An analysis of post-World War I efforts for permanent peace

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AN ANALYSIS OF POST-WORLD WAR I EFFORTS FOR PERMANENT PEACE

A Thesis Presented to the Faculty of The Los Angeles University of International Relations The University of Southern California

In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Foreign Service

■toy Conrado Beltran Seno June 19^2

UMI Number: EP58342

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T h i s thesis, w r i t t e n by

CONRADO BELTRAN SENO u n d e r the d i r e c t io n o f h i s . . F a c u l t y C o m m it t e e , a n d a p p r o v e d by a l l its m e m b e r s , has been presented to a n d accepted by the C o u n c i l on G r a d u a t e S t u d y a n d Research in p a r t i a l f u l f i l l ­ m e n t o f the re q u ire m e n ts f o r the degree o f

MASTER OF FOREIGN SERVICE

D ean

Secretary

rw, June, 1942

F a c u lty Com m ittee

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to take this opportunity to express sincerely a

special debt of gratitude he owes to the

following persons: to Miss Margaret Cressaty, head librarian of The Los Angeles University of International Relations Library, for her kind, gracious, and prompt assistance to the author in the course of his research; to Miss Adalia Haass, assistant librarian in the Sociology Department of the Los Angeles Public Library (Main Building), for similar reason; and last, but not least, to Dr, John Eugene Harley, chairman of the faculty committee assigned to this thesis, for his painstaking

efforts in smoothing out themany

awkward expressions

of the author as well as themany fine

suggestions and criticisms he made to him. Other names of those who have so kindly assisted the writer, in one way or another, should have been included here, but the list would be too long to attempt any enumera­ tion.

To all of them the author is greatly indebted, and is

profoundly appreciative of their helpful cooperation. Conrado Beltran Seno Los Angeles, California May 31$ 19^2.

DEDICATION This is heartily dedicated to the memory of my dearly beloved mother, Mrs. Juliana Beltran Seno, who, from my childhood, had constantly reminded me that the best thing a man can do in this flvale of tears14 is to love and fear God, first of all; next, to love my neighbor as myself and to render any possible service to him; and finally, to maintain, always, good understanding and friendly relations with all people.

TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER

PAGE

I. PLANS AND PROPOSALS BEFORE WORLD WAR I . . . .

1

Pre-Christian era peace plans and organizations

.........................

1

From the Roman Empire to the Congress of Vienna (1815)

3

Nineteenth to early twentieth century plans, congresses, and organizations • • . Conclusions II.

......................

11 23

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.................................

24

Proposals which led to the establishment of the League . .

...............

25

Peace organizations in different S t a t e s ...............................

26

Various drafts presented ................ The League s y s t e m The Covenant of the League of Nations

30

.

34

. .

34

The League in action as a means of preserving peace .......................

56

Achievements of the L e a g u e ..............

56

Failures of the L e a g u e ..................

64

Reasons for League failures

7^

............

iii CHAPTER III.

IV.

PAGE

OFFICIAL EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE INDEPENDENT OF THE LEAGUE 1920-1940......................

79

The Washington Conference of 1921-1922 • • •

80

The Geneva Naval

Conference of 1927

....

91

The London Naval

Conference of 1930

• • • •

94

The London Naval

Conference of 1935-1936

. .

101

Inter-American Conferences 1923-1940 . . . .

106

The Pact of Paris of 1928

120

THE ECONOMIC BASES FOR AN ENDURINGPEACE

. . .

127

The economic causes of w a r ................

127

The need for raw materials..............

150

Population pressure

152

....................

Commodity and investment markets • . . . .

153

Imperialism

154

Irredentism

. .........

Private munitions manufacturers

155 ........

Shipping rivalry . . . Tariff and other trade barriers

.

155 159

........

140

Causes of the second World W a r ..........

141

Importance of a stable international standard of exchange...............

144

Stable foreign exchange: a prerequisite to peaceful international economic relations

....................

144

iv CHAPTER

V.

PAGE Causes of exchange instability ............

147

Effects of exchange instability

148

..........

THE ECONOMIC BASES FOR AN ENDURING PEACE (cont i n u e d )................................

152

Efforts for monetary and economic reconstruction (1 9 1 9 -1 9 5 9 } ................

152

The Brussels Financial Conference

(1920)

152

The Geneva or World Economic Conference (1927)........................... . . The Ouchy Pact (1952)

....................

156 157

The London Monetary and Economic Conference (1955) The Oslo Agreement ( 1 9 5 7 ) ................

l6l

The Raw Materials C o m m i t t e e ..............

164

The Tripartite Agreement (1956)

168

The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program (1954 )

......................

Other post-War I economic endeavors

. . .

171

Proposals for future monetary reconstruc­ tion ...................................

174

Basis for a future stable international exchange................................

175

Fixed vs. flexible p a r i t y ................

184

V

CHAPTER

PAGE Importance of an international bank

. . .

1 87

Plans for future general economic 190

reconstruction........................ Access to, and distribution of, raw m a t e r i a l s .............................. More free t r a d e ...............

194

Future migration policy

..................

200

Disposition of colonies

..................

202

Joint development of backward areas

. . .

Summary and conclusion...................... VI.

THE

191

IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE

. . .

Peace through universal c o m m u n i s m ........

204 205 208 209

The background of c o m m u n i s m ..............

209

The Russian experiment....................

212

Result and significance of the Russian experiment..............................

214

Prospects of spreading communism In other

21

l a n d s .......................... Socialism as an instrument ofworld peace

.

Definitions of socialism..................

221 222

Distinction between communism and s o c i a l i s m ....................... Sources and varieties of socialism . . . . The socialists* case for p e a c e ............

225 225 227

vi CHAPTER

PAGE Prospects of realizing these claims

.

..

229

term ^regionalism” ...........

. . .

238

Types of regionalism...........

241

Definition and clarification of the

Limited geographical type of regionalism . Imperial type of regionalism-. . . .

..

250

The continental type of regionalism

..

251

The hemispheric type of regionalism

..

262

The ideological type of regionalism

..

263

The advantages of regionalism

VII.

246

.....

270

The disadvantages of regionalism . . . .

271

THE IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE ( c o n t i n u e d ).......................

277

World federation or union the ultimate solution to permanent world peace

....

277

Various advocates of world federation or union

. .

..........................

278

Differences between federation and confederation.....................

283

Representative plans .................... General summary and conclusion..... B I B L I O G R A P H Y ............................

300

285

CHAPTER I PLANS AND PROPOSALS BEFORE WORLD WAR I It has been said repeatedly that inventions are riot produced on the spur of the moment, hut are the results of long, gradual, and painstaking experimentation.

No inven­

tion is immediately found perfect, hut perfection is the sum total of innumerable improvements constantly appended to it. There is a great deal of truth in such a dictum as there is logic in the assertion that our present political institutions are the outcome of a long series of political evolution marked and marred by numerous recessions or retro­ gressions, advances or progressions, and finally culminating in what we now consider and accept as the best way of life in the political realm. Any analysis, therefore, of recent proposals and organizations for permanent peace will be incomplete without a brief resume of earlier peace proposals and organizations which are really their precursors. I.

PRE-CHRISTIAN ERA PEACE PLANS AND ORGANIZATIONS Starting from the ancient Grecian leagues and con­

federacies way back in the sixth century B.C., we find the

2 Peloponnesian League1 (550-500 B.C.) as the earliest known organization for the maintenance of peace in the then known civilized world.

This was later followed by the Delian

Confederacy2 organized in 477 B.C. under the hegemony of Athens.

Other Greek organizations for peace in this period

were: The Second Athenian Confederacy-^ of 577 B.C.j the 4 *5 Arcadian League of 571-0; the Aetolian League-' which began toward the close of the fourth century (B.C.); the Achean League^ of 568-146 B.C. which existed side by side with the Aetolian League and embraced, from the beginning, twelve city-states and later expanded to include some seventy citystates, including Sparta and Corinth.

It was probably the

longest-lived federal union and fIThe most highly developed political creation of the world before the rise of modern representative democracies such as those of Great Britain and the United S t a t e s . F i n a l l y there was the short-lived

1 G. W. Botsford. Hellenic History (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), PP. 98-100. 2 Ibid., pp. 196-97.

^ Ifrlfl*9 PP* 561-62. ^ Ibid., pp. 5 6 7 -6 8 . ^ rbid*> PP* 468-69. ^ Loc. cit. 7 Ibid., p. 470.

o

Olynthian Confederacy II.

of 549-348 B.C.

FROM THE ROMAN EMPIRE TO THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1815)

With the advent of Rome and the absorption of the Greeks by the Romans, international organizations or, shall we say, inter-city-state organizations for the preservation of peace ceased to exist.

Peace organizations were no

longer necessary, for under the mighty wings of the Roman Empire a fairly stable condition of peace, lasting as it actually did for five centuries,^ prevailed throughout the Roman world.

Thus was the justification for the well-known

and oft-quoted phrase, Pax Romana. However, with the fall of Rome in 476 A.D. at the handsof Attila and his Huns,

there ensued an era of war,

of

anarchy, of chaos which prevailed throughout the then known civilized world and lasted for over eight hundred years. Not until the advent of Charlemagne was some sort of order restored, but only to limited areas under his jurisdiction. Charlemagne1splan to realize nPAX TERRENA jugating all nations to a new Roman Empire”

by sub­

was merely the

® Ibid., pp. 5 8 5 -8 6 . • 9 George Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order (London: Constable & Co., Ltd., T93b), p. 7 . 10 Ibid., p. 8 .

consequence of proposals sponsored by famous poets and phi­ losophers such as Dante in his "De Monarchia"^ of 1314, Marsilius of Padua*s "Defensor Pacis"*^ of 1324, and finally Honore Bonnor*s uArbre de la Paix"-^ of 1330. In fact the only restraining force which prevented war of international magnitude under Charlemagne *s Empire was the Roman Catholic Church in which the Pope made himself judge and arbiter of conflicts between or among the Catholic princes and countries of Europe.

This prerogative of the

Pope was perhaps derived from Saint Augustine.

Saint

Augustine in his "Civitas Dei11 believed that the "Pope was invested with rights and duties of the supreme arbiter be­ tween peoples,11^

and that "his authority was to be uni-

versal. ,a5 hater came the most disputed plan of the Due de Sully so-called the "Grand Dessein" (Grand Design), but commonly 11

Dante, De Monarchia, III, 16, Church*s Tr., pp. 126-27. See J. E. Harley, Documentary Textbook (Los Angeles Suttonhouse, 1934), p. 6. For further idea on Dante*s plan for a unitary world ruled by one monarch, see De Monarchia, Book I, Chap. XV (Tr. by Aurelia Henry, Cambridge, 1904), P. 54. 12 Schwarzenberger, loc. cit. Loc. cit.

attributed to Henry IV of France.

uThe first reference to

this project is in a letter written to the king by Rosny in 1593. 11^

Harley, however, gave as the date of publication

“about 1 6 0 3 .11^

While on one hand many authors conceded the

“Grand Design“ as a “scheme for the organization of Europe11^ towards the preservation of peace in that continent, Herriot, on the other hand, considered it as “a warlike enterprise”^ designed “to wrest the German Empire from the House of Austria.“ /

Emeric Cruce,

20

a Frenchman, in his Le Nouveau Cynee

of 1623 proposed a continuous Congress of ambassadors repre­ senting all nations.

All disputes were to be settled by the

judgment of this congress.

Two years after the presentation

of Cruce*s plan, in 1625* Hugo Grotius^ wrote his Immortal

Edouard Herriot, The United States of Europe (Tr. by Reginald J. Dingle; New York: The Viking Press, 1930), P. 23. 17 Harley, op. cit., pp. 6-7. For inconsistencies in authorship of the Grand' Design and date of publication, purpose, et cetera, compare Herriot, op. cit., pp. 23-24; Schwarzenberger, o£. cit., p. 13; and E. Guy Talbott, “The Need for World Organization, 11 in World Affairs Interpreter, 11:290, October, 1940. 18 Harley, op. cit., p. 6 . ^

Herriot, op. cit., p. 23.

20

Harley, op. cit., p. 7 .

21

F. L. Schuman, International Politics (second edi­ tion; New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.,

6

treatise, De Jure Belli Ac Pacis, which later won for him not only renown, hut the honor of being designated as the ”father of international law.” Grotius heartily and profoundly supported inter­ national arbitration and conciliation as a means of restrict­ ing war and promoting peace.

He also believed in compelling

the disputant states to accept a fair settlement of their disputes.

He proposed a Congress of Christian Powers in

which any controversy arising among them was to be arbi­ trated by uninterested states with provisions to compel the parties to accept peace on the basis of fairness and equita­ bleness.

While Cruce^ wanted a permanent Congress to deal

with interstate controversies, Grotius believed that spe­ cially called congresses will suffice for the same purpose. William Penn came out in 1693-1694 with his An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe

22

whereby a

lfGeneral Dyet, Estates, or Parliament” was to be established

1937)9 PP* 41-42. Spe also Harley, op. cit., pp. 8-9* for a more complete resume of Grotius1 plan, as well as for useful references on the same. op William Penn, An Essay Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe,Hay the”Establishment of an European Dyet, Parliament or E s t at es (i6Q3)* re-edited 1915> p. b. See also Old South Leaflets, No. 75> or for a brief summary of important points in said proposal, see Harley, op. cit., pp. 9-10. Cf., William Penn, An Essay Toward the Present & Future Peace of Europe . . . (Boston: American Peace Society, 185717 a 21 page pamphlet.

in Europe with periodic meetings of the representatives of the sovereigns chosen in proportion to their revenues. The plan for the preservation of the peace of Europe was also included in the Treaty of Utrecht2^ of 1711.

It

provided for the use of the "common forces of the confeder­ ates11 against any state disturbing the "publik peace and tranquillity.tf Disputes were to he "amicably decided/1 hut . . . if amicable means should not succeed, then before the end of two months, or even sooner, . . . the common forces of the confederates . . . shall be united together . . . against the disturber . . . till there be an entire prospect or provision for renewing and secur­ ing the publik peace and tranquillity." Probably intended to preserve the status quo after the settlement at Utrecht, St. Pierre1s2^ plan of 171^ for a League of States was more or less all inclusive than the earlier plans.

He conceived the idea of na permanent offen­

sive and defensive alliance with the Mohammedan princes,11 but contrary to the principle embodied in Article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations over two hundred years

Complete History of the Treaty of Utrecht (London: A. Roper & S. Butler, 1715T7 I> 12b. See also Harley, op. cit., p. 10, for a more complete excerpt of the plan. 24 Loc. cit. 2^ St. Pierre, Pro .jet de Traite Pour Rendre la Paix Universelle (1713)> Art. I, in ¥. E. Darby,"“International Tribunals (190*0* PP. 10-21. See ^alsq. Schwarzenberger, bp. cit., pp. 13-14. Cf., Harleyfs resume, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

8

later, "according to Article IV of his plan, all changes, including peaceful changes, -were forbidden..

An interest­

ing part of the plan was the provision for the compulsory membership of states into the league after some fourteen states had voluntarily joined in. Considered by Achorn as "a disgruntled misfit" and nat worst an inspired madman,

Rousseau, who was the in­

spiration of the revolutionary French Democrats, came out in 28 1761 with his "jugement Sur la Paix Perpetuelle.w After criticizing St. Pierre1s plan for a strong union, he then proposed to have an indissoluble confederation of nineteen European States sitting in a permanent Diet with power to legislate for the confederation but powerless to change the constitution of the confederation itself unless agreed unanimously by all the members.

Any member disregarding the

decision rendered by the Diet on any dispute would be forced to accept it by the combined forces of all the other members. Perhaps one of the greatest and most successful

26

27

Schwarzenberger, 0£. cit., p. 13•

Erik Achorn, European Civilization and Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938'}"* p. 22. 28 Darby, op. cit., pp. 104-21. Cf., J. J. Rousseau, A Lasting Peace Through the Federation of Europe & the State of War . .“ (Tr. by C. E. Vaughn; London: ConstaBle, 19l7)• See also Harley, op. cit., pp. 11-12, for a summary of the main features of the plan.

9 attempts toward the unification of states (though in this particular case it is now commonly considered as purely local in scope) by the establishment of a strong centralized federal government, up to this time, was the American Con­ stitutional Convention of 1 7 8 7 .

The wisdom and foresight of

the leaders of that convention--particularly of Washington, Franklin, Madison (considered by many as the father of the American Constitution), Hamilton, and many others— in chang­ ing the Articles of Confederation, which for over half a decade of operation had amply demonstrated its weakness and ineffectiveness, paved the way to the founding, not of many petty and weak independent states, but of one great "United States of America" destined to become the mightiest, most democratic, and richest country on earth as we know it today. Samuel Adams, a distinguished citizen of Massachu­ setts, strongly urged in his instruction to the state’s delegates in Congress . . . to move the United States . . . to take into . . . consideration . . . through their influence with such of the nations in Europe, with whom they are united by Treaties of Amity and Commerce, that National Differ­ ences may be settled and determined, without the neces­ sity of war. . . .29 The Jay Treaty of 1794, termed by Bailey as

29

Massachusetts Court, Senate Report, No. 94 (1 8 3 7 ). See Harley, c>p. cit., p. 12, for a more complete excerpt.

10 “Hamilton1s Treaty,

was perhaps the most unpopular treaty

ever concluded by the United States up to that time.

How­

ever, many years later, it turned out to be of great sig­ nificance, at least in international relations, for it marked the beginning of pragmatic international arbitration. According to Bailey, “. . . the impetus it [international arbitration]' received from Jay*s Treaty was so great that modern arbitration is generally dated from the ratification of this pact.11^1 Immanuel Kant, “who is generally considered the greatest of modern philosophers . . .

and perhaps the

last of pre-nineteenth century philosophers to offer a con­ structive plan for a world order on the basis of practical politics, asserted in his Essay on Eternal Peace, published in 1 7 9 5 * that “the establishment of perpetual peace to take the place of those mere suspensions of hostility called treaties of peace, is not a mere chimera, but a problem • • t

r«33

Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American People (New York: P. S. Crofts & Co., ltPfO), p . 64. See also pp. 6 5 -6 6 for interesting account of the unpopu­ larity of the Jay Treaty in the United States and how Jay was derided and burned in effigy nightly. 51 Ibid., p. 6 5 . Achorn, 0£. cit., p. 2 6 . 33

Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, a Philosophic Essay

11 A few of the cardinal points of his plan include a loose dissoluble confederation on a representative basis, and a permanent international congress acting as a court to adjudge any controversy between or among the states.

He

also wanted to abolish all standing armies, if not, forbid the hiring and selling of troops, and prohibit the inter­ ference by force in the internal affairs of any government. Lastly, but rather the most significant of all, he proposed a dual citizenship,

a world citizenship as well as a

national citizenship. III.

NINETEENTH TO EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY FLANS, CONGRESSES, AND ORGANIZATIONS

A few years before the publication of Kant1s notable essay, the French nation was in the throes of the bloody French Revolution.

Three years earlier, on April 20, 1792,^

the King of France formally declared war on Austria. began . . .

“Thus

a struggle that was to last for twenty-three

years . . .”35 an(j finally ending at “Waterloo. “

(published in 1795; Tr. by Benjamin F. Trueblood; Boston: The American Peace Society, 1897)• See also Essay on Eternal Peace (World Peace Foundation, 1914). AlsoTound in Harley, op. cit., pp. 15-14. ^ T. W. Riker, Modern Europe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935) > P*. 3061 ^

Loc. cit.

12 After "twenty-three years*1 of warfare In which most of Europe was involved, then came the most famous of nine36 teenth century congresses, the Congress of Vienna^ of 1815 which marked the beginning of international cooperation among the European Powers.

From this date on a series of

congresses and conferences^? took place with the sole purpose of preserving the peace of Europe.

Among the nota­

ble ones of these congresses which immediately followed the Congress of Vienna were: Aix-la-Chapelle (1818),^ Troppau (1820),^ Laibach (1821),^ and Verona (1822).^ The above congresses were made possible only by the ko joint consent of the four major powers, then in a final coalition against Napoleon I, who formed the Quadruple

Achorn, op. cit., pp. 6 7 -6 9 , gives a good account of the Congress of Vienna, the "Congress that never met.11 See also Hazen, Thayer, and Lord, Three Peace Congresses.of the Nineteenth Century; also C. K. Webster, The Congress of Vienna; and E. B. Mowat, A History of European Diplomacy, I8i5- 1 9 i 4 .

:

~

37 F. S. Dunn, The Practice and Procedure of Inter­ national Conferences (London: Oxford University Press, 1929)? gives a distinction between conferences and congresses as formerly used. p. 89.

3& Hiker, op. cit., pp. 339-90. —

Cf., Achorn, op. cit., ” “

39 Riker, op. cit., p. 391. Loc. cit. in

Loc. cit.

Cf., Achorn, op. cit., p. 90.

42 The powers were Austria, Prussia, Russia, and England.

13 Alliance^ of l8l4 (l8l5?) “under the influence of Castlereagh, whereby they pledged themselves after the conclusion of peace with Prance to guarantee its permanence, and to supply a specified contingent to meet any future attack by M2i2i

Prance.

This Quadruple Alliance which is known also

later as the “Concert of Europe” (“a dictatorship of the Great Powers” as Professor Hiker put it) was designed, so the powers hoped, to establish an enduring peace, or--as Castlereagh called it— a “just equilibrium” on the Continent of Europe.

Consequently for thirty-eight years after the Congress of Vienna, peace prevailed in Europe. ous previous occasions, the

«

However, as in numer-

Balance-of-Power

2j.r

^ principle

is practicable only, as a peace preserver, as long as a

quasi-perfect equilibrium prevails.

But once this seemingly-

^3 Hiker, op. cit., pp. 384-92, gives a full treatment of the Quadruple Alliance, l»e,, its origin, accomplishments, failures, and final collapse. Note: Riker gave November 2 0 , 1815, as date of signing of the treaty, while Harley gave March 1, l8l4, as the date. For text of the treaty, see Harley, op. cit., pp. 16-17. ^ Riker, op. cit., p. 3 8 6 . hfr ^ Schuman, op. cit., pp. 44-64, gives a more complete exposition of the principle of the Balance-of-Power. See also S. C. Vestal, The Maintenance of Peace (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 19207,"Chaps. 10-15,“18., 22-24, 26-31, and 42. Also Carl J. Friedrich, Foreign Policy in the Making (New York: ¥. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 15387V PP. llo-59.

14 perfect equipoise of power becomes apparent and is destroyed, turmoil is likely to ensue.

On this point Professor Schuman

Clearly and precisely stated: If sovereignty is the mast to which the sails of mod­ ern statecraft are attached, the principle of the bal­ ance of power is the wind which drives the vessel over the stormy seas of international politics. The one has become the central concept of national political organi­ zation and of international law. The other has become the most important single pattern of political action in the international arena. . . .46 Then he continued: In Its elementary form . . . the balance-of-power principle is designed not to preserve peace or to con­ tribute toward international understanding, as later rationalizations would have it, but simply to maintain the independence of each unit of a State System by pre­ venting any one unit from so increasing its power as to threaten the rest.47 Other notable congresses aside from those already hO mentioned above were the Congress of Paris of 1 8 5 8 , which 49 ended the Crimean War of 1853> and The Congress of Berlin of 1 8 7 8 , which concluded the Russo-Turkish War of 1877• Besides the already cited congresses, there were also con­ ferences convened from time to time both in Europe and the 46

Schuman, op. cit., p. 44. rbld., p. 45.

48 Achorn, op. cit., p. 134, has a complete account of the Congress. See also Hazen, Thayer, and Lord, loc. cit., and Mowat, loc. cit. 49 ^ Achorn, op. cit., pp. 5 8 5 -8 6 . Also Hazen, et al., loc. cit.

15 Americas. Prominent among those held in Europe were the confer­ ences sponsored by the Holy Alliance^0 which for some time existed side hy side with the Quadruple Alliance and had caused no small amount of alarm or anxiety to the United States.

Both alliances were made up of practically the same

alignment of powers except in the Holy Alliance where Eng­ land refused to partake. In the Americas, periodic 51 conferences were held by the American Republics.

Although the idea is traceable back

52

to Henry Clay-'

53

and Simon Bolivar, ^ nevertheless, the First 54 Pan-American Conference was not convened until October 2,

5° Achorn, og. cit., pp. 83-84; Riker, op. cit., pp. 3 8 7 -8 8 ; and Harley, op. cit., pp. 14-16, for the text of the

Alliance. 51 The following are the places and years in which the Pan-American Conferences were held: Washington, D.C., 1889; Mexico City, 1901-1902; Rio de Janeiro, 1906; Buenos Aires, 1910; Santiago, 1923; Havana, 1928; Montevideo, 1955; Lima, 1958. (Source: Bailey, op. cit., p. 445 n.) 52 Ibid., pp. 195-96.

53 Loc. cit., has a good account of Bolivar. Cf., W. A. Reid, Storyoof the Pan American Union, Its Origin and Its Services to the Republics of the Western World, 1924. See also Harley, op. cit., pp."T 7 -T9 . 54 Note: The name was changed from International Bureau of the American Republics to Pan American Union by the Fourth International Conference of American Republics held in Buenos Aires on July-August, 1910. (For publication issued before that date, see International Bureau of the American Republics, Washington, D.C.)

1889.^

The agenda for this first memorable meeting were as

follows: (1) Measures to preserve peace and promote prosperity (2) the formation of a customs union; (3 ) improvement of communication; (4) uniform customs regulations; (5 ) uni­ form system of weights and measures; (6) laws to protect patents, copyrights, and trade marks; (7 ) extradition; (8) adoption of a common silver coin; (9) erection of adequate machinery for arbitrating disputes.56 Although nothing much was accomplished in this first meeting, nevertheless, it paved the way to other future con­ ferences which resulted not only in cementing the relations of the American Republics but also in promoting greater and closer collaboration among them. If the Pan-American Conferences were instrumental in promoting and paving the way to the amicable relationships of the Republics of the Western Hemisphere, as well as in preserving the peace of the Americas, there were also other conferences elsewhere which outranked them in their services to the world and humanity in general. Outstanding among these conferences were the Hague Conferences. 57 Twenty-six states sent representatives to

The date of the calling of the First Pan-American Conference was at first set by Blaine in l88l, but later canceled due to sudden change in administration and Blaine*s subsequent resignation. 56 Bailey, op. cit., p. 44^ n. ^ A. P. Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences (Cam­ bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969T* See "also Alfred

17 cQ the First Hague Conference of 1899» and forty-four were represented in the Second^^ in 1907.

Although the attempt

to limit armaments and compulsory arbitration failed, due chiefly to the opposition of Germany; nevertheless, the rules of international law were codified; the launching of projectiles from balloons and the like was outlawed, as was the use of poison gases of all sorts and dumdum bullets; and provision was made for the creation of a panel of judges who might be asked to arbitrate international disputes. In addition to the above-mentioned congresses and conferences, there was also a considerable amount of offi­ cial cooperation seeking to limit the possibilities of con­ flict.

This was accomplished through the so-called Public

International Administrative Unions, 1.e., The European Com­ mission of the Danube^ (1 8 5 6 ), The Rhine River Commission, the Congo River Commission, the Elbe River Commission, the Oder River Commission, the Straits Commission; the Inter-

Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law (London: Macmillan.& Co., Ltd., 1$39)> Chap. X, pp. 102-18. Harley, op. cit., pp. 23-24, gives a complete account of the conventions and declarations. See also B. Scott, The Hague Conventions and Declarations of 1899 & 1907 (New York: Oxford University iPress^ 1915). Harley for further Bibliography. 59 Harley, op. cit., pp. 26-27. Schuman, op. cit., p. 185.

£Ti national Telegraphic Union

(1 8 5 6 ); the Monetary Union of

hat in States^ (1 8 6 5 ) and the Scandinavian Monetary Union^ (1873); the Copyright Union^ (1874); the Universal Postal Union*^ (1874); the Telegraph Union^ (1875); the Inter­ national Bureau of Weights and

M e a s u r e s ^

(1 8 7 5 ); the Patent

Union^ (I8 8 3 ); the Railway Tariff Union^ (1 8 9 0 ); the Customs Tariff Union^0 (1 8 9 0 ).

These and many others^ not

listed here including the neutralization of various states, Switzerland, Belgium, and Luxemburg; the Geneva Con­ vention of 1864 which created the Red Cross Society; and a host of others operated in the direction toward international

^ 62

63 64

iSiS*

9

P*

Achorn, op. cit., p. 5 6 5 . hoc. cit.

hoc. cit. schuman, op. cit., p. 1 8 7 .

DO

6T ^

Achorn, loc. cit. Schuman, op. cit., p. 1 8 9 . Achorn, loc. cit.

69 Id°£- cit» h°e • cit. Paul S. Reinsch, Public International Unions (Boston Ginn and Company, 1911), has listed some f'orty-five such organization. Besides, some two dozens of other organiza­ tions are listed in the Handbook of International Organiza­ tions published by the League of Nations. These are the ones outside the League of Nations.

cooperation, understanding, and peace. Many private international unions or unofficial agencies were also working directly or indirectly toward the elimination of international friction and the maintenance of peace.

The most outstanding of these is the Institute of

International Law (1873)* as well as notable individuals such as Bentham and Ladd. Jeremy Bentham, 72 following the footsteps of the two vanguards of radical thought, Voltaire and Rousseau, and him­ self ,lthe great theorist of nineteenth-century liberalism and prophet of utilitarianism,11^

proposed a plan, which, to

date, is the subject of discussion and the source of inspira­ tion, not only to internationally minded economists, but also to all lovers of international peace. / / « A resume of the essential points of Bentham1s Plan for an Universal and Perpetual Peace,M as embodied in his Principles of International Law (1 7 8 6 -8 9 )* is given by Professor Schuman in the following manner: Jeremy Bentham, who was apparently the first to use the word international1; 1 in 1780, followed Rousseau1s footsteps. He argued that war, which he defined as 72 Achorn, op. cit., pp. 22-23* gives a brief account of Bentham himself and his works. 73 Ibid., p. 22. In next sentence on same page, Achorn said that nBentham did not originate the doctrine which is inseparably connected with his name, but his in­ domitable energy erected it into a world-shaking system.11

20 “mischief on the greatest scale,11 can he prevented hy defensive alliances, general guarantees, disarmament, and the abandonment of colonial imperialism. By agree­ ment the forces of the several nations comprising the European System are to be reduced and fixed and the distant dependencies of each State are to be emancipated. Secret diplomacy and the deeper causes of war must be eliminated and conditions must be created appropriate to the establishment of a tribunal of peace with power to enforce its decisions on refractory States. Tariff bar­ riers, bounties, and colonies must alike be abolished.74 Two years after the publication of Bentham*s plan in 1838,

75

William Ladd, a New Hampshire sea captain, published

Essay on a Congress of Nations.^

This work was proba­

bly the result of the encouragement given by “various inter­ national prize-essay contests . . . held in the 1830*3.“ The idea which he ingeniously conceived was to call a “Con­ gress of Nations11 to be . . . composed of ambassadors from all those Chris­ tian or civilized nations who should concur in the measure, each nation having one vote, however numerous may be the ambassadors sent to the convention. This convention would organize themselves^ into a Congress of Nations, by adopting such regulations and by-laws as might appear expedient to the majority. . . .77 Peace societies, scientific organizations, and

^ Schuman, op. cit., pp. 181-82. Harley, op. cit., p. 1 9 , has also a good summary of the plan. 75

Loc. cit.

76

■ William Ladd, An Essay on a Congress of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, l$lb;. ^ Lbid., p. 9. See also Harley, £p. cit., pp. 19-20, for a more complete summary of the essential points of Ladd*s plan.

21 otherwise, also developed which held both national and inter­ national conferences from time to time with a view to bring­ ing together men and women of all nationalities in a mutual cooperation for the furtherance of universal peace.

Among

such early "peace societies" were the British "Society for the Promotion of Permanent and Universal Peace" founded in 1816 shortly after the Napoleonic Wars.

Religious leaders

played no less important role in this early movement.

It

was the view of these early religious leaders that Christi­ anity and war were incompatible, which by no stretch of the imagination still holds true to the more "modern" Christians. In the United States the three American societies were later consolidated into the "American Peace Society" in 1 8 2 8 . Other groups of similar or identical purpose appeared also in The Netherlands, Switzerland, and Prance. So interested were these peace societies in their work that the First General Peace Convention was convened in London in 1843.

This was followed six years later by the

Second Congress at Paris in 1849.

Then almost yearly, one

Congress followed after the other in succession: at Frank­ fort in I8 5 0 , at London in 1851* and at Manchester and Edinburgh in 1853.

However, with the occurrence of hos­

tilities both in Europe and America in the middle of the nineteenth century, the first period of the modern peace movement had to lay dormant for the duration of the conflict.

22 The second period of the movement vas said to reap­ pear on or around 1867 when the tfLigue de la Paix" was established in Paris,

Old societies were reorganized and

revitalized, and new ones were founded,

A new impetus was

supplied by the socialists and humanitarian groups; the entire movement was no longer ecclesiastically dominated. Attention was now focused on disarmament and the unification of all Europe,

The end of the Franco-Prussian War increased

by leaps and bounds the number of peace organizations.

New

demands were made for the arbitration of international dis­ putes,

As of the first period, international congresses

found their way into the various centers of the world.

The

whole movement became world-wide in extent, but received less and less support from religious organizations.

In the

year of the First Hague Conference, the movement was greatly enlarged and strengthened by the enlistment once more of the support of the churches.

The movement has steadily gained

world-wide support and renown as to influence the govern­ mental policies of even the leading states.

Further

strength was added to the movement by the founding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 1897 > and still later by the establish­ ment of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in 1910.

In 1914 the "World Alliance for International Fellow­

ship Through the Churches11 was organized.

In this same year

(1914) some one hundred and thirty organizations in twenty-

25 six states were in operation. IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Thus, as is clearly indicated in the foregoing brief analysis, precedents of previous peace organizations of all sorts were not lacking.

Prom the dawn of early Hellenic

history of inter-city-state relations to the early twentieth century, men and women of all races and nationalities have worked constantly with ever-increasing interest, either indi­ vidually or collectively, officially or unofficially, toward the attainment of a better world understanding and coopera­ tion. Despite the bloody World War I, which intervened to mar their hard-earned initial successes in reaching their objective, and notwithstanding the temporary disorganization and restriction in their efforts toward peace in the course of the said war; nevertheless, their undying devotion to the ideal of an effective cooperation among all peoples for the preservation of peace has kept their minds and hearts continuously open and ready, when the proper time comes, to show the way and facilitate the founding of the greatest experiment (so far) ever undertaken by human political ingenuity for a universal interstate collaboration for the preservation of peace as ultimately embodied in the organi­ zation of the League of Nations.

CHAPTER II THE LEAGUE OF RATIONS AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY Without an iota of doubt, no assiduous student of history will ever conclude that the idea embodied in the League of Nations is the outcome of an overnight delibera­ tion by an individual or a group of individuals working together in quest of a solution for the establishment and preservation of an enduring peace. Many authors as well as publicists will surely sup­ port the above contention.

To quote C. K. Webster on this

point: The principles upon which the League of Nations is based are not new. They have been part of the content of the aspirations of humanity for a long period. The great empires of the ancient world were considered as embracing all civilized peoples in one law and govern­ ment. Many religions have stressed the interdependence of all adherents, whatever their race or nationality. Christianity, especially, considered all believers as in a sense members of one body and in theory recognized no division of colour or clime. The idea of world unity, even if it did not include the further parts of Asia with which only uncertain contacts could be maintained, extended to all Europe and the lands surrounding the Mediterranean. While war and conquest were not abol­ ished, the theory if not the practice of common institu­ tions was maintained between all members of the Chris­ tian civilization. 1 Although Professor Schuman conceded that the late

C. K. Webster, The League of Nations in Theory and Practice (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1953), p. 11.

