Anglo-American Relations: Contemporary Perspectives 0415678501, 9780415678506

Table of contents :
Anglo-American Relations Contemporary perspectives
Copyright
Contents
Notes on contributors
Introduction
1 Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? Contingency, identity, and the transformation of Anglo-American relations
2 ‘Affection is the cement which binds us’: Understanding the cultural sinews of the Anglo-American special relationship
3 Personal diplomacy: Relations between prime ministers and presidents
4 Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states
5 The Anglo-American economic relationship: Special or not?
6 Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship: climate change and post-Cold War US-UK environmental politics
7 The Anglo-American defence relationship
8 ‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo- American intelligence and security co-operation
9 The US-UK special relationship: The Nuclear Dimension
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE ADVANCES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND GLOBAL POLITICS

Anglo-American Relations Contemporary perspectives Edited by Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

Anglo-American Relations

This book provides an examination of contemporary Anglo-American relations. Sometimes controversially referred to as the Special Relationship, Anglo-American relations constitute arguably the most important bilateral relationship of modern times. However, in recent years, there have been frequent pronouncements that this relationship has lost its ‘specialness’. This volume brings together experts from Britain, Europe and North America in a long-overdue examination of contemporary Anglo-American relations that paints a somewhat different picture. The discussion ranges widely, from an analysis of the special relationship of culture and friendship, to an examination of both traditional (e.g. nuclear relations) and more recent (e.g. environment) policies. Contemporary developments are discussed in the context of longer-term trends and contributing authors draw upon a range of different disciplines, including political science, diplomacy studies, business studies and economics. Coupled with a substantive introduction and conclusion, the result is an insightful and engaging portrayal of the complex Anglo-American relationship. The book will be of great interest to students of US and UK foreign policy, diplomacy and international relations in general. Alan P. Dobson is Honorary Professor at the School of International Relations, St. Andrews University, and has written widely on post-World War II Anglo-American relations. Steve Marsh is Reader in International Politics at Cardiff University.

Routledge Advances in International Relations and Global Politics

1 Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis France, Britain and Europe Henrik Larsen 2 Agency, Structure and International Politics From ontology to empirical enquiry Gil Friedman and Harvey Starr 3 The Political Economy of Regional Co-operation in the Middle East Ali Carkoglu, Mine Eder, Kemal Kirisci 4 Peace Maintenance The evolution of international political authority Jarat Chopra 5 International Relations and Historical Sociology Breaking down boundaries Stephen Hobden 6 Equivalence in Comparative Politics Edited by Jan W. van Deth 7 The Politics of Central Banks Robert Elgie and Helen Thompson 8 Politics and Globalisation Knowledge, ethics and agency Martin Shaw 9 History and International Relations Thomas W. Smith

10 Idealism and Realism in International Relations Robert M. A. Crawford 11 National and International Conflicts, 1945–1995 New empirical and theoretical approaches. Frank Pfetsch and Christoph Rohloff 12 Party Systems and Voter Alignments Revisited Edited by Lauri Karvonen and Stein Kuhnle 13 Ethics, Justice & International Relations Constructing an international community Peter Sutch 14 Capturing Globalization Edited by James H Mittelman and Norani Othman 15 Uncertain Europe Building a new European security order? Edited by Martin A Smith and Graham Timmins 16 Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations Reading race, gender and class Edited by Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair 17 Constituting Human Rights Global civil society and the society of democratic states Mervyn Frost 18 US Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991 Of sanctions, embargoes and economic warfare Alan P. Dobson 19 The EU and NATO Enlargement Richard McAllister and Roland Dannreuther 20 Spatializing International Politics Analysing activism on the internet Jayne Rodgers 21 Ethnonationalism in the Contemporary World Walker Connor and the study of Nationalism Edited by Daniele Conversi

22 Meaning and International Relations Edited by Peter Mandaville and Andrew Williams 23 Political Loyalty and the Nation-State Edited by Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater 24 Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS Theories, Debates and Actions Nicole J. Jackson 25 Asia and Europe Development and different dimensions of ASEM Yeo Lay Hwee 26 Global Instability and Strategic Crisis Neville Brown 27 Africa in International Politics External Involvement on the Continent Edited by Ian Taylor and Paul Williams 28 Global Governmentality Governing International Spaces Edited by Wendy Larner and William Walters 29 Political Learning and Citizenship Education Under Conflict The Political Socialization of Israeli and Palestinian Youngsters Orit Ichilov 30 Gender and Civil Society Transcending Boundaries Edited by Jude Howell and Diane Mulligan 31 State Crises, Globalisation and National Movements in North-East Africa The Horn’s Dilemma Edited by Asafa Jalata 32 Diplomacy and Developing Nations Post-Cold war foreign policy-making structures and processes Edited by Justin Robertson and Maurice A. East

33 Autonomy, Self-governance and Conflict Resolution Innovative approaches to institutional design in divided societies Edited by Marc Weller and Stefan Wolff 34 Mediating International Crises Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen J. Young, David M. Quinn and Victor Asal 35 Postcolonial Politics, The Internet and Everyday Life: Pacific Traversals Online M. I. Franklin 36 Reconstituting the Global Liberal Order Legitimacy and regulation Kanishka Jayasuriya 37 International Relations, Security and Jeremy Bentham Gunhild Hoogensen 38 Interregionalism and International Relations Edited by Heiner Hänggi, Ralf Roloff and Jürgen Rüland 39 The International Criminal Court A global civil society achievement Marlies Glasius 40 A Human Security Doctrine for Europe Project, principles, practicalities Edited by Marlies Glasius and Mary Kaldor 41 The History and Politics of UN Security Council Reform Dimitris Bourantonis 42 Russia and NATO Since 1991 From cold war through cold peace to partnership? Martin A. Smith 43 The Politics of Protection Sites of Insecurity and political agency Edited by Jef Huysmans, Andrew Dobson and Raia Prokhovnik 44 International Relations in Europe Traditions, perspectives and destinations Edited by Knud Erik Jørgensen and Tonny Brems Knudsen

45 The Empire of Security and the Safety of the People Edited by William Bain 46 Globalization and Religious Nationalism in India The Search for Ontological Security Catrina Kinnvall 47 Culture and International Relations Narratives, Natives and Tourists Julie Reeves 48 Global Civil Society Contested Futures Edited by Gideon Baker and David Chandler 49 Rethinking Ethical Foreign Policy Pitfalls, possibilities and paradoxes Edited by David Chandler and Volker Heins 50 International Cooperation and Arctic Governance Regime Effectiveness and Northern Region Building Edited by Olav Schram Stokke and Geir Hønneland 51 Human Security Concepts and Implications Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy 52 International Relations and Security in the Digital Age Edited by Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello 53 State-Building Theory and Practice Edited by Aidan Hehir and Neil Robinson 54 Violence and Non-Violence in Africa Edited by Pal Ahluwalia, Louise Bethlehem and Ruth Ginio 55 Developing Countries and Global Trade Negotiations Edited by Larry Crump and S. Javed Maswood 56 Civil Society, Religion and Global Governance Paradigms of power and persuasion Edited by Helen James

57 War, Peace and Hegemony in a Globalized World The Changing Balance of Power in the 21st Century Edited by Chandra Chari 58 Economic Globalisation as Religious War Tragic Convergence Michael McKinley 59 Globalization, Prostitution and Sex-trafficking Corporeal Politics Elina Penttinen 60 Peacebuilding Women in International Perspective Elisabeth Porter 61 Ethics, Liberalism and Realism in International Relations Mark D. Gismondi 62 Law and Legalization in Transnational Relations Edited by Christian Brütsch and Dirk Lehmkuhl 63 Fighting Terrorism and Drugs Europe and International Police Cooperation Jörg Friedrichs 64 Identity Politics in the Age of Genocide The Holocaust and Historical Representation David B. MacDonald 65 Globalisation, Public Opinion and the State Western Europe and East and Southeast Asia Edited by Takashi Inoguchi and Ian Marsh 66 Urbicide The Politics of Urban Destruction Martin Coward 67 Transnational Activism in the UN and the EU A Comparative Study Jutta Joachim and Birgit Locher

68 Gender Inclusive Essays on Violence, Men and Feminist International Relations Adam Jones 69 Capitalism, Democracy and the Prevention of War and Poverty Edited by Peter Graeff and Guido Mehlkop 70 Environmental Change and Foreign Policy Theory and Practice Edited by Paul G. Harris 71 Climate Change and Foreign Policy Case Studies from East to West Edited by Paul G. Harris 72 Securitizations of Citizenship Edited by Peter Nyers 73 The Power of Ideology From the Roman Empire to Al-Qaeda Alex Roberto Hybel 74 The Securitization of Humanitarian Migration Digging Moats and Sinking Boats Scott D. Watson 75 Mediation in the Asia-Pacific Region Transforming Conflicts and Building Peace Edited by Dale Bagshaw and Elisabeth Porter 76 United Nations Reform Heading North or South? Spencer Zifcak 77 New Norms and Knowledge in World Politics Protecting People, Intellectual Property and the Environment Preslava Stoeva 78 Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World Social Movements, Networks and Hierarchies Athina Karatzogianni and Andrew Robinson

79 World-Regional Social Policy and Global Governance New Research and Policy Agendas in Africa, Asia, Europe and Latin America Edited by Bob Deacon, Maria Cristina Macovei, Luk Van Langenhove and Nicola Yeates 80 International Relations Theory and Philosophy Interpretive Dialogues Edited by Cerwyn Moore and Chris Farrands 81 Superpower Rivalry and Conflict The Long Shadow of the Cold War on the Twenty-first Century Edited by Chandra Chari 82. Coping and Conformity in World Politics Hugh C. Dyer 83. Defining and Defying Organized Crime Discourse, perception and reality Edited by Felia Allum, Francesca Longo, Daniela Irrera and Panos A. Kostakos 84. Federalism in Asia India, Pakistan and Malaysia Harihar Bhattacharyya 85. The World Bank and HIV/AIDS Setting a Global Agenda Sophie Harman 86. The “War on Terror” and the Growth of Executive Power? A Comparative Analysis Edited by John E. Owens and Riccardo Pelizzo 87. The Contested Politics of Mobility Borderzones and Irregularity Edited by Vicki Squires 88. Human Security, Law and the prevention of Terrorism Andrej Zwitter 89. Multilayered Migration Governance The Promise of Partnership Edited by Rahel Kunz, Sandra Lavenex and Marion Panizzon

90. Role Theory in International Relations Approaches and analyses Edited by Sebastian Harnisch, Cornelia Frank & Hanns W. Maull 91. Issue Salience in International Relations Edited by Kai Oppermann and Henrike Viehrig 92. Corporate Risk and National Security Redefined Karen Lund Petersen 93. Interrogating Democracy in World Politics Edited by Joe Hoover, Meera Sabaratnam and Laust Schouenborg 94. Globalizing Resistance against War Theories of Resistance and the New Anti-War Movement Tiina Seppälä 95. The Politics of Self-Determination Beyond the Decolonisation Process Kristina Roepstorff 96. Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect The power of norms and the norms of the powerful Theresa Reinold 97. Anglo-American Relations Contemporary Perspectives Edited by Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh 98. The Emerging Politics of Antarctica Edited by Anne-Marie Brady 99. Genocide, Ethnonationalism, and the United Nations Exploring the Causes of Mass Killing Since 1945 Hannibal Travis 100. Caribbean Sovereignty, Development and Democracy in an Age of Globalization Edited by Linden Lewis

Anglo-American Relations Contemporary perspectives

Edited by Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

First published 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2013 selection and editorial material, Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh; individual chapters, the contributors The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Anglo-American relations : contemporary perspectives / edited by Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh. p. cm. -- (Routledge advances in international relations and global politics ; 97) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. United States--Foreign relations--Great Britain. 2. Great Britain-Foreign relations--United States. 3. United States--Relations--Great Britain 4. Great Britain--Relations--United States. I. Dobson, Alan P. II. Marsh, Steve, 1967E183.8.G7A674 2012 327.73041--dc23 2012021679 ISBN: 978-0-415-67850-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-203-08008-5 (ebk) Typeset in Baskerville by Saxon Graphics Ltd, Derby

Contents

Notes on contributors Introduction

xv 1

S TE VE M A RS H AN D ALAN P. DOB S ON

1

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? Contingency, identity, and the transformation of Anglo-American relations

26

DAV I D G . H A GLUN D

2

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’: Understanding the cultural sinews of the Anglo-American special relationship

52

RO B E R T M . H EN DERS HOT

3

Personal diplomacy: Relations between prime ministers and presidents

82

J O H N D U M B RELL

4

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states

105

AL I S O N R . H O LMES

5

The Anglo-American economic relationship: Special or not?

129

J O E M CK I N N E Y AN D ALAN P. DOB S ON

6

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship: climate change and post-Cold War US-UK environmental politics

154

TO N Y J A CK S O N

7

The Anglo-American defence relationship S TE VE M A RS H

179

xiv

8

Contents

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary AngloAmerican intelligence and security co-operation

208

A DAM D. M . S V EN DS EN

9

The US-UK special relationship: The Nuclear Dimension

241

J O H N S I M P S ON

Conclusion

263

S T E VE M A RS H AN D ALAN P DOB S ON

Bibliography Index

274 295

Notes on contributors

Alan P. Dobson is an Honorary Professor in the School of International Relations, St. Andrews University and was Professor of Politics at Dundee University, 1999-2011. He is editor of the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and Chair of the Transatlantic Studies Association. He has published extensively on Anglo-American relations and the politics and diplomacy of the international airline system. Recent publications include FDR and Civil Aviation (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) and Globalization and Regional Integration: the Origins, Development and Impact of the Single European Aviation Market (London and New York: Routledge, 2007). In the autumn of 2012 he was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Baylor University, Texas. John Dumbrell is Professor of Government at Durham University. A graduate of Cambridge and Keele Universities, he previously worked at Manchester Metropolitan, Keele and Leicester Universities. He is the author of two books on US-UK relations: A Special Relationship: AngloAmerican Relations in the Cold War and After (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001) and A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006). His other recent books are President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Communism (Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2004: winner of the US Embassy Richard E. Neustadt prize for 2005), Clinton’s Foreign Policy: Between the Bushes: 1992–2000 (London and New York: Routledge, 2009) and Rethinking the Vietnam War (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). David G. Haglund is a Professor of Political Studies at Queen’s University (Kingston, Ontario, Canada). His research focuses on transatlantic security, and on Canadian and American international security policy. He co-edits the International Journal. Among his books are Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936-1940 (Albuquerque, NM, US: University of New Mexico Press, 1984), and Over Here and Over There: Canada-US Defence Cooperation in an Era of Interoperability (Kingston, Canada: Queen’s University, 2001). His current research project is on ethnic

xvi

Notes on contributors

diasporas in North America and their impact upon security relations between the United States and Canada. Robert M. Hendershot is an Associate Professor of History at the Grand Rapids Community College in Michigan, USA. His primary fields of expertise are American and British foreign policy, Cold War culture, and the role of public opinion in international relations. He is also the author of Family Spats: Perception, Illusion, and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship (Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008), which explains how public opinion trends and cultural notions of fraternity contributed to the alliance’s durability from the end of the Second World War through the American Bicentennial. Alison R. Holmes is the Program Leader of the International Studies Program at Humboldt State University in northern California and remains a History Fellow of the Churchill Memorial Trust. She spent 20 years in the UK, including running two general election campaigns for the Liberal Democrats, devising communications strategy at the BBC, managing the largest BritishAmerican business organisation and as speechwriter to the US Ambassador. She was awarded her PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics in 2005 and returned to the US in 2008 as the Pierre Keller Fellow of Transatlantic Studies at Yale University. Her current projects cover UK-US relations, diplomacy and international relations. Tony Jackson is an Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Dundee. An economist, he worked in agricultural development in Africa before holding academic posts in the Universities of St. Andrews and Dundee, the latter in Town and Regional Planning. He undertakes collaborative research with researchers in Canada, Australia and New Zealand as well as with a wide range of colleagues in the United Kingdom, focusing on environmental assessment, project appraisal and sustainable development, and addressing issues such as climate change and urban sprawl. Joseph A. McKinney is Ben H. Williams Professor of International Economics at Baylor University in Texas. Prior to joining Baylor University he served on the faculty of the University of Virginia. He has taught in Japan and France, and has been Fulbright Senior Scholar in the United Kingdom and in Canada. He has provided expert testimony on trade policy issues before such agencies as the United States International Trade Commission and the United States Trade Deficit Review Commission, and before state and national legislative committees. He has published articles and books on a variety of international trade policy issues. Steve Marsh is Reader in International Politics at Cardiff University. Research interests lie primarily in post-World War Two Anglo-American

Notes on contributors

xvii

relations, American foreign policy and European Union external relations. Principal publications include Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and the co-authored books US Foreign Policy Since 1945 (London: Routledge, 2006), The International Relations of the European Union (London: Longman, 2004) and The European Union in European Security (London: Routledge, 2011). John Simpson is an international expert on the evolution of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and other international mechanisms to prevent nuclear proliferation. He became Professor of International Relations at the University of Southampton in 1990, and has held a range of positions outside the university. These include representing the UK on the UN Secretary-General’s Study Group on Conventional Disarmament 1982-4; membership of the UK delegation to the UNESCO General Conference 1985; membership of the UN Secretary-General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters 1992-8; co-founder and Programme Director of the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) 1987-2002; advisor to the UK delegation to NPT Preparatory Committee Sessions and Review Conferences 1999-present. Professor Simpson was awarded the OBE in 1999 for services to nuclear non-proliferation. Adam D. M. Svendsen, PhD (Warwick, UK), is an intelligence and defence strategist, educator and researcher, based in the Centre for Military Studies (CMS), Department of Political Science (IFS), University of Copenhagen (KU), Denmark. He has been a Visiting Scholar at CPASS, Georgetown University, and has worked at Chatham House and IISS, London. He has also trained at various European defence colleges, and has multi-sector award-winning media and communication experience, including authoring several publications, such as the books: Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror (London: Routledge, 2010); Understanding the Globalization of Intelligence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) and The Professionalization of Intelligence Cooperation (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

“Focused on a traditional topic, this volume offers anything but the standard approach and treatment of the so-called Special Relationship. The authors combine the newest methods, especially on culture, with the newest topics, including the environment, intelligence, and personal and emotional ties. Transnational history at its best!” Thomas W. Zeiler, University of Colorado Boulder “Studies of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, and reports of its demise, are ubiquitous. Then every now and then a group of scholars penetrate the mist with a clear description of the diplomatic, political, cultural, and economic bond—the British and American bond—that underlies so much of modern international affairs. Dobson and Marsh have assembled one such penetrating study, useful to scholars and international observers alike, and for anyone desiring to better appreciate the most special of international relationships as it moves through the 21st Century.” Jeffrey A. Engel, Director, Center for Presidential History, Southern Methodist University “This remarkably comprehensive work by a distinguished international panel is a most welcome volume on the so-called “Special Relationship” that fills a historiographical gap of over two decades. It will prove immeasurably useful to both students and specialists of Anglo-American relations.” Serge Ricard, University of Paris III-Sorbonne Nouvelle “Based on multidisciplinary research and skillfully introduced by its two editors, this book highlights the cultural, psychological, sentimental and security dimensions of the Anglo-American special relationship, and examines the intricate bond that has held these nations together for the last two decades. Any scholar, journalist or student interested in recent transatlantic relations should not miss this significant publication.” Klaus Schwabe, Technical University

Introduction Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

Always scribble, scribble, scribble! Eh! Mr. Gibbon? William Henry, Duke of Gloucester 1743-18051

Why more on the special relationship? A considerable literature has accumulated on Anglo-American relations over the last seventy years and none of the ‘scribblers’ in this volume would claim to be a Gibbon, so what justifies this work and what does it achieve? The immediate trigger for the enterprise is twofold. First, with several notable exceptions,2 there is a surprising lack of book-length treatments of Anglo-American relations that focus on the post-Cold War period and it seems most fitting to remedy that, particularly in the immediate aftermath of the seventieth anniversary of the Destroyers for Bases Deal of September 1940, which symbolises the onset of the modern Special Relationship. Second, Anglo-American relations have been drawn by events more squarely into the public eye during the twenty-first century than at arguably any other time since the Suez Crisis. Political and emotional fallout from the controversial post-9/11 Bush-Blair tandem and military intervention in Iraq has spawned an intense period of British soul-searching about the relationship with their American cousins. An ICM poll for The Guardian in 2006 revealed 63 per cent of respondents felt Blair had steered Britain too close to the USA;3 that same year a poll by Populus for The Times indicated that 65 per cent believed Britain’s future lay more with Europe than America. Four years later there remained a palpable sense of British annoyance and grief at Britain’s apparent lack of influence in Washington. A YouGov poll in May 2010 revealed that 85 per cent of respondents thought the UK had little or no influence on American policies and that 62 per cent believed America failed to consider British interests. Anticipation of an ‘Obama bounce’ also appeared misplaced with 74 per cent of respondents believing that since the Obama administration assumed office Britain’s relationship with the USA had stayed the same or had deteriorated.4

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Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

In March 2010 the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee gave official voice to similar sentiments and sparked a British media frenzy when it argued in its report ‘Global Security: UK-US Relations’ that ‘the use of the phrase “special relationship” in its historical sense, to describe the totality of the ever-evolving UK-US relationship, is potentially misleading, and we recommend that its use should be avoided’.5 Michael Smith in the Sunday Times headlined with: ‘It’s over: MPs say the special relationship with US is dead’ and the News of the World vented colourfully: ‘UK & US love KO: Special relationship is over so it’s time to stop sucking up to the US, say MPs’.6 Somewhat unusually this bout of British soul-searching about the Special Relationship was picked up by American media and eventually entered the political realm via think-tanks and government reactions. For instance Nile Gardiner, Director of The Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, urged British Prime Minister-to-be Cameron to embrace the Special Relationship and to reject the report, which was in his view simplistic, misleading and ‘frankly look[ed] as though it could have been churned out by the propaganda office of the European Commission.’7 Wikileaks revealed later in 2010 the caution from Richard LeBaron, the US deputy chief of mission in London, that ‘This period of excessive UK speculation about the relationship is more paranoid than usual .... This over-reading would often be humorous, if it were not so corrosive’.8 A flustered spokeswoman from the Foreign Office responded in March 2010 to what she termed ‘the British media’s “preoccupation” with the state of the relationship’ with the assertion that ‘It doesn’t really matter whether someone calls it “the special relationship” or not .…What matters is that the UK’s relationship with the US is unique, and uniquely important to protecting our national security and promoting our national interest.’9 She missed the point in so many ways: the nomenclature matters very much.10 At the political level Britain’s ‘special’ standing with America has been the keystone of British foreign policy since the Second World War, a core feature of national identity and something of a marker of self-worth. At the broader cultural level the notion of an Anglo-American Special Relationship reflects genuine popular association between the two countries. A Leflein Associates poll in January 2010 revealed that 57 per cent of Americans ranked the US relationship with Britain as the world’s most important bilateral partnership; just 2 per cent disagreed.11 The same YouGov poll that in May 2010 reported such disillusion with British influence over American policy also found that 66 per cent of those surveyed held a favourable view of the USA and that 62 per cent agreed with the assertion that it is Britain’s most important ally. Indeed, the enduring power of the Special Relationship as a culturally embedded phenomenon in the UK especially is reflected in the short-lived nature of attempts by Cameron and Obama in May 2011 to rebrand Anglo-American ties as an ‘essential relationship’.12 The Foreign Office spokeswoman also stumbled against the fact that the notion of an Anglo-American Special Relationship has a rich academic and

Introduction 3 intellectual history, which both further inspires and deeply concerns this book. In some respects Anglo-American relations simply beget debate. For instance, the Special Relationship has so often been ‘consigned to history only to reappear against all prediction that it has seemingly acquired something of a Lazarus quality.’13 Yet even that would still need some explanation of how the Anglo-American saga started in the first place in the War of Independence. If I were an American, as I am an Englishman, while a foreign troop was landed in my country, I never would lay down my arms – never – never – never! 14 This was not some radical nobody fulminating over the rebellion in America; it was William Pitt the elder, Earl of Chatham speaking in the House of Lords in London on 18 November 1777. Notable conservatives such as Chatham and Edmund Burke supported the cause of the colonists, just as radicals did like Tom Paine. Partly as a result of that, debate continues over whether or not it was a conservative war of independence seeking to reaffirm the traditional rights of Englishmen, or a more radically informed revolution based upon the universal rights of man.15 It was in fact something of both, but from the very outset relations between Britain and America have been shrouded in ambiguity, complicated both by observers with different agendas and the application of widely differing interpretations. Difficulties enough one might think, but once the notion of the Special Relationship was mooted in the 1940s things became even more complicated. Something that at first seemed to simplify and capture a quality of the relationship, later prompted endless debate. If special, how did their relations differ from those with other nation states? What in fact was special, for whom and when did it emerge? And even if certain aspects of their relations could be so deemed, does this really warrant the accolade ‘special’ for the relationship in general? In the literature that has both propagated these questions and evolved to try to answer them, something of a Manichean division has opened between what might be called the schools of sentiment and interests. The former see shared values, culture, democratic principles, and kinship, all leading on to habits of co-operation and shared attitudes about how to deal with international issues, as the source and the being of what they conceive of as a special and often ‘natural’ relationship. The latter see shared and overlapping national interests forming a utilitarian or functional relationship that will only continue as special so long as the common interests abide and each side can be of importance to the other. One can see reflections here of the age-old tension in the contending approaches of idealism and realism in international relations theory. Attempting to bridge this explanatory divide are those who share much of the latter view, but invoke aspects of the former albeit often in vague and impressionistic ways,

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Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

or with a sense of frustration at trying to quantify or otherwise assess its actual contribution.16 Nested within these approaches some scholars foreground in importance more specific matters such as contributions to the international balance of power,17 defence, nuclear and intelligence co-operation,18 entwined economies,19 or causal factors from the changing nature of the international system and how that might help determine the characteristics of what can be special in nation state relationships.20 Whatever approach is taken controversy and confusion prosper. Edward Ingram denied the Special Relationship ever existed, Max Beloff and John Dickie, respectively wrote of it as a myth in the 1960s, and as ‘being no more’ in the 1990s, while H.C. Allen professed its strong reality and David Reynolds its resilient, if changing, continuity in the 1990s. At the start of the twenty-first century Robert Kagan wrote of Europeans, including the British, as being so different from Americans in their reluctance, even moral inability, to wield hard power that relations were fraught and it was as if they were from different planets; only subsequently to be confronted with Prime Minister Tony Blair standing shoulder to shoulder with President George W. Bush and committing substantial numbers of British troops to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan.21 One could argue that the events involved in two superpowers succeeding each other peacefully beginning at the end of the nineteenth century and continuing through uniquely extensive co-operation together during the Second World War, and arguably in the Cold War and its near-quartercentury aftermath, were always going to be complicated to explain and would attract a great deal of scholarly attention.22 But it is not just navel gazing academia that continues to be inextricably engaged in examining the quality of the relationship: it has also been of importance in the world of practice to policy-makers, politicians and the military. Just a few weeks after the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee concluded that the term Special Relationship should be abandoned, the US House of Representatives, not normally so enamoured of the term as its British counterpart, passed a resolution reaffirming that relations were indeed special. Ex-Prime Minister James Callaghan in 1987 felt that: ‘The Second World War was the apogee of the Special Relationship. British and American civil servants and military commanders and politicians used generally to work out policy ... there were joint solutions to joint problems.’23 Few politicians or scholars would argue with that time-specific description, but about what came next they would, largely on the basis of Britain’s declining power and claims about its bourgeoning irrelevance to the USA. Even so, similar sentiments to Callaghan’s about the importance of the Special Relationship have been echoed by successive prime ministers and presidents with varying degrees of intensity down to the very present. Notwithstanding assertions of use and disuse by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee it is not easy to strike the concept of the Special Relationship off the Anglo-American agenda. Not even Cameron and Obama have stood by their re-representation

Introduction 5 in May 2011 of Anglo-American ties as the ‘essential relationship’: after a brief meeting with Cameron at UN headquarters in New York in September 2011, Obama spoke once more of the ‘extraordinarily special relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom.’24 Trying to re-cast terminology to bring it more in line with what some saw as the changing realities of Anglo-American relations has been going on for a long time. For many, the Special Relationship has been little more than sentimental rhetoric for half a century used by a middle-range power trying to have an edge with the world’s leading superpower. Prime Minister Harold Macmillan provided the grist for much of this mill with his idea of the British playing the Greeks to the American Romans – an allegory that seems to have been subsequently grossly over-worked. In May 1966 a composite report from members of the US Embassy in London largely agreed with the statement that the Anglo-American alignment had been ‘the most important single fact of international life in the post-war world’, but just twelve months later, US Ambassador to the Court of Saint James’s, David Bruce, commenting on Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community and looking to the future wrote: The so-called Anglo-American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology, although the underground waters of it will flow with a deep current.25 Some, including one of the co-editors, have seen the 1960s as a turning point in Anglo-American relations, but that does not entail the demise of the Special Relationship. Credibility is sorely tested by the idea that underground waters alone, albeit flowing with a strong current, have been enough to keep the sentimental terminology talking for nearly fifty years without anything more of substance going on.26 Little wonder then that there has been such a profusion of writing about Anglo-American relations, or that another collection is warranted. The contributions to this volume stand as scholarship in their own right and their focus is contemporary. However, all build on what has gone before in terms of both substance and method and it is to these that attention next turns.

A few thoughts on method Several forms of discourse have been deployed by those who write on the Special Relationship, and that has contributed to the differing and contentious claims that complicate this body of work. There are clearly different attitudes possible towards the past. There is a world of difference between an explanation that discloses an intimate and extensive relationship, which leads ineluctably on to describing it as special, and someone writing of the same subject matter but with a practical agenda

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either for recommending its nurture as a good thing or damning it as a bad thing. Michael Oakeshott in trying to elucidate these matters spoke of the practical, the scientific and the contemplative attitudes towards the past.27 Here the concern is only with the practical and the scientific, or what one might prefer to call the academic. Conflation of the practical and the academic often confuses what is with what should be, or with what is desirable or undesirable. As philosophers would tell us: this is the confusion of the categories of is and ought, fact and value. Some of the key opinion makers and figures involved in Anglo-American relations at the close of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries for example held beliefs, reflected in the literature of the subject, that it was the destiny of Britain and the USA to lead the world because of some specious notion of Anglo-Saxon superiority, or less offensively because the alliance of their democracies was simply a force for good and mutually beneficial. Of similar ilk in form, if not substance, are works preoccupied with the moving present that are either highly critical or strongly supportive of the Anglo-American relationship and want it abandoned, changed or nurtured accordingly.28 The primary concern of this kind of literature is practical and not explanatory. The truth sought in explanation gives way too often to the requirements of partisan persuasion, political agenda and moralising, which interpret and select evidence according to predetermined patterns set by specific ethical or political dispositions. This has few, if any, pretensions to objectivity and is not scholarship. Other works approach the relationship through the discipline of international relations, which searches for generalisations or to construct analytical models through various forms of theory. This has been described by Hollis and Smith as the ‘outside’ way of accounting for behaviour, modelled on methods of natural science. In the strongest version of this approach, behaviour is generated by a system of forces or a structure, external not only to the minds of each actor but also external even to the minds of all actors. In that case it is a basic mistake to reduce US-Soviet [read Anglo-American] relations to the personalities of individuals.29 Such strong theoretical versions are few and far between, the best known is probably the work of Kenneth Waltz.30 More commonly international relations approaches are less procrustean, though no less complex and scholarly engagements for that, which shed important light on and explain various facets of state relationships. However, they also often, but not always, have a clear practical aspect or attitude to the past, which again can cause difficulties: explanation and even the most moral, sensible and non-partisan of prescriptions (for example from those who seek to improve the practice of diplomacy or contain the danger of war) do not always sit easily together. But it is this non-partisan aspect of the practical that sets international

Introduction 7 relations apart from other types of practical commentary and establishes its provenance as a form of explanation with accuracy and truth in its central focus. Different again are historical studies of the relationship, concerned with detailed evidence for reconstructing an explanatory narrative of the past derived from what might be suitably called inside understanding – the reasoning about the world – of the historical actors. In the language of Hollis and Smith again, this is the ‘inside’ way of dealing with behaviour, though it provides, according to their view, only meaning and not explanation.31 Historians, including the two editors, would disagree with that, but readily acknowledge that inside reasoning sometimes produces images such as Macmillan’s Greeks and Romans analogy, or the concept of the Special Relationship itself, which can confuse or distort explanation. In some instances general claims about the nature or quality of the Special Relationship have been crafted not necessarily with the aim of moralising or promoting political change, but with an intention to provide a form of short-hand explanation drawn from the detail. Nevertheless, such generalisations can develop lives of their own and be applied beyond their appropriate scope or historical sell-by date, distorting the accuracy of the narrative. Alternatively they can be hijacked for practical purposes of change and policy development. In short, these descriptive short-hand concepts can be used to drive the explanatory form rather than being the sum of its parts. One could argue that this is the case, though not carried excessively far, in the way Alex Danchev has woven the Greeks and Romans analogy into his wider concerns with the generation of myth, which he deems of such importance in any concept of a special relationship.32 Whether or not Macmillan took his own words seriously or whether it was just another example of his skill at the bon mot is debatable. Intuitively the idea of Greeks and Romans just does not seem to have much legitimate traction, but if one feels the need to work with such tools then Christopher Hitchens, in what is admittedly largely a pastiche of anecdotes and impressions (or as one astute reviewer put it his book looked like it had ‘an author in need of a theme’), nevertheless convincingly argues that Britain was more like Rome than Greece and an old Rome at that to America’s new Rome.33 More significantly, the idea of Britain providing a kind of tutelage for America’s emergence as a great power has muddied the historical record. For example the well-established view that the American intelligence service was born anew and greatly expanded in accordance with British ideas and established practice in the Second World War has been much exaggerated.34 The Greeks and Romans idea was certainly over-applied here. Maybe analogies of this kind are best left to imaginative literature because in using them to try to explain the past they can easily morph into colligations which inappropriately structure material and distort explanation – as in the case of Anglo-American wartime intelligence collaboration.35 This danger is also immanent in the use of the term Special Relationship.

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So, the study of the Special Relationship is complicated by a number of significant issue clusters. First, there is the major problem of approach – sentiment versus interests – and what relative weighting one might give to each in the composition of the relationship and what else might count, for example systemic determinants in the international system or in state bureaucratic continuities. Second, there are the ever recurring questions about whether it actually ever existed and, if it did, is it now in decline or is it already deceased. And third, there is the problem of the application of different attitudes towards the past resulting in different kinds of what claim to be explanations. At the heart of this explanatory matter there appear to be two central problems. First, there is a need to try to disentangle those works that have partisan and practical concerns and which tend to develop over-simplistic generalisations from those, primarily international relations scholars, with non-partisan practical concerns. Second, there needs to be caution about analogies, images and over-worked generalisations that lead to distortions in the more clearly historical mode of explanation. In their several and distinct ways each contribution to this collection casts penetrating light on one or more of these three central issue clusters and from them emerges a clearer and more detailed understanding of the Anglo-American Special Relationship.

A few thoughts on substance The overview of scholarship that follows is of necessity rough and ready as well as selective because the full corpus of work is so huge. Even that which is considered has to be grouped into categories, some of which do not do full justice to the singularity of specific books or articles.36 Understandably, given the on-going and contested importance of AngloAmerican relations in the differing worlds of practice there has been much partisan and journalistic commentary, often seizing on the sensational or the controversial and running with over-exaggerated generalising claims with clear and specific agendas. Christopher Hitchens for example asserts that the ‘… American rediscovery of the intoxication of a “natural” aristocracy, of an “expansionist” credo, of an affection for the marks and baubles of caste’ was all conveyed ‘from England as directly as the chests of tea that had once ended up in Boston Harbor.’37 For him, the Americans were cleverly seduced into being imperialists by the British who apparently at the same time suffered humiliation after humiliation at the hands of their pupils.38 Grayling and Langoon offer a similar story of British subservience during Cold War strategic embargo arrangements, but curiously, if conveniently for their thesis, they fail to mention successful British-led attempts in 1954 and 1958 to reduce the multilateral embargo lists and the British unilateral abandonment of the China Differential (additional items not embargoed to the Soviet Bloc) in 1957; all of which was opposed strongly by the USA and prompted much anger in Washington.39

Introduction 9 Work by Curtis goes even further to an extreme position of power asymmetry: conceiving of Britain as ‘largely a client state’.40 This tendency to over-state on the basis of highly selective and over-worked evidence is well illustrated by John Dickie. He is convinced there was a Special Relationship and he writes fulsomely but inaccurately about it, as well as rushing to judgement of its demise. It [President Clinton’s inaugural in 1993] was a transatlantic turning point, signalling fundamental change for America’s partners – none more so than for the British. In the course of five decades they had nurtured a partnership of unparalleled trust with the Americans. It was no accident that it was described by successive generations of political leaders as the Special Relationship, for it was a unique bond. Unlike any other, it was based on kinship, not on contract. Nothing was written down: no agreement was ever signed.41 Dickie is correct to claim that there was something special about the informality of important facets of Anglo-American relations and the intelligence relationship in particular, which he singles out as possibly the  most important link, but to suggest there was nothing written down invites ridicule. To provide just two important examples, in 1947 the UKUSA Security [intelligence collecting and sharing] Agreement was signed and in 1958 things were written down concerning the most sensitive of all matters, nuclear co-operation, in an agreement which has been periodically and successively renewed ever since, most recently in 2004 for ten years: the Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement. Just as Dickie succumbed to the temptation for over-egging a pudding of his own making regarding the character of the Special Relationship, so he cannot resist the temptation for over-statement about its demise. With the end of the Cold War and Clinton’s supposed reorientation of US foreign policy ‘the international agenda was so changed as to make it special no more.’42 Hitchens, Langoon and Grayson, Curtis and Dickie and others in varying degrees provide controversial claims and themes that have their place in certain types of discourse, but they should not be confused with the scholarship of explanation. Their work is too spiced with partisan themes, often polemically delivered, that drive but distort the narrative, which is overlaid with practical concerns for moral judgement and ambitions to change things: all this undermines the objective dispassion required for explanation.43 Impartiality at times can slip away from any scholar, but that is different from an enterprise that embraces partisanship. More serious scholarship is provided by Duncan Campbell in an interesting narrative that foregrounds the informality of the AngloAmerican defence relationship, but even here there is a lapse, a succumbing to moralism when he protests at America’s ‘right to start a war from UK territory [from their nuclear bases there] without guaranteeing even as

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much as a by your leave’ and concludes his work: ‘Since the Second World War, British politicians and civil servants have nurtured the Anglo-American special relationship in an endeavour to prove the old country’s strength. Failing, they have proved their weakness.’44 Campbell illustrates the difficulty of trying to draw clear distinctions between types of approach. Similar lapses are made by most scholars. The works of Jérôme Elie and Coral Bell also have purchase in the world of practice, but with somewhat clearer objectivity. Elie writes interestingly about the soft power relationship between Britain and the USA,45 and more will be said about this when looking at the literature of relationship decline. Similarly impartial is Bell’s Debatable Alliance, published in 1964, which traces the Anglo-American post-war relationship in terms of the balance of power, but with a recognition that other aspects may count. This essay has confined itself to considering the Anglo-American relationship as an element in the central power-balance, because the author would maintain that the failure to see it in this context is what leads to it either being sentimentalized or (and this comes to much the same thing) being written down as of no account. But to point out its relevance in the world of power politics is not to deny that this examinable diplomatic superstructure has its foundation in a less readily mapped historical and intellectual bedrock. No attempt at definition has been intended, only a contribution to argument.46 Bell is anchored in the tradition of international relations studies, but recognises the importance of the ‘historical and intellectual bedrock’ which lies in the domain of sentiment, and generally speaking of the historian, which will be examined in more depth shortly. Max Beloff is probably the scholar best known for claims about the myth of the Special Relationship, but he is also central to the argument about the nature of the succession of the USA to superpower status and whether or not it has taken Britain’s place. Beloff’s argument was partly prompted by concern that having championed anti-colonialism and seen it implemented the USA failed to fill the power vacuum left behind. According to Beloff, there was no Pax Americana to replace the Pax Britannica.47 Others have similar interests to Beloff in their concerns with succession and for the damage done to British interests by America’s rise to power and its policies, for example Watt, Ovendale, and McNeil, but much of this succession debate has little resonance with the current concerns of this collection of essays except in so far as it questions the nature of the Special Relationship by foregrounding Britain’s decline in power and the consequences for its relationship with America.48 There is understandable consensus that Britain’s power and influence have declined over the years and that the Special Relationship now is nowhere near as important as it was in the Second World War and for much of the Cold War, but then disagreement

Introduction 11 breaks out not just between those who claim it is no more and those who believe that it continues, but also between different factions of the continuity camp. One of the more interesting and recent takes on all this, by someone who credits the Special Relationship with more continuing, if changed, substance than most functionalists, is Jérôme Elie’s. He forthrightly argues that longevity in the relationship may in fact be a direct function of its asymmetry and that Britain’s use of the term Special Relationship, its elevation to mythlike status and London’s facility to continuously re-conceptualise its meaning to meet contingencies, especially new US priorities, are the hallmarks of its resilience and robustness. He illustrates this most tellingly by invoking the policies and actions of Tony Blair after 9/11 not just in terms of Britain’s contribution to the deployment of hard power, but even more importantly his role in helping to define strategy and project it to the rest of the world. Elie is in fact arguing that we should adjust our understanding of the Special Relationship through taking ‘soft power’ into more account: ‘The special relationship was indeed more valuable to the US than is usually thought’.49 These contributions to the scholarship on Anglo-American relations that severally and respectively emphasise myth, succession, and decline, but in the case of Elie a decline that has not gone so far as many claim, have similarities with what might be termed the ambiguity school, which includes work by Manderson Jones and R. M. Hathaway’s Ambiguous Partnership50. These authors are also concerned with trying to capture the character and content of the relationship and in so doing highlight its uncertain nature because of differing values and expectations placed on it by each side at different times. There are other scholars too, who often find themselves with a foot in this camp. And finally all have some resonance with the concerns of Alex Danchev in his attempts to dispel opacity and clarify the meaning of the Special Relationship and special relationships in general, and this deserves some degree of attention. In two essays Danchev engages with the problem of the Special Relationship and what it might amount to, what it might mean.51 In his essay ‘On Friendship’, he takes the Aristotelian notion that there are three kinds of friendship based on utility, pleasure and goodness. The latter only can be a form of perfect friendship and he believes it can be detected in the apologetics of Churchill, in his history of the Second World War. One could also add that such a concept of friendship is also evident in the writings of those who emphasise sentiment in the Special Relationship such as Nicholas and Allen and in Henry Butterfield Ryan’s The Vision of Anglo-America.52 Danchev believes that any idea or myth of such perfect friendship has long gone and that the friendships of pleasure and utility or functionalism are fast disappearing too. He accords a special quality to Anglo-American relations in the Second World War, but his analysis leads him to conclude that there is little left of that by the late 1990s.

12

Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh The rules of the game have changed. The game itself has changed. Guns are out. Butter is in. Tiger shooting is out. Cattle culling is in. Special relationships are out. Security communities are in. Alliances are out. Coalitions of the willing are in. The game is no longer Greeks and Romans, or Happy Families. It is pay and play …. The size of the stake determines the size of the say (no stake, no say). Neither the stake nor the say is transferable (a say in the Gulf conflict does not guarantee a say in the peace process).53

This is clearly the language of terminal decline and several scholars would see it as warranted. But Danchev has other concerns. What exactly is in terminal decline? What is a special relationship between states? For him the literature on the Special Relationship is ‘under-theorised’ and ‘underthought’.54 So, what in essence makes ‘specialness’? In his attempt to theorise an answer to that question he touches on important issues, particularly the relative quality of what might be considered special, especially as states such as Canada and Israel claim a special relationship with the US as well as Britain. What he eventually offers is a list of ten key characteristics: transparency, informality, generality, reciprocity, exclusivity, clandestinity, reliability, durability, potentiality, and mythicizability. But this is more or less where the analysis ends with no attempt to clarify meaning or determine how these terms are supposed to be applied. The assertion that the first and the last are probably the most important components remains more or less that – simply an assertion, but with the later observation drawn (somewhat tongue in cheek?) that transparency beats mythicizability every time ‘so they say’. 55 The basis of his claim here is the well-known and possibly apocryphal episode in December 1941 when President Roosevelt entered Churchill’s bedroom in the White House to find him completely (transparently) naked. This is not necessarily the best way to dispel opacity, to rest a conclusion on possible apocrypha qualified by the cryptic comment ‘so they say’. What should we make of all this? There’s no denying Danchev’s historical scholarship. One only has to read his work on Dill to recognise that, but his attempts to theorise and clarify the concept of a Special Relationship result more in amusing anecdotal stories, literary flourishes and a collection of possible ideas that might or might not clarify things rather than conceptual and theoretical clarity.56 Strip those out of his work and he is left talking about the Special Relationship in the Second World War and its post-war decline in a manner similar to many of the functionalists. After demanding more thoughtful clarity and more theorising, he rather contradictorily quotes Allen and the idea that the term Special Relationship is a term of art, subjective and elusive.57 This looks quite like a re-statement of the problem, rather than its resolution.58 The sentiment school of scholars agonise less over meaning and in most cases look to a wealth of detail to make their case perhaps not self-evident

Introduction 13 but as close as they can get to that. Ideas of a natural relationship derived from sentiment often with emphasis on its inevitability, coupled with the rather contradictory notion of the importance of actively cultivating good relations in the world of practice, can be found in varying degrees in the works of R.B. Mowatt, Lionel M. Gelber, Harry C. Allen and Bradford Perkins.59 There is a strong tendency to play down areas of conflict, even in some cases the war of 1812, and to develop the strong theme of peaceful resolution of differences through arbitration. Allen declares at the outset: ‘the ripening of friendship is the first theme of this book.’60 For Allen it is not power relations that are at the heart of things: ‘The cultural has probably been the most important of all the ties.’61 H.G. Nicholas takes a similar line asserting that: A shared language and a common historical inheritance of “AngloSaxon” polity created, for British and Americans alike, a set of immediately recognizable and axiomatically accepted habits of thought and behaviour – especially in the conduct of public affairs. This led not merely to the formulation and invocation of a common set of principles about foreign policy but, perhaps even more important, to a common cast of mind, parallel styles of action and reaction at both the popular and higher levels of government.62 It is probably unfair, but the words of a Gilbert and Sullivan operetta come to mind: ‘For he might have been a Roosian/ A French or a Turk, or Proosian/ Or perhaps Italian/ But in spite of all temptations/ To belong to other nations/ He remains an Englishman.’63 This is going too far. Those of English descent in America did not conceive of themselves as Englishmen, but many recognised towards the end of the nineteenth century that Englishness was certainly not the totally alien life-form that many had taken it to be in the aftermath of the War of Independence and that recognition has played a larger role in Anglo-American relations than has heretofore been recognised.64 Notwithstanding the above authors and their importance, there has been a general tendency to set matters of sentiment aside either because, in harmony with the canons of realism, they are seen of little or no importance in inter-state relations, or else because while they are recognised as having importance they have also been seen as posing difficult if not insuperable problems for incorporating into explanation. In Bell’s language it – sentiment – is ‘less readily mapped’ or in Allen’s words ‘its strength [of impact] is very difficult to assess in any practical manner.’65 Those who prioritise interests or the functionality of the Anglo-American relationship are an important group of scholars encompassing Christopher Thorne, C.J. Bartlett, John Dumbrell, John Baylis, Ian Clark, Johnathan Colman, Sylvia Ellis, Nigel Ashton, James Ellison, and David Reynolds.66 However, while they prioritise interests and functionality most would agree with the kind of

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reservations expressed by Bartlett who asserts ‘hard-headed calculations in both Washington and London in response to the grim realities of power politics do not wholly explain the remarkable Anglo-American relationship which developed after 1941’.67 The missing component of the explanation remains for many tantalisingly elusive. John Dumbrell argues: ‘It [the Special Relationship] was based, to put it bluntly, on interests’, but then explicitly states that his account places ‘quite a deal of emphasis on sentiment. In part, this reflects a reaction against ‘functionalism’ and a commitment to the view that shared history, culture and language do count for something.’68 For the vast majority of the functionalists the importance of sentiment is not denied, but it is largely interstitial, operating between power positions and the interplay of interests that determine policy-making and its execution. So sentiment does count, but for the more staunchly functionalists such as David Reynolds, it is not decisive. Reynolds has done much to try to unravel the complexities of the Special Relationship and in his view: ‘Fundamentally the post-war relationship has been shaped by the power and international position of the two countries. This is where we must look for what, if anything, has made it special’.69 Elsewhere he argues that the wartime alliance between the two was in a class of its own, and resulted from a ‘shared threat and mutual need’: it was ‘a marriage of necessity’.70 The functionalism of the relationship was bedded on two important factors: its importance to each other and the world at large; and its quality. By the mid-60s the importance factor had disappeared because of Britain’s decline in power and status, but the quality of the relationship was sustained, at least till the mid-1980s, in three areas which Reynolds describes as specialités: intelligence co-operation; nuclear co-operation; and diplomatic consultations. Those three areas continue in the present to be of special importance, but also there may be more to the overall importance of the relationship if Elie’s arguments about soft power are found to be persuasive.

Focusing on the present and introducing the contributions The authors grouped together in the school of functionalists have produced remarkably rich and varied contributions to our understanding of the Special Relationship, but many would undoubtedly want to nuance and qualify such a crude categorisation because some, as already noted, have insisted on weighting aspects of sentiment in the explanation they offer, while others introduce the idea of soft power as an important component in the overall relationship. Variety and richness of scholarship notwithstanding, we have seen from Danchev’s concerns that a clear conception of the Special Relationship does not emerge: or does it? There may be a case for arguing that when one takes this corpus of work together with that of the sentiment school and the other sub-categories that have been presented here that it is not the devil that is to be found in the detail,

Introduction 15 but the Special Relationship itself. And that contention might be buttressed by the suggestion that sentiment and interests are not so much polar opposites, but inextricably linked, two sides of the same coin if you like. A second source of clarity for the concept may be found in realism, which is sometimes the spoken and at others the unspoken assumption underpinning the functionalist approach. Actually to be more accurate what we mean here is that breaches in the canons of realism might clarify matters. So, the suggestion here is twofold: the Anglo-American Special Relationship can be better understood and defined through both an appreciation of the overall detailed complexity of its historical manifestation and a realisation that sentiments and interests cannot be usefully separated and by measuring the idea of a special relationship against canons and norms established by international relations theory. Let us elaborate on this a little. Engaging with this more abstract question about special relationships one might pose two very different types of question. What would it be to have a special relationship with another state? And: What was the AngloAmerican Special Relationship like between 1945 and 1955, between 1955 and 1965 and so on? The first type of enquiry tries to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for a special relationship and then applies them to a particular instance to see if it passes muster: this might be seen as the approach of international relations theory: Hollis and Smith’s explanation from the outside. The other, Hollis and Smith’s inside meaning – or for us explanation – examines the understanding that politicians and officials held about a particular relationship in a particular time period and in a very strong sense if they believe it to be special then it is, though one needs to qualify this somewhat by adding that such beliefs have to have some purchase with the concept of plausibility. No one would accept that there existed a special relationship between the USSR and Finland during 1939–40, no matter how avidly someone at the time might have protested that there were. There has to be a strong and substantial body of compelling evidence of the kind that might indeed lead us to say, echoing Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher: ‘It is special. It just is. And that’s that.’71 Necessary and sufficient conditions do not enter into things here, simply the overwhelming force of cumulative evidence and the recognition that when historical actors declare this is special that it resonates plausibly. Furthermore when considering the basis for the Special Relationship, particularly when adopting aspects of the inside kind of explanation, it is a serious error to juxtapose interests and sentiments in such a way as to regard them as separate and distinct. What comes to be seen as an interest is often moulded by common sentiment and the existence of friendly sentiments often leads on to common interests. This is a mutually and self-reinforcing dynamic. An important reason why the Special Relationship has flourished for so long has been the mutually supportive strength of shared interests and sentiments covering feelings of overlapping identity, friendship and moral and political values, co-operation in economic, defence, nuclear and

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intelligence relations and close comings together of their economic, educational, cultural and recreational experiences. What makes a relationship special according to necessary and sufficient conditions illuminates some of the more surprising aspects of the AngloAmerican Special Relationship and provides an important perspective on it. According to the canons of realism, nation states find themselves in an environment of anarchy where there is no Leviathan to impose order. All states ultimately have to ensure their own security by maximizing power by whatever means they can – through alliances or by standing alone if powerful enough in their own right – and on the premise that today’s friend could be tomorrow’s foe. They also confront the security dilemma that dictates that trust between two nation states can never be permanently established and that one country’s weapons of defence are always perceived by others as potential weapons of offence.72 One does not have to be a fully committed disciple of realism in all its glory to see that there are some elements in this characterisation of the world of nation states that ring true, or at least provide a type of practical reasoning to guide prudent statecraft. One way of establishing that a special relationship exists between states would be to see if they disregard these canons. And certainly regarding Britain’s relations with the USA they appear to be more honoured in the breach than the observance: for one state to sell to another the means of delivering nuclear weapons would be an absurdity for realists. Put simply, if two states do not take measures to defend themselves from each other and they have the potential to inflict serious damage then one might suggest that a prima facie ‘special relationship’ exists. The term prima facie is used because there has to be more to it than this, but it is a necessary starting point. The Destroyers for Bases Deal struck between Britain and the USA on 2 September 1940 was just about as far as President Franklin Roosevelt could go without declaring the formal demise of neutrality in the USA: it certainly amounted to a de facto abandonment of the principle. And so began the wartime entangling of the fortunes of Britain and the USA that Churchill had so earnestly sought and of which he could talk of credibly in 1944 as the Special Relationship.73 But there have been many currents and eddies in the flow of the relationship down the years to 2012 and there are both longstanding and rather new questions that need to be addressed to grasp what presently constitutes the Special Relationship, if indeed it still is special. As argued at the outset, this volume is justified by the lack of any booklength study of contemporary Anglo-American relations and by – what seems to us – the obvious need for such work given the recently renewed interest in them. But what does this volume achieve? Detailed consideration of that is more appropriately left till the conclusion, but a few sign-posts for the reader might be in order. The contributions to this collection do not answer all the questions that have been mooted about the relationship between Britain and the USA by any means, but some long-standing issues

Introduction 17 are put to bed and important light cast on the understanding and substance of others. Evidence from all contributions, with the possible exception of Jackson’s, provides clear proof of a robust and on-going Special Relationship and there is much clarification about its origins, the extent of functional co-operation, and the inextricable mix of sentiment and interest that have moulded so much of Britain and the USA together through the respective contributions of culture and friendship; power and national interests; and institutional and international systemic variables. And the contributing chapters are made from a range of different disciplines – political science, international relations, economics, business studies, and history, which, while not unique for a volume of collected essays, is rather novel. Surprisingly the result is a far more coherent picture than one might expect with one discipline often illuminating problems that trouble another with clearer understanding of important conceptual issues and a wealth of detail that portrays a relationship of great complexity and great reach often enriched between the interstices of policies and actions, power-plays and discussions by a special quality that continues to glue the two countries together in many important areas. David Haglund approaches the Special Relationship from the perspective of strategic culture, the sharing of which he argues can lead to ‘transnational collective identity’ – the maximalist condition; or ‘close co-ordination of otherwise self-regarding entities’ – the minimalist condition. He then brings this approach to the study of the Special Relationship. He endorses the importance of 1940 as the starting point for the development of path-dependency that leads on to the bourgeoning of the Special Relationship, but then turns to the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. A number of scholars have conceived of the rapprochement that took place during that period as key to understanding the coming about later of the Special Relationship and Haglund goes along with that, but sees something emerging from it that has not been sufficiently foregrounded before: a radical change of identity perception among ethnic English Americans. Reacting against assertive Irish and German Americanisms, particularly in the early part of the twentieth century, ethnic English Americans began to replace their long-standing nineteenth century Anglophobia with an appreciation of common inheritances. Just how far did this go to change the sense of ‘they’ and morph it into ‘we’? How far did this enfeeble the vestiges of eighteenth-century-War-of-Independence Anglophobia among English descendants in the USA and to what extent did this contribute to the conditions that facilitated the development of the Special Relationship in the Second World War and beyond? Robert Hendershot bravely goes where few have gone before and engages with what he calls the cultural sinews of the Special Relationship. Even those scholars who clearly fall within the sentiment school of the Special Relationship often acknowledge that this is not an easy area and one to which it is difficult to assign explanatory weighting. Scholars recognise it

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counts but to what extent, exactly how and when and with what direct effects? Hendershot seeks to illuminate the extent to which the cultural context, ‘the élite sentimentality it inspires, and the impervious nature of the sentimental myth that surrounds it’ have helped to carry the Special Relationship into the twenty-first century. Alison Holmes has similar interests in that she too is interested in the mores surrounding actions, but in her case focused on the specific case of diplomats. Her work is driven by questions about the developing nature of the state in the global system and how that impacts on diplomats and the changing Special Relationship. To what extent has the dissolution of the distinctions between foreign and domestic moved the debate beyond realist narratives and produced a kind of global social relations, perhaps best evidenced in the Special Relationship, and which far from being abstract and theoretical impacts on the personal lives of the individuals representing the state? Might the Special Relationship provide a model of diplomatic relations that others would do well to follow? John Dumbrell has a strong comparative component to his study of different and uneasy leadership successions: Lyndon Johnson-Harold Wilson and Richard Nixon-Edward Heath; George W. Bush-Tony Blair and Gordon Brown-Barack Obama. In some important ways this contributes to the debate between the schools of sentiment and interests, albeit at the highest political levels. Dumbrell essentially seeks to answer the question of what impact personal leader diplomacy has on the Special Relationship compared with the determinants of power and hard interests. Alan Dobson and Joe McKinney engage with the rather neglected economic component of the Special Relationship. When it has been the subject of enquiry it has usually been seen as the epitome of the idea, applied most notably by David Reynolds to the broader relationship, of competitive co-operation.74 In the post-Cold War era that has given way far more to co-operation than competition except in a few notable cases and in the conventionally accepted form of commercial competition in the marketplace. Rather than dwell on those issues McKinney and Dobson seek to answer the question of how the economic relationship has developed and changed over the last seventy years and they offer a three-stage response to that. They also seek to identify what kind of challenges might de-rail things and how respective memberships of the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement have affected relations. Finally they consider two questions which they judge to be indicative of the character of the current relationship: to what extent are their two economies synchronised, compatible, interdependent and intermingled, and what is the extent and quality of their relationship particularly in terms of the policy-exchanges at the highest levels? Economic relations may have been largely neglected, but planning and environment issues have hardly been raised. Tony Jackson helps to make up this knowledge deficit in climate change policy. He tracks policy changes

Introduction 19 that have come about in recent years and in particular something of a reversal of British and American positions. To explain these matters Jackson has three broad questions or approaches. He wants to know how the epistemic communities that deal with climate issues have developed and been influenced on each side of the Atlantic. He wants to demonstrate how different political and institutional contexts in Britain and the USA have affected outcomes. And finally he wants to identify different national interests that have also fed into the policy debate. His findings provide considerable food for thought about how the changing institutional contexts, particularly regarding Britain’s membership of the European Union, impact on the Special Relationship. The concerns of Steve Marsh, Adam Svendsen and John Simpson are largely dictated by considerations of utility or the functional argument resting on shared interests and mutual capabilities to protect them. This is hardly surprising given that their focus is respectively on defence, intelligence and nuclear co-operation, the three areas in which the functionalist aspects of the relationship have been strongest. However for Marsh the functionalist line of interpretation is tempered by the invocation of the two countries’ similar world views and it is in that context that he addresses the question of continuing defence collaboration and its importance given its acute and growing asymmetry. All three authors demonstrate the on-going depth of co-operation in their respective areas and how historical baggage carried on both sides, including Britain’s now long-standing membership of the EC/EU, helps determine the present. All three authors seek to explain the continuity after the end of the Cold War, while marking the changes and seeking to place boundaries on the impact of asymmetry. They all see the Special Relationship continuing. Indeed, one of them describes his particular field as deepening and widening and becoming more, rather than less equitable since the end of the Cold War: given the field in question this should give occasion for pause for those who talk of the Special Relationship being in terminal decline or of as being no more.

Notes 1 Quoted in notes to Boswell’s Life of Johnson from J.M. and M.J. Cohen (editors), The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations, London: Bloomsbury Books, 1960, p. 170 2 See, for instance, John Dumbrell, A special relationship: Anglo-American relations from the Cold War to Iraq, Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors.), US-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2008; Adam Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge, 2010. 3 ‘British and Canadians Criticize Leaders for Following U.S. Lead’, 9 August 2006, http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/breuropera/237.php?lb= breu&pnt=237&nid=&id=

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4 W. Inboden. and L. Aransson, ‘Obama and the “special relationship”’, The Wall Street Journal, 19 May 2010. 5 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2010, pt 4, 3. 6 M. Smith, (2010) ‘It’s over: MPs say the special relationship with US is dead’, The Sunday Times, 28 March. Available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ news/politics/article7078844.ece; News of the World, 28 March 2010, http:// www.newsoftheworld.co.uk/news/765588/Special-relationship-is-over-so-itstime-to-stop-sucking-up-to-the-US-say-MPs.html 7 N. Gardiner, ‘Foreign Affairs Committee trashes the US-UK alliance: David Cameron must defend the special relationship’, The Telegraph, 28 March 2010. Availableathttp://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100031741/foreignaffairs-committee-trashes-the-us-uk-alliance-david-cameron-must-defend-thespecial-relationship/ 8 Andy Bloxham, ‘WikiLeaks: Britain mocked by US over “special relationship’”, The Telegraph, 4 December 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world news/wikileaks/8180709/WikiLeaks-Britain-mocked-by-US-over-specialrelationship.html 9 BBC News, 28 March 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8590767.stm 10 Here we differ from the view taken by David Haglund that it matters ‘not a whit’: we think it does and that the term ‘special’ has accumulated deep and significant meaning over the years. 11 Available at http://www.theatlanticbridgeusa.com/poll.html 12 ‘Prime Minister and President Obama article: an essential relationship’, 24 May 2011,http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2011/05/primeminister-and-president-obama-article-an-essential-relationship-64103 13 S. Marsh and J. Baylis, ‘The Anglo-American ‘Special Relationship’: the Lazarus of International Relations’, Diplomacy and Statecraft 17, 2006, p. 173. 14 Quoted in notes to Boswell’s Life of Johnson from J.M. and M.J. Cohen (editors), The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations, London: Bloomsbury Books, 1960, p. 282. 15 An interesting debate on these matters may be found in Gerald Stourzh, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government, Stanford, US: Stanford University Press, 1970. 16 H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954, p.  129; Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p.  129; John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold war and After, London: Macmillan, 2001, p.  9, and second edition Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, London, Longman, 1992, p. 179. 17 C. Bell, The Debatable Alliance, London: Oxford University Press, 1964. 18 Greg Kennedy, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East 1933-1939, London: Frank Cass, 2002; John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations1939-1984: The Special Relationship, London: Macmillan 1984; J.T. Richelson and D. Ball, The Ties that Bind: Intelligence Cooperation Between the UKUSA Countries, Hemel Hempstead, UK: Allen and Unwin, 1985; and though in a lower key so far as the Special Relationship is concerned Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy 1939-1945, London: Macmillan 1964; and, of course, Simpson and Svendsen in this collection. 19 The main works of this kind are R.N. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980; and Alan P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, Sussex, UK and New York: Wheatsheaf and St. Martin’s, 1988; there are elements in H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954 and within the construct of

Introduction 21

20

21

22

23 24

25 26 27 28 29

the Atlantic triangle in J.B. Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle, New Haven Connecticut, US: Yale University Press, 1945. A populist historical depiction is also in James McMillan and Bernard Harris, The American Take-over of Britain, New York: Hart Publishing Co., 1968; also Dobson and McKinney’s contribution to this collection. John Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994, p.  xv; see also Alison R. Holmes, ‘Ronald Reagan: Conviction Politics and the Transatlantic Relationship’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 8(iii) 2010, pp. 257-267, at pp. 258-259 and her contribution to this collection. Edward Ingram, ‘The Wonderland of the Political Scientist’, International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 53-63; Max Beloff, ‘The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth’, in Martin Gilbert, A Century of Conflict: Essays for A.J.P. Taylor. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966, pp. 151-171; John Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994; Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. New York: Knopf, 2003; H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954; David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62(i), 1985/86 winter, pp.  1-20 and ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime AngloAmerican Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards a New Synthesis’ in William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull (editors) The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986, pp. 17-43. An interesting account of the growth of this succession, which exposes some of the difficulties involved in a purist realist explanation, can be found in Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective, Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1989; see also Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace,, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010. Interview with Lord Callaghan, conducted by Alan Dobson, House of Commons, 26 November 1987. ‘Barack Obama hails special relationship in meeting with David Cameron’, The Telegraph, 22 September 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ barackobama/8780930/Barack-Obama-hails-special-relationship-in-meetingwith-David-Cameron.html L.B. Johnson Library, NSF Country File, box 208-9, folder: UK memos. Vol. xiii, 1/6 – 7/66, US Embassy London to State Department and box 210-12, folder: UK memos. Vol. xi, 4/67 – 6/67, Bruce to Rusk. Alan P. Dobson, ‘The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 19611967’, Review of International Studies,16, 1990, pp. 239-258. Michael Oakeshott, ‘The Activity of Being An Historian’, in Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, London: Methuen, 1962, pp. 137-168. For the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ literature see Haglund’s contribution to this volume. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 3. There are of course many other approaches to the problem of explanation and the relationship between history and theory, for example see M. Trachtenberg, The Craft of International History: A Guide to Method, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006, p.44; I. Hall, ‘Review article: World government and empire: the international historian as theorist’, International Affairs, 82, 6, 2006, pp.1155-1165; and the related: S. Yetiv, ‘History, International Relations, and Integrated Approaches: Thinking about Greater Interdisciplinarity’, International Studies Perspectives, 12, 2, May 2011, pp.94-118.

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30 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading, Maryland, US: AddisonWesley, 1979. 31 This dichotomy between the inside and the outside aspect of events and relationships is discussed at length by Hollis and Smith but for a fuller grasp of the issue see also Charles Reynolds, Theory and Explanation in International Politics, London: Martin Robertson, 1973. A major point of difference between Reynolds on the one hand and Hollis and Smith on the other is that the latter argue that the narrative derived from the ‘inside’ only renders the past intelligible by providing meaning, but not explanation. Reynolds argues to the contrary and that the ‘inside’ provides explanation through ‘the understanding, reasoning and perceptions of the actors and not in any pattern, theoretical or colligatory, superimposed on action and events by “observers” or “narrators”.’ See Charles Reynolds, ‘Explaining the Cold War’ in Alan P. Dobson, Shahin Malik and Graham Evans (editors) Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999, pp. 63-64. 32 Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations, London: Macmillan, 1998. 33 Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990; Alan Ryan, review in New Republic, July 9 and 16, 1990, pp. 46-49. 34 Rhodri Jeffrys-Jones, ‘The Role of British Intelligence in the Mythologies Underpinning the OSS and Early CIA’, Intelligence and National Security, 15(ii), 2000, pp. 5-19. 35 For more on colligations see Reynolds, ‘Explaining the Cold War’ in Alan P. Dobson, Shahin Malik and Graham Evans (editors) Deconstructing and Reconstructing the Cold War, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 1999. 36 In 1988 a full volume was devoted to compiling an annotated bibliography of forty years of output and a great deal has been written on the same topic since: D.A. Lincove and G.R. Treadaway: The Anglo-American Relationship: An Annotated Bibliography of Scholarship, 1945-1985, Westport Connecticut, US: Greenwood Press, 1988. 37 Hitchens, Blood, Class and Nostalgia: Anglo-American Ironies, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1990, p. 360. 38 Hitchens did a later variant on this in Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship, New York: Nation Books, 2004. 39 Christopher Grayling and Christopher Langoon, Just Another Star: AngloAmerican Relations Since 1945, London: Harrap, 1988, chapter 12; Alan P. Dobson, US Economic Statecraft for Survival: Of Sanctions, Embargoes and Economic Warfare, London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 40 Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World, London: Vintage, 2003; for a discussion of the limits of US ‘hegemony’ see Alan P. Dobson, ‘The USA, Britain, and the Question of Hegemony’ in Geir Lundestad (editor), No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998, pp. 112-134. 41 Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994, p. ix. 42 Ibid., p. xv. 43 Some may baulk at these categorisations and it is as well to repeat what was stated at the outset namely that not all works fit comfortably into these categories and some have stronger characteristics of type than others. For example it is difficult to know where one would place the following between the partisan and objective groups identified above in the text: Tore T. Petersen, The Decline of the Anglo-American Middle east, 1961-1969, Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2006; Inderjeet Parmar, Special Interests, The State and the Anglo-American Alliance

Introduction 23

44 45

46 47 48

49

50

51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

59

1939-1945, London: Frank Cass, 1995; Andrew Adonis and Tim Hames (editors) A Conservative Revolution? The Thatcher-Reagan Decade in Perspective, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994. And, of course, there are others. Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: America Military Power in Britain, London: Michael Joseph, 1984, pp. 300 and 338. Jérôme Elie, ‘Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special relationship’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 3(i) spring 2005 Supplement, pp. 63-83; Joseph Nye, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower Can’t go it Alone, Oxford: OUP, 2002. C. Bell, The Debatable Alliance, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 129. William Roger Louis, ‘American Anti-Colonialism and the Dissolution of the British Empire’, in Louis and Bull, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 261-285. D.C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain’s Place 1900-1977, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984; Ritchie Ovendale, Anglo-American relations in the Twentieth Century, Basingstoke, UK, Macmillan, 1998; H. McNeil, America, Britain and Russia, London: Oxford University Press, 1953. Elie, ‘Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special relationship’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 3(i) spring 2005 Supplement, p. 73. For a similar view on the continuing importance of the Special relationship, but with somewhat different arguments see Warren F. Kimball, ‘The Anglo-American Relationship: Still Special After All These Years’, in Antoine Capet and Aïssatou Sy-Wonyu (editors), The “Special Relationship”: La “Relation Spéciale” entre le Royaume Uni et les États-Unis, Rouen: C.É.L.C.L.A/University of Rouen, 2003, pp. 207-224. R.M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981; R.B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations and Western European Union 1947-56, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972 Alex Danchev, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations, London: Macmillan, 1998, chapters 1 and 9, respectively ‘On Specialness: AngloAmerican Apocrypha’, and ‘On Friendship: Anglo-America at the Fin de Siècle’. W.S. Churchill, The Second World War, 6 volumes, London: Cassell, 1948-1954; Henry Butterfield Ryan, The Vision of Anglo-America: The US-UK Alliance 1943-46, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987. Alex Danchev, ‘On Friendship: Anglo-America at the Fin de Siècle’, from, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations, London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 162. Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’ from, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations, London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 1. Ibid., p. 13. Alex Danchev, Very Special Relationship, London: Brassey’s, 1986. Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’ from, On Specialness: Essays in Anglo-American Relations, London: Macmillan, 1998, p. 7. Warren Kimball has taken Alex Danchev to task on his views in a rather different manner: see Alex Danchev, ‘How Strong Are Shared Values in the Transatlantic Relationship’, and Warren Kimball, ‘Dangerously Contagious? The AngloAmerican Special Relationship’, respectively pp.  429-436 and 437-441, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2005, vol. 7(iii). R.B. Mowatt, The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States, London: Edward Arnold, 1925; Lionel M. Gelber, The Rise of the Anglo-American Friendship, London: Oxford University Press, 1938; H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954; Perkins, Bradford, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895-1914, New York: Atheneum, 1968. One can find similarities in approach

24

60 61 62 63 64 65 66

67 68 69 70 71 72

Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh in highly personal accounts of special relationships, for example Sir John Wheeler-Bennet, Special Relationships: America in Peace and War, London: Macmillan, 1975, and John A. Ziegler, In Search of the ‘Special Relationship’ with Britain, Bishop Auckland, UK: Pentland Press, 2000. H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954 p. 27. Ibid., p. 129. H.H. Nicholas, The United States and Britain, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975, p. 1. W.S. Gilbert, HMS Pinafore. See Haglund’s contribution in this collection. C. Bell, The Debatable Alliance, London: Oxford University Press, 1964, p. 129; H.C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783-1952, London: Odhams Press, 1954, p. 129. Christopher Thorne, Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1979; C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945, London: Longman, 1992; John W. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, London: Macmillan, 2001 and second edition A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006; J. Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations1939-1984; Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America, 1957-1962, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994; Jonathan Colman, A ‘Special Relationship’? Harold Wilson, Lyndon B. Johnson and Anglo-American Relations ‘at the Summit’, 1964-1968, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004; Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War, Westport: Praeger, 2004; Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, Basingstoke: Palgrave 2002; James Ellison, The United States, Britain and the Transatlantic Crisis: Rising to the Gaullist Challenge, 1963-68, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2007; David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62(i) 1985/86 winter, pp.  1-20, and ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939-1945: Towards a New Synthesis’, in Hedley Bull and William Roger Louis (editors), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 17-43. C.J. Bartlett, The Special Relationship: A Political History of Anglo-American Relations since 1945, London: Longman, 1992, p. 2. John W. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations in the Cold War and After, London: Macmillan, 2001, p. 9. Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62(i), 1985/86 winter, p. 3. Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62(i), 1985/86 winter, pp. 35, 38 and 39. Taken from Alex Danchev, ‘On Specialness’, sourced from H.C. Allen, ‘A Special Relationship’, Journal of American Studies, 19, 1985, p.  407, Thatcher speech in Washington, 21 February, 1985. K.N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Reading Massachusetts, US: AddisonWesley, 1979; John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security, 15(i), 1990, pp. 5-56; David A. Baldwin (editor) Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism: The Contemporary Debate, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.

Introduction 25 73 Charlie Whitham, ‘On Dealing with Gangsters: the Limits of British “Generosity” in the Leasing of Bases to the United States’, 2 September 1940 – 27 March 1941’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 7(iii), 1996, pp. 569-610; Dobson US Wartime Aid to Britain, London: Croom Helm 1986, pp. 20-24; James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: Anglo-American Naval Collaboration, 1937-1941 Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1977, pp.  72-93, 114-27; and Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-American Alliance Garden City, NY, US: Doubleday, 1965 74 David Reynolds, The Creation of the Anglo-American Alliance1937-41: A Study in Competitive Co-operation, London: Europa, 1981.

1

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? Contingency, identity, and the transformation of Anglo-American relations David G. Haglund

Introduction For more than a decade the concept of ‘strategic culture’ has been gaining traction among political scientists and other students of International Relations (IR), by whom it has been embraced in the hope that it will advance knowledge in whatever particular subject area they find of interest. Thus it can come as no surprise that the concept should also be conscripted for service in the analysis of what surely ranks as one of the more significant subject areas in modern IR, namely that strategic dispensation we refer to as the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, sometimes alternatively known simply as ‘Anglo-America’, occasionally even as the ‘Anglosphere’.1 By whatever label it is known, the topic of this volume represents an aspect of interstate cooperation that transcends the ‘normal’ bounds of diplomatic conduct in the international anarchy, and does so in a way that can even, at the extreme, call into question conventional assumptions of how allegedly self-regarding states do (or should) act in that anarchical environment. In a word, the special relationship has at times been invoked to suggest the ability of some states to so ‘empathise’ with others as to cast doubt upon assumptions rooted in the expectation that the ‘national’ interest trumps all other considerations in foreign policy. Instead, some say, a transnational interest, predicated upon a transatlantic collective identity, can at times emerge to inspire policy choices, and to put policymaking on a similar trajectory in both countries.2 The purpose of this chapter is to trace the origins and evolution of that collective identity we know of as the AngloAmerican special relationship, and to do so within a framework that makes direct appeal to the sometimes nebulous category of strategic culture. In what follows, I am going to argue two principal points, each derived from a particular reading of strategic culture. First, I am going to demonstrate why and how ‘path dependence’ can be employed in a bid to clarify the chronology of the special relationship, doing so in a manner that draws our attention to the crucial significance of 1940 as the effective starting date for that relationship. Secondly, I am going to invoke a different ‘cultural’ category, namely ethnicity, to show, somewhat counter-intuitively, how it

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 27 was possible for English-descended Americans to discard what had been, for them, a long-time touchstone of their own identity as Americans, namely Anglophobia, in a process of ‘identity shift’ that would serve as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for the creation of the special relationship.

On strategic culture and the special relationship Even if one does not subscribe to the most robust reading of the AngloAmerican special relationship – a reading that virtually emancipates policymaking from strict considerations of national interest in favour of a mooted collective identity (and therefore interest) – it is still possible for this volume’s organising concept to be mustered into service as a means of accounting for efficient interstate cooperation, predicated on the assumption that in shaping their respective states’ discrete (i.e. ‘national’) interests, American and British policymakers take it as axiomatic that securing each other’s cooperation is simply the ‘rational’ thing to do, and in most instances almost a necessary thing to do. As I intend to show in this chapter, strategic culture can be employed in two senses: a maximalist one stressing a transnational collective identity, and a minimalist one emphasising close coordination of otherwise self-regarding entities. Both can serve as a means of helping us gain insight into the Anglo-American special relationship. Now, it is true that more than a few scholars would dispute there is anything particularly noteworthy in either the style or the substance of Anglo-American diplomatic ties – mythical ties, they say, which effectively represent ‘nothing special’.3 Indeed, Edward Ingram has gone so far as not only to deny the touted merits of the special relationship, but also to claim that under its cover the US actually made it its business to so undercut British might as to effectively knock it out of the ranks of the great powers altogether, hardly the kind of thing one should do to any ally, least of all a special one. Remarks this heterodox historian, in a thinly disguised attack upon political scientists who proclaim the significance of transnational collective identity, ‘[a]lthough the United States did not formally declare war against Britain during World War II, it did destroy Britain and may have done so deliberately’. Moreover, he continues, the special relationship is simply verbiage that masks a grimmer reality, and should rather be regarded as an ‘extreme version of an alliance of restraint in which the weaker partner commits suicide by inviting its stronger partner to strangle it’.4 At the risk of being regarded as yet another political scientist stumbling naively through wonderland, I am going in this chapter to take it for granted that we can employ the adjective ‘special’ to discuss the bilateral relationship between the US and the UK, even if it remains obvious that America and some of its allies happen to possess other ‘special’ relationships.5 Still, there is, empirically and normatively, something so noteworthy about the manner in which the US and UK engage diplomatically with each other as to warrant

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being adjudged exceptional – and whether we express this exceptionality by calling it special or, as the respective leaders of the two countries, Barack Obama and David Cameron, have recently taken to styling it, ‘essential’, matters not a whit.6 The point is that they display toward each other a certain policy attentiveness, even deference, that neither of them consistently displays toward most of their other security partners or allies. This pattern of behaviour is so long-standing as hardly to need empirical demonstration, though perhaps not as long-standing as is sometimes imagined (a point on which I elaborate later in this chapter). Withal, though some may disagree, it is not how they interact in such a ‘special’ way that is important, but rather why they do so. And in respect of the latter, strategic culture might be of some utility. Two words of caution need to be sounded here. First, although this volume’s emphasis upon contemporary features of the special relationship means that most of its chapters will take as their starting point the historic year 1940, my own chapter, notwithstanding its inherently theoretical nature, is going to rely upon a temporal analysis that begins further back, in the 1890s. Although I will have something to say about both 1940 and the current era, I will spend most of my time discussing the seminal half-century that preceded the destroyers-for-bases deal of the late summer of 1940. Second, this chapter is written mainly from the perspective of American foreign and, to a lesser extent, domestic policy. Now, before we ask what, exactly, strategic culture can bring to the understanding of the special relationship, we need to know a thing or two about it. As one might imagine, there are almost as many definitions of strategic culture as there are scholars interested in it. I have wandered into this murky landscape myself, and though I would be the last to lay claim to having authoritatively defined the concept, I would happily be among the first to emphasise how contested it is, and will remain, among those who utilise it.7 By way of gross generalisation, let us say that there are two principal camps into which ‘strategic culturalists’ can be segregated. The first camp is peopled by scholars such as Colin Gray, who emphasise that what is important about the concept is to be found first and foremost in the context that surrounds any given state’s foreign and security policy.8 Our second camp groups those who, like Alastair Iain Johnston, seek to breathe ‘causal’ significance into the concept, by stressing the importance for policymaking of symbolic means of expressing interests and goals; let us call this second camp the preserve of those who work on the cognitive side of the house.9 It is only with the contextualists that my chapter is concerned. Just as they might be distinguished from the cognitivists, so too do they require being distinguished from each other. The basic fault line running through the contextualists’ terrain differentiates those who seek to explicate strategic interaction in terms of how particular states have acted toward each other in the past, from those who highlight instead how states are thought, by

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 29 their own and other peoples, as being likely to act based on the ‘way they are’. There is also a second distinction worth noting: for those who focus upon the past record of state interaction, the referent for strategic culture can be, and often is, more than simply the behaviour of a single state per se; instead, that referent can be the dyadic, or bilateral, interaction. In other words, the diplomatic relationship can be said to have developed and to express a ‘culture’.10 On the other hand, for those who examine identity, i.e. the way that states are thought to ‘be’, the referent in the first instance is the identity of the single state (or nation),11 although it can and sometimes does turn out that a ‘transnational’ identity also becomes the object of investigation, as was the case a century ago when a construct known as ‘Anglo-Saxonism’ was often taken seriously as a conditioning element in British and American foreign policy, serving for a time to bring the two countries closer together.12 For the first group of analysts, who employ strategic culture as a means of accounting for prior behaviour’s impact on current and future policy, historical sociology is often plumbed for guidance; those in the second group, who prefer to put the emphasis upon conceptions attending identity, similarly avail themselves of approaches with a long-established pedigree, subsumed under the rubric national character. If the two disciplinary wellsprings share the common characteristic of dating from the first half of the twentieth century, they differ in an important respect, given that historical sociology has regained scholarly respectability after having been for some years in eclipse,13 while national character studies, under that name, remain controversial, though when repackaged under the label ‘national identity’ they have attained a considerable cachet during the past decade or so.14 In the next two sections of this chapter, I will show how both contextual variants might help us to come more fully to grips with the Anglo-American special relationship. In respect of the first of these sections, our foray into the past will be animated by the conviction that history must ‘matter’, which to some strategic culturalists implies a turn toward narrative as a means of supplying explicative energy. This turn to narrative will require a focus on the process (or phenomenon) known as path dependence. This constitutes the main topic of inquiry in the section following immediately upon this one, in which the focus will be upon the events accompanying America’s rise to great-power status – events that, we shall see, various scholars have insisted served to ‘lock in’ a new cooperative pattern between the two countries, in effect making their shared future look decidedly different from their common past. Following that discussion, the chapter’s fourth section will shift the analysis to our other contextual category, national identity, or what once was referred to regularly as national character. Itself a term that is open to various interpretations, national character/identity has at least one clear connotation, namely ethnicity. Accordingly, in this section, attention will be directed toward the phenomenon of ‘ethnic politics’, with a view to

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determining whether or how this might have been said to contribute to shaping the course of Anglo-American relations. 

