An American policy in Asia [2. print. ed.]

Citation preview

MIT LIBRARIES

1S183.8 .ATI

3 9080 01750 0791

• R839

tsSHS.

3Qf*£&i af I'

:

; -5-i

jg-r'T ZS'i:' Sseg^a*)** • ." \*S

t’«5SfaR-’*: -*** : * Jp*-rj*9N« ^SfcSf' ■ wc k-it — •:

•

; ■■ ■ ?v-»r?V“*s*i'

M2 -—.::

-3 ~±C; ■ -s®*

*

^

.-

— S

:

' .. - _*‘

.i-~ - - -~

"■'

y-StX&m

■'?«ysr ~. '-

!

>r'

:rsL‘4~-

_._; T*"~-_ —a

_7

k# W 4 i

_ ..'^--'-■••_-,i^7j=fc: —> -

.

-*-.

Sags

--—v

-

-' V? .JC-Asaf,- Jim **> .'*'

-r— -~!

jg».

. - .S-"T -

■ ' - '_ .

l5jn^TrySV

»— - ■■rc.r ^c

4a£jgB$T

3^r==^^rr

*®^e*

fcfcVjfc' JSsSl

Silk JllJ.1. --W- ."

'*-1, --r —

-.«**.'-*-«»- —~ -*J?7 —-

74^30*2$,

-VV>',-L ^

•Ci'fl,

.

'jy«a r^-

———

_. ,,T „

r»*.T^ *

.‘XSN

LIBRARY OF THE

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

The MIT Press

This file has been authorized and provided by the publisher, The MIT Press, as part of its ongoing efforts to make available in digital form older titles that are no longer readily available. The file is provided for non-commercial use through the Internet Archive under a CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 license. For more information please visit www.creativecommons.org.

Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2018 with funding from The Arcadia Fund

https://archive.org/details/americanpolicyinOOrost

An AMERICAN POLICY -inASIA

TECHNOLOGY PRESS BOOKS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES An

American Policy in Asia

By W. W.

R. W.

Rostow and

Hatch

Machine Translation of Languages (in press)

Edited

W. N.

by

Locke

and A. D.

Booth

Nine Soviet Portraits

By

Raymond

A.

Bauer

The Prospects for Communist China

By W. W.

Rostow and others

Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity

By

Members of the Social Science Research Council

Nationalism and Social Communication

By

Karl

W.

Deutsch

Industrial Relations in Sweden

By

Charles

A.

Myers

Pressures on Wage Decisions

By

George P. Schultz

The Dollar Shortage

By

Charles

P.

Kindleberger

Mid-Century: The Social Implications of Scientific Progress Edited by John E. Burchard Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine

By

Norbert Wiener

The Movement of Factory Workers

By

Charles

A.

Myers

and W.

Rupert Maclaurin

An AMERICAN POLICY -inASIA W. W. ROSTOW in collaboration with Richard W. Hatch

Published jointly by The Technology Press of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and John Wiley & Sons, Inc., New York Chapman & Hall, Ltd., London

Copyright, 1955 By The Massachusetts Institute of Technology

All Rights Reserved This book or any part thereof must not be reproduced in any form without the written permission of the publisher.

Printed in the United States of America

Dewey

Preface It is supposed to be rather bad form for a university research organization to sponsor the publication of a policy book. The academic code insists on a rigid separation of “scholarship” and prescription. This is an important tradition, and one that should not be abandoned lightly. The usefulness to society of the academic community depends on continued public trust in its sober objectivity. In a curious way, however, in the field of China studies, the attempt to observe the rule has defeated its own purpose. China scholars have tended to develop split personalities, painfully excluding policy insights from their scholarly work, and then permitting their pent-up convictions as to what the United States should do in the Far East to spill out in most unscholarly bursts of temper. Far from protecting their scholarly reputations, this dual performance has convinced many citizens, quite incorrectly, that the scholarship was a mere cloak for emotional special pleading. Thus when the Center for International Studies concluded three years ago that an important service could be performed by launching a fresh examination of the nature of contemporary Communist Chinese society, we decided to assign to the direction of this task a man with no background whatsoever in the China field. There were many China scholars who in fact would have carried through the analysis with balance and objectivity, but few if any who were not, rightly or wrongly, identified in the public mind with an intemperately stated policy position. Professor Rostow accepted the assignment and, with the help of a number of researchers and the advice of many of the senior scholars in the field, produced The Prospects for Communist China. He started, with no policy preconceptions, to prepare an analytic volume but made no attempt to conceal either from his colleagues or himself that the central purpose of the effort was to cast new light on the troublesome decisions the United States would have to take in the Far East over the next few years. Meanwhile other work on Asia was going forward at the Center. Studies were launched of economic development problems in India and Indonesia, of patterns of communication in India, and of the social and political structure of a Javanese community. Putting insights derived from these studies together with his own work on China and his earlier work on the Soviet Union and on economic growth. Professor Rostow and his colleagues developed a set of views on how the United States might conduct itself in its Asian relations. The Center has decided for two reasons that these views deserve careful and widespread consideration.

First, we would like to help re-establish the legitimacy

of sober analysis of policy alternatives as an appropriate activity for scholars, to be carried forward with all the care, balance, and judgment that should charac¬ terize any scholarly activity.

Second, there has been available to the general

public very little thinking on Asian policy that is both informed and temperate. A research organization like the Center has, we feel, a responsibility to give wide circulation to any individual policy insights arising from our work. The Center and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology cannot and should not, of course, take any responsibility for the substance of the views set forth in this book. They are inherently controversial matters on which there is room for much difference of view. What we can certify is that the positions taken are responsible in the sense that they are based on careful study and disinterested in the sense that their sole purpose is to stimulate and clarify public thinking. Max F. Millikan

Director

Introduction This short book is a sequel to The Prospects for Communist China. As our research on China proceeded in 1953-1954 we set down our views on the particular policy issues posed for the United States by the intentions and activities of Communist China in Asia.

We interested ourselves in policy as

well as research in order to make sure that we answered as best we could those questions about Communist China most relevant to the making of a forwardlooking United States policy. After our research was completed we took stock of our informal policy papers. Despite the initial interest in Communist China which inspired them, they con¬ stituted an outline for a positive American policy in Asia.

This book proceeds,

then, not from a negative statement of the dangers the United States confronts, but from a positive definition of American interests in Asia. It has been our job for two years to educate ourselves in contemporary Asia. We have emerged with certain convictions concerning the course the United States should now follow in Asia. and clearly as we could.

We have stated them in this book as simply

We are under no illusion that they constitute the final

word on an American policy in Asia.

Their primary purpose is to assist in

public discussion of American action that looks forward rather than backward, to future opportunity rather than to past failure. Two of our conclusions we would commend without reservation.

They con¬

cern the broad nature of the American position in the world and the spirit in which the United States must approach its tasks in Asia. We as a people have made a momentous choice.

We have now clearly ruled

out one conceivable approach to a solution to our international problem: namely, a military attack on the Soviet Union and Communist China initiated by the United States.

In Chapter 6 we indicate why, in our view, the United States

has ruled out this way of dealing with men who are openly our nation’s enemies. That American decision has an important consequence.

It means that the

American people must find other ways for protecting their interests. native to total war initiated by the United States is not peace.

The alter¬

Until a different

spirit and a different policy prevail in Moscow and Peking the alternative for the United States is a mixture of military, political, and economic activity, con¬ ducted insofar as possible in coalition with other peoples in many parts of the world. The more complicated alternative the United States has chosen is immensely challenging.

It demands that Americans learn to work with peoples whom we

do not know instinctively or well. It demands that Americans undertake new kinds of military, political, and economic tasks. It demands, in short, a sustained and revolutionary change in American relations with the rest of the world. vii

Com-

placency, inaction, and an unwillingness to learn are as real enemies as the Communist leadership in Moscow and Peking. It follows directly that American interests are not likely to be protected unless the American people are prepared to concern themselves with foreign policy to an unprecedented degree, and unless they are prepared to invest in complex and apparently remote issues not merely increased resources but also increased energy and human concern. Only against such a background of responsible citizenship can a democratic government do the things it knows it ought to do. The record of public wisdom in the past fifteen years—when the facts and alternatives have been made clear—is excellent. We have not the slightest doubt that the Amer¬ ican people are capable of supporting a mature foreign policy when they are fully informed—supporting it with the sacrifices, the patience, and the human poise and confidence which are required. As we have come to learn something of the American problem in Asia we have become impressed not merely with the dangers to the American interest that are inherent in Asia’s present position but also with the greatness of the constructive tasks that must be undertaken if those dangers are to be reduced and eliminated. In Asia there are hundreds of millions of human beings now striving actively for national independence, increased human dignity, increased material welfare. work with them.

In order to protect American interests, the United States must Asians must achieve these goals largely by their own efforts;

but the scale and quality of the American contribution in resources, technique, and human fellowship could be decisive. Looking back over our national history since the Civil War, it is not too much to say that the United States has come near to solving many of the great issues of its domestic life.

The problems of monopolies and industrial concentration,

of equity for the farmer, of labor union organization, of social security, of cyclical unemployment, of the Negro and other minorities—on all of them the nation has made great progress.

There is still much to be done; great problems are

rarely solved once and for all. And yet these challenges do not dominate the scene as they did even a generation ago. The great task for the United States lies in using its limited but real margin of influence on the course of history to help create a world in which our society and other open societies, based on the sanctity of the individual in relation to the state, can survive and continue to develop.

Having looked hard and without

wishful thought at both the Soviet and Chinese Communist challenges, we are convinced that the United States can do this job; but it will take the best that American society can produce. As a nation we can not yet settle down to a comfortable middle age, refining the solutions to old and familiar domestic problems. be regretted. As Herbert Croly wrote in 1909:

And this is not wholly to

An America which was not the land of promise, which was not informed by a pro¬ phetic outlook and a more or less constructive ideal, would not be the America bequeathed to us by our forefathers.

For the views expressed in this book I take full and personal responsibility. Mr. Richard W. Hatch is, however, responsible for much of whatever virtue the book contains.

We have discussed and thrashed out together the point of view

that informs this set of conclusions.

He is directly responsible for the writing

of Chapters 3 and 4, on the Free Chinese and Formosa.

He fought a stubborn

battle, with many rear-guard actions, to make the text as simple as the clarity of our thought permitted. We were helped and strengthened in developing these views by many criticisms and suggestions from four advisers: Messrs. James B. Ames, Fred L. Anderson, Kingman Douglass, and Richard D. Hughes. Although they bear no respon¬ sibility for the text, their wisdom, experience, and good sense make this a sub¬ stantially better book than it would otherwise have been. At many points this set of conclusions owes much to my colleagues at the Center for International Studies who are themselves at work on Asian problems. Chapters 2 and 7 in particular represent one formulation of our experience and our judgment as a research group. In particular we are indebted to Messrs. G. Baldwin, F. Bator, E. Hagen, B. Higgins, H. Isaacs, W. Malenbaum, M. F. Millikan, I. Pool, and P. Rosenstein-Rodan. W. W. Rostow Cambridge, Mass. March 1, 1955

':

$9

BHUTAN

kuntmng PAKISTAN

Calcutta

Mandalay ^ BURMA

VlETM/iV// \ — •• y

Hanoi/

Hyderabad Rangoon

CA.MB

Madras

fEYLON Colombo George Town

iAALAYA

The ASIAN ARENA

Contents 1. THE UNITED STATES INTEREST IN ASIA The Asian Puzzle, 1. America, the Island Power, 1. Ideology and Se¬ curity, 2. Ideals and Interests, 3. The China Neurosis, 4. The United States Interest in Eurasia, 4. The New Weapons, 5. The Balance of Power and Ideology, 6. The Responsibility of Coalition, 7.

1

2. THE BROAD FOUNDATIONS FOR ALLIANCE IN FREE ASIA

8

Basic Differences in Outlook, 8. Colonialism, 9. Economic Growth, 9. The Outlook on Communism, 10. Asia and Democracy, 10. The Foundations for Coalition, 11. Some Possible Lines of United States Action, 11. Policy towards Colonialism, 11. Partnership for Economic Growth, 12. Intelligent Anti-Communism, 13. The Democratic Process, 14. Conclusion, 15. 3. THE FREE CHINESE Who and Where They Are, 16. Chinese Intellectuals, 19.

16 The Overseas Chinese, 17.

The Exile

4. FORMOSA

22

The Formosa Political Scene, 24. Formosa Objectives Past and Future, 25. Present Objectives, 26. The Question of Morale, 27. Formosa and Free Asia, 29. The United States Interest, 30. 5. THE VULNERABILITY OF COMMUNIST CHINA TO ITS ASIAN ENVIRONMENT

31

Chinese Communist Strengths, 31. Chinese Communist Weaknesses, 33. Military Policy, 35. Political and Economic Policy, 36. Conclusion, 36. 6. THE MILITARY PROBLEM

38

Politics and Force, 38. Should the United States Initiate War? 39. The Consequences of Rejecting War, 39. The Strategic Role of Atomic Weapons, 40. The Use of Force Short of Total Atomic Attack, 41. The Soft War, 42.

The Three Lines of Defense, 42.

7. AN ECONOMIC POLICY IN FREE ASIA The Transition to Self-Sustaining Growth, 43. A Policy of Assisting Take-Off, 44. The Problem of Japan, 45. The Empty Temptation of Trade with the Communist Bloc, 46. The Communist Challenge, 47. What Should We Do about the Asian Economic Problem? 48. Conclu¬ sion, 51. XI

43

Xll

8. UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP FOR COMMUNIST CHINA? UNITED STATES RECOGNITION?

53

The Issues Involved, 53. United States Recognition of Communist China? 54. Implications for United States Action, 55. 9. THE FREE WORLD ALLIANCE London, 57.

New Delhi, 57.

Washington, 58.

56

Chronology THE UNITED STATES IN ASIA

United

1785

States

First American Canton, China.

Other Events

Participation

trading

vessel

First United States government rep¬ resentative in Canton.

1789

First tariff trade.

encourages

First English concessions in India.

1619

First Dutch foothold in Indonesia (Batavia).

1689

Russo-Chinese (Nerchinsk).

1786

First British foothold in Malaya.

1798

Ceylon becomes British crown col¬ ony.

1824

Singapore ceded to Great Britain.

1839

Anglo-Chinese War.

1841

Hong Kong ceded to Great Britain.

1842

Beginning of extraterritorial rights in China (for European powers).

1849

French occupy Honolulu.

Commercial

Treaty

to

1787

act

1608

China

1826

Agreements with rulers of Hawaii, Tahiti, Society Islands.

1833

First United States diplomatic mis¬ sion to Asia (Cochin-China; Siam). Commercial treaty with Siam.

1844

First treaty with China granting the United States extraterritorial rights.

1846

United States’ request for treaty with Japan refused by Japan.

1849

French occupation ended by warning States.

of Honolulu from United

Treaty with King of Hawaii. 1853

Commodore Perry’s visit to Japan opens Japan to the West.

1854

First Commercial Treaty with Japan.

1857- Great Britain and France force (by 1858 war) confirmation of extraterritorial rights from China. 1861

First American Minister in Peking.

1867

Purchase of Alaska from Russia.

1868

Burlingame Treaty with China, by which China recognized interna¬ tional law.

1875

Reciprocity Treaty with Hawaii.

1882

Chinese pended.

1883

Treaty with Korea.

1889

Assumption of sovereignty American Samoa.

1894

1898

labor

immigration

1862

First seizure by French of territory later to become Indo-China.

1863

France establishes protectorate over Cambodia.

1868

Japan begins period of moderniza¬ tion (Meiji Restoration).

1877

Queen Victoria proclaimed Empress of India.

1885

Great Britain seizes Burma and adds it to India.

1893

France Laos.

1894

Sino-Japanese War.

1895

Japan acquires Liaotung Peninsula, Pescadores, and Formosa (by Treaty of Shimonoseki with China).

1896

Federation of Malay states (under Great Britain).

1898

Spanish-American War.

1900

Boxer Insurrection in China.

1904

Russo-Japanese War.

sus¬

over

Exclusion of Chinese labor immi¬ grants confirmed by treaty with China.

United States takes possession Wake Island and Guam.

of

acquires

protectorate

Annexation of Hawaii. Philippines and Guam ceded to the United States by Spain (Treaty of Paris). 1899

United States insurrection.

crushes

Philippine

Open Door Policy for China advo¬ cated by United States at First Hague Conference. 1900

Hawaii becomes United States Ter¬ ritory. United States Marines take part in defeat of Boxer insurrection and capture of Peking, China.

1901

Boxer Protocol, with China, gives the United States the right to station troops in China and special rights to American vessels in Chinese waters.

over

XV

1905

Russo-Japanese Peace Treaty signed at United States Navy Yard, Ports¬ mouth, N. H., following suggestion of President Theodore Roosevelt.

1907

United States returns nearly half of Boxer indemnity to China ($10,785,286). Later used for education of Chinese both in China and in United States.

1915

United States refuses to recognize any Japanese rights impairing Chi¬ nese political or territorial integrity.

1918

United States (and Allies) occupy Vladivostok.

1921

Agreement by United States, in Four Power Treaty with Great Britain, France, and Japan, to ad¬ just Pacific territorial disputes by diplomacy.

1922

Agreement by United States, in Five Power Treaty with Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan to limita¬ tion of naval armament.

1905

Japan acquires Port Arthur. Japan annexes Korea.

1912

Chinese Republic proclaimed.

1915

Japanese Twenty-One Demands ac¬ cepted by China. (Not fully en¬ forced because of United States ob¬ jections.)

1921

Chinese Communist Party organized.

1924

China recognizes Soviet Russia.

1925

Beginning of Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership of Chinese Nationalists.

1931

Japanese invade Manchuria.

1932

Thailand (Siam) becomes a consti¬ tutional monarchy.

Tariff Treaty with China (Nine Power Treaties included Great Brit¬ ain, Japan, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Portugal). 1924

Immigration act in effect excludes Japanese laborers.

1931 United States government considers but rejects action to oppose Japa¬ nese aggression in Manchuria.

Japan occupies Shanghai.

1934

United States guarantees Philippine independence in 1946.

1933

Japan resigns from League of Na¬ tions.

1934

Japan terminates Naval Limitations Agreement.

1937

Burma becomes self-governing unit of British Commonwealth. Sino-Japanese War begins.

1941

Japan attacks Pearl Harbor, pre¬ cipitating war.

1943

United States (and Great Britain) give up extraterritorial rights in China.

1945

Yalta Agreement. Japan surrenders to United States.

1943

Emergence of a Communist policy looking to postwar expansion in Southeast Asia.

1945

By surrender terms Japan loses all mainland territory (Manchuria, Ko¬ rea) and Formosa and Pescadores Islands.

1946

Marshall Mission to China.

1945

Chinese-Soviet Treaty confirming terms of Yalta Agreement.

1946

Japan adopts new constitution. India becomes independent repub¬ lic.

Philippine independence proclaimed.

Indonesian Republic proclaimed. 1947

Attempt to mediate in China aban¬ doned with termination of Marshall Mission.

1947

Immediate postwar Communist pol¬ icy of limited cooperation gives way to militant Communist activity throughout Asia. Dominion of Pakistan formed by partition of India.

1949 United States “White China published. “Point Four” technical program launched.

Paper”

on

1948

Ceylon granted full dominion status by Great Britain.

1949

Chinese Communists conquer China and proclaim Chinese People’s Re¬ public.

assistance

Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist government flee to Formosa. Burma assumes full independence. Indonesian Republic’s autonomy rec¬ ognized by Holland.

1950

United States consular officials re¬ called from Communist China.

1950

Sino-Soviet Treaty of Alliance.

United States-Korea Arms Pact.

Communist War.

China

enters

Korean

United States recognition of Asso¬ ciated States of Indo-China.

Vietnam becomes sovereign state in French Union.

Entry into Korean War. Ban on China. 1951

trade

with

Communist

United States assumes charge under United Nations trusteeship of 625 Pacific islands.

1951

United Nations names Communist China aggressor. Communist China invades Tibet, which becomes Chinese province.

Contributes to Colombo Plan. United States-Philippine Mutual De¬ fense Treaty.

Colombo Plan (Economic Develop¬ ment for South and Southeast Asia) formed by Britain, Canada, Aus¬ tralia, Ceylon, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Malaya, Singapore, Burma.

Pacific Security Pact with Australia and New Zealand. Japanese Peace Treaty.

India launches First Five Year Plan.

United States-Japan Security Pact. 1953

Korean War Armistice.

1952

End of Allied occupation of Japan.

1953

Sino-Soviet Trade Agreement. Launching of new General Line of “transition to socialism” in Com¬ munist China; First Five Year Plan under way.

1954

Observation of Geneva Conference. Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed.

1954

Vietminh victory at Dienbienphu. Geneva munist creation state in

Conference confirms Com¬ victory in Indo-China by of Vietminh (Communist) north.

1954

Krushchev visit to Peking. New Sino-Soviet Agreement returns Port Arthur and Dairen to China.

1955

United States-Formosa Mutual De¬ fense Agreement. Bangkok powers.

Conference

of

SEATO

President Eisenhower bids for truce in Formosa Strait, via United Na¬ tions, leaving position of Quemoy and Matsu undetermined.

1955

Tachen Islands evacuated by Chinese Nationalists and occupied by Chi¬ nese Communists.

;

CHAPTER

The United States Interest in Asia undercurrents in Japanese feeling and politics com¬

The Asian Puzzle

It is an irreversible fact of American life that the

bine with a continuing economic crisis to pull against

fate of our society is now bound up with the course

our interests and our hopes.

We have not reached a

of events throughout the world.

The United States

full understanding with India, which, along with the

as a nation and the American people collectively and

other Colombo powers, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon, and

as individuals must accept responsibilities in other

Indonesia, pursues a course that often baffles and frus¬

parts of the world as never before in our history.

trates us.

This is most strikingly true of our relations with Asia.

the efforts of India and the other Colombo powers to

Once a distant part of the world, in no way connected

achieve effective independence, to create stable demo¬

in American eyes to our fate, Asia now confronts us

cratic societies, and to develop growing economies.

Nevertheless, we sympathize deeply with

with problems that are far more complex and difficult

Although step by step we have become deeply, even

than those laid on us by the Japanese attack on Pearl

inextricably, tied up in Asia’s fate, it is by no means

Harbor and that are as directly connected to our

clear to many Americans why this should be so.

future security.

There is, therefore, deep disagreement as to what

Seen from the United States the panorama of Asia is, indeed, confusing and troubling.

We are openly

threatened,

by Communist

and we

feel menaced

our response should be to the condition of Asia and to its present urgent problems. And it is by no means clear to many Asians why we

the

should assert so powerful an interest in the fate of

United States as its enemy, which has allied itself with

their region, many parts of which are newly liberated

Soviet Russia, and which actively seeks to expand its

from the domination and influence of white men.

power in Asia.

Instinctively and understandably they question our

China,

which

has

systematically

singled

out

But our allies urge us to permit the

entrance of Communist China into the United Na¬ tions and, at the least, to restrict our Chinese friends

motives and our intentions. If our policies in Asia are to be effective, if they are

We

to be sustained by the American people, if they are

are seriously committed in Southern Vietnam, and

to rally the support of our allies and our potential

we are threatened by the Communist menace to the

allies on both sides of the Iron and Bamboo curtains,

other Indo-Chinese states, to Thailand, and to South¬

they must be based on a clear understanding of

east Asia as a whole.

American interests.

on Formosa to passive survival as island exiles.

We have troops in South Korea.

We have made formal guarantees through the SEATO Pact to protect a number of Asian states.

We are

committed to support Japan and assist in its evolu¬ tion as a constructive part of a free world; but deep

America, the Island Power

Instinctively, on issue after issue, we have behaved as if we understood our interests.

Our actions have

2 been vastly more consistent and more subtle than the

lation.

In good conscience Americans could devote

language we have used officially to describe them to

themselves to the extension of both their principles

the world or the terms in which we have debated the

and their power on this continent.

We have reacted

The foreign policy of the United States from the

when the Eurasian continent, bounded by the off-shore

Revolution to the end of the nineteenth century was

islands of Japan and Great Britain, threatened to fall

concerned with the winning of independence, with

under the sway of a single power or unified coalition.

the expansion to the West, with the protracted nego¬

We have reacted by trying to keep alive on the Eu¬

tiations that established the Canadian boundary, with

rasian continent a military and political coalition,

the avoidance of British intervention during the Civil

linked loosely or tightly to the United States, which

War, with the formulation of relations with Latin

could continue to hold the balance of power in Eu¬

America around the somewhat elastic concept of the

rasia. That is, we have behaved throughout the world,

Monroe Doctrine, and with an extension of the Amer¬

since 1945 (or perhaps since the passage of Lend-Lease

ican interest to Alaska and the mid-Pacific islands.

in 1941), as if the United States were an island that

Although these actions involved a revolutionary alli¬

could be threatened by the course of military and

ance with France, a war with Mexico, and extensive

political events on the great Eurasian continent.

This

dealings with France and Spain, in this period Amer¬

is the underlying strand of logic that unites our re¬

ican diplomacy was mainly a function of the larger

action to the Fascist axis of the 1930’s and our reaction

domestic effort to establish and consolidate an inde¬

to the Communist bloc of the past decade.

pendent continent-nation and to protect its position

matter among ourselves at home.

But our national behavior throughout this period

in the Western Hemisphere.

Thus American security

has been colored by the apparent newness of our na¬

and ideological interests converged for more than a

tional circumstance; by the clash between our aware¬

hundred years in a policy of continental or hemi¬

ness of what needed doing and old conceptions bedded

spheric isolation.

deeply in our national life, and by the curious mixture

It should be noted, however, that over this period

We

the United States did not fully appreciate the extent

must look into our own past before we can achieve

to which its isolation hinged on a control of the seas

a clear understanding of our present interests in Asia.

by another power, Great Britain, which had deep

of emotions and ideas that governs our behavior.

continuing interests in Ideology and Security

Canada

and elsewhere in

avoiding war with the United States.