25 President Wilson had much to do with the writing of the Covenant of the League, nevertheless, he is also prompt in admitting that the “League was the work of the long line of Utopian theorists.11 We may quote him at length in this regard: The League of Nations may he regarded as having been founded, by America*s war President. If it was not his invention . . . it was at any rate the project upon which he, more than any of the contemporary statesmen, had set his heart. He played a large part in writing into the Covenant the ideas of others and the experience of the past. He insisted emphatically, moreover, upon the creation of the League at the Peace Conference and upon the incorporation of the Covenant into the peace treaties. Had it not been for his active leadership, it is quite possible that the League would not have been established. In a broader sense, however, the League was the work of the long line of Utopian theorist. . . . It was a synthesis of the ideas of many people in many lands and it embodied into a single structure all of the past experience of the States of the world in establish­ ing and maintaining international organizations. That experience was supplemented by the efforts of the Allied Governments during the war to work out methods of joint action for the purpose of coordinating their activities in the fields of shipping, food supplies, munitions, and military affairs. The League was not, then, the creation of a single man or of a.single generation of men, but was the culmination of a long process of practical and theoretical preparation for the building of an enduring structure of cooperation between States.2 I.

PROPOSALS WHICH LED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OP THE LEAGUE It is not the object of this study to trace in detail

^ F. L. Schuman, International Politics (second edi­ tion; New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1937), PP. 192-93. -

26 the multifarious schemes, proposals, and organizations actively at work, in various countries, for the establish­ ment of some sort of an organization to maintain peace after the war (1914-1913).

Several books have already been writ­

ten to this effect, and international relations libraries are replete with materials on the same subject.

However,

as an integral part of this survey, it is of paramount im­ portance to include briefly the cardinal points which led to the founding of the Covenant. Peace organizations in different States.

In the

United States, immediately after the outbreak of the great­ est of hostilities ever witnessed by supposedly civilized men up to that time, there was a great popular interest in the possibilities of a League.

This interest grew tremen­

dously during the years of American neutrality.

A group of

eminent public officials, participated in by leading person­ ages in the Republican party, founded the tfLeague to Enforce Peace.n

The late, illustrious, jurist-politician ex-

President William H. Taft headed the group.

A conference

in Independence Hall, Philadelphia, was held by the said organization in June, 1915.

A four-point-^ program was

For the complete text of the four-point program of the League to Enforce Peace and its purpose, see J. E. Harley, Documentary Textbook on International Relations (Los Angeles: Suttonhouse, 1934), pp. 35-33. See also Florence

adopted by the conference which received, later, world-wide publicity.

The principal points of the program were: the

submission to arbitration of all disputes between or among the States; the submission to a council of conciliation of all other differences; the employment of both military and economic sanctions by all States against any State resorting to armed force without first submitting its disputes to pacific settlement; and finally, the convening of periodical congresses to codify the law of nations.

This program is

rather reminiscent of the Hague arbitration

system and the

Bryan "cooling-off period” or "moratorium for war."^

Of

course one essential element was added, namely, the use of military and economic sanctions. In another conference held by the "League to Enforce Peace," at Washington, in May, 1916, many prominent leaders of the organization were present.

Among the notable

speakers participating, to mention only a few, were: Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,^ Secretary of War Baker, and President

Wilson, The Origins of the League Covenant (London: The Hogarth Press, 192b), Appendix D, pp. 145-47. 4 A. P. Higgins, The Hague Conferences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909}. e; A. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law 1918-1935 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1939)> Chap. XI on "The Taft, and Bryan Treaties," pp..119-33* ^ It is interesting to note that at this conference,

28 Wilson himself. Besides the League to Enforce Peace, there were also other active organizations in the United States.

The most

outstanding one, second only to the League to Enforce Peace, Q

was the “League of Free Nations Association“

founded in New

York as an organization of more liberal minded individuals than those in the League to Enforce Peace.

However, both

organizations were in close cooperation with one another in achieving their common objective later embodied in the League of Nations Covenant which readily received their endorsement. As in the United States, so in other countries^ such as Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Holland, to mention only the more prominent ones, peace organizations

Senator Lodge “exhibited much more enthusiasm for a league of nations than did President Wilson.n Schuman, op. cit., p. 194. ^ For a more complete account of this conference, .i.e., the personages present, extracts of some of the speeches of eminent public officials including Lodge and Wilson, see ibid., pp. 193-94. o

The League of Free Nations Association was, after the war, renamed the “New York Foreign Policy Association. 11 9 * For plans advocated by Belgian, Dutch, French, German, and Norwegian writers, see F. Nansen, at al., The Nations and the League (London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1$20). A good discussion of unofficial Scandinavian plans may be found in S. Shepard Tones, The Scandinavian States and the League of Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 2 6 -5 5 , 4j5-46. A good description and comment on various Continental plans for peace may be obtained in Theodore Marburg, Development of the League of Nations Idea (New York: Macmillan Co., 193277 TT7 TW-75, 777, 785, W 7 and 7 8 6 -8 9 .

29 were at work, although in a somewhat restrained manner, in­ fluencing both governmental leaders and the general public in regard to their own respective views toward peace. Both the nBritish League of Nations Society11 the “Fabian Society”

and

were at work in England marshalling

peace sentiment behind the idea of a league, with the noted political scientist and statesman, James Bryce, and the great liberal writer, George Bernard Shaw, taking the initiative in their respective groups. Under the able leadership of M. Leon Bourgeois,

12

a

League of Nations Society was likewise founded in France.

A good account of “The British League of Nations Society” and its program may be found in the scholarly re­ port of.Lord Phillimore as reproduced in Appendix D of Wilson, op. cit., pp. 144-45. 11

Ibid., pp. 147-55, gives a good account of the activities of the “Fabian Society.” Note also that in same book, proposals of.other organizations are being treated, i.e., fThe Union of Democratic Control, 11 pp. 155-56; and 'lrTHe Organization Centrale pour une Paix Durable, 1 pp. 1 5 6 -5 7 . The plan of the Fabian Society is given by.L. S. Woolf, The Framework of a Lasting Peace (London: G. Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 191777 pp. 91-125. Ip Leon Bourgeois (1851-1925) was France 1 representa­ tive at the “Two Hague Conferences, 1899 and 1907. * He was also nominated a member of the Permanent Court of Arbitra­ tion in 19059 and was the leading delegate of France in the Council and Assembly of the League until 1924. He received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1920. The program of the French Association for a League of Nations is given in Marburg, op. cit., II, 822-24; that of the Italian League of Free Nations is given on pp. 824-28.

30 Almost in perennial fear of an outside attack, the French group put emphasis on the necessity of military sanctions and collective security against any foreign invader. Even Germany was not to he left behind.

There, a

similar organization was established -under the leadership of M. Erzberger. 13 ^ Other organizations were also appearing in neutral countries. Various drafts presented.

Among the various drafts

presented before and at the Paris Peace Conference were: Lord Robert Cecil fs draft1**’ in 1916 which was submitted to the British Foreign Office; the “interim and Final Reports of the Phillimore

Committee,

^

March 20 and July 3 9 1918“;

the “Draft Covenant1*1^ which was used as a basis for dis­ cussion by the commission on the League of Rations; Lord 13 For the text of Erzberger1s plan, see M. Erzberger, The League of Rations: The Way to the World 1s Peace (English translation by Bernard Miall; New York: Holt & Co., 1919). 14 Wilson, op. cit., Appendix C, pp. 112-13> contains the Cecil draft. See also David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant (Hew York: G. P. Putnamfs Sons, 1928), Vol. I, ChapT I on “Early Drafts, 11 pp. 3-1?. 15

Wilson, op. cit., Appendix D, pp. 114-72. Rote: The following reports were included: Interim Report of March 20, 1918, pp. 114-20; Annex Draft Convention, pp. 120-26; Final Report, pp. 126-38; Recent Schemes of Federation, pp. 139-72. See also Zimmern, op. cit., pp. 180-89. For the Phillimore Draft, see Miller, op. cit., II, 3-6, for the text. Wilson, op. cit., Appendix E, pp. 173-80.

31 Robert Cecil 1s1^ plan for a “League of Nations**; General 13 Smutsr plan for a “League of Nations*'; the “Draft Adopted by the French Ministerial Commission for the League of N a t i o n s ' * t h e "Draft Scheme for the Constitution of the League of Nations"

20

as presented by the Italian delegation;

and finally, "Avant-Projet De Convention Relative L Une /

/

Organisation Juridique Internationale, Elabore Par Les Trois Comit/s Par Les Gouvernements De Suede, De Danemark Et De Norv^ge.

Besides these, as listed by Florence Wilson in

her Appendices, other drafts are also dealt with by David Hunter Miller in his The Drafting of the Covenant, in two volumes. 22 For instance, in his Chapter II he treated of

^ 9 PP« 181-85. See also Miller, op. cit., I, 51-64, for comments, and II, 61-64, for the text. 18

Wilson, op. cit., pp. 184-88. See also Miller, op. cit., I, 54-39* for comments, and II, 23-60, for the text. For a very interesting analysis of Smuts 1 plan and its divergence from the Foreign Office Memorandum, see Zimmern, op. cit., pp. 2 1 0 -1 5 . ^9 Wilson, op. cit., Appendix H, pp. 189-98. 20 21

Ibid., Appendix I, pp. 199-210.

Ibid., Appendix J, pp. 211-55. quoted exactly.) 22

(Note: This is

D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, 2 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam1s Sons, 1928J7 Vol. I is merely commentary, while Vol. II contains the full texts of the different drafts presented.

32 the "American Suggestion";2^ Chapter IV of "Wilson*s Second and Third Drafts";2^ Chapter VI of "The Hurst-Miller D r a f t " ; a n d finally, Chapter VII of "Wilson*s Fourth Draft . " 26 As a compendium of the various drafts presented, per­ haps it is worth our while to quote Schuman*s precise re­ capitulation of the various drafts considered which led to the Hurst-Miller draft which, in turn, later became the basis for discussion by the "Commission on the League of 07

Nations"

at the Paris Peace Conference.

Schuman*s account

follows: By this time numerous plans for a league, both offi­ cial and unofficial, had been put forward. In March, 1918, a committee of the British Foreign Office, with Lord Phillimore as its chairman, had prepared a draft convention for the creation of a league. Three months later, Colonel House, President Wilson*s confidential adviser, prepared another draft on the basis of Wilson*s own ideas. In July of 1918 Wilson typed out his own first draft. In December General Smuts of South Africa proposed a plan containing the germs of the Council and the Mandate System. At the same time Lord Robert Cecil

^

^ 1* 18-33*

Oil

.

See Vol. II for the text.

Ibid., I, 40-50, for comments; and Vol. II, pp. 65-93* ^op second draft, and pp. 9 8 -IO5 for the third draft. 25 Ibid., I, 65-71; and II, 6 5 8 -6 7 . Ibid., I, 72-75; and II, 145-54. 2^ For descriptions of the composition of this commis­ sion, its duties, et cetera, see Wilson, op. cit., pp. xixii, Cf., Harley, op. cit., pp. j51-j52.

33

prepared a new draft on the basis of the Phillimore re­ port. Wilson prepared his second draft on January 10, 1919* and his third draft ten days later to submit to the Peace Conference. Meanwhile the British delegation to the conference had combined the Cecil and Smuts drafts into an official British draft of January 20, 1919. Since the third Wilson draft and the British draft diverged at a number of points, they were sub­ mitted to Cecil Hurst, legal adviser of the British delegation, and to David Hunter Miller of the American delegation, for revision. The result was the composite Hurst-Miller draft of February 3* 1919, which was used as a basis for discussion by the League of Nations Com­ mission of the Peace C o n f e r e n c e . 2 8

pq

After ten ^ meetings of the Commission on the League of Nations, the first draft of the covenant was ready. r,This was presented at the Plenary session, February 14th, by President Wilson, and was unanimously a c c e p t e d . F i v e ■31

more^

meetings were held after the unanimous acceptance of

the tentative draft of the covenant and its subsequent pub32 lication to "provoke11 criticisms. Ultimately, after some

28 Schuman, op. cit., p. 197* 29

For complete commentary of the first ten meetings of the Commission, see Miller, op. cit., Chaps. XI-XVIII inclusive, and Chaps. XX-XI. 30 ^ Wilson, op. cit., p. xii. For the text of the Pre­ liminary Draft, see Harley, og. cit., pp. 52-61. For the other texts, i.je., The American Plan for a League of Nations; Supplementary Agreements; Composite Draft for a League of Nations, et cetera, see ibid., pp. 3 8 -52. Miller, op. cit., I, Chaps. 25-27 and 32-33. A good chart of the genesis of the League Covenant is repro­ duced by Schuman, op. cit., p. 198. The various criticisms and subsequent changes which resulted from the publication of the first draft is treated by Miller, op. cit., I, Chap. 23.

34 changes of the first draft, “the final draft was presented at the Plenary Session of April twenty-eighth, 1919, and was unanimously adopted.11

The necessary process of treaty

making completed between the victors and the vanquished, “on, January 10, 1920, the League of Nations came officially into existence with the deposit at the Quai d !0rsay of eighteen ratifications of the Treaty of Versailles.11^ II.

THE LEAGUE SYSTEM

The Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Covenant

of the League of Nations, ^ as finally drafted and ratified, ■55

contained a preamble and twenty-six articles-'

which became

a sort of a universal constitution for the League of Nations created under it. It is not the province of this study to analyze, in a more comprehensive manner, the significance of each of the 33

Wilson, op. cit., pp. xii-xiii.

(Quoted exactly.)

34 ^ Schuman, op. cit., p. 199. 33 The full text of the Covenant of the League may be " found in the following: Harley, oj). cit., pp. 61-73; Schuman, op. cit., pp. 751-59; Wilson, op. cit., pp. 17-103; Zimmern, op. cit., see appendix; Davis, o£. cit., pp. 762-73; E. Achorn, European Civilization and Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1938), pp. 7b9-77; ©1 cetera. 36 ^ For a precise and concise analysis of the origin, reason for having each article of the Covenant, et cetera, see Wilson, o j d . cit . , pp. 17-103.

55 twenty-six articles.

However, a concise treatment of the

few pertinent ones may he made. Roughly speaking, the first seven articles deal with membership and structure of the League; while Articles 8-21 have to do with the League as an agency to keep the peace of the world; and finally, Articles 22-25 make the League an agency of international cooperation. It is of interest to note, and to analyze further, as briefly as possible, some of the relevant articles of the Covenant.

For instance, Article 5 gives rise to the unanimity 37 rule which, later, became the source of weakness of the League; Article 8 has to do with the intricate prob38 Article 10 became the source of con­ lem of disarmament;^ troversy among the States regarding the question of definition and test of aggression. 39 In the United States the

37 This will be discussed further in this chapter in connection with the discussion on the failure of the League. 38 The question of disarmament will be treated in this chapter. 39 For St. PierreTs definition of an aggressor and the test of aggression, see Davis, op. cit., pp. 84-85. See also Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, Articles 1 and 4 for a more modern attempt to define an aggressor. The “Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes11 (socalled Geneva Protocol of 1924) attempted to classify aggression under six headings, which is summarized by Davis, op. cit., p. 1 5 8 . See ibid., Appendix L, pp. 774-84, for text. It is also given in Harley, op. cit., pp. 403-13. Ibid., pp. 5 8 6 -8 9 * also gives the text of “Convention Defin­ ing Aggression“ signed at London, July 3* 1933. See also

36 same Article became one of the stumbling blocks

4o

on

Senatorial ratification of the Treaty of Versailles,

Arti­

cle 11 makes Many war or threat of war , . , a matter of concern to the whole League. . . .“

Article 12 provides for

the submission of “any dispute . . .

to arbitration or judi­

cial settlement. . . . ”

Article 13 reiterates the submis­

sion of disputes between States “to arbitration or judicial settlement,“ describes the nature of the dispute, where it is to be submitted, and finally provides for the carrying 4l out of any award or decision. Article 16 has to do with sanctions, military and economic; Article 18 provides for the registration of treaties, thus fulfilling one of Wilson1s 14 points, ^i.je., “open covenants. 11 Article 19, commonly known as the “Peaceful Change11 article, provides for “the reconsideration . . . plicable. . . . 11

of treaties which have become inap­

Finally, Article 22 is concerned with the

principles of the “Mandate System. 40

“Article 10 was condemned as committing the United States to.armed defense of Europe!s new frontiers,” Schuman, op. cit.,: p. 700. See also T. A. Bailey, A' Diplomatic His­ tory of the American People (New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1 9 4 0 ), pp. 6 6 7 -6 8 . 41 _ Article 16 was viewed with even greater alarm as foreshadowing the conscription of American men and money 'to fight Europe's wars.1” Schuman, loc. cit. For an interest­ ing account of the reason of the United States for not join­ ing the League, see Bailey, op. cit., pp. 6 6 7 -8 0 . 40

ter.

-

This will be treated further later on in this chap­ On the subject of mandates, see Quincy Wright, Mandates

37 Practically the same articles analyzed above (with three additional ones, and one omission) have also been very concisely paraphrased by Schuman as follows: The League system for the preservation of peace is a synthesis of almost all available solutions and proce­ dures. It embodies (Articles 12-13) solemn internation­ al engagements for the renunciation of war, though the f,gap in the Covenantf! is not yet closed and the member States are still free, so far as the Covenant is con­ cerned, to resort to war in certain contingencies. It embodies (Articles 11, 13-15, 17) utilization of the established modes of pacific settlement— arbitration, adjudication, coneillation--through the Council and the Permanent Court. It involves (Article 10) an inter­ national guarantee of the independence and integrity of the members. It involves, in addition (Article 16), the mobilization of international economic and military sanctions against peace-breaking States. It likewise involves efforts to promote disarmament (Article 8 ), to insure open diplomacy by registration and publication of treaties (Article 18;, to bring about the reconsidera­ tion of treaties which have become inapplicable (Article 1 9 )* and to promote in general the pacific settlement of their controversies and the solution of their common problems.^3 As explicitly stated in the preamble, the paramount object of the League is ”to promote international coopera­ tion and to achieve international peace and security. 11

Con­

sequently, in order to attain these ends, Article 2 created the Assembly,^ the

Council,

^5 and the Secretariat^ as the

•under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930)♦ ^ Schuman, op. cit., p. 6 5 6 . See also Oscar Newfang, World Federation (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1939), pp. 55-58". 44 The composition, place of meeting, sphere of action, and method of voting of the Assembly is prescribed by Article 3.

38 principal machinery of the League; while Article 14 sug­ gested the establishment of a Permanent Court of Interna­ tional J u s t i c e , a n d Article 23 gave birth to the Interna48 tional Labor Organization* The last organ, although the creation of the Covenant of the League, nevertheless, forms a separate entity and is run independently of the Assembly, the Council, and the Secretariat, although it receives its financial support from the Secretariat and works in close cooperation with it. It is appropriate here to go into a more or less detailed account to discover the nature, the function, and ilQ

the activities of the five organs y established by the Covenant.

The Assembly will be our first consideration. Assembly.

As a quasi-legislative organ of

the League, Article 2 of the Covenant provided for the Assembly.

It is the only organ of the League where equality

Article 4 gives the nature, composition, meeting place, duties, et cetera, of the Council. 46 Article 6 prescribes the composition, location, et cetera, of the Secretariat. 47 ‘ This Article 14 also defines the power of the Court. See also Article 13, paragraph 3, as amended. 48

See Article 23 for further details of the purpose, duty, et cetera, of this organization. 49 _I,_e., the Assembly, the Council, the Secretariat, the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the Inter­ national Labor Organization.

59

prevails among the large and small member-States alike. Each member-State is entitled to one vote and not more than three representatives, though several alternates are permis­ sible.

Every State determines the composition of its dele­

gations.

The delegates cast their one vote, to which they

are entitled, according to their previous instructions.

The

executive authorities in each State usually choose its repre­ sentatives.

In recent years very often the ministers for

foreign affairs, or even the prime ministers themselves, have found their way to the Assembly*s hall.

It is not also

unusual to find certain countries represented by alien nationals in the Assembly.

Ethiopia and South Africa, for

example, have done this. The Assembly meets regularly at Geneva, in September or October, and from time to time when important business may require (Art. 3)*

A good example of this was the spe­

cial sessions held by the Assembly to deal with such dis­ putes as arose between China and Japan over Manchuria, the Gran Chaco War, the Italo-Ethiopian incident, and a few others.

It determines its own rules of procedure, and

decides by unanimous vote, except where provision to the contrary is expressly made (Art. 5)*

It elects its own pre­

siding officers, and assumes responsibility for the admis­ sion of new members (Art. 1).

It has the power to select

the nonpermanent members of the Council (Art. 4).

It has

40 advisory power regarding the reconsideration of obsolete treaties which are likely to threaten the peace of the world (Art. 19).

In addition to these, the Assembly has delibera­

tive powers over the general political, economic, and tech­ nical questions of universal interest. Besides the above powers, and some others not stated here, which are specifically delegated to the Assembly, there are also other duties and powers which are either identical with those of the Council or are exercised jointly with the Council.

For instance, like the Council, the

Assembly has authority to deal “with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world1* (Art. 3) •

Either the attention of the Assembly or of

the Council may be called by any member of the League on any matter affecting international relations which threatens to disturb the peace of nations or the good understanding be­ tween them upon which peace depends (Art. 11).

Both

Assembly and Council have the power to ask the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion (Art. 14).

The Assembly has power to deal with disputes only if

the Council voluntarily refers the subject to it, or if one of the parties to the dispute requests the Assembly.

When

considering any such dispute so referred, the Assembly assumes identical powers as the Council, and its report, when concurred by the Council and a majority of the other

41 members of the League, except the disputants1 delegations, shall have the same force as a report of the Council itself (Art* 15).

Besides these, there are also the joint powers

regarding: amendments to the Covenant (Art. 2 6 ); the in­ crease of the permanent and nonpermanent members of the Council (Art, 4); the election of the judges of the Permanent Court; the selection of the Secretary-General which requires the approval of both bodies (Art. 6 ); and several others which could not be included here for lack of space. The Council.

Intended, perhaps, to be the ex­

ecutive body of the League and a sort of an inner circle for the "Five Great Allied and Associated Powers" purported to be its original and permanent members, the Council was destined, from the beginning, to become a very important organ of the League.

However, with the refusal of the

United States to join the League, the number of permanent original members was reduced to four.

Later this was again

increased to five with the admission of Germany in 1926.

In

19^4 it was further increased to six when Russia was admit­ ted as a permanent member. SO ^ See Margaret E. Burton, The Assembly of the League Nations (Chicago: The University of ChicagoTress, 1941). fEis book is the most comprehensive and most up-to-date study on the subject and its many and varied activities. It also contains a valuable and considerable list of references pertinent to same subject. See also Schuman, op. cit., pp. 203-4.

42 The permanent membership of the Council did not re­ main long at the above-mentioned number for in 1955 Japan and Germany withdrew from the League.

This was later fol­

lowed by Italy* s withdrawal from the League, on December 11, 1957*

Two years later, on December 4, 19399 a further reduc­

tion in membership was effected when the League expelled Russia as a result of her invasion of Finland. In addition to the five permanent members of the Council specifically provided for by Article 4 of the Covenant, the same article also provided for four nonperma­ nent members.

The number of the nonpermanent members did

not remain as such for long; in 1922 the Assembly increased the nonpermanent members from four to six.

By 1926 three

more seats were added making a total of nine nonpermanent members.

Further increases were made.

One, provisionally

for Portugal, in 1933> and two more, for China and Latvia, in 1936.

Thus by the end of 1937 the Council consisted of

three permanent members, 1.e., Britain, France, and the U.S.S .R ., and eleven nonpermanent members. Although the Covenant calls only for an annual meet­ ing, and for special sessions when occasion requires (Art.

4), nevertheless, the Council began very early the practice of assembling regularly four times a year.

The President of .

the Council is selected, in rotation, by alphabetical order of the member-States.

Specifically intended for the non­

43 members of the Council, Article 4, section 5> provided, in substance, that invitation be extended to any representative of the League not a member of the Council to sit with it dur­ ing its deliberations affecting that member.

Despite the

fact that non-League members are not given the above privi­ lege, nevertheless, the United States had the unique experi­ ence of attending a few sessions of the Council during the discussion over the Sino-Japanese controversy. Like the Assembly, the duties of the Council are broad.

For instance, Article 4, section 4, provides that

nThe Council may deal at its meetings with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world. *’ Some of the specific functions of the Council are: to appoint the Secretary-General, and to approve the secretaries and staff of the Secretariat nominated by the Secretary-General (Art. 6 ); to decide upon the seat of the League if it is to be established elsewhere (Art. 7)s to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments, and whatever limitations may be agreed upon may not be exceeded without the approval of the Council (Art. 8 ); to advise upon the means by which the League members are to preserve the inde­ pendence of the members (Art. 10); to formulate and submit plans for the establishment of a permanent court of inter­ national justice (Art. 14); to act as conciliator in the case of a threat of war, and to propose measures to be taken

44 in making effective an arbitral award (Art. 15)5 a-nd to re­ ceive reports from the mandatory States regarding their mandates (Art. 22).

There are many other specific powers of

the Council which are not included here for want of space. Besides its specific powers, there are also powers which are derived from the treaty agreements between States such as the minorities treaties which conferred special powers on the Council, the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923> be­ tween Turkey and the Allied Powers, which gave the Council jurisdiction over the Mosul controversy, and several others. The most important joint power of the Council and the Assembly is the settlement of international disputes, which, in practice, ordinarily falls heavily on the Council alone. In addition to all of these duties, the Council was also entrusted with the executive, administrative, and super­ visory powers over Danzig, the Saar Valley, the mandate systern, and many others. Sl The Secretariat.

The only permanent organ of the

League is the Secretariat (Art. 6 ).

It is the center of all

the administrative activities of the League.

Through its

51 See John I. Knudson, A History of the League of Nations (Atlanta, Georgia: Turner E. Smith and Co., 193^), pp. 48-52 ff. See also Felix Morley, The Society of Nations (Washington: The Brookings Institution^ 1932), Chaps. 10-12, pp. 338-499, for a complete study of the Council. Cf., Schuman, op. cit., pp. 204-6. See Harley, op. cit., pp. 828 6 , for Rules of Procedure of the Council.

45 international civil service comprising some six hundred ex­ pert men and women officials and subordinates from more tban fifty States, efficient work is rendered in preparing the groundwork for the Assembly, the Council, the Conferences held under the auspices of the League, and the various Com­ missions which were created by the League. The Secretary-General is not merely the titular or virtual director of the Secretariat, but its actual head. All of the permanent undertakings of the League are carried through his office.

Prom its inception in 1920 up to 1933,

the head of the Secretariat was Sir Eric Drummond of Great Britain.

On his broad shoulders fell the great responsi­

bility of organizing successfully and establishing perma­ nently the Secretariat.

His successor, M. Joseph Avenol of

France, was charged with the task of carrying on the work coramendably begun by his predecessor. Article 11 of the Covenant is the basis of one of the most important duties of the Secretary-General, for in this article is a proviso instructing him to "summon a meeting of the Council11 uon the request of any member of the League11 whenever "any war or threat of war11 shall arise.

It is the

Secretary-General who makes all arrangements for the inves­ tigation and consideration of disputes between members.

He

communicates with the disputants for the purpose of obtain­ ing precise information relating to disputes, and submits it

46 to the Council.

He has even made special flying trips to

the various capitals of the -world in the interest of the League. It is also incumbent upon the Secretary-General to act in the capacity of Secretary of the Assembly and the Council (Art. 6).

In fact a great deal of his time is spent

in the halls of the Assembly and the Council -when these bodies are in session, or in attendance at various confer­ ences sponsored by the League.

In addition to these, he is

also responsible for keeping the records of all the minutes of the Assembly and Council meetings, and of all resolutions passed by both bodies.

He also further performs the duty of

a liaison officer between the different organs of the League, and keeps in communication with the member-States. To assist the Secretary-General In his numerous duties and obligations, he is empowered to appoint, subject to the confirmation of the Council, two Deputy-Secretaries-General, and three Under-Secretaries-General (Art. 6).

These offi­

cials, in conjunction with the Chief of the Legal Section, frequently meet as a central committee to evolve plans for the improvement of the service.

The Secretariat is divided into fourteen sections, namely: (l) the Internal Administrative Section, (2) the Political Section, (3) the Legal Section, (4) the Informa­ tion Section, (5) the Minorities Section, (6 ) the Mandates

^7

Section, (7 ) the Disarmament Section, (8) the Financial Sec­ tion, (9) the Economic Relations Section, (10) the Communica­ tions and Transit Section, (11) the Health Section, (12) the International Bureaus and Intellectual Cooperation Section, (15) the Social Questions and Opium Traffic Section, and (14) the Treasury Section.

Each of these sections is under

the immediate direction and control of a Chief or Director. Every Chief takes control over the internal organization of his department and is directly responsible for making the necessary preparations for, and organization of, all meet­ ings and conferences relating to his particular section. Besides these fourteen sections, there are also almost an equal number of so-called “auxiliary organizations11 such as the “Economic and Financial Organization,11 the “Health Organization,” the “Permanent Mandates Commission,” and several others. There are many other functions of the Secretariat which may be mentioned, such as the publication of the "journal,” the “Official Journal,” and the “Monthly Summary,” the immediate translation of all speeches into one of the two official languages adopted by the League (i^.^e., English or French), the preparation of the budget, and the collection of membership dues. 52

See KLudson, 0 £, cit., pp. 53-62. See also Schuman, op. cit., p. 208. For a very comprehensive study of the

48

The Permanent Court of International Justice.

With the establishment of the Permanent Court of Interna­ tional Justice came the partial realization of a dream of an international tribunal to settle disputes of an international nature, between two or more sovereign States.

It was the

wisdom and foresight of the framers of the Covenant of the League not to entrust the settlement of all disputes to one body.

While they delegated the settlement of all political

controversies to the Council of the League, they were also careful enough not to rely on the same organ to handle cases of legal character.

With this in mind, the framers of the

Covenant provided in Article 14 that tfThe Council shall formulate and submit to the members of the League for adop­ tion plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice . 11

The same article empowered the

Court 11to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the parties thereto submit to it.”

In addi­

tion the Court is further vested with power fIto give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly. 11 Different procedures were followed in the establish­ ment of the Court on the one hand and the creation of the League and Labor Organization on the other.

The difference

organization and function of the Secretariat, see Morley, op. cit., Chaps. 8-9, pp. 261-337.

49

lies in the fact that whereas the Covenant and the Labor Charter are contained in the Treaty of Versailles, the Statute of the Court is not.

Immediately after receiving

its mandate, the Council lost no time in appointing, in February, 1920, ten distinguished jurists.

A few months

later, the jurists assembled at the Hague and drafted a "Statute” or plan of organization which with some amendments was adopted by the Council and the Assembly in December, 1920.

An international Treaty was then drawn up by the

Assembly establishing the Permanent Court of International Justice which was later approved by the Council and ratified by the necessary number of States. After the formal election of the judges in September, 1921, the Court finally met, for the first time, on January 30, 1922.

Several years later some sixty sovereign States

were numbered among its members.

It is regrettable, however,

that the United States has never officially joined the Court despite the fact that four of her prominent jurists (viz., John Bassett Moore, Charles Evans Hughes, Frank B. Kellogg, and Manley 0. Hudson) were among the outstanding judges of the Court, and the further fact that a prominent American philanthropist, Andrew Carnegie, has provided the Court with a magnificent "Peace Palace" at the Hague. Although from the very outset a formidable problem was encountered in the selection of judges, nevertheless, as

50 years vent by and experiences were accumulated, this diffi­ culty was later overcome.

For example, at its inception,

the Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice provided that ”The Court shall consist of fifteen members: eleven judges and four deputy-judges11 (Art. 5)«

In spite of

the fact that the same article further provided that the above-mentioned tvo categories of judges may be ftincreased by the Assembly, upon the proposal of the Council of the League of Nations, to a total of fifteen judges and six deputy judges,” nevertheless, not until 1950 vas an amend­ ment to this effect approved by the Assembly increasing the number of judges to fifteen in addition to four deputyjudges.

Hovever, these deputy-judges vere later abolished

by another amendment in February, 1956. According to Article lj5 of the Statute ,fThe members of the Court shall be elected for nine years.” is permissible.

Re-election

Candidates for these positions are nomin­

ated by the national groups of the Permanent Court of Inter­ national Arbitration at the Hague.

Each national group is

entitled to name four candidates, but only tvo of them may be of its ovn nationality.

A prepared alphabetical list of

the persons so nominated is transmitted by the SecretaryGeneral to the Assembly and the Council vhereby a concurrent majority by both chambers, voting independently of the other, elect the judges of the Court.

An ingenious provision is

51 further made in the event of a disagreement.

All States,

regardless of size, have an equal vote in the election of judges. Another difficult question confronting the organizers of the Court was that of jurisdiction.

However, this, too,

was ingeniously solved by granting the Court either volun­ tary or compulsory jurisdiction.

According to the Statute

nThe jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in treaties and conventions in force” (Art. 5 6 ).

hater this

same article was converted into the so-called “optional clause” whereby each member-State was given the choice of making an advance acceptance or rejection of the Courtfs compulsory jurisdiction over cases of international charac­ ter as specifically defined in Article 55.

Some fifty

States have already voluntarily accepted the Courtfs com­ pulsory jurisdiction.

Those that did not accept the “op­

tional clause” have the privilege of submitting any contro­ versy to the Court as they are pleased to do. As already amply manifested by the record of the Court in its two score years of operation, it has rendered a laudable service to the world.

It has not only rendered

numerous decisions with fairness and impartiality (except in the Austro-German customs union opinion of September 5> 1931> which some writers believe the Court was somewhat

52

partial), but has also given much valuable advisory assist­ ance to the Council of the League on the legal aspects of international problems.

Some believe that had the Court

been properly equipped with adequate power for the enforce­ ment of its decisions, its success would have been even more notable. S3 ^ 5.

The International Labor Organization.

The

framers of the Versailles Treaty, probably benefiting from the experiences of long established international public unions (£.£., the Postal Union), recognizing the importance of the problems of labor, and bearing in mind the pledges made by the different belligerent governments in the course of the war to labor, provided in Part XIII of the Treaty for the creation of the International Labor Organization.

Refer­

ence was also made of this Organization in Article 23 of the Covenant of the League. The general purpose of the International Labor Organi­ zation is clearly indicated by the Preamble of the Constitu­ tion which stated, in part, as follows: “Whereas the League of Nations has for its object the establishment of universal peace” on the basis of “social justice”; ”. . .

whereas also

See Schuman, op. cit., pp. 170-72. See also Harley, op. cit., Chap. 3, pp. "35 4-240, for the text and other im­ portant documents. Cf., Knudson, op. cit., Chap. 14, pp. 335-5^. Some of the important decisions of the Court are summarized in this chapter.

55 the failure of any nation to adopt humane conditions of labor is an obstacle in the way of other nations which de­ sire to improve the conditions in their own countries; the High Contracting Parties . . . agree to the following. . . . Then follow the articles providing for the organization, pro­ cedure, and work of the organization. The primary purpose of the International Labor Organi­ zation is to assist labor as well as to promote uniformity of labor legislation throughout the world.

It does not pre­

tend to occupy a neutral position between the laborer and the employer, but operates openly on the idea that it is set up for the benefit of the working people.

Thus a great deal

of misunderstanding prevails in various circles, even to the extent of branding the said Organization as socialistic. However, the experiences at various labor conferences, where­ by government representatives quite as likely favor employer groups as labor, seemed to temper this suspicion.

Then

there are also the benefits accruing to both labor and em­ ployer alike due to the absence of labor strikes. More than sixty-five international treaties or conven­ tions affecting labor were adopted by the end of 1959. not all of them are in operation.

But

Borne are still in process

of ratification by various governments.

The ever-increasing

acceptance of some of the labor legislation (j3.g. > that affecting child labor, night work, hours of work, weekly day

54 of rest, social insurance, safety, health, and unemployment, et cetera) has tended to keep pace with changing industrial conditions.

Hours of work, for instance, have been short­

ened gradually in different States and in various industries. The Italian Government in 1951 took the lead in this direc­ tion.

In order to show that the Italian Government had the

interests of the workers at heart, it conceived the idea of proposing the forty-hour week to the I.L.Q.

This initiated

the international program of the forty-hour week which, with­ in a period of eight years, brought the realization of four International Labor Conventions laying down the forty-hour week as the standard work-week in the manufacture of sheetglass, glass bottles and textiles, and in public works, and the eight-hour day in highway transportation. The requirement that each member country be repre­ sented in the International Labor Conference by four dele­ gates (i.je. $ two government, one employer, and one worker) has presented a special problem to the Organization.

