An Axiomatic Study of God: A Defence of the Rationality of Religion 9783110717839, 9783110717983, 9783110718058, 2020950182

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Introduction
1 Existence and General Attributes
2 God’s Knowledge
3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will
4 God as Creator
5 God is All-Good
6 Jesus Christ the Saviour
7 Consistency Proof of ASG
Bibliography
Subject Index
Name Index

Citation preview

Paul Weingartner An Axiomatic Study of God

Philosophical Analysis

Edited by Katherine Dormandy, Rafael Hüntelmann, Christian Kanzian, Uwe Meixner, Richard Schantz, and Erwin Tegtmeier Editorial Advisory Board: Natalja Deng, Michał Głowala, Thomas Grundmann, Jani Hakkarainen, Wolfgang Huemer, Markku Keinänen, Max Kistler, Robert Koons, Ingolf Max, Bruno Niederbacher, Francesco Orilia, Elisa Paganini, Marek Piwowarczyk, Maria Reicher-Marek, Benjamin Schnieder, Oliver Scholz, Henning Tegtmeyer, Peter van Inwagen, and Barbara Vetter

Volume 84

Paul Weingartner

An Axiomatic Study of God A Defence of the Rationality of Religion

ISBN 978-3-11-071783-9 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-071798-3 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-071805-8 ISSN 2627-227X Library of Congress Control Number: 2020950182 Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2021 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck. www.degruyter.com

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To the Mother of God

Preface The purpose of this book is to show that a considerable part of what is called Natural Theology or Philosophical Theology can be built up as an axiomatic system (ASG). In particular, it is shown that God’s attributes (ch.1), omniscience (ch.2), omnipotence (ch.3), benevolence (all-goodness, ch.5), and God as creator (ch.4) can be characterized by axioms and by theorems as consequences of the axioms. Further axioms say that God can do things that he does not do nor wills to do, and that God is a necessary cause and precondition for everything that happens in creation (in the universe) but not a su�cient one for everything (like moral evil). Moreover, axioms say that God’s will and love select (he does not will nor love every good) and that his goodness implies his justice, his mercy, and his love. Chapter 6 continues this study with Jesus Christ, the Saviour. This chapter treats axiomatically a part of Theology and thus goes beyond Natural Theology. Chapter 7 o�ers a proof of consistency for a considerable and important part of the axiomatic system ASG by constructing a model in which the most important axioms and theorems are satisfied. Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Hans Czermak, Edgar Morscher and the members of the 2018 Bergseminar, and most of all Georg Dorn for valuable suggestions concerning improvements. Moreover, my thanks go to Beate Cemper (up to ch.6) and Rodrigo Leeb (ch.7) for the typing and the layout and to Claire E. Craig and Rodrigo Leeb for improving my English style.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-202

Contents Preface � VII Introduction � 1 1 Underlying Logic and Terminology � 3 2 Definitions � 7 3 Principles of Deduction � 9 4 Interpretation � 11 � �.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�

Existence and General Attributes � 12 Definition D1 and Axiom A1: God � 12 Justification of D1 and A1 � 13 Axiom A1: Existence of God � 15 Biblical and Church Documents � 15 Axiom A2: Trinity � 16 Non-Identity of the Persons: ft =� sn =� hs � 16 Biblical and Church Documents � 17 All Three Persons Are United in One Essence � 18 Axiom A3: Personality � 19 Church Documents � 20 Jesus Christ � 20 Biblical and Church Documents � 20 God’s Essence and Relation to Creation � 21 Definition D4: Essence of God � 22 Definitions D5 and D6: God’s Relation to Creation � 24 God’s Perfection and Actuality � 25 Definition D7: Perfection � 25 Axiom A4: Actuality � 26 Biblical and Church Documents � 28 The Perfection of the World According to Leibniz � 29 God is Essentially ONE � 31 Definition D8: Essentially ONE � 31 Biblical and Church Documents � 31 God is Eternal � 32 Definition D9: Eternity of God � 32 ET-Simultaneity � 32 Eternity and Immutability � 34 Biblical and Church Documents � 36

X � Contents �.�� �.��.� �.��.� �.��.� �.��.� �.�� �.��.� �.��.� �.��.�

Immutability or Mutability � 36 Biblical Documents � 37 God Is Not Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Essence and His Knowledge � 37 God Need Not Be Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Will � 39 God Need Not Be Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Love � 42 Theorems on God’s Existence and Attributes � 43 Existence and Trinity � 43 Essence, Perfection, Actuality � 44 Eternity and Immutability � 46

� �.� �.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�

God’s Knowledge � 48 Axiom A6: Omniscience � 48 Biblical and Church Documents � 49 God’s Knowledge in General � 49 God Has Sound, Complete, and Necessary Knowledge � 49 God Is Logically Omniscient and Logically Infallible � 51 God’s Knowledge of the Universe � 52 God’s Knowledge of Past and Future � 54 The View of Thomas Aquinas � 54 A Defense of God’s Knowledge of the Future � 55 To Know Does Not Mean to Cause � 58 God Does Not Know Future Events as Future � 58 Biblical and Church Documents � 62 God Knows Everything That Is Not the Case � 65 Stronger or Weaker Axiom (or Definition) of Omniscience � 65

� �.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�

God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will � 66 Axiom A9: Omnipotence � 66 Justification of axiom A9 (omnipotence) � 66 God’s Will Is Always Fulfilled � 68 Biblical and Church Documents � 68 God’s Willing and Causing � 69 God’s Will, Cause, and Permission � 70 God’s Power � 71 God Cannot Change the Past � 73 Biblical Documents � 74 God Can Do What He Does Not Do. Or: God’s Power Exceeds the Facts � 75 Einstein’s Question � 75

�.�.�

Contents � XI

�.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.�

Alternative Fundamental Laws and Constants of the Universe � 76 Alternative Features of Our Universe � 78 Can God Make (Cause) Things Di�erent from Those That He Makes (Causes, Creates)? � 80 Biblical and Church Documents � 81 God’s Omnipresence � 82 Definition of Omnipresence � 82 Biblical Documents � 83

� �.� �.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�

God as Creator � 85 Axiom 13: Creator � 85 God’s Relation to Creation � 86 Facts Willed but Not Necessarily Willed by God � 87 Di�erent Types of Contingency � 88 Chance and Randomness � 90 Facts of Creation Not Necessarily Willed by God � 91 God as a Necessary and Su�cient Cause � 92 Biblical and Church Documents � 93 Cooperation of Creatures � 94 Causal Relations of Creatures � 94 God Wills the Cooperation of Creatures � 98 God’s Will and God’s Commands w.r.t. Men � 100 Biblical and Church Documents � 103 God as a Necessary and Conserving Cause of Creation � 104 God as a Necessary Cause � 104 God as a Cause of Conservation � 107 Biblical and Church Documents � 109 God’s Providence � 110 Definition of Providence � 111 God’s Plan � 113 Goals in Creation � 113 Local Exceptions to a Global Plan � 118 Biblical and Church Documents � 120 Moral Evil � 121 Definition of Moral Evil � 121 Consistency and Inconsistency with God’s Commands � 123 There Is Moral Evil � 127 Biblical and Church Documents � 131

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God is All-Good � 133

XII � Contents �.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�

Axiom of Being All-Good � 133 The Problem of Evil: Definitions of Di�erent Types � 135 General Remarks on Evil � 135 Metaphysical Evil (MetE) � 136 God Wills some Things Conditionally � 139 Natural Evil (NE) � 141 Necessary Evil (NecE) � 145 Legitimate Evil (LE) � 146 Soul-Making Evil (SE) � 147 God’s Punishment (PE) � 149 Undeserved Evil (UE) � 151 Axioms and Theorems Concerning Types of Evils � 153 Metaphysical Evil, Soul-Making Evil, Evil of Punishment � 153 Natural Good and Natural Evil � 154 Necessary Evil: Theorems � 160 Legitimate Evil: Theorem � 161 Undeserved Evil: Theorems � 162 Death as Evil � 163 A World Without Evil? � 166 God’s Will w.r.t. Di�erent Types of Evil � 169 Biblical Documents � 172 Church Documents � 175 God’s Goodness and Will � 177 Whatever God Wills Is Good. � 177 God Does Not Will Every Good � 179 Biblical and Church Documents � 180 God’s Goodness and Love � 181 Whatever God Loves Is Good � 181 God’s Love Selects � 182 The Good That God Loves Is Willed by Him to Himself and to Creatures � 183 The Goals That God Wills and Loves for Creatures are Good � 184 Biblical and Church Documents � 184 On God’s Relation Between Love and Will � 185 Evil Accompanied by Good � 188 There Is No Bare or Absolute Evil � 188 The Good That Accompanies Natural Evil and Moral Evil � 189 The Principle That Evil Is Accompanied by Good � 190 God’s Justice � 193

Contents �

�.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�

XIII

Axiom of God’s Justice � 194 Theorems About God’s Justice � 194 Biblical and Church Documents � 195 God’s Mercy � 196 Axiom of God’s Mercy � 197 Theorems About God’s Mercy � 197 Biblical and Church Documents � 199 God’s Love � 200 Axiom of God’s Love � 200 Religious Belief � 201 Theorems About God’s Love � 202 Biblical and Church Documents � 203

� Jesus Christ the Saviour � 206 �.� God the Son � 206 �.�.� The Divine Persons � 206 �.�.� Divine Nature � 207 �.�.� Theorems: Divine Persons � 209 �.�.� Theorems: God the Son � 209 �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents � 213 �.� Incarnation � 216 �.�.� God the Son Assumes Human Nature � 219 �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents � 223 �.�.� God the Son Unifies Divine Nature and Human Nature � 224 �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents � 227 �.�.� Sin as the Reason for Incarnation � 229 �.� Salvation � 231 �.�.� The Many Missions and Tasks of Christ’s Salvation � 232 �.�.� Christ’s Baptism � 233 �.�.� Christ’s Temptation � 234 �.�.� Christ’s Transfiguration � 236 �.�.� Biblical Documents � 237 �.�.� Christ as Teacher � 237 �.�.� Christ’s Working Miracles � 239 �.�.� Christ’s Instituting Sacraments � 247 �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents � 249 Christ Conditionally Wills His Passion for the Purpose of Salvation of �.�.�� Mankind � 251 �.�.�� Christ Conditionally Wills His Death for the Purpose of Salvation of Mankind � 255

XIV � Contents �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.�.�� �.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.� �.�.�

Christ Causes His Descent � 256 Biblical and Church Documents � 257 Christ’s Resurrection � 258 Christ’s Ascension � 259 God Sends the Holy Spirit � 260 Biblical and Church Documents � 262 Christ Institutes the Church � 263 God the Son is the Supreme Judge � 264 Biblical and Church Documents � 265 Holy Mary – Mother of God � 266 Holy Mary’s Part in Salvation � 267 The Gifts of God and God the Son � 268 The Freely Chosen Contributions of Holy Mary � 269 Biblical and Church Documents � 272 Holy Spirit and Holy Mary Work Together � 274 Holy Mary’s Compassion for Christ’s Passion � 275 Holy Mary Leads Believers to Her Son � 275 Holy Mary Speaks to the World � 276 Biblical and Church Documents � 277

� Consistency Proof of ASG � 280 �.� The Model OBE � 280 �.� Method of Proving the Consistency � 282 �.�.� Operations � 282 �.�.� Axioms � 283 �.�.� Definitions � 283 �.� Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions � 284 �.�.� God’s Actuality, Omniscience, and Omnipotence � 284 �.�.� God’s Will and Causation � 287 �.�.� God’s Conservation and Providence � 289 �.�.� Moral Evil � 290 �.�.� God is All-Good � 290 �.�.� Existence of Evils � 294 �.�.� God’s Plan and Execution of His Plan � 296 �.�.� God’s Will and God’s Love Selects � 296 �.�.� Evil Accompanied by Good � 297 �.�.�� Consistency of the Axiomatic System � 298 Bibliography � 299

Contents �

Subject Index � 307 Name Index � 313

XV

Introduction It has to be clear from the beginning that we cannot know the essence of God in this life in any complete or exhaustive way. This point is stressed by several medieval philosophers, notably by Thomas Aquinas. Therefore, the meaning of the word ‘God’ has to be taken from two sources: 1. from what we know about the world (universe) and from our interpretation of the world as the e�ect of God as an intelligent cause; 2. from religious texts, interpreted as revealed texts (like the Old Testament) and – especially for Christian believers – from the New Testament that treats the teachings and the life of Christ as God the Son. Concerning 1. we have to observe that the world is contingent and a contingent outcome of God’s free will. That means that God’s creating the world is not a necessary outcome of his nature or essence. Consequently, we must not expect to learn much of his essence by investigating the universe. Concerning 2. we have to observe that what is told to us about God in the Bible is told to us in parables since it seems that doing it di�erently would make it incomprehensible to us. Moreover, our common language and our scientific language are – at least to a great extent – unsuitable for describing facts about God. Nevertheless, we presuppose that the text of the Bible is interpreted with the help of modern scientific exegesis together with Church Documents. This last point is important in the following sense: if we describe an individual, we have to do this by attributing properties to a substantial bearer. If we describe a kind (species), we try to give a definition containing conditions that are necessary and su�cient. As Thomas Aquinas stresses, neither way is suitable for speaking of God: In speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify his substance, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify his simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.�

This di�culty should be remembered w.r.t. all “attributes” or “properties” of God that will be discussed in the subsequent axiomatic system on God (ASG). These are “properties” of God that we humans understand as most important – some of which belonging to his nature or essence but never completing or comprehending his essence, like being omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good; some other belonging to his free will and love, again never completing or comprehending his will and

1 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 3, 3 ad 1. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-001

2 � Introduction love, like being a creator or giving all creatures the ability to be his collaborators and to contribute to the development of the universe. It should be noted from the beginning that this book is not a book on the existence of God. For this topic, see Swinburne (1979), Szatkowski (2012), and Weingartner (2010) where the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas are formulated in First Order Predicate Logic.� A general study on the logical structure of religion is due to Bochenski (1965). A study on the “logic of God” is due to Heller (2019). We are not dealing with the question of the logic of God in this study, although God’s omniscience (axiom A6) implies that God knows everything (every truth) of (about) logic and mathematics. The present study presupposes the existence of God and God’s being triune, actual, omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, and creator in the first axiom A1. This already makes clear that it is an axiomatization of Christian Philosophy and Theology. The purpose of this study is to show that a part of theology can be built up as an axiomatic system. This is done by giving axioms for God’s properties (attributes) that are assumed in axiom 1, by giving further axioms (A) and definitions (D), and by deriving theorems (T) from them. An important advantage of an axiomatic deductive system is that truth is transported by logical inference from the axioms and definitions to the theorems: on the assumption that the axioms and definitions are true (cf. section 3 below), so are the theorems. On the other hand, an absurdity of a theorem can be traced back to a wrong axiom or definition in order to replace it by a weaker or a correct one. This means that critical control is possible to a high degree – even for complex and involved theological statements. The present axiomatization is not restricted to, but based – in many respects – on the philosophy and theology of Thomas Aquinas and on documents of the councils of the Catholic Church. This does not rule out contemporary theology although it does not explicitly incorporate it. The axioms, definitions, and theorems – all formulated in symbolic language – do not contain a direct translation of any statement of the Bible or of a Church Document. In this sense, they may be subsumed under what is called “Natural Theology” or “Philosophical Theology”. However, after each chapter quotations from both the Bible and Church Documents are given in support of the axioms, definitions, and theorems. In this sense – i.e. if the Bible and Church Documents are included as support – the axiomatic deductive system can be called theological, being a part of theology. 2 There is a misprint in the formalisation of the Third Way in Weingartner (2010), p.77 where indexes are missing on two occasions: 8a should read: ∃t∀x(¬EX t x) → ¬ � ∃y∃t� (BEG t� y) 8b should read: ¬ � ∃y∃t� (BEG t� y) → ¬∃x(EX t� x) (where t < t� < t� , < for earlier; t� for present) The formalisation of the Fourth Way in this book is not suitable. One may take the formalisation in Lö�er (1998) or the shorter one in Weingartner (Theodicy), section 3.1.3.

Introduction � 3

It will become clear from the content of the book that I owe Thomas Aquinas a great debt of gratitude. Without knowledge of his Summa Theologica this book could not have been written. Remark on the dedication: To the Mother of God. “Mother of God” does not mean that the divine nature of God the Son received the beginning of its existence from the Holy Virgin, but that the holy body, animated by a rational soul, which God the Son united to himself in person was born from her. Moreover, the expression “God” in “Mother of God” refers to God the Son and not to the triune God (see section 6.2 and 6.4 below and Church Document D251; ND605 of the Council of Ephesus where this title was o�cially given to the Holy Virgin).

1

Underlying Logic and Terminology

The underlying logic is classical two-valued Propositional Logic (CPC) restricted by intuitionistic and relevant inference (cf. Introduction 3) and extended by a Modal System not stronger than system T or by the one included in the six-valued decidable logic RQM.� Furthermore some epistemic and other operations applied to propositional variables are used and determined by axioms or definitions. In addition a small part of First Order Predicate Calculus (including the function “ESS” occurring in A2 and T8) as well as Second Order relations are used only in axiom A2 and theorems T5, T12, T13, and not in any further part of the axiomatic system. 1. We use the following types of variables: propositional variables p, q, r; three types of individual variables: ‘x’, ‘y’, ‘z’ for creatures or for things in the world or the universe (cr), for living things or living creatures (ls), and for humans (�); the quantifiers may be restricted accordingly: ∀x ∈ cr, ∀x ∈ ls, ∀x ∈ �. For the three divine persons, we use the individual variable ‘a’; for divine entity (divine being), we use individual variable ‘b’. Since the tree types of individual variables refer to three di�erent universes of discourse, the axiomatic system ASG is three-sorted. The three universes of discourse are necessary because otherwise God or the three divine persons would be in the same universe of discourse as creatures, which is completely impossible. Moreover, the triune God cannot be put into the same universe as the three divine persons. Whereas the universe of discourse for the variables referring to creatures is non-empty, the other two universes of discourse are allowed to be empty. The reason for this is as follows: since we know that humans, living things, and

3 Weingartner (2009).

4 � Introduction other things of our universe exist (in space and time), the universe of discourse for the variables referring to creatures cannot be empty. On the other hand, if the universes of discourse of the variables ‘a’ and ‘b’ were non-empty, the existence of a divine person or of a divine being would be provable by the usual logic of identity. This would be completely unacceptable. On the contrary, such existence postulates have to be explicitly made by special axioms as it is done in ch. 1. Moreover, we use variables for time, position, and reference frame: t, s, f . When using more than one variable of the same type, we assume referential di�erence but drop the additional remark x =� y, p =� q for reasons of simplicity. In addition, we use the following constants: g (for: God), and for the divine persons father, son and holy spirit: ft, sn, hs. 2. The copula ‘is’ is expressed by the two primitives ∈ and e, where ∈ is used for individual variables or constants (representing individuals) and e for propositional variables representing states of a�airs. For examples: ‘g∈OS’ for ‘g is omniscient’ or ‘x ∈ �’ for ‘x is human’; ‘p e ME’ for ‘the state of a�airs p is a moral evil’. Moreover, individual variables or constants are used in the following cases: (a) p e G(x), p e Goal(x), p e NecE(x) . . . etc. representing: p is a good of x, p is a goal of x, p is a necessary evil of x (cf. definitions of evils, section 5.2). (b) g ∈ Just(x), g ∈ Merc(x), g ∈Love(x) representing: God is just to x, God is merciful to x, God is full of love for x. These states of a�airs are described by axioms A33 – A35. (c) Predicate cases: ¬Mut-K(g). . . God has immutable knowledge or: God’s knowledge is immutable; Sin(x) . . . x sins; Virt(x) . . . x is virtuous . . . etc. These and similar cases are defined by definitions D10.2-D10.6, D46, D46.1, D56. In other cases, the predicates are primitive (undefined). (d) Relation cases: GG(g, x) . . . God gives grace to x; SentM(g, sn) . . . God sends the Son as Messiah; ¬Devastate(g, x) . . . God does not devastate x . . . etc. In these cases, the two-place predicate is either primitive (undefined) or described by an axiom (cf. axiom A40). 3. With respect to states of a�airs, the set-theoretical elementhood relation ε is used as for example: ‘pεT(LM)’, ‘pεT(CR)’, ‘pεT(g-Essence)’, ‘OpεT(gCommands)’ standing respectively for ‘the state of a�airs p is an element of the theorems of Logics and Mathematics’, ‘p is an element of the theorems of Creation’, ‘p is an element of the theorems of God’s Essence’, ‘Op is an element of the theorems of God’s Commands’. Theorems here are understood in a general sense: all the true propositions representing obtaining states of a�airs of some domain, i.e. all true propositions

Introduction � 5

of logic and mathematics, all true propositions of (or about) the universe T(U) or of (about) creation T(CR). We use both ‘of’ and ‘about’ in order to emphasize that, for example, “chromosomes duplicate” and “the universe is spatially finite” belong to the theorems of/about the universe T(U). Observe that theorem in this general sense should not be confused with the theorems of this axiomatic system (ASG) abbreviated as T joined with a number like T22. Norms, written as Op, Oq, Or, . . ., are understood as being translated into thatclauses so that they can be true or false. Thus “it is forbidden to lie” or “lying is forbidden” or “that lying is forbidden is true” are theorems of God’s Commands and therefore theorems. 4. There are di�erent operators attached to propositional variables by which new statements (true of false) are formed: K . . . knows xKp . . . x knows that p (is the case) W . . . wills CW . . . can will CondW . . . conditionally wills C . . . causes as necessary and su�cient CN . . . causes as necessary but not as su�cient CS . . . causes as su�cient CC . . . can cause P . . . permits CV . . . conserves L . . . loves Pref . . . prefers Pref (p, q) . . . prefers (that) p over (that) q A . . . acts in such a way Accepts . . . accepts SW . . . should will (ought to will) SA . . . should act (ought to act) CCS . . . can cause as su�cient but not as necessary Deserves . . . deserves RTA . . . repents and turns away from Emb . . . embraces O . . . it is obligatory Many of these operators can be used both for God and for creatures in an analogous way. The last seven are only used for creatures. In order to mark this di�erence, one could use an asterisk attached to these operators when they are used for creatures. We shall not do this but want to stress that these operators, when applied to creatures and to God, are understood in an analogous way.�

4 Cf. Bochenski (1948), Weingartner (1979) and Weingartner (1999).

6 � Introduction For the operators K, W, and C, we assume the usual distribution principles for → and ∧, which are valid in epistemic logic: K(p → q) → (Kp → Kq); K(p ∧ q) → (Kp ∧ Kq). Analogously for W and C. These distribution principles are used in the sense of additional axioms. With the exception of axiom A7, we do not list them as axioms of the present axiomatic theory about God. 5. There are the modal operators ‘�’ (standing for ‘necessary’) and ‘�’ (standing for ‘possible’) in accordance with the underlying system of Modal Logic. 6. Universal and existential quantifiers are used for the following types of variables: ∀x, ∃x where ‘x’ runs over creatures. This can be marked at the beginning: ∀x∈cr, ∀x∈ls, ∀x∈� . . . for all creatures, for all living systems, for all humans. ∀t, ∃t; ∀s, ∃s; ∀f , ∃f ; ‘t’ for time, ‘s’ for the three spatial (or positional) coordinates, ‘f ’ for reference frame. ∀a, ∃a; ∀b, ∃b where ‘a’ refers only to the divine persons and where ‘b’ refers to divine entity or divine being. E!b as used in axiom A1 reads: there is exactly one (i.e. at least one and at most one) b. For using separate variables a, b, see section , 1. above. (∀p), (∃p) . . . propositional quantifiers (see 7. below). Definitions are written as open formulas, but they could be universally quantified. 7. Propositional Quantifiers Adding propositional quantifiers to classical two-valued Propositional Logic (or some weaker forms like Intuitionistic Logic or some Relevance Logic) is only a conservative extension as has been shown by Kreisel (1981b) and Kreisel and Krivine (1972), p. 9f. The quantifiers ∀p and ∃p are to be read as: “for all states of a�airs p” and “for some states of a�airs p”. Concerning the existential quantifier ∃p, it has to be noted that it does not automatically have existential import; whether it has depends on the w� which follows the existential quantifier ∃p. This becomes clear from the following cases: (a) Operators attached to propositional variables In this case, it depends on whether the w� following ∃p implies that the state of a�airs p obtains or not. For example: With the help of theorem T92: (∀p)(gCp → p), therefore, granted that gCp: (∃p)(gCp ∧ p) (for some p, God causes that p and p is the case). On the other hand it does not hold that (∀p)(gCCp → p). The reason is that God can cause states of a�airs that he neither wills nor causes (axiom A12). In this case such a derivation is not possible even if gCCp holds.

� 7

(b) Set-theoretical elementhood for states of a�airs In this case, the w� following (∃p) says that p is an element of a class of theorems, i.e. of a class of true statements which represent obtaining states of a�airs (or which represent facts). From this, it follows that in this case there is always existential import in the sense that p obtains or is a fact. For example, (∃p)p ε T(CR) (p is an element of the theorems of creation) implies (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p), cf. theorem T117. (c) The copula ‘is’ used for states of a�airs, i.e. e like in p e G or p e ME In this case, there is no existential import in the sense that the respective state of a�airs obtains, except this fact is explicitly stated. For example: from “the state of a�airs p is a moral evil”, i.e. p e ME, it does not follow that such a moral evil exists: (∃p)(p e ME ∧ p) (some states of a�airs is a moral evil that obtains). Therefore, the fact that there is a moral evil in this world is explicitly stated by axiom A20: (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME), i.e. some facts of creation are moral evils. On the other hand, if it is said (theorem T198) that no moral evil is willed by God (or: if p e ME then God does not will that p), p may represent some possible moral evil that does not exist (either not yet or never will).

2

Definitions

Definitions are understood as true equivalences. As true equivalences they could also be called axioms. The reason why we treat them as definitions is that they answer a “What is it?”-question or questions of the form: “What is the meaning of . . . ?” Axioms, on the other hand, state that something is the case either for all or for some states of a�airs. To treat definitions as true equivalences is the view of the Lvow-Warsaw School. In this case, the equivalence-sign “↔” is a functor of the object language of the system, and definitions are true propositions. Russell and Whitehead treat definitions as typographical conveniences that are neither propositions, nor true or false, where the sign “=Df ” is not any functor of Principia Mathematica (p. 11) but a sign in the metalanguage combining two expressions on the object language.� Definitions in this study are understood according to the LvovWarsaw School, i.e. as true equivalences.� As Kreisel puts it, “the motto ‘Definitions are just stipulations and therefore neither true (valid) nor false, but a matter of 5 Cf. Weingartner (1989). Mere abbreviations which are also sometimes called definitions such as ‘U.l.’ for ‘university library’ or ‘DNA’ and the like do not create problems and do not need a theory of definition at all. 6 Tarski (1956), ch. X.

8 � Introduction expediency’ is grotesque: since for more than 2000 years some central questions of the form ‘What is (object) X’ are answered by – of course valid – definitions.”� 1. Types of Definitions Several types of definitions are used in this study. We distinguish between them by the definiendum. (a) Definiendum with propositional variables. For example: p ε T(g) . . . p belongs to the theorems about God (cf. D3 below). All such definitions can be universally quantified with the universal quantifier (∀p). For reasons of simplification, we shall not do that. (b) Definiendum with individual variables (x, y, z . . . for creatures). These definitions can also be universally quantified (cf. D2, D34.1 below). We use restricted quantifiers like ∀x∈cr, ∀x∈ls, ∀x∈� as: for all creatures, for all living systems (creatures), for all human persons. (c) Definiendum with the individual constant ‘g’. Such definitions may be called non-standard in the sense that usually all definitions have variables in the definiendum that can also be universally quantified. The reason why we use the constant ‘g’ in some of the definitions is this: assume we have variables for defining God’s perfection and God’s eternity (D7 and D9). Then, the universe of discourse of these variables would include either God and creatures or only God. Because of the essential di�erence(s) between God and creatures, it cannot be accepted to put them both into one universe of discourse. Moreover, it would not be a way out to have two separate universes of discourse and to use superposing variables for the union of both. Therefore, it can only be accepted that the respective universe of discourse only contains God as a reference since it is clear from the beginning that only God can be perfect and eternal. But then, it makes no sense to use variables at all. Consequently, definitions using the constant ‘g’ in the definiendum can be viewed as instances of a virtual universal definition which, in this case, does not exist. The situation is similar to that when we make an instance of the definition of man: Definition of man: x∈Man ↔ x∈Animal ∧ x∈Rational Definition of: Socrates is a man: s∈Man ↔ s∈Animal ∧ s∈Rational This is a particular instance of the definition of man above where ‘s’ is a constant standing for Socrates. There is an important point to notice here: the first definition is one of a general concept man and, therefore, we must have a variable in the definiendum. The second definition, which is an instance of the first, is not a definition of man but of Socrates is a man.

7 Kreisel (1981a), p. 186.

Introduction � 9

Analogously, definitions D7 and D9 are not definitions of perfection and eternity, but of God is perfect and of God is eternal. This also holds for the definitions of the other properties of God like being logically omniscient, logically infallible, or for saying what it means that God permits or causes some states of a�airs. 2. Eliminability and Non-creativity� (a) The definitions in this axiomatic study are all explicit definitions. This means that the definiendum and the definiens of each definition are connected by an equivalence and therefore separated from each other. (b) The definitions of this study satisfy the criterion of eliminabilty since the definiendum can always be replaced with the definiens. That is, in each formula, the definiendum can be replaced with the definiens. (c) All the definitions used in this axiomatic study satisfy the criterion of noncreativity. A definition satisfies the criterion of non-creativity if the definition does not enable us to derive statements (formulas) which are not derivable (from axioms and theorems) without this definition; except for such statements (formulas, theorems) that contain the definiendum of the respective definition as a condition like T15, T16, T42.

3

Principles of Deduction

One purpose of this axiomatic study is to be as transparent and understandable as possible. Therefore, for proving the theorems, we have chosen principles of deduction which are very simple, intelligible and well-known because they are frequently used in logic, mathematics, and science. The most frequently used principles for the derivation of theorems in this study are the following five: 1. Modus Ponens (used for the proofs of 124 theorems) 2. Hypothetical Syllogism (i.e. transitivity of implication) (90) 3. Simplification (deriving parts from a conjunction) (70) 4. Uniform Substitution (66) 5. Definitional Replacement (56) Less frequently used are the following principles:

8 For suitable treatments of these two important properties of definitions, see Suppes (1957), ch. 8, and Morscher (2017) part IV. The claim in the latter book on p. 270 that non-creativity follows from eliminability is incorrect.

10 � Introduction Contraposition (26); Distribution: mainly the principle [(p ∨ q) → r] ⇒ [(p → r) ∧ (q → r)] (25); DeMorgan, Conjunction, exchange of disjunction with implication, exportation, and importation; addition p ⇒ (p ∨ q) and adding premises. All of the principles of derivation we use – except for one DeMorgan-form, double negation and the change from implication to disjunction – are not only CPC-valid but also intuitionistically valid. It further holds: all of the principles of derivation we use – except for that of addition and that of adding premises – satisfy the relevance criterion RC (replacement criterion). RC forbids valid inferences of CPC in which parts of the consequence class can be replaced by any arbitrary parts (including by their negations) salva validitate of the inference. Such parts cannot be relevant consequences even if they are the result of a CPC-valid derivation. RC is defined as follows: RC α is a relevant (non-redundant) consequence of A i� A � α or A ⇒ α (according to CPC) and it is not the case that a propositional variable is replaceable in α on some of its occurrences by any other propositional variable salva validitate of A � α or A ⇒ α.� Examples: The following principles are CPC-valid but do not satisfy RC (i.e. have irrelevant consequences): p ⇒ (p ∨ q); p ⇒ (q → p); (p ∧ q) ⇒ (q → p); (p ∧ r) ⇒ ((p ∧ q) ∨ (r ∧ ¬q)). In the first two, q can be replaced by any arbitrary propositional variable (including its own negation) salva validitate (of CPC); in the third, the second occurrence of q and in the fourth both occurrences of q can be replaced by any arbitrary propositional variable (including its own negation) salva validitate of CPC.�� The third example is of a peculiar importance. The relevance-criterion RC is observed and met in this axiomatic study ASG. There are only some harmless exceptions where the principle p ⇒ (p ∨ q) is used in a restricted way such that q is not arbitrary. The third example shows that RC forbids to derive an implication (or equivalence) from a conjunction. Such a derivation is also ruled out by Intuitionistic Logic which is also satisfied in ASG (with only few exceptions). This understanding of derivation and proof is in accordance with its understanding in mathematics and in science. No mathematician or scientist would dream to derive from two true theorems or from two true results (or their respective conjunctions) that they 9 This criterion originates in Schurz and Weingartner (1987), where it serves for a rehabilitation of Popper’s theory of verisimilitude. Cf. Weingartner (2000b), Weingartner (2009), and Schurz and Weingartner (2010) for further development. 10 The fourth example plays a role in modern physics since it is one form of Bell’s inequalities. Cf. Weingartner (2009), §4.

Introduction � 11

imply each other, or that one is derivable from the other. Because the two true theorems or the two true results are usually not logically dependent of each other. Take FT to be Fermat’s Last Theorem (proved by Wiles in 1995) and PT to be the Poincaré Conjecture (proved by Perelman in 2002) then it would be crazy to claim that FT → PT, because both are true and can be put into a true conjunction. According to these considerations the reader should be careful to not overlook such important relevance – and intuitionistic restrictions when studying the axioms (many of them contain conjunctions in the consequence-part) and derivations of theorems of ASG. In this sense the Propositional Logic used in this study is weaker then CPC since it is CPC with the restrictions of Intuitionistic Logic and with the Relevance Restriction of RC (except the few exceptions mentioned).

4

Interpretation

In order to show that the axiomatic system proposed in chapters 1-6 below is understood as a theory and not just as a non-interpreted and uncommitted logical play, we cite a discussion between Carnap and Gödel about this question (November 13, 1940; recorded by Carnap; G = Gödel, ich = Carnap): G: Man könnte exaktes Postulatensystem aufstellen mit solchen Begri�en, die gewöhnlich für metaphysisch gehalten werden: “Gott”, “Seele”, “Ideen”. Wenn das exakt gemacht würde, wäre nichts dagegen einzuwenden. Ich: Gewiss nicht, wenn als Kalkül. Oder meinen Sie interpretiert? G: Nicht blosser Kalkül, sondern Theorie. Aus ihr folgt einiges über Beobachtungen: aber das erschöpft die Theorie nicht.��

We understand our axiomatic study about God as a theory in Gödel’s sense.

11 This is the first part of the discussion which is recorded in Koehler (2002), p. 127 (my translation): G: One could establish an exact postulate-system with concepts that are usually called metaphysical: ‘God’, ‘Soul’, ‘Ideas’. If this is done in an exact way, nothing could be said against it. Ich: Certainly not if taken as a calculus. Or do you mean with interpretation? G: Not a mere calculus, but theory. From it, something follows about observations: but this does not exhaust the theory.

1 Existence and General Attributes �.� Definition D1 and Axiom A1: God God is defined as being triune, actual, omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, and as creator. The first attribute, being triune, holds especially for the Christian Religion. It also holds to some extent for Judaism, in the sense that in the Old Testament at least Christ is announced and predicted with his birth, life, su�ering, death, and resurrection. According to the New Testament, these announcements and predictions have been fulfilled by the life of Christ. The subsequent axioms, definitions, and theorems about God, however, can be easily applied to monotheistic religions in general. In that case, one would only have to drop g∈Tr (the attribute of being triune) in D1, A1, and T1 and to drop A2 altogether. D 1. b = g ↔ (b∈TR ∧ b∈AC ∧ b∈OS ∧ b∈OM ∧ b∈AG ∧ b∈CT)

A 1. (E!b)(b∈TR ∧ b∈AC ∧ b∈OS ∧ b∈OM ∧ b∈AG ∧ b∈CT) T 1. g∈TR ∧ g∈AC ∧ g∈OS ∧ g∈OM ∧ g∈AG ∧ g∈CT

A1, D1

A 2. g∈TR → [(∃a)(a = ft) ∧ (∃a)(a = sn) ∧ (∃a)(a = hs) ∧ (∀a)(a = ft ∨ a = sn ∨ a = hs) ∧ (ft =� sn =� hs) ∧ ¬(ft ∈ cr) ∧ ¬(sn ∈ cr) ∧ ¬(hs ∈ cr) ∧ (∃R� R� )(R� (ft : sn) ∧ R� (ft, sn : hs)) ∧ (ft∈DPers ∧ sn∈DPers ∧ hs∈DPers) ∧ (Ess(ft) = Ess(sn) = Ess(hs))]

If God is triune then there exist father, son, and holy spirit such that they are not identical and they are not creatures; they stand in two relations to each other: father to son (paternity, R� ) and father and son to holy spirit (procession, R� ); each of the three is a divine person, and all three agree in their essence. As has been said in the Introduction 1, 1. above, the universes of discourse of the variables ‘a’ and ‘b’ are allowed to be empty. Therefore, it is necessary to postulate the existence of the three divine persons in the consequent of axiom A2, which leads to theorem T4 with the help of theorem T1. More accurately, since the universe of discourse of the variable ‘a’ is allowed to be empty, the inferential principle (or rule) of Existential Generalisation cannot be generally applied, such that (∃a)(a = ft) does not follow logically from ft = ft, although the latter is of course true. Consequently, theorem T4 is not a logical truth. For the same reason, theorem T2 is not a truth of logic because the universe of discourse for the variable ‘b’ is allowed to be empty (see section 1.11 below). A 3. (∀a)[a∈DPers → (a∈Ind ∧ ¬(a∈cr) ∧ (∃p)aKp ∧ (∃p)aWp ∧ (∃p)aLp)] https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-002

1.1 Definition D1 and Axiom A1: God � 13

D 2. x∈HPers ↔ (x∈cr ∧ x∈Ind ∧ (∃p)xKp ∧ (∃p)xWp ∧ (∃p)xLp)

g . . . God, OM . . . omnipotent, OS . . . omniscient, AG . . . all-good, AC . . . actual, CT . . . creator, TR . . . triune, cr . . . created, creature Ind . . . individual, DPers . . . divine person, HPers . . . human person R� . . . paternity, R� . . . procession Ess(ft) . . . the essence of God the Father

�.�.� Justification of D1 and A1 1. We begin with God’s being creator (g∈CT). As has been said in the introduction, we have two sources for our knowledge about God. The first one – accessible to everyone – is the world (the universe) which we (believers) interpret as an e�ect of an intelligent cause. Therefore, to deny God as a creator would be certainly absurd for those who believe in God at all.� For the others, several options can be considered: (a) The world is everlasting. (b) The world is “self-contained” in the sense that it contains its own cause. (c) The world is “self-contained” in the sense that it does not need an initial state as a cause for later states. (d) The world is “self-contained” in the sense that it contains its intelligent observer and cause. The last option (d) can be rigorously refuted.� For the other options, we refer to a detailed discussion� since this treatment is not a book on the existence of God. God as a creator will be treated in chapter 4 (theorems T121-227). 2. Omniscience: Assume that God is not omniscient. (see A6 below). Then, his knowledge could be greater than man’s knowledge, but not in an essential way. However, the assumption of God as creator already suggests that his knowledge must exceed man’s knowledge in an immense way. This is manifest of man’s present knowledge of the universe with its di�erentiated and complex structure.� But in addition to the fact that he must know everything about his universe and his creation in general (which might also incorporate entities that do not belong to the universe, like angels), we have to assume that he must know everything about logic and mathematics and everything about himself. This strongly supports that God’s knowledge must essentially exceed man’s

1 Clemens of Alexandria (150-215) one of the first Christian philosophers said: “God is the creator of the world. This is the only positive knowledge we have about God. Except that there is only negative knowledge about God.” Clemens of Alexandria, Stromata 5, 11-13. 2 Cf. Mittelstaedt (1998) section 5.3 and Breuer (1995), Breuer (1996). 3 Weingartner (2010), pp. 39–48. 4 Cf. Davis (1982), Denton (1998), Hawking and Ellis (1973), Heller (2004), Heller (2010).

14 � 1 Existence and General Attributes knowledge in the sense of being omniscient.� God’s Omniscience will be treated in chapter 2 (theorems 36-80). 3. Omnipotence: Assuming that God is not omnipotent (see A9 below) would either mean that his will is not always fulfilled or that he cannot will or cause things other than those that he in fact wills or causes. That his will is not always fulfilled – though frequently a fact for man’s will – is impossible for God’s will (see however the commentary to A9 below). If he could not have created an alternative world, at least in some sense of “alternative”, we would not speak of omnipotence.� God’s Omnipotence will be treated in ch. 3 (theorems T81-T120). 4. All-good: Assume that God is not all-good (see A21 ch. 5 below). Then, he would either contradict his commands (for example the Ten Commandments) or will something bad, or his will would not be “moved” by his love. The first is impossible since, then, his actions would be inconsistent which is impossible for a perfect being. Concerning the second, it has to be observed that God cannot will something bad unconditionally, although in some cases he wills the absence of some special good in order to achieve another higher good. Concerning the third: Since love is an essential feature of God’s essence as is his will, they are one w.r.t. himself but may di�er concerning his relation to creation (cf. 5.5.6). God’s All-goodness will be treated in ch. 5 (theorems T228-T350). 5. Actual: Assume that God is not actual (see A4 below). Then, he would not be pure actuality but also potency (i.e. something possible which is not realized) or he would not be permanently active by knowing, loving, and causing, but sometimes inactive. The first is impossible because there is no unrealized potency of God. From the second, it follows that God is not eternal but in time. Therefore, if God is eternal (see D9 below) and not in time, he must be purely actual. Observe Introduction 3 for all parts 1.-5. derived from A1-T1.

5 For a detailed treatment, see Weingartner (2008). 6 “Alternative world” can be understood in at least two senses: First, in a strong sense, such that the alternative world would have other laws of nature or other fundamental constants than our world. Second, in a weak sense, such that the alternative world would have some other initial conditions or some other constellation of moving atoms at a certain time relative to some reference frame of the universe. There are many other alternatives in between these two extreme senses. For a discussion of alternative worlds, see section 3.5 below and Weingartner and Schurz (1996), p. 76–84 and p. 89–92.

1.2 Axiom A1: Existence of God � 15

�.� Axiom A1: Existence of God Axiom A1 says that there is one God that is triune, actual, omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, and creator. This is the confession of one special type of monotheism: one God, undivided according to its common essence or nature and distinct according to the proper characteristics of the three persons. This type of monotheism fits only the Christian Religion, although there are some small hints at trinity in the Old Testament (Ge 18). If we drop triune, then axiom A1 is a clear confession of monotheism which holds at least for the three Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents The biblical documents for one God in the Old Testament and in the New Testament are numerous. Some examples are as follows: 1. Formulated as a statement Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one (Dt 6,4). This is what the Lord says – Israel’s King and Redeemer the Lord Allmighty: I am the first and I am the last; apart from me there is no God (Isa 44,6). We know that an idol is nothing at all in the world and that ‘There is no God but one’ (1Co 8,4). Since there is only one God who will justify the circumcised by faith and the uncircumcised through that same faith (Ro 3,30).

2. Formulated as a norm You shall have no other gods before me (Ex 20,3; Dt 5,7).

The existential quantifier E! of axiom A1, which means there exists one being such that . . . , indicates the being with the six characteristics. That the essence of God is being in the present (see D4 and D8 below) is revealed to Moses from the burning bush: “God said to Moses ‘I AM WHO I AM’. This is what you are to say to the Israelites: ‘I AM has sent me to you’ ” (Ex 3,14). Lateran(1215): We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal, infinite and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ine�able . . . (ND19; D800). Vatican(1870): The holy, Catholic Roman Church believes and confesses: there is one God, true and living, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in his intellect and will and in all perfection. As he is one unique and spiritual substance, entirely simple and unchangeable, we must proclaim him distinct from the world in existence and essence, blissful in

16 � 1 Existence and General Attributes himself and from himself, ine�ably, exalted above all things that exist or can be conceived besides him (ND327; D3001). The special type of triune monotheism of Christianity is described very well by the continuation of the Lateran document and the council of Lyon: Lateran(1215): We firmly believe and confess without reservation that there is only one true God, eternal infinite (immensus) and unchangeable, incomprehensible, almighty and ine�able, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; three persons indeed but one essence, substance or nature entirely simple. The Father is from no one, the Son from the Father only, and the Holy Spirit equally from both (pariter ab utroque). Without beginning, always and without end, the Father begets, the Son is born and the Holy Spirit proceeds. They are of the same substance (consubstantiales) and fully equal, equally almighty and equally eternal. [They are] the one principle of the universe, the creator of all things visible and invisible, spiritual and corporeal (ND19; D800). Lyon(1274): We believe in the Holy Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one almighty God; and that in the Trinity the whole Godhead is the same essence (coessentialis), the same substance (consubstantialis), equally eternal and equally almighty, of one will, one power and majesty. [This Trinity is] the creator of all things created, from whom, in whom, by whom all things exist in heaven and on earth, the visible and the invisible, the corporeal and the spiritual (ND22; D851).

�.� Axiom A2: Trinity God as being triune implies that there are three persons, God the Father (ft), God the Son (sn), God the Holy Spirit (hs) who are di�erent (not identical), not created and stand in di�erent relations, R� (father to son: paternity) and R� (father and son to holy spirit: procession), to each other. Each of them is a divine person (cf. A3). All three divine persons are one and the same in essence or nature (cf. theorems T3–T13).

�.�.� Non-Identity of the Persons: ft =� sn =� hs

Thomas Aquinas defends that we can know God as a creator by natural reason; and since God as a cause of the world is the triune God as a unity in essence, we cannot conclude the distinction of the persons from this: The creative power of God is common to the whole Trinity; and hence it belongs to the unity of the essence and not to the distinction of the persons. Therefore by natural reason we can know what belongs to the unity of the essence but not what belongs to the distinction of the

1.3 Axiom A2: Trinity � 17

persons. Whoever, then, tries to prove the trinity of persons by natural reason derogates from faith. [. . . ] For when anyone in the endeavour to prove the faith brings forward reasons which are not cogent, he falls under the ridicule of the unbelievers.�

Thomas Aquinas’ view of the trinity is that there is a unity in essence and di�erence in persons where the proper characteristics of the persons are the di�erent relations between them: Hence we can properly say that the Son is other than the Father, because He is another suppositum of the divine nature as He is another person and another hypostasis.�

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents It should be mentioned that Thomas Aquinas has not invented the above description of trinity. Its main points had already been formulated in the council of Constantinople in 553 and of Toledo in 675 and in a more concentrated way in the Lateran Council of 1215 (see ND19, ND22 above and below): Constantinople (553): If anyone does not confess that Father, Son and the Holy Spirit, are one nature or essence, one might and power, a Trinity one in being one Godhead to be worshipped in three hypostases or persons, anathema sit (ND620/1; D421). Toledo (675): We confess and believe that the holy and ine�able Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is one God by nature, of one substance, of one nature as also of one majesty and power (ND308, D525). Although we profess three persons, we do not profess three substances, but one substance and three persons. For the Father is Father not with respect to himself but to the Son, and the Son is Son not to himself but in relation to the Father; and likewise the Holy Spirit is not referred to himself but is related to the Father and the Son, in as much as he is called the Spirit of the Father and the Son. So when we say ‘God’, this does not express a relationship to another, as of the Father to the Son or of the Son to the Father or of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son, but ‘God’ refers to himself only (ND311, D528). Lateran (1215): It is the Father who generates, the Son who is generated and the Holy Spirit who proceeds, so that there be distinctions between the persons but unity in nature (ND318, D804).

7 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 32, 1. 8 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 31, 2. Cf. questio 40 for the di�erent relations.

18 � 1 Existence and General Attributes These council documents might have been influenced by both Augustine’s De Trinitate and Boethius’ De Trinitate. Augustine says there (book I, ch. 6) that those who claim that Christ is not God are refuted by the bible (Jn 1,1): “In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God.” That “the Word” refers to Christ is proved by “The Word became flesh” (Jn 1,14). Augustine there says further that the Son is of the same nature as the Father. Cf. also book VIII. The di�erence between the three persons becomes apparent in several places of the text from the Bible: And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever – the Spirit of Truth. (Jn 14,16) But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you. (Jn 14,26) When the Advocate comes, whom I will send to you from the Father – the Spirit of truth who goes out from the Father – he will testify about me. (Jn 15,26) As soon as Jesus was baptized, he went up out of the water. At that moment heaven was opened, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him. And a voice from heaven said, ‘This is my son whom I love; with him I am well pleased’. (Mt 3,16) Therefore go and make disciples of all nations baptizing them in the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. (Mt 28,19)

�.�.� All Three Persons Are United in One Essence Thomas Aquinas gives reasons for this in the following way: So, names which signify the divine essence in a substantive manner are predicated of the three persons in the singular and not in the plural. This, then, is the reason why we say that Socrates, Plato and Cicero are three men; whereas we do not say the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three Gods, but one God; forasmuch as in the three supposita of human nature there are three humanities, whereas in the three divine Persons there is but one divine essence. On the other hand, the names which signify essence in an adjectival manner are predicated of the three persons plurally, by reason of the plurality of supposita. For we say there are three existent or three wise beings, or three eternal, uncreated, and immense beings, if these terms are understood in an adjectival sense. But if taken in a substantive sense, we say one uncreated, immense, eternal being as Athanasius declares.�

That the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God with respect to essence or nature is expressed in A2 by Ess(ft) = Ess(sn) = Ess(hs). As explained by Thomas Aquinas above, this is the reason why all three divine persons are called God: They are united by one divine essence. 9 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 39,3.

1.4 Axiom A3: Personality � 19

�.� Axiom A3: Personality The five conditions in the consequent (see section 1.1 above) seem to be necessary conditions for being a divine person: to be an uncreated individual, to have intellect and will and love; i.e. to know something and to will something and to love something. The claim in the first part of T1 (via D1 and A1) that God is triune means (A2) that Father, Son and Holy Spirit are three persons. Assume that this is not the case: then, any one of the three (Father, Son or Holy Spirit) is either not an uncreated individual or does not have knowledge or does not have will or does not have love. This immediately contradicts at least the Christian God since all the four gospels of the New Testament describe Christ as communicating as a person with the apostles and other people; i.e. as some individual telling them what he knows and what he wills and what he loves. It further contradicts the practice in religions where prayers, trust, hope, and worship are directed to the object of religion as a supernatural unified being. This holds at least for the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Thomas Aquinas characterizes person as follows: Further still, in a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in the rational substances which have dominion over their own actions; and which are not only made to act, like others; but which can act of themselves; for actions belong to singulars, Therefore also the individuals of the rational nature have a special name even among other substances; and this name is person. Thus the term individual substance is placed in the definition of person, as signifying the singular in the genus of substance; and the term rational nature is added, as signifying the singular in rational substances.��

A short, suitable definition of person is given by Boethius:“A person is an individual substance of rational nature”�� This supports axiom A3 by emphasizing the activities of a rational nature (knowing and willing and loving) and the individual substance as important features. Concerning the question whether the term “person” can also be common to the three divine persons, Thomas Aquinas says: Now this is common in idea to the divine persons that each of them subsists distinctly from the others in the divine nature. Thus this name “person” is common in idea to the three divine persons.��

10 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 29,1. 11 Boethius (Trin) (MPL), 64, 1343. 12 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 30,4.

20 � 1 Existence and General Attributes �.�.� Church Documents As we have already mentioned, the main points of the doctrine of trinity have been formulated by di�erent councils and in 1215 by the Lateran Council; ten years before Thomas Aquinas’ birth, who treated trinity in great detail in his Summa Theologica I, questions 27-43. Toledo(675) For, if we are asked about the single persons, we must confess that each is God. Therefore, we say that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, each one distinctly; yet there are not three gods, but one God. Similarly, we say that the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty, each one distinctly; yet there are not three almighty ones, but one Almighty, as we profess one light and one principle. Hence we confess and believe that each person distinctly is fully God, and the three persons together are one God (ND312; D529). Cf. ND19; D800 in section 1.2.1

�.�.� Jesus Christ According to axiom A3 and definition D2, a divine person is uncreated and a human person is created. It therefore follows that the Son as a divine person cannot become a human person. However, the incarnation of the Son is not interpreted in such a way that the divine person changes into a human person or vice versa. The doctrine is that the Son assumed human nature in the unity of his person, therefore possessing two natures, the divine nature and the human nature. Whereas the Son and his divine nature is uncreated, his human nature and the unification of both are created. Thomas Aquinas describes these points as follows: Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the nature of the Word of God united flesh to itself in Person.” “So likewise the flesh is said to be deified . . . not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us. (Jn 1,1; 1,14).

13 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,1 ad 1 and 3. Cf. ch. 6.

1.5 God’s Essence and Relation to Creation �

21

The two quotations refer to Christ as a divine person possessing divine nature and to Christ as a divine person with divine nature assuming human nature. Chalcedon(451): We confess that one and the same Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son, must be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion or change, without division or separation The distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as they came together in one person (prosôpon) and one hypostasis. He is not split or divided into two persons, but he is one and the same Only-begotten; God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ, as formerly the prophets and later Jesus Christ himself have taught us about him and as has been handed down to us by the Symbol of the Fathers. (ND615; D302) Chapters 1–5 of this study are concerned with (the triune) God. Therefore, Jesus Christ, his incarnation, and his salvation will be treated separately in chapter 6. However, in order to avoid misunderstanding, it was necessary to give a brief comment on the problem mentioned in 1.4.2 concerning Christ’s person and his two natures.

�.� God’s Essence and Relation to Creation “p ε T(CR)” means that p is a theorem of (about) creation (or creatures) for all times t or p is a theorem of (about) creation at any time t or at any time-interval between t� and t� where t is not independent of creation (cf. sections 1.9.1, 2.5.4 below). Therefore, we could write p ε T(CR t ) to point that out, i.e. to mark CR with a time index. However, we shall not do that since CR is constantly understood in this way throughout the whole text of this study; therefore, it would be a superfluous addition. Even so, we want to stress that the above reference to time should not be forgotten as an important aspect of understanding CR. D 3. p ε T(g) ↔ (p ε T(g-Essence) ∨ p ε T(g-Relation to CR))

The statement p belongs to the theorems of (about) God i� p belongs to the theorems of God’s essence or p belongs to the theorems of God’s relation to his creation. D 4. p ε T(g-Essence) ↔ [(�gKp ∧ �gWp ∧ �gLp ∧ gK�p ∧ ¬(p ε T(CR))) ∨ p ↔ E!b(b = g) ∨ p ↔ g∈TR ∨ p ↔ g∈OS ∨ p ↔ g∈OM ∨ p ↔ g∈AG ∨ p ↔ g∈Inft]

22 � 1 Existence and General Attributes D 5. p ε T(g-Relation to CR) ↔ [p ε T(g-Knowledge about CR) ∨ p ε T(g-Will about CR) ∨ p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. creatures) ∨ p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. men) ∨ Op ε T(g-Commands)] D 5.1. p ε T(g-Knowledge about CR) ↔ (gK(p ε T(CR)) ∧ gKp ∧ �gKp ∧ gK¬�p)

D 5.2. p ε T(g-Will about CR) ↔ [(gWp → (¬�gWp ∧ gW¬�p)) ∧ (gCp ∨ (∃x∈cr)(gCNp → xCSp))] D 6. p ε T(CR) ↔ (p ε T(U) ∨ p ε T(OC))

D 6.1. p ε T(LM) ↔ (p ε T(Lg) ∨ p ε T(Math))

CR . . . creation and creature OC . . . other creatures U . . . universe LM . . . logic and mathematics Lg . . . logic Math . . . mathematics

�.�.� Definition D4: Essence of God 1. The definiens of definition D4 has seven parts in a disjunction. Definition D4 says that p belongs to the theorems of God’s essence i� any of the seven parts is satisfied. This means for the first part: If p is necessarily known, necessarily willed and necessarily loved by God and it is known by God that p itself is necessary and further that p does not belong to the theorems of creation or creatures then p belongs to the theorems of God’s essence (cf. theorem T15). Furthermore if p is (logically) equivalent to God (as one) exists then p belongs to the theorems of God’s essence; i.e. God’s existence belongs to his essence. The same holds if p is equivalent to God is triune, omniscient, omnipotent all-good or infinite (cf. theorem T16). 2. The first part of definition D4 (cf. T15 below) is also satisfied by what are called “eternal truths”. Therefore they also belong to God’s essence. From this, however, it seems to follow that all logical and mathematical truths, even the most simple, trivial and irrelevant ones and the multiplication table belong God’s essence. This, however, is not the case for the following reasons: God’s knowledge is essentially di�erent from human knowledge. The multiplicity of logical and mathematical truths is due to two facts of human reason: (a) Man cannot comprehend all truths at once but has to consider them after one another. And di�erent people di�erent truths at di�erent times. (b) Man cannot comprehend all true consequences of true premises or principles at once but has to derive them step by step.

1.5 God’s Essence and Relation to Creation �

23

Because of the multiplicity of logical and mathematical truths and their infinite number of consequences (which include a lot of redundant and irrelevant consequences, cf. Introduction 3) man can be distracted. As Augustine says: The situation is completely di�erent however if someone knows this, and the other one that, the one useful things, the other less useful or even derogatory things. Who would not prefer – in the latter case – the one who does not know over the one who knows? There are even things of which it is better not to know them, than to know them.��

All these important facts of human knowledge are impossible for God’s knowledge. First, because to know truths after one another means to know at some time; but God does not know at some time (cf. Axiom A5, section 1.11.3 below). Second, God does not derive consequences from premises or principles since he comprehends all truths at once and consequently all eternal necessary truths at once; among these logical systems or mathematical proof-methods which are adapted to the imperfect human mind are not included either. This means that God’s knowledge is not discursive. Third God cannot be distracted by redundant or irrelevant truths as he cannot be misled by knowing the immoral actions of men because his thinking is perfect. We have to assume therefore, that God knows all simple, trivial, redundant and irrelevant truths of logic and mathematics only in some implicit way by knowing all eternal truths in one activity of knowing and comprehending: Now God sees all things in one thing which is Himself.��

In this sense there is no hinderance that the eternal truths of logic and mathematics, known by God in a comprehensive way, belong to ( the theorems of) God’s essence. A narrower concept of the essence of God would result by adding the restriction: p does not belong to the theorems of logic or mathematics, ¬(p ε T(LM)), to the first part in definition D4. We think, however, that including eternal truths in God’s essence can be very well justified 3. From all parts (disjunctions) of definition D4 it follows that ¬(p ε T(CR)). Therefore it holds that p ε T(g-Essence) → ¬(p ε T(CR)), i.e. that if p belongs to (the theorems of) God’s essence then it does not belong to the theorems of creation or creatures. Although God necessarily knows them since whatever he knows, he necessarily knows (cf. T50), he does not necessarily will them nor are they necessary. In other words: for the facts of creation and creatures, it holds that if God wills them, then 14 Augustine (Ench), 17. 15 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 14,7.

24 � 1 Existence and General Attributes not necessarily so and they are contingent, not necessary. (Cf. definition D5.2). Since among the theorems of creation and creatures there are also theorems that describe immoral facts (events) which God cannot will, he does not will all of them, although he allows them (cf. T222). Thomas Aquinas treats questions of God’s will in questio 19 of his Summa Theologica. There, he defends that God necessarily wills what belongs to his essence but not necessarily those things apart from himself and not at all things that contradict his commands like moral evil: Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily. [. . . ] The divine will, which by its nature is necessary, determines itself to will things to which it has no necessary relation. [. . . ] As the divine existence is necessary of itself, so is the divine will and the divine knowledge; but the divine knowledge has a necessary relation to the thing known; not the divine will to the thing willed.��

Concerning evil in general and occurring moral evil in particular, it holds that God need not will or prevent the first, whereas he cannot will and does not prevent the second so as to not interfere with man’s free will: The statements that evil exists, and that evil exists not, are opposed as contradictories; yet the statements that anyone wills evil to exist and that he wills it not to be, are not so opposed; since either is a�rmative. God therefore neither wills evil to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills to permit evil to be done; and this is a good. ��

From this, it also follows that God is not all-willing and not all-causing, although he is omniscient, i.e. all-knowing (cf. theorems T225-T227). God’s will w.r.t. creation is elaborated in more detail below (cf. theorems T122-T227, ch. 4). That God’s will is not necessary w.r.t. his creation is also indicated in several places of the Bible: “God had done all things, whatsoever He would.” (Ps 135,6).

�.�.� Definitions D5 and D6: God’s Relation to Creation D5.1 says that p belongs to the theorems of God’s knowledge about creation i� it is known by God that p is a theorem about creation (or creatures) and p is both known and necessarily known by God and God knows that p is contingent. 16 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,3; ad 5,6. 17 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,9 ad 3.

1.6 God’s Perfection and Actuality � 25

D5.2 says that p belongs to the theorems of God’s will about creation i�: if p is willed by God then not necessarily and God wills that p is contingent and: p is caused by God or by some creature under the condition that God is a necessary cause. It has to be observed that all facts about creation, which are represented by theorems about creation, are interpreted as contingent. Although inside this type of contingency of creation, there is of course the di�erence in the ontological status between laws of nature and fundamental constants of nature on the one hand and initial and boundary conditions on the other. The laws of nature are empirically necessary relative to the initial and boundary conditions and the fundamental constants are at least omnitemporally necessary (together with the laws of nature).�� These distinctions will be handled later (cf. Axiom A8). D6 says that p belongs to the theorems of creation i� p belongs to the theorems of the universe (including man) or p belongs to the theorems of other creatures (OC). In what follows, such creatures (like angels) are not denied but they are not explicitly incorporated or dealt with.

�.� God’s Perfection and Actuality �.�.� Definition D7: Perfection D 7. g∈PF ↔ g∈AC ∧ g∈OS ∧ g∈OM ∧ g∈AG ∧ g∈CT

Definition D7 says that God is perfect i� he has all of the five properties of being actual, omniscient, omnipotent, all-good, and of being the creator of the universe and other creatures. This means that according to D7 (together with D1 and T1), being perfect follows from being God. Assume the opposite; then, God would lack some of the properties in the definiens of D7. But a perfect being cannot lack one of its features irrespective of whether they belong to his essence or to his free will since he would otherwise not be perfect any more. Compare this to Plato’s proof of the immutability of God: every alteration of a perfect being must lead to a lack of perfection (Politeia 2, 380d-381d). Boethius describes God’s perfection in his Consolation of Philosophy (3, 10; MPL 63). Furthermore, in Augustine’s definition of God as that than which nothing greater exists (quo nihil superius esse constiterit), the expression “greater” might be replaced by “more perfect”. (De libero arbitrio II, 6, 14; MPL 32). Thomas Aquinas treats God’s perfection as questio 4 of his Summa Theologica:

18 Cf. the discussion in Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), p. 181–198 and 222–226.

26 � 1 Existence and General Attributes Hence the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection. [. . . ] This word perfect signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality.��

Several other ideas concerning God’s perfection have been proposed in the history of philosophy. For example, Suarez characterises God as the most perfect being containing all creatable perfections (Disp. Met.30,1,4). Leibniz defines: God has metaphysical perfection = God has maximal quantity of essence. According to him, this fact is logically or metaphysically necessary (GP 7, 195). Kant characterises God as the sum total of all possible predicates (KRV, B604). Gödel defines: x is God i� x has all positive properties��. We do not go into a discussion of these ideas.�� God’s perfection is also expressed in the following Church Document: Vatican (1870) The holy, Catholic Roman Church believes and confesses: there is one God, true and living, Creator and Lord of heaven and earth, almighty, eternal, immense, incomprehensible, infinite in his intellect and will and in all perfection. (ND327; D3001)

�.�.� Axiom A4: Actuality We shall describe God’s actuality with the help of his actions that are knowing, willing, loving, and causing. Whereas the first three actions are concerned with both, God himself and his creation, the action of causing is only concerned with his creation. A 4. g ∈ AC → [(∃p)�gKp ∧ (∃p)gWp ∧ (∃p)gLp ∧ (∀p)(gCp ↔ (p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp))]

Thomas Aquinas underlines two of the features given in A4 as God’s activities: knowing (understanding) and causing (having an e�ect). Both are connected by him with the life in God: Wherefore that being whose act of understanding is its very nature, and which, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God.��

19 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 4,1; ad 1. 20 Gödel (1970). 21 For Gödel’s definition see Anderson (1990), Anderson and Gettings (1996), Czermak (2002) and Czermak (2010). 22 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 18, 3.

1.6 God’s Perfection and Actuality �

27

[. . . ] because, since God is the first e�cient cause, to act belongs to him primarily and essentially��

Axiom A4 says that if God is actual, then he necessarily knows (understands) and wills and loves and causes those states of a�airs belonging to creation that he wills. That these actions are timeless (eternal) follows from A5 (cf. section 1.9 and 1.11). The first part speaks of necessary knowing because whatever God knows, he necessarily knows. This should become clear later (see theorem T50). The same, however, does not hold for God’s will or God’s love since he necessarily wills and loves what belongs to his essence but not necessarily, and hence freely, what belongs to creation and creatures and is consistent with his commands. Therefore, there is no necessity-operation applied to God’s will and love in the second part of A4.�� For God’s perfection and actuality, see theorems T17-T22 below. The third part of A4 says that if some state of a�airs belongs to the theorems of creation and God wills that it is the case then God causes that it is the case and vice versa. From this, it also follows that, concerning obtaining states of a�airs of (about) creation, that which God wills is equivalent to that which God causes (cf. T104). However, this does not hold with regard to theorems of (about) God’s essence. For example, God wills his own goodness and his own existence, but he cannot cause it because the causal relation is a relation to his creation, and not towards himself (see theorems T15, T22, T111, T112 and axiom A9). Concerning causation, another important point has to be observed. The expression God causes that p is the case, when formulated as gCp means that God is both a su�cient cause for the occurrence of p and a necessary cause for the occurrence of p. We shall show later (see section 4.4) that for some obtaining states of a�airs that belong to creation, God is not a su�cient cause but only a necessary cause. Thus, God does not (and cannot) cause moral evil in the sense of a su�cient cause. However, those humans who cause need to be (to exist) in order to cause moral evil. And God is a necessary cause for their existence and the conservation thereof – just as for the existence and conservation of the universe – , i.e. a cause in the sense of a necessary condition; and thus, he is also indirectly a necessary cause for the moral evil, but only in the sense that a moral evil presupposes the existence of a human agent. Another point to be observed is that the causal relation when formulated as gCp or xCp (where x is a creature) means agent-causality in contradistinction to event-causality which would be formulated as pCq.

23 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 3, 8. 24 See section 1.5.1 above and the quotations of Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19, 3. For God’s eternity, see axiom A5 and definitions D9 and D10.1-D10.6 (section 1.9 below).

28 � 1 Existence and General Attributes �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents There are supporting passages in the Bible for all parts of A4. ‘My Father whom you claim as your God, is the one who glorifies me. Though you do not know him, I know him. If I said I did not, I would be a liar like you, but I do know him and obey his word. Your father Abraham rejoiced at the thought of seeing my day; he saw it and was glad’. ‘You are not yet fifty years old’, they said to him, ‘and you have seen Abraham!’ ‘Very truly I tell you’ Jesus answered ‘before Abraham was born, I am’(Jn 8,54-58).

The last part ‘I am’ also supports the timeless life and knowledge of Christ as God. ‘The Father loves the Son and has placed everything in his hands.’ (Jn 3,35) Whoever does not love does not know God because God is love. This is how God showed his love among us: He sent his one and only Son into the world that we might live through him. (1Jn 4,8) How many are your works, Lord! In wisdom you made them all; the earth is full of your creatures. (PS 104,24). Cf Ge 1,1-31. The Lord does whatever pleases him, in the heavens and on the earth, in the seas and in all their depths (PS 135, 6). Yet for us there is but one God, the Father, from whom all things came and for whom we live, and there is but one Lord, Jesus Christ through whom all things came and through whom we live (1Co, 8,6) . . . the God who gives life to the dead and calls into being things that were not (Ro 4,17).

Christian Church Documents underline the role of God’s free will with respect to creation: Florence (1442) [The Holy Roman Church] most firmly believes, professes and proclaims that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, who when he so willed, out of this bounty made all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal (ND408; D1333) Vatican (1870) This one and only true God, of his own goodness and almighty power, not for the increase of his own happiness, nor for the acquirement of his perfection, but in order to manifest his perfection through the benefits which he bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom of counsel, “from beginning of time made at once (simul) out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal, that is, the angelic and earthly, and then (deinde) the human creature, who as it were shares in both orders, being composed of spirit and body” (ND412; D3002).

1.7 The Perfection of the World According to Leibniz �

29

�.� The Perfection of the World According to Leibniz Leibniz thought, that in the universe, a certain type of perfection is realized, in the sense that the quantity of essence or reality is maximized: Everything possible [. . . ] tends with equal right towards existence according to its quantity of essence or reality, or to the degree of perfection which it involves, perfection being nothing but the quantity of essence.�� Absolutely speaking, it must be said that another state (of things) could exist; yet it must also be said that the present state exists because it follows from the nature of God that he should prefer the most perfect.�� Autrement s’il manquoit de volonté pour choisir le meilleur, il n’y auroit aucune raison pour qu’un possible existat preferablement aux autres.��

We do not agree with Leibniz’s view for several reasons: 1. God is not forced by nature to create a certain type of most perfect universe since his creation is due to his free will, but not to his nature (cf. theorems T123, T136, T137, definition D5.2). 2. God has decided to incorporate his creatures as his collaborators and coadjutors for the development of the universe by giving them a lot of abilities including causal forces.�� One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. iii. 9: We are God’s coadjutors. Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity causality.��

Ultimately, these abilities w.r.t. which we and other creatures are God’s coadjutors come from God: There are di�erent kinds of gifts, but the same Spirit distributes them. There are di�erent kinds of service, but the same Lord. There are di�erent kinds of working, but in all of them and in everyone it is the same God at work.

25 26 27 28 29

Leibniz (GP7), p. 303. Leibniz (LTI), p. 393. Leibniz (DM), §36. Cf. Leibniz (Theo), §196. Cf. section 4.4 and theorems T123-T125, T142, T145-T147, T156, T157. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 23, 8, ad 2.

30 � 1 Existence and General Attributes Now to each one the manifestation of the Spirit is given for the common good. To one there is given through the Spirit a message of wisdom, to another a message of knowledge by means of the same Spirit, to another faith by the same Spirit, to another gifts of healing by that one Spirit, to another miraculous powers, to another prophecy, to another distinguishing between spirits, to another speaking in di�erent kinds of tongues, and to still another the interpretation of tongues. All these are the work of one and the same Spirit, and he distributes them to each one, just as he determines. (1Co 12, 4-11)

Since all the creatures are more or less (im)perfect, the result cannot be a perfect world in the absolute sense, but only a perfect world relative to the abilities of creatures to act and to learn and to improve. 3. It was God’s decision that the biological part of our world is a world of learning. The process of learning consists of trial and error. Errors imply biological costs and lack of fitness. Therefore: a world of learning can never be absolutely optimal. A second reason which hinders optimality is the genetic load, i.e. the accumulation of detrimental genetic variants which cannot be eliminated by sexual or asexual reproduction. Therefore: Evolution in general and for di�erent special reasons does not find optimal solutions for the problems dictated by the environment. What is searched for are solutions that are sound enough . . . ��

Still, a world of learning, of variation, of selection, and of adaptation is a better world than one in which no such things are present and in which everything is fixed and determined from the beginning without evolution. 4. God has also decided to incorporate men endowed with free-will decisions as his collaborators and coadjutors. Therefore, God does not only accept imperfect activities with good intentions and growing virtues and saints but also activities with morally bad intentions that defy God’s advice and commands. Lots of evil in the world are the e�ects of such human activities.�� This hinders a universe that is maximally perfect (cf. sections 4.7 and 5.2).

30 Schuster (2004), p. 51. 31 Cf. Plantinga (1971).

1.8 God is Essentially ONE � 31

�.� God is Essentially ONE �.�.� Definition D8: Essentially ONE D 8. g∈ess-ONE ↔ (∀p)[(p ↔ E!b(b = g)) → p ε T(g-Essence)] God is essentially one means that his unique existence or being belongs to his essence. Aquinas expresses this by saying God is the same as his essence or nature. God is not only his own essence . . . but also his own existence.�� [. . . ] for God Himself is His own nature, as was shown above (qu. 3,3). Therefore, in the very same way God is God, and He is this God. Impossible is it therefore that many Gods should exist.��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents There are many Bible passages which support that God is essentially one (see section 1.2 above). Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is o n e (Dt6,4)

A special one says that Father and Son are one (in nature): I and the Father are one (Jn 10,30).

For Church Documents see ND308 of 1.3 ND19 of 1.4 and ND327 of 1.6 above and further: Florence (1442): The holy Roman Church, founded on the word of our Lord and Saviour, firmly believes, professes and preaches the one true almighty, unchangeable and eternal God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, one in essence, triune in persons. (ND325; D1330).

32 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 3,3 and 4. 33 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 11,3.

32 � 1 Existence and General Attributes

�.� God is Eternal �.�.� Definition D9: Eternity of God D 9. g∈Eternal ↔ (∀p)(gAp → ¬(∃t)gA t p) (where ‘A’ stands for any of God’s activities (Introduction 1, 4.))

God is eternal means that his activity of knowing and of willing and of loving and all of his other activities are not at some time. Assume the opposite. Then, God’s actions will occur at some time t of the world. Since time t is the time of some reference system of the universe and since there is no universal time for the whole universe according to General Relativity because its rotating subsystems have their own time��, we might ask at which time God’s activities occur. This is already absurd enough and it would become even more absurd if we asked whether God’s activities occur in New York time or in Moscow time. Since the time of our experience, be it the time we measure in physics or our psychic time experienced by introspection, is time of this universe, and since God does not belong to this universe, he is outside the time of this universe. The same holds for any reference system of time belonging to other creatures (for example angels) outside our universe. Nevertheless, God knows that some event of this universe occurs at some time relative to a reference system of the universe; in other words, time-indices can be attached to events of this universe, but not to God’s activities; i.e. it would be a wrong confusion to identify gKp t (God knows that p occurs at time t) with gK t p or with gK t p t (God knows at t that p occurs at t).�� That God is eternal is postulated by axiom A5 and theorem T26 (cf. section 1.11 below).

�.�.� ET-Simultaneity For the reasons given above, it does not seem necessary to introduce a kind of simultaneity between God’s activities and man’s activities, say between a prayer of some individual person and God’s knowledge of it. Stump and Kretzmann�� proposed a definition for ET-simultaneity (‘ET’ for ‘eternal-temporal’), i.e. a si-

34 Cf. Mittelstaedt (2008). 35 For a detailed elaboration of these problems see Weingartner (2008), p. 25–35. See below A5 and D10.2. 36 Stump and Kretzmann (1981). This proposal has been critically discussed by several authors. Cf. Craig (2001), p. 79�. and DeWeese (2004), p. 160�.

