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America’s Splendid Little Wars: A Short History of U.S. Military Engagements, 1975–2000 [Hardcover ed.]
 0670032328, 9780670032327

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"A must for

all

Americans."

—TOM

CLANCY

AMERICA'S

SPLENDID LITTLE AVARS A Short History of U.S. Military

Engagements: 1975-2000

PETER HUCHTHAUSEN Author of K-19: The

Widowmaker and October Fu

— $25.95 DA $39.00

Ince the evacuation of Saigon

s

America has committed more than

America's Splendid States

a

in

1975,

forces to

its

dozen military operations.

Little

Wars shows how

the United

— now the world's sole remaining superpower

has enforced the global "Pax Americana" by honing the military's capability to strike

desired targets, and also

by making sophisticated use of the media and public sentiment.

From the 1975 operation

hijacked merchant ship

Siam

to the

1

999

to recover the

SS Mayaguez

"relief intervention" in

in

the Gulf of

Kosovo,

distin-

guished author and former U.S. naval captain Peter

Huchthausen presents an intimate tary

history of

each

engagement through eyewitness accounts,

ough research, and

his

mili-

thor-

unique insider perspective as

an intelligence expert.

Huchthausen's fresh analysis of the

cue attempt, the invasions

of

the Gulf War, and the missions

Iran

in

Somalia and Bosnia

demonstrates the evolution of

ware,

communications,

policy

He

res-

Grenada and Panama,

lucidly

technologies.

hostage

battlefield hard-

and command and control

explores as well the impact on U.S.

and popular perceptions, and the underlying

motivations for these interventions, which were often peripheral to

and expertly cesses

vital

U.S. national interests. This unique

told history reveals the struggles

that created America's

and suc-

new

0803

ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRAR

GRB

3 1833 04410 8071

VVfTHeRAWN

I

I

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE

WARS

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE A

WARS

SHORT HISTORY OF

U.S.

MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS:

1975-2000

Peter Huchthausen

VIKING

VIKING Published by the Penguin Group

Penguin Group (USA)

375

Inc.,

Hudson

Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London

Street,

New

York,

New York

10014, U.S.A.

WC2R ORL, England

Penguin Books Australia Ltd, 250 Camberwell Road, Camberwell, Victoria 3124, Australia Penguin Books Canada Ltd, 10 Alcorn Avenue, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M4V 3B2 Penguin Books India

(P) Ltd, 11

Community

Centre, Panchsheel Park,

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Delhi-1 10 017,

India

Penguin Books (N.Z.) Ltd, Cnr Rosedale and Airborne Roads, Albany, Auckland, New Zealand Penguin Books (South Africa)

(Pty) Ltd,

24 Sturdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johannesburg

2196, South Africa

Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London First

published in 2003 by Viking Penguin, a

10

987654321

Copyright

©

The Nautical

&

WC2R ORL, England

member of Penguin Group (USA)

Aviation Publishing

Inc.

Company of America, 2003

All rights reserved

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Huchthausen, Peter A., 1939America's splendid little wars a short history of U.S. military engagements: 1975-2000 / Peter A. Huchthausen. cm. p. Includes bibliographical references and index. :

ISBN 1.

0-670-03232-8

United States-History, Military-20th century.

History-20th century. 4.

3.

United States-Military

2.

Intervention (International law)-

Presidents-United States-History-20th century. Policy.

I.

Title.

E840.4 .H83 2003

2002038025

973.92-dc21 This

book

is

printed

on

acid-free paper.

^

Printed in the United States of America All

maps by Mark

Stein Studios

Without limiting the

may be

rights

under copyright reserved above, no part of

this

publication

reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any

form or by any means

(electronic, mechanical,

photocopying, recording, or otherwise),

without the prior written permission of both the copyright owner and the above publisher

of this book.

The scanning, uploading, and distribution of this book via the Internet or via any other means without the permission of the publisher is illegal and punishable by law. Please purchase only authorized electronic editions and do not participate in or encourage electronic piracy of copyrighted materials. Your support of the author's rights

is

appreciated.

To if

my grandchildren,

ever called

on

Ewan, Bailey Anne, Blake, and Nicholas;

to fight for

your country, do so

but always with compassion for the beleaguered.

well,

Acknowledgments

I

deeply appreciate the assistance and counsel of Jim and Dorothy

Clunan, both dedicated foreign service

officers

and longtime

friends.

Their rich experience in diplomatic posts in Moscow, Kuwait, Belgrade, Ankara,

London, and Naples made

from

their contributions

the political-military field indispensable, and their patient editing was invaluable. Special thanks to

Ambassador Paul D.

Taylor,

who

pro-

vided his capable views of Latin America in the chapter on Panama.

am

also grateful for the insights

professor emeritus of history at the University of Southern

Gorham. at

I

and forbearance of Joyce Bibber,

Maine

in

Special thanks to Diane Barnes, former professor of history

Tuskegee University and the University of Maine, for her unique

ideas,

and Jack Barnes, veteran educator, author,

traveler,

and farmer, for

Jan Snouck-Hurgronje,

his advice

who

literary critic,

and encouragement.

conceived the idea for

this

I

world

also

thank

book and

per-

severed in getting the project under way. I

am

indebted to

my

Academy

U.S. Naval

classmate Admiral Sir

Leighton "Snuffy" Smith, one of the few U.S. naval officers in tory to be granted knighthood by a British monarch,

deep insight into the military events in the Balkans, and ership of U.S. and

proved so

vital.

NATO

Thanks

Admiral Joe Metcalf

and the

for their invaluable contributions

the

offered

whose

lead-

forces during the intervention in Bosnia

also to Brigadier General

III,

who

his-

late

David Grange, Vice

Captain John Michael Rodgers

from

their personal experiences in

Mayaguez and Iran rescue missions, Grenada, and the Gulf War.

viii

Acknowledgments

The views of U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonels Weiss on their participation in the Gulf spective

from the

trenches.

I

am

Peter Mueller

War gave me

a

and Ben

unique per-

also deeply thankful for the guid-

ance and inspiration of Ernest H. Knight, veteran, historian, and oracle of

who

Raymond, Maine, and

cared for and fed

me

while

I

for the fresh suggestions of Kathy,

undertook

this project.

Contents

Acknowledgments

vii

List of Maps

xi

Introduction

xiii

PART ONE Gerald R. Ford: Rebounding Against Piracy Chapter

1.

Recovering SS Mayaguez and the Fight

on Koh Tang PART

1

TWO James

3

E. Carter, Jr.:

Choosing Military Action

19

Chapter

2.

America and Special Warfare

21

Chapter

3.

The Hostage Rescue Attempt

27

PART THREE Ronald W. Reagan: Lashing Out

43

Chapter

4.

Intervention in

Lebanon

45

Chapter

5.

Intervention in Grenada

65

Chapter

6.

Retaliatory Attacks

on Libya

Chapter 7 Escort and Retaliation

87

in the Persian

Gulf

PART FOUR George H. W. Bush: Using a Big Stick

97 111

Chapter

8.

Storming Panama

113

Chapter

9.

The Gulf War: Desert Shield

127

Chapter

10.

The Gulf War: Desert Storm

Chapter

11.

The Rescue of the Kurds

in

Northern Iraq

142 152

X

Contents

PART FIVE Intervention

in

Somalia

159

Chapter

12. President

Bush Responds

Chapter

13. President

CHnton Crosses

PART SIX William J. Clinton:

On

to Starvation

the

Mogadishu Line

the Edge of the Balkans

161

170 183

Chapter

14. Intervention in

Bosnia

185

Chapter

15. Intervention in

Kosovo

212

Conclusions

219

Notes

221

Bibliography

231

Index

--

241

Maps

The Mayaguez Incident The

Persian

Iran:

Gulf Area,

2 1

26

980s

The Delta Entry/Exit

Plan, April 24-28, 1980

31

Lebanon, 1983

44

U.S. Sector, Beirut, October 1983

46

Grenada and the Caribbean

64

Grenada

-

77

Libya and the Gulf of Sidra, 1986

86

The Persian Gulf Area, 1980s

98

Panama

Military Installations in

112

Objectives of Operation Just Cause

122

Expected Iraqi Avenues of Approach

138

Conduct of the

Persian

Gulf War

147

Somalia and Mogadishu

160

The Balkans

184

Introduction

Since the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, the United States gov-

ernment has committed military operations. In

its

forces to

some

combat

cases, the

a country to protect or evacuate

in

more than

a

dozen

United States briefly invaded

American and foreign noncombat-

ants caught in volatile security situations. In other instances, U.S.

forces intervened at the request of friendly nations allies to liberate

occupied lands, to stop mass

blatant violations of

book

that

human

encompassed the

rights. Until

full

and joined with

killing,

and to thwart

now, there has been no

American military experience

since

1975 in one volume or explored this period in relation to past conflicts

and

its

larger

impact on modern world history. There are books

that address the individual conflicts

and some that study American

warfare of the 1990s in general, but this

engagement of the

military

book focuses on each U.S.

last twenty-five years

of the twentieth

century.