As the twig is bent: Looking for contingency in Anglo-American relations Whatever else might divide them, strategic culturalists are dissatisfied with structuralist accounts of foreign policy behaviour, of the sort for instance that ascribe policy outputs to variables such as relative capability (‘power’), or cumulative wealth.15 These culturalists may or may not be in agreement as to the attainability of reliable causality, but they do accept that cultural context, and therefore history, should ‘matter’. How history should matter, no one can say exactly, but many analysts have been turning to narrative to supply explicative energy, via an approach sometimes called ‘narrative positivism’.16 The emphasis upon narrative has led many of them to focus on the process of path dependence. Path dependence, as Paul Pierson observes, stands in contradistinction to certain assumptions of rationalchoice theory that claim ‘large’ causes should result in commensurately ‘large’ outcomes.17 As such, path dependence will have an ever more congenial ring in the ears of some strategic culturalists, whose antistructuralist epistemology, coupled with their conviction that patterns of behaviour are ‘culturally’ significant variables, will entice them to search for the origins and defining features of path-dependent foreign policy choices. It is, of course, one thing to invoke path dependence as the mechanism by which history can be said to continue to matter in the shaping of foreign (including security) policy, for instance in the general, and commonsensical, observation that choices made in the past can go on limiting policy options in the future.18 Yet it is quite another thing actually to tease out, or ‘trace’,19 the process(es) by which path dependence manages to yield the context called strategic culture. Strategic culturalists exploring the behavioural component of context will find themselves being drawn ever closer to historical sociology, and will as a result have to grapple with concepts closely related to path dependence. Among these latter, two stand out: temporal sequencing, and contingency. For if path dependence means anything, it cannot mean sensitive dependence upon ‘initial conditions’; rather, it must suggest a break point after which the ability of those initial conditions to shape the future is altered substantially.20 Some will label that break point ‘contingency’, by which they will mean the development required to have set in train a new inertia, one in which the ‘path’ led either to the efficient reproduction of cooperation (sometimes called ‘self-reinforcing sequences’, or ‘lock-in’) or the reverse, the efficient reproduction of conflict and discord (called ‘reactive sequences’).21 An instance of the latter kind of bilateral interaction would be the France-US relationship, which has to be regarded as being ‘suboptimal’ in the main, notwithstanding occasional outbursts of reciprocated good will.22 By

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 31 contrast, the Anglo-American relationship can be taken to represent the more positive sense of path dependence, in which previous episodes of successful cooperation give rise to expectations of continued such successes. But no matter the direction in which the twig is bent, toward or away from successful and sustained cooperation, the search for contingency becomes an essential component of foreign-policy analysis undertaken by culturalists for whom ‘context’ is first and foremost a function of historical behaviour patterns, and for whom, therefore, strategic culture becomes virtually unknowable apart from an examination of the country’s diplomatic history. Now, if one were to take the notion of ‘lock-in’ seriously, from when should we date it? Notionally, there would seem to be two major moments during which it might be said Anglo-American relations were set onto a new path, one from which there could be no going back to previous, unhappy, epochs of suboptimal cooperation. The first of these moments is the last decade of the nineteenth century, and the second is the late summer of 1940, which latter happens also to be the chronological and, indeed, logical starting point for most of the other chapters in this volume. Usually, scholars inquiring into the temporal sequencing of the special relationship turn to the earliest of these two periods, occupying the years between the ending of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, a moment aptly characterised by one historian as the fin de siècle’s ‘great rapprochement’.23 Charles Kupchan, for instance, writes that this period of growing cordiality between the two large English-speaking powers set in motion an historic transformation in the manner in which they had previously related to each other – a transformation that was not only startling in its sweep but also continuous in its workings, resulting in a ‘strategic partnership that has lasted to this day’.24 Nor is Kupchan alone in sensing that a new path emerged for the bilateral relationship at this time: indeed, it seems to be a consensus that after the turn of the century, Anglo-American relations would never again resemble what they had been, during the century and a quarter separating America’s war of independence from the rapprochement, which is to say a period of 125 years characterised at the extreme by warfare and threat of warfare, but for the most part simply by constant diplomatic wrangling and ennui – in other words, a period in which the bilateral relationship looked so far from being special, and so close to being just another dreary aspect of traditional balance-of-power politics.25 Exactly what set in motion this happier era of policy confluence, however, is not a matter of consensus. Here the dispute revolves less around contingency (i.e. the notion that something reasonably unexpected occurred that would not have been predicted on the basis of the tendances lourdes of the bilateral record) and more around temporal sequencing. Some scholars argue the great transformation in Anglo-America from a state of (potential) war to a ‘zone of stable peace’ – held by Kupchan to constitute ‘a grouping of nations among which war is eliminated as a

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legitimate tool of statecraft’26 – occurred in 1895, in the midst of the most acrimonious dispute between the two countries since the American civil war three decades previously. Others date the transformation to the ‘hinge year’ of 1898.27 And one reading of Perkins would have him ascribing contingency to 1896, and this because of that year’s defeat in the race for the American presidency of William Jennings Bryan, a ‘silverite’ who was no stranger to the Anglophobic sentimentality so widespread among the country’s populists, to whom nothing came so easy as to blame a nefarious Britain for seeking to keep innocent Americans impaled on the ‘cross of gold’ erected by the London bankers. Thus, says Perkins, that 1896 election: so important in American political history, was also important for diplomacy and even for relations with England. It ushered in sixteen years during which British governments, thankful of their narrow escape, did their best to eliminate tension between the two countries .28 That historic election to the contrary notwithstanding, most scholars who search for contingency in the first of the two periods limit their temporal sequencing either to 1895 or 1898. The selection of 1895 bespeaks a view that the most important development in Anglo-American relations during this entire period occurred with the short-lived threat of war between the two countries over what, on the surface, looked to be a most unlikely casus belli: a boundary dispute between Venezuela and Britain involving the latter’s territorial possession, British Guiana. For a brief but intense moment in December 1895, it appeared as if a war between the English-speaking countries loomed as a possibility, if not a probability, due to Washington’s ire at seeming British insouciance regarding the Monroe Doctrine, which America felt was not getting the respect it merited.29 The choice of this crisis as the turning point (the contingent moment) in the bilateral relationship inheres in the sobering scare it threw into policy elites in both countries, raising the spectre of ‘fratricidal’ war and reminding everyone of the need for a saner, and safer, method of resolving bilateral disputes. According to those who so date the great transformation in Anglo-American relations, i.e. from a lengthy period characterised by rumours of war and occasionally even war to an era in which peace would be the expectation, the Venezuela crisis provided elites on both sides of the Atlantic with a rare, and precious, glimpse into a choice of futures: they could have a catastrophic war, or they could have rapprochement and (who could say?) perhaps eventually even alliance or (re)union. Put in this way, the choice was an easy one for sentient policymakers. The case for regarding 1895 as the contingent moment is bolstered by two considerations, one an established pattern of bilateral interaction and the other a theoretical presupposition derivative of IR ‘realism’ – a presupposition sometimes known as ‘power-transition’ theory that seeks to account for change in the international system. As to the first of these

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 33 matters, the established pattern of bilateral interaction, it must be said that entering the closing decade of the nineteenth century, Britain and America gave every appearance of being fated to remain geopolitical rivals, just as they had been for more than a century – rivals whose mutual antagonism had been preserved if not embellished through generations and a series of crises. These, then, were the aforementioned tendances lourdes of AngloAmerica: suspicion and competition, occasionally exacerbated to the point of hostility. Nor did the second consideration, the theoretical presupposition, provide any basis for expecting a radical improvement in bilateral relations. As one scholar explains, ‘[f]rom the realist standpoint these two countries were natural, almost certain enemies, for they stood at the apex of the international power structure’. America was rising, Britain declining, thus the latter state should have sensed and acted upon the challenge presented to it by the former. ‘Yet this is not what happened. Instead of meeting in battle, Britain and the United States were reconciled, drawn together in part by a common desire to counter other potential adversaries …’30 Not only was there no ‘hegemonic’ clash between the two long-standing competitors, but something remarkable – nay, unprecedented – transpired: the ranking power accepted the rise of its erstwhile ‘challenger’ to the point of seeking to socialise it via rapprochement into its vision of world order, in the bargain making of it a buttress of its own power. Although by 1895 British opinion was fairly well intentioned in respect of the United States, the same could not be said about American opinion, including elite opinion, of Britain. There was, even on the part of some of the most long-established ‘Anglo’ types in America (for instance, Henry Cabot Lodge) an unwillingness to abandon the historic grudge against ‘tyrannical’ Britain.31 And as we shall see in the following section of this chapter, although America’s large and politically active Irish community did its utmost to stoke the flames initially fuelled by the historic rupture of 1775, it was not simply ethnic sensibilities that kept America estranged from its former mother country; economic rivalries, populist demagoguery, and growing worries about the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine also fed into American Anglophobia.32 Few in America, and hardly anyone in Britain, actually wanted a war as a result of an obscure dispute in a part of the world most Britons hardly knew existed, yet war remained a possibility, and for those who take the Venezuelan crisis as the turning point, the contingent moment, in Anglo-American relations, it is because of the ability of the dispute to serve as a ‘catalyst’ for rapprochement by concentrating minds on the enormity of the mistake that was likely to be made in the absence of rapprochement.33 The other serious contender for the contingent moment is 1898, a highpoint in the ideological quest for ‘Anglo-Saxon’ harmony if not unification, but also a particularly memorable year in the history of the bilateral relationship. It was a memorable year – what one writer has termed

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the ‘annus mirabilis in Anglo-American relations’34 – because of the welcome support shown by British public and elite opinion to the United States at the time of its war with Spain, a war that elsewhere in Europe met with varying degrees of scorn and contempt on the part of both publics and rulers.35 Not so in Great Britain, however, where alone among the European powers there was widespread support among elites and public alike for American military action against the decaying Spanish empire.36 This was much appreciated by many (though not, as we shall soon see, all) Americans, who just three years earlier had talked as if they had been willing to fight Great Britain. Now the latter country was even receiving credit for having made a signal military contribution to the American war effort, as a result of British Captain Edward Chichester being widely thought to have interposed his ships between American and German vessels in Manila Bay, thereby preventing, or so it was believed in a grateful America, the Germans from impeding their preparations for an attack upon the city. Although the Germans were not, in fact, trying to frustrate Admiral Dewey’s bombardment of Manila, that is not what Americans at the time believed; instead, they recalled, with gratitude, that Chichester had ‘saved Dewey from a stab in the back at a critical time…. More than any real episode, this imaginary one contributed to the belief that England was the only friend America had during the war with Spain’.37 When it came time to repay this gratitude, a short while later during the Boer War, American elite opinion demonstrated a similar understanding and support for Britain’s predicament, which is why it is incorrect to write, as some continue to do, that ‘every other great power – France, Germany, the United States – opposed London’s actions’ in South Africa.38 For sure, large non-Anglo ethnic groups in America tended to oppose British policy, as we shall soon discover, but the administration in Washington gave backing to London, as did a sizeable minority of the country’s Englishdescended population, many of whom were beginning to find allure in the Anglo-Saxon racialist vogue of the late nineteenth century.39 Exact figures are impossible to come by, but it appears that of the several hundred Americans who went to South Africa to fight in that war, more did so on the British side than on the Boer side, although as one author has remarked, this sometimes was a function of linguistic rather than of political solidarity.40 While there can be no doubt that the quality of Anglo-American relations, hitherto a very strained category, changed for the better at the end of the nineteenth century, it is not the same thing as saying that we can, in hindsight, identify that period (even if not any specific year) as the contingent moment in bilateral relations. For us so to do, and to conclude with Kupchan and others that from this time on, a new and permanent strategic partnership had taken root,41 would require us to forget that the interwar decades ever existed – two decades in which, for a time, it was a case of ‘back to the future’ for both of the English-speaking great powers. The pattern of Anglo-American relations, which just a short time before

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 35 had looked so promising to those who sought an English-speaking condominium over global affairs, was to turn negative once again, so much so that just a few years after the ending of the First World War, AngloAmerican relations appeared to have reverted to their familiar form, styled by one scholar as ‘petulant rivalry’.42 And because of this period of retreat in cooperative understanding, it is clear that no new path had really been locked into place as a result of the Great Rapprochement. Thus to employ path dependency in the context of the special relationship, it is necessary to resort to the latter of the two periods mentioned at the start of this section, and in particular to the year that truly would emerge as a temporal ‘hinge’, 1940. This is the year in which took place an historic development that, whether intended or not, happens also to serve as the starting point for most of this book’s other chapters, namely the destroyers-for-bases deal, which really did set the bilateral relationship upon a new path, one from which it has not substantially been diverted ever since. Although space does not permit any extensive discussion of that swap, two important considerations appertaining to it call out for emphasis here. The first concerns how radical a departure from American strategy this extraordinary decision to exchange 50 so-called ‘overage’ destroyers for long-term leases of British bases in the Western hemisphere was – a decision made public on 2 September 1940 and one that may not have been an act of war on Washington’s part, but certainly constituted a flagrant breach not only of America’s own neutrality policy but also of international law.43 The second consideration, following directly upon the first, is that it marked not just a turning point in American policy toward the war raging in Europe, but also constituted the first of several instances in which it truly could be said that a new cooperative path had been locked into place in the Anglo-American relationship, such that the future of the two states’ interaction never could resemble what the past had been. For once the decision had been taken by the United States effectively to involve itself in the European balance of power, there could be no going back from the logical implications. The destroyers-for-bases swap would lead, indeed would have to lead, to other measures intended to keep Britain from succumbing at the hands of a Germany that was, by late 1940, now considered in Washington as a mortal threat to America’s own security, as a result of the widespread conviction that a German victory in Europe would be followed by aggression in the Western hemisphere, beginning in the southernmost republics of Latin America, the ‘soft underbelly’ of homeland defence.44 Among those other measures would be the Lend-Lease Act in March 1941, and the decision to begin convoying war materiel, which would result in the US navy and the German navy entering into a real, albeit ‘undeclared’, war in the Atlantic by the summer of 1941, some half-year before America officially entered the war following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

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So if one wanted to argue that ‘strategic culture as context’ has great import for the study of the special relationship, then a way of making the case would be to insist that after the late summer of 1940 and the creation of the informal but very real Anglo-American alliance, a new and to date unbroken path has been followed by the two countries. In a word, their relationship took a cultural ‘turn’ as a result of the contingent moment of August and September 1940 – a moment followed by subsequent temporal sequences including Lend-Lease and convoying, all of which testified to the existence of what many had strived for, but failed to achieve, since the era of the Great Rapprochement, namely an alliance between the two great English-speaking powers. But there is a second manner in which strategic culture, taken as context, might be said to have a bearing on the evolution of the special relationship; it involves the notion of ‘identity’.

Identity, ethnicity, and the complications of Anglo-American alliance What I have been calling in this chapter the tendances lourdes of the AngloAmerican relationship might simply be taken as another way of saying the ‘weight of history’, and as we discovered in the previous section, those who stress path dependence are really arguing that the so-called legacy of the past can be annulled, and the weight can be lifted, because of contingent factors that can and do transform the ‘culture’ of the bilateral strategic relationship, setting it upon a new path of policy confluence from which there can be no easy deviation. In this section, culture’s impact upon strategy is something different – something that resides in the presumed causal significance of ‘collective identity’, usually of the national but sometimes of the transnational variety. By this I mean that many scholars have, of late, been insisting that it is simply impossible to take the measure of any particular country’s national interest in the absence of knowledge about the national identity of the country under examination.45 And delving into that identity can lead, in the case of Anglo-American relations, into an investigation of the element of ‘ethnicity’. Thus for this group of culture-as-context analysts, what is ‘cultural’ is not the pattern of past interstate behaviour but rather the ‘essence’ or ‘character’ of each of the dyad’s member-countries. Now, there is nothing about identity that requires that its group, or societal, referent be the state or nation; collective-identity accounts of international security phenomena are certainly not rare, or insignificant, and they might feature, inter alia, such transnational variables as religion or liberal-democracy, to take just two common referents. But when it comes to the strategic culture of any particular country, the group referent reduces to the state or nation, and even to subnational identity groupings.46 Interestingly, for all the attention accorded these days to identity, even and especially the ‘national’ variant thereof, there is a marked reluctance of

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 37 scholars openly to embrace the erstwhile concept of national character, held by many to be a retrogressive notion that smacks of ‘essentialist’, or ‘primordialist’ categories.47 If what is being alleged is that national character has been found guilty by prior association with ‘hereditarian’ or racist assumptions about IR,48 then one can easily see why it should have fallen out of favour; but if it is being avoided in name (though not in practice) because it is, as are most political concepts, ambiguous and even selfcontradictory, then the shunning becomes less easy to justify, given the generic problems associated with political concepts, and especially given that national character’s replacement by national identity merely substitutes one essentially contested category for another, in the process violating Ockham’s razor.49 The burden of this section of my chapter will be to try to bring strategic culture, conceived this time to be a derivative of ethnic identity, to bear on the analysis of the evolution of the Anglo-American special relationship. Briefly, the story told in the following pages will be one of a profound ‘identity shift’, one that saw Americans becoming gradually less reliant upon a long-standing practice of ‘twisting the lion’s tail’50 (which evidently required them to give regular ventilation to Anglophobic preferences and even prejudices), and growing more willing to conceive of their own identity as forming part of a larger perspective. This larger perspective, call it a transnational collective identity, had a transatlantic dimension featuring strong political and cultural affinities said to have been bequeathed by America’s mother country, England. It would take a great number of decades following the break with the mother country before Americans would stop thinking of themselves as being fundamentally anti-British, and some never would get over the old psychological hang-up. But many did, and they began to conceptualise their own ‘national’ self as being embedded in a larger cognitive community, one that was impregnated with Englishbestowed social and political practices.51 In a word, Americans would become, in the twentieth century, more ‘English’ than they had been at any time since the late eighteeenth century and the great schism in AngloAmerica. And in becoming more English, they made it possible for policy convergence to occur between their country and Britain. There are two elements in this story. One concerns the transformation of the American Anglos themselves, from stylized foes of British tyranny into supporters of British democratic values and cultural practices. The other element concerns the important role that non-English ethnic diasporas had in the shaping of American foreign policy toward Britain. The two narrative strands are intertwined, as I will argue. In his suggestive recent study on Anglo-American relations, Walter Russell Mead draws an analogy between a contemporary psychological need of many Canadians to stake out a difference from, and postulate a superiority over, Americans to an earlier identity practice of Americans themselves, who used England as the ‘significant other’ against which Americans’ own

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identity (and, needless to say, their superiority) could be established, if only in their own minds. ‘We can still hear the high and sometimes irritatingly nasal tone of whiny self-righteousness today among some Canadians who’, Mead writes, ‘accepting the undoubted superiority of American military power, feel that their distinctive contributions to the alliance can and should be a quality in which Americans are poor, while Canada is specially, even uniquely rich – morality’. He goes on to note that ‘[o]ne of the most annoying things for foreigners about Americans is that we sometimes sound to them the way Canadians sound to us’.52 There is something to it, but still the analogy is less than exact, for it would be impossible for Canadians really to sound to Americans the way that the latter once so consistently, annoying, and ultimately puzzlingly sounded to Britons, and to the English especially; compared with the heady broth of traditional American Anglophobia, which bubbled up again during the interwar period after becoming somewhat subdued in the turn-of-the-century heyday of AngloSaxonism, Canadian ‘anti-Americanism’ is an insipid brew indeed. The sources of the Anglophobia of English-descended Americans were numerous, and some of them can only be properly analysed by social psychologists, bent upon establishing the relationship between ‘enemy images’ (or heterostereotypes) and the construction of one’s own identity – a relationship that has begun to whet the intellectual curiosity of numerous IR specialists in recent years.53 For more than a century, English-descended Americans knew, had to know, themselves as being so politically different from and opposed to the English as to well-nigh guarantee that the bilateral relationship would be characterised by a low ethical and behavioural tone – not entirely, it should be stressed, the fault of the Americans themselves, for the British also during most of the twentieth century were not averse to hurling barbs (and worse) at ‘Brother Jonathan’ across the sea, a practice that persisted, diminuendo, into the twentieth century, when it flared up during the interwar period, as counterpart of the recrudescent Anglophobia in the US during those same years.54 It is highly probable that the identity shift among English-descended Americans would have occurred as a simple function of the passage of time and the melding, in an era characterised by growing economic interdependence, of discrete American and British national interests. Likely it is that the emotional wounds inflicted by the rupture of 1775 would have healed eventually, and rational cooperative patterns would have been set in train, based on reciprocal cooperative measures in the two countries; and with this passage of time the weight of the past and its tendances lourdes inclining the two countries toward enmity and rivalry would have been overcome by the kind of institutional lock-in discussed in the preceding section of this chapter. But the process was helped along by the second contextual category, ethnic politics, addressed here. Put at its simplest, English-descended Americans, almost alone in the United States of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had been

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 39 incapable of engaging in ‘diaspora’ politics, for the good reason that in the originally heavily English country that the United States had been, the English-descended Americans had no identity-based need to show sympathetic concern for the interests of the ‘kin’ country. Indeed, for many scholars, even to think of the English element in America as a diaspora was to commit a category error, for these people were not ‘immigrants’ but rather were ‘settlers’, and therefore could not constitute a diaspora.55 Not only this, but the English-descended Americans had every reason, including identity-based ones such as those mentioned above, to stake out their differences with governments and societies in that kin country, based on real and perceived ‘historic’ grievances, which is one of the reasons why, alone among American ethnic communities, most of the English-descended saw no purpose in engaging in the kind of ‘filiopietism’ (ancestor worship) so common among policy intellectuals in other ethnic constituencies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.56 As a result of massive immigration into nineteenth century America, and the country’s increasing inability, try as it might, to isolate itself from the moils of the debased ‘old’ world, Americans of many ethnic stripes would come to see that what went on in Europe had a great deal of bearing upon the quality of their lives at home. No one captured this shift among Englishdescended Americans more clearly than did one Irish-American policy advocate of the early twentieth century, who deplored a trend that he saw was as unmistakable as it was unfortunate: Americans in growing numbers, lamented Edward McSweeney, were identifying positively instead of negatively with England, so much so that ‘[f]or the first time since the American Revolution it has been possible to be more British than American and still claim and retain legally United States citizenship’.57 What was happening is that as America became less of an ‘Anglo’ society its English-descended citizens began to warm to the idea that, on ‘civilisational’ grounds, they might actually have more in common with England than they had thought. There can be no question that for some English-descended Americans, the Anglo-Saxon ideologising of the turn-ofthe-century period had a certain attractiveness. But something more important was working to complement the pull of Anglo-Saxonism – a pull that, in the end, never could achieve a wide audience, not even among the English-descended Americans, who were its most natural constituents.58 What happened was that during the 1914–17 years, when the country was agonising over the position it should take vis-à-vis the European war, identity politics began to push the English-descended Americans closer to the former mother country than they had been at any time since 1775. To these Americans, not only was it wise on foreign policy grounds for their country to work toward bettering the relationship with the ‘historic’ foe, Great Britain, but it was becoming, during the emotional years of the First World War and the early post-war period, urgent to do so for reasons related to domestic policy as well. Attacks made on England by non-English ethnic

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diasporas in the US had a way of being regarded, by America’s Englishdescended, as attacks on them, as well. Seen in this light, the American ‘culture wars’ of the first two decades of the twentieth century take on new significance. For the English-descended Americans, the First World War and its immediate aftermath presented both a need and an opportunity to rally around the cause of England, and while the emotions stirred up by the crisis of the war years – emotions that, to borrow an expression later introduced by Samuel Huntington, reflected a kind of ‘civilisational rallying’59 – would rapidly abate during the interwar period, there can be no mistaking the identity shift of the wartime years. Thus a societal grouping, America’s English-descended population, began to experience a new ethnic consciousness that would engender feelings of affinity with, rather than hostility toward, the former mother country. These feelings were trenchantly summarised by Sen. John S. Williams (Democrat-Mississippi) during the heated debate in the Senate over the Versailles treaty and the League of Nations in 1919. The treaty had been stirring vigorous opposition from many quarters in the United States, and especially from two large ethnic diasporas, the Irish- and GermanAmericans. In light of the activities mounted by both groups over the course of the past decade, in which strident claims had been repeatedly voiced to the effect that rapprochement with Britain represented a ‘betrayal’ of all that America had stood for and a rejection of the values of the Revolution, Williams remarked sardonically that ‘[w]e have reached the point where no man can be a real American unless he is an Irish-American or a German-American’.60 However accurate the senator’s barbed comment might otherwise have been, he was not wrong in singling out the Irish- and German-Americans as the principal antagonists of the English-descended Americans in the struggle over the national identity and the implications flowing therefrom for the national interest. These were not the only ethnic diasporas in America at the time to militate in favour of the ancestral homeland, but they were far and away the largest, and they had, arguably, the greatest impact upon US foreign policy, and therefore upon Anglo-American relations.61 Nor was the ‘lobbying’ that occurred around the Versailles treaty the first such instance of ethnic diasporas seeking to influence foreign policy outcomes. More than two decades earlier, the Senate had debated another treaty with the potential to strengthen Anglo-American relations – the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of 1897, which would have required, in certain instances, the US and the UK to take their disputes to arbitration – with the result being that the two-thirds majority required for passage proved incapable of attainment, and it failed in part because of heated opposition from Irish-Americans, always on the lookout for any initiative that might be construed as beneficial to British interests.62 It is not hard to see why the Irish- and German-Americans would come to take an interest in American foreign policy debates: to both groups, even if

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 41 for different reasons, Britain loomed as the principal object of their loathing, in the Irish case because of the long, and seemingly never-ending struggle for Irish ‘freedom’,63 and in the German case because the downturn in relations between the English-speaking countries and Germany presented not only a threat to the interests of their kin country, but also to the interests of the diaspora in America itself.64 Their respective Anglophobic logics would lead, during the first two decades of the twentieth century, to a tacit alliance between the two large ethnic diasporas in America – an alliance whose founding sentiment could be summed up, somewhat brutally as far as the British and many Americans were concerned, by an editorial in the Irish-American Chicago Citizen in July 1908: ‘There is not an Irishman in America today, in whose veins good red blood is flowing, who would not rejoice to hear that a German army was marching in triumph across England from Yarmouth to Milford Haven’.65 The year in which this editorial appeared was also the year in which a formal alliance was compacted between the leading German-American diaspora group (the National German-American Alliance) and the Ancient Order of Hibernians, but the ties between to the two ethnic constituencies would extend far beyond the formal linkages created in what they took to be the ‘heat of the battle’, namely those years in which voices in England were calling not only for a rapprochement with America, but an alliance with it. In the US, so long and habitually conditioned to a policy of avoiding alliance with Britain or anyone else, the question whether America was to abandon its ‘splendid isolation’ and commit itself to involvement in the European balance of power was, understandably, a searing one. And no one took such a passionate interest in trying to frustrate both rapprochement and alliance than did the German- and Irish-Americans. The German-Americans were the largest non-English ethnic group of European origin in the US in the early twentieth century. Germans had started to immigrate into America in the century prior to the American Revolution, and by the time the latter erupted, they constituted nearly 10 per cent of the total population. During the nineteenth century, massive migration from Germany made the US ‘home of the third largest number of German-speaking people in the world’.66 Successive waves of heavy immigration during the decades following 1830 would bring roughly 6 million Germans to the US.67 The last federal census prior to the First World War, in 1910, revealed that out of a total American population of 92 million, some 2.5 million had been born in Germany, with another 5.8 million being second-generation Germans (i.e. American-born but with either one or both parents German-born). Thus with the first and second generations combining to top the 8-million mark, Germans constituted far and away the leading immigrant group in the US, and made up 26 per cent of the country’s total foreign (i.e. not English-descended) ‘stock’.68 But even this understated what might be taken to be the German ‘fact’ in American demography, for to the first- and second-generation Germans had to be

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added those who had been in the country longer, yet who continued to identify themselves as German and to live, as much as possible, a German life in America. Thus it could be, and was, argued that there existed a German ‘element’ in America (usually construed as meaning anyone with an admixture of German blood flowing through their veins) accounting for no less than 27 per cent of the population in the years just prior to the First World War!69 Hardly less numerous were the Irish-Americans. The first federal census published in the twentieth century (in 1900) revealed an Irish content to American demography that came close to matching the German one, with some 4,826,904 listed as Irish, meaning either that they themselves had been born in Ireland or that they had at least one parent born there (i.e. the Irish ‘stock’). But Irish-American nationalist leaders were not slow to seize upon a larger figure, representing the Irish ‘element’, and regularly would claim to speak on behalf of some 20 million Irish-Americans.70 However, because Germany remained so heavily populated even during the era of heavy emigration, the large numbers of its people who left the homeland during the nineteenth century still only constituted a small slice of the overall population, such that the German nation continued mainly after 1870 to reside within the new German state. Not so with the Irish who came to America, where they constituted an important part of what some were beginning to call ‘Greater Ireland’. The United States did not merely serve as a model for those seeking Ireland’s outright independence according to republican principles and institutions. It also served, in many instances, as a springboard by which physical-force nationalists – who might in a later age have been dubbed ‘terrorists’71 – could achieve Irish freedom, either by taking Britain’s North American possessions away from it and swapping them in exchange for Irish independence, or by aiding directly the cause of insurrection in the British Isles through bases of operation on American soil.72 This is why so many observers, in that long period from the American Civil War to the AngloIrish war at the start of the 1920s, could easily believe that the future of Ireland would ultimately be settled in America, with Irish-American nationalists taking the lead role. Together, Irish- and German-American diaspora leaders warned against any departure from American neutrality, and as we know, by 1917 their efforts would meet with failure, upon American entry into the war. Usually, scholars assessing the ‘influence’ of the two groups on Anglo-American relations argue that even if they did not attain their ultimate aim, they certainly contributed to America’s staying out of the fight for as long as it had. Therefore, the assessment is that the groups were baneful for the course of American and British policy confluence. Here I would simply inject a cautionary note, and draw our attention to the ‘principle of the opposite effect’. By this I mean to suggest that by challenging, on the basis of ethnic identity, American national self-conceptions, the German- and

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 43 Irish-American influence attempts could be construed as contributing to the reformulation of an ‘Anglo-American’ identity within the US, making it possible for the first time in more than a century for a large number of English-descended Americans to see themselves as sharing fundamentally a transnational collective identity with the British, rather than continuing to regard those selfsame British as the ‘significant other’ against which America’s own national identity required being measured. In a word, ethnic diasporas in America who sought to inhibit the further development of closer Anglo-American ties contributed, entirely without knowing or desiring it, to the first stages of the elimination of what had heretofore been a significant and real ‘ontological security dilemma’73 in transatlantic relations, one whose consequences had been to keep, on identity grounds, Americans from empathising and cooperating more closely with the British. The novelist Owen Wister testified better than anyone to this budding identity shift among America’s English-descended population, when he recounted, shortly after the war, that although mainly English-descended himself, he too had been affected by the national ‘antiEnglish complex’ in the pre-war years, and that as a result he had shrunk from endorsing closer ties between the US and Britain. This was so, even though he had many good English friends and that: I knew also … that all the best we have and are – law, ethics, love of liberty – all of it came from England, grew in England first, ripened from the seed of which we are merely one great harvest, planted here by England .74 But the emotions of wartime converted Wister into a staunch advocate of Anglo-American strategic cooperation. What occurred in the case of Owen Wister helps us to grasp the deeper meaning of the above-cited complaint against the British lodged by Edward McSweeney during the height of the controversy over the League of Nations, in the middle of 1919. McSweeney was correct to the extent that by the first year of the post-war era it was becoming possible for Americans – at least the great majority who had descended from the British settlers – to reflect more sympathetically upon their own ‘ancestral homeland’ than most of them had ever been used to doing. They may not have become, as the IrishAmerican nationalist charged, ‘more British than American’,75 but at least they were able to begin to overcome what had been a generations-long ontological complex, and in the process start to sense that they shared a transnational collective identity with the British. It would not, however, be until after 1940 that adherents to the transnational perspective would be able to see their preferences reflected in an evolving American policy toward Britain.

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Conclusions Three conclusions can be drawn from this chapter’s attempt to shine a ‘strategic cultural’ spotlight on the Anglo-American special relationship. The first, and least contentious, of these concerns is the choice of 1940 as a very appropriate moment from which to date the most meaningful steps in the evolution of that relationship – a choice the editors of this volume have made, and one that has been reflected in this volume’s other chapters. Pace those writers (and they are many) who insist that it was the historic rapprochement of the turn of the century that set in motion the special relationship, we can instead interpret the onset of that relationship as being of more recent vintage, dating from the late summer of 1940. This conclusion is triggered by our use of strategic culture as an instance of path dependence. For if the conceptual accompaniment called ‘lock-in’ (ideally ratified by institutions) really is a necessary condition for ‘selfreinforcing sequences’ to come into effect, and if these sequences constitute merely another way of expressing the pattern of sustained cooperation we so often associate with the special relationship, then it becomes obvious what is wrong with the choice of the Great Rapprochement of the turn of the last century as the starting point for that relationship: nothing got locked in at the start of the twentieth century. The first burst of cooperation associated with British accommodation of American strategic goals during the late 1890s proved to be short-lived, and after the First World War there was a return to the earlier practices of suboptimal cooperation, so much so that it was even thought, during the interwar period, that another war between the US and UK could not a priori be excluded from the realm of possibility. In short, no ‘stable peace’ had been achieved by the two Englishspeaking countries at that time. After 1940 and the subsequent developments set in motion during that late summer, however, one could say that a set of institutional arrangements was put in place that would culminate in the two countries becoming what they remain today, reliable allies between whom an armed conflict simply is taken to be a logical absurdity. Our second conclusion is a bit more speculative, and depends upon a different manner of understanding strategic culture, namely as an instance of ethnic politics. Here what is suggestive is the notion that identity shifts have had a bearing upon policy shifts, such that American foreign policy toward Great Britain has depended in no trivial manner upon the way that American opinion has interpreted the meaning of the English ‘other’ in the formation of the national identity. The social constructivists would sometimes employ the ungainly, but nonetheless useful, word ‘alterity’ to refer to the manner in which one’s own identity requires having someone else able to provide a cognitive foil, and this was a role that Americans designed for England after their Revolution, and a role that prevented the first, halting steps toward bilateral cooperation from emerging into that fuller fabric we now call the special relationship. What was significant about the civilisational rallying of

Is there a ‘strategic culture’ of the special relationship? 45 the wartime years (1914–18) is that it constituted, for the English-descended Americans, a way out of their hitherto dominant ontological dilemma; it did so by changing the nature of their own politics of ‘alterity’. Now, for the first time, English-descended Americans would sense that there were other ‘others’ – right there at home – with greater bearing upon their own sense of who they, themselves, were than the English of the former mother country, across the seas. If this is so, then we need to reassess the consequences of the ethnic lobbying around foreign policy that so animated the Irish- and German-Americans during the early twentieth century. Rather than providing yet another wedge between America and England, it could be that those ethnic diasporas, quite involuntarily, cleared the path for the development of the special relationship. The third and final concluding observation concerns the future of American ethnicity, and relates to the suspicions entertained by some European observers that as the US becomes demographically less and less ‘European’, it will perforce turn its attention away from what had been for so long the lodestar of American grand strategy, namely the ‘old world’. And in so doing, it will, again for reasons related to demography, distance itself from both the UK and the Anglo-American special relationship. For sure, this could be what will transpire. However, I suspect that the institutional lock-in accomplished over the past seven decades – an institutional process that was assisted if not enabled by the identity shift on the part of English-descended Americans, whose altered understanding of their own place in American society led them to swap their erstwhile Anglophobia for Anglophilia, will continue to influence American policymakers to want to go on collaborating closely with Britain on matters related to security and defence – even if the attention of those policymakers continues to drift away from European affairs, as it is almost certain to do. For unlike America’s other European allies (France possibly excepted), Britain is seen in Washington as a reliable, perhaps almost necessary, global partner.

Notes 1

Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of Racialized Identity in International Relations, Stanford, US: Stanford University Press, 2011; James C. Bennett, Anglosphere: The Future of the English-Speaking Nations in the Internet Era, Lanham, MD, US: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004; Owen Harries, ‘The Anglosphere Illusion’, National Interest, no. 63 (Spring 2001), pp. 130–6. 2 Bruce Cronin, Community Under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. 3 See Niall Ferguson, ‘Nothing Special’, American Interest 1 (Summer 2006): 66–70; and Max Beloff, ‘The Special Relationship: An Anglo-American Myth’, in A Century of Conflict, 1850–1950: Essays for A. J. P. Taylor, Martin Gilbert, editor, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1966, pp. 151–71. Also see Coral Bell, The Debatable Alliance: An Essay in Anglo-American Relations, London: Oxford

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David G. Haglund University Press, 1964; and John Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994.  Edward Ingram, ‘The Wonderland of the Political Scientist’, International Security 22 (Summer 1997): 53–63, quote at p. 57. See the volume edited by John Dumbrell and Axel R. Schäfer, America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance, London: Routledge, 2009. The alternative descriptive appeared in a Times of London op-ed piece co-authored by the two leaders, and published on Tuesday, 24 May 2011. See Mark Landler, ‘Britain Welcomes Obama, with Concerns Remaining in the Background’, New York Times, 25 May 2011, p. A11. See my ‘What Good Is Strategic Culture? A Modest Defence of an Immodest Concept’, International Journal 59 (Summer 2004): 479–502. I have based portions of this chapter on that article. Colin S. Gray, ‘Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back’, Review of International Studies 25 (January 1999): 49–69; and ibid, ‘Out of the Wilderness: Prime Time for Strategic Culture’, Comparative Strategy 26 (January-March 2007): 1–20. See especially Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995; and ibid, ‘Thinking about Strategic Culture’, International Security 19 (Spring 1995): 32–64. For a good recent example of employing the category of ‘diplomatic culture’ (one variant of what I call ‘strategic culture’), see Brian Bow, The Politics of Linkage: Power, Interdependence, and Ideas in Canada-US Relations, Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press, 2009. The state, of course, is a politico-juridical term; the nation is a sociological one. Stuart Anderson, Race and Rapprochement: Anglo-Saxonism and Anglo-American Relations, 1895–1904, Rutherford, NJ, US: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1981; George Edward Gordon Catlin, The Anglo-Saxon Tradition, London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1939; and H. Perry Robinson, The Twentieth Century American: Being a Comparative Study of the Peoples of the Two Great Anglo-Saxon Nations, Chautauqua, NY, US: Chautauqua Press, 1911. On the rise, decline, and re-emergence of historical sociology see Harry Elmer Barnes, Historical Sociology: Its Origins and Development, New York: Philosophical Library, 1948; and Dennis Smith, The Rise of Historical Sociology, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991. On the arrival of identity as an element of conceptual high-fashion, see Glenn Chafetz, Michael Spirtas, and Benjamin Frankel, ‘Introduction: Tracing the Influence of Identity on Foreign Policy’, Security Studies 8 (Winter 1998/99Spring 1999): vii-xxii. For a fairly recent invocation of the former variable, see Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and the New World Order, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003; for a somewhat less recent employment of the latter, see Robert Briffault, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1938. See Andrew Abbott, ‘From Causes to Events: Notes on Narrative Positivism’, Sociological Methods and Research 20 (May 1992): 428–55. Also relevant here are Kevin Fox Gotham and William G. Staples, ‘Narrative Analysis and the New Historical Sociology’, Sociological Quarterly 37 (Summer 1996): 481–501; John Gerard Ruggie, ‘Peace in Our Time? Causality, Social Facts and Narrative Knowing’, American Society of International Law: Proceedings 89th Annual Meeting (1995): 93–100; and Lawrence Stone, ‘The Revival of the Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History’, Past and Present 85 (November 1979): 3–24.

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26 27 28 29 30 31 32

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Paul Pierson, ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics’, American Political Science Review 94 (June 2000): 251–68. Also see Margaret R. Somers, ‘“We’re No Angels”: Realism, Rational Choice, and Relationality in Social Science’, American Journal of Sociology 104 (November 1998): 722–84. See Theda Skocpol, ‘Sociology’s Historical Imagination’, in Vision and Method in Historical Sociology, Theda Skocpol, editor, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1984, pp. 1–21. On the methodological bona fides of process tracing, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 64–7. See Jack A. Goldstone, ‘Initial Conditions, General Laws, Path Dependence, and Explanation in Historical Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology 104 (November 1998): 829–45. James Mahoney, ‘Path Dependence in Historical Sociology’, Theory and Society 29 (August 2000): 507–48. Or so I have argued in ‘Happy Days Are Here Again? France’s Reintegration into NATO and Its Impact on Relations with the United States’, European Security 19 (March 2010): 123–42. Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914, New York: Atheneum, 1968. Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 2. On the history of the bilateral relationship, see Kathleen Burk, Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning, New York: Grove Press, 2009; Kenneth Bourne, Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908, Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 1967; Harry Cranbrook Allen, The Anglo-American Relationship since 1783, London: Black, 1959; Charles S. Campbell, Jr, From Revolution to Rapprochement: The United States and Great Britain, 1783–1900, New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1974; Robert Balmain Mowat, The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States, London: E. Arnold, 1925. Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 2. So labelled by Christopher Hitchens, Blood, Class, and Empire: The Enduring Anglo-American Relationship, New York: Nation Books, 2004, p. 166. Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914, New York: Atheneum, 1968, pp. 25–6. Jennie A. Sloan, ‘Anglo-American Relations and the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute’, Hispanic American Historical Review 4 (November 1938): 486–506. Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective, Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1989, pp. 40–2. See William C. Widenor, Henry Cabot Lodge and the Search for an American Foreign Policy, Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 1980; and Owen Wister, A Straight Deal or, The Ancient Grudge, New York: Macmillan, 1920. Edward P. Crapol, America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglophobia in the late Nineteenth Century, Westport, CT, US: Greenwood, 1973; and Walter LaFeber, ‘The Background of Cleveland’s Venezuelan Policy: A Reinterpretation’, American Historical Review 66 (July 1961): 947–67. Stephen R. Rock, Why Peace Breaks Out: Great Power Rapprochement in Historical Perspective, Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1989, pp. 56–7; and Marshall Bertram, The Birth of Anglo-American Friendship: The Prime Facet of the Venezuelan Boundary Dispute – A Study of the Interrelation of Diplomacy and Public Opinion, Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1992.

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David H. Burton, ‘Theodore Roosevelt and His English Correspondents: The Intellectual Roots of the Anglo-American Alliance’, Mid-America 53 (January 1971): 12–34, quote at p. 33. France was one of the European countries most opposed to America’s war with Spain. See Louis Martin Sears, ‘French Opinion of the Spanish-American War’, Hispanic American Historical Review 7 (February 1927): 25–44; Octave Noël, Le Péril américain, Paris, France: De Soye et fils, 1899; and Sylvia L. Hilton and Steve J. S. Ickringill, editors., European Perceptions of the Spanish-American War of 1898, New York: Lang, 1999. Geoffrey Seed, ‘British Reactions to American Imperialism Reflected in Journals of Opinion, 1898–1900’, Political Science Quarterly 73 (June 1958): 254–72. Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States, 1895–1914, New York: Atheneum, 1968, pp. 46–7. Also see Alfred Vagts, ‘Hopes and Fears of an American-German War, 1870–1915: I’, Political Science Quarterly 54 (December 1939): 514–35. Fareed Zakaria, The Post-American World, New York: W. W. Norton, 2009, p. 172. For a corrective, see John Henry Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War, Philadelphia, US: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1939, p. ix: ‘In spite of the fact that public opinion in the United States came to be overwhelmingly in favor of the Boers, the American government acted throughout the war as if in friendly alliance with England, and by doing so did much to prevent intervention by the European powers, thus assuring the annihilation of the Boer republics’. Stuart Anderson, ‘Racial Anglo-Saxonism and the American Response to the Boer War’, Diplomatic History 2 (Summer 1978): 219–36. One former Rough Rider who had served in Cuba with Theodore Roosevelt went off to fight alongside the underdog Boers, only to discover that they spoke Dutch, so he switched and joined the British forces! See Byron Farwell, ‘Taking Sides in the Boer War’, American Heritage 27 (April 1976): 21–5, 92–7. For instance, see Iestyn Adams, Brothers Across the Ocean: British Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Anglo-American Special Relationship, 1900–1905, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2005. William Clark, Less than Kin: A Study of Anglo-American Relations, Boston, US: Houghton Mifflin, 1958, p. 104. The Hague Convention of 1907, although allowing neutrals to trade legally with belligerents and still maintain their neutrality, specifically prohibited any transfer of forces-in-being to belligerents, which of course was the whole point of the swap. As for the vintage of these destroyers, in Washington much emphasis was put on their being rather ancient, when in fact they had mostly been built over the past quarter-century – not such a long period when one considers that the USAF continues to operate with success B-52 bombers dating from the Cold War era or that the Canadian air force’s ‘top-of-the-line’ CF-18 fighter-bombers, most recently in action over Libyan skies, are today as ‘old’ as were those American destroyers transferred to Britain in late 1940. On the destroyers-bases exchange, see James R. Leutze, Bargaining for Supremacy: AngloAmerican Naval Collaboration, 1937–1941, Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1977, pp. 72–93, 114–27; and Philip Goodhart, Fifty Ships that Saved the World: The Foundation of the Anglo-American Alliance, Garden City, NY, US: Doubleday, 1965. For the hemispheric element in Washington strategising, see my Latin America and the Transformation of U.S. Strategic Thought, 1936–1940, Albuquerque, US: University of New Mexico Press, 1984.

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See Christina Rowley and Jutta Weldes, ‘Identities and US Foreign Policy’, in US Foreign Policy, Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, editors, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 183–209. See Rodney Bruce Hall, National Collective Identity: Social Constructs and International Systems, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; and William Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity and International Relations, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990. This critique is made by Paul A. Kowert, ‘National Identity: Inside and Out’, Security Studies 8 (Winter 1998/99-Spring 1999): 1–34. But for a rebuttal, see Francisco Gil-White, ‘How Thick Is Blood? The Plot Thickens…: If Ethnic Actors Are Primordialists, What Remains of the Circumstantialist/Primordialist Controversy?’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 22 (September 1999): 789–820. A charge made, inter alios, by Hamilton Fyfe, The Illusion of National Character, London: Watts, 1940. For a sharp rebuke to those who would steer clear of national character while embracing other vague categories (e.g. class), see Dean Peabody, National Characteristics, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1985. Also see Kenneth W. Terhune, ‘From National Character to National Behavior: A Reformulation’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 14 (June 1970): 203–63. John E. Moser, Twisting the Lion’s Tail: American Anglophobia between the World Wars, New York: New York University Press, 1999. As argued in David Hackett Fischer, Albion’s Seed: Four British Folkways in America, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.  Walter Russell Mead, God and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008, pp. 47–8. See, for some examples drawn from IR and social psychology, Jonathan Mercer, ‘Identity and Anarchy’, International Organization 49 (Spring 1995): 229–52; Jennifer Crocker and Riia Luhtanen, ‘Collective Self-Esteem and Ingroup Bias’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 58 (January 1990): 60–7; Noel Kaplowitz, ‘National Self-Images, Perception of Enemies, and Conflict Strategies: Psychological Dimensions of International Relations’, Political Psychology 11, 1 (1990): 39–82; Iver B. Neumann, ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations 2 (June 1996): 139–74; and Susan Oyama, ‘Innate Selfishness, Innate Sociality’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (December 1989): 717–18. See George H. Knoles, The Jazz Age Revisited: British Criticism of American Civilization during the 1920s, Stanford, US: Stanford University Press, 1955; ‘The Source of Anti-Britishism’, New Republic 52 (16 November 1927): 325–6; and ‘Anti-British Hysteria’, Nation, 143 (11 September 1937): 253–4. For the claim that America has to be considered as predominantly a country of ‘settlers’ instead of ‘immigrants’, see Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, pp. 40–5. For a counterclaim, stressing that the English-descended also deserved to be regarded as one ethnic group among many, see Alexander De Conde, Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy: A History, Boston, US: Northeastern University Press, 1992. Notes one historian of ethnic consciousness in America during this period, ‘historians belonging to the non-English ethnic groups … endeavoured as best they could to add cubits to their ancestors’ stature’, with the purpose of their filiopietism being to compensate for identity problems in their new homeland, as well as to advance the interests of their respective kin countries. The irony of this neglect of the English, the ethnic group that had done so much to build America, is found in the ‘[t]remendous industry [that] went into the discovery of a number of lesser folk heroes who shared with the Anglo-Saxon giants the

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David G. Haglund major trials of the Republic’. Edward N. Saveth, American Historians and European Immigrants, 1875–1925, New York: Russell and Russell, 1965; orig. pub., 1948, pp. 202–3. Edward F. McSweeney, Ireland Is an American Question, New York: Friends of Irish Freedom, 1919, pp. 5–6. See the pessimistic account by one Californian, who regretted that AngloSaxonism had a very dim future in the US in the twentieth century. Homer Lea, The Day of the Saxon, New York: Harper & Bros, 1912. Samuel P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’ Foreign Affairs 72 (Summer 1993): 22–49. Quoted in Edward Cuddy, ‘“Are the Bolsheviks Any Worse than the Irish?”: Ethno-Religious Conflict in America during the 1920s’, Éire-Ireland 11 (Autumn 1976): 13–32, quote at pp. 15–16. Even if these diasporic groups were incapable on their own of determining the course of US policy toward the war, their influence on that policy was, in the words of one scholar, certainly ‘more than marginal’. Tony Smith, Foreign Attachments: The Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy, Cambridge, US: Harvard University Press, 2000, p. 47. Nelson Manfred Blake, ‘The Olney-Pauncefote Treaty of 1897’, American Historical Review 50 (January 1945): 228–43. Richard English, Irish Freedom: The History of Nationalism in Ireland, London: Macmillan, 2006. Clifton James Child, The German-Americans in Politics, 1914–1917, Madison, US: University of Wisconsin Press, 1939; Russell A. Kazal, Becoming Old Stock: The Paradox of German-American Identity, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2004.  Quoted in Alan J. Ward, ‘America and the Irish Problem, 1899–1921’, Irish Historical Studies 16 (March 1968): 64–90, quote at pp. 73–4. La Vern J. Rippley, The German-Americans, Boston, US: Twayne Publishers, 1976, p. 21. Early German settlement was heaviest in what today would be called the Mid-Atlantic states, above all Pennsylvania, leading some of that colony’s political elites in the middle of the eighteenth century, for instance Benjamin Franklin, to express concerns about their assimilability; see Edmund S. Morgan, Benjamin Franklin, New Haven, US: Yale University Press, 2002, pp. 78–9. See Mack Walker, Germany and the Emigration, 1816–1885, Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press, 1964. Frederick C. Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German-Americans and World War I, De Kalb, ILL, US: Northern Illinois University Press, 1974, pp. 29–30, 34. John A. Hawgood, The Tragedy of German-America: The Germans in the United States of America during the Nineteenth Century – and After, New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1940, pp. 59–60; Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A ‘Special Relationship’? Cambridge, MA, US: Harvard University Press, 1980, pp. 28–31. Michael Doorley, Irish-American Diaspora Nationalism: The Friends of Irish Freedom, 1916–1935, Dublin: Four Courts Press, 2005, pp.  21–4. By the 1980 federal census, due to processes related to natural as well as ‘social’ increase, the number of Irish-Americans would more than double; see Michael Hout and Joshua R. Goldstein, ‘How 4.5 Million Irish Immigrants Became 40 Million Irish Americans: Demographic and Subjective Aspects of the Ethnic Composition of White Americans’, American Sociological Review 59 (February 1994): 64–82. Instead, a term that was consistently applied to these nationalists by their adversaries was ‘criminals’. See H. B. C. Pollard, The Secret Societies of Ireland: Their Rise and Progress, London: Philip Allan, 1922.

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Kenneth R. M. Short, The Dynamite War: Irish American Bombers in Victorian Britain, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, US: Humanities Press, 1979. 73 On this kind of identity-based security dilemma, see Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations 12 (September 2006): 341–70. 74 Owen Wister, A Straight Deal or, The Ancient Grudge, New York: Macmillan, 1920, p. 205. 75 Edward F. McSweeney, Ireland Is an American Question, New York: Friends of Irish Freedom, 1919, pp. 5–6.

2

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ Understanding the cultural sinews of the Anglo-American special relationship Robert M. Hendershot

Introduction In 1976, the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Anne Armstrong, addressed a British audience at Westminster Abbey and argued that, ‘as we examine the unprecedented and enduring relationship between Britain and the United States, it is clear that affection is the cement which binds us.’1 She also spoke of emotional connections and affinities that were unique to the culture of the Anglo-American special relationship, and admitted that this was all highly unusual in the pragmatic field of international relations. Such ideas about the distinctive nature of the alliance’s operational dynamic, which were by no means limited to Ambassador Armstrong, point to aspects of the special relationship that must be fully understood if we are to effectively analyze its past, present, and future. Towards those ends, this chapter examines the centrality of AngloAmerican cultural connections and the élite perceptions of cultural affinity that have helped to preserve this unique bilateral partnership since 1940. Through an integrated examination of Anglo-American diplomacy, discourse, and perceptions of public opinion, this chapter focuses on the stabilizing effects that perception and cultural affinity have historically wrought upon the special relationship. By establishing when perceptions of cultural bonds did and did not have an effect on the thoughts, decisions, and actions taken by Britain and America, this analysis contributes to a holistic understanding of the fundamental nature of the special relationship, its strengths and weaknesses, its cultural core, and its unique operational dynamic within the broader Western Alliance. In particular, this chapter surveys the role of perception in the operation and history of the special relationship. Though very influential, AngloAmerican cultural affinity is nebulous in nature and intermittently difficult to measure. However, evidence of the perception of cultural affinity is plentiful in the historical record. Therefore this chapter refers to the perception of cultural affinity, especially amongst the Anglo-American foreign policy élite, as Anglo-American sentimentality. This tendency, which

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 53 existed on both sides of the Atlantic, to view the alliance in a romantic sense, to perceive the American and British peoples as being bonded together in thought and action by more than strategic and economic convergence, exerted tremendous influence upon the decision to hold one another close (diplomatically and publicly) throughout the post-war period. Put simply, this sentimentality has been a major component of the special relationship’s durability. Anglo-American élites perceived mutual cultural affinity in a variety of constituent areas, including shared memories of alliance and combat, shared democratic and historical heritage, shared language and literary traditions, shared cultural references, shared popular culture, and shared familial ties. As a result, praise for such cultural sinews and affinities has dominated the diplomatic discourse and élite perceptions of cultural affinity have remained constant, even during periods of diplomatic tension. Accordingly, this chapter is designed to establish two things. First, that élite perceptions of cultural affinity have existed and remained stable throughout the history of the alliance, and second, that these perceptions influence the operation of the alliance, making it uniquely flexible and contributing to its ability to weather inequality, crisis, and disagreement. This analysis not only demonstrates the importance of cultural affinity and sentimentality but also helps to explain why the special relationship survived major policy divergences, such as Britain’s 1956 invasion of Egypt, America’s long war in Vietnam, and more recent squabbles over the sources of terrorism and the best ways to combat its threat. By the mid-1950s, numerous scholars openly attached great significance to the cultural dimensions of the Anglo-American diplomatic alliance. The British historian H. C. Allen reflected the widespread belief that the special relationship was both natural and fundamental to the security of both nations: ‘I have not written this book purely as an academic study: I have written it because I believe in the necessity for cordial Anglo-American relations.’ He went on to argue that the sources of Anglo-American friendship included ‘sentiment’ as well as a ‘wide complex of causes, political, economic, and social.’ Indeed, Allen believed that ‘the intimacy of Anglo-American relations . . . has manifold links embedded deep in the lives of both peoples.’2 Similarly, the Briton Paul Wilson and the American Henry Roberts published a joint study of their nations’ cooperation, in which they argued, ‘to the great majority of Britishers, the American is not really a “foreigner” ’. Such notions of Anglo-American intimacy may not have been entirely accurate, but as will be explained in this chapter, all that was required to influence international diplomacy was that members of the foreign policy élite perceive them to be true.3 Indeed, this chapter seeks not to buttress the claims of Allen, Roberts, and Wilson, but rather to demonstrate that it has been this widespread perception of cultural affinity that has created much of the special relationship’s elasticity and durability, and that continues to facilitate the relationship’s survival in the twenty-first century.

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Subsequent historiographical trends tended to focus on the numerous and fascinating tensions and contradictions of the alliance, which is understandable given their frequency and importance. The result was the emergence of more critical analyses of the special relationship in the later twentieth century. Indeed by the mid-1970s, much of the established work on the modern special relationship had come to focus on the expanding and problematic economic differences between the United States and Great Britain. For example, scholars such as Bernard Porter and Paul Kennedy fostered considerable consensus regarding the nature of Britain’s decline. Since the time of Lord Palmerston, Britain had found its early industrial supremacy challenged by other nations and its previously unequalled position of power in relative decline. Simultaneously, the world wars forced the United Kingdom to defend its interests with force, and thus to endure the associated and crippling financial costs. After 1945 the British, choosing economic stability over military power, were forced to gradually abandon their Great Power status as well as their colonial possessions.4 In this way, the nature of Britain’s decline became the guiding theme for the later Cold War interpretations of the special relationship, inspiring Watt’s Succeeding John Bull, America in Britain’s Place and Reynolds’s Britannia Overruled, among others. Building on the foundation laid by Porter and Kennedy, Watt concluded that America’s post-war economic supremacy led it to a larger global role and a growing focus on Asia, while the United Kingdom’s economic decline forced it to turn toward Europe. Reynolds essentially agreed, but also pointed out that Britain’s decline was neither steady nor obvious, and that consequently the British paid dearly for delaying their integration with Europe while relying on their American and Commonwealth connections longer than was in their best interests.5 Though this analysis has the ability to explain much of the alliance’s operational dynamic, it does not tell the whole story of the special relationship. For that, we need to incorporate study of cultural affinity and associated perceptions, and recognize that these were indeed forces capable of counteracting the tensions caused by changes in economic power. While the inverse economic positions of Britain and America made it impossible to maintain the alliance as it existed during the Second World War, the stabilizing effects of sentimentality simultaneously worked to counteract tensions and troubles, with at least enough success to maintain the special relationship’s existence throughout the post-war period. The Cold War era works mentioned above successfully isolated one of the main sources of tension in the Anglo-American special relationship: the deterioration of the equality of the alliance, mainly in economic terms. Yet, the special relationship has survived the changes detailed by Watt, Reynolds, and others. It still exists and, indeed, continues to affect global events in the twenty-first century. Britain’s decline and America’s rise did not spell the end of their alliance, and neither did the disappearance of the perceived

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 55 Soviet threat at the end of the Cold War. In this way, the narratives constructed by Cold War era historians did not fully explore the question of what makes the special relationship special, nor of what has kept it special over time. In their efforts to detail the ways in which economic and strategic tensions frustrated and weakened the alliance, they simultaneously introduced the quiet idea that the relationship was not likely to endure, and yet it has. An important quest for modern historians, then, is to analyze how and why the alliance survived the troublesome tensions outlined by Reynolds and Watt. How did the alliance persevere? What factors and forces have sustained it as a recognized diplomatic entity? Why has it remained a fixture of Western geopolitics, in spite of dramatic shifts in economic capabilities and regional interests? While each of the chapters in this volume offers considerable insight into the answers to these questions, this chapter establishes that another significant component of the answers lies in AngloAmerican myths, ideas, and perceptions; the culture of the special relationship. Popular perception and mythology have always played important roles in the operational dynamic of the special relationship. The ability of the alliance between the United Kingdom and the United States to survive substantial differences in their foreign policies is in no small way due to a shared belief that the basis of their nations’ relationship is constructed of more than common strategic and economic interests. To put it another way, much of the ‘special’ quality of the alliance is historically derived from a feeling of friendship between the British and the Americans that extends far beyond personal connection. Indeed, the relationship is supposed to be natural and unflappable, and to exist in a general sense in the hearts and minds of the populace of both countries. It is supposed to guarantee that each country and its government would think of the other when setting policy, respecting their special partner’s wishes and needs almost as their own. In this way, these great and powerful, historically and culturally linked nations are supposed to turn the pages of history together, simultaneously setting the examples by which other countries would learn of civility, strength, duty, equal cooperation, and international friendship. Evidence of this idyllic perception of the relationship has been clearly seen since the period of the Great Rapprochement6, and subsequently in the early twentieth century as well, and readers will find a thoughtful exploration of this earlier period in the chapter contributed by David Haglund. Subsequently, this perception has routinely characterized public opinions in both nations and, in turn, has had consistent dominion over the political discourse of the relationship, just as American and British governments became ever more practiced at enacting this mythology before a global audience. However, this idyllic and reassuring concept of the special relationship, despite its popularity and polish, has always been a chimera. In order to fully understand the history of Anglo-American relations, it must be recognized that there are two special relationships, or

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at least two distinct halves of the relationship, that have continually impacted one another during the last seventy years. Put simply, there is a difference between the actual (diplomatic) special relationship and what will be referred to in this chapter as the sentimental myth of the special relationship. The day-to-day operation of the diplomatic alliance has always been characterized by tension and disagreement, even at its zenith in the Second World War. Whether in deliberating the best ways to combat Nazism, contain communism, deal effectively with crises in the Middle East, exploit a nuclear deterrent, or any number of other issues, the Americans and the British have rarely, if ever, seen exactly eye-to-eye. In this way, the idea of smooth, intimate, fruitful, and (most importantly) equal cooperation between friends has always been a sentimental myth. However, this has proven to be an extremely popular myth in both Britain and America. Indeed, the myth has been characterized by impressive durability and longevity. Winston Churchill’s rhetoric regarding the special bond and shared burden of Britain and America, and the ‘fraternal association of the English-speaking peoples’ struck deep chords within both populations, and such grandiloquence quickly became a fixture of perceptions and discourse within the alliance, at diplomatic as well as popular levels.7 Again, these were not new ideas. Similar expressions of Anglo-American bonds, though not universal, had been common well before Churchill. For example, the Anglo-American author Henry James wrote frankly of Atlantic convergence: ‘I can’t look at the English-American world, or feel about them, any more, save as a big Anglo-Saxon total, destined to such an amount of melting together that an insistence on their differences becomes more and more idle and pedantic.’8 Nevertheless, it was during the 1940s that we saw the entrenchment of the modern special relationship. It was in this era, of course, that Great Britain and the United States achieved their highest level of diplomatic and military cooperation and that the characteristics of the sentimental myth became entrenched in public opinion. The necessity and emergency of the war created the conditions for both the uniquely intimate bilateral relationship as well as the ideal of like peoples standing shoulder-to-shoulder against common enemies. Even before Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill had met alternately aboard a British and an American ship at Placentia Bay in Newfoundland to coordinate British and American might and objectives. As a result of this meeting, the leaders produced the Atlantic Charter, which stressed ‘certain common principles’ upon which to construct ‘a better future for the world.’ The document declared the allies’ joint war aims, calling for the ‘final destruction of Nazi tyranny’ and for a post-war world of free nations. In December 1941, shortly after the United States entered the war, the American and British leaders met again, this time in Washington D.C., to create an Anglo-American strategy for the war as well as bureaucratic structures to assist their intimate cooperation. Planning the war became a joint process with the

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 57 creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was headquartered in Washington but composed of both American and British officers.9 Furthermore, Anglo-American unity and interdependence became particularly apparent as the US and the UK pooled their munitions as well as their shipping resources, and as they established another joint authority to administer this sharing. As David Reynolds has pointed out, the wartime alliance ‘forged enduring and important personal relationships at all levels of the two countries’ officialdoms.’ The contacts at the highest levels of government were of course the most obvious, but ‘connections lower down, among middle-ranking officials later to rise to policy-making positions in the 1950s and early 1960s, were perhaps more significant as well as wider ranging.’10 Even further down the hierarchy of governmental bureaucracy, common soldiers from all over the United States were plied with sentimental notions of the United Kingdom and the British people. For example, in 1942 the US War Department produced and distributed a seven-page pamphlet to American servicemen sent to Britain to prepare for the invasion of occupied Europe. The government intended the pamphlet to prepare soldiers for life in Britain and, as one might expect, to fulfil the strategic goal of not offending their British hosts and allies. The language is awash with ideas of Anglo-American connection, likeness, friendship, and respect – all key components of the cultural message that permeated the Anglo-American alliance both during and after the war: The most evident truth of all is that in their major ways of life the British and American people are much alike. They speak the same language. They both believe in representative government, in freedom of worship, in freedom of speech. [. . .] The British are tough, strong people, and good allies. [. . .] The best way to get on in Britain is very much the same as the best way to get on in America. The same sort of courtesy and decency and friendliness that go over big in America will go over big in Britain. The British have seen a good many Americans and they like Americans. They will like your frankness as long as it is friendly. They will expect you to be generous. They are not given to back-slapping and they are shy about showing their affections. But once they get to like you they make the best friends in the world. 11 Such measures were clearly designed to secure high levels of AngloAmerican cultural affinity and are simultaneously indicative of the sentimentality that existed within the US War Department. Both nations also produced and circulated a wide variety of public posters themed around Anglo-American relations which were designed to visually reinforce

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similar notions, often depicting the camaraderie of US and British soldiers, Uncle Sam and Britannia marching side by side, or the American eagle and the British lion working together to demolish a swastika. Indeed, during the war a solid majority of American citizens felt committed to a permanent military alliance with Great Britain and believed that the United States and Britain should ‘come to each other’s defence immediately’ if the other were attacked in the future. This majority grew stronger through the war years. Gallup polling demonstrated that the majority of Americans in favour of such an alliance grew from 59.68 per cent to 67.21 per cent in 1943 alone. Furthermore, American citizens favoured such a continual alliance with Great Britain considerably more than with their other major wartime allies. For example, Gallup polling in August 1943 demonstrated that only 38.68 per cent of Americans favoured such an alliance with the Soviet Union, and in April of 1944, that only 41.88 per cent favoured such an alliance with China. As indicated by this data, the American public was uniquely fond of their alliance with the British.12 Cultural intimacy and affinity grew during the war, but it is also important to recognize that such growth reveals the emergent power of the alliance’s sentimental myth and its distinctive notions of Anglo-American unity, equality, partnership, and inevitable success through their nations’ cooperation. In both Great Britain and the United States, such expressions were neither rare nor, as will be explored below, limited to the duration of the war. It is safe to say that, at least since the Second World War, both the tension of day-to-day operations and the sentimental myth of the special relationship have remained consistent and ever-present, the latter sustaining the former, and thus allowing for continuation of the special relationship’s unique pattern of cooperation. To be sure, the sources of tension have changed in the post-war period. For example, new tensions over America’s excessive strength and unilateralist attitude eventually became the dominant theme of strains within the alliance. This change proved highly problematic, since it spoke directly to the inequality of the relationship, which in turn jarred with the equality component of the persisting sentimental myth. Yet the sentimental myth has remained popularly perceived and so the continuous tensions have never been able to divide American and British foreign policy entirely. In this way, the study of the cultural affinity, the sentimental myth, and the sentimentality of the American and British foreign policy élite illustrates aspects of the alliance that were always present, though less dramatically punctuated, during what Robert Hathaway has referred to as ‘the steady workaday routine functioning of what were indeed unusually close ties.’13 It is also illustrative to note that such special conditions existed in marked contrast to the ‘degree of anti-Germanism in America’ and the ‘deep-rooted antipathy’ toward the French.14 Likewise, British cultural affinity for the United States and the special relationship remained strong while British anti-Americanism remained low. In their work on global trends in

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 59 anti-Americanism, Hating America: A History, Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin have demonstrated that in Britain, ‘anti-Americanism was largely defused or driven underground by the close alliance between the two countries.’ While some in the Labour Party’s left wing, notably Aneurin Bevan, chafed under America’s Cold War hegemony and criticized American capitalism, these sentiments did not accurately represent those of the entire Labour Party, or indeed of the majority of Britons. For example, in 1956 Anthony Crosland, a leading member of the Labour Party and a noted socialist theorist, observed that anti-Americanism was a ‘left-wing neurosis, springing from a natural resentment at the transfer of world power from London to Washington.’ Nor was this perception strictly limited to the foreign policy élite. British author George Orwell believed antiAmericanism was popular only among an admittedly vocal, but nevertheless minority section of British society, ‘I do not believe the mass of people in this country are anti-American politically, and certainly not culturally.’ The authors of Hating America have agreed, adding that, ‘generally in Britain, anti-Americanism was usually voiced by a minority that knew it to be an unpopular idea.’15 Furthermore, anti-Americanism was consistently and significantly weaker in Britain than in other allied European nations. These conditions were highlighted in the frequent United States Information Agency (USIA) surveys of post-war European opinion, which were based on thousands of interviews in various western European nations.16 The USIA survey results are particularly valuable to this study, since they both provide quantitative measurements of cultural affinity and demonstrate that such information was ‘of real interest to a number of agencies and departments besides the United States Information Agency.’17 The foreign policy élite’s interest in such measurements of cultural affinity remained keen throughout the post-war period, indicating the significance élites attached to levels of Anglo-American fraternity. Additional studies, such as those produced by the Gallup Organization, help with the tasks of quantifying cultural affinity, indicating sentimentality, and illustrating the strong distinction between the Anglo-American relationship and each nation’s relationship with other major allies, revealing a pattern of comparatively high degrees of Anglo-American affinity. For example, when asked in January 1953 if the United States had done anything since the Second World War that had ‘made an unfavourable impression’ on them, a solid majority (60 per cent) of Britons surveyed gave a negative response. In contrast, continental Europeans from allied nations responded ‘yes’ in far greater numbers than the British, thus revealing the higher degree of stability that underpinned the Anglo-American alliance. Significantly, the USIA was little concerned with the smaller number of Britons irritated by the United States’ policies. For example, the USIA concluded that such irritation as existed ‘in Great Britain . . . should not be accorded undue importance,’ because among the British, ‘even those annoyed by American influence are nonetheless committed to the west. In

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France, Italy and West Germany, however, irritation is more frequently associated with neutralism.’18 In accordance with the sentimental myth of the special relationship, the British also placed more trust in the United States than in their other allies. For example, while in 1953 79 per cent of the British public had a ‘great deal’ of trust in the United States, only 37 per cent maintained such trust in the French, and only 16 per cent maintained such trust in the Germans. This is, of course, not to argue that the British people distrusted the French or the Germans, but only to help demonstrate that they maintained comparatively greater trust and affinity for the Americans. Consistently through the post-war period, British respondents indicated a stronger cultural preference for the Americans than for other allies. Furthermore, the British also had greater trust in the United States than did other Europeans. While 79 per cent of Britons had a ‘great deal’ of trust in the United States, the figures for the French and West Germans were respectively 64 and 52 per cent.19 As will be discussed below, these levels of cultural affinity in Britain and America have remained remarkably stable throughout the post-war period. Popular feelings of Anglo-American friendship, along with the entrenched and powerful sentimental myth of Anglo-American relations, are both intrinsic components of the special relationship’s historical resilience. Of course, in a single chapter it would be impossible to describe every scenario in which cultural perceptions impacted the alliance, but it is possible to focus on several key examples in which cultural affinity, sentimentality, and the sentimental myth have helped to shape the modern alliance, namely the Suez crisis, the Vietnam War, and the post-9/11 era.

Suez: The roles of popular opinion, perception, and mythology Although 1956 would become one of the most difficult and infamous years of the Anglo-American alliance, diplomatic relations and cultural affinity were exceptionally healthy throughout much of the year. For example, as the American government surveyed and studied British feelings toward the United States, it found that the British populace maintained highly favourable opinions of the United States in general, especially so in regard to American cultural life. Indeed, the high level of British good opinion towards America and Americans was notably stronger than simultaneous measurements taken in France and West Germany. In June 1956, 20 per cent of the Britons surveyed stated that they maintained a ‘very good opinion’ of the United States, which was the strongest possible response to the survey question. In contrast, only 10 per cent of West Germans and a mere 4 per cent of French citizens felt similarly. The USIA kept the American foreign policy élite well apprised of these national emotions and views, and thus provided a statistical justification for continued perceptions of Anglo-American cultural affinity.20

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 61 The crisis emerged in the autumn when Egypt’s government nationalized the critically important Suez Canal. In the standoff that followed, Britain failed to get the Americans to agree to use force against Egypt, and instead organized a clandestine agreement with Israel and France. As planned, Israel initiated an attack on Egypt, and then Britain and France entered the Canal Zone under the guise of a peacekeeping mission. The world saw through this feeble subterfuge, the Eisenhower administration refused to come to the aid of the British and French, and the United Nations sought a diplomatic solution to the crisis. When the United States ultimately threatened economic sanctions, the British finally relented and the entire endeavour collapsed. Though Prime Minister Anthony Eden argued and pled for American support throughout the crisis, the Americans were unyielding. Invasion of Egypt was viewed throughout the world as an anachronistic colonialist enterprise, appeared to offer the Soviet Union an opportunity to extend its influence into the region and distracted world attention from the Soviet brutal repression of the Hungarian uprising. Frustrated and disappointed, President Dwight Eisenhower complained privately about his ‘unworthy and unreliable ally’ and stated bluntly: ‘We will not help them.’ His public statements, however, were not so strong. While he firmly stated that the attack on Egypt had been made ‘in error’ and he assured the world that the United States would not be involved in the hostilities, the president also steered clear of public vituperation and instead explained that the American position on this issue would not minimize Anglo-American friendship or the determination to retain and strengthen the common bonds with Britain and France.21 Even in crisis and bitter disagreement, the sentimental discourse of the special relationship persisted unabashedly. After the British had begun their invasion, Eden sent a message to Eisenhower again asking for American support for British actions. Just as Eisenhower had done in his attempts to dissuade Britain from invading, Eden incorporated several aspects of the sentimental myth into his request, including references to wartime camaraderie, mutual responsibility, and the desirability of intimate Anglo-American partnership: I believe as firmly as ever that the future of all of us depends on the closest Anglo-American cooperation. It has of course been a grief to me to have had to make a temporary breach into it which I cannot disguise, but I know that you are a man of big enough heart and vision to take things up again on the basis of fact. If you cannot approve, I would like you at least to understand the terrible decisions we have had to make. I remember nothing like them since we were comrades together in the war. History alone can judge whether we have made the right decision, but I do want to assure you that we have made it from a genuine sense of responsibility, not only to our country, but to all the world.22

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At this juncture, however, such appeals were unable to resolve the matter. The fear of an expanded crisis proved stronger than the appeals to the sentimental myth and restrained the United States from supporting British actions in Egypt. Such attempts to employ sentimentality as a diplomatic tool may seem specious; but that leaders like Eden and Eisenhower, both of whom had immense experience in Anglo-American relations, believed that such attempts were justifiable, that is, that they were worth trying, signifies that each believed that the other understood and felt that elusive sense of Anglo-American fraternity, and that such feelings could wield influence. At this point in the crisis, it appeared to many that the special relationship had evaporated. But despite harsh words, angry feelings, and decisions to disregard each other’s foreign policy concerns, the special relationship never really disappeared. American spy planes, flying over damaged Egyptian airfields, sent their intelligence photographs on to British analysts, the CIA continued to network with MI6, and, at the very beginning of the disagreement, the United States decided to share information with Britain on its new nuclear submarine program, Nautilus. In October, and near the climax of the Suez crisis, the United Kingdom and the United States reached more agreements that allowed American and British scientists to cooperate on nuclear research.23 Clearly their disagreement, though sour, had not severed the alliance. Moreover, the Americans and the British quickly resolved the breakdown in personal and political relations over Suez as both countries realized their strategic need and widespread desire for reconciliation. Harold Macmillan, as the Chancellor of the Exchequer, soon realized that Suez was the wrong decision, since a serious rift with their closest and most lucrative ally was not something that the British could afford financially.24 At the same time, the Eisenhower administration was concluding that an extended disagreement with its closest allies would be a negative scenario in the Cold War. On November 1, the president addressed the National Security Council: ‘We must not permit ourselves to be blinded by the thought that anything we are going to do will result in our fighting with Great Britain and France. Such a course of action is simply unthinkable, and no one can possibly believe that we will do it.’ During the crisis, Eisenhower succinctly expressed his dominant opinion of the British by noting, ‘they’re still my right arm.’25 In describing the British in this way, as a part of his own body, the president pithily demonstrated an archetypal example of Anglo-American intimacy and fellowship. With domestic support eroding, the pound sterling on the verge of collapse, and the potential for reconciliation with the United States still strong, the British were forced to admit that they needed American help to, as Eden phrased it, ‘carry this through.’ The British accepted the UN resolution that called for a cease-fire. When speaking with Eden over the telephone on the following day, Eisenhower explained that the dispute between their nations had been ‘like a family spat.’ And although the

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 63 Americans withheld aid until British forces began leaving the region, the special relationship quickly renewed itself.26 Not everyone in the British government was happy with the current state of Anglo-American relations, but the Eisenhower administration’s early December announcement of a large recovery loan to Britain effectively muted some of the more outspoken critics. Shortly thereafter, a House of Lords inquiry on the aftermath of the Suez crisis concluded that Britain and the United States must have a complete reconciliation.27 Suez had, more than any other event in the post-war period, cemented the idea that Britain needed continued American friendship and assistance to maintain its position in the world. Painful experience had pointed out that collaborating with France or other European nations would not achieve this goal. A future in which Britain could not firmly rely on American support was foreboding indeed. Reconciliation took place faster than many would have expected during the fraught autumn of 1956, and a steadfast commitment to the sentimental myth can be seen, both diplomatically and popularly, in the years after the crisis subsided. For example in September 1958, the American secretary of defence and the British minister of defence met for three days at the Pentagon to discuss their nations’ global strategic concerns. At the conclusion of their visit, the United States and the United Kingdom jointly emphasized the ‘frank and intimate relationship between the two countries.’ Their public statement also explained that the talks were conducted ‘in the spirit of interdependence’ typical of their alliance.28 It is significant to note the use of the word ‘interdependence’ to describe the spirit of the alliance, indicating that post-Suez relations remained rooted in the classic mythology of an equal partnership. After the Suez crisis, Britain’s position could more accurately be described as dependent on the United States, while the American position had been proven manifestly independent. To insist upon labelling the alliance ‘interdependent’ clearly demonstrated that the equality and partnership of the sentimental myth remained embedded within the culture of the special relationship. Such public discourse, while representative of many remarks issued in the course of Anglo-American diplomacy, is not included here to prove that foreign policy élites earnestly believed everything they said. Such proof cannot be established from press releases alone. However, these and similar statements are evidence of the impulse to provide the kind of sentimental rhetoric that Anglo-American leaders believed their respective publics desired. In this way, élite perceptions of cultural affinity habitually set both the language and tone of AngloAmerican relations throughout the post-war period. Likewise, the diplomatic rift had not done permanent damage to the widespread cultural affinity for the special relationship that had existed before the crisis. While statistical analysis conducted by the USIA during the Suez crisis indicated concern over the state of the alliance, the USIA found ‘nothing that could be considered a groundswell of anti-Americanism in Great Britain.’29 Of those who described the United States as disapproving

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of Britain’s actions, only 3 per cent believed that Suez represented a ‘fundamental split’ in the alliance, while the majority responded that the crisis was only a ‘temporary disagreement.’30 While the USIA studies revealed a decline in Anglo-American cultural affinity in 1957, this did not last. By the following summer, British affinity for the United States was already approaching earlier levels.31 In August 1959, President Eisenhower journeyed to Britain for a meeting with Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, and his visit demonstrated the solidarity of the Anglo-American alliance at the end of the decade. Indeed, despite the seriousness of the Suez crisis, relations remained strong and highly sentimental. Macmillan met Eisenhower at the airport, and both were astonished to find that, despite the minimal publicity given their meeting, crowds lined the streets to greet the American president. Eisenhower later recalled of his arrival, I knew I had friends there and, in a sense, felt as if I were coming home. Even though I was sure we would encounter no general hostility, I must confess that I was happily overwhelmed by the reception accorded our party. As we made our way toward the city, the crowds grew ever denser and Harold kept repeating, “I never would have believed it, I never would have believed it.”32 During their time together, the president and the prime minister discussed many issues of global strategic policy and the forthcoming talks with Nikita Khrushchev. They also attended church services together near Chequers and appeared on television together to ‘express our confidence in the future.’ On the following night, the president had a private dinner with ‘about thirty of my British wartime friends’ and later recalled that this ’fulfilled a deep ambition I had long cherished.’ Naturally, the Second World War continued to influence the Anglo-American worldview, and Eisenhower and Macmillan also attended a ceremony at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London to dedicate its American Memorial Chapel in honour of Americans who had been based in the UK and died during the war. Recalling the journey to the ceremony in his memoirs, Macmillan noted ‘the crowds were so great that we changed into an open car.’33 To help assess the impact of the president’s visit to the United Kingdom, the USIA arranged for a survey of Britons’ opinions of the United States and the special relationship. The research demonstrated a significant growth in positive opinions of the United States, with nearly 20 per cent more Britons reporting that they maintained a ‘very good opinion’ of the United States than had done so in October 1958.34 In the immediate wake of the Suez crisis, many Britons had felt that their country was no longer treated as an equal partner by the United States. Such perceptions clashed with the sentimental myth of the special relationship, and yet it was clear by the end of the decade that this perception was declining. In 1958, only 38

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 65 per cent of Britons surveyed thought the United States treated the United Kingdom as an equal partner, while 51 per cent believed the United Kingdom was not treated equally. By September of 1959, however, the perception of equality in the special relationship had shifted, 5 per cent more respondents perceived equality and 5 per cent fewer perceived inequality.35 While it would be a stretch to call this a dramatic shift in opinion, these numbers attest to the resilience of the sentimental myth. Despite the events of the decade, British public opinion remained evenly split on the issue of equality within the Anglo-American alliance. Regardless, 82 per cent of respondents felt that Anglo-American interests were in agreement. Furthermore, when asked which country they considered ‘Britain’s best friend’ (apart from the Commonwealth nations), a majority, 62 per cent, of respondents named the United States. In comparison, France, the United Kingdom’s ally in the Suez invasion and the second most frequent response, was only listed by 5 per cent of Britons. The Americans were keenly attentive to this perception, and the USIA noted that ‘such consensus on an open-end question when no alternative is given is impressive.’36 Most respondents felt that Eisenhower’s meeting with Prime Minister Macmillan was ‘of value to Britain,’ that he would speak for the entire Western Alliance in his talks with the Soviet Union, and that he ‘could be counted on not to slight British interests.’37 By visiting the United Kingdom and consulting with its leadership before a significant diplomatic event, the American president had inspired trust in the relationship. He had enhanced public perceptions of the US paying attention to Britain and hearing the British voice, and thus fulfilled fundamentals of the sentimental myth. While there is no doubt that the events of Suez had damaged feelings of connection and trust between Britain and the United States, such conditions were not permanent. For example, Britons who said they trusted the United States a ‘great deal’ to side with Britain in international disputes dropped to 40 per cent in November of 1956, and plummeted to 25 per cent in 1957. But trust in the United States did not remain at these low levels. Rather, by the summer of 1961, they had recovered pre-Suez levels, with 56 per cent of Britons reporting a ‘great deal’ of trust in the United States.38 It is highly noteworthy that ideas of Anglo-American connection, trust, and partnership strengthened in Britain as the Suez crisis faded into memory. The events of the actual diplomatic rift and the obvious inequality of the alliance did not hold sway over people’s views alone, and over time the sentimental myth of the relationship not only endured, but also demonstrated that it was the more powerful influence upon public perceptions. American perceptions were subject to the same dynamic; their nation’s recent argument with Britain had little impact on the prevailing cultural preference for their special relationship. For example, a February 1963 Gallup Poll revealed that a majority of the American public still believed Great Britain to be the most trustworthy of their allies. Indeed, approximately 63 per cent of Americans deemed that the British were a ‘dependable ally

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(friend) of the United States.’ In comparison, only about 32 per cent felt similarly about France.39 Given that the British and French had conspired together during the Suez crisis and acted together in the invasion, this acute American preference for the British is highly indicative of the sentimental myth’s power over the American worldview. A generation of special relations and the rhetoric associated with the Anglo-American alliance had successfully etched incisive ideas of British partnership and friendship into American perspectives. Clearly, the ‘family spat’ had ended and the possibility of a protracted diplomatic rift remained ‘simply unthinkable.’ Yet the special relationship would never be the same after Suez. Britain’s inability to act successfully without American support was indicative of its diminishing role in global politics. This had been punctuated by the Eisenhower Doctrine of January 1957, which announced that the United States would defend any Middle Eastern nation against a communist threat, alone if necessary. By the end of the 1950s, the operational dynamic of post-war Anglo-American relations was already becoming clear. In the period after the Suez debacle, when the impotence of the British military and economy had been exposed and British leaders began to discuss the withdrawal of their forces east of Suez, Anglo-American divergences would be less dramatic. The new and growing inequality of the actual diplomatic special relationship clashed with the persisting and popular sentimental myth, and this would continue to produce frequent Anglo-American tensions. Nevertheless, in the post-Suez world, when Great Britain needed its closest ally more than ever and when the United States was rapidly growing more comfortable functioning on its own, divergent opinions on foreign policy matters could no longer be met by Britain with independent action, but rather with muted criticism, political advice, and the shrewd confidence that American sentimentality for the British would translate into additional influence. Just as the undercurrent of sentimentality helped the special relationship survive Suez, it would also help sustain the alliance under these new realities. In the autumn of 1956 a few suggested, and undoubtedly more suspected, that the special relationship may be finished, and yet it was not. The diplomatic and military alliance forged during the Second World War had unmistakably undergone heady changes, but the sentimental myth had survived the crisis intact, as had élite perceptions of Anglo-American cultural affinity. Together, these cultural components of the special relationship helped facilitate the speedy restoration of intimate diplomatic partnership after the crisis, and would continue to bolster the alliance in the decades and crises yet to come.

