Since the evacuation of Saigon in 1975, America has committed its forces to combat in more than a dozen military operati
350 69 44MB
English Pages 272 [288] Year 2003
"A must for
all
Americans."
—TOM
CLANCY
AMERICA'S
SPLENDID LITTLE AVARS A Short History of U.S. Military
Engagements: 1975-2000
PETER HUCHTHAUSEN Author of K-19: The
Widowmaker and October Fu
— $25.95 DA $39.00
Ince the evacuation of Saigon
s
America has committed more than
America's Splendid States
a
in
1975,
forces to
its
dozen military operations.
Little
Wars shows how
the United
— now the world's sole remaining superpower
has enforced the global "Pax Americana" by honing the military's capability to strike
desired targets, and also
by making sophisticated use of the media and public sentiment.
From the 1975 operation
hijacked merchant ship
Siam
to the
1
999
to recover the
SS Mayaguez
"relief intervention" in
in
the Gulf of
Kosovo,
distin-
guished author and former U.S. naval captain Peter
Huchthausen presents an intimate tary
history of
each
engagement through eyewitness accounts,
ough research, and
his
mili-
thor-
unique insider perspective as
an intelligence expert.
Huchthausen's fresh analysis of the
cue attempt, the invasions
of
the Gulf War, and the missions
Iran
in
Somalia and Bosnia
demonstrates the evolution of
ware,
communications,
policy
He
res-
Grenada and Panama,
lucidly
technologies.
hostage
battlefield hard-
and command and control
explores as well the impact on U.S.
and popular perceptions, and the underlying
motivations for these interventions, which were often peripheral to
and expertly cesses
vital
U.S. national interests. This unique
told history reveals the struggles
that created America's
and suc-
new
0803
ALLEN COUNTY PUBLIC LIBRAR
GRB
3 1833 04410 8071
VVfTHeRAWN
I
I
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE
WARS
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE A
WARS
SHORT HISTORY OF
U.S.
MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS:
1975-2000
Peter Huchthausen
VIKING
VIKING Published by the Penguin Group
Penguin Group (USA)
375
Inc.,
Hudson
Penguin Books Ltd, 80 Strand, London
Street,
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York,
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Penguin Books Ltd, Registered Offices: 80 Strand, London First
published in 2003 by Viking Penguin, a
10
987654321
Copyright
©
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&
WC2R ORL, England
member of Penguin Group (USA)
Aviation Publishing
Inc.
Company of America, 2003
All rights reserved
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Huchthausen, Peter A., 1939America's splendid little wars a short history of U.S. military engagements: 1975-2000 / Peter A. Huchthausen. cm. p. Includes bibliographical references and index. :
ISBN 1.
0-670-03232-8
United States-History, Military-20th century.
History-20th century. 4.
3.
United States-Military
2.
Intervention (International law)-
Presidents-United States-History-20th century. Policy.
I.
Title.
E840.4 .H83 2003
2002038025
973.92-dc21 This
book
is
printed
on
acid-free paper.
^
Printed in the United States of America All
maps by Mark
Stein Studios
Without limiting the
may be
rights
under copyright reserved above, no part of
this
publication
reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any
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appreciated.
To if
my grandchildren,
ever called
on
Ewan, Bailey Anne, Blake, and Nicholas;
to fight for
your country, do so
but always with compassion for the beleaguered.
well,
Acknowledgments
I
deeply appreciate the assistance and counsel of Jim and Dorothy
Clunan, both dedicated foreign service
officers
and longtime
friends.
Their rich experience in diplomatic posts in Moscow, Kuwait, Belgrade, Ankara,
London, and Naples made
from
their contributions
the political-military field indispensable, and their patient editing was invaluable. Special thanks to
Ambassador Paul D.
Taylor,
who
pro-
vided his capable views of Latin America in the chapter on Panama.
am
also grateful for the insights
professor emeritus of history at the University of Southern
Gorham. at
I
and forbearance of Joyce Bibber,
Maine
in
Special thanks to Diane Barnes, former professor of history
Tuskegee University and the University of Maine, for her unique
ideas,
and Jack Barnes, veteran educator, author,
traveler,
and farmer, for
Jan Snouck-Hurgronje,
his advice
who
literary critic,
and encouragement.
conceived the idea for
this
I
world
also
thank
book and
per-
severed in getting the project under way. I
am
indebted to
my
Academy
U.S. Naval
classmate Admiral Sir
Leighton "Snuffy" Smith, one of the few U.S. naval officers in tory to be granted knighthood by a British monarch,
deep insight into the military events in the Balkans, and ership of U.S. and
proved so
vital.
NATO
Thanks
Admiral Joe Metcalf
and the
for their invaluable contributions
the
offered
whose
lead-
forces during the intervention in Bosnia
also to Brigadier General
III,
who
his-
late
David Grange, Vice
Captain John Michael Rodgers
from
their personal experiences in
Mayaguez and Iran rescue missions, Grenada, and the Gulf War.
viii
Acknowledgments
The views of U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonels Weiss on their participation in the Gulf spective
from the
trenches.
I
am
Peter Mueller
War gave me
a
and Ben
unique per-
also deeply thankful for the guid-
ance and inspiration of Ernest H. Knight, veteran, historian, and oracle of
who
Raymond, Maine, and
cared for and fed
me
while
I
for the fresh suggestions of Kathy,
undertook
this project.
Contents
Acknowledgments
vii
List of Maps
xi
Introduction
xiii
PART ONE Gerald R. Ford: Rebounding Against Piracy Chapter
1.
Recovering SS Mayaguez and the Fight
on Koh Tang PART
1
TWO James
3
E. Carter, Jr.:
Choosing Military Action
19
Chapter
2.
America and Special Warfare
21
Chapter
3.
The Hostage Rescue Attempt
27
PART THREE Ronald W. Reagan: Lashing Out
43
Chapter
4.
Intervention in
Lebanon
45
Chapter
5.
Intervention in Grenada
65
Chapter
6.
Retaliatory Attacks
on Libya
Chapter 7 Escort and Retaliation
87
in the Persian
Gulf
PART FOUR George H. W. Bush: Using a Big Stick
97 111
Chapter
8.
Storming Panama
113
Chapter
9.
The Gulf War: Desert Shield
127
Chapter
10.
The Gulf War: Desert Storm
Chapter
11.
The Rescue of the Kurds
in
Northern Iraq
142 152
X
Contents
PART FIVE Intervention
in
Somalia
159
Chapter
12. President
Bush Responds
Chapter
13. President
CHnton Crosses
PART SIX William J. Clinton:
On
to Starvation
the
Mogadishu Line
the Edge of the Balkans
161
170 183
Chapter
14. Intervention in
Bosnia
185
Chapter
15. Intervention in
Kosovo
212
Conclusions
219
Notes
221
Bibliography
231
Index
--
241
Maps
The Mayaguez Incident The
Persian
Iran:
Gulf Area,
2 1
26
980s
The Delta Entry/Exit
Plan, April 24-28, 1980
31
Lebanon, 1983
44
U.S. Sector, Beirut, October 1983
46
Grenada and the Caribbean
64
Grenada
-
77
Libya and the Gulf of Sidra, 1986
86
The Persian Gulf Area, 1980s
98
Panama
Military Installations in
112
Objectives of Operation Just Cause
122
Expected Iraqi Avenues of Approach
138
Conduct of the
Persian
Gulf War
147
Somalia and Mogadishu
160
The Balkans
184
Introduction
Since the evacuation of Saigon in April 1975, the United States gov-
ernment has committed military operations. In
its
forces to
some
combat
cases, the
a country to protect or evacuate
in
more than
a
dozen
United States briefly invaded
American and foreign noncombat-
ants caught in volatile security situations. In other instances, U.S.
forces intervened at the request of friendly nations allies to liberate
occupied lands, to stop mass
blatant violations of
book
that
human
encompassed the
rights. Until
full
and joined with
killing,
and to thwart
now, there has been no
American military experience
since
1975 in one volume or explored this period in relation to past conflicts
and
its
larger
impact on modern world history. There are books
that address the individual conflicts
and some that study American
warfare of the 1990s in general, but this
engagement of the
military
book focuses on each U.S.
last twenty-five years
of the twentieth
century.
