American State Papers, The Federalist Papers, works by Mill [1 ed.]

Table of contents :
Cover
Title Page
GENERAL CONTENTS
AMERICAN STATE PAPERS
CONTENTS
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
THE FEDERALIST
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
CONTENTS
ON LIBERTY
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
CONTENTS
Introductory
Of the Liberty of Thought and Discussion
Of Individuality, as one of the Elements of Well-being
Of the Limits to the Authority of Society over the Individual
Applications
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
CONTENTS
PREFACE
UTILITARIANISM
CONTENTS
General Remarks
What Utilitarianism Is
Of the Ultimate Sanction of the Principle of Utility
Of what sort of Proof the Principle of Utility is Susceptible
On the Connection between Justice and Utility

Citation preview

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD GILBERT GALILEO

41.

GIBBON

HARVEY

42.

KANT

29.

CERVANTES

43.

AMERICAN STATE

30.

FRANCIS BACON

28.

II

PAPERS

THE FEDERALIST J. S.

MILL

DESCARTES SPINOZA

44.

BOSWELL

32.

MILTON

45.

33.

PASCAL

LAVOISIER FOURIER

34.

NEWTON

31.

FARADAY

HUYGENS 35.

LOCKE BERKELEY

46.

HEGEL

47.

GOETHE

48.

MELVILLE

49.

DARWIN

50.

MARX

HUME 36.

SWIFT STERNE

ENGELS 37.

FIELDING 51.

TOLSTOY

38.

MONTESQUIEU ROUSSEAU

52.

DOSTOEVSKY

39.

ADAM SMITH

53.

WILLIAM JAMES

40.

GIBBON

54.

FREUD

I

>

MH ti m i>> M M tt MM «« HHHMH M »t MM t

»

»

g^

GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD ROBERT MAYNARD HUTCHINS, EDITOR IN CHIEF >«»»»»

»»»

««««»««««»»»»»««»i«t»»»«««>«««»«

nnnm m >«>«ii>>>>»«i«« n ««

43'

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS THE FEDERALIST J. S MILL

Mortimer J. Adler,

Associate Editor

Members of the Advisory Board: Stringfellow Barr, Scott Buchanan, John Erskine,

Clarence H. Faust, Alexander Meiklejohn, Joseph J. Schwab, Editorial Consultants: A. F. B.

Clark,

F. L.

Wallace Brockway,

Lucas,

Mark Van Doren.

Walter Murdoch.

Executive Editor

>»

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS THE FEDERALIST BT ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON, JOHN JAY

ON LIBERTY REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT- UTILITARIANISM •

BT JOHN STUART MILL

William Benton,

Publisher

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, CHICAGO LONDON •

•

INC.

TORONTO GENEVA SYDNEY TOKYO MANILA •

•

•

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO The Great Books is

published with the editorial advice of the faculties of

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University of Chicago

an> form or by any part of his work may be reproduced or utilized in rccordinj:. or by any means, elcclronic or mechanical, includinti pholocopving. permission in writing from the informauon storage and relneval system, without

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publisher.

© 1952 BY Encyclop.€dia Britannic.\, Inc.

Coi'VRlOMT UNDER

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NTKRNA TIONAL CoPVRIGHT UnION

Ki:m rvkd lndi.r Pan Amkrican and Universal Coi'viuciiT Conventions by Hncvclopadia Hritannica, Inc.

Ail Kif.ms

Library of Congress Catalog Card

Number: 55-10^4^

GENERAL CONTENTS AMERICAN STATE PAPERS,

THE FEDERALIST,

Page

i

Page 29

By Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay

ON LIBERTY, Page 267 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, UTILITARIANISM,

Page 445

By John Stuart Mill

Page 327

CONTENTS:

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, 5

THE CONSTITUTION,

11

i

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE [THOMAS JEFFERSON]

A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States OF America

in

Congress assembled, July

4,

1

776

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political

bands which have connected them with another, and

the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; to assume,

among

5

We

that they are that

among

endowed by

these are

their Creator with certain unalienable rights; and the pursuit of happiness. That, to se-

life, liberty,

cure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just 10 powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to

them

shall

seem most

likely to effect their safety

and happiness. Prudence,

15

indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing in- 20 variably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute

throw off such government, and Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present 25 King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having, in direct object, the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world: He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for

despotism, to provide

it is

their right,

new guards

it is

their duty, to

for their future security.

the public good.

3°

has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and, when so suspended, he has utterly neglected to attend to

He

them.

He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of 35 people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS the legislature; a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only. He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the depository of their public records, for the sole 40 purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures. He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly, for opposing, with manlv firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people. He has refused, for a long time after such dissolutions, to cause others to

be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have the 45 returned to the people at large for their exercise; the state remaining, in conand without, from invasion of danger the meantime, exposed to all vulsions within.

the population of these States; for that purpose, obstructing the laws for naturalization of foreigners, refusing to pass conditions of 50 others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the

He has endeavored to prevent

new appropriations

of lands.

has obstructed the administration of justice, by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers. He has made judges dependent on his will alone, for the tenure of their salaries. 55 offices, and the amount and payment of their He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of of-

He

ficers to

He

and eat out their substance. time of peace, standing armies, without the in us,

harass our people,

has kept

among

consent of our legislatures. He has affected to render the military independent of, and superior to, 60 the ci\ il power. He has combined, with others, to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to

pretended legislation: For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us: For protecting them by a mock trial, from punishment, for any murders which thcv should commit on the inhabitants of these States: For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world: For imposing taxes on us without our consent: For dejjriving us. in many cases, of the benefit of trial bv jury: 70 For transjjorting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offenses: For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring jnovince, their acts of

65

and enlarging its boundaries, instrument for introducing the

establishing therein an arbitrary government, so as to render

it

at

once an example and

fit

75 same absolute rule into these colonies: For taking away our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering fundamentally the forms of our govenmients: For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested

80

with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever. He has abdicated government here, by declaring us out of his protection,

and waging war against us. He has plundered our seas, ravaged our stroyed the lives of our jieople.

coasts,

burnt our towns, and de-

He is. at tliis time, iranspoiiing large armies of foreign nuKcnaries to 85 (oiuplclc the works of death, dcsolalion. anul)li( expenses- to borrow money, 315 or emit bills on the rcclil of the United States,

anned. and equipped in the same manner as the quota of such State, unless the legislature of such State shall judge that such extra number cannot be safely spared out of the same, in which case they shall raise, officer, clothe, arm, and equip as many of such extra number as they judge can be safely spared: and the officers and men. so clothed, armed, and equipped shall march to the place appointed, and within the time agreed on, by the United States in Congress assembled. The United States in Congress assembled shall never engage in a war. nor grant letters of marcjue and reprisal in time of i)eace. nor enter into any treaties or alliances, nor coin money, nor regulate the value thereof, nor ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defence and welfare of the L'nited States, or any of them, nor emit bills, nor borrow money on the credit of the United States, nor appropriate money, nor agree upon the number of ves.sels of war to be built or purchased, or the number of land or sea forces to be raised, nor appoint a commandcr-in chief of the army or navy, unless nine Slates assent to the same: nor shall a cjuesiion on any other point, except for adjourning from clay to day, be determined, unless by the votes of a majority of the United States in Congress assembled. The Congress of the United States shall have power to adjourn to any lime within the year, and to any place wiihiii ilie United States, so that no period of .icliounnneiil be

transmitting every half-year to the respective

for a longer duraiioii ih.in the sp.x e of six

ing all officers of the land forces in the service of the United States, excepting regimental officers— appointing all the officers of the naval forces, and commissioning all officers what295 ever in the service of the United States-

making

rules for the

government and regulaand naval forces, and

tion of the said land

directing their operations.

he United States in Congress assembled have authority to appoint a committee, to sit in the recess of Congress, to be deI

300

shall

nominated "A Committee of the States." and to consist of one delegate from each State; to appoint such other committees and civil of305 ftcers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States under their direction: and to appoint one of their innnber to preside, provided that no person be allowed to serve in the

310 mcjre than one year

office of j)resiclent

in

(

sums ol money build and ecpiip

Slates an account of ihe

.so

bor-

rowed or emitted— lo a navy —to agree up«»n the lujuiber of land forces, 320 and lo make recjuisitions from each State for it.4

(|uoia,

in

|)roportion

lo the

number

of

white inhabiianis in such Slate: which recjui%ition shall be binding, and iheieupon the legislature (if each Stale shall a|>pitini the reg325 imenial ofiu ers, raise the men, and clothe, arm, and ((jinp ihem in a soldier-like man-

motilhs.

;iii(l

shall

ihcir proceedings

publish

the

journal

345

350

355

360

365

370

of

monthly, excc|)l such parts

thereof relating to treaties, alliances, or military operations, as in their secrecy,

340

judgment

375

recpiire

and the yeas and nays of the delegates on any cjueslion shall be entered

of each Stale

on ihe journal, when il is desiicd by any delegale; and the clelegales ol a Slate, or any of 380 them, nished

at

his or

Willi a

their recpiesi,

li.iiiMiipi

(it

the

shall s.iid

be furjdurii.d.

ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION except such parts as are above excepted to lay before the legislatures of the several States.

Article Thirteen

Every State Article 385

The Committee

tions of

Ten

of the States, or any nine

of them, shall be authorized to execute, in the recess of Congress, such of the

gress as the

United States

powers of Con-

in Congress assem-

bled, by the consent of nine States, shall from 390 time to time think expedient to vest them with: provided that no power be delegated to the said Committee, for the exercise of which, by the Articles of Confederation, the voice of nine States in the Congress of the United 395 States assembled is requisite.

shall

sembled, on all questions which by this Confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this Confederation shall be invio- 415 lably observed by every State, and the Union shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them, imless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards 420 confirmed by the legislatures of every State.

AND WHEREAS

it

hath pleased the Great

Governor of the world of the legislatures

Article Eleven

abide by the determina-

the United States in Congress as-

we

to incline the hearts

respectfully represent in

Congress to approve of and to authorize us to 425 Confederation and perpetual Union, Know Ye, That we, the undersigned delegates, by virtue of the power and authority to us given for that purpose, do ratify the said Articles of

Canada, acceding to this Confederation, and joining in the measures of the United States, be admitted into and entitled to all the advantages of this Union; but no other colony 400 shall be admitted into the same, unless such admission be agreed to by nine States. shall

Article

Twelve

All bills of credit emitted, moneys borrowed, and debts contracted by or under the authority

of Congress, before the assembling of the

405 United States in pursuance of the present Confederation, shall be deemed and considered as a charge against the United States, for payment and satisfaction whereof the said United States and the public faith are hereby 410 solemnly pledged.

by these presents, in the name and in behalf 430 of our respective constituents, fully and entirely ratify and confirm each and every of the said Articles of Confederation and perpetual Union, and all and singular the matters and things therein contained: and we do further 435 solemnly plight and engage the faith of our respective constituents that they shall abide by the determinations of the United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by the said Confederation are submitted to 440 them. And that the Articles thereof shall be inviolably observed by the States we respectively represent, and the Union shall be per-

petual.

George Washington

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA SEPTEMBER

1787

17,

We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish THIS Constitution for the United States of America.

Article

ber of Representatives shall not exceed one 30 for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and 35 Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, Neu' York six, Nexo Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaivare one, Maryland six, Virginia ten. North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three. 40 When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such

One

Section i. All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate

and House

of Representatives.

Sfxtion 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most 10 numerous branch of the State legislature. No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five years, and been seven years a citizen of 5

[

the Llnited States,

15 elected, be

and who

shall not,

vacancies.

The House

when

of Representatives shall choose 45 Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment. Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six 50 years; and each Senator shall have one vote. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three

an inhabitant of that State in

their

which he

shall be chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be

apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, accord20 ing to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other per25 sons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The nimi-

classes.

The

seats of the Senators of the first

55

be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class, at the expira-

class shall

tion of the fourth year, at

one-third

11

and

of the third class,

the expiration of the sixth year, so that

may be chosen

every second year;

60

AMERICAX STATE PAPERS

12

and

\acanties

if

happen by resignation or

othenvise during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporarN appointments until the next meet65 ing of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies. No person shall be a Senator who shall not

have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine \ears a citizen of the United States, 70 and who shall not. when elected, be an inhal)itant of that State for which he shall be

The

Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall ha\e no vote, unless they be equally divided.

The and

Senate shall choose their other

also a President f>ro

tempore

sence of the \'ice-Presidcnt, or

officers,

in the ab-

when he

shall

exercise the office of President of the United

The

Senate shall have the sole power to try

impeachments.

pose,

When

sitting for that pur-

thev shall be on oath or affirmation.

in

cases of

impeachment

shall

fice, and discjualiFuation to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall,

ing Senators. The (>)ngrcss shall assemble at least once

every year, and such meeting shall be on

in

the shall

first \)\

Monday l.iw

Si^c'iioN 5.

in

December, unless they

.ippoint a dilicrent day.

Kach house

(he elections, reiurns.

shall

and

i)e

pro-

(jualificaiions of

own

and may be aulhori/ed to compel the attendance of absent members, in such m.in ner, and under stu h penalties, as each house

day,

may

120

same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy, and the yeas and iiavs of

the

question

members

of either house

on any

the desire of one-fifth of

at

shall,

125

on the journal. Neither house, during the session of Con-

those present, be entered

without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting. Sf.c;tion 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law and paid out of the Treasury of the I'nited States. They

130

135

except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged frcjm arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses,

and

in

going to and return-

provide.

lacli

house may determine the rules of

its

140

which he was elected, be apunder the author- 145 iiy of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time: and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his 150 the time for

pcjinted to any civil office

(

oiitinuanc e in

SroTioN

7.

originate in l)ut

office.

.Ml bills for raising revenue shall

Mouse of Representatives;

the

the Senate

may propose or concur with

amendments

as on other bills. Kvery bill which shall havepas,sed the House of Representatives and the Senate shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it. but if not he shall leturn it, with his oi>iections, to that house in which it sh.iil li.iNc-

the judge of

memi)ers, and a majority of each shall 110 constitute a cpioruin to do business; but a imallcr number may adjourn from day to its

15

its

to time publish the

tioned in any other place. No Senator or Repiesentative shall, during

is

nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, ac95 cording 10 law. Sk iio\ .}. The times, places, and manner of holding elec lions for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the C^ongress too may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choos-

1

a journal of

person shall be con\icted without the con(urreiue of two-thirds of the members present. Judj^ment

105

Each house shall keep and from time

ceedings,

and no

tried, the (;hief Justice shall preside:

States

not extend further than to removal from of-

90

for disorderly

ing from the same: and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be ques-

\Vhen the President of the United 85

members

shall, in all cases

80 States. all

its

gress, shall,

chosen.

75

proceedings, punish

behavior, and. with the concurrence of twothirds, expel a member.

originated,

who

>5^

lOo

shall enter the ob-

jectionsal large on their journal and proceed to rc-consider

it.

If

after such reconsideration

house

shall agree to j)ass the be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two tliiids of ih.it house it shall become a law, Uiit in .ill such cases the votes of both houses sli.iil l)e determined by yeas and navs. and the names of the peisons voting lor and against tw4 285

S

made by la^\•: and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to title

of nobility shall be granted by the

290 United States: and no person holding any

of-

fice of profit or trust under them shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign

same State with themselves. And they

of the

make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list 340

shall

No

State shall enter into any or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal: coin money: emit bills of credit: make anything but gold and 300 silver coin a tender in payment of debts: pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, or grant any title of nobility. No State shall, without the consent of Con305 gress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exf>orts, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any State on imports or ex310 ports, shall be for the use of the Treasury of the United States: and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control SEcrrioN 10.

treaty, alliance,

of the Congress.

No State shall, without the consent of Con315 gress, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded f>r in such imminent danger 320 as will not admit of delay. Article Section

to the seat of the

government of the United

States, directed to the President of the Senate.

The

President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and Mouse of Representatives,

open

the certificates,

all

345J

and the votes

be counted. The person having the number of votes shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if 350 there be more than one who have such majority, and have an equal number of votes, then shall then

greatest

295 State.

i.

The

Two

executive

power

shall

be

vested in a President of the United States of

America, lie shall hold his oflu e duritig the term of four years, and t«)gcther with the \'i(c 3J5 President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

Ka(h Stale

shall appoint, in such niaiiiui

as the legislature thereof

may

direct, a

of electors, e«|ual to the whole

nuntlxr

number

of Sen-

330 alors and Representatives to which the State may be eiiiiilecl in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the I 'niiccl States, shall be appointed an elector. 535

i

thev shall sign and certifv, and transmit sealed

time.

No

TATE PAPERS

[The c-lc-ctors sh.ill ince-t in their respective States and vole by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not bor, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such scr\ice or 535 lal>or mav be clue. Sk HON 3. New Stales may be admitted by the C>»ngrevs into this I'nion; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of anv other State: nor any State 540 be formed by the junction of two or more Stalc-s or |)arts of States, without the consent of the legislaltnes of the States

I

5.]r,

of

the* (

(

one eriicd as

Congress.

all nc-ecllul

rules

and regulations

respecting the territory nr other [iropertv be I'liited Slates: and nothing in Omslituiion sliall be k> cr)ustrued as to prejudice any claims of the I'nited States or 550 of any particular St,ite.

longing to the thi»

Skiion

.j.

F

of

he I'nited

Si.itcs sh.dl

tec to e\ery Slate in this t'luoii

form of govcriunent. and

sh.dl

.1

this

Constitution,

when 5^5

bv the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several Stales, or bv conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed bv provided that no amendthe (loiigress: ment which may be made prior to the \'ear One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any maimer affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first .\rticle:

and

no

that

State.

consent, shall be deprived of

its

with(»ut

its

equal suffrage

in the Senate.

Article Six debts contracted and engagements en-

tered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the L'nited

States

under

this

Const itulion.

as

580

under the

(ionfederation.

and tlielawsol the I'nited made in pursuance thereol made, or which shall be m.ide. 5^5

riiisCionsliiuiion

States whic h shall be

and all treaties under the authority of the I'liited States, shall be the supreme law of the land: and the judges in every Slate shall be l>ound thereby,

anvthing

in the

Constitution or laws of any

State to the contrary notwithstanding. 1

590

he Senators .md Rej)resentati\es before

mc-ntioned. and the State Legislatures,

he (iongicNs shall h.ive power to dispose

and make

part

as

ratified

All

the crime.

well as ol

poses,

members

and

all

of the several exccuti\e and jii

both of the United States and be bound by oath 595 or aflirmation. to support this Constitution: but no religious lest shall e\er be recpiired as a cpi,dilication to any oilue or public liust under the I iiited Stales. dici.il ollicers.

ol the several Slates, shall

gu.iran

Article Seven

republican

protect e.u

li

I

III

r.ilific

itioii

ol

the {!oM\«iiiions of nine

fioo

THE CONSTITUTION States shall

be

sufficient for the

establishment

of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same.

Done

in convention by the

G° Washington— Pre^/d! and deputy from Virginia

unanimous con-

sent of the States present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one

17

thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven and of the independence of the United States of America the twelfth, in witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names. 610

Attest

William Jackson

Secretary

AMENDMENTS Article 615

Congress

shall

of law; nor shall private property be taken

One

make no law

respecting an

for public use, without just compensation. es-

tablishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of

Article Six

speech, or of the press; or the right of the peo-

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district

ple peaceably to assemble,

620

Government

and

to petition the

for a redress of grievances.

Article

Two

A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to

keep and bear arms

shall not

be infringed.

Article Three

No 625

soldier shall, in time of peace, be quar-

Article Four

The

635

wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con- 655 fronted with the witnesses against him; tohave compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.

tered in any house, without the consent of the owner, nor in time of war but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

630

650

right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article Seven In suits at common law, where the value of 660 controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise reexamined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common 665 law.

Article Eight Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual

punishments

inflicted.

Article Five

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, 640

645

or in the militia,

when

in actual service in

time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process

Article

The enumeration

Nine

in the Constitution of cer-

tain rights shall not be construed to

670

deny or

disparage others retained by the people.

Article

Ten

The

powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it

to the States, are reserved to the States re-

spectively or to the people.

675

AMERICAN STATE PAPERS

18

shall

Article Eleven

The

68o

power of the United

judicial

States shall

not be construed to extend to any suit in law or ecjuitv. commenced or prosecuted against one of the I'nited States by citizens of another State, or

choose the \'ice-President;

a

quorum

for

the purjKJse shall consist of two-thirds of the

by citizens or subjects of any foreign

number of Senators, and a majority of the whole nimiber shall be necessarv to a

wliole

choice.

But no person constitutionally

730

ineligi-

ble to the ofTice of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the

United

States.

State.

Article Thirteen

Twelve

Article

in dis-

Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.

person voted for as Viceshall make distinu lists of all persons voted for as President and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of

Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris-

The

Electors shall

States,

68:

and vote by

meet

Section

their respective

in

ballot for President

whom,

Vice-President, one of

and

at least, shall

not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves; they shall

name

in their ballots

the person voted for as President, tinct

6qo

of votes for each, which

and

the seat of

lists

thev

and transmit sealed to the Government of the United certify,

States

and of the State wherein they

State shall

make

citizens of the

open

all

the certificates

and the votes

be counted; the person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majojitv. then from the persons ha\ing the highest numl)ers not exceeding three on the Mst of those voted for as President, the House of Re|)resentatives shall choose immediately. I)y ballot,

the President,

liut

in

choosing the

President the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote; a

of a

cjuorum for

member

or

this

purpose

members from

shall consist

two-thirds of

the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary lo a chr)ice. And if the House of Representatives shall n«)t choose a President

whenever the right of choice shall clev(»lve upon ihem, before the fourth day of .March next following, then the Vice-President shall .!
- The structure of the government MUST furnish the PROPER CHECKS and balances between the differ-

The HoisF

68. 69.

50.

52-

63.

66.

>53

These departments should not be so far separated as to have no conSTITUTIONAL control ONER EACH OTHER Method of guarding against the encroachments OF ANY ONE DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT BY APPEALING TO THE PEOPLE THROUGH A CON-

49-

62.

PARTICULAR STRUCTURE OF THE

PARTS 48.

61.

()5.

NEW GOVERNMENT AND THE DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AMONG ITS DIFFERENT

page

Nujnber

Restrictions on the AurHORiTV of 144 THE SEVERAL STATES THE POWERS 45- The ALLEGED DANGER I ROM or THE UNION TO THE STATE GOVERN44.

182

83.

The

Jl

diciary.

Continued

tion TO trial by jury H 4.

237 242

C"f)«/;>n/^f/

in

rela244

Ceriain general and miscellaneous OBJECT ions to THE CONSTITUTION CONSIDERED AND ANSWERED 25 CoNCI UDINC; REMARKS 256 I

8r,.

THE FEDERALIST Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the ob-

Num ber i [HAMILTON] After an unequivocal experience of the efficiency

of

the

subsisting federal

vious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument, and consequence of the offices they hold under the State establishments; and the perverted

in-

govern-

ment, you are called upon to deliberate on a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences nothing less than the existence of the UNION,

ambition of another either

and welfare of the parts of which composed, the fate of an empire in many respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to deit is

for their political constitutions

on

It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve indiscriminately the opposition of any set of

men

(merely because their situaticms might them to suspicion) into interested or ambitious views. Candour will oblige us to admit that even such men may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted that much of the opposition which has made subject

acci-

its appearance, or may hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless at least, if not respectable— the honest errors of minds led astray by preconceived jealousies

So numerous indeed and so powerwhich serve to give a false bias to the judgment, that we, upon many

and

and good

feel for the event. Happy will it be our choice should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected

and good men on the on the right side of questions of the first magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would furnish a occasions,

if

wrong

with the public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular interests, innovates too

many

little

see

wise

as well as

lesson of moderation to those

much persuaded

who

are ever so

of their being in the right in

any controversy.

And

a further reason for

caution, in this respect, might be

local institutions, not to in-

volve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and

prejudices of truth.

fears.

ful are the causes

men must

upon

men, who will by the

under one government.

dent and force. If there be any truth in the remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind. This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate

class of

to aggrandise themselves

confusions of their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial confederacies than from its union

the safety

pend

hope

the reflection that

we

drawn from

are not always sure that

who advocate the truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists. Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party those

favourable to the discovery

29

THE FEDERALIST

30

opposition, and many other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation, noth-

ing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which has, at all times, characterised

political

parties.

For in

politics,

as in

equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be cured by persecution. And yet. however just these sentiments will religion,

it is

be allowed to be. we have already sufficient dications that

it

will

happen

in-

in this as in all

former cases ot great national discussion. A torrent of angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude thev will mutually hope to evince the and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of that

justness of their opinions,

their declamations

and the

bitterness of their

invectives. .An enlightened 7eal for the energy and efficiency of government will be stigma-

power and

fice,

new

own

that, after

attentive consideration,

ion \

I

am

clearly of opin-

your interest to adopt

is

it

my countrymen. having given it an

Constitution. Yes,

you

to

inced that this

is

it.

am

I

con-

the safest course for your

your dignity, and your happiness.

liberty,

I

not reserves which I do not feel. 1 will not amuse you with an appearance of deliberation when I have decidecl. I frankly acknowl-

affect

edge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be judged of by all. They shall at least be cause of truth. I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the

the stale bait for popularity at the ex-

pense of the public good. It will lie forgotten, on the one hand, that jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a

narrow and

illiberal distrust.

On

the

other hand, it will be ecjually forgotten that the vigour of gf)vernment is essential to the security of lil)erty; that, in the (onteinplation

and well-informed judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal for the rights of the |)eople than under the forbidding appearance of /cal for the lirnmess and efficiency of govof a sound

ernnicnt. History will teach us that the former

has been found a much iiiorc- certain road to (he introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men who have overturned the liberties of repiii>lic s. the- greatest number have begut) their career l)y paying an obsei)alion, nor to blind repii)l);ilion; but to iliat sed.ite and candid (onsidcra(ion which the magnitude and importance ol the subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this (as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to be wished than expected, that it juay l)e so considered and xainined. Fx|)erienceona former occasion leaches us not to be loo sanguine in (

such hopes.

Il

is

not yel forgotten that well

grounded apprehensions of imminent danger

induced the people of America to form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom; yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem with pamphlets and weekh papers against those very measures. Not only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public good, were indefatigable in their efforts to persuade the people to reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned and decided judiciously:

and happy they are

in reflecting that they did

so.

They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and experienced men. That, being convened from difierent parts of the country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowl-

1 hat they were individand prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as, after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and edge on that

heaci.

ually interested in the public liberty

advisable.

These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress: and ihey took their advice, notwithstanding the various and endeavours used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason to

arts

confide in the

wliom had been still

the for

i>ic.iter

men

of that Ccmgress. few of

fuliv tried

(»r

generally known,

reason have they

now

to respect

judmnent and advice of the convention, it is well known that some of the most

distinguished inc-mbers of that Congress,

who

appioved for patriotism and abilities, and who have grown old in accjuiring political information, were also members of this convention, and carried into it their accumulated knowledge and exhave been since tried and

justly

|)erience. It

fust,

worthy of remaik that not oidy the but eveiy succeeding (Congress, as well

is

N UMBER convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the pros-

as the late

perity of

America depended on

its

Union.

To

preserve and perpetuate it was the great object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for

what good purposes, are attempts at this particular period made by some men to depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why suggested that three or four confederacies

is it

would be better than one?

I

am

persuaded in

that the people have always thought right on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to the cause

my own mind

of the sons,

Union

which

I

rests

shall

on great and weighty reaendeavour to develop and

explain in some ensuing papers. They who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the con-

tinuance of the Union in the utmost jeopThat certainly would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly foreardy.

seen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of the poet:

MY

"Farewell! a long Farewell to all Publius

Greatness."

ety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and compre-

hensively.

At present

I

mean

only to consider

it

as

it

respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers

from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities

from abroad.

The number

of wars

happen

in the

or will

which have happened world will always be

found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by disunited America; for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations. The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or from will

America has already formed with no less than six foreign nations, of them, except Prussia, are maritime,

direct violence.

Mumberj

treaties

[JAY] not a new observation that the people of any country (if, like the Americans, intelligent and well-informed) seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinIt

33

5

is

and all and therefore able

to

annoy and injure

us.

ion respecting their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for

She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain, and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance of neighbourhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of

the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national

America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate

purposes.

States or by three or four distinct confederacies.

The more

attentively

vestigate the reasons

I

Because when once an

consider and in-

which appear

to

have

government

is

efficient

established, the best

national

men

in

given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive. Among the many objects to which a wise

the country will not only consent to serve, but

and

contracted influence, may place men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other

free people

their attention,

find

it

necessary to direct

that of providing for their

be the first. The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great vari-

safely seems to

be appointed to manage although town or country, or other

also will generally it;

for,

THE FEDERALIST

34

qualifications will be necessary to men to offices under the national

—especially as

it

will

recommend government

have the widest

field for

and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of th€ States. Hence, it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and

choice,

the judicial decisions of the national governwill be more wise, systematical, and ju-

ment

dicious than those of individual States, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as well as

more

sa^e with

respect to us.

Because, under the national government, and articles of treaties, as well as the

be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favours the to

safety of the people.

As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter. Because such violences are more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has

been occasioned by aggressions of the pres-

treaties

yet

laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner— whereas adjudications on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or four

ent federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostili-

confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent: and that, as well from the variety

and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing

of independent courts

such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and respx)nsible

only to one national government, cannot be too

much commended.

Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other States, and consecjucntly having little

or no influence on the national govern-

ment, the temptation will be fruitless, and good faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.

Because, even

if

the governing party in a

State should be disposed to resist such temptations,

yet,

commonly

as

such temptations ntay. and

do. result from circumstances pe-

ties having been provoked by the improper conduct of indiviclual States, who. either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offences, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants. The neighbourhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some States and not

on

others,

quarrel

naturally confines

more immediately

the causes of

to the borderers.

The bordering

States, if any. will be those who. under the impulse of sudden irritation, and a cjuick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely, by direct violence, tcj excite war with these nations: and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government, whose wisdoiu and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately inter-

ested.

But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending Slate. The pride of slates, as well as of men,

them

culiar to the State, and mayaffc-ct a great nuinber of the inhabitants, the governing party

naturally disposes

may

lecting. or repairing their errors

always be able, if willing, to pre\ent the injustice meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national govertnnent. not Ijeing affected hy those local circumstances, will neitiier be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others. .So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford ]ust causes of war. they are less n«)t

tions,

and

to justify all their ac-

oj)|)oses their

acknowledging, cor-

and

offences,

govertnnent. in such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed with moderation and (aiuiour to consider and riu' national

decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them. Besides,

it

is

well

known

that acknowledge-

ments, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory fiom a strong united nation, which would be lejected as un-

NUMB ER satisfactory

if

offered by a State or confeder-

acy of little consideration or power. In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having

offended Louis XIV., endeavoured to appease him. He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful

Publius

nation?

35 4 With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and can supply their markets

cheaper than they can themselves, notwith standing any efforts to prevent it by bounties their own duties on foreign fish. With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to

on

it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree dimin-

see

ishing theirs, will

promote

Mumber 4 [JAY]

last paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be exposed to by just causes of war given to other nations; anid those reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given, but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government than either by the State governments or the proposed little con-

My

federacies.

But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force depends not only on their forbearing to give y«5; causes

is

it

cumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

ation as not to invite hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are pretended

sissippi against us

It is

too true, however disgraceful it may be nature, that nations in general will war whenever they have a prospect of

human

make

getting anything by

archs will often

it;

nay, absolute montheir nations

make war when

are to get nothing by

it,

but for purposes and

objects merely personal, such as a thirst for

military glory, revenge for personal affronts,

ambition, or private compacts to aggrandise or support their particular families or partisans. These and a variety of other motives, which

only the mind of the sovereign, often to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others which affect nations affect

lead

him

as often as kings;

and some

of

them

will

examination be found to grow out of our ative situation

and circumstances.

on rel-

and

it.

war to otTier nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situ-

to

their interest,

In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolised, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them. The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the cir-

of

as well as just causes of war.

more

be more their policy, to restrain than to

Spain thinks

it

convenient to shut the Mis-

on the one

side,

and

Brit-

ain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and traffic. From these and such like considerations, which might, if consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and composure. The people of America are aware that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit time and opportunity for operation, pretences to colour and justify them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union and a good national government as necessary to put and

THE FEDERALIST

36

tion

and

and

fleet— let

resources of the countrv. .\s the safety of the whole

is

the interest of

and cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or many, let us inquire whether one good government is not. relative to the object in question, more competent than any other given number whatthe whole,

ever.

One government self of the talents

can collect and avail

and experience

it-

of the ablest

in whatever part of the Union thev may be found. It can move on uniform principles of p)oIicv. It can harmonise, assimilate, and

men.

protect the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In the formation of treaties,

it

will regard the interest of the whole,

and the particular

interests of the parts as

connetted with that of the whole.

It

can ap-

ply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State gov-

ernments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place the militia under one plan of disand. bv putting their oHicers in a to the Chiel Magistrate, will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby render them more ef-

cipline,

proper line of suijordination

ficient

than

if

divided into thirteen

cjr

into

three or four distinct independent companies. What would the militia of Britain be if the

English militia oijeyese that alliances offensive and defensive might be formed between these confederacies,

state of

defence against foreign

encinics.

When Kritain

judge, then, whether the di-

independent sovereignties would tend to cure us against the hostilities and improper terference of foreign nations.

and w«)uld produce that combination and union r»f wills, of arms, and of resources, which wf)uld be necessary to put and keep them in a fonniciablc-

men

vision of .America into any given iuniii)er of

appears that

those gentlemen are greatly mistaken

mans and others make in the characters of and what innovations did they under

did the independent states, into which and Spain were formerly divided, com-

bine in such alliance, or unite their forces

enemy? The proposed conbe distinct nations. Kadi of them would ha\e its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and ;is their

se-

in-

PlBLlL'S

Number 6 [HAMILTON] paper have been dedicated to an eiunneration of the dangcrs to which we should i)e exposed, in a state of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now proceed to delineate dan1

III

iiiRKK last niMubers of this

more

against a foreign

gers of a different and, perhaps,

federacies will

alarming kind— those which will in all prol)ability How from dissensions between the .States ihcinselves, and from domestic factions and

still

NUMBER convulsions.

