An analysis of the debates on neutrality legislation in the United States senate 1935-1941

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NAME AND ADDRESS

DATE

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY

AIM ANALYSIS OF THE DEBATES ON NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE

1935-1941

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL in

partial

fulfillment

of

the

requirements

for the degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY FIELD OF SPEECH

By Earl Richard Cain

Evanston,

Illinois

August, 1950

ProQuest Number: 10101242

A ll rights re se rve d INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The q u a lity o f this re p ro d u c tio n is d e p e n d e n t u p o n th e q u a lity o f th e c o p y s u b m itte d . In th e u n like ly e v e n t t h a t th e a u th o r d id n o t se n d a c o m p le te m a n u s c rip t a n d th e re a re m issing p a g e s , th e s e will b e n o te d . Also, if m a te ria l h a d to b e re m o v e d , a n o te w ill in d ic a te th e d e le tio n .

uest P ro Q u e st 10101242 P u b lis h e d b y P ro Q u e st LLC (2016). C o p y rig h t o f th e D isse rta tion is h e ld b y th e A u th o r. All rights re se rve d. This w o rk is p r o te c te d a g a in s t u n a u th o riz e d c o p y in g u n d e r Title 17, U n ite d S tates C o d e M ic ro fo rm E dition © P ro Q u e st LLC. P ro Q u e st LLC. 789 East E ise nh o w er P arkw ay P.O. Box 1346 A n n A rb o r, Ml 48106 - 1346

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I wish to acknowledge the assistance and counsel of Ernest J. Wrage, the director of this study.

His guidance and encourage­

ment have been of immeasurable value in the preparation of this dissertation.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

I.

INTRODUCTION ................................. Purpose of the S t u d y ..................

1

Scope and Place of the S t u d y .........

2

Method of the Study

II. III. IV. V.

.....................

8

Organization of the S t u d y .............. ..

12

WAR FEARS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND NEUTRALITY

. .

15

NEUTRALITY ON PROBATION FOR A YEAR:

. .

62

A LOOPHOLE IS PLUGGED: CASH-AND-CARRY:

Part I: Part II: VI. VII. VIII.

1

1936

JANUARY, 1937

. . . .

114

1937

136

The Pittman B i l l .............

136

The House and Senate Compromise .

THE THEORY MEETS THE PRACTICE:

1939 ........

T?A CYCLE IN HUMAN EVENTS IS ABOUT TO COME TO ITS END. n

208

.......

290

SUMMARY AND C O N C L U S I O N S .................

368

APPENDIX A:

, APPENDIX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY

Notes of

on the Historical Foundations a Neutrality P o l i c y ..............

Breakdown of Senate Voting on Neutrality Legislation, 1935-1941

• *

........................................

185

337 401 408

CHAPTER I j

INTRODUCTION

!

Purpose of The Study

j

In his Memoirs. Cordell Hull recalled his impressions

jof the American mood in relation to world affairs in 1935: i ! In the United States an avalanche of isolation­ ism was overwhelming any prospect of inducing the American people to agree to a more vital share in world affairs. Congress, having disavowed the World Court, was seeking ways to legislate us out of pos­ sible involvement in the next war which was becoming more and more inevitable. . . . it was to color our foreign relations up to and after the day that Hitler’s armies plunged into Poland and the Second World War began.1 In the 1930fs the American people witnessed the break­ down of virtually every piece of international machinery for keeping world peace, and a great many Americans believed that the security of the United States would best be assured by withdrawal into what has been commonly called a policy of iso­ lation.

This thinking found expression in many places.

One,

as Hull describes, was the Congress of the United States.

From

Congress there came, in response to the pleas of many groups |and individuals, a series of legislative acts known as the Neu­ trality Acts.

On six separate occasions between August of 1935

and November of 1941, Congress deliberated and acted upon some phase of neutrality legislation.

In the congressional debates,

(arguments and strategy were largely keyed to the question: ,i

'

I

—

The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. I, p. 397. 1

Can

2

i:

the United States act to insure itself against participation i in a future war? The absorbed attention given to legislation I ; i l!designed to promote this end, and the historical consequences i t ! j !which flowed from the action taken give point to Senator Elbert j ■D* Thomas1 judgment that . . all our international consid­ erations were influenced in a way by the neutrality acts.T,l j|

The study is focused upon the neutrality debates as

Ithey occurred on the floor of the Senate of the United States 'ibetween 1935 and 1941*

The object is to provide a narrative

of these debates within the context of contemporary events and to analyze the discussions by means of concepts taken from the iitheory of argumentation.

For the first time, as distinguished

from other studies on the subject, this dissertation relates ithe debates on the several neutrality measures in such a fashion as to provide a profile of the leading debaters, issues, argu­ ments, and appeals within their historical context.

Such a

istudy, it is believed, is not only informative as to the shap­ ing of our foreign policy for this period, but to the student of argumentation it also affords insight into the practices and characteristics of legislative debate. Scone and Place of the Study The time interval of this study was determined by recent legislative history on neutrality.

Between 1935 and

1941> six neutrality bills were proposed, debated in Congress,

: i

I

Letter to the writer from Senator Elbert Thomas, i/United States Senator from Utah, January 30, 1950. Senator ilThomas participated in the neutrality debates from 1935 to 1941-

'land enacted into law. Following the first measure, each subj ! Ilsequent debate proved to be an extension of previous arguments* bhen read today, with all of the records at onefs disposal, the jl

Jseveral debates may be seen really as one debate, an unfolding ! j polemic which informs only if the chronicle of argument is read ]i

jjfrom the first stirrings for neutrality to the interruption of |i

fiiscussions by the events of war.

There is an inextricability

labout these debates which gives them unity and which therefore j jaade it almost mandatory that the entire sweep of the discussion jibe brought into view. I I But some limits had to be imposed.

Since legislative

■measures, such as the neutrality bills, are debated in both iBenate and House, any attempt to make a close analysis of what r Was said in the entire Congress for this period becomes an in­ credibly time consuming task.

In the Senate alone, to which

this study is confined for reasons shortly to be stated, the Rebates run through five volumes of the Congressional Record, s ^nd in the 1939 Senate debate, the Record printed more than one million words uttered by seventy senators.!

And since the study,

as conceived, made necessary a wide consultation of historical and contemporary literature in addition to an examination of the actual debates, it was deemed wise to focus upon one chamber of the national legislature. j ;

But why choose the Senate rather than the House?

eral reasons dictated this selection. J

Sev­

The first hinges on the

i

The total quoted in the New York Times. October 2S, 1939, p. U

|Senate?s legal and historic role in the determination of for! lieign policy* Odder its constitutional authority to approve |treaties and foreign appointments, the Senate has become on ii

many occasions an equal of the Executive branch in interna­ tional affairs*

The greater public attention given to the

jjsenate neutrality debates became evident in the reading of

It

1‘contemporary opinion publications. The personalities in the ' ! ilSenate were better known nationally than those who engaged in [j

jthe House debate.

The Senate included many of the leaders who

{helped formulate and who spearheaded Administration policy, i;

iland also included their opponents, the leading isolationists.! k second

j u s t i f i c a t i o n

f o r

selection of the Senate grows out

lof its size and composition.

The Senate is smaller in numbers

than the House, which makes the task of presenting participants in the debate more manageable than would be the case in a body of four hundred and thirty-five Representatives.

Senators are

Elected for a six-year term compared to the two-year term of ' i House members. This meant that Senate membership remained rel­ atively stable during the period of the debates, and makes pos­ sible a noting of alignments, strategies, shifts, consistencies i

or inconsistencies in argument.

As research progressed, it be­

came evident that the relatively stable membership of the Senate Was extremely important in interpreting the debates. '

I

Isolationist arguments could hardly be presented ac­ curately without a consideration of the speeches of Nye, Bone, pennett Clark, LaFollette, or Vandenberg.

Finally, a sampling of the debates in the House of jRepresentatives revealed there was little in the pattern of [argument and appeals which was not also present in the Senate debates.

In those isolated cases when distinctive development

of argument appeared to affect the course of the legislation in the House, the arguments were quickly adopted by some sen­ ators and used in the debates of that Chamber.

It became evi­

dent that novelty in the House quickly found its way to the jSenate.

In many instances, contemporary commentators pointed

i

lout, Senate discussion and action set the pattern for House i Jdeliberation on neutrality legislation. 'i

j

In summary, this study embraces all six of the debates

|on neutrality measures between 1935-1941> tut is confined to the discussion which occurred on the floor of the Senate of the United States. This is by no means the first doctoral dissertation on these debates.

Several theses and dissertations have been pre­

pared on the subject in departments of history and political science, all of which have a quite different focus from this study.!

They deal with the historical roots of neutrality,

questions of legality, the effects upon international relations 3 ' and other specialized approaches. Among the dissertations in Speech, two studies bear upon the neutrality debates between 1935 and 1941.

The focus of each of these studies was not iden

tical with that contemplated for this study. ,

In one, nMethods

i

These studies are listed in the bibliography at the close of the study.

6

for Describing a Public Discussion Applied to the United States Neutrality Debates* 1935-41*" "by Laurence Mouat,! the writer made no attempt to place the debates within the historical or contemporary setting or to offer a detailed analysis of the argumentative process in relationship to the backdrop against which the debates unfolded.

Mouat established three standards

by which the effectiveness of the debates might be measured, and in only one section of his study are the principles of ar­ gumentation utilized as a standard.

Even within this section,

the debates of only two of the six-year period are considered for illustrative analysis.

A systematic portrayal of the broad

sweep of argument was not an aim of Mouat*s study.

In a second

study in Speech, ”An Analysis of Senatorial Debate on Neutral­ ity Legislation in the 1939 Special Session of Congress,” by H.

Hardy Perritt,^ the limitations imposed by the writer are

at once obvious.

Perrittfs thesis focused on one phase of the

debates and affords no analysis of the progression and relation­ ship of the arguments in the series of debates, i

While this study benefited in one way or another from

'others upon the same general subject, it rests upon a purpose land underlying conceptions which are quite different from the iothers.

It alone attempts to reproduce the discussion of neu­

trality measures already specified (l) from the introduction il p

_ _ _ _ _ _j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

| Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept, of Speech, Cornell University, 1942. 2

Unpublished Masterfs thesis, Louisiana State UniSversity, 1942.

7

of the first measure to the termination of debate; (2) in one branch of the national legislature;

(3) within the context of

contemporary events and public attitudes; and (4) as a chronjicle of legislative debating-

It is, moreover, the only study

on the subject which utilizes principles and concepts of arguj jmentation as a basis for analyzing and interpreting what was i said within the structure of debating* i

I

Inspiration and suggestions for an analysis of eon-

igressional debating were gained from previous studies in Speech* | |j There was the study by Ralph Micken on the Senate debate of the

j League

of Nations Covenant;! the dissertation by Naomi Wrage

on representative anti-war speeches in C o n g r e s s ; 2 j. Calvin '.j

j iCallaghan’s case study of the isolationist-interventionist dei

jbate;3 and the master’s thesis of Giraud Chester devoted to a i j case study of Senate debate on selective service legislation.4 ! lThese indicate the value in selecting congressional debates for ! j rhetorical analysis with special regard to the role of the argu-

j

ments in influencing the climate of opinion, or as reflections

|of public attitudes. I j jj

_

i Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, |Northwestern University, 194&. I 2 ■ Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, i |Northwestern University, 1946.

j!!i

3 Unpublished * Ph.D. dissertation, IUniversity of Wisconsin, 1949*

■i

4

j!

Dept* of Speech, Dept* of Speech, Dept, of Speech,

Unpublished Master’s thesis, Dept, of Speech, University of Wisconsin, 1943. i

■I j

Method of the Study The steps in the development of this subject, while

not to be taken as strictly chronological stages in its gene­ sis, are here reviewed* j

In the first place, it was considered important to

[read the debates between 1935 and 1941 in the perspective of [historical precedent.

\\

The history of the United States for-

jeign policy is marked by a popular wish and specific legisla­ t i v e action to guarantee its neutrality.

A cursory reading

j;of the Senate debates of our recent history established that j;

|the senators were mindful of historical precedent and that I ; 'they drew upon it. 1

Many specialized studies contributed to an understand­

ing of the background against which the debates were read.

Es­

pecially helpful were the works of Fenwick,! Atwater,2 Jessup,3 1Seymour,4 and Borchard and I»age.5 mary value were:

Still other sources of pri­

The Foreign Policy Association Reports.

Political Science Quarterly. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. The American Political Sci­ ence Review. American Journal of International Law, and Amer­ ican Historical Association Reports.

:

I

“

!

Out of these several

~

The Neutrality Laws of the United States, and Amer­ ican Neutrality: Trial and Failure. 2 American Regulation of ftrms Exports. 3 Neutrality: Its History. Economics, and Law. 4 vols. A* American Neutrality; 191A-1917. 5 Neutrality for the United States.

9

!sources was written a factual digest of basic historical infor­ mation, which is included as Appendix A.

j

A second step involved a survey of the contemporary

jsocial and political setting of the Senate debates. James i | |Bryce indicates in The American Commonwealth that in a reprejl |sentative democracy public opinion is shaped by a mutual inter­ action between the public and its leaders.

The views of states-

men, journalists, and lecturers may prevail, Bryce points out, Ibut those views are modified by the reception which public opinion gives them.l

Applied to the neutrality debates, this

i

jwould suggest that the Senate debates were at once a reflection of public attitudes and a force crystallizing and shaping pub'■i

i

ilic opinion. The materials which portray contemporary life and opinion seemingly are endless and are of unique value.

Con­

temporary histories give one only a general impression of the atmosphere in which the debates occurred.

They are useful,

however, in summarizing and in presenting a digest of the neu­ trality acts and the results of the debates. general historical value for the study are

Two works of Bailey, Diplomatic

History of the American People, and Bartlett, Record of Amer­ ican Diplomacy.

To assess the forces responsible for direct­

ing American thought into the patterns characteristic of the mid-thirties were Warfel, Gabriel, and Williams, The American —

.

James Bryce, The American Commonwealth. II, pp. 247-

254-

||Min d ; Merle Curti, Growth of .American Thought: Preston Slosson, The Great Crusade and After: and Charles and Mary Beard, Amer­ ica in Midpassage. i | Another category of -writings discussing and describ| i ijing contemporary background are books such as Cordell Hull’s j|S§ffi£±£&; Henry L. Stimson’s On Active Service: Walter Millis,

i

iThis is Pearl: and Dorothy Detzer, Appointment on the Hill, i : |; To assess the debates in relation to public opinion, |jnewspapers representing various geographic areas and shades j iof political opinion were consulted.

The Hew York Times was

jjmost useful. In addition, the Chicago Tribune. Chicago Daily h jHews. St. Louis Post-Dispatchf Washington Daily Hews, and the I1Christian Science Monitor provided variety in opinion.

An at-

i jtempt was made in the selection of periodicals to secure a ;representative cross section of American opinion.

For this

!purpose, Business Week represented financial and business opin­ ion; Catholic World and Christian Century afforded examples of !ireligious views on foreign policy; HarperTs was selected as a I ] !!popular organ appealing to thoughtful Americans; the Hation, ;the Hew Republic. Time. Newsweek, and Literary Digest presented various schools of political opinion.

Public Opinion Quarterly

supplied an index to shifts and trends in American thought on ;foreign affairs. In the organization of the study, it was deemed best to treat each debate upon a legislative bill as a onit.

With­

in each unit or chapter is a selection on the contemporary backdrop of the debate which includes events, opinions, and

11 i

jj

jikey personalities and forces shaping the specific legislation to be debated*

In addition to the contemporary literature dis-

jcussed, information on participants in the Senate debate was [javailable in sources such as the Congressional Directory, Naj i .tional Cyclopedia ofAmerican Biography* and Current Biography. !

i

Thirdly, the method of the study emerged from the de-

|sire to analyze and display the pattern of argument on the ^legislation itself.

Several subsidiary steps were taken in

jjconducting and reporting the analysis* ji ||

1.

A reading of the debates in the Congressional

Record on each specific bill was undertaken in order to become I '[acquainted not only with the content of the arguments but also to get in mind the debate as a whole— -an overview which would ;reveal the time consumed by the debate, principal speakers, critical points in the debate, Senate attendance and reaction, voting, and final results. 2* After locating the principal speakers and speeches i ;|in the Record* a digest of each speech was prepared. In this digest, scrupulous attention was paid to the position of each jspeaker on the bill, and to an accurate reproduction of the , | arguments offered by each to support his position* 3. This step was followed by an extropolation of arI guments, evidence, and special appeals on each side of the Question.

Especially noted were arguments and appeals repeatedly

Used in displaying and supporting a position.

By the very fre­

quency of their appearance, they assumed a pattern characteris­ tic of the argumentative process used by both sides in the debate*

12 ;i

!|

4* Once isolated, the arguments and appeals of all

sides of the question were arrayed and compared*

Following this

procedure it was possible to conduct a meaningful analysis and jreport of the debate, delineating the proposition for debate, |uncontested argument, the issues on which the arguments clashed, jand the nature and characteristics of the modes of reasoning, if

jevidence, and appeals in the various cases offered in the debate* 1

5. Newspapers and magazines were surveyed to obtain

an index to prevailing evaluations of the debates and legisla­ tive actions* 6.

From a comparative analysis of the data obtained

ion the six debates, an attempt was made to develop such conclu­ sions as were warranted about the characteristics of the several debates. Organization of the Study Since each debate provided a natural unit, the chap­ ters of the study are organized so as to constitute a descrip­ tive and analytical profile of a complete debate.

Common to

the development of each chapter are certain types of information hnd analytical procedures. 1.

Each chapter opens with a review of the events and

prevailing climates of attitudes which furnish the background for the debate* 2*

Biographical information on the participants in the

debate follows.

This includes political experience and service,

reputation and leadership in the Senate, evidence of attitude toward national and international issues, and speaking ability.

13

3*

A description and narrative account of the debate,

indicating order of speakers, length of debate, voting, audience jreaction, and final results*

This is followed by a chronolog-

jical summary of the principal speeches in the debate, presenting Ithe position, arguments, and rebuttals of each speaker* |

4*

Against this view of the debate, an attempt is

i

bade to discover the argument, evidence, and appeals character| listic of opposing or differing positions* This section is dii vided into the proposition debated, uncontested argument, issues 'in dispute, and argument on the issues. ! 5* A final section reviews representative contemporary i jreaction to the debate and the legislative action, j

The order of chapters in the study follows the chron­

ological appearance of the several neutrality bills from 1935 to 1941* Chapter II:

War Fears. Investigations, and Neutrality. This chapter deals with the first of the neutrality debates which eventuated in the Neutrality Act of 1935. This de­ bate extended from August 20, 1935, to August 24, 1935.

Chapter III:

Neutrality on Probation for a Year:

1936*

This chapter deals with the second of the neutrality debates which ended in the Neutrality Act of 1936. This debate occurred on February 17 and 18, 1936. Chapter IV:

A Loophole, is Plugged:

January. 193,7.

This chapter deals with the de­ bate on the application of the arms em­ bargo to the Spanish Civil War resulting in the special addition to the neutral­ ity laws. This debate occurred on January 6, 1937.

Chapter V:

Cash-andr Carry:

1937

This chapter deals with the debate on a permanent neutrality law which even­ tuated in the neutrality law titled the Peace Act of 1937. This debate extended from March 1, 1937, to March 3, 1937, and was renewed and concluded on April 29, 1937. Chapter VI:

The Theory Meets the Practice:

1939.

This chapter deals with the debate on the proposal to repeal the arms embargo and produced the Neutrality Act of 1939. This debate extended from October 2, 1939, to October 27, 1939. Chapter VII:

TtA cvcle in human events is about to come to its end.rc 19A1. This chapter deals with the debate on the proposal to repeal sections of the Neutrality Act of 1939, which eventuated in the repeal of three important provisions of the 1939 Act. This debate extended from October 27, 1941* to November 7, 1941*

Chapter VIII:

Summary and Conclusions.

CHAPTER II WAR FEARS, INVESTIGATIONS, AND NEUTRALITY War Fears On September 4, 1935, the Nation took a look at the recent Senate action on neutrality. The speed with which temporary neutrality leg­ islation was rushed through Congress dramatizes the American peoplefs abhorrence of war. Seldom in our history has a spontaneous demonstration of the pop­ ular will been translated more quickly into action.1 There exists ample contemporary comment which bears out the NationTs estimate of public opinion in August, 1935.

The

threat of war in Ethiopia raised concern over the policy of the United States should that conflict lead to a general Eur­ opean war.

For over a year the State Department had antici­

pated the invasion of Ethiopia, but the problems of a domestic depression and recovery occupied the front pages and obscured the foreign issue.

When war threatened, the American public

was stirred only by ominous headlines. IT'S WAR] MUSSOLINI'S EDICTS Fear Italian-British Breach See all Europe Embroiled by Ethiopian R o w 3 1 "Sanctions or War?", CLXI (September 4, 1935), p. 266. 2 Chicago Tribune, August 19, 1935, p. 1. 3 Ibid., August 21, 1935, p. 1. 15

16

j iEthiopia seemed far away to most people, but involvement of > i fa major European power in war provoked demand for congressional i ! jaction* "For better or for worse," said the Washington Daily i

INews, "the American people now favor strict neutrality in forjeign wars."l ji

j

The seventy-fourth Congress had been in session since

ji

January 3, 1935, and "Harried by the heat, bedeviled by a heavy i j i 'legislative program," the Senate was "anxious to end the ses­ sion and relax at home . • ."2

I /

The scene was one in which

Both House and Senate . * * concentrated fraz­ zled nerves on one objective: Speedy adjournment* Spectators who jammed galleries . * • saw a typical congressional wind-up. Bills vitally affecting 120, 000,000 Americans spilled helter-skelter through the hopper.3

As late as August 19, the fate of any neutrality law was in question, and the newspapers indicated that Congress intended to adjourn without passing one.

The New York Times listed

[the principal bills remaining for consideration before adjourn­ ment, and neutrality was not included.A And Allen predicted:

Columnists Pearson

"Neutrality Resolutions— Remote chance

that a resolution with most of its teeth pulled as desired by the State Department may be jammed through the Senate.

No

chance at all that it will get by the House."5 1 August 20, 1935, quoted in the Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1377£. 2 Literary Digest. CXX (August 31, 1935), p. 7. 3 Newsweek. VI (August 31, 1935), p. S. 4 New York Times. August 19, 1935, P* 1# 5 St. Louis Post-Dispatch. August 19, 1935, P* 3C.

17

Amid the threat of war in Africa and the pressure |for adjournment, Senators Nye and Clark fired the opening salvo |in the campaign to force immediate consideration of neutrality ‘^legislation.

In a letter to Key Pittman, Chairman of the For­

eign Relations Committee, Nye and Clark warned: ' |

If Congress imposes no restrictions on munitions sales and shipments before a war breaks out in Europe, it will be impossible for Congress to form a policy later without incurring representations that such a new policy involved the taking of sides against one particular belligerent. As your committee is aware, every embargo after war is declared affects bellig­ erents unequally. 1

The determination of the neutrality bloc to force action asisumed the form of an effective Senate device, the threat to i filibuster and hold up progress on all Senate business in the closing days of the session. Nye and "Behind him . . .

This threat was made by Senator

a group including Senators Bone,

jkong, Clark, and possibly Senators Vandenberg and Ashurst."^ Administration strategists hoped to forestall any action on neutrality at this session, but . . . the imminent threat of war and the resul­ tant fears by scores of Congressional members that the United States might be involved without a neu­ trality policy increased sentiment for legislation so strongly that the llhite House was unable to re­ sist. 3 1 Hew York Times. August 19, 1935, p. 1*

2 Ibid.. August 21, 1935, p. 1» 3 Ibid.. August 23, 1935, p* 1*

IS

j |

The Springboard for Neutrality Congressional leadership in the demand for neutrality

legislation came principally from the members of the Nye Muni­ tions Investigation Committee* On April 12, 1934, the Senate ; ! !passed Resolution #206 providing for the appointment of a i ! i |special committee, j|

; j | ! !|

1.

To investigate the activities of firms engaged in the manufacture, sale, and export of arms, munitions, or other implements of war.

2.

To investigate the adequacy or inadequacy of existing legislation for the regulation and manufacture of traffic in arms, munitions, or implements of war.

3*

To inquire into the desirability of creating a Government monopoly in respect to the manufacture of arms, munitions, or implements of war.

4-

To review the findings of the War Policies Commission and to recommend specific legisla­ tion to accomplish the purposes set forth in such findings.!

i

|| | !

!

I:The committee under the chairmanship of Senator Gerald P. Nye .1

Iof North Dakota was popularly known as the Nye Committee, and in the opinion of Cordell Hull, ”. . .

furnished the isola­

tionist springboard for the first Neutrality Act.”2

The evi­

dence of the role played by the munition makers and interna­ tional bankers in the first World War as it was presented and 1 See Congressional Record, 73rd Cong. 2nd sess., p. 6485. Summary of the resolution appears in Engelbrecht, "One Hell of a Business," pp. 7-8. For an account of the events 'leading to the passage of the resolution, see Detzer, Appoint­ ment on The Hill: also Current Biography. 1941* PP« 618-621, for Senator NyeTs role in the Senate action.

2 Hull, op. cit.. I, p. 404

.

19

!interpreted by this committee, was to motivate subsequent neu­ trality debates* Its immediate effects in stimulating public I i jjinterest and support for neutrality legislation were threefold: IjFirst, during the period between 1934 and 1936, when the com­ i l jjmittee was conducting its investigations, popular opinion was ilpredisposed to accept its findings. This predisposition was i ||the result of the predominant isolationist sentiment in the jUnited States.

Not long after the close of the war in 191B,

j”America went back to her ancient policy— older than George Washington— of attempting to keep out of the political broils land wars of the mother continent.”1

By the mid-thirties, this

idesire had been deepened by an accumulation of events which had convinced the majority of Americans that the United States ihad gained nothing from involvement in the World War.

The Nye

Committee gave expression to this popular feeling and today, fifteen years after the first of the neutrality debates under study, Gerald Nye remains convinced that Public sentiment for isolation in the mid-30fs very definitely had a hand in forcing the issue of neutrality legislation in Congress. The revelations growing out of the public investigation of the causes contributing to our involvement in the First War had so convinced the American public of the extent to which an honest practice of neutrality might save our country from involvement in more foreign wars that Congress, and the President, found it difficult to evade the issue when our Committee presented it to Congress. Public polls at the time revealed something more than eighty per cent of sentiment for the legis­ lation. 2

1 Bailey, Wilson and the Peacemakers, p. 31. 2 Letter to the writer from Gerald P. Nye. May 12, 1950.

20

A second influence of the Nye Committee on neutrality legislation was the publicity given its findings at the moment when there was a specific threat to peace in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.

This furthered a popular demand to translate its find­

ings into specific neutrality legislation.

As the St. Louis

Post-Dispatch put it: We repeat that the Wilson-Lansing notes are disquieting, particularly in view of the imminent conflict between Italy and Ethiopia. If that war should begin and find us with no neutrality legis­ lation whatever, our position would be made more dangerous. Incomplete as they are, the Nye-Clark suggestions are a form of insurance which Congress may well consider purchasing before adjournment.! A third influence exerted by the Nye Committee was its leadership in securing the passage of a neutrality act. The committee consisted of Senators Nye, Vandenberg, Clark, Pope, Bone, George, and Barbour.2

Their investigations con­

firmed and strengthened their individual isolationist lean­ ings.

In the words of one journal, The conspicuous preoccupation of Wye, Clark, and Bone with peace is of recent origin, and begins with their service as members of the Senate munitions investigation committee. In the case of all three men, their conception of the problem of peace has been visibly colored by their experiences in the munitions investigation.3 1

August 20, 1935* p* 2C. The Wilson-Lansing notes referred to here were an exchange of notes between President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, prior to American entry into the first World War. In the notes, made public by the Wye Committee, Lansing had declared that financial support of Allied purchases in this country could not be halted without severe repercussions to the economy of the United States.

2 See Hull, op. cit.. pp. 398-399, for an account of W y e fs selection as chairman of the committee. I 3 j Wew Republic. LXXXIV (September 4, 1935), pp. 101jl02* Judgment on the Wye Committee is suggested by two

21

The, Foreign Relations Committee Acts Neutrality had been under special study in the State Department since June, 1934> sind the following December a ten­ tative draft of legislation was prepared by experts in the De­ partment*

This bill which gave the President discretion in

applying an arms embargo had been considered and rejected by la Senate sub-committee on August 7, 1935• -*- Between January 10 and August 17, 1935, Senate committees had considered five neu­ trality bills and House committees had considered ten.

Based

upon investigations of the Nye Committee, three resolutions Krere introduced in the Senate by Senators Nye and Clark on April 9, 1935.2

These were referred to the Foreign Relations

Committee where no action had been taken.

An attempt by the

tfye Committee to consider neutrality legislation as part of its report was discouraged in letters from the State Department to members of that group.

The principal difference between Admini­

stration neutrality proposals and those of Nye and Clark turned In whether presidential enforcement should be mandatory.

ipposing evaluations. Hull wrote, "It is doubtful that any con­ cessional committee has ever had a more unfortunate effect on iur foreign relations, -unless it be the Senate Foreign Relations lommittee considering the Treaty of Versailles . . .n (See fall* on. cit.. I, p. 39S.) Dorothy Detzer declared, nSurely, io Senate committee ever rendered to the American people a more .ntelligent or important service. It was the nation’s loss that .t did not comprehend it.n (See Detzer, op. cit.. p. 171.) 1 See Hull, o p . cit.. I. p. 409*

2 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 5286;7* Known as Senate Joint Resolutions #99, 100, and 120, proided for (a) prohibition of American citizens to travel on hips of a warring power; (b) an arms embargo against belligernts; (c) prohibition on loans and credits to a belligerent for

22

There were, therefore, previous proposals upon which the Foreign Relations Committee might draw in formulating a neu­ trality law for consideration by the Senate.

On August 19,

Chairman Pittman, assisted by Senator Borah, drafted a neutrality resolutionin three tration,

hours.

While not favored by the Adminis­

it was the only type of bill certain of passage with­

out extended debate at that time.

By a vote of eleven to three,

the Committee approved Senate Joint Resolution #173.

Stripped

of legal verbiage, it provided: 1.

That upon the outbreak of war or during the pro­ gress of a war between foreign states, the Presi­ dent shall proclaim the fact, and thereafter it shall be unlawful to export arms, ammunition, or implements of war from any place in the United States or its possessions to any port of such bel­ ligerent states, or to any neutral for transship­ ment to a belligerent.

2.

A National Munitions Control Board was to be es­ tablished with authority to register all persons engaged in the manufacture, export, or import of arms, ammunition, or implements of war. No arms could be exported without first obtaining a li­ cense from the Board.

3*

No American ship could carry munitions to bel­ ligerent ports after the Presidential proclamation.

4*

The President was given authority to bar foreign submarines from American ports when the United States was neutral in any conflict.

3*

Americans could travel on belligerent vessels only at their own risk.l

purchase of any article declared to be contraband of war by any belligerent. S.J. Resolution #173 of August 19, 1935, was in­ troduced as a substitute neutrality resolution for the three arlier proposals on which no action had been taken. 1 Congressional Recordf 74th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 137953796.

23

The scope of the mandatory arms embargo was without precedent in United States1 history.

As Edwin L. James indicated:

♦ . . there are two important aspects of the neutrality resolution. The first is that it tends to curtail what we had always proclaimed as our rights as a neutral in wars of other days. The second is that it puts out of the picture consider­ ation on our part of doing anything to restrain an aggressor under the anti-war (Kellogg) treaty. It had always been presumed that the one thing we might do would be to furnish supplies to the attacked na­ tion while withholding them from the attacker. Now that is out.l In spite of the implications of the proposal, Philip Jessup remarked: It is, however, probably unduly complimentary to that statute to credit it with any rational un­ derlying thesis. The Act is a hodgepodge of ideas scrambled together in the legislative frying pan in the closing days of a hot summer session in Wash­ ington. 2 On August 20, the Senate met for the avowed purpose of con­ sidering the Guffey Coal Bill, but many Senators ”. . .

swell­

ing with alarm at the London and Paris dispatches in their morning p a p e r s , ”3 were prepared to consider even a hodgepodge pill to prevent involvement in a war. 1 New York Times. August 25, 1935, part IV, p. 3.

2 Jessup (ed.,) on. cit.. IV, p. 124* 3 Time. XXVI (September 2, 1935)> p. 12. Many Senators specifically feared that England and France would ask the United States to cooperate in the application of economic sanctions against Italy. Sanctions were associated with the League of Nations and the majority of Americans were against cooperation nrith the League.

24

Participants in The Debate The membership of the Senate consisted of sixty-nine Democrats, twenty-five Republicans, one Progressive, and one Farmer-Laborite.

From these, the following Senators actively

engaged in the debate on the neutrality resolution. Gerald P. Nye came to the Senate from North Dakota in 1925 as a Republican, amid protest by the Republican majority in the Senate that Nyefs appointment by the Governor had been illegal.

After his funds were almost exhausted while he waited

in Washington for Senate decision on seating him, Nye finally was accepted by a bare majority; in 1926 he was elected to the office for the next regular term.

Prior to his entry into na­

tional politics, Nye had been editor of nev/spapers in Iowa and North Dakota.

As an editor, he n. . . was active in the polit­

ical life of the state and the community.

As a champion of the

interests and welfare of agriculture, he became one of the leaders in the non-partisan league movement in North Dakota . . In the Senate, Nye associated himself with the farm bloc and took an active part in the effort to pass the NcNaryHaugen bill for the relief of agriculture in the sixty-ninth Congress.

TtBelieving that the United States should pursue as

far as possible a course of noninterference in the affairs of other nations, he voted against the resolution of 1926, propos­ ing that the United States should join the Permanent Court of International Justice.”2 _

.

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. C, p.

360. 2 Ibi.d.

See also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong.

25

Nye has made himself a national figure at the age of forty-two, either because the average newspaperman is especially well-equipped to make a first-rate legis­ lator, because the U.S. Senate is singularly lacking in talents, or because of pure luck— or because of all three factors in combination. Not that Nye lacks ability; he has plenty of it, but in ten years in the Senate he has shown repeatedly not only that news­ paper training may show one how to get in the lime­ light but that it is superior to the average legal training for the conduct of a senatorial investiga­ tion.! At the time of the neutrality debate in 1935, "The munitions investigation . . . has made Nye a national figure."2

He had

also served on the Public Lands committee in the Senate and on the second oil scandal investigation. Homer T._ Bone was " . . .

the senior of the Washington

duet of liberals,"3 having run for various public offices on the Republican, Progressive, and Socialist tickets before com­ ing to the Senate in 1932 as a Democrat.

A lawyer, Bone had

served as special deputy prosecuting attorney and as corporation counsel for the port of Tacoma, continuing in the latter post until his election to the Senate.

In 1922, he had been elected

to the state legislature in Washington as a Farmer-Laborite and had taken an active part in public power legislation.

He at­

tempted unsuccessfully to secure the Republican nomination for

1st sess., April, 1935> p. 86; and Current Biography, 1941* PP*

61S-621. 1 Carter, American Messiahs, p. 143.

2 Ibid., p. 145* 3 Ibid., p. 139. senator from Washington.

Lewis Schwellenbach was the junior

congressman in 1928.1

Bone was described as having ”. . .

la­

vished most of his legal talents on the financially unprofit­ able business of defending underdogs . . .”2

He was ”. . .

a hardy nationalist who voted against the World Court . . . and indulges in no little flag-waving.”3

in the Senate, with

few exceptions, Bone supported the Roosevelt Administration and had served as chairman of the committee on patents, and as a member of the committees on interstate commerce, naval affairs, and territories and insular affairs.

”He has been,”

noted one source, TIone of the most painstaking workers on the Nye munitions investigation.”4

Bone was characterized as

ITa forceful orator.”5 Millard Tvdings was a Democrat from Maryland, a law­ yer who ”. . .

early attained popularity in Hanford county

as a youthful politician who championed the cause of Democ­ racy and states rights, and was elected to the state legisla­ ture in 1915-”6

He had been in the Senate since 1926, after

na brilliant record in the lower House led to the Democratic 1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, p. 489. See also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess [April, 1935, p. 122.

I

2

! i

Carter,

op.

cit.. p. 139.

3

A

Ibid., p. 140.

Carter, o p . cit*. p. 140. !' 5 ! Ibid. I 6 I National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, p. 203. Also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess., (April, 1935, p. 43.

27

nomination for U.S. Senator . . . and the defeat of . . . h i s Republican opponent and the dominant figure of his party in the s t a t e . T y d i n g s had served in both houses of the state legis­ lature, and his election on every occasion for the state legis­ lature was by

* . the largest vote ever accorded a candidate

in Hanford county.1^

He had distinguished himself in the first

World War, received the Distinguished Service Medal and the Distinguished Service Cross, and had risen from the ranks to lieutenant-colonel.

In the Senate, he had served as chairman

of the committee on territories and insular affairs, and as a member of the committees on appropriations, naval affairs, and public buildings and grounds.

He had been a consistent Admini­

stration supporter. Huev P. Long had come to the Senate as a Democrat from Louisiana in 1930, after a stormy and colorful career in state politics.

Long was admitted to the state bar in 1915, and con­

ducted a general law business until his election to the state public service commission in 1921.

He was elected Governor of

Louisiana in 1928, defeating a powerful Hew Orleans political group.

wHi( s administration was marked by continuous turmoil

and conflict, culminating in 1929 in an attempt to impeach him. "3

He was brought to trial; but a supporter of Long moved

the adjournment of the state senate sine die, and the forced 1 Hational Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, p. 203* 2 ! I

Ibid. 3 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. D,

p p . 4-09-410 •

adjournment of that body ended the trial.

Long made himself

the dominant political figure in the state by his influence over the rural voters.

Many constructive measures were passed

|during his administration, including paved roads, night schools for illiterate adults in the rural areas, aid to schools, and flood control projects.1

"Wishing to enter the U.S. Senate,

Ihe engineered his nomination and election . . . by the largest ! majority ever given a candidate in Louisiana . . .”2 In the j!

(Senate, ”Re refused to acknowledge the leadership of Senator i i j 'iJoseph T. Robinson, the Democratic leader of the Senate, conjj

jjdueted single-handed an eight-day filibuster against a bill ^sponsored by Senator Carter Glass . . . and in speeches on the ilfloor of the Senate, radio talks and newspaper articles • . . 1

ladvocated a redistribution of the virealth ^ assassin!s j jibullet ended LongTs turbulent career in September, 1935* i j

Key Pittman, Democrat from Nevada, was elected to the

iSenate in 1912.

He began the practice of law in Seattle in

jl892, and spent the years between 1897 and 1901 in the North| ! West Territory and in Alaska, where he aided in the formulation -of the "consent” form of government for Nome and served as the |first prosecuting attorney in that city.

Following this ser­

vice, Pittman came to Nevada where in 1910 he was defeated for

1

ithe Senate but was renominated and elected two years later

! ip. 203. !

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F,

2 Ibid. il 3 Ibid., Also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong., 1st jsess., April, 1935, p. 40.

upon the death of the man who had defeated him.

During the

i

first World War, he was a member of the Naval Affairs Committee and participated in the framing of the permanent naval program. |At the same time he was appointed to the Foreign Relations Com|mittee and opposed the Gore Resolution which would have pro] ! fhibited American ships from entering ports of belligerents and ji

ifrom arming themselves against attack.1

Pittman favored a

i

i jdeclaration of war against Germany on the grounds that that j

j country had committed actual war against the United States. ri He supported the League of Nations in 1919. In 1933, the Sen' i 'ate rule of seniority made Pittman chairman of the Foreign Re-

illations Committee and president proterapore of the Senate. i As chairman of the foreign relations committee and a | i staunch supporter of the policies of President Roose­ velt, he wielded a potent influence on the course of the nation’s relations with other governments during the turbulent period that preceded and immediately followed the outbreak of the SecondWorld War. 2 On domestic policies, he

had been one of the ablest silver

champions in the Senate. Pittman was tall slender gentleman .

described as n. . . a

. . with an abilityto keep his mind’s

1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXXIV, pp. 500-501. Also, Congressional Directory. 74-th Cong. 1st iSess., April, 1935, p. 65. The Gore Resolution was opposed by ithe Wilson administration and failed to pass. Twenty years af­ ter his opposition to this resolution, Pittman was convincingly presenting the Roosevelt Administration proposal which contained the identical restrictions as the Gore resolution. See Borchard and Lage, on. cit. , p.15. for further details on the Gore pro­ posal. National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXXIV, p. 501. Hull lacked complete confidence in Pittman, described him as n . . . a n isolationist in numerous respects.n See Hull, op. cit.. V, p. 39S.

30

eye focused on the ice-cold political realities.”1 Henry Ashurst was elected to the Senate from Arizona in 1912*

A Democrat and a lawyer, he began practice in that

state in 1904, and was admitted to practice before the United States Supreme Court in 190S.

"Early in his career," one source

narrates, "he became interested in politics.

He had not been

long in Williams, Arizona when he was made Justice of the peace . . ..n2

At the age of twenty-one, he announced himself as a

candidate for the territorial legislature, " . . .

stumped the

surrounding country in his own behalf, and surprised his hearers by the extent of his knowledge and familiarity with the polit­ ical questions of the day.

Despite his youth, his victory at

the ensuing election was described as a landslide."3

As speaker

of the state house of representatives, Ashurst was said to be the youngest man who had ever been selected for that post in the United States.

He also served in the territorial senate

before entering the national scene.

He is ". . . of a studious

bature, fond of reading, and an orator of force and ability."4 Ashurst was aligned with the neutrality bloc in the Senate. J. Hamilton Lewis was a Democrat from Illinois, who had distinguished himself as lawyer, author, and Senator.

He

1 Time. XXXIV (October 9, 1939)> p. 15.

2 jjational Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XV, pp. 415-416. Also Congressional Directoryr 74th Cong. 1st sess., Anril, 1935* p. 5. 3 I National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XV, |p. 415. j 4 Ibid.

had obtained degrees from universities in Virginia, Texas, and Ohio as well as honorary degrees from countries in Europe.

Be­

ginning his practice of law in Seattle, he 11. . . rose to dis­ tinction at the bar, acquiring an extensive and successful p r a c t i c e . L e w i s received seventeen votes for vice-president at the National Convention in 1896, and one hundred and ten votes for that office in 1900. Washington

As congressman-at-large for

• . h e early took high rank, though a member of

the minority.

He was active in debate, introduced the resolu­

tions recognizing the independence of Cuba . . ."2

Lewis was

defeated for the Senate in 1899, and also lost the political battle for Governor of Illinois in 1908.

After his move to

Chicago, he served as corporation counsel of that city, and was the author of treatises on federal law, and works in hi s t o r y . 3 He was recognized as an authority on constitutional questions and foreign affairs.

In 1912, he was elected to the Senate and

served as Democratic whip in 1919, the first whip the Senate allowed itself as a part of its organization. During the first World War, Lewis had been consulted often in matters of foreign policy by Wilson and the State De­ partment, serving on-special missions in Europe.

He was

/ :f National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVIII

1 pp.

38-39.

2 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVIII p. 38. 3

Ibid.. Also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st isess., April, 1935, p. 23. Two of Lewis1 best known works as given in this source are The Two Great Republics, and Home and America*

32

defeated for reelection in 1920, but returned to the Senate in 1930, and was again Senate whip of the majority party*

ftWith

but one or two exceptions, Lewis gave loyal support in the Sen­ ate to the measures and policies of President Franklin D. Roose­ velt.1^

As a speaker, he possessed w . . . an excellent command

of the English language and a mellifluous voice . . .

He was a

master of satire and invective, and his adversaries in the court­ room or the Senate and in political debate had reason to fear his a t t a c k s . H e was a member of the Foreign Relations Com­ mittee in 1935. Bennett Champ Clark was a Democrat from Missouri, elected to the Senate in 1932.

"The keynote of Senator Clark’s

temperament and career,n according to one source, "is his clan­ nishness and his adoration of his father, the late speaker Champ Clark, the ’Little American.*"3

Clark virtually grew up in

Washington where his father had become a Representative when Bennett was only three.

In politics, Bennett Clark ". . .

started campaigning for his father when he was little more than a child, and was precinct captain at 14*

Politics and the Dem­

ocratic Party are part of his lifeblood."4-

Although trained in

law, Clark was never very active as an attorney, since his prin­ cipal interest was politics. —

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVIII, Ip. 39.

2 Ibid. 3

■

Current Biography. 1941 > PP- 153-155. -4 Ibid.

33

Like his father, he opposed American entry into the first War, but when that war came, Bennett Clark served in the army and became one of the original founders of the American Legion and a national commander of that organization.! was a consistent and avowed isolationist.

Clark

"He was, however,

one of the few isolationists who has not been personally on bad terms with the President.1,2

He was described as "A large

man, over six feet tall and more than two hundred pounds in weight . . .

He has what McCormack calls a 1magnificent set

of vocal cords'; but it has also been said that in argument he sometimes uses them 'almost like a s c h o o l b o y . '"3

Clark had

served on the Nye Committee and together with Nye and Bone led the neutrality bloc in 1935William E. Borah. Republican from Idaho, was one of the most famous and familiar figures in contemporary Senate history.

Beginning as a lawyer first in Kansas and then in

!Idaho, Borah " . . .

established a reputation for ability, cour­

age, and integrity that gave him a large practice and ultimate recognition as the leader of the Idaho bar."-4

His political

career began in 1896, as nominee for Congress on the Silver I __________________ ____________________________________ _____________ _______ j

_

| l Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess., April, 11935, p. 58. I 2 I Current Biography. 1941> P* 155. ! 3 Ibid. Clark was the author of John Quincy Adams— Old Man Eloquent. 4 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVIII, ipp. 1-3*

Republican ticket which supported the Democratic nominee for President.

He was defeated in this campaign and lost again in

1903, in the race for the Senate.

nAt the close of this con­

test, n one source related, nhe declared an independence of party organization control that characterized the remainder of his public career . . .”1

He was nominated and elected for the

Senate in 1907. As a Senator, his independence of thought and action, which frequently led him into conflict with members of his own party in the Senate and with Republican administrations, never deserted him. He was a champ­ ion of states rights • • • was an advocate of world peace, and was one of the outstanding liberals in the Senate. Economy in government and the cause of world peace were two of his favorite themes . . . While he exercised a strong influence upon domestic policies, Borah’s greatest distinction rests upon his utterances and achievements in the sphere of foreign affairs.2 Borah was a leader against Wilson’s League of Nations and favored disarmament rather than any League to insure peace.3 He had opposed membership in the Yforld Court.

He served as chair

man of the Foreign Relations Committee until the Democratic vic­ tory in 1932. Borah was HTall of frame, massive of face and head, bushy of hair, and almost eccentric in appearance . . . generally regarded as the most eloquent and inspiring speaker of the Sen­ ate, if not of his generation.4

He was generally known as an

1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. XXVIII pp. 1-3. Also Congressional Directory, 74th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1935, p. 22.

2 Ibid. 3 Bailey, Wilson and the Peacemakers, pp. 63-65. Gives an interesting historical account of the role played by Borah in the League battle. 4 Ibid.

35

"eloquent public speaker and a skilled debater,"! and his speeches in the Senate " . . . floor and the

never failed to fill both the

g a l l e r i e s . " 2

Tom Connallv was a principal Administration spokesman in the Senate, a Democrat from Texas elected to the Senate in 1929.

He had served in the Spanish-American War and returned

to practice law in Texas.

His political career began with ser­

vice in the Texas legislature where he had also acted as chair­ man of the house judiciary committee.

After a term as prose­

cuting attorney and six years of private law practice, Connally was elected to the House of Representatives in 1916, and served until his election to the Senate.3

in the House

. . h e was

an aggressive advocate of Democratic principles and took a prom­ inent part in party debate.

He was the advocate and author of

measures for farm relief and for regulation of cotton exchanges."4 In the Senate, Connally supported many of the Roosevelt Admini­ stration’s domestic policies with " . . . and pointed mimicry."5

his outspoken analyses

He had served twelve years on the House

Foreign Affairs Committee and had been on the similar Senate committee since 1929.

His committee service also embraced the

1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXVIII, p. 3.

2 Ibid. 3 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, pp. 166-167. Also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1935, P* 112. 4 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, p.

166.

5 Ibid.

finance and judiciary committees in the Senate.

Connally*s

delivery of speeches was described by one source as ". ♦ . a highly calisthenic style ♦ . . full of sweeping gestures and elaborate pantomime.tti

He was considered to be one of the Sen

ateTs most effective debaters.2 Hirarn Johnson came to the Senate as a Republican from California in 1916, after "Having made his reputation as a smasher of the Corrupt Southern Pacific political machine in California . . ."3

a

lawyer, Johnson served as Governor of

his home state from 1910 to 1916.4

In the Senate, he early

gained national prominence for his fight against ratification of the League of Nations covenant following the first World War.