Enduring Vietnam: The emergence of the culturally modern special relationship Perhaps the greatest of these crises was America’s protracted war in Vietnam; a conflict that dominated the worldview of the US from the early 1960s

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 67 through much of the 1970s, and a conflict whose spectre has never ceased to haunt the American psyche, particularly in matters of foreign relations and future conflicts. Throughout the war, the US government continued to perceive a strong American cultural preference for partnership with the British, and this led successive administrations to consistently desire and request British support in Vietnam. This pursuit of British participation indicated strong governmental perceptions of the importance of cultural affinity, and provided many classic examples of sentimentality. For example, in 1961 President John Kennedy bluntly explained to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan that Anglo-American cooperation in Southeast Asia had great political value for his administration. Kennedy expressed his belief that there was ‘a large body of opinion in the United States who would regard active, if limited, British support’ as ‘the determining factor’ when it came to military intervention in South East Asia.40 Such American perceptions persisted throughout the decade, and as public support for the war effort became ever more conflicted, President Lyndon Johnson’s administration consistently attempted to gain at least some British soldiers for the war. The strategic military value of a token British force would have been negligible, but as expressed by Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy, to have British soldiers fighting alongside American soldiers ‘would have made a considerable psychological difference …’ It was the symbolism the Americans coveted. The persisting sentimental myth of the alliance held the promise of legitimacy and righteousness, and in drawing upon the cultural memory of their previous wartime collaboration in the 1940s, these leaders felt that if America and Britain fought side by side, more Americans would accept that the cause in Vietnam was just and their ultimate victory inevitable. In the summer of 1966, Johnson himself blurted out that a ‘platoon of bagpipers would be sufficient’ and noted that it was ‘the British flag that was needed.’ Secretary of State Dean Rusk agreed that any regiment would do, stating that the ‘Black Watch would have done.’ So intense was this American desire for British soldiers that National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy once wrote, ‘a British Brigade in Vietnam would be worth a billion dollars at the right moment.’41 In addition to the traditional sentimentality of the foreign policy élite, these perceptions of American affinity for the British were supported by the available data. For example, a 1965 Gallop poll in the United States demonstrated that Americans felt the British were the most reliable of all their allies. The poll also revealed that Americans ranked the United Kingdom as the world’s fourth most important nation, after the US, the USSR, and China. In this way, polling data demonstrates that Britain was perceived as the most important American ally, as well as the most trusted.42 Such cultural affinity for the British, the simultaneous belief in their nation’s importance, and the perceptions it inspired among the American foreign policy élite would lead the US to continually seek British participation, and later to sustain the special relationship even after the hope of British soldiers had faded away.

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On the other side of the Atlantic, the British governments of the era had to weigh a variety of complex pressures regarding the Vietnam War. In the British worldview, the issue of the war was inexorably tied to the United States and, thus to the special relationship. This was indeed complicated, since the British people widely approved of the alliance.43 This inspired many leading politicians, including many in the Macmillan and Wilson governments, to hold fast to the Americans. These leaders believed that to maintain the relationship as it was supposed to be, Britain would have to demonstrate its dedication and offer assistance to American efforts in Vietnam, lest the UK fail in its obligation to assist as ordained by the sentimental myth of alliance. However, while the British people widely approved of the special relationship, they increasingly did not approve of the Vietnam War. British governments of the 1960s thus sought to maintain the special relationship with the US without becoming deeply embroiled in Vietnam. This task was difficult, given the American viewpoint and desires. In their search for a solution to this dilemma, the British participated in a variety of limited ways during the 1960s. This included the creation of the British Policy Advisory Mission to South Vietnam, which was limited in both cost and personnel.44 Later, working for peace in Vietnam was a way for the new Labour prime minister, Harold Wilson, to ostensibly appease both his party (which was growing increasingly concerned about the war by 1965) and the Americans. Working to produce peace in Vietnam meant a continuing intimate involvement and a valued contribution, both of which were intrinsic characteristics of the relationship’s sentimental myth. Still, the UK continued to support the American effort openly, and this was thought to have considerable domestic political value for the Johnson administration, which attempted to exploit it thoroughly. However, American pleas for British soldiers continued in vain. In 1967, the American Ambassador to Britain, David Bruce, stated that the ‘so-called Anglo-American special relationship is now little more than sentimental terminology, although the underground waters of it will flow with a deep current.’45 Bruce understood that while the diplomatic relationship was certainly no longer equal, a cultural preference for the mythical ideal of the alliance endured, and that this would help sustain the special relationship as a recognized diplomatic entity. The British policy élite also perceived the endurance of cultural affinity, and indeed they depended upon this factor in their foreign policy planning. At the end of the 1960s, the Foreign Office recognized that Britain’s military and economic strengths, though diminishing, still impacted the global situation and afforded them influence with the Americans. On a par with these factors, the Foreign Office perspicaciously attached significant value to: the fact that Britain is a source of much of America’s cultural ancestry to which a comparatively rootless people attach a great deal of

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 69 importance. This, together with the facility of communication, renders the American mind particularly sensitive to movements in British public opinion as expressed in Parliament and the press to a degree which does not apply to any other English speaking, or indeed any other country.46 Such perceptions of continued cultural affinity and influence largely defined how the special relationship weathered the Vietnam War. In a 1972 survey, 72 per cent of Britons trusted the US to assist Britain if its security were threatened and 89 per cent of Britons believed the basic interests of the UK and the US were in agreement.47 Similar perceptions existed within the United States. A 1973 Gallup Poll asked Americans to rate their opinion of various nations on a scale between +5 (for ‘a country you like very much’) and –5 (for ‘a country you dislike very much’). This study revealed that, of their major European allies, Americans held the strongest positive feelings for Great Britain. For example, nearly 40 per cent of Americans rated Britain above three while only about 25 per cent reported similar feelings for West Germany. Furthermore, feelings of dislike were relatively weak for Great Britain and comparatively stronger for West Germany, France, and Italy.48 Though the diplomatic special relationship was not equal, and diplomatic support could not be counted upon by either nation, strong cultural affinities and belief in the sentimental mythology of the ideal special relationship had once again endured. Consequently, in the postVietnam period, the United States government has been steadfast in the perception that having allies in general and British allies in particular remains essential to fulfilling the wish for ‘No more Vietnams’ and crucial, of course, in all attempts to deflect charges of unilateralism. As a result, expressions of sentimentality became a constant and permanent feature of the diplomatic discourse of the relationship. Examples of this came frequently as the Vietnam War ended, as the American and British governments sought to demonstrate their commitment to special relations now that issue of the war no longer stood between them. In an overt example of this, the Americans invited Queen Elizabeth II to participate in their bicentennial celebrations, and the British government happily accepted, though they had already sent a copy of the Magna Carta and a variety of other reminders of their shared cultural heritage to America for the celebration.49 Of all the many bicentennial functions in which Queen Elizabeth participated, the most visible was the official state dinner at the White House in July. Perhaps no other event in post-war AngloAmerican relations has provided so many overt examples of both cultural affinity and sentimentality. The rhetoric of the special relationship, always predictably rooted in the sentimental myth, demonstrated the emotional core of the Anglo-American alliance, as well as its durability. In greeting the Queen on the south lawn of the White House, President Ford recalled how Britons and Americans had ‘worked together and fought together side by

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side,’ and he applauded the ‘common values of an Anglo-American civilization.’ Queen Elizabeth, by way of response, stressed not only the unique intimacy of Anglo-American relations, but also the shared responsibility and classic equality of the sentimental myth: ‘Mr President, the British and American people are as close today as two people have ever been. We see you as our strong and trusted friend, and we believe that you, in turn, will find us as ready as ever to bear our full share in defending the values in which we both believe.’50 This public discourse, while representative of many remarks issued during the bicentennial year, cannot prove that the heads of state earnestly believed every word. However, such statements may be taken as evidence of a more Machiavellian impulse to provide the kind of sentimental rhetoric that Anglo-American leaders believed their respective publics desired. Certainly interest in the state dinner was prodigious, both among the foreign policy élite and the public. The Public Broadcasting Service had spent the preceding year negotiating permission from the White House to make this the first state dinner broadcast live on American television, as well as via satellite to Great Britain.51 One highlight of the evening was the exchange of toasts between the two heads of state. They each made multiple obligatory references to their nations’ partnership in World War Two, and of course neither Suez nor Vietnam was ever mentioned, since neither of these more recent problematic episodes fits within the dominant narrative of the alliance. Indeed, their respective toasts were rooted in the mythical ideal of perfect partnership, as well as being significant for their statements on the future of AngloAmerican relations. The president proclaimed before his multi-national audience that the special relationship would remain a fixture of international diplomacy. Like Ford, Queen Elizabeth seized the opportunity to recognize that: ‘One thing is certain, and that is the strength and permanence of Anglo-American friendship. It has brought with it benefits beyond measure to our peoples.’ These statements provided the public with a unified assertion that the special relationship would always be there, forever reliable and unique.52 Not long after the Queen’s visit to the United States, the American ambassador to Britain, Anne Armstrong, was invited to give the esteemed annual ‘One People Oration’ at Westminster Abbey. She seized the opportunity to thank the British people for their ‘warm response to our Bicentennial,’ and, in a classic example of sentimentality, to issue a frank and earnest recognition of the role of cultural affinity within the diplomatic special relationship. I speak of the affection between us. It is an emotion not normally given to the pragmatic affairs of nations. Alexander Hamilton certainly would have warned against it as a basis, or even a consideration, for national policy.

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 71 And yet, as we examine the unprecedented and enduring relationship between Britain and the United States, it is clear that affection is the cement which binds us.53 Deeming it truly special in comparison to the world’s other international relationships, she stressed the continuity of modern Anglo-American relations and argued that in every significant way, the British and the Americans were ‘one people’, intrinsically bound together by their shared history, culture, and values. Change had characterized the diplomatic special relationship since 1945, but such perceptions had proven strong enough to help neutralize disagreements, serious though they were, and allowed the relationship to persevere. In this way, cultural affinity and sentimentality must be considered among the most significant stabilizing forces at work within the special relationship. Ambassador Armstrong’s use of the term ‘dependence’ was highly indicative of the alliance’s modern dynamic. While the United States continued to value Britain’s contributions, it certainly no longer depended on the United Kingdom for military or economic partnership as it once had done. A significant element of dependence, however, did indeed continue to characterize the special relationship. Early in the post-Vietnam era, the United States became very wary of entering into foreign conflicts without British partnership, which was now perceived as a virtual necessity in order to maintain critical levels of domestic support during a major foreign conflict. Put simply, the American government remained reliant upon British cooperation, not militarily or economically, but rather culturally. These conditions provided the United Kingdom with a recognizably significant and unique level of influence, always considered politically valuable by any British government, and thus assured the mutual diplomatic dedication to the special relationship that continues in the present era. In these ways, as in so many other ways, the Anglo-American experience with Vietnam was formative, and this is why Vietnam must be considered the origin of the culturally modern special relationship. The modern dynamic of the alliance had emerged with cultural affinities and the sentimental mythology as accepted and lauded causes of its continued existence. After Vietnam, the nature of America’s need for allies had become abundantly clear, and the high degree of cultural affinity and the strength of the sentimental myth have meant that the UK has remained the most effective and significant ally for the US government to tout before its citizenry. Of course, this lesson was well learned, and has remained at the forefront of American thinking ever since. The iconic friendship of President Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher demonstrated the continued health of the special relationship through the 1980s. At their first meeting, Thatcher assured Reagan and the American people that ‘your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends we shall be there.’ Of course, diplomatic cooperation continued as

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well – the American government supported Britain over Argentina in the Falklands War, and during the bombing of Libya in 1986 American military aircraft were allowed to use airbases in Britain.54 And of course, those who speculated about the continued survival of the alliance after the end of the Cold War were largely silenced during the 1990s, first by the high degree of Anglo-American partnership in Operation Desert Storm and later by the cooperation exhibited by President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair. Despite the Anglo-American disagreements over nuclear test bans and the need for ground troops in the Kosovo crisis, the American and British governments continued to stress that the true story of the special relationship was one of friendship and partnership, as highlighted by their cooperation in Northern Ireland’s peace process. At the end of the Clinton administration, the US State Department’s Office of Research found that 83 per cent of the British public held favourable opinions of the United States, which was predictably the highest percentage of favourable responses among the western European allies.55 Likewise, a Gallup survey in early 2002 found that 90 per cent of Americans held favourable opinions of Great Britain, again outstripping American affinities for any other ally.56 Overall, the central dynamic of the special relationship remained remarkably consistent in the wake of the Cold War. New crises, enemies, and disagreements would still plague the relationship, but perceptions of cultural affinity would stabilize the alliance much as they had done before. Indeed, Ambassador Armstrong’s frank statement about mutual affection binding the partners was likely even more sagacious than she realized at the time.

Continuity in the post-9/11 era In the days immediately following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the emotions of fear, shock, sorrow and anger permeated the United States as well as the international community. In the days and years that followed, the special relationship’s central role in both American and British foreign policy became abundantly clear. When President George W. Bush made a special address to Congress and the public just nine days after the attacks, he made sure that Prime Minister Blair was present. Though other nations and allies were mentioned in his speech, Britain received special attention, and lawmakers offered loud applause and even saluted the British prime minister with a standing ovation as Bush highlighted his attendance: America has no truer friend than Great Britain (applause). Once again we are joined together in a great cause – so honored that the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his unity of purpose with America. Thank you for coming, friend. (applause)57

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 73 Giving such special attention to the British was an astute political move by the Bush administration because, as we have seen, the American public held the British in significantly higher regard than their other allies. This pattern continued in the years that followed, especially as Britain contributed more soldiers to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq than any other ally. In 2003, for example, 82 per cent of Americans held favourable opinions of the British, while only 44 per cent felt similarly about Germany, and a mere 29 per cent felt similarly about France.58 Indeed, the significance of British partnership was not wasted on the American administration, and in his 2004 State of the Union Address, Bush acknowledged America’s desire to act with ‘friends and allies at our side.’59 Clearly, the Bush administration perceived that Americans valued allies, and the nation’s uniquely favourable opinions of Britain meant that the special relationship promised to yield the greatest amount of political capital. British affinity for the United States was not impervious to the frustrations of the Bush years, yet while the widely unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Iraq did negate positive feelings toward the US, and Blair’s government took heat for their apparent subservience to the Americans (a gross assault on ideas of what the relationship ought to be), the British public remained comparatively much more positive than America’s other major European allies. For example, in 2006, after five years of war and unpopular American leadership, 56 per cent of the British public still reported favourable opinions of the US, while only 39 per cent of the French and 37 per cent of Germans felt similarly.60 The operational dynamic that had emerged after the Vietnam War was holding steady. The majority of the British population favoured the Americans and the special relationship, yet their government also knew the Americans favoured partnership with Britain. Thus cultural affinity held the promise of greater access to and influence upon the world’s hegemonic power. The American government likewise perceived preference for the alliance in both nations and equated the special relationship with political capital. In this context, the sentimental myth of a natural and equal alliance based on unwavering commitment to partnership has remained a key tool for both governments. Of course, it had long since become established in the culture of the special relationship that presidents and prime ministers visit one another, confer together, speak publicly together, and generally use one another to highlight their international influence and importance, and this trend remains as strong in the twenty-first century as ever, perhaps more so. Even before his election to the presidency, Barrack Obama demonstrated understanding of cultural affinity’s role in the special relationship during a visit to the United Kingdom in 2008. Though only a candidate for the presidency, he secured a meeting with Prime Minister Gordon Brown, pledged himself to strengthening transatlantic relations and to solving problems together. Of course, he also openly acknowledged cultural affinity

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as one of the foundations of the modern special relationship: ‘I think there’s a deep and abiding affection for the British people in America and a fascination with all things British that is not going to go away any time soon.’61 As president, Obama has continued along these lines. Gordon Brown was the first European leader invited to Washington by the new administration and in a press conference with the prime minister, Obama told reporters why the historic alliance with Britain was special, and also found a clever way to dismiss the concerns of those who had wondered if his African heritage would somehow trump the traditional Anglo-American bonds: The special relationship between the US and the UK is one that is not just important to me, it’s important to the American people. And it is sustained by a common language, a common culture, our legal system is directly inherited from the English system, our system of government reflects many of the same values. And by the way, that’s also where my mother’s side of the family came from, so this notion there is anything less of that special relationship is misguided. The UK is one of our closest and strongest allies. There is a link, a bind, there that will not break.62 His remarks focused on the commonality and mutual respect of the alliance, and were logically designed to negate the perceptions of subservience that had dogged the Bush-Blair era in the British media.63 Unfortunately, the leaders’ meeting was not a resounding success. On the contrary, the president’s spoken remarks were soon overshadowed by a symbolic fiasco. The crisis emerged with the traditional exchange of gifts between president and prime minister. Gordon Brown certainly understood the purpose and power of the gift exchange, and accordingly presented Obama with a penholder carved from the wood of the sister-ship of the HMS Resolute, the source of wood for the American president’s famous oval office desk, as well as a first edition of the seven-volume biography of Winston Churchill by Sir Martin Gilbert. Obviously, Brown’s gifts were carefully chosen to symbolize the shared history of Britain and America, emphasize their closeness and solidarity, and conjure positive memories of their wartime partnership. Though President Obama had spoken the correct words about the alliance, he failed to properly enact the sentimental myth when it came to his gift to Brown, which was the now-infamous box set of twenty-five DVD’s chosen by the American Film Institute. Prime Minister Brown had never been known as a film buff, and the British press and public took great umbrage at this frustratingly impersonal gift. To some it was merely tacky, while to others it was also a deliberate snub designed to herald the end of the special relationship. The Mail called Obama’s insulting gift ‘about as exciting as a pair of socks.’64 Such outrage was caused by more than mere disenchantment

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 75 with typical Yankee vulgarity. Indeed, the persisting popularity of the sentimental myth of the special relationship can be seen in this diplomatic episode. The British naturally had higher expectations from their special partner, and so the tawdriness and thoughtlessness of Obama’s gift stung all the more. However, as the storm of media criticism subsided, it quickly became obvious that the new president had learned an important lesson about Anglo-American sensitivity to the state of the alliance, and he took care to be publicly supportive and close to Gordon Brown thereafter. Indeed, the dominant discourse of the special relationship remained embedded in the sentimental myth. Almost as though they were all reading from a single script, foreign policy élites in both nations have remained continuously keen to praise the special relationship and name culture among its foundations. In March of 2010, a House of Commons committee report on the relationship stated that Britain and America have ‘an extremely close and valuable relationship. The historic, trading and cultural links are profound; and the two countries share common values in their commitment to freedom, democracy, and the rule of law.’ Speaking to the Commons committee, David Manning, former British Ambassador to the US, explained that ‘sentiment’ still has the power to produce positives for Britain in the special relationship, and added, ‘I don’t think one should disguise the fact that warmth between the two countries can help us.’ At the same time, a research study prepared for members of the US Congress revealed that similar perceptions continue in America as well. The report declared that Britain is ‘Washington’s staunchest and most reliable ally’ and attributed much of their bilateral cooperation to ‘a shared sense of history and culture.’65 As he became prime minister in the spring of 2010, David Cameron received a telephone call from Obama in which the president explained, ‘the United States has no closer friend and ally than the United Kingdom.’66 As dictated by tradition, Cameron visited the White House soon afterward and again President Obama spoke of ‘a truly special relationship’ between their nations. Amid the barrage of classic Anglo-American discourse, diplomatic cooperation continued as well, and in September the US Senate ratified a trade agreement which made the exchange of military hardware between America and Britain easier as well as faster. The Obama administration hyped the agreement as ‘evidence of broad bipartisan support that undergirds the special relationship.’67 On an official visit to Britain the following year, the American president had the perfect opportunity to show both American esteem for the alliance and that he had learned his previous lesson about Anglo-American giftgiving. Obama presented Prime Minister Cameron with a pair of custom cufflinks made of silver and White House Magnolia wood, as well as a first edition of Profiles in Courage, John F. Kennedy’s Pulitzer Prize-winning book. The Obamas likewise gave Samantha Cameron a custom-made bracelet of silver and matching Magnolia wood. The White House was keen to explain

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that these gifts were presented simultaneously on a ‘hand-carved Magnolia wood valet tray crafted specially for this occasion.’68 These unique and personal gifts were much more on target, clearly designed to symbolize and underscore the American commitment to the idyllic special relationship. Of course, tensions, disagreements, and the occasional ‘snubgate’ will continue to plague the alliance, but the sentimental myth of the alliance will undoubtedly continue to have the power to help keep things running smoothly. For example, when it became known in 2010 that some British soldiers in Afghanistan would be coming under the authority of an American general, the British media predicted tension. Cameron waved such concerns away by saying, ‘British and American troops have been working together without problems in many theatres over many decades, and will, I’ve no doubt, do so again.’69 Despite all the historic tensions and disagreements that have taken place between the US and the UK since the Second World War, the sentimental myth of an alliance ‘without problems’ remains both ubiquitous and useful.

Conclusions: The power of an Anglo-American mythology In his classic work Ishmael, Daniel Quinn famously argued that the best definition of a culture is a group of humans who are engaged in enacting the same mythology.70 Though Quinn was not writing about the culture of British and American foreign relations, scholars of the special relationship can employ some of his ideas to help us fully understand this unique alliance. For example, as both governments continue to argue that the sentimental myth of Anglo-American relations is indeed the reality, they enact this mythology together. The generations of Americans and Britons who have lived in the era of the special relationship have been reared to see the mythical version of the alliance as their truth, and this has created a cyclical dynamic. Since the 1940s, American and British governments have consistently told themselves, each other, and their respective populations that the special relationship was equal, positive, necessary, natural, and indestructible. As a result, publics and governments alike have internalized this message and accepted the myth as their reality, which in turn has dictated their perpetual commitment to the mythology. Even as they may recognize the roles of myth and culture in the operational dynamic of the modern relationship, clever foreign policy élites remain nevertheless ensnared by the mythology. It is possible that a future American government could proceed with major foreign policy decisions and military actions without their British ally, and it is likewise possible that a British government could refuse to support the Americans, but due to the stable cultural dynamics of the special relationship, neither scenario is likely at the present time nor in the anticipatable future. President Obama’s senior advisor on Europe, Elizabeth SherwoodRandall, recently explained that the special relationship ‘is so broad and

‘Affection is the cement which binds us’ 77 rich and deep that it works along a continuum.’71 This was apt phrasing, since the forces of continuity examined in this chapter have certainly proven remarkably steady. Indeed, cultural affinity, the élite sentimentality it inspires, and the impervious nature of the sentimental myth must each be counted among the forces that have kept Britain and America close during the past seventy years. The respective capabilities and limitations of each partner have shifted along the continuum, but widespread cultural affinity has helped each government continue to perceive a need for the other, and consequently the special relationship, though altered and unequal, has survived into the twenty-first century.

Notes 1

Charles Ritcheson, ‘“One People Oration” Given by Ambassador Armstrong at  Westminster Abbey, London,’ July 29, 1976, Robert T. Hartmann Files, 1974–77, Counselors to the President, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, US. 2 H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States: A History of Anglo-American Relations, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1955, pp. 5, 17–18. 3 Henry Roberts and Paul Wilson, Britain and the United States: Problems in Co-operation, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, pp. 6–9. 4 Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850–1970, London: Longman, 1975; Bernard Porter, Britain, Europe and the World, 1850–1982: Delusions of Grandeur, Boston, US: George Allen and Unwin, 1983; Paul Kennedy, The Realities Behind Diplomacy, Boston, US: George Allen and Unwin, 1981. 5 D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull, America in Britain’s Place, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984; David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, London: Longman, 1991. 6 See Charles Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2010; Kathleen Burk, Old World, New World: Great Britain and America from the Beginning, New York: Grove Press, 2009. 7 David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988, pp.  x-xii; John Charmley, Churchill’s Grand Alliance, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995, pp. 4, 72. 8 Percy Lubbock (editor), The Letters of Henry James, Volume I, London: Macmillan, 1920, p. 143. 9 David Reynolds, ‘Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Wartime Anglo-American Alliance, 1939–1945’ in William. Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, The ‘Special Relationship’, Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1986, p. 40; Patrick Hearden, Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order during World War Two, Fayetteville, US: University of Arkansas Press, 2002, pp. 31–3, 94. 10 Ibid. 11 US War Department, Over There: Instructions for American Servicemen in Britain, 1942, Oxford, UK: Bodleian Library, 1994, pp. 1, 3, 7. 12 Gallup Poll #300, August 17, 1943, Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup. com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0300 (July 1, 2005); Gallup Poll #303, September 28, 1943, The Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup. com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0303 (July 1, 2005); Gallup Poll #317, April 25, 1944, Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup.com/ documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0317 (July 8, 2005).

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13

Robert Hathaway, Great Britain and the United States: Special Relations Since 1945, Boston, US: Twayne Publishers, 1990, p. xvii. D. Cameron Watt, Succeeding John Bull, America in Britain’s Place, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. ix, 186–7; David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, London: Longman, 1991, p. 213; Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 93; also see John Dumbrell and Axel Schäfer, America’s ‘Special Relationships’: Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance, London: Routledge, 2009. Barry Rubin and Judith Colp Rubin, Hating America: A History, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 129, 131–3. ‘Reactions in Western Europe to the Suez Crisis, Report #43’ January 28, 1957, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency,Record Group 306, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland, pp. i, iv, 4; ‘Opinion About U.S. Treatment of Negroes: With Comparisons to Other Areas of American Life, Report #38,’ July 24, 1956, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, 1, 4; Research and Reference Service, ‘The Impact of President Eisenhower’s Visit on British Public Opinion,’ October 1959, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. i, 1. Lewis Nixon to Bradley Connors, American Embassy, London, January 14, 1955, Office of Research, Country Project Correspondence, 1952–63, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration. Hugh Parry and Leo Crespi, ‘A Survey of Public Opinion in Western Europe,’ January 1953, Office of Research, Misc. Reports, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. 25–6, 77–8, 97; Reactions Analysis Staff, ‘Political Opinion in Western Europe: Attitudes Toward Political, Economic, and Military Integration (Summary Highlights),’ January 1953, Office of Research, Misc. Reports, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. 2–3. Ibid. ‘Opinion About U.S. Treatment of Negroes: With Comparisons to Other Areas of American Life, Report #38,’ July 24, 1956, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. 1, 4. ‘U.S. Not to be Involved: Mr. Eisenhower’s Assurance,’ Glasgow Herald, November 1, 1956, p. 7. David Carlton, Britain and the Suez Crisis, Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1988, p. 131. Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 93. ‘Developing a Grand Design,’ The Economist, March 5, 1960, Vol. 194, p. 897. Robert Griffith, Ike’s Letters to a Friend, 1941–58, Lawrence, US: University Press of Kansas, 1984, pp. 175–6; Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996, p. 97. ‘Text of Mr Dulles’ Remarks about Suez,’ October 2, 1956, FO 371/119151, British National Archives and Public Record Office; Scott Lucas, Britain and Suez: The Lion’s Last Roar, Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 1996, pp. 104–5. ‘U.S. Maneuvers Against Britain Alleged: Mr R. A. Butler’s Statements to American Magazine,’ Glasgow Herald, November 28, 1956, p.  7; ‘U.S. Raising Loan of £357,140,000,’ Glasgow Herald, 8 December 1956, p. 5; ‘Lords Examine

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The Suez Aftermath,’ Glasgow Herald, December 12, 1956, p.  7; Similar comments were made in the Commons, Hansard, Fifth Series, Vol. 562, columns 1094–1095, (December 18, 1956). US Defense Department, ‘Joint United States-United Kingdom Communiqué,’ September 24, 1958, Digital Collections, National Security Archive, George Washington University, US, 1. ‘Reactions in Western Europe to the Suez Crisis, Report #43,’ January 28, 1957, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. i, iv, 4. Ibid., pp. 11, 21. ‘West European Interest in Various Areas of American Life’, January 10, 1958, Office of Research, Program and Media Studies, 1956–62, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp.  1, 4; ‘Reactions in Western Europe to the Suez Crisis, Report #43’, January 28, 1957, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. 12, 22. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961, New York: Doubleday & Company, 1965, p. 419. Ibid., pp.  421–4, 431; Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm: 1956–1959, New York: Harper & Row, 1971, p. 748. Research and Reference Service, ‘The Impact of President Eisenhower’s Visit on British Public Opinion,’ October 1959, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. i, 1. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., pp. i, 7. ‘The Current State of Confidence in the U.S. Among the West European Public,’ August 1961, Research and Reference Service, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, p. 7. Gallup Poll #668, Survey conducted February 7–12, 1963, Gallup Organization, http://brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0668 (November 12, 2011). ‘Telegram from the Prime Minister to the Secretary of State for the Colonies,’ March 26, 1961, U.S. Policy on the Vietnam War, Part I: 1954–1968, National Security Archive, pp. 1–2. Alan Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940–1987, Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1988, pp. 213, 218; C. Bartlett, British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, London: Macmillan, 1989, p. 108; David Dimbleby and David Reynolds, An Ocean Apart: The Relationship Between Britain and America in the Twentieth Century, New York: Random House, 1988, pp. 267–8, 270; Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War, Westport, US: Praeger, 2004, pp. 6–7. C. Bartlett, The Special Relationship, New York: Longman, 1992, p.  109; Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War, Westport, US: Praeger, 2004, p. xvi. ‘The Impact of President Eisenhower’s Visit on British Public Opinion,’ October 1959, Public Opinion Barometer Reports, 1955–62, Western Europe, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, p. 3. Editorial Note, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–1963, Volume I: Vietnam, 1961, Doc. 315, www.state.gov/www/

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Robert M. Hendershot about_state/history/vol_i_1961/zb.html; George Ball, Telegram From Department of State to Embassy in the United Kingdom, Washington, December 13. 1961, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961–63, Vol. I: Vietnam, 1961, Doc. 319, www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i_1961/ zb.html; Sylvia Ellis, Britain, America, and the Vietnam War, Westport, US: Praeger, 2004, pp. 2–3. Alan Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940–1987, Brighton, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1988, p. 223; John Baylis, Anglo-American Defence Relations, 1939–1980: The Special Relationship, London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 96, 98. Report prepared by the British Embassy in Washington and by the Foreign Office Planning Staff, ‘Underlying Elements in Anglo-U.S. Relations,’ January 17, 1969, FO 32/376, British National Archives and Public Record Office, pp. 8–10. ‘U.S. Standing in Britain Between the President’s China and USSR Visits,’ September 5, 1972, Office of Research, Records of the United States Information Agency, National Archives and Records Administration, pp. 2, 8. Gallup Poll #868, Survey conducted April 3, 1973, Gallup Organization, http:// brain.gallup.com/documents/questionnaire.aspx?STUDY=AIPO0868 (July 1, 2005). For more information on Britain’s participation in the US bicentennial, see Robert M. Hendershot, Family Spats: Perception, Illusion, and Sentimentality in the Anglo-American Special Relationship, Saarbrucken, Germany: VDM Verlag, 2008. Office of the White House Press Secretary, ‘Exchange of Remarks Between the President and Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II,’ July 7, 1976, Robert Orben, Special Assistant to the President Files, 1973–77, Office of the Editorial Staff, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, US; Robert Hartman, Palace Politics: An Inside Account of the Ford Years, New York: McGrawHill, 1980, p. 397. Barbara Gamarekian, ‘State Dinner for Elizabeth Will Be on PBS on July 7,’ New York Times, May 9, 1976; Tom Shales, ‘Quaint Spectacle of a State Dinner,’ The Washington Post, July 8, 1976, p. B11; ‘Dinner in Honor of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II,’ State Visits File, Shelia Weidenfeld Files, 1974–77, First Lady’s Staff, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, US. Ibid. Charles Ritcheson, ‘“One People Oration” Given by Ambassador Armstrong at  Westminster Abbey, London,’ July 29, 1976, Robert T. Hartmann Files, 1974–77, Counselors to the President, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, US. Flamini, ‘U.S.-British Relations: Will the historic “special relationship” endure?,’ CQ Researcher, November 5, 2010, Volume 20, Number 39, p. 930. Public Broadcasting Service, ‘What does the world think of us?,’ April 6, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/314/opinions-of-us.html (May 5, 2011). Pew Research Center, Views of a Changing World, Washington, DC, The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, 2003, pp. 19, 20. George W. Bush, ‘Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People,’ September 20, 2001, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html, (June 20, 2011). Pew Research Center, Views of a Changing World, Washington, DC, The Pew Research Center For The People & The Press, 2003, p. 20. Such findings are also significant because they help to reveal (in conjunction with Records of the United States Information Agency and Gallup Poll data presented earlier in this chapter) the continuity of comparative Anglo-American affinities throughout the post-war period, and thus such data has the power to refute any

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fears that generational and demographic change in the United States and the United Kingdom will dissolve Anglo-American cultural or diplomatic ties. George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, January 20, 2004, http://www. washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html, (June 27, 2010). Public Broadcasting Service, ‘What does the world think of us?,’ April 6, 2007, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/314/opinions-of-us.html (May 5, 2011). Peter Walker, ‘Obama hails US-UK ties after talks with Brown at Downing Street,’ The Guardian, July 26, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/ jul/26/barackobama.gordonbrown, (May 20, 2011). Ian Dunt, ‘“Not for war”: Brown goes to Washington’ Politics.co.uk, March 3, 2009, http://www.politics.co.uk/news/2009/3/3/not-for-war-brown-goes-towashington , (May 15, 2011). ‘Britons see Blair as George Bush’s poodle,’ Edinburgh Evening News, July 25, 2006, http://edinburghnews.scotsman.com/britainsworldrole/Britons-seeBlair-as-George.2795332.jp, (June 2, 2010). Ian Drury, ‘To my special friend Gordon, 25 DVDs: Obama gives Brown a set of classic movies. Let’s hope he likes the Wizard of Oz,’ March 6, 2009, Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1159627, (November 13, 2011). Flamini, ‘U.S.-British Relations: Will the historic “special relationship” endure?,’ CQ Researcher, November 5, 2010, Volume 20, Number 39, pp. 919–20, 923–4. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, ‘Statement by the President on his call with Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom,’ May 11, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/, (May 15, 2010). Flamini, ‘U.S.-British Relations: Will the historic “special relationship” endure?,’ CQ Researcher, November 5, 2010, Volume 20, Number 39, pp. 918–19. The ‘White House Magnolia wood’ had been used to make the gifts particularly precious and rare; it came from old trees of the White House garden that had been felled by a recent storm. Rachel Rose Hartman, ‘Obama visit to UK under the microscope,’ Yahoo! News, May 25, 2011, http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_ theticket/20110525/ts_yblog_theticket/obama-visit-to-uk-underthe-microscope, (May 25, 2011). Flamini, ‘U.S.-British Relations: Will the historic “special relationship” endure?,’ CQ Researcher, November 5, 2010, Volume 20, Number 39, p. 934. Daniel Quinn, Ishmael, New York: Bantam, 1995. Flamini, ‘U.S.-British Relations: Will the historic “special relationship” endure?,’ CQ Researcher, November 5, 2010, Volume 20, Number 39, p.  935; Edward Luce, ‘Neurosis Develops Over Special Rapport,’ Financial Times, July 19, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aca1fc7e-935d-11df-bb9a-00144feab49a.html, (June 1, 2011).

3

Personal diplomacy Relations between prime ministers and presidents John Dumbrell

Introduction Personal relationships, especially personal friendships, between prime ministers and American presidents are part of the received mythology of the Special Relationship. The history of the Special Relationship indeed is often defined by ‘special’ personal partnerships which seem to embody and exemplify the Anglo-American alliance. Pre-eminent here were the Cold War friendships between Harold Macmillan and John Kennedy, and between Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The obvious post-Cold War equivalent would be Tony Blair’s relationships with Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. The picture of close US-UK relations being driven by periodic personal friendships is superficially persuasive. Did not Kennedy and Macmillan – two leaders who were actually related by marriage – heal the transatlantic rifts associated with the Suez crisis of 1956? Did Thatcher and Reagan not bury the rows associated with the Vietnam War and the cooling of relations during the premiership of Edward Heath? Did the strange trinity of Clinton-Blair-Bush not revive special relations following the removal of shared anti-communist interests after the end of the Cold War? Such received notions about the importance of personal leader relations in sustaining the US-UK Special Relationship invite some rather familiar counter-arguments. Concentration on personal relations, it might be argued, risks sentimentalising our understanding of the Special Relationship. It also risks over-simplifying a complex web of interests and multi-layered connections: what President John F. Kennedy called the ‘coral reef’ of transatlantic linkages.1 The Special Relationship is frequently, and helpfully, likened to a layer-cake, with personal leader relations at its apex, bureaucratic interweaving in the middle, and public-level cultural interactions at its base. A few initial comments on the intellectual defensibility of studying leader relations will prepare the ground for the subject matter of my chapter. Prevailing interpretations of international politics emphasise power considerations and national advantage, rather than personal relationships. Alliance theory within the discipline of International Relations typically concerns itself with utility – notably the concept of the ‘bandwagoning’ of

Personal diplomacy 83 weaker states behind stronger ones – rather than with leader friendships (or indeed personal leader antagonisms). At the very least, a focus on leader relations in the context of transatlantic politics raises substantial problems of structure and agency.2 It would, however, surely be a very extreme form of structural determinism which did not accord a significant explanatory role for political leaders, and for their ability to make real choices between competing policy alternatives. Both British and American leaders inherit particular dominant understandings of the national interest. They operate within democratic political frameworks which also inhibit freedom of choice and limit the impact of personal relationships upon policy choice. Indeed, leader decisions are framed by many socially constructed and organisationally structured factors, but they are not absolutely determined by them. Personal leader choice tends to some extent to be influenced by relations with other leaders who are affected by the choice. This influence may derive from direct pressure exerted by, or from the anticipated effect of the choice upon, such leaders. In response to the charge of oversimplification – the failure to appreciate the significance of transatlantic ‘coral reefs’ and ‘layer-cakes’ – we can appeal to arguments relating to levels of analysis in international political study. The study of international relations, including the study of transatlantic relations, becomes coherent only if it takes due note of differing levels of analysis. Prime ministerialpresidential relations is an intellectually defensible level of analysis. The fact that the study of leader relations is notoriously susceptible to sentimentalism and over-simplification is not, in itself, a reason for abandoning it. We will proceed with a synoptic contextualisation of leader relations during the Cold War. The chapter then considers post-Cold War leader relations, drawing out the radically changed context in which they operated. By way of putting some bones upon the skeleton of shifting US-UK relations, there follows a section on transitions. We consider the complex transitions (Lyndon Johnson, Harold Wilson, Richard Nixon, Edward Heath) of 1968 to 1970, comparing them to the years between 2007 and 2009 (George W. Bush, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown, Barack Obama). The point of these transitional comparisons will be to examine the impact of rapid personnel shift on the underlying Special Relationship. To what extent did the good ship ‘Anglo-America’ simply speed ahead, regardless of dramatic leader changes? We will then draw out some general conclusions from study of the two transitions, before attempting to take the temperature of contemporary US-UK relations in the context of personal leader diplomacy.

The Cold War context of personal US-UK leader relations: To the end of the Cold War Looking back on the history of the Cold War Special Relationship, one is struck by three features which have significant relevance to the topic of

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leader relations. First, for an alliance which is reputedly one of the strongest in the world, the Cold War Special Relationship was a very bumpy ride. There were dramatic Anglo-American rows throughout the era of the Cold War, rows which often erupted in the form of fierce conflict between presidents and prime ministers. Second, there is the undoubted fact of ongoing military and defence cooperation – conventionally explained, of course, in the Cold War context by shared interest rather than by any personal leader diplomacy. Third, there was the frequent appearance of ‘end of the affair’ jeremiads – prophecies of the imminent collapse of special relations. These portents of collapse usually coincided with periods of tricky leader relations, and came to a climax in the era of the Cold War’s termination. To what extent were these predictions of Anglo-American ungluing premature and overstated? To what extent was the Special Relationship ‘saved’ by the renewal of close personal leader relations? In this section, we will discuss these three features of Cold War and end-of-theCold-War US-UK relations in turn. Even if we confine our discussion to those two Cold War partnerships (Kennedy-Macmillan and Reagan-Thatcher) normally regarded as especially close, we can easily locate instances of significant leader tension. John F. Kennedy seems to have developed a genuine personal fondness for the older leader, but there is no reason to suppose that he would not have cooperated perfectly happily with a Labour government.3 The Foreign Office reported the views of the Kennedy administration in 1962 as follows: ‘Even the apparent drift of the Labour Party towards neutralism last year was discounted on the grounds that this sort of thing had happened before and that if and when a crisis came Britain would rally at once’.4. Tensions with Washington developed over Berlin, notably over how to respond to the Soviet signing of a peace treaty with East Germany. Macmillan had a degree of input into the diplomacy of the Cuban missile crisis. Yet, as David OrmsbyGore, British Ambassador to Washington, concluded, the crisis illustrated not so much any special role for Macmillan; rather, it showed that the UK’s relationship with the US ‘is perforce unequal’.5 If we move on to Reagan and Thatcher, we find a plethora of transatlantic rows: notably over the Siberian pipeline, the 1983 Grenada invasion, the Strategic Defense Initiative, and policy towards Northern Ireland. Personal tensions between Thatcher and Reagan were generally resolved by the employment of selfdeprecation and charm, by the stronger party, President Reagan. Phoning Downing Street in the wake of the Grenada invasion, Reagan indicated that the next time he came to visit, he would be sure to throw his hat in first.6 It is also worth remembering that Margaret Thatcher, ostensibly the most proAmerican Cold War British leader, had very awkward relations with Presidents Carter and George H. W. Bush. In the latter case, tension was especially associated with Thatcher’s opposition to German reunification, as well as with the apparent American inclination to see Bonn (and/or Berlin), rather than London, as its premier European partner.

Personal diplomacy 85 How far did relatively warm or relatively cool leader relations impinge upon Cold War military and intelligence cooperation? The simple answer must be that such relations were rooted in perceptions of common threat, and American appreciation of the geo-strategic importance of its European ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’, rather than in personal leader diplomacy. Nevertheless, it is at least worth recalling that Macmillan did extract a generous nuclear deal from the US at Nassau in 1962, albeit following the Skybolt fiasco and in the context of considerable British reliance on US nuclear technology. Particularly difficult to interpret is the American response to the Falklands invasion of 1982. Did eventual American support for Britain illustrate the strength of institutionalised cooperation, energised by the personal difficulty that Reagan would have had in not fully supporting his friend in London? Or did the (initially uncertain) American response show the limits of institutionalised cooperation and of personal loyalty? Prime Minister Edward Heath’s ambivalent attitude towards American power undoubtedly affected not only his personal relationship with President Nixon; it also had security implications. Henry Kissinger later recalled the lack of British cooperation for US logistical air support to Israel during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Kissinger wrote that Heath did not formally refuse American access to British bases in Cyprus; rather, ‘it had been made plain that we should not ask’.7 The death of US-UK ‘special relations’ has been proclaimed on many occasions: in the Cold War context, most notably at the time of the Suez crisis and in the later 1960s. US-UK relations soured dramatically in the later years of the presidency of Lyndon Johnson over London’s refusal to send troops to Vietnam, over the 1967 devaluation of the pound, and over London’s decision (published in the July 1967 Supplementary Statement on Defence) to end military commitments East of Suez. David Bruce, US Ambassador to London, noted in 1967 that the ‘so-called Anglo-American special relationship’ was ‘little more than sentimental terminology’.8 Even more striking was the outpouring of ‘end of the affair’ predictions which accompanied the end of the Cold War. Without shared anti-Sovietism, what would become of the Special Relationship – not only of military and intelligence cooperation, but also of the expectation that London and Washington would act together at times of international crisis?9 To many commentators, Britain’s future seemed to point in the direction of European integration; while demographic change in the United States also seemed likely to devalue the putative specialness of Anglo-American relations.10 As we will see below, the Special Relationship (defined in terms of military and intelligence cooperation and the expectation of US-UK partnership in crisis) did struggle on through the upheavals of the later 1960s. Personal relations, notably between President Carter and Prime Minister James Callaghan, may be accorded some role in preserving them. However, though the Nixon years were scarcely ones of personal warmth between the

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Anglo-American leadership, ‘special relations’ just about persisted, not least through the agency of inertia and bureaucratic momentum. It might be argued that the relationship was eventually ‘saved’ by Reagan and Thatcher, at least in terms of the restoration of the expectation of US-UK convergence. Such an argument is not entirely implausible, though it both tends to ignore the transatlantic tensions of the 1980s and to exalt unduly élite agency over structure as a way of explaining international history. More plausible is the view that the post-1989 ‘end of the affair’ was avoided (or at least postponed) by the premiership of Tony Blair. We turn now to our review of post-Cold War leader relations.

Post-Cold War developments The later Thatcher years (1989–90) and the period of John Major’s leadership (1990–7) gave significant grounds for supposing that the Special Relationship was expiring under post-Soviet conditions. Links and structures were still in place but, even more than in the early 1970s, seemed as much the product of inertia – the smile on the face of the transatlantic Cheshire cat – as of any deep mutual commitment. The waning of special relations had its roots in transformed geopolitical conditions. Yet signs of the AngloAmerican affair ending were evident, too, in the relatively poor élite relations between 1989 and 1997. As we have seen, Thatcher’s closeness to Reagan was not replicated with George H W. Bush. Margaret Thatcher discerned a political need on Bush’s part to distance himself from Reagan, a distancing which involved ‘turning his back fairly publicly on the special position I had enjoyed in the Reagan Administration’.11 George Bush senior was the master of ‘rolodex diplomacy’ and certainly developed some degree of personal closeness to John Major during the diplomatic exchanges which preceded the 1991 Gulf War. Major  recalled the elder Bush as ‘a good friend and a poor hater’.12 Yet the Major-Bush era was beset by a series of policy disagreements, ranging from policy towards Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong to continuing British defence cuts. The British press in the early 1990s seemed convinced that the Special Relationship was finished, with the US drawing back from the kind of European engagement which had characterised the relationship in its heyday.13 The most difficult policy disputes of the Bush-Major years involved contrasting attitudes to the war in Bosnia. These conflicts continued into the Clinton-Major era (1993–7) against a background of worsened personal leader relations. Major found Bill Clinton in 1993–4 to be ‘alarmingly under-briefed’.14 Clinton’s Irish interventions – notably the granting of a visa to Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams in 1993 – infuriated Major. The British prime minister took the opportunity of a Cabinet meeting on 3 February 1994 to express his extreme anger at the US president.15 For its part, the Clinton team found British Conservative politicians pompous and

Personal diplomacy 87 condescending.16 Reports that Downing Street had assisted Bush’s 1992 re-election campaign fanned the flames further. President Clinton seems to have taken the lead in attempting to patch over the rift with Major, notably during the latter’s visit to Washington at the end of February 1994 and during Clinton’s visit to Britain to celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day.17 However, the relationship between Clinton and Major continued to operate as Raymond Seitz, US Ambassador to London during the BushClinton transition, put it, on a ‘grin-and-bear-it basis’.18 The experience of the immediate post-Cold War years seemed to be one of a pulling apart of the Anglo-American relationship at all levels. US-UK cooperation in the 1991 Gulf conflict certainly indicated that there would be no abrupt break with the past. However, the Major-Clinton tensions in particular did seem to confirm the weakening of the alliance in the context of transformed global geopolitics. The lack of personal friendship between Clinton and Major was not of itself of great significance. To some extent the coolness between the two men may have been linked to a misconception among the Clintonites about the putatively exalted social background of British Conservative leaders. More important, however, was the fact that neither leader strove very hard to conceal the rifts. From Clinton’s point of view, Major combined European cynicism about the fate of Bosnia with a slightly amusing air of hurt dignity over American interventions in Ireland. For Major, Clinton was ill-informed (especially regarding Ireland) and excessively driven by domestic American pressures.19 At set-piece occasions, the two leaders did observe the symbolism of ‘special relations’; nevertheless their widely reported mutual coolness seemed to indicate a rather deepseated weakness in Anglo-American relations. The election of Tony Blair in 1997 brought to Downing Street a leader who shared the general policy outlook of the American president, and who positively welcomed the interventions in Ireland. New Labour modernisers were warm admirers of the Clinton approach, both in political/strategic and policy terms. In his memoir, A Journey, Blair recorded his strong sense of personal and philosophical closeness to Clinton in language which came close to self-parody: We were political soul-mates. We shared pretty much the same analysis of the weakness of progressive politics. We were both quintessential modernisers. We were both informal in style and young in outlook for our age. And both of us were at one level easy-going; but when you reached right down, there was a lot of granite providing the foundation.20 Clinton recorded his personal gratitude to Tony and Cherie Blair for their support during the impeachment crisis. When the Blairs arrived in Washington for a two-day state visit in early February 1998, they were ‘a sight for sore eyes for both Hillary and me’.21 There were policy tensions between Clinton and Blair, not least over the former’s reluctance to commit

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ground troops to Kosovo in 1999. However, the major achievement of Blair’s premiership – the 1998 Belfast Agreement – was to a considerable degree the result of personal transatlantic leader partnership. Clinton also conspicuously shared Blair’s vision for Britain’s future – as an Atlantic bridger, committed to a strong role at the heart of Europe. What should we conclude from the contrasting Major-Clinton and BlairClinton relationships about the importance of post-Cold War leader relations? With defence and intelligence cooperation broadly continuing under both pairs, it is tempting to argue that the contrasting personal interactions mattered little. However, a more persuasive interpretation is that Anglo-American relations were in crisis during the 1990s. During the Major-Clinton period, the alliance persisted, but primarily as a result of subleader ‘coral reef’ connections. Neither leader was tempted publicly to renounce ‘special relations’, yet neither was prepared to make much in the way of a serious effort to reverse the sense of drift between allies. During the Blair-Clinton years, the will to arrest drift was present at the leadership level. The relationship was still in a condition of acute transition. Blair consciously sought to position himself close to the American president. This was done without hypocrisy – Blair genuinely admired Clinton and Clintonism – but nevertheless carried the risk that London might come to be seen (not least by British voters) as unduly subservient to Washington. From the viewpoint of 2001, Blair’s strategy at the very least could be plausibly seen as reversing some of the problems of the Major years; and as at least postponing the fracturing of ‘special relations’ which had seemed likely with the removal of the Soviet threat. Blair’s continuation of the strategy of close support for Washington after 2000 exposed the risks in his strategy: the danger of the close leader alliance dragging Britain into commitments a long way removed from core UK interests, and the widespread perception of becoming a creature of American power. Blair’s strong support for the policies of President George W. Bush and the War on Terror rested on Blair’s understanding of the obligations of the Special Relationship: London should be a friend to Washington in bad times as well as good. It reflected Blair’s understanding of the ‘Greeks and Romans’ doctrine: the view that London should seek intimate involvement with American decision-making, with a view actually to improving the quality of those decisions. It rested also on a genuine convergence between American neo-conservatism and Blair’s liberal interventionism. As with his relationship with Clinton, there was an element of calculation in the closeness to Bush. Blair believed that British interests were indeed best served by hugging Washington close. There is, however, no reason to question the degree of personal warmth between Blair and Bush. In A Journey, Blair wrote that there ‘weren’t many social issues we seemed to agree on’. However, the idea of Bush as ‘a dumb idiot who stumbled into the presidency’ was a ‘ludicrous’ caricature.22 One might argue that Blair protesteth too much. Nevertheless a more or less genuine

Personal diplomacy 89 regard for Bush (as distinct from a regard for the power he represented) does emerge from Blair’s account of their friendship. From Bush’s side, Blair’s support was valued, though there is little evidence that the British leader was given much in the way of concrete reward for his loyalty over Iraq – or indeed had much in the way of substantive impact on policy. Some members of the Bush team seem indeed to have regarded Blair as little more than a rather sanctimonious nuisance.23 Blair’s judgement of his relationship with Clinton – the repositioning of relations following the difficult Major years, the achievement of the Irish peace deal – seems sound and defensible. His recalibration of extremely close leader relations following 9/11 was less felicitous, equally for core British interests and for Blair’s own political reputation. In terms of the dynamics of Anglo-American relations, the lesson of Blair-Bush would seem to be that personal closeness between leaders does matter. For several years after 9/11, the course of transatlantic history depended to large extent precisely upon the personal contact between Downing Street and the White House. We will now take a step back from the controversies of early twenty-first century Anglo-American relations. As already indicated, we will look briefly at two leader transitions, those of 1968–70 and 2007–9. Each period witnessed complex and very rapid changes of leader personnel. Comparison of the two eras may provide a clue both to the significance of leadership relations for the developing course of Anglo-American relations, and to changing conditions during and after the Cold War.

Two transitions: 1968–1970; 2007–2009 By 1968, Lyndon Johnson’s final year as president, the personal diplomacy between Downing Street and the White House had virtually broken down in the wake of the British devaluation and Far East troop decisions. From the British side, high levels of distrust remained as a legacy of London’s failed effort in February 1967 to mediate in the Vietnam War.24 In a sense, the devaluation and East of Suez decisions simplified the US-UK agenda. After 1967, London no longer faced significant pressure from Washington to commit forces to Vietnam. Yet the agenda was still complex. It included British involvement in strategic arms talks with the USSR, issues relating to European integration, policies towards Rhodesia, the civil war in Nigeria, questions relating to the Middle East, and various economic and trading issues. With élite relations at such a low ebb, the working through of such an agenda seemed to require a rebuilding of trust. The impulse to rebuild at the end of 1968 seemed to be coming from the newly elected president, Richard Nixon. According to his national security adviser Henry Kissinger, Prime Minister Wilson was much more highly regarded by the new US administration than by its Democratic predecessor. Kissinger recalled than some members of the outgoing administration had

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seen Wilson’s leftist background and personal vanity as making him ‘unusually susceptible to Soviet blandishments’. For the new team, however, Wilson ‘represented a curious phenomenon in British politics; his generation of Labour Party leaders was emotionally closer to the United States than were many leaders of the Conservative Party’.25 A few days after his inauguration, President Nixon wrote a friendly note to Wilson, expressing the desire to uphold ‘the depth of feeling and kinship existing between our nations’.26 An early visit to London was arranged via Senator Jacob Javits, the New York liberal Republican. Nixon’s visit was preceded by an extended discussion in London about the need to extract a firm understanding on the nuclear commitment to Europe. The talks with Nixon involved lengthy discussion of the future of NATO and somewhat less intense exchanges on Vietnam, the Middle East, Rhodesia, London’s renewed desire to join the European Community, and the general state of East-West relations. On the evening of 25 February, Wilson arranged for Nixon to attend an impromptu Cabinet meeting. Wilson later offered a characteristically Pooterish gloss on what was probably a rather grisly occasion: Nixon, wrote Wilson, ‘still recalled it a year later as the highlight, unexpected and unplanned though it was, of his tour’.27 Kissinger recalled that Wilson’s suggestion that the two leaders move to first name terms as being met by a ‘fish-eyed stare’ from Nixon. The new president, however, did defuse a potentially difficult situation at the 25 February Downing Street dinner. He gave a welcoming toast for John Freeman, former New Statesman editor and now British Ambassador in Washington. Freeman had previously described Nixon in the New Statesman as ‘a man of no principle’ and had been appointed by Wilson in expectation of a Democratic victory in the 1968 presidential election.28 In the discussions, Nixon treated Wilson to an outline of the emerging strategy of détente, while also underlining the US commitment to Europe – albeit in the context of anticipated increases in European defence spending. Wilson’s own notes indicate his satisfaction with the meeting, though it is not difficult to find evidence of Nixon rebuffing some of Wilson’s proposals. The British leader again put forward the possibility of UK mediation in Vietnam and in the Middle East. He raised the possibility of a new ‘strategic doctrine’, effectively committing the US to defending Europe without significant increases in European defence expenditures. Nixon seems to have rejected such proposals, though without the rudeness of his presidential predecessor. Wilson was pleased by Nixon’s general tone. Michael Palliser, Wilson’s Foreign Office adviser, recorded that Nixon was prepared to accept some kind of special role for British diplomacy. Palliser noted Nixon’s view that ‘all over the world’ Britain ‘had diplomats of very high quality .... It would always be useful to him to have two opinions on some of these questions’.29 Wilson next met the new US leader during a brief presidential stopover at RAF Mildenhall on 3 August 1969. Nixon briefed Wilson on Vietnam and

Personal diplomacy 91 again politely indicated the limits to any substantive British involvement in arms control talks with Moscow. Again, Wilson’s notes reflected an upbeat assessment. Nixon, wrote Wilson, ‘no more regards us as a Super Power than we do ourselves’. However, he ‘does not regard us as a poor relation; he is essentially lonely carrying out the great responsibilities and wants to share them at any rate in analysis and prognosis before taking the decisions he has to take’.30 The final Wilson-Nixon meeting took place in Washington in January 1970. Ambassador Freeman informed Wilson before the meeting that ‘Nixon did not have a lot of humour or imagination but was quick to take a point and make a relevant reply’. The Washington agenda covered East-West relations, Vietnam, Rhodesia, trade, the Middle East, European integration, Greece and the Nigerian civil war. Pre-meeting worries on the British side focused on the putative lack of American commitment to UK entry into the European Community and the possibility of a new, post-de Gaulle, US-French understanding. Wilson achieved various reassurances about US support for British entry into the European Community, as well as on the US commitment to European defence. Wilson attended a National Security Council meeting, arranged as a direct response to Nixon’s Cabinet meeting visit. On Greece, now controlled by military junta, Kissinger told Freeman that ‘the views of the Prime Minister and the President would not be congruent’.31 In respect of the Nigerian civil war and the crisis in Biafra, in Kissinger’s words, ‘British obfuscation’ allied itself to ‘State Department procrastination’: ‘Wilson influenced Nixon’s policy to a degree and curbed our interventionist impulses’.32 In these early Wilson-Nixon exchanges, we discern a clear shifting of terms from the Johnson years. 1969 was, for Wilson, to be the year to rebuild the UK’s intermediary role with a new president, who would (so Wilson hoped) be keen to embrace old friends and escape America’s global ‘loneliness’. No more than Johnson was Nixon prepared to accept Wilson’s vision of London as a global mediator. However, Nixon was prepared to make certain guarantees to Wilson and also to reassure the British leader that there was indeed something special in the US-UK relationship. Within limits, the damage of the late 1960s seemed to be on the mend. With Wilson’s defeat in the June 1970 general election, the rebuilding of élite US-UK relations would have to adjust to yet another important change of personnel. Edward Heath’s personal orientation towards the US was far more idiosyncratic and ambivalent than that of any other post-1945 British leader. Kissinger later wrote that ‘of all British leaders, Heath was the most indifferent to the American connection and perhaps even to Americans individually’. President Nixon welcomed the 1970 Conservative victory, but developed, again in Kissinger’s words, an attitude towards Heath ‘like that of a jilted lover’.33 Interesting observations on the transatlantic dynamics as Heath succeeded Wilson emerge from a Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) report dated 23 September 1970 under the title, ‘Anglo/

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United States Special Relations’. The report developed the notion of American ‘loneliness’ and tendency to ‘look instinctively to us’, presumably for support and reassurance in a troubled world. Yet the report clearly considered the Special Relationship to be at a crossroads. British entry into the European Community ‘will bring us into conflict with some American commercial interests, and after our entry into Europe, the special links between the United Kingdom and the United States are bound generally to become less and less “exclusive” ’.34 Heath was briefed by the FCO on the possibilities for US-UK tension over American economic protectionism, and over attitudes towards the emerging disorder in Northern Ireland.35 Nixon and Heath met for one day at Chequers on 3 October 1970. Nixon declared at the outset that he did believe in the ‘special relationship’, seeing it as ‘essentially a matter of personal relationship’. The US, said Nixon, was in ‘a lonely position and, perhaps, not a very healthy one’. The president welcomed Heath’s apparent recommitment to East of Suez (Heath had negotiated a rather unconvincing ‘five power pact’ for Far Eastern defence). For his part, Heath ‘entirely agreed with the emphasis which the President had placed to be seen to withdraw from Vietnam in good order’. The discussion with Heath was amicable, with Nixon promising action to resist protectionist measures in the US Congress. Nixon offered support for UK arms sales to South Africa, and for the Simonstown Agreement on cooperation between London and Pretoria for the defence of sea routes around the Cape of Good Hope. Heath and Wilson discussed attitudes towards the new leftist Allende regime in Chile, with Secretary of State William Rogers chipping in to the effect that the US ‘would not seek to destroy the Allende regime, but they would not be concerned to preserve it either’.36 The available record of the early Heath-Nixon interactions does not yield much evidence of any overt disagreements between the two leaders. Heath visited Washington shortly before Christmas 1970, in a visit marked by a strange shift of roles in relation to the phrase, ‘special relationship’. Nixon favoured the phrase, while Heath conspicuously avoided it.37 Significant disputes were to emerge over succeeding years – notably over the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, Nixon’s 1971 suspension of dollar convertibility (announced without consultation with allies), and the 1973 nuclear alert and Yom Kippur War. Even in the very early meetings, however, it is possible to discern a palpable change from the Wilson era. Heath was temperamentally averse to any behaviour which might be construed as toadying towards Washington, and Nixon appears to have been taken aback by the shift in Anglo-American mood music. Heath did not seek to dismantle the deep structures of the Special Relationship, especially the structures surrounding nuclear defence and intelligence cooperation. Rather, he sought to reject the trappings, flummeries and pretensions of the Special Relationship – all of which Heath saw as obstacles to a viable, Europeanised future for Britain.38

Personal diplomacy 93 Our second transition also involved four leaders. Between 2007 and 2009, Anglo-American relations were led by President George W. Bush, Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and by President Barack Obama. This second transition also involved significant efforts by Downing Street to signal a change of direction from preceding patterns of AngloAmerican relations, with rather uncertain American ideas about how to respond. By 2007, Tony Blair was a broadly unpopular British leader, whose fall from unpopularity was widely linked to his association with Bush. The G8 summit in St Petersburg, coinciding with the outbreak of the IsraelLebanon war, in mid-2006 was the occasion of the accidental broadcasting of a conversation between Bush and Blair. The latter – famously greeted by Bush with the words, ‘Yo, Blair!’ – appeared to be offering British mediatory services in respect of the Middle East conflict. Blair’s supplications were reminiscent of Wilson’s rather desperate efforts to promote British mediation in the era of the Vietnam War. Dismissed as a light-hearted exchange in Blair’s memoirs, the ‘Yo, Blair!’ incident fixed once more the image of British subservience as Blair’s leadership approached its end.39 When Gordon Brown finally assumed power the following June, he appears to have determined that the symbolism of the Special Relationship required attention. Gordon Brown brought to Downing Street strong American connections. These were primarily with the Democratic Party, though Brown had developed links with some US conservatives and had an interest in American neo-conservative social thought.40 The political logic of 2007 seemed to require some symbolic distancing from the past, not merely from the rather unpopular (and soon to be departed) US leader, but also from the legacy of Blair. Yet Brown certainly did not wish to see any radical overhaul in the structures of US-UK special relations. In fact, in the first months of his premiership, Brown announced measures to facilitate British integration into the US missile defence system, as well as the construction of two aircraft carriers hosting Chinook helicopters and the Joint Strike Fighter. The ‘trick’, according to one senior Brown adviser, was to get the US relationship ‘right without us doing a Tony’.41 An invitation to visit Washington at the end of July 2007 plunged Downing Street into weeks of dithering about how to handle the first meeting with Bush. When it came, the first visit was surrounded by clear signals from the new Brown team that it was not to be a case of transatlantic business-as-usual. In mid-July, for example, Mark Malloch Brown, the new minister for Asia and Africa, stated that it was very unlikely ‘that the Brown-Bush relationship is going to go through the baptism of fire and therefore be joined at the hip like the Blair-Bush relationship’.42 When Brown did meet Bush at Camp David in late July, the familiar Bush-Brown symbolic closeness and shared body-language were conspicuously absent. Following an awkwardly staged encounter with Bush in Golf Cart One, Brown described the leader exchanges as ‘full and frank’ – common diplospeak for confrontational. The British press reported a

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range of potential disputes including UK policy in Iraq and Afghanistan, Brown’s schemes for Middle Eastern economic development, and issues relating to the conflict in Darfur. While in the US, Brown departed from the public American position by describing Afghanistan, rather than Iraq, as the ‘front line against terrorism’.43 According to British journalist Jonathan Freedland, Brown had gone ‘about as far as a British Prime Minister could reasonably be expected to go in putting an American president at arm’s length’.44 A Washington Post headline captured the American assessment of Brown: ‘More Bulldog than Poodle’.45 That Bush and Brown never achieved any great degree of personal friendship is scarcely surprising. The White House was aware of the intense rivalry between Blair and Brown, and may have tended to blame the latter for precipitating Blair’s departure. Brown was probably more concerned with the 2008 presidential contenders than with the second term leader in the White House. Brown’s personal stiffness reinforced his concern not to be seen ‘doing a Tony’ during the visit to Camp David. Even in the case of the difficult first meeting, however, the personal tension between Bush and Brown should not be exaggerated. The British leader offered reassurances over the British commitment both to Iraq and to Afghanistan; London was not about to cut itself loose from American understandings of the War on Terror. Bush and Brown apparently converged over their attitudes to Darfur. Brown was included in high-level US national security exchanges over tensions between Israel and Syria. Even at the most personal level, there was little if any animosity. George W. Bush was capable of understanding the electoral pressure on Brown to establish a degree of political distance from the Blair years. Bush told David Manning (the UK Ambassador who was now giving way to Nigel Sheinwald) that the two leaders could ‘work together fine’. Simon McDonald, foreign policy adviser to Gordon Brown, noted: ‘Brown was surprised by how much he liked Bush. He found Bush to be much smarter than he had imagined. Bush consulted him and listened to him and that was helpful in building the relationship’.46 Following the Camp David visit, Brown and Bush conversed by video link about once a month, roughly half as frequently as Bush-Blair.47 Given the relative diminishing of the crisis in Iraq and the decline in personal intimacy, this counted as significant and frequent contact. Brown travelled to Boston in April 2008 to give a major foreign policy address at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library. The address hailed the advent of global interdependence and appealed for American leadership in overhauling global economic institutions. The speech was widely seen as Brown’s effort to establish a dialogue with an incoming Democratic president. For his part, Bush does not appear to have been bothered by any such positioning and received Brown with considerable friendliness. Bush praised Brown as a ‘good friend’, noting the British leader’s recent handling of a terror attack at Glasgow airport.48 For Brown, symbolic distancing from the White House had come to an end. The Times published an editorial to the effect that any

Personal diplomacy 95 continuation of such distancing would simply contribute to Brown’s marginalisation in Washington.49 On meeting Bush, Brown publicly acknowledged ‘a great deal of gratitude’ to the president for his policies on terrorism, while enthusiastically using Churchillian language about standing ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with America.50 Brown met Barack Obama during the April 2008 trip, when Obama was still engaged in the nomination fight with Hillary Clinton, as well as in London in late July. Candidate Obama’s decision to make his key European address in Berlin rather than London was interpreted in the British press as a slight to Brown, as was Obama’s neglect of the phrase, ‘special relationship’, during the day-long London visit.51 The coming to power of Barack Obama was accompanied by a cacophony of ‘end of the affair’ editorialising. Writing in The Times in January 2009, Rachel Sylvester described the new president as ‘the least Anglophile American leader in living memory’. Barack Obama, argued Sylvester, ‘has no innate affection for this country – in fact, his grandfather was imprisoned and tortured by British colonialists in Kenya’.52 Tensions over the British military performance in Iraq and in Afghanistan were widely reported. Overshadowing everything during 2008–9, however, was the global economic crisis. Brown was far more preoccupied with leading an international response to the crash than even with establishing a relationship with the incoming president. However, in March 2009, Brown became the first European leader to secure an invitation to Washington. The trip, which involved an address by Brown to both Houses of Congress, was something of a public relations calamity. Press coverage concentrated on the failure to hold a joint BrownObama press conference and on the president’s inappropriate gift to Brown (a DVD collection which would not work in the UK). In fact, the trip did involve substantive and amicable discussion between the leaders. Obama and Brown agreed on the need for global fiscal stimulus and on the importance of tackling climate change.53 The general atmosphere, however, was not especially warm. Reports emerged to the effect that the regular video links between the White House and Downing Street had been discontinued, that Obama was deliberately uninterested in personal diplomacy with European leaders, and that Washington was distinctly uninterested in using London as an ‘Atlantic bridge’. Obama conspicuously supported Brown at the G20 summit, held in London in April 2009. The president was prepared publicly to acknowledge the leading role taken by the British leader in securing a coordinated global response to the financial crisis. Yet still the Obama-Brown relationship struggled to achieve convincing public expression. In London at the G20, Obama witnessed Brown venting his temper on staffers. The president’s remark – ‘Tell your guy to cool it’ – was widely reported. Further confusions attended other meetings in 2009, for example at the sixty-fifth commemoration of D-Day. In September, Brown and Obama managed a brief meeting in the kitchen at the United Nations building in New York. Malloch Brown criticised Brown aides for

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being ‘so desperate’ to arrange any sort of one-to-one meeting with Obama.54 In November, Con Coughlin wrote in The Spectator that Obama’s relations with London were now at a new low point, with Brown shut out of decisions about the need to reinforce troop levels in Afghanistan. The new personal ‘diplomatic cold-shouldering’ of Brown, for Coughlin, showed that Obama had ‘little interest in listening to what Britain has to say on many world issues, even at a time when British servicemen and women are sacrificing their lives in what is supposed to be a common cause’.55 Our two complex transitions yield a number of conclusions about the role of personal leader relations in the recent history of the Special Relationship. One obvious point is simply that, in the public realm, the state of Anglo-American relations is judged by common understandings of how the two leaders interact: especially the extent to which the views and needs of the British prime minister are seen to be taken seriously in Washington. It is easy to dismiss this as simple media hysteria and distortion. Yet, when – as was the case with Lyndon B. Johnson and Wilson by 1968 – an American leader treats his British counterpart with more or less open contempt, this is indeed very serious for the future of the Special Relationship. Brown’s difficulties with Bush and (especially) Obama were less serious. However, particularly in the case of Brown-Obama, the perception of being shut out of important policy loops was damaging. Above all, prime ministers must avoid being seen either in Washington or by the British public as mere supplicants. Achieving the symbolic balance here, as both Blair and Brown found, is exceedingly difficult. Our transition case studies illustrate that personalities do matter. The contrast between the Wilson and Heath approaches to US relations was palpable and immediate. The personnel shifts – Wilson to Heath, Johnson to Nixon, Blair to Brown, Bush to Obama – produced abrupt shifts in the tone of the transatlantic relationship. It might be objected that this again is all a matter of perception and media distortion. It is the case that reporting of leader meetings can be very misleading. The Camp David meeting between Bush and Brown seems to have been far more cordial than was actually recorded in contemporary press accounts. Yet the tone or ‘mood music’ of personal diplomacy is not without significance. Indeed much of the point of personal transatlantic diplomacy is precisely concerned with the creation and projection of symbolism, style and tone. Generally leaders do recognise the political needs of their counterparts and are prepared to do what is needed to meet the symbolic needs of their transatlantic interlocutor. The only figure in our two transitions who failed to play the Anglo-American game in this way was Edward Heath, who came close to treating Special Relationship symbolism with contempt. Such an attitude seems to have disconcerted Nixon, though it could hardly inflict much political damage. On the other hand, a US president who (consciously or unconsciously) fails to treat his British counterpart with public respect will inflict significant damage. The case of Obama and Brown is relevant here,

Personal diplomacy 97 even if we accept the degree to which misadventure, press distortion and Brown’s social awkwardness all had a role to play. There are a few more points to consider about the transitions. During the history of the Special Relationship, ideological compatibility has been a factor in sustaining close leader relations – witness not just Reagan and Thatcher, but also Carter and Callaghan, and Blair and Clinton. However, in the case of our two transitions, the personal dynamics between the leaders seem to have had little to do with party ideology. Wilson and Nixon had a better relationship than either Wilson and Johnson, or indeed Heath and Nixon. Brown actually found it easier to conduct a relationship with Bush than with Obama. Secondly, the dynamics of leader relations do not seem to have changed very much across our Cold War and post-Cold War examples. The context of discussion, of course, altered enormously, but the problems of the transatlantic partnership remained fairly constant. Well after the fall of the Berlin Wall, London remained concerned to retain special access to decision-making circles in Washington. British leaders in both the Cold War and post-Cold War eras – again with the partial exception of Heath – sought to maintain the ‘Atlantic bridge’ role. Both before and after 1989, individual US presidents varied in the extent to which they saw Britain as primarily a regional power, and in the degree to which they were willing to indulge London’s global pretensions. Lastly, the limits to the significance of personal leader relations should be made clear. The Special Relationship was a creation of the Second World War and the Cold War, and was rooted in the doctrine of defeating the Axis and then anticommunist containment. Shared interests lapsed in the 1990s, only to be revived in the context of the War on Terror – or, more precisely, in the context of Prime Minister Blair’s response to the War on Terror. Personal ties can, as we have seen, help ‘rescue’ the Special Relationship from periods of drift. Difficult leader relations can exacerbate pre-existing problems. However, secular trends in global geopolitics cannot be resisted indefinitely. Within the discipline of International Relations, neo-classical realism teaches precisely that undergirding power developments can be resisted, postponed or camouflaged by such contingencies as personal friendships and animosities; they cannot be extinguished by contingent leader behaviour. I will end the chapter with some thoughts about contemporary leader relations which relate to the links between geopolitical logic, personal leader diplomacy, and the future of the Special Relationship.

Contemporary leader relations Gordon Brown’s relationship with President Obama never developed into anything resembling a close partnership. The US president contacted Brown with a friendly message on the evening of 11 May 2010, the date of the general election which brought the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat

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government into power. However, American good will towards Brown was severely damaged by the decision to release the Lockerbie bomber (Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi) in early 2009. The Megrahi release formed the backdrop to the damaging bungles which surrounded the Brown-Obama meetings and non-meetings at the UN in September 2009. The row also involved direct briefing against Brown by the White House.56 Brown’s own part in the Megrahi release was more a case of ineptness than any simple disregard for the opinion of the United States. However, the incident formed part of a series of Anglo-American mishaps which plagued the later period of Brown’s presidency. The bomber release was linked in the British and American press to the granting of a major oil contract to BP by the Libyan government. BP – inaccurately rendered by Obama as ‘British Petroleum’ – also became the subject of intense American opprobrium during the huge Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010. Downing Street issued a frosty statement in response to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s March 2010 apparent support, given during a visit to Argentina, for talks over the Malvinas/Falklands.57 By the time David Cameron entered Downing Street in May 2010, it had become almost conventional wisdom that President Obama was not especially interested in the Special Relationship. Obama was widely regarded as an American leader who was rather uncommitted to personal, leader-driven diplomacy. In opposition, Cameron had followed Brown in trying to distance himself from the George W. Bush administration. He used the occasion of the fourth anniversary of 9/11 to distance his own ‘liberal conservatism’ from the tougher beliefs of American ‘neoconservatives’ – earning himself a rebuke from Lady Thatcher in the process.58 If nothing else, Cameron’s pragmatism seemed to signal that there would be no ideological obstacle to establishing a close relationship with a Democratic president. Visiting Washington in July 2010, Cameron announced his intention to establish a ‘realistic, sensible and practical’ relationship. Talks covered major areas of tension. British military performance in Afghanistan was being openly criticised in the US, while Cameron was identified more strongly than Obama with the need to open a dialogue with the Taleban. The two countries were also following opposing strategies – the US stimulative, the UK contractionist – to the global economic recession. Talks also covered the BP oil spill, Gary McKinnon (the British youth with Asperger’s syndrome wanted in the US for computer hacking) and the Megrahi release. On the latter question, Obama seemed publicly to acknowledge the complexity of the case, with its roots in Scottish jurisdictions. Cameron announced that he and Obama were in ‘violent agreement’ over the Lockerbie release and ordered a formal review.59 Throughout the event, Obama scrupulously observed the rhetorical formalities of the Special Relationship. At the final press conference, the leaders were on conspicuous first name terms. Journalist Giles Whittell concluded: ‘There is life in this mottled old alliance yet’.60

Personal diplomacy 99 Memories of the Blair years continued to affect US-UK relations into the Cameron-Obama era. Drawing from the pragmatic anti-Bushism of the opposition years, Cameron and Foreign Secretary William Hague continued to use the phrase, ‘solid not slavish’, as a way of describing the ideal form of British loyalty to the US. In a piece written for the Wall Street Journal to coincide with the July 2010 visit, Cameron offered a pragmatic analysis of ‘special relations’: ‘The US-UK relationship is simple: It’s strong because it delivers for both of us’.61 With Obama also seeking to establish distance from the ‘ideological’ George W. Bush years, there appeared to be some scope for the two leaders to come together under the banner of pragmatic foreign policy.62 Press reports indicated the beginnings of a good working relationship between the two leaders, though with the ever-present danger of ‘doing a Tony’. Cameron was reported, for example, to be taking his cue, regarding statements on Israel, directly from the White House.63 Wikileaks material also publicly exposed the extent to which Conservatives in opposition had balanced their declarations of independence from Washington with secret promises of fealty once they came into office. A 2008 cable from US deputy chief of mission Richard LeBaron commented on William Hague’s promise of a ‘pro-American’ Conservative government. Such ‘over-reading’ of the Special Relationship, according to LeBaron, ‘would often be humorous, if it were not so corrosive’.64 Such expectations seemed to be confounded by reported strains between Cameron and Obama in relation to plans to intervene in Libya in March 2011. Cameron joined French leader Nicolas Sarkozy to urge Obama to take direct action in Libya, initially to defend Benghazi from the air against an assault from the Ghaddafi government forces. The operation seemed to have more in common with liberal interventionism (if not outright neoconservatism) than with pragmatism.65 With the UK pushing for a United Nations resolution for a Libyan no-fly zone without US support, Cameron and Obama were reported as having suspended personal telephone contact. Downing Street was forced to insist that Cameron’s call for international leadership regarding Libya was not meant as a personal attack on Obama.66 The US eventually provided vital support for the operation, though President Obama faced domestic attacks on contrasting fronts: from those who argued that he was failing to provide adequate global leadership, and from critics who opposed involvement in action on the grounds that it did not affect core American interests. Some of the contenders for the Republican presidential nomination in 2012 embraced both lines of attack more or less simultaneously.67 British commentators pointed to a new closeness between London and Paris and to British policy apparently displaying a ‘new bilateralism’ – a willingness to look beyond the US for military and diplomatic partners.68 Obama’s state visit to the UK in May 2011 was played out against the tensions surrounding the Libyan engagement, tensions which were deepened by the scale of British defence spending cuts. Again, Obama

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observed all the niceties of Special Relationship personal diplomacy during the May 2011 trip. Cameron and Obama presented themselves as personal friends, with phone calls between them apparently being exchanged at least once every two weeks. President Obama’s address at Westminster Hall combined an eloquent appeal to Anglo-American shared history, with a defence of liberal interventionism – dedicated to promoting the rights of citizens as well as states. Obama seemed directly to be challenging the view that he was a very pragmatic and cautious president, committed to ‘leading from behind’. However, Obama also co-wrote with Cameron what was essentially a pragmatic defence of the Special Relationship along the lines of the British leader’s 2010 Wall Street Journal piece. For Obama and Cameron, the Special Relationship ‘thrives’, not so much because of the ‘deep emotional connection between the two countries’, but ‘because it advances our common interests and shared values’. A new joint ‘National Security Board’ was established to coordinate the US-UK ‘essential’ security relationship.69 The tensions over Libya diminished as the operation moved towards plausible success with the fall of the Ghaddafi regime later in 2011. However, tensions between the US and its NATO partners were brought into the public gaze in Defence Secretary Gates’s valedictory address on the state of the alliance in June 2011. Gates railed against those NATO members, which had failed to reach even the promised threshold of two per cent (of GDP) annual spending on defence. Gates did not explicitly criticise the UK, and indeed noted that (at least in current projections) London was in line to reach the two per cent target. However, particularly given the recent history of US-UK tensions over the scale and success of British military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan – not to mention coming defence cuts – Gates’s address did have important implications for the Special Relationship. The tensions within NATO indicated the likely context for future US-UK relations: economic hard times; American unwillingness automatically to act as global security guarantor of last resort (especially in regions unconnected to Pacific security); and intense US annoyance at perceived security free-riding by European countries.70

Conclusion Detailed historical investigation into the various famous leader pairings within the history of US-UK special relations produces shades of grey. Some of the famous friendships involved famous disagreements between the allies. The received mythology of special relations also tends to omit some important pairings, such as Carter and Callaghan. Periods of apparent personal frostiness are open to different possible interpretations in terms of the connection between leader relations and alliance strength. Thus the Heath years can be interpreted either as exemplifying the impact of difficult leader relations; or, alternatively, in terms of the resilience of alliance

Personal diplomacy 101 structures in difficult times. As David Manning, former UK Ambassador to Washington, testified to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in 2010, personal chemistry between presidents and prime ministers has been a vital ingredient in the historical development of the Special Relationship. However, Manning also emphasised that other relationships, lower down in the transatlantic layer-cake, also matter.71 Wider geopolitical and economic realities matter even more. At the news conference following his 2011 Westminster Hall address, President Obama declared that the US and UK ‘have a unique relationship and that is going to be consistent regardless of who the president and the prime minister is’. Determined not to interpret the remark as simply a diplomatic courtesy, journalist Andrew Rawnsley commented that Obama was effectively telling David Cameron ‘that the British prime minister could fall out of a helicopter and it wouldn’t make any substantial difference’.72 Élite habits of cooperation militate against any significant foreseeable rupture in the Special Relationship. More likely is a slow decline in US-UK closeness as global trends cause Washington to focus increasingly on the rivalry with China, while the UK adjusts to a world of complex multipolarity. As the Special Relationship reached its seventieth anniversary, prospects for a new leader-driven ‘rescue mission’, rooted in a new close prime ministerialpresidential pairing, seemed rather weak.

