistory of Philosophy is to expand the range, 'arict� and quality of tots in the histor� of philosoph' which arc a'ailahle in English. The series includes texts hy familiar names (such as Descartes and Kant) and also h� less \\cll-knmm authors. \\"hcrncr possible, texts arc published in complete and unabridged li>rm, ami translations arc specially commissioned for the series. Each 'olumc contains a critical introduction together" ith a guide to further reading and any ncccssar�

glossaries and tc\tual apparatus. The 'olumcs arc designed lin· student usc at undcr­ t;raduatc and postgraduate le\ cl and will he of interest not on I� to students of philosophy, hut also to a \\idcr audience of reader' in the histon of science, the histon of theology and the history of ideas.

For a lis! o/lilln pu/J/i.,ltl'll in lite series, please St"e nul o/booJ:.

IJVlMANUEL KANT

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View TR \'-SL.\TED .\1\D EDITED B Y

ROBERT B. LOUDEN l ·un:crslly t�(Southcrn \taint \\!Til \1'\ 1:'\TRODLCTIOI\ B Y

MANFRED KUEHN Boston l"nir:crst(J'

gCAMBRIDGE V UNIVERSITY PRESS

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r the persistence or accuracy of URI .s f(>r external or rh i rd-p;lr ty internet wchsitcs referred to in this hook, and docs nor g;uara ntec that any content on such \\ Ch�i t cs is, or " ill remai n , accurate or appropriate .

Camhridg;e

Contents !ntroduclion

page

,·ii

XXX

Chronology Further reading

XXX!ll

Note on the tc.rt and translation

XXX\"!

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View Preface Contents Part I

Part II

Index

Anthropological Didactic. On the way of cognizing the interior as \Yell as the exterior of the human being Book I On the cognitive faculty Book II The feeling of pleasure and displeasure Book III On the facultv of desire Anthropological Characteristic. On the way of cognizing the interior of the human being from the exterior

3 7

I3 r5 125 149

rH3 239

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View

Preface' All cultural progress, by means of which the human being advances his education,2 has the goal of applying this acquired knowledge and skill for the world's usc. But the most important object in the world to which he can apply them is the human being: because the human being is his own final end. -Therefore to know the human being according to his species as an earthly being endowed with reason especially deserves to be called knomledge I!( the world, eycn though he constitutes only one part of the creatures on earth. A doctrine of knowlcdgc of the human being, systematically formulated (anthropology), can exist either in a physiological or in a pragmatic point of view. - Physiological knowledge of the human being concerns the investigation of what nature makes of the human being; pragmatic, the investigation of what he as a free-acting being makes of himself, or can and should make of himself. - I le who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the t:1culty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Dcscartcs)3 mer the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere obscncr and must let nature run its course, for he docs not know the cranial ncn-cs and fibers, nor docs he understand hem to put them to usc for his purposes. Thcrcf(>rc all theoretical spec­ ulation about this is a pure waste of time. - - Hut if he uses perceptions concerning \\·hat has been fi>uml to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowlcdg·c of the human being 1 The Pn:Eu:e ;ttH.l contcnts an.: m i!-.�int! in t hc !laudsdtn/i (//). ; Sec. c.� .. I )r,cartc�\ fJilSSlfii!S o(!flt' .\on/ ( l(q()). \rt ...p.. 3

.:

,,·me

Sdwk 11/tltflt.

IT• "JI

Prc/ilcc f(n· this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a pragmatic l�>ol

purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here. Such an anthropology, considered as l.:nrnl'lct��c r�{ the u>orld, which must come after our schooling, is actually not yet called pragmatic when it contains an c:xtcnsiYc knowledge of things in the world, f(>r example, animals, plants, and minerals from Yarious lands and climates, but only \\hen it contains knowledge of the human being as a citi:::.c n o{the Jl>orM­ Therefore, C\ en knowledge of the races of human beings as products belonging to the play of nature is not� ct counted as pragmatic knowledge of the world, but only as theoretical knowledge of the world. In addition, the expressions "to !.:nom the world" and "to hare the \rorld"-t arc rather far from each other in their meaning, since one only understands the play that one has watched, while the other has participated in it. - But the anthropologist is in a very unfarorablc position f(>r judging so-Glilcd ln�!(h society, the estate of the nobles;' because they arc too close to one another, but too far from others. Trarel belongs to the means of broadening the range of anthropology, cyen if it is only the reading of travel books. But if one wants to know what to look for abroad, in order to broaden the range of anthropology, first one must have acquired knowledge of human beings at home, through social intercourse with one's townsmen or countrymen. a Without such a plan (which already presupposes knowledge of human beings) the citizen of the world remains very limited with regard to his anthropology. CCilentf knowledge always precedes local knowledge here, if the latter is to be ordered and directed through philosophy: in the absence of which ail acquired knowledge can yield nothing more than fragmentary groping around and no science. ***

11211

I lowncr, all such attempts to arriYe at such a science with thoroughness encounter considerable difficulties that arc inherent in human nature itself. �

du· I l l.'/! J..·omcn mu/ 11 dt /wheu.

s

dtc :wgtlllllllllt' gro/.�c l l l:/1 ahcr. den Stand dtr l "oruehmt'll.

such as 1-.:iinigsherg on the rirer Pregel, which is the center of a kingdom, in which the pr01 incial councils of the g01 ernment are located, " hich has a uni1 ersity (fi>r culti, a tion of the sciences) ami 11 hich has also the right location fi>r maritime commerce -a cit1 11 hich, hr wa1 of ri1ers, has the ad�;mtr hroadening o ne 's kn01dedge of human hcings as well as of the 11orld, where this kno11 ledge can he acquired without e1en tra,ding.

·' :\ lar�e city

Prefi/Cc 1.

If a human being notices that someone is ohscn-ing him and trying to study him, he will either appear embarrassed (self-conscious) and cannot show himself as he really is; or he dissembles, and docs not !l'a/11 to he known as he is. 2. b·cn if he only wants to study himself� he will reach a critical point, particularly as concerns his condition in affcct,1' which normally docs not all1>1>).

seinm /.ustanJ im lf/i'A·t

5

1 122[

Pre/{[((!

readers man� occasions and im·itations to make each particular into a theme of its own, so as to place it in the appropriate category. Through this means the details of the work arc naturally divided among the connoisseurs of this study, and they arc gradually united into a whole through the unity of the plan. As a result, the growth of science for the common good is promoted and accelerated. b

"

In

1m

\\or!."ith purr the mother a n d n urse, and this i nclines them to h u g and kiss him constantly, and they thoroughly spoil the t i n y dictator by ful­ filling h i s C\cry wish and desire. On the one hand, this creature's charm in the time period of his dnelopmcnt toward humanity m ust be cred i ted to the i nnocence and openness of all of his still faulty utterances, d u ring which no dissimulation and no mal ice arc presen t . But on the other hand, the chi l d 's charm must also be credited to the natural tcndcnn o f the n urses to com fort a creature that i ngratiatingly entrusts h imsel f entirely to the will of anothcr.1 This perm its him a playtime, the happiest time of all, d ur i n g which the teacher once more enjoys the charm of chil d hood, and practically makes himself a chil d . I Iowncr, t h e memory o f the teacher's childhood docs n o t reach back to that time; f(>r it \\ as not the time of experiences, but merely of scattered perceptions not yet u ni ted u n der the concept o f an object .

On egoism

From the day that the human bei n g begins to speak by means o f " l ," he brings h i s beloved self to light whcrncr he is perm itted to, a n d egoism progresses unchecked. If he docs not do so openly ( f(>r then the egoism of others opposes him), nc\crthclcss he docs so covert ly and with seem ing sel f-abnegation and pretended modesty, i n order all the more rel iably to gi \c h i mself a superior worth i n the j udgment o f others. Egoism can contain t h ree kinds of presumption : the presumption of u nderstand ing, of taste, and o f practical interest; that i s, i t can be logical, aesthetic, or practical. ' 1I ;

;md

12:

injustice; //: �indness.