This was the beginning of a career which by 1935, had

given to Johnson the title of "California^ historic isolation ist*"5

With Borah, he had become a symbol of opposition to

American cooperation with the League and the World Court. "Thickset, ruddy-faced, silver-thatched, he was," Bailey be­ lieved, "probably the most accomplished rabble-rouser of them all . . .

no one can deny that the man had bulldog tenacity, a

ripsaw voice, and the ability to move great crowds."6

his

—

Life. March 23, 1942, p* 113.

2 Ibid. 3 Bailey, Wilson and the Peacemakers, p. 63. 4 Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess., April 1935, P* 3. > 5 Timer XXXIV (September 25, 1939), p. 12.

6 j

Bailey, on. cit.. p. 63*

37

committee service in the Senate included the committees on commerce, foreign relations, immigration, irrigation and recla­ mation, naval affairs, and privileges and elections. Arthur Vandenberg. Republican from Michigan, was elected to the Senate in 192S.

After studying law for a year,

he had worked as a reporter on the Grand Rapids Herald and was made editor of that paper in 1907. Ihile editor of the Herald he was active in all move­ ments to bring about better government for the city, state, and nation. He was a member of the charter commission of 1912, which drafted a new form of gov­ ernment for Grand Rapids. This form was rejected at the polls. In 1916, he fostered another such move­ ment which was successful.! He had served on the Republican state central committee for six years and was chairman of the state convention of his party on two occasions.2

in 1933, Vandenberg was the unanimous choice

of his party for president pro tempore of the Senate, and he was considered w . . . the outstanding authority on and opponent of the League of Nations Covenant.

He has always been an intense

Constitutionalist, is a leading authority on the U.S. Consti­ tution and believes in literal adherence to its provisions.”3 He served on Senate committees on commerce, foreign relations, printing, and territories and insular affairs.

Although uncom­

plimentary on the quality of Senate speaking, one source compared Vandenberg favorably with his colleagues:

1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. D, p* 394* 2 Ibid. Also Congressional Directory. 74th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1935, p* 50. 3 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. D, p. 394-

3S

By careful attention Vandenberg now strives to inflect his monotonous growl instead of merely shout­ ing less loudly• But in a Senate of mumblers, where the hisses and clicks of false teeth, the hushed plat­ form delivery and the cracked croaks of old men pre­ dominate, Vandenberg sounds good, clear, and loud. His one oratorical trick is to draw a deep breath, then roar into his last paragraph until his breath is gone.i The Debate is Qn An Overview of the Debate When the Senate met on August 20, the champions of the Guffey Coal Bill had been informed by the neutrality sup­ porters that not more than thirty minutes would be needed for the approval of a neutrality law.

To give a show of his deter­

mination to filibuster unless a a neutrality proposal were con­ sidered before the Coal Bill, "Nye's desk was loaded with books and materials for an interminable speech . . ."2

Senator Neely

of West Virginia moved to take up the Guffey Bill when asked to yield to Senator Bone. Mr. President, the first session of the Seventyfourth Congress is drawing to a close, and it now ap­ pears that a measure or measures which, in my judgment, are the most important that could be considered by this body are to remain in committee at a time when the whole civilized world threatens to break into flames of war* I am referring to the so-ealldd "neutrality Joint resolutions."3 This was Bonefs introduction, and for the following two and 1 Time. XXXIV (October 2, 1939), p. 13* 2 Chicago Tribune. August 21, 1935, p. 1* 3 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 13775-

39

one-half hours, he stated the case for immediate consideration of neutrality legislation. As Bone spoke, ”Senators listened, their eyes fixed on the short wiry figure,nl and all during the speech, n. . . Senator Long was firing in interruptions demanding that the resolution he passed . . .”2

Bone occasionally yielded the

floor during his argument, receiving support for his position from Vandenberg, and engaging in eolloquoy with Tydings who ex­ pressed some disagreement with Bonefs position.

Senators Clark

and Ashurst approved Bonefs arguments, and Ashurst predicted of B o n e ^ speech, wMark my word, the speech of the Senator may be­ come historic.n3

Lewis, though opposing Bonefs argument, ad­

mitted that he had presented his viewpoint in *. . . a most eloquent manner.”4

Senator Long argued for a neutrality law,

after which Pittman introduced the Neutrality Resolution agreed upon the previous day by the Foreign Relations Committee.5 His presentation of the proposal was brief, and the Senate upon !his suggestion agreed to delay action for one day in order that members might have a chance to study the proposal. 1 Literary Diges_t, CXX (August 31, 1935), p. 7.

2 New York Times. August 21, 1935, p. 11. 3 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 13786. 4 Ibid.. p. 13787. 5 See pp. 21-22. When the debate opened, the neu­ trality bloc was not certain that the Committee intended to present the Resolution.

4-0

On the following day Senate action on the Neutrality Resolution came swiftly.

Senator Lewis opposed consideration

of neutrality legislation at this session of Congress but of­ fered no amendments or substitutes for the Committee proposal. Pittman explained certain features of the bill in a ten-minute speech, and Borah expressed favor with all of its provisions except that which allowed Americans to travel on belligerent vessels at their own risk.

He offered no specific amendment

to alter the proposed measure, and twenty-five minutes after the Senate had begun consideration of the proposal, the Neu­ trality Resolution was passed without a roll call.^*

After the

final vote was completed, TlSenator Nye . . . slapped Senator LaFollette enthusiastically on the back and warmly shook hands with Senator Clark.

All had been prepared to filibuster to in­

sure success of the Resolution."2 On August 23, after a brief debate the House of Repre­ sentatives passed House Resolution #364* which stated that the House accepted the Senate Resolution #173 on neutrality, with the significant addition that the neutrality law be limited to February 29, 1936.3 the House action.

On the following day the Senate took up Senator Nye spoke briefly, predicting action

in the next session of Congress on a permanent neutrality law. Opposition to the proposed measure was expressed by Senator 1 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 13956. 2 New York Times. August 22, 1935, p. 13* 3 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 14321.

41

Lewis, and at the close of a rather long speech by the Illinois Senator, Pittman warned that if there were to be any long speeches on the following day on the proposal, other business would be held up, or a final vote on neutrality could not be taken.

The

Senate agreed to set a time limit on the debate with a final vote to be taken by eleven o*clock the following morning. On the last day of the debate, Senator Johnson took the floor to oppose the Neutrality Resolution*

Following his lengthy

remarks, Connally concluded the debate by opposing certain basic principles upon which the proposal had rested.

The final vote

was then taken with fifty-eight Democrats, seventeen Republicans, and two Independents in favor of the measure with the time limi­ tation added by the House.

Only two opposing votes were cast,

by Senators Bankhead of Alabama and Gerry of Rhode Island, both Democrats.!

Although the Administration had opposed the manda­

tory arms embargo, Hull urged the President to sign the measure and thereby avoid further debate which could only strengthen the cause of the isolationists.^ Summary of the Arguments !

In opening the debate, Bone stressed a fundamental

theme of the neutrality bloc, insisting that the principal need for immediate neutrality legislation rested upon the overwhelm­ ing desire to keep the nation out of war. i i

This objective could

1 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 14434*

2 i

Hull, op. cit*. I, part III.

42

only be achieved by drawing upon the experience of the last war.

Relying upon his knowledge of the evidence taken from

munitions investigation, he argued that economic relationships with the nations of Europe led the United States into the World War*

He asserted that similar opportunities for financial en­

tanglements would exist in the event of another European con­ flict.

In the World War, the lack of a neutrality law placed

the United States in the position of defending a one-sided traffic in munitions, and a defense of avowed rights to trade with belligerents had forced the country into that war.l

If

the same situation were again to be faced in 1935, it would lead to the same disastrous results unless neutrality precau­ tions were taken.

A great deal of Bone’s case was spent in des­

cribing the horrors of war in general and of the tragedy of the last war in particular.

Picturing the threat of war as immed­

iate, he challenged the Senate to act before it was too l a t e . 2 Vendenberg supported Bone’s thesis that to be effective, a neu­ trality law must be enacted before the necessity to apply it arose.

He also agreed that war trade had constituted a princi­

pal cause for involvement in the war in 1917.3 1 Opponents of Bone’s position could cite evidence from historical sources, for example, Seymour, American Neutrality: 1914-1917. to establish that trade in munitions was not a vital factor in Germany’s decision to inaugurate unrestricted subma­ rine warfare. As Seymour contended, ’’The historian with German sources at his disposal, can show with reasonable certainty that in the winter of 1916-17, the export of American munitions played a relatively unimportant part in leading the Germans to make their fateful decision.” (p. 145.)

2 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 13775-13787. 3 Ibid.. p. 13777.

Tydings offered the first disagreement in the debate. He questioned the extent to which a neutrality resolution could be effective in a modern war.

Arguing that the submarine had

made all seas war zones, Tydings maintained that it would be difficult to regulate any commerce without stopping all com­ merce with belligerents.

Such an alternative for a nation de­

pendent upon trade, as was the United States, was unthinkable. Further, he contended, no resolution could cover all possible situations.

For example, an attack on Mexico by another power

would so affect the interests of the United States that a neu­ trality resolution would be valueless.! Bone and Clark protested.

This contention both

Bone replied:

I would rather temporarily abandon all our world com­ merce than to have this Republic which my father fought to preserve, destroyed or irreparably injured by an­ other great war.2 Clark insisted that the hypothetical case of the attack on Mexico was irrelevant because such a case fell under the his­ toric policy of the Monroe Doctrine and would not destroy a general neutrality policy.3 Senator Ashurst insisted that a parallel to 1914 ex­ isted in 1935.

In 1914* a strong nation had attacked a weak

one when Austria warred on Serbia. was attacking Ethiopia.

Similarly, in 1935, Italy

If the neutrality resolution were

1 Congressional Record. 74th Cong. 1st sess., p. 13785.

2 Ibid.. p. 13784. 3 Ibid.

:

AA passed, the nation must live up to the intent of the law, and ”If we choose peace and tranquillity, safety and security ra­ ther than to assert our right, it is our lawful privilege to do so.”1

Long reiterated the parallel to 1914* &n 1936, p. 15.

l |j

desire for other legislation; peace organizations are highly critical. So influential and peaceminded an organ as the Christian Science Monitor is convinced that the neutrality legislation requires such instant amendment as to justify calling a spe­ cial session of Congress, even though the regular session is only six weeks distant.!

j

Some objections

| ,

:i

j ! strong

to the Neutrality Act came from the

Isolationist sentiment in the country.

Public opinion

jpolls confirmed the Nation1s conclusion of a "strong isola­ tionist sentiment which exists throughout this country . . . A Fortune poll in October, 1935, indicated a majority indif­ ferent to the policies of any country, although antagonism to­ ward a single nation, when expressed, was predominately against iGermany.3

A Gallup poll in September, 1935, showed only a

twenty-nine per cent approval of the United States joining with other nations in economic or non-military measures to compel one nation to refrain from attacking another.4

This

was an indication of opposition to cooperation with the League of Nations in sanctions against an aggressor.

The Capper pub­

lications in Kansas found that an overwhelming percentage of people in that state opposed American participation in a foreign war and disapproved of loans to foreign nations to be used for war purposes.

In reporting the results of the Capper poll, the

|i .

_

.

November 20, 1935, p. 147$.

2 CXLII (January 8, 1936), p. 32. 3 Public Opinion Quarterly. IV (March, 1940)* PP* 4^-65. 4

Ibid.

66

j|Christian Science Monitor concluded that ”The middle west is !| ijoverwhelmingly against any kind of war . . . One target of Ithis isolationist sentiment was apparently a strengthened neu­ trality program. |j i 'i ; ! i

As Admiral Sims reported:

. . . in all his experience he had never seen audiences so determined upon the country1s being kept out of war and upon having a real neutrality measure as on his recent speaking trip in the South and Southwest. He declared that he could not speak on any subject without having to talk about neutrality before the evening was over .2

p.G. Villard wrote that he had had the same experience on his speaking trip in the fall of 1935, and added that TT. . . Con­ gressman Maury Maverick also told the Economic Club that after Speaking in twenty-four states during the recent recess of Con­ gress he could uphold Admiral SimsT statement at every point . L ."3 The Administration Takes the Initiative Between August, 1935, and January, 1936, the White House and the State Department had had time to recoup their forces.

The swift congressional action in August had forced

bn the executive branch a neutrality law with which it did not agree.

As a result, the Administration, determined to prevent

the neutrality bloc from taking the initiative in the new ses­ sion of Congress, placed neutrality high on the list of legis­ lature to be considered early in the session.

At a White House

1 January 2, 1936, p. 1. 2 Nation, CXLII (February 26, 1936), p. 239. 3 Ibid.

67

'conference on January 1, a comprehensive neutrality bill em■ i bracing both mandatory and discretionary features was agreed upon for submission to Congress,

This bill provided:

1. To continue and to make permanent and mandatory the arms embargo contained in the 1935 Act, ’ , , i i i :

2. To give the President discretionary authority to bar abnormal amounts of exports of “conditional contraband” to belligerents* The standard for abnormality was to be determined on the basis of a three year average of normal exports to the belligerent, 3* To impose a mandatory ban on loans and credits to belligerents. 4* To forbid the transportation of arms or of any cargo to a belligerent through designated war zones. 5. To forbid travel on belligerent vessels except at the traveler's own risk.

6 . To bar belligerent submarines from American ports .1 As this bill was more comprehensive than the Act of 1935, “Senators Nye, Clark and other members of the Congres­ sional peace-by-isolation bloc were, in general, surprised and pleased by the Administration's concessions to their ideas of neutrality.2

a

concession to the isolationists did not, how­

ever, motivate the Administration, according to the New York Times: One reason for the prompt move contemplated isn't only the uncertain East African situation with its Eur­ opean aspects, but the fact that the present neutrality 1 As summarized in the New York Times, January 3> 1936, p. 1 , and January 4, 1936, p. 6 . 2 Time, XXVII (January 3, 1936), p. 11.

68

| i i !

;

resolution expires on February 29, and Congress will probably debate the proposals at length. Immediate submission of a neutrality bill also would give the Administration the advantage of "getting the jump” on Senators Gerald P. Nye and Bennett C. Clark of the Senate Munitions Committee. These Senators are drafting a measure of an extreme mandatory character . . . Being first with its bill, it was believed, would give the Administration a tactical advantage in the battle that looms .1 On January 3, 1936, the second session of the seventy-

'fourth Congress convened.

The opening message was delivered

by the President to both Houses, in an unprecedented night ses­ sion.

The neutrality program which the Administration would

support was to be a twofold program by which the nation would discourage war through its refusal to sell arms to belligerents, and it would also aid in shortening a war by denying to bellig­ erents any and all American products over normal peacetime ex­ ports.

The arms embargo, the President declared, was already

■a part of the neutrality policy and should be made permanent, but the restriction on exports of other goods would be a new ad­ dition to the neutrality l a w s . 2

a

few hours before the Presi­

d e n t s message, Senator Pittman in the Senate and Representative McReynolds in the House introduced specific bills to embrace this neutrality program. The Administration bill was not the only neutrality proposal to be introduced into the Senate. I

On January 6 , the

1

January 1, 1936, p. 1. 2 Text of President Roosevelt’s message appears in the New York Times. January 4, 1936, p. 8 .

69

iNye-Clark-Maverick bill was presented.1 f

On the whole, this

jbill was identical with the Pittman measure with the important ji

jjexception that the Nye-Clark bill gave far less discretion to the President in determining the nature and quantity of the nor­ mal exports to be controlled.

His proposal, Senator Nye ex­

plained, was one T,proposing a strict policy of neutrality, the 'enforcement of which at once be not permissive or at the dis­ cretion of the President, but mandatory upon him .”2 Congress must decide whether it shall adopt the stand­ point of Senators Clark, Nye, and others that the sole purpose of this legislation is to keep us out of war, or that of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull that we should take all safe and reasonable measures for stopping a war that has already begun.3 There was a general

feeling in Congress that some compromise

would be reached and a satisfactory law passed.

The Christian

Century reported: The files of the reveal practical the Capital that would be quickly

press for the first week in January unanimity among correspondents at such a generally satisfactory law drafted and as quickly passed.4-

Senator Pittman was optimistic and told the press that the bill would be reported out ” . . . i n probably not more than two weeks.”3

1 Congressional Record. 74-th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 4*7.

2 New York Times, January 7, 1936, p. 8 . 3 From the Detroit News, as quoted in the Literary Di­ gest. CXXI (January 4-> 1936), p. 5* A March 4*> 1936, p. 350. 5 New York Times. January 20, 1936, p. 2.

70

i

Despite this general optimism, there were those who

jforesaw extended debate as a possibility*

Said the Cleveland

llPlain Dealer: ji

jj

:! i; j ! 11 j l

|i

There will be no neutral Congressmen in the battle over the neutrality policy. Congressional opinion ranges from the advocates of the "Freedom of the Seas" thesis, so largely responsible for taking this country into the World War, to those who would place an ironclad embargo on shipment of all goods to belligerent nations. 1

i '^Summing up periodical comment, the Literary Digest concluded, :|"The drive for peace will not be peaceful."2

Edwin L. James

believed that the anticipated debate would differ from the hasty consideration given to the Neutrality Act in 1935: . !

■ :

Now the Neutrality Resolution was something enacted in a hurry, against the wishes of the Admin­ istration, to deal with specifically the unpleasant­ ness between Italy and Ethiopia. But the Neutrality Bill of January 3 , 1936, is something else. In the first place, it has the support of the Administration. In the second place, it is hailed and intended as something that will establish a definitely permanent policy on the part of the United States. Put succinctly, the Neutrality Bill means that this country intends to stay out of war and is ready to pay the price for doing so. . . . That policy is popular and may or may not be wise. The debates which are to take place will bring into brighter light all of the implications in­ volved. 3 The Alignments on Neutrality When the Senate convened for the second session of

jthe seventy-fourth Congress there were sixty-nine Democrats,

I

As quoted in the Literary Digest. CXXi (January

1936), p. 5. 2 Ibid. 3 New York Times, January 5, 1936, sec. IV, p. 3.

71

twenty-three Republicans, one Progressive, one Farmer-Laborite, and two vacancies.

The division of opinion on a neutrality

policy, however, crossed party lines.

Since the adjournment

||in August, 1935, it had become apparent that there would be

ij

divergent groups within the Senate, each with strong leader-

ij

| ship and definite ideas on the proper neutrality policy. i!I.

! II i ! |

Freedom-of-the-Seas Bloc This group was represented by Senators Hiram Johnson and William Borah.

They believed that the United States should

| avoid any cooperation with the League of Nations or with any

1 1 foreign combination and that war should be avoided but not at the cost of surrendering its rights as a neutral.

Business

I Week summarized their position on freedom of the seas:

;

They insist that people either have the right to trade, or they have not. If they have, it is cowardly for the government to say that they must do so at their own risk, because it is obviously impossible for them to protect themselves .1

|This group, as a bloc, was least in numbers of any alignment on neutrality.

Most isolationists favored surrendering free-

idom of the seas and supported the strict neutrality faction. The Strict-Mandatory-Neutrality Bloc Senators Nye, Clark, and Bone represented this group. They agreed with the isolationists that the nation should avoid foreign entanglements, but they were ionwilling to risk war in a defense of freedom of the seas, insisting that the

1 Business Week. January 18, 1936, p. 37.

sole objective of a neutrality law should be to keep the na­ tion out of war.

Although the label of isolationist could

i;

jappropriately be attached to most of the members in the strict jneutrality bloc, the isolationists were not united in 1936 on a neutrality program.

It was accurate to note that ". . .

[senator Hiram Johnson of California and Senator Gerald P. Nye i

jiof North Dakota were not of one mind on neutrality."! i ; l j!

The Administration Bloc

I

Described as the "strongest bloc"2 this coterie sup-

ji

ported the White House program of granting discretion to the President in discriminating between aggressor and victim in j the matter of embargoes. Spokesman was Senator Pittman who urged an elastic policy whereby the nation could keep out of kar and at the same time exert an influence in curbing aggres­ sion.

Within this bloc existed difference of opinion as to

how far the United States should cooperate in world affairs. ,'One faction, accepting the position of Senators Thomas and Pope who urged support of the League of Nations, were luke­ warm toward Administration proposals which had provided for Unilateral instead of cooperative action in a world threatened with war.

This extreme group, however, supported the Admini­

stration proposals in preference to the program of the■strict ineutrality bloc. ;

_

Other Senators believed, as did J. Hamilton —

Literary Digest. CXXI (February 29, 1936), p. 5. 2 Business Week. January 18, 1936, p. 37.

73 ij

iLewis, that no neutrality law should be enacted, but they too went along with the Administration's flexible policy. Most | j'Administration supporters agreed with the freedom of the seas jjbloc in one phase of neutrality.

This was an agreement that

i:

|the United States should insist upon certain rights under inS| iternational law. i;

| :

These alignments on neutrality were, in the opinion

Of one source, "presumably reflecting publie opinion ."1

r

Such

differences of opinion were not to be easily reconciled, and When the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began secret heari-

ings on the Administration bill on January 10, it was obvious that the general optimism following the opening of the session had been premature.

1 The Foreign Relations Committee Acts Senator Arthur Vandenberg " . . . of one session, snorting:

strode fiercely out

Neutrality goes fround and around,

■but it doesn't come out anywhere .1"2

This was the Senator's

impression of a Committee session considering the Administra­ tion's neutrality bill, and Vandenberg's reaction expressed the conflict within the Committee.

Between January 10 and Feb­

ruary 12, the Committee attempted to reconcile differing atti­ tudes on neutrality.

Each of these factions was ably repre­

sented on the. Committee.3 ,

As a result, "The fight," wrote

_

Mew York Times. February 16, 1936, p. 16. 2 Literary Digest. CXXI (February 29, 1936), p. 5. 3 Membership of the Committee included Robinson, Borah, Lewis, Johnson, LaFollette, Pope, Pittman, Vandenberg, Connally, and Thomas.

74

j!Hull, "turned out to be a sleeveless controversy, with the j i !|certainty from the beginning that the opposition would win, owing to the strong isolationist sentiment in the country ."1 |The attempts of the Committee to agree on a permanent neu­ trality bill were i

. . . attended by indescribable confusion. Con­ gressmen skilled in dealing ? . probably be discussed during the next war and after that war.w3 In addition to the cash-and-carry provisions, Pittiman pointed out that prohibition of travel on belligerent ves­ sels was based upon World War experience, when such travel had been a major cause of incidents dragging the nation into

1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1672. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.

iwar.

Similarly, the ban on armed merchantmen was an outgrowth

of experiences in 1917, when arming of ships created the cause fcfor German attack on them.

In an emotional tone, Pittman con­

cluded that human tragedies resulting from war should never ;again be permitted to occur if they could be prevented.1 Senator Vandenberg agreed with ninety per cent of Pittman*s argument, accepting every provision of the resolu­ tion with one exception.

He proposed the deletion of that

section giving the President power to decide, limit, or re­ voke lists of goods which American vessels could not carry to belligerents.

This, Vandenberg maintained, was dangerous be-

icause it gave the President authority to underwrite traffic ■in goods not placed on the restricted list.

It would be equiv­

alent to placing sanctions against certain nations by prohib:iting the shipment of goods to them.

Sanctions, argued Van­

denberg, were not desirable for the United States to attempt. A further objection was that the World War experience had demonstrated that neutrality decisions could not be made after the necessity to apply them arose.

”Such decisions,” believed

Vandenberg, ”are at the mercy of belligerent resentment and reprisal abroad.

They are at the mercy of commercial pres­

sures at h o m e . V a n d e n b e r g recommended that the resolution provide for transfer of title to all goods, as it did, with the addition of a proclamation that any American shipping I 1 Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1672. 2 Ibid., p. 1674*

155

foreign goods would do so at his own risk.

Senator Bone i.n-

:i

|terrupted to argue that even if such a proclamation were is|sued, American ships would he sunk on the high seas, and the j

:danger of incidents would he as great as ever.

Bone insisted

|that the only protection for the nation would be to prohibit I |American ships from transporting any goods to belligerents. .j

Vandenberg did not reply directly to Bone, but concluded his

Iarguments by repeating that allowing the President discretion ;in the matter of cash-and-carry was to give him power to inter­ vene in a war and to decide which belligerent this country was ; | to support. Otherwise, the proposed resolution was n. . . a jthoroughly splendid advance in the direction of quarantining |America against other people’s wars.Ttl Immediately, Senator Pittman defended the resolution

i by maintaining that this nation had a right to protect itself; ,and if some belligerent attacked it because of its attempts to :stay out of war, the United States would not be responsible for such a war.

The possibility of such attack was remote,

Pittman argued, because in a future war both belligerents would be evenly matched and would not wish to involve the United States In the war against them.

Vandenbergfs fears,

therefore, were unfounded.2 There then followed one of the strongest attacks on the proposed measure when Senator Borah presented his arguments. .

■

__

Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 1673-1676. 2 Ibid., p. 1676.

156

Approving every provision in the resolution except those labeled as the cash-and-carry provisions, Borah condemned these on two counts.

First, by these provisions the nation

sought to avoid all danger but at the same time to assure itjself the profits from war. The effect of this attempt, Borah i |jinsisted, would be to bring the war closer to the shores of the United States, for no belligerent would sit idly by while Igoods for its opponents were loaded on ships in United States* harbors.

Further, Borah maintained, cash-and-carry solved no

;problem which the World War had indicated would exist in event j

of another conflict.

In the World War, the problem had been

shipments of goods to neutrals for transshipment to belliger­ ents and not the sale of goods to belligerents. The proposed L resolution did nothing about transshipment. Senator Gerry !interrupted briefly to agree with Borah that a virtual blockjade of United States* ports would result from cash-and-carry.1 I

Borah contended, in direct reference to Senator Bone*s

arguments, that cash-and-carry did nothing to restrict war trade or war profits.

Bone replied that his proposal to re-

■quire American shippers to take the full risk of war trade 'would have the effect of cutting down war trade, but Borah ■retorted that this policy would mean economic ruin for the country.

This led Borah into his second objection to cash-

and-carry which was that it meant surrender of freedom of the seas.

!

"Those things," he declared, "which are fit only for

‘

I Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1678.

jwar, fit only for destruction I would not sell or ship, but ;those things indispensable to human comforts and human life !I would sell and ship and I would fight for the right to do ;So."-l

j not

Bone interrupted to express the hope that America would

send another army of young men into war to preserve war

l jtrade, and Borah quickly countered that all American citizens ; j |^and not just the DuPonts were interested in the economic con­ dition of the country.

This caused Bone to comment that if

the preservation of this nationTs honor and economic interests were to cost the price of another war, ", . . in God's name it |is not worth it.

Anything we can do to prevent that would cer-

; !tainly be a desirable alternative* ,

Borah continued to insist that the proposal did not

mean peace, for war trade had not taken this nation into the World War.

In that conflict, the people had never been neu­

tral in thought, and the nation would have gone to war in any case if it had appeared that the Allies were to be defeated. In event of another conflict, this nation should be as econom­ ically strong as possible to meet the situation.

Summarizing

his objections to cash-and-carry, he concluded that it was a policy which surrendered legitimate rights and was inconsistent ■with national welfare.3 i

1 Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 1681-

1682. 2 Ibid., p. 1682. 3 Ibid., pp. 1682-1683. Borah's objections to cash-andcarry are summarized in French (ed.,) Common Sense Neutrality.

158

Following Borah, Senator Schwellenbach supported the :j

^resolution as offering no positive guarantee of peace, but as I |the best neutrality policy the nation could work out in advance :i of a war.l Senator Gerry repeated and accepted Borah's argu; l

:|ments that the proposal actually would bring war closer to :iAmerican shores.2 Senator Thomas opposed Vandenberg's amendment for limiting the discretion of the President.

The Utah senator

favored Executive discretion because no President would mis­ use that power contrary to the spirit of the legislation. Thomas indicated favor for cooperation with the League of Nations but admitted that such cooperation was far from the sentiments of public opinion.

In concluding, Thomas agreed

with Borah that the surrender of rights under cash-and-carry was unwise, but that if it were to be included in the law, it should be discretionary to allow for future uncertainties.3 To this Pittman replied that certain elements of a future situation were fairly determinable.

One problem bound to

in which Borah also makes reference to the authorship of the proposal: "It must be remembered that when the cash-and-carry plan was introduced in Congress it was not regarded as a neu­ trality plan. In fact, it was declared to be plainly unneu­ tral. My understanding is— and I think it is generally con­ ceded— that the author of the cash-and-carry plan was Bernard M. Baruch, the distinguished financier, who is well known on two continents. It was his resourceful brain which conjured up the idea that we could attain money out of war without be­ ing hurt. He declared that cash-and-carry was not neutrality, but that it was clearly unneutral." (p. 66.) 1 Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1683.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.. pp. 1732-1735.

arise was the seizure of goods going to belligerents.

In

such cases, United

States ships would be attacked, and without

the resolution the

owners of these ships could be aroused to

a point demanding war.

Thomas remained skeptical of the ad­

visability of cash-and-carry and concluded that he did not accept the general opinion that a next war would be exactly like the past conflict.

It was preferable, he contended, to

avoid the enactment of permanent neutrality laws until the success of such laws had been proved conclusively.! On the final day argued in favor of

of the debate, Senator Johnson

the arms embargo, but he opposed the

attempt to restrict the sale and shipment of other goods under cash-and-carry.

He labeled the proposal, "an attempt,

by a policy of scuttle and run, to take the profits out of war and shirk the responsibility. !|2

Johnson agreed with Borah

that the policy would bring war closer to this country*s shores and would Invite reprisals by belligerents.

He also opposed,

as Borah had done, the surrender of freedom of the seas.

This

surrender, Johnson insisted, negated ". . . the very deeds of the men who have gone before and who have given this country its glory and its prestige."3

Senator Clark interrupted to

declare that the proposed measure was not intended to keep 1

“

Congressional Becord, 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1735.

2 Ibid., p. 1778. 3 Ibid., p. 1779.

160

profits out of war because other measures pending in commit­ tees would attempt that program.

Johnson replied that the

pending measure must be one, therefore, of making profits out of war, a neutrality measure, and a peace-at-any-price measure.

nIf it is possible,” he said, ”to have a combina-

|jtion of that sort, gentlemen can have any kind of a measure j ' 'they prefer.”1 Johnson added that cash-and-carry made the United IStates an ally of nations with large navies.

Reaching his

'conclusion, Johnson contended: I know that it is of little use to talk of the tra­ ditions of America or of what they have meant. I have passed the proscribed age, so I feel I am at liberty to do so, but I know that to do so leaves one in a situation in which it will be said he thinks in terms of some years ago . . . But now, when we have become flabby and great we are to do— what? We are to send other people upon the seas with their ves­ sels filled with our goods, and then, like hypocrites, we will stand aside and say, ”We take none of the blame or responsibility.”2 Johnson urged defeat of what he termed a ”terrible measure.”3 Support for the resolution came from Senator Capper who agreed that it would keep this nation from being drawn in­ to wars in which it had no real interest.

He maintained that

international law and freedom of the seas did not exist in wartime and that defense of these illusory rights would force the nation into war.4

Senator Bone supported Vandenberg on

Congressional R e c o r d . 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1779.

2 I b i d ., p. 1782.

3 Ibid., p. 1783•

4

Ibid., pp. 1784-1785.

161

the contention that the discretion allowing the President to determine articles which could or could not be shipped was un­ desirable*

Attacking Johnson*s reverence for international

law, Bone argued that such law had no existence ”. . . except I ; I Jin the imagination of some law shark.”1 He repeated a chali j 'lenge he had made in the 1936 debate that he be offered one exj |ample of a belligerent in the World War who had respected in­ ternational law.

Amid laughter in the Senate, he added, ”Bel-

jligerent nations are interested in international law just like S :a hog is interested in trigonometry.”2 Bone repeated his appeal ifor an embargo on all trade, but Senator Pope interrupted to ; !point out that such an embargo did not work in 1807, and would not work in 1937.

In his conclusion, Bone asked the Senate to

set defense of so-called rights against Americafs desire for peace, and then to picture the defense of these rights in the ■form of financial loss and the human tragedy of war.3 Senator King followed to declare that he could not support the measure.

He agreed that under the resolution, Amer-

ica abdicated its rights under international law.

A more de-

Isirable alternative, King asserted, would have been for the United States to have led in formulating a code of international ;law protecting the neutrals, for neutrality was an international i

question and not one affecting the United States alone.

To

1 Congressional Record, 73th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1788.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid.. p. 1789.

162

jBone’s argument that international lam' was not respected, iKing replied that domestic laws were often violated, but such violations did not mean that Americans had no respect for laws of their states or of the United States. King concluded j that the proposed measure would not assure peace.1 Senator Lee took the floor to support the resolution. iHe had decided, he said, to participate in the debate because ;he could not sit by and hear property rights placed above hu|man life.

In answer to the argument that this was a new pol­

icy, Lee argued that simply because a thing hasn’t been done before was no reason to avoid doing it now.

On the argument

that war might result from the resolution, he declared: We are confronted with this dilemma. On one side we have a situation that is not certain. We know the other situation leads to war. Therefore, why not resolve the doubt in favor of a possibility that might prolong the period of peace?2 Insisting that international law had never been defined, Lee remarked nWar knows no law. ”3

The issue was gold against

blood, in his opinion, and those who had opposed the resolution had offered no program of their own to keep the nation out of war.

Lee concluded by saying that he was speaking for those

left in France, for those who were now saying to this Senate, nDon’t put property in the scale with blood.”-4

Senator Nye

1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 17941795.

2 Ibid., p. 1796. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., pp. 1798-1807.

Ispoke briefly supporting Vandenberg’s amendment which was de­ feated.

Borah’s amendment was offered and defeated as the

idebate neared its end.

Gerry repeated his insistence on build­

ing the nation’s naval strength, and Borah made a last appeal for defeat of the resolution.! Despite this final appeal, TTThe peace hungry Senate jwas unimpressed.

When the vote on the bill came, only the

Igrandson of another 1919 irreconcilable, Massachusett’s Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., and three other Senators2 lined up with Borah and Johnson against it, 6-to-63.”3 source commented ” . . .

Following the vote, one

there was no doubt that sentiment in

the Senate was overwhelmingly in favor of trying the experi­ ment that the proposal offered.”4 Analysis Of The Debate The Proposition for Debate The proposition for debate was, Resolved:

That, Sen­

ate Joint Resolution #51, known as the Pittman bill, should be enacted into la?/.

This resolution continued munition controls

and the arms embargo.

In addition, it provided for cash-and-

1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 17981807.

2 Senators Austin of Vermont, Styles Bridges of New Hampshire, and Gerry. Senator King said he would have voted against it if he had been present when the roll was called, see New York Times. March 4> 1937, p. 18. 3 Time. XXIX (March 15, 1937), pp. 15-16. 4 Nev/ York Times. March 4> 1937, p. 18.

164 ii

carry on all goods other than arms sold to belligerents* Amendments were proposed to change or to modify the origi­ nal resolution, but none of these v/ere accepted by the Sen­ ate and the proposition did not change throughout this debate. Uncontested Argument In spite of the fact that this proposition resulted in the most direct clash on the issue in dispute of any neu­ trality debate prior to 1937, there remained several phases of the proposition which were accepted or ignored by both sides. 1. All provisions of the resolution except the cash-and-carry provisions were apparently accepted by both sides. Many speakers both for and against the resolution overtly expressed agreement with every provision except that on control of trade through cash-and-carry.

Those who did

not express their approval, assumedly, had no objections to most provisions of the resolution.

Some of the Senators,

Thomas and King for example, opposed any neutrality legisla­ tion, and others like Borah and Johnson would have probably favored greater Executive discretion in all phases of the law.

Considering the sentiment of the Senate and of the na­

tion, however, these speakers chose to accept most of the resolution as the inevitable minimum demanded of a neutrality law.

Vandenberg accepted and praised ninety per cent of the

resolution, and Borah and Johnson agreed to all provisions ex­ cept cash-and-carry.

King expressed his opposition to the

il

jjconcept of neutrality legislation, but his arguments were dii

Jrected at no specific provision of the Pittman bill, except jcash-and-carry.

The position of Bone, Nye and others of the

jlstrict neutrality bloc was, of course, in complete agreement Ij

jjwith the restrictions placed on arms, loans, and travel on i;

^(belligerent vessels,

Pittman*s opening speech analyzing the

ilneed for these restrictions upon the evidence of the World War was thoroughly consistent with the basis of support used in the neutrality bloc*s case since 1935.

As a result, the

New York Times agreed that the debate centered around cashand-carry because ^There appeared to be no opposition to other provisions of the resolution."1 2. out of war.

Whatever policy is adopted should keep the nation

On January 13, 1937, the Christian Science Monitor predicted, f!. . . with regard to this approaching conflict of opinion . . . both sides seek the same end. the United States out of war . . .

Both want to keep

The choice which Congress

must make before the end of April will only be a choice among probabilities.n2

This prediction was accurate, for speakers

on both sides premised their main arguments on the position that the policy they supported would keep the nation out of war and that the policy of their opponents would lead to par­ ticipation in a war.

This common objective, keyed by Pittman

in opening the debate, indicated that the bill was intended “

~T~ March 2, 1937, p. 6. 2 p. 39.

! j

166

I

i|

i | Jas a new peace policy for the United States. speakers adopted the same theme.

Subsequent

Borah and Johnson were not

;j

|opposed to the bill on the issue of involvement or non— is

!iinvolvement in a future war. It was an assumption of every I |speech in the debate that the nation wanted to stay out of |war.

The two arch isolationists opposed the bill for the

very reason that it would not accomplish this objective and ’proceeded from that premise to build their arguments and proof. Members of the strict neutrality bloc continued to follow their familiar theme of peace.

Bone repeated his earl­

ier predictions of the effects of a future war, and again des­ cribed the human suffering and destruction of civilization to follow another conflict.

For the first time, Pittman emotion­

alized the theme of war in the sufferings of young men, broken bodies and minds*

Lee ended the debate on the same emotionalized

note, drawing upon his personal experiences in France in the World War and describing what he had seen of the effects of war. He effectively asked his audience to imagine ?vThat the soldiers who were left in France might now say to the Senate debating how to stay out of another war. 3. The proposed bill would not control profits from war trade, other than in implements of war. Borah and Johnson insisted that cash-and-carry would result in profits from war trade.

Taking the bill as presented

to the Senate, they asserted what they believed would be the effects of that bill.

Their support of the assertion followed

this causal reasoning; war trade created profits for those

167

jengaged in it; the Pittman "bill allows war trade; therefore, the Pittman bill allowed war profits. admitted this conclusion.

Both Bone and Clark

Their defense was that restrict­

ing war profits had never been the intent of the bill. The i main objective, they repeated, was to keep the nation out of i war. Bone did assert that a possible effect of the bill would be to restrict trade under the requirements of cashjand-carry, and therefore restrict profits.

He did not stress

|the assertion, however, and the supporters of cash-and-carry |were content to refute Borah and Johnsonfs argument by agree|ing that it was probably so but was also irrelevant to the ! I jpoint at issue. By the end of the debate, both sides had acicepted the position that war profits were not a consideration jin the Pittman bill. I

Issues in Dispute This debate witnessed a more direct clash on the is­

sues, a more skillful use of refutation, and a more effective i |utilization of opposing argument than had been observable in previous debates on neutrality legislation. ^ I | I : i |

The issues were:

1.

Should the President be given discretion under cash-and-carry to determine the goods which American ships might carry?

2.

Is the principle of cash-and-carry defensible?

3.

Should a neutrality law be based upon interna­ tional law?

jArgument on the Issues !j

!

Issue:

Should the President be given discretion

Iunder cash-and-carry to determine the goods which American

168

jships might carry?— This issue featured early in the debate when Senator Vandeni |berg stated his only objection to the proposed bill. At the ,heart of this issue was the unsettled problem of whether neu­ trality legislation could safely rest on the premise that |Presidential discretion would be wisely used to further the | ! l |objectives of the legislation. This issue separated the Adjministration supporters from the strict neutrality bloc. I

Arguments Offered by the Proponents of Presidential

IDiscretion.1— 1.

Presidential discretion in controlling trade with

belligerents would not invite reprisal attacks from belligerents. !

Senator Pittman presented this argument and supported

it first by an assumption and then strengthened it by historical example.

His assumption was that any future war would repeat

the pattern of the World War and would find two sides evenly matched as were the Allies and Germany in that conflict.

This

■assumption had been utilized by the strict neutrality bloc in support of their conclusions in the 1935 and 1936 debates.

In

!this debate, Pittman was depending upon acceptance of the as­ sumption for a different type of argument, but the assumption remained the same.

If the assumption were true, Pittman rea-

: soned, its application to this argument of presidential discre­ tion was evident.

I

At this point, Pittman introduced evidence

'

‘

~

It should be noted that the opponents of presidential discretion were not opponents of the Pittman bill;even though those who supported the Vandenberg amendment were defeated, they supported the bill in the final vote.

169

ifrom the World War.

Without citing specific sources, he as■

!

|serted that Germany would not have attacked had she known the jr

iresults of her submarine warfare, and German statesmen had !jregretted forcing the United States into the war.

In a future

conflict, no belligerent would wish to force the United States iinto the war regardless of the manner in which the President ;|used the discretion given him under the law.

No other speaker

|developed this argument, and it was never directly refuted in the debate. 2.

The discretionary provision strengthens the ef-

ifectiveness of the resolution. Senator Schwellenbach made the assertion as an expres­ sion of personal opinion, that allowing the Executive discre­ tion would be a strong means of preventing the nation from being drawn into war.

He pursued no chain of argument to this

conclusion in his speech.

Most detailed, in the analysis of

this argument, was Senator Thomas who disagreed with both Pitt­ man and Vandenberg.

Thomas’ premise in the debates previously

had been that no mandatory neutrality law could successfully operate in unforeseen future situations.

On this he was in

direct clash with Vandenberg and was opposed to Pittman’s views on the inclusion of any mandatory provisions in the law. As the lesser of two evils, however, the Pittman bill partially met his premise on neutrality legislation. In defense of this premise, Thomas stated the factual evidence that the President was the representative of the United States in foreign affairs.

From this evidence, Thomas asserted

jthat one effect of the Presidents position would be his power to involve the nation in war regardless of any neutrality laws. ITherefore, Thomas concluded, the opponents of presidential dis!cretion had overlooked or ignored the vital evidence of the i;

!|Presidents position in international affairs when they had asi( |serted that a neutrality law could prevent a President from in­ volving the nation in war.

Expanding his argument, Thomas laid

Ihis premise that the President would not act contrary to the wishes of the people in adopting a neutrality policy in event ||of war.

No speaker contested this premise in 1937, although

it was to be challenged in subsequent debates.

From the evi-

1dence of the Presidents position and the asserted premise that he would not act contrary to the wishes of the people, Thomas concluded that there was no danger in allowing the Executive !discretion in administering the law.

A specific example was

Iadded for emphasis

at this point in the argument when Thomas

:cited the instance

of the Spanish civil war in which the Pres-

1ident had been handicapped until Congress had changed the law to conform to national interests. In the next phase of his argument, Thomas challenged the assumption that the next war would be similar to the World War.

This assumption of the strict neutrality bloc and of

Pittman rested upon uncertain and indeterminable evidence, Thomas asserted.

The

be those which had the World War.

causes present in the next war might not

been responsible for bringing America into

If the causes were different, Thomas reasoned,

the effects would be different.

The fallacy of strict, manda­

171

tory legislation was, therefore, one of attempting to elimi­ nate effects without knowing the causes; and a law based upon this fallacy would be more of a hindrance than a help in the 'j

!;future.

Pittman and the neutrality bloc insisted that their

i lassumption of similarity between past and future wars was ac) | l jcurate. Pittman argued that some causes would always be pre­ sent in a future war which could be foreseen and prevented ahead of the conflict. I Arguments Offered by Opponents of Presidential Pis' i cretion.— 1.

The exercise of discretion by the President would

be too difficult a task for any one man.

;I

This argument was advanced by Senator Vandenberg and i supported by Bone. It rested upon the evidence of Wilson1s attempts in the World War to maintain neutrality when the na­ tion had no neutrality law.

Neither speaker developed the

1evidence in detail but simply referred to it and asked their audience to recall the situation.

While neither speaker stated

the conclusion from the evidence, it was obviously implied that the effect of the situation in the World War was entry into the war.

Without citing specific evidence, both speakers asserted

that pressure from commercial interests would be too great for a President to resist.

Neither speaker attempted to adapt to

their argument Thomas1 premise that the President would adhere to the wishes of the people. 2.

Discretionary authority for the President would

result in sanctions against an aggressor.

Vandenberg and Nye rested this argument on an uncontested as|sumption that application of sanctions by the United States |was undesirable* Public opinion appeared to support this, and ! i ||in the argument it remained only to show the relationship bei l !jtween discretionary authority and sanctions. Once this was ij

established, the undesirability of discretionary authority jjwould be accepted.

To show this relationship, Nye and Vanden-

iberg asserted that the effect of allowing the Executive dis­ cretion to place goods on an embargo list would be to give Ihim authority to embargo goods to nations of whose actions he did not approve.

This, the speakers contended, ?/as the exact

I ;intent of sanctions as the League of Nations had practiced the j|policy. tions.

Therefore, discretionary authority could lead to sanc­ Senator Thomas was forced to admit that public opinion

would not favor cooperation with the League, and thereby he |lent weight to the assumption against sanctions.

The only

refutation, and that not too direct, was the argument of Thomas that a President would act in accordance with public opinion iand would not impose sanctions if opinion opposed it. Issue:

Is the principle of cash-and-carry defensible?—

Opening the debate on the theme that peace and security were the objectives of the bill, Pittman developed the argument that cash-and-carry would achieve those objectives.

While ac­

cepting Pittman*s expression of the desirability of peace, op­ ponents of cash-and-carry were less prepared to accept his conclusion that such a policy would bring the effects of peace and security for the nation.

This became the most prominent

173

issue as the debate proceeded. Arguments offered by the proponents of the resolu­ tion.— 1.

Cash-and-carry will tend to keep the nation out

j!

|of war. | This argument found Pittman and spokesmen for the strict ; ! ilneutrality bloc reasoning upon the basis of the identical evi|;dence and premises.

In addition to Pittman; Bone, Lee, and

l|Capper featured in supporting the principle of cash-and-carry. ■Relying upon the familiar evidence of the World War, these ^speakers asked their audience to analyze the causes of American involvement in that conflict.

These causes were American trade

iwith belligerents and incidents resulting from that trade.

In

this debate, no specific evidence was cited, but implied was the evidence from the Nye Committee.

In addition, the predis­

position of public opinion to accept these causes as the real reasons for entry into the war, gave the argument an additional impact.

The next step in the argument vras to offer cash-and-

carry as the solution.

By the evidence of the actual operation

of cash-and-carry, its proponents concluded that it would elim­ inate the causes of war as those causes had operated in 1917. Therefore, cash-and-carry would prevent involvement in the war. ! lemma.

To this familiar pattern of argument, Lee added a di­ The nation could do one of two actions.

It could re-

ifuse to do nothing and wait for the operation of known causes to involve the nation in another war.

Or the nation could at­

tempt to eliminate those causes with the fairly logical conclu-

Ision that war could be prevented. jsame dilemma.

Capper subscribed to the

The attack on the assumption that the causes of

.the World War would operate again in the future was attempted by Thomas and King, but this debate concluded with that assumption still verified in the thinking of most people.

h ii

j i j carry.

2.

The nation surrenders no rights under cash-and-

In his opening speech, Pittman anticipated that oppo­ sition to cash-and-carry would come from those who supported the doctrine of freedom of the seas.

He, therefore, attempted

to defend cash-and-carry as no surrender of legitimate rights. To accomplish this, he first attacked the assumption that freecom of the seas was a legitimate right in wartime.

He contended

from the evidence of the World War and from general unsupported assertion that freedom of the seas ceased to exist in wartime. The attempt of one nation to declare its rights had not been respected by the belligerents. was not a clearly defined right.

Freedom of the seas, therefore, Pittman concluded that past

attempts by this nation to defend its avowed rights had resulted in war.

Supported by Bone and Capper, Pittman appealed to the

common sense of his audience to ask themselves whether it was not ridiculous for the nation to fight for an indeterminable right.

Bone carried the reference to an even more specific

level by comparing the attention paid by belligerents to freedom of the seas to that paid by a hog to trigonometry.

Bone and

Capper also followed a familiar theme of the strict neutrality bloc in associating freedom of the seas with the profits made

by a few interests in war trade. |

Arguments offered by_ the opponents of the

|

1.

resolution.—

Cash-and-carry would involve the nation in war.

j This argument advanced by Borah, Johnson, and Gerry i !jfollowed a different pattern from that presented in the argu­ ments of those who had supported cash-and-carry.

In the argu­

ments of these three speakers were strong logical pattern and !■

an undercurrent of emotive development.

