An Examination of the Dualism of Scientific Objects and Perceptual Objects

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EXAMIHATIOM op t h e DUALISM OF

SCIKMTIFIO OBJECTS AMD PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS

By Haig A# Khatohadourlan

Being a thealm presented to the Department of Philosophy at the Amerloan University of Beirut, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts#

Beirut, Lebanon, 1050#.

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ProQuest Number: 27550597

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TO ! RICHARD H, BCOTT

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/

with deep gratitude, and te her who la a neTer-falllng aouree ef Inaplration*

O O K T E M T S

PAGE PREFACR ....................................... 1 CHAPTER I THE DUALISM OF SCIEKTIFIO OBJECTS AMD PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS, OR THE EPISTEMOLOOIC AL DUALIST’S CONCEPTION OF THE REUTIOM OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS TO PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS ................. II III IV V

1

THE ASSUMPTIONS AMD PRESUPPOSITIONS OF DUALISM................................ 20 !•- THE LOGIC OF DUALISM 2.- THE kTETHOD OF DUALISM . . . . . . .

42

THE PERCEIVED WORLD AND THE WORLD OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE........... 59 SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE SPACE AND TIME .

89

VI

CHANGE IN THE PERCEPTUAL WORLD.......... 104

VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION..................U S

P R E F A C E

It la not the purpose of the present Inquiry to trace the hlatorlal genesis and evolution of the metaphysical theories of the dualism of so-called scientific objects and perceptual objects#

That la left to the historian of philosophical Ideas.

My approach la primarily analistlc and critical, an attempt to assess the doctrine in the light of logical principles and brute facts.

"Rie examination in hand confines itself to the

more refined forms which the duallstlo doctrine has taken In contemporary thought, and of those forms the form which holds that perceptual objects are mental as w ell as causally subje­ ctive* The inquiry In hand is a metaphysical one.

But as the

subject-matter of the present work It was arrived at as a resu­ lt of episteaologioal reflections. In particular as a result of reflection on perception as cognitive, as a source of knowledge of the external world.

The study of the various theories of

peroept#M#M.ed me to Inquire into the duallstlo theory of perce­ ption and reflect on Its validity.

The question as to whether

knowledge '>f the external world is mediate or immediate la equi­ valent in meaning^ to the question whether what we apprehend perceptuelly is the external world —

the world as It exists

^However, it Is not exactly equivalent in meaning uvoeuse it may be held (as is held by Russell) that knowledge of the "external world" is mediate, though what we perceive Is part of the external world, the medlaoy being Involved, of course, in the knowledge of that "part" of the external world which is imperceptible.

11 Independently of our perception of It —

or another world

which le conditioned in sorae manner by the percipient or* ganiam.

Put in another way, this question raises the basic

issue: what la the nature of the perceived world, which common-8ense realism regards as the external world. The dum alist’s answer to this question brings in his doctrine of the dualism of scientific objects and perceptual objects: the topic of the Inquiry in hand* It was mentioned above that the form of dualism which I have chosen for examination is one of the forms which du­ alism has taken in contemporary thought*

ihe reason of this

choice of a contemporary formulation of the doctrine is the desire to benefit from the history of philosophy, from the criticisms, modifications and refinements which critics of dualism and dualists themselves have indulged in since its first formulations in modem times by Descartes and Locke. I shall apeak about this point later in connection with Lovejoy's The Revolt Against Dualism in which, among other things, the author expounds his duallstlo view.

It may be

mentioned here in anticipation that in examining the doctrine in its present refined forms one is spared the task of repea­ ting over what the history of philosophy has done for him; and what is more important. Is guarded from losing himself in the unessential inconsistencies and ambiguities of its ori­ ginal formulations ; thus missing the essential part of the doctrine which may be valid even If its exponents may not have presented it consistently, clearly, or convincingly* In criticising the really unessential details of the doctrine

Ill one may fall Into the error of supposing that he has refuted the doctrine as a whole* connection by wqy

X would like to mention In this

of a digression, that to my mind what one

should direct bisenergies to particularly in doctrine believed

crltiolalng a

to be untenable, should not be merely the

doctrine as it haa been or is held by certain thinkers, but the doctrine as a possible interpretation of matters of fact* Thus the particular formulations of the doctrine actually held may be untenable, without the doctrine being Invalid in a mo­ dified form#

In this connection one should not only examine

and assess the validity of arguments actually brought forward In supoort of the doctrine being examined, but consider ar­ guments which can be brought in its favour*

Ttie purpose o*

criticising a doctrine Is not to refute Its exponents but to find the truth by first eliminating ineligible candidates to the truth. To return to one main discussion Lovejoy points out in discussing the First Phase Of The Revolt against dualism In contemporary philosophy what he considers polemics against dualism caused by misconceptions of dualism, partly produced by the seventeenth century conceptions of "Ideas"®# Now dualism as held in contemporary philosophy is of two main format the form which considers perceptual objects to be psychlo in the sense of being conditioned existentlally by the mind's awareness, and the one which considers perceptual objects to be physical*

Both forme consider knowledge of the

2

Love Joy, A. 0*, The Revolt Against Dualism* ([N*p#] , 1930), pp#36 ff#

Iv

external world, by »hlch la meant here the non-perceptual world, or of objects which exist Independently of the aware­ ness of sentient beings, to be mediate#

But whereas the for­

mer is metaphysically duallCtlc, the latter is not, A conte­ mporary exponent of the former form of dualism is Lovejoy* and Russell is an exponent of the latter form.

The present

inquiry confines itself to the former form of dualism# The reason for thus delimiting the area of inquiry is the brevity of time at my disposal.

It is preferable In any serious

inquiry, however catch time one may have at his disposal, to confine oneself to as small — * and as fundamental —

an area

of inquiry as possible in order to be sufficiently exhaustive. But this is indespensable when the time is brief. Now it is possible that the position that perceptual objeots are physical la untenable, and that any duallstlo theory must hold, in order to be validly duallstlo, that perceptual objects are psychic.