1.9 God is Eternal �

33

multaneity between eternity and time (of our world), that has the following three necessary (together su�cient) conditions: Let ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over entities and events. Then: (ET) For every x and for every y, x and y are ET-simultaneous i� (i) either x is eternal and y is temporal, or vice versa; and (ii) for some observer, A, in the unique eternal reference frame, x and y are both present – i.e., either x is eternally present and y is observed as temporally present, or vice versa; and (iii) for some observer, B, in one of the infinitely many temporal reference frames, x and y are both present – i.e., either x is observed as eternally present and y is temporally present, or vice versa. This idea of Stump and Kretzmann’s is motivated (p. 437) by the Special Theory of Relativity (SR), according to which simultaneity can be defined (by Einsteinsynchronization) between two di�erent inertial reference frames; di�erent in the sense that they might move with di�erent velocities. However, Stump and Kretzmann try to define a simultaneity-relation between an inertial system and eternity, i.e. between a system changing in time and a state outside time. They understand eternity according to Boethius (see below) – which is the usually accepted concept – as not having past or future and consequently no “time flow”. From this, it already follows that Stump and Kretzmann’s concept of “ET-simultaneity” is not a genuine simultaneity at all, because it is not an equivalence relation between two states (events) at two time-instances of two space time reference systems. “ET-simultaneity” might better be called a comparisonrelation between a state at some time relative to a reference system of the world (universe) and a timeless state of presence. Another di�culty is the question of how the temporal observer is able to “observe” what is required in condition (iii); i.e. how can he observe that something is eternally present? Jammer has tried to give a consistent geometrical model of this situation in SR (Special Relativity).�� In this model, E(eternity) is simultaneous with P in the (in P) local inertial system. In this sense, E can be “ET-simultaneous” with P� and P� (di�erent space time points relative to di�erent inertial reference systems) even though P� and P� are not simultaneous; moreover, in this model, eternity is a point-event as in the view of Boethius. However, it follows from this model that the point-event E (eternity) is in space. And this is a completely unacceptable consequence for God’s eternity and for God’s eternal life. A much more simple solution seems to be – as described above – that God’s activities – especially his knowledge (and also his will and love) – have no time37 Jammer (1995), p. 96–99. Cf. Jammer (2006), p. 51f.

34 � 1 Existence and General Attributes index, i.e. they do not occur at some time, where time is the time of some reference system of our world (universe), although God knows that some event of this world happens at some time relative to some reference system of this world.

�.�.� Eternity and Immutability Thomas Aquinas derives the eternity of God (qu. 10,2.) from God’s immutability which he has defended earlier (qu, 9,1 and 2). Since time implies change or mutation�� it follows that if there is no change or mutation, there is no time. This comes close to an idea of Boltzmann’s: in a complete equilibrium, a state with maximal entropy, there is no “flow” of time any more, i.e. no direction from past to future. Boltzmann compared this to gravitation: as there is no downward direction in regions of space where there is no gravitational force, there is also no past to future direction of time in regions that are at equilibrium.�� Moreover, it can be said that any change implies some kind of time, and, consequently, physical or biological change implies time relative to a reference system of the universe; furthermore, psychic or mental change implies a kind of time which we can only understand as a time of our universe even if we allow di�erences of understanding between humans and other living things like higher animals. Therefore, it holds for change and time in our universe that there is time if and only if there is change. It has to be observed, however, that change as it is understood by Thomas Aquinas is not restricted to physical change, and also Aristotle speaks of movement in the soul. This is change in the psychological or mental sense: Any conscious proceeding of thinking, feeling, desiring, willing, loving leads to an understanding of time by inner mental experience. It is underlined here that this kind of mental understanding of time is not completely independent of the one based on experience with the “outside world” but plays an additional role for our under38 That time cannot be disconnected from change has been stressed already by Aristotle (Phys), 218 b21. A similar point was made by Ernst Mach:“It is utterly beyond our power to measure the changes of things by time. Quite the contrary, time is an abstraction at which we arrive by means of the changes of things” (Mach (1960), p. 273). Observe Mach’s point that a clock (as a time-measurement) is another thing that changes. Remark: The English edition of Mach’s Mechanics is based on the sixth edition in which the important passage in which Mach anticipates the idea of General Relativity was eliminated (after the 4th edition of 1901) by his son Ludwig. This forgery has been proved with a painstaking analysis by Wolters (1987). Cf. Jammer (1960), p. 159. 39 Boltzmann (1897), p. 583. For a discussion cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), p. 166�.

1.9 God is Eternal �

35

standing of time.�� For psychic or mental time it also holds that it implies some conscious proceeding which means some kind of mental change. Without any such mental change, there cannot be psychic or mental time and vice versa. According to Thomas Aquinas, there is time in spiritual creatures, and that means there is mental change in them, either actually or potentially: We say then that since eternity is the measure of a permanent being, in so far as anything recedes from permanence of being, it recedes from eternity . . . But others recede less from permanence of being, forasmuch as their being neither consists in change, nor is the subject of change; nevertheless they have change annexed to them either actually or potentially . . . The same applies to angels, who have an unchangeable being as regards their nature with changeableness as regards choice; moreover they have changeableness of intelligence, of a�ections, and of places, in their own degree.��

It seems that the terms permanent being and permanence of being (in Latin: aeternitas sit mensura esse permanentis and recedit a permanentia essendi), which Thomas Aquinas uses as a description of eternity in this quotation, could also be interpreted as everlasting. However, Aquinas stresses on several occasions that eternity has no succession, i.e. no past and no future, in contradistinction to a time infinitely extending in both directions, i.e. in the sense of everlasting: Thus eternity is known from two sources: first, because what is eternal is interminable – that is, has no beginning nor end (that is no term either way); secondly, because eternity has no succession, being simultaneously whole.��

These distinctions, especially that between everlasting (sempiternity) and eternity originate in Boethius: Eternity, then is the total and perfect possession of life without end. So anything subject to a status within time even if it has had no beginning and never ceases to exist . . . is not yet such as can be rightly accounted eternal.��

40 The mental experience of time has been discussed by several authors. Cf. Augustine (Conf), XI,27–28. 41 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 10,5. 42 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 10,1. 43 Boethius (CPh), V,6. The distinction is also made in his (Trin)4. Both places are cited by Thomas Aquinas (STh), 10,1 and 2. Cf. the discussion in Jammer (2006), p. 50�.

36 � 1 Existence and General Attributes �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents There are several Bible passages which support God’s eternity. As has been said, the important property of eternity is that it does not have a past or future but just present. This is expressed in the following two famous quotations of the Old and New Testament: I am who I am (Ex 3,14) Before Abraham was born I am (Jn 8,58).

The Hebrew expression “olam” which is often translated into Latin as aeternitas or into English as eternity (similarly to translations into other living languages) does not have a meaning that lacks past and future. It rather refers to the farthest distance to the past and the farthest distance to the future. Therefore, the translations for ever or everlasting seem more appropriate for the following passages: The Lord reigns for ever and ever (Ex 15,18) Before the mountains were born or you brought forth the whole world, from everlasting to everlasting you are God (Ps 90,2).

The following quotations speak of Christ and the Holy Spirit: I am the First and the Last. I am the Living One; I was dead, and now look, I am alive forever and ever! (Rev 1,17). Jesus Christ is the same yesterday and today and forever (Heb 13,8). And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever. (Jn 14,16).

Church Documents: Besides ND19 (section 1.4) and ND325 (section 1.8), the following two documents speak of the eternity of God and of the three persons: Rome (382) Anyone who denies that the Father is always, the Son is always, and the Holy Spirit is always is a heretic (ND306/10; D162). Toledo (675): The Father has eternity without birth; the son has eternity with birth; the Holy Spirit has procession with eternity but without birth. (ND316; D532)

�.�� Immutability or Mutability There are several philosophers in the non-Christian and in the Christian tradition who defended God’s immutability and unchangeability. Plato gives a proof (Pol 2,280d-381d) that something that is most perfect, such as God, must be immutable, since any change could be only a change to the worse. Moses Maimonides says that God is without potency and immutable (Guide for the

1.10 Immutability or Mutability � 37

Perplexed 1,61). According to Bonaventura, God is the immutable eternal being (De Mysterio Trinitatis I,1,6-10). Thomas Aquinas defends that God is immutable in his Summa Contra Gentiles (I,14) and Summa Theologica (I,q.9). As has been mentioned above, Thomas Aquinas derives the eternity of God from the immutability of God. Furthermore, important Church Documents also speak of the immutability of God, as is clear from documents ND19 and ND325 (cf. 1.3.2 and 1.8.2 above). The Latin expression used in these documents is incommutabilis.

�.��.� Biblical Documents However, concerning documents of the Bible, there are both passages that support the immutability of God and passages that support the mutability of God. 1. Immutability In the beginning you laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear out like a garment . . . But you remain the same and your years will never end (Ps 102,26-28). He who is the Glory of Israel does not lie nor change his mind; for he is not a human being, that he should change his mind (Isa 15,29). I the Lord do not change (Mal 3,6). Every good and perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of the heavenly lights, who does not change like shifting shadows (Jas 1,17) If we are faithless, he remains faithful, for he cannot disown himself (2Ti 2,13). For God’s gifts and his call are irrevocable (Ro 11,29) Because God wanted to make the unchanging nature of his purpose very clear to the heirs of what was promised, he confirmed it with an oath (Heb 6,17).

2. Mutability [. . . ] if that nation I warned repents of its evil then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned (Jer 18,8). My heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused. I will not carry out my fierce anger, nor will I devastate Ephraim again. For I am God, and not a man – the Holy One among you (Hos 11,8-9). [. . . ] I cried out ‘Sovereign Lord, forgive! How can Jacob survive? He is so small.’ So the Lord relented. This will not happen’ the Lord said (Am 7,2-3).

�.��.� God Is Not Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Essence and His Knowledge As biblical documents have shown, the question of whether God is mutable (changeable) or, more specifically, whether God’s will is mutable (changeable) is rather

38 � 1 Existence and General Attributes complicated. Therefore, we want to restrict ourselves to the modest or weakest claim possible. But this claim also has to be di�erentiated in the following way: 1. With respect to God’s essence and God’s knowledge, will, and love that concerns his essence, God cannot change and cannot be mutable. This also follows from definition D4 (section 1.5) about God’s essence. 2. Concerning God’s knowledge about his creation, it holds that whatever God knows, he necessarily knows; even though that what he knows is contingent if it belongs to the states of a�airs of creation. Thus, �gKp and gK¬�p and �gK¬�p must not be confused. This also follows from definition D5.1 (section 1.5) concerning God’s knowledge about creation.

For further elucidation, we may define mutable (changeable) and immutable (unchangeable) w.r.t. God’s knowledge thus: D 10.1. Mut-K(g) ↔ (∃t� ∃t� )(t� =� t� ∧ gK t� p ∧ gK t� ¬p)

D 10.2. ¬Mut-K(g) ↔ (∀t� ∀t� )(t� =� t� → ¬(gK t� p ∧ gK t� ¬p))

Mut-K(g) . . . the knowledge of God is mutable (changeable) ¬Mut-K(g) . . . the knowledge of God is immutable (unchangeable)

However, if we agree with what has been said in section 1.9 above, then no time-indices can be attached to God’s knowledge. Specifically, if God knows that the state of a�airs p happens at time t (gKp t ), where t refers to some reference frame of this universe, then p occurs at t (p t ). But from this, it does not follow that his activity of knowing occurs at some time t of the universe. Such a claim would amount to the logical fallacy of confusing gKp t with gK t p. That means that statements like gK t� p or gK t� p are false. From this, it then follows that God’s knowledge is immutable by D10.2. Observe that although definition D10.1 is a true equivalence, both its definiendum and definiens are false, whereas the definiendum and definiens of D10.2 are both true. The conclusion, i.e. ¬Mut-K(g), also follows from God’s eternity (cf. D9 and theorem T29). According to Thomas Aquinas, God’s knowledge is not changeable (immutable): Since the knowledge of God is his substance . . . just as this substance is altogether immutabl . . . so His knowledge likewise must be altogether invariable. From the fact that he knows some things might be which are not, or that some things might

1.10 Immutability or Mutability � 39

not be which are, it does not follow that his knowledge is variable, but rather that he knows the variability of things.��

Turning to the biblical documents which seem to speak for mutability, we might interpret the first (Jer 18,8) as follows: (i) God knows that he warned the nation in the following sense: if the nation does not repent of its evil, then I will inflict on it the disaster. (ii) God knows: if that nation repents of its evil ,then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster. From these two facts, (i) and (ii), one cannot conclude that God’s knowledge had changed or is mutable. Consider the following analogous situation: Person A is a person under sentence, and the judge knows and tells A: if you continue your bad deals, you will be in prison; however, if you repent your earlier deals and do not continue, you will not be put in prison. Does it follow from this that the judge has changed his mind or his knowledge? By no means – his judgement is perfectly consistent. The two implications in (i) and (ii) complement to an equivalence: I will not inflict on this nation the disaster if and only if that nation repents of its evil. An equivalence of such form is also supported between the quote of Jeremias 18,8 (ii) and the continuing passage 18,10. But from the truth of such equivalences and from God’s knowledge of them, one cannot derive that his knowledge is changing or mutable.

�.��.� God Need Not Be Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Will Since it is God’s will rather than God’s knowledge that is contained in the biblical documents concerning mutability, we shall ask whether they support mutability and change of God’s will. 1. Willed, but not necessarily According to definition D5.2 (section 1.5), a state of a�airs that belongs to God’s will about creation is – if willed – then not necessarily willed by God and willed to be contingent and either caused by God himself or by some creature under the condition of God as a necessary cause. His will concerning creatures and specifically concerning men is described in definitions D21 and D22.

44 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 14,15; 14,15, ad 2.

40 � 1 Existence and General Attributes What has been said about God’s knowledge w.r.t. time does also hold for God’s will. Time indices, where time is the time of this universe, cannot be attributed to any of God’s activities and, consequently, not to his will either. That means that in this respect, God’s will is not mutable or changeable in the sense that at one time t� , he wills that p and at a later time t� , he wills that ¬p (where t� , t� are points of time referring to a reference frame of the universe). D 10.3. Mut-W(g) ↔ ∃t� ∃t� (t� =� t� ∧ gW t� p ∧ gW t� ¬p)

D 10.4. ¬Mut-W(g) ↔ ∀t� ∀t� (t� =� t� → ¬(gW t� p ∧ gW t� ¬p)) Mut-W(g) . . . the will of g is mutable (changeable) ¬Mut-W(g) . . . the will of God is immutable (unchangeable)

A fallacy similar to that concerning God’s knowledge can happen with regard to God’s will. From God wills that a certain event p of the world occurs at time t (relative to a reference system of the world) – gWp t (where ‘p t ’ stands for ‘event p occurs at time t’) – , it does not follow that his will occurs at time t; this would be a confusion of gWp t with gW t p or gW t p t . That God’s will is immutable follows from God’s eternity (cf. A5, D9, T32). As with definition D10.1, definition D10.3 is a true equivalence as well, although both definiendum and definiens are false. In general, it holds: to will and cause that events of this world change does not imply that God’s will changes. This can be illustrated by the following example: an architect (or master builder) wills that his workers build at time t� the foundation of a house and wills that at time t� they do not build the foundations (since they are finished) but that they work on the walls. Does the architect change his will? Certainly not w.r.t. his plan (goal) to build a house. With his will to build a house, he wills as consequences that di�erent things have to be done at di�erent times according to an ordered sequence. Thus, although the architect’s particular actions of will (that at t� the workers build the foundations and that at t� they do not build the foundations) change, his will to build a house according to an ordered plan and w.r.t. a sequence of events is always the same and does not change; i.e. although the architect (with his will directed at the goal and acting according to a plan) wills that certain events (things) change, he does not change his plan or goal-directed will. Similarly, if God wills that the universe changes in the sense of a great evolution, it does not follow from that that his wills changes. And similarly, if God wills that event E� of the world occur at world-time t� – say the capture of the people of Israel by the Egyptians – and wills that event E� –

1.10 Immutability or Mutability �

41

the Exodus of the people of Israel with Moses – happen at world-time t� (where t� − t� = ��� years and t� and t� refer to the reference system of Egyptian time), then this does not mean that God changes his will, since he keeps to his plan. The upshot is: to will that things (events) change does not mean that the will itself changes.�� 2. Interpretation of Biblical Documents Referring to the biblical documents of Jeremiah and Amos above, we may interpret God’s will as follows: PMC God wills that: no infliction takes place if there is repentance. From this principle, which might be interpreted as a principle of God’s mercy (cf. section 5.8), it does not follow that God’s will is mutable or changeable. The menaces given to Nineveh by Jonah can be interpreted in a similar way. In this case, the warning contains only the threat: Fourty more days and Nineveh will be overthrown (Jnh 3,4).

The condition under which this infliction could be prevented was not told and might have been hidden on purpose by God in order to arouse the people of Nineveh to repent; knowing that they will repent under such conditions. Therefore, God’s message can be interpreted thus: If the people of Nineveh repent and pray to God and ask for forgiveness, then Nineveh will not be overthrown.

The facts according to the book Jonah were that a fast was proclaimed and the king put on sackcloth and issued a proclamation to fast and to urgently call on God. And Nineveh was not destroyed. These happenings satisfy the principle of Mercy (PMC). In this case, it does not follow that God’s will is mutable or changeable. On the contrary, this principle is equivalent to that of God’s mercy above and it might be a principle of God w.r.t. which “he remains faithful for he cannot disown himself” (2Ti 2,13). In a similar way, Christ’s incarnation does not imply a change of God’s will: God wills that the son be send as Messiah if man were to begin to sin with Adam and continue to do so in further generations. Here, we can also replace “God wills that” by “God knows that”, and this also may be done with the above principles of mercy. 45 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,7.

42 � 1 Existence and General Attributes In no case does it follow that God’s will or God’s knowledge is mutable or changeable.

�.��.� God Need Not Be Mutable or Changeable w.r.t. His Love D 10.5. Mut-L(g) ↔ ∃t� ∃t� (t� =� t� ∧ gL t� p ∧ gL t� ¬p)

D 10.6. ¬Mut-L(g) ↔ ∀t� ∀t� (t� =� t� → ¬(gL t� p ∧ gL t� ¬p)) Mut-L(g) . . . the love of g is mutable (changeable) ¬Mut-L(g) . . . the love of g is immutable (unchangeable)

To defend the theses (cf. theorem T35 below) that God’s love is not mutable (changeable) we try to finally interpret the biblical document of Hosea (11,8-9) and Amos (7,2-3). This cannot be interpreted with the help of the principle of mercy PMC above since there is no repentance of Ephraim (northern part of Israel) mentioned. God does not devastate it, even though Ephraim turns away from him, worshipping and appealing to false gods. Ephraim’s misery arouses God’s compassion. An interpretation of this situation seems to be possible with the help of the following principle of love (PLV) (cf. section 5.9): PLV If God loves some person or people x and x sins and turns away from God then: God’s compassion is aroused and he does not devastate x if this is compatible with his Commands. From PLV it does not follow that God’s will or love changes or is mutable (cf. theorems T32 and T35 below). Recall the example of the master builder. Although x may sin and turn away from God at time t� and may not be devastated at time t� (where t� and t� refer to some reference frame of this world), God permits actions of free will of person or people x and does not devastate x although his will or love is not at a certain time. However, the e�ects of his will, which happen in the world, occur at a certain time (relative to a reference system) of the world. The expression “my heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused” may suggest that God did not have compassion or love at first and then changed his heart and had compassion and love. This interpretation is not necessary, and, moreover, it is inconsistent with other passages of the Bible e.g.: “God is love. Whoever lives in love lives in God and God in them” (1Jn 4,16). This cannot be interpreted in the sense that sometimes God loves and sometimes he does not,

1.11 Theorems on God’s Existence and Attributes �

43

which would be rather absurd. That means that the above quotation (Hosea of the Old Testament) refers to the e�ects that God’s love and compassion have on x in the world (who turns away from God at a certain time of the world): these (i.e. not devastating) are e�ects of God’s love in the world occurring at a certain time (of a reference system) of the world. From a change in the e�ect, we usually conclude as humans that there was a change in the cause, i.e. a change of the intention in the mind. By analogy, from changing e�ects God causes in this world, we (and prophets) ascribe to God a change of his will and love. But such a conclusion is not even generally true for man. This is manifest from the example of the master builder (section 1.10.3 above): he does not change his will or plan, even though the e�ects of his will and plan change. In agreement with this, one has to be very careful with interpretations of the words “if – then” as they are used, for example, in the principle of mercy (PMC) and the principle of love (PLV) above: from a purely logical point of view, there is neither time nor a causal relation involved in an implication. Although such an interpretation is often unconsciously added in everyday use of language; and there are in fact situations where such an additional meaning is correct or applicable. But from this, it does not follow that it is correct in general. As is well known, from a logical point of view, an implication “if p then q” (p → q) is true if and only if there is no case (instance) in which p is true and q is false; in all other cases, p → q is true. Thus, “If God loves some people then . . . ” does not express a time development between “if” and “then”. And this is consistent with the fact that the e�ects of his love to a people x occur at a certain time in (and of) this world. Moreover, one has to be careful not to immediately interpret an if-then statement (an implication) as an equivalence; thus, the principle of mercy (PMC) is the implication: if there is repentance, then the infliction will be prevented. From this it follows by contraposition: if there is infliction then there was no repentance. However, there is no su�cient reason to also claim: if there is no repent then there will be infliction. This can be shown by the fact that the latter implication is equivalent by contraposition to: if there is no infliction, there is repent; and this statement is certainly false as a general claim.

�.�� Theorems on God’s Existence and Attributes �.��.� Existence and Trinity T 2. E!b(b = g) A1, D1 God exists

44 � 1 Existence and General Attributes T 3. g∈TR T1 God is triune T 4. (∃a)(a = ft) ∧ (∃a)(a = sn) ∧ (∃a)(a = hs) ∧ (∀a)(a = ft ∨ a = sn ∨ a = hs) T3, A2 There is a Father, a Son, a Holy Spirit T 5. (∃R� R� )(R� (ft : sn) ∧ R� ((ft, sn) : hs)) T3, A2 There is a relation R� of Father to Son (paternity) and there is a relation R� of Father and Son to the Holy Spirit (proceeding) T 6. ft =� sn ∧ sn =� hs ∧ ft =� hs ∧ ¬(ft∈cr) ∧ ¬(sn∈cr) ∧ ¬(hs∈cr) T3, A2 The three persons are di�erent since they have di�erent relations to each other (T5) and neither of them is created T 7. ft∈DPers ∧ sn∈DPers ∧ hs∈DPers T3, A2 Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are Divine Persons

T 8. Ess(ft) = Ess(sn) = Ess(hs) T3, A2 The three divine persons are one in essence or nature T 9. ft∈Ind ∧ (∃p)ftKp ∧ (∃p)ftWp ∧ (∃p)ftLp

T7, A3

T 10. sn∈Ind ∧ (∃p)snKp ∧ (∃p)snWp ∧ (∃p)snLp

T7, A3

T 11. hs∈Ind ∧ (∃p)hsKp ∧ (∃p)hsWp ∧ (∃p)hsLp T7, A3 Each divine person is individuated from the others by standing in di�erent relations to the others (T5, T6) having knowledge, will and love (T9–T11) T 12. ft∈DPers ∧ sn∈DPers ∧ (∃R� )R� (ft : sn) T5, T7 God Father and God Son stand in the relation R� of paternity to each other.

T 13. ft∈DPers ∧ sn∈DPers ∧ hs∈DPers ∧ (∃R� )R� (ft, sn : hs) T5, T7 God Father and God Son stand in the relation R� of procession to God Holy Spirit �.��.� Essence, Perfection, Actuality T 14. (∀x∈cr)(x∈HPers → (x∈cr ∧ x∈Ind) D2 Every human person is a created individual (or an individual creature)

T 15. (∀p)[(�gKp ∧ �gWp ∧ �gLp ∧ gK�p ∧ ¬(pεT(CR))) → p ε T(g-Essence)] D4

1.11 Theorems on God’s Existence and Attributes � 45

The theorems that are not theorems about creation and which are necessarily known by God, necessarily willed by God, necessarily loved by God, and such that God knows that they are necessary belong to God’s essence (see section 1.5.1, D4). T 16. (∀p)[(p ↔ E!b(b = g) ∨ p ↔ g∈TR ∨ p ↔ g∈OS ∨ p ↔ g∈OM ∨ p ↔ g∈ AG ∨ p ↔ g∈Inft) → p ε T(g-Essence)] D4

The theorems that God exists, that he is triune, omniscient, omnipotent, all-good and infinite belong to God’s essence. The first part says that God’s existence belongs to God’s essence��; the second part says that the five divine properties mentioned above belong to God’s essence (cf. axions A2, A6, A9 and A21 below). T 17. g∈PF T1, D7 God is perfect T 18. g∈PF → (g∈AC ∧ g∈OS ∧ g∈OM ∧ g∈AG ∧ g∈CT) above)

D7 (cf. section 1.6

T 19. g∈AC T1 God is actual

T 20. g∈AC → ((∃p)�gKp ∧ (∃p)gWp ∧ (∃p)gLp) A4 That God is actual implies that he necessarily knows and that he wills and loves (cf. 1.6 above). T 21. g∈AC → (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp) ↔ gCp] T 22. (∀p)[gCp ↔ (p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp)]

A4

T19, T21

T22 can also be understood as a definition of God’s causation. Whatever God causes belongs to his creation and is willed by him. It follows from this that the causal relation (in which God is involved) only exists between him and his creation; there is no causal relation concerning God’s essence since the causal relation is irreflexive and God cannot cause his goodness or his existence, although he wills it (for more details, see section 3.3 below). Observe that the causal relation expressed by gCp and gCCp is understood as agent-causality: that means that an agent (God or a creature in xCSp and xCCSp, see section 4.4 below) brings about (or partially brings about) a state of a�airs represented by ‘p’. Agent-causality is di�erent from event-causality where an event

46 Thomas Aquinas treats this in his Summa Theologica I,3,4; Avicenna defines God as the one whose essence is identical with his necessary existence. See Coplestone (1950), II, p. 192.

46 � 1 Existence and General Attributes or a state is a su�cient or necessary or just a causal factor of another event or state.�� T 23. g∈ess-ONE T16, D8 God is essentially one (cf. section 1.8 above)

�.��.� Eternity and Immutability A 5. (∀p)(gAp → ¬(∃t)gA t p) (where ‘A’ stands for any activities of God, cf. Introduction 1, 4.)

God’s activities are not at some time, where time is the time belonging to a reference system of our universe or of other parts of creation (see section 1.9 above): God’s activities are tenseless. However the e�ects of his activities may occur at some time of our universe.

T 24. g ∈ AC → [(∃p)(�gKp ∧ ¬(∃t)�gK t p) ∧ (∃p)(gWp ∧ ¬(∃t)gW t p) ∧ (∃p)(gLp ∧ ¬(∃t)gL t p)] T20, A5 That God is actual implies that he necessarily knows timelessly, that he wills timelessly and that he loves timelessly. This follows also from God’s perfection: T 25. g ∈ PF → [(∃p)(�gKp ∧ ¬(∃t)�gK t p) ∧ (∃p)(gWp ∧ ¬(∃t)gW t p) ∧ (∃p)(gLp ∧ ¬(∃t)gL t p)] T18, T24

T 26. g∈Eternal God is eternal

A5, D9

T 27. (∀p)(gKp → ¬(∃t)gK t p) God’s knowledge is tenseless

A5

T 28. (∀p)[gKp → (∀t� t� )¬(gK t� p ∧ gK t� ¬p)]

T27

T 29. (∀p)(gKp → ¬Mut-K(g)) T28, D10.2 God’s knowledge is not mutable (not changeable)(cf.section 1.10.2) T 30. (∀p)(gWp → ¬(∃t)gW t p) God’s will is tenseless

A5

47 For a theory of event-causality which distinguishes besides causal factors (neither necessary nor su�cient) three types of su�cient and one type of necessary cause, see Weingartner (2016). This theory is based on a 6-valued decidable logic with relevance properties. It is also applicable to causal explanations in di�erent domains of modern physics.

1.11 Theorems on God’s Existence and Attributes �

T 31. (∀p)(gWp → (∀t� t� )¬(gW t� p ∧ gW t� ¬p)]

T30

T 32. (∀p)(gWp → ¬Mut-W(g)) T31, D10.4 God’s will is not mutable (not changeable)(cf. section 1.10.3) T 33. (∀p)(gLp → ¬(∃t)gL t p) God’s love is tenseless

A5

T 34. (∀p)(gLp → (∀t� t� )¬(gL t� p ∧ gL t� ¬p)]

T33

T 35. (∀p)(gLp → ¬Mut-L(g)) T34, D10.6 God’s love is not mutable (not changeable) (cf. section 1.10.4)

47

2 God’s Knowledge �.� Axiom A6: Omniscience A 6. g ∈ OS → (∀p)(gKp → p) ∧ (∀p)[(p ε T(g) ∨ p ε T(LM) ∨ p ε T(CR)) → gKp] ∧ (∀p)(gKp → �gKp)

Justification of Axiom A6 1. (∀p)(gKp → p). Assume: ¬(∀p)(gKp → p). Then (∃p)(gKp ∧ ¬p), i.e. there is a state of a�airs such that God knows that it obtains but it does not obtain. This is inconsistent with the concept of (strong) knowledge and also inconsistent with a perfect being. Therefore, (∀p)(gKp → p) 2. (∀p)(p ε T(g) → gKp). Assume ¬(∀p)(p ε T(g) → gKp). Then (∃p)(p ε T(g) ∧ ¬gKp), i.e. there is a state of a�airs about God himself although God has no knowledge about it. This is inconsistent with the concept of omniscience and in general with the concept of a perfect being. Therefore, (2) holds. 3. (∀p)(p ε T(LM) → gKp). Assume: ¬(∀p)(p ε T(LM) → gKp). Then (∃p)(p ε T(LM) ∧ ¬gKp), i.e. there are some theorems of logic or mathematics that God does not know. Since this holds for man, for logicians and mathematicians, God’s knowledge would not di�er essentially from that of humans. But this seems to be absurd, especially if we think of God as the creator of man. Therefore, (3) must hold. 4. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gKp). Assume ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gKp). Then (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ ¬gKp), i.e. there are some true propositions about (his own) creation that God does not know. Again this holds for man: there are some (in fact many) true propositions about the universe that humans do not know. But if God is the creator of the universe, we cannot assume that his knowledge concerning the universe is human or fallible. 5. (∀p)(gKp → �gKp). Assume ¬(∀p)(gKp → �gKp). Then, it follows that (∃p)(gKp ∧ �¬gKp), i.e. for some states of a�airs p, God knows that p but possibly does not know that p. Now this combination – to know in fact that p but possibly not to know it – is impossible for God; although it is very often the case with man: in all cases in which we learn something new in the sciences, we can say that we in fact know it now but (since we had not known it before) we possibly do not know it. D 11.1. g∈SK ↔ (∀p)(gKp → p)

cf. T38

D 11.2. g∈CK ↔ (∀p)[(p ε T(g) ∨ p ε T(LM) ∨ p ε T(CR)) → gKp] D 11.3. g∈NK ↔ (∀p)(gKp → �gKp) cf. T51 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-003

cf. T40

2.2 Biblical and Church Documents �

49

�.� Biblical and Church Documents From heaven the Lord looks down and sees all mankind; from his dwelling place he watches all who live on earth – he who forms the hearts of all who considers everything they do (Ps 33,15). Before a word is on my tongue you, Lord, know it completely (Ps 139,4). For your ways are in full view of the Lord, and he examines all your paths (Pr 5,21). Death and Destruction lie open before the Lord, how much more do human hearts (Pr 15,11). He reveals deep and hidden things; he knows what lies in darkness, and light dwells with him (Da 2,22). Lord you know everyone’s heart (Ac 1,24). If our hearts condemn us, we know that God is greater than our hearts, and he knows everything (1Jn 3,20). Nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight. Everything is uncovered and laid bare before the eyes of him to whom we must give account (Heb 4,13).

It should be emphasized that the first four and the sixth and seventh of the biblical documents say that God knows “the hearts”, i.e. the most private and secret thoughts of man that are free and contingent actions. That these thoughts and ways of man are free-will actions and that they are contingent is of special importance (see below T73 and T74). Rome(382): Anyone who denies that the Son of God is true God, as the Father is true God, that he can do all things, know all things, and is equal to the Father, is a heretic (ND 306/12; D164). Anyone who denies that the Holy Spirit can do all things, knows all things and is everywhere present, just as the Father and the Son, is a heretic (ND 306/17; D169). Vatican(1870): . . . there is one God . . . infinite in his intellect and will and in all perfection (ND327; D3001)

�.� God’s Knowledge in General �.�.� God Has Sound, Complete, and Necessary Knowledge T 36. g∈OS

T1

T 37. (∀p)(gKp → p) T36, A6 Whatever God knows is true (is the case). T 38. g∈SK T37, D11.1 God has sound knowledge.

50 � 2 God’s Knowledge T 39. (∀p)[(p ε T(g) ∨ p ε T(LM) ∨ p ε T(CR)) → gKp] T36, A6 If p is a theorem about God or a theorem about logic or mathematics or a theorem about creation, then God knows that p. In other words: God knows everything about himself, about logic and mathematics and about his creation. T 40. g∈CK T39, D11.2 God has complete knowledge. T 41. (∀p)(p ε T(g) → gKp) T39 God knows everything about himself.

Thomas Aquinas defends this as follows: God perfectly comprehends Himself, as can be thus proved. A thing is said to be comprehended when the end of the knowledge of it is attained, and this is accomplished when it is known as perfectly as it is knowable; as, for instance, a demonstrable proposition is comprehended when known by demonstration, not, however, when it is known by some probable reason. Now it is manifest that God knows Himself as perfectly as He is perfectly knowable. For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality; since a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality; but in so far as it is in actuality, as said in Metaph. ix. Now the power of God in knowing is as great as His actuality in existing; because it is from the fact that He is in act and free from all matter and potentiality, that God is cognitive, as shown above. Whence it is manifest that He knows Himself as much as He is knowable; and for that reason He perfectly comprehends Himself.�

T 42. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Essence) → gKp) T41, D3 God knows everything about his essence.

T 43. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Relation to CR) → gKp) T41, D3 God knows everything about his relation to his creation. T 44. (∀p)(p ε T(LM) → gKp)

T39

T 45. (∀p)(p ε T(Lg) → gKp) T44, D6.1 God knows all theorems of logic.

T 46. (∀p)(p ε T(Math) → gKp) T44, D6.1 God knows all theorems of mathematics.

T 47. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gKp) T39 God knows all theorems (truths) about creation and creatures.

Thomas Aquinas defends this as follows:

1 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 14,3.

2.3 God’s Knowledge in General � 51

God necessarily knows things other than Himself. For it is manifest that He perfectly understands Himself; otherwise His existence would not be perfect, since His existence is His act of understanding. Now if anything is perfectly known, it follows of necessity that its power is perfectly known. But the power of anything can be perfectly known only by knowing to what its power extends. Since therefore the divine power extends to other things by the very fact that it is the first e�ective cause of all things, as is clear from the aforesaid, God must necessarily know things other than Himself.�

T 48. (∀p)(p ε T(U) → gKp) T47, D6 God knows all theorems about (of) the universe. T 49. (∀p)(p ε T(OC) → gKp) T47, D6 God knows all theorems about other creatures.

T 50. (∀p)(gKp → �gKp) T36, A6 Whatever God knows, he knows necessarily� T 51. g∈NK T50, D11.3 God has necessary knowledge.

T 52. g∈SK ∧ g∈CK ∧ g∈NK T38, T40, T51 God has sound knowledge; he has complete knowledge, and he has necessary knowledge.

�.�.� God Is Logically Omniscient and Logically Infallible D 12. g∈LO ↔ (∀p)(p ε T(Lg) → gKp) LO. . . logically omniscient

T 53. g∈LO T45, D12 God is logically omniscient.

T 54. (∀p, q)[(p → q) ε T(Lg) → gK(p → q)]

T45

A 7. (∀p, q)[gK(p → q) → (gKp → gKq)]

This axiom A7 is well-known from Epistemic Logic and also holds for humans. D 13. g∈LI ↔ (∀p, q)[p � q → (gKp → gKq)] God is logically infallible i� for all p, q: if q is derivable from p (q logically follows from p), then if God knows that p he also knows that q.

2 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 14,5. 3 For a detailed justification see Weingartner (2008), ch. 2.

52 � 2 God’s Knowledge D 13.1. p � q ↔ (p → q) ε T(Lg)

T 55. g∈LI T54, A7, D13.1, D13 God is logically (or: deductively) infallible.

�.� God’s Knowledge of the Universe D 14. p ε T(U) ↔ (p ε T-Law(U) ∨ p ε T-State(U) ∨ p ε T-Init(U) ∨ p ε T-Const(U) ∨ p ε T-Event(U)) p ε T-Law(U) . . . p belongs to the law-theorems or law statements of the universe U p ε T-State(U) . . . p belongs to the theorems describing a state of the universe U or of a part of it p ε T-Init(U) . . . p belongs to the theorems describing an initial condition of the universe U or a part of it p ε T-Event(U) . . . p belongs to the theorems describing an event (or process) of the universe U p ε T-Const(U) . . . p belongs to the theorems about the value of a constant of nature of the universe U D 15. p ε T-State(U) ↔ (∃t, f)p t,f where p t,f represents a fact of a (physical, biological, psychological) system belonging to U at time t relative to a reference frame f D 16. p ε T-Event(U)↔∃S� (t� f)∃S� (t� f)S� , S� ∈State(U) ∧ (p ↔ Tr(S� , S� )) where Tr(S� S� ) describes the transition from state S� to state S� and S(t, f) represents a state at t relative to f .

D 17. p ε T-Init(U) ↔ ∃S� (t� f)∃S� (t� f)S� , S� ∈State(U) ∧ (p ↔ C(S� , S� )) where C(S� , S� ) describes S� as a causal condition (causal factor), together with a law, for S� . Initial conditions as causal factors together with laws of nature as necessary causes lead as su�cient causes to the respective predictions.�

T 56. (∀p)[(p ε T-Law(U) ∨ p ε T-State(U) ∨ p ε T-Init(U) ∨ p ε T-Const(U) ∨ p ε T-Event(U)) → gKp] T48, D14 God knows all the theorems about the laws, states, initial conditions, constants, and events of the universe T 57. (∀p)(p ε T-Law(U) → gKp)

T 58. (∀p)(p ε T-State(U) → gKp)

T56 T56

4 For a causal theory that describes this, cf. Weingartner (2016).

2.4 God’s Knowledge of the Universe � 53

T 59. (∀p)(p ε T-Init(U) → gKp)

T 60. (∀p)(p ε T-Const(U) → gKp) T 61. (∀p)(p ε T-Event(U) → gKp)

T56 T56 T56

A 8. (∀p)[(p ε T-Law(U) ∨ p ε T-Const(U)) → (∀t, s)p t,s ]

Laws of Nature (of the universe) and Constants of Nature (of the universe) hold always and everywhere, viz. they have space-time invariance (‘s’ stands for the spatial coordinates). We have to add here critically: According to our knowledge today. The question whether some constants of nature change very slowly has been severely tested by experiments within the last decades. So far, no violation of their constancy was discovered (within the respective degree of accuracy). If some fundamental constants like α or G were to change, then the laws of nature would not be completely time-translation-invariant either, since such constants enter fundamental laws of nature.� In this case, however, there would be a new meta-law about the rate of change. We assume that axiom A8 is a theorem of the universe (of creation). T 62. (∀p)(p ε T-Law(U) → (∀t, s)p t,s )

T 63. (∀p)(p ε T-Const(U) → (∀t, s)p t,s )

A8 A8

T 64. (∀p)[gK(p ε T-Law(U)) → gK((∀t, s)p t,s )]

T 65. (∀p)[gK(p ε T-Const(U)) → gK((∀t, s)p t,s )]

A7, T48, T62 A7, T48, T63

Observe that A8, T62, and T63 are facts represented by theorems of the universe (T48) and of creation (T47). T 66. (∀p)(p ε T-State(U) → (∃t, f)p t,f )

D15

T 67. (∀p)(p ε T-Event(U) → (∃S� (t� f)∃S� (t� f)S� , S� ∈State(U) ∧ (p ↔ Tr(S� , S� ))) D16

T 68. (∀p)(p ε T-Init(U) → (∃S� (t� f)∃S� (t� f)S� , S� ∈State(U) ∧ (p ↔ C(S� , S� ))) D17 T 69. (∀p)(∀t� f)(p t,f ε T-State(U) → gKp t,f )

T58 Instantiation

T 70. (∀p)[Tr(S� , S� ) ε T-Event(U) → gK(Tr(S� , S� ))] T61 Instantiation God knows any event or process which develops from state S� to state S� (of the universe).

5 Cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 8.2 and section 3.5.2 below.

54 � 2 God’s Knowledge T 71. (∀p)[C(S� , S� ) ε T-Init(U) → gK(C(S� , S� ))] T59 Instantiation God knows any initial condition where a state S� as a causal factor together with laws of nature leads to a state S� . T 72. (∀p)(∀t, f)[p t,f ε T(U) → gKp t,f ] T48 Instantiation God knows any (singular) state occurring at time t relative to reference frame f (of the universe).

�.� God’s Knowledge of Past and Future T 73. (∀p)(∀t ≤ t� ∀f)[p t≤t�f ε T(U) → gKp t≤t�,f ] T72 Instantiation Where t� is the present time relative to a reference frame f . God knows all past and present states (of the universe), viz. God knows all singular truths concerning past and present time (in this world). T 74. (∀p)(∀t > t� ∀f)[p t>t�f ε T(U) → gKp t>t�,f ] T72 Instantiation God knows all future states (of the universe), viz. God knows all singular truths in the future. One can also derive the following theorems in an analogous way: God knows all past and present events (of the universe); God knows all singular truths describing past and present events. God knows all future events (of the universe). God knows all past and present initial conditions (of the universe). God knows all future initial conditions.

�.�.� The View of Thomas Aquinas Thomas Aquinas treats the di�cult question whether God knows future contingent things in article 13 of questio 14 of the first part of his Summa Theologica. According to Thomas Aquinas, there are two ways in which God knows future states of a�airs: he may know them “in their causes” and he may know them in their actuality. He can know future states in their causes because he knows the causes of the events (states) in the universe and because he knows his power and the power of every creature, especially that of man. He can know the future states in their actuality as he is outside time. I answer that, Since as was shown above (A9), God knows all things; not only things actual but also things possible to Him and the creature; and since some of these are future contingent to us, it follows that God knows future contingent things.

2.5 God’s Knowledge of Past and Future �

55

In evidence of this, we must consider that a contingent thing can be considered in two ways; first, in itself, in so far as it is now in act: and in this sense it is not considered as future, but as present; neither is it considered as contingent (as having reference) to one of two terms, but as determined to one; and on account of this it can be infallibly the object of certain knowledge, for instance to the sense of sight, as when I see that Socrates is sitting down. In another way a contingent thing can be considered as it is in its cause; and in this way it is considered as future, and as a contingent thing not yet determined to one; for asmuch as a contingent cause has relation to opposite things: and in this sense a contingent thing is not subject to any certain knowledge. Hence, whoever knows a contingent e�ect in its cause only, has merely a conjectural knowledge of it. Now God knows all contingent things not only as they are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in itself. And although contingent things become actual successively, nevertheless God knows them in their actual existence – not successively as we do – but all at once; because His knowledge is measured by eternity as is also His being:� Things reduced to act in time, as known by us successively in time, but by God (are known) in eternity, which is above time. Whence to us they cannot be certain, forasmuch as we know future contingent things as such; but (they are certain) to God alone, whose understanding is in eternity above time. Just as he who goes along the road, does not see those who come after him; whereas he who sees the whole road from a height, sees at once all travelling by the way.�

�.�.� A Defense of God’s Knowledge of the Future That God could have a possibility to know contingent future events has been defended in chapters 10 and 11 of Weingartner (2008). 1. The ontological status of states of a�airs is unchangeable First (ch. 10), it is shown that neither knowledge nor truth can change the ontological status of a state of a�airs. That means that the necessity of a state of a�airs represented by p or the contingency of a (another) state of a�airs represented by q cannot be changed by the fact that someone (even God) knows that p and knows that q or by the fact that p is true or that q is true, i.e. by correctly applying the truth-predicate to p and to q. Specifically, a contingent state of a�airs cannot be changed to a necessary one by the fact that someone knows it or by the fact that it is true, i.e. it stays contingently true. This is defended w.r.t. eleven di�erent stronger and weaker types of necessity (roughly: logical, mathematical, natural-law-necessity as dynamical, statistical, conditional and past-necessity) and six di�erent types of contingency (roughly: probabilisti-

6 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 14,13. 7 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,14,13; ad 3.

56 � 2 God’s Knowledge cally contingent, compatible with laws but not ruled by it, future contingency, omnitemporal contingency like fundamental constants of nature etc.). 2. God knows future states of a�airs ruled by laws of nature. Future states of a�airs which are ruled by dynamical or statistical laws are predictable (even by humans) by knowing laws plus initial conditions. However, humans can only know a part of it since their knowledge is imperfect, whereas God, who created the universe with its laws and its cosmological constants and initial conditions, must know all the future states ruled by laws of nature. In the case of dynamical laws, an earlier state can be called a cause (or at least a causal factor) for a later state which follows from the earlier with the help of the law (di�erential equation). In the case of statistical laws, earlier microstates can be called causes (causal factors) of later microstates resulting statistically in a macrostate. More accurately, it has to be emphasized that there are di�erent causal relations realized in our universe. A list, though not exhaustive, of four important ones, is the following: (a) The causal relation described by Classical Mechanics and SR (Special Relativity) w.r.t. dynamical laws. It is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and continuous. (b) The causal relation described by Statistical Mechanics w.r.t. statistical laws. Statistical Mechanics uses the behaviour on the micro-level as a causal structure for the behaviour on the macro-level. The respective causal relation is irreflexive and continuous but not symmetric and not transitive. (c) The causal relation described by the Law of Entropy. This law describes the development from a finite (but huge) number of microstates that can realize a certain macrostate with entropy E, to a still huger number of microstates that can realize a later macrostate with a higher entropy E� . The respective causal relation is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and not continuous, but discrete. The types of causality in (b) and (c) have been called statistical causality. (d) The causal relation realized in a Quantum Jump. In this case the energy h ⋅ ν produced by absorption of a photon causes an electron to jump up from the ground state to the first excited state. The respective causal relation is irreflexive, asymmetric, discrete, and not transitive. The underlying laws are statistical.�

8 For a detailed analysis of the causal relations represented by laws of nature, see Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 9. For a defence of a pluralism concerning types of causality, see Weingartner (2016). The theories of causality of Dowe (2000) and Salmon (1994) are non-pluralistic

2.5 God’s Knowledge of Past and Future � 57

That God knows the future states “in their causes” means, then, that he knows the laws of nature, the di�erent states of the universe plus its elements down to the singular causes, and its boundaries like the fundamental constants of nature.� 3. God knows his power and the power of creatures, especially that of man. God’s knowledge exceeds his power because he also knows the free immoral actions of man which do not come under his power in the sense that he could will or cause them, even if he permits them. As states of a�airs that he knows and permits, they fall under his providence (see 4.6 below). For some future events (actions) of man, it holds that they are both in God’s power and willed by God, and thus they are also known by God. But God also knows the power of his creatures. In this sense, he knows all of their abilities, not only of man in general, but also of every particular person. A free will decision and action implies responsibility of the person’s actions in connection with the evidence that the decision was in his/her power and that s/he caused the action��. In other words, free actions and decisions of the human will are not without causes. The freely acting and deciding human person knows that s/he himself (herself) is the cause of those actions and decisions. But we have to assume that the power and ability to cause free decisions and actions in man is known to God far better than to the person himself (herself). For some free will decisions and actions, it holds that there are inner actions going on – sometimes not without inner conflict – in preparation for a free will decision. In such cases, the respective person might not even himself (herself) foreknow what s/he is going to decide on. But from this, it does not follow that a close friend of his (her) could not know him (her) better and foreknow what s/he will decide on. This is all the more reason for us to assume that God will be able to know his/her future decision. Summing up (2) and (3), we may say that God can know future states of a�airs “in their causes”, both, if the causal connection is based on laws of nature and if it and restricted to causality of type (a): see Dowe (2000), p. 90�. and Salmon (1994), p. 298�. The examples used by both authors are partially mistaken, especially when they are taken from Quantum Mechanics or Statistical Mechanics because in these cases, they violate the conditions of Minkowski Space-Time and continuous trajectories assumed by Dowe and Salmon. For statistical causality, see Pearl (2000) and Hausman (1998). 9 For a detailed analysis of the causal relations represented by laws of nature, see Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 9. For a defence of pluralism concerning types of causality, see Weingartner (2016). 10 This condition was already stressed by Aristotle in his Metaphysics (982b25).

58 � 2 God’s Knowledge is based on his power or on the power and inner autonomous self determination of man in actions or decisions of free will.

�.�.� To Know Does Not Mean to Cause Imagine a person A watching a corner of a street without tra�c lights from a balcony at a corner of a house. A can see two streets meeting rectangularly at the corner, whereas cars approaching the corner cannot see around the corner. Imagine that A saw two cars driving fast to the corner and that A correctly predicts a serious accident where drivers would be injured. This happens, and A is a witness at court since he has seen the accident and knows how it came about. Question: Could the public prosecutor or the judge say that A is implicated in the accident, since he knew how it came about and since he has predicted it and seen it? This would be completely absurd. Imagine that for a long time A has had two friends B and C. B and C have recently been fighting over a piece of land. A tries to calm them down, but knowing their characters, he correctly predicts that they will injure each other. If the case is brought to court, we could ask again: Could the public prosecutor or the judge accuse A of having been an accessory because A knew what would happen? Again, this would be completely absurd. In both cases, the predicted event is a contingent future event that depends on free will decisions of the persons involved. And in both cases, knowing and predicting the future event does not imply and does not mean causing it. In an analogous way, God’s knowing and predicting contingent future events including free will decisions of man does not imply and does not mean causing them. As is clear from theorem T22, God causes with his will. And all his causation is concerned with his creation, and not with himself or his essence.

�.�.� God Does Not Know Future Events as Future 1. God knows neither past events (states of a�airs) as past, nor future events (states of a�airs) as future. This can be substantiated as follows: (a) If x knows the occurrence of an event e as past (for him, for x), then there must be a time interval between the point of time of his action of knowing (t� ) and the occurrence of e (the past event) (t� ), where t� is later than t� (t� > t� ).

2.5 God’s Knowledge of Past and Future � 59

(b) If x knows the occurrence of e as future (for him, for x), then there must be a time interval between the point of time of his action of knowing (t� ) and the occurrence of e (the future event) (t� ), where t� is earlier than t� (t� < t� ). It follows from (a) and (b): If there is a time interval between the point of time of the action of knowing of x and the occurring event, then the action of knowing of x occurs at a certain point of time. But according to axiom A5 and according to what has been defended in sections 1.9.1-1.9.4, it is not the case that God knows something at some time. Or in other words: No time index can be attributed to God’s action of knowing, even though God can know that some event happens at some time (in this world), i.e. time indices must be attributed to events of this world (they are in space-time), but not to any action of God.�� Therefore, God does not know the occurrence of an event as past (for him); nor does he know the occurrence of an event as future (for him). However, God does know the occurrence of an event of this world as past (or future) with respect to some point of reference (or reference system) of this world, or more specifically, God does know the occurrence of an event of this world (say a human action) as a past or as a future event with respect to a point of time (say London time) of a group of men in this world. The deeper reason for that is that there is no absolute time as Newton thought��. Time is the time of (in) this world (universe). And for the time in the universe, it holds: (i) There is not one time for the whole world (universe). According to General Relativity, a unique time for the whole universe is not definable, especially because of its rotating subsystems (galaxies). (ii) Consequently, there is no designated point of time, but only time intervals.��

11 This has been justified by discussing di�erent types of time in ch. 3 of Weingartner (2008). 12 Newton (Princ) Scholium. 13 It may seem that a designated point of time is the point of time of the Big Bang which is – according to the Standard Theory of Cosmology – about 13.8 billion years in the past. But although the Standard Theory is well supported by cosmic background radiation (discovered by Penzias and Wilson in 1965), the theory rests on a number of theoretical assumptions. For instance, on the assumption that cosmic background radiation cooled down uniformly to the magnitude 2.7 K at this time. However, it has been discovered that the cosmic background radiation is anisotropic (cf. Peebles and Yu (1970) Nobel Price of Physics 2019, Scientific American Dec. 2019). Moreover, the calculated age rests on the problematic assumption of unique time development of the whole universe, which cannot be defined according to the General Theory of Relativity (see Mittelstaedt (2008)). This does not mean that there is serious doubt on the finite age of the universe; but the numerical value of 13.8 billions of years is a problematic conjecture.

60 � 2 God’s Knowledge (iii) The time scale and simultaneity are not the same in di�erent reference systems which are moving with di�erent inertial movement or acceleration. (iv) Time does not pass equably for di�erent reference systems. Whether time passes more slowly or more quickly depends both on the movement of the reference system and on the gravitational field in which it is located. From this, it follows: (v) For a reference system (observer) moving with the velocity of light (in vacuum), no time passes. From these considerations, it should be clear that we cannot attribute time to God’s activities. Which time, we could ask: the time of one of the galaxies, of the Milky Way, or of the Andromeda Galaxy? All this is completely absurd, since God is outside the world (universe) and therefore also outside time. 2. The same event may be present and future for di�erent observers (or reference systems). A star explosion of the Sirius (Alpha-Centauri) is present for an observer there (or close to it), but is future for us on earth, since we could observe it only about 4 years later (since the distance is about 4 light years). The respective star may be further away, say 1000 light years. It may even not exist any more when we observe it in a certain state. Imagine an observer (A) (or reference system) who is locally present whenever a cosmological event like a star explosion actually takes place. He then knows these events in their actuality, whereas other observers B� . . . B n which are further away will observe these events in their future; where the time interval depends on the distance the light has to travel. Under this supposition, observer A who sees all these events in its present actuality will therefore know (and and be able to predict) the future observations (events) of all the other observers B� . . . B n . This shows a consistent possibility that an omnipresent being can know events in their present actuality, which are future events for human observers. Such events are not restricted to cosmology; they also include events like human actions, where he who acts might not be aware of even the slightest motive until some time has passed. However, the human observer cannot see the distant object (or event) until its light or the respective causal propagation reaches his telescope and his eyes, travelling with finite velocity (light velocity), which takes time. On the other hand, God does not need for his knowledge light or causal propagation coming from the event, and there is neither spatial nor temporal distance between his knowledge and any event because he is outside space and time. And being omnipresent by his knowledge (see D20 below), God can know events (states of a�airs) of this universe (and of everything he has created) in its present actuality. Under these

2.5 God’s Knowledge of Past and Future �

61

events, there are some which are future events for humans. Thus in this sense, God can know events in their actuality which are future events for humans. It is another consequence of the Theory of Special Relativity that time does not “flow equably” as Newton thought (Principia, Scholium), but rather it can be “stretched” or “compressed”. Clocks when transported with high speed or in a gravitational field go more slowly relative to those transported with low speed or outside of gravitation.�� Living organisms (including men) when transported with high speed grow or become older more slowly than others which are “at rest” or are transported with low speed. A consequence of this is the so-called “clock paradox” or “twin paradox”: an astronaut starting at the age of 20 travelling in space with ν = ��/��c for �� years (according to his clock and ageing process) when coming back meets his twin brother, who became 52 years older meanwhile (according to how time passed on clocks on earth and according to his ageing process). Thus, the meeting of the twin brothers is further in the future for the one who stays on earth and nearer in the future for the one who travels; i.e. the space traveller knowing and predicting the meeting 20 years ahead (his time) can know and predict the future event of the meeting 52 years ahead relative to the reference system earth, i.e. relative to the clocks of his twin brother on earth. Imagine an observer for whom no time passes because he is travelling with velocity of light (in vacuum). He knows events as present, although they are future for di�erent reference systems (observers) moving more slowly. Now for God, no time can pass, not because he would move with the speed of light, but because he is outside time. He can therefore know every event as actual (present), since he is omnipresent (in this world, or in his creation) by his knowledge. On the other hand, these events, which are present and actual to his knowledge, can be future for us and, moreover, future in a di�erent sense for di�erent observers or reference systems in this world, depending on the distance from the event; and they can also be nearer or further in the future depending on the movement of the observer (reference system) or on the gravitational field in which he is located. 3. An observer who belongs to the world (universe) cannot have complete knowledge of the world (universe). The observer of a domain of reality may have incomplete knowledge for di�erent reasons: first, because concerning the domain observed, only statistical laws are known, and statistical laws do not

14 This e�ect was first confirmed precisely with atomic clocks in aeroplanes by Hafele and Keating (1972) and by the Gravity Probe A (Vessot-Levine) experiment 1976. Earlier confirmations have been done with the decay rates of fast moving elementary particles like mesons.

62 � 2 God’s Knowledge allow predicting with certainty an individual case (a singular event, a particular microstate . . . etc.), but only the behaviour of the whole ensemble (the average over the individual cases, the macrostate); second, because the system observed behaves chaotically (in the sense of dynamical chaos) and therefore no predictions are possible, except for a very short time, although the underlying laws are dynamical laws; third, because neither the initial conditions nor the development of the system in its long history is known enough in order to make exact predictions about the future, as is the case with the beginning and further evolution of the whole universe. Moreover, there is a further sense according to which an observer cannot have complete knowledge about the world (universe). It is because he belongs as a part to this very world which he tries to observe, to describe, and to explain. More specifically, it can be proved that under certain normal conditions (like a consistency condition and a deterministic viz. dynamical time evolution between the measured state of the system S at t� and the apparatus state(s) at t� ) the apparatus (observer) contained in S cannot measure at time t� all states of S at t� . Consequently, the respective apparatus (observer) which is contained in S cannot distinguish at time t� certain states of S at t� .�� But he may (in principle) have complete knowledge about S in an extended system S� of S. Thus, if the system S is the whole world, the observer cannot have complete knowledge of the whole world to which he belongs as a part. Now God is not a part of the world. Therefore, he is not subject to this restriction. Only a pantheistic God would be. Moreover, we cannot assume that God has some kind of incomplete knowledge of the sort described. Not belonging to the world means that God can have a “point of view” of the world which is impossible for a human observer. He can know events of this world which happen at a certain point of time relative to a reference system of this world and which are nearer in the future for some observers and more remote in the future for some other observers belonging to this world.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents There are numerous biblical documents for God’s knowledge of contingent future states of a�airs. In many cases, messages have been given to the prophets to enable them to make predictions of the future. Such predictions concern wars, captivity, liberation

15 For proof and further discussion, see Breuer (1995) and Breuer (1997).

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63

of the people of Israel; others concern the appearance of important persons like David, John the Baptist, or Christ; still others concern things unpredictable for humans. Some examples will be given below. Concerning messages to the prophets, there is a criterion of reliability: You may say to yourselves, ‘How can we know when a message has not been spoken by the Lord?’ If what a prophet proclaims in the name of the Lord does not take place or come true, that is a message the Lord has not spoken. That prophet has spoken presumptuously, so do not be alarmed (Dt 18,21; cf. Jer 28,9). Prediction [605]: “The word came to Jeremiah concerning all the people of Judah in the fourth year of Jehoiakim [609-598] . . . which was the first year of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon [605-562] . . . Because you have not listened to my words . . . this whole country will become a desolate wasteland and these nations will serve the king of Babylon seventy years” (Jer 25,1; 8; 11). Came true [587]: “On the seventh day of the fifth month in the nineteenth year of Nebuchadnezzar king of Babylon, Nebuzaradan, commander of the imperial gard, an o�cial of the king of Babylon came to Jerusalem. He set fire to the temple of the Lord, the royal palace and all the houses of Jerusalem“ (2Ki 25,8-9).

Prediction of John the Baptist: A voice of one calling: In the wilderness prepare the way of the Lord; make straight in the desert a highway for our God (Isa 40,3; cf. Mal 3,1).

Came true: When it was time for Elizabeth to have her baby she gave birth to a son (Lk 1,57; cf. Mk 1,1-4).

Prediction of Christ: The virgin will conceive and give birth to a son, and will call him Immanuel (Isa 7,14; cf. Mic 5,2)

Came true: While they were there [in Bethlehem] the time came for the baby to be born and she gave birth to her firstborn, a son (Lk 2,6-7; cf. Mt 1,21-23).

Prediction: They divide my clothes among them and cast lots for my garment (Ps 22,18)

Came true:

64 � 2 God’s Knowledge When the soldiers crucified Jesus, they took his clothes, dividing them into four shares, one for each of them, with the undergarment remaining. This garment was seamless, woven in one piece from top to bottom. ‘Let’s not tear it’ they said to one another. ‘Let’s decide by lot who will get it’ (Jn 19,23-24).

Prediction: He said ‘Throw your net on the right side of the boat and you will find some’

Came true: When they did they were unable to haul the net in because of the large number of fish (Jn 21,6).

Prediction: But so that we may not cause o�ence, go to the lake and throw your line. Take the first fish you catch; open its mouth and you will find a four-drachme coin.

Came true: Take the coin and give it to them for my tax and yours (Mt 17,27).

Prediction: Jesus sent two of his disciples, saying to them ‘Go to the village ahead of you and just as you enter it you will find a colt tied there, which no one has ever ridden. Untie it and bring it here. If anyone asks you ‘Why are you doing this’ say: ‘the Lord needs it and will send it back here shortly’.

Came true: They went and found a colt outside in the street tied at a doorway. As they untied it, some people standing there asked ‘What are you doing, untying that colt?’ They answered as Jesus had told them to and the people let them go. (Mk 11,1-6).

Vatican (1870): By his providence, God protects and governs all things which he has made, “reaching mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all things well” (Wis 8,1). For“all are open and laid bare to his eyes” (Heb 4,13) including those things which are yet to come into existence through the free action of creatures. (ND413; D3003).

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65

�.�.� God Knows Everything That Is Not the Case T 75. (∀p)[(¬p ε T(g) ∨ ¬p ε T(LM) ∨ ¬p ε T(CR)) → gK¬p] T39, ¬p/p God knows what is not (the case); what is not the case about himself, what is not the case about Logics and Mathematics and what is not the case about creation T 76. (∀p)[(¬p ε T-Law(U) ∨ ¬p ε T-State(U) ∨ ¬p ε T-Init(U) ∨ ¬p ε T-Const(U) ∨ ¬p ε T-Event(U)) → gK¬p] T56, ¬p/p God knows what is not (the case) concerning the universe; what is not the case about laws, what is not the case about states, what is not the case about initial conditions, what is not the case about constants of nature, what is not the case about events.

�.�.� Stronger or Weaker Axiom (or Definition) of Omniscience T 77. (∀p)(p → ¬gK¬p) Contraposition

T37 ¬p/p,

T 78. (∀p)(gKp → ¬gK¬p)

T77, T37

T 79. (∀p)(gK¬p → ¬gKp) T78 T 80. (∀p)(¬gKp ∨ ¬gK¬p)

T78

Observe that (∀p)(gKp ∨ gK¬p) – for every p: God knows that p or God knows that not p – does not follow from T37 or T78. This thesis implies together with T37 the thesis (∀p)(gKp ↔ p). The latter is also used in the literature as a definition of omniscience. Although we think that this strong thesis is a possible thesis (or axiom) of omniscience if the universal quantifier in “for all states of a�airs p: if p then God knows that p” is taken with respective care, we proposed a weaker but at the same time much more detailed axiom of omniscience; its respective thesis, which replaces (∀p)(p → gKp), is T39.�� Omniscience in the sense of axiom A6 and theorem T39 seems to be su�cient for all theorems about God proved in this study. More specifically, it follows from theorem T39 that any true conditional p → q is known by God since it must belong either to the theorems of (about) God himself or to the theorems of (about) logic or mathematics or to the theorems of (about) creation.

16 Cf. the problems discussed in Weingartner (2008), ch. 12.

3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will �.� Axiom A9: Omnipotence A 9. g ∈ OM → (∀p)[(gWp → gKp) ∧ gCCp ↔ (gCWp ∧ ¬(p ε T(g-Essence)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM)))] D 18. gCWp ↔ [Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands))]

Cons(p) . . . p is consistent Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) . . . p is consistent with the theorems of God’s essence Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) . . . p is consistent with the theorems of God’s commands (see D30, section 4.7.2) CW . . . can will CC . . . can cause, can make, can bring about P . . . permits (does not prevent) The will of God is understood in such a way that his will is always fulfilled, i.e. it never fails. This is expressed in the first part of axiom A9 of omnipotence: (∀p)(gWp → gKp) from which it follows with the help of T37 that (∀p)(gWp → p). Observe, however, that expressions like “God wills that man obeys his ten commandments” are not formulated in a correct way since it would hold by the above principle: if God wills it, then man will always obey his ten commandments; but that is not the case, as we know. Therefore, if God’s will is applied to human actions of free will, the correct formulation is that God wills that man should (ought to) obey his ten commandments since God does not destroy the freedom of man. This is formulated in axiom A13 and also in D23. On the other hand, this does not prevent such cases from existing where God wills that a human person wills something, and in these cases, this is not a free will decision but maybe some inclination (natural right) which is genetically inborn or a result of environment conditions or of education.

�.�.� Justification of axiom A9 (omnipotence) 1. (∀p)(gWp → gKp), i.e. of whatever God wills to happen, he knows that it happens. We shall first examine the following important consequence of it: (∀p)(gWp → p), i.e. whatever God wills to happen is the case. Assume the contrary: for some state of a�airs p, God wills that p occurs but p does not https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-004

3.1 Axiom A9: Omnipotence �

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

67

occur: (∃p)(gWp ∧ ¬p). In this case, God couldn’t be almighty (omnipotent). We know that this very often happens with humans: they will that something happens, but it does not happen, i.e. their will is not (always) fulfilled. But this is impossible for an omnipotent being. In order to justify (1), assume the contrary: for some states of a�airs which obtain by God’s will, it would hold that God would not know that they obtain. This is completely impossible for a perfect being; such a case would even be almost impossible for a man: that he brings something about with his will, but does not know that this is the case. Therefore, (1) must hold. (∀p)(gCCp → gCWp) i.e. if God can cause that p, then God can will that p. The contrary is not possible since the scope of what God can will must be wider than the scope of what God can cause since God can will his own existence and goodness but he cannot cause them. (∀p)(gCWp → Cons(p)), D18, i.e. if God can will (or can cause, A9 and D18) that p, then p must be consistent. Assume the contrary: then, God’s will and God’s power would be inconsistent, which is impossible for a necessary being. (∀p)[gCWp → Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence))], i.e. whatever God can will (can cause) is consistent with his essence or with his nature. Assuming the contrary would mean that his will or his power (which belong to his essence) is inconsistent (incompatible) with his essence, which is impossible. (∀p)[gCWp → Cons({p} ∪ T(p-Commands))], i.e. whatever God can will (can cause) is consistent with his Commands (towards man). Assuming the contrary would mean that his will or power would be inconsistent in the sense that it would be contrary to his commands which already express his will and power towards man. God’s Commands can be interpreted as theorems, i.e. true statements (cf. the Introduction and section 4.7.2 below). (∀p)[gCCp → ¬(p ε T(g-Essence)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM))]. As is plain from (2) above, God cannot cause necessary facts belonging to his essence; similarly, he cannot cause necessary states of a�airs belonging to the theorems of logic or mathematics; but he can will both of them.

T 81. g∈OM T1 God is omnipotent. That means according to axiom A9: 1. Whatever God wills is the case and is known by him to be the case. 2. Whatever God can cause (has the power to bring about) is consistent and consistent with his essence and his commands and is neither a theorem of his essence nor a theorem of logic or mathematics.

68 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will T 82. (∀p)(gWp → gKp) T81, A9 Whatever God wills (that it is the case), he knows (that it is the case) T 83. (∀p)(gWp → ¬gK¬p)

T82, T78

T 85. (∀p)(gK¬p → ¬gWp)

T79, T84

T 84. (∀p)(¬gKp → ¬gWp)

T82

�.� God’s Will Is Always Fulfilled

T 86. (∀p)(gWp → p) T82 T37 Whatever God wills is the case, or God’s will is always fulfilled

T86 is an important part of God’s omnipotence. Without it, God could not be almighty or omnipotent. Thomas Aquinas defends the necessitation of T86 thus: The will of God must needs always be fulfilled.�

To this, he quotes from Psalm 135,6 in the Sed Contra: Whatever he wills he does.

Observe, however, that the opposite of T86: p → gWp does not hold. For example, if p represents the event of an immoral action then God neither wills that p occurs nor wills that p does not occur but permits (D19) that p occurs, not taking away man’s free will (see section 4.7 and theorem T211).

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents And God said ‘let there be light’ and there was light (Ge 1,3) For he spoke, and it came to be, he commanded and it stood firm. (PS 33,9) I say ’My purpose will stand and I will do all that I please’. . . What I have said, that I will bring about; what I have planned, that I will do (Isa 46,10-11) So is my word that goes out from my mouth: It will not return to me empty, but will accomplish what I desire and achieve the purpose for which I sent it (Isa 55,11) Whatever I say will be fulfilled, declares the Sovereign Lord (Eze 12,28) Against all hope, Abraham in hope believed and so became the father of many nations, just as it had been said to him. . . Yet he did not waver through unbelief regarding the promise of

1 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,6. Cf. the remark after D18 in section 3.1 above.

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God, but was strengthened in his faith and gave glory to God being fully persuaded that God had power to do what he had promised (Ro 4,10-21)

Toledo (675): Similarly we say that the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty, each one distinctly; yet there are not three almighty ones, but one Almighty. (ND312; D529). Cf. also ND306/12 of section 2.2.

�.� God’s Willing and Causing T 87. (∀p)(gCp → gWp) T22 Whatever God causes, he wills. Or: God causes with his will

T 88. (∀p)[gCCp ↔(gCWp ∧ ¬(p ε T(g-Essence)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM))]

T81, A9

Observe that ‘God can cause that p’ (gCCp) implies via T88, D18 and A9 that p must be consistent and consistent with the theorems of God’s essence and God’s commands (cf. T113).

T 89. (∀p)(gCCp → gCWp) T88 Whatever God can cause, he can will

Observe that the opposite implications of T87 and T89 do not hold since God (necessarily or by his own nature) wills (and can will) his own existence and his goodness but he does not (and cannot) cause it. As a first cause, he is only related to his creation and creatures, but with his will he is related to both, himself and his creation and creatures.

T 90. (∀p)(¬gWp → ¬gCp) T87 What God does not will, he does not cause T 91. (∀p)(¬gCWp → ¬gCCp) T89 God cannot cause what he cannot will

For example, God cannot will that moral evil occurs since this would be inconsistent with his essence and with his commands; therefore, he cannot cause that moral evil occurs (see T211 below). T 92. (∀p)(gCp → p) T86, T87 Whatever God causes is the case T 93. (∀p)(gWp → ¬gW¬p) God’s will is consistent

T86 ¬p/p Contraposition

70 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will T 94. (∀p)(p → ¬gW¬p) T86 ¬p/p Contraposition Whatever is the case is not hindered by God’s will.

Observe that this also holds for immoral states of a�airs. If God willed that they not occur, then they would, in fact, not occur and then God would have destroyed man’s free will (see T198, T211 below).

T 95. (∀p)(gCp → ¬gC¬p) T92 ¬p/p Contraposition God’s causation is consistent

T 96. (∀p)(p → ¬gC¬p) T92 ¬p/p Contraposition Whatever is the case is not prevented by God’s causation (cf. T94 and commentary above)

�.�.� God’s Will, Cause, and Permission D 19. gPp ↔ ¬gW¬p

God permits that p i� it is not the case that God wills that p does not occur. If we translate “God wills that p does not occur (gW¬p) as God prevents that p occurs, then “God permits that p" means “God does not prevent that p". The kind of God’s permission defined by definition D19 refers to God’s will where there is no ought or should or obligation or prohibition. Therefore this kind of permission is not deontic and cannot be replaced by ¬O¬p. The concept of obligation (O) understood as God’s Commands towards rational creatures and especially humans is introduced later by definitions D23 and D30. T 97. (∀p)(gWp → gPp) T93, D19 Whatever God wills, he permits T 98. (∀p)(gCp → gPp)

T87, T97

T 99. (∀p)(p → gPp) T94, D19 Whatever is the case is permitted by God.

Observe that this does not mean that God permits everything but only that he permits everything that in fact occurs. And among those states of a�airs that do in fact occur, there are some or even many that he wills to occur. Therefore, the following is also a theorem:

T 100. (∀p)(p → (gWp ∨ gPp)) T99 Whatever is the case is either willed or permitted by God.

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T 101. (∀p)(gKp → gPp) T99, T37 Whatever God knows to be the case is permitted by him

T 102. (∀p)(p → (gCp ∨ gPp)) T99 Whatever is the case is either caused (done) by God or permitted by God. This is expressed by Augustine thus:

Nothing is done unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by doing it�

This quote may also be described by theorem T103: T 103. (∀p)(gWp → (gCp ∨ gPp)) T86, T102 Whatever God wills, he causes (does) or permits

T 104. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → (gWp ↔ gCp)) T22 If p belongs to the theorems of God’s creation, then God’s willing that p is equivalent to God’s causing that p. Or shorter: Concerning creation, God’s willing is equivalent to God’s causing.

As has been mentioned already, this equivalence does not hold for God himself since there is no causation w.r.t. himself since all his causation is restricted to creation. For example he (necessarily) wills his own goodness, but he cannot cause it. T 105. (∀p)(gCp → gKp) T87, T82 Whatever God causes, he knows.

Observe that the opposite does not hold because God knows that somebody sins, but God cannot cause that.

�.� God’s Power A 10. (∀p)(gCp → gCCp)

Whatever God causes, he can cause (or he has the power to cause). The expression “can” used here does not mean to introduce a potency into God but is meant as “having the power". Observe that the opposite of A10 does not hold because God has the power to cause (to do) something which he does not actually cause (does not do; see axiom A12 below and section 3.5). This holds analogously for God’s will: 2 Augustine (Ench), 95; MPL 40,276.