' of the prog:ress not in //.

\ltn:!!.ina! note in//: Cognition consists oft\\O pllow from the j udgment of all others who with talent and ind ustry dedicated themselves to this discipline, then e\"Cn mathematics i tself would not he fi·cc from fear of somewhere falling i nto error. - There are also many cases where we do not c\·en trust the j udgment of our own senses alone, for example, whether a ringin g is merely i n our cars or whether it is the hearing of hells actually being rung, but find i t necessary to ask others whether it seemed the same to them. :\nd while in philo­ sophizing we may not call up the j udgments of others to confirm our own, as j urists do i n calling up the judgments of those \ -crscd i n the law, nc\ - c rthclcss each writer-' who finds no f(>llowers with his publicly a \ owcd opinion on an important topic is suspected of being i n error. For this very reason it is a lw:::.ardous mterprise, even for intelligent people, to enterta i n an assertion that contradicts generall y accepted opinion. This semblance of egoism is called paradox. It is not boldness to run the risk that what one says m ight he u ntrue, hut rather that only a few people might accept i t . - The predilection for paradox is in fact

logical o/Jsti/1/1£)', in which someone docs not want

to he an imitator of

others, h u t to appear as a rare h uman being. Instead, a person like this often appears only straup:c. But because c\cry person m ust have and assert

/

his own thoug·hts (Si II Illites patrt'S sic, at ep:r' 111111 sic. . -1/Jdard ) ' the reproach

of paradox, \\ hen it is not based on \ thcr" ;t.., a tm1cl"tone of truth J. Tr,u".: hen if ;Ill bthers ;tiT this \\a\, I am not this \\a\ Peter \helard (107-1 llXo). Fkmi'h Christian m� stic. adherent of ()_uietism. Blai"· l'23 11>1>2), noted French scientist mathematician and rdig:ious philosopher. Pascal's primar� philosophical \\ork is t h l: PtllSc;c'S (1()70), in \\ hich he pre"'ents hi:-. ttn1ou� "\\agcr" f(H· Ciod's nistence ( fi·ag:ment +'X). " ' :\lhrecht \ on I blkr (170•� 1777), S\\iss scientist and \\ ritcr , appointed professor of anatom\ , nu�dicinc, and bot an� a Sclm/istdla uud tif>a sich scll>sl, ed. J G. I kinznunn ( Bern, 17H7), \ OI. 2, pp. 2 1 yff. (iottfried l.dl (17Jil·· I7r e\;tmplc, 11 hire stockin�s present fuller c;th es t han do black ones, a fire started i n t he night on n; f(>r in bc1th cases �hining: c>hjccts appear tI· onesel f) is a pedant, whether he is a scholar, a sold ier, or c\·cn a courtier. The scholarly pedant is actually the most tolcrahlc of all of these, because one can still learn ti·om h i m . On the other hand, \Yi th the l atter two scrupulo usness in t(>rmalitics ( pedantry ) is not merely useless hut also, on acco u n t of the pride to which the pedant unan>idahly di ngs, ridiculous as well, si nce i t is the pride of a n l�!!,nora mus . ..: I

Crosst"d fill/ 111

II: if jthi� r o�niti on i � t o he expcncll(c' 1 ) Jpprc!JoJSwll of the g.-i H� n ..,...- ohjc ch r c p rc"'cnLni on. 2) Crms. Jo!ISIIt'S.' of t he manif(>id of it.-.. nmh.' n h (appcr, ,·ptloll) . .)) Rt:flc'dioll on the molll l1LT of r omhi n in l; thl' hlltcr in a umsci ou�ncs ... ( rdlc.uo ) hd on �i n � t o �uch �l cog niti on ]. (apprtht'l!Sto)

·

�­

_,

. lnthropological /Jidactic l lowc\(:r, t he art , or rat her the L1cil i t y , of speaki ng- in a sociable tone and in general of appearing fashionable is falsely named popularity

-

particularly when it concerns science. I t should rather be called polished s upcrficialit� , because i t frequently cloaks the paltriness o f a l i m i ted mind. But only children can be misled by it. :\s the (�akcr \\ ith :\.ddison said to the chatteri ng officer sitting next to him in the carriage, " Y our drum is a symbol of yoursel f: i t resounds beca use i t is empty. "

11

I n order to j u d ge h u m a n beings according to their cogniti,·c bculty ( u nderstanding i n general ) , \\C d i,·ide t hem into those who m ust be granted connnon smsc (sensus COIInnunis), wh ich certainly is not COIIIII/1111 (smsus �.·u��aris), and people of science. The former are knmdcdg·cable in the appl ication of rules to cases (in concreto); the latter, i n the rules thcmsch cs before their application (in abstracto) . - The understanding that belongs to the first cognitiYe bculty is called sound human under­ standing· ((ion sots); t hat belongi ng to the second, a dear lllilld (ingl'llium pcrspica.r) . - It is strange that sound human understandi ng, which is usually regarded only as a practical cogn iti ,·c f�1cu lty, is not only pre­ sented as something that can manage w i thout culture, hut also something for which cult ure is cYcn disad,·an tageous, i f i t is not pursued enough. Some praise it highly to the point of enthusiasm and represent it as a rich source of treasure lying hid den in the mind, and someti mes its pro­ nouncement as an oracle ( Socrates' genius) is said to he more rel iable than anything academic science otTers for sale. - This m u ch i s certain, that i f the solution to a problem is based on general and in nate rules of understanding (possession o f which is cal led mother w i t ) , it is more dangerous to look around for academic and artificially drawn-up princi1 I -to[ pies (school wit) and thereafter to come to their conclusion than to take a

chance on the outburst from the determ i n i n g grounds of masses of judgment that lie in t h e obscurity of the m i n d . One could call this logical

tar!, where reflection on the object is presented fro m many d i fferent sides and comes out with a correct result, without being conscious of the acts that are goi n g on inside the m ind during this process. But sound understanding can demonstrate i ts superiority only

in

regard to an object of experience, which consists not only in increasing knmdedgc !hroug!J experience hut also i n enbrging experience itself; not, " Joseph -\ddi"m ( 1 ll72- 1 7 1 himsl'if. and i f he pursues t his im csti�;llion as t;u· as he can, he 11 ill hare to L·onfcss that self-knell\ ledg-e 11ould lc;l has somcthinfl similar to 11 l"u 11 c c1ll represent a t ions (bcclllse it Ius effects t hat arc similar to the rcprcscnt;llions in the human hcing-), hut 11 hich ma1 perhaps be cnt ircl) d i fferent hut no . cogn ition of things� f(,r this requires fllldcrslt/Jltlillf.!., ;,t t�tcult� of n :pn:scnt;.ttion '' ith conscious­ ness of action 11 herch) the representat ions relate to a g-i1 ·cn object and t his relation ma) be though t . - l lo\\ e\ cr. \\ e do not understand an� thin!! correct!� < ;,lccon.ling t o i()rm> e\ccpt t hr it 11 mdd he g;i1 en to us. ( :on�cquentt� . undcr�tanding is �\ f�tcult� of �pon t �meit � in our cogni t ion� a higher Ctcult� of co�n ition, becau:-. c it :-.uhtnit:-. rcprcscnt�ttions t o LTrt;.tin a prion rules and itsl·lf makes c\pcricnct· possible. I n t he sclt�cog-n ition of the human being; t hrou�h inner C\}lcricncc he docs not mal·c 11 '"" he has pcrcci1 cd in himself� f(>r t h is depends on impressions ( t h e subject mat t er of represe n t ations) that he rt"t"t'li"t'.S of the rule of hi:-. action� and omi:-.."ion.-.. , \\ it hout t hcreh� acquirin� ol theoretical ( ph� :-.iolog;ical) cog:n i t ion of Empirical .-.. e lf L·ognit ion therdi lrl· hi� nat u n:, \\ hich is " ha t Jh� dH>iog'� ;tL·tuall� aim:-. a t .