In the

first

thirty years following the

gles in Greece, Korea, Berlin,

American

end of World War

II,

Vietnam, and the Caribbean

strug-

foiled

aspirations for peace in a seemingly never-ending global

Communism. In the decades after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, as the Communist sphere withered away, America, now the sole world military power, was plagued by other nasty conflicts. By the turn of the new millennium, it was clear that the Pax contest with

Americana had been rian age

as

troubled as the Pax Britannica of the Victo-

and the Pax Romana of ancient times.

Introduction

xiv

The following chapters explore the underlying motivation itary intervention, which, in

many

was peripheral to

cases,

for mil-

vital

U.S.

national interests. Each engagement, from the 1975 operation to

re-

cover the hijacked merchant ship SS Mayaguez and her crew in the

Gulf of Siam through the Iran hostage

and

crisis

conflicts

in

Grenada, the Middle East, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, the Balkans, and finally Kosovo, the

last

American military operation of

examined

in a purely historical context.

the twentieth century,

is

Sometimes American

forces

were successful; on occasion they

merely interrupted the ugly work of dictators. In a few

government

initiated action

cases, the U.S.

on humanitarian grounds only

after the

world media deluged the public with wrenching coverage of

suffer-

ing-often in countries of little obvious relevance to U.S. national terests.

One

largely

unknown

military

action

1991

in

in-

was an

exceptional, bloodless success. Called Operation Eastern Exit, this

extraordinary evacuation of 281 American and foreign personnel

from Mogadishu, Somalia, was

navy and marine operation

a joint

that involved extreme-range helicopter flights ings.

Other engagements,

like

tion of

allies,

air-to-air refuel-

Operation Desert Storm in 1991, were

full-scale wars, albeit brief, that

The United

and

Americans fought with

a

broad

coali-

using both conventional and special operations forces.

States

employed limited conventional and semi-special

operations forces during the 1991 and 1993 conflicts in Somalia. In 1987,

convoying operations

conducted primarily by

NATO

of the Iran-Iraq War were

in the course

naval forces.

In the 1990s, America and

intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo to stop the blatant slaughter

of innocent

civilians

by Balkan

clans. Tactical air operations

dictators

and

their

marauding ethnic

dominated the fighting

cent conflicts and presented their lenges and strategic solutions.

own

set

in these

more

re-

of unique operational chal-

Each military engagement

in

this

history demonstrates the progression of a blend of battlefield hard-

ware, improved communications, and command-and-control technologies. This

melding has led to both great success,

and heavy

of life for

loss

little

as in

Kuwait,

purpose, as in Somalia.

Across the breadth of the United States, in places large and small, subtle exhibits

remind us of the

men and women who

participated in

xv

Introduction

one or more of the

jarring post-Vietnam confrontations. Small glass

cases display military awards,

daughters in

and aging photographs of sons and

uniform dot the dusty corners of

homes, reminding families of their offspring's

diners, shops,

and

service.

In an 1898 letter to Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt fol-

lowing the

fall

of Santiago, Cuba, U.S. Ambassador John Milton Hay

used the phrase "splendid

little

war" to refer to the bloody victories

of the Spanish-American War. The U.S. military encounters from 1975 to 1999 were neither splendid nor small. Instead, the personal adventures of the blood-caked veterans described in these pages more accurately reflect the words of the duke of Wellington in 1815: "[A] great country can have

these veterans is

no such thing

do not speak

as a little war."

Because most of

in public about their battle experiences,

it

necessary to record the details of these events so that neither the

participants nor their descendants forget

what they achieved.

PART ONE Gerald

R. Ford:

Rebounding Against

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AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

32

ment, a handful of Iranian revolutionary guard students scaled the walls

and seized the American embassy compound

tainly they

had the blessing of Khomeini, who had been

United States

and

in the

was not the

first

time the embassy had been

therefore puzzling

why

such an action took the em-

earlier. It it is

bassy by surprise. Nine months

earlier,

on February

14, revolutionar-

had attacked and captured the ambassador and some of

ies

On

that occasion

triumph with

members of Khomeini's

and within twenty-four hours

been

released.

security.

They

When

made

further

embassy

a

staff,

his staff.

recently returned in

had intervened on the ambassador's be-

their leader,

half,

offering the

coun-

months. The former shah had been admitted to the

try only nine

attacked,

in Tehran. Cer-

the

all

American captives had

provisions for token protection by

band of young revolutionary guards

the ultimate provocation

came

in

to act as

November,

it trig-

gered a long standoff between Iran and the United States that did not

end

until

444 days

later,

when

a shattered President Carter left the

White House.

The AyatoUah's takeover

in Iran

and the seizure of the U.S. em-

bassy in 1979, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in

December of

the

same

year,

prompted

Carter Doctrine in his State of the 1980.

It

stated:

the Persian terests

the president to declare his

Union Address on January

"An attempt by an outside power

Gulf region

will

be regarded

as

to gain control

an assault on the

by any means necessary, including military

a

will

be

force." This pol-

icy provided the direct rationale for developing the U.S.

ployment Force,

of

vital in-

of the United States of America, and such an assault

repelled

23,

Rapid De-

conventional unit designed to respond

large

quickly at extreme distances from home. Events of that year also

drew more American naval forces into the

main

at

reduced

levels for the next

reliable U.S. military bases

reluctance to

area,

where they would

re-

twenty years. Given the lack of

on Saudi Arabia's

soil,

and that country's

make binding defense arrangements with Western pow-

ers,

America was limited

ties

there

and elsewhere

to developing only

in the region.

to handle potential surges

should the need

arise.

minimal

logistic facili-

These provided the capability

of American forces on

a

temporary basis

The Hostage Rescue Attempt

33

President Carter frequently but reluctantly considered military action against Iran to gain release of the

American hostages.

A long and

anguishing period during which negotiations and limited economic sanctions failed produced

no

results,

The military choices addressed by

but a rescue seemed a long shot.

his national security advisers in-

cluded imposing a blockade, mining Iranian ports, unleashing

and

lected air strikes against Iranian oil refineries,

complex rescue mission formed army After the

to be

se-

a carefully crafted,

conducted by Delta Force, the newly

special operations antiterrorist unit.

first

occupation of the embassy

compound

in February,

Delta Force had requested permission to send a team to Tehran to

conduct

a detailed survey

ticipation of

some

sort

of the embassy and

its

of future operafion. The

surroundings in an-

Army Chief of Staff,

General Edward C. Meyer, denied permission for Delta to survey the area,

an unfortunate decision that proved in the end to greatly com-

plicate

planning when the army was ordered to formulate a hostage-

rescue plan later that year.

Then Delta Force requested

a covert

reconnaissance flight into Iran to locate staging areas for a possible rescue attempt. This request was

sought from the president on

first

February 28. President Carter denied the request on the basis that the mission might

March

fail

and jeopardize diplomatic negotiations.^

7 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secre-

tary of State

Cyrus Vance resubmitted

sance mission and were again turned

he

felt

On

a proposal for the reconnais-

down by

that such a mission, if discovered,

the president because

might further provoke the

Iranians.^

After four called a

months of frustradng

talks

with Iran, President Carter

meeting of the National Security Council to review

tary solution.

During

on Saturday, March

this gathering,

which was held

at

a mili-

Camp

David

22, 1980, the president finally approved a recon-

commitment of special operafions personthe hostages by force. The meeting began at

naissance mission and the nel to attempt to rescue

10:45 A.M. and continued until 3:30 P.M.

Panama

to investigate the possibilit}^ of

considering an invitation by President in Egypt. President Carter

had

just

The shah was then settling there.