More

than one State has encountered difficulties in sending full delegations required, because of the great distance and the expense involved.

There is also the problem of the absence

of any representative group of employers or workers from which delegates can be chosen.

Moreover, there is also the

fact that, at times, certain States lack the necessary in­ terest in the work of the I.L.0. to do anything more than

55 to appoint their consuls in Geneva to represent their gov­ ernments at certain Labor Conferences.

To counteract these

difficulties certain measures have been proposed.

For

instance, in the matter of expense, two possible solutions have been offered.

One is to have the I.L.0. itself meet

the travelling expenses of the delegates by making appropri­ ate provision in its budget.

The other is to require the

member-States to pool expenses so that the burden may be equalized. Then there is also the inadequate time allotted to Labor Conferences.

Normally it meets once a year for a

period of some three weeks.

Several days are spent in organ­

izing the conference for work.

Nearly a week is devoted to

a debate of the Director^ Report.

Taking into considera­

tion the parties and week ends, hardly two weeks are given to the discussion and adoption of conventions and recommenda­ tions. So many other points might have been discussed here, but space does not allow.

For example, there is the ques­

tion of membership in the I.L.O., the means of support of the I.L.O., the unique leadership rendered by M. Albert Thomas as Director of the Labor Office, the composition and function of the Governing Body, the achievements and fail­ ures of the I.L.O., the present temporary headquarters of

the I.L.G., and several others. III.

54

THE LEAGUE IN ACTION AS A MEANS OF PRESERVING PEACE

With a little insight of the pertinent articles of the Covenant of the League as well as the machineries created thereby, inquiries may now he appropriately made of the achievements, and nonetheless, of the failures of the League since its creation over two decades or so ago.

A

survey may first he made of its outstanding achievements. Achievements of the League.

The following achieve­

ments are credited to the League of Nations. Political.

The League is credited with having

attained success, at least partially, in the settlement of the following controversies.

First of all there was the

Corfu^ incident of August 27 > 1923> between Italy on the one hand, and Greece on the other.

The said incident was

the result of the activities of the commission appointed by

5^ See ibid., Chap. 13# PP. 315-32. See also Smith Simpson, The International Labor Organization, in the Inter­ national Conciliation, April, 1941, No. 369~PP. 317-3^ Cf., ScKuman, op. cit., pp. 211-13. See also Harley, op>. cit. Chap. 4, pp. 241-64,for the text of the Statute of the I.L.0., and other interesting materials. 55 gee Knudson, op. cit., pp. 7 6 -7 8 . See also Schuman, op. cit., pp. 660-61, for a more detailed account.

57 the Conference of Ambassadors to fix the Greco-Albanian frontier.

General Tellini, an Italian, who headed the com­

mission was accused by the Greeks of deciding all disputed points in favor of Albania.

Tellini, his chauffeur, and

other Italians riding with him were found murdered nigh the village of Janina on Greek territory on the morning of the said date.

Immediately on August 29, Mussolini, the Italian

premier, sent a seven-point ultimatum to the Greek Govern­ ment.

Greece, upon receipt of the ultimatum, addressed an

appeal to the Secretariat of the League to bring the matter before the Council under Articles 12 and 15.

Meantime, the

Italian Government, dissatisfied with the reply of Greece, ordered its naval forces to occupy the Greek island of Corfu. However, through the intermediary of the Conference of Am­ bassadors, the Greek and Italian- Governments immediately accepted its recommendations for settlement which was trans­ mitted on September 7.

Thus further bloodshed was averted,

and peace restored but at a great price to the Greeks. Schuman, on this point, observed that “Peace!t had been preserved and territorial conquests averted. But Greece was obliged to bow to superior force, and the Conference of Ambassadors acceded to practically all of the Italian demands. The whole settlement, more­ over, had been taken out of the hands of the League Council.56

56 Ibid.., p. 661.

58 Next in line was the Greek-Bulgarian dispute, over their frontier, which took place in the Struma 57 valley in 1925.

This conflict was precipitated when a Greek soldier

crossed the boundary and fired on a Bulgarian sentry who returned the fire by killing the Greek, followed.

General fighting

The Greek Government, alleging fear of Bulgarian

invasion, ordered its troops to occupy the Struma valley in Bulgaria,

Bulgaria*s timely appeal to the Secretary-General

invoking Articles 10 and 11 of the Covenant, in conjunction with Briand*s quick action in reminding both disputants of their obligations, halted a general Greek offensive sched­ uled to begin within two and a half hours.

Thus once more

another bloody frontier struggle was averted and peace pre­ served. Third in line of successes credited to the League was the Colombian-Peruvian controversy over Leticia^ in 19521954.

Peru is said to have started the dispute when, on

September 2, 1952, a group of Peruvians entered the Port of Leticia on the Amazon,

Leticia had been recognized by Peru

as belonging to Colombia by a treaty signed at Lima on March 24, 1922, and ratified in 1928.

Colombia notified the

^ 9 P* 6 6 2 , gives the details of this conflict. See also Knudson, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 58 Ibid., pp. 91-92. See also Schuman, op. cit., pp. 6 6 2 -6 5 * for a more complete account of the whole controversy.

59 Secretary-General of the League of the incident on January 4, 1955.

Through the intercession of the Council of the

League ■with the collaboration of both Brazil and the United States, a successful solution of the dispute was concluded. lfDn June 19, 1934, the League Commission handed over the territory of the !Leticia Trapezium1 to the civil authori­ ties of Colombia.n^9 2.

Administrative.

In addition to the above-mentioned

political successes, the League is probably entitled to greater merit in the realm of administration.

In fact Pro­

fessor Schuman believes that . . . if the League be evaluated in terms of its con­ crete contributions toward serving the common purposes of nations, it has been far more significances an admin­ istrative agency than as a political a g e n c y . However, he is also quick in admitting that “it is as a political agency that it must finally be judged.’ From its inception, the League was designed to pro­ mote a greater and more effective administrative cooperation among the States by coordinating the activities of existing

Ibid., p. 6 6 5 . Note: Besides the above three dis­ putes, there were several others which were referred to the League, £.£., the Aaland Islands controversy between Finland and Sweden, the Eastern Carelia dispute between Finland and Russia, et cetera. See Knudson, op. cit., pp. 63-113, for a summary of many of these, disputes. Schuman, op. cit., p. 65561 Loc. cit.

agencies and by establishing new agencies to tackle new problems.

At the outset, it was hoped that all internation­

al unions in existence would be placed under the Leagued direction.

In this manner, administrative officials as well

as private interests would be placed in direct and benefi­ cial contact at Geneva for purposes of consultation and coordination.

In the prosecution of this end, the member

States which had, by convention, established various inter­ national organizations agreed to the direction of their activities by the League, as contemplated in Article 24 of the Covenant.

Thus from time to time a number of organiza­

tions have availed themselves of this opportunity.

For

instance, from 1936 to 1937 > six international bureaus were under the League's supervision, jL.e*., International Commis­ sion for Air Navigation, the International Hydrographic Bureau, the Central International Office for the Control of the Liquor Traffic in Africa, the International Bureau for Information and Inquiries Regarding Relief to Foreigners, the Nansen Office for Refugees, and the International Exhibi­ tion Bureau. It may be added also that a number of technical agen­ cies, commissions, and advisory committees, in addition to the afore-mentioned organizations, have been organized around the League.

Outstanding among these are the Perma­

nent Advisory Commission on Armaments, and the Mandates

6l

Commission which are explicitly provided Tor hy Articles 9 and 22 respectively of the Covenant.

The others have been

created by the Council as bodies of technical experts to supply information and render counsel on various intricate problems falling within the sphere of action of the League. These organizations are constantly in close collaboration with the corresponding establishments of the Secretariat. 62 In the said fashion, four great technical organiza­ tions have been instituted. These are the Economic and 63 Financial Organization; the Organization for Communication and Transit; 6

the Health Organization; 65 and finally, the

Council, in 1922, set up the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation “to coordinate the work of such bodies as the International Research Council, the Interna­ tional Academic Union, the Institute of International Law, , ti etc. Besides the technical organizations referred to above,

62

Most of the materials of the foregoing discussion were taken from Schuman. For a more complete discussion of the “Technique of International Administration,n see Khudson, op. cit., pp. 1 5 7 -8 9 . 63 Ibid., pp. 206-24. 64 Ibid., pp. 225-43. 65 Ibid., pp. 244-71.

66 209-10.

Ibid., pp. 272-85.

See also Schuman, op. cit., pp.

62 numerous other permanent or temporary committees have "been created from time to time by the Council, oftentimes on the basis of resolutions by the Assembly, to deal with special problems.

Two good instances of this are the Committee of

Experts for the Progressive Codification of International 67 Law, and the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament /TO

Conference.

Furthermore, there is also the social and

humanitarian endeavors of the League which have necessitated the founding of the necessary organizations of experts.

The

Advisory Commission on the Traffic in Opium and other Danger­ ous Drugs established by the First Assembly is a good example. It has been not only instrumental in securing more effective enforcement of the Hague Opium Convention of 1912, but has drawn up a new opium convention in 1925 to regulate the pro­ duction and distribution of opium on a world-wide scale.

A

conference, in 1921, on what was generally known as the nwhite slave traffic11 drew up a final act, later embodied in the International Convention for the Suppression of the

6 7 por a very scholarly treatment of the origin, his­

tory of the development and progress of international law, et cetera, see C. Van Vollenhoven, The Law of Peace (Trans, by W. Horsfall Carter; London: Macmiilan & Co., Ltd., 1936). 68 A complete discussion of the activities of the Pre­ paratory Commission, and the political and technical back­ ground of the World Disarmament Conference of 1932, see John W» Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security Since Locarno (London: George Alien & Unwin, Ltd.", 1932), especiaITy Chap. 3, PP. 43-102.

63

Traffic in Women and Children.

An Advisory Committee on the

Traffic in Women and Children was established by the Council. In 1925 it was reorganized as the Advisory Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People. Several other organizations have been created to handle such problems as slavery and slave trade, the repatriation of war prisoners as well as refugees, the traffic in obscene publi­ cations, and many others which need not be mentioned here for lack of space. 3.

Conferences sponsored by the League.

In addition

to the aforesaid administrative activities of the League, it may be cursorily mentioned here of the numerous international conferences convened under the Leaguefs auspices.^

For

example, there were the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920, the White Slave Traffic Conference of 1921, the London Health Conference of the same year, the European Health Con­ ference of 1922, the Conference on Obscene Publications in 1923* the Opium Conferences of 1924, the Arms Traffic Con­ ference of 1925* the Second Passport Conference of 1926, the 70 Economic Conference of 1927> the General Transit Conference 69 A list of conferences held under League auspices is iven by Norman L. Hill, The Public International Conference Stanford: Stanford University Press”, 1929) * PP. 125-26. See also Henry A. Atkinson, Prelude to Peace (New York and London: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 15*37) * PP. 193-99* for a ?List of Principal International Conferences” held since the signing of the Armistice November 11, 1918. , 70 ' This will be discussed later in this chapter. A

f

64 of 1927, Conferences on Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions of 1928, the World Disarmament Conference of 71 1932, and a host of others too numerous to mention here. Failures of the League.

As is clearly indicated in

the foregoing brief analysis, the League was credited, on the one side of the ledger, with a great number of important administrative and several minor political successes in its endeavors to avert war and preserve peace as well as to pro­ mote better understanding, closer cooperation, and a more friendly relation among nations.

However, if the other side

of the ledger is to be examined, it is rather regrettable to say that the League has utterly and completely failed in most, if not all, of its major undertakings both in the political and economic realms* 1. League.

Two unsuccessful conferences sponsored by the Although the League found a series of successes in

the minor conferences held under its auspices, as enumerated above, yet in the two conferences of the greatest magnitude

lengthy treatment of this conference may be found in F. H. Simonds & B. Emeny, The Price of Peace (New York and London: Harper and Bros. Publishers, 1935) > Chap. 34, pp. 316-20. 71 This will be commented later in this chapter. For a comprehensive study of the general subject of "Disarmament11 see P. J. Noel-Baker, Disarmament (New York: Hareourt, Brace. & Co., 1926)| see also Salvador de Madariaga, Disarmament (New York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1929). There is also a good chapter in Simonds and Emeny, op. cit., Chap. 35>9 PP. 305-15*

65

convened by it (.1..©. > Economic and Disarmament), in which, the peace and security of* the States of the world largely depended, the League encountered insurmountable difficulties, a.

The World Economlc Conference of 1927.

Despite

the increasing importance of economics in the relations of nations in modern times, and the fact that there was urgent need of restoring monetary stability and international trade between or among the States of the world after the termina­ tion of World War I, nevertheless, not until 1927 did the real and serious effort to grapple with the dilemma created by the so-called neo-mercantilism come, when, under the League of Nations' auspices, the World Economic Conference'72 was convened at Geneva from May 4 to May 27. Three special committees were appointed by the Confer­ ence, i.j5., on commerce, on industry, and on agriculture. After a thorough presentation by the different schools of

72

' A more detailed account of this conference may be found in Schuman, op. cit., pp. 557-53. The materials for the ensuing two paragraphs were gathered from Schuman. Note: There was actually a conference preceding this in the form of the Brussels Financial Conference of 1920. However, the fact that the League of Nations was just recently organ­ ized and not fully prepared to tackle the problem of inter­ national economics led to the belief that the Brussels Con­ ference could not be considered a real and serious effort to solve the said problem. It was in fact considered by many as a mere fldress rehearsal11 for the following conference now under consideration. The Brussels Conference, however, will be discussed later under the chapter on economics.

66

thought of their arguments, pro and con, relating to their respective subjects under consideration, the delegates, in a final report and resolutions of the conference, declared •unanimously that “each nation1s commerce is today being hampered by barriers established by other nations, resulting in a situation, especially in Europe, that is highly detri­ mental to the general welfare •t! They further urged that “the time has come to put a stop to the growth of customs tariffs and to reverse the direction.“

Recommendations were

made for the adherence, to several trade agreements already signed, by outside States as well as participation in a con­ ference for the abolition of import and export prohibitions, to be held in October, 1927.

Stability and uniformity of

tariff duties were encouraged; dumping and subsidies were discouraged; and finally, the treatment of foreigners and alien corporations on an equal basis as the nation1s own citizens was urged.

However, all these recommendations were

largely ignored by the governments of the participating States in spite of the dire need for the amelioration of the existing economic conditions throughout the world which were in constant threat to their peaceful relations. As a final attempt to secure the adoption of the said final report and resolutions, the conference, through the instrumentality of the Council of the I*eague, enlarged the economic committee of the heague and supplemented it with a

67 consultative committee to see to it that their execution is carried out accordingly.

It is rather regretful to say, how­

ever, that despite this last effort, the history of the Leaguefs attempts in this direction ended in an almost com­ plete failure.

Plans for a second World Economic Conference

were initiated in 1932 by several European Chancelleries, but due to the unwillingness of the States to modify their policies of rigid economic nationalism, the conference was repeatedly postponed.

When it finally met in London In June,

1933> it was foredoomed to failure because the United States, though originally conceding that monetary and tariff prob­ lems were inseparable, refused to limit the depreciation of its currency inaugurated in the preceding March.

Without a

currency agreement the rest of the participating States declined to reduce their tariffs.

Thus, pending a restora­

tion of some stable international medium of exchange, efforts at permanent reduction of barriers to trade by universal international agreement were practically abandoned.

It is

not to be Inferred, however, that the Conference had met with complete failure.

The fact was that several temporary

agreements were concluded: a sort of a ntruce pact,” such as on wheat, on silver, on tariff, and a few others. b.

The Disarmament Conference. With regard to the

second important conference sponsored by the League in accordance with Article 8 of the Covenant, i.e., T,the

reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consist­ ent with national safety,11 a “World Disarmament Conference1*^ was convened at Geneva on February 2, 1932,7** after over a decade of international endeavors to effect a disarmament and insure the perpetuation of peace. It is not the object here to describe, in detail, what actually happened in the conference as it would require a chapter or two to really render justice to some 337 sepa­ rate proposals brought by the 232 delegates to the confer75 ence representing fifty-nine countries as well as the proceedings of the conference.

However, some of the impor-

tant points may be briefly stated here.

76

Arthur Henderson*

of Great Britain was elected president of the conference with M. Motta of Switzerland as its honorary president.

In

addition there were also fourteen vice-presidents from Ibid., p. 612, called this same conference the “Gen­ eral Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations. “ See Harley, op. clt., Chap. 11, p. 623* A good study of this conference may be obtained from John W. Wheeler-Bennett, The Pipe Dream of Peace (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1935}V 7** There is rather a discrepancy in dates. Harley, loc. clt., gives February 2, while Schuman, loc. clt., gives February 3 as the meeting. Wheeler-Bennett, loc. clt., gave also February 2. 75 * Another discrepancy occurs here between Schuman and Harley. Schuman, loc. clt., gives fifty-seven, while Harley, loc. clt., has lisTetl tKe~complete names of the fifty-nine States represented at the conference as well as other pertinent facts. 7^ Ibid., pp. 624-26, gave the important paragraphs of Henderson's speech at the opening of the conference.

69 fourteen States. 77

There were created five main commissions

to deal with "budgetary limitation, political problems, land, air, and naval armaments.

Furthermore, a General Commission

and a Bureau^ were also constituted. Andre Tardieu's proposal, on February 5* for the establishment of a “preventive and punitive international police force11 through the action by various States to lay at the League of nations' disposal civil aircraft over a speci­ fied tonnage, bombing planes, and all other “offensive11 weapons such as dreadnoughts, long range cruisers, and artillery, submarines, et cetera, in addition to compulsory arbitration and a new definition of aggression, was immedi­ ately met with a strong British, American, and German opposi79 encountered a similar tion. This and many other proposals’ fate. 2*

Political. The achievements of the League in

settling minor international conflicts have already been re­ ferred to above.

It is now fitting and proper to point out

here a few of the many unsuccessful attempts of the League 77 ’ For a list of the States whose delegates were elected vice-presidents, see ibid., p. 627 Ibid., pp. 627-28, gives a statement of the composi­ tion of each commission. ^ * PP« 632-57# has a r&sum& of the various lead­ ing official proposals presented by the delegates at the conference, and discussions thereby.

in its efforts to settle international controversies of greater significance. Starting with the Par Eastern crisis of 1951-1932, we find China and Japan crossing swords over the Manchurian®0 question.

This was, probably, the first real test of the

efficiency of the League system for settling major inter­ national disputes involving greater powers.

The conflict

was alleged to have been precipitated by a series of inci­ dences, .i.e., the robbing and attacking by Chinese soldiers of Captain Nakamura of the Imperial Army on June 28, 1951» and his later execution, along with his companions, for spy­ ing; the explosion of a bomb on the tracks of the South Manchurian Railway near Mukden by Chang's soldiers on September 18, 1931; et cetera. Through Dr. Alfred Sze, head of the Chinese delega­ tion at Geneva, the Chinese Government immediately invoked Article 11 of the Covenant on September 21, 1931.

Thereby

the operation of the machinery of the League was started. The failure

8i

of the League to prevent the conflict between

So A detailed analysis of the origin and causes of the Sino-Japanese conflict over Manchuria is given by Schuman, op. cit., pp. 333-39. This is perhaps the best of the many TSooks and pamphlets written on the subject. See also Knudson, op. cit., pp. 86-90. 8l For a more comprehensive survey of the unsuccessful efforts of the League to prevent further eoafliet, see Schuman, op. cit., pp. 665-71*

71

Japan and China is too well-known^2 to warrant any further discussion here. Next in line is the Gran Chaco8*5 controversy between Bolivia and Paraguay (1928-1935) over their respective claims in the Chaco Boreal.

War was precipitated when, fol­

lowing the failure of negotiation, Paraguayan troops launched a successful attack upon the Bolivian stronghold of Port Vanguardia on December 5 » 1928.

Here, despite the

fact that merely third-class Powers were being dealt with by the Council of the League, the League machinery broke down, more or less completely.

The real reason behind it was the

traditional attitude of the United States toward the inter­ vention of non-American States in the disputes between or among the States of the Western Hemisphere, and the noncoop­ erative attitude of the contestants as well as their remote­ ness from the source of effective pressure from the League. The third of the unsuccessful attempts of the League to settle international disputes of greater magnitude was the giL now notorious Italo-Ethiopian conflict. This controversy —

r-

Libraries, particularly international relations libraries, are replete with materials on the subject. A more complete account of the Gran Chaco dispute, the difficulties encountered by the League, and its failure to effect a settlement may be found in Schuman. on. clt., pp. 671-76. See also Knudson, og. cit., pp. 84-85. r\U

Schuman, og. cit., pp.

gives a brief

72 was partly the consequence of many decades of covetous de­ sign by Italy to conquer and annex Ethiopia*

The immediate

reason of the conflict was the so-called Ual-TJal frontier incident.

Like China and Japan the participants of this

controversy, under consideration, were both active members of the League.

In spite of the most touching appeal of

Emperor Haile Selassie himself on the floor of the Assembly 11shamed into silence,11 in final plea for **justice that is due to my people, and the assistance promised to it eight months ago by fifty-two nations who asserted that an act of aggression had been committed in violation of international t r e a t i e s , n o t h i n g further was done by the League to re­ solve this act of international banditry.

More than fifty

nations, including the Great Powers which had applied economic sanctions against Italy accepted Italian aggression as a fait accompli. Other failures of the League.

In addition to the

above cited instances of League failures, many others®^

historical background of Ethiopia*s successful efforts to frustrate the Invaders for over thirty centuries and pre­ serve her national Independence and territorial integrity; the origin of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict and final annexa­ tion of Ethiopia by Italy. Many other books and articles were written on the subject, and libraries are pregnant with materials to the same effect to warrant any further citation here. Q r

Extract of Haile Selassie!s speech.

86 a whole list of twenty-four disputes submitted to

could be enumerated here, but for lack of space.

However,

it is a well-known fact, at least to students of history and international relations, that a series of other reverses were suffered by the League, in its efforts to prevent aggression and maintain peace, down to the beginning of the current For Id War II.

Among them were the Polish-Lithuanian

dispute over Vilna, the Italian invasion of Albania, the German occupation of the Sudeten land and subsequent annexa­ tion of Austria as well as the German invasion of Poland which precipitated the present general European War which has already engulfed the entire world, and finally Soviet Russia1s invasion of little Finland. Failure over the mandates.

Aside from inter­

national controversies which found no solution under the League of Nations peace machinery, it is also worth while noting the failure of the League with regard to the mandated territories.

In spite of the fact that the mandated terri­

tories were intended to be supervised by the mandatory States under the principle of the "open door," nevertheless, as subsequent events amply demonstrated, these mandates

the Council, methods used for settling them, et cetera, is given by T. P. Conwell-Evans, The League Council in Action (London; Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1929), pp. 278-81. See also Oscar Newfang, The United States of the World (New York: G. P. Putnamfs Sons, 195OT, PP* 34-37, Tor a good account of the ten territorial disputes and sub­ sequent defiance by some of the member States.

74 became practically the outright possessions of the manda­ tories to the exclusion of other interested powers.

What

steps have been taken by the League to correct this obvious usurpation of power under its very nose? obvious answer.

There is no

In a very mild manner, Newfang expresses

his opinion of the mandate system as follows: While the mandate system for backward lands . . . has thus far worked fairly well, it has been impossible to avoid discriminations by the mandate powers in favor of their own nationals in the resources and commerce of the mandated territories. The question of the return of Germany Vs former colonies is still one of the serious threats to world peace, and the League does not seem to possess sufficient control over the mandated territories to assure fair and undiscriminating treatment for the traders of other nationality than that of the manda­ tory. o7 Reasons for League failures.

It Is not just, or even

fair, to blame the League, as a whole, for all its short­ comings.

The League can do no more than its component mem­

bers are willing to do through the League machinery.

It can

exercise no greater power than what has actually been vested in it.

The essence of the League*s weakness, the reasons or

factors attributable to its failures in achieving the weighty objectives before It can be briefly and precisely enumerated as follows: First o f .all there Is the insistence on the principles of the unanimity rule for almost

all the actions

w ' Oscar Newfang, World Federation (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1939)> P* 60.

75 of the League; second, the lack of equality of the member States, large or small, particularly in the make up of the Council; third, the absence of power of the League’s repre­ sentatives to make any binding decision without the confirma­ tion of the governments of each of the member States; fourth, the presence of an ambiguous and cumbersome machinery for the enforcement of the decisions of the League and the Perma­ nent Court of International Justice— in other words, lack of executive authority and legislative power as well as indefi­ nite location of responsibility; fifth, the financial de­ pendence of the League upon the willingness or unwillingness of the member States to contribute for the support of the League; sixth, insistence on the maintenance of the status quo; and finally, the inability of the League to effect international economic cooperation and to guarantee the equality of economic opportunity to all States alike. Along similar lines of reasoning, as enumerated above, Oscar Newfang voiced his own personal views of the matter in the following manner.

Speaking first of the fundamental

reason of the weakness of the League, he observed: It is obvious to the statesmen of all nations that at the present day the League of Nations is in an Impotent and comatose condition in regard to the two main pur­ poses of its existence, the preservation of international peace and security and the establishment of economic peace through the removal of the barriers to world trade, investment and travel. The fundamental reason for this weakness of the

76 League is the fact that it was organized as an alliance of goggrnments rather than as a federation of nations, ♦

•

•

Then Newfang went on to discuss, rather lengthily, the consequences of the formation of the League as an alli­ ance as follows: . . . The first consequence was that, since a sover­ eign will cannot he compelled to do anything without its own consent, all important action of the League must he unanimous. A single negative vote, even hy the smallest and most insignificant state, suffices to prevent any decision. This rule of unanimity in government has heen in history, and its result has heen disastrous. Poland any single member of the legislative hody thwart all action hy his single vote, called the Veto. . . .

tried In could Liherum

The second consequence of the organization of the League of Nations as an alliance of sovereign govern­ ments was, that there must he an equal vote for every member state, whether large, populous and important in world affairs, or small sparsely peopled and insignifi­ cant. . . . . . . A third consequence of the League!s form of organization was, that the sovereign member states were so jealous of parting with the least hit of their power, that their representatives in the League Assembly were regarded merely as diplomats who might, if they could reach unanimity, make recommendations to the governments of the member states, which recommendations these govern­ ments could accept, reject or quietly ignore, hut who could not make any binding decision without the ratifica­ tion of their home governments. . . . A fourth consequence of the League's form of organiza­ tion was, that it rendered all effective enforcement of the decisions of the Assembly or of the Council impossi­ ble. The Covenant provided for economic and military

^

Ibid., p.

6j>.

77 sanctions to enforce its terms, but the rule of unanim­ ity has completely frustrated their prompt and effective application. . . . The fifth consequence of the League's organization as an allionoe of governments was, that the League ¥as wholly dependent for its financial needs upon the gov­ ernments of its member states. It could only make re­ quests for quotas from each government, but had no authority to levy and collect its necessary financial support directly from the citizens, as the states do for their own financial support. . . . And the final consequence of the form of the League's organization was, that since it created no effective general authority, no world political unity, it became impossible for the League to make any progress toward establishing world economic freedom. Since the member states were compelled to maintain their own defense, owing to the impotence of the League's protection against aggression, they were absolutely unwilling to reduce their economic armament of tariffs, preferences, quotas and embargoes. . . . 8 9 A concise statement of the cardinal defects of the League of Nations, which brought so many failures in its efforts to avert war and preserve peace among nations, may also be readily obtained from William C. Brewer's book, en­ titled Permanent Peace, as follows: Briefly summarized, the chief defects of the League of Nations which caused it to fail to prevent war and to achieve international peace and security were: The League did not have supreme power to insure permanent world peace; It was not universal; It had no strong executive branch capable of enforc­ ing its decisions; ^ JklS.* > PP* 6 5 - 7 0 . See also pp. 81-86 for flA Sug­ gested Revision of the League Covenant.”

78 It did It was nations;

not outlaw war; not "based on the theory of equality of all

Its decisions were not based on the will of the maj ority; It hadno limitations comparable to a Bill It did It did bers;

of Rights;

not guarantee individual liberty; not provide adequate protection for its mem­

Its machinery was too cumbersome and slow-moving to insure speedy action In case of emergency; It provided no means for the application of force against an offending nation to prevent disturbances short of war; It provided no adequate means for safeguarding the economic and social welfare of the world.90

William C. Brewer, Permanent Peace (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Co., Publishers, 19^0), p.” T5"6"~

CHAPTER III OFFICIAL EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE INDEPENDENT OF THE LEAGUE 1920-1940 In the preceding chapter, effort has heen made to show the various and numerous activities undertaken hy the League in its endeavors, first, to mitigate the chronic warbreeding political, -economic, and social conditions prevail­ ing throughout the world at the close of World War I; second, to hring into an amicable solution all disputes between or among the States right at their very inception; and, finally, to promote mutual understanding and closer collaboration among the States in the interest of tranquillity and harmony among them.

However, in spite of all these attempts of the

League, the sequence of events preceding the present world­ wide sanguinary war have amply demonstrated its inability to cope with very dangerous and serious international situations. It is now clear that the circumstances manifested in the past few years of bloody conflict have conclusively proved the futility of the peace machinery set up by the League to pre­ vent controversy, half aggression, and preserve the peace of nations. The League was not alone in its various endeavors to attain the above-mentioned objectives.

There were other

official efforts toward the attainment of universal peace

80 outside the sphere of action of the League.

Outstanding

among them were: the Washington Conference of 1921-1922; the Geneva Conference of 1927; the London Naval Conferences of 1930 and 1935; the Periodical and Non-Periodical InterAmerican Conferences; and lastly, there was the most -unique and most outstanding endeavor, toward the preservation of world peace, in the form of the Pact of Paris of 1928. I.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE OF 1921-1922

So far, the most successful conference ever convoked was the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922.

The con­

ference was, perhaps, the result of the ever-increasing rivalry among the Naval Powers in their desire not to he outdone hy the others.

For instance, a naval building pro­

gram was enacted by the United States Congress in 1916 which called for the construction of ten battleships mounting twelve sixteen-inch guns each; half a dozen battle cruisers carrying sixteen-inch guns, ten scout cruisers, and more than a hundred other smaller auxiliary vessels.

The con­

summation of this project would have Insured a United States supremacy in certain categories of naval vessels over its closest rival, the British, notwithstanding the fact that Britain had more capital ships than the combined navies of her competitors at the end of the warTo counteract the coming American naval superiority,

the British Admiralty had plans for the construction of two ftSuper-Hoods*1^ of 5 0 ,0 0 0 tons, mounting eighteen to twentyinch guns; while in Japan, due to increasing apprehension of the American naval building program, plans were laid in 1920 for the construction of forty-eight battleships and battle cruisers.

Thus the new race for naval armaments portended a

great menace to the peace and security of the States and endangered both Japan and Britain as well as the United States with an onerous financial burden which would be added to the already staggering and mountainous taxes being shoul­ dered by the taxpayers of each country to meet the huge war debts as well as the problems of rehabilitation and increas­ ing industrial unemployment. In America, it was believed by authoritative circles that the carrying out of the Congressional naval program would certainly arouse resentment and, probably, retaliation on the part of the other naval Powers, and, perhaps, the perpetuation of the odious Anglo-Japanese Alliance which was looked upon with great suspicion and apprehension in the United States as well as in Canada. In view of the above-mentioned circumstances, in the 1920 session of the United States Congress, that venerable

Yamato Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1 9 2 8 ), p. 46.

82 and firm isolationist from Idaho, the late Senator Borah, suggested, hy offering a resolution, that an international conference he convened for the main purpose of considering the reduction of naval armaments.

On February 24, 1921, he

submitted an amendment to the naval apprcppriation hill authorizing and requesting the President to invite England and Japan to a conference for the purpose of . . . entering into an understanding or agreement hy which the naval building program of each of said Govern­ ments, to wit, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, shall he substantially reduced during the next five years, . . .2 The bill, Including the amendment, was passed.

This paved

the way for the calling^ of the conference hy President Harding on Armistice Bay, November 11, 1921, after a balloon d !essay (jL.e., a feeler) had been made in the capitals of 4 the interested States. The grand opening of the Washington Conference took place 11in the spacious, simple, but beautiful room of the

2 Congressional Record, 66th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. LX, Part 3, p. 374. ’ 3

President Hardingfs formal invitation was Issued on August 11, 1921. See Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 21-23> for the text of the invitation. 4 1.e., Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy. Later broadened to include Belgium, the Netherlands, Portu­ gal, and China for the purpose of considering the problems of the Far East.

Daughters of the American Revolution Building11^ under the presidency of the head of the American delegation, as is customary in international conferences in which the head delegate of the host State becomes automatically the presid­ ing officer, or president.

After a brief introductory

address by the President of the United States welcoming the assembled delegates and wishing them “that understanding which will emphasize the guarantees of peace, and for com­ mitments to less burdens and a better order which will tranquilize the w o r l d , t h e conference was then turned over to the presidency of the Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes. Secretary Hughes then proceeded to propound his bold, straightforward, and sweeping plan^ of disarming the naval Powers.

He asserted that the best way to disarm was to dis­

arm; that the time to start was immediately and not in the near or distant future.

He then proposed a ten-year naval

building holiday in capital ships, and the scrapping of

of the Thomas People it was

Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 3^. A further description general atmosphere, seating, et cetera, see loc. cit. A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History of the American (New York: F. S. Croft's & Co., 13PF0)-, p . b$0, said 1convened in the beautiful Memorial Continental Hall. ^ Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 35*

^ rbid., Chap. Ill, pp. 3^-^5* gives complete discus­ sion of the American proposal.

84 other battleships either already built or in process of building*

Thus the naval strength of the three Great Powers

(l..je., Great Britain, Japan, and the United States) would be left at a ratio of 5-5-3.

Under Secretary Hughes1 plan the

United States was "to scrap thirty (new and old) ships with a total tonnage of 845*740,"^ while Great Britain was to scrap or abandon "a grand total of 581,575 tons,"^ and Japan was "to abandon or scrap, in all, 17 ships, with an aggre­ gate of 448,928 tons."^

"Thus these three Powers were to

reduce their capital-ship strength by scrapping, in all, sixty-six ships with an aggregate of 1,876,045 tons."'*'1 The reaction of the assembled delegates upon hearing the proposal is portrayed by one writer as follows: ". . . It electrified the calm session; some were shocked, some were even alarmed, but others were pleased. a memorable one in history. «IPc

It made the day

Professor Thomas Bailey made

his own observations in the following manner: The audience was stunned. Then Congressmen, Senators, and Supreme Court justices broke into wild applause like that of a political convention. It seemed as if the o Ibid., p. 55. 9 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 10 Ibid.. p. 36. 11 Loc. clt. 12 Ibid., p. 35.

85 millenium were being ushered in. The newspapers ran banner headlines. Enthusiasm throughout the United States mounted to a fever pitch. Sermons and prayers hailed Hughes as the savior of civilization, and be­ sought divine guidance. The president of the American Civic Association caught the spirit when he proposed that the antiquated cannon encumbering the public parks be taken to the dump yards.13 Commenting further on the magnitude of Secretary Hughes* proposal, Professor Bailey continued: . . . In less than fifteen minutes he (Hughes) destroyed sixty-six ships with a total tonnage of 1,878,045— more, as one British reporter put it, uthan all the admirals of the world have sunk in a cycle of centuries.” It was not only the greatest naval en­ counter on.record, but probably the most dramatic moment in American diplomatic history.14 The unusually high spirit of friendliness, understand­ ing, cooperation, and, much more important, the determina­ tion to accomplish something pervaded the delegations^ throughout the duration of the conference and enabled them to achieve almost all, if not all, of their major objectives, and set a precedent and a record difficult enough for the succeeding disarmament conferences to equal or surpass. Furthermore, there was also the support of a growing public

Bailey, og. cit., p. 6 9 1 . 14 koc. cit. ^ Except for a little difficulty with the French delegations, the conference proceeded on with its business smoothly. See Ichihashi, op. cit., Chap. V, pp. 60-71* for a discussion of the difficulty with the French. See also Bailey, op. cit., pp. 693^95.