Notes 1 2

3

4 5 6 7 8 9

David Ryan, The United States and Europe in the Twentieth Century, London: Pearson, 2003, p. 153. See Mark Beeson, ‘The Declining Theoretical and Practical Utility of “Bandwagoning”: American Hegemony in the Age of Terror’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 9/4, 2007, 618–35; John Dumbrell, ‘US-UK Relations: Structure, Agency and the Special Relationship’, in Terrence Casey, editor, The Blair Legacy: Politics, Governance, and Foreign Affairs, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. See Alan P. Dobson, ‘Labour or Conservative: Does it Really Matter in AngloAmerican Relations?’, Journal of Contemporary History, 25:3, 1990, 387–407; Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years, 1957–1963: The Emerging Truth, London: Murray, 1995, p. 59. PREM 11 5192, UK National Archives. See John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: From the Cold War to Iraq, London: Palgrave, 2006, p. 52. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 332; Hugo Young, One of Us: A Biography of Margaret Thatcher, London: Pan, 1990, p. 347. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, pp. 708–9. National Security File UK, boxes 211/212, Bruce to Rusk, 8 May 1967, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. Richard Hodder-Williams, ‘Reforging the “Special Relationship”: Blair, Clinton and foreign policy’, in R. Little and M. Whickham-Jones, editors, New Labour’s Foreign Policy: A New Moral Crusade? Manchester, UK: Manchester University

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John Dumbrell Press, 2000; John Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK “Special Relationship” in a World Twice Transformed’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17:3, 437–50; John Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994. See Christopher Coker, ‘Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s’, International Affairs, 68:3, 1992, 407–21. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins, 1993, p. 783. John Major, The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p. 497 See John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: From the Cold War to Iraq, London: Palgrave, 2006, pp. 130–1. John Major, The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p. 499. Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997, pp. 444–5. Conor O’Clery, The Greening of the White House, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, p. 98. Anthony Seldon, Major: A Political Life, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997, pp. 445–6 Raymond Seitz, Over Here, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1993, p. 322. See Taylor Branch, The Clinton Tapes: Wrestling History in the White House, London: Simon and Schuster, 2009, p. 217. Tony Blair, A Journey, London: Hutchinson, 2010, p. 231. Bill Clinton, My Life, London: Arrow, 2005, p. 778. Tony Blair, A Journey, London: Hutchinson, 2010, p. 393. For further discussion of these issues, John Dumbrell, ‘The US-UK “Special Relationship” in a World Twice Transformed’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 17:3, 437–50. See John Dumbrell and Sylvia Ellis, ‘British Involvement in Vietnam Peace Initiatives: Marigolds, Sunflowers, and “Kosygin Week”’, Diplomatic History, 27:1, 2003, 11–42. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1970, pp. 91–2. Quoted by Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 138. Harold Wilson, The Labour Government, 1964–1970: A Personal Record, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1971, pp. 610–11. Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1970, pp. 621, 92. See PREM 13 3008–09. PREM 13 3009. PREM 13 3545 (‘Freeman-Wilson conversation’). Henry A. Kissinger, The White House Years, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1970, p. 417. Ibid., p. 964; Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982, p. 141. Foreign and Commonwealth Office 7 1810, UK, British National Archives. Ibid. (Wiggin). Foreign and Commonwealth Office 7 1815, UK, British National Archives. See John Dickie, ‘Special No More’: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994, pp. 144–5; see also Edward Heath, The Course of My Life, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998, p. 472 on Heath’s attitude towards the concept of the ‘special relationship’. See John Dumbrell, ‘Sentiment and the US-UK Relationship, 1960–1990’, in Antoine Capet and Aissatou Sy-Wonyu, editors, The “Special Relationship”,

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39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65

Rouen, France: University of Rouen, 2003, pp.  130–5; Christopher Hill and Christopher Lord, ‘The Foreign Policy of the Heath Government’, in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon, editors, The Heath Government: 1970–74: A Reappraisal, London: Longman, 1996; Alex Spelling, ‘Edward Heath and Anglo-American Relations, 1970–74’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 20/4, 2009, 638–58; Thomas Robb, ‘Antelope, Poseidon, or a Hybrid?: The Upgrading of the British Nuclear Deterrent, 1970–1974’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/6, 2010, 797–817. Tony Blair, A Journey, London: Hutchinson, 2010, p. 595. See John Lloyd, ‘An Intellectual in Power’, Prospect, July 2007. Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at 10, London: Biteback, 2010, p. 23. BBC News, ‘US and UK ‘no longer inseparable’’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/ uk/_politics/6898587.stm 14 July 2007: Accessed 23 April 2008. Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at 10, London: Biteback, 2010, pp. 24–5; Bagehot, ‘Doublespeak’, The Economist, 4 August 2007. Quoted in I. Stelzer, ‘Now We Know: Brown is a European, not an Atlanticist’, The Spectator, 11 August 2007. Dana Milbank, ‘More Bulldog than Poodle’, Washington Post, 31 July 2007. Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at 10, London: Biteback, 2010, pp. 25–6. Ibid., p. 28. Ibid., p.  191; Gordon Brown, ‘Keynote Foreign Policy Speech’, http://www. pm.gov.uk/output/Page1503.asp 18 April 2008: Accessed 23 April 2008. The Times, 7 January 2009, editorial. N. Watt and E. MacAskill, ‘Brown and Bush Reignite that Special Relationship’, The Times, 18 April 2008. See, for example, A. Penketh, ‘Obama’s Plea’, The Independent, 25 July 2008. Rachel Sylvester, ‘Memo: Don’t Rely on the Brits during a Battle’, The Times, 6 January 2009. Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at 10, London: Biteback, 2010, pp.  227–30. See also Andrew Rawnsley, ‘Obama at Least didn’t treat Brown Like a Lame Duck’, The Observer, 8 March 2009. F. Elliott and J. Bone, ‘Brown Aides “Should Not Have Been So Desperate”’, The Times, 25 September 2009. Con Coughlin, ‘A Special Form of Disrespect’, The Spectator, 21 November 2009. Anthony Seldon and Guy Lodge, Brown at 10, London: Biteback, 2010, p. 319. See G. Whittell, ‘Argentina Claims a Falklands Victory’, The Times, 3 March 2010. See S. Coates, ‘US Relationship Divides Thatcher and Cameron’, The Times, 12 September 2006. R. Watson and C. Philip, ‘In “Violent Agreement”’, The Times, 21 July 2010. Giles Whittell, ‘White House Sketch’, The Times, 21 July 2010. David Cameron, ‘A Staunch and Self-Confident Ally’, The Wall Street Journal, 20 July 2010. See Jacob Weisberg, ‘Obama’s Visit Marks a New Special Relationship of the Super-Realists’, The Observer, 22 May 2011. ‘All the President’s Messengers’, The Economist 19 March 2011, 32. BBC News, ‘Wikileaks File Shows UK Considered “Paranoid” by US’, http:// www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11917398?print+true Accessed 13 June 2011. On contemporary debates within the Conservative Party regarding neoconservative and liberal interventionist approaches to foreign policy, see Klaus Dodds and Stuart Eldon, ‘Thinking Ahead: David Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-conservatism’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 10:2, 2008, 347–63; Matt Beech, ‘British Conservatism and Foreign Policy: Traditions and Ideas Shaping Cameron’s World View’, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 13/3, 2011, 348–63.

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66 ‘Cameron Rift with Obama over Libya’, The Times, 17 March 2011. 67 David Greenberg, ‘G.O.P vs. World’, New York Times, 29 June 2011. 68 Bagehot: ‘David Cameron’s War’, The Economist, 27 August 2011. 69 Barack Obama and David Cameron, ‘Not Just Special, But an Essential Relationship’, The Times, 24 May 2011; Andrew Rawnsley, ‘America and Britain Have Interests and Values’, The Observer, 29 May 2011. 70 See Robert M. Gates (Secretary of Defence), ‘Reflections on the Status and Future of the Transatlantic Alliance’, http://london.usembassy.gov/nato003. html 10 June 2011: Accessed 14 June 2011. 71 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 2010, Global Security: US-UK Relations, EV 35. 72 Andrew Rawnsley, ‘America and Britain Have Interests and Values’, The Observer, 29 May 2011.

4

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states Alison R. Holmes

Introduction The morning air was heavy with chill as thousands gathered outside Buckingham Palace. The people came, as they always do, to watch centuries of tradition at the Changing of the Guard. A ceremony dating back to 1660, it is an impressive occasion, but on 13 September 2001 the crowd was muted, the mood sombre. The two-day-old reaction of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair that, ‘We … here in Britain stand shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy and we … will not rest until this evil is driven from our world,’1 was still front page news. The Queen had cut short a break at Balmoral and was on her way back to London. That morning, the Duke of York took the formal salute and the US ambassador to the United Kingdom of only six weeks, Ambassador William Farish, put his hand on his heart as the Queen’s own Coldstream Guards struck up the ‘Star Spangled Banner’ for the first time in history.2 Viewed in the knowledge of all that followed in Iraq and Afghanistan, to the death of Osama Bin Laden nearly ten years later, it is hardly surprising this story instantly became an iconic part of the post-9/11 chronology – if not mythology – of the ‘special’ relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. A convergence of the cultural, political and diplomatic levels, it connects many of the strands of the standard narrative of the ‘special relationship’. This line of argument is well-rehearsed, but briefly it poses that ‘specialness’ is a post-World War II construct, born in conflict, tempered by experience, and occasionally worn thin by diverging interests and clashing projections of power. In this version, there was a muchpredicted parting of paths at the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall that never quite materialized3 and a renewed sense of purpose after the attacks of 9/11. Today, so the argument goes, the link again appears to be in danger due to changing geopolitics, economic turmoil and the sense of a discredited mission in the war on terror. Within this approach are the debates as to the real drivers of the relationship: does it require a common enemy or just shared military hardware?; does it live more in the rhetoric than the reality of relations between presidents and prime ministers?; and,

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has it shifted from the realpolitik of the Pentagon and the Ministry of Defence, to the econopolitik of the financial districts in New York and London? In other words, is the military, political or economic ‘component’4 the strongest aspect of this unusual, if not unique, bilateral relationship? By examining the individuals, the structural pressures and suggesting a typology of roles adopted by American and British ambassadors since the Cold War, this chapter will attempt to do three things: 1

2 3

to go beyond these traditional, rote, ‘descriptions’5 of the special relationship by contending that ‘specialness’ is a function of the process of development at the level of the state; examine the post-Cold War debates in the field of diplomacy and apply them to the transatlantic relationship; and, demonstrate a new basis for ‘specialness’ by drawing out parallels in the institutions of the state and diplomatic statecraft between the UK and the US that are as long-term as they are exceptional.

The conclusion is that these two specific states have a relationship based not only on commonalities of language, culture and values, but also on much deeper foundations. From personal loyalty to institutional bureaucracy, they are enmeshed in ways that are not possible between states that differ in ‘type’ and it is the extraordinary depth and breadth of these connections that render transatlantic relations ‘special’. Over time, the diplomacy between these states has provided a model for others; in part because of their superior power in the international system, but also because other states are responding to the same economic, technological changes in the international system and thus becoming more ‘global’ in similar ways. As other states continue to develop, it may be possible to use features of transatlantic diplomacy as a guide to understanding an emerging form of diplomacy – although the exact role and function of the new ‘global diplomat’ are questions still to be answered.

‘Specialness’ or ‘globality’ At its core, the standard ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ narrative referenced above is a realist interpretation of ‘high’ politics and can be limited by its often exclusive focus on shared enemies, military power and intelligence-sharing among elites. As such, it falls in line with one of three narratives of state change outlined by Martin Shaw, namely, post-modern, post-Cold War and globalization. As Shaw explains, each of these narratives looks to different causal relationships with respectively different outcomes in terms of our understanding of the state. In his view, and in common with most transatlantic literature, the post-Cold War narrative, driven by military and political change, has become dominant and now appears in most explanations as the ‘defined transition’ in the state system.6 Shaw does not

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 107 look specifically at UK/US relations (except to note that the United States and the United Kingdom are both ‘global-Western state conglomerates’, one of the three types he identifies7) or the impact these narratives have on the system of diplomacy specifically. However, it seems clear that most approaches to UK/US relations rely on a political/military or ‘defence frame’ with periods of ‘war’ versus periods of ‘peace’ shaping the fundamental analysis. The problem is that, by default, this specific post-Cold War construct leaves diplomacy with a relatively narrow role as the handmaiden of national interest. While this approach was doubtless accurate at various points in the past and key to what is widely recognized as the ‘very special’8 aspects of the relationship, it has two damaging consequences for an inquiry into transatlantic diplomacy generally and the work and role of ambassadors more specifically. First, by retaining a view that privileges sovereignty and security, the impact of economic and technological change can be under-emphasized. The state-centric model tends to focus on bilateral boundaries rather than seeing the transatlantic relationship as part of a wider system of states as changed by the constant inter-reactions between levels and actors. This leads to a second problem insofas as this approach has relatively little to offer the main post-Cold War debate within diplomacy regarding the impact the processes of globalization have on the day-to-day realities of the ambassador. To take each of these issues in turn; UK/US relations do not fit the traditional view of states found in international relations because they are ‘too close’. These specific states do not behave, as would be predicted by mainstream theory, strictly on the basis of national interest, but rather, through exchanges that have ‘too much’ depth at ‘too many’ levels. As Ambassador Mitchell Reiss, special envoy to Northern Ireland, argued in 2006, the inflexibility for some within international relations not only creates a problem for the formation of a theory of order, but gives theory, ‘an even more difficult time explaining the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom’.9 The proposal here is that, beyond the high politics of defence and intelligence, there is a story of the development of the state which, rather than being a remote or purely theoretical concern, has had a causal impact on the personal stories of the individual diplomats representing these two states. To return briefly to Shaw’s third narrative of globalization, his argument is that technical and economic change are fundamental catalysts of cultural and political change. They produce ‘global’ social relations through a process that transforms all levels simultaneously.10 By applying that idea to transatlantic relations, it is possible to observe a character of ‘embedded-ness’ and the early, if not total disintegration of the distinction between ‘foreign’ versus ‘domestic’ policy enshrined in international relations theory. The suggestion here is that this should be seen as evidence, particularly in the post-Cold War era, of the kind of global social relations posed by Shaw. By more fully recognizing these features of US/UK relations, we can expand our understanding of

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transatlantic diplomacy beyond the ‘old’, or what Shaun Riordan calls the prevailing ‘realist school of diplomacy’,11 to present a more balanced approach, encompassing the entirety of the UK/US relationship. On the second, more practical level, the story of transatlantic diplomacy is much longer than war-time camaraderie and Cold War warrior narratives allow, and consistently broader than the calculus of military alliances suggests. By setting the post-Cold War era in a longer timeframe and looking at the structural aspects of diplomacy, specifically the parallels in the development of institutions of state such as the foreign ministry and the offices of the president and prime minister, it becomes possible to examine the diplomatic ‘face’ of the state more thematically. In this light, the ‘habits’,12 often identified by transatlantic scholars, can be seen less as precursors or by-products of war, but rather as the outcomes of the longerterm bureaucratic evolution of the state itself. Following this line, these habits take on a ‘global’ quality, i.e. a connectedness or interdependence not found when looking at each level in isolation, and offer the opportunity to examine the impact of state development on the function and influence of embassies and ambassadors. Looking thematically across time, it also becomes plausible to theorize that these influences have produced three strategic ambassadorial types, namely: Whitehall/Beltway, Trade Promotion and Public Diplomacy. These roles while not exclusive, are used to express a broad classification of diplomatic/ambassadorial activity and offer an alternative to the usual ‘war-time ambassador’ versus ‘peace-time ambassador’ frame. The hope is that this approach may better reflect the longer cycles of change in the state evidenced through its politics and statecraft, as well as the more subtle interpersonal aspects of transatlantic relations.

The ambassadors Before going into the wider structural issues, some background on the six British and seven American ambassadors of the post-Cold War era is required. The first observation is a similarity between those sent to take up these posts. Doubtless influenced by the tone of some media coverage, various British ambassadors have sought to distance themselves from their American political appointee opposite numbers over the years. The intriguing feature for those looking more closely is the commonality in the basic profile across the Atlantic. Over this period there have been no women ambassadors. In fact, there has only been one woman ambassador in Anglo-American transatlantic history13 and no ambassador of colour for either side. Given that both London and Washington are considered prestigious posts, perhaps it is to be expected that all of the ambassadors have tended to be more senior and therefore, older. Educationally speaking, the sides are relatively evenly matched. All of the ambassadors have an undergraduate degree. However,

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 109 while the Americans represent a relatively broad range of almae matres, the British come exclusively from Oxbridge. In terms of higher degrees, on the American side there is one doctorate (Crowe), one MBA (Tuttle) and two law degrees (Lader and Susman). Lader also holds an MA in History and studied law at Oxford as a Rotary Scholar. For the British, there is one doctorate (Sheinwald) one MA (Renwick – History), and three with further study, Renwick (Sorbonne), Meyer (Johns Hopkins University, Bologna and a sabbatical year at Harvard) and Manning (also at Johns Hopkins) For the Americans, London is famously known as the preserve of the political appointee, although the post-Cold War period includes the only career diplomat in history to hold the post, Ambassador Raymond Seitz. He was also the only American in the period to attend an Ivy League school as an undergraduate and, unusually, to be appointed by both a Republican and a Democratic president.14 There is a British footnote here in that, while all of the post-Cold War ambassadors have been career diplomats, this has not universally been the case, even in relatively recent times.15 Perhaps the most surprising statistic, contrary to the views of the more vocal critics of political appointees, four of the seven American ambassadors of this period were not major contributors/fund-raisers to the campaigns of the presidents they served (Catto, Seitz, Crowe and Lader). Given the amount of publicity dedicated to the wealth of American ambassadors, it is worth noting that a majority actually came from what most would consider ‘humble’ beginnings.16 This perceived lack of financial support for their leader may be at least somewhat explained by the fact these four, plus Ambassador Tuttle, also had significant government experience – with its strictures on donations. Yet both of these points of fact are consistently ignored by most commentators on the London post, presumably because they do not conform to the expected appointee ‘type’. Ambassador Seitz also stands out in another dimension in this second set as the only one whose government experience did not put him in the White House. The other four (Catto, Crowe, Lader, Tuttle) all had experience that involved direct access to the presidents they served in their previous posts. Indeed, it is ultimately access, not only to the Foreign Office/State Department machinery, but to the head of state that stands out as a primary feature of ambassadors on both sides of the Atlantic. On the American side this involves being ‘considered to have been a personal selection of the President’ or his ‘personal envoy’.17 As Chairman Senator Percy (RepublicanIllinois) put it rather bluntly at the Senate hearing for Ronald Reagan’s first appointment, John Louis, in 1981: I think one of the qualities that any country looks to in an Ambassador is a close personal relationship with the President of the United States … accessibility and … clout …. Would you describe for this committee whether you feel you would have any problem in maintaining a direct relationship with the President and with the Secretary of State and with

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This ‘crony’ criterion is one that almost all of the Americans in the postCold War period have fulfilled through deep and long-standing personal connections to the president. For example, Ambassador Catto knew President Bush Snr while they were still both young men in Texas – at a time when Republicans were scarce. The Bushes were also the ‘only people we knew’ when the Cattos first moved to Washington. 19 Ambassador Farish’s connection also goes back to the first President Bush in Texas, where Farish volunteered to be Bush’s aide and travelled with him during his (unsuccessful) bid for the Senate in 1964.20 They became firm friends, shared business interests and even took family vacations together, resulting in Ambassador Farish’s distinction of being asked to be the UK Ambassador twice, first by the father and then again by the son.21 While Ambassador Tuttle’s financial support of the second President Bush makes his connection look more (stereo)typical, his family links also go much further back. As the son of Holmes Tuttle, a very early Reagan supporter, the ambassador grew up knowing the President’s California ‘kitchen cabinet’ and his Washington inner circle as family friends and went on to serve as Director of Presidential Personnel for the entire second term of Reagan’s presidency.22 This post not only gave him government experience, but given Reagan’s belief that ‘people are policy’ and his use of political appointments as an extension of the power of the office of the president – a subject we shall return to – it also placed Tuttle at the heart of a generation of Republican leadership.23 If long-term, personal knowledge of the president by an appointee is the under-appreciated pattern, it may be slightly more obvious in Republican than Democratic administrations with all of the exceptions being first-term appointments. Ambassador Seitz, as a career diplomat, was a departure when appointed by President Bush (although his career had brought him to the president’s personal attention) and therefore not indicative. However, the appointment of Crowe by Clinton does suggest a notable difference of approach by party. 24 Republican presidents have tended to appoint long-term personal friends to the Court of St James’s; including many campaign contributors, but more importantly men they were confident would be able to offer a secure back channel to the British government and the ability to use their ‘clout’ back home. Conversely, Democratic presidents have tended to make at least their first appointments on a more overtly political basis. Admiral Crowe, a capable and wellrespected military person, did not know President Clinton before the first campaign and was named ambassador as reward particularly for his crucial support for Clinton over the issue of gays in the military.25 President Obama’s ambassador, Louis Susman, is a fellow-Chicagoan who spotted the young Senator’s potential as early as 2004. However, Susman’s twenty-plus years of service are strictly as a ‘money man’, a specific and important role,

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 111 but one that generally has little to do with policy or strategy and requires a loyalty to the party more than to the candidate – in this case President Obama.26 Two important caveats: the first returns to Ambassador Louis, Reagan’s first appointment, one of only a handful of recalled ambassadors to the UK. He was, despite his assurances to Senator Percy, apparently not confident enough and did not know the president well enough to fend off bad advice. The second, at the happier end of the spectrum, is Clinton’s second term appointment, Ambassador Lader, who proved to be a return to the traditional profile of his Republican predecessors in that he enjoyed many years of close personal and family links with the president as well as serving in the White House throughout Clinton’s first term. In this way, all of the ambassadors reflect a more fundamental rule: they are the products of the president’s overall strategy on appointees and use of the power of the office – for better or worse. This issue will be returned to, but given the change in tone towards the United Kingdom during President Obama’s 2011 visit, it would appear he too has developed a revised view as to the value of the transatlantic partnership. If he is successful in securing a second term, we will see if this theory is borne out by the sending of a longterm confidant rather than a political party favour to London. On the British side, access provides an important, and often overlooked, parallel to the American profile in that all six of the ambassadors had senior Cabinet-level experience, often immediately prior to Washington. This has included serving the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Kerr), the Foreign Secretary (Acland, Meyer) and in Downing Street, though not always with the prime minister directly (Renwick, Meyer, Manning, Sheinwald). This can be explained, in part, by the fact Washington is widely regarded as the pinnacle of a high flying career in the Foreign Office and borne out by the fact that four of the six served in Washington as their final posting before retiring or just prior to leaving the diplomatic service. However, it would appear that a very British form of ‘old boy’ cronyism also plays a part for the career diplomat in London. If there is not a happy coincidence of the Foreign Minister attending Cambridge with your wife’s uncle, precipitating weekends of croquet and Scrabble at Chequers for the family (Acland),27 then perhaps there are overlapping ties of public school, Oxbridge and early days in the Foreign Office. In this period, five of the six ambassadors had two tours in the United States – always New York or Washington. This might not be significant in itself, except that a number ended up serving with, or under, each other in the US. This has created a kind of musical chairs of postings through Downing Street to the eastern seaboard, particularly in more recent times. On the plus side, this has also meant that the access gained on one posting stood them in good stead when they returned. This is significant because, as Ambassador Meyer puts it, ‘Washington is a very hierarchical society, where access to people is worth its weight in gold.’28 He goes on…‘the name of the game in Washington … is access and influence. It is who you know and who you can get to’.29

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In one particularly fortuitous example involving both sides, Raymond Seitz’s career included three tours in the UK. On his first tour (1975–1979) he was the US embassy’s Rhodesia officer in London when, as it happened, Robin Renwick held that role in the Foreign Office with Charles Powell30 as his deputy. Through the ‘fire’ of the Rhodesian issue, the three became fast friends. Indeed, Renwick describes Powell as ‘my closest friend’ and explains that, ‘I was able to get a message to her [Thatcher] if I needed to through Charles Powell’.31 Little did they know how it would turn out. As Seitz recalls, ‘Robin and Charles and I knew each other very, very well. So then suddenly, Charles is sitting in Number 10 and Robin is running the Embassy in Washington … we had meals together, we talked on the phone, we talked about what the issues were …. They made it a wonderful job’.32 Whatever the source, there is a smallness in the circle of the transatlantic personal network, particularly on the British side, that may be unavoidable, but is at least as powerful and perhaps even more pervasive over time than the charge levelled at American ambassadors. These details give only the barest outline of the backgrounds and experience of the men sent across the Atlantic by their respective governments. However, it becomes clear that while transatlantic diplomacy in the post-Cold War period has remained ‘privileged’ in the sense that it is still a job for the white male educated middle/upper classes, it is also intimate in ways that cannot be replicated between the diplomatic services of other countries. Wealth matters to the extent it represents education, social acceptability and connection, but it has not been, in this group at least, the primary factor in the majority of selections. Access to the highest echelons of the host government and a network of home contacts are the real tests of ambassadorial mettle. Working the system, or the use of what Ambassador Meyer calls ‘wheels within wheels’,33 provides the key to the success, or otherwise, of each ambassador.

The institutions: Diplomacy Many scholars have posited that the history of diplomacy as an institution, ‘grew out of the development of the nation-state’,34 with diplomacy serving as ‘both a function and a determinant of the international order’.35 This can be discerned, they suggest, by looking at the ‘evolution of states’36 and the way foreign ministries at home, the power of the diplomat and the role of resident embassies abroad have followed the evolution of state sovereignty, even to the point of creating the ‘idea of “foreignness” itself’.37 Diplomacy, in this traditional view, has been described as operating in the ‘shadows of power’,38 with the ambassador conducting the ‘dialogue of states’39 and negotiating the ‘great divide’ between the foreign and domestic realms.40 Many scholars have challenged the rigidity of this perspective,41 yet it continues to pervade discussion and form the basis of the post-Cold War narrative commonly used in the transatlantic debate.

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 113 This representation of the state (and its diplomatic echo) is also at the heart of one of diplomacy’s most enduring debates: the status of the ‘old’ versus the ‘new’ or even the ‘new, new’ diplomacy. Recurring disagreements about the diminishing role of the ambassador have gained ground in recent times on the reasoning that changes in technology and the increasing number and importance of actors rather than states in international affairs have overwhelmed these official representatives of the state. This discussion hinges on three questions: What are the implications of the erosion of the divide between the internal and external realms of state action? What is the relative power of the different actors in the international system? And, what can and should a diplomat do about those changes – if anything? Classic writers such as Harold Nicolson have argued that this break was not about technology, but something deeper. As he put it, ‘No, it was not the telephone that from 1919 onwards brought about the transition from the old diplomacy to the new. It was the belief that it was possible to apply to the conduct of external affairs, the ideas and practices … of internal affairs’.42 This same sentiment, replacing ‘telephone’ with ‘internet’, still resonates. In 1998 Ambassador Meyer observed that diplomacy had changed ‘beyond all recognition’ and went on to lay out his version of what he called the ‘new diplomacy’ on the basis of three factors: It is now increasingly difficult to distinguish between what is a foreign policy matter and what is a domestic policy matter. And secondly, it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between what is political diplomacy and what is economic, and indeed whether there is a dividing line between the two which has any validity at all. And thirdly, the traditional bilateral diplomacy is increasingly overshadowed by multinational diplomacy as global issues and international organisations force themselves to the front of international affairs … issues of trade; issues of investment, of science of agriculture; issues of the environment, of transport, crime fighting, drug busting, all these things have now interrupted [sic] into the traditional world of diplomacy.43 The question is still open as to whether this represents, ‘the “domestication” of international relations’ or, ‘evidence of the “internationalization” of all aspects of domestic life’ as ambassadors adopt more and more of the domestic techniques of lobbying and coalition-building to achieve national objectives.44 However, it is clear that there is a problem of compression between worlds that once could be kept separate, but can no longer be parsed so as to guarantee that audiences do not overlap in ‘real time’. For diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, this has meant an increasing focus on soft power and a growing importance placed on the role of public diplomacy. Yet, as we see in the traditional UK/US narrative, the ‘old’ notions are difficult to dispel.

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Jan Melissen tries to capture a sense of co-existing models by setting out, ‘two worlds … that intersect, overlap, collide and cooperate within a variety of contexts. On the one hand we have a traditional ‘hierarchical’ image of diplomatic system, and on the other, we have what has come to be termed a ‘network’ model’.45 Riordan warns that today’s different types of states require different types of public diplomacy. ‘If’, he argues, ‘public diplomacy is central to relations between post-modern states, it is equally central to relations with the modern and pre-modern worlds. A traditional approach … will only result in more crisis management, more policing/military intervention’.46 In a variety of attempts to describe the impact this contraction of the international system has on the practice of diplomacy, terms such as ‘multilateral’47, ‘specialist’48, ‘functional’49, ‘polylateral’50 or even ‘total’51 have been offered. As yet, there is little consensus as to whether these are new phenomena or just better ways to explain the way diplomacy has always operated, but there is agreement that all diplomats of the future will have to deal with the new paradigm of public diplomacy. In some ways, the post-Cold War narrative or the ‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ view of UK/US relations follows the shape of the debates in international relations and diplomacy quite closely. First as Ministers, and later as ambassadors, diplomats between the United States and the United Kingdom have been providing the traditional, official channel of communication between governments generally and presidents and prime ministers specifically from the moment they were sent across the Atlantic. There was an identifiable step-change in the diplomacy of the post-World War I era, another such shift at the end of World War II (led by changes demanded by the United States) and again at the end of the Cold War (this time led, to a certain degree, by the United Kingdom). Thus, the customary view of the timeline and flow of the evolution in diplomacy, that it follows that of the state and is related to periods of conflict, remains intact. However, bearing the critique of this traditional view in mind, it is also clear that transatlantic relations went well beyond the established, strictly hierarchical diplomatic form and were ‘networked’ or ‘global’ from the earliest days. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 recognized the sending of envoys to other countries,52 but it was not until 1893 that American Legations abroad became embassies – with reciprocal recognition provided to representatives from other countries sent to Washington. The British minister in Washington at the time, Sir Julian Pauncefote, quickly announced himself as the first ambassador to the United States, ensuring himself the position of doyen in the diplomatic corps.53 He effectively set the mould and established the British embassy as pre-eminent in Washington, a position it has enjoyed almost continuously, officially or unofficially, ever since. While the same cannot be said of the American presence in London so consistently, it is true that there is a mutual expectation that, with any change in administration, the first official visits would come from the other side of the Atlantic. This long-standing tradition, while not universally honoured, but

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 115 meriting comment even in the breach, has certainly been the case from the post-Cold War period to the present day. It remains symbolic of the natural mutuality found both at the level of embassy practice and in the foreign policy infrastructure of both sides. In terms of embassy practice, parallel progress can be seen from the outset. From the mundane administrative developments in operations as early as the 1830s and 1850s, to the broader issues of increased support of transatlantic businesses,54 accusations of dabbling in local politics,55 the impact of technology and travel and a perceived need to speak to the press and their respective publics,56 British and American diplomats found the same, or similar solutions to these problems at much the same time, and often provided a model for other diplomatic representatives in the process. Beyond the protocol of the diplomatic corps, this two-way flow of influence also applied to the structure of government at home. In the United States, the office of the Foreign Secretary was established in 1782.57 This was the same year that the United Kingdom abolished the ‘Northern’ and ‘Southern’ departments and created a structure that, ironically, split the responsibility between foreign and domestic concerns.58 In the 1850s both the US and the UK began to professionalize their services by introducing an exam system (which failed in the US) followed approximately twenty years later in both places with a reorganization of departmental functions. The aim of these later reforms, initially undertaken by the US, was to establish a regional system which the UK emulated in 1881.59 At the turn of the century, both services again underwent significant re-structuring as the services tried to elevate their role from clerical to advisory in the policy process.60 These moments of parallel re-tooling continued and were particularly rapid in both the run up to, and aftermath of both World Wars – with World War II marking the point at which the various branches of the services on both sides were finally combined to create single entities.61 The final, and perhaps best, example occurred in the post-Cold War era in 2006 when, within weeks of each other, Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, and Jack Straw, the UK Foreign Secretary, announced Transformational62 and Active Diplomacy,63 respectively. Without any direct reference to each other, these initiatives were designed to prepare their departments for the ‘global’ age in almost identical ways. As H. C. Allen pointed out: it is a problem throughout their history to determine whether common or analogous courses of actions in the two countries are due to direct influence of the one upon the other, or to similar responses to similar stimuli … but even to the casual glance there are broad parallels in the two histories which cannot possibly be ascribed merely to coincidence.64

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The institutions: The head of state Similar cross-fertilization is also evident in the other state institution most directly related to diplomacy: the offices of the president and prime minister. In American politics, the evolution of the office of the president is often understood to have four stages: Patrician (1789–1832), Partisan (1832–1900), Pluralist (1900–72) and Plebiscitary (1972–present).65 These stages can then be linked to those identified in the development of the presidential appointment process for the logical reason pointed out by Mackenzie that, ‘at every stage the appointments process has been shaped by the politics of its time’.66 Mackenzie identifies these stages as: Governing elite (1789–1800), Patronage (1800–1950s), Nascent Corporatism (1958–74), New Realities (1975–87) and the Battleground (post-1987). The earlier phases are not especially pertinent here, though it is interesting given the development of the respective foreign services noted above, that presidential phases and those of diplomacy seem to move together so closely. The chief features for a discussion of the post-Cold War era deal with the ‘modern presidency’ and fall into three categories. At the most general level, as the power of the president increased there has been a professionalization or tightening of the appointment process.67 Second, as the machinery of government grew, the White House felt an increasing need to draw more power to itself, both in terms of appointments and in the execution of policy.68 And finally, as information became more readily available to the public, the need (and ability) of the president to go to the people over the heads of the legislative branch increased substantially. Technology, the media, and the broader processes identified as part of globalization are obviously not features of the presidency per se, but the shifts in the power of that office have been reinforced and intensified by such factors. This course of development has not been directly mirrored on the British side, but the general trend, despite the differences in political system, has been in the same direction. As Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon put it, ‘From the mid-Victorian age to Edward Heath’s arrival at Number Ten in 1970, Number Ten has burgeoned in size, specialization and sophistication’.69 They also note, in common with scholars such as Dick Neustadt in regard to the American presidency, that the prime minister has ‘remarkably few formal powers and “owns” few policies’.70 Yet, over the course of the past 40 years, the Number Ten machinery has ensured that it directs not only government business, but also the presentation of policy to the general public. Not surprisingly, this has produced an accusation of the ‘presidentialization’ of British politics, particularly under the premiership of Tony Blair. Traditionally, a great deal of attention has always been paid to the chemistry or lack thereof, between prime ministers and presidents. Whereas relatively little notice is taken of the way the structural power of these offices

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 117 can affect both ‘chemistry’ and policy. Leaders must deal with being both the symbolic and practical ‘face’ of the state for the internal and external audiences simultaneously. The machinery of these offices reflects that pressure, often by drawing more and more power towards that domain. The result on both sides of the Atlantic has been that departments, agencies and cabinet/departmental secretaries that were once ‘internal’, are becoming increasingly overshadowed.71 Traditional diplomats may continue to assert their policy function, but are increasingly finding it a struggle to overcome the conflicting forces within their own government – particularly when it emanates from the head of state.72 As Ambassador Wright put it, there is a direct line … from Churchill and Roosevelt to Macmillan and Eisenhower and Kennedy to Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan … there was no doubt at all there was a special relationship … it was the White House that decided the issues … in American matters, what matters is the White House.73 The reality is that diplomacy is being increasingly broadened and flattened to adjust to the changing expressions of state power.

Going through ‘channels’ The story of the issuing of a visa to Gerry Adams, the leader of Sinn Fein, by President Clinton in 1994 is well-documented, but it useful here as an example of an interaction between heads of state and ambassadors that is as much a return to early direct diplomacy from the head of state as it is a new form. The British were clear that Adams should not be given a visa unless and until certain conditions were met. Ambassador Renwick records he had been lobbying hard in Washington and Ambassador Seitz had been lobbied equally hard by the British government in London. Seitz felt that the British arguments should win the day and had made this plain in his representations. Meanwhile, Renwick had received, what he believed to be, a ‘cast iron’ promise this would be upheld. When these career ambassadors – and old friends – came to discover this was not the case by reading it on the front pages of the relevant, respective newspapers, they were both deeply shocked and disappointed.74 Examples of egregious breakdowns in communication are not confined to the Clinton administration (Grenada comes to mind), but it was a lesson learned, not only about President Clinton75, but also about new style presidential policy operations.76 Clinton had effectively become the ‘desk officer’ and had closed out both the State Department and the Foreign Office. White House staff had used their own access to lobby the president and perceived no obligation that the British government, its representative in Washington, or even their own ambassador should be alerted. As civil servants, both ambassadors were deemed superfluous to the White House political process. It is also interesting to note that Ambassador Seitz did not

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speak to the president directly.77 He put his trust in the official diplomatic system and did not get the president on the line. This opens the question of what might have happened if Ambassador Lader, as a political appointee, had pursued this on a personal basis and what, if any, change may have been possible in terms of consultation (at least a phone call) if not in policy. In contrast to this dramatic example of exclusion are the numerous accounts from ambassadors about the use of the ‘back channel’ in both directions. A number of American ambassadors have related stories of individuals and organizations coming to them confidentially, outside government or party channels, to convey a personal message to the president. Northern Ireland and Iraq stand out as sensitive issues on which this occurred in recent times, but it was the perception of closeness between an ambassador and a president that engendered these ‘unsanctioned’ communications in an effort to further ‘mutual understanding’. Similarly, British ambassadors also noted the tendency of their American contacts to rely on them for information regarding other departments of their own government – and attempt to engage their support for inter-agency power struggles. This seems particularly true when there is a strong relationship between a prime minister and president engaging in regular telephone contact because of the speed and efficiency of the British system of reporting. Several ambassadors on both sides commented on the need to cultivate ‘inside’ contacts to obtain and use internal British memos, not only to keep themselves up to date, but as ‘currency’ for obtaining further information.78

The types When reading histories of transatlantic affairs, especially the memoirs of ambassadors, one of the most striking characteristics is the way the same challenges come up, and how similar the responses of different ambassadors proved to be. The most fundamental question endures: what is possible – in the circumstances? As Ambassador Wright explains, success is a curious thing in the diplomatic service. Diplomatic life is continuous. When you arrive at a post you tidy up the stuff that your predecessor was unable to complete. When you leave a post you leave a lot of stuff that your successor has to take over … it comes to very few of us to be in the right place at the right time to be called a success.’79 Some ambassadors are given ‘orders’. For example, Ambassador Meyer has often been quoted on his mission from Tony Blair’s chief of staff, Jonathan Powell,80 ‘We want you to get up the arse of the White House and stay there’.81 In a very different tone, Ambassador Tuttle explains he was told by President Bush directly that his mission was public diplomacy.82 Years earlier, Ambassador Kerr had been instructed, ‘No surprises’ by Foreign

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 119 Secretary, Geoffrey Howe (post-Grenada), 83 and Ambassador Lader chose to ask himself, ‘What would President Clinton do?’84 Yet, even ‘orders’ fall within a wider strategy and leave room for maneuver in terms of implementation by each individual ambassador. In the post-Cold War time frame, but arguably going back much further, the process of choosing a successful strategy rests on the accurate assessment by an ambassador of three factors: their own personal strengths and weaknesses – as related to the strength and strategy of their government and reflecting their personal links to the relevant parties and players; the current state of affairs, as they affect their own and their host’s interests; and the mood of the host country at every level of interaction. Looking at transatlantic diplomacy, there are three dominant strategic roles: Whitehall/Beltway, Trade Promotion, and Public Diplomacy. As indicated, these are not intended to be exclusive as every ambassador must, by necessity, operate in every area. Nor is there any attempt here to debunk the importance generally attributed to security and intelligence by more traditional interpretations of UK/US relations. These categories are offered as an alternative way to explore the role of the ambassador as an agent of political change and for examining his priorities across the range of issues and events of the time in which he served. The goal is a more balanced portrayal of the transatlantic relationship using the necessary breadth of perspective provided by the work of diplomats. These strategies will be reviewed, in turn, and each ambassador placed in an initial group. It should be noted however, that the two holders of the post at the time of writing, Ambassadors Susman and Sheinwald, have not been included on the basis that recent history is hard enough to gauge, current events are nigh impossible. The Whitehall/Beltway ambassador is the traditional diplomat. He is a political animal who works mainly on issues and policy development. He spends his time primarily with the political elite, which includes publishers and editors of the media and the leaders of business and investment as necessary. This type is less common for American ambassadors, not only because they are political appointees, but because their experience often brings them from a commercial/business background – an area still slightly looked down upon by the career diplomats of both sides. In London, Whitehall ambassadors include Ambassadors Seitz and Admiral Crowe. Seitz, as the career diplomat, is an obvious choice, but the judgment is based more on his own statement as to his approach. In his words, I certainly got out of London and I made a point of going out to other places. But the truth of the matter is that in terms of key American interests, London is the place. It’s the only place, and not only that. It’s London within about three square miles.’85 Admiral Crowe is a less obvious choice and could easily be considered elsewhere. However, the events of the time, including Northern Ireland on

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which he focused ‘like a laser’86 and the increasing tensions in the Balkans combined with his military background suggest he concentrated largely on certain contacts and policy areas, albeit taking a very different approach to that of Seitz. In contrast, most of the British ambassadors could easily be called Beltway ambassadors by virtue of both training and attitude. However, at least two stand out: Ambassador Meyer, already mentioned as deeming access to be ‘all’, and Ambassador Acland, of Scrabble and croquet fame. Ambassador Acland was a close advisor to Margaret Thatcher and her trust in him (unusual for Mrs Thatcher) is reflected in the fact he was asked to stay beyond retirement age. He also knew President Bush Sr ‘extremely well’ and felt he knew what was going on ‘95 per cent of the time’87 (also unusual). The Trade Promotion ambassador is primarily focused on business and economic concerns within government, but is also active with investors and financiers. As many American ambassadors come from a business background this might apply to several, but again two stand out. Ambassador Lader’s personal background was in property and investment while his government experience was in reducing bureaucracy and waste as the head of Clinton’s Small Business Administration, all making him particularly attuned to business issues. His outgoing personality also lent itself to public diplomacy, including a walk the length of the United Kingdom, but it was business initiatives that gained him the reputation of doing business ‘better than anybody’88 and being ‘just amazing with the business community’.89 Despite Ambassador Farish’s very different approach and style, business was also a primary concern for him. An investor through and through, Farish felt his contribution would be on the economic and commercial side primarily because, ‘State Department people really haven’t been involved in the economic world’. 90 This included his unique initiative to work more collaboratively with the Canadian and Mexican representatives in London on investment issues. Unfortunately, the events of 9/11, instructions from Washington regarding public speaking and specialist delegations on the war on terror, overtook much of the business agenda during the ambassador’s tenure. For the British, the interplay between commercial and political diplomacy has a long and complicated story, but the fact that the United Kingdom and the United States are each other’s largest investors is a point ambassadors have to repeat often and loudly in Washington. Ambassador Renwick, author of Fighting with Allies: America and Britain in Peace and War, explains the importance of the economic relationship between the two countries and the need to work together, not only on the ‘big issues’ of the Uruguay Round and the World Trade Organization, but also transatlantic issues such as aviation and extraterritoriality. He found, as ambassador, there was a need to get out of Washington to escape its ‘distortion’ by speaking to political and business audiences across the country.91 In this sense, he is much like Ambassador Manning who had to contend with the rising tide of

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 121 ‘buy America’ sentiment in Washington in the post-9/11 environment. To counter those arguments, the embassy researched and updated their map of UK investment in the US. They ensured that the information was specifically related to US jobs and further broke it down by district in support of their lobbying efforts. At the same time, Manning established a transatlantic business advisory committee with the largest names from American and British companies who had interests on both sides of the Atlantic. A quintessential Beltway man by nature, and one deeply involved in the prosecution of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he nonetheless viewed the continuing of business as a vital concern of the embassy and pursued it vigorously.92 The Public Diplomacy ambassador could appear, at first glance, to be a creation of the post-9/11 climate and the debate on ‘soft’ or ‘smart’ power. Yet looking at the record, the perception of a need to talk to both the press and the public has presented itself to ministers and ambassadors since the earliest days. The drawing of a distinction between a public diplomacy ambassador and a trade promotion or even a Beltway/Whitehall ambassador who also speaks to the press and the public is a matter of level and tone. All of the ambassadors listed above have dealt with the media and the public during the course of their tenure. The question is whether or not they dealt with them on an ‘elite’ basis, in other words CEOs and Chamber of Commerce leaders versus small businesses and individual businessmen, Editors and Publishers versus ‘jobbing’ journalists; and whether they personally felt their mission was to the government of a country or if it included the country’s people as well. On the American side there are two clear public diplomacy ambassadors in this period: Ambassadors Catto and Tuttle. Catto’s background made him ideally suited to a person-to-person approach in London. In business, he ran his very successful family firm (and helped his wife run her family’s media empire). In government, he had been involved in both protocol and press operations and was eventually called back from London to run the US Information Agency. Ambassador Tuttle, as discussed, was sent with a public diplomacy mission in President Bush’s second term, a task he took up with relish by extending the ‘footprint’ of the ambassador into religious groups, charitable organizations and civic groups across the country. Neither ambassador spent much, if any, time debating the academic points of public diplomacy, but both felt the urgent need to connect with the people of the United Kingdom. British ambassadors are not natural public diplomats. Their instincts are not attuned to the idea that the greater public has a role in foreign policy. Even their trips outside Washington tend to be geared to the top leadership of cities, sectors and businesses – though given the size of the country it is not surprising that resources must be marshalled and efforts prioritized. Of this group, Ambassador Kerr appears the likeliest candidate as one who understood that ‘in America a lot of the job is chat shows and gossip

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columns’93 – and more importantly did not despise the fact. As suggested above, there is much in the wider debates on diplomacy to suggest that all diplomats will be required to take on at least some form of public diplomacy in the future.

Conclusion The story of the Queen’s Coldstream Guards playing the American national anthem after the events of 9/11 was an iconic ‘first’, but ultimately only one of many such ‘firsts’ in the long history of transatlantic relations. Since the founding of the United States, there have been numerous moments of sorrow and respect, joy and mutual admiration that found expression, ranging from the symbolic exchange of gifts, songs and flags to the solemn sending of ships, trains, cavalcades and honour guards. The mainstream international relations narrative of the ‘special relationship’ or the debates regarding ‘new’ versus ‘old’ diplomacy would suggest these have primarily been the products of kinship and warfare. Unfortunately, these traditional accounts as to how the world works do not seem to reflect accurately the way the transatlantic connection has actually operated over time. By using a longer frame and a more thematic approach it becomes clear that the narratives of shared history, culture and language, as useful as they are, cannot fully explain this affinity. The number of corresponding developments, illustrated through state institutions and diplomatic practice and repeated over time, suggest something equally fundamental. For example, the Foreign Office and the State Department have, in many ways, led the development of diplomatic services around the world. Yet, in relation to each other, they have created an infrastructure that can operate jointly, in parallel or at tangents when the need arises, while remaining largely enmeshed. The offices of president and prime minister have steadily drawn power towards their respective centres in terms of their own system, while remaining more consistently open to each other at a personal level in ways not conceivable between any other pair of countries or leaders. In this light, it becomes possible not only to assert that UK/US relations are unique in the international community, but also to establish a pattern or typology of the roles adopted by ambassadors that is applicable to both sides over time. The multi-layered processes of globalization have exposed the changing nature and form of the state while the post-Cold War era has highlighted the shortcomings of traditional approaches when applied to the specific roles and work of the respective ambassadors to these two ‘global states’. As such, transatlantic diplomacy may provide indicators for global diplomacy as more states respond in similar ways to these common shifts in the international system. These trans-global features (as distinct from, for the sake of argument, the current direction of European diplomacy) might include ideas such as: the possibility of retaining a strong notion of

Transatlantic diplomacy and ‘global’ states 123 sovereignty while still allowing for a mutual porousness not only between diplomats abroad, but between agencies and departments at home; a policy process driven by heads of state, supported by officials not separated by demarcations of foreign versus domestic, appointee versus civil servant, generalist versus specialist; the opportunity for a more stakeholder-oriented dialogue of states which accepts different areas of expertise while recognizing the different levels of responsibility required of the different voices. In other words, features of the relationship we have traditionally identified as part of ‘specialness’ may be more accurately identified as functions of the state and stages in its development, now evolving towards the new phase of ‘global’ relations. As early as 1955, Allen identified a ‘totality of Anglo-American intercourse’ that, he argued, could not be based on ‘sentiment alone’ yet we continue to attribute the success or closeness of the UK/US connection to notions of cooperation or habit. It is almost as if we assume the observation of the pattern is as good an explanation of how these two states, as Allen put it, ‘triumph’ over all ‘obstacles’ as any other.94 At its most basic level, the argument posed here is that, by continuing to explore the implications of the ‘global’ and applying an alternative interpretation of the habits of transatlantic statecraft to the institutions and the roles adopted by the diplomats of these two states, we may discover a both more robust explanation of the specialness of the past as well as the outline of the global diplomacy of the future. The author is grateful to the Winston Churchill Memorial Trust for their support through their History Fellowship which funded the interviews of the six surviving post-Cold War Ambassadors. She would particularly like to thank Ambassadors Price, Catto, Seitz, Lader, Farish and Tuttle for being so generous with their time and for giving their permission to use this material for educational/academic purposes. For use only with author permission.

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Tony Blair, ‘Blair’s Statement in Full’, BBC News Online, 11 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/1538551.stm. Among others see: Rebecca Thomas, ‘Tears and Unity at Palace Tribute’, BBC News Online, 13 September 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/ 1542446.stm and David Graves, ‘Palace Breaks with Tradition in Musical Tribute’, The Daily Telegraph, 14 September 2001, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1340465/Palace-breaks-with-tradition-inmusical-tribute.html. Among others see: Terrence Casey (editor), The Blair Legacy: Politics, Governance, and Foreign Affairs, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009. Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 3. Dobson calls this one of the ‘most striking things in the literature on AngloAmerican relations’, while other scholars such as Roger Louis and Hedley Bull, Jorgen Rasmussen and James McCormick and David Reynolds concentrate not

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Alison R. Holmes on components, but levels of the relationship for example. leaders, elites and societies. Steve Smith, ‘The Special Relationship’ Political Studies, Volume 38:1,1990, pp. 126–36: p.136. Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 8. Ibid. p. 212. Steve Smith, ‘The Special Relationship’ Political Studies, Volume 38:1, pp. 126–136, 1990: p.  136. Smith concurs with the concept that military/nuclear/defence and intelligence is the most significant aspect, but goes on to argue it is due to ‘the nature of international relations’ – an idea less common in the general literature. Ambassador Mitchell Reiss in Jeffrey D. McCausland and T Stuart Douglas, US-UK Relations at the Start of the 21st Century, Carlisle, CA, US: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army College, 2006, p. v. Martin Shaw, Theory of the Global State, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 3–4. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 32. David Reynolds explores the importance of habit as ‘regular and informal consultation’ and ‘diplomatic and bureaucratic consultation’ as a ‘fundamental’ aspect of transatlantic relations in International Affairs: ‘A Special Relationship? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War’, Volume 62, Issue 1, pp. 1–10 and in ‘Re-thinking Anglo-American Relations’. Volume 65, Issue 1, pp.  89–111. Alan Dobson, quoting Joseph Frankel, concludes, ‘Good habits of cooperation and the absence of barriers to cooperation may play important roles in any relationship to warrant the accolade of “special”.’ Alan Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 149. Anne Legendre Armstrong was appointed by President Gerald Ford in 1976. David K.E. Bruce was also appointed by different Presidents, but to different posts: France 1949–52 under Truman, Germany 1957–9 under Eisenhower and the UK 1961–9 under Kennedy). Peter Jay (1975–9) was the son-in-law of James Callahan and David OrmsbyGore (1961–5) was the nephew of Harold Macmillan. Catto was born in a Dallas suburb to a homemaker and a manager of a stock brokerage firm who later became an insurance broker for a family firm in San Antonio. Seitz was born into an army family. His mother died when he was young necessitating some time living with his grandmother before heading to boarding schools and summers with his father. Crowe was born in Kentucky, but at the start of the Depression his father moved the family to Oklahoma City. From there he went to Annapolis. Lader was the son of immigrants: an elementary school teacher and a night cook. Tuttle is the son of an original ‘Okie’ who stowed away on a freight train to California where he used skills gained in Tuttle, Oklahoma (named for the ambassador’s grandfather) to get an entry level job. Monteagle Stearns, Talking to Strangers: Improving American Diplomacy at Home and Abroad, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 1999, p. 74. Senator Charles H. Percy. Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Hearings, Confirmation of John Louis, United States Senate, 1981, p. 11. Ambassador Catto, interview with Author, 10–12 June 2008, Woody Creek, CO, US.

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Ambassador Farish, interview with Author, 27–8 May 2008, Gasparilla Island, FL, US. Ibid. Ambassador Tuttle, interview with Author, 23–4 August 2008, Beverly Hills, CA, US. It is interesting to note a relevant exchange of letters between current and future ambassadors to the UK on precisely this point. On 7 March 1986 Ambassador Price wrote to Don Regan, then Chief of Staff to the President (on State Department headed paper rather than embassy paper though he was Ambassador) supporting a rumour he had heard (or was starting) that Richard Noyes Viets, a Foreign Service Officer, was being considered for the post of ambassador to South Africa. Price says, ‘As you know I have no axe to grind on who gets such appointments other than the overriding concern we share – namely that the individual selected be fully competent and a forceful advocate of the President’s policies’. This was sent on to Tuttle (then Director of Presidential Personnel) with a hand written note from Regan, dated the same day as the letter, saying ‘Charlie Price came in to see me on this’. It was clearly part of a wider campaign as evidenced by the fact there is also a letter from Tuttle to Price dated three months earlier (6 January 1986 and sent to his Kansas City address) thanking Price and assuring him his letter would be held on file, ‘as we endeavor to select the most qualified individuals to serve in the second term of the Reagan Administration’. Ronald Reagan Library: 355990, F0002, C0079 C0167, FG006-01. In the end, the South African post went to Edward Perkins – another Foreign Service Officer and the first black ambassador to that country. Viets was nominated by the President to be Ambassador to Portugal in 1987, but not commissioned. Although President Carter is not a post-Cold War president, the same point could be made regarding Ambassador Kingman Brewster. Brewster was not a close friend of the president, but a confidant of the Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and ultimately not considered a powerful voice. Among others see: John Lancaster, John. ‘Crowe Discounts Military Objection to Homosexuals; Retired Service Chief Regards Attitude as “Generated More by Emotion Than by Reason”’, The Washington Post. 11 April 1993 and ‘Gays Won’t Ruin Forces: In Clinton’s Corner, Retired Adm. William Crowe Says The Military Has Long Been In “The Forefront Of Social Change”’, Orlando Sentinel, 11 April 1993. Among others see: Tim Shipman, ‘Louis Susman: Obama’s Choice as London Envoy’, The Telegraph. 21 February 2009, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ worldnews/barackobama/4742696/Louis-Susman-Obamas-choice-as-Londonenvoy.html. Tim Reid and Matt Spence, ‘Obama appoints Louis Susman as new US Ambassador to Britain’, Times Online. 28 May 2009 and David Kesmodel, ‘Some Surprised by Obama’s Choice for UK Ambassador’, Wall Street Journal, 6 July 2009. Interview of Sir Antony Acland by Liz Cox. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College and Sir Antony Acland. Cambridge, UK: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, DOHP. April 2001. Interview of Sir Christopher Meyer by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College. Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 17 June 2004, p. 25. Sir Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential, London: Phoenix, 2006, p. 68.

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Alison R. Holmes Charles Powell (older brother of Jonathan Powell, Tony Blair’s Chief of Staff) was Margaret Thatcher’s Private Secretary and famously became one of her most trusted foreign policy advisors. Interview of the Rt Hon Lord Renwick of Clifton KCMG by Malcom McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge, UK: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 August 1998, p.15. Ambassador Seitz, interview with Author, 20–2 June 2008, Orford, NH, US. Interview of Sir Christopher Meyer by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge, UK: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 17 June 2004, p. 24. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 1. Keith Hamilton, and Richard Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 238. Ibid. p. 3. Brian Hocking (editor), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 3. Hermann Eilts, ‘Diplomacy – Contemporary Practice’ in Elmer Plischke, Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans, Washington DC, US: American Enterprise Institute, 1979, p. 11. Adam Watson, Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States, New York: McGraw-Hill Books, 1983, p.11. Ian Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999. There is a much wider debate within International Relations as to the relationship between ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’. See Fred Halliday, Christopher Hill and Ian Clark among others. Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomacy, New York: Macmillan, 1966, p. 117. Christopher Meyer, ‘British Ambassador to the United States Delivers Remarks on the Future of Diplomacy’, Washington Transcription Service, 24 March 1998, http://www.highbeam.com/DocPrint.aspx?DocId=1P1:28682043. Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Relations, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 269. Jan Melissen (editor),The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p. 35. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 124. Hermann Eilts, ‘Diplomacy – Contemporary Practice’ in Elmer Plischke, Modern Diplomacy: The Art and the Artisans, Washington DC, US: American Enterprise Institute, 1979, p. 4. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 9. Strobe Talbott, ‘Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective’, Foreign Policy, Volume 108, Autumn 1997, pp. 68 – 83: p.74. Geoffrey Wiseman, ‘“Polylateralism” and New Modes of Global Dialogue’ in Diplomacy Vol. III, Christer Jönsson, and Richard Langhorne (editors), London: Sage, 2004, pp. 36 – 57: p. 37. Keith Hamilton, and Richard Langhorne, Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 183. Ibid. p. 2. Beckles Willson, Friendly Relations: A Narrative of Britain’s Ministers and Ambassadors to America (1791–1930), Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1934, p. 265. Ibid. p. 199. American Consuls were created in British manufacturing towns in 1832 and the Embassy began to support business at the London Exhibition in 1851.

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Ibid. There were various accusations of domestic political interference, but the 1888 ‘Sackville Incident’ stands out. The British Minister, Lord Sackville, had his passport ‘returned’ by Secretary of State Bayard (who was, ironically, later the first full Ambassador to the UK) for becoming involved in Irish politics during the re-election campaign of Grover Cleveland. Cleveland’s loss was attributed to the issue and despite the fact that the British Minister was clearly ‘set up’ by the press, he was sent home. Ibid. p. 173. In 1851 British Minister Bulwer is said to have been so concerned by ‘ignorance and misconception’ he took a step ‘no British Minister had taken before – the delivery of speeches and addresses to American audiences.’ On the UK side, public speaking by American ministers was stepped up in 1880 by James Lowell (essayist and poet) and expanded by Joseph Choate in 1901, who was ‘occupied to a far greater extent than any of his predecessors … in making speeches and addresses’. Beckles Willson, American Ambassadors to England 1785 – 1928, London: John Murray Albemarle, 1928, p. 425. This was followed by the Foreign Affairs Act in 1789, but when it was discovered that some domestic issues were ‘left out’, was renamed as the Department of State later that same year – the first Executive Department of the federal government. H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States; A History of AngloAmerican Relations 1783–1952, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1955, p. 2. Harold Nicolson, The Evolution of Diplomacy, New York: Macmillan, 1966, pp. 11–12. Ibid., pp. 119–120. Brian Hocking (editor), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan Press, 1999, p. 3. Ibid., p. 120. Condoleezza Rice, ‘Transformational Diplomacy’, http://www.state.gov/r/ pa/prs/ps/2006/59339.htm. and ‘Georgetown University address’, January 2006, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/59306.htm. Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Active Diplomacy for a Changing World: The UK’s International Priorities, Foreign and Commonwealth Office White Paper on International Strategy Priorities, London: The Stationary Office, March 2006. H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States; A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783–1952, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1955, p. 121. Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton, Cambridge, US: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 53. G. Calvin Mackenzie, Innocent Until Nominated: The Breakdown of the Presidential Appointments Process, Washington DC, US: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, p. 11. James Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, p. 132. Robert Maranto, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Modern Presidency: Careerists and Appointees in the Reagan Administration, Westport CT, US: Greenwood Press, 1993, p. 30. Dennis Kavanagh and Anthony Seldon, The Power Behind the Prime Minister: The Hidden Influence of Number Ten, London: Harper-Collins, 1999, p. 34. Ibid. p. 31. James Pfiffner, The Modern Presidency, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994, p.122. Shaun Riordan, The New Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Polity, p. 14, 17. Interview of Sir Oliver Wright. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 18 September 1996, p. 12. This version of events comes from a number of sources but primarily: interview of The Rt Hon Lord Robin Renwick of Clifton by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced

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Alison R. Holmes with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College. Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 August 1998 and interview of Ambassador Seitz with author. 20–2 June 2008, Orford, NH, US. Ambassador Kerr concluded that President Clinton was an inveterate procrastinator rendering early lobbying ineffective and left it as late as possible – much to the concern of his staff. Interview of Lord Kerr of Kinlochard by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 January 2004, p. 37. Ambassador Seitz interview with Author, 20–2 June 2008, Orford, NH. This information came from a number of ambassadors and other diplomats. Most were on the record, but some requested that their trust with these private contacts not be broken. None are listed here as a partial list could, by default, reveal the others. Interview of Sir Oliver Wright. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 18 September 1996, p. 29. Jonathan Powell reported to Meyer in the early 1990s when they both worked in Washington. Sir Christopher Meyer, DC Confidential, London: Phoenix, 2006, p. 1. Ambassador Tuttle, interview with Author, 23–4 August 2008, Beverly Hills, CA, US. Interview of Lord Kerr of Kinlochard by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 January 2004, p.38. Ambassador Lader, interview with Author, 13–14 August 2008, Charleston, SC, US. Ambassador Seitz, interview with Author, 20–2 June 2008, Orford, NH, US. Deputy Chief of Mission Timothy Deal, interview with Author, 10 March 2009, Washington DC, US. Interview of Sir Antony Acland by Liz Cox, Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College and Sir Antony Acland, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), April 2001, p.14. Deputy Chief of Mission (now ambassador) Glyn Davies, interview with Author 21 May 2008, Washington DC, US. Sir Robert Worcester. Head of Pilgrims Society, Founder of MORI, interview with Author, 17 July 2008, London, UK. Ambassador William Farish, interview with Author, 27–8 May, Gasparilla Island, FL, US. Interview of The Rt Hon Lord Robin Renwick of Clifton by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 August 1998. The author served on Ambassador Manning’s Transatlantic Advisory Committee in her role as the London Managing Director of the largest transatlantic business membership organization based in London and New York. Interview of Lord Kerr of Kinlochard by Malcolm McBain. Reproduced with permission of the Master and Fellows of Churchill College, Cambridge: Churchill Archives Centre, British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (DOHP), 6 January 2004, p. 40. H. C. Allen, Great Britain and the United States; A History of Anglo-American Relations 1783–1952, New York: St Martin’s Press, 1955, p.18.

5

The Anglo-American economic relationship Special or not? Joe McKinney and Alan P. Dobson

Introduction Thomas Carlyle may have been correct and it probably is the dismal science, but economics matter, and economic relations between the US and Britain hugely so, though surprisingly little attention has been paid to them.1 From a purely quantitative perspective, as we shall see in due course, they might even warrant the accolade special, but there is not always a necessary link between quantity and quality. Furthermore even quantitatively their economic relations do not have the kind of importance that they once had and whatever quality remains globalisation and the pull of regional arrangements, both of which tend to degrade the importance of bilateral relations, could conceivably impoverish rather than enrich them. So, what might one make of Anglo-American economic relations? What kind of quality do they have and might they indeed be special? If they are: What makes them so and since when? Do they continue to be special and what has in the past and might in the future, in addition to regionalisation and globalisation, challenge that quality? Answering those questions requires a rather complex explanation and it might be helpful at the outset to lay out the key moves and judgements that drive it. Currently there is intense interaction between, and complex intermingling of, the British and the American economies, which amount to important significance in both quantitative and qualitative terms. Furthermore, the two economies appear to be more synchronised in their cyclical functioning than for example the British and German economies even though the latter two are both members of the European Union (EU). An even more important contrast is often drawn between the Anglo-Saxon capitalism of Britain, the USA and others such as Canada and Australia, and the Rhenish (or Gallic) capitalism, sometimes taken to embrace the whole of continental Europe. Character lines are drawn between on the one hand a lightly regulated, competition driven wealth-producing regime with lower government profile and on the other a more tightly regulated economy with more emphasis on state provision of welfare, job security, and distributive justice. Generally speaking there is considerable truth to these

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characterisations though it is important to note that there are anomalies: levels of taxation and welfare spending are significantly higher in the UK than in the USA as well as higher than in continental countries such as Holland, Spain and Portugal. Nevertheless, the ethos of economic modus operandi in the UK and the USA is highly compatible and largely a consequence of shared values and historical baggage that they both carry and which has created other important ties that support the importance of economic relations. Their economies also share similar procedures and organisational structures, especially important in companies and banking. This economic convergence was not however inevitable: there have been serious challenges that could very well have derailed it and these need to be understood as do the reasons why in the end they failed. Without that kind of understanding the nature of Anglo-American economic relations, their resilience, scope and quality cannot be properly grasped. In examining this kind of relationship there are no beginnings or endings, only an on-going journey, but parts of the journey are more important than others for determining its character. For contemporary Anglo-American economic relations its recent past tells us much about why the present is as it is, in particular two phases running from 1941 to 1973 and from 1973 to 1979. In the mid twentieth century the importance of economic relations between Britain and the USA arose partly because of their respective roles as lead players in the world economy and the overlapping of their dominant liberal capitalist economic philosophies. Then in the Second World War between 1941 and 1945 they collaborated closely and jointly crafted plans for a new post-war world economic order. That regime provided an important framework for close Anglo-American co-operation, but time and chance changed things and eventually there was such turbulence that the regime – Bretton Woods – collapsed between 1971 and 1973 and a new phase of world economic relations began. During the early stages of this second phase Anglo-American economic relations, already stressed in the 1960s, went through a critical phase. They emerged from that in the 1980s and embarked on a new course of convergence, notwithstanding disagreements and regional developments that would have a tendency to weaken their ties. From all this emerged a commonality of outlook and behaviour that coalesced into what has been called the Anglo-Saxon model and more specifically by some as the Anglo-American economic special relationship.

Phase one: America succeeds Britain During its heyday Britain was truly hegemonic economically, but by the late nineteenth century production in the USA had surpassed Britain’s, the effects of the First World War then weakened the latter’s economy significantly, and the strategic burdens of empire began to outweigh

The Anglo-American economic relationship 131 economic benefits. As both countries adjusted to new realities, frictions arose because of war debts, protectionism in the form of the US FordneyMcCumber and Smoot-Hawley Tariffs of 1922 and 1930 and Britain’s adoption of the discriminatory imperial preference tariff system in 1932, the weakening of sterling and the strengthening of the US dollar as major international currencies, and a variety of specific disputes over matters such as rubber and oil.2 Much of this was symptomatic of friction between rising and declining superpowers and did not bode well. In the 1930s it contributed to the chaos in the global economy and drives for economic autarky. Economic historian Charles Kindleberger laid major responsibility for the Great Depression at the door of the USA, which refused to assume the hegemonic role Britain could no longer play and provide leadership that might have alleviated its worst effects.3 While there was little co-operation during the inter-war period, the Second World War made it imperative for their survival and for that of the  economic system to which they were both wedded. Most importantly for the future, experts and politicians on both sides determined that they must not repeat the mistakes of the inter-war period. They essentially decided to internationalise the US New Deal domestic reforms and bring responsible capitalism, freer trade and stable exchange rates, through a form of institutionalised regulatory management, to the world economy. There were three important aspects to their collaboration in the Second World War: the practical, the post-war planning, and their overlapping values. The practical involved massive and intricate systems of combined production boards and allocation procedures, divisions of labour in crucial areas of production, world-wide collaboration to wage economic warfare, and economic aid delivered to the UK in the form of Lend-Lease and from Britain to the USA in the form of Reciprocal Aid. The figures involved were staggering: Lend-Lease amounted to about $27 billion (about $324 billion 2011 dollars) and Reciprocal Aid $6 billion (about $36 billion 2011 dollars). As equally impressive as this was the energy and vision that they brought to planning a new economic world order. The idea that globalisation came unexpectedly upon the world is fatuous: it was planned. Commitment to such planning was made early on by both the Americans and the British. It was to be structured but with a light regulatory touch primarily under American management and embodying broadly shared economic values as expressed in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 in which President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill declared that they would endeavour ‘to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their prosperity.’4 Working together, however, was not always easy. While there was general agreement on the broad principles to be followed, die-hard protectionists in the USA and imperialists and left-wing socialists in Britain strongly dissented. But, the central problem largely came down to a matter of timing.

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At the end of the war the British feared that their economy would not be competitive and argued for a lengthy transition period. In contrast the Americans wanted to implement the new regime immediately. At the end of August 1945 the war and Lend-Lease both came to an abrupt and unexpectedly early end because of the atom bomb, and that, among other things, denied the British the possibility of reconverting to peacetime production during the late stages of the war. Because Britain’s export capabilities had been greatly impaired by wartime destruction and reorientation of production toward armaments, the country suffered a severe shortage of foreign exchange, had huge wartime debts and was virtually bankrupt. The termination of Lend-Lease, required by US law at the war’s end, thus posed a serious economic problem. Britain desperately needed financial help and the celebrated economist John Maynard Keynes was dispatched to Washington as a special envoy from the UK Treasury to seek it. The main outcome was the Anglo-American Loan Agreement of 15 July 1946, whereby the US lent Britain $3.75 billion (equivalent to approximately $42 billion 2011 dollars) at 2 per cent interest to be repaid in 50 annual instalments beginning in 1950. The loan provided for deferral of payments in times of foreign exchange shortage, a provision used by Britain on six occasions, so the last instalment of the loan was paid in 2006. In the terms accompanying the Loan Agreement, the USA reiterated agreed wartime economic principles, but also, and most importantly, required Britain to enter the newly created International Monetary Fund (IMF) and make sterling freely convertible in 1947. So Anglo-American wartime economic co-operation and post-war planning experienced difficulties and conflict as well as co-operation, but possibly the most remarkable things to emerge from all this were new international institutions providing means for managing the world economy – the IMF, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) – a broad Anglo-American consensus and a strong habit of working together that was expected to continue in these new institutions. The underlying aim of the new economic world order was to provide stable exchange rates via the IMF, funds for development via the IBRD, and reduced barriers to trade in goods via the GATT. This was a multilateral vision that provided common rules for world-wide economic intercourse. The US took the lead role with Britain as a junior, but important, partner helping to manage the system. Until the late 1950s Britain still had the third largest economy in the world, was a major force in international trade and sterling was still an important international currency. Four factors compromised the immediate consummation of this vision. After the war Anglo-American relations deteriorated into disarray. The British resented the harsh terms of the Loan Agreement, while Americans suspected that the British wanted to renege on wartime commitments and were suspicions of British socialism. Disagreements were also rife over

The Anglo-American economic relationship 133 strategic and international issues such as the ending of wartime nuclear collaboration and disputes over how to treat the Palestinian-Israeli problem – the latter was probably the most venomous dispute of all. Ironically their erstwhile wartime ally came to the rescue and pushed them back together through the onset of the Cold War. However, that also posed a problem for the new economic order and directly connected with other factors which also compromised its integrity, at least in the medium term. The Soviet Union would have nothing to do with the Anglo-American fashioned new economic world order and Western Europe was not robust enough to play the kind of economic game it envisaged, and neither was Britain. The onset of the Cold War, growing economic distress in Western Europe and the catastrophic failure of Britain’s attempt in 1947 to make sterling freely convertible convinced US leaders that an alternative strategy was needed to help economic recovery. The US now temporarily abandoned its much vaunted multilateralism and aversion to discriminatory policies and adopted a form of regionalism, which actually subsidised European and British discrimination against the US as the most effective way to reinvigorate economic growth and ward off communism. The most obvious example of this was the European Recovery Program or Marshall Aid. Between 1948 and 1952 it extended over $12 billion dollars of aid (about $109 billion in 2011 dollars) to seventeen European countries. The special relationship that existed between America and Britain is apparent in the fact that Britain received 26.6 per cent of Marshall Plan funds, much more than any other country, despite the fact that communism was not perceived to be a threat to the government there.5 But perhaps an even more telling development was in the field of foreign exchange payments. Here the IMF was simply not fit for purpose in the late 1940s. The Bretton Woods system was suspended until general convertibility of currencies became possible in 1958. Until then other and more ad hoc arrangements were required. The concentration of British trade in the sterling area reduced Britain’s economic interaction with both the US and the rest of Europe, but sterling was not robust enough to withstand international pressures and the pound was finally devalued by just over 30 per cent in September 1949. Given the fact that between one-third and one-half of Britain’s trade was within the sterling area, and that other Western European countries also were devaluing their currencies, the effective devaluation was only by about 9 per cent.6 Even so this development worried US officials and when they linked British currency problems with those of Europe where currencies were also inconvertible, and thus much of their trade restricted to bilateral arrangements, they decided on further regional action. In an attempt to remedy Europe’s currency difficulties, the European Payments Union was established and financially underwritten by the USA in 1950 to provide a mechanism for settling balances so that trade could be multilateral at least within Europe. Britain joined at the insistence of the USA, but only after working out a special arrangement concerning sterling area payments.

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According to Neal, ‘The British obsession with maintaining its preferred trading relationships within the sterling area meant continued resistance to American plans to liberalize trade patterns and reintroduce multilateral settlements of financial imbalances within Europe.’7 Just as the Bretton Woods international monetary system had clearly been too ambitious for the immediate post-war world and the IBRD even more so – hence Marshall Aid for European reconstruction – hopes for trade liberalisation were also over-sanguine. The ‘third stool’ of the institutional framework for the post-war global economy was put forward by the US government in December of 1945, as a draft for an International Trade Organization (ITO). A preparatory conference was held in London in October 1946 followed by other meetings in New York, Geneva, and finally in Cuba in 1948 to finalise the charter. In these meetings there were strong disagreements over trade policy between the USA and Britain, with the USA pushing for more complete liberalisation of trade and Britain advocating provisions that would allow for the use of quantitative restrictions and trade discrimination in certain instances. In the end, however, it became clear that political opposition to the ITO from protectionists in Congress would not allow it to pass and in December 1950 President Truman duly withdrew it from the Senate. Only a portion of the charter, the GATT that dealt with trade in goods, was adopted.8 The GATT nevertheless provided the ground rules for international trade in goods, and provided a framework for multilateral trade negotiations and a formal system for settlement of trade disputes until the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995. In the 1940s and 1950s the GATT was a modest force for liberalisation, but then later with the Dillon, Kennedy, Tokyo and Uruguay rounds of negotiations running from the 1960s through the 1980s more significant progress was made. Notably, that acceleration of liberalisation coincided with the Bretton Woods system coming into full operation. Between the end of the war and 1958, the USA was frustrated and unable to implement the economic vision that American and British planners had formulated during the war. In fact it felt obliged to tolerate and actually subsidise preferential and discriminatory financial and trade practices by Britain contrary to principles to which they had both agreed. The main driving force behind this was Cold War imperatives and the strategic value of Britain in waging a cold war of attrition against communism. Even so the ambition of implementing the Anglo-Saxon model whenever possible remained alive in both Washington and London notwithstanding departures from principle in the late 1940s and for most of the 1950s. It is also important to note the way other facets of the relationship cut across the economic, often ameliorating difficulties there, and helped to sustain close and robust relations. This often compensated for economic differences that might otherwise have proved more damaging than they actually were. In the aftermath of sterling and the French franc’s move to convertibility in late 1958 it looked as if the fulfilment of the American and British

The Anglo-American economic relationship 135 wartime vision for a new economic order was about to be realised, albeit without participation from the communist bloc. Unfortunately it was largely illusion: it would not last. Important changes were underway in the world economy that undermined and eventually brought down Bretton Woods, demonstrating the now relative weakening of the USA. Anglo-American economic ties remained strong in the early 1960s and especially notable was US help to support Britain’s defence of its ailing currency, but by the mid1960s that central pillar of the relationship came under strain and by the summer of 1966 Secretary of the US Treasury Henry Fowler advised President Johnson that the USA should not provide further unilateral support for sterling. If the USA were to help in future it would have to be under the aegis of multilateral efforts.9 Americans were beginning to ask why they should support the British economically if they would not play the part expected of them in the conflict with communism. Failure to provide troops for the war in Vietnam and the prospect of a British military withdrawal from East of Suez, which became certain after the devaluation of sterling in 1967, occasioned considerable resentment in Washington where there was much talk of Americans being abandoned to man the ramparts alone. This was symptomatic of Britain’s waning importance in world affairs and it must also be seen in the context of two other significant factors: Britain’s growing determination to join the European Economic Community, which had been established by France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries in 1957, and economic divergence from the USA which seemed to loom large in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s. Added to all this was now intense pressure on the Bretton Woods system.10 Even before the strains of the Vietnam War and the costly programme of domestic renewal launched by President Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ initiative the USA had a net loss of over $7.4 billion from its gold reserves between 1957 and 1963. With the travails of the 1960s came serious economic costs and falling competitiveness of American manufactured goods. Between the late 1950s and 1971, America’s gold reserve was cut in half to stand at $11 billion in August 1971; that same year the USA also experienced its first trade deficit of the twentieth century. The government’s response to all this was the ‘Nixon shock’, which introduced price and wage controls, a 10 per cent import surcharge, a 10 per cent reduction in foreign aid, and an 8 per cent reduction in the value of the dollar. Bretton Woods was terminally ill and finally expired in March 1973 when all efforts to keep the value of the dollar tied to gold were abandoned and the dollar along with all other major currencies was allowed to float in value on the exchange markets. All these factors and Britain’s successful entry into the European Economic Community in 1973 threatened to unravel whatever remained of a special Anglo-American economic relationship. The USA had staunchly and for a long time supported Britain’s entry into Europe, partly in the hope that Britain would make it more outward looking and less protectionist,

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especially in agricultural trade, but once in the Community Britain’s influence was limited by the power of the Franco-German combination and many economic links between the USA and Britain were now mediated through Brussels. In joining the Community, Britain had to abandon preferential trading relationships with Commonwealth countries, adopt the common external tariff, participate in the Common Agricultural Policy, and adhere to the numerous regulations of the acquis communautaire. Given Britain’s strong economic ties with both the Commonwealth countries and the USA, this move was made with considerable ambivalence and it threatened to complicate the Anglo-American economic relationship. When the Cold War drew to an unexpected close in 1989 it looked as if even more ties that bind were likely to be severed.

Phase two: Intermittent divergences and long-term threat The Cold War renewed the special quality of Anglo-American relations after the temporary down-blip at the end of the war, even though it was never again as formal or as extensive as it had been.11 But it is important to acknowledge that special does not and has never meant untroubled or that there were not clashing interests: ownership of the Anglo-Saxon model did not guarantee harmonious economic relations even during the continuous crisis known as the Cold War. A good illustration of this is the troubled life of the Western strategic embargo directed against the Soviet Bloc and China. The USA and Britain were at the very heart of this multilateral effort to restrict strategic goods from reaching communist hands, but there were always difficulties and in 1954 and 1958 the British led efforts within the Coordinating Committee (COCOM) to reduce the length of the embargo lists and in 1957 to abandon the China Differential, which treated China more severely than the Soviet Bloc. In all cases Washington strove hard to resist change, but with only limited success. For example in 1957 Britain unilaterally abandoned the China Differential and was followed by all other members of COCOM apart from the USA. These kinds of disputes repeatedly recurred and did so even during the heady days of the special relationship between Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Ronald Reagan. When Reagan tried to persuade his West European allies to tighten the embargo and in particular to embargo pipeline technology for the Soviet oil and gas industry in 1981–2, Thatcher bluntly told his Secretary of State Alexander Haig in February 1982 that this was nonsense and that West Germany, France and Britain would not break contracts with the Soviets.12 These kinds of disputes, however, no matter how unsettling and distasteful, never threatened the broader relationship. For that kind of damage another and important ingredient was necessary – ideology, and that did manifest itself on at least two occasions in the post-war period and threatened to break the broad consensus on the Anglo-Saxon model. The

The Anglo-American economic relationship 137 main source of ideological differences arose from unlikely bed-fellows in Britain, namely imperialists and socialists and in the US from right-wing conservatives and Anglophobes. Imperialists such as Leopold Amery in the 1940s were angry with the USA and wary of its ambitions and power. For them, their worst fears were realised in 1956 when the USA blocked IMF support for sterling in the Suez Crisis, thereby forcing an ignominious British military withdrawal from Egypt. The imperialists prioritised close ties with the Empire and Commonwealth and held to faith in the imperial vision. Ideological fears of America in the mid-1940s were also shared by the left wing of the then Labour Government of Clement Attlee and reciprocated by many in the USA who detested socialism. Beliefs that the USA was determined to undermine Labour’s plans for a welfare state, socialised medicine, and nationalisation of swathes of British industry and infrastructure were strong in London. Prior to agreement on the AngloAmerican Loan Agreement one alternative vision purveyed by the imperialists had been retrenchment, a strengthening of the empire and developing it as an economic bloc independently of American political and economic influence. The political mainstream in London, however, deemed that to be so dangerous and unlikely of success that it was never adopted.13 If it had been it would have had enormous impact on the character and content of Anglo-American relations. But as British economic fortunes faltered in the summer of 1949 and a dramatic devaluation of sterling loomed on the horizon, another ideological alternative threatened to take its place, which had no less serious implications: socialist planning running out into the international arena. The components of this British economic crisis were potentially combustible and the US Ambassador to London thought that at almost any cost they should avoid ‘ideological differences from developing into at least softly acrimonious debate’ and the idea in London that Washington was trying to bring down the government.14 There was clearly danger here arising from the potential of economic difficulties entangling with a broader ideological position that could seriously damage Anglo-American relations. In the event there was damage, but the deteriorating Cold War situation and in particular the explosion of the Soviet atomic bomb, the ‘loss’ of China in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, muted AngloAmerican differences and constrained the potential for things to run out of hand. There were still difficulties to be navigated, not least the resignation of ministers Aneurin Bevan and Harold Wilson over welfare cuts and Korean War rearmament costs, but ideological arguments became more subdued and the anti-Americanism they fostered became fragmented into more discrete concerns about specific challenges to British power and status.15 This period of unrest encompassing ideological dangers did not end in the 1940s. There was always a tendency in Washington to prefer a Conservative to a Labour government because of both economic policies

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and matters to do with nuclear deterrence and the long-standing debate in the Labour Party about unilateral nuclear disarmament. American preferences were widely known and resented in London, but ironically, in the event, when confronted by Labour governments, the Americans were usually pleasantly surprised.16 But, by the mid-1970s British socialist economic policies gave rise to deep concerns in the White House. The performance of the British economy troubled members of President Gerald Ford’s immediate entourage. In April 1975 Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, passed a damning article on the British economy from the Economist to President Ford with a comment that this was a model of what the US should not do. Later in the year Ford referred to Britain as a ‘horrible example of a government that spends itself sick … with its Labor [sic] Government and its welfare state.’17 All this was bad enough and the cause for much hurt reaction in the UK. After all, Ford and Prime Minister Callaghan were close friends. Yet worse followed in 1976 when the USA stood aside while the IMF applied the medicine of economic discipline: the IMF was the agent, but most in Britain knew that the prescription came from Washington. The IMF provided funds to bolster the threatened position of sterling on condition that Britain drastically reduce its public borrowing right, which amounted to a sharp dose of domestic deflation. This broke the ‘social contract’ between the government and the trade unions founded on high rates of spending on health education and welfare in return for modest wage claims. The result was widespread union disruption of the economy and the 1978–9 ‘winter of discontent’. Some have dubbed this as ‘goodbye to Great Britain’ and indeed over the following years the situation continued to deteriorate and Washington became concerned that Britain was becoming ungovernable.18 Throughout, anti-Americanism, particularly in the Labour Party and on its left, rumbled and protested, but it never formed into a coherent force and, importantly, close co-operation in other areas continued. In 1979 Callaghan negotiated with President Jimmy Carter at the Guadeloupe summit about the possibility of buying Trident Missiles for Britain’s nuclear deterrent on a similar basis to Polaris and Carter responded that in principle he would. It was this kind of linkage between the two countries that cut across the problems arising in the economic sphere and prevented them from connecting strongly with power and status, identity and values in such a way that they might develop ideological coherence. Also, the Labour Government was replaced in 1979 by that of the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher and ideological differences at government to government level subsided. The legacy of the mid-1970s was long and bitter in the Labour Party. They held the USA responsible for the strictures of the IMF Loan Agreement, which broke their social contract with the unions and contributed to the economic and social disarray of the winter of discontent, which in turn helped to wreck the Labour Party’s electoral fortunes for a generation. If nothing else, the 1970s demonstrated that the special relationship and

The Anglo-American economic relationship 139 especially its economic incarnation could not be taken for granted. And while the last significant ideological danger was posed in 1976, vestiges remain, which rise and fall in strength, for example between the presidencies of George W. Bush and Barack Obama. Whenever they are renewed in strength they pose dangers of spilling over and impacting on politics, identity and values that range beyond the purely economic. For those who wish to nurture good Anglo-American economic relations it would be folly to disregard them. Two other major developments in the 1970s with huge economic consequences emphasised why the special relationship could not be taken for granted. The first of these concerned Britain’s relationship with Europe. During the 1950s Britain found its trade patterns shifting in relative terms away from the Commonwealth and empire, where decolonisation was gathering pace, and towards Europe. At the same time within Europe it disliked the political integration inherent in the prospective European Community. However, having failed to create through the European Free Trade Association a vehicle that could meet both its economic needs and its ambition to derail negotiations for the EC, Britain was forced to turn volteface and seek EC membership, which French President de Gaulle twice vetoed in the 1960s. Final entry into the EC in 1973 required recasting Britain’s global economic ties and set a key parameter of British foreign policy that extends through to the present, namely trying to maintain compatible relations with the EC and the US and seeking added influence through a self-appointed mediatory role between the two. In 1979 British Foreign Secretary David Owen wrote: ‘I see no incompatibility whatever in maintaining a strong commitment to the Atlantic Alliance [read the USA] with Community membership and full participation in the responsibilities of Commonwealth.’19 In 1999 Prime Minister Tony Blair effectively reprised Churchill’s three-circle concept in changed times with his declared aim of establishing Britain as ‘a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future.’20 Britain would play, among other things, a pivotal role between the USA and Europe with Blair trying to mediate the one to the other and hold things together. Yet maintaining compatible relations with two stronger powers and seeking to mediate between them has been a sometimes fraught exercise, especially since the Cold War as transatlantic relations have drifted apart, the EU has become more integrated and powerful and reunified Germany has carefully reasserted itself. Britain’s leading political parties generally favour the status quo but are buffeted from within and from public opinion by Eurosceptic and Europhile pressures. The second key event in the 1970s was the Yom Kippur War (1973) that precipitated an oil crisis as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries cartel orchestrated a massive hike in prices. This impacted severely on both the USA and Britain, contributing to their already bourgeoning economic difficulties, and causing tensions. However, the

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effects were not wholly negative. The appearance in Britain of stagflation as a novel economic experience and one that was directly related to the economic difficulties arising from the oil crisis prompted scepticism about the received wisdom of Keynesianism, which appeared to offer no help in conditions where prices were rising and out-put and employment falling. The result was Thatcherism which re-positioned British economic values and brought them closer to those of the USA than ever before in the twentieth century.