In other words, it is possible that

eplstemologlcal dualism, as defined by Lovejoy necessarily entails psychophysical dualism in respect to perceptual objects^. AS a matter of fact Lovejoy maintains that eplstemologlcal du­

alism does entail psychophysical dualism, though eplstemological dualism can be established without either holding that perce­ ptual objects are mental or tlm t they are physical,

Renee If

it is true that the only èenable form in which dualism may be held is the form which holds that perceptual objects are mental and it is shown that that form of dualism is not tenable. It I say "in respect W perceptual objects" because one may be a psychophysical dualist independently of his conception of the nature of perceptual objects#

will mean that the farm of dualism which holds that perce­ ptual objects are physical is also untenable*

Hence I have

chosen that form of dualism which holds that perceptual objects are mental rather than that form which holds that they are physical, since my inquiry into dualism consists in an attempt to refute the doctrine* Moreover, what I am Interested In In the present Inquiry is the metaphysical dualism, the bifurcation of nature which the doctrine concerned holdst hence my choice of Lovejoy's and not Russell's form of dualism, since the former bifurcates nature metaphysically, while the latter 4 does not • In addition to the fact that I have chosen for ray inquiry that form of dualism which holds that perceptual objects are mental, I have chosen as foundational Lovejoy** exposition of this form of dualism*

But in addition to this,

I have used extensively Lovejoy's The Revolt Against Dualism both as a reference in rof text and as a whole In my endeavour to ha#e an adequate understanding of dualism, and the arguBwnta brought in its favour and against It, in all their intricacies, subtlltles and details*

I acknowledge ray parti­

cular Indebtednesa to this work for making me aw##e of the various problems Involved in the theory of perception, for stimulating me to study dualism more extensively and for making me dev*te my present Inquiry to It*

The seeming

convincingness and finality of the work by way of truth. Bussell bifurcates nature epistemologically Into an order of iunediately known and an order of mediately known entities*

▼1 particularly In Its attempt to show that the contemporary revolts against dualism have all failed. Impressed me strong­ ly, on my first reading of the work, and challenged me to Inquire more earnestly than I had hitherto done whether du­ alism oannot be shown to be false.

With this In mind. It was

my policy during the period of my study of the various the­ ories of perception in preparation for the preaent work to attempt to explain in terms of this theory all the facts which a theory of perception Is meant to explain, and to attempt to overcome any arguments which might be brought against it, until I should find a point In the doctrine at which It breaks down.

The results of these attempts —

does break down somewhere — work.

my belief that dualism

form the contents of the present

My thesis, put summarily, is this;

the duallstic bi­

furcation of nature into two orders, one subjective, private, and the other objective, but unpercelved and unpercelvable, * known only mediately, la untenable. But it may still be asked why I ahose Lovejoy's, The Revolt Against Dualism 4tl ^^WPtidular aft foundational for my present work.

The reasons for this choice are several,

(1> The Revolt Against Dualism is not only an exposition and a demonstration of the duallstlo view and the grounds from which dualism arises logically, but also a comprehensive exposition of the revolt against dualism, particularly In contemporary philosophy, and an attendit to show that this revolt has been unsuccessful. (2)

Hence the work concerned is also a historical survey

of contemporary philesophy so far as theories of perception are concerned. It presents a plctwe of the various non-

vil duallstlo theories held in contemporary thought, though It seems to me the t its author misrepresents, or misunderstands the positions of such thinkers as Whitehead, Russell, Broad, and Kddlngton. (3) The work isrloh In thought exhaustive, end closely reasoned, and manlgests uncommon critical acumen and insight* It haa elicited the praise of such men as Brightman, C.S#, another dualist, who believes that Lovejoy's criticism of monism Is conclusive®. (4) Finally, and as mentioned before, Lovejoy's above work refines on and clarifies the positions of the first modern foraulators of dualism — ' Descartes and Locke — guards the interpreter —

and thus

from misunderstanding the positions

of these thinkers, and from wasting one's energies in polemics over the unessential ambiguities and inconsistencies of these thinkers and missing ths essentials of the doctrine. As will be seen from my bibliography, my references are fairly exhaustive of the immediate field of the present work. In terms of tbs resources Nhldi were available to me in Beirut during the time of preparation of this work the bibliography almost exhausts' the available resources. Certain books, such as H.H. Price's Perception, would have been pertinent to nqr discussion, but were unobtainable in Beirut* HAIO A. KHATCnADOimiAK Bie American University of Beirut Beirut, June,1950*

See Brightman, E.S., A Philosophy Of Religion, (New York, 1947), p*414 footnote*^TJ

TUB KPISTKMOIiOOIüAL DUALIST'S CONCEPTION OF THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTS TO PERCEPTUAL OBJECTS

The aim ef thla chapter la to present the daetrlne ef the dualism of scientific ebjeets and perceptual objects. Per this purpose I shall start by discovering the empirical startlng-pelnt or points from which dualism may be construc­ ted as a logical system.

By the erapArloal starting-points

I mean starting-points grounded in immediate sense-experience, in sense-data. Sense data are the ultimate data of all knowledge^. And any empirical proposition must directly or indirectly rest upon sense-data.

Whether sense-experlenoe can and does give

us a certain and Indubitable ground for the upbuilding of knowledge, or only a ground where probability operates, there is no OScape from sense-experlenoe.

Even those thinkers who

may come to reject sense-data as the ultimate logical startingpoint of their system, and even those who reject all eye tens and deny the possibility ef any knowledge, oannot reach such a position except through starting from sense-data themselves. And It will be reflection upon sense-experlenoe and sense-data that will convince them that sense-data are not the unquestion­ ed data te start from®.

I might add that the adequacy of suàh

^Of. Whitehead, A.N., The Alms Of Education And Other Essays, (New Ÿork7^94Ô), pp.ill, TSBT* 2

In saying the above I do net exclude Descartes, who, ad is well-known, grounded his philesephy en the fact of his con­ sciousness. Why Descartes may be thought an exception Is that tha f.«t of o«n.a,ou.n.«. ^ may appear

s A repudiation of sense-oxporienoe and senae-data, and the adequacy of the doctrine Involving this repudiation, will have to be tested In the lif^t of empirical fact and therefore ul­ timately in the lif^t of aense-data. Granting, therefore, that we have to start from sensedata, we new have to look for the particular data In their mani­ fold which point beyond themselves to an order of existence not perceptually given, but which sense-experienoe necessitates. In ether words, whet experiential grounds can be found for assum­ ing that the perceptual world is not existentially self-sufficient and oannot supply its own sufficient reason or explanation. It is true, to begin with, that no existing thing contradicts or can contradict other existing things.

the perceptual world,

whatever nature, cannot be self-contradictory.

Hence according

to Bussell, "... if ... we are to believe in the exis­ tence of things which we neither perceive nor recollect, it must be either on the not to involve sense-data, Itiat this is not the case is seen when we consider that consciousness Is sensclousness of a certain object or "content". And sense-data are part of this content. It is true that for Descartes it was not sense-data as such that were the logical starting-point of his Oeglto# ergo sum, and therefore of his philosophy, but these sense-dataas experlended by a subject. It was sense-data as presentation, as experienced, as object of consciousness, that was for him the ground for his existence. From sense-data taken by themselves nothing else could follew: there are colours, shapes, odours, pttns, etc. — ergo what? Colours, shapes, odours, pains, etc. Exist — nothing more, whatever 'exist' may mean here, and assuming that the notion ef existence can be conceived and have meaning to a man at this stage. But the awareness of sense-data qua given is not an lenedlate unrefleotive datum. Awareness of sense-data presupposes sense-data in the first place; and awareness of sense-data qua given presupposes awareness of sense-data ( and therefore sensedata), and else awareness of a subject to whia' to designate both the presen tatlen-complex and the objective constituent, distlnguishing between them only when meoessary.