Anwar Sadat

to

visiting

He was end

also

his flight

spoken to Sadat and persuaded

34

America's splendid little wars

him

more prudent

that Egypt was a

States.

place of refuge than the United

Sadat beHeved he could weather the political consequences,

and the shah flew to Egypt the next day,

president

The

on

lack

General

just as air force

David Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, briefed the

the details of a planned rescue mission.

of intelligence that had frustrated any possibility of an

immediate rescue mission had

from

military was receiving reports

Additionally,

some

finally

been overcome, and the U.S.

allied foreign observers in Iran.

agents from the Defense Intelligence Agency's In-

Any

telligence

Support Activity had been sent into

would be

particularly difficult to formulate, because

Iran.

it

rescue plan

would

take

place in a landlocked capital in a country surrounded by states

openly hostile to the United

Union,

States: the Soviet

and

Iraq,

Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Although the locations of the hostages

were generally known, together quickly and

it

was not

moved

easily

essary that a rescue plan include

search a large

likely that they

during a rescue. Thus,

enough time

number of buildings

could be mustered

in the

it

was nec-

for the rescue forces to

embassy compound before

gathering the hostages and rescue forces together and whisking

them

out of the city and the country. General Jones was certain that

if

rescue forces could get into the

compound without

the

alerting the revo-

lutionary guards, the operation stood a high chance of success. Getting into the difficult

compound and

evacuating the Americans seemed

less

than getting the rescue forces to the embassy and surprising

the guards.

The army devised

a rescue plan that consisted

of separate phases,

each of which could be terminated and the forces withdrawn, essary,

worse.

if

nec-

without making the situation between the two countries

The

first

phase of the plan required positioning forces covertly

at various tactically

East. Certainly

advantageous locations throughout the Middle

one of the most challenging aspects of the

eration was to keep secret a large

movement of

entire op-

specialist units

from

the observant eyes of the free press and the Soviets. The potentially

high

visibility

of the particular ground,

air,

and naval forces that

might be expected to take part in an engagement of

this

kind

the operational security of the effort a key aspect of the plan.

made

The Hostage Rescue Attempt

Camp

The main purpose of the March 22

David meeting was

35

to set a

timetable in motion so that once the president decided to go, a

hearsed force would be ready with minimal delay. called Desert

One was

A

re-

staging base

selected in the remote Great Salt Desert, near

town of Tabas, two hundred miles southeast of Tehran. The plan

the

was to

night in a combination of fixed-wing aircraft

fly in a force at

and long-range hehcopters coming from

would converge

force

different directions.

from huge bladders delivered by the fixed-wing

fuel

assault force,

The

Desert One, where the helicopters would

at

and take off again for

aircraft,

re-

load the

a spot called the hide site near

Garmsar, eighty miles southeast of Tehran. They would then land and conceal the helicopters, the

rest,

and wait

in darkness for their assault

on

embassy compound.

The plan required long-range distance with

maximum

helicopters to fly an incredibly long

fuel load

and minimal cargo. The mission,

code-named Eagle Claw, included more than one hundred pants.

Two

Iranian generals

who had

partici-

fled Iran during the revolution

were to help the rescuers get in and out of the embassy. Altogether, the

team consisted of ninety Delta

voy of hostages and

rescuers,

and

rangers, twelve drivers for the cona

twelve-man road-watch team,

cluding interpreters, that would secure Desert intruders.

An

would enter

One

in-

against chance

additional thirteen-man Special Forces assault team

the Iranian foreign ministry

and

free three hostages

who

were held separately. Delta's ninety-man assault team was divided into three groups: Red, White,

and Blue. After the road-watch teams

were withdrawn from Desert One, 120 hide

men would

continue to the

site.

The

rescuers expected the assault

on

the embassy

the most certain part of the operation, and peatedly. Getting the hostages also well rehearsed

it

compound

part of the operation.

The rescue force had

re-

and rescue teams out of Tehran was

and was not considered to be the most

The long

were made complex and

to be

had been rehearsed

flights

difficult

to take off

in and out of

by the necessity

from an

difficult

Iran, however,

for concealment.

aircraft carrier in the

Gulf

36 of

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

Oman. Because

deck in the tails,

had

the helicopters

carrier's

to be

hidden below the

flight

hangar bay, which required them to have folding

the choice of aircraft was limited to navy helicopters.

The mis-

sion of the helicopters was so closely held, and the importance and vitality

fare

of the

effort so well concealed, that

the

navy mine war-

squadron commanders were ordered to provide some of their he-

licopters for

an undefined joint operation, they naturally offered up

their aircraft with the worst

using navy

RH-53D

and folding

tail

At it

first

maintenance records. The plan

on

Sea Stallion helicopters, since they had the range

assembly that allowed them to be concealed in the

the navy wanted the helicopters to be flown

had no

settled

hangar bay.

aircraft carrier

but

when

pilots experienced in the type

by navy

pilots,

of low-level night flying

required by the special rescue force. Nevertheless, navy pilots

came

with the helicopters and began training with Delta Force, but

soon

became obvious

it

that they were unsuited to the type of flying re-

quired by the mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then selected Marine

Corps

even though they, too, had

pilots to fly the helicopters

of secrecy the

special operations flight training. For reasons

little

partici-

pants had not once trained together. Incredibly, the entire force never

met

until the operation began.

Why Delta

lots

with the required training

is still

of

Force was not assigned pi-

With

a mystery.

the

mixed bag

services involved in the operation, experts claim that the mission

commander. Colonel Charles Beckwith, never

mand of the

really

had

overall

com-

effort.

The mission began on April

on time from

24, 1980.

The

helicopters lifted off

the carrier Nimitz but promptly flew into two big

clouds of suspended dust and sand that caused them to veer off course and to delay their arrival by

The

first six

more than an hour

of the eight helicopters arrived

to ninety minutes late,

at

at

Desert One.

One from sixty arrived. One of the

Desert

and the other two never

missing landed with mechanical failure and was abandoned. The

crew boarded the eighth, which was not damaged, and returned to the carrier Nimitz.

At Desert One

a third helicopter

was declared un-

usable owing to a hydraulic failure. Faced with having only five out

of the

minimum

six helicopters that

he needed for the mission, Colo-

The Hostage Rescue Attempt nel Beckwith

made

37

make

the difficult decision to abort. Then, to

RHHC-130 Her-

matters worse, while preparing to evacuate the staging area, one

53D

helicopter collided with one of the six fixed-wing

cules in the mission

men

(five air

several

force

and both

men and

aircraft burst into flames, killing eight

three marines)

and seriously wounding

more.

The rescue plan by the Vietnam-era

itself

was complex, haphazard, and characterized

practices

of employing

niques that avoided centralized initiative.

civilian

management

command and impeded

Even more deplorable was

tech-

individual

the finger-pointing that fol-

lowed. Senior administration figures second-guessed the determination and even the courage of the mission participants, particularly the

helicopter pilots. In postaction accounts several senior

White House

claimed that two of the three helicopters that aborted the

officials

mission because of mechanical failure could have continued on. Specifically, they referred to the cockpit instrument

the

BIM

warning

lights,

(Blade Inspection Method) in the two helicopters that

aborted. These lights had indicated possible early stages of internal structural failure in the rotors

and that the blades were losing the

pressure of the inert nitrogen gas indications did not necessarily criticism

is

inside.'^

make

unwarranted, and those

Some

critics

claimed these

the helicopter inoperable.^ Such

who

participated in the mission

were the most qualified to judge those matters.

When

President Carter told the

tempt to

free the hostages

symbol of military ter at

failure

American people

that a rescue at-

had been unsuccessful, the event became that was hard to overcome. After the

Desert One, the secretary of defense appointed a special inves-

tigative

panel chaired by Admiral James

L.

Holloway

chief of Naval Operations, to seek recommendations lessons learned.

Made

III, a

former

and elucidate

public in August 1980, the report of the rescue

mission prepared by Admiral Holloway and all

a

disas-

five

other officers from

the participating services was a comprehensive, independent evalu-

ation of

all

aspects of the mission.^

The choice of using navy

helicopters flown

by Marme Corps

pilots

38

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

was a point of considerable censure singled out as

one of the primary reasons

Another glaring

sion.

Holloway

in the

issue that

report,

and was

for the failure of the mis-

marred the operation was the absence

of the helicopters' unit maintenance personnel aboard the Nimitz.

By default, necessary maintenance

USS

for the unusual helicopters

men of the Nimitz helicopter squadron, own Sea Kings and not the RH-53D Sea

had to be performed by the

who

were trained on their

Stallion, a totally different kind

of helicopter. Spare-parts shortages

and poor maintenance plagued the rescue mission, which was characteristic

of the poor defense management of the 1970s. These

compounded by

One

to Desert

secrecy and haste,

made

errors,

the long and difficult flight

nearly impossible to achieve successfully.