30

On till' cop:nitin· .fi{({t!ty

presenb to inner sense t h e human hein� as h e appears to it, not as he is in himself, because e\ en cogn ition e\phtins mere!� the afl;•i!alllli/J' oft h e subject, not the inner ch;tracteristic of the subject ;ts object. l lo\\ t hen is the gre;lt d i tlicult\ t o he remm ed, in \\ hieh consciousness o f oneself still presents on!� the appL·aranee of oneself. and not the human being in himself: :\nd wh\ Joes it not present a double I, hut ne\ nthcless a doubled consciousness of this I, first that of mere tiJinl-ing but then also that of inner pcrn·ptwn (rational and empirical); that is, discursi' e ;md i n t u i t i ' e apperception, of which the first belongs to logic ami the other to anthropolo�� (as p h \ Siolog' ): The fi>rmer is \\ ithout content (matter of cog;nition ), " hilc the httter is prm ided \\ ith a content

In

inner sense.

\n object of the (nternal or inner) sense, in so t:u· ;ts it is percei\ ed, is called ilf>/lre appearance is t hat representation t h rough " hich an object of the sense is gi , en (an object of perception, that is, of empirical intuition), but npcrience or empirical t'ognition is that reprcsL·ntation t h rough \\ hich the object as such at the same time is tiJIIngiJt. - Thercfi>re appearance is that represent;ttion t h rough " hich ;tn object o f the sense is gi' en (;tn object of perception, tlut is, o f empirical intuition), hut npcrience or empirical mg111tion is that representation t h rough \\ hich the object as such ;Jt the same time is tiJougiJt.

Therefi>n'

e\periencc is the acti\ it� (of the po\\ er o f imagination) through \\ hich appearances arL' brought under the concept o f one object o f npcricncc, and npcricnccs arc made h� ohsen·ations ( i n tentional perceptions) and through reflecting

(rr/latirt)

onplo)'/11.�

about how to unih

them under one concept. - \\'c acquire and bnwlcn our cognition through c�pcricncc h� suppl� inl,( thL· understanding \\ith appearances of ntcnul or e\ cn inner sense as material. :\ nd no one doubts that \\ C could not equ;tl!� m;tke inner ohsL·nations o f oursehes ;tnd mah· nperiences in this wa \ , h u t if \\c dare no\\ to spea!. of objects of inner sense ( which as sense al\\ a � s prm ides appearances on!� ) it is hLT;t use \\C arc able to reach on!\ cognition of oursclrcs, not as \\e arc, hut as \\c appear ( i ntern;t!h ) to oursehcs. There is something shocking i n this proposition, \\ hich \\ e must consider more careful!,·. - \\ c allo\\ ;t judgment of this !.ind regarding objects outside us, hut it loo!.s q u i te absurd t o ;tppJ, it t o " hat w e perce i \ e \\ ithin oursehcs.

Tlut some word - t \\ isters ta!.e ;tppearancc and

srml>lant'e ( l:'rsc iJeinung I/1/cl Sdu·in)

li>r one and the same thing and sar th;tt their statements me;tn as much as: "it seems (.r L'\ en being as such that is conscious of itself� thcrdin-e the co:;nirion '' hich lu� t he inner sen�t· of t he h um�tn hcing ;J� it� t-tround cannot represent

IH

inner np�rienc� ho" hL· himself is ( b�cause the condition is not "tlid tin· all t hin!.in�

JI

. ·Jnihropological Oidactic and all n pcricnn: ( e m p i rical cogn ition), i n ner no less than o u ter, is o n ! � t h e cogni tion o f objects as t h e y

appear t o

u s , n o t as t h e y

a rc

(considered

in thcmsch·cs alon e ) . For what kind of sensible intuition there will he depends not merely on the constitution of the ohjcct o f the represen tation, hut also on the consti t ution of the subject and its recepti,·ity, a fter w h ich thinking ( t he concept of the object) follows. - \low the formal constitu­ tion of this reccpti\·ity cannot i n turn he borrowed from the senses, hut

a priori;

rather m ust (as intuition) he gi,·en

that is, i t m ust he a sensible

intuition which rem a i n s c\·cn after e\crything empirical (comprising sense experience) is omitted, and in inner experiences this formal clement

of intui tion is time. E xperience is empi rical cog;ni tion, hut cogn i t ion ( si nce i t rests on judgments) requires reflection

( rc(/e.rio),

and consequen tly conscious­

ness of acti \ ity in combining the mani fold of ideas according to a rule of the unity of the m a n i fold; tha t is, i t requires concepts and thought in general (as distinct from i n tuition). Thus consciousness is d i ,· ided into

dismrsi;:e

consciousness ( which as logical consciousness m ust lead the

way, since i t gi,·es the rule), and

intuitiu

consciousness. Discursi \ e

consciousness (pure apperception of one's mental acti\·ity) is simple. The "I" of reflection con tains no manifold i n i tself and is al ways one and the same in e\cry j ud gment, because i t is merely the formal dement of consciousness. On the other hand,

inner experience

contains the matc-

1 q2l rial of consciousness and a m a n i fold of empirical inner i n t u i tion, the " I"

of apprehension (consequently a n empirical apperception ) .

/fmtnolc

.q. ( umtinued)

hein!(s, ti>r then it 1\ould he a represent.ttion of t h e understanding;). Rather, it is mereh a rtm:-.cild in one'� i n t u ition is {!iH�n

I smud�cd I an 11 .!X

�nori f(mn i n " h ich it can he ordered . . I

. \ larp,mal uolc in II: Perception (empirical i n t u i t ion with consciousness) could he called mere!: appl"ilfr then it would be a mere mechanism of applying pO\\Cr. Rather, \·irtuc is lllllral strcup,th in adherence to one's duty, \Yhich nc\-cr should become habit but should ah, ays emerge entirely new and original from one's way of thinking. The easy is contrasted to the dUficu/1, but often it is contrasted to t h e 11ucrous as wel l . :\ subject regards something as cas)' \\·henc\-er he encoun­ ters a large surplus i n his capacity for applying the req uisite power to an action . What is easier than ohscn·ing the formalities of \ isits, con­ gratulations, and condolences? But \Yhat is also more arduous f(>r a b us� man? They arc friendship's u.rati1111s (drudgeries), from \Yhich C\Tryonc hearti l y wishes to be free, and yet still carries scruples about o ffending against custom. What \Txations there arc in external customs that arc attributed to religion but which actually collect around ecclesiastical form ! The merit of piety is set u p exactly in such a way that it scrYcs no pu rpose other than the mere submission of belicYcrs to let themsel ves patiently be tormented by ceremonies and obscnanccs, atonements and mortifications o f the flesh ( the more the better) . To be sure, this compulsory scn·icc is mcdw uicallr cas)' (because no vicious inclination need be sacri ficed as a result), hut to the reasonable person it m ust come as 11/llra//J• n>r)' a rduous and onerous. - So when the great moral teacher of the people said , " M y 1 com mands arc n o t d i fficult," 'J he did n o t mean by this that they requ i re only a limited e xpenditure of power in order to he ful fi lled; f(>r in t:1ct as commands that req u ire p u re d ispositions of the heart they arc the most J , �s J difficult ones of all that can be commanded. B u t f(>r a reasonable person

they arc still i n fi n itely easier than commands of busy inactiYity (gratis

"' 1 John ;;:3.