These have been already

instances slightly anticipated; serve a

more

particular

in

some

but they de-

and more

full investi-

gation.

A man must tions

who can

be far gone in Utopian specula-

doubt that, if these be wholly disunited, or

seriously

States should either

only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an argument against their

would be to forget that men are amand rapacious. To look for a continuation of harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties in the same neighbourhood, would be to disregard the uniform course of human events, and existence,

bitious, vindictive,

to set at defiance the

accumulated experience

of ages.

The causes of hostility among nations are

in-

numerable. There are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the

6

39

prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,* or from a combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the name of the Peloponnesian war; which, after various vicissitudes, intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the

ruin of the Athenian commonwealth. The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII., permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,^ entertained

hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the favour and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided

by his counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a sovereign who bid fair to realise the project of universal monarchy, it

Of this description power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion— the jealousy of power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which have a more circumscribed

was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once the instrument and the

though an equally operative influence within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less numerous th^n either of the former, which take their

bals of a third,*

collective bodies of society.

are the love of

origin entirely in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests, hopes, and fears

communities of which they are members. Men of this class, whether the favourites of a king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public motive, have not scrupled

of leading individuals in the

dupe.

The

influence which the bigotry of one feand the ca-

male,* the petulance of another,'

icy,

ferments,

had in the contemporary poland pacifications, of a consider-

able part of Europe, are topics that have been too often descanted upon not to be generally

known.

To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic, according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time. Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from which they are to be drawn, will them-

celebrated Pericles, in compliance with

and those knowledge of human nature will not stand in need of such lights, to form their opinion either of the reality or

the resentment of a prostitute,^ at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of his coun-

extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a reference, tending to illustrate the general prin-

trymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the Samnians. The same man, stim-

ciple,

to sacrifice the national tranquillity to per-

sonal advantage or personal gratification.

The

ulated by private pique against the Megarensians/ another nation of Greece, or to avoid a prosecution with which he was threatened as

an accomplice in a supposed theft of the

statu-

ary Phidias,^ or to get rid of the accusations '

Aspasia, vide Plutarch's Pericles— Puhuvs

selves recollect avariety of instances;

who have

a

tolerable

may with

which has

lately

propriety be

made

happened among

to a case

ourselves.

*Ihid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public sold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the statue of Minerva.— PUBLIIIS ^ "

Worn by the popes.— i'Ubli us Madame de Maintenon.— Publius

^

Ibid— PvhLivs

'Duchess of Marlborough.— Publius

"

/fojd.— PUBLIUS

'Madame de Pompadour.- Publius

THE FEDERALIST

40

Shays had not been a desperate debtor, it is much to be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a civil war. But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing If

men. who stand ready to advocate the paradox between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other. of perpetual peace

The

genius of republics (say they) is pacific: commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men. and to extinguish those inflammable humours which have so often

the spirit of

kindled into wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other.

be governed bv mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual amitv and concord.

Thev

Is

will

it

not

(we may ask these projectors in

politics) the true interest of all nations to cul-

tivate the

in fact

pursued

it?

Has

it

not.

have they

on the contrary,

momentary pasand immediate interests, have a more ac-

invariably been found that sions,

tive and imperious control over human conduct than general and remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? Have republics in practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? .^re not the former administered by

men

as well as the latter? .Are there not aver-

sions, predilections, rivalships.

and

desires of

unjust acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? .Are not popular assemblies frequently

subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, and of other irregidar and

jealousy, avarice,

not well known that their determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confiviolent propensities?

Is it

dence, and are, of course, liable to ije tinctured bv the passions and views of those individuals? Has connnene hitherto done anything more than change the object of war? Is not the love of wealth as donuneering

and enterpris-

ing a passion as that ol power or glory? there not been as

Have

many wars founded upon

(ommercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the s|)irit of connnerce. in many instances, adnnnistered new incentives to the appetite. Ixith for the

one and

thage, of the conmiercial kind. Vet were they

engaged in wars, offensive and defenneighbouring monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and conquest. Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her anus intci the heart of Italy, and to the gates of Rome, before Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth. as often

sive, as the

in later times, figured more than wars of ambition, till, becoming an objec to the other Italian states. Pope Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league.' which gave a deadly blow to the power

\'enice,

once

swer to these inquiries.

in

t

and pride

The

of this haughty republic.

provinces of Holland,

till

they were

overwhelmed in dei)ts and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe. Thev had furious contests with England for the dominion of the sea, and were among the most persevering and most i!n|)lacal)le oi the opponents of Louis \l\'. In the government of Britain the representatives of the people compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been for ages the predominant |)uisuit of that country. Few nations, nevertheless, have been more frecjuenth engaged in war; and the wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous instances, proceeded from the people. There have been, if I may so express it. almost as many popular as royal wars. The cries of the nation

and the importunities of their upon various occasions,

representatives have,

dragged their nionarchs into war, or continued

them in it. contrary to their inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the state. In that

memorable

between the Bdurhon, which Maine,

is

it

well

struggle for superior-

houses of .-imtria and

rival

ity

long kept

.so

known

I'",uro|K'

in

a

that the antipathies of

the Fnglish against the French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favourite leader,' protracted the war beyond the limits m.iikcci out by sound policy, and for a con'

lor the

other? Ixt experience, the least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an an-

and Car-

republics: two of them, Athens

same benevolent and philosophic

spirit? If this i)e their true interest,

Rome, and Carthage were

Sparta, Athens, all

riie

I

e;igiu- ot

(

.;iiiil)ia\

,

compn

ln-mliiig the-

Kmpptor, the

Kmn

goii,

of the Iialiaii |)tiiKes aiul states.

I't

:i!icl

mil

iiicKsi

of

I

raiice,

the King nl .Ara-

s

•The

Puke- ol

\!;)i

llu.Knij^h.

Pi'iuii's

NUMBER siderable time in opposition to the views of the court.

41

7

ances in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in Massachusetts, declare

The wars

of these two last-mentioned nahave in a great measure grown out of commercial considerations— the desire of supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and navigation.^ tions

From

summary

of what has taken place whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of this

So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with the tenets of those who endeavour to lull asleep our apprehensions of discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion, that it has from long observation of the progress of society become a sort axiom in politics, that vicinity, or nearness of situation, constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "Neighbouring

in other countries,

of

the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not already seen enough of the

other, unless their

fallacy

and extravagance

of those idle theories

which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the imperfections, weaknesses, and evils incident to society in every shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and perfect

NATIONS

[says he] are naturally

aggrandise themselves at the expense of their neighbours." ^ This passage, at the same time, points out the evil and suggests the remedy.

PUBLIUS

Number j [HAMILTON]

Let the point of extreme depression to which our national dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a part of the State of

^

late

menacing

disturb-

In the text said to have been revised by Hamil-

ton and Madison, and adopted by Mr. J. C. Hamfollowing additional sentences occur at this point: "and sometimes even the more culpable desire of sharing in the commerce of other nations without their consent. The last war but two between Britain and Spain sprang from the attempts of the English merchants to prosecute an illicit trade with the Spanish main. These unjustifiable practices on their part produced severity on the part of the Spaniards towards the subjects of Great Britain which were not more justifiable, because they exceeded the bounds of a ilton, the

and were chargeable with inhumanity and cruelty. Many of the English who were taken on the Spanish coast were sent to dig in the mines of Potosi; and by the usual progress just retaliation

of a spirit of resentment, the

innocent were, after

confounded with the guilty in indiscriminate punishment. The complaints of the merchants kindled a violent flame throughout the nation, which soon after broke out in the House of Commons, and was communicated from that body to the ministry. Letters of reprisal were granted, and a war ensued, which in its consequences overthrew all the alliances that but twenty years before had been formed with sanguine expectations of the most beneficial fruits." a while,

forces

them to league in a confederative republic, and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all states to

virtue?

North Carolina, the

enemies of each

common weakness

sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon each other? It would be a full answer to this question to say— precisely the same inducements which have, at different times, deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately for us, the question admits of a It

is

more

particular answer.

There are causes of

differences within our

immediate contemplation, of the tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were removed. Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It is well known that they have ^

Vide Principes des Negociations, par I'Abbe de

Mably.— PUBLIUS

THE FEDERALIST

42 heretofore had

and animated

serious

discus-

sion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name of

crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property, the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished in the treaty of peace. This, it has

been said, was at all events an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the Ignited States for the benefit of the whole.

This has been so

accomplished

far

as,

under

a

continuation of the Union, to afford a decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A dismemberment of the Confeder-

however, would revive this dispnite, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least, if not by any

acy,

common

anterior right, the

Union.

made

If that

were

the cession,

property of the

at

an end, the States which

on

a principle of federal

compromise, would be apt, when the motive of the grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a

other States would no on a proportion, by right of repre-

reversion.

df)ubt insist

The

Mtuation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made, tould not be revoked: and

the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at

Wyoming, admonish

us not to lie sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of such differences. The articles of federation obliged the parties to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The submission was made, and the court decided in favour of Pennsylvania. But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to it, till, by negotiation and management, some-

thing like an equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest

censure on the conduct of that State. She sincerely believed herself to have

no doubt

been injured by the decision; and

in determinations to their disadvantage.

Those who had an opportunity

Vermont, can vouch the opas well from States not interested as from those which were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State attempted to

and the

district of

position

assert

its

we experienced,

entertained of our future power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of influeiue in the neighi)()ining Slates, who had obtaiiu'd grants of lands under the actual govenuneiu of tiiat district. K\en the States whic h

brought forward claims,

all

the States, that each

of

this

(ommon

had

l)e

admitted by

a right to a

stock, there

would

still

share

be

a

be surmounted, as to a proper rule ol apportioiMuent. Dilkrcul principles would be set up by different Stales lor this purpose; and as they would aflect the opposite interests dillu ultv to

«»f

the parties, they might not easily be suscep-

liljle

of a pacific adjustment.

In the wide field

r)f

Western

territory, there-

an ample liicaire for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or connnon judge tcj interpose beiwec-n the coiuending parties. TV) reasle alliances were formed:

miuual

who

and war,

servance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this

ihev are mere recommendations which the Stales observe or disregard :it their option. ca|)riciousIt is a singidar inslance ol the ness of the hun\an miiul, thai, after all the ad lice

its

scribe to us.

Hut

if

we

.lie

unwilling il

we

lo Ix' i)l.iceriocl

c»f

l-.uropcan

c-mjihatically styled bv hisiori.ms the

times of feudal anarchy. When the .sovereign happened to be a man of vigorousand warlike temper and of superior .ibiliiics. he would a(C|uire a pc-isonal weight ,incl

inllucnce, which answered, for the time,

more regular authority. But power of the barons triumphed over til. It of the prince-; and in many instances Ins (loininiiin was cntirelv thrown oil. .iiid tiie ihc

|)in

poses of a

Ml gpciis, on anv emergency, be more- imitecl its

situation

I. It

ions must

l)y

the necessity of

is still ele

be-

|)rececled by so

discussions, arising

sell

eleteiue,

plorable. .Military prepa

many

tedious

liom the jealousies,

|)ii(le\

separate views, and clashing pretensions ofsov-

NUMBER ereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters. The small body of national troops, which

has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with prejudices, and supported by irreguand disproportionate contributions to the

local lar

treasury.

The

19

midable powers all around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor derives from his separate and hereditary dominions; and the interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride is connected, and which constitutes him the first

impossibility of maintaining order

among

and

these sovereign sub-

produced the experiment of dividing the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an interior organisation, and of jects,

charging them with the military execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious

members. This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature picture of the deformities of this political monThey either fail to execute their commis-

Europe;— these causes support a and precarious Union; whilst the repel-

prince in feeble

dispensing justice

75

foreign powers; the weakness of most of the principal members, compared with the for-

lent quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded on

proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagif this obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighbouring powers would suffer a revolution to take place, which would give to the empire the force and pre-eminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by events in this constitution; and have, a

ined,

ster.

on various

or they do it with all the devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were instituted to remedy.

anarchy and weakness. examples were wanting, Poland, as a government over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and self-defence, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful neighbours; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one-third of its peo-

sions,

We

may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth,

a free

and imperial

Abbe de St. Croix enjoyed certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise of these, city of the circle of Suabia, the

on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it. He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext that his ancestors had suffered the place to

be dismembered from his

territory,^

own name,

possession of

it

and punished

the inhabitants,

in his

he took

disarmed,

and reannexed

the city to his domains. It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed machine from falling en-

tirely to pieces? The answer is obvious: The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose themselves to the mercy of ^

Pfeffel,

Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de

I'Hist., etc.,

occasions, betrayed their policy of

perpetuating If

ple

more

and

The

its

direct

territories.

connection

scarcely

amounts

among

the Swiss cantons

though it sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions. They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common to a confederacy;

is

mark of sovereignty. They are kept together by

the peculiarity of

their topographical position;

by their individ-

ual weakness

and

insignificancy; by the fear of

powerful neighbours, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated, and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and per-

manent provision

d'Alleinagne, says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the expense of the expedition.—

among

PUBLIUS

parties

for

the cantons. at

accommodating disputes

The

provision is, that the variance shall each choose four

THE FED EP^ALIST

76

judges out of the neutral cantons, who. in case of disagreement, choose an umjMre. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pro-

into treaties

nounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce. Ihe competency of this regulation may be estimated by a clause in

all

their treaty of 1683. with \'ictor Amadeus of Savov: in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and 10 employ forte, if necessary, against

the contumacious party. So far as the pecidiarity of their case will admit of comparison with that of the United serves to confirm the principle intended to be established. Whatever efficacv the union may have had in ordinary cases, it ap-

States,

it

moment

a cause of difference

pears that the sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed. The controxersies on the subject of religion, which in three instances have kindled

and

alliances: to

make war and

peace: to raise armies and equip fleets: to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In

and the

these cases, however, unanimity

sanction of their constituents are requisite. Thev have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors: to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for the collection of duties on imports and exports: to regulate the mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as sovereigns the dependent territories. The provincesare restrained, unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign treaties;

from establishing imposts injurious neighbours with

to others, or charging their

higher duties than their

own

subjects.

A

coun-

of accounts, with five and fortify the fedaid admiralty, of colleges cil

of state, a

chamber

eral administration.

have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general diet little other business than to take

executive magistrate of the union is the who is now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title: from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Kurope; and. more than all. per-

care of the common baiiages. That separation had another consequence,

haps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which

and bloody

violent

contests,

may be

said, in

fact, to

which merits attention.

It

produced opposite

alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at the head of the Protestant association, with the

United Provinces: and ni lAizerne. at the head of the Catholic association, with France. Plblius

The

stadtholder.

provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates imder certain regulations,

executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has thrf)ughout the power of pardon. As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable j>reroga lives.

In his political capacity, he has authority to settle disputes between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the delibera-

Number 20 [ham II ION

The Uniikd

.\ND

MADISON]

Nkiukri.ands are

a

confederacy

of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet lonfirming all the les-

sons derived from those which

we have already

re\ iewed.

The union is(ompf)sed of seven (oecpial ami sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of etjual and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces iiies must be unanimous. The sovereignty of the Union is represented

but the


ui inces.

lifty

deputies ai>pointed by the piov-

They hold

for six. three,

their seats. s^Mue for

and one

inces they continue in

life,

some

from two provappointment during

years:

pleasure. I

he States-General have authority

t« of Ik'"^- ;""' l'^' k'"' sa\s not .1 woul al)oiii ilu- m.iiici. .No l)ilh of lights a|)|K-ai anmxcil lo the coiisiiiiitions of the other States, cxcciU the loicgoiiin, and thcii constitiuions aic cc|iiall\ silent. I am lohl, however, thai one or two Slates have l)iils to l)c. to anv ureal extent."

'

often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order is

it

equitable, that those duties should

especially in a couii

try of small conuncrcial capital,

not so generally true as to render

form the onlv national fund. When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional tax upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of them in the character of

same State. Suppose, as has been contended for. the federal power of taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident that the government, for want of being able to command other resources, would frequently be tempted

improper degree,

the duties

would

citizens of the

to

it is far more equitable that on imports should go into a common stock, than that they should redound to

proposition, that

But

undue proportion of the upon those objects. Two

the several States as

sale.

should

evils would spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as

among

more expeditious

a

The maxim that the consumer is the payer, so nmch of tener true than the reverse of the

III

|)i()|)(iiti(iii is

NUMBER

in their

new precautions. The

more

first

success would be apt

which it might require long course of subsequent experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often octo inspire false opinions,

a

and a system of measures correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should not be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed. Let us now return to the examination of casions false hopes, false reasonings,

objections.

One

which,

quency of

its

we may judge from

if

the fre-

repetition, seems most to be re-

is, that the House of Representatives not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings of every

lied on, is

part of the community,

and

produce a due sympathy between the representative body and its constituents. This argument presents itself under a very specious and seducing form; and is well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object it seems to aim at is, in the first

place, impracticable,

to

and

in the sense in

113

55

leisure to contrive expedients to elude these

own good

effectually

sense, their interests can

be

promoted by the merchant

than by themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which, in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural useless; and that and superior acquiremerchants render them more

abilities are for the

most part

the influence andweight,

ments of the

equal to a contest with any

happen

spirit

to infuse itself into the

which might public coun-

unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading interests. These considerations, and many others that might be mentioned, prove, and ex-

cils,

it, that artisans and manucommonly be disposed to bestow upon merchants and those whom

perience confirms facturers will their votes

they

recommend.

merchants

We

these classes of the

With regard tle

must therefore consider

as the natural representatives of all

community.

to the learned professions,

need be observed; they truly form no

tinct interest in society,

and

and according

lit-

dis-

to their

be indiscriminately the objects of the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the community. Nothing remains but the landed interest; and situation

talents, will

and

this, in a political

view,

lation to taxes,

take to be perfectly united,

I

particularly in re-

from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest tenant. No tax can be laid on land which

contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for another place the discussion of the question which relates to the sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers, and shall content myself with examining here the particular use which has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the immediate subject of our inquiries. The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be inclined, with few exceptions, to give

Every landholder will therefore have a cominterest to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact as our guide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this less the

their votes to merchants, in preference to per-

case in the senate

which

it is

sons of their

own

professions or trades.

Those

discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise and industry.

Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with the operations of commerce. They know tron

that the

and

merchant

friend;

and they

is

their natural pa-

are aware, that

ever great the confidence they

may

how-

justly feel

will not affect the proprietor of millions of

acres as well as the proprietor of a single acre.

mon

number than

which

consists of a smaller

which is composed of a greater number. Where the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have to choose a small or a large number, in the assembly

their votes will fall

upon

those in

whom

they

have most confidence; whether these happen to be men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at all. It is said to be necessary, that all classes of

^^^ ^^^ ERALIST

114

The man who understands

should have some of their own number in the representative body, in order that their feehngs and interests may be the better understood and attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is the case, the represcntati\ e body,

ness of taxation.

with too few exceptions to have any influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But where is the dan-

that in order to fol)tain] a judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is neces-

citizens

ger that the interests and feelings of the different classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these three descriptions of AVill not the landholder know and feel whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property? And will he not. from his own interest in that species of property, be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic and manufacturingarts. to which his commerce is so nearly allied? Will not the man of the

men?

learned profession,

who

will feel a neutrality

to the rivalships between the different branches of industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them, ready to promote either,

so far as

it

shall

appear

to

him conducive

to

the general interests of the society? If we take iriio the account the momentary humours or dispositions which may happen to

and which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less likely to be a cftmpetent judge of their nature, extent, and foundation than f)ne whose observation does not travel beyond the circle of his neighbours and accjuaintantes? Is it not nat-

prevail in particular parts of the society, to

those principles best will be least likely to resort to oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of citizens to the procureof revenue. It might be demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will

ment

always be the

least

burdensome. There can be

no doubt

whose hands itisshould

sary that the person in

be acquainted with the general genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and with the resources of the country. .\nd this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning, or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citi/cn judge for himself

most

where the requisite qualification

is

Publr's

be found.

likely to

Number ^6 [hamiiio.n]

We

have seen

tliat

the result of the observa-

which the foregoing numlier has been j)riiui|ially devoted, is. that from the nalinal tions, to

operation of the different interests and views cjf the various classes of the community, whether the representation of the people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of proprietors of land, of merchants, and of memi)ers of the learned jirofessions. who will truly represent all those different interests anil views. If it should l)e objected that we ha\t seen other descriptions of legislatures,

1

answer that

it

men is

in

the local

admitted there

are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient

man who is a candidate for the favour of the people, and who is dependent on the

ninnber to influence the general complexion or character of the government, riifre are strong minds in every walk of life that will rise siq)erior to tiie disadvantages of situation, and

suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continu-

will

ural that a

ance of his j)ublic honours, should take care to in form h imsel f of their disp«)sit ions and inclinations,

and should

Ijc

willing to a How

them

their

conduct? proper degree ol induence This (lepetKlcnce, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his posterity, by the laws u|)nvenient, will be pre! erable, because ii will be more effectual: and it is impossible to prove in theory, or otherwise than l)\ the experiment, that it cannot be advantageously exercised. The (ontrary. indeed, appears most probable. The second an swer is. that the existence of such a power in the Ccmstitution will have a strong influence

ercise of that

in

giving efficacy to requisitions. When the know that the Union can apply itself

States

without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for exertion on their part. As to the interference of llic- revenue laws of the Uni«»n.and oi its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or repug nancv c»f autlmrity. Ilie laws cannot, there fore, in a legal sense, interfere with each other;

As neither can control the other, each have an obvious and sensible interest in to.

And where

there

yvill

this is

an

immediate common interest, we may safely count upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their natural compass, the possibility almost of interference

A small land-tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be their most simple and most fit resource. Many spectres have been raised out of this

will vanish.

of internal taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of revenue olhcers. a duplication of their burdens by double taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive poll-taxes, have been

power

played

off

with

all

the ingenious dexterity of

political legerdemain. .As to the first point there are two cases in which there can be no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies to the duties on imports: the other, where the oljject has not fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be appli-

cable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the State

and State regulations for collecting the additional imposition. This will best answer the view!> of revenue, because it will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any

officers

occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. .At all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an inconvenience: and nothing more can be rec]uired than to show that evils predicted do not neces-

from the plan. As toan\ argument derived from

sarily result

a

supposed

system of influence, it is a sullicient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed: but the

supposition is susce|)til)le of a more precise answer. If such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most certain road to the accom|)lishnieni of

its

aim would be

to

employ

the State olhcers as much as possible, and to attach lluni to the Union 1)\ .ni ace umulalicm of their e-moluments. This would serve to turn the tide of State inlineiiec into the chainielsof

NUMB ER making an opposite and ad-

117

57

the national government, instead of

tional government, or even be urged as

federal influence flow in

stacle to its

verse current.

am

the consideration of the great question before

recourse to

But all suppositions of this kind are invidious, and ought to be banished from the people.

They can answer no other end than

to cast a mist

over the truth.

double taxation, the answer is plain. The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another; if to be done by the authority of the federal government, it will not be to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case; with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the Union— that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and of course will render it less necessary to recur to more inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of internal taxation, it will impose a

As

to the suggestion of

disposition to greater care in the choice

and

adoption? As

little

an ob

friendly as

1

to the species of imposition, I still feel a

thorough conviction that the power of having it ought to exist in the federal government. There are certain emergencies of nations in which expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be forborne, be-

come

essential to the public weal.

And

the

government, from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the option of making use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue, is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of the national councils in this respect. There may exist certain critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll-tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to exempt this portion of the

globe from the common calamities that have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed for the general defence and

arrangement of the means; and must naturally

security.

tend to make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the poorer and

have now gone through the examination powers proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government; and have endeavoured to answer the principal objections which have been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the Con-

most numerous it

is

when

classes of the society.

the interest which the

has in the preservation of

its

Happy

government

own power,

coin-

cides with a proper distribution of the public

burdens, and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from oppression! As to poll-taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in those States^ which have uniformly been the most tenacious of their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice under the national government. But does it follow because there is a power to lay them, that they will actually be laid? Every State in the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State governments to be stigmatised as tyrannies because they possess this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power justify such a charge against the na-

^

The New England

States.— Pubi.ius

I

of such of the

stitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy. The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an investigation under this head, had it not been

for the consideration that its

extent

its

organisation and

may be more advantageously

con-

sidered in connection. This has determined

me

to refer

it

to the

upon which we

branch of our inquiries Publius

shall next enter.

Number ^y [MADISON J In reviewing the defects of the existing Confederation, and showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy than that before the public, several of the most important principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as the ultimate ob-

THE FEDERALIST

ii8 ject of these

papers

to

is

determine clearly and

fully the merits of this Constitution,

and the

expediency of adopting it. our plan cannot be complete without taking a more critical and thorough survey of the work of the convencomtion, without examining it in all its sides, its calculating and parts, its paring it in all probable effects. That this remaining task may be executed imder impressions conducive to a just and fair be result, some reflections must in this place indulged, which candour previously suggests. from human It is a misfortune, inseparable investiaffairs, that public measures are rarely of moderation which

is

gated with that spirit essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to advance or obstruct the public good: and that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it. To those wlu) have been led by experience to attend to this consideration,

it

could not appear sur-

prising that the act of the convention, which

recommends

so

many important changes and may be viewed in so many

innovations, which lights

and

and which touches the many passions and interests,

relations,

springs of so should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on one side and on the f)ther, to a fair discussion and accurate judgment of its merits. their it has been too evident from the scanned have they that publications, own proposed Constitution, not only with a pre-

In some,

disposition to censure, but with a predetermination to condemn: as the language held by

others betrays an opposite predetermination

or bias. whi(h must render their opinif>ns also of little moment in the (juestion. In placing. however, these different diaracters on a level, with respect to the weight of their opinions. I wish not to insinuate that there may not l)e a material difference in the purity of their intentions. It is but just to remark in favour of (he latter description, that as our situation is universally admitted to be pecidiarly critical,

is. that these papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these characters. They solicit the attention of

pable. But the truth

those only who add to a sincere zeal for the happiness of their coimtry a temper favourable to a just estimate of the means of promot-

ing it. Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the plan submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to find or to magnify faults: but will see the propriety of reflecting that a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will they barely make

allowances for the errors which may be chargeable on the fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men. were liable: but will keep in mind that they themselves also are but men.

and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others. With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these inducements to candour, many allowances ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred to the convention. The novelty of the inidertaking immediately strikes us. It has

been shown

in the course of

these papers, that the existing Confederation fallacious; is founded on principles which are

we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown that the other confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been vitiated by the same errothat

neous principles, and can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons which give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be pursued. Ihe most that the convention could do in such a situation, was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other countries, as well as of our own: and lo provide a convenient mode of rectifying their own errors, as future experience may unfold them. Among the dillicidties encr)unierccl by the

convention, a very important one must have

niincd patron of wiial has l)ecii adu.div done may have taken his bias from tlie weiglii of these considerations, as well as from considera-

combining the recjuisite stability and government wiih the inviolai)le attention clue to liberty and to the republican form. Without substantially a((om|)lishing this part of their inidcitaking. they would have

tions of a sinister nature. The predetermined adversary, on the other hand, can have been

very impcrfcc appointiiu 111,

and to rcc|uire indispcns;ibly that something sliould l)e done for our rebel, ihe predctc-r-

govc-rned bv no venial motive whatever.

The

inicntions of the- first may l)c- ujiright, as they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot be upright, and must be cul-

lain in

energy

in

tlv i>i

fidlilled the object of their the expec talion of the pulilic :

could not be easily accomplished will l)e denied by no one wlio is imwilling to betray his ignorance of the sul)ject. Knergy in

vet that

it

govennuent

is

essential lo that security against

NUMBER and internal danger, and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government. Stability in government is essential to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which external

are

among

An

irregular

the chief blessings of civil society.

and mutable

legislation is not than it is odious to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the nature,

more an

and

evil in itself

interested, as the great

body of them

are,

good government, will never some remedy be applied to the and uncertainties which character-

119

37

rated by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a preg-

nant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy. The boundaries between the great kingdom of nature, and, still more, between the various provinces and lesser portions into which they are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same important truth. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have

never yet succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the district of vege-

from the neighbouring region of unorganised matter, or which marks the terminatable life

and the commencement of

in the effects of

tion of the former

be

the animal empire.

satisfied

vicissitudes

till

On

comparing, however, these valuable ingredients with the ise

the State administrations.

vital principles of liberty,

at

once the

difficulty of

we must

perceive

mingling them

to-

gether in their due proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on one side not only that all power should be derived

from the people, but that those intrusted with should be kept in dependence on the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that even during this short period the trust it

should be placed not in a few, but a of hands. Stability, that

the hands

in

number

on the contrary, requires which power is lodged

should continue for a length of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a single hand. How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an arduous part. Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper line of partition between the authority of the general and that of the State governments. Every man will be sensible of this difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in their nature. The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be sepa-

lies

A

still

greater obscurity

in the distinctive characters by

which the

objects in each of these great departments of

nature have been arranged and assorted.

When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated, we must perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations and hopes from the efforts of

human

sagacity.

Experience has

no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces— the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of instructed us that

the different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice which

prove the obscurity which reigns in these suband which puzzle the greatest adepts in

jects,

political science.

The

experience of ages, with the continued

and combined labours of the most enlightened legislators and jurists, has been equally unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of laws and different tribunals of justice.

common

law,

The

and the

precise extent of the

statute law, the

maritime

law, the ecclesiastical law. the law of corporations, and other local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has been more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world. The jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local, of

law, of equity, of admiralty, etc., is not less a source of frequent and intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate limits

THE FEDERALIST

120

bv which thev are respecti\elv circumscribed. All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical

skill,

and passed on the

fullest

and

most mature deliberation, are considered as

more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudica-

tation

had been adjusted,

tions. Besides the obscuritv arising from the complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveved to each other adds a fresh embarrassment. The

greatest share of influence.

use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity, therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly formed, but that they

retical

should be expressed by words distinctly and exclusi\eh appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as to supply words and

States only,

phrases for every complex idea, or so correct many equi\ocallv denoting

as not to include

Hence it must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. .And this unavoidable inaccuracy must

different ideas.

ijc

greater or

less,

according to the complexity

Wiicn the .AlmightN himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated. Here. then, are three sources of vague and

and novelt\

of the objects ckfuied.

incorrect definiticins: indistinctness of the oIjimperfection of the organ of conception,

ject,

inadecjuatrness of the vehicle of ideas. Any f^f these must produce a certain degree of

one

obscurity.

The

convetition. in delineating the

boundary between the federal and State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them all. To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller .States. We cannot err in su|>posing that the former would contend for govetnnieni, lull\ proportioned to their superior wealth and importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the ecjuality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose that ncithc-r

a participation in the

side

would

entirely Nield to the other,

and con-

that the situggle could be terminated only by compronuse. It is extiemeh probable, also, that after the ratio of represen-

senies com-

eral

mit led on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations; to regulate foreign commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the

year 1808, the importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations.

powers forms an obvious and branch of the federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any respect, it clearlv ought to be in respect to other nations. The powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the articles

This

class of

essential

of Confederation, with this difference only, that the fonner is disembarrassed, by the plan of the convention, of an exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrat-

ed bv regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and receiving "other public ministers and consuls," is expressly and verv properly added to the former provision concerning ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to be required by the second of the articles of Confederation, comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers, and excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Con-

employ the inferior grades of public and to send and receive consuls. It is true that where treaties of commerce stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions are coiniccted with com-

gress, to

ministers,

merce, the admission of foreign consuls may fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that where no sudi treaties exist, the mission of American consuls into foreign countries may perhaps be covered under the authority, given by the ninth article of the

Confederation, to appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply of the

omission is one of the lesser instances in which the convention have improved on the model i)efore them. But the most minute provisions l)ecome important when tliey tend to obviate the necessity or liie pretext for gradual and unol)ser\ed usurpations of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into violalitms of their chartered

W(mld not a little surprise those paid no attention to the subject; and

authorities.

who have

NUMBER would be no inconsiderable argument in favour of the new Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the old.

The power and

felonies

to define and punish piracies committed on the high seas, and

offences against the law of nations, belongs

with equal propriety to the general government, and is a still greater improvement on the articles of Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the case of offences against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations. The provision of the federal articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of these offences.

piracies

The

definition of

might, perhaps, without inconven-

iency, be left to the

law of nations; though a

them is found in most municipal codes. A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the common law of England; and of various import in the statute law of that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for legislative definition of

the proceedings of

own by

its

this,

made The meaning

unless previously

legislative adoption.

of the term, as defined in the codes of the sev-

would be as impracticable as the former would be a dishonourable and illegitimate guide. It is not precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each with every revision of its criminal laws. For the eral States,

sake of certainty

power

and uniformity,

therefore,

was and proper. The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully discussed to need additional proofs here of its the

of defining felonies in this case

in every respect necessary

being properly submitted to the federal administration. It

were doubtless

to

be wished that the

power of prohibiting the importation of slaves had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in favour of humanity, that a period of twenty years

42

137

may terminate

for ever, within these States, a

traffic which has so long and so loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that period it will receive a considerable discouragement from the federal government, and may be totally abolished by a concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural traffic in the prohibitory example which has been given by so great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of being redeemed from the op-

pressions of their

European brethren!

Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit to conduct their opposition to the proposed government. The powers included in the third class are those which provide for the harmony and proper intercourse

Under

among

the States.

head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial department; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the structure and organisation of the government. I shall

this

confine myself to a cursory review of the

remaining powers comprehended under third description,

to wit:

to

this

regulate com-

merce among the several States and the Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and securities of the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures; to establish a uniform rule of naturalisation, and uniform laws of bankruptcy; to prescribe the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States; and to establish post-offices and postroads.