It is

unlikely

that the precise cause of the mechanical failures will ever be deter-

mined. Flying

at

extremely low altitude over

five

hundred miles of

desert beneath Iranian radar coverage, a total of six

from the

carrier,

Whether

was a superhuman and heroic

a rescue

feat in

hundred miles and of itself.

mission with properly trained personnel and

well-maintained equipment could have succeeded remains an open question. rity

Gary

Council

Sick,

who

staff, said

on

served

that the rescue was a military failure, not a

ure of political judgment or

command.

David Grange, who served

as a

part of the rescue force, saw

it

prise, ful.

President Carter's National Secu-

forces,

During the American embassy

would have had some

disagreed.

Kennedy

a success."^

not

all

"Due

.

said,

to the audacity, sur-

.

am

success-

and extraction out of

.

casualties, I

and some of the

convinced the mission

Former hostage Moorhead Kennedy

"The Iranians had warned us

as

early

February,"

as

"that they hoped Mr. Carter would do nothing foolish

like a helicopter rescue if

^

Retired Brigadier General

we would have been

assault

hostages would have been hurt, but

would have been

fail-

Ranger company commander and

differently:

and training of the ground

Iran, the force

^^

attempt, for they were ready for

of us would be

Washington knew

killed.

.

.

that Mr. Carter

.

Don't you think

if

it,

and some

everyone in

was running out of options, the

students might have arrived at the same conclusion and taken precautions accordingly?"'^

The Hostage Rescue Attempt

Another

39

point in studying the mission in hindsight

critical

is

the

massive security assistance present in Iran, the

fact that despite the

U.S. government lacked any effective remaining intelligence sources

on

had been forced

the ground and

operations nearly from scratch.

^^

to begin intelligence collection

The HoUoway Commission's

find-

ings ultimately resulted in the creation of the Special Operations

way

visory Panel that was to pave the separate Joint Special Operations

The

failure

Ad-

forming

a

Command.

of the rescue mission in Iran was the lowest point of

American military esteem

in the post-Vietnam era.

midst of a period of international caused by the

crisis

in the future for

American military

oil shortage,

life

in the

and the deteriorating conditions of

in late 1970s.

During

time

this

The

of the 1970s had forced the navy to decrease

many were

happened

domestic economic

instability, a

struggling to remain operationally ready.

half in ten years, and

It

all

services

were

austere defense budgets its

number of ships by

unable to go to sea for lack of ade-

quate manning. Air force aircraft were frequently cannibalized for spare parts to keep a bare

minimum number

flying,

and 7 percent

were grounded because of a spare parts supply shortage. The junior grades of the eral

armed

minimum

their families

forces were paid less than 85 percent of the fed-

wage, and

many

servicemen had no choice but to put

on food stamp programs.

Less than half of the military

were high school graduates. Morale was reflected in the retention rates

of

for example, was barely 28 percent,

at

an all-time low, which was

all services.

Navy

pilot retention,

which seriously diluted the

fleet's

air capabilities.

The fect

failure

of the Iran rescue mission had

a severe

and

lasting ef-

on American military leadership. Never again would U.S. committed without possessing an overwhelming advannumbers and firepower. The operation had been planned

forces be tage in

and rehearsed over

a period

could not be dismissed

as

of more than

six

months, and

its

failure

simply due to mechanical problems. Not

having an adequate number of helicopters to back up those that failed

proved to be an error that would

operations.

Caspar Weinberger,

affect

many

future military

President Reagan's secretary of

40

America's splendid little wars

defense, stated that during the preparations for the next American

mihtary engagement, the intervention in Grenada three years

later,

he had ordered General John Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to double the assets he thought necessary to do the job because of the results of the failed hostage-rescue mission.

Costly and futile as the Iran rescue attempt was, the end result was a

necessary boost to the acceptance of the special operations troops

not only legitimate but also necessary, given the changing nature

as

of human

conflict.

There has always been a general feeling in the United States that its

diplomats abroad should be protected. Throughout history Britain

has shared the same belief concerning

Henry Palmerston declared

Foreign Secretary Lord

House of Commons: "As from

indignity,

subjects. In

its

the

Roman

when he could

subject in whatever land he

say

in days

civis

may

1850 British

in a debate in the

of old held himself

Romanus sum, so

free

also a British

be, shall feel confident that the

watchful eye and strong arm of England will protect him against justice

and wrong." In 1864, when Emperor Theodore of Abyssinia

imprisoned Queen Victoria's consul to the Abyssinian court and tured

in-

him because of a diplomatic faux

force that triggered the Abyssinian War.

tor-

pas, the British reacted with a

The Crown

sent forth an ex-

pedition consisting of thirteen thousand British and Indian soldiers in a

campaign

lasting

more than

three years. In April 1868 they

at-

tacked the Abyssinian fortress of Magdala, killed seven hundred Abyssinians, and rescued the consul and a group of forty-eight other

European prisoners held by Emperor Theodore.^"* Just

two years

Red Brigade

after the hostage rescue

terrorists

kidnapped U.S.

James Dozier. The Pentagon,

State

attempt in Iran, Italian

Army

Brigadier General

Department, and Central

Intelli-

gence Agency spent an inordinate amount of time struggling over

who would

take action to find

and

free Dozier,

but the Italians suc-

ceeded in rescuing him. Congressional leaders were outraged and discouraged by interservice bickering, and in 1987 Congress passed a

law ordering the Defense Department to form

Operations

Command.

a

new Joint

Special

Senior military leaders fought the issue,

The Hostage Rescue Attempt feeling that Congress

the joint

was meddling in

command was formed and

their affairs, but in the

41

end

did extremely well, beginning

with the storming of Panama in 1989. However, more failures and

embarrassing operations were undertaken before that milestone was reached.

•I

J

PART THREE

Ronald W. Reagan Lashing Out

N

BEIRUT MNF WEST

French

"

Italian

MNF

Sabra"

/

-^

^

/ ^

Shatila

y^

V.

EAST BEIRUT

I

BEIRUT \^ C^

^

\

Tripoli -^^^O/iy

• Zegharta

MNF

British

MNF'

Airport

*Juniye

Beirut

^^

n^

Zahle

Mediterranean

• Suq

Sea

.J

al

/

Gharb

SYRIA

//

/

LEBANON

Saida

/

^

y^

/

y -/

Damascus

/ / I

( r'-^-/ i

Tibnin



En Naqura

Bent Jubayl^

',

\

I

/

/

ISRAEL

LEBANON, 1983 25

miles

^

CHAPTER

4

Intervention

Lebanon

in

June 1982-February 1984

In 1982 the United States sent marines into

Lebanon

as part

United Nations-sponsored multinational force including French, and Italian

army

units. Their

of

British,

mission was to supervise the

multaneous withdrawal of the U.S. -backed

Israeli

a

si-

and Soviet-backed

Syrian military forces poised for battle inside Lebanon. The buildup

followed the

Lebanon

Israeli

invasion in 1982 and threatened to transform

Over

into a full-scale battleground.

time, however, the mis-

sion of the international force failed to adjust to the dynamics the belligerents,

among

and the chances for successful peacekeeping gradu-

ally evaporated.

Roughly the

size

of the

state

out of the wreckage of the

World War It

I,

when

of Connecticut, Lebanon was created

Ottoman Empire's

the victorious Allies

drew up

Greater Syria after artificial

boundaries.

has a rich history and a mixed ethnic population with a myriad of

religious behefs. Following tively stable state

World War

governed by

a

II,

Lebanon emerged

parliamentary system in

as a rela-

which the

Christians enjoyed a majority. In subsequent years, the Muslims be-

came

the majority group, but the Christians retained control of the

government through manipulation of various power blocs during rigged elections. For

more than

ten years

Lebanon continued

to

SECTOR, BEIRUT OCTOBER 1983 U.S.

s T

^

Id

r

fs

HQ

24th

MAU

I^B^ Co.

A

Beirut International Airport

^/

y BO-X3^"^

Co-C ov

s^^

o^

N

S

Co. B

1/8

^ miles

Intervention

maintain a basically stable, Beirut, acting as

both

trade centers of the

47

Lebanon

if

weak, government with the capital,

a cultural

hub and one of the main commercial

Middle

East.