72 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will A 11. (∀p)(gWp → gCWp)

Whatever God wills, he can will (or he has the power to will). Again, the opposite does not hold because God can will something which he does not will to actually occur (see theorem T115 below). T 106. (∀p)(gCp → gCWp) T87, A11 Whatever God causes, he can will

T 107. (∀p)[gCCp → (Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)))] T89, D18 Whatever God can cause is consistent and consistent with his essence and with his commands. Or: God’s power is consistent and consistent with his essence and with his commands. T 108. (∀p)[gCp → (Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)))] T107, A10 Whatever God causes is consistent and consistent with his essence and with his commands. The next two theorems are analogous to theorems 107 and 108: T 109. (∀p)[gCWp → (Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)))] D18

T 110. (∀p)[gWp → (Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)))] A11, D18 God’s will is consistent and consistent with his essence and with his commands T 111. (∀p)[gCCp → ¬(p ε T(g-Essence)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM))] T88 God cannot cause states of a�airs that are represented by theorems of his essence or of logic or mathematics. However, according to theorems T42 and T44-T46, God knows all theorems about his essence and all theorems of logic and mathematics. Observe that genuine theorems that are true are meant here, not just valid logical consequences of questionable (or just assumed) axioms. T 112. (∀p)[gCp → ¬(p ε T(g-Essence)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM))] T111, A10 Whatever God causes is not represented by a theorem of his essence or of logic or mathematics T 113. (∀p)[gCCp ↔ (Cons(p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Essence)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(g-Essence) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM)))] T88, D18 God can cause that p (or: God has the power to bring about p) i� p is consistent

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and consistent with every truth about his essence and his commands and p is not itself a truth (theorem) of (about) his essence and not one of (about) logic and mathematics. The first part of God’s omnipotence is that God’s will is always fulfilled (recall section 3.2 and theorem T86). The second part of God’s omnipotence is that God’s power exceeds the facts and extends to what is possible or consistent and not contradictory. This is more accurately expressed by theorem T113, which incorporates the compatibility with God’s essence and commands and says that facts about God’s essence and about logic or mathematics do not fall under God’s power. Thomas Aquinas describes God’s omnipotence as follows: All confess that God is omnipotent; but it seems di�cult to explain in what His omnipotence precisely consists: for there may be doubt as to the precise meaning of the word ‘all’ when we say that God can do all things. If, however, we consider the matter alright, since power is said in reference to possible things, this phrase, God can do all things, is rightly understood to mean that God can do all things that are possible. . . . Therefore, everything that does not imply a contradiction in terms, is numbered amongst those possible things, in respect of which God is called omnipotent: whereas whatever implies contradiction does not come within the scope of divine omnipotence, because it cannot have the aspect of possibility. Hence it is better to say that such things cannot be done, than that God cannot do them. Nor is this contrary to the word of the angel saying No word shall be impossible with God. For whatever implies a contradiction cannot be a word, because no intellect can possibly conceive such thing.�

�.�.� God Cannot Change the Past A further point to be clarified is that God cannot change the past as not being past, since this would also imply a contradiction. Thus, if p t describes an event that happened at a time t (relative to a reference frame of this world) in the past, he cannot make it that ¬p t since this is a contradiction, even though he could have prevented p t from occurring before it happened. And he can remove e�ects of the event p t after it has happened. Recalling theorem T102, assume that p occurred in the past at time t : p t . Then either God causes p t or God permits p t . In the first case, God cannot cause ¬p t since this would be a contradiction. And in the second case, permitting ¬p t is also impossible since p t has already occurred. 3 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 25,3.

74 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will Thomas Aquinas first quotes an objection against false opinions by Jerome before giving his answer and that of Augustine and of Aristotle: On the contrary, Jerome says: Although God can do all things, He cannot make a thing that is corrupt not to have been corrupted. Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot e�ect that anything else which is past should not have been. I answer that, As was said above (Q.7,A.2), there does not fall under the scope of God’s omnipotence anything that implies a contradiction. Now that the past should not have been implies a contradiction. For as it implies a contradiction to say that Socrates is sitting, and is not sitting, so does it to say that he sat, and did not sit. But to say that he did sit is to say that it happened in the past. To say that he did not sit, is to say that it did not happen. Whence, that the past should not have been, does not come under the scope of divine power. This is what Augustine means when he says: Whosoever says, if God is almighty, let Him make what is done as if it were not done, does not see that this is to say: If God is almighty let Him e�ect that what is true, by the very fact that it is true, be false: and the Philosopher says: Of this one thing alone is God deprived - namely, to make undone the things that have been done.� Reply Obj. 3. God can remove all corruption of the mind and body from a woman who has fallen; but the fact that she had been corrupt cannot be removed from her; as also is it impossible that the fact of having sinned or having lost charity thereby can be removed from the sinner.�

�.�.� Biblical Documents Then the Lord said to Abraham ’Why did Sarah laugh and say: will I really have a child, now that I am old? Is anything too hard for the Lord? I will return to you at the appointed time next year, and Sarah will have a son’ (Ge 18,13-14). To whom you will compare me? Or who is my equal? says the Holy One. Lift your eyes and look to the heavens: Who created all these? He who brings out the starry host one by one and calls forth each of them name by name. Because of his great power and mighty strength, not one of them is missing (Isa 40,25). I foretold the former things long ago, my mouth announced them and I made them known; then suddenly I acted and they came to pass (Isa 48,3). Then the word of the Lord came to Jeremiah: I am the Lord the God of all mankind. Is anything too hard for me? (Jer 32,27). How will this be, Mary asked the angel, since I am a virgin... Even Elizabeth your relative is going to have a child in her old age, and she who was said to be unable to conceive is in her sixth month. For no word shall be impossible with God (Lk 1,34;36-37).

4 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,25,4; Jerome (Cust), 22 (MPL)22,397; Augustine (CFst), 26,5 (MPL)42,481; Aristotle (NEt), 1139b10. Mackie does not seem to understand this when he claims “that there are no limits to what an omnipotent thing can do” Mackie (1971), p. 93. Cf. Weingartner (Theodicy), section 2.3. 5 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 25,4, ad3.

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Then Jesus came to them and said: All authoritative power in heaven and on earth has been given to me (Mt 28,18).

For Church Documents, see sections 3.2.1 (ND312), 2.2 (ND306/12) and 1.2.1 (ND19).

�.� God Can Do What He Does Not Do. Or: God’s Power Exceeds the Facts As has been mentioned already, the opposites of axioms A10 and A11 do not hold. That means that God has the power to do (cause) something which he does not actually do (cause) because he does not will to do it. Thomas Aquinas treats this question as follows: In consequence we should declare quite simply that God can make other things than the things he does make. . . . consequently there is no reason why something should not be within divine power which God does not will, and which is no part of the present order he has established . . . for his doing falls under his foreknowing and pre-ordained, not the power of his doing, for that is his nature, not his choice. Why he does something is because he wills to do it; why he is able to do it is because such he is by nature, not because he wills it.� Whence it follows that His e�ect is always less than His power.�

We might consider the above question in a more concrete way by applying it to creation or more restrictedly – not considering other creatures – to the universe. Then, we have to distinguish the following cases: 1. Could God have created another universe than that which he created? 2. Could God have created the same universe in such a way that it had some other features or that it included some further entities or missed some, existing now?

�.�.� Einstein’s Question It will be clear from section 1.7 that Leibniz answers both questions with: no. Since the world (universe) is the best of all possible worlds (whatever that is supposed to mean, since we have no absolute comparison), there cannot be a su�cient reason for God to create another, less perfect world. We have given reasons in section 1.7 that Leibniz’ thesis of the best of all possible worlds is not correct, and so both questions are open for discussion.

6 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 25,5 and ad 1. 7 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 25,2 ad 2.

76 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will To have an answer to the first question (1) was one of the deepest interests of Einstein: Was mich eigentlich interessiert hat, ist, ob Gott die Welt hätte anders machen können; und das heißt ob die Forderung der logischen Einfachheit überhaupt die Freiheit lässt.�

Einstein’s question leads to further specification: (a) Was God forced by principles of logic or mathematics to create one unique world (universe), if he were to create at all? (b) Could God have created a universe with di�erent fundamental laws of nature and with di�erent fundamental constants of nature? (c) Could God have created a universe that is equal to ours in that it has the same fundamental laws and the same fundamental constants but di�erent from ours concerning other features? According to Leibniz, subquestion (a) has to be answered with Yes; the mathematical principles of maximization of perfection (= the quantity of essence) of maximization of existence, of maximization of variety, order and continuity and of minimization of laws and discontinuity lead to a unique universe on logicalmathematical grounds.� In section 1.7, we defended that our universe is not perfect in such an absolute or mathematical sense for several reasons: a very important one is the cooperation of contingent imperfect creatures in the development of the universe. Moreover, there are further reasons why subquestion (a) cannot be answered with Yes. For centuries it has been an experience of theoretical physics that there are more consistent mathematical models than the one which is physically realized and selected by severe testing and corroboration. The same has been true (for decades) for consistent models of cosmology.��

�.�.� Alternative Fundamental Laws and Constants of the Universe Einstein’s Question may also be interpreted with the help of specification (b): “another universe" is a universe with di�erent fundamental laws of nature and with di�erent fundamental constants. By fundamental constants of nature we

8 “What really interested me is whether God could have made the world in a di�erent way; and this means whether the requirement of logical simplicity allows freedom at all". Fölsing (1993), p. 823. 9 Cf. Friedman (1975) and Weingartner (1983), p. 178�. 10 For a discussion of cosmological models see Heller (2004) and Penrose (2005), §27.11-27.13.

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understand the following six constants: velocity of light in vacuum (c), unit of electric charge (e), rest mass of electron (m e ), rest mass of proton (m p ), Planck’s constant (h), constant of gravitation (G)��. The fine-structure constant (α = �/���) can be defined α = �πe� /hc. It is dimensionless, as is the proportion m p /m e = ����. Since all of these six constants enter fundamental laws of nature, a change of these constants leads to a change of the laws. However change can be understood in a twofold way: (i) A very slow change in time of one of these constants would imply that the laws of nature which contain that constant as a constituent would not be strictly time-translation invariant any more, i.e. would slowly change with time. For example, if G were to decrease slowly, one of the e�ects would be that the orbit of the moon would increase slowly accordingly. So far, no such e�ects could be measured.�� There is further evidence for the constancy of fundamental constants, especially for the electric charge e from investigations of the natural nuclear reactor in the Oklo-mine (West-Africa), where measurements of the decay-rate of the chemical element Samarium show the constancy of e. (ii) Other values for the fundamental constants would imply the following consequences: keeping the same laws would lead to incorrect predictions and incorrect results in tests. This would not necessarily mean that the laws are incorrect. According to a possible theory of space-time quantization��, the value of the quantum of length a is left unspecified but dependent on the energy of the whole universe thus: a = h ⋅ c/�E u . Consequently, c (light velocity) is also dependent on the energy of the whole universe (E u ). Therefore, if E u were to be greater than it is in our universe, c would be greater too. But from this, it does not follow that our laws of nature would be incorrect. For example, Einstein’s law E = mc� need not to be incorrect as a result. 11 What is listed under fundamental constants of nature di�ers to some extent, although the above seven are included in most of the serious treatments on constants of nature. Cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 8.2 and Petley (1985), Dyson (1972). 12 Checking the distance of the moon by radar measurement with a reflecting mirror on the moon (established in one of the astronautic missions) did not lead to a significant e�ect within the limits of accuracy. Moreover, most accurate measurements of the orbits of double star systems of two neutron stars show no change of G. For an overview of the question whether the constants of nature are really constant cf. Dyson (1972), Petley (1999), Rees (2001), ch. 10, Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), p. 190�. 13 Cf. Meessen (2000).

78 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will However, a further point is that other values of the fundamental constants are incompatible with the development of our universe according to our knowledge today. What astrophysicists found out in the last decades is that there is, and has been, an immense fine-tuning at work in the development of our universe. Martin Rees lists about 15 necessary conditions involved in this fine-tuning which enables the development of carbon-based life.�� Barrow and Tipler show the very specific and unique conditions for human evolution by 3 criteria and 10 crucial steps.�� Roger Penrose tried to calculate the extraordinarily specific ��� and unique degree of precision in creating the Big Bang as � : ���� : ��� “The Creator’s pin has to find a tiny box, just 1 part in ���� of the entire phase space volume, in order to create a universe with as special a Big Bang as that we actually find."�� The above considerations seem to show that a change of the laws of nature would certainly lead to another universe; although it does not seem that such a change would imply any logical inconsistency. A change in the fundamental constants does not necessarily lead to a change of the laws of nature as a change of the energy (or mass) of the whole universe (with consequences to the value of c) seems to show. However, because of the extreme fine-tuning a change of any of the constants would also probably lead to another universe.

�.�.� Alternative Features of Our Universe What is the set of all changes which do not change laws of nature? Weinberg called this set the “symmetry group of nature".�� We may speak of a universe which is essentially the same as our universe if it has the same laws of nature as our universe. A very di�cult question is whether some (or any) change in the fundamental constants can leave the laws invariant. A general answer to this question is not known; although for special cases, like the one that the energy or mass of the whole universe is changed with the consequence that the velocity of light is greater (or smaller), it seems that the laws can be kept the same (see 3.5.2,

14 Rees (2001), ch. 11 Denton (1998) discusses such conditions for life on earth in great detail. For examples, see also Weingartner (2015a), p. 191�. 15 Barrow and Tipler (1986), ch. 8.7. 16 Penrose (2005), section 27.13. These calculations are based on a thermal equilibrium of the matter in the early universe taken in conjunction with the universe’s rapid expansion and assuming a ���� baryon-universe. 17 Weinberg (1987), p. 73 cf. Weingartner (1996b), section 7.

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(ii) above). However, there are several types of other “accidental" changes that certainly leave the laws invariant: (i) Change of Microstates The phenomena of thermodynamics, quantum mechanics, radiation, of cosmological evolution and of certain kinds of chaos show that not all laws of nature are dynamical-deterministic laws. That means that statistical laws in a realistic interpretation, i.e. as describing branching in nature – not just understood epistemologically as degrees of our ignorance – are genuine laws of nature.�� If this is true, there are degrees of freedom for states of the universe in the future which are compatible with the laws. That means that changes of singular states that are allowed as degrees of freedom of statistical laws are members of the set of all changes which do not change laws of nature. Consider as an example the number of possible microstates in a litre of gas (air) at T = �°C �� (���K). This number is about ���⋅�� . Each of these microstates can realize the same macrostate litre of air at T = �°C. A change (replacement) of one microstate (by another) does not change any law of nature. Observe also that it is impossible that all possible microstates of the universe (an outrageous number if we compare it to that above) can be realized in the lifetime of the universe which is about � ⋅ ���� seconds since the Big Bang according to our best hypothetical calculations of today. This means that there is a huge number of possible changes (of microstates) that do not change laws of nature. (ii) Permutation Invariance Permutational change, i.e. interchange of elementary particles of the same sort (electrons/electrons, protons/protons, neutrons/neutrons etc.) does not change laws of nature. That means that elementary particles of the same kind are treated as indistinguishable by laws, although they are numerically (or individually) di�erent. This is again a huge number of changes that leave laws invariant. (iii) Change of Initial Conditions Assuming that initial conditions or boundary conditions can be distinguished from laws of nature in a scientifically justified way��, they are another subset of changes that do not change laws of nature. Take as an example that the special plane of the orbit of one of the planets (of our solar system) has a slightly di�erent angle compared to the now realized one. That the orbit lies in a plane follows from the rotationally symmetric laws, but the special angle does not. Or think of slight changes in the constellation of stars or of charge-symmetry

18 Cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 7, Weingartner (1998). 19 Cf. Wigner (1967), ch. 1, Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 8.1.

80 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will violation where the ratio of decay could be slightly di�erent. Another example is parity: the ratio of the rates of snails having left screw houses to those having right screw houses could be di�erent without a�ecting biological laws. (iv) Additional Beings Additional chemical elements, minerals or biological species of a similar kind as those existent are easily compatible with laws of nature. (v) Human Free Will Decisions Also human free will decisions and states and events caused by them are another subset of the set of changes that do not change laws of nature. Think of all the cultural, scientific, technical, artistic and welfare achievements of mankind; however unfortunately also of animosity, enmity, discord, war, suppression etc. All the possible changes listed in (i)–(v) are accidental in the sense that they do not change the laws, i.e. keep the laws invariant, and therefore, they are alternative features of a universe which is the same as ours w.r.t. laws of nature. Many – even if not all – of these changes can be caused by the creatures belonging to this universe.

�.�.� Can God Make (Cause) Things Di�erent from Those That He Makes (Causes, Creates)? (i) We have seen that alternative accidental changes compatible with laws of nature 3.5.3 (i)–(v) can – at least some part of them – even be caused by creatures, including humans. It would then be absurd to deny that they can be caused by God. God does not (and cannot) cause man’s free will decisions, but keeps his will o� and permits them (cf. theorems T99, T100 and 102, T200, T211). (ii) Alternative laws of nature are not logically or mathematically inconsistent. However, a universe with alternative laws of nature would be essentially different from our universe. It follows from theorem T107 together with A9 and definition D18 that God can cause (make) it if it is consistent with his essence and with his commands. From this it follows that God can suspend laws of nature for some time when working miracles, although he is able to work miracles in accordance with laws of nature in a way unknown to us (cf. section 6.3.7). As every good fact in creation, the way how God causes miracles is a matter of his free will. (iii) From what God can do, it does not follow that he is doing all which he can do. Therefore, Thomas Aquinas says that his e�ect is always less than his power. Consequently, from the fact that other universes are possible, one should not

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conclude that they are and that multiverses exist. In other words, God can do something he does not do because he does not will to do that. In sum, we may say that the above considerations in sections 3.5.2-3.5.4 provide a justification of the following axiom A12: A 12. (∃p)(gCCp ∧ ¬gWp) God can (has the power to) cause states of a�airs that he does not will to occur T 114. (∃p)(gCCp ∧ ¬gCp) A12, T90 God can (has the power to) cause things that he does not cause to occur T 115. (∃p)(gCWp ∧ ¬gWp) A12, T89 God can (could) will things that he does not will to obtain

T 116. (∃p)(gCWp ∧ ¬gCp) T115, T90 God can (could) will things that he does not cause to obtain �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents I say ’My purpose will stand and I will do all that I please’ . . . What I have said that I will bring about; what I have planned, that I will do (Isa 46,10-11). For no word from God will ever fail (Lk 1, 37) All the people were amazed and said to each other, ‘What words these are! With authority and power he gives orders to impure spirits and they come out’ (Lk 4, 36) Do you think I cannot call on my Father, and he will at once put at my disposal more than twelve legions of angels? But how then would the Scriptures be fulfilled that say it must happen in this way? (Mt 26,53-54). Jesus commanded to Peter ’Put your sword away! Shall I not drink the cup the Father has given me’. (Jn 18,11) Now my soul is troubled and what shall I say? ’Father, save me from this hour?’ No, it was for this very reason I came to this hour (Jn 12,27) Abraham reasoned that God could even raise the dead, and so in a manner of speaking he did receive Isaac back from death (Heb 11,19).

Constantinople (543): If anyone says or holds that God’s power is finite, or that he has created all that he could comprehend and think, or that creatures are co-eternal with God, anathema sit (ND401/8; D410). Sens (1140) Condemned Propositions of Peter Abaelard: God can do only those things that he in fact does or permit only what he in fact permits or only in this way or at this time, but not otherwise. (D726).

82 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will Pius V. Bull Ex Omnibus A�ictionibus (1567). Condemned Propositions of Michael de Bay: God could not have created the human being from the beginning in the condition in which one is now born (ND1984/55; D1955). Cologne (1860): As God could create the world or not create it, so he could create this world or another world. In fact: the same reasons that prove God’s freedom concerning the creation of the world also teach that he was free to create this world or another world. (NR307)

�.� God’s Omnipresence �.�.� Definition of Omnipresence D 20. g ∈ Omnipresent ↔ (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (gKp ∧ (gWp ∨ gPp) ∧ (gWp → gCp))]

God is omnipresent or God is everywhere refers to everywhere in his creation; that means: if p is a theorem (fact) of his creation, he “is present" there with his knowledge, with his will or permission and with his causation conditioned by his will. God does not will every occurring event or state of the universe like immoral actions, although he knows them and permits that they occur. Therefore, we have to say: God wills that p or God permits that p. Similarly, God does not cause every occurring event or state of his creation since, first, he entrusts creatures with causation, and second he does not cause states of a�airs caused by actions of free will of man or other creatures. Thus, he causes those events (states of a�airs) that he wills. The three parts mentioned above are included in the above definition D20: God is in the things of the world and in other creatures created by him as they are things and states of a�airs known by him. He is further in the things created by him in the sense that every state of a�airs about these creatures and about the things "created" by these creatures is either willed or permitted by him. And finally, God is in his creatures as a cause in the e�ect; in those things “created" by his creatures indirectly as an underlying necessary cause (cf. axioms A15 and A17 below). In a special sense, God is present in rational creatures if they believe in him, think of him, and love him. This is included in definition D20 as an instance in so far as these are facts of creation which are described by theorems of (about) creation (p ε T(CR)) known by God (gKp). Thomas Aquinas expressed these facts as follows:

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I answer that, God is said to be in a thing in two ways; in one way after the manner of an e�cient cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way He is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this is proper to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature which knows and loves Him actually and habitually. But how he is in other things created by Him, may be considered from human a�airs. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Again a thing is said to be by its presence in other things which are subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house.��

T 117. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → p) T47, T37 If something is a fact of (about) Creation, then it obtains T 118. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → (gWp ∨ gPp))

T117, T100

T 119. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (gKp ∧ (gWp ∨ gPp) ∧ (gWp → gCp))]

T47, T118, T104

T 120. g∈Omnipresent T119, D20 God is omnipresent or God is everywhere.

�.�.� Biblical Documents Where can I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence? If I go up to the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the depths, you are there. If I rise on the wings of the dawn, if I settle on the far side of the sea, even there your hand will guide me, your right hand will hold me fast. If I say, ‘Surely the darkness will hide me and the light become night around me’ even the darkness will not be dark to you; the night will shine like the day, for darkness is as light to you. (Ps 139,7-12) The spirit of the Lord has filled the whole world: and that which contains all things has knowledge of every voice. (Wisd 1,7). Am I only a God nearby’ declares the Lord, ’and not a God far away? Who can hide in secret places so that I cannot see them?’ declares the Lord ’Do not I fill heaven and earth?’ declares the Lord. (Jer 23,23-24). Hear the cry and the prayer that your servant is praying in your presence this day. May your eyes be open toward this temple night and day. (1Ki 8,28-29). When you pray go into your room, close the door and pray to your Father who is unseen. Then your Father who sees what is done in secret, will reward you. (Mt 6,6). Therefore judge nothing before the appointed time; wait until the Lord comes. He will bring to light what is hidden in darkness and will expose the motives of the heart. (1Co 4,5). For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities - his eternal power and divine nature - have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made. (Ro 1,20).

20 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 8,3.

84 � 3 God’s Omnipotence Knowledge and Will Nothing in all creation is hidden from God’s sight. Everything is uncovered and laid bare before the eyes of him whom we must give account. (Heb 4,13)

4 God as Creator �.� Axiom 13: Creator A 13. g∈CT → (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (p ε T(g-Knowledge about CR) ∧ p ε T(g-Will aboutCR) ∧ p ε T(g-Prov))] ∧ (∀x∈cr)(∃p)[p ε T(CR) ∧ p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. creatures)] ∧ (∃p)(∀x∈�)[p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. men)] ∧ (∃p)[Op ε T(g-Commands)]

D 21. p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. creatures) ↔ (∀x∈cr)[gWxCSp ∨ (gWxCCSp → gWxSCSp)]

D 22. p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. men) ↔ (∀x∈�)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp) xCp . . . x causes that p (is the case) xWp . . . x wills (desires) that p (is the case) xAp . . . x acts (in such a way) that p (is the case) xCSp . . . x causes (pt-su�ciently) that p xCCSp . . . x can cause (pt-su�ciently) that p xSCSp . . . x should (pt-su�ciently) cause that p (is the case)

D 23. Op ε T(g-Commands) ↔ (∀x∈�)(gWxSWp ∧ gWxSAp)

By the theorems of God’s commands – T(g-Commands) in axiom A13 and definition D23 – we shall understand in this study theorems of God’s commands directed to humans. This restriction is made because we do not treat other creatures like angels in this study. Therefore, we could write throughout this study T(g-Commands w.r.t. men) instead of T(g-Commands). However, we use the shorter version throughout this study keeping in mind that God’s commands are understood as being directed to men. xSWp . . . x should (ought to) will that p (is the case) xSAp . . . x should (ought to) act that p (is the case) Op . . . it is obligatory that p, or: it ought to be the case that p (see below 4.7.2) Since this concept of obligation refers to humans (D23) it is deontic in contradistinction to the concept of permission (see the remark after definition D19 section 3.3.1) such that both are not interdefinable. However Op can also be expressed by a deontic permission P+ as ¬P+ ¬p. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-005

86 � 4 God as Creator Axiom A13 has six parts: the first concerns God’s knowledge about his creation; the second God’s will about his creation and the third God’s care about his creation which is described by his providence. The fourth, fifth, and sixth parts are concerned with God’s will specifically directed to his creatures and God’s will and commands directed to humans.

�.� God’s Relation to Creation T 121. g∈CT T1 God is creator T 122. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (gK(p ε T(CR)) ∧ gKp ∧ �gKp ∧ gK¬�p)] T121, A13, D5.1 T 123. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → ((gWp → (¬�gWp ∧ gW¬�p)) ∧ (gCp ∨ (∃x∈cr)(gCNp → xCSp))] T121, A13, D5.2

T 124. (∀x∈cr)(∃p)[p ε T(CR) ∧ (gWxCSp ∨ (gWxCCSp → gWxSCSp))] A13, D21

T121,

T 125. (∃p)(∀x ∈ �)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp) ∧ (∃p)(∀x ∈ �)(gWxSWp ∧ gWxSAp) T121, A13, D22, D23 T 126. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → p ε T(g-Prov))

T121, A13

The first part of axiom A13 is expressed by theorem T122. It says that every fact about creation is known by God and known by him as being a fact about creation; moreover, every fact about creation is necessarily known by God, and furthermore God knows that it is a contingent (not necessary) fact. All this is included in God’s omniscience and has been treated in detail in Ch. 2 with axiom A6 and theorems T36,T39, T43, T47, T48,T56-T76. The second part of axiom A13 is expressed by theorem T123 which says: for every fact about (of) creation it holds that if God wills it, then he does not necessarily will it and he wills that it does not necessarily (i.e. contingently) obtain; and furthermore, it holds that either God causes that fact (to obtain) or some of the creatures cause pt-su�ciently that it obtains under the condition that God is an underlying necessary cause. The third part says that every fact of creation falls under God’s Providence (cf. definitions D26-D28 below, section 4.6). The fourth part of axiom A13 is expressed by theorem T124 and definition D21: for all creatures and some (or other) fact p of creation it holds that either God wills that they cause (in the sense of a pt-su�cient cause, cf. section 4.4 and note 12)

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87

fact p or if God wills that creatures can cause fact p then he wills that they should cause (SCS, pt-su�ciently) fact p. The expression “should cause” may refer to humans or to other creatures. If it refers to humans, then it expresses a general task to cooperate and contribute to the development of creation by their capability of causality. The special task for humans which involves natural law and moral obligation is expressed in theorem T125 and definitions D22 and D23. If “should cause” refers to other creatures of the universe, then it expresses an analogous general task to cooperate and to contribute on a lower level to creatures with or without consciousness. The fifth part of axiom A13 is expressed by theorem T125 and definition D22: For some (specific) states of a�airs, God wills that all humans will them to occur and act in such a way that they occur. This first part of T125 refers to men’s natural inclinations towards natural goods like health, survival, happiness, increase of knowledge, receiving and giving love, . . . etc. The sixth part of axiom A13 (= second part of T125) refers to God’s commands towards men, i.e. to those states of a�airs that should be willed and should be brought about by humans according to God’s commission by his commands. Observe that the last two parts in axiom A13 and theorem T125 are formulated in such a way that the existential quantifier for states of a�airs proceeds the universal quantifier for humans. This means that for some (special) states of a�airs concerning all humans, God wills that they have certain abilities for obtaining natural goods and that they should obey his commands. This is the stronger claim compared to that which says that for all humans, God wills that they will (should will) some states of a�airs to obtain (in which case the universal quantifier proceeds the existential one).

�.� Facts Willed but Not Necessarily Willed by God Some facts of (about) creation are willed by God himself, others he entrusts creatures with causing. Since there are also moral evils among the facts of (about) creation, God does not will and cannot will every fact of (about) creation. However, for all facts of (about) creation that he wills, it holds that he does not necessarily will them and wills that they not necessarily (i.e. contingently) be the case (see theorem T123, first part). The same also holds for God’s causation since according to theorem T104 w.r.t. his creation, God’s willing is equivalent to God’s causing. Or in other words: God causes with his will. This theorem – T123 with its parts (¬�gWp ∧ gW¬�p) and gCp – holds, first of all, of his creation of the whole universe, in its beginning, not out of something

88 � 4 God as Creator (existing already). And secondly, it must hold of the most fundamental laws of nature and of the fundamental constants of nature. Since both cannot have developed according to the extreme fine-tuning in the development of the universe (recall section 3.4.2 above). However, both the creation of the universe and that of fundamental laws and constants are not necessarily willed or caused by God, since they are not consequences of his essence, but of his free will. Thomas Aquinas treats these things as follows: I answer that, We must hold that the will of God is the cause of things; and that He acts by the will, and not, as some have supposed, by a necessity of His nature.� Accordingly as to things willed by God, we must observe that He wills something of absolute necessity: but this is not true of all that He wills. For the divine will has a necessary relation to the divine goodness, since that is its proper object. Hence God wills His own goodness necessarily, even as we will our own happiness necessarily, . . . God wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own goodness as their end. Now in willing an end we do not necessarily will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be attained without them . . . Hence, since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely necessary.�

�.�.� Di�erent Types of Contingency 1. External contingency As has been said already in section 1.5.2 above, all facts of (about) creation are interpreted as contingent. This type of contingency means that in relation to the necessary states of a�airs of God’s essence or in relation to theorems of logic and mathematics, every fact of creation is contingent. We call this type of contingency external contingency. It is expressed by the following theorems which follow from God’s knowledge about his creation: T 127. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gK¬�p) T122 God knows that every fact of creation is not necessary. T 128. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → ¬�p) T127, T37 Every fact of creation is not necessary.

1 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,4. 2 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,3.

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Contingency can be defined in two ways: first, as that which is not necessary. This contingency of creation is already expressed by theorem T128. In a more complete way, contingency can be defined as that which is possible and possible not. Since not necessary is equivalent to possible not this more complete type of contingency is expressed by definition D24: D 24. Cont(p) ↔ (�p ∧ �¬p)

T 129. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → �p) T117 and principle of Modal Logic: p → �p Every fact of creation is possible.

T 130. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → (�p ∧ �¬p)) T128, T129 and principle of Modal Logic: ¬�p ↔ �¬p Every fact of creation is possible and possible not. Alternatively: Every fact of creation is possible but not necessary. T 131. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → Cont(p)) T130, D24 Every fact of creation is contingent.

This external contingency of the facts of creation is also involved in God’s will and God’s causation about creation as expressed in definition D5.2 and theorems T122-123. It is expressed more explicitly by the following theorem T132: T 132. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp) → (gW¬�p ∧ gC¬�p)] T123, T104 Of those facts of creation that God wills it holds that God wills that they do not necessarily occur and God causes them in such a way that they do not necessarily occur. T 133. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (gCp ∨ (∃x∈cr)(gCNp → xCSp))] T123 All facts of (about) creation are either caused by God or by some (or other) creature with God’s help (CN). T 134. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp) → Cont(p)] T131 Those facts of creation that God wills are contingent.

T 135. (∀p)(gCp → Cont(p)) T22, T134 Whatever God causes is contingent.

Observe however that contingent is meant here in relation to the necessity of God’s essence: Whatever is not necessary in the sense of God’s essence or in the sense of theorems of logic or mathematics is contingent in this sense, i.e. externally contingent. 2. Internal Contingency However, inside this type of contingency of creation there is the important di�erence in the ontological status between the laws of nature and the fundamental

90 � 4 God as Creator constants of nature on the one hand and the initial and boundary conditions on the other. In relation to the empirical or natural necessity of the laws of nature the initial and boundary conditions are internally contingent. This holds for both types of laws of nature, for the dynamical and for the statistical laws. On the other hand, the empirical or natural necessity of laws of nature is still an external contingency compared to the absolute necessity of the states of a�airs of God’s essence�. An important feature that dynamical and statistical laws of nature share is their space-time invariance. However, they also share this property with the fundamental constants of nature. The space-time invariance of the laws of nature and the fundamental constants is described by axiom A8 (section 2.4). As has been elaborated in section 3.4.2 (3), the laws of nature seem to be invariant w.r.t. additional changes, which may not hold for the fundamental constants of nature – even though the latter are spatially and omnitemporally necessary, i.e. they hold as long the universe exists. Taking into account these or similar di�erences, especially those between dynamical and statistical laws, which have already been stressed by Aristotle�, Thomas Aquinas writes: Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the universe. Therefore to some e�ects He has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which arise contingent e�ects. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the e�ects willed by God happen contingently, but because God has prepared contingent causes for them, it being His will that they should happen contingently.�

�.�.� Chance and Randomness Thomas Aquinas’ statement “it being His will that they should happen contingently” refers to theorems T131–T135. As has been said already, this refers firstly to the type of external contingency in creation, i.e. as contingent relative to the necessity of God’s essence. Secondly, events which are said to occur by chance or randomly are also internally contingent w.r.t. the necessity of dynamical laws of nature. It 3 For a detailed comparison of dynamical and statistical laws see Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 7. 4 Aristotle (Met), 1027a20: For all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part. 5 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,19,8.

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has been defended elsewhere that chance and randomness in nature are very well compatible with God’s providence, i.e. with his plan concerning creation and in particular concerning our universe. If God has created nature, then he has not ruled everything by dynamical laws since we know that a great part of physics, chemistry, and biology obeys statistical laws but no dynamical laws. But statistical laws allow degrees of freedom and branching for the individual case (for example for the molecules in a gas). For those, then, there are kinds of chance and randomness according to the definitions given elsewhere.� Therefore, if God wills that parts of physical, chemical, and biological systems obey statistical laws, then he also wills chance and randomness according to the definitions mentioned in note 6. But from this it does not follow that God needs to engage his will into every state of a�airs directly. Since he wills the cooperation of creatures (on di�erent levels) and since he wills degrees of freedom and chance and randomness, by creating the world in this way, he can refrain from interfering with his will in some of these events. That is, he can leave them to occur by chance or to be caused or decided by creatures (see section 4.3, 4.3.3 below). In this sense, Aquinas’ quote “to some e�ects he has attached necessary causes, that cannot fail” can be interpreted as dynamical laws that lead to strict predictions without exceptions; moreover “to others defectible and contingent causes” can be interpreted as statistical laws. That all laws of nature are either dynamical laws or statistical laws can also be justified with good reasons.�

�.�.� Facts of Creation Not Necessarily Willed by God As is clear from definition D4 and theorem T15, God necessarily knows, necessarily wills, and necessarily loves whatever belongs to the theorems of God’s essence. This, however, does not hold for God’s will and causation w.r.t. creation, even though it holds for God’s knowledge about creation: God necessarily knows whatever belongs to the theorems of creation. This is the case since by theorem T50, God necessarily knows whatever he knows (see section 2.3). However, God does not necessarily will the facts of creation that he wills, and he does not necessarily cause the facts of creation that he causes. This is expressed by the following theorems:

6 Weingartner (2015b), p. 53�. and 58f. Df 6.4, Df 6.8-6.10. 7 See Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 7, Weingartner (1998).

92 � 4 God as Creator T 136. (∀p)((p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp) → ¬�gWp) T 137. (∀p)(gCp → ¬�gCp)

T123

T22, T104

From theorems T136 and T137 it follows easily that God both wills and not necessarily wills those facts of creation that he wills; and that God both causes and not necessarily causes those facts of creation that he causes. Instead of saying “God wills these facts but not necessarily wills them” we can also say that “God freely wills them”; and instead of saying “God causes these facts but not necessarily causes them” we can say that “God freely causes them”.

�.�.� God as a Necessary and Su�cient Cause The first parts of theorem T123, T132 and T136 describe those facts of creation that are willed by God himself. According to theorem T104, these are the same facts of creation that are caused by God himself (T133, T135 T137). Among causes, one can distinguish between su�cient causes or causes as su�cient conditions and necessary causes or causes as necessary conditions. For those facts of creation that are willed or caused by God himself, God is both a su�cient and a necessary cause. Thus, God’s causation C in ‘gCp’ can be defined as being both a su�cient and a necessary cause: D 25. gCp ↔ (gCSp ∧ gCNp)

gCSp . . . God is a su�cient cause for p gCNp . . . God is a necessary cause for p

T 138. (∀p)(gCp → gCSp) D25 Whatever God causes himself God causes as a su�cient cause.

T 139. (∀p)(gCp → gCNp) D25 Whatever God causes himself God causes as a necessary cause.

According to theorem T104, the definiens of D25 is equivalent to God’s will w.r.t. facts of creation: T 140. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (gWp ↔ (gCSp ∧ gCNp))]

D25, T104

Being a su�cient cause means that the cause is su�cient for bringing about the e�ect. In case of creatures and especially humans, we know that they are hardly ever su�cient causes in a complete sense: since there are many other – usually unknown – conditions (called ceteris paribus conditions) that have to be fulfilled

4.3 Facts Willed but Not Necessarily Willed by God � 93

to produce the e�ect (see section 4.4.1 below). This does not hold, however, for God as an omnipotent being. For God to be a su�cient cause means to be completely su�cient to bring about the e�ect. Thus, it must hold that if God is a su�cient cause that p obtains, then p obtains. Moreover, it follows from theorem T22 that whatever God causes obtains as a fact of creation since God only has a causal relation to his creation and not to himself (see section 1.6.1 above). This also holds for God’s being a su�cient cause since it means that he is completely su�cient to bring about the e�ect. Thus, according to this consideration, the following axiom A14 is justified: A 14. (∀p)(gCSp → p ε T(CR)) If God is a su�cient cause for the fact that p obtains, then p belongs to the facts of (about) creation. Axiom A14 can also be defended thus: according to theorem T22, it holds that if God causes that p occurs, then p belongs to the theorems of (about) creation: gCp → p ε T(CR). Since gCp ↔ (gCSp ∧ gCNp) by definition D25 it follows that: gCSp → p ε T(CR) or gCNp → p ε T(CR). The second part cannot be true; from it, it would follow by theorem T117 that gCNp → p. This, however, does not hold for God as a necessary cause; for in this case as a necessary cause, he may leave the partially su�cient causation to be done by creatures though providing them with many necessary conditions as being a necessary cause (see sections 4.4 and 4.5 below). Thus, it follows that the first part of the above disjunction is true, and that is axiom A14. T 141. (∀p)(gCSp → p) A14, T117 Whatever God causes as a su�cient cause obtains. �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Ge 1,1). He made the moon to mark the seasons and the sun knows when to go down (Ps 104,19). How many are your works Lord! In wisdom you made them all, the earth is full of your creatures (Ps 104,24). This is what the Lord says – the creator of the heavens, who stretches them out, who spreads out the earth with all that springs from it, who gives breath to its people, and life to those who walk on it . . . (Isa 42,5). How could things be lasting if you did not will them to be so or how could things be preserved if they were not called by you (Wisd 11, 25). In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning. Through him all things were made; without him nothing was

94 � 4 God as Creator made that has been made (Jn 1,1-3). By faith we understand that the universe was formed at God’s command, so that what is seen was not made out of what was visible (Heb 11, 3). Of God’s own free will he gave us birth . . . (Jas 1,18).

Florence (1442): [The Holy Roman Church] most firmly believes, professes and proclaims that the one true God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, who when he so willed, out of his bounty made all creatures, spiritual as well as corporeal. They are good since they were made by him who is the highest good, but they are mutable because they were made out of nothing. (ND408; D1333). Cologne(1860): Even if God necessarily wills his own goodness it does not follow from this that he necessarily wills those things that he wills because of his goodness; since his goodness can be without other things. (NR305). Vatican(1870): If anyone refuses to confess that the world and all things contained in it, the spiritual as well as the material, were in their whole substance produced by God out of nothing; or says that God created not by an act of will free from all necessity, but with the same necessity by which he necessarily loves himself; or denies that the world was made for the glory of God, anathema sit. (ND418; D3025).

�.� Cooperation of Creatures God’s will with respect to creatures is described by definition D21 and theorem T124: for some facts of creation, either 1. God wills (causes) that creatures cause (pt-su�ciently) that p – gWxCSp – (by T104 also gCxCSp) or 2. If God wills (gives) the capability for (to) creature x, then God wills that x should cause pt-su�ciently that p obtains (i.e. that x has the task to bring about that p).

�.�.� Causal Relations of Creatures As has been shown in section 4.3.4 above, God causes the facts of (about) creation that he himself wills in the sense of both a su�cient and a necessary causation. However, God also wills the cooperation of creatures, and therefore he has given them the dignity of causality; in this sense, he entrusts and invites creatures to contribute to the happenings and development of the universe. As Kurt Gödel puts it,

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God created things in such a way that they themselves can create something.�

In the case that God wills that creatures cause (bring about successfully) some state of a�airs (represented by) p, God does not act as a su�cient cause for bringing about p, but only as a necessary cause, leaving the su�cient causation to a considerable extent, or least its ability, to creatures. If we say that some creature x is a su�cient cause for some state of a�airs p (xCSp), then this has to be interpreted with care. Strictly speaking, no creature can be a su�cient cause for any state of a�airs p to obtain if “su�cient” means including exhaustively all preconditions needed for the occurrence of p. For example, merely striking a match is not su�cient for its burning, nor is a measles-infection alone su�cient for the outbreak of the illness. One says it is su�cient under normal conditions or including ceteris paribus conditions. In this sense, a judge in court convicts someone for a shooting because it is interpreted as a su�cient cause for killing the person under normal conditions. Strictly speaking, these conditions are endless, including for instance that the person striking the match or the virus causing the infection does not die in that moment or that laws of nature are preserved . . . etc. We shall not go into these problems, but it su�ces to say that su�cient causation of creatures means a severe restriction and selection in the sense of pars pro toto: it takes for granted an immense number of normal conditions and hidden preconditions which have been preserved. In many cases, therefore, when we speak of causes, it is more adequate to speak of causal factors only which are neither su�cient nor necessary. For example, in many cases when making a medical diagnosis, the conjectured causes are causal factors but not su�cient causes.� A theory which comes close to a description and explanation of a complete su�cient cause is the Special Theory of Relativity (SR). It unifies Maxwell’s Theory (which in itself unifies electricity, magnetism, and optics) with an adaptation (by Lorentz-Transformation) of Classical Mechanics. According to its Minkowski spacetime structure, all events of the past light cone together are a su�cient cause for the events in the future light cone. This su�cient cause is complete in the sense that any future event is caused, not just by some past event, but by all events of the past going back indefinitely in time. However, even this kind of completeness is restricted: it does not hold for quantum-mechanical events, it does not hold for the huge area that is the part of physical events which obey statistical laws (such as 8 Gödel (MPh), 4X. The second occurrence of ‘create’ is not meant as creation out of nothing, but out of something already there. 9 A theory of causality that distinguishes 3 types of su�cient causes, one type of necessary cause, and one type of causal factor has been proposed in Weingartner (2016). It is based on a decidable 6-valued propositional logic with relevance properties.

96 � 4 God as Creator thermodynamical events or events of radiation, di�usion, friction, osmosis which are important in biology), and in addition it does not hold for events of acceleration and gravitation, since they are not included in SR but only in GR. Concerning GR (General Relativity), and concerning the causal relations among creatures in general, the following remark should be made: in 1949, Kurt Gödel proved that there are solutions of Einstein’s field equations of GR that allow a universe which does not expand and has closed time-like geodesics. That our universe is not such a universe was shown by the, nowadays very well confirmed, empirical fact that our universe expands (and that its expansion rate even increases). A universe with closed time-like geodesics would violate the chronology condition of space-time as a necessary condition for causality;�� consequently, it would allow travel into one’s own past. Generally speaking, such a situation is not new since it has been well-known for decades, if not centuries, that there are mathematically consistent models of the universe which are not realized physically. This means that the causal relations�� which are realized in our universe all satisfy the chronology condition of space-time which does not allow closed time-like geodesics. The mathematical possibility of time travelling into the (and one’s own) past has led to a plethora of non-scientific debates that persist until the present day. What is usually neglected is that Gödel took Einsteins’s remark towards him seriously that his solution of 1949 was physically useless: in 1952, Gödel proved that there exist solutions of Einstein’s field equations that satisfy the chronology condition and allow for an expanding universe. Because of these considerations, we shall understand su�cient cause among creatures in a restricted and weak sense only, viz. not as exhaustively including all preconditions; and consequently, no principle of the form (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(xCSp → p) can be accepted as an axiom since exhaustively completing all the preconditions would ultimately require including even the existence of the universe with its fundamental laws and fundamental constants plus an uncountable number of initial conditions. These facts suggest that the exhaustive incorporation of all preconditions for a cause to be completely su�cient surpasses the ability of every creature. Therefore we must include the support of God – not as a su�cient cause, but as a necessary cause in the sense of an underlying preserving precondition

10 Hawking and Ellis (1973), p. 189. Gödel (1949), Gödel (1952). 11 It has to be stressed that di�erent causal relations are realized in our universe (see section 2.5.2, 2. above).

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for the causes of every creature which are only partially su�cient�� to bring about their e�ects. The respective Bible passage explaining this is: Apart from me you can do nothing (Jn 15,5).

Although the context (vine, vine dresser) refers first to the apostles and then to Christians and religious believers, it also seems to be directed to all creatures who got the dignity of causality, but in such a way as to be dependent on God as a necessary precondition for everything they can do. God’s inclusion is expressed by the following axiom A15: A 15. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(xCSp → (gCNp → p ε T(CR)))

Creature x is a pt-su�cient cause for p as a fact of creation under the condition that God is a necessary cause for p.

T 142. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)((xCSp ∧ gCNp) → p ε T(CR)) A15 If creature x is a pt-su�cient cause for p and God is a necessary cause for p then p is a fact of creation. T 143. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)((xCSp ∧ gCNp) → p) T142, T117 If x is a pt-su�cient cause for p and God is a necessary cause for p then p obtains.

Observe that the terms ‘C’, ‘CS’, ‘CN’, ‘A’ for causes that, su�ciently causes that (or: is a su�cient cause for), necessarily causes that (or: is a necessary cause for), acts that have a di�erent meaning when applied to some creature from when applied to God. The di�erence, however, is not just a bold equivocation but consists in a certain analogy. More accurately, the analogy is a type of analogy by proportionality which can be defined by certain relations between two relations. For example if “God is a su�cient cause that p occurs” and “creature x is a su�cient cause that p occurs” are the two relations A and B, then the relations between “completely su�cient” of A and “partially su�cient” of B is one analogy relation, and the relation between “exhaustively su�cient” of A and “su�cient under the condition of God being a necessary cause” of B is another analogy relation. Other, more general analogy relations are those between the irreflexivity of A to that of B or between the asymmetry of A to that of B.��

12 We shall subsequently abbreviate “partially su�cient cause” with “pt-su�cient cause”. If the symbol ‘x’ representing “creature x” is followed by ‘CS’, then the latter always represents: pt-su�cient cause. This also refers to definition D21 and theorems T123–125. 13 For more on analogy see Bochenski (1948) and Weingartner (1979) and (1999).

98 � 4 God as Creator �.�.� God Wills the Cooperation of Creatures God created things in such a way that they themselves can create something”��

According to theorem T123 (second part) and T133, if God does not himself cause, he employs creatures to cause facts of creation, and according to theorem T124 God wills the cooperation by willing (and causing) their causal activity or that they should fulfil their causal task when giving them the capability to cause. This is expressed by the following theorems: T 144. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ ¬gCp) → (∃x∈cr)(gCNp → xCSp)] T133 Every fact of (about) creation that God does not cause is caused pt-su�ciently by some creature with God’s help as a necessary cause. T 145. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)[(xCSp ∧ gCNp ∧ ¬gCp) → (p ε T(CR) ∧ ¬gCSp)] A15, D25 If creature x causes pt-su�ciently that p and God supports that by being a necessary cause for the occurrence of p but does not cause that p then p is a fact of creation (creatures) and God is not a su�cient cause for the occurrence of p. Recall that gCp (God causes that p occurs) is defined by definition D25 as gCSp ∧ gCNp (God is a su�cient cause and a necessary cause for p to obtain). Negating gCp (i.e. ¬gCp) means that ¬gCNp ∨ ¬gCSp, i.e. gCNp → ¬gCSp. Similarly to axiom A15, theorem T145 shows the cooperation of creatures as follows: With the help of God as a necessary cause (gCNp), creatures can cause pt-su�ciently facts of creation (creatures) that God does not cause su�ciently.

T 146. (∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[p ε T(CR) ∧ (gCxCSp ∨ (gCxCCSp → gWxSCSp))] T124, T104 For all creatures it holds concerning some facts p of creation: God causes that creatures cause (pt-su�ciently) that p obtains or if God causes their capability to cause then God wills that creatures should cause (fulfil the task to cause) that p obtains. (cf. the passage in Genesis 1,11–12, 4.4.4 below). T 147. (∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[p ε T(CR) ∧ (xCSp ∨ (gCxCCSp → xSCSp))] T146, T92, T86 For all creatures x it holds concerning some facts p of creation: Creature x causes pt-su�ciently that p obtains or if God causes the capability of x to cause then x should cause (fulfil the task to cause) that p obtains. For both, T146 and T147, recall the remarks on the fourth part of axiom A13 in section 4.2. 14 Gödel (MPh), 4X.

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Observe however that in all cases in which a fact of creation occurs (p ε T(CR)), God is involved at least as a necessary cause as axiom A17 below states. T 148. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gWxCSp → xCSp)

T86

T 149. (∀p)(∀x∈r)(gCxCSp → xCSp) T92 If God wills (causes) that creature x causes (in the sense of a pt-su�cient cause) that p is the case then creature x does so; i.e. God’s will or God’s causation w.r.t. creatures is fulfilled. Observe that from this will (or cause) of God, it does not follow that p is the case since xCSp is not su�cient to bring about that p obtains. It is only su�cient in conjunction with God as a necessary cause (cf. axiom A15). Therefore, the following theorems hold: T 150. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)((gWxCSp ∧ gCNp) → p)

T148, T143

T 151. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)((gCxCSp ∧ gCNp) → p) T149, T143 If God wills (causes) that creature x causes (pt-su�ciently) that p and God is a necessary cause for p then p obtains. Observe that despite theorems T148 and T149, neither does God will that p (gWp) follows from God wills that creature x causes (pt-su�cient) that p (gWxCSp) nor does God cause that p (gCp) follows from God causes that creature x causes ptsu�cient that p (gCxCSp). Theorems T148 and T149 are instances of theorems T86 and T92 which say that God’s will (or God’s causation) is always fulfilled. It is fulfilled in the sense that creature x in fact causes that p in the sense of a partially su�cient cause. But from this it does not follow that God himself, by his will or by his causation, brings about that p is the case since if he wills (causes) that creatures cause, then he leaves it to the creatures to contribute by their causing that p, accepting creatures as his coadjutors because he does not do it by himself (cf. section 4.3.4). Therefore, it holds that if God wills (causes) that creature x causes (CS) that p obtains, and p obtains, then God’s relation to the occurrence of p is not that of a su�cient and necessary cause but only that of a necessary cause, leaving the pt-su�cient causation to creatures. Theorems T150 and T151 show that only if we explicitly add God’s necessary causation does the contribution of creatures lead to the obtaining fact. T 152. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gWxCCSp → xCCSp)

T86

T 153. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gCxCCSp → xCCSp) T92 Whatever God wills (causes) that creatures can cause (pt-sufficiently) they can cause.

100 � 4 God as Creator Similarly, by theorems T152 and T153, God’s will (causation) is fulfilled in the sense that creatures can cause that p obtains. But he leaves it to creatures whether they use their ability to in fact cause in the pt-su�cient sense that p is the case. In this case God’s relation to the occurrence of p is not that of a su�cient and necessary cause either, but only that of a necessary cause. In analogy to axiom A10 (cf. section 3.4), we say that for creatures it also holds that what they cause (in any sense of causing), they can cause. This is just based on the principle of Modal Logic that possibility follows from factuality: p → �p. Although we do not only mean a logical possibility by can cause, but a factual ability, the relation is analogous: the ability to act follows from factual acting. In this sense, we assume axiom 16: A 16. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(xCSp → xCCSp)

If creature x causes (in the sense of a pt-su�cient cause) that p is the case then creature x can cause (in the sense of a pt-su�cient cause) that p is the case. Or: Whatever x causes, x can cause. T 154. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gWxCSp → xCCSp)

A16, T148

T 155. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gCxCSp → xCCSp) A16, T149 Whatever God wills (causes) that creatures cause (as a pt-su�cient cause) they can cause (as a pt-su�cient cause). Observe that God’s will also includes his permission since he permits whatever he wills (theorem T97) and God wills or God permits whatever is the case (theorem T100). Therefore, it holds that whatever belongs to God’s will w.r.t. creatures he permits to be caused by creatures i.e. by secondary causes. T 156. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gWxCSp → gPxCSp) T97 If God wills creatures to cause (pt-su�ciently) certain states of a�airs then God permits them to cause.

�.�.� God’s Will and God’s Commands w.r.t. Men The cooperation of humans is included in the cooperation of creatures in general. Thus, God’s will w.r.t. creatures also applies to men as creatures. But there is a special, additional task for men by God’s will: humans should live – by their free will and conscious free will decisions – according to God’s Commands; or in other words, men should will freely and act freely according to God’s Commands. In order to do that, God has given to men a natural inclination as a precondition for what men should will and should do. This is expressed by definition D22 (cf. 4.1):

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(∀x∈�)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp) for those p that belong to the theorems of God’s will w.r.t. men: T 157. (∃p)[p ε T(g-Will w.r.t. men) → (∀x∈�)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp)]

A13, D22

For some states of a�airs p belonging to God’s will w.r.t. men, God wills that men will that p and God wills that men act in such a way that p obtains. This holds for all states of a�airs towards which humans have a natural inclination. Firstly, men have a natural inclination to strive for happiness; i.e. humans want (will) to be happy and act in such a way as to reach that goal. Since they do not do this by a decision of free will but by natural inclination, God has made sure by his will that humans possess this inclination; that is, God wills that person x wills to be happy and God wills that person x acts in such a way as to reach happiness. Since God’s will is always fulfilled (theorem T86), it follows that in fact every human person x wills to be happy (xWp) and acts in such a way as to be happy (xAp). Observe however that from this it does not follow that human will is always fulfilled or that human actions are always successful, reaching their goal: We do not have general axioms or theorems that claim that “if p describes a state of happiness then every human reaches p by his will and actions”. Although it holds that every human wills – in the sense of desires or strives for – his/her happiness and acts in order to achieve his/her happiness, he (she) nevertheless does not always obtain it (at least not in this life). Secondly, this holds not only for happiness but also for other natural goods to which humans have a natural inclination; first, for natural goods that humans have in common with all living creatures, as survival and health. Secondly, also for such natural goods as are specific for humans as increasing knowledge. Thus, Aristotle seems to be right by his first sentence of his metaphysics (980a): All men by nature desire to know.

We may interpret this under normal conditions, i.e. excluding exceptional cases like mentally ill people. Moreover, we may relativize it to abilities and interests in the following sense: Under normal human conditions all men by nature desire to know and to increase their knowledge according to their abilities and interests. Observe moreover that from (∀x∈�)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp) it does not follow that God wills or causes p (gWp; gCp) because gWp and gCp is understood as a necessary and su�cient condition for that what is willed or caused. However, it holds that God is still a cause for men’s will and actions in the sense of a necessary condition since he preserves the world besides many other preconditions for human life (see 4.4.1 above and axiom A17, 4.5.1 below). The last

102 � 4 God as Creator part of axiom A13 and of definition D23 are concerned with God’s Commands, that is with God’s will what men should will and should do (act): T 158. (∃p)[Op ε (g-Commands) → (∀x∈�)(gWxSWp ∧ gWxSAp)] A13, D23 For some states of a�airs p belonging to God’s Commands (w.r.t. men), God wills that men should will that p and God wills that men should act in such a way that p obtains. As has been pointed out in section 3.1 above, expressions like “God wills that men obey his ten commandments” are not formulated in a correct way since they lack the term “should” or “ought”; similar with “your will be done” in the Pater Noster. Since God’s will is always fulfilled (theorem T86, section 3.2) men would always obey God’s commandments which is of course not the case. Thus the meaning of “your will be done” is that God’s will should be satisfied in general and concerning men’s free actions in particular. Similarly “God wills that men obey his Ten Commandments” means “God wills that men should (ought to) obey his Ten Commandments”. From theorems T157 and T158, one can also derive their respective consequentparts with the help of theorem T121 and the last parts of axiom A13: (∃p)(∀x ∈ �)(gWxWp ∧ gWxAp) and (∃p)(∀x ∈ �)(gWxSWp ∧ gWxSAp) where the first refers to man’s natural inclination according to natural law and the second refers to man’s task to obey God’s commands. This has been done already in theorem T125. It seems, however that theorems T157 and T158 express more completely what has to be said, as they explicitly incorporate God’s will and God’s Commands w.r.t. men in their antecedents. In medieval philosophy the contributions of creatures in the development of the universe were called secondary causes or intermediate causes or inferior causes. In this sense, Thomas Aquinas writes: The will of God, as it is the first and universal cause, does not exclude intermediate causes that have power to produce certain e�ects. Since, however, all intermediate causes are inferior in power to the first cause, there are many things in the divine power, knowledge and will that are not included in the order of inferior causes . . . . And God wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior cause a thing shall happen; but in the order of the higher cause it shall not happen; or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that God sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior causes, as of nature, or merit, which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher cause.�� Two things belong to providence – namely, the type of the order of things foreordained towards the end; and the execution of this order, which is called government . . . . As to the

15 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,7, ad2.

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second there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in his power, but by reason of the abundance of his goodness, so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.�� One is said to be helped by another in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as he receives power from him: and to be helped thus belongs to the weak; but this cannot be said of God, and thus we are to understand, Who hath helped the Spirit of the Lord? In another way one is said to be helped by a person through whom he carries out his work, as a master through a servant. In this way God is helped by us; inasmuch as we execute His orders, according to 1 Cor. iii. 9: We are God’s coadjutors. Nor is this on account of any defect in the power of God, but because He employs intermediary causes, in order that the beauty of order may be preserved in the universe; and also that He may communicate to creatures the dignity of causality.��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents Then God said ‘Let the land produce vegetation: seed-bearing plants and trees on the land that bear fruit with seed in it, according to their various kinds’. And it was so. The land produced vegetation: plants bearing seed according to their kinds and trees bearing fruit with seed in it according to their kinds. (Ge 1,11-12) God blessed them and said ‘Be fruitful and increase in number and fill the water in the seas and let the birds increase on the earth’. (Ge 1,22). Then God said ‘Let us make mankind in our image in our likeness, so that they may rule over the fish in the sea and the birds in the sky, over the livestock and all the wild animals, and over all the creatures that move along the ground’ (Ge 1,26). God blessed them and said to them ‘Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it’ (Ge 1,28). What is mankind that you are mindful of them, human beings that you care for them? You have made them a little lower than the angels and crowned them with glory and honor. You made them rulers over the work of your hands; you put everything under their feet: all flocks and herds, and the animals of the wild, the birds in the sky, and the fish in the sea, all that swim the paths of the seas (Ps 8,4-8). For it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good purpose (Php 2,13). Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them (Ro 2,14-15). When you sow, you do not plant the body that will be, but just a seed, perhaps of wheat or of something else. But God gives it a body as he has determined, and to each kind of seed he gives its own body (1Co 15,37-38).

16 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22,3. 17 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 23,8, ad2.

104 � 4 God as Creator Vatican II (1965): Considered in itself, human activity, individual and collective – all that tremendous e�ort which people have made throughout the centuries to better their living conditions – is in keeping with God’s design. Human beings, created in God’s image, were given the mandate to subject the earth and all it contains, and to rule the world in justice an holiness; acknowledging God as the creator of all things, they were to refer to him their own person and all creation; and thus, by the subjection of all things to them, the name of God would be wonderful in all the earth (ND422/34; D4334). Vatican II (1965): [. . . ] If by the autonomy of earthly realities we understand that created things and societies have their own laws and values which the human person must gradually come to know, use and organise, then it is altogether right to demand that autonomy; it is not only requested by people of our day but is also in concordance with the will of the Creator. It is by virtue of their very creation that all things are provided with a stability, truth and goodness of their own, with their own laws and order. People must respect all this, while acknowledging the methods proper to each science or art. Consequently, if methodical research in any branch of learning is carried out in a truly scientific manner, and in keeping with the norms of morality, it will never really conflict with the faith, because both secular things and the realities of faith derive from the same God [. . . ] (ND423/36; D4336).

�.� God as a Necessary and Conserving Cause of Creation �.�.� God as a Necessary Cause Axiom A17 below postulates that God is a necessary cause for everything that happens in creation, but he is not a su�cient cause for everything that happens in creation. Assume the contrary: that God is a su�cient cause for everything that happens in creation. Then, since moral evils happen in creation, God would be a su�cient cause of all moral evils, and consequently he would be an inconsistent God: being all-good (recall theorem T1) and causing moral evil; requiring humans to freely fulfil his moral commands (recall section 4.4.3 D23 and T158) on the one hand and preventing their free decisions by interfering with his causation on the other. Since this is impossible for a perfect being (cf. definition D7 and theorem T17), God cannot be a su�cient cause for everything that happens in creation. Therefore, all definitions or descriptions of God as a su�cient cause for everything or as a su�cient reason for everything lead to an inconsistent God and are untenable. Although such definitions and descriptions are frequent and widespread in the domain of philosophy of religion, they can hardly be interpreted in a consistent

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way. An exception may be a very weak interpretation of su�cient reason in the sense of necessary cause. However, it is possible that God is a necessary cause for everything that happens in creation. This can be shown as follows: 1. For those facts (represented by) p that God wills directly, i.e. for which it holds that (gWp ∧ ¬�gWp ∧ gW¬�p) or respectively (gCp ∧ ¬�gCp ∧ gC¬�p), God’s will (or his causation) is a su�cient cause and a cause as a su�cient condition and a necessary cause and a cause as a necessary condition for the fact represented by p according to T86 and T92. In addition, God is a su�cient cause and a cause as a su�cient condition and a necessary cause and a cause as a necessary condition for the contingency of all facts of (about) creation according to theorems T134, T135 and T22. The expressions su�cient cause and cause as a su�cient condition or necessary cause and cause as a necessary condition have to be distinguished as follows: gCp says that God is a cause for p, which means according to definition D25 that God is both a su�cient and a necessary cause for p. The implication gCp → p says that if God causes that p, then p obtains; here, the antecedent gCp is – logically speaking – a su�cient condition for the consequent p but ontologically speaking a su�cient cause for p. It holds in general that if some agent or some event is a su�cient cause for p, then the agent’s or event’s causing that p is also a su�cient condition for p, but not vice versa since the causal relation is stronger than the logical relation. Analogously, it holds that if some agent or some event is a necessary cause for p, then their causing that p is also a necessary condition for p, but not vice versa��. Thus, in p ε T(CR) → gCNp gCNp is – logically speaking – a necessary condition for the antecedent that p is a fact of creation, whereas gCNp says that God is a necessary cause for p. 2. Those facts of (about) creation that are not caused directly by God, are caused at least partially by creatures. As has been shown in section 4.4.1 however, no creature can be a su�cient cause for any state of a�airs p to obtain if “su�cient” means including exhaustively all preconditions needed for the occurrence of p. These preconditions go ultimately back to the fundamental laws and constants of nature and in fact to the conservation of the whole universe. For these preconditions – underlying every fact of (about) creation that is not directly willed (caused) by God—, a necessary but not su�cient cause is needed. This is what is stated in axiom A17. A 17. (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCNp)

18 For a system of di�erent causal relations between events or states in which these are provable theorems, see Weingartner (2016).

106 � 4 God as Creator For all facts of (about) creation God is (at least) a necessary cause T 159. (∀p)(gCp → p ε T(CR)) T22 Whatever God causes is a fact of (about) creation.

Theorem T159 and axiom A17 complement each other. Observe, however, the following important point: although p is a fact of (about) creation – according to p ε T(CR) – gCp and gCNp are not facts of (about) creation. In general, any complex fact where God is involved as an active part cannot be a fact of creation simply because an activity of God is not a fact of (about) creation. Thus, gWxCSp, gCxCSp, gCNxCSp, gWxSWp, gWxSAp . . . etc. cannot be facts of (about) creation. Therefore, gCp, gCNp, gCSp . . . and the above-mentioned statements cannot become true instances of p in p ε T(CR): any such substitution would make p ε T(CR) necessarily false. However, we may say that the above mentioned facts belong to God’s relation to creation. T 160. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(gCxCSp → gCNxCSp) T139 If God causes creature x to cause pt-su�ciently that p occurs, then God is a necessary cause for x’s causing. T 161. (∀p)(gCSp → gCNp) A14, A17 For whatever God is a su�cient cause, he is also a necessary cause.

T 162. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)((xCSp) ε T(CR) → gCNxCSp) A17 If the fact that creature x is a pt-su�cient cause belongs to the theorems of creation then God is a necessary cause for this fact. T 163. (∀p)(p ε T(U) → gCNp) A17, D6 For every fact of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

T 164. (∀p)(p ε T(OC) → gCNp) A17, D6 For every fact about other creation (besides the universe), God is a necessary cause. T 165. (∀p)(p ε T-Law(U) → gCNp) T163, D14 For every true law of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

T 166. (∀p)(p ε T-State(U) → gCNp) T163, D14 For every occurring state of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

T 167. (∀p)(p ε T-Init(U) → gCNp) T163, D14 For every occurring initial state of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

T 168. (∀p)(p ε T-Const(U) → gCNp) T163, D14 For every fundamental constant of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

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T 169. (∀p)(p ε T-Event(U) → gCNp) T163, D14 For every occurring event of the universe, God is a necessary cause.

As has been said already in section 4.3.4 above, those facts for which God is a necessary cause but not a su�cient one, he has left it up to creatures to bring them about as his coadjutors by acting as partially su�cient causes. Thus, it cannot hold that gCNp → p because in this case God would do everything by himself leaving no causal activity and free decisions to his creatures. Moreover, God as a necessary cause leaves enough room for evolution in all domains of the universe since all evolutionary changes and stages are executed by God’s creatures as partially su�cient causes.

�.�.� God as a Cause of Conservation For a suitable definition of God’s Conservation, the following points have to be observed: 1. Since his conservation is a type of causing and all his causing is concerned with creation and not with himself (i.e. not with his essence or existence etc.), it follows that all his conservation is concerned with creation. That means if God conserves a state of a�airs p, then p is a fact of (about) creation. 2. Although God is a necessary cause for everything that happens in creation and of creatures (axiom A17), God does not conserve everything that happens in creation or of creatures. For example, God does not conserve occurring moral evil. Therefore, his conservation must be restricted to those facts of (about) creation that he wills. 3. Conservation is concerned with time in the sense that something is conserved for a certain amount of time. Since God conserves only those facts of (about) creation that he wills, his will determines the time of conservation he gives to some creature. These considerations lead to the following axiom: A 18. (∀t)(∀p)[gCVp t → [p t ε T(CR) ∧ (gCNp t → gWp t )]]

If God conserves that p at t is the case, then p at t is a fact of (about) creation, and if God is a necessary cause for p occurring at time t, then God wills that p occurs at time t (where t is a point of time or a time-interval belonging to a reference frame of the universe or a reference frame of other creatures). In other words: God conserves those facts of creation at time t (or through time-interval t) for which it holds that

108 � 4 God as Creator he wills them to occur at time t (or through time-interval t) under the condition that he is a necessary cause for them at time t (or through time-interval t). Observe that when instantiating “creature x commits a moral evil” for “p t ”, gWp t becomes false although gCNp t is true according to axiom A17. Therefore, the right part of A18 is false, and thus it is false that God conserves moral evil. T 170. (∀t)(∀p)[gCVp t → ((p t ε T(CR) ∧ gCNp t ) → gWp t )] A18 Whatever God conserves at (through) time (interval) t, he wills under the condition that it belongs to creation and that he is a necessary cause for it. T 171. (∀p)(gCVp → p ε T(CR)) A18 Whatever God conserves is a fact of (about) creation.

T 172. (∀p)(gCVp → gCNp) T171, A17 For whatever God conserves, God is a necessary cause. T 173. (∀p)(gCVp → (gCNp → gWp))

A18

T 174. (∀p)(gCVp → gWp) T173, T172 Whatever God conserves, he wills

T 175. (∀t)(∀p)(gCVp t → gWp t ) T174, A18 Whatever God conserves at some time t (or for some time-interval t), he wills to be at this time t (or for this time interval t) T 176. (∀p)(p ε T(U) → (p ε T(CR) ∧ gCNp)) D6, T163 If p is a fact of the universe, then p is a fact of creation and God is a necessary cause for it T 177. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ gCNp ∧ ¬gWp) → ¬gCVp] T170 Facts of creation (for which God is a necessary cause) that God does not will are not conserved by him. T 178. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ (gCNp → gWp) ∧ (p ε T(CR) → gCNp)) → (p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp)] Prop. Logic

T 179. (∀p)(gCVp → gCp) A18, A17, T178, T22 Whatever God conserves he causes. Observe that the opposite does not hold. God caused the Big Bang but did not conserve it. T 180. (∀t)(∀p)(gCVp t → gCp t ) T179, A18 Whatever God conserves at time or at time-interval t God causes at time or at time-interval t The time-index in theorem T180 as in A18 and T170 refers to a reference system in creation: that is either a reference system of the universe or one of other creatures

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outside the universe. Since time is a measure of change, there is time whenever there is change. This is familiar to us from the types of change in our universe. But also other creatures outside the universe (for example angels) are not completely immutable and as eternal as God is (cf. section 1.9 above). That means that in so far as there is some change in them, there must be time. And in this sense, we may speak of a reference system of time for other creatures in analogy to reference systems as we know them of our universe. God as a necessary cause and as a cause of conservation for his creation is described by Augustine and by Thomas Aquinas: If the ruling power of God were withdrawn from his creatures, their nature would at once cease, and all nature would collapse.�� Secondly, a thing is said to preserve another per se and directly, namely, when what is preserved depends on the preserver in such a way that it cannot exist without it. In this manner all creatures need to be preserved by God.�� For the creature needs to be preserved by God in so far as the being of an e�ect depends on the cause of its being.”�� Therefore that God gives existence to a creature depends on His will; nor does He preserve things in existence otherwise than by continually pouring out existence into them, as we have said. Therefore, just as before things existed, God was free not to give them existence and not to make them; so after they have been made He is free not to continue their existence; and thus they would cease to exist.��

Thomas Aquinas supports this passage by quoting Psalm 135,6: The Lord does whatever pleases him, in the heavens and on the earth.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents God saw all that he had made, and it was very good (Ge 1,31). I know that everything God does will endure forever; nothing can be added to it and nothing taken from it (Ecc 3,14). For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made: for thou didst not appoint, or make any thing hating it. And how could any thing endure, if thou wouldst not? or be preserved, if not called by thee? (Wisd 11,25-26). Are not five sparrows sold for two pennies? Yet not one of them is forgotten by God. Indead the very hairs of your head are all numbered. Don’t be afraid; you are worth more than many sparrows (Lk 12,6-7). 19 20 21 22

Augustine (De Gen), 4,12. Cf. also 5,20; 8,12; 9,15. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 104,1. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 104,1, ad 2. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 104,3.

110 � 4 God as Creator My father is always at his work to this very day, and I too am working (Jn 5,17). He is before all things and in him all things hold together (Col 1,17). The Son is the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word (Heb 1,3).

Rome(382): Anyone who denies that there are three true persons, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, equal, living eternally, containing all things visible and invisible, all-powerful, judging, creating and saving all things, is a heretic (ND306,21; D173). Lateran(649): If anyone does not, according to the holy Fathers confess truly and properly the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity, that is, one God in three consubstantial hypostases equal in glory; and for the three one and the same Godhead, nature, essence (ousia), power, Lordship, kingship, authority, will, action (energeia) and sovereignty; uncreated, without beginning, infinite, immutable, creator of all beings and holding them together in his providence, let him be condemned (ND627,1; D501).

�.� God’s Providence If God is the creator of the universe (and of other creatures) – theorem T121 and axiom A13—, then he must have knowledge of (about) the universe (T47-T49, D6). And moreover, if he is omniscient (T36, A6), he must have complete knowledge of (about) the universe (T40, T56-T74). If God is the creator of the universe (and of other creatures), he must have will concerning the universe. (D5.2, D21, D22, T123-T125). Although we do not and did not rule out other creatures (like angels) – therefore we speak of creatures in general in expressions as ∀x∈cr or p ε T(CR) – we only have access to scientific knowledge about the creatures of our universe. In this sense, ‘creature’ refers first and foremost to creatures of our universe and might only be extended by analogy and with great care to other creatures. God has will concerning the universe – not only as free (not necessary) will to create it, but also as the will concerning the many di�erent details and properties of the universe (T132-T158). Since every action of will has an intention towards some goal, God’s will concerning creation has certain goals. Now every rational being that is acting with his knowledge and his will towards goals possesses a plan for his actions. In an analogous way we have to say that God possesses a plan for his creation, not only that it comes into existence and not only as a whole but also for its development and also for the details. And in so far as his will has certain goals, his plan incorporates

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his will and knowledge concerning creation with which he directs his creation and creatures to certain goals. This plan according to which God guides and directs his creation and creatures to certain goals is called providence. Therefore, it is necessary to attribute providence to God under the assumption that he has created the world (universe). God cannot order himself towards an end because he is the ultimate end. For in God Himself there can be nothing ordered towards an end, since He is the last end.��

And furthermore, God cannot order logical or mathematical truths or conceptual entities towards an end since these entities do not have an end. On the other hand, creatures and creation as a whole have an end. Therefore, providence is concerned with creatures and with creation. However, that God acts according to his plan concerning the development and evolution of the universe does not mean that he executes everything himself. Likewise, a king, although he possesses a plan for his government, delegates many things concerning the execution of the plan to his servants. Thus, the plan of God concerning the universe is solely his own work. Concerning the execution of the plan, however, he delegates many things to his creatures by giving them the power of causality and higher abilities to contribute respectively to the development and evolution of the universe.�� (T144-T158, T160, T162; D21).

�.�.� Definition of Providence D 26. p ε T(g-Prov) ↔ (p ε T(g-Plan) ∨ p ε T(g-Exc)) p is a theorem (fact) of God’s Providence i� p is a theorem of God’s plan or p is a theorem of God’s execution (of his plan). According to theorem T126 it holds that every fact of (about) creation comes under God’s providence. Consequently, it holds because of definition D26: T 181. (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (p ε T(g-Plan) ∨ p ε T(g-Exc))] T126, D26 Every fact of (about) creation belongs to God’s plan or to the execution of his plan.

T 182. (∀p)(gCVp → p ε T(g-Prov)) T126 T171 Whatever is conserved by God comes under God’s providence.