Phase three: Convergences and special again? Between 1980 and 2012 remarkable changes buffeted Anglo-American relations and their special economic relationship had to be robust indeed to survive. The demise of the Cold War removed an important imperative for close Anglo-American relations generally, though in many respects that was replaced in 2001 with the threat from terrorism, rogue states and weapons of mass destruction. Britain’s relations were complicated by membership of the EC/EU and the USA’s by the creation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). There were frequent outbreaks of disruptive economic-based disputes, which seemed to have the potential for broader impact on the relationship in general. There was also now an absence of structure for international and, more importantly for our present concerns, Anglo-American co-operation. The idea of formally managing the world economy expired with Bretton Woods, though recurrent difficulties make the resurrection of such management a distinct possibility. This is not to say co-operative initiatives did not still happen, they did but were of a different order of importance. For example in the early 1980s the strength of the US dollar became internationally problematical and the result was that Britain, along with the USA, West Germany, Japan and France agreed in the Plaza Accord of September 1985 to engage in co-ordinated intervention in foreign exchange markets to lower its value. About eighteen months later, in February 1987, the same countries plus Canada agreed in the Louvre Accord to co-ordinate intervention to halt the decline in the value of the US dollar. These meetings developed into what became the G7 and then the G8 and now the G20. At times, particularly at times of crisis, these meetings can be of major importance. The April 2009 G20 in London was one such meeting with agreement on huge stimuli for the world economy and commitment to helping the world’s poor. Orchestrated by Prime Minister Gordon Brown and dubbed ‘Brown’s New World Order’, it tried to deal with the immediate crisis precipitated by fault lines revealed in the banking system and the long term problem of world poverty. It did not quite live up to the hype, but it was a significant event and success for initiatives in these gatherings often have Anglo-American co-operation in evidence and as an important ingredient.21 Nevertheless, generally such meetings are poor substitutes for

The Anglo-American economic relationship 141 the kind of management possible under the Bretton Woods regime. Often they simply provide a platform for grandstanding. President Bill Clinton was overheard after one G8 meeting to say he would like to go up in a hot-air balloon fuelled by all the discussion at these summits ‘we could stay up there for days.’22 The looser, less institutionalised and lighter regulatory approach that economic forces seemed to have obliged the world to accept, became characteristic of views that were formulated and took grip in both Washington and London in the 1980s. One of the main reasons why the Anglo-American economic relationship was able to cope so successfully with numerous challenges over the last thirty years was due to a broad new convergence after tendencies to diverge in the late 1960s and throughout most of the 1970s. Upon taking office in 1979, Margaret Thatcher resolved to bring inflation under control and pursue deregulation, privatisation of nationalised industries, withdrawal of industrial subsidies, and reduction of trade union power in order to make labour markets more flexible. Concurrently in the USA, there was the kindred spirit of President Ronald Reagan who made similar moves, although the US economy was already much more privatised and deregulated than the British and had more flexible labour markets. After considerable dislocation during the early Thatcher years, the reforms in the UK eventually improved productivity and increased the rate of economic growth. During this same period, the Single Market initiative of the EC removed many non-tariff barriers to trade within the Community which also benefited the British economy. The end result was that Britain and America entered the 1990s with economies and economic policies perhaps more similar than they had ever been before. With strong determination to see that inflation did not take hold again in Britain, the Thatcher administration in 1990 agreed to link the pound to the West German mark and other European currencies in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System. This proved to be a mistake, however, for with the reunification of Germany and the surprising conversion of East German marks into deutschmarks at a 1:1 exchange rate, the Bundesbank had to follow a very tight monetary policy in order to absorb the large amount of ostmarks. Britain was unable to restrict its money supply sufficiently to stay in the Exchange Rate Mechanism and therefore ignominiously exited in September 1992. However, the fact that Britain had withdrawn before it ratified the Maastricht Treaty provided the option of joining the eventual monetary union, or not, according to future developments. Perhaps equally significant it allowed Britain to avoid being drawn closer into the European way of doing things and allowed it to keep its economic style and cycle more in tune with that of the USA. Furthermore, because Britain had access to the EU market, but escaped the economic costs imposed upon members of the EMS by German reunification, it attracted considerable foreign investment (much of it from the USA) from countries looking to produce for the EU market.23

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Remaining outside European currency arrangements, including the creation of the euro-zone, meant Britain retained some advantages for its economic relations with the USA, which have facilitated the convergence of the two countries’ economies. However, before presenting an overview of just how converged and intermingled they are, it is important to turn to the challenges the relationship had to meet and overcome in order to establish just how robust and resilient it was and still is. While Britain was not as economically integrated into Europe as Germany and France, it is salient that the European Commission gained sole competency in the areas of competition policy and takes the lead on trade negotiations so that Britain no longer speaks with an independent voice on such matters and under terms of the Lisbon Treaty of 2009 the European Parliament must approve any changes in EU trade policy. Certainly the UK is an influential voice within the EU on matters such as these, and the USA derives benefit with regard to some economic issues from the fact that Britain is a member of the EU, but co-operation between America and Britain is less direct and more complex than before. The UK is subject to regulations and directives of the EU on economic issues that it would not always unilaterally choose, and which limit its policy independence in a variety of ways and in some cases to the detriment of its US links. A case in point is the recent proposal that funds for the EU budget be generated by means of a ‘Tobin tax’ on financial transactions. The rationale for this proposal is that funds raised in this way would reduce the frictions that arise from the annual negotiations over the EU budget.24 Such a tax would fall heavily upon London as a major financial centre, and therefore the UK is vigorously opposing the proposal. US banks would also be adversely affected, as a large number of them operate in London. In December 2011, Prime Minister Cameron thought protecting the City of London from further EU regulation of this kind was so important that he vetoed German and French proposals for treaty change and thus somewhat isolated Britain not just from Germany and France, but from the rest of the EU as well who agreed that they would go ahead with the proposals though not now as a treaty change. The full consequences of all this remain to materialise. Similarly, in the US, the context for economic relations with Britain also radically changed during the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it embarked on a new trade policy. In 1989, the USA put into force a free trade agreement with its largest trading partner, Canada. This was followed in 1994 by the incorporation of Mexico into the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Economic integration has deepened considerably in North America as a result of these developments. During the George W. Bush administration, the United States entered into new free trade agreements involving 15 countries, and negotiated three other agreements that have since been waiting Congressional approval. While a US-EU free trade agreement has been proposed from time to time, for a variety of reasons that is unlikely to happen. The EU has, however, negotiated free trade

The Anglo-American economic relationship 143 agreements with countries such as Turkey, Mexico, and South Korea, and has negotiations underway with India, Canada, Singapore and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. A great deal of world trade is now conducted under preferential arrangements rather than under the most favoured nation principle, and economic relations between the USA and the UK are disadvantaged by this fact. There would almost certainly be a US-UK free trade agreement were the UK free to negotiate such an agreement on its own. In more recent years, notwithstanding positive opinion polls about their relations in general, there have been a series of high profile economic issues that have drawn critical comments from both sides, frequently including a rhetorical tone and content of anti-ism that posed problems for their economic relations and which threatened to run out into the broader relationship. These included civil aviation, the Deepwater Horizon affair, the ‘Banana War’, hormone treated beef, and the Airbus-Boeing controversy. Interestingly, with the exception of the Deepwater Horizon affair, all these were mediated through EU dealings with the World Trade Organisation or directly with the US Department of Transportation. Between 1980 and 2007, pursuant to an agreement freely entered into, but subsequently bitterly rued by the USA, the UK was able to limit US carrier access to Heathrow Airport. When the USA suggested changing this, the British argued that they would only do so in return for access to US cabotage, i.e. its domestic market, and/or abandonment of the prohibition on foreign ownership of airlines.25 Meanwhile, in the decade between 1987 and 1997 the EC/EU established a Community-wide market in air services so that the airlines of any EU country could operate freely throughout the region. Then in 2002 the European Court of Justice ruled that bilateral air service agreements between EU member countries and outside countries violated the single market concept since the terms of these agreements differed from one member country to another. Therefore, bilateral air service agreements had to be replaced by a Community-wide agreement. In the agreement negotiated by the EU with the USA greater access was given to Heathrow Airport, but without any changes to cabotage and foreign ownership of airlines. The UK’s trump card was given away without getting much in return.26 So, for the time being at least, the matter ended, but some interesting points may be drawn out of the saga and not just the obvious one that sometimes the EU is more in harmony with the USA on economic issues than the UK. There is no denying the importance of the transatlantic airline market to Britain and the dispute with the USA waxed exceedingly acrimonious at several crisis-like points between 1980 and 2007. Furthermore, the controversy had much raw material that could have fed the potential for anti-Americanism, which in turn could have involved wider political and economic disruption of the relationship. So why did the dog of antiAmericanism not bark more loudly? First of all the range of the controversy

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was fairly narrow. From one perspective it did impinge on differing economic ideological positions and those differences tended to wax and wane depending on whether the government was Labour or Conservative, but the differences were not crucial and often about the extent to which competition should run rather than challenging the principle itself. The dispute also had resonance in the spheres of power and status, identity and values, but again the resonance was rather weak, for example the British challenged the workings of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet, but only insofar as it excluded non-American airlines.27 They did not challenge the idea that there was a bona fide security issue here for the USA. And possibly most important of all is the mundane and obvious: airlines are about capturing and carrying customers and the British Government, British Airways and Virgin Atlantic were hardly likely to advance that cause by launching into a virulent campaign laced with anti-Americanism. It would not be attractive to their potential American customers. In short there was no strong ideological underpinning to the dispute, there was little tendency for the economic to resonate strongly in other spheres, and the nature of the economic activity did not lend itself to resorting to anti-Americanism to promote its cause. In the Deepwater Horizon affair in 2010 for a brief period what sounded like blatantly anti-British sentiments originating from the White House were reciprocated by the British tabloid press. The oil spill crisis in the Gulf of Mexico prompted President Obama to heap blame on the British-owned company BP. He reverted to calling it British Petroleum just to drive home the point about where blame lay. British Petroleum is a terminology that had been out of use for years and Obama’s resurrection of it provoked a countervailing storm of anti-American protest in the British tabloid press. But, as the kinds of interdependence emerged that had also constrained matters in the airline dispute, both sides moderated their language and muted nationalistic xenophobia. The fact that icons of American industry such as Halliburton were at least partly responsible for what actually went on at the rig, that American shareholders almost outnumber British and that huge numbers of Americans work for the company all made singling out one country for national blame-gaming seem slightly absurd. In the civil aviation dispute Brussels clearly played a significant role which cut across British interests, but how the EU has impacted more widely on Anglo-American economic relations is difficult to assess. In the longstanding ‘Banana War’ the EU position and UK interests were essentially the same. It rumbled on from 1993 to 2009 and concerned Britain and other ex-European colonial powers granting import preference to high production cost bananas from their ex-colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific under the provisions of the Lomé and later Cotonou Convention. The main justification was that it helped development in poor countries. In strong opposition to this system of trade preference the USA took matters to the WTO demanding a level playing field for bananas

The Anglo-American economic relationship 145 produced primarily by US mega-corporations Dole and Chiquita at much lower cost from large plantations in South and Central America. This dispute was finally settled in 2009 with an agreement that the tariff rate quotas imposed by the EU would be gradually converted to import tariffs and licensing requirements would be phased out. In the dispute between the USA and the EU on hormone-treated beef, the UK was helpful to the USA in advocating for restrictions only if they were based on solid scientific evidence. This dispute has also been resolved by an agreement to phase in market access of untreated American beef through increasing tariff-rate quotas in exchange for a phasing out of US retaliatory duties.28 In the interminable Boeing-Airbus dispute involving allegedly different forms of state subsidy, as a major partner in Airbus the UK was fully in agreement with the European Commission in its pursuit of the case. In some cases Britain is not so sanguine about supporting the EU position, for example in the dispute over imports of biotechnology products, but it still nevertheless generally supports the EU position. Clearly, the EU now cuts across bilateral UK-US economic relations in an unprecedented manner. How these developments might impact on bilateral economic relations between the USA and Britain and the management of them is difficult to say. From one perspective one might suggest that having difficult economic issues mediated through the EU may have a tendency to defuse potentially difficult matters for their bilateral relations, but on the other hand EU imposed economic policies that Britain does not favour brings it into confrontational positions with the USA. The assumption by the EU of responsibilities for economic relations with the USA needs more attention than has hitherto been accorded. The focus needs to be not only on the specific content of economic disagreements and how they are handled but also on the shifting institutional and procedural framework, which tends to distance British and American officials within the economic sphere compared with how they used to relate. Such relations have often been seen as part and parcel of the very essence of the special relationship in the past. So in the face of such challenging evidence about the state of AngloAmerican economic relations what quality might one currently ascribe to them? Two perspectives point the way: the degree of convergence of shared values and practices and the intermingling of the two economies; and second, the extent to which key economic decision-makers in each country, notwithstanding the changes wrought by the demise of Bretton Woods, Britain’s membership in the EU and the US membership in NAFTA, still negotiate and co-ordinate closely with each other. As can be seen in Table 5.1, the trading relationship of Britain with the USA in goods is very significant, but is overshadowed by that of some other countries. In 2010, the UK was the fifth largest export market for US goods, accounting for 3.84 per cent of the total compared with Canada’s and Mexico’s 19.55 per cent and 12.77 per cent, respectively. China purchased

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Table 5.1 2010 US Trade in Goods and Services Rank

Country

Exports (millions $)

Percent of Total Exports (%)

  1 2 3 4 5

Total, All Countries Canada Mexico China Japan United Kingdom

1,278,139 249,862 163,246 93,006 61,606 49,110

100.00 19.55 12.77 7.28 4.82 3.84

Rank

Country

Imports (millions $)

Percent of Total Imports (%)

  1 2 3 4 5 6

Total, All Countries China Canada Mexico Japan Germany United Kingdom

1,912,041 366,086 280,741 232,840 122,873 83,194 51,379

100.00 19.15 14.68 12.18 6.43 4.35 2.69

Source: Calculated from data in US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, ForeignTrade http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/country/

almost twice as many US goods as Britain, and Japan significantly more. In terms of US imports, China is the top supplier with 19.15 per cent, followed by Canada with 14.68 per cent and Mexico with 12.18 per cent. Japan and Germany, at 6.43 and 3.45 per cent, respectively, also supply significantly greater shares of goods to the USA than Britain’s 2.69 per cent. The bilateral trading relationship is much more important for the UK than for the USA. In 2009 the USA was the largest purchaser of British goods, accounting for about 15 per cent of British exports in 2009. The USA was the second largest supplier of foreign products to Britain in 2009, accounting for 9.5 per cent of imports in comparison to Germany’s 12.8 per cent.29Services trade is a rapidly growing sector of international trade and can be expected to account for an increasing percentage of US-UK trade. Britain is in a relatively strong position with regard to trade in services, having a strong ‘revealed comparative advantage’ in services overall.30 Britain accounts for 8.8 per cent of US cross-border imports of services, the largest share of any country, and also purchases the largest share of US cross-border exports of services, accounting for 10.5 per cent of sales. Trade statistics, however, do not reveal the depth of the economic relationship between America and Britain, even though goods and services trade between the two countries is significant in absolute terms at around £120 billion. Possibly more importantly than trade they are each other’s largest single foreign investor. To some extent international investment and international trade can serve as substitutes for each other, and the USA

The Anglo-American economic relationship 147 and the UK enjoy the world’s largest bilateral investment relationship. Britain’s total direct foreign investment is well over five times that of China’s, standing at about 20 per cent of total FDI in the USA, though recently investment flows from China into the USA have exceeded Britain’s. The UK accounted for nearly 27 per cent of all investment from the European Union countries in 2009, which was also approximately equivalent to the investment in the USA by all other non-European countries put together. US investments in Britain tend to be more capital intensive, for the total assets of US affiliates in Britain are about two and one-half times as great as UK affiliate assets in the USA, with sales about one and one-half times as great. They are similar in having the largest venture capital markets in the world and there is other important intermingling with approximately one million Americans working for British companies in the USA, and approximately one million Britons working for American companies in Britain. Over seven million people cross the Atlantic each year between Britain and the USA with three out of the five largest transatlantic air routes servicing them, and of those travellers about 33,000 of them are Americans coming to study in Britain and 9,000 are Britons going to study in the USA.31 This web of trade, investment, banking, commerce and exchange of peoples is crucial to both sides and to the health of the international economy. The strong investment relationship between the USA and Britain is partly the result of the comfort level that investors have with the investment climate of the other country. The cultural and linguistic similarities of the USA and the UK minimize the adjustment costs of investment in the USA for UK firms as compared to most other countries. By the same token, US firms looking to access not only the domestic market of the UK but also the EU market as a whole often consider investment in the UK as an attractive option. The economic systems of Britain and America have much in common: the Anglo-Saxon model. They each have a relatively light regulatory burden compared to most other countries. The accounting and legal systems of the two countries are similar and there is strong protection for property rights. Labour markets are relatively flexible in each so that investors are not reluctant to add workers. A high level of competition is fostered, with ease of both entry and exit for firms. More of business financing is through equity shares and corporate bond issues than on the European continent where there is a higher degree of bank lending.32 Each country has a stable social environment, and good technological, telecommunications, and transportation infrastructure. Both countries rank near the top of the World Bank Group’s 2010 assessment of ease of doing business, with the UK ranked fourth in the world and the USA ranked fifth.33 Many believed that the refusal of the UK to adopt the euro as its currency would place the country at a disadvantage relative to Euro-zone countries in attracting foreign investment. The data in Table 5.2 lend some limited support to that proposition. While Europe’s share of the total foreign direct investment of the USA has been increasing, particularly in

101615.8 38512.4 37.90 11254 11.08 29.22

40.73

1971–1975

62767 20394.6 32.49 8306 13.23

1966–1970

28.16

169751.8 73536.2 43.32 20705.8 12.20

1976–1980

30.37

220942.4 98300.4 44.49 29854 13.51

1981–1985

32.47

351241.2 169792 48.34 55125.2 15.69

1986–1990

34.11

569219.6 282274.2 49.59 96270.4 16.91

1991–1995

2001–2005

2006–2009

34.72

28.71

25.18

1039884 1849803 2397459 529604.8 999802.4 1710825 50.93 54.05 71.36 183891.2 287071.4 430806.8 17.68 15.52 17.97

1996–2000

Source: Calculated from data in U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Economic Accounts http://www.bea.gov/ international/index.htm 

All Country Total Europe Total Europe Percentage United Kingdom United Kingdom Percentage United Kingdom Percentage of European Total

 

Table 5.2 US Direct Investment Abroad on a Historical-cost Basis (Annual Averages in Millions of Dollars)

The Anglo-American economic relationship 149 the latter half of the past decade, the UK share of that investment has been declining, reaching a low of approximately 25 per cent in 2006–9. However, with just over one-quarter of total US foreign direct investment in Europe, the UK is certainly in a strong position. Recent difficulties in the Euro-zone countries may well shift the pendulum back in favour of the UK as the preferred destination for investment to service the European market. The fact that the British currency can adjust independently should allay fears of American investors that the competitiveness of their firms might be affected by economic conditions on the continent. Indeed the deep economic linkages between the USA and Britain provide an economic rationale for Britain continuing to maintain its own currency. An IMF study found that the growth cycle of UK GDP between 1960 and 1997 was more correlated with that of the USA than with that of continental Europe.34 Using similar methodology, the Bank of England found that the correlation of economic cycles between Britain and America was even stronger during 1990–7 than for the period as a whole.35 Further empirical evidence of strong economic linkages between the American and British economies is provided by Spencer and Liu who found that while economic fluctuations in the USA do not appear to have strong effects on the rest of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, they do have significant effects on the UK economy.36 The fact that Britain has opted out of participation in the EU monetary union gives the UK policy flexibility and independence that it would not otherwise have. Britain is able to pursue an independent monetary policy that provides the possibility of policy co-ordination with US monetary authorities when such co-ordination seems appropriate. British and American monetary officials and regulatory authorities are key players in the effort to provide international financial stability, a global public good. As such, there is extensive consultation between the Bank of England and both the Federal Reserve Board and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. In meetings of the Financial Stability Board, the international institution that monitors developments in the international financial system and makes recommendations concerning its stability, the United States and Britain often find themselves with a common view of the appropriate approach.37 The United States and Britain have shared interests in very large financial institutions of each country that have a substantial presence in both New York and London, such as Barclays, Citibank, J. P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs. The interlinking of US-UK financial markets of course means that difficulties in one market will soon be transmitted to the other. This was very evident in the global financial crisis of 2008. The crisis that began in the US housing market required action in London as well as in the US in order to prevent financial collapse. United States and British authorities had engaged in planning prior to the crisis concerning what actions might be necessary if a crisis occurred. As the crisis unfolded consultations became intense, as is evident from the references in Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s

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memoir to his discussions with President George Bush concerning the crisis,38 and in Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson’s references in his memoir to discussions with Prime Minister Brown, British Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling, and Bank of England Governor Mervyn King.39 As a result of the financial crisis, the supervisory approaches of the British and United States financial authorities have become more similar than they were before. Before the crisis, Britain had a principles-based regulatory approach while the United States had a more prescriptive rules-based approach. After the Bank of England was granted independence in 1997, supervision of financial institutions was taken out of the Bank. Oversight of banks is now moving back into the Bank of England, giving it a role more like that of the Federal Reserve. In addition, the UK authorities now recognize the need for a more prescriptive and hands-on regulatory approach, though differences remain. The monetary and regulatory authorities of the two countries are working very hard to provide for enhanced co-ordination and co-operation in dealing with possible failures of large financial institutions. Both countries have put in place new resolution regimes for systemically important institutions to preserve stability while imposing losses should such an institution get in trouble. Differences in legal systems still complicate resolution of such cases, but the United States and British legal systems have much more in common than those of most other countries. Of course, each country will in the final analysis look after its own interests. This was made abundantly clear when the British regulatory authorities refused to permit Barclays to rescue the failing Lehman Brothers as the financial crisis unfolded in the United States.

Conclusion As one looks to the future, profound changes in the world economy can be expected. Emerging market countries are rapidly increasing their share of global output and of world trade.The IMF projects that between 2007 and 2030, the share of world output accounted for by China, Brazil, Russia and India will increase from 12.7 per cent to 29.4 per cent.40 Nobel-laureate economic historian Robert Fogel more dramatically projects that by 2040 China will account for 40 per cent of world output, more than twice the amount of the USA and the EU-15 combined. Fogel fears that lack of reforms and adverse demographic trends will reduce the EU-15 share of world output to only 5 per cent by 2040.41 Uncertainty exists as well concerning the long-term viability of the EU, or at least its monetary union. And the course of economic and political developments in the Middle East is clouded with uncertainty. In a changing and uncertain world, it might be prudent to nurture and capitalise on the strong and enduring AngloAmerican economic linkages. Over the years they have proven robust enough to withstand the demise of the Bretton Woods management system,

The Anglo-American economic relationship 151 the relative decline of not just Britain but the USA as well, and the re-positioning involving the EU and NAFTA. Not only have they survived but the British and US economies continue to be underpinned by similar economic values, practices and procedures and have intermingled and converged in ways hardly experienced elsewhere and certainly not outside formal regional economic blocs. Whether in and of itself the economic relationship warrants the accolade special is contestable, but it undeniably still plays an important role not just in the economic world but in its contributions to the wider Anglo-American relationship.

Notes 1 2 3 4

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

One notable exception is Alan P. Dobson, The Politics of the Anglo-American Economic Special Relationship, 1940–1987, Brighton, Sussex, UK: Wheatsheaf, 1988. Alan P. Dobson, Anglo-American Relations in the Twentieth Century: Of Friendship, Conflict and the Rise and Decline of Superpowers, London: Routledge, 1995, Chapter 3. Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929–1939, Berkeley, US: University of California Press, 1973. Richard N. Gardner, Sterling Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective: The Origins and the Prospects of Our International Economic Order, New York: Columbia University Press, 1980 (First published by Oxford University Press 1956); Alan P. Dobson, US Wartime Aid to Britain, London: Croom Helm, 1986; Randall Bennett Woods A Changing of the Guard: Anglo-American Relations 1941–1945, Chapel Hill, US: University of North Carolina Press, 1990; Patrick J. Hearden, Architects of Globalism: Building a New World Order During World War II, Fayetteville, US,: Arkansas University Press, 2002; the full text of the Atlantic Charter can be found in various places including H. V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting, London: Methuen, 1943. Alan S. Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe 1945–51, London: Methuen, 1984; J. Foreman-Peck, .A History of the World Economy: International Economic Relations since1850. Totowa, NJ, US: Barnes & Noble Books, 1983. L. Neal, ‘Impact of Europe’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (Editors), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 267–95. Ibid., p. 276. Not even this portion of the agreement was formally accepted by the US Congress. Congress agreed to abide by the terms of the agreement only to the extent that it did not conflict with any US laws. Johnson Presidential Library, Country File, box 208–9, folder: UK memos. Vol. III 1/66–7/66, Fowler memorandum to Johnson, 14 July 1966. Alan P. Dobson, ‘The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 1961–1967’, Review of International Studies, 1990, 16, pp. 239–58. Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, ‘Churchill at the Summit: SACLANT and the Tone of Anglo-American Relations in January 1952’, The International History Review, 2010, 32(ii), 211–29. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, London: Harper Collins, 1993, p. 255; Alexander Haig, Caveat, New York: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 255–6; Alan P. Dobson, U.S. Economic Statecraft for Survival 1933–1991, London: Routledge, 2002. Another good example of conflict is in Steve Marsh, Anglo-American Relations and Cold War Oil, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003

152 13 14 15

16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

30

31

Joe McKinney and Alan P. Dobson Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes 1883–1946: Economist, Philosopher, Statesman, London: Pan Books, 2004, pp. 748–55. Harry Truman Presidential Library, Acheson Papers, box 64, folder: memorandums of conversation August to September 1949, Douglas to Acheson, 15 August 1949. See Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, ‘Churchill at the Summit: SACLANT and the Tone of Anglo-American Relations in January 1952’, The International History Review, 2010, 32(ii), 211–29, for the good example of the dispute over SACLANT. Alan P. Dobson, ‘Labour or Conservative: Does it Matter in Anglo-American Relations?’ Journal of Contemporary History, 25 (1990) 387–407. Gerald Ford Presidential Library, White House Central Files, box 57, CO 160, folder: 11/1/75–12/31/75, Ramsbotham to Hartman, and Scowcroft’s reply, 28 October and 7 November 1975. Kathleen Burk and Alex Cairncross, Goodbye Great Britain: the 1976 IMF Crisis, Newhaven, US: Yale University Press, 1992. David Owen, ‘Britain and the United States’, in W.E. Leuchtenburg, A. Quinton, G. W. Ball and D. Owen, Britain and the United States: Four Views to Mark the Silver Jubilee, London: Heinemann, 1979, p. 76. Blair’s speech Lord Mayor’s Banquet, London, 22 November 1999 www.theislander.org.ac/oldsite/1461.htm Anthony Seldon, Brown at Ten, London: Biteback, 2010, pp. 234–43; Tony Blair, A Journey, London: Hutchinson, 2010, pp. 555–70. Alastair Campbell, The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries, London: Hutchinson, 2007, p. 203, entry 17 May 1998. L. Neal, ‘Impact of Europe’ in R. Floud and P. Johnson (Editors) The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004. J. Chaffin, ‘Brussels eyes Tobin tax to aid EU coffers’, Financial Times, 27 June 2011, p. 1. Alan P. Dobson, ‘Aspects of Anglo-American Aviation Diplomacy 1976–1993’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 4(ii), 1993, pp. 235–57. Alan P. Dobson and Joseph A. McKinney, ‘Sovereignty, Politics and U.S. International Airline Policy’, Journal of Air Law and Commerce, 74iii, 2009: 527–52. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet allows the US government to commandeer civil airliners for uplift duties in times of crisis, in return the Fly America Program requires all official government travel to be on US airlines. US International Trade Commission July 2010. ‘The year in trade 2009: Operation of the trade agreements program’ USITC Publication 4174, 61st Report, 2010. It is interesting to note that the share of the US in total UK trade has not changed much over time, accounting for 23.3 per cent in 1955, 23.1 per cent in 1972, 26.4 per cent in 1985, and 24.9 per cent in 2009. Percentages for 1995, 1972 and 1985 calculated from data in J. Tomlinson, ‘Economic policy’ In R. Floud and P. Johnson (Editors), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 189–211. R. Millward, ‘The rise of the service economy’, in R. Floud and P. Johnson (Editors), The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Britain, Volume 3: Structural Change and Growth, 1939–2000. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 238–65. Facts and figures are taken from the US Census Bureau, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the British-American Business.com websites. See

The Anglo-American economic relationship 153

32 33 34 35 36 37

38 39 40 41

also M. Calingaert, ‘The Special Relationship – Economic and Business Aspects: American Perspectives’, in J.D. McCausland and D.T. Stuart (Editors), U.S.U.K. Relations At the Start of the 21st Century, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, US: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006, electronic version. Ibid. The World Bank Group (2010, June), Economy Rankings, retrieved 5 July 2011, from http://doingbusiness.org/rankings. Z.G. Kontolemis, and H. Samiei, The UK business cycle, monetary policy, and EMU entry, Working Paper No. 00/210, Washington, DC: IMF, 2000, December. S.B. Wadhwani, ‘The impact of the US slowdown on the UK Economy’, Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 1(2) 248–51, 2001, summer. P. Spencer and Z. Liu, ‘An open-economy macro-finance model of international interdependence: The OECD, US and the UK’, Journal of Banking & Finance 34(3), 667–80, 2010, March. Phone interview with Donald L. Kohn conducted by McKinney on 10 October 2011. Mr. Kohn had a 40-year career with the United States Federal Reserve System, interacting specifically with the Bank of England during much of that time. He served as Vice Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, and upon his retirement from the Federal Reserve System was appointed by Her Majesty’s Treasury as External Member of the Financial Policy Commission of the Bank of England. The next two paragraphs draw heavily on the interview with Mr Kohn. Gordon Brown, Beyond the Crash: Overcoming the First Crisis of Globalization, London: Free Press, 2010, pp. 28, 33–4, 38, 43–4, 46–7, 57, 64–5, 115, 120. Henry M. Paulson, On the Brink: Inside the Race to Stop the Collapse of the Global Financial System, New York: Business Plus, 2010, pp. 87, 117, 130, 187–8, 208, 210–11, 335–6, 348–9, 374. International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, 2009, October. R. Fogel, $123,000,000,000,000, Foreign Policy, 2010 January/February, pp. 70–5.

6

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship Climate change and post-Cold War US-UK environmental politics Tony Jackson

Introduction Boulding’s seminal paper on The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth focused minds on the need to co-operate in sharing global resources, rather than simply compete for global strategic influence.1 The realisation of Kennedy’s 1961 Cold War commitment to a manned moon landing prompted similar responses: ‘Apollo 8’s photographs of a little Earth, shining vulnerably in a great black emptiness, made people aware of the planet’s fragility and helped to spur the green movement’.2 For the past half-century, the Anglo-American special relationship has embraced the ecosphere. The 1987 Brundtland Commission Report and the 1992 Rio de Janeiro Earth Summit represent a watershed in the evolution of US-UK environmental politics over this period.3 The previous two decades had seen Washington make the international running. Its 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) heralded ‘the passage in the 1970s of a series of extraordinarily demanding and sweeping pollution control and natural resource conservation laws’.4 Westminster’s concurrent neglect of its environmental responsibilities attracted the epithet ‘the dirty man of Europe’.5 The two decades following the ending of the Cold War witnessed a radical shift in these positions. Under Prime Minister Gordon Brown climate security became a cornerstone of Westminster’s diplomatic efforts, bolstered by a revised National Security Strategy that saw climate change as ‘potentially the greatest challenge to global stability and security, and therefore to national security’.6 Obama’s negotiator on this issue, Todd Stern, acknowledged that in rejecting the Kyoto Protocol the previous US administration had relinquished claims to global environmental leadership and was ‘not fundamentally looking for an international agreement’.7 Three possible explanations for this role-reversal are examined. The first suggests that environmental policy-making has been driven by discourse coalitions from competing epistemic communities, consisting of knowledgebased transnational networks of specialists who hold common views about

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 155 the nature of environmental problems and the means of addressing these.8 Under this scenario, UK policy-makers have joined a European Union (EU) epistemic community focused on the promotion of sustainable development and the need to adopt a precautionary approach to climate change.9 The US policy-making consensus adheres to an alternative discourse coalition driven by formal risk-based scientific approaches to regulation, using costbenefit analysis (CBA) to measure the burdens imposed on industry and commerce by environmental controls and abatement measures.10 This explanation attributes shifts in US-UK environmental politics to widening conceptual differences in their approach to the environment. To test its validity, the nature of these epistemic issues must be explored. The second explanation points to the influence of institutional frameworks in shaping environmental policy-making. Changes in environmental governance on both sides of the North Atlantic account for growing divergence in British and American environmental policies. UK policy-makers now have more scope to pursue pro-active environmental measures and lead the international community in tackling climate change.11 Although there is plenty of grass-roots engagement in such initiatives at lower tiers,12 institutional factors make it increasingly difficult for the US federal government to translate this diffuse American support for green policies into national and international legislative actions.13 To evaluate the strength of this explanation, the evolution of environmental governance in both jurisdictions needs to be tracked, comparing the way EU membership has facilitated UK support for higher environmental standards with the obstacles erected in recent decades to similar US federally-mandated actions. The third explanation relies on the pursuit of self-interest on the part of British and American environmental policy-makers, focusing on how their national interests differ when negotiating multinational environmental agreements (MEAs).14 Advocates of an interest-based explanation of international environmental policy argue that epistemic communities and institutional factors play second fiddle to self-interest in understanding a nation’s stance on such matters.15 In assessing the substance of this claim, differences in the packages of national interests brought to the negotiating table in US-UK discussions on MEAs must be identified. This will enable us to trace how these packages have been modified in recent decades in ways that make British negotiators appear more environmentally pro-active and their American counterparts less so. The rest of this chapter examines the evidence for each of these explanations, and offers an opinion on which has the greatest explanatory power. Each explanation may contain elements that offer some support for its two alternatives. Epistemic communities are not simply value-free bodies of knowledge, driven only by the search for truth. They may well be serving the interests of their own nations. By the same token, interest-based determinants of policy-making may be supported by belief in scientific

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discourses that justify advocacy of national concerns. Furthermore, institutional factors may prove influential only when there is a confluence of scientific arguments and national interests that highlight the role of particular forms of environmental governance. Nevertheless, these competing arguments offer sufficient analytically-distinct elements to provide the basis for a comprehensive examination of the way in which a leading environmental issue, global warming, has cooled the special relationship since the end of the Cold War.

The epistemic explanation Hajer attributes environmental policy shifts to the relative effectiveness of competing policy discourse coalitions within epistemic communities, arguing that ‘developments in environmental policies critically depend on the specific social construction of environmental problems’.16 In reviewing environmental policy-making since the 1980s, he traces a move from traditional pragmatism toward a sustainable development paradigm termed ecological modernisation (EM).17 Adopting Huber’s belief that existing structures of society have the technological capacity to decouple rising living standards from material resource use through a ‘super-industrial ecological switchover’,18 EM has permeated key transnational policyformulating bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the EU.19 Its advocates favour anticipatory rather than reactive management of the environment. They require rectification to be at source rather than at the end of the pipeline, contending that pursuit of higher environmental standards offers a ‘positive-sum game: pollution prevention pays’.20 At the international level, EM has been configured as strategic environmental policy. This rejects the so-called race-to-the-bottom thesis, which claims that removal of trade barriers exposes domestic industries to unfair foreign competition operating with lower environmental standards.21 Applying Porter and van der Linde’s hypothesis that stringent national environmental standards promote domestic industries that are more competitive and innovative,22 advocates of a strategic approach to international environmental policy regard the costs of meeting higher environmental standards as investments in long-term competitiveness and self-interest, which provide the jurisdictions who enforce them with strategic trading advantages that open up a race-to-the-top.23 EM represents a paradigm shift away from zero-sum postulates that assume enterprises already focus on using resources with maximum efficiency and minimal harmful effects. Traditional pragmatism associates tighter environmental standards with higher operating costs and lower material living standards. Its adherents contend that more demanding requirements should therefore only be approved following scientificallyincontrovertible evidence, using CBA to indicate that society is willing to

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 157 bear the cost.24 CBA’s limitations when confronted with irreversible nonmarginal shifts in resources are overlooked.25 It is instructive to explore the development of these storylines within US and UK environmental policy circles. At the start of the 1970s, policy-makers in both countries experienced growing concerns about inter-jurisdictional forms of environmental pollution of a diffuse and intangible nature, such as ozone depletion, acid rain and global warming. These started to displace traditional worries about more tangible local sources of pollution attributable to the specific actions of identifiable industrial concerns. A switch in the perception of environment threats from local externalities towards global common property problems was duly mirrored in the evolution of environmental governance itself.26 The US federal government led the way in enacting legislation to tackle environmental problems that were seen as beyond the jurisdictional capacity of its individual states.27 Its 1969 NEPA legislation establishing the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was followed by the Clean Air Act of 1970, the Clean Water Act of 1972, and other federal environmental mandates culminating in the 1980 Superfund. During the 1980s, US policy-makers provided international environmental leadership in tackling the threat of ozone-depleting chemicals. Richard Benedict, chief US negotiator at the 1985 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, criticised the UK government and British chemical interests for being ‘more interested in short-term profits than in the protection of the environment for future generations’.28 Following ratification of the Convention’s Montreal Protocol in 1987, Washington supplemented agreed international quota restrictions with a recycled tax on US producers of ozone-depleting chemicals funding research and development on less damaging (and less costly) substitutes, designed to exploit American first-mover advantages.29 These measures appeared to substantiate claims that higher environmental standards were capable of stimulating induced innovation leading to enhanced competitiveness, indicating that strategic environmental policy could be a positive-sum game. The American response to the problem of acid rain was more hesitant.30 The 1988 EC (European Commission) Directive on Large Combustion Plants required its Member States to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 60 per cent, but the US Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 followed ‘a thirteen-year legislative logjam arising out of distributional battles surrounding acid rain’.31 Nevertheless, the approach eventually adopted again demonstrated a US commitment to EM. Title IV of the 1990 amendments saw a version of the cap-and-trade system initially pioneered for ozone-depleting chemicals extended to the emission of sulphur dioxide, giving US power generators considerable flexibility in choosing optimal abatement strategies.32 In assessing the effectiveness of this market-based approach to emissions control, Stavins regarded it as a precursor for future MEAs on greenhouse gases (GHGs).33

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The 1970s heralded a similar burst of national environmental governance in the UK, beginning with the establishment of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and the Department of the Environment (DoE) at the start of the decade, followed by the 1974 Control of Pollution Act. However, according to a former DoE Director General of Environmental Protection, his departmental budget suffered from general government spending cuts, so that: by the mid to late 1980s we were trailing badly nationally and internationally on environmental matters .… Instead of acknowledging the reality of environmental problems and the need for new investments in clean processes and technology to overcome them, the Government made much of the absence of 100% scientific proof and made this a lame excuse for inaction.34 The UK also displayed little inclination to engage in MEAs. Evidence of adherence to traditional pragmatism could be seen in the Thatcher government’s reluctance to sign up to the Montreal Protocol, and its strong resistance to efforts to control its sulphur emissions through the 1985 Helsinki Protocol.35 In marked contrast to EU epistemic advocacy favouring a precautionary pro-active ecosystems approach focused on critical loads and assimilative capacities, the UK DoE Chief Scientist at the time was quoted as saying ‘we see no point in making heroic efforts at great cost to control one of many factors unless there is a reasonable expectation that such control will lead to real improvement in the environment’.36 Faced with the introduction of EU qualified majority voting and the prospect of having the legislation imposed on it, in 1988 Westminster committed itself to the EU Large Combustion Plants Directive.37 The storylines for the evolution of US-UK climate change policies reveal movement in the UK position on MEAs, prompted by efforts to extend the special relationship to the field of environmental politics.38 Sir Crispin Tickell had written a monograph calling for international diplomacy to address climate change while on secondment from the Foreign Office as a Fellow of Harvard’s Centre for International Affairs.39 As head of the UK delegation to the United Nations (UN) during initial preparations for the Earth Summit, he urged Thatcher to pursue co-ordinated international action, encouraging her to deliver speeches to the Royal Society and UN on the subject.40 Public funding of additional research capacity followed, giving impetus to subsequent UK government climate change programmes and legislation.41 Westminster sought Washington’s support in agreeing a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) prior to any negotiations over specific commitments. This would pre-empt EC plans, seen as harmful to UK efforts to privatise its energy sector and unlikely to gain US support.42 Michael Heseltine, Secretary of State for the Environment in the Major

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 159 government, visited Washington in 1991 to prepare the ground for an accommodation over the proposed FCCC which avoided binding targets. His successor, Michael Howard, engaged in a similar bout of shuttle diplomacy when these negotiations met American resistance.43 British recollections stress the significance of this role: Shortly before the Earth Summit in 1992 a tense conversation took place. A senior State Department official … tried to reopen an earlier understanding reached with the US by Howard’s predecessor Michael Heseltine. In a forensically argued defence that became legendary with officials, Howard held the line. The understanding stood. At stake was the FCCC. It had many fathers but those involved certainly felt that Michael Howard’s tenacity had kept the US on board.44 After becoming leader of the Conservative opposition, Howard castigated the Blair government in 2004 for ‘squandering the opportunity’ to use its ‘privileged relationship with the USA’ to ‘persuade them into the international fold’ with regard to the 1997 global warming agreement known as the Kyoto Protocol, which set targets for reducing greenhouse emissions.45 However, Blair’s efforts to broker an accommodation with the US in post-Kyoto negotiations were as diligent as his predecessors’. His Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott’s attempt to reach accord with the Clinton administration during the sixth FCCC Conference of the Parties at The Hague in 2000 was derailed by an inflexible EC delegation, but any binding commitments would have proved unpalatable regardless to the incoming George W. Bush administration.46 Paradoxically, the US made much of the initial running in securing MEAs on climate change, with its negotiators gaining UK support for pursuing an EM agenda lifted from prior American emissions control legislation.47 Article 2 of the FCCC sets the long-term objective of ‘stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. Article 3 establishes the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’.48 This acknowledges that all countries share an obligation to act, but that industrialised countries have a particular responsibility to take the lead in reducing GHG emissions.49 The Kyoto Protocol applied these principles in setting GHG emission reduction targets for the world’s major industrialised countries, identified as Annex 1 nations. The EU accepted a collective envelope amounting to an 8 per cent reduction in overall GHG emissions relative to 1990 levels by 2008, which was to be distributed amongst its then fifteen Member States in varying proportions. The US provisionally committed itself to a 7 per cent reduction within the same time frame.50 The Protocol also outlined five options by which Annex 1 parties could meet their targets, offering alternatives in keeping with EM precepts. These

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entailed: the introduction of national policies to lower emissions; calculation of benefits from domestic sinks that soaked up more carbon than they emit; participation in emissions trading schemes with other Annex 1 countries; creation of joint implementation programmes to allow Annex 1 parties to get credit for projects that lower emissions in other Annex 1 countries; and use of a ‘clean development mechanism’, by which Annex 1 parties received credit for lowering emissions in non-Annex 1 countries. The UK Royal Institution of International Affairs ran its model to indicate how the costs of compliance with Kyoto could be greatly reduced by the various marketbased instruments contained within the Protocol, observing that the ‘most startling result is that with the base case assumptions, unrestricted trading enables the commitments … to be met without aggregate resource cost’.51 Some alternative modelling of these proposals generates results that disagree with these findings.52 However, there is broad consensus amongst epistemic communities on both sides of the Atlantic that MEAs are required for managing climate change, given that the atmosphere displays the nonexclusion characteristics of a global common property resource.53 The main challenges for negotiators derive from the free-rider characteristics of the problem.54 Non-ratifying nations can share in the benefits of an MEA without having to bear any of its costs. Asymmetric implementation of commitments under the Kyoto Protocol, covering Article 3 dispensations as well as non-ratifiers, introduces the possibility of market distortions, for which the term ‘carbon leakage’ has been coined. Tighter controls on GHGs in one jurisdiction might simply lead to a loss of business to jurisdictions with laxer controls, resulting in net reductions in global GHG emissions far smaller than the gross reductions in the jurisdictions applying more stringent abatement measures.55 Epistemic opinion amongst economists on the policy implications of carbon leakage remains divided.56 Yet even if the costs remain in dispute, divergent US-UK stances on global warming cannot be attributed to any sharp transatlantic divisions amongst epistemic communities on the need to address the problem.57 The views of most American climate change scientists align with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change findings that underpin the Kyoto Protocol.58 Moreover, in tackling international environmental problems prior to climate change, US negotiators adopted strategies which embodied EM precepts to a far greater extent than their UK counterparts. US failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol does not therefore reflect any deep division amongst its own epistemic communities on the wisdom of pursuing MEAs to this end. Nor do epistemic differences serve to explain why UK politicians ultimately sought international leadership on climate change, accepting a larger burden than initially allocated when the EU ratified Kyoto in 2002, and then pushing for more demanding targets once the Protocol finally came into effect in 2005.59 We must look consequently

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 161 to our two alternative explanations to make some sense of this fundamental shift in their environmental relations.

The institutional explanation One profound institutional change affecting US-UK relations over this period has been the UK’s accession to what has become the EU. Both countries now exercise their environmental governance through federal processes. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam added a new environmental title to the EC Treaty, which stipulates that ‘environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of Community policies … in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development’.60 Article 130r of the EEC Treaty emphasised that EU actions with respect to the environment must be based on the principles of preventive action, rectification at source and making the polluter pay, all of which are key EM precepts.61 Formal extension of the powers of the EU into the environmental sphere at this point acknowledged the realities of creating the Single European Market. The 1987 Single European Act had already linked the creation of free movement of capital, labour, goods and services within the EU to the harmonisation of environmental regulations across its Member States.62 Following the (Maastricht) Treaty on European Union, which entered into force in November 1993, EU environmental legislation required the harmonised set of environmental standards adopted across the single market to be based on ‘a high level of protection’ and the ‘principle of precaution’. Free access to the markets of those Member States which already had tougher environmental requirements served as the quid pro quo in persuading the rest to accept this levelling-up. The 1987 Single European Act also allowed what was then the Council of Ministers and has since become the Council of the European Union, made up of representatives of Member States, to pass new EU environmental legislation by qualified majority rather than unanimous voting. This greatly reduces the capacity of individual Member States to block any unwelcome tightening of standards, except insofar as EU environmental proposals might involve areas where unanimity is still required, such as fiscal policy initiatives involving carbon taxation.63 Moreover, qualified majority voting also permits Member States to maintain or adopt their own more stringent environmental standards.64 Applying Swanson and Johnston’s analysis of the theoretical rationale for MEAs in the management of shared or common natural resources, the EU’s approach in making trade liberalisation between its twenty-seven Member States conditional on majority voting for a common set of higher environmental standards can be seen as providing a Nash co-operative bargaining solution.65 Such an outcome seeks to minimise the capacity of individual participants to pursue rent-seeking free-rider behaviour by

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resisting agreement until their specific demands are met.66 A further element in extending such co-operative bargaining solutions is that the EC now commonly negotiates on behalf of Member States with respect to MEAs. Despite some resistance from other parties to such agreements, the EU drafted and ratified a collective reduction target under the Kyoto Protocol, allowing its institutions to determine through subsequent internal bargaining how this was to be allocated amongst its Member States.67 During negotiations over the Kyoto Protocol, therefore, major institutional shifts occurred in the EU which had a direct bearing both on the process of environmental policy formulation within the UK and on the various mechanisms available to politicians, lobbying and interest groups to influence this. For UK producers, the issue is no longer what environmental standards should prevail at home, but what these standards should be across the Single European Market to which they have free access. Although Westminster and Whitehall continue to be important in formulating UK environmental policy and representing UK environmental interests, in terms of determining the application of environmental standards to trade attention has largely switched from London to Brussels.68 The EU’s 501 million population exceeds that of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), while the purchasing power of these two trading blocs is comparable. Its institutions set the minimum environmental standards for those wishing to operate in this market. The growing economic significance of its internal market allows the EU to impose these standards on countries wishing to gain access to it, including American and Chinese exporters.69 Nevertheless, the EU is not yet a federal government able to exercise its remit directly within individual Member States. EU Directives must be transposed into national legislation by Member States within a given timescale, with each Member State assuming responsibility for the costs of doing so. It is also up to each Member State to enforce compliance with its own statutory measures to this end, with the EC dependent on being notified about non-compliance by individuals, agencies and interest groups, and ultimately threatening Member States with legal sanctions through the European Court of Justice.70 Major changes in the structure of UK environmental governance have been accompanied by changes in its environmental policy formulation. Part of the explanation for the UK’s pursuit of a more pro-active environmental stance is to be found, not in its own domestic political parties which now largely share a common environmental agenda,71 but in what Osborn refers to as the internal dynamics of the EU’s Council of Environment Ministers.72 The process of environmental governance within the EU has been channelled through this mechanism, allowing the elected politicians and their civil servants from each Member State’s own environmental ministry to meet up and agree a common approach to EU environmental legislation. As a past participant himself, Osborn notes the salutary effect this has had on UK environmental policy, arguing that the general ethos of the Council:

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 163 is strongly pro-environment, and several Member States are thereby encouraged to make better progress than they would do themselves. This function-led dynamic of the Council of Environment Ministers contrasts in a very striking way with the mixed range of subjects which are represented around the Cabinet Table in Britain and each of the Member States. 73 The US federal system has not been so kind to its own version of environmental governance.74 Although part of the constitutional basis for the federal government’s intervention in the administration of environmental protection by US states rests in the Commerce Clause, which is intended to regulate inter-state commerce to preserve open and equal access to US internal markets, Washington has yet to create an environmental department with its own secretary of state.75 Despite dwarfing its EU counterparts in scale, the US EPA is purely a regulatory body answerable to the president and not a policy-formulating one. The US constitution also lacks anything resembling the EU Council of Environmental Ministers, which if it existed would offer a mechanism for its fifty states to negotiate a common environmental agenda which could then be presented to federal legislators. Although it serves to represent the interests of individual American states within the US federal system, the Senate has never sought to operate on this basis. Commentators observe that American environmental federalism embodies different institutional concepts from those emerging within the EU. Wälti contends that the EU’s approach mirrors the German co-operative form of federalism, while ‘American federalism … tends to be depicted in dual (competitive) terms, in which responsibilities are separated by policy area between levels of government’.76 Under traditional pragmatism, this duality of US federalism left individual states to administer their own environmental regulations within a single US market, facilitating the external environmental spillovers and distortive effects on internal trade that EU-wide environmental legislation has specifically sought to minimise during the process of opening up its own single market. Attempts to promote an EM agenda during the 1970s witnessed the imposition of coercive, non-consensual, federal government environmental mandates on its states as the means of addressing such problems.77 This  process raised a number of states-rights constitutional issues, the implications of which continue to complicate US environmental governance. Mandating states to administer federal environmental policies obliged them to operate what often proved to be inadequately-funded programmes without having any influence over their contents.78 A 1994 US Supreme Court judgement determined that mandated federal policies could only be imposed on states if the full costs of compliance were met from federal sources, otherwise leaving individual states with the option of noncompliance. The 1995 US Unfunded Mandate Reform Act now imposes

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procedural restrictions when the aggregate cost burden of a federal mandate exceeds $50 million.79 This reassertion of federal dualism has complicated the task of the federal government in delivering a harmonised set of higher national environmental standards, because (unlike the EU) it is now obliged to fund such standards. Moreover, again unlike the EU, the federal government cannot argue that its states should accept at least part of the burden of paying for environmental federalism because they will gain greater access to the US market for their goods: such access is already part of the status quo for which they are now being asked to meet an unwelcome retrospective bill. Following federal funding cuts in US mandated environmental programmes during the 1980s, the US government came under growing pressure from the business sector and from its states to justify their implementation costs.80 One defensive federal response has been to demand detailed regulatory impact assessments for every new or revised environmental initiative. Such an approach conflicts with EM’s precautionary principle, and is especially problematic in addressing the uncertainties embodied in climate change issues.81 These pressures, reinforced by changes in the political complexion of the White House, have precipitated a shift in US environmental federalism, away from mandated environmental initiatives towards lessdemanding consensual and voluntary approaches. Wälti notes that ‘environmental policy was infused with federal-state partnerships and public-private co-operation throughout the 1990s’.82 Lazarus concludes from an analysis of federal environmental legislation that: an appropriations-process-driven dynamic has overridden environmental lawmaking in the federal arena for almost twenty years’, ensuring that Congress ‘passes no sweeping, comprehensive lawmaking through its authorisation committees, which is one reason why it has proven so hard to enact climate change legislation .83 In sum, the evidence on institutional differences helps explain why UK governments have found it somewhat easier to pursue coherent environmental policies than US administrations over recent decades. It does not, however, provide a plausible explanation of why Westminster should seek to assume international leadership of efforts to address global warming, during a period when Washington chose to cede such leadership to others. For further insight into the possible reasons behind this, we must look to our third explanation.

The self-interest explanation Motives determining a country’s self-interest in international negotiations can be expected to emerge at various points across the political spectrum, ranging from the effects on domestic and overseas markets of foreign

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 165 competition, to wider strategic interests and the extent to which these may be circumscribed by economic or political weaknesses. The key issues that influence decision-making at any moment in time are as much a matter of perception as of reality, as demonstrated by the influence of the illusory 1960s missile gap on Cold War strategies.84 Perceptions of national selfinterest shape the interpretation policy-makers put on events and help form their attitudes towards international initiatives, including those involving global warming. In this section, we consider the extent to which different US-UK perceptions of self-interest can, at least in part, account for recent shifts in their international stance on this issue. Following the sudden end of the Cold War, a number of think-tanks reviewed the implications for the US and its NATO allies of the resulting new world order. One of these, the Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, envisaged that Cold War geopolitics would be replaced by a new geo-economics based on international competitiveness.85 Such studies  identified the difficulty facing the US in striving to maintain its political hegemony should its economic dominance and international competitiveness be permitted to erode. Growing US international indebtedness, much of which is held by a buoyant Chinese economy, together with evidence that American vehicle and electronics manufacturers are losing domestic market share, have reinforced these strategic concerns. Most recently the impact of the global financial crisis on American business has highlighted the US’s growing international economic vulnerability. By contrast, the EU and its Member States have been able to demonstrate more tangible evidence of the economic rewards flowing from the end of the Cold War. Following German reunification and the extension of membership to eastern European nations, the EU has established itself as a serious economic rival to the US and its NAFTA trading bloc. The perception of economic dynamism within the EU and its euro-currency zone has not been totally dissipated by recent economic turmoil. In terms of the postCold War share of geo-economic spoils, the US might appear to have lost out to the EU and the newly-emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China (the so-called BRIC group). Informed publications have pointed to the dangers that such perceptions of a decline of US global economic influence might create within the American political establishment, in terms of a shift of support from free trade towards protectionism and a reaction against illegal immigrants.86 The recession produced by the financial crisis of 2008 and the collapse of the US housing market has reinforced such fears. A parallel realignment can be identified in terms of environmental leadership, with public debates pointing to an erosion of US belief in the capacity of higher environmental standards to boost national competitiveness, and a concern that MEAs to tackle global issues such as climate change might unduly disadvantage American economic interests.87

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No equivalent post-Cold War loss of economic self-confidence is apparent within the UK, which in any case no longer possesses the means of shielding its economy from the competition of an enlarged EU. Until the recent recession, appeals to any form of protectionism generated little support amongst the British political establishment. Instead, use of the enhanced economic leverage created by the Single European Market to pursue global leadership with regard to climate change has supplied Britain with the type of role Acheson’s 1962 West Point speech suggested it lacked in nurturing its special relationship with the US.88 In a 2011 Chatham House speech, the UK Special Representative for Climate Change claimed its international negotiations on climate change were now his government’s main priority in terms of global security, drawing an analogy with UK Cold War diplomacy to describe its climate strategy as ‘a model for 21st century diplomatic excellence’.89 Different assessments of the economic returns gleaned from the postCold War political settlement are central in explaining divergent perceptions of national self-interest shaping environmental policy in each country. Citing the success of federal regulation of ozone-depleting chemicals, during the 1980s US promoters of a strategic approach to international environmental policy argued that unilateral adoption of high environmental standards by trading blocs might prompt win-win induced innovation offsets, arguing that these ‘can not only lower the net cost of meeting environmental regulations, but can even lead to absolute advantages over firms in foreign countries not subject to similar regulations’.90 Subsequent academic research on both sides of the Atlantic has yet to deliver an epistemic consensus on this hypothesis.91 Lack of consensus on these matters has important implications for attempts to reach agreement over ways of tackling climate change. It means that the significance of carbon leakage, and by extension the net cost of meeting GHG mitigation obligations which Kyoto assigns to Annex 1 nations, remains open to interpretation.92 When initially contemplating the role of international epistemic communities in addressing climate change, Haas remarked that ‘an economic epistemic community might have much greater influence [than one composed of atmospheric scientists], since it would be able to mitigate uncertainty about the cost of action’.93 Failure to establish a consensual epistemic community on the economics of climate change has frustrated attempts to bridge these different vantage points and align the bargaining positions of UK and US environmental policy-makers. Simply on grounds of self-interest, if a nation’s policy-makers believe that induced innovation amongst their own producers can offset carbon leakage whilst opening up new global market opportunities for their most innovative domestic enterprises, they are likely to regard asymmetrical binding international commitments as a necessary means of facilitating further beneficial international trade. Countries with policymakers who interpret the conflicting economic evidence more pessimistically

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 167 can find equal justification in resisting such pressures, withdrawing from such negotiations, and focusing on alternative arrangements that minimise any perceived detrimental effects on their most vulnerable domestic sectors. Part of the mechanics of such perceptions of self-interest involves the route each set of policy-makers has been forced to follow in reaching such a point in negotiations. During the 1970s when the US took the initiative in promoting higher environmental standards, federal administrations imposed coercive environmental controls on their state governments, which already enjoyed full access to the US domestic market. In these circumstances, any additional environmental compliance costs for some US states that were not fully offset by induced innovation would entail a loss of competitiveness and market share to others, allowing higher environmental standards to be associated with a reduction in profits and fewer economic opportunities. This legacy undoubtedly accounts in part for the strength of American lobbying groups such as the Global Climate Coalition (GCC) established in 1989, which Steurer reports as embracing six million enterprises from virtually every sector of the US economy.94 The GCC rejects binding GHG commitments in favour of an agenda based on traditional pragmatism: realistic targets, more research and voluntary actions which would reduce energy intensity but not necessarily see a fall in total carbon emissions. In response, the George W. Bush administration’s ‘Clear Skies’ and ‘Global Climate Change’ initiatives promoted precisely such a defensive, reactive, agenda as its alternative to Kyoto.95 The UK formulated its pro-active anticipatory climate change policies during a period when domestic producers were being rewarded for agreeing to higher environmental standards by gaining greater access to a continually expanding EU single market. Supplementing these trade rewards, under the Blair government the UK was able to reposition itself as an environmental leader within the EU in respect of climate change by the fortuitous inheritance of a structural shift in UK energy generation. This was created by the previous Conservative government’s privatisation of coal production and power utilities, which freed the UK market for energy, precipitating new investment in lower-carbon gas and the collapse of its former commitment to high-carbon coal. As a result, UK policy-makers could use climate change as a chance to demonstrate their green credentials. Whilst US GHG emissions continued to climb steadily between 1990 and 2006,96 the UK together with a reunified Germany accounted for the bulk of the falls in EU emissions. The Blair government voluntarily committed itself to a larger reduction than required under Kyoto, 20 per cent rather than 12 per cent, drawing on a review of the economics of climate change Brown commissioned as Chancellor of the Exchequer from the chief economist at the Treasury, Nick Stern.97 The Brown government subsequently pushed climate change domestically and internationally to the fore of its political agenda. As well as creating a

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Department of Energy and Climate Change, Brown took a lead role in delivering the Copenhagen Accord in December 2009, which, while not meeting the hype that preceded the conference, provided some further momentum on climate change issues. Al Gore, former US Vice President and much respected authority on environmental matters, praised Brown for doing ‘more than any other world leader to bring momentum to this process’.98 Despite some sceptical assessments of the UK’s GHG performance to date, recent changes in the political complexion of the UK government have done little to alter this stance.99 UK policy-makers appear to harbour few doubts about pushing for more-demanding GHG emissions targets, which would commit the UK to ‘at least a 34% cut in UK emissions by 2020 and at least 80% reductions by 2050’.100 The UK’s International Climate Change Action Plan (ICCAP) observes: if left unchecked, climate change presents an increasing threat to our security and prosperity. Lord Stern has shown that if we do not take action, the longer term costs of climate change will vastly outweigh the costs of early movement to a low-carbon, climate resilient economy .101 In introducing this plan, Ed Miliband the Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in the Brown government (now serving as Leader of the Opposition) emphasised how the UK’s best interests would be served ‘if we all move as one, within the context of a legally-binding agreement’.102 The ICCAP sets out the UK’s official follow-up to the Copenhagen Accord, offering a package of carbon-related development aid and technical assistance to facilitate Cancún negotiations on an MEA to replace Kyoto.103 Extracts in Table 1 (Appendix) demonstrate how the UK draws heavily on the logic of the 2006 Stern Review to adopt a leadership role in pushing for international action on climate change, justifying this predominantly on grounds of economic self-interest.104 They indicate the extent to which the Action Plan is suffused with claims of the early-mover advantages such leadership would offer the UK, including opening up the markets of developing nations to its own business interests through the various funding and development mechanisms to which the UK government is committed.

Conclusions Taking all these factors into account, the recent history of EU and US interjurisdictional efforts to apply a common set of high environmental standards and targets to their internal markets suggests that it might be possible to formulate a hypothesis that this type of exercise is path-dependent, with the capacity to deliver such objectives being a function of national self-interest related to the starting position from which the parties to such arrangements initiate negotiations. The following proposition is advanced:

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 169 Proposition: that, in assessing the support for adoption of a common high set of inter-jurisdictional environmental standards within a trading area, the parties’ willingness to sacrifice (WTS) some of the current benefits already enjoyed from existing levels of free movement of goods and services will be lower, ceteris paribus, than their willingness to forego (WTF) part of the anticipated additional benefit of further improvements in the free movement of goods and services from the removal of any remaining barriers to trade. Symbolically, in exchange for a common new trans-jurisdictional set of high environmental standards: ∑WTS Uxa-zti < ∑WTF Uxa-ztj where Ux represents the utility derived from exporting, ti represents existing levels, tj represents potential new enhanced levels, and a-z represent the jurisdictions involved. This hypothesis suggests that, other things being equal, in the process of agreeing a common set of higher environmental standards, jurisdictions will be more resistant to calls to impose additional burdens (loss of current utility) on existing levels of inter-jurisdictional trade, if they start from a position in which most barriers to such movements of goods and services have been already been removed, than they would be to accepting these standards (failure to realise all expected future utility) as part of the cost of removing remaining barriers to trade. An alternative formulation of the above proposition is that, in return for agreeing the same common higher environmental standards, parties who need to sacrifice some of the existing gains from higher levels of free trade already achieved through prior removal of barriers are likely to demand greater compensation (WTS), whereas parties offered potential future gains in trade through subsequent removal of remaining barriers conditional on this are likely to be more willing to forego (WTF) part of such gains in the way of accepting additional environmental costs. In constructing his ‘conservative social welfare function’ for trade policy, Corden offers theoretical support for the above postulate, which in essence amounts to a simple assumption of diminishing marginal utility generated by additional measures of trade liberation.105 No formal proof of such a proposition is offered here. It is instead advanced as a conceptual device to help explain why perceptions of self-interest might have persuaded the US government and American vested interest groups to resist MEAs for implementing GHG emission abatement measures, and why the UK government and British vested interests might have formed a more favourable view of such opportunities. As any analysis of MEAs framed in terms of Nash co-operative bargaining theory demonstrates, much depends on the extent to which US and UK policy-makers interpret any offer of concessions to emerging nations such

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as the BRIC group (‘common but differentiated responsibilities’) as an economic threat or opportunity.106 The argument made here is that the UK is part of a rapidly-enlarging trading bloc which is promoting higher environmental standards as a means of liberating trade; that international trade forms a far more significant part of its economic base; and that its own energy sector has been boosted by a major structural reform allowing easier attainment of climate change targets. In these circumstances, if its government perceives that the country has already done well in meeting its Kyoto commitments, it should not be surprising to observe a willingness on its part to adopt a leadership role in pursuing further agreements in this direction which might also offer first-mover economic benefits and related diplomatic advantages in disbursing aid and assistance. Compared with efforts to counter international terrorism, further international trade liberation is not as big a deal for US politicians, particularly if some of its own economic sectors appear more vulnerable than those in the EU to attempts to reduce energy intensities through stricter environmental regulations.107 The costs of climate change might also appear less daunting to US interests than they do to EU ones. Resistance to MEAs that would offer the BRIC nations easier access to the US market and NAFTA, combined with a legislative system that has evolved to block federal environmental initiatives which impinge on vested interests, helps explain why US policy-makers have not ratified Kyoto.108 Despite British attempts to include climate change in the portfolio of issues successfully addressed through informal US-UK understandings, its transatlantic environmental diplomacy has not resolved these differences. Britain’s capacity to deliver binding commitments under Kyoto following domestic energy deregulation made it central to EU efforts to deliver climate change outcomes, deflecting the obloquy Westminster previously attracted for dragging its feet with regard to MEAs on ozone and acid rain. In the lead-up to the Earth Summit, British diplomats saw global warming as a vehicle for reshaping EU environmental policy to the UK’s preferred transatlantic agenda. Westminster used this to shift European efforts away from creating new global environmental organisations which the US might not support, pursuing traditional UN MEA structures based on a system of national representation which did not accord the EC equal status.109 The greening of UK foreign policy allowed British environment ministers to serve as informal brokers between the US and the EU in negotiating the FCCC. Their transatlantic shuttle diplomacy attempted ‘to preserve British sovereignty and create a counter-balance to internal European efforts to regulate environmental problems’, allowing the UK to draw on ‘its ‘special relationship’ with the US to both provide it greater influence within European deliberations and also to counter European policy initiatives’.110 Under the George H. W. Bush administration, negotiations over the FCCC were facilitated by Washington’s acknowledgement of environmental security as an important element of US foreign policy. His Secretary of State

Global warming and the cooling of the special relationship 171 James Baker committed the White House ‘to ensuring that environmental issues were fully integrated into diplomatic efforts’, claiming this was ‘the greening of [American] foreign policy’.111 These initial efforts proved nugatory. Blair’s ultimate failure to translate his own close relationship with George W. Bush into a transatlantic modus vivendi on Kyoto left Westminster clearly in the EU camp, wielding ‘soft power in order to shape global sustainability norms, having won itself the mantra of global environmental leader due in large part to Washington’s retreat’.112 UK politicians now pursue this role without US support, committed to a task likely to prove increasingly burdensome during a period of economic retrenchment, and bereft of the leverage that any special environmental relationship might have offered.

Appendix Table 6.1 Extracts from UK International Carbon Change Action Plan113 • p.10: In making this transition, countries that show leadership are better placed to take advantage of new markets for low-carbon goods and services that are already worth £3.2 trillion to the global economy. We believe that the UK must not fall behind other countries in the low-carbon race. • p.11: As the largest single market in the world, the EU is in a strong position to benefit from early action. We want to see strong European action to promote low-carbon infrastructure, technology and jobs. • p.11: The UK continues to believe that there is a strong case for the EU to raise its emissions target to 30% in the context of an international legallybinding agreement with comparable offers from others, which will drive demand for low-carbon goods and services and incentivise investment in decarbonising the power sector, enhancing long-term energy security. • pp.34–5: The transformation to a low-carbon resource efficient economy will also be accompanied the emergence of new global markets, with considerable potential for growth …. Global climate revenues (e.g. from energy efficiency and energy management and low-carbon energy production) rose 75% in 2008 to $530 billion; this figure is now larger than revenues derived from the global aerospace and defence sector. On the basis of recent growth rates in revenue for global companies, HSBC estimate climate revenues from the equity market could exceed $2 trillion by 2020. There are strong scientific and economic reasons to take ambitious action and to move at pace to a low-carbon, climate resilient economy. • pp.38–9: The Government believes that it is firmly in the UK’s interests to play a leading role in the low-carbon race. The UK already has a strong base on which to build – the UK low-carbon environmental goods and services market is the sixth largest in the world – worth around £112 billion and employing 910,000 people directly or through its supply chain .… The UK is, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the largest single market for offshore wind in the world .… The City of London has confirmed its world financial leadership by moving quickly to seize the opportunities offered by the low-carbon economy. With 81% of all international carbon trading now taking place in London and the City’s growing expertise in carbon products, the UK represents the natural centre for innovation in the carbon market. The UK market is also well-positioned to develop and gain comparative advantage in

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key areas of environmental supply chains, such as water and wastewater treatment, and through countries looking to upgrade their current infrastructure. p.46: The UK believes that as part of the EU there are important advantages of moving to a low-carbon economy. As countries across the world make the low-carbon transition, the EU is in a good position to benefit from early global action as the largest importer and second largest exporter in the world. p.46: The UK Government believes that as the world economy gears up for a low-carbon future, economic innovation and leadership will increasingly be built on energy-efficient and carbon-reducing technologies. Countries will have to compete with those that are at the forefront of the coming low-carbon revolution. Already, global demand for green technologies is on the rise, with China and other emerging economies making huge strides in this direction. p.50: A quotation is added from Connie Hedegaard, EU Climate Action Commissioner, made in March 2010: The EU must continue to take leadership. The most convincing way Europe can do so is by taking tangible and determined action domestically to become the most climate-friendly region in the world. It is in Europe’s own interest. If we do it intelligently, it will strengthen our competitiveness, strengthen our energy security, stimulate green economic growth and innovation, and by that we will create new jobs. p.52: If all countries including the EU take ambitious action to reduce their emissions this will increase the global demand for low-carbon technologies. UK and EU low-carbon businesses would be well placed to benefit from this expanding market. p.52: This addresses the problem of carbon leakage: It is important to ensure that the competitiveness of British and EU business is not adversely affected by a higher target, for example through increased energy costs passed through the supply chain, and that the UK and EU economy does not suffer from carbon leakage. With our EU partners, we have already taken steps to ensure that UK and EU business, in particular energy intensive industries, are guarded against the risk of carbon leakage through the mechanisms set out in the EU-ETS Directive, which provide for 100% free allocation of allowances for sectors at risk of leakage and the possibility of financial compensation for indirect transmissions …. The best way to manage the risk of carbon leakage would be to secure a legally binding international climate agreement.

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Notes 1

K.E. Boulding, ‘The economics of the coming spaceship earth’, in Jarrett, H., Editor, Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy, Baltimore, MD, US: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, pp. 3–14. 2 Lexington, ‘Apollo plus 50’, The Economist, 21 May 2011, p.54. 3 WCED, Our Common Future, Oxford: World Commission on the Environment and Development, 1987. UNCED, Agenda 21, New York: United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, 1992. 4 R.J. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future’, Cornell Law Review, 2009, 94, pp.  1153–234, p. 1155. 5 C. Rose, The Dirty Man of Europe: the Great British Pollution Scandal, London: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

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Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, Cmnd.7241, Norwich, UK: The Stationery Office, 2008, para.3.34. C.P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US approaches, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010, p.240. P.M. Haas, ‘Obtaining international environmental protection through epistemic consensus’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1990, 19(3), pp.347–63. M.A. Schreurs, H. Selin and S.D. VanDeveer, Editors, Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives, Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009. K. Palmer, W.E. Oates and P.R. Portney, ‘Tightening environmental standards: the benefit-cost or no-cost paradigm?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9, pp.119–32. L.R. Cass, ‘The indispensable awkward partner: the UK in European climate policy’, in Harris, P.G., Editor, Europe and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Co-operation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007, pp. 63–86. C.P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US approaches, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010. R.J. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future’, Cornell Law Review, 2009, 94, pp. 1153–234. J. Ederington and J. Minier, ‘Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003, 36(1), pp. 137–54. D. Sprinz and T. Vaahtoranta, ‘The interest-based explanation of international environmental policy’, International Organisation, 1994, 48(1), pp. 77–105. M.A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse – Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997, p.2. A.P.J. Mol, D.A. Sonnenfeld and G. Spaargaren, Editors, The Ecological Modernisation Reader: Environmental Reform in Theory and Practice, London: Routledge, 2009. J. Huber, The Lost Innocence of Technology: New Technologies and the Super-industrial Switchover, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany: Fischer-Verlag, 1982. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Paris: Future Directions for Environmental Policies in Environment and Economics, 1984; Environmental Policies and Industrial Competitiveness, 1993; Changing the Environment: The Role of Economic Instruments, 1996; Environmental Taxes and Green Tax Reform, 1997a; Evaluating Economic Instruments for Environmental Policy, 1997b; Eco-efficiency, 1998; Commission of the European Communities (CEC), Brussels: A Common Strategy to Limit Carbon Dioxide Emissions and to Improve Energy Efficiency, 1991; Towards Sustainability: Fifth European Union Environmental Action Programme COM(1992)624 , 1992; Economic Growth and the Environment: Some Implications for Economic Policy-Making, 1994; Environmental Taxes and Charges in the Single Market, 1997. M.A. Hajer, The Politics of Environmental Discourse – Ecological Modernisation and the Policy Process, Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1997, p.3 J. Golub, ‘Global competition and EU environmental policy: introduction and overview’, in Golub, J., Editor, Global Competition and EU Environmental Policy, London: Routledge, 1998, pp. 1–33. M.E. Porter and C. van der Linde, ‘Towards a new conception of the environmentcompetitiveness relationship’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(4), pp. 97–118. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Environmental Policies and Industrial Competitiveness, 1993. A.M. Freeman, ‘Environmental policy since Earth Day 1: what have we gained?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002, 16(1), pp.125–46.

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Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives, Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009, p. 44. R.J. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future’, Cornell Law Review, 2009, 94, pp.  1153–234, p.1181. R.E. Licklider, ‘The missile gap controversy’, Political Science Quarterly, 1970, 85(4), pp. 600–15. W. Sandholtz, M. Borrus and J. Zysman, The Highest Stakes: the Economic Foundations of the Next Security System, New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. The Economist, ’Green protectionism’, 15 November 2007. G.L. Brady, ‘Climate politics, strategic behaviour, hold-outs, free-riders and rent seekers’, Economic Affairs, 2011, 31(2), pp. 4–9. D. Brinkley, ‘Dean Acheson and the ‘special relationship’: the West Point speech of December 1962’, The Historical Journal, 1990, 33, pp. 599–608. J. Ashton, ‘A ticking clock that we cannot stop or slow down’, Chatham House speech 22 February 2011 by UK Special Representative for Climate Change, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office,p. 10. M.E. Porter and C. van der Linde, ‘Towards a new conception of the environmentcompetitiveness relationship’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9(4), pp. 97–118, p. 98. T. Barker and N. Johnstone, ‘International competitiveness and carbon taxation’,, in Barker, T. and Köhler, J., Editors, International Competitiveness and Environmental Policies, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998, pp. 71–142; P. Ekins and S. Speck, ‘The impact of environmental policy on competitiveness: theory and evidence’, in Barker, T. and Köhler, J., Editors, International Competitiveness and Environmental Policies, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1998, pp. 33–70; J. Ederington and J. Minier, ‘Is environmental policy a secondary trade barrier? An empirical analysis’, Canadian Journal of Economics, 2003, 36(1), pp. 137–54.; A.M. Freeman, ‘Environmental policy since Earth Day 1: what have we gained?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002, 16(1), pp.125–46; A.B. Jaffe, R.G. Newell and R.N. Stavins, ‘Environmental policy and technological change’, Environmental and Resource Economics, Special Issue April 2002; K. Palmer, W.E. Oates and P.R. Portney, ‘Tightening environmental standards: the benefit-cost or no-cost paradigm?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1995, 9, pp.119–32; R.N. Stavins, ’What can we learn from the Grand Policy Experiment? Lessons from SO2 allowance trading’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1998, 12(3), pp. 69–88. N. Mabey, S. Hall, C. Smith and S. Gupta, Argument in the Greenhouse: The International Economics of Controlling Global Warming, London: Routledge, 1997; D. Campbell & M. Klaes, Copenhagen, ‘Cancún and the limits of global welfare economics’, Economic Affairs, 2011, 31(2), pp. 10–16. P.M. Haas, ‘Obtaining international environmental protection through epistemic consensus’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 1990, 19(3), pp.347–63, p.363 R. Steurer, ‘The US’s retreat from the Kyoto Protocol: an account of a policy change and its implications for future climate change policy’, European Environment, 2003, 13, pp. 344–60, p.350. Ibid.; C.P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy: EU and US approaches, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010. M.A. Schreurs, H. Selin and S.D. VanDeveer, Editors, Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives, Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009.. S.N. Stern, The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, London: H M Treasury, 2006; this is not an uncontested position: see, for example, W.D.

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Tony Jackson Nordhaus, ‘A review of the Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change’, Journal of Economic Literature, 2007, 45(3), pp. 686–702. A. Seldon and G. Lodge, Brown at 10, London, Biteback Publishing, 2010, p.352. D.R. Helm, R. Smale and J. Phillips, Too Good to be True: the UK’s Climate Change Record, 2007, http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/sites/default/files/Carbon_ record_2007.pdf Accessed 5 June 2010; A. Bowen & J. Rydge, ‘Climate change policy in the United Kingdom’, London: Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, London School of Economics, 2011. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Beyond Copenhagen: the UK Government’s International Climate Change Action Plan, Cm 7850, London: DECC, 2010, p.10; see also J. Ashton, ‘A ticking clock that we cannot stop or slow down’, Chatham House speech 22 February 2011 by UK Special Representative for Climate Change, London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, p.2. 2011. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Beyond Copenhagen: the UK Government’s International Climate Change Action Plan, Cm 7850, London: DECC, 2010, p.10. Ibid., p.7. D. King, K. Richards and S. Tyldesley, International Climate Change Negotiations: Key Lessons and Next Steps, Oxford, UK: Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment, University of Oxford, 2011, reviews the position on international negotiations over climate change up to Copenhagen. For a summary of the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, see http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/Executive_Summary.pdf W. Corden, Trade Policy and Economic Welfare, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Second Edition, 1997. H. Ward, ‘Game theory and the politics of global warming: The state of play and beyond’, Political Studies, 1996, 44(5), 850–61; K.H. Engel and S.R. Saleska, ‘Subglobal regulation of the global commons: the case of climate change’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 2005, 32. C.R. Sunstein, ‘On the divergent American reactions to terrorism and climate change’, Chicago, US: University of Chicago John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No.295 (Second Series), 2006. R.J. Lazarus, ‘Super wicked problems and climate change: restraining the present to liberate the future’, Cornell Law Review, 2009, 94, pp. 1153–234. J. Vogler, ‘The European contribution to global environmental governance’, International Affairs, 2005, 81(40), pp. 835–50, 844–5. L.R. Cass, ‘The indispensable awkward partner: the UK in European climate policy’, in Harris, P. G., Editor, Europe and Global Climate Change: Politics, Foreign Policy and Regional Co-operation, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2007, p.69. P.G. Harris, International Equity and Global Environmental Politics: Power and Principle in US Foreign Policy, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2001, p.122. M.A. Schreurs, H.Selin and S.D. VanDeveer, ‘Transatlantic environmental relations: implications for the global community’, in M.A. Schreurs, H. Selin and S.D. VanDeveer, Editors, Transatlantic Environment and Energy Politics: Comparative and International Perspectives, Farnham, Surrey, UK: Ashgate, 2009., pp.  251–66, p. 255. Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC), Beyond Copenhagen: the UK Government’s International Climate Change Action Plan, Cm 7850, London: DECC, 2010.