The defect of power in the existing Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its

several

members

is

in the

number

of those

which have been clearly pointed out by experience. To the proofs and remarks which

THE FEDERALIST

138

former papers have brought into view on this subject, it may be added that, without this supplemental provision, the great and essen-

bours, without the general permission. The regulation of commerce with the Indian

commerce

limitations in the articles of Confederation, which render the provision obscure and contradictory. The power is there restrained to

of regulating foreign

tial power would have been incomplete and ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief of the States which import and export through other States from the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were

these at liberty to regulate the trade between and State, it must be foreseen that ways

State

would be found out to load the articles of import and export, during the passage through their jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the latter and the consumers of the former.

We may

be assured by

past experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future contrivances: and both by that and a common knowledge of affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities and not improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public tranquillity. To those who do not view the ques-

human

medium of passion or of inthe desire of the commercial States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from tion through the terest,

their uncommercial neighbours, must appear not less impolitic than it is unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resent-

ment

as well as interest, to resort to less con-

venient channels for their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the clamours of an impatient avitlity for

The

immediate and immoderate gain.

necessity of a superintending author-

ity over the reciprocal trade of confederated States has been illustrated by other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged

to allow to merchandises a passage rhrough its juiisdidion into other cantons, without an

augmentation of the tf)lls. In C;crmany it is a law of the empire that the princes and states shall not lay tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the consent of the emperor and the diet: though it appears from a (juotaiion in an antecedent paper that the practice in this, as in

many

other instances in

has not followed the law. and has produced there the mischiefs whicii have been foresec-n lure. Among the restraints that

conlcciciac

y,

of the Netherlands on that they shall not cstab

Union

imposed by the its memljcrs, one lish

is,

imposts disadvantageous to their neigh-

tribes

is

very properly unfettered from two

members

Indians, not

of any of the States,

and

not to violate or infringe the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What description of Indians are to be deemed nxembers of a State is not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity and contenis

tion in the federal councils.

And how

the trade

with Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. not the only case in which the artiConfederation have inconsiderately endeavoured to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial sovereignty in the Union,

This

is

cles of

with complete sovereignty in the States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part, and letting the whole remain. All that need be

remarked on the power

to

coin money, regulate the \ alue thereof, and of foreign com, is. that by providing for this last case, the Constitution has supplied a material omission in the articles of Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is restrained to the regulation of coin struck by their own authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at once that the proposed uni-

formity in the value of the current coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the different regulations of the different States.

The punishment lic

of counterfeiting the pubis sub-

securities, as well as the current coin,

mitted of course to that authority which is to secure the value of both. The regulaiion of weights and measures is transferred from the art ides of Confederation, and is founded on like considerations with the

preceding power of regulainig coin. The dissimilarity in the rules of natmalisalion has long been remarked as a fault in our

and as laying a foundation for intriand delicate cjuesticms. In the fourth arti-

system, cate

cle of the

Confederation

it

is

declared "that

the Irrr nihahtlnuls of each of these States, pau|)ers. vagalxmds,

and

fugitives

excepted, shall be entitled to

immunities States;

of

and the

\rec

all

citizctis

from

justice

privileges

in

the

and

several

fyeoplc of each State shall, in

NUMBER every other, enjoy

all

the privileges of trade

43

139

vision against them,

and

others proceeding

all

and commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here which is remarkable. Why the

from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorising the general government

terms jree inhabitants are used in one part of the article, free citizens in another, anti people

uniform rule of naturalisation throughout the United States. The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and valuable im-

what was meant by superadding and immunities of free citithe privileges of trade and com-

in another; or

to "all privileges

zens," "all

merce," cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction scarcely avoidable, however, that those

who come under

the denomi-

nation of free inhabitants of a State, although not citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to all the privileges of free citizens of the latter; that is, to greater privileges than thev that

may be entitled to in their own State: so may be in the power of a particular

it

State, or rather every State

is

laid

under a

to establish a

provement on the clause relating

to this sub-

the articles of Confederation.

The

necessity, not only to confer the rights of citi-

ject

zenship in other States upon any whom it may admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which would confine the stipulated

meaning of the latter is extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under

privileges to citizens alone,

the difficulty

is

diminished only, not removed. The very improper power would still be retained by each State of naturalising aliens in

every other

in

any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States, where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign jurisdiction.

The power

of establishing post-roads must,

State. In

one State residence

confirms

all

in every view, be a harmless power,

An

perhaps, by judicious management, become productive of great public conveniency. Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse

for a short

term

the rights of citizenship: in another, qualifications of greater importance are required.

alien, therefore, legally incapaci-

tated for certain rights in the latter, may, by

previous residence only in the former, elude and thus the law of one State be preposterously rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction of the his incapacitv;

We

owe

mere casualty, that very on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had other.

it

between the States can be deemed unworthy Publius of the public care.

Number 4^

to

serious embarrassments

rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship, within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal consequences might have been, other consequences would probably have resulted of too serious a nature not to be provided against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made pro-

and may,

[MADISON]

The

fourth class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:

A

power "to promote the progress of and useful arts, by securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and 1.

science

discoveries."

The

utility of this

power

will scarcely

be

questioned. The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of

common

law.

The

right to useful in-

ventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of individuals.

The

States

cannot separately make

THE FEDERALIST

140

effectual provision for either of the cases,

and

stitution, every

most of them have anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the instance of

be obviated.

Congress.

magazines,

exercise exclusive legislation, in all over such district (not exwhatsoever, cases ceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States and the acceptance of

government,

2.

"To

Congress, of the

seat of the

become the

United

government

to exercise like au-

and

States:

thority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in which the same shall be. for the erection of forts,

magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings."

Tlie indispensable necessity of complete au-

government carries its own evidence with it. It is a power exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the world, by virtue of its general supremacv. Without it. not only the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings interrupted with impunity: but a dependence of the members of the general government on the thority at the seat of

State

comprehending the

seat of the govern-

ment, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence, equally dishonourable to the government and dissatisfactorv to the other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more weight, imas the gradual accumulation of public the of residence stationarv the at provements government would be both too great a public left in the hands of a single State, and would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as still further to

pledge to be

abridge

its

necessary independence.

tent of this federal district

cumscribed to

satisfy

is

The

ex-

sufficiently cir-

every jealousy of an op-

posite nature. .\nd as

it

is

to

be appropriated

to this use with the consent of the State ceding provide in the it; as the State will no doubt

compact

for the rights

citizens inliabiting

find suflicieni

it:

and the consent

of the

as the inhabitants will

inducements of

interest to be-

come willing parties to the cession: as they will have had their voice in the election of the government which is to exercise authority over them: as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants of the ceded part of it. to concur in the cession, will be derived from the whole peo-

ple of the State, in their adoption of the Con-

imaginable objection seems to

necessity of a like authority over forts, etc., established by the general

The

is

not

less

monev expended on such

evident. places,

The

public

and the pub-

propertv deposited in them, require that thev shoidci be exempt from the authoritv of the particular State. Nor would it be proper for the places on which the security of the en-

lic

tire Union may depend to be in anv degree dependent on a particular member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated,

by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned in every such establishment.

"To

3.

declare the punishment of treason,

but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life

of the person attainted."

As treason may be committed against the United States, the authority of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines bv which violent factions, the natural offspring of free government, have usuallv wreaked their alternate malignitv on each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a barrier to thispeculiar danger, bv inserting a constitutional definition of the

crime, fixing the proof necessary for conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing it. from extending the consequences of guilt

bevond the person

ol

its

author.

"To admit new States into the Union: but no new State shall be formed or erected within 4.

the jurisdiction of any other State: nor any formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent

State be

of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." In the articles of Confederation, no pro-

found on this important subject. to be admitted of right, on her joining in the measures of the United States; and the other colonies, by which were evi-

vision

is

Canada was

dently meant the other British colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual estab-

lishment of new States seems to have been overlooked by the compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new States shall be formed without the

concurrence of the federal authority, and that

NUMB ER consonant to the principles which ought to govern such trans-

of the States concerned, actions.

is

The particular precaution against the new States, by the partition of a

erection of

State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of the larger States; as that of the smaller is

quieted by a like precaution, against a junction of States without their consent. 5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States, with a proviso that nothing in the Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State."

This is a power of very great importance, and required by considerations similar to those which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary by and questions concerning the Western territory sufficiently known to the public. 6. "To guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect each of them against invasion; and on jealousies

application of the legislature, or of the executive

(when the

legislature

cannot be con-

4^

141

be asked, what need there could be of such a precaution, and whether it may not besibly

come

a pretext for alterations in the State

governments, without the concurrence of the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If the interposition of the general government should not be needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States, by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be answered, that if the general government should interpose by virtue of this

constitutional authority,

bound

it

will

be,

of

pursue the authority. But the authority extends no further than to a guarantee of a republican form of government, which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the fedcourse,

to

eral Constitution.

Whenever

the States

may

choose to substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so, and to claim the federal guarantee for the latter. The only re-

vened), against domestic violence."

striction

In a confederacy founded on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the sys-

not exchange republican for anti-republican Constitutions; a restriction which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a griev-

tem against

monarchical innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be, the greater interest have the members in the political institutions of each other;

aristocratic or

and the greater

right to insist that the

forms of government under which the compact was entered into should be substantially maintained. But a right implies a remedy; and where else could the remedy be deposited than where it is deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal coalition of any sort than those of a kindred nature. "As the confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists of free cities

and petty

states,

subject

different

to

princes, experience shows us that

it

is

more

imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland." "Greece was undone," he adds, "as soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphictyons." In the latter case, no doubt, the disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the

share of influence

new

on the

confederate, events. It

had

may

its

pos-

imposed on them

is,

that they shall

ance.

A protection against invasion is due from every society to the parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hosbut against ambitiousor vindictive enterits more powerful neighbours. The history, both of ancient and modern confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought not to be insensible to the policy tility,

prises of

of this article.

Protection againstdomestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has been remarked that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for this object; and the history of that league informs us that mutual aid is frequently claimed and aff^orded; and as well by the most democratic as the other cantons. A recent and well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for emergencies of a like nature. At first view, it might seem not to square with the republican theory, to suppose either that a majority have not the right, or that a

THE FEDERALIST

142

the force, to subvert a gov-

minority will have ernment; and consequently, that the federal interposition can never be required but when theoretic reasonit would be improper. But be ing, in this as in most other cases, must

Why

may qualified by the lessons of practice. not illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as well by a majority of a State, especially a small State, as by a majorsame State; itv of a county, or a district of the and if the authority of the State ought, in the latter case,

to protect

the local magistracy,

ought not the federal authority, in the former, there to support the State authority? Besides, are certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be given wound to the one without communicating the rarely to the other. Insurrections in a State will

induce a federal interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some proportion much to the friends of government. It will be better that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the superintending power than that the majority should be left to maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate coninterpose test. The existence of a right to will generally

ing

prevent the necessity of exert-

it.

Is it

true that force

and

right are necessarily

governments? on the same May not the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret succours from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous position turn the side in republican

scale

on the same

ber, sosituatedas

numprompt strength? Nothing

side, against a

superior

tobe lesscapable of

and collected exertion of

its

a

can be more chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force, victory mav be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census of the inhabitants, or which determine the event

an election! May it not happen, the minority of cniz.KNs may become a majority f>f I'KRsoNs. I)y the accession of alien residents, of a casual concourse ol adxcnturers, or in fine, that

of

of those

whom

the (onsliliuion ol the State has

not admitted to the rights of suffrage? I talte no notice of an unhappy species of population aJ)ounding in some of the States, who, during the (aim of regular government, arc sunk ijelow the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of (ivil violence, may

emerge into the human character, and give a

superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves. it may be doubtful on which what better umpires could be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms and tearing a State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States not heated by

In cases where

side justice

lies,

the local flame? To the impartiality of judges they would unite the affection of friends.

Happy would

it

be

if

such a remedy for

its

infirmities could be enjoyed bv all free governments: if a project equally effectual could be es-

tablished for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked, what is to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States,

and comprising a superiority

of the entire

though not a constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as it would be ^vithout the compass of human remedies, so it is fortunately not within the compass of force,

probability; and that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal Constitution,

human that

it

diminishes the risk of a calamity for

which no possible constitution can provide a cure.

Among the advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu, an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that re-

main 7.

soiuid."

"To

consider

all

engagements entered

debts contracted, and

adoption

into, before the

of this Constitution, as being

no

less

valid

against the United States, under this Constitution, than under the Confederation." This can only be considered as a declaratory proposition;

among

and may have been

inserted,

other reasons, for the satisfaction of the

foreign creditors of the United Slates, who cannot he strangers to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of civil society has the magical ellect of dissolving

its

moral obligations. the le.sser criticisms which have been on the Constitution, it has been remarked that the validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in fayour of the United Slates, as well as against them; and in the

Among

exercised

which usually characterises little critics, the onussion has been translormed and magniThe fied into a plot against the national rights.

spirit

authors of this discovery may be told, what few others need to be informed of. that as engagements arc in their nature reciprocal, an asscr-

NUMBER tion of their validity

on one

side, necessarily

involves a validity on the other side; as the article

is

and

that

merely declaratory, the estab-

4^

143

solemn form of a compact among the can be superseded without the unani-

in the States,

mous consent

of the parties to

it?

2.

What

lishment of the principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be further told that every constitution must limit its precautions to dangers that are not altogether imagi-

between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it? The first question is answered at once by

nary; and that no real danger can exist that the government would dare, with, or even with-

relation

is

to subsist

it,

recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's

to

remit the debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned. 8. "To provide for amendments to be rati-

God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such

fied by three fourths of the States, under two exceptions only."

institutions must be sacrificed. Perhaps, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere

out, this constitutional declaration before

That useful alterations will be suggested by experience could not but be foreseen. It was

mode for introducing them should be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against that extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mutable; and that requisite, therefore, that a

legislative ratification.

The

principle of recip-

rocality seems to require that

its

obligation on

the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent

extreme

sovereigns,

its

lative authority,

may be pointed out by the experience on one side or on the other. The exception in favour

treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one

of the equality of suffrage in the Senate,

whole treaty; and that committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorises them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to

difficulty, which might perpetuate discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as they

was palladium to the residuary sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was probably insisted on by the States particularly attached probably meant

as a

to that equality.

The

other exception must

have been admitted on the same considerations which produced the privilege defended by it. 9.

"The

ratification of the conventions of

nine States shall be sufficient for the establishof this Constitution between the States ratifying the same." This article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required

ment

unanimous ratification of the thirteen States would have subjected the essential interthe

ests of the

whole

to the caprice or corruption

member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention which our own experience would have rendered inexcus-

of a single

able.

Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion; 1. On what principle the Confederation, which stands

founded on ordinary acts of legiscan pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of

article

is

a breach of the

a breach,

appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the multiplied and important infractions with which they may be con-

fronted?

The

cumbent on

time has been when

it

was

in-

The

is

now changed,

the part which the

same motives

paragraph exhibits.

and with

it

us all to veil the ideas which this

scene

dictate.

The second

question

is

not

the flattering prospect of

less delicate;

its

and

being merely

hypothetical forbids an over-curious discussion it. It is one of those cases which must be

of

left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation

can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must

THE FED ERALIST

144

in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endear-

ing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODtRATiON on ouc sidc. and prudence on the

PuBLius

other.

Nwnber 44 [madison]

A

class of provisions in

fijth

favour of the

federal authority consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the several States: 1. "No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit;

make anything but gold and silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility."

The

prohibition against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no explanation is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is

somewhat extended the former,

to

new. According of marque could be

in the

letters

might pre\ent an inconvenient remittance of gold and silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well attained by local mints established under the general authority.

The credit

extension of the prohibition to bills of to every citizen, in

must give pleasure

proportion to his love of justice and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The loss which America has sustained since the peace from the pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people

and on the character

voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice of the power which has been the instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive considerations, it may be observed that the same reasons which

show the necessity of denying to the States the power of regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had every State a right to regulate the value of

its

coin, there

suffer

l)e

responsible. right of coining

money, which

is

here

taken frr)m the States, was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent right with that of Congress, under an exception in favour of the exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the old. Wiiilst the alloy and value tlependcd the general authority, a right of coinage in the jjarticuiar Slates tould have no other elicit than to multiply ex])ensive mints and di\ersily

on

and weights of the (irculaiing i)ieces. rhe latter inconveniency defeats one pur|)osc for which the power was originally suliuiitted to the federal head; and as far as the former

the forms

many

different

retrospective

value might be made, and thus the citizens of other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the States them-

This alteration is fully justified United by the advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all those for whose conduct the nation itself is

The

as

and thus the intercourse

among them would be impeded; alterations in

to

might be

currencies as States,

granted by the States after a declaration of war; according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of the States.

of republi-

can government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt, which can be expiated no otherwise than by a

its

The subjects of foreign powers might from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make anything but gold and silver a tender in payment of deins is withdrawn from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a paper

selves.

c

urrciu

y.

f.v post fuclo laws, and laws impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound legislation. I he two former are expressly prohib-

Bills ol attainder,

ited l)y the dec larations prefixed to some of the Slate constiliuions, ancl all of them are prohil)itecl 1)V liie si)irit and scope ol these fun-

damciual taught

charters.

Our own

us, nevertheless, that

experience has additional fences

against these dangers ought not to be oiniticcl.

NUMBER Very properly, therefore, have the convention added this constitutional bulwark in favour of personal security and private rights: and I am much deceived if they have not. in so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the

undoubted

interests of their constitu-

lative interferences, in cases affecting personal

become jobs in the hands of enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to

rights,

145

have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark. so obvious, or

Thei?'.v//7 and last class consists of the several powers and provisions by which efficacy is

given to

The

sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public coimcils. They have seen with regret and indignation that sudden changes and legisents.

44

which are either

1.

Of

all

the rest.

these the

first is,

"power

the

to

make

laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing

all

powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof."

Few

parts of the Constitution have been

and less-informed part of the community. They have seen, too, that one

assailed with

is but the first link of long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally produced by the effects of the preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public measures, inspire a general prudence

appear more completely invulnerable. Without the substance of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead letter. Those

the more-industrious

legislative interference a

and

industry,

and give

a regular course to the

The

prohibition with reis copied from the articles of Confederation, and needs no combusiness of society.

spect to titles of nobility

ment. 2. "No State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except Avhat may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws, and the

net produce of

all

duties

and imposts

laid by

any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall be subject to the revision

and control

of the Congress.

No

State

without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay." The restraint on the power of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the arguments which prove the necessity of submitshall,

ting the regulation of trade to the federal councils. It

is

needless, therefore, to

remark

yet

on

more intemperance than this; it, no part can

a fair investigation of

who object to the article, therefore, as a part of the Constitution, can only mean that the ^orm of the provision is improper. But have they considered whether have been substituted?

a better

form could

There are four other possible methods which the Constitution might have taken on this sub-

They might have copied the second article of the existing Confederation, which would

ject.

have prohibited the exercise of any power not expressly delegated: they might have attempted a positive enumeration of the powers compre-

hended under the general terms "necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted from the general definition: they might have been altogether silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper

powers

Had

to construction

and

inference.

the convention taken the

first

method

of adopting the second article of Confederation, it is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing the term "expressly" with so much rigour, as to dis-

arm

the

government of

ever, or with so

much

all real

authority what-

latitude as to destroy

together the force of the restriction.

al-

would that no

It

be easy to show, if it were necessary, important power delegated by the articles of Confederation has been or can be executed by Congress without recurring more or less to the

further on this head, than that the manner in which the restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to the States a rea-

doctrine of construction or implication. As the

sonable discretion in providing for the conveniency of their imports and exports, and to

powers delegated vmder the new system are more extensive, the government which is to

the United States a reasonable check against

administer it would find itself still more distressed with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing nothing, or of violat-

the abuse of this discretion.

The remaining

particulars of this clause fall within reasonings

THE FEDERALIST

146

powers iniiig the Constitution by exercising dispensably necessary and proper, but, at the

same time, not expressly granted. Had the convention attempted a positive enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their other powers into efcomfect, the attempt Avould have involved a plete digest of laws on every subject to which the Constitution relates; accommodated too, not onlv to the existing state of things, but to proall the possible changes which futurity may general a of application new every in for duce: power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object,

and be often properly varied whilst the

be asked what is to be the consequence, Congress shall misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers not warranted by its true meaning. I answer, the same as if they should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one of these were to be violated; the If it

in case the

same, in short, as if the State legislatures should violate their respective constitutional authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are to

expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people,

object remains the same.

thev attempted to enumerate the parpowers or means not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into execution, the task would have been no less chimerfurther ical; and would have been liable to this objection, that every defect in the enumeration

Had

ticular

who

can, by the elec-

faithful representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers. The truth is. that this

tion of

more

ultimate redress may be more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal than of the State legislatures, for this plain rea-

would have been equivalent

to a positive grant

son, that as every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to

to avoid this

consequence, they

sound the alarm

of authority.

If.

to the people,

and

to exert

change ol federal representatives. There being no such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the people interested in watching the

had attempted a partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue by the general terms, not necessary or proper, it must have happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be

their local influence in effecting a

be assumed or tolerated, because would of course select such enumeration the that as would be least necessary or proper; and includpowers improper and the unnecessary ed in the residuum would lie less forcibly excepted than if no partial enumeration had been

noticed and unredressed. 2. "This Constitution and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the

least likely to

made.

Had the Constitution been silent on this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers requisite as means of executing (he general powers would have resulted to the government, by unavoidal)le implication. No axifmi is more dearly cstai)lislKd in law. or in reason, than that wherever the end is required. general the means are authorised; wherever a power to do a thing is given, every particular

power nc(essarv for doing it is included. Had this last method, therefore, been pursued by ihe convention, every objection now urged against their plan would remain in ;ill ns plausil)ilitv;and the real in((»nvenien( y

would

be incurred of not reinoving a pretext windi may be seized on critical occasions for drawing into question the essential powers of the

Union.

conduct of the former, violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain un-

United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

rhe indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it also, without which it would have been evidently and radically defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only sup pose lor a moment that the supremacy of the Slate consiitiuions had been leli complete by a saving clause in their favour. In the first jilace. as these constitutions insovervest the State legislatures with absolute

eignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing articles of Confederation, all the authorities

contained in the proi)osed Constitution, so lar the Conas ihev exceed those eninnerated in the aniuiiU(l..incl been have would federation,

NUMB ER new Congress would have been reduced same impotent condition with

to the

their predeces-

sors.

In the next place, as the constitutions of States do not even expressly and fully recognise the existing powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of the former would, in such States, have brought into question every power contained in the proposed Constitution. In the third place, as the constitutions of the

some of the

States differ

much from

each other,

it

might

happen that a treaty or national law, of great and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the authority of the whole society everywhere subordinate to the authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster in which the head was under the direction of the members. 3. "The Senators and Representatives, and

members

the

and

all

of the several State legislatures,

executive and judicial

the United States

and the

officers,

both of

several States, shall

4^

147

departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government, and are brought to this undeniable conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. tion, therefore,

whether

this

The

amount

ques-

of poAver

shall be granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or not a govern-

ment commensurate to the exigencies of the Union shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union itself shall be preserved. PUBLIUS

Number 4^ [MADlSONj

Having shown

no one of the powers transferred to the federal government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be considered is, whether the whole mass of them will

that

be dangerous to the portion of authority

left in

The

the several States. adversaries to the plan of the conven-

tion, instead of considering in the

place

first

what degree of power was absolutely

neces-

be bound by oath or affirmation to support

sary for the purposes of the federal govern-

this Constitution."

ment, have exhausted themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the particular States. But if the

has been asked why it was thought necessary that the State magistracy should be bound It

support the federal Constitution, and unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of the United States, in favour of the State constitutions. to

Several reasons might be assigned for the disI content myself with one, which is

tinction.

obvious and conclusive. federal

government

will

The members

of the

have no agency in

Union,

been shown, be essential to the America against foreign danger; if it be essential to their security as has

security of the people of

against contentions and wars among the different States; if it be essential to guard them against those violent

and oppressive

which embitter the blessings of

factions

liberty,

and

carrying theState constitutions into effect. The members and officers of theState governments,

against those military establishments which must gradually poison its very fountain; if, in

on

a word, the

the contrary, will have an essential agency

in giving effect

The

to the federal Constitution.

election of the President

depend,

in all cases,

several States.

And

on the

and Senate

will

legislatures of the

the election of the

House

of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in the first instance; and will, probably, for ever be conducted by the officers, and according to the laws, of the States.

Among

the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might be added those 4.

which belong

to the executive

and judiciary

Union be

essential to the happi-

ness of the people of America,

is it not preposterous to urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual States? Was, then, the y\merican Revolution effected, was the

American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands spilt, and the hardearned substance of millions lavished, not that the people of America should enjoy peace,

THE FEDERALIST

148 liberty,

and

but that the government of

safely,

the individual States, that particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities

attributes of sovereignty?

and

We

have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New in another shapethat the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is the supreme object to

Were

ject the plan.

the

Union

be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifar the fice is necessary, has been shown. How unsacrificed residue will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important considerations have been touched in the course of these papers, which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the federal government will l)y degrees the State governments.

to

The I am

revolve the subject, the more fully persuaded that the balance is much more likely the to be disturbed by the preponderancy of last

I

first scale.

than of the

We have seen,

in all the

a

greater analogy to it. Yet history does not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to degenerate, into one con-

still

solidated governinent. On the contrary, we know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions,

and

finally the dis-

union, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the

more worthy

of

our attention, as

the external causes by which the parts were pressed together were

numerous and powerful than

in

component

much

our

inore

case;

and

want of proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments. Had no

with the public happiness, it would Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be. Let the former

fatal

principles

incon-

itself

be.

prove

its

consequently less powerful ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have seen a similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the

sistent

more

Lycian Confederacy, as far as

and form are transmitted, must have borne

government

be pursued; and that no form whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reof

government framed by the convention. The

examples of ancient

external dangers enforced internal harmony and subordination, and, particularly, had the local sovereigns possessed the affections of the

people, the great kingdoms in Europe would at this time consist of as

many independent

princes as there were formerly feudatory barons.

The

State

governments

will

have the advan-

tage of the Federal government, whether we compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them: to the predilection

and probable support

of

and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually l)etraying itself in the mem-

the people; to the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of each

bers to despoil the general government of its authority with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself against the encroach-

other.

ments. Although, in njost of these examples, the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the fate the States will retain, of the former, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active sovereignty, the inyet, as

ference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In the Achican league it is probal)le that the federal head

had

which gave

it

a

a degree

and

species of

power

considerable likeness to the

The

State

governments may be regarded

as

constituent and essential parts of the federal government: whilst the latter is nowise essenorganisation of the tial to the operation or former. Without the intervention of the State

United States cannot be elected at all. They must in all ca.scs have a great share in his appointment, and themselves dewill, perhaps, in most cases, of termine it. The Senate will be elected absolegislatures, the President of the

and exclusively l)y the State legislatures. Kven die House of Representatives, thcmgh drawn iniinedialciv from llie people, will l)e lutely

NUMBER chosen very

much under

149

tion will then be given to the States to supply

class of men, whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal

their quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union, will generally be made by the officers, and according to the rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely probable that in

branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or less to the favour of the State governments, and must consequently feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On the other side,

component parts of the State governments no instance be indebted for their ap-

the

will in

pointment to the direct agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to the local influence of its members. The number of individuals employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much smaller than the number employed under the particular States. There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States, the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers of justice,

and town

tion,

more

with

all

the county, corpora-

for three millions

officers,

and

and having parand circle of people, must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence, those of every description who will be employed in the of people, intermixed,

ticular acquaintance with every class

^

4^

the influence of that

administration of the federal system.

members

the

of the thirteen States, excluding

department the

diciary

members

the

Compare

of the three great departments

of

from the

justices of peace,

ju-

with

the corresponding depart-

ments of the single government of the Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people with the military and marine officers of any establishment which is within the com-

may

add, of possibil-

view alone, we

may pronounce

pass of probability, or, ity,

and

in this

I

the advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government is to have collectors of

revenue, the State governments will have theirs also.

And

cipally

as those of the

on the

sea-coast,

former will be prin-

and not very numer-

be spread over the face of the country, and will be very numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side. It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise, the power ous, whilst those of the latter will

of collecting internal as well as external taxes

throughout the

but it is probable that be resorted to except for supplemental purposes of revenue; that an opthis

power

States;

will not

other instances, particularly in the organisation of the judicial power, the officers of the States will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union. Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale. Within every district to which

would be allotted, there than thirty or forty, or even

a federal collector

would not be more,

officers

less

of different descriptions,

and

many of them

persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the side of the State.

The powers

delegated by the proposed Con-

government are few Those which are to remain in the governments are numerous and in-

stitution to the federal

and

defined.

State

definite.

The former

will

be exercised prin-

on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most cipally

part, be connected.

The powers

the several States will extend to

reserved to all

the ob-

which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.

jects

The

operations of the federal government be most extensive and important in times of war and danger; those of the State governments, in times of peace and security. As the former periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers may be rendered to the national defence, the less frequent will be those scenes of danger which might favour their ascendancy over the governments of the will

particular States. If the new Constitution be examined with accuracy and candour, it will be found that the change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of new powers to the Union, than in the invigoration of its original POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it

THE FEDERALIST

150

is true, is a new power: but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which no apprehensions are entertained. The powers

relating to treaties

and

war and peace, armies and finance, with the other

fleets,

more con-

siderable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress bv the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not enlarge these powers: it only substitutes a more effectual mode of administering them. The change relating to taxation mav be regarded as the most important: and vet the present Congress have as complete authority to ri:qiirk of the States indefinite supplies of

monev

for the

common

defence and general welfare as the future Congress will have to require them of individual citizens: and the latter will be no more bound than the .States themselves have been to pav the (juotas respect ivelv taxed on them. Had the States complied piuictuallv with the articles of Confederation, or could their compliance have iieen enforced by as peaceable means as may be used with success towards single persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an opinion that the State governments would have lost their constitutional powers, and have graduallv imdergone an entire consolidation. To maituain that such an event would have ensued, would be to say at once that the existence of the State governments is incompatil)le with any system whatever that accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union. Publius

by anv common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not depend merely on thecomparativeambitionor address of the different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in everv case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and sanction of their

Many

common

constituents.

considerations, besides those suggest-

ed on a former occasion, seem to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the govern-

ments of

their respective States. Into the ad-

number of indiFrom the gift of

ministration of these a greater viduals will expect to

rise.

and emoluBy the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and these a greater lumiber of offices

ments

will flow.

provided for. W^ith the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarlv and mimuely conversant. And with the meml)ers of these will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments: on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to incline.

Number 46 [m.xdison] RF-siMiNr, the subject of the

last

paper.

I

pro-

whether the federal govern ment or the State goveriuuents will have the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different nuules in which they are a|)pointecl, we must consider both of them as sui)siantiallv «le|)endent on the great body of the cili/ens of the I'nited States. assume this position here c

C"ed

to inendent of the society the

under the repub-

lican forms, for the rights of every class of

separate descriptions of citizens

governments possessing an hereditary or selfappointed authority. This, at best, is but a precarious security; because a power inde-

f)f

facilitated; the best security,

tions or parties be gradually induced, by a like

render an unjust combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not im-

ests

more circumscribed Confederacies, or States, oppressive combination of a majority will be

in the so-

as will

practicable.

same government. This view must particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be formed into the

parts, interests,

and

classes of citizens,

that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority. In a free government the security lor civil rights must be the

rightsunder the popular form of governlimits would be displayed by such reiterated oppressions of facrity of

ment within such narrow

tious majorities that some power altogether independeiu of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the United States, and

among and

the great variety of interests, parties,

which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the whole society could selclcmi take place on any other principles than those sects

of justice

and the general good; whilst there less clanger to a minor from the major |)arty, there nuist be less pre-

ixing thus will of a

NUMBER text, also, to

provide for the security of the

former, by introducing into the government a other will not dependent on the latter, or, in words, a will independent of the society itself. important, notIt is no less certain than it is

withstanding the contrary opinions which have been entertained, that the larger the sosphere, ciety, provided it lie within a practical the more duly capable it will be of self-government. And happily for the republican cause, very the practicable sphere may be carried to a great extent by a judicious modification and Publius mixture of the federal principle.

Mumber 52 [HAMILTON OR MADISON] From the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers, I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts of the government. I shall begin with the House of

first

view to be taken of

this part of the

government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the electors of the most numerous branch

of the State legislatures.

of the right of suffrage

is

The

definition

very justly regarded

fundamental article of republican government. It was incumbent on the convention,

as a

therefore, to define and establish this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the

occasional regulation of the Congress would have been improper for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the legislative discretion of the States would have been im-

proper for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in

one uniform rule would some would have been difficult to

the different States to

probably have been of the States as

federal Constitution. qualifications of the elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State

them by the

The

constitutions,

it

the convention.

as dissatisfactory to

The

provision

made by

the

be the best convention that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable to the standard already established, or which may be established, by the State itself. because, It will be safe to the United States, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that the people of the States will appears, therefore, to

and being at the same time more

susceptible of uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by the convenStates tion. A representative of the United must be of the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election, be an

inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the time of his service, must be in no these office under the United States. Under reasonable limitations, the door of this part of of the federal government is open to merit every description, whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of religious faith.

The term

Representatives.