Sec .!lso K;tnt·s Rdigwu l l ttluu the liouud,mcs o/ l lo c Rc,!Stlll ll:

' 7rt connected to it still scn es no p u rpose. To

11111/.:c something d i fficult

easy is

meritorious;

to depiCt i t to someone

as easy, c\cn though one is not able to accomplish it oneself� is To do that w h i ch is easy is

mcritless.

deception.

�lcthods and machines, and among

these the d i , ision o f labor among d i fferent craftsmen ( m a n u factured goods ) , make many things cas� w hich would be d i fficult to do with one's own hands w i thout other tools. To

point out

d i ffi culties before one gi\cs instruction f(>r an undcr­

taking; (as, e . g . , in metaphysical in Yestigations) may admi tted l y discourage others, but this is still better than

concealing

d i ffic u lties from them . He

tlwught less. He who adept; just as he ,,-hose

who regards cYcrything that he u ndertakes as easy is pcrf(>rms ncrything that he docs with case is actions rc\'cal cff(>rt is

a/PA'/Pard. -

Social entertainment ( com·crsation ) is

merely a game in ,,-hich c\·crything; must be easy a n d m u s t allow easiness. Thus ceremony (stiffness) in com-crsation, e . g . , the solemn good-bye a fter a banquet, has been gotten rid of as something outmoded . People's state of mind in a business undertaking \aries according to the d i fference of temperaments. Some begin ,,-i t h di fficulties and concerns ( the melancholic temperamen t ) , w i th others ( the sanguine) hope and the presumed easiness o f carrying out the u n derta k i n g arc the first thoughts that come i n to their minds. B u t hll.\, and in spl'aking /Jo( es t unpus \\ f>7- ' 7+5). En�J i,h " riter, aurhor of (,'u/lh·rtunatc he is - I say more f(n·tunatc, not nactly morally better - f(>r he has the feeling of his own well-being more under his control. One can call the capacity f(>r sensation that comes from

stn:np,lh delicate scnsitiod hcfi>rehand, at the gate of entrance to the intestinal canal; for as long as l u x ury and indulgence ha\ c not o\ cr-rcfincd the sense, the agreeableness of the sense of taste is connected to the wholesomeness of food, as a f�1 irly certain prediction of it. - In the case of people who arc i l l t h e appetite, \Yhich usuall� takes care of them and is of benefit t o them l ike a medicine, f�1ils. - The smell of fi>Od is so to speak a foretaste, and by means of the smell of his bYOritc fi>Od the hungry person is im·itcd to pleasure, j ust as the satiated person is repelled by the same smell . ·' 3 Can the senses he used \ icariously, that i s, can one sense be used as a substit ute for another? Through gestures one can coax the usual speech fro m a deaf person, granted that he has once been able to hear, thus b� means of his eyes. OhscrYing the moYcmcnt of one's lips also belongs here; i n deed, exactly the same thing can take place by means of the feeling of touching mo,·ing li ps in the dark. Hm\cYcr, if the person is horn deaf, the sense of seeing the moYcmcnt of the speech organs must com crt the sounds, which ha YC been coaxed from him by instruction, into a feeling o f the moYcmcnt of his own speech m u scles. But he ncYcr arri\cs at real concepts in this way, because the signs that he needs arc not ; .!

. \ loJ:!!,mtll no/(' 111

II:

Smell doe:-. not a llo\\ ihrlf to he described, hut on!� conlJU!Td throug-h

similari t ' \\ i t h ;tnot her sense ( l i ke music \\ it h I he phl\ of colors), tin· csampk, o f taste, to c·ompare, L' . g . , t ha t ''hich smells :-.our, :-o\\ LTt , rotten

;,; l ltn:�mtl! uo/t' lll fl: I )j, ision

\ kthod . ( :h,n·;tcleristic.

l�tinr odor of :-.latc.

. \ n t h ropological l )octrinc o f E knlL'Ilh . 1 ·: \pw.. i t ion and I )octrinc of

Ekmc n t .

I )octrinc. ( >n t h e Facuh\

of C :of(ni t ion ., t he Feel i n � of Pk,tsurc

and I >isplcasurc, and the Facult\ of I )c,irc. \II of t h is i, "·n,ihlc or i n t clkct u a l . On rill' Sc·n.s ihk Facult� of Co)!: nition. 1. On t he Sense.., 2 . On the Po\\L'r of l nut!·ination. \ �JTL'ahll'ncs:-. '' hich it

presses on a - - m u :-. i c h . odor. Cunosn:i is he \\ ho de:-.ires t o e \ periencL' rare t h in �:-. or otl:-.o to posses:-. t h en1 t( n· nrrio:-. i t )

.

( h er!-' st rong l i g h t or shouting make:-. one blind and deaf� that is, one cannot n-ce i H· conccph of objects. . \\ hcthcr t here is not rea l h '' l>th scthL' I o ac q u ire ( ['llg()'). n.um·h " it h rc'f(ard to '" ' · the k i" i ...... olll cnjo-' ment hel\\ eL'I1 both Sl'\l'�. The embrace of t ho:-.c of t h l' \

On the causes that increase or decrease sense impressions according to degree §zs Sense i mpressions arc increased according to degree IH means of ( 1 ) contrast, ( 2 ) nm d ty, ( J ) change, (.4-) i n tens i fication .

a Con/ ras/ Oissimi/a rity (contras t ) is t h e j u x taposition, arousing our a t tention, of mutual!� con t rary sotse reprcsmlatio11s under one and the same concept. "1'

\ Ln:!!,lllt!l lloh' in !/: :'\B :\bo\ L' t h e tll/1111/lS sui (1111/jws, \\ ho h;ls all Illl'TlLll chang-t.:s in his po\\tL

On dull, \\cak, dcl it:.lll' :-.cn....c:-. li.:ding or l'\ h.tu:-.tion .md .... t rUli!lh Sdf.!,tf(//(/tf, of dog... on t he . lookou t . The old o1w hdie1 ,., he· 11 ill he line, 11 b i le t he ;·i/r a considerable length of time, since one m uscle (of the leg) al!cma/cs at rest \\ ith the other, than it is to remain standing rigid in one and the same spot, where one muscle m ust \n>rk t(n· a while \Yi thout relaxing. ­ This is \\ hy traYel is so attracti \-c; the only pity is that \Yi t h idle people i t

�"

\ ltn:!f.wal J/01£' m I I: .\ lonoton� . di�h;trmon� . a n d aton� of t h e t�t c u l t � of sensation . The� incn:asc with the dosap:e.