The saga of U.S. intervention ident

in

Dwight D. Eisenhower

Lebanon began

when

Pres-

sent in a military force to forestall

what

in

in 1958,

was perceived to be an attempt by acolytes of United Arab Republic leader

Gamal Abdel

Nasser, backed

by the Soviet Union,

to overthrow

government of Lebanese president Camille Chamoun. The Ameri-

the

can intervention, involving seventeen thousand army troops and marines, appeared to shore

up

and

the government's stability,

after a

few months the troops were successfully withdrawn. However, over the next ten years the situation in Lebanon steadily deteriorated as the

country became more and more embroiled in internecine

Renewed unrest began

in 1970 with

strife.

King Hussein's expulsion of

the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan. Led by Yasir Arafat

and with nowhere

tled in southern

else to go, the Palestinian fighters set-

Lebanon and began

to operate out

of those

areas,

using terror tactics to gather worldwide support for their cause. Several

thousand dedicated

PLO

Lebanon and began

fighters settled in

from the

vicinity

of Beirut, which had

tory of peaceful coexistence

among

its

forays against Israel

ian residents.

With

the influx of the

to suffer serious sectarian violence.

relatively

long

his-

Muslim, Jewish, and Christ-

PLO, however, Lebanon began By early 1975 civil war erupted

between the Christians and the Muslims and

Over time Lebanon's

a

weak

central

their Palestinian allies.

government gave way

under the pressure of inter-Arab disputes and the outbreak of long-

dormant

internal conflict,

and by the

had become the primary locus of Arab-Israeli by 1981 the

Shiite

Lebanon

early 1980s southern

horrors. Additionally,

Mushms, who were among

the largest

and most

destitute sectarian communities in the world and occupied the bot-

tom of

formed

the Lebanese political structure,

the Palestinians in order to improve their tus.

With

mad, the

a belief system centered Shiite

on

a

new

alliance with

economic and

Ali, the son-in-law

political sta-

of

Muham-

branch of Islam had long been characterized by a

sense of persecution. During the 1980s, fanatical political groups in the

it

grew into one of the most

Middle East and harbored

a

more

48

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

virulent hatred for the

West than other branches of Islam.

that an accurate census in

have

a plurality,

Shiites felt

Lebanon would prove they might indeed

but their efforts were consistently curbed by the

more numerous and more moderate Sunni Muslims and

Ma-

the

from

ronite Christians, the Phalangists. Further grievances sprang

what they perceived

as the

disproportionate Christian wealth and

The governing Maronite Christian

power.

Gemayel

sect,

headed by the

clan in the 1980s, held the Palestinians primarily responsi-

ble for the loss of order.

While neighboring Syria had generally supported Palestinian forts against Israel,

its

politically astute President

Hafez

ef-

Assad en-

al

sured that no single faction became too powerful in Lebanon. To

prevent the

PLO

from gaining superiority

in

Lebanon

in 1976, Syria

even intervened sporadically on behalf of the Phalangists-a curious alliance,

but

of President Assad's

t}^pical

that, to protect its interests,

Lebanon

as a

methods. After

Syria kept tens of thousands troops

equipped and trained by the Soviet Union

rael,

political

in

Lebanon. Syria viewed

convenient place from which to stage attacks against

while Israel saw Lebanon as a potential buffer to protect

it

Is-

from

Syrian or Palestinian attacks.

Matters came to a head in April 1981,

when

Phalangist leaders de-

vised a scheme to draw the Israelis into a clash with the large Syrian forces

around the town of Zahle, the third

Lebanon,

largest city in

with a population of two hundred thousand (mostly Greek Orthodox). Zahle was the capital of the Bekaa Valley, the long narrow valley

lined

by mountains

that separates central

Lebanon from

Phalange leader Bashir Gemayel informed the

was

a

Syria.

The

Israelis that the city

major Phalange stronghold about to be surrounded and over-

run by Syrian commandos. Then, to confirm unit attacked

Syrian

soldiers

this claim, a Phalangist

guarding a bridge on the Beirut-

Damascus highway and destroyed two

tanks. President

Assad reacted

immediately and rushed Syrian reinforcements to Zahle by road and helicopter.

The Syrians troops behaved with considerable

burning crops and shelling the

an

air battle in

which

Israel

city.

downed

The ground

brutality,

fighting precipitated

a Syrian military helicopter,

Syria immediately installed Soviet-made

SAM-6

and

antiaircraft missiles

Intervention

Bekaa

in the

Valley.^ This miUtarization

of Israeli

led to a series

Lebanon and,

air strikes against

of the

strategic valley quickly

Syrian and

PLO

an increase in Palestinian

in response, to

49

Lebanon

in

positions in

and

artillery

rocket attacks against northern Israel launched from Lebanon.

Seeking to de-escalate the spiraling conflict, U.S. Ambassador

Habib hammered out

Philip

and the

plex,

tation:

First,

a cease-fire.

The agreement was com-

immediately began enforcing

Israelis

their

world constituted a violation of the delicate regional ond,

long

as

most

cease-fire. Sec-

of the

a violation

by the

cease-fire

side.^

While the rael,

in the

they were not actively shooting. If they were fired

as

upon, that action would constitute opposing

interpre-

were free to advance into any area peacefully,

Israeli forces

meaning

own

any Palestinian attack against Jews anywhere

PLO

Israelis

ish off the

PLO

Lebanon was focusing

in

viewed the situation

one

in

fell

its

hostility against Is-

opportunity to

as a perfect

swoop. Furthermore, some

Israelis,

fin-

such

as

Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, viewed the entire Arab-Israeli conflict at the

time

as

merely a sideshow of the Soviet-U.S. cold war. Sharon

PLO

believed that destroying the

worldwide terrorism and be

might bring an abrupt end to

a regional tactical defeat for the Soviet

Union. Secretary of State Alexander Haig held views similar

to

Sharon's.

The

Israelis

Lebanon when

claimed justification for a a "Palestinian"

gunman wounded

dor in London, even though four days

found

Abu

to be

from

full-scale

later the

invasion of

the Israeli ambassa-

would-be assassin was

completely different faction-the anti-Arafat Iraqi

a

Nidal group. The head of the hit squad was the cousin of

Abu

Lebanon

in a

Nidal. In any event,

on June

fierce effort to destroy the

6,

PLO

1982, Israel invaded

completely, and end years of

inter-

mittent warfare in which the vicfims had been mostly civilians.

The

Israelis successfully

advanced deep into the Bekaa Valley

against Syrian forces while the

indeed to survive,

fought to hold on in Beirut and

as Israeli forces cut off

Grave concern for innocent lent

PLO

urban fighting

if Israel

civilians

and surrounded the

who might

be caught

city.

in vio-

advanced into Beirut formed the

basis

of a Lebanese request for a multinational force to be brought in to

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

50

separate the belligerents. France, Italy, the United States, and Britain

were asked to contribute to the force. Secretary of State Haig backed

American

participation, arguing that the

the presence of three foreign armies in

main obstacle

to peace

keeping" force, the military arm of the PLO, and the

army-all

Israeli

of which were stronger than the Lebanese army.^ The idea of pating in such an international force was at tary of Defense Caspar Weinberger

was

Lebanon-the Syrian "peace-

first

partici-

opposed by Secre-

and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff General John Vessey. Desperate to keep the peace in Lebanon and to prevent escalation to a full-scale war, the

United Nations Security Council passed Reso-

lution 508 in July 1982 calling for the withdrawal of Israel

Lebanon. The United States agreed to participate

from

in a multinational

Force (MNF), the purpose of which was to supervise the withdrawal

of both

Israeli

and Syrian

forces,

whose presence

in

Lebanon had

been roundly condemned by the United Nations.

On

August 25, 1982, elements of the Thirty-second Marine

phibious Unit,

commanded by Colonel James M. Mead,

the port of Beirut.

A

Marine Amphibious Unit

force of roughly twelve

hundred troops with

weapons, helicopters, and fixed-wing

aircraft.

its

is

Am-

landed in

a self-contained

own

artillery,

heavy

After going ashore, the

marines assisted in the evacuation of 6,436 Palestinians and Syrians.

PLO

leader Arafat was escorted to safety and eventually to Tunis

by

French and American forces. By September 3 the mission seemed

complete and the marines withdrew without having boarding their ships on September

10. It

had worked and the mission was seen

as a

fired a shot, re-

appeared that intervention

model of successful peace-

keeping.

Four days backed

after the

Christian

marines withdrew, the leader of the

Phalangist

movement.

Gemayel, was assassinated, presumably by lowing day

Israeli forces

President-elect

PLO

supporters.

Israeli-

Bashir

The

fol-

overran the Muslim sector of West Beirut.