Although it

One key to American history is this: we have always

was mutual power interests between the United States

had, in addition to a natural military interest in our

and Britain that made American isolation an accept¬

national security, a parallel, related interest in and

able basis for our foreign policy in the nineteenth

devotion to certain principles concerning the indi¬

century, the importance of a friendly or neutralized

vidual and his relationship to the state.

British sea power remained an unspoken and even

Those prin¬

ciples were set down in the truths held self-evident

unconscious element in our security position.

by the signers of the Declaration of Independence

talked and even behaved as if it lay wholly in our

and were embodied with great subtlety in our Con¬

own power to ensure our isolation.

We

stitution. They are the core of the American ideology.

When the United States entered the First World

In its first years the United States regarded itself—

War, under Wilson’s leadership, our participation

and was regarded by the world—as embarked on a

was presented mainly as a defense of American prin¬

unique historical experiment in democracy, with its

ciples—as an ideological crusade rather than as a

great task the pioneering on a new continent of a new

course of action in the direct American security in¬

organization of society for free men.

terest.

Washington’s

Some Americans were aware that the control

injunction that we avoid permanent alliances and

of the Atlantic by a hostile European power, implied

involvement in European quarrels expressed a judg¬

by the success of German submarine warfare, was a

ment that both American ideological interests and

threat to American security.

security interests were best served by a policy of iso¬

the war and afterwards, American interests and ob-

However, both during

3 jectives in Europe tended to be publicly defined in ideological rather than in security terms.

When the

First, we have exhibited as a nation a persistent tendency to separate our ideals from our practical

ideological objectives defined by Wilson and largely

performance.

accepted by the American people proved difficult or

powerful role in the nation’s behavior.

impossible of immediate attainment, a shattering wave

come to action, idealism is mixed, as it must be, with

of disillusion struck the United States.

a sense of painful limitations, realities, and special

The United

Idealism has played and plays today a But when we

States largely withdrew from serious commitment in

interests.

Europe, never having clarified its basic and persistent

our statesmen by and large reflect our ideals.

security interests in the area.

performance is made up of a subtle and generally in¬

We returned to isola¬

Our formal statements and the speeches of Our

tion without understanding why we had left it or

articulate mixture of idealism and lesser interests.

whether it was a sound basis for the nation’s security.

is the Declaration of Independence which incorpo¬

Over the interwar years the structure of arrange¬

rates our creed; but it is the Constitution, incorporat¬

ments, which the United States had in large part fos¬

ing a shrewd sense of human weakness in the handling

tered, fell apart: the League of Nations itself, Ger¬

of power and a keen awareness of the power of spe¬

man disarmament,

the small democratic national

states created in eastern Europe, and so on.

Many

elements entered into this disintegration, but the fail¬ ure of the United States to appreciate that it had fundamental and continuing interests in the organi¬ zation of the power and political structure of Europe was certainly an extremely important if not decisive factor. In the Second World War a strong ideological bias also affected the American view of our own interests and objectives, although now we were strongly aware of the recurrent danger of German and Japanese ag¬ gression.

Both our insistence on unconditional sur¬

It

cial interests, which governs our political life from day to day.

American political oratory generally

looks to the Declaration rather than the Constitution. There is nothing cheaply cynical about this na¬ tional quality.

It represents one way of dealing with

a general dilemma of human beings—the problem of good and evil in public life.

And, on balance, the

American performance in relation to professed ideals has been remarkable.

However, this shifting from

abstract principles to hardheaded considerations of interest in foreign policy has produced considerable confusion abroad, where American life and its history are not well understood; and it has produced con¬ fusion at home as well.

render and the idea of postwar occupation, originally

In domestic politics we are all instinctively aware

devoted to a long-run weakening of German and Japa¬

of the subtle balance between idealism and special

nese military potential, represented the formulation

interest; but the issues of foreign policy are more re¬

of American security interests in Europe and Asia.

mote, and we cannot see them and feel them with the

Since the end of the war the realities of Soviet and

same directness as taxes and farm policy, unemploy¬

Chinese Communist strength and aggressive intent

ment and social security.

have forced the United States to change its focus;

one foreign policy issue on which the battle is car¬

and now we are concerned primarily with the build¬

ried forward with a sophisticated blending of ideal¬

ing in Europe and Asia of a security basis against

ism and special interest is the tariff, which is not only

Communist power.

There is evident danger that the

an old question but also one in which the average

Communist threat to American security may lead us

citizen sees or believes he can see the direct conse¬

to define American interests as inadequately and nega¬

quences of alternative policies in terms of his daily

tively as we did in the formula of unconditional sur¬

life.

render in the Second World War.

our history requires that the United States produce

It is significant that the

To clarify our national interest at this stage of

and project abroad a more orderly vision of its mixed Ideals and Interests

Our foreign policy performance over the first cen¬ tury and a half of our national life has been colored by two general characteristics of American life.

ideological and security interests than ever before in our history. There is a second and related national character¬ istic that has colored and confused our foreign policy

4 We have had a marked tendency to

In the past twenty-five years the considerable com¬

define our foreign interests and objectives in terms of

mercial, religious, educational, and security interests

formal or legal arrangements, as in our domestic life

of the United States in China have met defeat.

we tend to formalize desired relationships in legal

failed to aid China effectively when Japan intervened

documents.

In foreign policy, however, unlike our

on the mainland in the 1930’s; and after 1945 we

domestic life, we have tended to regard such docu¬

failed to prevent the Communists from seizing the

ments and such legal formulations as having power

Chinese mainland and turning China’s capabilities

in themselves regardless of whether or not there

against the United States.

were continuing efforts made to sustain them.

have prevented this outcome, it is essential to make

performance.

The

Kellogg-Briand Pact between the wars is an example of this tendency, as were certain of the wartime and immediate postwar agreements among the allies.

It

We

Whether or not we could

blunt acknowledgment of defeat. And so, since 1898 at least, the United States has suf¬ fered from a failure of will, a failure of understand¬

is evident that a mature American relationship with

ing, or both in its policy toward China.

Whether we

the outside world must, like our democracy at home,

have allocated too much attention and resources to

be based on our acceptance of the necessity of end¬

China or too little, it is indisputable that we have

less striving for certain basic purposes, our acceptance

not matched our general statements of national in¬

of a course of action in which formal arrangements

terest with national action.

may play a key role but are not ends in themselves.

China was right or wrong, we never backed it.

Whether our play in

The American people must now define the United The China Neurosis

States interest in China in terms we are likely to

These two national characteristics have been no¬

back as a nation and on a sustained basis.

We can

In many ways the

do this properly only if we accept the fact that

confusion of the United States with respect to its po¬

United States policy toward China must be part of

sition in Asia has been even more profound than in

United States policy in Asia and in the rest of the

the case of Europe.

world.

tably present in our Asian policy.

Much of the American story in

And this demands that we establish an or¬

Asia centers on China; and our policy toward China

derly and mature relation between our ideological

holds a special place in our history.

interest, as an open democratic society, and our mili¬

We began trading with China more than a hun¬ dred years ago.

American missionaries and educators

followed the traders.

tary interest as an island off a great and potentially threatening continent.

At the beginning of this cen¬

tury we advocated an Open Door policy in China, but no one knew whether we were expressing a pious hope or stating a national interest.

The United States Interest in Eurasia

The fundamental task of American foreign policy

We were not

is to maintain a world environment for the United

sure what the connection was between China and

States within which our form of society can develop

our national security, and we never decided how

in conformity with the humanistic principles which

much energy, inconvenience, treasure, or blood the

are its foundation.

Open Door was really worth.

protect our own

Theodore Roosevelt

We must, of course, physically country;

but

the

protection of

moved toward a balance of power in Northeast Asia

American territory is essentially a means to protect

among Russia, Japan, and China; but that policy was

our still-developing way of life.

never made wholly clear to the American people,

The United States has two distinct but connected

was never fully accepted in American political life,

interests in the vast continent of Eurasia.

and was never backed by the full force of American

combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious

power.

From the Open Door down to 1931 there

threat of military defeat to the United States, it is

was a distinct and chronic gap between our pro¬

our interest that no single power or group of powers,

claimed purpose of maintaining China’s territorial

hostile or potentially hostile to the United States,

integrity and independence and our national per¬

dominate that area.

formance when the chips were down.

uation might be, a Eurasia under totalitarian die-

Since the

Since, whatever the military sit¬

5 tatorships would threaten the survival of democracy

ideological threat to South Korea may prove a crea¬

both elsewhere and in the United States, it is equally

tive Free World task for a generation.

our interest that the societies of Eurasia develop

There is a much closer connection between the mili¬

along lines broadly consistent with both our own con¬

tary, or security, threat and the ideological threat in

ception of the proper relation of the individual to

Asia than in Europe.

the state and with their own cultural heritages.

We

fluenced by the great gap between material aspiration

do not seek societies abroad built in our own image.

and reality throughout Asia, by bitter memories of

We do have a profound interest that societies abroad

colonialism, and by powerful feelings of race and

develop and strengthen those elements in their re¬

color.

spective cultures that elevate and protect the dignity

been deeply affected by the wide circulation of Lenin’s

of the individual as against the claims of the state.

theory of imperialism and by the respect and awe

We have a major and persistent stake in a world en¬

with which they regard the Soviet example of rapid

vironment predominantly made up of open societies.

industrialization.

In terms of geography, it is a persistent interest

Asian thinking is strongly in¬

The attitudes of educated Asian leaders have

Aspects of Communism interest

and tempt Asians with peculiar strength.

By and

of the United States that no single power or power

large we face a much greater risk of seeing Asia pass

grouping militarily dominate either western or east¬

into hostile hands and become a threat to our se¬

ern Eurasia.

curity without any military aggression by the Com¬

In western Eurasia the threat of such

an outcome is posed for us by the virtual absorp¬

munist powers than we do in Europe.

tion within the Soviet empire of eastern Europe and

not be too strongly emphasized now when it appears

East Germany.

The threat would become virtually

to be the policy of Moscow and Peking to expand—

a reality should West Germany be lost to the Free

notably in Asia—while avoiding large-scale overt use

World.

In the East the threat of such an outcome

of their own armed forces, but using diplomacy, sub¬

is posed for us by the close alliance of the Soviet

version, and local guerrilla bands to erode and de¬

Union and Communist China.

stroy weak areas in the Free World.

The situation in

Asia is, however, more complicated than in Europe. Whereas in Europe West Germany, by and large, is the crux of the matter, in Asia there is Japan on the one hand and the whole area of Southeast Asia on the other, Southeast Asia stretching from Indo-China around Thailand, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, India, and Pakistan.

In Asia the threat would become vir¬

tually a reality should either Japan or Southeast Asia be lost to the Free World. threats to the United States—a military threat and an ideological threat.

These threats are clearly related:

the ideological loss of India, for instance, would raise important military problems;

If a stalemate

develops in weapons of mass destruction, the conflict may be decided by techniques of a mixed politicalmilitary character without any real engagement even between the ground forces of the major powers. The New Weapons

Underlying all these basic considerations of United States interests in Europe and Asia is an inescapable fact of contemporary life—the existence of the new weapons of mass destruction.

It is plain that the Communist world poses two

This fact can¬

The new weapons have

this fundamental characteristic: when a nation has built up the air power necessary to deliver a certain number of them, its military strength is no longer increased in direct proportion to further increase in

the military loss of

the ability to deliver. It may not increase at all.

northern Indo-China has raised important problems

Thus, it appears that in the near future relative

of ideological orientation throughout Southeast Asia.

industrial strength may not be a measure of rela¬

But the two American interests are not and should

tive military strength above a critical absolute point.

not be considered identical.

The time necessary and

Also, we must assume that in the long run many na¬

the kind of effort required to cope with the military

tions, including those of Asia, will develop impor¬

threat are likely to differ from those required by the

tant if not absolute delivery capabilities.

ideological threat.

The military threat to South

If this is true, the historic security mission of the

Korea was dealt with in a few years; defeating the

United States in the perhaps transitory period of its

6 world primacy can be defined as follows: to employ

1. To eliminate the present threat of eventual Com¬

every American military, political, and economic ca¬

munist military superiority in Asia by defeating any

pability to achieve effective international control of

attempt at Communist military aggression and by

armaments; and to maintain indefinitely thereafter

building up the military strength of Free Asia.

that system of control by assuming the responsibili¬

it is obvious that there can be no steady and creative

ties of leadership in an effective coalition of all those

growth of free democratic societies in Asia as long

states likely to share the United States interest that

as Asia lives under the fear of Communist military

international control be maintained.

conquest.

The United

States must have no illusions about armament con¬ trol.

Armament control is a means to an end, but it

is not an end in itself.

It will not permit the United

States safely to relax.

If achieved, it will simply

For

2. To eliminate the ideological threat of Commu¬ nist victory in Asia by encouraging and reinforcing the steady progress of Asian nations toward inde¬ pendence as free democratic societies.

For the idea

move international relations into a more heavily po¬

of Communism cannot be destroyed.

litical phase, in which American security will require

replaced.

endless attention to the maintenance of an effective

principles only if these principles prove themselves

alliance among those states that share our interest

in action.

that control be sustained.

International control of

And it can be replaced by democratic

Although it is possible thus to define the United States interests in Asia in brief and simple terms,

armaments will not sustain itself. As we consider the meaning of the existence and fundamental characteristic of the new weapons it again becomes obvious that our security interest and our ideological interest are closely linked.

Since gov¬

ernments based on the democratic conception of the proper relation of the individual to the state tend to reflect the average citizen’s desire for peace, they are generally not warlike.

It can only be

Thus both the long-run se¬

curity of the United States and its short-run security are intimately tied to the success achieved by the Free World in its ideological struggle against totali¬ tarianism.

there is vast meaning in them for the American peo¬ ple.

The Communist threats in Asia are threats to

the United States. The threat of Chinese Communist military and ide¬ ological expansion endangers the whole Free World position in Asia.

The ideological threat to our in¬

terest, that is, the possibility that the Chinese Com¬ munists can prove to Asians by progress in China that Communist methods are better and faster than democratic methods, is as great as the military threat. But, if we meet the challenge of that ideological threat, if we defeat Communism in that conflict, our victory there might end decisively the wave of Com¬

We must be clearly aware of these broad United States security and ideological interests in Europe and Asia, of the connection between these interests, and

munist expansion begun in 1917 and set the stage for serious measures of peace on a worldwide basis. The heart of the military threat to the United

of their connection to the struggle between Commu¬

States lies in the Soviet Union: in Soviet atomic

nism and the free societies.

weapon delivery capabilities, its army, and the indus¬

These three factors de¬

termine the specific United States interests in Asia.

trial potential behind them.

The Soviet Union,

Europe, and North America are now the centers of The Balance of Power and Ideology

military power.

But, barring a gross disintegration

Our interests in Asia are thus defensive—therefore

of the western alliance and western purposes. Com¬

in one sense negative; and they are offensive—there¬

munism can advance in the West only by military

fore positive and creative.

means, with the certainty of a major war that would

They exist side by side

as inseparable parts of a whole.

In these terms, it

be likely to destroy the foundations of Soviet power

is the very real and pressing interest of the United

in Russia.

States to hold and strengthen the precarious balance

advance is in Asia.

of power and ideology the Free World still holds in

munism in Asia might have decisive over-all conse¬

Asia.

quences.

This means that we must strive:

The most promising line for Communist Thus a major defeat of Com¬

7 The United States interest in Asia means, in the end, that we face complex and difficult tasks.

other peoples are basic to our security.

We must

We

strain our efforts to avoid seeing the balance of power

must be prepared to meet the challenge of raw mili¬

and ideology move against us in Europe and Asia.

tary power when it is used against us, as in Korea.

There was a long time when Britain, in combination

We must, working with our friends, learn to deal

with other European states, could do the job, aided

effectively with subversion and insurrection, as in the

by our occasional intervention.

Philippines a few years back and as now in Southern

must work over the indefinite future with those who

Vietnam.

share our interests.

Simultaneously, we must bend our crea¬

Now we ourselves

tive efforts by every possible means and over a long

We remain what we have been since the eighteenth

time toward building economic and political strength

century—the decisive portion of an island-continent,

in the societies of Free Asia.

lying off the still greater and ultimately more power¬

substitute for the other.

And neither job can

When guns are confronted,

ful land mass of Eurasia.

We have grown in the

they must be met with guns or there will be no Free

past century and a half, but Eurasia has also be¬

Asia to build.

stirred itself.

Unless creative progress is palpable

Vast areas, sluggish or passive in the

and hope is strong, there may be no power in Asia

nineteenth century, are now great powers or are striv¬

to resist Communist aggression when it comes in

ing to become great powers.

military form.

weapons have altered the strategic meaning of the

Communications and

oceans; and the fate of our society depends substan¬ The Responsibility of Coalition

tially on how we use or fail to use the limited but

As we face the tasks imposed on us by the new

real power and influence we can bring to bear on

importance of Asia in our national life and to our

the evolution of Eurasia.

And it is in the nature of

future, the first step we take must be to adjust our

the case, the case of an island coping with develop¬

thinking, our very emotions, to a new relationship

ments on a vast continent, that we must apply our

between ourselves and other peoples.

Perhaps the

power and influence in conjunction with others; for

most confusing aspect of our new and revolutionary

it is on the military and political orientation of

relation to the outside world is this: the accident of

other peoples living in distant places that our fate

world history has forced us quite suddenly from a

ultimately depends.

position where our interests appeared to be served by

ful, we shall remain a coalition power, with all the

the avoidance of alliances into a position where the

responsibilities and need for understanding ourselves

maintenance of alliances and a steady working with

and others that position demands.

We are and, if we are success¬

CHAPTER

The Broad Foundations for Alliance in Free Asia The outlook of the Asian political leadership ap¬

Basic Differences in Outlook

pears to differ significantly from the instinctive out-

Our postwar experience in Asia has made clear

that there is still no solid basis of common under¬ TTbok of Americans on four key issues: imperialism and colonialism, economic growth, the nature of standing between the Western World and the lit¬ erate Asians, who largely determine the course of

Communism, the nature of the democratic process.

Asian politics.

The Communist movement has made a sustained eF-”

The failure to understand each other

has had serious consequences in China and Indo-

fort to induce the Asian to interpret these issues in

China.

Communist terms.

It is an obstacle to building a serious Free

From the doubts, fears, and frus¬

World alliance embracing India, Burma, and Indo¬

trations of the literate Asian, Communist parties have

nesia.

sought

It presents problems even in areas where a

to

create

an

“intellectual

climate” *

that

precarious basis for common action appears to have

would lead Asians to reject western concepts and ac¬

been achieved: Japan, South Korea, Formosa, and

tively or passively accept Communism.

Pakistan.

ing in Asia with a literate leadership quite strongly

We are deal¬

influenced by Marxist and Communist ways of look¬

Asia embraces a variety of cultures and of modern

ing at the world around them.

experience: the Japanese view of colonialism and its perspective on economic problems is a special case;

Those responsible for American policy have been

the view of Communism in South Korea and on For¬

uneasily aware of this problem but have never come

mosa differs from that in India or Burma; the pri¬

fully to grips with it.

ority given economic development is higher in India

lem of shaping or even influencing the ideas that

and Burma than in Thailand or Indonesia.

govern the action of others is difficult for us.

The lit¬

For several reasons the prob¬ We

erate Asians who shape Asian politics are individual

rarely engage on an official basis in efforts to reshape

men and women living in distinctive societies spread

the ideas of our own citizens.

over the great arc from Japan to India.

Neverthe¬

so to speak, in an open market, where many indi¬

less, their relations to the West and especially to the

viduals and groups assert their views about what the

United States pose certain common problems and

important problems are and how they ought to be

offer certain common foundations on which to build

solved.

and sustain a Free World alliance including Asia.

a normal part of the workings of our society.

It is the purpose of this chapter to identify those

decision-influencing techniques most familiar to us,

problems and foundations and then to suggest some

primarily commercial advertising techniques, do not

The process proceeds,

We do not develop propaganda specialists as The

broad lines of United States action that appear neces¬ * For an excellent

sary to build and sustain an effective alliance in

discussion of

this problem, see

George

Taylor, “Asia’s Intellectual Climate,” The Yale Review, Winter,

Free Asia.

1953.

8

9 convert easily or effectively into methods for affecting the minds of intellectuals.

Economic Growth

Perhaps most important,

The aspirations of the Asian intellectual appear to

we in the United States are not clear in our minds

him impossible of achievement without a prompt

about the problems that concern the Asian; nor have

transformation of his nation’s economy.

we developed clear positions and lines of action in re¬

independence, international stature, higher levels of

lation to them that we can project effectively by word

individual human dignity, all manner of desired so¬

and deed.

cial reforms hinge on the achievement of a higher

Our concepts are, after all, the product

of a Christian, feudal, capitalist past, and they do not translate automatically into Asian idiom. If we are to sustain a position of Free World lead¬

National

standard of living. The creation of a situation in which sustained eco¬ nomic growth will be more or less automatic is ex¬

ership in a world embracing Asia, we must begin

ceedingly difficult.

with a cool but sympathetic appraisal of the prob¬

undeveloped country to such a situation has taken

lems the Asian regards as important and with an

ten to twenty years, preceded by a much longer period

understanding of how he looks at them.

of preparation marked by partial and sporadic eco¬ nomic progress.

Colonialism

Historically, the transition of an

It involves not only the mobilization

and wise use of a nation’s savings but also the accept¬

The impact of colonialism on the minds of literate

ance of new methods.

More than that, it requires

Asians has been too complex to be dealt with in any

changes in human attitudes from top to bottom of

detail; but the principal consequences of that impact

the society and the drastic alteration of institutions.

so far as they affect our relationships with Asia can

Certain of the Asian nations are striving purposefully

be stated in simple terms.

to make this transition, notably India and Burma.

Asians place a much higher priority than we do on the elimination of colonialism from those parts of the world in which it still exists.

They are intolerant of

delay in the solution of the many problems of the transition of colonial areas to independence; they are impatient for results.

Asians are inclined to accept

all or part of Lenin’s theory of imperialism and there¬ fore to accept the Communist interpretation of the motives of the West with respect to colonies: that is, they believe or half believe that the West has been driven on to create and then to cling to its imperial holdings

by

the

inevitable

working

of

capitalist

economies. In the midst of a transition from dependence to responsibility for their own problems and destiny, Asians are prone to blame all their difficulties on a colonial past; and they are extraordinarily sensitive to any action or attitude that might seem to be

Others, notably Pakistan and Indonesia, are con¬ cerned with the problem of growth but have not yet grasped the magnitude of the task and the responsi¬ bilities it imposes upon the nation’s leadership. Whatever the exact stage of the growth process in Asia, the problem of domestic economic progress has first place in the minds of many Asians.

They feel

that Americans are so concerned with the menace of Communist aggression in Asia that we fail to give proper emphasis and priority to their real interests, problems,

and

ambitions.

They

seek,

sometimes

wishfully, to maintain by whatever means are open to them an environment in which their own resources and those of the rest of the world can be devoted pri¬ marily to the searching domestic tasks implicit in the growth process. This frame of mind, not easily understood by Americans or others who live in societies where the

patronizing on our part. Most important, perhaps, the total problem of

transition to growth has been accomplished, poses

East-West relationships is complicated by deep, often

searching questions for the United States.

Can we

unconscious, issues of race and color.

The intensity

more effectively associate ourselves with Asian efforts

of certain anti-Western and anti-American reactions

to create a sustained rise in real income per capita?

on the part of Asians is undoubtedly caused by fierce

Can we simultaneously help induce the Asian leaders

underlying resentment of real or believed attitudes of

to take measures to cope with the various forms of

racial superiority in the West.

Communist aggression before it is too late?

10 Of course, if this represented the total of Asian

The Outlook on Communism

Americans generally think of Communism as a pur¬

thinking the Asians would long ago have all been

poseful conspiracy to maintain itself in power where

Communists.

it has already seized power and to expand its power

munism is weakened by increasing knowledge of the

to the limit compatible with the security of its exist¬

facts of Soviet society, by a profound nationalism

ing bases.

which distrusts the international nature of Commu¬

The image of Communism general among

nism, by the growing irrelevance of arguments based

Asian intellectuals is more complex. Marxist dogma, which offers a broad batch of sim¬ ple

concepts

for

interpreting and

The tendency to be attracted by Com¬

predicting

the

on past colonial history, by elements of humanistic individualism derived both from Asian cultures and

course of societies, exercises great power over Asian

from knowledge of the West.

Nevertheless, it is es¬

intellectuals, including non-Communists.

The diffuse

sential for us to understand that the Asian image of

and complex concepts of the West are more difficult

Communism is very different from ours; and that an

to grasp; and their very lack of dogmatism is dis¬

effective effort to build and sustain an alliance must

turbing to some Asians who, in the unsettled state of

recognize and cope with these special attitudes of

the societies in which they live, find satisfaction in

mind.

the false clarity and specious firmness of Marxism. Lenin’s doctrine of imperialism in particular has strongly influenced the minds of Asian intellectuals, especially those who now are leaders in the various Asian nations.

Almost without exception these men

spent the formative years of their lives struggling against colonial rule; and in their youth the Commu¬ nist concept of imperialism deeply impressed them as an explanation of the problem that most concerned them. The fact that the Communist struggle against the West has accelerated the breakup of colonial rule— for example, that French concessions to Indo-Chinese independence were related to the military pressure of Vietminh—has impressed the Asians.

Soviet methods

of industrialization, ruthless as they have been, appear to many Asians more applicable to Asia than the more humane processes that western values would suggest. Some Asians, although pursuing policies that are con¬ sistent with democratic practice, are not sure that

Asia and Democracy

The attachment of Asian political leaders to the fundamental

principles of democratic theory

and

practice and their understanding of them are often very deep.