I bhit

makes them ncrcssar�

Crossed on/

in //:

r;tritic:-. t"llrioslly: otlthou�h t h at '' hid1 is concc.tkd

;lltl'ntion [ ( )nc calls t h L· indin:ttion to �LT

lllL'tTI�

'iliL'h

hec.w:-.c i t j..., IT!!S [ sense representation that was

nerer

given to our faculty of sense; one can

always furnish evidence of the material of its ideas. To one who has nc\·cr seen red among the seven colors, we can never make this sensation compre­ hensible, but to the person who is born blind we cannot make any colors comprehensible, not even the secondary colors, for example, green, which is produced from the m i xture of two colors. Yellow and blue m i xed together give green ; but the power of imagination would not produce the slightest idea of this color unless it had seen them m i xed together. This is exactly how it is with each one of the five senses, that is, the sensations produced by the five senses in their synthesis cannot be made by means of the power of imagination, but must be drawn originally from the faculty of sense. There have been people for whom the representation o f light by their faculty of sight consisted of no greater selection than white or black, and f(>r whom, although they could sec well, the visible world seemed like a copperplate ent,'Taving. I jkewisc, there arc more people than one would believe who ha,·c a good and c\·cn extremely sensitive sense of hearing, but who ha\ c absol utely no musical car; whose sense for tone is entirely indifferent not merely to imitating tones ( singing) but also to distinguishing them from noise. - The same may be true with the ideas of taste and smell; namely that the

sense

lacks the material of enjoyment f(>r

many specific sensations, and one person believes that he understands another in this connection, while the sensations of the one may differ from those of the other not only in degree but specifically and completel y. There arc people who lack the sense of smell entirely; they regard the sensation of i n haling pure air through the nose as the sensation of smelling, and conseq uen tly they cannot make head or tail of any description '' hich tries to describe the sensation of smell to them. B u t '' here the sense of smell is lacking, the sense of taste is also badly missing, and if someone has no sense of taste, it is \\astcd effort to instruct and teach him about i t . B u t hunger and its satisfaction (satiation) is something quite different from taste. So, no matter how great an artist, e\·en a sorceress, the power of imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the

material

t(>r

i ts images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories 1 1 hq [ formed o f them, arc not so universally communicable a s concepts o f under­ standing. I Iowner, sometimes ,,-c also name (though on I� in a figurati\ c () !

lnthropolop,iml /)itfactic sense) t h e pm\ er of i maginal ion's scns i t i \ ity fill· representat ions thro ugh comm unicat ion as a sense, saying "This h uman hcing has no

smse li>r i t . "

Though i n n o t graspi ng communicated represen tations a n d uniting them in t hought, there exists an i nahility not of sense, hut partly of under­ standing. r lc himself docs not think ahout \\hat he says, and thcrcli>rc others also do not understand him; he speaks

nonsmse ( wm snHe) - a deroid o(smse, ,,·here

m istake that is still to he disting·uishcd fi·om \Yhat is

thoughts arc paired together in such a \\ uml sense ( hence the word "aphorism " ) , and that sound h uman underst anding is also ca lled "com­ 11 mon scnsc" ' 1 and is sti ll p laced at the top, c\ cn though this expression actually sign i fies only the l owest lc\ el of the cogniti\c 1�1culty - a l l of this i s hascd on the f�lCt that the po\\cr of imagination, which puts material u nder the understanding in order to p rm·idc content li>r its concepts ( li>r cog·nition), seems to prm ide a reality to i ts ( i mented) i n tuitions hecausc of the analogy hctwccn them and real percept i ons.

Partaking of i n toxicating fi>Od and dri n k is a physiceakm the

\ ita! force (certain m ushrooms, wild rosemary, wild hogweed, the Chicha o f the PerU\ ians, the .'h a o f the South Sea Indians, opi u m ) ; others

strl'llp,then it or at least ele\ ate its feeling ( like fermented he\erages, �,1, 11

:

Scn:-.c: .).u/1/, thou�h t : C'edau/.:oJ, aphori:-.m: .)'nwsprlll /1, common :-,c n :-.c Gclll!'WSlllll. I pass O\ er here '' hat i� n o t a llll'r \\·hich sobriety is req uired). For their e x ternal worth rests simply on others' hcliLf in their chastity, piety, � and a separatist lawfulncss. >7 For, as concerns the last point, all separatists,

. ·lnthmpolop,ital Didactic

that is, those \Yho submit not only to a public law of the land hut also to a special one (of their own sect), arc, as oddities and a llcgcdl� chosen people, particularly exposed to the attention o f the com m u n i ty and the sting of criticism; thus they cannot slacken their attention to thcmschcs, 1x since drunkenness, which rcmo\cs caution, is a stant!al for thcm. 1

:\ Stoic admirer of Cato sai d : "his ' irtuc was strengthened hy wine . . · elliS 111ca ( nrtus . . I1111. mcro ) " ; r,9 an d a moeI ern G erman sa1 d o f t h c anCient Germans: "they f(>rmcd their counsels (to make a resolution of war) while they were drunk, so that they \nJuld not he lacking i n ,·igor, and reflected on them while so her, so that they would not he without understanding. "70 I )rink loosens the tongue (iu z·iuo t!iscrtus) . 7 ' - But it also opens the heart

and is an i nstrumental \-chicle of a moral q uality, namely fra nkness. Holding hack one's thoughts is an opprcssi\c state f(>r a sincere heart; and merry drin kers do not read i l y tolerate a \ cry temperate guest at their rnel, because he represents an obscn cr \\·ho looks o u t f(>r the fa u l ts of 2 others while he hides his o w n .7 I l umc also says: "The drinking compa­ nion who nc\ cr f(>rgets is annoying; the f(>llies of one day must be f(>rgotten i n order to make room for those of the nex t . "73 Good-naturcdncss is presupposed by this permission that man has, f(>r the sake of social pleasure, to go a hit beyon d the borderli n e of sobriety for a short while. The bshionable poli tics of hal f a century ago, when the Nord ic courts sent cm·oys who could drink a great deal without getting drunk, but w ho made others drunk in order to q uestion or persuade them, was deceitful;

tx , Htn:�mal Hole 111 II: 'l'he po\\ cr of irnagination is either Cfl'llics of the nc\ 1 . "

On the cognitiu jiwtlty but i t has disappeared along with the coarseness of the customs of those times, and a long lecture of warning against this vice may well be super­ fl uous with respect to the civilized classes.' � Can one also explore the temperament of the human being who is getting drunk, or his character, while he is drinking? I think not. Alcohol 1 , 7 1 [ is a new fl uid m i xed w ith those flowing i n h i s veins and a further neural stimulus, one that docs not racal the natural temperature more clearly but rather introduces another one. - That is why one person who gets drunk becomes amorous, another boastfu l , a third cantan kerous, a fourth (especially when drinking beer) soft-hearted or pious or a ltogether silen t . B u t all o f t h e m , once t h e y have s l e p t it o tT a n d one reminds t h e m of what they said the prcYious C\Tning, will laugh at this strange h umor or i ll­ humor of their senses.

§J o Originality of the power of i m agination (not im itative prod uction ), when it harmonizes w i t h concepts, is called genius; when it docs not harmonize with them, it is cal led mthuslasm . It is noteworthy that we can think of no other suitable f(>rm f(Jr a rational being than that of a h uman being. Every other form would represent, at most, a symbol of a certain q uality of the h uman being - as the serpent , f(>r example, is an image of evil cunning ­ but not the rational being h imself. Therefore we populate a l l other planets i n our i m agination with nothing but h uman f(>rms, although i t is probable that they may b e f(>rmcd very d ifferently, gi ven t h e diversity o f soil that supports and nourishes them, and the d i fferent clements of which they arc composed. A l l other f(>rms which we m i gh t give them arc cari(a/urcs. 1 When the lack of a sense ( f(>r example, sight) is inborn, then the crippled person culti vates, as far as possible, another sense to usc as a

substitute t(n· it, and exercises the prod uctive power of the imagination to

' There! in-c the 1/ol)' '/ 1-unl)', an old nun, a ) oun!,( man, Jnd a hird ( t he dm c), must not be presented as rc;tl fin·ms t llrm. - Only when a subject has been c\haustcd and a short pause sets in can one in trod uce another subject of interest. The i rrcg·ular, roami ng pllows the rules of sensibility, \Yhich proYidc the material \\hose association is achicYcd without consciousness of the rule, and this association i s in

ml!/imnily miJh the understanding although not dcriYed .fimn it. The \Yord i(/.(inil )' (af./i11ilas) here recalls a process filllnd in chemistry: intellectual combination is analogous to an interaction o f two specifical ly d i fferent physical substances intimately acting· upon each other and stri\'ing for unity, where this union brings about a third entity that has properties which can only he prod uced hy the union of two heteroge­ neous clements. Despite their d issimilarity, understanding and sensibil­ ity hy themsciYcs form a close union for bringing about our cognition, as i f one had its origin in the other, or hoth originated from a common ori gi n; hut this cannot he, or a t least we cannot conceive how dissim i lar things could sprout forth from one and the same root. " TIK·

k

tirst t \\ o '' r their san ity. - One also fi nds that when someone explains something in affect to ,i ,·acious people, especially something that may ha\c caused x2 their attention is so aroused that they make bees and arc

anger to him,

imoluntari ly moved to a play of expression corresponding to this affect. ­ One may also haYc noticed that compatibly married people grad ually acquire a similarity in t:Kial features, and the cause is interpreted to he