23 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22,1. 24 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22, 3.

112 � 4 God as Creator God executes his plan either by acting (causing) himself or by using secondary causes, i.e. by leaving the activity of causing to his creatures. These are causing pt-su�ciently supported by God as a necessary cause (A15). This is expressed by definition D27: D 27. p ε T(g-Exc) ↔ (gCp ∨ (∃x∈cr)(xCSp ∧ gCNp))

p is a fact of God’s execution of his plan i� God causes p himself or some creature causes (pt-su�ciently) p together with God as a necessary cause. From Logic we know that whatever follows from both (all) disjuncts of a disjunction follows from the disjunction. Therefore, the following theorems hold: T 183. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Exc) → p ε T(CR)) T22, D27, T142 Whatever is a fact of God’s execution of his plan is a fact of creation T 184. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Exc) → gKp) T183, T47 Whatever is a fact of God’s execution of his plan is known by God T 185. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Exc) → p) T184, T37 Whatever belongs to God’s execution of his plan obtains

T 186. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Exc) → gCNp) T183, A17 For every fact of God’s execution of his plan God is a necessary cause

T 187. (∀p)(gCVp → p ε T(g-Exc)) T179, D27 Every fact that is conserved by God belongs to God’s execution of his plan. T 188. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Exc) → Cont(p)) T131, T183 Every fact of God’s execution of his plan is contingent.

Observe, however, that this type of contingency is the contingency of creation in contradistinction to the necessity of God’s essence. It can also be called external contingency. As has been pointed out in sections 1.5.2 and especially in section 4.3.1, there is also internal contingency w.r.t. the universe in the sense that initial and boundary conditions are contingent in contradistinction to laws of nature, which are naturally or empirically necessary. Thus, the first part of the definiens of D27 – gCp – (God causes that p obtains) might imply that p is just an empirical fact in the sense of an initial condition, but it may also imply that p is a law of nature which is empirically necessary. This is expressed very well by Thomas Aquinas in his Summa I,19,8 (see quotation in section 4.3.1). Concerning the execution (cf. D27 and D28) of God’s plan, God employs creatures as his coadjutors. This is described by Thomas Aquinas as follows:

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Two things belong to providence – namely, the type of the order of things forordained towards an end; and the execution of this order . . . . As to the second, there are certain intermediaries of God’s providence; for He governs things inferior by superior, not on account of any defect in His power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.��

This point is included in the second part of D27. The second part of the definiens of definition D27 says that some creatures as secondary causes can bring about p, causing pt-su�ciently that p with the help of God as a necessary cause. Among these facts brought about by creatures, there are also those based on free will decisions of men. This means that God’s execution allows the cooperation of imperfect creatures and especially human actions based on free will decisions. Therefore, neither God’s execution of his plan nor God’s providence impose necessity on states of a�airs foreseen by God. Thus, although God knows everything that belongs to his execution (theorem T184), his knowledge does not impose necessity on such states of a�airs.��

�.�.� God’s Plan D 28. p ε T(g-Plan) ↔ [gCp ∨ (∃x∈cr)(gC(peGoal(x)) ∧ gWp) ∨ (∃x∈cr)(gCxCS(p e Goal(x)) ∧ gCN(p e Goal(x)) ∧ gWp)]

The state of a�airs p belongs to God’s Plan i� God causes that p or God causes that p is a goal for some creature x and God wills that p obtains or all three: God causes that some creature x causes (pt-su�ciently) that p is a goal for x (for itself) and God is a necessary cause for p being a goal for x and God wills that p obtains. p e Goal(x) . . . p is a goal for x

�.�.� Goals in Creation There is the opinion that only creatures that have consciousness and intentions can have goals. This can be accepted for a type of goal on a higher level. However, there are also goals on a lower level. In this sense, non-living things and living

25 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22,3. Cf. section 4.4 above. 26 For a detailed justification of the compatibility of God’s providence with free will, see Weingartner (2015b), ch. 15.

114 � 4 God as Creator things without consciousness can also have goals. Exact definitions have been given elsewhere.�� 1. Goal for non-living systems (nls) can be defined via environment, structure, order, becoming, teleological order and basic value. A process of becoming (upward development) leads to a higher level of order such that entropy decreases and information increases; such a process possesses teleological order. A property or process C of a nls is a basic value for nls i� meeting C is necessary to increase order or keep or retain a certain level of order for nls relative to its environment. X is a relative goal for nls i� X is a state of a process B of becoming of nls such that X has the highest level of order relative to the other states of B and B satisfies the condition of being a basic value for nls. Examples: The growth of a crystal is a process of becoming, the final form of which (according to the crystal system) can be conceived of as a goal relative to earlier states of growth. In this sense, the growth of a crystal is a teleological process. The magnetization process is a process of becoming, the final state of which can be considered a goal w.r.t. earlier states since it is a state of much higher order. Moreover, if we consider the magnetization of the iron in the inner core of the earth, then we know that it causes the magnetic dipole and the magnetic field of the earth. In the inner core (between 5100 and 6360 km), the iron is solid and responsible for the geomagnetism. This geomagnetism and its magnetic field contribute to the realization of several extrinsic goals such as the orientation of animals like migrant birds. Water and its properties contribute to the realization of an overall comprehensive goal: carbon-based life on earth: “Water gives every appearance of being uniquely fit for the type of carbon-based life that exists on earth. Every one of its chemical and physical properties seems maximally fit not only for microscopic life but also for large warm-blooded organisms such as mammals, as well as for the generation and maintenance of a stable chemical and physical environment on the surface of the earth.�� The fact that things without intelligence, such as natural bodies also act for an end shows – according to Thomas Aquinas – that they must be directed towards an end by some intelligence. This argument is used by him in the fifth way of his proofs for the existence of God:

27 Weingartner (2015b), ch. 5, Df 5.7 – 5.15; ch. 7, Df 7.2 – 7.8. 28 Denton (1998), p. 19.

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The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God:��

A goal-directed world order or goal-directed evolutionary development is suggested by the so called Anthropic Cosmological Principle and by the extreme fine tuning which modern cosmology reveals by its increasing accuracy of measurements (within the last decades, one decimal place/15 years). One form of the Anthropic Principle is as follows: Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.�� If one regards the Planck time as the initial moment when the subsequent cosmic dynamics were determined, it is necessary to suppose that nature chose ρ to di�er from ρ crit by no more than one part in ���� ��

The initial conditions at the beginning of the universe had to be of a peculiar and special range to allow the present state with carbon based life and observers: one important condition mentioned first by Collins and Hawking is that the ratio � o of the potential energy of the universe and its kinetic energy of expansion is close to � (� o = �). With values � o � �, the cosmos would have re-collapsed before stars could have come into being or life could have evolved. With values � o � �, the cosmos would expand so rapidly that material would never be able to condense into galaxies and stars.�� The optimal condition for the formation of galaxies is that � o = �, i.e. that the universe is flat. The existence of galaxies would seem to be a necessary precondition for the development of any form of intelligent life.�� If the relative strengths of the nuclear and electromagnetic forces were to be slightly di�erent then carbon atoms could not exist in Nature and human physicists would not have evolved. Likewise many of the global properties of the Universe, for instance the

29 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 2, 3. 30 Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 16. 31 Davis (1982), p. 89 ρ crit is the largest density the universe can possess and still expand for all future time. 32 Cf. Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 375 and 411, Collins and Hawking (1973). 33 Collins and Hawking (1973), p. 317.

116 � 4 God as Creator ratio of the number of photons to protons (≈ ��� ) must be found to lie within a very narrow range if cosmic conditions are to allow carbon based life to arise.�� Hoyle realized that this remarkable chain of coincidences – the universal stability of beryllium, the existence of an advantageous resonance level in C�� and the non-existence of a disadvantageous level in O�� – were necessary and remarkably finetuned conditions of our own existence and indeed the existence of any carbon based life in the universe.��

According to calculations by Penrose, the creator of the universe had to meet ��� an accuracy of � part in ���� in order to create a universe with as special a Big Bang as that which we actually find.�� 2. Goal for living systems (ls) can be defined in an analogous way. A process of becoming, i.e. of increasing order, is presupposed. A property or process C of a ls is a basic value for ls i� meeting C is necessary to stay alive or to keep or regain one’s health in its environment. X is a relative goal for ls i� X is a state of a process B of becoming of ls such that X has the highest level of order relative to the other states of B and B satisfies the condition of being a basic value for ls or of being a higher-level teleological order or legitimate higher human value for ls.�� Observe that the definitions in (1.) and (2.) above and the more detailed ones cited in notes 27 and 37 define goal as a relative goal. This means that neither goals nor values of creation are understood in an absolute sense. Basic values are defined in relation to a certain environment. Goals are defined as states of highest value relative to other states in a process of becoming. This need not be the final state of this process since order may decrease later. Therefore, teleological order does not imply straight-forward progress towards a predetermined goal, even if such a situation is not ruled out either. Moreover, teleological order does not exclude chance since there may be chance-like events during the process of becoming. Teleological order does not imply harmony since there might be competition w.r.t. goals during the process of becoming. And finally, there is no need for teleological order to be realized always and everywhere.�� Examples: A cell is integrated into a network of goals of the greater organism or ls to which it belongs. With its teleological processes the cell contributes to the realization of goals of the whole organism. Similarly, an organ contributes w.r.t. 34 Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 5, Rees (2001), p. 182, Davis (1972), p. 1296. 35 Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 253 The disadvantageous process would be C�� + He� → O�� where all the carbon would rapidly be burnt to O�� . 36 Penrose (2005), §27.13. 37 For the respective definitions see Weingartner (2015b), Def. 7.7 – 7.11. 38 Weingartner (2015b), for details see ch. 5–9 and 14.

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the organism to which it belongs or an individual plant, animal, man w.r.t. its plant-society, population, or society. In more general terms, any ls contributes w.r.t. goals of its activity-space which is that part of the environment on which ls acts. A special case in this respect is the symbiosis of two ls, ls� and ls�, such that ls� realizes some important goals of ls� which are extrinsic to ls� and vice versa. This is the case with the thousands of bacteria in the human digestive system. Even a parasite contributes to the realization of its goals (survival and health) as long as it is not too selfish since in this case it kills its host and thereby itself. That God is necessary to direct creatures and their processes to goals either directly or by enabling creatures and giving them necessary support (definition D28 and axiom A15) is suggested by the following quotations: An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have to be satisfied to get it going.�� This raises the very natural . . . idea . . . that perhaps the entire process of biological evolution, from the origin of life to the emergence of man, was somehow directed from the beginning.�� [. . . ] man is not only a unique animal, but the end product of a completely unique evolutionary pathway, the elements of which are traceable at least to the beginnings of the Cenozoic. We find, then, that the evolution of cognition is the product of a variety of influences and preadaptive capacities, the absence of any one of which would have completely negated the process, and most of which are unique attributes of primates and/or hominids.�� [. . . ] the case of the evolution of eyes is [indeed] of decisive importance in the argument about the evolution of intelligence. The crucial point is that the evolution of eyes is not at all that improbable. In fact whenever eyes were of any selective advantage in the animal kingdom, they evolved. Salvini-Plawen and myself have shown that eyes have evolved no less than at least 40 times independently in the animal kingdom. Hence a highly complicated organ can evolve independently, if such evolution is at all probable. Let us apply this case to the evolution of intelligence. We know that the particular kind of life (system of macromolecules) that exists on Earth can produce intelligence . . . We can now ask what was the probability of this system producing intelligence (remembering the same system was able to produce eyes no less than 40 times). We have two large super-kingdoms of life on Earth, the prokaryote evolutionary lines each of which could lead theoretically to intelligence. In actual fact none of the thousand of lines among the prokaryotes came anywhere near it. There are 4 kingdoms among the eukaryotes, each again with thousands or ten thousands of evolutionary lineages. But in three of these kingdoms, the protists, fungi and plants, no trace of intelligence evolved. This leaves the kingdom of Animalia to which we belong. It consists of about 25 major branches, the so-called phyla, indeed if we include extinct phyla, more than 30 of them. Again, only one of them developed real intelligence, the chordates. There are numerous Classes in the chordates, I would guess more than 50 of them,

39 Crick (1981), p. 88. 40 Denton (1998), p. 298 (my italics). 41 Lovejoy (1981), p. 326.

118 � 4 God as Creator but only one of them (the mammals) developed real intelligence, as in Man. The mammals consist of 20-odd orders, only one of them, the primates, acquiring intelligence, and among the well over 100 species of primates only one, Man, has the kind of intelligence that would permit [the development of advanced technology]. Hence, in contrast to eyes, an evolution of intelligence is not probable.��

We could go on with examples of this sort. Numerous examples for purposeful fine-tuning are collected in Barrow and Tipler (1986), Denton (1998), Davis (1982) and Rees (2001). They all show that these facts are not only closely interrelated but also incorporated into a network of goals, one of which is the development of the human species. T 189. (∀p)(gCp → pεT(g-Plan)) D28 Whatever God causes belongs to God’s plan

T 190. (∀p)[p ε T(g-Plan) → (gCp ∨ (∃x ∈ cr)(p e Goal(x) ∧ gWp))] D28, T92, T143 By T143 the last part of D28 reduces to the last part of T190. If a state of a�airs belongs to God’s plan then God causes that p or for some creature p is a goal for x and God wills that p. T 191. (∀p)[(∀x∈cr)(gC(peGoal(x)) ∧ gWp) → p ε T(g-Plan)] D28 If for any creature x, God causes p to be a goal for x and God wills that p, then p belongs to God’s plan T 192. (∀p)[(∀x∈cr)(gCxCS(peGoal(x)) ∧ gCN(peGoal(x)) ∧ gWp) → p ε T(g-Plan)] D28 If for any creature x, God causes x to cause p as its goal, with the help of God as a necessary cause and God wills that p obtains, then p belongs to God’s plan

T 193. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Plan) → gWp) D28 Whatever comes under God’s plan is willed by God

T 194. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Plan) → p) T193, T86 Whatever God plans obtains. In other words: God’s plan is always fulfilled. �.�.� Local Exceptions to a Global Plan However, a further important point has to be observed: local exceptions do not destroy a global plan, just like local exceptions do not refute a general comprehensive law of nature: a local decrease of entropy and increase of information is not only 42 Barrow and Tipler (1986), p. 132. Letter from Ernst Mayr to FJT dated December 23, 1982.

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compatible with the law of entropy, but it is the usually realized situation in the whole cosmos. This also holds of God’s plan in an analogous way. It is described very well by Thomas Aquinas: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered. Hence, corruption and defects in natural things are said to be contrary to some particular nature; yet they are in keeping with the plan of universal nature; inasmuch as the defect in one thing yields to the good of another, or even to the universal good: for the corruption of one is the generation of another, and through this it is that a species is kept in existence. Since God, then, provides universally for all being, it belongs to His providence to permit certain defects in particular e�ects, that the perfect good of the universe may not be hindered, for if all evil were prevented, much good would be absent from the universe.��

We might also consider the following analogy: As a master builder employs di�erent kinds of workers to execute his plans, God employs di�erent kinds of creatures to execute his plan (providence) concerning creation (concerning the universe). Some workers (creatures) are more talented to help him carry out his plan. But he also employs less talented workers whose help is not as e�ective and whose ability to learn is slower, even if they might be helped by the more talented workers. He might even have some workers who try to hinder his plan or to work against it. However, much more than a clever master builder, God is able to have the saboteurs serve the global goal, or even some local goals or unconsciously help good workers, such that the plan of his providence is finally satisfied. Observe that the “workers” in this analogy might serve as a symbol for any non-living or living system (including man) involved in a developmental or in a evolutionary process of the universe. As Peter Thomas Geach puts it: God is the Supreme Grand Master who has everything under his control. Some of the players are consciously helping his plan, others are trying to hinder it; whatever the finite players do, God’s plan will be executed.��

43 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22,2 ad 2. 44 Geach (1977), p. 58.

120 � 4 God as Creator �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents For God will not except any man’s person, neither will he stand in awe of any man’s greatness: for he made the little and the great, and he hath equally care of all (Wisd 6,8). But thy providence, O Father, governed it: for you have made a way even in the sea, and a most sure path among the waves (Wisd 14,3). You gave me life and showed me kindness, and in your providence watched over my spirit (Job 10,12). A person’s steps are directed by the Lord. How then can any one understand their own way? . . . In the Lord’s hand the king’s heart is a stream of water that he channals toward all who pleases him (Pr 20,24; 21,1). Surely the Sovereign Lord does nothing without revealing his plan to his servants the prophets (Am 3,7). Cf. Psalm 105. But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous (Mt 5,44-45). He then began to teach them that the Son of Man must su�er many things and be rejected by the elders, the chief priests and the teachers of the law, and that he must be killed and after three days rise again . . . [Jesus to Peter]: You do not have in mind the concerns of God, but merely human concerns (Mk 8,31-33). If you declare with your mouth ‘Jesus is Lord’ and believe in your heart that God raised him from the death you will be saved (Ro 10,9). And we know that in all things God works for the good of those who love him, who have been called according to his purpose (Ro 8,28). Oh, the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgements and his paths beyond tracing out! Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor? (Ro 11,33-34).

Innocent III (1208): Creed of Innocent III prescribed for those returning from movements of the Waldensians to the doctrine of the Church: We believe with our heart and confess with our tongue that Father, Son, and Hoy Spirit are one God . . . creator, maker, ruler and provider of all things, corporal and spiritual, visible and invisible (ND403; D790). Pius IX: Condemned Errors (1864): Any action of God on the human being and the world must be denied (ND411/2; D2902). Vatican (1870): By his providence God protects and governs all things which he has made, “reaching mightly from one end of the earth to the other, and ordering all things well” (Wisd 8,1). For “all are open and laid bare to his eyes” (Heb 4,13), also those things which are yet to come to existence through the free action of creatures (ND413; D3003).

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�.� Moral Evil �.�.� Definition of Moral Evil From the considerations in section 4.4.3 above it is clear that creatures also produce evil; and in particular humans produce moral evil.�� Since moral evil is inconsistent with God’s commands, it follows from theorem T109 that God cannot will it, and consequently, he does not will it (recall axiom A11). This may also hold for other evil which is not moral evil but is produced by creatures. Observe that from “God does not will it” it does not follow that God wills that it does not obtain. Since then, it would not obtain – contrary to facts – since his will is always fulfilled (theorem T86); i.e. from ¬gWp it does not follow that gW¬p. According to this consideration, there must be some facts of creation produced by creatures that God cannot will and God does not will, although he permits them (recall definition D19) since otherwise they would not occur. We shall first give a definition of moral evil (D29) and a description of three modes of evil (D29.1-29.3) D 29. p e ME ↔ [p e E ∧ ¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands))]

The state of a�airs p is a moral evil i� p is an evil (peE) and p is inconsistent with the theorems of God’s Commands. This section 4.7 is only concerned with moral evil. Other types of evil like metaphysical evil, natural evil, necessary evil, legitimate evil, soul-making evil, undeserved evil, and evil as punishment will be treated in section 5.2 below. All di�erent types of evil can appear in the following three di�erent modes or senses or functions: D 29.1. State of a�airs p is an evil in the first mode (sense) E� i� p is some lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some particular good that ought to be present in a thing or subject or organism. D 29.2. State of a�airs p is an evil in the second mode (sense) E� i� p is some lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some particular good that is accepted to be absent in a subject in order to serve as a necessary condition for achieving another higher good. D 29.3. Creature (thing) x or state of a�airs p is an evil in the third mode (sense) E� i� x or p is a su�cient cause for an evil in the mode (sense) E�. 45 For definitions of di�erent types of evil and a theory of theodicy see Weingartner (2003), Weingartner (Theodicy) and section 5.2 below.

122 � 4 God as Creator Examples: E� : Illness, hunger, injury, biological costs, crime, death within the appropriate life-time; on a lower level and in non-living systems: disorder, chaos, destruction. E� : Imperfection of parts serving the perfection of the whole, waste of seed serving selection, error and biological costs in order to achieve improvement by learning, surgery in order to regain one’s health, just punishment in order to compensate for injustice. E� : Earthquake, flood, tsunami; crime, murder, corruption, war. D 29.4. p e E ↔ (p e E� ∨ p e E� ∨ p e E�) The state of a�airs p is an evil i� p is an evil in mode (sense) E� or in mode (sense) E� or in mode (sense) E�. We define evil in general as the privation of some good of a creature. This holds for all three modes (senses) of evil defined by D29.1-D29.3. D 29.5. p e E ↔ (∃q)(∃x ∈ cr)(pePriv(q) ∧ qeG(x))

It has to be observed that mentioning the creature, thing, subject, or organism is essential. By dropping it, evil would just become a lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some good. Since a lack or absence of something cannot have e�ects (as a lack or as an absence), it would not be real because in order to be real it is necessary for it to function as a cause with e�ects. But a subject or organism lacking some property which it should have can have e�ects and can function as a cause. Therefore, the absence of some particular good in a thing or subject or organism is real. T 195. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands))) D29 If p is a moral evil then p is inconsistent with the theorems of God’s Commands. T 196. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gCWp) T109, T195 If p is a moral evil then p cannot be willed by God.

T 197. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gCCp) T195, T107, (T91; T196) If p is a moral evil then God cannot cause (that) p.

T 198. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gWp) T196, A11 If p is a moral evil then God does not will (that) p.

Observe that “p e ME” says that the state of a�airs p is a moral evil. From this it does not follow that this state obtains or that this moral evil exists: from “an (any) unjustified war is a moral evil” it does not follow that such a war exists or takes place. Similarly “to lie is a moral evil” does not imply that this evil obtains. Nevertheless, moral evil exists (see axiom A20 and theorem T210 below). However,

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God may prevent (i.e. not permit, or will (cause) that it does not obtain) many moral evils and other evil such that they do not obtain, even though we would not have knowledge of it. Only of the evil that in fact obtains do we know that God permits it according to theorems T94 and T99. T 199. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gCp) T198, T90 If p is a moral evil, then God does not cause it.

T 200. (∀p)[p e ME → (¬gCWp ∧ ¬gWp ∧ ¬gCCp ∧ ¬gCp)] T196-199 If p is a moral evil, then God cannot will and does not will and cannot cause and does not cause it. If one of the four consequences of T200 were false even though p e ME were true, then God would be normatively inconsistent since moral evils are inconsistent with his Commands (D29).

�.�.� Consistency and Inconsistency with God’s Commands D 30. Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) ↔ (¬(p e MRel) ∨ ¬(O¬p ε T(g-Commands)))

The state of a�airs p is consistent with the theorems of God’s Commands i� either p is not morally relevant or O¬p does not belong to the theorems of God’s Commands. p e MRel . . . p is morally relevant. Example: The state of a�airs begging or dispense with possession are consistent with the theorems of God’s Commands i� either they are not morally relevant or it is obligatory not to beg or not to dispense do not belong to the theorems of God’s Commands. Instead of saying “obligatory non-p does not belong to the theorems of God’s Commands”, ¬(O¬p ε T(g-Commands)), we could say “not permitted p does not belong . . . ” since they are interchangeable by the usual definition in Deontic Logic. In this case, however permission has to be represented by a di�erent symbol ‘P+ ’ from ‘P’ which is used in definition D19. Thus it is no problem to define: Op ↔ ¬P+ ¬p and use it in the following theorems, although we will not do that for reasons of simplicity. A further di�erent concept of permission P∗ could be defined thus: P∗ p ↔ ¬(O¬p ε T(g-Commands). Then the consistency of p with God’s Commands could be expressed by saying: p is not morally relevant or p is permitted. However, since this does not bring new information or di�erentiation we shall not add complications.

124 � 4 God as Creator The theorems of God’s Commands are understood as a consistent and complete system of theorems in the sense of Deontic Logic, however, with the following difference: Deontic Logic is Applied Logic and is concerned with the logical relations between norms. Examples for principles of Deontic Logic are: If it is obligatory that p (Op) then it is not forbidden that p (¬Fp). If it is obligatory that if p then q (O(p → q)) then if it is obligatory that p (Op) then it is also obligatory that q (Oq): O(p → q) → (Op → Oq). These principles are formal in the sense that no specific content is mentioned, i.e. it is not said what is obligatory or what is forbidden. Therefore, Deontic Logic is a logic. The theorems of God’s Commands, however, are contentful, informative norms, rules, or advice which say what is obligatory or what is forbidden. Examples for such norms are: “Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in the land the Lord your God is giving you”; “You shall not steal” (Ex 20,12 and 15). “Love your neighbour as yourself” (Lev 19,18; Mt 22,39; Mk 12,31; Lk 10,27; Gal 5,14). “Carry each others’s burdens”, (and in this way you will fulfil the laws of Christ) (Gal 6,2). Besides obligations and prohibitions the theorems of God’s Commands contain councils which do not imply obligation but are optional. Whereas obligations and prohibitions demand obedience councils render the gaining of the eternal end more assured and expeditious. The theorems of God’s Commands include the principles of so-called Natural Law like the Golden Rule (Tob 4,15; Mt 7,12; Lk 6,31: Do to others as you would have them do to you) and principles that “are written on their hearts” (Ro 2,15). Cf. 4.4.4 above. From these examples it is plain that a system of such contentful norms is not a logic. However, these norms can be integrated into a deductive system. As mentioned above, the theorems of God’s Commands are understood as a consistent and complete system of theorems. For important parts of it, this can be rigorously proved: it can be shown that the commandments 4–10 of the Ten Commandments (Ex 20,2–17; Dt 5,6–21) follow logically from the principle of charity, provided some evident principles of human action are presupposed.�� For example, by assuming the following principle of action: “If person a loves person b as neighbour then a does not murder b”; LN(a, b) → ¬Murd(a, b) it follows from the principle of charity: “It is obligatory that a does not murder b”. This can be demonstrated as follows. A usual axiom of Deontic Logic is: If p is logically valid (logically necessary) then Op holds. One may restrict this axiom to

46 This is shown in Weingartner (1996a), ch. 9.

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logically valid and relevant principles.�� If we replace “logically valid” with “valid human action principle”, then we get an analogous axiom for human action principles. With respect to the above example, we get from the valid action principle: LN(a, b) → ¬Murd(a, b) the normative principle: O(LN(a, b) → ¬Murd(a, b)). And from this by distribution of O : O(LN(a, b)) → O(¬Murd(a, b)). Thus, if we assume the principle of charity as a general first principle O(LN(a, b))– Love your neighbour (b) as yourself (a) – we can derive: O(¬Murd(a, b)) – you (a) should not murder your neighbour (b). The examples above, the Ten Commandments, the principle of Charity, the councils and the principle of Natural Law belong to the core of the theorems of God’s Commands. We might characterise the core of the theorems of God’s Commands as theorems that are morally relevant and valid for every mature human person independent of his/her environment. This characterisation holds for the Commands given in the New Testament and for a part of those in the Old Testament. In addition to the core, the Old Testament contains a number of rules and advice that does not meet the condition of independence of any environment. Environment is understood in a wide sense as including geographical location, culture, tradition, community, and society. Since the structure of such normative sentences consists of applying the normative operation O – it is obligatory that – to a state of a�airs p, the normative sentence can be true or false, and as a theorem of God’s Commands, it is true. Morally neutral or not morally relevant states of a�airs are not included. The core of the theorems of God’s Commands is understood as a consistent and deontically complete normative system. It holds for any morally relevant norm that either Op (obligatory that p) or O¬p (obligatory that not-p) or ¬O¬p (not obligatory that not-p, or permitted that p) is included under the theorems of God’s Commands and that if O¬p is included then neither Op nor ¬O¬p is included. This consideration leads to axiom A19 below. Observe that the complete system of God’s Commands is not identical with the commands revealed in the Bible, not even if commands of what is called natural law are added. God did not reveal every moral obligation but left a part for men, providing them with abilities for cooperation (see section 4.4 above). Thus, many morally relevant principles have been developed by men in the long tradition of 47 Such a restriction serves for avoiding paradoxes coming up when logic is applied in di�erent domains of science and especially in Ethics as Deontic Logic. Cf. Weingartner (2015a) for avoiding the paradoxes of Deontic Logic; for another possibility to avoid the paradoxes of Deontic Logic see Fine (2018).

126 � 4 God as Creator jurisprudence, some of them being independent of environment and historical development, some others dependent. On the other hand, it is a Christian doctrine that enough has been revealed for men to reach their eternal goal, provided they freely contribute their own part. T 201. (∀p)[(Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) ∧ p e MRel) → ¬(O¬p ε T(g-Commands))] D30 If the state of a�airs p is both consistent with the theorems of God’s Commands and morally relevant then it is obligatory that ¬p does not belong to the theorems of God’s Commands.

T 202. (∀p)[p e MRel → (Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) → ¬(O¬p ε T(g-Commands))] T201 If p is morally relevant then – provided p is consistent with God’s Commands – O¬p does not belong to the theorems of God’s Commands. T 203. (∀p)[¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) ↔ (p e MRel ∧ O¬p ε T(g-Commands))] D30 The state of a�airs p is not consistent (inconsistent) with the theorems of God’s Commands i� p is morally relevant and O¬p (it is obligatory that not-p) does belong to the theorems of God’s Commands A 19. (∀p)[p e MRel → [(Op ε T(g-Commands) ∨ O¬p ε T(g-Commands) ∨ ¬O¬p ε T(g-Commands)) ∧ (O¬p ε T(g-Commands) → (¬(Op ε T(g-Commands)) ∧ ¬(¬O¬p ∧ T(g-Commands))))]]

If the state of a�airs p is morally relevant then: Op or O¬p or ¬O¬p does belong to the theorems of God’s Commands and if O¬p does belong to them, then neither Op nor ¬O¬p does.

T 204. (∀p)[p e MRel → (Op ε T(g-Commands) ∨ O¬p ε T(g-Commands) ∨ ¬O¬p ε T(g-Commands))] A19

T 205. (∀p)[¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) → O¬p ε T(g-Commands)] T203 If the state of a�airs p is inconsistent with the theorems of God’s Commands then O¬p (it is obligatory that not-p) belongs to the theorems of God’s Commands Example: If lying to your friend is inconsistent with the theorems of God’s Commands, then it is obligatory not to lie (or: you should not lie) to your friend belongs to the theorems of God’s Commands. Axiom A19 can also be expressed as follows:

T 206. (∀p)[p e MRel → [O¬p ε T(g-Commands) ↔ (¬(Op ε T(g-Commands)) ∧ ¬(¬O¬p ε T(g-Commands)))]] A19

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If the state of a�airs p is morally relevant then O¬p does belong to the theorems of God’s Commands i� neither Op nor ¬O¬p does.

T 207. (∀p)[¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)) → (∀x∈�)(gWxSW¬p ∧ gWxSA¬p)] T205, D23 If p is inconsistent with the theorems of God’s Commands then it holds for all humans x: God wills that x ought to will that not-p and God wills that x ought to act in such a way that not-p obtains T 208. (∀p)(p e ME → (∀x∈�)(gWxSW¬p ∧ gWxSA¬p)) T195, T207 If the state of a�airs p is a moral evil then it holds for all humans x: God wills that x should will that not-p and God wills that x should act in such a way that not-p obtains T 209. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(p e MG → (xSWp ∧ xSAp)) ∧ (p e ME → (xSW¬p ∧ xSA¬p))] D23, D45, T86, T208 Moral good should be willed and done and moral evil should be refused and prevented.��

�.�.� There Is Moral Evil Although it can be easily and empirically proved that there is evil, both moral and physical, there are some doctrines which deny this. These doctrines claim that events called “evil” are unrealities or illusions though they seem to be real to humans:“If sin, sickness, and death were understood as nothingness, they would disappear”. . . “the only reality of sin, sickness or death is the awful fact that unrealities seem real to human, erring belief until God strips o� their disguise” (p. 205 and 472).�� Two short arguments which prove the existence of physical and moral evil are as follows: 1. Preserving life and health (for an appropriate period of time relative to the species) are great goods for every organism, and loss of life or health (within this appropriate time) is great evil for every organism. But there is loss of life or health within the appropriate time for many organisms. Therefore there is evil. 2. Killing innocent people is moral evil. In Hitler’s war and Concentration Camps, about 6 million Jews, 7 million Poles, and 24 million Russians were killed. Thus,

48 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I–II, 94,2. 49 An example of such a doctrine is the belief system Christian Science founded by Mary EddyBaker (1934). For a discussion see Weingartner (2003), ch. 1.

128 � 4 God as Creator Hitler’s war and Concentration Camps were moral evils. Therefore, there is moral evil. A 20. (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME)

Some facts of creation are moral evils

T 210. (∃p)(p ∧ p e ME) There is moral evil

A20, T117

T 211. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME) → (gKp ∧ p ε T(g-Prov) ∧ ¬gCWp ∧ ¬gWp ∧ ¬gCCp ∧ ¬gCp ∧ ¬gW¬p ∧ ¬gC¬p)] T47, T126, T200, T94, T96

For every fact of creation that is a moral evil, it holds: (a) It is known to God, and it comes under his providence. (b) Neither can God will it, nor does he will it, and neither can God cause it, nor does he cause it. (c) God does not prevent it, neither by his will nor by his causation.

The reason for (c) is that God has endowed men with free will (see the remark after theorem T222 below). T 212. (∃p)(gKp ∧ p ε T(g-Prov) ∧ ¬gCWp ∧ ¬gWp ∧ ¬gCCp ∧ ¬gCp ∧ ¬gW¬p ∧ ¬gC¬p) A20, T211 For some states of a�airs p the statements (a), (b), (c) above hold

T 213. (∃p)(p ∧ ¬gWp) T212, T37 Some facts are not willed by God

T 214. ¬(∀p)(p → gWp) T213 God does not will everything that is the case

T 215. ¬(∀p)(p → gCp) T212 (T210, 199) God does not cause everything that is the case

This also follows from the fact that God cannot and does not cause any fact of his essence or existence T 216. (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ ¬gWp) A20, T198 Some facts of creation are not willed by God

T 217. ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gWp) T216 God does not will every fact of creation

T 218. ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCp) A20, T199 God does not cause every fact of creation. Cf. theorem T133.

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Observe, however, that according to axiom A17, God is a necessary cause (CN) for every fact of creation. Since gCp ↔ (gCSp ∧ gCNp) according to definition D25, it follows that gCp can be replaced with gCSp:

T 219. ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCSp) T199, D25, A17, A20 God does not cause every fact of creation as a su�cient cause T 220. ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCWp) T196, A20 God cannot will every fact of creation

T 221. ¬(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCCp) T197, A20 God cannot cause every fact of creation

The reason for this is that he cannot cause (nor will) moral evil (sin), which is a fact of creation (axiom A20). T 222. (∀p)((p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME) → gPp)

T211, D19

Every fact of creation that is a moral evil is permitted, i.e. not prevented by God. This is so since God created men with free will such that they are allowed not to obey his Commands. Observe, however, that from T222 it does not follow that God permits (does not prevent) every moral evil; i.e. (∀p)(p e ME → gPp) is not a theorem. He only permits those moral evils that in fact occur. God may prevent several moral evils in a way which does not take away free will from the acting human person and also moral evil which can possibly be produced by man but of which man is ignorant. D 31. g∈AllWill ↔ (∀p)(gWp ∨ gW¬p)

God is all-willing i� for every state of a�airs p, either God wills that p or God wills that not-p D 31.1. g∈AllCaus ↔ (∀p)(gCp ∨ gC¬p)

God is all-causing i� for every state of a�airs p, either God causes that p or God causes that not-p Observe that all-willing (D31) and all-causing (D31.1) lead together with theorem T86 (gWp → p) and T92 to the false theses of religious fatalism: (∀p)(p → gWp) and (∀p)(p → gCp) i.e. to the claim: whatever happens is willed (caused) by God. These false theses of religious fatalism are already refuted by theorem T215.�� 50 For more details on religious fatalism see Weingartner (1974), p. 89� and Weingartner (2003), p. 110�.

130 � 4 God as Creator T 223. (∃p)(¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) T212 For some states of a�airs (for example for moral evil) it holds: neither does God will that they occur nor does he will that they do not occur (otherwise they would not occur, contrary to facts). T 224. (∃p)(¬gCp ∧ ¬gC¬p) T212 For some states of a�airs it holds: neither does God cause them nor does he cause them not to occur. Recall the remarks after T218. T 225. ¬g∈AllWill T223, D31 God is not all-willing

T 226. ¬g∈AllCaus T224, D31.1 God is not all-causing

Observe that the restricted thesis of all-willing (all-causing) (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → (gWp ∨ gW¬p)) can be refuted as well since (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ ¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) is derivable from A20 and theorem T211.

T 227. g∈OS ∧ g∈OM ∧ ¬g∈AllWill ∧ ¬g∈AllCaus T36, T81, T225, T226 God is all-knowing (omniscient) and all-powerful (almighty, omnipotent), but not all-willing and not all-causing If God were all-willing or all-causing according to definitions D31 and D31.1, then he would interfere in all actions of creatures and consequently in all free will actions of humans. In that case, there could not be any cooperation or contribution of creatures to the development and evolution of the universe. Moreover, there could not be autonomous, free decisions of men. Since all of this is absurd, God is neither all-willing nor all-causing, as proved by theorems T225-227. There is no doctrine of an all-willing or of an all-causing God in any of the great religions. This is rather definite for Judaism and Christianity. In Islam, the important attribute of God is the mercifulness of God (Rahman) which is manifest from the beginning of the Koran. But if God is all-willing or all-causing, he himself wills (causes) the immoral actions. Therefore, he cannot be merciful to man, who would not be guilty for that action. But according to the Koran, man is guilty for his actions which deviate from the “correct (straight) path” (which go astray). Thus, there cannot be an all-willing or an all-causing God, according to Islam. Concerning Buddhism and Hinduism (Brahmanism), the question is more di�cult because in these religions it is not clear whether there is something like a personal God who has more definite attributes like in Judaism and Christianity such as being almighty, omniscient, and a God of life (and especially in Christianity: of love) who announces his knowledge, power, and will (as is clear from the Old and

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New Testament). In Islam, attributes like life, knowledge, will, and power are also manifest from Sure 112. However, even in Buddhism and Hinduism there is at least no evident sign (less than any claim) of an all-willing or all-causing God. All this does not rule out that some subordinate versions or sects – especially of the immense number of di�erent Hinduistic schools – may believe in a mythos of fatalism which may be completely impersonal. A personal form of fatalism is present in Calvinism. If fatalism is present, the belief in an all-willing and allcausing fate (and if personal: God) may be closely connected with it.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents You shall have no other gods before me . . . Honor your father and your mother . . . You shall not murder . . . You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor . . . (Ex 20,2-17; Dt 5,7-21). Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength (Dt 6,5; Mt 22,39; Mk 12,31; Lk 10,27) Love your neighbor as yourself (Lev 19,18; Mt 22,39; Mk 12,31; Lk 10,27; Gal 5,14). What you detest, don’t do to others (Tob 4,15) So in everything, do to others what you would have them do to you (Mt 7,12; Lk 6,31). Do not pervert justice or show partiality. Do not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and twists the words of the innocent. Follow justice and justice alone . . . (Dt 16,19-20). Oh that their hearts would be inclined to fear me and keep all my commands always, so that it might go well with them and their children forever (Dt 5,29). The acts of the flesh are obvious: sexual immorality, imparity and debauchery; idolatry and witchcraft; hatred, discord, jealousy, fits of rage, selfish ambition, dissensions, factions and envy; drunkeness and orgies and the like. I warn you as I did before, that those who live like this will not inherit the kingdom of God. But the fruit of the spirit is love, joy, peace, forbearance, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control . . . Since we live by the Spirit, let us keep in step with the Spirit (Gal 5,19-25). Do not say ‘It was the Lord’s doing that I fell away’; for he does not do what he hates. Do not say ‘It was he who led me astray’; for he has no need of the sinful. The Lord hates all abominations (Sir 15,11-13). For thou lovest all thing that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made: for thou didst not appoint, or make any thing hating it” (Wisd 11,25).

Carthage (418): Whoever holds that the words of the Lord’s prayer where we say:“Forgive us our debts” (Mt 6,12) are said by the saints out of humility but not truthfully, anathema sit. (ND1906; D230). Trent (1547): Nobody, however much justified, should consider oneself except from the observance of the commandments and no one should say that the observance of God’s commandments is impossible for the person justified – a rash statement censured by the Fathers with anathema (ND1938; D1536).

132 � 4 God as Creator Trent(1547): If anyone says that the commandments of God are impossible to observe even for one who is justified and established in grace, anathema sit. If anyone says that nothing is commanded in the Gospels except faith, and that everything else is indi�erent, neither prescribed nor prohibited, but free; or that the ten commandments in no way concern Christians, anathema sit. If anyone says that Jesus Christ was given by God to human beings as a redeemer in whom they are to trust, but not as a law-giver whom they are to obey, anathema sit. (ND1968,1969,1971; D1568,1569,1571).

5 God is All-Good According to Thomas Aquinas, God’s all-goodness follows from God’s perfection and essence: God alone is good essentially. For everything is called good according to its perfection. Now perfection of a thing is threefold: first, according to the constitution of its own being; secondly, in respect of any accidents being added as necessary for its perfect operation; thirdly, perfection consists in the attaining to something else as the end . . . This triple perfection belongs to no creature by its own essence; it belongs to God only,in whom alone essence is existence; in whom there are no accidents; since whatever belongs to others accidentally belongs to him essentially; as, to be powerful, wise, and the like . . . ; and He is not directed to anything else as to an end, but is Himself the last end of all things. Hence it is manifest that God alone has every kind of perfection by his own essence; therefore He himself alone is good essentially�

That God is all-good� (g∈AG) also follows from his perfection according to theorem T18 and definition D7 in agreement with Thomas Aquinas. However, it follows in this study already from theorem T1. T 228. g∈PF → g∈AG

T18

Since God is perfect, he is all-good.

T 229. (∀p)((p ↔ g∈AG) → p ε T(g-Essence))

T16

That God is all-good belongs to the theorems of God’s essence

�.� Axiom of Being All-Good A 21. g ∈ AG → (∀p)[(gWp → p e G) ∧ (gLp → p e G)] ∧ (∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(g))] ∧ (∀x∈cr)(∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(x))] ∧ (∀x∈cr)(∀p)(gW(p e Goal(x)) → p e G) ∧ (∀x∈�)[g∈Just(x) ∧ g∈Merc(x) ∧ g∈Love(x)] g∈Just(x) . . . God is just to x g∈Merc(x) . . . God is merciful to x g∈Love(x) . . . God is full of love for x

1 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 6,3. 2 The expression “all-good” is taken from Plantinga (1971), p. 109: The Free Will Defence. It may also be replaced with “wholly good”. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-006

134 � 5 God is All-Good Axiom A21 of being all-good has four parts: 1. Whatever God wills is good and whatever God loves is good. This holds for his will and love to himself and to creatures. 2. Something that God loves is willed by him as a good fact to himself, and for all creatures it holds: something (or other) that God loves he wills as a good fact to them. 3. For all creatures it holds: Whatever God wills to them as a goal is good. 4. For all men (humans) it holds: God is just to them and God is merciful to them and God is full of love for them. Preliminary informal definitions for just, merciful, love are as follows. Axioms are given in section 5.7-5.9 below. D 32.1. g∈Just(x) ↔ (1) God gives to human x what is due to x by humans’s nature and condition; and (2) God rewards the good actions of x; and (3) God punishes the bad actions of x. D 32.2. g∈Merc(x) ↔ (1) God removes undeserved calamity from x; and (2) God prevents deserved infliction or punishment from x if there is repentance and turning away (from sin). Cf. the principle of mercifulness PMC in section 1.10.3 above. D 32.3. g∈Love(x) ↔ (1) God has sent his Son as Messiah, i.e. as redeemer (2) God wills to save human sinners x from final death by sending his Son such that whoever believes in him and obeys his commands shall have eternal life (Jn 3,16). (3) If x sins and turns away from God, then God’s compassion is aroused and he does not devastate x if this is compatible with his Commands. Cf. the principle of love PLV in section 1.10.4 above. T 230. g∈AG T1 God is all-good T 231. (∀p)(gWp → p e G) T230, A21 Whatever God wills is good

Observe that the opposite: (∀p)(p e G → gWp) does not hold. God is all-good does not mean that God wills everything that is good, nor that God wills every good. This is also defended by Thomas Aquinas and postulated by axiom A30 below (5.4.2).

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All that can have the nature of being and truth virtually exists in God, though it does not all exist in created things. Therefore God knows all truth; but does not will all good, except in so far as He wills Himself, in whom all good virtually exists.�

Moreover the stronger statement: (∀p)(gCWp → p e G) does hold. According to definition D18 (section 3.1) God can will (CW) everything that is consistent and consistent with his essence and with his commands. Thus he can will (and can cause) that there are some more hydrogen atoms in the universe than actually exist in it. According to scientific estimation there are about � ��� hydrogen atoms in our universe. However it can hardly be claimed that to have some more or some less is something .

�.� The Problem of Evil: Definitions of Different Types One main objection against theorem T231 is the claim that God wills and causes evil. That is, it seems to hold that there are states of affairs that God wills and causes, even though they are evil: (∃p)(gWp ∧ p e E).

To discuss this objection, it is necessary to distinguish different types of evil. After some general remarks on evil we list eight types in addition to moral evil (see definition D29) without claiming that this list is exhaustive (see axiom A22 and definitions D33 and D35.1-D43).

�.�.� General Remarks on Evil According to definition D29.1 (section 4.7) an evil E is some lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some particular good which either (E�) ought to be present in a subject or organism or (E�, D29.2) is acceptable to be absent in order to serve as a necessary condition for achieving another higher good. In the first case (E�), the particular good ought to be present for different reasons: for example, in order to be a full member of one’s species (lacking sight is such an evil for an animal or for men); or in order to survive (shortage of food or of fresh air is such an evil), or in order to regain health, or in order to preserve peace, or in order to receive education, or in order to meet moral rules, . . . , etc. In the second case, the absence of the particular good is accepted in order to achieve another higher good which can be of a different kind: thus, for example, 3 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,6 ad 2.

136 � 5 God is All-Good the absence of being uninjured in order to regain health through an operation, or the absence of freedom in prison (for the murderer) in order to save the lives of others . . . etc. Observe that an evil in the sense of E� or E� can only be a state (state of a�airs) or an event belonging to a thing or organism, but not a thing or an organism itself. We shall say that an event (process, state of a�airs) or a thing or agent that causes some evil E� is an evil in a derived (or secondary) sense too. We shall call this kind of evil, which is a cause as a causal factor or su�cient cause or necessary cause of some evil E�, evil E�. Causal factors are neither su�cient causes nor necessary causes but contribute to the su�ciency of a cause�. In what follows, however, we understand evil E� in the sense of definition D29.3 (section 4.7) as a su�cient cause for evil E�. The respective causal relation referred to in E� need not be strict or deterministic in the sense of satisfying a dynamical law; it can also be statistical, making it very probable (su�cient enough) to produce the e�ect.

�.�.� Metaphysical Evil (MetE) MetE consists in di�erent degrees of imperfection and finitude. There are two kinds of imperfection, one bound to the nature and necessary of a thing or organism, the other contingent. a) Imperfection which is bound to nature and necessary For example, those organisms which – by their nature – cannot move (themselves) are less perfect than those that can. Or those species of organisms that have a much simpler DNA are less perfect than those which have a more complex one. But this is not a deficit of some particular good which ought to be present and therefore not an evil in the sense of E�. This can be substantiated thus: if there were no imperfection (in things or organisms) which were bound to nature, then there would not be di�erent degrees of (necessary) imperfection in the universe. If so, there would only be things and organisms of one degree of perfection in the universe distinguished only by contingent imperfections, and consequently there would not be any such multitude and di�erentiation which is so by nature and necessary. But in fact, there is a lot of multitude and di�erentiation in the universe (which is usually accepted as a great good).

4 For a detailed theory of causal factors, su�cient, and necessary cause see Weingartner (2016).

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Therefore, there is imperfection which is necessary because it is bound to the nature of certain things and organisms. However, this kind of imperfection (which is necessary because it is bound to the nature) can be understood as an evil in the sense of E� because it contributes to achieve a higher good, that is an ordered universe with a lot of multitude and di�erentiation. Although the imperfection which is necessary (because bound to the nature of a thing) does not mean that there is anything absent concerning the nature of such things locally, the imperfection can be seen as serving a higher good as a higher degree of order globally with new emergent properties. Moreover, certain imperfections which are necessary may be called evils in a derived sense (E�) in so far as they are causes for evils in the sense of E�. For example, certain imperfections in creatures are the cause of death, or natural catastrophes are causes of many evils in the sense of E�. b) Imperfections which are contingent Not all things, organisms, or processes in the universe (or on earth) obey dynamical laws�, i.e. laws which do not have exceptions. Examples are: processes of thermodynamics, radiation, cosmology (such as expansion of the universe), quantum mechanics, psychology, sociobiology, human societies, etc. These processes and their underlying particles or organisms obey statistical laws. If an ensemble of things obeys statistical laws, then most of the members of the ensemble behave in the same way, but some are exceptions: on a realistic interpretation of statistical laws�, there are genuine degrees of freedom for the members of the ensemble such that both the “behaviour” of most of the members and the behaviour of the remaining members is in accordance with the (statistical) law. It is important to realise, therefore, that the exceptions (relative to most of the members) also obey the law because it is a statistical law, i.e. one which has as its essential property the fact that it allows exceptions. Such exceptions may be interpreted in a di�erent way, depending on whether obeying most cases guarantees achieving a particular good which ought to be present (i) or whether being an exception guarantees achieving a particular good which is preferable to the one achieved by meeting most cases (ii). In this latter case, exceptions are not imperfections but rather special perfections. (i) In the first case, the exceptions are failures in the sense of deviations from the rules for most cases. Since these deviations are not happening necessarily (because the law permits them) they can be understood as contingent imperfections.

5 Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 7. 6 Cf. Mittelstaedt and Weingartner (2005), ch. 7 and 12; Weingartner (1998).

138 � 5 God is All-Good In this case, the contingent imperfection is a deficit of some particular good (achieved by behaving like most of the members of the ensemble) which ought to be present, i.e. an evil in the sense of E�. Examples: the state of crystals which deviate from the form of their respective crystalline system, the state of animals who fail to produce o�spring, the state of worker bees which fail to produce honey, monster (freak) . . . etc. But some of these examples may not only be seen as evils in the sense of E� but also as evils in the sense of E�, i.e. as leading to or even as means to achieve a higher good. Thus, failing to produce o�spring is first of all – seen from a “local” point of view – an evil with respect to the preservation of the (respective) species. But viewed in a larger context, it may contribute to the balance of the population according to higher order principles and goals (goods). (ii) In the second case, it is not the case that exceptional behaviour means that a particular good which ought to be present is missing. Therefore, we cannot speak of an evil in the sense of E� here. One the contrary, there are great particular goods which are achieved via such exceptions. Examples: The few seeds which successfully develop into a plant (in contradistinction to the millions which die); those mutations which lead to new di�erentiation among the species or exceptional genetic combinations which lead to a genius . . . in general: exceptions which lead to particular goods via selection. In this second case, therefore, the exceptions are not imperfections but rather perfections. c) Finitude A similar consideration to that concerning imperfection which is necessary holds with respect to finitude. Independently of the question whether the universe is infinite in time or not, allthough it it has finite age, an infinite space in which matter is distributed is hardly conceivable and incompatible with the Theory of General Relativity. The things and organisms of the universe and on earth are all finite by their nature, certainly in space and also in time because they come into being, change, and pass away. To extinguish all degrees of finitude would again mean to extinguish multitude and di�erentiation of the universe. Thus finitude is not an evil in the sense of E�. However, the di�erent degrees of finitude may be interpreted as an evil in the sense of E�. This can be understood in a twofold way: first of the non-human things and organisms of this world in so far as they contribute to the higher good of order, multitude, and di�erentiation. Second, of the human species in so far as their finite life on this earth may contribute – according to almost all religions – to achieving the higher good of an eternal life after death.

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d) Definition of metaphysical evil (MetE) D 33. p e MetE ↔ [(p e E� ∨ p e E�) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃q)(q e World-Order ∧ gCond W(p, q))]

The state of a�airs p is a metaphysical evil i� p is an evil in the sense of E� or E� and not a moral evil (ME) and there is a state of a�airs q (it could also consist of a conjunction of states of a�airs) describing the world order such that God conditionally wills the occurrence of p as a necessary condition for obtaining q. Observe that if metaphysical evil p is a necessary consequence of world-order q, then this fact belongs to the theorems of (about) creation and, consequently, by theorem T47 is known by God as he knows any fact of (about) creation. e) Does God will metaphysical evil? A first point to observe is that those facts of creation that are willed by God are not necessarily willed by him and willed that they happen not necessarily, i.e. contingently. This is already stated by theorems T132 and T136. Secondly, God permits some evil because he wills some good for which this evil is a necessary condition. As Thomas Aquinas says: The evil of natural defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the good to which such evils are attached. Thus in willing justice He wills punishment; and in willing the preservation of the natural order, He wills some things to be naturally corrupted.�

We may also say that God wills some things conditionally. This is explained in the following section.

�.�.� God Wills some Things Conditionally D 34. gCond W(p, q) ↔ (∃r)[p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ gWq ∧ q e G ∧ (q → p) ∧ gPref(q, r) ∧ gPp]

God conditionally wills that (p, q) i� there is some good r of which p is the privation such that p is a necessary condition for the good (state of a�airs) q that is willed by God who prefers q over r and permits that p. Applying this definition to metaphysical evil (MetE), we can say: God permits the occurrence of MetE as a privation of some good (r) and as a necessary condition for a multitude of order and di�erentiation of the universe as a good (q) and preferring it over the good r of which MetE is the privation. In a similar way, God conditionally wills the finitude of the di�erent things in the universe. 7 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,9.

140 � 5 God is All-Good 1. Creatures will some things conditionally To will conditionally also happens in creatures such that the above definition holds analogously for living creatures x as well, including humans. The knowledge-operator K has to be relaxed appropriately in the direction of unconscious instinct and biological mechanism for lower living organisms: D 34.1. (∀x ∈ ls)xCondW(p, q) ↔ (∃r)[p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ xWq ∧ q e G ∧ xK(q → p) ∧ xPref(q, r) ∧ xAccepts p]

Example: Human creature x conditionally wills (p, q) i� there is a good state r (being uninjured) of which p (an operation) is a privation such that x knows that p is a necessary condition for the good state q (health) which x desires and x prefers q over r by accepting p. 2. Conditionally willing =� willing directly Observe that from gCondW(p, q), it follows that God wills that the good q occurs (gWq). However, it does not generally follow that God wills that p occurs (gWp), although it follows that God permits that p (an evil) occurs (gPp); the former, (gWp), does not follow because from the fact of creation that q → p (that the respective evil is necessary for achieving the respective good), it does not follow that God wills that this is the case. The reason is that there is no theorem of the sort (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gWp); on the contrary, the negation of this is a theorem (T217). Consequently, (∀p, q)[(q → p) ε T(CR) → gW(q → p)] does not hold generally either. On the other hand, it generally holds (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gPp), which follows from theorems T99 and T117. When applied to metaphysical evil (cf. T232), God wills world order as the global aim, but in order to achieve that, he may permit local defects without willing them directly (cf. definition D19). This situation is described by Thomas Aquinas: It is otherwise with one who has care of a particular thing, and one whose providence is universal, because a particular provider excludes all defects from what is subject to his care as far as he can; whereas, one who provides universally allows some little defect to remain, lest the good of the whole should be hindered.�

A similar situation may take place in the case of God’s punishment (cf. T236): God wills that justice is satisfied. God need not directly will the evil of punishment as a necessary condition for satisfying justice if the punishment occurs in this world. He may permit its happening as an evil (for the respective person) in this world caused by other creatures.

8 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 22,2 ad 2. Cf. section 4.6.4 above.

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�.�.� Natural Evil (NE) Natural evil (NE) comes in two modes: one is an evil in the sense of E� (see 5.2.1), the other an evil in the sense of E�, i.e. a su�cient cause for E�. But accidentally, NE can also be evil in the sense of E�. 1. Definitions The following definitions define NE via natural good (NG) for non-living systems and for living systems in the sense of E�. D 35.1. p e NG� ↔ p is a state or process of a non-living system (nls) and meeting p is necessary to increase order or to keep or regain order of nls relative to the environment of lns. Order and increasing order can be defined with the help of definitions of structure, environment, and decrease of entropy.� NG� will also be called basic good for non-living systems. D 35.2. p e NE� ↔ p is some lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some NG� of a nls

D 36.1. p e NG� ↔ p is a state or process of a living system or living creature (ls) and meeting p is necessary to stay alive or to keep or regain one’s health in the environment of ls�� NG� will also be called basic good for living systems or cratures.

D 36.2. p e NE� ↔ p is some lack, defect, absence, privation, or deficit of some NG� of a ls NE� will also be called basic evil for living systems or creatures.

D 37.1. p e NG ↔ (p e NG� ∨ p e NG� ) D 37.2. p e NE ↔ (p e NE� ∨ p e NE� )

2. Examples Examples of natural evils NE� : Natural disasters, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, tsunamis, tornadoes, floods, climate changes . . . etc.

9 We need not to go into these details here. For such definitions, see Weingartner (2015b), ch. 5. Cf. also Bunge (1979), ch. 1. 10 Cf. the definitions in Bunge (1989), p. 35 and Weingartner (2015b), p. 66.

142 � 5 God is All-Good Such NE� are not necessarily evils in the sense of E� generally since they are not always lacks of a particular good that ought to be present. But they are lacks of goods in the sense of NG� , i.e. lacks of a particular order, and in this restricted sense, they are evils in the sense of E�. Moreover, they are usually also evils in the sense of E�, causing lots of evils NE� for living organisms, and they may be evils in the sense of E�, i.e. serving to achieve another (some times even higher) good. For instance, volcanic earth is very fertile, and the flood of the Nil was responsible for the fertility of the Egyptian land. But even killing most of the members of a species and selecting some may lead to a group of fittest individuals according to the theory of evolution: A species perfectly adapted to its environment may be destroyed by a change of the latter if no hereditary variability is available in the hour of need. Evolutionary plasticity can be purchased only at the ruthlessly dear price of continuously sacrifying some individuals to death from unfavourable mutations��

Examples of natural evils NE� : Pain, ache agony, diseases, hunger, monster, freak, psychosis . . . etc. Such evils are called “physical evils” by Leibniz, who makes a threefold distinction between metaphysical evil, physical evil, and moral evil in his Theodicy.�� Natural evils NE� are certainly evils in the sense of E�, i.e. some lack or deficit of a particular good NG� that ought to be present. NE� can also be E� evils if one disease su�ciently causes another. However, nothing hinders such evils from being – under a certain aspect – evils in the sense of E�: pain – viewed as a symptom – may help to diagnose the illness and find a therapy. Or in a symbiosis, one deprives the other of some good and vice versa, and under this aspect, it means evil to the other. But one also gives to the other some necessary good and vice versa, and under this aspect, the symbiosis leads to some higher good, i.e. the unity of giving and taking. Thus, the evil in a symbiosis is evil in the sense of E�. 3. Formal Definitions The following are more formal definitions of natural evil, when definitions D35.1 and D36.1 for NG� and NG� are presupposed: D 38.1. p e NE� ↔ [(p e E� ∧ p e Priv(NG� ) ∧ NG� is a state of order) ∧ (p e E� ∨ (p e E� ∧ (∃q)(q e G ∧ q → p))) ∧ ¬(p e ME)]

D 38.2. p e NE� ↔ [(p e E� ∧ p e Priv(NG� ) ∧ NG� is a state of life or health) ∧ (p e E� ∨ (p e E� ∧ (∃q)(q e G ∧ q → p))) ∧ ¬(p e ME)]

11 Dobzhansky (1937), p. 126f. Cf. Rees (2001). 12 Leibniz (Theo), §21.

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p e Priv(NG) . . . p is a privation of a natural good Translated into natural language, these definitions say: p is a natural evil NE� i� p is an evil E� that is a privation of a natural good NG� and that good is a state of order and p is an evil E� (i.e. a cause of some evil E�) or p is an evil E� (i.e. a necessary condition for achieving a good q) and p is not a moral evil. Observe that p may be both, an evil E� (say an earthquake) and an evil E� (a su�cient cause for other evils in the sense of E�). Moreover p may be both, an evil E� (say a flooding of a river) and an evil E� (a cause for agricultural fertility as it was in case of Nil). p is a natural evil NE� i� p is an evil E� that is a privation of a natural good NG� and that good is a state of life or health and p is either an evil E� (i.e. a cause of some evil E�) or p is an evil E� (i.e. a necessary condition for achieving some good q) and p is not a moral evil. Like above p may be both, an evil E� (say an illness) and an evil E� (a cause for a further illness). Moreover p may be both, an evil E� (an illness the body is able to overcome) and an evil E� (a cause for improving the immune-system). Observe that both natural evil NE� and NE� , although they are not moral evils themselves, can be caused by moral evil produced by humans: thus, today’s earthquakes and tsunamis may be caused by subterranean atom bomb tests conducted by China (and probably by the USA and Russia as well) for decades. Similarly, pain, diseases, and freaks may be caused by hate, torture, gluttony, conception under alcohol, or drugs . . . etc. 4. Does God will natural evil? It has been defended in section 4.4 (and 4.4.1, 4.4.2) that God wills the cooperation of creatures, and for that reason, he has given them the dignity of causality. God knows that all his creatures are imperfect, although they possess di�erent levels of perfection; this means that he entrusts and invites even imperfect creatures to contribute to the happenings and development of the universe. It is quite clear from the beginning that imperfect creatures make mistakes. The imperfect creatures understood as causes of e�ects in the universe have been called secondary causes by medieval philosophers, in contradistinction to God as the first cause. God as the first cause is understood as satisfying axioms A15 and A17 but not as all-causing (theorem T226) since he employs his creatures as his coadjutors (cf. theorems T144-147, T157-158, T244-246, T249-252, T255-259). Creatures as secondary causes produce a lot of good things but also some “bad” things in the sense of being a lack, defect, or deficit of some particular good that ought to be present (E�). This begins on the lowest level of non-living things.

144 � 5 God is All-Good For example, a growing crystal may not achieve his specific crystalline structure. An earthquake destroys a lot of particular order in nature and is therefore an evil E�. Moreover, it is an evil E� relative to what evil E� it causes. On the level of living things, there is learning, and that means trial and error. Errors lead to biological costs which may cause pain and su�ering, even death. However, errors and biological costs may also lead to better adaptation, better health, and learning from mistakes, i.e. to a higher good. In this case, the evils E� of pain and su�ering from errors serve to achieve a higher good and can be interpreted as evils in the sense of E�. The answer to the above question is: God need not will or cause natural evil since he is neither all-willing nor all-causing (theorems T223-226 and definitions D31 and D31.1). That means he may keep o� his will – from several natural evil and leave it to creatures to cause natural good and natural evil. Although God is always concerned with any evil or good of creatures by his providence�� and by being a necessary cause for everything that happens in creation according to axiom A17. And concerning several natural good and evil, God wills that creatures be active themselves by causing natural good and by avoiding natural evil (cf. axioms A23, 25, 26). This is the domain of natural desire in humans and higher animals. Concerning humans, it is the basis for natural right. However, God may will and cause some higher good for which a natural evil is necessary such that he permits the latter to occur. In addition to that, God may conditionally will and cause natural evil for humans with a special purpose: 1. God may conditionally cause natural NE� as a means against failing the ultimate goal of man, which is eternal life. This evil was called soul-making evil (SE) by John Hick.�� 2. God may conditionally cause natural evil NE� or NE� as just punishment (PE) as a means to satisfy justice including the evil predicted at the end of the world. However, in both cases this “natural evil” is good at least in the sense of being just and preferable for the respective persons, even if it seems to be evil in a subjective sense. The upshot is: some natural evil is neither willed nor caused by God. For some other natural evil, God wills that creatures avoid it. Again some other natural evil is conditionally willed and caused by God.

13 For providence, see Weingartner (2015b) and section 4.6 above. 14 Hick (1977), part III.

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�.�.� Necessary Evil (NecE) The universe consists of a huge number of necessary evil in order to achieve a huge number of natural (basic) goods. For example, the process of selection and adaptation in evolution makes it necessary that many sperm and egg cells and also individuals die and even that some species die out. Or in order to achieve di�erent kinds of strength, diseases of living organisms (including children’s diseases) are necessary evil, and so is struggling for food and shelter, fighting for life of all living organisms.�� Natural selection has costs – physical pain – but these are costs that must be paid.��

1. Definition of Necessary Evil D 39. p e NecE ↔ [p e E� ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃q)(q e NG ∧ (q → p))]

p is a necessary evil i� p is an evil in the sense of E� and not a moral evil; but p is necessary for achieving or protecting a natural good. 2. Examples of necessary evil: Struggling for food is a necessary evil for animals and for a great number of humans in order to stay alive. The biological costs connected with the learning process by trial and error of living organisms are necessary evil in order to achieve a higher-level good by learning a better way and by learning from mistakes. Surgery that is necessary in order to regain one’s health is a necessary evil. Prison is a necessary evil for a murderer if it is what is necessary to protect other people that could be killed by him. Death penalty cannot be a necessary evil according to definition D39 because it is hardly defensible that it is necessary for achieving or protecting a natural good. For the same reason, hunger cannot be a necessary evil because it is not necessary for achieving or protecting a natural good. It may partially even be a moral evil and caused by a moral evil of egoism and profit or of laziness. It will be clear from the examples of natural evil and those of necessary evil that some natural evils are necessary evils (for example, biological costs). Moreover, some necessary evils are natural evils (for example, certain diseases where overcoming them strengthens the immune system). However, some natural evils are not necessary evils (for example: earthquakes, diseases, hunger). And

15 Cf. Dobzhansky (1937), p. 126f. See note 11 above. 16 Ruse (2001), p. 134.

146 � 5 God is All-Good furthermore, some necessary evils are not natural evils (for example, surgery to regain one’s health). 3. Does God Will necessary evil? As has been said in section 4.4, God wills the cooperation of creatures (cf. theorems T144-147, T244-246, T249-252, T255-259) and wills their conservation for their appropriate time (cf. theorems T170 and T175). Therefore, he also wills that his creatures cause su�ciently and with his help as a necessary cause those natural goods (NG) for the achievement of which creatures have to accept some necessary evil. Therefore, since God wills that his creatures cause and will and act accordingly to reach their natural goods (NG), God permits the respective necessary evil.

�.�.� Legitimate Evil (LE) Legitimate evil will be defined via legitimate good (LG) of human persons. Such goods can be chosen freely provided some restrictions which are based on human rights are satisfied. 1. Definitions D 40.1. p e LG ↔ p is a state or process (activity) of a human person x that is a desired good of x living in society d and p can be met in d (a) without preventing the satisfaction of any natural good (basic good) NG� (D36.1) of any member of d and without doing natural evil (basic evil) NE� to any of the members of d (b) without endangering the integrity of any valuable subsystem of d, much less that of d as a whole. D 40.2. p e LE ↔ p is a state or process (activity) of a human person living in society d that is a lack or deficit of some legitimate good LG; p is neither a natural nor a moral evil (ME), and p is necessary to achieve or protect some legitimate good LG in d D 40.3. (∀x∈�)[p e LE(x) ↔[p e E� ∧ ¬(p e NE) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃q)((q e LG(x) ∨ (∃y∈�)(x =� y ∧ q e LG(y))) ∧ (q → p)) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands))]]

p is a legitimate evil for a human person x i� p is an evil in the sense of E� and neither a natural evil nor a moral evil, but p is necessary for achieving or protecting a legitimate good q for x himself or for some other human person(s) y and p is consistent with God’s commands. In the case of the legitimate evil being the bungling and botching of a beginner x while learning some handicraft, the legitimate good (q), i.e. a certain level of

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expertise in that handicraft, is a good achieved by x himself. If the legitimate evil is the being in prison of a murderer x, the legitimate good (q) achieved might be the protection of the life of some other person(s) y, though q could also be the good of expiation of the murderer x. In cases where the legitimate evil (as criticism, reprimand) is accepted by x, one may replace q → p in D40.3 by the more detailed: xCondW(p, q) (D34.1). 2. Examples of legitimate evil Education is a high legitimate good. To achieve it, execution of school attendance is sometimes necessary. The bungling and botching of apprentices (beginners) is a legitimate evil in the process of learning. Expropriation can be legitimate evil in certain situations. Just (human) punishment is an important case of legitimate evil. Note that circumstances can turn a legitimate good (to go on holiday) into an illegitimate one depending on the right time. Or they can turn an illegitimate evil (depriving somebody of freedom) into a legitimate evil (prison) if the person has committed some crime. 3. Does God will legitimate evil? It has already been said (section 4.4) that God wills the cooperation of creatures. This pertains in a special way to creatures endowed with rationality, i.e. humans since they are able to rationally and freely decide what is good and best for them and their environment. Since legitimate goods of humans belong to the domain of their free decision, God need not interfere concerning human’s free choice. The same holds for legitimate evil which has to satisfy principles of human right, chosen again rationally by humans. Thus, concerning legitimate evil, God leaves the decision to humans whom he has endowed with rationality and free will.

�.�.� Soul-Making Evil (SE) The concept of soul-making evil was reintroduced by John Hick.�� It can be described as follows: 1. The Status of Men in this World The status of men in this world is not a final one. It is the status of pilgrimage in order to reach a final state of happiness, or in other words the state of men in this world is a state of probation or of crucial test for becoming worthy for the final state of happiness. If this is true, a (human) life in this world without su�ering 17 Hick (1977), part III. The idea is not new as biblical documents show (see 5.3.9 (3) below). But the educational function of God’s providence and grace is important.

148 � 5 God is All-Good would even be a strange thing. For in this case the probation would be cheap and the test not very serious. Such a life would be a kind of counterexample which would prove that the above theory about the status of men in this world is not true because this theory – accepted by all of the five great religions – assumes that happiness without any su�ering is a possible state after this life, but not a possible state in this life. 2. Faith According to all five main religions, the ultimate goal of mankind (final state of happiness) is not of this world (does not lie in this world). But it can be reached by living an appropriate life in this world together with the help (grace) of God. The explicit help of God by giving his grace is a doctrine of at least the Old and New Testament. At least according to the three Abrahamic religions, faith (religious belief) is one important necessary condition – as a contribution from the side of man – for reaching the ultimate goal. However, being without sin or without guilt is not a necessary condition because it is a condition which cannot be fulfilled in any case by any human; otherwise, Christ, who came to save men from sin, would be a liar. Thus, unbelief is a most serious danger of failing the ultimate goal. If God, who o�ers the ultimate goal (final state of happiness) to every man, is a God of love and is almighty, it seems that he could change unbelief into belief. But this is not the case because then he would interfere with men’s free will, and his own will would be inconsistent, having created men with free will. Therefore, belief needs an assent (consent) of free will as a necessary component. And thus, no human person can be forced by anyone (not even by God) to believe religiously or not to believe religiously. What else then could God do in order to rouse men (shake them into action) from their unbelief without interfering with his free will? One possibility is to send him evil in order to “open his eyes”. Evil of any kind not caused by men or partially caused by men may lead to some purification and may even have the additional good consequence of giving him the opportunity to work out a part of his guilt at the same time: The evils that press on us in this world force us to go to God.��

3. Definition of Soul-Making Evil D 41. (∀x∈�)[p e SE(x) ↔ [(p e E�(x) ∨ p e E�(x)) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ GG(g, x) ∧ (∃q)(q e EtH(x) ∧ (q → p) ∧ (xWq ∧ xAq ∧ xAccepts p ∧ Cons({q} ∪ T(g-Justice))) → gCondW(p, q))]] 18 Gregory the Great (Evang),(MPL), 76,370.

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p is a soul-making evil for human creature x i� p is an evil E� or E� and not a moral evil and God gives grace to x; and it holds for some states of a�airs q: q is the state of eternal happiness (EtH) of x (for which p is a necessary condition) and if x wills that q and acts in such a way as to obtain q and accepts p and q is compatible with God’s justice then God conditionally wills p for q (cf. D34). GG(g, x) . . . God gives grace to x p e E�(x) . . . p is an evil in the sense of E� for (of) x p e E�(x) . . . p is an evil in the sense E� for (of) x Observe that the soul-making evil may not be understood as an evil in the sense of E� (serving the highest good of eternal life) by person x – at least not at the beginning when it should rouse x; although it is an evil E� in an objective sense and may be understood in this function by person x later on. 4. Does God will Soul-Making Evil? It is clear from the description in 1. and 2. and further form the definition D41 above that God conditionally wills soul-making evil since he wills the eternal happiness of human creatures under the condition that this is compatible with his justice and that humans will it and act in such a way as to obtain it and accept (put up with) soul-making evil as necessary for it.

�.�.� God’s Punishment (PE) 1. Punishment Punishment in general and God’s punishment is concerned specifically with human creatures endowed with intellect and free will. A rational or intellectual nature in comparison with other creatures is related in a special way to good and evil because every other creature is naturally ordered to some particular good, but only an intellectual nature, by means of the intellect, grasps the universal nature of good and is moved to good universally by the appetite of the will. And therefore evil in the rational creature is divided by a special division into fault and punishment.�� There are two evils of the rational creature: one by which it is voluntarily alienated from the supreme good, the other by which it is punished against its will.��

With respect to the just agent (judge, God) and the restitution of justice, punishment is something good. But with respect to the person who is punished, punishment is evil. This is the case because punishment is some su�ering from 19 Thomas Aquinas (Mal), 1,4. 20 Augustine (DFP), 21,64. (MPL) 40,773.

150 � 5 God is All-Good outside, i.e. against the will of the person who is punished since this person is deprived from his own good (for instance from freedom or from possession or from some gift) to which everyone’s will is inclined. Thus, just punishment is something good in the objective sense – something on which those persons punished who regret their deeds agree, despite of feeling the punishment as subjective evil. 2. Definition of just punishment by God D 42. (∀x∈�)[p e PE(x) ↔ [(p e E�(x) ∨ p e E�(x)) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃r)(xWr ∧ xAr ∧ r e ME) ∧ (∃q)(qεT(g-Justice) ∧ gCondW(p, q))]]

p is an evil of God’s punishment for x i�: p is an evil in the sense of E� or E� for x, p is not a moral evil, there is a moral evil r such that x willed it and acted in order to bring it about and for some q, q belongs to the theorems of God’s Justice (or: follows from them) and God wills his justice and as a consequence conditionally that p. 3. Does God will his punishment? As follows from definition D42, God conditionally wills his punishment for person x under the condition that it is necessary for satisfying God’s justice. Cf. section 5.5.6. Punishment in so far as it satisfies justice is good. Since God’s punishment always satisfies justice, it is therefore good. Punishment as it is compared to the subject is evil inasmuch as it deprives the subject in some way; but according as it is compared to the agent who inflicts the punishment, it sometimes has the nature of good, when the one who inflicts the punishment does so for the sake of justice.��

As Thomas Aquinas says, punishment is an evil for the subject, and that is expressed in definition D42 as p e E�(x). However, if the subject (person) is mature enough, he(she) may regret the moral evil committed and may accept the punishment for the sake of justice. In this case, the punishment is an evil in the sense of E� for him(her), i.e. p e E�(x). In addition to individual inflictions, God may punish whole nations or peoples of the whole world if their sins and unconcern about God are a crying shame.