In one sense democracy may mean more

to them than to many Americans.

In their minds it

is linked to the removal of colonial rule and to the elevation of the dignity and status of individuals whose subjection and subservience have been living facts.

In the United States we take much for granted.

But there are important distinctions between Asian and American attitudes toward the democratic proc¬ ess.

Mass illiteracy and the existence of vast peasant

populations still bound in traditional cultures give the educated minority in Asia a position of leader¬ ship and power for which there is no equivalent in American democracy.

Initiative must come from the

top down; and, by standards of American society, the outlook of the few leaders has disproportionate influence.

they will succeed and not sure that they will not have

American democracy is linked to a system of pri¬

to fall back on Stalin’s or Mao’s methods at a later

vate capitalism that assumes the existence of a large

stage.

responsible middle class capable of performing the

Finally, the Asian is powerfully affected by the

task of saving, initiating new methods, efficient man¬

western failures in China and Indo-China, and by

agement, tax paying, and so on.

the possibility that Communism may, in fact, prove

erally do not have such a middle class.

to be Asia’s wave of the future.

The ineffectual per¬

combined with the special difficulties of Asian econo¬

formance of the West in Asia, systematically empha¬

mies in transition, makes private capitalism much

sized in Communist propaganda, encourages Asians

less automatically an adjunct to democracy there

to accept Communism or neutrality rather than at¬

than here.

tempt resistance.

more powerful and especially more direct state con-

Asian societies gen¬ This fact,

Generally speaking, we must expect a

11 trol of economic activities in Asia than in the United

good will, human concern, and willingness to help

States.

which run deep through the American people and

Further, the existence of widespread hunger, pov¬

which can be brought to bear on the problem of

erty, disease, and illiteracy strongly influences Asian

building an Asian coalition.

ideas about the most important tasks for the demo¬

not so wrapped up in its own problems and difficul¬

cratic process.

ties as to lack a margin of energy to give to the con¬

Free elections and the other purely

The United States is

political mechanisms of democracy appear less impor¬

temporary drama of Asia.

tant to Asians than the relief of social and economic

its citizens have a direct interest in the outcome of

evils.

Asia’s struggle with its own problems and with Com¬ munism.

The Foundations for Coalition

The United States and

United States action to assist in a demo¬

cratic resolution is in the national interest; and this

Although the potential cross purposes between the

fact should not be concealed from ourselves or from

United States and Asian intellectuals are significant,

the world.

there are real foundations of common interests and

ing transcend the national interest in its narrower

objectives on which a coalition could be built.

sense.

But the motives of individuals in assist¬

Our religious and ethical value systems, our

In addition to the American tradition of anti¬

curiosity and sense of challenge in the face of tough

colonialism, there is, first, the simple fact of Indian,

problems, are, for many Americans, all engaged when

Burmese, Indonesian, and Philippine independence.

we contemplate the state of Asia.

British and American statesmanship and the Dutch

istic American policy must build on these qualities

acceptance of defeat have lifted a large part of the

among Americans as well as on the more conven¬

colonial burden in Asia.

tional areas of national interest and motivation.

Second, there is the simple

A wise and real¬

fact of responsibility for Asians, which is producing among those who are rising in the new national states a changing attitude toward their own countries and the external world.

Responsibility has made them

Some Possible Lines of

United States Action

It lies within American capabilities to improve our relations with Asian political leadership.

There are

look at their own limitations, and it has gradually

things to be done that we are not now doing, things

made them aware of the need for protecting their so¬

we should do better, and things we should stop doing.

cieties from internal and external aggression.

Their

Two thoughts above any others should be built into

reliance on the colonial powers is steadily decreasing,

any American program and should govern the be¬

a process that also decreases the tendency to blame

havior of the men who carry it out.

all difficulties on

Although

dealing in Asia with societies going through a com¬

we confront here a complex process that will take

plex and painful transition; a transition takes time;

decades to work itself out, the shape of a mature re¬

our working horizon at any given moment must be

lationship of mutual respect and dignity is begin¬

at least a decade; and we must be prepared above all

ning to emerge.

to sustain steadily the actions we undertake.

the colonial powers.

One element in that potential re¬

First, we are

Second,

lationship is that the former colonial areas will re¬

we are also dealing in Asia with complex and sensitive

quire a measure of economic and military assistance

human beings, coming to responsibility after a difficult

that only the United States and its western allies can

history; their effective assumption of responsibility is

provide.

our interest; and the mood of dignified partnership

Third, despite the power of Marxist ideas

over Asian minds and the favorable image of Com¬ munism, there is growing knowledge of Communist methods, with an increasing Asian awareness of the

should color all our relations with them. The main lines of action worth consideration ap¬ pear to be these.

reality of their threat. But the United States can offer more than an anti¬ colonial policy, economic assistance, military protec¬

Policy toward Colonialism

The United States should use its influence more

Its decisive

strongly to speed up the process of transition to in¬

resource for an Asian coalition is the disinterested

dependence in the areas where colonialism still exists.

tion, and alliance against Communism.

12 As the Indo-China situation has made abundantly

than to be trapped openly between contesting Free

dear, we did France and ourselves serious injury by

World groups.

financing France in Indo-China although France was

3. It is the lesson of the postwar years that it is

delaying interminably the dismantling of its Asian

safer for the colonial powers and ourselves to move

empire.

sooner rather than later.

Only Britain’s relinquishing of power in

India and Burma gave the Free World a real pos¬ sibility of sustaining significant ties with Southeast Asia.

The developing situation in colonial Africa,

Partnership for Economic Growth

The American interest in Asian economic growth

which Asians watch with the closest attention, presents

is an acknowledged part of national policy.

us now with issues of statesmanship in which the tim¬

the things we ought to do to accelerate the economic

ing of our actions will greatly matter.

transition of Asia are under way in one form or an¬

We must not underestimate the difficulty of engi¬ neering a peaceful transition to independence.

There

Most of

other: private and public loans, technical assistance, scientific

aid,

students’

grants,

food grants when

are problems of constitutional formulas for each stage,

needed, and so on.

and there are the deeper and more important prob¬

efforts and, especially, to make far greater efforts than

lems of developing increased competence and respon¬

we have thus far to enable Asians to understand and

sibility among the native populations involved.

believe in our genuine interest in their problems.

Our

It remains for us to increase such

general objective must be to make persuasive the

We must make it clear that our interest in their

promise of ultimate independence for colonial peoples

transition is distinctly separated from our military

and to make the fulfillment of that promise visible

interests in Asia.

by giving those peoples increasing responsibility for

are obsessed with military problems, possibly in prepa¬

their own political and social growth.

ration for an American-instigated war.

The develop¬

Too many Asians believe that we Asian con¬

ment of the capability to govern is a circular process,

fusion about American purposes will not be dissipated

in which the experience of responsibility is essential

at a stroke, but a fresh statement of our concern with

to create the capability to assume greater responsi¬

Asian economic development, backed by prompt and

bility.

sustained action, would go far toward creating an

We should recall here our national experience

in the progress of the American Negro toward full citizenship status.

accurate Asian view of our purposes. Our efforts to assist the growth process in Asia

Obviously, it is one thing to agree on a general ob¬

should certainly be enlarged; for economic growth

jective for American policy toward colonialism and

is a matter of degree, not merely a matter of the gen¬

quite another matter to find the right formulas in

eral direction of policy.

particular situations at particular moments of history.

invest more resources in Asia as part of a purposeful

There are no magic formulas, for example, on the

regional development program.

troubled issues of Africa.

accelerated from many directions, our efforts should

But three general proposi¬

tions can be asserted:

We should be prepared to Since growth can be

remain diverse; but, in terms of administration and

1. The possibility of American leadership in Asia

in American and Asian minds, they should be unified

depends in large part on Asians’ believing that it is

by an American policy of partnership for growth,

an unequivocal American policy to accelerate the

within which many private and public agencies could

transition to independence throughout the world.

play a constructive part.

We must accept the Amer¬

2. Since some of our allies have colonial posses¬

ican role in the partnership, not as a quick emergency

sions, there is a temptation for us to express our views

task of aid or reconstruction, but as an effort designed

but still maintain American neutrality when it comes

to extend over a decade at least; and the political and

to action on this issue.

Such neutrality will only de¬

institutional forces must be mobilized on that basis.

lay the process of transition and confront us in the

It is essential to emphasize the interconnection of

end with almost insoluble crises.

By and large, it is

Asia’s regional problems, especially the close link be¬

likely to be sounder Free World policy to press hard

tween Japan’s dangerous foreign trade problem and

our colonial partners (preferably behind the scenes)

the requirements of growth in Southeast Asia.

More-

13 over, important technical assistance is possible among

Southeast Asia.

Asian nations themselves—for instance, the general

sistance to military aid.

lessons to be learned from Indian planning experi¬

rity measures only where people share our awareness

ence and Formosan agriculture.

and sense of urgency.

We should not link economic as¬ We can take common secu¬

Indian leaders are acutely aware

There is a final element that should be introduced

of Communist political activity in India, and nothing

in such a fresh effort at consolidation and enlargement

we say is likely to make them more aware or more

of our economic policy in Asia.

able in coping with it.

We are engaged in

They are acutely and increas¬

a direct competition between Chinese Communist

ingly aware of Communist operations around their

theories of the Asian transition and those generated

borders.

elsewhere in Asia.

of national pride to respond.

The Chinese Communist theories

We can and we must rely on their own sense They do not now be¬

are derived almost wholesale from the Soviet and east¬

lieve that Communist intentions require the creation

ern European satellite experiences.

of an Asian defense pact.

They involve the

Neither pressure nor ties

ruthless mobilization of capital by the state, a priority

between promised economic aid and military asso¬

for heavy industry and armaments, limited investment

ciation will persuade them.

in agriculture, and a totalitarian system of controls over the individual.

Led by India, Free Asia is ex¬

perimenting with a different pattern.

This pattern

Our anti-Communist propaganda in Asia should be factual and accurate. own minds.

Asians must make up their

If their view of Communist theory and

involves a lesser relative mobilization of capital, pri¬

practice is false, it will not be altered by exhortation

ority for agriculture over industry, and the effort to

or rhetoric from us.

generate voluntary, cooperative, individual action to

reliable and relevant information combined with their

stimulate economic growth.

own experience.

It may be altered by a flow of

The outcome in Asia will depend on the relative

The United States believes there are two kinds of

results achieved in China and in the rest of Asia. The

Communist threats: a military threat and a political

Free World would be strengthened if our social sci¬

threat.

entists could develop in concrete form a general set

ers who accept the reality of the second threat but not

of growth concepts based on past and contemporary

the first.

experience and on democratic political and social

threats; but we should also be prepared to separate

principles.

our efforts and to use coalitions of different composi¬

There is little doubt that Asians are at

this point overly impressed with what they believe

There are those among Asian political lead¬ We must be prepared to deal with both

tions to deal with each.

has been the Soviet economic performance and with

The positive response of India and Southeast Asia

Communist China’s well-advertised industrialization

to the United Nations action in defense of South

plan.

Korea, in the summer of 1950, suggests that collective

A sober evaluation of the modern world’s ex¬

perience of the transition to sustained growth, focused

security

for defensive purposes is not unpopular

on the concrete problems and setting of Asia, would

among those who control Asian politics.

give confidence and perspective to those now charged

northward crossing of the 38th parallel was not pop¬

with guiding the development plans of Free Asia.

ular with most Asians.

This is not so much a task for governments as one for

are not in

Asian and western social scientists to undertake to¬

munism.

gether.

it is clear; and defensive collective security measures

But the

In general the Asian leaders

a mood for military crusade against Com¬ They will react to military menace when

can probably be developed in time and with patience. Intelligent Anti-Communism

It will require skill and patience to change Asian

But peace is an immensely powerful word and concept in Asia.

It does not imply a willingness among Asians

thinking about Communism itself, especially the Asian

to see their countries turned over to Communism by

reluctance to consider the military threat of Com¬

internal or external aggression; rather, it reflects a

munism.

desire to leave no stone unturned, no device unex¬

The United States should sharply reduce its ex¬ hortation and pressure for anti-Communist action in

plored, to prevent the world’s tension from generating a major war.

14 If we are to maintain an alliance embracing the

In a democracy there is wide acceptance of the prin¬

Asian peoples, it is essential that they understand and

ciple that the citizens have certain rights in the face

believe in our peaceful purposes.

The widespread

of the state and, especially, in the acceptance of their

belief in Asia that we intend to launch aggressive war

aspirations to move toward an enlargement of those

is already extremely costly to us.

rights.

And, should war

A totalitarian state is one in which no sig¬

come, its outcome in both political and power terms

nificant effort is made to achieve the compromise be¬

may well hinge on whether or not Asians believe that

tween the sanctity of the individual and the needs of

it was started by us.

the state; the moral weakness of men in power is ig¬

Thus, the permanent recapture by the United States

nored; the aspiration toward a higher degree of demo¬

of the symbols of peace is an essential ingredient in

cratic quality is not recognized as good; and, con¬

any anti-Communist policy that aims to bring and

versely, the extreme authority of concentrated power

hold the Asian intellectual in the Free World alliance;

is declared to be a virtue.

and this requires that we make our purposes clear and

A broad view of the democratic process is necessary

that we demonstrate by our words and actions not

if we are to understand sympathetically the political

only a willingness to use American military strength

evolution of Asia.

against Communist military aggression but also an

mocracy developed there will differ from our own, and

equal willingness to explore all avenues of peaceful

that the functions of the state in relation to the in¬

adjustment with the Communist bloc that are con¬

dividual will differ from those we would advocate in

sistent with our basic interests.

the United States.

It requires that we

It is certain that the forms of de¬

It is further evident that, even if

demonstrate a willingness to help positively with the

democratic Asia manages to make the transition to

great domestic tasks of transition which confront the

self-sustaining growth, conquer the problems of illiter¬

new Asian nations.

acy, and develop grass-roots democratic processes, the result will be forms of society radically different from

The Democratic Process

our own.

It is a persistent characteristic of American society reaching back to the Declaration of Independence that we enunciate our ideals in abstract absolutes.

As a

nation, we promptly translated our political beliefs into the Constitution which reflects not merely ideal aspirations but a shrewd awareness of human frailty and of the special problems of national politics.

We

have maintained in our domestic political life this mixture of idealistic aspiration and practicality; but we tend to present our purposes to others in terms of moral absolutes that match neither our performance nor the facts and possibilities of the real world out¬ side the United States.

These qualities in our own

The various cultures of Asia will leave

marks on Asian politics. These observations have certain implications for American action and public statement.

The behavior

and words of responsible Americans must reflect an awareness of the range of legitimate democratic forms, clarity about the minimum common democratic es¬ sences, and a living sense of the endless striving that is the democratic process.

On this basis, a common

understanding with Asians might be erected; whereas a rigid projection of the meaning of democracy only in terms of American ideas and experience at this stage of our history is likely to seem empty and remote

society raise certain specific issues for America’s rela¬

to those struggling toward similar goals but faced with

tions with the Asian.

very different problems and cultural settings.

First, we must come to understand and to articulate what is the essential truth about democracy.

Democ¬

Second, American policy must reassess the impor¬ tance of politics and political action in the Free World

racy is a matter of aspiration and degree; it is not an

alliance.

absolute.

sumption that it will preserve or accelerate the de¬

In all societies the freedom of an individual

Economic aid is usually given on the as¬

is limited by the requirements of civil order, common

velopment of democracy in political practice.

defense, and certain other matters of common welfare.

are conditions where this assumption is invalid.

There

The balance struck between liberty and order will

It is essential that there be an increase in relative

differ from society to society and from time to time.

power in Asian societies of those groups who meet

15 both the American interests: namely, that they wrestle

Indo-China would have been very different from what

with vigor, intelligence, and democratic technique

it proved to be.

with their domestic problems and that they under¬

using our full bargaining power to bring about an

stand and are prepared to resist assorted Communist

effective change in French colonial policy, we inter¬

efforts at subversion and aggression.

fered mightily in Indo-China.

Given the force

By giving France resources without

This is merely the

of unsatisfied Asian aspirations, men who meet the

most current and painful of several such lessons to

second but not the first criterion are likely to be in¬

be learned from our postwar experience.

effective in mobilizing support for the foreign policies we find most congenial.

In order to bring the best and ablest Asians into

The success of our efforts

a responsible coalition with us, our political policy in

at economic and military assistance has generally de¬

Asia must, in good balance, pursue both aspects of

pended since 1945 on local political constellations

our national interest; and we must proceed with a

embracing both elements: e.g., in the United King¬

dual awareness—a humble awareness of the limits of

dom, Turkey, the Philippines in the past few years.

American influence and an acute awareness of the

Our failures or danger spots are notable for a lack

unavoidable margin of our influence.

of this convergence: e.g., Nationalist China 1945-1949, Conclusion

Indo-China, Italy. It must be recognized immediately that the Amer¬

The general problem for American policy repre¬

ican ability to shape the local political scene is limited.

sented by Asian political leadership comes to this: at

It is an illusion, however, to believe that non-inter¬

present the Asian is not at all sure that his own and

ference is possible in the modern world.

his country’s interests and objectives are also United

Without

United States assistance (or with assistance in different

States interests and objectives.

forms or under different conditions) the postwar evo¬

and hold the literate Asian within the Free World

lution of Italy and South Korea, Indo-China, France,

alliance, he must come to believe that American in¬

and Formosa would, for better or worse, have been

terests and objectives conform in important respects

different from what it has been.

to his own.

American power and

If we wish to bring

And we must accept the basic fact that

its degree of involvement around the world make us

whether men are with us or against us does not de¬

a more powerful force in local politics than our tech¬

pend primarily on whether they like us; it does not

niques and habits of conventional diplomacy would

depend primarily on whether we give them money;

credit.

Our task is to use our influence well—to aid

on whether or not they are grateful for our assistance;

the essential political convergence where possible, not

it does not even depend on whether or how much they

to retreat to the illusion that we are not interfering.

hate and fear Communism; but it does depend heavily

History is unlikely to forgive us for serving as banker

on whether they believe United States interests and

to a supremely self-defeating French policy in Indo-

objectives as we see them overlap with their interests

China.

and objectives as they see them.

Without our aid, French political policy in

CHAPTER

The Free Chinese squarely to the issue of the United States interest in

Who and Where They Are

The Communist conquest of a country has generally

the Asian future, it is essential that we look more

meant that only a handful of its people, too few to

closely at the Free Chinese as one of the significant

represent

other

components of the over-all Asian situation that we

They could hardly be

must include in any calculation of the purposes and

any

great

potential

strength, have remained free.

political

or

possible effects of our Asian policy.

either a significant threat to the Communist regime

In the broadest sense all of the Free Chinese wher¬

in their native country or a major concern of Amer¬ ican policy.

ever they are represent a potential for keeping alive

The Communist conquest of China is

an exception to this general rule.

the symbols and realities of Chinese culture and as¬

There are some

pirations beyond the corrupting reach of Communism.

15,000,000 Chinese still beyond the reach of Chinese

Their presence, either as a minority in an Asian so¬

Communist control; and, in contrast to most ex¬

ciety or as a nucleus on Formosa, is the best possible

patriates and exiles, they have such potential political

evidence that the Chinese Communists do not speak

and economic power that they are a key factor in the Communist attempt to win Asia.

for all the Chinese people.

The Chinese Com¬

nese can be unified in spirit by a common allegiance

munist regime, well aware of this, has, since the be¬

to the true principles of the Chinese revolution, which

ginning of its rule, made increasing efforts to win the

looked to the making of a free democratic China,

Chinese now outside of mainland China to Com¬

there will be a living alternative to the present totali¬

munism, efforts so persistent that they have alarmed

tarian Communist China. A Free Chinese alternative,

the leaders in such Free Asian countries as India,

like the alternative of the successful political and eco¬

Burma, and Thailand.

nomic growth of a Free Asia outlined in the preceding

The United States has been slow to understand fully

chapters, would be a challenge to Communist claims

the connection between the loyalties of the Free Chi¬

to Asian leadership and could progressively weaken

nese and the United States interests in the growth

Communist rule in China itself.

and transition to independence of Free Asia and in the future of Communist China.

So long as the Free Chi¬

These generalizations indicate the basic nature of

To most Americans

the Free Chinese are an unknown quantity.

the United States interest in the future of the Free

And,

Chinese.

If the Free Chinese were all in one place,

therefore, although we have been sharply aware of

we might consider the problem of advancing our in¬

Formosa as a military problem, we have failed to sense

terest and theirs in terms of some inclusive single

the broad significance of the total phenomenon of the

policy.

Free Chinese in Asia, of which the military defense

varying degrees of influence that the United States can

of Formosa is only one part.

exert on them and the special nature of their position

If we are to face up 16

As it is, they are widely dispersed; and the

17 in their various locations make it necessary to consider

reorientation, and has had to face the possibility of

them in terms of a whole range of problems.

being forced to live under a Communist government

The simplest approach to understanding the Free

no matter where in Asia he might be.

Chinese potential and the possible lines of action that

This conventional Overseas Chinese, whose think¬

the United States might take to strengthen that po¬

ing has been woven over time into the whole texture

tential in the interest of the Free World is to consider

of Overseas Chinese thought, is outnumbered by those

separately three principal Free Chinese elements: the

of the second, third, and fourth generation born out¬

Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, the exile Chinese

side of China—in northern Malaya, for instance, some

intellectuals, and the Chinese Nationalist regime on

75 per cent of the Chinese population.

Formosa.

who have never seen any other place but the country

To this group,

where they were born, China has not meant either a The Overseas Chinese

home or a goal; but it has symbolized their identity

Like any other immigrant, the Chinese as an in¬

and dignity as a people.

Therefore, they, as well as

dividual in Southeast Asia left his native land in search

the first generation, have retained in varying degrees

of opportunity to acquire economic status he could

their hold on language and customs; they have sought

not hope for at home.

But, unlike most other immi¬

to establish their own schools; in good times their

grants, he had a deeply rooted, almost religious, de¬

sons have gone to China for college education; and,

termination to return to China—to his family village

like the first generation of immigrants, they have had

for a life of retired ease, if possible, but at least to

a sustained interest in the strength and stability of

live his last days and be buried in the place of his

China’s government while taking only a minimum

ancestors.

He had, therefore, little real interest in

interest in the local political situation except as it

the affairs of his temporarily adopted land so long as

touched them personally in the form of taxes or dis¬

business was good.

crimination.

He kept to himself unless a short¬

age of women of his own kind encouraged intermar¬

A first generalization, then, is that the Overseas

riage—and even then often kept his wife in China and,

Chinese in Southeast Asia, identifying themselves sen¬

while he was making his way up the economic ladder,

timentally with ancestral China, are currently listen¬

returned there periodically to beget sons.

ing to and watching both the Communists and the

He invested

a large share of his savings in land at home.

It fol¬

lowed that he was inactive in local politics but keenly

Free World, waiting to see where the ultimate strength lies.

Although prone

Over the years the Overseas Chinese acquired in¬

to judge a regime by the single criterion of strength,

creasing power in the economies of most of the South¬

he was by no means without principles and political

east Asian countries.

philosophy; and he financed and supported the 1911

per cent of the population, as in Thailand, or only

Revolution.

from 2 to 7 per cent as in the Philippines, Indonesia,

aware of the state of things at home.

This conventional Overseas Chinese still existed in some numbers in 1949.

He thought that he saw

Whether they represented 16

and Indo-China, they secured near-monopoly control of both wholesale and retail trade.

In Malaya, in

China unified and then given international status by

addition to controlling pineapple and poultry raising,

a strong central government that could even live up

they owned and operated more than a third of the

to its immediate promises to protect the rights of

tin mines; in Thailand they owned 80 per cent of the

Chinese wherever they were in Asia.

rice mills and furnished 70 per cent of the non-agri-

But then, as

news from mainland China leaked out to the rest of

cultural labor.

Asia, it became very plain that the Communist system

The rise of Asian nationalism has been almost uni¬

had no place in it for a life of retirement supported

versally accompanied by increased local hostility to

by investment in land—or, probably, in anything else.

the Chinese, arising invariably from the combination

China was no longer home; home was now where he

of their economic power and their unassimilability.

lived.

At the present time they are confronted with pressing

Thus the conventional senior Overseas Chinese

has had old roots cut, has had to attempt a difficult

local difficulties.

In many places their citizenship

18 Economic hostility causes them real

nese teaching in the national system, and other re¬

fears, whether it takes the concrete form of trade-

strictions have resulted in strong and increasing Com¬

exclusion laws such as those recently enacted by the

munist sympathies and complete Communist control

Philippine government and such exclusion acts as the

of Chinese labor unions.

Thailand laws closing some twenty-seven occupations

widely successful in penetrating educational systems

to Chinese, or whether it is evidenced only by a na¬

in Asia; and, according to their figures, drew 10,086

tional mood that makes their future uncertain.

Their

students, nearly all Overseas Chinese, from Asian com¬

attempts to preserve their own language and culture,

munities to the Communist mainland universities in

especially to establish their own schools beyond the

1953.

primary level, have met increasing resistance; language

returning Chinese students came from first-generation

and other obstacles have made local education at col¬

immigrant families, not from those fairly established

lege level practically inaccessible.

in the Overseas communities.

status is obscure.

The Communists have been

It must be noted, however, that apparently all

A second valid generalization is that the Overseas

On the other hand, the Overseas Chinese response

Chinese in Southeast Asia are more urgently con¬

to Formosa’s appeals has steadily increased as For¬

cerned with their own local problems of status and

mosa’s survival seems more sure and its regime to

survival than with external affairs, their first problem

represent, at least to the older generation, something

being that of integration into the various societies

more familiar and better than Communism.

where they live.

was host to only 826 Overseas Chinese university stu¬

In the situation outlined by these generalizations,

Formosa

dents in 1953, the first year any real effort was made

the Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia, with their

to counter the Communist drive in education.

sentimental ties to the ancestral land but the facts of

small number is an indication of Formosa’s previous

life dictated by the local climate, have been, since

failure to encourage students, which reflects both in¬

1949, subject to three separate pressures.