""

that they were married on account of this similarity (simi/is simili gaw/c/). 3 But this is false; f(>r nature instead striYcs, in the sexual instinct, for d i Y crsi t� of subjects so that they t:di in ! m e w i th each other and so that a l l x t h e ' aricty \\ hich n a t u r c h a s i mplanted i n their gcrms { w i l l d e Y clop. Rather, it is the intimacy and inclination with which they look into each ot her's eyes so often and at such length when they arc close to each other '7'' 'I' ran:-. .. I lome i� '' hl'rc \\c arc doing ,, d l . '" s�e I kh 0 ti u , , /)t' l 't'sfnl ( 1 7 .1 X), 1 . 2·. "-•mt use' t his same nampk i n his 1 7/q " ork, t:ssa)' "" tillhJ\\ ing morning after a night's sleep . \\'ith time, how-

l • X • l C\ cr, he feels a weakening of his mental powers from this had habit.

Therd(n-c the taming; of the power of imag;ination, b� going to sleep carl� so that one can get up carl� , is a Ycry usdl.d rule f(>r a psychological diet . But " omen and h� pochondriacs ( " ho common!� haYc their ailment f(>r j ust this reason ) enjoy the opposite bchaYior more. - \\'hy arc ghost stories, which arc welcomed late at night, fi>und to he distasteful to C\-cryonc and entirely inappropriate fi>r cmwcrsation as soon as \\T get up the fi>llo\\·ing morning? Instead \\T ask if anything nc\\ hrmcr im-cntions could still fi nd their place in a possible world ( the world of f:1ble); but rulekss imcntions h a Yc no place in an� \\ orld at all, because they arc sel f-contradictory . - Images of the first type, that is, of unbridled imagination, account for the horror \Yith which the .\rahs regard h uman and animal figures hc\\ n in stone that arc often encountered in the I -i\wan desert Ras-Scm; theY consider . xx t hem to be human beings pet r i fied by a curse. - But these sa 1c Arabs'

�

opi nion that on the da� of uni\crsal resurrection these st.nucs of animals " i ll snarl at the artist and ad monish him for haYing made them without being _; 1 f>:;,;) .

, . ., l .udm ico \riosto ( q7� I ,,;_; ). I talian epic ;llld h ric· poe!. C ::mli n .d htc\ l'L'nwl ''Pf>L';ll'' in \L'\ trod difkrcnt hio�Ltphic:-. of \rio\to .

7+

On the cop, nitiJl ji·cc clioicc, contain an absurdity - in addition to the fact that the ford.no\\ ledge is useless to them, si nce they cannot escape ti·om 1 , g, J I i t . For in this uncon d i tional t:nc

(darclt!llt a/Jsofllllllll) there is thought

to

be a mcdwnism t{/i·eedom , b� which the concept contradicts i tself. The ex treme limit of absur d i ty, or of deception, in specious soothsay­ ing may be that a madman has been considered a seer (of in ,-isible things); as if a spirit were speaking fro m h i m which had taken the place o f the soul that had long since departed ti·om i ts bod i l y d welling. And so the poor mental (or merely epileptic) patient was looked upon as an };'nn;l!,lllltC/1 (one possessed ) , and he ,,-as called a /v1antis b� the Greeks if the demon possessing him \\ere considered to be a good spiri t . The interpreter of the

J1alllis, howncr, \\ as called a prophet.

-

E\·cry form of t(Jl!y must be

exhausted in order t(Jr u s to gai n possession of the fut u re, the f(Jrcsecing of which i n terests us a great deal, by leaping o\·cr all the steps that m i ght ha\c led u s there by mea n s of the understanding working through experience. 0, mras lwmilllllll _1 ' 03 .\1orc0 \ cr, there is no science of soothsaying so certain and yet so far­ reaching as astronomy , which t(Jrctclls the rcnJi utions of the hca\ e n l y bodies ad in/inilfl/11. B u t C\ Cn this could n o t prcrcnt a mysticism from promptly joining i t \rhich, i nstead of reckoning the epochs of the world on the basis o f C\Cnts, as reason requires, wanted, on the contrary, to make the c\·cnts dependent on certain sacred numbers, thus transt(Jrming chronology itsel f� ,,·hich i s such a necessary condition of all history, i n to a fable.

On involuntary invention in a healthy state, i.e., on dreams §J 7 To imcstigatc the nat u ra l consti t ution of sleep, of dreaming, and of somnam/J11fimt (to '' hich talking aloud d u ring sleep also belongs) lies o u tside the tick! of a prap, nw/i( anthropolog� ; for we cannot dra\\ any rules o f mwlucl from these phenomena i n the state of dreaming, since these r u les arc \·alid only t(n· the person who is awake and docs not want

' " ' Trrcall!s o( . \ l,·tapll)'SlcmL's prim;trih on S11 cdcnbor�\ rdi�ious ' is ions and alk�cd sup�rn;tt ural po\\ ns. \\ bile i t is prcdominant h s�cptical i n tone, occasimul momcnh of admiration arc also C ' idcnt in i t . Sec also ��tnt 's letter to Charlot t e \ on hnohloch of \u�ust 1 0, 1 7h 1 ( 1 0:43 4 X ) . . \ llll:!.!illal uotc Jll II: ( )n superstition . . \ om ina/ and real si):!llS. I ndircct direct. Crossed out m I 1: \\ ould. j < For t h e ··.., For the desi1!Ilrc us. '

10"

\ ltn:�malnolc m /1: \ . \ oluntar� si�n .... . 1. ( >f )!l'�tUIT (mintt·t ic) .! . \\"rittcn �ig.-ns (lettLTS) J. Tone �i�ns (note") �- Secret �uild �ign� (code... ) .1 · Si�n ... of social st:mdin� (coah of arn1s) h. St·n icc �ign� ( u n i f(lrm or l i \ t'l'� ) 7. Si)!TlS of honor ( rihhon� of .lcsl means.