7

The Anglo-American defence relationship Steve Marsh

Introduction Anglo-American defence cooperation is a mainstay of the special relationship. Its antecedents lie in World War 2 where intimate cooperation developed from fighting a global war, Britain hosting large quantities of American servicemen and equipment, unique nuclear cooperation in the Manhattan project and intensive collaborative mechanisms such as the Combined Boards. Though after the war defence relations initially cooled, they soon revived once Britain and America rediscovered a common foe in communism and the USSR. The powerful symbols, heritage and experience of the wartime defence effort survived the generation of wartime leaders that guided the Cold War resurrection of the Anglo-American defence relationship. They survived the Cold War, the post-Cold War and the post-9/11 eras too. They comprise part of the myth, sentiment and kinship that form intangible bonds holding Britain and America together in a special relationship. However, myth and tradition are merely important lubricants of the defence relationship. What has counted most are calculations of mutual utility, assiduous British cultivation of Washington, practices of military cooperation acquired over decades of experience and similar worldviews that enable unusually high political consensus on the use of force for foreign policy objectives. Over time the orientating power of history weakens, nations rise and decline and events drive relationships in unpredictable ways. Upon the end of the Cold War some commentators divined the demise of the special (defence) relationship. US strategic interests would drift away from Europe. British decline would make London ever less consequential to Washington. The evolving European Union (EU) would draw Britain inexorably towards Brussels. Britain’s Atlantic intermediary role would become untenable. Much of this has not happened and in the short to medium term at least the defence relationship will likely endure. Nevertheless, the warnings of doomsayers may yet prove premature rather than wrong because for all Britain’s determined cultivation of the defence relationship it has been the particular unfolding of events that has most kept London on Washington’s radar.

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The Cold War defence relationship The Cold War enabled Anglo-American global military cooperation as Britain’s imperial legacy and America’s burgeoning hegemony melded in communist containment. Britain’s role in the creation of NATO has been described as ‘London’s decisive contribution to post-war history’1 and the Anglo-Saxon duopoly was at the heart of continental defence. There developed uniquely close military intelligence cooperation and an intimate nuclear defence relationship too. Anglo-American military ties were also re-affirmed on the Cold War battlefield as British and American troops exercised together and fought side-by-side in Korea. The special quality of the defence relationship did not prevent sometimes acute tensions. There were critical moments when neither side came to the aid of the other in battle, notably Suez and Vietnam. Trust was often tested. The British regarded termination of nuclear cooperation under the 1946 McMahon Act as a betrayal given the Manhattan project and wartime agreements between Churchill and Roosevelt; even in the 1960s the US seemed willing to sacrifice Britain’s independent deterrent in favour of a NATO Multilateral Force. There was also jockeying for position and friction as Britain fought a rearguard action against its relative decline, such as over American leadership of the Atlantic Command and exclusion of Britain from the Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS). There were instances of grave British doubt about American military policies, including President Truman’s apparent intimation that he might use the atom bomb in Korea, US (over) commitment in Vietnam, President Reagan’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) and America’s unilateral military intervention in the Commonwealth country of Grenada in 1983. And reciprocally, America was deeply frustrated by Britain’s refusal in the early 1950s to become a member of the European Defence Community and alarmed at evident British intent to offload military responsibilities onto American shoulders as they withdrew from empire. Furthermore, an asymmetry developed within the defence relationship that accorded the US significant and sometimes controversial leverage. For instance, President Kennedy pressed Prime Minister Macmillan for greater British military commitments to Europe at the Nassau conference in 1962 when Britain was desperate to secure a US-assisted nuclear deterrent.2 The Reagan administration similarly used Prime Minister Thatcher’s desire of Trident to secure concessions on Britain’s military commitment to Europe and upgrading the Diego Garcia base. As the weaker partner Britain gained most from the defence relationship. After the 1949 Soviet atomic test Britain depended wholly on the extended US nuclear deterrent until it developed its own nuclear weapons and delivery platforms. Following the watershed US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) in 1958 Britain readily exchanged nuclear independence for a policy of interdependence that enabled it to attain and sustain a

The Anglo-American defence relationship 181 deterrent at vastly reduced cost. Close nuclear partnership also facilitated spillover physical, economic and political benefits in the defence realm. For instance, the US helped fund the development of the Diego Garcia base by waiving research costs charged to the UK in the Nassau deal on Polaris.3 The stationing of US nuclear forces and weaponry in the UK drew American financial and technical support in non-nuclear defence matters. For example, the US funded the RAF Regiment Rapier short-range air defence squadrons from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s to defend USAF main operating bases in Britain. And Britain’s nuclear status and close alliance with the US gave London additional influence within NATO. Hence, as a full participant in NATO’s Special Consultative Group, the British government was influential in shaping and implementing the Alliance’s 1979 decision to base US Cruise and Pershing missiles in Western Europe in response to Soviet SS-20 missile deployments.4 Britain received vast amounts of equipment and defence support aid under the 1949 US Military Defence Assistance Act and the 1951 Mutual Security Act. Between 1951 and 1956 the US provided it with £400 million of defence aid and £300 million of offshore procurement.5 The 1958 MDA opened a floodgate to advanced US technology, research and weaponry. The Polaris Sales Agreement enabled Britain to purchase the launching system, components of the inertial navigation system, the fire control system, communications equipment and even the high stress steel for the submarine hulls.6 The US also concluded various offset agreements that enabled the UK to purchase the latest American defence equipment and sometimes eased its balance of payments by buying British military equipment. Britain was also able periodically to use buy-American policies to ease defence budget constraints. In the 1960s it cancelled three domestic aircraft programmes in favour of US alternatives – the TSR-2 was replaced by F-111s, the HS681 by C-130s and the P1154 by F-4s.7 Furthermore, Britain frequently benefited from American investment in manpower, bases and other facilities hosted on British territory. Under the agreement reached to develop the Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) at Fylingdales in 1959 Britain provided the site, paid for the building work, and subsequently ran the station using RAF personnel. The US supplied and paid for the equipment, almost 80 per cent of the total cost. As Stocker emphasises, the agreement ‘met a major UK national requirement and, in financial terms, was a bargain.’ Moreover, when the entire BMEWS chain was modernised between 1987 and 1992 the UK Government only met approximately 30 per cent of the £170 million cost plus the Fylingdales site was the only one to receive 360 degree coverage.8 The scale of US support for British defence efforts testifies to the perceived advantages that accrued to America and consequently to the mutual utility that underpinned the relationship. Britain was its most powerful military ally. It held off communist pressure in Greece and Turkey prior to the Truman Doctrine and British troops were active across a host of

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places, including Kenya, Cyprus, Radfan, Aden, Borneo, Oman and Malaysia. Expending British blood and resources in a common cause won Britain American consideration and the British armed services earned respect for their professionalism and adaptability across an array of tasks, including colonial policing, counter-insurgency, peacekeeping and highintensity warfare. For much of the 1950s the US delegated Middle Eastern defence to the British. Britain was the key Western power within the Central Treaty Organisation, with the US lending support through associate status and bilateral military aid treaties. Elsewhere Britain and the US were full members of the Southeast Asia Treaty, Anglo-American conventional deployments in Europe provided vital reassurance to allies that Washington and London would not accept a limited nuclear war fought in continental Europe, and Britain assumed responsibility for key tasks within NATO, especially patrolling the eastern Atlantic, guarding the North German plains and protection of the UK home base. Britain’s status as a second centre of strategic decision-making also had advantages, including augmenting Western capability, instilling greater caution in Soviet policies lest they doubt American commitment to Europe as Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) developed and, perhaps most significantly, reassuring European partners of American commitment to NATO Article V. Britain and its (former) imperial possessions were also of great strategic value. The British Isles were America’s ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’9 and so remarkable was it, when in July 1948 US nuclear capable B29s were deployed to bases in the UK without any explicit formula governing their deployment, that US Secretary of State Marshall asked Foreign Secretary Bevin whether the implications had been fully considered.10 Britain became a forward defence base, central within American strategic planning and for a range of US military activities, including communications, intelligence gathering, early warning systems and physical military assets. The UK hosted US nuclear bombers and weapons, deployed Thor missiles between 1959 and September 1963 and supported controversial deployment on British soil of Pershing II and Cruise missiles. The UK also made the Holy Loch submarine base available to the US Navy’s Ballistic Missile Fleet, hosted a number of sensitive intelligence and communication assets, and provided extensive facilities for US air force use, such as bases at Mildenhall, Lakenheath, Sculthorpe and Fairford from which extensive strategic reconnaissance operations over Eastern Europe and the USSR were conducted. Farther afield the proximity of British bases to the USSR assisted scientific efforts to calculate Soviet plutonium stocks. The extent of the British Commonwealth enabled monitoring stations to detect Soviet nuclear tests in places otherwise inaccessible.11 Having made the Anglo-American relationship the cornerstone of their foreign policy, British governments underpinned mutual utility with assiduous cultivation of the defence relationship. This entailed accepting great risk – Churchill described Britain as a possible ‘bull’s eye’ for a Soviet

The Anglo-American defence relationship 183 nuclear strike. It meant proving Britain’s advanced military credentials. British conventional defence equipment contributions included the steam catapult, the angled-deck, improved landing aids, VTOL techniques and Chobham armour – the US order in 1970–71 for Britain’s VTOL Harrier aircraft was the first time since World War 1 that America had bought an operational military aircraft from abroad.12 Cultivation of defence relations with Washington also necessitated serious military overstretch; a number of Britain’s Cold War Defence Reviews were essentially Treasury-driven and much of what Britain was expected to do would probably have proved hollow if put to the test.13 Furthermore, every opportunity had to be seized to draw closer to the American military. One aspect of this was arms cooperation. Britain was a major participant in the US Mutual Assistance Programme and Foreign Military Sales programme, it avoided expensive R&D commitments whilst gaining technology transfer advantages by manufacturing some weapons designed by the US under license and in September 1975 an Anglo-American Memorandum of Understanding determined to develop greater weapons standardisation and interoperability through cooperation in research, development, production and procurement. Service-to-Service relations also became very close and important. Finn and Berg argue that ‘combined planning, personnel exchanges, and training events like bombing competitions and Red Flag war games have honed US-UK co-ordination to a fine edge .… Only truly close friends share their ballistic missiles, bombers, and nuclear warheads.’14 Rees has argued similarly that Anglo-American naval relations became ‘especially strong’, something Bartlett uses to explain the especially sympathetic and helpful role of the US Navy during the Falklands crisis.15 The Cold War defence relationship was thus uniquely close and mutually important. Though it had numerous highs and lows and Britain’s decline progressively diminished it in quantitative terms at least, the defence relationship survived British retreat from East of Suez.16 Moreover, Britain’s relative decline was not a linear process and its impact fluctuated in tune with events and personalities in leading positions. The 1980s actually witnessed a resurgent defence relationship. The Reagan administration afforded Britain vital support during the Falklands conflict. Thatcher allowed US use of American air bases in Britain from which to bomb Libya in 1986. The Falklands War especially scuppered military economies planned in the 1981 Nott Defence Review; during the 1980s Britain still committed a greater percentage of GDP than the European average to defence.17 The British Government was the first to sign an SDI Memorandum of Understanding (6 December 1985) and during the 1980s the Anglo-American defence equipment relationship deepened, especially in terms of business transacted.18 British naval patrols resumed in the Gulf of Oman, Britain contributed a token force to the US-led Multinational Force in the Lebanon and in 1987 Britain committed six minesweepers in support of the US policy of re-flagging international oil tankers to afford them protection in the Persian Gulf.

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The post-Cold War defence relationship The collapse of the Cold War challenged national militaries, established alliances and defence relationships. Military plans and heavy platforms geared to large-scale, high-intensity warfare in Europe became obsolete. Security agendas became more expansive and permeable and military focus shifted from national survival to ‘elective wars’, complex emergencies often within states where Western forces would be confronted by paramilitary organisations and blurred divisions between combatants and noncombatants.19 This demanded new doctrine and new capabilities, with an onus on highly mobile, relatively lightly armed and flexible forces that could work in politically charged conditions and adapt to the demands of what US Marine General Charles Krulak dubbed three-block warfare. Concomitantly, the revolution in expectations and requirements of modern armed forces ran into demands for a peace dividend and political problems in legitimising military expenditure and the dedication of resources and lives to waging wars of choice. This radically revised geo-strategic and political context rendered AngloAmerican defence relations vulnerable. Their principal institutional manifestation, NATO, entered an existential crisis as the USSR disintegrated and the Warsaw Pact dissolved. British and American strategic priorities drifted apart.20 The strategic glue in the Anglo-American defence relationship had been common defence of Europe but whilst British interests afterwards remained vested primarily in continental security the US, basking in its ‘unipolar moment’, had unprecedented strategic freedom and choice of allies. That it would progressively focus upon the Middle East and Asia was foreshadowed upon the violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. George H W. Bush’s Secretary of State James Baker declared ‘We don’t have a dog in this fight’.21 Furthermore, the broadening security agenda and Europe’s release from military dependence on the US for survival enabled the EU to expand into the security field, thereby potentially further challenging NATO and Britain’s ability to sustain compatibly between its European and Atlantic relationships. Post-Cold War British grand strategy nevertheless demonstrated remarkable continuity, embracing continental balance and global influence and remaining posited upon the assumption that American power and close Anglo-American relations were the foundation of these ambitions. From this flowed commitment to NATO primacy in defence matters, to balancing and bridging between Britain’s European and US relationships, and to maintaining military power sufficient to support a global foreign policy and warrant American attention. John Major’s Conservative government zealously pursued these objectives in opposition to the EU developing any defence role lest it undermine NATO and the special relationship. This Thatcherite Eurosceptic inheritance was fed by early American warnings such as the Dobbins démarche in February 1991 against

The Anglo-American defence relationship 185 a decoupling of European from transatlantic security. Were the US to decline to participate in a crisis, then Britain would have recourse to the Western European Union (WEU) which, though nominated in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty as a potential future defence arm of the EU, was intergovernmental and easier to control. The successor Blair government rejected this approach. It supported EU acceptance in the Amsterdam Treaty of responsibility for the Petersberg tasks, the progressive absorption of the WEU into the EU and, most notably, the 1998 St Malo agreement with France. British agreement that the EU should have a military capability sufficient to meet the Petersberg tasks was something of a ‘revolution in military affairs’;22 Thatcher called it ‘an act of monumental folly’ taken ‘to satisfy political vanity’.23 Yet New Labour’s revised defence approach was a change of tactics rather than embrace of a European vocation. It argued that a limited EU defence capacity would be complementary to NATO, meet American demands for greater European burden-sharing and provide a credible option in the event America chose not to participate in a particular mission. Implicit, too, was that Britain’s Atlantic intermediary role would be more tenable if able to influence the EU in ways compatible with Atlanticism from within rather than confront Britain, by staying outside EU security evolution, with reduced influence and a choice between its European and Atlantic relationships. As Blair told the Labour Party conference in October 2001: ‘Britain needs its voice strong in Europe and bluntly Europe needs a strong Britain, rock solid in our alliance with the USA, yet determined to play its full part in shaping Europe’s destiny.’24 The subsequent challenge was to restrain French-led calls for an EU defence capacity coordinated with but independent of NATO and to reassure Washington against Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s warning in December 1999 of the ‘three Ds’ of de-linking, duplication, and discrimination.25 Success would enhance Britain’s importance to Washington, increase Britain’s options through a more capable and outwardly orientated EU and potentially offer opportunity to weaken the Franco-German axis at the heart of the EU by promoting trilateralism. Failure risked leaving Britain stranded between two receding shorelines as transatlantic drift accelerated and British influence waned. Britain’s record in this endeavour has been mixed. It has prevented the EU developing a formal mutual defence clause to rival NATO’s Article V. It has participated in initiatives such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) to improve EU defence capabilities in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), albeit British commitment to the EDA per se seems increasingly ambivalent.26 It has also both encouraged arrangements with NATO – such as the EU-NATO Capability Group and Berlin Plus agreement – that reassure Washington and blocked the emergence of a core-Europe defence group. For instance, Blair delivered at the December 2000 EU Nice summit the language he wanted regarding the EU’s planned Rapid Reaction

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Force, stressing the importance of the Atlantic alliance, EU reliance on NATO infrastructure and delimiting the scale of potential EU military action. In April 2003 leaders of Germany, France, Belgium and Luxembourg – the same countries that had just blocked NATO aid for Turkey as the US prepared to intervene in Iraq – agreed to form an EU defence Avant Guard, including creating a highly controversial operational planning staff in Tervuren. Assiduous British diplomacy, backed by American opposition, again weakened these proposals to a point that structured cooperation was focused on defence materials improvements, a veto was institutionalised over military operations, and the December 2003 European Council stressed that Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and national headquarters remained the main options for conducting EU-led operations. The proposed EU planning cell was locked into SHAPE, with a small group of military planners added to the EU Military Staff to allow for coordination of military missions run by French, German or British headquarters. Britain’s ability to sustain compatibly between its US and European defence relationships has nevertheless been questioned, especially given fractious post-Cold War transatlantic relations. Though largely successful in blocking defence initiatives unwelcome in Washington, Britain has been far less effective in persuading fellow EU states to meet American burdensharing demands by investing more in military capabilities and engaging more actively in overseas crises. In March 2006 Blair accused many European states of holding a ‘doctrine of benign inactivity’ in an erroneous assumption that the world was basically calm with ‘a few nasty things lurking in deep waters’ that over time would largely resolve themselves.27 Britain has also sometimes been forced to choose between European and Atlantic defence relationships. In extremis the US-led intervention in Iraq split the transatlantic alliance and paralysed London’s attempts to develop trilateralism with Paris and Berlin. Blair acknowledged in November 2004 consequent strains in Britain’s intermediary role especially: ‘Call it a bridge, a two lane motorway, a pivot or call it a damn high wire, which is how it often feels’.28 William Wallace simply argued ‘the bridge has again collapsed … it cannot now be rebuilt.’29 A further pressure, slower but arguably more important, is Britain’s gradual Europeanisation, which may lead to its security and defence policies being increasingly developed through and shaped by Brussels rather than in cooperation with the US. Consider, for example, defence equipment and procurement. British governments have sought European and American options. In February 2000 US Secretary of Defense William Cohen and his British counterpart Geoff Hoon signed the Declaration of Principles, designed to improve arrangements for bilateral defence equipment cooperation and trade. In classic British fashion the UK balanced this Atlanticism with signature of the Framework Agreement in July 2000, which evolved out of the 1998 Letter of Intent between France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Some analysts argue this balance is unsustainable,

The Anglo-American defence relationship 187 especially given resource constraints and an essentially bipolar transatlantic defence trade and industrial base (DTIB). In 2000 Dorman predicted that Britain would likely face a choice of purchasing limited amounts of equipment such that its armed forces maintain compatibility with the US or to build equipment in conjunction with its European partners.30 In 2005 North argued that Britain’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) had already shifted procurement towards European partners so much that ‘The pattern of this dependence implies a state of technical and doctrinal integration with the EU’s defence effort so complete that collaboration with the US will eventually not be feasible.’31 Yet on balance the European threat to the Anglo-American defence relationship has to date been relatively limited. This owes in part to Britain’s continuing Atlanticist defence disposition, something reflected in its making no attempt in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) to coordinate with fellow EU states; the MOD argued in 2004 that British forces could be sized and composed on the assumption that full spectrum capability for large-scale operations was unnecessary because these would only be undertaken alongside the US.32 Also, the (in)voluntary pull of Europe remains particularly weak in the defence domain. The EU has made great institutional strides as a security actor but has been far more successful in developing soft than hard security tools. Its putative (at best) strategic culture makes political agreement on use of force difficult and its limited military assets mean all CSDP missions have been at the low-end of the Petersberg spectrum.33 Moreover, spilling over from EU defence weakness is a further development that has eased pressure on the Anglo-American defence relationship, namely an Atlantic turn in French policy. In March 2009 President Sarkozy announced that France would end over forty years of self-imposed exile from NATO’s integrated military command. Then, in November 2010, British Prime Minister Cameron and Sarkozy announced a sweeping fifty-year Anglo-French defence treaty that included creation of a 10,000 strong joint expeditionary task force capable of high-intensity peacekeeping, rescue and combat missions, cooperation on unmanned drone aircraft, nuclear submarine technology and nuclear safety, coordination of the planned British and French Charles de Gaulle aircraft carriers and development of an integrated strike force ensuring British, French and American aircraft can operate off each carrier. The potential European challenge to British defence loyalty has been further weakened by the threat posed by strategic dissonance to the AngloAmerican defence relationship proving at least premature. NATO has endured through a combination of reform, outreach, institutional inertia, lack of credible alternatives and continuing transatlantic interest in having American power locked into Europe. NATO survival, and the AngloAmerican defence relationship, have been helped substantially, too, by events unfolding in ways that dragged America back into European security provision and focused immediate military attention more on the Middle

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East, where Britain had greater residual defence capability, than on Asia. Repeated crises in the Balkans, palpable European inability to cope with them and fears for NATO credibility eventually impelled Washington to intervene. This was not a smooth process for the Anglo-American defence relationship. Former British Prime Minister John Major described policy disagreements over Bosnia as the most serious since the Suez Crisis.34 Particularly problematic was the Clinton administration’s initial refusal to commit American ground troops whilst advocating a ‘lift and strike’ policy that combined air strikes with removal of an arms embargo. This would endanger British peacekeeping troops deployed under the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), the neutrality of humanitarian operations and civilian lives; the British Chiefs of Staff advised that meteorological and geographic features of Bosnia, coupled with a highly confused situation on the ground, rendered bombing to protect civilian lives almost impossible.35 Crisis in Kosovo in 1998–99 reprised this intense Anglo-American disagreement. The Blair government adopted a hawkish stance in which early commitment of ground troops was favoured to counter Serb President Milosovic and protect the Dayton Accords. The Clinton administration, with the ‘Mogadishu syndrome’ making American casualty aversion acute, once more insisted on airstrikes rather than deploying US ground troops. Nevertheless, two NATO-led military interventions, subsequent implementation and stabilisation forces (IFOR, SFOR, KFOR) and the Contact Group during a decade of Balkan crisis helped sustain AngloAmerican military interaction and prevent American military disengagement from the continent. Then, just as the George W Bush administration signalled its intent to wind down US military deployments in Europe, 9/11 transformed the US into a nation officially at war and one that under Bush foregrounded military power in its global war on terrorism. Anglo-American militaries once more had opportunity in Iraq and Afghanistan to demonstrate that long-established habits of cooperation, integrated command structures, and access to the same real-time intelligence mean their armed coordination comes more easily and effectively than with any other country. There have been inevitable tensions in these difficult campaigns, including American treatment of ‘unlawful combatants’, mutual tactics and Britain’s limited ability to size, equip and support its forces adequately in the field. The latter has drawn US criticism upon British performance in Basra and pre-US surge Helmand Province, where insufficient troops and lack of appropriate counter-insurgency equipment plagued British security efforts, especially in Sangin. Yet British capability has still exceeded that of any other US ally and cooperation has been smoother. Many NATO countries apply restrictive national caveats to their troops. When developing the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) Germany, for instance, expressed reservations about putting its troops under the US Central Command whilst Britain readily accepted to avoid conflict between two different missions.36 Conversely, in 2003 a sizeable number of American marines were placed

The Anglo-American defence relationship 189 under British command for the first time since World War 2 for operations in southern Iraq.37 It is an oft quoted adage that the special relationship waxes fat on war. Conflict brings on what in September 2001 The Economist termed a ‘thickening of the old intimacy’.38 Since the Cold War British and American Armed forces have had considerable opportunity to reaffirm their former intimacy in the field, serving together in the Gulf War, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. There has also been mutual learning about new challenges in asymmetric warfare and in working across a wide spectrum of military tasks, ranging from high-intensity warfare through to counterinsurgency, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and the training of foreign militaries. Moreover, the Services benefited from an unexpected resource surge in response to the Blair government’s liberal use of force and, especially, 9/11. In the period 2001–10 British military expenditure rose 21.9 per cent and America’s by 81.3 per cent.39 There are two even more important factors that have contributed to the relative good health of the Anglo-American defence relationship. The first is that the frequency and location of armed conflict have enabled Britain to reprise its Cold War loyal lieutenant role. As former British Ambassador to the US Sir Robin Renwick once put it, ‘The price of consultation has always been presence and participation.’40 Britain has paid this price with remarkable consistency. Thatcher famously told George H W. Bush not to ‘go wobbly’ before the first Gulf War.41 Britain later stood alone with the US in maintaining air patrols over Iraq’s no-fly zones once France withdrew. Blair endorsed unilateral US bombings of Afghanistan and Sudan in 1998 and despite holding the EU presidency at the time committed Britain to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 – controversial Anglo-American military strikes against Iraq in response to Saddam Hussein’s obstruction of UN weapons inspections. British forces alone participated in the opening strikes of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ against the Taliban and British Special Forces fought alongside American counterparts in the ground offensive. Britain first assumed responsibility for ISAF in Kabul and its force contribution to Afghanistan currently remains second only to the US. Furthermore, Britain’s robust military commitment to the 2003 Iraq intervention and lengthy stabilisation process was particularly prominent given the desertion of many traditional American allies. One commentator suggested of a meeting between Blair and Bush in March 2003 that ‘the choreography of the Camp David war council, so reminiscent of the FDRChurchill meetings on that very spot, seemed to echo the greatest moments of the Anglo-American Alliance.’42 How much influence Britain’s defence loyalty buys in Washington is fiercely debated but there is another consideration therein too, namely that London views the international system underpinned by American power as underwriting British interests. High levels of Anglo-American political ability to agree on the use of force suggest that the similar strategic cultures,

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values and worldviews that underpinned Cold War defence cooperation have endured. Blair’s depiction of Britain as a ‘pivotal power’43 reflected the continued commitment of most of its political class, including the bulk of the media, to an activist and global, rather than Euro-centric, foreign policy.44 New Labour’s year 2000 consultation document, Britain in the World, stressed the need for Britain’s leading role or leadership forty times in forty-three pages.45 Britain’s armed forces loomed large within this sense of global leadership and responsibility. The notion of their being ‘a force for good’ appeared in the Conservative Party’s first post-Cold War election campaign46 and was appropriated by the Blair government. It expanded the range of defence tasks, introducing defence diplomacy in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) and the 2002 SDR: A New Chapter.47 It also liberalised the likely use of British forces. Blair broke with the traditional ‘pragmatic empiricism’ of British foreign policy when expounding the doctrine of international community in April 1999, a concept he argued was ‘an essential pre-condition of our future prosperity and stability’ and ‘based on core, shared values, prepared actively to intervene and resolve problems’.48,49 Cast in this light the St Malo initiative was more than the ‘defensive engagement’ some claim.50 It sought not only to maintain broadly the existing security system and pre-empt French attempts to undermine NATO supremacy but also to better enable Britain to manage change and thereby protect its vested interests in the extant international system in conjunction with the US. Foreign Secretary Robin Cook confirmed in January 2001 that the strategic relationship with the US lay at the heart of Britain’s commitment to a global foreign policy.51 9/11 saved the defence partnership from a much predicted cooling as a consequence of the George W Bush administration’s initial interest in cutting overseas commitments and National Security Agency (NSA) Condoleezza Rice’s pledge that the US would not be ‘the world’s 911.’52 The terrorist attacks drew a new coincidence of Anglo-American interests in re-shaping the international system. British calculations demonstrated remarkable continuity as the Bush administration considered its immediate response. In March 1944 the Foreign Office advocated harnessing American power to British ends and argued that: If we go about our business in the right way we can help steer this great unwieldy barge, the United States of America, into the right harbour. If we don’t, it is likely to continue to wallow in the ocean, an isolated menace to navigation.53 In April 2002 Blair declared ‘American power affects the world fundamentally …. It can affect the world for good or affect it for bad. Stand aside or engage, it never fails to affect. You know I want it engaged.’54 Chancellor Gordon Brown subsequently attacked regressive American genes of isolation and detachment and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw warned ‘We will reap a

The Anglo-American defence relationship 191 whirlwind if we push the Americans into a unilateralist position in which they are at the centre of this uni-polar world.’55 From the US perspective Britain has been its staunchest military ally since the Cold War. In 2006 the National Security Strategy (NSS) hailed the strength of the Anglo-American special relationship and the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) cited their close military relations as a model for ‘the depth and breadth of cooperation that the United States seeks to foster with other allies and partners around the world.’56 US trust in the defence relationship is reflected in Britain being America’s most important and privileged defence trade partner. The defence trade relationship is worth approximately $2.8 billion per annum and in 2010 the US and UK were engaged in twenty-two collaborative equipment programmes, the US was the MOD’s largest supplier, the UK was the biggest offshore supplier to the US and British companies employed some 117,000 Americans across almost all fifty US states.57 Also, Britain is arguably the ally closest to America’s own values, something British officials take every opportunity to emphasise: 9/11 ‘was an attack on us all .… It was an attack on our shared values and a test of our integrity’;58 ‘When America is fighting for those values, then, however tough, we will fight with her.’59 Britain’s material contribution has been militarily significant within NATO missions and US-led coalitions of the willing. This owes not only to its ability to provide America with added value in niche areas but also to the experience and professionalism of its armed forces, its willingness to put them in harms way and its readiness to take on missions the US either cannot or prefers not to accept. British bases and support structures also retain importance to Washington, such as the Fylingdales facility within American Ballistic Missile Defense plans. Perhaps most important to Washington since the Cold War, though, has been the political assistance Britain offers as a consequence of its military capabilities. Anglo-American cooperation in the UN is very close and Britain’s continued Security Council seat owes in part to its official nuclear weapons power status. This depends in turn on the MDA and president Bush told Congress in December 2004 ‘it is in our interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.’60 Britain is also America’s most important ally within NATO and the EU. Their shared global disposition and post-Cold War fighting experiences encourage similar reform agendas within NATO, including capability development and pressing members for greater military spending and a global mission vocation. Most post-Cold War US administrations have railed against the dangers of the EU decoupling transatlantic defence but all have eventually accepted that if it is to burden-share more effectively then they must accept whatever the Europeans did provided it was compatible with NATO. Britain has been Washington’s most secure guardian in this respect within both the EU and influential informal groupings such as the Quint.61 Finally, British military support provides substantial international and domestic political benefit to US administrations, especially in terms of

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helping rebut charges of unilateralism and maintaining domestic support for overseas military action. There is significant continuity in this respect in Anglo-American relations too. Blair’s military commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan afforded the Bush administration some cover against charges of unilateralism and helped maintain public support, something that contrasted markedly with Prime Minister Wilson’s (in)famous refusal to meet Lyndon Johnson’s request for the deployment of at least a troop of British bagpipers to Vietnam. Similarly, the importance of Britain not leaving America isolated is a recurring theme. In May 1965 US Secretary of State Dean Rusk told British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart ‘we can’t do the job of world policeman alone.’62 The Obama administration’s 2010 NSS resonated of this conclusion, emphasising ‘The foundation of United States, regional, and global security will remain America’s relations with our allies’ and that ‘the relationships our Armed Forces have developed with foreign militaries are a critical component of our global engagement and support our collective security’.63 In May 2011 Obama and Cameron pronounced their countries’ relationship to be ‘not just a special relationship, it is an essential relationship – for us and for the world.’64

The future of Anglo-American defence relations Predicting future developments in the defence relationship is hazardous. Few foresaw the international military engagement against Gaddafi in Libya in March 2011 that again drew London and Washington (and Paris) into close cooperation and challenged assumptions underpinning the British Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and defence spending announcements of autumn 2010. Similarly, the roots of the November 2010 Anglo-French defence treaty pre-dated the financial crisis but its scope nevertheless caught commentators by surprise. With this caveat, though, some tentative conclusions may be drawn. The broadly similar worldviews and objectives that undergird uniquely close Anglo-American military cooperation will likely endure in the short to medium term at least. Historical, linguistic, cultural and political ties tend to degrade, if at all, only slowly. The two countries also still have a mutual investment in what remains of the post-World War 2 international system that they fashioned and a shared experience of empire – be it formal or informal. Add to this not dissimilar strategic cultures and one can see why Britain and America remain each other’s most natural ally and enjoy a much higher coincidence of agreement on the appropriateness of applying military instruments to a given problem than they do with any other country. Similar worldviews and attitudes will not alone, though, sustain defence cooperation. Three principal challenges often still levied against the future wellbeing of the Anglo-American defence relationship are the EU, British military capabilities and diverging strategic priorities. The former excites considerable passion, the basic argument being that Britain should or will

The Anglo-American defence relationship 193 have to accept a European vocation that de facto undermines the AngloAmerican relationship. The ultimate bogeyman conjured by those perceiving Europe as a threat to the special relationship is the emergence of an EU super-state, for which some cite the Lisbon Treaty as a blueprint.65 Proponents of the latter critique especially should take pause. An EU that is stronger in the security and defence fields probably is beneficial to the Anglo-American relationship and to NATO – the British argument since the St Malo agreement. The EU has emerged as a holistic security actor that can complement American power but cannot now, and is unlikely in the foreseeable future to become able to, either challenge American military power or compete with Washington for British defence loyalties. On the one hand, the EU struggles to generate the modest military assets pledged in successive Headline Goals, is heavily dependent on Anglo-French commitment, and has to date made little headway into the intergovernmental realm of national defence. Moreover, Britain has become increasingly frustrated by a perceived lack of meaningful commitment by many of its EU counterparts to defence. Though the EU’s Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council argued that the 2010 Anglo-French defence agreement ‘should help create a dynamic for stimulating further opportunities for cooperation between the Member States’,66 its genesis lies more in recognition that these countries are Europe’s only serious military players and that at a time of constrained budgets and rising costs of high-end military capability, bilateral intergovernmental cooperation may be more manageable and cost effective than multinational collaborative programmes such as the infamously expensive and delayed A400M aircraft. The agreement may even constitute a pre-emptive Anglo-French move to galvanise and protect their DTIBs before the EU’s new Defence and Security Directive, aimed at promoting competition in the procurement of defence and security equipment in the Single European Market, enters into force in August 2011. On the other hand, Britain’s activist global foreign policy is rooted in national interests, strategic culture and national identity67 and while anxious to avoid dependence on the US for defence procurement and to have options should Washington elect not to act, the relationship across the Atlantic and not the Channel – be it Paris or Brussels – remains the ‘unspoken leitmotif in British defence policy’.68 Blair was the most proEuropean British Prime Minister in decades but the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrated that in matters of war, peace and international security Atlanticism remained the cornerstone of British defence policy. The current Coalition government is even less ambiguous. Conservative Atlanticists hold most of the key defence-related positions: before the 2010 British General Election senior Conservative politicians promised the Obama administration a ‘much more pro-American’ regime and Foreign Secretary Hague’s first post-election trip was a dash Washington.69 The Coalition government is committed to Britain’s nuclear deterrent, which demands continuing the unique nuclear relationship with the US.

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The 2010 SDSR was also unequivocal in prioritising conventional defence cooperation with the US. The US is described as ‘our pre-eminent defence and security relationship’ and NATO is hailed as ‘the bedrock of our defence’.70 From this consistent premise flow a series of consequences, including for military doctrine, procurement and collaboration. Even before the 2010 British election former Defence Minister Liam Fox promised ‘a much more pro-American profile in procurement’.71 The 2004 UK White Paper ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’ emphasised ‘our Armed Forces will need to be interoperable with US command and control structures, match the US operational tempo and provide those capabilities that deliver the greatest impact when operating alongside the US.’72 Experience of working alongside US forces in Iraq convinced the British MOD that potential partners would need to adjust their force structures and be close to US policy-making and planning if they were to maintain congruence and contact with accelerating American technological and doctrinal pre-eminence.73 And the primacy of the Anglo-American defence relationship sets parameters for multinational defence cooperation. The MOD has argued that this should be pursued only when it ‘is compatible with, and does not threaten our links to, the US and NATO.’74 Though the SDSR flagged the importance of deepening cooperation with countries such as France, Article 13 of the UK-French treaty carefully protected the ‘rights and obligations of each Party under other defence and security agreements.’75 The EU thus offers Britain little foreseeable alternative to the AngloAmerican defence relationship and the current British government seems more interested in reaffirming than reappraising this state of affairs. Some analysts already contend that the Coalition government is accelerating a British withdrawal from EU defence efforts.76 This raises the question of American reciprocity, particularly in terms of British ability to make defence contributions sufficient to hold Washington’s attention – an issue highlighted by the recent financial crisis, a gaping £38 billion hole in the British defence budget and the onset of an age of defence austerity that some claim marks a ‘turning point for UK defence’.77 In October 2010 the whiff of retrenchment drew US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates into publicly voicing fears about prospective deep reductions in Britain’s armed forces and to intimate negative consequences for the special relationship, NATO and international security.78 The Coalition government’s SDSR nevertheless focused on national deficit reduction. The headline figure was a projected drop in UK GDP commitment to defence from 2.7 per cent in 2010 to 2.2 per cent by 2014. Cuts to Cold War legacy capabilities including fast jets and main battle tanks did not safeguard assets for expeditionary warfare. Front-line forces were reduced and whereas the 1998 SDR envisaged a deployable force of 45,000 for a major operation this was cut to 30,000.79 British power projection capability and prestige were also weakened by controversial

The Anglo-American defence relationship 195 decisions to decommission the eighty-strong Harrier fleet and HMS Ark Royal, and to mothball or sell-off an aircraft carrier under construction once it proved more expensive to cancel than complete. Britain is most likely bereft of an aircraft carrier able to launch jets until at least 2019. These cuts are serious for the Anglo-American defence relationship. After all, it was insufficient investment and scale of forces that most drew American criticism of British contributions in Basra and Helmand province and former Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Stirrup has publicly argued that SDSR cuts instantiate ‘a period of strategic shrinkage’.80 There is a real risk, too, that British budgetary constraints will so accelerate the disparity between UK and US investment in their armed services and military R&D that Anglo-American forces become decoupled by default and areas where Britain enjoys a comparative advantage are compromised. However, this is not inevitable and in terms of Britain’s worth to the US as a military partner perspective is needed. Britain was America’s closest defence partner throughout the 1990s and this preceded the massive 2001–10 increase in British defence expenditure. The nuclear deterrent remains sacrosanct and the Coalition government aims to recover within a decade a coherent balanced set of British capabilities under Future Force 2020. Britain’s relative position needs acknowledgement too. In 2010 Britain was the world’s third largest military spender and once it reduces expenditure to 2.2 per cent GDP it will probably remain Europe’s largest military spender as other countries slash their defence spending too. Germany was estimated in 2010 to have committed just 1.3 per cent of its GDP to defence and made an overall reduction of 2.7 per cent 2001–10; double digit cuts in 2010 military expenditure were made in a host of NATO states, including Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania and Slovakia.81 Also, the British Coalition government made a firmer than expected commitment to the military budget – cuts were less severe than anticipated and the MOD actually increased its share of government departmental expenditure from 8.7 to 9.1 per cent over four years.82 This priority mirrored to a degree the exemption made for US military and other security spending such as intelligence and Homeland security from Obama’s FY2012 budget five-year freeze on discretionary spending. Furthermore, British and American military budgets are distorted by ongoing missions. The two countries will likely use anticipated drawdowns of commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan to ease budgetary pressure and, in a manner akin to the aftermath of the counter-insurgency wars fought in the late 1960s, reduce their proclivity for elective wars for the foreseeable future. This will afford breathing space for their armed forces, enable lessonlearning for future conflicts and allow popular support for military action to recover. Indeed, the UK’s SDSR states explicitly: we will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at the right time but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we have a clear strategic aim; where the

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Britain, albeit reduced again relative to American might, will thus probably remain America’s most capable military partner. It is also the case that the quantity of British capabilities is arguably less relevant to the AngloAmerican defence relationship now than it was during the Cold War. America is a military behemoth and in war-fighting terms has no absolute need of allies. Long a mainstay of the Anglo-American defence relationship, but now vital, is that Britain can add military value in discrete areas and share the political, economic and psychological costs of military action. The former calculation is evident in Britain’s pledge in the SDSR to ‘maintain military capabilities that provide maximum mutual benefit …’84 The latter is important because it helps generate shared agendas, such as concern from the Iraq and Afghan campaigns about NATO mission funding and the imposition of national caveats. Britain’s military support is also useful to Washington in terms of international and domestic politics. Parallels between current and past situations reflect this enduring feature of the defence relationship. Defence Secretary McNamara’s argument in the 1960s that indication of British withdrawal in the Far East ‘would fatally undermine our domestic base on Viet Nam’ chimes closely with contemporary US concerns of precipitate British drawdown in Afghanistan.85 Will Anglo-American defence relations diminish as British and American strategic foci further diverge? This is a genuine possibility. Britain’s strategic reflex may be to look across the Atlantic but its key interests – and capabilities – reside principally in Europe, the Mediterranean rim and the Middle East. The US is less interested in Europe than at any time since World War 2, with the possible exception of its eastern periphery that bears on Russian ambitions and energy resources. It views China as its principal strategic competitor and in the war on terrorism prioritises an arc of crisis spanning from West Africa through the Mediterranean to the Gulf and on to South and Central Asia. Were these trends to solidify then interaction opportunity for Anglo-American militaries, Britain’s ability to bring niche contributions to bear meaningfully in US operations and political agreement on the use of force might all diminish. British influence in Washington beyond the tactical level, already much debated, might consequently wane further too and Washington may allow priorities elsewhere to trump the AngloAmerican defence relationship. Grist is added to the latter argument by revelations in 2011 that the US agreed within an arms control agreement to provide Russia with details of every Trident missile supplied to Britain, which over time analysts argue may enable Moscow to discern the exact size of the British nuclear arsenal. The shifting focus of American attention puts renewed emphasis on British military bases, expeditionary capabilities and power projection.

The Anglo-American defence relationship 197 There are evident constraints therein. The carrier issue looms large, irrespective of potential sharing of the French Charles de Gaulle. Britain’s contributions to the Libyan air campaign in 2011 could have been more efficient with aircraft carrier support – the US and France both deployed carriers to the region – and even when the Queen Elizabeth carrier becomes available maintenance schedules coupled with the prospective sale/ mothballing of Britain’s second carrier weakens British long-term ability to project power consistently alongside the US in theatres farther from Europe of key importance to Washington. Indeed, British proponents of naval power quickly rehearsed risks inherent in cutting carrier capability, including to Anglo-American defence relations. Following an artillery exchange between North and South Korea in November 2010 and consequent US dispatch of an aircraft carrier to the Peninsular, Lord West, former First Sea Lord, declared that ‘to fail to stand by the USA, when they have supported us in Europe over some 70 years, would be a mistake’, and argued that The dispatch of a carrier, its small air wing and a Tactom-armed nuclear submarine, should any such crisis escalate, is just the sort of commitment an ally such as the United States requires. Nothing else in our military inventory has similar flexibility and adaptability.86 The picture would be particularly gloomy if the government’s build schedule for the new British aircraft carriers slipped significantly. In November 2011 the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee already concluded that actual costs of the revised programme would not likely be known until the end of 2012 and that the SDSR decision ‘will lead to nine years without Carrier Strike and full capability will not be achieved until 2030.’87 However, it would be premature to write-off the future Anglo-American defence relationship solely on account of diverging strategic foci. One of the strengths of the Cold War defence relationship that Washington valued was its ability to delegate area responsibilities to the British, especially Europe and the Middle East. Circumstances are now much different but it would still be advantageous for Washington to be able to offload some of these responsibilities to Britain and to the EU, within which it could rely on London to develop matters broadly favourable to US preferences. Also, the carrier gap especially is a gamble by the Coalition government but arguably not a critical deficiency given that conventional threat is low and likely to remain so through to 2019. Britain shares US threat analyses enumerated in the 2010 QDR and Homeland Security Review,88 which develop a complex and unpredictable environment. A premium is placed on flexibility, deployability and particular military capabilities, including intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance. Perhaps fortuitously, a number of consequently important major British procurement projects

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were too close to completion to be usefully terminated at the behest of the Treasury. These include the Typhoon (Eurofighter) fighter aircraft, the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft that is seen as essential if air force jets are to deploy quickly over long distances, the Astute Attack Submarine, the A400M aircraft and the Type 45 anti-air warfare destroyer.89 Furthermore, Washington needs to link-up established global military/security positions in the war on terrorism and as a strategic hedge against China especially. In 2006 Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried spoke of a ‘global democratic security community’90 and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Volker suggested that NATO might ‘create some kind of relationship … with countries with which we are likely to be operating in various spots in the world in the future as we deal with crises or peacekeeping or humanitarian support.’ 91 Britain could play a significant part within this American effort. It is a key player within the protean Anglo-sphere, from which America’s most stalwart post-Cold War military partners have been drawn. It is Washington’s most loyal and important partner within NATO as it struggles to persuade reluctant Europeans to undertake urgent military reforms and accept a global vocation for the organisation. And Britain can potentially perform a similar function within the EU, guiding it in directions complementary to NATO – especially if the French ‘Atlantic turn’ in defence policy survives Sarkozy’s ousting from office. Pronouncements of the (impending) death of the Anglo-American defence relationship as a result variously of the EU, waning British capabilities and diverging strategic priorities therefore remain premature. However, there is another threat that could erode the defence relationship faster than any commonly enumerated, and that is the US itself. In secret diplomatic cables revealed by Wikileaks in 2010, Richard LeBaron, the US deputy chief of mission in London, reported that British ‘obsession’ with the Anglo-American alliance could be ‘humorous’. Crucially, he qualified this remark by noting that it was also ‘so corrosive’ of the relationship.92 One of the most important challenges, therefore, for the Anglo-American defence (and wider) relationship is American ability to convey through words and deeds the impression that Britain remains a privileged partner. If they fail, then Britain will likely drift towards the EU and a considerably reduced international defence role. Positive high level mood music helps shape public attitudes, ease substantive discussion and encourage the lower level connectivities and epistemic communities that are the daily heartbeat of the special relationship. The Obama administration began badly in this respect, sending Fleet Street apoplectic by returning the bust of Winston Churchill that sat in George W Bush’s Oval Office, giving Gordon Brown 25 DVDs unplayable in the UK and aggressively attacking BP after the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. This inattentiveness to British sensitivities fed the popular and official backlash epitomised by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee conclusion in 2010 that the traditional special relationship was

The Anglo-American defence relationship 199 over.93 The administration subsequently got on message, culminating in Obama’s visit to London in May 2011 and the triumphalist announcement of Anglo-American relations being ‘special’ and ‘essential’. The challenge will be maintaining this positive tenor of relations and doing so without raising unrealistic popular expectation of British influence in Washington – a perception management challenge highlighted by the Bush-Blair years. The US needs to complement this PR dimension of Anglo-American relations with substantive cooperation that Britain benefits from. The defence field is in principle a prime opportunity. More collaborative procurement projects such as the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) could enable the privileged technology transfer, cost sharing and combined training and maintenance that might help offset the impact of British defence budget constraints and preserve interoperability. Greater access to American defence markets for British companies could generate economies of scale and interdependencies. Britain’s level 1 status in the JSF project and Senate approval in September 2010 of the US–UK Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty are small steps in this direction. Furthermore, ensuring Britain a privileged defence relationship would afford Washington greater leverage over the UK and Europe insofar as it would help assure Britain’s Atlantic disposition and weaken prospects for a rival European DTIB and EU CSDP. Indeed, some argue the US has already used the JSF as a modern day ‘Trojan horse’ to encourage long-term dependence on American weaponry, combat a Fortress Europe and protect market share against European alternatives – the multinational Eurofighter, French Rafale and Swedish Gripen.95 However, supportive measures to help sustain the Anglo-American defence relationship require active sponsorship by US administrations and sustained effort vis-à-vis Congress. The attention of US administrations fluctuates in response to international events and as American priorities move from Europe it is easy to neglect the UK, at least until crises remind the US of its value. It is also the case that issues such as collaborative procurement, technology transfer and access to the US defence market run into American distrust and protectionism. US export licensing and technology transfer regimes and protectionist initiatives such as the Buy American Act and the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States obstruct interoperability, standardisation and industrial competitiveness – something explicitly conceded in the 2010 US QDR.96 Congress especially tends to relegate political and strategic considerations of transatlantic defence cooperation to national security, protecting the US DTIB, and preserving jobs. Disagreement sometimes rages within administrations too as relative willingness to share technology and open the US defence market becomes entwined in national concerns for defence technology supremacy, domestic politics and perceptions of threat and transatlantic relations. Pentagon official James Thomas warned in 2000 that ‘predictions of an inevitable and unbridgeable gap between the US and its

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Allies have reinforced the strong inclination within the US military to ensure that it retains the capacity for unilateral action.’96 The Clinton administration’s Defense Trade Security Initiative was seriously weakened by its applying only to unclassified technology and equipment and the George W Bush administration’s NSPD-19, a comprehensive review of defence trade export policy and national security, sparked a turf war between the US State and Defense Departments. The former tended to support strict controls as a part of wider US foreign policy, while the latter favoured limited relaxation for reasons of competition, economy and interoperability.

Conclusion The special relationship has defied critics and prophets of doom to remain the West’s single most important defence relationship. It still helps underpin NATO and is the best hope of driving the military and mission reform necessary to keep the organisation relevant and capable in a radically changed international environment. It continues to provide the backbone of Western expeditionary and power projection capability. And it continues to be uniquely close as a consequence of historical experience, ingrained practices of cooperation, military networks, broadly shared worldviews and, crucially, repeated post-Cold War combat operations that reinforce past lessons of shared sacrifice, solidarity and knowledge that British and American troops fight together easier than they do with forces of any other nation. The relationship is highly asymmetric. But then it has been for decades. In 1964 Foreign Office planners conceded that ‘we find American support for our overseas policies virtually indispensable, while they find our support for theirs useful and sometimes valuable.’97 American military power is now so great that the worth of its defence relationships is measured more in terms of niche areas of value-added, reliability and shared political cost of military commitment than of quantity of military assets. This situation carries risk of diminishing British influence yet there is little evidence of Britain reconsidering the primacy of the Anglo-American defence relationship or the assumption that military commitment ‘means that we secure an effective place in the [American] political and military decisionmaking processes.’98 Conversely all post-Cold War American administrations have steered politically at some point away from the special relationship only to re-embrace it in moments of crisis and as other partners fail comparative loyalty and capability tests. Britain thus continues to gain currency within Washington from its influence within, especially, NATO, EU and the UN, from its relative military capabilities and from its proven willingness to expend blood and treasure alongside US forces. Some oft touted threats to the future Anglo-American defence relationship are overstated. In an era in which military allies are an option

The Anglo-American defence relationship 201 rather than absolute necessity for the US, Britain is likely to remain Washington’s most reliable partner. American attention might focus on developing new relationships with, for instance, India, but it will take many years – if ever – to develop a depth of trust comparable to that embedded in the Anglo-American defence relationship. Meantime Britain may be entering a period of defence austerity but as in the past more capable, reliable American allies are difficult to discern. Within the Atlantic Alliance especially Britain’s leading status is likely to be preserved by a combination of determination to maintain a credible military capability threshold, a military modernisation process ahead of many others and a scale of cuts likely to be exceeded by most Western countries. Moreover, Britain is the most powerful US ally that is likely to continue actively to seek to size forces and distribute resources in ways designed to complement American strengths. Fear of the EU is also overblown; the European option remains comparatively unattractive as a mainstay of British defence and claims of a federal EU compromising the Anglo-American defence relationship reflect currently Europhile wishful thinking or a Eurosceptic spectre. British governments view the EU as an option where Washington chooses not to become involved but consistently defend NATO primacy and plan on the assumption that British forces will only engage in major operations alongside US counterparts. While the EU has made impressive progress in developing institutional apparatus and soft security tools it struggles even more than NATO to match military assets to declared commitments and has made few inroads into the intergovernmental defence realm. Britain has helped ensure this, especially where even a hint of threat to NATO arises. Most recently in July 2011 Foreign Secretary Hague shot down a Franco-German backed plan by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton, for a permanent EU operational military headquarters.99 Moreover, the US can further preempt an EU defence challenge to NATO and British ‘defection’ by offering judicious sustenance to the Anglo-American defence relationship such that Britain maintains both its Atlanticist orientation and its precarious balance between its US and European relationships. This means privileging it enough to retain primacy in London’s calculations without such overt preference that France be encouraged to revert from Sarkozy’s Atlantic turn to aspirations for a French-led defence core Europe. All things being equal, it is probable that the Anglo-American defence relationship will wane in public prominence once the Afghan campaign especially winds down and Britain and America reduce their proclivity for elective wars in order to recover strength and assimilate lessons learned. In and of itself this will likely be good for the defence relationship. However, it might also feed the greatest current threat to its long-term health, namely neglect by US administrations and Congressional myopia. Diverging strategic interests could feed this, albeit slowly given Britain’s usefulness in

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keeping watch on America’s European interests, determination to maintain a credible military threshold and prospective role within an American global defence system, especially as part of the protean Anglo-sphere. The more imminent danger is twofold. First, US administrations may fail to invest sufficient consistent attention in maintaining established relationships as they pursue new partnerships and priorities. The Obama administration’s initial neglect of London and subsequent re-embrace of the ‘essential’ relationship bears testament to this danger and the consequent risk to the defence relationship of future US ‘light-switch’ diplomacy vis-à-vis the wider special relationship. Second, and even more likely, is that domestic preoccupations and fear of external relationships compromising American independence and military predominance will cause Congress to become a major obstacle to privileged Anglo-American defence relations, especially in terms of technology transfer, market access and collaborative procurement. This alone would be problematic. However, it would also raise in turn the amount of effort and political capital that administrations would need to expend on the Hill to ensure Britain retained sufficient privilege in practice to sustain the special Anglo-American defence relationship. Though US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy rightly noted in February 2010 that ‘you can’t quickly rebuild a partnership that you’ve neglected’,100 the temptation in this scenario would be to invest capital only sporadically. Therein lies the risk of America diminishing by benign neglect its most capable and reliable military ally and pushing it reluctantly into a reduced international role and deeper European integration.

Notes 1 R.A. Best, Cooperation with like-minded peoples: British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945–1949. Westport, CT, US: Greenwood, 1986. 2 Just how successful he was is debated. See, for instance, M. Middeke, ‘Britain’s global military role, conventional defence and Anglo-American interdependence after Nassau’, Journal of Strategic Studies 24:1, 2001, p. 143; R. Lamb, The Macmillan Years, 1957–63: the Emerging Truth, London: John Murray, 1995, p. 316. 3 J. Baylis, Anglo-American defence relations, 1939–80, London: Macmillan, 1981, p. 93. 4 R. Weitz, ‘Britain’s dual nature in U.S.-Russian nuclear arms control’, in J. Mackby and P. Cornish (Editors), US-UK Nuclear Cooperation after 50 years, Washington DC: CSIS press, 2008, pp. 72–88, at p. 78. 5 J. Baylis, Anglo-American defence relations, 1939–80, London: Macmillan, 1981, p. 43. 6 A. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–70 London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 293. 7 A. Dorman, ‘Crises and Reviews in British Defence Policy’, in S. Croft, A. Dorman, W. Rees and M. Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945–2000: A Policy Re-evaluation, Harlow, UK: Pearson, 2001, pp. 9–28, at p. 16.

The Anglo-American defence relationship 203 8 J. Stocker, ‘Britain’s role in U.S. missile defence’, July 2004, p. 14, http://www. strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/00374.pdf 9 D. Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain, London: Michael Joseph, 1984. 10 A. Pierre, Nuclear Politics: The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939–70 London: Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 79. 11 M. Goodman, ‘With a little help from my friends: The Anglo-American atomic intelligence partnership, 1945–58, Diplomacy and Statecraft 18:1, 2007, 155–83, at p. 156. 12 J. Baylis, Anglo-American defence relations, 1939–80, London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 125, 106. 13 W. Rees, ‘Britain’s Contribution to Global Order’, in S. Croft, A. Dorman, W. Rees and M. Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945–2000, pp. 29–48, at p. 44. 14 C. Finn and P.D. Berg, ‘Anglo-American Strategic Air Power Co-operation in the Cold War and Beyond’, Air and Space Power Journal, Winter 2004, http:// www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj04/win04/finn. html#finn, np. 15 W. Rees, ‘Preserving the Security of Europe’, in S. Croft, A. Dorman, W. Rees and M. Uttley, Britain and Defence 1945–2000, pp. 49–68, at p. 56; C.J Bartlett, ‘The Special Relationship’: A political history of Anglo-American relations since 1945, New York: Longman, 1992, p. 156. 16 J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship. Anglo-American relations from the Cold War to Iraq, Second Edition, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2006, p. 85. 17 ‘Following the Falklands Campaign, we shall now be devoting substantially more resources to defence than had been previously planned.’ Secretary of State for Defence, ‘The Falklands Campaign: the Lessons’, Command 8758, London: HM Stationery office, December 1982, p. 35. 18 W. Walker and P. Gummet, ‘Britain and the European armaments market’, International Affairs 65:3, 1989, p. 425. 19 R. Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, New York: Alfred A Knopf, 2007. 20 Former American Ambassador Raymond Seitz warned explicitly in 1994 that it was ‘likely that our priorities won’t match with quite the same frequency as they once did, and the overlap of our strategic interests may not be quite as extensive as before.’ Speech by Raymond Seitz to the Pilgrims Society, London, 19 April 1994. 21 M. Walker, ‘Variable Geography: America’s Mental Maps of a Greater Europe’, International Affairs 76:3, 2000, p. 460. 22 J. Howorth, ‘Britain, France and the European Defence Initiative’ Survival 42:2, 2000, p. 33. 23 Thatcher cited by R. Harris, ‘Blair’s “ethical” policy’ The National Interest 63, 2001, p. 34. 24 Tony Blair, ‘The power of community can change the world’, speech to the Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 2 October 2001. 25 M. Albright, ‘The Right Balance will Secure NATO’s Future’ Financial Times, 7 December 1999. 26 House of Commons, European Scrutiny Committee, Third Report of Session 2010–11, p.  87, http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmse lect/cmeuleg/428–iii/428iii.pdf 27 Tony Blair’s speech to the Foreign Policy Centre, Tuesday 21 March 2006. 28 Tony Blair’s speech at the Lord Mayor’s Banquet, 15 November 2004. 29 W. Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs 82:1, 2005, p. 55.

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30 A. Dorman, ‘Reconciling Britain to Europe in the Next Millennium: The Evolution to British Defence Policy in the post-Cold War Era’, Paper to the International Studies Association, March 2000, p.  41, http://www.ciaonet. org/isa/doa01 31 R. North, ‘The Wrong Side of the Hill: The Secret Realignment of UK Defence Policy with the EU’, Centre for Policy Studies, October 2005, p. iv. 32 British Ministry of Defence, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World. Future Capabilities,’ Command 6269, July 2004, Introduction, p. 2. 33 S. Marsh and W. Rees, The European Union in European Security, London: Routledge, 2012, Chapter 3. 34 J. Major, John Major: The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p. 540. 35 Ibid., p. 541 36 S. McGhie, ‘UK leads security assistance force’, Janes Defence Weekly 37, 2002, p. 2. 37 J.K. Wither, ‘British Bulldog or Bush’s Poodle? Anglo-American relations and the Iraq war’, Parameters, winter 2003–04, p. 75. 38 Unattributed, ‘Britain and America: Who gains?’, The Economist, vol.360, no.8241, 29 September 2001, p. 35. 39 Unattributed, ‘Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010’, SIPRI, April 2011, http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/fact sheet2010 40 R. Renwick, Fighting With Allies, New York: Times Books, 1996, p. 394. 41 M. Thatcher The Downing Street Years , London: HarperCollins, 1993, pp. 823–4 42 A. Sullivan, ‘Winds of war are blowing Britain away from Europe’, The Sunday Times, 30 March 2003. 43 Speech by Tony Blair at the Lord Mayor of London’s Banquet, 22 November 1999. 44 A. Gamble, Between Europe and America: The Future of British Politics, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave, 2003, p. 232. 45 B. Barder, ‘Britain: Still Looking for that Role?’, The Political Quarterly 72:3, 2001, p. 370. 46 The Conservative Party, ‘The Best Future for Britain’, 1992 General Election Manifesto, http://www.psr.keele.ac.uk/area/uk/man/con92.htm. 47 Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review, July 1998, http://www.mod. uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_ complete.pdf; UK Ministry of Defence, Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, July 2002, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/79542E9C-11044AFA-9A4D-8520F35C5C93/0/sdr_a_new_chapter_cm5566_vol1.pdf 48 Cited from Tony Blair’s speech to the Foreign Policy Centre, 21 March 2006. 49 C. Hill, ‘Foreign Policy’ in A. Seldon (editor), The Blair Effect. The Blair government 1997–2001, London: Little, Brown and company, 2001, pp. 331–54 50 D. Baker, ‘Islands of the mind: New Labour’s “defensive engagement” with the European Union’, Political Quarterly 76:1, 2005, p. 29. 51 Statement by Robin Cook, London, 19 January 2001. 52 Condoleeza Rice, speech to the Republican National Convention, 1August 2000. 53 UK National Archives, FO 371 38523, ‘The Essentials of an American Policy’, 21 March 1944. 54 Speech by Tony Blair at the George Bush senior library, 7 April 2002; ‘The UK and the United States: realising Churchill’s vision of interdependence’, Speech by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, to the British American Business Inc, New York, 19 April 2002. 55 Comments of Jack Straw, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 4 March 2003, column 173.

The Anglo-American defence relationship 205 56 US National Security Strategy, March 2006, pp.  37–8; US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 6 February 2006, pp. 6–7. 57 House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2010), ‘Global Security: US:UK Relations’, HC 114, Incorporating HC 1100–i, Session 2008–09, London: The Stationery Office Limited, p. 25. 58 Statement by FCO Minister, Denis MacShane, Westminster Hall, London, 25 April 2002. 59 Speech by Tony Blair at the George Bush Senior Presidential Library, 7 April, 2002; P. Waugh and C. Brown, ‘Hawkish Blair tries to calm the doubters’, The Independent, 8 April 2002, p. 4. 60 George W Bush, ‘Message to the Congress of the United States’, 14 June 2004. 61 The Quint has no official status but its resolutions repeatedly feed in to the EU’s CFSP. 62 Views of Rusk cited in S. Dockrill, ‘Forging the Anglo-American global defence partnership: Harold Wilson, Lyndon Johnson and the Washington summit, December 1964’, Journal of Strategic Studies 23:4, 2000, p. 107. 63 US National Security Strategy, May 2010, p. 41, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 64 Prime Minister and President Obama article: an essential relationship, 24 May 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/statements-and-articles/2011/05/ prime-minister-and-president-obama-article-an-essential-relationship-64103 65 N. Gardner, ‘Mind the Gap: Is the Relationship Still Special?’, World Affairs Journal, March/April 2011, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/articles/2011– MarApr/full-Gardiner-MA-2011.html 66 Council of the European Union, Council conclusions on Military Capability Development, 3055th Foreign Affairs (Defence) Council meeting Brussels, 9 December 2010, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/EN/foraff/118347.pdf 67 Foreign Secretary Jack Straw argued in 2002 that ‘an ambitious foreign policy with global reach’ followed automatically from Britain’s global interests and it having the world’s fourth largest economy, an active development aid programme and very effective armed forces. Jack Straw, Britain’s Future World Role’, Password, 2002, no.8, np. 68 H. Strachan, ‘The Strategic Gap in British Defence Policy’, Survival 51:4, 2009, p. 51. 69 A. Bloxham, ‘WikiLeaks: Britain mocked by US over “special relationship”’, 4 December 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ wikileaks/8180709/WikiLeaks-Britain-mocked-by-US-over-specialrelationship.html 70 Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), Cm 7948, London: The Stationery Office, October 2010, p. 59. 71 A. Bloxham, ‘WikiLeaks: Britain mocked by US over “special relationship”’, 4 December 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/ 8180709/WikiLeaks-Britain-mocked-by-US-over-special-relationship.html 72 UK White Paper, Delivering Security in a Changing World, p. 8, Cm 6041-I, December 2003, http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/051AF365-0A97-455099C0-4D87D7C95DED/0/cm6041I_whitepaper2003.pdf 73 Ministry of Defence, ‘UK Operations in Iraq: Lessons for the Future’, December 2003, pp. 34 and 36. 74 Ministry of Defence, Paper No. 2 – Multi-national Defence Co-operation, 2002, p. 8, http:www.mod.uk/issues/cooperation/multinational.htm 75 ‘Treaty between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island and the French Republic for Defence and Security Cooperation’, London, 2

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Steve Marsh November 2010, http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm79/ 7976/7976.pdf, p. 9. C.M. O’Donnell, ‘Britain’s coalition government and EU defence cooperation: undermining British interests’, International Affairs 87: 2, 2011, p. 420. M. Chalmers, ‘Keeping our powder dry?’, RUSI Journal 156:1, 2011, p. 20. J. Kirkup, ‘Hillary Clinton’s warning to Britain over cuts in defence budget’, The Daily Telegraph, 14 October 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ newstopics/politics/defence/8065363/Hillary-Clintons-warning-to-Britainover-cuts-in-defence-budget.html B. Jones, ‘Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European Defence?’, Occasional Paper 88, February 2011, European Union Institute for Security Studies, p. 14. Cited in unattributed, ‘SDSR strategy “was deficit reduction”’, 19 May 2011, http://www.defencemanagement.com/news_story.asp?id=16345 Unattributed, ‘Background paper on SIPRI military expenditure data, 2010’, SIPRI, April 2011. M. Chalmers, ‘Keeping our powder dry?’, RUSI Journal 156:1, 2011, p. 20. HM Government, British Strategic Defence and Security Review,2010, p. 17. Ibid., p. 60. View of McNamara cited in D. Kunz, ‘Somewhat mixed up together: AngloAmerican defence and financial policy during the 1960s’, The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27:2, 1999, p. 222. Cited in unattributed, ‘The ghost ship: “Mighty Ark” emerges through freezing fog to be greeted by cheering crowds as aircraft carrier returns to her home port for the last time’, 4 December 2010, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/ article-1335326/HMS-Ark-Royal-aircraft-carrier-returns-Portsmouth-time.html Public Accounts.Committee – Fifty-Sixth Report, ‘Providing the UK’s Carrier Strike Capability’, 23 November 2011, http://www.publications.parliament. uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1427/142702.htm HM Government, British Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010, p. 60; US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600.PDF; US Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report, February 2010 http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf Unattributed, ‘Factbox – How Britain’s 15 biggest defence contracts stand’, 22 February 2011, http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/22/uk-britain-defencefactbox-idUKTRE71L3VC20110222 Testimony of Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, before the House Committee on International Relations: Subcommittee hearing on Europe and Emerging Threats, 8 March 2006. Kurt Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, Remarks at Media Roundtable, Brussels, Belgium, 6 February 2006. A. Bloxham, ‘WikiLeaks: Britain mocked by US over “special relationship”’, 4 December 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/wikileaks/ 8180709/WikiLeaks-Britain-mocked-by-US-over-special-relationship.html. House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (2010), ‘Global Security: US:UK Relations’, HC 114, Incorporating HC 1100–i, Session 2008–09, London: The Stationery Office Limited. E. Kapstein, ‘Capturing fortress Europe: International collaboration and the Joint Strike Fighter’, Survival 46:3, 2004, p. 138. US Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, February 2010, p.  xvi, http://www.defense.gov/qdr/qdr%20as%20of%2029jan10%201600. PDF

The Anglo-American defence relationship 207 96 James Thomas cited in E. Kapstein, ‘Allies and Armaments’, Survival 44:2, 2002, 141–55, at p. 149. 97 UK National Archive, FO371 177830, PLA 24/4, Draft Paper: SC(64)30, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Steering Committee: An Anglo-American Balance Sheet, 20 July 1964, cited in M. Middeke, ‘Britain’s global military role, conventional defence and Anglo-American interdependence after Nassau’, p. 157. 98 UK White Paper, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World’, 3.5. See also HM Governement, British Strategic Defence and Security Review, 2010, p. 16. 99 ‘I have made very clear that the United Kingdom will not agree to a permanent operational HQ. We will not agree to it now and we will not agree to it in the future. That is a red line’. Hague, cited in B. Waterfield, ‘Britain blocks EU plans for “operational military headquarters”’, The Telegraph, 18 July 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/8645749/Britainblocks-EU-plans-for-operational-military-headquarters.html 100 Michèle Flournoy, US Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, ‘Rebalancing and Reforming Defense: Quadrennial Defense Review 2010’, 2 February 2010, http://www.cfr.org/defense-policy-and-budget/rebalancing-reformingdefense-quadrennial-defense-review-2010/p21363

8

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American intelligence and security co-operation Adam D. M. Svendsen

Introduction Anglo-American intelligence and security relations are multi-faceted and highly pluralistic. Adopting the different established ‘schools’ of interpretation of Anglo-American relations, UK-US intelligence and security relations effectively reflect a ‘complex co-existence plurality’ of the main modes of ‘evangelicalism’ and ‘functionalism’, and, less substantially, ‘terminalism’.1 When analytically disaggregated, they also consist of several different high to low ranging levels of experience and activity, including strategic, professional and personal dimensions.2 Especially during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ (c.2001–09), on the whole relations have grown exponentially. This has been in harmony with intelligence liaison trends generally being on ‘a continuum with expansion’. Sustaining coverage of the multiple pluralities involved, ‘good, bad and ugly’ aspects have likewise increased. Both internally in their relations and externally during their interactions beyond, the UK and US continue to attempt to carefully navigate those complex dimensions.3 Focus, here, is concentrated on the dynamics of the covert intelligence world. In summary, this chapter argues that while both partners have gained through their enhanced interactions, a reflection of the ‘good’ experienced in their relations, greater strains are also readily apparent. Because of the asymmetric nature of the relationship, and due to the fact that, on the whole, the UK has not gone as far and as fast as the US down roads such as implementing the counter-terrorism paradigm, on qualitative bases critics can effectively assert that the UK has become more exposed to a higher quantity of guilt by association. Generally, this has been due to the UK standing substantially ‘shoulder to shoulder’ with the US, particularly in the post-9/11 international security environment.4 Some ‘blowback’ does figure. This last observation is not least apparent concerning the controversial ‘bad’ and ‘ugly’ issues of ‘normalised’ US extraordinary renditions and intensive interrogation techniques, as well as including the presence of ‘secret prisons’.5 It extends to also include the issue of alleged torture and the poor treatment of detainees – of which, in

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 209 the UK, arguably the Binyam Mohamed case, unfolding during 2008–10, has become the most emblematic. These ethically and morally vexing traits in relations were witnessed most emphatically during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ and the George W. Bush era, occurring over the years 2001–09.6 Hand-in-glove, at least in the background, there has been the lingering shadow of an official, and already widely challenged from the date of its announcement in July 2010, UK inquiry into allegations of torture. These developments were confronted for a time until mid-January 2012, when the Gibson inquiry was formally cancelled/postponed by the UK Government.7 The eventual shelving of the inquiry, before it actually got underway, was due to further UK Scotland Yard police investigations being launched into more recent controversial revelations that emerged following rapid developments in Libya – for instance, associated with the fall of Tripoli during late August 2011, and including, perhaps most troubling for Whitehall and Langley, the associated public disclosure of documentary evidence obtained during the ‘rebel’ overrun of the headquarters of Colonel Gaddafi’s former intelligence and security apparatus.8 Collectively, these problematic aspects have not been easy to navigate. They have been difficult to negotiate in both UK-US intelligence and security relations, as well as in several domains beyond merely those confines. Several compromises, not always for the ‘better’, nor ethically or morally pure or right, have been witnessed. These distinctly unsatisfactory features have had to be navigated carefully and effectively in relationships, as – at least potentially – important intelligence and information flows are also closely imperiled.9 This chapter adopts a straightforward approach. Evaluation begins with the in-depth unpacking of general transatlantic ‘gains’ in UK-US intelligence and security relations. These have tended to be more long-term and enduring in their influence. Next, this chapter then examines the more specific ‘strains’ experienced transatlantically in relations. By contrast, generally these have tended to have more of a shorter-term impact on interactions. Finally, some overall conclusions are presented.

Transatlantic gains – reaping the ‘good’ in UK-US intelligence and security relations. Characterising the strategic terrain In overall terms, there can be little doubt that both the UK and US gain significantly from their interaction together. Repeatedly, the mode of functionalism, where there are particular purposes behind their interactions, is key in general UK-US relations.10 In turn, these constructs are substantially underpinned by the functionalism that flows in the more specifically focused and details-concerned area of Anglo-American intelligence and security co-operation.11

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Along with the Anglo-American nuclear relationship, these more specific relations form one of the key pillars for the wider UK-US relationship.12 The UK and US intelligence and security interactions also represent a ‘best’ example of general international intelligence co-operation in practice or in action. Indeed, UK journalist and former military intelligence officer Michael Smith has credibly argued that ‘the relationship between the various American spy organisations has been so bad at times … that they have had far better relations with their British counterparts than they have enjoyed with each other.’13 Together, the UK and US intelligence communities form what can be regarded as the most globalised, homogenised and internationally standardised liaison relationship. This is where the traditionally more compartmentalised national intelligence lines have become increasingly blurred in an arguably post-modern manner.14 Today, the UK–US intelligence community has become an increasingly fused entity, boasting exceptional ‘networked’ as well as quasi-epistemic qualities.15 Indeed, not too much of a claim can be fashioned that this domain constitutes the most ‘special’ and important dimension of contemporary Anglo-American relations. In part, this is demonstrated by the fact that the interactions embedded within the intelligence and security domain are most carefully protected and finitely managed.16 Some firewalls and safeguards still exist. Any tensions encountered here are arguably kept contained through their expeditious management. For instance, this was seen during the Katharine Gun UK Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)-‘whistleblower’ affair in 2003–04. This was an episode that emerged after Gun, a translator working at GCHQ, leaked a controversial ‘informal’ US National Security Agency (NSA) memo to the London Observer newspaper in early March 2003, shortly before the launch of the Iraq War.17 The ‘special’ management arrangements are found enshrined historically. For example, they are substantially formalised within the longstanding agreements between the UK and US dating from the 1940s, including being embedded within the appendices of the documents relating to the UKUSA Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) arrangement.18 This is especially apparent where the few documents that have been declassified concerning the UKUSA arrangement note: ‘In addition to the … regularly assigned [liaison] personnel, visits by selected personnel for short periods of time to deal with special problems will be encouraged.’19 Through using these relationship management tools, the UK and US strove to carefully prevent business from spiraling out of control, and they continue to do so to date. Operational parameters remain distinct. In summary, within the intelligence and security domain of international relations, much is vulnerable to high risk. With acute strategic resonances, intelligence itself, including sensitive sources, is frequently at considerable stake in complex,

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 211 multi-functional, high-tempo and condensed-space operating environments. This is, together with the operations and the methods used surrounding the intelligence, also being intimately involved in the overall mix of developments.20 These factors help to concentrate minds in both London and Washington when interacting. The gains for both the UK and US can be disaggregated. These are composed of both general and more specific components, which intricately overlap. Qualitative and quantitative aspects are closely shared. It is most helpful if appraisals begin with the general qualities. For the UK, Whitehall is not likely to ever voluntarily relinquish the intelligence and security relationship.21 Indeed, to a substantial extent, conducting this relationship has largely become a rarely questioned, ingrained habit for its practitioners, at least in the UK.22 The UK-US intelligence and security relationship delivers much of high value. The US also gains much in general terms. There is a substantial degree of burden sharing, socially, politically, and economically.23 In various ways, considerable, or, at the least, sufficient, ‘mission’ support is provided by the UK. As former US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Michael Hayden (2006–09) observed generally in 2010: ‘We’re big, powerful, technologically savvy, global, and we have a broad global context into which we can put events. Our [foreign] liaison partners are local, focused, and culturally nimble. That’s good partnership.’24 Together with the other features discussed in this chapter, the UK similarly offers those qualities. Among many tasks, overall the support provided by the UK helps to sustain the US hegemony of intelligence power. The UK also helps to bolster the US intelligence and security reach, both regionally in Europe and more widely across the globe.25 Historical underpinnings There is much historical importance attached. Over the past 70 years, a shared history has developed. Indeed, it has even come to matter strongly, as well as gaining what can be regarded as some self-sustaining critical mass and momentum.26 When charting the (today, in 2012, better-researched) historical origins of the Anglo-American intelligence and security relationship, most notably some exchange of military intelligence occurred during the 1914–18 First World War.27 However, it is fair to claim that UK-US intelligence and security interactions at their most substantial and formal, including even occurring on an ‘industrial scale’, date from the 1939–45 Second World War, and especially from the year 1943.28 This claim still stands albeit those interactions may not have always been entirely smooth all the time in every area of intelligence and security activity.29 Ebbs and flows in relations at particular times aside, the Anglo-American intelligence and security co-operation has continued to burgeon over time

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throughout the twentieth century and more or less firmly into the twentyfirst. In essence, from the postwar era onwards, these relations have been considerably aided by the overarching crisis and emergency conditions of joint concern engendered by, first, the Cold War (c.1946–89), and then, later, those constructs continued fostering the relationship through the worries involved during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ and ‘Long War’ (c.2001–09), and continue to do so through their persistence in its wake to date.30 Moreover, on both structural and cultural bases, UK and US intelligence and security communities are closely intertwined. When compared, this is perhaps to a greater extent than any other countries’ intelligence and security services, helped by both partners using the English language. From their earliest days, and especially during periods of their establishment (such as the CIA in 1947), US intelligence institutions have over time largely benefited from their close relationship with British Intelligence.31 In November 1944, as General William J. ‘Wild Bill’ Donovan, head of the US wartime intelligence and special forces service, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), declared in a memorandum to US President Franklin D. Roosevelt: ‘we have greatly profited by our working with the British’, while stressing that ‘at the same time we have maintained the integrity of our organization.’32 More widely, US intelligence practitioner, W. R. Johnson, remarked in 1976 that: ‘the history of our Service [the CIA], from its first feeble squirming in the arms of its old British aunt, has been dominated in many ways by liaison.’33 Through these substantial ties, however specifically embellished, both partners have provided one another with a high degree of education, each learning many useful and valuable lessons from their individual and joint experience. This was a process that was still clearly evident around 2002–3 when terrorism threat analysis centres (as discussed below) were being established.34 Substantial resilience in relations has also been demonstrated effectively over the years. The UK and US intelligence and security interactions have successfully weathered times of intense stress in history. For example, this was most in evidence during the low ‘blip’ in general Anglo-American relations surrounding the Suez Crisis of 1956, when, nevertheless, US U-2 ‘spy’ plane Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) product continued to be shared with the UK along regular-operating defence channels, helpfully allowing the UK to assess how effective its bombing of Egypt had been. This was even while UK Prime Minister Anthony Eden and US President Dwight Eisenhower had simultaneously fallen out over policy and strategy issues at the ‘highest levels’.35 Historical UK-US political differences over the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Northern Ireland, particularly acute during the Troubles in the 1970s and 1980s, have similarly been navigated adequately.36 UK-US intelligence and security relations will again weather such times of stress, as those events do not occur in isolation disconnected from the wider context.37 Indeed, in many ways, the sustained development of UK-US

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 213 intelligence and security interactions has been considerably helped by exponentially increasing general developments in wider affairs, such as regarding technology. The so-called ‘computer and Internet revolutions’, and the increasingly expanding and networked ‘information age’ era, along with today’s rapidly burgeoning cyber concerns and social media dimensions, can be readily cited. These are substantial transformative developments to which both the UK GCHQ and the US NSA can certainly attest.38 General trends have an important impact.39 Nuts and bolts More specific observations exist. The UK and US share a large volume of intelligence, as especially witnessed in the domain of Technical Intelligence (TECHINT), including SIGINT and IMINT. Their intelligence exchange particularly includes the ‘take’ acquired from US ‘spy’ satellite platforms, in which system the UK is a part investor.40 Albeit being conducted on a significantly smaller scale, due to their distinct asymmetric resource differences, UK collection efforts complement those of the US intelligence community.41 This extends across the full spectrum of different intelligence collection disciplines or ‘INTs’ that exist (see figure 8.1).42 The UK also offers the US valuable foreign language assistance, especially in the rapid-paced domains of human intelligence (HUMINT) and SIGINT.43 It also provides a useful back-up role in times of crisis. This was seen, for instance, in 2000 when the GCHQ assisted the NSA during a period of prominent computer outage.44 The UK similarly assists the US on analysis and assessment (‘estimate’) issues. It helps to answer the grand ‘what is it?’ and ‘what does it mean?’ questions. Rather than being more akin to the other allies of the US, and being merely more locally and regionally-focused in its activities and outlook, the UK is a US partner that adopts more of a world-view. It remains enduringly interested in Weltpolitik across the globe, also taking into account its other friends and allies, such as the United Nations (UN), North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and Commonwealth partners.45 So-called ‘alliance obligations’ also continue to be adhered to in a suitably robust manner. Pursuing this path is an essential attribute in our contemporary era, which can be appropriately characterised generally as being mainly shaped by globalisation writ large.46 Mutual interests also feature significantly. In 2006, emphasising the functional utility of UK-US ties, US House Committee on Homeland Security Chairman Peter T. King reportedly declared that: ‘Increased intelligence-sharing and cooperation with foreign countries, especially Britain, has been “one of our biggest accomplishments since 9/11”.’47 Enhanced co-operation was particularly apparent during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. This was especially concentrated on the media headlinedominating issues of counter-terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) non-/counter-proliferation.48 In February 2009, as reported during

214 Adam D. M. Svendsen vendsen United Kingdom

United States of America

Central Government & Key Government Departments

The President and The White House

The Prime Minister (PM) and No. 10 Downing Street

Leadership, Directing & Strategy/policy decision-making etc

UK Cabinet Office - especially UK National Security Council (NSC), Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), and their staffs

National Security Council (NSC)

Department of Defence (DoD/the Pentagon)

Ministry of Defence (MoD) Analysis & assessment/estimate product

Home Office - especially the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT)

Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

US State Department - especially Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR)

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) - especially security-related departments

Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) - inc. the National Counterterrorism Center

(US ODNI has several relevant lies 10 multiple UK agencies, etc., as displayed)

Intelligence

(NCTC)

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

HUMINT (human intelligence)

National Security Agency (NSA)

SIGINT (signals intelligence)

BBC Monitoring

British Security Service (MI5) - inc. the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC)

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

Law enforcement

Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)

OSINT (open source intelligence)

ODNI Open Source Center (OSC)

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF)

(due to be replaced by National Crime Agency)

Police - especially New York Police Department (NYPD)

Police - especially London Metropolitan Police Counter-terrorism Command (SO15)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

Military/Defence

Secret Intelligence Service (SIS/MI6)

US CENTCOM (Central Command)

IMINT, MASINT, etc (imagery intelligence, measurement) Defence and signature intelligence, etc.)

Intelligence

UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) OPINT (operations intelligence)

US SOCOM (Special Operations Command)

British Special Forces (SAS and SBS)

N.B. Linkages shown in this figure are not exclusive. Only major, approximate ties are shown, mainly as they occur, e.g., transatlantically, and in the organisational/institutional sectors, at mostly the strategic level. Only a very general and rough representation of UK-US intelligence and security interactions can be conveyed in this figure, and they remain subject to change over time UK-US intelligence and security 'counterparts' do not always directly mirror each other, and their interactions vary according to the details and demands of the specific cases being liaised over making simple generalisations difficult.