In the
first
thirty years following the
gles in Greece, Korea, Berlin,
American
end of World War
II,
Vietnam, and the Caribbean
strug-
foiled
aspirations for peace in a seemingly never-ending global
Communism. In the decades after the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, as the Communist sphere withered away, America, now the sole world military power, was plagued by other nasty conflicts. By the turn of the new millennium, it was clear that the Pax contest with
Americana had been rian age
as
troubled as the Pax Britannica of the Victo-
and the Pax Romana of ancient times.
Introduction
xiv
The following chapters explore the underlying motivation itary intervention, which, in
many
was peripheral to
cases,
for mil-
vital
U.S.
national interests. Each engagement, from the 1975 operation to
re-
cover the hijacked merchant ship SS Mayaguez and her crew in the
Gulf of Siam through the Iran hostage
and
crisis
conflicts
in
Grenada, the Middle East, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, the Balkans, and finally Kosovo, the
last
American military operation of
examined
in a purely historical context.
the twentieth century,
is
Sometimes American
forces
were successful; on occasion they
merely interrupted the ugly work of dictators. In a few
government
initiated action
cases, the U.S.
on humanitarian grounds only
after the
world media deluged the public with wrenching coverage of
suffer-
ing-often in countries of little obvious relevance to U.S. national terests.
One
largely
unknown
military
action
1991
in
in-
was an
exceptional, bloodless success. Called Operation Eastern Exit, this
extraordinary evacuation of 281 American and foreign personnel
from Mogadishu, Somalia, was
navy and marine operation
a joint
that involved extreme-range helicopter flights ings.
Other engagements,
like
tion of
allies,
air-to-air refuel-
Operation Desert Storm in 1991, were
full-scale wars, albeit brief, that
The United
and
Americans fought with
a
broad
coali-
using both conventional and special operations forces.
States
employed limited conventional and semi-special
operations forces during the 1991 and 1993 conflicts in Somalia. In 1987,
convoying operations
conducted primarily by
NATO
of the Iran-Iraq War were
in the course
naval forces.
In the 1990s, America and
intervened in Bosnia and Kosovo to stop the blatant slaughter
of innocent
civilians
by Balkan
clans. Tactical air operations
dictators
and
their
marauding ethnic
dominated the fighting
cent conflicts and presented their lenges and strategic solutions.
own
set
in these
more
re-
of unique operational chal-
Each military engagement
in
this
history demonstrates the progression of a blend of battlefield hard-
ware, improved communications, and command-and-control technologies. This
melding has led to both great success,
and heavy
of life for
loss
little
as in
Kuwait,
purpose, as in Somalia.
Across the breadth of the United States, in places large and small, subtle exhibits
remind us of the
men and women who
participated in
xv
Introduction
one or more of the
jarring post-Vietnam confrontations. Small glass
cases display military awards,
daughters in
and aging photographs of sons and
uniform dot the dusty corners of
homes, reminding families of their offspring's
diners, shops,
and
service.
In an 1898 letter to Lieutenant Colonel Theodore Roosevelt fol-
lowing the
fall
of Santiago, Cuba, U.S. Ambassador John Milton Hay
used the phrase "splendid
little
war" to refer to the bloody victories
of the Spanish-American War. The U.S. military encounters from 1975 to 1999 were neither splendid nor small. Instead, the personal adventures of the blood-caked veterans described in these pages more accurately reflect the words of the duke of Wellington in 1815: "[A] great country can have
these veterans is
no such thing
do not speak
as a little war."
Because most of
in public about their battle experiences,
it
necessary to record the details of these events so that neither the
participants nor their descendants forget
what they achieved.
PART ONE Gerald
R. Ford:
Rebounding Against
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AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
32
ment, a handful of Iranian revolutionary guard students scaled the walls
and seized the American embassy compound
tainly they
had the blessing of Khomeini, who had been
United States
and
in the
was not the
first
time the embassy had been
therefore puzzling
why
such an action took the em-
earlier. It it is
bassy by surprise. Nine months
earlier,
on February
14, revolutionar-
had attacked and captured the ambassador and some of
ies
On
that occasion
triumph with
members of Khomeini's
and within twenty-four hours
been
released.
security.
They
When
made
further
embassy
a
staff,
his staff.
recently returned in
had intervened on the ambassador's be-
their leader,
half,
offering the
coun-
months. The former shah had been admitted to the
try only nine
attacked,
in Tehran. Cer-
the
all
American captives had
provisions for token protection by
band of young revolutionary guards
the ultimate provocation
came
in
to act as
November,
it trig-
gered a long standoff between Iran and the United States that did not
end
until
444 days
later,
when
a shattered President Carter left the
White House.
The AyatoUah's takeover
in Iran
and the seizure of the U.S. em-
bassy in 1979, coupled with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
December of
the
same
year,
prompted
Carter Doctrine in his State of the 1980.
It
stated:
the Persian terests
the president to declare his
Union Address on January
"An attempt by an outside power
Gulf region
will
be regarded
as
to gain control
an assault on the
by any means necessary, including military
a
will
be
force." This pol-
icy provided the direct rationale for developing the U.S.
ployment Force,
of
vital in-
of the United States of America, and such an assault
repelled
23,
Rapid De-
conventional unit designed to respond
large
quickly at extreme distances from home. Events of that year also
drew more American naval forces into the
main
at
reduced
levels for the next
reliable U.S. military bases
reluctance to
area,
where they would
re-
twenty years. Given the lack of
on Saudi Arabia's
soil,
and that country's
make binding defense arrangements with Western pow-
ers,
America was limited
ties
there
and elsewhere
to developing only
in the region.
to handle potential surges
should the need
arise.
minimal
logistic facili-
These provided the capability
of American forces on
a
temporary basis
The Hostage Rescue Attempt
33
President Carter frequently but reluctantly considered military action against Iran to gain release of the
American hostages.
A long and
anguishing period during which negotiations and limited economic sanctions failed produced
no
results,
The military choices addressed by
but a rescue seemed a long shot.
his national security advisers in-
cluded imposing a blockade, mining Iranian ports, unleashing
and
lected air strikes against Iranian oil refineries,
complex rescue mission formed army After the
to be
se-
a carefully crafted,
conducted by Delta Force, the newly
special operations antiterrorist unit.
first
occupation of the embassy
compound
in February,
Delta Force had requested permission to send a team to Tehran to
conduct
a detailed survey
ticipation of
some
sort
of the embassy and
its
of future operafion. The
surroundings in an-
Army Chief of Staff,
General Edward C. Meyer, denied permission for Delta to survey the area,
an unfortunate decision that proved in the end to greatly com-
plicate
planning when the army was ordered to formulate a hostage-
rescue plan later that year.
Then Delta Force requested
a covert
reconnaissance flight into Iran to locate staging areas for a possible rescue attempt. This request was
sought from the president on
first
February 28. President Carter denied the request on the basis that the mission might
March
fail
and jeopardize diplomatic negotiations.^
7 National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secre-
tary of State
Cyrus Vance resubmitted
sance mission and were again turned
he
felt
On
a proposal for the reconnais-
down by
that such a mission, if discovered,
the president because
might further provoke the
Iranians.^
After four called a
months of frustradng
talks
with Iran, President Carter
meeting of the National Security Council to review
tary solution.
During
on Saturday, March
this gathering,
which was held
at
a mili-
Camp
David
22, 1980, the president finally approved a recon-
commitment of special operafions personthe hostages by force. The meeting began at
naissance mission and the nel to attempt to rescue
10:45 A.M. and continued until 3:30 P.M.
Panama
to investigate the possibilit}^ of
considering an invitation by President in Egypt. President Carter
had
just
The shah was then settling there.
Anwar Sadat
to
visiting
He was end
also
his flight
spoken to Sadat and persuaded
34
America's splendid little wars
him
more prudent
that Egypt was a
States.
place of refuge than the United
Sadat beHeved he could weather the political consequences,
and the shah flew to Egypt the next day,
president
The
on
lack
General
just as air force
David Jones, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, briefed the
the details of a planned rescue mission.
of intelligence that had frustrated any possibility of an
immediate rescue mission had
from
military was receiving reports
Additionally,
some
finally
been overcome, and the U.S.
allied foreign observers in Iran.
agents from the Defense Intelligence Agency's In-
Any
telligence
Support Activity had been sent into
would be
particularly difficult to formulate, because
Iran.
it
rescue plan
would
take
place in a landlocked capital in a country surrounded by states
openly hostile to the United
Union,
States: the Soviet
and
Iraq,
Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Although the locations of the hostages
were generally known, together quickly and
it
was not
moved
easily
essary that a rescue plan include
search a large
likely that they
during a rescue. Thus,
enough time
number of buildings
could be mustered
in the
it
was nec-
for the rescue forces to
embassy compound before
gathering the hostages and rescue forces together and whisking
them
out of the city and the country. General Jones was certain that
if
rescue forces could get into the
compound without
the
alerting the revo-
lutionary guards, the operation stood a high chance of success. Getting into the difficult
compound and
evacuating the Americans seemed
less
than getting the rescue forces to the embassy and surprising
the guards.