Cra/iiness, a head for in trigue, is often regarded as great though misused understanding; h u t it is only t h e \\ a y of thinking of\· cry limi ted human beings and is \Try di fferent from prudence, whose appearance it has. One can dccci\·c the nai\c person only once,

\\

hich in the course

of time is \cry disad vantag;cous to the personal intention of the crafty person . The domestic or ci \ i l scn·ant under express orders needs o n ! � to have understanding. The officer, to whom only the general rule is prescribed fi>r his entrusted tasks, and who is then left alone to decide ti>r himself what to do in cases that come up, needs j udgment . The general, \Yho has to judge all possible cases and has to think out the rules fi>r himself� m ust

possess reason . - The talents necessary fi>r these d i fferent dispositions arc \en· distinct. "Mam· a man shines on the second rank who would he

l

i nvisib e on the firs t . "

( lei /Jrille au sccmul ranp:, tjui s 't;dipsc au premicr. ) ' ' 6

Quib/Jiing is not the same as ha,·ing understandi ng, and to dra w up maxims for show and yet contradict them hy one's actions, like Christina of Sweden,

' '7

is called being u n reasonable. - This is how it was with the

Earl of Rochester's answer to King Charles II of England, w hen the King came upon h i m i n deep reflection and asked: "What arc you meditating on so deep l y ? " - Answer:

"I

am composi ng your l\.1aj csty's epitaph . " -

1 "N I Q_ucstion: "How docs it r u n ? " Answer:

"I Icrc

lies King Charles

II,

who

said many prudent t hings i n his l i fe, hut never did anything prud e n t . " ,

,x

' ' ; Trans.: the concept has to he adequ;lte to t he object. " " "•lilt Ius quoted from \ olt;tire\ epic poem on l lenn I \ , /.a 1/mnadc ( t 7' X), 1 erse 3 1 . ' ' ' ( :hristina ( 1 621>- 1 f>K.P 1 l>.q ), dau!(hter and succe"or of (htst). 1)2

On the cognitil·e J(wdty One who i s silent in com pany and only nm\ and then drops a 4uitc ord inary j udgmen t looks reasonable, j ust as a certain degree of marseness i s passed off as (old German )

honesty. ***

l\'atural understanding can he enriched through instruction with man� concepts and furnished with rules. B u t the second in tellect ual bculty, namely that o f d i scerning whether something is an instance of the rule or not

-

the pon>cr o(jw��lllcn/ (iudici11111)

-

cannot he ins/meted, hut onl�

exercised . That i s why its growth is called 11/itlllrity, and its understand­ ing that which comes only with years. It is a l so easy to sec that this could not be othcn\ isc; hccausc instruction takes place hy means of comm u­ nication of rules. Therefore, if there '' ere to he doctrines for the power of j udgment, then there \Yould haYc to he general rules according to which one could decide whether something was an i nstance of the rule

or

not,

which would generate a further in4uiry on i n to i n fi n i t y . Thus the power of j u dgment is, as we say, the understanding that comes only \Yith � cars; it i s hascd on one's long experience, and it i s the un derstand ing whose j udg·mcnt a French Republic searches for in the assembly o f the so-called Elders. This t:1culty, which i s aimed only at that which i s feasible, what is fi tting, and \\hat i s proper ( for technical , ' " 1 aesthetic, and practical power of j udgmen t ) , i s not as l ustrous as the bculty that e x tends k n m\­ lcdgc. For it merely makes room for sound understanding and forms the association hctwccn it and reason .

Now if understanding is the EJCulty of rules , and the power of j udg·ment the t:1culty of d iscm·ering the particular in so b r as i t i s a n i nstance of these rules, then reason is the t:JCulty of deri,·ing the particular ti·om the uni \ crsal and thus of representing i t according to principles and as necessary. - We can therefore a l so explain reason hy means of the f:JCulty ofjudging and (in a practical regard) acting accord ing to principles. The human hcing needs reason for c\·cry moral (consc4 ucnt l y also rel igious) j udgment, and cannot rest on statutes and established customs.

' "' !!, 1 1 : t heoretica l . 93

-

Ideas

lll!hropologim/ /)itfoclic IIow the appointed dcJg)'111tlll ( Cicrims), thus someone else's rcason, 1 2 3 is an unj ust deman d . For in moral matters ncry man must himself he responsible fi>r what he docs and does not do, and the clergyman \\ i l l not, and indeed cannot, ass ume the responsibi l i ty fi>r it at his own risk . Howe\cr, in these cases h uman beings a r c incli ned to place more security in their own person, so that they renounce completely a l l use o f their O\\ n reason and subm i t passi , ely and obed iently to formulas laid dmm hY hoh men. But theY do this not so much because theY fed -

.

.

-

incapable of i nsight ( for the essence of all religion is surely moral, \\ hich soon becomes cYident to e\-ery h uman heing hy himself); rather they do it out of cm/ii11css, partly i n order to he a hie to push the hlamc on t o someone else \\ hen t hey ha\c acted wrongly ; partly, and ahm·c all, to C\ ade gTaccful l y that which is essen tial (change of heart ), and \\ hich is m uch more d i fficu l t than cult worship ( Cul!us) .

11 ist!om, as the idea of a practical use of reason that confi>rms pertCctly with the hm, is no douht too m uch to demand of h uman beings. But a l so, not C\ en the sligh test degree of \Yisdom can he poured i n to a man hy others; rather he must bring i t forth fi·om h imself. The precept for 1 �0 I l'rlllin!icln. 1.! � fi·onrlcr I

.

l'JHitl�/i.

rt�SIIIllllrcu.

! ..! .!

\ larglllal notl' llf II: Pnn isional judgment-..

On the cognitiu jif(ftl/y re in comprehending is fi>r this reason not yet a \\ cak mind; j ust as he \\·ho is

nim/Jic \\ ith concepts is not ahvays profimnd but is often very shalhm. l ..! .'i I louse cricket : 1/ansgri/k. l\.;.t n t 's \\ordpla� i n t h i s section doesn't come o u t \\ e l l i n t rd. If at the same time he has \\ i t , then he is called clcz-cr. I k " ho merely affects one of the qualities, the joker as \rell as the pn:f!, , is n\Ons f(n· sons, ont: is a h u ft(>On in prose, the otht:r in \ nsc" (ont: had thrown himsdf into Jansm ism and was pt:rst:cutcd; tht: otht:r had to pay for his satirical \ t:rst:s in the Bast i l k ) . In gt:ncral , tht: fool places a

greater \ al u t: on things than fi·om a rational poi nt o f \ ic\\ ht: sh ould do; the b u ft(>O n , on IJ imsc(( Calling a h uman being; aji1p or a mxmm/J is also bast:d on tht: conct:pt of im prud t:ncc as buft(>oncry. Tht: fop is rmer i s taken fi·mn the analog� to listeni n g, i n the middle of the night, to the chirping noise of a cricket in the house, \Yhich disturbs the peace of m i nd necessary f(u· s l eep. 1 .p i\:o\\ the illness of the hypochondriac con sists i n this: that certain i nternal physical sensations do not so much disclose a real disease presen t in the body but rather arc m ere ca uses of an:x iety about it; and that human n;lturc, by Yirtue of a pecul i a r char­ acteristic ( \\ hich animals do not haYc), can strengthen or sustain a feeling

h� paying attention to certain local imprcssiolls. O n the other hand , either i n tentional

a/Jsimclioll, or abstraction caused by other d istract ing occupa­

tions, may weaken the feeling, and if the abstraction becomes habi t ua l , m a k e i t stay ;may com pletely." In this \Yay hypochondria, considered a s melancholia, becomes the ca use o f i magi n i ng physical disease: the patient is a\\·;u-e that it i s imaginar� , but e\cry no\\· and then he cannot refrai n from regard ing it as somet hing rea l . Or, com ersdy, from a real physical ailment (such as unease fi·om flat u lent f(lOd a fter ha, ing a meal), 1 �n l .J I

1F

I 1: \ I ental i l l nc�... l'� .tre 1 . \ \ e1kcning 2. ill pochondri;l) and mehmchoh .

\ la rgiual note i11 ( Na{'tns or

I )ist urhant..T ;tnd a m e a n hct\\ L'l'n ht•th

l .c., at 7 : 1 0 2 , be!-!inning of §-J..i .

Sec n . 1 11� a ho \ L' on ( ,'n/lcn/...·rt!l!l.. :llnt ;�nd (,'rille.