86

opinion, in all participating States, toward the reduction of expenditures in armaments. Some of the major achievements of the conference may he briefly summarized here as follows: First of all, there l6 was the Five Power Treaty Limiting Naval Armaments which was signed on February 6 , 1922.

It provided for the scrap­

ping of sixty-six1^ ships, built or in building. Great l8 Britain was left with twenty capital ships with a total tonnage of some 558*950; the United States with eighteen capital ships of 5 2 8 ,8 5 0 tons; while Japan was allowed to have ten capital ships with an aggregate of 2 0 3 ,3 2 0 tons. France and Italy were permitted to have ten capital ships each, but of lesser tonnage (2 2 1 ,1 7 0 tons for the former, and 182,800 for the latter). limited by the same treaty.

Aircraft carriers were also Both the United States and

Great Britain were to have 135,000 tons each, 81,000 tons for Japan; and for France and Italy, 60,000 tons each.

For

the other categories of vessels, no acceptable proposals 16

For the text of the treaty, see J. E. Harley, Docu­ mentary Textbook on International Relations (Los Angeles: Suttonhouse, 193477 PP* 713-50. See also ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 365-85. — 17 Ibid., p. 106. See also pp. 377-81 for the names of vessels to be scrapped and replacements thereby. See Harley, op. cit., pp. 724 et sqq. for same. T O xu This and the following figures are taken from a list given by Ichihashi, op. cit., p. 105. Replacement figures are also listed loc. cit.

87 could be reached.

The British plan for the abolition of the

submarines was turned down by the other Powers, and a draft treaty prohibiting the use of submarines as commerce de­ stroyers, though signed, failed of adoption on account of the refusal of Prance to ratify it.

British refusal to make

any concession on the limitation of destroyers made it im­ possible to make also any limitation on cruisers.

However,

further provisions were made w . . . i n the nature of limita­ tion . . .

as regards the number and the caliber of guns to

be carried by various types of vessels. f,19 A few other agreements pertaining to the Pacific region and the Par East were also concluded.

This was made

a condition precedent for Japan’s acceptance of the 5-5-3 ratio in naval armaments.

For example, Article 19 of the

Naval Treaty specifically provided that . . . the United States, the British Empire and Japan agree that the status quo at the time of the signing of the present treaty, with regard to fortifications and naval bases, shall be maintained in their respective territories and possessions specified hereunder.20 Wherefore, under this provision, the United States agreed to maintain the status quo in all its insular possessions and those which may be acquired hereafter in the Pacific ^except

Ibid., p. 107- Further discussion of other provi­ sions and limitations may be found ibid., p. 1 0 5 et seq.

88

(a) those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska and the Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian Islands The British also accepted the same provision with respect to Hongkong and the insular possessions which the Brit­ ish Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean east of the Meridian of 110 east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand.22 Japan, on the other hand, agreed not to alter the status quo of its defenses in "the Kurile Islands, the Bonin Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa and the Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire." ^ oil * On December 13, 1921, the Four Power Treaty was signed, the purpose of which was to guarantee "the preserva­ tion of the general peace and the maintenance of their rights in relation to their insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean.

21 Ibid., p. 369. 22

Loc. cit.

n2 5

^

The

See Harley, op. cit., p. 717.

See also Ichihashi, loc. cit.

23 Loc. cit. See also Harley, loc. cit. 24 The four Powers were the United States, Great Britain, France, and Japan. ^ 733.

Preamble to the treaty.

See Harley, op. cit., p.

89 signatories further wagree as between themselves to respect their rights11 in these possessions.

Moreover, a provision

was made for the peaceful settlement of any future contro­ versies between or among the signatories over the same territories; and that in the event of any outside threat the parties would communicate with each other ”in order to arrive at an understanding as to the most efficient measures to be taken, jointly or separately, to meet the exigencies of the particular situation.o26

However, probably the most

important provision of the Pour Power Treaty (at least from the American and Canadian point of view) was the specific abrogation2? Qf the Anglo-Japanese Alliance whiGh was re­ newed at London on July 13, 1911* The last treaty which may be briefly mentioned here is the Nine Power Treaty,2^ concluded on February 6, 1922, whereby the signatories obligated themselves #,to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and ad­ ministrative integrity of China,”29 and to uphold the Open Door principle, i,*£•, #,the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout the

2^ Harley, loc. cit. 27

-> P. 734.

2® The text of the treaty is given ibid., pp. 736-39* 29 Ibid., p. 736 (Article I).

90 territory of China.11^ In addition to the afore-mentioned major accomplish­ ments at the Washington Conference, one may mention in pass­ ing the minor agreements such as the termination of the 31 Shantung dispute between China and Japan, the withdrawal by Japan of the obnoxious uTwenty-one Demands,11 the agree­ ment to evacuate Siberia, the Chinese Tariff Treaty,*^2 and the granting of special cable rights to the United States by Japan oh the island of Yap. With regard to the various claims and counterclaims of advantages or disadvantages derived by the contracting parties at the conference, Professor Bailey had this to say: But with the passage of time it becomes increasingly evident that the Washington Conference was not a triumph for anybody. In general, it recognized existing reali­ ties and attempted to freeze the status quo. Like all compromises, it was not completely satisfactory to any­ one. The United States, to be sure, surrendered poten­ tial naval supremacy, and potential fortifications on her Pacific islands. But the American delegation, know­ ing the mood of the taxpayers and recognizing that public opinion would not permit a war in behalf of the Open Door, regarded these potentialities as liabilities rather than assets. When both sides are balanced it is clear that the Conference was a landmark in history. It actually did bring about a temporary cessation of frantic naval

Harley, loc. cit. See Ichihashi, op. cit., pp. 389-97* for the text. 52 Ibid., pp. 398-^02.

91 building, with a consequent improvement of international feeling. In the Par East, where the achievements of the Conference were less dramatic but more important, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated; the Open Door was given a new lease of life; and the navies of the great Powers in the Pacific were so scaled down that none could hope to attack the other with reasonable prospect of success. This general air-clearing dis­ pelled the fetid international atmosphere, and made pos­ sible a more satisfactory recuperation from the World War than would otherwise have been possible.53 II.

THE GENEVA NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1927

Notwithstanding the general agreement among text writers, after the Washington Conference, regarding the out3k standing success of the conference in reducing and limiting --

naval armaments, nevertheless, as the years went by, it was later discovered that what reduction and limitation there was in capital ships and aircraft carriers were practically made useless by the increasing naval armaments race in other categories, viz., cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, not provided for in the Washington Naval Treaty.

So that be­

tween February 6, 1922, and October 1, 1928, the United States began construction of eight cruisers, Great Britain fifteen, Japan fifteen, France eight, and Italy six.-^

^ Bailey, op. clt., pp. 698-99. ■3 h. ^ Reasons for this success are attributed to four factors. See F. L. Schuman, International Politics (second edition: New York.and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1937), P. 602. ^

Ibid., p. 6o4.

92 Practically outnumbered in cruisers by Japan and Great Britain, the United States became somewhat apprehen­ sive.

So, on February 10, 1927* President Coolidge invited

Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy to take part in a conference with the United States to limit the construction of the categories of naval vessels not provided for by the Washington Naval Treaty.

But the refusal*^ of Italy and

France to participate almost foredoomed the conference to failure even before it met.

However, inasmuch as the two

greater Powers, .i.e., Great Britain and Japan, had already accepted the invitation, and after further consultation, President Coolidge decided to proceed with a Three Power Con­ ference. Accordingly, the so-called Coolidge or Geneva Confer­ ence was convened on June 20, 1927* at Geneva, under the presidency of Mr. Hugh Gibson, the head of the American delegation.

The participants were represented mostly, if

not entirely, by their delegations to the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference which, unfortunately, were largely composed of admirals and other high ranking naval men, designated as naval experts, who had 36

Reasons for such refusal may be found in John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Disarmament and Security Since Locarno, 1925-1931 (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932), p. 108. See also Harley, op. cit., p. 610.

93

no intention whatsoever of abolishing their own jobs.

With

this background in view, plus the now-known notorious activi­ ties of !lan American lobbyist, William B. Shearer, generously paid by three large shipbuilding firms,**37 who 11did his patriotic bit to wreck the conference by dispensing unfavora­ ble publicity,n3& one can hardly expect any forthcoming suc­ cess out of such a conference. In addition to the aforesaid obstacles, there was also the adamant disagreement between the British and the American delegations regarding the question of cruisers, one of the three*^ main purposes of the conference.

While the Ameri­

cans, on the one hand, insisted on a global limitation on cruisers, and the construction of 10,000 ton cruisers mount­ ing eight-inch guns which are consonant with the United States* needs owing to her lack of naval bases; the British, on the other hand, with bases at strategic places all over the world, clung tenaciously to her demand for greater ton­ nage, a large number of small cruisers with a maximum dis­ placement of 7 ,5 0 0 tons and carrying no more than six-inch guns. 40 With both sides holding fast to their respective

37 Schuman, op. cit., p. 6 0 5 . 38 hoc. cit. 39 The others were destroyers and submarines. 40 For a more complete account of British and American

94

proposals and hardly giving up anything for compromise, and realizing that there was no other means of escape from the impasse after further attempts were made hy the United States and Japanese delegates, the conference finally broke » 4l up in complete failure on August 4, 1927. III.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1930

Subsequent to the break-up of the Geneva Naval Con­ ference of 1927, the responsible authorities in the capitals of the interested parties immediately made pronouncements pledging 42 themselves that, in spite of the failure of their delegates, at Geneva, to conclude any agreement, they would build no more cruisers, destroyers, and submarines than what their national interest, safety, and security actually war­ ranted.

Despite these promises, it was soon evident that

the construction of the above-mentioned categories of naval vessels proceeded in earnest.

In the United States, for

example, the Committee on Naval Affairs of the House of Representatives introduced a bill calling for the construc­ tion of twenty-five cruisers, nine destroyers, thirty-two

plans and their differences, et cetera, see Nheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 109 et, sqq. 4l Ibid., pp. 118 ejb sqq., gives the various reasons attrnYbuted to the failure of the conference. 4p Ibid., p. 126.

95 submarines, and five airplane carriers which would cost the taxpayers approximately $725*000,000.

It was only through a

vocal opposition to this program fired at the capital that Congress was forced, in February, 1929* to reduce the appro­ priation to $274,000,000, sufficient only to build fifteen cruisers and a single aircraft carrier. Meantime, the Anglo-French Naval Compromise^ of 1928 drew no little amount of resentment, nay even consternation, in American and other European countries.

The compromise

was later unqualifiedly rejected by the United States. Italy followed suit.

The estrangement between the two great

Anglo-Saxon Powers became wider and wider.

However, with

the advent of a new administration both at Washington and hondon, a bright prospect for a reconciliation coming.

Il Ji

was forth­

At the behest of Mr. Hugh Gibson, who was at the

Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, the initial step

2ir

was taken, on April 22, 1929* to allay the

new differences by proclaiming that the United States was ready to consider further limitation and reduction of naval armaments on the basis of the French thesis, i..j3., global

^ Ibid., pp. 127-42, gives a good account of the com­ promise. 44 Ibid., pp. 142-57. 45

Ibid., p. 6 9 * gives the pertinent paragraph of Mr. Gibson1s speech.

96 limitation by tonnage and division of total tonnage for each State into the four categories of "capital ships; aircraft carriers; surface vessels of 10,000 tons and under, mounting a gun above 6-inch; submarines." After the assurances given by President Hoover on May 5 0 , 1929* reiterating the desire of his government to cooper­

ate in finding new avenues for naval limitation and reduc­ tion, and the prolonged conversations between the new Brit­ ish Prime Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, and Charles G. Dawes, the new American Ambassador to London, as well as the sub­ sequent good-will tour of the former (i..e., MacDonald) in the United States in October, a way was now open for the calling of a conference.

So, on October 7 * 1929* invita-

217

tions ' were dispatched by Foreign Secretary Henderson of the British Government, to Japan, the United States, France, and Italy, to a new naval conference to be held in London in 1930. The London Naval Conference met on Tuesday, January 21, 1930* at 11:00 A.M., in the Royal Gallery, House of Lords, Westminster, S.W.l.

The Prime Minister of Great

^ 5kid., pp. 129* 145. 47 The text of Henderson1s note to Ambassador Dawes as well as copies of the notes to the other Powers may be found in the Proceedings of the London Naval Conference of 1930 and Supplementary Documents (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing office, 1931)* PP. 3-6.

97 Britain., Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, presided.^8

The opening of

the conference was marked with a formal speech by H. M. the King, welcoming the delegates and assuring them his con­ fidence in the good results to be attained if each country was equally determined to make sacrifices as a contribution to the common good.

The rest of the session was devoted to

the speeches of the heads of the different d e l e g a t i o n s ^ who took the privilege of expounding their respective national views.

The speeches were broadcast throughout the world. The second day of the conference was utilized by Mr.

MacDonald to broadcast a statement of his views to the people of the United States saying that the conference would strive to bring to the lowest common level all the programs of the five countries assembled at the conference, so that there would be no more competition between them in building ships, and that the program would be reduced to the very lowest possible level. Not until January 23 did the first business meeting of the conference take place.

The first weeks of the con­

ference were devoted to the preparation of the

a g e n d a .

50

Ibid., p. 23* Ibid., pp. 9Sl8, lias the complete list of names of the delegations, et cetera. 50 Wheeler-Bennett, o£. cit., p. 171*

98 The paramount object of the conference -was to reach an agreement on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines, con­ cerning which the Geneva Naval Conference of 1927 failed to conclude an agreement acceptable to all interested Powers. A brighter prospect of success was anticipated by the conference due to previous 51 understanding between the British and Americans regarding the question of parity.

However, as

in many previous conferences, it was later found out that this one was unable to sail smoothly.

The stumblingblock 52 was supplied by the parity claim of Italy and France. The French delegation insisted on global limitation as a solu­ tion which would allow each Power to put emphasis in what­ ever types of vessels it required most.

The acceptance, how­

ever, by the French delegation of a compromise involving the limitation by six categories of ships, with the possibility of transferring tonnage from one category to another, paved the way for the conclusion of a treaty acceptable to all. The Italians merely reiterated their willingness to reduce their naval armaments to any level, as long as parity was granted to them with other European Powers, viz., France. 51 The question of parity was already ironed out by personal conversations between MacDonald and Hoover while fishing together at the banks of the Rapidan. 52 por the different views of the French and Italians, see Wheeler-Bennett, op. cit., pp. 162 _et sqq.

99 Japan, on the other hand, simply asked for na 70 per cent «53 ratio in cruiser strength with the United States,

and the

retention of her existing strength in submarines, i_.

*

about 78,000 tons.

The British proposal for the abolition

of the submarines was readily supported by the United States, 54 but met the immediate refusal of both France and Japan. 55 The London Naval Treaty-^ which finally emerged from the conference, on April 22, 1930, consisted of five parts, but only four were signed by all the five Powers.

Part III,

which is probably the essence of the agreement, was not signed by both Italy and France in view of their inability to iron out their differences with regard to parity in cruisers, destroyers, and submarines.

The other three

Powers, however, were in complete accord.

56

An "escalator1*

clause, JL.J3., a safeguard"^ clause, is inserted in the treaty empowering any of the high contracting parties the right to augment its ratios in the event a nonsignatory State should

53 It Id., p. 179. 54 Reasons for French and Japanese refusal are given in ibid., pp. 1 7 8 -7 9 . 55 The text of the treaty may be found in ibid., pp. 205-15* or in Harley, op. cit., pp. 743-61. 56

A list of the categories of vessels and the re­ spective tonnages allotted to each of the three Powers is given by ibid., p. 6 1 3 . 57 Article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930.

100 build its navy to a threatening proportion.

However, due

notice is required when and if the said clause is invoked. In Part I, the five Powers agreed to extend till 1936 the provision of the Washington Treaty calling for a holiday in 58 the construction of capital ships; furthermore, certain 5Q by the signatories. capital ships were to be scrapped-^ Part II has to do with rules determining displacement,^ re­ placement,^ and "special types of vessels. . . . Part 63 IV required the submarines operating as commerce destroyers to place the crews and passengers in a place of safety (con­ sidering weather conditions, distance from land or nearness to a passing surface vessel) before sinking the vessel. While Part V provided for the duration of the treaty,

,

till December 31 9 1936, Part IV, which was designed to endure indefinitely, was an exception.

Finally, a specific provi­

sion was made for the calling of another conference in 1935 to frame a new treaty to replace and carry out the purposes 64 of the present treaty. Ibid., Article 1. 59 Ibid,, Article 2. Ibid., Articles 6-8. ^

Ibid.> Articles 9 and 10.

62

Ibid., Article 12.

^5 Ibid., Article 22. ^ Ibid., Article 23.

101 IV.

THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE OF 1935-1936

Pursuant to the specific provision of the afore­ mentioned London Naval Treaty of 1920, the British Govern­ ment issued invitations calling the signatories of the. London and Washington Naval Treaties to attend a conference 65 in London on the 2nd of December next, r after a series of bilateral conversations

66 with representatives of the other

signatories were instituted by the British Government in London. In spite of the inauspicious 67( developments of events in the preceding months, the delegates of the Five 68 Great Naval Powers, with the representatives of the Brit­ ish Dominions and India, gathered together on December 7, 65 The text of the invitation of the British Govern­ ment is given in The London Naval Conference, 1925• Report of the Delegates of the United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty of 1926 and Other Documents (Washing­ ton, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1926), p. 19. ^ Ibid., pp. 1 ejt sqq. 67 The conference was held in a somewhat unfavorable atmosphere after Japan had given a formal notice on December 29, 192^> to terminate the treaty regarding certain cate­ gories of vessels, including capital ships, aircraft car­ riers, et cetera. See ibid., p. 2. Then there was also the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in June, 1925* (loc» cit.), as well as the failure of the General Disarmament Conference held under League auspices as already discussed above.

68 The names of the Great Powers and the British Dominions participating are given In ibid., pp. ~3-**■• A list of the United States delegation is also given in ibid., p.

23.

102 19359

in a final and vain effort to prevent the naval arma­

ments race which was a contributing factor in plunging the world into armed conflict. The question of parity between Prance and Italy, and also between America and Japan, had, up to the opening of the conference, not yet been resolved.

They still consti­

tuted the crux of the problem, confronting the conference, which had to be ironed out as each delegation continued to reiterate the proposals already made by their respective governments.

Counter proposals, eloquent speeches, and im­

passioned appeals to reason and common sense failed to produce a compromise.

A proposal by the American delega­

tion for a reduction of twenty per cent in the navies, and the continuation of existing ratios found no support.

The

plea by the Japanese for a wcoramon upper limit” was rejected. Later came the withdrawal of the Japanese delegation from the conference on January 15> 1936.

However, the four

Powers remaining continued their negotiations resulting in a new naval treaty?*-* which was signed by the United States Great Britain, and Prance on March 25, 1936.

Japan refused

to have anything to do with it; while Italy, confronted with

The conference was delayed five days. 70 The text of the London Naval Treaty of 1936 is given in The London Naval Conference, 1935* op. cit., pp. 27-42.

103 a British naval demonstration in the Mediterranean and the economic sanctions invoked b y the League as a consequence of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, could not be expected to sign it.

The newly concluded treaty which contained five parts, a Protocol of Signature, and an Additional Protocol made no provision either for reduction or quantitative limitation of naval armaments.

Its cardinal contributions

were merely as follows: Part II simply provided for the limitation of capital ships to 35*000 tons mounting 14-ineh guns, but with a reservation that “if any of Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments signed at Washington . . . should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision . . .“71 then it will be permissi­ ble to carry 16-Inch guns.

Capital ships of “less than

17*500 tons” shall not be “laid down or acquired prior to the 1st January, 193^ .“72

Aircraft carriers were limited

to 2 3 ,0 0 0 tons and 6.1-inch guns;73 light surface vessels to. 8,000 tons;7^ and submarines to 2,000 tons and 5*l-inch guns.75

Part III provided for “advance notification and

Ibid., p. 31* Article *f. ^

Lojc. cit.

^

Ibid., Article 5*

^

Ibid., Article 6.

^

Ihid., p. 32, Article 7•

104 76 exchange of information1 on future building programs; while Part IV provided for several “general and safeguard­ ing”^

and “escape” clauses which prepared the way for later

departure from even these insufficient restrictions.

Parity

between the two great' Anglo-Saxon Powers was reiterated. Tokio and London availing themselves of the “safeguarding” clauses proceeded to enlarge their fleets before the end of 1936.

Thus by the dawn of 1937* all naval treaties imposing

quantitative restrictions on Great Britain, the United States, and Japan came to an end.

The beginning of a new period of

unrestricted naval expansionist program was on its way. Meanwhile, Britain had agreed to let Germany build her navy up to thirty-five per cent of the British fleet, while negotiations between Soviet Russia and Britain failed due partly to German opposition to any increases of the Russian Navy in the Baltic.

The United States, on the other

hand, was not to be left behind, but proceeded to strengthen the fortifications of her bases in the western Pacific and paid no attention to the British suggestion to continue the enforcement of Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty in order to preserve the status quo of the Pacific fortifica­ tions . 76

Ibid., pp. 3 2 -3 6 .

77 Itoid., pp. 3 6 -3 9 .

105 The British Government had March,

already announced in

1937* her plans for the construction of some 233,000

tons of capital ships, including three 35*000 ton battle­ and for the expenditure of over $5 0 0 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0 on naval

ships,

armaments in the following year.

Uncle Sam, not to be out­

done, increased also her naval budget with Japan desperately staggering behind to continue with her naval expansion pro­ gram in order to keep pace with her two wealthier and more powerful competitors. The consequences of the various attempts for both naval and land disarmaments, as briefly discussed above and the preceding chapter, may be ably and precisely concluded by a short quotation from the concluding remark of Professor Schuman in his section on "The Failure of Disarmament," as follows: Disarmament at sea had become a memory of the fading past and a feeble hope of the remote future. Disarma­ ment on land and in the air had never amounted to more than the temporary reduction to helplessness of the vanquished of 1918. Even this was now gone with the victors helpless to prevent the vanquished from arming to the teeth for revenge. Japan and America drifted toward conflict. Germany armed for the day of glory and her neighbors armed desperately in self-defense. Each Power sought safety in matching its potential enemies regiment for regiment, bombing plane for bombing plane, battleship for battleship. In this there could be no security but only the promise of disaster. . . . The letters of FAILURE, written large over the portals of successive disarmament conferences during the two decades after Versailles, have become letters of impend­ ing catastrophe for the Western w o r l d , 78 ^

Schuman, op. cit., pp. 619-20.

106 V.

INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCES 1923-19^0

In addition to the afore-mentioned naval conferences, and despite the fact that the topic of Inter-American Con­ ferences has already been treated, though rather cursorily, in the first chapter of the present study, nevertheless, it is appropriate to deal with it here once more.

Particular

attention will he centered on the peace efforts of the InterAmerican Conferences held after World War I. Although the nature and purpose of the periodical and nonperiodical Inter-American Conferences 79 have been predi­ cated primarily and solely toward the promotion of closer understanding, mutual cooperation, and the solution of InterAmerican problems, with a view to the ultimate preservation of the peace of the Western Hemisphere, and, therefore, as such, are quite unique from the other conferences hereinbe­ fore dealt with, yet they form a part and parcel of this work due to the fact that they typify one of the most out­ standing endeavors toward the attainment of peace on a regional basis. For instance, in 1925 > at the Fifth Inter-American

79 '^ A complete list of all Inter-American Conferences is compiled by Warren Kelchner, Inter-American Conferences, 1826-1955j Chronological and Classified Lists (Washington, B.C . 2 Unit ed States Government Printing OffIce, 1955)* (a pamphlet)

Conference

go

held at Santiago, Chile, the fITreaty to Avoid n8 l and Prevent Conflicts Between American States, generally

known as the Gondra Treaty, was signed.

It provided for the

submission of all disputes to ad hoc ^Commissions of InOp * quiry.M Two permanent commissions, -composed of diplomatic representatives, were set up to initiate pacific settlement. 83

The Sixth Inter-American Conference ^ at Havana, on January 16 to February 20, 1928, may be mentioned here, in passing, first, simply for its resolution, adopted at the beginning of the conference, which paid 11tribute to the memory of the eminent citizen of America, Woodrow Wilson, Oa See Harley, op. cit., pp. 2 6 7 -6 8 , for a concise statement of other acts of the conference.

81

See Report of the Relegates of the United States of America to the Fifth Internetional~Conference of American States, Held at Santiago, Chile, March 23-May 37 1$23 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1923) See also .Fifth International Conference of American States. Verbatim record of the Plenary Sessions; Vol. 1, Journal of Sessions; Pan American Union, 1923* tTexts in both Spanish and English.) 82

For the .explanation of the composition and function of these commission as well as the Gondra Treaty in general, see Charles Evans Hughes, Pan .American Peace Plans (New Haven: Yale University Press, 192$), pp. 53 et sqq. 83

See the Report of the Delegates of the United States to the Sixth Conference oT American States (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1928). See also James B. Scott, The Sixth,International Conference of Ameri­ can States, January lb to February 20, 1$28 (A survey), International Conciliation^ published in New York by Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June, 1928, No. 2417 Note: this contains an appendix of all the resolutions, declarations, et cetera.

108 Q2j.

apostle of international peace and justice*1;

and second, 8*5 for another fIHesolution Concerning the Outlawry of War . 11 The Seventh Inter-American Conference convened at

Montevideo, on December 3 to 26, 1933> may be remembered principally for two things: first, for the resolution of approval

86 of the “Argentine Anti-War Pact ,

11 the so-called

“Saavedra Lamas Treaty,fl named in honor of Argentina’s Ql7 Foreign Minister; and second, for the convention on the QQ “Rights and Duties of States . 11 The said convention partly declared that !,No State has the right to intervene in the O Q

internal or external affairs of another.1*

The convention

itself was substantiated by the pronouncement of Secretary 84

See Scott, loc. cit., for the text of the resolu­

tion. 8*^5 The text of the resolution is given in the Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Sixth International Conference of American States, op. cit., pp. 26-27.

86 The resolution for the approval of the Argentine Anti-War Treaty is embodied in Resolution IV and was unani­ mously approved on December 16, 1933- Note: The said treaty was first signed on October 10, 1933> at Rio de Janeiro by Argentina, Brzil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Dr. Saavedra hamas was the author of the treaty and a Nobel Peace Prize winner as a result of his successful efforts to settle the Gran Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay.

88 See L. S. Rowe, The Seventh International Confer­ ence of American States in the Bulletin of the Pan American Uni onTWashing t on, D.C.: United. States Government Printing Office, Vol. 6 8 , March, 1934), p. 156. ^

hoc. cit.

109 of State Hull in the course of the discussion of the same project when he declared: I feel safe in -undertaking to say that under our sup­ port of the general principle of the non-intervention as has “been suggested, no Government need fear any inter­ vention on the part of the United States under the Roosevelt administration.90 Two days after the adjournment of the conference, on Decem­ ber 2 8 , 19339 the President of the United States further strengthened the said convention when he solemnly announced, in speaking before the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, that flThe definite policy of the United States from now on is one opposed to armed intervention.11^'1' Probably one of the most outstanding Inter-American Conferences, including those held periodically, was the Qp Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace^ held in Buenos Aires, from December 1st to the 23^d, 1936* The said conference was originally proposed and personally opened by President Roosevelt on December 1, 1938.

After a

Rowe, loc. cit. 91

Quoted by Rowe, loc. cit. 92 „ For the Texts adopted by the Inter-American Con­ ference for the Maintenance.of Peace,” see League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement No* 1 7 8 / Geneva, 1937* See also Report of the Delegation of the United States of America to the Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Print­ ing Office, 1937).

110 very animated reception, the President declared that nonAmerican States seeking f,to commit acts of aggression against us will find a Hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good. «93 ^ This declaration may he correctly construed as none other than a general invitation to multilateralize the traditional uni­ lateral policy of the United States respecting the Western Hemisphere as embodied in the Monroe Doctrine.

Howbeit, due

to the obligations of some of the Latin American States to the League of Nations and the then prevailing jealousies among them, nothing worth while arose from the proposal. Instead the assembled delegates adopted a consultative pact with a view to coordinating further the existing peace machinery, 9^ and reaffirming the principle of noninterven­ tion in a protocol which was later unanimously approved by the United States Senate.

Secretary of State H u l l ^ who sat

93 ^ The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin Delano Roosevelt (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193b), V, 6o6. Oil. ^ See Department of State, Press Releases December 26, 1936, PP. 5 3 6 -3 7 , for a list of the peace machinery. See also Walter W. Van Kirk, The Lima Conference (New York: National Peace Conference, 1939J* P. 6. 95 see C. Hull, . . . Opening Address to the InterAmerican Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, Buenos. Aires, Argentina, December 193b (Washington, D.C.f United States Government Printing Office, 1936). (A pamphlet). See also Hull!s speech before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, February 25* 1937* on the Results and Signifi­ cance of the Buenos Aires Conference (Washington, D.C.:

Ill throughout the conference as head of the American delegation contributed much to the success of the conference by his tactful handling of the Argentine delegation. Prominent among the sixty-nine conventions, resolu­ tions, declarations, and recommendations providing for closer economic, political, and cultural relations signed by the delegates of the twenty-one American Republics at the time of the adjournment of the conference on December 23 > was the "Convention for the Maintenance, Preservation and Establishment of Peace."

The first article of this conven­

tion provided that: In the event that peace of the American Republics is menaced, and in order to coordinate efforts to prevent war, any of the Governments of the American Republics signatory to the Treaty of Paris of 1928 or to the Treaty of Non-Aggression and Conciliation of 1933* or to both, whether or not a member of other peace organiza­ tions, shall consult with the other Governments of the American Republics, which, in such event, shall consult together for the purpose of finding and adopting methods of peaceful cooperation.9o Then the convention went on to provide that: In the event of war, or a virtual state of war be­ tween American States, the Governments of the American Republics represented at this Conference shall undertake without delay the necessary mutual consultations, in

United States Government Printing Office, 1937)* Then there are also the two addresses of Sumner Welles on the Accom­ plishments of the Buenos Aires Conference, one on February W, 1$37/ and the other on April”~77 1937- Both are govern­ ment publications as above. ^ kQQfjUQ of Nations Official Journal, Special Supple­ ment, No. 1 7 8 , p. 10.

order to exchange views and to seek, within the obliga­ tions resulting from the pacts above mentioned and from the standards of international morality and method of peaceful collaboration; and, in the event of an inter­ national war outside America which might menace the peace of the American Republics, such consultation shall also take place to determine the proper time and manner in which the signatory States, if they so desire, may eventually cooperate in some action tending to preserve the peace of the American C o n t i n e n t . 97 Included among the sixty-nine conventions, resolu­ tions, and declarations was a resolution to defer the con­ sideration of the project for a ^League of American Q O

Nations,11^

1

as originally presented separately by the dele­

gates of the Dominican and Colombian Republics, to the Eighth Inter-American Conference scheduled to meet at Dima in 1958.

The Mexican project for a KCode of Peace,”^

as

well as other proposals such as the Inter-American Court of International Justice,***^ Codification of International Daw , 1 0 1 and a few others, met a similar fate. In point of time, the latest of the regular InterAmerican conferences, the eighth in the series since its first meeting in Washington in 1889* was convened at Lima,

^ league of Nations Official Journal, Special Supple­ ment, No. 1 7 8 7 “loc. cit. ^ Tbid., pp. 49.70. 99 Loc. cit.

113 Peru, on December 10, 1938,

102

amidst the fast approaching

crisis in the international relations of Europe.

The in­

creasing fear of the United States of the rapidly rising power of the European dictatorships, in conjunction with the steady penetration of their commerce as well as subversive propaganda into the Datin American States, drove the United States to redouble her efforts to align the twenty-one Republics of the Western Hemisphere into an iron-front against the so-called "aggressor nations."

However, much as

the United States tried her very best to secure a binding agreement along this line, but due to the stone-wall put up by Argentina, nothing much could be done except to join the rest of the twenty Datin sister States of the South in adopt­ ing, unanimously, "the rather innocuous Declaration of Dima. u !03 • • • This "Declaration of Dima,"10^ as signed by all the American States, asseverated the hemispheric solidarity

10P

There is discrepancy in the opening date of the Dima Conference. Bailey, op. cit., p. 7^9* gave December 10 as the date of convening, while Graham Stuart, The Dima Conference, published in the World Affairs Interpreter of the Dos Angeles University of International Relations, Vol. 1 0 , No. 1, Spring , 1939 > ] ? » * gave December 7 as the open­ ing date. See also Van Kirk, loc. cit. 103 Bailey, loc. cit. 104 The full text is given by Van Kirk, op. cit., pp. 12-13.

114 principle and firm determination to defend it against the intervention of any non-American State.

In the event that

Mthe peace, security or territorial integrity of any Ameri­ can Republic is thus threatened,” it -was mutually agreed ”to make effective their solidarity . . .

by means of the pro­

cedure of consultation, established by conventions in force. . .

In order to nfacilitate the consultations” the

Declaration provided that Hthe Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American Republics when deemed desirable and at the initiative of any one of them, will meet in their several capitals by rotation.

. . .

The Declaration of Dima is rather self-explanatory. Although it is not in the form of a convention, yet by estab­ lishing a definite procedure for consultation and at the same time maintaining the principles laid down at the Buenos Aires Conference in 1936, it became a shibboleth of success for the American Secretary of State, Hull, in his unceasing efforts to obtain unanimous action against any potential autocratic aggression.

The said declaration may be also

held to be broader in scope and stated with greater preci­ sion the aims and purposes of the American Republics.

It

unequivocally reaffirmed both the principle of continental

Ibid., p. 13. Qii«

(Third Declaration)

(Fourth Declaration)

115 solidarity and the firm determination to defend the peace, security, and territorial integrity of the Americas against any foreign intervention or subversive activity of a threat­ ening character. Of the many achievements of the said conference, one of the last and perhaps the most important was the “Declara107 tion of American Principles . 11 The essence of this declaration may be readily gathered from Professor Stuart's own words: . . . intervention and the use of force as an instru­ ment of national or international policy were proscribed; international differences must be settled by peaceful means and international law must govern relations be­ tween states; the faithful observance of treaties is an indispensable rule of international conduct, and revi­ sion must be obtained by agreement of the signatory powers; intellectual and economic cooperation are essen­ tial to national and international well-being, and world peace can only be achieved by international cooperation based upon these principles. By patterning its conduct upon these bases, the New World might again “redress the balance of the Old 11 upon a firmer foundation. 108 Neither did the conference ignore the great importance 109 of economic problems confronting the American States, nor •^7 Ibid., p. 16, gives the full text. Stuart, The Lima Conference, op. cit., pp. 12-13. 109 See Van Kirk, op. cit., pp. 17-19, for a discussion of the Economic Problems at the conference and the text of the resolution to the same effect. This will be discussed further in the next chapter. Note: The projects for 11A League of American Nations” and the “Mexican Code of Peace” scheduled to be taken up in this conference failed to make any headway. See ibid., pp. 5-6 and p. 8 respectively.

116 did it minimize the increasing necessity of codifying the lav of nations. I10 In compliance with the provisions of the Declaration of Lima, shortly after the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, on September 1, 1939, the Foreign Ministers of the twenty-one American Republics gathered together at Panama,

111

on Septem­

ber 23 to October 3* 1939> and made consultations among them­ selves as to the best means of keeping the Western Hemisphere from becoming embroiled in the Second World War.

As a result

of this meeting, the twenty-one American States reaffirmed their determination to protect themselves from outside inter­ vention, and from involvement in the war by unanimously approving a "Joint Declaration of Continental Solidarity,1*11^ a "General Declaration of Neutrality of the American Repub­ lics,"11^ and, finally, a new "Declaration of Panama . 1111^ Besides the afore-mentioned approved declarations, there were 110

Ibid., pp. 26-27, gives a good discussion on the subject of Codification of International Law. See also Van Kirk*s reasons why the Lima Conference may be regarded as a distinct gain for peace.on pp. 34-36. 111 See Report of the Delegates of the United States of America to the Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Ameri­ can RepubXics (Washington, D7CT: United States Government Printing Office, 1940). 112 For the text see ibid., p. '53. ll"2) Ibid., pp. 54-57* bas the text. 114 Ibid., pp. 62-64, contains the text.