In support of their

^argument, they took cash-and-carry as a cause and reasoned to future effects.

The supporters of cash-and-carry had reasoned

|from past experiences and had assumed future effects.

Paced

'by Borah, opponents of cash-and-carry asked their audience to go a step further and imagine Y?hat those effects might be. (The New York Times caught the characteristic of this pattern Jin the following observation made after Borah’s opening speech:

| i 1

A picture of the factories and ports of the United States suffering aerial bombardment from the aircraft of a desperate belligerent in the next world war if this country attempted to preserve its neutrality through the Pittman resolution now under consideration, was painted for the Senate today by Senator William E. Borah of Idaho.1

'Senator Gerry emphasized the same picture of future events, picturing belligerent warships lying off American shores to seize vessels bound with goods for their enemies.

Since there

existed no precedent for cash-and-carry, these speakers asked their audience to accept their conclusions as logically the re­ sult of cash-and-carry*

Capper and Lee attempted to refute

1 jiew York Times. March 2, 1937, p. 6.

176

|this pattern of argument by citing the evidence of the geo|graphical distance of the United States from any potential belligerents, concluding that it would be unreasonable to ijassume that any attack could be made off this nationTs shores. U :i

|jAt this point, Pittman1s argument, that no belligerent would i|

jjattempt to attack the United States for fear of tipping the H q scales against itself, was applied for refutation. ij

; j

2.

Freedom of the seas is an actual right and is

•worth defending.

|i

This argument expressed the doctrine emphatically de­

fended by Borah and Johnson in their attack on cash-and-carry, in addition to these two opponents of cash-and-carry, King al­ so supported this argument. mises.

The argument rested upon two pre­

First, national interest would be more effectively

served in a defense of freedom of the seas than by the sur­ render of that right under cash-and-carry.

Support for this

premise came from the evidence of the first World War which led Borah to conclude that the economic structure of the nation would have collapsed if trade had been cut off.

Supporting

this further, Borah cited the authority of President Wilson on the extent of American dependence upon trade.

Bringing the

implications of this evidence to a specific level, Borah re­ futed Bone*s contention that only a few large corporations benefited from war trade.

Farmers, miners, and producers,

everyone in the nation had a stake in the economic life of the nation.

Therefore, Borah concluded, every citizen had a stake

in defense of freedom of the seas upon which the economic life

177:

jof the nation depended.

Johnson’s development of this same

[premise was different from that of Borah’s.

Johnson emotion-

[alized the theme by calling upon historical examples, refer­ ences, and traditions upon which freedom of the seas had been built.

Recalling for his audience that defense of this doc-

itrine had symbolized America’s greatness in the past, Johnson concluded that surrender of the right symbolized America’s repudiation of its glorious past.

He made the final connection

of this support to the premise by asserting that national in­ terest could not be served when this great nation adopted a policy which in Johnson’s words was a policy of "scuttle and run.” The second premise in establishing this argument re­ sulted from a direct attack upon the premise of the strict neu­ trality bloc that war trade had been the principal cause for American entry into the war.

Borah and King asserted, citing

the authority of Wilson, that America entered the World War from a sympathy with the Allied cause and in a belief that principles to which this nation subscribed were endangered. This was a significant attack upon the basic premise of the neutrality case, and led Borah and King to advance their pre­ mise that defense of freedom of the seas was not a cause of war.

From this premise, they concluded that cash-and-carry

had been built upon a false premise and would not achieve the results for which it was being supported.

In addition, from

the conclusions reached in the first premise, this restriction on trade would produce effects detrimental to national interest.

ijFreedom of the seas was, in the opinion of its defenders, well |jworth maintaining* 'j

! Issue:. i national law?—

Should a neutrality law be based upon inter-

:Senator Thomas had introduced this issue into the 1936 debate and repeated his contentions supported by King in 1937.

This

Jissue went beyond freedom of the seas and embraced all pro­ visions of any neutrality law.

The basic clash occurred on

ithe premise of whether a single nation could effectively esI

■tablish rules of neutrality without reference to the customary .law of nations.

The proponents of the Pittman bill had taken

;the position that one nation alone could effectively enact domestic legislation without resort to international princi­ ples as a foundation of the laws.

The opponents of domestic

neutrality legislation were principally those who favored greater international cooperation and membership in the League of Nations. Arguments offered by the proponents of the resolution.—

1.

International law has never been successfully cod­

ified. Pittman opened the debate ?ri.th the assertion that in­ ternational lawyers had never succeeded in determining what constituted international law.

Thus, Pittman pointed out, it

was not surprising to find that in wartime there had resulted a conflict among belligerents and neutrals over the rights each nation insisted upon maintaining.

Evidence of the elusiveness

of international law was found in the first World War, Pittman

179

.'Contended*

On the basis of this past example, the United

'States had two alternatives. i ;

It could attempt to secure agree-

!i

;ment among nations on what constituted international law, or jit could determine its rights for itself.

The first alterna­

tive could not be proved acceptable because of the fact that no agreement had yet been reached and from the convincing evi­ dence of the World War attempts to secure any agreement.

By

a process of elimination, the second alternative was the log­ ical step to follow.

Lee supported Pittman on the assertion

that international law had never been defined, and without 1citing specific examples, Lee suggested that international law might be good in peacetime, but not in war. To these arguments, KingTs answer was that the fail­ ure to agree on international law was the effect of a cause which Lee and Pittman had neglected to analyze in their argu­ ment.

The cause for the failure of international agreement was

not to be found in the nature of international law but rather in the lack of dynamic leadership.

Evidence of this, as cited

by King, was the spirit of nationalism after the World War which had isolated nations into competing blocs and prevented any attempts at international agreement.

King agreed that in­

ternational law had not been codified but insisted that isolat­ ing the true cause of such failure would be preferable to a policy of refusing further attempts at agreement.

This was

the expression of the cooperationists in the nation, and it was not directly refuted in this debate.

i

2.

j

This was principally Bone!s argument which he had

A defense of international law could lead to war.

j!

'presented in earlier neutrality debates. i

Support for the ar-

gument rested upon the familiar pattern of the evidence from the World War and the assumption that future wars would be similar.

Bone consistently emphasized the relationship be­

tween defense of international law and the human tragedy of ;war which resulted from a defense of illusive legal prin­ ciples.

Bone!s argument was more immediate in its application

in the minds of his audience than the somewliat labored and technical development of the foundations of international law 1exposited by Thomas or King.

General audience acceptance of

the evidence and assumption in the neutrality case gave BoneTs I ;implications more direct realism in treating of the possibil1ities in a future war. Arguments offered bv the opponents of the resolution. 1.

Cooperation among nations is the most effective

means to isolate a war. In 1936, Thomas had supported this argument with his­ torical examples.

While not going into such detail in this

debate, he asserted that cooperation would prove more effec­ tive than unilateral action.

Supporting him, and taking a

premise which was ahead of his times, King asserted that iso­ lation was no refuge for the United States in future wars. ' His support for this premise was the World War, in which Amer­ ica had been unable to remain aloof from the conflict.

Weak­

ness in international law was not an issue in 1917, King had

181

;j

I jjasserted.

The causes for American involvement went "beyond

|that oversimplified analysis. |

At fault for failing to resolve this issue was the

j i confusion by both sides in use of the term, "neutrality.”

King

^jand Thomas were arguing from the assumption that a neutrality |policy should operate to hinder an aggressor and to aid his ivictim.

Pittman, Bone, Lee, and others argued from the assump­

tion that a neutrality policy should operate to keep the nation out of war regardless of which belligerent might be affected. It was obvious that with a different objective in view, the ar­ guments supporting that objective would also be at variance. Hence, the unresolved conflict on the issue of cooperation ver­ sus unilateral action. Contemporary Reaction To The Debate The Senate vote on the Pittman bill did not represent final congressional action on neutrality.

The House of Repre­

sentatives was considering a bill different in essential re­ spects, and much contemporary comment was withheld awaiting the House action.

In reaction to the Pittman bill, two themes

are discoverable.

First, it was agreed that the Senate action

had established an unprecedented policy on neutral rights and that this new policy was probably a good idea.

Second, some

sources felt that certain important issues had been overlooked or confused in the debate on neutrality. In agreeing that Senate action had broken traditions of neutral rights, the isolationist Chicago Tribune reflected complete agreement with this result:

An American tradition 150 years old— the free­ dom of the seas "principle”— was abandoned by the Senate today when it passed the ”peace act of 1937" which is designed to keep the United States out of foreign wars. Only a few statesmen shed a tear for the sur­ render of the rights of the nation to venture out upon the ocean in ships of commerce when foreign nations take up arms.l

'■

The neutrality law now taking its course through Congress represents an attempt to remove America still further from the complications of Europe . . . Con­ gress apparently is willing to make some sacrifices, some of them unknown, to keep European influences from affecting the United States.2

A more cautious approval of Senate action came from the Chris­ tian Science Monitor which agreed that the act "set Americafs foreign policies in radically different channels."3

Another

source apparently agreed with the arguments set forth by pro;ponents of the bill that "War would not be war if there was freedom of the seas."4

This same source agreed that the World

.War experience afforded sufficient justification to control the traffic in arms and other materials during a foreign war.3 Several sources considered that the rhyme quoted by Senator Lee in the debate, "Here lies old man Jay; he died defending his right of way,"6 expressed the argument against freedom of the seas very effectively.

This rhyme was quite generally

1 March 4, 1937, p. 8

2 March 5, 1937, p. 12. 3 March 4, 1937, p. 1. 4 Christian Century. LIV (March 3, 1937), p. 275. 5 Ibid., March 31, 1937, p. 416.

6

Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 1798.

183

quoted. n i | Although accepting the Senate action, some contemi ! jporary comment was critical of the failure to clarify or rec­ ognize some issues in the neutrality problem,

Christian Cen-

,itury complained: I ' j 3 i

The "neutrality” proposals have a purpose which is commonly misstated. Their purpose is to keep the United States out of those foreign wars in which it might become entangled by reasons of money and greed or by reasons of irresponsibility or by reasons of misunderstanding of the totalitarian conduct of mod­ ern war, or by a combination of such reasons. Their purpose is not to keep us out of wars which we would feel obliged to enter in defense of our country or form of government. Much of the current debate is confused and even vicious because this distinction is not kept constantly in mind. The distinction should be made clear.I

The same source pointed to the confusion in the use of the word "neutrality."

"Congress,” it declared, "is not legis­

lating neutrality for the nation. tional power to declare war:

It still has the constitu­

it still may commit America to

one side or the other of a war."2

Rather, the Christian Cen­

tury contended, ". . . it is designed to keep private citizens neutral so long as the nation is neutral . . . tion is obviously important.

This distinc­

To legislate in advance of a

crisis that the United States must be neutral would be as unethical in form as it would be futile in effect."3

Louis

Fischer, writing in the Nation, contended that the best way

1

2

Christian Century. LIV (March 3, 1937), p.

275*

Ibid., LIV (March 17, 1937), p. 343. 3 Christian Century. LIV (March 17, 1937), p. 343*

184

of keeping out of war would be to work for world peace |stead of planning

a neutrality law in event of a war*

inHe

]

contested the arguments of the proponents of neutrality that

j wars were caused solely or in part by the munition manufacturers1 desires for profit,

J

and declared that, "Taking the

|profit out of war would not stop wars.

Taking the profit

i

|out of the economic system would. i

The propaganda for neun

|trality befogs these fundamental issues."-1- The Nation1s program was probably too radical in its economic and political | :philosophy to find general approval in contemporary comment, j As had been the case in the Senate debate, the focus j |of public interest was on the cash-and-carry provisions. This jl

;!was the significant change in policy, for by 1937 there was i

jrelatively little opposition to arms and credit embargoes. |Interest now turned to House action on cash-and-carry.

1 Christian Century. LIV (March 27, 1937), p. 34^

i'Il j! ; !

i:

PART II:

THE H OU S E AND SENATE COMPROMISE

The House Substitutes Its Own Measure

I,

|

Simultaneous with Senate action on the Pittman hill,

'Representative McReynolds introduced a neutrality bill into the House of Representatives,

This bill was passed by the

ii

! ;House on March 18, and was identical with the Pittman bill i;

|with four important exceptions: j I

1.

The cash-and-carry provision would not be put into effect by the President until such time as he decided the peace of the United States was threatened. The Senate bill provided that the program went into effect immediately as soon as a President declared that a state of war or civil strife existed. The House proposal provided for complete discretion to be vested in the President. The life of this pro­ vision on cash-and-carry was also limited to two years.

i ! I .

1

2. !

"Personal goods and effects" were exempted from the cash-and-carry provision.

3. Prohibition on American travel in belligerent vessels was made discretionary with the Presi­ dent. The Senate bill had made It automatic upon declaration of a state of war or civil strife.

4 . No provision for the prohibition of the arming of American merchantmen.! When news of the House action reached the Senate, the strict neutrality bloc was disappointed and angered at the discrer tion allowed the President under cash-and-carry. The Senate bill had met their desires in most respects; but the House 1

Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 24-0724-08. 185

186

jjbili, Senator Bone declared, destroyed "everything secured in all the previous neutrality legislation adopted, begin|ning in 1935* "1

On the floor of the Senate, with the mem-

|bers of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the Senate chamber, Bone contended, "I do not believe I have ever seen a more adroit interpolation of qualifying phrases in any piece of legislation."2

Using a theme familiar in the debates,

ii

jBone concluded that the House bill would "open wide the gateI : way to an untrammeled and unrestricted trade with belliger­ ents in time of w a r . "3 |

It was necessary to appoint a conference committee

' !consisting of members from both Houses to resolve the differ­ ences in the two bills. man, Robinson, and Borah.

Appointed from the Senate were Pitt­ No member of the Nye-Bone group

was included, and this fact prompted the Christian Science ;Monitor to believe that the House version of cash-and-carry --

had been destined to gain acceptance because

1

The whole point turned on appointment of the Senate conferees. So the Vice-President selected Senator Key Pittman . . . who nominally supported the rigid bill, but actually did not have stiff views. He was supported by Senator Joseph T. Robinson . . . the majority leader and Senator William E. Borah . . . who was against any neutrality bill, but preferred the flexible to the rigid form.4 1 New York Times, March 25* 1937, p. 7.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 May 1, 1937, p. 6.

j!

1 3 7

i The conference committee met at frequent intervals until April ||27.

The Neutrality law passed in 1936 was scheduled to expire

j!

!jOn May 1, so the leaders in both Houses made plans to rush the ij

iicompromise measure through Congress in one day.

Committee delay

in reaching a decision aroused critical contemporary and Con-

[i

,:gressional comment, for the compromise did not reach the Seni j ate for debate until April 29, two days before the country i

‘would have been left with no neutrality law.

This timing and

jithe form taken by the committee bill revealed that the Adminiistration wanted the discretionary cash-and-carry without sub­ jecting the issue to prolonged debate.

In spite of rumblings

of discontent, Senator Pittman said he had "every reason to be­ lieve there would be no attempted filibuster."!

The conference

committee report which was to become the Neutrality Act of 1937 provided for: 1.

Acceptance of the House cash-and-carry provision. This meant that the President could determine if and when the restrictions on trade other than arms would go into effect. He was guided by the suggestion that the provision should be invoked if the peace of the United States were threatened. The provision was limited to two years.

2.

The House exemption of "personal goods and ef­ fects" under cash-and-carry was eliminated. All goods came under the law.

3*

Acceptance of the Senate mandatory prohibition on American travel on belligerent vessels.

4*

Acceptance of the Senate prohibition on the arm­ ing of American merchantmen.

1 New York Times. April 28, 1937, p. 8.

188

! | i ! H | I j | I

5.

The provisions for an arms embargo, restrictions on loans and credits, munition licensing and control, and use of ports by belligerent submarines were essentially the same as in the Pittman bill originally passed by the Senate.!

|The main burden of defending this bill fell on Senator Pittman i who opened the debate on April 29. ‘ l | l ! I :

Participants In The Debate There were no new figures in this debate, and famil-

iar figures included Senators Pittman, Johnson, Vandenberg, |Lewis, Robinson, Connally, Bone, Nye, Clark, and Borah.

In

1this final attempt to reach a decision on permanent neutrality legislation, all of the Senate alignments on this problem were ably represented. The Debate Is On An Overview of the Debate News reports on April 30, told the story of the de­ bate the previous day. lined its report:

The New York Times, for example, head­

"Neutrality Bill Adopted in Rush— Both

Houses of Congress Push Aside Other Matters to Enact Permanent 1Legislation."2

With other matters pushed aside, Senator Pitt­

man opened the debate urging acceptance of the bill agreed up­ on in committee.

His speech was short and was followed by

Senator Johnson who doggedly held to his original convictions -

Conference committee bill in Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 3937-3939. 2 April 30, 1937, p. 1.

189

! | l land found them unaltered by the compromise bill. Senator Vani : !j ndenberg, who had been reasonably well pleased with the original iPittman bill, was the first spokesman of the strict neutrality ;bloc.

He condemned the discretion given the President under

jthe new bill.

Senator Lewis spoke immediately after Vandenberg

and refuted the position held by the Michigan Senator.

The

discretion in the final bill appealed to him on the basis of the arguments he had been offering since 1935 for a loose, flex­ ible law.

Support for the bill continued when Senators Robinson

and Connally addressed the Senate.

The latter speaker took is­

sue with VandenbergTs arguments. The opposition to the committee report came from Sen;ator Bone who presented his arguments in a speech interrupted by exchanges with Senator Connally.

When Bone finished, Nye

took up the attack on the bill and was supported by Clark.

The

final period of the debate was monopolized by these representa­ tives of the strict neutrality bloc until Borah took the floor to challenge some of the arguments offered by Clark.

Following

a speech by Borah for the bill, Clark summarized his position and the final vote was taken. Summary of the Arguments Senator Pittman explained the changes made by the con­ ference committee and emphasized that the bill contained two important provisions for keeping the nation out of war.

These

were prohibition of travel in belligerent vessels and restric­ t i o n against the arming of American merchantmen.

Both of these

190

provisions had been in the Senate bill and remained in the fi­ nal law.

The major change, he pointed out, was in allowing the

President discretion in cash-and-carry.

This, he said, would

not destroy the effectiveness of the law because the President would feel morally bound to put the provision into effect when he declared that a state of war existed.

In his summation,

Pittman revealed that the main strength of the bill probably lay in the two original Senate provisions which had been retained by the conference committee.

A certain cautious approval of Pres­

idential discretion in cash-and-carry was noted in his conclusion. I feel that in preserving, as we did, the provision with regard to our citizens traveling on belligerent vessels, and with regard to the arming of our ships, if we had nothing else, that would remove one of the chief causes which drag neutral countries into war. I have confidence that the President will put into force and effect these provisions if it appears necessary. I would rather have had section 2 (cashand-carry) mandatory; but I have no complaint to make against any member of the conference. All the con­ ferees were sincere and worked sincerely. I, there­ fore, heartily accept the conference report.! Senator Johnson followed, insisting that the law was enacted in response to an nemotional urge” and would not keep the nation out of war.

He opposed the principle of cash-and-

carry and especially opposed the discretion given to the Pres­ ident in the law.

This, he argued, conferred on the President

the virtual power of declaring war.2

When Johnson had con-

Ieluded, Vandenberg declared that the original Senate bill had j

gone to the extreme border of Presidential discretion and that 1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3942. 2

Ibid.

jjthe conference report had crossed that limit. He opposed | [discretion because it transferred the war-making power to the I .President and placed on his shoulders an impossible task of jiusing the discretion wisely.

He cited the World War exper­

ience in which the Executive had the responsibility of main­ taining neutrality and could not do so.

His proposal, urged

Vandenberg, would be to determine a neutrality formula ahead of time.

This would set the course a President could follow.1 Lev/is clashed with Vandenberg on the issue of Presi­

dential discretion.

The President, argued Lewis, should have

full power to handle a situation as it arose.

In the first

place, he insisted, this nation would be placed in a ”commerjcial strait jacket” by mandatory provisions.

The United States

was interested in a conflict which involved human liberty and :justice, and discretion would allow a President to adopt what­ ever policy would represent national interest in any specific conflict.

In addition, it was folly to place the responsibil­

ity for foreign relations on Congress.

Every time that some

new crisis arose Congress would have to be called into session to debate a new policy.2

He supported the pending measure be­

cause it allowed more discretion than any bill the Senate had voted upon. Senator Robinson repeated Pittmanfs belief that the President would act in good faith to enforce the necessary

Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3943. 2 Ibid.. p. 3944*

192

'I

l ] [jsafeguards.

He repeated his contention of the 1936 debate

i

[that the nation should not abandon all of its rights to carry jon trade.

Some restrictions would be necessary, but they

ijshould not be inconsistent with national interest.1 He was ' I :supported by Senator Connally who followed him speaking in ifavor of the measure.

Connally felt that one desirable fea­

t ure of the law was its discretionary provisions.

The Presi­

dent, he argued, should not sit like an automaton and register ;the will of Congress in every conceivable situation which might Iarise.

nEvery nation,” he said, "which has attempted to con-

;duct its foreign relations through its parliament has made a very serious mess of it.”2

This was in refutation of Vanden-

■berg's arguments for Congressional control of policy. Opposition to the conference report came from Senator Bone, who followed Connally and argued that the effect of Pres­ idential discretion would be to place the war-making power in the hands of one man.

This power, he declared, he would not

give to ”my own mother.”

The real issue, he insisted, was

that those who supported a flexible cash-and-carry were plac­ ing a stamp of approval upon war trade and profits.

He re­

peated his arguments of previous debates that the cost of defending those profits was greater than the benefits of trade.3

He referred to recent polls in which the people ex­

pressed a desire to avoid a repetition of the World War

_

— -

Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3945. 2 Ibid., p. 3946. 3

Ibid., p. 3947.

experience and maintained that the conference hill did not represent that wish. !

i

Connally interrupted to declare that Congress still

had the power to declare war and to pass appropriations. would respond to national sentiment in any case.

It

He accused

Bone of possessing admirable ideals to which everyone sub­ scribed.

But the world was materialistic and ambitious which

Ishould prompt a realistic approach to the problem.^

To this,

Bone replied that the only idealist in the Senate was the man who thought that his ideals were worth the lives of an army of ;boys.

The effect of the discretionary bill would have been to

|idealize war trade and war profits.

Bone agreed with Vanden-

1berg that discretionary provisions in the law transferred the war-making power to the President.2 Agreeing that no one could foresee all future situa­ tions, Wye argued that from past experience some certainties could be predicted.

On the basis of the World War experience,

the pending measure was inadequate, for the heart of the prob­ lem was defense of war trade.

The experience of the World War

had taught that discretionary power in the hands of the Pres­ ident did not secure the nation from involvement in the war.3 1

3948.

Congressional Record, 75th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 39472 Ibid., p. 3949. 3

Ibid., p. 3954* Seymour, op. cit.» draws a different conclusion from the World War experience concerning strict, man­ datory neutrality laws: TTThe policy of legislating automatic embargoes before the outbreak of war or before the character of the crisis can be appreciated is open to serious objections.

I ;Clark agreed with Nye and argued that it would he better to I i j!

|restrict the profits of a few individuals than risk plunging jthe nation into war.l

Nye continued to express his opposition

to the measure by insisting that there was no such right as i jfreedom of the seas in time of war, so that a mandatory law ! ' !,would not deprive the nation of some essential or sacred right, |He asked that the Senate adopt the old neutrality law of 1936 Iuntil a more intelligent course” could be worked out*

No

parent, he concluded, would be willing to jeopardize the life Iof a son to protect war trade,2 i l |

Senator Borah took the floor to repeat that he had

not changed his mind on opposing cash-and-carry, but that he would support the conference report because of its discretion­ ary features*

He declared:

I believe thoroughly in the discretionary features of the cash-and-carry provision, I will go further and say that in my opinion, in all probability it will never be put into effect by any President, I think the economic and financial situation will con­ trol in such conditions. But whether it is or not, there ought to be some discretion about it, and I feel, therefore, that the law will not be weakened by having that discretionary power lodged with the President.3

Any policy designed to operate automatically in a certain way, under conditions which cannot be exactly foreseen, will break down if conditions develop othervd.se than expected. The best example is the embargo upon general loans to belligerents^im­ posed by Mr. Bryan in August 1914* which in the changed circum­ stances of the following year could not be maintained.11 (pp.

174-175.) Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3955. 2 Ibid., pp. 3957-3958. 3 Ibid., pp. 3959-3960.

195

In refutation of this, Senator Clark repeated the arguments presented earlier in the debate that the load on the President would be lessened if Congress established a policy ahead of the need to apply it.

He referred again to the World War ex­

perience and the failure of Wilson to control the events lead­ ing to war.

Borah replied that trade might have hastened the

entrance into the war, but that the real cause of United States* participation was that "Rightly or wrongly, wisely or unwisely, we were unwilling that the Central Powers should win."!

Therefore, he concluded, experience indicated that the

nation would not go to war unless it was felt that the inter­ est of the country was involved.

Clark remained unconvinced

and closed the debate by repeating that a mandatory provision was needed to make the law workable and that having no law was preferable to the discretionary measure sent out from the conference committee.2 In the final vote, the members of the strict neu­ trality bloc held to their contention that having no law was better than a discretionary law. The members of the bloe which grew out of the mu­ nitions committee two years ago, including Senators Nye of North Dakota, Bone of Washington, Clark of Missouri, and Vandenberg of Michigan, all voted against the conference committee substitute, al­ though they had voted for the original Pittman re­ solution with its mandatory section. Only six Sen­ ators voted against the Pittman measure, compared to fifteen against the compromise passed today.3 1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3960

2 Ibid.. p. 3962. 3 New York Times. April 30, 1937, p. 10.

j|This presented the unusual spectacle of the strongest propo­ nents of neutrality legislation voting to leave the nation ! j,

jh/srith no such law at all*

Senator Borah voted for the confer-

ii

;jence report, but he was the only one to change his vote of ji

|the six who had opposed the original Pittman bill.

In the

jfinal tally, forty Democrats and one Republican voted for the

ji

bill against ten Republicans and five Democrats in opposition* A large bloc of the Senate, thirty-nine members, were recorded as absent or not voting on the measure.1 Analysis Of The Debate The Proposition for Debate The proposition for debate was, Resolved:

That, the

Conference Report on Senate Joint Resolution #51 be enacted in­ to law.

This resolution embraced munitions control, the arms

embargo, and provided for cash-and-carry under Presidential discretion.

Opponents of the report did not suggest any amend­

ments to the bill, and the proposition did not change through­ out the debate. Uncontested Argument Uncontested argument remained the same as in the de­ bate on the Pittman bill. only issue in dispute.

The cash-and-carry section was the

Both sides accepted all other parts

of the bill which remained essentially unchanged in the confer­ ence committee’s bill.

It was still the professed objective

1 Congressional Record. 75th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3962.

of both sides to adopt a policy which would serve to keep the jnation out of war.

Both sides again indicated that specific

|control of war profits was not a part of the proposed neutral­ i t y legislation.

No new types of argument or evidence were

!!

'used in the discussion on the uncontested argument.

Senator

||Bone again referred to human suffering in war and was supported |:by Senator Nye in appealing to the people whose sons would have Ito fight another war.

Spokesmen for the resolution were less

I intent on picturing the horrors of war but implied that they ;were just as opposed to sending anybody to battle as were Nye and Bone.

Except for Pittman*s reference to the other provis­

i o n s of the bill, every speaker turned his attention to the cash-and-carry provision. The Issue in Dispute In discussing the debate, one source observed the conference committee’s acceptance of the House provision on cash-and-carry and declared that tTThe opposition to the com­ promise bill in the Senate grew out of this concession.nl This was the issue in the debate:

Should the President have

discretionary authority to put cash-and-carry into effect? On this issue the strict neutrality bloc fought the bill and voted against it, while supporters of the bill attempted a defense of this controversial feature.

1 New York Times. April 30, 1937, p. 10.

Argument on the Issue j

Arguments offered by the proponents of the confer­ ence hill.— ■ I |j 1* The President would he morally bound to put the jprovision into effect. ij

_

|

Presented by Pittman and Robinson, this argument con—

jsisted of little more than an expression of hope, but the im­ plication was that the President by virtue of his office would

I!i

Iact in good faith and be consistent with the spirit of the law and wishes of the people.

Opponents of presidential discre-

||tion had a possible opening for challenging the accuracy of Ithat assertion in historical evidence.

They chose, however,

|to refute the argument by terming it irrelevant on the grounds !

that their opposition to discretionary authority arose from no personal distrust of any President but from the difficulty which any President would face in attempting to use his discre­ tionary authority wisely.

The fact, opponents of discretionary

ipower argued, that a Presidents position required the assump­ tion of trust in any one holding that office did nothing to dispel the difficulty a chief executive faced in administering la neutrality law. ij

2.

Presidential discretion would be more effective

because of unforeseen conditions which a strict congressional policy could not provide for. In developing this argument through causal reasoning,

1 New York Times. April 30, 1937, p. 10.

Lewis and Connally asked their audience to imagine the probjable effect of a mandatory neutrality law. jthat effect in form of a d.ilemma:

Lewis expressed

If a foreign country fol—

|!

!lowed a different course from that predicted in the law, Conijgress could rush back into session and debate a new law for

i|

|ievery occasion that arose; or the law could continue to operjate in ignorance of the changed conditions and produce unde­ sirable or negative results.

To this dilemma, the strict neu-

, i

trality bloc applied their basic assumption that the causes operating in a past war would operate in a future conflict. jNye asserted that certain causes were bound to repeat them-

j selves

and could be predetermined.

Therefore, Lewis1 dilemma

ijrested upon a false assumption that in no way would a future .situation possess the characteristics of a past occasion. |

Connally made the generalization, without citing

specific evidence, that other nations which had allowed the legislative branch to control foreign affairs had found even­ tually the need for Executive direction.

Borah repeated his

assertion of the previous debate that the cause of entry into the World War was not war trade but sympathy for the Allies. He had referred to Wilson’s own statements as evidence in the previous debate.

The application to the argument on presi­

dential discretion was that in future situations the attitude of the people could not be foreseen; and since this attitude was a cause of participation in a war, no neutrality law could specifically promise to eliminate that cause.

Executive dis­

cretion would be more effective in dealing with future problems

of this type.

Borah admitted the difficulty of proving his

thesis on the cause of entry into the World War, hut he sug­ gested it as reasonably well-founded. j |

3.

The nation should not surrender its rights to

ifreedom of the seas under a mandatory cash-and-carry law. ij

■

This was an extension of the important argument ad­

vanced by the opponents of cash-and-carry in the previous dell

j|

jjbate.

Under the debate on the conference report, the defenders

of freedom of the seas became the proponents of the bill on the basis that discretionary cash-and-carry carried less danger to ifreedom of the seas than a mandatory law.

The premises on

iwhich the argument rested were the same as they had been in the previous debate: First, there was an actual right to free; j Idom of the seas, and second, defense of that right was essen­ tial to national interest. |in this debate.

Pittman was in an unusual position

In the debate on the original bill, he had

argued as an opponent of these premises.

In this debate on the

conference bill, he was supporting that bill and found himself on the same side as Borah and Johnson.

The brunt of the de­

fense, therefore, fell in the arguments of Lewis, Robinson, and Borah as exponents of freedom of the seas.

Lewis and Robinson

projected the future probable effects of surrendering freedom of the seas, and from these effects concluded that the attempt to surrender this right would create greater evils than the re­ tention of freedom of the seas in wartime.

The defenders of

freedom of the seas argued that lack of respect for these rights by belligerents in the World War had not been the major cause

jjOf American involvement, for as they had asserted previously, i ! i ] !The American sympathy for the Allies constituted the greater jlcause for participation in the war. This cause bore no rela1 ; Ition to freedom of the seas. The conclusion from all of this |argument was that under mandatory cash-and-carry, the nation would be surrendering an essential right to freedom of the Iseas for no logical cause. Arguments offered by the opponents of the conference bill.— 1.

Discretionary authority transfers the war-making

power to the President. This argument had occurred in the previous debate and rested upon the evidence of Wilson’s lone hand in deter­ mining neutrality policy in the World War.

Opponents of pres­

idential discretion reasoned from this evidence that since there had been no neutrality law and as America had entered the war, Y/ilson’s attempts at Executive neutrality had failed to prevent participation in the war.

Although there was an

obvious failure to establish completely the causal connection between Executive policy and entry into the war, proponents of Presidential discretion did not refute the reasoning of the strict neutrality bloc.

In further development of the argu­

ment of the war power inherent in presidential discretion, Vandenberg, Nye, and Bone suggested the probable effect that a President could distinguish between aggressor and victim in a war by the manner of exercising his discretion under a neu­ trality law.

As they had done in the first debate on the Pitt-

J

202

i j p a n bill, these speakers associated the concept of sanctions jjas an effect of executive discretion, giving the argument fur­ ther acceptability for the audience, fearful of any hint of Ibecoming involved in sanctions.

At this point, the contention

ji

|jof those who saw no danger in executive discretion was that a

j i president

would not apply the equivalent of sanctions if that

ii

!|were contrary to national welfare. 2.

The exercise of Executive discretion would be too

jdifficult a task for one man to fulfill effectively. Vandenberg and Nye presented this argument and refer­ r e d their audience to the example of Wilson in the World War. This reference was never developed in detail, but it was sug­ gested that Wilson had found the pressures too great to resist in attempting to maintain neutrality.

It was asserted that

; |another President would be similarly unable to act in the in­ terest of the nation amid the pressure of individual and pri­ vate interests with a stake in the war.

No direct refutation

was made to this argument, but the contention of Pittman and Robinson that a President would act in good faith constituted a partial answer for the implications in Vandenberg and Nye’s argument.1

:

1 The Implications that Wilson yielded to pressure to force the nation into the World War is denied and discussed in Seymour, bn. cit. Seymour contends, from evidence he presents, that Wilson . . never gave any indication that any^financial or commercial Interests in' the United States could bring pres­ sure upon him, the Department of State, or Congress. The only pressure that affected him came from the German submarine.” (pp. 137-138.)

|

3*

The effect of Presidential discretion would be

to allow unrestricted war trade. This argument assumed most importance of any offered by the opponents of the discretionary bill.

Paced by Bone,

jjNye, and Clark, the neutrality bloc attempted to establish a [causal connection between presidential discretion in a neutral! ity law and unrestricted war trade. This they did by drawing [upon the first two arguments, to support the Validity of this ]third argument.

They argued that because the exercise of any

discretion in the law was too difficult a job for one man and because such discretion vested the war-making power in the Pres­ ident, no sincere holder of that office would desire to assume the responsibilities inherent in effectively exercising the powers granted under the neutrality law. Therefore, he would i n o t apply the restrictions on trade which had been the intent of the law.

This made the connection between discretionary law

and unrestricted war trade complete; for in failing to use the power given him, the President actually permitted a war trade jas extensive as though there had been no neutrality law at all. To cement the argument further, the opponents of executive dis­ cretion added the further possibility that a President might attempt to use the powers under the law in such a way as to discriminate in trade between belligerents.

This led directly

back to the argument that sanctions could result from a dis­ cretionary neutrality law.

The conclusion offered by the op­

ponents of a discretionary law was that the powers either would never be used, with the effects discussed; or the powers would

Ibe used contrary to the national welfare. i!

!j

Correlating their arguments, the strict neutrality

jbloe maintained that their case had shown that the causes of jjAmerican participation in the World War had been determined ij

land that to prevent involvement in a future war, those causes j l [had to be eliminated. They would not be eliminated under a Ijdiseretionary neutrality law because Presidential discretion jfwould allow the identical causes to operate in a future conjflict, and logically, involvement in the war would result. jTo refute this case, the proponents of a discretionary law re­ ferred again to their challenge of the premise that causes of the World War had been correctly isolated and to their asseri

tion that a future conflict might not contain the identical

jcauses as those present in past wars.

A strict neutrality law,

therefore, rested upon asserted premises which could prove [false when future situations tested their validity. Contemporary Reaction To The Debate In general, the focus of public reaction to the de­ bate was on (1) would the neutrality act be effective in keep­ ing the nation out of war?; and (2) was the discretionary pro­ vision on cash-and-carry desirable? In predicting the effectiveness of the law to achieve ;its objective of keeping the nation out of war, contemporary comment was not optimistic.

With its usual negativism, the

Chicago Tribune belittled the law and declared that "The new law will not satisfy a great many people, but it will at least please such persons as think that the munition makerfs daughter1

jdiamond necklace is the chief cause of most conflicts."1

The

jsame source concluded its opinion of the law by noting that j"So long as the law isnft needed, it may work well enough, al­ though there are people who say that the United States may be jjsetting up a rotten precedent for itself."2 Edwin L. James | ; in the New York Times was willing to give the law a try, but She was skeptical of its effectiveness.

"Its theory," he wrote,

["is clear; it is intended to keep the United States out of war. Rut it is far from clear that in practice it will have any such [effect."3

Some comment was more optimistic.

As another source

declared, "Probably no laws that could be enacted would guar­ antee to do this, but the new law should help."4

As had been

[the case in previous neutrality legislation, contemporary com­ ment indicated a more skeptical attitude on the effectiveness of the laws than was noticeable among the proponents of such laws in the Senate debate. The power given the President under the cash-andcarry provision aroused most comment.

The general reaction

indicated more favor for the mandatory law which the confer­ ence committee had rejected.

One source thought that the ac­

tion of the committee had "pulled the teeth of the bill as it was passed by the Senate two months ago,"5 and the Nation \

T

~ ~

Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1937, p. 10.

2 Ibid. 3 New York Times, May 2, 1937, sec. P* 3. 4 Christian Century. LIV (May 12, 1937), p. 604* 5Time, XXIX (May 10, 1937), pp. 15-16.

206

complained: The Neutrality Act as finally adopted by the House and Senate is a far cry from either the mandatory law desired by our isolationists or the flexible meas­ ure advocated by those who support the idea of col­ lective security. As it stands it does little more than place in the hands of the President the final choice of the side we shall support in the next war In its final form the ”cash-and-carry” provision was made discretionary with the President. Thus it lies with the Chief Executive to decide after the out­ break of war whether we shall attempt to send goods to both sides and run the risk of having American ships sunk, or limit our trade to the nation which happens to control the seas. This, it scarcely needs to be

Another comment was that the law embargoes arms automatically iut left trade in other goods unrestricted, and ”If raw mater­ ials can be obtained along with foodstuffs, the supplies of a hation at war can be provided for . . .”2

The Christian Cen-

£ury which had supported mandatory neutrality laws was critipal of both the method used and the results obtained. Exactly the manner forecast . . . was resorted to by administration forces to jam a neutrality bill through Congress during the afternoon of April 29. Having contrived a synthetic crisis by waiting until the last moment when a bill could be enacted and signed without involving a lapse in the existing legislation . . . the conference committee rushed out a ”compromise” bill which was essentially the discretionary measure sought by the White House. This was pushed through Congress without any real debate; then with all the flourishes of a movie thriller*s finale, it was flown to the President, who was fishing somewhere in the Gulf of Mexico, and became law just as the deadline was reached.3

1 Nation. CXLIV (May 8, 1937), p. 524* 2

Chicago Tribune, May 1, 1937, p. 10. 3 Christian Century. LIV (May 12, 1937), p. 603*

207

iWhat the results of the law would be, no one could foresee. |The most appropriate comment was probably that "Fnether the ;act, to run two years, will remain in force; whether, in the !event of war it might be quickly repealed . . . whether in ||another conflict it would work out to keep us from trouble— jail that remains to be seen."l

1 New York Times, May 2, 1937, sec. 4-> P* 3*

! 1| ] '

CHAPTER VI THE THEORY MEETS THE PRACTICE:

1939

1 ! I ; i :

The Slow Retreat From Neutrality During the two year limit placed upon the cash-and-

i!

I !carry provision, world events clearly indicated that congres­ sional attempts to legislate neutrality were soon to meet j;their severest test.

Attention was shifted from Europe to

the Ear East in the summer of 1937 when Japan launched its long-expected assault on China.

The President refused to de­

clare that a state of war existed between the two nations, and the Neutrality Act was not operative in relation to the conflict in the Far East.

The President and Secretary Hull

carried their assault on the neutrality laws and the isola­ tionist philosophy in general throughout 1937 and 1933.

One

of the Presidents most famous speeches was delivered in Chi­ cago on October 5, 1937, in which he attacked the theories of isolationism upon which the neutrality acts had been based. In this famous, "Quarantine Speech”, the President called for "positive endeavors to preserve peace.”1

As the "epidemic

of world lawlessness” to which the President referred in this speech continued to spread in Europe and the Far East, Hull declared that ”There is one thing that we cannot do; and that _

_

Address at Chicago, October 5, 1937, in Bartlett, Record of American Diplomacy, pp. 377-530. 208

is, to prepare and to place before every government of the :world a detailed chart of the course of policy and action i|which this country will or will not pursue under any particii

jular set of circumstances."1 As the Japanese continued to advance in China, and

|j

the German absorption of Austria and Czechoslovakia fomented j :a European crisis, the retreat from isolation "seemed inter­ minably slow."2

Public opinion polls indicated a realization

that a general European war could involve the United States in some way.

A Gallup poll question, "If there is such a war,

do you think the United States will be drawn into it?", was ■answered in the affirmative by thirty-eight per cent of those questioned in January, 1937.

The percentage of affirmative

replies rose to fifty-eight in April of 1939 and to seventysix in August of that year.3

At the same time, the percentage

in favor of the isolationist supported national war referendum i

fell from seventy-three in October, 1937, to fifty-eight in March of 1939.4

A question, "If Germany and Italy go to war

!against England and France, do you think we should do every:thing possible to help England and France win, except go to war?", brought an affirmative reply from sixty-nine per cent of those polled in February, 1939.5

'

A strong majority of

I Bartlett, op. cit.. p. 593• 2 Ibid.. p. 588. 3 Public Opinion Quarterly. Ill (October, 1939), pp.

581-607. 4

Ibid. 5 Ibid.

210

Ieighty-four per cent in March of 1939 favored sending food (Supplies to England and France, but were opposed to invol­ ving the army and navy abroad. Most indications of favor I ; Ifor aid to those countries still opposed military involvei | Iment.l In June, 1939, seventy-two per cent opposed sending I;arms to Japan.2

one interesting feature of national attitudes

iin these years was the focus of interest on Europe.

The prin­

cipal attack and defense of the neutrality acts and of the isolationist philosophy was made with less emphasis upon the Far East than upon Europe. Isolationism may have been weakening in public opin­ ion, but nThe isolationists appeared to hold Congress firmly in their control.T!3

The cash-and-carry provision of the 1937

Act had never been applied by the President, and the provision expired on May 1, 1939, with no action having been taken by the Congress to renew it. in force.

The rest of the 1937 Act remained

Committee hearings were held in the Senate from

April 5 to May 8 in an attempt to reach agreement on the re­ newal of cash-and-carry.A

After conflicting testimony from

such authorities as Henry Stimson, Bernard Baruch, Charles Fenwick, Raymond Buell, and Hugh Johnson, the Committee reached 1 Public Oninion Quarterly. Ill (October, 1939), pp. 581-607.

2 Ibid. 3 Bartlett, op. cit.. p. 588. 4 Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April 5-May 8, 1939.

211

no solution and decided to postpone the neutrality problem indefinitely. |

j

The Administration and the State Department were

intent on reaching a solution, however; and their "strategy

i

! . . . was to center upon one feature of it alone, the arms I ' ' ! jembargo."1 Accordingly, Hull transmitted to Senator Pittman i i ! jand Congressman Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee jon May 27, a six point program "providing for the safeguardi

jing of our nation to the fullest possible extent from incur>ring the risks of involvement in war . . ."2

This program

Ieliminated the existing arms embargo and provided for the es­ tablishment of combat areas through which American ships and ji i jcitizens could not travel. It provided that all goods exported from the United States to any belligerent must be sold on a cash-and-carry basis, and continued the existing legislation i on loans and credits and munition licensing.3 These proposals ■were incorporated into the Bloom bill which was debated in the iHouse of Representatives and passed on June 30, 1939.4

One

!important change was made in this bill from Hullfs original program.

This was the retention of an embargo on arms and

munitions but not on implements of war, which meant that air­ planes could be sold to belligerents.

Senator Pittman proposed

~T

:

Bartlett, op. cit.. p. 588. 2 Ibid., p. 602. 3 Ibid., p. 602. 4 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 79837990

212

|that the repeal of the entire arms embargo be included in jthe Senate bill before it was reported on the floor for deIjbate.

The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations received

jPittmanTs proposals and the House bill early in July. !

The alignment on neutrality in 1939 was somewhat

M

different from that in previous years. Instead of three blocs, | i jjthe strict neutrality, the isolationists, and the AcLminis tra­ ction, there were actually only two as the demand for repeal of ! !;the arms embargo took definite form. There were the repeal | j ;!and the anti-repeal blocs. In the latter were now combined the forces of the strict neutrality bloc and the isolationists. jiFor the issue was not freedom of the seas which had formerly jsplit these groups, but rather to the anti-repeal bloc it was ja question of taking active steps to involve the nation in a j .foreign war. On this issue, the isolationists and the neutrali |ity bloc joined hands. "By July 7," wrote one source, "the anti-repeal bloc consisted of such names as Borah, Johnson, jNye, Clark, LaFollette, Vandenberg, Bone, Lodge, and nearly thirty o t h e r s . T h i s group declared that they were "unal­ terably opposed to the repeal or modification of the present neutrality law."2

Senator Johnson had thirty-four signatures

?:to a manifesto which "amounted to a threat to filibuster against lifting the arms embargo."3 ,

_

_

.

Francis 0. Wilcox, "The Neutrality Fight in Congress: 1939," American Political Science Review. XXXIII (October, 1939), n. 823* 2 Ibid. 3 Newsweek, XIV (July 17, 1939), p. 18.

213

j The Administration hopes for repeal of the arms em' i j|hargo as war threatened in Europe rested upon approval of the j!

||Pittman proposals by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. i jjOf the tv/enty-three members on the Committee, the Administra3! Jtion could count on eleven as certain.1 Ten were practically ii

sure to vote against the repeal m e a s u r e . 2

The final decision

rested upon two uncertain votes, George of Georgia, and Gil­ lette of Iowa.

Rather unfortunately for Administration hopes,

ithese two Senators had been intended "purge" victims when the President sought their defeat in State senatorial elections. To what extent this influenced their final decision is, of 1course, indeterminable.

On July 11, these two men joined the

i ;anti-repeal bloc to vote twelve to eleven for postponement of i | ;!Senate debate on repeal of the embargo. This action killed .the chances of the Administration bill for that session of Con­ gress.

"Making no attempt to conceal his anger, the President

accused Senate isolationists of playing into the hands of the dictators . . ."3

Senator Thomas of Utah, an Administration

supporter on the Committee, declared "I, myself, have always felt that the action of the Senate Committee on that day was a green light to Hitler . . .

I mark that day down as the cul­

mination of all the false thinking which held our country in .

..

Pittman, Harrison, Wagner, Connally, Thomas, Murray, Schwellenbach, Pepper, Green, Barkley, and Guffey.

2 Clark, Van Nuys, Reynolds, Borah, Johnson, Capper, Vandenberg, White, LaFollette, Shipstead. 3 Newsweek, XIV (July 24, 1939), p. 13.

214

regard to international relations since 1919. On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland, and the European war had begun.

Circumstances which had been dis­

cussed as future possibilities in neutrality debates of 193$ through 1937 were now realities.

The neutrality bloc had suc­

ceeded in holding the lead for these years.

With the outbreak

of war, the Administration was determined to break this bloc. The Committee Votes Repeal As German armed forces moved swiftly into Poland in September, the Administration moved as rapidly to determine American neutrality policy.

On September 3, President Roose-

Ivelt spoke by radio to the nation and declared that "There will be no blackout of peace in the United States."2

The

United States would be neutral in the conflict, he said, but |he could not ask every American to remain neutral in thought, for "Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his mind or his c o n s c i e n c e . ”3

it was known that the supporters of repeal in­

tended to resume the battle they had lost in July.

A special

session of Congress would be required inasmuch as the lawmakers had gone home in August.

According to Stephen T. Early, White

House secretary, the President n. . . felt that the sooner the session could get under way the sooner it would end . . .

Af­

ter doing a good bit of telephoning with various leaders . . .

Letter to the writer from Senator Elbert Thomas, January 30, 1950.