Local gov¬

adequate facilities and lack of vision, rather than an

ernments have attempted both to limit their economic

indication of lack of Overseas Chinese students who

power and to encourage or compel their social inte¬

would go to Formosa if given the chance.

gration.

Formosa, at first with only limited means

Chinese interest in the educational problem has led

and imagination, has gradually worked up a steady

to their own establishment of a new Overseas Chinese

appeal for their loyalty but has had little to give in

university in Singapore, under the direction of local

return, not offering until 1953 even a token oppor¬

Chinese businessmen.

tunity for college education on the island.

The

Overseas

The Chi¬

The foregoing is a brief summary of salient facts.

nese Communists have consistently played every angle

Chinese now in the United States who have kept in

from the beginning: propaganda by radio and the

constant touch with the Overseas Chinese or have re¬

printed word, infiltration of Asian schools with both

cently returned frdln visits to the Overseas Chinese

personnel and texts, guidance and then leadership of

communities in Southeast Asia share opinions that can

unions.

They have made vitriolic attacks on any dis¬

be summarized as follows: The most urgent and criti¬

criminatory actions, stressing the theme that Com¬

cal issue is educational opportunity for Overseas Chi¬

munist China promises protection and equal status for

nese youth.

Chinese everywhere as part of the Asian revolution.

their economic hostility to the Chinese and let changes

The Chinese Communists’ shrewdest move, probably,

in the balance between Chinese and native roles in the

has been the offer of free college education followed

economies develop naturally.

by important and responsible jobs in the “New China”

in all the Asian countries for more news and infor¬

—status and opportunity for all youth, the age group

mation of all kinds from other than Communist

at which the Communists have directed their greatest

sources—in many places the only ones now readily

efforts.

available.

It is essential that Asian nations temper

There is a great need

The Overseas Chinese, like hosts of other

In Thailand, with one of the most vociferously anti¬

Asians, believe in their hearts that the political fate

communist governments in Asia, the forbidding of

of Asia will be determined largely by the action or

Chinese middle schools, without providing any Chi¬

inaction of the United States, whose apparently in-

19 consistent course baffles and worries them but whose

relaxing of barriers to the entrance of qualified Over¬

power they believe to be unquestionably the decisive

seas Chinese into this country for the purpose of get¬

factor in world affairs.

ting an education.

It is obvious that the Overseas element of the Free

Over the longer period necessary, the kind of Asian

Chinese confronts us with a complex situation on

economic policy outlined in Chapter 7 would offer

which the United States can have only limited direct

opportunities for exerting effective, if indirect, influ¬

influence.

ence on the problem of integration.

The Overseas Chinese are bound, like any

It should be

people with a long rich past, to cherish their racial

possible, as part of an economic program, to develop

and cultural heritage; there must be the opportunity

native industries, capital, and human resources that

and incentive for them to identify their symbolic

would steadily correct the imbalance between the na¬

loyalties with the principles and ultimate hopes of a

tive and the Overseas Chinese roles in the national

Free China.

Yet those loyalties must not conflict with

economies, not by suppressing the Chinese, but by

their integration as responsible citizens into the so¬

expanding the total numbers of other nationals en¬

cieties where their economic power and clannishness

gaged in commerce, industry, and other forms of

have generated a deep hostility.

modern economic activity.

This sounds very

The minority problem is

much like an impossibility—and, of course, it is for

likely to be less acute if the Asian nations are expand¬

the very near future; but, whatever the difficulties,

ing and the monopoly powers of the Overseas Chi¬

both their integration and their loyalty to the symbols

nese are being diluted constructively.

of a Free China are very much in the United States

setting of a general Asian development program it

interest, and we must encourage them by whatever

should not be beyond the reach of American tact and

means are at our disposal.

The first step is our own

diplomacy to encourage in Asia a more constructive

acceptance of two basic facts: first, that the Overseas

approach to the gradual integration of the Chinese

Chinese integrated by free choice into Free Asian

into the various Asian societies.

Within the

societies could be important assets in the Asian growth

Finally, as considered in Chapter 4, we can use our

process; second, that as a dissident, potentially Com¬

margin of influence over Formosa to help see devel¬

munist, and economically powerful group they would

oped there a program of cultural, economic, and po¬

constitute dangerous centers for subversion and ob¬

litical activities that would make that important is¬

structive tactics, a constant threat to both political

land a Free Chinese center for the Overseas Chinese,

and economic stability throughout Southeast Asia.

harmonious with the rest of Free Asia, a center whose

Despite the apparent difficulties, there are certain

activities would reinforce, not interfere with, the long-

actions that we can and should take now on behalf

run integration of the Overseas Chinese in the Free

of the Overseas Chinese.

Asian communities within which they now live, with¬

We can enlarge our information activities in South¬ east Asia, making a conscious effort to reach the Over¬

out denying the vitality of their long-run links to China, its traditions, and its future.

seas Chinese, especially groups like those in Indonesia that have no organized sources of information except Communist-dominated chambers of commerce and so on.

The Exile Chinese Intellectuals

The exile Chinese intellectuals are college- and

In particular, we can increase the flow of techni¬

university-trained Chinese who have fled Communist

cal literature, political comment, and history from

China or have been stranded in other countries after

non-official American and other democratic sources.

leaving China to study.

Their attitude toward Com¬

We can enlarge the opportunities of Overseas Chi¬

munism is plain enough: they have chosen exile and

nese youth to get an education without recourse to

abject poverty rather than serve the Chinese Com¬

Communist China, a course of action that would in¬

munist regime; but they are for the most part also

clude support and tactful guidance of local Overseas

either unsympathetic to the conservative Chiang Kai-

enterprises such as the new Overseas university in

shek regime or unable to find employment on For¬

Singapore, support and encouragement of Formosa’s

mosa.

program to enlarge its educational facilities, and a

United States, homeless for the most part, and at best

They are stranded in Hong Kong and in the

20 living from hand to mouth or supported by partial

In the first year of the operation of the United States

and often unsuitable employment, their skills wasted.

Refugee Relief Act, according to available informa¬

They are a significant and potentially powerful

tion, not one of the Chinese refugees in Hong Kong

minority among the millions of Free Chinese.

Not

was admitted into the United States.

Not only are

only do they have the deepest possible hostility to

the legal and sponsorship requirements almost im¬

Communism, but also they are typical of the Asian

possible for any Chinese in Hong Kong to meet, but

intellectual, who has in his society a unique influence

also the money requirements are prohibitive.

as the articulate voice of Asian aspirations and as

emphasis of the Act is that the United States is too

organizer and leader of reform and revolutionary

poor and too overcrowded to finance any exile intellec¬

movements.

tuals or to find either employment for them or places

Yet the existence of these Free Chinese

The

is almost unknown to most Americans; and official

for them to live.

America, repeatedly made aware of them, has chosen

of Representatives voted to cut approximately in half

generally to ignore them.

the appropriation to finance the foreign student ex¬

For thirty years a principal Communist strategy has been aimed at the winning of the Asian intellectual to Communism.

In 1954 the United States House

change program. Although there are over 5,000 trained Chinese in¬

As already pointed out in this book,

tellectuals presently stranded in the United States,

one result of the sustained long-range Communist

there has been no adequate continuing official action

efforts is that the whole intellectual climate of Asia

either to finance and encourage the operation and

is tainted with the acceptance in varying degrees of

collaboration of private groups who are trying to find

the Marxist-Leninist rationale and with sympathy for

appropriate occupation for these Chinese intellectuals

and tolerance, if not acceptance, of Communist prac¬

or to finance such obvious constructive devices as mak¬

tice.

Ho Chi-minh is but one example of Communist-

ing it possible by subsidy for American colleges to

trained leadership—one example of the comparative

employ these intellectuals in work commensurate with

influence in Asia of the intellectual leadership and of

their training.

military force.

There is no denying the complexity of the problem

And yet the United States has cultivated, and ap¬

posed by the situation of the Chinese and other Asian

parently still cultivates, a national obtuseness about

intellectuals.

Great skill and sustained effort over a

the Asian, and in this case Chinese, intellectual—re¬

long time are required for its solution; and there is

fusing to profit by the bald facts of Communist his¬

no simple answer such as blanket admission of refugees

tory, refusing to consider seriously any important ef¬

to this country or vast appropriations.

fort that may not pay off for many years, refusing to

challenge to our skill and understanding.

consider any adequate expenditure of money in the

not met that challenge.

It is a direct We have

cause of the Asian and Chinese intellectual, although

Although we can have for a long time only an in¬

the total sum required would be infinitesimal com¬

direct influence on the Overseas Chinese in Southeast

pared to our expenditures for arms.

Asia, we can take certain direct actions to influence

The Russians find it possible to teach Asians in their own languages.

The Soviet Union accepted

2,500 students from China alone in 1954.

the fate of the potentially powerful minority of exile Free Chinese intellectuals.

We can revise the terms

Communist

of refugee admission and coordinate the efforts of the

China accepted more than 10,000 students from South¬

several private and official operations required to deal

east Asia in 1953, urging them to come, offering free

constructively with the refugee intellectuals.

college education with all expenses paid, and promis¬

take a more intelligent and imaginative look at the

ing them jobs.

The Chinese Communist leaders have

future potential represented by the experience and

offered every inducement to persuade the trained exile

training of the refugees now in Hong Kong and the

intellectuals to return.

Chinese intellectuals in the United States.

There are more than 10,000 Chinese intellectuals, 2,000 of them with degrees from American colleges, who have fled from Communist China to Hong Kong.

We can

Above all,

we can take a realistic view of the costs involved. It is not necessary here to detail a program. main outlines are obvious.

Its

It is the purpose here to

21 emphasize that as the United States contemplates

sources as are symbolized by the Chinese and other

an Asian policy we must face certain facts that are

Asian intellectuals.

relevant to the present problem of the exile Chinese

hamstringing United States efforts in a vital sector

intellectual.

of the world conflict by immigration policies rooted

Nor is there any justification for

First, the Communist victories in China in 1949

in ignorance, prejudice, and fear and by financial

and in Indo-China in 1954 are dramatic proof that

policies dictated by the cheap and shortsighted evasion

revolutionary victory in Asia is not rooted so much

of adequate money commitments because they will

in military strength as in the emotional and intellec¬

not pay off tomorrow.

tual commitments of the people.

A United States policy for Asia that does not en¬

Second, in these terms Communist China has the

visage imaginative, broadly based action over an ex¬

means to win the rest of Asia without recourse to

tended period aimed at the problem of the Chinese

creating either a modern industrial economy or a vast

and other Asian intellectuals will fail to meet an issue

military machine—and it could win by means that

critical to the United States interest in Asia.

bypass the purely military and economic strength of the Free World.

The foregoing discussion touches upon two sides of the Free Chinese triangle.

In a very real sense

Third, in the light of present knowledge and in

both the present and future of the Overseas Chinese

view of the United States position and interests, there

in Southeast Asia and of the exile Chinese intellectuals

is no rational relationship between United States in¬

are closely related to, if not dependent on, the third

vestments in the military and other material weapons

side—Formosa, which is treated in some detail in the

and United States investments in such human re¬

next chapter.

CHAPTER

Formosa It must be pointed out first of all that Formosa,

of the Kuomintang, the Chinese Nationalist Party.

besides being the island retreat of the Chinese Na¬

There has been little understanding of the Formosa

tionalist government and some 2,000,000 Free Chinese

situation as a whole, and, especially, no evident Amer¬

from the mainland, is also the home of some 7,000,000

ican awareness of its potential political significance

Formosans, who have sought Formosan autonomy

in the struggle with Communism in Asia.

ever since Formosa was ceded to Japan in 1895, and

our national discussion of Formosa has been con¬

who now live under the rule of the Chinese National¬

ducted as though there were no connection between

ist regime.

Formosa and the rest of Free Asia.

Although the two groups therefore have

In fact,

The Formosa

different long-run interests, the present Formosa situa¬

debate in the United States government seems to have

tion does not repeat the conditions of Japanese occu¬

been centered largely on the United States military

pation and rule, for the great majority of Formosans

interest, leaving both the international status of For¬

are of Chinese origin, the original settlers having

mosa and the over-all interest of the United States

emigrated from the Chinese coastal provinces.

in Formosa so obscure that it has seemed as if we had

The authors would emphasize that the long-run operation of political and social reform on Formosa

no Formosa policy. As this is written, the world is in the midst of an

and, therefore, any detailed planning of the Formosa

acute crisis over Formosa.

future must take into consideration the related prob¬

at the Geneva Conference in translating the military

lems of both groups and embrace the entire Formosa

position of the Vietminh forces in Indo-China into

population.

Communist possession of the northern half of the

One of the major tests of the Nationalist

In 1954 Peking succeeded

regime on Formosa will be the pace and the extent

country.

to which the Formosans come to assume political and

as next in priority, to increasing the pressure on the

social equality and responsibility—a trend already well

Free World to turn over Formosa to Peking.

under way since 1949.

propaganda campaign to this effect began in China;

The Chinese Communists promptly turned, A major

Taking first things first, this chapter treats the

Free World diplomats were solemnly informed in

Formosa situation in terms of the most urgent present

private that the Chinese Communists were deter¬

task of United States policy toward Formosa—the cre¬

mined to retake Formosa; artillery and air attack

ation

began on Tachen.

of a

constructive relationship

between

the

United States and the Free Chinese government on Formosa. Public discussion of Formosa in the United States

Up to this point the United States government had left its intentions with respect to Formosa and the islands held by the Nationalists vague.

Strategically

has centered almost wholly on conflicting and highly

it was not wholly clear to the Free World whether or

emotional views of Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants

not the United States backed Chiang Kai-shek’s policy

23 of returning to the mainland by force at the earliest

gard a truce agreement as binding over the long fu¬

possible moment.

ture.

Tactically it was not clear whether

One must assume that, if Quemoy and Matsu

the United States was prepared to defend the off-shore

are evacuated, Peking will behave in the future in

islands (notably Tachen, Quemoy, and Matsu) as well

the Formosa Strait as the relative power potentialities

as Formosa and the Pescadores.

permit.

Many on Formosa

Nevertheless, it would be an important Amer¬

were not even clear that under pressure the United

ican advantage to have at least Free World consensus

States would defend Formosa itself.

on a Formosa policy so that future action there would

In the face of Communist propaganda, diplomacy, and military pressure, the United States began to

not be as unilateral and divisive within the Free World as it has been in the past.

clarify its intentions and commitments in this area.

Except for the extraordinarily explicit commitments

A Mutual Security Pact covering Formosa and the

of Peking to take over Formosa within a year and

Pescadores was negotiated and passed by the Senate.

for Moscow’s recently increased backing for Peking

Under American pressure the Nationalist forces and

on this issue, one would be inclined to assume that

many civilians were evacuated from Tachen.

The

the sort of de facto truce sought by the British, Indian,

British and Indian governments urged the United

and American governments might easily be achieved.

States to bring about a withdrawal from Quemoy and

And a number of factors make this still the most likely

Matsu and urged the Chinese Communists to abandon

outcome of the crisis: the military advantages of the

any effort to seize Formosa and the Pescadores by

United States in a battle that would be primarily

force.

They sought, in fact, a de facto truce in the

naval and air; the ability of Peking to turn off a

Formosa straits and the de facto emergence of two

propaganda campaign as easily as it turned it on; the

Chinas, as opposed to a state of actual or potential

assumed reluctance of both Moscow and Peking to

civil war.

involve themselves in major military operations at

As this is written,* the American government has

this juncture; the emergent unity of the Free World

taken the position that it is prepared to see the in¬

on the issue of Formosa’s defense.

ternational negotiation of a truce in the Formosa

may see substantial limited warfare in 1955 in the

Strait, but that it is not prepared to insist on the

Formosa Strait or even major war arising from the

evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu before such a truce

present crisis.

had been negotiated.

The grounds for this view are,

Nevertheless, we

Should major war come in 1955 the substance of

presumably, these: Moscow and Peking are now talk¬

this book becomes largely irrelevant.

ing not about a truce but about a Communist military

should come, the context of our recommendations

takeover of Formosa; they now know that the Mutual Security Pact requires the United States to defend Formosa and the Pescadores against military attack; the holding of Quemoy and Matsu would be of ad¬ vantage should a military assault be attempted; the United States will not surrender this military advan¬ tage until it is clear that it does not confront a direct military challenge at a point where it is now solemnly committed. We are holding Quemoy and Matsu thus far essen¬ tially as bargaining points in a truce negotiation and running the risk of division in the United States and the Free World should the Communists attack with¬ out entering such negotiation.

There is, of course,

no reason to believe that the Communists would re* March 1, 1955.

If limited war

would change, but not their basic import; for the holding of the balance of power in Eurasia for the Free World would remain not merely a military task but a combined task of military, political, and eco¬ nomic policy.

The reasoning in this chapter proceeds

from the assumption that the present crisis will be resolved along lines of a de facto truce.

This will

leave Formosa an island sanctuary, guaranteed mili¬ tarily by the United States and, perhaps, by other Free World powers.

Formosa will be committed to

avoiding acts of military provocation against the main¬ land; and the possibility of a Nationalist return to the mainland by force of American arms, at American initiative, is ruled out. The United States guarantee of military protection for Formosa places this country before the world, and especially in the eyes of the Asian peoples, squarely

24 in a position of responsibility for Formosa's future.

government, the Kuomintang firmly in control, with

This means more than merely Formosa’s future phys¬

Chiang Kai-shek its unquestioned leader.

For the watchful Asians,

The unbroken continuation of Kuomintang rule

the social, political, and economic progress of For¬

has meant that the Formosa political climate is the

mosa will be a test of the purposes and effectiveness

product of Kuomintang thinking and action and an

of American policy toward the Asian peoples.

accurate measure, therefore, of present Kuomintang

ical security from attack.

Thus,

in making the decision to protect Formosa we have

political philosophy.

Its chief feature is the pre¬

also made the underlying even if unspoken decision

ponderant emphasis on personal loyalties.

to meet a crucial test of our whole policy in Asia.

qualification for individual political power is personal

The first

There is little chance that we can meet that test

loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek; the second is loyalty to

successfully if we continue indulging in the emo¬

the Kuomintang as the unique means of China’s sal¬

tional hangover of the Chinese defeat of 1949 and if

vation.

we continue debating on the basis that Formosa is

petuate the idea that the future of the Free Chinese

a political liability we have somehow come to be sad¬

must depend on a single-party elite.

dled with, a hopeless situation because the govern¬

Kuomintang attitude appears to be one of very lim¬

ment on Formosa is exactly the same government that

ited understanding and even suspicion of the revolu¬

was defeated in China.

tionary role of the intellectual.

longer relevant.

The 1949 perspective is no

It has paralyzed American thought

Therefore, there is a strong tendency to per¬ The typical

Efforts at social re¬

form tend to emphasize physical welfare, to see that

It behooves us to think seri¬

people get more to eat, but to go slow on political

ously about Formosa in the perspective of 1955 and

reform and other aspirations that are voiced by the

to weigh the possibility that Formosa can be a po¬

intellectuals and are a vital factor of revolutionary

litical asset to the United States and the rest of the

nationalism in all Asia.

Free World.

traditional Kuomintang practices means that the For¬

and initiative too long.

Under such circumstances, what should be For¬ mosa’s

objectives?

would then exist?

What

foundations

for

Finally, the perpetuation of

mosan military is an inseparable element of the po¬

morale

litical picture: the army is Chiang Kai-shek’s army,

Aside from being an island out¬

therefore the Kuomintang’s army, with a built-in sys¬

post of American and Free World defense, can For¬

tem of political commissars.

mosa survive as a Nationalist base and have a mean¬

servers, there are two political networks in the mili¬

ingful place in Free Asia?

tary, the Kuomintang party organ and Chiang Kai-

These are the questions

this chapter seeks to answer.

shek’s personal agents.

According to some ob¬

Whether or not Chiang Kai-

shek employs a network of personal agents, the close The Formosa Political Scene

connection between the military and a political party

Before considering possible Formosa objectives un¬ der present conditions, it is necessary to have some

violates, in American eyes, a fundamental principle of democratic government.

idea of the nature of the Formosa regime and of the

Critics of the Formosa regime point to the increas¬

objectives that have been the basis of its morale in

ing power of Chiang’s older son, Chiang Ching-kuo.

six years of exile.

Chiang Ching-kuo is a controversial figure, partly be¬

The government that undertook the task of ruling

cause he has lived in the Soviet Union and is believed

in exile and under constant threat of attack was

by many to accept without reservation the methods

the escaped nucleus of Chiang Kai-shek’s mainland

and discipline of Communist Party organization and

Kuomintang regime, the tested and loyal center, from

operation and partly because he seems to be so intent

which the political and military bureaucracies and

first of all on making himself personally powerful

the dissident elements had been lopped off in the

that some observers fear that he is aiming at dictator¬

process of the Communist victory.

ship.

The Kuomintang

It is plain that he has considerable power and

has neither outlawed nor silenced the minority Young

that he bosses the various arms of the political control

China and Democratic Socialist parties; but the gov¬

apparatus from the military and the police down to

ernment of Formosa has continued to be a one-party

the youth level and the rehabilitation of the Korean

25 prisoner-of-war repatriates.

There is nearly unani¬

other factors—the war conditions in which it has had

mous agreement among Chinese and Americans best

to operate and a genuine lack of experience with

qualified to judge that Chiang Ching-kuo is insatiably

practical working democracy.

curious, possessed of unlimited energy, and tough.

selves that Americans shattered precedent to keep one

Opinions as to where he would be without his father’s

party and one president in office for the duration of

backing vary widely.

His supporters insist that he

our last war emergency and that the Kuomintang has

hates Communism and sincerely believes in demo¬

had to function under war conditions since 1937.

cratic principles.

view.

Unless those who know the many younger men in the

Therefore it is difficult at this point to know what

Formosa regime are wrong, there is in the present

his potential and his ultimate purposes are—whether

Kuomintang a considerable number who have fully

or not he has the will and capacity to develop as a

accepted the theories and are eager to learn the prac¬

constructive democratic leader of the Chinese on For¬

tical techniques of democracy—the know-how of steady

mosa.

progress toward what have always been the goals of

Others

take an opposite

But he is very much a part of the Formosa

political scene, and there seems little doubt that he

We might remind our¬

the Chinese revolution. The first requirement of any constructive American

hopes to succeed his father. A last political element consists of the Young China and Democratic Socialist groups.

approach to the problem of Formosa is to shake off

Their parties have

the 1949 blues and see the Formosa political situa¬

carried over from the mainland, where Young China

tion in the 1955 perspective—to grasp the fact that

originally stood for emphasis on nationalism and the

we are not confronted with a hopeless situation, but

Democratic Socialists for emphasis on social and po¬

with an organization in being that has distinct po¬

litical reform, with sharp attacks on one-man rule.

tentialities for the advancement of

Together they have 14 of the 702 seats of the Legisla¬

the Free Chinese and of the United States.

the interests of

tive Yuan and 10 of the 171 seats in the Control Yuan of the Formosa government.

One gets the impres¬

Formosa Objectives Past and Future

sion that they exist on Formosa by Kuomintang suf¬

The overriding objective of the Chinese on Formosa

ferance, a gesture the Kuomintang can well afford in

ever since they established themselves there in 1949

view of their small numbers; and it can hardly be

has been their return to the mainland.

said that they represent any real change from the

table that this common hope of all exiles should be

traditional Kuomintang one-party system.

translated into avowed determination in such a con

But, even

It was inevi¬

if there is no powerful leaven here, these small parties

centration of exiles as the 2,000,000 Chinese, includ¬

have survived, and they keep alive a nucleus with

ing some 600,000 soldiers, on Formosa.

some degree of independent thought; they keep alive

as pointed out in the preceding chapter, there are

the idea of loyal opposition.

some 12,000,000 Overseas Chinese, whose cultural loy¬

The important point to be made here is that the

Moreover,

alties even if only to a symbolic China require some

Formosa regime of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomin¬

focus.

tang is not, as many Americans still assume, the same

and the Chinese regime on Formosa should appeal to

exhausted, inefficient, corrupt apparatus that was de¬

those Overseas Chinese loyalties and that the Formosa

feated on the mainland in 1949.

These survivors

regime could have little or no basis for such an ap¬

have proved capable of maintaining unity, order, and

peal unless it proclaimed both its legitimacy as the

morale in exile and in danger.

government of China and its intention to return and

Objective observers

It was inevitable that both Communist China

agree that corruption in party or government is to

exert its rights.

any measurable degree non-existent.

the primary task of the Formosa regime has been to

The regime is

In the eyes of its leadership, then,

neither a totalitarian dictatorship nor what Ameri¬

create a military-political potential:

to unify and

cans could call a truly democratic government.

It can

keep in order a society in constant danger of attack,

be fairly described as ultraconservative, its evolution

and to create an armed force capable of both sus¬

in democratic directions delayed not simply by tra¬

tained defense of their island and bold attack on the

ditional Kuomintang stubbornness but also by two

Communist mainland.

It is necessary, as part of our

26 understanding of the present Formosa situation, that

thinking about Formosa.

we understand that these have been the human reali¬

attack on Communist China seems only a remote pos¬

ties underlying Formosa developments from 1949 to

sibility, two questions come immediately to mind.

the present.

What objectives can Formosa have?

The maintenance of unity and personal integrity in

Now that any Nationalist

What is to sus¬

tain Formosa morale?

the Formosa political regime, the establishment of an orderly, functioning society, the sustained morale of

Present Objectives

the armed forces—these are the outstanding successful

The preceding discussion emphasizes that any in¬

results of the pursuit of the great objective of return

telligent American approach to understanding the

to the homeland.