117 also many other declarations, resolutions, and agreements 11S ^ which had been approved, hut cannot he discussed here for lack of space.

A new provision for a second “Meeting of

Foreign Ministers”11^ was also agreed upon.

This material­

ized later in the Havana Conference of 1940. Pursuant to the agreement of the Foreign Ministers of the twenty-one American States in their first consultative meeting at Panama in 1939, as stated ahove, the “Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Re117 publics 11 assembled in Havana, Cuba, on July 21 to 30, 1940. While the delegates in their meeting at Panama were primarily concerned with measures designed to strengthen their neutrality as well as to minimize the economic conse­ quences of the war on the States of the Western Hemisphere; at Havana, although the delegates still remained greatly concerned with peace and neutrality, the emphasis at this time rather shifted to hemispheric problems of defense.

The

Ibid., pp. 23-81, gives the full text of other declarations, resolutions, et cetera. rbid*, p. 6 2 . 117

See Second Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics, in International ConeiTiation, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Septem­ ber, 19?0, No. 382, for text of Final Act and Convention signed July 30, et cetera.

118 reasons for this are readily discernible.

The successful

invasion of Germany in Denmark, Norway, and the Low Coun­ tries, coupled with the capitulation of France in face of a much superior German air and mechanized forces, as well as the threatened invasion of Britain had carried the war much closer to the Western Hemisphere, in the following manner. Politically, due to French, Dutch, and Danish territories in the Americas, and, economically, because the extension of the war zone had gradually and tremendously reduced Latin American exports due principally to the ever-increasing and tightening British blockade.

Then there is also the growing

apprehension to a greatly expanded Nazi activity in Latin America in conjunction with the increasing belief that com­ plete German domination and consolidation of economic powers in Europe will result in political and/or economic dictation in South America. Thus, while the purported agenda 119 of the Havana Conference was couched in very general terms, but nonethe­ less, it unmistakably reflected the crisis in the affairs of 1 *1 o

See Howard Trueblood, The Havana Conference of 19^0, in the Foreign Policy Reports, V o l . 16, No. 15, September 15, 19^0 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc.~ 19^0), p.

1587 119

See United States Department of State, Bulletin, June 29, 19^0, pp. 705-6 , for full text of the tentative agenda. See also ibid., July 6, 19^0, p. 11, for the final­ ly approved agenda.

119 Europe and the quick development of a novel idea of Hemi­ spheric collaboration. A total of forty-four projects of conventions, resolu­ tions, and declarations were submitted by the assembled delegates to the different committees sideration.

120

for study and con­

The conference finally approved twenty-six

resolutions, declarations, and recommendations. 121

In addi-

tion, a convention 122 dealing with European possessions in the Western Hemisphere was also approved which required the ratification by two thirds of the American States before 123 becoming effective. An approved resolution made certain improvements and modifications on the method of consultation, and specifically designated the Brazilian capital, Rio de Janeiro, as the host of the third meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Nations.

Finally special

mention may be made of the following approved resolutions: 12k Codification of International Law, Promotion of Continen-

120

A list of the Five Committees and their respective membership is given in International Conciliation, September, 1940, op. cit., pp. 275::75~' 121

The full texts of the twenty-six resolutions, declarations, and recommendations are given in ibid., pp. 277-302. 122 Ibid., pp. 305-11, has the complete text including the resolutions. 123 iphig iS Resolution XVII on "Procedure on Consulta­ tion." See ibid., pp. 291-92,.for text. I’ b id., p. 287* gives the text.

120 tal Solidarity,12'* The Peaceful Solution of Conflicts,12^ 127 and Economic and Financial Cooperation. Furthermore, there were also approved the following declarations:

(Con­

demning) Hostile Acts in Territorial Waters and in the noA Security Zone, ^ Reciprocal Assistance and Cooperation for the Defense of the Nations of the Americas, 129^ and Mainten130 ance of Peace and Union Among the American Republics. VI.

THE PACT OF PARIS OF 1928

Probably the most unique in the annals of official efforts ever undertaken in the interest of the peaceful re­ lations among nations was the conclusion of the lfPact of Paris,” popularly known as the ”Kellogg-Briand Pact,” signed in Paris on August 27, 1928, and put into force on July 24, 1929. Officially the Pact had its origin1''*1 ”in the Message

125 Ibid., p. 288. 12

Ibid., p. 289.

27 Ibid., pp. 298-301. 128 Ibid., pp. 288-89.

„

129 Ibid., p. 290. 130 ^ Loc. cit. 131 See Denys P. Myers, Origin and Conclusion of the Paris Pact (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1929* Vol. XII, No. 2), p.. 2.

121 of M. Briand addressed to the American people on the tenth anniversary of the entrance of the United States into the World War, April 6, 1 9 2 7 . However, actually, "the in­ spiration of the message^

was undoubtedly a talk which

M. Briand had with Professor James T. Shotwell a fortnight earlier.

Since there was no French official communica­

tion to the State Department, nothing was done with the message.

"Those in authority at Washington appeared to con­

sider the Briand message simply as in expression of friend13S

ship.”

Thanks to the initiative of Dr. Nicholas M.

Butler, who commenced a public discussion of the Briand proposal, "the American press and the American public awoke to the significance of the French offer."156 Not until June 20, 1927* did the Department of State receive a "Draft Pact of Perpetual Friendship between France

David H. Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris (New York: G-. P. Putnamfs Sons, 1928), p. 7. See also following pages. 133 The text of M. Briand1s message is given in ibid., pp. 154-59, Document I, in both French and English. See also James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy and Its Renunciation in the Pact of Paris (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co. , 1929) * P~ 4l. 134 Miller, op. cit., p. 7* See also Harley, op. cit., p. 526 n. 13 S 136

^

Miller, op. cit., p. 8. Loc. cit.

122 and the United States”1-^ from M. Briand.

In reply to this,

the American Secretary of State, Frank B. Kellogg, countered with an offer on December 28, 1927* that instead of ”a bi­ lateral declaration of the nature suggested by M. Briand,” the Governments of France and the United States nmight make a more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all of the principal powers of the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy.”1^

This proposal, except

for minor differences which were later ironed out, found im­ mediate approval by France. As was ultimately signed 1 ” "5Q by the fifteen original 140 141 signatory States and, later, by forty-seven adhering States, the Treaty was the exact copy of the ttAmerican 14? Draft” of April 15* 1928, and, in turn, was, with minor ^57 Ibid., pp. 160-65* gives the text. for discussion of the text.

See pp. 10-12

Ibid., p. 1 6 5 (Document 5). 159 p0p ^he text of M. Briand*s address at the signing of the Fact, and a general description of the signing, see J. Shotwell, op. cit., Chap. 16, uThe Signing of the Treaty,” pp. 1 7 7 -8 6 . The text of M. Briand1s address is on pp. 18186. Briand1s address may be found also in Miller, op. cit., pp. 254-59* and also in Harley, op. cit., pp. 545-487 Ibid., p. 548, has the list of the original signa­ tory States and the dates of their ratification. Ibid., pp. 548-49* gives the complete list of all the adhering States and the dates of ratification. Miller, op. cit., pp. 184-85.

123 changes and modifications, the copy of M. Briand1s original proposal of June 20, 1927 The conclusion of the Pact of Paris marked a new era in international cooperation.

It brought together all the

Great Powers, particularly those not members of the League of Nations, into a common orbit.

It raised new and high

hopes in the final elimination of lfwar as an instrument of national policy.”

It, once and for all, attempted to outlaw

all wars of aggression.

On this point it may be said that

Schwarzenberger, with certain conditions, and after evaluat­ ing the importance of the Pact, made a similar conclusion when he said: . . . [The] Briand-Kellog-Pact is of the utmost impor­ tance. Since it has been ratified by nearly all civi­ lized nations it must be regarded as more than a treaty; it has become a rule of international law, which, being embodied in a treaty, can claim to be universally valid with greater authority than many other rules of inter­ national common law. If we disregard the reservations accompanying some of the signatures, we can derive from this Pact the rule that wars of aggression have become illegal.144 Then the same author went on to justify the legal right of the States under the Pact to intervene for the

^ ^ Compare Briand1s original proposal with the Ameri­ can Draft, and the text of the treaty in ibid., pp. 160-63, 184-85* and 246-53 respectively. 144

Georg Schwarzenberger, The League of Nations and World Order (London: Constable & Co., Ltd.,~T93b), p. 113.

124 purpose of maintaining peace.

In this regard, he further

observed: Their intervention in order to maintain peace must therefore he regarded as lawful intervention, since its object is not only the enforcement of this specific -wtreaty, but also a vindication of international law. ^ However, although Schwarzenberger believed that the Pact of Paris had made it unlawful to launch a war of aggres­ sion, he was also of the opinion that the said Pact was far from completely outlawing war when he said, tTWar in the in­ terests of the international community as a whole is not outlawed by the Briand-Kellogg Pact.

The signatories have

only renounced war ‘as an instrument of national policy.1"1^ hack of a definite provision in the Pact of Paris for the complete outlawry of all wars, in conjunction with the total absence of any kind of an enforcement machinery to re­ solve questions arising between the States, soon brought the Pact to a crucial test.^2^ In the summer and autumn of 1929* Russia, n48 the first of all the States to ratify the Pact

145 Ibid., p. 114. 1 Ibid., p. 116. 147 The Pact was tested in the conflicts between China and Russia, China and Japan, Colombia and Peru, et cetera. 148 Notice that Russia ratified the Pact of Paris on September 27* 1928, more than five months earlier than the first signatory State ever to ratify the same. See Harley, loc. cit.

125 of Paris, came into blows with China in northern Manchuria. Secretary of State Stimson, after consultation and much dis­ cussion with the other signatory States as to what should be done, finally agreed with the British, Italian, and French 149 in December, 1929* to dispatch identic notes to Moscow and Nanking.

The notes, however, arrived after the exchange

of "hot lead" had ceased and a new treaty had been concluded. The absence of a specific organ for consultation led Mr. Stimson, the American Secretary of State, to suggest to the French Ambassador in Washington, M. Claudel, that machinery be immediately instituted In the manner of an im­ partial conciliation commission for consultation and for the marshalling of public opinion against an aggressor State. Unfortunately the proposal failed due to the traditional American policy of opposition to any "foreign entanglements." Nothing was further undertaken to correct the abovementioned weakness of the Pact of Paris.

But the emergence

of the Sino-Japanese crisis of 1951-1952 created a new inter­ est in the United States and at Geneva of the great necessity

■^9 Qn the Stimson note which, was transmitted through the French, Litvinov declared, 11 ... . the Soviet Government cannot forbear expressing amazement that the Government of the United States, which by its own will has no official re­ lations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel,” Harley, £p. cit., p. 554. See pre­ ceding pages for the text of the note in reply to the Stimson note, and the following pages for other important notes and documents.

126 of establishing some means of reinforcing the Pact if it was to become an effective instrument of peace.

However, in

spite of many attempts to strengthen it, the subsequent events have sufficiently demonstrated its inability to cope with acute international situations. Thus other official efforts outside of the League of Nations in the form of Naval Disarmament Conferences, Region­ al International Conferences, Multilateral Pact for the "Re­ nunciation of War," et cetera, are inadequate measures to meet and resolve international problems of greatest magni­ tude.

The clash of national interests of great import, be

they political, economic, financial, or otherwise, cannot be stopped by partial disarmament, regional

p a c t s ,

and multi­

lateral treaties of all kinds, in the absence of a strong centrally located enforcement organization.

^ Besides the Inter-American Conferences and agree­ ments thereby for the preservation of peace in the Americas, there were also other regional agreements in Europe such as the so-called "Locarno Treaties. See Schuman, qp. cit., pp. 589 sqq* For the text o f .the treaties, see Harley, op. cit., pp. 413 ejfc sqq. Note: Recent meetings of the min­ isters for Foreign Affairs will be incorporated in the next chapter to bring this up to date.

CHAPTER IV THE ECONOMIC BASES FOR AN ENDURING PEACE It was the province of the preceding chapter to make a definite study of other official efforts for peace under­ taken independently of the League of Nations.

The present

chapter will he devoted entirely to a brief survey of the numerous and various outstanding individual or group plans for better economic conditions which form an important phase in the establishment of any lasting peace. It is an incontrovertible fact that economics has played a very important part in the life of every State or nation.

Much more so has it occupied a greater role in the

past few centuries, or, to be more exact, since the dawn of the new era of industrial revolution.

However important was

the role of economics in the past, it is greatly over­ shadowed by its present magnitude in the life of each State or nation, particularly with regard to the Great Powers locked In a life and death struggle for existence in the current world-wide sanguinary conflict. I.

THE ECONOMIC CAUSES OP WAR1

Before proceeding any further with a discussion on

1

See John Bakeless, The Economic Causes of Modern

128 the basic economic principles underlying any attempt to mitigate the poor economic conditions which greatly con­ tributed to the Second World War, it is of great import that a brief summary be made of one of the greatest causes of war --economics. Without the slightest doubt, there are, indeed, many factors^ which contribute to precipitate war.

However,

among the long list of factors usually enumerated by differ­ ent authors, there is one which stands high and outranks the others in importance, and is usually conceded by all text writers on the subject to be the cardinal cause of many wars, if not all past wars, viz., the economic cause. If we turn back the pages of history and investigate one by one all the great wars of the past, indubitably it will be revealed that the economic cause of war was not W a r : A Study of the Period (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., 1 9 2 1 )• See aTso Lionel C. Robbins, Economic Causes of War (London: J. Cape, 1939); and G. L. Dickinson, Causes of International War (London: The Swarthmore Press Ltd. etc., 1920 ). 2 For a complete list of factors which lead to war, see Erik Achorn, European Civilization and Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1938)> PP* 384-8 b . Cf., Walter C. Langsam, The World Since 1914 (New York: The Mac­ millan Co., 1940), Chap. I, pp. 3-21. Also H. E. Barnes, World Politics in Modern Civilizations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1930), Chap. 14, pp. 306-23. Cf., A. Porritt, editor, The Causes of W a r : Economic, Industrial, Racial, Religious, Scientific, and Political (London: TheMacmillan & Co., L td., 1532); A. Salter” et al.,~ The Causes of War (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932*7; and Quincy Wright, Causes of War and Conditions of Peace (New York: Longmans, Green &fl!To., 1935) *

129 wanting.

Even the so-called wars of the “Crusades11 which

some believe were purely religious wars between the Moham­ medans and the Christians are now conclusively proved to have been tainted also with economic aspects. Various text writers in economics,

in history, and

other publications dealing with world affairs have listed a number of economic factors which,

they believe,

tend to

create frictions among the independent sovereign States under the Western State System.

For example, among the

3

principal economic factors*^ generally alleged to have con­ tributed much to precipitate the 1914-1918 debacle were the following: pressure;

(l) the need for raw materials;

(3) markets for goods or commodity markets;

markets for capital or investment markets; (6) irredentism;^ rivalry;

(2) population

(5) imperialism;

(7) munitions manufacturers;

(8) shipping

and (9) tariffs and other trade barriers.

are the more basic ones.

(4)

These

There are a number of others which

might be listed here, but they are simply the consequence of the above-mentioned factors. It is rather axiomatic that raw materials are

Achorn, op. c i t . , p. 384, enumerated theeconomic factors as follows: “unequal distribution of national re­ sources, pressure o f .population, tariff barriers, trade rivalry, and imperialism.“ C f ., F. L. Schuman, International Politics (second edition;.New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1937), Chap. 8, pp. 263-301.

^ Ibid., pp. 242-46

130 unequally distributed throughout the world.

Therefore, it

necessarily follows that no country on earth, no matter how richly endowed by mother nature with natural resources, could be completely self-sufficient.

Some countries, viz.,

Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Russia, the United States, and others, may possess many and varied raw materials of all sorts at their command, but none of them has all the raw materials she needs or wants.

For instance,

according to Professor J. Russell Smith, Mlt takes three or four continents, if not indeed five, to produce the makings for a single telephone instrument.

. . . ^

Again, Professor Staley illustrated, rather very clearly and cleverly, the world-wide search for raw materi­ als by listing 183 essential materials to the manufacture of an automobile and superimposing them across a map of the world.

The list is a very comprehensive one, ranging from

crude rubber to diamonds.^

These few States, referred to

above, are, in fact, the exception rather than the rule. The need for raw materials.

A survey of the resources

J. Russell Smith, North America (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1925), p. 800 n. Read also pp. 801-2. Cf., F. H. Simonds and Brooks Emeny, The Great Powers in World Politics (New York: American Book Co., 19357* ’ 6 Eugene Staley, World Economy in Transition (New York: Council on Foreign, Relations, 1939)V P- 2b (a pamphlet).

131 of the different States of the world conclusively proves that the great majority of the States are devoid of many of the natural resources which they need.

This unequal dis­

tribution of raw materials, therefore, led to rivalry among the States, particularly the industrial ones (or at least the vested interests within the country who wanted them) in their efforts to procure the goods to supply the needs of their industries.

Rivalry in the acquisition of raw materi­

als sometimes led to pressure; pressure was followed by partial control, and eventually by outright annexation of territories;^ annexation led to friction between the interO ested nations; and finally friction led to war.

7 Various writers give different reasons which may contribute to the annexation of territories, , honor, power, prestige, population pressure, commodity markets, in­ vestment markets, et cetera. o Many authors tried to prove that the rivalry for raw materials was and still is unnecessary as they are available to all. In fact, so they claimed, the market is glutted with excess raw materials. The only question which prevented them from obtaining these raw materials was lack of means to pay for them. See Grover Clark, The-Balance Sheet of Imperialism (New York: Morningside Heights, Columbia University Press, 1536), pp. 13-17. Cf., Norman Angell, Raw Materials, Population Pressure, and War (Boston and New York: World Affairs Books, World Peace Foundation, No. 14, 1936), pp. 12-32. See also Brooks Emeny, The Strategy of Raw Mate­ rials (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1934); aTso, Royal Institute of International Affairs, Raw Materials and War (information Dept. Papers, No. 18, New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 1936), and Eugene Staley, Raw Materials in Peace and War (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 19377*

152 Population pressure.

Population pressure is another

factor often used by the States to rationalize their imperi­ alistic motive to acquire colonies, or “a place in the sun." After 1880^ the race for colonial expansion was renewed with more intensified vigor than ever before.

England, Prance,

Italy, Germany, Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands were competing in Africa and elsewhere.

However, the importance

of the argument based on population pressure was not of so much weight prior to the first World War (1914-18) as it was in the present World War II.

Before 1914 there was still

freedom**'0 of movements of people from one country to another,

9 Clark, op. cit., p. 5* gives 1880 as the beginning of another mad race for colonies. 10 There was, however, already the Gentlemen1s Agree­ ment of 1907, between President Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese Government, whereby Japan voluntarily agreed not to issue passports to laborers desiring to go to the United States. The Japanese Exclusion Law did not come until May 26, 1924. In 1921 the United States had already a "quota law" restricting entry of aliens into the United States to 5 per.cent of foreign born persons of same nationality living in the United States in 1910. This was later reduced to 2 per cent by the law passed in 1924, and the date was moved down to 1890 instead of 1910. In 1929 the "national origins" plan came into effect which only admits 1 5 0 ,0 0 0 aliens annu-. ally on quota basis. (See Schuman, op. cit., pp. 258-61) Note further that long before the Japanese Exclusion Law, there was already a Chinese Exclusion Law in 1882. It had its origin in 1 8 7 9 when Congress passed a bill forbidding any ship from bringing into the United States more than fifteen Chinese on any one trip, but said bill was vetoed by President Hayes on March 1, 1879* as contravening the Bur­ lingame Treaty of 1 8 6 8 . Finally in 1882 a law was passed which, in its nature, called only for ten years suspension of Chinese immigration. However, subsequent renewals finally

135 but in later years several States passed immigration restric­ tions . Commodity and investment markets.

The struggle for

commodity and investment 11 markets brought the States closer together and caused them to rub elbows continually; this soon created animosities.

The same States already enumer­

ated above are now joined by the United States, Japan, Russia, and one or two minor powers, which are fIlate comers” in the struggle for supremacy in trade and investment in the Far East. As in Africa, so in Asia, were the two companion phrases "spheres of influence11 and "spheres of interest" utilized by the contending powers in the so-called backward regions which are not yet colonies.

To quote Professor

Schuman, the "spheres of influence" method was used by the Powers . . . in order that their nationals may enjoy ex­ clusive opportunities for profit making in these areas. International agreements for the creation of such spheres usually contemplate the closing of the door to

led to permanent restriction. See J. B. Trevor, Japanese Exclusion: A Study of the Policy and the Law (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing OlTTce, 1925j• (Further citations will be given elsewhere.) 11 Eugene Staley, War and the Foreign Investor (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., I n c . , 1935)* and also Fopslgrt Investment and .War (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935) CFublic Policy Pamphlet No. 18).

134 nationals of outside States. i pc Examples of the above methods were found in Persia by the Anglo-Russian Compact of 1907, the Franco-German Agreement of 1914 concerning Turkey, the inter-Allied secret treaties of 1915-1917 dealing with the Near-East, and many others. ■When 11spheres of interest11 and "spheres of influence” were no longer usable and feasible, in order to give access to the vested interests of some of the Powers which were "late-comers" in the race and which still want to have room for investments and markets for the products of their indus­ tries in these areas, the "Open Door11^ sisted upon.

principle was in­

Thus has the famous doctrine of the "Open

Door" been meticulously sponsored and jealously pursued by the United States in its Far-Eastern policy as well as by its real originator, Great Britain.

However, despite the

insistence on the "Open Door" rivalry prevailed among the leading powers, thereby contributing further to the ever­ growing friction among them. Imperialism.

Imperialism

I ii

is rather too broad or too

12 Schuman, op. cit., p. 5 6 7 . 13 ^ M. J. Ban, The Open Door Doctrine In Relation to China (New York; The.Macmillan Company, T9237* 14 See N. I. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (New York; International Publishers Co., Inc."^ i$29); Grover Clark, op. cit., and P. T. Moon, Imperialism-and World Politics (New York: The Macmillan Company, X926)j Schuman, op. cit., pp. 324-48, 349-57.

135 inclusive a word to use here without explanation.

Any dic­

tionary will define it as 11The policy Or practice of seeking to extend the control or empire of a nation.”

Several

writers have agreed that any extension of a State1s control or territorial domain is imperialism.

Imperialism, then,

will include the preceding factors already discussed with all their ramifications. Irredentism.

nIrredentism” has also been another

source of friction and is, therefore, well considered as a factor.

There was Italian irredentism and Italy*s desire to

recover Tyrol and Trentino from Austria, which are not rich in natural or mineral resources.

This contributed to the

continuously growing fuel for the approaching holocaust of 191^-1918.

The equivalent term in French, which is revanche,

was applied to the recovery of Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. The rich mineral resources of this region, particularly coal, were quite essential to France when this territory was taken away from her in 1 8 7 1 .

While this was not really a matter of

life and death to the French Republic, nevertheless, the de­ pletion of her already limited coal resource, provided good fuel to the already boiling cauldron of hatred for the Germans. Private munitions manufacturers.

Unrestricted pri­

vate manufacture of armaments is another factor destined to

136 help create either an internal disorder, or an international war.

It is now a well-known and well-established fact that

the unrestricted private manufacture of armaments has aided, to no small degree, in the making of wars, whether it be the First World War, the Spanish Civil War, the Gran Chaco War, or/and other wars. In a very exhaustive study on The Private Manufacture of Armaments, Professor

N o e l - B a k e r 1^

pointed out unerringly

the evil effects of such an unhindered and unrestricted manu­ facture of the weapons of destruction. The author asserted that the British Government, not only trapproves the system of private manufacture, and encour­ ages private firms to increase the scale of their produc­ tion,1*'1'^ but also aids them by placing huge orders and by granting subsidies. 171

Not content with these, the govern­

ment also often encourages the companies to extend their sales abroad, and even goes to the extent of permitting

1R

^ Philip Noel-Baker, The Private Manufacture of Arma­ ments (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd. , 1936). See also H. C. Engelbrecht, Merchants of Death (New York: Dodd, Mead & Co., Inc., 193^)i and R. Neumann, Zaharoff: The Armaments1 King (New York: Alfred A. Khopf, Inc., 1935)• Noel-Baker, op. cit., p. 58. See also p. 60 and the following pages for United States1 approval and encour­ agement . 17 Ibid., pp. 63-6 5 .

157

government diplomatic representatives in foreign capitals to aid or support the agents of private armament firms.

■so

There are many other ways in which various govern­ ments have given practical support to private arms manufacturers, such as, for instance, financial help, 19^ the loaning of government experts, 20 the use of government warships for demonstration to prospective buyers, 91 and many others which cannot be mentioned here for lack of space. As a result of governmental sanction and encourage­ ment, and the untrammelled activities of the private arms manufacturers, several abuses have been uncovered by the League of Nations1 Sub-Committee on Private Manufacture of Armaments.22

Perhaps it will be worth while to quote, in

part, the report of the said sub-committee, in the early stage of its proceedings, pointing out the objectionable

18 Ibid., pp. 76- 80 . Ibid., pp.

68 ff.

20 Ibid., pp.

71 ff.

Ibid., pp.

74 ff.

22

The League of NationsCouncil appointed a Temporary Mixed Commission which included in itsmembership the political representatives of G-overnments, Trade Union Dele­ gates, Manufacturers, Economists, Civil Servants, Sailors, Soldiers, and Airmen. However, due to the size of this com­ mission, a Sub-Committee on Private Manufacture of Armaments was established which actually conducted the investigation.

138

features of the unrestricted private manufacture of arma­ ments as follows: It is common knowledge that the public mind is strongly prejudiced against the uncontrolled private manufacture of munitions and implements of war, and that it is a common belief that wars are promoted by the com­ petitive zeal of private armament firms, and would be rendered less frequent were the profit-making impulse brought under control or eliminated altogether. In gen­ eral the objections that are raised to untrammelled pri­ vate manufacture may be grouped under the following headings: 1. That armament firms have been active in fomenting war scares and in persuading their own countries to adopt warlike policies and to increase their armaments. 2. That armament firms have attempted to bribe gov­ ernment officials both at home and abroad. 3. That armament firms have disseminated false re­ ports concerning the military and naval programmes of various countries in order to stimulate armament ex­ penditure. 4. That armament firms have sought to influence pub­ lic opinion through the control of newspapers in their own and foreign countries. 3. That armament firms have organized international armament rings through which the armaments race has been accentuated by playing off one country against another. 6. That armament firms have organized international armament trusts which have increased the price of arma­ ments sold to governments.23 Other objectionable features of private armament firms which are not included in the above report may be

League of Nations. Report of the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armaments, IX Disarmament, A. bl, 1921> C. 321, p. il. '

139 readily found from the most comprehensive report compiled by a committee of seven senators, under the chairmanship of Senator Gerald P. Nye, appointed in conformity with a Senate Resolution of April 12, 1934, to conduct hearings and inves24 tigations of the munitions industry in the United States. Shipping rivalry.

Shipping rivalry among the mari­

time powers is often pointed out as another factor in the making of wars.

Whereas at the dawn of the nineteenth cen­

tury there were only a few maritime powers engaged in the shipping industry, by 1914 the number and tonnage had been increased tremendously.

2*5

Discriminations in shipping rates

in favor of the nationals of the owners of the steamship companies led to clamor by those who suffered by the dis­ crimination for the creation of their own merchant marine. Then there was, and still is, the adaptation of the merchant marine as naval auxiliaries,

26

A*.®** transports,

hospital ships, gasoline tenders, et cetera, in time of war. Once the merchant marine is created, then it becomes

See United States Government Publication for the lengthy report of Senator Nye and his committee. See also W. T. Stone, The Munitions Industry, in Foreign Policy Re­ port N o . 20 (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., December 1934). 25 See Paul V. Horn, International Trade: Principles and Practices (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1930 )9 P P • 2 4 9 -5 5 .

26 Ibid., pp. 269-72.

140 imperative that it seek cargoes to offset its maintenance and overhead costs.

Otherwise it will he necessary, for its

existence, that government subsidy*^ t,© sought.

Thus, the

more merchant marine afloat, the more acute the shipping rivalry becomes.

Rivalry leads to cut-rate competition and

then to friction. Tariff and other trade barriers,

hast but not least

among the factors enumerated above are tariffs barriers to trade.

28

and other

Customs tariffs, the time-honored method

of regulating trade, still remains an important factor in commercial relations.

Probably originally designed as a

means of raising revenue, it soon became widely used as a method of protecting new industries against the competition of long established ones abroad.

When utilized in this

sense, it soon became a weapon in international economic re­ lations which immediately found widespread retaliations and repercussions.

Subsequent retaliations necessitated the

invention of other means of tariff discriminations as mani­ fested by the now common phrases such as: 11invisible

27 Ibid., pp. 27^-76.

28

For a list of the origin of tariffs and tariff sys­ tems, see ibid., pp. 126-27. See also J. B. Condliffe, The Reconstruction of World Trade (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc., l$4o), Chap. V, pp“I 178-209, for a brief but precise treatment of tariff.

l4l tariff,"2^ “multiple and flexible tariffs,” “tariff quota,” "global quota," "country quotas,” "export and import prohibi­ tions,” "emergency customs duties,” "licensing system," and ‘ *

a host of others too numerous to mention here. Causes of the second World War.

30

In the light of the

preceding analysis, some of the cardinal economic causes of the present war may, therefore, be briefly summarized as follows: 1.

Renewal of the trade rivalry between Germany on

the one hand and Great Britain, France, and their satellites on the other, not only in Western Europe but more particu­ larly in Northern, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe. 2.

31 Rivalry in the investment^ markets in the same

P. W. Bidwell, The Invisible Tariff (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 1939). See also Condliffe, c>p. cit., pp. 196-203. 30

^ See Horn, op. cit., pp. 126-44. See also Sir W. H. Beveridge, et al., Tariffs: The Case Examined (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1932); also T. E. Gregory, Tariffs: A Study in Methods (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Co., I521J; and H. Liepman, Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1536’)’". Some economists or otherwise may point out the lack of German capital or investment abroad due to her inability to meet her reparations obligations. However true this may be, the fact still remains that it does not preclude any private or individual investments abroad, and the further fact that the Germans are jealously guarding said area as a potential, if not actual, investment preserve.

142 general directions as already stated above, with special emphasis on British and French loans to Poland, Czecho­ slovakia, Rumania, Finland, and Greece, not to mention other areas. 3.

Intensification of restrictions In the freedom of

movements of people, particularly of certain races or nation­ alities .^ 4.

Lack of exchange clearing center and commodity

trading center followed by exchange instability and the final abandonment of the gold standard,^ as a medium of International exchange, which made the introduction of all kinds of monetary control possible.

^ As already pointed out in footnote 10, above, after the war the United States made several changes in her immi­ gration law. Other States could be expected to do likewise. So that Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, and others, countries which could have been a place of refuge for the excess population of densely populated States have, instead, since the 1929 depression, become inaccessible as a haven of rest for these peoples. See League of Nations1 World Eco­ nomic Survey, 1938-1939 (Series of League of Nations Publica­ tions: II. Economic and Financial, 19399 II. A. 18), pp. 1 6 5 and 166. For further information on population problems, see A. M. Carr-Saunders, The Population Problem (New York: Oxford University Press, 1922X7 See also World Population: Past Growth and Present Trends (New York: Oxford University Press'^ 1935) / by same author. Cf., M. R. Davie, World Immi­ gration (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), and R. R. Kuczynski, Population Movements (New York: Oxford University Press, 193677 33 This will be treated elsewhere in this chapter. For an interesting study on this subject, see G. Cassel, The Downfall of the Gold Standard (New York: Oxford University Press, 1936)•

143 5*

The ever-growing demand Tor economic nationalism

and economic self-sufficiency (autarky) ^ which led to a more drastic legislation and intensification of all kinds of trade restrictions. 6.

35

In a more general sense, there is also the evil

effects of the Versailles Treaty, and the failure of the British and the French to live up to the provisions of the said treaty, v i z ., disarmament, reconsideration of obsolete treaties as provided for by Article 19, et cetera.

^ See Michael A. Heilperin, Economic Nationalism A Menace to the Future Peace published in the World Affairs Interpreter of the Los Angeles University of International Relations, VoT.~~X2,. N o .' 4, w£nter, 1942, p p . 394-403• See also in same Issue, E. V. Guerrant, Economic Determinism and German Expansion, pp. 415-29. For a distinction between the words "Autarky" and "Autarchy,tf see Condliffe, op. cit., p. l6l n . . For further discussion.as to the meaning of Autarchy, see Ernest M. Paterson, The Economic Bases of Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), Chap. X, pp. 175 ff* ^ It may be pointed out that while it is already bad to restrict the movements of people from one country to another, it makes It worse than ever before when the free movements of goods are also tampered or trammelled. See ibid., pp. 196-97* Even England which was a "Free Trader11 in World War I has abandoned her traditional free trade policy in favor of trade restrictionism shortly after the United States passed her Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930. Pr o ­ fessor Condliffe considered the Hawley-Smoot Tariff as "a landmark In the disintegration of World Trade." If t h e .two English-speaking democracies pursued a policy of trade r e ­ strictionism, the other States in Europe and elsewhere could be surely expected to follow suit. In fact the European States have more reasons for doing so, considering their bitter experience in the last World War I, and the fear of an impending war. See Condliffe, o p . c i t ., p. 6 7 . It may be added further that even the question of Philippine Inde­ pendence revolved mostly around the problem of economics and trade restriction.

144 These, and many others not mentioned here, were the principal economic causes of the current World War II. II.

IMPORTANCE OP A STABLE INTERNATIONAL STANDARD OP EXCHANGE

Experience teaches slowly and at the cost of many mistakes.

Illustrating this point, it may he said that the

Nation-States of the world are now paying no small price for their grave error in abandoning a stable international standard of exchange which has amply demonstrated its utility for the past several decades. Stable foreign exchange: a prerequisite to peaceful international economic relations.

In recent years many lead­

ing economists have said that a stable foreign exchange is a prerequisite to a harmonious international economic relations. Indeed this seems to be true, judging the economic chaos which preceded the present World War II.

What brings about

the stability or instability of foreign exchange?

To answer

this question will require, first, an inquiry as to the practical importance of gold as a medium of exchange. Por several decades prior to 1914, and over a score of years after 1918, the gold standard was "customarily treated as a simple automatic standard which safely and surely brings about appropriate adjustments in the inter-

145

36

national monetary system.1

However, Professor "Whittlesey,

the author of the foregoing statement, is not in complete agreement with it.

He "believes that nthe gold standard is

truly automatic only when it functions according to the strict assumption of theory. . . .»37 ^'

He agrees in the

automatic functioning of the gold standard in one end only "and that end is stability of rates of exchange among the gold standard countries. Under the international gold standard of exchange, a prerequisite is made that the monetary system of each coun­ try be pegged to gold, 3..e., national statutes must provide that the country1s currency be of certain ratio to the gold content of the other countries' respective currencies.^ 36

\Charles R. Whittlesey, International Monetary Issues (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1937), P. 47. 37 Ibid., p. 48. Cf., Arthur G. Gayer, Monetary Policy and Economic Stabilization (second edition; New York: The Macmillan Company]! 1937), pp. 9-10. ^ Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 49. Cf., J. E. Meade, The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace (New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, 194"o J, p. 39. 39 See ibid., pp. 37-39, for a clear explanation of the question of parity of exchange between two or more gold standard countries. See also M. A. Heilperin, International Monetary Economics (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), Chap. Vll~, "Monetary Parities," pp. 126-41. Cf., T. E. Gregory, The Gold Standard and.Its Future (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1932), p. 8^ For aTTist of mint par of ex­ change, in terms of the pre-January 1934 dollar and in terms of the revalued dollar (5 9 .0 6 ), of some of the principal

146 When this is done, and using this as the basic starting point of each country1s foreign exchange, and supposing that a State makes a substantial foreign loan which is expressed in terms of the domestic currency unit, and assuming that the said loan is not spent locally, but is transferred to the borrowing State, this will necessarily increase the sup­ ply of bills of exchange on the lending State.