2 New York Times. September 3 Ibid.

4>

1939, p. 1-

jhe felt that the time had come for the call."l

Accordingly,

i

the special session was set for September 21, and leaders of both sides in the fight began their preparations. :

On September 12, Senator Borah met with Vandenberg,

|Nye, Barbour, and Townsend and declared that these and other jSenators would fight "to the last ditch any effort to limit I debate on neutrality amendments" and would oppose repeal of the arms e m b a r g o . 2

Referring to the anti-repeal bloc, one

source commented: To the side of the thinning-maned Lion (Borah) came a wide variety of men, notable examples of how the great debate crossed party lines. To lead the group on the floor came Missouri’s Bennett Clark, still remembering how his father, Speaker Champ Clark, fought and distrusted another World War Pres­ ident; Wisconsin1s LaFollette, North Dakota’s Nye and Frazier, Michigan’s Vandenberg, Idaho’s Clark, West Virginia’s Holt, Washington’s Bone, North Caro­ lina’s Reynolds, California’s historic isolationist Hiram Johnson.3 The Administration was also planning its strategy and indi­ cated that the floor manager for the debate would be Senator James Byrnes of South Carolina, described by Time magazine as "the slickest, most persuasive man in the Senate for leader­ ship to combat an isolationist filibuster."4

This same source

held that he v/ould need all of this talent because no one on the pro-repeal side could "orate with the power and clarity 1 New York Times, September 15, 1939, p. 13. 2 Ibid., September 12, 1939, p. 1* 3 Time. XXXIV (September 25, 1939), p. 12. 4 Ibid.

216

land command of Borah; no one on the other side is as agile i

land knowing a parlimentarian as Bennett Clark.”1 IByrnes would be Pittman and Connally.

Assisting

Speakers for both

|sides wasted no time in opening public debate on the issue, for during the first three weeks of September there were sev­ eral important radio addresses presenting both sides of repeal of the arms embargo to the people.

Senator Thomas of Utah

called on the nation to give up the "impartial dream" which never had held when the country’s sense of justice was out­ raged*

He urged repeal and declared it was possible to carry

on peaceful pursuits during a war without being a party to I

that war.2

The anti-repeal bloc made a greater drive before

the special session, represented in radio speeches by Borah,3 Vandenberg,4 and Lindbergh who made his first formal speech since August, 1931*5

These speakers stressed the theme that

repeal amounted to participation in the European war and that this war was not the concern of the United States. Public opinion polls which had been taken during the year on the question of changing the neutrality act indicated that supporters of repeal had a small majority of popular opinion in their favor. ,

In April, fifty-seven per cent favored — _

_

Time, XXXIV (September 25, 1939), p* 12.

2 New York Times, September 12, 3 Ibid., September 16, 1939, p. 4 Ibid., September 17, 1939, p. 5 Ibid., September 16, 1939, p.

1939, p. 1* 1* 1* 1.

217

I!a change in the law to sell war materials to England and [ I !|France. This percentage fell to fifty per cent in August, |jhut it had risen to sixty-two per cent after the actual outji

jbreak of war.l

At the same time, the percentage was very

| jdefinitely in favor of requiring cash for any materials the two nations purchased in this country.

Ninety per cent of

j

j!those polled insisted upon cash payments for goods to belligj i jerents.2 |

By September 21, public interest in repeal of the em­

bargo was high.

On that date in the House chamber a joint

session of Senate and House opened the special session of the ■seventy-sixth Congress with the PresidentTs address.

"The

galleries were crowded to capacity, and hundreds of people unable to get inside lined the walks in front of the Capitol. !The largest force of police in recent years guarded the meet■ing."3

"It was,” declared one source, "a grim gathering of

men and women who greeted the President . . ."4

In his ad­

dress, the President asked that no group assume the exclusive label of the peace bloc, for regardless of party or section "the mantle of peace and of patriotism is wide enough to cover us a l l . "3

He reviewed the history of neutrality legislation

Public Opinion Quarterly, III (October, 1939), pp. 581-607.

2 Ibid., IV (March, 1940)* P* 65. 3 Hew York Times, September 22, 1939, p. 14* 4

Ibid. 5 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 10.

Ijfrom 1789 to 1939, and declared that with the exception of N ^Jefferson's embargo and the 1935 legislation, this nation had followed the principle of international law.

To those

.who sought to retain the arms embargo, he insisted they ^should be consistent and support the cutting off of all trade : | jin a thousand other articles needed by belligerents. Repeal i | l | ]of the arms embargo would have the effect of returning the 'nation to normal trade practices and the "age-old and timeihonored doctrine of international law.l

Present legislation

gave aid to the aggressors and denied it to the victim. The President asked for repeal of the arms embargo, the authority to establish combat zones through which American ships and citizens could not travel, and for authority to re­ quire transfer of title to all goods sold to belligerents. By this program, he asserted, "the United States will more probably remain at peace than if the law remains as it stands today. "2

In his conclusion he called on the Congress to show

the vforld that "we of the United States are one people, of one mind, one spirit, one clear resolution, walking before God in the light of the living."3

The joint session was concluded,

and the Senators went back to their chamber. As they walked through the rotunda of the Capitol, a crowd of women and men carrying small flags were pouring into the building. The guards held them

1 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 11. 2

Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 12.

219

| j ! : !

back until the Senators had passed, and then lined them up on each side of the passageway through the rotunda. The women took up a sort of chant: "No cash and carry. No cash and carry. No cash and carry."1

'

Both the Senate and House agreed to withhold full

j!debate on the President's proposals until a definite bill was |drawn up by the committees in each House.

During this period

iof time, "The heaviest flood of mail in the history of Congress"2 poured into the Capitol.

For example, Senator Wagner

of New York received two hundred thousand communications on the subject of repeal, and other Senators reported a similar deluge of opinion from the country as a whole. i

One source re-

ported that the "preponderence of their content still regis­ tered opposition to lifting the embargo or changing the Neu­ trality Act in any manner."3

Most opinion was for staying out

iof war, and many communications to Senators associated repeal of the embargo with participation in the war. The sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee were interestingly different in one respect.

Although the Com­

mittee consisted of twenty-three members,, only fourteen Demo­ cratic members participated in writing the draft of the final bill.

Behind closed doors, these fourteen^ met on September 23,

1 New York Times, September 22, 1939, p. 142 Ibid... October 1, 1939, sec. 4> P* 7. 3 Ibid., September 2 1 9 3 9 , p* 16. 4 Pittman, Connally, Thomas, Barkley, Wagner, Gillette, Reynolds, Murray, Green, Schwellenbach, George, Pepper, Guffey, Van Nuys. Harrison was absent because of illness.

to consider the preliminary draft of the bill prepared by iPittman, Connally, and Thomas,

The Republican members of

|the Committee and the lone dissident Democrat, Clark, were |

Inot invited to the preliminary hearings nor were they asked !to express their views.1

This barring of certain committee

jmembers was not unusual, for as one source pointed out, "other I :|groups had on many occasions held equally private meetings to jj

jjdraft legislation for final presentation to the whole eommitii 0

jtee."^

At the same time that the fourteen supporters of re­

peal were drafting the bill, the opposition members were meet­ ing to work out ways to defeat the proposal.

On September 25,

the final draft of the bill was referred to the entire Foreign ‘Relations Committee.

After study of the draft for three days,

the Committee voted sixteen to seven to send the bill to the Senate for debate.

It was a different result from the action

by the same Committee in July.3 debate on foreign policy"4

"The prospectively historic

was scheduled to begin on October 2

Galleries in the Senate had been well-filled all that week awaiting the start of the debate. trality Act of 1939

The provisions of the Neu­

followed the Presidents proposals and

were similar in many respects to the Bloom bill passed by the House in June.5 , berg,

_

It provided: .

White, Capper.

_

LaFollette,

_

Shipstead, Borah, Johnson, Vanden-

2 New York Times, September 24> 1939, p. 27. 3 Senator White

(Rep.) voted with the majority.

A New York Times, September 29, 1939, p. 1. 5 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 47-A9

221

1.

Vyhenever the President or the Congress by con­ current resolution found that there existed a state of war, the President should proclaim such fact and thereafter no American vessel could carry goods or passengers to the belligerents named in the proclamation.

2.

Thereafter, no goods could be exported to any belligerent until all right, title, and interest were transferred to some foreign government, agency, national or corporation. Arms could now be sold and exported provided title were transferred.

3.

The President would define combat areas, and no American citizen or vessel could travel through such areas. American ships could go to neutral ports, if they did not pass through these combat zones.

4-

No American citizen could travel on a belliger­ ent vessel.

5.

American merchantmen were forbidden to carry arms.

6.

Loans and credits to belligerents were prohibited.!

7.

The law did not apply to an American State at war with a non-American State.

8.

The provisions for licensing and control of muni­ tions were continued from the previous neutral­ ity acts.

| | | I ;

I | |

i

This bill repealed all previous neutrality acts, but many of the same provisions were reenacted with additional ones included, IMost in question was the elimination of the arms embargo.

On

October 2, Seventy Senators were in their seats as Senator Pittman opened the historic debate. Hours before, crowds of rain— soaked men and women jammed corridors vainly attempting to get gallery seats although 1 The original Committee draft allowed a ninety day extension of credit for short term obligations and^credits, but so strong was the opposition to this even within the re­ peal bloc that it was deleted during the month of debate.

guards shouted "there are no seats in the galleries; y o u ’ll have to take your chance in the line." As Senator Pittman started he had four volumes of the Congressional Record stacked on his desk, filled with slips of references for use in the argu­ ment. 1 Participants In The Debate Familiar Figures Many of the Senators who spoke in this debate were not new to the problem.

Death had taken from the Senate one

influential figure, J. Hamilton Le?uTis, whose opposition to neu trality laws characterized previous debates.

Still active in

the Senate were Senator Pittman, in his role as chairman of the powerful Foreign Relations Committee; the isolationist Capper from Kansas; the colorful representative of the anti­ repeal bloc, Borah, who was called by some "the best mind in the Senate;"2 the Administration battler, Connally; Michigan1s effective isolationist, Vandenberg; the familiar Gerald P. Nye Washington’s Schwellenbaeh; the authority and spokesman for international law, Thomas of Utah; Hiram Johnson still fight­ ing for isolation from European affairs; Tydings of Maryland; Clark of Missouri without whom no neutrality fight could have been complete; and the spokesman for disarmament, Frazier. These Senators had fought out the issues on neutrality pre­ viously, "but the intense struggle and interest in the debate on repeal of the embargo brought forth voluminous speaking

'

l Christian Science Monitor, October 3, 1939,

p

. 6.

2 From a poll of fifty-three correspondents in Washing ton, D.C., Life. VI (March 20, 1939), p. 16.

involving over thirty new personalities. New Figures |

Ernest Lundeen was a lawyer and senator for the Farmer-

Labor party from Minnesota.

He had been a member of the House

jof Representatives "intermittently since 1917"! and had "first 'won fame by arguing and voting against United States* entry in­ to the war. Washington knows him chiefly as a consistent champI lion of soldier bonuses . . ."2 He had served in the Minnesota I !House of Representatives for two terms in 1910-1914• had |been in the Spanish-American War and delivered the Memorial Day oration at National Cemetery, Arlington, Va., in 1919 upon ■invitation of the National Grand Army of the Republic.

He was

elected to the Senate upon the death of Governor Floyd Olson, nominee for the Senate, in 1936.3

He voted for the Pittman bill

in March of 1937. Claude Pepper was the "well-dressed, pleasant-voiced”4 senator from Florida, elected to the Senate without opposition in 1936.

He taught school before entering college and com­

pleted his law TiTorh after service in the World War.

In the

following years he taught law at the University of Arkansas and later practiced in his home state.

In politics he served

Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 14-

2 Ibid. 3 Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 544 Newsweek, IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15.

224

Iin the State House of Representatives and as a member of the State Democratic executive committee.1

He supported the Ad­

ministration in most domestic and foreign issues and voted !for both the Pittman bill and the compromise report in 1937. John Danaher was the Republican senator from Connect-

j

icut.

A lawyer, he was new to the Senate, having been elected

!in 193S.

In his home State he served as United States Attorney

j

|from 1922 to 1934> and as Secretary of State in Connecticut in I j 1932. Serving in the World War, he was a member of the Amer-

j

ican Legion.2

|

Robert Wagner had been active in Democratic circles

I in Hew York before his election to the Senate in 1933.

He was

!born in Germany, and after coming to Hew York had become a lawi yer, a member of the New York Assembly, and of the Hew York

j

| Senate from 1909 to 1918.

The last eight years in the State

senate, Wagner was Democratic leader.

Election as Lieutenant-

Governor, justice of the State Supreme Court, and finally the !United States Senate followed.

He had been influential in la-

;

j

bor legislation in his first years in the Senate and served

1 as chairman of the national Labor Board in 1933-34*3 Wagner i ! was declared to be "simple, genial, slow-moving;"4 and a "most l useful Senator in a constructive w a y . "5 !

|

~T

Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, ; 1939, p. IS! 2 Ibid., p. 15. i 3 Ibid.. p. 72. 4 Life. VI (March 20, 1939), p. 16. !| 5 i Ibid.

Josiah Bailey had been in the Senate since 1930 as |a Democrat from North Carolina.

A lawyer, Bailey served as

i'

ijUnited States collector of internal revenue for North Carolina ifrom 1913-1921. In his State he had been a member of the State r ! iBoard of Agriculture and a member of the State Constitutional |

j i

Commission in 1 9 1 5 Bailey supported the Administration on ^neutrality legislation and supported the Pittman and compromise ; bills in 1937. r Henry Cabot Lodge J r . brought a familiar name to the iSenate when he was elected in 1936 as a Republican from Mass­ achusetts.

His grandfather had been an important Senate figure

itwenty years before.

As a newspaperman he had worked on Boston

and New York papers and been a member o£ the House and Senate press galleries in Washington. General

In 1932 he was elected to the

Court of Massachusetts.2

He was described as

boyish-looking, socially prominent, liberal."3

in

..

1936 he had

"amazed old-timers by thrashing the veteran Governor James M. Curley in the senate race."4 who has

Lodge was "an effective speaker

won laborTs confidence . . ."5

He opposed boththe

Pittman and compromise neutrality bills in 1937. ~ " Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. S3. 2 Ibid., p. 47. 3 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 144 Ibid. 5 Ibid. ~

:

226

| i

Edward Burke was the Democratic senator from Nebraska

who was elected to the Senate in 1935* ;had served in the World War.

He was a lawyer and

Before his election to the Sen-

late he had been a member of the House in the seventy-third jCongress.l

He favored the Pittman bill in 1937 but had not

participated in the debates before 1939. |

Wallace White J r . was the only Republican member of

!the Foreign Relations Committee in 1939 to vote for a favorable !report on the repeal of the arms embargo. |it in July of that year.

He had voted against

A lawyer, he was elected to the sixty-

fifth through the seventy-first Congresses from his home state In 1930, White was elected to the Senate.

of Maine*

He had

served as United States* representative to several interna­ tional conferences on radio and telephonic communication in the Coolidge administration.

Holding honorary degrees from

Bowdain and Bates Colleges, he was a member of the Board of overseers of Bowdain.2

White joined the neutrality bloc to

oppose the compromise bill in 1937. W i lliam Bulow was a lawyer and Democratic Senator from South Dakota.

He had been a member of the State senate

and had been county judge,

city attorney, and mayor before his

election to the Senate in 1930.3

~ ~ Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 65.

’

I

He voted for the Pittman bill

2

Ibid., p. 43.

3 Ibid.. p. 108.

227

|and had sided with the neutrality bloc. !j

Robert Reynolds had come to the Senate from North

j!

jCarolina in 1932.

A lawyer and a Democrat he served as prose-

■l

jjcuting attorney for four years, and at that time he was the Ifirst Democratic prosecuting attorney ever elected in his disii

Ijtrict. :two tor

Reynolds traveled extensively and was the author of

books about his travels. in 1928.

He had been a

When nominated for

Presidential elec­

the Senate in 1932, Reynolds

had received the largest majority ever given a candidate for major office in a Democratic primary in North Carolina.1 ihad

opposed repeal

of the embargo in

jhis

committee vote in September.

He

July of 1939 but switched

Dennis Chavez was a Democrat from New Mexico elected |to the Senate in 1936.

He was a lawyer and had served as clerk

Iof the United States Senate in 1918-1919. In his home State j : I'he was a member of the legislature while practicing law. He was elected to the seventy-second and seventy-third Congresses ^before his service in the S e n a t e . 2

He favored the Pittman bill

in the 1937 vote and had sided with the neutrality bloc during these years. Alexander ¥Jiley was another newcomer to the Senate from Wisconsin. publican.

He was elected to the Senate in 193$ as a Re­

The only public office he had held prior to this

date was as District attorney for Chippewa county in his home

~

1

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, P- 83.

2

Ibid., p. 72.

22 8

||State from 1909 to 1915.-*-

There was no previous indication

j

;of his position on neutrality. .1

,

Guy Gillette. Democrat from Iowa, had come to the

i

(Senate in 1936 after serving in the seventy-third and seventyl|

fourth Congresses.

A lawyer, Gillette had been prosecuting

((attorney and a member of the State senate for four years. He ; ! jsaw service in the Spanish-American and World Wars and returned jfrom the latter to engage in farming in Iowa.2

"Big-framed,

■genial, conscientious . . . he ranks in Iowa as a keen student i ! of foreign affairs. In the House the last four years, he dis­ tinguished himself from other Democrats by voting against both the HRA and. the AAA on grounds they were unconstitutional.w3 Gillette and Senator George of Georgia had turned the vote against repeal in the Committee in July by voting with the iso­ lationists.

He switched his vote in September.

In 1937, he

supported both the Pittman and compromise bills. David Walsh was the Democratic Senator from Massachu­ setts elected to the Senate in 1918 as the first Democratic Senator since the Civil War from that State.

He was defeated

for reelection in 1924 but elected again in 1926 to succeed the late Henry Cabot Dodge.

A lawyer, Walsh served in the

Massachusetts House of Representatives as Lieutenant-Governor, 1

— ' Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 125. 2 Ibid., p. 32. 3 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15. "

229

land then in 1914 as Governor of the State,

He was delegate-

|at-large to all of the Democratic national conventions from j1912 to 1936,1 Walsh voted for the Pittman bill in 1937. i j Francis Maloney had been in the Senate since 1934* [He was a Democrat from Connecticut and had been a member of |the seventy-third Congress before his election to the Senate. He served in the navy during the World War and entered politics i

|as mayor of Meriden, Connecticut in 1930.2

Maloney had favored

Ii

|Presidential discretion in neutrality legislation and voted for the compromise bill in 1937. Pat HcCarran was Pittmanfs colleague from Nevada.

A

Democrat and a lawyer he had been elected to the Senate in 1932 [after a long career in State politics.

He had been a member

|of the Nevada legislature, district attorney, associate justice j

[and Chief Justice of the Nevada Supreme Court.

In addition he

served on the State Board of Pardons, Parole Commissioners, and I

Bar Examiners.

In 1922, he was vice-president of the American

Bar Association.

McCarran had been the author of many important

jlegal opinions on water, mining, corporation, and criminal law.3 jjHe was generally considered an isolationist and voted for the Pittman and compromise bills in 1937. Allen Ellender came to the Senate as a Democrat from Louisiana in 1936. ■

A lawyer and a farmer, he had served in the

j

“

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April :1939, p. 4-6.

i

2

Ibid.. p. 15.

3 Ibid., p. 67.

23 0

World War and as city and district attorneys in his home State. |He was a delegate to the constitutional convention of Louisi­ ana in 1921 and a member of the State House of Representatives !J

Ifor twelve years before his election to the United States Sen­ ate.

During the administration of Huey Long, Ellender was floor

j|leader in the State House of Representatives.!

According to

lone source, he had "ranked high in Huey Long»s machine."2

But

ihe was "no demogogue of the Long type," being "principally in­ terested in agricultural problems."3

One contemporary opinion

declared Ellender to be ". . . stocky, energetic, colorless."4 He followed the New Deal on voting and supported the Pittman Ibill in 1937. W. Warren Barbour was a Republican from New Jersey and had returned to the Senate in 1938 after being defeated for reelection in 1936.

He had originally been appointed to the Sen­

ate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Dwight Morrow in 1931.5

His political career began with election to the borough

council of Rumson, New Jersey.

He was elected mayor without op­

position for two terms and entered national politics as a delegateat-large to the 1928 national convention. 1

In the Senate he had

I

Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 41. 2 Newsweek, IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 11939, P. 6 ^

jj

jjserved on committees for military affairs, manufactures, li||

library, post offices and post roads, and rules.1 He was a memj i Iber of the Nye Committee in 1934-36 and supported the neutral-

jj

ity bloc in those years, :j

Prentiss

Brown,M. . . quiet,

athletic.

A personal

;j

jfriend of Mr. Roosevelt and a member of the House since 1932,n2 had been elected to the Senate from Michigan in 1936.

He was

a Democrat and had TTregularly voted with the Hew Deal.”3

A law­

yer, Brown, had been a prosecuting attorney for twelve years, and in 1930 upon recommendation of the State Supreme Court had been appointed to the State Board of law examiners. so served as chairman of himself he says: greater ability.* TT5

He had al­

Democratic state conventions.4

TThere are thousands

n0f

inMichigan of equal or

Broim voted for the Pittman bill in 1937.

Scott Lucas was new to the Senate, coming as a Demo­ crat from Illinois in 1938.

A lawyer, he had been States At­

torney and national judge advocate of the American Legion.

In

this latter organization, he had been state commander in 1926. Lucas was a delegate to the national convention of his party in 1932 and had been elected to the seventy-fourth and seventyfifth Congresses.6

It was assumed that he would support the

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. XXXII, pp. 443-444* 2 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), P* 15. 3 Ibid. 4 Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 50. 5 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15.

6 C.D., 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, pp. 23-24-

232

!Administration in the fight for repeal of the arms embargo. Charles Andrews was a Democrat from Florida, elected to the Senate in 1936.

He was a lawyer and had served in the

Spanish-American and World Wars.

In politics he had been sec-

!retary of the Florida State Senate, judge of the criminal court, jjand assistant attorney general of the State.

Andrews had also

||been president of the Florida State Bar Association.! jjtall, rawboned, slow-speaking, Townsendite . . . jjwith Townsend club backing”2 j_n 1936*

”. . .

he campaigned

He had supported the com-

I!promise bill in 1937. Edwin Johnson had come to the Senate from Colorado ilin 1936 after a successful term as Governor of that State.

A

:i

!Democrat,* "as Governor . . . Johnson achieved a balanced budget, showed marked sympathy for labor and for the New Deal, and effected government consolidations . . .”3

in Colorado,

he operated a farmers’ cooperative for ten years, served in the State House of Representatives, and as Lieutenant-Governor.4 iHe was described as a ” . . . hulking, rough and ready, ungram­ matical speaker . . .”3

in 1937, he supported the Pittman and

compromise bills.

“

1

“

”

~

”

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. IB. 2 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 14-* 3 Ibid., p. 1$. 4

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, i1939, P- 14. 5 Newsweek, IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15.

233

Matthew Neely was elected to the Senate in 1922, deIfeated for reelection in 1928 and again elected in 1930.

He

was from West Virginia, a lawyer, and a veteran of the Spanish:American War.

Neely practiced law in his State and served as

|mayor and clerk of the State House of Delegates before his elecjition to the sixty-third Congress in 1913.1

A Democrat, he sup-

ported the Administration in the Pittman bill in 1937. I

James Murray was a Democrat from Montana elected to

||the Senate in 1934* A lawyer, he had served as county attorney I' !'and chairman of the State advisory board, Montana P.W.A. in ;1933.^

Murray was a member of the Foreign Relations Committee

in 1939 and had supported the Administration in its attempt to repeal the embargo in July.

In previous neutrality voting he

jj

:followed Administration desires for discretionary legislation jand supported the Pittman and compromise bills in 1937. '

Charles Tobey came to the Senate in 1938 as a Repub-

; lican from New Hampshire.

He was a lawyer and had been in the

insurance, agriculture, banking, and manufacturing businesses. In politics he served in the State House of Representatives : and was speaker of that body in 1919.

He was elected to the

| State senate and became Governor of the State in 1929.

Tobey

!:

i was elected to the seventy-third through the seventy-fifth Congresses before his election to the Senate.3 =

—

-

His position —

Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, : 1939, p. 122.

2

Ibid., p. 64 . 3 Ibid.. pp. 67-68.

234 I

on neutrality had not been indicated. 1

George W. Morris was one of the oldest members of

|the Senate in point of service.

He came to the Senate from

|Nebraska in 1913 after serving in the House from the fiftyIeighth through the sixty-second Congresses.

He was an Inde-

;j

pendent in political affiliation. spent in Ohio on a farm.

His early life had been

Norris taught school to earn money

for college and studied law while teaching.

After moving to

Nebraska, he became a prosecuting attorney, and district Ijudge until his election to Congress.1

Norris had been one

|of the ”little group of willful men” who opposed President j Wilson in the Senate on American entry into the World War.

|Washington correspondents termed Norris ”a grand old man; ■i

jgreatest liberal of them all; the only real statesman in Con' j g r e s s . ”2 He had taken active leadership in many major pieces I Iof legislation in the Senate and had supported the original .proposals for the Nye Committee.

Dorothy Detzer indicated

|that Norris had backed Nye for the leadership of the munitions ,investigation.3

He had not been active in the debates on neu­

trality legislation but voted with the neutrality bloc in 11936 and 1937. I D. Worth Clark was Borah*s colleague in the Senate from Idaho. , _

-

j

A Democrat, Clark was elected to the Senate in “

-

-

^

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 65. 2 Life. VI (March 20, 1939), p. 16. 3 Detzer, op. cit*. pp. $-12.

235

1938.

He had practiced law in Idaho and served as assistant

attorney general of that state in 1933—34-

He was elected to

jthe seventy-fourth and seventy-fifth Congresses before his jSenate election.1

His exact position on neutrality had not

jbeen indicated, 'j I !

Frederick Hale had come to the Senate from Maine in He was a Republican and had served in the Maine legisla­

11916.

ture in 1905 while practicing law in that s t a t e . 2

Despite his

i|

jjlong service in the Senate, Hale had aroused no particular con! | ([temporary interest. He voted for the Pittman bill in 1937 but jjhad opposed the compromise report. ;j Rush Holt was a Democrat from West Virginia elected ! | j;to the Senate in 1934* He had attended public schools and col!i ;jlege in that state receiving his bachelorTs degree in 1924*^ _

'Despite his party affiliation, Holt opposed much of the Roose­ velt domestic and foreign policies and had favored a strictly mandatory neutrality law.

He voted with the neutrality bloc

in past legislation and opposed the compromise report in 1937. Sheridan Downey had been elected to the Senate as a ■Democrat from California in 1938. state.4

He had practiced law in that

Despite his newness to the Senate, Downey had gained

!|Some national prominence by his association with Upton SinclairTs ,

_

~

--

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939,

p.

30.

2 Ibid., p. 43 . 3 Ibid.,

4

p. 120.

Ibid., p. 8.

236 l|

pension plans and political ambitions in California.

Downey

had run for Lieutenant-Governor of the state with Sinclair backing.

His speaking had gained him attention in his home

|state and gave him the following necessary for his election j i |i to the Senate. Spellbinding for Downey, according to one source, |”is habitual, irresistible, self-indulgence.”1

He had been

jj

active in debate and declamation contests while attending the

j

Michigan

Law School.

A ”.. . small, gray, easily emotional

! m a n ,”2 was the description

offered by one source.

Sherman Minton was considered ,Tone of the Administra: tionTs most capable men.”3 \ the Senate since 1934*4

He was a Democrat and had been in

Minton served in the World War and

returned to practice law in his home state of Indiana.

As pub-

i .lie counselor of Indiana under Governor Paul McNutt, Minton won a reputation which ^extended even beyond his own state.”5 .1

Victorious in his senatorial campaign, ”he first announced his arrival in the Senate when he called together a group of his colleagues for joint action to break a Huey Long filibuster. They broke it. ”6

Minton had been ,Tone of the Administration

1 Saturday Evening

— 7 Post. CCXII (September 16, 1939),

p. 5. 2 Ibid. 3 Current Biography, 1941* P* 586. 4 Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 29. 5 Current Biography. 1941, p. 583.

6 Ibid., p. 586.

237 |i

aces in the Supreme Court fight,"1

Following the death of

Joseph Robinson in 1937, Minton had been offered the Senate*s |assistant Democratic leadership.

He supported the Pittman

;and compromise bills in 1937. |

Henrik Shipstead was elected to the Senate in 1922

Ias a Farmer-Laborite from Minnesota.2

He had practiced den­

tistry in that state and became identified with local affairs, i jserving as mayor for two terms and as a member of the state :i |legislature. Following service in the World War, he tried uni>

1successfully for the Republican nomination for Congress and as the choice of the Non-Partisan League for Governor.

His

ability was soon recognized by his colleagues, notably Senator i jLodge, who characterized him TTas one of the most promising of Ithe younger senators.**3

Shipstead took an interest in "all

important issues that came before the Senate . . . especially agricultural legislation, finance, and foreign affairs, in;eluding American adherence to the World Court, which he opposed. He favored the promotion of world peace by disarmament . . ."4 Shipstead had been on the Foreign Relations Committee in July of 1939 and opposed repeal of the embargo.

He voted against

the Committee bill in September and indicated that he would ,

_

_

_

_

_

_

Current Biography. 1941* P* 535. 2 Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, P. 543 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. B, p. 256. 4 Ibid.

238

follow his consistent support of the isolationists, i

j

John Overton was a Democrat from Louisiana and had

|been elected to the Senate in 1932.1

11had practiced in his home state.

Overton was a lawyer and

He had served as city attorney

!

:several terms and was active in Democratic politics.

Overton

|served as counsel for Huey Long when the latter was impeached ■ 'in 1929, but the charges were dropped before the case came to

j trial.

nIn the senate he has been interested primarily in agri-

i !cultural measures and flood control for the Mississippi river. !,2 j |He had served on committees on appropriations, commerce, and iririgation and reclamation.

He voted for the Pittman and eompro-

! lmise bills in 1937. Robert Taft was the son

of President William Taft and

had come to the Senate in 1938 from Ohio.

He practiced law

,alone and with his brother from 1920 to 1923 before entering state politics.

He served as Republican floor leader in the

state house of representatives in 1925 and as speaker of the house the following year.

This was followed by his election

1 to the Ohio senate in 1931.3

Taft had defeated Senator Bulk-

ley, a New Deal supporter, to gain his Senate seat in 1938. In the Senate, he served on committees on appropriations, bank­ ing and currency, education and labor.

!TIn 1939 . . .

he

Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, P. 40. ’

2

National Cvclooedia of American Biog r a n h v . Vol. D,

p. 286. 3 * Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, P* 87.

239

[refrained from criticism of President Roosevelt’s foreign polj.

icy and even actively supported the Presidents proposal for |!repeal of the neutrality law . . .”1 Kenneth McKellar was a Democrat from Tennessee elected

|j

|j

[to the Senate in 1916 after serving two terms in the House of |!Representative s. 2

He had been ”. . .

one of the most successful”

jlawyers in Memphis and early in his career began to take an acI tive interest in politics.3 He served several years as chairman

il

5of the tenth congressional district Democratic committee, as I 'Presidential elector, and as delegate to the national convention :iin 1908.

McKellar had supported the program of the Wilson admin-

[istration and served on the military affairs committee during jthe World War.

He supported the League of Nations and the World

ICourt with reservations, and favored the Administration plans [for neutrality legislation voting for the Pittman and compromise bills in 1937. Robert LaFollette Jr. was a Progressive from Wisconsin elected to the Senate in 1925 to fill the unexpired term of his ifamous father.-4

”He was the youngest man elected a United States

Senator in the country’s history except Henry Clay. ”5

He had

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, p. 135. 2 Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 11939, p. 109. 3 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. C, p. 427. 4 Congressional Directory, 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, ;1939, p. 125. i 5 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. C, p. 351.

jjworked as his father’s private secretary and political manager j

jjand was vice-chairman of the national executive committee in j charge of his father’s campaign for President on the Progressive |jticket in 1924*

LaFollette had served on committees on manu­

factures, finance, foreign relations, and mines and mining.

He

ivoted against repeal of the embargo in July and in September as ] ||a member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was a staunch j;supporter of the strict neutrality bloc. LaFollette was des: ! ;cribed by a poll of Washington correspondents as "The most sane ' j and effective of the leftist liberals; willing to stick out his ■i

chin for his convictions."! !

Alben Barkley is considered last but certainly not

least of the participants in this debate.

The Kentucky Demo­

crat was elected to the Senate in 1927 after a long service in the House of Representatives and had become a top Administra­ tion leader in the Senate.

Barkley was a lawyer by profession

i

land served as prosecuting attorney and judge of county court.2 ■While attending district school, young Barkley disclosed that talent for debating which by diligent application and study he :i

|had developed until it has earned him a national reputation."3 ,i

:He was picked as lieutenant-leader in the Senate by Joseph Robinson in 1933. .

Upon Robinson’s death in 1937, Roosevelt swung

_

Life. VI (March 20, 1939), p. 16. 2 Congressional Directory. 76th Cong. 1st sess., April, 1939, p. 37. 3 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. C, p. 4!!•

241

Barkley’s election as Senate leader, declaring that "Senator Barkley’s long familiarity with national affairs, his integrity, his patriotic zeal, his courage and loyalty, and his eloquence . . . give him exceptional equipment as a legisla­ tor and a leader."1

Barkley served on committees on banking

and currency, finance, and foreign affairs.

He supported re­

peal of the arms embargo in committee in July and September. !

The Debate Is On

i

i

An Overview of the Debate

I

j i |j |l

It is not the destruction of property that arouses a war spirit in our people. It is the illegal destruction of the lives of our citizens. It is what we con­ ceive to be the illegal destruction of the lives of our citizens. This was the cause asserted by Woodrow Wil­ son in his war message to Congress before our entry in­ to the World War.2

With this introduction, Senator Pittman presented the proposal i ! .for repeal of the arms embargo and enactment of the Neutrality IAct of 1939.

The Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee

land Senator Borah ”. . .

shared the day at one of the most

Iheavily attended sessions of the Senate since the Court bill ;fight of 1937, and before galleries packed with every manner I

'of spectator from the humblest American citizen to the daughter '!

of the President of Brazil."3 After Pittman had spoken more than an hour, the Repub­ lican cloakroom door opened and ”in came William Edgar Borah 1 Current Biography. 1941 > pp. 40-4-2. 2

Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 51. 3 New York Times. October 3, 1939, p. 1.

242

of Idaho in a black suit, a black straggly tie, his old, lined face solemn*”1

When Pittman concluded, Borah rose to reply, and

"there was a stir in the galleries and a straightening of Sen­ ators in their seats."2 ' i

From 1:42 P.M. to 3:50 P.M.. Borah 9

"stated with his cool, withering clearness the case for isolajtionism, the case against cash-and-carry."3

when Borah had con-

|eluded, the Senate adjourned for the first day of the debate as | ji"the galleries cracked palms in hand, illegal applause; Pittman i:

|walked over to shake his foeTs hand."4 | f Despite this "auspicious Monday debut"5 the debate was 'slowed the following day when the Senate suspended business in [tribute to Senator Logan of Kentucky who died on October 3. ;According to one source, "Both sides promptly profited by the Hull to hold strategy talks, map speeches, and take stock of strength.

Isolationists were quick to boast that BorahTs or­

ation had won theia half a dozen more votes . . ."6

on the next

!;day Connally and Vandenberg exchanged arguments, and "the prosjpects of a word duel between Tom Connally . . . and Arthur Van^denberg, repacked the galleries, with women again forming the hulk of the spectators . . ."7

Connally spoke for two and one-

1 Time. XXXIV (October 9, 1939), p. 15. 2 New York Times, October 3, 1939, p. 14* 3 Time, XXXIV (October 9, 1939), p. 15. 4 Ibid. 5 Newsweek, XIV (October 16, 1939), p. 29.

6 Ibid. 7 Ibid.

243

half hours seldom referring to the manuscript before him. One opinion characterized his speech as an "old-style stump speech."1

His speech brought him a personal congratulatory

phone call from the President.

Vandenberg delivered a set

speech and did not yield for interruption.

When the Michigan

Senator had concluded, "Applause broke out in the galleries . . .

It was sustained for many seconds despite the efforts of

the presiding officer to restore

o r d e r . "2

On the following day, Senator Schwellenbach carried the defense of repeal with Nye and Overton in opposition.

This

third day of debate "saw that contest drop sharply from the dramatic tone with which it had opened, to a general reading of speeches which failed to hold the interest of a sizable group of Senators or the spectators who on previous days have crowded to galleries."3

Interest in the debate was noticeably

less than on previous days, for when the Senate session opened soon after noon, two quorum calls were necessary to gather the requisite forty-nine members.

Nye spoke only twenty minutes,

indicating that "he would speak at length later."4

Overton

was a surprise opponent of repeal, breaking with a large ma­ jority of Southern Senators who favored the proposal. his first break with the Administration since 1935. _

.

„

.

_

Newsweek. XIV (October 16, 1939), p. 29.

2 New York Times, October 5, 1939, n. 14* 3 Ibid., October 6, 1939, p. 13. 4 Ibid.

This was

The first week of debate was concluded with Admin­ istration supporter Thomas of Utah opposed by the isolation­ ist, Sheridan Downey.

These two speakers "made a desperate

effort to entertain the thinning gallery . . .

Interest had

fallen to such an ebb that only twenty—four colleagues were !on hand to hear Thomas and only fourteen to listen to Downey. IAt one point, exactly six senators were in their seats ."-1* jjThe two men spoke for five hours with Downey using no manui script as he opposed the repeal of the embargo*

!

As the week

concluded, Pittman predicted that the bill would be on its ! i jway to the House "by the end of next w e e k . "2 j

When debate opened again, Downey continued his as-

1 sault on the bill replying in part to Senator Thomas» argu­ ments.

Attendance in the Senate was still poor as evidenced

by Downey Ts remarks that the Senators who were vailing to give him their attention "• • . do not seem to be very numer­ ous. "3

He was aided in his opposition by Lundeen who occasion­

ally interrupted to add to DowneyTs remarks.

Senator Tobey

moved that the cash-and-carry feature of the measure be speeded to a vote but that the repeal of the arms embargo be submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee for further study and later action.

This day of debate ended with an exchange of verbal

blows between Johnson of California and Connally over the fact

I

-

'

~

^Newsweek. XIV (October 16, 1939), p. 29. New York Times. October 8, 1939, p. 39. 3 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 178.

245 I

that minority members of the Foreign Relations Committee were not asked to sit in on the drafting of the proposed bill. |

The next day Senator Danaher spoke in opposition to

:the bill, after which Tydings and Borah engaged in a collojquoy and Tobey argued for his motion to recommit repeal to the "Committee.

The vote on this motion was considered by Admini-

;stration leaders as a ’’practical test”l on repeal of the em­ bargo.

The vote was an Administration victory, sixty-five to

twenty-six against recommitting the repeal provision.

Byrnes

declared that defeat of the motion had taken T1all the punch out of the debate,”2 while Pittman insisted that the vote should ”satisfy the country that further debate will accomplish noth­ ing.1^

Tobey left the chamber exclaiming, ’’You can’t lick a

steamroller.”4

Galleries were filled until the vote on the

Tobey motion, but interest lagged as Senator Wagner went into an extended argument for repeal of the arms embargo.

Bailey

followed him to argue for the proposed bill, and Lodge ended the debate for that day with a plea for defeat of the Admini­ stration’s measure to repeal the embargo. Two speakers held the spotlight the following day when Senator Clark of Missouri gave the debate ”a sudden turn toward b i t t e r n e s s ”^ by accusing the Administration of resorting ,

_

—

_

'

New York Times. October 11, 1939, P- 1* 2 Ibid., p. 14* 3

Ibid.. p. 1. 4 I b i d . » pp.

1 , 14 .

5

Ibid., October 12, 1939, p. 1.

246

to ’’warlike” moves for the purpose of inflaming the people and making them war-minded.

Equally candid was the speech

of Senator Burke in which he supported repeal because it would aid the Allied powers against Hitler.

Senator Bulow began the

debate the next day with a few ’’earthy remarks in opposition to embargo repeal.”1

In addition to Bulow, other opponents

of the measure ’’subjected the embargo repeal to five hours of raking fire.”2

Chavez of New Mexico surprised Administration

jleaders by his decision to vote ”no,” and as he concluded his ;speech against repeal, ’’Administration leaders turned in ob:vious amazement to the Senator, who had been speaking from the 'back row.

Later several of them joined the equally astonished

isolationist Senators in congratulating him on his address.”3 LaFollette spoke for three hours, and his address, declared one source, ’’for drama and silence-provoking interest has not been surpassed during the debate.”4 Senators Taft and Nye highlighted the debate the next day with Taft favoring repeal in a speech lasting almost an hour and Nye speaking for four hours against the measure.

The

second week of debate concluded with Frazier and Lundeen op­ posing the bill and exchanging arguments with Wiley and Connally as the presiding officer was forced to warn the galleries sev­ eral times against demonstrations on both sides, for ”after all, 1 New York Times, October 13, 1939, p. 1* 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

247 |

we are not engaged in a political mass meeting.”1 j

I i

By now, the Administration was attempting to get an

agreement on limiting debate, and the ninety-day credit clause had been eliminated in an attempt to speed a vote on the meas-

'iure.

The next week of debate opened with a bitter attack on

;Great Britain and France as ’’aggressors in the present war”2 by D. Worth Clark, whose speech was given without manuscript I ;or notes.

There was still a definite lack of interest in the

! idebate, for the galleries were ”hardly more than one-third i|filled for most of the afternoon.”3

Shipstead and Capper re-

ipresented the anti-repeal bloc, and Gillette spoke for the ^measure.

The following day, Maloney spoke for five hours to­

gether with Danaher and Walsh in opposition.

Holt continued

the attack the following day in a four and one-half hour speech. I'

By this time, as the third week neared its end, it

was reported that ’’the general debate apparently is driving j |toward a close.”4 McCarran continued the opposition to repeal while Barkley defended the proposal.

On October 20, ’’the

Senate filled almost to capacity as the isolationist Johnson ■rose to speak. ”5

He ’’was singled out for the honor of ending

the general case for the opposition to embargo repeal, just ; as Senator Borah had been designated to open it.”6

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 423. 2 New York Times, October 17, 1939, p. 10. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., October 19, 1939, p. 145 Ibid., October 21, 1939, p. 6.

6 Ibid., p. 1.

After Johnson’s speech, lasting for more than an hour, Ellender defended embargo repeal, and he was supported by Brown, Lucas, :and McKellar.

The latter had sharp verbal exchanges with Holt

Ias the d a y ’s debate ended.

The sole speaker on the final day

of the third week was Senator Reynolds who spoke against the bill in a three hour speech. The final week of the debate opened with ,fone of the | liveliest days of the current special session.”!

Wiley called

| on the Senate to recognize that ”it is time and high time that this debate be finished. The position of almost every Senator l | jin this room is already k n o w n . ”2 He opposed repeal of the em!

;!bargo.

Nye was attacked by Minton for being inconsistent in

j:arguing for repeal of the embargo on arms to Spain over the pre i'

j ceding two years but opposing repeal of the general arms embarg h in 1939. During this attack, Nye ”jumped up from his seat from ' j ! time to time, and so did Senator Clark.”3 Holt attacked the ; j inconsistencies in the arguments of the pro-repealers over the I previous few years to end the debate that day.

The next day

!; several amendments were offered by opponents and all were defeated.

Debate continued for the next few days as Administra-

i tion and opposing speakers indicated or summarized their posi1 tion on repeal of the arms embargo.

Many of those who had

. spoken earlier, especially those opposed to repeal, renewed ! . the attack. :

_

New York Times, October 23, 1939, p. 1. 2 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 714* 3 New York Times. October 23, 1939, p. 1.

249

On the last day of debate, amid constant cries from the floor of wVote! Vote!nl tempers became short as Senators IClark and Pittman were ordered by the presiding officer to take their seats after personal exchanges. jamendments were defeated.

Two important

One by Senator Clark of Missouri

|would have written the arms embargo into the proposed measure |and was defeated sixty to thirty-three in what was believed to be a final test on the embargo.2

The other was an amend­

m e n t by Senator Nye in the form of a substitute bill providing | i 'for the arms embargo and the quota system of regulating exports i f to belligerents. This met defeat by a sixty-seven to twentyttwo vote.3

Shortly before 9:00 P.M. T!at the end of a momen-

;tous Senate debate lasting four weeks less a day, in which nearly seventy Senators put more than 1,000,000 words into the ■record,n4 the final vote was taken.

The New York Times ob-

j;

"

served: I ; : i

The roll calls in Congress on the Neutrality Bill show both sides very much in earnest with effec­ tive organization for getting out the vote. In the Senate the final vote, 63 to 30, makes ninety-three members on record in a legislative body of ninetysix men. This is much better than the vote declar­ ing war on Germany in 1917, when eighty-eight Senators were recorded.5 1 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 1023* 2 Ibid., p. 1022. 3 Ibid., p. 1023. 4 New York Times, October 28, 1939, p. 1* 5 Ibid., November 4, 1939, p. 14-

250

The Senate approval of the Neutrality Act of 1939, repealing the arms embargo passed the House on November 2, in substan­ tially the same form*

On November 3, in only ten minutes the

Senate approved the minor House changes, and the bill was sent to the President. Summary of the Arguments Arguing that the destruction of American lives on bel­ ligerent vessels or in war zones had constituted the principal cause of entry into the World War, Pittman urged repeal of the arms embargo and enactment of the additional safeguards in the i proposed measure. He attacked the belief that munition makers or selfish interests forced the nation into war in 1917.

The

arms embargo was now seen to be unneutral, Pittman contended, I for while Germany was receiving arms from the neutrals in Eu­ rope, England and France were denied such aid from this country. This was a violation of international law.l

Presenting an argu­

ment destined to become prominent in the debate, Pittman declared that if supporters of the embargo were interested in keeping the nation out of war, they should propose an embargo on all goods !to belligerents.

Pittman concluded by indicating that the is-

jisue was not repeal of the neutrality laws, for the proposed |measure actually strengthened the laws through the establishment

i Compare Pittman*s arguments in support of a neutrality jlaw which would be consistent with international law in this deibate with his arguments for the Neutrality Act in 1937. Pitt;manTs apparent reversal of position on the importance of inter­ national law allowed his opponents a wide berth in attacking him for inconsistency. (See Pittman*s speech in March. 1937, Con­ gressional Record. 75th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1672.)

of combat zones through which American ships and citizens could not travel.1 In opposing repeal of the arms embargo, Borah de-

j

clared that the embargo had been enacted with two purposes

|in view:

to keep this country out of the wars of the Old

t

!World and to prevent the United States from profiteering In ! ithe destruction of others. ij

On the basis of these two pur-

| jposes, the law had worked; so where, challenged Borah, was Ithe demand for repeal coming from? Answering his own chalj i j ! lenge, he maintained that the cry for repeal had originated j iin those nations who wanted arms from the United States. ; jThis was proof, he pointed out, that the embargo was success; iful, for ITif it were not working they would not be complain;ing.

Borah denied that there had been any violation of in­

ternational law in refusing to sell arms to b e l l i g e r e n t s . 3 1When the embargo was passed, everyone understood that an ini

:dividual nation could do what it desired in preserving its own peace.

When Pittman interrupted to explain that he had

1 Congressional Record. 76th Cong., 2nd sess., pp. 51-53 2 Ibid., p. 68. 3 "Great and multitudinous in these days are the en­ comiums on international law. Its healing and uplifting ef­ fects upon the wrongs and miseries of the virorld are being discussed and revealed. I have great regard as all must have iwho have studied international law, for that great body of 'customs and practices which has grown up through the experjience of the centuries. We had before us this question of i :international law, and what use we could make of it, in framing an embargo statute. It was all considered and debated. IBut as I understood, the opinion was almost unanimous that while international law had its place in all schemes for peace, there were other things which individual nations ought to do and had to do in order to advance the cause of peace, and

252

not seen in 1937, that the law would operate unneutrally in the event of war, Borah retorted that it was none of this countryTs business whether the embargo operated unneutrally or not.l Repeal of the arms embargo was presented by Borah as a means of involving this nation in the war.

If the Eu­

ropean conflict were actually a war to save civilization, as supporters of repeal intimated, the honorable step would have been to have given the Allies arms and to send men if neces­ sary.

Instead of advocating this action, supporters of re­

peal were measuring their contribution in cash-and-carry. Borah denied that the war was anything more than nanother chapter in the bloody volume of European power p o l i t i c s . ”2 If the embargo were repealed and the Allies appeared to be losing the war, Borah predicted that further steps would be taken leading to full participation in the conflict.

In his

conclusion, Borah expressed himself as ready to meet an enemy on the field of battle if American rights were violated, but he could not vote for war when peace was still o b t a i n a b l e . 3 Connally agreed math Borah that the United States should have no part of European power politics, but the Texas senator maintained that to denounce war and European politics

specially there were things which should be done but could not be done under international law.TT (Senator Borah in French (ed.,) op. cit., p. 62.) 1 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 69. 2 Ibid., p. 72. 3 Ibid., pp. 68-75.

253

did not prevent the sinking of American ships and loss of Amer­ ican lives.