The

165

52

alter this part of their constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured to

for

which the representatives are

which to be elected falls under a second view may be taken of this branch. In order to decide

on the propriety of this article, two questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary or useful. As it is essential to liberty that the government in general should have a common inter-

with the people, so

est

it is

particularly essen-

under consideration dependence on, and immediate an have should an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular tial

that the branch of

it

may be absolutely necesnot appear to be susdoes purpose sary for the ceptible of any precise calculation, and must depend on a variety of circumstances with

degree of frequency

connected. Let us consult exthat ought always to be guide the perience,

which

it

may be

followed whenever

it

can be found.

of representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in person, be-

The scheme

ing at most but very imperfectly known to ancient polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the greatest

analogy to our particular case. The first to which this character ought to be applied is the House of Commons in Great Britain. The

THE FEDERALIST

i66

history of this branch of the English Consti-

Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question among political antiquaries. The earliest records of tution, anterior to the date of

subsequent date prove that parliaments were to sit only every year; not that they were to be elected every year. And even these annual sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch, that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of Charles II. that the intermissions should not be protracted beyond a period of three years.

when

On

the accession of

William

III.,

a revolution took place in the govern-

ment, the subject was still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the fundamental rights of the people, that parliaments ought to be held frequently. By another statute, which passed a few years later in the same reign, the term "frequently," which had alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted that a new parliament shall be called within three years after the termination of the former. The last change, from three to seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early in the present century, under an alarm for the Hanoverian succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents, does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial elections,

and

all

the other vicious ingre-

dients in the parliamentary constitution,

cannot doubt that from seven to three

we

reduction of the period years, with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections, under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the requisite

a

dependence

of the

House

of

Representatives on their constituents.

KU(tions

in Ireland,

till

of late, were regu-

lated entirely by the discretion of the crown,

and were seldom repeated, except on the acnew prince, or some other contingent event. The parliament which commenced

cession of a

with George

II. was continued throughout whole reign, a period of about thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representa-

his

on the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply occasional vacancies, by the election of new members, and in the tives

chance of some event which might produce a general

new

The

election.

ability also of the

parliament to maintain the rights of their

Irish

might was extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects of their delibconstituents, so far as the disposition exist,

eration.

Of

late,

these shackles,

if

I

mistake

have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the people of that country have been able under all these disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of biennot,

nial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty, which might depend on a due connection between their representatives and themselves.

Let us bring our inquiries nearer home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims particular attention, at the same time that

it is

in

known as to require little to The principle of representation,

so well

be said on

it.

one branch of the

established in

all

legislature at least,

was

of them. But the periods of

They varied from one Have we any reason to infer, and conduct of the representa-

election were different. to seven years.

from the

spirit

tives of the people, prior to the

Revolution,

would have been dangerous to the public liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished that biennial elections

the obstacles to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion of liberty had

been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement. This remark holds good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most frequent. Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence. In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed, elections under the former government were septennial. This partii ular example is i)rought into view, not as a proof of any i^eculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was prob-

NUMBER

167

53

ably accidental; and still less of any advantage in septennial elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to

nection subsists between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human virtue can bear the temptations of power. Hap-

a very substantial proof, that the liberties

confined to any single point of time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude for all the variations which may be required by the various situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our attention to the periods es-

be

of the people can be in

no danger from bien-

nial elections.

The

conclusion resulting from these exam-

by

ples will be not a little strengthened

recol-

lecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal legislature will possess a part only

of that

supreme

legislative authority

which

is

vested completely in the British Parliament; and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial assemblies and the Irish legislature. It

is

a received

and well-founded

where no other circumstances afthe greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration; and, con-

maxim,

that

fect the case,

power, the more safely duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will not only be restrained by its dependence on the people, as

versely, the smaller the

may

its

other legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which other legislative

bodies are not.

And

in the third place,

no

comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed by the more permanent branches of the federal government for seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of Representatives from their duty to the people, and

the

means

of influence over

the popular branch possessed by the other branches of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one side, and will be doubly watched on the other.

PUBLIUS

Number ^^ [HAMILTON OR MADISON] SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation, "that where annual elections end, tyranny begins." If it be true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become proverbial are generally founded in reason, it I

not less true that when once established they are often applied to cases to which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a is

proof beyond the case before us. What is reason on which this proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to the ridicule of pretending that any natural conthe

pily for

mankind,

tablished

among

liberty

is

not, in this respect,

ourselves, for the election of

numerous branches of the State legislatures, we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut and the most

Island the periods are half-yearly. In the other States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South Carolina they are

Rhode

biennial— as is proposed in the federal government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the longest and shortest periods; and yet it would not be easy to show that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina; or that either the one or the other of these States spects,

and by

is

distinguished in these refrom the States

these causes,

whose elections are

different

from both.

In searching for the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so well understood in America, be-

tween a Constitution established by the people and unalterable by the government, and a law established by the government and alterable by the government, seems to have been little understood and less observed in any other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change the form of the government. Even in Great Britain,

where the principles of political and civil libhave been most discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the Constitution, it Parliais maintained that the authority of the ment is transcendent and uncontrollable, as

erty

well with regard to the Constitution as the ordinary objects of legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several instances, actually changed, by legislative acts some of the most

fundamental

articles of the

government. They

THE FEDERALIST

i68

have in particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election; and, on the last occasion, not onlv introduced septennial in place of triennial elections, but by the same act continued themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous practices

has produced a very natural alarm in the

votaries of free government,

of

which

fre-

quency of elections is the corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to libertv, against the danger to which it is exposed. "Where no Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed or could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better security would the case admit than that of selecting and appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the subject, was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount Constitution?

Or who

will pretend that the liberties of the people of America will not be more secure under biennial elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those of any other nation would be where elections were annual, or even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary power of the govern-

ment?

The second

question stated

is,

whether bien-

nial elections be necessary or useful.

The

pro-

priety of answering this question in the affirmappear from several very obvious

ative will

considerations.

No man can be a competent legislator who dots not add to an upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the sul)jef ts on which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only be attained,

or at least thoroughly attained, by actual experience in the station which requires the use of it. The period of service ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance of the service. The period of legislative service established in most of the

more numerous branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be put into this simple form; does the period of two years bear no greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite States for the

for State legislation?

The

very statement of

the question, in this form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to

it.

In a single State, the requisite knowledge

which are uniform and with which all the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and conversarelates to the existing laws,

throughout the

State,

tion of every class of people.

The

great theatre

of the United States presents a very different scene.

The

laws are so far from being uniform

that they vary in every State; whilst the public

Union are spread throughout a very extensive region, and are extremely diversified by the local affairs connected with them, affairs of the

and can with difficulty be correctly learnt in any other place than in the central councils, to which a knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even of the laws, of all the States ought to be possessed by the members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be properly regulated by uniform laws without some acquaintance with the commerce, the ports, the usages,

and the regulations

of the different

How

can the trade between the different States be duly regulated without some States?

knowledge of their relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes be judiciously imposed and effectually collected if they be not accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances relating to these objects in the different States? How can uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided without a similar knowledge of many internal ircimislanc es by which the States are distinguished from ea(h other? These are the prin(

cipal objects of federal legislation,

and

sug-

most forcibly the extensive information which the representatives ought to acquire. gest

NUMB ER

169

55

portional degree of information with regard

and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more seri-

to them.

ous objections with

by degrees, be very much diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year become both easier

limited to a single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be drawn on this subject from the case of the delegates to the

and fewer. Past transactions of the government will be a ready and accurate source of information to new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more objects of curiosity and conversation among the

of course.

The

other interior objects will require a pro-

It is true that all these difficulties will,

citizens

large.

at

And

the

increased inter-

course among those of different States will contribute not a Httle to diffuse a mutual knowledge of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these abate-

ments, the business of federal legislation must continue so far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of service

existing Congress.

fit

men

They

to this 'service,

if

are elected annually,

but their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies almost as a matter

it is

true;

The

election of the representatives

by the people would not be governed by the

same principle. A few of the members,

as

happens

in all

such assemblies, will possess superior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become members of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the less the information of the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This remark is no less applicable to the relation

which

will subsist

between the House of

assigned to those who A branch of knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal representative, and which has not been mentioned, is that of

Representatives and the Senate. It is an inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent elections, even in

foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce, he ought to be not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States and other nations, but also with the commer-

but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by what unlawful means, the irregular mem-

are to transact

cial

policy

and laws of other

it.

nations.

He

be altogether ignorant of the law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government. And although the House of Representatives is not immediately

ought not

to

to participate in foreign negotiations

and

ar-

rangements, yet from the necessary connection between the several branches of public affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will sometimes demand particular sanction and co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be derived from the public sources of information; and all of it will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the sub-

legislative

ject

during the period of actual service in the

legislature.

There are other considerations of less importance, perhaps, but which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to travel,

single States,

ber,

who

holding

it

where they are

large,

takes his seat of course,

and hold

is

sure of

a sufficient time to answer his pur-

Hence a very pernicious encouragement given to the use of unlawful means for obtaining irregular returns. Were elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice might become a very serious abuse, par-

poses. is

ticularly in the is,

more

as it necessarily

Each house judge of the

distant States.

must

be, the

elections, qualifications, and returns of its members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse before an illegitimate member

could be dispossessed of his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these considerations taken together warrant us in affirming that biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public as we

have seen that they will be safe of the people.

to the liberty

Publius

THE FEDERALIST

170

Number ^4 [HAMILTON OR MADISON]

The next view which

I

shall take of the

House

appointment of its members to the several States, which is to be determined by the same rule with that of

of Representatives relates to the

direct taxes.

not contended that the

It is

number

of peo-

ple in each State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion of those

who

are to represent the people of each State. The establishment of the same rule for the ap-

pointment of taxes

probably be

will

contested; though the rule

itself,

as little

in this case,

by no means founded on the same principle. In the former case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection. In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a very is

But notwithstanding the imperfec-

unfit one.

tion of the rule as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the

practicable rules,

and had too recently ob-

tained the general sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with the convention. All this

is

admitted,

it

will

perhaps be

said;

from an admission of numbers for the measure of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included but does

it

follow,

numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended in in the

estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be excluded from representation

which

is

regulated by a census of persons.

understand it, stated be equally candid in in its stating the reasoning which may be offered on the opposite side. "We subscribe to the doctrine," might one

This

is

the objection, as

full force.

I

I

shall

sons, and in other respects as property. In being compelled to labour, not for himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another,— the slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed with those irrational animals which fall under the legal denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all others, even the master of his labour and his liberty; and in being punishable himself for all violence committed against others,— the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere article of

The federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed property.

character of persons and of property. This is in fact their true character. It is the character

bestowed on them by the laws under which they live; and it will not be denied that these are the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an equal share of representation with the other inhabitants.

"This question may be placed in another is agreed on all sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as thev are the only proper scale of representation. Would the convention have been imlight. It

partial or consistent, slaves

from the

list

if

they had rejected the when the

of inhabitants

shares of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the lists when the tariff

of contributions was to be adjusted? Could it be reasonably expected that the Southern States

would concur

in a system

which con-

of our Southern brethren obser\'e, "that representation relates more immediately to persons,

sidered their slaves in some degree as men when burdens were to be imposed, but refused

and taxation more immediately to property, and we join in the application of this distinction to the case of our slaves. Hut we must deny the fact that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as

to consider them in the same light when advantages were to be conferred? Might not some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as properly a part of their human l)rethren, should themselves con-

persons.

The

true state of the case

is,

that they

partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws, in some respects, as per-

tend that the government to which all the ought to consider this

States are to be parties,

NUMBER

171

^4

unfortunate race more completely in the unnatural light of property than the very laws of which they complain? "It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are

tation related to persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea? Government is instituted no less for protection of the prop-

not included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States possessing them. They

one

neither vote themselves nor increase the votes of their masters.

Upon what

principle, then,

ought they to be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to as the proper guide. "This objection is repelled by a single observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed Constitution, that as the aggregate

number

several States rule,

of representatives allotted to the is to be determined by a federal

founded on the aggregate number of

inhabitants, so the right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself

may

designate.

The

qualifications

on

which the right of suffrage depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of the States the difference is very material. In every State, a certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives. In this point of view the Southern States might retort the complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of particular

towards their own inhabitants; and consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been admitted into the census

States

according to their full number, in like manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted, which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude below the equal

which regards the slave as divested of two-fifths of the man. "After all, may not another ground be taken on which this article of the Constitution will admit of a still more ready defence? We have hitherto proceeded on the idea that represenlevel of free inhabitants;

The may be who are

than of the persons, of individuals.

erty,

as well as the other, therefore,

considered as represented by those charged with the government. Upon this principle

it

is

that in several of the States,

and

New

York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to be the guardian of i)roperty, and is accordingly elected by that part of the society which is most interested in this object of government. In the federal Constitution particularly in the State of

does not prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be paid to property in the choice of those hands. "For another reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the people of each this policy

some proportion to the comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen

State ought to bear

but a single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very frequently guide the votes of others to the objects

and through this imperceptible channel the rights of property are conveyed

of his choice;

A

State posinto the public representation. sesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any other advantage in the federal

legislature,

over the representatives of

other States, than what may result from their superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it ought to be secured to them by a superior share of representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect, materially different Confederation, as well as

from the existing from that of the

United Netherlands, and other similar confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of

the federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary resolutions of the states

composing the union. Hence the states, though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of these subse-

THE FEDERALIST

172

quent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed Constitution, the federal acts will

with which it has been assailed. The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a

take effect without the necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend merely on the majority of votes in the fed-

number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous

eral legislature,

and consequently each

vote,

whether proceeding from a larger or smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the votes individually given in a State legislature, by the representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the personal character of the individual representative, rather than from any regard to the extent of the district from which he comes."

Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of representation which the convention have established. In one respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily depend, in a considerable degree, on the disposition, if not on the cooperation, of the States, it is of great importance that the States should feel as little bias as possible to swell or to reduce the

amount

of their numbers. Were their share of representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants.

Were

the rule to decide

their share of taxation alone, a contrary temp-

would prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will have opposite interests, which will control and balance each other, and produce the requisite impartiality. PUBLIUS tation

constituents: thirdly, that thev will be taken from that class of citizens which will sympathise least with the feelings of the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly, that defective as the

number will be in the first instance, it will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the people, and the obstacles which will prevent a

correspondent increase of the

representatives.

In general

no

ject, that

it

may be remarked on

political

Number ^^ is to consist forms another and a very interesting point of view under which this branch of the federal legislature may be

sentatives

iontemplated. Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constiluticni seems to l)e rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and the apparent force of argument

is

this sub-

less

suscep-

than that which relates to the number most convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any point on which the policy of the several States tible of a precise solution

is

more

at variance,

whether we compare their

legislative assemblies directly

with each other, or consider the proportions which they respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing over the difference between the small-

and largest States, as Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between three and four hundred, est

a very considerable difference

is

observable

among States nearly equal in population. The number of representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one-fifth of that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than one-third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity prevails

between the States of Georgia and Delaware or

Rhode

sentatives

Island. In Pennsylvania the repre-

do not bear

proportion to

a greater

their constituents than of

or five thousand. In

[hamilion or madison] The number of which the House of Repre-

problem

one

Rhode

a proportion of at least

for every four

Island they bear

one for every thou-

And according to the constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the proportion in any of the other sand.

States.

Another general remark

to

be

made

is,

that

and the people ought not to be the same where the latter are very numerous as wliere they are the ratio lieiween the representatives

very few.

Were

the representatives in Virginia

NUMBER Rhode amount to

to be regulated by the standard in Island, they would, at this time,

between four and

five

hundred; and twenty

or thirty years hence, to a thousand.

On

the

other hand, the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware, would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven or eight members. Nothing can be more

found our political calcuon arithmetical principles. Sixty or seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all fallacious than to

lations

cases a certain

number

at least

seems to be

necessary to secure the benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard against

too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the other hand, the number ought at

most

be kept within a certain limit, in order and intemperance of a multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character composed, passion never to

to avoid the confusion

^^

173

not be thought an extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes in the proportion of three-fifths, it can scarcely be doubted that the population of the United States will by that time, if it does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase, the number of representatives will amount to two hundred; and of fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume, will put an

end

to all fears arising

the body.

I

from the smallness of

take for granted here what

I shall,

answering the fourth objection, hereafter show, that the number of representatives will be augmented from time to time in the manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed. The true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the in

Whether sixty-five members for and a hundred or two hundred

public liberty? a

few

years,

to wrest the sceptre from reason. Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every

for a few more, be a safe depositary for a

Athenian assembly would mob.

United States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to this question without first obliterating every impression which I have received with regard to the present genius of the people of America, the spirit

fails

It is

still

have been a

necessary also to recollect here the ob-

servations which were applied to the case of

biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify

less

frequent elections than the public safety might otherwise require, the members of the Con-

need be less numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation, and were under no other than the ordinary restraints gress

of other legislative bodies.

With

these general ideas in our minds, let

us weigh the objections which have been stated against the the first

House

number

of

members proposed

of Representatives. It

is

for

said, in the

number cannot be much power.

place, that so small a

safely trusted

with so

The number legislature

is

of

which

this

branch of the

to consist, at the outset of the

government, will be sixty-five. Within three years a census is to be taken, when the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be made under the above limitation. It will

limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the

which actuates the State legislatures, and the principles which are incorporated with the political character of every class of citizens. I

am

unable to conceive that the people of America, in their present temper, or under any circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures, which must feel so many motives to watch, and

which possess

so

many means

ing, the federal legislature,

of counteract-

would

fail

either

to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter

against the liberties of their

common

constitu-

am

equally unable to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men capable of recommending thements. I

selves to the choice of the

would

people

at large,

who

either desire or dare, within the short

space of two years, to betray the solemn trust

THE FEDERALIST

174 committed

to them.

stances, time,

and

What change

of circum-

a fuller population of our

produce, requires a prophetic which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them within a moderate period of

country

may

spirit to declare,

time. I must pronounce that the liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands proposed by the federal Constitution. From what quarter can the danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to ensnare and betray their con-

how has it happened that we are at time a free and independent nation? The congress which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, stituents, this

nor responsible to, their fellow-citizens at large; though appointed from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were genercontinued for three years, and, prior to the ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term. They held their consultations ally

always under the veil of secrecy; they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will ever

be the case with our future representatives; and from the greatness of the prize at stake,

and the eagerness

of the party

which

lost

it,

it may well be supposed that the use of other means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has the

purity of our public councils in this particular ever suffered, even from the whispers of

calumny. Is the danger apprehended from the other branches of the federal government? But where are the means to be found by the President, or the Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the House of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for

be the victim. The improbability mercenary and perfidious combination of the several members of government, standing on as different foundations as repub-

House

is

to

of such a

and at the same time accountable to the society over which they are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But, fortunately, the Conlican principles will well admit,

stitution has provided a

The members

still

further safeguard.

of the Congress are rendered

any civil offices that may be which the emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election. No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every rule by which

ineligible

to

created, or of

events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an indiscriminate and unbounded jeal-

which

ousy, with

The

all

reasoning must be vain. who give them-

sincere friends of liberty,

up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not aware of the injury they do their own cause. .\s there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of cirselves

cumspection and

distrust, so there are

other

human

nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher degree

qualities in

than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of

some among us human character,

faithful

of

the

would be

that

likenesses

the inference

there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another.

PUBLIUS

Number ^6 [ham LION OR M.ADISON] I

The second charge against the House of sentatives

is,

that

it

will

due knowledge of the

Reprebe too small to possess

interests of

its

constitu-

very different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must all be .American citizens, cannot

a

possibly be sources of danger. The only means, then, which they can possess will be in the

As this objection evidently proceeds from a comparison of the proposed luimlKr of representatives with the great extent of tlie United

dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption is to be ex-

hausted by the President tue of the Senate.

Now,

in

subduing the

vir-

the fidelity of the other

ents.

States, the

number

of their inhabitants,

and

the diversity of their interests, without taking into view at the same time the circymstances which will distinguish the Congress from other

NUMBER answer that can be be a brief explanation of these

legislative bodies, the best

given to

it

will

peculiarities.

sound and important principle that to be acquainted with the interests and circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the authority and care of the It is a

the

representative ought

representative relate. An ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a

due performance of the

legislative trust. In

determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that authority. What are to be the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are commerce, taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation of commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and local situation of each individual State, a very few representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the federal

^6

175

be expected that whenever internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts, each having and exercising within itself a power of local legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information and preparatory labour would be found in the several volumes of their proceedings which would very much shorten the labours of the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of members sufficient for

The

it?

federal councils will derive great ad-

vantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of its laws,

and

a local

knowledge of

their respective

but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature, where all the local information and interests of the State are assembled, and from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands districts,

councils.

into the legislature of the United States.

Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as it may

The observations made on the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of the militia. For however different the rules

consist of internal collections, a

more

diffusive

knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary. But will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide

the largest State into ten or

and it will be found that there be no peculiar local interests in either which will not be within the knowledge of twelve

districts,

will

the representative of the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the State, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there have been made,

and must continue to be made, regulations on this subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done by the federal legislature than to review the different laws, and reduce them in one general act. A skilful individual in his closet, with all the local codes before him, might compile a law on some subjects of taxation for the whole Union with-

out any aid from oral information, and

it

may

of discipline

may be

in different States, they

same throughout each particular State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in different parts of the same State. are the

The attentive reader will discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the extensive information which the representatives ought to possess, and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This information, so far as

it

may

relate to local objects,

is

ren-

dered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and local circumstances within a single State, but of those among different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men, therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every other.

THE FEDERALIST

176

State might be competently represented by a single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the different

and the whole

in their laws,

and

in

real representatives of the nation.

however, consider them in this light alone, and will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of others, who do not reside

other circumstances

connected with the objects of federal legislation, with all of which the federal representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few representatives, therefore, from each State may bring with them a due knowledge

own State, every representative will have much information to acquire concerning all the other States. The changes of time, as

of their

was formerly remarked, on the comparative situation of the different States, will have an assimilating effect.

The

effect of

time on the

internal affairs of the States, taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the States are little

bandmen. Few

more than a society of husthem have made much prog-

of

branches of industry which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These, however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced population; and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly taken care that the progress in those

population may be accompanied with a proper increase of the representative branch of the government. The experience of Great Britain, which preress of

sents to

mankind

so

many

political lessons,

their constituents, are very faintly connected with them, and have very little partic-

ular knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions two hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depositary of the safety,

and happiness of eight millions— that be one representative only to maintain the rights and explain the situation of twenty-eight thousand six hundred and seventy constituents, in an assembly exposed to the whole force of executive influence, and interest, is

to say, there will

extending

its

authority to every other object

of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very certain, not only that a

valuable portion of freedom has been preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of the people. Allowing to this case the weight

which of the

due to it, and comparing it with that House of Representatives as above ex-

is

plamed,

it

seems to give the

and competent guardian of the will

which we have

doms

of

England and Scotland cannot be

to five hundred and fiftynumber, one ninth are elected by three hundred and sixty-four persons, and one half by five thousand seven hundred and twenty-three persons.^ It cannot be supposed that the half thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at large, can add

Of

which Publius

interests

it.

made.

just

Commons amount

eight.

be confided to

of inhabitants in the two king-

stated at less than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions in the House

of

assurance

fullest

that a representative for every thirty thousand inhabitants will render the latter both a safe

course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the reflections

will,

among

both of the monitory and exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the

The number

We

find a great dissimilarity

many

we

States together,

They might, therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more than a mere deduction from the

of the popular rights.

this

anything either to the security of the people against the government, or to the knowledge

Number ^y [hamilion or madison] The third charge against the House of Reprebe taken from that have least sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandisement of the few. Of all the objections which have been

sentatives

is,

that

class of citizens

it

which

will

will

framed against the federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary. Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended strikes at the very

the

oligarchy, the principle of

no-

torious that they arc

root of republican government. The aim of every political constitution

resentatives

or ought to be,

of

their circumstances

On

legislative councils.

and

interests

the contrary,

in it

is

more frequently the repand instruments of the executive magistrate than the guardians and advocates 'Burgh's Political

l)i against it as seemed to merit notice, 1 enter next on the examination of the Senate.

The heads into which this member of the government may be considered arc: I. The (jualitualion of senators; II. The appointment them by the State legislatures; III. The 1\'. CHjualitv of representation in the Senate; for term the and senaU)rs. of number The

of

whith they are

to be elected; V.

I

he powers

vested in the Senate. I.

I

he (|ualifications proposed for senators,

as distinguished from those of representatives.

NUMBER

62

189

consist in a more advanced age and a longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age at least; as a representative must

Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and con-

be twenty-five. And the former must have been a citizen nine years; as seven vears are required

cession

for the latter. tions

is

The

propriety of these distinc-

explained by the nature of the sena-

torial trust,

which, requiring greater extent

of information and stability of character, requires at the same time that the senator should

have reached a period of life most likely to supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who are not thoroughly weaned from the pre-

and habits incident to foreign and education. The term of nine years appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the national

possessions

birth

councils. II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which might have been devised for constituting this branch of the government, that which has been proposed by the convention is probably the most

congenial with the public opinion.

It is

recom-

the double advantage of favouring a select appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency in the formation

mended by

of the federal government as must secure the authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the two systems. III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the

government, and that among independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league, the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some

compound

republic, partak-

reason that in a ing both of the national and federal character,

the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the

which the peculiaritv of our

situation rendered indispensable." government, with powers equal to is

called for by the voice,

and

still

political

A common its

objects,

more loudly

by the political situation, of America. A government founded on principles more consonant to the wishes of the larger States is not likely to be obtained from the smaller States.

The only

option, then, for the former,

lies

between the proposed government and a government still more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify the sacrifice. In this spirit it may be remarked, that the

equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States into

one simple republic. Another advantage accruing from

this in-

gredient in the constitution of the Senate is the additional impediment it must prove against improper acts of legislation.

No

law

or resolution can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar defence which it involves in favour of the

more rational, if any and distinct from other States, would otherwise be

smaller States would be interests

common

to them,

those of the to peculiar danger. But as the larger

exposed

States will always be able, by their

power over

the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this prerogative of the lesser States, and as the facility and excess of law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in con-

templation. IV.

The number

of senators,

and the dura-

THE FEDERALIST

igo tion of their appointment,

come next

to

be

and led by no permanent motive devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country, should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present embarrassments of America is to be charged on

a short time,

considered. In order to form an accurate judgment on both these points, it will be proper to inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the inconveniences which a republic must suffer from

to

the want of such an institution. First. It is a misfortune incident to republican government, though in a less degree than

the blunders of our governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather

to other governments, that those who administer it may forget their obligations to their

constituents,

and prove unfaithful

than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and disgrace our

to their im-

portant trust. In this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or corruption of

voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people of the value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted senate? A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the object of government, which is

one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well understood in the United States, that it would be more than superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as

the happiness of the people; secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained. in

and pernicious resolutions. Examples on might be cited without number: and from proceedings within the UnitedStates, as well as from the history of other nations. this subject

But a position that will not be contradicted need not be proved. All that need be remarked infirmity is, that a body which is to correct this ought itself to be free from it, and consccjuently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to

firmness,

possess great

ought

to

hold

its

and consequently

authority by a tenure of con-

sidcraljle duration.

Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in a

want of due

accjuaiiitaiue

with the objects and principles of legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men failed for the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for

scruple not to assert that

American gt)verrnnents too little attention has been paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode which increases the security for the first. Fourthly. The mutabilityin the public coun-

genuine principles of republican government.

ate

first. I

are deficient

most governments are

in

genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the

pulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by factious leaders into intemper-

Some governments qualities:

deficient in the

the improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the dissimilarity in the

Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to the im-

both these

afising from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may be, points out, in the strongest manner, the neces-

cils

,

sity of

some

stable institution in the govern-

ment. Every new election in the States is found to change one half of the representatives. From this change of men must proceed a change of opinions: and from a change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence and every prospect of success.

The remark

and becomes more

is

verified in private

just, as well as

life,

more impor-

tant, in national transactions. trace the mischievous elfectsof a niulable

To

government would fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be perceived to be a source of innuiiierai)le others. In the first place, it forfeits the respect and conlickiuc of other nations, and all the advantages connected with national character. An incliviclual who is observed to l)e inconstant to his plans, or pcriiaps to carry

on

his affairs

NUMBER without any plan at all prudent people,

all, is

marked

at once,

by

speedy victim to his own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbours may pity him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and not a

few will

seize the

as a

opportunity of making One nation is to

their fortunes out of his.

another what one individual is to another; with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions of each other. Every nation, con-

want of wison every loss which can be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser neighbours. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and embarrassed af-

sequently, whose affairs betray a dom and stability, may calculate

fairs.

The still

191 63 which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant will

hazard his fortunes in any new branch of

commerce when he knows not but

laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national policy.

But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity,

many

of their

No

Number 6j

of liberty itself. It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their

go such incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule

so

government, any more than an individual, will long be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable without possessing a certain porPublius tion of order and stability.

internal effects of a mutable policy are It poisons the blessing

choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or under-

and disappoints

flattering hopes.

more calamitous.

own

that his

plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labours and advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government? In a word, no great improvement or

[HAMILTON OR MADISON]

A

fifth

desideratum, illustrating the utility of is the want of a due sense of national

a senate,

character.

Without

a select

and

stable

member

of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will not only be foifeited by an unenlight-

ened and variable policy, proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the

which is little known and less fixed? Another effect of public instabiHty is the unreasonable advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the moneyed few over the industrious and uninformed mass of the people. Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any manner affect-

opinion of the world which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than it is to

ing the value of the different species of proppresents a new harvest to those who watch the change and can trace its consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the

ure,

erty,

toils

and

cares of the great

body

of their

fel-

a state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws are made for the few, not for the many.

low-citizens.

This

is

In another point of view, great injury results

from an unstable government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit of

its respect and confidence. attention to the judgment of other nations is important to every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently of the merits of any particular plan or meas-

obtain,

An

it is

desirable,

on various accounts, that

should appear to other nations of a wise

and honourable

it

as the offspring

policy; the second

is,

that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the pre-

or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have

sumed

avoided,

if

the justice

and propriety

of her

THE FEDERALIST

192

measures had, in every instance, been previoiislv tried by the hght in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind? Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be the portion of each individual: or in an assemblv so durably invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its members mav be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and prosperity of the community. The half-vearlv representatives of Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in

on the iniquitous measures drawn from the which such measures would be viewed

their deliberations

of that State by arguments light in

by foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is now labouring. add, as a sixth defect, the want, in some cases, of a due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from that frequency of elections which in other cases I

important

This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new. but paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained, to be as undeniable as it is produces

this responsibility.

important. Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, to objects within the power

must be limited

and in order to be must relate to operations of that power, of whiih a ready and proper judgment can bo formed by the constituents. The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and sensible operation: the other depending on a succession of well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation. Tiie importance of the latter description to the collective and permanent welfare of every (ouniry needs no explanation. And vet it is evident that an assembly eleded for so short a term as to be unable to provide more than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for

of the responsible party, effectual,

the final result, any

more than

a steward or

tenant, engaged for one year, could be justly to answer for places or improvements which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years. Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the share of influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on events resulting from the mixed transac-

made

tions of several years. It

is

sufficiently difficult

to preserve a personal responsibility in the

members

of a

numerous body

for such acts of

an immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents. The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional bodv in the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention and a train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the attainthe

bodv

as ha^ e

ment of those objects. Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the necessity of

a well-con-

structed Senate only as they relate to the representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall not scruple to add that such an institution may be sometimes necessary as a defence to the people against their own temporary errors and delusions. As the cool and community ought, in

deliberate sense of the all

governments, and

actually will, in all free governments, ulti-

mately prevail over the views of

its

rulers; so

there are particular moments in public affairs when the people, stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or misled

by the artful misrepresentations of interested call for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to

men, may

lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of citizens in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the blow meditated by the people against themselves, imtil reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind? What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often escaped if their government had contained so provident

own

a

safeguard against the tyranny of their

passions? Po]iular libiTty might then have

escaped the to the

and

incielil)le

same

statues

re|}t()ach of

citizens the

decreeing

hemlock on one day

on the next.

may be

suggested that a people spread over an extensive region cannot, like the It

NUMBER crowded inhabitants of a small

district,

be sub-

ject to the infection of violent passions, or to

combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the contrary, endeavoured in a former paper to show that it is one of the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the same time, this advantage ought not to be conthe danger of

sidered as superseding the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked that the

same extended situation, which will exempt the people of America from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose them to the inconveniency of remaining for

193 63 tion. The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed bv the representatives of the people; and the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is

required in every public

act.

on between the American and other republics consists in the principle of representation; which is the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have been unknown to the latter, or

The

difference most relied

at least to the ancient part of

them.

The

use

under the influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of interested men may succeed in distributing

which has been made of this difference, in reasonings contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance.

among them.

I feel

a longer time

It

adds no small weight to

all

these con-

siderations to recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which had not a senate. Sparta,

Rome, and Carthage

are, in

only states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two first there fact, the

was a senate senate in the

for

life.

The

last is less

constitution of the

known. Circumstan-

probable that it was not from the two others. It is at least certain that it had some quahty or other which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed tial

evidence makes

it

different in this particular

not only for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as unfit for the imitation, as they are

repugnant

to the genius, of

notwithstanding, when compared America, with the fugitive and turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive proofs are,

of the necessity of

some

institution that will

with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well ancient as modern; and which render

blend

stability

extreme circumspection necessary in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be maintained that there are many points of similitude which render these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects, as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by the people, and to the people themselves.

There are others peculiar

to the former,

which require the control of such an

institu-

the less restraint, therefore, in observing that the position concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject of rep-

resentation

is

by no means precisely true

in

the latitude commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which here would

be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts in support of what I advance. In the most pure democracies of Greece many of the executive functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by officers elected by the people, and representing the people in their executive capacity. Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was o^overned by nine Archons, annually elected %y the people at large. The degree of power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity. Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and afterwards of six hundred members, annually elected by the

people; and partially representing them in their legislative capacity, since they were not only associated with the people in the function

making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage, also, whatever might be its power or the duration of its of

appointment, appears to have been elective by the suffrages of the people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all, the popular governments of antiquity. Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually elected by the whole body of the people, and considered as the representatives of the people, almost in their plenipotentiary capacity. The Co.smi of Crete were also annually elected by

THE FEDERALIST

194

the people, and have been considered by some authors as an institution analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this ditierence only, that in the election of that representative

body

communicated

to a

the right of suffrage was part only of the people.