The army devised
a rescue plan that consisted
of separate phases,
each of which could be terminated and the forces withdrawn, essary,
worse.
if
nec-
without making the situation between the two countries
The
first
phase of the plan required positioning forces covertly
at various tactically
East. Certainly
advantageous locations throughout the Middle
one of the most challenging aspects of the
eration was to keep secret a large
movement of
entire op-
specialist units
from
the observant eyes of the free press and the Soviets. The potentially
high
visibility
of the particular ground,
air,
and naval forces that
might be expected to take part in an engagement of
this
kind
the operational security of the effort a key aspect of the plan.
made
The Hostage Rescue Attempt
Camp
The main purpose of the March 22
David meeting was
35
to set a
timetable in motion so that once the president decided to go, a
hearsed force would be ready with minimal delay. called Desert
One was
A
re-
staging base
selected in the remote Great Salt Desert, near
town of Tabas, two hundred miles southeast of Tehran. The plan
the
was to
night in a combination of fixed-wing aircraft
fly in a force at
and long-range hehcopters coming from
would converge
force
different directions.
from huge bladders delivered by the fixed-wing
fuel
assault force,
The
Desert One, where the helicopters would
at
and take off again for
aircraft,
re-
load the
a spot called the hide site near
Garmsar, eighty miles southeast of Tehran. They would then land and conceal the helicopters, the
rest,
and wait
in darkness for their assault
on
embassy compound.
The plan required long-range distance with
maximum
helicopters to fly an incredibly long
fuel load
and minimal cargo. The mission,
code-named Eagle Claw, included more than one hundred pants.
Two
Iranian generals
who had
partici-
fled Iran during the revolution
were to help the rescuers get in and out of the embassy. Altogether, the
team consisted of ninety Delta
voy of hostages and
rescuers,
and
rangers, twelve drivers for the cona
twelve-man road-watch team,
cluding interpreters, that would secure Desert intruders.
An
would enter
One
in-
against chance
additional thirteen-man Special Forces assault team
the Iranian foreign ministry
and
free three hostages
who
were held separately. Delta's ninety-man assault team was divided into three groups: Red, White,
and Blue. After the road-watch teams
were withdrawn from Desert One, 120 hide
men would
continue to the
site.
The
rescuers expected the assault
on
the embassy
the most certain part of the operation, and peatedly. Getting the hostages also well rehearsed
it
compound
part of the operation.
The rescue force had
re-
and rescue teams out of Tehran was
and was not considered to be the most
The long
were made complex and
to be
had been rehearsed
flights
difficult
to take off
in and out of
by the necessity
from an
difficult
Iran, however,
for concealment.
aircraft carrier in the
Gulf
36 of
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
Oman. Because
deck in the tails,
had
the helicopters
carrier's
to be
hidden below the
flight
hangar bay, which required them to have folding
the choice of aircraft was limited to navy helicopters.
The mis-
sion of the helicopters was so closely held, and the importance and vitality
fare
of the
effort so well concealed, that
the
navy mine war-
squadron commanders were ordered to provide some of their he-
licopters for
an undefined joint operation, they naturally offered up
their aircraft with the worst
using navy
RH-53D
and folding
tail
At it
first
maintenance records. The plan
on
Sea Stallion helicopters, since they had the range
assembly that allowed them to be concealed in the
the navy wanted the helicopters to be flown
had no
settled
hangar bay.
aircraft carrier
but
when
pilots experienced in the type
by navy
pilots,
of low-level night flying
required by the special rescue force. Nevertheless, navy pilots
came
with the helicopters and began training with Delta Force, but
soon
became obvious
it
that they were unsuited to the type of flying re-
quired by the mission. The Joint Chiefs of Staff then selected Marine
Corps
even though they, too, had
pilots to fly the helicopters
of secrecy the
special operations flight training. For reasons
little
partici-
pants had not once trained together. Incredibly, the entire force never
met
until the operation began.
Why Delta
lots
with the required training
is still
of
Force was not assigned pi-
With
a mystery.
the
mixed bag
services involved in the operation, experts claim that the mission
commander. Colonel Charles Beckwith, never
mand of the
really
had
overall
com-
effort.
The mission began on April
on time from
24, 1980.
The
helicopters lifted off
the carrier Nimitz but promptly flew into two big
clouds of suspended dust and sand that caused them to veer off course and to delay their arrival by
The
first six
more than an hour
of the eight helicopters arrived
to ninety minutes late,
at
at
Desert One.
One from sixty arrived. One of the
Desert
and the other two never
missing landed with mechanical failure and was abandoned. The
crew boarded the eighth, which was not damaged, and returned to the carrier Nimitz.
At Desert One
a third helicopter
was declared un-
usable owing to a hydraulic failure. Faced with having only five out
of the
minimum
six helicopters that
he needed for the mission, Colo-
The Hostage Rescue Attempt nel Beckwith
made
37
make
the difficult decision to abort. Then, to
RHHC-130 Her-
matters worse, while preparing to evacuate the staging area, one
53D
helicopter collided with one of the six fixed-wing
cules in the mission
men
(five air
several
force
and both
men and
aircraft burst into flames, killing eight
three marines)
and seriously wounding
more.
The rescue plan by the Vietnam-era
itself
was complex, haphazard, and characterized
practices
of employing
niques that avoided centralized initiative.
civilian
management
command and impeded
Even more deplorable was
tech-
individual
the finger-pointing that fol-
lowed. Senior administration figures second-guessed the determination and even the courage of the mission participants, particularly the
helicopter pilots. In postaction accounts several senior
White House
claimed that two of the three helicopters that aborted the
officials
mission because of mechanical failure could have continued on. Specifically, they referred to the cockpit instrument
the
BIM
warning
lights,
(Blade Inspection Method) in the two helicopters that
aborted. These lights had indicated possible early stages of internal structural failure in the rotors
and that the blades were losing the
pressure of the inert nitrogen gas indications did not necessarily criticism
is
inside.'^
make
unwarranted, and those
Some
critics
claimed these
the helicopter inoperable.^ Such
who
participated in the mission
were the most qualified to judge those matters.
When
President Carter told the
tempt to
free the hostages
symbol of military ter at
failure
American people
that a rescue at-
had been unsuccessful, the event became that was hard to overcome. After the
Desert One, the secretary of defense appointed a special inves-
tigative
panel chaired by Admiral James
L.
Holloway
chief of Naval Operations, to seek recommendations lessons learned.
Made
III, a
former
and elucidate
public in August 1980, the report of the rescue
mission prepared by Admiral Holloway and all
a
disas-
five
other officers from
the participating services was a comprehensive, independent evalu-
ation of
all
aspects of the mission.^
The choice of using navy
helicopters flown
by Marme Corps
pilots
38
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
was a point of considerable censure singled out as
one of the primary reasons
Another glaring
sion.
Holloway
in the
issue that
report,
and was
for the failure of the mis-
marred the operation was the absence
of the helicopters' unit maintenance personnel aboard the Nimitz.
By default, necessary maintenance
USS
for the unusual helicopters
men of the Nimitz helicopter squadron, own Sea Kings and not the RH-53D Sea
had to be performed by the
who
were trained on their
Stallion, a totally different kind
of helicopter. Spare-parts shortages
and poor maintenance plagued the rescue mission, which was characteristic
of the poor defense management of the 1970s. These
compounded by
One
to Desert
secrecy and haste,
made
errors,
the long and difficult flight
nearly impossible to achieve successfully.
It is
unlikely
that the precise cause of the mechanical failures will ever be deter-
mined. Flying
at
extremely low altitude over
five
hundred miles of
desert beneath Iranian radar coverage, a total of six
from the
carrier,
Whether
was a superhuman and heroic
a rescue
feat in
hundred miles and of itself.
mission with properly trained personnel and
well-maintained equipment could have succeeded remains an open question. rity
Gary
Council
Sick,
who
staff, said
on
served
that the rescue was a military failure, not a
ure of political judgment or
command.