Attacking what he termed the illogical hasis of

the arms embargo, Connally pointed out that it allowed arms shipments to the aggressor in time of peace but denied arms to the victim in time of war.

Challenging Borah on interna­

tional law, he contended that if a nation had a right to pass an embargo, it had as much right to repeal it.

Instead of a

step toward, war, Connally pictured the repeal of the arms em­ bargo as a step toward keeping out of war by aiding the vic­ tims of aggression.! Vandenberg opposed repeal on the basis that the nation was being asked to depart from a neutrality it had twice de­ clared since 1935, and changing the rules in the midst of a war ?70uld be a violation of international law.

The issue, as

he saw it, was that repeal made the United States vulnerable, while the embargo made it immune from war.

Vandenberg argued

that a nation could not be half in and half out of a war; and that, therefore, the wisest policy was to retain all of the protective provisions in the proposed neutrality law plus the |additional safeguard of the arms embargo.

The real purpose of

repealing the arms embargo, contended Vandenberg, was to alter the relative resources of the belligerents.

If neutrality

were the aim of the United States, the resources of the bellig­ erents should have been no concern.

The difficulty had been,

however, that some people were hunting a middle ground by which

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 83-95.

254

the nation could be neutral and at the same time helping jbelligerents with whom its sympathies lay.

There existed

no middle ground in Vandenbergfs opinion.

Answering Pitt­

man fs challenge that all goods should be embargoed if arms were embargoed, Vandenberg pointed out that there had always existed a distinction between arms and non-contraband of war. In the 1937 Neutrality Act, this distinction had been pre|served.1 ! i | Nye felt that the issue was limited to repeal of j]

|the arms embargo, for he favored every other safeguard in jthe proposed measure.

He agreed with Vandenberg that the

!arms embargo should have been included as an additional safejiguard against involvement in the w a r . 2 with this view, Over! l l j | !ton agreed, and he also attacked the inconsistency of those i1 !-who had supported the arms embargo in 1935 and 1937, but who j-

now turned against it.

Overton foresaw repeal of the embargo

ii

•as a step leading America into the w a r . 3 In support of repeal, Schwellenbach admitted that he had made a mistake in voting for the arms embargo because j !it had been proved unneutral in the European conflict.

He

| shared Pittman»s contentions that the sale of munitions had ;i

not been the primary cause of American participation in the war in 1917.4 !

Thomas disagreed that repeal was contrary to

l Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 102.

!|

2

>

Ibid.. p. 114. 3 Ibid., pp. 115-120. 4

Ibid., pp. 121-130.

255

international law because the proposed bill was domestic leg­ islation, affecting only the citizens of the United States and could not be considered an act of intervention in the war* He concluded by asserting that the United States had entered the World War because of a "sense of outraged justice, not for the purpose of collecting debts."! Downey condemned the repeal proposal as a means of inaugurating a war boom which would lead to an inflation of prices in this country.

He argued that if the United States

began a trade with the Allies, and if their cash were soon exhausted, this country either would be forced to stop trad­ ing with them and face a depression or to continue the war prosperity by entering the war.

Downey urged that this nation

solve its domestic problems before it became involved in a war thousands of miles away.

He feared no attack on the United

States if England and France were defeated.

Accusing supporters

of repeal of failing to state their desire to aid the Allies through repeal of the arms embargo, Downey concluded that he had no wish to "exchange the golden coin of isolation for that miserable leaden counterfeit of intervention in the Old World."2 Lundeen interrupted to agree with Downey*s support of American isolation from European affairs.3 Danaher opposed repeal of the arms embargo as an _

'

'

”

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 152.

2 Ibid., pp. 160-166. 3 Ibid.. p. 185.

'

256

jattempt to change the rules in the middle of the game, and he jsaw no need of cash-and-carry on non-military goods,

Tydings

jdemand that those who supported an arms embargo should be con­ s i s t e n t and urge an embargo on all goods brought from Borah the reply that he would favor such an embargo if it were prac­ ticable,1

At this point,

i

Tobey offered his amendment to re-

commit embargo repeal to Committee.

This was opposed by Pitt-

ij

Ijman and Connally who declared that if opponents of repeal felt •|that they had enough votes to strike out repeal in the pending

i ; !measure,

they should seek to amend the law on the floor of the

|j Senate.2

i

Wagner supported repeal of the arms embargo as the

: S most effective means of keeping America out of war.

He main­

tained that trade in goods other than arms threatened to a

j

greater extent to involve the nation in war than trade in mu­ nitions,

and he cited World War evidence to support this.

All

Iof the arguments against the sale of munitions, if they were valid,

applied against the sale of all materials, in W a g n e r fs

opinion.

He subscribed to T h o m a s T view that the neutrality

! law was domestic legislation and not a part ox international ■law.3

Bailey agreed with Wagner,

and both men asserted that

the world, had had warning in the summer of 1 9 3 9 9 that America i

intended to change its neutrality law.

j

~ 1

Therefore, America was

'

Congressional R e c o r d , 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 227:: 232 .

2 Ibid., pp. 232-237.

3 Ibid., pp. 238-243.

257

n ot changing rules in the middle of a game.l Lodge reiterated V a n d e n b e r g fs argument that the n a ­ tion could not be "half-in, half-out at the back door ashamed to come in the main g a t e . ”2

Repeal was unneutral, he argued,

for it altered the balance of power in Europe.3

In a bitter

iattack on the proposal to repeal the arms embargo, Bennett ;|Clark challenged the "secret as sumption "4 that America had a ^direct stake in the war.

He agreed with Borah that if the Al­

llies were actually fighting this n a t i o n 1s battles,

it would

I;

jjhave been more honorable to have gone into the conflict all the :!way.

Clark attacked the inconsistencies of those who had de­

nied the validity of international law in earlier neutrality ^debates and who were n o w championing the sacredness of that :!law.

He approved the other protective measures in the proposal

i ;|but insisted that the arms embargo should be a part of the neu­ trality la w.3

Equally strong in favor of repealing the embargo,

Burke contended that it was unneutral and aided Germany.

The

real question as Burke posed it, was whether the United States wanted a law on its books which aided Hitler.

He felt that re­

peal would probably shorten the war and thereby diminish the chances of American involvement.&

1 Congressional R e c o r d , 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 244-

249. 2 Ibid., pp. 249-250. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 266. 5 Ibid., pp. 266-283.

6 Ibid., pp. 285-290.

j

Bulow and Chavez opposed repeal on the grounds that

|engaging in war trade was a certain step toward becoming injvolved in the war, and Chavez saw in the pressure for repeal

I i

the same forces at work as had forced the nation into the first World War.1

In his arguments against repeal, LaFollette agreed

w i t h previous opponents that it was a step toward war.

He pre­

sented repeal as a symbol of intervention in the European war, -land insisted that national interest did not require an Allied ji

||victory in the conflict.

LaFollette contended that the domes-

jtic failures of the A d m i n i s t r a t i o n s program had led to the de-

! |

;sire for a war boom to escape these failures.

He attacked the

i

b a r aims of England and France,

and repeated that it was the

n a t i o n 1s duty to stay out of Europe and Asia.

In conclusion,

he indicated his support of cash-and-carry on all goods and ’■the retention of the arms embargo.2 In a belief that repeal of the arms embargo would keep the nation out of war by preventing incidents likely to lead to war, Taft gave his support to the pending bill.

He agreed with

earlier arguments that a neutrality law was domestic legisla­ tion with no relation to international law and Yms not there­ fore changing rules in the middle of the game.

Taft also sup­

ported the position that the embargo had operated unneutrally :in the European war.3

:j

'

1 |319. !

Nye maintained that repeal was a symbol

~T Congressional R e c o r d , 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 312-

2 Ibid.,

pp. 316-335.

3 Ibid., pp. 355-360.

259 lj

i i|of intervention in the war.

He denied that England and France

were the first line of defense for the United States. ponents of repeal would debate this, Nye declared, lem of repeal would appear in a different light.

If pro­

the probHe agreed

j with former speakers that if the Allies appeared to be losing i ||the war, this country would be forced to enter the conflict I. i| if the first steps had been taken through repeal of the arms

j

e m b a r g o .1

!

In a similar vein as Nye and LaFollette, Frazier,

;Lundeen,

and D. Worth Clark continued the case for the isola-

! ] ;i

| !tionists.

Clark was especially bitter in his condemnation

!of the B r i t i s h and French Empires which he contended were I guilty of the very crimes against which they were supposedly jfighting.

He called repeal a step toward w a r . 2

Gillette

1 favored repeal as a means of keeping the country out of war ! but indicated that he would not have given his approval if he 1 had thought the step was being taken to aid the Allies in the i

i war.3

Capper reiterated the arguments of the anti-repeal bloc

!that the pending law was a step toward war, and Walsh agreed .with Capper that when the United States became a base of supplies for the belligerents,

involvement in the war would follow.4

i!Maloney disagreed and argued that the embargo was unneutral.5

1 Congressional R e c o r d , 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 362383.

2 Ibid., np. 445-449. 3 I b i d . , p. 457. 4 Ibid., pp. 461-466. 5

Ibid.» p. 504.

260

Holt took the position that repeal of the embargo was intended to aid England and France and to make a profit out of war trade. lead to wrar.l

Both of these objectives, he argued, would

McCarran reasserted the same argument and

labeled the arms embargo a symbol of American desire to stay out of war.2 Barkley gave support for repealing the embargo on the basis that the Neutrality Acts of 1935-1937 had been an encouragement for aggressors.

Contending that repeal was no

violation of international law, he pointed out that no one na­ tion could change international law.

The proposed repeal was

a shift from one neutral status to another, and this was not unneutral.

He agreed that the loss of American lives and ships

had let to entry into the war in 1917, and he asserted that the pending proposal would eliminate those incidents likely to lead to war.3 Opposition to repeal came from Hiram Johnson, who termed the proposal as unneutral and as being adopted in re­ sponse to the demand of those European powers who wanted the United States to take sides in the conflict.

There existed

no need, Johnson argued, to take sides in the war, for Hitler was no threat to the United States.

Repeal would risk war,

he concluded, and he was prepared to TTstand here until dooms“

" T

—

—

—

-

—

-

Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 545567.

2 Ibid.. pp. 591-603. 3 Ibid., pp. 603-609.

261

day . * . and plead for what I believe to be r i g h t . I n

fa­

vor of repeal, Ellender maintained that it would not mean war and that it would tend to eliminate those incidents likely to lead to war.

Barbour and Lucas supported the same position

with the latter declaring that if the "step toward war" argu­ ments were taken from consideration, the debate could "end overnight."2 McKellar favored repeal because in his opinion embar­ goes had never proved successful, and the existing arms embargo had aided the aggressor.3

Andrews limited his argument to a

negative answer of the question:

would repeal lead to war?

He insisted that repeal would tend to shorten the war by sup­ plying the Allies with arms.A

Reynolds charged that the pend­

ing measure was based upon the false assumption that the war aims of England and France were consistent with United States1 interests.

Proponents of repeal, Reynolds asserted, had as­

sumed that the war was already one involving the United States. He contended that Allied war aims were never stated, and in no case would be consistent with the welfare of the United States.5 Wiley did not agree that repeal inevitably meant war, but he opposed the step because he felt that the nation could

1

—

—

—

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 630631.

2 Ibid.. pp. 632-647. 3 Ibid., pp. 647-655. 4

Ibid.. pp. 679-667.

5 Ibid., pp. 666-702.

262

more usefully solve its domestic problems than to become in­ volved in any degree in the European war.l

Minton declared

that the pictures conjured up by Borah and others as to the probable effect of repeal were flights of imagination "here on the eve of Halloween."2 The final days of the debate were devoted to consid­ eration of amendments. original measure.

None of these essentially changed the

LaFollette suggested an amendment to impose

quotas on trade with neutrals and was supported by Nye, Capper, Downey, Frazier, and Holt; but the amendment was defeated. 3 Neely and Hale repeated the argument that repeal would serve to defeat Hitler before he could attack the United States.4 LaFollette*s amendment for a popular referendum on any over­ seas war unless the nation were attacked was defeated. 5

The

final vote came shortly afterwards. Analysis Of The Debate The Proposition for Debate The proposition for debate was, Resolved:

That, the

Senate Joint Resolution to be cited as the Neutrality Act of 1939, be enacted into law.

This resolution provided for repeal

1 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 709714-

2 Ibid.. p. 745. 3

Ibid.. pp. 842- 856.

4 Ibid., p. 895. 5 Ibid., pp. 892-894*

263

of the arms embargo and cash-and-carry on all goods, for the establishment of combat zones, and continued munitions control. Attempts of the opponents of this proposition to modify or to change the principal provisions of the Act by amendment were defeated, and the proposition did not change throughout the debate. Uncontested Argument The following arguments, while taking up an extensive amount of time in the debate, went uncontested. 1. A principal objective of any policy should be to keep the nation out of war. Speakers for both sides in the debate agreed that in­ volvement in the war should be avoided.

This agreement was

overtly stated by speakers for both sides.

Senator Connally1s

reply to Borah’s speech typified this agreement.

The Texas

Senator declared that Borah had delivered a nstirring address, an oration denouncing the horrors of war, a view which we all share; denouncing European conflicts over territories and boun­ daries, a view with which we all agree.”1

For the anti-repeal

block, Vandenberg indicated this area of agreement by contend­ ing that he applauded the objectives of the supporters of repeal to keep out of the war.

Ellender observed that no senator had

raised his voice in favor of war, and Barkley declared that both sides in the debate wished to avoid war. Virtually every speaker prefaced his arguments with or

Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 83*

264

included within the speech the premise that the test of any policy adopted was its ability to keep the nation out of the war*

The anti—repeal speakers, following Borah1s opening

blast at the measure, pursued a pattern of emotionalizing the horrors and effects of another war.

Contemporary comment had

it that Borah1s speech was "pitched on an emotional rather than an intellectual plane,"! and that while Pittman^ speech was "a matter-of-fact analysis," the Senate could not help sympathizing with "Senator Borah1s eloquence"^ which followed PittmanTs speech.

Similar to Borah1s emphasis upon the effects

of war were the pictures presented by other isolationists, for example, Vandenbergfs contention that another war meant loss of freedom and loss of life.3

Downey portrayed the same theme

in greater detail visualizing a nation facing "internal regi­ mentation, debt, and dictatorship," in another war.4

LaFollette,

Walsh, Tobey, and Overton indicated that the real losers in the next war would be the "fathers, mothers, sons . . .

if their

prayers to keep us out of war are not answered."3 On the other hand, while agreeing with the objective of staying out of war, the proponents of repeal treated the theme more briefly and less emotionally.

In most cases, these

speakers expressed their agreement with the objective; but they 1

~

“

Chicago Daily Mews. October 4j 1939, p. 10.

2 Christian Science Monitor, October 4> 1939, p. 1. 3 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 96. 4

Ibid., p. 161.

5 Ibid., p. 236.

265

did not go into detail to predict the effects of another war. The pattern of the pro-repeal bloc in treating the theme in­ dicated that they felt the emphasis of the argument for repeal lay in other directions.

The anti-repeal bloc used the theme

as a springboard for a reaffirmation of the isolationist phil­ osophy. 2. The ninety-day credit allowed in the original ICommittee resolution should be eliminated. i |

The Committee report provided that an exception to

! |the ban on credit for belligerents would be made in the case i!

!of short-term minety-day loans or credits. This provision 1 icarae under attack before the Senate debate opened from Senators I on both sides of the proposition.

In the Senate debate, Borah

j ;first attacked it^ and he was followed by LaFollette^ and Buj low3 for the anti-repeal bloc; and by Taft4 and Gillette^ among | 1!others for the pro-repeal. The crux of the argument of these j 'and other speakers was that the exception had potentially dani gerous effects.

Principally, they maintained that any credit

'could set off a war boom in this country which was an undesirI able result.

Although not explicitely stated in all of the

I speeches on this provision, the main support for the probable I ; effects of credit to belligerents was the experience of the

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 72. 2 Ibid., p. 334* 3 Ibid., p. 312. 4 Ibid.. p. 355. 5 Ibid.. p. 457.

266

World War.

The memory of the war debts was still fresh in

the minds of the audience.

The association of the pending al­

lowance for credit with that experience was sufficient support for rejection of the ninety-day credit.

Mo Administration

supporter sought to defend that provision in the debate, and it was eliminated on Administration initiative. 3. acceptable.

Cash-and-carry on materials other than arms was

Supporters of repeal favored the cash-and-carry pro­ vision, and they argued this as a strong element of strength in the pending measure.

This argument will be discussed later.

The anti-repeal speakers made it clear that they were not op­ posed to cash-and-carry on other materials.

As a matter of

fact, they claimed credit for having first supported the idea of mandatory cash-and-carry.

On this contention, they were

historically correct, for as early as April, 1935, Senators Nye and Clark had advocated such a provision.

Acceptance of

cash-and-carry constituted a premise upon which the opponents of repeal of the arms embargo based one of their principal at­ tacks on the bill.

Their argument was that both sides agreed

there was strength in cash-and-carry.

Both sides agreed that

all safeguards possible to keep the nation out of war should be enacted into law.

Therefore, concluded opponents, why do

away with an additional safeguard in the form of the arms em­ bargo, when it virould be just as reasonable and more logical to have both cash-and-carry and the arms embargo?

This theme re­

appears consistently in the opponents* arguments and will be discussed later in more detail.

267

Cash-and-carry did not become an issue despite the fact that Senators Borah and Johnson were not completely in favor with the principle as was revealed in the 1937 debate. In 1939, hovvever, the focus of the problem had changed, and the strict neutrality bloc and isolationists were together in this debate.

Senator Tobeyrs motion to separate repeal of

the arms embargo from cash-and-carry of other goods was spe^ cific evidence in the debate that both sides would probably agree to enacting the cash-and-carry into law, if the main issue in dispute were sent back to Committee for further study, 4- The establishment of combat zones, prohibition of travel on belligerent vessels, and munition controls should be accepted. Although the debate centered on a relatively few sec­ tions of the proposed bill, there were these important pro­ visions which received minor attention.

They were ignored by

most,speakers in the debate or were accepted as strong argu­ ments in favor of the bill.

Two opponents of repealing the

arms embargo took a completely negative view of the entire bill.

Senators Clark of Missouri and LaFollette argued against

allowing the President any discretion in determining combat zones or in placing the provisions of the bill into effect. This was not a new theme of the neutrality bloc, for arguments in favor of mandatory neutrality laws had featured in the group*s speeches in previous neutrality debates.

That issue,

however, was subordinated in 1939, as speakers from both sides appeared intent upon making their arguments prevail on the strength or weakness of the arms embargo.

i

As a result, there

268

was no clash of argument with Clark and LaFollette in their discussion of these three provisions in the proposed bill. The Issue in Dispute Despite the length of the debate and the voluminous record of speaking accomplished in 1939, determining the issue in dispute is amazingly simple after a complete systematic reading of the arguments and other statements of contemporary views.

Before the debate actually opened, opponents of repeal

set the issue in clear terms.

On September 22, the foes of

repeal decided to fight the proposition on the embargo question itself with as little reference to cash-and-carry as possible. They felt that the issue was clear-cut and that "Whatever is done in regard to cash-and-carry will be incidental."!

As John­

son of California declared, "We will not be distracted by any other issue."2

In the speeches of the debate, speakers from

both sides recognized the narrowing of the clash to the one is­ sue.

For example, Vandenberg said that the major issue was re­

peal and its consequences,3 with which Nye4 and D. Worth Clark agreed.5

Senator Andrews was an example of a proponent of re­

peal of the arms embargo who saw the same issue as having emerged in the debate.6

It was not easily possible to confuse

1 New York Times. September 22, 1939, p. 6. 2 Ibid., September 27, 1939, p. 1. 3 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 96. A Ibid.. p. 114* 5 Ibid., p. 443.

6 Ibid.. p. 679.

269

the main issue for the reason that most speakers read their speeches from manuscript,! and the cross fire of questions and answers which often send a Senate debate on irrelevant but confusing tangents was lacking.

The speakers stated the

theme of their speeches clearly and followed a set pattern in their organization.

The issue in dispute then emerged as:

Should the arms embargo be repealed? Argument on the Issue Arguments offered by the proponents of the repeal of the arms embargo.— 1.

Repeal of the arms embargo would be more likely

to keep the nation out of war than the present neutrality law. This argument evolved from three premises, the first of which was offered by Pittman and from which the attack on the existing neutrality law was to proceed. the existing neutrality law was unsafe.

This premise was:

It was unsafe argued

Pittman because it allowed American ships to transport goods other than munitions to belligerents through combat zones. This was an admitted fact since cash-and-carry had expired in May, 1939, and American ships were free to carry all goods i

other than arms.

This right of American ships to travel in

war zones could involve the nation in war, an assertion which Pittman supported from the evidence of the causes for American entry into the first World War.

He supplied as evidence, Wil­

s o n s statement from his war message to Congress in which _

_

-

New York Times, October 22, 1939, sec.

P* 6.

270

Wilson had declared that the loss of American ships and lives created the incidents leading to war.

Connally presented the

same premise and supported it from evidence of the list of ships sunk in the World War, none of which had been carrying munitions to the belligerents.

Schwellenbach cited authority

from German sources that submarine warfare would have been carried on in

spite of any arms embargo by the United States

because trade

in materials other than arms was more of a help

to G e r m a n y ^ enemies than the commerce in munitions.

Taft,

Bailey, Ellender, Lucas, and others argued the same premise. Therefore, to

remain out of the war, the country could not de­

pend upon the

existing law

which allowed trade in non­

contraband goods in American ships. Developing the argument for repeal, these speakers adopted a second premise: would prove impracticable.

a complete embargo on all goods This premise was easily established

from the admission of the anti-repeal bloc.

Borah, for example,

agreed that a complete embargo on all trade would not be ef­ fective, and Nye had indicated a similar position on a complete embargo.

This premise established, the pro-repeal speakers

carried the chain of argument to one final premise:

any attempt

to draw a line between arms and other materials was an incon­ sistent position.

In support of this, Pittman, Taft, and Wag­

ner asserted that every argument used in support of an arms embargo applied with equal validity to a complete embargo on all materials.

This assertion was never completely developed

but was recognizable in the arguments of the pro-repeal bloc.

271

The implication from this premise was that those who argued for an arms embargo were logically required to support a com­ plete embargo on all goods.

Failure to support a complete em­

bargo deprived those who argued only for an arms embargo of a logical conclusion to their arguments. From these three premises, drew their conclusion:

the pro-repeal speakers

the existing neutrality law was unsafe

because it could involve the nation in war.

It, therefore,

of­

fered no solution to the common objective of both sides in the debate to stay out of the war.

Another possibility would have

been a complete embargo on all trade with belligerents; but this, on the admission of the anti-repeal bloc offered no prac­ ticable solution.

Another alternative would have been to in­

clude an arms embargo and cash-and-carry on other goods in the same neutrality law.

This was suggested by the anti-repeal

bloc as the best solution, but it had been asserted by the p ro­ repeal speakers as a logically untenable position.

Therefore:

the only alternative lay in the proposed neutrality law which allowed for cash-and-carry on all goods, including arms. Another pattern of argument was also observable in the speeches of the pro-repeal bloc.

This rested upon the conten­

tion that through aid to England and France,

the United States

gained the best opportunity to stay out of the war.

The foun­

dations of American isolationism were still strong;

therefore,

spokesmen for the pro-repeal bloc were faced with the obstacle of establishing a premise which was contrary to accepted aud­ ience beliefs.

The anti-repeal forces were arguing that repeal

272

of the arms embargo was a symbol of intervention in European affairs, so it was not surprising that those who attempted to support aid for England and France irere cautious in develop­ ing their argument.

The premise was supported in the first in­

stance by the assertion that repeal of the arms embargo was in America's interest and was not intended to interfere in Euro­ pean affairs.

This assertion was valid, the pro-repeal bloc

argued, because it was in America's interest to stay out of the war; repeal of the arms embargo would tend to shorten the war by aiding England and France; and therefore, American chances of involvement would, be diminished.

Few speakers stated or even

suggested that they were supporting repeal because it would en­ able America to take sides in the conflict to defeat Hitler. Burke's speech was an exception, and because it was an excep­ tion created special contemporary interest.

As one source de­

clared, "Senator Burke took the bull by the horns."1

He had

overtly advanced the argument that America's interest lay in helping to defeat Hitler, and Norris had suggested that the United States had a stake in the war.

But these were exceptions,

for "Most of the pro-repeal debaters," wrote a contemporary ob­ server, "are at pains to insist that they have no such purpose in mind; that they are intent upon keeping us out of war by remedying the defects of the present a c t . "2

Because of the

difficulty in gaining audience response to a direct defense of

Christian Science Monitor. October 13, 1939, p. 3. 2

Newsweek. XIV (October 16, 1939), p. 64*

273

American interest in the war, speakers for the pro-repeal group were guilty of resting a large portion of their case on what Senator Clark had termed a "secret assumption."1 2.

The arms embargo was unneutral.

Despite the predominate isolationist sentiment in the country, there was a natural sympathy on the part of a ma­ jority of Americans for England and France in the war.

Polls

in February and April of 1939 had revealed that approximately two-thirds of those polled favored aid to England and France in case of war with Germany.2

iflhile spokesmen for repeal of

the arms embargo might not argue that America had an interest in the war, they could more effectively present the contention that the arms embargo was an actual aid to Germany.

Argued by

Pittman, Connally, Barkley, Burke, Taft, and others, this posi­ tion was supported in two ways:

first, was the undisputed fact

that under the provisions of the existing neutrality law, which contained the arms embargo, a potential aggressor could receive arms from the United States in peacetime.

When war came, how­

ever, the effect of the embargo was to deny arms to the victim of aggression.

This meant that the United States was actually

aiding the aggressor to prepare for war but refused to help a weaker belligerent defend itself.

In this way, the embargo was

unneutral because the stronger belligerent was assisted.

Second

support that the embargo was unneutral, was the reference to T

~ Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 266. " "

2

Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (March, 194-0), pp. 4-5-6$.

274

available evidence which indicated that Germany was receiving arms from neighboring neutrals.

By denying arms to England

and France, the United States was actually aiding Germany to build its war potential.

Therefore, the arms embargo was un—

neutral by assisting one belligerent to increase its capabil­ ities for waging war while denying the same opportunity to the other belligerents. Some speakers in the pro-repeal bloc used this argu­ ment to explain charges of inconsistency leveled against them by anti-repeal speakers.

Pittman, McKellar, and Connally were

accused of inconsistency for having supported the arms embargo from 1935 through 1937, and now presenting a reversal of opin­ ion on the embargo.

Those charged with this shift of position

defended themselves by reference to the argument that the arms embargo had proved itself unneutral in actual operation.

In

the years before war had broken out, this effect of the embargo could not have been foreseen.

Thus, argued those charged with

inconsistency, it was only a reasonable and sensible change of mind in light of observable conditions. In refutation of the argument that the arms embargo was unneutral, the anti-repeal bloc replied that the neutrality laws had been predicated on the belief that America should be kept out of a war, regardless of the effect of the laws upon the relative resources of the belligerents.

Borah contended

that to interpret the arms embargo in terms of its effect on the resources of the belligerents was a denial of the basis up­ on which the embargo had been enacted.

Sympathy for the Allies,

275

in all probability, assisted the pro-repeal speakers to sus­ tain their position in the debate:

H.B. Elliston in the Chris­

tian Science Monitor summed up the effectiveness of the arguthat the arms embargo was unneutral: Presently there will be a din of argument, but as Lecky once wrote, the ”success of any opinion depends much less upon the force of arguments, or upon the ability of its advocates, than upon the predisposi­ tion of society to receive it.” I think this will be the case in regard to the embargo. National polls say that Americans are predisposed to repeal. Prob­ ably they find in repeal a common denominator for the desire to remain noncombatant and yet to register sym­ pathy with the Allies.1 3*

Repeal of the embargo is consistent with interna­

tional law. Speakers for repeal of the arms embargo resorted to this argument for both constructive and rebuttal purposes.

In

his message to Congress urging passage of the proposed neutral­ ity bill, President Roosevelt had declared that repeal of the arms embargo would return the nation to the practices allowed neutrals under international law.

This contention was carried

into the debate by several senators. on three premises.

This argument rested up­

In the first premise, supporters of repeal

stated that a neutral may permit its citizens to sell arms to either belligerent.

Under international law, a belligerent may

seize these arms, but the shipper assumes that risk.

This was

based upon the evidence of customary practice under international law, and was correctly stated by proponents of repealing the arms embargo.

Anti-repeal speakers did not refute this, but advanced

this contrary premise which, they argued was more applicable to

1 ”This Changing World,” October 3, 1939, p. 1.

276

the issue under debate:

if a neutral could allow the sale of

arms, the contrary was also true, viz., that a neutral could embargo arms.

In support of this, Borah challenged proponents

of repeal to cite a case in which a neutral was ever denied that right.

Connally refuted this challenge by pointing out

that Borah had neutralized the whole argument, for if a neu­ tral had a right to pass an embargo, it also had a right to repeal it.

Therefore, Connally insisted, international law

was not defensible ground upon which to argue retention of the arms embargo. A second premise in arguing the consistency of repeal with international law was a more frequent contention and ap­ peared in the speeches of Thomas, Taft, Barkley, and others. These speakers argued that the proposed neutrality law was domestic legislation and did not relate to international law. This was implied from the evidence of the law itself which in­ dicated that the restrictions in the bill affected the activi­ ties of American citizens in their dealings with the belliger­ ents.

No part of the law purported to alter agreements among

nations.

This was factually correct, and the premise was not

refuted by the anti-repeal speakers. A third premise offered by pro-repeal spokesmen was advanced in refutation of an argument by Vandenberg, Nye, Rey­ nolds, Bulow, and others.

These speakers against repeal had

argued that it was contrary to international law for a neutral to change its position after a war had begun; the United States by repealing the arms embargo was changing its position; and

277

therefore was acting contrary to international law.

To the

general premise that a neutral could not alter its policy af­ ter a war had begun, Wagner and Bailey agreed.

Their reply

vms that the general rule did not apply in the specific case of the arms embargo because in the summer of 1939, before war had broken out, the United States had indicated that the em­ bargo Tjould be repealed.

Therefore,

this nation was guilty

of no violation of the general premise.

No anti-repeal speaker

refuted this reply in spite of the possible fallacy that it was arguing beside the point,

for the actual step for repeal was

being taken after the war had started regardless of any prior warning that the policy would be altered.

Arguments offered by the opponents of repeal of the arms embargo.— 1.

Repeal of the arms embargo is a symbol of inter­

vention in the European war. Hull indicates in his Memoirs that the isolationists had come to regard the neutrality acts as a concrete manifes­ tation of isolationism. As a result,

The two were considered synonymous.1

one of the most frequent attacks made upon the

proposal to repeal the arms embargo was based upon this reason­ ing:

if the arms embargo had been a symbol of American intent

to stay out of foreign wars, the repeal of the embargo was a symbol of intent to intervene in a foreign war.

Borah laid

down this premise early in the debate, and other anti-repeal

1

Hull, Memoirs. I, pp. 409-410.

27a

speakers made it a focus of their case.

No evidence, other

than personal opinion, was offered to support the assertion that the intent of the embargo had been to stay out of war. It will be recalled from the debates of previous years that there had existed a difference of opinion on whether this was or could be the objective of a neutrality law.

Speakers

for the anti-repeal bloc, however, assumed that the intent of the embargo had been to keep the nation out of war and pre­ mised their arguments from this assumption.

In addition to

Borah, Vandenberg and Nye referred to repeal as a symbol of a desire to intervene in the European conflict. From this, the opponents of repeal drew out and em­ bellished for their audience the familiar themes of isolation­ ism.

America1s founders were reintroduced and glorified as

authorities in defense of American isolationism and, by impli­ cation, in opposition to repeal of the arms embargo.

Bennett

Clark called upon Washington, Jefferson, the Adamses, Madison, Monroe, and Jackson, and concluded:

*Tthe men who made this

country great were isolationists.”1

Lundeen enumerated the

same authorities and added a reference to Washington*s Farewell Address and to Henry Clay.

Holt added the Monroe Doctrine as

a pillar supporting isolation.

No supporter of repealing the

embargo refuted the high esteem in which all Americans would hold these authorities, but pro-repeal spokesmen denied that theirs was a purpose to violate American determination to stay

1 Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 283*

279

out oT tiie war.

In view of the public temper of the day,

the attempt of the isolationists to interpret repeal as a repudiation of isolationism was an effective argument. 2.

.Repeal of the embargo will be a step toward war.

This argument was in direct clash with the contention of the pro-repeal bloc that repeal would more likely keep the nation out of war, and it was the most prominent argument by both sides.

One contemporary source summarized this argument

of the anti-repeal bloc as one based tTon a premise composed of two parts:

the first that it was our war trade, primarily

if not wholly, that got us into the last war; the second that war trade will again draw us in.T1l

This was an accurate state­

ment of a premise familiar in the strict neutrality bloc case since 1935*

In previous debates, this bloc had made the as­

sumption that a future war would follow the pattern of the first World War, and that therefore the causes involving Amer­ ica in that conflict would operate again in a future war.

To

eliminate those causes was the objective of the case for strict neutrality legislation.

In 1939, the anti-repeal bloc argued

that their assumption of similarity between a past and future war was confirmed in the steps being taken to involve America In a war trade.

Repeal of the arms embargo, they argued, would

lead to war, based upon the evidence of causes in the 1917 con­ flict. Connally, Barkley, and others made a direct assault on 1 St. Louis Post-Dispatch. October 16, 1939, p. SC.

2 BO

the premise laid down in the anti-repeal case.

These pro­

repeal speakers maintained that the causes for entry into the World War had been the sinking of American ships and loss of American lives.

The proposed neutrality bill would elimi­

nate these causes; and therefore would keep the nation out of war.

The anti-repeal bloc held to their statement of the causes

throughout the debate and strengthened the argument by refer­ ence to the evidence of the Nye Committee.

Nye told his aud­

ience that tThistory, reason, and experience,”1 supported his analysis of the causes leading to war in 1917.

LaFollette, Cap­

per, Chavez, D. Worth Clark, and Vandenberg advanced a similar pattern of argument. Downey presented the argument in the form of a dilemma: if arms were sold to the Allies, a ¥?ar boom would result; if the Allies were winning the war, this war boom would result in in­ flation and depression.

On the other hand, if the Allies were

losing the war, the United States either would have to enter the war as it did in 1917, to protect its economic structure, or to give up the war trade and face a collapse of the inflated economy.

According to Downey, once the embargo was repealed,

there was no way out of this dilemma.

Uo pro-repeal speaker

attempted the task of breaking the dilemma. 3.

The war in Europe is not "our war."

The anti-repeal bloc had argued that repealing the arms embargo was a step toward war.

The next link in their arguments

1 Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 114*

281

against repeal was that the war was of no concern to the United States.

In establishing this argument* the first pre­

mise offered was in the form of a dilemma:

if the interests

of this country were involved in the conflict* the honorable policy would have been to enter into full participation with those nations fighting Hitler; if the war were none of this nation1s concern* adopting a policy of cash-and-carry for mu­ nitions was a subterfuge and a threat to the peace and security of the country.

As previously discussed, some pro-repealer

speakers solved this dilemma by denying that full participation in the war was necessary.

Other pro-repeal speakers attempted

to skirt the dilemma by arguing that repeal made less likely our involvement in the war. Supporting the argument that this was not ,Tour war*” some speakers in the anti-repeal bloc sought to allay the fears of the American audience rooted in a belief that Hitler would attack the United States if England and France were no longer able to resist him.

Johnson of California declared that the

arguments of those supporting repeal rested upon the ”perfectly idiotic assumption” that Hitler would or could attack the United States.1

Declaring an attack by Hitler to be incon­

ceivable* Downey offered the evidence of the geographical lo­ cation of the United States* which he maintained* led to the conclusion that no aggressor could reach this country from Europe or Asia.

Clark supported the argument in another manner

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess.* p. 631.

282

by presenting historical background which* he asserted, es­ tablished the English and the French as ecj.ua! aggressors with Hitler.

Bulow, LaFollette, and Capper argued that the war

was a European conflict with no implications for the United States.

LaFollettefs phrase that the United States had a

"rendezvous with destiny" in this Hemisphere instead of "with death" in another indicated the emotional theme of this argument.1 4-

There existed a distinction between selling arms

and selling other materials to belligerents. This argument was advanced both as a constructive argument and used in rebuttal by the opponents of repeal. Pittman had accused the anti-repeal bloc of an inconsistency in advocating an embargo on arms but not on other materials. Several other pro-repeal speakers had made the same charge. Two form of support are discoverable in the attempt of the anti-repeal speakers to answer this charge of inconsistency. One might be termed the logical support represented in the speeches of Vandenberg and D. Worth Clark in which the point was made that historically there had always been a distinction between contraband (arms) and non-contraband goods.

This was

Justified in international law and had been preserved in the 1937 Neutrality Act.

For the pro-repeal group, Wagner admitted

that the distinction existed in theory but that in wartime no belligerents agreed on what constituted contraband.

In evidence,

1

Congressional Record, 76th Cong. 2nd sess., pp. 334335.

283

Wagner was historically correct in his contention that food was considered contraband by some belligerents in the World War.

The logical distinction was refuted on what some as­

serted was a common sense basis that a ship sunk with non­ contraband cost as many lives as one sunk with contraband. Another form of support for this argument was the humanitarian appeal made by Borah, Bennett Clark, LaFollette, Frazier, and Holt.

The speakers pictured America as profit­

ing from the destruction of others by selling arms.

As La­

Follette argued, "The distinction between selling arms and selling raw materials is an important one, for the sale of arms is attached to a hatred by the people whose lives are destroyed.”1

Frazier argued that the question was a moral

one, for if war is wrong— and all agreed that it was— the na­ tion should support it in no way whatever.

Holt insisted that

T,we are sending them (bombers) to drop missiles on soldiers— yes; not alone soldiers, but women and children just like your wife and just like your child.”2

Lifting the embargo, he des­

cribed as ,Tvoting to contribute to the toll of death in Eu­ rope. n3

The pro-repeal spokesmen depended in refutation up­

on less visual emotional appeals as they maintained that the i United States had to trade in the ¥/orld and that their pro­ posal for repeal had the best interests of the United States at heart. 1

’

Congressional Record. 76th Cong. 2nd sess., p. 320. 2 Ibid., p. 563. 3

Ibid.

284

5.

It was unneutral to change policy in the middle

of a war* The anti-repeal hloc laid down two premises in sup­ port of this argument*

The first was:

the arms embargo had

been enacted to keep the United States out of war.

To support

this, Overton quoted the statements of Hull and Roosevelt in 1935, that such had been the objective of the Neutrality Act. Capper referred to the same authority.

This premise presented,

opponents of repeal pointed out the illogical position in which the advocates of repeal found themselves.

The advocates were

forced to deny that the purpose of the arms embargo had been to keep out of war or they had to admit that repeal vms in­ tended to aid one side in the conflict and was an involvement in the war. i

The supporters of repeal took the expected alter-

native and denied that keeping out of war had been the sole objective of the embargo.

Instead,

they argued,

the purpose

of the arms embargo had been to discourage war in Europe, and jin this respect it had failed.

The anti-repeal speakers con­

tinued to insist that by repealing the embargo,

the nation was

taking sides in the war and negating the purpose of the Neutraljity Act to keep the nation neutral. More frequent as a premise by the anti-repeal speakers was:

changing a neutrality policy in the middle of a war was

in violation of international law. Johnson,

Vandenberg, McCarran, Hiram

and Reynolds advanced this premise and supported it by

historical examples and the statement of authority.

McCarran

presented an effective piece of evidence in his reference to

285

the situation in 1915, when the United States refused to change its policy upon German request because such action after a war had begun was unneutral.

Reasoning from this

general premise that it was unneutral to alter policy after a war had begun, the anti-repeal speakers applied it to the specific case of repealing the arms embargo after the out­ break of war. tral act.

This, by the general premise, was an unneu­

No direct attempt was made by the pro-repeal side

to refute the general premise, but they attempted to minimize the application of this premise to the repeal issue by point­ ing out that there had been warning of a change of policy in July before the outbreak of war. An implied assumption of the pro-repeal case to which no speaker on that side in the debate overtly addressed him­ self was that repeal of the arms embargo would aid the Allies because they were the only ones able to come and to get the arms under cash-and-carry.

No anti-repeal spokesman directly

referred to this obvious result of repeal, but it was clearly suggested by their arguments that the anti-repeal side was aware of this unneutral effect of repealing the arms embargo. Contemporary Reaction To The Debate In sifting the volume of contemporary comment on this debate, three generalizations appear valid.

The first is that

there was wide agreement among outside observers that the de­ bate was marked by an absence of frankness in presenting the real reasons for or against repeal of the arms embargo. neth Crawford wrote in the Nation:

Ken­

286

An extraordinary lack of frankness on both sides was probably the principal reason for the reluctance of Senators to listen to one another. Like the President in his message opening the ses­ sion, most of the debaters seemed to feel that it would be indelicate to argue the point at issue: Neither Roosevelt nor any of his followers has said in so many words: !IWe want to pass this bill . . . because it will help Great Britain and France to lick Germany . . . Similarly, oppositionists have avoided saying: TTWe concede that the embargo isn!t very important in itself, but to lift it would be to give to the President, an Anglophile who canft be trusted where foreign relations are concerned, an opening through which eventually he would drag the United States into war . . . Consequently, the debate has been an exercise in phony dialectics which has fooled none and interested few . . .1 Catholic World observed that the Saturday Evening Post and the Chicago Tribune criticized Pittman and the President for failing to explain their change of position on the embargo from 1935, and it was agreed that many who talked "neutrality” did not mean it.2

"Those in particular who abrogate the em­

bargo and substitute cash-and-carry do not really want neu­ trality,” wrote Catholic World, "What they aim at is to help England and France.

Why donftthey say so?

or crime in that intention . .

There is no sin

.”3 Another source maintained

that the President and his supporters wanted to take the po­ sition in favor of the Allies,

but "yielded to the pressure

of public opinion and extolled

thevirtues of U.S. neutrality

and absention from foreign wars.”4

”Shadowboxing in Washington,” CXLIX (October 14, 1939), p. 4°.

2 CL (November, 1939), p. 130. 3 Ibid., p. 131* 4

Walter Yust (ed.,) Ten Eventful Years. II, University of Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica inc., p. 695*

237

A second index of public reaction to the debate is the impression to be gained from the public opinion polls. These indicated that the majority of the people favored the repeal of the embargo, and accordingly, applauded the outcome of legislative debate on the issue.

The percentage in favor

did not change measurably throughout the debate.

For example,

a Gallup poll on October 3, had revealed a majority of sixty per cent in favor of repeal, and this percentage did not change in the month of debate*1-

It was correct to state that

"Supporters of the Administration bill say that it accurately expresses the will of the majority of voters, who want to re­ main out of the war and to aid in beating Hitler."2

it should

not be concluded, however, that support for repeal was synony­ mous with any desire to enter the war.

During and after the

debate one poll indicated that ninety-eight per cent of those polled wanted the United States to stay out of the war,3 and another poll reported ninety-five per cent of the same opinion.4 The debate obviously did not change American determination to stay out of the fighting.

As a matter of fact, the Gallup poll

showed that the percentage favoring armed intervention if the Allies appeared to be losing, dropped during the debate from forty-four to twenty-nine per cent.5 1

~

Public Opinion Quarterly, IV (March, 1940), PP* 48-65. 2 Hew Republic. C (October 25, 1939), p. 338. 3 Business Week. November 11, 1939, p. 60. 4 Ibid. 5 Nation. CXLIX (November 4> 1939), p. 485.

288

A third characteristic reaction was a realization that whatever the merits of the bill were, its passage repre­ sented an act of historical significance in American foreign policy.

For example, New Republic believed that "Had legisla­

tion of this sort been on the statute books in 1914* the course of American policy would have been quite different."1

The

same source referred to the new Neutrality Act as a "milestone in American foreign policy."2

Another opinion reflected a

realization that the new Act had realigned "American neutrality in the light of actual European war, and undoes much of the speculative program which was written into Neutrality Acts of 1935 and 1936.113

As might have been expected, some comment

was critical of the Act and its implications.

The Chicago

Tribune probably best exemplified the anti-repeal position that "the thing will be to see that the Administration and its supporters in Congress and throughout the country fulfill their promises and make good on their statements that the sale of mu­ nitions will not lead this country into war."4

The New York

Times felt that the debate had been of value in permitting the Presidents proposals to be studied from all sides and in allow­ ing time for public'opinion to crystallize and to make itself felt, and it concluded that "We may count ourselves highly 1 New Republic, Cl (November 8, 1939), p. 90. 2 Ibid. 3 Christian Science Monitor, October 28, 1939, p. 1. 4 Chicago Tribune. October 30, 1939, p. 10.

289

fortunate, meanwhile, that the neutrality debate so far from arousing bitterness, has served to relieve much of the tense feeling evident when it began.”1

Perhaps the best word of

caution came from Alfred M. Landon who reminded his country­ men that nwe cannot just pass a law and have peace.

1 hew York Times. November 4> 1939, p. 14* 2 Newsweek. XIV (November 13, 1939), p. 13.

CHAPTER VII

WA Cycle In Human Events Is About To Come To Its End*tl Isolation On The Defensive Shortly before the Senate debate on neutrality leg­ islation in October, 1941 > Newsweek magazine noted that nAs with each previous neutrality debate, world events, often racing ahead of the Senate and House clocks, shaped the strat­ egy of both

s i d e s . i n

the two years since the repeal of

the arms embargo, these world events had moved the war close to America. serious

nBy midsummer 1940, the United States had more

things to think about than the repeal of the arms em­

bargo,as Germany invaded Norway and tries, and France.

Denmark, the Low Coun­

The conquest of the British Isles appeared

to be the next inevitable step on the German timetable.

Act­

ing under a law of 1917, the President authorized increased supply of arms to the British and negotiated an agreement transferring some overaged American destroyers in exchange for rights to British bases in the Western Hemisphere.4

Tension

between the United States and Japan increased with the signing 1

' ' From an address delivered by Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, at Washington, November 11, 1941* “

2 Newsweek, XVIII (October 20, 1941)> P* 17. 3 Bartlett, op. cit.» p. 388. 4 Ibid.,

pp.

604-603*

290

291

|of the treaty of alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan. ;i

jjln January, 1941 * President Roosevelt appealed to Congress ;|to make the United States the "arsenal of democracy, "1 and [in March the famous Lend-Lease Act was passed.2

"This," wrote

Bartlett, "initiated a bitter debate over the old problem of isolation, but the lines of the isolationists were no longer invulnerable . . .

Although the debate continued, the offen­

sive had passed to those who favored aid to the democracies."3 Acquisition of bases in Greenland and Iceland and announce­ ment of the Atlantic Charter in August left little doubt "that the United States had turned back from the road it had taken when the first Neutrality Act was passed in 1935."4 Indications of public opinion reflected the trend away from isolation.

In December, 1940, Nathaniel Peffer ex­

pressed the growing realisation that: America can be neutral in law, then, but not in fact. It has not been neutral in fact in any recent war of any magnitude. It was not neutral in 19141918; it is not neutral in the present war in Europe; it is not neutral in the present war in the Far East. In 1914-1918, the violation of neutrality was in ac­ cord with national sympathies; in the present Europ­ ean war the violation of neutrality is even more clearly in accord with national sympathies . . .3 1 Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 607-610*

2 Ibid., pp. 610-612. 3 Ibid.. p. 589* 4

Ibid. 5 "Entanglement or Non-entanglement: Is There a Choice?" Political Science Quarterly. LV (December, 1940), p. 525*

292

Public opinion polls revealed support for Administration pol­ icies among a majority of those polled.

In November, 1939,

sixty-six per cent approved Congressional action in repealing the arms embargo.1

Throughout 1940, polls indicated that a

majority of the people wanted to extend all aid possible to the democracies, short of actual military involvement.

For

example, in July a Gallup poll found that fifty-three per cent wanted to give England and France more aid than was being given, short of going to war.2

in November, opinion was evenly di­

vided with half of those polled favoring aid to the democracies even at the risk of war.3

The declining influence of isolation

was revealed in answers to the question, "Do you think it was a mistake for the United States to enter the last World War?" In April, 1937, sixty-four per cent thought entry into that war had been a mistake, but by December, 1940* that percentage had fallen to thirty-nine.4

Isolationists would have had cause for

concern in a poll taken in January, 1941* which revealed that sixty-eight per cent believed that the future safety of the United States depended upon England winning the war.5 Concerning the neutrality legislation, public opinion 1 Public Opinion Quarterly. IV (March, 1940), pp. 4&“65.