From

these

facts,

might be added,

it is

to

corrupting the people themselves, a succes-

which many others

clear that the principle

of representation was neither

unknown

to the

ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions.

these

The

the whole body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coecjual branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and without

ate

true distinction

between

and the American governments

lies in

the total exclusion of the people, in their colfrom any share in the latter, and not in the total exclusion of the represent-

lective capacity,

atives of the people from the administration of the former. The distinction, however, thus qualified, must be admitted to leave a most

advantageous superiority in favour of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its full elfect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other advantage of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed that any form of representative government could have succeeded within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece. In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason, illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself with repeating that a senate appointed not immediately by the people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it into a ty-

sion of

new

representatives

would speedily

restore all things to their pristine order. Is

there any self that

sible

man who can

seriously persuade him-

the proposed Senate can, by any pos-

means within the compass

of

human

address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambi-

tion through all these obstructions? If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes the most opposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as the federal Senate will be, indirectly

by the people and for a term less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished, also, by the remarkable prerogative c)f filling up its own vacancies within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not under the control of any such notation as is provided for the federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions which would expose the former to colourable objections that do not lie against the latter. If the federal Senate, therefore, really contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have ap-

ought to be sufficient, that liberty may be endangered i)y the abuses of liberty as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous instances of the former as well as of the latter;

peared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by men of the same description with those who view with terror the correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually extinguished by the progress oi the experiment; and the Maryland constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this part of it, a reputation in

that the former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may

of any State in the Union. But if anything could silence the jealousies

rannical aristocracy. To this general answer, the general reply

and

be given. Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of Representatives and must finally corrupt the people at large. It is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can attempt anesiablishmentot tyranny. With out corrupting the State legislatures it (aiuioi prosecute the attempt, because the periodical y whose notions of morality and religion ing, public

these recreations are

londemned: and those

persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who are the ascendant power in the pieseiu social and political condition of the kingdom, impossible that persons of it is by no means these sentiments may at some time or other

(ommand

a

majority in Parliament.

How

will

like the remaining portion of the (oiiunimitv

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL

309

bad workmen who form the

have the amusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious and moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would they not, with considerable

known

peremptoriness, desire these intrusively pious

good, and that no one ought to through piecework or otherwise, superior skill or industry more can without it. And they employ

to

members ness?

mind

of society to

This

is

precisely

their

own

busi-

what should be said

to

every government and every public, who have the pretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think wrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can reasonably object to its being acted

on

in the sense of the majority, or other pre-

ponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready to conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the early settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to theirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions supposed to be declining have so often been known to do. To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than the one last mentioned. There ency in the modern world towards a demois

confessedly a strong tend-

cratic constitution of society,

accompanied or

not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the country where this tendency is most completely realised— where both society and the government are most democratic —the United States— the feeling of the major-

that the

majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are decidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as

be allowed, to earn by than others a moral po-

which occasionally becomes a physical workmen from receiving, and employers from giving, a larger remuneralice,

one, to deter skilful

more

tion for a

useful service. If the public

have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot sec that these people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public can be

same authority over conduct which the general public asserts over people in general. But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own day, gross usurpa-

blamed

for asserting the

his individual

tions

upon

practised,

the liberty of private

and

still

life

actually

greater ones threatened

with some expectation of success, and opinions propounded which assert an unlimited right in the public not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but, in order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit a number of things which it admits to be innocent. Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English colony, and

United

of nearly half the

States,

have been

ity, to whom any appearance of a more showy or costly style of living than they can hope to

interdicted by law from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical

disagreeable, operates as a tolerably sumptuary law, and that in many

purposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to be, prohibition of

rival

is

effectual

parts of the

Union

it

really difficult for a

is

person possessing a very large income to find any mode of spending it which will not incur popular disapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much exaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state

not only a conceivprobable result of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public has a right to a veto on the

of things they describe

and

able

is

possible, but a

in which individuals shall spend their incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion of Socialist opinions,

manner

and

it

may become infamous

in the eyes of the

majority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any income not earned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to these already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh oppressively on those

who

are

amenable

of that class, namely,

opinion chiefly own members. It is

to the

its

their use.

And though

the impracticability of its repeal in sev-

executing the law has caused eral of the States

which had adopted

it,

in-

cluding the one from which it derives its name, an attempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with considerable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate for a similar law in this country. The association, or "Alliance" as it terms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some notoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its secretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a politician's opinions

ought

to

be founded on principles. Lord Stan-

share in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes already built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as ley's

are manifested in

some of

ances unhappily are political life.

his public appear-

among those who

The organ

figure in

of the Alliance,

who

ON LIBERTY

310

would "deeplv deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested to justify bigotry and persecution," undertakes to point out the "broad and impassable barrier" which divides such principles from those of the asthought, sociation. "All matters relating to opinion, conscience, appear to me," he says, •'to

legislation; all

be without the sphere of

pertaining to social

act. habit, relation,

subject

power vested

in the

State

itself,

within

and

tarian legislation. Without doubt, abstinence on one clay in the week, so far as the exigencies of life permit, from the usual daily occu-

made

pation, though in

it."

No mention

is

of a third class, differand habits

either of these, viz., acts

ent from which are not social but individual; although the act of drinkit is to this class, surely, that ing fermented liquors belongs. Selling fer-

mented

liquors,

however,

is

trading,

and

trad-

ing is a social act. But the infringement complained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the buyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to drink wine as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain

The

it.

secretary, however,

says, "I

claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate whenever my social rights are invaded by the social of act of another." And now for the definition

mv these "social rights." "If anything invades strong social rights, certainly the traffic in drink does. It destroys my primary right of security,

by constantly creating and stimulatuig

social disorder. It invades

my

right of equality,

by deriving a profit from the creation of a misery 1 am taxed to support. It impedes my right to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path with dangers, and bv weakening and demoralising society, from which I have a right to claim mutual aid

and intercourse." A theory of ".social rights" the like of which probably never before found being nothing its way into distinct language: short of this-that it is the absolute social right of every individual, that every other individual shall act

ought:

that

in

every respect exactly as he fails thereof in the

whosoever

smallest particular violates

my

social right,

and

the legislature the entitles me removal of the grievance. So monstrous a prin(iple is far more dangerous than any single to

demand from

is no violation would not justify; it acto any freedom whatever,

interference with liberty; there f)f

liberty

which

it

knowleflgcs u right except pcrha|)s to that ol holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: lor. the moment an opinion which I consider noxious passes any

even physical perfection, to be defined by each claimant according to his own standard. Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful liberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried into triumphant effect, is Sabba-

not in the individual, to be

to a discretionary

only

rights" attributed to me by the Alliance. The doctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's moral, intellectual, and

ones

li|)s,

it

invades all the "social

no respect

religiouslv bind-

ing on anv except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent to that therefore, effect among the industrious classes, in so far as some persons by working may im-

pose the same necessity on others, it may be allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each the observance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations

on a particular day. But this justigrounded on the direct interest which

of industry fication,

others have in each individual's observance of the practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a person may think fit to

employ

his leisure;

nor does

it

hold good,

on in the smallest degree, for legal restrictions amusements. It is true that the amu.sement of some is the day's work of others; but the pleasmany, ure, not to sav the useful recreation, of provided the ocis worth the labour of a few, cupation

is

freely chosen,

and can be

freely

operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all worked on Sunday, seven davs' work would have to be given for six days'

resigned.

The

wages: but so long as the great mass of employments are sus])ended, the small number who work, for the enjoyment of others must still

obtain a proportional increase of earnings: and they are not obliged to follow those occupations if they prefer leisure to emolument. be found If a further remedy is sought, it might on in the establishment bv custom of a holiday

week for those particuIhe onlv ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday amuse ments can be defended, must l)e that they are religiously wrong: a motivcof legislation which

some other day

of the

lar classes of persons.

can never be too earnestly protested against. Deorum injurite Diis curce. It remains to be |)ro\cci that society or any of its officers holds a commission fron) on high to avenge any sup

posed offence to Onuiipotetu e. which is not also a wrong to our iellow creatures. The no-

SOCIETY AND THE INDIVIDUAL tion that it is one man's duty that another should be religious, was the foundation of all

the religious persecutions ever perpetrated,

nanced by the principle of

311 liberty,

it is

a direct

infraction of that principle, being a mere riveting of the chains of one half of the commu-

and an emancipation of the other from

admitted, would fully justify them. the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to stop railway travelling

nity,

Though

reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as

on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of Museums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the state of mind indicated

much

and.

if

by it is fundamentally the same. It is a determination not to tolerateothers in doing what is permitted by their religion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It is a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but will not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested. I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account commonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution which breaks out from the press of this country whenever it feels called on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might be said on the unexpected and instructive fact that an alleged new revelation, and a religion founded on it. the product of palpable imposture, not even supported bv the prestige of extraordinary qualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has been made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers, railways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that this religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs: that its prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob; that others of its adherents lost their

by the same lawless violence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country in which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into a solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly declare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send an expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the opinions of other peolives

ple.

The

article of the

Mormonite doctrine

which is the chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the ordinary restraints of religious tolerance,

is its

sanction of

polvgamy; which, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems to excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak English and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper disapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other reasons, and because, far from being in any way counte-

voluntary on the part of the women concerned in it. and who may be deemed the sufferers bv it. as is the case with anv other form of the marriage institution: and however surprising this fact mav appear, it has its explanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching women to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that many a ^yoman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a wife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognise such unions, or release any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the score of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to the hostile sentiments of others far more than could justly be

demand-

which were unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the earth, which thev have been the first to render ed:

when

they have

left

the countries to

their doctrines

habitable to

human

beings:

it is

difficult to see

on what principles but those of tvrannv they can be prevented from living there under what laws they please, provided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect freedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied

with their ways.

A

recent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use his own words)

not a crusade, but a civilisade, against this to put an end to what

polygamous community,

seems to him a retrograde step in civilisation. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilised. So long as the sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other communities. I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them ought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all who are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end to because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant, who have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if thev please, to preach against it: and let them,

bv any

fair

means

(of

which silencing the

teachers is not one), oppose the progress of similar doctrines among their own people. If civilisation has got the better of barbarism

when barbarism had

the world to

itself.,

it is

ON

312 too

much

to profess to

LIB ERTY

barbagot under, should

be afraid

lest

having been fairly and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first ha\e become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take

rism, after

revive

Such oppositions of interest between individuals often arise from bad social institutions, but are unavoidable while those institutions last; and some would be unavoid-

of obtaining.

able under any institutions. Whoever succeeds in an overcrowded profession, or in a competitive examination, whoever is preferred to an-

Chapter 5

other in any contest for an object which both desire, reaps benefit from the loss of others, from their wasted exertion and their disappointment. But it is, by coinmon admission, better for the general interest of mankind, that persons should pursue their objects undeterred by this sort of consequences. In other words, societv admits no right, either legal or

Applications

moral, in the disappointed competitors to im-

The principles asserted in these pages must be more generally admitted as the basis for discussion of details, before a consistent applica-

munity from this kind of suffering: and feels called on to interfere, onlv when ineans of success have been employed which it is contrary to the general interest to permit— namely, fraud or treachery, and force.

the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice

can only go on from bad and regenerated (like destroyed to worse, until the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians. to quit the better. It

tion of them to all the various departments of government and morals can be attempted with

anv prospect of advantage. The few^ observations I propose to make on questions of detail are designed to illustrate the principles, rather than to follow them out to their consequences. as specimens I offer, not so much applications, of application; which may serve to bring into

meaning and limits of maxims which together form the entire doctrine of this Essay, and to assist the judgment in holding the balance between

greater clearness the the two

them, in the cases where it appears doubtful which of them is applicable to the case.

1 he maxims are, first, that the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself. .'Vdvice, instruction, persuasion,

and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their own good, are tlie only measures by which society can justifiably dislike or disapprobation of his conduct. Secondly, that for such actions as are prejudicial to the interests of others, the indi-

express

its

is accounial^le. and may be subjected cither to social or to Ugal punishment, if society is oi opinion that the f>nc or lh( r)ther is

\i(lual

requisite for

its

protection.

In the first place, it must by no means be supposed, because damage, or probability of damage, to the interests of others, can alone justify the interference of society, that there-

fore

always does justify su( h interference. In an individual, in pursuing a legiti-

it

many mate

Again, trade is a social act. Whoever undertakes to sell any description of goods to the public, does what affects the interest of other persons,

and of

society in general;

and thus

his

conduct, in principle, comes within the jurisdiction of society: accordingly, it was once held to be the duty of governments, in all cases which were considered of importance, to fix

and regulate the processes of manufacBut it is now recognised, though not till after a long struggle, that both the cheapness and the good quality of commodities are most effectually provided for by leaving the producers and sellers perfectly free, under the sole check of equal freedom to the buyers for supprices, ture.

plying themselves elsewhere.

This

is

the so-

1 rade. which rests on grounds different from, though equally solid

called doctrine of Free

with, the principle of individual liberty asserted in this Essay. Restrictions on trade, or

on production for purposes of trade, are indeed restraints; and all restraint, qua restraint, is an evil: but the restraints in questicm aftect onlv that part of conduct which society is competeiu to restrain, and are wrong solely because thev do not reallv |M()duce the residts which it is desired to produce by them. .\s the principle of individual liberty is not involved in the doc trine of Free Trade, so neither is it in most of the questions which arise respecting the limits of that doctrine;

as,

for example,

admissible

cases,

what amount of

object, necessarily

for the prevention of fraud by adulteration;

mately causes pain or cepts a

good

wliic

and therefore

loss to others,

h they

had

a

legiti-

or inter-

reasonable

lindemnable, nor sujiposed to l)e so. There is another cjuestion to which an answer must be found, consistent with the prin-

.s()(

which have been laid down. In cases of personal conduct supposed to be blamable, but which respect for liljerty precludes sf)ciety from preventing or punishing, because the evil directly resulting falls wholly on the agent;

lie

ciples

society

as free to persuade as anotiier to dissuade. In opposition to litis it may Ik- (onteiuled. that although the public, or the State, are not warranted in authoritatively deciding, for pur-

poses of rcpres-sion or punisiuneut.

tlial

such

APPLICATIONS

315

or such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad, they are fully

restrictions and requiring guarantees which, but for that justification, would be infringe-

if they regard it as bad, being so or not is at least a disputable question: That, this being supposed, they cannot be acting wrongly in endeavouring to ex-

ments of legitimate

justified in assuming,

that

its

clude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested, of instigators who cannot possibly be impartial— who have a direct personal interest

on one

side,

and

that side the

one which the State believes to be wrong, and confessedly promote it for personal objects only. There can surely, it may be urged, be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good, by so

who

ordering matters that persons shall make their election, either wisely or foolishly, on their own prompting, as free as possible from the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own. Thus (it may be said) though the statutes respecting unlawful games are utterly indefensible—though all persons should be free to gamble in their own or each other's houses, or in any place of meeting established by their own subscriptions, and open only to the members and their visitors— yel public gambling-houses should not be permitted. It is true that the prohibition is never effectual, and that, whatever amount of tyrannical power may be given to the police, gambling-houses can always be maintained under other pretences; but thev may be compelled to conduct their operations with a certain degree of secrecy and mystery, so that nobody knows anything about them but those who seek them; and more than this society ought not to aim at. There is considerable force in these arguments. I will not venture to decide whether they are sufficient to justify the moral anomaly of punishing the accessary,

when

the principal

(and must be) allowed to go free; of fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator— the gambling-house keeper, but not the gambler. Still less ought the common operations of buying and selling to be interfered with on analogous grounds. Almost every article which is bought and sold may be used in excess, and the sellers have a pecuniary interest in encouraging that excess; but no argument can be founded on this, in favour, for instance, of the Maine Law; because the class of dealers in strong drinks, though interested in their abuse, are indispensably required for the sake of their legitiinate use. The interest, however, of these dealers in promoting intemperance is a real evil, and justifies the State in imposing is

A

liberty.

further question

is,

whether the

State,

while it permits, should nevertjieless indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests of the agent; whether, for example, it should take measures to render the

means

of drunkenness rnore costly, or

to the difficulty of

the

number

of the places of sale.

on most other

add

procuring them by limiting

On

practical questions,

tinctions require to be

made.

To

this as

many

dis-

tax stimu-

purpose of making them more be obtained, is a measure differing only in degree from their entire prohibition; and would be justifiable only if that were justifiable. Every increase of coSt is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the

lants for the sole difficult to

and to those who do, it is on them for gratifying a particular taste. Their choice of pleasures, and their mode of expending their income, after satisfying their legal and moral obligations to the State and to individuals, are their own concern, and must rest with their own judgment. These considerations may seem at first sight to

augmented

price;

a penalty laid

condemn

the selection of stimulants as special

subjects of taxation for purposes of revenue.

But

must be remembered that taxation for purposes is absolutely inevitable; that in

it

fiscal

most countries

it is

necessary that a consider-

able part of that taxation should be indirect; that the State, therefore, cannot help imposing penalties,

hibitory,

which to some persons may be proon the use of some articles of con-

hence the duty of the State to what commodities the consumers can best spare; and a fortiori, to select in preference those of which beyond a very moderate it deems the use, quantity, to be positively injurious. Taxation, therefore, of stimulants, up to the point which produces the largest amount of revenue (supposing that the State needs all the revenue which it yields) is not only admissible, but to be approved of. sumption.

It

is

consider, in the imposition of taxes,

The

question of making the sale of these

commodities a more or less exclusive privilege, must be answered differently, according to the purposes to which the restriction is intended to be subservient. All places of public resort require the restraint of a police, and places of this kind peculiarly, because offences against society are especially apt to originate there. It is, therefore, fit to confine the power of selling

ON LIBERTY

3i6 these commodities

(at least for

consumption

thev do,

it is fit.

as a general rule, that those

laws,

or vouchedfor respectability of conduct; to make such regulations respecting hours of opening and closing as may be requisite for public surveillance, and to withdraw the licence ii breaches of the peace repeatedly take place through the

engagements should be kept. Yet, in the

connivance or incapacity of the keeper of the house, or if it becomes a rendezvous for concocting and preparing offences against the

engagement, that it is injurious to themselves. In this and most other civilised countries, for example, an engagement by which a person should sell himself, or allow himself to be sold, as a slave, would be null and void; neither enforced by law noi bv opinion. The ground for

on

the spot) to persons of

law.

Any

known

further restriction

I

to be, in principle, justifiable.

in

number,

do not conceive 1 he limitation

for instance, of beer

and

spirit

houses, for the express purpose of rendering them more difficult of access, and dimishing the occasions of temptation, not only exposes all to an inconvenience because there are some

whom the facility would be abused, but is suited only to a state of society in which the labouring classes are avowedly treated aschildren by

or savages, and placed under an educatio'^ of restraint, to fit them for future admission to the privileges of freedom. This is not the principle on which the labouring classes are professedly

governed

person

who

sets

in any free country; and no due value on freedom will

give his adhesion to their being so governed,

unless after all efforts have beta exhausted to educate them for freedom and govern them as freemen, and it has been definitively proved that they can only be governed as children. The bare statement of the alternative shows the absurdity ot suppo>ing that such efforts have been made in any case which needs be

considered here. It is only because the institutions of this country are a mass of inconsistencies, that things find admittance into our practice which belong to the system of despotic, or what is called paternal, government, while the general freedom of our institutions

precludes the exercise of the amount of control necessary to render the restraint ot any real efficacy as a inf>ral education.

probably, of every country, this general rule has some exceptions. Not onh persons are not

held to engagements which violate the rights of thiid parties, but it is sometimes considered a sufficient reason for releasing them from an

thus limiting his

ing of his

own

power

of voluntarily dispos-

lot in life,

is

apparent, and

is

very clearly seen in this extreme case. The reason for not interfering, unless for the sake of others, with a person's voluntary acts, is consideration for his liberty. His voluntary

choice

is

evidence that what he so chooses

is

desirable, or at least endurable, to him, and his good is on the whole best provided for b\

allowing him to take his own means of pursuing it. But by selling himself for a slave, be abdicates his liberty he foregoes any future use ;

of

it

beyond

that single act.

own

feats, in his

He

case, the very

therefore de-

purpose which

him to dispose no longer free: but is thenceforth in a position whichhas no longer the presumption in its favour, that would be afforded by his voluntarily remaining in it. The principle of freedom cannot require that he should he free not to be free. It is not freedom to be allowed lo alienate his freedom. These reasons, is

the justification of allowing

of himself.

He

is

the force of which is so conspicuous in this peculiar case, are evidently of far wider appliis everywhere set to them by the necessities of life, which continualh require, not indeed that we should resign our freedom, but that we should consent to this

cation; yet a limit

(|U(slioii presents

the other limitation of it. The principle, however, which demands uncontrolled freedom of action in all that concerns only the agents themselves. rec|uires (hat those who have become bound to one another, in things which concern no third paii\, should he able to release one another from the engagement: and even without such voluntary release there are •perhaps no conirac ts or engagements, except those that relate to money or money's worth,

will of all ihi-

ol

It

was pointed out

I'.ssay,

in

an early part of

ihis

that the liberty of the individual, in

things wherein the individual is alone concerned, implies a corresponding lii)eity in any number of individuals to regulate by mutual agreement sudi ihings as regard iheni jointly, and regard no perstms but ihemselves. This

no dilii

prcjiidK es

spirit.

Such, in

its

general conception,

is

the central

the localities merely, but the whole community; since no locality has a moral right to make itself

by mismanagement a nest of pauperism,

necessarily overflowing into other localities, and impairing the moral and physical condition of the whole labouring community. The powers of administrative coercion and subordinate legislation possessed by the Poor Law

Board (but which, owing to the state of opinion on the subject, are very scantily exercised by them), though perfectly juslihable in a case of first-rate national interest, would be wholly out of place in the superintendence of interests purely local. But a central organ of infor-

mation and instruction for all the IcKalities would be ecpiallv valuable in all departments of administration. A goyernnient cannot have too much of the kind of activity which does not impede, but aids and stimulates, individhe mischief ual exertion and development, begins when, instead of calling forth the activity and powers of individuals and bodies, it substitutes its own activity for theirs; when, inI

upon ocmakes them work in fetters, or bids ihem stand aside and does their work instead of them. The worth of a State, in

stead of inlormiiig. ad\ising, and, c.ision,

denouncing,

the long run,

is

il

the woitli of the individuals

APPLICATIONS composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation to a of that

little

more

semblance of

of administrative skill, or it which practice gives, in

the details of business; a State which dwarfs men. in order that they may be more docile instruments in its hands even for beneficial

its

323

purposes-will find that with small men no great thing can really be accomplished; and that the perfection of machmery to which it has sacrificed everything will in the end avail it nothing, for want of the vital power which, in order that the machine might work more smoothly, it has preferred to banish.

.

CONTENTS: REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT

1

To WHAT EXTENT FoRMS OF GOVERNMENT

2.

The Criterion

3.

That the

327 ARE A Matter of Choice of a Good Form of Gov-

ernment

4.

Form of Government IS Representative Government Under what Social Conditions Representaiive Government is Inappli-

332

ideally best

cable 5.

Of the Proper Functions of Represent-

6.

Of the

ative Bodies Infirmities and Dangers to

341

350 355

which Representative Government is Liable 7.

8.

9.

10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

sentation of All, and Representa370 tion OF the Majority only 380 Of the Extension OF the Suffrage Should there be Two Stages of Elec389 tion? 392 Of the Mode of Voting 400 Of the Duration of Parliaments Ought Pledges to be Required from 401 Members of Parliament? 406 Of a Second Chamber Of the Executive in a Representative

17.

Government Of Local Representative Bodies Of Nationality, as Connected with Representative Government Of Federal Representative Govern-

18.

Of the Government of Dependencies

15.

16.

3^2

Of True and False Democracy; Reprf-

ments by a Free State

4^9 417

424

428 433

REPRESENTATIVE

GOVERNMENT PREFACE THOSE

who have done me the honour of reading my previous writings will probably receive no strong impression oj novelty from the present volume; Jor the principles are those to which I have been working up during the greater part oj my life, and most novof the practical suggestions have been anticipated by others or by myself. There is however, in the fact of bringing them together, and exhibiting them in their con-

elty,

nection;

and

also,

I

believe, in

much

of the opinions at all events, if not

that is brought forward in their support. Several

new, are for the present as

little likely to

meet with

general acceptance as if they were. It seems to me, however, from various indications, and from none more than the re-

Reform of Parliament, that both Conservatives and Liberals {if I may what they still call themselves) have lost confidence in the political creeds which they nominally profess, while neither side appears to have made any progress in providing itself with a better. Tet such a better doctrine must be possible; not a

cent debates on

continue to call them

mere compromise, by splitting the difference between the two, but something wider than which, in virtue of its superior comprehensiveness, might be adopted by either

either,

Liberal or Conservative without renouncing anything which he really feels to be valuable in his own creed. When so many feel obscurely the want of such a doctrine, and so

few even flatter themselves that they have attained offer

what

his

own

thoughts,

and

the best that he

it,

any one may without presumption

knows of

those of others.^ are able to

contribute towards its formation.

C^hnbtPT T

T

To what

extent Forms of

Government

pedients for the attainment of human objects. They are regarded as wholly an affair of in

All speculations concerning forms of government bear the impress, more or less exclusive,

made by man, assumed that man has the choice either to make them or not, and how or on what pattern they shall be made. Government, accord-

of two conflicting theories respecting political institutions; or, to speak more properly, con-

worked

are a Matter of Choice

Hiding conceptions of what

political institu-

tions are.

By some minds, government

is

conceived as

giving rise to no quesof government are assimilated to any other exstrictly a practical art,

tions but those of

means and an end. Forms

^e^tion and contrivance. Being it is

ing to this conception, is a problem, to be like any other question of business. The first step is to define the purposes which

governments are required to promote. The next, is to inquire what form of government is best fitted to fulfil those purposes. Having satisfied ourselves on these two points, and ascertained the form of government which com-

REPRESENTATIV E GOVERNMENT

328

bines the greatest amount of good with the least of evil, what further remains is to obtain the concurrence of our countrymen, or those

considers whether he possesses the other

He

opinion which we have privately arrived at. To find the best form of government; to persuade others that it is the best; and having done so, to stir them up to insist on having it,

which must be combined with it to employment advantageous, and in particular whether those by whom it will have to be worked possess the knowledge and skill necessary for its management. On the other hand, neither are those who speak of institutions as if they were a kind of living organisms

who

really the political fatalists they give them-

for

is

whom

the institutions are intended, in the

the order of ideas in the

adopt

upon

look

minds

of those

view of political philosophy. They

this

a constitution in the

same

light

(difference of scale being allowed for) as they

would upon a steam plough, or

a threshing

machine.

To

opposed another kind of reasoners, who are so far from assimiform of government to a machine,

these stand

political

lating a

that they regard it as a sort of spontaneous product, and the science of government as a branch (so to speak) of natural history. According to them, forms of government are not

a matter of choice. We must take them, in the main, as we find them. Governments cannot be constructed by premeditated design. They "are not made, but grow." Our business with them, as with the other facts of the universe, is to acquaint ourselves with their natural properties,

and adapt ourselves

to

them.

The fundamen-

tal political institutions of a people are considered by this school as a sort of organic

growth from the nature and life ple: a product of their habits, instincts, and unconscious wants and desires, scarcely at all of their deliberate purposes. Their will has had no part in the matter but that of meeting the necessities of the moment by the contrivances of the moment, which contrivances, if in of that peo-

sufficient

and

conformity to the national feelings commonly last, and by succes-

character,

requisites

render

its

selves out to be.

mankind have

They do not pretend

as to the government they will live under, or that a consideration of the consequences which flow from different forms of polity is no eleat all in deciding which of them should be preferred. But though each side greatly exaggerates its own theory, out of opposition to the other, and no one holds without modification to either, the two doctrines correspond to

ment

a deep-seated difference

thought:

of

selves of the

amount

1

rally hold.

No one

believes that every peo-

capable of working every sort of institutions. Carry the analogy of mechanical contrivances as far as we will, a man does not ii

sought for outside the machinery; and if it is not forthcoming, or is insufficient to surmount the obstacles which may reasonably be ex-

This is no and amounts subject to the same

pected, the contrivance will

fail.

peculiarity of the political art;

only to saying that it is limitations and conditions as

all

other

arts.

judgment and sagacity, There is also another consideration not to be lost sight of. A people may be unprepared for good institutions; but to kindle a desire for them is a necessary part of the preparation. To recommend and advocate a particular institution or form of government, and set its advantages in the strongest light, is one of the

point we are met by another objection, or the same objection in a different form. The forces, it is contended, on which the greater political phenomena depend, are not amenable to the direction of politicians or philosophers. The government of a country, it is af-

modes, often the only mode within reach, of educating the mind of the nation not only for accepting or claiming, but also for working,

country in regard to the distribution of the elements of social power. Whatever is the strongest power in society will obtain the gov-

At

this

firmed,

is,

in all substantial respects, fixed

determined beforehand by the

state of

and the

Italian patri-

erning authority; and a change in the political

during the last and present generation, of preparing the Italian people for freedom in unity, but by inciting them to demand it? Those, however, who undertake such a task, need to be duly impressed, not solely with the benefits of the institution or polity which they recommend, but also with the capacities, moral, intellectual, and active, required for work-

constitution cannot be durable unless preceded or accompanied by an altered distribu-

the institution.

What means had

ots,

tion of fore,

power

in society itself.

cannot choose

its

A nation,

there-

form of government.

The mere details, and practical organisation, it may choose; but the essence of the whole, the

that,

supreme power, is determined for by social circumstances. That there is a portion of truth in this doctrine I at once admit; but to make it of any use, it must be reduced to a distinct expression and proper limits. When it is said that

by the three conditions to, institutions and forms of government are a matter of choice. To inquire

the strongest power in society will make itself strongest in the government, what is meant by power? Not thews and sinews; othel-^\'ise

ing

that they

it;

up a

desire too

may avoid, if possible, stirring much in advance of the ca-

pacity.

The

result of

within the limits so often adverted

what has been

said

into the best

form of government

stract (as

called)

it is

is,

set

is

in the ab-

not a chimerical, but a

highly practical employment of scientific intellect; and to introduce into any country the best institutions which, in the existing state of that country, are capable of, in any tolerable degree, fulfilling the conditions, is one of the most rational objects to which practical ef-

can address itself. Everything which can be said by way of disparaging the efficacy of human will and purpose in matters of government might be said of it in every other of its applications. In all things there are very strict limits to human power. It can only act by

fort

wielding some one or more of the forces of nature. Forces, therefore, that can be applied to the desired use must exist; and will only act according to their own laws. We cannot make the river run backwards; but we do not therefore say that watermills "are not made, but mechanics, the power grow." In which is to keep the engine going must be politics, as in

seat of the it

pure democracy would be the only form of polity that could exist. To mere muscular strength, add two other elements, property

and

intelligence,

and we are nearer the

truth,

but far from having yet reached it. Not only is a greater number often kept down by a less, but the greater number may have a preponderance in property, and individually in intelligence, and may yet be held in subjection, forcibly or otherwise, by a minority in both respects inferior to

it.

To make

these various

elements of power politically influential they must be organised; and the advantage in organisation is necessarily with those who are in possession of the government. A much weaker party in all other elements of power may greatly preponderate when the powers of government are thrown into the scale; and may long retain its predominance through this alone: though, no doubt, a government so situated is in the condition called in mechanics unstable equilibrium, like a thing balanced on its small-

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

832 fT end, which,

Second, of Peter Leopold, of Benedict XIV.,

ami more

of Ganganelli, of

to, its

it once disturbed, tends more depart from, instead of reverting previous state.

to

But there are

still

stronger objections to this

theory of government in the terms in which it is usually stated. The power in society which has anv tendency to convert itself into political power is not power quiescent, power mereIv passive, but active power: in other words,

power actually exerted;

that

is

to say, a very

Pombal, of Aranda: when the

very Bourbons of Naples were liberals and reformers, and all the active minds among the noblesse of France were filled with the ideas

which were soon after

to cost

them

so dear.

Surelv a conclusive example how far mere physical and economic power is from being the

whole of social power. It was not by any change

in the distribution

small portion of all the power in existence. Politically speaking, a great part of all power consists in will. How is it possible, then, to

of material interests, but bv the spread of moral convictions, that negro slaverv has been put

compute the elements of political power, while we omit from the computation anything which acts on the will? To think that because those who wield the power in society wield in the end that of government, therefore it is of no

The

use to attempt to intiuence the constitution of the government bv acting on opinion, is to forget that opinion is itself one of the greatest active serial forces. lief is

a social

have only

One

power equal

interests.

person with a be-

to ninety-nine

who

They who can succeed

in

creating a general persuasion that a certain form of government, or social fact of any kind, deserves to be preferred, have made nearlv the

most important step which can possibly be taken towards ranging the powers of society on its side. On the day when the proto-martyr was stoned to death at Jerusalem, while he who was to be the Apostle of the Gentiles stood by "consenting unto his death," woidd any one have supposed that the party of that stoned man were then and there the strongest power in society? .And has not the event proved that they were so? Because theirs was the most powerful of then existing beliefs. The same element made a monk of Wittenberg, at the meeting of the Diet of Worms, a more powerful social force than the Emperor Charles the Fifth, and all the princes there asseml)le(l. But these, it may be said, are cases in which religion was concerned, and religious convictions are something peculiar in their strength. Then let us take a case purely political, where religion, so far as concerned at

all,

was

chiefly

on

the losing side. If any one rcc|uires to be convinced that speculative thought is one of the

hid elements of soc iai power, let him bethink himscll of the age in which there was scarcch a throne in Euroj^e which was not filled by a

(

and reforming king, a liberal and reforming emperor, or, strangest of all, a liberal and reforming pope; the age of Frederic the Great, of Catherine the .Second, of Joseph the liberal

an end

to in the British

Empire and elsewhere.