Figure Figure 8.1 8.1 Mapping Mapping key key UK-US UK-US intelligence intelligence and and security security ties ties (as (as at at late late 2011)] 2011)]

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 215 an evidence session given in camera to a sub-committee of the UK House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee, head of the Office of Security and Counter-terrorism (OSCT) in the UK Home Office, Charles Farr: confirmed there were CIA agents operating in Britain and that Britain had a “very close” relationship with the US intelligence community. Asked if CIA agents and other “outside organisations” were working in Britain, Farr replied: “Most certainly, yes. Are they declared? Yes. They are in regular dialogue with our agencies here. The cornerstone of this is the American relationship.” Providing some further insights, Farr continued: “Why? For two reasons, I think, above all: because of the huge American capability that can be brought to bear on counter-terrorism, and has been since 9/11. Secondly … because people who pose a threat to this country are six hours away from the eastern seaboard, something which the Americans are acutely aware of, as are we, and therefore take a very close interest in.” 49 Due to the pressing nature of these threats, as well as the persisting uncertainty surrounding them, we can readily anticipate that these trends will continue. Similar trajectories will be reflected into the foreseeable future.50 Values also matter. UK and US intelligence and security relations clearly extend beyond mere costs, ad hoc-leaning quid pro quos, and stripped-down interests into specially sculpted and more regularised areas of responsibility. Stemming from already forged deals, including in those areas where even ‘fudges’ exist (see below), these bespoke areas of responsibility help to increase the speed of UK-US interactions. This attribute is highly useful, particularly when the UK and US are working together, literally side-byside, in a plethora of high-tempo and condensed-space operating contexts, and when confronting a substantial quantity of challenging problems – as seen in recent years, for example, while undertaking military operations together in Iraq (from 2002) and Afghanistan (from 2001).51 Important worth is likewise clear in intelligence-related sectors of interaction, such as in the area of Special (Operations) Forces interoperability, helping the conduct of joint military operations and striving towards the most successful meeting of overall mission accomplishment factors.52 Dynamic relationship qualities Observations, here, can be advanced further. Focused on the tasks of counter-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation, together with the

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bilaterally-focused interactions being underway, more multilaterallyorientated UK-US intelligence and security co-operation might additionally be invoked. This is seen particularly markedly through the UK and US participation in broader intelligence access, sharing and pooling arrangements, such as the UKUSA arrangement. Thereby, enhanced intelligence coverage of the globe is provided, alongside input from other partners, extending to including the other English-speaking countries of Canada, Australia and New Zealand (collectively the so-called ‘Five Eyes’).53 Indeed, highlighting the importance of the UKUSA forum, the UK intelligence oversight and accountability body, the Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), noted in its Annual Report of 2000 that ‘the quality of intelligence gathered clearly reflects the value’.54 These areas of joint intelligence endeavour have since rapidly expanded. From around 2003–04 onwards, the increasing international connection of joint (terrorism) threat analysis and assessment centres, such as, foremost from its outset, the UK Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) and the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) (originally the US Terrorist Threat Integration Center (TTIC) from May 2003 to December 2004), can likewise be included as part of the Anglo-American intelligence liaison expansion trends.55 On the security policy development front, a more recent participant in co-operative UK-US intelligence and security interactions since May 2010 has been the UK National Security Council (NSC) and its associated satellite committees.56 Although arguably, at times, being somewhat problematic, even the ‘European-dimension’ considerations, notwithstanding the European Union (EU) Lisbon Treaty being increasingly implemented from 2008, fail to substantially dent or dampen the considerable intelligence and security co-operation between the UK and US.57 This occurs as the UK continues to attempt to perform its role as the transatlantic bridge between Europe and America, through pursuing its most desired dual-track foreign policy.58 Ultimately, the UK-US intelligence and security interactions are underway amid a wider appreciation that, on the whole, more important, higher and broader considerations in foreign policy exist for all parties involved – whether they are the UK, US, EU or other European-region countries. Factors likely to impact upon the wider rule of law, global governance and global order, or operational policy (where policies and strategies can work as most desired and intended by their designers), are all recognised to be crucially at stake.59 This is together with all parties striving to best maintain concepts such as the ‘Protective State’ and the ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) at home and abroad.60 More insights prevail. Where the multiple bargains or ‘fudges’ exist (essentially where the UK and US might ‘agree to disagree’ in areas), each party’s detailed differences can be more mutually traded-off during the process of co-operation. This results in a greater degree of neutralisation in overall relations, including at times over the pressing and highly vexing moral and ethical questions frequently encountered.61 For instance,

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 217 compromises are often implemented by the UK so that it can sufficiently maintain at least some degree of access or ‘buy-in’ into the high-level military and political US decision-making processes.62 Both partners seek to sustain a high degree of flexibility and agility in relations. For similar reasons, the differences experienced in relations are not allowed to overwhelm the overall system or regime of UK-US intelligence and security relations. This is either systemically or systematically.63 Some of those differences are explored next. These have generated some noteworthy strains within contemporary UK-US intelligence and security relations in recent years and they should not be overlooked.

Transatlantic strains – navigating the ‘bad’ and the ‘ugly’ in UK-US intelligence and security relations Background Intensified relations have brought challenges with them. The enhanced UK-US intelligence and security interactions over counter-terrorism (CT) and WMD counter-proliferation (CP) issues have not all been smooth. Several ‘differences’ have crept in and were experienced most vividly during the so-called ‘War on Terror’ era, together with some ‘fallout’ being encountered in its wake.64 These historical UK-US intelligence and security differences, such as concerning recent CP issues in the early twenty-first century, surrounding, for example, the breaking up of the A.Q. Khan ‘nuclear network’, and the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq and its aftermath, have already been extensively discussed in the subject literature.65 Extending observations, sometimes, when enough agreement has been present, these differences have acted in a constructive ‘vis-à-vis manner’ on relations, complementing and even providing some synergistic effects. At other times, however, some of the differences encountered have had more of a negative impact, acting in a harder ‘versus manner’ on relations.66 It is on this last mode of differences that attention is now concentrated. Through their development, some greater stress has been introduced into relations. Some increased strains on the UK and US intelligence and security co-operation have been generated and witnessed.67 The British ‘have a really hard time understanding that people like Masri and Abu Qatada are real goddamn problems’ 68 During the so-called ‘War on Terror’, a substantial degree of increased awkwardness was injected into relations. Some of the most enduring difficulties have been CT-related. Certainly around the summer of 2005, and soon after the 7 July London bombings, there were apparent concerns emanating particularly forcefully from US critics that the UK was not doing enough to clampdown on its domestic extremists. Both homeland and

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international security delivery paucities were claimed. At least for the UK and US, 2005 was a bleak year during the so-called ‘War on Terror’. According to Daniel Pipes, a US commentator, ‘one American security group has called for Britain to be listed as a terrorism-sponsoring state. Counterterrorism specialists disdain the British.’ This was while he claimed ‘Roger Cressey calls London “easily the most important jihadist hub in Western Europe” ’ , and ‘Steven Simon dismisses the British capital as “the Star Wars bar scene” of Islamic radicals.’69 Sentiments reflective of ‘terminalism’ made some inroads. These differences essentially pivoted around the fact that the situation being confronted was generally perceived slightly differently by those in the UK and by people in the US. On the one hand, the UK generally saw the situation it was confronting as an emergency and/or a crisis. In its disruption activities, the UK intended to have a frustrating impact on adversaries and their subversive use of the terrorism tactic. This was while the US, on the other hand, viewed the terrorism situation that was being confronted in more globalised strategic-terms, as a wider ranging so-called ‘war’. In the military-dominant actions it employed, the US instead intended to have more of a forward defeating effect on its adversaries with greater kinetic impact. UK and US risk thresholds varied.70 Some of the UK-US differences did not stop there. What can be regarded as the normalisation, even regularisation, of the US extraordinary renditions process, and the associated poor treatment of detainees, also figured centrally.71 Certainly in the UK, the controversial case of Binyam Mohamed has arguably been the most emblematic of these problems.72 Into 2011–12, this case, together with other prickly ‘terror’ detainee-related cases, has continued to have an important impact.73 Most crucially, the case of Binyam Mohamed brought with it the whiff of scandal and some sustained allegations of the UK’s complicity in torture. Naturally, this has considerably impacted on closely associated intelligence-sharing areas.74 These alleged torture claims have been strongly denied by the UK Government, but they have been hard to dismiss officially.75 Indeed, as UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) Minister, Ivan Lewis, argued during an appearance on the BBC Radio 4 Today Programme in August 2009: ‘We always make it clear that torture is unacceptable and abhorrent.’ He continued by remarking: ‘What is true, however, in a modern world you cannot counter terrorism by acting in isolation; we have to work on a global basis with many other countries.’76 Attempts at contextualisation became the focus. However, a multitude of revelations kept on being exposed. The ‘torture’ problem Challenges related to allegations of ‘torture’ have figured prominently. While becoming somewhat besieged by the strains experienced (if only by alleged close association), UK-US intelligence and security relations have

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 219 had to be explicitly and rigorously defended in public. This has not all been comfortable, especially for activities that prefer to be conducted covertly. Again embedded in the context of the Binyam Mohamed affair (2008–10), and while it appealed after it had lost its case during early February 2009, the UK FCO argued in a statement that: ‘Intelligence relationships, especially with the United States, are vital to Britain’s national security.’ Maintaining its defence, more specifically regarding the issue of why essentially summaries of the sensitive confidential information concerning Binyam Mohamed shared by the US with the UK intelligence and security services should not be openly published, the FCO statement continued with the important observation that the intelligence relationships are ‘based on an assumption of trust. Matters regarded as secret by one government should be treated as secret by others.’77 In order to try and better bolster its legal defence, reportedly ‘the Foreign Office (FCO) solicited the letter from the US State Department that forced British judges to block the disclosure of CIA files documenting the torture of a British resident [Binyam Mohamed] held in Guantánamo Bay.’78 This movement was decried by critics, such as Crispin Black, who claimed that ‘the Foreign Secretary’s suppression of evidence of alleged torture was typical of Britain’s “intelligence cringe” towards the USA.’79 Later, in early 2010, the appeal advanced by the UK Government was lost in the UK Court of Appeal. The earlier finding of the High Court of February 2009, that the information should be released, was upheld by the UK judicial system. This judgment was passed on the basis that the bespoke information had already been publicly revealed during a US court case.80 UK-US intelligence and security relations did not escape unscathed. The passing of this legal judgment was very much to the expressed disappointment of the US Government.81 Established international information governance and handling principles were being undermined. These form the bedrock for effective secret interactions. Indeed, as the US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) remarked in a statement: The protection of confidential information is essential to strong, effective security and intelligence cooperation among allies. The decision by a United Kingdom court to release classified information provided by the United States is not helpful, and we deeply regret it . Somewhat softening the blow for the agencies involved, the ODNI statement continued: The United States and the United Kingdom have a long history of close cooperation that relies on mutual respect for the handling of classified information. This court decision creates additional challenges, but our two countries will remain united in our efforts to fight against violent extremist groups .82

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More concerns prevail. The Binyam Mohamed case clearly has significant implications that extend far beyond merely its own parameters. Again, these implications especially cluster around the central ‘third party rule’ (sometimes also known interchangeably as the ‘confidentiality rule’ or ‘control principle’) in intelligence liaison interactions. This protocol is designed to preserve the confidentiality of secret exchanges of information between different parties.83 Wider ramifications than just for UK-US intelligence and security liaison relations therefore exist, as these legallyorientated challenges to the sanctity of the ‘third party rule’ impact on all of the UK’s intelligence liaison interactions. This is manifest as these legal challenges have a general eroding effect on one of the most fundamental intelligence standards and best practices that seeks to govern these types of interactions, including when they are occurring internationally.84 Indeed, at least in some circumstances, this rule, as a safeguard, actually has greater value in being preserved for facilitating future interactions and essential liaison enablers, such as trust, than the value the shared intelligence protected by it sometimes possesses (reflecting that the whole system or regime involved is greater than merely the sum of its parts).85 Where this issue goes into the future, and what exactly will be its overall fallout, still waits to be fully, and more clearly, seen. This is especially in terms of its wider effects and outcomes over the longer term, and not only with ramifications for merely UK-US intelligence and security relations. In its 2010 National Security Strategy, the UK Government argued: Our security and intelligence agencies play a vital role in protecting our country from threats to our way of life. It is inherent in their work that most of it has to be done in secret to protect those who risk their lives for our security, and to maintain the confidence and cooperation of partners overseas … Continuing, the Government noted in its National Security Strategy document that: [W]e must strike a balance, between the transparency that accountability normally entails, and the secrecy that security demands… we have to strike a balance between public condemnation of any deviation from our values and the need to protect our security through international cooperation. Striking these balances is not always straightforward, and reasonable people can differ on how to do it. In recent years it has not proved easy to find this balance in some cases.86 While enough mutual interests and/or mutual values do remain present for sustaining UK-US (and other) intelligence and security relations to an adequate extent, worries persist.87 However, what can be argued as somewhat of a ‘breach of the dam’, with any consequent ‘flooding’, for UK intelligence

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 221 and security services and the UK Government more widely, regarding the secrecy-sharing dilemma raised and encountered in these cases, seems to be sufficiently stemmed, at least for now. This is particularly the case as the UK Government has attempted to draw a distinct line under these cases and their related issues, with some prominent out-of-court settlements, for example.88 Further landscape features Other relevant developments in UK and US intelligence and security relations have surfaced in recent years. Arguably, with some US knowledge being apparent of the UK’s different legal obligations as stipulated particularly strongly by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), over time the US was somewhat equivocal on the subject of giving the UK the fullest details concerning the controversial issue of ‘War on Terror’ detainee treatment.89 This was particularly apparent concerning revelations that emerged during the summer of 2008 surrounding the existence of extra-territorial US so-called ‘prison ships’.90 Some of the ‘sting’ in the overall whiff of controversy was arguably desired to be removed by the US for its UK partner, albeit somewhat imperfectly. To the UK ISC inquiry held during 2006–07 on the subject of the US practice of renditions, Sir David Pepper, Director of GCHQ (2003–08), was able to succinctly observe that his agency, GCHQ, had ‘never knowingly provided support to a US rendition operation … and we have never been asked to do so.’91 However, in general terms, the UK still experienced a greater degree of overarching ‘guilt’. If only by its alleged association with the US and the US pursuit of these contested practices.92 Partly, this degree of ‘blowback’ was also because of the well-known overall nature of the UK’s well-established close intelligence and security relations with the US; and also due to the fact that many UK-US intelligence and security ties, especially those focused on ‘high value/priority targets’, have essentially continued to be maintained unimpeded, or, at the least, less impacted. This includes overlapping with at least elements of persisting occasional UK involvement in US-led rendition operations.93 On occasions, more pressing interests did override values in relations and in associated interactions beyond. This included at times vis-à-vis human rights particularly those of some individuals who became targets legitimately or via other routes. These developments occurred as utilitarianism, the philosophy that emphasises ‘the greatest happiness and good for the greatest number’, emerged strongly in governance contexts. Decision-makers and intelligence practitioners likewise sought to maintain intelligence and information flows as advantageously as possible.94 As Reuters Correspondent William Maclean has found: ‘International intelligence cooperation is too important in tackling a transnational, networked foe like al Qaeda to allow tactical differences to grow into major disputes, analysts

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say.’95 Risk management approaches continue, while differing risk thresholds persist. Continuities with the past remain. Again reflecting their highly pluralistic nature and multiple ties, despite the evident difficulties encountered, overall UK-US intelligence and security relations are sustained more or less steadily into the future. As the former UK Foreign Secretary (2001–06), Jack Straw, observed at Chatham House in December 2010, the UK’s ‘security and foreign policy relationship with the United States is at its deepest in respect of intelligence and military operations, and – Wikileaks notwithstanding – I see no reason why that degree of cooperation should not continue.’ Outlining the basis for his conclusion, he remarked: The intelligence relationship is mutually supportive, and whilst in the military sphere the United States certainly has the capacity, and sometimes the need to go it alone (as did we over the Falklands), they understandably prefer to operate with allies. We have forces which are familiar with their counterparts in the US, and typically are both more willing and more able to make significant troop or other contributions than any other country .96 Importantly, UK-US intelligence and security relations are helped by the problems encountered being carefully managed, and their successful weathering is assisted through constant referral back to the imperatives of more general considerations, as characterised above, for driving continued UK-US intelligence and security co-operation. Those general considerations help to determine the precise mode and tone that overall co-operation adopts. While over time ebbs and flows in relations naturally exist, in our contemporary era of delivering ‘public safety’, the governing notion of ‘protect and serve’, together with a strong prevention agenda, dominates.97 Several overall conclusions are now presented.

Conclusions As the twenty-first century continues, the overall system of Anglo-American intelligence and security relations is not overwhelmed. Although, at least at times, a greater degree of awkwardness and stress might have been injected into relations in recent years, more substantially they continue to reflect their most important and ‘special’ status.98 These more specifically focused interactions continue to be subject to being more carefully protected and managed by both the UK and the US. This is as well as continuing to help perform a significant role in sustaining overall (general) Anglo-American relations.99 Generally on intelligence and security issues, despite being somewhat besieged, the UK and US remain broadly ‘exemplary “friends and allies” ’. This status, where the UK and US essentially remain ‘shoulder to shoulder’,

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 223 can also be regarded as continuing to be sustained into the foreseeable future. This is so, despite not always having gone in exactly the same direction, as far, or as fast as one another. Some similar differences in relations can be readily anticipated to continue to be reflected as time progresses.100 Also, generally during the conduct of intelligence and security work, in some circumstances, the risks of at least a modicum of unhelpful (alleged) association, with even ethically and morally dubious methods of activity, such as torture, cannot always be entirely avoided.101 Neither can these issues be avoided in their entirety in, and when interacting with, the highly pluralistic and multi-faceted domain of UK-US (and, equally, other) intelligence and security relations. These risks and problems, or ‘knocks’, have to be weathered and dealt with as and when they arise and have impact. A pragmatic, ideally balanced, risk management-based approach continues to be adopted for the most viable way forward.102 Notably, the greatest ‘terminalism’ claimed in UK-US intelligence and security relations came from critics and ‘outsiders’. This was from those people located more on the periphery of interactions, and who have generally more forcefully and vociferously projected their concerns in the public domain. Instead, ‘insiders’ and those more involved in the core and central domain of interactions have, on the whole, kept more emphasis on ‘functionalism’ and ‘evangelicalism’.103 (This conclusion does not, however, automatically mean that critique and critical perspectives have been absent within, and from, the ‘insider’ domain.104) For the most part, degrees of sufficient agreement have been evident. This has particularly been the case when options and choices have been lacking, and where concepts of ‘lesser evils’ have figured strongly in the overall governance of situations.105 UK-US intelligence and security relations have also been kept much more carefully protected than other domains of interaction where greater openness is more permissible. Into the foreseeable future, we can readily anticipate that they will continue to be managed in that manner. Ultimately, the UK’s appreciated and privileged access to the hegemony of US Intelligence, and its associated power that extends across the globe, offers much. Whether desirable or not, both diplomatically and militarily, it allows the post-Empire UK to continue to be able to ‘punch above its weight’ in contemporary international affairs.106 Likewise, the US, more or less, benefits to enough of a satisfactory extent from UK support. These constructs also allow the grander ‘public safety’ governance principle of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) to be sustained emphatically by both London and Washington. A degree of Pax Americana, with some closely supporting Pax Britannica behind it, aims to be most successfully maintained on a global basis.107 Highly optimised UK-US intelligence and security relations are fundamental to accomplishing that joint mission. Emphasising resilience,

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as the popular British civil defence motto dating from the Second World War goes: ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’.108 With great effort on occasion, into the future both the UK and the US are likely to continue to well-sustain their intelligence and security interactions. Relations are indeed ‘essential’ and they do ‘keep calm and carry on’ with shared burdens.109

Notes 1 A.D.M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 8 and pp. 170–3. For the schools of interpretation in Anglo-American relations, A. Danchev, ‘On Specialness: Anglo-American Apocrypha’, Chapter 1 in his On Specialness, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1998, from p.  1; ‘Introduction’ in J. Baylis (editor), Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997. 2 For details on these levels, see A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/ Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 167. 3 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. xxi and pp. 167–73; W. Rees and R. J. Aldrich, ‘Contending cultures of counterterrorism: transatlantic divergence or convergence?’, International Affairs, 81, 5, October 2005, pp. 905–23. 4 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 3, p. xx and p. 34; D. Gardham, ‘Intelligence officers could face court for “aiding and abetting torture” despite new guidelines’, The Daily Telegraph, 24 June 2011; D. Casciani, ‘Official guidance for questioning suspects held by foreign powers is unlawful’, BBC, 28 June 2011; ‘High Court interrogation ruling due’, UK Press Association, 3 October 2011 and D. Casciani, ‘Human rights torture challenge thrown out by High Court’, BBC, 3 October 2011; I. Cobain, ‘UK’s secret policy on torture revealed’, The Guardian, 4 August 2011 and ‘The secret interrogation policy that could never be made public’, The Guardian, 4 August 2011; I. Cobain, ‘Terror suspect claims abuse by British officer’, The Guardian, 17 August 2011. 5 See also ‘US embassy cables: Britain demands information on rendition flights’, The Guardian, 1 December 2010 and ‘US embassy cables: UK foreign office tries to smooth relations with US over Cyprus flights’, The Guardian, 1 December 2010; ‘UK overruled on Lebanon spy flights from Cyprus, WikiLeaks cables reveal’, The Guardian, 3 December 2010; I. Cobain, and M. Chulov, ‘Libyan papers show UK worked with Gaddafi in rendition operation’, The Guardian, 4 September 2011, M. Chulov, N. Hopkins and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Libyan commander demands apology over MI6 and CIA plot’, The Guardian, 4 September 2011, and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Sir Mark Allen: the secret link between MI6, the CIA and Gaddafi’, The Guardian, 4 September 2011; ‘Libya rendition claims: David Cameron calls for inquiry’, BBC, The New York Times, 5 September 2011, and J. F. Burns and A. Cowell, ‘British Panel to Examine Libya Rendition Reports’, The New York Times, 5 September 2011; R. NortonTaylor, ‘MPs in freedom of information call for release of files on secret rendition’, The Guardian, 11 November 2011; I. Cobain and R. Norton Taylor, ‘Scotland Yard asked to investigate MI6 role in abduction of Gadaffi opponent’, The Guardian, 16 November 2011, J. Borger, ‘William Hague lifts the lid on UK

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 225 spying operations’, The Guardian, 16 November 2011, and UK Foreign Secretary, William Hague, ‘Securing our future’, 16 November 2011, http:// www.FCO.gov.uk, and G. Corera, ‘William Hague hails not so secret spies’, BBC, 16 November 2011, and W. Maclean, ‘Torture charges hurt UK status: Hague’, Reuters, 16 November 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Is William Hague spooked by rendition “allegations”?’, The Guardian, 17 November 2011; N. Inkster, ‘Balancing secrecy with openness and accountability’, IISS Voices, 21 November 2011. 6 For background: D. Froomkin, ‘Is Torture In America’s Future As Well As In Our Country’s Past?’, The Huffington Post, 4 July 2011; see also UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Annual Report 2010–2011, July 2011, p.  6, para.16. More broadly on these issues, M. Herman, ‘Ethics and Intelligence after September 2001’, Intelligence and National Security, 19, 2, June 2004, pp.  342–58; D. Omand, ‘Ethical Guidelines in Using Secret Intelligence for Public Security’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 19, 4, December 2006, pp.  613–28; J. Goldman (editor), Ethics of Spying: Volumes 1 and 2, Lanham, MD, US: Scarecrow, 2006 and 2010; D.L. Perry, Partly Cloudy: Ethics in War, Espionage, Covert Action, and Interrogation, Lanham, MD, US: Scarecrow, 2009; S. Sewall, ‘Ethics’, Chapter 15 in T. Rid and T. Keaney (editors), Understanding Counterinsurgency, London: Routledge, 2010; M. Phythian, ‘The Problem of Intelligence Ethics’, Chapter 8 in his and A. Bergman-Rosamond (editors), War, Ethics and Justice: New Perspectives on a Post-9/11 World, London: Routledge, 2011. 7 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. xx; see also pp. 70–6; ‘Inquiry to be held into security service torture claims’ BBC, 29 June 2010, and S. Swann, ‘Government urged to publish “terror guidelines”’, BBC, 29 June 2010; for details, see ‘UK involvement with detainees in overseas counter-terrorism operations’, UK Cabinet Office, 6 July 2010; Her Majesty’s Government, Consolidated Guidance to Intelligence Officers and Service Personnel on the Detention and Interviewing of Detainees Overseas, and on the Passing and Receipt of Intelligence Relating to Detainees, July 2010; Her Majesty’s Government, ‘Note of Additional Information from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, the Home Secretary, and Defence Secretary’, July 2010; UK Prime Minister David Cameron to The Right Honourable Sir Peter Gibson, Letter, 6 July 2010; I. Cobain, ‘Torture inquiry is legally flawed, say rights groups as NGOs ponder boycott’, The Guardian, 23 February 2011; ‘Editorial: The Gibson torture inquiry: A whitewash won’t wash’, The Guardian, 24 February 2011; B. Brady, ‘Torture inquiry will “not cover US rendition”’, Independent on Sunday, 15 May 2011; J. Rozenberg, ‘Torture inquiry will cover rendition, pledges QC’, The Guardian, 9 June 2011; I. Cobain and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Lawyers to boycott UK torture inquiry as rights groups label it a sham’ BBC, 6 July 2011, The Guardian, D. Stringer, ‘UK torture panel to study rendition’, Associated Press BBC, 6 July 2011, and S. Swann, ‘Spy chiefs to give public evidence at rendition inquiry’, BBC, 6 July 2011; ‘Campaigners to shun UK inquiry into detainee “torture”’, BBC, 4 August 2011; see also D. Martin, ‘Iraq torture inquiry will not investigate whether British troops handed suspects to U.S.’, Daily Mail, 16 May 2011; A. Crawford, ‘Iraq Historic Allegations team probe “is a shambles”’, BBC, 14 June 2011; ‘Iraqi civilians win legal bid for torture inquiry’, BBC, 22 November 2011; ‘Exclusive — Rowan Williams in conversation with William Hague’, New Statesman, 17 June 2011; Casciani, ‘Official guidance for questioning suspects held by foreign powers is unlawful’, The New York Times, 18 January 2012; J. F. Burns, ‘Britain: Rendition Inquiry Put on Hold’, The New York Times, 18 January

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Adam D. M. Svendsen 2012 and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘The Gibson inquiry: a chance for truth possibly lost forever’, The Guardian, 18 January 2012 and ‘UK panel will not complete investigation into torture allegations’, Jurist, 18 January 2012; O. Bowcott, I. Cobain and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Gibson inquiry into MI5 and MI6 torture collusion claims abandoned’, The Guardian, 19 January 2012, and Editorial, ‘The Gibson inquiry: good riddance’, The Guardian, 19 January 2012; Peter Gill, University of Liverpool and Professor Mark Phythian, University of Leicester,( authors of Intelligence in an Insecure World) ‘Letter: Intelligence oversight not fit for purpose’, The Guardian, 20 January 2012; ‘The UK needs a rendition inquiry with real clout’, http://www.defencemanagement.com, 30 January 2012; E. Jones Parry, ‘Why the UK government must get to the bottom of any complicity in torture’, OpenDemocracy, 30 January 2012; R. Brant, ‘Fears over security service cases “held in secret”’, BBC, 31 January 2012. See, for instance, G. Corera, ‘Torture claims raise questions over Libya-Britain ties’, BBC, 5 September 2011 and ‘Rendition apology demanded from MI6 and CIA by Libyan’, BBC, 5 September 2011; N. Hopkins, R. Norton-Taylor, and I. Cobain, ‘Whitehall alarm as secret papers from Libya link UK spy agencies to torture’, The Guardian, 6 September 2011, and Editorial, ‘Rendition and the UK: hands-on experience’, The Guardian, 6 September 2011 and ‘Bagehot’s notebook: Britain is more pro-American, even more American, than the headlines about Libyan torture suggest’, The Economist, 6 September 2011; C. Williams, ‘The Drum Opinion: The enemy of my enemy is my friend?’, Australia Broadcast Corporation (ABC), 7 September 2011; see also further sources cited below. See, for example, I. Black, ‘MI6 man who saved Gaddafi risks being mired in an intelligence minefield’, The Guardian, 6 September 2011; N. Hopkins, ‘The Libya papers: A glimpse into the world of 21st-century espionage’, The Guardian, 9 September 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Ministers distance themselves from spooks’, The Guardian, 12 September 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Former MI6 chief says ministers approved Gaddafi links’, The Guardian, 16 September 2011; D. Rieff, ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much: Libyans may be celebrating the killing of Muammar al-Qaddafi, but you’d better believe that Western governments are breathing a sigh of relief themselves’, Foreign Policy, 24 October 2011; I. Birrell, ‘MI6 role in Libyan rebels’ rendition “helped to strengthen al-Qaida”’, The Guardian, 25 October 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘MPs in freedom of information call for release of files on secret rendition’ Reuters, 16 November 2011; I. Cobain and R. Norton Taylor, ‘Scotland Yard asked to investigate MI6 role in abduction of Gadaffi opponent’ Reuters, 16 November 2011, ‘William Hague lifts the lid on UK spying operations’ Reuters, 16 November 2011, W. Hague, ‘Securing our future’, Reuters, 16 November 2011, W. Maclean, ‘Torture charges hurt UK status: Hague’, Reuters, 16 November 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Is William Hague spooked by rendition “allegations”?’ BBC, 31 January 2012; D. Casciani, ‘Former MI6 officer Sir Mark Allen sued over rendition’, BBC, 31 January 2012, and R. Norton-Taylor and I. Cobain, ‘Libyan dissidents sue MI6 officer over abduction and torture claims’, The Guardian, 31 January 2012 and J. F. Burns, ‘Britain: 2 Libyans Sue Former Counterterrorism Chief’, The New York Times, 31 January 2012. See, for example, under subheading ‘Functionalism in UK-US relations’ in A.D.M. Svendsen, ‘Exemplary “friends and allies”? Unpacking UK-US relations in the early Twenty-First Century’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 9, 4, December 2011, pp. 347–8. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp. 170–1.

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 227 12 On UK-US nuclear relations, J. Mackby and P. Cornish, U.S.-UK nuclear cooperation after 50 years, Washington, DC/London: CSIS/Chatham House, 2008; see also, historically and related, M. S. Goodman, Spying on The Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, Stanford, CA, US: Stanford University Press, 2007; see also ‘Work on Trident nuclear renewal gets go ahead’, BBC, 18 May 2011. 13 M. Smith, The Spying Game, London: Politico’s, 2004, p. 25. 14 See also A. Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-modern Intelligence’, Intelligence and National Security, 17, 3, 2002, p. 95. 15 See also J. Sugden, ‘Security Sector Reform: The Role of Epistemic Communities in the UK’, Journal of Security Sector Management, 4, 4, November 2006. 16 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 8. 17 For details, see A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010pp. 132–3; see also R.J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: HarperPress, 2010, pp. 517–24. 18 For more on UKUSA, see as discussed below. 19 ‘Liaison Personnel’ in ‘Appendix I – Sheet 1: Liaison and Methods of Exchange’, 1 June 1951, p.  85, para.5, HW/80/9 - UK National Archives, (Declassified June 2010). 20 See also D. Lonsdale, ‘Strategy’, Chapter 1 in his and D. Jordan, J. D. Kiras, I. Speller, C. Tuck and C. D. Walton, Understanding Modern Warfare, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 36; A. D. M. Svendsen, ‘Intelligence Liaison: An essential navigation tool’, chapter in J. Schroefl, B. M. Rajaee and D. Muhr (editors), Hybrid and Cyber War as Consequences of the Asymmetry, Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang Intl., 2011; R. Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2007. 21 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 5. 22 See, for example, M. Herman, ‘Intelligence in the Anglo-American Relationship’, Mexico conference paper, 2005, p. 9. 23 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 7 and p. 81; see also R. J. Aldrich, ‘The UK–US Intelligence Alliance in 1975: Economies, Evaluations and Explanations’, Intelligence and National Security, 21, 4, August 2006, pp. 557–8. 24 M. Mansfield, ‘Reflections on Service: A Conversation with Former CIA Director Michael Hayden’, (CIA) Studies in Intelligence, 54, 2, June 2010 (Unclassified), p. 5, col.1. 25 On ‘intelligence power’, see M. Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press/Chatham House (Royal Institute of International Affairs – RIIA), 1996; see also C. Norrlof, America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Cooperation, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. 26 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 171. 27 See, for example, J. Beach, ‘Origins of the special intelligence relationship? Anglo-American intelligence co-operation on the Western Front, 1917–18’,

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Adam D. M. Svendsen Intelligence and National Security, 22, 2, April 2007, pp.  229–49; for further background, see also B. F. Smith, ‘The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence Partnership’, American Intelligence Journal, 16, 2/3, Autumn/Winter, 1995; for context see, for example L. Freedman, ‘Alliance and the British way in warfare’, Review of International Studies, 21, 1995, pp.  145–58; R. J. Aldrich and M. F. Hopkins (editors), Intelligence, Defence, and Diplomacy: British Policy in the Postwar World, London: Frank Cass, 1994; P. Hennessy, The Secret State: Preparing For The Worst 1945–2010, London: Penguin, 2010; see also, for example J. Ferris, ‘Signals Intelligence in War and Power Politics, 1914–2010’, Chapter 10 in L. K. Johnson (editor), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010, from p. 155. See, for example, as discussed in R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Comment & Analysis: **** you too, pal: I thought I’d won my struggle against the military asterisk’, The Guardian, 17 November 2000. See, for example J. Jakub, Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940–45, NY: St. Martin’s, 1999; P. H. Hansen, Second to None: US Intelligence Activities in Northern Europe, 1943–46, Dordrecht, Netherlands: Republic of Letters, 2011; R. J. Aldrich, Intelligence and the War Against Japan: Britain, America and the Politics of Secret Service, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2000; M. S. Goodman, Spying on The Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb, Stanford, CA, US: Stanford UP, 2007; C. Andrew, ‘The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance’ in H. B. Peake and S. Halpern (editors), In the Name of Intelligence: Essays In Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994; C. M. Andrew, ‘The Growth of Intelligence cooperation in the English Speaking World’, Wilson Center Working Paper, 83, November, 1987; D. Ball and J. Richelson, The Ties that Bind, Boston, US: Unwin Hyman, 1990 (Second Edition); ‘The Path to UKUSA’ in M. Rudner, ‘Britain Betwixt and Between: UK SIGINT Alliance Strategy’s Transatlantic and European Connections’, Intelligence and National Security, 19, 4, Winter, 2004, pp. 572–5; R.J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: HarperPress, 2010. Other sources include: W. Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid: The Secret War 1939–1945, Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan, 1976, and H. Montgomery Hyde, Room 3603: The Incredible True Story of Secret Intelligence Operations During World War II, Guildford, CT, US: The Lyons Press/The Globe Pequot Press, 1962, with a foreword by James Bond author, Ian Fleming (originally published in the UK, with official sanction to help address some publicly circulating Soviet revelations, as The Quiet Canadian: The Secret Service Story of Sir William Stephenson, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1962.); see also A. D. M. Svendsen, ‘1968 – “A year to remember” for the study of British Intelligence?’, in C. R. Moran and C. J. Murphy (editors), Framing Intelligence History: The Historiography of British and American Secret Services since 1945, Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh University Press/Columbia University Press, forthcoming. See also R. J. Aldrich, ‘British intelligence and the Anglo-American “Special Relationship” during the Cold War’, Review of International Studies, 24, 1998; for an in-depth analysis, R. J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, London: John Murray, 2001; S. Shane, ‘Cold War Nuclear Fears Now Apply to Terrorists’, The New York Times, 15 April 2010; for background, J. L. Gaddis, The Cold War, London: Penguin/Allen Lane, 2005; T. Judt, Postwar, London: Heinemann, 2005. See, for example, R. Jeffreys-Jones, ‘Why Was the CIA Established in 1947?’, Chapter 2 in his and C. Andrew (editors), Eternal Vigilance?: 50 Years of the CIA, London: Frank Cass, 1997, especially pp. 33–4.

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 229 32 W. J. Donovan, Director, Memorandum for the President 2/8/52-ABD, 7 November 1944, via CREST, CIA-RDP83-01034R000200090008-3 (2006/02/07); Interpret ive Notes of Memorandum for the President, 18 November 1944, via CREST, CIARDP83-01034R000200090008-3 (2006/02/07), especially p.  8; T. F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA, Washington, DC: CSI, 1981, via CREST, CIA-RDP9000708R000600120001-0 (2000/04/18). 33 W. R. Johnson, ‘Clandestinity and Current Intelligence’, CIA Studies in Intelligence, 20, 3, Fall 1976, p.  56, obtained via CREST, CIA-RDP78T0 3194A000400010019-1 (Declassified: 26 January 2005). 34 See, for example, A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p.  5; J. Burns and M. Huband, ‘US considers security reforms along UK lines’, The Financial Times, 5 May 2003. 35 W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the US and the Suez Crisis, London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995; see also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 168 and p. 171; see also, on another issue, P. Kornbluh, ‘CIA Forced to Release Long Secret Official History of Bay of Pigs Invasion’, US National Security Archive Update, 1 August 2011 – particularly where he notes: ‘Volume 2 provides new details on the negotiations and tensions with other countries, including Great Britain, which the CIA needed to provide logistical and infrastructure support for the invasion preparations’. 36 See, for example, ranging across these themes, P. Finn, ‘As Rep. Peter King’s Muslim hearings approach, his past views draw ire’, The Washington Post, 5 March 2011; A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 48; see also R. English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA, Basingstoke, UK: Pan, 2004; P. Taylor, Provos: The IRA & Sinn Fein, London: Bloomsbury, 1998; D. McKittrick and D. McVea, Making Sense of the Troubles, London: Penguin, 2001; T. Harnden, ‘Bandit Country’: The IRA & South Armagh, London: Hodder & Stoughton, 2000; see also the episode recounted in Document, BBC Radio 4, Broadcast: 8pm, Monday 15 August 2011 – Programme information: ‘Mike Thomson investigates the collapse of the US UK special relationship in 1973, via a revealing transcript of a phone call between President Nixon and Henry Kissinger which suggests the split was deeper and more severe than previously thought. As Britain joined the EEC, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger became increasingly annoyed at the lack of support by Edward Heath’s government for American foreign policy. Mike uncovers papers which suggest that in retaliation, the US switched off the supply of intelligence to the UK.’; R. Aldrich, ‘Allied code-breakers co-operate – but not always’, The Guardian, 24 June 2010. 37 See also L. Eznack, ‘Crises as Signals of Strength: The Significance of Affect in Close Allies’ Relationships’, Security Studies, 20, 2, 2011, pp. 238–65. 38 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp.  13–14. For more on NSA, M. M. Aid, The Secret Sentry: The Untold History of the National Security Agency, NY, US: Bloomsbury, 2009; T. Zakaria, ‘NSA is looking for a few good hackers’, The Washington Post, 3 August 2011. On GCHQ, R.J. Aldrich, GCHQ: The Uncensored Story of Britain’s Most Secret Intelligence Agency, London: HarperPress, 2010; see also ‘Over 5 billion mobile phone connections worldwide’, BBC, 9 July 2010. 39 See also the trends as characterised in A. Bousquet, ‘Chaoplexic warfare or the future of military organization’, International Affairs, 84, 5, 2008; J. Arquilla and

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Adam D. M. Svendsen D. Ronfeldt (editors), Networks and Netwars, Santa Monica, CA, US: RAND, 2001. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp. 14–15 and p. 17, pp. 27–30; see also T. Graham Jr. and K. A. Hansen, Spy Satellites, Seattle, WA, US: UW Press, 2007; J. Amos, ‘Skynet satellite system extended’, BBC, 9 March 2010. For details on the different UK/US ‘scale/size’ factor, see A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp. 31–2; see also J. Kirkup, ‘Defence cut threat to the special relationship’, The Sunday Telegraph, 12 September 2010; M. R. Gordon and J. F. Burns, ‘British Cuts to Military Concern U.S. Officials’, The New York Times, 23 September 2010; Professor M. Clarke, RUSI Director, ‘How will UK defence cuts impact on UK-US relations?’, RUSI Commentary, September 2010; ‘British Nukes vs. British Troops’, The New York Times, 2 October 2010; ‘Top of the Agenda: U.S. Worried About UK, EU Defense Cuts’, CFR Daily News Brief, 15 October 2010; A. Barker and G. Parker, ‘US “concerned” over UK defence cuts’, Financial Times, 14 October 2010 and J. G. Neuger and K. Donaldson, ‘Clinton, Gates Question Britain’s Defense Cuts, See Added Burden for U.S.’, Bloomberg, 14 October 2010; ‘European defence cuts alarm US authorities’, Jane’s Intelligence Weekly, 12 November 2010; ‘Labour “left £3.3bn black hole in defence budget”’, BBC, 15 October 2010, and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘US commander praises Britain’s armed forces, easing defence cuts dispute’, The Guardian, 15 October 2010; ‘Spending Review: David Cameron “intervenes on defence”’, BBC, 16 October 2010; ‘Britain “will stay closest US ally”’, UK Press Association, 18 November 2010; see also P. Rogers, ‘Britain’s Security Future’, OpenDemocracy, 20 September 2010; ‘SDSR an opportunity, not a death sentence, says RUSI analyst’, RUSI News, 15 September 2010; W. Hague, UK Foreign Secretary, ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review: We have a clear vision of Britain’s role in the world’, The Daily Telegraph, 1 October 2010; S. Rayment, ‘National security strategy’s real test will come when the next shock arrives’, The Sunday Telegraph, 17 October 2010; P. Cornish, ‘Muddling Through’, The World Today, November 2010, pp. 4–5; ‘Editorial - Security strategy: The age of uncertainty’, The Guardian, 19 October 2010; ‘Defence review: Cameron confirms 8% spending cuts’ BBC, 19 October 2010, ‘Defence review: Cameron unveils armed forces cuts’ BBC, 19 October 2010, ‘Defence review at-a-glance’ BBC, 19 October 2010, ‘The UK’s defence dilemma’ BBC, 19 October 2010, and G. Corera, ‘What does the spending review mean for security policy?’, BBC, 19 October 2010. For the different ‘INTs’ involved and the UK-US dynamics surrounding them, see A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: AngloAmerican Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp.  11–22; for further details, see also M. M. Lowenthal, ‘Collection and the Collection Disciplines’, Chapter 5 in his Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2006 (Third Edition), pp. 68–108. See also T. Zakaria, ‘U.S. spy agencies struggle with post-9/11 languages’, Reuters, 19 September 2011. ‘UK Spied for US as Computer Bug Hit’, The Times, 26 April 2000. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 7; see also p. 22. See also R. J. Aldrich, ‘Beyond the vigilant state: globalisation and intelligence’, Review of International Studies, 35, 4, October 2009, pp. 889–902; R. J. Aldrich,

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Adam D. M. Svendsen 2004; C. Andrew, ‘The Making of the Anglo-American SIGINT Alliance’, in H. B. Peake and S. Halpern (editors), In the Name of Intelligence: Essays In Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994; C. M. Andrew, ‘The Growth of Intelligence Cooperation in the English Speaking World’, Wilson Center Working Paper, 83, November, 1987. See also ‘Declassified UKUSA Signals Intelligence Agreement Documents Available’, NSA Press Release, and ‘UKUSA Agreement Release 1940–1956’, NSA/CSS website, 24 June 2010; ‘Newly released GCHQ files: UKUSA Agreement’, The (UK) National Archives, June 2010; see also G. Corera, ‘Details of secret US-UK “spying pact” released’, BBC, 25 June 2010, and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Not so secret: deal at the heart of UK-US intelligence’, The Guardian, 25 June 2010 and R. G. Satter, ‘Details of Cold War intelligence pact published’, Associated Press, 25 June 2010. UK Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC), Annual Report 1999–2000, June 2000, para.14; see also essays in D. Stafford and R. Jeffreys-Jones (editors), American-British-Canadian Intelligence Relations, 1939–2000, London: Frank Cass, 2000; ‘CAZAB’ references in S. Rimington, Open Secret: The autobiography of the former Director-General of MI5, London: Hutchinson, 2001, pp. 206–8. See, for example, as discussed in ‘International Cooperation’ in ‘ITAC: The Integrated Threat Assessment Centre’, Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) publication, July 2006, p. 3; see also CSIS, ‘Liaison and Cooperation’ in ‘Counter-terrorism’, Backgrounder Series, 8, 11, August 2002, pp. 10–11; S. Fidler and M. Huband, ‘A special relationship? The US and UK spying alliance is put under the spotlight’, The Financial Times, 6 July 2004; A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 56; see also references to ‘Alliance Base’ in pp. 23–4. FCO, ‘National Security Council Established’, http://www.FCO.gov.uk, 12 May 2010 and ‘Establishment of a National Security Council’, http://www. Number10.gov.uk, 12 May 2010; ‘Cameron chairs security council’ and P. Reynolds, ‘Liberals will constrain Tories in British coalition’, BBC, 12 May 2010; FCO ‘National Security Council hold “intensive” discussions on Afghanistan’, http://www.FCO.gov.uk, 2 June 2010; P. H. J. Davies, ‘Twilight of Britain’s Joint Intelligence Committee?’, International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 24, 3, 2011, pp. 427–46. ‘New EU Treaty Worries US Intel Services’, Jane’s Intelligence Digest, 15 January 2008; see also the sentiments expressed in J. Bolton, ‘Britain Cannot Have Two Best Friends’, The Financial Times, 1 August 2007; for related US concerns, G. Poteat and W. Anderson, ‘A Declaration of Interdependence’, Daily Standard, 3 May 2007. On the ‘dual-track’ UK foreign policy, see, for instance, W. Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British foreign policy’, International Affairs, 82, 1, 2005; W. Wallace, ‘The Collapse of British foreign policy’, Chatham House Transcript, 29 September 2004; W. Wallace, ‘British Foreign Policy: Broken Bridges’, The World Today, December 2004; see also C. Hill, ‘BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES: Tough Choices’, The World Today, April 2010, pp. 11–14. See, for example, former US Secretary of State, James Baker, ‘The Whitehead Lecture – The West and the World: A Question of Confidence’, Chatham House Transcript, 29 October 2007, p. 5; see also ‘Clinton backs US-UK relationship’, BBC, 12 July 2004; see also references to the ‘European dimension’ in A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 234; A. D. M. Svendsen, ‘On “a continuum with expansion”? Intelligence co-operation in Europe in the early 21st century’, Journal of Contemporary European Research (JCER), 7, 4, December 2011, and in C. Kaunert and S.

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Leonard (editors), European Security, Terrorism and Intelligence: Towards Europeanization of Security, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming; W. Rees, Transatlantic Counter-terrorism Cooperation, London: Routledge, 2006; A. Pabst, ‘Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security in a Multipolar World’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 33, 1, January 2011, pp. 26–40; ‘Europe says Americans slow in sharing intelligence from Osama bin Laden cache in Pakistan’, Associated Press, 13 May 2011; R. Winnett and D. Gardham, ‘Osama bin Laden planned Easter bomb campaign, files seized in US raid show’, Daily Telegraph, 20 May 2011; S. Wilson, ‘Warsaw visit concludes Obama’s four-nation European trip’, The Washington Post, 28 May 2011. See, for example, P. Hennessy (editor), The New Protective State, London: Continuum, 2007; ‘Responsibility to protect: An idea whose time has come— and gone?’, The Economist, 23 July 2009; ‘London 7/7 attacks “avoidable”’, BBC, 26 April 2010; ‘Transatlantic relations in the 21st century’, http://www. fco.gov.uk, 5 April 2011; see also the collection of essays in D. Whetham (editor), Ethics, Law and Military Operations, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. See as discussed throughout this chapter, particularly regarding the extensive problems raised by the multiple and persisting torture and renditions controversies; see also ‘Former MI5 head: Torture is “wrong and never justified”’, BBC, 8 September 2011, and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Ex-MI5 chief’s Gaddafi regime rendition fears’, The Guardian, 8 September 2011. See also ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper’, Cm.6,041, London: The Stationery Office, 2003, p.  8, as quoted in A. M. Dorman, Transforming to Effects-based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom Experience, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/, January 2008, p.  22; see also L. Freedman, ‘Defence’, Chapter 28 in A. Seldon (editor.), Blair’s Britain, 1997–2007, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.  615–32; L. Freedman, ‘Britain and the Revolution in Military Affairs’, Defense & Security Analysis, 14, 1, 1998, p.  64; see also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp. 18–19, pp. 136–7 and p. 169. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 168 and p. 170. See, for instance, insights revealed in UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘Global Security: UK-US Relations’, Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, 18 March 2010; see also ‘UK-US special relationship “over”’, BBC, 28 March 2010. See, for example, A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp.  101–164; G. Corera, Shopping for Bombs, London: Hurst, 2006; B. Jones, Failing Intelligence, London: Dialogue, 2010; J. N. L. Morrison, ‘British Intelligence Failures in Iraq’, Intelligence and National Security, 26, 4, August 2011, pp. 509–20. See also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: AngloAmerican Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 171. With regard to the potential impact of the UK Chilot Inquiry (2009–11) into Iraq on UK-US relations, D. Stringer, ‘UK’s Iraq inquiry turns focus to Bush officials’, The Washington Post, 8 February 2010; ‘Wikileaks cable claims UK “pledged to limit Iraq probe”’, BBC, 30 November 2010; N. Morris, ‘Labour put limits on Iraq Inquiry to keep the US happy’, The Independent, 1 December

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Adam D. M. Svendsen 2010; ‘Iraq inquiry “disappointed” by Bush-Blair note secrecy’, BBC, 18 January 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Iraq dossier drawn up to make case for war – intelligence officer’, The Guardian, 12 May 2011; D. Martin, ‘Iraq torture inquiry will not investigate whether British troops handed suspects to U.S.’, Daily Mail, 16 May 2011; J. Doward, ‘Iraq war inquiry report faces long delay as doubts on evidence persist’, The Guardian, 16 October 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Iraq war inquiry report delayed’, The Guardian, 16 November 2011. Unnamed US official quoted in J. Burns, S. Fidler and D. Sevastopulo, ‘Intelligence Agencies’ Different Approach to Tackling Terrorism Exposed’, The Financial Times, 13 July 2005; see also ‘Radical cleric Qatada released from UK jail’, AFP, 14 February 2012; A. Travis, ‘Abu Qatada: Theresa May arrives in Jordan for talks’, The Guardian, 5 March 2012. D. Pipes, ‘Weak Brits, Tough French’, The New York Sun, 12 July 2005. For details, see, for example, A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/ Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp.  42–3 and pp.  62–3; see also Travis, ‘CIA at work in UK, anti-terror chief tells MPs’; Leach, ‘CIA working in UK, anti-terror chief tells MPs’; A. D. M. Svendsen, ‘Re-fashioning risk: Comparing UK, US and Canadian security and intelligence efforts against terrorism’, Defence Studies, 10, 3, September 2010, pp.  307–35; S. Rayment, ‘200 suicide bombers “planning attacks in UK”’, The Daily Telegraph, 8 October 2011; N. Inkster, ‘9/11/11: A Decade of Intelligence’, Survival, 53, 6, 2011, pp. 5–13. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp. 70–6; W. G. Weaver and R. M. Pallitto, ‘Extraordinary Rendition’, Chapter 20 in Johnson (editor), The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence, from p. 328; ‘“Torture complicity”: Key cases’, BBC, 29 June 2010; see also R. Verkaik, ‘Furious exchange over UK “complicity” in rendition’, The Independent, 27 January 2010; E. Dugan, ‘MPs refused the facts on UK’s part in rendition cases’, The Independent on Sunday, 2 January 2011; O. Bowcott, ‘Secret memorandum reveals Britain’s involvement in rendition’, The Guardian, 23 June 2011. For details, see ‘Individual allegations of UK involvement in or knowledge of torture by foreign liaison services’ in UK ISC, Annual Report 2008–2009, Norwich: The Stationery Office, March 2010, pp. 41–47. See also ‘“Torture complicity”: Key cases’, BBC, 29 June 2010; ‘Torture claims: David Cameron announces inquiry’, BBC, 6 July 2010; see also the other related sources (dated 6 July 2010) cited earlier, above; see also associated cases, for example, I. Cobain, ‘Terrorist who alleged torture in custody loses appeal’, The Guardian, 25 February 2011; D. Gardham, ‘Security and intelligence services cleared of complicity in torture of al-Qaeda commander’, The Daily Telegraph, 28 February 2011 and A. Maniar, ‘Torture evidence: a secret between Britain and her allies?’, openDemocracy, 28 February 2011; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Narrowing the definition of torture to the point of hypocrisy’, The Guardian, 3 March 2011; D. Leigh and I. Cobain, ‘Guantánamo Bay files: Shaker Aamer, inmate from Britain the US won’t let go’, The Guardian, 25 April 2011, I. Cobain, ‘British Guantánamo detainees held for years “just in case”’, and R. Norton-Taylor and D. Leigh, ‘Binyam Mohamed held on torture “confessions”’, The Guardian, 25 April 2011; ‘UK judges say they cannot free Afghanistan detainee’, BBC, 29 July 2011; see also the references to the Libyan cases cited throughout this chapter. See, for example, ‘Allegations of UK Complicity in Torture’, The (UK) Government Reply to the Twenty-Third Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, Session 2008–09, HL PAPER 152, HC 230, Presented to Parliament by the

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Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, October 2009; ‘MI5 chief defends torture stance’, BBC, 16 October 2009; ‘UK faces torture collusion claim’, BBC, 24 November 2009, and I. Cobain, ‘“Cruel, illegal, immoral”: Human Rights Watch condemns UK’s role in torture’, The Guardian, 24 November 2009; see also The Chairman, The Rt. Hon. Dr Kim Howells, MP, UK Intelligence and Security Committee, ‘Allegations of Complicity in Torture’, ISC Letter to Human Rights Watch, 19 February 2010; T. Porteous, Director, London Office, Human Rights Watch, and Nigel Inkster, Director, Transnational Threats and Political Risk, IISS, ‘Intelligence Cooperation and Torture’, International Law Discussion Group Meeting - Chatham House, 5 July 2010; ‘MI6 chief Sir John Sawers says torture illegal’, BBC, 28 October 2010, ‘MI6 chief: we have nothing to do with torture’, The Guardian, 28 October 2010 and ‘“Britain’s secret frontline” MI6 Chief speaks in public for the first time’, Foreign and Commonwealth Office website, 28 October 2010; E. Ballard, ‘Head of UK’s MI6 stresses importance of intelligence-sharing’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 October 2010; J. Gaskarth, ‘Entangling alliances? The UK’s complicity in torture in the global war on terrorism’, International Affairs, 87, 4, July 2011, pp. 945–64; ‘Report: UK police seek to question Guantanamo detainees over inquiry into torture allegations’, Associated Press, 29 July 2011. See also I. Cobain and F. Karim, ‘MI5 faces allegations over torture of British man in Bangladesh’, The Guardian, 11 May 2010; I. Cobain, ‘Human Rights Watch calls for inquiry into Britain’s role in torture’, The Guardian, 14 May 2010; I. Cobain, ‘Challenge to Cameron over torture claims’, The Guardian, 30 March 2011; I. Cobain, ‘Guantánamo Bay files: Britain joined renditions despite knowing of torture’, The Guardian, 26 April 2011; ‘Craig Murray: The biggest threat to Clegg lies overseas’, The Independent, 5 June 2011. ‘Ivan Lewis on the Today Programme’, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 4 August 2009; see also ‘FCO publishes guidance on reporting torture overseas’, http://www.fco.gov.uk, 22 March 2011; W. Maclean, ‘Torture charges hurt UK status: Hague’, Reuters, 16 November 2011. ‘Statement on the Binyam Mohammad High Court Judgement’, UK FCO, 4 February 2009; see also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/ Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 75–6; see also V. Dodd and R. NortonTaylor, ‘Guantánamo torture: UK wants claims of complicity to be heard in secret’, The Guardian, 26 October 2009; D. Gardham, ‘MI5 and MI6 seek court permission for secret torture hearings’, The Daily Telegraph (UK), 27 October 2009; D. Gardham, ‘UK courts “irresponsible” for trying to publish US intelligence says Foreign Secretary’, The Daily Telegraph, 15 December 2009; ‘Judges criticised in torture case’, BBC, 14 December 2009. P. Harris and M. Townsend, ‘Foreign Office Link to Torture Cover-up’, The Observer, 15 February 2009. ‘Crispin Black: A One-sided Relationship isn’t that Special’, The Independent, 8 February 2009; see also T. Garton Ash, ‘Comment Is Free: This Torture Scandal Reveals us as an Ineffective Jeeves to our US master’, The Guardian, 19 March 2009. ‘Government loses torture appeal’, BBC, 10 February 2010; J. Lawless, ‘Binyam Mohamed: Britain Discloses Secret Info On Gitmo Prisoner’, Associated Press newswire, 10 February 2010. For a similar Canadian case, see B. Curry, ‘CSIS ordered to hand over file in terror case’, Globe and Mail, 21 October 2009; see also ‘Canada’s use of torture data sparks outcry’, AFP, and R. DiLeonardo, ‘Canada security service authorized to use information obtained through

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Adam D. M. Svendsen torture’, Jurist, 8/9 February 2012; J. Bronskill, ‘CSIS can share info despite “substantial” torture risk’, Canadian Press, 2 March 2012. ‘US disappointed at torture ruling’, BBC, 11 February 2010, and K. Adam, ‘U.S. data about Guantanamo detainee’s treatment is revealed in Britain’, The Washington Post, 11 February 2010; The Rt. Hon. Lord Justice Gross, Judiciary of England and Wales, ‘National Security and the Courts’, RUSI, 16 November 2010. ‘Statement by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Regarding United Kingdom Court Decision’, ODNI press release, Washington, DC: 10 February 2010. See also ‘Comment: Professor Michael Clarke: Judgment undermines intelligence co-operation’, The Independent, 11 February 2010; for background context, Hennessy, The Secret State, pp.  360–415, especially on this issue, pp. 408–13. Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source; see also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Binyam Mohamed court ruling shatters spies’ culture of secrecy’, The Guardian, 10 February 2010; ‘MI5 denies Binyam case “cover-up”’, BBC, 12 February 2010; D. Casciani, ‘Fresh legal bid on torture advice’, BBC, 23 February 2010; ‘Court lifts ban on MI5 criticism’ and ‘MI5 record on detainee “dubious”’, BBC, and ‘Brown: we do not torture’, Press Association, 26 February 2010; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Ken Clarke plans secret court hearings to avoid revealing intelligence’, The Guardian, 19 October 2011 and W. Johnson, ‘Terror payout cases to be secret’, The Independent, 19 October 2011; A. McSmith and K. Sengupta, ‘Centuries of open justice threatened by secret courts: Government rewrites judicial principles after lobbying by CIA’, The Independent, 20 October 2011; ‘Telegraph View: A fair and just proposal’, The Daily Telegraph, 19 October 2011; A. Maniar, ‘Closed courts and secret evidence: Britain’s own Guantanamo Bay’, OpenDemocracy, 2 November 2011; S. Chakrabarti, ‘CiF: Our human rights are not a fad. We don’t need this Botox bill’, The Guardian, 13 November 2011; J. Rozenberg, ‘CiF: The justice and security green paper is an attack on liberty’, The Guardian, 16 November 2011; Inkster, ‘Balancing secrecy with openness and accountability’, The Guardian, 24 January 2012; O. Bowcott, ‘Government warned over secret hearings’, The Guardian, 24 January 2012; T. Helm, ‘Human rights abuses could be covered up under new justice bill proposals’, The Guardian, 12 February 2012. Based on paraphrased information from a non-attributable source; see also ‘Government to compensate ex-Guantanamo Bay detainees’ and ‘Compensation to Guantanamo detainees “was necessary”’, BBC, 16 November 2010, A. Porter, ‘Guantanamo seven “paid off” to halt legal action against Government’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 November 2010, P. Dodds, ‘UK agrees to settle with ex-Guantanamo detainees’, Associated Press, 16 November 2010 and ‘Editorial: Accountability for Torture (in Britain)’, The New York Times, 16 November 2010; R. Omonira-Oyekanmi and P. Finn, ‘Britain to compensate former Guantanamo Bay detainees alleging abuse’, The Washington Post, 17 November 2010; B. Brogan, ‘This looks like a win for judicial jihad – but it isn’t’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 November 2010, and M. Riddell, ‘Why it’s right to pay the Guantanamo Seven’, The Daily Telegraph, 16 November 2010; ‘The secret services and torture: The price of secrecy – How the government plans to draw a line under torture allegations’, The Economist, 18 November 2010 and N. Assinder, ‘Gitmo Inmates Settlement: Why Britain Decided to Pay’, TIME Magazine, 18 November 2010; see also ‘Hague presses Clinton to release Guantanamo inmate’, Reuters, 17 November 2010; V. Brittain, ‘Ken Clarke’s Guantánamo credibility test’, The Guardian, 10 December 2010; ‘Rights group chides prolonged detention of UK man in Guantanamo’, Jurist, 12 February

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2011; G. Lee, ‘UK to press Obama over British resident in Guantanamo’, BBC, 27 April 2011; ‘Foreign Secretary meets representatives of Guantanamo detainee’, http://www.fco.gov.uk, 1 March 2012. ‘National Security and British values’ in ‘Britain’s Distinctive Role’, Part 2 of Her Majesty’s Government, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, Norwich: The Stationery Office, 18 October 2010, p. 23; see also the collection of essays in H. Born, I. Leigh, A. Wills (editors), International Intelligence Cooperation and Accountability, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence, 2011; A. D. M. Svendsen, ‘Strategy and disproportionality in contemporary conflicts’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 33, 3, June 2010, pp. 367–99; W. Maclean, ‘Torture charges hurt UK status: Hague’, Reuters, 16 November 2011; see discussion of Binyam Mohamed case in this chapter. More widely, see other cases, for example, Q. Sommerville, ‘Afghan prisoner torture fears in UN report’, BBC, 6 September 2011; see also Inkster, ‘Balancing secrecy with openness and accountability’. See also ‘The exchange of intelligence’ in UK ISC, Annual Report 2009–2010, Norwich: The Stationery Office, March 2010, pp.  17–19; UK Her Majesty’s Government, Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee’s Annual Report 2009–2010, Norwich: The Stationery Office, March 2010, p. 3, para.G; C. Spencer, ‘Daily View: Binyan Mohammed verdict reaction’, BBC, 11 February 2010; N. Assinder, ‘Did British Agents Participate in Torture?’, TIME, 6 July 2010; ‘Handing foreign intelligence to British courts to be made illegal’, The Daily Telegraph, 7 July 2010; R. Norton-Taylor, ‘David Cameron moves to allay US fears on intelligence’, The Guardian, 6 July 2010; see also ‘Ninth Circuit dismisses CIA rendition suit on state secrets grounds’, Jurist, 8 September 2010; H. Siddique, ‘US court rejects Binyam Mohamed torture case’, The Guardian, 9 September 2010; D. Gardham, ‘Britain and US resume full sharing of intelligence’, The Daily Telegraph, 25 September 2011. As is suggested by the presence of out-of-court settlements in the cases discussed in ‘Government to compensate ex-Guantanamo Bay detainees’ BBC, 4 August 2011, and in related reports cited throughout this chapter; C. Hope, ‘MI5 and MI6 pay out £12m to Britons held in Guantánamo’, The Daily Telegraph, 4 August 2011; see also R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Intelligence agencies go to supreme court over ruling on secret evidence’, The Guardian, 23 January 2011; O. Bowcott, ‘Secret court procedures could damage UK’s reputation, critics claim’, The Guardian, 16 February 2012; R. Winnett, ‘Nick Clegg seeks assurances over secret court trial plans’, The Daily Telegraph, 2 March 2012 and ‘Secret terror trials protect our agents, says Cameron’, The Daily Telegraph, 2 March 2012; O. Bowcott, ‘Secret civil court hearings “would put government above the law”’, The Guardian, 5–6 March 2012, S. Chakrabarti, Liberty, D. Davis, MP, H. Kennedy, QC, Lord K. Macdonald, QC, Rev. N. Mercer, Human Rights Lawyer of the Year, D. Rose, QC, ‘Letter: Secrets and scrutiny’, The Guardian, 5–6 March 2012, and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘Clarke’s concerns: spies and satisfying the Americans’, The Guardian, 5–6 March 2012. ‘US “hid terror suspect treatment”’, BBC, 10 March 2010; P. Taylor, ‘Musharraf “not told of UK’s disapproval of torture”’, BBC, 14 March 2011; see also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, pp.  70–6 and p.  89; ‘George W Bush claims UK lives “saved by waterboarding”’, BBC, 9 November 2010, ‘UK intelligence “unaware” of waterboarding interrogation’, BBC, 9 November 2010, and ‘Q&A: Waterboarding’, BBC, 9 November 2010; see also ‘US embassy cables: US sought to press new EU chief on rendition’ The Guardian, 17 December 2010 and ‘US embassy cables: European human rights body “an irritant”, says US

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Adam D. M. Svendsen diplomat’, The Guardian, 17 December 2010; D. Casciani, ‘Terror watchdog says UK is “safe haven” for suspects’, BBC, 3 February 2011; ‘UK “should cut links to European Court of Human Rights”’, BBC, 7 February 2011; ‘UK government to press for European Court reform’, BBC, 20 February 2011; ‘UK troops in Iraq “governed by human rights code”’, BBC, 7 July 2011; ‘Sir Menzies Campbell warns against human rights changes’, BBC, 21 August 2011; J. Landale, ‘UK presses for European human rights convention changes’, BBC, 29 February 2012; M. Urban, ‘Could Britain have carried out Bin Laden raid?’, BBC Newsnight, 5 May 2011; ‘Holder: Bin Laden killing “lawful”’, Jurist, 4 May 2011; ‘Council of Europe demands truth on CIA “black sites”’, http://www. cnn.com, ‘Europe rights commissioner urges probes into secret prisons’, Jurist, 6 September 2011; S. Aftergood, ‘European Council Offers Rebuke to U.S. Secrecy Policy’, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) Secrecy News Blog, 8 September 2011. Based on information from a non-attributable source; see also on this issue, D. Campbell and R. Norton-Taylor, ‘US Accused of Holding Terror Suspects on Prison Ships’, The Guardian, 2 June 2008; A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 74; E. Pilkington, ‘Obama under fire over detention of terror suspect on US navy ship’, The Guardian, 6 July 2011. Quoted in ISC, Renditions, Norwich: The Stationery Office, June 2007, p. 55. See also S. Ross, ‘28 Nations Helped U.S. To Detain “Suspects”’, http://www. scoop.co.nz, 1 April 2010. See, for example, R. Verkaik, ‘British involvement in rendition of suspects will continue, says Straw’, The Independent, 13 April 2010; Dugan, ‘MPs refused the facts on UK’s part in rendition cases’, The Guardian, 19 April 2011; R. NortonTaylor, ‘Ministry of Defence ordered to disclose involvement in US-led rendition’, The Guardian, 19 April 2011; ‘More Afghan detainee data must be released – judge’, BBC, 18 April 2011; O. Bowcott, ‘Judges accuse Ministry of Defence of stifling challenges over treatment of detainees’, The Guardian, 12 May 2011; Cobain, ‘Terror suspect claims abuse by British officer’, The Guardian, 31 August 2011; ‘Extraordinary rendition: a backstory’, The Guardian, 31 August 2011; I. Cobain, ‘How secret renditions shed light on MI6’s licence to kill and torture’, The Guardian, 15 February 2012; J. Lewis, ‘Rendition: did UK play secret role?’, The Daily Telegraph, 25 February 2012. See as discussed in-depth in Chapter 2 (2.0) of Svendsen, Understanding the ‘Globalization of Intelligence’. W. Maclean, ‘Analysis: Europe, U.S. juggle divergent tolerance of risk’, Reuters, 5 October 2010; see also A. Ulbrich, ‘Sir Richard Dearlove, former Chief of the British Secret Service: “Al-Qaeda ten years after 9/11”’, World Security Network newsletter, 10 October 2011. Rt. Hon. J. Straw MP, ‘The Whitehead Lecture: Special or Merely Close? Britain’s Relationship with the US in 2010’, Chatham House Transcript, 7 December 2010, p. 6. A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p.  6; see also K. Dias, ‘The responsibility to prevent: Are new norms emerging in humanitarian intervention?’, CIGI, 20 April 2011. Notably, see: J. Watson, ‘US and Britain set up joint security body: reports’, AFP, 23 May 2011 (yet to be identified and verified); ‘Obama, Cameron Discuss Security Aspects of U.S., UK Ties’, http://www.defense.gov, 25 May 2011, and ‘Shared Values Define U.S.-U.K. Ties, Obama Tells Parliament’, http://www. defense.gov, 25 May 2011.

‘Strained’ relations? Evaluating contemporary Anglo-American co-operation 239 99 D. Jerome, ‘Poised for a British-U.S. Realignment’, US Council on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2010; see also D. Alexander, ‘Hague lavish, not “slavish,” on first U.S. trip’, Reuters, 15 May 2010; see also ‘US embassy cables: Americans discuss British “paranoia” over special relationship’, The Guardian, 3 December 2010; P. Reynolds, ‘Wikileaks reveal US diplomats’ view of UK as ally’, BBC, 4 December 2010. 100 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 168; see also ‘Wikileaks: Iraq war logs “reveal truth about conflict”’, BBC, 23 October 2010; S. Malik, ‘Jihadi who helped train 7/7 bomber freed by US after just five years’, The Guardian, 14 February 2011 and ‘The al-Qaida supergrass and the 7/7 questions that remain unanswered’, The Guardian, 14 February 2011. 101 See also the comments made in the Dutch Review Committee for the Intelligence and Security Services, ‘On the cooperation of GISS [Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (GISS/AIVD)] with foreign intelligence and/or security services’, Review Report CTIVD no. 22A, 2009, p. i; I. Turner, ‘Freedom From Torture in the “War on Terror”: Is it Absolute?’, Terrorism & Political Violence, 23, 3, 2011, pp. 419–37. 102 See also D. Omand, Securing the State, London: Hurst, 2010; Sir David Omand, ‘Securing the State: A Question of Balance’, Chatham House Meeting Transcript, 8 June 2010; G.F. Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009 (updated 2011); IISS Strategic Survey 2009, London: IISS/Routledge, 2009, especially pp. 35–6; M.V. Rasmussen, The Risk Society at War, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006; C. Coker, War in an Age of Risk, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009. 103 See also A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: AngloAmerican Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 171. 104 See particularly that voiced by Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the British Security Service (MI5) 2002–07, cited throughout this chapter. 105 See also D. Casciani and S. Swann, ‘Foreign Office officials “backed Guantanamo detentions”’, BBC, 14 July 2010; D. Casciani and S. Swann, ‘Guantanamo papers: The UK’s handling of detainees’, BBC, 15 July 2010; ‘“Al-Qaeda assassin worked for MI6”, secret cables claim’, BBC, 26 April 2011; M. Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror, Princeton, US: Princeton University Press, 2005; D. Casciani, ‘Long Lartin unit for terror suspects criticised’, BBC, 18 August 2011. 106 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p.  6; see also Hill, ‘BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES: Tough Choices’, pp. 11–14; ‘UK “needs to find new world role”’, BBC, 22 April 2010; P. Porter, ‘Geography, Strategy and the National Interest: The Maps are too Small’, The World Today, May 2010, pp. 4–6; P. Porter, ‘Why Britain doesn’t do grand strategy’, RUSI Journal, 155, 4, August/September 2010, pp. 6–12; see also ‘US embassy cables: Gordon Brown’s first national security strategy greeted by “collective yawn”’, The Guardian, 2 December 2010. 107 A. D. M. Svendsen, Intelligence Cooperation and the War on Terror: Anglo-American Security Relations after 9/11, London: Routledge/Studies in Intelligence Series, 2010, p. 173; P. Porter, ‘Last charge of the knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the special relationship’, International Affairs, 86, 2, 2010; H. Strachan, ‘Strategy and contingency’, International Affairs, 87, 6, 2011, pp. 1281–96. 108 See also N. Inkster and A. Nicoll, ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’, Survival, 52, 2, April 2010, pp. 249–56; P. Sherwell, ‘Donald Rumsfeld criticises Barack Obama

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for undermining “special relationship”’, The Sunday Telegraph, 13 February 2011; A. Pabst, ‘Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian Security in a Multipolar World’, American Foreign Policy Interests, 33, 1, January 2011, pp.  26–40; S. Wilson, ‘Warsaw visit concludes Obama’s four-nation European trip’, The Washington Post, 28 May 2011. 109 ‘Barack Obama: UK relationship is “truly special”’, BBC, 20 July 2010; ‘Barack Obama coming to UK on state visit in May’, BBC, 17 February 2011; ‘UK and US defence chiefs assess Afghanistan and Libya operations’, UK MoD, 27 April 2011; Steve Clemons, New America Foundation, ‘The raw truth about the US-UK “special relationship”’, BBC, 23 May 2011, and ‘Hillary Clinton and William Hague hail US-UK bond’, BBC, 23 May 2011; B. Wright, ‘Burgers and burning issues on Obama’s UK visit’, and M. Mardell, ‘US and UK share a more than “special relationship”’, BBC, 24 May 2011, and ‘President Obama hails “special relationship” at banquet’, BBC, 24 May 2011, and J. Mason and S. Holland, ‘Obamas get royal welcome at Buckingham Palace’, Reuters, 24 May 2011, and UK Prime Minister David Cameron and US President Barack Obama, ‘UK and US: an essential relationship’, The Times, 24 May 2011, via http://www.fco.gov.uk, 24 May 2011, and A. Faiola, ‘Obama’s London visit comes amid British reckoning’, The Washington Post, 24 May 2011; N. Robinson, ‘A new bond between David Cameron and Barack Obama?’, BBC, and ‘Prime Minister and US President strengthen collaboration’, http://www.fco.gov.uk, 25 May 2011; A. Rawnsley, ‘What is the special relationship behind the barbecue bonhomie?’, The Observer, 29 May 2011; ‘Britain and America: Essential, but fraying: Defence cuts could jeopardise Britain’s security relationship with America’, Economist, 26 May 2011; ‘UK can stay in Libya as long as needed, says Cameron’, BBC, 15 June 2011; ‘NATO head worried about low European defense spending, calls on allies to reduce US reliance’, Associated Press, 16 June 2011; J. Doward, ‘“Son of star wars” base in Yorkshire finally ready to open’, The Guardian, 18 June 2011; H. Cooper, ‘Obama Says Facts Support Accusation of Iranian Plot’, The New York Times, 13 October 2011; ‘“Iranian US terror plot” accused assets seized in UK’, BBC, 18 October 2011; I. Cobain, ‘Two British terror suspects killed in US drone strikes in Pakistan’, The Guardian, 19 November 2011.

9

The US-UK special relationship The nuclear dimension John Simpson

Introduction At 08.15.11hrs on Monday, 6 August 1945, the global politico-military world changed irrevocably. The Little Boy atomic bomb, dropped on Hiroshima, inflicted mass destruction on a city through a single nuclear device in a split second, thus demonstrating that it was qualitatively different from anything that had gone before. For the next half-century the existence of such devices dominated global political and military affairs. As Jacques Hymans has highlighted, this weapon was not only developed by the combined efforts of the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US); the decision to use it was (nominally at least) a joint one.1 More was to follow. From 1952 until 2006 operational US nuclear weapons and their delivery systems were deployed in the UK. From 1958 onwards the two states’ nuclear weapon procurement and deployment infrastructures were inter-related. As a consequence, the nuclear dimension of their relationship was not only different in quality from their bilateral (nuclear) relationships with other states, for half a century it was the ‘jewel in the crown’ of their many bilateral relationships (at least when viewed from the UK). In short, it was the US-UK special relationship. However, it has been neither a single monolithic relationship nor one that has been static. It has involved a broad spectrum of activities, though the high level of secrecy that enveloped them accentuated its singularity. Some activities were intertwined, integrated or juxtaposed, others not. All were handled through a number of different bureaucratic channels on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as operating at several different levels of political, official and technical activity. Although the content of the multiple relationships was often changing, some static elements existed which served to anchor and guide them. For example, many current activities are based upon agreements made between 1958 and 1963. Yet the issues that dominated one decade were often less salient by the next. Throughout, there existed one very significant, discernible human element of continuity: the personal relationships between individuals at both the working and higher political levels. The

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state secrets involved were the domain of a limited circle of self-effacing national experts who knew each other well. Those involved tend to emphasise the trust engendered by this as central to the relationship(s), albeit it is extremely difficult to produce documented evidence of this.2 This chapter can do no more than skim over the surface of the many activities and issues involved in the 70-year evolution of the US-UK nuclear relationships. It will, however, seek to draw together in a preliminary way some of the empirical data on that relationship in the UK National Archives used in recent histories of the relationship and the memories of those who shaped policy at both the working and high political levels. The analytic framework for this analysis is the proposition that the last 70 nuclear years can best be understood in terms of eleven distinct chronological phases. These start in 1940 and end in 2012. By way of conclusion, the author will offer some initial thoughts about the past, present and future of the relationship, its changes and continuities, and the ‘wildcards’ that could disrupt and even destroy it.

Genesis (1940–1946) US-UK nuclear relations can be traced back to 1940 when Frisch and Peierls, two British refugee German scientists, produced a theoretical paper on using the uranium isotope U-235 to make a nuclear explosion3 and Sir Henry Tizard led a mission to Washington where ‘the scientific secrets of the two countries were freely exchanged’.4 This development led in mid19415 to the US receiving the UK MAUD reports6 which assessed how the use of uranium to make a bomb and as a source of power might be progressed, and the issues and costs involved. By the end of that year a formal UK organisation, code-named Tube Alloys, had been created to implement these ideas. In the US a National Academy Committee had reported on the issues raised by the UK reports7, and the army had been given overall responsibility for running what was known as the Manhattan Engineering Project. However, the British ‘marked time, while the Americans ... were developing an immense effort with astonishing rapidity’.8 In October 1941 Roosevelt had written to Churchill suggesting a dialogue on how ‘any extended efforts may be coordinated or even jointly conducted’9, but Churchill favoured proceeding in parallel, but exchanging information. The war then became global in December with Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbour. By mid-1942 UK representatives in the US were reporting that the Manhattan Project was moving rapidly to produce fissile materials10 and that a joint project was now the way to proceed. Also that the Manhattan Project was now being run on a ‘need to know’ basis and exchanges of information with the UK were drying up. This situation persisted until mid1943 when the Quebec executive agreement was signed by Churchill and Roosevelt. Both countries agreed never to use nuclear weapons against

The US-UK special relationship 243 each other; not to use them against third parties without the other’s consent; not to communicate or transfer nuclear data to third parties without mutual agreement; and that any post-war industrial or commercial advantages of nuclear energy should be dealt with on terms specified by the US president. A Combined Policy Committee (CPC) was then created to agree a joint work programme and allocate materials for it. While its members were to have unconstrained access to information, at lower working levels exchanges were to be restricted to ‘those in the two countries engaged in the same sections of the field’.11 Thereafter the joint project took three forms: a Combined Development Trust (CDT) to acquire raw materials, particularly uranium ore; a multinational research team based in Chalk River in Canada to design and build a heavy water reactor; and the integration of a small number of UK scientists and engineers into some of the teams working on the US military project.12 However, this left the UK with incomplete working knowledge of all aspects of the US nuclear weapon programme.

The rupture (1946–1954) Neither the US Congress nor the UK parliament had been given information on the wartime project. At war’s end it became necessary to place the US project on a more constitutional and permanent basis. The result was the passing of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act (the McMahon Act) which sought to limit the ‘secret’ of nuclear weaponry to the US by making it illegal to pass US nuclear secrets to others. Congress legislated on this without any information on the UK’s involvement in the Manhattan Project. Although the wartime executive agreements pre-supposed that the joint project would continue into the post-war world, the 1946 Act prevented this. However, the CDT uranium supply arrangements continued in existence, as did the wartime intelligence co-operation on the nuclear activities of other states.13 The result was that the US and UK nuclear programmes proceeded independently. In the UK, the new Attlee government created a national nuclear research establishment (Harwell) and started to plan the production of fissile material. The Royal Air Force (RAF) drew up a requirement for a bomber to carry a UK nuclear bomb14 and in January 1947 a small cabinet committee made the formal decision to develop a UK nuclear weapon.15 In January 1948, as relations between the western states and the USSR slowly deteriorated, Anglo-American discussions started on what became known as the modus vivendi. This identified nine specific areas within which technical nuclear information might be exchanged with the UK. In return, the UK agreed to both nullify the (nominal) veto over the use of US nuclear weapons against third parties contained in the Quebec agreement, and cede to the US the UK’s right to existing stocks of CDT uranium.16 In July 1948, as the Berlin Crisis developed, the UK agreed to squadrons of US B-29 bombers, some versions of which were nuclear capable, ‘visiting’

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the UK.17 In April 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty and its executive arm, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were created to collectively deter attacks by the USSR on Western European states. In parallel, it was agreed that up to ten UK airfields would be made available for use by the United States Air Force (USAF). The issue of a UK veto over their use to mount a nuclear attack on a third country then became the subject for ongoing US-UK discussions, especially after non-nuclear components for US nuclear weapons started to be stored on UK bases (fully operational weapons were not stored there until 1952).18 These air force developments were given enhanced urgency in September 1949 when US-UK air sampling arrangements detected a test by the USSR of a fission weapon.19 In other areas, however, problems remained. The Fuchs nuclear spy case strengthened the hands of those in the US who believed collaboration with the UK would lead to US nuclear secrets being communicated to Moscow. The UK Minister for War being a former member of the Communist Party did not help matters. Although discussions took place on sending UK fissile material to the US for manufacture into UK bombs, the US insisted these should be stored in America until needed. As a result, it proved impossible to enhance existing nuclear information exchange arrangements.20 This situation persisted after Churchill returned as Prime Minister in 1951 and Eisenhower became President in 1953 as, among other things, it remained unclear who in the US had authority to make such decisions: the legislative or the executive branch.21 In 1954, the emerging potential for development of, and collaboration over, nuclear energy for non-weapon purposes led to a revision of the 1946 Atomic Energy Act. Amendments were also made to enable US allies to be given technical data enabling their own aircraft to carry American-owned nuclear bombs, and to facilitate enhanced nuclear intelligence activities with the UK.22 The United States Navy (USN) also claimed it permitted data on naval power reactors to be transferred to the UK, but this interpretation resulted in a major inter-governmental disagreement with the powerful Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) resulting in the proposal being vetoed by them.23 Thus, although momentum was starting to build by 1954 for an easing of restrictions on US-UK nuclear information exchanges on pragmatic and operational grounds, legislative and other obstacles continued to block further progress.