2 Ibid.. IV (June, 1940), pp. 229-232. 3 Ibid., V (March, 1941)> P* 68. 4 Public Opinion Quarterly. V (March, 1941), PP* 133-165. 5 Ibid.

appeared to favor some changes as early as December, 1940, when nearly half of those polled favored the use of American ships to carry war supplies to England.1

This percentage in­

creased throughout 1 9 4 1 until November when sixty-one per cent approved changes in the law.2

Support for arming American

merchant vessels was even greater with seventy-two per cent desiring such action in October, 1 9 4 1 . 3 According to Secretary Hull, "The question whether to ask Congress to repeal parts of the Neutrality Act so as to permit American ships to be armed and to carry cargoes di­ rectly to Britain was much under discussion in and out of the Administration during the spring of 1941 *"4

The Administra­

tion recognized, however, that isolationist sentiment in Con­ gress was still strong.

"I felt," wrote Hull, "that these

influential isolationists would take advantage of the debate to delay action perhaps for many months and still further di­ vide public opinion."5

No action was taken toward repeal un­

til after German attacks on American shipping had created a situation which made the request for repeal possible.

The

attacks on American ships began with the submarine attack on the merchant ship Robin Moor in May and were followed by 1 Public Opinion Quarterly, V (March, 1 9 4 1 ) > PP* 1 3 3 - 1 6 5 .

2 Ibid.. VI (December, 1 9 4 1 ) > PP* 1 4 0 - 1 7 4 * 3

Ibid. 4

Hull, op. cit.. II, p. 9435 Ibid.

294

similar incidents involving a United States destroyer Greer in September and other merchant ships*

In a radio address

on September 11, President Roosevelt warned that the navy would protect all merchant ships engaged in commerce in defen­ sive waters of the United States, and he told the nation that he had given orders to the navy to shoot on sight any Axis raiders who entered United States* defense zones.1

The de­

mand for repeal of the prohibition against the arming of Amer­ ican merchantmen came from other Administration spokesmen, in­ cluding Secretary of Navy Knox and Senator Connally.

Impetus

to this demand came also from the announcement by the Panaman­ ian Government that the United States could no longer rely on the subterfuge of arming American owned ships and then trans­ ferring these ships to Panama r e g i s t r y . 2 By mid-September, the drive for repeal of some sec­ tions in the neutrality Act was gaining rapid headway in Ad­ ministration plans, and Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, declared n . . . that the question would come up for a test in the near future.”3

The President

met with Congressional leaders on September 15, to discuss the matter.

At a press conference on September 23, President Roose­

velt indicated that he planned to ask for arming of merchant ships and for a revision of the law. .

How much of the law would

j

Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 625-628.

2 Newsweek. XVTII (October 20, 1941)y P* 17* 3 New York Times. September

20,

1941>

P*

3*

295 |

|require revision, the President did not specify.1

Senator

Connally hinted that repeal of the provision establishing comhat areas into which American citizens and ships might not

I i

j travel was under consideration*^

in the Senate on September

\.25, Senator McKellar presented a short resolution to repeal

j the

entire Neutrality Act of 1939, and contended, »We made a

|mistake in passing the neutrality laws, as they have done no i

Igood and have merely cluttered up a situation that was already jbad.”3

This was not a unanimous opinion, for the proposals

to repeal any of the Neutrality Act were already meeting oppo­ sition.

Senator George called the drive for repeal tla step

jtoward involvement” in the war*4

Senator Gillette in a radio

!address declared that repeal or revision of the neutrality policy would repudiate the will of the people as it had been i

[expressed in the Act of 1939.5 | By September 28, the sides started choosing up in the j ; {neutrality fight, as the President conferred with Hull on the -legislative program to be r e c o m m e n d e d , 6 and opponents of the Presidents foreign policy made plans to hold meetings for de­ termining the attack on the proposals.?

The climax of

i

I

I

“

New York Times. September 24, 194i> P* 10. i

2

! i !! i

Ibid.. p. 22. 3 Ibid.. September 4 Chicago Tribune.

I

5

!

Ibid.. October 6,

i

6

;i

7

26, 1941* P* 1September 21,1941> P* 1* 1941> P* 1*

New York Times. September 30, 1941* P* 1*

j

Ibid.. September

29, 1941, p. 1.

296

Administration

strategy

talks was

reached

in

two White

House

;i

conferences on October 7 and 9.

nNot since the beginning of

the war,n wrote the Christian Science Monitor, nhas there been such a full-dress non-partisan policy conference assembled at the White House***1

One source gave this report on Administra­

tion strategy as a result of the conference: Most of the Congressional leaders he^, (the Pres­ ident) called into conference agreed that it will be easy to get authorization to arm ships out of the House and Senate but that the isolationists would make a desperate and impressive if unsuccessful stand against direct shipments* They felt that the debate would be disturbing to the American people and per­ haps alarming to the British even though the final outcome was favorable * * • But it was not this argument, in the last analy­ sis, that dissuaded the President from going the whole way. What got him was the assurance of Repub­ lican leaders that many of their colleagues wanted to back off the isolationist limb, and would do so if given a chance to sneak back a step at a tim e *2 Whatever the predominate motive in the strategy, Mr* Roosevelt agreed with his leaders that it would be wise to avoid two things: (1) jeopordizing the more immediately urgent matter of enabling American crews to defend themselves by tying section 6 to the more controversial sections 2 and 3, which forbid American citizens and American ships to call at bel­ ligerent ports, and (2) coming as close to defeat as he did on the draft extension bill* Hence, the adoption of the one-thing-at-a-time tactic.3 1 October 9, 1941, p* 1. The conference included the President, Secretary Hull, Harry Hopkins, Senators George, Barkley, Austin, McNary, and Connally; Representatives Bloom, Eaton, Rayburn, McCormack, Martin, Wadsworth, and Johnson*

2 Hew Republic* CV (October 20, 1941)* P* 506. 3 Newsweek. XVIII (October 20, 1941)9 P* 18. The draft extension had passed in August by a margin of one vote in the House of Representatives*

297

On October 9, President Roosevelt sent a message to Congress in which he recommended repeal only of section 6 of the Neutrality Act prohibiting the arming of merchant ships. In the message, he declared that the Act had seemed in 1939, to be as reasonable a protection against aggression as did the Maginot Line, and later events had proved that neither served that purpose.

Revision of the law was ”a matter of

essential defense of American rights,w and it would be a warn­ ing that the nation ”will not let Hitler prescribe the waters of the world on which our ships may travel.nl The House of Representatives was first to act upon the Presidents request and debate began on October 15.

Two

days later the House voted approval of authority to arm mer­ chant ships by repealing section 6 of the 1939 Neutrality Act.2

This vote came after a nsharp debate set off by the

announcement of the attack on the destroyer Kearny.”3

As the

Senate Foreign Relations Committee prepared to consider the House action, news of further attacks on merchant shipping spurred the ”interventionist wing of Republicans”4 led by Wendell Willkie to seize the legislative initiative and to favor repeal of the entire Neutrality Act. 1

Senators Austin,

' ” Bartlett, on. cit.. pp. 628-630.

2 Congressional Record. 77th Cong. 1st sess., pp. 7883, 7949-3041. 3 New York Times. October 18, 1941* P* 1American destroyer Kearny was damaged but not sunk by a torpedo while operating off Iceland. *

N e w s w e e k . XVIII

(October

3,

1941)*

PP*

14-15.

Bridges, and Gurney indicated that they would introduce a proposal for complete repeal in the Committee hearings.1 Senator Glass referred to the Neutrality Act as ”a craven piece of poltroonery,”2 and urged complete repeal.

On the

other side, the isolationists privately conceded that the House authority to arm merchant ships would pass the Senate, hut they indicated that the main floor fight would come on an expected attempt to repeal those provisions concerning combat zones and travel to belligerent ports.3 Secret Hearings In The Senate Committee On October 20, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted twelve to nine to hold four days of secret hearings on the House approved ship-arming bill titled House Joint Resolu­ tion #237.4

The vote in the Committee was split with the

twelve Democrats in favor of secret hearings and six Republi­ cans, two Democrats, and one Progressive opposed.

This action

of the Committee aroused protest in the Senate and gave a pre­ view of the subsequent debate on the Committee report.5

Sen­

ators Danaher and Vandenberg protested that the secret hearings were an attempt to withhold the full facts of repeal of the neutrality law from the people.

Connally and Lee defended the

1 Newsweek. XVIII (October 3, 1941)* PP* 14-15. 2 New York Times. October 18, 1941* P* 7. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., October 22, 1941* P* 15 See

8061-8067.

Congressional

Record. 77th

Cong.

1st

sess.,

pp.

299

decision on grounds that the international situation was too !critical to allow delay and to permit the embarrassing of cabinet members who wanted to testify.

Frank statements, de­

clared Connally, could better be made in closed sessions.1 :Lee took the occasion to attack the isolationists for oppos­ ing every step of the defense program.

Their action, main­

tained Lee, was ^forging weapons for Hitler.fl2 '

During the Committee hearings, an informal poll showed

that the Administration had sufficient votes in the Committee to approve the ship-arming proposal of the House, but there were not sufficient votes assured for an outright repeal of the entire Neutrality Act.3

Senators Lee, Green, and Pepper

suggested the compromise which was approved at the conclusion of the hearings.

This provided for repeal of sections two and

three of the 1939 Neutrality Act, in addition to the House ap­ proved repeal of Section six.

These two additional sections

repealed provided for the establishment of combat zones and prohibited American ships sailing directly to belligerent ports. It should be kept in mind that no other provision of the Neu­ trality Act of 1939 was affected under the CommitteeTs report. Witnesses who testified in the closed hearings included Secre­ tary Hull4 and Admiral Stark, Chief of Naval Operations.3 1

'

Congressional Record. 77th Cong. 1st sess., p. 3061.

2 Ibid., p. 3065* 3 New York Times. October 20, 1941* P« 16.

4-5 U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings before Foreign Rela­ tions Committee, 77th Cong. 1st sess., on H.J. Res. 237, Octo­ ber 21-25, 1941. Hull argued that the right of self-defense

^Opposition witnesses included David Heed, former Senator from ; i jPennsylvania,1 and Oswald Garrison Villard, journalist and au-

i

9

'thor.^

Even as the Committee was meeting, news of further

;j

^'attacks on American merchant ships reached Washington.3 S i

On October 25, the Committee voted twelve to eleven

'to broaden the House Resolution to include repeal of sections two and three; and then in the critical vote approved thirteen to ten sending the proposal to the Senate floor for debate.4 As leaders of both sides got set for a ”bitter struggle,” in­ dependent observers were forecasting approval by the Senate with fifty-five to sixty assured votes.5 Commenting on the I .vote in the Committee, Senator Nye declared, ”tliis is the last !step we take before actually entering the war and it is an is­ sue which quite normally would call for speeches by close to ninety-six Senators.”6

Coincident with the opening of Senate

debate on October 27, President Roosevelt in a sensational Navy Day speech declared that ”America has been attacked by

must be maintained by the nation. Stark gave naval authority !on value of armed merchant ships. They at least, he main­ tained, had a better chance of escaping from submarines if attacked.

1 Ibid., Heed maintained arming ships was impractical and ineffective.

2 I b i d . . Villard characterized the arming of ships as another step in undeclared war. Opposition witnesses consumed nearly three days of the four day hearings.

3 Notably the sinking of the L e h i g h . Times, October 23, 1941> P* 1.

See N e w York

4 N e w York T i m e s , October 26, 1941* P* 1*

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid.,

p.

25.

301

,|German rattlesnakes of the sea," and notwithstanding American

i!

desire to avoid war, "the shooting has started."1

It was not

isurprising to find that j S

^ The neutrality debate drew the largest galleries to attend Senate sessions so far this year. By the time Senator Connally was launched in his speech long lines of spectators were waiting at the door of each gallery, including the one reserved by Senators1 families. Some were admitted to stand along the walls.2

Participants In The Debate Familiar Figures In this first session of the seventy-seventh Congress, there were sixty-five Democrats, twenty-nine Republicans, one Progressive, and one Independent in the Senate.

Death had re­

moved two personalities whose names had been featured in pre­ vious neutrality debates, Senators Key Pittman and William E. Borah.

Illness during the 1941 debate prevented Senator Homer

T. Bone of Washington from continuing the fight he had been so prominent in initiating in 1935*

Replacing Pittman as chair­

man of the influential Foreign Relations Committee was the col­ orful Administration spokesman, Tom Connally.

Other well-known

names included, Vandenberg, Lee, Taft, Pepper, Barkley, Nye, LaFollette, Thomas of Utah, Capper, Bennett Clark, Hiram John­ son, Tydings, Danaher, Bailey, Wiley, McKellar, Maloney, Gil­ lette, Shipstead, Lucas, Lodge, D. Worth Clark, Walsh, Downey, Andrews, and Tobey.

While most of these speakers were to follow

_

.

—

Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People. p.

788.

2 New York Times. October

2 8,

1941*

P*

1*

the position they had consistently advocated, four of the Sen­ ators, Taft, Tydings, Maloney, and Gillette, who had hacked the Administration on repeal of the arms embargo in 1939, were to Join the opposition in 1941. New Figures As had been the case in 1939, the circumstances and i |importance surrounding the debate attracted to the Senate floor I j over a score of new names. |

Styles Bridges was elected to the Senate from New Hamp shire in 1936.

A Republican,

. . h e climbed through a ser­

ies of New Hampshire political Jobs until he reached the Gover|norship in 1 9 3 4 * These Jobs had included membership on the j New Hampshire Public Service Commission for a five year period* j In addition, Bridges had been a delegate-at-large and chairman i

I of the New Hampshire delegation to the Republican national conI | vention in 1936.2 He was a lawyer, " . . . athletic and aggres| sive.n3 In the Senate, he had served on the appropriations, i j education and labor, and military affairs committees. Bridges I j had opposed the surrender of any national rights under neutralj ity legislation and had been one of the six to oppose the Pitt-

i I man Bill in 1937. i !

i j

_____________________________________________

i Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 14• 2 j Congressional Directory. 77th Cong. 1st sess., May, 1941* P* 68 * 3 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 14* !

J

303 | : j1

Chan Gurney was a Republican from South Dakota,

elected to the Senate in 1933. He had served in the World r War and had established a statewide reputation through a mer­ chandising business and radio station in partnership with ,his brothers.!

in the Senate, Gurney had served on commit­

tees of interstate commerce, military affairs, appropriations, and public lands and surveys.

He was recognized as one of

the principal Republicans supporting the Administration move to modify the Neutrality Act.2

Gurney ". . . saw no reason

to parrot the purportedly noninterventionist sentiment of his constituents at the expense of his convictions."3

He had

voted for repeal of the arms embargo in 1939. C. Wayland Brooks was elected to the Senate from Il­ linois in 194*0, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator J. Hamilton Lewis.

Brooks was a Republican.

Follow­

ing a notable career of service with the marines in the World War, he returned to complete his law degree.

He was admitted

to the bar in 1926, and as assistant state*s attorney for seven years engaged in an "aggressive fight" against organized crime.4* As the Republican nominee for Governor in 1936, in face of the Democratic landslide, Brooks polled one hundred r

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong. 1st sess., May,

1941, P* 109.

2

See Newsweek. XVIII (October 3, 1941), PP* 14-15. 3 Ibid. 4 1941,

p.

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong. 1st sess., May,

24*

land five thousand more votes than any other Republican cand­ idate in that election.

He was a delegate to the 1940 Repub­

lican national convention and a member of the platform draft­ ing committee*!

In the Senate, he served on committees on

appropriations, claims, interstate commerce, and pensions* He was known to possess definite isolationist views. George Aiken was a Republican from Vermont, elected to the Senate in 1940> to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator Gibson*

He was a lawyer and a farmer and had served

as town representative in 1931 and 1933*

He was elected Gov­

ernor of the State after service as speaker of the state house of representatives and Lieutenant-Governor.

His selection to

the Senate follovjed one term in the State Ts highest off ice. 2 Aiken had served on the agriculture and forestry, civil service, education and labor, and pensions committees. Harry H* Schwartz was a Democrat and an n. . . ardent Hew Dealer,” from Wyoming.3

He came to the Senate in 1936, af­

ter a long career in law, politics, and as an official in the Federal Land Office.

Schwartz had come west from Ohio where

his grandparents were pioneer farmers.

He served in the South

Dakota legislature before moving on to Wyoming, where he built up a successful law practice.

He served as Chief of Field Ser­

vice in the General Land Office in Washington from 1907-1910. ,

-

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong. 1st sess., May, 1941, PP* 24-23.

2 Ibid., p. 118 3 News wee k. IX

(January

2,

1937),

p.

15.

305

,He turning to Wyoming, he was elected to the state senate, and ' I ■served as Democratic precinct committeeman and national com— i imitteeman in subsequent years. In 1930, he was an unsuccess­ ful candidate for the Senate.1

In the Senate, Schwartz was

i

a member of committees on claims, education and labor, mili­ tary affairs, interstate commerce, and chairman of the commit­ tee on pensions.

He was adjudged by one source as a "poor

ispeaker," but "a top specialist in legal matters affecting the public

domain.

"2

Schwartz voted for all of the Adminis­

tration sponsored neutrality legislation. Warren Austin was a Republican Senator from Vermont. He was elected to the Senate in 1931 to fill an unexpired term and was reelected in 1934*

Austin was a lawyer and served as

statefs attorney, as mayor of St. Albans, Vermont, and as pres­ ident of the Vermont Bar Association.

He was also chairman of

the Republican State Convention in 1908, and delegate to na­ tional conventions in 1928 and 1940**^

Austin served on the

committees on interstate commerce, judiciary, military affairs, and territories and insular affairs.

He was one of the six who

opposed the Pittman Bill in 1937 and voted for repeal of the arms embargo. Theodore Green came to the Senate from Rhode Island ...

-

_.

- .

.-

-

.-

—

-

1 Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, p. 129.

2

Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15. 3 Congressional 194-1 > P*

11®.

D i r e c t o r y . 7 7 t h Cong.,

1st

sess.,

May,

Iin 1936.

He was a Democrat and a lawyer with two years of

IItraining at German universities.

In addition to practicing

ij

j !law in the state, Green was an instructor in Homan law at

i!

Brown University, a member of the state house of representa-

i!

i tives, chairman of Democratic State Conventions, and a dele­

gate to all national conventions from 1912 to 1940.

"Having

mixed a successful business career with semisuccessful polit­ ical activity for twenty-five years, he finally became Governor in 1932."1

He was reelected by the largest vote ever cast for

any candidate for any office in the state.2

He was described

as a "♦ . . lean, aristocratic, erudite, bachelor."3

His com­

mittee service had included appropriations, foreign relations, privileges and elections, and public buildings and grounds. He supported the Neutrality Acts of 1937 and 1939. Joseph Ball was appointed to the Senate as a Repub­ lican from Minnesota in 1940*

He filled the vacancy created

by the death of Senator Lundeen.

He attended the University

of Minnesota and entered the newspaper field as a cub reporter for a Minneapolis paper in 1927.

After a year of free lanc­

ing and writing fiction, he returned to a position as reporter and rewrite man for the St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch. In 1934, Ball was made a State political writer for the same 1 Newsweek. IX (January 2, 1937), p. 15.

2 Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May,

1941, p. 1 0 ^ 3 Newsweek,

IX

( J a n u a r y 2,

1937),

p.

15.

30 7

Ipaper and remained in that work until his appointment to the Senate by Governor Stassen.l

In the Senate, he served on the

[j

.banking and currency, education and labor, immigration, manufactures, and printing committees. Theodore Bilbo was a Democrat from Mississippi, com­ ing to the Senate in 1934*

His reelection in 1940 was without

opposition, and he carried all but thirteen of eighty-two coun­ ties against his opponent in the Democratic primaries of the same year.

Bilbo was a lawyer and a farmer in addition to his

career in Mississippi politics which carried him from member­ ship in the state senate to Governor of the state in 1916.

He

served in that office until 1920, and returned eight years later to win the same honor from the v o t e r s. 2

Bilbo had been on com­

mittees on agriculture and forestry, commerce, library, and pensions.

He was absent for all of the voting on neutrality

legislation except for the repeal of the arms embargo which he supported. Lister Hill came to the Senate in 1938, as a Democrat from Alabama.

He had practiced law in Montgomery, Alabama and

served as the president of the Montgomery Board of Education for five years.

Following army service in the first World War,

he was elected to fill a vacancy in the House of Representatives. He had the distinction of being renominated and reelected without 1 Congressional Directory, 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, P. 55.

2

Ibid., p. 58.

308 i ; ;|opposition for eight terms. a t e appointment in 1938.1

He resigned his seat for the Sen­ Hill had served on committees on

commerce, education and labor, military affairs, and as chair— man of the committee on expenditures in the executive depart> f ment. He had voted in favor of repeal of the arms embargo in 1939. Ralph Brewster. Republican of Maine, was elected to the Senate in 1941.

A lawyer, Brewster was the principal of

a high school before his admittance to the bar in 1913.

He

was a representative in the Maine legislature for one term and !was renominated but resigned to enter military service in the first World War.

Returning to politics after the war, he served

in the state house and senate before becoming Governor of the state in 1925.

As Governor, Bridges was the chairman of the

Governorsf conference in 1926.

He was elected to the House of

Representatives of the seventy-fourth Congress and subsequently reelected for two more terms.2

in the Senate, Brewster served

on the committees on claims, commerce, library, naval affairs, and public buildings and grounds. Albert Chandler entered the Senate from Kentucky in 1939, during the debate on repeal of the arms embargo.

He was

appointed to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator Logan.

The following year, Chandler was elected to fill the

remaining three years of Logan1s term in office.

He was a

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941,

P*

3.

2

Ibid..

p.

44 .

309

ijDemocrat and a lawyer and was prominent in state political circles.

After service in the first World War, Chandler had

ibeen master commissioner of Woodford circuit court, a member of the state senate, and Lieutenant-Governor.

■i

In 1935, by the

largest vote ever cast for the office, he became Governor. His committee work included the judiciary, military affairs, mines and mining, and privileges and elections committees. Chandler was a loyal Administration supporter in neutrality legislation and cast one of his first Senate votes in favor of repealing the arms embargo. Raymond Willis was fairly new to the Senate, being elected as a Republican from Indiana in 194*0 •

A graduate of

Wabash College, Willis was a newspaper publisher in his state. In the first World War he served as chairman of a county coun­ cil of defense.

Following the war, he became a member of the

state legislature for two terms.2

in the Senate, he was a mem­

ber of the committees on agriculture and forestry, library, post offices and post roads, printing, and public lands and surveys. Tom Stewart was a Democrat from Tennessee, elected to the Senate in 1938, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Senator Bachman.

A lawyer, Stewart had been the district

attorney general of the eighteenth circuit of Tennessee since -

_

_

_

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941>

P-

2 Ibid.,

p.

3 1.

310

!1923*^ He served on committees on agriculture and forestry, ! |claims, immigration, interstate commerce, and privileges and elections in the Senate*

In voting on neutrality legislation,

Stewart consistently followed the Administration policy* i I John Bankhead was elected to the Senate from Alabama ;;in 1930*

A Democrat, Bankhead was the brother of the famous

jSpeaker of the House of Representatives, the late William B. Bankhead*

Admitted to the bar in 1893, John Bankhead became

the senior partner of a law firm with his brother until the latterfs election to the House in 1916*

He continued the law

partnership with the son of the famous Speaker until 1930.2 In the Senate, Bankhead served on committees on agriculture and forestry, appropriations, banking and currency, rules, and as chairman of the committee on irrigation and reclamation* In 1935, his was one of the only two votes against the Neutral­ ity Act, and he voted for repeal of the arms embargo in 1939. James Tunnell was a Democrat from Delaware, elected to the Senate in 1940.

His career began as a teacher and principal

in the public schools of the state in 1903.

Completing his

training for the law profession, he was admitted to the bar in 1907, and practiced in Delaware until 1936.

In addition to his

law work, Tunnell served as chairman of the Democratic county committee and as a delegate to the party's national convention „

-

Congressional Directory* 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, P- I1 1 -

2

I b i d *,

p.

3.

311

j . i ! in 1916.

He was an unsuccessful nominee for the Senate in i ! | j1 9 2 4 * In the Senate, Tunnell served on committees on claims, |interstate commerce, naval affairs, pensions, and privileges |i

and elections. i|

S

i| |i

Berkeley Bunker was appointed to the Senate as a Demo-

crat from Nevada in 194-0

j ideath of Key Pittman.

>

"to fill the vacancy caused by the

He had been in business in Nevada and

I'had served as president of the Young Democrats of Nevada and |as secretary of the Democratic county central committee.

In

1936, Bunker was elected to the state legislature and subse­ quently reelected for two terms.

In the state legislature, he

had been chairman of the ways and means committee and speaker of the house.2

His Senate committee service included the com­

mittees on agriculture and forestry, education and labor, Indian affairs, and mines and mining. Alva Adams came to the Senate from Colorado in 1932. He was a Democrat and a lawyer, having practiced law in Colo­ rado and serving as county and city attorney and a member of the charter convention of the city of Pueblo.

His public ser­

vice included a term as a member of the Colorado State Univer­ sity Board of Regents.

During the first World War, Adams

1 served in the Judge Advocate General's Department.

He had been

in the Senate under appointment for a one year unexpired term 1 Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941* P* 17*

2

I b i d .,

p .

67.

312 t

i±n 1923-24.1

ji

His committee service included the committees

jl

Ion appropriations, hanking and currency, irrigation and re­ clamation, rules, and as the chairman of the committee on ii Ij

j!public land and surveys.

Adams had voted for the Neutrality

Acts in 1937, and 1939. !

Ellison Smith had been in the Senate since 1908, when

ijhis nomination in the primaries followed the largest vote ever Ireceived by any candidate for that office prior to that date. j

He was from South Carolina, a Democrat, and a graduate of Wof­ ford College in Spartanburg, South Carolina.

Smith had been

a member of the state legislature and one of the principal figures in the organization of the Southern Cotton Association in 1905.

Following his election to the Senate, he was elected

chairman of the interstate commerce committee at the end of only five weeks in the Senate.

In 1941, he was the ranking

Democrat on the interstate commerce, manufactures, and patents committees.2

He was also the chairman of the agriculture and

forestry committee and a member of the naval affairs and priv­ ileges and elections committees.

He had supported the Admini­

stration on neutrality legislation in previous years. Hattie W. Caraway. Democrat from Arkansas, was ap­ pointed to the Senate in 1931, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of her husband, Senator fhaddeus Caraway.

In 1932,

Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, p. 13.

2

I b i d ..

p.

107.

Ishe was renominated over six other Democratic candidates and

j elected

| !

for the full six year t e r m * M r s #

Caraway was the

second woman to be admitted to the Senate and the first to be 'i

|elected to that body. j ,

wAs senator, Mrs. Caraway has continued

;her h u s b a n d fs policies to a large degree.

She is a member of

Ithe important committee on agriculture and forestry, devoting Ithe major part of her legislative efforts to its field."2 She also served on committees on commerce, library, and as chairman of the committee on enrolled bills. from interested organizations,

Despite pressure

"she has persistently refused

to champion w o m e n ’s rights in the S e n a t e #”3

Mrs. Caraway con­

sistently followed the Administration vote on neutrality legis­ lation. Wilbert Lee 0 TDaniel came to Washington in August,

1941> accompanied by his dome-topped sound truck and famous string band.4

He was elected in a special election in Texas

to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Morris Sheppard. A Democrat, and a colorful political figure, 0 ’Daniel had been elected Governor of Texas in 1933, wi t h a clear majority over twelve opponents, the first time this had happened in the s t a t e ’ history.

He had previously operated a flour milling and grain

1 Congressional Di r e c t o r y . 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, P. 7.

2

National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. D, pp. 143-149* 3 Ibid. 4 T i m e . XXXVIII

(July

14,

194l)>

P*

15.

314

business in the state.l

Breaking tradition that freshman

senators wshould be seen and not heard until the elder states: men have taught them the legislative ropes, Senator W. Lee 0*Daniel . . . introduced a bill on his first day in office and made a speech on his second. w2

This speech created a

mild sensation when 0 fDaniel declared that nhe would support the White House foreign policy as long as President Roosevelt jjstayed within the Constitution and the laws of C o n g r e s s . "3 'O’Daniel was especially interested in legislation to penalize 1!

strikes in defense industries.

WI did not come to the United

States Senate,n he proclaimed, wto be a yes man or a rubber stamp for anybody.”4 Joseph C. Q fMahoney, a Democrat from Wyoming, was ap­ pointed to the Senate in 1933 upon the death of Senator Kendrick. Following his graduation from Columbia University, he entered ■newspaper work as a reporter on the Cambridge (Mass.) Democrat. 0 fMahoney moved west and became editor of newspapers in Colo­ rado and Wyoming prior to the first World War.

In 1917, he was

selected by Governor Kendrick as his secretary when Kendrick was elected to the Senate.

While in Washington, O'Mahoney com­

pleted his law degree and returned to Wyoming to practice.

~ — Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 2nd sess., Jan­ uary, 1942 , p. 113*

~

I

He

2 Hewsweek. XVIII (August 18, 1941)> 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid.

V *

16.

315

ij :

represented looming in the conference on uniform state laws in 1925*1

WA Democrat in politics since 1916, he became an

active figure in the political life of his state and in 1929 r

was selected Democratic national committeeman for Wyoming.”2 In Roosevelt’s 1932 campaign, 0 ’Mahoney took an active role ;as vice-chairman of the campaign committee*

He was appointed

as first assistant postmaster general before his appointment to the Senate*

He had "warmly supported the policies of the

Roosevelt administration,"3 and had followed the Administration in voting on the neutrality acts*

In the Senate he had served

on committees on appropriations, Indian affairs, irrigation and reclamation, judiciary, and post offices and post roads* Walter F* George was elected to the Senate in 1922, from Georgia*-4

a

Democrat, George was admitted to the bar in

1901, and practiced law in the state while being associated with local banking and mercantile interests.

He served as so­

licitor general of the circuit court, judge of the circuit and state court of appeals, and associate justice of the state su­ preme court before his election to the Senate.

"In the Senate

he has displayed unusual independence, courage, and ability in dealing with public questions, becoming one of the most influ­ ential and respected members of the Democratic side."5 r

George

“ 1 — Congressional Directory* 77th Cong., 1st sess., May,

1941, p* i2inr 2

national Cyclopedia of American Biography* Vol. D, p. 391* 3 Ibid* 4 Cong. Dir., 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941, P* 20* 5 national

Cyclopedia

of American

B i o g r a p h y . Vol.

F,

p.

16&.

316

supported most of the New Deal policies with notable excep­ tions in the cases of the legislation to regulate holding companies and the Guffey coal bill in 1935, and his opposi­ tion to the supreme court expansion bill in 1937 A

"Largely

because of his opposition to the supreme court bill, Presi­ dent Roosevelt spoke against him in Georgia in 1938,

Never­

theless, Senator George was reelected by an overwhelming vote . • ."2

upon the death of Key Pittman in November, 1940,

George succeeded to the chairmanship of the Foreign Relations Committee, but he resigned this post in July, 1941, to accept the chairmanship of the Senate finance committee.

He con­

tinued, however, as ranking member on the Foreign Relations Committee*

"Since the outbreak of the second World War he

has cooperated loyally with the President in carrying out var­ ious aspects of the administration^ foreign policy and is fre­ quently called to the White House to give his advice . . . most questions of foreign policy."3

on

There was some doubt as

the 1941 debate on neutrality legislation began whether George would support the Administration, since he had publicly declared that repeal of the Act was equivalent to a declaration of war.4 Burton K. Wheeler. Democrat from Montana, was accepted 1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography. Vol. F, pp. 168-169.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 169. 4 New York

Times. September

21,

1941,

p.

27.

by many tt. * . a s the leader of the non—interventionist bloc.wl He was elected to the Senate in 1922, by the largest majority ever given a Democrat in Montana,

"In the Senate he aligned

himself generally with what became known as the progressive farm bloc and although one of the youngest men in the chamber speedily attained a place of influence and power in its delib­ erations *"2

Wheeler had gained a reputation as a lawyer of

ability by winning a number of claims against railroad and min­ ing companies in his state.

He served in the Montana house of

representatives and as United States district attorney before his election to the Senate.3

He was nominated as the running

mate of Senator LaFollette, Sr, in the latter*s campaign for the presidency under the progressive party in 1924.

Wheeler

had supported the candidacy of Franklin Roosevelt in 1932, and had sponsored and secured the passage of some measures which had the approval of the Administration.

The public utility hold

ing company act of 1935> was one of the most notable pieces of legislation sponsored by Wheeler.

As chairman of the interstate

commerce committee, he had also sponsored railroad labor legis­ lation .-4

Although supporting much of the Hew Deal program,

• . h e has at times been one of the Roosevelt administration1 1 National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol. F, pp. 152-153-

2 Ibid. 3 Congressional Directory. 77th Cong., 1st sess., May, 1941> P*

4 National

p.

152.

Cyclopedia

of American B i o g r a p h y . Vol.

F,

318 i

I jseverest critics.

He led the Senate opposition to the Presi­

dent’s supreme court expansion bill of 1937, which was defeated."1 Wheeler was one of the principal opponents of the Administra­ tion’s foreign policy,

. . which he denounced in the senate,

|over the radio and from public platforms throughout the country*"2 j

The Debate Is On An Overview of the Debate j

Opening the debate by presenting the Committee’s de­

cision to recommend repeal of three sections of the 1939 Neutral!ity Act, Senator Connally spoke to crowded galleries although i ljn . . . not more than half the Senators were in their seats. ”3 ! ITracing the history of neutrality legislation and the need for ii i

revision of the laws, "the eloquent phrase-making Texan spoke

'without a manuscript but referred occasionally to a few notes i

!which he had scrawled on a piece of paper."4

During his speech

i

!he was occasionally interrupted by Senator Taft who questioned |Connally concerning the reasons for the Texan’s change of po­ sition from his support of the Neutrality Act of 1939. The first i | |opposition speaker to deliver a prepared address was Senator jVandenberg who followed Connally in the first day’s debate, fin

a lengthy speech, Vandenberg laid the foundation of the

I iip. !!

!j

'! i| i!

National Cyclopedia of American Biography, Vol.

F,

152.

2

Ibid., p. 153. '3 Christian Science Monitor. October 28, 1941* p. A Ibid.

7.

319

opponents1 case against revision of the Act. He spoke without i j ||interruption, and his remarks concluded the debate for the open■ j |ing day. I

On the second day of debate, the opposition to revision

of the Neutrality Act was led by Senator Taft whose prepared i Ispeech was followed by an address given by Senator Pepper in fa­ vor of repeal of the three sections of the Neutrality Act.

Pep­

per was interrupted throughout his speech by Senators Taft and Wheeler who challenged certain assertions and arguments put for­ ward by the Florida Democrat.

Some personal exchanges resulted

in the ensuing colloquoys which heightened interest among the gallery and Senate audiences.

At the conclusion of Pepper1s

address, no other speakers were prepared to speak.

This caused

Barkley and Connally to complain that the work of the Senate was being held up because the Senators did not plan their speeches to facilitate speed in consideration of the pending business. Barkley called on his colleagues to get down to "brass tacks”! and prepare their speeches so as to be ready to respond if they were called upon to do so the following day.

Connally gave the

suggestion that the Senators did not have to memorize their speeches, for nThey may,” he pointed out, "read them if they de­ sire . . . because it is unseemly to have the Senate adjourning because no Senator wants to speak when the country thinks we all want to speak.”2

Congressional

2 Ibid.

R e c o r d . 7 7 t h Cong.,

1st

sess.,

p.

8298.

320 i!

The next day of debate found two prominent isolation­ ists prepared to speak, Senators Nye and LaFollette. On this l i day, the two isolationists argued without interruption against 1repeal of any sections of the Neutrality Act. i1

”Interest in

V.

I;the debate,n wrote the New York Times, !Iapparently was waning. ii ' i j|At no time during the afternoon were the galleries filled, and for most of the session no more than fifteen or twenty Senators j

were in their places*,!1

Nyefs audience at one point consisted

iof six senators.2 j.

By the fourth day of debate an external factor had ‘entered into the neutrality debate in the form of labor strikes in several defense industries, and nat least four Senators on whom the leadership had counted in early calculations were hos­ tile or wavering because of the labor situation* ”3

Many Sen­

ators were demanding more drastic action by the Administration to halt the strikes. s.

Senator Thomas of Utah renewed the fight

for repeal of sections in the Neutrality Act, and Senator Bailey continued the case for repeal.

In refutation of Bailey1s speech

and in renewing the isolationists1 arguments, Senator Wiley op­ posed any steps likely to involve the nation in war.

The day*s

proceedings were concluded with a short speech urging outright repeal of the entire Act by Senator Bridges. Senator McKellar was the first speaker on the fifth —

October 30, 1941* P* 1» 2 St. Louis Post-Dispatch. October 29, 1941* ?• !• 3

New York Times. October 31, 1941 > ?• 3.

321

jday of the debate; and following McKellar’s speech supporting |the repeal proposal, Connally dramatically announced the news ||of the sinking of an American destroyer, the Reuben James.l j:

'This prompted O ’Daniel to declare that he would forego his ij

j iportion of speaking on the repeal proposal if the Senate would 'vote immediately on it.

His eagerness was not shared, however,

for Senators Brooks, Capper, Aiken, and Wheeler spoke against change in the Neutrality Act, while 0 ’Mahoney attempted to de­ fend the Administration position.

Connally concluded the day’s

debate with a request that there be a good attendance on the j ' following day ”. . . because several very eminent Senators will speak, and I am sure, will contribute to the information of Sen­ ators who may attend.”2

He added as a possible element of per­

suasion that ”It being Saturday, of course, newspapers will give those who speak a very good play.”3 Apparently Connally’s suggestion was heeded because there were seventy-four Senators present when the session opened the next day.

Senators Green and Ball carried the arguments

for repeal of the three sections in the Neutrality Act with Sen­ ator Bennett Clark constituting the opposition.

When the Senate

1 Torpedoed and sunk off western Iceland on October 30, while engaged in convoy duty. This was the first armed national vessel of the United States to be destroyed by Germany. Loss of life was heavy, numbering about one hundred officers and men. Bailey believed that "this tragic event accelerated the movement in Congress for removing the most seriously restrictive sections of the Neutrality Act.” See Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American_ People. I, p. 788. Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8393* 3 Ibid.. p. 8393.

322 jl

jjmet after the Sunday recess, Senator Gurney advocated complete |repeal of the Act; and Senator Gillette told the Senate that [he had prepared a set speech to present, but his arguments had s ! ■ Ijbeen given by other Senators so he had thrown the speech in Ijthe wastebasket*1 Instead, he had decided to give a "brief i1 |statement" which indicated his opposition to repeal of any por­ tion of the Neutrality Act.

Shipstead continued the case for

!the opposition, and the Administration supporters were relieved ' i to hear the speech of Senator George who said that he would vote lifor repeal of the three sections in the Act.

His position had

jj

been in question.

Senator Maloney concluded the day’s debate

with "an impassioned impromptu address"2 against repeal. On the eighth day of debate, "before galleries which engaged in demonstrations against further delay of the vote . . ."3 Senators Lucas and Lee defended the Administration pro­ posal against the attacks of Bilbo, Lodge, and D. Worth Clark. As the day ended, Lee and Wheeler strayed from the specific mat­ ter Tinder debate when Lee turned his fire on the America First Committee and demanded to know who was paying for the propaganda it put out against the pending proposal.

Wheeler defended the

Committee and its leaders and concluded with the observation that he would like to know who was paying for the propaganda put out In favor of the pending proposal by the organization 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8-416. 2 New York Times, November 4> 1941* P* !• 3 Ibid.. November 5, 1941* p. 2.

Iknown as the Friends of Democracy*1 Senator Walsh opened the debate the following day indicating his opposition to the proposal.

This was followed

!by the longest speech in the entire series of neutrality de­ bates when Senator Wheeler took the floor.

Starting the speech

at 12:15, the Montana isolationist spoke with only one inter­ ruption until 5:00 o fclock. i

"Ranging far from his 10,000 word

text, and mopping his brow from time to time with a towel that

;was brought from the cloakroom when his supply of handkerchiefs ran out ♦ • ."2

Wheeler yielded only long enough for Mrs. Cara­

w a y ^ short speech in favor of the pending repeal proposal.

As

the day ended Wheeler declared he was "very tired” and wished to be recognized when the Senate met the next day.3 Continuing his attack on the specific proposal under debate and on the entire foreign policy of the Administration, Wheeler opened the tenth day of debate.

When he had concluded

amid "manifestations of applause in the galleries,"4 Senator Hill took up a defense of the proposed repeal.

He was followed

by Danaher and Brewster who opposed modification of the Neutral­ ity Act. 1 Senator Wheeler was closely associated with the Amer­ ica First Committee in its speaking activities. Many of Wheelerfs public speeches were under the auspices of that Committee. The leftist New Republic had sarcastically written that "General Robert Wood of America First had moved into the office of Senator Burton K. Wheeler . . . " CV (October 20, 194*1)* P* 506.

2 New York Times, November 6, 1941, P* 4* 3 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8531* 4 Ibid., p. 8566.

324

By November 7, "the Senate was ready for a showdown."! With only seventeen Senators on the floor, Senator Austin con­ cluded his speech in favor of the proposal at 12 :10.2

^ en

had finished, "short, stocky Albert B* ("Happy") Chandler took the floor while four or five Senators came to where Mr. Austin had seated himself to congratulate him on his speech. "3

Although

Senate attendance was poor, "there was tense interest in the pub­ lic galleries which gradually filled up during the day as the debate continued."4

After Chandler expressed approval of the

proposal to repeal sections of the Neutrality Act, Senator Willis declared his opposition to the proposal. his position in an hour address.

Senator Nye reiterated

Andrews devoted most of his

final speech to an attack on "20 years of isolation, "5 and Tydings surprised many Administration supporters by indicating he would vote against the proposal to repeal three sections of the 1939 Act.

Barkley urged passage of the measure and asked for

the vote to be taken.

But other Senators wanted to express

their opinions as the debate neared its climax, and Senators Bankhead, Tunnell, Bunker, and Schwartz spoke for the proposal with Senators Tobey and Adams in opposition to repeal of sec­ tions in the Neutrality Act. 1 Newsweek. XVIII (November 17, 1941), P* 15. 2 Christian Science Monitor. November 8, 1941, P* 13. 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid., p. 1. 5 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8630.

325

jj The final speeches were presented as Connally ". . . ! !summed up by denying the isolationist contention that the bill’s passage would 1automaticallyf mean war*

But the Texan admitted:

j'fI can’t say that we shall not have war.’"l

For the isolation­

ists, Hiram Johnson replied, and "Holding on to his front-row :desk and shaking his forefinger, the veteran Republican cau­ tioned in a sobbing voice: peace and war.

’This is a question, after all, of

I say, declare war tonight and under the pro­

vidence of God every man who votes to do so will live to regret i

it.’

Senator Smith opposed repeal, and Senator Bennett Clark

offered an amendment to repeal the entire Neutrality Act.

This,

he said, was "more honorable and candid"3 than emasculation of the Act.

Following defeat of the amendment by seventy-eight

to eleven,4 0 ’Daniel concluded the debate favoring repeal of sections in the Act of 1939. Newsweek magazine gave this description of the final voting: When the balloting began long after dinnertime, the galleries were so jammed for the historic scene that not another standee could be accommodated. The Senate floor itself was crowded by not only almost all the Senators but also their secretaries and a host of visitors from the House of Representatives. The roll call started: "Adams . . . Aiken . . . Andrews • * . Austin . . . Bailey . . . " At 9:22, it was all over* By 50-37, the Senate voted to reassert the traditional right of armed merchantmen to sail anywhere on the seven seas. 1 Newsweek. XVIII (November 17, 1941)> p. 15.

2 Ibid. 3 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8675. 4

Ibid., p. 8676.

I

Voting in favor were not only 43 Democrats but also the lone Independent, George W. Norris and six Repub­ licans . . . In opposition, Burton K. Wheeler led 15 Democrats, 21 Republicans, and the one Progressive Robert M. LaFollette, Jr. . . . 1

j

| ,j

On November 13, by the close margin of eighteen votes, the !House of Representatives accepted the Senate proposal to re­ peal sections two, three, and six, which had provided for the j

establishment of combat zones, had prohibited an American ship

;from sailing to belligerent ports, and had denied the right of an American merchant ship to be armed.2 Summary of the Arguments In his opening speech, Connally told the Senate that the objectives of the neutrality legislation passed in the previous six years had not been fulfilled.

These objectives

■had been to contribute to the peace of the United States and to influence other nations from going to war.

Repeal of the

arms embargo in 1939, had been approved because the Neutral­ ity Act had aided the aggressor.

Taft challenged this asser­

tion and maintained that he had been one of many Senators who voted for repeal in 1939, only because cash-and-carry had been included as a precaution.

Admitting that cash-and-carry might

have had some effect, Connally nevertheless held to his orig­ inal position.

Taft quoted excerpts from Connally*s 1939

speech on the arms embargo to indicate that Connally had .

_ Newsweek. XVIII (November 17, 1941)* P* i5.

2 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8891

|emphasized cash-and-carry in support of the bill.1

in continu-

|ing his arguments, Connally maintained that events had changed !since 1939, and that the policy of aid short of war had been j

|approved by the people.

He contended that repeal of section

six would permit the arming of merchantmen and was necessary i Ibecause the belligerents had not respected unarmed merchant i

ships.

Under international law, Connally contended, the nation

had a right to arm these ships. sacrifice the seas to Hitler.

To fail in doing so was to In favor of repealing the other

two sections which would permit American merchant ships to go to any ports and through any seas they wished, Connally argued that this was a necessary corollary to the lend-lease policy. Repeal of these sections, concluded Connally, was " . . .

our

solemn duty to the American p e o p l e . ”2 Opposing repeal of these sections, Vandenberg laid the premise that passage of the proposed resolution for repeal involved the more fundamental issue of American entrance into the war and raised the ffgrim and sinister specter” of a second American Expeditionary Force to Europe.3

Insisting that Amer­

ica could and should stay out of war, Vandenberg declared that he had no consideration for those who would argue repeal of the three sections on the theory that it was intended to keep the nation out of war.

It was his opinion that those who

.

"

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8891.

2 Ibid., pp. 8246-8250. 3 Ibid., p. 8251.

328

supported the proposal wanted America to move faster toward the battlefield.

The defeat of Hitler, Vandenberg contended,

was not essential to American survival; and the United States could more effectively aid the Allies as a non-belligerent than as a belligerent.

Opposing the arming of merchant ships,

he cited the experience of the first World War when the arming of merchant ships hastened the war.

Thus far in the second

World War the only American lives lost had been those on armed war vessels which the proposal for repeal of section six would make of all American vessels.

Arming merchant vessels, Vanden­

berg pointed out, deprived them of the immunity they otherwise possessed under international law; and the net result would be to invite attacks which could have been prevented.

He concluded

that the proposed resolution virtually asked for war.l Taft agreed with Vandenberg.

He contended that to

vote for repeal was to reverse the position he had taken in 1939, when he had voted for cash-and-carry.

So far as he could

see, Taft felt that the reason for changing the Neutrality Act was that the time had come to go to

w

a

r

Pepper agreed that

the issue was peace or war, but he maintained that those who supported repeal had the peace of the nation closest to heart. He referred to all those who opposed defense measures like the pending proposal, wnegative defenders.”

A positive policy would

aid England and France and defeat Hitler before the United States -

Congressional Kecord. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8251-S257.

2 Ibid., p. 8284.

jhad to face him alone.1 Senator Nye replied to Pepper on the policy of nei jgation.

The North Dakotan argued that the nation would not

jbe so close to war as it was if the policy laid down in the ■ I ]neutrality laws had been faithfully followed by the AdminiIstration.2

Failure to enforce these laws had invited the in­

cidents leading to war*

The facts of the ship sinkings, Nye

imaintained, were not told to the people.

For example, the

Greer had actually followed the submarine and reported its ■ |location to British planes.

History and experience suggested,

Nye declared, that passage of the pending resolution meant war He insisted that until that date the interventionists had ap­ pealed to the people that all steps taken were aid short of war, that

. . w e could really go for a stroll with the

leper of war and come back without having caught leprosy."3 That appeal was no longer valid, insisted Nye, for by the arm­ ing of merchant ships attacks and war were openly invited.A LaFollette traced what he termed "the deadly parallel between the steps whereby we entered World War No. 1, and 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8284-3296.

2 Although this argument had not been prominent in previous neutrality debates, it was to assume prominence in 1941, in the arguments of the isolationists. Their premise was that the neutrality laws had not failed, but that the Administration had failed to enforce them. In 1950, Nye was still emphatic on this point, declaring in a letter to the writer on May 12, 1950, that "The failure was not in the laws themselves . . . The laws were ignored and sabotaged by those whose duty it was to enforce them." 3 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8313 4 Ibid., pp. 8305-8313.