David Grange, who served
as a
part of the rescue force, saw
it
prise, ful.
President Carter's National Secu-
forces,
During the American embassy
would have had some
disagreed.
Kennedy
a success."^
not
all
"Due
.
said,
to the audacity, sur-
.
am
success-
and extraction out of
.
casualties, I
and some of the
convinced the mission
Former hostage Moorhead Kennedy
"The Iranians had warned us
as
early
February,"
as
"that they hoped Mr. Carter would do nothing foolish
like a helicopter rescue if
^
Retired Brigadier General
we would have been
assault
hostages would have been hurt, but
would have been
fail-
Ranger company commander and
differently:
and training of the ground
Iran, the force
^^
attempt, for they were ready for
of us would be
Washington knew
killed.
.
.
that Mr. Carter
.
Don't you think
if
it,
and some
everyone in
was running out of options, the
students might have arrived at the same conclusion and taken precautions accordingly?"'^
The Hostage Rescue Attempt
Another
39
point in studying the mission in hindsight
critical
is
the
massive security assistance present in Iran, the
fact that despite the
U.S. government lacked any effective remaining intelligence sources
on
had been forced
the ground and
operations nearly from scratch.
^^
to begin intelligence collection
The HoUoway Commission's
find-
ings ultimately resulted in the creation of the Special Operations
way
visory Panel that was to pave the separate Joint Special Operations
The
failure
Ad-
forming
a
Command.
of the rescue mission in Iran was the lowest point of
American military esteem
in the post-Vietnam era.
midst of a period of international caused by the
crisis
in the future for
American military
oil shortage,
life
in the
and the deteriorating conditions of
in late 1970s.
During
time
this
The
of the 1970s had forced the navy to decrease
many were
happened
domestic economic
instability, a
struggling to remain operationally ready.
half in ten years, and
It
all
services
were
austere defense budgets its
number of ships by
unable to go to sea for lack of ade-
quate manning. Air force aircraft were frequently cannibalized for spare parts to keep a bare
minimum number
flying,
and 7 percent
were grounded because of a spare parts supply shortage. The junior grades of the eral
armed
minimum
their families
forces were paid less than 85 percent of the fed-
wage, and
many
servicemen had no choice but to put
on food stamp programs.
Less than half of the military
were high school graduates. Morale was reflected in the retention rates
of
for example, was barely 28 percent,
at
an all-time low, which was
all services.
Navy
pilot retention,
which seriously diluted the
fleet's
air capabilities.
The fect
failure
of the Iran rescue mission had
a severe
and
lasting ef-
on American military leadership. Never again would U.S. committed without possessing an overwhelming advannumbers and firepower. The operation had been planned
forces be tage in
and rehearsed over
a period
could not be dismissed
as
of more than
six
months, and
its
failure
simply due to mechanical problems. Not
having an adequate number of helicopters to back up those that failed
proved to be an error that would
operations.
Caspar Weinberger,
affect
many
future military
President Reagan's secretary of
40
America's splendid little wars
defense, stated that during the preparations for the next American
mihtary engagement, the intervention in Grenada three years
later,
he had ordered General John Vessey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to double the assets he thought necessary to do the job because of the results of the failed hostage-rescue mission.
Costly and futile as the Iran rescue attempt was, the end result was a
necessary boost to the acceptance of the special operations troops
not only legitimate but also necessary, given the changing nature
as
of human
conflict.
There has always been a general feeling in the United States that its
diplomats abroad should be protected. Throughout history Britain
has shared the same belief concerning
Henry Palmerston declared
Foreign Secretary Lord
House of Commons: "As from
indignity,
subjects. In
its
the
Roman
when he could
subject in whatever land he
say
in days
civis
may
1850 British
in a debate in the
of old held himself
Romanus sum, so
free
also a British
be, shall feel confident that the
watchful eye and strong arm of England will protect him against justice
and wrong." In 1864, when Emperor Theodore of Abyssinia
imprisoned Queen Victoria's consul to the Abyssinian court and tured
in-
him because of a diplomatic faux
force that triggered the Abyssinian War.
tor-
pas, the British reacted with a
The Crown
sent forth an ex-
pedition consisting of thirteen thousand British and Indian soldiers in a
campaign
lasting
more than
three years. In April 1868 they
at-
tacked the Abyssinian fortress of Magdala, killed seven hundred Abyssinians, and rescued the consul and a group of forty-eight other
European prisoners held by Emperor Theodore.^"* Just
two years
Red Brigade
after the hostage rescue
terrorists
kidnapped U.S.
James Dozier. The Pentagon,
State
attempt in Iran, Italian
Army
Brigadier General
Department, and Central
Intelli-
gence Agency spent an inordinate amount of time struggling over
who would
take action to find
and
free Dozier,
but the Italians suc-
ceeded in rescuing him. Congressional leaders were outraged and discouraged by interservice bickering, and in 1987 Congress passed a
law ordering the Defense Department to form
Operations
Command.
a
new Joint
Special
Senior military leaders fought the issue,
The Hostage Rescue Attempt feeling that Congress
the joint
was meddling in
command was formed and
their affairs, but in the
41
end
did extremely well, beginning
with the storming of Panama in 1989. However, more failures and
embarrassing operations were undertaken before that milestone was reached.
•I
J
PART THREE
Ronald W. Reagan Lashing Out
N
BEIRUT MNF WEST
French
"
Italian
MNF
Sabra"
/
-^
^
/ ^
Shatila
y^
V.
EAST BEIRUT
I
BEIRUT \^ C^
^
\
Tripoli -^^^O/iy
• Zegharta
MNF
British
MNF'
Airport
*Juniye
Beirut
^^
n^
Zahle
Mediterranean
• Suq
Sea
.J
al
/
Gharb
SYRIA
//
/
LEBANON
Saida
/
^
y^
/
y -/
Damascus
/ / I
( r'-^-/ i
Tibnin
•
En Naqura
Bent Jubayl^
',
\
I
/
/
ISRAEL
LEBANON, 1983 25
miles
^
CHAPTER
4
Intervention
Lebanon
in
June 1982-February 1984
In 1982 the United States sent marines into
Lebanon
as part
United Nations-sponsored multinational force including French, and Italian
army
units. Their
of
British,
mission was to supervise the
multaneous withdrawal of the U.S. -backed
Israeli
a
si-
and Soviet-backed
Syrian military forces poised for battle inside Lebanon. The buildup
followed the
Lebanon
Israeli
invasion in 1982 and threatened to transform
Over
into a full-scale battleground.
time, however, the mis-
sion of the international force failed to adjust to the dynamics the belligerents,
among
and the chances for successful peacekeeping gradu-
ally evaporated.
Roughly the
size
of the
state
out of the wreckage of the
World War It
I,
when
of Connecticut, Lebanon was created
Ottoman Empire's
the victorious Allies
drew up
Greater Syria after artificial
boundaries.
has a rich history and a mixed ethnic population with a myriad of
religious behefs. Following tively stable state
World War
governed by
a
II,
Lebanon emerged
parliamentary system in
as a rela-
which the
Christians enjoyed a majority. In subsequent years, the Muslims be-
came
the majority group, but the Christians retained control of the
government through manipulation of various power blocs during rigged elections. For
more than
ten years
Lebanon continued
to
SECTOR, BEIRUT OCTOBER 1983 U.S.
s T
^
Id
r
fs
HQ
24th
MAU
I^B^ Co.
A
Beirut International Airport
^/
y BO-X3^"^
Co-C ov
s^^
o^
N
S
Co. B
1/8
^ miles
Intervention
maintain a basically stable, Beirut, acting as
both
trade centers of the
47
Lebanon
if
weak, government with the capital,
a cultural
hub and one of the main commercial
Middle
East.
The saga of U.S. intervention ident
in
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Lebanon began
when
Pres-
sent in a military force to forestall
what
in
in 1958,
was perceived to be an attempt by acolytes of United Arab Republic leader
Gamal Abdel
Nasser, backed
by the Soviet Union,
to overthrow
government of Lebanese president Camille Chamoun. The Ameri-
the
can intervention, involving seventeen thousand army troops and marines, appeared to shore
up
and
the government's stability,
after a
few months the troops were successfully withdrawn. However, over the next ten years the situation in Lebanon steadily deteriorated as the
country became more and more embroiled in internecine
Renewed unrest began
in 1970 with
strife.