During the next two days, angry Phalangists, under the protection of the Israeli forces in

West

Beirut,

massacred hundreds of Palesfinian

Intervention

including

civilians,

the senior Israeli

and turned

and children,

Beirut.

commander,

Lebanon

in the refugee

51

camps of

There were strong indications that

Ariel Sharon, ignored these actions

a blind eye to the slaughter. Directly following the horri-

Amin Gemayel,

massacre,

ble

women

and Sabra south of

Shatila

in

the

new Lebanese

brother of the slain Bashir, requested that the

president and

MNF once again inter-

vene to protect the Muslims of West Beirut and guarantee the with-

and Syrian forces from the

drawal of

Israeli

Lebanon,

as well as

city.

The government of

most Christian and Muslim

factions, supported

MNF.

the reintroduction of the

On

September 29, despite the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, President

rine

Reagan ordered Colonel Mead's Thirty-second Ma-

Amphibious Unit back

into Beirut, this time with the mission of

providing a "presence in Beirut, that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the

their capital.'"^

Lebanese government to regain control of

The mission of the marines

as written in the

Order of September 23, 1982, was defined an environment which

will

as follows:

and

British again agreed to participate.

had assured Congress

Alert

permit the Lebanese armed forces to

carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area."^ ians,

JCS

"To establish

The French,

Ital-

President Ronald Reagan

that the marines were in

Lebanon not

to en-

gage in combat, but to pacify Lebanon. However, the mission was less

than a model of

clarity for the marines,

whether they were supposed

to act as

who

order between feuding factions backed by the Soviet side

and

Two

Israel

on

were not sure

peacekeepers or to maintain

Union on one

the other.

days after going ashore, the marines began to receive spo-

from both the Syrians and the Lebanese Muslims. The totaled three thousand troops, including a British force of 155

radic fire

MNF

observers.

The French portion of

the

MNF

was stationed

in Beirut,

and the Italians were stationed near the heavily populated refugee

camps a force ians at

in the south.

The U.S. Marine contingent, which had grown

to

of twelve hundred, was assigned to an area south of the Italthe Beirut International Airport. There was no single com-

mander of the

force; each contingent

had

its

own

leadership that was

authorized to coordinate with the other contingents. Three U.S.

52

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

Marine forces

companies came ashore

rifle

from the

flank and the

airport.

initially

The marines had

Old Sidon Road

in the east

and displaced

the Mediterranean

on

on one

As an

the other.

Israeli

experi-

enced combat commander, Colonel Mead immediately sought to place his marines

on

the high

ground across the road, but he was

overruled by his commanders. The United States did not wish to ap-

pear to be supporting

Road

Israeli forces that

were

using the Sidon

still

for the logistic support of their forces positioned elsewhere.

This forced the marines into a tactical situation that would prove to

be seriously flawed.

The marines' around the flights

terrain

was

airport. Traffic

difficult to defend.

was heavy

They were deployed

there, with

more than

thirty

and twenty-four hundred passengers moving through on an

average day. The marines established their headquarters in a twostory concrete building that fighting training school.

The

had previously been the full

airport fire-

marine battalion used

a partially

bombed-out four-story reinforced concrete building, located the southwest of the headquarters, as a barracks.

Lebanese Aviation Administration Bureau.

On

It

to

had been the

October 30, the

commanded by Colonel Thomas M. Stokes, Jr., came ashore and relieved the Thirty-second. The new unit consisted of 1,806 Marines and 81 navy personnel, including

Twenty-fourth Marine Amphibious Unit,

corpsmen, chaplains, and construction personnel called Seabees. As the

new marine

contingent came ashore, a car

bomb

exploded on the

beach nearby, an ominous warning to the new peacekeepers. In an

tempt

to

emphasize

a

renewed determination to improve the

the marines began to patrol actively

began

to train the

Lebanese

Armed

by jeep and on

command and

factions believed, but to

the defensive capability of the

By

the

end of 1982, when

They

also

control proce-

of the Lebanese military was

tempt to show that the mission was there not

Muslim

situation,

Forces Rapid Reaction Force in

small-unit tactics, the use of arms, and dures. This outward support

foot.

at-

a further at-

to support Israel, as the

make concrete

progress shoring

up

government of Lebanon. it

became

clear to

all

the factions that

neither Israel nor Syria intended to withdraw anytime soon, they

Intervention

began to attack one another

in

53

Lebanon

MNR The American train-

as well as the

ing and equipping of the Lebanese army were neither sufficient nor effective in helping to quell the fighting

on

all

sides.

Nor was

the

Lebanese army able to deal with the thirty thousand Syrians and

many

present in Lebanon.

Israelis still

The marines'

first

force occurred

serious confrontation with a major conventional

on February

1983,

2,

three Centurion tanks at high speed

of

when the Israeli army dispatched down the Sidon Road after one

supply columns had been ambushed.

its

tackers

as

had emerged from the

tended to flush out the

under U.S. control and

territory

culprits.

perceived that the

It

The

three tanks were

at-

in-

stopped

abruptly in the middle of the road by Captain Charles B. Johnson,

an outraged marine company commander. Johnson bravely stood in

and faced off the tanks

the road

which they did only

stop,

threatened the

until they

complied with

his order to

he climbed onto the lead tank and

after

commander at gunpoint. This act was initially local Muslim community as indicating that the

Israeli

acclaimed by the

American

forces were sincerely neutral in their mission, but the senti-

ment was

short-lived.

phibious

Unit relieved

On

February 14 the Thirty-second Marine Twenty-fourth

the

in

Colonel James Mead's third tour in Lebanon. the marines

and

Habib applied

Israeli forces

pressure,

link for coordination

Am-

beginning

Beirut,

between

Difficulties

continued until Ambassador Philip

and the

Israeli

army

between the U.S. and

installed a direct radio Israeli

on-scene com-

manders.

As

the

cial ally

grew.

who

MNF was increasingly perceived by Muslims to be the offi-

of the Christian-dominated Lebanese government,

On

March

killed

15 an Italian patrol was

ambushed by Muslim

one soldier and wounded nine. The next day

Marines were wounded when

a

Muslim

hostility

tossed a

forces

five

hand grenade

U.S. at a

patrol north of the airport. Thereafter, the Marines curtailed foot patrols

and increased vehicular

later, after

patrols with loaded weapons.

coming under sniper

fire,

the marines returned

Two

fire

days

for the

54

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

first

time against the unidentified assailants. Then, on April 18, a

man

drove a pickup truck loaded with explosives past a Lebanese

guard into the lobby of the American embassy in West Beirut.

It

ex-

ploded, killing sixty-three people, including seventeen Americans.

Evidence proved that suicidal and determined Iranian revolutionary guards were active in the area and were assisting the Palestinian Shiites

with considerable financial support.

celeration of violence

among

seemed

It

that the rapid ac-

had drawn other

the local factions

similarly motivated activists.

bombing

After the

attack at the embassy, the marines' mission ex-

panded. The U.S. European

Command, under whose

authority the

marines operated, changed the rules of engagement to permit the marines to

initiate fire if

doubled guards on

amphibious 5,

all

tractors

they perceived an imminent threat. They

posts and for the

on main

Israel

17,

equitable,

hit

fire

from uniden-

U.S.-sponsored withdrawal agreement

a

but Syria and the Muslim factions opposed

and tensions rose

and Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty

commander. During

nel began to

accompany

Soviet-built rockets

this

by

fired

tion.

Apparently

work together

mon "enemy"

in

Mead

as the U.S.

On

July 22 twelve

in Beirut airport,

sailor, killing

one

The rounds were determined

a Syrian-backed left-wing all

the

deployment, Lebanese army person-

wounding two marines and an American been

Colonel

relieved

the marine patrols.

others.

as in-

Unit replaced the marines ashore,

and mortar rounds landed

and wounding thirteen

it

At the end of May,

higher.

still

Twenty-fourth Marine Amphibious

MNF

by small-arms

On May

but there were no casualties.

and Lebanon signed

on May

time employed armored

routes around their positions.

Colonel Mead's helicopter was

tified shooters,

first

Muslim Druze

civilian,

to have

military fac-

of the disparate Muslim factions had begun to

an altogether natural process of focusing on a com-

force-the intruder from

far

away-without considera-

tion of that force's purpose.