Formosa problem requires that we adjust our think¬

But Formosa also has had another objective, sec¬

ing about Formosa to the present, that we measure

ondary, in one sense, because far less emphasized than

the accomplishments and nature of the Nationalist

the first, and, in another sense, derived from the first,

regime realistically—not by 1949, but in terms of what

but still an objective that has taken on meanings and

it is today.

realities of its own increasingly independent of the

phasized that American thinking about Formosa must

possibility of a return to mainland China.

also be adjusted in another sense.

This

At this point, it must be as strongly em¬ The American

second objective is reform—political and social re¬

failure over the past five years to create any definable

form in the direction of democratic evolution.

policy toward Formosa, a failure that has meant that

The housecleaning in the Kuomintang itself has

it has been impossible to give Formosa any definable

been accompanied by changes in the operation of

international status, was at least partly the result of

government.

Chiang Kai-shek’s administration oper¬

an American frame of mind in which Formosa was

ates in at least partial obedience to constitutional

treated simply as a geographical item on a shifting

law.

military map.

It operates on a published budget.

The Legis¬

And most American discussion today

lative Yuan, no longer completely a rubber stamp,

seems to assume that Formosa is some kind of abstrac¬

has taken on a part of its proper function of initiat¬

tion, a piece in the Pacific puzzle to be disposed of

ing laws; and it works with an increasing freedom of

this way or that as the larger world may decide.

discussion and criticism.

Native Formosans and non-

have quite ignored the disturbing fact that Formosa

Kuomintang aspirants can make their bid for and

is a human element in the world situation, that what

occupy public office.

There has been sweeping land

we call Formosa is not just a fortified island in a de¬

reform, embracing the redistribution of 85 per cent of

fense scheme but also 9,000,000 human beings whose

the island’s agricultural acreage, a reform so success¬

hopes and fears we have been juggling with and for

ful to date that it could serve as a model for other

whose lives and destinies we have assumed responsi¬

parts of Asia.

bility.

Land reform has been accompanied

We

We must attempt to understand the problem

by public health programs that have reduced the

of Formosa objectives and morale, not as a problem

death rate from a level of 21 per 1,000, under Japa¬

of certain mechanical moves in a United States and

nese rule, to approximately 9 per 1,000 in 1953.

Free World operation, but as a problem of human

The

Formosa government has indicated an increasing in¬

life.

terest in the movement of exiles from Hong Kong to

that at the very heart of the Communist struggle in

Formosa and in the Overseas Chinese communities,

Asia, as elsewhere, are human aspirations and cour¬

especially in the needs of Overseas Chinese youth in

age and that Formosa is inseparable from the total

Asia for educational opportunity, by launching a

Asian problem, common justice would demand that

vigorous campaign to enlarge Formosa’s educational

we adjust our thinking about Formosa to include a

facilities.

consideration of Formosa as first of all a human situa¬

The great objective and hope of return to the main¬

tion.

Even if we were so shortsighted as to fail to see

What follows here, therefore, is an attempt to

land and the steady but slow progress of reform have

clarify the relationship between Formosa as a group

sustained the morale of the Free Chinese on For¬

of human beings and the United States interests in

mosa and have been the focus of Overseas Chinese

Asia.

27 What are to be Formosa’s objectives in such terms?

nese who are now free must thrash out and develop

The answer to this question is obvious: Formosa’s

an alternative.

The change

Second, although the exile’s process of change and

that the new, at least partially, defined position of

adjustment is difficult and complex, especially when

Formosa compels is not a change of objectives, but a

it means launching into a new kind of life, the cru¬

change of emphasis, a change of balance or relation¬

cial and hardest step in the process is the first one

ship between the two objectives already firmly fixed

of perceiving the alternative and taking the first set

in Free Chinese minds.

of consistent actions to realize it.

objectives must remain what they are.

First, the recent actions of the United States have

The Chinese on

Formosa have already taken that crucial step.

The

not altered Free Chinese emotions—the desire, the

assumption that up to the minute of the United States

hope of the exile for return to his home.

Since no

pronouncement they blindly believed that they were

action of the outside world can change human nature,

on the verge of assaulting Communist China is based

return will continue to be the ideal objective of the

on complete ignorance of Chinese realism.

exile Formosa Chinese regardless of what we do and

nese on Formosa have been aware of the facts of their

no matter how far into the future his hope is moved.

situation, aware that the United States has no inten¬

But it is also a basic fact of human nature that as

tion of starting a war—and the subtle process of

circumstances he is powerless to change move the

change has been under way for some time.

exile’s ideal into the indeterminate future, if he is

dence is plain in the visit Chiang Ching-kuo paid to

not to die in despair, he must come to live with the

the United States in 1953, in the increasing efforts

reality of the distant and perhaps unattainable ideal

to provide for Overseas Chinese students educational

goal by turning to present and attainable objectives.

opportunities on Formosa, in the delegations of For¬

This is the universal human story of exiles every¬

mosa

where.

teachers to educational centers here to learn about

Once there is the awareness of the attainable

alternative and there is a real value set on that alter¬

scholars

and

university

The Chi¬

The evi¬

administrators

and

American methods.

native, the subtle process of change is inevitable: the

In the simplest terms, then, the Formosa mission

dream remains in the heart, but everyday life assumes

for the foreseeable future is to keep militarily pre¬

reality and purpose.

And the Formosa Chinese al¬

pared and strong against possible attack while creat¬

ready have their alternative—the creation of a society

ing a new kind of free democratic Chinese society.

that moves urgently toward the free democratic goals

This conclusion leads directly to the question of mo¬

of the Chinese revolution, a society that would be a

rale—in other words, to the question of the capability

living symbol to every Chinese in the world—in Free

of the Formosa Chinese to undertake and accomplish

Asia or behind the Bamboo Curtain—a society that

such a mission.

would be a living challenge to the revolutionary per¬

of the connection between the Formosa future and

versions of Chinese Communism.

the United States interests.

The Formosa Chi¬

And it leads directly to the question

nese not only have their alternative in their present reform objectives; they have also set a value on that

The Question of Morale

What remains is to expand their reform

Now that the great objective of recapture of the

efforts and give them steadily increasing importance

mainland, which has been employed so emphatically

and emphasis.

The Formosa Chinese must enlarge

and consistently to rally and keep firm the Formosa

their democratic goals and their awareness of the

spirit, has been removed for the foreseeable future,

meaning of these goals for the Chinese future—and

what is to sustain Formosa morale?

alternative.

not only in Formosa terms.

They must develop and

At first glance it would seem, as many Americans

be able to communicate a concrete political and so¬

have assumed,

cial program for a Free China.

would collapse.

No man can now

that the whole Formosa structure This view coincides perfectly with

say when and under what circumstances the Chinese

the prophecy of Chou En-lai, Chinese Communist

people will again have the opportunity to choose a

premier, who boasts that even if Communist armies

government; but Formosa is the place where the Chi¬

do not conquer Formosa it will fall in a few years

28 into Communist hands by default.

Before conceding

in advance a Communist victory that would do ir¬

democratic peoples, a view that the authors of this book reject.

reparable damage to the cause of freedom in Asia

As already pointed out, Formosa has already set its

and equal damage to the prestige and position of the

eye on reform and social progress both for its own

United States in the eyes of all the Asian peoples,

sake and as a symbol of the Chinese democratic revo¬

we had better take a hard realistic look at Formosa

lution.

to see if there is another answer to the question.

role as a revolutionary party committed to the crea¬

The morale of a people is always sustained ulti¬

The Kuomintang has never abandoned its

tion of a free democratic China.

Its efforts at reform

mately by some hope or faith in the future, by the

have been weakened and postponed partially, it is

vision of an ideal goal such as the theoretically final

true, because of lack of vision and courage but also,

form of free democratic society toward which Ameri¬

and very largely, because of the conditions of war

cans look—what has been called the American Dream.

and revolution in which the Kuomintang has oper¬

And the morale of the Chinese on Formosa will con¬

ated almost continuously since 1937.

tinue to be sustained in some degree by their ideal

of social progress on Formosa during a most difficult

objective of return home.

period is evidence of the survival of Kuomintang

Day-to-day, or what we

The very fact

might call “working,” morale, the necessary human

revolutionary ideals.

support for the larger faith, must be sustained by

a secondary aim.

some sense of present and visible accomplishment.

It

standards, and we would not call Chiang Kai-shek’s

is this sense of worthwhile progress, in itself of the

regime truly democratic; but the start has been made.

living present yet having connecting threads to the

There is already at least a base of morale as Formosa

ideal future, that must be the principal basis of For¬

faces the future.

mosa morale now that return home is so uncertain

or not Formosa can be “converted.”

and remote a possibility.

In the simplest concrete

to make good its ultimate mission of keeping alive

terms, the basis of Formosa morale must be visible

for all Chinese—including those on the mainland—

success in creating a free self-respecting society that can take its place in and be respected by the rest of

Reform on Formosa has been It has been slow by American

The test of survival is not whether If Formosa is

the vision of a new democratic China, its policies and its program must look forward, not backward.

For¬

mosa cannot fulfill its mission merely as an orderly

Free Asia. It is no easy or simple process to substitute for the dynamic appeal of a glorious crusade to recapture the homeland the prosaic call to toil for the sake of constructing a stable society in exile.

The danger of

collapse of morale is very real—not only at the time of change but also for the extended period during which energies and, above all, emotions must be re¬ directed and supported until progress in the new di¬ rection is self-sustaining.

It would be unrealistic in

the extreme for the United States to assume that there is no possibility of a collapse followed by a process of degeneration that would result in the loss of For¬

garrison.

It must demonstrate and project effectively

to the world the principles of the Chinese democratic revolution. It is the consensus of thoughtful mature Chinese who judge the Formosa situation from long personal knowledge of the present Kuomintang leaders and from sustained current contacts by correspondence that Formosa has all the requirements for survival but one: the practical day-to-day working techniques, the training and organizing methods, the trade se¬ crets, so to speak, that go to make up what can best be called the democratic know-how. Now this is history repeating itself.

Sun Yat-sen,

mosa to Communism without the firing of a shot.

inspired by western, and especially American, democ¬

But, in view of the existing potentials of Formosa, to

racy, sought western assistance forty years ago in his

accept such a collapse as inevitable is equally un¬

attempt to translate his theoretical knowledge of de¬

realistic.

mocracy into action.

Moreover, it implies that the task of vital¬

At that time, because the West

izing an exile society and successfully supporting its

had no dogma to offer, no set of rules, and was not

efforts toward realization of worthwhile human goals

sufficiently interested to pitch in at the working

is beyond our power as the strongest of the free

level, Sun accepted the Russian Communist offer of

29 assistance.

The present Kuomintang has progressed

destiny is largely in our hands.

-

Whether we like this

beyond Sun’s concept of democracy, but it still lacks

view or not hardly matters.

the encouragement, support, and, above all, the tech¬

to develop a strong free society would have in Asian

nical political knowledge to move successfully for¬

minds widespread repercussions capable of serious

ward to its revolutionary goals.

long-lasting injury to the United States interests.

The challenge this

time is directly to the United States.

The failure of Formosa

And this time

What positive role can Formosa have in Free Asia?

there is no question whether it is in the United States

The immediate possibilities have been suggested in

interest to accept that challenge.

We must accept it.

this and the preceding chapter.

From the very be¬

We have been engaged for some time in a kind of

ginning of the process of successful evolution toward

military partnership with Formosa to ensure the de¬

the status of a free democratic Asian society, Formosa

fense of the island.

What is required now is some

would have a significant role in Asia both as visible

form of political partnership to ensure the successful

evidence of United States purposes and effectiveness

development of Formosa society as a whole—an asso¬

in dealing with Asian problems and as a symbol of

ciation for support and instruction at the working

a Free China to the 12,000,000 Free Chinese in the

level of Formosa’s administrative machinery.

rest of Asia.

This

Such a role would have positive con¬

does not suggest an easy task, but one that will re¬

structive values—intangible, but of critical importance

quire time and patience and that will require a de¬

for their effect on Asian minds.

gree of insight and imagination, and, most important,

It is difficult to look beyond this symbolic role and

a degree of tolerance and human understanding that

define with any exactness the part Formosa might

we have not heretofore applied to the Formosa prob¬

play in other relationships to Free Asia; for this is

lem.

a development that must come along with the later

But such an assignment is well suited to the

best in the American democratic spirit. To return to the question of Formosa morale, a realistic view in terms of the present leads to the blunt fact that the serious issue of Formosa’s survival as an asset to the Free World hangs not merely on the question of the ability of the Free Chinese on Formosa to sustain their morale but also, and in the end decisively, on the willingness of the United States to meet the challenge of its responsibility for the Formosa future. Formosa and Free Asia

It has already been noted that the eyes of Free Asia are on Formosa, and that the Asians are bound to look at the development of Formosa as a demonstra¬ tion of United States policy toward the Asian peo¬ ples.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the

prevalent American picture of Formosa as a problem

stages of Formosa growth.

But certain general pos¬

sibilities can be foreseen now.

Formosa could have

an extremely useful economic role in Free Asia.

The

development of secure conditions for private enter¬ prise on Formosa could draw Chinese capital, from Hong Kong and perhaps elsewhere, that is now un¬ productive or not as productive as it might be.

For¬

mosa agriculture, raw material, and industrial re¬ sources could be made to fit into a regional economic program.

Formosa experience with high-productivity

Asian agriculture could be helpful to other Asian areas in a technical assistance program. It should be noted that the prospect of participa¬ tion by Formosa in common Asian economic enter¬ prises would serve as one solvent to the awkwardness of Formosa’s present relations with certain Asian countries.

isolated from the rest of Asia is dangerously wrong.

The point to be made here is that in its planning

The reality we face is that, no matter what words or

the United States cannot, even if it would, isolate

policy pronouncements of good will we address to the

Formosa from the rest of Asia.

Asians, their judgment of us and the shape of their

now exactly define the future relationships between

responses to us will be powerfully influenced by the

Formosa and Free Asia, we must approach the For¬

effect of our actions on the development of Formosa.

mosa problem with the realization that Formosa’s

We cannot conceal from them the fact that Formosa

future will inevitably involve Formosa’s status in Free

is our charge, nor change their view that Formosa’s

Asia.

Although we cannot

We must shape any American effort to help

30 the successful growth of Formosa society on the island

which we have much at stake.

We can no longer

itself to include the development of Formosa’s role

afford confusion and indecision on such a vital issue. The general nature of the United States interest in

beyond the island in all the rest of Asia.

Formosa is made clear by the alternatives of the For¬ The United States Interest

mosa future, for which we have a unique responsi¬

The advancement of the United States interest in

bility.

The Formosa situation will not remain static.

Formosa and of our interests in Asia has been re¬

The degeneration of Formosa morale and the failure

tarded, if not seriously threatened, because the true

of Formosa to develop an increasingly strong and in¬

nature of our interest in Formosa has been obscured

dependent free democratic Asian society would do a

for Americans by emotion and ignorance.

Our bitter

great injury to the United States interests in all Asia.

preoccupation with the past has blinded too many

The successful evolution of Formosa as a focus for

American eyes to the realities of the present.

The

the spirit of a Free China for 15,000,000 Free Chi¬

explicit purpose of this chapter on a highly contro¬

nese and as a democratic society with a meaningful

versial subject has been to set forth a realistic view

political and economic role in Free Asia will power¬

of Formosa as of the present and to consider the real

fully advance the United States interests in Asia and

nature of the United States interest in Formosa.

create a Free World asset of far-reaching significance

Another and implicit purpose has been to urge on

in the Asian struggle with Communism.

Americans a rational approach to a situation in

no choice but to strive for such an evolution.

We have

CHAPTER

The Vulnerability of Communist China to Its Asian Environment A vigorous American policy, grounded in the prin¬

fore has the strength of tested loyalty and long asso¬

ciples of responsible alliance and economic partner¬

ciation; and the men who rule Communist China

ship, represents the best chance of holding the bal¬

have the strength of confidence born of past success.

ance of power in eastern Eurasia for the Free World

It follows from the unity of the small group who

and ourselves.

Such a policy would justify itself even

share power under Mao’s direction that the chains of

if it promised in no way to mitigate or alter the

command in Communist China are likely to remain

threat represented by Communist China.

under unified control and to follow loyally the lines

But the

Free World can affect the evolution of Communist

of policy laid down from above.

China if it acts with sufficient pace and if it can sus¬

ticular, maintained his close ties with the chief mili¬

tain its purposes for a sufficient period of time.

tary figures of the Communist movement,

The

Mao has, in par¬ all of

Sino-Soviet alliance and Communist China itself are

whom are still active at high levels in the present

vulnerable to a Free World policy that would frus¬

administrative system and share Mao’s revolutionary

trate Peking’s efforts at expansion and expose the

prestige.

falseness of its pretensions as an ideological model for

With the chains of command effectively unified at the top, the people of China are under extremely

underdeveloped areas. This judgment arises from a particular view of

effective control.

Several millions have been killed

or sent to forced labor camps; and no organized in¬

Chinese Communist strengths and weaknesses.

surrectional groups of importance are now known to Chinese Communist Strengths

exist.

China is ruled by Mao Tse-tung and a few men

Communist secret police and armed force

reach down to the villages and to the individual

who hold all the top positions of power in the mili¬

blocks of cities.

tary and civil organizations that govern China. These

trol, Communist China already matches the Soviet

men are a closely unified group; they have been in¬

Union in efficiency and ruthlessness.

timately associated for some twenty-five years.

As for the sheer mechanics of con¬

It

The Communist administrative system can assure

seems probable that high policy is made in small

government control of a very high proportion of

meetings in which Mao’s final power of decision is

China’s total resources.

not questioned.

Mao’s power has not been based

the village level, the existence of increasingly nation¬

thus far on the threat of violence against colleagues

alized industry and trade, and the tight government

or on mutual suspicion and jealousy among his sub¬

control exercised over all private industry and trade

ordinates but on the success of his leadership in in¬

make it possible for the Chinese Communist govern¬

surrection and the prestige that attaches to him.

ment to control something like 30 per cent of the

The

unity of Chinese Communist top leadership there¬

Tax collection techniques at

Chinese national income.

This sum is exceedingly

32 small by western standards—approximately 10 billion

to achieve a stalemate in conflict with the United

United States dollars in 1953, but by previous stand¬

Nations in Korea, its ability to keep the streets clean

ards of Chinese government it is a large sum; and it

and orderly, its ability to stabilize the currency, and

permits the government to bring the country’s re¬ I so on. sources under the direct control of national policy

The Chinese Communists benefited in this respect

for military, administrative, and investment purposes.

from certain aspects of Chinese culture.

Because of its heavy commitments to totalitarian con¬

it is in the Chinese tradition to accept powerful rule

trol at home and to its ambitions abroad, about two-

when it is successful rather than to oppose it.

thirds of the resources mobilized by Peking appear

example, there is no Chinese equivalent of the In¬

to be allocated to administration and military pur¬

dian tradition of passive resistance.

poses, about one-third to productive outlays.

intellectuals there is a special tradition of working

Communist China has greater military strength

In general, For

Among Chinese

with and accepting autocratic rule despite disagree¬

There are at least 4,000,-

ment with, and even despite a substantial amount of

000, excluding the militia, in the well-organized Chi¬

opposition to, the policies followed by the autocratic

nese Communist army.

ruler; and many Chinese intellectuals believed in

than all the rest of Asia.

The military chains of com¬ and, as a result

1949 that the Communists offered the best available

of the Korean War, the ground forces have acquired

possibility of achieving their aspirations for China.

a stock of artillery, tanks, aircraft, and motorized

At lower levels in the population the existence of

transport—and considerable experience in their use.

internal peace in the sense of the absence of civil war

The ground forces are supported by local militia,

and war-lordism added to popular respect for the

which exercise control down to the village level and

regime.

mand are effectively centralized;

number many further millions.

Communist China

As time has passed, popular respect has clearly

has also a considerable number of fighter aircraft and

diminished.

antiaircraft weapons;

and at present the Chinese

the deadly risks of opposition to the Communist

Communist regime is giving high priority to the con¬

rule, an attitude that from the regime’s point of

tinued modernization of its armed forces.

view is almost as satisfactory as positive approval and

The 1950 treaty with the Soviet Union gives the

What remains is a keen awareness of

almost as great an asset.

Chinese Communist regime added military protection

Finally, the Chinese Communist regime has con¬

since any opponent engaged with the Chinese Com¬

siderable assets in Asia, although these have prob¬

munists must reckon with the possibility of war with

ably declined from

the Soviet Union should hostilities be pressed beyond

after the Chinese Communist takeover.

a certain point.

spect the achievement by the Communists of effective

Although Soviet military support

their high point immediately Asians re¬

cannot be automatically invoked by Peking, the alli¬

national control in China.

They respect the vigor

ance with the Soviet Union adds considerably to the

with which the Chinese Communists appear to be

threat posed by Chinese Communist military strength.

going about the tasks of industrialization.

They

The regime still commands some popular respect

think it at least possible that an adaptation of the

for the simple reason that it is strong and successful

Communist type of collectivized agriculture in Asia

in imposing its authority on the whole country.

might quickly solve their problems of low produc¬

Dur¬

ing the first two years of its rule, its performance

tivity and overpopulation.

was impressive in other ways.

The success of the

strengths of the regime is its considerable if some¬

Chinese Communists in seizing power and their effi¬

what declining prestige in Asia as a possible model

ciency contrasted favorably with previous Chinese

for the solution of persistent and widespread Asian

experience of weak and ineffective government.

problems.

Chi¬

In short, one of the

nese (even some Chinese who were otherwise dissi¬

It would be shortsighted indeed not to give careful

dent) felt a certain pride in the strength and unity

consideration to these Chinese Communist strengths.

of the government, its ability to rule in China, its

With apparently complete control over the people

ability to eject at least western foreigners, its ability

and resources of the whole Chinese mainland, with a

33 massive military force mostly of well-organized vet¬

out some resolution of the competition for power be¬

erans, and with the support of the Soviet Union,

tween the different chains of command—civil versus

Communist

military, party versus government, police versus mili¬

China

has

the

potentials of a great

power and is striving mightily to be one.

But there

tary.

This in turn involves the development of bu¬

are great problems still facing the Chinese Commu¬

reaucratic loyalties and points of view as opposed to

nist regime, and grave weaknesses in the workings of

a simple party loyalty and the development within

the system, problems and weaknesses that could have

departments or provincial governments of independ¬

great meaning for the Chinese Communist future.

ent authority which becomes increasingly difficult for the top-level executives to manipulate and control.

Chinese Communist Weaknesses

These inevitable problems of organization have not

The regime has only begun the enormous task of transforming its vast administrative system into a conventional Communist bureaucracy.

This process

yet been solved by the men who are ruling Commu¬ nist China. After five years of Communist rule the people give

requires forms of training that are generally lacking

little genuine support to the regime.

in China; it requires, in place of the specialists in

comments reveal that the peasants resent the forced

agitation and propaganda who make a revolution,

government collection of their grain and the constant

great numbers of efficient technicians and adminis¬

pressure toward collectivization.

trators.

That the problem of efficient administration

ers, exhausted by exhortation and rising work quotas,

is still far from being solved is revealed by the fact

have reacted so unfavorably that, in 1953, the gov¬

that the Communist press and official reports con¬

ernment temporarily let up in its political, social,

tinuously criticize the cadres, the lowest level of ad¬

and economic pressure.

ministrators and active agents, who are indispensable

cadres have been harassed by shifting instructions

in a Communist system.

and by chronic purges.

It is apparent that, although

Communist

The factory work¬

The more than 5,000,000 The people are trapped by

they are undoubtedly anxious to follow instructions

the ruthless Communist control system, it is true; and

and to conform to the regime’s wishes, the cadres

their passive dislike and distrust for the regime are

have such difficulties in carrying out their tasks in

of little importance unless the unified control system

the villages and factories that they are not yet satis¬

is weakened by other factors.

factory instruments of administration.

to recognize the radical change in the political atmos¬

Although this

But it is important

condition does not seriously threaten the stability of

phere.

the regime, it is a source of inefficiency and low

days of 1949, Communist China has moved rapidly

productivity.

toward the dour, suspicious, prison atmosphere of

At the top of the regime there is always in the

Since the relatively enthusiastic and hopeful

Russian and eastern European totalitarianism.

background the fact that the present unity is due

The most formidable internal opponent of the

almost entirely to Mao’s personal power and prestige,

Communist regime, and its greatest weakness, is the

which raises the unspoken question of succession.

Chinese economy.

There is the problem of the division of power be¬

limited in terms of their own power aspirations and

tween such men as Liu Shao-ch’i and Chou En-lai,

in terms of the aspirations they have stirred among

the problem of preparing for the possibility of col¬

the Chinese people by the quality and quantity of

lective leadership when Mao dies or becomes unable

the resources available to them in China.

to carry on.

bilities of China for agricultural and industrial ad¬

The

Chinese

Communists

are

The capa¬

And even more fundamental, because it concerns

vance are real, if modest; and, with 30 per cent of

the entire top leadership and the entire Communist

the gross national product in the hands of the gov¬

control system and is interwoven with the problem

ernment, there is the possibility of a self-sustaining

of maintaining the unity of the regime after Mao, is

process of economic growth.

the problem of the balance of power in the Commu¬

pelled, however, to move rapidly and simultaneously

nist administrative machine.

toward rapid industrialization, agricultural collectivi¬

By the very nature of

Communist totalitarian rule there must be worked

The regime feels im¬

zation, and enlarged military strength.

It has, more-

34 over, stirred hopes in the Chinese people for a prompt rise in their real income.

The goals of rapid

First, the alliance with the Soviet Union, helpful as it is, creates a far from perfect situation for Com¬

industrialization, increased military strength in being,

munist China.

and rising standards of real welfare are almost cer¬

pressures, for Chinese Communist military strength

tainly incompatible goals in contemporary China,

is critically dependent on Soviet supplies of heavy

notably if agricultural collectivization is pursued with

equipment, aircraft, spare parts, and, for the time

vigor, as now seems likely.

being, on certain military technicians.