21 Thomas Aquinas (Mal), 1,4 ad 9.

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�.�.� Undeserved Evil (UE) 1. The paradigm case of undeserved evil is the book Job in the Old Testament. Job’s friends who intended to console Job did not in fact console him because they believed in the general validity of the principle: if pain (evil), then guilt. And so they accused Job to have charged upon himself some guilt by sinning in some way. Job himself was in despair because he also believed in the validity of that principle on the one hand but knew on the other that he had not committed a sin and was innocent. According to this principle, there is no undeserved evil since it follows from the above principle (by contraposition): if there is no guilt (sin) then there is no evil (su�ering, pain). We shall call the above principle the evil-guilt principle. The apostles also believed in this principle when they asked Jesus concerning the man who was blind from birth: Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents . . . neither this man nor his parents sinned, said Jesus (Jn 9,2-3).

The evil-guilt principle was not only refuted by Job’s story as a general valid principle, but it was refuted in a much higher degree by Jesus Christ. In this sense, Job was an imperfect forerunner of Christ. There is innocent su�ering, there is undeserved evil. And this fact is just the negation of the evil-guilt principle. 2. There is a further continuation of the evil-guilt principle by the following principle which may be called the guilt-punishment principle: If there is guilt (sin), there should be (must be) punishment. The Pharisees presupposed this as a universally valid principle as is clear from Jn 8,4-11, but Jesus refutes it by not punishing: ‘Teacher, this woman was caught in the act of adultery. In the Law Moses commanded us to stone such woman. Now what do you say?’ . . . But Jesus bent down and started to write on the ground with his finger. When they kept on questioning him, he straightened up and said to them, ‘Let any one of you who is without sin be the first to throw a stone at her.’ Again he stooped down and wrote on the ground.�� At this, those who heard began to go away one at a time, the older ones first until only Jesus was left, with the woman still standing there. Jesus straightened up and asked her. Woman, where are they? Has no one condemned you? ‘No one, sir,’ she said. ‘Then neither do I condemn you,’ Jesus declared. ‘Go now and leave your life of sin.’

From connecting the two (wrong) principles, it follows logically that if there is evil (su�ering, pain), there is punishment because every evil implies guilt ac-

22 According to patristic commentators, Jesus wrote down the names of those Pharisees accusing her who also committed adultery.

152 � 5 God is All-Good cording to the evil-guilt principle. From this the following invalid generalization is often made: Every evil (su�ering, pain) is an evil of punishment. Since both premises are wrong, this conclusion is not proved by these premises. However, it is easy to see that this conclusion: “Every evil (pain or other) is a punishment” is also refuted by Job and by Christ; Job’s su�ering was a hard test and Christ freely took over his su�ering as the redeemer (see theorems T347, T394, T428 below). Job did not agree to undeserved su�ering. One reason was that he did not see any higher purpose in it. Christ came as Messiah, as Redeemer to save mankind from their sins. Here, the higher purpose was given from the beginning. Saints accepted and consciously willed undeserved evil in the Imitation of Christ. 3. Definition of Undeserved Evil D 43. (∀x ∈ �)[p e UE(x) ↔ [p e E(x) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ ¬(p e SE) ∧ ¬(p e PE) ∧ (∀r)(r e ME → xHB(¬xWr ∧ ¬xAr)) ∧ ((∃q)xCondW(p, q) ∨ (∃q)gCondW(p, q) ∨ gPp) ∧ (∃q)(q e REW(x) ∧ q → p)]]

p is an undeserved evil of (for) x i� p is an evil for x and p is neither a moral evil nor a soul-making evil, nor an evil of God’s punishment; and according to what x honestly believes x did not will nor act in such a way as to bring about a moral evil; and x himself conditionally wills this undeserved evil or God conditionally wills it or God permits it; and there is a reward q for x for which the undeserved evil is necessary. 4. Does God will undeserved evil? If we take the prologue (Job 1,1-2,7) and the epilogue (Job 42,7-17) into consideration, then it appears that Job’s su�ering was an infliction and test which was finally passed and survived by Job. From this it is clear that God conditionally willed Job’s undeserved evil. The higher purpose was Job’s purification and stamina which was honoured highly in the end. In the case of Christ’s su�ering as a redeemer it is manifest that it was God’s will and Christ’s will, which is evident from numerous passages in the New Testament (Mt 26,40; Lk 22,42; Jn 3,16; 17,4). Saints freely will and accept undeserved evil, and thus God at least permits its occurrence, not interfering in the free will of saints but possibly supporting them with grace and in the end with reward. Concerning the numerous other undeserved evils in this world: God permits them. One has to observe, however, that many necessary evils are also undeserved evil but still necessary in order to achieve higher order, structure, and value. Thus, for example, biological costs have to be paid in every process of selection, adaptation and learning. This concerns all living organisms, humans included (cf. 5.2.4). There are also lots of undeserved evils which are unnecessary. For example hunger, war,

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polluted air, polluted water. They are due to mistakes of humans, partially caused by imperfectness and ignorance, but partially by egoism, corruption, crime, quarrel, prejudice, destruction of peace . . . etc. Among these, several people, like children and mothers, are in no way involved in moral mistakes here. They su�er from undeserved evil caused by others or by other peoples. God wills the cooperation of creatures and in a specific way the cooperation of human creatures whom he has endowed with causal power and free will. Since God cannot will to destroy men’s free will decisions without being inconsistent, he invites them to contribute freely in a most positive way according to their intelligence and ingenuity and according to his commands and advices on the one hand; however, on the other, God also has to permit them to sabotage by causing moral evil and other evil. However, God may prevent lots of possible actions of sabotage of which we are ignorant.

�.� Axioms and Theorems Concerning Types of Evils We assume that all the eight kinds of evil described in sections 5.2.2 and 5.2.4-5.2.9 exist in the world (universe) and on earth. Since no existence-axioms follow from our definitions, the existence of these kinds of evil is not explicitly stated. The definitions describe the properties of the respective kinds of evil but do not claim existence. For moral evil, its existence is stated by axiom A20. For the other types of evils, it is stated by axiom A22: A 22. (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e MetE) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e NE� ) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e NE� ) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e NecE) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e LE) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e SE) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e PE) ∧ (∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e UE) �.�.� Metaphysical Evil, Soul-Making Evil, Evil of Punishment T 232. (∀p)(∃q)(p e MetE → gCondW(p, q)) D33 If p is a metaphysical evil then God conditionally wills p as a consequence of willing some state of a�airs q. T 233. (∀p)(∃q)[p e MetE → (∃r)(p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ gWq ∧ q e G ∧ q is the world-order ∧ (q → p) ∧ gPref(q, r))] D33, D34 If p is a metaphysical evil then God wills the World-Order q which is a (great) good and since p is a consequence of it (q) he prefers q over the good r of which p is the privation.

154 � 5 God is All-Good T 234. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e SE(x) → ((p e E�(x) ∨ p e E�(x)) ∧ GG(g, x))] D41 If p is a soul-making evil for x then p is an evil E� or an evil E� for x and God gives grace to x. T 235. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[p e SE(x) → (∃q)[q e EtH(x) ∧ (q → p) ∧ (xWq ∧ xAq ∧ xAccepts p ∧ Cons({q} ∪ T(g-Justice))) → gCondW(p, q)]] D41 If p is a soul-making evil for x then there is a state q of eternal happiness for x such that if x wills it and acts in such a way as to obtain it and if it (q) is compatible with God’s Justice then God conditionally wills that soul making evil (cf. D34). T 236. (∀p)(∃q)(p e PE → gCondW(p, q)) D42 If p is an evil of God’s punishment then God conditionally wills p as a consequence of willing some state of a�airs q (justice). T 237. (∀p)(∃q)(∀x ∈ �)[p e PE(x) → (¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃r)(xWr ∧ xAr ∧ r e ME) ∧ gWq ∧ q e G ∧ q ε T(g-Justice) ∧ (q → p))] D42, D34 If p is an evil of God’s punishment then p is not a moral evil but there is a moral evil r committed by willing and acting of human creatures x and God wills the good of God’s justice which implies the evil of God’s punishment p for x as a necessary condition. T 238. (∀p)[(p e MetE ∨ p e PE) → (∃q)(gCondW(p, q))] T232, T236 If p is a metaphysical evil or an evil of God’s punishment then God conditionally wills that p under the condition of some state of a�airs q.

�.�.� Natural Good and Natural Evil 1. Natural Good NG� and Natural Evil NE� A 23. (∀p)(∀x ∈ cr)[p e NG� (x) → [(gCp ∨ (∃y ∈ cr)gWyCSp) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃z∈cr)gPzCSp ∧ (∃z∈cr)gPzCS¬p))]]

If p is a natural good NG� for creature x then God causes that p occurs or God wills that some creature y causes (pt-su�ciently) that p and if God keeps o� his will from the occurrence of p then he permits that some creature z causes that p obtains and also permits that some other creature z causes that non-p obtains; i.e. if God keeps o� his will, he permits that creatures cause either way. Observe that it is not ruled out that y = x (Cf. D35.1). A 24. (∀p)(p e NG ↔ ¬p e Priv(NG))

p is a natural good NG i� non-p is the privation of that natural good NG.

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Commentary on axiom A24: Natural goods NG� are restricted to an appropriate time. Thus, life is a natural good NG� of living organisms for an appropriate time depending on the respective species, not for ever. Within the life-time up to the lower limit (lime-tree 1000-2000 years; horse 30-60; humans in developed countries 60-100), absence of life is a privation. Outside this appropriate time of the respective species, the absence of life is not a privation of a natural good NG� of that species. In an analogous way, natural goods NG� of non-living systems are restricted to an appropriate time. For example, stars do not live forever and they keep a high degree of order and a low entropy for an appropriate time, although this time consists of billions of years. Thus, the solar system has been having a high degree of order, harmony, and stability which may be called a natural good NG� for about four billion years and will keep this order for another three to four billion years. Outside this “life-time”, the absence of order is not a privation of that natural good NG� . Therefore, a natural evil NE� or NE� is a privation of a natural good NG� or NG� if it occurs within the appropriate time. Outside this time, there is no privation and consequently no natural evil. This concerns the subsequent theorems. However, we do not introduce time-indices here in order to not complicate matter beyond necessity. T 239. (∀p)(p e NG� ↔ ¬p e Priv(NG� ))

T 240. (∀p)(p e NG� ↔ ¬p e Priv(NG� ))

A24, instantiation A24, instantiation

T 241. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(p e NG(x) ↔ ¬p e Priv(NG(x)))

A24, instantiation

T 242. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(p e NE� (x) → p e Priv(NG� (x))) D38.1 If p is a natural evil NE� for x then p is a privation of NG� for x

T 243. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(p e Priv(NG� (x)) → ¬p e NG� (x)) A24 If p is the privation of a natural good NG� of x then non-p is a natural good NG� of x. Example: Destruction and conservation of a crystal structure T 244. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)[¬p e NG� (x) → [(gC¬p ∨ (∃y∈cr)gWyCS¬p) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃z∈cr)gPzCS¬p ∧ (∃z∈cr)gPzCSp))]] A23 p/¬p

T 245. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)[p e NE� (x) → [(gC¬p ∨ (∃y∈cr)gWyCS¬p) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃z∈cr)gPzCS¬p ∧ (∃z∈cr)gPzCSp))]] T242, T243, T244 If p is a natural evil NE� of x then God causes that non-p (i.e. prevents p) or wills that some creature y (where it may be that y = x) causes (pt-su�ciently) that non-p obtains and if God keeps o� his will then he permits that some creature

156 � 5 God is All-Good z causes (pt-su�ciently) that this natural evil NE� does not obtain and he also permits that some other creature z causes that this natural evil obtains. Observe that if some creature causes su�ciently (CS) that p, it can only partially su�cient cause i.e. a creature alone can never su�ciently (in a complete sense) bring something about (cf. section 4.4.1 above). As axiom A15 says, every causation of a creature leads to the e�ect only with the help of God’s necessary (but not su�cient) causation (cf. also axiom A17). It follows from theorem T245 that God permits that creatures cause pt-su�ciently some natural evil in cases where he keeps o� his will from such states of a�airs. The reason is that God wills the cooperation of all his creatures and therefore leaves the causation for some events to them. The expression “if God keeps o� his will” . . . (then creatures may act either way) must not be misunderstood. It occurs on three levels referring to natural goods NG� (axiom A23 and T244, T245), to natural goods NG� (axiom A25, T249 for living creatures), and to natural goods NG for humans (axiom A26, T255, T258). To avoid misunderstanding, the following four points have to be kept in mind: (i) That God keeps o� his will concerning certain occurring states of a�airs does not a�ect God’s providence. According to theorem T126, every fact (occurring state of a�airs) of creation comes under God’s providence. Consequently, this also holds for occurring moral evil, although this does not belong to God’s plan but to the execution of his plan, which incorporates all imperfect creatures. (cf. definitions D26 and D27). (ii) Moreover, for every fact of creation it holds that nothing escapes God’s will or permission (cf. theorem T100). (iii) However, there are some facts of creation, as certain evils, like moral evils, that God does not will and does not prevent with his will (so as to not interfere with man’s free will); that is, God keeps his will o� it, but permits it (cf. theorem T211). He also keeps his su�cient causation o� it, whereas his necessary causation (which underlies every fact) is always present according to axioms A15 and A17. (iv) If God interfered with his will in every occurring fact, he would be all-willing (cf. definition D31), which is refuted by the fact of moral evil (cf. theorems T223 and T225). 2. Natural Good NG� and Natural Evil NE� Concerning living creatures, God wills their cooperation to a higher degree than concerning non-living creatures. This is especially the case w.r.t. natural goods NG� of living creatures which are essential to them, like staying alive and keeping or regaining health. Of these natural goods, God wills that they are

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willed and brought about by their actions. In this sense, God created natural inclinations in them for natural goods NG� , like staying alive and keeping and regaining health. This is expressed by the following axiom A25: A 25. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)[p e NG� (x) → ((gWxWp ∧ gWxCSp) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃y∈ls)gPyCSp ∧ (∃z∈ls)gPzCS¬p)))]

If p is a natural good NG� for living creature x then God wills that x wills and causes pt-su�ciently that p occurs and if God keeps o� his will from the occurrence of p then he permits some living creature y that it causes that p and permits that some other living creature z causes that non-p; Observe that it is not ruled out that y = x. (Cf. D36.1).

T 246. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)[p e NG� (x) → (xWp ∧ xCSp)]

A25, T86, T148

Theorem T246 says that if p is a natural good NG� for a living creature x then that creature wills that p occurs and causes pt-su�ciently that p occurs. This inclination and causing of x concerning the natural good NG� of x has been implanted into living creatures by God and is the basis for a theory of natural good or natural right. Observe that the natural inclination does not imply that p obtains. Neither from gWxWp or gWxCSp nor from xWp or xCSp does it follow that p obtains. It would follow only with the help of God as a necessary cause (axiom A15). Recall what has been said about creatures as God’s coadjutors in section 4.4.2 (after theorems T148-149, T150-151) and 4.4.3 (after theorem T157). T 247. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)(p e NE� (x) → p e Priv(NG� (x))) D38.2 If p is a natural evil NE� for x then p is the privation of a natural good NG� for x

T 248. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)(p e Priv(NG� (x)) → ¬p e NG� (x))

A24

T 249. (∀p)(∀x ∈ ls)[p e NE� (x) → [(gWxW¬p ∧ gWxCS¬p) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃y∈ls)gPyCS¬p ∧ (∃z∈ls)gPzCSp))]] T247, 248, A25 p/¬p If p is a natural evil NE� then God wills that living creature x wills and causes ptsu�ciently to avoid it (p), and if God keeps o� his will from the non-occurrence (or occurrence) of p then he permits that some living creature y causes that NE� does not occur and also permits that some other living creature z causes that p (NE� ) occurs. T 250. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)[p e NE� (x) → (gWxW¬p ∧ gWxCS¬p)] T249 Concerning natural evil NE� of living creature x, God wills that creature x by his willing and causing avoids natural evil NE� . As an e�ect of God’s will, all living creatures are willing and causing ptsu�ciently that the respective natural evil NE� does not occur; and this they do

158 � 5 God is All-Good by natural inclination, since natural evil NE� is a danger to loose the natural goods NG� (basic goods) of life and health (cf. section 5.2.4). This is expressed by theorem T251: T 251. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)(p e NE� (x) → (xW¬p ∧ xCS¬p))

T250, T86, T148

Observe however that creature’s willing and causing is not always successful. If it is, i.e. if reaching the goal of the natural good NG� becomes a fact, then God helped as a necessary cause as it is described by axiom A17.

3. God’s Task for Humans Concerning Natural Good and Evil God wills the cooperation of humans in a special manner: since human creatures have a specific control over their actions concerning their natural goods and evils and concerning their environment through their rationality and free will. Although the natural goods like survival, health, living in a society, increasing knowledge according to abilities and interests (cf. the first sentence of Aristotle’s metaphysics) and receiving and giving love cannot be chosen freely themselves, but are willed by natural inclination, the means to achieve them can , and are a special task for human creatures. For unspecified states of a�airs God’s will w.r.t. men is already stated in theorems T157 and T158. With the specification to natural goods it is expressed by axiom A26: A 26. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e NG(x) → [(gWxWp ∧ gWxSAp) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃y∈�)gPyCSp ∧ (∃z∈�)gPzCS¬p))]]

If p is a natural good NG for (human person) x, then God wills that x wills that p occurs and God wills that x should act in such a way that p occurs; and if God keeps o� his will from p then God permits that some human y causes (pt-su�ciently) that p occurs and he also permits that some other human z causes that non-p occurs (x = y is not ruled out). T 252. (∀p)(∀x∈�)(p e NG(x) → (xWp ∧ xSAp))

A26, T86

Theorem T252 says that all men will their natural goods by natural inclination but should act (through their free will and with their rational consideration) in such a way that this natural good is achieved. The second part concerning the task or obligation cannot be required from all living creatures and is therefore absent in axiom A25. Observe further that here natural good NG is not restricted to natural good NG� since humans may also will and have the task to act in such a way as to preserve and regain natural goods of their non-living environment. For example, it is

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one of the tasks of mankind to preserve or regain clean air and clean water since these are necessary preconditions for their natural basic goods of life and health. T 253. (∀p)(∀x∈�)(p e NE(x) → p e Priv(NG(x)))

T 254. (∀p)(∀x∈�)(p e Priv(NG(x)) → ¬p e NG(x))

D37.2, D38.1, D38.2 A24

T 255. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[p e NE(x) → [(gWxW¬p ∧ gWxSA¬p) ∧ ((¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃y∈�)gPyCS¬p ∧ (∃z∈�)gPzCSp))]] A26, T253, T254 If p is a natural evil for human creature x, then God wills that x wills to avoid it (p) and that x should act in such a way as to avoid it (p), and if God keeps o� his will from the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of p then he permits that some human creature y causes (pt-su�ciently) that non-p occurs and also permits that some other human creature z causes that p obtains. T 256. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e NE(x) → (gWxW¬p ∧ gWxSA¬p)]

T255

T 257. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e NE(x) → (xW¬p ∧ xSA¬p)] T256, T86 Concerning natural evil NE of human creatures, God wills that humans are willing to avoid it, and he wills that humans should act in such a way as to avoid it (T256); moreover, humans are willing (by natural inclination) to avoid it and humans should (ought to ) act in such a way as to avoid it (T257). T 258. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[p e NE(x) → [(¬gWp ∧ ¬gW¬p) → ((∃y ∈ cr)gPyCS¬p ∧ (∃z∈cr)gPzCSp)]] T245, T249, T255 God need not will or cause any natural evil NE; i.e. if he keeps o� his will from it he permits some creature to do (cause) either way. Theorem T258 leaves open the question as to which creature it is that may cause natural evil if God keeps o� his will. It may be one or several non-living creatures of the universe which work as imperfect secondary causes. It may be one or several living creatures acting as imperfect secondary causes. It may be one or several human creatures endowed with intellect and free will. In this case, the respective evil can be the unforeseen consequence of legitimate actions, but it can also be the consequence of problematic and dangerous actions (like subterranean atom bomb tests that may cause earthquakes or the plastic-pollution of oceans) or the consequence of immoral actions. Finally, the creatures causing natural evil may be non-human creatures with intellect and free will like bad angels or Satan. We agree with Plantinga that this final explanation is possible for some of the evil (including natural evil) in the world.

160 � 5 God is All-Good We do not agree, however, with his thesis – neither factually nor possibly – that all evil is moral evil.�� Since such a position would neglect as causes imperfect creatures as secondary causes and the cooperation of creatures (cf. sections 4.4.1-4.4.3). T 259. (∀p)(∀x ∈ cr)[p e NE(x) → (gC¬p ∨ (∃y ∈ cr)(gWyCS¬p ∨ gWyW¬p ∨ gWySA¬p))] T245, T249, T255 If p is a natural evil for creature x then either God prevents p or there is some creature y (possibly identical with x) such that God wills that y prevents (ptsu�ciently) p or God wills that y wills that non-p or God wills that y should act in such a way that non-p. Theorem T259 shows that God wills the cooperation of creatures in the sense that they avoid natural evil. Some of the creatures do his will by natural inclination, others by their free will. But since creatures are not perfect, they may not be, and in fact are not, always successful in avoiding all natural evil. Observe that T259 does not rule out that some natural evil might be conditionally willed by God as an evil of just punishment in the sense of being an evil E� or E� for the person to be punished (see theorems T236 and T237). In addition it should be emphasized that by beseeching God with strong belief, repentance and serious prayer much evil can be diminished or avoided. (Cf. PMC, section 1.10.3; PLV, 1.10.4 and section 5.8 and 5.9).

�.�.� Necessary Evil: Theorems A necessary evil is an evil that is necessary for achieving or protecting a natural (basic) good. As has been said in section 5.2.5, there are lots of necessary evils in all domains of the universe in order to serve for the achievement of natural (basic) goods. As axioms A23, A25, and A26 say, God wills that his creatures cause and will such natural goods by their natural inclination and moreover that humans through their intellect and free will should act in such a way as to achieve natural goods. This is described for living creatures by the following theorems: T 260. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)[p e NecE(x) → (∃q)(q e NG� (x) ∧ (q → p))] D39, instantiation T 261. (∀q)(∀x∈ls)(q e NG� (x) → (gWxWq ∧ gWxCSq))

A25

23 Plantinga (1974), p. 58f. and Plantinga (1990), p. 154f. Cf. Weingartner (2015a), p. 262f.

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T 262. (∀p)(∀x ∈ ls)[p e NecE(x) → (∃q)(q e NG� (x) ∧ (q → p) ∧ gWxWq ∧ gWxCSq)] T260, T261 If p is a necessary evil for a living creature x then there is a state of a�airs q which is a natural good NG� of x, such that p is a necessary condition for achieving this natural good q and God wills that living creature x wills and causes (pt-su�ciently) that q occurs. A 27. (∀p)(∃x∈ls)[p eNecE(x)→(∃q)(q e NG� (x) ∧ xCondW(p, q))]

If p is a necessary evil for some living creature x then there is a state of a�airs q which is a natural good NG� of x such that x conditionally wills that p in order to achieve q. T 263. (∀p)(∃x ∈ ls)[p e NecE(x) → (∃q)(xWq ∧ q e NG� ∧ xK(q → p) ∧ (∃r)(p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ xPref(q, r)) ∧ xAccepts p)] A27, D34.1 If p is a necessary evil for living creature x then there is a state of a�airs q such that x wills that q, q is a natural good NG� , x knows that p is a necessary condition for achieving q, x prefers q over r of which p is the privation, and x accepts p. The expression “knows” has to be adapted respectively according to the level of the living creature (species). On lower levels instinct and DNA-ruled behaviour like CRISPR are appropriate. T 264. (∀p)(∃x∈ls)(p e NecE(x) → xAccepts p) T263 Some living creatures accept necessary evil. The word “accept” may sometimes be better replaced by “put up with”. It is important to notice that we cannot use the universal quantifier in front of axiom A27 since it does not hold universally that all living creatures conditionally will and accept (T264) the necessary evil which is needed for achieving their natural goods NG� . Some living creatures are naturally inclined to accept some necessary evil, for example when animals struggle for food. Some other living creatures are forced to accept necessary evil, for example when they have biological costs because of errors in the learning process. Humans possessing free will may accept necessary evil like in the case of surgery for regaining health or may not accept but being forced to accept it like in case of ordained prison for a murderer.

�.�.� Legitimate Evil: Theorem As has been said in section 5.2.6, concerning legitimate evil, God leaves the activity and decision to humans. Humans can choose legitimate goods, and for achieving them, it is sometimes necessary to accept or invent legitimate evil. God need not

162 � 5 God is All-Good interfere since legitimate evil is not moral evil and is therefore consistent with God’s Commands. T 265. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[p e LE(x) → (∃q)((q e LG(x) ∨ (∃y ∈ �)q e LG(y)) ∧ (q → p) ∧ Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands)))] D40.3, D30 If p is a legitimate evil of human creature x then there is some legitimate good q for x or for some other human y such that p (the legitimate evil) is a necessary condition for q and p is consistent with God’s Commands.

�.�.� Undeserved Evil: Theorems As has been elaborated in section 5.2.9, undeserved evil is neither evil (because) of guilt nor evil of punishment. Moreover it is not soul-making evil since the person who su�ers from undeserved evil is innocent to a great extent and is not in need of a conversion. Further undeserved evil is not moral evil. The second part of definition D43 is concerned with the innocence of the person who su�ers from undeserved evil. According to the Christian Creed, no human person (except Holy Mary) is completely innocent. Otherwise, Christ’s incarnation and its function as a Messiah and Redeemer would be a lie. Therefore, the second part of definition D43 says that the respective person honestly believes (HB) that s/he did not sin (did not commit a moral evil). Both parts are expressed by theorem T266: T 266. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e UE(x) → [¬(p e PE) ∧ ¬(p e SE) ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∀r)(r e ME → xHB(¬xWr ∧ ¬xAr))]] D43

The third part of definition D43 has three alternative parts. The first says that the person who su�ers from undeserved evil conditionally wills it himself, may be in the Imitation of Christ or as expiation for the sins of others . . . etc. This is the case with many saints. The second alternative says that God conditionally wills undeserved evil for example to endure a hard test. This was the case with Job. It also holds for all other cases where God wills undeserved evil in order to satisfy some higher good or purpose usually unknown by men. The third alternative says that God permits the undeserved evil. This is the case when human’s free will actions are involved. Humans produce wars, corruption, crimes, . . . etc causing lots of undeserved evil for other humans and living organisms. T 267. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e UE(x) → ((∃q)xCondW(p, q) ∨ (∃q)gCondW(p, q) ∨ gPp)] D43

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The fourth part of the definition of undeserved evil (D43) says that there is (will be) a special rewarding for x for which the undeserved evil is (was) necessary. T 268. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e UE(x) → (∃q)(q e REW(x) ∧ q → p)]

D43

A 28. (∀p)[(p e NG ∨ p e LG ∨ p e EtH ∨ p e REW) → p e G]

If p is a natural or legitimate good or the eternal happiness or a reward then p is good.

�.�.� Death as Evil 1. Death of Living Creatures Death can be viewed as an evil in two ways. In one way, if it happens within the average life-time of the living organism. The life-time di�ers considerably among living organisms: some bacteria (a few minutes), mouse (1 year), horse (30-60), man (in developed countries 60-100), lime-tree (1000-2000), mammoth-tree (4000), depending in addition on happenings in the environment. In this sense, death is an evil E�, i.e. a loss of a particular good (life) which ought to be present within the average life-time. In a second way, death can be considered as an evil in so far as death is the loss of the natural good (life) to which every living organism is inclined even independently of the respective life-time. However, in this case one can only speak of “evil” in an accidental sense; this is the case since all living creatures are mortal by nature because of their corruptive body, and what happens by nature cannot be called an evil. Otherwise, a horse’s having no human intellect would be an evil. Moreover, there is life and death of living creatures since about 3 billions of years on earth, which proves that this is a natural e�ect of evolution, i.e. of God’s creation and the cooperation of his creatures. Since being alive (within the appropriate life-time) is a natural good NG� for a living organism, it follows from axiom A25 that God wills that living creatures will and cause their state of life and by theorem T246 that they in fact will and cause this state to obtain. On the other hand, since loss of life (within the appropriate life-time) is a natural evil NE� , it follows from theorems T250 and T251 that God wills that living creatures will and cause to avoid such a loss and that they in fact will and cause (pt-su�ciently) to avoid it. 2. Human Death For human life and death, the same holds as for living creatures when consid-

164 � 5 God is All-Good ered from the nature of human beings. All humans are mortal by nature. The immortality given to Adam and Eva in their state of innocence was a gift of grace by God: A thing may be incorruptible in three ways . . . Thirdly, a thing may be incorruptible on the part of its e�cient cause; in this sense man was incorruptible and immortal in the state of innocence. For, as Augustine says: God made man immortal as long as he did not sin; so that he might achieve for himself life or death.�� For man’s body was indissoluble not by reason of any intrinsic vigor of immortality, but by reason of a supernatural force given by God to the soul, whereby it was enabled to preserve the body from all corruption so long as it remained itself subject to God . . . This power of preserving the body was not natural to the soul, but was the gift of grace. And though man recovered grace as regards remission of guilt and the merit of glory; yet he did not recover immortality, the loss of which was an e�ect of sin.��

The state in the paradise was also a state of test or probation as the one for humans on earth now, even if it was a much better state. According to Thomas Aquinas, Adam, after brought to spiritual maturity, would have gone to heaven without dying (ibid 102,4). Adam and Eve could also have sinned later and lose the paradise and so Adam and Eve’s descendants could have done (ibid. 100,2 ad 1). 3. Di�culties In texts of theology and in the Catechism of the Catholic Church (CCC) but not in o�cial Church Documents, two types of fallacies seem to be drawn from the important passages of the Bible concerning death as a consequence of Adam’s and Eve’s original sin: (i) a fallacy of extrapolation to living creatures (ii) a fallacy of extrapolation to death in general. In the following pages, it will be shown that these fallacies are neither contained in the texts of the Bible nor in o�cial Church Documents referring to the death of Adam. The important passages in the Bible are: And the Lord God commanded the man, ‘You are free to eat from any tree of the garden, but you must not eat from the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat from it you will certainly die’ (Ge 2,16-17). But God did say ‘You must not eat fruit from the tree that is in the middle of the garden, and you must not touch it, or you will die’ (Ge 3,3). Therefore, just as sin entered the world through one man, and death through sin, and in this way death came to all people, because all sinned (Ro 5,12).

24 Augustine (QNV), p. 19 (MPL) 35, 2227. 25 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 97,1 and ad 3.

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Then, after desire has conceived, it gives birth to sin; and sin when it is full grown, gives birth to death (Jas 1,15). Seek not death in the error of your life, neither procure the destruction by the works of your hands. For God made not death, neither has he pleasure in the destruction of the living”(Wisd 1,12-13). For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness (Wisd 2,23).

(i) Fallacy of Extrapolation to Living Creatures Two sorts of extrapolation seem to be used in the Catechism: One is from the death of man (humans) to the death of all living organisms the other to death in general: Death is a consequence of sin . . . death entered the world because man has sinned (CCC1008).

The Latin original reads: Mors consequentia est peccati . . . mortem in mundum ingressam esse propter hominis peccatum.

This claim which looks as if “death” is meant as “death of all living organisms” does not follow from any of the texts of the Bible nor does it follow from the Church Document D1511 (ND508) referred to in CCC1008. (ii) Fallacy of Extrapolation from death through sin to death in general Death contradicts God’s decree” (“Mors igitur contraria consiliis fuit Dei Creatoris; CCC1008).

The Catechism cites Wisdom 1,13. From this passage alone it seems that God did not create contingency, transitoriness, and death at all – neither of stars nor of living organisms – although we know that coming into being and passing away and dying out had existed and belonged to the universe for billions of years before Adam. But the mistake is unmasked when looking at the preceding verse (Wisdom 1,12) which restricts this death to the death through sin. It is plain that moral evil (sin) contradicts God’s decree in his commandments. This follows from the definition of moral evil D29 and from theorems T195, T209, and T211, which say that God does not will (cause) that moral evil occurs and does not will (cause) that it does not occur since he created man with free will. A correct deductive argument is therefore the following: Death through sin implies (as a necessary condition) moral evil (sin) and moral evil (sin) contradicts God’s decree in his commandments (T195). Therefore, death through sin contradicts God’s decree in his commandments. But it is not true that any death (like death of stars, plants or animals) contradicts God’s decree since this death is included in God’s creation. The

166 � 5 God is All-Good fallacy of extrapolation is not only not committed by texts of the Bible, but it is explicitly refused by Saint Paul (Ro 5,12):“. . . and in this way death came to all people . . . ”. Moreover, it is refused by Church Documents (cf. ND509, D1512). Therefore, CCC1008 is at least misleading if not false. 4. Adam’s Death as God’s Punishment Adam’s death as God’s punishment can be derived and explained as an instance of theorem T237 (for simplicity, we take ‘p∗ ’ and ‘r∗ ’ as instantiations of ‘p’ and ‘r’ in T237). T 269. (∃q)[p∗ e PE(adam) → (¬(p∗ e ME) ∧ adamWr∗ ∧ adamAr∗ ∧ r∗ e ME ∧ gWq ∧ q e G ∧ qεT(g-Justice) ∧ (q → p∗ ))] T237 If p∗ represents the fact of the death of Adam’s body as God’s punishment PE of Adam then: p∗ is not a moral evil, but Adam committed the eating from the tree of knowledge of good and evil (r∗ ) by willing and acting accordingly, and God wills the good q belonging to the theorems of God’s Justice which implies p∗ as a necessary condition of q. T 270. p∗ e PE(adam)→(∃q)(qεT(g-Justice) ∧ gCondW(p∗ , q)) T238, T269 God’s punishment of Adam is conditionally willed by God, satisfying God’s Justice.

�.�.� A World Without Evil? Hume and Mackie think that an omnipotent and good God must extinguish every evil: if God can make it that evil does not obtain but does not will that evil does not obtain, then he is malevolent (not good).�� A good and omnipotent God eliminates evil completely.�� That these claims cannot be true can be seen as follows: 1. It is logically impossible to create a di�erentiated world without creating things which di�er in perfection; the lack of perfection in one thing relative to a more perfect one is called metaphysical evil. From this necessary fact (that creating a multitude of things implies di�erent perfections and metaphysical evil), Mackie concludes that God is either not omnipotent or limited. But he does not seem to see that this kind of limitation means to create in a consistent way only.

26 Hume (1947), p. 198 and Hume (1886,1964), Vol II, p. 440. 27 Mackie (1971), p. 93.

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2. Extinguishing all evils is incompatible with a world of learning organisms (instead of having all abilities and activities available when they are born) since every genuine learning process requires e�ort and trial and error (natural evil and biological costs). 3. Extinguishing all evils is incompatible with God’s will that all the more or less imperfect creatures, especially living organisms and man, cooperate and contribute to the development of the universe since imperfect collaborators will always make some mistakes (recall the examples of the master builder, and consider a mother who teaches children). 4. Since even just punishment is an evil to the person being punished, it would follow that God (or also the judge) cannot be good if he punishes criminals or terrorists (either in this life or later). If the judge eliminated the evil of prison for the terrorist, he would be an unjust judge. 5. If God permits necessary evil to obtain in order to achieve a higher good, then this does not mean that he is malevolent. 6. If God conditionally wills soul-making evil, then he helps man to reach his highest possible good, i.e. eternal happiness. This cannot be something bad. A similar situation is present if God may conditionally will some undeserved evil to achieve some higher good as the sanctification of a person. 7. God cannot eliminate all evil that is produced by men’s decisions and actions because he does not will to take away men’s free will. This is so, because God has endowed men with free will to be able to choose between actions that are either in accordance with his commands and advices or incompatible with them. 8. Although there is no logical impossibility to choose freely the good on every occasion��, God did not create perfect saints but such humans who contribute to their own development in such a way that they can become saints. Thus, the state in which one chooses freely the good on every occasion is a final state reached usually by a long process of trial and error doing the good on more and more occasions and thus producing a good habit or virtue. Such a way is usually not an easy way and according to the Christian religion God’s grace (as a help) is always involved in such a process. Mackie seems to think that the final state of choosing freely the good (of being a saint) should be given to man from God without any contribution and cooperation of man for becoming virtuous. To claim that this would be the better possibility (for God to choose) – as Mackie thinks – is more than questionable.

28 Mackie (1971), p. 100.

168 � 5 God is All-Good Independently of such an evaluation, the more important reason that things are otherwise seems to be not so easily available for non-believers: all great religions agree that the status of man in this world is not a final one but a status of pilgrimage, of probation and of crucial test in order to reach the final state of happiness and free of evil. If this is true, then a life without e�ort, di�culties, evil, and su�ering would be very strange since then the test would not be hard but very easy and not a serious test. And consequently, being a saint without any e�ort would be inconsistent with a status of probation and crucial test. A second point comes from the following extension of the free will defence: if God created all men with free will in such a way that they contribute freely (in a kind of learning process) to their own moral development, then they are also free to produce a habit in them, either a virtuous one by freely doing good actions or a wicked one by freely doing bad actions. But this is incompatible with creating persons who already possess (genetically?) the virtue of always freely choosing the good. 9. Hume’s Argument From Evil What is called Hume’s argument from evil is in fact an abbreviated argument of Epicurus. The text is this: Is he willing to prevent evil, but not able? then is he impotent. Is he able but not willing? then is he malevolent: Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil.��

Hume assumes certainly in addition the following two true premises: There is evil; this is already asserted by “whence then is evil”. And: Everyone who is malevolent (i.e. willing the bad) wills evil. Two lines before the above quotation, Hume writes: Through the whole compass of human knowledge there are no inferences more certain and infallible than these. Why is there any misery at all in the world? Not by chance, surely. From some cause, then. It is from the intention of the deity? But he is perfectly benevolent. Is it contrary to his intention? But he is almighty. Nothing can shake the solidity of this reasoning, so short, so clear, so decisive.��

From the context and from Hume’s praise of the solidity of his reasoning (argument), it seems clear that Hume also had a conclusion of his reasoning in mind: either God is not omnipotent or God is malevolent. Or (by using the additional premise that to be malevolent implies to will evil): either God is not omnipotent or God wills evil. Hume’s argument can be put into the following logical form: 29 Hume (1886,1964), Vol II, p. 440. 30 Hume (1886,1964), Vol II, p. 443.

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(i) (W ∧ ¬C) → ¬O . . . If God is willing to prevent evil, but not able (to prevent evil) then God is impotent (not omnipotent). (ii) (C ∧ ¬W) → M . . . If God is able to prevent evil but not willing (to prevent evil) then God is malevolent. (iii) (C ∧ W) → ¬EV . . . If God is both able and willing (to prevent evil) then there is no evil. (iv) EV . . . There is evil (premise assumed by Hume) (v) ¬O ∨ M . . . God is impotent (not omnipotent) or God is malevolent.

It can be easily shown that this argument is a logical fallacy by giving an interpretation where all premises are true but the conclusion is false: (W ∧ ¬C) → ¬O;(C ∧ ¬W) → M;(C ∧ W) → ¬E;E/ :¬O ∨ M F T F F T F F F F T F F T T T F

Moreover, Hume’s second premise is false. Hume’s second premise is refuted by every just judge in court: if the judge is able to acquit a criminal (or reduce the sentence) but is not willing to do so (because he is just and because he is acting according to Human Rights and lawfully) then – according to Hume’s second premise – the judge is malevolent. Observe that imprisonment is certainly an evil for the criminal since it is a basic evil, i.e. a deprivation of a human basic good. Since both Hume’s argument is a logical fallacy and its second premise is false, the conclusion of this argument, that God is impotent or malevolent (including the conclusion: God is impotent or willing evil), is not proved for two reasons: first, because an invalid argument (fallacy) does not prove anything, and second because an argument with a false premise does not prove its particular conclusion.��

�.�.� God’s Will w.r.t. Di�erent Types of Evil 1. God in No Way Wills Moral Evil (Sin) As is clear from theorems T107, T109 and T195–197, God cannot cause and cannot will moral evil (ME). Furthermore, according to theorems T198 and T199, God does not will and does not cause moral evil (cf. T200). Moreover, since God has endowed human creatures with free will, God does not prevent the occurrence 31 For other fallacies and false assumptions in attacks against God concerning evil see Weingartner (Theodicy), chs. 2 and 3.

170 � 5 God is All-Good of moral evil if it is committed by some human person, but permits it. This is expressed in theorems T211 and T222. In addition, every fact occurring in creation and in the universe, including commitments of moral evil, come under God’s Providence (T126, T211). Since God does not cause and does not will moral evil, God is not all-causing and not all-willing (T225, T226, D31, D31.1). 2. Some Evil Is Conditionally Willed by God Some necessary consequences of great goods are conditionally willed by God. (a) There cannot be a hierarchical order of perfection or di�erentiation of kinds if everything is equal. Thus di�erentiation and di�erent levels of perfection imply that there must be some more imperfect things relative to some more perfect things; and sometimes, local disorder must be accepted so as to not to endanger the higher order of the whole. However, these necessary imperfections and local disorders cannot be called evil in the sense of E�. But contingent imperfections and failures or deficits of some particular good that ought to be present can be called metaphysical evil in the sense of E� (cf. 5.2.2 (b,i)). In addition, certain aspects of the contingent finitude in the universe may be called a metaphysical evil in the sense of E� (cf. 5.2.2 (c)). These are types of metaphysical evil which God conditionally wills because he wills a certain order and harmony of the whole universe which is guided by both dynamical and statistical laws (where the latter allow exceptions) (cf. T232, T233) (b) The great good of eternal happiness requires sometimes what John Hick called soul-making evil. This, God conditionally wills since he wills the great good of eternal happiness for the respective person and prefers it to the non-occurrence of this soul making evil (T235). (c) God wills justice, and as a consequence he conditionally wills just punishment (T236, T237). However, God is merciful if there is some sign of repentance (cf. sections 1.10.3; 5.1, D32.2; 5.8, A34). Moreover, God diminishes punishment in order to save men (cf. Mt 24,22). To summarise, it holds for the three types of evil – metaphysical evil, soulmaking evil and just punishment – that God conditionally wills them in order to achieve the great goods of a certain world-order of eternal happiness for men and of justice (cf. T235, T238). 3. God’s Will and Natural Evil Some natural evil is neither willed nor caused, and not prevented either, by God, and he leaves it to creatures to prevent or to cause it (T258). Some other natural evil is either prevented by God himself, or he wills that some of his creatures prevent it either by natural inclination (T245) or by intellect and free

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5.

6.

7.

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will (T259). Still some other natural evil may be conditionally willed by God as just punishment (T236, T237). God’s Will and Necessary Evil God wills that his living creatures will and cause those natural goods NG� for the achievement of which some evil is necessary (T261, T262). However, he leaves it to them whether they conditionally will (A27) and accept some necessary evil needed for the achievement of those natural goods (A25). All living creatures have been endowed by God to strive for life and health, the basic natural goods NG� . From this it does not follow however that all living creatures automatically accept and conditionally will all the necessary evil connected with the achievement of those natural goods. Some of his creatures have been endowed by God with a natural inclination to conditionally will and accept some necessary evil. Others are forced to accept necessary evil; and again others, humans, may freely accept or reject it (T263, T264). God’s Will and Legitimate Evil Concerning legitimate evil, God leaves the activity and decision to humans since legitimate good and legitimate evil is compatible with his commands on the one hand and depends on human rights and laws and rules established for social life on the other (T265). God’s Will and Undeserved Evil Some undeserved evil is accepted and willed by those human persons who are acting expiatory and in the Imitation of Christ. God may give grace to them. Other undeserved evil is conditionally willed by God in order to achieve some higher good or purpose, usually unknown to men. Much undeserved evil is caused by immoral free-will actions of human persons as by egoism, crime, fight, war, . . . etc. Since God has endowed humans with free will, God permits these evils that are factually produced; however, he may prevent still many others of which men are ignorant. Final Result From points (1)–(6) and sections 5.2.1-5.2.9 above, it follows that God does not will any evil directly or unconditionally: In no way does he will moral evil (sin). God conditionally wills metaphysical evil, soul-making evil, and evil of just punishment because he wills the respective goods (world-order, eternal happiness, justice) with which these evils are necessarily connected. God keeps his will o� natural evil or God prevents natural evil himself or God wills that creatures prevent it or that they should act in such a way as to prevent it. Concerning necessary evil, God leaves it to living creatures to conditionally will and accept it; in a similar way, God leaves it to humans to accept legitimate evil on rational grounds connected with human law or to

172 � 5 God is All-Good accept undeserved evil as expiation for others committing moral evil. Moreover, in all cases of evil God wills the respective good and its achievement which is necessarily connected with the evil (cf. 5.5 and 5.6). It should be noted in order to avoid misunderstanding that God’s will must not be confused with God’s providence; God’s will does not extend to all facts of creation and creatures (cf. theorems T213 and T86) whereas God’s providence does (cf. theorem T126).

�.�.� Biblical Documents 1. Natural Good NG� For it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good purpose (Php 2,13). Indeed, when Gentiles, who do not have the law, do by nature things required by the law, they are a law for themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness, and their thoughts sometimes accusing them and at other times even defending them (Ro 2,14-15).

2. Natural Evil For the generations to come none of your descendants who has a defect may come near to o�er the food of his God. No man who has any defect may come near; no man who is blind or lame, disfigured or deformed, no man with a crippled foot or hand . . . (Lev 21,17-19). Jonathan son of Saul had a son who was lame in both feet. He was five years old when the news about Saul and Jonathan came from Jezreel. His nurse picked him up and fled but as she hurried to leave, he fell and became disabled”(2Sa 4,4). Two blind men were sitting by the roadside, and when they heard that Jesus was going by they shouted ‘Lord, Son of David have mercy on us’ ”(Mt 20,30). As he went along he saw a man blind from birth. His disciples asked him, ‘Rabbi, who sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?’ Neither this man nor his parents sinned, said Jesus”(Jn 9,2-3). While Jesus was in one of the towns, a man came along who was covered with leprosy. When he saw Jesus he fell with his face to the ground and begged him ‘Lord if you are willing you can make me clean’. Jesus reached out his hand and touched the man. ‘I am willing’ he said ‘Be clean’. And immediately the leprosy left him”(Lk 5,12-13). Just then a woman who had been subject to bleeding for twelve years came up behind him and touched the edge of his cloak. She said to herself, ‘If I only touch his cloak, I will be healed’. Jesus turned and saw her, ‘Take heart, daughter’, he said ‘your faith has healed you’. And the woman was healed at that moment”(Mt 9,20-22). Some men came, bringing to him a paralyzed man, carried by four of them . . . When Jesus saw their faith he said to the paralyzed man ‘Son your sins are forgiven’ . . . ‘But I want you to know that the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins’. So he said to the

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man ‘I tell you get up, take your mat and go home’. He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all”(Mk 2,3-12).

3. Soul-Making Evil Know then in your heart that as a man disciplines his son, so the Lord your God disciplines you (Dt 8,5). Now I urge those who read this book not to be depressed by such calamities, but to recognise that these punishments were designed not to destroy but to discipline our people . . . Therefore he never withdraws his mercy from us. Although he disciplines us with calamities, he does not forsake his own people (2Macc 6,12; 16). My son, do not despise the Lord’s discipline, and do not resent his rebuke, because the Lord disciplines those he loves as a father the son he delights in Pr 3,11-12). A�icted in few things, in many they shall be well rewarded: because God has tried them, and found them worthy of himself (Wisd 3,5). For my own name’s sake I delay my wrath; for the sake of my praise I hold it back from you, so as not to destroy you completely. See, I have refined you, though not as silver; I have tested you in the furnace of a�iction (Isa 48,9-10). Endure hardship as discipline; God is treating you as his children. For what children are not disciplined by their father. If you are not disciplined – and everyone undergoes discipline – then you are not legitimate, not true sons and daughters at all (Heb 12,7-8). [. . . ] but we also glory in our su�erings, because we know that su�ering produces perseverance; perseverance character; and character hope. And hope does not put us to shame, because God’s love has been poured out into our hearts through the Holy Spirit, who has been given to us (Ro 5,3-5). Consider it pure joy, my brothers and sisters whenever you face trials of many kinds, because you know that the testing of your faith produces perseverance. Let perseverance finish its work so that you may be mature and complete, not lacking anything. If any of you lacks wisdom, you should ask God, who gives generously to all without finding fault, and it will be given to you (Jas 1,2-5).

4. God’s Punishment Pharaoh will not listen to you though I multiply my signs and wonders in Egypt. Then I will lay my hand on Egypt and with mighty acts of judgement I will bring out my divisions, my people the Israelites (Ex 7,3-4). This continues with the “Agyptian Plagues”. Then the Lord came down in a pillar of cloud . . . he said ‘Listen to my words: . . . Why then were you not afraid to speak against my servant Moses?’ The anger of the Lord burned against them, and he left them. When the cloud lifted from above the tent, Mirjam’s skin was leprous (Nu 12,5-10). The Lord says: ‘These people come near to me with their mouth and honor me with their lips but their hearts are far from me. Their worship of me is based on merely human rules they have been taught. Therefore once more I will astound these people with wonder upon wonder; the wisdom of the wise will perish, the intelligence of the intelligent will vanish (Isa 29,13-14). Hear, you earth: I am bringing disaster on this people, the fruit of their schemes, because they have not listened to my words and have rejected my law (Jer 6,19). I will not completely destroy you. I will discipline you but only in due measure of justice. I will not let you go entirely unpunished (Jer 30,11).

174 � 5 God is All-Good The Lord reigns forever; he has established his throne for judgement. He rules the world in righteousness, and judges the people with equity (Ps 9,7-8). This is what the Lord says: ‘For three sins of Judah, even for four, I will not relent. Because they have rejected the law of the Lord and have not kept his decrees, because they have been led astray by false gods the gods their ancestors followed. I will send fire on Judah that will consume the fortresses of Jerusalem’. This is what the Lord says: ‘For three sins of Israel even for four, I will not relent. They sell the innocent for silver, and the needy for a pair of sandals. They trample on the heads of the poor as on the dust of the ground and deny justice to the oppressed. Father and son use the same girl and so profane my holy name . . . Now then I will crash you as a cart crushes when loaded with grain. The swift will not escape, the strong will not muster their strength and the warrior will not save his life (Am 2,4-14). Settle matters quickly with your adversary who is taking you to court. Do it while you are still together on the way, or your adversary may hand you over to the judge and the judge may hand you over to the o�cer and you may be thrown into prison. Truly I tell you, you will not get out until you have paid the last penny.(Mt 5,25-26). The ax is already at the root of the trees, and every tree that does not produce good fruit will be cut down and thrown into the fire (Mt 3,10). For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world, but to save the world through him. Whoever believes in him is not condemned, but whoever does not believe stands condemned already because they have not believed in the name of God’s one and only Son (Jn 3,17-18). In the past God overlooked such ignorance, but now he commands all people everywhere to repent. For he has set a day when he will judge the world with justice by the man he has appointed (Ac 17,30-31). As the weeds are pulled up and burned in the fire so it will be at the end of the age. The Son of Man will send out his angels, and they will weed out of his kingdom everything that causes sin and all who do evil. They will throw them into the blazing furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father. Whoever has ears, let them hear (Mt 13,40-43).

5. Undeserved Evil Naked I came from my mother’s womb and naked I will depart. The Lord gave and the Lord has taken away; may the name of the Lord be praised (Job 1,21). My spirit is broken, my days are cut short, the grave awaits me. Surely mockers surround me; my eyes must dwell on their hostility. Give me, O God, the pledge you demand. Who else will put up security for me? (Job 17,1-3). But he knows the way that I take; when he has tested me, I will come forth as gold. My feet have closely followed his steps; I have kept to his way without turning aside. I have not departed from the commands of his lips; I have treasured the words of his mouth more than my daily bread. That is why I am terrified before him; when I think of all this, I fear him. God has made my heart faint; the Almighty has terrified me (Job 23,10-12; 15-16). See, I have refined you, though not as silver; I have tested you in the furnace of a�iction (Isa 48,10). Consider it pure joy, my brothers and sisters whenever you face trials of many kinds, because you know that the testing of your faith produces perseverance.

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As you know we count as blessed those who have persevered. You have heard of Job’s perseverance and have seen what the Lord finally brought about.(Jas 1,2-3; 5,11).

�.�.�� Church Documents Florence (1442) [The Holy Roman Church] most firmly believes, professes and proclaims that the one true God, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, who when he so willed, out of his bounty made all creatures spiritual as well as corporeal. They are good since they were made by him who is the highest good, but they are mutable because they were made out of nothing. She asserts that there is no such thing as a nature of evil, because all nature, as nature, is good. (ND408; D1333). Trent (1547) If anyone says that it is not in one’s power to make one’s ways evil, but that God performs the evil works just as he performs the good, not only by allowing them but properly and directly, so that Judas’ betrayal no less then Paul’s vocation was God’s own work, amathema sit. (ND1956; D1556). John XXIII (1963): Pacem in Terris . . . The Creator of the world has imprinted in the heart of human beings an order which their conscience reveals to them and strongly enjoins them to obey: “They show that what the law requires is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness” [Ro 2.15] (ND2026; D3956). Leo XIII (1888): Libertas Praestantissimum God himself, in his providence, though infinitly good and allpowerful, permits evil to exist in the world, partly in order that greater good may not be impeded, and partly that greater evil may not ensure. (ND2014; D3251). Valence (855) God’s foreknowledge does not impose necessity on the wicked . . . The wicked do perish not because they couldn’t have been di�erent, but because they did not will to be good. (D627). Concerning God’s predestination . . . we profess the predestination of the chosen for life and the predestination of the wicked for death; concerning the chosen who will be saved God’s mercy precedes their merit; concerning the condemnation of those who will perish their guilt precedes God’s just judgement . . . Concerning the wicked God foresaw their malignity because it came from themselves but God did not predestine it because it didn’t come from him. (D628). Leo IX (1053) . . . I also believe that God, the Lord almighty, is the only author of both the Old and the New Testaments, i.e., the Law and the Prophets, and the Apostles; and that God has predestined only the good but has foreseen the good and the bad. (ND207; D685). Pius V (1567): Ex Omnibus A�ictionibus. Condemned Propositions of Michael de Bay:

176 � 5 God is All-Good All a�ictions of the righteous are punishments of their own sins; therefore also Job and the martyrs who su�ered, su�ered because of their sins. (D1972). Trent (1563) The Catholic Church, instructed by the Holy Spirit and in accordance with sacred Scripture and the ancient tradition of the Fathers, has taught in the holy Councils and most recently in this ecumenical Council that there is a purgatory, and that the souls detained there are helped by the acts of intercession (su�ragia) of the faithful, and especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the altar. (ND2310; D1820). Trent (1547) 30. If anyone says that after the grace of justification has been received the guilt is so remitted and the debt of eternal punishment so blotted out for any repentant sinner, that no debt of temporal punishment remains to be paid, either in this world or in the other, in purgatory, before access can be opened to the Kingdom of heaven, anathema sit. (ND1980; D1580). Trent (1546) 1. If anyone does not profess that Adam, the first man, by transgressing God’s commandment in paradise, at once lost the holiness and justice in which he had been constituted; and that, o�ending God by his sin, he drew upon himself the wrath and indignation of God and consequently death with which God had threatened him, and together with death captivity in the power of him who henceforth “has the power of death” [Heb 2:14] i.e., the devil; and that “the whole Adam, body and soul, was changed for the worse through the o�ence of his sin”, (cf. ND504; D371) anathema sit. (ND508; D1511). 2. If anyone asserts that Adam’s sin harmed only him and not his descendants and that the holiness and justice received from God which he lost was lost only for him and not for us also; or that, stained by the sin of disobedience, he transmitted to all humankind only death and the su�erings of the body but not sin as well which is the death of the soul, anathema sit. For, he contradicts the words of the apostle: “Sin came into the world through one man, and death through sin, and so [death] spread to all men as all sinned in him” [Rom 5:12] (ND509; D1512). Pius V (1567): Ex Omnibus A�ictionibus. Condemned Propositions of Michael de Bay: The immortality of the first human being was not a gift of grace but a natural condition. (ND1984/78; D1978).

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�.� God’s Goodness and Will �.�.� Whatever God Wills Is Good. This has already been proved by theorem T231 above (section 5.1). The following is an immediate consequence of it. T 271. (∀x∈cr)(gWE!x → E!x e G) T231 For all creatures x it holds: if God wills that creature x exists then the existence of creature x (that creature x exists) is good. From theorems T86 and T230, it also follows that since God is good and wills that creatures exist, they exist. Thus, Augustine says:“Quia Deus bonus est, sumus.” (Because God is good we are).�� T 272. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)[(g∈AG ∧ gWE!x) → E!x] T86, T230

T 273. (∀x∈cr)(¬(E!x e G) → ¬gWE!x) If it is not the case that the existence of creature x is good then it is not the case that God wills the existence of creature x. Observe that from ¬gWE!x (it is not the case that God wills the existence of creature x), it does not follow that gW¬E!x (God wills that creature x does not exist). If the latter were the case, then creature x would not exist since God’s will is always fulfilled (recall theorem T86, section 3.1). However, since God has given free will to men and since he accepts creatures as his coadjutors (cf. section 4.4), men may create many good things, but also bad things: for example, men may create monsters by genetic engineering. The existence of such products might not be good, and consequently (by theorem T273) God does not will them, although he permits men to create them – and similarly for other products which might not be good for mankind nor for our earth. T 274. (∀p)(pεT(g-Plan) → p e G) T193, T231 All states of a�airs belonging to God’s Plan are good.

T 275. (∀p)(∀x∈cr)(E!xεT(g-Plan) → E!x e G) T274 If the existence of creature x belongs to God’s plan then the existence of creature x is good.

T 276. (∀p)[¬(p e G) → ¬(pεT(p-Plan))] T274 A state of a�airs that is not good does not belong to God’s plan 32 Augustine (DDC), 1,32; (MPL) 34,32.

178 � 5 God is All-Good Thus, individual or collective bad actions of mankind such as crime or war do not belong to God’s plan. Observe, however, that God’s providence is defined as the union of God’s plan and of the execution of God’s plan (D26). Since the execution of God’s plan includes the cooperation of imperfect creatures, they may produce states of a�airs that are not good (cf. section 4.6). Therefore, the analogue of theorem T274 neither holds for providence nor for the execution of God’s plan (see below T280, T282, T283). T 277. (∀p)(gCp → p e G) T87, T231 Whatever God causes is good

T 278. (∀p)(¬(p e G) → ¬gCp) T277 States of a�airs that are not good are not caused by God

A state of a�airs that is certainly not good is the state of a�airs of moral evil (ME) (cf. axiom A29 below). Of moral evil, it holds that God does not will it and does not cause it; he does also not prevent it since then it would not exist, and humans could not have free will (cf. theorems T200 and T211). Concerning di�erent types of evil that are not moral evil, some are caused by creatures since God has decided to employ his imperfect creatures as his coadjutors (cf. T246, T250, T256); concerning some evil of them, God may even keep o� his will and causation (cf. theorems T244, 245, 249, 255, 258); some others like metaphysical evil are either not evil E� or contribute to the di�erentiation and multiplicity of the universe (E�); again some others serve some higher level goods and are conditionally willed and caused by God in order to achieve or satisfy that higher good which can be natural or may even be eternal happiness or final justice. A 29. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬(p e G))

If the state of a�airs p is a moral evil then this state of a�airs p is not good. Or: Whatever is a moral evil is not good. Observe that the opposite:“whatever is not good is a moral evil” cannot be true for at least two reasons. One is that it does not allow neutral states of a�airs, the other is that it restricts evil to moral evil. However, not every state of a�airs is morally relevant (cf. theorems T202, 204 and 206). T 279. (∃p)(pεT(CR) ∧ ¬(p e G)) A29, A20 Some facts of creation are not good. A20 states that some facts of creation are moral evil. T 280. (∃p)(pεT)(g-Prov) ∧ ¬(p e G)) T126, T279 Some facts coming under God’s providence are not good (recall the remarks after theorem T276).

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T 281. ¬(∀p)(pεT(g-Prov) → p e G) T280 Not everything that comes under God’s providence is good. This is already evident from theorem T126 which says that every fact of creation comes under God’s providence together with axiom A20 which states that moral evils are facts of creation. For a correct derivation however axiom A29 is needed. Moreover, observe that the statement “every state of a�airs that is good comes under God’s providence” is not true either because God’s existence and God’s love to himself is good, but they do not come under God’s providence because God’s providence is concerned with his creation only. T 282. (∃p)[(pεT(g-Plan) ∨ pεT(g-Exc)) ∧ ¬(p e G)] T280, D26 Some states of a�airs which belong either to God’s plan or to its execution are not good T 283. (∃p)(pεT(g-Exc) ∧ ¬(p e G)) T282, T274 Some states of a�airs of God’s execution of his plan are not good

As it has been mentioned already, God employs imperfect creatures for the execution of his plan, among them also humans with actions of free will (cf. section 4.6.3(2)). T 284. (∀p)(gCVp → p e G) T174, T231 Every state of a�airs that is conserved by God is good.

T 285. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gCVp) A29, T284 (T174, T198) No moral evil is conserved by God. �.�.� God Does Not Will Every Good As has been said as a comment to theorem T231, the opposite of this theorem does not hold: God does not will every good. This is also defended by Thomas Aquinas as questio 19 article 6 of Summa Theologica shows. Thus the thesis that God is all-good means that whatever God wills is good but it does not mean that he wills every good, since he selects by his free will, i.e. there is some good that is not willed by God. This is expressed in the following axiom A30: A 30. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gWp)

There is some good that God does not will. Or: Some states of a�airs that are good are not willed by God.

180 � 5 God is All-Good T 286. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gCp) A30, T90 Some states of a�airs that are good are not caused by God.

T 287. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gCVp) A30, T174 Some states of a�airs that are good are not conserved by God.

T 288. (∃p)(¬(p e ME) ∧ ¬gWp) A29, A30 Some states of a�airs that are not moral evil are not willed by God.

T 289. ¬(∀p)(¬gWp → p e ME) T288 Not everything that is not willed by God is a moral evil. For example there are morally neutral (not morally relevant) states of a�airs that God does not will. T 290. (∃p)[p e G ∧ ¬(pεT(g-Plan))] A30, T193 Some states of a�airs that are good do not belong to God’s Plan. T 291. (∃p)(gCNp ∧ ¬gWp) A17, A20, T198

Some states of a�airs for which God is a necessary cause are not willed by God. Recall that by axiom A17 God is a necessary cause for every fact of creation and creatures; otherwise, creatures or the whole universe could not even exist. In this sense, God is a necessary underlying cause even for human actions (facts) of moral evil. However, actions (facts) of moral evil are not willed by God.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents God saw all that he had made, and it was very good (Ge 1,31). How many are your works, Lord! In wisdom you made them all, the earth is full of your creatures (Ps 104,24). Praise the Lord, my soul and forget not all his benefits . . . who satisfies your desires with good things (Ps 103,2; 5). Jesus answered ‘No one is good – except God alone’ (Mk 10,18). [God] “who works out everything in conformity with the purpose of his will (Eph 1,11). Like clay in the hand of the potter, to be moulded as he pleases, so all are in the hand of their Maker, to be given whatever he decides (Sir 33,13). ‘Can I not do with you, Israel, as the potter does?’ declares the Lord ‘Like clay in the hand of the potter, so are you in my hand, Israel’ (Jer 18,6). But who are you, a human being, to talk back to God? Shall what is formed say to the one who formed it, ‘Why did you make me like this?’ Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for special purposes and some for common use? (Ro 9,20-21).

Florence (1442): . . . God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, is the creator of all things, visible and invisible, who when he so willed, out of his bounty made all creatures,

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spiritual as well as corporeal. They are good since they were made by him who is the highest good . . . (ND408; D1333).

�.� God’s Goodness and Love It has to be mentioned at the beginning that God’s love is represented in this study in a twofold way. First, as applied to states of a�airs as in gLp and second as applied to individuals as in g∈Love(x). This twofold way corresponds to a twofold reference of love to the good; first, to the good that is willed to someone and second to someone for whom that good is willed. As Thomas Aquinas says: An act of love always tends towards two things; to the good that one wills, and to the person for whom one wills it.��

Examples for the first application are: God loves to provide man with a natural inclination to happiness, to endow man with free will, to send his son for the salvation of mankind, . . . etc. If we interpret gLp as a that-clause, then such expressions get more lengthy: God loves that he is providing man . . . etc. The second application, g∈Love(x), means that God is full of love to person x, or shorter that God loves x. This is love: not that we loved God, but that he loved us (1Jn 4,10).

The second application, g∈Love(x), will be described by axiom A35 below (section 5.9).

�.�.� Whatever God Loves Is Good T 292. (∀p)(gLp → p e G) T230, A21 Whatever God loves is good. Or: Every state of a�airs that God loves is good. The opposite of T292 does not hold (cf. axiom A31 below).

T 293. (∀x∈cr)(gLE!x → E!x e G) T292 If God loves that creature x exists then it is good that creature x exists. Or: If God loves the existence of a creature x then the existence of x is good. This holds in an analogous way for all other facts that God loves.

33 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,20,1 ad 3.

182 � 5 God is All-Good T 294. (∀p)(¬(p e G) → ¬gLp) T292 States of a�airs that are not good are not loved by God

T 295. (∀p)(p e ME → ¬gLp) A29, T294 Whatever is a moral evil is not loved by God

T 296. (∀p)(gLp → ¬(p e ME)) T295 Whatever is loved by God is not a moral evil

T 297. (∃p)(pεT(CR) ∧ ¬gLp) A20, T295 Some facts of creation (of creatures) are not loved by God

T 298. (∃p)(pεT(g-Prov) ∧ ¬gLp) T126, T297 Some facts that come under God’s providence are not loved by God

T 299. (∃p)(pεT(g-Exc) ∧ ¬gLp) T283, T294 Some facts belonging to God’s execution of his plan (in contradistinction to those belonging to his plan only) include bad actions and immoral actions of imperfect creatures as God’s coworkers (cf. section 4.4 above). They are not loved by God. T 300. (∃p)(gCNp ∧ ¬gLp) A17, T297

According to axiom A17, God is a necessary (though not su�cient) cause for every fact of creation and creatures; otherwise, creatures could not even exist. However, among the facts of creation and creatures there are errors, mistakes and moral evils; and these are not loved by God (recall theorem T291). T 301. (∃p)(gPp ∧ ¬gLp) T99, T117, T297

Some states of a�airs that God permits are not loved by him. Or: Some states of a�airs that God does not prevent (cf. definition D19) are not loved by him. For example, God does not prevent bad free will decisions.

�.�.� God’s Love Selects Observe that the opposite of theorem T292: (∀p)(p e G → gLp) does not hold. As has been said in section 5.1 (after theorem T231) concerning God’s will, it also holds concerning his love: God is all-good does not mean that God loves every good since with respect to creatures God selects freely by his will and his love (recall the parable of the potter in section 5.4.3 above). That God selects with his love is also manifest from numerous places in the Bible (cf. section 5.5.5 below). That God does not love every good is expressed by the following axiom A31:

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A 31. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gLp)

T 302. ¬(∀p)(p e G → gLp) A31 God does not love every good. Or: It is not the case that every good is loved by God T 303. (∃p)(¬(p e ME) ∧ ¬gLp) A29, A31 Some states of a�airs that are not moral evil are not loved by God

T 304. ¬(∀p)(¬(p e ME) → gLp) T303 Not everything that is not a moral evil is loved by God. Examples are morally neutral (not morally relevant) states of a�airs; they need not even occur.

�.�.� The Good That God Loves Is Willed by Him to Himself and to Creatures T 305. (∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(g))] T230, A21 Some good that God loves is willed by him to obtain to himself T 306. (∃p)(gLp → p e G(g)) T86, T305 Some good that God loves is a good for himself

T 307. (∀x∈cr)(∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(x))] T230, A21 To every creature God wills some (or other) obtaining good that he loves

T 308. (∀x∈cr)(∃p)(gLp → p∈G(x)) T86, T307 For every creature x there is some (or other) state of a�airs such that if God loves it then it is a good for x.

T 309. (∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[(gLp ∧ pεT(CR)) → (gWp ∧ gW(p e G(x)) ∧ pεT(g-Prov))] T307, T126 It holds for every creature x that some fact of creation p that God loves is willed by him to occur and to be a good for creature x where fact p belongs to God’s providence The gist of the theorems T305–T309 is about one important characteristic of love: Love is to will good to someone. As Thomas Aquinas says: Since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing��

34 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,20,2.

184 � 5 God is All-Good �.�.� The Goals That God Wills and Loves for Creatures are Good T 310. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)(gW(p e Goal(x)) → p e G) T230, A21 For all creatures x it holds: Whatever God wills to be a goal for x is good.

T 311. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[gL(p e Goal(x)) → (p e Goal(x)) e G] T292 For all creatures x it holds: If God loves p to be a goal for x then this is good.

T 312. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[¬((p e Goal(x)) e G) → ¬gL(p e Goal(x))] T311 Whatever is not a good goal for x is not loved to be a goal for x by God T 313. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)(gW(p e Goal(x)) → ¬(p e ME)) A29, T310 Whatever God wills to be a goal for x is not a moral evil

T 314. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)(p e ME → ¬gW(p e Goal(x))) T313 What is a moral evil is not willed by God to be a goal for any creature x.

T 315. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[(p e Goal(x)) e ME → ¬gL(p e Goal(x))] A29, T312 A goal of x that is a moral evil is not loved by God to be a goal for any creature x.

Summarizing sections 5.5.1, 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, we may say that four important characteristics of God’s love are these: Whatever God loves is good; God’s love selects; by his love, God wills good to himself and to his creatures; the goals that he wills and loves to creatures are good. These properties of God’s love are also expressed by biblical and church documents.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents For thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which thou hast made” (Wisd 11,25) And God said “Let the land produce living creatures according to their kinds . . . ” And it was so . . . And God saw that it was good (Ge 1,24-25). The Lord your God has chosen you out of all the peoples (Dt 7,6). I have chosen you and have not rejected you (Isa 41,9) For we know, brothers and sisters loved by God that he has chosen you because our gospel came to you not simply with words but also with power, with the Holy Spirit and deep conviction (1Th 1,4). For the Lord your God . . . mighty and awesome, who shows no partiality and accepts no bribes. He defends the cause of the fatherless and the widow, and loves the foreigner residing among you, giving them food and clothing (Dt 10, 17-18). For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life (Jn 3,16). But I tell you, love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you that you may be children of your Father in heaven. He causes his son to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the unrighteous (Mt 5,44-45).

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Or do you show contempt for the riches of his kindness, forbearance and patience, not realizing that God’s kindness is intended to lead you to repentance? (Ro 2,4).

Toledo (589): By God’s goodness every creature was created as good (D470) Indiculus (between 435 and 442): Therefore with the help of the Lord, we are so strengthened by these Church norms and these documents derived from divine authority that we acknowledge God as the author of all good desires and deeds, of all e�orts and virtues by which from the beginning of faith the human person tends towards God. And we do not doubt that all human merits are preceded by the grace of him through whom it is that we begin to will and to do any good work (cf. Phil 2,13). (ND1914; D248). Vatican (1870): This one and only true God, of his own goodness and almighty power . . . in order to manifest his perfection through the benefits which he bestows on creatures, with absolute freedom of council, from the beginning of time made at once out of nothing both orders of creatures, the spiritual and the corporeal (ND412; D3002).

�.�.� On God’s Relation Between Love and Will Since it is very di�cult to postulate principles about this relation, we shall not formulate any axioms here in order to not make any false claims. However, we shall discuss some of the important questions involved here and state two postulates. 1. Principles concerning God himself For principles concerning God himself, it seems to hold that what he wills is equivalent to what he loves. For example, he wills his own goodness if and only if he loves his own goodness, and similarly for other necessary facts about himself such as existence, perfection, eternity, omniscience, omnipotence, . . . etc. Since this does not follow from any of our axioms, we assume it as a postulate. P 1. (∀p)(pεT(g-Essence) → (gLp ↔ gWp))

If p is a theorem of God’s essence then God loves that p (is the case) i� God wills that p (is the case). 2. Principles concerning creatures It is a di�cult question whether an analogous principle to the one above also holds for non-human creatures of the universe (we do not discuss the case of angels). However, the following arguments seem to show that for facts about human creatures the equivalence between God’s love and God’s will does not seem to hold. Since an equivalence consists of two implications, we shall ask whether one or both of them do hold generally.

186 � 5 God is All-Good (a) The first question is then as to whether (∀p)(gWp → gLp) (if God wills that p is the case then God loves that p is the case) holds generally concerning facts about human creatures. This seems not to be true concerning God’s punishment: Although God conditionally wills to punish because he wills his justice (cf. section 5.2.8), God does not love to punish. This is supported by the following passages from the Bible: Though he brings grief, he will show compassion, so great is his unfailing love (La 3,32). Do I take any pleasure in the death of the wicked? declares the Sovereign Lord. Rather, am I not pleased when they turn from their ways and live? (Eze 18,23). For I take no pleasure in the death of anyone declares the Sovereign Lord. Repent and live. (Eze 18,32).

Therefore, the statement (∀p)(gWp → gLp) does not hold since for some states of a�airs as for example for God’s just punishment it holds that he (conditionally) wills it but does not love it: (∃p)(gWp ∧ ¬gLp). As has been elaborated in section 5.2.3(2.), from: God conditionally wills that p (under the condition that he wills that q) it does not follow that he (directly) wills that p occurs (gWp). God may execute his punishment – if it occurs in this world – through other creatures. However, concerning his punishment after man’s life in this world, it holds that God wills it (gWp) even if under the condition of balancing justice. Nevertheless, it is not ruled out that some of God’s punishments occurring in this world are not only permitted but willed by him. Therefore, (∃p)(gWp ∧ ¬gLp) holds at least for God’s punishment after this life but also for those punishments in this world that are willed by him. (b) The second question is as to whether (∀p)(gLp → gWp) (if God loves that p is the case then God wills that p is the case) holds generally concerning facts about human creatures. For God’s will it holds that his will is always fulfilled, i.e. it never fails (cf. theorem T86): Whatever God wills that it occurs does in fact occur: (∀p)(gWp → p) This has to be understood in the right way. If we say that God wills that men obey his ten commandments, then this is not formulated in the correct way since by the above principle it would follow that humans always obey God’s ten commandments, but this is not the case, as we know. Therefore, if God’s will is applied to human actions of free will, the correct formulation is that God wills that men should (ought to) obey his ten commandments since God does not destroy the freedom of man. In the case of men committing moral evil, God does not will that this occurs and does not prevent it (i.e. does not will that it does not occur), otherwise it would not occur (cf. theorems T200 and T211).