Dualism also starts from the above conception,

and does not distinguish a from ultimately that

at first#

But it finds

and g are messrlsally distinct from each

21

other^, la the ear» way that k and b are nunorloally dis­ tinct, aa shown by the dlsouBslon whloh follows* infers from the above ezperlmont that ^

Dualism

eonaldered as a

set of charaoters. Is numerloally distinct from A#

It

reasons as follows: the objeot observed by the naked eye Is the same as the objeot looked at through the coloured glass.

And yet it appears different when seen throuf^ the

coloured glass,

Henee the change Is not in the object itself,

but Is apparent; and therefore what Is seen when looking through the oeleured glass Is not the objeot, but an appear­ ance ef It, an existent numerically distinct from the object. It is assumed above that the objeot Is the same through­ out the experiment, that we have A — A —

A from the moment

we first see a to the moment we see a again. (a) (a) — & —

(A) — £ —

Hence we get

if^) &

No have a at the beginning and at the end of the experi­ ment; hence the first and third ^'s« thetleal Intemedlary.

The seoend A is a hype-

Let us call It Ag.

Pew there la no proof that £ existed while b was perceived (d.e, that Ag is a real existent) or during the time a was not perceived; slnoe I said in effeot that ^ and b are numerloally dietinet frwa each other.

However, dualism assumes that ^

existed during the time It was not pereelved.

The pereeptlen

ef b (while looking through the coloured glass) as not chang­ ing Its position, and the pereeptlen ef a at the end of the experiment, may be taken as ooneon-sense indleatiens that A existed during the time it was net pereèived. ^ e e Chapter I.

|

28 Dualism assumas also that A has not ohanged during tho oxporimsnt, at least not approelably.

The following seen to

be the reasons on whioh the presupposition rests : (1) No change of colour, also, or shape is perceived either during the time a Is first being perceived, or during the time b is being perceived.

Or If a change was perceived, it was

such that it could not account for the whole difference in oharaoter between b and a. (2) The coloured glass Is assumed not to have affected A slnoe it lay between the object and tiie percipient. I sàld above tiiat dualism assumes that A continued to exist un perceived.

Thus dualism assumes In this experiment

(1) that there are entitles which exist unperoelved, enti­ tles whose existence Is not conditioned by perception; (8) that the world la not a Heraclltean flux, a perpetual change with no pemanenee whatsoever; or at least that some portions of It do not change appreciably at least while an observation for Instance Is being sAde.

If we assume that A may have gene

out of existence when not perceived (as a), and then came back Into exlstenoe when it was perceived again, we cannot infer that b is an appearance of jj we cannot say that b is related to But assuming that the ebjeot observed throuj^ the coloured glass Is A at the time we are perceiving ^

on Phat grounds

is it inferred from this fact that b is numerically distinct from at

It Is assumed that A cannot be characterised by b

since It is characterised at the same time by a.

In otiier

words, (3) Aristotle's law of contradiction along with the law of Identity ( and hence also the law ef excluded middle)

23

ere asatsaed» The first preauppoaltlon, above. Is ss-oalled ostaphysloal rsallsn, the belief in the exlstenoe of entities whioh are not conditioned axis tentlally by perception.

In this meta­

physical réalisa dualism agrees with the réalisa of what Love­ jey calls epis temolegioal acnlsa or realism, whloh does not peslt (like dualism) an Indlreotly-known world of scientific objects over and above the world of perceptual objects. But whereas eplsteaologioal realism holds that what exists in­ dependently of perception Is itself the world we experience i

in sense-peroeptlon, dualism holds that it Is a world causally related to the perceptual world, but numsrloally distinet from It.

The perceived world is exlstentlally conditioned

by pereeptlen.

Thus, so far as metaphysical realism Is con­

cerned, dualism and epistemclcgiSal realism differ only in what they consider to be exlstentlally independent of percep­ tion.

And it Is because dualism as a metapbysio holds that

this world existing Independently ef perception Is not per­ ceived and therefore la known (assuming that it la known) only i\ mediately, through the perceptual world, tiiat It differs from realism eplstemelegloally, and Its peculiar eplstemology arises. It is to be noted that the dualist's presuppesitlcn that i

the world Is relatively stable doe# not fellow from the laws A ' ■ Of contradiction. Identity, and excluded middle, as such, .

because these 3s ws are not violated by^'a mCtaphySic ef Mdfd" elitean flux.

l\ l\

\

4

This is true whether cha ng ee eh e pi ve d as disoontinueus I '\

or continuous, whetiier on the one (band change consists In the

I ! 'V -

84 destruction of existent» and the creation of other 4xlstents, or In the replaoesisnt of an existent by another, or on thm other hand, in the literal transformation of one existent into another.

Only it should be assumed that the particular

changes are not instantaneous, but involve a duration, however small the duration may be^.

Granting this, no two different

oharaoters of the same type will oome to exist in the same spatie-temporal locus. Again, returning to our experiment, it Is seen that ft is eemmSAved an appearance of ^ beeayse It Is assumed at first that it occupies the same spatial locus as g, slmltaneeusly with the latter. region as a.

b Is perceived to be located in the same

If that is not assumed. It cannot be Inferred,

on the basis of the law of contradiction, that b is apparent, because the law of oentradletlon would not be violated.

The

as8Uiq)tlon that b occupies the sasie region as a because it is perceived to be so located, presupposes the identification of the spparent location of b with its actual location. The reader has notioed that in discussing the experiment imagined at the beginning of the chapter, 1 spoke in terms ef an object A, its assumed ohar#cter-ccmp3s % a, and Its ap­ parent character-complex b.

The discussion assumed a certain

relatively stable existent located in a eettaln region in space.

For our purposes, tiie object {^) was equivalent to

^Xf duration le not assumed, change would become Impossible. Change has to be change in time. But there will be no tine if there Is no duration.

25 the oharaoter-complex perceived with the naked eye (l.e.a). The b wae first referred to this objeot; but analysis showed that it could not be so referred.

However, no assumption

was made, so far as the argument went, that k Is anything more or other than the perceived oharaoter-complex a. Re substratum underlying a was assumed.

That much was essen­

tial, however, boosuse without a posited stable charactercomplex, I could not proceed in zy argument In distinguish­ ing between it as that whloh is te be perceived (if possible), and b.

It can be said, therefore, that in the above-defined

sense ef "objeot" or "thing" the duallstic argument I dis­ cussed, and therefore dualism, presupposes (i) the existence of objects or things, which (assuming metaphysical realism) continue to exist when unperoelved.