The U.S. Marines found themselves tactical posifion

in

an increasingly untenable

while vainly trying to support the local Lebanese

army. The Soviet-equipped and -supported Syrian army backed the local

Muslims, an increasingly united front consisting of the Druze

Intervention

and

who

Shiite militias,

were

locked in combat against the

still

army and

Christian-led Lebanese

55

Lebanon

in

Phalangists backed

by the

Israelis.

In the middle stood the marines, appearing to each side to be sup-

porting

On

its

antagonists.

August

after

8,

again, the marines

Druze

employed

first

time.

On

Israeli

army

units

out the source of shooting for the

MNF,

out prior warning to the

draw. Simultaneously, hostile

and mortar

artillery

a

when two of their men were

heavy mortar round that

fire their

support.

knock

August 28, with-

began

to with-

The

against snipers.

fire

and three wounded by

killed

marines began to

hit their position, the

155mm howitzers and to use U.S. Navy gunfire The cruiser USS Belknap and destroyer USS Bowen pro-

vided the

heavy

first

naval gunfire by shooting illumination rounds to

cover the marines

at night.

Cobra helicopter gunships a

erupted

concentrated on the U.S. area,

fire

and the marines began routinely to return next day,

fire

their counterbattery radar to

The marines for the

Druze armored personnel

began to employ

also

time.

first

One Cobra

had

carrier that

fired

on

their

destroyed

the marines'

A second Cobra was hit and made an emergency landing on USS Iwojima, which was offshore in the Mediterranean. From

position.

that

day on, the marines were deeply engaged

in daily sporadic

warfare and continued to take casualties with no achievable objective in sight.

Their mission had been to support the government of

Lebanon and

to prevent the situation

had inevitably expanded

Although the

hostility.

from

deteriorating, but

in response to the reality

initial

deployment of the

accomplished with good intentions,

it

of the intense

MNF

soon became

it

had been

clear that

it

re-

quired full firepower just for self-defense, employing the complete array of

modern American weaponry, including

port and limited

American way of

air

power. This response

war."^

A man

is

naval gunfire sup-

consistent with "the

taught and trained as

expected to take the traditional steps of returning fired

upon, and to use

all

means

not consistent with the role plish

the

at

hand

fire in

kind

However,

is

when

this

was

of peacekeeper and would not accom-

mission but rather create

perpetuating combat.

to win.

marine

a

a

new

situation

of

self-

56

America's splendid little wars

The U.S. government was now faced with the U.S. force, which was

three options: withdraw

what the theater commander, U.S. Army

General Bernard Rogers, wished to do; reinforce and reposition the

marines to compensate tactically for the

Israeli

withdrawal; or stay

with the status quo and make no changes. The question went directly

who

to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,

decided to leave the

marines in their indefensible position. In Weinberger's view, the mission of the marines had not changed, but the situation surely had since the withdrawal of the Israeli forces-they were

now engaged

in

repeated firefights with experienced Syrian troops and Iranian revolutionary fighters situated directly outside their positions.

General Rogers authorized Vice Admiral Edward H. Martin, the

commander of the

Sixth Fleet, to provide the marines with aerial

re-

connaissance and naval gunfire support from ships located off the coast in a position called Bagel Station. also

moved

the helicopter carrier

other Marine

USS

The Sixth

Fleet

Tarawa closer to shore with an-

Amphibious Unit embarked

down

positions while maintaining two vulnerable outposts

By August

3

1

The

as reinforcements.

marines ashore suspended patrols and hunkered

perimeter for early warning.

commander

in defensive

beyond

their

combat had increased

to

the point that the marine foot patrols into Beirut were totally sus-

pended and two

aircraft carriers,

USS

Eisenhower and the French Foch,

moved in to provide air support to the besieged MNF. By September 4 Israeli forces had withdrawn beyond

the Awali

River in southern Lebanon. However, the Lebanese army did not

fill

vacuum

into

which the irregular forces of the multiple factions could and did

infil-

the gap left

trate

by the departing

thus leaving a

Israelis,

with impunity. Despite the

Israeli

departure, Syria continued to

refuse to withdraw

its

demning

invading Lebanon in the

Israel for

pealing for

Israeli

forces. Ironically, the

forces

to

first

States, after

place,

The

Israelis

con-

was now ap-

remain and help keep order

seriously deteriorating tactical situation. in their withdrawal.

United

in

the

refused to pause

Intervention

Early

on September

position, kilhng

Lebanon

in

57

6 twenty-one heavy rockets hit the marines'

men and wounding two

two

more. The Lebanese government forces were pushed eastward, leaving the Druze militia

dominating the high ground overlooking Beirut and the put the marines in

an even

combat would have

called for an

airport. This

tenable position, which in normal

less

immediate

assault against those en-

trenched above them. Diplomatic and political restrictions governing

MNF overrode

the

the designs of combat, echoing the

American

ex-

perience in Vietnam.

From September

7 on, the marines were calling in routine naval

gunfire

support from the destroyers

Rodgers.

The

Thirty-first

U.S. Pacific Fleet

On

12 to act as reinforcements for the

September 19 navy ships

fired

more than

350 five-inch rounds in support of the Lebanese forces holding ridgetop positions at

Suq

al

On

marines,

a

September 20 navy

who

significant

to

by American

escalation

carrier aircraft

began to support the

were forced to withdraw their two vulnerable outer

warning outposts and consolidate

The order

their

Gharb, nine miles southeast of the center

of Beirut. This represented forces.

John

Marine Amphibious Unit arrived from the

on September

entrenched Marines.

USS Bowen and USS

their perimeter.

to support Lebanese forces with naval gunfire

was given

Colonel Geraghty directly by Assistant National Security Adviser

Robert C. McFarlane, cial

who had

replaced Ambassador Habib as spe-

envoy and the principal Middle East

negotiator.

McFarlane had

been pressing for authorization to send the marines into the mountains to

support the Lebanese army. The marine

commander

ashore.

Colonel Geraghty, opposed calling in heavy naval gunfire support for the Lebanese army,

tional fire stricted

knowing such an action would

and pressure against

his

own

marines,

result in addi-

who

were

from going on the offensive and were stagnating

still

re-

in their

indefensible posifions. In the view of the Syrians, the Druze, and their Shiite allies, the

American

force's stance as neutral peacekeepers

was further diminished with the increase in direct gunfire support by the navy. Then, to exacerbate the situafion, tleship

USS New Jersey began

firing

its

on September 25

sixteen-inch guns.

the bat-

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

58

A

went into

fragile cease-fire

on September

effect

26,

and the

Beirut airport closed for six days. During the cease-fire the Americans

increased their support to the Lebanese

army by providing them with

armored personnel

and

the

PLO

began

carriers, howitzers,

to fight

its

way

into the

Sabra and Shatila, and the Iranian

tanks.

At the same time,

abandoned refugee camps of

leftist

group called Islamic Amal

erected bunkers in front of the marine positions. So the peacekeeping

marines, already fighting a full-fledged war against soldiers,

now had

men dug

in directly outside their perimeter.

a

new

Syrian

first-rate

adversary in Iranian revolutionary guards-

Despite the cease-fire, the marines were engaged in a vicious sniper war. Firefights

became nearly continuous, and

were killed and forty wounded. For a fleeting period

it

six

marines

seemed

that

the violence might have reached a peak, but in reaction to the

marines' successes with their night-vision devices and superb

fire dis-

cipline during sniper exchanges, a small extremist Shiite splinter

group with direct

ties

to Iran arrived

unannounced on

the scene.

These new fanatics were closely linked to the Islamic Jihad, or Holy War, and grew determined to exact revenge. This was the group linked to rael. It

many

past car

was probably

bombings and kidnappings

at this

in Beirut

juncture that the idea of massive

and

Is-

retalia-

tion against the marines was formulated, and since these radicals did

not possess heavy weapons of their own, they would resort to to

do

bombs

the job.^

On

October 12 the U.S. Congress voted to allow President Rea-

gan to keep the marines in Lebanon for an additional eighteen

months

Law

as

an extension of the authorization to send troops. Public

98-119.

On

remote-controlled

October 19 four marines were wounded when

bomb, hidden

to their resupply convoy.

downplay the tar fire

fighting,

landing

among

in a blue Mercedes,

exploded next

At home the U.S. government

and often reported that the

a

artillery

tried to

and mor-

the marines were just accidents intended for

the combating Lebanese militia forces, but the marines were in fact the targets.

