An Analytical Philosophy of Religion 9781135976132, 9780415822138

Citation preview

ROUTLEDGE LIBRARY EDITIONS: PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

AN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

This page intentionally left blank

AN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

WILLEM F. ZUURDEEG

Volume 40

i~ ~~o~~~~n~~~up LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published in 1959 This edition first published in 2013 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 1959 Willem F. Zuurdeeg All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-0-415-65969-7 (Set) eISBN: 978-0-203-52926-3 (Set) ISBN: 978-0-415-82213-8 (Volume 40) eISBN: 978-0-203-65414-9 (Volume 40) Publisher’s Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original copies may be apparent. Disclaimer The publisher has made every effort to trace copyright holders and would welcome correspondence from those they have been unable to trace.

AN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

Willem F. Zuurdeeg

Ruskin House GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD MUSEUM

STREET

LONDON

FIRST

PUBLISHED

IN

GREAT

BRITAIN

IN

1959

This book is copyright IInder tlte Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealingfor the purposes of pril'ate study, research, criticism, or review, as permitted under tlJe Copyright Act, H)j6. no portion may be reproduced by auy process without writtell permission. Enqlliry Sllllll/d be made to the publisher.

Copyright © MCML J/IlI by Abingdon Press © MC.HL VI by J;Villem Frederik ZlIurdeeg

Copyr(~ht

Chapter VIII, pages 282-306, is based on an article entitled "Hermeneutics," by Willem F. Zuurdeeg. in Nederlauds Theologisch Tijdschrift, October, 1951.

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY BRADFORD AND PICKENS LONDON, W.e.I

TO My Wije and Children

This page intentionally left blank

PREFACE THIS BOOK. IS WRITTEN WITH A THREEFOLD PURPOSE. FIRST, IT IS

planned as a textbook in philosophy of religion. It is meant for students in philosophy who are well acquainted with modern analytical and empirical philosophy and who wonder what can be said about religion from the point of view of this philosophy. It is intended also for theological students who are well acquainted with modern theology and who wonder about the implications of contemporary philosophy for theological thinking. The second purpose of the book is more ambitious. I hope that it will encourage a fruitful discussion between philosophers and theologians, between those who respect Carnap and Feigt and have read some of Sartre, and those who admire Barth, Nygren, and the Niebuhrs. Yet by means of this second intention also the volume addresses itself to students. By students are meant persons who do not uknow," and who therefore want to discuss and to learn. They differ from another type of person, people who uknow," who are quite certain and who therefore are no more in need of learning, namely, the ((professors!" The world of philosophers and theologians is full of professors. We have all met theologians who uknow" that logical empiricism is un _ spiritual," that it does not take into account Hthe deeper aspects of reality," and therefore cannot be of any use to a religious man. And who does not know those professors of philosophy who are quite certain that religion is a «cultural lag," and who suggest that a cultivated man who claims to be a Christian is lacking either in moral integrity or in intellectual keenness? I myself have not yet reached the maturity and certainty of such professors; my thinking is too full of question marks and doubts, as well in regard to ((religion," as in matters of philosophy. I hope to find readers who suffer from similar doubts and questions, and who share my interest in an encounter of theological and philosophical thinking. It is not impossible that one can learn a great deal in this way. The third purpose of the book is to try to defend a particular thesis. It is possible to discuss matters of faith in a more or less impartial way_ It is possible to try to understand the deepest motivations of our own and of others' beliefs without immediately becoming defensive or aggresH

7

AN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

sive. One can analyze these beliefs while being on guard as to one's own convictions and prejudices, lest they cloud one's vision and make an increase in understanding impossible. It is not easy, but it is sometimes possible to check one's inclination to preach, and to become a philosopher. Furthermore, the world shows us so many theologians and metaphysicians who are full of their convictions (that is to say, full of themselves) that it is a relief to realize that an activity exists, philosophy, which takes a certain distance to these cherished and important convictions (or selves). Philosophy is not to be condoned as an attempt (a bit Utopian) to think impartially; it is to be hailed as a healthy counterbalance against a too anxious concern with our convictions. I have not aimed at completeness. Certain pertinent problems have been selected, but not all the relevant issues have been brought into discussion. I have chosen some important authors, but not everyone who truly merits study has here received attention. It has seemed more important to show what can be done by the analytical approach in philosophy of religion than to pursue a completeness which could not easily be attained by a single man. Left out are such important problems as symbol, nondiscursive communication, demythologizing, and philosophers such as Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Russell. The reader may wonder why I do not refer to Kierkegaard and Buber, since my approach is akin to the basic position of these two men. The answer is, partly, that the full meaning of their ideas (especially in respect to Kierkegaard) still largely escapes my understanding; partly, that discussion of Kierkegaard and Buber is not strictly necessary, because the approach set forth in this essay has not been influenced (directly) by the methods of these scholars. I regret that Ian T. Ramsey's Religious Language l was published after this manuscript was finished. Also, John Hick's Faith and Knowledge 2 and Walter F. Otto's Die Gestalt und das Sein 3 reached me after the manuscript was completed. Perhaps the reader will feel that some of the thinkers discussed did not receive their due. I want to state emphatically that I have not intended either a full approval or a denunciation of the person or the work of any writer. I disclaim the ability and the right to such total appraisals 1 Religious Language: An Empirical Placing of Theological Phrases (London: SCM Press, 1957). • Faith lind Knowledge: A Modern Introduction to the Problem of Religious Knowledge (Ithaca, N.Y.: CorneU University Press, 1957). • DUsseldorf: Diederichs, 1955.

8

PREFACE

of men so eminent as Tillich or Whitehead. It could be suggested that in regard to some specific problems these men seem to be in the wrong. Opinions like this should not be interpreted in any specific case as an easy dismissal of the achievements of such major thinkers of our time. The term "analysis" in the title of the book does not mean that I am convinced of having given a "pure," "neutral" analysis. I believe that a completely neutral analysis in matters of conviction is unattainable, even that the notion of such an analysis implies an ideal of questionable value. On the other hand, I believe that it is important to strive for an analysis which is as unbiased as is humanly possible. Yet even such an unbiased analysis has not been fully realized in this book. First, I am limited in my understanding. It seems beyond doubt that an analytical philosopher should try to analyze only those convictions of which he possesses a more or less intimate knowledge. In this case I am acquainted with the ideas of what is called Reconstructed Liberalism, Neo-Reformation theology, a certain type of humanism, Marxism, Nazism, and to a small extent the ancient and primitive religions. Examples and illustrations are chosen from these convictions only, and the most from the convictions which I know most intimately, those of the churches united in the Ecumenical Movement. Therefore, the fact that the last chapter deals only with some Protestant convictions does not mean that I consider these convictions to be the "best," the "highest," or the ones "most acceptable to a philosopher" (whatever that might mean) . This fact simply shows that I do not know contemporary Judaism, Roman Catholicism, or naturalism well enough to discuss them in this chapter. Second, I am not only limited in my understanding of contemporary convictions, but my analysis is inevitably informed by the convictions which I share. Sometimes such "information" will be a help (it can assist the author in seeing specific things); at other times it will be a hindrance (it can prevent him from seeing other things) . We could rise above both limitations if other analytical philosophers whose thinking is informed by other convictions, and who possess an intimate knowledge of a wider range of beliefs, would enter into the discussion of convictionallanguage. These remarks hope to make clear that this book is intended as more than the defense of a specific theology with philosophical means. I am interested not in defense but in understanding. I wish to understand convictional language-that is, man-who-speaks-not to defend a Aol