'Hie fact that I waiXall

the time inquiring ooneerning k and its appearances without reference to the rest of the pres enta tion-con tinuum ef which a and b were spatial parts again presupposes relatively dis­ tinct stable objects.

However, as we shall see later on, I

do not mean by an "object" an entity omapletely self-sufficient and independent of the rest of reality^. ;

Furthensere, dualism assumes, like oeianon-senae, (5) that

sensuous cognition Is cognition of objects, and net cognition ef distinct, sensible characters varying spatie-temporally: of shifting colours and oonfigurations and hardnesses and odours, etc. etc. Sensible oharaoters which are perceived ^ o r further discussion of this point, see pp,3H34.

86 at a given moment to oooupy a ear tain spatial loous, are aesooiated together in thought as ooaetituting a aelf-subsistent objeot, preeervlng it# Identity asddmt change. The fellevlng dleouasien will, I hope, make clearer what X mean here*Let us asauM that an ebaerrer le gaming at what we call 'a star*.

What ia actually perceived la a certain luminous

point of a golden line, etc., among other such luminous points Interrupting a large somewhat concave patch of a dark blue colour which we call 'the dky'.

With the lusdnous point

concerned we associate certain characters — volume, shape, swtion, etc. etc. — constitute a "star" in astronosy.

a oertain mass,

all of which together We do not see the "star*

in the state, shape, and sise, which it Is supposed to have. But we still may that we are observing a star when as I said, we are observing only a tiny luminous point.

And If we ob­

serve the luminous point for a sufficiently long time, we may see that it is changing Its relative position with respect to some point which we take as fixed (usually a terrêetial f point).

But we still consider the point in the changing

positions the same "star" we were observing at first: which Involves the notion of self-identity amid external change. So far ao good.

But when we consider the distance of

the "star" f r M us, and the time li^t rays take to travel from its surface to our myes, and when we consider that tliese light rays are refracted as they pass throu^ the earth' atmosphere, we become pussled as to whether what we awe per­ ceiving is the star, or only an "appearance" of it. We

8% then say that what «e are peroeiring at a certain moment le the state In whioh the star was at the time the rays left its surface, perhaps tiiousands of years ago.

But even here we are

still referring the perceived luminous point to the star, though a temporal ohasm Is opened between the two.

And when

we speak of the luminous point as an "appearance", we are still referring It in some lumner to the star.

And we continue to

refer the presentations to the star even when the ppatlo-'teti temporal and qualitative chasm between the two becomes in­ creasingly wide and deep.

And finally, in the causal theory

of perception the star (which by now has become a scientific object) becomes the cause of the existence of the luminous point, the common cause of a group of qualitatively and quan­ titatively associated presentations.

A scientific objeot is

posited to account for the BlmlXaritles of groups of presenta­ tions.

And different scientific objects are posited to account

for pronounced qualitative and other differences between a group of (qualitatively and quantitatively) associated presen­ tations and other such groups.

Cownon-sense constructs objects

from presentations, and associates the presentations with time# objects.

And it assumes that we perceive objects, and that

sensuous (and also non-seasuous) cognition Is cognition of objects.

Dualism takes over these cosnon-sense assumptions,

but repudiates the vsgue oonnon-eense belief that though an object cannot possess all the discordant oharaoters it appears to have, yet all these charaoters are in some way "in* t)ie objeot, Common-sense remains a non-blfurcationlst, while dualism bifur­ cates nature.

m

It was Bsntloned that one of the reasons why the objeot A was assumed not to have ohanged during the hypothetloal experiment dlaousaed was that the ooloured glass lay between the objeot and the percipient, and therefore It was assumed tiiat it oould not have affected the objeot. a change did take place — was perceived —

However, since

a different sensuous pattern (b)

and the ohXy difference In the conditions

Invelved in the peroeptlcn of j| and of b was the introduction of the coloured glass in the manner described before, the coloured glass mist have affected soam object in some manner. The position, as such, of the coloured glass relative to tiie object and the percipient does not tell us Whether It affects the object, or the percipient, or both.

It is because it is

assumed that perception involves action of the object on the percipient, and not vice versa: and because this action is assumed to be modified through the presence of the coloured glass, that the position of the latter between the object and the percipient enters In as a determining element in percfption.

In other words, the above assmq^tion concerning the

effeot of the coloured glass presupposes (6) the causal theory of perception.

Assuming the traditional scientific conception

of the nature of the perception as a physical process and so far as it is a physical process, an object acts upon the percip­ ient organism through light rays whltii it emits or reflects# Any effects Which the object, or the medium (or media) may have on tiie percipient organism through action other than that of, or assoolated with, light rays, are assumed to be irre­ levant to the popoiplent event and what is perceived as a

20 result of that event.

But If the T;*rolplent organlom located

In a certain region affectedthe object, presumably this change affecta the light rays emitted, resulting In a corresponding effect on the percipient event.

However, If the medium acts

upon the objeot, the object would be different from what It would be in the absence of the medium.

The changes perceived

when the medium le present would not then be apparent.

If

such effects of the medium on the objeot are granted, we cannot Infer validly the numerical distinctness of the objeot and the sensuous oharac ter-complex perceived when the medium Is present.

Thus the Inference that the object and the sensuous

character-complex are numerically distinct presupposes tiie premise that the medium acts oausally only upon the llgdit rays omitted from the objeot and not on tlie object Itself;

or If

It does so act, this action is such that It cannot account for the perceived differences between the presentations (a and b). This fact, oonpled with the faot that one causal relation or chain of relations Is picked out as essential for perception, from all the oatual relations which may obtain between percip­ ient orgaAlsiq medlUB, and object^ all these mean that dualism assumes that (7) the causal relations between objects vary in relevance and Importance in determining or affecting the objects s6 related, that some relations are essential so far as a par­ ticular state or character of an object are concerned, while other relations are not essential; or that relations may be Hbeent between certain objects in respect to certain charac­ teristics they have, and states in which they are Involved. Thus although objects nay be relational, still, not every relation which an object enters Into witii another or other

M

objeot# le eeeentlal for It In the sense of being constitutive of its essence. In Isolating certain osussl relations or chains of rela­ tions as essential in respect to a oaStaln happening, dis­ regarding others as unessential, dualism follows scientific praotloe in Its oons true tion of ideally Isolated systems. Such Isolation of faotcrs assumes that spatial and tesg>oral remote­ ness means causal disconnection^#

Thus even If it Is granted

that the aedlw acts on the objeot-to-be-peroelved-lf-posalble when the medium is close to the objeot, such action is denied When the objeot is remote from the medium.

For example, the

earth's atmosphere is usually considered to have no effect on a star observed from the earth. Rote that in the argument In hand direct causal action at a distance seems to be avoided by positing light rays passing from the objeot, through the medium, to the peroiplent organism. And In every case of visual perception, including perception of heavenly bodies separated from us by alsKWt a pe rfeot vacuum, tile causal chain seems to involve only contiguous bodies# Similarly in perception involving the other senses#

However,

resssWbering the atomlo structure of matter, it is seen tiiat this esmsal continuity is apparent only.