Russia owe their emancipation, if not to a sentiment of duty, at least to the growth of a more enlightened opinion respecting the true interest of the State. It is what men think that determines how they act; and though the persuasions and convictions of average men are in a much greater degree determined bv their personal position than by reason, no little power is exercised over them by the persuasions and convictions of those whose personal position is different, and by serfs in

the united authority of the instructed. When, therefore, the instructed in general can be

brought to recognise one social arrangement, or political or other institution, as good, and another as bad. one as desirable, another as condemnable, very nuich has been done to-

wards giving

to the one. or

withdrawing from

the other, that preponderance of social force which enables it tosubsist. And the maxim, that the

is what the social compel it to be. is true only which it favc^urs. instead of dis-

government

of a country

forces in existence

in the sense in couraging, the attempt to exercise, among all forms of government practicable in the exist-

ing condition of society, a rational choice.

The

Chapter 2 Good Form

Criterion of a

of

Government Thf roRM

of government for any given coiuibeing (within certain definite ccmdiiions) amenable to choice, it is now to be considered by what test the choice should be directed; try

what are the distinctive characteristics of the foiin of government best fitted to pioniote the iiuerests of any given society. Before entering into this incpiiry, it may to decide what are the proper functions of goverinnent; for. go\crinnent al-

seem necessary

together being only a means, the the means must depend on

cligii)ilitv ol

iluir adaptation

I

THE CRITERION OF to the end.

But

this

mode

of stating the prob-

lem gives less aid to its investigation than might be supposed, and does not even bring the whole of the question into view. For, in the first place, the proper functions of a government are not a fixed thing, but different in different states of society:

much more

exten-

backward than in an advanced state. And, secondly, the character of a government or set of political institutions cannot be sufficiently estimated while we confine our attention to the legitimate sphere of governmental functions. For though the goodness of a government is necessarily circumscribed within that sphere, its badness unhappily is not. Every kind and degree of evil of which mankind are susceptible may be inflicted on them by their government: and none of the good which social existence is capable of can be any further

sive in a

realised than as the constitution of the govern-

ment

is

compatible with, and allows scope

for,

attainment. Not to speak of indirect effects, the direct meddling of the public authorities its

has no necessary limits but those of human existence: and the influence of government on the well-being of society can be considered or esti-

mated in reference to nothing less than the whole of the interests of humanity. Being thus obliged to place before ourselves, as the test of good and bad government, so complex an object as the aggregate interests of society, we would willingly attempt some kind of classification of those interests, which, bringing them before the mind in definite groups, might give indication of the qualities by which a form of government is fitted to promote those various interests respectively. It would be a great facility if we could say the good of society consists of such and such elements: one of these elements requires such conditions, another such others; the govern ment, then, which unites in the greatest degree

The

GOOD FORM

A

tion begins

and ends with

333

a partition of the

exigencies of society between the two heads of Order and Progress (in the phraseology of French thinkers); Permanence and Progression in the words of Coleridge. This division is plausible and seductive, from the apparently

clean-cut opposition between its two members, and the remarkable difference between the

sentiments to which they appeal. But I apprehend that (however admissible for purposes of

popular discourse) the distinction between

Order, or Permanence, and Progress, employed to define the qualities necessary in a govern-

and incorrect. what are Order and Progress? Concerning Progress there is no difficulty, or none which is apparent at first sight. When Progress is spoken of as one of the wants of

ment,

is

For,

unscientific

first,

society, it may be supposed to mean Improvement. That is a tolerably distinct idea. But what is Order? Sometimes it means more, sometimes less, but hardly ever the whole of what human society needs except improve-

human

ment. In its narrowest acceptation Order means Obedience. A government is said to preserve order if it succeeds in getting itself obeyed. But there are different degrees of obedience, and it is not every degree that is commendable. Only an unmitigated despotism demands that

the individual citizen shall obey unconditionmandate of persons in authority.

We

ally every

must

at least limit the definition to

such man-

dates as are general and issued in the deliberate form of laws. Order, thus understood, expresses, doubtless, an indispensable attribute of gov-

ernment. Those who are unable to make their ordinances obeyed, cannot be said to govern. But though a necessary condition, this is not the object of government. self

obeyed

is

That

if

should make

requisite, in order that

it

it-

may

accomplish some other purpose. We are still to seek what is this other purpose, which gov-

these conditions, must be the best. theory of government would thus be built up from the separate theorems of the elements

ernment ought to fulfil, abstractedly from the idea of improvement, and which has to be ful-

which compose a good state of society. Unfortunately, to enumerate and

progressive.

all

filled in

classify

the constituents of social well-being, so as to admit of the formation of such theorems, is no

easv task.

Most

of those who, in the last or

present generation, have applied the philosophy of politics in

themselves to

any comprehen-

have felt the importance of such a classification; but the attempts which have been made towards it are as yet limited, so far sive spirit,

as 1

am

aware, to a single step.

The

classifica-

every society, whether stationary or

In a sense somewhat more enlarged, Order the preservation of peace by the cessa-

means

tion of private violence. Order is said to exist where the people of the country have, as a general rule, ceased to prosecute their quarrels by

and acquiied the habit of referring the decision of their disputes and the redress of their injuries to the public authorities. But in this larger use of the term, as well as in private force,

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

334

the former narrow one. Order expresses rather one of the conditions of government, than

these qualities fully as

purpose or the criterion of its excellence. For the habit may be well established of submitting to the government, and referring all disputed matters to its authority, and vet the manner in which the government deals with those disputed matters, and with the other things about which it concerns itself, may differ bv the whole interval Avhich divides the best from the worst possible. If we intend to comprise in the idea of Order all that society requires from its government which is not included in the idea of Progress, we must define Order as the preservation of all kinds and amounts of good which already

If

either

its

exist, and Progress as consisting in the increase of them. This distinction does comprehend in one or the other section everything which a government can be required to promote. But,

thus understood, it affords no basis for a phicannot say that. losophv of government. in constituting a polity, certain provisions ought to be made for Order and certain others

We

for Progress: since the conditions of Order, in the sense now indicated, and those of Progress,

are not opposite, but the same. The agencies which tend to preserve the social good which

already exists are the very same which promote the increase of it, and vice versa: the sole dif-

serving the good there

is

much

we have,

required for pre-

as for

anvthing certain in

adding

human

to it?

affairs,

that valuable acquisitions are only to be retained by the continuation of the same energies which gained them. Things left to take it is

care of

whom care

themselves inevitably decav. Those

success induces to relax their habits of

and thoughtfulness. and

their willingness

encounter disagreeables, seldom long retain their good fortune at its height. The mental attribute which seems exclusivelv dedicated to Progress, and is the culmination of the tendencies to it. is Originality, or Invention. Yet this is no less necessary for Permanence: since, in the inevitable changes of human affairs, new inconveniences and dangers continually grow up. which must be encountered by new resources and contrivances, in order to keep things going on even onlv as well as they did

to

before.

qualities, therefore, in a gov-

Whatever

ernment, tend

to

encourage

activity, energy,

courage, originality, are requisites of Permanence as well as of Progress; only a somewhat less degree of them will on the average suffice for the former purpose than for the latter. To pass now from the mental to the out-

ward and objective

requisites of society:

it

is

impossible to point out any contrivance in

ference being, that a greater degree of those agencies is required for the latter purpose than

politics, or arrangement of social affairs, which conduces to Order only, or to Progress only; whatever tends to either promotes both. Take,

for the former.

for

What,

for example, are the qualities in the

which conduce most to keep up the amount of good conduct, of good management, of success and prosperity, which already exist in society? Everybody will agree

citizens individually

that those qualities are industry, integrity, justice, and prudence. But are not these, of all qualities, the

and

is

most conducive

not any growth

f)f

to

improvement?

these virtues in the

(onnnunitv in itself the greatest of improvements? If so, whatever qualities in the government are promotive of industrv, integrity, justice, and prudence, conduce alike to permanence and to progression; only there is needed

instance,

police.

Order

the is

common

institution

of a

the object which seems most

immediately interested

in the efficiency of this

part of the social organisation. Yet

if it is

effec-

promote Order, that is. if it represses crime, and enables every one to feel his person and property secure, can any state of things be more conducive to Progress? The greater security of property is one of the main conditions and causes of greater production, which is Progress in its most familiar and vulgarest tual to

The better repression of crime represses the dispositions which tend to crime, and this

aspect.

is

Progress in

a

somewhat higher

release of the individual

sense.

The

from the cares and

more of those qualities to make the society decidedlv progressive than merely to keep it per-

anxieties of a state of imperfect protection.

manent. What, again, are (lie particular attributes in human beings whith seem to ha\e a more especial refcrcni e to Progress, and do not so direct-

new

ly

suggest the ideas of Order and Preservation? are chiefly the qualities of mental activ-

They ity,

enterprise,

and courage. But are not

all

be employed in anv improving his own state and that of others: while the same cause, bv attaching him to social existence, and making him no lf)nger see present or prospective enemies in sets his faculties free to

effort for

his fellow creatures, fosters all those feelings and fellowship towards others, and

of kindness

interest in the general well-being of the

com

\

THE CRITERION OF munity, which are such important parts of social improvement. Take, again, such a familiar case as that of a good system of taxation and finance. This would generally be classed as belonging to the province of Order. Yet what can be more conducive to Progress? A financial system which promotes the one, conduces, by the very same excellences,

to

the other.

Economy,

for ex-

GOOD FORM

A

is still more sacrificed to it; and if it be not worth the sacrifice, not the interest of Permanence alone has been disregarded, but the general interest of Progress has been mistaken. If these improperly contrasted ideas are to be used at all in the attempt to give a first

ress

commencement

of scientific precision to the

ample, equally preserves the existing stock of national wealth, and favours the creation of more. A just distribution of burthens, by holding up to every citizen an example of morality and good conscience applied to difficult adjustments, and an evidence of the value which the highest authorities attach to them, tends in an eminent degree to educate the moral sentiments of the community, both in respect of

notion of good government,

and of discrimination. Such a mode of levying the taxes as does not impede the industry, or unnecessarily interfere with the

not for

promotes, not the preservation only, but the increase of the national wealth, and encourages a more active use of the individual faculties. And vice versa, all

of good,

strength

liberty, of the citizen,

and taxation which obstruct improvement of the people in wealth

errors in finance

the

and morals tend also, if of sufficiently serious amount, positively to impoverish and demoralise

them.

It

holds, in short, universally, that are taken in

when Order and Permanence

their widest sense, for the stability of existing advantages, the requisites of Progress are but the requisites of Order in a greater degree; those of Permanence merely those of Progress

somewhat smaller measure. In support of the position that Order

in a

trinsically different

is

in-

from Progress, and that

and acquisition

of

additional good are sufficiently distinct to

af-

preservation of existing

ford the basis of a fundamental classification, shall perhaps be reminded that Progress may

335

kind; whenever Permanence is sacrificed to some particular kind of Progress, other Prog-

it

would be more

philosophically correct to leave out of the definition the word Order, and to say that the best

government to Progress.

is that which is most conducive For Progress includes Order, but

Order does not include

Progress. Progress

greater degree of that of which

Order

is

is

a

a less.

Order, in any other sense, stands only for a part of the pre-requisites of good government, a

more

its

idea

to take

are

Order would

essence.

among

find

the conditions of

we would increase our sum more indispensable than due care of what we already have. If endeavouring after more riches, our

Progress; since,

we

and

suitable place if

nothing

is

rule should be not to squander useour existing means. Order, thus considered, is not an additional end to be reconciled with Progress, but a part and means of Progress itself. If a gain in one respect is purchased by a more than equivalent loss in the same or in any other, there is not Progress. Conduciveness to Progress, thus understood, includes the whole excellence of a government. But, though metaphysically defensible, this definition of the criterion of good government is not appropriate, because, though it contains the whole of the truth, it recalls only a part. What is suggested by the term Progress is the idea of moving onward, whereas the meaning of it here is quite as much the prevention of falling back. The very same social causes— the

very

first

lessly

and prac-

we

same

be at the expense of Order; that while we are acquiring, or striving to acquire, good of one

tices—are as much required to prevent society from retrograding, as to produce a further

kind,

we may be

others: thus there

losing

ground

may be

in respect to

progress in wealth,

deterioration in virtue. Granting proves is not that Progress is generically a different thing from Permanence, but that wealth is a different thing from virtue.

while there

is

beliefs, feelings, institutions,

advance.

hoped

Were

for, life

there no improvement to be would not be the less an un-

ceasing struggle against causes of deteriora-

thing imply Progress in everything. Progress

tion; as it even now is. Politics, as conceived by the ancients, consisted wholly in this. The natural tendency of men and their works was to degenerate, which tendency, however, by good institutions virtuously administered, it might be possible for an indefinite length of time to counteract. Though we no longer hold this opinion; though most men in the present

same

age profess the contrary creed, believing that

this,

what

it

is permanence and something more; and it is no answer to this to say that Progiess in one thing does not imply Permanence in everything. No more does Progress in one

Progress

of any kind includes

Permanence

in that

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

336

the tendency of things, on the whole, is towards improvement; we ought not to forget that there is an incessant and ever-flowing current of human affairs towards the worse,

consisting of all the follies, all the vices, all the negligences, indolences, and supinenesses

the young, of those whose position and reputation are made and those who have them still to make, will in general sufficienily answer the

purpose, if only this natural balance disturbed by artificial regulation.

is

not

mankind; which is only controlled, and kept from sweeping all before it. by the exertions which some persons constantly, ^nd others by fits, put forth in the direction of good and worthv objects. It gives a very insufficient idea of the importance of the strivings which take place to improve and elevate human nature and life, to suppose that their chief value consists in the amount of actual improvement realised by their means, and that the consequence of their cessation would merely be that we should remain as we are. A very small diminution of those exertions would not only put a stop to improvement, but would turn the

Since the distinction most commonly adopted for the classification of social exigencies does not possess the properties needful for that use. we have to seek for some other leading distinction better adapted to the purpose. Such a distinction would seem to be indicated by the considerations to Avhich 1 now proceed.

general tendency of things towards deterioration; which, once begun, would proceed with

We may take, as a first instance, the adminis-

of

and become more and

increasingly rapidity,

more

difficult to

check, until

often seen in history,

and

in

it

reached a state

which many large

mankind even now grovel; v.'hen hardly anything short of superhuman power portions of

seems

sufficient to

turn the tide, ;ind give a

commencement to the upward movement. These reasons make the Avord Progress as unapt as the terms Order and Permanence to become the basis for a classification of the requisites of a form of government. The fundamental antithesis which these words express

fresh

does not as

in

lie in

the things themselves, so

the types of

human

nmch

character which

answer to them. There are, we know, some minds in which caution, and others in which boldness, predominates; in some, the desire to avoid imperilling what is already possessed is a stronger sentiment than that which prompts to improve the old and acquire new advantages; while there are others

who

more eager

trary way, and are careful of present good.

of both

wander

lean the con-

for future than

The road

to the

ends

the same; but they are liable to from it in opposite directions. This is

is of importance in composing the l>rrsoTiuel oi dny political l)ody: persons of both types ought to be included in it. that the

consideration

tciukncies oi each

may be tempered,

in so far

by a due proportion ol needs no express provision to There other. the ensure this object, provided care is taken to admit nothing inconsistent with it. The natuas they are excessive,

ral

and spontaneous admixture

of the old

and

ask ourselves on what causes and congood government in all its senses, from the humblest to the most exalted, depends, we find that the principal of them, the one which If

we

ditions

all others, is the qualities of the fmbeings composing the society over which

transcends

man the

government

is

exercised.

more propriety, no part of public business in which the mere machinery, the rules and contration of justice; with the

since there

is

trivances for conducting the details of the operation, are of such vital consequence. Vet

even these vield in importance to the qualities human agents employed. Of what efficacy are rules of procedure in securing the ends of justice, if the moral condition of the people is such that the witnesses generally lie. and the judges and their subordinates take bribes? Again, how can institutions provide a wood municipal administration if there exists of the

such indifference to the subject that those

who

would administer honestly and capably cannot be induced to serve, and the chuics arc left to those who undertake them because thev have .some private interest to be promoted? Of what avail tive

is

the most broadly popular representaif the electors do not care to choose

system

the best

member

him who

will

How

can

good

if its

of parliament, but choose

spend most money

to Ijc elected?

representative assembly work for tneml)ers tan l)e i)ougiu. or if their

a

excitability of

temperament, uncorrected by

public discipline or private self-control, makes them incapable of calm delil)eration, and they rescjrt to manual violence on the floor of the House, or shoot at one another with rifles? How. again, can go\ernment, or any joint concern, be carried on in a tolerable manner by

people so envious that, if one among them seems likely to succeed in anvihing. those who ought to cooperate with him form a tacit combination to

make him

fail?

Whenever

the gen-

THE CRITERION OF eral disposition of the people

is

such that each

individual regards those only of his interests which are selfish, and does not dwell on, or concern himself for, his share of the general interest, in such a state of things good government is impossible. The influence of defects of intelligence in obstructing all the elements

government requires no illustration. Government consists of acts done by human beings; and if the agents, or those who choose

of good

the agents, or those to whom the agents are responsible, or the lookers-on whose opinion ought to influence and check all these, are

mere masses of ignorance,

stupidity,

and

bale-

operation of government will go wrong; while, in proportion as the men rise above this standard, so will the government improve in quality; up to the point of ful prejudice, every

excellence, attainable but

where the

officers of

nowhere attained,

government, themselves

persons of superior virtue and intellect, are surrounded by the atmosphere of a virtuous

and enlightened public opinion. The first element of good government, therefore, being the virtue and intelligence of the human beings composing the community, the most important point of excellence which any form of government can possess is to promote the virtue and intelligence of the people themselves. The first question in respect to any political institutions is, how far they tend to foster

GOOD FORM

A

and

illustration.

The

337

judicial system being

given, the goodness of the administration of is in the compound men composing the

justice

of the

worth of the public opinion which influences or controls them. But all the difference between a good and a bad system of judicature lies in the contrivances adopted for bringing whatever moral and intellectual worth tion

on the

result.

The arrangements

gence; the salutary forms of procedure; the publicity which allows observation

it is on these qualities, so far as they exist in the people, that all possibility of goodness in the practical operations of the gov-

criti-

ill adapted to elicit truth; the faciliwhatever be their amount, for obtaining access to the tribunals; the arrangements for detecting crimes and apprehending offenders; —all these things are not the power, but the machinery for bringing the power into contact with the obstacle: and the machinery has no action of itself, but without it the power, let it be ever so ample, would be wasted and

well or ties,

of

no

A

effect.

similar distinction exists in regard to the

constitution of the executive departments of

distributed

does this the best has every likehood of being the best in all other

and

cism of whatever is amiss; the liberty of discussion and censure through the press; the mode of taking evidence, according as it is

The government which

of the

for render-

ing the choice of the judges such as to obtain the highest average of virtue and intelli-

administration. Their machinery

members

exists

community to bear upon the administraof justice, and making it duly operative

in the

community the various desirable qualities, moral and intellectual; or rather (following Bentham's more complete classification) moral, intellectual, and active. in the

worth and the

ratio of the

tribunals,

is

good, when

the proper tests are prescribed for the qualifi-

cations of officers, the proper rules for their

promotion; when the business

among

those

who

is

conveniently

are to transact

it,

and methodical order established transaction, a correct and intelligible

a convenient

respects, since

for

ernment depends.

record kept of it after being transacted; when each individual knows for what he is responsible, and is known to others as responsible for it; when the best-contrived checksare provided against negligence, favouritism, or jobbery, in

We

may consider, then, as one criterion of the goodness of a government, the degree in which it tends to increase the sum of good qualities in the governed, collectively

and

in-

its

any of the

acts of the

cal checks will

department. But

no more

politi-

act of themselves than

without a

dividually; since, besides that their well-being

a bridle will direct a horse

the sole object of government, their good qualities supply the moving force which works

the checking functionaries are as corrupt or as negligent as those whom they ought to check,

the machinery. This leaves, as the other constituent element of the merit of a government, the quality of the machinery itself; that is, the

and

adapted to take advantage of the amount of good qualities which may at any time exist, and make them in-

part, little benefit will be derived

strumental to the right purposes. Let us again take the subject of judicature as an example

ables such

is

degree in

which

it

is

rider. If

if the public, the mainspring of the whole checking machinery, are too ignorant, too pas-

sive,

or too careless and inattentive, to do their

from the

best administrative apparatus. Yet a good apparatus is always preferable to a bad. It en-

power

insufficient

moving or checking

as exists to act at the greatest advantage;

REPRESEXTATIV E GOVERNMEXT

388

and wiihoul. it. no amount of moving or checking power would be sufficient. Publicity, for instance, is no impediment to evil nor stimulus to good if the public will not look at what is

done: but without publicity,

how could

they

either check or encourage what they were not permitted to see? The ideally perfect consti-

tution of a public office is that in which the infunctionarv is entirely coincident

terest of the

pacity

its

beneficial action

government is not, like that between Order and Progress, a difference merely in degree, but in kind. We must not, however, suppose that they have no intimate connection with one another. The institutions yvhich ensure the best

said of the arrangements for the detailed administration of the government is still more evidently true of its general

of that state.

government which aims at an organisation of some part of

constitution. All

being good

is

the good qualities existing in the individual members of the community for the conduct of its collective affairs. A representative constituof bringing the general standard of intelligence and honesty existing in the

tion

is

a

means

community, and the individual intellect and virtue of its wisest members, more directly to bear upon the government, and investing them with greater influence in it, than they would in general have under any other mode of organisation: though, under any, such influence as thev do have is the source of all good that there is in the government, and the hindrance of every evil that there

is

not.

The

greater the

of these good qualities which the institutions of a country succeed in organising,

amount

and the better the mode of organisation, the better will be the government. We have now. therefore, obtained a founda tion for a twofold division of the merit which any

set of political institutions

can possess.

It

consists partly of the degree in which they promote the general mental advancement of the cf)mmunity. including under that phrase advancement in intellect, in virtue, and in practical activity and efficiency: and partly of the degree of perfection with which they organise the moral, intellectual, and active worth already existing, so as to opcratcwith thcgreatest effect on public affairs. A government is to be judged by its action upon men. and by its action upon things: by what it makes of the citizens, and what it does with them: its tend-

ency to improveordeteriorate ihcpco|)le themselves, and the goodness or badness of the work it performs for them, and l)y means ol them. Ciovcrnment is at once a great influence acting on the human mind, and a set of organi.sed arrangements for public business: in the first ca-

chiefly indirect,

of a

with his duty. No mere system will make it so. but still less can it be made so without a system, aptly devised for the purpose.

What we have

is

but not therefore less vital, w'hile its mischievous action may be direct. The difference betyveen these two functions

management

of public affairs

practicable in the existing state of cultivation tend by this alone to the further improvement

A

people which had the most and most efficient judicature, the most enlightened administration, the most equitable and least onerous system of finance, compatible with the stage it had attained in moral and intellectual advancement,

just laws, the purest

would be

in a fair

higher staee.

Nor

way

is

to pass rapidly into a

there anv

mode

in

which

can contribute more effectually to the improvement of the people than by doing their more direct work well. And, reversely, if their machinery is so badly

political institutions

constructed that they do their own particular business ill, the effect is felt in a thousand ways in lowering the morality and deadening the intelligence and activity of the people. But the distinction is nevertheless real, because this is

only one of the means by which political institutions improve or deteriorate the human mind, and the causes and modes of that beneor injurious influence remain a distinct and much wider subject of study. Of the two modes of operation by which a form of government or set of political institutions affects the welfare of the ccwimunity— its ficial

operation as an agency of national education, and its arrangements for conducting the collective affairs of the

community

in the state of

education in which they already are: the evidently varies

much

less,

last

from difference of

country and state of civilisation, than the first. It has also much less to do with the fundamental constitution of the govennnent. The of conducting the j)ractical iiusiness of government, which is best under a free constitution, would generally be best also in an absolute njonarchy: only an absolute monarchy

mode

not so likely to practise it. The laws of propexample: the principles of evidence and jticlic iai procedure: the system of taxation is

erty, for

of financial administration, need not necessarih he ditferent in different forms of government. Fach of these matters has principles and rules of its own. which are a subject of

and

^

THE CRITERION OF separate study. General jurisprudence, civil

and penal

legislation, financial

cial policy, are sciences in er,

separate

members

and commer-

themselves, or rath-

of the comprehensive

science or art of government:

and the most

enlightened doctrines on all these subjects, though not equally likely to be understood, or acted on under all forms of government, yet, if understood and acted on, would in general be equally beneficial under them all. It is true that these doctrines could not be applied without some modifications to all states of society

and

of the

the greater

human mind: nevertheless, by far number of them would require

modifications solely of details, to adapt them to any state of society sufficiently advanced to possess rulers capable of understanding them. to which they would be wholly unsuitable must be one so bad in itself, or so opposed to public feeling, as to be unable to maintain itself in existence by honest means. It is otherwise with that portion of the interests of the community which relate to the

A government

better or worse training of the people them-

GOOD FORM

A

339

ment. And the one indispensable merit of a government, in favour of which it mav be forgiven almost any amount of other demerit compatible with progress, is that its operation on the people is favourable, or not unfavourable, to the next step which it is necessary for them to take, in order to raise themselves to a higher level. Thus (to repeat a former example), a people in a state of savage independence, in which everv one lives for himself, exempt, unless by fits, from any external control, is practically incapable of making anv progress in civilisation until it has learnt to obey. The indispensable virtue, therefore, in a government which establishes itself over a people of this sort is, that it make itself obeyed. To enable it to do this, the constitution of the govern-

ment must be

nearly, or quite, despotic.

A

con-

any degree popular, dependent on the voluntary surrender by the different mem-

stitution in

bers of the

dom

community would

of action,

lesson

of their individual free-

enforce the

fail to

which the pupils, in

first

this stage of their

selves.

progress, require. Accordingly, the civilisation

stitutions

of such tribes,

Considered as instrumental to this, inneed to be radically different, according to the stage of advancement already reached. The recognition of this truth, though for the most part empirically rather than philosophically, may be regarded as the main point of superiority in the political theories of the present above those of the last age; in which it was customary to claim representative democracy for England or France by arguments which would equally have proved it the only fit form of government for Bedouins or Malays. The state of different communities, in point of culture and development, ranges downwards to a condition very little above the highest of the beasts. The upward range, too, is considerable, and the future possible extension vastly greater.

A community

can only be

when not

the result of juxtaposi-

is almost always the work of an absolute ruler, deriving his power either from religion or military prowess; verv often from foreign arms.

tion with others already civilised,

Again, uncivilised races, and the bravest and most energetic still more than the rest, are averse to continuous labour of an unexciting kind. Yet all real civilisation is at this price; without such labour, neither can the mind be disciplined into the habits required by civilised society, nor the material world prepared to receive

There needs a rare concurrence and for that reason often a

it.

of circumstances,

vast length of time, to reconcile such a people to industry, unless they are for a while

com-

Hence even personal slavery, by commencement to industrial life, and

pelled to

it.

developed out of one of these states into a higher by a concourse of influences, among the principal of which is the government to which they are subject. In all states of human improvement ever yet attained, the nature and

giving a

degree of authority exercised over individuals, the distribution of power, and the conditions of command and obedience, are the most powerful of the influences, except their religious belief, which make them what they are, and enable them to become what they can be. They may be stopped short at any point in their progress by defective adaptation of their government to that particular stage of advance-

most needless

enforcing it as the exclusive occupation of the most nimierous portion of the community,

may

dom is

A

accelerate the transition to a better freethan that of fighting and rapine. It is alto say that this

excuse for slavery

only available in a very earlv state of society. civilised people have far other means of im-

parting civilisation to those under their fluence;

pugnant

and

slavery

to that

is,

in all

its

government of

in-

details, so re-

law,

which

is

the foundation of all modern life, and so corrupting to tlie master-class when theyhaveonce

come under

civilised influences, that its

adop-

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

340

erations of society, so as to keep before each the sense of a present force sufficient to compel

under any circumstances whatever in mod-

tion

ern society

is

a relapse into

worse than barba-

obedience

rism.

his

At some period, however, of their history, almost every people, now civilised, have consisted, in majority, of slaves. A people in that condition require to raise them out of it a very different polity from a nation of savages. If they are energetic by nature, and especially if there be associated with them in the same com-

owing

munity an industrious

class

who

improvement than

sure their free:

when

freed, they

may

often be

to en-

like

fit,

at

generally a sign that it is becoming obsolete. A slave, properly so called, is a being who has not learnt to help himself. He is, no doubt, one step in advance of a savage. He has not the first lesson of political society still to acquire.

has learnt to obey. But what he obeys

He

command.

is

It is the characteristic

only a direct of born slaves to be incapable of conforming their conduct to a rule, or law. They can only do what they are ordered, and only when they are ordered to do it. If a man whom they fear is standing over them and threatening them with punishment, they obey; but when his

back

is

turned, the work remains undone.

The motive determining them must

appeal

not to their interests, but to their instincts; immediate hope or immediate terror. A despotism, as

which may tame the savage,

it is

a despotism,

will, in so far

only confirm the slaves in

their incapacities. Yet a

government under

their own control would be entirely unmanageable by them. Their improvement cannot come from themselves, but must be superinduced from without. The step which they have

improvement, to is to be raised from a government of will one of law. They have to be taught self-government, and this, in its initial stage, means the capacity to act on general instructions. What to take,

and

their only path to

they recjuire is not a goverinnent of f(jrce, but of guidance. Being, however, in too low a stale to yield to the guidance of any but those

one to

whom

son of gov( which possesses tlie

up as rmnent

they look

the possessors of force, fittest for

force, i>ut

them

is

seldom uses

one it:

Such appears to have been government of the Incas of Peru; and such was that of the Jesuits of Paraguay. I need scarcely remark that leadingstrings are only admissible as a means of gradually training the people to walk alone. It would be out of place to carry the illustration further. To attempt to investigate what kind of government is suited to every known state of society would be to compose a treatise, not on representative government, but on political science at large. For our more limited purpose we borrow from political philosophy the idea of the

once to the full rights of citizenship. This, however, is not the normal condition of slavery, and is freedmen, to be admitted

Roman

to

in social progress.

make them

to

descending

all

the government of leading-strings, seems to be the one required to carry such a people the most rapidly through the next necessary step

are neither

no more

down, but which,

the minutia- of industry and life, necessarily leaves and induces individuals to do much of themselves. This, which may be termed

regulate

was the case in

slaves nor slave-owners (as Greece), they need, probably,

to the rule laid

to the impossibility of

a

aristocracy. reseiiil)liiig

parental despotism or the St. Siinonian form of .Socialism; maiiiUming a general superintendence over all the op-

only

its

general principles.

To

determine the

form of government most suited to any particular people, we must be able, among the defects and shortcomings which belong to that people, to distinguish those that are the immediate impediment to progress; to discover it is which (as it were) stops the way. The government for them is the one which tends most to give them that for want of which they cannot advance, or advance only in a lame and lopsided manner. We nuist not, however,

what

best

forget the reservation necessary in all things which have for their object improvement, or

namely, that in seeking the good needed, no damage, or as little as possible, be done to that already possessed. A people of savages should be taught obedience, but not in such a manner as to convert them Progress;

which

is

into a people of slaves. And (to gi\ e the observation a higher generality) the form of government which is most effectual for carrying a people through the next stage of progress will

still

this in

be very improper for them

such a

manner

if it

does

as to obstruct, or posi-

tively unfit them for, the step next beyond. Such cases are fretjuent, and are among the most melancholy facts in history. The Egyp-

tian hierarchy, the paternal despot ism of China, were very fit instruments for carrying tiiose

nations up to the point of civilisation which point, tiiey attained. But Iiaying reached that

were brougiit to a permanent halt for want of inciilal lii)erly and individuality; req-

tliey

THE IDEALLY BEST POLITY

341

Hebrew Conservatives

uisites of

able work

that

sacerdotal order),

In contrast with these nations, let us conexample of an opposite character afforded by another and a comparatively insig-

stationary like other Asiatics, were, next to the Greeks, the most progressive people of antiq-

improvement which the institutions had carried them thus far entirely incapacitated them from acquiring; and as the institutions did not break down and give place to others, further improvement stopped. sider the

and. jointly with them, have been the and main propelling agency of

uity,

their organised institutions were as obviously of sacerdotal origin as those of the Hindoos. These did for them what was done for other

modern

tries,

the exclusive

moulding

of their char-

starting-point

cultivation.

then, impossible to understand the question of the adaptation of forms of government to states of society without taking into account not only the next step, but all the steps which society has yet to make; both those It

is,

which can be foreseen, and the far wider indefinite range which is at present out of sight.

acter.

It follows, that to

of genius

of government,

Their religion, ivhich enabled persons and a high religious tone to be regarded and to regard themselves as inspired from heaven, gave existence to an inestimably precious unorganised institution— the Order (if it

may be

so termed) of Prophets.