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The question is now whether the principle that God’s will is always fulfilled also holds for God’s love. It must hold if (∀p)(gLp → gWp) held generally since it follows from it. That it does not hold, however, is shown by the following consideration: We can say that God loves that the wicked turn away from their ways, or God loves that they repent. But we cannot say that God wills that the wicked turn away from their ways, or God wills that they repent, for in this case they would in fact turn away and repent, caused to do so by God’s will and losing their freedom. In order for man’s free will decision to not be touched, we must say that God wills that the wicked should turn away and that God wills that they should repent. For God’s love, however, this addition in the form of should is not necessary since God’s love is not always fulfilled: men do not always answer God’s love; they sometimes ignore it or even refuse it. As the love of a lover is not always answered by the beloved since love highly respects man’s free will, neither is God’s love always answered by the beloved. This is supported by the following passage from the Bible: As surely as I live, declares the Sovereign Lord, I take no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but rather that they turn from their ways and live. Turn! Turn from your evil ways! Why will you die, people of Israel? (Eze 33,11). Oh, that their hearts would be inclined to fear me and keep all my commands always, so that it might go well with them and their children forever (Dt 5,29). Jerusalem, Jerusalem, you who kill the prophets and stone those sent to you; how often I have longed to gather your children together, as a hen gathers her chicks under the wings, and you were not willing (Lk 13, 34).

Therefore the statement (∀p)(gLp → gWp) is not generally true since for some states of a�airs it does not hold. God, by sending his son, loved to save men from final death but did not bring this about by his will, leaving it to the free acceptance of men: (∃p)(gLp ∧ ¬gWp).

Summarizing points (a) and (b), we arrive at the following postulate Post2:

P 2. ¬(∀p)[pεT(CR) → (gWp → gLp)] ∧ ¬(∀p)[pεT(CR) → (gLp → gWp)]

188 � 5 God is All-Good

�.� Evil Accompanied by Good �.�.� There Is No Bare or Absolute Evil By bare or absolute evil, we understand evil that is not accompanied by any good. It seems to be certain that such a kind of evil does not exist in this world; neither in the non-living nor in the living domain. A reason for that is that we experience on all levels of creation that evil is accompanied by some good. This also becomes evident by looking at di�erent types of evils described by definitions D33, D35.2–D43: The good that accompanies metaphysical evil is the di�erentiation and hierarchical order in the universe. The good that accompanies natural evil NE� can be a new type of order or an emergence of new structures. The good that accompanies natural evil NE� , like illness, is – provided that the illness is overcome – strengthening of the body and its immune system, and if the illness leads to death, it might produce a more adapted group of organisms or species by natural selection. The good that accompanies natural evil NE� of committing errors with the consequence of biological costs is the improvement in the learning process by learning from mistakes. The good that accompanies necessary evil is the goal for which the evil is necessary; for example regaining health for which surgery is necessary. The good that accompanies legitimate evil is either a good (for example education) for the one who has to accept that legitimate evil or for someone else (for example the parents or his/her children). The good that accompanies errors made by scientific activity (for example by making scientific experiments or tests) – also a kind of legitimate evil – consists of improvements of instruments, of the methodology, of experimental investigation, of theoretical inquiry, in general by learning from mistakes. The good that accompanies the evil of (just) punishment is the balance of justice. The good that accompanies soul-making evil is the conversion to a better life; the good that accompanies undeserved evil is the reward in this life or in the life to come. The good that accompanies moral evil is some subjective good in this life. The following theorems show that for six types of evil described in sections 5.2 and 5.3 the good that accompanies the evil follows from former theorems based on the respective definitions. T 316. (∀p)[p e MetE → (∃q)(q e G ∧ q e World-Order ∧ (q → p))] T233 If p is a metaphysical evil then there is some good q such that q is the world-order and p is a necessary condition for q. T 317. (∀p)[p e PE → (∃q)(q e G ∧ q ε T(g-Justice) ∧ (q → p))] T237 If p is the evil of God’s punishment then the good is a state of a�airs of God’s justice such that p is necessary for satisfying q

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T 318. (∀p)(∀x∈ls)[p e NecE(x) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] T260, A28, D37.1 If p is a necessary evil for living system x then there is a good q of x such that p is necessary for achieving good q T 319. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[p e LE(x) → (∃q)(∃y ∈ �)(x =� y ∧ (q e G(x) ∨ q e G(y)))] T265, A28 If p is a legitimate evil for a human being x then there is a good q either for x or for some other human being y T 320. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e SE(x) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] T235, A28 If p is a soul-making evil then there is a good q (in this case: eternal happiness) such that p is necessary for q T 321. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[p e UE(x) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] T268, A28 If p is an undeserved evil there is a good q (as reward) such that p is necessary for q T 322. (∀p)[(p e MetE ∨ p e PE ∨ p e NecE ∨ p e LE ∨ p e SE ∨ p e UE) → (∃q)(q e G ∧ q → p)] T316-T321 Theorem T322 shows – as a summary of theorems T316-T321 – that each of these six types of evils is accompanied by some good.

�.�.� The Good That Accompanies Natural Evil and Moral Evil Theorem T322 does not include natural evil or moral evil. This is the case because all six types of evil as such, i.e. without an additional condition, are accompanied by some (particular) good: There cannot be something less perfect without there being something more perfect (metaphysical evil); there cannot be God’s punishment without satisfying justice; there cannot be necessary evil without a good purpose (health for which an operation is necessary); there cannot be legitimate evil without a good goal (for example education); there cannot be soul-making evil without the aim of achieving eternal happiness; there cannot be undeserved evil without reward. On the other hand, natural evil NE� need not be accompanied by some particular good, although that can be the case. Thus, a flood need not be good for any creature, but it can be (as the flood of the Nile was in ancient times). Or a forest fire (not caused by humans) need not be good for any creature, but its cinders can serve fertilization. Independently of these particular goods, natural evil NE� may be accompanied by some non-local good of which we humans are ignorant. Similarly, natural evil NE� need not be accompanied by some particular good, although

190 � 5 God is All-Good this might be the case. Thus, a certain illness need not to be good for anyone, but it can help for the discovery of a new medicament which can save many others from that illness. Or draught and hunger in some country seem to not be good for anyone but might lead to getting food from other countries and to arousing charity. However, the following connection with a particular good seems to hold generally: if some living creature x seeks or accepts or puts up with the respective evil, then there is a particular good for which the evil is necessary and which x desires more than the good of which the respective evil is the privation. Thus, for example, if living creatures seek or accept or put up with a flood or cloud-burst, then the particular good of watering the land is more desired than the uninjured land of which the flood or cloud-burst is the privation. If a lion seeks to kill a stag, the lion desires the food for which the corruption of the stag is necessary, and the food is more desired than the life of the stag of which the corruption is the privation. If a student puts up with hard work of studying and as a consequence with renunciation of several recreations and pleasures, then the student desires the respective degree of the university for which these renunciations are necessary, and the student desires the respective degree more than the pleasures and recreations of which the renunciations are the privation. A similar connection with a particular good holds for moral evil. Moral evil as such need not to be accompanied by some particular good. However, if some human person x seeks or accepts or puts up with some moral evil, then x desires that particular good for which committing the moral evil is necessary, and that good is more desired by x than remaining innocent of which the moral evil is the privation. For example, if a man lies to a judge, then he desires to make the judge believe that he is not guilty for which the lying is necessary – according to his judgement of the situation; moreover, he desires it more to appear as not guilty than to remain innocent when speaking in court.

�.�.� The Principle That Evil Is Accompanied by Good According to the considerations in section 5.6.2 including section 5.6.1, the following principle due to Thomas Aquinas seems to be satisfied: Never therefore would evil be sought after, not even accidentally, unless the good that accompanies the evil were more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation��

35 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,9. The latin text reads: Nunquam igitur appeteretur malum, nec per accidens, nisi bonum cui conjungitur malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum.

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Thus, for example, concerning necessary evil, obtaining and regaining health is preferred to remaining uninjured of which the evil of operation is the privation. Or concerning natural evil, improvement by learning from mistakes is preferred to being free of biological costs produced by errors. Or concerning legitimate evil, the good of elementary education is preferred to the absence of sanctions. Or concerning moral evil, the stolen good is more desired than the moral good of remaining innocent of which the moral evil (which is accepted) is the privation. Or concerning undeserved evil, the final reward is more desired than the good of being free from undeserved evil which is a necessary condition for the reward. These considerations lead to axiom A32, which is an interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’ principle and seems to hold at least for all human creatures. However, it seems to also hold for higher animals and may even hold partially for animals whose activities are guided by instinct. Before we translate the principle of Thomas Aquinas into an axiom, we have to consider its structure. Not: evil would be sought-after (not even accidentally) (A) – nunquam igitur appeteretur malum (nec per accidens) – if not the good that accompanies the evil is more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation (B) – nisi bonum cui conjungitur malum, magis appeteretur quam bonum quod privatur per malum. This statement has the logical form: Not A if not B (in Latin: nunquam A nisi B). Put into an if –then statement the form is: If not B then not A. This, again, is logically equivalent (by contraposition) to: If A then B. This latter form is also supported by a passage shortly before the above quotation: Nevertheless evil may be sought accidentally, so far it accompanies (implies) a good. Sed aliquod malum appetitur per accidens, inquantum consequitur ad aliquod bonum.��

In order to be most general, we shall use the weaker expression accepts instead of seek (sought) or desire. This is supported by the expression “sought accidentally” and by the beginning of article 19: It is impossible that any evil, as such, should be sought for . . .

According to this consideration, we may express the principle of Thomas Aquinas in the following form:

36 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 19,9.

192 � 5 God is All-Good If evil is accepted (sought for accidentally), then the good that accompanies the evil is more desired than the good of which the evil is the privation. We use this form to formulate axiom A32: A 32. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[(p e E+ ∧ xAccepts p) → (∃q)(∃r)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p) ∧ xPref(q, r) ∧ r e G(x) ∧ p e Priv(r))]

If p is any evil according to definition D44 (below) which is accepted by human person x then there is a desired good q for which evil p is a necessary condition such that good q is preferred to good r of which the evil p is the privation. The expression “x Accepts p” can also be replaced by “x puts up with p” if this is more appropriate for certain situations.

Although axiom A32 also seems to hold for living creatures on lower levels, it has to be observed that this can only be the case if the concepts involved are interpreted in an analogous way: wills, acts, knows, prefers, accepts are first of all taken and understood from the human point of view. On a lower level, they may be applied analogously to higher animals. In this sense, we say that the lion desires the food (meat) when he kills the stag. On a much lower level, animals may desire, know, prefer, accept instinctively. Or in a symbiosis, the “desired” good received from the partner may be “preferred” to the good which is lost. D 44. p e E+ ↔ (p e NE ∨ p e NecE ∨ p e LE ∨ p e ME ∨ p e SE ∨ p e UE)

As is clear from definition D44, axiom A32 is satisfied by six types of evil not including metaphysical evil and the evil of God’s punishment. The reason is that axiom A32 holds for all humans and furthermore most probably for all living creatures where we can speak of some inclination or instinct when we say desires, prefers or accepts and puts up with. Moreover, good q is preferred over good r by that living creature who accepts or puts up with evil p. These conditions are not satisfied by metaphysical evil, which is independent from living creatures and their evils or goods. They are also not satisfied by the evil of God’s punishment since in this case God’s justice is God’s good and accepts, puts up with . . . etc. is not generally satisfied. T 323. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(p e NE� (x) ∧ xAccepts p) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] A32, D44, D37.2 Every natural evil NE� of a human person x that is accepted by x is accompanied by some good for x T 324. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(p e NE� (x) ∧ xAccepts p) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] A32, D44, D37.2

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Every natural evil NE� of a human person x that is accepted by x is accompanied by some good for x T 325. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[(p e ME(x) ∧ xAccepts p) → (∃q)(∃r)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p) ∧ xPref(q, r) ∧ r e G(x) ∧ p e Priv(r))] A32, D44 Every moral evil of human person x, that is accepted by x, is accompanied by some good for x that x prefers to (desires more than) the good r (innocence) of which the moral evil is the privation (i.e. which x loses by accepting the moral evil). As has been said above, the good that x desires more than his innocence is some subjective good in (of) this life. T 326. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[((p e NE(x) ∨ p e ME(x)) ∧ xAccepts p) → (∃q)(q e G(x) ∧ (q → p))] T323-T325 Every natural or moral evil of x that x accepts is accompanied by some good for x

Combining the two theorems T322 and T326 establishes that each of the nine types of evil described in sections 4.7, 5.2 and 5.3 is accompanied by some good.

�.� God’s Justice Here, we restrict God’s Justice to human creatures, even if it could be also considered for all creatures. Concerning human creatures, God’s justice contains at least three components: First, that God gives to each human person what is due to the person by his or her nature. Thomas Aquinas expresses this point more generally w.r.t. every creature: Thus also God exercises justice, when he gives to each thing what is due to it by its nature and condition.��

Second, that God rewards morally good actions of men and third that God punishes morally bad actions of men if there is no repentance and turning away from them. These three components are contained in the following axiom of “God is just to human creature x” symbolized as: g∈Just(x).

37 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 21,1 ad 3.

194 � 5 God is All-Good �.�.� Axiom of God’s Justice A 33. (∀x∈�)[g∈Just(x) → (∃p)[p e NG ∧ gW(p e NG(x)) ∧ gWxWp ∧ gWxSAp] ∧ (∀p)[(xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e MG) → (∃q)(q e REW(x))] ∧ (∀p)[(xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e ME ∧ ¬xRTAp) → (∃q)(q e PE(x))]] xRTAp. . . x repents and turns away from p

Axiom A33 says that if God is just to human person x, then the following three conditions are satisfied: 1. For some natural good p it holds (D35.1, 36.1, 37.1): God wills it as a natural good for x and God wills that x wills that p (i.e. God gives the inclination towards p to x) and God wills that x should act in such a way as to obtain it. 2. If p is a moral good and if x wills that p occurs and acts in such a way that p occurs then there is a state of a�airs q such that q is God’s reward for x. 3. If p is a moral evil and if x wills that p and acts in such a way that p occurs and does not repent and turn away from p then there is a state of a�airs q such that q is God’s punishment of x. D 45. p e MG ↔ Op ε T(g-Commands)

The state of a�airs p is a moral good i� Op belongs to the theorems of God’s commands. ‘Op’ stands for ‘it should be that p’ or ‘it ought to be that p’ or ‘p is obligatory’ There is the question as to whether we should add that p is good (p e G) in the definiens of moral good (MG). In this case, p e G would be a necessary condition of p being a moral good. There is, however, the case that some states of a�airs that are evil for the respective person might be a moral good. For example, in certain cases it might be a moral good to endure pain or to tolerate unjust treatment. This is the reason why the definiens of definition D45 does not contain that p e G.

�.�.� Theorems About God’s Justice T 327. g∈PF → (∀x∈�)g∈Just(x) T228, A21 Since (if) God is perfect (then) God is just to all men T 328. (∀x∈�)g∈Just(x) T230, A21 God is just to every human person

T 329. (∀x∈�)(∃p)[g∈Just(x) → (p e NG ∧ gW(p e NG(x)) ∧ gWxWp ∧ gWxSAp)] A33

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As the view of Thomas Aquinas shows, that part of God’s justice which is concerned with natural goods can also be attributed to creatures in general. This has already been stated by axioms A23, A25, although without mentioning God’s justice. God’s justice to humans, however, is concerned in addition and importantly with man’s actions by free will (A26). Theorem T329, which is concerned with the first part pertaining to natural goods, says: God’s justice concerning natural goods implies that God wills some natural good to humans and God wills that humans will and should act in such a way as to obtain it. T 330. (∀x∈�)(∃p)[g∈Just(x) → (p e NG ∧ xWp ∧ xSAp)]

T329, T86

T330 stresses that God’s justice concerning natural goods implies the cooperation of humans by providing their willingness (xWp) and their obligatory task to act (xSAp) in order to obtain that natural good (recall the first part of axiom A26 and theorem T252). T 331. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[g∈Just(x) → ((xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e MG) → (∃q) (q e REW(x)))] A33 Since (if) God is just to human person x (than) he rewards actions of x that are morally good (MG), freely willed (W) and done (A) by human person x.

T 332. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[g ∈ Just(x) → ((xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e ME ∧ ¬xRTAp) → (∃q)(q e PE(x)))] A33 Since (if) God is just to human person x (then) he punishes (PE) actions of x that are moral evil and freely willed and done by x without repentance or turning away (RTA) from them. T 333. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e MG) → (∃q)(q e REW(x))] T328, T331 Freely willed and done human actions that are morally good are rewarded by God. T 334. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e ME ∧ ¬xRTAp) → (∃q)(q e PE(x))] T328, T332 Freely willed and done human actions of x that are morally bad (moral evil) and such, that x shows no repentance or turning away from them are punished by God.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents For it is God who works in you to will and to act in order to fulfill his good purpose (Php 2,13). They show that the requirements of the law are written on their hearts, their consciences also bearing witness (Ro 2,15). God is a righteous judge (Ps 7,11). For God does not show favoritism (Ro 2,11). If you pay attention to these laws and are careful to follow them, then the Lord your God will

196 � 5 God is All-Good keep his covenant of love with you, as he swore to your ancestors (Dt 7,12). Truly the righteous attain life, but whoever pursues evil finds death (Pr 11,19). Suppose there is a righteous man who does what is just and right . . . That man is righteous; he will live, declares the Sovereign Lord (Eze 18,5,9). But if a righteous person turns from their righteousness and commits sin and does the same detestable things the wicked person does, will they live? . . . Because of the unfaithfulness they are guilty and because of the sins they have committed, they will die (Eze 18,24). Then the King will say to those on his right, ‘Come you who are blessed by my father; take your inheritance, the kingdom prepared for you since the creation of the world. For I was hungry and you gave me something to eat . . . ’ The King will reply, ‘truly I tell you, whatever you do for one of the least of these brothers and sisters of mine, you did for me’. Then he will say to those on his left, ‘Depart from me, you who are cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels. For I was hungry and you gave me nothing to eat . . . ’ He will reply, ‘truly I tell you, whatever you did not do for one of the least of these, you did not do for me’.” (Mt 25,34–45). “For we must all appear before the judgement seat of Christ, so that each of us may receive what is due to us for the things done while in the body, whether good or bad” (2Co 5,10).

Constantinople (381): He shall come again in glory to judge the living and the dead (ND12; D150). Toledo (675): There, seated on the right hand of the Father, he is awaited till the end of time as judge of all the living and the dead. From there he shall come with all the holy [angels and human beings] to pass judgement and to render to each one the reward due to one, according to what each one has done while in the body, whether good or evil (ND2302; D540).

�.� God’s Mercy God’s mercy contains at least the following two components: First, God prevents undeserved evil according to his will, and secondly, God even prevents deserved evil if there is repentance. This has been expressed above (cf. section 1.10.3) by the principle of mercy PMC and with the help of the informal definition D32.2. Below, we shall give a more formal definition including the two components. Moreover, it has to be understood that God’s mercy is not opposed to God’s justice. On the contrary, God’s mercy presupposes God’s justice and is based on it. By his justice, God gives to each creature (person) what is due to it (him/her) whereas by his mercy he surpasses his justice by an additional gift which is characterized by the two components above. These are contained in the following axiom of “God is merciful to human creature x”:

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�.�.� Axiom of God’s Mercy A 34. (∀x ∈ �)[g ∈ Merc(x) → (∀p)[(p e E(x) ∧ ¬(xDeserves p)) → (gW¬gPp → ¬p)] ∧ (∀p)(∀q)[(xWq ∧ xAq ∧ q e ME ∧ p e E(x) ∧ xDeserves p) → (xRTAq → gW¬p)]]

If God is merciful to human person x, then the following two conditions are satisfied: 1. If p is an undeserved evil of x then – if God wills not to permit it then it does not obtain. 2. If x wills and does moral evil and deserves evil (as God’s punishment) for it, then, if x repents and turns away from that moral evil, God prevents the evil as punishment. Instead of p e E(x) ∧ ¬(xDeserves p), one can also use UE(x) (cf. D43). D43 describes further characteristics of UE(x) which need not be repeated here (cf. theorems T266-T268) since they are not needed in axiom A34 of God’s Mercy.

�.�.� Theorems About God’s Mercy T 335. (∀x∈�)g∈Merc(x) T230, A21 God has mercy on every human person

T 336. g∈PF → (∀x∈�)g∈Merc(x) T228, A21 Since (if) God is perfect (then) God has mercy on all men

T 337. (∀p)(∀q)(∀x ∈ �)[(xWq ∧ xAq ∧ q e ME ∧ p e E(x) ∧ xDeserves p ∧ xRTAq) → gW¬p] T335, A34 If any human person x wills and does moral evil (q) and deserves evil (p) as punishment for it but repents and turns away from q then God prevents that evil (p) from x Observe that if x deserves that p and p is an evil for x (p e E(x)) as a (possible) punishment, it does not follow from that that p is (or became) already an evil of God’s punishment (p e PE(x)). Although x deserves the evil that p obtains, it is prevented that it becomes God’s punishment for x (p e PE(x)) because x showed repentance and turning away from sin. T 338. (∀p)(∀x∈�)[(p e E(x) ∧ ¬(xDeserves p)) → (gW¬gPp → ¬p)] T335, A34 If p is an undeserved evil of x then it does not obtain if God wills not to permit it

It may seem at first that we could replace the conditional gW¬gPp → ¬p in T338 just by gW¬p (like in theorem T337). This is, however, not possible since there are cases where God allows undeserved evil to happen for some human creature (re-

198 � 5 God is All-Good call the case of Job, section 5.2.9 above). Thus, there is no general theorem that every undeserved evil is prevented by God and does not obtain (see below T340). T 339. (∀p)(¬gPp ↔ gW¬p) D19 God does not permit that p (occurs) i� God prevents that p occurs

T 340. (∀p)(∀x ∈ �)[(p e E(x) ∧ ¬(xDeserves p)) → (gWgW¬p → ¬p)] T338, T339 If p is an undeserved evil of x, then it does not obtain if God wills to prevent it Comparing theorem T337 to the theorems T338-T340 reveals an important point: it follows from God’s goodness (AG, T230, A21) and God’s mercy (Mercy, T335, A34) that God does not devastate the sinner if s/he repents; or in other words, God prevents deserved evil from those who show repentance and turn away from their sins as theorem T337 says. From this it does not follow, however, that God prevents every undeserved evil. This is also clear from the fact that there is undeserved evil and innocent su�ering. Thus, theorem T338 says that God prevents undeserved evil if he wills not to permit it or if he wills to prevent it (T340). The fact that there cannot be undeserved evil or innocent su�ering originates from the invalid evil-guilt principle which we discussed already in section 5.2.9(1). This principle was presupposed as universally valid by Job and by the apostles (cf. Jn 9,2). It says: if there is evil (su�ering, pain) then there is guilt (sin) and consequently by contraposition: If there is no guilt (sin) there is no evil (su�ering, pain). This principle was refuted not only by Job and by the life of prophets but in a much stronger and higher sense by Jesus Christ. By this consideration, it is plain that the theorems T338 and T340 which follow from God’s goodness and mercy show by assuming a non-empty antecedent the invalidity of the evil-guilt principle and of its consequence the non-guilt-non-evil principle. The invalidity of both principles is also implied by axiom A22. Theorem T337, which also follows from God’s goodness and God’s mercy, shows the invalidity of another principle, the guilt-punishment principle (cf. section5.2.9(2): If there is guilt (sin), there is (must be) punishment. Theorem T337 says that even if there is guilt (moral evil) and if evil as punishment is deserved, this evil will not obtain if there is repentance. Analogously by T350 devastating the sinner will not obtain because of God’s Love. The Pharisees presupposed the guilt-punishment principle as universally valid when accusing the woman of adultery. But they were refuted by Jesus Christ (Jn 8,4-11).

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�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents And Jahwe passed in front of Moses proclaiming ‘The Lord, the Lord, the compassionate and gracious God, slow in anger, abounding in love and faithfulness’ (Ex 34,6). The righteous person may have many troubles but the Lord delivers him from them all (Ps 34,19) Give thanks to the Lord, for he is good. His mercy endures forever (Ps 136,1). The Lord is full of compassion and mercy (Jas 5,11). For he says to Moses: ‘I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, I will have compassion on whom I have compassion’ (Ro 9,15) Whoever conceals their sins does not prosper, but the one who confesses and renounces them finds mercy (Pr 28,13) But if a wicked person turns away from all the sins they have committed and keeps all my decrees and does what is just and right, that person will surely live (Ez 18,21). [. . . ] and if that nation I warned repents of its evil, then I will relent and not inflict on it the disaster I had planned (Jer 18,8). As he went along, he saw a man blind from birth, His disciples asked him, ‘Rabbi who has sinned, this man or his parents, that he was born blind?’ ‘Neither this man nor his parents sinned’ said Jesus (Jn 9,1-3).

Leo I (452): God’s manifold mercy comes to the aid of human beings who have fallen so that the hope of eternal life may be restored not only through the grace of baptism but also through the remedy of penance. (ND1605; D308). Trent (1547): If anyone says that for the good works performed in God the just ought not to expect and hope for an eternal reward from God through his mercy and the merits of Jesus Christ, if they persevere to the end in doing good and in keeping the devine commandments, anathema sit. (ND1976; D1576). Trent (1551): But since God, who is “rich in mercy” (Eph 2,4) “knows how we are made” (Ps 103,14), he has given a remedy of life also to those who after baptism have delivered themselves up to the bondage of sin and the devil’s power, namely the sacrament of penance whereby the benefit of Christ’s death is applied to those who have fallen after baptism. (ND1615; D1668). Vatican II (1964). Lumen Gentium (16): There are finally those who have not yet received the Gospel; they too are ordained (ordinantur) in various ways to the People of God. In the first place there stands that people to which the covenants and promises were given and from which Christ was born according to the flesh [cf. Rom 9:4-5], a people of election most dear to God because of their Fathers, for the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable [cf. Rom 11:28-29]. The plan of salvation includes those also who acknowledge the Creator; foremost among these are the Muslims: they profess fidelity to the faith of Abraham and with us, adore the one and merciful God who will judge humankind on the last day. Nor is God far from those who in shadows and images seek the unknown God; for he gives to all life and breath and all things [cf. Acts 17:25-28], and as Saviour desires all to be saved

200 � 5 God is All-Good [cf. 1 Tim 2:4]. For those also can attain eternal salvation who without fault on their part do not know the Gospel of Christ and his Church, but seek God with a sincere heart, and under the influence of grace endeavour to do his will as recognised through the promptings of their conscience (ND1018; D4140)

�.� God’s Love As has been said in section 5.5, God’s love is represented in this study in two ways, i.e. as applied to states of a�airs (gLp) and as applied to individuals (g∈Love(x)). The first way has been dealt with in section 5.5.1-5.5.6. The second way will be dealt with in this section.

�.�.� Axiom of God’s Love A 35. (∀x∈�)[g∈Love(x) → [GG(g, x) ∧ ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → SentM(g, sn)) ∧ (∀q)[(xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn)) ∧ q e MG ∧ xWq ∧ xAq ∧ xEmbGG(g, x)) → (∃p)(p e EtH(x) ∧ p)] ∧ [Sin(x) → (Cons({¬Devast(g, x)} ∪ T(g-Commands)) → CompAr(g) ∧ ¬Devast(g, x))]]] GG(g, x) . . . God gives grace to x SentM(g, sn) . . . God sent his son as Messiah (as redeemer) xGLp . . . x believes that p (is the case) xEmbGG(g, x) . . . x embraces that God gives grace to x p e EtH(x) . . . p is the state of eternal happiness of x CompAr(g) . . . God’s compassion is aroused Devast(g, x) . . . God devastates x Sin(x) . . . x sins

Axiom A35 says: Every human creature x is loved by God in such a way that the following four conditions are satisfied: 1. God gives grace to every human person x 2. If (since) Adam and men have been committing sin (ME), God has sent the Son as Messiah (redeemer) 3. If x believes that God is creator and that he has sent the Son as Messiah (as redeemer) and if x wills and acts in such a way as to obey God’s commands and embraces God’s grace, then x obtains eternal happiness.

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4. If x wills and acts in such a way as to commit sin (moral evil), then – if not devastating x is compatible with God’s commands – God’s compassion is aroused such that God does not devastate x (cf. D32.3). D 46. Sin(adam) ↔ (∃r)(adamWr ∧ adamAr ∧ r e ME ∧ r e PeccOr ∧ rεT(CR)) PeccOr . . . peccatum originale (original sin)

Adam sins (sinned) i� for some moral evil r, Adam wills (willed) it and Adam acts (acted) in such a way that r obtains (obtained) and r is the original sin. D 46.1. (∀x∈�)[Sin(x) ↔ (∃q)(xWq ∧ xAq ∧ q e ME)

Human (person) x sins i� for some moral evil q x wills q and x acts in such a way that q obtains.

�.�.� Religious Belief The religious belief (GL) used in axiom A35 is well characterized by St. Paul: Now faith is confidence in what we hope for and assurance about what we do not see (Heb 11,1).

In what we hope” is usually concerned with transcendental goals like eternal life, poetic justice, reward, and punishment. “What we do not see” refers to these things of hope just mentioned but also to the reasons for belief; thus, concerning the Christian New Testament, that means that we are not eyewitnesses but believe the eyewitness report, not being able to see Jesus Christ or the eyewitnesses. It can be shown that the above description for religious belief fits also quite well to scientific belief.�� A reason for this is that there are several interesting similarities and analogies between the two: There is confidence in the hope that the scientific conjecture or theory will be confirmed by experience, and there is assurance and conviction about what scientists do not see; at least about what scientists do not see at the time they invent their theories or even about what technically or in principle is unobservable, like black holes. Quantum Theory applies to all atoms of the universe, but scientists can (indirectly) see only a very tiny sample of them. Although physical theories talk about forces, forces as such can never be observed, although they can be measured but only via a law (Newton’s second law), which

38 Weingartner (2018), ch. 10, especially section 10.3.1.3; and Weingartner (1994).

202 � 5 God is All-Good connects them with the change of momentum in time or with the behaviour of a springbalance.�� Moreover, both scientific and religious belief agree in the point that they are knowledge-exclusive: If person x believes scientifically that p is the case then x does not know that p is the case. And consequently, by contraposition: If x knows scientifically that p is the case (say by proof or by experiment), then x does not (any more) believe scientifically that p is the case. The same holds analogously for religious belief. Symbolically, these facts can be described by the following principles: (∀p)(∀x)(xGLp → ¬xKp) (∀p)(∀x)(xKp → ¬xGLp) Here the operators ‘GL’ and ‘K’ can stand for both scientific and religious belief on the one hand and scientific knowledge and knowledge in the beatific vision on the other as described in St. Paul: For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face (1Co 13,12).

It will be obvious that the opposite of the two principles above does not hold. That is, no equivalence between not-knowledge and belief holds. Therefore, claims like belief means nothing but not-knowledge are false. There is, however, a weaker kind of belief which is knowledge-inclusive: To believe that p is the case (Bp) in this weaker sense can be interpreted as asserting that p is true.�� Therefore, the following principles hold: (∀p)(∀x)(xKp → xBp) (∀p)(∀x)(xGLp → xBp) �.�.� Theorems About God’s Love T 341. g∈AG → (∀x∈�)(g∈Just(x) ∧ g∈Merc(x) ∧ g∈Love(x)) A21 From God’s goodness it follows that he is just, merciful, and full of love to all humans T 342. g∈AG → (∀x∈�)g∈Love(x) T341 Since (if) God is all-good he loves all human persons T 343. g∈PF → (∀x∈�)g∈Love(x) T228, T342 Since God is perfect, he loves all human persons

39 This fact that scientific theories transcend all possible observations has been described convincingly and in detail by Popper (1963), ch. 8. 40 For a detailed discussion of both kinds of belief see Weingartner (2018), ch. 8,13 and Weingartner (1994). This kind of weaker belief is also described by Hintikka (1962).

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T 344. (∀x∈�)g∈Love(x) T230, T342 God loves all human persons

T 345. (∀x∈�)(g∈Love(x) → GG(g, x)) A35 God gives grace to all human persons since (if) he is full of love to them T 346. (∀x∈�)GG(g, x) T344, T345 God gives grace to all men

T 347. (∀x∈�)[g∈Love(x) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → SentM(g, sn))] A35 Since (T344) (if) God loves all humans he has sent his son as Messiah (redeemer) since (if) all humans from Adam onwards (except Holy Mary) have been committing sin (moral evil) T 348. g∈AG → (∀x∈�)((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → SentM(g, sn)) T342, T347 If God is all-good then if Adam and all humans (except Holy Mary) have been committing sin, God sent his son as Messiah (redeemer). Observe that since Holy Mary is free of every sin, she as a human does not satisfy the antecedence of the second parts of T347 and T348 such that they are both true despite such a substitution. T 349. (∀x ∈ �)(∀q)[(xGL(g ∈ CT ∧ SentM(g, sn)) ∧ q e MG ∧ xWq ∧ xAq ∧ xEmbGG(g, x)) → (∃p)(p e EtH(x) ∧ p)] A35, T344 Whoever (x) believes that God is creator and that he has sent his son as Messiah (redeemer) and who (x) wills and acts according to God’s commands (MG, D45) and embraces God’s gift of grace, receives eternal happiness. T 350. (∀x∈�)(∀r)[(xWr ∧ xAr ∧ r e ME) → (Cons({¬Devast(g, x)} ∪ T(g-Commands)) → CompAr(g) ∧ ¬Devast(g, x))] A35, T344, D46.1 It follows from God’s love (A35): If human person x wills and commits moral evil, then – under the condition that not-devastating x is compatible with God’s Commands – God’s compassion is aroused and he does not devastate x.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life. For God did not send his Son into the world to condemn the world but to save the world through him (Jn 3,16-17). My people are determined to turn from me. Even though they call me God Most High . . . My heart is changed within me; all my compassion is aroused. I will not carry out my fierce anger, nor will I devastate Ephraim again. For I am God, and not a man – the Holy One among you (Hos 11,7-9).

204 � 5 God is All-Good But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us (Ro 5,8). The Lord will call you back as if you were a wife deserted and distressed in spirit – a wife who married young, only to be rejected, says your God. For a brief moment I abandoned you, but with deep compassion I will bring you back (Isa 54,6-7). Whoever believes in the Son of God accepts this testimony. Whoever does not believe God has made him out to be a liar, because they have not believed the testimony God has given about his Son. And this is the testimony: God has given us eternal life, and this life is in his Son (1Jn 5,10-11). And without faith it is impossible to please God, because anyone who comes to him must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who earnestly seek him (Heb 11,6). Jesus performed many other signs in the presence of his disciples, which are not recorded in this book. But these are written that you may believe that Jesus is the Messiah, the Son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name (Jn 20,30-31).

Trent (1547): And so it came to pass that, when the blessed “fulness of time” [Eph 1:10; Gal 4:4] had come, the heavenly Father, “the Father of all mercies and God of all comfort” [2 Cor 1:3] sent to human beings his own son Jesus Christ [cf. n. 1951], who had been announced and promised to many holy fathers before the Law and during the time of the Law [cf. Gen 49:10, 18]. He was sent that the Jews, who were under the Law, might be redeemed, and that the Gentiles “who were not pursuing righteousness” [Rom 9:30] might attain it, and that all “might receive adoption as sons” [Gal 4:5]. God has “put him forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith” [Rom 3:25]; for our sins and “not for our sins only, but also for the sins of the whole world” [1 Jn 2:2]. (ND1926; D1522) Vatican II (1965) Gaudium et Spes: Respect and love ought to be extended also to those who think and act di�erently from us in social, political and even religious matters. In fact, the more deeply we come to understand their ways of thinking through sympathy and love, the more easily shall we be able to enter into dialogue with them. (ND1027b; D4328,28) Paul VI (1964) Address to Representatives of Various Religious: Therefore we must come closer together, not only through the modern means of communication, through press and radio, through steamships and jet planes; we must come together with our hearts, in mutual understanding esteem and love. We must meet not merely as tourists, but as pilgrims who set out to find God, not in buildings of stone but in human hearts. Person must meet person nation meet nation, as brothers and sisters, as children of God. In this mutual understanding and friendship, in this sacred communion, we must also begin to work together to build the common future of the human race. We must find the concrete and practical ways of organisation and cooperation, so that all resources be pooled and all e�orts united towards achieving a true communion among all nations. Such a union cannot be

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built on universal terror or the fear of mutual destruction; it must be built on a common love that embraces all and has its roots in God who is Love. (ND1032). John Paul II (1979) Redemptor Homines: Human beings cannot live without love. They remain beings that are incomprehensible for themselves, their life is senseless, if love is not revealed to them, if they do not encounter love, if they do not experience it and make it their own, if they do not participate intimately in it. This [. . . ] is why Christ the Redeemer fully reveals them to themselves. If we may use the expression, this is the human dimension of the mystery of the Redemption. In this dimension human beings find again the greatness, dignity and value that belong to their humanity. In the mystery of the Redemption they become newly “expressed” and in a way, are newly created. [. . . ] (ND678; D4640).

6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.� God the Son �.�.� The Divine Persons In addition to what has already been said in section 1.3 and by theorems T4– T13, the following axioms A36–A38 and definitions D47, D48 and, furthermore, the theorems in section 6.1.3 below treat properties of the divine persons and particularly of Jesus Christ in a more specified way. A 36. (∀a)[a = ft → (a∈DPers ∧ aHasDN ∧ (∃R� )R� (a : sn) ∧ (∃R� )R� (a, sn : hs))]

If a is the Father then a is a divine person and a has divine nature and there is a relation R� from Father to Son and a relation R� from Father and Son to the Holy Spirit.

A 37. (∀a)[a = sn → (a∈DPers ∧ aHasDN ∧ (∃R� )R� (ft : a) ∧ SentM(g, a))]

If a is the Son then a is a divine person and a has divine nature and there is a relation R� from Father to Son and God (the triune God) has sent a (the Son) as Messiah (Redeemer).

Observe that ‘g’ refers to the triune God as it has been understood in chapters 1 to 5. This understanding pertains to the Christian Religion based on the Old and New Testament together with the decisions of Christian Tradition given in the Church Documents of the Catholic Church. As has been said already in sections 1.1 and 1.2 above, the axioms, definitions, and theorems of chapters 1–5 can also be applied to monotheistic religions in general. In this case, one has to drop axiom A2 and God is triune in axiom A1 as well as theorems T3–T13. Chapter 6, however, is an essential part of Christian Religion. We use the expression God the Son as a synonym of Jesus Christ or Christ. God the Son, (= Jesus Christ (Christ)), is understood as having divine nature (DN, T352), as assuming human nature (HN, T392), and furthermore as being one divine person and not as assuming a human person (cf. axioms A37, A40, A41, A42). The relation of sonship refers only to God the Father, not to the triune God. We therefore use God the Son instead of Son of God (which is often used in translations) in order to avoid misunderstanding.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-007

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God the Son (Christ) took up the many missions and tests of salvation (cf. section 6.3 and axiom A44 below) as one person, even if he su�ered (T461) and died on the cross (T469) by his human nature, i.e. human soul and body, whereas his divine nature was impassible. Since he did not assume an additional person (T410), it is justified to say that God the Son is the same person as Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, Christ is not created concerning his divine nature but assumed a created human nature (T413) and human birth (T418), cf. the Church Documents in sections 6.2.2 and 6.2.4. A 38. (∀a)[a = hs → (a∈DPers ∧ aHasDN ∧ (∃R� )R� (ft, sn : a) ∧ SentP(g, a))]

If a is the Holy Spirit then a is a divine person and a has divine nature and there is a relation R� from Father and Son to a (the Holy Spirit) and God (the triune God) has sent a (the Holy Spirit) as Paraclete.

T 351. (∀a)aHasDN Each a(ft, sn, hs) has divine nature �.�.� Divine Nature Divine nature (DN) is common to all three divine persons. Their common properties are those of being actual, omniscient, omnipotent, and of being all-good. Moreover, those activities of the divine persons which belong to their divine nature are also activities of (the triune) God, and some of the activities of (the triune) God are also activities of the divine persons. A 39. (∀a)[aHasDN → [a ∈ AC ∧ a ∈ Eternal ∧ a ∈ OS ∧ a ∈ OM ∧ a ∈ AG ∧ (∀p)(aA∗ p → gA∗ p) ∧ (∀p)(gA+ p → aA+ p)]]

If a has divine nature then a is actual and a is eternal and a is omniscient, omnipotent and all-good and if a acts (in the sense of) A∗ that p then (the triune) God acts A∗ that p and if God acts (in the sense of) A+ that p then a acts A+ that p. D 47. aA∗ p i� A∗ is replaced by one of the following operations: K, W, L, C, CW , CC, CS, CN, P.

D 47.1. gA∗ p i� A∗ is replaced by one of the following operations: K, W, L, C, CW , CC, CS, CN, P. D 47.2. aA+ p i� A+ is replaced by one of the following operations: K, W, L.

D 47.3. gA+ p i� A+ is replaced by one of the following operations: K, W, L.

208 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour It will be demonstrated that not all properties of God given in axiom A1 and definition D1 can be included as properties of divine persons concerning their divine nature. First of all, a divine individual person cannot be triune. Secondly, being actual (axiom A4), omniscient (axiom A6), omnipotent (axiom A9), and being all-good (axiom A21) are all concerned with both God himself and his relation to and activity in creation. Therefore, they may belong to the divine nature and, consequently, to every divine person. However, being a creator (axiom A13) is concerned solely with creation and God’s relation to creation. And this does not belong to the divine nature of a divine person for several reasons: First, because all of creation and creatures are freely willed and caused by God, but not necessarily, whereas the activities belonging to divine nature are partly necessary (those concerned with the divine persons or God) and partly free (those concerned with the relation to creation). Second, because the creator of all creatures (universe and other creatures) is the triune God and not a single divine person (see Church Documents of Florence 1442 and Lateran 649 in sections 4.3.5 and 4.5.3 above). In combination with D47 and D47.1, aA∗ p → gA∗ p says that many activities of each of the three divine persons are also an activity of (the triune) God. For example, Christ’s knowledge (as having divine nature) that Judas will betray him, also belongs to the knowledge of (the triune) God, and Christ’s calming down the storm or causing health (healing blind, lame, and paralysed people) also belongs to the causation of (the triune) God. This holds similarly for other cases. In combination with D47.2 and D47.3, gA+ p → aA+ p says that the activities of knowledge, will, and love of (the triune) God also belong to the divine persons according to their divine nature. For example, according to axiom A6 (omniscience), second part, it follows from T39 and (gA+ p → aA+ p) that the Son (as having divine nature) also knows everything about God, about logic and mathematics, and about creation and creatures (T366); and furthermore, it follows from theorem T193 that the Son also wills everything that belongs to God’s plan (T368). This holds similarly for the other two divine persons. Observe, however, that causation (C) is not included in definitions D47.2 and D47.3. This is so, because not everything that is caused by (the triune) God is also caused by each singular divine person. Thus, as mentioned already, creation is caused by (the triune) God, and, similarly, incarnation (Christ’s assuming human nature) and the sending of the holy spirit as Paraclete are caused by (the triune) God and not by one of the divine persons.

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�.�.� Theorems: Divine Persons T 352. ftHasDN ∧ snHasDN ∧ hsHasDN T351, T4 Father, Son and Holy Spirit have divine nature T 353. SentM(g, sn) A37, T4 God (the triune God) has sent the Son as Messiah

T 354. SentP(g, hs) A38, T4 God (the triune God) has sent the Holy Spirit as Paraclete T 355. ft∈AC ∧ ft∈Eternal ∧ ft∈OS ∧ ft∈OM ∧ ft∈AG A39, T352 The Father is actual, eternal, omniscient, almighty, and all-good

T 356. sn∈AC ∧ sn∈Eternal ∧ sn∈OS ∧ sn∈OM ∧ sn∈AG A39, T352 The Son is actual, eternal, omniscient, almighty, and all-good T 357. hs∈AC ∧ hs∈Eternal ∧ hs∈OS ∧ hs∈OM ∧ hs∈AG A39, T352 The Holy Spirit is actual, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good

T 358. (∀a)(∀p)(aA∗ p → gA∗ p) T351, A39, D47, D47.1 All A∗ -activities of the divine persons (having divine nature) are A∗ -activities of (the triune) God T 359. (∀a)(∀p)(gA+ p → aA+ p) T351, A39, D47.2, D47.3 All A+ -activities of (the triune) God are A+ -activities of the divine persons �.�.� Theorems: God the Son In the following theorems there is a selection concerning the Son (sn), although all of these theorems also hold of the two other divine persons. Observe that God the Son is here, (sections 6.1.3 and 6.1.4), understood as having divine nature. Below, we shall deal with incarnation. There, the Son will be considered as having assumed (in addition) human nature. The theorems of 6.1.4 do not hold for the Son under the aspect of his human nature. T 360. (∀p)(snKp ↔ gKp) T358, T359, D47, D47.1, D47.2, D47.3 The Son knows that p (is the case) i� God knows that p T 361. (∀p)(snWp ↔ gWp) T358, T359, D47-D47.3 The Son wills that p i� God wills that p T 362. (∀p)(snLp ↔ gLp) T358, T359, D47-D47.3 The Son loves that p i� God loves that p

210 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Since theorem T360 also holds for the Father, it follows that the Son knows that p i� the Father knows that p: snKp ↔ ftKp. This seems to contradict Mark 13,32, which says according to the usual translations: But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels in heaven, not the Son, but only the Father.

However a literal translation of the Greek text suggests the following: But about that day or hour no one knows, not even the angels and not the Son if not the Father.

The last part of this translation “not the Son if not the Father” means: if not the Father then not the Son which is logically equivalent to: if the Son then the Father. This formulation permits of course the knowledge of the Son about that day or hour. We may also focus on the first and last part:“no one knows . . . if not the Father”. This means: if not the Father then no one knows which is logically equivalent with: if one (anyone) knows it then the Father. This formulation does not rule out the Son or the Holy Spirit from knowing either. Therefore, the divine persons may agree in knowledge and omniscience (theorems T355-T357). Irrespective of this, we may interpret the usual translation above as saying that the Son does not know the day or hour with respect to his human nature but knows it w.r.t. his divine nature since he has two kinds of knowledge and will, belonging to his two natures (cf. theorems T419 and T420 below). This interpretation is also supported by the following Church document: Gregory the Great, Sicut aqua (600). This can also, therefore, be understood in a more subtle way by saying that the only begotten Son incarnate, made perfect man for us, knew the day and the hour of judgement in his human nature but did not know it from his human nature. What he knew therefore in his humanity he did not know from it, because it is by the power of his divinity that God-made-man knew the day and the hour of judgement. Thus it is that he denied having knowledge which he did not have from the human nature by which he was a creature as angels are, as he also denied it to the angels because they are creatures (ND625; D475). T 363. (∀p)(snCp → gCp) T358, D47, D47.1 If the Son causes that p (is the case) then God causes that p (is the case)

Observe that the opposite does not hold: The (first) cause of creation is (the triune) God, not one of the divine persons.

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T 364. (∀p)(snCCp → gCCp) T358, D47, D47.1 If the Son can cause that p obtains then God can cause that p obtains

Analogous theorems also hold for the operations CW, CS, CN, P. T 365. (∀p)(gWp → snKp) T82, T359 Whatever (the triune) God wills is known to the Son.

T 366. (∀p)[(p ε T(g) ∨ p ε T(LM) ∨ p ε T(CR)) → snKp] T39, T360 The Son knows everything (every theorem) about (the triune) God, about logic and mathematics and about creation (and creatures). T 367. (∀p)(p ε T(U) → snKp) T48, T360 The Son knows everything about the universe

T 368. (∀p)(p ε T(g-Plan) → snWp) T193, T361 Whatever belongs to God’s plan is willed by the Son T 369. (∀p)(snKp → p) T37, T358 (T360) Whatever the Son knows to be the case, is the case T 370. (∀p)(snWp → p) T47, T358 (T361) Whatever the Son wills to be the case, obtains

T 371. (∀p)[p e ME→(¬snCW p ∧ ¬snCCp ∧ ¬snWp ∧ ¬snCp)] T200, T358 If p is a moral evil then the Son cannot will it and cannot cause it and neither wills it nor causes it T 372. (∀p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME) → (snKp ∧ p ε T(g-Prov) ∧ ¬snCWp ∧ ¬snWp ∧ ¬snCCp ∧ ¬snCp ∧ ¬snW¬p ∧ ¬snC¬p)] T211, T360, T358 If p is a moral evil that in fact occurs, then the Son knows this and p belongs to God’s providence and the Son cannot will it and does not will it and cannot cause it and does not cause it but the Son permits it and does not causally prevent it

T 373. (∃p)(p ∧ ¬snWp) T213, T361 The Son does not will everything that is the case T 374. (∃p)(¬snWp ∧ ¬snW¬p) T223, T361

For some states of a�airs (for example for moral evil caused by a free will decision) it holds: the Son does not will that they occur and he does not will that they do not occur (otherwise they would not occur contrary to facts). In other words: the Son keeps o� his will but permits them to occur.

T 375. (∃p)(¬snCp ∧ ¬snC¬p) T224, T363, p/¬p

212 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour For some states of a�airs it holds: neither the Son causes them to occur nor he causes them not to occur. Recall the remark concerning God’s causation after theorem T218. D 48. sn∈AllWill ↔ (∀p)(snWp ∨ snW¬p) (cf. D31)

The Son is all-willing i� for every state of a�airs p, either the Son wills that p or the Son wills that not-p. (Recall the analogous definitions D31 and D31.1). D 48.1. sn∈AllCaus ↔ (∀p)(snCp ∨ snC¬p) (cf. D31.1)

T 376. ¬sn∈AllWill T374, D48 The Son is not all-willing

T 377. ¬sn∈AllCaus T375, D48.1 The Son is not all-causing

T 378. sn∈OS ∧ sn∈OM ∧ ¬sn∈AllWill ∧ ¬sn∈AllCaus T356, T376, T377 The Son is omniscient (all-knowing) and omnipotent (almighty), but not all-willing and not all-causing. Recall what has been said after theorem T227 (section 4.7.3). T 379. (∀p)(snWp → p e G) T231, T361 Whatever the Son wills is good T 380. (∀p)(snCp → p e G) T277, T363 Whatever the Son causes is good

T 381. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬snWp) A30, T361 There is some good that the Son does not will.

Or equivalently: The Son does not will every good. Recall what has been said in section 5.4.2.

T 382. (∀p)(snLp → p e G) T292, T362 Whatever the Son loves is good

T 383. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬snLp) A31, T362 There is some good that the Son does not love. Or equivalently: The Son does not love every good. Recall what has been said in section 5.5.2 T 384. (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬snCp) T286, T363 There is some good that the Son does not cause. Or equivalently: The Son does not cause every good. T 385. (∃p)(¬snLp ∧ ¬snW¬p) T301, T362, D19, T361

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Some states of a�airs that the Son does not love he does not prevent. Or: Some states of a�airs that the Son does not love he permits. For example the Son does not prevent (occurring) immoral free-will decisions. T 386. (∀x∈cr)(∃p)[snLp → snW(p ∧ p e G(x)] T307, T362, T361 For every creature x the Son wills some (or other) obtaining good that he loves.

T 387. (∀x∈cr)(∃p)(snLp → p e G(x)) T386, T370 For every creature x there is some state of a�airs such that if the Son loves it then it is a good for x. T 388. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[snW(p e Goal(x)) → p e G] T309, T361 For all creatures x it holds: Whatever the Son wills to be a goal for x is good.

T 389. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[snW(p e Goal(x)) → ¬(p e ME)] T388, A29 Whatever the Son wills to be a goal for x is not a moral evil.

T 390. (∀x∈cr)(∀p)[p∈ME → ¬snW(p e Goal(x))] T389 What is a moral evil is not willed by the Son to be a goal for any creature x. �.�.� Biblical and Church Documents 1. Divine Persons As soon as Jesus was baptized, he went up out of the water. At that moment heaven was opened, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him. And a voice from heaven said, ‘This is my Son whom I love; with him I am well pleased’ (Mt 3,16-17). And I will ask the Father, and he will give you another advocate to help you and be with you forever – the Spirit of truth (Jn 14,16-17). But the advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you (Jn 14,26).

Toledo (675): And we profess that the Father is not begotten, not created but unbegotten. For he himself, from whom the Son has received his birth and the Holy Spirit his procession, has his origin from no one. We also confess that the Son was born, but not made, from the substance of the Father without beginning before all ages, for at no time did the Father exist without the Son, nor the Son without the Father . . . The Son, therefore, is God from the Father, and the Father is God, but not from the Son . . . Yet in all things the Son is equal to God the Father . . . We also believe that he is of one substance with the Father. We also believe that the Holy Spirit, the third person in the Trinity, is God, one and equal with God the Father and God the Son, of one substance and of one

214 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour nature, not, however, begotten nor created but proceeding from both, and that he is the Spirit of both. (ND308, 309, 310; D525-527). 2. Characteristics of Divine Nature Toledo (675): We confess and believe that the holy and ine�able Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Spirit, is one God by nature, of one substance, of one nature (ND308; D525; cf. Lateran (1215), ND19; D800; section 1.2.1). For actuality see biblical and church documents in section 1.6.3. For eternity see section 1.9.4. (a) For omniscience see section 2.2, 2.5.5 and the following quotations: When he [Christ] had finished speaking, he said to Simon:‘Put out into deep water, and let down the nets for a catch’, Simon answered, ‘Master, we have worked hard all night and haven’t caught anything. But because you say so, I will let down the nets’. When they had done so, they caught such a large number of fish that their nets began to break. (Lk 5,4-6; Cf. Jn 21,3-6). But so that we may not cause o�ence, go to the lake and throw out your line. Take the first fish you catch; open its mouth and you will find a four-drachme coin. Take it and give it to them for my tax and yours. (Mt 17,27).

(b) For omnipotence see section 3.2.1, 3.4.2 and 3.5.5 and the following quotations: See the Sovereign Lord comes with power and he rules with a mighty arm . . . Who has measured the waters in the hollow of his hand or with the breadth of his hand marked o� the heavens? Who has held the dust of the earth in a basket or weighed the mountains on the scales and the hills in a balance? . . . Whom did the Lord consult to enlighten him, and who taught him the right way? Who was it that taught him knowledge or showed him the path of understanding? (Isa 40,10; 12; 14). Ah, Sovereign Lord, you have made the heavens and the earth by your great power and outstretched arm. Nothing is too hard for you. (Jer 32,17).

Prediction of the divine power of Christ: I, the Lord have called you in righteousness, I will take hold of your hand. I will keep you and will make you to be a covenant for the people and a light for the gentiles, to open eyes that are blind, to free captives from prison and to release from the dungeon those who sit in darkness. I am the Lord . . . See the former things have taken place, and new things I declare; before they spring into being I announce them to you. (Isa 42,6-9). Jesus looked at them and said ‘With man this is impossible, but with God all things are possible. (Mt 19,26). All the people were amazed and said to each other, ‘What words these are! With authority and power he gives orders to impure spirits and they come out. (Lk 4,36).

Florence (1442): On account of this unity [common nature] the Father is wholly in the Son and wholly in the Holy Spirit; the Son wholly in the Father and wholly in the Holy Spirit; the Holy Spirit wholly in the Father

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and wholly in the Son. None precedes the other in eternity, none exceeds the other in greatness, nor excels the other in power. (ND326; D1331) (c) For benevolence (being all-good) see sections 4.5.3, 5.4.3, 5.5.5 and the following quotations: I will proclaim the name of the Lord. Oh, praise the greatness of our God. He is the rock, his works are perfect, and all his ways are just. (Dt 32,3-4). Give thanks to the Lord for he is good; his love endures forever. (Ps 106,1). No one is good – except God alone. (Mk 10,18; Lk 18,19). If anyone acknowledges that Jesus is the Son of God, God lives in them and they in God. And so we know and rely on the love God has for us. (1Jn 4,15-16). Consider therefore the kindness and sternness of God: sternness to those who fell, but kindness to you, provided that you continue in his kindness. (Ro 11,22). But because of his great love for us, God who is rich in mercy made us alive with Christ even when we were dead in transgressions – it is by grace you have been saved. (Eph 2,4-5).

Toledo (589): . . . By God’s goodness every creature was created as good (D470). Leo IX, Letter Congratulamur vehementer to Peter, Patriarch of Antioch (1053): . . . I also believe . . . that God predestined only the good but foreknew both the good and the bad (D685). 3. God the Son I will proclaim the Lord’s decree: He said to me, ‘You are my son; today I have begotten you’ (Ps 2,7) In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and the Word was God (Jn 1,1). The Son is the radiance of God’s glory and the exact representation of his being, sustaining all things by his powerful word (Heb 1,3). The Son is the image of the invisible God, the first born over all creation. For in him all things were created: things in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or powers or rulers or authorities; all things have been created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together (Col 1,15-17). ‘Very truly I tell you’ Jesus answered, ‘before Abraham was born, I am’ (Jn 8,58). The high priest said to him ‘I charge you under oath by the living God: Tell us if you are the Messiah, the Son of God’. ‘You have said so’, Jesus replied (Mt 26,63-64).

Nicaea (325): We believe . . . in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the onlybegotten generated from the Father, that is from the being (ousia) of the Father, God from God, Light from Light, true God from true God, begotten, not made one in being (homoousios) with the Father. (ND7; D125). Lateran (1215): Hence, though “the Father is one person (alius), the Son another person, and the Holy Spirit another person, yet there is not another reality

216 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour (aliud)”,� but what the Father is, this very same reality is also the Son, this the Holy Spirit, so that in orthodox Catholic faith we believe them to be of one substance. For the Father gives his substance to the Son, generating him from eternity, as he himself testifies: “That which my Father has given me is greater than all” (Jn 10,29). One cannot say that he gave him a part of his substance and retained a part for himself, since the substance of the Father is indivisible, being entirely simple . . . Thus, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both are the same reality. (ND319; D805). Toledo (675): For, if we are asked about the single persons, we must confess that each is God. Therefore, we say that the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God, each one distinctly; yet there are not three gods, but one God. Similarly, we say that the Father is almighty, the Son is almighty, the Holy Spirit is almighty, each one distinctly; yet there are not three almighty ones, but one Almighty, as we profess one light and one principle, (ND312; D529). Lyon (1274): We believe in the Son of God, Word of God, eternally born from the Father, of the same substance, equally almighty and in all things equal to the Father in divinity. (ND23; D852).

�.� Incarnation According to Jn 3,16, God sent his Son: For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall not perish but have eternal life.

Since God the Son was sent into this world, he assumed a human body: The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us (Jn 1,14). Today in the town of David a Saviour has been born to you; he is the Messiah, the Lord. This will be a sign to you: You will find a baby wrapped in cloths and lying in the manger (Lk 2,11-12).

The purpose of sending the Son was the salvation of humankind: She will give birth to a son, and you are to give him the name of Jesus, because he will save his people from their sins (Mt 1,21).

1 Gregory of Nazianz, (ECl), (MPG), 37,180AB.

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As is manifest from the biblical documents above, God’s sending the Son has two important components: incarnation and salvation. We specify incarnation as the Son assumes human nature, the meaning of which is described by axiom A41. The two components are described by the following axiom A40: A 40. SentM(g, sn) → [gC(snAssumesHN) ∧ gC(sn ∈ SAV) ∧ (E!x ∈ �)(x = hm) ε T(CR) ∧ hm∈HIS]

If God (the triune) sends God the Son as Messiah then (the triune) God causes that God the Son assumes human nature (HN) and God causes that God the Son is the Saviour (SAV) and there is a human person which is the Holy Mary, belonging to creation and helping in incarnation and salvation (HIS)

T 391. gC(snAssumesHN) A40, T353 God causes that God the Son assumes human nature T 392. snAssumesHN T391, T92 God the Son assumes human nature Both theorems T391 and T392 are defended by Thomas Aquinas as follows: As was said above, assumption implies two things, viz. the act of assuming and the term of assumption. Now the act of assumption proceeds from the divine power, which is common to the three persons, but the term of the assumption is a person as stated above . . . ; for the three persons caused the human nature to be united to the one person of the Son.�

According to theorem T22, every fact of (about) creation that is willed by God is also caused by God; and God’s causation is only concerned with creation and not with himself (cf. T22 and T104). Since the fact that God the Son assumes human nature is a fact of creation according to theorem T413 (below), it is appropriate that theorem T391 speaks of God’s causation. T 393. gC(sn∈SAV) A40, T353 God (the triune) causes and also wills (T87) that God the Son is (the) Saviour (Redeemer). T 394. snW(sn∈SAV) T393, T361, T87 God the Son wills to be (the) Saviour. Or: God the Son wills that he is (the) Saviour (Redeemer). That the triune God causes and wills and God the Son (Christ) wills the salvation (theorems T393 and T394) is defended by Thomas Aquinas as follows:

2 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 3,4. Cf. the document of Toledo (ND630) of section 6.2.2 below.

218 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour For someone to redeem two things are required – namely, the act of paying and the price paid . . . Now Christ’s blood or His bodily life, which is in the blood, is the price of our redemption and that life He paid. Hence both of these belong immediately to Christ as man; but to the Trinity as to the first and remote cause.�

Remark on the structure of expressions It has to be noted that the expressions used in axioms A36–A42 are di�erent in structure. They can be divided into two di�erent groups: the first group contains expressions in which some property (or complex of properties) is predicated of a subject. Such cases are: a∈DPers, aHasDN, snHasDBth; snAssumesHN, snAssumesHBody, snAssumesHW, ¬(snAssumesHPers) . . . etc. belong to this group. The second group contains expressions in which one part represents states of affairs. Such cases are gC(snUnif(DN, HN)), gW(sn∈SAV), gC(snAssumesHN) where the parts in parenthesis represent certain states of a�airs; snAssumesHN ε T(CR), snUnif(DN, HN) ε T(CR) also belong to this second group since the expressions before the ε represent certain states of a�airs. T 395. (∀p)(gCp → p ε T(g-Exc)) D27 Whatever God causes belongs to God’s execution of his plan

T 396. gC(snAssumesHN) → (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Exc) T395 If God causes that the Son assumes human nature then this fact belongs to (the theorems of) God’s execution of his plan

T 397. (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Exc) T391, T396 That God the Son assumes human nature belongs to (the theorems of) God’s execution of his plan. T 398. (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Exc) → (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Prov) D26

T 399. (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Prov) T397, T398 That God the Son assumes human nature belongs to (the theorems of) God’s providence T 400. (snAssumesHN) ε T(g-Plan) T189, T391 That God the Son assumes human nature belongs to (the theorems of) God’s plan.

3 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 48,5.

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�.�.� God the Son Assumes Human Nature Assuming human nature implies several important features which are described by axiom A41 and will be discussed below. A 41. snAssumesHN → [gC(snUnif(DN, HN)) ∧ gC(snAssumesHSoul) ∧ snAssumesHBody ∧ ¬(snAssumesHPers) ∧ ¬(HSoul(sn)∈OS) ∧ ¬(HSoul(sn)∈OM) ∧ (snAssumesHN) ε T(CR) ∧ (snUnif(DN, HN)) ε T(CR)]

If God the Son assumes human nature then it holds: God causes that the Son unifies in him (in his person) divine nature (DN) and human nature (HN) and that the Son assumes a human soul; the Son assumes a human body but does not assume a human person; furthermore, his human soul is neither omniscient nor omnipotent, and both the assumption of the human nature and the unification of the divine nature with the human nature in his person are facts of creation, i.e. something created. Thomas Aquinas describes Christ’s assuming human nature as follows: But the divine nature is not said to be assumed by the human, but conversely, because the human nature is joined to the divine personality, so that the divine person subsists in human nature.� Hence the sense is not that from two natures one results; but that the nature of the Word of God united flesh to itself in person.� So likewise the flesh is said to be deified . . . not by change, but by union with the Word, its natural properties still remaining.�

T 401. gC(snUnif(DN, HN) A41, T392 God causes that the Son unifies in him (in his person) divine nature (DN) and human nature (HN); cf. axiom A42 below. T 402. snUnif(DN, HN) T401, T92 God the Son unifies in him (in his person) divine nature (DN) and human nature (HN). Therefore, although his human nature [which God the Son assumed] is a kind of individual in the genus of substance, it has not its own personality, because it does not exist separately, but in something more perfect, viz. in the Person of the Word. Therefore the union took place in the person.�

4 5 6 7

Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,8. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,1 ad 1. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,1 ad 3. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,2 ad 3.

220 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour T 403. (snUnif(DN, HN)) ε T(g-Plan) T189, T401 That God the Son unifies in him divine nature (DN) and human nature belongs to (the theorems of) God’s plan T 404. (snUnif(DN, HN)) ε T(g-Exc) T395, T401 That God the Son unifies in him DN and HN belongs to (the theorems of) God’s execution of his plan. T 405. (snUnif(DN, HN)) ε T(g-Prov) D26, T403 That God the Son unifies in him DN and HN belongs to (the theorems) of God’s providence T 406. snAssumesHSoul A41, T392, T92 God the Son assumes a human soul T 407. (snAssumesHSoul) ε T(g-Plan) T392, A41, T189 That God the Son assumes a human soul belongs to God’s plan

Theorems T406 and T408 say that the incarnation of God the Son implies that he assumed soul and body as a unity created at the same time (cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III q.6), and not just a body (cf. the document of Rome in section 6.2.2 below). By assuming a human soul, God the Son also assumed freely (willingly) certain defects of the human soul. Among the defects of a human soul there are those that are inconsistent with God’s Commands and thus inconsistent with Christ’s divine nature. Such defects, like moral evil or sin, cannot and could not be assumed by God the Son. However, there are other defects of a human soul which Christ assumed freely in order to satisfy us, in order to prove the truth of his human nature, and in order to become an example of virtue to us.� In this sense, there was sorrow, pain, fear, and trouble in Christ as is manifest from several places in the Bible: My soul is overwhelmed with sorrow to the point of death (Mt 26,38). He took Peter, James and John with him, and he began to be deeply distressed and troubled (Mk 14,33). When Jesus saw her weeping and the Jews who had come along with her also weeping, he was deeply moved in spirit and troubled (Jn 11,33). After he has said this Jesus was troubled in spirit and testified, ‘very truly I tell you, one of you is going to betray me’ (Jn 13,21).

8 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 15,1.

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T 408. snAssumesHBody A41, T392 God the Son assumes a human body By assuming a human body, God the Son also assumed freely (willingly) certain defects of a human body. Among the defects of a human body there are first those which belong to its nature like hunger, thirst, and death. Second, there are those which are contrary to nature, being forced from outside, like striking, scourging, or nailing to the cross. Christ assumed both of these defects by willing them freely. Thomas Aquinas gives three reasons for that: First, because it was in order to satisfy for the sin of the human race . . . Now one satisfies for another’s sin by taking on himself the punishment due to the sin of the other . . . Secondly in order to cause belief in the Incarnation . . . if the Son of God had assumed human nature without these defects, He would not have seemed to be true man, nor to have true, but imaginary, flesh, as the Manicheans held . . . Thirdly, in order to show us an example of patience by valiantly bearing up against human passibility and defects.�

T 409. (snAssumesHBody) ε T(g-Prov) T392, A41, T126, D15, D6, D14 That God the Son assumes a human body belongs to God’s providence.

T409 presupposes the premise that snAssumesHBody ε T(CR). However, this premise is granted because Christ’s conception and birth happened at a certain place and time of this world, and therefore he assumed his human body at a certain place and time of this world such that this fact belongs to the theorems of creation according to definitions D15, D14 and D6. The two theorems T406 and T408 do not suggest that there was no unity of soul and body in Christ when he assumed human nature. However, this unity did not belong to a new individual person but was assumed by the already existing divine person. And hence from the union of the soul and body in Christ a new hypostasis or person does not result, but what is composed of them is united to the already existing hypostasis or person.��

This is expressed in the following theorem T410: T 410. ¬(snAssumesHPers) A41, T392 God the Son (being already a divine person) does not assume (in addition) a human person

9 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 14,1. 10 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III 2,5 ad 1.

222 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Hence it follows that the Son of God nowise assumed a human person.��

T 411. ¬(HSoul(sn)∈OS) A41, T392 The human soul of God the Son (of Christ) is not omniscient, or: God the Son is not omniscient by his assumed human soul. The reason for that is that God the Son by assuming human nature and a human soul had a second kind of created knowledge besides his divine knowledge according to his divine nature. And with respect to this second kind of created knowledge belonging to his created human soul, Christ was not omniscient (cf. theorem T419 below and the doctrine of the twofold knowledge in Christ of Thomas Aquinas): Christ knew all things with the divine knowledge by an uncreated operation which is the very essence of God; since God’s understanding is His substance, as the Philosopher proves (Met 12,1072b20). Hence this act could not belong to the human soul of Christ, seeing that it belongs to another nature.��

T 412. ¬(HSoul(sn)∈OM) A41, T392 The human soul of God the Son is not omnipotent, or: Christ is not omnipotent by his assumed human soul. The reason for that is similar to that above concerning a second kind of created knowledge. Since the human soul assumed by the Son is created, it cannot be omnipotent: On the contrary, What is proper to God cannot belong to any creature. But it is proper to God to be omnipotent, according to Ex 15,2-3: He is my God and I will glorify Him, and further on, Almighty is His name. Therefore the soul of Christ, as being a creature, has not omnipotence.��

T 413. (snAssumesHN) ε T(CR) A41, T392, D6, D14, D15 The state of a�airs that God the Son assumes human nature is a fact of creation.

The reason for that is that every fact that has a beginning at some time of this created world is a fact of creation or a created fact (cf. D6, D14, D15). The fact that Christ assumed human nature occurred at some time (ca 2028 years ago) of this world. Therefore, the fact that Christ assumed human nature is a fact of creation or a created fact.

11 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 4,2. Cf. the document of Toledo (ND629) of section 6.2.2 below. 12 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 9,1 ad 1. 13 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 13,1 sed contra. Cf. theorem T420 and the doctrine of the twofold will in Christ.

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The cause for this created fact is the triune God as is clear from T353, A40, T391 (cf. the document of Toledo ND630, section 6.2.2 below and the quotation of Thomas Aquinas footnote 2 above). Observe, however, that the activity of (the triune) God, i.e. the fact that God causes that the Son assumes human nature is not a fact of creation since no activity of God can be a fact of (about) creation, though we may say that such activities belong to God’s relation to creation (cf. the remarks after theorem T159, section 4.5.1 above). The same holds for theorem T414 below. Although every fact that God causes is a fact of creation according to theorem T22, it does not follow (and it is not the case) that God’s causing of this fact belongs to the facts of creation; this would be a confusion of gCp with p; God causes that p (gCp) and p are two di�erent facts. Moreover, recall that according to axiom A5, no activity of God occurs at a certain time (where time is always understood relative to some reference frame of this universe). However, those facts that God causes occur at a certain time of this world; thus the fact that the Son assumes human nature occurred at a certain time of this world. T 414. (snUnif(DN, HN)) ε T(CR) A41, T392 The state of a�airs that God the Son unifies his divine nature with human nature is a fact of creation. The reason is the same as for T413: this unification has a beginning at some time of this created world; therefore, it is a fact of creation or a created fact. Thomas Aquinas explains this fact as follows: The union of which we are speaking is a relation which we consider between the divine and the human nature, in as much as they come together in one person of the Son of God. Now, as was said above ( Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 13,7), every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being; whereas it is not really in God, but only in our way of thinking, since it does not arise from any change in God . . . Therefore we must say that it is something created.��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents Some important biblical documents for incarnation have been given in section 6.2. Additional ones are:

14 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,7.

224 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Therefore the Lord himself will give you a sign: The virgin will conceive and give birth to a son and will call him Immanuel (Isa 7,14). While they were there [in Bethlehem] the time came for the baby to be born and she gave birth to her firstborn a son. (Lk 2,6-7). In your relationships with one another, have the same mindset as Christ Jesus: Who being in very nature God, . . . made himself nothing by taking the very nature of a servant being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man. (Php 2,5-8). In the past God spoke to our ancestors through the prophets at many times and in various ways, but in these last days he has spoken to us by his Son. (Heb 1,1-2).

Toledo (675): We must also believe that the entire Trinity brought about the incarnation of the Son of God, because the works of the Trinity are inseparable. However only the Son took the form of a servant (cf. Phil 2,7) in the singleness of person, not in the unity of the divine nature: he took it into what is proper to the Son not into what is common to the Trinity. (ND630; D535). Chalcedon (451): We confess that one and the same Lord Jesus Christ the onlybegotten Son, must be acknowledged in two natures, without confusion or change, without division or separation. The distinction between the natures was never abolished by their union but rather the character proper to each of the two natures was preserved as they came together in one person and one hypostasis. (ND615; D302). Rome (382): We condemn those who say that the Word of God dwelling in human flesh took the place of the rational and spiritual soul, since the Son and the Word of God did not replace the rational and spiritual soul in his body but rather assumed our soul (i.e. a rational and spiritual one) without sin and saved it. (ND603/7; D159). Toledo (675): By asserting that there are two natures in the Son, we do not, however, set up two persons in him, lest – which God forbid – the Trinity should seem to become a quaternity. For God the Word did not take the person of man but his nature; he took the temporal substance of the flesh into the eternal person of the divinity. (ND629; D534).

�.�.� God the Son Unifies Divine Nature and Human Nature As it is said by theorem T401, the act of unification of divine and human nature in the person of God the Son is caused by the triune God, and this unification is a fact of creation as is stated by theorem T414. The unification of the two natures in the person of Christ implies several facts which are described by axiom A42.

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A 42. snUnif(DN, HN) → [¬Mut-DN(sn) ∧ Mut-HN(sn) ∧ ¬Cf(DN(sn), HN(sn)) ∧ snHasDBth ∧ snHasDK ∧ snHasDW ∧ snHasDA ∧ snAssumesHBth ∧ snAssumesHK ∧ snAssumesHW ∧ snAssumesHA]

God the Son (Christ) unifies in him (in his person) divine nature (DN) and human nature (HN). This implies: his divine nature is immutable, his human nature is mutable, both natures are without confusion (Cf ), Christ has divine birth (DBth), divine knowledge (DK), divine will (DW), divine action (DA), and Christ assumes human birth (HBth), human knowledge (HK), human will (HW), human action (HA). T 415. ¬Mut-DN(sn) A42, T402 The divine nature of God the Son is immutable.

Since the divine person is infinite, no addition can be made to it.�� The union [between DN and HN] of which we are speaking . . . is not really in God . . . since it does not arise from any change in God.��

T 416. Mut-HN(sn) A42, T402 The human nature of God the Son is mutable Every relation which we consider between God and the creature is really in the creature, by whose change the relation is brought into being . . . the union [between DN and HN] of which we are speaking is not really in God . . . but in the human nature, which is a creature, it is really.��

Theorems T415 and T416 state clearly an important di�erence between the divine nature of God the Son and his assumed human nature. Whereas the former is immutable, the latter is mutable. The immutability also holds more specifically of God’s knowledge, will, and love (cf. theorems T29, T32, T35), and consequently it also holds true for knowledge, will, and love of Christ concerning his divine nature (cf. theorems T360–T362). However, since the human nature assumed by Christ is something created, it is mutable and changeable, not only in the sense that it had a beginning at a certain time of this world but also in the sense that there were defects in the assumed soul and body of Christ, as has been said after theorems T406 and T408. T 417. ¬Cf(DN(sn), HN(sn)) A42, T402 The two natures of God the Son (as an undivided person) remain unconfused 15 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 3,1 ad 1. 16 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,7. 17 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 2,7.