The vibrating atosm,

etc. are not contiguous except in oases of atomlo bombardment, whioh Is a rare phenomenon.

It seems to me therefore that the

causal tiieory of perception presupposes the possibility of ^ e e for inatanoe Whitehead, A.R., The Alsm Of Bduoatlon And Other Rssays, (SeWTTtirit, lOiO), ppTTO^IHT.---------------

98 action At a dlatanoa, though it is true that the aotlon of Individual atomlo particles Involves comparatively small dis­ tances only* In discussing astaphysloal realism I said that dualism assumes that there are objects which exist independently of perception*

But I did not explain thsArehat "independence

from perception" meant in that connection*

To speak precise­

ly, dualism assumes that there are objects exlstentlally In­ dependent of the awareness of sentient beings.

These objects

sHsy be conceived as relational In nature, in the sense that the relations they enter into determine the oharaoters they have*

Or they may be conceived as non-relational*

It Is to

be understood, however, that If the former view Is adopted, awareness is not one of the relations determining their charac­ ters*

But on that view the percipient organism will be a con­

ditioning factor as a physical object.

Further, the percip­

ient organism's spatio-temporal standpoint stay then be one of the conditioning factors*

The nature of the percipient organ­

ism (qua physical object) and Its relations to an object seem to me to determine the qualitative aspect of the characters conditioned by the percipient organism*

The relative spatlo-

teaporal standpoint seems to me to d e t e m l M the quantitative, measurable aspect of the characters.

If a percipient were

in a different relative standpoint from the one In which he actually is, the characters would have been different quan­ titatively, but not necessarily qualitatively.

Thus for

instance the length of a moving body decreases in the direc­ tion of its notion relatively to a reference-systern which '"V

’*

at has a smaller velocity In the aame direotlon as that of the body, as tiie velocity of the body increases (Lorens-Fitsgerald Contractions).

Similarly the mass of an electron increases

as its velocity increases in respect to a reference-sys tern which has a smaller velocity in the same direction^.

But in

the first exasiple the body still has some length, and in the second case

sobw

mass.

However, when dualism asks the question what things are in thesmelves. It assumes that It is meaningful to apeak of the characters of things without mentioning the reference-sys tern in respect to which these charscters are possèaseâ.

Row this

question does not refer to any particular object, but to ob­ jects in genmral, considered as a class.

Row if what I said

concerning the detexvlning role of the standpoint is correct, tiie above question does not assume the reapeotlvlty^.of cha­ racters.

However, if the characters as such are assumed to

be conditioned by spatio-temporal standpoints, then the above question does Involve a respective conception of characters. We conm now to a discussion of the presuppositions of the doctrine of causal, existential, and attributive subjec­ tivity of percepts. ^%riseoe. T.R.. The Structure And Properties of Matter. (Rew Tork, “ ---- ^ -------------^ A character is said to be "respective" when the term designating It has no meaning, as a possible predicate of a subject of discourse, unless, besides that tent and the subject, soam definite third term is implicitly or expli­ citly specified." (lovejoy. A.O.. the Revolt Against Dualism. ([R.p.J, 1930), p.98).

sa The finite velocity of ll^t nekee It InpoeulbXe for a percept resulting from the aotlon of ll^t rays on a percip­ ient organism to exist at the same time light rays leave the ooxnoeoendum. Hence the percept and the oognosoendum cannot be numerloally identical. This argument assumes not only that perepption is oondlt ttoned by a chain of causal action, but that (7) shat Is per­ ceived is also conditioned In oharaoter or content by the 7 nature of the causal action . And hence if shat is perceived la to be identified with the cognosoendi^. it has to be iden­ tified with the cognoscendum as it existed at the moment the ll ^ t rays left it, since the percept sill be qualitatively similar to the cognoscendum as it existed at that particular moment: the smmsnt when It initiated the causal chain result­ ing finally In the peroep#.

But the cwwaeendum. so far as

its particular state at that moment is concerned, no longer exists.

Hence the percept must be numerloally dietinot from

the oognosoendum. But in saying that the percept's character Is determined by the ooAcoecendum and other objects in the causal chain. Is it not already assumed that the percept is exlstentlally deter­ mined by causal action upon the percipient organism, and not only by the percipient event, peroeivingT

ttie event which culmina tee in

If the causal action determines the percept's

?5ee Lovejey, A.O., the Revolt Against IX&alism. ([w.p.l ,1930), p.a*.

w oharaoter, it determines first of all Its existence, and there­ fore oaueal action generates the percept*

Renee it is not the

faot that the percept exists after the light rays have left tiie oognosoendum tiiat constitutes the real reason for reject­ ing the Identity of percept and coP>*oeoh the pres sent inquiry with a preowception one way or another.

What

this inquiry alms to discover is whether an investigation of soiente lends support to the dualistie contention, or weakens it, independently of any metaphysical viewpoint; i.e. on the strength of science qua science.

It Is apparent that start­

ing from a specific metaphysical stanteolnt science itself can be Interpreted in accordance with that metaphysical standpoint. But such a procedure Is weeless for mj purpose. The problem of the nature of the "entitles” of science: electrons, pretons, or eleotron waves and proton waves, pho­ tons, etc., is a central problem In the philoso^Aqr of science, and an answer to It is a central task of any interpre tatlon of science.

A complete account of the relationship of peroep-

objeots to the "entities” of solenoe should include an answer to this problem.

But for the purpose of the present work such

an attempt Is not necessary;

moreover, it will carry us beyond

the scope of the present woik.

I shall not therefore enter

into this question. It is a ocnnonplaoe that science starts from sense-data, that its hypotheses are based on these data, that these hypo­ theses are verified by reference to them by testing the capa­ city of the hypotheses to predict new sense-experienoes In certain specific patterns (experimentation), that it discovers new facts again by the use of experiments and instrumental aids which terminate in sense-data, and that the results of seienoe, and the principles discovered explain, or attempt to

68

to explain, the world of ■enee-experienoe«

But all these facts

do not aa such prove that solenoe deals solely and exoluslvely with the .world of experlenoe*

Nor does the oonoeption that

solenoe deals with the probleaatlo as against the unprobleaath In experlenoe, or that soienee is prédictive of future exper­ ience for the guidance of action prove that above oontentlon. All these facts can be interpreted dualistioally as well as non-dualistloallyi moreover, as such they do not touch the crucial point in tee problem. In order to answer our question we have to discover the manner in which scientific entities and prftnciples are arrived at* the various stages which are passed through Trtm tee con­ crete data of experience to these entities and principles. This will enable us to know the exact type of relationship holding between these entities (or tee class of such entities) and principles on the one hand, and the data of experience on the other. In seeking for the unifying principles of things science starts by significant observation, isolating certain charact­ ers of experienced things as relevant to a particular problem it is seeking the solve from other characters considered as irrelevant.