The gaps between the

The Soviet Union can apply various

This depend¬

real economic capabilities of China, the regime’s am¬

ence almost certainly is a principal reason why the

bitions, and the people’s material aspirations have

Chinese Communist regime feels goaded to develop

set up painful tensions.

independent

Further, the possibilities of

military strength

at

a

period

when

advance in China on any of these fronts, let alone

China’s resources are being strained to the limit.

all of them, will certainly be limited and may be

Moreover, Moscow seems to have set a limit to the

forestalled by a rapid increase in population, in part

amount of machinery it is willing to exchange for

due to the regime’s success in the public health meas¬

Chinese exports—in effect, a limit on the speed of

ures it has undertaken

Communist China’s industrial progress unless the

and in

creating,

after a

fashion, internal peace.

regime can raise more hard cash.

The agricultural situation holds a place of special

Second, Chinese Communist claims to leadership of

importance in China over the next several years. The

the Chinese people are weakened by the existence of

regime must mobilize increasing amounts of agricul¬

Free Chinese on Formosa and in the Overseas Chinese

tural products to feed the growing cities, the armed

communities who refuse to recognize the Communist

forces, the cadres, and those in forced labor; and to

regime and are pledged to destroy it.

increase exports in order to acquire modern military

12,000,000 Overseas Chinese; and the Communists

equipment, machinery, and those industrial raw ma¬

remember that it was this group, much smaller then,

terials in which China is not self-sufficient.

who financed and planned the revolution that over¬

The re¬

There are some

quirements for the cities and exports will surely grow.

threw the Manchu dynasty in 1911.

Meanwhile, the rise of population in the countryside

munist propaganda threats aimed at Formosa clearly

will proceed, increasing the pressure to retain food

betray the weakness in the Communist claims so long

locally.

as a free Formosa exists and show that the Com¬

At just this juncture the regime has introduced measures of forced grain sale and collectivization,

Chinese Com¬

munists realize that Formosa is a potential Chinese rallying place for a new free China.

which the peasants oppose and which in the Soviet

Finally, Communism in Asia is challenged by the

Union and eastern Europe have led to declining or

fact that the Free Asian nations, especially India, are

sluggish agricultural output.

Finally, after good or

seeking to make the transition to independence and

excellent harvests in the years 1950-1953, the rhythm

modern economies by essentially democratic methods

of weather may well run against the regime in the

and with Free World assistance.

next few years.

Although an agricultural crisis can¬

are as yet unwilling to accept Chinese Communist

not be predicted firmly, it is not to be ruled out; and

claims to leadership in solving the historic problems

it would strike at the foundations of Peking’s basic

of Asian weakness and poverty.

policies.

Broadly speaking, it is our conclusion that

are essentially the same in Communist China as in

Peking requires a 10 per cent increase in agricultural

the rest of Asia and the Chinese Communists have

output over 1952 to fulfill its First Five Year Plan;

made their claim to Asian leadership on the basis

and that a 10 per cent decline would yield a major

that they seek the same goals. Communist China can¬

disruptive crisis if it were to persist for several harvest

not isolate herself from Asia as Soviet Russia could

seasons.

isolate herself from Europe. Thus, Communist China

In addition to these weaknesses due to internal con¬

These Asian nations

Since those problems

is caught in the ideological struggle in Asia.

If Free

ditions the Chinese Communist regime has distinct

Asia succeeds in making significant progress toward

liabilities in its relationships with the outside world.

dignified independence and improvements in welfare

35 without using Communist methods, the Chinese Com¬

gression

munist regime’s claims to leadership will have little

power beyond its present limits.

meaning to the other Asian nations.

be

blocked

from

expanding

Communist

The successful geographical frustration of Com¬

When we balance the strengths and weaknesses of

munism in Asia is necessary first of all to provide the

the Chinese Communist regime, it is evident that Com¬

minimum security for the economic and political de¬

munist China, for all its potential strength, is not yet

velopment of Free Asia.

established as a great independent power but instead

able length of time, it would also significantly, if in¬

has only begun the process of becoming one.

directly, affect Communist China.

The

If sustained over a consider¬

Chinese Communist regime, faced with unsolved

The Chinese Communists entered into the Sino-

problems of administration and with increasing pop¬

Soviet alliance at a time when they had confident

ular discontent, must still overcome economic weak¬

hopes of Communist expansion in Asia.

nesses that endanger their whole program of economic

provisions and the possibility of the extension of

growth and industrialization.

Far from being assured

Communist power by joint Sino-Soviet action in Asia

of success, the Chinese Communists face a future that

compensated for the unfavorable aspects of the alli¬

is uncertain in the extreme.

ance, especially Communist China’s dependence on

And, most important

Its military

from the United States and Free World point of view,

the Soviet Union.

it can readily be seen that the future of Communist

military containment would reduce the value of the

China depends not only on what the Communist re¬

military provisions of the alliance in the eyes of many

gime can accomplish inside of China but also on what

Chinese and emphasize those elements in the alliance

happens in the rest of Asia.

least attractive to the Chinese—the border provisions

Returning, then, to United States policy in Asia

A protracted period of effective

and the economic arrangements.

In short, the frus¬

and its meaning in the struggle against Communism,

tration of Communism in Asia would increase the

the significant conclusion to be drawn from a realistic

elements of friction in the Sino-Soviet alliance and

appraisal of Communist China’s strengths and weak¬

deny Peking important power advantages both within

nesses is that a successful United States policy in Asia

and outside the Communist bloc.

can have important, perhaps decisive, influence on

The frustration of Chinese Communist expansion

the development of Communist China—and, therefore,

would be also the frustration of any hope of quickly

on the whole issue of Communism in Asia.

The po¬

adding new channels of trade and new sources of

tential interplay between American policy in Free

food and raw materials so urgently needed to assure

Asia and the forces at work in Communist China can

the success of Chinese Communist plans for economic

be described in broad outline at least.

growth and rapid industrialization.

There would be

no diverting the people’s attention from failures at Military Policy

home by pointing to triumphs abroad, no justifying

The British experience in Malaya, the French fail¬

food shortages and lower standards of living on the

ure in Indo-China, and the problem of the Huks in

ground that victorious armies must be fed.

The Chi¬

the Philippines have demonstrated that the frustra¬

nese Communist regime would be forced to live with

tion of Communism in Asia cannot be achieved by

the realities, the critical weaknesses, of their economy.

Flowever, there will be for

If Communist China had no hope of expansion by

some time the possibility of Communist military ag¬

armed force, the problem of the balance of power

gression for which the new Asian nations are not

between the military and civil chains of command

adequately prepared; and those nations must know

might well become acute, for military frustration

that we are ready and able to assist them.

For we

would raise the question of allocations of manpower

must retain in the Free World all of Free Asia, in¬

and resources to the military, a highly controversial

cluding Laos, Cambodia, and Southern Vietnam.

issue in a strained economy.

military means alone.

The

The present power and

minimum condition for any American policy in Asia

prestige of the Chinese Communist military leaders

worthy of the name is that Communist military ag¬

would be threatened.

36 In general, then, a positive United States military

would inevitably find a way into China; and there are

policy in Asia would both increase the serious prob¬

many ways of accelerating the communication proc¬

lems already faced by the Chinese Communist regime

ess.

and severely test the unity of its leadership, the real

dermine the foundations of Communist power in

source of its power.

Communist China; at the very least, it would seriously

These indirect effects of military

frustration would increase over time even with Mao

The awareness of such an alternative could un¬

weaken that power.

in control; and they would aggravate the complex and unsolved problem of succession if Mao died.

Conclusion

The message of this chapter is that the policies and Political and Economic

Policy

the performance of Communist China are susceptible

A creative United States policy that successfully

to the influence of Free Asia; that the political and

strengthened and speeded up economic and political

ideological threat of Communist China to Free Asia

development in Free Asia would have far-reachin

has its direct counterpart in the threat of Free Asia

effects on Communist China.

to Communist China.

The Chinese Communists have based their right

These assertions cannot be conclusively proved.

to rule China and their claim to political leadership

The realist looking for immediate clearly defined re¬

in Asia on the “correctness” of Communist theory and

sults is likely to be skeptical.

methods.

It is obvious that the success of Free World

policies proposed here were to be defended solely on

guidance and democratic methods in Asia, that is,

their believed effects on the power structure now

the steady progress of Free Asian nations to genuine

operating on the Chinese mainland, the case for them

independence under their own native leadership,

would be weak—or at least extremely difficult to make

would deny the Chinese Communists any hope of

with conviction.

political leadership in Asia; for a strong Free Asia

link.

which

claims

the policies that have been outlined in the foregoing

would destroy the prestige of the Chinese Communist

chapters are required as a minimum to hold the pre¬

regime in Asia.

carious balance of power that still lies with the Free

successfully

challenged

Communist

More than that, Free World success in Asia would

And, indeed, if the

But they do not depend on this

Regardless of their effect on Communist China,

World in Asia.

have effects inside Communist China—on the literate

Nevertheless, the judgment and the faith underly¬

Chinese, including many of the 6,000,000 Chinese

ing the thesis of this chapter are to be taken seriously.

Communists, and, in the longer run, on the Chinese

Communism came to China because the Communists

peasant and industrial worker.

It should be recalled

exploited the failure of modern China, in association

that the success of Chinese Communism in 1949 was

with the West, to realize the revolutionary aspirations

largely due to the fact that there was no alternative

that have been stirred in Asia over the past century.

then to the choice between the weakened and ineffi¬

The policy of the Communist regime in Peking is in¬

cient Kuomintang and the Communists; and that the

tended primarily to consolidate its own absolute

Communists now deny that there is any path to the

power at home and to make possible its expansion

realization of Chinese aspirations except Communism.

abroad rather than to realize those revolutionary as¬

The successful democratic evolution of Free Asia

pirations.

would demonstrate the existence of an alternative—

and if Free Asia succeeds in meeting successfully the

that a lean-to-one-side policy is unnecessary to main¬

challenge of that region’s aspirations, we shall see a

tain the dignity of Asian nations; that the productivity

new phase in the Chinese revolution.

of Asian agriculture can be increased without violence

of Asian history, the Sino-Soviet alliance in its present

and coercion, whereas the results of Communist vio¬

form is the wrong way to meet China’s authentic de¬

lence and coercion are declining food production and

sire for independence and dignity on the world scene;

hunger; that industrial progress and national strength

the Chinese Communist New General Line is the

can be maintained without totalitarian sacrifice of

wrong way to meet China’s authentic desire to mod¬

individual rights.

ernize and to develop its economy.

The fact of such results in Asia

If Peking’s expansionist dream is frustrated

As a matter

A strong and

37 creative Free Asia can both frustrate Peking and dem¬

to determine the fate of Thailand, Malaya, and, per¬

onstrate to the Chinese that a more attractive alterna¬

haps, Burma and Indonesia.

tive exists.

that will decisively succeed or fail in the next decade,

At some future time the profoundly

pragmatic Chinese people will choose their own ver¬ sion of that alternative.

Asia is under an attack

if not the next few years. We are in the midst of a climactic battle.

In the face of the brute reality of Peking’s current

It is

being fought with diplomacy, economic policies, sub¬

unity and strength, this faith in an historical process

version, and guerrilla forces.

may seem an act of optimism relevant only to a very

a place in the battle; but it is a small place now and

long future.

may remain small.

But it must be borne in mind that we

Guns and armies have

Despite its enormous domestic

stand at a highly dramatic moment in Asian history.

problems, Communist China has initiated this battle

The two greatest countries of Asia plan, within the

and it has staked its future on maintaining forward

coming decade, to make their bids for economic mod¬

momentum in Asia.

ernization.

The relative performance of India and

The United States should enter the battle of this

Communist China over the course of their respective

decade in Asia along the whole of its front.

First Five Year Plans may very well determine the

so we should be aware not only that we have a stake

outcome of the ideological struggle in Asia.

in avoiding defeat but also that victory could be de¬

The fate

of Southern Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia is likely

cisive.

In doing

CHAPTER

The Military Problem states of mind.

Politics and Force

This book is mainly a discussion of the political and

The policies of war were one thing,

the policies of peace another; and we did not prac¬

economic policies of the United States in Asia—poli¬

tice both at the same time.

cies that we would hope to pursue by peaceful means.

to be fought through to clean-cut decision by soldiers;

For that very reason, it is of particular importance

and then peace was to be resumed, dominated by

that the military component of our national problem

civilians and civil action.

not be ignored or taken for granted.

of force in relation to peaceful instruments for wield¬

We live in a world in which peace is by no means

ing influence and power.

Wars were special events,

Americans did not think In fact, our national debate

assured, and it cannot be assured by the action of the

on foreign policy since 1945 has tended often to as¬

United States alone.

sume the form of a debate on military versus non¬

On the contrary, the threat of

war is heavy on our minds.

We are opposed by men

to whom war is a legitimate means of extending their power.

So long as this condition exists, any United

military action, as though there could be no connec¬ tion between them. Until recently many Americans assumed that we

States policy in Asia or elsewhere by which we intend

had a clear-cut choice.

Some felt that, since we faced

to protect the security and ideological interests of

an avowed enemy, we should go forth to meet him

our country must take into account the possible use

for a military showdown at the earliest convenient

of force.

moment; or that we should meet the menace of his aggression by building up American armaments and

A vigorous military policy can never be a substitute In fact,

strictly military alliances with friends prepared to

no military policy can succeed without a proper po¬

confront Communist strength with military counter¬

litical and economic foundation.

strength.

for proper political and economic policies.

But under present

Others, sensing that the struggle was being

world conditions political, economic, and military

conducted against us substantially by non-military

action are so closely linked and interdependent that

means, exclusively emphasized the political, economic,

we dare not ignore the fact that our peaceful interests

and ideological nature of the struggle.

in Asia must be supported by a soundly conceived

majority of Americans recognize that both military

and firmly sustained military policy.

and non-military action are required to ensure our

Now the vast

The acceptance of a close link between military

national interests, but the nature of our military

and non-military policy is relatively new to us as

problem and its connection with other forms of United

a nation.

States action abroad are still far from clear in many

It has been our habit to regard war and

peace as two wholly different states of action and

American minds.

38

39 Should the United States Initiate War?

First, it is against our deepest moral and religious

Despite the strains of the past decade, the United

instincts to initiate war; and our national feeling is

States has avoided enlarging even such provocative

so strong that it would be impossible for the com¬

tests of strength as the Berlin Blockade or the Korean

mander-in-chief to act with the requisite secrecy and

War into an ultimate showdown.

initiative without violating some of our most cher¬

It has been con¬

sistently the policy of our government (Democratic

ished political traditions.

and Republican) to look after American interests with

Second, we cannot foresee even the purely military

the minimum use of force compatible with its respon¬

developments of a war initiated by us against the

sibilities. As a government and as a people the United

Soviet Union and Communist China: it might lead

States has rejected the idea of what has come to be

to a quick victory, notably if we did not demand the unconditional surrender of our enemies; but it might

called preventive war. But there is hardly an American citizen who has not at one time or another felt a strong instinctive desire to have it out with our enemies; and there has been a small minority, including some men of un¬ questionable integrity, who have more or less openly advocated that we do so.

Although this is an issue

difficult to discuss with coolness and clarity, it can¬ not be ignored; for our national decision not to ini¬ tiate war has important consequences. What are the arguments for United States initiation of a military showdown with the Soviet Union and

rilla struggle of which the outcome would be uncer¬ tain; it might lead to the effective elimination of com¬ peting centers of power, but the tasks of making such a victory stick for the long run would be enormously difficult. Third, the United States cannot enter a major war without counting on major loss of human life, major material damage, and possibly more profound and long-lasting damage to the fundamentals of our so¬ ciety. Fourth, our more vulnerable allies would not at

Communist China? First, we are confronted by sworn enemies whose steady unswerving objective is to destroy the founda¬ tions of American security in Europe and Asia so that they can deal with an isolated United States in their own good time. Second, starting from our absolute advantage in atomic weapons in

degenerate into a prolonged ground force and guer¬

1945, our military capabilities

relative to those of our enemies have steadily dimin¬ ished; and it is in the very nature of the new weapons that our advantage will grow less and less because our industrial strength will be less and less a guarantee of effective military strength.

first support a major war initiated by the United States; and, depending on the course of such a war, American relations with Eurasia might be perma¬ nently and adversely affected, with the possibility that even if we won a military victory we might lose what is more important to our national interest—the good will and effective cooperation of the people of Europe and Asia. Leaving aside the question of morality, the case against major war initiated by the United States comes to this: the possibility of a quick resolution of our fears, worries, and strains must be set off against incalculable risks.

Third, it is in the nature of the atomic weapon delivery problem that important advantages attach to initiative and surprise. Fourth, if we do not have a military showdown

The Consequences of Rejecting War

As a people we have seen both sides of this argu¬ ment pretty clearly; and we have decided against

while we still have some lead in atomic weapons, we

initiating an anti-Communist war.

shall have to engage in a long-drawn struggle in¬

seen so clearly the full meaning of that decision. Since

volving revolutionary and unfamiliar problems for

war initiated by us is not accepted as national policy,

the United States and requiring complex and awk¬

we are taking upon ourselves the responsibility of

ward alliances—a kind of struggle in which the United

protecting our national interests by other means.

States has not proved its capabilities.

Although our decision may involve less risk and cer¬

What are the arguments against initiating war?

But we have not

tainly conforms better to our national tradition, we

40 are accepting a deadly challenge on ground that is new for us as a nation.

We are not eliminating risk.

We are substituting one set of risks for another.

In

This does not mean that our atomic weapons are unimportant to security or that the degree of our danger is wholly outside our control.

The mainte¬

rejecting war initiated by us we must recognize that

nance of the kind of atomic weapon delivery capability

the propositions underlying the case for it are true.

we now apparently have, including the protection of

We do live in a world with sworn enemies, constrained

that capability against surprise attack, can deny to

from destroying us only by their internal power limi¬

any enemy not bent on suicide his ability to use them

tations set against the strength of all kinds that we

against us.

can mount against them; our strictly military power

But the maintenance of this capability is not a

is relatively diminishing; potentially, we are leaving

static thing.

initiative and surprise in attack in the hands of our

livery, the means of defense are all under constant

enemies, and this could matter greatly.

development and change.

We still must

The weapons, the means of their de¬ Until the very day when

demonstrate that we can build an alternative policy

effective international controls are installed we must

that will protect our society and our geographical

maintain our ability to deliver overwhelming national

base.

disaster on our enemies; and we must minimize their

More than that, the rejection of war initiated by us does not mean that major war cannot come.

ability to damage us and our allies.

This is an end¬

It

less task—not merely of allocating money and produc¬

does not mean that we shall never have to use force

ing gadgets, but also an endless task for creative

short of major war to protect our national interest.

scientists.

It in no sense guarantees peace.

long pull only if we recognize this fact and avoid

Our decision re¬

quires that we combine enormous military prepara¬ tion for various contingencies with a creative and vigorous political and economic policy.

In the course

of action that we have chosen, our enemies are not only the top leadership in Moscow and Peking; com¬ placency, lack of creative imagination, and inadequate understanding and effort here at home are equally dangerous enemies.

technical complacency. Our present position so far as atomic weapons are concerned might be summarized briefly as follows: First, our enemies know that atomic war would threaten Communist rule in Russia and China.

With

will and leadership our free society would re-erect itself after atomic attack.

The new weapons thus

carry a threat to our enemies not duplicated in the

The Strategic Role of Atomic Weapons

The United States is now in the process of reap¬ praising the role of atomic weapons in our security system in the light of their enlarging power of de¬ struction and the enemy’s ability to deliver them against us and our allies.

We can maintain our capability for the

It was clear from the be¬

ginning, in 1945, that atomic weapons would not in¬ definitely guarantee the security of the United States. If we developed such weapons, our potential enemies

United States.

We have this advantage in the test

of will with which we live. Second, our major allies in Europe and Asia, less protected than ourselves, will go to the greatest lengths to avoid atomic war.

It will be nearly impossible

to hold the Free World alliance together if our mili¬ tary policy is to depend solely on the accumulation of atomic weapons and air power for the purpose of massive retaliation.

We were also

Third, we must, therefore, find ways of coping with

aware that atomic weapons carried with them the new

the enemy’s challenge by means short of our ultimate

threat that our enemies could inflict directly upon us

weapons, if our aim is to maintain our coalition and

grievous damage and that future all-out wars would

to stay in Eurasia.

not be fought wholly on the territory of other peoples.

the enemy’s limited aggression in Eurasia can only

Thus we have had to accept the fact that the United

be met with our ultimate weapons and the citizens

States must live in a world of physical danger and

and governments of the Free World in Eurasia are

insecurity, at least until effective disarmament is in¬

openly or covertly blackmailed into accepting limited

stalled on a world basis.

defeat rather than permitting us to use those weapons.

could and would also develop them.

We must avoid situations in which

41 Fourth, in the last analysis, we must be prepared

assumption makes sense only if the United States

to confront the enemy with superior relative delivery

maintains its atomic weapon delivery capability, in¬

capabilities, as a deterrent, and to fight and win a

cluding the ability to maintain it in the face of sud¬

war with the ultimate weapons—if necessary on a bi¬

den secret assault and if Moscow and Peking remain

lateral basis—should his irrational action detonate a

aware that this is true.

war.

With the published evidence it is possible to en¬

From this view, it would be a disaster to the Amer¬

visage substantial military operations, limited in scope,

ican interest if we now prepared ourselves simply for

where atomic weapons could be used without yielding

the ultimate war; step by step this position leads to

mass destruction of cities and civil populations. Troop

our isolation on this continent; that is, it leads to

concentrations, air fields, communications facilities,

the achievement of the enemy’s primary immediate

shipping concentrations might all present targets sus¬

objective.

It would equally be a disaster if we did

ceptible of such limited attack; and it might well be

not maintain the capability to fight such a war to

to the advantage of both sides to maintain the rules

victory, if necessary on a national basis, alone; for

of the game, excluding large-scale strategic atomic at¬

we could then be bluffed to defeat or actually de¬

tack, down to the end of hostilities.

feated.

We must bend our energies to coping with

In accepting this possibility we must not have any

the enemy’s threat by means short of ultimate war,

illusion that such a situation would simply repeat the

holding our coalition together, holding the balance

Second World War experience with poison gas.

of power in Eurasia, while still maintaining a frame¬

use of gas at no time in the Second World War prom¬

work of superiority in delivery capabilities in the ulti¬

ised clean-cut decision or even a major effect on the

mate weapons.

enemy’s position.

A successful counter to our enemy’s atomic weapon

The

Hitler, mad and going down to

defeat in his Berlin shelter, could not pull his enemy

delivery capabilities is, then, the beginning, not the

down with him even by the use of poison gas.

end, of the military security task.

Our enemy noted

perate enemy, on the verge of major defeat in tactical

some years back that we had apparently come to re¬

atomic war, might well think of breaking the rules

gard atomic weapons as our main strength.

of the game.

Just as

A des¬

This possibility underlines the need to

the Russians worked around, blunted, and defeated

think of future war, should it come, not only in terms

Hitler’s main strength—his ability to penetrate Russia

of limited military techniques but also in terms of

with armored divisions—so they and the Chinese Com¬

limited objectives; that is, objectives short of uncon¬

munists are seeking to work around our atomic

ditional surrender.

weapon delivery capability by diplomacy, blackmail,

The fundamental role of alliances in the strategy

subversion, and limited military operations that afford

of American foreign policy, in addition to our national

neither satisfactory atomic weapon targets nor a po¬

stake in avoiding large-scale atomic attack, appears to

litical setting in which we can find it possible to

make the current trend of thought sound; namely,

launch a direct attack upon the centers of Commu¬

that we should envisage the possibility of coping with

nist strength.

a major military test of strength by means that would

This is the awkward form in which

we face the struggle with Communism in Asia.

exclude (at our initiative) the employment of atomic weapons in a general assault on the enemy’s society.

The Use of Force Short of Total Atomic Attack

The evolution of a strategy and tactics to match this

It is evident that the military men of the West are

conception is a challenging task, evidently involving

now turning their minds to the possibilities of de¬

new ideas, new types of military formations, new

fensive warfare short of total atomic counterattack

equipment.

on the enemy’s society.

must press forward; but limited major war is not now

Underlying this trend in

It is a task with which we and our allies

thought is the judgment that it is to the interest of

the form of assault the Free World faces in Asia.

Moscow and Peking, as well as Washington, London,

we could lose Asia to Communism without being

and Paris, to avoid the unlimited use of weapons of

offered the occasion for such a new, but fundamentally

mass destruction.

familiar military trial of strength.

It cannot be said too often that this

And

42 the point where guerrilla and other limited operations

The Soft War

can take effective hold; but we must be prepared to

What we face in Asia—and we face it now—is the

meet them now and in the future.

possibility that new territories will fall to the enemy by a combination of subversion and guerrilla warfare.

The Three Lines of Defense

Such operations do not require masses of troops or They do not demand that Soviet

Our military policy, then, must be a three-part

or Chinese Communist troops cross borders and create,

policy: we must remain prepared to fight and win

politically as well as militarily, targets for major Amer¬

a total war; we must develop new capabilities for lim¬

ican military strength.

In Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia,

ited warfare, embracing the tactical use of atomic

Thailand, and possibly in Indonesia as well, the enemy

weapons; we must develop with our Free World part¬

is now conducting this targetless warfare in which he

ners methods for dealing with subversive and guer¬

is a professional and we are amateurs.

rilla operations.

modern equipment.

Such aggression confronts the Free World and the

v

It is doubtful that we would reject the idea of a

It is clear that

showdown with our enemies and adopt the more diffi¬

we cannot act alone to stem Vietminh activities in

cult and complex method for dealing with our enemies

Southern Vietnam.