If this is

not met by an increased demand at the existing rate, naturally the exchange rate must inevitably decline. However, under the old international gold standard, although a decline in exchange rate may result, nevertheless, such a decline will not be so radical as one might think. The principle of the flgold export and import points11 will automatically function.

So that the most that the exchange

could fluctuate would be within the price of shipping the gold,

approximately two cents per five dollars from

New York to hondon.

On this point, Professor Whittlesey

made the following explanation: Under a gold standard a decline of this sort could proceed only as far as the gold export point. If the decline to this point failed to elicit an appropriate expansion in the demand for (and contraction in the sup­ ply of) foreign exchange, gold would be exported until the price level had fallen in the exporting country and risen in gold-importing countries to such an extent as would cause the balance of payments to be brought into

countries normally on the gold standard, see the table in Horn, op. cit., pp. 404-5.

147 equilibrium. Tills adjustment would come about chiefly through the stimulating effect the price changes would ha,ve on imports. As soon as the price levels had been brought, in this way, into the appropriate relationship, the transfer would be effected chiefly through the move­ ment of goods. The adjustment could not proceed too far without the competitive action of traders automatically altering the goods balance and bringing the price rela­ tionships back to the appropriate positions. Likewise any falling short of the adjustment would set competi­ tive forces into operation to carry the respective price-level movements still further. If the original disturbing influence were to continue, because of the extension of additional loans, the new adjustment would endure, while, if no new loans were made, the relation­ ships would tend to shift back, by a similar process, to their old positions. Under the assumption laid down, all the adjustments are automatically and smoothly effected through the operation of the gold standard m e c h a n i s m . 4 0 Causes of exchange instability.

In contrast to the

above-mentioned exchange stability under the old internation­ al gold standard, there has been an ever-increasing insta­ bility over the world in the past decade and a half.

What

causes this instability may be found readily in the ensuing outline prepared by Professor Heilperin: (a) divergent price movements in the various countries, (b) changes in the volume and direction o f .international capital movements (long-term lending), 40 ■Whittlesey, op. cit., p. 52. For a clear and con­ cise discussion of the function of gold as trade-balancing and exchange-stabilizing instrument, see Heilperin, Inter­ national Monetary Economics, op. cit., pp. 118-21. See also Horn, op. cit., pp~ 402-4; and Meade, op. cit., pp. 36-40. Cf., Dr. Feliks Mlynarski, The Functioning of the Gold Standard (a memorandum submitted to the Gold-’Delegation of the Financial Committee; Geneva: League of Nations Publica­ tion, September 10, 1931).

148 (c) movements of short-term balances from country to country (i.e. transfer of these balances from one currency into another) in search of safety, / %

(d) accidental disturbances in production or materials.

4i

Exchange instability may be further briefly explained in the following manner: “free competition, free trade, free gold movements were all at an end. it42 It may also be added, that the final abandonment of the gold standard by the major trading States put the finishing touches for the complete extinction of gold as an automatic balancing instrument. Effects of exchange instability.

With the complete

abandonment of the gold standard, there followed an everincreasing instability in foreign exchange, and with this instability, many evil effects resulted which may be stated briefly. In the first place, this instability became a barrier to international trade.

According to Professor Condliffe,

“The multiplication of trade restrictions after 1931 was due primarily to the disappearance of exchange stability. . . ,fI^ 41 Michael A. Heilperin, International Monetary Organ­ ization (Paris: League of Nations, International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, 1939)> pp. 28-29. Note: An elaboration of this outline may be found on pp. 29-32. 42 Schuman, op. cit., p. 5^0. For a complete and con­ cise discussion of the causes of exchange instability and the final abandonment of the gold standard as a medium of exchange, see ibid., pp. 539-5l. See also Cassel, loc. cit. ^

Condliffe, op. cit., p. 71.

See also Whittlesey,

149 The uncertainty of the exchange caused importers to hesitate, and in some cases, to abandon entering into contracts to imrport goods for fear that when said goods arrived they would have to pay more than the originally agreed and anticipated prices.

Exporters, on the other hand, also became reluctant

to ship their goods abroad due to their apprehension that the foreign importers would default in their payments on account of a sudden and unanticipated rise in prices caused by changes in the exchange rates. Second, exchange Instability is a deterrent to the 44 free-movement of short term loan in the sense that it might require the borrower to pay more than what he original­ ly borrowed in the event that his country’s currency should depreciate in value in terms of the money of the lender, and that the interest on the loan might become more burdensome to the borrower.

The lender, on the other hand, hesitates

to send his money abroad for fear of nonpayment by the bor­ rower due to the increase in the amount he has to pay back in the event the exchange rate changes. Third, exchange instability tends to discourage long-

op. cit., pp. 81-91# for a more complete discussion on this point. Cf., Meade, op. cit., p. 45. 44 Whittlesey, op. cit., pp. 154-73. See also Cond­ liffe, op. cit., pp. 90-95# and Meade, op. cit., pp. 45-46.

150

term

45

capital movements abroad for similar reasons pins the

added difficulty of paying the interest as well as in liqui­ dating the capital itself by the shipment of goods and mate­ rials due to trade restrictions of all sorts. Fourth, exchange instability leads to exchange con­ trol, and exchange control enhances the multiplication of all kinds of restrictions both in the internal and external economy of a State, 46

In States where exchange control is

in effect, imports are restricted to a point where the for­ eign exchange is available for payment of the goods imported (except perhaps in Germany); as a result, it must necessarily follow that control within the country1s economic activity must be made in order to distribute the goods accordingly to those who need them.

Exporters are not excluded from govern­

mental interference.

Further discrepancies in the foreign

exchange due to changes in the value of the currency of the other States will be met also by further imposition of more restrictive measures. 471 45

'Whittlesey, loc, cit.

See also Condliffe, op. cit.,

p . 98. 46 Meade, op. cit., pp. 115-16. op. cit., pp. 238Tff.

See also Condliffe,

47

For an instructive discussion of "clearing agree­ ments" and "payments agreement," see Meade, op. cit., pp. 115-16, and,120-21 ff. respectively. See also Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 275-77 and 277-78 respectively. See other pages in Condliffe for a discussion of other restrictions. Cf., Enquiry into the Clearing Agreements, 1935> A League of Nations Publication.

151 Finally, Further governmental restrictions, dis­ criminations, retaliations, et cetera, as a consequence of this exchange instability, •will cause the hiatus of inter­ national economic cooperation to become wider and wider until it reaches a point where it is ever more difficult to reconcile these differences.

This situation precludes the

establishment of exchange stability which is an important prerequisite to harmonious international economic relations, and which is attainable only through mutual understanding and sincere cooperation among nations.

CHAPTER V THE ECONOMIC BASES FOR AN ENDURING PEACE (continued) I.

EFFORTS FOR MONETARY AND ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION (1919-1959)

In order to combat the exchange instability in par­ ticular, and the international economic anarchy in general (as pointed to in the preceding chapter) in the interwar period (1919-1939)> several methods had been resorted to in the past.

For instance, there had been the Brussels Finan­

cial Conference (1920), the World Economic Conference at Geneva (1927)> the Ouchy Fact (1932), The London Monetary and Economic Conference (1933)> the Oslo Agreement (1937)> the Raw Materials Committee, and several others.

In addi­

tion there were also the so-called "monetary blocs,

,

the sterling area or "sterling bloc," the "German bloc," the "Asiatic bloc,” and the "Russian bloc."

Then there were

also the "Tri-partite Agreement^ of September, 1936, and, finally, the American Reciprocal Trade Agreements of 193^• The Brussels Financial Conference (1920).

The first

notable effort undertaken to mitigate the badly shattered

^ See J. B. Condliffe, The Reconstruction of World Trade (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1940), pp. 31b27.

153 economic relations among the States of the world, after the termination of World War I, took the form of an Interna­ tional Financial Conference,

The conference was convened at

Brussels on September 24, 1920. It is not the object here to delve into a detailed p survey of what took place in this conference. It will suf­ fice here to state, as briefly as possible, the purpose, im­ portant points considered, and the result of the conference. The purpose of the conference was to find a means of ameliorating the chaotic international economic relations among the States after the termination of World War I. After the conference had been formally opened, its first task was to hear reports regarding the economic conditions in various countries.

Then four committees, in which every

State was represented, were organized for discussion on the subjects of public finance, international credits, currency and exchange, and international trade.

The resolutions

drafted by these committees were later presented to a general meeting of the conference for final approval and adoption. It is of interest to note that the League of Nations later used as its model in forming its own committees the scheme 2

For a detailed report of the conference, see The Proceedings of the International Financial Conference (Brus­ sels, 1920}, A League of Nations Pub1ication, Report of the Conference in two volumes.

154 of representation found in each of the four committees of this conference. Among the subjects discussed at the conference were: the question of disarmament and reduction of all arms ex­ penditures;-^ the relation of reparations to the German economy;

the necessity for a settlement of intergovern­

mental debts and the difficulties involved in meeting the same;^ the importance of economic cooperation, particularly with regard to basic raw materials;

the necessity for cur­

rency reform;^ and several other problems. A unanimous report was arrived at by the conference which included resolutions covering every phase of the high­ ly technical nature of the problems considered.

Included

among them was: condemnation of postwar economic barriers as embodied in Resolution III.

The resolution recommended that

. . . each country should aim at the progressive restoration of that freedom of commerce which prevailed before the War including the withdrawal of artificial restrictions on. and dissemination of price against, ext ernal trad e.o

3 Ibid., I, 14. ii

Ibid., II, Verbatim Record of the Debates, p. 20.

^ I M d . , p. 21. rbid., p. 75. ^ lt»id., II, Verbatim Record of the Debates. o

Ibid., I, 22.

155 The so-called Ter Meulen Plan dealt: with the question of credit.

Under this plan international assistance is

granted only on condition that there is a willingness, on the part of the countries involved, . . . to assist one another in the restoration of economic life and to make every effort to bring about within their own frontiers the sincere collaboration of all groups of citizens and to secure conditions which gave to work and thrift liberty to produce their full results.9 hike other previous conferences, the Brussels Confer­ ence realized the necessity for a permanent machinery of international financial and economic cooperation.

Reliance

upon an active League intervention in the realm of finance was unmistakably indicated in this projected new sphere of international cooperation.^

The conference proposed

That the activities of the League might usefully be directed towards promoting certain reforms and collect­ ing the relevant information required to facilitate credit operations. In this connection the Conference considers it well to draw attention to the advantage of making progress under each of the following heads: (l) Unification of the laws relating to bills of exchange and bills of lading. (2) The reciprocal treatment of the branches of foreign banks in different countries. (5) The publication of financial information in a clear com­ parative form. (4) The examination of claims by the holders of bonds the interest of which is in arrears. (5) An international understanding on the subject of lost, stolen or destroyed securities. (6) The establish­ ment of an international clearing house. (7) An inter­ national understanding which while ensuring the due pay­ ment by everyone of his full share of taxation, would 9

Ibid., p. 25.

10 Ibid., p. 27.

156 avoid the imposition of double taxation which is at present an obstacle to the placing of investment abroad,H As indicated above, a comprehensive plan was drawn up by the conference making it obviously necessary for the League of Nations to organize the financial and economic phase of its work.

Thus, the foundation of the significant

efforts exerted by the League with regard to international economic cooperation was laid. The Geneva or World Economic Conference (1927)• Under the chapter on “The League of Nations and Collective 12

Security,11

a concise discussion has already been made on

the work of the World Economic Conference which took place at Geneva from May 4 to May 27* 1927.

Therefore, it is no

longer necessary to repeat the same discussion here, except to point out certain facts which have not been mentioned be­ fore. Mention has been made above of the “real and serious effort” of the World Economic Conference “to grapple with the dilemma created by the so-called neo-mercantilism.” True as this statement is, it is also an indisputable fact that at the time said conference convened, the whole world

11 JklS*> P* 2 6 * See supra, p. 6 5 .

157 was on its way to an increasing prosperity in business and otherwise.

The suffering of the last four years of warfare

was almost forgotten, and the States of the world had finally drifted,,once more, to a period of normalcy.

The

exchange or monetary instability, which marked the years during the war and immediately after the war, no longer ex­ isted as it was.

Many States had returned to the gold

standard and exchange stability seemed to prevail once again.^

The fact alone that the entire attention of the

conference was centered mostly on the elimination of all barriers to international trade, and little, if any, was devoted to financial and monetary matters is sufficient evi­ dence of the accuracy of the above statement.

In passing,

reference should be made to the important role played by the International Chamber of Commerce in the conference; it pre14 pared much of the materials discussed at the gathering. The Quchy Pact (1952).

Third in line of successive

Post-War I efforts for international economic cooperation was the Pact of Ouchy of 1952, by Belgium, Luxembourg, and

^ See Condliffe, o£. cit., p. 48. 14 For a very interesting study of the work of the International Chamber of Commerce toward international eco­ nomic cooperation as well as the part it played at the World Economic Conference of 1927, see George L. Ridgeway, Mer­ chants of Peace (New Yorks Columbia University Press, 1958).

158

the Netherlands.

As is plainly indicated, this is purely an agreement on a regional 15 ^ hasis, though other countries may he admitted under certain specified conditions.

A summary

of the agreement, as given by Richardson, follows: 1. Not to increase existing tariff levels against any country. 2. To reduce tariff levels between themselves by a considerable amount in successive stages over a period of five years. 3. To invite any other country to enter the agree­ ment on similar terms. 4. To admit to the agreement not only countries observing conditions similar to those adopted by the original participants but also countries which, without complying with the specific conditions, had tariff rates at least as low as the rates fixed in the agreement. The London Monetary and Economic Conference (19530 • In order to ameliorate the chronic financial monetary and economic condition prevailing throughout the world in the years immediately following the worst world-wide depression, so far, in history, which began in the market crash of 19299

The subject of "regionalism11 will be discussed later elsewhere in the next chapter. J. H. Richardson, British Economic Foreign Policy (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936), p. 126. It is also quoted by Ernest M. Patterson, The Economic Bases of Peace (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 193$), p. 225. (Note: Patterson gave 1950 while Richardson gave 1932 as the date of the Ouchy agreement.) This conference has been mentioned very briefly elsewhere.. 17 See supra, p. 6 7.

159 -i o

an International Monetary and Economic Conference vened In London on June 12, 1955*

was con­

As was pointed out else­

where in this study, this conference failed to accomplish its purpose, largely because of the selfish and stubborn refusal by the United States to stabilize the dollar.

It

appeared that In the preceding March, before the opening of the conference, the United States had embarked on a program of currency depreciation.

During the interval of about

three months, between the launching of the program and the convening of the conference, the United States had begun to taste the sweetness of prosperity after a sorry and bitter experience of more than three years of economic stagnation. Thus many Americans, including the President, feared that the stabilization of the dollar, at this time, would com­ pletely negate the slight gains already made.

Therefore, in

order to counteract the insistent demand of the gold-bloc States to commit the United States to a program of currency stabilization, President Roosevelt hastily drafted a message to the assembled delegates in London.

The message (person­

ally read by Secretary of State Hull) called the attention of the conferees 11to better and perhaps to cure fundamental

1 ft

For a complete report of this conference, see League of Nations Publication, Journal of the Monetary and Economic Conference, June 10-July 2bth, 1933 (London: 1953)V No. 1-39.

16 0

economic ills,11 and then added that they "must not he di­ verted from that effort.11 While the Americans applauded this latest pronunciamiento of their newly installed chief executive, the assem­ bled delegates in London were furious upon hearing this latest manifestation of America1s noncooperation.

As a

result, in spite of Secretary Cordell Hullfs efforts to reach some amicable solution of the problems confronting them, the rest of the participants declined to cooperate any further-and reduce their tariffs. It is not to be concluded, however, that the confer­ ence met complete failure in its efforts to reach some agree­ ments.

The fact was, a few minor agreements were made.

Among them were an agreement on silver and another on wheat. However, commenting on the latter agreement, Professor Ridge­ way declared, "Business influence at London was limited to the participation of the financial experts from the Bank for International Settlements and the negotiation outside the conference of the international agreement on wheat. 19

^ The complete text of the Presidents message may be found in Paul Einzig, The Sterling-Dollar-Franc Tangle (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1933;> PP* 205-7. (Hull1s in­ troduction is on pp. 204-5j• See also Chapter VIII for a good study of the Conference in general, pp. 102-15. 20 Ridgeway, op. cit., pp. 571-72. For a good study of the problem of wheat planning, see Paul de Hevesy, World Wheat Planning and Economic Planning in General (London: Oxford University Press, X Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland as well as the Dutch East Indies,

This endeavor

to ease the ever-growing economic anarchy was not new to these States.

As early as December 22, 1930, the same

aggregation of Powers had initiated the original Oslo Con­ vention,*^ so that the 1937 Agreement is merely a revision and extension of the original convention. It is worth while to notice a few of the relevant provisions of this agreement.

The preamble amply and clear­

ly points out its purpose: [The high contracting parties] Proceeding progres­ sively to the reduction of barriers to trade, to the abolition of exceptional defensive measures taken by different States in order to protect themselves from the effects of the crisis, and to the adoption of measures conveying guarantees of stability more extensive and precise in their nature than those arising from the Oslo Convention; Have agreed as follows:24 Then followed several articles covering the agreement. Article I provides that Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Nether­ lands will . . . undertake without restrictions the importation of the goods . , . when they originate in and consigned

23 por ^he original Oslo Convention of December 22, 1930, see League of Nations Treaty Series, No. 2893> Vol. CXXVI, p. 3417 24 See Stephen Heald, editor, Documents on Interna­ tional Affairs, 1937 (London: Oxford University Press, 1939)7 p. 8 0 0 .

163

from the territories of the signatory States. . . . The same Governments undertake . . . not to take any initiative tending to increase Customs duties, taxes, or other special charges on importation at present in force, or to establish new o n e s . 23 Article II covers identical provision as Article I, paragraph I, except that this time ”the Governments of Den­ mark, Finland, Norway, and the Netherlands (for the Nether26

lands Indies), and Sweden . • .M

are to be bound by said

provision as of Article I. Article II further provides that f,The same Govern­ ments undertake • • • not to render the importation of • • • goods, when originating in and consigned from . . . signa­ tory States, of which the entry is at present free, subject to any quantitative restriction . * .I,27 Article III looks forward to the conclusion of "further agreements of the same nature tending to reduce 28 barriers to trade.fl Article IV gave the signatory States . . . the opportunity of raising any objection thereto, all measures subjecting to quantitative restrictions, to exchange control, or to special taxes, the importation of any goods which previously were not subject to such 25

Heald, loc. cit.

2 Loc. cit. 27 Loc. cit. 2

Ibid., p. 801.

164 measures. 29 It also provided the time limit for such notification. Article VI made provision for the admission of other States not original signatories to the agreement. As may he noted from the above articles, ample provi­ so sions were made for a freer commercial^ intercourse among the signatory States, and a way was left open for other States to join and enjoy the beneficial effects of such an arrangement.

Unfortunately, however, it was announced on

May 11, 1938, that it would be impossible to extend the agreement after July 1, the date on which it was due to ex­ pire, on account of international conditions.

Thus another

attempt to mitigate international economic relations met the same fate as other endeavors toward the same end. The Raw Materials Committee.

Perhaps in view of the

world-wide acute economic depression as well as the Japanese incursion into Manchuria, the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, and German colonial claims, the problem of access to raw

29 30

Heald, loc. cit.

For an interesting study of the commercial policy of the "Northern Countries," see The Northern Countries in “World Economy Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, published by the Delegations for the Promotion of Economic Cooperation Between the Northern Countries (Finland: The Otava Printing Office, 1937 )9 ChapT 13* PP* 171-79* See also Chapter 14 on "Economic Cooperation Between the Northern Countries," pp. 180t91.

165 materials was broached by Sir Samuel Hoare, on the floor of the League of Nations Assembly, in his address on September 11, 1955.^

As a result of his address, and after some dis­

cussion and due consideration by the next Assembly, a resolu­ tion was adopted on October 10, 1936, requesting the Council to appoint a Committee to undertake the study of the problem of ffequal commercial access for all nations to certain raw materials.n

Acceding to the Assembly1s request, the Council

appointed a "Raw Materials Committee" consisting of experts from twelve countries and from the I.L.G. 32 After three meetings,

33

a preliminary report

was issued by the Com­

mittee on September 8, 1937* It may be of interest here to quote briefly some of the Committee1s observations and recommendations.Regarding the question of prohibitions andrestrictions on export raw materials, the Committee had

of

this to say:

31 See League of Nations Assembly, Verbatim Record of the l6 th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, Vol. 16-19* 1935T978, A.2, V4, pp. 6 - 7 . 32 For the names of countries from which the experts were drawn, see Heald, op. cit., p. 773. For an interesting study of the subject of raw materials," see Herman Kranold, The International Distribution of Raw Materials (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1$38)3 See also C. A. Ward, Those Raw Materials (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., W . --------------- _ 33

The meetings were held on March 8-12; June 16-25; and September 1-4, 1937. 34 ^ An extract of the Committee1s report is given by Heald, op. cit., pp. 773-99*

166 . . . the Committee considers that, while certain prohibitions and restrictions can he justified, when they are of the nature of defensive measures, serious objections can be taken to prohibitions or restrictions which are designed to apply pressure to other countries, to preserve uneconomic industries or to maintain an artificial level of prices, either by creating an ex­ cessive supply in the internal market, by starving the market, or by maintaining monopolies or quasi­ monopolies .35 The Committee, however, fthas not been able to find any substantial evidence of such impedimentsM; but suggested, just the same, that if any exist it may be given up either 36 by voluntary action or by international convention, A very interesting as well as a very progressive re­ port was also made by the Committee on the subject of "Devel­ opment of Natural Resources."

On this point certain members

of the Committee expressed the hope that . . . the principle of unrestricted access to such resources might be applied as liberally as possible . . .; and that nationals of countries poor in raw materi­ als of colonial origin might be given direct access to natural resources by means of concessions which would afford them the opportunity of exploiting the necessary materials with their own capital or labor without there­ by creating any discrimination against nationals of other countries.37 In suggesting the above arrangement, the Committee did not anticipate any changes in the status of the colonies

35 rbld., p. 780. Loc. clt. 57 ItoId., p. 781.

167 concerned.

Their original status at the institution of such

an arrangement were to he preserved.

38

The Committee fur­

ther suggested that . . . the regime of the Open Door which prevails in the Congo Basin by virtue of the Treaties, and is also in force in the territories under "a " and "B" Mandates, should b e .extended as regards the development of natural resources to other territories that are sparsely popu= lated and whose resources are inadequately developed." Covered also in the report of the Committee was the question of monopolies in raw materials.

It is the opinion

of the Committee that what few monopolies exist "do not constitute real obstacles to the circulation of raw materials. . . .n2i'0 In the second report of the same Committee entitled "Examination of Complaints and Difficulties Experienced with Regard to the Acquisition of and Payments for Raw Materi41 als," the Committee made the following conclusion: . . . it was not the inability of the manufacturing countries to acquire foreign exchange, but the inability of the raw material producing countries to do so, which was one of the principal symptoms of the great depres­ sion. . . . 2 38

Heald, loc. cit.

39 ^ hoc, cit. rbJici.j p. 7 8 2 . See ibid., pp. 782-95. 42

Ibid., p. 782.

168

Even after the rise of prices of raw materials the Committee still believed that whatever rise there was, • . . it is still relatively lower than those of manu­ factured goods so that manufacturing States ought not to have any special reason to complain of difficulties in obtaining supplies of raw materials and in fact_many of them never experienced any difficulties. . . . 5 Practically all of the Committee’s recommendations and conclusions were accepted by the Assembly of the heague of Nations.

Among them were those on the subjects of "Com­

mercial Access to Raw Materials" and "Exchange Control.11^ The Tripartite Agreement (1936).

About the last

attempt to stabilize foreign exchange, in a world of everincreasing and ever-widening exchange instability, occurred when the three leading democratic powers

, the United

States, Great Britain, and France) entered into the so-called Tripartite Agreement of September 25, 1936.

This agreement

was later further strengthened by the adherence of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland in October and November of the same year.

The object of the agreement was to maintain

exchange stability and to promote freer trade, within a great trading area dominated by each of the three currencies

Ibid.. PP. 782-83. Ibid., pp. 796-99. See also the following pages for other suggestions and conclusions accepted by the Assembly.

169 (_i._e., the Sterling, the Franc, and the Dollar); this would, in turn, maintain stable ratios among themselves in order that a large proportion of the world1s currencies could be stabilized, ^

The agreement may be regarded as a sort of

monetary peace treaty concluded for the sole purpose of end­ ing the period of monetary disturbances which were rampant between 1 9 3 1 and 1 9 3 6 , and which were detrimental to free trade.

In spite of some initial success in establishing the

new exchange setup, by the manipulation of the so-called "stabilization f u n d s " ^ created and laid aside for the pur­ pose by each of the six signatory States mentioned above, this scheme was only a temporary palliative. 47 The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program (193*0 •

45

See Condliffe, op. cit., p. 322 and p. 377* for fur­ ther comments. See also G. Griffith Johnson, Jr., The Treasury and Monetary Policy 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1939)* Chap. IV, pp. 92-132. See also pp. 115-28 for a discussion of the Tripartite Agreement. ^ The Stabilization (Exchange equalization) fund was originated at a much earlier date. For example, the British had one in 1932, the United States in 193**-* and France in 1936. For further comment on this subject, see Michael A. Heilperin, International Monetary Economics,(London: Long­ mans, Green & Co., 1939)* pp. 245-45 f f . See also Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 237 ff. A good study on the subject of Ex­ change equalization may be found in N. F. Hall, The Exchange Equalization Account (London: The Macmillan & Co., Ltd.,

1935T.

~

47

-

(. For a comprehensive study of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program," see Henry J. Tasca, The Reciprocal Trade Policy of t h e .United States (Philadelphia; University

One of the most outstanding single national efforts toward the improvement of trade relations among nations, in a period of ever-growing economic nationalism between the years 1930-1940, was the passage of the Trade Agreements Act of June 12, 1934, "by the American Congress.

Better known,

perhaps, as the "Hull's Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program, the twenty-one agreements negotiated and concluded by Hull, within a period of five years from its inception, is con­ sidered by Professor Condliffe as "notable and courageous achievement, perhaps the outstanding piece of sane and con­ structive economic statesmanship in recent years. The said Act empowered the President, for a term of three years (subject, however, to renewal or termination after three years' operation), to negotiate bilateral agree­ ments for the reduction of tariffs on a reciprocal basis. The President is further authorized to increase or reduce, by not more than fifty per cent, any standing American tariff duties.

Said reductions are applicable also to

States having most-favored-nation agreements with Washington

of Pennsylvania Press, 1933). See also Grace Louise Beckett The Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program (New York: Columbia University Press, 1941). Of., Francis Bowes Sayre, The War Forward: The American Trade Agreements Program (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193$)I and Raymond L. Buell, The Hull Trade Program and the American System in World Affairs Pamphlet of April, f9'39, N o . 2. 48 Condliffe, op. cit., p. 205.

171 but might be denied to States imposing discriminatory duties against American exports.

Any agreement concluded under the

above Act will not require the usual Senatorial ratification. Thus the President has full power to determine the execution of his newly acquired trade-bargaining power. Cuba was the first country to sign a treaty under the Trade Agreements 3, 19^4.

A c t .

^9

The treaty took effect on September

The twenty-first and last agreement, so far, to be

signed under the said Act was of November 16 , 1938, between the two great English speaking Powers.

Although the negotia­

tion lasted for a considerable period of time, nevertheless, the agreement which was finally concluded was very limited in scope. 50 Other post-War I economic endeavors.

The efforts

which are briefly discussed above are only a few among the numerous endeavors undertaken between a space of two decades (1919-1939).

Several others of almost equal importance

could have been discussed here, but space and time forbid.

Note: The Act has since been renewed twice by Con­ gress. The first extension took place in March, 1937* by a joint resolution and was supposed to expire on June 12, 19^0. However, on April 6 , 19^0, Congress extended the Act further to 1 9 ^3 . 50 For further comments on the Anglo-American Agree­ ^ ment, and the difficulties encountered by the reciprocal program, see Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 206-8.

172 However, it will suffice to mention a few more in recogni­ tion of their importance.

For instance, there was the Con­

ference of Spa^ 1 in 1 9 2 0 which considered the question of “Labor, Industry, and Finance.”

Under finance, perhaps the

most important discussion revolved around the question of “reparations.

There was also the Porto-Rosa Conference

of March 11, 1921, called "for the purpose of bringing to­ gether the Succession States and Italy in an effort to re­ establish normal economic relations in this part of Europe.n53 The Barcelona Conference on Communication and Transit was also held at this time (March 10 to April 20, 1 9 2 1 ).5^

The

Genoa Conference which took place in 1922 devised the "new gold standard.*55

In Rome a “Business Congress” assembled

51 See Ridgeway, op. cit., pp. 78-91, for the Conferenc e of Spa. 52 A good study of the reparations settlement may be obtained from the following: The Reparation Settlement Signed June 7, 1929, With Historical and Explanatory Intro­ duction by Dr. Leon Fraser in the International Conciliation October, 1929, N o . 253, PP. 9-55. See further Annexes IVIII, pp. 57-98. See also Denys P. Myers, The Reparation Settlement (Boston: World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1929, Vol. 12, No. 5), PP. 1-1^1. 53 Ridgeway, op. cit., p. 156. Ibid., pp. 284-508. (TJT Heilperin, International Monetary Economics, op. cut., p. 191, gave an account of the Genoa Conference. A good study of the New Gold Standard may be found in the fol­ lowing: Arthur G. Gayer, Monetary Policy and Economic Stabilization (second edition; New York: The Macmillan

175 on March 18, 1925.

r^6

To ease the ever-.spreading and ever-

increasing "tariff” legislation-^ in various countries, the "Tariff Conference of 1950" -was convoked.^

Due to the

worst economic depression ever experienced by the States of the world up to this time, and the difficulty encountered hy the Germans in meeting their reparations obligations, the Lausanne Conference 59 was called in June to July, 1952. The said Conference also discussed the question of "inter-Allied Debts.Prior

to the Lausanne Conference, the League of

Nations appointed the "Gold Delegation of the Financial Com»6l mittee which made several constructive reports covering

Company, 1957); T. E. Gregory, The Gold Standard and Its Future (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd." 1952); and R. G. Rawtrey, Monetary Reconstruction (Second edition; London: Longmans, Green & Co., Ltd., 1926); and a few others. 56

Ridgeway, op. cit., pp. 108 f.

57

See H. Liepmann, Tariff Levels and the Economic Unity of Europe (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958), P* 4 l 4 , f o r a table summarizing the tariff increases of certain States. 58 See W. E. Rappard, Post-War Efforts for Freer Trade (Geneva Research Center, Geneva Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2, March, 1958). See also Ridgeway, loc. cit. A r£sum& of what was achieved in this Conference may be found in Schuman, op. cit., pp. 557-58. See also J. H. Landman, The War Debt Problems and a Solution, pub­ lished in the World"ATf airs Interpreter of the Los Angeles University of International Relations, Vol. 9> No. 2, Summer, 1 9 5 8 / p T 147. Ibid., pp. 142-53^ee Report of the Gold Delegation of the Financial

174 almost every phase In the economic H i e of the world.

These

and several others constitute the various endeavors under­ taken to ameliorate the financial, monetary, and other kinds of disequilibrium in international economic relations which took place in the interwar years of 1919 to 1939* II.

PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE MONETARY RECONSTRUCTION

In the decade (1930-1940) immediately following the 1929 market crash, numerous books were written which carried plans for future monetary and economic reconstruction. 6 2 However, for lack of space, only a few of these plans will be treated here.

Mention will be made of some of the others

that have appeared.

Boiled down to a few words, the various

proposals revolved around the questions of: 1.

Basis for a future stable international exchange,

Committee, League of Nations Publication, Geneva, 1931-1932, loc. cit. 62

Among these authors are: Paul Einzig, International Monetary Economics (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939), as well as his earlier book entitled The Future of Gold (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935); Robert Eisler, Stable Money, the Remedy for the Economic World Crisis (London: The Search Publishing Co., L t d ~ 1932); Gayer, loc. cit.; F. A. Von Hayek, Monetary Nationalism and International Stability (New York and London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1937); Charles R. Whittlesey,.International Monetary Issues (New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Ltd., 1937); and several others. The decades preceding the said.depression were also charac­ terized by similar endeavors. For Instance, we had R. G. Hawtrey, loc. cit., et cetera.

175 and its possible alternatives; 2.

Fixed versus flexible parity;

5.

An international clearing house or international

4.

An international monetary authority.

bank;

Basis for a future stable international exchange. Starting from the first question* what shall be the basis for a future stable international exchange? tives have been advanced.

Several alterna­

For example* Professor Heilperin

listed and discussed* at some length* four possible alterna­ tives as follows: 11(l) The International Gold Standard; Exchange Standards;

(2)

(5) The Gold Exchange Standard; and (4) 6"2>

Free Paper Currencies.11 1.

The international gold standard.

!!international gold standard11?

"What is the

What is its significance in

the relation of nations? Perhaps the best answer to these questions may be found in Professor Gregory's masterly work: When a whole series of countries possess currency sys­ tems which have a fixed relationship with gold . . . an 6 "3 See Heilperin, International Monetary Economics* op. cit.* Chap. IX* pp. 175-224• For other possible alternatives* see also Gayer, qp. cit.* Chap. IX* pp. 180-208. See also Von Hayek* op. cit.* Lecture I, pp. 5-16* and Lecture V* pp. 75-94. Cf., Gregory* op. cit.* Chap. V, pp. 78^100* and several others.

176 international gold-standard system comes into existence, not in any formal fashion, hut as a matter of fact. The only intelligible meaning to he assigned to the phrase rfthe international gold standard” is the simultaneous presence, in a group of countries, of arrangements hy which, in each of them, gold is convertible at a fixed rate into local currency and the local currency into gold, and hy which gold movements from any one of these areas to any of the others are freely permitted hy all of them.64 According to the above quotation, the importance of the “international gold standard” lies in the fact that it furnishes the States of the world a common basis whereby they can organize their separate national monetary systems, thus making it possible to establish precise parities among the various monetary units.^

A further essential feature

of the international gold standard is the freedom of inter­ national movement of gold.

Such freedom of movement limits

considerably any radical fluctuations of foreign exchange rates by the simple application of the so-called "export and import points.”66

Therefore, Professor Heilperin concluded

that the importance of the international gold standard lies in the fact that it "minimizes the disturbing effects which the plurality of national currencies can have upon inter64 Gregory, op. cit., p. 8. o ^ Heilperin, op. cit., p. 179* ^ For a clear and concise explanation of the "gold points,” see ibid., pp. 118-21. See also James Edward Meade, The Economic Basis of a Durable Peace (New York: Oxford University Press, l’^fO’J, pp. 36-59•

177 national commercial and financial relations, and provides the best practicable approximation to a world currency.*1^ Exchange standards.

A possible alternative to

the international gold standard is the "exchange standard.” An exchange standard is defined by Mr. Keynes as "Managed Representative Money the objective standard of which is the legal tender money of some other country."

68

As indicated

above, the exchange standard is based on a country’s (any 69 country’s) currency other than gold or silver. Its advantage is expressed by Professor Heilperin in the follow­ ing manner: An international exchange standard assures the fixity of exchange rates, not only between each of the curren­ cies based on that standard and the currency chosen as standard . . ., but also between the currencies of the various countries having adopted that standard. . . . There is, of course, in this system nothing comparable to "gold points," and unless special measures are taken to the contrary,.no fluctuations of exchange rates can take place between currencies based on the same exchange standard. In this respect the system operates more like the "gold clearing standard" than like the traditional gold.standard.70 /T

1~7

Heilperin, op. cit., pp. 179-80. For further dis­ cussion of the implications of the international gold standard, d. 175* and 218-19. O

q

See Meade, o£. cit., pp. 45-48, for a concise dis­ cussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the gold standard. 90 Heilperin, op. cit., pp. 258-57* For another con­ cluding remark on "the objective of monetary policy11 on the basis of "stability of price level" see Gayer, op. cit., pp. 272-75* 91 Ibid., p. 202.