Such an isolation of characters from the concrete

manifold of experience is of two sorts, so far as this activi­ ty of science is concerned* (1) the Abstraction of characters which are relevant for a particular problem In hand from oha­ raoters not relevant for that purpbee;

and (8) abstraction of

certain types of character as relevant to science qua science, from other types of character white are cmwpletely disregarded in science qua science.

63

The meaning of the first sort of abetraotion may be glo­ rified by an iXluatration.

Suppose that we are interested in

die covering the laws governing the periods of pendulums. We measure the periods of a nuWber of pendulums of different lengths but wite bobs of the sans material, and of ones of the same length but with bobs of different material.

We find

that the periods of the first groups of pendulums vary from one to another, while they are the same for all of the second group.

We infer from this that the length of the pendulum

is an essential, determining, or relevant factor in the con­ sideration of tee period; but not the material of the bob. Hie material of the bob is therefore disregarded while the exact relation of the length to the period is investigated* And When the more exact relationship is found, this rela­ tionship connects length end period, but not period and the material which the bob is made of.

In anoteer instance

length may be irrelevant, and other characters may become relevant. And so on. The second sort of abatractio%b white is wfaat oèmoWvna us in the present chapter, is the complete disregard of colours, odours, fcmstes, sounds* in general the so-oalled secondary qualities, as irrekevant to scientific inquiry. It is true that optics and aeons tics for instance speak respectively of certain wave-lengths of light rays as the physical causes of certain colours, and certain wave-lengths of sound vibrations as those of certain sounds.

Bat this

way of distinguishing wave-lengths is indulged in for pureill human reasons t because these wave-lengths happen to be

ones appreciated by our eenae-organa• But so far as optics and acoustics, and physioak science in general are concerned, the secondary qualities are disregarded so far as investiga­ tion into the nature of the external world is concerned. The disregmurd of secondary qualities by science may be though of as due to the elimination of these qualities from the external world, since these qualities were explained — or believed to be explained —

in terms of motion of extend­

ed particles of matter, in general, qualities.

terms of the primary

But the latter can itself be considered as a con­

sequence of the former, and not the cause of it.

The logical

common cause both for the disregard of the secondary qualities in science and for their elimination from the external world, seems to me to be possibly the cosraon-sense conception that qualities are attributes inhering in a substratum.

Interac­

tion takes place between substrata dnd not between attributes. The attributes are isodified or changed as a result of such interaction.

But substrata interacted by virtue of their ex­

tension snd motion and solidity in impinging upon one another. Objects are coloured extents, snd not extended colours. This attribution of a superior status to the primary qualities, particularly extension, hardness, motion and sise, as against the secondary qualities, is probably due to the fact that tactual perceptions give us (for oonon purposes) the cri­ terion of the substantiality, the concreteness, the reality of things, snd it is the primary qualities, as against the secondary qualities, which are taetudly perceived.

Thus It

seems that theme was no need for Galileo's and Newton's re­ duction of the secondary qualities in things to certain no-

tiona of partiel## (or for the awo# thing by Dftsoart## and Look# la phlloeopkiQr) for the mooondary qualities to be dis­ regarded In solenoe* Wo# althoui^ the notion of the Interaction of bodies by virtue of their primary qualities pot# the emqphasl# In the «rong plane, namely on the primary qualities, and not on the interaction. It gives us a olue to the nature of solentlfio Inquiry* The genera) problem In scientific Inquiry Is to un­ derstand all the properties of things (I.e. the nature of things) In terms of the dynsslo relationships Into vhloh things enter, and not to aooount for certain qualities In tense of other qualities.

Thus though the understanding of the pro­

perties of things is the end of scientific Inquiry, this end,Is reached through an understanding of the relationships betveen things.

And for Uiat purpose the secondary qualities as spe­

cific, Individual oharactere, are disregarded. fore

Science

there­

is not Interested, in the sense explained, in the obarao-

tere of things qua characters. It is not Interested even In the primary qualities as qualities. of things.

It turds to the behavloum

What science seeks primarily is to discover the

causal relationship betveen things.

And fMa relationship in­

volves the study of things as interacting, behaving, and not sli^ly as possessing stable characters.

Charaotera are speci­

fic, individual; interaction involves relatedness, vhloh Is vhat Is sought la science.

Hence science comes to explain the

characters of things In terms of Wieir behavious.

It Is not

extension vhloh accounts for colour, but the motion of parti­ cles vhlcb have extension.

In the present century It has

been found that the primary qualities themselves t laotlon, ex­ tension, hardness, Vhloh still oharaoterlsed the ultimate units of things up till tbs m d of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth oenturiee —

Dalton* a hard billiard-ball agi­

tated atom and even tlm (later) solar-system Bohr atom —

are

not as primary as they were supposed to be, and they oame to be oonsldered as the effects of entities idiirloe physiaal and not purely mathematioal relations retain the ease relation­ ship Aey had to sensible things from the start.

Tor it is in

the order of diaoovery, logftoal derivation and knowledge that they beoome inoreaslngly Abstract as their ultimate and most exact formulation is more end more closely approximated, and not In their nature itself.

Objects are the relata of the in#

teraoting forces; and ttie behaviour and states of objects are sensible manifestations of Aeae forces#

Scientific analysis

of forces gives us the manner of mid the factors involved in their operation, and the nature of tbs relationships of these factors to one another and to the total fwces. The forces are specific, partloular, in the sense of being relations holding between specific objects.

But science is not interested In

these forces as particular relations.

It is Interested in

the class (and the classes of classes) of such relations and in the classes of objects between which these relations hold, Hence the behaviour of a particular object,which in accordance with certain (classes of) forces is said to be sn instance exemplifying these (classes of) forces; and the specific for­ ces involved in the behaviour of the object concerned an ins­ tance of the (classes of) forces.

And in verifying the prln-

the sense in w h i ^ concepts are said to be mathematically or logically abstract or more abstract than other concepts.

71 oiples dl# covered, science resorts ultimately to the sensible exemplification of these prlnolplea*

It oteervee whether un­

der tbs conditions specified as necessary for the presence of these relations, the sensible manifestations arise or not. Thus the procedure involved in the verification of principles (hypotheses) is the reverse of the prooedure involved in dis­ covering the iminolples, where the question, put in its ulti­ mate form 1st- "Given certain specific data of expevienoe un­ der certain conditions,^that are the causal reXatlonshipe in­ volved?" I have mentioned the concepts of length and force in mf foregoing discussions.

The other basic concepts of physics

also are based on sens e-experience; but as ooncepts, they stand for no specific sense-character in particular.