King Hussein's expulsion of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan. Led by Yasir Arafat
and with nowhere
tled in southern
else to go, the Palestinian fighters set-
Lebanon and began
to operate out
of those
areas,
using terror tactics to gather worldwide support for their cause. Several
thousand dedicated
PLO
Lebanon and began
fighters settled in
from the
vicinity
of Beirut, which had
tory of peaceful coexistence
among
its
forays against Israel
ian residents.
With
the influx of the
to suffer serious sectarian violence.
relatively
long
his-
Muslim, Jewish, and Christ-
PLO, however, Lebanon began By early 1975 civil war erupted
between the Christians and the Muslims and
Over time Lebanon's
a
weak
central
their Palestinian allies.
government gave way
under the pressure of inter-Arab disputes and the outbreak of long-
dormant
internal conflict,
and by the
had become the primary locus of Arab-Israeli by 1981 the
Shiite
Lebanon
early 1980s southern
horrors. Additionally,
Mushms, who were among
the largest
and most
destitute sectarian communities in the world and occupied the bot-
tom of
formed
the Lebanese political structure,
the Palestinians in order to improve their tus.
With
mad, the
a belief system centered Shiite
on
a
new
alliance with
economic and
Ali, the son-in-law
political sta-
of
Muham-
branch of Islam had long been characterized by a
sense of persecution. During the 1980s, fanatical political groups in the
it
grew into one of the most
Middle East and harbored
a
more
48
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
virulent hatred for the
West than other branches of Islam.
that an accurate census in
have
a plurality,
Shiites felt
Lebanon would prove they might indeed
but their efforts were consistently curbed by the
more numerous and more moderate Sunni Muslims and
Ma-
the
from
ronite Christians, the Phalangists. Further grievances sprang
what they perceived
as the
disproportionate Christian wealth and
The governing Maronite Christian
power.
Gemayel
sect,
headed by the
clan in the 1980s, held the Palestinians primarily responsi-
ble for the loss of order.
While neighboring Syria had generally supported Palestinian forts against Israel,
its
politically astute President
Hafez
ef-
Assad en-
al
sured that no single faction became too powerful in Lebanon. To
prevent the
PLO
from gaining superiority
in
Lebanon
in 1976, Syria
even intervened sporadically on behalf of the Phalangists-a curious alliance,
but
of President Assad's
t}^pical
that, to protect its interests,
Lebanon
as a
methods. After
Syria kept tens of thousands troops
equipped and trained by the Soviet Union
rael,
political
in
Lebanon. Syria viewed
convenient place from which to stage attacks against
while Israel saw Lebanon as a potential buffer to protect
it
Is-
from
Syrian or Palestinian attacks.
Matters came to a head in April 1981,
when
Phalangist leaders de-
vised a scheme to draw the Israelis into a clash with the large Syrian forces
around the town of Zahle, the third
Lebanon,
largest city in
with a population of two hundred thousand (mostly Greek Orthodox). Zahle was the capital of the Bekaa Valley, the long narrow valley
lined
by mountains
that separates central
Lebanon from
Phalange leader Bashir Gemayel informed the
was
a
Syria.
The
Israelis that the city
major Phalange stronghold about to be surrounded and over-
run by Syrian commandos. Then, to confirm unit attacked
Syrian
soldiers
this claim, a Phalangist
guarding a bridge on the Beirut-
Damascus highway and destroyed two
tanks. President
Assad reacted
immediately and rushed Syrian reinforcements to Zahle by road and helicopter.
The Syrians troops behaved with considerable
burning crops and shelling the
an
air battle in
which
Israel
city.
downed
The ground
brutality,
fighting precipitated
a Syrian military helicopter,
Syria immediately installed Soviet-made
SAM-6
and
antiaircraft missiles
Intervention
Bekaa
in the
Valley.^ This miUtarization
of Israeli
led to a series
Lebanon and,
air strikes against
of the
strategic valley quickly
Syrian and
PLO
an increase in Palestinian
in response, to
49
Lebanon
in
positions in
and
artillery
rocket attacks against northern Israel launched from Lebanon.
Seeking to de-escalate the spiraling conflict, U.S. Ambassador
Habib hammered out
Philip
and the
plex,
tation:
First,
a cease-fire.
The agreement was com-
immediately began enforcing
Israelis
their
world constituted a violation of the delicate regional ond,
long
as
most
cease-fire. Sec-
of the
a violation
by the
cease-fire
side.^
While the rael,
in the
they were not actively shooting. If they were fired
as
upon, that action would constitute opposing
interpre-
were free to advance into any area peacefully,
Israeli forces
meaning
own
any Palestinian attack against Jews anywhere
PLO
Israelis
ish off the
PLO
Lebanon was focusing
in
viewed the situation
one
in
fell
its
hostility against Is-
opportunity to
as a perfect
swoop. Furthermore, some
Israelis,
fin-
such
as
Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, viewed the entire Arab-Israeli conflict at the
time
as
merely a sideshow of the Soviet-U.S. cold war. Sharon
PLO
believed that destroying the
worldwide terrorism and be
might bring an abrupt end to
a regional tactical defeat for the Soviet
Union. Secretary of State Alexander Haig held views similar
to
Sharon's.
The
Israelis
Lebanon when
claimed justification for a a "Palestinian"
gunman wounded
dor in London, even though four days
found
Abu
to be
from
full-scale
later the
invasion of
the Israeli ambassa-
would-be assassin was
completely different faction-the anti-Arafat Iraqi
a
Nidal group. The head of the hit squad was the cousin of
Abu
Lebanon
in a
Nidal. In any event,
on June
fierce effort to destroy the
6,
PLO
1982, Israel invaded
completely, and end years of
inter-
mittent warfare in which the vicfims had been mostly civilians.
The
Israelis successfully
advanced deep into the Bekaa Valley
against Syrian forces while the
indeed to survive,
fought to hold on in Beirut and
as Israeli forces cut off
Grave concern for innocent lent
PLO
urban fighting
if Israel
civilians
and surrounded the
who might
be caught
city.
in vio-
advanced into Beirut formed the
basis
of a Lebanese request for a multinational force to be brought in to
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
50
separate the belligerents. France, Italy, the United States, and Britain
were asked to contribute to the force. Secretary of State Haig backed
American
participation, arguing that the
the presence of three foreign armies in
main obstacle
to peace
keeping" force, the military arm of the PLO, and the
army-all
Israeli
of which were stronger than the Lebanese army.^ The idea of pating in such an international force was at tary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
was
Lebanon-the Syrian "peace-
first
partici-
opposed by Secre-
and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff General John Vessey. Desperate to keep the peace in Lebanon and to prevent escalation to a full-scale war, the
United Nations Security Council passed Reso-
lution 508 in July 1982 calling for the withdrawal of Israel
Lebanon. The United States agreed to participate
from
in a multinational
Force (MNF), the purpose of which was to supervise the withdrawal
of both
Israeli
and Syrian
forces,
whose presence
in
Lebanon had
been roundly condemned by the United Nations.
On
August 25, 1982, elements of the Thirty-second Marine
phibious Unit,
commanded by Colonel James M. Mead,
the port of Beirut.
A
Marine Amphibious Unit
force of roughly twelve
hundred troops with
weapons, helicopters, and fixed-wing
aircraft.
its
is
Am-
landed in
a self-contained
own
artillery,
heavy
After going ashore, the
marines assisted in the evacuation of 6,436 Palestinians and Syrians.
PLO
leader Arafat was escorted to safety and eventually to Tunis
by
French and American forces. By September 3 the mission seemed
complete and the marines withdrew without having boarding their ships on September
10. It
had worked and the mission was seen
as a
fired a shot, re-
appeared that intervention
model of successful peace-
keeping.
Four days backed
after the
Christian
marines withdrew, the leader of the
Phalangist
movement.
Gemayel, was assassinated, presumably by lowing day
Israeli forces
President-elect
PLO
supporters.
Israeli-
Bashir
The
fol-
overran the Muslim sector of West Beirut.