We can only be effective if the

if we did not have faith that a successful frustration

Vietnamese themselves and their government are pre¬

of Communist expansion by successfully building and

pared to resist; but, if they are prepared to resist, then

maintaining economic and political health in the

the United States can contribute a significant margin

Free World will eventually lead to changes within the

of help.

Communist bloc that will diminish or end the present

United States with a major challenge.

It should be recalled that Communism has

several times been set back by the Free World in this

acute dangers under which we live.

History affords

kind of muted warfare: in the Philippines, where a

few examples of peaceful transition of societies from

few years back the situation was almost as precarious

totalitarianism (or acute autocracy) to more benevolent

as in South Vietnam; in Burma, where on its own the

and peaceful forms of rule.

newly independent government made an almost magi¬

with Hitler and Mussolini offers little hope.

cal recovery from initial chaos; in Greece, where a

wars were required to end their rule.

substantial civil war had to be fought.

examination of the changes now taking place in Soviet

Our modern experience Bloody

But a close

Success in resisting the combination of subversion

society and of the problems and dilemmas with which

and guerrilla operations depends directly on the po¬

a successful Free World would confront Communist

litical, economic, and social health of the area at¬

China give limited grounds for maintaining faith in

tacked.

the possibility of a non-military resolution to the cur¬

A substantial part of American and Free

World policy must be devoted to eliminating or pre¬

rent struggle.

venting those circumstances under which subversion

the peaceful courses of American political and eco¬

can succeed.

In a sense, the rest of this book concerns

nomic action in Asia we must face the fact that they

substantially what the United States can do to avoid

cannot succeed unless they are conducted within a

such circumstances of weakness in Asia.

But we live

framework of American and Free World military

in a revolutionary world where rapidly changing so¬

capabilities covering the whole range from all-out

cieties may well be weak and vulnerable to the ene¬

atomic warfare to guerrilla and even lesser local sub¬

my’s methods of aggression in certain phases of their

versive operations.

history.

minimizing the use of force, we must be prepared to

It should be a major aim of American policy

to prevent situations in Asia from degenerating to

We must keep our faith, but as we plan

And, within a general policy of

use these capabilities when occasion demands.

CHAPTER —

7

—

An Economic Policy in Free Asia The United States must develop a more vigorous economic policy in Asia.

communications, and such products as raw materials

Without such a policy our

in which other nations have an economic interest.

political and military efforts in Asia will continue to

The scope of commerce, internal and external, widens.

have weak foundations.

And, here and there, manufacturing enterprise ap¬

As emphasized in Chapter 2,

Asia’s economic aspirations are linked closely to the

pears.

highest political and human goals of Asia’s peoples;

But all this activity proceeds on a limited basis

and American economic policy in Asia has, therefore,

within an economy and a society still mainly charac¬

important political as well as economic meaning.

terized by traditional low-productivity methods and

This chapter, however, deals with Asia’s economic

by the old social and cultural values and institutions

problem in narrower technical terms.

that developed in conjunction with them.

During

The Asian economic problem includes four key

this period, which generally lasts some time, the abil¬

elements: the problem of transition to self-sustaining

ity to use additional capital productively is low but

growth, dramatized by India; Japan’s acute problem

the small amounts absorbed are critical to further

of paying its way in international trade; the tempta¬

growth.

tion of trade with the Communist bloc; and the ideo¬

can wither and the economy return to stagnation.

logical challenge of the Communist example.

is also the period when the spreading of new technical

Each deserves separate examination.

This is a dangerous period; for early growth It

developments and technical assistance is most urgently needed; and where there may be occasion for large

The Transition to Self-Sustaining Growth

investment from abroad in railways, roads, docks,

Once societies are stirred from the lethargy of tradi¬

electric power stations, and other overhead capital.

tional economic stagnation, their transition to mature

Roughly, this was the stage in which Great Britain

self-sustained

found herself in 1783, the United States in 1848,

growth

generally

proceeds

in

three

Japan in 1868, Russia in 1890, Indonesia in 1954.

broadly definable stages. First, there is a period of several decades at least

Second, there is a stage of take-off in which many

during which the preconditions for economic progress

old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally

are established.

The idea that economic progress is

overcome.

Under the impact of a particular stimulus,

possible spreads.

Education, for some at least, broad¬

sometimes

technological,

sometimes

political,

the

ens and changes to suit the needs of modern economic

economy lurches forward.

activity.

New types of enterprising men come forward

progress, which have yielded limited bursts of ac¬

willing to mobilize savings and to take risks in pursuit

tivity, expand and come to dominate the society.

of profit.

The rate of effective investment and savings rises

Banks and other institutions for mobilizing

capital appear.

Investment increases in transport,

43

The forces for economic

from, say, 5 per cent of the national income to 10

44 Key new industries expand rapidly,

Others, like Indonesia and perhaps Egypt and Iran,

yielding profits a large proportion of which are re¬

are approaching a point where a sustained effort to

invested in new plant.

make the transition may become feasible within, say,

per cent or more.

New techniques spread in

agriculture as well as industry, as increasing numbers

a decade.

of persons are prepared to accept them and the deep

sition; and Mexico is, perhaps, emerging from it.

changes they bring to ways of life.

A new class of

Argentina and Brazil have, on the whole, passed

businessmen, usually private, sometimes public serv¬

through this transition with success and confront now

ants, emerges and directs the enlarging flow of invest¬

the problems of regular growth itself.

ment.

India and Burma are beginning the tran¬

New possibilities for export and new import

requirements develop.

The economy exploits hitherto

unused natural resources and methods of production.

A Policy of Assisting Take-Off

An American policy designed to assist Asian eco¬

This is the stage when the need for foreign capital

nomic growth can be related to these stages.

is at its peak.

tain Asian countries the purpose of technical assistance

Often all this burgeoning enterprise

attracts substantial private capital from abroad.

In cer¬

In

and loans will be to help create the preconditions for

a decade or two both the basic structure of the econ¬

take-off; in other countries the purpose will be to

omy and the social and political structure of the so¬

accelerate and ease the social and political strains of

ciety are transformed in such a way that a steady rate

the take-off process itself.

of growth can be sustained with a diminishing inflow

assistance policy is to see the underdeveloped countries

of capital.

This was the process through which

of Asia through the take-off process into a stage where

Britain had passed, roughly, by 1815; the United

they are growing regularly out of their own resources.

States by 1873; Japan by 1890; Russia by 1913; and

This does not mean, of course, that we would be

through which Communist China and India seek to

assuming the responsibility for elevating their stand¬

pass in the next decade or so.

This is the complex

transition to a stage where sustained economic growth becomes possible.

Our aim would be to join

in partnership with those countries that are themselves taking measures to accelerate the growth process and

Third comes the long stage of regular if fluctuating progress.

ards of life to our own.

The ultimate goal of an

Some 10-20 per cent of the national in¬

come is steadily invested.

The make-up of the econ¬

omy changes unceasingly as technique improves, new industries accelerate, older industries level off.

The

economy finds its place in the international economy: goods formerly imported are produced at home; new import requirements develop, and new export com¬ modities to match them.

The society alters or adjusts

its old social and cultural values in such ways as to make possible modern and efficient production.

As

rapid growth provides a surplus from which addi¬

are prepared to absorb effectively increased technical assistance and capital from abroad.

Our goal would

be to assist their own efforts to develop forward momentum. The growth problem of each country at each stage will, therefore, differ.

Any program designed to ac¬

celerate growth must be hand-tailored, case by case, with a proper balance between technical assistance and capital investment and with a proper distribu¬ tion of both. At the moment India is the largest of the Asian

tional investment can be made, the need for capital

nations within the Free World and has the most pur¬

from abroad slackens and ultimately ceases entirely,

poseful economic program.

until domestic savings become so abundant that they

take off into self-sustaining growth.

begin to seek profitable employment abroad in areas

Five Year Plan is directed primarily toward agricul¬

even more recently launched on the growth sequence.

ture; and this makes sense as a first stage; but to suc¬

The so-called underdeveloped countries of the con¬

ceed in its take-off, India’s industrial effort must be

temporary world stand at different points in relation

expanded at the same time that the progress already

to these three rough stages.

under way in the rural areas is maintained.

Some, notably in Africa

It is actively trying to India’s First

Further

and the Middle East, have barely begun to develop

United States assistance to India, if granted and ac¬

the

cepted, should be directed mainly to industry.

preconditions

for

the

transition

to

growth.

45 The other Asian nations present problems different from that of India in many respects.

For example,

Japan has the energy, skill, frugality, investment experience, and trading know-how to develop its ex¬

Indonesia must still develop an agricultural policy

port industries and enlarge its foreign trade.

that will meet a food problem that is just around the

in fact moved in these directions in recent years.

corner, given the rise of population.

And, in gen¬

What is in doubt is whether the rate at which it

eral, Indonesian society must reorganize in order to

moves and the pattern of its investments will suffice

exploit that country’s great long-run opportunities

to avoid stagnation or decline in Japanese standards

for growth.

of living or a degenerative dependence on United

Pakistan must create adequate machinery

It has

for planning and administration in order to absorb

States grants.

What is also in doubt is whether the

capital effectively.

Technical assistance in its widest

United States and the rest of the Free World will

sense has a large role to play in Free Asia, and im¬

move at a sufficient rate in their investment and trade

portant changes in domestic attitudes and institutions

policies to provide the Japanese economy with the

must come about in some areas before the transition

Free World markets and sources of supply Japan needs

to self-sustaining growth can be seriously attempted.

for a solution to its problem.

In general, Asia is in an active pretake-off stage,

There are two major links between a solution for

with many possibilities for agricultural, raw material,

Japan and accelerated growth in the rest of Free

and industrial development that have an importance

Asia: first, accelerated Free Asian growth could offer

both for the evolution of each country and for t;he

Japan important new export markets; second, Free

possibility of solving Japan’s long-run problem.

Asia could increase its output of the commodities Japan needs increasingly to import.

The Problem of Japan

Potentialities exist in Free Asia for meeting a part

Japan confronts a basic long-run problem that is made more difficult by its immediate situation.

of Japan’s raw material and foodstuff requirements.

The

The known potentialities must be further developed

Japanese population is rising at the rate of 1.5 per

and new potentialities must be explored (e.g., the

cent each year.

development of Mindanao) in any effective regional

To maintain its living standard,

Japan needs more food and more industrial raw ma¬ terials.

In part, these commodities must come from

abroad.

Japan must, therefore, increase its exports

steadily, and this requires that it modernize and de¬ velop those industries whose products have the best chance of finding a future market. Japan faces this basic problem from a weak posi¬ tion.

Since the end of the war Japan has relied on

large imports from the United States of food and raw materials—notably cotton, wheat, and coal. Japan could not fully pay for these imports by selling in the United States.

Dollars were provided by American

aid and by military expenditures of American forces in the Far East.

As American aid and military expendi¬

tures in Japan have decreased, Japan has been strug¬ gling to find ways of earning dollars by exporting to the United States and seeking to find food and raw materials in countries more willing than the United States to buy Japanese products.

program for Free Asia. In such a regional effort it would have to be estab¬ lished in detail what Asian natural resources are suitable for economic development as Japanese im¬ ports.

Those Asian nations prepared to contribute

to the development of exports to Japan would cer¬ tainly have to receive additional loans for national development purposes.

Finally, the Asian nations

would have to feel assured that their development plans would be accelerated by these arrangements and not distorted; and they would have to feel assured that the increase in their trade with Japan would not carry with it political dependence. In short, the technical assistance and investment efforts in a regional plan for Asia should have three major purposes which would be mutually support¬ ing: the acceleration of growth in the underdeveloped economies, including the growth of demand for in¬

Japan needs, therefore, enlarged markets for its

dustrial equipment; a development of Japan’s capacity

exports, enlarged supplies of imports, and the mod¬

to produce economically and to export competitively

ernization of its export industries.

more industrial equipment; and the development of

46 foodstuff and raw-material surpluses in the region for

strained.

Although a totalitarian regime can allocate

Japanese import.

scarce commodities for export even under starvation conditions at home—as Stalin did for a time in the

The Empty Temptation of Trade with the

early 1930’s—there are likely to be grave difficulties

Communist Bloc

in expanding and maintaining an expanded level of

In the present phase of Communist policy Peking appears to seek an expansion in trade with the Free World.

Chinese agricultural exports unless total Chinese agri¬ cultural output expands.

In part this move may arise from real eco¬

From a strictly business point of view China is not

nomic interests; and it is certainly in part a political

likely to have a significant amount of grain, rice,

tactic to weaken the unity of the Free World and its

cotton, coal, or iron ore to sell Japan.

ties to the United States.

The technical prospects for expanded Japanese

The following may be the economic basis for

trade with the Communist bloc look little better,

Its

even if one were to assume that the total export sur¬

Five Year Plan calls for a substantial increase in im¬

pluses of the Communist bloc were to be made avail¬

ports over 1952 levels; and these imports must be

able to Japan.*

essentially financed by exports since Moscow’s credits

seed, and nuts could total Communist bloc exports

to Peking are limited.

The Communist bloc may

have met total Japanese import requirements in 1953.

have set some kind of upper limit to its willingness

A high proportion of the Communist-bloc coal avail¬

to accept key Chinese export commodities in exchange

able represents Polish exports to western Europe; and,

for industrial equipment.

similarly, the bulk of the timber exports available are

Peking’s interest in trade with the Free World.

There may be, therefore,

Only in coal, soybeans, timber, oil

pressure on Peking to increase its exports to the Free

Soviet shipments to western Europe.

Neither trade

World in order to secure Free World commodities

is likely to be diverted in large amounts to Japan.

or Free World foreign exchange that Moscow may

It is, in fact, out of the question to envisage a total

well be willing to accept in exchange for further ex¬

diversion of Communist-bloc trade to Japan.

ports to China.

On the other hand, the agricultural

if such a diversion occurred, however, Japan’s mas¬

difficulties of the Soviet Union may justify a shift in

sive requirements for cotton, rice, petroleum, wool,

Chinese production to meet Russian requirements;

wheat, and sugar could not be met.

and the economic basis for Sino-Soviet trade may be

trade holds out no significant prospects for Japan,

expanding.

except as a minor palliative.

Even

Communist-bloc

Peking’s Five Year Plan apparently requires an in¬

To Japan, and to the industrialized countries of

crease in imports of about $600 million by 1957 as

the Free World generally, the somewhat vague offers

compared with 1952.

of expanded trade that Peking dangles before them

There appears to be no inten¬

tion to diminish the present volume of trade with the

represent a powerful attraction.

rest of the Communist bloc; but Peking may seek

a serious dollar crisis; and any imports for which

to achieve a part of its trade expansion outside the

Japan can pay with its own exports look highly attrac¬

Soviet bloc.

tive.

The bulk of any increase in Peking’s exports must come from Chinese agriculture.

Increases in coal and

Second,

First, Japan faces

the attractiveness of such trade to

Britain, Germany, and other industrialized countries is only in degree less than it is for Japan.

Although

iron-ore output in China will be largely absorbed by

the western European trade position is now relatively

expanded domestic requirements unless an extraor¬

good, it remains precarious.

dinary investment effort is made to develop a surplus

economies are to grow, their foreign trade must con¬

for export.

tinue to grow.

There are no indications that such an

effort is in process or planned; and there is positive

If the western European

And this increase in foreign trade must be in good

evidence of difficulties in Communist China’s coal

part with areas other than the United States.

supply for domestic purposes.

reduction in American tariffs could help greatly; but

Peking plans to siphon

off an increasing proportion of agricultural output for export, even if the domestic food position is

* These conclusions are based on of George Waldstein.

unpublished

A sharp

calculations

47 the American market cannot offer a total solution

shared between the standard of living and further

to our allies’ requirements for trade expansion.

investment.

A concerted policy of investment and trade develop¬

This Communist advantage must be met

by a policy of loans and grants to Free Asia from the

ment within the Free World is the only technical

industrialized countries of the Free World.

solution open to the Free World over the foreseeable

loans and grants should be on a scale sufficient to

future: trade with the Communist bloc will remain

permit Free Asia to surpass Peking’s economic per¬

a minor matter.

With the underlying confidence such

formance; and this broad effort at Free Asian growth

a policy would impart to the Free World, our friends

must be woven into a solution to Japan’s trade prob¬

might take a fresh look at trade with the Communist

lem.

bloc, freed of its illusory glamor.

These

In this race Free Asia has one major advantage of its own, the significance of which is still to be

The Communist Challenge

Peking is now engaged in a ruthless effort to in¬

measured, but which may prove decisive.

That asset

is the ingrained attitude of the peasant.

Communist

dustrialize China and is apparently mobilizing suffi¬

techniques have demonstrated that men in a modem

cient resources to launch a sustained process of eco¬

factory and in urban life generally can be so con¬

nomic growth.

Its key problem centers on agricul¬

trolled that reasonable levels of output per man can

ture because the cost of its policies may be hunger

be maintained, even with a politically discontented

and starvation on a scale that may lead to major

population.

crisis.

Peking is applying in Asia essentially the

demonstrates that its techniques drag down agricul¬

method applied by Stalin in Russia after 1929—the

tural output by removing or reducing the peasants’

mobilization of a high proportion of the national

incentive to produce.

income in the hands of the state; a concentration on

hinges on so many unobservable acts that even highly

heavy industry at the expense of agriculture; the ex¬

organized collective control systems have not been

ploitation of agriculture to supply resources for in¬

able to make the peasant produce efficiently when he

vestment and other purposes of the state.

did not think it was in his interest to do so.

The whole

The history of modern Communism

Productivity in agriculture

In

effort of Peking is geared to a military modernization

pressing the peasant to increase output against his

program to expand its current lead as the largest

will Communism has been pushing on a string.

military power in Asia and to a political program

In the Soviet Union and eastern Europe the costs

that presents Communist China as the model for the

of Communist methods in agriculture could be borne

solution of Asia’s problems of backwardness.

for a time.

In

Communism was installed in both areas

short, Peking is projecting itself to Asia as the wave

at periods when there were natural food surpluses,

of the future in both a power and an ideological sense.

normally exported; and in addition food consumption

A reasonable degree of relative success in Commu¬

could be reduced without mass starvation.

Moreover,

nist China, as compared with Free Asia, could have

when Communism took over, these areas already had

the greatest political significance for Asia’s future.

enough industrial capacity to expand industry with¬

One obvious objective of United States policy should

out enlarging foreign trade.

In China and in Asia

be to help those Asian areas that are ready to help

conditions are very different.

There are no natural

themselves

growth

food surpluses except in a few special areas; there is

achieved by consent can outstrip Peking’s totalitarian

no substantial food margin above subsistence to be

effort.

The Asians will make this comparison whether

depressed; industrialization depends on an enlarged

or not we in the United States acknowledge it, and

flow of equipment that must come substantially from

whether or not the Free Asians now acknowledge it.

abroad, either through loans or as payment for ex¬

to

demonstrate

that

economic

In this race for economic growth Peking has one

ports.

Communism is taking much greater short-run

major advantage: its control system can force invest¬

risks in Asia than it did in the Soviet Union and east¬

ment at the cost of lowered standards of living and

ern Europe.

In Free Asia

In the longer run, the costs of collectivization for

increases in output must be shared with the people.

agricultural output will assert themselves in the Soviet

in the face of acute popular discontent.

48 Union and eastern Europe, as, indeed, they are be¬

lenge—and here the United States and the rest of the

ginning to do at the present time.

industrialized Free World can help.

In Free Asia it is possible to envisage a rural revo¬

This economic race poses two specific challenges

lution, brought about at the grass roots and by con¬

to Free World policy.

First, it demands that we in¬

sent, in which the peasant is won over to new meth¬

crease the capacity to absorb industrial capital in

ods, in which he shares with agents of national and

Free Asia and that we increase the availability of

regional governments the responsibility for the social,

capital to Free Asia on a sufficient scale to outstrip

political, and technical transformation required, and

Communist China.

in which he shares the fruits of increased output.

Second, it demands that we accelerate the village

The experience of the Indian village development

revolution by democratic means so that the agricul¬

experiments is not yet conclusive, but the results

tural foundations for economic growth will be firm.

are mightily hopeful.

They have produced sufficient

This is the economic challenge with which Peking

effect to make us believe that increased output shared

confronts us.

by the peasant and industrial investment is not an

but it is important not to overlook our assets and

impossible goal.

potentials,

Quite aside from morality, the Free World’s po¬

nesses.

The challenge is real and dangerous;

and

the

enemy’s

problems

and weak¬

It appears to lie well within the capabilities

litical method of consent may prove vastly more effi¬

of the Free World to meet and defeat the challenge

cient in agriculture than are Communist methods. It

represented by China’s industrialization effort if we

may well give Free Asian development plans the agri¬

are prepared to mobilize our energies, technical skill,

cultural underpinnings they require for sustained

and a reasonable margin of capital for the effort.

success and which Communist China now notably lacks.

To drive home this advantage, however, the

effort in Asian agriculture must be pushed at high

What Should We Do about the Asian Economic Problem?

priority and with great tact and skill; and investment

The problems of the underdeveloped countries and

in industry must be supplemented by flows of inter¬

of Japan argue strongly for a vastly expanded, more

national capital.

vigorous and purposeful American economic policy

This conclusion can be roughly illustrated by com¬

in Asia.

It is here that we have the opportunity to

paring the investment magnitudes in the Chinese

act not merely to outrace the Chinese Communist

Communist and Indian Five Year plans.

Peking

challenge but also to provide the foundations for a

plans to invest something like $14 billion in the course

political and human association of Free Asia with

of its First Five Year Plan; the comparable Indian

the Free World.

figure may be of the order of $8 billion.

Since India’s

population is about 60 per cent of China’s, these over-all investment figures are similar on a per head basis.

The principles that should underlie our action are -jd^ar enough.

They might be summarized as follows:

1. We must make available in Asia sufficient addi¬

Peking, however, plans to place perhaps $8

tional technical assistance and capital to help the

billion of its investment in industrial expansion; New

underdeveloped areas of Asia through the stage of

Delhi, concentrating on agriculture, will probably put

transition and into the take-off process as rapidly

less than $2 billion in industry.

as their economic, social, and political capabilities

Given the rates of

population growth in Asia and the long-run basic

permit.

role of agriculture in Asian economic development

2. This pool of capital and technical assistance

as a whole, the Indian initial emphasis is correct.

should be made up not only by the United States

Peking will pay, in one way or another, for its skimp¬

but also by other industrialized countries.

ing on agricultural investment, as well as for the damage it does to peasants’ incentives.

On the other

3. Capital and technical assistance should be made available only where they can be effectively and pro¬

hand, a heightened Indian effort in industry appears

ductively used.

required to meet fully the Chinese Communist chal¬

ment program.

This should be primarily an invest¬

49 4. There should be no tie between economic aid

countries everywhere, is not merely to mobilize capi¬

and military pacts; and no explicit political condi¬

tal but also to develop the ability to absorb capital,

tions within the Free World.

The Free World in¬

and, then, as the economy expands its output, to

terest in accelerated economic growth in Asia is a

plough an increasing proportion of its resources into

sufficient basis for common action.

further productive investment.

At the present stage

5. Although individual programs must be worked

of Asian history, a large proportion of additional

out for each country, there should be a regional plan

capital from abroad might go to India; but, as the

developed, probably through the Colombo Plan Or¬

momentum of the Indian transition increases, Indo¬

ganization, which already embraces Japan.

nesia, having further developed the preconditions for

6. The plan must look to a long future and en¬

take-off, might be ready to absorb large amounts of capital

visage a sustained United States effort. It is inevitable and proper that we ask what the

productively.

The

would certainly change.

distribution

of

effort

There is good reason to

price tag is likely to be for such a program if it is

believe that an annual program on some such scale

to produce the desired result.

No firm figure can

as this—an extra $2 billion per year—could be effec¬

The reason we cannot estimate firmly is

tively absorbed in Asia over, say, a five-year period

this: the program should look ahead some years, and

and that it would have a major accelerating effect on

it depends heavily on the ability of Asian states to

Asian economic growth.

absorb capital efficiently; but that capacity itself is

here the American contribution would be only a

changing rapidly and one purpose of technical assist¬

portion of the total, say, two thirds, the rest coming

ance is to stimulate that change.

mainly from the countries of western Europe.

be given.

Only a rough ap¬

On the principles suggested

By and large, then, the United States should con¬

proximation, therefore, can be made. Assuming what the economists call a marginal

sider enlarging its program of technical assistance

capital-output ratio of 3.5 to 1—that is, assuming 3.5

and loans to Asia, looking ahead at least five years,

additional dollars of capital yield a dollar increase

at a rate of about $1.3 billion per year; and the

of output—and if we set as an arbitrary target a 1

other industrialized areas of the Free World should

per cent per annum increase in real income per

put up about $0.7 billion.

head, a rate of investment of about $2 billion higher than that now current in Free Asia is required.

There are, of course, legitimate queries and objec¬ tions to a commitment of this kind, on this scale. Why cannot private investment do the job?

Rest of Asia South Central (Burma, Indo-China, Indo¬ Asia (India, Ceylon, nesia, Malaya, South Pakistan) Korea, Japan) Population (in millions) Per cent population increase Income (in billions of dollars) Net investment (in billions of dollars) Gross investment (in billions of dollars) Additional capital required (in billions of dollars for 1% per annum increase in real income per head)

There

are, basically, two reasons why private investment cannot now do the job that is required in Asia.

First,

it is of the nature of Asia’s transitional economic status (as well as its somewhat precarious political and

440 1.3

250 1.7

military position) that responsible private investors are reluctant to commit their resources in that area.

On

the whole, the scale of private investment is increas¬ 27 1.4 1.96

30

ing in Asia; but we cannot now expect a rapid

2

enough increase to do the job required in the Free

2.8

World’s interest.