11 I

h;l\ e rcmotrh.cd i n ;lllothL·r \\ riting tlut a ' crt ing- ;Htcntion from ccrt;.tin painful sensations omd

L'\LTting- it on an� other ohjl'ct \ ol u nt a r i l � grasped in t hou�ht can \\ ani off the painfu l sensation� so completd) t hat t he\ arc unable to hrc;Jk out into i l lncss. ! Scc· !-:.an t 's discussion i n Part I l l of l lirds, and other­ w i se i n d i fferen t actions of others as aimed against them personally and as traps set for them, belong in this category. - I n their unhappy delusion they arc often so astute in i n terpreting that which others do nat urally as aimed against them that, i f only the data were true, we would ha\'C to pay due honor to their understanding.

-

I ha\'C nc\'Cr

seen an yonc who has been cured of this disease ( for to ra \'C with reason is a special predisposition ) . I lo\\C\'Cr, they arc not to he reckoned among the hospital b u ffoons; for, being concerned only w i th thcm­ sch·cs, they d irect their supposed craftiness only to their own prcscr­ \ation, w ithout putting others in danger, and therefore do not need to he locked up for reasons of safety. This second type of derangement is mel hodil'a I. 3) lnsania qs is a deranged po!l'l'l' of./ut�!!, lllC/1/ i n \\ hich the mind is held i n suspense hy means of analogies that a r c con fused w i t h concepts o f similar things, a n d thus the power of imagination , i n a play resembling understand i ng, con j ures up the con nection of d isparate things as

1 46

{

·usinuJ�!!.h·it.

�-rl

l l (tfmsiun.

� �x

l l alnnPil ::..

I O()

. lllthropolop,ical /)/tfaclic uni\ crsal, under \\ hich t h e representations of the uni\ crsal arc con­ tained. \ lcntal patien ts of this kind arc for the most part \ Cry cheerful; they write insipid poetr� and take pleasure in the rich ness o f " hat , in their opinion, is such an extcnsi\c alliance of concepts all agreeing with each other. - The l unatic of this sort is not curable because, like poetr� in general, he is creat i H' and entertaining hy means o f d i ' ersi ty . - This third kind o f d erang;ement is indeed methodical, but only ji-ap,IIU'/1/ar)'.

-t) I csa11ia is the sickness of a deranged rcaso11. - The mental patient tlics O\cr the entire guidance of ex perience and chases a fter principles that can he com p letely exempted fi·om its touchstone, imagi n i n g that he concci\ cs the inconcci , ahlc. -- The imcntion o f the squaring of

/ 2 1 11 1

the circle, of perpetual motion, the umci ling of the supcrsensihle forces of nature, a n d the comprehension o f the mystery of the Trinity arc in his po\\ cr. I l c is the calmest of all hospital patients and, because of his self-enclosed speculation, the fu rthest I-cmm ed from raYing; fi>r, "·i t h complete sel f-suffi ciency, he shuts his eyes to a l l the d i ffi­ culties of inquiry. - This fourth kind of derangement could he ca lled

S)'S/CJI/il//(. ' -t ' l For in this last kind o f mental derangement there is not merely d isorder and dc,·iation from the rule of the usc of reason, hut also positiu

111/rcasoll; that is, al/othcr rule, a totally d i fferent standpoin t into which the soul is transferred, so to speak, and from which it sees all objects

d i fferently. And from the Smsorio colllllllllli ' 5 0 that is req u i red for the u n i t y of fiji· (of the a n i m a l ), it finds i tself transferred to a t:1ra way place ' ( hence the \\ ord 'derangement ' ) ' ' - j ust as a mountainous landscape sketched from a hird 's-cyc ,-ic\\ prompts a completely d i fferent j udg­ men t ahout the region than when it is ,-icwcd from le' el gro u n d . It is true that the soul docs not feel or sec itself in another place ( for i t cannot pcrcci\ e i tself accord i n g to its position in span: \\·ithout com m i tting a con tradiction, since it would then i n tu i t i tself as an object of i ts outer sense, when it i tsel f can only he the object of i ts i n n er sense) ; howc\ cr, in this way we explai n , as hcst we can , the so-called derangeme n t . - lt is

J.+ ' l I csauia: 2... 1

�o

lf,c,wit��.

.

\ laJ�f.!.Jlltt! noll' m II: 'l 'ht'IT is a s� stem in lunac� . lmu('/ had t \\ o huf"f(mn..,

:\ot nl\ in� mad.

I list urhcd. mente irtune has smiled upon him, i t sho\\ s itself ful l y de\ eloped. The person \Y ho ta l/.:s aloud to hi msel f or is ca ught p:csticula ti11g to himse l f in h i s room f�d ls under the suspicion that something i s not right \Yi th his head. - The suspi cion gnms e\t:n more i f he helie,·es that he is blessed \\ ith inspirations or Yisited by higher beings in com-crsations and 12 ' " I deal i n gs . I lm\t:\Tr, i t does not apply i f he grants that other holy men are perhaps capable of these supersensihle in tuitions, does not imagine that he has been chosen f(n· them; indeed, does not e\t:n once con fess to \\ ishing to he chosen f(n· them, and therd(>re excludes himself. ' S S

The only u n i ' ersal characteristic of madness is the loss of conn11on scl/sc (sensus col/llllllllis) and i ts replacement with logical priratc scmc (smsns prinl lus); t(n· example, a human being in broad daylight sees a light burni n g on his table wh ich, howe\ er, another person standing nearby docs not sec, or hears a Yoice that no one else hears. For it is a suhjecti,·ely necessary touchstone of the correctness of our j udgments generally, and consequently a l so of the soundness of our understanding, that \\' C also

restrain our understanding by the undcrstandi11p. oj ' others, instead of

isolatin,f.!. oursch es with our 0\\ n understanding and j u dging puMicl)' with o u r priYatc represen tations, so to spea k . Thus the proh ibition o f books that a proper track. (,'nllliS, IHl\\ (.' \ t'l', i:-. origin�tlit,\ i n t he gt·ncration of products of the facult� or l'Ot!Tlit ion� ! IH.: facult� o f t h i nkin� .md acting in an c\cmplar� lllr reason, then h i s fi·icnd Bos\\ d l could not coax out from Johnson an� of those oracular utter­ ances, \\ h ich he sought so incessantly, that tc\ ealed the slightest \\ i t . Rather, e\Tr� t h i n g t h a t J oh nson uttered about skeptics in rel igion, or o f t h e right of go\ crn ment, or eYen about h u m a n freedom in general, fell out \Yith a blunt coarseness because of his nat ur;l( despotism \\hich the pampering of his flatterers rooted deeply in h i m . His a d m i rers liked to 1 223 1 call this

roup,lmess; ' but i t sho\\ed his great inability to unite '' it \\ith

profun dity in the same thought. - .\ lso, i t appears that men o f i n fl uence, '' ho refused to listen \\ hen Johnson's friends suggested that he '' ould be an exceptionally q u a l i fied member of parliament, appreciated his talent \Cr� \\ ell . For the \\it that suffices f(>r the composition of the di ctionary 1 r,s of a hm guage is not enough f(>r a\Yaken ing and enliYen i ng the ideas of reason that arc required f(>r insight into important afbirs.

- -

Modes/ )'

automaticallY enters in to t h e m i n d o f one '' ho sees himsel f called t o this otlice, together \\ith a mistrust in one's 0\\11 talents that leads one not to decide f(>r oneself hut rather to take others' judgments into account ( unnoticed, if necessary) . This was a q uali ty that Johnson ncYer possessed .

B On sap:acil )', or /he p,i(i of"intJllir)'

§s6 To discm:cr something (that lies hidden either in oursch es or else\\ here) in many cases often req ui res a special talent of kn1ming ho\\ to search

' "' Samud Johnson ( l jO 1 (>X7). Hut t his anenlott· .2 1 ) spells out an indw.:ti\ c method that stron�l .' inilucncl·d modern science.

Gunpo\\tkr \\