During the next two days, angry Phalangists, under the protection of the Israeli forces in
West
Beirut,
massacred hundreds of Palesfinian
Intervention
including
civilians,
the senior Israeli
and turned
and children,
Beirut.
commander,
Lebanon
in the refugee
51
camps of
There were strong indications that
Ariel Sharon, ignored these actions
a blind eye to the slaughter. Directly following the horri-
Amin Gemayel,
massacre,
ble
women
and Sabra south of
Shatila
in
the
new Lebanese
brother of the slain Bashir, requested that the
president and
MNF once again inter-
vene to protect the Muslims of West Beirut and guarantee the with-
and Syrian forces from the
drawal of
Israeli
Lebanon,
as well as
city.
The government of
most Christian and Muslim
factions, supported
MNF.
the reintroduction of the
On
September 29, despite the opposition of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, President
rine
Reagan ordered Colonel Mead's Thirty-second Ma-
Amphibious Unit back
into Beirut, this time with the mission of
providing a "presence in Beirut, that would in turn help establish the stability necessary for the
their capital.'"^
Lebanese government to regain control of
The mission of the marines
as written in the
Order of September 23, 1982, was defined an environment which
will
as follows:
and
British again agreed to participate.
had assured Congress
Alert
permit the Lebanese armed forces to
carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area."^ ians,
JCS
"To establish
The French,
Ital-
President Ronald Reagan
that the marines were in
Lebanon not
to en-
gage in combat, but to pacify Lebanon. However, the mission was less
than a model of
clarity for the marines,
whether they were supposed
to act as
who
order between feuding factions backed by the Soviet side
and
Two
Israel
on
were not sure
peacekeepers or to maintain
Union on one
the other.
days after going ashore, the marines began to receive spo-
from both the Syrians and the Lebanese Muslims. The totaled three thousand troops, including a British force of 155
radic fire
MNF
observers.
The French portion of
the
MNF
was stationed
in Beirut,
and the Italians were stationed near the heavily populated refugee
camps a force ians at
in the south.
The U.S. Marine contingent, which had grown
to
of twelve hundred, was assigned to an area south of the Italthe Beirut International Airport. There was no single com-
mander of the
force; each contingent
had
its
own
leadership that was
authorized to coordinate with the other contingents. Three U.S.
52
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
Marine forces
companies came ashore
rifle
from the
flank and the
airport.
initially
The marines had
Old Sidon Road
in the east
and displaced
the Mediterranean
on
on one
As an
the other.
Israeli
experi-
enced combat commander, Colonel Mead immediately sought to place his marines
on
the high
ground across the road, but he was
overruled by his commanders. The United States did not wish to ap-
pear to be supporting
Road
Israeli forces that
were
using the Sidon
still
for the logistic support of their forces positioned elsewhere.
This forced the marines into a tactical situation that would prove to
be seriously flawed.
The marines' around the flights
terrain
was
airport. Traffic
difficult to defend.
was heavy
They were deployed
there, with
more than
thirty
and twenty-four hundred passengers moving through on an
average day. The marines established their headquarters in a twostory concrete building that fighting training school.
The
had previously been the full
airport fire-
marine battalion used
a partially
bombed-out four-story reinforced concrete building, located the southwest of the headquarters, as a barracks.
Lebanese Aviation Administration Bureau.
On
It
to
had been the
October 30, the
commanded by Colonel Thomas M. Stokes, Jr., came ashore and relieved the Thirty-second. The new unit consisted of 1,806 Marines and 81 navy personnel, including
Twenty-fourth Marine Amphibious Unit,
corpsmen, chaplains, and construction personnel called Seabees. As the
new marine
contingent came ashore, a car
bomb
exploded on the
beach nearby, an ominous warning to the new peacekeepers. In an
tempt
to
emphasize
a
renewed determination to improve the
the marines began to patrol actively
began
to train the
Lebanese
Armed
by jeep and on
command and
factions believed, but to
the defensive capability of the
By
the
end of 1982, when
They
also
control proce-
of the Lebanese military was
tempt to show that the mission was there not
Muslim
situation,
Forces Rapid Reaction Force in
small-unit tactics, the use of arms, and dures. This outward support
foot.
at-
a further at-
to support Israel, as the
make concrete
progress shoring
up
government of Lebanon. it
became
clear to
all
the factions that
neither Israel nor Syria intended to withdraw anytime soon, they
Intervention
began to attack one another
in
53
Lebanon
MNR The American train-
as well as the
ing and equipping of the Lebanese army were neither sufficient nor effective in helping to quell the fighting
on
all
sides.
Nor was
the
Lebanese army able to deal with the thirty thousand Syrians and
many
present in Lebanon.
Israelis still
The marines'
first
force occurred
serious confrontation with a major conventional
on February
1983,
2,
three Centurion tanks at high speed
of
when the Israeli army dispatched down the Sidon Road after one
supply columns had been ambushed.
its
tackers
as
had emerged from the
tended to flush out the
under U.S. control and
territory
culprits.
perceived that the
It
The
three tanks were
at-
in-
stopped
abruptly in the middle of the road by Captain Charles B. Johnson,
an outraged marine company commander. Johnson bravely stood in
and faced off the tanks
the road
which they did only
stop,
threatened the
until they
complied with
his order to
he climbed onto the lead tank and
after
commander at gunpoint. This act was initially local Muslim community as indicating that the
Israeli
acclaimed by the
American
forces were sincerely neutral in their mission, but the senti-
ment was
short-lived.
phibious
Unit relieved
On
February 14 the Thirty-second Marine Twenty-fourth
the
in
Colonel James Mead's third tour in Lebanon. the marines
and
Habib applied
Israeli forces
pressure,
link for coordination
Am-
beginning
Beirut,
between
Difficulties
continued until Ambassador Philip
and the
Israeli
army
between the U.S. and
installed a direct radio Israeli
on-scene com-
manders.
As
the
cial ally
grew.
who
MNF was increasingly perceived by Muslims to be the offi-
of the Christian-dominated Lebanese government,
On
March
killed
15 an Italian patrol was
ambushed by Muslim
one soldier and wounded nine. The next day
Marines were wounded when
a
Muslim
hostility
tossed a
forces
five
hand grenade
U.S. at a
patrol north of the airport. Thereafter, the Marines curtailed foot patrols
and increased vehicular
later, after
patrols with loaded weapons.
coming under sniper
fire,
the marines returned
Two
fire
days
for the
54
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
first
time against the unidentified assailants. Then, on April 18, a
man
drove a pickup truck loaded with explosives past a Lebanese
guard into the lobby of the American embassy in West Beirut.
It
ex-
ploded, killing sixty-three people, including seventeen Americans.
Evidence proved that suicidal and determined Iranian revolutionary guards were active in the area and were assisting the Palestinian Shiites
with considerable financial support.
celeration of violence
among
seemed
It
that the rapid ac-
had drawn other
the local factions
similarly motivated activists.
bombing
After the
attack at the embassy, the marines' mission ex-
panded. The U.S. European
Command, under whose
authority the
marines operated, changed the rules of engagement to permit the marines to
initiate fire if
doubled guards on
amphibious 5,
all
tractors
they perceived an imminent threat. They
posts and for the
on main
Israel
17,
equitable,
hit
fire
from uniden-
U.S.-sponsored withdrawal agreement
a
but Syria and the Muslim factions opposed
and tensions rose
and Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty
commander. During
nel began to
accompany
Soviet-built rockets
this
by
fired
tion.
Apparently
work together
mon "enemy"
in
Mead
as the U.S.
On
July 22 twelve
in Beirut airport,
sailor, killing
one
The rounds were determined
a Syrian-backed left-wing all
the
deployment, Lebanese army person-
wounding two marines and an American been
Colonel
relieved
the marine patrols.
others.
as in-
Unit replaced the marines ashore,
and mortar rounds landed
and wounding thirteen
it
At the end of May,
higher.
still
Twenty-fourth Marine Amphibious
MNF
by small-arms
On May
but there were no casualties.
and Lebanon signed
on May
time employed armored
routes around their positions.
Colonel Mead's helicopter was
tified shooters,
first
Muslim Druze
civilian,
to have
military fac-
of the disparate Muslim factions had begun to
an altogether natural process of focusing on a com-
force-the intruder from
far
away-without considera-
tion of that force's purpose.
The U.S. Marines found themselves tactical posifion
in
an increasingly untenable
while vainly trying to support the local Lebanese
army. The Soviet-equipped and -supported Syrian army backed the local
Muslims, an increasingly united front consisting of the Druze
Intervention
and
who
Shiite militias,
were
locked in combat against the
still
army and
Christian-led Lebanese
55
Lebanon
in
Phalangists backed
by the
Israelis.