226 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour The union of the two natures in the person of Christ took place in such a way that the properties of both natures remained unconfused, i.e. ‘the uncreated remained uncreated, and the created remained within the limits of the creature’, as Damascene says.��

T 418. snHasDBth ∧ snAssumesHBth A42, T402 God the Son has divine birth and assumes human birth

The divine birth of God the Son is understood as the “eternal birth” from God the Father being of the same substance, i.e. “being in very nature God” (Php 2,6). The human birth of God the Son is his incarnation by which he made himself nothing by taking the very nature of a servant being made in human likeness (Php 2,7). T 419. snHasDK ∧ snAssumesHK A42, T402 God the Son has divine knowledge and assumes human knowledge

As is manifest from theorem T360, God the Son has divine knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of God the Son as a divine person having divine nature is equivalent to the knowledge of God. Moreover, by assuming human nature and by unifying his divine nature with human nature in his person he also assumed human knowledge. That God the Son also has human and created knowledge in addition to divine knowledge is defended by Thomas Aquinas thus: The Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul. And therefore it behooved Him to have created knowledge . . . And therefore it was necessary that there should be another knowledge in Christ, besides the divine knowledge.�� Nothing that God planted in our nature was wanting to the human nature assumed by the Word of God. Now it is manifest that God planted in human nature not only a passive, but an active intellect . . . And thus it is necessary to say that in Christ there were intelligible species received in the passive intellect by the action of the active intellect; – which means that there was acquired knowledge in him, which some call empiric.�� There is a twofold advancement in knowledge – one in essence, inasmuch as the habit of knowledge increased – the other in e�ect – e.g. if someone were with one and the same habit of knowledge to prove to someone else some minor truth at first, and afterwards greater and more subtle conclusions. Now in this second way it is plain that Christ advanced in knowledge and grace even as in age, since as He increased He wrought greater deeds and showed greater knowledge and grace.”��

18 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 10,1. Damascene (DFO), 3,3; (MPG), 94,994. Cf. the document of Chalcedon section 6.2.2 and Toledo (684) D564. 19 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 9,1. 20 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 9,4. 21 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 12,2.

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That the human knowledge of Christ was restricted in a certain way compared to his divine knowledge is also supported by Mark 13,32: he says that not even Christ knows the day of the end of the world (or of the return of Christ) w.r.t. his human knowledge (cf. the discussion in section 6.1.4 after T362). T 420. snHasDW ∧ snAssumesHW A42, T402 God the Son has divine will and assumes human will

As is manifest from theorem T361, God the Son has divine will, i.e. the will of Christ as a divine person having divine nature is equivalent to the will of God. However, by assuming human nature and by unifying his divine nature with human nature in his person, he also assumed human will. Hence we must say that the Son of God assumed a human will, together with human nature. Now by the assumption of human nature the Son of God su�ered no diminution of what pertains to his divine nature, to which it belongs to have a will ( Thomas Aquinas (STh), 19,1). Hence it must be said that there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other divine.��

T 421. snHasDA ∧ snAssumesHA A42, T402 God the Son has divine action (activity, operation) and assumes human action (activity, operation) That God the Son has divine action (or operation) is clear from theorem T363, which says that everything which the Son (Christ) causes is caused by God. By assuming human nature and unifying divine nature with human nature, God the Son also assumes human activity and operation. Therefore in Christ the human nature has its proper form and power whereby it acts; and so has the divine. Hence the human nature has its proper operation distinct from the divine, and conversely. Nevertheless, the divine nature makes use of the operation of the human nature, as of the operation of its instrument.��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents The immutability of (the triune) God also holds for the divine nature which is common to all three persons:

22 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 18,1. 23 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 19,1.

228 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour In the beginning you laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands. They will perish, but you remain; they will all wear out like a garment . . . But you remain the same.” (Ps 102, 25-27). If we are faithless he [Christ] remains faithful, for he cannot disown himself” (2Ti 2,13).

However, w.r.t. his human nature, Christ was mutable: Jacob’s well was there, and Jesus, tired as he was from the journey, sat down by the well. It was about noon (Jn 4,6). And Jesus grew in wisdom and stature and in favor with God and man. (Lk 2,52). For I have come down from heaven not to do my will but to do the will of him who sent me (Jn 6,38).

Chalcedon (451): [The Council] opposes those who attempt to divide the mystery of the incarnation into two sons. It excludes from the sacred assembly those who dare to declare subject to su�ering the divinity of the Only-begotten. It withstands those who imagine a mixture or confusion of Christ’s two natures. (ND613; D300). Constantinople(553): If anyone does not confess the two births of the Word of God, one from the Father before the ages which is timeless and incorporeal, the other [which took place] in the latter days when the same [Word], descending from heaven was made flesh from Mary, the holy and glorious Mother of God ever Virgin, and was born of her, anathema sit. (ND620,2; D422) Lyon (1274): We believe in the Son of God, Word of God, eternally born from the Father, of the same substance, equally almighty and in all things equal to the Father in divinity; born in time, from the Holy Spirit and from Mary ever Virgin, with a rational soul. He has two births, one an eternal birth from the Father, the other a temporal birth from the mother. (ND23; D852). Constantinople (681): We likewise proclaim in him, according to the teaching of the holy Fathers, two natural volitions or wills and two natural actions, without division, without change, without separation, without confusion. The two natural wills are not – by no means – opposed to each other as the impious heretics assert; but his human will is compliant, it does not resist or oppose but rather submits to his divine and almighty will. (ND635; D556). Leo I. Letter to bishop Flavian (449): For each of the two natures performs the functions proper to it in communion with the other: the Word does what pertains to the Word and the flesh what pertains to the flesh. The one shines forth in miracles, the other is subjected to insults. And as the Word does not lose the glory which is his in equality with the Father, so the flesh does not abandon the nature of our race. (ND612; D294).

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�.�.� Sin as the Reason for Incarnation According to those places in the New Testament (cf. 6.2) that speak of Christ’s incarnation, the reason for incarnation is the original sin of Adam, and the sins of all humans later (Ro 5,15). Therefore, sin seems to be some kind of cause for Christ’s incarnation. However, sin cannot be a su�cient cause for the incarnation since God cannot be forced by creatures or by some activity of creatures; but the fact of Adam’s original sin and the sins of all human generations seem to be a cause in the sense of a necessary condition for Christ’s incarnation. Thus, it seems to hold: if sin had not happened, Christ’s incarnation would not have been. And this means (by contraposition): if Christ’s incarnation happened, then sin had been happening. However, this claim also has its problems. Thomas Aquinas describes this as follows: For such things as spring from God’s will and beyond the creature’s due, can be made known to us only through being revealed in the Sacred Scripture, in which the divine will is made known to us. Hence since everywhere in the Sacred Scripture the sin of the first man is assigned as the reason of the Incarnation, it is more in accordance with this to say that the work of the Incarnation was ordained by God as a remedy for sin; so that, had sin not existed, the Incarnation would not have been. And yet the power of God is not limited to this; even had sin not existed, God could have become incarnate.��

The last critical sentence of Aquinas’ quotation shows that we cannot claim it to be true that if incarnation happened, sin had been happening, or in other words: if sin had not happened, incarnation would not have been. This means that we cannot claim that sin is a necessary cause (condition) for incarnation. On the other hand, sin cannot be a su�cient cause for incarnation as has been said above. Therefore, Adam’s original sin and the sins of all later generations were neither a su�cient nor a necessary condition for God’s sending the Son as Messiah or Saviour. However, it can be defended that sin is a causal factor for God’s sending the Son or for Christ’s incarnation. To give an example from the medical domain: a good physician usually finds a causal factor for a certain illness, but very rarely a su�cient or necessary cause. Smoking is neither a necessary nor a su�cient cause for lung cancer, although it certainly is a causal factor. A causal factor may be interpreted as a part of a complex su�cient cause. In this sense, Adam’s original sin and human’s sins (moral evils) are a part of the whole su�cient cause for incarnation which includes God’s love and God’s all-goodness. Thus, the main reason and the main cause in the whole su�cient 24 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 1,3.

230 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour cause for God’s sending the Son as Messiah is his love and his all-goodness cf. Jn 3,16. This is expressed already in theorems T347 and T348 and, furthermore, by the following theorems: T 422. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → snAssumesHN)] T347, T348, A40, T92 If God is all-good and loves all humans, then under the condition that Adam sinned and humans had been sinning, God the Son (Christ) assumes (assumed) human nature T 423. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → (snAssumesHSoul ∧ snAssumesHBody))] T422, A41 Under the same conditions as above, God the Son assumes both a human soul and a human body T 424. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → (snAssumesHBth ∧ snAssumesHK ∧ snAssumesHW ∧ snAssumesHA))] T422, A41, T92, A42 Under the same conditions as above, Christ assumes human birth, human knowledge, human will, and human action T 425. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → gW(sn∈SAV))] T347, T348, A40, T87 If God is all-good and loves all humans, then under the condition that Adam sinned and humans had been sinning, God wills that God the Son is the saviour (redeemer) T 426. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → ((Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → snW(sn∈SAV))] T425, T361 Under the same conditions as above, God the Son (Christ) wills to be the Saviour. A 43. (∀x∈�)(Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x))

Adam sins (sinned) and all humans are (have been) sinning. This is an important fact belonging to all humans (except Holy Mary) and has an e�ect on many creatures. It has to be stated explicitly, because it does not follow from an axiom or theorem so far. Although it holds by axiom A20 that there is moral evil as a fact of creation (creatures), this is only a part of the definientia of D46 and D46.1 which define Sin(adam) and Sin(x).

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�.� Salvation Christ as the saviour of the world was already predicted in the Old Testament, particularly by Isaiah: Surely he took up our pain and bore our su�ering . . . he was pierced for our transgressions, he was crushed for our iniquities; the punishment that brought us peace was on him, and by his wounds we are healed (Isa 53,4-5).

Even the Samaritans strongly believed Christ’s words, although he did not do any miracle there: . . . now we have heard for ourselves, and we know that this man really is the Saviour of the world (Jn 4,42).

And Christ himself told us: For I did not come to judge the world, but to save the world (Jn 12,47).

According to theorems T393 and T394, both God (T87) (the triune God) and God the Son will that God the Son is the Saviour or that he wills the task of salvation. If the salvation of Christ is understood as focussed on the time when he lived in this world (from his birth in Bethlehem to his Ascension), then one may use the expression “willed”. However, the salvation of God the Son is in God’s thought. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use the expression “will” which is not restricted to a certain interval of time. T 427. SentM(g, sn) → sn∈SAV A40, T92 If God sends God the Son as Messiah then God the Son is the Saviour T 428. sn∈SAV T353, T427 God the Son is (the) Saviour

T 429. (sn∈SAV) ε T(g-Plan) T189, T393 That God the Son (Christ) is the Saviour belongs to (the theorems of) God’s plan

T 430. (sn∈SAV) ε T(g-Exc) T395, T393 That God the Son (Christ) is the Saviour belongs to (the theorems of) God’s execution of his plan T 431. (sn∈SAV) ε T(g-Prov) T429, D26 That God the Son (Christ) is the Saviour belongs to (the theorems of) God’s providence

232 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.�.� The Many Missions and Tasks of Christ’s Salvation The many missions and tasks of Christ’s salvation can be divided into four groups: First group: Christ’s baptism, temptation, and transfiguration Second group: Christ’s teaching, working miracles, and instituting sacraments. Third group: Christ’s assuming passion and death and Christ’s descent to hell. Fourth group: Christ’s resurrection and ascension, Christ’s and God’s sending the Holy Spirit, Christ’s instituting his Church, and Christ’s executing judiciary power as the supreme judge at the right hand of the Father. It is not claimed that this list is exhaustive, though it contains fourteen important missions and tasks. That there are many other missions and tasks that are not included in this list can be seen in Thomas Aquinas’ treatment from Christ’s birth to his judiciary power. It is very detailed and consists of 25 questions and 148 articles (Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 35-59). Thirteen of these are included in the following axiom A44 (God’s sending the Holy Spirit already follows from axiom A38 and T4): A 44. sn ∈ SAV → [snCBapt ∧ (snCondP(Tempt, Salv) ∧ (∃x ∈ cr)xCSTempt ∧ gCNTempt) ∧ snCTrans ∧ snC(sn∈DTeach) ∧ snCMirR ∧ snInstSac ∧ (snCondW(Pass, Salv) ∧ (∃x∈cr)xCSPass ∧ gCNPass) ∧ (snCondW(Death, Salv) ∧ (∃x∈cr)xCSDeath ∧ gCNDeath) ∧ snCDesc ∧ snCRes ∧ snCAsc ∧ snInstChurch ∧ gC(sn∈SJudge)]

If God the Son (Christ) is the Saviour, then the following conditions are satisfied: (1) the Son causes baptism, the Son conditionally permits temptation for salvation under the culpable causal contribution of some creature, the Son causes his transfiguration; (2) the Son is the divine teacher, the Son causes miracles of religion, the Son institutes the sacraments; (3) the Son conditionally wills his passion for salvation under the culpable causal contribution of some creatures, the Son conditionally wills his death for salvation under the culpable causal contribution of some creatures, the Son causes his descent; (4) the Son causes his resurrection and his ascension; he institutes the Church and God causes the Son to be the supreme judge. Christ’s and God’s sending the Holy Spirit as Paraclete is not included in this axiom since it already is a theorem (T354). It has to be noted that the expressions ‘Bapt’, ‘Tempt’, ‘Salv’, ‘MirR’, ‘Sac’, ‘Pass’, ‘Life’, ‘Death’, ‘Desc’, ‘Res’, ‘Asc’ are understood as representing states of a�airs or events. Thus, snCMirR says that God the Son causes that miracles (of religion cf. section 6.3.7 below) occur. A particular instance would be: Christ causes that water is transformed into wine. Or snInstSac says that Christ institutes

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sacraments, i.e. institutes that certain signs of holy things make men holy.�� A particular instance would be: Christ institutes that, by baptism, every sin is taken away. Furthermore, ‘Salv→Tempt’ or ‘Salv→Pass’ means that the state of a�airs of salvation (by Christ) implies the state of a�airs of temptation (of Christ), and the state of a�airs of salvation implies the state of a�airs of passion (of Christ). Moreover, it should be noted that the above expressions, though representing states of a�airs or events do not automatically represent obtaining states of a�airs or facts. If God or God the Son causes or wills them, then they obtain (T92, T363); otherwise, their existence has to be explicitly postulated (see axiom A45 below). On the other hand ‘SAV’, ‘DTeach’, and ‘JurP’ represent properties.

�.�.� Christ’s Baptism T 432. snCBapt A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) causes himself to be baptised. 1. That Christ caused (and consequently willed T363, T87, T361) his baptism is evident from Mt 3,13-16. Christ went to the Jordan to be baptised by John; and when John tried to deter him he said “Let it be so to fulfill all righteousness.” Christ willed and caused to be baptised by John. That means that he willed the baptism in water, since Christ did not need spiritual baptism. Reasons for this are given as follows: Our Lord was baptized because he wished, not to be cleansed, but to cleanse the water�� Though Christ needed not baptism for his own sake, yet carneal nature in others had need thereof.�� Christ wished to be baptized “because he wished to do what he had commanded all to do.”��

2. Whereas John baptised Christ in water, his disciples administered spiritual baptism with the e�ect of God’s grace. Now grace was to be conferred on men through Christ according to Jn 1,17: Grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. Therefore the baptism of John did not confer grace, but only prepared the way for grace; . . . first by John’s teaching, which led men to faith in Christ; secondly by accustoming men to the rite of Christ’s baptism; thirdly by penance, preparing men to receive the e�ect of Christ’s baptism.�� 25 26 27 28 29

Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III 60,2. Ambrose (Luc), (MPL) 15,1583. Chrysostom (Matth), (MPG) 56,657. Augustine (Epiph), (MPL) 39,2013. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 38,3.

234 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour 3. According to theorems T363 and T189 Christ’s baptism belongs to God’s plan. T 433. (Bapt) ε T(g-Plan) T363, T189

As it is said in agreement by all the three evangelists, Mt(3,16-17), Mk(1,10-11), Lk(3,22), God revealed his trinity immediately after the baptism of God the Son. All three divine persons were accessible through senses: the Son and the Holy Spirit (as a dove) visible, the Father audible. Since we can assume that God caused this revelation of his trinity at Christ’s baptism, it follows that this revelation of the trinity belongs to God’s plan and consequently to God’s providence: T 434. gCRevTrin → (RevTrin) ε T(g-Plan) T189, instantiation If God causes the revelation of his trinity (RevTrin) then this revelation of his trinity (RevTrin) belongs to (the theorems of) God’s plan. T 435. gCRevTrin → (RevTrin) ε T(g-Prov) T434, D26 If God causes the revelation of his trinity then this (RevTrin) belongs to God’s providence.

�.�.� Christ’s Temptation Then Jesus was led by the Spirit into the wilderness to be tempted (tested) by the devil (Mt 4,1; cf. Lk 4,1-2).

This passage suggests that the cause of Christ’s temptation or test was the devil, whereas Christ permitted to be tempted or tested. This interpretation is also defended by Thomas Aquinas as follows: Christ wished to be tempted; first that He might strengthen us against temptations . . . Secondly, that we might be warned, so that none, however holy, may think himself safe or free from temptation . . . Thirdly, in order to give us an example; to teach us, to wit, how to overcome the temptation of the devil . . . Fourthly, in order to fill us with confidence in His mercy.��

The four points of Thomas Aquinas clearly underline the purpose for permitting to be tempted (tested). All four reasons concern salvation, specifically Christ’s tasks as a divine teacher (cf. section 6.3.6 below). We may say, therefore, that Christ permitted (his) temptation on the condition that it serves (specific tasks of) salvation. This is expressed by theorem T436:

30 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 41,1. Cf. Augustine (Trin), 4,13; (MPL) 42,899.

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T 436. snCondP(Tempt,Salv) ∧ (∃x∈cr)(xCSTempt ∧ gCNTempt) A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) conditionally permits temptation under the condition to serve salvation and some creature (the devil) causes pt-su�ciently (Christ’s) temptation with God as the underlying necessary cause We define conditionally permits (CondP) in analogy to conditionally!wills (CondW, cf. definition D34), as follows: D 49. gCondP(p, q) ↔ (p e E ∧ q e G ∧ gPp ∧ (q → p))

D 49.1. snCondP(p, q) ↔ (p e E ∧ q e G ∧ snPp ∧ (q → p))

God (the Son) conditionally permits p under the condition of q i� p is an evil, q is good, God (the Son) permits that p and p is a necessary condition of q.

Applying definition D49.1 to Christ’s temptation, we receive the following theorem T437: T 437. snCondP(Tempt, Salv) ↔ ((Tempt) e E ∧ (Salv) e G ∧ snPTempt ∧ (Salv → Tempt)) D49.1 God the Son conditionally permits (his) temptation under the condition that it serves salvation i� temptation is an evil and salvation is good, the Son (Christ) permits (his) temptation as a necessary condition of salvation. The expressions ‘Tempt’, ‘Salv’ are understood as representing states of a�airs (recall what has been said after axiom A44, section 6.3.1). That the temptation of Christ is an evil can be justified as follows. Although the Greek text also allows the interpretation “test” instead of “temptation”, it is very clear from the context that the devil wanted to tempt and seduce Jesus. And in this sense, this temptation caused by the devil was moral evil (and therefore evil) of the devil. According to Thomas Aquinas, the devil was not sure whether this person in the desert, being hungry, was God the Son, although he knew that God the Son would come on earth at some time since, as Augustine says, Christ was known to the demons only as far as he willed; not as the author of eternal life, but as the cause of certain temporal e�ects.��

Concerning the implication Salv → Tempt, it has to be observed that though Tempt is a necessary condition of Salv (according to the above implication), this does not mean that there is a necessity in the absolute sense. For God and God the Son, it would have been possible to satisfy salvation by other means also. However, on the 31 Augustine (Civ), 9,21 (MPL)41,273. Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 41,1 ad 1.

236 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour condition that the tasks of God the Son as the saviour (of the Son’s salvation) belong to God’s plan (T429), it can be said that the Son’s temptation was conditionally necessary for salvation. However, the temptation of Christ belongs to God’s execution of his plan. This is so because a culpable causal contribution of a creature (the devil) is involved in Christ’s temptation, as is said in theorem T438: T 438. (∃x∈cr)(xCSTempt ∧ gCNTempt) A44, T428 Some creature (the devil) causes pt-su�ciently Christ’s temptation with the help of God as a underlying necessary (but not su�cient) cause T 439. (Tempt) ε T(CR) T438, T142 Christ’s temptation is a fact of creation

T 440. (Tempt) ε T(g-Exc) T438, D27 The temptation of Christ belongs to God’s execution of his plan.

Since Christ’s temptation is a moral evil (of the devil), it cannot be willed by God (T196, T198), and consequently it cannot belong to God’s plan by theorem T193. Cf. section 6.3.10 below for more details.

�.�.� Christ’s Transfiguration T 441. snCTrans

A44, T428

T 442. snWTrans T441, T363, T87, T361 God the Son (Christ) causes and wills his transfiguration The reason for this is also a task of salvation by showing Christ’s glory to the three selected apostles: Christ wished to be transfigured in order to show men His glory, and to arouse men to a desire of it.��

Since whatever is caused by God comes under God’s plan (T189) and whatever is caused by God the Son is caused by God (T363), it also holds: T 443. (Trans) ε T(g-Plan) T441, T189, T363 The transfiguration of God the Son belongs to God’s plan

32 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 45,3.

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According to Mt(17,3), Mk(9,4), Lk(9,30), Moses and Elias were witnesses (besides the three apostles) and spoke with Christ. One reason for that was to refute the opinion that Christ = Elijah, and another to refute the claim that Christ violated the law of Moses.�� After Christ’s baptism (cf. section 6.3.2), God the Father confirmed God the Son to be his beloved Son and the Saviour who should be heard and obeyed. Since this happened during the transfiguration, it also belongs to God’s plan and to his providence: T 444. (Trans) ε T(g-Prov) T443, D26 �.�.� Biblical Documents As soon as Jesus was baptized, he went up out of the water. At that moment heaven was opened, and he saw the Spirit of God descending like a dove and alighting on him. And a voice from heaven said, ‘This is my Son whom I love; with him I am well pleased. (Mt 3,16-17). Jesus, full of the Holy Spirit, left the Jordan and was led by the Spirit into the wilderness where for forty days he was tempted by the devil. (Lk 4,1-2). About eight days after Jesus said this, he took Peter, John and James with him and went up onto a mountain to pray. As he was praying, the appearance of his face changed, and his clothes became as bright as a flash of lightening. Two men, Moses and Elijah, appeared in glorious splendor, talking with Jesus . . . A voice came from the cloud, saying ‘This is my Son, whom I have chosen, listen to him.’ (Lk 9, 28-30; 35). But our citizenship is in heaven. And we eagerly await a Saviour from there, the Lord Jesus Christ, who by the power that enables him to bring everything under his control will transform our lowly bodies so that they will be like his glorious body. (Php 3,20-21).

�.�.� Christ as Teacher T 445. snC(sn∈DTeach) A44, T428 God the Son causes to be the divine teacher T 446. (sn∈DTeach) T445, T363, T92 God the Son is the divine teacher

Christ’s peculiarity of being the divine teacher can be described by di�erent characteristics: 1. God the Son (Christ) reveals God to us humans.

33 Cf. Chrysostom (Matth), (MPG) 58,550.

238 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour No one has ever seen God, but the one and only Son, who is himself God and is in closest relationship with the Father, has made him known (Jn 1,18 cf. Heb 1,1).

In this function and with this task of revealing to humans important messages of God, Christ, when living on earth, is appropriately called a prophet (Cf. Lk 24,19; Acts 3,33). 2. God the Son is a teacher appointed by God and a mediator between God and men. Therefore, since we have a great high priest who has ascended into heaven, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold firmly to the faith we profess (Heb 4,14). The o�ce proper to a priest is to be a mediator between God and the people: to wit, inasmuch as he bestows divine things on the people, wherefore sacerdos (priest) means a giver of sacred things.��

In this function and with this task, God the Son is appropriately called priest. That the Son is appointed by God is expressed by theorem T447, which follows from T445: T 447. gC(sn∈DTeach) T445, T363 God causes the Son to be a divine teacher 3. God the Son (Christ) is the only divine teacher The people were amazed at his teaching, because he taught them as one who had authority, not as the teachers of the law. (Mk 1,22). You call me ‘Teacher’ and ‘Lord’ and rightly so, for that is what I am (Jn 13,13). Nor are you to be called instructor, for you have one instructor, the Messiah (Mt 23,10). Now the power of Christ’s teaching is to be considered in the miracles by which He confirmed His doctrine, in the e�cacy of His persuasion, and in the authority of His words, for He spoke as being Himself above the law when He said:‘But I say to you’ (Mt 5,22; 28); and again in the force of His righteousness shown in His sinless manner of life.��

It is not claimed that the three characteristics above are exhaustive to describe what is said in theorem T446; however, they are important features that seem to be necessary ingredients of the concept of divine teacher. T 448. (sn∈DTeach) ε T(g-Plan) T447, T189 That God the Son is the divine teacher belongs to God’s plan

34 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III 22,1. 35 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III 42,1 ad 2.

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�.�.� Christ’s Working Miracles T 449. snCMirR A44, T428 God the Son causes miracles of religion We use the term miracles of religion in order to distinguish between them and miracles of nature. This distinction is made by the following definitions D50–D50.2. In these definitions, a miracle is understood as an event, process, or state of a�airs, i.e. as something which is the case. Therefore, it can be described by a proposition. D 50. p e MirN� ↔ p is very frequent ∧ p is admirable and amazing p e MirN� . . . p is a miracle of nature in the first sense D 50.1. p e MirN� ↔ p e MirN� ∧ p is not yet fully or not at all understood, because its causes are partially or completely hidden to humans so far. Examples for MirN� : the beauty of flowers, trees, animals, mountains, lakes, landscapes, human beings; or the recently discovered DNA-repair-mechanisms in order to correct mistakes occurring in the replication process or due to environmental factors like radiation.�� Examples for MirN� : How trees and especially high trees manage to transport water to the top. Since God wills the cooperation of creatures (cf. section 4.4 and axiom A15 above), many of the miracles of nature, MirN� and MirN� , may be caused at least partially by creatures, although the ultimate cause is always (the triune) God, at least as a necessary cause (cf. axiom A17). In the many cases where God incorporates creatures as secondary causes, God does not act as a su�cient cause and gives enough room for evolutionary development on all levels of creation.�� D 50.2. p e MirR ↔ p is a single unique event ∧ p is very improbable ∧ p is admirable and amazing ∧ the possibility of p is not understood because its causes are hidden from humans ∧ p is not against nature or its laws, although contrary to that 36 Cf. Lindahl, Modrich, Sancar (2015) Nobel Prize in Chemistry. 37 Cf. Denton (1998), part 2. Weingartner (2015b), ch. 13.

240 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour course of nature known or accessable to us ∧ p is beyond the capacity of creatures ∧ p is done (caused) by (the triune) God or by one of the three divine persons ∧ the purpose of p is to help men for salvation by confirming faith D 50.3. snCMirR ↔ (∃p)(snCp ∧ p e MirR)

God the Son causes a miracle of religion i� for some states of a�airs p, the Son causes that p occurs and p is a miracle of religion. D 50.4. gCMirR ↔ (∃p)(gCp ∧ p e MirR)

Now a miracle is so called as being full of wonder; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all; and this cause is God. Wherefore those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.�� That which is done miraculously by the divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature.��

Definition D50.2 has eight parts. We shall give comments to each part subsequently. 1. Single unique event T 450. (∀p)(p e MirR → p is single and unique) Miracles of religion are single and unique

D50.2

This means that this event as such is historically unique and not repeatable. Only the type or kind of the event is repeatable; for example, there are di�erent types of healing for a blind person or persons with leprosy or di�erent fish-fangs (according to NT). On the other hand, some miracles do not occur in di�erent instances, but only once; for example, calming down the storm, or transformation of water into wine. This is already a clear di�erence in contradistinction to miracles of nature which frequently occur as the same event. This di�erence can be represented very well if we apply the concepts of epistemic entropy and epistemic information to the respective events.�� D 51. EE(p) = df the number of possible real states satisfying p EE(p). . . the epistemic entropy of p

D 51.1. EI(p) = df the number of possible states which are excluded by p EI(p). . . the epistemic information of p 38 Thomas Aquinas (STh), I,105,7. 39 Thomas Aquinas (STh), II-II,154,2 ad 2. 40 These concepts are elaborated in detail and applied to scientific laws and scientific knowledge in Weingartner (2018), ch. 5.

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By way of illustration, the following states of a�airs may elucidate the above definitions: A Plants disintegrate water into hydrogen and oxygen B The Higgs Boson was discovered at CERN on July 4, 2012 Since the event A happens very frequently the epistemic entropy of A, EE(A), is very large. On the other hand, since B happened only once, EE(B) = �. Moreover, the epistemic information of both events A and B is very large: the disintegration of water into hydrogen and oxygen is a very special biochemical process which carries a lot of information and therefore excludes a huge number of possible states that are forbidden to happen in order for this event to occur. The detection of the Higgs Boson required a lot of special conditions on the side of reality and on the side of the experimental design and so also carries a lot of information excluding a huge number of possible states. Therefore, EI(A) and EI(B) are very large. When applying these considerations to miracles of nature and miracles of religion, we observe the following: if p is a miracle of nature, then both its epistemic entropy and its epistemic information are very large. The first is the case since miracles of nature occur frequently and are therefore satisfied by a large number of possible real states. The second is the case since miracles of nature are very specific events and therefore exclude a great number of possible states. T 451. (∀p)[p e MirN → (EE(p) is large ∧ EI(p) is large)]D50, D50.1, D51, D51.1

On the other hand, if p is a miracle of religion, its epistemic entropy equals 1 since it is a unique event satisfied just by one possible real state. However, its epistemic information is a large number because as a single state it excludes all other possible states. This also follows from the fact that miracles of religion are very improbable (see below). 2. Very improbable T 452. snCMirR → (∃p)(snCp ∧ p is very improbable) D50.3, D50.2 Miracles of religion caused by God the Son are very improbable events

We shall use probability in an “objective” sense, i.e. we use the frequency interpretation of probability; “improbable” means, then, having low frequency. If a state of a physical system is very improbable, its physical entropy is very low and its order and structure are very high. Analogously, if an MirR event is very improbable, its epistemic entropy is very low, but its epistemic information is very high. This also fits the concept of information defined in Shannon’s theory of

242 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour information: a very improbable event has a high degree of information��. From this, it also follows that if we are only concerned with that component of the MirR-event which can be interpreted as the accompanying physical event – say the calming down of the storm or the disappearance of the leprosy – then this event or process has a low entropy and a high degree of order and information. T 453. (∀p)(p e MirR → (EE(p) = � ∧ EI(p) is very large)) T450, T452, D51, D51.1 If p is a miracle of religion then its epistemic entropy equals 1 (since it is an unique event, T450) but its epistemic information is very large since it is very improbable (T452). This is in agreement with Shannon and Weaver’s theory of information. 3. Admirable and amazing This point is supported by a great number of passages of the Bible (especially the New Testament). Three examples are as follows: The crowd was amazed and said ‘Nothing like this has ever been seen in Israel’ (Mt 9,33). He got up, took his mat and walked out in full view of them all. This amazed everyone and they praised God, saying ‘We have never seen anything like this’ (Mk 2,12) The dead man sat up and began to talk, and Jesus gave him back to his mother. They were all filled with awe and praised God (Lk 7,15-16).

4. Not understood because its causes are hidden from humans Hidden causes can be interpreted in a twofold way: In an ontological sense as events, things, or agents or in an epistemological sense as explanations with the help of laws. In science, causes (as things or events) may be hidden because they are unobservable (black holes)�� or because they were not observable earlier (Higgs Boson), and causes as explanations by laws may be hidden because they are unknown. From observing certain facts and interpreting them as e�ects, one conjectures causes which have to have certain necessary properties in order to bring about these e�ects. A concrete example for hidden causes as things is this: the star HDE 226868 with a mass of 30 times and a diameter of 25 times of that of the sun is orbited by an unobservable satellite with half of its mass and a diameter of only 50km.

41 Shannon and Weaver (1949). 42 Despite all the exciting new cosmological pictures, what is observable is not the black hole itself but the light-reaction at or outside the Schwarzschild-Radius (event-horizon) which is not identical with the surface of the black hole but includes it. Cf. The Event Horizon Telescope Collaboration: First M87 Event Horizon Telescope Results. The Astrophysical Journal Letters 875,2019.

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That such an unobservable satellite must exist is sure, but about its structure and its properties, we have only consistent hypotheses which suggest that it must be a black hole. What can be measured and observed in the case of the big star HDE 226868 is that its spherical shape is disturbed in that it forms a top from which matter is sucked away in the direction of the (unobservable) black hole. It has to be noted that the kind of unobservability of the black hole is of a principal kind. For it to be observable, light would be needed, and a black hole does not send out light beyond the Schwarzschild-Radius, and arriving light is swallowed up. A concrete example for causes as explanation by laws is the search for an explanation of the apparent non-locality of quantum-physics suggested by Bell’s Inequalities. Applying these considerations to miracles of religion shows the following analogies: (a) For those who have seen Christ working miracles (especially some or all of the apostles) the cause of the miracle was not hidden in the sense that they saw and heard Christ working or speaking as the powerful agent. (b) However, the real cause was Christ as being God the Son and as having divine nature, and this was completely hidden from human senses. (c) The occurrence of astronomical events or of scientific discoveries and new results is told to us by reliable scientists, and we believe them. For every educated human, the individual amount of scientific belief is much greater than the amount of scientific knowledge. The occurrence of miracles of religion caused by Christ is told us by his reliable disciples, and we (if we are religious believers) believe them.�� (d) A cause (for the miracles of Christ) in the sense of an explanation or in the sense of a regularity based on experience was hidden even from those who saw Christ working miracles, including his apostles and disciples. This also holds for later generations who believe in the respective reports of the Bible (New Testament).�� 5. Compatibility with laws of nature (a) The very improbable occurrence is not incompatible with laws of nature. T 454. snCMirR → (∃p)(snCp ∧ p is not against nature or its laws) D50.3, D50.2 43 For similarities and di�erences between scientific and religious belief cf. Weingartner (1994) and Weingartner (2018). 44 See quotation of note 38 by Thomas Aquinas above.

244 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Miracles of religion caused by God the Son are not against nature or its laws�� Assume that one litre of hot water and one litre of cold water are poured together. According to the law of entropy, they will mix very quickly. The mixed state of lukewarm water has a much higher probability than the state where the two litres separate again into a cold and a hot part. This latter state is highly improbable. This also means that the entropy of the mixed state is much higher than the entropy of the separated state; i.e. the number of microstates which can realize the mixed lukewarm state is much greater than the number of microstates which can realize the state of separation of hot and cold. Although this state of separation is not impossible and not incompatible with the law of entropy, it is extremely improbable. This shows that even an extremely improbable event can be compatible with the laws of nature. And thus, an MirR-event as a very improbable event can also be compatible with laws of nature. That which is done miraculously by the divine power is not contrary to nature, though it be contrary to the usual course of nature.��

(b) God may use the laws of nature, which he created, to bring about miracles. This holds of course for both miracles of nature and miracles of religion. And it also holds for both the miracles worked by the triune God – such as creation – and the special miracles of religion worked by Christ. It follows from theorem T363 that if a miracle (of religion) is caused by Christ, God the Son, then it is also caused by (the triune) God: T 455. snCMirR → gCMirR

T363

On the assumption that both the MirR-event is caused by God and Christ, and God has created the universe with its laws, we have to admit that God and Christ may use these laws when causing MirR-events and, moreover, that God and the Son know in a comprehensive way how these laws can be used. In contradistinction to that, humans have only very partial knowledge of the laws of nature and very partial knowledge of how to use them. This is manifest, for example, from scientist’s or technician’s understanding of Einstein’s law: E = m ⋅ c� . If this law could be fully used, we would not have energy problems any more since �g of mass would give us �, � ⋅ ��� kilowatt hours of energy. 45 Cf. Tipler (2007), ch. V for a detailed discussion. 46 Thomas Aquinas (STh), II-II, 154,2 ad 2.

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Since the purpose of miracles of religion is to confirm faith, a mistrust in the compatibility of MirR with the laws of nature is a hindrance to religious belief. Therefore, showing the compatibility of or, for some cases, even the accordance with the laws of nature helps to remove hindrances to religious belief. This is shown by the following examples: The possibility of the ascent into “heaven” or that of walking on water are easily explainable by a transformation of less than a gram of air into repulsing radiation energy. Concerning MirR-events of healing, their possibility may be explained by causing a special DNA-repair-mechanism in the patients’ cells, which is a law-like process under normal circumstances. Recent discoveries have shown that in tumours and illnesses certain DNA-repair-mechanisms have been eliminated.�� Concerning birth from a virgin, it is scientifically known today that there are XX-men, i.e. male humans who possess only the two female XX-chromosomes without possessing a Y-chromosome. This is a rarely occurring fact (according to today’s estimation, the odds are about � : ��.���). Therefore, with the help of the statistical law for the occurrence of XX-man, one can explain the possibility of virgin-birth in humans.�� In order to avoid misunderstanding we do not claim that the miracles of religion made by God the Son are fully explainable by our knowledge of the laws of nature. On the contrary, the above examples should show our partial knowledge of the “known” laws and our ignorance of many others. In particular, DNA-repair could not be a su�cient explanation for raising Lazarus from the death since biological death or cell-death had already taken place. This is evident from the following description: But Lord, said Martha, the sister of the dead man, by this time there is a bad odor, for he has been there four days (Jn 22,39).

Further virgin-birth (parthenogenesis) cannot be a su�cient explanation of Christ’s incarnation because the essential contribution of the Holy Spirit cannot be explained that way: The Holy Spirit will come on you and the power of the Most High will overshadow you. So the holy one to be born will be called the Son of God (Lk 1,35).

On the other hand, the examples above serve as a refutation of those who claim that miracles of religion including virgin birth are nonsense from

47 Cf. the discoveries of DNA-repair by Lindahl, Modrich and Sancar (Nobel-Price in Chemistry 2015; Scientific American 12,2015). 48 Cf. Anderson, M. (1986), Balakier (1993), Chapelle (1981), Page (1985), Petit (1987), Tipler (2007), ch. 7, Winston (1991).

246 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour a scientific point of view. Moreover, such examples (as scientific results) refute the claim that religious miracles are incompatible with laws of nature (Hume’s view) or have nothing to do with laws of nature. As Augustine says: God the creator and author of all natures, does nothing contrary to nature: for whatsoever he does in each thing, that is its nature.��

(c) God may suspend laws of nature for some time when causing miracles of religion. Since he is the creator of the world (universe) and consequently the creator of the laws of nature, this is perfectly compatible with his power according to theorem T107, axiom A12, and theorem T114 (cf. section 3.5.4,(ii)). Nevertheless, God may work many miracles of religion in accordance with laws of nature, but in a way unknown to us. In which way he causes miracles of religion is his own decision of his free will. 6. Beyond the capacity of creatures Everything which happens through the power of some creature cannot be called a miracle.��

This seems to contradict the Bible, where it is said that “the apostles performed many signs and wonders among the people” (Acts 5,12). There are many other reports in the Acts of particular miracles worked by the apostles. This di�culty, however, can be resolved because the power to cause a miracle (of religion) comes from God and from God the Son who endow the apostles with the ability to fulfil the task of an instrument. This also holds for other creatures like prophets and saints to whom God gave instrumental power to fulfil such tasks. On the other hand, since God wills the cooperation of imperfect creatures (cf. section 4.4 above), he endowed them with the ability to bring about many miracles of nature. 7. Done by the triune God or by one of the three divine persons It follows already from point 6. that miracles of religion need divine power: The miracles which Christ worked were a su�cient proof of His Godhead in three respects. First, as to the very nature of the works, which surpassed the entire capability of created power, and therefore could not be done save by divine power . . . Secondly as to the way in which He worked miracles – namely, because He worked miracles as though of His own power, and not by praying, as others do.��

49 Augustine (CFst), 3,26 (MPL) 42,481. 50 Thomas Aquinas (SCG), III, 102. 51 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 43,4.

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According to theorems T449 and T455, miracles of religion are caused by God the Son and by the triune God. This we can express still more explicitly by the following theorems: T 456. (∀p)((snCp ∧ p e MirR) → gCp) T455, D50.3, D50.4

T 457. (∀p)[(snCp ∧ p e MirR) → p ε T(g-Plan)] T456, T189 Every miracle of religion caused by God the Son belongs to God’s plan.

8. The purpose of MirR is to help men to salvation

Christ came into the world and taught in order to save man according to John 3,17: For God sent not His Son into the world to judge the world, but that the world may be saved by Him. Therefore it was fitting that Christ, by miraculously healing men in particular, should prove himself to be the universal and spiritual Saviour of all.��

According to theorem T349, a partial condition for achieving eternal happiness is religious belief (faith) in Christ and in God as creator. One important function of Christ’s miracles was to strengthen faith by confirming Christ’s teachings: Christ worked miracles in order to confirm His doctrine, and in order to show forth His divine power.�� Therefore Christ’s miracles (of religion) served to help men for salvation.

�.�.� Christ’s Instituting Sacraments T 458. snInstSac A44, T428 God the Son institutes the (7) sacraments D 52. snInstSac ↔ (∀p)(p e Sac → snCp)

God the Son (Christ) institutes the (7) sacraments i� each (of the 7) sacraments is caused by God the Son As will be clear from the translation of theorem T459, the sacraments referred to are the 7 sacraments of the New Testament, and not some forerunners used by prophets of the Old Testament (cf. 6.3.9 Council of Florence). The claim that all of them have been introduced – in the strong sense of caused – by Christ and by God (cf. T363) is essential. Although the sacraments have been administered by the apostles, priests, and bishops, these are but administrators who function as instruments whereas the grace coming with the sacrament is caused by the Son of God and by God. Thomas Aquinas defends this as follows: 52 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 44,3. 53 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 43,3.

248 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour There are two ways of producing an e�ect; first, as a principal agent; secondly as an instrument. In the former way the interior sacramental e�ect is the work of God alone: first, because God alone can enter the soul wherein the sacramental e�ect takes place . . . ; secondly, because grace which is an interior sacramental e�ect is from God alone . . . In the second way however, the interior sacramental e�ect can be the work of man in so far as he works as a minister. For a minister is of the nature of an instrument.��

T 459. (∀p)(p e Sac → snCp) T458 D52 Each (of the 7) sacraments is caused by God the Son (Christ) T 460. (∀p)(p e Sac → gCp) T459, T363 Each (of the 7) sacraments is caused by God

D 52.1. p e Sac ↔ p is a sensible event in space and time that signifies a holy event so far as it makes men holy��

The definiens of the above definition of sacrament (D52.1) has three parts. 1. The first part says that a sacrament is a sensible event in space and time (cf. theorem T67) that signifies something. In this sense, this sensible event in space and time has the function of a sign. This function is expressed very well by the following definitions: A sign is something which – besides the sensible picture that it produces for perception – leads to the knowledge of something else.�� A sign is something perceived from which one infers the existence of something unknown.”�� Now a sign is something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought C.”��

That a sacrament is a sensible event (as a sign) in space and time has several reasons. First, the human condition is such that it needs sensible and corporal things to lead us to spiritual and intelligible ones. Secondly, its seems too hard for men to be directly connected with spiritual, nonsensible things drawn away from bodily actions. Therefore, the institution of the sacraments as sensible signs performed through bodily actions is consistent with human nature. From this description of a sacrament as an event in space and time, it also follows that such an event is a fact p that can be represented as a theorem of creation: p ε T(CR), according to D14, D15 and D6.

54 55 56 57 58

Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 64,1. Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 60,2. Augustine (DDC), II, 1.(MPL)34,35. Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 60,4. Leibniz (OFI), p. 497. Peirce (1958-60), 1.339.

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Moreover, certain determined things, actions, and words are needed to be used as sensible signs, like water, washing and the words: “I baptize you.” (Mt 28,19; ND1413, D1314) in the sacrament of baptism; or “This is my body” (Mt 26,26) in the sacrament of the Eucharist. These determined things, actions, and words are instituted (by Christ) serving man’s sanctification and therefore cannot be changed. 2. The holy event that the sacrament signifies consists in man’s sanctification. According to Thomas Aquinas, this sanctification’s cause is the passion of Christ; it manifests itself in men by God’s grace and the virtues, and its goal is eternal life.�� The sanctification in the sense of God’s grace is not a natural human disposition but something received from outside. The respective virtues are not inborn but are acquired dispositions, emerging by frequently acting morally good with the help of God’s grace. 3. The holy event that is signified by the sensible event makes men holy. However, the degree in which it makes men holy depends on both the willingness to embrace God’s grace and on seriously making e�orts to frequently acting in a morally good way. Only then can the respective virtues be built up as habits, i.e. stable, acquired dispositions which help men act morally good in the future.

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents The people were amazed at his teaching, because he taught them as one who had authority” (Mk 1,22). No one has ever seen God, but the one and only Son, who is himself God and is in closest relationship with the Father, has made him known (Jn 1,18). Put out into deep water, and let down the nets for a catch. Simon answered: Master we have worked hard all night and haven’t caught anything. But because you say so, I will let down the nets. When they had done so, they caught such a large number of fish that their nets began to break (Lk 5,4-6). A man with leprosy came and knelt before him and said ‘Lord, if you are willing, you can make me clean.’ Jesus reached out his hand and touched the man. ‘I am willing’ he said ‘Be clean’. Immediately he was cleansed of his leprosy (Mt 8,2-3). When Jesus looked up and saw a great crowd coming toward him, he said to Philip, ‘Where shall we buy bread for these people to eat?’ He asked this only to test him, for he already had in mind what he was going to do . . . ‘Here is a boy with five small barley loaves and two small fish, but how far will they go among so many?’ Jesus said, ‘Have the people sit down.’ There was plenty of grass in that place and they sat down; about five thousand men were there.

59 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 60,3.

250 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Jesus then took the loaves, gave thanks, and distributed to those who were seated as much as they wanted. He did the same with the fish (Jn 6,5-11). When he had said this, Jesus called in a loud voice ‘Lazarus come out’. The dead man came out, his hands and feet wrapped with strips of linen and a cloth around his face. Jesus said to them, ‘Take o� the grave clothes and let him go’ (Jn 11,43-44). Baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (Mt 28,19). And with that he breathed on them and said ‘Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive anyone’s sins, their sins are forgiven; if you do not forgive them, they are not forgiven’ (Jn 20,22). While they were eating, Jesus took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and gave it to his disciples saying ‘Take it; this is my body’. Then he took a cup, and when he had given thanks, he gave it to them, and they all drank from it. ‘This is my blood covenant, which is poured out for many’ he said to them (Mk 14,22-24). On hearing this they were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. When Paul placed his hands on them, the Holy Spirit came on them, and they spoke in tongues and prophesied (Ac 19,6).

Vatican II, Gaudium et Spes (1965)38: For the Word of God through whom all things were made, was himself made flesh and dwelt on the earth of human beings (Jn 3,13). Thus he entered the world’s history as the perfect man, taking up into himself and recapitulating that history (Eph 1,10). He is it who reveals to us that God is love (1Jn 4,8) and who teaches us at the same time that the basic law of our perfection and hence of the transformation of the world is the new commandment of love (ND2060; D4338). Ephesus (431): If anyone says that the one Lord Jesus Christ was glorified by the Spirit, implying that through him he had access to a power that was not his own, and that he received from the Spirit the power to overcome unclean spirits and to work divine signs among us, and does not rather say that he performed divine signs by virtue of the Spirit which was his own, anathema sit (ND606/9; D260). Vatican (1870): However in order that our submission of faith be nevertheless in harmony with reason, God willed that exterior proofs of his revelation, viz. divine facts, especially miracles and prophecies, should be joined to the interior helps of the Holy Spirit; as they manifestly display the omnipotence and infinite knowledge of God they are the most certain signs of divine revelation, adapted to the intelligence of all people. Therefore Moses and the prophets, and especially Christ our Lord himself, performed many manifest miracles and uttered prophecies; and of the apostles we read:‘They went forth and preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that attended it’ (Mk 16,20) (ND119; D3009). Florence (1439): We here set out the true doctrine of the sacraments of the Church in a brief formula . . . There are seven sacraments of the New Law, namely

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baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, Order and matrimony; and they di�er greatly from the sacraments of the Old Law. For these did not cause grace but were only a figure of the grace that was to be given through the passion of Christ; but our sacraments both contain grace and confer it on those who receive them worthily (ND1305; D1310). Vatican II, Sacrosanctum Concilium (1963)59: The purpose of the sacraments is to sanctify human beings, to build up the Body of Christ, and finally, to give worship to God; because they are signs, they also instruct. They not only presuppose faith, but by words and objects they also nourish, strengthen and express it; that is why they are called “sacraments of Faith”. They do indeed impart grace, but in addition, the very act of celebrating them most e�ectively disposes the faithful to receive this grace in a fruitful manner to worship God duly, and to practise charity (ND1335). Vatican II, Sacrosanctum Concilium (1963)47: At the Last Supper, on the night when he was betrayed, our Saviour instituted the eucharistic sacrifice of his body and blood. He did this in order to perpetuate the sacrifice of the cross throughout the centuries until he should come again (ND1575; D4047).

�.�.�� Christ Conditionally Wills His Passion for the Purpose of Salvation of Mankind T 461. snCondW(Pass, Salv) ∧ (∃x∈cr)(xCSPass ∧ gCNPass) A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) conditionally wills his passion for the purpose of salvation

We define snCondW(p, q) in the same way as gCondW(p, q) (D34) by the following definition D53: D 53. snCondW(p, q) ↔ (∃r)[p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ snWq ∧ q e G ∧ (q → p) ∧ snPref(q, r) ∧ snPp]

What is said in the first part of theorem T461 can be made more explicit if we instantiate definition D53 by the following theorem T462: T 462. snCondW(Pass, Salv) ↔ [Pass e Priv(Unh) ∧ Unh e G ∧ snW(Salv) ∧ Salv e G ∧ (Salv → Pass) ∧ snPref(Salv, Unh) ∧ snP(Pass)] D53, instantiation God the Son (Christ) conditionally wills his passion for the purpose of salvation i� the passion is the privation of being unhurt (Unh) and being unhurt is good and the Son wills the salvation which is good and for which the passion is a necessary condition; and the Son prefers the salvation to being unhurt and permits passion. (Recall what has been said after axiom A44, section 6.3.1 concerning expressions like Pass, Salv, Unh).

252 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Theorem T462 contains seven conjuncts that will be discussed in three points subsequently: 1. Christ’s passion was a great evil in the sense of a privation of the basic goods of the unhurt body and soul (D29.5). Christ su�ered and was hurt with regard to all his bodily members and all his bodily senses; similarly, Christ su�ered and his soul was hurt in a comprehensive way by sadness, fear, mockery, insults and blasphemies hurled at him.�� Although Christ’s su�ering in body and soul was immense, his divine nature was untouched because his divine nature is impassible and Christ’s passion belonged to his human nature. Although God the Son unified in his divine person his divine nature with his human nature (T402), both natures are not confused (T417) as the document of the council of Calcedon (ND615; D302) says (section 6.2.2). This is also defended by Thomas Aquinas: [. . . ] the passion is to be attributed to the suppositum of the divine nature, not because of the divine nature which is impassible, but by reason of the human nature . . . Therefore Christ’s passion belongs to the suppositum of the divine nature by reason of the passible nature assumed, but not on account of the impassible divine nature.��

2. God the Son wills salvation as a great good for mankind for which his passion is necessary. T 463. snW(Salv) ∧ Salv e G ∧ (Salv → Pass) T461, T462 Since God the Son (Christ) wills the salvation of mankind as a great good, he also conditionally wills his passion as a necessary consequence of it. However, it has to be observed that there is no necessity in the absolute sense here. For God, it would have been possible to save mankind in an other way than by the passion of Christ. However, on the condition that the salvation belonged to God’s plan (T429) and Christ’s passion to the execution of his plan (T468), and furthermore, since it was announced and predicted in the scriptures (for example Isaiah 53), it can be said that it was conditionally necessary for the salvation. This is also defended by Thomas Aquinas: Therefore, speaking simply and absolutely, it was possible for God to deliver mankind otherwise than by the passion of Christ, because no word shall be impossible with God (Lk 1,37). Yet it was impossible if some supposition be made. For . . . it is impossible for God’s foreknowledge to be deceived and his will or ordinance to be frustrated.��

60 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 46,5. 61 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 46,12. 62 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 46,2.

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As the first parts of theorem T463 and T394 say, Christ’s salvation was ancillary to his will, and so was – under this condition i.e. conditionally – his passion. However, the cause acting directly to produce Christ’s passion and death were Christ’s persecutors, whereas Christ himself did not prevent it out of obedience: It was befitting that Christ should su�er out of obedience. First of all because it was in keeping with human justification (Ro 5,19). Secondly it was suitable for reconciling man with God (Ro 5,10) . . . Now obedience is preferred to all sacrifices (1Sa 15,22) . . . Thirdly, it was in keeping with his victory whereby he triumphed over death and its author.��

3. God the Son prefers (the great good of) salvation of mankind to being unhurt in body and soul and permits passion. This is expressed by the following theorem: T 464. snPref(Salv, Unh) ∧ snP(Pass) T461, T462 God’s goodness and God’s love to humans is the su�cient reason for Christ’s preference of salvation over being unhurt and for permitting (not preventing) his passion on the condition of Adam’s and men’s sins: T 465. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → [(Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → (snPref(Salv, Unh) ∧ snP(Pass))]] T425, A44, T462, T86

As is evident from definition D19 (section 3.6), God (or God the Son) permits something i� he does not prevent it, i.e. i� he does not will that it is not the case. God the Son (Christ) freely decided to permit, i.e. not to prevent, his passion. According to his divine nature and divine power, he could have prevented his passion in many ways.�� For example, by repulsing his enemies, which happened for a short time according to John 18,6: “When Jesus said ‘I am he’ they drew back and fell to the ground”. Or by preserving his body and by making himself invulnerable. However, Christ did not prevent the unjust inflictions and su�ered freely out of obedience for the purpose of men’s salvation. 4. Christ’s persecutors caused (pt-su�ciently) Christ’s passion T 466. (∃x∈cr)(xCSPass ∧ gCNPass) T461 Some creatures (the persecutors of Christ) caused Christ’s passion pt-su�ciently – with the help of God as an underlying necessary (but not su�cient) cause. As is clear from axioms A15 and A17, nothing can happen in creation without God as a necessary – though not su�cient – cause. Since this is true for every

63 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 47,2. 64 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 47,1.

254 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour fact of creation, it is also true for men’s and other creatures’ free decisions and for occurring moral evil. In the existential quantifier ∃x ∈ cr of T466, we do not restrict creatures to humans (∃x ∈ �) because we do not want to generally rule out the possibility that other rational creatures such as the devil and bad angels might be causally involved in Christ’s passion and death. T 467. (Pass) ε T(CR) T466, T142 Christ’s passion belongs to the facts (theorems of) creation T 468. (Pass) ε T(g-Exc) T466, D27 Christ’s passion belongs to God’s execution of his plan

As has been said in section 4.4 and 4.6.1, God does not do everything himself but employs imperfect creatures as his coadjutors for executing his plan concerning the development and evolution of the universe. This also holds for executing his plan of the salvation of mankind. Among the imperfect human coadjutors for executing salvation, there are good ones like the prophets, John the baptist, Christ’s apostles and disciples, etc. and bad ones like many of the Pharisees, Judas the traitor, and Christ’s persecutors. God permits both, for he has endowed men with free will; and Christ did not prevent the morally bad actions of his persecutors because of obedience and because he considered salvation and its e�ects to be more important than his passion (being hurt, T464). The morally bad actions of Christ’s persecutors cannot be willed and are not willed by God nor by Christ. This is evident from theorems T200 and T211: if p is an occurring moral evil (ME), then God cannot will it and does not will it, but permits it. The same holds for God the Son (T371, T372). From this, it follows by theorem T193 that the (actions of) moral evil (sin) involved in Christ’s passion do not belong to God’s plan, although they belong to God’s execution of his plan (T468) since, for the execution of his plan, he permits imperfect coworkers and even saboteurs. On the other hand, Christ’s salvation is willed by God (axiom A40 and T429) and belongs to God’s plan; however, this does not hold for Christ’s passion as a whole since the morally bad actions involved in it cannot be willed and cannot be planned by God. For an explanation of this and to avoid misunderstanding it, recall what has been said already in section 5.2.3 (2.) above: conditionally willing =� willing directly. From: Christ conditionally wills his passion for the purpose of salvation – snCondW(Pass,Salv) – it follows that Christ (and God, T361) wills the salvation. However, it does not follow that Christ (God) wills his passion, although it follows that he permits it (T464). As it has been said in 5.2.3 (2.) above, there is no theorem of the sort: if p → q is a real (contingent)

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fact of creation, then God (or the Son) wills that p → q (gW(p → q)). This also applies to the real contingent (true) implication Salv → Pass. What has been said above about Christ’s passion also applies to Christ’s temptation and to Christ’s death. In both cases, there can be only conditional will or permission as is clear from theorems T436 and T469, and consequently Christ’s temptation and Christ’s death belong to God’s execution of his plan (T440, T474), but not to God’s plan. Although it holds that everything that is caused by God or God the Son (in the sense of a su�cient cause) belongs to God’s plan (T189), the latter does not hold as soon as imperfect coworkers are involved in the respective occurring fact. In this case, this fact belongs to God’s execution and to his providence (cf. D26, D27).

�.�.�� Christ Conditionally Wills His Death for the Purpose of Salvation of Mankind T 469. snCondW(Death, Salv) ∧ (∃x∈cr)(xCSDeath ∧ gCNDeath) A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) conditionally wills his death for the purpose of salvation and some creatures cause pt-su�ciently Christ’s death with God as an underlying necessary cause. As theorem T461, theorem T469 can be made more explicit by using definition D53: T 470. snCondW(Death, Salv) ↔ Death e Priv(Life) ∧ Life e G ∧ snW(Salv) ∧ Salv e G ∧ (Salv → Death) ∧ snPref(Salv, Life) ∧ snP(Death) D53 God the Son (Christ) conditionally wills his death for the purpose of salvation i� death is the privation of life and life is good and the Son wills salvation which is good and for which death is a necessary condition; and the Son prefers salvation to life and permits death. Observe that what has been said about necessity (passion as a necessary condition for salvation) in section 6.3.10, (2.) above also holds here. The necessity is not an absolute one, but conditional necessity. T 471. (∀x∈�)[(g∈AG ∧ g∈Love(x)) → [(Sin(adam) ∧ Sin(x)) → (snPref(Salv, Life) ∧ snP(Death))]] T425, T86, A44, T470 God’s goodness and love are the su�cient reason for Christ’s preference for the tasks of salvation over his (human) life and for his permitting death because (under the condition that) Adam and all men have been being sinners.

256 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Thus, as it is said in Jn 3,16 and 1Pe 3,18, God’s love caused him to send God the Son as Messiah who died for our sins. T 472. (∃x∈cr)(xCSDeath ∧ gCNDeath) T469 Some creatures (Christ’s persecutors) caused pt-su�ciently Christ’s death with God as an underlying necessary (but not su�cient) cause. According to axiom A15 and A17, nothing can happen in creation without God as a necessary – though not su�cient – cause. Therefore, it follows from axiom A15 together with T472 that Christ’s death is a fact of creation: T 473. (Death) ε T(CR) T472, T142 (A15) Christ’s death is a fact of creation

T 474. (Death) ε T(g-Exc) T472, D27 Christ’s death belongs to God’s execution of his plan. However, it does not belong to God’s plan because immoral actions of Christ’s persecutors are involved in Christ’s death, which cannot belong to God’s plan (recall what has been said after theorem T468).

�.�.�� Christ Causes His Descent T 475. snCDesc A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) causes his descent into hell According to Christian Tradition and to Thomas Aquinas, one of the main purposes for Christ’s descent into hell was to free the saints and all the other just souls who were being held captive there. [. . . ] it was fitting when the devil was overthrown by the passion that Christ should deliver the captives detained in hell, according to Zec 9,11. When Christ descended into hell, by the power of His passion He delivered the saints from the penalty whereby they were excluded from the life of glory, so as to be unable to see God in his essence, wherein man’s beatitude lies.��

T 476. gCDesc T475, T363 God causes Christ’s descent into hell T 477. Desc ε T(g-Prov) ∧ Desc ε T(g-Plan) T476, T22, T126, T189 Christ’s descent into hell belongs to God’s providence and to his plan 65 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 52,1; 52,5.

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�.�.�� Biblical and Church Documents Surely he took up our pain and bore our su�ering (Isa 53,4). I am overwhelmed with troubles and my life draws near to the death (Ps 88,4). My soul is overwhelmed with sorrow to the point of death (Mt 26,38). Who being in very nature God, did not consider equality with God something to be used to his own advantage; rather, he made himself nothing by taking the very nature of a servant, being made in human likeness. And being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself by becoming obedient to death even death on the cross. (Php 2,6-8). Yet it was the Lord’s will to crush him and cause him to su�er . . . by his su�ering my righteous servant will justify many and he will bear their iniquities (Isa 53,10; 11). The reason my Father loves me is that I lay down my life – only to take it up again. No one takes it from me, but I lay it down on my on accord (Jn 10,17-18). As for you, because of the blood of my covenant with you, I will free your prisoners form the waterless pit. (Zec 9,11). For Christ also su�ered once for sins, the righteous for the unrighteous, to bring you to God. He was put to death in the body but made alive in the Spirit. After being made alive he went and made proclamation to the imprisoned spirits, – to those who were disobedient long ago when God waited patiently in the days of Noah while the ark was built. (1Pe 3,18-20).

Constantinople (381): For us and for our salvation he [Christ, God the Son] came down from the heavens, and became flesh from the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary and was made man. For our sake too he was crucified under Pontius Pilate, su�ered and was buried. (ND12; D150). Constantinople (553): If anyone says that the Word of God who performed miracles was someone other than the Christ who su�ered, or that God the Word was with the Christ born of a woman (cf. Gal 4,4) or was in him as one in another, but [does] not [confess] one and the same our Lord Jesus Christ the Word of God incarnate and made man, to whom belong the miracles and the su�erings which he has voluntarily endured in the flesh, anathema sit. (ND620/3; D423). Lateran (1215): He [Jesus Christ] also su�ered and died on the wood of the cross for the salvation of the human race; he went down to the underworld (ad infernos) rose again from the dead and ascended into heaven; but he went down in the soul, rose again in the body and ascended equally in both. (ND20; D801). Vatican II, Sacrosanctum Concilium 5 (1963): God who “wills that all men be saved and come to the knowledge of truth” (1Tim, 2) “who in many and various ways spoke in times past to the fathers by the prophets” (Heb 1,1), when the fulness of time had come sent His Son, the Word made flesh, anointed by the Holy Spirit, to preach the gospel to the poor, to heal the contrite of heart, to be a bodily and spiritual medicine, the Mediator between God and man. For His humanity, united with the person of the Word, was the instrument of our salvation.

258 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.�.�� Christ’s Resurrection T 478. snCRes A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) causes his resurrection T 479. snWRes T478, T363, T87, T361 God the Son (Christ) wills his resurrection T 480. gCRes T478, T363 God causes the resurrection of God the Son For both theorems, T478 and T480, there is support in the New Testament: I have authority to lay it [my life] down and authority to take it up again (Jn 10,18). For to be sure, he was crucified in weakness, yet he lives by God’s power (2Co 13,4; cf. Ac 2,24).

The two theorems, T478 and T480, and these two quotations are very well compatible with each other. Whatever God the Son causes as a divine person having divine nature is also caused by God (T363), and this holds for the Son’s resurrection and also for his ascension. T 481. (Res) ε T(g-Prov) ∧ (Res) ε T(g-Plan) T480, T22, T126, T189 Christ’s resurrection belongs to God’s providence and to God’s plan

Since Christ’s resurrection is (was) an event or state at a certain place and at a certain time (relative to a reference frame) of this world, it must belong to the theorems of creation according to D5 and D6. Moreover, since the Son and God caused Christ’s resurrection, it also follows that Christ’s resurrection is willed by God. This is expressed by theorem T482:

T 482. gWRes ∧ (Res) ε T(CR) T480, T87, T22, D15, D14, D6 God wills Christ’s resurrection and Christ’s resurrection is a fact of creation

From this it also follows that Christ resurrected with his human soul and body (T406, T408) such that his disciples could see him and touch him; it is said in the New Testament: She [Mary Magdalene] turned toward him and cried out in Arameic, ‘Rabboni’ which means teacher (Jn 20,16). Look at my hands and my feet. It is I myself. Touch me and see; a ghost does not have flesh and bones, as you see I have (Lk 24,39).

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�.�.�� Christ’s Ascension T 483. snCAsc A44, T428 God the Son (Christ) causes his ascension T 484. snWAsc T483, T363, T87, T361 God the Son (Christ) wills his ascension T 485. gCAsc T483, T363 God causes the ascension of God the Son In a similar way, as has been said after theorem T480, we may say that both God the Son and God were the cause of Christ’s ascension (T483, T485). Since he ascended with his body, the body was moved by his soul and his will (T484): Consequently the divine power is the first source of the ascent into heaven. Therefore Christ ascended into heaven by His own power, first of all by his divine power, and secondly by the power of His glorified soul moving His body at will.�� He who had made all things, was by His own power raised up above all things��

T 486. (Asc) ε T(g-Prov) ∧ (Asc) ε T(g-Plan) T485, T22, T126, T189 Christ’s ascension belongs to God’s providence and to God’s plan

As is (was) Christ’s resurrection, Christ’s ascension is (was) an event that happened at a certain place and time (relative to a reference frame) of this world (universe). Therefore, it must belong to the theorems (facts) of creation. Moreover, it also follows that Christ’s ascension is willed by God: T 487. gWAsc ∧ (Asc) ε T(CR) T485, T87, T22 God wills Christ’s ascension and Christ’s ascension is a fact of creation.

As in Christ’s resurrection, Christ also ascended with his soul and body (T406, T408). However, in this case, in such a way that his disciples could see him ascending; it is said in the Acts: After he said this, he was taken up before their very eyes, and a cloud hid him from their sight (Ac 1,9).

66 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 57,3. 67 Gregory the Great (Evang), 2,29. (MPL) 76,1216.

260 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.�.�� God Sends the Holy Spirit A 45. SentP(g, hs) → (gC(hs∈ADV) ∧ gC(hs∈RMT))

If God sends the Holy Spirit as Paraclete then God causes that the Holy Spirit is the advocate and God causes that the Holy Spirit is the teacher and reminder of truth. According to John 14,26 and 16,7, both God the Father and God the Son send the Holy Spirit.

T 488. hs∈ADV ∧ hs∈RMT

A45, T354, T92

D 54. hs∈ADV ↔ (∃x ∈ �) hs consoles x and hs stays with x forever and hs strengthens x concerning faith, good actions, and love

D 54.1. hs∈RMT ↔ (∃x ∈ �) hs teaches x the truths of Christ and reminds x of the truths of Christ

Thomas Aquinas defends D54 as follows:

The Holy Spirit is a consoler and advocate and so is the Son . . . Christ is called an advocate because as a human being he intercedes for us to the Father; the Holy Spirit is an advocate because he makes us ask. Again the Holy Spirit is called a consoler because he is formally love . . . The Spirit is truly given because he is given forever.��

It follows further from definition D54 together with theorem T488 that the Holy Spirit strengthens humans who believe, in their faith, in bringing about morally good actions and by improving their love. Although this kind of strengthening is a gift of the Holy Spirit, the following holds for it – as it holds for all gifts or talents given by God: that person who uses the gift well will get more and greater gifts; if the person uses the gift badly, it will be taken away from him or her. Accordingly we should say that it is characteristic of the gifts of God that if one makes good use of a gift granted to him, he deserves to receive a greater gift and grace. And one who badly uses a gift, has it taken away from him. For we read in Matthew 25,24 that the talent which the lazy servant received from his master was taken away from him because he did not use it well, and it was given to the one who had received five talents. It is like this with the gift of the Holy Spirit.��

Bringing about morally good actions according to Christ’s teaching and improving one’s love is connected by an equivalence:

68 Thomas Aquinas (CGJ), 14,4,1912; 1914. 69 Thomas Aquinas (CGJ), 14,4,1909.

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Anyone who loves me will obey my teaching . . . Anyone who does not love me will not obey my teaching (Jn 14,23; 24):

Any human person loves Christ i� this human person obeys Christ’s teaching. T 489. (hs∈ADV) ε T(g-Plan) ∧ (hs∈ADV) ε T(g-Prov) T189, A45, T354, D26 That the Holy Spirit is the advocate belongs to both the theorems of God’s plan and the theorems of God’s providence. It follows from definition D54.1 together with theorem T488 that the Holy Spirit teaches the truths of Christ to those who believe and are interested. Furthermore, he reminds them of the truths of Christ. However, sometimes even belief and interest are not necessary since “the wind blows wherever it pleases . . . So it is with everyone born of the Spirit” (Jn 3,8). An example is the conversion of St. Paul. First of all the Holy Spirit reveals truths since he is “the Spirit of truth”, called so by Christ (Jn 14,17). Secondly, he teaches the truths of Christ by making them understandable, and furthermore he reminds us of the truths of Christ. As Thomas Aquinas puts it: We should notice that of all the things Christ said to his disciples, some were not understood, and others were not remembered. Thus our Lord says, he will teach you all things, which you cannot now understand, and bring to your remembrance all that you cannot remember. How could John the Evangelist after forty years have remembered all the sayings of Christ he wrote in his Gospel unless the Holy Spirit had brought them to his mind?��

T 490. (hs∈RMT) ε T(g-Plan) ∧ (hs∈RMT) ε T(g-Prov) T189, A45, T354, D26 That the Holy Spirit is the teacher and reminder of the truths of Christ belongs to both the theorems of God’s plan and the theorems of God’s providence. According to section 6.1.4 above, the theorems T360–T390 hold for God the Son as a divine person. They do not hold for God the Son as having assumed human nature and a created soul and body (section 6.2.1). However, theorems T360–T390 also hold for the Holy Spirit as a divine person. Therefore, we can assume the following theorem: T 491. In the theorems T360-T390 ‘sn’ may be replaced by ‘hs’ T 492. hsW(hs∈ADV) ∧ hsW(hs∈RMT) T489, T490, T368, T491 The Holy Spirit wills being the advocate and he wills being the teacher and reminder of the truths of Christ

70 Thomas Aquinas (CGJ), 14,6,1960.

262 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.�.�� Biblical and Church Documents The reason my Father loves me is that I lay down my life – only to take it up again” (Jn 10,17). The angel said to the women ‘Do not be afraid, for I know that you are looking for Jesus, who was crucified. He is not here he has risen, just as he said’ . . . So the women hurried away from the tomb, afraid yet filled with joy, and ran to tell his disciples. Suddenly Jesus met them. ‘Greetings’ he said. They came to him, clasped his feet and worshiped him. Then Jesus said to them, ‘Do not be afraid. Go and tell my brothers to go to Galilee; there they will see me’. (Mt 28,5-6; 8-10). At this, she (Mary Magdalene) turned around and saw Jesus standing there, but she did not realize that it was Jesus. He said to her ‘Woman, why are you crying? Who is it you are looking for?’ Thinking he was the gardener, she said, ‘Sir if you have carried him away, tell me where you have put him, and I will get him’. Jesus said to her, ‘Mary’. (Jn 20,14-16). For what I have received I passed on to you as of first importance, that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures and that he appeared to Cephas and then to the Twelfe. After that he appeared to more than five hundred of the brothers and sisters at the same time, most of whom are still living. (1Co 15,3-6). They were looking intently up into the sky as he was going, when suddenly, two men dressed in white stood beside them. ‘Men of Galilee’ they said ‘why do you stand here looking into the sky? This same Jesus, who has been taken from you to heaven, will come back in the same way you have seen him go into heaven. (Ac 1,10-11). But the Advocate, the Holy Spirit, whom the Father will send in my name, will teach you all things and will remind you of everything I have said to you. (Jn 14,26) Unless I go away the Advocate will not come to you; but if I go, I will send him to you. (Jn 16,7).

Toledo (675): And yet he endured his passion for our o�ences without loosing his divinity. Condemned to death, he has experienced on the cross a real death in the flesh and on the third day, restored to life by his own power, he rose from the grave (ND634; D539). Vatican II, Sacrosanctum Concilium (1963): The wonderful works of God among the people of the Old Testament were but a prelude to the work of Christ the Lord in redeeming mankind and giving perfect Glory to God. He achieved his task principally by the paschal mystery of his blessed passion, resurrection from the death, and the glorious ascension, whereby “dying, he destroyed our death and, rising, he restored our life” (D4005). Toledo (675): We also believe that the Holy Spirit, the third person in the trinity, is God, one and equal with God the Father and the Son, of one substance and of one nature, not, however, begotten nor created but proceeding from both, and that he is the Spirit of both (ND310; D527). Vatican II, Lumen Gentium (1964): Further, the same Holy Spirit does not only sanctify the people of God, lead it and enrich it with virtues by means of the sacraments and the ministers of the Church, but he “apportions to each one

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individually as he wills” (1Co 12,11), he distributes among the faithful of every rank special graces that make them fit and ready to undertake various tasks and functions conducive to the renewal and further development of the Church; for so writes the Apostle, “to each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good” (1Co 1,27)(ND1999; D4131).