330

jthose by which we are entering the present conflict. "1

He

ji

j !accused the Administration of paying only lip service to the | l !;neutrality acts while whittling away the precautions the acts i had offered. He agreed with Vandenberg that arming merchant \ Iships would lead to incidents and would strip the ships of !!

the immunity they possessed. LaFollette suggested two prei ' mises upon which the nation was being asked to go to war. jj

jOne, the fight for foreign markets and free trade was not valid :because the United States could control world trade through its economic power regardless of the outcome of the war.

The sec-

,ond premise was the attempt to instill a fear of invasion by I Hitler; and this premise, LaFollette said, had the "greatest sales

a p p e a l . g e

cited authorities that any such invasion

would have presented insurmountable difficulties for Germany.3 Senator Thomas argued from the thesis that America had entered the first World War because of a sense of "outraged justice," based upon Germany's violation of the law of nations. The cause for American entry was not, according to Thomas, as i

the isolationists had pictured it, based upon war trade and the incidents arising from that trade.A

Thomas then carried

1 Congressional Hecord. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8316.

2 Ibid.. p. 8322. 3 Ibid., pp. 8316-8324. 4

For a complete and documented development of Thomas' theory of the causes for American entry into the war, see Sey­ mour's American Neutrality 1914-1917. This historical work supports the idea that Wilson and most Americans thought they were entering the war as champions of right. Seymour attacks the isolationist contention that economic motives were respon­ sible for entry into the war in 1917.

331 •i

r jthis argument into the situation in 194*1, and insisted that i;

ji

Iarming merchant ships would not cause war because wars were no longer caused by incidents*

This argument by Thomas was

jconsistent with his position on neutrality legislation from i-

11935 on*2-

Taft reentered the debate at this point to main-

tain that the provisions on combat zones in the 1939 Neutral:ity Act were written into the law to protect American ships and American boys.

The argument for repeal appeared to him

to be that Hitler was telling America where its ships could sail*

But, retorted Taft, the Neutrality Act was not written

for Hitler or against Hitler.

The President had power to

designate combat zones and only he had the authority to tell :American ships where they might go.

Sending ships into com­

bat zones would only create incidents, Taft concluded.2 Senator Bailey contended that the Neutrality Act had failed to bring peace and security, for the voluntary restric­ tions America had placed on herself were not respected by the belligerents.

The policy least likely to bring war would be

a strong policy defending freedom of the seas against Hitler.3 Senator Wiley insisted that the proposal was not a step to peace but rather unwarranted involvement in the war.

He agreed

■that Hitler should be defeated; but since America was unprepared _

_

“

Congressional Record* 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 83308337. 2 Ibid.* p. 8337. 3 Ibid., pp. 8339-834*0.

332

for war, any steps likely to bring it about at that time were dangerous*

He concluded that the Neutrality Act had not failed

in its purposes but that those who wanted full involvement in the war now considered the Act an obstacle.1

Bridges replied

that repeal of these sections in the Act did not mean war.

fhe

pending proposal was simply a definite stating of the country’s position.^

xo this interpretation, McKellar subscribed, and

added that the nation was still at peace in spite of and not because of the Neutrality Act.

Peace had been maintained only

because Hitler had not been ready to engage the United States in war.3

Brooks renewed the isolationists1 attack by repeating

that the proposal was a decision to go into the war.

He devel­

oped the familiar isolationist contention that the war was a foreign war with which America had no concern.4

0 ’Mahoney in­

sisted that the Neutrality Act had attempted to legislate neu­ trality where there had existed no neutrality in thought when­ ever aggression was involved.5 Senator Capper repeated earlier isolationists’ argu­ ments that the Administration had evaded the spirit of the N e u ­ trality Act and that America had no part in a war toward which

1

8347

.

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 83412 Ibid.. p. 8343* 3 Ibid.. pp. 8375-8376. 4

Ibid.. pp. 8377-8381.

5 Ibid.. pp. 8381-8384.

Jjit was being led step by step.

The crucial issue, in Capper’s

opinion, was whether America should enter the war, and if so, jWhy?l

Aiken agreed that the Administration had failed to en-

j-

j!force the Neutrality Act.2 Green supported the proposed rel ! jlpeal in order that Germany’s enemies might receive essential war supplies.3 r

t| Bennett Clark declared that the issue was peace or i: ;war, the last step in a series of smaller decisions leading to entry into the conflict.

He repeated that the Administration

had determined to destroy the Neutrality Act piecemeal in the face of public support for the Act, and he contended that the entire strategy had been to seek "an authorization for a state of war— declared or undeclared. ”4

Tracing the similarity in

pattern between American entry into the first World War and that observable in 1941? Clark concluded that America was be­ ing forced in a war which was of no concern to this country. 3 Ball disagreed with the isolationist and argued that freedom of the seas and defense of the United States against the "evil force” of Hitler were at stake.6

He shared Thomas’ opinion

:that America had gone to war in 1917, to protect certain rights 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8384*

2 Ibid.. p. 8393. 3 Ibid., p. 8404. 4

Ibid., p. 8405. 5 Ibid.. pp. 8405-8407.

6 Ibid.♦ p. 8412.

land to defend national security.1

Gurney indicated that he

j!

|would have favored complete repeal of the Neutrality Act he||

cause, in his opinion, it had helped to start and to prolong ji

the war.

Following the advice of the isolationists, Gurney

asserted, would have forced the United States to wait until an aggressor were on the horizon before preparing to fight him.2 Senator Gillette came to the defense of the Neutral­ ity Act and termed it a "dam of restraint" which could not be breached without crumbling the peace structure of the nation. He repeated the familiar contention that repeal of portions of the Act was sought by those who favored complete involvement in the war.3

Shipstead agreed and condemned American partici­

pation in a war which was a European squabble.4

To the side

of the pro-repeal bloc came Senator George with the argument that America was not impartial in any conflict involving jus­ tice and right.

He supported defense of the important doctrine

of freedom of the seas, a doctrine which any free nation should protect.

Indicating that he had supported the Neutrality Act

because the Administration supported it, George admitted that he had had no confidence in it. -

Kepeal would not mean war, —

—

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 8412-8413.

2 Ibid., pp. 8414- 8416. 3 Ibid.. pp. 8417-8419. 4 Ibid.. pp. 8419-8425.

335

jjfor wars were not caused by incidents*

He attacked the isola-

|tionist contention that it was not a war involving United !States* security by pointing out that "all the evidence is in" !jto prove Hitlerfs plan of world domination*1

Maloney disagreed

ti

with the supporters of the pending proposal because there was jsuch a thing as going too far toward war*

Indicating that he

would favor arming merchant ships, he saw repeal of the combat j!zones as a vote for war.

He challenged the arguments in de—

fense of freedom of the seas by asking, "where was the doctrine of freedom of the seas * . . when we were sanely and calmly considering legislation of such importance," as the neutrality Acts in 1935 through 1939?2 1 Congressional Record, 77th Cong*, 1st sess., pp. 84268430.

2 Ibid., pp. 8437-8438. Maloney*s challenge at this point raised an interesting question of what actually did constitute neutral rights on the high seas in wartime. Despite the constant recurrence of the argument for defending freedom of the seas in this and previous neutrality debates, no one had clearly defined what constituted that freedom. Isolationists had argued that freedom of the seas did not imply the right of the United States to convoy war supplies to England. Whether this was included in the definition of freedom of the seas by the supporters of that doctrine was never made clear by any speaker. It will be •recalled that the Administration had shifted position somewhat on this issue, for in the 1937 debate, Senator Pittman, presum­ ably reflecting the Administration support for his bill, denied that freedom of the seas actually existed in wartime. If it did exist, he had argued, each nation had to determine for itself what the right included, for no international law was specific on this matter. (Congressional Record. 75th Cong., 1st sess., :p. 1672.) Authorities on international law would tend to have agreed with Pittman in 1937. Jessup noted that different inter­ pretations of freedom of the seas throughout the centuries n* . . indicates the highly artificial and unreal nature of that body of illogical compromises known as the international law of neutral and belligerent rights at sea . . . " (neutrality; Its History. Economics and Law. I, pp. 268-269.)

Senator Lucas defended the Administration policy on changing the Act, basing his support on the grounds that Hit­ ler was a threat to the United States*

Specifically, in Lucas*

view, Hitler was a threat to the Monroe Doctrine through the sinking of ships in the waters of the Western Hemisphere.1 Bilbo favored repeal of section six to arm merchant ships, but he expressed his opposition to repeal of the other two sections because that step would lead to war.

He belittled freedom of

the seas as a doctrine which lost its significance in wartime.2 Lodge also favored arming merchant ships but shared Bilbors fear of involvement in the war through repeal of the other two sections.3

D. Worth Clark termed the proposal for repeal n. .

the last spot at which we can stop short of war.n4

He traced

the steps leading toward war and reiterated that the Administra tion had never given the Neutrality Act a chance.

Clark took

the occasion to attack the British Empire and American attempts to underwrite it.5

Lee immediately replied to Clark, contend­

ing that Clark had repeated the familiar case of those who wanted to do nothing for national defense.

The only alterna­

tive proposed by the isolationists, as Lee presented it, was to have left the nation unprepared to defend itself.6 1

8473

.

Congressional Record. 2 Ibid.. pp. 8473-8476. 3 Ibid.. pp. 8476-8477. 4 Ibid.. p. 8478. 5 Ibid.. pp. 8478-8493. 6 ' Ibid., p. 8495.

Walsh

33 7

jopposed repeal because it meant sanctioning involvement in jjthe war.

He declared that freedom of the seas was not the

right of a neutral to supply one side with munitions in time of war.-*,

In his extensive speech* Wheeler developed several

familiar isolationist themes.

Repeal of the sections under

[consideration was granting the President authority to send :ships into combat zones which would create incidents and lead to war.

He accused the interventionists in both political

parties of sabotaging the Neutrality Act* and he accused the Administration of inconsistency in asking for repeal in 1941* after lip service to cash-and-carry in 1939.

Freedom of the

seas came under Whe e l e r ^ attack, and he pointed out that that principle had been the rallying cry for past wars.

He chal­

lenged his Senate colleagues to be honest in voting on the pro­ posed measure, and "If you do not want to go to war, why do jyou not say so and vote against this joint resolution?

If you

do want to go to war, why do you not have the courage to stand up and introduce a bill declaring war?"2

Wheeler pointed to

the first World War experience on arming merchant ships.

It

1 Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 85078510. Walsh was partially correct under international law. A neutral government might not supply one of the belligerents, but citizens of a neutral state could sell and ship munitions to a belligerent under the risk that the other belligerent injured by such commerce^was within its rights to seize the munitions or contraband being shipped. What rights a submarine had to sink a neutral ship carrying contraband was never definitely settled by international agreement. (Fenwick, The Neutrality Laws of the United States, pp. 104-105.

2 Ibid.. p. 8531.

338 | meant war then, he contended.

He developed his ideas on the

jprobable results of any future war for America.

In his con­

clusion, Wheeler declared that he was proud to be called an i is Iisolationist, for he predicted that in due time that term would become a term of approbation.

He called on the Senate

to reject the "deceit" of those who were trying to get this i ! ^nation into war.! Mrs. Caraway supported repeal and defended :freedom of the seas as a doctrine threatened by Hitler fs ag­ gressive designs.2 i

Senators Brewster and Danaher voiced objections to

the pending proposal as inviting incidents likely to lead to war.3

On the other side of the proposition, Hill advocated

repeal to protect American sailors and ships; and Austin termed the Neutrality Act a "hindrance” to quick and effec­ tive action by this nation. tion as "gone forever."4

Austin also referred to isola­

Chandler repeated the frequent argu­

ment that the neutrality acts had not worked, for they had been based upon conditions as they were in 1914-1917, and these conditions had been changed as the plans of the aggres­ sors for world domination had unfolded.

The defeat of the

Allies would be disastrous for the United States. _

The nation, -

Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 85158536, 8556-8566.

2 Ibid., pp. 8536-8537. 3 Ibid.. pp. 8571-8572. 4 Ibid.. pp. 8567-8594.

Chandler insisted, must aid those nations while there was tixae.l

Senator Willis, by contrast, pointed to the Neutral­

i t y Act as the "only fiber of our foreign policy safeguard­ ing the nation’s liberty."2

Repeal sections of that Act, he

maintained, and the nation had taken not a step toward war but a "leap" into war.

He cited the experience of the first

World War when ships were armed, and war came in a few weeks.3 jThe isolationist cause was revitalized by Senator Nye who jcalled the pending proposal, " . . .

authority to the President

to shoot our way into the shooting war. "4

Tracing the steps

leading to the present situation, he maintained that the ships i which had been sunk were engaged in a service in direct viola­ tion of the law.

Nye insisted that the situation in Europe

was identical with that of 1917, and the war was not "our war."3

He refuted the arguments given by those who said that

the United States had a stake in the war.6 1

8598- 8600.

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp.

2 Ibid., p. 8601. 3 Ibid., pp. 8601-8602. 4

Ibid.. p. 8602. 5 Ibid., p. 8609.

6 Ibid., pp. 8602-8609* Nye submitted for inclusion in the Record several briefs, in which he took what he felt were the three basic arguments for intervention in the war, and then developed his answer to those arguments. The argu­ ments were, (l) "The first line of defense argument," that Eng land’s navy was essential to American security, (2) "The invas ion" argument, that Hitler would attack and invade the Western Hemisphere, and (3) "The raw materials argument," that the United States and the Western Hemisphere could not be self-

j

In the final hours of the debate, the speakers summed

up or repeated the arguments already given for both sides. Senj Iators Andrews, Barkley, Stewart, Bankhead, Tunnell, Schwartz, ;and Adams followed the theme that the freedom of the seas must be protected, both for national defense and to implement the jforeign policy approved by a majority of the people.1

Senator

Tydings opposed the proposal as voting the United States into Ithe war, and "anyone who votes for complete repeal and who is not in favor of war by this country against Germany, Italy, and possibly Japan," declared Tydings, "is so devoid in my judgment, of mental processes as to be a fit subject for a lunatic asy­ lum."-^

He too accused the Administration of having evaded the

Neutrality Act.

Until the country was prepared for war, Tyd­

ings was not ready to vote that step.3

Senator Tobey shared

Tydings1 convictions, and traced the violations of the Neutral­ ity Act and of international law by the Administration.4

Sen­

ator Smith favored the arming of merchant ships, but he opposed

sufficient. For a well-organized presentation of the isolation­ ists1 case, these briefs are interesting and helpful. See Con­ gressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8609. 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 86308663*

2

Ibid.. p. 8633. 3 Ibid.. pp. 8633-863$. 4

Ibid., pp. 8647-8657. Tobey!s analysis of the rights of neutrals under freedom of the seas was the most nearly com­ plete and accurate of any speaker in the debate. See p. 8653*

341 l ' ]. i;

Isending ships into combat zones because that was a vote for I war.l The debate closed as 0 !Daniel strayed from the point | ! ||at issue and argued against strikes in defense industries# IAs he concluded, however, he indicated his support for the !proposed repeal .2 i;

Analysis Of The Debate The Proposition for Debate I

The proposition for debate was, Resolved:

That, sec­

tions two, three, and six of the Neutrality Act of 1939, should be repealed.

Section two declared it unlawful for any American

vessel to carry any passengers or any articles to belligerent ports; section three prohibited American vessels from entering combat zones which the President would have designated; sec!tion six declared it unlawful for any American merchant ship engaged in commerce with any foreign state to be armed.

Although

Senators Bridges, Gurney, Austin, Thomas, and McKellar favored complete repeal of the entire 1939 Act, they did not advance any specific amendment which would have altered the proposition.3 Uncontested Argument By contrast with previous debates on neutrality legis­ lation, there was a limited area of uncontested argument in 1941* _

—

-

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 86728673.

2 Ibid., p. 8679. 3

Bridges, Austin, and Gurney declared in the debate that they would support partial repeal at that time. See Con­ g r e s s i o n a l Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 834^, 8592, 0669.

342

;Speakers for both sides of the proposition had recognized the issues in dispute and had developed their speeches to in­ dicate clearly a clash on the main arguments under consider­ ation*

As a result, only one argument was overtly, at least,

uncontested.

This was:

If possible, war should be avoided.

Evidence that both Administration and isolationist speakers subscribed to this premise was probably most clearly stated by Senator Tunnell, who favored adoption of the propo­ sition for repeal, when he observed that

. . most of the

arguments made by those who are intending to vote against the joint resolution are against war in the abstract; and on that I think all of us can a g r e e . P e p p e r ,

an ardent supporter

of repeal, had also pointed out that the isolationist speakers had n . . . waved the flag of war from every housetop,"2 but that he was just as anxious to keep out of war as were those who opposed the proposition.

The significant feature of this

argument in 1941, was that the isolationists consistently ad­ hered to the identical patterns of arguments and appeals against war as they had been using since 1935.

On the other side, the

Administration supporters revealed a shift in their approach to the argument from earlier years of the debates. On the isolationist side, the argument that war must be avoided appeared frequently and received strong emphasis. These speakers, as in previous debates, pictured the dire con,

_

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8658.

2 Ibid.. p. 8289.

343

!l

| !sequences of war.

In the speeches of Vandenberg, Bennett

j;

||Clark, Brooks, Bilbo, Hiram Johnson, Wheeler, and others came jforth the emotionalizing of the human loss in war.

As Bilbo

;described it, a vote for the measure was a vote to send Amer­ i c a n sailors and soldiers to "watery graves • . . and their jj

cries and their dead bodies wasting away by the eating of the fishes in European waters would forever haunt me in my dreams."1 And Johnson added to this picture the scene of casualty lists rolling into the country with the lists of those whose legs had been blown off and whose bodies had been impaired by war as evi­ dence of the tragedy of war.2

BilboTs prediction of "watery

graves" reappeared in Wheelerfs speech, and Bennett Clark reas­ serted the same theme by calling war a chance to "peddle the blood of our young m e n . "3

One isolationist who had been adept /

at expressing the horrors of war in previous debates, Senator Bone, was absent in 1941*

But his colleagues in the cause

gave their audience the same future fears to reflect upon.

The

desire of the people for peace was woven tightly into the iso­ lationists1 case. In the speeches of the Administration supporters, how­ ever, the argument to keep America out of the war was consider­ ably less emphasized than in previous years.

In many cases, it

was offered as an answer to the charges of the isolationists 1

■

■

-

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8475* 2 Ibid.. p. 8515. 3 I b i d .. p.

8407.

jjthat those who supported repeal favored entry into the war* i ;It was thus more of a defensive argument than a positive pre— i!

.

mise upon which the case for repeal was built.

As a matter of

fact, while expressing agreement with the hope for peace, Sen­ ators Connally, Pepper, Caraway, and Barkley frankly admitted that while a vote for the proposition was not a vote for war, jthey were not prepared to predict that war could be avoided in the future. In 1 9 3 9 , overtly at least, most speakers went out of their way to insist that their first concern was the United States.

One received the impression from these speakers that

it made no particular difference to them whom their vote af­ fected among the belligerents.

In 1941 > Administration sup­

porters agreed that peace was what the people wanted, but they made no attempt to labor the point as did the isolationists. This was a further indication that perhaps isolation was on the decline, and Administration speakers were aware of the public support for all aid to the nations fighting Hitler.1 Issues in Dispute In this debate the clash of arguments occurred on .

-

Bailey agrees that public opinion supported the Ad­ ministration policy and cites as evidence the Gallup polls in October 1 9 4 1 > in which seventy-six per cent approved .Rooseveltf foreign policy and fifty-seven per cent thought that the Admin­ istration had done "about right" in the extent of aid given to Great Britain. He concludes that the closeness of the vote, especially in the House, on repeal of the three sections of the 1 9 3 9 Act was misleading as an indication of the strength of pub lie support for the isolationists* See Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 7 8 8 - 7 8 9 .

these two issues: | j

1*

Have the neutrality laws operated successfully?

2.

Will the proposed repeal lead to war?

i;

In the arguments on these issues the debate became not only jia consideration of the specific proposal to repeal three sec­ tions of the 1939 Neutrality Act, but also a debate involving a reexamination of certain basic assumptions and premises up­ on which previous neutrality debates had been argued. Argument on the Issues Issue:

Have the neutrality laws operated successfully?— *

Assuming the burden of proof in favor of the proposition for re­ peal, the Administration speakers sought to establish the fail­ ure of the neutrality laws.

The arguments on this issue were

the principal foundations upon which the Administration had built its constructive case.

Opposing the arguments which sug­

gested the failure of the neutrality laws were the isolationists whose refutation constituted the defense of the neutrality leg­ islation enacted since 1935.

The opening Administration speaker,

Senator Connally, set the pattern of argument on this issue which was to be followed by succeeding supporters of the proposition. Arguments offered by the proponents of the proposed re­ peal.— 1.

The neutrality laws had been a surrender of free­

dom of the seas in spite of which American ships had still been attacked. As it was set forth by Connally and reiterated by Bailey, McKellar, Green, Lucas, Caraway, Pepper, Ball, and others, this

346

j !j |argument rested upon the premise that the 1939 Neutrality Act i.had been a voluntary relinquishing of the right to send Amer­ ican ships anywhere on the high seas in time of war. The Adi ; Iministration speakers argued that in 1939 they had been will­ ing to adopt such a policy to keep the nation out of contact with the war.

The effect of this policy had been, however, to

repudiate a traditional defense of freedom of the seas in return for which Hitler had shown his scorn by attacking American ships in the remaining waters of the world to which these ships were permitted to sail*

Therefore, concluded Administration spokes­

men, the premise upon which the 1939 Act had rested was unsound. There were two forms of support utilized in establishing this conclusion:

first, they cited the factual evidence and statis­

tics of American ship losses in non-combat areas; second, they strengthened the factual evidence by emotionalizing the theme of Hitler’s insults to America in telling this nation where its ships could or could not sail.

Typical of this latter appeal

to repel such a national insult was Bailey’s comment that "I do not think of that flag as just the symbol to sing about, to hurray about.

I think of that flag as something that is float­

ing above me, that commands the respect of the greatest nations on the earth for the humblest man if he be an American.”1

Ball

and Connally put this stigma on the isolationists by maintain­ ing even more emphatically that any opponent of the proposed repeal was "playing Hitler’s game.”2

“

”

I Congressional

Record. 77th

2 I b i d . . p.

84,13.

Cong.,

1st

sess.,

p.

8340*

ji

In

addition

to

the

conclusion

that

the

1939

Act

had

;been enacted upon an unwarranted premise, freedom of the seas I! !!

was defended on the premise that America had traditionally de­ fended this right*

Senator Barkley was representative of this

;pattern of support as he traced the historical foundations of IAmerican defense of freedom of the seas*

From past experience,

he concluded that the nation should !t. . . assert the rights we preserved for 150 years.*1

The historical evidence cited by

Barkley was emotionalized on the grounds of respect for tradi­ tions of a great nation. lenge to

The isolationists made a direct chal­

the evidence and reasoning presented in favor of free­

dom of the seas, which will be discussed below.2 2.

The Neutrality Act was inconsistent with the at-

!titude of the American people. i

Not only did some Administration speakers attack the specific provisions of the 1939 Act, but they also attacked the basic premise upon which the neutrality laws since 1935 had been built.

That premise had been that it was possible

to legislate the nation into a status of neutrality for any war which might occur.

In 1936, Thomas had denied the validity

of this premise, and Lewis had been a voice in the wilderness in 1935, attacking the unsoundness of the premise.

By 1941*

Thomas was assisted in the argument by McKellar, 0 ’Mahoney, Gurney, George, and Hill.

These speakers advanced the premise

1 Congressional

fiecord. 7 7 t h

2 See below,

p.

349

Cong.,

1st

sess.,

p.

8641*

jthat Americans were not impartial in a war, because in any iwar there was an aggressor and a victim.

The premise there­

fore, that through neutrality legislation the people could ibe forced into an attitude of impartiality, was not consis­ tent with the facts of American thought and attitudes.

Thomas

admitted being an idealist but argued that those who opposed taking sides in a conflict were "making fun of the very prin­ ciples upon which our nation was built.”1 This attempt to rekindle in the hearts and minds of the audience the flame of a defense of liberty and justice was followed by other Administration speakers in attacking the prei

mise upon which both neutrality and isolation had been founded. As Mrs. Caraway declared, in a typical appeal to the audience for support of the Administration policy,

. . w e find we

can no longer remain aloof from wars that threaten our liber­ ties as Americans."2

Senator George attached the label of

"hypocrisy* to the principle of neutrality legislation.3

Thus,

Administration speakers asked their audience to reject the pre­ mise upon which neutrality legislation had been built from the historical evidence and from the contemporary situation in which that premise had been found invalid.

The audience was made to

realize that abstract principles of impartiality did not hold when the moral and material interests of the people were at stake. i

I Congressional Hecord. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8337.

2 Ibid.. p. 8536.

3 Ibid.,

p.

8430.

Arguments offered by the opponents of the proposed repeal.— 1.

Freedom of the seas was an indeterminable right

iwhich offered no justification for the policy pursued by the jAdministration. The isolationists developed two patterns of support for this argument.

First, they played on an apparent incon­

sistency in the case of Administration spokesmen.

It will be

;recalled that in the neutrality debates of 1937 and 1939, sev­ eral Senators who supported the Administration had denied the ,validity of international law and of a clearly defined right of freedom of the seas in wartime.

In support of cash-and-

carry particularly, the Administration had adopted the premise that one of the causes for entry into the World War had been the failure of the belligerents to agree on the interpretation of neutral rights and freedom of the seas set forth by the United States.

These earlier arguments came back in 1941 to

haunt the Administration speakers, many of whom remained in the Senate.

The principal isolationist speakers who empha­

sized this inconsistency included Maloney, Taft, Nye, and Wheeler.

Sprinkled throughout their speeches were excerpts

from the speeches of Administration spokesmen in earlier de­ bates which represented the stand taken by the isolationists in 1941-

The conclusion which they attempted to establish by

this inconsistency was that freedom of the seas was a right which could not be defined.

To the credit of the isolation­

ists, it must be admitted that no Administration speaker

350

|became specific in answering the challenge to define this jright for which they had insisted the nation must fight.1 The isolationists used this about face by the Admin-

i

listration spokesmen to build their case that the neutrality Jlaws had been no abridgment of any clearly defined rights of freedom of the seas.

In addition, Senators Maloney and Nye

ij

offered historical evidence taken from the first World War when England had violated American rights to sail the seas. Yet, the United States did not see fit to fight England.

It

followed that freedom of the seas was a matter of convenience and offered only a shield for the real purpose, which was in­ volvement in the war.

The contention of the supporters of re­

peal was in this fashion directly challenged.

In addition,

the isolationists defended the specific provisions in the 1939 Act which were to be repealed. The opponents of the Administration policy leveled a second attack, viz., even if freedom of the seas were de­ finable, such a definition did not include the right to con:voy ships carrying supplies to a belligerent. Tobey, and Walsh developed this premise.

Senators Taft,

The Administration

spokesmen were vague in answering the challenge as to whether convoying was a part of freedom of the seas.

But from a read­

ing of the speeches, one gets the implication that in defending _

-

The Administration position on international law had shifted. In 1937, Pittman argued that international law and freedom of the seas ceased to exist in wartime. (See Congres­ sional Record. 75th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1672.) In 1939, Koosevelt had urged a return to international law as the most ddvisable policy to pursue in the nationfs interest.

351

I:

jjthe right to ship goods to belligerents, Administration jspeakers were also supporting the right of convoy*

Isola-

jitionist evidence in the debate that the American ships which had been attacked were either engaged in convoy duty or were sailing under the Panamanian registry through combat zones was correct*

Much use was made by the isolationist of the

evidence that freedom of the seas was not even involved in ;the incidents to that time.

Therefore, it was argued that

the neutrality laws could not be called a failure on the grounds and evidence presented by the Administration. 2.

The United States was not in the war; therefore,

the neutrality laws had been a success. From a pragmatic point of view, the isolationists argued, the neutrality laws had been a success.

They began

with the premise that the purpose of the neutrality laws had been to keep the nation out of war.

Obviously the nation was

not at war; therefore, the laws had been a success.

Senators

Wye and LaFollette pursued this pattern of argument, and Sen­ ator Clark of Missouri quoted the President from a 1940 speech in which Roosevelt had declared that the purpose of the Neu­ trality Act was to keep the nation at peace.

Senator Gillette

supported the same premise by the literal analogy that it would be as logical to demand repeal of the traffic laws be­ cause there were traffic accidents.

No law was one hundred

per cent perfect, Gillette pointed out.

If the overall pur­

pose of a law were achieved there was no reason to destroy it for isolated violations.

Similarly, D. Worth Clark and Wheeler

352

maintained that any extent to which the nation was nearer the war was not because of the neutrality laws but rather in spite of the laws which the Administration had chosen on occasion to ignore*

These occasions were cited in evidence by Wheeler.

Underlying this argument and the clash on it was a divergence of opinion between the isolationists and the Admin­ istration supporters on the question:

What had been the pur­

pose of the neutrality laws from 1935 on?

The isolationists

held to the premise that the purpose had been to keep the na-

i

tion out of war.

The Administration speakers had insisted

that the purpose had been to discourage the outbreak of war in the world by the moral and psychological effect which the neu­ trality laws would have in the attempt to reveal the peaceful sentiments of the American people.

As the Administration sup­

porters did not grant the isolationists1 premise in 1941* their refutation to the success of the neutrality laws was that they had not prevented war in the world and had, therefore, failed in their primary purpose.

This failure to agree on the purpose

of the neutrality laws had kept the isolationists and the Ad­ ministration apart in their evaluation of the laws for the en­ tire six year period from 1935-

This failure to agree was with­

out doubt a factor in the gradual lack of public confidence in the laws.

Up until Pearl Harbor in December, 1941* most of

the isolationists were emphatic in their contention that had the Administration accepted the premise upon which the neu­ trality laws were originally enacted, involvement in the war

353

would have been prevented i

Issue;

Will the proposed repeal lead to war?—

;Many of the isolationists considered this to be the principal (issue in the debate, and they began their arguments with the premise that the proposal to repeal sections of the 1939 Act was one final evidence of the Administration’s attempt to in­ volve the nation in war by the policy of steps-short-of-war. To the isolationists, the debate involved more than a debate on a specific proposal«

It was a debate on the entire foreign

policy of the Roosevelt Administration, and that policy invol­ ved the issue of peace or war for the United States.

For ex-

;ample, Vandenberg considered the debate as one "facing the i

|controlling issue so far as our own acts are concerned in re­ spect to our entry into World War No. 2.”2 this was the "real issue” in the d e b a t e . 3

Capper agreed that Tobey called it the

’’fundamental issue” of war or no war,4 and the bulk of Bennett Clark, Nye, and Wheeler’s arguments were similarly devoted to the same issue*

On the Administration side, this issue received

less consideration than the first issue.

As it was noted in the

1 In © l e t t e r to the writer on May 12, 1950, Nye re­ peated the isolationists’ arguments to which he and others had adhered in this debate: ”. . . after we had become thoroughly involved by reason of the ignoring of the laws, it was easy to repeal them, with the Administration terming, not itself, but the laws a failure.”

2 Congressional Record, 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. £251. 3 Ibid.. p. 8387. 4 Ibid.. p. 8653*

;consideration of uncontested argument, speakers supporting Ithe proposal for repeal had insisted that they were as much Ifor peace as were the isolationists*

Their principal conten­

t i o n was that the attempt by the isolationists to imply that those who favored modification of the Neutrality Act favored involvement in the war was a misleading interpretation of the premises upon which the case for modification had been estab­ lished. Arguments offered bv the proponents of the proposed repeal.— 1.

American entry into the first World War was not

caused by ”incidents.” This argument took the form of a direct challenge on the isolationists1 premise that American entry into the World War had been the result of economic involvement through trade with the belligerents.

Since Senator Bone’s opening

speech on neutrality legislation in August, 1935, the isola­ tionists had built much of their case on this premise which, they maintained, had been soundly established as a result of the Nye Committee investigations.

It has been noted that this

premise was coming under increased analysis and attack by the Administration speakers as each new neutrality proposal was debated.

By 1941, Administration spokesmen concentrated much

of their fire on this attack.

Leading the speakers on this

argument was Senator Thomas of Utah, who advanced the premise that it had been a sense of ’’outraged justice, which from the days of Aristotle has been a reason for war, which brought us

to war.wl

He supported this premise by the evidence of Wil-

; !son’s protest to Germany over the sinking of the Sussex in !which Wilson had considered the German action a violation of the principles of right.

This, Thomas asserted, was an ex—

ipression of the moral sentiments of the American people.

Fur-

ither evidence, cited by Thomas, was the failure of Germany to :honor international law by the unrestricted submarine campaign of 1917.

From this evidence, Thomas attempted to establish

the premise that entry into war in 1917, was a protest by the American people against the international wrong committed by ;Germany.

This was in contradiction to the oversimplified causes

which Thomas maintained had been advanced by the isolationists. Senator Ball spoke in support of the same premise as that of Thomas.

Refuting the arguments of the isolationists

that the sinkings of ships in war zones constituted the main cause for American entry into the war in 1917, Ball attacked the causal reasoning upon which the isolationist case had rested.

This, Ball argued, was not the real cause for American

entry into the World War*

He advanced another cause; viz.,

Americans were convinced that a German victory would threaten American security.

Ball concluded that the attempted analogy

between 1917 and 1941, on the possibility of incidents as likely to lead to war, was a parallel which did not stand, for inci­ dents did not lead to war in 1917.

Thomas’ argument and evi­

dence had led to the destruction of the same isolationist soning.

rea­

Senator George reached a similar conclusion in his 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8331.

attack on this phase of the isolationists’ ease.

He cited the

additional contemporary evidence that Japan had created inci­ dents involving the United States hut that the two nations were not at war.

Therefore, he reasoned, if the isolation­

ists’ assumption were correct, Japan had given sufficient pro­ vocation for war.

But in this specific case the assumption

had not been proved valid. 2.

Repeal

of thethree sections ofthe 1939

Act would

more likely prevent

war byaiding inthe defeat ofHitler

he could attack the

United States*

before

This argument occurred more frequently in the speeches of the Administration supporters than any other argument ad­ vanced by that side in the debate.

It should be kept in mind

that repeal of these particular sections of the Neutrality Act was not an isolated phenomena.

Rather it took place as one of

several actions by the Roosevelt Administration to aid the Al­ lies in 1941.

It was natural, therefore, that support for the

proposition in this debate would involve a defense of the as­ sumptions upon which the Administration had built its foreign policy of aid-short-of-war.

One of these assumptions was that

America and the Western Hemisphere faced the threat of an at­ tack from the Axis powers if England, France, and Russia were totally defeated in Europe.

The isolationist speakers in this

debate concentrated much of their case in a continuation of an attack upon this assumption, which they had been repeatedly challenging since the first days of the European war.

In the

debate in 1939, on repeal of the arms embargo, the opponents

357

Iof that proposal challenged the assumption that the war was 'of direct concern to the United States.

Since 1939, the Ad-

i

Iministration policy had been to strengthen public support for that assumption in face of the isolationists* attacks,

i

The assumption that Hitler could and would attack the United States was keyed early in the debate by Senator

jPepper who referred his audience to Hitler’s actions and ob­ vious designs, all of which led to the conclusion that ntwo worlds are in conflict; one must fall asunder.nl main argument was built on this belief.

Pepper’s

He was supported by

Maloney who gave evidence of Hitler’s steps of conquest in Europe and added a familiar and popular concept in alluding to defense of the Monroe Doctrine as the basis upon which Amer­ ica must keep the war away from the Western Hemisphere.

This

was an attempt to utilize a traditional appeal in defense of a contemporary policy.

Senator Green quoted from Mein Kamnf to

point up the danger for his audience in a German victory. Senator George came forth with the Monroe Doctrine and the war in Russia as two foundations for American interest in Hitler’s ■plans for world conquest.

Lucas followed a similar pattern

with reference to the Monroe Doctrine for support.

Senator

Chandler supported this argument by defending the entire for­ eign policy of the Administration since 1937*

He called the

attention of his audience to the fact that events had proved the soundness of that policy.

The supposition in this argument

i-

"

I

-

" Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. S2&4*

358

awas that the policy, of which the pending repeal of the 1939 !i ;i

!Act was a part, had been proved sound; therefore, any part of ;j

! ;that policy was sound*

This conclusion was asserted by the

majority of Administration speakers and was directly attacked Iby the isolationists*

Defense of this argument, that war would

•i

|inevitably come if aid were not given to defeat Hitler, was not !supported in this debate by factual or statistical evidence of I |the ability of Hitler to attack the Western Hemisphere. The ;principal appeals were to a natural fear of Hitler as evidenced by his apparent designs in Europe*

It was maintained that all

of the evidence pointed to the inescapable conclusion of a sim­ ilar threat to America.

The isolationists asked their audience

to realize the practical aspects of this fear of Hitler and to visualize the improbability of the threat presented by the Ad­ ministration speakers. Arguments offered by the opponents of the proposed repeal.— 1.

The pattern of events leading to war in 1917, was

being repeated in the years 1939 to 194*1 • This argument was not new to the neutrality debates. Since the first arguments in favor of neutrality legislation had been advanced in 1935, the isolationists had built their case on the premise that American involvement in the first World War was the result of economic entanglement with the Allies and that this financial involvement had led to the war trade, which the Wilson Administration had been forced to defend by entering the war.

The premise was, in the opinion of the isolationists,

!well-founded on the evidence brought forth from the Wye Com­ mittee investigations.!

The chain of events set in motion by

war trade had led to the sinking of ships, loss of American life, a war boom which could not be stopped without endanger­ i n g American economy, and eventual military participation in the conflict.

This causal chain was presented by the isola­

tionists in every neutrality debate.

It appeared too obvious

to be ignored from their point of view.

When the Administra­

tion sought repeal of the arms embargo in 1939, the isolation­ ists drew the analogy to the first World War with even greater conviction.

In 1941, the specific focus of their attack was

:the repeal of those provisions which would have allowed the arming of merchant ships and the sending of American ships through war zones.

Although the specific focus of their at­

tack was slightly varied from previous years, the isolation­ ists1 arguments that repeal would lead to war was based upon the consistently recurring premise that incidents and war trade had brought about American entry into the war in 1917.

The

same causal chain was in operation again and could produce no different effects from those which had resulted some twenty years before. Seizing upon the arming of merchant ships as a contri­ buting cause for war in 1917, and as likely to be repeated in _

In a letter to the writer on May 12, 1950, Gerald P. Nye wrote: "The revelations growing out of the public in­ vestigation of the causes contributing to our involvement in the First War had so convinced the American public of the ex­ tent to which an honest practice of neutrality might save our country from . . . foreign wars that Congress . . . found it difficult to evade the issue . . . "

360

1941> Senator Vandenberg referred the Senate to the opinion of "most international authoritiesf'l that arming merchant ships in 1917 had tThastened the final tragedy.”2 to 11the facts of World War No, 1”3

jjye made reference

evidence that arming mer­

chant ships had provoked attacks leading to war.

LaFollette

went into an exposition of international law, quoting Jessup, Borchard, and others that merchant ships could claim immunity ifrom attack if unarmed, but that arming these ships invited attacks.

Senators Wiley, Capper, D.Worth Clark, Wheeler,4 and

Tobey supported the same argument by recalling the experience of 1917.

The Administration speakers made no attempt to refute

the evidence from international law on armed merchant ships and their lack of immunity from attack.

The refutation against

sending armed ships into combat zones was based upon the con­ temporary factual evidence that Hitler’s submarines were sink­ ing ships armed or unarmed, in or out of combat zones.

The im­

plication was that international law and the experience of 1917 afforded no grounds upon which to argue the situation in 1941* Another pattern of refutation employed by the Administration speakers was that in which they had argued that the premise upon 1 Congressional record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8255.

2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., p. 8314. 4

Ibid., p. 8531. Wheeler called the parallel to 1917, ^striking” and had quoted from Senator George Norris’ speech against the arming of merchant ships in 1917. This was a rather effective bit of evidence for many in the Senate recalled Norris’ colorful fight against this proposal.

361

which the isolationist case was founded was unsound, for inI

;cidents of ship sinkings did not cause the entry into war in !l917. 2.

The Administration policy of aid-short-of-war

was unjustified and dangerous. In 1939, the isolationists had argued that repeal of the arms embargo was a symbol of intervention in the European war.

As a result, many of the isolationist speakers in that

debate used the occasion to expand their arguments against re­ peal of the arms embargo to embrace a consideration of the en­ tire problem of isolation versus intervention in the war.

Sim­

ilarly, in 1941> most of the isolationists extended their attack on the Administration proposal to repeal certain sec­ tions of the Neutrality Act by attacking the entire foreign policy of the Administration.

The specific proposition under

debate was taken to represent one last step by the Administra­ tion to involve this nation in the war.

Throughout the argu­

ments of Vandenberg, Nye, Capper, D. Worth Clark, LaFollette, Wheeler, Wiley, and others ran the theme that repeal of the 1939 provisions was the last step before entry into war and was intended to hasten that entry. In development of this contention, the isolationists attacked what they felt were two false assumptions upon which the policy of aiding the Allies had been built.

These assump­

tions were that Hitler constituted a threat to America and that the European war involved a defense of democracy for which the United States must assume some material responsi-

362

bility*

The supporters of the Administration attempted to

defend these assumptions.

Senator LaFollette typified the

isolationist case in attacking the first of these assump­ tions.

He accused the Administration of appealing to hy­

steria and fear of an imminent invasion of the Western Hemi­ sphere.

In refutation of what he termed this trsales appeal,”

LaFollette represented the isolationist position as one based upon the logic and statistical evidence of the situation.

As

evidence, he referred to the geographical factors and to the military obstacles barring any attempt to invade the Western Hemisphere from Europe.

These facts he accused the interven­

tionists of overlooking. The attack on the second assumption that defense of democracy was involved in the war, was most sharply presented by D. Worth Clark, who took up where he had left off in 1939, in an attack on the European democracies for representing ideals not worth defending.

He employed a technique of not­

ing inconsistencies in the Administration spokesmen by quot­ ing from their speeches of 1939, in which many of them had argued for repeal of the arms embargo but had professed no intention of favoring United States’ involvement in behalf of either belligerent.

Clark pointedly summarized this argument

by asking, tfIt was not our war two years ago, why is it now?”1 Clark also brought into sharp focus what the isolationists re­ garded as the strength of their argument in contrast to the _

Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. &4S9.

363

pattern of argument developed by the Administration.

He de­

clared that the interventionists had appealed "wholly to the emotions of the nation, "1 whereas the isolationists were bringing the debate down to the realm of "intelligent dis­ cussion. "2

jn this analysis of the two cases, Clark was par­

tially correct, for the Administration speakers did not at­ tempt to defend their assumptions on the practicability of the threat to this nation.

On the other hand, the isolation­

ists had ignored the pattern of conquest in Europe and Asia which stood as evidence for the future probability of the threat to the Western Hemisphere. In attacking Administration foreign policy, the iso­ lationists visualized the ultimate effect of the causal chain set in motion if the pending proposal for repeal of sections in the 1939 Act were carried out.

The Administration contended

that sending an army to Europe was what the proposed policy of aid to the Allies was intended to avoid.

Countering this, the

isolationists maintained that this was exactly what would re­ sult because each step taken by the Administration had been insufficient to aid the Allies and had been inevitably supple­ mented by the next step involving the nation in the war to an even greater extent.

In support of this, they cited each step

in the Administration policy to that date.

By a process of

cumulative evidence, the isolationists asked the audience to 1 Congressional Record. 77th Cong., 1st sess., p. 8490.

2 Ibid.

364-

conclude that the final effect of all these causes was log­ ically full participation in the war*

Administration speakers

sought to deny this reasoning by contending that no such in­ evitable effect would occur because the purported causes were not sufficient to produce the effect claimed by the isola­ tionists*

War could result, they maintained, only if Hitler

wanted it.

Any action by the United States would not of it­

self produce the war so feared by the isolationists in their arguments* Contemporary Reaction To The Debate In surveying the press and periodical comment during and following the Senate debate, there is evident one general characteristic.

There was considerably less comment on the

debate and on its outcome than had been the case in 1939. One probable cause for this might have been that by October 194-1, a change in neutrality legislation was but one phase of the Administration’s policy to aid the Allies* date

that policy had been

firmly implemented,and

By this the Neutral­

ity Act seemed to many to be inevitably doomed as an inconsis­ tent feature of the foreign policy*

In 1939, this Act had

been

a strong obstacle to

the Administration,and there had

been

considerable speculation and interest in its ability to

reverse the trend begun in the mid-thirties* trend had been fairly well reversed*

By 1941> that

From existing comment,

three generalizations may be drawn. First, the majority of press and periodical opinion

365 considered the Senate action in voting repeal of the three sections as a wise and justified policy consistent with the generally acceptable program of aiding the Allies by all means short of war.

"For the first time since the start of

the war," wrote the Christian Science Monitor, "it gives clear and unequivocal evidence that the Senate and the Pres­ ident are at one on foreign policy, that the vigorous meas­ ures of factive defense1 which President Roosevelt has initi­ ated is also Congress1 p r o g r a m . T h e Hew York Times expressed the same view and called neutrality a "pretense . . . which does not exist in fact."2

From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

came the observation that "Since the passage of the LeaseLend Act, the Neutrality Act no longer represents national pol­ icy . . .

The Senate, therefore, has faced the issue squarely

and voted the revisions necessary to make our help to the antiHitler nations fully effective."3

Among the periodicals, Nation

agreed with this view, declaring that the Neutrality Act had been " . . .

a wet blanket on the enthusiasm of the interven­

tionist majority*"4 A second generalization indicates that in addition to support for repeal of the specific provisions in the 1939 -

—

November 10, 1941* P* !•

2 November 5, 1941> P* 22. 3 November 9, 194i> P* 2F. 4 Freda Kirchwey,

22, 1941)> P- 302.

"End of a Myth," CLIII

(November

366

Act, some sources took the occasion to attack the principle of the entire period of neutrality legislation as some speakers had done in the Senate debate.

Among these sources was the

Chicago Daily Mews which opined: Our abject Neutrality Act was a mistake from the first. It assumed we had something to gain by sur­ rendering without a shot, rights at sea that we have fought at least four victorious wars to maintain. It proceeded from the jittery notion that we could some­ how stay out of trouble by tying our own hands and feet. In effect, it was aimed, not at our enemies, but at ourselves.1 Another source expressed a similar view that "Repeal of the key sections of the Neutrality Act removes from American for­ eign policy a statute which, however well-intentioned, was never consistent with the responsibilities of the United States as a world power or with the interests of its own ultimate safety."2 A third generalization is the conclusion that while the isolationists had lost much of the support which they had had in the early years of neutrality legislation, the support that remained clung to the arguments offered in the Senate. On November 26, 1941, less than two weeks before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Christian Century came to the defense of the isolationists by declaring: Technically only three sections of the neutral­ ity law were repealed by Congress last week. Act­ ually, however, the entire act was cast into the discard and the principle upon which it rested was repudiated . . . The undisputable fact is that 1

October 15, 1941, P* 10. 2

Christian Science Monitor. November 10, 1941 ? P* 14*

367

Congress lias now legalized the course by which the President is taking the nation into an un­ declared war ♦ . . However, there is reason to hope that the closeness of the vote in the House may serve to slowr down the pace at which Presi­ dent Roosevelt is leading toward war . . . In­ terpret that eighteen vote margin as he may, he must by now be aware that no war policy can com­ mand anything resembling unanimous support from the nation,1 In the speech on November 11, 1941* by Sumner Welles, from which the title to this chapter is taken, is included this paragraph which provides an appropriate con­ clusion to AmericaTs attempt at isolating itself from a war anywhere in the world: The American people after full debate, in accordance with their democratic institutions, have determined upon their policy. They are pledged to defend their freedom and their ancient rights against every form of aggression, and to spare no effort and no sacrifice in bringing to pass the final defeat of Hitlerism and all that which that evil term implies*2

1 November 26, 1941> P* 1459•

2 Bartlett,

op,

cit.. p, 632.

| j

CHAPTER VIII SUMMARY AND COBCLUSIONS

i

At the outset, this study sought to provide an analysis or the Senate debates on neutrality legislation |within the historical context which produced them*

With

this in mind, each chapter was developed to provide a pro­ file of the leading debaters, issues, arguments, and ap­ peals involved in one of the six separate debates on neu­ trality measures proposed between 1935 and 1941,

This chap­

ter is designated to summarize each of the previous chapters and to present general conclusions which grow out of com­ parative analysis of the debates. War Fears. Investigations, And Neutrality The latent forces which brought the neutrality is­ sue to the fore in 1935, can be traced to the period of dis­ illusionment and indifference about world affairs which dom­ inated American mood after the close of the first World War. Most Americans felt that the interests of this nation would be safeguarded by staying out of any future war.

Evidence

was required, however, to support this position and to trans­ late sentiment into tangible measures.