Under

though not always effectual, of their sacred character, the Prophets were a power in the nation, often more than a match for kings and priests, and kept the protection, generally

of the

and the morality and religion of the Prophecies: a distance as wide as between these last and the Gospels. Conditions more favourable to Progress could not easily exist: accordingly, the Jews, instead of being

nificant Oriental people— the Jews. They, too. had an absolute monarchy and a hierarchy, and

Oriental races by their institutions— subdued them to industry and order, and gave them a national life. But neither their kings nor their priests ever obtained, as in those other coun-

of

judge of the merits of forms

an ideal must be constructed of the form of government most eligible in itself,

that

is,

which,

if

the necessary conditions its beneficial tend-

existed for giving effect to

would, more than all others, favour and promote not some one improvement, but all forms and degrees of it. This having been done, we must consider what are the mental encies,

conditions of

all sorts,

necessary to enable this

and what, which a

corner of the earth, the antagonism of influences which is the only real security for continued progress. Religion con-

government

sequently was not there what it has been in so many other places— a consecration of all that

would then be possible to construct a theorem of the circumstances in which that form of government may wisely be introduced; and also to judge, in cases in which it had better not be introduced, what inferior forms of polity will best carry those communities through the intermediate stages which they must traverse before they can become fit for the best form of government.

up, in that

little

was once established, and a barrier against further improvement. The remark of a distinguished Hebrew, M. Salvador, that the Prophets

Church and modern liberty of

were, in

of the

State, the equivalent

the press, gives a just

but not an adequate conception of the part fulfilled in national and universal history by this great element of Jewish life; by means of which, the canon of inspiration never being complete, the persons most eminent in genius and moral feeling could not only denounce and reprobate, with the direct authority of the Almighty, whatever appeared to them deserving of such treatment, but could give forth better and higher interpretations of the national religion, which thenceforth became part of the religion. Accordingly, whoever can divest himself of the habit of reading the Bible as if it was one book, which until lately was equally inveterate in Christians

and

in unbelievers,

with admiration the vast interval between and religion of the Pentateuch, or even of the historical books (the unmistaksees

the morality

to realise its tendencies,

therefore, are the various defects by

people fits.

is

made

incapable of reaping

its

bene-

It

Of

these inquiries, the last does not confirst is an essential part

cern us here; but the

we may, without rashness once enunciate a proposition, the proofs and illustrations of which will present themselves in the ensuing pages: that this ideally best form of government will be found in some

of our subject: for at

one or other variety of the Representative System.

Chapter ^ ideally best Form

of GovernThat the Government ment is Representative It has long (perhaps throughout the entire duration of British freedom) been a common

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

342

good despot could be ensured, of despotic monarchy would be the best form and radical as a this upon look I government. most pernicious misconception of what good saying, that

if

government

a

is;

which, until

of, will fatally vitiate all

it

can be got rid

our speculations on

government.

The

supposition

is,

that absolute power, in

would the hands of an eminent individual, ensure a virtuous and intelligent performance laws of all the duties of government. Good would be established and enforced, bad laws would be reformed; the

best

men would

be

placed in all situations of trust; justice would be as well administered, the public burthens would be as light and as judiciously imposed, every branch of administration would be as purely and as intelligently conducted, as the circumstances of the country and its degree of adintellectual and moral cultivation would mit. to

I

am willing,

concede

argument, must point out how

for the sake of the

all this;

but

great the concession

I

is;

how much more

is

needed to produce even an approximation to these results than is conveyed in the simple expression, a good despot. Their realisation would in fact imply, not merely a good monan all-seeing one. He must be at all correctly, in considerable deinformed times working of every tail, of the conduct and

arch, but

branch of administration, in every district of twentythe country, and must be able, in the granted is that all are which day four hours per labourer, to give to a king as to the humblest an effective share of attention and superintendence to all parts of this vast field; or he must at least be capable of discerning and choosing out, from among the mass of his subof honest jects, not only a large abundance and able men. fit to conduct every branch of public administration under supervision and control, but also the small number of men of

eminent virtues and talents who can be trusted I)ut not only to do without that supervision. others. So exto exercise it themselves over traordinary are the faculties and energies resupport(juired for performing this task in any we whom despot good the that manner, able as conare supposing ran hardly be imagined seiuing to undertake it, unless as a refuge from inioUraljle evils,

and

a transitional prepara-

argument tion for somelhing beyond. Hut the (an do without even (his imnicnse item in the account. Suppose the diHuulty vancjuished. What should we then have? One man of superhuman mental activity managing the entire

mentally passive people. Their pasimplied in the very idea of absolute power. The nation as a whole, and every individual composing it, are without any poten-

affairs of a sivity

tial

is

voice in their

own

destiny.

They

exercise

will in respect to their collective interests. All is decided for them by a will not their own,

no

which

it is

What

legally a crime for

them

to disobey.

human beings can be formed regimen? What development can

sort of

under such

a either their thinking or their active faculties attain under it? On matters of pure theory they might perhaps be allowed to speculate, so iong as their speculations either did not

or had not the remotest practice. On practical afits with connection fairs they could at most be only suffered to suggest; and even under the most moderate of despots, none but persons of already admitted or reputed superiority could hope that their

approach

politics,

would be known to, much less regarded by. those who had the management of affairs. A person must have a very unusual suggestions

taste for intellectual exercise in

and

for

itself,

put himself to the trouble of thought when it is to have no outward effect, or qualify himself for functions which he has no chance of being allowed to exercise. The only sufficient incitement to mental exertion, in any

who

will

but a few minds in pect of

some

a generation,

practical use to be

is

the pros-

made

of

its

does not follow that the nation will be wholly destitute of intellectual power. The common business of life, which must necesor sarily be performed by each individual

results. It

family for themselves, will call forth some

amount

of intelligence

and

practical ability,

within a certain narrow range of ideas. There may be a select class of savants, who cultivate for science with a view to its physical uses, or be a the pleasure of the pursuit. There will bureaucracy, and persons in training for the bureaucracy, who will be taught at least some empirical maxims of government and public adutinistration. There may be, and often has been, a systematic organisation of the best mental power in the country in some special direction

(commonly

military) to

promote the

grandeur of the despot. Bin the public at large remain without information and without inpractice; or, terest on all greater matters of it is but them, of knowledge any if they have that which people a (lilrUanle knowledge, like have of the mechanical arts who have never handled

Nor

a tool.

is it

only in their intelligence that they

THE IDEALLY BEST POLITY suffer.

Their moral capacities are equally stunt-

of action of human circumscribed, their sentiments are narrowed and dwarfed in the same proportion. The food of feeling is action: even domestic affection lives upon voluntary good

Wherever the sphere

ed.

beings

is artificially

343

tions into the Oriental state.

does not rity

mean

And

that state

stupid tranquillity, with secuit often

against change for the worse;

means being overrun, conquered, and reduced

offices.

domestic slavery, either by a stronger desby the nearest barbarous people who retain along with their savage rudeness the en-

his country,

ergies of freedom.

that may be relied on for and minds above the dust

Such are not merely the natural tendencies, but the inherent necessities of despotic government; from which there is no outlet, unless in so far as the despotism consents not to be despotism; in so far as the supposed good despot abstains from exercising his power, and, though holding it in reserve, allows the general business of government to go on as if the people really governed themselves. However little probable it may be, we may imagine a despot observing many of the rules and restraints of constitutional government. He might allow such freedom of the press and of discussion as would enable a public opinion

Let a person have nothing to do for and he will not care for it. It has been said of old, that in a despotism there is at most but one patriot, the despot himself; and the saying rests on a just appreciation of the effects of absolute subjection, even to a good and wise master. Religion remains: and here at least, it may be thought, is an agency lifting

men's eyes

at their feet.

But

even supposing it to escape perversion for the purposes of despotism, ceases in these circumstances to be a social concern, and narrows into a personal affair between an individual and his Maker, in which the issue at stake is but his private salvation. Religion in this shape is quite consistent with the most religion,

selfish

and contracted egoism, and

the votary as his

kind

little

identifies

in feeling with the rest of

as sensuality itself.

to

pot, or

form and express itself on national affairs. might suffer local interests to be managed, without the interference of authority, by the people themselves. He might even surround to

He

A good despotism means a government in which, so far as depends on the despot, there is no positive oppression by officers of state,

himself with a council or councils of government, freely chosen by the whole or some por-

but in which all the collective interests of the people are managed for them, all the thinking

the

lative as well as executive authority.

that has relation to collective interests done for them, and in which their minds are formed

to act thus, and so far abdicate as a despot, he would do away with a considerable part of the

by,

and consenting

own

energies.

to, this

abdication of their

Leaving things

to the

Govern-

ment, like leaving them to Providence, is synonymous with caring nothing about them, and accepting their results, when disagreeable, as visitations of Nature. With the exception, therefore, of a few studious men who take an

tion of the nation; retaining in his

power of

taxation,

evils characteristic of tivity

and capacity

own hands

and the supreme

legis-

Were he

despotism. Political ac-

for public affairs

would no

longer be prevented from growing up in the body of the nation; and a public opinion would form itself not the mere echo of the gov-

and sentiments of the whole people are given up to the material

ernment. But such improvement would be the beginning of new difficulties. Thispublicopinion, independent of the monarch's dictation, must be either with him or against him; if not the one, it will be the other. All governments

and, when these are provided for, to amusement and ornamentation, of private

must displease many persons, and these having now regular organs, and being able to ex-

is to say, if the whole testiworth anything, that the era

press their sentiments, opinions adverse to the measures of government would often be ex-

intellectual interest in speculation for

its

own

sake, the intelligence

interests,

the life.

But

to say this

mony of history

is

of national decline has arrived: that

is,

if

the

nation had ever attained anything to decline from. If it has never risen above the condition of an Oriental people, in that condition it continues to stagnate. But if, like Greece or Rome, it had realised anything higher, through the energy, patriotism, and enlargement of mind, which as national qualities are the fruits solely of freedom, it relapses in a few genera-

pressed.

What is

the

monarch

to

do when

these

unfavourable opinions happen to be in the majority? Is he to alter his course? Is he to defer to the nation? If so, he is no longer a despot, but a constitutional king; an organ or first minister of the people, distinguished only by being irremovable. If not, he must either put down opposition by his despotic power, or there will arise a permanent antagonism be-

REPRESEXr.lTlV E

544

nveen the people and one man, which can have but one possible ending. Not even a religious principle of passive obedience and "right divine" would long ward oft the natural consequences of such a position. The monarch would have to succumb, and conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty, or give place to some one who would. The despotism,

being thus chiefly nominal, would possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute monarchy; while it would realise in a very imperfect degree those of a free government; since however great an amount of liberty the citizens might practically enjoy, they could never forget that they held it on sufferance, a concession which under the existing

and by

constitution of the state might at any moment be resumed; that they were legally slaves, though of a prudent, or indulgent, master. It

is

not

nmch

be wondered at if impagroaning un-

to

tient or disappointed reformers,

der the impediments opposed to the most salutary puljlic improvements by the ignorance, the indifference, the intractableness, the perverse obstinacy of a people, and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests

armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions,

strong

hand

shoidd at times sigh for a

down

to bear

all

these obstacles,

and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed. But (setting aside the fact that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse, there are ninety-nine who do nothing but create them) those who look in any such direction for the realisation of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element, the improvement of the people themselves.

One

dom

it

of the benefits of freethe ruler cannot pass by the people's minds, and amend their affairs for is

that

imder

them without amending them.

If it

were

possi-

ble for the people to be well governed in spite of themselves, their good government would last no longer than the freedom of a

people usually lasts who have been liberated bv loreign arms without their own co-operation. It is true, a despot may educate ihe people;

and

to

do so

really,

would

l)e

the

l)cst

apology for his despotism, liul any educaticni

making hinnan beings other than machines, in the long run makes tiiem

which aims

at

claim to have the control of their own actions. The leaders of French philosophv in tiie eiglneenih century had l)een educated by the Jesuits.

E\en

|esuit

education,

it

seems, was

sufficiently real to call forth the appetite for

GOVERXMEXT

freedom. Whatever invigorates the faculties, in however small a measure, creates an increased desire for their more unimpeded exercise; and a popular education is a failure, if it educates the people for any state but that

which it will certainly induce them to desire, and most probably to demand. I am far from condemning, in cases of extreme exigencv. the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporarv dictatorship. Free nations have, in times of old, conferred such power by their own choice, as a

necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic wliich could not be got rid of by less violent means. But its acceptance, even for a time strictly limited, can only be excused, if. like Solon or Pittacus, the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom. A good despotism is an altogether false ideal, which practically (except as a means to some temporary purpose) becomes the most senseless and dangerous of chimeras. Evil for evil, a good despotism, in a country at all advanced in civilisation, is more noxious than a bad one; for it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts, feelings, and energies of the people. The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius. If the whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two gencrrttions of that mild slavery, they would probabh have had spirit enough left to rebel against the more odious one.

no difficulty in showing that the form of government is that in which the sovereignty, or supreme controlling power in the last resort, is vested in the entire aggregate of the communitv; every citizen not

There

is

ideally best

onlv having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate .sovereignty, but being, at least occasionally, tailed on to take an actual part in the government, by the personal discharge of some public function, local or general. To test this proposition, it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which, as pointed out in the

last

chapter, the

government comeniently divides itself, namely, how far it promotes the good management of the affairs incjuiry

into the goodness of a

of society

i)y

means

of the existing faculties,

moral, intellectual, and active, of its various memi)ers. and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties.

The

ideaiU best form of govemment,

it

is

THE IDEALLY BEST POLITY scarcely necessary to say,

which

is

does not

practicable or eligible in

mean one

all states

of

civilisation, but the one which, in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible,

attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences, immediate and prospective. A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character. It is pre-eminent in both the is

mitting that

Communism would

345 now be

mankind, and But as this anything but popular with those

among the elite may become so among the

practicable

even

of

rest.

opinion is defenders of existing institutions who find fault with the doctrine of the general predominance of self-interest, I am inclined to think they do in reality believe that most men consider themselves before other people. It

is

not,

departments between which the excellence of a political constitution is divided. It is both more favourable to present good government, and promotes a better and higher form of national character, than any other polity what-

however, necessary to affirm even thus much in order to support the claim of all to participate in the sovereign power. We need not sup-

soever.

sacrifice

superiority in reference to present wellbeing rests upon two principles, of as universal

suffices that, in

and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs. The first is, that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure

in

Its

tiuth

from being disregarded when the person

in-

himself able, and habitually disposed, to stand up for them. The second is, that the general prosperity attains a greater terested

height,

is

and

is

portion to the

more widely diffused, amount and variety of

in pro-

the per-

pose that class,

when power

an exclusive and deliberately

resides in

that class will knowingly

the other classes to themselves: it the absence of its natural de-

fenders, the interest of the excluded

is

always

danger of being overlooked; and, when looked at, is seen with very different eyes from those of the persons

In

whom

it

directly concerns.

example, what are called may be considered as ex-

this country, for

the working classes

cluded from all direct participation in the government. I do not believe that the classes who do participate in it have in general any intention of sacrificing the working classes to themselves.

They once had

that intention; witness

sonal energies enlisted in promoting it. Putting these two propositions into a shape more special to their present application; hu-

the persevering attempts so long made to keep down wages by law. But in the present day

man

they willingly

beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have

power of being, and are. se\i-protecting: and they only achieve a high degree of success the

in their struggle with

Nature

in proportion as

they are se\i-dependent, relying on what they themselves can do, either separately or in concert, rather than on what others do for them. The former proposition— that each is the

only safe guardian of his own rights and interests—is one of those elementary maxims of prtidence, which every person, capable of conducting his own affairs, implicitly acts upon,

wherever he himself is interested. Many, indeed, have a great dislike to it as a political doctrine,

and

are fond of holding

it

up

to

obloquy, as a doctrine of universal selfishness. To which we may answer, that whenever it ceases to be true that mankind, as a rule, prefer themselves to others, and those nearest to them to those more remote, from that moment Communism is not only practicable, but the only defensible form of society; and will, when that time arrives, be assuredly carried into effect. For my own part, not believing in universal selfishness, I have no diffictdty in ad-

their ordinary disposition

make

is

the very opposite:

considerable

sacrifices, es-

pecially of theirpecuniary interest, for the benefit of the working classes, and err rather by

too lavish

and indiscriminating beneficence;

nor do I believe that any rulers in history have been actuated by a more sincere desire to do their duty towards the poorer portion of their countrymen. Yet does Parliament, or almost any of the members composing it, ever for an instant look at any question with the eyes of a working man? When a subject arises in which the labourers as such have an interest, is it regarded from any point of view but that of the employers of labour? I do not say that the working men's view of these questions is in general nearer to the truth than the other: but it is sometimes quite as near; and in any case it ought to be respectfully listened to, instead it is, not merely turned away from, but ignored. On the question of strikes, for instance, it is doubtful if there is so much as one

of being, as

among the leading members of either House who is not firmly convinced that the reason of is unqualifiedly on the side of the and that the mens view of it is simply absurd. Those who have studied the question

the matter masters,

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

m6 know and

how far this is trom being the case; how different, and how infinitely less

well

in

In proportion as any, no matter who, are excluded from it, the interests of the excluded

to

are left without the guarantee accorded to the

be argued, if the classes who strike were able to make themselves heard in Parliament. affairs It is an adherent condition of human

rest, and they themselves have less scope and encouragement than they might otherwise have to that exertion of their energies for the good of themselves and of the community, to which

superficial a

that

manner

would have

the point

no intention, however

sincere, of protect-

ing the interests of others can make it safe or salutary to tie up their own hands. Still more

obviously true is it, that by their own hands only can any positive and duralile improvement of their circumstances in life be worked out. Through the joint influence of these two principles, all free communities have both

been more exempt from social injustice and crime, and have attained more brilliant prosperity, than any others, or than they themselves after they lost their freedom. Contrast the free states of the world, while their freelasted, with the cotemporary subjects of monarchical or oligarchical despotism: the Greek cities with the Persian satrapies; the Italian republics and the free towns of Flan-

dom

ders

and Germany, with the feudal monarchies Switzerland, Holland, and Eng-

of Europe;

land, with .Austria or an terevolutionary France. Their superior prosperity was too obvious ever to

have been gainsaid; while their superiority

good government and social relations is proved by the prosperity, and is manifest bein

sides in every

page of history.

we compare,

If

not one age with another, but the different

governments which co-existed in the same age, no amount of disorder which exaggeration it(an pretend to have existed amidst the tlie free states can be compared for a moment with the contemptuous trampling upon the mass of the people which pervaded

self

publicity of

the whole life of the monarchical countries, or the disgusting individual tyranny which was of more than daily occurrence under the systems of plunder which they called fi.scal ar-

rangements, and

in the secret y of their fright-

ful courts of justice. It

must be acknowledged

that the benefits

of freedom, so far as they have hitherto Ijoen enjoyed, were obtained by the extension of its

the general prosperity is always proportioned. Thus stands the case as regards present wellbeing; the good management of the affairs of the existing generation. If we now pass to the influence of the form of government upon character, we shall find the superiority of popular government over every other to be, if pos-

more decided and indisputable. This question really depends upon a still more fundamental one, viz., which of two common types of character, for the general good of humanity, it is most desirable should predominate—the active, or the passive type; that which struggles against evils, or that which endures

sible, still

them; that which bends to ciicumstances, or that which endeavours to make circumstances

bend

to itself.

The commonplaces

of moralists,

sive arc those

which most men personally pre-

passiveness of our neighbours increases our sense of security, and plays into the hands of our wilfulness. Passive characters, if

The

fer.

need their activity, seem our own path. A contented character is not a dangerous rival. Yet nothing is more certain than that improvement in human affairs is wholly the work of the un-

we do not happen

to

an obstruction the

less in

contented characters; and, moreover, that it to accpiirc is nuich easier for :in active mind one passive a for than patience of the virtues to

assume those of energy.

Of

the three varieties of mental excellence, and moral, there never

intellectual, practical,

could be any doubt in regard to the first two which side had the advantage. .\ll intellectual .superiority

is

the fruit of active effort. Enterkeep moving, to be trying

prise, the desire to

privileges to a part only of the

community;

and accomjjlishing new things

whi(h

they are ex-

benefit or that of others,

and

that a

govenunent

in

tended impartially to all is a desideratum unrealised. Ikit though every approach to lias

an indepeiidenl value, and

in

many

speculative,

this

ent.

cases

ideally perfect conception of free

government.

is

for

our own

the parent even of

and nnich more of practical, talThe intellectual culture compatible with the other type is of that feeble and vague de.scriplion which belongs to a mind that stops

still

tnore than an approach coidd not, in the existing state of general iinprov( nuiu. be made, ri>e |)articipation of all in the.se benefits is the

and the

general sympathies of mankind, are in favour of the passive type. Energetic characters may be admired, but the accjuiescent and submis-

at

anuisement, or at simple contemplation. test of real and vigourous thinking, tiu'

The

thinking uliidi ascertains inuhs instead of

THE IDEALLY BEST POLITY dreaming dreams,

Where

practice.

is

successful application to

that purpose does not exist,

to give definiteness, precision,

and an

intelligi-

generates nothing better than the mystical metaphysics of the Pythagoreans or the Vedas. With respect to ble

meaning

to thought,

it

improvement, the case is still more character which improves human life is that which struggles with natural powers and tendencies, not that which gives way

practical

evident.

The

The

to them.

self-benefiting qualities are all

347 who possess what they would

will towards those like to have.

In proportion as success in life is seen or believed to be the fruit of fatality or accident, and not of exertion, in that same ratio does envy develop itself as a point of national character. The most envious of all mankind are the Orientals. In Oriental moralists, in Oriental tales,

the envious

man

is

remarkably promi-

the terror of all who possess anything desirable, be it a palace, a hand-

nent. In real

life,

he

is

even good health and

on

some

the advantage of each individual member of the community must be at least a part

the supposed effect of his mere look constitutes the all-pervading superstition of the evil eye. Next to Orientals in envy, as in activity,

the side of the active and energetic character: and the habits and conduct which pro-

mote

which conduce most in the end to the advancement of the community as a whole. But on the point of moral preferability, there seems at first sight to be room for doubt. of those

I

am

not referring to the religious feeling so generally existed in favour of the

which has

inactive character, as being more in harmony with the submission due to the divine will. Christianity as well as other religions has fostered this sentiment; but it is the prerogative of Christianity, as regards this and many other perversions, that it is able to throw them off.

are

child, or

some

spirits:

of the Southern Europeans.

The

Spaniards pursued all their great men with it, embittered their lives, and generally succeeded in putting an early stop to their successes.^ With the French, who are essentially a southern people, the double education of despotism and Catholicism has, in spite of their impulsive temperament, made submission and endurance the common character of the people, and their most received notion of wisdom and excellence:

and

if

all superiority, is

envy of one another, and of not more

rife

among them

the circumstance must be ascribed

Abstractedly from religious considerations, a

than

passive character, which yields to obstacles in-

to the

stead of striving to overcome them, may not indeed be very useful to others, no more than

French character, and most of all to the great individual energy which, though less per-

might be expected to be at least inoffensive. Contentment is always counted among the moral virtues. But it is a complete error to suppose that contentment is necessarily or naturally attendant on passivity of character; and useless it is, the moral consequences

sistent and more intermittent than in the selfhelping and struggling Anglo-Saxons, has nevertheless manifested itself among the French

are mischievous. Where there exists a desire for advantages not possessed, the mind which does

are, no doubt, in all countries, really contented characters, who not merely do not seek, but do not desire, what they do not already possess, and these naturally bear no illwill towards such as have apparently a more favoured lot. But the great mass of seeming contentment is real discontent, combined with indolence or self indulgence, which, while tak-

to itself,

but

it

not potentially possess them by means of its energies is apt to look with hatred and malice on those who do. The person bestirring

own

himself with hopeful prospects to improve his circumstances is the one who feels good-will towards others engaged in, or who have succeeded in, the same pursuit. And where the majority are so engaged, those who do not attain the object have had the tone given to their feelings by the general habit of the country,

and

ascribe their failure to

want of

effort or

opportunity, or to their personal ill luck. But those who, while desiring what others possess,

put no energy into striving for

it,

are either in-

grumbling that fortune does not do for them what they do not attempt to do for themselves, or overflowing with envy and ill-

cessantly

it

is,

many

valuable counteracting elements

in the

in nearly every direction in which the operation of their institutions has been favourable to

it.

There

ing no legitimate means of raising itself, delights in bringing others down to its own level. And if we look narrowly even at the cases of II limit the expression to past time, because I say nothing derogatory of a great, and now

would

at last a free, people, who are entering into the general movement of European progress with a vigour which bids fair to make up rapidly the ground they have lost. No one can doubt what Spanish intellect and energy are capable of; and their faults as a people are chiefly those for which freedom and industrial ardour are a real specific.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERXMEXT

348

innocent contentment, we perceive that they onlv win our admiration when the indifference is solely to improvement in outward circumstances, and there is a striving for perpetual advancement in spiritual worth, or at least a dinnterested zeal to benefit others. tented man, or the contented family,

The conwho have

no ambition to make any one else happier, to promote the good of their country or their neighbourhood, or to improve themselves in moral excellence, excite in us neither admiration nor approval. We rightly ascribe this sort of contentment to mere unmanliness and want of spirit. The content which we approve is an ability to do cheerfully without what cannot be had. a just appreciation of the comparative value of different objects of desire, and a willing renunciation of the less when incompatible with the greater. These, however, are excellences more natural

portion as

it is

actively

to the character, in pro-

engaged

in the

attempt

or some other lot. He who to improve against is continually measuring his energy difficulties learns what are the difficulties insuperable to him, and what are tliose which, its

own

though he might overcome, the success is not worth the cost. He whose thoughts and activities are all needed for, and habituallv employed in, practicable and useful enterprises, his is the person of all others least likely to let mind dwell with brooding discontent upon things either not worth attaining, or which are not so to him. Thus the active, self-helping character is not only intrinsically the best, but exis the likeliest to acquire all that is really cellent or desirable in the opposite type. The striving, go-ahead character of England

and the United

States

is

only a

fit

subject of

disapproving criticism on account of the very secondary objects on which it commonly exthe foundation

pends its strength. In of the best hopes for the general improveinent of mankind. It has been acutely remarked that itself it is

whenever anything goes amiss the

hal)itual

to say, "II taut

impulse of French people dc la patience"; and of English people, "What a shame." The people w-ho think it a shame when anything goes wrong— who rush to the conclusion that the evil could and ought to have Ijcen prevented, are those who. in the long run, do most to make the workl Ijctler. If the desires are low placed, il tiiey exiend to is

little

Ijeyond physical comfort, and the show immediate results of the energy

of riches, the will not

be

much more than

tension of man's

the continual ex-

power over material

objects;

but even this makes room, and prepares the mechanical appliances, for the greatest intellectual and social achievements; and while the energy is there, some persons will apply it, and it will be applied more and more, to the perfecting not of outAvard circumstances alone, but of man's inward nature. Inactivity, unaspiringness, absence of desire, are a more fatal hindrance to improvement than any misdirection of energy; and are that through which alone, when existing in the mass, any verv formidable misdirection by an energetic few becomes possible. 1 1 is this, mainly, which retains in a savage or semi-sa\ age state the great

majoritv of the human race. Now there can be no kind of doubt that the passive type of character is favoured by the government of one or a few, and the active self-helping type by that of the Many. Irresponsible rulers need the quiescence of the

ruled more than they need any activity but that which they can compel. Submissiveness to the prescriptions of

nature

ments

men

as necessities of

the lesson inculcated by all governupon those who are wholly without paris

ticipation in them.

The

will of superiors,

and

the law as the will of superiors, must be passively yielded to. But no men are mere instru-

ments or materials in the hands of their rulers who have will or spirit or a spring of internal activity in the rest of their proceedings: and any manifestation of these qualities, instead of receiving encouragement from despots, has to get itself forgiven by them. Even when irresponsible rulers are not sufficiently conscious of danger from the mental activity of their subjects to be desirous of repressing it, the posiis a repression. Endeavour is even effectually restrained by the certainty of

tion itself

more

impotence than by any positive discouragement. Between subjection to the will of others, its

and the

virtues of self-help and self-governis a natural incompatibility. This

ment, there

less com|)leie. according as the bondstrained or relaxed. Rulers differ very much in the length to which they carry the control of the free agency of their sul)jects, or is

more or

age

is

it by managing their busiBut the difference is in degree, priiu iple: and the best despots often go

the supersession of ness for them.

not in

the greatest lengths in chaining

up

the free

agency of their siilijects. .\ l)ad despot, when his own personal indulgences have been provided for. may sometimes l)e willing to let the pco])le alone; i)ut a good despot insists on doing them good, by making them do their own

THE IDEALLY BEST POLITY business in a better way than they themselves regulations which restricted to the leading branches of French manufactures were the work of the great Colbert. Very different is the state of the human faculties where a human being feels himself

know

The

of.

fixed processes all

under no other external restraint than the necessities of nature, or mandates of society which he has his share in imposing, and which it is open to him, if he thinks them wrong, publicly to dissent from, and exert himself actively to get altered. No doubt, under a government partially popular, this freedom may be exercised even by those

who

are not par-

takers in the full privileges of citizenship. But a great additional stimulus to any one's

it is

self-help

and

self-reliance

when he

starts

from

even ground, and has not to feel that his success depends on the impression he can make

upon of

the sentiments

and

whom he is not one.

dispositions of a

It is

body

a great discourage-

349

raised the intellectual standard of an average Athenian citizen far beyond anything of which

there is yet an example in any other mass of men, ancient or modern. The proofs of this are

apparent in every page of our great historian of Greece; but we need scarcely look further than to the high quality of the addresses which their great orators

deemed

best calculated to

understanding and will. kind, though far less in same the benefit of A degree, is produced on Englishmen of the lower middle class by their liability to be placed on juries and to serve parish offices; which, though it does not occur to so many, nor is so continu-

act with effect

ous,

on

their

nor introduces them

to so great a variety

of elevated considerations, as to admit of com-

parison with the public education which every Athens obtained from her democratic institutions, must make them neverthe-

citizen of

very different beings, in range of ideas and development of faculties, from those who have done nothing in their lives but drive a quill, less

goods over a counter.

an individual, and a still greater one to a class, to be left out of the constitution; to be reduced to plead from outside the door to the arbiters of their destiny, not taken into

or

consultation within. The maximum of the invigorating effect of freedom upon the character is only obtained when the person acted

tions. He is called upon, while so engaged, to weigh interests not his own; to be guided, in case of conflicting claims, by another rule than

looking forward to becoming,

his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles and maxims which have for their

ment

to

on either

is,

or

is

a citizen as fully privileged as any other.

What

is still

more important than even

matter of feeling

is

this

the practical discipline

which the character obtains from the occasional

demand made upon

for a time

and

the citizens to exercise, some social func-

in their turn,

not sufficiently considered how little there is in most men's ordinary life to give any largeness either to their conceptions or to their sentiments. Their work is a routine; not a tion. It

is

labour of love, but of self-interest in the most elementary form, the satisfaction of daily wants; neither the thing done, nor the process of doing it, introduces the mind to thoughts or feelings extending beyond individuals: if instructive books are within their reach, there is

no stimulus

them; and in most cases access to any person of superior to his own. Giving

to read

the individual has cultivation

much

him something

to

no

do

for the public, supplies,

in a measure, all these deficiencies. If circumstances allow the amount of public duty assigned him to be considerable, it makes him an educated man. Notwithstanding the defects of

the social system and moral ideas of antiquity, the practice of the dicastery and the ecclesia

sell

more salutary is the moral part of the instruction afforded by the participation of the private citizen, if even rarely, in public funcStill

reason of existence the common good: and he usually finds associated with him in the same work minds more familiarised than his own with these ideas and operations, whose study it will be to supply reasons to his understand-

and stimulation to his feeling for the general interest. He is made to feel himself one of the public, and whatever is for their benefit to be for his benefit. Where this school of public spirit does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons, in no eming,

inent social situation, owe any duties to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the government. There is no unselfish sentiof identification with the public. Every thought or feeling, either of interest or of duty, is absorbed in the individual and in the family.

ment

The man

never thinks of any colieclive interany objects to be pursued jointly with others, but only in competition with them, and in some measure at their expense. A neighbour, not being an ally or an associate, since he is never engaged in any common undertaking est,

of

for joint benefit,

is

therefore only a rival. Thus suffers, while public is

even private morality

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

350 actually extinct.

Were

this the universal

and

only possible state of things, the utmost aspirations of the lawgiver or the moralist could only stretch to make the bulk of the community a flock of sheep innocently nibbling the grass side

by

is

one in which the whole people any participation, even

that

ipate;

smallest public function,

is

partic-

in

tlie

useful; that the

participation should everywhere be the general degree of improvement of the comas great as

will allow: and that nothing less can desirable than the admission of ultimately be all to a share in the sovereign power ot the

munity

But since all cannot, in a community exceeding a single small town, participate personally in any but some very minor portions of the public business, it follows that the ideal type of a perfect government must be repre-

state.

sentative.

Chapter 4 Under what Social Conditions Representative Government is Inapplicable

We have recognised in representative government

the ideal type of the most perfect polity, any portion of man-

for wliich. in consequence,

kind are better adapted in proportion to their degree of general improvement. As they range lower and lower in development, that form of government will be, generally speaking, less suitable to them; though this is not true universally: for the adaptation of a people to representative government does not depend so

much upon the place they occupy in the general scale of humanity as upon the degree in which they possess certain special requisites: requisites, however, so closely connected with their degree of general advancement, that any variation between the two is rather the exception than the rule. Let us examine at what jjoint in the descending series represeiuative government ceases altogether to be ;idmissible. cither ihrougii rior fitness ot

its

The

to

3.

willingness of the people to accept repgovernment only becomes a prac-

resentative

side.