If the United States and the coun¬

tries of western Europe should undertake a program of the kind proposed here, private investors would gain confidence as time went on; and, over a five- or ten-year period, we might hope and even expect that

1

1

The table above gives a rough order of magnitude

an increasing proportion of external assistance would take the form of private investment in Asia as is

for the region as a whole, but no more than that.

already true in Latin America.

But it is too soon to

The key problem of Asia, and of underdeveloped

lean heavily on private investment in Asia now.

50 Second, many essential projects are of a character

not large.

that yield a very large return in terms of economic

envisages only a 1 per cent increase in output per

growth, but the yield is difficult or impossible to

head as the basis for Free World investment in Asia.

pass along to the private investor.

Is such an increase worth striving for?

For example, a

The rough calculation presented here

The answer

major hydroelectric power station or a new railway

here is, emphatically, yes.

line or an enlarged harbor may have profound ef¬

ples of Asia is whether progress is being made,

fects on the economic growth of a whole region; but

whether it is likely that their children will live better

such investments are often unattractive to the private

and have wider opportunities than they could enjoy.

investor because he must wait long for his return

They do not demand that they have American or

and because the large indirect effects on growth do

western European standards of living immediately;

not return fully to the investor as income.

In Asia,

and, as they develop, the Asian countries may develop

as indeed in the United States and western Europe,

their own kinds of modern societies, quite different

a large part of such overhead investment must be

in ways of life from those of the West.

undertaken by governments or with governmental aid

stagnation frustrates men and makes them desperate,

if it is to be undertaken at all.

once their hopes and ambitions have been aroused.

Can we do anything useful in Asia, given the Asian

What matters to the peo¬

Economic

Limited but real progress encourages these hopes and

population problem? It is clear that the rapid growth

ambitions and fosters further constructive effort.

in population makes difficult a rapid increase in hu¬

idea is more fundamental both to economic growth

man welfare in Asia.

It is clear that a good propor¬

and to democratic development than this: that men,

tion of Asian investment must go into an effort to

of their own individual initiative, have it in their

increase the food supply for a growing population.

power to alter their environment for the better.

With a 1.5 per cent per year increase in population,

steady 1 per cent increase in output per head in Asia,

something like 5 per cent of the national income

at the present difficult stage of growth, is almost cer¬

must be invested merely to prevent a deterioration

tainly enough to confirm that basic faith.

in living standards; and such population increases are normal at this stage of Asian history.

But the

No

A

Is there any guarantee that the Free Asian nations will emerge from rapid economic growth politically

situation is by no means hopeless, quite aside from

democratic?

evidence, in India and elsewhere, that birth rates

relation between economic growth and political de¬

may be beginning to decline.

mocracy is not simple and automatic.

There is an immense

No such guarantee can be made.

The

More than

gap between agricultural productivity as it is in most

that, the decisive take-off process involves complex

of Asia and what it might become.

For example,

and often unsettling effects on societies, which must

rice and wheat yields per acre in India are about

transform their institutions and ways of doing things.

one third what they are in Japan, where chemical

But we must be clear about two fundamental facts.

fertilizers, irrigation, and double-cropping have been

First, the drive for economic development in Asia is

pretty fully applied.

already under way.

This gap gives the Free World

We can help determine how

the potentiality of coping with the problem of food

well or badly it goes and what the cost in human

supply for some decades.

The gap gives us the time

suffering is likely to be and whether or not Asians

to set in motion an industrialization process and

do the job in association with the rest of the Free

more direct social policies which are likely to cut

World.

down the rate of population increase.

tions will occur, but at what rate and how.

We cannot

The choice is not whether these transforma¬ Second,

ignore the seriousness of the Asian population prob¬

the process of deciding between Democracy and Com¬

lem; but there is no reason for despair.

munism as a political basis for economic growth is

Does a 1 per cent increase in output per head matter?

It is easy to become discouraged in looking

already under way in the minds of Asians.

The Chi¬

nese example is before them and is being watched

at Asia’s economic problem from an American point

with attention, even with fascination.

of view.

sure of the outcome even if we strongly help.

The increases in standards of living that

can be contemplated for the next decade or so are

We cannot be We

can be reasonably and pessimistically sure of the out-

51 come if we do not help.

In the sphere of Asian eco¬

nomic policy the risks of inaction

appear vastly

greater than those of action. What about India?

gifts; and even productive investment requires that we forego other things in the short run.

A commit¬

ment by the United States to invest something like

Nehru often appears at cross

an additional $6.5 billion in Asia over a five-year

purposes with American foreign policy and sometimes

period is serious and not casually to be proposed.

positively anti-American in his statements.

A serious

Nevertheless, given the scale and normal rate of

Asian economic development program must at this

growth of the American economy and the margin of

stage throw great weight behind the Indian effort.

unused capacity it now contains, it is evident that we

Does this make sense?

can assume this responsibility without risking either

Should we not support only Here we

our national standard of living or our ability to exe¬

must clear our minds as to what the American in¬

cute other tasks necessary for our national security.

terest is.

Our current national output is running at the rate of

our friends, like Pakistan and Thailand?

Does it matter to the United States whether

the Indian domestic effort succeeds or fails?

It is the

about $355 billion per year.

Normally our national

burden of a good portion of this analysis that it

output increases each year by $14 billion, owing to

matters greatly to us.

increases in population and in productivity.

If the Indian domestic effort

More¬

fails, it is altogether likely that India will choose

over, we now have a margin of about $30 billion in

totalitarian methods to carry on its economic devel¬

unused capacity, unemployed ability to produce. The

opment effort.

More than that, if India, the greatest

expenditure of an extra $1.3 billion a year for 5 years

country of Free Asia, fails, that failure will pro¬

is clearly not a threatening, let alone a crippling,

foundly discourage the rest of Free Asia.

extra burden for the United States to assume.

India and

It

Asia could be won to Communism without a Chinese

would add, in fact, less than 5 per cent to our present

Communist soldier crossing Chinese borders.

security outlays of all kinds.

This is

the negative case for United States support of India.

The issue at stake here is, then, whether an Asian

Despite the cross

economic development program is required in the

purposes between the United States and India, India

national interest and whether we have the will to

is now deeply committed to protecting its national

undertake it.

independence and to resisting Communism at home

States can afford such a program without incurring

as well as abroad.

significant cost to our national life and welfare.

There is a positive case as well.

Nehru does take a view of how

There is no doubt that the United

to cope with the Chinese Communists somewhat dif¬ ferent from that of the United States government.

Conclusion

Because of India’s history, geography, and concentra¬

Major steps in history are usually taken because a

tion of domestic tasks, it is altogether natural that

number of different considerations argue for the same

the problem of Communism in Asia should look

course of action.

somewhat different in New Delhi.

tained investment program in Free Asia, supported

Differences of this

sort are normal in any system of alliance.

The real

The case for an enlarged and sus¬

by the United States and the other industrialized na¬

question is not whether Nehru agrees with the De¬

tions, has this characteristic.

partment of State or even whether Nehru “likes” us.

lenge flung out from Peking argues for it; the nature

The question is whether there is a sufficient real

of Free Asian aspirations combined with the long-run

overlap of Indian and American interest to justify a

importance of India, Burma, and Indonesia argue for

major economic partnership.

There is every reason

it; the problems confronted by Japan argue for it;

to believe that such an authentic overlap of interest

and the possibility of stalemate in major military

exists. Can we afford an Asian economic development pro¬

weapons between the Communist bloc and the Free

gram?

potential Free World asset.

What is proposed here is not a program of

gifts but primarily a program of productive invest¬

The ideological chal¬

World argues for bringing into play this enormous Without attaching false magic to the estimates

Nevertheless, technical assistance and some

made in this chapter, it seems clear that a program

grants to Asian countries could take the form of

on something like the scale indicated is required to

ment.

52 shift the balance of advantage in Free Asia decisively

industrialization is already launched.

in our favor.

Moscow have set the time span of the race.

It seems clear that over a five-year

Peking and It be¬

period the proposed additional investment sums can

hooves the Free World and especially the United

be efficiently absorbed by Free Asian societies.

Fi¬

States to decide promptly whether it is to observe or

nally, this is an issue of the greatest urgency: the

participate in this struggle on which so much of our

Communist bid to win Asia by demonstrating rapid

destiny hinges.

CHAPTER

8

-

-

United Nations Membership for Communist China? United States Recognition? The Issues Involved

Communist China out of the United Nations we

The issue of United Nations membership for Com¬ munist China and the related but separate issue of United States recognition have caused a good deal of trouble in the past six years.

American politicians

would be effectively frustrating Chinese Communist expansionist purposes. From the point of view of Moscow, the absence of Peking from the United Nations offers two advan¬

have treated the possibility of membership and rec¬

tages.

ognition as virtually unmentionable.

Some of our

national champion and to maintain a higher degree

allies, having recognized the Communist regime in

of Peking’s diplomatic dependence on Moscow than

Peking, have regarded the American position as irra¬

would otherwise exist.

tional at best and possibly sinister; that is, they have

sibly the ardent sponsor of United Nations member¬

wondered whether our non-recognition policy was

ship for Peking has in fact done little or nothing to

the prelude to a military assault on the mainland in

alter the existing situation except to make proposals

association with Chiang Kai-shek.

calculated to make Peking’s entrance into the United

The lack of Free World unity on Communist China

It permits Moscow to pose as Peking’s inter¬

Thus, Moscow, while osten¬

Nations more difficult.

and on the future status and role of Formosa has

We can assume that Peking seeks a place in that

given Moscow and Peking a handy issue which they

international forum for two reasons: to enhance its

have systematically exploited with vigor and with

prestige at home and in Asia and to diminish the

some success.

They have portrayed the problem

degree of its diplomatic dependence upon Moscow.

posed for the Free World by Communist China as

Peking also desires the elimination of Formosa from

simply a matter of accepting an accomplished fact.

the United Nations, an act that would strengthen its

They have used the issue of United Nations recogni¬

political hand at home and abroad and undermine

tion in an attempt to split the United States from the

the potential role of Formosa as a rallying point for

rest of the Free World; and they have succeeded in

the Free Chinese.

diverting attention and energy from the fundamental

.J

From the perspective of our Free World allies the

Many of our

failure to bring Communist China into the United

friends in the Free World have been jockeyed into a

Nations after they had recognized Peking has been

position where they have come almost to believe that

an inconsistency difficult to justify to their own peo¬

if only the United States would permit the entrance of

ple and in diplomatic debate.

Communist China into the United Nations all would

perspective the United Nations issue has also been a

be well in Asia.

Many in the United States have

difficult domestic and diplomatic issue that has posed

come almost to believe that if only we could keep

sharply the question of our commitments to Formosa.

tasks of a Free World policy in Asia.

From the American

54 This brief outline of the principal issues involved

At least three conditions should attach to Commu¬

in the membership problem underlines the fact that

nist China’s entrance into the United Nations quite

they are virtually all minor issues of political or psy¬

aside from the return of our prisoners and the pacifi¬

chological warfare in the narrow sense except the

cation of Korea, Indo-China, and the Formosa Strait.

question of Formosa.

Peking’s entrance into the q First, Communist China should not have a perma¬

United Nations if accompanied by Formosa’s removal

nent seat on the Security Council.

would have a disastrous effect on Formosa morale.

seat on the Security Council now held by Nationalist

The pressure and emphasis given this issue by the

The permanent

China should pass to an authentically independent

Communist bloc and the Free World’s politicians

Asian power, perhaps to India.

Communist China

have had, however, a distinctive result: if member¬

has proclaimed itself a lean-to-one-side power, inti¬

ship came now as the result of pressure, and despite

mately tied to Moscow.

United States opposition, Peking could portray the

to status apart from its role in the Communist bloc.

event to the Chinese people and to the peoples of

Even if that role is not one of pure subservience to

Asia as a Chinese Communist diplomatic victory and

Moscow, the Security Council seat should pass from

an American defeat.

Nationalist China to an independent Asian state.

It does not seriously pretend

When the military situation is stabilized, when the

Second, Communist China’s entrance into the United

United States has set in motion on Formosa and in

Nations should be accompanied by that of Japan and

the rest of Asia positive policies designed to meet

perhaps by the entrance of other states now outside

and ultimately to defeat the political and ideological

the world organization.

challenge of Chinese Communism, then we can deal

Nations Charter in the course of 1955 may be the

with the recognition and membership issues from a

proper occasion to recognize that the weaknesses of

position of strength.

Under present conditions the

the United Nations caused by the split among the

voting of United Nations membership for Peking

world’s powers should be compensated for at least

would be an act of appeasement by the Free World.

partially by more nearly total world participation.

It would be correctly taken by the peoples of Asia as

Third, Formosa should retain a seat in the United

a sign of the Free World’s weakness and lack of co¬

Nations Assembly.

hesion and purpose.

The review of the United

Whether or not Peking would accept such terms

With Asia at peace, with a clear and positive Free

for entrance into the United Nations, it may be well

World policy launched, there would be a reasonable

for the Free World to agree on some such terms and

case for United Nations membership for Peking: for

make them known.

United Nations membership does not imply approval,

nition issue has been costly to the United States, not

and it need not interfere with a constructive political

because Peking’s presence in New York would be

role for Formosa.

One essential purpose of the

helpful, but because this issue has divided the Free

United Nations is that its membership be inclusive.

World and inhibited other more important lines of

It is a forum for the settlement of disputes short of

common action in Asia.

For the United Nations recog¬

war, and the one place where the Free World and the Communist bloc confront each other in non¬ military politics.

These central functions limit the

possible scope of United Nations action.

United States

Recognition of Communist China?

If the Chinese Communists should enter the United

But the

Nations, they would have a diplomatic headquarters

existence and power of Communist China are un¬

in New York; and we would meet and deal with

questioned; and the presence of Communist China’s

them around the various United Nations conference

representatives in the United Nations might assist in

tables. In one sense we would be recognizing the Chi¬

unifying the Free World coalition, since that action

nese Communist government.

would permit its members to take the measure of

then, as to whether or not we should then exchange

Peking’s policies and purposes without the confusion

ambassadors and enter into general recognition of

caused by the membership conflict.

Peking.

The question arises,

55 There would be little reason to withhold recogni¬ tion if the Chinese Communists were to accept For¬ mosa’s independent status in the Free World.

any American shift in policy are obviously serious matters.

Such

But the entrance of Peking into the United Na¬

action by Peking seems somewhat unlikely, however,

tions is a limited political movement, the importance

even if a truce is established in the Formosa Strait.

of which can easily be overestimated.

The Chinese Communists are unlikely to take any

at a time of Free World weakness—or actual military

step that would formally alter their claim to control

or diplomatic defeat—it would indeed symbolize Com¬

of Formosa; and, even if the Nationalist government

munist China as Asia’s wave of the future.

on Formosa is prepared to limit its operations across

be brought about under the circumstances envisaged

the Formosa Strait, it is unlikely to forego its claim

here, its adverse consequences can be minimized, and

to legitimacy on the mainland.

an important divisive issue removed from Free World

Under such circum¬

stances the United States might well find it desirable to postpone recognition although acceding to United Nations membership.

If it occurred

If it can

politics. It cannot be too strongly emphasized, however, that the entrance of Peking into the United Nations is unlikely to bring with it any results favorable to the

Implications for United States Action

The definition of our formal relations with Peking,

Free World; and the removal of this divisive Free World issue does not constitute a Free World policy

Communist China’s role in the United Nations, if

in Asia.

At the most, it may clear the ground for

any, and the consequences for the fate of Formosa of

the creation of such a policy.

CHAPTER

The Free World Alliance The proposals outlined in this book have been set

Geneva; where we have stood thus far on the ques¬

down in the belief that they would prove acceptable

tion of recognition of Communist China and on the

to our major Free World allies and that, put effec¬

question of Formosa.

tively into operation, they would strengthen the Free

would limit strictly the areas of common action and

World alliance in both Asia and Europe.

resolution of differences.

This form of compromise

This judgment proceeds from a general concept of

The danger here is evident: when one Free World

how and why the Free World alliance works or fails

position is put to the test, as in Indo-China, and

to work.

Each member of the Free World alliance

Free World common action fails, then a wave of

has a distinctive set of national interests and priori¬

what might be called isolationist sentiment is set in

ties; each has a somewhat different outlook on the

motion, with mutual recrimination and a weakening

major regions of the world and the problems they

in the Free World’s bonds.

pose for action.

confronted in mid-1954.

The American view of Formosa dif¬

fers from that of India and of Great Britain.

The

This is the situation we

On the other hand, we can negotiate common ac¬

French perspective on Indo-China differs from that

tion around the major Free World problems.

of the United States; and our view differs from that

inevitably means that the perspectives of various na¬

of Britain.

tions on the problem must be reconciled and what

The economic development problem in

Southeast Asia looks somewhat different in Delhi, Tokyo, and Washington.

New

The image of Com¬

This

might be called the “isolationist” view must be aban¬ doned.

This form of compromise was accomplished,

munist China is certainly not identical in Washing¬

for example, in the early stages of the war in Korea.

ton, London, and New Delhi; and so on.

It was accomplished in the Marshall Plan in Europe

An effectively united Free World policy requires compromise.

But this is an inadequate and perhaps

even misleading way of putting the matter. kind of compromise?

and in the Schuman Plan.

It was accomplished in

the organization of NATO.

It failed in Indo-China;

What

and it has not been attempted generally with respect

At the extremes there are two

to the problems posed by the Chinese Communist

possible forms of compromise within the Free World.

threat in Asia.

At one extreme we can agree to disagree and let each

Success in this form of compromise requires the

member of the Free World deal, more or less on its

making of a policy that includes certain elements

own, with those Free World problems that fall within

from the perspectives of all the Free World nations;

its historical range of national authority and respon¬

and it usually requires the abandonment of certain

sibility.

elements from each.

This is, for example, more or less where

we stood on the Indo-China question down through

The criterion for such an ac¬

ceptance or abandonment in the making of a com-

mon policy must be the common interest of the alli¬ ance.

3. The persistence of a residual Chinese sentiment

The meaning of this obvious criterion can

among the Overseas Chinese should be recognized as

only be established concretely; and the following dis¬

a fact; and constructive relations between the Over¬

cussion attempts to specify the manner in which the

seas Chinese and a developed Formosa should be

lines of action presented in this book would require

encouraged in forms that do not interfere with the

the acceptance and abandonment of certain positions

role of Overseas Chinese as citizens of local commu¬

held by individual members of the Free World alli¬

nities in Southeast Asia (notably Malaya).

ance for the sake of advancing their common interest.

4. The limitations and dangers of trade with Com¬

The method of the following analysis is to examine

munist China should be frankly recognized, and the

the meaning of the key suggested lines of action for

primary effort to solve the trade problem of the in¬

three Free World centers: London, New Delhi, and

dustrialized nations of the Free World should be

Washington.

made within the Free World by developing markets

If Britain and India (as well as the

United States) could be reconciled along the lines suggested here, it is likely that the Free World could be carried.

and sources of supply in underdeveloped areas. 5. Clear conditions and limitations on Peking’s en¬ trance into the United Nations should be agreed. There is every probability that London would

London

accept these shifts in position if the United States

The following elements in the proposed lines of

were to commit itself firmly to the actions outlined

action would meet present British positions and atti¬

in the preceding chapters of this book—to a sustained

tudes:

economic policy in Asia, to using its leverage to urge

1. The Free World should not on its own initia¬

forward the constructive political and social evolu¬

tive launch military operations against Communist

tion of Formosa, to clarifying its stance in Asia gen¬

China.

erally in terms of long-range United States interests.

2. Increased assistance should be given the eco¬ nomic

development

programs

of Southeast Asian

countries. 3. The Free World should take common action to

New Delhi

On the whole what holds true of London may be said of New Delhi as well.

The Indian view differs

prevent the Japanese effort to solve its trade problem

from the British in this context mainly in its more

from upsetting the precarious British trade equilib¬

parochial character.

rium.

outlook than Britain—although a growing sense of

4. Formosa, as presently constituted, is not an ef¬

India is more “isolationist” in

Peking’s external ambitions may be altering New

fective and constructive political force in the Free

Delhi’s complacence.

World alliance.

creased United States assistance in its development

5. United Nations membership, in some form, at some stage, for Peking should not be ruled out.

India will be moved by in¬

program if it is sustained and if it is without political or military strings.

Beyond that, it wants essentially

The following elements in the proposed lines of

an environment in which regional security is looked

action would require alteration in London’s perspec¬

after by someone else and general war is avoided.

tive:

Formosa and even Japan seem far away in New

1. The Free World should recognize frankly the

Delhi.

aggressive intent of Peking and not place its hopes

Indian gestures toward Communist China have

in wooing Peking from Moscow by concessions at

been part of a policy of general pacification—to the

the present time.

extent that they have been serious diplomacy.

Put

2. The Free World should develop Formosa as an

another way, New Delhi is not likely to interfere or

important and constructive political element in Free

disagree in more than a perfunctory way with the

Asia.

kind of program and function for Formosa that is

58 suggested in this book if it is felt that the United

has seriously weakened the bonds that hold the Free

States does not intend to launch on its own a major

World coalition together.

war against Communist China, and if it comes to

This book has emphasized the conviction

that

believe that the United States is prepared to launch

major United States foreign policies must be geared

and sustain a serious policy of partnership for eco¬

to the interests of the coalition we lead and that

nomic growth in Southeast Asia.

they should be implemented in the main by coali¬

Given the serious¬

ness of the Indian growth problem in the competi¬

tion action.

It does not follow, however, that the

tive context of Communist China, and given our stake

United States should hesitate to act unilaterally on

in Indian success, we should be prepared to accept

certain occasions.

a mood of Indian parochialism and in a sense even

of leadership is to take the first step in the dark.

Indian irresponsibility on certain general Free World

There have been and will be occasions when agree¬

issues if, in fact, India throws its energies whole¬

ment within the coalition will be impossible to ob¬

heartedly into its own development program.

tain unless and until the first decisive step is taken

An important part of the function

unilaterally by the United States. Washington

There have been

and will be occasions when we cannot persuade our

The proposals made in this book require that the

allies to sustain jointly the actions undertaken by us in the common interest.

United States:

The United States should

1. Increase its degree of concern with the political

be prepared to initiate actions unilaterally and even,

and social problems and the aspirations of the coun¬

if necessary, to sustain them unilaterally under the

tries of Southeast Asia.

following condition: that we are deeply convinced

2. Increase the priority it would accord and the

that such actions are in our own interest, when that

resources it would make available for Asian economic

interest is conceived at its highest level, embracing

development.

as it then does the long-run interests of the Free

3. Treat

the Japanese

trade

problem

and

the

growth problems of various Asian nations on

a

In short, the strategy

of a sound coalition policy does not always require coalition tactics; and coalition tactics should not be

united regional basis. 4. Acknowledge unavoidable responsibility for mov¬ ing Formosa in directions that would make it a con¬ structive element in the Free World coalition. 5. Place its Asian policy, in general, on a long¬ term basis, clarifying in the process the nature of abiding United States interests and objectives in Asia. The underlying American appraisal of Peking’s hostile intentions and the United States intent to sustain Formosa within the Free World have been sound.

World coalition as a whole.

United States resistance thus far to Peking’s

membership in the United Nations and United States denial of recognition have been sound.

made a fetish. But by and large the most important conclusion of this book is that American interests, properly de¬ fined, do in fact overlap with those of our major allies or potential allies.

If the United States meas¬

ures up to the challenges it confronts and acts with the mixture of idealism and energy that lies at the core of its heritage, our abiding interests in Asia can be protected. Do we have the will to do this job?

Here each

man must speak from his own sense of the nation and from private faith.

There is nothing in our his¬

United States

tory out of the long or recent past to suggest that,

technical assistance in Southeast Asia and economic

when the facts are laid before the American people

aid to Japan have been sound.

and vigorous leadership offered, we shall fail to re¬

But these particular

lines of action must be supplemented and more

spond.

broadly developed if they are to constitute an Asian

lief that, once the trend of events in Asia is made

policy around which the whole Free World can rally.

clear, it is not in the American temperament to ac¬

The underlying interests and objectives that inform

cept the slow, only momentarily comfortable defeat

our Asian policy must be clarified and effectively

the enemy plans for us.

projected.

symbol to the world of national independence and

The ambiguity concerning our purposes

This book was written in the profound be¬

Our country was born as a

59 freedom ordered by individual consent.

Americans

It will not be hastened by attempts at short cuts or

are not yet ready to retire from a field where inde¬

by partisan slogans.

pendence and freedom are the issues of combat.

maintaining a solid creative effort, military, political,

Victory will not come without sustained effort. will

not

arise

from

complacency,

brooding over past errors.

peevishness,

It requires a united America

It

and economic, for decades if necessary—although the

or

urgent character of the struggle in Asia may yield

It will not come cheaply.

a decision sooner than we now can know.

•

*

)

Date Due Auu 12 1961

„

itiU* M6 W

5 61 *7?

l fefi 12 73j

MIT LIBRARIES

DUPL

3 9080 01750 0791

Rostov, W.W• & Hatch, .U. American policy in Asia

;Elb3.y *A?7 .R839

1955

SIGN THIS CARD and leave it at the CIRCULATION DESK

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY LIBRARIES

DEWEY LIBRARY

* I

?v'

■ ^3?'

I

S5-—r -. .£ - ^' ■ j^rj IT.- r*#. *si=M

“^^aSSssi^

-. —r-'S, ,“* *- •* ? * »

' —'

-•

•'•- ’ ffjPjjfcf »■ »1

—L-T‘ JjwS*1

- aa^ .... !

“~~il *~»|I i’ |«

■pt__r--_ 1

TS*»P

-In

m .

i KSSaapMSs:

r -. tfttfi&SSS SMh —

WP

I___Pg_

. -

Ja*1* -

~~;.7f:-. -^~~-

•a*:-

*•*= .".rwi —

"