�.�.�� Christ Institutes the Church T 493. snInstChurch A44, T428 God the Son institutes the Church D 55. snInstChurch ↔ (∃p)(snInstp ∧ p e Church ∧ p ε T(CR))

God the Son (Christ) institutes the Church i� God the Son institutes some fact of creation p such that p is the Church A 46. (∀p)[p e Church → [p → (∃x∈�)xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn) ∧ SentP(g, hs)) ∧ snLp]]

If p is the Church then p implies that there are human persons who believe in God as creator and further believe that God has sent God the Son as Messiah and that God has sent the Holy Spirit as Paraclete and the Son loves the Church. Belief (GL) means both actually believing and having the disposition to believe which is partially a gift of grace and partially a contribution of the human person x who is embracing the grace. Observe that, according to axiom A46 and definition D55, the Church is an event or fact in space and time of this world which consists of human persons who actually and dispositionally believe in God as a creator and in God the Son who came as Messiah by assuming human nature and being the Saviour, and in the Holy Spirit who came as Paraclete, i.e. as advocate, teacher, and reminder of the truths of Christ. T 494. (∃p)(p e Church ∧ p ε T(CR)) D55, T493 There is a fact of creation that is the Church

T 495. (∀p)(p e Church → snLp) T494, A46, T117 The Church is loved by God the Son T 496. (∀p)(p e Church → gLp) T495, T362 The Church is loved by God

264 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour T 497. (∀p)[p e Church → (∃x∈�)xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn))] T494, A46 The event which is the Church implies that human persons (the Christian believers) believe in God as creator and that God has sent the Son as Messiah It should be noticed that it is assumed that the operation GL allows distribution concerning ∧, i.e. xGL(p ∧ q) implies (xGLp ∧ xGLq).

T 498. (∃x∈�)xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn)) T494, T497 There are human persons who believe in God as creator and that God has sent God the Son as Messiah There is an important point to notice here: We do not have an axiom or theorem that says: someone (x) who believes also believes all the logical consequences of what x believes. This neither holds for scientific nor for religious belief nor for any other weaker or even stronger kind of belief. In other words: ¬(∀p)(∀q)[(xGLp ∧ (p → q)) → xGLq]. Therefore, we cannot generally assume that every Christian believer (or member of the Church according to axiom A46) who believes in God as creator would also believe in all the consequences which follow from axiom A13 which describes God as creator. This would not even be true for theologians. The same holds for axioms A40(A41, A44, A45) and the respective theorems as consequences. T 499. (∀x∈�)(∃p)[(p e Church ∧ p ∧ xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn))) → (∀q)[(q e MG ∧ xWq ∧ xAq ∧ xEmbGG(g, x)) → (∃r)(r e EtH(x) ∧ r)]] T497, T349 The fact that there is a church, together with humans’ believing that God is creator and sent his Son as Messiah – under the condition of willing and acting in a morally good way and embracing God’s grace – is a su�cient condition for receiving eternal happiness. Observe that, according to theorem T499, the Church is not a necessary condition for eternal happiness but a part of a su�cient condition.

�.�.�� God the Son is the Supreme Judge T 500. gC(sn∈SJudge) A44, T428 God causes the Son to be the Supreme Judge According to theorems T333 and T334, it follows from God’s justice that human persons willing and acting in such a way as to bring about virtuous (morally good) actions will be rewarded by God; whereas human persons committing morally bad actions (by sinning) and not repenting their deeds will be punished by God. The task of a just judge is to find out the facts of the case. This can already be very di�cult. Much more di�cult is to find out the innermost intentions of the

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person acting in a good or bad way. For a human judge, this is rather impossible. Not so much though for God the Son (Christ), the divine supreme judge who is omniscient (T356) and consequently knows not only the facts of the case but also the innermost intentions since “God knows the hearts”. T 501. sn∈SJudge T500, T92 God the Son is the Supreme Judge A 47. sn∈SJudge → (∀x∈�)[[Virt(x) → (snK(Virt(x)) ∧ snK(Int(x)) ∧ snW(∃q)(q e REW(x)))] ∧ [(∃r)(xWr ∧ xAr ∧ r e ME ∧ ¬xRTAr) → (snK(Sin(x)) ∧ snK(Int(x)) ∧ snW(∃q)(q e PE(x)))] ∧ snC(LstJ)]

If God the Son is the Supreme Judge then (first) he knows the virtuous actions of humans and their intentions and wills them a reward, and (second) he knows their morally bad actions (sins) and their intentions without repentance and wills them his punishment and (thirdly) the Son causes the Last Judgement. Int(x) . . . x has such and such intentions D 56. (∀x∈�)Virt(x) ↔ (∃p)(xWp ∧ xAp ∧ p e MG)

Human person x is acting virtually i� for some states of a�airs p, x is willing and acting that p occurs and p is morally good. T 502. (∀x∈�)[Virt(x) → (snK(Virt(x)) ∧ snK(Int(x)) ∧ snW(∃q)(q e REW(x)))] A47, T501 All virtuous actions of humans together with the respective intentions are known to the Son and are rewarded by him (cf. T370). T 503. (∀x∈�)[(∃r)(xWr ∧ xAr ∧ r e ME ∧ ¬xRTAr) → (snK(Sin(x)) ∧ snK(Int(x)) ∧ snW(∃q)(q e PE(x)))] A47, T501 All sins of humans with the respective intentions that are not repented are known to the Son and are punished by him (cf. T370). T 504. (sn∈SJudge) ε T(g-Plan) ∧ snC(LstJ) ε T(g-Plan) T189, T500, A47, T501 The fact that God the Son is the Supreme Judge and the fact of the Last Judgement belong to God’s plan.

�.�.�� Biblical and Church Documents All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Therefore go and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, and teaching them to obey everything I have commanded to you. And surely I am with you always, to the very end of the age (Mt 28,18-20). And I tell you that you are Peter, and on this rock I will build my church, and the gates of

266 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour Hades will not overcome it (Mt 16,18). You who are young, be happy while you are young . . . Follow the ways of your heart . . . but know that for all these things God will bring you into judgement (Ecc 11,9). For God will bring every deed into judgement, including every hidden thing, whether it is good or evil (Ecc 12,14). Moreover the Father judges no one, but has entrusted all judgement to the Son, that all may honor the Son just as they honor the Father (Jn 5,22-23). The harvest is the end of the age, and the harvesters are angels. As the weeds are pulled up and burned in the fire so it will be at the end of the age. The Son of Man will send out his angels, and they will weed out of his kingdom everything that causes sin and all who do evil. They will throw them into the blazing furnace, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth. Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father (Mt 13,39-43).

Vatican II, Lumen Gentium (1964): When the Son had accomplished on earth the task entrusted to him by the Father, the Holy Spirit was sent on Pentecost day that he might for ever sanctify the Church . . . The Spirit dwells in the Church and in the hearts of the faithful as in a temple (cf. 1Co 3,16; 6,19) . . . He guides the Church into the fulness of truth (cf. Jn 16,13). (ND1998; D4104). Vatican II, Ad Gentes (1965): The Church fulfils her mission by that activity by which, in obedience to the command of Christ and under the impulse of the grace and love of the Holy Spirit, she becomes fully actively present among all people or nations so as to lead them, by living example, by preaching, by the sacraments and other channels of grace, to the faith, the liberty and the peace of Christ. (ND1137). Trent (1547): And since “we all o�end in many things” (Jas 3,2) everyone ought to keep in mind not only God’s mercy and goodness but also his severity and judgement. Neither should anyone pass judgement on oneself, even if one is conscious of no wrong, because the entire life of a person should be examined and judged, not by human judgement but by the judgement of God, “who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart. Then everyone will receive commendation of God” (1Co 4,5) who, as it is written “will render to everyone according to one’s works” (Ro 2,6). (ND1949; D1549). Lyon (1274): He (God the Son) is seated at the right hand of God the Father, wherefrom he shall come to judge the living and the dead and to render to each one according to his works, whether these have been good or evil. (ND23; D852).

�.� Holy Mary – Mother of God As has been said already in the Introduction, the expression “Mother of God” was o�cially decided to be a name for Holy Mary or Holy Virgin by the Council of Ephesus in 431 (D251, D252). Whereas the latter titles underline holiness and

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virginity, the first stresses motherhood. She gave birth to Jesus Christ when he, God the Son, assumed human nature, receiving his body from Holy Mary, his mother. And since it was the divine person, God the Son, who assumed a human body (“became flesh”, Jn 1,14), Holy Mary can be called Mother of God, ( Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 35,4). Although all the tree names are used in Christian tradition, and could also be used here, we shall use the name Holy Mary subsequently.

�.�.� Holy Mary’s Part in Salvation T 505. (E!x∈�)(x = hm) ε T(CR) ∧ hm∈HIS A40, T353 There is exactly one human person who is Holy Mary (hm) and this fact belongs to the theorems of creation and Holy Mary is a helper for incarnation and salvation (HIS). A 48. [(E!x∈�)(x = hm) ε T(CR) ∧ hm∈HIS] → [gC¬(∃r)(r e PeccOr ∧ hmSTr) ∧ snCAscBody(hm) ∧ hmEmbGG(g, hm) ∧ ¬Sin(hm) ∧ hm∈Virg ∧ hmFATasks ∧ hsCN(snAssumesHBth ∧ snAssumesHBody) ∧ hmCS(snAssumesHBth ∧ snAssumesHBody) ∧ hsC(snAssumesHSoul) ∧ hmComp(Pass, Salv) ∧ (∀x∈�)[(xGl(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn)) → hmLeads(x, sn)] ∧ hmSpeaks(W)]

Axiom A48 has many parts in its consequent, its antecedent being theorem T505. We divide the consequent into seven parts as follows: 1. God causes that Holy Mary (hm) is not stained (ST) by the original sin (PeccOr), and God the Son causes hm’s ascension with her body 2. Holy Mary embraces God’s grace given to her, hm does (did) not sin, hm is a virgin, hm freely agrees with her tasks in incarnation and salvation (FATasks) 3. God the Holy Spirit is the necessary cause for God the Son’s assuming human birth and human body, and Holy Mary contributes pt- su�ciently that God the Son assumes human birth and human body 4. The Holy Spirit causes that the Son assumes a human soul, animating the Son’s human body 5. Holy Mary has compassion for Christ’s passion for the purpose of salvation 6. Holy Mary leads every human person who believes in God as creator and in God’s sending the Son as Messiah to God the Son 7. Holy Mary speaks to the world

268 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour �.�.� The Gifts of God and God the Son T 506. gC¬(∃r)(r e PeccOr ∧ hmSTr) ∧ snCAscBody(hm) A48, T505 God causes that Holy Mary (hm) is unstained and God the Son causes that she ascends into heaven with her body 1. The fact that Holy Mary was free from any stain of original sin from the first moment of her conception is called immaculate conception; it is a great gift to her from God and without any contribution of hers. The doctrine of immaculate conception has a long tradition in the Catholic Church. The Lateran Council (649) already speaks of the immaculate Virgin. Sixtus IV (1477) declares this again (ND704; D1400) and introduces the feast (D1425); Pius IX formulates the doctrine of immaculate conception on Dec. 8, 1854 (ND709; D2803), See section 6.4.4 below. The doctrine that Holy Mary was free from the e�ects of the original sin from the first moment of her conception was not an article of faith before 1477 (Sixtus IV), and it o�cially became an article of faith in 1854 (Pius IX). This article of faith was confirmed by Holy Mary: on March 25, 1858 Holy Mary herself answered with Immaculate Conception when Bernadette Soubirous (Lourdes) asked her who she is. Thomas Aquinas defends that Holy Mary was freed from the e�ects of the original sin before her birth: But the Blessed Virgin did indeed contract original sin, but was cleansed therefrom before her birth from the womb.��

What Thomas Aquinas in fact defends is that the sanctification, i.e. the cleansing from original sin, of the Blessed Virgin has not taken place before the animation by her soul; since “the soul of the Blessed Virgin had never incurred the stain of original sin.”�� In order to understand his view, one has to know that, according to him, a human body is animated at conception first by the vegetative (function of the) soul, later by the sensitive (function of the) soul, and again later by the rational (function of the) soul��, and only the latter is concerned with sin. 2. A further great gift from God the Son to Holy Mary is that he caused her ascension into heaven with her body. This is defended by the fact that Holy Mary was the 71 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 27,2 ad 2. 72 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 27,2 and ad 2. 73 Cf. Thomas Aquinas (STh), I, 118,2 ad 2. Thomas Aquinas does not give a time, but there was a widespread view among scholastic philosophers that God creates the intellectual soul 40 days after conception. Cf. Stockums (1924).

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human mother of Christ, when assuming human nature, whereby she fed and nursed and embraced and caressed the baby with her body. This doctrine also has a tradition in a letter of pope Alexander III (1169) and was o�cially made a doctrine of the Church by pope Pius XII in 1950 (ND715; D3903). Also this article of faith was confirmed by Holy Mary who answered to a respective question of the juveniles in Medjugorje (Oct. 12, 1981): “I went to Heaven before death”.�� Since both gifts are caused by God and by God the Son they must belong to God’s plan (theorem T189): T 507. ¬(∃r)(r e PeccOr ∧ hmSTr) ε T(g-Plan) ∧ AscBody(hm) ε T(g-Plan) T506, T189 �.�.� The Freely Chosen Contributions of Holy Mary T 508. hmEmbGG(g, hm) ∧ ¬Sin(hm) ∧ hm∈Virg ∧ hmFATasks A48, T505 Holy Mary embraces that God gives her grace, she does (did) not sin, she is virgin, and she freely agrees with the tasks required from her concerning incarnation and salvation 1. Holy Mary received the fullness of God’s grace This is announced by the greeting of the angel. The reasons for it are explained by Thomas Aquinas as follows: Now Christ is the principle of grace . . . whence (Jn 1,17) it is written: Grace and truth came by Jesus Christ. But the Blessed Virgin Mary was nearest to Christ in his humanity: because He received His human nature from her. Therefore it was due to her to receive a greater fulness of grace than others. There was a threefold perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin. The first was a kind of disposition by which she was worthy to be the mother of Christ . . . The second perfection of grace in the Blessed Virgin was through the presence of the Son of God Incarnate in her womb. The third perfection of the end is that which she has in glory.��

That Holy Mary embraced the gift of grace is evident from her words to the angel: I am the Lord’s servant, may your word to me be fulfilled (Lk 1,38). 2. Holy Mary did not sin This can be justified as follows: God so prepares and endows those, whom He chooses for some particular o�ce, that they are rendered capable of fulfilling it, according to 2Co 3,6. Now the Blessed Virgin was

74 Laurentin and Lejeune (1988), p. 166. 75 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 27,5; ad 2.

270 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour chosen by God to be His Mother. Therefore there can be no doubt that God, By His grace, made her worthy to this o�ce, according to the words spoken by the angel (Lk 1,30-31). But she would not have been worthy to be the Mother of God, if she had ever sinned . . . We must therefore confess simply that the Blessed Virgin committed no actual sin, neither mortal nor venial.��

3. Holy Mary Virgin That Holy Mary was a virgin in conceiving Christ is manifest from her question to the angel: How will this be, since I am a virgin (Lk 1,34).

It was also predicted that way by Isaiah: The virgin will conceive and give birth to a son (Isa 7,14).

Being a virgin before Christ’s birth has never been subject to doubt in all of Christian tradition. That Holy Mary was a virgin in giving birth to Christ has never been doubted in Christian tradition either. But the justification was di�erent depending on di�erent conditions of virginity. (a) According to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas, it is a necessary condition for the virginity of a woman that no child opened the woman’s womb: But opening of the womb excludes virginity��

Since they both held that Holy Mary was a virgin, when giving birth to Christ, they assumed that Christ came forth through the closed womb of the Virgin: To the substance of a body in which was the Godhead closed doors were not a obstacle.��

A further reason for this explanation was that opening a woman’s womb causes pain; and the Holy Virgin could not have pain in giving birth to Christ because it was God the Son who assumed human nature in her and because pain in giving birth was a punishment for Eva’s sin and for her descendants according to Ge 3,16. The pains of childbirth are caused by the infant opening the passage from the womb. Now it has been said above (qu. 28,2) that Christ came forth from the closed womb

76 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 27,4. 77 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 28,2. 78 Augustine (Ioan), 121.

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of His Mother, and, consequently without opening the passage. Consequently there was no pain in that birth, as neither was there any corruption.��

However, this explanation is not necessary. As “closed doors are no obstacle” for God, it is no obstacle for him to preserve Holy Mary from every pain even if her birth is natural in the sense that the womb is opened. Observe that the above necessary condition (a) was not understood as a su�cient one for virginity since there were famous examples of women who had been sterile for a long time, even though they had been living in a true marriage with conjugal intercourse (Sara and Abraham; Elizabeth and Zachariah). (b) The usual necessary condition for virginity is that the woman is untouched by any man (cf. Dt 22). The virginity of Holy Mary in giving birth to Christ is satisfied in this sense (b) by the answer of the angel to her question: “The Holy Spirit will come on you . . . ” (Lk 1,35) and by Matthew about Joseph her husband: But he did not consummate their marriage until she gave birth to the son (Mt 1,25).

In other words, virginity in the sense of (b) is satisfied when given birth to Christ. (c) According to Thomas Aquinas, Holy Mary was a virgin after Christ’s birth, both in the sense of (a) and in the sense of (b): Without any hesitation we must abhor the error of Helvidius, who dared to assert that Christ’s Mother, after His birth, was carnally known by Joseph, and bore other children.��

However, he defends that there was a true marriage between Mary and Joseph in the sense of a first perfection. This consists “in a certain inseparable union of souls, by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual a�ection that cannot be sundered”��, whereas what he calls the second perfection is satisfied by this marriage concerning duties of husband and wife and bringing up a child, but not concerning conjugal intercourse.

79 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 35,6. The idea of the closed womb seems not to be present in Church Documents. On the contrary D368 says that Christ’s birth opened the womb despite of the virginity of the mother. 80 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 28,3. According to D(Denzinger) there seems to be no Church Document against Helvidius. 81 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III,29,2. The view of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas that Holy Mary took a vow of virginity ( Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 29,4) has no confirmation in the Bible and there seems to be no support for it in a decision of a Church Council.

272 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour There are few Church Documents which assert that Christ is not only the first born by Holy Mary but also the only one born by her (D485, D299). These documents, therefore, defend the virginity of Holy Mary after the birth of Christ in the sense of (a). There are other Church Documents which say that Holy Mary was a virgin before, during, and after Christ’s birth, but without determining whether sense (a) or (b) or both are meant (D503, D571, D1400). D503 and D571 say that after Christ’s birth Holy Mary saved the virginity or chastity of being uncorrupted (post partem incorruptelae pudorum) and D1400 says that (after Christ’s birth) she stayed immaculate (immaculate Virgo nihilominus post partem remaneret). However, since conjugal intercourse in a true marriage was never a sin according to the Bible (AT or NT) or according to the Church, the question concerning (b) – also taking into account Mt 1,25 – seems to not have a definite answer according to these documents. 4. Holy Mary freely agrees with her tasks in incarnation and salvation. This is already manifest from her answer to the angel: I am the Lord’s servant, may your word to me be fulfilled (Lk 1,38).

In order to be a free decision, the task of incarnation was announced to Holy Mary. This and further reasons are given by Thomas Aquinas as follows: It was reasonable that it should be announced to the Blessed Virgin that she was to conceive Christ. First, in order . . . that she should be informed in mind concerning Him, before conceiving Him in flesh . . . Thirdly, that she might o�er to God the free gift of her obedience (Lk 1,38). Fourthly, in order to show that there is a certain spiritual wedlock between the Son of God and human nature. Wherefore in the Annunciation the Virgin’s consent was besought in place of that of the entire human nature.��

Holy Mary showed the same free obedience when Simeon announced her future passion at the presentation of Jesus in the Temple: “And a sword will pierce your own soul too” (Lk 2,35).

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents Listen to me you islands; hear this you distant nations: Before I was born the Lord called me; from my mother’s womb he has spoken my name (Isa 49,1). In the sixth month of Elizabeth’s pregnancy, God sent the angel Gabriel to Nazareth, a town in Galilee, to a virgin pledged to be married to a man named Joseph, a descendant of David. The virgin’s name was Mary. The angel went to her and said ‘Greetings, you who are highly

82 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 30,1.

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favored! The Lord is with you . . . Do not be afraid, Mary: you have found grace with God’ (Lk 1,26). Then Simeon blessed them and said to Mary his mother: ‘This child is destined to cause the falling and rising of many in Israel, and to be a sign that will be spoken against, so that the thoughts of many hearts will be revealed. And a sword will pierce your own soul too’ (Lk 2,33-35).

Sixtus IV, Cum praeexcelsa (1477): In His divine providence the almighty God looked from eternity on his humble virgin. Having prepared her by the Holy Spirit, he made her the dwelling place of his only-begotten . . . From her he was to receive the flesh of our mortality for the redemption of his people, while she would remain an immaculate virgin also after his birth. All the faithful of Christ should give thanks and praise to almighty God for the wonderful conception of the immaculate virgin. (ND704, D1400). Pius IX, Ine�abilis Deus (1854): By the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, and our own authority, we declare, pronounce and define: the doctrine which holds that the most Blessed Virgin Mary was, from the first moment of her conception, by a singular grace and privilege of almighty God and in view of the merits of Christ Jesus the Saviour of the human race, preserved immune from all stain of original sin, is revealed by God and, therefore, firmly and constantly to be believed by all the faithful. (ND709; D2803). Alexander III, Ex litteris tuis (1169): Holy Mary conceived without stain, gave birth without pain and passed away without putrefaction. (D748). Pius XII, Munificentissimus Deus (1950): By the authority of our Lord Jesus Christ, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, and by our own authority, we proclaim, declare and define as a dogma revealed by God: the Immaculate Mother of God, Mary ever Virgin, when the course of her earthly life was ended, was taken up body and soul into the glory of heaven. (ND715; D3903). Trent, Canons of Justification 23 (1547): If anyone says . . . that a person once justified can avoid all sins, even venial ones, throughout one’s entire life, unless it be by a special privilege of God as the Church holds of the Blessed Virgin, anathema sit. (ND706; D1573). Toledo (693), 16: As the Virgin saved her virginity before conception, after birth her being uninjured was not violated (post partum nullam sensit integritatis corruptionem); since she conceived as a virgin, gave birth as a virgin and, after birth, without interruption, stayed uncorrupted (post partum incorruptelae pudorem sine inter ceptione obinuit). (D571). Leo XIII, Octobri Mense (1891): When the eternal Son of God willed to take the human nature for the redemption and honour of human beings, and so wanted in a certain sense to enter into a mystical marriage with the whole of the human

274 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour race,he did not do so before his chosen mother had given her totally free consent. (ND710; D3274).

�.�.� Holy Spirit and Holy Mary Work Together T 509. hsCN(snAssumesHBth) ∧ hsCN(snAssumesHBody) ∧ hmCS(snAssumesHBth) ∧ hmCS(snAssumesHBody) ∧ hsC(snAssumesHSoul) A48, T505, distribution over ∧ for hsCN, hmCS. The Holy Spirit is the necessary cause for God the Son’s assuming human birth and for the Son’s assuming human body and Holy Mary contributes by causing pt-su�ciently that the Son assumes human birth and that the Son assumes human body. Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the cause for God the Son assuming the human soul. The whole Trinity e�ected the conception of Christ’s body: nevertheless, this is attributed to the Holy Ghost, for three reasons. First, because this is befitting to the cause of the incarnation, considered on the part of God. For the Holy Ghost is the love of Father and Son (Q 37,1). Now, that the Son of God took to Himself flesh from the Virgin’s womb was due to the exceeding love of God (Jn 3,16).��

It follows from theorem T358 that whatever is caused by one divine person is caused by (the triune) God. Thus, the point made by Thomas Aquinas that the whole Trinity is also causally concerned with Christ’s conception and with his assuming his human body follows from theorem T509 together with T352. Although the Holy Spirit is the active principle in Christ’s conception, the contribution of Holy Mary is a genuine contribution since she is pt-su�ciently causally involved. This means that her causal contribution is neither necessary nor su�cient, but with the e�ect of the Holy Spirit both contributions together are su�cient. As has been said after theorem T409 (section 6.2.1), Christ’s human body and soul were a unity. This was so from the beginning of his conception since Christ’s body was animated from the beginning: Now it has been shown above ( Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 6,1; 2) that the Word of God assumed the body by means of the soul and the soul by means of the spirit, i.e. the intellect. Wherefore in the first instant of its conception Christ’s body must needs have been animated by the rational soul.��

83 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 32,1. 84 Thomas Aquinas (STh), III, 33,2.

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As theorem T509 says the assumption of the human soul is caused by the Holy Spirit. What is meant here is the rational function of the human soul since, concerning its vegetative and sensitive function (blood circulation, function of lungs, organs, sense-organs . . . etc.), the contribution of Holy Mary is involved.

�.�.� Holy Mary’s Compassion for Christ’s Passion T 510. hmComp(Pass, Salv) A48, T505 Holy Mary has compassion for Christ’s Passion for the purpose of salvation A 49. hmComp(Pass, Salv) → [snCondW(Pass, Salv) → (hmSubW(sn) ∧ hmFAS(sn))]

If Holy Mary has compassion for Christ’s Passion, then, if the Son (Christ) conditionally wills his passion for the purpose of salvation, then Holy Mary subordinates her will (SubW) to her Son (Christ) and freely accepts su�ering (FAS) in imitation of Christ. As Holy Mary did in her answer to the angel (Lk 1,38), she also, in her later life, subordinated her will completely to the will of her Son and consequently to God. Moreover, to a higher degree than any saint, Holy Mary freely accepted the undeserved evil (cf. section 5.2.9) of su�ering in the imitation of Christ and in order to take (a part of) pain o� Christ’s shoulders. This is expressed by the following theorem T511:

T 511. hmSubW(sn) ∧ hmFAS(sn)

A49, T510, T461

�.�.� Holy Mary Leads Believers to Her Son T 512. (∀x∈�)[xGL(g∈CT ∧ SentM(g, sn)) → hmLeads(x, sn)] A48, T505 All those human persons that believe that God is creator (of the world, universe) and that he has sent God the Son (Christ) as Messiah are led by Holy Mary to God the Son (Christ). There is, of course, the question of whether theorem T512 holds unconditionally, i.e. whether it holds that Holy Mary leads everybody to her Son: (∀x∈�)hmLeads(x, sn). This may be possible if the person in question receives a special and great amount of grace, although s/he does not believe in God as creator nor in Jesus Christ as Messiah or Redeemer. For, as the angel says to Holy Mary, “No word from God will ever fail” (Lk, 1,37). This translation may be interpreted by theorem T86: Whatever God wills, obtains. Or: God’s will never fails. Other translations suggest that nothing

276 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour is impossible for God. The latter translations, however, have to be restricted to all which does not imply a contradiction (cf. section 3.4 and what has been said after theorem T113). As a conclusion to the above consideration, we may say that, for most cases, belief in God, at least in a weak sense, is required of human person x to be guided to Christ by Holy Mary, and what her activity in this sense means is very well expressed by what she says to the servants before Christ changed water into wine: “Do whatever he tells you” (Jn 2,5).

�.�.� Holy Mary Speaks to the World T 513. hmSpeaks(W) A48, T505 Holy Mary speaks to the world 1. What is meant by theorem T513 is that Holy Mary appears to humans and gives them a message for all people in the world. 2. Known places, accepted by the Church, where this happened, are as follows: Guadalupe (1531), La Salette (1846), Lourdes (1858), Fatima (1917), Kibeho (19811989). Medjugorje (1981-) got the permission for o�cial pilgrimages in May 2019 but is still under investigation. 3. With the exception of Guadalupe (a male Indian adult), Holy Mary appeared to young children (La Salette, Lourdes, Fatima) and Juveniles (Medjugorje, Kibeho).The children were all from poor families, and most of them were illiterates. In most cases (especially Fatima), almost nobody believed the children or the juveniles; they were persecuted, cross-examined, and (in Fatima all 3 and in Medjugorje 1) put into jail. In other cases, common people believed, but most of the public o�cials did not. The local bishops at La Salette, Lourdes and Kibeho acted promptly to install a commission. 4. The messages of Holy Mary: She says that she su�ers because of the indi�erence and of the unconcern of so many people about the message of her Son, Jesus Christ. She requires to say one’s prayer for the reclamation of sinners and to be expiatory of the sin of others. She requires to tell over the rosary daily and to do penance. She requires that her messages should be brought to all people of the world

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5. Special requirement (Fatima): At her third appearance Holy Mary required to dedicate Russia to her immaculate heart. She repeated her wish in her appearance to Lucia in 1929.��

�.�.� Biblical and Church Documents The Holy Spirit will come on you and the power of the Most High will overshadow you. So the holy one to be born will be called ‘Son of God’ (Lk 1,35). While they were there [in Bethlehem], the time came for the baby to be born, and she gave birth to her firstborn, a son (Lk 2,6-7). The Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us (Jn 1,14). An angel of the Lord appeared to Joseph in a dream. ‘Get up’ he said ‘take the child and his mother and escape to Egypt. Stay until I tell you, for Herod is going to search for the child to kill him (Mt 2,13). Near the cross of Jesus stood his mother . . . (Jn 19,23). They all joined together constantly in prayer, along with the women and Mary, the mother of Jesus, and his brothers (Ac 1,14).

Ephesus (431): It was not that an ordinary man was born first of the holy Virgin, on whom afterwards the Word descended; what we say is that, being united with the flesh from the womb, [the Word] has undergone birth in the flesh, making the birth in the flesh his own [. . . ]. Thus [the holy Fathers] have unhesitatingly called the holy Virgin “Mother of God” (theotokos). This does not mean that the nature of the Word or his divinity received the beginning of its existence form the holy Virgin, but that, since the holy body, animated by a rational soul, which the Word united to himself according to the hypostasis, was born from her, the Word was born according to the flesh. (ND605; D251). Lateran (1215): Finally, the only-begotten Son of God, Jesus Christ, whose incarnation is the common work of the whole Trinity, conceived from Mary ever Virgin with the cooperation of the Holy Spirit, made true man, composed of a rational soul and a human body, one person in two natures (ND20; D801). Cf. D291. Pius X, Ad Diem Illum (1904): From the community of will and su�ering between Christ and Mary she merited to become the restorer (reparatrix) of the world that was lost, and the dispenser (dispensatrix) of all the benefits which Jesus won for us by his death and at the price of his blood. We do not deny indeed that the distribution of these gifts belongs personally to Christ by a unique right. For they were won through his death alone and he alone has the power to be mediator

85 This has not been done explicitly so far, although Pius XII dedicated the world to her immaculate heart in 1942, and John Paul II repeated this in 1981.

278 � 6 Jesus Christ the Saviour between God and human beings. Nevertheless, on account of the union of sorrow and pain between mother and Son, of which we have spoken, it has been given to the august Virgin to be the most powerful mediator (mediatrix) and advocate (conciliatrix) for the whole world with her only-begotten Son [. . . ]. Since she stands above all others in sanctity and in union with Christ, and was drawn by Christ into the work of our salvation, she merits for us by equity (de congruo); as it is said, what Christ merited by right (de condigno), and she is the primary minister in the distribution of the divine graces. (ND712; D3370). Vatican II; Lumen Gentium (1964)(60): In the words of the apostle there is but one mediator; “for there is one God, and there is one mediator between God and humankind, the man Jesus Christ, who gave himself as a ransom for all” [1Tim 2;5-6]. But Mary’s function as mother of human beings in no way obscures or diminishes this unique mediation of Christ, but rather shows its power. But the blessed Virgin’s salutary influence on human persons originates not in any inner necessity but in the disposition of God. It flows forth from the superabundance of the merits of Christ, rests on his mediation, depends entirely on it and draws all its power from it. It does not hinder in any way the immediate union of the faithful with Christ but on the contrary fosters it. (ND716c; D4176). Lumen Gentium (61): The predestination of the Blessed Virgin Mary as Mother of God was associated with the incarnation of the divine Word: in the designs of the divine Providence she was the gracious mother of the divine Redeemer here on earth; and above all others and in a singular way the generous associate and humbled handmaid of the Lord. She conceived brought forth, and nourished Christ, she presented him to the Father in the temple, shared her son’s su�erings as he died on the cross. Thus, in a wholly singular way she cooperated by her obedience, faith, hope and burning charity in the work of the Saviour in restoring supernatural life to souls. For this reason she is a mother to us in the order of grace. (ND716d; D4176) Lumen Gentium (62): Mary’s motherhood in the economy of grace continues without interruption, from the moment of her consent – which she gave at the annunciation and maintained unwaveringly under the cross – until the eternal fulfilment of all the elect. Her assumption into heaven does not mean that she has laid aside her salvific role; she continues to obtain by her constant intercession the graces we need for eternal salvation. In her maternal love, she takes care of her Son’s brothers and sisters, still journeying on earth and surrounded by dangers and di�culties, until they reach their blissful home. That is way the Blessed Virgin is invoked in the Church under the titles of Advocate, Auxiliatrix, Helper, Mediatrix. All of which, however, have to be so understood that they in no way diminish or add to the dignity and e�cacy of Christ the one Mediator (ND717; D4177).

6.4 Holy Mary – Mother of God �

279

Despite these parts of Lumen Gentium it is an unfortunate fact that the Council Vatican II did not include an explanation of the important messages of Holy Mary that were given to the children in La Salette, Lourdes and Fatima and that were supposed to be distributed to all people over the whole world in the plan of God.

7 Consistency Proof of ASG The aim of this chapter is to show that a great and essential part of the Axiomatic Study of God (ASG) developed in chapters 1-6 is consistent. Chapter 6 contains axioms, the parts of which are not represented by operations of OBE. However, 64 of the theorems of chapter 6 can be reduced to theorems of chapters 1-5 and proved to be consistent by the model OBE. The consistency proof will be done by defining a 10-valued matrix representing a 10-valued decidable propositional logic, which serves as a model for the axiomatic system in such a way that a great part of the axioms and theorems of the system are satisfied by the model: 18 axioms, 174 theorems, and 11 definitions of chapters 1-5 are satisfied by the model. Moreover, 64 theorems of ch. 6 are satisfied by OBE. We shall first define the model OBE (section 7.1) and secondly say something of the method of proving (7.2), and, thirdly (7.3), we shall show that and how several of the above-mentioned axioms, theorems, and definitions can be proved to be satisfied by the model OBE (Omnipotence, Benevolence, Evil). For the remaining axioms, theorems, and definitions, we shall refer to detailed proofs in my book on Theodicy or leave the proof to the reader in very simple cases.

�.� The Model OBE Definition: The model OBE is the set of all formulas (built up from propositional variables p, q, r . . . in the usual way) which are satisfied by the matrix M = �True, False, ¬, →, gKp, gCp, gWp, gPp, gCCp, gCW p, gCSp, gCNp, gLp, gCV p, T(g), T(LM), p ε T(CR), p ε T(g-Plan), p ε T(g-Prov), p e G,p e Goal, p ε T(g-Exc), Op, p e E, p e ME, xCSp, xAcceptsp� where True = �����, False = ����� and the connectives ¬, →, and the above-listed operations are defined by the following matrices. The model OBE is an extension of Classical Two-Valued Propositional Calculus (CPC) which has 5 values for true (instead of one) and 5 values for false (instead of one), but nothing between true and false. For the definitions of the di�erent operations, the di�erent positions (1–10) are decisive.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110717983-008

7.1 The Model OBE �

p � � � � � � � � � �

¬p � � � � � � � � � �

p→q � � � � p � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

q � � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � � � � � �

p ∨ q ↔ ¬p → q

p ∧ q ↔ ¬(¬p ∨ ¬q)

(p ↔ q) ↔ (p → q) ∧ (q → p)

g K p g C p gWp g Pp g CC p g CWp gCSp gCNp gLp gCV p � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

T(g) T(LM) p ε T(CR) p ε T(g-Plan) p ε T(g-Prov) p e G p e Goal p ε T(g-Exc) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

281

282 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG Op � � � � � � � � � �

peE � � � � � � � � � �

p e ME � � � � � � � � � �

xCSp � � � � � � � � � �

xAcceptsp � � � � � � � � � �

p ε T(U) � � � � � � � � � �

Observe that the operations above are characterized not only by the number of truth-values true (=1) and truth-values false (=0) but also by the places at which they occur. Thus, p e Goal, Op, and p e ME have 3 values true (=1) and 7 values false (=0), but on di�erent places. Consequently, p e Goal and Op have a common value true (=1) in line 5 and line 8, and this means that they are compatible, whereas Op and p e ME have no common value true (=1) in any of the 10 lines and are therefore incompatible. As can be easily verified, the matrix of p e ME, M(p e ME), is identical with the matrix of O¬p M(O¬p), i.e. M(p e ME) = M(O¬p). As can be seen from the list of operations, there are no modal operations (necessary, possible, contingent) included. Therefore, theorems and parts of axioms which contain modal operators are either not included in the consistency proof, or the modal operator is just dropped. It should be remarked that the model OBE is not suitable to replace the axiomatic system ASG. The reason is that the model OBE makes several simplifications, which reduces di�erentiation and distinctions made in ASG. The purpose of the model OBE is solely to serve as a consistency proof of the most important parts of the axiomatic system ASG.

�.� Method of Proving the Consistency �.�.� Operations From the operations listed in section 7.1, further operations can be constructed with the help of negation. For example, all operations can be negated: ¬gWp, ¬(p e G), ¬Op, ¬(p ε T(CR)), . . . etc. Further operations can be constructed from ¬p: gW¬p, ¬gW¬p, or O¬p, ¬O¬p . . . etc. All these constructions with the help of negation are included in the available operations. Several of them will occur in the axioms and theorems of ASG for which the consistency is proved.

7.2 Method of Proving the Consistency �

283

�.�.� Axioms When applying the model OBE to the axioms of ASG, we notice a di�erence between two types of axioms. One type is such that its antecedent is not represented by an operation with a certain matrix in OBE. Of the 18 axioms to be proved as satisfying the model, these are the following four axioms: A4, A6, A9, A21. Their antecedents are g ∈ AC, g ∈ OS, g ∈ OM, g ∈ AG. The consistency of these axioms is proved by showing that the right part of the implication is satisfied by the model OBE. Thus, since the structure of these axioms is A → B where B is a complex compound formula, we show that B is satisfied in OBE, and, indirectly, so is A → B. All of the other 14 axioms are such that both antecedence and consequence are represented by operations of OBE. This is also the case with all 238 theorems to be proved.

�.�.� Definitions There is an analogous di�erence between two types of definitions as described in 7.2.2 concerning the axioms. The definiendum of some of them does not have a representation among the operations. This is the case for the following definitions: D12, D20, D34. The definienda are g ∈ LO, g ∈ Omnipresent, and g CondW(p, q). In these three cases, the definiens can be proved to satisfy the model OBE (i.e. to be consistent). However, from this it follows that the implication: Definiendum → Definiens is also consistent, which is the important part. It says that the definiens is necessary. The other direction (su�ciency of the definiens) does not follow and is not proved that way. In the case of D6 and D14, the definiens consists of a disjunction where every disjunct implies the definiendum. Concerning D6, p ε T(U) → p ε T(CR) is provable in OBE. D14 is consistent concerning the direction from right to left (the only one needed) since the definiendum p ε T(U) obeys OBE. The other 6 definitions are such that both the definiendum and the definiens are represented by operations of OBE. Consequently, the equivalence (both directions of the implication) can be proved to satisfy the model. There are, however, many other definitions in ASG. These contain parts in their definiens which are not represented by operations of the model OBE, although other parts are represented. This is also the case for the remaining axioms and theorems of ASG: only a part of them is represented by operations of the model OBE, such that we cannot prove their satisfaction. However, as will be seen from the proofs, these axioms for which the consistency proof is possible are the most important ones of the system ASG: axioms of God’s omniscience, omnipotence, benevolence, of God’s su�cient and necessary causation, of his will, his providence, his plan, his conservation, his execution

284 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG of his plan, his love; moreover, of man’s su�cient causation together with God’s necessary causation, of evil and moral evil.

�.� Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �.�.� God’s Actuality, Omniscience, and Omnipotence Axiom A4: God’s Actuality g∈AC → (∃p)gKp ∧ (∃p)gWp ∧ (∃p)gLp ∧ (∀p)((p ε T(CR) ∧ gWp) ↔ gCp) The first part with existential quantifiers is satisfied since every matrix of the three operations contains at least one truth-value 1. The modal operator is dropped. The second part is proved thus: p ε T(CR) gWp

Proof:

gCp

� � � ↔ � � ∧

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

This also proves theorems T20-T22. Axiom A6:

God’s Omniscience

g ∈ OS

→ (∀p)(g K p → p) ∧ (∀p)[(p ε T(g) ∨ p ε T(LM) ∨ p ε T(CR)) → g K p]

The last part of A6: (∀p)(g K p → �g K p) will be dropped since OBE has no modal operator defined. This part, however, is not essential for the consistency proof. The consistency of A6 is proved by proving the consistency of its parts, i.e., by showing that they are satisfied by the model OBE. First part of A6: (∀p)(g K p → p) T37 Proof: g K p is interpreted in OBE as p, i.e., it is assumed that: g K p ↔ p. That means that M(g K p) = M(p). Second part of A6: this part will be split into three parts (1)–(3):

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

285

(1) (∀p)(p ε T(g) → g K p)

T41

(2) (∀p)(p ε T(LM) → g K p)

T44

(3) (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → g K p)

T47

Proof: � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ↓ � � � � � � � � � � Proof: � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ↓ � � � � � � � � � � Proof: � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ↓ � � � � � � � � � �

This also proves theorems T38-T40. Theorems T45 and T46 follow via definition D6.1. Theorems T48 and T49 follow via definition D6 from T47. T75 follows from T39. T42 can be proved since in model OBE the theorems of God’s Essence are interpreted as the theorems of about God (T(g)). Definition D12: God’s Logical Omniscience (LO) Proof: The definiens is identical with theorem T45. This also proves theorems T53 and T45, where p is replaced by p → q, and T55 via D13 and D13.1. Theorem T56 follows from T48 via definition D14. Theorems T57–T61 and T76 follow from T56 via Propositional Logic and are therefore satisfied in OBE. Axiom A7: (∀p)[g K (p → q) → (g K p → g K q)] Proof: Trivially satisfied because in OBE, gKp is interpreted as p via the equivalence (∀p)(g K p ↔ p). This equivalence also easily proves T77-T80. Axiom A9:

God’s Omnipotence

g ∈ OM → (∀p)(gWp → g K p) ∧ (∀p)[g CC p ↔ g CWp ∧ ¬(p ε T(g-Ess)) ∧ ¬(p ε T(LM))]

First part of A9: (∀p)(gWp → g K p) Proof:

gWp gK p

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ↓ � � � � � � � � � �

T82

286 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG Second part of A9: g CC p ↔ g CWp � � � � � � � � � � � � Proof: � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � (∀p)[

∧ (¬(p ε T(g-Ess)) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

∧ � � � � � � � � � �

¬(p ε T(LM)))] T�� � � � � � � � � � �

Here p ε T(g-Essence) is interpreted (in OBE) as equivalent with p ε T(g). Definition D18 Definition D18 can only be proved as an implication – i.e. as implying the definiens – not as an equivalence. However, this (i.e. the implication) is used in the proofs of the respective theorems. D�� g CWp → Cons(p)∧ Cons({p}∪T(g)) ∧ Cons({p}∪T(Commands)) (∃p)p ∧ ¬(¬p ε T(g)) ∧ ¬O¬p � � � � � � �� � � � � � � �� � � � � � � �� � � � � � � �� Proof: � � � � � � �� � � � � � �� � � � � � �� � � � � � �� � � � � � �� � � � � � ��

As in A9, p ε T(g-Essence) is interpreted as p ε T(g). Furthermore, p is consistent with T(g) is interpreted as: it is not the case that not-p is a theorem of (about) God. Similarly, from axiom A9 and definition D18, the following theorems, T83–T96, are provable. They can easily be shown to be satisfied in the model OBE. We shall show this for the important theorems T86 and T92.

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

287

T�� (∀p)(gWp → p) God’s will is always fulfilled gWp � � � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � � � p � � � � � � � � � � T�� (∀p)(g C p → p) gCp Proof: p

Whatever God causes, obtains � � � � � � � � � � → � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

�.�.� God’s Will and Causation Definition D19:

God’s Permission

D�� gPp ↔ ¬gW¬p Proof:

gPp

� � � � � � � � � � ↔ � � � � � � � � � � ¬gW¬p � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T97–T105 can easily be shown to be satisfied by the matrices of OBE. We show this for the important theorem T104. T��� (∀p)(p ε T(CR) → (g C p ↔ gWp)) W.r.t. the theorems of creation, God’s will is equivalent to God’s causation p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � � � gWp � � � � � � � � � � ↔ � � � � � � � � � � gCp � � � � � � � � � �

Axiom A10

Whatever God causes, he can cause

A�� (∀p)(g C p → g CC p)

Axiom A11

g CC p

� � � � � � � � � �

Whatever God wills, he can will

A�� (∀p)(gWp → g CWp)

g CWp � � � � � � � � � � Proofs of A�� and A�� by comparing M(gCp) and M(gWp) with M(gCCp) and M(gCWp)

Theorems T106–T113 are easily proved to be satisfied in OBE by comparing the proofs of D18 and A10 and A11.

288 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG Axiom A12 A��

God can cause things that he does not will to occur.

(∃p)(g CC p ∧ ¬gWp)

Proof:

g CC p ¬gWp

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T114–T116 are easily proved to be satisfied in OBE, analogously to A12. T117 and T118 are easily proved by comparing their respective matrices: M(p e T(CR)), M(p), M(gPp). Subsequently we use in this chapter 7 provable and proved as abbreviations for satisfied by the model OBE or proved to be consistent by satisfying the model OBE. Theorem T119 (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → ((g K p ∧ (gWp ∨ g Pp)) ∧ (gWp → g C p))] p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � gK p � � � � � � � � ∧ � � � � � � � � gWp ∨ g Pp � � � � � � � � ∧ � � � � � � � � gWp → g C p � � � � � � � �

� � � � � � �

� � � � � � �

This proves via D20 that God is omnipresent (T120). Theorem T126 is easily provable by comparing matrices. Theorem T133 (∀p)[p ε T(CR) → (g C p ∨ (∃x ∈ cr)(gCNp p ε T(CR) � � → � � gCp � � ∨ � � gCNp → xCSp � �

→ xCSp))] � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

Definition D25, theorems T138–T140, and axiom A14 with theorem T141 are easily provable by comparing the respective matrices. We show the proofs of the important two axioms A15 and A17. Axiom A15 Creature x is a partially su�cient cause for a fact of creation under the condition that God is a necessary cause for it

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

289

(∀p)(∀x ∈ cr)[xCSp → (gCNp → p ε T(CR))] xCSp � � � � � � � � � � → � � � � � � � � � � gCNp → p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � � �

Axiom A17

For all facts about creation, God is (at least) a necessary cause

(∀p)(p ε T(CR) → gCNp) p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � � � gCNp � � � � � � � � � �

With the help of A15, T117, and D25, theorems T142–T145 can be proved to satisfy the model OBE. T159 follows from T22 (see 7.3.1) and T161 from A14 and A17. With the help of A17 and definitions D6 and D14, theorems T163–T169 can be proved to satisfy OBE.

�.�.� God’s Conservation and Providence Axiom A�� (∀p)[gCV p t → (p t ε T(CR) ∧ (gCNp t → gCV p � � � � Proof: → � � � � p ε T(CR) � � � � ∧ � � � � gCNp → gWp � � � �

gWp t ))] � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

With the help of A18, theorems T170–T175 and T177–T180 are easily provable by comparing the respective matrices. T176 follows from D6 and T163. Definitions D26 (Providence) and D27 (Execution) with theorems T181, T182, and T183–T187 are easily provable by comparing the respective matrices. Theorems T189, T190, T193, and T194 are provable by comparing the respective matrices.

290 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG �.�.� Moral Evil Definition D29:

Moral Evil

p e ME ↔ (p e E ∧ ¬Cons({p} ∪ T(g-Commands))) p e ME � � � � � � � Proof: ↔ � � � � � � � peE � � � � � � � In OBE ¬Cons(. . .) ∧ � � � � � � � is interpreted as O¬p O¬p � � � � � � �

D��

� � � � �

� � � � �

� � � � �

Theorems T195–T200 are easily provable by comparing the respective matrices. Axiom A20

Moral Evil is a fact of (in) creation

(∃p)(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e ME) p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � � � Proof: p e ME � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T210–T224 are provable with the help of the respective matrices. Theorems T225 and T226 are provable via definitions D31 and D31.1.

�.�.� God is All-Good Axiom 21

God is All-Good

g ∈ AG → (∀p)[(gWp → p e G) ∧ (gLp → p e G)] ∧ (∃p)(gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(g))) ∧ (∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(x))] ∧ (∀x ∈ cr)(∀p)[gW(p e Goal(x)) → p e G] ∧ (∀x ∈ �)[g ∈ Just(x) ∧ g ∈ Merc(x) ∧ g ∈ Love(x)]

As with axioms A6 and A9, the consistency of axiom A21 (or its satisfaction in model OBE) is proved by proving its parts. Although God’s Justice, Mercy, and Love are characterized by axioms A33–A35 in this study, these axioms contain concepts which are not represented by matrices in OBE. Therefore, A33–A35 are not included in the consistency proof. (1) (∀p)(gWp → p e G) Proof:

gWp

� � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � ↓ peG � � � � � � � � � �

T231

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

(2) (∀p)(gLp → p e G)

291 T292

gLp � � � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � � � peG � � � � � � � � � �

(3) (∃p)(gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(g)))

gLp � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � gW(p ∧ p e G) � � � � � � p ∧ peG � � � � � � The special value true which is needed for p which is the value true of p ε T(g).

T305 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � e G(g) may be interpreted as the fifth value

(4) (∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[gLp → gW(p ∧ p e G(x))]

T307

We split p e G(x) – the state of a�airs p is good for creature x – into two states: G(x) – good for x – and p e G – p is good. The matrix of p e G is 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0. For the matrix of G(x), we use the same matrix as for p. So far, the direction of matrices with the propositional variable ‘p’ was used both as line and column in accordance with saving space, since no other variable was used. If two variables are used, they have to be used in di�erent directions, as is clear from the definition of p → q in section 7.1. Similarly, the two matrices of p e G and G(x) have to be used in di�erent directions. We choose M(p e G) as a column and M(G(x)) as a line. To obtain M(p e G(x)), we apply M(p e G) to M(G(x)). This can be done in di�erent ways: one simple way is to use the connective conjunction. Another is to use M(p e G) as an operation on M(G(x)), just as M(p e G) results from M(p); recall section 7.1. Below, we shall show the result of both interpretations for the first 5 lines since, by the conjunction of p in p ∧ p e G(x), lines 6–10 contain only values false. peG � � � � �

� � � � � �

� � � � � �

G(x) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � interpreted as conjunction

� � � � � �

� � � � � �

peG � � � � �

G(x) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � M(p e G) as an operation on M(G(x))

The conjunction with p (values in column) results in the same matrices as that above since the first 5 lines of M(p) have values 1. Thus, M(p ∧ p e G(x)) =

292 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG M(p e G(x)) for the first 5 lines. Lines 6–10 contain only values false. We now apply aWp to the matrices above to obtain: aW(p ∧ p e G(x)): aWp � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � aWp applied as a conjunction

aWp applied as an operation to the above matrix

� � � � �

aWp � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � aWp applied as a conjunction to the matrix above aWp � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

Thefinal result of the proof below is the same for both interpretations

� � � � �

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� � � � �

� � � � �

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

(∀x ∈ cr)(∃p)[gLp � � � Proof: � � ∃p is true � for � values � of p � � �

Proof: ∃p is true for � values of p

Proof: ∃p is true for � values of p

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gW(p ∧ p e G(x))] � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

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293

(5) (∀x ∈ cr)(∀p)[gW(p e Goal(x)) → p e G] T309 The proof is analogous to that of (4) above. We show, therefore, only the resulting matrices for the two interpretations of p e Goal(x).

294 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG (∀x ∈ cr)(∀p)[gW(p e Goal(x)) � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � Proof: � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

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p e G] � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �

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interpreted as conjunction � � � � Proof: � � � � � �

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interpreted as an operation

�.�.� Existence of Evils Axiom A22:

Existence of Evils

(1) The existence of moral evil has been proved as axiom A20 above. The existence of evil in general (E) can be proved by proving (∃p)(p ε T(CR ∧ p e E)): p ε T(CR) � � � � � � � � � � Proof: peE � � � � � � � � � �

(2) Existence of Natural Evil (NE� , NE� ), of Necessary Evil (NecE), of Legitimate Evil (LE), and of Soul-Making Evil (SE). These five kinds of evil have the following common essential part in their respective definientia: p e E ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃q)((q → p) ∧ q e G). Although the definitions D38.1, D38.2, D41 (for NE� , NE� , NecE, LE, SE) contain di�erent modes of evil (E�, E�, E�), we interpret them generally as E. We can prove the existence (consistency) of these kinds of evils by proving that the following

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

295

statement is satisfied in OBE: (∃p)[(p ε T(CR) ∧ p e E ∧ ¬(p e ME)) ∧ (∃q)(q → p ∧ q e G)]. The first threefold conjunction has a truth-value true in the 4th row (4th value of p), and this also holds for the second part (∃q)(q → p ∧ q e G) in the fourth row for all values of q. This completes the proof. (3) Existence of Metaphysical Evil (MetE), God’s Punishment (PE), and of Undeserved Evil (UE). Metaphysical Evil (D33) and God’s punishment (D42) have (∃q)gCondW(p, q) ∧ ¬(p e ME) as an essential common part in their definientia. This part also occurs as the strongest of the alternatives in the definiens of Undeserved Evil (D43); therefore, we have to prove the existence of the definiens of g CondW(p, q) in conjunction with ¬(p e ME) and p ε T(CR). D�� g CondW(p, q) ↔ (∃r)[p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G ∧ gWq ∧ (q → p) ∧ q e G ∧ g Pp ∧ gPref (q, r)]

According to definition D29.5, (∃r)(p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G) can be replaced by p e E. The definiens then reduces to: p e E ∧ gWq ∧ (q → p) ∧ q e G ∧ g Pp ∧ (∃r)gPref (q, r)

Consequently, the essential common part of the definientia of p e MetE, p e PE, p e UE is the following: (∃q)[gWq ∧ (q → p) ∧ q e G ∧ p e E ∧ g Pp ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃r)gPref (q, r)]

In the existence (consistency) proof, this statement has to be proved (in OBE) for some p that are facts of creation: (∃p)(p ε T(CR)). Since there is no separate matrix for gPref (q, r), we shall define it as follows: D��.�

gPref (q, r) ↔ (gWq ∧ q e G ∧ r e G ∧ ¬gWr)

Since (gWq ∧ q e G) is already contained in the statement to be proved we can replace gPref (q, r) with (∃r)(r e G ∧ ¬gWr). The final statement to be proved for existence (consistency) is then as follows: (∃q)[gWq ∧ (q → p) ∧ q e G ∧ p e E ∧ g Pp ∧ ¬(p e ME) ∧ (∃r)(r e G ∧ ¬gWr)]

The values of r have to be distributed in the direction of the values of p (column, vertical) in such a way that the first value of r corresponds to the first 10 values of p, the second to the second 10 values of p etc. We only need the first value of

296 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG r of the matrix of r e G ∧ ¬gWr, which is truth-value true and is distributed on the 10 values of p. The matrix of the first part containing 6 conjuncts has truthvalues true in row 4 (4th value of p) and columns 2 and 5 (2nd and 5th value of q). Therefore, the statement above is true for 2 values of q. For the existence of the three types of evil, we have to add the matrix of (∃p)(p ε T(CR)) in conjunction, which also has truth-value true in the 4th row. This completes the proof for the existence of MetE, PE, and UE according to OBE. For a detailed proof, see Weingartner (Theodicy) 6.2.4(5).

�.�.� God’s Plan and Execution of His Plan Axiom A�� (∀p)(p e ME → ¬(p e G)) p e ME � � � � � � � � � � Proof: → � � � � � � � � � � ¬(p e G) � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T279–T285 are easily provable by comparing their respective matrices of OBE.

�.�.� God’s Will and God’s Love Selects Axiom A�� (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gWp) Proof: peG � � � � � � � � � � ¬gWp � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T286–T292 and T294–T301 are easily provable by comparing matrices. Axiom A�� (∃p)(p e G ∧ ¬gLp) Proof: peG � � � � � � � � � � ¬gLp � � � � � � � � � �

Theorems T302–T309 are provable in OBE (T305, T307, T309 have been proved in section 7.3.5). Theorems T312 and T313 are provable using T309. Theorems T318, T320, T321 are provable using the matrix of (∃q)(q → p ∧ q e G) of 7.3.6(2).

7.3 Consistency of the Axioms, Theorems, and Definitions �

297

�.�.� Evil Accompanied by Good Axiom A32

Evil Accompanied by some Good

(∀p)(∀x ∈ cr)[(p e E ∧ xAcceptsp) → (∃q)(∃r)(q e G ∧ (q → p) ∧ xPref (q, r) ∧ p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G)] Axiom A�� section �.�.� contains p e E + instead of p e E, as above. p e E + is defined by definition D�� as either natural or necessary or legitimate or moral or soul-making or undeserved evil. All these special types of evil are evil in the sense of E. Therefore, our antecedent of A�� is weaker than that of A�� of section �.�.�, because we use p e E; i.e. our formulation of A�� is stronger, which is why we shall prove the consistency of the stronger version.

As is clear from D34, we shall replace p e Priv(r) ∧ r e G by p e E according to definition D29.5. Furthermore, we shall define xPref (q, r) analogous to gPref (q, r) by D34.2. D��.� xPref (q, r) ↔ (xWq ∧ q e G ∧ r e G ∧ ¬xWr) For xWq we take the same matrix as for xCSq i.e. M(xWq) = M(xCSq). Thus D��.� gets D��.�.

D��.� xPref (q, r) ↔ (xCSq ∧ q e G ∧ r e G ∧ ¬xCSr) Since q e G is already contained in A��, D��.� reduces to D��.� xPref (q, r) ↔ (xCSq ∧ r e G ∧ ¬xCSr)

Accordingly, axiom A32 gets the following form: (∀p)(∀x ∈ cr)[( p e E ∧ xAcceptsp) → (∃q)

Proof:

� � � � � � � � � �

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� � � � � � � � � �

(q → p ∧ q e G ∧ xCSq ∧ (∃r) (r e G ∧ ¬xCSr))] ↓ � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � q → p ∧ q e G ∧ xCSq

298 � 7 Consistency Proof of ASG (∃p)(r e G � � � � � � � � � � � � �

∧ � � � � � � � � � �

¬xCSr) � � � � � � � � � �

M(r e G ∧ ¬xCSr) has 3 values true. We need only one value for (∃p) and take the first: 1. This value has to be distributed on 10 values of p. Cf. the remark to r e G∧¬gWr (axiom A22(3) above). Adding the 10 values 1 (true) in conjunction does not alter the former matrix.

�.�.�� Consistency of the Axiomatic System 18 axioms have been proved to be consistent viz. satisfied in the model OBE. In addition, those 6 definitions where both definiendum and definiens are determined by matrices have been proved to be consistent. The other five definitions have been proved to be consistent for that direction of the implication which is used for the proofs of the respective theorems. This is already su�cient to establish the consistency of the most important part of the axiomatic system developed in chapters 1-5. However, we have additionally proved 174 theorems of chapters 1-5 to be satisfied by the model OBE. As has been said already at the beginning (ch. 7), chapter 6 contains axioms, the parts of which are not represented by operators of the model OBE. However, theorems T360-T390 and T395 concerning God the Son (sn) are reducible to theorems of chapters 1-5, where ‘sn’ is replaced with ‘g’ according to axiom A39 of section 6.1.2. Since the latter theorems are satisfied by the model OBE, the former are satisfied too and so are proved to be consistent. The same holds analogously for other 32 theorems where in theorems T360-T390 and T395 concerning God the Son (sn) ‘sn’ can be replaced with ‘hs’ (Holy Spirit), cf. theorem T491. This shows that 64 theorems of chapter 6 can also be proved consistent by the model OBE. As a final result, we can say that 18 axioms, 11 definitions, and 238 theorems of the axiomatic system ASG are satisfied by the model OBE and are therefore proved to be consistent. Since they all are satisfied by one and the same model OBE they are together consistent too viz. their conjunction is consistent. There is no consistency proof by OBE for the remaining axioms, definitions, and theorems of ASG since they contain parts that are not representable by matrices of OBE. However, since ASG is built up axiomatically and since all derivations follow by very simple principles of deduction (recall Introduction 3), the proofs of the theorems and the correctness of ASG can be checked thoroughly.

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[Weingartner (����a)] Weingartner, P. (����a). Basic Questions on Truth. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Weingartner (����b)] Weingartner, P. (����b). Reasons for Filtering Classical Logic. In: D. Batens et al.: Frontiers of Paraconsistency pp.���-���. Dordrecht: Kluwer. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). Evil. Di�erent Kinds of Evil in the Light of a Modern Theodicy. Peter Lang, Frankfurt. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). Omniscience. From a Logical Point of View. Heusenstamm-Frankfurt: Ontos. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). Matrix Based Logic for Application in Physics, The Review of Symbolic Logic �, ���-���. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). God’s Existence. Can it be Proven? A logical Commentary on the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas. Frankfurt: Ontos. [Weingartner (����a)] Weingartner, P. (����a). A �-Valued Calculus which Avoids the Paradoxes of Deontic Logic. In: J. Y. Beziau et al. Conceptual Clarifications. Tributes to Patrick Suppes (����-����), ���-���. College Publication, Tributes, Vol ��. [Weingartner (����b)] Weingartner, P. (����b). Nature’s Teleological Order and God’s Providence. Are They Compatible with Chance, Free Will, and Evil?. Berlin: De Gruyter. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). The Need for Pluralism of Causality, Logic and Logical Philosophy ��, ���-���. [Weingartner (����)] Weingartner, P. (����). Knowledge and Scientific and Religious Belief. Berlin, De Gruyter. [Weingartner (Theodicy)] Weingartner, P. Theodicy (forthcoming). [Wigner (����)] Wigner, E. P. (����) Symmetries and Reflections. Scientific Essays of Eugene P. Wigner, ed. by W. J. Moore and M. Scriven. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana Univ. Press. [Whitehead and Russell (PMt)] Whitehead, A. N. and Russell, B. (PMt). Principia Mathematica, �Vols. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press ����. [Winston (����)] Winston, N. et al. (����). Parthenogenetic Activation and Development of Fresh and Aged Human Oocytes, Fertility and Sterility ��, ���-���. [Wolters (����)] Wolters, G. (����). Mach I, Mach II, Einstein und die Relativitätstheorie. Eine Fälschung und ihre Folgen. De Gruyter, Berlin.

Subject Index absolute – evil ��� – time �� acting virtually ��� action – divine- ��� – human- ��� activities of (the triune) God ���, ���, ��� actual �� actuality – present- �� agent-causality �� all-causing ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� all-good ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� all-knowing �� all-willing ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� alternative laws of nature �� analogy �� anthropic principle ��� ascension – Christ’s- ��� ASG �, ���, ���, ��� assumes human nature ��� axioms ���, ��� baptism ��� basic – evil ��� – good ��� basic value ���, ��� belief – religious- ���, ��� – scientific- ��� Bell’s inequalities �� Big Bang ��, �� body – human- ���, ��� boundary condition ��, �� can cause ��� – God- �� https://doi.org/��.����/�������������-���

can will – God- �� causal – factor ��, ��� – relations ��, �� causality – agent- �� – event- �� – statistical- ��, �� cause �� – can- ��� – first- �� – God can- �� – God cannot- �� – necessary- ��, ��, ��, ���, ��� – partially su�cient- ��, ��, ��� – pt-su�cient- ��, �� – secondary- ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – su�cient- ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ��� ceteris paribus conditions �� chance and randomness �� change the past �� changeable �� Christ’s – ascension ��� – passion ���–���, ���, ��� – resurrection ��� chronology condition of space-time �� Church ���, ��� clock-paradox �� compassion ��� complete knowledge ��, �� condition – boundary- �� – initial- ��, �� – normal- �� conditionally – permits ��� – wills ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� consistency proof ��� constants � – fundamental- ��

��� � constants of nature ��, ��, ��, �� contingency ��, �� – external- ��, ��, ��� contingent �� cooperation – of contingent imperfect creatures �� – of creatures ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – of humans ���, ��� copula ‘is’ � CPC �, ��� creation ��� – fact of- ��, ���, ��� creator �� creatures – cooperation of contingent imperfect- �� – cooperation of- ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� criterion – of eliminabilty � – of non-creativity � death ���, ���, ��� deduction – principle of- � defects of the human body ��� defects of the human soul ��� definition �, ��� – explicit- � derivation – principle of �� descent into ��� divine – action ��� – essence �� – knowledge ��� – nature ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – person ��, ���, ��� – teacher ���, ��� – will ��� DNA-repair-mechanisms ���, ��� eliminabilty – criterion of- � epistemic entropy ��� epistemic information ��� essentially one �� ET-simultaneity ��

eternal ��, �� – happiness ���, ���, ���, ��� – truth �� event �� – holy- ��� – sensible- ��� event-causality �� everlasting �� evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – absolute- ��� – accompanied by some good ���, ���, ��� – basic- ��� – legitimate- ���, ���, ��� – metaphysical- ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – moral- ���, ���, ���, ��� – natural- ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – necessary- ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – soul-making- ���, ���, ���, ��� – undeserved- ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� evil-guilt principle ���, ��� evolution of intelligence ���, ��� explicit definition � external contingency ��–��, ��� fact of creation ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� factor causal ��, ��� faith ���, ���, ��� fallacy of extrapolation ��� Father ���, ��� fine-tuning �� free actions and decisions �� full of love ���, ��� fundamental constants �� future states of a�airs ��, �� genetic load �� global plan ��� goals ���, ��� God – activity of- ���, ��� – can cause ��, ��, �� – can will ��, ��

�

– cannot cause ��, ���, ���, ��� – cannot will ��, ���, ���, ��� – causes ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – conserves ���, ��� – does not cause ���, ���, ��� – does not will ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – existence of- � – loves ���–��� – mother of- � – pantheistic- �� – permits ��, ���, ���, ��� – properties of- � – the Son ���, ���, ��� – will of- ��, �� – wills ���, ���, ��� God’s – actuality ��, ��� – coadjutors �� – commands ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – compassion ���, ��� – essence ��, �� – execution of his plan ���, ���, ���, ��� – existence �� – grace ��� – justice ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – knowledge �� – love ���, ���, ��� – mercy ���–��� – perfection �� – plan ���, ���, ���, ��� – power �� – providence ���, ���, ���, ��� – punishment ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – reward ��� good – basic- ��� – moral ��� – moral- ��� – natural- ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� guilt-punishment principle ���, ��� habit ���, ��� happiness ��� – eternal- ���, ���, ��� hidden causes ���

holy event ��� Holy Mary ���, ���, ���, ���–��� Holy Spirit ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� Holy Virgin ��� human – action ��� – body ���, ��� – knowledge ��� – nature ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – observer �� – person ��, ���, ��� – soul ���, ��� – will ��� human free will decisions �� if – then �� immaculate conception ��� imperfection ���, ��� implication �� improbable ���, ��� incarnation ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� incomplete knowledge �� individual variables � infallible – logically- �� inference – relevant- � initial condition ��, ��, �� institutes the Church ��� internal contingency �� intuitionistic valid �� invariance – permutation- �� – space-time- �� – time-translation �� just ���, ���, ���, ��� just punishment ���, ��� knowledge – complete- ��, �� – divine- ��� – human- ��� – incomplete �� – necessary- �� – sound- �� Last Judgement ���

���

��� � law – of entropy �� – of nature ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ��� – statements �� – statistical- �� – theorems �� learning ��, ���, ���, ��� legitimate – evil ���, ���, ��� – good ��� logically – infallible �� – omniscient �� merciful ���, ���, ��� metaphysical evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� microstates �� miracle – of nature ���, ���, ��� – of religion ���, ���, ��� modal operators � monotheism �� moral – evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – good ��� morally relevant ���, ��� most perfect universe �� Mother of God �, ��� mutable �� natural – evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – good ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – inclination ���, ��� – necessity �� nature – constants of- ��, ��, �� – divine- ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – human- ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� – law of- ��, ��, ���, ���, ��� – miracle of- ���, ���, ��� necessary – cause ��, ��, ��, ���, ��� – evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – knowledge ��

non-creativity – criterion of- � norm � normal condition �� not all-causing ��� not all-willing ��� not necessarily willed ��, �� OBE ���, ���, ��� observer – human- �� omnipotence ��, ��, ��� omnipresence ��, ��, ��� omniscience ��, ��, ��, ��� omniscient – logically- �� ontological status �� operator � – modal- � original sin ���, ���, ��� pantheistic God �� partially su�cient cause ��, ��, ��� peccatum originale ��� perfect ��, ��� perfection �� permission ���, ��� permits – conditionally- ��� – God- �� permutation invariance �� person �� – divine- ��, ��, ���, ��� – human- ��, ��, ���, ��� plan – God’s- ��� PLV �� PMC ��, ��� power – God’s- �� present – actuality �� principle – evil-guilt- ���, ��� – guilt-punishment- ���, ��� – of charity ��� – of deduction �

S

– of derivation �� – of Thomas Aquinas ��� proof – consistency- ��� providence – God’s- ���, ��� pt-su�cient cause ��, �� quantifier – existential- � – propositional- � Quantum Jump �� RC �� relation – set-theoretical elementhood- � relations – causal- ��, �� relevance criterion �� relevant inference � religion – miracle of- ���, ���, ��� religious – belief ���, ���, ��� – fatalism ��� sacrament ��� salvation ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� saviour ��� scientific belief ���, ��� secondary – cause ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� sensible event ��� should cause �� sign ��� sin – original- ���, ��� Son ���, ��� soul – human- ���, ��� soul-making – evil ���, ���, ���, ��� sound knowledge �� space-time invariance ��, �� spirit of truth ���

I

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state �� statistical – causality ��, �� – law �� status – ontological- �� su�cient cause ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ��� supreme judge ���, ��� symmetry group of nature �� teacher – divine- ���, ��� temptation ���, ��� theorem � time ��, �� – absolute- �� time-translation invariant �� transfiguration ��� trinity ���, ��� triune ��, ��� undeserved evil ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� unifies in him ���, ��� universe – most perfect- �� universe of discourse � unobservable ���, ��� variables – individual- � virgin-birth ��� virginity ���–��� virtue ��� virtuous ��� will – conditionally- ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� – divine- ��� – God cannot- �� – human- ��� – of God ��, �� world of learning ��, ��� XX-men ���

Name Index Abraham, �� Adam, ���–���, ���, ���, ��� Alexander III, ��� Ambrose, ��� Anderson C.A., �� Anderson, M., ��� Aristotle, ��, ��, ��, �� Athanasius, �� Augustine, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���–���, ���, ���, ���, ��� Avicenna, �� Balakier, ��� Barrow, J.D., ��, ���, ���, ��� Bell, J., �� Bernadette Soubirous, ��� Bochenski, J.M., �, �, �� Boethius, M.T.S., ��, ��, ��, �� Boltzmann, L., �� Bonaventura, �� Brahmanism, ��� Breuer, Th., ��, �� Buddhism, ��� Bunge, M., ��� Calvinism, ��� Carnap, R., �� Carthage, ��� Cemper, B., VII Chalcedon, ��, ���, ��� Chapelle, A., ��� Christianity, ��, ��� Chrysostom, ���, ��� Clemens of Alexandria, �� Collins, C.B., ��� Cologne, ��, �� Constantinople, ��, ��, ���, ���, ��� Coplestone, F., �� Craig, C.E., VII Craig, W.L., �� Crick, F., ��� Czermak, J., VII, �� https://doi.org/��.����/�������������-���

Damascene, J., ��� Davis, P., ��, ���, ���, ��� Denton, M.J., ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� DeWeese, �� Dobzhansky, Th., ���, ��� Dorn, G., VII Dowe, P., �� Dyson, F.J., �� Eddy-Baker, A., ��� Einstein, A., ��–��, �� Ellis, G.F.R., ��, �� Ephesus, ���, ��� Eva, ��� Fölsing, A., �� Fatima, ��� Fine, K., ��� Florence, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ���, ��� Friedman, J.I., �� Gödel, K., ��, ��, ��, ��, �� Geach, P.T., ��� Gettings, M., �� Gregory of Nazianz, ��� Gregory the Great, ���, ���, ��� Guadalupe, ��� Hafele, J.C., �� Hausman, D.M., �� Hawking, St.W., ��, ��, ��� Heller, M., �, ��, �� Helvidius, ��� Hick, J., ���, ���, ��� Hinduism, ��� Hintikka, J., ��� Hoyle, F., ��� Hume, D., ���, ���, ��� Indiculus, ��� Innocent III, ��� Islam, ��, ��� Jammer, M., ��–��

��� � Jerome, �� Job, ���, ���, ��� John Paul II, ���, ��� John the Baptist, �� John XXIII, ��� Joseph, ��� Judaism, ��, ��� Kant, I., �� Keating, R.E., �� Kibeho, ��� Koehler, E., �� Kreisel, G., �, � Kretzmann, N., ��, �� Krivine, J.L., � Lö�er, W., � La Salette, ��� Lateran, ��–��, ���, ���, ���, ��� Laurentin, R., ��� Leeb, R., VII Leibniz, G.W., ��, ��, ��, ���, ��� Lejeune, R., ��� Leo I, ���, ��� Leo IX, ���, ��� Leo XIII, ���, ��� Lindahl, T., ���, ��� Lorentz, H.A., �� Lourdes, ���, ��� Lovejoy, C.O., ��� Lucia, ��� Lyon, ��, ���, ���, ��� Mach, E., �� Mackie, J.L., ��, ���, ��� Maxwell, J.C., �� Mayr, E., ��� Medjugorje, ���, ��� Meessen, A., �� Minkowski, H., �� Mittelstaedt, P., ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��� Modrich, P., ���, ��� Morscher, E., VII, � Moses, �� Moses Maimonides, ��

Newton, I., ��, ��, ��� Nicaea, ��� Page, D., ��� Paul VI, ��� Pearl, J., �� Peebles, P.J.E., �� Peirce, C.S., ��� Penrose, R., ��, ��, ��� Penzias, A.A., �� Petit, C., ��� Petley, B.W., �� Pius IX, ���, ���, ��� Pius V, ��, ���, ��� Pius X, ��� Pius XII, ���, ���, ��� Planck, M., ��� Plantinga, A., ��, ���, ���, ��� Popper, K.R., ��, ��� Rees, M.J., ��, ��, ���, ��� Rome, ��, ��, ���, ��� Ruse, M., ��� Russell, B., � Salmon, W., �� Salvini-Plawen, L., ��� Sancar, A., ���, ��� Schurz, G., ��, �� Schuster, P., �� Sens, �� Shannon, C.E., ��� Simeon, ��� Sixtus IV, ���, ��� Stockums, W., ��� Stump, E., ��, �� Suarez, F., �� Suppes, P., � Swinburne, R., � Szatkowski, M., � Tarski, A., � Thomas Aquinas (see Bibliography), ��� Tipler, F.J., ��, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� Toledo, ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ���–���, ���, ���, ��� Trent, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���

N

Valence, ��� Vatican, ��, ��, ��, ��, ��, ���, ���, ��� Vatican II, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ���, ��� Vessot-Levine, ��

Whitehead, A.N., � Wigner, E.P., �� Wilson, R.W., �� Winston, N., ��� Wolters, G., ��

Weaver, W., ��� Weinberg, S., ��

Yu, I.T., ��

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