184

caution is given by Gayer: The technical problems alone -which would first have to be solved are so complex and difficult that should a restoration of a full gold standard with fixed invaria­ ble parities be effected eventually, it would of neces­ sity have to follow a fairly long preliminary period of experimental de facto stabilisation. . . .92 Fixed vs. flexible p a r i t y .

Another subject, which

^

has caused much interest and discussion among various economists,

is the question of fixed or invariable parity

as against flexible or variable parity.

On this question

the economists are again divided, with the overwhelming majority in favor of a fixed parity. For instance, Keynes is quoted by Gayer as favoring the alteration of parity “if necessary, from time to time, if circumstances were to require.

.jQli *

Meade,

in his chapter

on “Variable Foreign Exchange Rates,11 also argues that 11in order to avoid the continual raising of trade barriers for the purpose of adjusting the balances of international pay-

92

Gayer, l o c . c i t . See also pp. 166-74 for Professor G a y e r fs “Prerequisite Conditions of a Return to Gold.*1

^ See Heilperin, op. cit., Chap. VII, pp. 126-41, for a concise and clear treatment of the subject of “Monetary Parities.11 See also The Future of Monetary Policy, a Report on International Monetary ProbTems by a Group of the Royal Institute of International Affairs "(London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press, 1955), Chap. XI, pp. 154-42. 94 See Gayer, op. c i t ., pp. 190-91. See also Whittle­ sey, op. c i t ., wherebv whole attention is devoted to an argument in favor of flexible11 exchanges.

ments, it would be preferable to rely upon the mechanism of h 95 variable foreign exchange rates for this purpose. How­ ever, he is also quick to point out four great impediments of such a mechanism.

First of all, he considers it a

11sacrifice of the convenience that would result from having the same unit of monetary account in all the member States"; second, he pointed out "the added uncertainty which it in­ volves for the traders of imported and exported goods in the various States"; third is the probable encouragement of "the speculative movement of short-term capital from one currency to another . .

and finally, there is also the risk of Q/r "competitive exchange depreciation." In addition to the above-mentioned disadvantages of a

variable foreign exchange, Condliffe stressed strongly a fifth additional disadvantage, which Meade failed to include in his list, and which Condliffe considers "the most serious disadvantage."

This is "the impediment to international

lending that results from uncertainty as to the future valua­ tion of the investment."^7

95 Meade, op. cit., p. 5 8 . Cf., Heilperin, op. cit., p. 1 5 8 , where he stated that "a system of freely fluctuating exchanges does not eliminate the possibility of a long-run stability . . . of exchange rates." See further pp. 1 5 6 - 6 0 and pp. 1 6 7 -6 9 . Q^ ^ Meade, op, cit., pp. 58-59. 97 Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 376-77.

186

The disadvantages of a fluctuating exchange rate is further elucidated h y Gayer: A gold standard with movable parities would affect the international movement of short-term liquid funds, as well as international investment. It might permit the continuance of the nuisance of sudden migrations of foreign balances which has wrought so much damage in recent years. Each prospective alteration of the parity would be likely to provoke speculative operations on the part of foreign exchange dealers and to produce trans-' ferences of liquid capital held by foreigners. The political difficulty noted above in discussing Professor F i s h e r s proposals would also be present in some measure. In both cases international as well as domestic politi­ cal problems might easily arise. Since downward revi­ sion of the parity of its currency unit would strengthen a c o u n t r y 1s export position, it would be tantamount to the recent exchange depreciation of off-gold currencies, and as such might provoke resentment and reprisals from other countries, even were the adjustment made merely to correspond to changes in the real terms of t r a d e . 9 8 The concluding remarks of Heilperin, chapter entitled "Monetary Problems

in his last

. . ," in a book devoted

solely to the problems of "international Monetary Economics" may be added further here to the already long list of quota­ tions dealing with the subject, as a means of closing this section of the present study: Let us envisage in conclusion the technical features with which a reconstructed system of monetary Inter­ nationalism could most usefully be endowed. For reasons stated before, my personal preference Is for fixed ex­ changes. It is true that, in pure theory, exchange fluctuations of a limited size and linked with long-run stability of the foreign exchanges are reconcilable with

98

Gayer, op. cit., p. 192.

187 monetary internationalism. But it seems to me that the abstract model is not susceptible of being carried out in practice in a world in which exchange fluctuations are"likely to incite international movements of short­ term funds of a disturbing character (movements caused by the fear of currency depreciation or by the hope of speculative gains). Furthermore a system of flexible exchanges demands, on the whole, more international co­ operation than a system of fixed parities. Finally, it results, I think, from the foregoing analysis that--with the exception of major disturbances and in the absence of "autonomous*1 national policies--internal economic stability can be quite well maintained under a system of fixed parities. To this I should like to make two reservations: (l) a return to fixed parities cannot be safely effected at present; (2) fixed parities may oc­ casionally, in the case of major accidental difficulties, have to be replaced by more flexible exchanges. In these cases Exchange Funds (or, if the amalgamation has been carried out, central banks) would come prominently into action in order to secure a maximum of stability and the greatest possible smoothness of adjustment to changed c ircumstanc e s . It is most important that the return to fixed pari­ ties and to an international standard should not be attempted before enough economic and financial coopera­ tion has been achieved between countries. The failure of the reconstruction of the ’"twenties should demonstrate that "monetary reconstruction is not merely a matter of monetary technique. "99 Importance of an international b a n k . a growing realization,

in recent years,

There is, indeed,

of the greatest im­

portance of establishing and maintaining an international bank,

or, at least, an international clearing house.

the public platforms, articles on economics,

From

school textbooks, and various other one will hear or read the ever-

99 Heilperin, op. cit., pp. 255-56.

188

increasing emphasis placed upon this point.

There is a

widely spreading belief that nothing much will be accom­ plished, in any future monetary reconstruction, without the institution of some kind of a "world central bank"100 or a "world clearing house."

The experience of almost two

decades of international anarchy in financial and monetary matters, after the collapse of London as the industrial, financial, and monetary center of the world, gives added impetus to this claim. Meade, for example, has enough courage to propose the creation of an International Bank fully equipped with ade­ quate funds to be used solely as a world stabilization fund, with a prohibition against its use in purely national mat­ ters.101

The said bank, according to him, should be given

adequate authority to regulate and "expand the issue of International Currency" in order to meet "a general trade depression" which "threatens to spread among the Member States."

102

The bank is also given the power to "issue new

notes and invest them in appropriate securities on the stock market exchanges of the various Member States."10^

100 rbia., p. 4. 101

Meade, jop. cit., p. 71*

102 Zfeid., pp. 50-51. 10^ Ibid., p. 51.

See also p. 69.

The bank

189 would also be empowered to "restrict the total supply of cur­ rency if widespread inflationary movement of money prices and incomes threatened to develop among the Member States"

■104

Another power to be given to the bank would be to raise or lower exchange rates.

105

Still other powers would be con­

ferred upon it. The above proposal for the creation of an Interna­ tional Bank as well as others of similar nature are consid­ ered by many conservative economists as unrealistic and not consonant with the condition of contemporary monetary, nomic, and political relations among nations. lieu of a World Central Bank,

However,

eco­ in

these same conservatives are

in favor of persuading the governments and central banks "to show the necessary degree of cooperation, by means of an en­ largement of the powers and functions of the Bank for Inter­ national Settlements.11"**0^ As to the question of whether the Bank for Interna­ tional Settlements,

or an International Bank will be in a

10 IM5..» p. 5i. 105 Ibid., p. 64. tion of this bank,

106

For further details on the opera­ see pp. 63-70.

Gayer, op. cit ., p. 195* See also pp. 195-96. Of., Heilperin, op. cit., pp. 199* and 256-57. See also Walter Lichtenstein, International Financial Organization in Int ernat ional C one ill at ion, Apr ii,~ 1941, No. 369* pp. 43T32, and Eugene Staley, The Economic Organization of Peace in International Conciliation, April,~~l941, No. 369, p. "413.

190 position to operate effectively once established, Professor Condliffe replied as follows: An international bank would work effectively if the leading Powers were determined to make it work. They could equally well make their policies effective by agreement among themselves. Whether formal agreement is necessary, or a/permanent institution desirable, is merely a matter of convenience in administration and perhaps of political prejudice. There can be no effec­ tive international economic co-operation unless there is a will to cooperate and to make the adjustments of na­ tional policy necessary in a cooperative system.1°7 Thus as clearly and explicitly stated above, any international organization is capable of working effectively provided that the great States of the world are sincere and determined enough in their efforts to make it work; its suc­ cess is, therefore, predicated upon the full-hearted coopera­ tion of all the nation-States of the world, particularly the leading Powers. III.

PLANS FOR FUTURE GENERAL ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION There are, indeed, multifarious plans for general

economic reconstruction which have been offered in recent months.

Books, pamphlets, and articles in various magazines,

dealing with them, are not difficult to find.

However, it

will require a volume or two to analyze them one by one.

It

is, then, the object here simply to point out a few important

10^ Condliffe, op. cit., p. 381.

191 topics which have received much interest and comments by various economists and students of international affairs. Particular attention seems to be focused principally on the questions of: (l) access to, and distribution of, raw materials;

(2 ) trade;

(3) migration policy;

(4) disposition

of colonies; and (5 ) investment and development of backward areas. Access to, and distribution of, raw materials.

Per­

haps one of the most outstanding questions confronting the statesmen all over the world is the question of access to, and distribution of, raw materials, whether strategic or otherwise.

This question, of course, dates back not only in

the interregnum between the First and Second World Wars, but even before 1914.

However, this same question was greatly

aggravated in the interwar years when rigid economic nation­ alism and autarky,' in conjunction with the application of all sorts of controls, became the universal practice throughout the world.

Condliffe pointed out:

There is a baffling complication of control arrange­ ments in which it is difficult to distinguish types. Both production and prices are controlled. National merges into international control. Raw materials, semi­ finished products and manufactures are covered, and there are varying combinations of technique in these different fields.1°8

108 Ibid., p. ,,0 338.

192

It is, therefore, the above-mentioned type of* prob­ lems which world statesmanship must first solve before any lasting economic peace can be achieved.

But it is rather

gratifying to note that both official and unofficial spokes­ men realize its presence and prime importance. As a solution to the difficulties of access to raw materials and their distribution, Condliffe thinks that the logical end must be international regulation, and, perhaps, more effective consumer representation.

In this regard he

•observes that It is apparent, therefore, that the abandonment.of a free trading world economy and the substitution there­ fore of regulated production and trade in important raw materials, must either proceed to the logical end of international regulation or run the risk of embittering international relations. . . . The key to the situation may perhaps be found in more effective consumer repre­ sentation, if possible including consumer interests in countries outside the controling group. A means of securing such representation might possibly be found by a linking-up of cartel agreements between the manufactur­ ing countries with the commodity controls over raw mate­ rials. But in the long run the most important practical consideration is likely to be the spirit in which such controls are administered. . . .109 In his book (cited above), Meade suggests the institu­ tion of an HInternational Authority.IT

One of the many

powers he wants to vest in such an authority would be the

Ibid.> p. 340. See also Staley, loc. cit. Cf., Oscar Newfang, World Federation (New York: Barnes & NoEle, Inc., 1939) > PP~ 2F6^‘4T] and Meade, op. cit., pp. 162-66.

193 control and administration of essential raw materials.

It

is his opinion that ”International controls of particular raw materials may . . .

he used solely to equalize demand as

between years of good and bad trade.”110

In other words, he

wants the international authority to act both as a great buy­ ing and selling concern.

He believes that stocks of raw

materials may be purchased “during years of low prices in order to sell from these stocks to prevent too rapid a rise of prices in other years.1,111 On Thursday, February 26, 19^-2, the graduate students of the University of Southern California had the pleasure of hearing, at their luncheon, a lecture on “international Eco­ nomic Policies After the Present War,” given by Dr. Redvers Opie, economic adviser to the British Embassy in Washington, D.C.

In his talk, which covered the most important points of

the (then week-old) economic agreement between the British and American Governments, Dr. Opie did not fail to discuss, among other things, the raw materials question. In his private capacity, rather than as an official spokesman, he voiced the opinion that each nation should 110

«

Ibid., p. 170.

hoc. cit. Note also that Meade takes into consid­ eration the variations In prices of agricultural products due to: (a) “variations in crop yields”; and (b) variations in demands.“ .

19k

continue to exercise control over its own raw materials dur­ ing the transition period after the war, and until a "Raw Material Board”

TIP

has been constituted which would then

assume the control, not only over production, but also its distribution.

He warned, however, that there should be a

common unified decision before each nation drops its control. "Cooperation is necessary," he said. Thus, as indicated above, the consensus of intelli­ gent opinion points toward the unification, centralization, and internationalization of the controlling body, whether it be of monetary matters, raw m a t e r i a l s , o r otherwise. More free trade.

Separate and distinct from the ques­

tion of raw materials is the problem of greater freedom in the movements of goods and commodities. "more free trade."

In other words,

Without doubt, there is strong realiza­

tion in its importance in regard to future world commerce.

lip

In connection with the raw materials board, it was this student’s privilege to ask Dr. Opie a question concern­ ing the constitution of this body, jL.je. , whether the board should be made up only of the victorious Powers, to the ex­ clusion of the vanquished, or whether the vanquished will be given representation in said board. To this question he re­ plied that eventually the vanquished will be given a share in its administration. Cf., ibid., pp. 1 0 0 ff. 113 For further study on the subject of raw materials, see the following: C. A. Ward, Those Raw Materials (London: George, Allen & Unwin, 19^1); Herman Kranold, ioc7 cit., and Paul de Hevesy, loc. cit.

195 Not counting unofficial statements, from whatever source, the official pronouncements alone will occupy several vol­ umes. To quote some of the prominent high ranking British public officials will be sufficient for the present purpose. For instance, the late Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, in a broadcast on November 2.6, 1939* declared, ". . . there can be no lasting peace unless there is full and constant flow of trade between the nations.

. . .

In a speech before the National Defense Public Inter­ est Committee on January 31> 19^0, the Prime Minister again reiterated his interest in the full development of interna­ tional trade when he said: We recognize that, for full development of interna­ tional trade, it must flow along multilateral channels, and that we must put an end to the vicious policy of eco­ nomic nationalism and autarky which did so much to upset the last great peace settlement. One of our foremost aims of the future will be the restoration of international trade. . . . This is a point which we have in mind when the time comes to turn once more from war to peace. 5 Viscount Halifax, the British Ambassador to Washing­ ton, D.C., in a speech before the Pilgrims 1 Society in New

See "Peace Aims," British Official Statements from September 2, 1939* to September 24, 19^1, an official Brit­ ish publication--a pamphlet. 115 Ibid., p. 7.

196

York, on March 25> 19^1., said: n . . . When . . . victory has been won, it must be our aim to promote the common in­ terest in the greatest possible interchange of goods and services. . . #» 1 1 6 Anthony Eden, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in an address at the Mansion House, on May 299 19^1> promised among other things that, . . . When peace comes we shall make such relaxation of our war-time financial arrangements as will permit the revival of international trade on the widest possi­ ble basis. We shall hope to see the development of a system of international exchange in which the trading of goods and services will be the central feature. . . .117 Besides the above-quoted pronouncements by high rank­ ing British public officials, many others, from the other side of the Atlantic, should also be quoted.

For example,

the numerous statements made by Secretary of State Cordell 118 Hull in his efforts to promote a greater and freer inter­ national trade, but for lack of space.

But his activities

and accomplishments on this subject are too well-known and too numerous to need any further discussion here. Probably the most memorable of all official pronounce116 117

Ibid., p. 21.

Ibid., p. 22. Cf ., Professor Charles Ristfs state­ ment in The New York Times Magazine, March 51> 19*1-0, p. 25* 118 See the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Program else­ where in this chapter.

197 ments with respect to the question of trade and raw materi­ als is embodied in the joint declaration by the President of the United States and the British Prime Minister in the now famous “Atlantic Charter.*1

The fourth paragraph (point) of

said Charter declared: They will endeavor, with due respect for their exist­ ing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperi­ ty .H 9 So much for official pronouncements regarding their designs and peace aims for a future international trade reconstruction.

Turning to the unofficial plans for a

1on future “freer trade,11

one encounters far more numerous

proposals than will be found on the official side.

Not only

are they numerous, but they offer a greater range to choose from.

They are unlike the official plans which tend to be

couched with utmost conservatism, vagueness,

and generali­

ties.

Q

“Peace Aims,*1 op. c i t ., p. 24. There are many other special pamphlets printed on the subject such as the League of Nations Association, Southern California Branch*s reprint of Dr. J. E. Harley's The Coming Revival of the League of Nations, whereby he compared side b y sideHFresident Wilson*s fourteen points and the eight points of the Atlantic Charter. See also Los Angeles dailies of August 14, 1941. 120 W. Rappard, P ost-War Efforts for Freer Trade (New York: Columbia University Press’^ I$'58), a pamphlet of 62 pp. (This is a Cobden Lecture, delivered at the London School of Economics on February 2-4, 1938.)

198 However, it is not to be inferred bere that all u n ­ official proposals are liberal.

The truth of the matter is

that there are also many economists who are cautious and conservative by nature.

Only a few among the many of them

who have expressed their opinion regarding the future of international trade may be quoted here.

To begin with Pro­

fessor Ernest M. P a t t e r s o n 1s opinion is that there should be more freedom of trade to offset immigration restrictions. He puts it in the following terms: . . . If autarchy is depressing living standards where it is most fully applied and if emigration from those areas cannot be used to relax the pressure, there is all the more reason for lowering the barriers to the movement of trade and of capital. If people cannot pass as freely as before from congested to sparsely populated areas, from countries where standards of living are b e ­ ing depressed to countries where they are higher or pe r ­ haps rising, then freedom of trade should be encouraged as a means of r e l i e f . 121 Condliffe in his recent book entitled The Reconstruc­ tion of World Trade expresses his conviction that the elimina­ tion of the newer types of discriminatory trade controls is insufficient to restore normal trade relations unless tariffs are reduced to a minimum.

On this point he observed:

. . . Though no longer the chief instruments of trade restriction in the exchange-control countries, tariffs remain formidable barriers to any resumption of normal trade. While any attempt at trade revival must, by com­ m o n consent, begin with a relaxation of the new dis­ criminatory trade controls, such an attempt would

Patterson, op. cit., p. 197* cit., p. 104.

Cf., Condliffe, op .

199 quickly encounter the Tact that tariffs at their present levels, and in their present complexity, are formidable obstacles. It is not sufficient, therefore, to concen­ trate attention upon exchange-control, and quota systems. Still less is it practicable to contemplate the replace­ ment of such controls by consolidated and hightened tariff barriers. If ever trade is to flow more freely, tariffs must come down t o o . 122 It is his further belief that "The only way in which multilateral trade can be restored is by the establishment of such price relationships as will enable trade to flow freely without disturbing the balances of external pay­ ments.

But "there can be no restoration of multilateral

trade unless the United States is prepared to accept the position, proper to a great creditor nation, of receiving a volume of Imports much in excess of its exports,

.,124

he

promptly warned. Meade would establish an "international Authority" and empower it to "arrange for the gradual reduction of barriers to trade.

..."

I PS

However, he would permit the Mem-

ber-States with planned economies "to control their foreign

Ibid., p. 179. See also pp. 52-54, Cf., Gayer, op. cit.,.pp. 44-47, and p. 167; also Ivor Jennings, A Fed­ eration for Western Europe (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1940), pp. 150-51. 125 Condliffe, op. cit., p. 578. l*oc* oit.

Cf., Staley, op. cit., p. 4ll.

Meade, op. cit,, p. l8l.

200 trade provided that imports and exports were planned on the principles of buying in the cheapest and selling in the dearest market. Thus as clearly shown above, while different ways have been proposed, the objective is the same, jUje., greater and freer movements of international trade 127' by the gradual reduction of trade barriers of all types. Future migration policy.

"While equal access to, and

a better distribution of, abundant resources of this world, and the restoration of normal international trade relations among nations are problems of great importance awaiting im­ mediate or eventual solution by world statesmanship, these are matched by another problem of great importance and magnitude, viz., the thorny question of migration.

Meade, loc. cit. See also Chap. V on MInternational Trade 11 for a lengthy discussion on important aspects of inter­ national trade. 127 For a concise study of the value of free trade to peace, see Louis Baudin, . . . Free Trade and Peace (Paris: International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, a League of Nations Publication, 1959); Cf., Jennings, op. cit., p. 121. See also D. H. Robertson, The Future of Inter­ national Trade in the Economic Journal, March, 1958, published by Royal Economic Socrety of London. Cf., Oscar Newfang, The United States of the~WorXd. (New Yorli and London: G. P. Putnamrs Sons, etc., 1950)., pp. 188-89. See Charles W. Cole, International Economic Interdependence in International Conciliation, April, 194-1* PP~ 240-45. See also Herbert Feis, Restoring Trade~~Af ter~~~the War in the American Quarterly Re­ view of January," l"942, Vol.. 20, No. 2, pp. 2l?2'-9lT.

201 Up to the end of the last century the subject of migration was not a problem.

ipQ

It was not even a problem,

in the present sense, in the first decade of this century. However, in the Interim between the First and Second World Wars, the States of the world, particularly those that are sparsely settled, entered into a new era of rigid immigra­ tion r e s t r i c t i o n , t h u s precluding the movements of people from one country to another. In the many plans for a future general economic re­ construction, the subject of migration occupies an important aspect in most, if not all, of them.

However, only a very

few of these plans incorporated some kind of proposals for future solution of the problem of migration.

The majority

simply stated the problems involved, its importance, and the difficulties to be surely encountered in attempting to solve it, but failed to make any constructive suggestion as to its future solution.

If unofficial plans are wanting, it is more

to be expected that official pronouncements, which are always well guarded, are practically, if not completely, devoid of any proposal to the same effect. Meade Is the only one who is bold enough to venture

12 ^ See supra, Chap. IV, footnote 10, pp. 132-33> and footnote 3 2 , p. 1 ^ 2 .

See Condliffe, op. cit., pp. 59-71*

202 into the realm of making a definite suggestion for encourag­ ing migration from States of low labor productivity to States of high productivity.

He thus tackles this subject:

From the world economic point of view there can be little doubt that migration should be positively encour­ aged from countries of low labour productivity to coun­ tries of high productivity; and from the purely economic point of view there is only one serious qualification of this principle to be made. Emigration should not be freely permitted from a country in which an existing pressure of population upon the means of subsistence is maintained as a result of excessive and unchecked fer­ tility in that country. For . . . emigration would pro­ vide no permanent cure for the pressure of population at home, since the empty places would quickly be refilled; and, secondly, there would logically be no end to such emigration until all the possible countries of immigra­ tion had themselves been overpopulated by this unchecked source of immigrants .1 5 0 Disposition of colonies.

Problems for future disposi-

of the vast colonial domains of the great imperial States of the world occupy no small amount of interest and speculation in current literature.

Plans to solve this problem are of

several types, but only four will be considered here: 1.

Leaving the present mother-States to continue to

manage their own respective holdings, but with guarantee of equal economic opportunity to other States; 131 2.

A joint regional management of each respective

130 Meade, op. cit., pp. 1 5 6 -5 7 . See also pp. 55 f. and 143-44. 131 See Jennings, op. cit., pp. 51-52.

205 regional area; 5.

Continuation and widening of the powers of the

League of Nations Mandate System; 133 ^ and finally 4.

Creation of an international authority with power

of supervision and administration of all colonial possessions. 134 Of the four types of plans enumerated above, the last one seems to recbive the greatest support and interest among more recent writers.

There is a growing belief that the

best possible solution of the baffling colonial problem is to throw them all under the administration of an interna­ tional body created for the purpose.

It is the further be­

lief that this will solve, once and for all, the ever-recur­ ring rivalry and jealousy among the imperialistic States which now and then exchange blows with dreadful consequences. Of course there is no doubt that many objections and opposi­ tions will be encountered from the States affected, but it is claimed that in the end it will work for the advantage of all.

However, warning has been made that, whatever body

132

See Frank Lorimer, Population Factors Relating to the Organization of Peace in International Conciliation, ApFiiT ig^r—

y: ¥ 50^51—

-----------------------------------

133 See Benjamin Gerig, Colonies in an Eventual World Settlement in International Conciliation, April, 1941 > pp. 522-25. 134 See Meade, op. cit., pp. 163 f. See also Staley, op. cit., p. 4l8.

204 administers these colonies, "the social welfare of the 1 -z ir

native populations must be the first consideration. Joint development of backyard areas.

. . .11

Aside from the

problem of* colonial administration, there is also a com­ panion problem of development of the vast undeveloped areas of the globe.

"While it is true that ntrade was greatest,

and developed fastest, between already highly industrilized countries,

aiso equally true that there is greater

return or profit for every investment made in backward areas than in highly developed regions.

In view of this fact

there is, then, the problem of international scramble for the development of untapped areas. Several plans have been advanced regarding the devel­ opment of still unproductive areas.

But all plans seem to

converge on the idea that any such future development should be made jointly or, at least, undertaken under the super­ vision of either regional or international authority. 135

For

Gerig, o£. cit., p. 524.

136 Condliffe, op. cit., p. 6 7 . See also Staley, op. cit., pp. 400-401. 137 Qualification should be made of the above statement. Of course there is no doubt that larger demands for invest­ ments may be needed in well-developed States, particularly after a destructive war or a catastrophe. But at the same time one should wonder if the rates of interest paid on in­ vested capital are as high as in backward areas where the risk is greater.

205 instance, Gerig proposes nThe creation of an International Development Fund which might be administered jointly by an International Bank and the International Con onial Commis138 sion.ff Staley suggested that . . . Investments made in the regions chosen for international development should be flde-nationalized. ” That is, they should be made through.international institutions which would have no right of "protection” from any national government, thus removing the fear . that they would become tools of political penetration. To replace national protection, there must be an inter­ national agency with authority to handle questions such as disputes and defaults arising out of these special investments.139 With regard to the value of developing backward areas, Meade characterized its importance as follows: In the first place, it leads to an increase in total world production. For investment of new machinery, for example, in an undeveloped area where capital is scarce and where the productivity of capital is therefore high will increase total production more than the investment of an equivalent amount of machinery in a country where the most productive uses of capital have already been satisfied. Secondly, international capital movements from rich to poor countries are likely to reduce existing differ­ ences in the standard of living. Such movements should benefit both the lending and the borrowing countries. IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Any one who reads this chapter will immediately Gerig, op. cit., p. 525* 139 140

1

Staley, op. cit., p. 413. Meade, op. cit., pp. 102-3*

206 realize that it is far from being a complete analysis of all plans or aspects of certain plans for a lasting economic peace.

In fact it is rather beyond the intention of this

study to make such an analysis.

The purpose of this chapter

was simply to point out, as briefly as possible, the eco­ nomic causes of the First World War with a cursory outline of some of the cardinal economic questions involved in the present World War II.

An attempt has also been made to show

the importance of a stable international standard of exchange in the commercial relations of nations; the efforts made to reconstruct the badly shattered monetary and economic sys­ tems after the last World War; and, finally, to note some of the most important topics which have drawn the attention of both laymen and experts as well as statesmen in their numer­ ous plans for future monetary reconstruction in particular, and economic reconstruction in general. It should be pointed out that an official "Economic Planning Commission11 has already been appointed In Great Britain.

The purpose of the Commission is to make an ex­

tensive study of the possibilities for economic rehabilita­ tion after World War II.

In the United States similar stud­

ies are being made by subdivisions of the "National Resources Planning Board."

However, just as In England, in the United

States, various individuals or unofficial group organiza­ tions have already been making definite study toward the

207 same end.

In fact several preliminary reports and mono­

graphs have already been put out with very interesting sugl4l gestions which are worth while noting. This chapter may be appropriately closed by a quota­ tion from Staley, who pointed out in a very clear manner the three most essential economic conditions that must be met after the current Second World War if the next peace is to be enduring: First, there must be assurance of access to the world!s markets and materials through peaceful exchange; that is, there must be economic alternatives to conquest. Second, there must be reasonable economic stability, for disastrous booms and depressions which bring so much personal suffering also imperil the peace between na­ tions. Third, there must be a coordinated program of progressive economic development, not merely because this will make rising living standards possible for the peoples of the world, but also because it is the only way to deal satisfactorily with certain acute problems which we can foresee in the postwar situation, namely: the problem of economic demobilization when the fighting stops; the problem of maintaining a sufficient rate of investment in the advanced countries; and the problem of peaceful adjustment to rapid population increase, which must continue for sometime yet in certain areas of the world, now that migration no longer provides a safety valve.142

JLH-J.

For instance, several of the quotations given above were taken from the Preliminary Report and Monographs11 re­ leased by the "Commission to Study the Organization of. Peace.11 See International Conciliation, April, 1941, No. 369. ■ 142 Staley, op. cit., p. 394. Note: Meade is in full agreement with Staleyrs second point. See Meade, op. cit., p. 1 8 .

CHAPTER VI

THE IDEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO WORLD PEACE Realization of the great importance of economics In the peaceful relations of nations has been clearly Indicated In the two preceding chapters.

The present and last chapter

of this study will he devoted wholly to a survey of some of the outstanding Ideological proposals for permanent peace. When it comes to an ideological approach to a lasting peace there Immediately appears a great number of welldivided schools of thought.

For instance, there are those

who believe that "universal communism" is the answer to a lasting peace.

Others think that world peace Is attainable

only through "world socialism."

There is also a third group

which sincerely advocates "regionalism” as having the best prospects of laying the foundation stone for an enduring peace.

Finally there Is a fourth group which, in recent

years, has grown in number and importance.

This group is of

the firm conviction that permanent peace can only be achieved through an outright establishment of a "world federation” or a ”supra-national-State."

Thus through the instrumentality

of any one of the above four "isms” (jL.e., communism, socialism, regionalism,1 and federalism), it Is believed, by

1 The present regime under the so-called capitalistic-

209 each of the respective groups, that a durable International peace can be established. X.

o

PEACE THROUGH UNIVERSAL COMMUNISM

Before proceeding further to discuss the possibili­ ties of communism as an instrument of international peace, perhaps it is important to deal, first, with its origin or historical background. The background of communism.

What is communism?*^

imperialistic-democracy is not given a separate section here for two reasons. First, it is presumed that contemporary educational institutions in countries operating under this system are giving adequate instructions to their respective citizens as to the basic elements of the said system, to warrant the Inclusion of any definition or explanation. Second, the said system will be Included, here and there, in the discussion on the subjects of regionalism and federalism. 2 Two other "isms" should have been included here, i.e., "Fascism11 and,"Nazism." However, due to the fact that T>orEh "isms” are predicated completely on "world domination by the employment of armed force," therefore, It Is not the province of this study to Include>them here. Communism should be classified with them, but for differences in meth­ ods or technique in spreading its doctrine and accomplishing its ends. At least prior to the invasion of Finland and Poland. See Russell E. Westmeyer, Modern Economic and Social Systems (New York: Farrar & Rinehart, Inc., T5¥0), pp. $ II* 70. h

For instance, a good example of a roundabout way of defining communism may be found in William N. Loucks, et al., Comparative Economic Systems (New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1938;, Chap. 13, pp. 275-8?. c; ** James E. Le Rosslgnol, From Marx to Stalin, A Cri­

tique of Communism. (New York: T. YVCrowelT”Co., 1$40T, p. $6.

6 Ibid., p. 2k,

out with a warning that a distinction should he made . . • between the earlier utopian communism of such men as More and Owen and the communism expounded by the All-Russian Communist Party and its satellites in other countries, for the two have very, little in common*7 Some authors attribute the origin of communism to the early primitive life of society.

Q

Another pointed out that

the first and only real and still existing communists of the world are the ants.

Howbeit, from the modern point of view,

the present communism is said to be "derived directly from the classical idealism of Hegel . . ."^ and still more particularly from the "Manifesto of the Communist Party"10 which was first drawn up in German by Marx and Engels in January, 1848.11 7

Westmeyer, og. cit., p. 229.

8 See Le Rossignol, og. cit., pp. 145 and 151. Cf., Joyce O. Hertzler, The History of Utopian Thought (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926); ancT Levis Mumfora, The Story of Utopias (New York: Bonl and Liveright, 1922). ^ John MacMurray, The Philosophy of Communism (London Faber & Paber Ltd., 1933)# p. 9. dee also P. Hearnshaw, A Survey of Socialism (London: The Macmillan Company, 1929)# 10 For a complete text of the "Manifesto," see West­ meyer, og. cit., pp. 527-54. See also Loucks, og. cit., pp. 719-50; and "Karl Marx and P. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: International Publishers, 19357^ 11 Westmeyer, og. cit., p. 523. Note: For an inter­ esting and scholarly study"of The Philosophy of Communism" in general, and the "Historical Background of communism in particular, see Charles J. McPadden, The Philosophy of Com­ munism (New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc., T939J; see aTio

The Russian experiment*

In Spite of the fact that

Marx and Engels are conceded by many, if not by all, writers to be the fathers of modern communism, whenever the word communism is mentioned, immediately one thing comes into one's mind: that is none other than Soviet Russia*

On this

point MacMurray is in complete accord when he says, "it Is only natural that we should think of Communism In terms of the existing situation in Soviet Russia*"12

However true

this statement is, in some respects, in others it is not true*

Whereas the Russian experiment started with the idea

of a "dictatorship of the proletariat"1^ which is in conso­ nant with the Marxian principle, as the years went by, ehanges and modifications have been made to suit the exist­ ing need and situation*

So that the present regime in

Russia no longer conforms with the original tenets of Marxism.

Instead of a dictatorship of the proletariat which

is supposed to be the "transition state" between capitalism

T. Brameld, A Philosophic Approach to Communism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1£33}» and also Macmurray, loc* cit* 12 Ibid*, p. 10 (MacMurray)• Note: Benin is consid­ ered only.as founder and father of Russian Communism in particular. ^ Ibid., p. 11.. See also Harry W. Baidler, A History of Socialist Thought (New York: T. Y. Crowell Co., T933)> p. 195. A good study of the "dictatorship of the prole­ tariat" may be found in Be Rosslgnol, op. cit*, Chap* 23 » pp. 349-68. See also pp. 424-27 for a comprehensive bibli­ ography on the subject. Cf., G. B. Briefs, The Proletariat (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1938).

213

and eventual communism in the Marxian theory, the present regime In Russia represents neither the transitional form nor the ultimate goal which Is communism*

14

On this point*

perhaps, it is worth while to quote Westmeyerfs observation: “The dictatorship In the Soviet Union may be described as a dictatorship over the proletariat, or possibly even as a dictatorship in the interests of the proletariat, but it is certainly not a dictatorship of the proletariat."^

Mac-

Murray, on the other hand, was explicit in saying that * * • Russia at present is not a communist society even on communist theory* The main reason why this Is so is that there exists at present In Soviet Russia a dictatorship and therefore, a system of government and of social organization determined by the dictatorship* We must remind ourselves that the existence of the dic­ tatorship Is inconsistent with the realization of com­ munism. lo Westmeyer, however, pointed out that ”it may be argued that the above departures from communist principles Ik

A good study of the background of Russian Communism may be found in N. Berdyaev, The Origin of Russian Communism (London: Centenary Press, 193?) • A DrieT~but elucidating work on the Russian System from the "Background of the Russian Revolution" to the present setup under the 1936 con­ stitution may be obtained from Westmeyer, o£. cit *, Part IV, Chaps. 15, 16, and 17* See also Loucks, op. cit., Chap. 19, pp. 391-^11• For a complete study of the soviet Government, see S. Harper, The Government of the Soviet Union (New York: Van Nostrand Co., 1938). *5 westmeyer, oj>. cit., p. 231*-* See further down on same page, and also on p7 25o for further statement of the existence of a dictatorship In Russia. See also Le Rosslgnol, o£. cit., p. 366. ^

MacMurray, op. cit., pp. 10-11.

214

represent changes In tactics rather than In fundamentals, and that the Soviet Union still adheres to the original com­ munist program."1^

Nonetheless, he Immediately answered

this argument by saying that although It may be the case, "but present (early 1940) developments do not as yet warrant a categorical answer to this question.

nl8

Result and significance of the Russian experiment. It Is not an easy matter to evaluate the success or failure of the Russian experiment with communism.