Their

universal, abstract end non-quaatltatlve character enables them to be related to other ccmoepta, while the specific ins­ tances which these concepts stand for are quantitatively spe­ cific.

But the connection of these concepts w i % sense-exper-

leace is never lost, since translation

directly or indirect­

ly 4» into a particular instance is possible. From what has been said hitherto it la seen that the prin­ ciples of science deal throuid^out with and are intended to ex­ lain the nature of perceptual objects, though for that purpose science investigates relationships between objects which are not sensible.

The only perceived relation between objects is

the spatial relation^, which docs not, as spatial, account for ^Temporality is not a perceived character end relation. It Is inferred from all forms of change, external (I.e. physical) and internal (flew of feelings sad Wicughte).

Ic

the exletentlel reletlonshlpi between things.

But the spa­

tial (end also the temporal) framework beoonea In solenoe a framework within whloh causal relationships are placed, and the metrical aspect of space (and also of time) becomes a factor In determining the quantitative aspect of causal a#C' tlon.

Thus spatial (and temporal) closeness and spatial

(and tes^ral) separation determine the presence or absence o and the intensity of causal action • Hots that nowhere In the analysis of the derivation of scientific principles a Jump is Involved from the peroeptual world to ahother world. The laws of science are all Intended to explain the observed X^ienoiaena of peroeptual objects, whether these phenomena are observed under natural conditions or under artificiallydevised ones.

The astronomer identifies his heavenly bodies

wit&i the perceptual objects he observes through his teles­ cope and calls "planets", "stars", "nebulae”, etc.

And to

"explain" the behaviour of perceptual objects does net mean here the tracing out of the behaviour of ahother order of objects which are the causes of perceptual objects and of their apparent behaviour.

The sclentlet takes the observed

notioR, interaction, etc. of peroeptual objects as real, and not as apparent.

If scientific laws are not the laws

of the perceptual world, i.e. if perceptual objects do not behave as these lams specify, which follewc if we accept a duallatlc position. It follow* either (1) that percep&ial objects behave In accordance with other laws than the laws of scienoe; or (8) that perceptual objects b^iave in accor­ dance with no laws at all, simply because they do not be% e e CÂiapIm II, section on action at a distance.

have In any way at all.

If we aaaune (1), It follows that the

laws of solenoe do not explain the phenomena of the peroeptual world and are useless, therefore, while it Is the purpose of science, even if it has other aims also, to explain the pheno­ mena of the experienced world. Moreover, if these laws do not account for the phenomena of the experienced world, scientific objects (which behave in accordance with these laws) cannot account causally for the phenomena of the experienced world, and the experienced world would remain unexplained.

If we

take the other alternative (8), what grounds would we have for attributing to the world of scientific objects all the laws which science considers to be the k ws of nature, if what occurs in thm peroeptual world is the generation of per­ ceptual objects in specific regions of mental spaoe, and the annihilation of these objects?

what in these occurrences

necessitates the attribution to soieptifio objects of all the various and numerous laws of the various physical sci­ ences?

If the observed behaviour of experienced things is

only apparent, the laws inferred from this behaviour would also be apparent laws, fictitious laws applying to nothing existent. low.

It may be said that this conclusion does not fol­

Hallucinations are explained in terms of certain phy­

siological and psychological principles, but these principles are nèt the principles according to which the objects in the hallucination appear to behave, which behaviour is of course non-existent.

The pink rats in an hallucination may be seen

by the alcoholic to crawl towards him, to jump about, perhaps to fly.

In answer to this it may be said that even if phy-

74 ■lologloal and psychological principle# can explain why and how an hallucination should occur, and why pink rats and not bats or serpents should be seen, and perhaps even why the rats should be seen to jusq> or crawl or fly, still these facts can be explained because we already have at our disposal the laws of physiology and psychology, derived not from the analysis of the content of hallucinations, but from otiier facts involv­ ing the alcoholic subject himself as an object of solenoe. Ho amount of smalysis of the behaviour of the rats in the alcoho­ lic's hallucination without a knowledge of the behaviour and the Isws governing the behaviour of any other existent things, things In the world of experienoe in the usual sense of the term "world of experienoe", can reveal any^lng of the physlologloal and psychological causes of that hallucination,

nor

even suggest tb us that what Is experienced Is mhallucination. And the same is true in the case of the peroeptual world: no amount of the ansdysis of the perceptual world can give us the laws governing scientific objects and thereby governing perceptual objects if the behaviour of peroeptual objects is apparent and not real*

And an analysis of the peroeptual

world is the only means of discovering these laws. The dualist may reply that ev«i if it is granted that the above would follow if change in the perceptual world is only apparent, this would be the case provided that we are analysing only the peroeptual world itself.

But that is

Where the error lies in the above argument.

Science deals

from the very start with "scientific objecte” and discovers the laws which govern their behaviour.

It is only because

75 ^8olen£lfio objects" ere unperoelvable that solenoe has to re­ sort to peroeptual ejects and discover these lavs through then. However, this dees not seem to me to overcome the difficulty, since in order that the laws of the physical world may be dis­ covered throu#! an analysis of the perceptual world, the per#

ceptual world should be really as it appears to be. The duAlist would answer that since there Is a oneeome causal oorrespondenoe between experienced things and scienti­ fic objects, to«sums that scientific laws are the laws of the perceptual world comes to mean actually that these laws hold between scientific objects.

There Is no h a m in considering

provisionally that perceptual things are causally efficacious and their behaviour is real and not apparent, since by using peroeptual objects we arrive at the laws governing the world of scientific objects. may be objected to.

The dualist nay add that the above

It will be said that we do not know a

prioid. whether there is one-cm correspondence between causes and effects.

Causality is discovered through an analysis of

the perceptual world, and the nature of the relationship bet­ ween cause and effect is discovered in the sasm way.

If we

assume provisionally that soientlfie laws deal with the ex­ perienced world, we have to assume the same concerning cau­ sality,

But in scientific practice there is no such thing

as this provisional examination of the experienced world, re­ sulting in the recognition that the principles of solenoe really apply to "scientific objects".

The dualist would ans­

wer that this is true, but for a different reason.

He will

say that there is no such transfer of the scientist's ideas

76 beoause the scientist deals from the very start with scienti­ fic objects, eh ether he knows It or not*

But this brings us

beck to the same objection against the dualist's contention vhloh the dualist's above account Is meant to overoome*

The

objection still remains, since even If science deals through­ out with scientific objects, the perceptual world has to be what it appears to be in order that Ian analysis if it ms}' A

yield knowledge of scientific objects*

^

It nay be noted that the same nethodology is used here J / by the dualist as elsewhere* Dualism utilises the properties ,

of the peroeptual world, transfers these propertlek to sci­ entific objects, and then denies these properties to percep­ tual things* dure?