This was supplied by

the Nye Munitions Investigation Committee in 1934 and 1935. From its investigation flowed conclusions that American bankers and munition makers deliberately involved the United

368

!States in war in 1917 to protect their investments. i

Against

the backdrop of this investigation, the fear of another world conflict emerging from the Italo-Ethiopian dispute provided the immediate stimulus for Senate action in behalf of a neu­ trality law. In the Senate debate which extended from August 20, to August 24, 1935, Senators Gerald P. Nye, Homer T. Bone, Huey P. Long, Henry Ashurst, Bennett Champ Clark, William E. Borah, and Arthur Vandenberg supported the proposed neutrality law.

Opposing them were Senators Millard Tydings, Key Pittman

J. Hamilton Lewis, Tom Connally, and Hiram Johnson. sition debated was, Resolved:

The propo

That Senate Joint Resolution

#173 should be enacted into law.

This resolution prohibited

the sale or export of arms to any belligerent named in a pres­ idential proclamation, and established the National Munitions Control Board.

The resolution was hastily enacted with little

challenge to the premises upon which it was based. Much of the speaking included argument which v/ent uncontested.

Both sides agreed that (l) the United States

should stay out of a future war; and (2) war trade and eco­ nomic relationships with the belligerents had been a major cause of entry into the first World War.

The only issues

which emerged were (l) Is the principle of the proposed neu­ trality law consistent with national interest? and (2) Should a neutrality law be enacted at this session of Congress? the first issue proponents of the measure argued that it would keep the nation out of war.

Opponents denied this

On

370

icontention and maintained that it would, moreover, restrict or destroy American commerce on the high seas.

Supporters

of the law insisted that a neutrality law must he enacted be­ fore the necessity to apply it arose; whereas opponents de­ clared that a neutrality law held promise only if it were developed to meet the actual circumstances in which the na­ tion found itself at a given moment. Contemporary reaction, as displayed in the press, emphasized the importance of the debate and the neutrality law but registered complaint that the debate was too brief for full consideration of the problem.

Many observers felt

that while Senate action represented public opinion, there were weaknesses in the law, Neutrality On Probation For A Year;

1936

In January 1936, the Roosevelt Administration pre­ pared and presented to Congress a permanent neutrality law to replace the temporary Act of 1935, which was due to expire on February 29, 1936.

Three senatorial alignments on neutral­

ity policy emerged in committee hearing:

(1) the freedom of

the seas bloc; (2) the strict neutrality bloc; and (3) the Administration bloc.

While realizing the weaknesses in the

1935 Act, representatives of these alignments failed to agree on the form of a permanent law.

An extension of the 1935 law

-until May 1, 1937, was finally accepted in committee. Critics of the 1935 law supported the temporary ex­ tension and became the proponents in the debate.

Among these,

371

Senators Pittman, Johnson, Lewis, Thomas, Robinson, Pope, and Gore featured in the debate.

Supporters of the 1935 Act

opposed the extension, favoring instead a permanent law or a sixty-day extension in which to formulate a permanent meas­ ure.

Among these, who were now the opponents in the debate,

were Senators Vandenberg, Bone, Bennett Clark, and Frazier. The debate occurred on February 17 and IS, 1936, with the proposition, Kesolved:

That the Senate Joint Resolution

#193 to extend for one year the Joint Resolution approved August 1935, be enacted into law.

Prohibition on loans and

credits to belligerents and exemption of American states at war with any non-American state were added to the arms em­ bargo and munitions control. As before, the speaking offered considerable uncon­ tested argument:

(l) whatever policy is to be adopted should

be one best calculated to keep the nation out of war; (2) loans and credits to belligerents should be prohibited; (3) the exemption from the arms embargo of any American state at war Y/lth a non-American state was desirable; and (4) United States citizens should be prohibited from traveling on bel­ ligerent vessels.

The issues in dispute were:

icy of strict neutrality possible?

(l) Is a pol­

(2) Is the best neutral­

ity policy that which is consistent with international law and freedom of the seas?

and (3) Can American entry into the

World War be explained solely on the basis of its commercial relations with the Allies?

In the argument on the first is­

sue, proponents of the proposed temporary law contended that

strict neutrality was impossible since America was never im­ partial in a war, and strict neutrality would not keep the nation

out of war* Spokesmen for a strict,

permanent law

argued

that it was the only policy to keep the nation out of

war. With respect to the second issue, proponents of the temporary law upheld international law and freedom of the seas, insisting that rules of neutrality were effective if built up­ on the

customary international agreements.

manent

legislation declared that adherence to freedom of the

seas would lead to war.

Advocates of per­

On the third issue, it was held that

illegal destruction of American lives provided the principal cause for American entry into the first World War; whereas supporters of strict neutrality asserted economic involvement was the cause. Contemporary reaction reflected dissatisfaction on the grounds that the temporary law was inadequate to keep the nation out of war.

Observers also speculated concerning the

reasons for Senate failure to agree on a permanent neutrality law. A Loophole Is Plugged:

January. 1937

The outbreak of the Spanish civil war in July, 1936, revealed a loophole in the neutrality laws.

Arms could still

be sent to one or both sides in civil conflict.

The United

States had pursued a policy of nonintervention in the Spanish war; and when the attempt of a Mew York exporter to ship

373

Iplanes to the Loyalist government received extensive publicity, the Administration moved to enact a special resolution forbid­ ding the export of arms to both sides in Spain.

Senate debate

consumed part of one day on January 6, 1937, with Senators Pittman, Clark, Vandenberg, Borah, Connally, Lewis, and McNary agreeing to the proposal and Senator Nye providing the oppo­ sition. The proposition debated was, Resolved: Joint Resolution #3 should be enacted into law.

That Senate This prohibited

the export and sale of arms to both sides in the Spanish con­ flict.

As in previous debates, there was uncontested argument:

(l) Senator Pittman1s analysis of the nature of the conflict in Spain; (2) the proposed resolution should be an amendment to existing neutrality law rather than a separate resolution; (3) the "whereas” clauses in the preamble should be omitted; and (4) circumstances relative to the proposed resolution indi­ cate the need for nationalization of the munitions industry. The single issue in dispute was, Should the proposed embargo be specific and limited in its application to the Span­ ish civil war?

Supporters of the embargo argued that the

United States was aware of conditions surrounding the Spanish war, but that phrasing a general resolution to embrace all civil conflict was difficult and unwise.

As principal oppo­

nent, Hye contended that the measure was unneutral since it aided the Fascists in Spain.

Public comment favored the em­

bargo with the exception of those observers who shared Kye’s

374

argument that it was unneutral to enact the law after the outbreak of a war* i

Cash-And-Carry: Part I:

1937

The Pittman Bill

Temporary neutrality legislation was to expire on May 1, 1937*

Following two months of committee considera­

tion, the Senate received the Administration sponsored perm­ anent neutrality law on March 1.

Most significant in the

proposal was the provision requiring belligerents to take title to all goods, other than arms, before the goods left American ports.

The President was also given authority to

enumerate goods which American ships could not transport to belligerent ports*

This policy of cash-and-carry was sup­

ported by both Administration and strict neutrality spokes­ men except for the letter's insistence upon reducing the ex­ tent of presidential discretion in enforcing the law. Senators supporting the proposed measure and who featured in the debate were Pittman, Vandenberg, Bone, Thomas, Bennett Clark, Pope, Nye, Lewis, Connaliy, Robinson, Schwellenbach, Capper, and Lee. Gerry, and King.

Opponents included Borah, Johnson,

The proposition for debate was, Resolved:

That Senate Joint Resolution #51, known as the Pittman bill, should be enacted into law.

This bill reenacted the arms em­

bargo, munitions control, and the ban on extension of credit to belligerents.

Hew provisions were (1) cash-and-carry;

(2) extension of the law to civil conflict; and (3) prohi-

375

bition of travel on belligerent vessels*

The debate extended

‘from March 1, to March 3, 1937* i

These were the uncontested arguments:

(l) all pro­

visions oi* the resolution except cash-and-carry were accepted i by both sides; (2) whatever policy is adopted should keep the Ination out or war; and (3) the proposed bill would not eonitrol war profits*

Clash or argument occurred on three issues;

(l) Should the President be given discretion under cash-andcarry to determine lists or goods which American ships might carry?

(2) Is the principle or cash-and-carry defensible?

and (3) Should a neutrality law be based upon international law?

Supporting presidential discretion, Administration spokes­

men argued that it would strengthen the effectiveness of the law and would not involve the nation in a future war*

Oppo­

nents of the discretionary provision contended that exercise of discretion was too great a task for one man and such author­ ity could result in sanctions against one belligerent. On the second issue, supporters of cash-and-carry maintained that it would keep the nation out of war and was no surrender of essential neutral rights*

Opponents of cash-

and-carry insisted that it would involve the nation in war and was a surrender of neutral rights.

In respect to the

third issue, proponents of the measure argued that since in­ ternational law had never been successfully codified, any attempt to establish a neutrality policy on such law would involve the nation in future wars*

Opponents declared that

cooperation among neutrals was the effective way to isolate

376

a war, and they urged international agreements in lieu of neutrality laws. Contemporary reaction agreed that the Pittman hill established an unprecedented policy on neutral rights, but many sources criticised failure of the debate to clarify im­ portant arguments* Part II:

The House and Senate Compromise

The House failed to accept several provisions of the Pittman bill, rejecting the mandatory transfer of title on all goods sold to belligerents.

A Senate-House conference

committee accepted the House version which permitted the Pres­ ident to determine when and on what goods cash-and-carry would be effective.

Speakers in the strict neutrality bloc indi­

cated that they favored enacting no neutrality law to one al­ lowing discretion on cash-and-carry.

As a result, in the

debate on April 29, 1937, Senators Vandenberg, Bone, Hye, and Clark were the opponents of the proposed measure with Pittman, Johnson, Lewis, Robinson, Connally, and Borah supporting the law. The proposition debated was, Resolved:

That the

Conference Report on Senate Joint Resolution #31 should be enacted into law.

Tfocontested argument remained the same as

in the debate on the Pittman bill, and the only issue in dis­ pute was, Should the President have discretionary authority to put cash-and-carry into effect?

Proponents insisted that

a President would be morally bound to put the provision into

377

effect, and presidential discretion would be more effective than a mandatory law for unpredictable future circumstances* Speakers upholding the law also argued that mandatory neutral­ ity laws resulted in a surrender of freedom of the seas.

Op­

ponents of the measure contended it would transfer war-making powers to the President while imposing a task too great for any President to fulfill.

Spokesmen of the strict neutrality

bloc also declared that presidential discretion would result in unrestricted war trade. Contemporary reaction questioned whether the law could keep the nation out of future war and reflected the dif­ ference of opinion outlined in the debate concerning the wis­ dom of permitting presidential discretion in a neutrality law. The Theory Meets The Practice:

1939

With war in Europe, the neutrality law faced its first serious test.

Professing a desire to return the nation to the

practices of international law and condemning the unneutrality of the arms embargo under the actual circumstances of the Eu­ ropean war, President Roosevelt called Congress into special session in September 1939.

Administration program called for

cash-and-carry on all goods, including arms; presidential au­ thority to establish combat zones through which American ships and citizens could not travel; and reenactment of provisions in the 1937 law prohibiting the arming of merchant ships and continuing the National Munitions Control Board. In

the

debate which

extended

from October

2,

to

378

i

October 27, Senators Pittman, Connally, Schwellenbach, Thomas, l |Tydings, Pepper, Wagner, Burke, Taft, and Barkley were lead;ing supporters of the Administration measure.

Opponents fea­

tured in the debate were Senators Capper, Borah, Vandenberg, ;Nye, Hiram Johnson, Bennett Clark, Tobey, LaFollette, Downey, and D. Worth Clark.

The proposition was, Resolved:

That the

Senate Joint Resolution to be cited as the Neutrality Act of 1939, be enacted into law. Both sides agreed that (l) a principal objective of any policy should be to keep the nation out of war; (2) a pro­ vision in the measure for ninety-day credit should be elimi­ nated; (3) cash-and-carry of materials other than arms was ac­ ceptable; and (4) establishment of combat zones, prohibition of travel on belligerent vessels, and munitions control should be accepted.

Arguments centered on the one issue:

arms embargo be repealed?

Should the

Proponents declared that repeal

would more likely keep the nation out of war than would the existing neutrality law.

They presented the arms embargo as

unneutral in effect and inconsistent with international law. Opposing speakers contended that repeal of the embargo was a symbol of intervention in the European war and a step toward entry into war.

Opponents also argued that the war was not

our war and that to change policy in the middle of a conflict was unneutral. Current opinion held there had been an absence of frankness in argument on both sides; but observers agreed that whatever the merits of the bill, its passage was signif-

379

Ileant In American foreign policy•

Public opinion polls re—

fleeted popular support for the outcome of the debate. tTA Cycle In Human. Events Is About To Come To Its End.« Administration policy to aid nations fighting Hit­ ler, and German attacks on American shipping led to the pro­ posal to repeal three sections of the 1939 Neutrality Act: (1) cash-and-carry on all goods sold to belligerents; (2) establishment of combat zones; and (3) prohibition of arming merchant ships.

The debate extended from October 27, to

;November 7, 1941> and leaders in support of repeal were Sen­ ators Connally, Lee, Pepper, Barkley, Thomas, Bridges, George, Bailey, and Austin.

Opposing repeal were Senators Vandenberg,

Taft, Nye, LaFollette, Capper, Bennett Clark, Hiram Johnson, Tydings, D. Worth Clark, Downey, and Wheeler. The proposition debated was, Resolved:

That sec­

tions two, three, and six of the Neutrality Act of 1939, should be repealed.

Both sides agreed that if possible, war should

be avoided, but clash of argument occurred on these issues: (l) Have the neutrality laws operated successfully? and (2) Will the proposed repeal lead to war?

On the first issue,

proponents of repeal contended that the neutrality laws sur­ rendered freedom of the seas, yet American ships had been at­ tacked.

Moreover neutrality laws were inconsistent with the

attitude of the American people.

Opponents maintained that

freedom of the seas was an indeterminable right and no justi­ fication for Administration policy.

In addition, since the

nation was not at war, the neutrality laws were a success* In respect to the second issue, supporters of repeal insisted that incidents were not the cause of entry into war in 1917, and repeal would more likely prevent war by hastening Hitler*s defeat before he could attack this country*

Opponents de­

clared that Administration policy was dangerous, for it re­ peated the pattern which led to war in 1917* The press favored repeal as consistent with Admini­ stration foreign policy, while some sources attacked the prin­ ciple underlying the entire period of neutrality legislation. There remained, however, scattered support for the isolation­ ists* arguments. General Conclusions 1.

Senate debate on neutrality legislation occupied

approximately fifty days between August 1935, and November 1941 Although each debate was relatively short, it held a position of prominence and importance in contemporary opinion.

In 1935,

the debate consumed five days; supported by evidence of public opinion in favor of a neutrality law, spokesmen for the legis­ lation delayed adjournment of the session until the Senate had enacted one.

There were only two days of debate on the Senate

floor in 1936, but Administration leaders had formulated a neu­ trality proposal with high priority for debate and action early in the session.

This proposal was in issue in committee hear­

ings for over a month following President Rooseveltfs urgent recommendation of the measure in his opening message to Congres

381

Floor debate in 1937 covered four days, but committee delib­ erations featured proposed neutrality legislation for four months.

In 1939, the neutrality act was passed in a special,

historic session of Congress after four weeks of debate.

Ac­

tion on neutrality in 1941 followed eleven days of debate, with Administration forces and isolationists interpreting the proposals as a symbol of American commitment in the war. While no attempt is here made to generalize on the effectiveness of all congressional debating, this study indi­ cates that at least a portion of speaking on the Senate floor did reach out, did gain attention, and did Influence the thought of senators and public opinion on neutrality.

Occa­

sionally within the speeches of individual senators there were some explicit statements by individual senators as to the influence which another senator*s speech had exerted In determining his vote on the proposal.

Attempts by leaders

in the debate to destroy or answer opposing arguments indi­ cate that both sides looked upon the debate as an important event and force in determining our foreign policy. Each debate on each neutrality bill produced its own post-mortem in current publications.

Weaknesses, fallacies,

inadequacies of evidence, as well as strength of argument, were exhumed.

During the six years, there was general ap­

proval voiced in contemporary comment on the Senate action, although there was the inevitable criticism of some aspect of a debate or legislation.

One may conclude, frequently

voiced opinion to the contrary, that congressional debating

is sometimes followed with interest and attention both by members and the general public*

At least, such was true of

the debates on neutrality whenever senators prominent in the debate presented their arguments* 2.

The drive for neutrality laws and the envelop­

ing mood of isolationism were related.

The neutrality laws

were Instruments to insure isolation from international co­ operation and entanglements.

The premises upon which the

case for neutrality legislation rested were in the main a re­ flection of the arguments and appeals of isolationism.

The

neutrality debates in Congress crystallized those arguments and kept them steadily before the nation.

The isolationist

case enjoyed its peak popularity in 1935 but was discredited by events in 1941* 3.

From 1935 to 1937, there were three principal

positions on neutrality taken in the debate:

(1) the strict

neutrality bloc, with the leadership of Senators Nye, Bone, Bennett Clark, and Vandenberg.

This group supported a perma­

nent, mandatory law providing for restriction of all trade with belligerents; (2) supporters of the Administration, rep­ resented by Senators Pittman, Connally, Tydings, Thomas, Rob­ inson, and Lewis, who favored a temporary and flexible law which allowed for Presidential discretion in its enforcement; and (3) freedom-of-the-seas isolationists, principally Sen­ ators Borah and Johnson, who favored an arms embargo but op­ posed restriction on trade in non-military goods.

383

In 1939, Borah and Johnson joined the strict neu­ trality bloc when repeal of the arms embargo supplanted the issue of freedom of the seas in the debate*

By 1941, there

were only two positions in modification of the neutrality laws, the isolationists and Administration supporters. With the notable exceptions of Senators Borah and Johnson, leading Senate isolationists were also the leading supporters of permanent, mandatory neutrality legislation. An analysis of the speeches of Nye, Bone, Vandenberg, Bennett Clark, LaFollette, and Wheeler proves them to be exponents of beliefs, appeals, and argument which comprise the isolation­ ists1 case for neutrality during those years. Administration leadership rested on Senator Pittman until his death in 1940, when that leadership passed to Sen­ ator Connally.

A survey of the debates reveals fewer out­

standing personalities representing Administration position than among the isolationists.

Besides Pittman and Connally,

Senators Thomas and Lewis were prominent in advancing through their arguments the Administration1s case for flexible, dis­ cretionary legislation. 4.

One argument went uncontested throughout each

of the neutrality debates, viz., the policy adopted should be designed to keep the nation out of war.

Although uncon­

tested, this argument was repeated by both sides in every debate.

On means to attain this objective, the Administra­

tion and strict neutrality bloc disagreed.

The former advo­

cated presidential authority to distinguish between agressor

384

and victim in enforcement of neutrality laws; whereas strict neutrality senators favored application of the laws irrespec­ tive of circumstances surrounding a foreign war. In the case for strict neutrality, the findings and interpretations of the Nye Committee were the principal evi­ dence used.

On the basis of this evidence, neutrality speakers

evolved three premises:

(l) America must be kept out of a for­

eign war; (2) American involvement in the first World War re­ sulted from economic entanglement in the Allied cause; and (3) neutrality legislation would keep the nation out of a future war.

Through 1937, the neutrality bloc asserted that a future

war would result from the same problems and follow the same pattern as the first World War.

Beginning in 1939, they main­

tained that their claims were borne out in the chain of events following the Administration’s foreign policy.

In each de­

bate, isolationist speakers introduced emotionalized appeals to heighten their arguments. From 1935 to 1937, leading Administration spokesmen accepted the first two premises of the neutrality bloc.

In

1937, arguments on cash-and-carry displayed agreement by both sides on the economic explanation for involvement by the United States in the first World War.

Administration speakers dis­

agreed on the third premise that strict neutrality legislation could guarantee peace.

They believed that a future circum­

stance might defy the pattern of 1917.

In 1939, Administra­

tion supporters insisted that this prediction had been veri­ fied, since it had become evident that America had an interest

385

i

in the outcome of the European war apart from economic con­ siderations, viz., the protection of traditional freedoms. Moreover, for the first time, these speakers now challenged the assertions that economic ties had drawn America into war in 1917; they now contended that America’s sense of jus­ tice and decency had forced the issue.

Because of the Ad­

ministration’s direct assault on a premise heretofore agreed upon, the neutrality debate in 1939 and 1941 brought forth a sharper clash on the issues and a narrowing of uncontested argument. 5.

From contemporary comment and evidence in the

Congressional Record, one may conclude that gallery aud­ iences for the neutrality debates were small and undemon­ strative prior to 1939, but in the two final debates there was a sizable and responsive audience in the galleries. While contemporary observers reported the overall progress of Senate deliberations on neutrality, speeches of individ­ ual senators were not often featured in these reports before the 1939 debate.

In the 1939 and 1941 debates, individual

speeches were occasionally reproduced or summarized in news­ papers and periodicals. Throughout the debates in which they participated, Senators Bone, Johnson, Connally, Thomas, Nye, Pittman, Vandenberg, Borah, Bennett Clark, LaFoliette, and Wheeler at­ tracted the greatest attention in and out of Congress.

Their

speeches were accepted and interpreted by senators and obser­ vers as representative of the position these men supported.

386

In general, senate speeches on neutrality were set |speeches presented without interruption.

In the first four

|debates, there appears little colloquoy between senators jwithin or following a speech.

The final debates possess a

give and take of argument with more'skillful adaptation |and utilization of rebuttal in meeting opposing positions. Through the 1937 debate, with occasional exception, individual speeches were relatively short, but in 1939 and 1941 the debate was characterized by long speeches, notably those of Borah, Connally, Vandenberg, LaFollette, and Wheeler, which ;required several hours for presentation. While this study does not attempt to deal in detail with the rhetoric of individual speeches, certain general im­ pressions emerge from an extended reading of them.

Common

to most Senate speeches on neutrality is a well-defined, log­ ical analysis of the issues in which the speaker states his position, supports it through evidence and reasoning, and concludes with a summation of his argument or a direct appeal to his audience to accept conclusions.

Some isolationists

provided exceptions to this pattern, often attempting to gain acceptance of their case through emotional appeals which per­ sonalized the concepts of isolationism and peace.

There is

authenticity in the style and development of the speeches, which bear the marks of oral discourse— concreteness of lan­ guage, colloquial idioms, illustrative material and the syn­ tactical irregularities that mark the spoken word.

Today, nearly

a decade after the final debate, one can read the speeches in print and still capture the vitality of the debate.

APPENDIX A

A NOTE ON THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A NEUTRALITY POLICY The Foundations Of Neutral Conduct In Wartime In an attempt to establish certain clearly defined principles upon which neutral rights and the interests of belligerents can best be served in wartime, there evolved a set of rules and standards which are incorporated into the great body of international law.

A knowledge of the outstand­

ing rules governing the conduct of neutrals in wartime con­ tributes to an understanding of the neutrality laws enacted by the United States in its history as a neutral power. As early as the tv/elfth and thirteenth centuries, the Hanseatic and Mediterranean cities had developed an inter­ national trade for which they sought protection through mari­ time codes.

One basic principle of such codes was recognition

by belligerents of the immunity of the ships and goods of a neutral.1

For several centuries, neutral rights were defined

in treaties between States.

Under the provisions of such

treaties, when one of the States was a belligerent in a war, the neutral State with whom it had a treaty gave assistance. Until the seventeenth century, it was a principle of interna­ tional law that a neutral should n. . . pass upon the justice .

_

_

_

_

Borchard and Lage, Neutrality for The United States, pp. 3-4*

387

3BS of the war in progress and modify its neutral conduct accordIingly.”1 's

J

As Hugo Grotius, the Father of International Law,

ideclared In his Law of War and Pea.ce, rrIt is the duty of ;those who stand apart from a war to do nothing which may strengthen the side whose cause is unjust, or which may hin­ der the movements of him who is carrying on a just war • . ."2 It was not until the eighteenth century that neutral conduct came to be regulated irrespective of sympathy for either bel­ ligerent in a conflict.

The old Idea of binding the conduct

of a neutral with the cause for which a belligerent was sup­ posedly fighting yielded to a new concept that the neutral could adopt a policy of complete impartiality toward either belligerent.

Under such circumstances the neutral would de­

termine for itself what obligations should be placed upon its citizens in the matter of giving assistance to the parties involved in the conflict.

These obligations were defined as

1 Fenwick, The Neutrality Laws of The United .States,. p. 4*

2 As quoted in Neutrality: Its History. Economics, and Laws. Philip Jessup (ed.),IV, pp. 8 6 - 8 7 . In his Memoirs. Cordell Hull expressed the belief that Grotius’ principle had been incorporated into the League of Nations through which neu­ trals could help the victim and thwart the aggressor. There­ fore, Hull argued, the need for a single nation to pass any neutrality legislation had ceased to exist with the establish­ ment of an international neutrality In the League. Supporters of stringent neutrality legislation in the 1930’s, of course, were the same ones who opposed the League of Nations and re­ jected Hull’s solution.

1

;neutral duties.

The extent to which a neutral was forced

jto restrict the activities of its citizens was often deter­ m i n e d by international agreements to which most nations Isubscribed.

As Fenwick wrote, however:

Iv/ in s?me cases> neutrality laws may go beyond the requirements of the international obli­ gations of the state by restricting the action of its citizens to an even greater extent than inter­ national law demands . . . Accordingly, while a state will naturally seek . . . to conform to the obligations of international law, it may find it expedient, especially where it has particular rea­ sons for maintaining an unassailable position of neutrality, to make its municipal laws more strin­ gent than is required by a faithful compliance with international law.l In addition to neutral duties, there evolved a body of rules termed neutral rights.

These were also determined

by international agreement, and they set forth the general conditions under which neutral ships could sail the high seas in carrying on normal commerce with nations at war.

It was

the failure of belligerents to respect these rights and of neutrals to agree with belligerent interpretation of them which had led to the incidents bringing neutrals in many cases into the war.

This view is upheld in Neutrality:

Its History.

Economics, and Law: It was the economic motive which led carrier nations like the Dutch to assert and to defend one interpre­ tation of various legal rules while England, the dominant belligerent sea power, denied and combated the Dutch position. It was the same motive which dictated much of the strategy of the Napoleonic Wars — a strategy no less important than that of the cam­ paigns of Napoleon’s armies. It was again an econ­

1 Fenwick,

op.

c i t . . pp.

12-13.

390

omic base which underlay the quarrels between the United States and both groups of belligerents from 1914 "to 1917 • The story runs from war to war* from century to century, and dominates the history of neutrality,1 Throughout the nineteenth century, the nations of the world including the United States attempted through a series of agreements to codify international law as it re­ lated to neutral conduct in time of war.

Among these attempts

to secure agreement were the Declaration of Paris in 1856,2 which became universally recognized as correctly stating the rule of international law governing b l o c k a d e s ; 3 the findings of the Geneva Tribunal in the Alabama claims between the United States and England in 1872;4 the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907;3 and the Declaration of London in 1909.6 1 neutrality;

Hot all of

Its History. Economics, and Law. IV,

p. 23.

2 Bartlett, Kecord of American Diplomacy, pp. 281283, 445. 3

Abolished privateering; established that tTfree ships made free goods;” and that blockades to be binding must be effective. 4 See Bartlett, op. cit., pp. 332-335; Borchard and Laee. op. cit., p. 9. The Tribunal awarded claims to the United States for damages done to its shipping by the Alabama, a vessel built and launched in England during the Civil War for the service of the Confederacy. The Tribunal declared that a neutral should not allow its territory to be used as a base of supplies for either belligerent. 5 See Bartlett, o p . cit.. p. 334; Bailey, Diplomatic History of the American People, pp. 530-531, 573; Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 9*

6 ”The blockading forces must not bar access to neu­ tralports or coasts.” See Bartlett, op. cit., p. 445.

391

these agreements were adhered to by every nation involved in the first World War, but from the centuries of usage and custom in the matter of neutral conduct, there were certain principles to which it was assumed the belligerents would conform*

Philip Jessup provides an excellent summary of the

rules of international law as they were generally accepted by 1914i 1*

"Paper blockades" were illegal. A blockade of a belligerent port must be maintained by an ade­ quate naval force to make it effective.

2.

Enemy goods carried on neutral ships were immune from seizure provided those goods were not con­ traband and were not destined for a blockaded port, This was the recognized principle laid down in the Declaration of Paris that "Free ships make free goods."1

3.

Neutral goods were immune from seizure if car­ ried on enemy ships provided those goods were not contraband or were not destined for a bloc­ kaded port.

4-

A fortiori, neutral goods were safe on neutral ships if the goods were not contraband and were not destined for a blockaded port.

5.

There were two categbries of contraband, absolute and conditional. In the first type were included goods used exclusively for war and destined for a belligerent. This type was subject to seizure and confiscation by a belligerent and were shipped at the traderfs own risk. Supposedly a neutral government assumed no responsibility for protect­ ing its citizens in such trade. Actually, as was evidenced in the first World War, even ships

1 The difficulty in enforcement of the rule had always been that belligerents were interested in extending the defini­ tion, of what constituted contraband; whereas neutrals to pro­ tect their normal trade attempted to limit the definition^to strictly military supplies. See Borchard and Lage, op* cit., pp. 10-15; and Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 442-444*

392

carrying absolute contraband were as likely to arouse national protest when sunk as were ships carrying cargo of any other type. Conditional contraband was defined as goods having a peaceful Qr a wartime use which was supposedly protected from seizure and was afforded governmental pro­ tection. As was noted on the previous page, this distinction in contraband types often failed to exist.1 "These were,** concluded Jessup, "the rules of international law in 1914> and their violation by belligerents in the late war (First World War) has not changed them.

New law is not

to be found in the violations of the old . . ."2 In addition to Jessupfs summary of the law as it had developed over the centuries, there is one additional facet of neutral conduct which was under consideration in the legis­ lation of the 1930Ts.

This was stated by Fenwick:

A neutral state is, moreover, under no obliga­ tion to prevent its citizens from making loans of money to a belligerent power. The neutral state cannot itself make such a loan . . . nor can it guar­ antee a loan made by one of its citizens. But while it cannot thus give either its material or its moral support to a belligerent, it is not obliged to pre­ vent its subjects from giving such support as an in­ cident of ordinary mercantile transaction.3 The question of governmental underwriting of private financial involvement in the cause of a belligerent constituted a strong part of the case for stringent neutrality legislation in the period under consideration in this study. 1 Jessupfs summary appears in Borchard and Lage, cit.> P * 1*7• 2 Ibid. 3 Fenwick, op. cit.» p. 124*

ojd .

As a result or international agreement, custom, and usage, a nation which desired to remain neutral in an actual or probable conflict possessed these rules upon which it could determine its policy.

If the neutral believed that de­

pendence solely upon international law would prove inadequate j to protect its neutrality, it could enact further domestic

J legislation intended to affect the conduct of its own citi-

j

zens in their relationship with the belligerents.

j

islation could restrain the activities of the citizens of the

Such leg-

i neutral state to an even greater degree than required under | 1 international law. As defined by Fenwick, neutrality laws I | are thus ”. . . enacted by a State to prevent individuals i

| within its jurisdiction from compromising the neutrality of

j

' the State . . . Neutrality laws are thus purely domestic regi I | ulations and form no part of the body of international law.!,l l ! In its history as a nation, the United States had on several ! occasions prior to 1935, found it advisable to enact such doj]

j| mestic neutrality laws in an attempt to remain aloof from a j foreign war.

| |

The History Of United StatesT Neutrality Laws As war swept Europe in the latter years of the eigh-

! teenth century, the leaders of the new-born United States rea1 | lized the desirability of maintaining as strict a neutrality I in those wars as was possible.

It was realized that involve-

ii

| ment in favor of any belligerent in the conflict y/ould have ii ii i

:j |

________________________________________________________________ -—

1

Fenwick, op. cit.. p. 11.

—

—

------------------------- --------------

394

jeopordized the diplomatic independence which the new Republic ;had fought to secure.

Accordingly, on April 22, 1793, Presi-

•i

ident Washington issued a Proclamation of Neutrality in which he called upon the citizens of the lAiited States to ", . . pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belliger­ ent Powers."1

This Proclamation was not sufficient to prevent

the arming of French vessels in ports of the United States, and a second similar proclamation was issued by Washington in March, 1794*

This second proclamation was more specific in

its references to military expeditions then being outfitted in Kentucky for service in the cause of the belligerents. 2 In order to strengthen the hope for neutrality in the European wars, the first neutrality law was enacted by Congress in 1794*

This law provided that (l) Citizens of the

United States should not accept commissions in the army of a foreign state; (2) Persons residing within the territory of the United States should not enlist nor encourage others to enlist in the service of a foreign state; (3) No military ex­ pedition should be formed nor launched from territory of the United States against a foreign state with whom the United States was at peace; (4) Vessels should be neither outfitted

Bartlett, on. c i t .. p. 90. For further information on the historical background of W a s h i n g t o n Ts proclamations, see Bailey, on. c i t .. pp. 71-89; Fenwick, op., c i t ., pp. 15-26; Stipp> "Contemporary Views of What Neutrality Means to Ameri­ cans^ As Disclosed by Discussions on Recent Neutrality Legis­ lation," Unpublished M a s t e r fs Thesis, Dept, of History, North­ western University, 1938, pp. 1-2; Jessup, (ed.), op. c i t ., I, pp. 15-17.

2 Fenwick,

op.

c i t ..

p.

25.

395

Inor armed in the ports of the United States with an intent to use such vessels against a foreign state with whom the United States was at peace.!

This law was extended in 1797,

;to include punishment for unneutral acts of United States' citizens abroad, many of whom had been outfitting privateers in foreign ports.2 As the Napoleonic wars intensified, President Jef­ ferson attempted to maintain American neutrality and at the same time to force belligerent respect for American rights on the high seas through the Embargo Act of 1807, which

.

virtually prohibited the export of any goods from the United States by sea or land."3

The adverse effect of this complete

paralyzing of American commerce on public opinion forced its repeal by Congress in 1809, and the substitution of a nonin­ tercourse act which legalized American commerce with all ports of the world except those under British and French control.4 1 See Stipp, op. cit., p. 2; and Fenwick, op. cit.. pp. 26-27. "The scope of the act was not only more compre­ hensive than any of the previous temporary neutrality acts issued by the nations of Europe earlier in the century, but it went considerably beyond what was considered the duty of a neutral nation."

2 See Fenwick, op. c i t . . pp. 30-31> Stipp, op. c i t . , George Canning, British Foreign Secretary in the per­ iod preceding the War of 1812, declared: "If I wished for a guide on a system of neutrality, I should take that laid down by the presidency of Washington and the secretaryship of Jefferson."

p. 3.

3 Bailey, op. cit.. p. 119. See pp. 108-119. for the historical background of Jefferson1s attempts at neutrality through the embargo. The specific provisions of the Embargo appear in Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 127-128. 4 Bailey, op. cit.. p. 123; Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 127-128.

396

IAmerican neutrality policy was also applied to the civil |wars in South America where the Spanish colonies were attempt­ ing to throw off the rule of Spain,

In this case there was

;no specific legislation, but Jefferson issued a proclamation |which warned all Americans against talcing part in any expe­ dition involving the Spanish colonies.1

A similar proclama­

tion was issued in 1815, by President Madison when violations of Jefferson1s warning were discovered.2 A further step in the enactment of specific neutral­ ity legislation was taken in 1817, when upon the advice of President Madison that

. existing laws have not the ef­

ficacy necessary to prevent violations of the obligations of !

the United States as a nation at peace towards belligerent parties . . .°3 Congress enacted the Neutrality Act of 1817. This provided a supplement to the Act of 1797, in the form of a requirement that owners of armed vessels leaving United States ports must post a bond.

It further allowed the col­

lector of customs to hold any vessel suspected of being out­ fitted for use of a belligerent with whom the United States was at peace.

The most significant contribution of the Act

128-129. Failure of the 1807 Embargo Act was frequently cited by opponents of a strict neutrality law in the period from 1935 to 1941* 1 Stipp, op. cit.. p. 3; Fenwick, op. cit., p. 33. 2 Stipp, on. cit.. p. 3; Fenwick, op. cit., pp. 33-34* 3 Fenwick, op. cit.. p. 35.

|Was its extension to civil conflict, applicable especially -to the wars in South America. 1

In 1818, all of the exist-

|ing neutrality acts were codified into a single act.

This

codification represented the laws of the United States upI on the subject of neutrality until 1838. In 1837 and 1838, rebellion in Canada tested Ainerican neutrality and resulted in the Act of March, 1838, which supplemented the Act of 1818, with the additional provision that United States* officers could seize any munitions, ves­ sel, or vehicle passing across the frontiers of the United States if such vehicle was suspected of being destined for use by a belligerent.2

This was the last neutrality law en­

acted by Congress until 1912, when by Joint Kesolution the Act of 1818 was amended to give the President power to recog­ nize the existence of conditions under which the export of arms could be forbidden to any American country.

This was

in special reference to revolutions In Central and South Amer­ ica in which the United States desired to prevent the revolu­ tionary faction from securing arms in the United States.3 Throughout the nineteenth century, wars and revolutions in various parts of the world provoked neutrality proclamations from the Government of the United States.

"

~

1

All of these were

' Stipp, op* cit., p. 4; Fenwick, op* cit., p. 39. ~

2 Stipp, op. cit.. pp. 5-6; Fenwick, op. cit., pp. 43-445 Bailey, op. cit.. pp. 204-209. 3 Fenwick, op. cit.. pp. 57-58.

similar

in

tone

and

intent

in

calling

upon

the A m e r i c a n

tpeople to maintain an attitude of impartiality and to re— |frain from unneutral conduct.1 \

i

When the first World War broke out in 1914, Presi­

dent Wilson issued a similar proclamation of neutrality.

It

|was evident from the outset of that conflict that Americans were not impartial in their attitude toward the belligerents, and as Stipp observed, "Never was so little attention paid to neutrality r u l e s . "2

There were no attempts during the

period before American entry into the war to restrict Ameri­ can travel or trade in the war zones by specific legislation. ' |On the contrary, Wilson insisted upon the rights of American citizens until the final break with Germany.

These rights,

as Wilson and the State Department interpreted them, were violated by both sets of belligerents.

As Bailey concludes,

1 I For a detailed list and discussion of these varij ous proclamations see Fenwick, op. cit.. pp. 44-57; and Stipp, op. cit.. pp. 6-8. 2 Stipp, o p . cit.. p. 9. There is considerable dif­ ference of opinion among historians and authorities on inter­ national law on the actual cause of American entry Into the war. Seymour in American Neutrality: 1914-1917. supports one thesis that the German use of the submarine violated in­ ternational morality and justice for which Wilson believed that Americans stood. Borchard and Lage, op. cit.. contend that the Wilson administration stood on untenable grounds while attempting to justify its unneutrality in favor of the j Allies and at the same time expecting Germany to consider | this nation as a neutral. Bailey, op.^cit.. holds that Affler; ica was attacked by Germany and that Wilson did the only ! thing in insisting upon respect for the neutral rights of a I great power.

399

! n * . . Allied practices hurt only American property rights ;• . .

The German submarine took American lives.

,seemed to be no proper recompense for lives.

And there

So the United

;States fought Germany. ;

Between 1917 and 1931, neutrality was little in

public interest.

There were no major wars which seemed to

require consideration of the subject. jstances

Stipp cites two in-

in which some element of neutrality might have been

involved in the 1927 treaty for international control of trade in arms on which the United States Senate took no ac| tion,2 and the Briand Anti-War Pact in 1928, to which the United States subscribed.3

Beginning in 1931, American pol­

icy, in a world apparently preparing for another world con!flict, brought the problem of neutrality into focus.

In 1933,

|President Hoover asked for legislation to embargo arms ship!ments to any nation the President might designate.

This dis-

Icretionary authority was intended to supplement the joint |resolution of 1912, which had given such power in case of Icivil conflict.

The Senate had amended Hoover’s proposal to

require that an embargo be placed on both belligerents, and

i

Bailey,

,

2

I !

^

Stipp,

op. op.

cit.. p. 646.

cit.. p. 9♦

Ibid. See also Bartlett, op. cit.. pp. 520-521, for the text of the Briand Pact, sometimes referred to as the Pact of Paris, which outlawed war as an instrument of !national policy.

j

400

!the House of Representatives failed to pass the bill on this jbasis.i

With the outbreak of the Chaco war in South America,

IPresident Roosevelt repeated HooverTs request for an arms :embargo to apply to that conflict. Congress passed such an I |embargo in May, 1934, but required that it apply to all bel|ligerents alike rather than the discretionary authority asked !by the President.2

By 1935, neutrality legislation for a

;future war had reached a degree of public interest to the ex!tent that one source could declare:

' i ■j

Only four years ago (1931) no one would talk about neutrality— it was dead, or deadly dull. Today, our newspapers are full of the subject, while books and articles expound every point of view. Tomorrow, who knows what the fate of neutrality will be? Anx­ ious eyes are turned toward Europe and the Far East wondering whether an American neutrality policy will again be severly tested.3

1 Borchard and Lage, on. cit.. pp. 304-311; Stipp, op. cit.. p. 10.

2 Borchard and Lage, cit.* p. 10. Whether an tionary or applicable to all in dispute in the neutrality 3 Jessup, (ed.), op. op*

op. cit.. pp. 311-313; Stipp, arms embargo should be discre­ belligerents was a basic issue debates to follow. cit., IV, preface, p. v.

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Christian Century, LVIII

"Neutrality and Freedom of the Seas," I (January 29, 1936), 326.

Hew Republic, LXXXV

419

j"Neutrality and Oil." j 1935), 117-18.

New Keoublic. LXXXIV -----

"Neutrality or Shadow Boxing?" 2, 1935), 202-03. j"Neutrality Problems,"

(Sentember

11.

New Keoublic. LXXXIV (October ------ ------

Business Week. January 4, 1936, p. 34-

"Neutrality? What Do You Mean 'Neutrality'?" CL (November, 1939), 130.

Catholic World

jPatterson, Ernest Minor* "Economics of Neutrality," Annals of the__Araerican A cademy of Political and Social Science, CLX5QCVI (JulT, 1936), 155-62. Peffer, Nathaniel* "Entanglement or Non-Entanglement: Is There a Choice?" Political Science Quarterly, LV (Decemj her 1940), 522-34* i"Pro-Fascist Neutrality," Nation. CXLIV (January 9, 1937), ! 33-4* l | |jPublic Opinion Quarterly. IV, V, VI.

1

j’"Publicity for Spanish Interventionists," ! LXXXVIII(August 26, 1936), 62.

New Republic,

1

!Raushenbush, Stephen. "Neutrality— The Heal Issue," i Century. LIV (March 3, 1937), 275-78.

Christian

IRobinson, Zon. "Are Speeches in Congress Reported Accurately?" ;j Quarterly Journal of Speech, XXVIII (February, 1942), 8-12. ;|"Sanctions or

War?"Nation, CXLI (September

4>1935),

256.

j Smith, Abbot. "Mr. Madison’s War: AnUnsuccessfulExperiment i! in the Conduct of National Policy," Political Science || Quarterly. LVII (June, 1942), 229-46. IStraight, Michael* " ’Dear Senator LaFollette’," CV (October 21, 1941)> 506. "Strengthening the Neutrality Act," 1936), 32*

New Republic,

Nation, CXLII (January 8,

! Thomas, E.D* "Theory of Neutrality," Annals of the American 1 Academy of Political and_ Social Sciences, CLXXXVI (July, I 1936), 163-68. I ! !Thomson, Charles A. "Spain: Civil War," Foreign Policy :j Reports, Vol. XI, January 15, 1936.

Villard, O.G. "Issues and Men," 1936;, 239• 19.

"Issues and Men,"

Nation. CXLII (February 26,

Nation, CXLIV (January 2, 1937),

Warren, Charles. "Troubles of a Neutral," XII (April, 1934 ) 9 Pp. 377-94.

Foreign Affairs, ----- ----------

"Washington Correspondents Name Ablest Members of Congress in Life Poll," Life, March 20, 1939, pp. 13-17.

;j

"Washington Notes," 101—02•

New Republic. LXXXIV (September 4, 1935),

"Washington Notes," 103 .

New Republic. LXXXV (December 4, 1935),

I"Washington Notes," 45.

New Republic. LXXXVI (February 19, 1936),

| "Washington Notes,"

New Republic. C (October 11, 1939), 269-70.

."Washington Notes," New Republic. CLXXXV (October 20, 1941), I 506. | i |"What Happened to Neutrality?" Christian Century, LIII (March, !| 4, 1936), 350.

I!

|Wieman, Henry Nelson, and Holt, Arthur E. "Keep Our Country Out of This War!" Christian Century. LVI (September 27, j 1939), 1162-64. ;Wyart, Rowena, and Herzog, Herta. "Voting Via the Senate Mailbag," Public Opinion Quarterly. V (Fall, Winter, 1941)9 ! 359-32, 590-624. i ! ij !

IV. DISSERl‘A'1‘1ONS AND 1'HESES

!

[Adams, John W. Jr. "Embargo Legislation in the United States Since the World War: Its Relation to American Neutral­ ity." Unpublished Masterfs thesis, Department of History, Northwestern University, 1937. Chester, Giraud. "The Senate Debate on the Selective Service Bill of 1940." Unpublished Master1s thesis, Department of Speech, University of Wisconsin, 1943. Foote, Walter A. "An Interpretation of the Decisions of the U.S. Neutrality Board, 1914-1917." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, American University, 1935.

421

jGoff, C.D. "The Purposes of American Neutrality Legislation*11 Unpublished Masterfs thesis, Department of Political Sci­ ence, Northwestern University, 1941. i

Hall, John Allen. ^Neutrality and Nonbelligerency." Unpub; lished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Scii ence, Harvard University, 1941. :Hilliard, Robert H. "The Ohio Press and American Neutrality j (1914-1917)." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Depart| ment of History, Ohio State College, 1938. |Hunter, S.A. Dulany. "The Revision of the Neutrality Policies of the United States.TT Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, ;j Department of Political Science, Georgetown University, j 1936. ||Marshall, Charles B. "The Relation of the Neutrality Act to || the Control of Foreign Relations." Unpublished Ph.D. |i dissertation, Department of Political Science, Harvard j University, 1939. Mieken, Ralph A. "A Rhetorical Study of the Senate Debates on the League of Nations.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertaI tion, Department of Speech, Northwestern University, 1948. IMorrissey, Alice M. "Some Legal and Economic Aspects of the American Policy of Neutrality, 1914-1918.” Unpublished | Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, RadI cliffe, 1936. ||Moseley, Harold W. "The *Cash and Carry* Section of the 1937 i! Neutrality Act." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Departj ! ment of Political Science, Harvard University, 1939. !Mouat, Laurence Henry. "Methods for Describing a Public Disj cussion Applied to the United States Neutrality Debates." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Speech, |j Cornell University, 1942. Pechota, Henry L. "Neutrality Legislation and the Foreign 1 Policy of the United States with Special Reference to | Neutrality Statutes of 1935* 1936, 1937." Unpublished I! Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, ! Southern California University, 1939. i

|perritt, H. Hardy. "An Analysis of Senatorial Debate on Neu!! trality Legislation in the 1939 Special Session of Con|j gress." Unpublished Master*s thesis, Department of Speech, Louisiana State University, 1942.

422

|Peterson, Horace. "Factors Governing the Decision for War, | 1914-1917.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Depart­ ment of History, Cornell University, 1935. |Smith, Harold E. ”A Critical Study of the International Law of Neutrality.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Depart­ ment of Political Science, Fordham University, 1934*

i

jSteinmeyer, Reuben. nCertain Aspects of German Public Opinion ! Relative to American Neutrality.” Unpublished Ph.D. dis! sertation, Department of History, American University, 1935. j jStipp, J.L. "Contemporary Views of What Neutrality Means to Americans, as Disclosed by Discussions on Recent Neutral; ity Legislation.” Unpublished Master*s thesis, Depart! ment of History, Northwestern University, 1938. |Wrage, Naomi. ”A Study of Representative Anti-War Arguments Presented in Congressional Debates.” Unpublished Ph.D. | dissertation, Department of Speech, Northwestern Univerj sity, 1946. V. NEYtfSPAPEHS |Chicago Daily News. ‘I !jChicago Tribune. i

IChristian Science Monitor. ; ! iNew York Times. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. • jWashington Daily News.

VITA

Earl Hichard Cain was horn August 11, 1919 in Terry, South Dakota. He attended Deadwood High School in Deadwood, South Dakota and was graduated in 1937. He re­ ceived the degree of Bachelor of Arts from the University of South Dakota in 194-2 and the degree of Master of Arts from North­ western University in 1947. He was a teach­ ing fellow at Northwestern University in 1946-1947 and 1948-1950, and an instructor in public speaking at Oregon State College, 1947-1948. In the years 1942 to 1946 he served in the United States Army. He was appointed instructor at St. Louis University, effective September, 1950.