Slow convergence (1955–1957) After 1954 a number of separate channels of US-UK nuclear activity gradually converged. Discussions moved forwards between the RAF and USAF on war and target planning. The UK became the forward base for the expanding numbers of US nuclear bombers (the ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’24). Also discussions started on emplacing USAF Thor intermediate range nuclear missiles on UK soil25, as well as US missile early warning

The US-UK special relationship 245 radars. In 1956 the RAF’s own strategic jet-engined nuclear V-bombers started to be issued to squadrons, together with the limited number of UK designed and manufactured Mk 1 Blue Danube nuclear bombs then in existence.26 This energised joint planning for air warfare against the USSR, both on a bilateral strategic and a NATO tactical level. Discussions started on implementing co-ordinated action by the two air forces in the event of war, and also on what became known as Project E: the set of bilateral arrangements under which the UK would have access to weapons stored under US custody on UK airbases should major hostilities occur.27 Links were also being forged between the two navies. The Royal Navy (RN) restarted the nuclear submarine project it had suspended in the early 1950s for lack of fissile material, and UK liaison officers were embedded in the equivalent USN programme. In the army context, plans were evolving for the storage and deployment in Germany of US nuclear armed short range missiles, atomic demolition mines and artillery shells. These were to be used by UK and other allied ground forces in time of war. Thoughts also turned to joint nuclear war planning for the Middle and Far East in the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) alliance contexts, as both states were independently planning to substitute kiloton-yield nuclear weapons for existing ground forces in these areas.28 Looking to the technical future, the UK exploded its first megaton fission and two-stage thermonuclear weapons at Christmas Island in the Pacific in spring 195729, as well as conducting experiments with smaller yield kiloton devices in Australia.30 In parallel, the UK armed services were drawing-up an expanding list of desirable UK weapons tailored to their own specific requirements.31 Work had also been started on an intermediate range UK designed and manufactured ballistic missile, Blue Streak, using motors based on those used in a larger US missile.32 Indeed few constraints existed on US-UK aircraft and missile collaboration (i.e. on nuclear-weapon delivery systems), in comparison with those on nuclear warheads. Arrangements were also in place for both states to share and independently analyse fall-out from Soviet atmospheric tests (nuclear forensics), as it was hoped that this could make national assessments of the USSR’s activities more accurate. All these activities were facilitated by the stationing of a dedicated nuclear liaison officer in the UK Embassy in Washington. As discoveries of uranium in Australia and Namibia eased both states’ nuclear materials supply problems, CDT activities became focussed on denial of uranium to the Warsaw Pact countries and China. The UK had commissioned its first nuclear power reactor at Calder Hall in 1956, which also operated as a military plutonium supply source. The UK appeared to be ahead of the US in this peaceful activity, as the latter’s first civil power reactor at Shippingport was a land based naval reactor design. Finally, at the highest political level, negotiations had been progressing since 1954 on nuclear disarmament energised by the realisation that the

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thermonuclear tests by the US and the USSR could lead to the end of humankind, given that such devices could in theory have infinite explosive yields. Discussions revolved around a proposed three-step process of halting atmospheric testing immediately to limit global radioactive fall-out; stopping the production of weapon materials to cap stockpiles; and then engaging in reductions leading to disarmament. In addition, the probability that an increasing number of states would seek to acquire civil power reactors (and suppliers compete to sell them) led to the creation in 1957 of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) based in Vienna. Its safeguards system was designed to provide assurances that the plutonium produced by civil power reactors was not being diverted for military purposes.33

Marriage (1957–1958) At the start of 1957, the UK was anxious to increase its available supplies of nuclear materials, while the US was increasingly dependent on the UK’s ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’ to deter nuclear attacks on its cities. The UK was also concerned that, as the US was ahead of the USSR in nuclear weapon engineering, it would seek to terminate weapon testing before the UK had a weaponised version of its thermonuclear devices. While this made for a situation ripe for an agreement on nuclear collaboration, the problem for the US executive branch was how to persuade the US Congress to agree to this. Events provided the answer. The launch of the USSR’s Sputnik space satellite in October 1957 generated widespread perceptions that the US was falling behind in military technology, as well as being vulnerable for the first time to direct USSR attack. Eisenhower and the UK Prime Minister Harold Macmillan recognised the opportunity this offered for revising the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and removing existing Congressional barriers to collaboration. Macmillan argued that ‘countries of the free world should try to pool their resources to meet the increasing threat’.34 Eisenhower hoped that assisting the UK in its nuclear ambitions would allow it to retain its conventional forces in areas of the world where the US had little military capability.35 The result was a bilateral summit meeting in Washington on 24 October 1957 and a Declaration of Common Purpose. Implementation was to be through two joint committees tasked with organising a full interchange of weapon and other information.36 A month later in Paris, the NATO leadership agreed to the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in other western European states, and the creation of a stockpile of such weapons earmarked for allied use on national delivery systems.37 The US 1954 Atomic Energy Act had to be amended to implement these developments. This remained difficult as, among other things, certain members of the JCAE wanted any changed relationship with the UK to be one of balanced exchanges, and demanded that Britain should reveal the commercial secrets inherent in the design of its civil Calder Hall fuel rods.38

The US-UK special relationship 247 A further summit in Washington on 7 and 8 June 1958 sought to energise the process, assisted by the UK having exploded a 1.7 megaton thermonuclear device on 28 April, which demonstrated unequivocally that it had reached technical equality with the US and USSR. The President was therefore able to sign the resulting 1958 Atomic Energy Act on 2 July 1958, followed the next day by a revised Anglo-American Agreement for Military Co-operation (normally referred to as the Mutual Defence Agreement or MDA), which became live 30 days later.39 The MDA was an enabling agreement allowing the two states to exchange information on weapon design and many other aspects of nuclear weapon functioning and development, with details of how it was to be implemented contained in secret protocols or annexes. In practice it was a ‘need to know’ agreement on the US side, and initially excluded information on thermonuclear weapons. However, Macmillan extracted from Eisenhower a personal assurance that the US would be liberal in its interpretation of the Act, and pass to the UK information enabling it to manufacture its own thermonuclear weapons much earlier than possible if national means only had been available, enabling the UK to accept a global ban on all nuclear testing from November 1958 onwards.40 Thus Macmillan’s long-sought objective of an Anglo-American division of labour over nuclear weaponry had been realised, though it had yet to be implemented in practice.

The honeymoon (1958–1960) The initial meeting to exchange nuclear-weapon design data took place between high level scientists and defence experts from both countries in Washington on 27 August 1958. The US participants had to obtain a Presidential Determination that the material they were to pass would contribute to ‘the Common Defence’ and the UK team were reluctant to discuss their work until they knew what they would receive in return. After a day of inconclusive talks, the British delegation decided the way forward was to make a presentation on one of its most modern weapon designs.41 This enabled the US team to conclude the next day that the UK had significant new knowledge to offer and resulted in full and frank disclosures of information on six US warhead designs taking place during a second meeting at Sandia in September.42 One of the designs was the US Mk 28 one megaton weapon, which in November the UK decided to manufacture for itself. However, modifying it to conform to UK ordnance board standards delayed its coming into service until December 1960.43 The lesson learnt by the UK lab at Aldermaston was never again to try to copy a US design, as against asking for US advice on original designs of its own. Article III of the 1958 MDA specified the terms under which a submarine reactor and its supply of HEU fuel was to be procured through a commercial agreement between Westinghouse in the US and Rolls Royce in the UK. This enabled HMS Dreadnought, the RN’s first nuclear attack submarine, to

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be commissioned in 1963 and the first wholly UK built one, HMS Valiant, in 1966. Both dates were some years in advance of any purely national procurement process. The positive results of the exchange of weapon data, and agreement on the supply of information on UK civil Magnox fuel rods, smoothed the path to a new series of amendments to the 1958 MDA that were passed through Congress in April 1959. These covered exchanges and purchases of fissile materials, specifically the barter of UK plutonium for US HEU and Tritium. Also, the UK was able to purchase non-fissile weapon components from the US, including those used in thermonuclear weapons. Although the UK supplied small quantities of plutonium to the US in the period up to 1964, the majority of this barter exchange took place between 1964 and 1971, when several tonnes of civil plutonium were exchanged for military HEU.44 One result was that the UK closed down its military enrichment plant before the full implementation of the barter agreement. On the operational front, arrangements had been made in 1958 to arm the RAF’s first medium bomber, the Valiant, and its light bomber, the Canberra, with US nuclear weapons under Project E, while the UK’s first megaton fission weapons were being deployed on the Vulcan and Victor aircraft just coming into service. Joint targeting faced significant complications, however, as RAF Bomber Command’s 1955 national strike plan prioritised counter value attacks on USSR cities, but its role in the joint US-UK strike plan was increasingly to be to attack counter force targets to open the way for US nuclear bombers arriving from the US mainland.45 In Europe, British Canberras were to operate with US nuclear bombs in a tactical role, as were UK nuclear artillery and short range missiles purchased from the US, with their warheads supplied from that source in war.46 A testing ban from October 1958 onwards led the UK into detailed negotiations with the US and USSR over verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and thus bilateral discussions between the UK and US over what might be involved. As a consequence of the MDA, the US and UK could now discuss the significance of their data and methodology more freely and collaborate on developing effective detection mechanisms. The ban also led Aldermaston staff to be re-tasked to develop a new science of seismic monitoring of underground nuclear test explosions, which became the UK’s unique contribution to future CTBT negotiations.

Asymmetric developments (1961–1962) In the discussions leading to the MDA in late 1957, the UK had indicated its intention to develop a wide range of nuclear weapon designs However, Aldermaston’s development capacity was very limited in comparison with that of the US laboratories, and the logic underpinning the new relationship was that the UK should not attempt to ‘reinvent the US wheel’. Moreover, although the MDA enabled the UK to manufacture over 200 nuclear

The US-UK special relationship 249 warheads by 1962, many of the UK military nuclear requirements were being fulfilled at least cost by Project E and NATO arrangements. Indeed the main drivers for continuing development and deployment of UK manufactured gravity bombs had become the UK’s non-NATO military commitments to CENTO and SEATO and the practical problems of implementing US custodial arrangements for nuclear munitions on UK aircraft carriers and other vessels.47 By 1962, UK nuclear development work had narrowed down to only two designs: a third-generation warhead for the US Skybolt air launched ballistic missile the UK was purchasing from the US to extend the credible deterrent life of UK V-bombers and a ‘universal’ airdropped multipurpose gravity bomb.48 In 1959, a system of joint working groups (JOWOGS) was instituted to implement the MDA, together with periodic ‘stocktake’ meetings to review past work and plan future activities. These meetings had an unanticipated benefit for some of the US participants, as the presence of UK interlocutors facilitated useful discussions between the three US weapon laboratories, something which commercial competition constrained in a purely domestic context. However, by 1963 it was becoming clear to many on the US side of the MDA that areas suitable for collaboration with the UK were shrinking, given the UK’s narrowed research and development focus. In response to these developments, the UK Cabinet approved a decade long series of explosive nuclear research tests at the US nuclear testing ground in Nevada, the UK’s facilities in Australia and the Pacific having been closed down. One of their objectives was to enable the UK to make a unique, if limited, contribution to the US nuclear weapon development programme.49 In the meantime, the UK had started to test in Nevada in 1962 its innovative ‘Octopus’ implosion system for use in its new ‘universal’ fission bomb, and also as a primary in its future new thermonuclear designs.50

The Skybolt crisis and its missile consequences (1963–1964) At the end of 1962 US President Kennedy agreed on a variety of grounds to the cancellation of the USAF’s Skybolt project. This left the British without an effective future delivery system for its nuclear deterrent. The consequence was a new US-UK nuclear relationship created through the Nassau Agreement of December 1962.51 This involved the procurement of US Polaris Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM) for carriage by UK designed and manufactured nuclear submarines. These were to have ‘anglicised’ US nuclear reactors and carry UK designed and manufactured nuclear warheads.52 There were three major consequences for Anglo-American relations flowing from this agreement. One was that the Polaris purchase had significant politico-military conditions attached. The Nassau agreement permanently ‘assigned’ four US and four UK missile submarines to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The UK ones were

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for use by him in the event of major hostilities occurring in Europe, unless the UK’s ‘supreme national interests’ were at stake. These commitments are still operative.53 The second consequence was that the UK had to construct in Scotland a totally new infrastructure to support the future UK ‘invulnerable’ deterrent force. The third was that by the end of the decade, the USAF-RAF relationship for targeting the USSR would be replaced by a USN-RN one. The practical implementation of the Nassau agreement was to be through the Polaris Sales Agreement (PSA) of early 1963.54 This provided for the sale of the missiles and blueprints of the missile compartment. It also covered updated versions of the missile, as the existing A2 model was in the process of being superseded in USN service by the A3 version with greater range and three separate warheads. Subsequently this wording was interpreted as committing the US to providing the UK with the Trident successor SLBM system.

Choppy waters: Wilson, Johnson, Heath and Nixon (1965–1978) Harold Wilson’s Labour government took office in October 1964 with a commitment to ‘re-negotiate’ the Nassau agreement. However, senior ministers argued that contractual commitments made it cheaper to complete the missile submarines than to scrap them or convert them to other uses.55 Ministers were aware of an evolving set of issues over the vulnerability of the Polaris A3 missiles and their UK warheads to the development of anti-missile defence systems by the USSR, particularly those around Moscow. The RN took the view that the USSR would use a worst case analysis to assess the penetrative capabilities of the force, but others in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) believed that the USSR investment in missile defences would in time reduce its credibility and that urgent pre-emptive actions were needed to prevent it.56 This situation was made more complex by the need for major financial economies, leading to the cancellation of the existing multi-year UK underground research testing programme in Nevada; the suspension of UK nuclear weapon development; and above all public statements by the Wilson government that the UK would not purchase the successor US missile, the Poseidon.57 Offsetting these negative developments was the initiation of the barter exchange agreement as fuel from the UK civil reactor started to be reprocessed at Sellafield and sent to the US; the completion of underground testing on the definitive UK Polaris warhead design, known as ET 317; and the major nuclear weapon production programme then underway to provide over 200 warheads for the Polaris fleet and 150 plus new WE177 laydown bombs and anti-submarine depth bombs for the RN and RAF.58 A new UK financial crisis in 1967 resulted in further reductions in defence capabilities and commitments. However, this did not result in the termination of the UK nuclear programme as some had suggested, but in a

The US-UK special relationship 251 decision to withdraw all UK conventional forces from bases and commitments East of Suez by the early 1970s.59 These developments impacted significantly on nuclear relations with the US. Part of the argument for sustaining the MDA and the Nassau arrangements had been that this would enable the UK to maintain its conventional and out-of-NATO-area defence commitments. The decision of the UK to abandon its future nuclear warhead and R&D programme had already been seen by some in the US as justifying terminating nuclear information exchanges. As a balance to these negative developments, a decision was then taken to engage the US in a dialogue over hardening nuclear warheads against exo-atmospheric explosions and ways of overcoming missile defences, as part of an ongoing research programme into ways to penetrate future USSR missile defences.60 The refusal of the Wilson government to assist the US in its military operations in Vietnam, and the possibility that it might engage in nuclear weapon co-operation with de Gaulle’s France to facilitate UK entry into the EC, further complicated US-UK nuclear relations. One consequence was the Mildenhall Agreement of 1969 between Nixon and Wilson which committed the two states to keeping each other informed of all nuclear contacts with the French.61 A developing area of Anglo-American collaboration during the later 1960s was over multilateral arms control. By 1965 negotiations on a global non-proliferation treaty (the NPT) had begun, resulting in it opening for signature in July 1968. This led to no further US-UK barter agreements involving civil-origin fissile material being negotiated after it came into force in 1970.62 In parallel, the US and USSR reached agreement on a Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) one. While these negotiations were supported by the British government, they also generated ongoing concerns that the US would yield to USSR pressures for the inclusion of non-transfer clauses in any resulting agreements, and thus negate existing and future US-UK nuclear weapon and missile transfer arrangements. The 1959 MDA had stipulated that notice of termination of the weapon information agreements had to be made by the end of 1968 if it was to be terminated at the end of 1969. Policy differences between the two states made negotiations on its renewal both long and difficult. However, by September 1968 it had been agreed that they should be extended to the end of 1974. This was facilitated by the UK engaging in active investigations of methods of neutralising the effects on its newly deployed Polaris warheads of USSR missile defence developments. A little later an amended materials section of the MDA terminating in December 1974 was agreed. This focussed on the enrichment in the US of UK uranium for use as submarine reactor fuel.63 Heath’s Conservative government from 1970 to 1974 was sympathetic to developing nuclear relations with France, but in practice little of substance

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emerged. Instead it moved ahead with the design and testing of both a new nuclear warhead and re-entry vehicle for Polaris. This necessitated close co-operation with the US, including use of their test facilities. By late 1973 it had been decided that the UK Chevaline upgrade of Polaris would be developed further and procured, a decision simplified by the US and USSR ABM limitation treaty placing an upper limit on the number of anti-missile interceptors around Moscow. There was then a significant delay before this was finally implemented in 1975, partly due to continued opposition to the update from the RN. Meanwhile, the weapons design information and materials elements of the MDA were renewed through to December 1979.64 Although the NPT entered into force in 1970, doubts persisted in both the UK and US about its ability to prevent nuclear proliferation, especially following the explosion in 1974 by India of a nuclear device based on imported materials and technology. Consequently, a private meeting of technology supplier states took place in London in that year to create a set of ‘guidelines’ for future exports of enrichment and reprocessing technology. Secret protocols committed group members to deny such exports to all non-nuclear weapon states. Its existence was not publicised until 1978 when its guidelines were published as IAEA INFCIRC 254. A new US administration came into office in January 1977, with Carter as President. Although his ambitious bilateral arms control and non-proliferation agenda was in principle welcomed by the UK Labour government, in practice it generated significant problems for Anglo-American nuclear relations. The USSR had tabled proposals for a bilateral SALT II agreement which again sought to limit all transfers of strategic technologies. The US administration also wanted to move rapidly towards a CTBT, despite opposition from within both the US and UK strategic nuclear communities to the likely absence of effective on-site and other verification measures. UK-US-USSR negotiations on this treaty then came to a halt after the Iranian revolution of 1979 and the subsequent Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The Carter non-proliferation policy involved attempting to ban, both domestically and internationally, the reprocessing of civil light-water fuel; burning separated plutonium in reactors as mixed oxide fuel (MoX); and fast-breeder reactor development.65 This directly impacted on the British government’s major commercial venture of reprocessing other states’ lightwater reactor fuel in its new THORP plant at Sellafield, and also its plans to burn its separated Magnox plutonium in fast reactors. The Nuclear NonProliferation Act was passed by Congress in 1978 to implement this policy, and had the side-effect of apparently moving the US government towards terminating military US-UK fissile material trading after the current MDA arrangements ran out in 1979. To safeguard its supply of submarine fuel, the UK decided to build a military centrifuge enrichment plant in the UK, it having already decided in April 1976 to build a national tritium plant at Chapelcross to pre-empt anticipated Congressional opposition to the US trading in this material.66

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From Chevaline to Trident: The Reagan-Thatcher entente (1979–1990) Despite the difficulties for the MDA generated by the domestic aspects of Carter’s non-proliferation policies, discussions within the UK government and with the US on a successor system to Polaris started in 1978. At the Guadeloupe Conference of four western heads of state in January 1979, the then Labour Prime Minister, James Callaghan, obtained from Carter a personal commitment to make available the USN’s new Trident C4 missiles for installation in a new class of UK missile submarines. The Conservative administration of Margaret Thatcher that came to power in May 1979 moved rapidly to confirm the commitments given to its predecessor. In July 1980, the UK requested, and the US agreed to, the sale of Trident I/ C4missiles (less warheads), equipment, and services to the UK. On 30 September 1980, this was formally recognised through an exchange of diplomatic notes that authorised the purchase on the basis that it was merely an extension to the existing 1963 PSA. By December 1980 agreement had been reached on a further extension of the MDA to January 1985.67 Reversing his predecessor’s policy, in April 1981 the new President, Reagan, signed a contract with the UK lasting five years for the supply of US toll enrichment capacity for military purposes.68 Eighteen months later, after the USN had decided to procure the Trident II/ D5 missile to replace the existing C4, the UK requested to purchase this to maintain commonality of equipment with the US. An exchange of letters between Reagan and Thatcher confirmed this arrangement, and also that the UK’s nonoperational missiles were to be stored in a non-differentiated manner with those of the US at the latter’s store in Kings Bay. The UK now had to design new warheads for the D5 missile, as well as organise a major expansion in the numbers of warheads to be carried by each submarine and the amount of fissile and other nuclear materials needed to manufacture them. Additional HEU would have to be acquired from the US and new weapon grade plutonium and tritium produced in the UK for the potential 192 warheads that could be carried by each submarine, rather than the maximum of 32 carried by a Polaris/Chevaline boat. Building new warheads for Trident proved far from easy, as Health and Safety problems at Aldermaston resulted in shortages of UK plutonium, and for a time 40 kilograms had to be ‘borrowed’ from the US to keep production lines going. The clear commitment to sustaining the UK’s nuclear weapon capabilities into the 2020s implied by the Trident project, and the active research and development programme that followed led to a much more relaxed era of Anglo-American nuclear collaboration. One indication of this was the signature of a new extension to the MDA in June 1984. Its early renewal, in comparison with past decades, was assisted by a desire not to have its completion delayed until 1985 by the upcoming US election campaign.

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The amended agreement incorporated several significant changes. The materials exchange agreement now had a life of ten years, rather than the previous five. A new section, Article IIbisC, was added guaranteeing UK access for military purposes to US enrichment services. It also guaranteed UK access to US weapon materials ‘on demand’ as warhead production progressed through to the anticipated first commissioning dates of the new submarines (i.e. December 1994). The nuclear information exchange arrangements were now assumed to continue indefinitely unless one or both parties agreed otherwise, rather than being reviewed every five years. Two new items, ‘sensitive nuclear technology’ and ‘controlled nuclear information’ were brought under the agreement to facilitate co-ordination of non-proliferation policies. Exchanges of information were now specifically allowed on ‘special materials properties and production or processing technology’ relevant to nuclear weapon production. Such exchanges had previously been limited by commercial considerations, but trust between the parties was now such that information on centrifuge and laser enrichment technology could be exchanged for non-proliferation and military purposes.69

The first post-Cold War decade (1991–2001) The end of the Cold War in 1989–1991 brought about a revolutionary change in global nuclear relations. The emphasis of US-UK nuclear policies started to change from one of planning to attack what had become the Russian Federation to one of assisting it to secure its nuclear facilities and weapons and to start to dismantle them. Agreements between the US and Russian Presidents led to parallel unilateral withdrawal of many of their nuclear weapons from existing non-strategic roles. The US and the Russian Federation also negotiated a new agreement for reducing their active strategic nuclear stockpiles (START I), and negotiations started on a follow-on treaty (START II). The changed international context generated by these developments had rapid and visible impacts on the specifics of US-UK nuclear relations. The arrangements that had persisted since the late 1950s for the UK to access US nuclear weapons in the event of a major European war were terminated by mutual consent. US depth bombs were withdrawn from maritime aircraft bases in the UK and atomic demolition mines, short range nuclear missiles and atomic artillery from UK bases in West Germany, though US gravity bombs remained in store at US airbases in the UK.70 The UK itself decommissioned half its WE177 holdings (i.e. its ageing WE177A naval depth bombs and WE177B megaton weapons). Plans for replacing WE177 with new stand-off systems were abandoned, mirroring similar activity in the US. However, it continued to manufacture new warheads for its incoming Trident fleet, but decommissioned its Polaris fleet soon after the first of the new Vanguard class submarines became operational from

The US-UK special relationship 255 1994 onwards.71 It also decided to limit the number of warheads on each Trident boat to 48.72 One of the most significant changes in the US-UK nuclear relationship became the increased focus of the two states on nuclear non-proliferation activities. The Bush Snr administration in the US had been confronted with the possibility that Iraq, which had invaded and occupied Kuwait in 1990, had both chemical and nuclear weapons. After it had defeated Iraq with military force in 1991 steps were taken to strengthen IAEA safeguarding activities in non-nuclear weapon states. In parallel, the joint nuclear intelligence operations of both states that had focussed on the USSR were run down and it was not until the end of the decade that the two states started to rebuild and refocus these activities upon states attempting to proliferate. During the mid-1990s, these nuclear non-proliferation concerns led the two states to focus their diplomatic work on agreeing a CTBT and ensuring that the NPT was extended indefinitely at its Review and Extension Conference in 1995. A voluntary moratorium on testing among the five NPT nuclear weapon states (the P-5) had come into force in 1993 and facilitated the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995. After a burst of testing by China and France, a CTBT text was agreed in Geneva in the summer of 1996 and was opened for signature in September. The US Clinton Administration pushed this through despite misgivings over its implications among some other P-5 states, including the UK. The termination of nuclear testing and the move to stockpile maintenance policies by the UK and US removed one of the major advantages the US nuclear weapon laboratories had had over the sole UK one. Both states therefore found themselves addressing and collaborating on a common technical problem: how to sustain the reliability and safety of their existing stockpile of weapons without resort to underground testing.73 This was one reason among others why the MDA was renewed without obvious difficulties in 1994 for a further ten years. Indeed its scope was extended to include exchanges of information on nuclear submarine reactors, given that the UK’s national reactor industry was by then limited to Rolls-Royce’s military submarine reactor facilities at Derby. The issue of French-UK nuclear exchanges had never gone away, and arose again in 1993, partly in connection with France’s entry into the NPT in advance of its crucial 1995 conference, but also because France found itself without a clear rationale for its shorter range missiles and aircraft delivered weapons. Formal talks started in 1992 and informal Track II exchanges took place between 1993 and 1996, aimed among other things at bringing France into the NATO nuclear planning system. However, the consequence of these nuclear exchanges remains obscure, as they stalled in 1996 over France’s demand for a NATO naval command in the Mediterranean.74 In 1997 a new Labour government headed by Tony Blair embarked on a far ranging Defence Review. Although initially it was not supposed to cover

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nuclear forces, it resulted in the withdrawal from service and dismantling of the remaining WE177A and WE177C gravity bombs. Their NATO tactical roles were formally transferred to the UK Trident submarines force, which was now declared to carry no more than 200 ‘operationally deployed warheads’.75 In addition it was announced that the UK would start a programme of work on techniques for verifying nuclear disarmament, based on data gained from dismantling its Chevaline and WE177 warheads.76 US laboratories had undertaken work of this type in relation to bilateral reductions but not focussed on disarmament. US-UK nuclear targeting through NATO or bilaterally presumably continued at the planning level, though a P-5 statement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference committed all five states to de-target their nuclear weapons.77 A key UK infrastructure change during this period was a decision to adopt the US arrangement of having its military production and R&D nuclear facilities managed by commercial companies, rather than government employees. This was introduced in 1993 for a seven-year trial period, leading in 2000 to Aldermaston being managed by a consortium including the UK part of Lockheed Martin, the US manufacturer of the UK Trident missiles. This generated additional close links between the two state’s nuclear programmes as US personnel acquired management roles in the UK facilities.

Into the twenty-first century (2001-The Present) The twenty-first century saw the Anglo-American nuclear relationship evolving in several new directions. After 9/11, the major nuclear threat to the two states was increasingly perceived to be from non-state actors, fuelled by concerns over possible links between al Qaeda and the Pakistani nuclear weapon programme. The new area for US-UK collaboration under the MDA that resulted was research on the forensics of nuclear terrorism, and the need for databases to enable post-detonation investigations to trace the sources of their fissionable materials. Also, the inaccurate intelligence in 2003 on a non-existent Iraq programme generated measures to enhance both states’ nuclear intelligence capabilities. The MDA was renewed in 2004 for a further ten years with both states emphasising the need to maintain a ‘reactive’ nuclear capability. In the US case, this focussed on having an ability to rapidly re-create and manufacture existing designs of nuclear weapon, rather than holding large ‘hedge’ stocks. By 2010 it had become apparent that both states had significant non-operational stocks, with the UK having a total stockpile of 265 warheads, of which up to 160 are operational.78 In October 2010, as part of a Strategic Defence and Security Review, it was announced that the UK’s operationally deployed warhead numbers would be reduced to 120 out of a total stockpile of 180 by the mid2020s. Ultimately the aim seems to be to arrive at a force with 40 warheads on each submarine carried in only 8 out of 16 installed missile tubes.79

The US-UK special relationship 257 After 2000, the UK initiated a programme to refurbish the nuclear weapon infrastructure built in the 1950s and 1960s, and also started planning and budgeting for a new generation of nuclear weapons and delivery systems. By contrast, the US did neither during the George W. Bush administrations, in part because of Congressional opposition to such expenditures. While the US focussed on programmes to extend the life of their existing submarines and missiles to 2040, the UK was implementing new-build programmes, as well as rebuilding facilities and recruiting a new generation of nuclear specialists. One visible result was the 2006 decision of the Blair government to replace its Trident submarines from 2024 onwards, as well as developing a new submarine reactor for them.80 Moreover, Rolls Royce was now proposing to participate in the manufacture of new UK-built civil nuclear power stations, as this no longer appeared to be subject to a US MDA veto. One consequence was that while the US appeared to have been standing still in these areas, the UK moved forward in them with US assistance and advice, including the letting of contracts for key equipment and components to US companies. Joint programmes were progressed in areas such as the design of the missile centre section for a new generation of missile submarines, so that future US missiles will fit into both UK and US future designs. Indeed at least one US individual involved in these matters was heard to say that it was a pity that the 1958 MDA was written in such a restrictive way, as it was hindering, not assisting, the types of Anglo-American collaboration that are needed to meet current US needs. At the operational military level, although joint target planning presumably continued in the NATO context, US weapons previously stored in the UK for use from the UK were withdrawn at some point around 2006, thus ending an arrangement that had persisted since 1952.81 In addition, the number of US Trident submarines in the Atlantic was reduced to five out of a total of fourteen, both as a consequence of START I and a shift in the focus of US military attention to the Pacific. This in turn highlighted the UK nuclear force’s ongoing role in providing strategic nuclear guarantees to other NATO states. An ongoing issue was the developing parallel nuclear bilateral relationships between the UK and the US and France. The latter remained a non-member of the NATO nuclear planning group but decisions have been moving forward at the highest political levels to share military capabilities, including nuclear facilities, where this could be done without revealing secret data to each other. This has now become easier to organise as the UK had decades of experience in using US facilities in this way, and civil scientists also used similar facilities through arrangements designed to keep confidential and safeguard their own data. Such joint use of technical facilities was the basis of the 2010 UK-France nuclear collaboration agreement, with the UK providing facilities it plans to build at Aldermaston for French (and US?) use, and vice versa.82 Finally, a new development was

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the start of multilateral talks among the five NPT nuclear weapon states on verification of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, with France hosting the start of regular consultations of this type in Paris in June 2011 following an initial meeting in London in September 2010, with a further meeting planned for Washington in mid-2012.

Conclusions The US-UK nuclear relationship can now best be described as one of maturity, after some initial decades of uncertainty and incipient distrust. The commercial nationalism that complicated matters through to the 1980s is now largely irrelevant, and the two nuclear weapon programmes are more closely interwoven than ever before. Despite Macmillan’s vision in 1958 of a future interdependent relationship, it was inevitable that both states would view its backbone, the MDA, as necessitating the UK making a unique and independent nuclear contribution to the ‘Common Defence’. This concept was operative both in terms of NATO deterrence and contributions to work on nuclear weapon design, as well as the role of UK personnel in ‘peer reviewing’ the work of the commercially competitive US Labs. While the end of the Cold War should logically have reduced the significance to the US of the special relationship, the opposite seems to have occurred. The comparative advantage held by the US in nuclear weapon research has been degraded by the global ban on nuclear explosive testing which has existed since 1996. This forced it to rely on other methods for stewardship of its nuclear stockpile, something which the UK had focussed upon for many years following its unilateral moratorium on such testing from 1965–1973. While the US had the more powerful laser facilities, it was the UK which had the software to exploit it fully, and thus a relationship of complementary capabilities emerged. The post-1958 limitations on exchanges of information on submarine reactor designs on commercial grounds have also been removed, permitting new collaborative arrangements in this area. These developments served to offset the reduced significance or elimination of activities such as fissile material supply, the storage of US nuclear weapons in the UK, and UK access to US nuclear weapons for use in a European war. More recently, rising concerns about nuclear terrorism generated expansion of the MDA into new areas such as post-explosion forensics and design and detection of improvised nuclear explosive devices. Also, while the UK government recognised the need for renewing its 1950s nuclear research and production infrastructure in the mid-2000s, the US by contrast delayed this until 2010. US-UK nuclear weapon and delivery system collaboration could therefore be argued to have become deeper and wider following the end of the Cold War, rather than having weakened, and to be operating on a more equitable (though by no means equal) basis. In addition it has started to take on a new dimension following agreements for co-operation with France.

The US-UK special relationship 259 However, the future of the relationship is by no means guaranteed. The international world has changed, and with it the salience of nuclear threats and interests. The consequences of an evolving France-UK-US nuclear triangle are difficult to predict. The UK has yet to commit itself to actually building, as against planning to build, a new fleet of missile submarines. New management arrangements for nuclear laboratories may change the role and trust between the committed individuals at working level who have been seen to be the backbone of the relationship in the past. But what cannot be doubted is that the relationship will continue to be driven, as in the past, by the apocalyptic nature of nuclear weaponry: this differentiates the US-UK special relationship from all others.

Notes 1 Jacques Hymans, ‘Britain and Hiroshima’, Journal of Strategic Studies, London: Taylor and Francis, 2009, Vol. 32 (5), pp. 769–97. 2 Several references to this can be found in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Significant Issues Series, Volume 30, Number 3, 2008. See for example, Oral Interviews with James Schlesinger (US) [pp. 264–6] and Sir Michael Quinlan (UK) [pp. 273–5], but more particularly the chapter by Tim Hare, ‘The MDA: A Practitioner’s View’,pp.  189–99 and especially his comments on p. 193. 3 Reproduced as Appendix 1 in Margaret Gowing, Britain and Atomic Energy, 1939–1945, London: Macmillan, 1964, pp. 389–93. 4 Ibid., p. 64. 5 Ibid., pp. 116–7. 6 Ibid., Appendix 2, pp. 394–436. 7 Ibid., pp. 116–17. 8 Ibid., p. 115. 9 Ibid., p. 123. 10 Ibid., pp. 127–46. 11 Ibid., see pp. 439–440 for the full text of the agreement. 12 Ibid., pp. 256–60 and 269–96. 13 For a short, detailed discussion of how and why this occurred, see John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 30–40. 14 See material in The National Archives (TNA) files AVIA 65/1153 and AVIA 65/1163 on how this requirement started in August 1946 as a device to be carried by a Canberra light bomber, and then became centred on a 10,000 pound bomb to be carried by the trio of British medium range heavy V-bombers then in the early stages of development. 15 John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp.  43–7 and Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, Policy Making, London:Macmillan, 1974, pp. 179–85. 16 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, Policy Making, London:Macmillan,1974, pp.  241–65. The document itself is reproduced in Appendix 9, pp. 266–72. 17 Simon Duke, US Defence Bases in the United Kingdom, London: Macmillan, 1987, pp. 29–36.

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18 Ibid., pp. 44–104. The change came about in part because new types of weapon had their fissile material permanently installed in the weapon capsule, and thus were available for use at a moment’s notice, whereas the first generation weapons had it stored separately and a weapon had to be assembled before it became operational. 19 Richard Hewlett and Francis Duncan, Atomic Shield,1947–1952, A History of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, Volume 2, Berkeley and Los Angeles, US: University of California Press (California Studies in the History of Science):, 1969, pp.  364–6. Gowing’s equivalent UK nuclear history contains no information on the UK role in this, as the author herself acknowledges in a footnote (Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, Policy Making, London:Macmillan,1974, p. 282). 20 Margaret Gowing, Independence and Deterrence, Volume 1, Policy Making, London:Macmillan,1974, pp. 282–98. 21 John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 86–9. 22 Ibid., pp. 111–14. 23 Ibid., pp. 116–22. 24 Duncan Campbell, The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: The Implications of American Military Power in Britain, London: Keith Joseph, 1985. 25 John Boyes, Project Emily: Thor IRBM and the RAF, Chalford, Stroud, UK: Tempus, 2008. 26 A comprehensive history of this first UK bomb design (or more accurately designs) has yet to be written, though some idea of the available archive material can be found in John R. Walker, ‘British Nuclear Weapon Stockpiles, 1953–78’, RUSI Journal, October/November 2011, Vol. 156, No 5,Footnotes 1–5. 27 Ken Young, ‘A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.9, No 2, Spring 2007, pp. 5–31. 28 Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion and Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64, London: Palgrave 2010, pp. 71–3. 29 Lorna Arnold, Britain and the H-Bomb, London: Palgrave, 2001. 30 Lorna Arnold and Mark Smith, Britain, Australia and the Bomb, London: Palgrave, 2006. 31 Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion and Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64, London: Palgrave 2010, pp.  79–83 lists 23 official requirements for the development and production of UK nuclear weapons during the period 1958–1961. 32 Ibid., pp. 40–50. 33 Richard Hewlett and Jack Holl, Atoms for Peace and War, 1953–1961 (A History of the United states Atomic Energy Commission, volume 3), Berkeley and Los Angeles, US: University of California Press (California Studies in the History of Science):1969, pp. 403–48 and 489–514 chronicles the evolution of US policy towards the ‘peaceful atom’ during this period. See also Susanna Schrafstetter and Stephen Twigge, Avoiding Armageddon: Europe , the United States and the Struggle for Nuclear Nonproliferation, 1945–1970. London: Praeger, 2004, pp. 71–8 and John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 151–2. 34 Harold Macmillan, Riding the Storm, 1956–1959, London: Macmillan, 1971 p. 315, 35 Brian Jamison, ‘Completing the Transatlantic Nuclear Bridge: A UK View’ in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50

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36 37 38 39 40 41 42

43 44

45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

Years, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Significant Issues Series, Volume 30, Number 3, 2008, pp. 51–2. John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, p. 128. Ibid., p. 129. Ibid., p. 134. Ibid., pp. 138–9. Ibid., pp. 142–51. Ibid., p. 143. Brian Jamison, ‘Completing the Transatlantic Nuclear Bridge: A UK View’ in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Significant Issues Series, Volume 30, Number 3, 2008, pp. 55–7. Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion and Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64, London: Palgrave 2010, pp. 87–90. Ibid., Appendix 2: Estimated Fissile Material Stockpile, 1958–1965. This Appendix was based on material in UK Ministry of Defence, ‘Historical accounting for Plutonium’ and ‘Plutonium and Aldermaston: an historical account’, MoD, 2000. Ken Young, ‘A Most Special Relationship: The Origins of Anglo-American Nuclear Strike Planning’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol.9, No 2, Spring 2007, pp. 24–8 Richard Moore, Nuclear Illusion and Nuclear Reality: Britain, the United States and Nuclear Weapons, 1958–64, London: Palgrave 2010, pp. 215–17. Ibid., pp. 214–15. Ibid., pp. 217–220. Ibid., p. 202. Ibid., pp. 200–.1 Cmnd.1915-see also Ibid., pp. 166–70 and 175–82. For a comprehensive account of the RN programme to build this new capability see Peter Nailor, The Nassau Connection, London: HMS0 for MoD, 1988. This conditionality arose in part from ongoing negotiations for a NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force, see Ibid., pp. 182–6. Ibid., pp. 186–9. A copy of the agreement is to be found in Peter Nailor, The Nassau Connection, London: HMS0 for MoD, 1988, Appendix 1, pp. 106–16, Kristan Stoddart, Losing an Empire and Finding a Role, London: Palgrave, 2012, pp. 20–4. Ibid., pp. 38–53. Ibid., pp. 128–31. Ibid., pp. 217–24. Ibid., pp. 232–3. Ibid., pp. 130–41. Ibid., pp. 141–9. John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, p. 191. Ibid., pp. 192–5. Ibid., pp. 195–6. For a contemporary view of the impact of this Carter initiative see William Walker and M. Lonnroth, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983 John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, p. 196. Kristan Stoddart, ‘The Special Nuclear Relationship and the 1980 Trident Decision’ in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors), U.S.-UK Nuclear

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77 78 79

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John Simpson Cooperation After 50 Years, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Significant Issues Series, Volume 30, Number 3, 2008, pp. 92–6. John Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State: The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, London: Macmillan, 1983, pp. 200–2. Ibid., Postscript, pp. xxxiii and xxxiv. H. M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning, Washington, DC, US: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005, pp. 67–8. Peter Jones, ‘Overview of the history of UK strategic weapons’, Symposium on The History of the UK Strategic Deterrent, London: Royal Aeronautical Society, March 1999. British Ministry of Defence, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm3999, HMSO 1998, paras 67–8. Troy Wade, ‘Nuclear Testing: a US Perspective’ and Clive Marsh, Peter Roberts and Ken Johnson ‘Nuclear testing: a UK view’ in Jenifer Mackby and Paul Cornish (editors), U.S.-UK Nuclear Cooperation After 50 Years, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, Significant Issues Series, Volume 30, Number 3, 2008, pp. 200–11 and 224–9. Matthew Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’, Survival, London: IISS, February March 2012, pp. 12–13 Malcolm Rifkind, ‘UK Defence Strategy: a Continuing Role for Nuclear Weapons’, Speech at the Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College London, 16 November 1993 Verification of Nuclear disarmament: Final report on Studies into the Verification of Nuclear Warheads and their Components, NPT/CONF.2005/WP.1, Working paper submitted by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 18 April 2005. Statement by France on behalf of the P5 delivered at the start of the second week of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, NPT/CONF.2000/21, 1 May 2000 The Times, 27 May 2010. Securing Britain in an Age of Austerity: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm 7948, London: The Stationary Office, October 2010, pp.  38–9 and Malcolm Chalmers, ‘The United Kingdom: A Status Quo Nuclear Power?’ in Small Nuclear Forces: Five Perspectives, London: RUSI, Whitehall Report, December 2011, pp. 22–3. The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, Cm6994, London: The Stationary Office, December 2006. H. M. Kristensen, US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: A review of Post-Cold War Policy, Force Levels and War Planning, Washington, DC, US: Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005. Matthew Harries, ‘Britain and France as Nuclear Partners’, Survival, London: IISS, February March 2012, pp. 13–27.

Conclusion Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh

Our world has been transformed over and over, and it will be again. Yet, through the grand sweep of history, through all its twists and turns, there is one constant -- the rock-solid alliance between the United States and the United Kingdom. (President Obama, March 2012) The reason for this close friendship doesn’t just have to do with our shared history, our shared heritage; our ties of language and culture; or even the strong partnership between our governments. Our relationship is special because of the values and beliefs that have united our people through the ages. (President Obama, May 2011) This book came about because of the popular topicality of Anglo-American relations and the relative academic neglect of the contemporary special relationship. An assessment of its fortunes and prospects was overdue. The approach in consummating this task has been deliberately eclectic, sourcing insights from different disciplines and policy areas, and seeking to break down disciplinary boundaries that have hitherto limited understanding and explanation of Anglo-American relations. This exercise has resulted in proof positive both of the essential vibrancy of debate that a multidisciplinary enterprise can deliver to investigation of the special relationship and of the futility of seeking a singular narrative of Anglo-American ‘specialness’. Rather surprisingly, with the notable exception of Jackson, the contributors concur that there has been and continues to be a special Anglo-American relationship. Less unexpected is that there is disagreement about the principal drivers of the special relationship and how best to account for its longevity. These differences in part at least reflect the different topics to which contributors spoke and their array of disciplinary backgrounds. Svendsen, for example, foregrounds a strong functionalist dynamic in his examination of Anglo-American intelligence and security cooperation. Haglund, though, emphasises strategic culture and the development of a transnational collective identity, especially when confronted by the Nazi challenge, as being formative in establishing a path dependency in close post-World War Two Anglo-American relations.

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Hendershot goes further. Though not dismissing the importance of functional cooperation he ascribes the ability of the special relationship to survive crises and re-invent itself across time to the cultural sinews of AngloAmericana. The sentimental myth of the special relationship has been seemingly quite impervious to adversity within Anglo-American relations and has provided a domestic expectational environment of close relations between the US and UK that leaders have played to and to an extent been bound by. There are differences, too, about the relative importance of the nomenclature ‘special relationship’. Haglund largely dismisses it, arguing that it ‘matters not a whit’ how the relationship is described but rather what constitutes it and how it causes the US and UK to act. This is an interesting observation, not least in the context of an argument constructed around strategic culture and identity formation. At the other end of the continuum, to Hendershot (and a number of other contributing authors) it matters very much how the Anglo-American relationship is publicly described and demonstrated. The sentimental myth of Anglo-American relations depends upon the repeated trappings and public declarations of ‘specialness’. Neither is this a matter of idle academic debate, for it was drawn squarely into the elite and public spotlight by the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in its March 2010 report ‘Global security: US-UK relations’. Its recommendation that the appellation special relationship no longer be used to describe Anglo-American relations flowed in part from a perceived causal linkage between its ready and uncritical use and the encouragement of unrealistic expectations of what the UK-US relationship can deliver to Britain under contemporary conditions. The contributions by Marsh, Simpson and Svendsen all confirm that the domains of defence, nuclear relations and intelligence and security cooperation respectively remain functionally ‘special’. The UK has, since the Cold War, stood shoulder to shoulder with the US on the battlefield, within international institutions and in cyberspace. The ongoing nuclear intimacy of Anglo-American relations was reflected in the renewal of the Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) in 2004 and the careful wording of the 2010 Anglo-French defence treaty that safeguarded privileged UK-US cooperation. The importance and quality of intelligence and security relations blossomed once President Bush committed America to the global war on terrorism, irrespective of perhaps inevitable and well-documented frictions and disagreements. Dumbrell notes that these tensions were sometimes of sufficient moment to upset leadership relations, such as those between Brown and Obama upon the release of the Lockerbie bomber, Abdelbaset Ali al-Megrahi. Yet the waters in the lower Anglo-American ‘coral reef’ remained largely undisturbed. And the defence relationship thrived upon massive post-9/11 increases in US and UK military expenditure, renewed opportunity for their armed forces to fight and learn together and, perhaps ironically, the

Conclusion 265 reluctance of many other NATO allies to step into the breach. Whilst the British military performance in Iraq and Afghanistan were far from immune from US criticism, this has been limited next to the scorn poured upon other allies, notably France in 2003–04. Moreover, there is no indication of a reappraisal by the current British coalition government of either Britain’s traditional prioritisation of defence relations with the US or British determination to prevent the emergence of the EU as a rival security actor to NATO. It is tempting from a functionalist perspective to attribute the renewed public intimacy of Anglo-American relations in the twenty-first century to 9/11 and consequent fresh opportunity for the UK to reprise with the US its Cold War loyal lieutenant role. However rather inconveniently for such arguments – and for the (neo-) realist canon within international relations more generally – there is, as Dumbrell’s analysis of leadership transitions demonstrates, a temporal disjuncture between warming Anglo-American relations and 9/11. The Blair-Clinton years exhibited a warmth between Prime Minister and President and between their immediate entourages that was reminiscent of the halcyon days of Thatcher and Reagan. Their relationship survived intense disagreement over Kosovo in ways that the Major-Clinton relationship proved incapable of doing during the Bosnian crisis. Why should this be the case? There are, as Dumbrell outlines, a number of reasons. Some of these were functional – Blair’s willingness to commit to military strikes against Iraq in 1998 and stalwart support for the US and Clinton personally when isolated, notably over missile strikes against Sudan and impeachment hearings respectively. Yet functionalism is not fully explanatory; John Major committed British forces to the Balkans under the Dayton Accords and resolutely defended NATO primacy but still endured a ‘grin and bear it’ relationship with Clinton. The ebb and flow of Anglo-American relations owes evidently to more than pure utility. In the case of Blair and Clinton ideological and generational closeness clearly helped the leadership relationship, fuelled too by third way politics, a shared fascination with globalisation and so forth. Holmes emphasises also the importance of Ambassadors, the different strengths they can bring to the relationship and how their perceived roles and priorities have changed over time. For her there is a form and content of Anglo-American diplomacy that appears to transcend the barriers between even friendly states to achieve a kind of informal supra-national diplomatic relationship. Neither ideology nor the age of leaders has necessarily determined relations between US and UK governments. Consider, for instance, Harold Macmillan and John F Kennedy. It is true, as Dobson and McKinney demonstrate, that ideological differences across the Atlantic can complicate Anglo-American relations, such as American distrust of British socialism and the risks this potentially carried for economic – and wider – cooperation. Equally, though, that this potentiality never came to fruition attests to two

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important considerations. First, ideological differences within and between mainstream parties in the US and UK have, since the denouement of US isolationism, been too weak to seriously rock the Anglo-American boat. Second, and more importantly, US-UK ideological differences exist within a broadly shared value system and pale into insignificance next to their mutual interests in, and determination to defend, this system. This digression into ideology is not just about explaining leadership relations. It has a much wider significance and this flows from various chapters in this book: values matter in explaining Anglo-American relations. Dobson and McKinney demonstrate how over time the British and American economies have become more tightly enmeshed than at any period in the past and that US-UK differences over the Anglo-Saxon model have paled next to their commitment to it. Advancing into murkier waters, it might be suggested that the longevity of the special relationship owes in part to the evolution of a transnational collective identity. Here Haglund’s chapter on ‘strategic culture’ is thought-provoking. He emphasises that by the early twentieth century Anglo-American leaders had recognised the potentially calamitous implications of a conflict between their nations. However, as the interwar period showed, this realisation and eventual wartime alliance were insufficient to lock in a cooperative pattern of relations. Rather, that path dependence originated in World War Two and the Destroyers for Bases deal. It is at least possible that this point marked the culmination of an identity formation process in the US that finally embraced a shared heritage and value system with the old country at the very time the UK faced destruction by a foe antithetical to the values of Britain and America. This suggestion might be a stretch too far for some. Nevertheless, what is clear is that it is necessary indeed in understanding and explaining AngloAmerican relations to regard interests and values as two sides of the same coin – or as President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron put it in May 2011, the UK-US relationship ‘is a perfect alignment of what we both need and what we both believe’.1 Consider, for instance, the economic institutions set up in the aftermath of World War Two. These reflected the economic interests of the US and UK – and clearly not the USSR, evidenced by its swift rejection of participation. Both nations saw international trade as essential in avoiding a return to the interwar years, in dealing with economic consequences of a reversion to peacetime production and in managing a globalising economy. However, those same institutions reflected and exported Anglo-American values: entrepreneurship, liberal democratic capitalism and the Anglo-Saxon model. What draws the US and UK together has been, and evidently remains, stronger than what divides them. The remarkable transition from British to American hegemony owes in part to the American informal empire largely protecting the core values as well as interests of the UK. To be sure this has not prevented at times fierce disagreement and instances where each country has prioritised its particular national interests over transnational concerns. Yet time and again rifts were

Conclusion 267 healed and common cause re-established. Nazi Germany, communism and international terrorists have all been touted by US and UK leaders as threats to the Anglo-American way of life. It stretches credulity to argue that this is just rhetoric. Britain’s consistent adoption of the Anglo-American relationship as the cornerstone of its post-World War Two foreign policy reflects not just American power but a calculation that that power best protects British interests and values. Blair exemplified this in his assertion of the need to shape international relations in the aftermath of 9/11: ‘This is a moment to seize. The Kaleidoscope has been shaken. The pieces are in flux. Soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us re-order this world around us.’2 Conversely, that Washington has been able to look repeatedly since the Cold War to the UK as its most stalwart ally is not due simply to the power of historical precedent. Rather, the railings of the likes of Kagan et al aside, it reflects Britain being the state with values, interests and modus operandi arguably most similar to those of the US. Turning attention to the intricacies of Anglo-American (non-) cooperation we encounter in the contributions to this book explanations that incorporate many levels of analysis. Structural shifts in the international system are seen to open and potentially close opportunities for special Anglo-American relations. Svendsen emphasises 9/11 and the consequent restructuring of the US security agenda especially as being highly significant in the thickening of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation. Whilst terminalists were evidently premature in ascribing the death of the special relationship to the end of the Cold War, several contributors flag the potential dangers for the future of the relationship flowing from accelerating Anglo-American strategic dissonance as the US prioritises Asia and the Pacific rather than Europe. Holmes, Dobson and McKinney all emphasise the importance of state reactions to changes in the international system. Globalisation may undermine national sovereignty and weaken the relative weight of bilateral diplomatic relations but it also offers opportunities. Dobson and McKinney emphasise the profound Anglo-American economic interdependence that has been driven not just by governments but also by business and investor interests. This is symbolised by the twin financial centres of New York and London and ensures the British economy cycles closer to the US than continental Europe. Indeed, Holmes views ‘specialness’ in Anglo-American relations as a function of the process of development at the level of the state within the wider international system. Jackson’s analysis of environmental policy in Anglo-American relations throws up interesting findings. Alone amongst the contributors he discerns no evidence of a special relationship. Why this is the case is one of his most fascinating conclusions: a ‘special’ Anglo-American response to shared concerns about climate change is prevented in part by governance structures within the US where the federal government is caught constitutionally between the transnational concern of the global environment and the local

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concerns of US states. Whether this is an exception that proves the rule of a special Anglo-American relationship or is indicative of another challenge to Anglo-American bilateralism being newly posed by the emergence of transnational issues crossing international and domestic jurisdictions requires further research. What is certain, though, is that governance structures within as well as between states impinge upon Anglo-American cooperation. Marsh cautions that Congress might become an increasing obstacle to the special relationship if in its parochial concerns it should make it ever more difficult for US administrations to deliver the gestures and incentives necessary for British governments to restrain domestic critics of their dual Atlanticist-Europeanist strategy. Simpson’s account of the sometimes tortuous path to renewed Anglo-American nuclear cooperation after the McMahon Act underscores this potential. Conversely, Holmes’ analysis offers a positive example of state development whereby AngloAmerican national diplomatic responses to globalisation and shifting power centres represent a strength of the special relationship and serve as a possible model for future diplomacy. Indeed, in May 2011 President Obama spoke directly to the need of Anglo-American diplomatic innovation: the days are gone when Roosevelt and Churchill could sit in a room and solve the world’s problems over a glass of brandy …. In this century, our joint leadership will require building new partnerships, adapting to new circumstances, and remaking ourselves to meet the demands of a new era.3 Finally, there is the level of public opinion. Realist interpretations especially of international relations give this short shrift in explaining foreign policies. However, several of the analyses in this book demonstrate considerable sensitivity to the impact of public opinion upon the special relationship. Dumbrell, for instance, argues that the British media outcry against Obama’s ill-considered DVD gift to Brown encouraged a much more considered and considerate approach with Cameron. It is also the case that popular backlash against Blair’s seemingly unrewarded closeness with George W Bush and tarnishing by association with the President’s eventual high unpopularity at home and abroad prompted a complicated AngloAmerican diplomatic waltz. For instance, fear of ‘doing a Tony’ drove Brown and Cameron to try distancing themselves from the Bush-Blair era but without compromising the special relationship. More broadly, and flowing from his concern with the cultural sinews of the special relationship Hendershot argues public opinion to be representative and constitutive of the special relationship. As he demonstrates in the activities of the United States Information Agency (USIA), British and American governments were interested in public opinion, not least as an admittedly unsophisticated barometer of national political sentiment and concern. However, Hendershot sees still greater importance in public opinion. First, he cites

Conclusion 269 public opinion data that consistently demonstrates Anglo-American popular mutual attachment as evidentiary of a special sentimentalised relationship between the US and the UK. Secondly, and even more significantly, he postulates that the strength of the public sentimental myth of the special relationship impacts upon leaders, encouraging them at least to maintain the public face of special relations. This produces something of a selfsustaining dynamic in the sentimental dimension of Anglo-American relations that also spills over into the power and interest relationship. For instance, media furore greeted the reported pronouncement by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee in March 2010 that the special relationship was over. Similarly, though Cameron and Obama introduced the idea of an ‘essential relationship’ as a marker of post-Bush era functionality and mutual importance within Anglo-American relations, neither has felt able to abandon the nomenclature ‘special relationship’. The White House statement announcing that Cameron would visit Washington in March 2012 was classic special relationship prose: The visit will highlight the fundamental importance of the U.S.-U.K. special relationship and the depth of the friendship between the American people and the people of the United Kingdom, as well as the strong personal bond that has developed between the two leaders and their families. It will also be an opportunity to recall the valor and sacrifice of the U.S. and British armed forces and their long tradition of standing shoulder-to-shoulder beside each other in defense of our liberties and shared values.4 What, then, of the future of the special relationship? Such speculation is always fraught with danger and, as with contributors to this book, rarely draws a consensus. Prime Minister Cameron spoke on his visit to Washington in March 2012 of ‘a great history of close relationships between U.S. Presidents and British Prime Ministers’ and placed his relationship with Obama squarely in that category. The President obligingly reciprocated: ‘In good times and in bad, he’s just the kind of partner that you want at your side. I trust him. He says what he does, and he does what he says.’5 Still, Dumbrell is pessimistic about the prospects in a Cameron-Obama era for a renewed leadership-driven special relationship and cautionary about divergent trends in Anglo-American priorities that might further atrophy the relationship. Verdicts are mixed in respect of the impact of institutions and globalising governance. Holmes sees similar Anglo-American responses to diplomatic challenges and an evolving model of diplomatic relations that stands the relationship in generally good stead. Dobson and McKinney view the impact of the EU and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Anglo-American economic relations as being ambiguous and in need of greater detailed research. Marsh is relatively sanguine about the EU threat to the Anglo-American defence relationship, albeit the principal

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reason for this is EU failure to offer a meaningful alternative rather than British success in either driving a European Union that is more capable of military burdensharing or one that clearly accepts a transatlantic division of labour acceptable to Washington. Increasing emphasis by the Obama and Cameron governments on smart power, together with a basic continuity in the post-9/11 security agenda set out by the Bush administration, buttresses Svendsen’s optimism for the continuation of close Anglo-American intelligence and security cooperation for the foreseeable future. One of the most interesting findings to flow from these chapters about the future of the special relationship concerns the asymmetry in AngloAmerican relations. For years Britain’s relative decline and British management of this has been the defining characteristic of narratives of Anglo-American relations. It has also been the staple diet of functionalists and, especially, terminalists. The thesis ran that Britain’s capabilities and global reach would so contract that the US neither could nor would recognise London as a preferred partner. For Coker et al. that moment came with the end of the Cold War.6 They were wrong then but were they simply premature or did they miss some other dynamic? Hendershot’s work suggests an under-recognised consideration in the guise of the power of the sentimental myth of the special relationship. Crucially, too, there has also emerged reason to question the assumed impact and universality of the asymmetry in Anglo-American relations. Though Jackson does not see a special Anglo-American relationship emerging in the field of climate change he does argue that there has been a role reversal since the Cold War whereby it is now Britain rather than the US that is a (comparative) leader in climate security. Simpson goes further. He argues forthrightly that the Anglo-American nuclear relationship has been and remains the most intimate and special of all the domains within the special relationship. He also develops a persuasive case that since the Cold War UK-US nuclear relations have actually formed a more, rather than still less, equitable partnership as a consequence of new nuclear agendas, comparative British advantage in certain areas and the impact on executive nuclear (non) decisions of different national domestic politics. In the military and intelligence and security domains, Svendsen and Marsh emphasise the need for the UK to continue to maintain a threshold capability sufficient to add demonstrable value to US capabilities within clearly asymmetric relationships. However, the latter draws renewed attention to the distinction between qualitative and quantitative dimensions of the special relationship. The argument rests essentially on the hypothesis that the US emergence from the Cold War as a hyperpower actually diminished in relative terms the significance of Britain’s quantitatively weakened military capabilities. The US could wage war on its own and committed in a number of strategy documents to maintaining martial supremacy.7 This, together with a new security agenda and radically changed battlespace, meant the UK could remain Washington’s military ally of

Conclusion 271 choice even with reduced relative and overall capabilities. This owed in part to Britain’s determination to restructure, size and equip its armed forces based on an assumption of Anglo-American cooperation in any large-scale conflict and to complement US capabilities. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) confirmed this ongoing intent. More important, though, was that the value of allies to the post-Cold War US military behemoth was different to that during the East-West stand-off. Willingness to share the political, moral and to an extent economic costs of committing to military action became acutely important as Washington waged elective wars. Blair’s military commitment to Iraq and Afghanistan was useful. However, it was operationally negligible for the Bush administration next to its symbolic value as it sought to maintain public support and counter soft balancing tactics by other states within and beyond the transatlantic alliance. To this was added Britain’s traditional willingness to support the US within NATO reform, protect NATO from within the EU and undertake military tasks that the US preferred not to undertake, notably peacekeeping in the Balkans and Afghanistan. There is, of course, a tipping point even in this scenario where British capabilities become too limited, or Anglo-American strategic dissonance so pronounced, that the UK becomes unable and/or unwilling to maintain its role as US ally of first resort. How close within the defence relationship to that point the cuts announced in 2010 take Britain remains to be seen. However, and this leads us to the final consideration about the impact of asymmetry within Anglo-American relations, it may be that draw-downs in Iraq and Afghanistan mark a (temporary) end to Anglo-American military adventurism and accentuate the emphasis on smart power, which in turn raises the question of Britain’s soft power contribution within AngloAmerican relations. Assuming, as Elie argues, that Britain’s soft power resources are less diminished than generally allowed, a US concentration on smart power could increase Britain’s relative importance once more to Washington.8 Holmes certainly sees strength in Anglo-American diplomatic capabilities and practices, and the UK will be influential in how the EU’s new External Action Service impacts international relations. It is also the case that Britain retains structural power arguably greater than it warrants, including its permanent UN Security Council seat. To the regret of some, and the confounding of others, the AngloAmerican special relationship survives in both its sentimental and power and interest forms. The nuclear relationship is unparalleled in the history of international relations writ large and has discovered new circumstances and avenues of investigation that auger well for its future. British and American armed forces have fought and kept the peace together more often and in more places since the Cold War than they did in the era of superpower confrontation. Counter-terrorism has emerged as a new area of privileged cooperation and here, as well as elsewhere on other pressing ‘safety/security’ issues, intelligence ties have thickened. The White House

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may invest heavily in other partnerships and even prioritise dealing with strategic competitors but times of crisis re-emphasise publicly the oldest, most trusted friendship and for a while raise to the surface more than just the tip of what former US Ambassador Crowe likened to the iceberg of Anglo-American relations.9 When the transatlantic chips were down over the Iraq war the American public were as strong in their embrace of Britain as they were in their rejection of French fries and ‘cheese-eating surrender monkeys’.10 In March 2012 President Obama declared: ‘I can stand here today and say with pride and with confidence -- and I believe with David’s agreement -- that the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom is the strongest that it has ever been.’11 Yet this is not the special relationship conjured by Churchill in his 1946 Sinews of Peace speech. It is more mature, more battle-hardened and arguably more culturally embedded, at least in the UK. At the same time it is quantitatively much reduced and as other powers continue to rise the special relationship is evidently no longer the world’s, or even the West’s, decisive bilateral relationship. It is possible that Britain will retain global importance for the US, perhaps as part of, in conjunction with the dominions, an evolving global perimeter defence – a new incarnation of Churchill’s ‘fraternal association of English-speaking peoples’. Equally, resources and priorities may eventually become so different that the power and interest special relationship will atrophy and lingering sentimental ties will be left increasingly divorced from the reality of Anglo-American relations. None of our contributors has, or probably would, proclaim conclusively as the future for Anglo-American relations either of these, or any number of other scenarios in between. What is certain, though, is that the special relationship will for some time yet remain a contested feature of the political landscape and for that it is hoped that this book has contributed to stoking the fires of healthy debate.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron, joint article for The Times, 23 May 2011, http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/prime-minister-and-presidentobama-article-an-essential-relationship/ Blair speech to the Labour Party Conference, 2 October 2001, http://www. guardian.co.uk/politics/2001/oct/02/labourconference.labour7 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by the President to Parliament in London, United Kingdom, 25 May 2011. Official White House announcement, Obama to host state dinner for Cameron, 3 February 2012, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/ post/2012/02/obama-to-host-state-dinner-for-cameron/1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom in an Exchange of Toasts at State Dinner, 14 March 2012. See for example C. Coker, War in an Age of Risk, Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2009, and his ‘Britain and the New World Order: The Special Relationship in the 1990s’, International Affairs, 68:3, 1992, pp. 407–421

Conclusion 273 7

8 9

10 11

PBS, Frontline, ‘The War Behind Closed Doors’, excerpts from 1992 Wolfowitz draft, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/etc/wolf.html; Patrick Tyler, ‘US Strategy Plan Calls for Insuring No Rivals Develop. A OneSuperpower World’, New York Times, 8 March 1992; ‘A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement’, February 1996, preface; United States Department of Defense, Joint Vision 2020; PBS, Frontline, Interview with John Lewis Gaddis, ‘Analyses 1992: First Draft of a Grand Strategy’, 16 January 2003, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/iraq/interviews/gaddis. html Jérôme Elie, ‘Many Times Doomed But Still Alive: An Attempt to Understand the Continuity of the Special relationship’, Journal of Transatlantic Studies, 3(i) Spring 2005 Supplement, pp.  63–83 Crowe: ‘I have always described the relationship like an iceberg, in that there is a small tip of it sticking out, but beneath the water there is quite a bit of everyday business that goes on between our two governments in a fashion that’s unprecedented in the world.’ Cited in ‘US and the UK: Special relationship?’, 23 February 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1185177.stm Nick Mowbray, ‘Cheese-eating monkeys and Gallic merde’, The Observer, 16 February 2003, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/16/iraq1 The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Cameron of the United Kingdom at Arrival Ceremony, 14 March 2012.

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Index

9/11 1, 11, 60, 72–76, 89, 98, 105, 120–122, 179, 188, 189, 190, 191, 208, 213, 256, 264, 265, 267, 270 Acheson, Dean 166 Acland, Anthony 111, 120 Adams, Gerry 86, 117 Afghanistan war in 4, 73, 76, 95, 96, 98, 100, 105, 121, 188, 189, 192, 193, 215, 265, 271 policy on 94, 195, 196 al-Megrahi, Abdelbaset Ali 98 al Qaeda 221, 256 American Civil War 32, 42 Amsterdam Treaty 161, 185 Anglo-American Agreement for Military Cooperation (Mutual Defence Agreement MDA) 1958 9, 180, 181, 191, 247, 248, 249, 251, 252, 253, 255, 256, 257, 258, 264 Anglo-American Loan Agreement 1946 132, 137 Anglo-American Mutual Defence Agreement See AngloAmerican Agreement for Military Cooperation. Anglo-French Defence Treaty 2010 187, 192, 194, 264 Anglo-Saxon capitalism 129 Anglo-Saxonism 29, 38, 39

Anglophilia 45 Anglophobia 17, 27, 33, 38, 45 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 252 Armstrong, Anne 52, 70, 71, 72 Ashton, Catherine 201 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 143 Atlantic Bridge 88, 95, 97, 186, 216 Atlantic Charter 1941 56, 131 Atomic Energy Act 1954 246 Atomic Energy Act 1958 247 Attlee, Clement 137, 243 Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) 180 Baker, James 171, 184 Banana War 143, 144 Bank of England 149, 150 Barclays 149, 150 Belfast Agreement 1998 88 Benelux Countries 135 Berkeley Roundtable 165 Berlin Crisis 1948 243 Bevan, Aneurin 59, 137 Bevin, Ernest 182 Blair, Tony 1, 4, 11, 73, 74, 82, 86, 87, 88, 93, 97, 105, 116, 139, 159, 167, 171, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 192, 193, 255, 257, 267, 268, 271

296

Index

Bush-Blair 1, 4, 11, 73, 74, 82, 88, 89, 93, 94, 189, 199, 268 Clinton-Blair 72, 82, 87, 88, 97, 265 Brown-Blair 94, 96 Boeing-Airbus (Airbus-Boeing) Controversy 143, 145 Bosnia 86, 87, 188, 189, 265 Bretton Woods 130, 133, 134, 135, 140, 141, 145, 150 BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 165, 170 British (Beyond) Petroleum 98, 144, 198 British Airways 144 Brown, Gordon 18, 73, 74, 75, 83, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 140, 149, 150, 154, 167, 168, 190, Blair-Brown See Blair, Tony above. Obama-Brown 96, 97, 198, 264, 268 Bush-Brown 94, 95, 97 Bruce, David 5, 68, 85 Brundtland Commission Report 154 Bush, George H. W. 84, 86, 87, 110, 120 Major-Bush 86 Bush, George W. (Administration) 1, 4, 72, 73, 82, 83, 88, 89, 93, 99, 118, 121, 142, 150, 159, 167, 170, 171, 184, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 200, 209, 257, 264, 268, 270, 271 Blair-Bush See Blair, Tony above. Brown-Bush See Brown, Gordon above. Cameron-Bush 98 Buy American Act 199 Cabinet (UK) 86, 90, 91, 243, 249 Callaghan, James 4, 85, 97, 100, 138, 253

Cameron, David 2, 4, 5, 75, 76, 98, 142, 266, 268, 269, 270 Obama-Cameron 2, 4, 28, 75, 98, 99, 100, 101, 192, 266, 269, 270 Sarkozy-Cameron 187 Carter, Jimmy 84, 85, 97, 100, 138, 252, 253 Catto, Henry E. Jr. 109, 110, 121, 123 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 211 Central Treaty Organisation 182, 245 Chatham House 166, 222 China 8, 58, 67, 101, 136, 137, 145, 146, 147, 150, 165, 172, 196, 198, 245, 255 Chiquita 145 Churchill, Winston 11, 12, 16, 56, 74, 182, 198, 244, 272 Roosevelt-Churchill 12, 56, 131, 180, 242 Citibank 149 Civil Reserve Air Fleet 144 Clean Air Act 1970 (1990) 157 Clean Water Act 1972 157 Clear Skies Initiative 167 Clinton, Bill 72, 82, 97, 110, 111, 117, 141, 159, 188, 200, 255, 265 Blair-Clinton See Blair, Tony above. Major-Clinton 86, 87, 88, Clinton, Hillary 95, 98, 194 Cohen, William 186 Cold War 4, 8, 9, 10, 19, 54, 55, 59, 62, 72, 82–86, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 154, 184, 270, 179, 180–183, 194, 196, 197, 212, 258, 265, 267 post-Cold War 1, 18, 82, 86–89, 97, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 119, 122, 154, 156, 165, 166, 179,

Index 184–192, 198, 200, 254–256, 258, 264, 267, 270, 271 Combined Development Trust (CDT) 243, 245 Combined Policy Committee 243 Common Agricultural Policy 136 Common Security and Defence Policy 185, 187, 199 Commonwealth 54, 65, 136, 137, 139, 180, 182, 213 Communist 66, 97, 135, 136, 180, 181 anti-communist 82 Communist Party (UK) 244 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 248, 252, 255 Congress (US) 72, 75, 92, 95, 134, 142, 191, 199, 202, 243, 246, 248, 252, 257, 268 Congress of Vienna 1815 114 Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) 244, 246 Conservative 3, 93, 98, 99, 137, 169 Conservative Party (UK) 86, 87, 90, 91, 97, 138, 144, 159, 167, 184, 190, 193, 251, 253 Control of Pollution Act 1974 158 Cook, Robin 190 Coordinating Committee (COCOM) 136 Copenhagen Accord 168 Cotonou Convention 144 Court of Appeal (UK) 219 Crowe, William J. 109, 110, 119, 272 Cuban Missile Crisis 84 Cultural relations 2, 13, 14, 26–45, 52–77, 106, 122, 147, 189–190, 192, 212, 264, 266, 268, 272 Darling, Alistair 150 Dayton Accords 188, 265 de Gaulle, Charles 91, 139, 251 aircraft carrier 187, 197

297

Declaration of Common Purpose 1957 246 Deepwater Horizon 143, 144 Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 2010 199 Defence Trade Security Initiative 200 Defense Department (US) 200 Democrat (US) 40, 93, 94, 98, 109, 110 Department of Environment 158 Department of Energy and Climate Change 168 Destroyers for Bases Deal 1, 16, 28, 35, 45, 266 Diplomatic relations 14, 18, 27, 29, 53, 56, 60, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 86, 96, 99, 101, 105–123, 154, 166, 170, 198, 265, 267, 268, 269, 271 Dole 145 Donovan, Bill 212 Earth Summit 1992 154, 158, 170 EC Directive on Large Combustion Plants 1988 157, 158 EEC Treaty 161 Ecological modernisation 156 Economic relations 55, 106, 129–151, 211 Eden, Anthony 61, 62, 212, Eisenhower, Dwight 61–66, 212, 244, 246, 247 Environmental Protection Agency 157 Environmental relations 18, 154–172, 267 EU Council of Environment Ministers 162, 163 EU Nice Summit 2000 185 Euro-zone 142, 147, 149 European Commission 2, 142, 145, 157 European Community 90, 91, 92

298

Index

European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 221 European Court of Justice 143, 162 European Defence Agency (EDA) 185 European Defence Community 180 European Economic Community (EEC) 5, 135 European Free Trade Association 139 European Monetary System 141 European Parliament 142 European Payments Union 133 European Recovery Programme (Marshall Aid) 133, 134 European Trade Policy 142 European Union 18, 19, 129, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 150, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 179, 184, 185, 186, 187, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201, 216, 265, 269, 270, 271 Exchange Rate Mechanism 141 Falklands War 72, 85, 183, talks 98 Farish, William 105, 110, 120, 123 Federal Reserve Bank 149, 150 Federal Reserve Board 149 Financial Crisis 95, 149, 150, 165, 192, 194, 250 Financial Stability Board 149 First World War 35, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 114, 115, 130, 183, 211 Flournoy , Michèle 202 Fogel, Robert 150 Ford, Gerald 69, 70, 138 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 91, 92, 218, 219 Foreign Military Sales programme 183 Fowler, Henry 135 Framework Agreement 2000 186

France-US-UK 259 Freeman, John 90, 91, Functionalist 11, 12, 14, 15, 19, 263, 265, 270 G20 (Group of) 95, 140 G7 (Group of) 140 G8 (Group of) 93, 140, 141 Gates, Robert 100, 194 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 132, 134 German re-unification 84, 141, 165 Ghaddafi, Muammar 99, 100 Gibson Inquiry 209 Global Climate Change Initiative 167 Global Climate Coalition (GCC) 167 Global Warming 154–171 Globalisation 129, 131, 213, 265, 267, 268 Goldman Sachs 149 Gore, Al 168 Great Power Status 29, 54 Great Rapprochement 17, 31, 35, 36, 44, 55 Great Society Initiative 135 Greenhouse gases (GHGs) 157, 159, 160, 166, 167, 168, 169 Grenada Invasion 84, 180 Guadeloupe Conference 253 Gulf War 86, 87, 189 Gun, Katharine 210 Hague, William 99, 193, 201 Halliburton 144 Hayden, Michael 211 Heath, Edward 18, 82, 83, 85, 91, 92, 96, 97, 100, 116, 250, 251 Helsinki Protocol 1985 158 High Court (UK) 219 Hiroshima 241 HM Queen Elizabeth II 69, 70, 105, 122 Hoon, Geoff 186

Index Howard, Michael 159 Howe, Geoffrey 119 Hussein, Saddam 189 IMF Loan Agreement 138 Indo-Pakistan War 92 Intelligence relations 4, 9, 14, 16, 62, 85, 88, 92, 106, 119, 180, 182, 197, 208–224, 243, 255, 263, 264, 267, 270, 271 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 246, 252, 255 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 132, 134 International Climate Change Action Plan (ICCAP) 168 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 132, 133, 137, 138, 149, 150 International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) 188, 189 International Trade Organization (ITO) 134 Iraq war in 1, 4, 73, 89, 94, 95, 100, 105, 118, 121, 186, 188, 189, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 210, 215, 217, 255, 256, 265, 271, 272 Irish Independence 17, 42 Irish Republican Army 212 Israel-Lebanon war 93 J. P. Morgan 149 Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) 216 Johnson, Lyndon 18, 67, 68, 83, 85, 89, 91, 96, 97, 135, 192, 250 Johnson, W.R. 212 Kennedy, John F. 67, 75, 82, 84, 154, 180, 249, 265 Presidential library 94

299

Kerr, John 111, 118, 121 Keynes, John Maynard 132 Keynesianism 140 Kissinger, Henry 85, 89, 90, 91 Korean War 137, 180 Kosovo Crisis 72, 88, 188, 189, 265 Kyoto Protocol 154, 159, 160, 162 Labour Party (UK) 59, 68, 84, 90, 138, 185, 190 Lader, Philip 109, 111, 118, 119, 120, 123 LeBaron, Richard 2, 99, 198 League of Nations 40, 43 Lehman Brothers 150 Lend-Lease 35, 36, 131, 132 Liberal Democrats (UK) 97 Libya 72, 98, 99, 100, 183, 192, 197, 209 Lisbon Treaty 142, 193, 216 Lockheed Martin 256 Lomé Convention 144 Louvre Accord 140 Maastricht Treaty 141, 161, 185 Macmillan, Harold 5, 7, 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 82, 84, 85, 180, 246, 247, 258, 265 Major, John 86, 87, 88, 89, 158, 184, 188, 265 Clinton-Major See Clinton, Bill above. Manhattan Project 179, 180, 242, 243 Manning, David 75, 94, 101, 109, 111, 120, 121 Marshall Aid See European Recovery Programme. Marshall Plan 133 MAUD Reports 242 McMahon Act 1946 (Atomic Energy Act) 180, 243, 268 McNamara, Robert 196 Meyer, Christopher 109, 111, 112, 113, 118, 120

300

Index

Middle East 56, 66, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94, 150, 182, 184, 187–188, 196, 197, 245 Mildenhall Agreement 1969 251 Military Defence Assistance Act 1949 181 Military relations 54, 58, 75, 76, 84, 85, 95, 98, 99, 100, 106, 107, 108, 179–202, 215, 218, 222, 241–259, 270, 271 Ministry of Defence (UK) 106, 187, 250 Mohamed, Binyam 209, 218, 219, 220 Monroe Doctrine 32, 33 Montreal Protocol 1987 157, 158 Mutual Assistance Programme 183 Mutual Defence Agreement 9, 180, 247, 264 Mutual Security Act 1951 181 Nassau Conference 1962 85, 180, 181, 249, 250, 251 National Environmental Policy Act 154 National Security Agency 190, 210 National Security Council 62, 91, 216 National Security Strategy 154, 191, 220 NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) 90, 100, 165, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189 190, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 200, 201, 213, 244, 245, 246, 249, 251, 255, 256, 257, 258, 265, 271 NATO Multilateral Force 180 Nazism 56, 263, 267 New Deal 131 Nigerian Civil War 89, 91 Nixon, Richard 18, 83, 85, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 135, 250, 251 Nixon ‘shock’ 135 Non-proliferation Treaty 251

North American Free-Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 18, 140, 142, 145, 151, 162, 165, 269, 170, 269 North Atlantic Treaty 1949 244 Northern Ireland Peace Process 72 Nuclear cooperation/ relations 9, 14, 19, 62, 85, 133, 179, 180, 181, 193, 210, 241–259, 268, 270, 271 Obama, Barack 1, 2, 4, 5, 18, 28, 73, 74, 75, 83, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 110, 111, 139, 144, 154, 192, 193, 195, 198, 199, 202, 263, 264, 266, 268, 269, 270, 272 Cameron-Obama See Cameron, David above. Brown-Obama See Brown, Gordon above. Sarkozy-Obama 99 Ockham’s razor 37 Olney-Pauncefote Treaty 1897 40 Operation Desert Storm 72 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 149, 156 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 139 Ormsby- Gore, David 84 Owen, David 139 Palestinian-Israeli conflict 133 Percy, Charles H. 109, 111 Parliament (UK) 243 Pearl Harbour 242 Pentagon 63, 106, 199 Plaza Accord 140 Polaris 138, 181, 149, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254 Prescott, John 159 Price, Charles H. II 123

Index Quadrennial Defense Review 191, 197, 199 Reagan, Ronald 71, 82, 84, 85, 86, 97, 109, 110, 111, 136, 141, 180, 183, 253–258, 265 Thatcher- Reagan 71, 82, 84, 86, 253–258, 265 Realist 16, 18, 33, 106, 108, 265, 268 Reciprocal Aid 131 Reiss, Mitchell 107 Renwick, Robin 109, 111, 112, 117, 120, 189 Republican 42, 90, 99, 109, 110, 111 Rhenish capitalism 129 Rice, Condoleezza 115, 190 Rio Earth Summit 1992 See Earth Summit above. Rogers, William 92 Rolls Royce 247, 255, 257 Roosevelt, Franklin 12, 16, 56, 131, 180, 212, 242 Churchill-Roosevelt See Churchill, Winston above. Sarkozy, Nicholas 99, 187, 198, 201 Cameron-Sarkozy See Cameron, David above. Obama-Sarkozy See Obama, Barack above. SDSR 192, 194–197 Second World War 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 12, 17, 27, 54, 56, 58, 59, 64, 66, 70, 76, 97, 105, 114, 115, 130, 131, 179, 189, 192, 196, 211, 224, 263, 266, 267 Security 2, 28, 30, 53, 69, 100, 154, 166, 179–202, 208–224, 256, 263, 264, 265, 270, 271 Seitz, Raymond 87, 109, 110, 112, 117, 119, 120, 123 Senate (US) 40, 75, 109, 110, 134, 163, 199

301

Sheinwald, Nigel 94, 109, 111, 119 Sherwood- Randall, Elizabeth 76 Siberian pipeline 84 Simonstown Agreement 92 Single European Act 1987 161 Single European Market 161, 162, 166, 193 Single Market Initiative 141 Sinn Fein 86, 117 Skybolt Crisis/ Fiasco 85, 249 Smoot-Hawley Tariff 1930 131 Socialist(ism) 59, 131, 132, 137, 138, 265 Southeast Asia Treaty 182 Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) 245, 249 Soviet Union (USSR) 15, 58, 61, 65, 67, 89, 133, 179, 182, 184, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 255, 266 St Malo Agreement 1998 185, 190, 193 Stagflation 140 START I/ START II 254 State Department (US) 72, 91, 109, 117, 120, 122, 200, 219 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) 251, 252 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 84, 180, 183 Strategic Defence Review 1998 187, 190 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 271 Straw, Jack 115, 190, 222, Suez Crisis 1, 60–66, 70, 82, 85, 137, 180, 188, 212 Superfund 1980 157 Supreme Court (US) 163 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 186 Susman, Louis 109, 110, 119 Sustainable development 155, 156, 161

302

Index

Terrorism 53, 94, 95, 140, 170, 188, 196, 198, 208, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 218, 256, 258, 264, 271 Thatcher, Margaret 15, 71, 82, 84, 86, 97, 98, 112, 120, 136, 138, 140, 141, 158, 180, 183, 185, 189, 253–265 Centre for Freedom 2 Reagan-Thatcher See Reagan, Ronald above. Thatcherite 184 Thomas, James 199 Tobin Tax 142 Transnational 26, 27, 29, 36, 37, 43, 154, 156, 221, 263, 266, 267, 268, Treasury (US) 135 Treasury (UK) 132, 183, 198 Treaty of Amsterdam 1997 161, 185 Trident 138, 180, 196, 250, 253–258 Truman, Harry S. 134, 180, 181 Doctrine 181 Tuttle, Robert H. 109, 110, 118, 121, 123 UK-France Nuclear Collaboration Agreement 2010 257 UK-US Defence Trade Cooperation Treaty 2010 199 UK-US Relationship 2, 145, 208– 224, 252, 264, 266, 270 UK-US-USSR 252 UK-USA Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) arrangement 210 Unfunded Mandate Reform Act 1995 163 United Nations 5, 61, 95, 99, 158, 188, 213 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) 158, 159, 170

United Nations Protection Force 188 United States Information Agency (USIA) 59, 60, 63, 64, 65, 268 US Fordney- McCumber Tariff 1922 131 US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 216 Versailles Treaty 1919 40 Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 157 Vietnam 70, 66, 90, 93, 192, 251 Vietnam War 60, 66–72, 73, 82, 85, 89, 93, 135, 180, 192, 251 Virgin Atlantic 144 Volker, Kurt 198 War Department (US) 57 War on Terror 88, 94, 97, 105, 120, 188, 196, 198, 208, 209, 212, 213, 217, 218, 221, 264 Warsaw Pact 184, 245 Weapons of Mass Destruction 140, 213, 215, 217 Western Alliance 52, 65 White House 12, 69, 70, 75, 89, 94, 95, 98, 99, 109, 111, 116, 118, 138, 144, 164, 171, 269, 271 Wikileaks 2, 99, 198, 222 Wilson, Harold 18, 68, 83, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 96, 97, 137, 192, 250, 251 World Bank 147 World Trade Organization (WTO) 120, 134, 144 Wright, Oliver 117, 118 Yom Kippur War 85, 92, 139