Wow what is the justification for sueh a prooe-

Dualism denies objectivity to peroeptual objects on

the ground that their objectivity would involve a Violation of tba law of contradiction*

But vhat logical absurdity fol­

lows if we assume that perceptual objects are causally efflcaoieas, even if we assume that they are conditioned by aware­ ness?

The results of physics arise by direct inference based

on statements involving sense-d^ta, and not by inference based on reduotignad absurdum from them*

Hence if science (inter-

1,

preted dualis tlcally) makes the Vbove-mentloned characters of peroeptual objects mere appearances, it undersdnes itself, and not the reality of these oharWoters of peroeptual things* Ttus Russell says: An argument designed to prove tAiat a propo­ sition is faiae is not Invalidated by having that proposition among its presdesss. Hence fS modem lÉnpedmâramvalldatea perception as a source of knowledge about the external

77 world, and yat depends upon perception, that la a valid argument against modem phyaloa®. And Whitehead says:

"Our problem la. In fact, to fit the

world to our peroeptions, and not our peroeptlona to the world®®^*

The notion, the change we peroeive In the percep­

tual world la an undeniable fact, whether appearance or no appearance.

Any hypothesis concerning these facts is episte-

Bologioally posterior to these facta, and cannot have an eq­ ual or greater probability of being true than these facts. Russell, in the passage referred to above, continues: 1 do not sqy that physios in fact has this de­ fect, [i.e. "that it invalidates perception as _ a Bourse of knowledge about the external worldiJ but X do say that a considerable labour of in­ terpretation is necessary in order to show that it can be absolved in this respeot. And it is because of the abstractness of physios, as de­ veloped ^ mathematicians, that this labour is required^. For Russell, percepts are physical entitles existing in phy­ sical spaoe: each percept la an event or a group of events 18 which belong to one or more groups constituting an eleotron « These percepts are arranged in a pattern whloh physios flndi?®. They have an influence on other percepts ("appearances"), cau­ sing them to depart from what they would be if they followed the laws of perspective strictly^*.

Thus percepts are part

of the physical world, and there is no ontological dichotomy 0 Russell, B., The Analysis Of Matter, (London,1927), p.157, ^^Vhltehead, A.*., The Alms Of Education And Other Essays, (Hew York, 1949), p.lSd. ^^Russell, B., The Analysis Of Matter, (London,1927),pp.157-138. l*Ibid., p.330, l&8ee Russell, B., The ABO Of Relativity, (London ,1925),p,191. ^^ee Russell, B., The Analysis Of Matter,(London,1927),pp.MD-

2dO.

78 between peroepts and "solentlfio objects" so far as ttw order of exlstenoe to whloh they belong Is concerned.

Andsince we

do not know the entrlnsle nature of scientific objects, we do not know whether it is very different from that of peroepte. Thus to quote Russell again: The gulf between percepts and physios is not a gulf as regards intrinsic quality, for we know nothing of the Intrinsic quality of the physi­ cal world, and therefore do not know whether it is, or is not, vexy different from that of peroepts. The gulf is as to what we know about the two realms, we know the quality of peroepts, but we do not know their lavs so well as we could wish. We know the laws of the physical world, in 80 far as these are mathematical, pre­ tty well, but we know nothing else about it. If there Is any intellectual difficulty in suppos­ ing that the physical world is intrinsically quite unlike that of percepts, this Is a reason for supposing that there is not this complete unlikeness. And there is a certain ground for such a view, in the fact that percepts are part of the physical world, and are the only part that we ban knew without the help of rather elaborate and difficult inferences^". Furthermore, Russell believes, with Whitehead, that the world of xdxysios is a construction from the world of experience, end not an Inference from it^^«

Thus in Russell we have an

eplstemologlcal dualist who does not bifurcate nature into two orders as Lovejoy, for instance, does. made on page savent

Hence the criticism

does n

The whole foregoing dlsousslon has been an attempt to prove that the laws of solenoe are the laws of the experienced world.

If this is true, it is more obvious of the laws govern­

ing owparatively large bodies than of those governing atoado and sub-atomic bodies.

But if the principle is true In the

Mgs##., p,864. ^^Russell, B., our teowledge Of The External World, ( London , 191B), Preface, p,Vi,

79

former oase. It Id alao true in the latter case, since the lawB governing the behaviour of comparatively large bodle» are approxlnatione to the lawo governing atomlo and aul>atomlc bod lee Thla brings us to the second part and to the more cru­ cial aspect of the problem In hand.

If the laws of science,

including the laws of the sub-atomlo world, are concerned throughout with the experienced world, then the atonic and sub-atoBLlo "entitles" which physics deals with must have a place in the experienced world Itself. But if this Is the case, how shall we account for the essential differences bet­ ween these entitles and experienced things?

In other words,

how is it possible to fit in the electrons, protons and pho­ tons with patches of colour, odours, hardnesses, motions and sounds in a consistent scheme?

How can we place such dispa­

rate entities In tiio same spatio-temporal and causal frame­ work?

*Hie dualist answers those questions in the negative:

they canhot be put within the sane order of existence.

The

dualist puts the ultimate entitles of science over against ten perceived entitles as cause to effect, as objective to sub­ jective. Ve have examined haw scientific principles are reached starting from sense-data.

I shall now proceed in the same

way to trace out the path by which, starting from sense-data, the ultimate entitles of physics are reached.

Actually, the

^See Edington. A.. The~Thilosophy Of PhysIgal Science. (Cambridge, 1039), p.2^| %^Whitehead, A.M., m Knqulry Concerning Principles Of Natural %iowledge. (Üambrïage,1025), pp.W-18.

80

A two Isaqes were Involved Indleorlmiumu— . solentlfio prlnolples. 1 spoke In that oonneotlon of the rédac­ tion of objective reality to partioles In motion In terns of which the so-oalled seoondary qualities were explained, end of the attenuated forms which these partioles have taken in eontemporary solentlfio thouf^t.

But the interweaving of the two

issues In the dlsousslon Is no aooldent*

It is a result of the

fact that the two issues are closely oonneoted, as will be shown presently.

If It Is true that Uie immediate conoem of scien­

tific inquiry is to discover the ground for the behaviour of things in terms of *miversai principles, the fact that science posits certain entities as the ultimate constituents of reali­ ty is seen to be not the result of a belief on the part of sci­ ence that the things we experience are not real, or are not ultimately real (whatever that may mean), and therefore the re­ sult of a desire bo find something real or ultimately real in lieu of the things we experience.

The positing of these ulti­

mate entities results from the belief of science that the ulti­ mate relationships underlying experienced things and their be­ haviour is better explainable if experienced things are regard­ ed as oomKwed of these ultimate entitles, and that the relation­ ships are determined with greater exactness and precision than otherwise.

This is again seen by considering that 3^ Sa exper­

ienced things themselves that are composed of these ultimate entitles.

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