In fact, In more

recent years, It Is not unusual to hear people deny that there was ever a Russian experiment with "communism."

It

has been this student's privilege to have met persons of different social standing who frankly denied that any such thing as communism has ever taken place in Russia.

They

usually backed up their denials by pointing out to the four letters of the Russian Union, .i.e.* U.S.S.R. which stands for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This, they claim,

is sufficient indication that it was not communism that the Russians were trying to establish in Russia. 17

19

Westmeyer, o£. cit., p. 235*

^ i2£- Sit19 Some of those that this student has talked to claim that It was socialism which the Russians were trying to es­ tablish In Russia. Others refused to commit themselves any further, except to deny that communism ever existed in Russia.

215 It is not, however, the purpose here to get into the argument or whether there was or there is a Russian experi­ ment with Communism.

One will rind several hooks written,

pro and con, on this highly debatable question.

20

The sole

object in this study is to attempt to rind out the accom­ plishments and railures or the Russian experiment. As already pointed out above, it is extremely diFFicult to evaluate the Russian system.

Froressor Loucks, for

instance, gave rive reasons or the major dirriculties in evaluating the Soviet system. 21

Nevertheless, in spite or

They probably rorgot that the name U.S.S.R. did not come until the adoption or a rederal constitution in 1923, end arter the inauguration oF the so-called NEP (New Economic Policy), on March 15* 1921. See Westmeyer, op. cit., pp. 219-20* See also Loucks, og. cit., pp. 392-*53. Also the Further Fact that the Russian system is an outgrowth oF the ManiFesto oF the Communist Party oF 1848, and still the Further Fact that the public statements alone oF leading Soviet delegates to international conFerences conclusively showed the use oF the word communism. For instance, in a speech delivered by G. Chicherin, Vice-Chairman oF the Russian delegation, at the First Plenary Sitting oF the Genoa ConFerence on April 10, 1922, he declared, MI desire to repeat once more that, as communists [italics not in the original], we do not entertain any special illusion as to the responsibility For the existing state oF aFFairs. . . ." See Henri Barbusse, editor, The Soviet Union and Peace (New, York: International Publishers, T9S9T7 p. 8b. 20

Valuable reFerences on Soviet Russia are given by Westmeyer, op. cit., pp. 273-76. There the author attempted to classiFy“ the materials as to whether they are MFriendly" or "unFriendly" to the Soviet Union. See also Loucks, op.. cit., p. 479 n. ^ See ibid*, Chap. 23, PP* 479-83, For his Five "major diFFicultles in evaluation."

216

his awareness of the existing difficulties, he attempted to list seven important 11accomplishments of the Soviet System11 in the vaguest and most generalized terms as follows: 1. A system organized along primarily socialistic lines has been kept going.22 2. A wealth of experience with a planned economy has been worked out and accumulated for whomever it may serve.23 3. A substantial degree of industrialization has been developed.24 4. Scientific modes and mechanical aids have been widely developed in agriculture.25 5. General living standards probably have at least been preserved during a period when it was not true in other portions of E u r o p e . 26 6 . Other world powers have developed and retained a respect for, and, in some cases, even a fear of the Soviet Union.27 7* Economic relationships of a contractual nature have been established with other nations and have been scrupulously adhered to.28 22 see ibid., pp. 483-84 for a general discussion and elaboration. (ft'ote: in the ensuing thirteen footnotes only the pages will be given. But it should be understood that these pages refer to the discussion and explanation or elaboration by the author.) 25 Ibid., p. 484. Oil

Ibid., pp. 484-85.

25 Ibid.. pp. 485-86. Ibid., pp. 486-88. 27 Ibid., pp. 488-89. 28 Ibid., p. 489.

2X7

As to the "failings of the Soviet System," Professor Loucks has also tried to enumerate seven major failures, hut onee more in the most general terms: 1. The Soviet Union has not become the spearhead of the world proletariat in the manner intended.29 2. The Soviet Union has failed to isolate and insu­ late itself from the problems of a capitalistic world.30 3.

Industrial efficiency has not developed rapidly.^

4. Individuals have not been socialized in their motivations.32 5. The productivity of the economy has not increased as rapidly as anticipated.33 6 . There has been no tendency to emerge from certain features of the "dictatorship of the proletariat."34 7* Certain long-promised and hoped-for institutions, commonly held to embody the spirit of real democracy, have failed to develop.35 The significance of the Russian experiment is of utmost importance to the world both to its friends and foes alike.

The fact that it is the first^ really practical 29 Ibid., p. 490. 30 1*0c. clt. 31 Ibid., pp. 32 Ibid., pp. 33 Ibid., pp. 34 Ibid., PP.

490-91. 491-92. 492-93. 493-94.

35 Ibid., pp. 494-98. 36 The Manifesto had the chance of practical applica-

218

application or the principles embodied in the "Manifesto of the Communist Party" which was carefully drawn by the comblned minds of two great champions of communism or of a "classless commonwealth,"^ was, indeed, awaited with eager­ ness, if not, with utmost interest and anxiety by its friends and foes alike as to what its ultimate outcome will be*

If

successful, then it will pave the way to the furtherance of the communist doctrine in other countries*

However, its

failure will hinder the propagation of the same. Prospects of spreading communism in other lands* Meantime, while the experiment was going on, and true to the tenets of Marxism, as embodied principally in the now famous Manifesto, the communists in other lands launched their separate, unorganized campaigns in various countries with­ out awaiting any further the outcome of the experiment in Russia.^®

However, after the "First Congress of the Com­

tion in the French Revolution of 1848, but failed in spite of the fact that Marx and Engels "not only expected the triumphs of the proletariat but courageously fought for it." See I*e Rosslgnol, op. cit., p. 318. Again further attempts* were, made later, but "with the downfall of the Commune of Paris in 1871 and the*transfer of the secretariat of The International to New York in 1872," Marx’s active participa­ tion in revolutionary agitation practically ceased* See ibid., p. 322. *57

Ibid.. Chap. 24, pp. 369-87 give an interesting discussion of the classless commonwealth*" On pp. 427-28, same author gives a list of references dealing with the sub­ ject. ^

On January 24, 1919 > however, the Central Committee

219

munist International"^ (Third International), or, as some­ times called, the Comintern,^0 was organized in Moscow, a well-directed and coordinated effort was carried on in various States.

41

Prom the time of the organization of the

Comintern on, . . . all communist bodies, no matter where located, are subordinate to it and are pledged to carry out its of the Russian Communist Party issued a general call by wire­ less telegraphy to the communists of the world for a **first Communist International Congress” at Moscow, so as to "lay the foundation of a common fighting organ, which will be a uniting link and methodically lead the movement for the Com­ munist International, which subordinates the interests of the movement in every separate country to the common inter­ ests of the revolution on an international scale*” See Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Soviet Communism: A Hew,Civiliza­ tion? (New York: Charles Scribner1s Sons, 1936)» I, 40b. See also History of the Communist Party of the.Soviet Union (New York: International Publishers, 19357* pp. 23b-3b. 59 Congress met in Moscow on March 2-7, 1919; sev­ eral States were represented by one or two delegates each. See I*e Rossignol, op. clt., Chap. 25* pp. 338-412, for a lengthy discussion of 11The Third (Communist) International.” See pp. 428-29 for bibliography on the subject. See also V. Lenin, The Foundation of the Communist Internetlonal (New York: International Publishers, 1934); also the Program of the Communist International (New York: Workers Library *Pub­ lishers , 1933), and Sugene Lyons, The Red Decade (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1941), ChapT”T, pp. 20-28. 40

-

™ It is also variably spelled as Komintern. Note: The Comintern not only immediately accepted the Communist Manifesto as its own, but also promulgated a new manifesto, “Manifesto of the First Congress of the Communist Interna­ tional," designed to clarify as well as to bring up-to-date the doctrines enunciated by Marx and Engels. The text of this manifesto is in Westmeyer, o|>. cit., pp. 555-69. 41 « By 1931# there were communist parties in over fifty countries, all or nearly all affiliated with the Moscow International." See Le Rossignol, op. cit., pp. 555-69. . , -

220

orders. The first loyalty of every communist must be to the Komintern, and not to the country of which he hap­ pens to be a citizen or r e s i d e n t .^2 However, in spite of the well-organized and welldirected efforts emanating from a central body, the Comin­ tern, and despite the fact that all communists were supposed to be loyal subjects, first of all, to that body, neverthe­ less, subsequent events conclusively manifested that its endeavors were not highly successful*

Attempts by the

communists to seize governmental powers in Germany, France, Spain, China, and India (not to mention England and the United States, and elsewhere) met with failures.^

It is

enough that after a quarter of a century of vainful efforts and experimentation in Russia,

J1.4

and great exertions to

spread the doctrine of communism all over the world, ^ not

^2 Westmeyer, oj>. cit,, p. 230. ^ See ibid., pp. 277-89* for a brief study of com­ munism in the United States. For a lengthy treatment of com­ munism in the United States, see Lyons, loe. cit. Libraries are too full of books and magazines dealing wTES the activi­ ties of the communists in various countries to warrant the listing of said references here. lik

Max Eastman, Stalin*s Russia and the Origin in Socialism (New York: W. W. Norton Co. , ) ; Victor Serge, Russia Twenty Years After (translated by Max Schachtman; New York: Hillman-durl, Inc., 1937); Boris Souvarine, A Critical Study of Bolshevism (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1939); Henry ITT ^arkes, Marxism: An Autopsy (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1939); ancT"Freda Utley, The Bream We Lost: Soviet Russia Then and Now (New York: John Say (Jo., Inc., r j w r

:---------------

^

M. T. Florinsky, World Revolution and the U.S.S.R.

on© other country has shown any permanent Interest In fol­ lowing the footsteps of the Russian system.

Therefore, the

claim of many communists that the only solution to the problem of establishing an enduring world peace through the instrumentality of a world-wide communism is far from reali­ zation.1*^

The tremendous difficulty in convincing other

peoples, if not in upsetting completely the well-established and traditional systems of governments throughout this uni­ verse, will be an insuperable and insurmountable stumblingblock to any such idea as communlzing the whole world for peace.

Any success achieved in the future through the

utilization of brute force will, undoubtedly, not insure an enduring peace, but merely temporal or a passing one until the yoke is overthrown by those under subjugation. II.

SOCIALISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OP WORLD ORDER

Another ideological approach to permanent interna-

(Rew York: The Macmillan Company, 1933)J also P. Borkenau, World Communism (New York: W. W. Norton Co., 1939). Cf., Cyril L. R. James, . . . World Revolution, 1917-1936 “(London M. Seeker & Warburg, Ltd., 1937TH A6

This is in spite of Mr. Stalin's claim that the U.&S.R. is ^the living prototype of the future union of all nations in a single world economic system." See J. Stalin, The Foundations of Leninism (New York: International Pub­ lisher s, l93"£), p. 82. On the various claims of the urgent need for communism, see J. M. Murry, The Necessity of Com­ munism (New York: T. Seltzer Co., 193377 6f., J. HecIEer, The Communist Answer to the World's Needs (Loncton: Chapman & Hall, T9337T----------„

tional peace Is through, world socialism* the ardent claim of many socialists*

At least this is

This claim is based on

the premise that under the present capitalistic-democratic system which is characterized, among other things, by com­ petition and profit, there will always be recurrent wars. However, before indulging any further the socialist claims for world peace under socialism in place of the pres­ ent system under capitalism, some definitions are in order to show some perspective of the system under consideration* Definitions of socialism* ously defined*

Socialism has been vari­

Hughan's definition follows:

Socialism is the political movement of the workingclass which aims to abolish exploitation by means of the collective ownership and democratic management of the basic Instruments of production and distribution.47 Another definition is given by Humphrey: "Socialism is a system of society in which the means of life belong to the community as a whole, and are developed and operated by the community with the aim of promoting the general welltoeing.”*8 Loucks has defined socialism as • • • that movement which aims to vest in society as 47

Jessie W. Hughan, What is Socialism? {New York: Vanguard Press, Inc., 1928), p. 48 , A. W* Humphrey, The Modern Case for Socialism (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928J, p. 51 •

225 whole, rather than In Individuals, the ownership and management of all nature-made and man-made producers' goods used In large-scale production, to the end that an Increased national Income may he more equally distrib­ uted without materially destroying the Individual's eco­ nomic motivation or his freedom of occupational and con­ sumption choices.49 Finally, according to dean Le Rossignol of the Uni­ versity of Nebraska, socialism is “The social philosophy which hopes for and advocates the collective ownership and operation of most, if not all, of the means of production, and the distribution of the social income of goods and services in some equitable way.ft^ Several other definitions by various authors might be included here, but the above are sufficient to give some in51 sight of the system. The others, excluded for lack of space, may be worded and expressed in different manner, but the general idea is the same. Distinction between communism and socialism.

52

It

^9 Loucks, og. cit., pp. 276-77* 50 he Rossignol, oj>. cit., p. 50. 51 See O. D. Skelton, Socialism; A Critical Analysis (Boston and New York; Houghton & Mifflin Co•, l§Il), pp. 2-5 > where he gave a definition of socialism in an indictment form. See also A. C. Figou, Socialism Versus Capitalism (London; Macmillan & Co., Ltd7, 1937)» pp. 2-5 fr. 52 For an explanation distinguishing Socialism and Communism, see John Strachey, How Socialism Works (New York; Modern Age Books, Inc., 1959), (SfiapT Xlt, pp. 147-ol. See also Loucks, op. cit., Chap. 15, pp. 275-67; and Le Ros­ signol, op. cTt., pp. 42-44 and 68-70.

224

has heen mentioned above, In passing, that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is merely the transition stage between capitalism and communism.^*

Other writers, however, seem to

make socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat synonymous.

For example, Strachey lh his book, already

cited elsewhere, stated that It is, accordingly, proposed to establish socialism as something which we can put in the place of our pres­ ent decaying capitalism. Hence communists work for the establishment of socialism as & necessary transition stage on the road to communism. 54 Whatever the relationship may be, between socialism and the dictatorship of the proletariat, is not the concern of this study.

The purpose here is merely to show the dis­

tinguishing feature or features between socialism and com­ munism. According to Strachey, the distinction between social­ ism and communism lies in the theory that socialism Is "a system of planned production for use in which the products are distributed in accordance with the quantity and quality CE

of work done."

While under communism although "also based

C1 *

^ See houcks, loc. cit.; Le Rossignol, loc. cit.J MacMurray, loc. cit.; and Solomon P. Bloom, The WorTcT"of Nations (New Iforkt Columbia University Press/“1‘941), p. 70. 54 Strachey, oj>. cit., p. 156. 55 Ibid,, p. 155.

225

upon planned production Tor use . • • the products are dis­ tributed according to need, and work Is done according to ability.”56 Sourcea and varieties of socialism.5 ' Socialism has, undoubtedly, many sources, and, surely, different varieties* However, It Is not the object here to delve deeper Into the mysteries of Its origin except to point out, In passing, Its line of development* As pointed out by various authors, socialism Is deep­ ly rooted In human nature Itself with Its relevant aspira­ tions for equality, for power, for justice, and for liberty. However, aside from these, he Rossignol thinks that socialism has three lines of development and Influence which, according to him, have special significance*

First he points to the

"Hebrew prophecy and Christian teaching";-*® second, to the emergence of "utopian thoughtH*59

finally, to "the

Ibid*, pp* 155-56. For further distinction, see houcks, op. cit., 284-87. A graphic distinction between these two "isms" is given on p* 287• See also he Rossignol, op* cit*, pp. 42-44. Of., Erik Achorn, European Civiliza­ tion and Politics (Nev"“¥ork: Harcourt, Brace & 60*, 1958)» pp. 545-451 57

A good study of the sources of socialism may be found In he Rossignol, op* cit*, Chaps* 1 and 2, pp. 1-25• See also Westmeyer, op. cit *, pp. 5-92. A bibliography on the subject is given on pp. 15-14; 57 9 and 95* 58 See he Rossignol, og. cit., pp. 2-8. 59 ibid., pp. 8-15.

226 political and industrial revolution of the eighteenth cen­ tury and after* f,^° In point of time, the word socialism existed long be­ fore the word communism, although "both of them existed in theory and practice long before the names were coined.

61

-

The word socialism first appeared in England in "a copy of the Owenite Cooperative magazine of the year 1027» and in another Owenite publication, The Poor Man*3 Guardian, in while that of the word communism did not appear

1833,

until it was "coined by the revolutionists of Paris"^ shortly before the French Revolution of February 24, 1848. It did not become a popular name until after the promulga** tion by Marx and Engels of the now famous "Manifesto of the Communist Party."

From that time on, the word communism was

generally considered synonymous with the bad or worst ele­ ments of society, while socialism was identified with the middle or the better class. At present, there are many varieties of socialism. For example, Le Rossignol listed several of them as follows: communism, state socialism, Fabian socialism, syndicalism,

60 rbia., pp. 16-23.

Ibid., p. 24. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 65

Ibid., p. 25.

227 64

guild socialism, and cooperative socialism. ^ The socialists1 case for peace.

Many of the intelli­

gent socialists throughout the world are of the opinion that socialism is the answer to the prayer for world order.

For

example, Miguel Quintana is quoted by Professor Condiiffe as saying that, nTo achieve economic peace, which will also be spiritual peace, there is no alternative to socialism which levels wealth and makes impossible a system of potentates confronting unfortunates• But capitalism will continue to defend Itself and in the coming war, which is very near, the proletariat will fight again for the dominance of some capitalist group and not for its own interests. Until the working masses, tired of enduring an unduly prolonged insecurity, take political power by a revolution like the Russian revolution in 1917 and finish off the capitalist era.,f65 A noted French socialist and statesman, Leon Blum, also believes that socialism is the one solution to the problem of peace in a world full of turmoil under a capital­ istic regime.

Thus runs his observation on this points

When all is said and done, it is SOCIALISM alone that can destroy the old Instincts, and cure humanity of all her old psychoses. The name of this cure is MORAL DIS­ ARMAMENT. As the workers grow stronger SOCIALISM will be more and more successful in carrying out this task. The working class is fighting, and will finally supplant the social order which always has contained and still contains the physical seeds of war. I have shown in 64 Ibid., pp. 50-51 give the definition for each of them. See also Achorn, op. cit., pp. 544-48. J

Quoted and translated by Condliffe, og. cit., p.

this book that the success of any system of mutual guarantees and agreements will ultimately depend on the pressure of the workers on the governments; that any system of effective control must depend on the will of the working class; and that the violation of interna­ tional agreements can only be prevented by the resist­ ance and the 11sanctions11 of the workers* Thus we see that the working class, belonging to the Socialist organization, is that element which will cure the mind and give fresh life to the national feelings and in­ stincts. The obvious conclusion can best be found in Anatole Prance's words: nThe union of the workers will bring Peace to the World."66 H.

G. Wells, a well-known British writer and lecturer,

who really needs no introduction to contemporary readers, has his faith also in world socialism as the would-be savior of the world's ever-growing economic ills and intermittent wars.

His dream of a new spirit of cleanliness and beauty

in this "vale of tears" may be quoted here as follows: This new and complete Bevolution we contemplate can be defined in a very few words. It is (a) outright world-socialism, scientifically planned and directed, plus (b) a sustained Insistence upon law, law based on a fuller,.more jealously conceived restatement of the per­ sonal Bights of Man, plus (c) the completest freedom of speech, criticism, and publication, and a sedulous ex­ pansion of the educational organization to the ever growing demands of the new order. What we may call the Eastern or Bolshevik Collectivism, the Bevolution of the Internationale, has failed to achieve even the first of these three items and it has never even attempted the other two. Putting it at its compactest, it is the triangle of Socialism, Law, and Knowledge which frames the Bevolu­ tion that may yet save the world. 66 Leon Blum, Peace and Disarmament (translated by Alexander. Werth; London: Jonathan Cape, 1.932), p. 202. ^7 Hv G. Wells, New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 19*10), p. 89* See also Chap. X, pp. 105-10, for Mr.

Thus, as shorn, by the few quotations above, and sev­ eral others not quoted here, numerous socialist intellec­ tuals all over the world have pinned their hopes in world socialism as the one and only one system that will establish durable peace on earth* Prospects of realizing these claims* What are the possibilities of realizing the socialists* claim of a world order under a socialistic system?

This question may seem

easy to answer from the point of view of a socialist, but to an impartial or ‘ unbiased observer, it is not so easy*

How­

ever, the question is not too difficult to warrant any in­ telligent reply based on consideration of past performances and experiences* For example, it would not be difficult to point out the various criticisms leveled against socialism by those who have made a definite study of the subject, as well as to point out the great diversity of opinion among socialists, not only among socialists from various groups of socialism, as already pointed out above, but also the differences of opinion among the members of the same group* Loucks, for instance, in his chapter entitled 11A

Wells* “Declaration of the Rights of Man.“ Note further that in;this book, Mr* Wells thinks that there is a great necessity for organizing production for use and not for profit, as the only basis for a world order.

250 68 pointed out two main lines of

Critique or Socialism,” criticism of socialism*

One, he designated as "superficial

criticisms”; the other as "basic criticisms." Under "superficial criticisms," Loucks listed several criticisms, viz.: "socialism is too theoretical";^9 "social­ ists are insincere";^0 "improvements in capitalism make 71 socialism unnecessary"; "socialism would breed dishonesty and g r a f t " " s o c i a l i s m would cause an exportation of capital";^ "socialistic methods may be used to anti-social e n d s " ; a n d finally, "socialism is un-American. Some of the so-called "basic criticisms," indicated 68 Loucks, og. cit., Chap. 18, pp. 560-85. See also pp. 586-87 for reTerences on the subject. See James E. lie Rossignol, ^flaat is Socialism? An Explanation and Criticism of the Doctrines and Proposals of "scientific Socialism11 TNew ¥ork: T. l T. Crowell Co., 1921); 6f., Reginald Tayier, Socialist Illusion; Being a Critical Review of the Princi­ ples ^oi1 State Socialism (Londons (George Alien & ttnwin, Ltd., 69 Loucks, op. cit., pp. 560-61, gives a brief discus­ sion and answer to the criticism. Pages on the following sixteen footnotes denote the same thing. 70 Ibid., pp. 562-64.

71 Itold.* PP. 564-66. 7^ rbld., pp. 566-68. 7^ 3Tb^.» PP. 568-69. 7^ Ibid., pp. 569-70. 75

Ibid., pp. 570-71.

by Loucks, were the following: "the primary operational task of socialism" will be just the same as in capitalism;?^ while the "general nature of the pricing process under socialism" "would be no less arbitrary . . .";r‘ there are more "advantages of the capitalistic pricing process" than under a socialistic system;

the "nature of the guidance of

production under socialism" "would be irrational as compared with the automatic direction given production by a capitalistic pricing process. «i79 He then went on to say that the socialists rely on "ideal equilibria as goals in a socialized .*80 economy. In the next section he pointed out the incon­ sistency of the socialist claim that there is "possibility of competitive price determination under socialism" just as Si

under capitalism,

and that under socialism "competitive

pricing of land and capital is impossible."

Then he went

on further to point out "the effects of the arbitrary pricing

76 Ibid., P. 572. 77 Ibid., PP. 572-73. 78 Ibid., PP. 37^-75. 79 Ibid.. PP. 375-76. 80 Ibid., PP. 376-78. 81 Ibid., PP. 378-79. 82 Ibid., PP. 379-80.

232

or land and capital11S3 as veil as the wconsequences of an arbitrary interest rate under socialism.11®^

Finally he

stressed the "effect of socialist pricing upon individual freedom of choice. In addition to the above, mention may here be made of the basic inconsistency in socialism.

To quote houcks again:

. . . The vital criticism of socialism is that it in­ sists that a socialized economy, vlth its necessary choice of comprehensive social goals and its arbitrary pricing to those ends, can exist without substantially interfering vlth either the freedom of consumers1 choice or the freedom of occupational choice. if comprehensive goals are chosen, Individual action must conform to them; whereas, if individual actions are left free, the com­ prehensive results will be determined thereby*”® As already stated above, socialists differ among them­ selves, not only between two groups but also between or among the members of the same group.

A good instance of

these differences among socialists is on the method of dis­ tribution appropriate to a planned system of production. George B. Shaw unequivocally proposed equality of income* In fact his whole program is centered on It.

He even went

to the extent of writing, in his book entitled The Intelli­ gent Woman*a Guide to Socialism and Capitalism, that

85 Jala., pp. 380-81. fui ° Ibid., pp. 381-82. 85 Ibid., p. 383. 86 Ibid., pp. 383-811.

235

socialism is predicated on equality of income; that whoever refuses to demand that incomes shall be made equal is not a socialist.^ In opposition to Shaw's plan, Strachey,

88

another

leading socialist by his own right, offered as a counter­ proposal for the immediate alternative to capitalism the distribution of the "goods and services produced by a system of planned production for use in accordance with the quantity and the quality of the work done.

He urged that the

method used at present be continued for the time being, "but to close the second of these channels (namely, distribution by way of rent, interest and profit) to persons in respect of their ownership of property in the means of production."9° In other words, unearned income Is to be abolished, thus leaving earned income as the only means of obtaining a live­ lihood.

In this way a person can get paid only for his

labor. There are many other differences and inconsistencies

which could have been cited here, but space forbids.

91

^7 see George B. Shaw, The Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism and Capitalism (Hew forks hrentano, 19287."“ 88 See Strachey, op. cit., Chap. IX, pp. 127-38. 89 Ikld., p. 130. 90 ibid., p. 131. 91 ^ For a good study on the general subject of social­ ism, see the followings F. A. Hearnshaw, A Survey of Social-

However, It will “be adequate enough for present purposes simply to point out that just as there are many kinds and varieties of socialism, one should expect a large number of differences of opinion between the several groups and be­ tween or among the numerous adherents in each group*

Thus,

the more there are of branches of socialism and differences of viewpoints, the more difficult it is to institute a uni­ fied working system that could adequately and effectively supplant the present long-established capitalistic system. If past performances and experiences are to be in­ vestigated, there is not much that socialism can offer. Several countries have adopted some kind of "state social­ ism,"^2 but to persons belonging to other groups of social­ ism such experiments are inadequate.

The great majority of

socialists are still looking forward to the time when the

ism (London: The Macmillan Company, 1929); J. Strachey, The Theory and Practice of Socialism (Hew York: Random House, 1956)7 Francis ¥. CoIEer, Recent Political Thought (New York: and London: D. Appleton-Century do., incT, 195?); Corlis Lamont, Yon Might Like Socialism (New York: Modern Age Books, Inc., 1939 );"and Loucks, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 289-535. 92 Australia, New Zealand, and some of the Scandi­ navian countries were, or are generally considered,Under this category. Germany under Bismarck was also placed on the same footing. The present socialism in Germany is rather dubious. Writers disagree as to their nature. How­ ever, it may be stated here, in passing, that there seems to be an increasing trend, all over the world, toward govern­ mental participation, if not ownership, in some of the in­ struments of production, communication, transportation, et cetera.

235

present order will collapse and the new order under the aegis of socialism will he ushered in.

This may or may not

he very far in the future; time only will tell.

Some claim ox

that it will take place after another great war. ^

If this

is so, then that time is not far distant as the whole world is already engulfed in a life and death struggle among the mighty imperialistic, capitalistic, socialistic, and faseistic States for their very existence. hast to he pointed out here, in a cursory survey of socialism’s past experiences, is the socialists' attitude toward war.

On the Issue of war, there seems to he a clash

of opinion between the “revolutionary” and "evolutionary” socialists.

Oil

According to J. Bruce Glasier, there are

socialists who “refuse to take up arms whatever the alleged ground of war" may he*

A second group of socialists will

fight only “if convinced that their government or country is in the right.”

Finally, a third group of socialists are

ready to fight any time whenever “their 'country is in danger* no matter whether their government or country he in the right or the wrong.

This claim was originated hy Marx. time other socialists have done likewise. Oil

Ever since that

See houcks, op. cit., pp. 357-58. 95 s©e J . Bruce Glasier, The Meaning of Socialism (New York: Thomas Seltzer, Inc., 192T5J7 p. 2£h7

In an able summary of the principles and practices of the Second International (which is the embodiment of world­ wide socialism), Markham has unequivocally stated that the socialists opposed militarism, imperialism, and standing armies as making for war and the suppression of the pro­ letariat*

The said International usually demanded that

socialists in every country refuse to vote military and 96 naval credits, especially in time of war* Notwithstanding all of the socialist commitments with regard to war, at the outbreak of the First World War social­ ists the world over were duly mobilized side by side with nonsocialists.^7

According to Le Rossignol, "there were no

strikes; and, under the Influence of patriotism, propaganda, and war fever, socialist parties everywhere voted for war credits and other means of winning victory for their respective countries."

98

As a consequence of socialist participa­

tion in the war efforts, the Second International was split "into two sections, pro-war and anti-war, making an almost

^ See S. F. Markham, A History of Socialism (Londons The Macmillan Company, 1931)# pp. 151-53* 97

For an interesting study of socialism and the First World War, see A. Humphrey, International Socialism and the War (London: P. S. King & Son, Ltd., 1915)1 see also Merle Fainsod, International Socialism and the World War (Cam­ bridge, Mass. s harvard University "firess, T9557V Le Rossignol, o|>. cit., p. 391*.

237

irreparable breach in international harmony. . . .»99 Before the outbreak of the current World War II, the American socialists, in their convention in 1936, voiced the general attitude of modern socialists toward the issue of war by adopting a resolution to the effect that The twin danger of war and fascism must be fought simultaneously as the products of capitalist nationalism. Uncompromising struggle against all capitalist states, both before and after war is declared, is the only method of fighting imperialism and the threat of fascism In our country and throughout the world. The Socialist party, therefore, repudiates support of an imperialist power against a present fascist power as a means of overthrow­ ing fascism.10° What happened to this resolution now that the United States has become an active belligerent since the treacher­ ous attack by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 19^17

What became of the similar resolutions In other

States?

These and other questions are difficult to answer

as no one seemed to know (at date of writing) what the Socialist Party Is doing.

Inquiries were made at the Los

Angeles Times, the Los Angeles Public Library, and other in­ formation bureaus,

Telephone calls at the Socialist Party

office met no reply. 99 Le Rossignol, loc. cit. A good study of the break­ down of socialism Is given by Arthur Shadwell, The Breakdown of Socialism (Bostons Little, Brown, & Co., 1927). , 100 See p. 15.

American Socialist Quarterly, July, 1936,

238

III.

PROSPECTS OP PEACE IN REGIONALISM

As a third ideological plan to prevent the resurgence of future conflicts, a large group of people all over the world has increasingly advocated, in the past two decades, the development of regionalism.

However, before going any

further in the discussion of the prospects of peace under a regional system, perhaps it is of importance to define and clarify the term "regionalism.11 Definition and clarification of the term "regionalism."

What is regionalism?

It is rather difficult to

answer this question without any definite understanding of the exact sense in which it is to be used. al definitions which could be given.

There are sever­

None, however, could

be found which is appropriate to the sense in which this word is to be employed here.

For Instance, the dictionary

gives the meaning of regionalism as "The doctrine or prac­ tice of subdividing or decentralizing a country into regions on a political, economic, or other, basis."101

Hedvig

Hintze was probably thinking in the same manner when, in a scholarly report on Regionalism" in the Encyclopedia of *

t

Social Sciences, he gave as his definition the following:

101 See Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language (second edition; Springfield, Mass•: G. & . clt., pp. 311-13 Ibid., pp. 315-15.

251 now at the gates of India* Australia* and New Zealand* The continental type of regionalism* The continental type of regionalism has received more interest and attention* by both official and unofficial circles* than any other type of regionalism so far discussed here* Since the publication of Count Richard N* CoudenhoveKalergl’s Fan-Europa in 1923* there has been a growing in­ terest in the question of unifying the entire Continent of Europe.

The idea of a European Federation did not, however,

originate at the time of publication of the Count’s book* but antedated this event*

Its origin may be traced back to

the days of MGeorge of Podebrad*M King of Bohemia*

As early

as the fifteenth century--to be exact* on or around 1464— "George of Podebrad conceived the idea of founding an inter­ national Congregatlo Concordiae* a sort of League of Na­ tions

But in spite of his efforts to carry out his

plans* largely because of lack of cooperation by both the King of France* Louis XI* and the Holy Roman See* this plan was foredoomed to failure.1^ It is not* however, the purpose here to dwell any 137 Edouard Herriot* The United States of Europe (trans­ lated by Reginald J. Dingle; New ‘ Y'ork: the Vllcing Press* 1930), p. 20. 15

Ibid., pp. 20-22.

further on the historical background of present plans for the unification of all the existing States of Europe.1^9 The main object is to analyze, as briefly as possible, the more recent proposals for the federation of that Continent. 1.

Count Coudehhove-Kalergl1s plan. As already

indicated above, perhaps the modern originator of the plan for the federation of Europe is Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, an Austrian born son of a Japanese mother.

*i 2l

q

The essence of

his plan, in its modern version, would be to federate the old world, Including Great Britain, but excluding Russia. However, he did not stop here.

He went further to propose

not only the unification of Europe, but also the division of the whole world into what he termed the “five political con­ tinents, “ i.♦£« > Fan-America, Pan-Europa, the Russian Federa­ tion, the British Empire, and the Far East.

It was his

opinion that the States constituting each group, with the exception of the Orient, have already achieved considerable degree of unity among themselves. For instance, according to the Cotint, the Soviet Union has already manifested its ability to unite all the peoples within its vast domain into a single, well-

139 For ^ interesting survey of the “forerunners” of modern plans, see ibid., Chap. II, pp. 20-48. 140 Paul Hutchinson, The United States of Europe (New York: Willett, Clark and CoTBy, 1§29), P* T 4 .

253

integrated federation, while the members of the British Em­ pire are, in a measure, well-united under a common alle­ giance to the British Crown*

Moreover, the States of the

two Americas are already loosely joined together by the PanAmerican Union*

The nations of Western Europe are closely

related among themselves by common Interests such as civili­ zation, religion, and culture*

As to the remaining States

of the Far East, China and Japan are akin in race, possess more than one interest in common, and, probably, would l4l receive more benefit by such a union* Count Coudenhove-Kalergi1s plan hibernated for six long winters.

Wot until 1929# in the brightest days of

post-World War I international cooperation, when some fiftyeight States were in the League of Nations and were earnestly collaborating among themselves, when its activities were anxiously but rather hopefully watched by the world at large, when some fifty-seven States had happily acclaimed and signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact, did M. Briand resurrect the idea of a United States of Europe*

See Richard N* Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1926). See also a digest of an article by same author in World Affairs Interpreter, pub­ lished by the Los Angeles University of Internatlonal Rela­ tions, Winter,.1940/^Voi* lo, So. V, pp. 421-2^. wherein he analyzed three ways o^ unlTIng“Europe, i*e., (l) under Hitler or German regime; (2) by way of the Russian system; (3) by equal federation of all States under British and French leadership*

2*

The Briand plan. M. Aristide Briand*s plan for a

United States of Europe was presented to the world in his speech at Geneva on September 5, 1929* to the Tenth Assembly of the Beague of Nations.

iko

Sir Austen Chamberlain of

Great Britain, and Dr. Gustav Stresemanm of Germany acted as its godfathers.

The salient points of M. Briand*s speech

which contained the essence of his plan may be readily noted from the following quotation: I think that between peoples constituting geographi­ cal groups, like the peoples of Europe, there should be some federal bond; it should be possible for them to get into touch at any time, to confer about their interests, to agree on joint resolutions and to establish among themselves a bond of solidarity which will enable them, if need be, to meet any grave emergency that may arise. That is the link I wish to forge. Obviously, this association will be primarily eco­ nomic, and I think we may look for success in that direction. Still, I am convinced that, politically and socially also, this federal link might, without affect­ ing the sovereignty of,any of the nations belonging to such an association, do useful work; and I propose dur­ ing this session to ask those of my colleagues here who represent European nations to be good enough to consider this suggestion unofficially and submit it to their Gov­ ernments for examination, so that those possibilities which I see in the suggestion may be translated into realities later— perhaps at the next session of the Assembly.143 Ikp

The above date is taken from Herriot, og. cit., p. 49. Cf., The date given by Schuman, og. cit., p. 729, which is 19