In the middle stood the marines, appearing to each side to be sup-
porting
On
its
antagonists.
August
after
8,
again, the marines
Druze
employed
first
time.
On
Israeli
army
units
out the source of shooting for the
MNF,
out prior warning to the
draw. Simultaneously, hostile
and mortar
artillery
a
when two of their men were
heavy mortar round that
fire their
support.
knock
August 28, with-
began
to with-
The
against snipers.
fire
and three wounded by
killed
marines began to
hit their position, the
155mm howitzers and to use U.S. Navy gunfire The cruiser USS Belknap and destroyer USS Bowen pro-
vided the
heavy
first
naval gunfire by shooting illumination rounds to
cover the marines
at night.
Cobra helicopter gunships a
erupted
concentrated on the U.S. area,
fire
and the marines began routinely to return next day,
fire
their counterbattery radar to
The marines for the
Druze armored personnel
began to employ
also
time.
first
One Cobra
had
carrier that
fired
on
their
destroyed
the marines'
A second Cobra was hit and made an emergency landing on USS Iwojima, which was offshore in the Mediterranean. From
position.
that
day on, the marines were deeply engaged
in daily sporadic
warfare and continued to take casualties with no achievable objective in sight.
Their mission had been to support the government of
Lebanon and
to prevent the situation
had inevitably expanded
Although the
hostility.
from
deteriorating, but
in response to the reality
initial
deployment of the
accomplished with good intentions,
it
of the intense
MNF
soon became
it
had been
clear that
it
re-
quired full firepower just for self-defense, employing the complete array of
modern American weaponry, including
port and limited
American way of
air
power. This response
war."^
A man
is
naval gunfire sup-
consistent with "the
taught and trained as
expected to take the traditional steps of returning fired
upon, and to use
all
means
not consistent with the role plish
the
at
hand
fire in
kind
However,
is
when
this
was
of peacekeeper and would not accom-
mission but rather create
perpetuating combat.
to win.
marine
a
a
new
situation
of
self-
56
America's splendid little wars
The U.S. government was now faced with the U.S. force, which was
three options: withdraw
what the theater commander, U.S. Army
General Bernard Rogers, wished to do; reinforce and reposition the
marines to compensate tactically for the
Israeli
withdrawal; or stay
with the status quo and make no changes. The question went directly
who
to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger,
decided to leave the
marines in their indefensible position. In Weinberger's view, the mission of the marines had not changed, but the situation surely had since the withdrawal of the Israeli forces-they were
now engaged
in
repeated firefights with experienced Syrian troops and Iranian revolutionary fighters situated directly outside their positions.
General Rogers authorized Vice Admiral Edward H. Martin, the
commander of the
Sixth Fleet, to provide the marines with aerial
re-
connaissance and naval gunfire support from ships located off the coast in a position called Bagel Station. also
moved
the helicopter carrier
other Marine
USS
The Sixth
Fleet
Tarawa closer to shore with an-
Amphibious Unit embarked
down
positions while maintaining two vulnerable outposts
By August
3
1
The
as reinforcements.
marines ashore suspended patrols and hunkered
perimeter for early warning.
commander
in defensive
beyond
their
combat had increased
to
the point that the marine foot patrols into Beirut were totally sus-
pended and two
aircraft carriers,
USS
Eisenhower and the French Foch,
moved in to provide air support to the besieged MNF. By September 4 Israeli forces had withdrawn beyond
the Awali
River in southern Lebanon. However, the Lebanese army did not
fill
vacuum
into
which the irregular forces of the multiple factions could and did
infil-
the gap left
trate
by the departing
thus leaving a
Israelis,
with impunity. Despite the
Israeli
departure, Syria continued to
refuse to withdraw
its
demning
invading Lebanon in the
Israel for
pealing for
Israeli
forces. Ironically, the
forces
to
first
States, after
place,
The
Israelis
con-
was now ap-
remain and help keep order
seriously deteriorating tactical situation. in their withdrawal.
United
in
the
refused to pause
Intervention
Early
on September
position, kilhng
Lebanon
in
57
6 twenty-one heavy rockets hit the marines'
men and wounding two
two
more. The Lebanese government forces were pushed eastward, leaving the Druze militia
dominating the high ground overlooking Beirut and the put the marines in
an even
combat would have
called for an
airport. This
tenable position, which in normal
less
immediate
assault against those en-
trenched above them. Diplomatic and political restrictions governing
MNF overrode
the
the designs of combat, echoing the
American
ex-
perience in Vietnam.
From September
7 on, the marines were calling in routine naval
gunfire
support from the destroyers
Rodgers.
The
Thirty-first
U.S. Pacific Fleet
On
12 to act as reinforcements for the
September 19 navy ships
fired
more than
350 five-inch rounds in support of the Lebanese forces holding ridgetop positions at
Suq
al
On
marines,
a
September 20 navy
who
significant
to
by American
escalation
carrier aircraft
began to support the
were forced to withdraw their two vulnerable outer
warning outposts and consolidate
The order
their
Gharb, nine miles southeast of the center
of Beirut. This represented forces.
John
Marine Amphibious Unit arrived from the
on September
entrenched Marines.
USS Bowen and USS
their perimeter.
to support Lebanese forces with naval gunfire
was given
Colonel Geraghty directly by Assistant National Security Adviser
Robert C. McFarlane, cial
who had
replaced Ambassador Habib as spe-
envoy and the principal Middle East
negotiator.
McFarlane had
been pressing for authorization to send the marines into the mountains to
support the Lebanese army. The marine
commander
ashore.
Colonel Geraghty, opposed calling in heavy naval gunfire support for the Lebanese army,
tional fire stricted
knowing such an action would
and pressure against
his
own
marines,
result in addi-
who
were
from going on the offensive and were stagnating
still
re-
in their
indefensible posifions. In the view of the Syrians, the Druze, and their Shiite allies, the
American
force's stance as neutral peacekeepers
was further diminished with the increase in direct gunfire support by the navy. Then, to exacerbate the situafion, tleship
USS New Jersey began
firing
its
on September 25
sixteen-inch guns.
the bat-
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
58
A
went into
fragile cease-fire
on September
effect
26,
and the
Beirut airport closed for six days. During the cease-fire the Americans
increased their support to the Lebanese
army by providing them with
armored personnel
and
the
PLO
began
carriers, howitzers,
to fight
its
way
into the
Sabra and Shatila, and the Iranian
tanks.
At the same time,
abandoned refugee camps of
leftist
group called Islamic Amal
erected bunkers in front of the marine positions. So the peacekeeping
marines, already fighting a full-fledged war against soldiers,
now had
men dug
in directly outside their perimeter.
a
new
Syrian
first-rate
adversary in Iranian revolutionary guards-
Despite the cease-fire, the marines were engaged in a vicious sniper war. Firefights
became nearly continuous, and
were killed and forty wounded. For a fleeting period
it
six
marines
seemed
that
the violence might have reached a peak, but in reaction to the
marines' successes with their night-vision devices and superb
fire dis-
cipline during sniper exchanges, a small extremist Shiite splinter
group with direct
ties
to Iran arrived
unannounced on
the scene.
These new fanatics were closely linked to the Islamic Jihad, or Holy War, and grew determined to exact revenge. This was the group linked to rael. It
many
past car
was probably
bombings and kidnappings
at this
in Beirut
juncture that the idea of massive
and
Is-
retalia-
tion against the marines was formulated, and since these radicals did
not possess heavy weapons of their own, they would resort to to
do
bombs
the job.^
On
October 12 the U.S. Congress voted to allow President Rea-
gan to keep the marines in Lebanon for an additional eighteen
months
Law
as
an extension of the authorization to send troops. Public
98-119.
On
remote-controlled
October 19 four marines were wounded when
bomb, hidden
to their resupply convoy.
downplay the tar fire
fighting,
landing
among
in a blue Mercedes,
exploded next
At home the U.S. government
and often reported that the
a
artillery
tried to
and mor-
the marines were just accidents intended for
the combating Lebanese militia forces, but the marines were in fact the targets.