On

Sunday morning, October

23, 1983, while

more than

three

(

Intervention

hundred marines and naval personnel

down

ton open-bed truck drove

and entered the parking

59

Lebanon

yellow Mercedes

slept, a

five-

the road west of the headquarters

lot in the

south front of the building. The

driver suddenly accelerated and, gaining circles in

in

momentum by

driving in

the lot several times, drove at high speed through the

barbed wire and concrete barricade between two guard posts. Before the guard could

open

the truck, loaded with

fire,

thousand pounds of TNT, everyone inside was

killed:

hit the building

and exploded. Almost

241 Americans including 220 marines, 18

navy medical corpsmen, and killed in a single

more than twelve

3 soldiers-the largest

number of marines

day since the invasion of Iwo Jima. The explosion de-

stroyed the building and blasted a forty-by-thirty-foot hole eight feet

deep beneath the concrete

floor.

Immediately following the bombing there was United States for

retaliation. Secretary

November

publicly in

the "sponsorship, knowledge,

ment."^ The

initial

Iranian training

of Defense Weinberger stated

had

that Iranians

a strong call in the

carried out the attack with

and authority of the Syrian govern-

reaction was to plan to strike back

camp

in the Baalbek region

by bombing

of the Bekaa

However, there was grave concern for the security of the marines ashore with their battered battalion their defenses. Despite strong

Navy John R Lehman, Jr., ing,

who

the

Valley. still

were busily reestablishing

recommendations by Secretary of the

to retaliate against

someone

for the

bomb-

Weinberger and General John Vessey, the chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, opposed immediate

strikes,

and the United

States

hesitated.

In

November

the Twenty-second Marine

to relieve those embattled marines

mained

in

Amphibious Unit

of the Twenty-fourth

arrived

who

Lebanon. Under the revised security procedures, only

companies remained ashore while units stayed aboard

all

rifle

company north of

maining marine units dispersed

rifle

headquarters and supporting

amphibious ships off the

replaced one marine

re-

coast.

Lebanese troops

the airport, and the re-

their forces into freshly prepared

command posts. who had also suffered

hard bunkers and

The French,

casualties

from

terrorists,

60

America's splendid little wars

struck back

But

still

by bombing the Iranians

the Americans delayed.

strike against Syrian targets east

same

in Baalbek

The

conducted

of Beirut on December

Navy conducted

day, the U.S.

Israelis

with two F-14s flying from the carrier

a

The

firing

of these

from Washington radar positions in

an A-7 Corsair

tactics

mount major air strikes Lebanon. On December 4 to

at

fly-

by Soviet-made

air strike

gun and

the Sixth Fleet attacked

and

in the process lost

An A-6 Intruder bomber and downed. One airman died; another

surface-to-air missiles. II

were hit and

caused these

lost eight

flight

Kennedy. While

against Syrian

a

month

later.

Poor planning,

haste,

and

losses.

The marines ashore came under heavy rocket and

Later the

surface-to-air-missiles but not hit.

was captured and released

bad

3.

antiaircraft missiles finally triggered approval

Syrian targets with a major carrier

two airplanes to

16.

a large air

photo reconnaissance

USSJohn F.

ing low over the Beirut area, the F-14s were fired

SA-7 shoulder-launched

on November

men. From

this

attack immediately

point until the final withdrawal or-

dered by President Reagan in February 1984, the U.S. and other

MNF

contingents

came under

relentless attack

from weapons of

all

types, including surface-to-surface missiles, antitank rockets, small

arms, and even tanks. The original mission of deterrence and peace-

keeping had given way completely. In February 1984 vicious fighting erupted between Lebanese gov-

ernment troops and the various Muslim lost control

The Lebanese army

of the situation when the hard-line Amal faction suc-

ceeded in forcing

all

Muslims

Amal and Druze went on the Lebanese ally

factions.

to leave the Lebanese

the offensive. These

army became locked

in

army and

Muslim

combat, and the

militias

the

and

militias eventu-

overran Christian-controlled West Beirut. The Lebanese army

collapsed,

and the Amal factions who did not wish

marines pulled back, while the marines

filled the

positions vacated

some of the surrendering Lebanese army. The mission territorial integrity

of Lebanon had

failed,

to fight the

to support the

and there was no other

choice than to depart. British forces withdrew on February

lowed by the

Italians

by

7,

and French. The remaining U.S. Marines,

fol-

ex-

Intervention

cept for eighty

who

Lebanon

in

were guarding the U.S. embassy

were flown out by hehcopter on March

3

in East Beirut,

and returned to

1

61

their ships

off the coast. The Druze mihtia occupied the marines' former posi-

and the U.S. force remained on board ship off the coast

tions,

until

April 10.

U.S. troops had been

on

the ground in

during which 266 Americans of

wounded.

On

by yet another

twenty-three people and

could be

Lebanon

for 533 days,

services were killed

and 151 were

September 20, 1984, the annex of the U.S. embassy

Beirut was struck

"martyrs" in

all

suicide truck attack,

wounded

killed

Three Muslim

eight marines.

Lebanon had proved how

which

in

bombings

effective suicide

as a tool to achieve their objectives-in this case, the with-

drawal of the

MNF.

The purpose of the intervention

in

Lebanon had been

to keep the

warring factions apart in Beirut, but the end results were sectarian vio-

more than

lence that continued well into 1993 and claimed

thousand

lives.

sixty-three

Thirty thousand Syrian troops continued to occupy

the country in 2001,

and the newly formed

radical revolutionary

group Hezbollah controlled southern Lebanon. America's eighteen-

month involvement

In

November 1983

in

Lebanon had

Secretary of Defense Weinberger established a

commission headed by

commander

in

failed despite the great cost.

retired

Admiral Robert

chief Pacific, to

investigate

Lebanon. The Long Commission found that the did not cover attacks

Blame

Long,

a

rules

command.

in

the Beirut embassy and the marine barracks.

on

the

In the commission's report issued in December,

and Iran were held

A House Armed

former

of engagement

for not supervising the marines' security was placed

chain of Syria

on

L.J.

what went wrong

at least indirectly

responsible for the attack.

Services subcommittee conducted

its

own

investiga-

tion and found not only that the security had been "inadequate" but also that the Marine Amphibious Unit commander had "made seri-

ous errors of judgment in failing to provide better protection for his troops

"^

AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS

62

Why

didn't the marines take adequate security measures? Their

presence in Beirut had certainly been highly visible within the U.S.

command

chain of command. The marine

stream of recurring

visits

in

Lebanon had endured

by senior Defense Department

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, the

a

officials, the

European Supreme Com-

mander, the chief of Naval Operations, the commander of the Sixth

and the commandant of the Marine Corps

Fleet,

mander of the Amphibious Task als

and admirals had

visited the

their operation before the

focus

bomb

no purpose other than

served

on

the issues at

Force.

A

of twenty-four gener-

total

marines during the entire period of destroyed their barracks. These

to distract the small

hand-no

com-

as well as the

visits

command from

its

precise or significant guidance was

offered toward interpreting the marines' rules of engagement or,

more

seriously, the

mission found

Com-

changing nature of their mission. The Long

no

this fact disturbing, especially since

tions were taken to change or

corrective ac-

improve the marines' security or

their

mode of operations. Noninterference was viewed chain of

as a

command who remembered

good thing by many the long

of war in Southeast Asia beleaguered by

and obstruction

same area sures

for

at all levels.

more than

political

micromanagement

The marines had been

a year,

and

in the

and frustrating years

billeted in the

their limited defensive

and lack of adequate control points were

justified

mea-

by some

as

being in keeping with their diplomatic mission. At the congressional hearings into the deaths of the marines.

Habib was asked

if

Ambassador

fected the political goals of the marine intervention. "It

impaired

the

Philip

increased defensive measures would have af-

diplomatic

mission,"

he

replied.



would have

Said

Admiral

Robert Long, "Our marines didn't belong in Beirut under those conditions."^

On

^

the very day the explosion ripped through the marine bar-

racks in

October 1983, President Reagan signed the approval

U.S. forces to intervene tect

American

two Marxist

The

final

citizens

on

the Caribbean

whose

lives

island of

Grenada

for

to pro-

might have been threatened by

political factions locked in a vicious

days of the American involvement in

power

struggle.

Lebanon were over-

Intervention

in

shadowed by the intercession of combined United

Lebanon States

63

and Ca-

ribbean forces in Grenada. The long and painful American involve-

ment

in

Lebanon, although executed with valor and determination

by forces made up mostly of marines, seemed to have been in vain. Worse yet, the same mistakes would be repeated in a civil war in Somalia in 1993. Little was learned from the intervention in Lebanon.

i

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