On
Sunday morning, October
23, 1983, while
more than
three
(
Intervention
hundred marines and naval personnel
down
ton open-bed truck drove
and entered the parking
59
Lebanon
yellow Mercedes
slept, a
five-
the road west of the headquarters
lot in the
south front of the building. The
driver suddenly accelerated and, gaining circles in
in
momentum by
driving in
the lot several times, drove at high speed through the
barbed wire and concrete barricade between two guard posts. Before the guard could
open
the truck, loaded with
fire,
thousand pounds of TNT, everyone inside was
killed:
hit the building
and exploded. Almost
241 Americans including 220 marines, 18
navy medical corpsmen, and killed in a single
more than twelve
3 soldiers-the largest
number of marines
day since the invasion of Iwo Jima. The explosion de-
stroyed the building and blasted a forty-by-thirty-foot hole eight feet
deep beneath the concrete
floor.
Immediately following the bombing there was United States for
retaliation. Secretary
November
publicly in
the "sponsorship, knowledge,
ment."^ The
initial
Iranian training
of Defense Weinberger stated
had
that Iranians
a strong call in the
carried out the attack with
and authority of the Syrian govern-
reaction was to plan to strike back
camp
in the Baalbek region
by bombing
of the Bekaa
However, there was grave concern for the security of the marines ashore with their battered battalion their defenses. Despite strong
Navy John R Lehman, Jr., ing,
who
the
Valley. still
were busily reestablishing
recommendations by Secretary of the
to retaliate against
someone
for the
bomb-
Weinberger and General John Vessey, the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, opposed immediate
strikes,
and the United
States
hesitated.
In
November
the Twenty-second Marine
to relieve those embattled marines
mained
in
Amphibious Unit
of the Twenty-fourth
arrived
who
Lebanon. Under the revised security procedures, only
companies remained ashore while units stayed aboard
all
rifle
company north of
maining marine units dispersed
rifle
headquarters and supporting
amphibious ships off the
replaced one marine
re-
coast.
Lebanese troops
the airport, and the re-
their forces into freshly prepared
command posts. who had also suffered
hard bunkers and
The French,
casualties
from
terrorists,
60
America's splendid little wars
struck back
But
still
by bombing the Iranians
the Americans delayed.
strike against Syrian targets east
same
in Baalbek
The
conducted
of Beirut on December
Navy conducted
day, the U.S.
Israelis
with two F-14s flying from the carrier
a
The
firing
of these
from Washington radar positions in
an A-7 Corsair
tactics
mount major air strikes Lebanon. On December 4 to
at
fly-
by Soviet-made
air strike
gun and
the Sixth Fleet attacked
and
in the process lost
An A-6 Intruder bomber and downed. One airman died; another
surface-to-air missiles. II
were hit and
caused these
lost eight
flight
Kennedy. While
against Syrian
a
month
later.
Poor planning,
haste,
and
losses.
The marines ashore came under heavy rocket and
Later the
surface-to-air-missiles but not hit.
was captured and released
bad
3.
antiaircraft missiles finally triggered approval
Syrian targets with a major carrier
two airplanes to
16.
a large air
photo reconnaissance
USSJohn F.
ing low over the Beirut area, the F-14s were fired
SA-7 shoulder-launched
on November
men. From
this
attack immediately
point until the final withdrawal or-
dered by President Reagan in February 1984, the U.S. and other
MNF
contingents
came under
relentless attack
from weapons of
all
types, including surface-to-surface missiles, antitank rockets, small
arms, and even tanks. The original mission of deterrence and peace-
keeping had given way completely. In February 1984 vicious fighting erupted between Lebanese gov-
ernment troops and the various Muslim lost control
The Lebanese army
of the situation when the hard-line Amal faction suc-
ceeded in forcing
all
Muslims
Amal and Druze went on the Lebanese ally
factions.
to leave the Lebanese
the offensive. These
army became locked
in
army and
Muslim
combat, and the
militias
the
and
militias eventu-
overran Christian-controlled West Beirut. The Lebanese army
collapsed,
and the Amal factions who did not wish
marines pulled back, while the marines
filled the
positions vacated
some of the surrendering Lebanese army. The mission territorial integrity
of Lebanon had
failed,
to fight the
to support the
and there was no other
choice than to depart. British forces withdrew on February
lowed by the
Italians
by
7,
and French. The remaining U.S. Marines,
fol-
ex-
Intervention
cept for eighty
who
Lebanon
in
were guarding the U.S. embassy
were flown out by hehcopter on March
3
in East Beirut,
and returned to
1
61
their ships
off the coast. The Druze mihtia occupied the marines' former posi-
and the U.S. force remained on board ship off the coast
tions,
until
April 10.
U.S. troops had been
on
the ground in
during which 266 Americans of
wounded.
On
by yet another
twenty-three people and
could be
Lebanon
for 533 days,
services were killed
and 151 were
September 20, 1984, the annex of the U.S. embassy
Beirut was struck
"martyrs" in
all
suicide truck attack,
wounded
killed
Three Muslim
eight marines.
Lebanon had proved how
which
in
bombings
effective suicide
as a tool to achieve their objectives-in this case, the with-
drawal of the
MNF.
The purpose of the intervention
in
Lebanon had been
to keep the
warring factions apart in Beirut, but the end results were sectarian vio-
more than
lence that continued well into 1993 and claimed
thousand
lives.
sixty-three
Thirty thousand Syrian troops continued to occupy
the country in 2001,
and the newly formed
radical revolutionary
group Hezbollah controlled southern Lebanon. America's eighteen-
month involvement
In
November 1983
in
Lebanon had
Secretary of Defense Weinberger established a
commission headed by
commander
in
failed despite the great cost.
retired
Admiral Robert
chief Pacific, to
investigate
Lebanon. The Long Commission found that the did not cover attacks
Blame
Long,
a
rules
command.
in
the Beirut embassy and the marine barracks.
on
the
In the commission's report issued in December,
and Iran were held
A House Armed
former
of engagement
for not supervising the marines' security was placed
chain of Syria
on
L.J.
what went wrong
at least indirectly
responsible for the attack.
Services subcommittee conducted
its
own
investiga-
tion and found not only that the security had been "inadequate" but also that the Marine Amphibious Unit commander had "made seri-
ous errors of judgment in failing to provide better protection for his troops
"^
AMERICA'S SPLENDID LITTLE WARS
62
Why
didn't the marines take adequate security measures? Their
presence in Beirut had certainly been highly visible within the U.S.
command
chain of command. The marine
stream of recurring
visits
in
Lebanon had endured
by senior Defense Department
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the
a
officials, the
European Supreme Com-
mander, the chief of Naval Operations, the commander of the Sixth
and the commandant of the Marine Corps
Fleet,
mander of the Amphibious Task als
and admirals had
visited the
their operation before the
focus
bomb
no purpose other than
served
on
the issues at
Force.
A
of twenty-four gener-
total
marines during the entire period of destroyed their barracks. These
to distract the small
hand-no
com-
as well as the
visits
command from
its
precise or significant guidance was
offered toward interpreting the marines' rules of engagement or,
more
seriously, the
mission found
Com-
changing nature of their mission. The Long
no
this fact disturbing, especially since
tions were taken to change or
corrective ac-
improve the marines' security or
their
mode of operations. Noninterference was viewed chain of
as a
command who remembered
good thing by many the long
of war in Southeast Asia beleaguered by
and obstruction
same area sures
for
at all levels.
more than
political
micromanagement
The marines had been
a year,
and
in the
and frustrating years
billeted in the
their limited defensive
and lack of adequate control points were
justified
mea-
by some
as
being in keeping with their diplomatic mission. At the congressional hearings into the deaths of the marines.
Habib was asked
if
Ambassador
fected the political goals of the marine intervention. "It
impaired
the
Philip
increased defensive measures would have af-
diplomatic
mission,"
he
replied.
^°
would have
Said
Admiral
Robert Long, "Our marines didn't belong in Beirut under those conditions."^
On
^
the very day the explosion ripped through the marine bar-
racks in
October 1983, President Reagan signed the approval
U.S. forces to intervene tect
American
two Marxist
The
final
citizens
on
the Caribbean
whose
lives
island of
Grenada
for
to pro-
might have been threatened by
political factions locked in a vicious
days of the American involvement in
power
struggle.
Lebanon were over-
Intervention
in
shadowed by the intercession of combined United
Lebanon States
63
and Ca-
ribbean forces in Grenada. The long and painful American involve-
ment
in
Lebanon, although executed with valor and determination
by forces made up mostly of marines, seemed to have been in vain. Worse yet, the same mistakes would be repeated in a civil war in Somalia in 1993. Little was learned from the intervention in Lebanon.
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