From these accumulated considerations it is evident that the only government which can fully satisfy all the exigencies of the social state

do what is necessary for its preserThat they should be willing and able to fulfil the duties and discharge the functions which it imposes on them.

and able vation.

own

unfitness, or the supe-

some other regimen.

then, representative, like any other government, must be unsuitable in any case First,

tical

question

when an enlightened

tion

is

almost irrelevant, since,

jection can be

made

if

no other ob-

to their enterprise

very end they aim adverse,

its

at.

hostility

When is

opinion

repugnance to any limitation of the of a particular line of rulers; but, in general, the doctrine of passive obedience ligious

power

meant only submission to the will of the powers that be, whether monarchical or popular. In any case in which the attempt to introduce representative government is at all likely to be made, indifference to it, and inability to understand its processes and requirements, rather than positive opposition, are the obstacles to be expected. Ihese, however, are as fatal, and may be as hard to be got rid of, as actual aversion: it being easier, in most cases, to change the direction of an active feeling, than to create one in a state previously passive. \Vhen a people have no sufficient value for. and attachment to. a representative constitution, they have next to

no chance of retaining it. In every country, the executive is the branch of the government which wields the immedi.ue power, and is in direct contact with the public; to it, ])rincipaldily, the hopes and fears of individuals are and by it both the benefits, and the terand prestige, of government are mainly

rected, rors

represented to the public eye. Unless, therefore, the authorities whose office it is to check the execiuive are backed by an elTective opinion and feeling in the country, the executive has always the means of selling them aside, or

compelling them to subservience, and is sure to be well supported in doing so. Representative institutions necessarily depend for

That

they sliould be willing

really

change, rather than to representative government in itself. The contrary case is not indeed unexampled; there has sometimes been a re-

upon

it, 2.

is

usually to the fact of

in

ing to receive

than

that the opinion of the nation is not yet on their side, they have the ready and proper answer, that to bring it over to their side is the

in

which it cannot permanently subsist— J.e. which it does not fulfil the three fundamental (onditions enumerated in the first chapter. willI hese were— I. That the people should l)e

ruler, or a

foreign nation or nations who have gained power over the country, arc disposed to offer it the boon. To individual reformers the ques-

permanence

the readiness of the people to fight for them in case of their being endangered. If loo little valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and if they do, are almost sure to be

IN

WHAT

CASES INAPPLICABLE

overthrown, as soon as the head of the government, or any party leader who can muster force for a coup de main, is willing to run some small risk for absolute power. These considerations relate to the first two causes

ment. either

which

of failure in a representative governThe third is, when the people want the will or the capacity to fulfil the part belongs to them in a representative con-

stitution. When nobody, or only some small fraction, feels the degree of interest in the

351

certainly, as in Spanish America, keep the country in a state of chronic revolution and civil war. A despotism, not even legal, but ol illegal violence,

would be

alternately exercised

and would have no effect but to prevent despotism from attaining the stability and security by which

by

the

a succession of political adventurers,

name and forms

of representation

alone its evils can be mitigated, or its few advantages realised. The preceding are the cases in which repre-

government cannot permanently exThere are others in which it possibly might exist, but in which some other form of government would be preferable. These are princi-

general affairs of the State necessary to the formation of a public opinion, the electors will seldom make any use of the right of suffrage but to ser\'e their private interest, or the interest of their locality, or of some one with

sentative

whom

they are connected as adherents or dependents. The small class who, in this state of public feeling, gain the command of the repre-

civilisation,

sentative body, for the most part use it solely as a means of seeking their fortune. If the ex-

be an impediment. The most obvious of these cases is the one already considered, in which the people have

ecutive

is

weak, the country

mere struggles

for place;

if

is

distracted by

strong,

it

makes

despotic, at the cheap price of appeasing the representatives, or such of them as are capable of giving trouble, by a share of the spoil; and the only fruit produced by national repreitself

sentation

is.

that in addition to those

who

an assembly quartered on the public, and no abuse in which a portion of the assembly are interested is at all likely to be removed. When, however, the evil stops here, the price may be worth paying, for the publicity and discussion which, though not an really govern, there

is

invariable, are a natural accompaniment of any, even nominal, representation. In the mod-

ern Kingdom of Greece, for example,' it can hardly be doubted, that the placehunters who chiefly compose the representative assembly,

though they contribute little or nothing directly to good government, nor even much temper the arbitrary power of the executive, yet keep up the idea of popular rights, and conduce greatly to the real liberty of the press which exists in that country. This benefit, however, is entirely dependent on the co-existence with the popular body of an hereditary king. If, instead of struggling for the favours of the chief ruler, these selfish and sordid factions struggled for the chief place itself, they would

ist.

the people, in order to advance in have some lesson to learn, some habit not yet acquired, to the acquisition of which representative government is likely to

pally

still

when

to learn the

of obedience.

first

lesson of civilisation, that trained in

A race who have been

energy and courage by struggles with Nature and their neighbours, but who have not yet settled down into permanent obedience to any superior, would be little likely to acquire this habit under the collective government of their own body. A representative assembly drawn from among themselves would simply reflect their own turbulent insubordi-

common

would refuse its authority to all proceedings which would impose, on their savage nation. It

independence, any improving restraint. The mode in which such tribes are usually brought to submit to the primary conditions of civilised society is through the necessities of warfare,

and the despotic authority indispensable military

command. A

military leader

to

the

only superior to whom they will submit, except occasionally some prophet supposed to be inspired from above, or conjurer regarded as possessing miraculous power. These may exercise a temporary ascendancy, but as it is it rarely effects any change in the general habits of the people, unless the prophet, like Mahomet, is also a military chief,

merely personal,

and goes forth the armed apostle

of a

new

ligion; or unless the military chiefs ally

selves with his influence, ^Vritten before the salutary revolution of 1862, which, provoked by popular disgust at the system of governing hy corruption, and the general demoralisation of political men, has opened to that

prop

rapidly inipro\ ingpeople a new and hopeful chance of real constitutional government.

last

^

is

A tive

for their

and turn

it

re-

theminto a

own government.

people are no less unfitted for representagovernment by the contrary fault to that specified; by extreme passiveness, and

ready submission to tyranny. If a people thus

REPRESENTATIV E GOVERNMENT

352

prostrated by character and circumstances could obtain representative institutions, they would inevitably choose their tyrants as their representatives,

and the yoke would be made

heavier on them by the contrivance which prima facie might be expected to lighten it. On the contrary, many a people has gradually emerged from this condition by the aid of a central authoritv, whose position has made it the rival, and has ended by making it the mas-

and which, above all, has been single. French history, from Hugh Capet to Richelieu and Louis XIV., is a continued example of this course of things. Even when the King was scarcely so powerful as of the local despots,

ter,

many

of his chief feudatories, the great advan-

tage which he derived from being but one has been recognised by French historians. To him the eyes of all the locally oppressed were turned; he was the object of hope and reliance throughout the kingdom; while each local potentate was only powerful within a more or less confined space. At his hands, refuge and protection were sought from every part of the

country, against first one, then another, of the immediate oppressors. His progress to ascendancy was slow; but it resulted from successively taking advantage of opportunities which offered themselves only to him.

It

was, therefore,

and, in proportion as it was accomplished, it abated, in the oppressed portion of the community, the habit of submitting to oppression. The king's interest lay in encourag-

sure;

trate another mode in which unlimited monarchy overcomes obstacles to the progress of civilisation ^v•hich representati\e government

a decided tendency to aggraof the strongest hindrances to im-

would have had

One

\ate.

provement, up to a rather advanced stage, is an inveterate spirit of locality. Portions of mankind, in many other respects capable of. and prepared for. freedom, may be unqualified for amalgamating into even the smallest nation.

repel

Not only may jealousies and antipathies them from one another, and bar all pos-

voluntary union, but they may not have acquired any of the feelings or habits which would make the union real, supposing it to be nominally accomplished. They may, like the citizens of an ancient community, or those of an Asiatic village, have had considersibility of

yet

able practice in exercising their faculties on village or town interests, and have even real-

popular government yet have but slender sympathies with anything beyond, and no habit or capacity of dealing with interests ised a tolerably effective

on

that restricted scale,

common to many such connnunities. I am not aAvare that history furnishes any example in which a number of these political atoms or corpuscles have coalesced into a body, and learnt to feel themselves one people, except through previous subjection to a central authority common to all.^ It is through the habit of deferring to that authority, entering into its plans and subserving its purposes, that

we have supposed receive into minds the conception of large interests,

ing

a people such as

to

their

all partial attempts on the part of the serfs emancipate themselves from their masters, and place themselves in immediate subordination to himself. Under his protection numerous communities were formed which knew no one above them but the King. Obedience to a

and may

common

to a considerable geographical ex-

distant

on the contrary, are necespredominant consideration in the mind of the central ruler; and through the relations, more or less intimate, which he pro-

the

gressively establishes with the localities, they

monan h is liberty itself compared with dominion of the lord of the neighl)ouring castle: and the monarch was long compelled by necessities of position to exert his authority as the ally, rather than the master, of the classes whom he had aided in affecting their liberation. In this manner a central power, despotic in principle though generally much restricted in praclite, was mainly inMrumental in carrying the people through a necessary stage of improvement, which represenialive government, if real, would most likely have prevented them from entering upon. Nothing short of despotic rule, or a general massacre, could have effected the emancipation of the serfs in the

The same

Russian Empire. passages of history forcibly

illus-

tent.

Such

interests,

sarily the

to the general mind. The most favoinablc concurrence of circinnstances under which this step in impro\ement could i)e made, would be one which should raise up representative institutions without representative government: a representative body, or

become familiar

bodies, self the tral

drawn from the localities, making itauxiliary and instrument of the cen-

power,

l)iit

seldom attempting

to thwart or

which alone can be ciiiotcd as an exccp only so in regard to the final stage of its transformation. The more (hiruiilt previous advance from the city isolation of Florence, Pisa, or Milan, to the provincial unity of luscany or I omhardy, took place in the usual manner. 'Italy,

tion.

is

7.V

WHAT

CASES INAPPLICABLE

control it. The people being thus taken, as it were, into council, though not sharing the supreme po^ver, the political education given

by the central authority is carried home, much more effectually than it could otherwise be, to the local chiefs and to the population generally; Avhile, at the same time, a tradition is kept

up

of

government by general consent, or

at

least, the sanction of tradition is not given to government without it, which, when conse-

crated by custom, has so often put a bad end to a good beginning, and is one of the most frequent causes of the sad fatality which in most countries has stopped improvement in so early a stage, because the work of some one period has been so done as to bar the needful work of the ages following. Meanwhile, it may be laid down as a political truth, that by irresponsible monarchy rather than by representative gova multitude of insignificant pounits be welded into a people, with common feelings of cohesion, power enough to protect itself against conquest or foreign ag-

ernment can litical

gression,

and

affairs sufficiently

various and

considerable of its own to occupy worthily and expand to fit proportions the social and political intelligence of the population. For these several reasons, kingly gove^-nment,

from the control (though perhaps strengthened by the support) of representative institutions, is the most suitable form of polity for the earliest stages of any community, not except-

free

ing a city-community like those of ancient Greece: where, accordingly, the government of kings, under some real but no ostensible or constitutional control by public opinion, did historically precede

by an

unknown and

prob-

ably great duration all free institutions, and gave place at last, during a considerable lapse of time, to oligarchies of a few families. hundred other infirmities or short-com-

A

ings in a people might be pointed out, which pro tanto disqualify them from making the best use of representative government; but in

regard to these the

it is

not equally obvious that

government of One or

a

Few would have

any tendency to cure or alleviate the evil. Strong prejudices of any kind; obstinate adherence to old habits; positive defects of national character, or mere ignorance, and deficiency of mental cultivation, if prevalent in a people, will be in general faithfully reflected in

their representative assemblies: and should

that the executive administration, the direct management of public affairs, is in the hands of persons comparatively free from it

happen

353

more good would frequently be done by them when not hampered by the necessity of carrying with them the voluntary assent of such bodies. But the mere position of these defects,

the rulers does not in these, as it does in the other cases which we have examined, of itself invest them with interests and tendencies op-

erating in the beneficial direction. From the general weaknesses of the people or of the state of civilisation, the One and his counsel-

or the Few, are not likely to be habitually exempt; except in the case of their being foreigners, belonging to a superior people or a more advanced state of society. Then, indeed, the rulers may be, to almost any extent, supe-

lors,

rior in civilisation to those over rule;

of

and subjection

this

description,

to a foreign

whom

they

government

notwithstanding

its

in-

often of the greatest advantage to a people, carrying them rapidly through several stages of progress, and clearing away

evitable evils,

obstacles to

is

improvement which might have

lasted indefinitely

if

the subject population

had been left unassisted to its native tendencies and chances. In a country not under the dominion of foreigners, the only cause adequate to producing similar benefits is the rare accident of a monarch of extraordinary genius. There have been in history a few of these, who, happily for humanity, have reigned long eto render some of their improvements permanent, by leaving them under the guardianship of a generation which had grown up under their influence. Charlemagne may be cited as one instance; Peter the Great is another. Such examples however are so unfrequent that they can only be classed with the happy accidents which have so often decided at a critical moment whether some leading portion of humanity should make a sudden

nough

start,

or sink back towards barbarism: chances Themistocles at the time

like the existence of

of the Persian invasion, or of the

first

or third

William of Orange. It would be absurd to construct institutions of for the mere purpose of taking advantage such possibilities; especially as men of this calibre, in any distinguished position, do not require despotic power to enable them to exert great influence, as is evidenced by the three conlast mentioned. The case most requiring sideration in reference to institutions is the not very uncommon one in which a small but

leading portion of the population, from difference of race, more civilised origin, or other peculiarities of circumstance, are markedly

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

354

superior in civilisation and general character to the remainder. Under those conditions, gov-

ernment by the representatives of the mass would stand a chance of depriving them of much of the benefit they might derive from the greater civilisation of the superior ranks;

while government by the representatives of those ranks would probably rivet the degradation of the multitude, and leave them no hope of decent treatment except by ridding themselves of one of the most valuable elements of future advancement. The best prospect of improvement for a people thus composed lies in

the existence of a constitutionally unlimited, or at least a practically preponderant, authority in

the chief ruler of the

dominant

class.

He

alone has by his position an interest in raising and improving the mass of whom he is not jealous, as a counterpoise to his associates of

he is. And if fortunate circumstances place beside him, not as controllers but as subordinates, a body representative of the superior caste, which by its objections and ques-

whom

and by its occasional outbreaks of keeps alive habits of collective resistance, and may admit of being, in time and by degrees, expanded into a really national repretionings, spirit,

sentation (which is in substance the history of the English Parliament), the nation has then the most favourable prospects of improvement which can well occur to a community thus cir-

cumstanced and

Among

the tendencies which, without absopeople unfit for representa-

tive government, seriously incapacitate them from reaping the full benefit of it, one deserves particular notice. There are two states of the inclinations, intrinsically very different, but which have something in common, by virtue

which they often coincide

in the direction

they give to the efforts of individuals nations: one is, the desire to exercise

over others; the other

is

and of power

disinclination to have

power exercised over themselves. The difference between different portions of mankind in the relative strength of these two dispositions is one of the most important elements in their history. There are nations in whom the passion tor governing others is so nuich stronger than the desire of personal in-

dependence, that for the

mere shadow of the

one they are found ready of the otlier. Each one of

to sacrifice the wliolc

ing,

the

their

number

like the private soldier in

alnlicate his personal

hands of

is

will-

an army,

to

freedom of action into provided the army is

his general,

the taste of such a people. In their eyes the possessors of authority can hardly take too

much upon ity itself is

themselves, provided the author-

open

to general competition.

An

average individual among them prefers the chance, however distant or improbable, of wielding some share of power over his fellowcitizens, above the certainty, to himself and others, of having no unnecessary power exercised over them. These are the elements of a people of place-hunters; in whom the course is mainly determined by place-huntwhere equality alone is cared for, but not liberty; where the contests of political parties are but struggles to decide whether the power of meddling in everything shall belong to one class or another, perhaps merely to one knot of public men or another; where the idea entertained of democracy is merely that of open-

of politics ing;

ing

offices to

the competition of

of a few; where, the

all

more popular

instead

the insti-

more innumerable are the places the more monstrous the over-government exercised by all over each, and by the executive over all. It would be as unjust as it would be ungenerous to offer this, or anything tutions, the

created,

constituted.

lutely rendering a

of

triumphant and victorious, and he is able to flatter himself that he is one of a conquering host, though the notion that he has himself any share in the domination exercised over the conquered is an illusion. A government strictly limited in its powers and attributions, required to hold its hands from over-meddling, and to let most things go on without its assuming the part of guardian or director, is not to

and

approaching to it, as an unexaggerated picture of the French people; yet the degree in which they do participate in this type of character

has caused representative government by a limited class to break down by excess of corruption, and the attempt at representative

government by the whole male population to end in giving one man the power of consigning any numijcr of the rest, without trial, to Lambessa or Cayenne, provided he allows all of them to think themselves not excluded from the possibility of sharing his favours. I'he point of character which, beyond any other, fits the people of this country for representative

government

is

that they have almost

universally the contrary characteristic. They are very jealous of any attempt to exercise

power over them not sanctioned by long usage and by their own opinion of right; but they in general care very er over others.

little

for the exercise of

Not having

pow-

the smallest sym-

I

ITS

PROPER FUNCTIONS

pathy with the passion for governing, while mothey are but too well acquainted with the tives of private interest

from which that

office

sought, they prefer that it should be performed by those to whom it comes without seeking, as a consequence of social position. If

is

foreigners understood this, it would account to them for some of the apparent contradictions in the political feelings of Englishmen; their unhesitating readiness to let themselves be governed by the higher classes, coupled with no so little personal subservience to them, that people are so fond of resisting authority when limits, or so it oversteps certain prescribed

determined

to

make

their rulers always

remem-

ber that they will only be governed in the way they themselves like best. Place-hunting, accordingly,

is

a

form of ambition

to

which the

considered nationally, are almost strangers. If we except the few families or conEnglish,

nections of whom official employment lies directly in the way, Englishmen's views of advancement in life take an altogether different direction— that of success in business, or in a

They have the strongest distaste any mere struggle for office by political parties or individuals: and there are few things to which they have a greater aversion than to the multiplication of pubhc employments: a thing, on the contrary, always popular with profession. for

the bureaucracy-ridden nations of the Continent, who would rather pay higher taxes than diminish by the smallest fraction their individual chances of a place for themselves or their relatives,

and among

whom

a cry for re-

trenchment never means abolition of offices, but the reduction of the salaries of those which are too considerable for the ordinary citizen to have any chance of being appointed to them.

355

must reside somewhere. This ultimate poAver they must possess in all its completeness. They must be masters, whenever they please, of all the operations of government. There is no need that the constitutional law should itself give them this mastery. It does not in the British

does give practically of final control balanced as essentially single, in a mixed and

Constitution. But what

amounts is

to this.

it

The power

government, as in a pure monarchy or democracy. This is the portion of truth in the opinion of the ancients, revived by great authorconstiities in our own time, that a balanced

There is almost always but the scales never hang exactly even. Which of them preponderates is not always apparent on the face of the political institutions. In the British Constitution, each tution

impossible.

is

a balance,

of the three co-ordinate

members

of the sov-

invested with powers which, if fully exercised, would enable it to stop all the ma-

ereignty

is

chinery of government. Nominally, therefore, each is invested with equal power of thwarthig and obstructing the others: and if, by exerting to that power, any of the three could hope hubetter its position, the ordinary course of

doubt that the power There can be no question be emthat the full powers of each would ployed defensively if it found itself assailed

man

affairs forbids us to

would be

exercised.

by one or both of the others. What then preagvents the same powers from being exerted Congressively? The unwritten maxims of the stitution-in other words, the positive political morality of the country: and this positive politif we ical morality is what we must look to, in whom the really supreme power in the Constitution resides. By constitutional law, the Crown can refuse

would know

assent to any Act of Parliament, and can appoint to office and maintain in it any Minin opposition to the remonstrances of its

ter Chaptt 5 Of the Proper Functions

ister,

of

Representative Bodies In treating of representative government, it disis above all necessary to keep in view the tinction between its idea or essence, and the particular forms in which the idea has been clothed by accidental historical developments, or by the notions current at some particular

period. of representative government numerous is, that the whole people, or some portion of them, exercise through deputies periodically elected by themselves the ultimate con-

The meaning

trolling power, which, in every constitution,

Parliament. But the constitutional moraUty preventof the country nullifies these powers, by reand, used; ever being from them ing quiring that the head of the Administration should always be virtually appointed by the

House

of

Commons, makes

that

body the

real

sovereign of the State. These unwritten rules, which limit the use of lawful powers, are, however, only effectual, and maintain themselves in existence, on condition of harmonisingwith the actual distribution of real political strength. There is in every constitution a strongest pow-

er—one which would gain the victory if the compromises by which the Constitution habit-

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

356

ually works were suspended and there came a of strength. Constitutional maxims are adhered to, and are practically operative, so trial

long as thev give the predominance in the Constitution to that one of the powers which has the preponderance of active power out of doors. This, in England, is the popular power.

government. Btit in order to determine through this general control may most expediently be exercised, and what portion of

what channel

the business of

government the representative

thus a

assembly shotdd hold in its own hands, it is necessary to consider what kinds of business a numerous body is competent to perform properly. That alone which it can do well it ought to take personally upon itself. With regard to the rest, its proper province is not to do it, but to take means for having it well done by others. For example, the duty which is considered as belonging more pectiliarly than any other to an assembly representative of the people, is that of voting the taxes. Nevertheless, in no country does the representative body undertake, by itself or its delegated officers, to prepare the estimates. Though the supplies can only be voted by the House of Commons, and

representative government in the correct sense of the term: and the powers which it leaves in hands not directly accountable to the people

quired for the appropriation of the revenues to the different items of the public expend-

If,

therefore, the legal provisions of the British

Constitution, together with theunwritten maxims bv which the conduct of the different political authorities is in fact regulated, did not give to the popular element in the Constitution that substantial supremacy over every de-

partment of the government which corresponds to its real power in the country, the Constitution would not possess the stability which characterises it; either the laws or the unwritten maxims would soon have to be changed.

The

British

government

is

can only be considered as precautions which the ruling power is willing should be taken against its own errors. Such precautions have existed in all well-constructed democracies. ThcAthenian Constitution had many such pro-

and so has that of the United States. But while it is essential to representative government that the practical supremacy in visions;

the state should reside in the representatives

an open question what actual functions, what precise part in the machinery of government, shall be directly and personally discharged by the representative liody. Great varieties in this respect are comof the people,

it is

patible with the essence of representative government, provided the functions are such as

secure to the representative body the control of everything in the last resort.

There trf>lling

tually

is

it.

it is

do everything; and

in

many

cases

its

con-

over everything will be more perfect the less it personally attempts to do. The commander of an army could not direct its movements effciiually if he himself fought in the ranks, or led an assault. It is the same with bodies of men. Some things catuiot be done except by bodies; other things cannot be well

done by them. It is f)ne (juestion, iherelorc, what a popular assembly should coturol, another what it should itself do. It should, as we have already seen, control

all

the operations of

maxim and the uniform practice money can be granted

plans and calculations on which the disbursements are grounded. Parliament, accordingly,

not expected, nor even permitted, to originate directly either taxation or expenditure. All it is asked for is its consent, and the sole is

power

The

it

possesses

lowed

is

that of refusal.

principles which are involved

ognised in

and

this constitutional doctrine,

as far as they will go, are a

limitation

and

it

is

guide to the

definition of the general func-

admitted in

all

the representative system that

rec-

if fol-

tions of representative assemblies. In the

stood,

trol

also re-

only on the proposition of the Crown. It has, no doubt, been felt, that moderation as to the amoufit, and care and judgment in the detail of its application, can only be expected when the executive go\ernment, through whose hands it is to pass, is made responsible for the

cannot pos-

Ijut

the

is

of the Constitution that

place,

be able to control everything, siljly

iture,

between congovernment and acThe same person or body may

a radical distinction

the business of

doing

though the sanction of the House

first

countries in which

is

practically under-

numerous representative bodies

ought not to administer. The maxim isgroundcd not only on the most essential principles of good government, but on those of the successful conduct of business of any description. No body of men, unless organised and under command, is fit for action, in the proper sense. Even a select board, composed of few members,

and these

specially conversant with the

is always an inferior instrument to some one individual who could be found among them, and would be impro\ ed in character if that one person were made the

l)usiness to be done,

ITS

PROPER FUNCTIONS

subordichief, and all the others reduced to than body a by better done be nates. What can is by any individual is deliberation. When it and hearing secure to important necessary or

consideration to

manv

deliberative body

is

conflicting opinions, a

indispensable.

Those bod-

therefore, are frequently useful, even for administrative business, but in general only ies,

rule, betas advisers; such business being, as a

conducted under the responsibility of one.

ter

Even

company has always in pracmanaging director; its bad management depends essentially

a joint-stock,

tice, if

not in theory, a

good or on some one person's qualifications, and the remaining directors, when of any use, are so power by their suggestions to him, or by the restraining they possess of watching him, and That or removing him in case of misconduct.

him in a conbut advantage, no the management siderable set-off against any good which they the are capable of doing: it weakens greatly other sense in his own mind, and in those of they are ostensibly equal shares with is

in people, of that individual responsibility which he should stand forth personally and

But

a

popular assembly

is still less

fitted to

who Even when

administer, or to dictate in detail to those

have the charge of administration. honestly meant, the interference is almost always injurious. Every branch of public administration is a skilled business, which has

own peculiar principles and traditional many of them not even knoAvn, in any effectual way, except to those who have at some its

rules,

time had a hand in carrying on the business, and none of them likely to be duly appreciated by persons not practically acquainted with the department. I do not mean that the transaction of public business has esoteric mysinitiated. teries, only to be understood by the

any perIts principles are all intelligible to son of good sense, who has in his mind a true picture of the circumstances and conditions to be dealt with: but to have this he must know those circumstances and conditions; and the

knowledge does not come by intuition. There in are many rules of the greatest importance every branch of public business (as there are a perin every private occupation), of which son fresh to the subject neither knows the reason or even suspects the existence, because they are intended to meet dangers or provide against

inconveniences which never entered into his thoughts. I have known public men, ministers, of

their

first

brought to light by themselves, something which was probably the first thought of everybody who ever looked at the subject, given up as soon as he had got on to a second. It is true that a great statesman is he who knows when to depart from traditions, as well as when to adhere to them. But it is a great mistake to suppose that he will do this better for being ignorant of the traditions. No one who does not thoroughly know the modes of action which common experience has sanctioned is capable of judging of the circumstances which require

from those ordinary modes of acdependent on the acts done by a public department, the consequences liable to follow from any particular mode of conducting it, require for weighing and estimating them a kind of knowledge, and of specially exercised judgment, almost as rarely found in those not bred to it, as the capacity to reform

a departure tion.

The

more than ordinary natural

capacity,

who

interests

the law in those

studied

undividedly.

357

introduction to a department of business new to them, have excited the mirth of their inferiors by the air with which they announced as a truth hitherto set at nought, and

on

who have not

professionally

it.

All these difficulties are sure to be ignored a representative assembly which attempts to decide on special acts of administration. At

by

judgment its best, it is inexperience sitting in on experience, ignorance on knowledge: ignorance which never suspecting the existence of what it does not know, is equally careless and supercilious, making light of, if not resenting, all pretensions to have a judgment better worth attending to than its own. Thus motives intervene: is when no interested but when they do, the result is jobbery more unblushing and audacious than the worst corruption which can well take place in a public it

office

under

a

government of

publicity. It

is

not necessary that the interested bias should extend to the majority of the assembly. In any particular case it is often enough that it affects two or three of their number. Those two or three will have a greater interest in misleading the body, than any other of its members are likely to have in putting of the assembly

may keep

but they cannot keep their their

The bulk hands clean, minds vigilant or it

right.

their

judgments discerning in matters they about; and an indolent major-

know nothing

the like an indolent individual, belongs to person who takes most pains with it. The bad measures or bad appointments of a minister may be checked by Parliament; and the inity,

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

358

terest of ministers in defending, and of rival partisans in attacking, secures a tolerably equal discussion: but quis custodiet custodes? who

ister

Parliament? A minister, a head of an office, feels himself under some responsibility. An assembly in such cases feels under no responsibility at all: for when did any member of Parliament lose his seat for the vote he gave on anv detail of administration? To a minister, or the head of an office, it is of more importance what will be thought of his proceedings some time hence than what is thought of them at the instant: but an assembly, if the cry of the moment goes with it. however hastily raised or artificially stirred up, thinks itself and is thought by everybody to be completely exculpated however disastrous may be the consequences. Besides, an assembly never personally experiences the inconveniences of its bad measures until they have reached the dimensions of national evils. Ministers and administrators see them approaching, and have to bear all the annoyance and trouble of attempting

dividuals for special duties can onlv be recog-

shall check the

to

ward them

off.

The proper duty

of a representative assem-

bly in regard to matters of administration is not to decide them by its own vote, but to take

who have to decide them proper persons. Even this they cannot advantageously do by nominating the individuals. There is no act which more imperatively requires to be performed under a strong sense of individual responsibility than the nomination to employments. The experience of every person conversant with public affairs bears out the assertion, that there is scarcely any act respecting which the conscience of an average man is less sensitive; scarcely any case in which less consideration is paid to qualifications, partly because men do not know, and partly because they do not care for, the difference in qualifications between one person and another. When a minister makes what is meant to be an honest aj)pointment, that is when he does not actually job it for his personal connections or his party, an ignorant person might suppose that he would try to give it to the person best cjualified. No such thing. An ordinary minister thinks himself a miracle f)f virtue if he gives it t(» a person of meiit, or who has a claim on the |)ul»li( on any account, though the claim or llu- merit may be ol the most opposite description tcj that required. // fallail un caUulateur, ce jut uu care that the persons

shall be the

is hardly more of a caricature than in the days of Figaro; and the min-

(lanscur qui I'obtint,

less

doubtless thinks himself not only blamebut meritorious if the man dances well.

Besides, the qualifications which

nised by those

who make

it

who know

fit

special in-

the individuals, or

their business to

examine and

judge of persons from what they have done, or from the evidence of those who are in a position to judge.

When

gations are so

little

these conscientious obli-

regarded by great public

who can be made responsible ior their appointments, how must it be with assemblies who cannot? Even now. the worst appointofficers

ments are those which are made for the sake of gaining support or disarming opposition in the representative body:

what might we

ex-

they were made by the body itself? Numerous bodies never regard special qualifipect

if

Unless a man is fit for the galthought to be about as fit as other people for almost anything for which he can offer himself as a candidate. When appointments made by a public body are not decided, as they almost always are, by party connection or private jobbing, a man is appointed either because he has a reputation, c:)ftcn quite undeserved, for general ability, or frequently for no better reason than that he is personally popular. It has never been thought desirable that Parliament should itself nominate even the members of a Cabinet. It is enough that it virtually decides who shall be prime minister, or who shall be the two or three individuals from whom the prime minister shall be chosen. In doing this it merely recognises the fact that a certain person is the candidate of the party cations at lows, he

all.

is

whose general policy commands its support. In reality, the only thing which Parliament decides is, which of two, or at most three, parties or bodies of men. shall furnish the executive government: the opinion of the parly itself decides which of its mcmljcrs is fittest to be placed at the head. According to the existing practice of the British

Constitution, tluse things

be on as gocxl a footing as they can be. Parliament does not nominate any minister, but the Crown appoints the head of the administration in confonnity to thegeneral wishes and inclinations manifested by Parliament, and the oilier ministers on the reconnnendation of the chiel; while every minister has the undividc-d moral responsibility of .q)poiiuing fit persons to the other offices of administration which are not permanent. In a republic, some other arrangement would be necessary: but

seem

to

die nearer

it

approached in practice

to that

ITS

PROPER FUNCTIONS

which has long existed in England, the more Either, as in likely it would be to work well. the Execuof head the the American republic, entirely tive must be elected by some agency independent of the representative body; or the body must content itself with naming the prime minister, and making him responsible for the choice of his associates and at least nates. To all these considerations, general astheoretically, I fully anticipate a

subordi-

is strong sent: though, practically, the tendency interfere more and in representative bodies to more in the details of administration, by vir-

whoever has the tue of the general law, that tempted to more and more is strongest power make an excessive use of it; and this is one of futurity of the practical dangers to which the representative governments will be exposed. But it is equally true, though only of late and slowly beginning to be acknowledged, that fitted for the dia numerous assembly is as little business of legislation as for that of adminrect

hardly any kind of intelistration. There be done, lectual work which so much needs to minds, exercised and experienced not only by minds trained to the task through long is

but by

and laborious study, as the business of makwere there ing laws. This is a sufficient reason, made but well be never can no other, why they by a committee of very few persons.

A

reason

that every provision of a no less conclusive most aclaw requires to be framed with the its effect of perception long-sighted curate and is,

the other provisions; and the law when made should be capable of fitting into a conexisting laws. sistent whole with the previously

on

all

359

from session to session through sheer impossibility of finding time to dispose of it. It matters not though the Bill may have been deliberately drawn up by the authority deemed the best qualified, with all appliances and means to boot; or by a select commission, chosen for their conversancy with the subject,

and hav-

ing employed years in considering and digesting the particular measure; it cannot be passed, because the House of Commons will not forego the precious privilege of tinkering it with their clumsy hands. The custom has of late been to some extent introduced, when the principle of a Bill has

been affirmed on the second reading,

of referring

it

for consideration in detail to a

Committee: but

Select

it

has not been found

that this practice causes much less time to be lost afterwards in carrying it through the Committee of the whole House: the opinions or

private crotchets which have been overruled by knowledge always insist on giving them-

chance before the tribunal of ignorance. Indeed, the practice itself has been adopted principally by the House of Lords, the members of which are less busy and fond of meddling, and less jealous of the importance of their individual voices, than those of the

selves a second

elective

And when

House.

a Bill of

many

clauses does succeed in getting itself discussed in detail, what can depict the state in which it

comes out of Committee! Clauses omitted which are essential to the working of the rest; incongruous ones inserted to conciliate some private interest, or some crotchety member

who in

threatens to delay the Bill; articles foicted sciolist with a mere

on the motion of some

impossible that these conditions should voted be in any degree fulfilled when laws are assembly. miscellaneous a in clause by clause

smattering of the subject, leading to consequences which the member who introduced or those who supported the Bill did not at the

incongruity of such a mode of legislating would strike all minds, were it not that our laws are already, as to form and construction,

ing Act in the next session to correct their mis-

It

is

The

such a chaos, that the confusion and contradiction seem incapable of being made greater

by any addition to the mass. Yet even now, the utter unfitness of our legmaking islative machinery for its purpose is felt every year more and time necessarily occupied in getting through Bills renders Parliament more and more incapable of passing any, except on itself

practically

more. The mere

detached and narrow points. If a Bill is prepared which even attempts to deal with the whole of any subject (and it is impossible to legislate properly on any part without having the whole present to the mind), it hangs over

moment

foresee,

and which need an amend-

chiefs. It is one of the evils of the present mode of managing these things that the explaining and defending of a Bill, and of its various provi-

person is scarcely ever performed by the from whose mind they emanated, who probably has not a seat in the House. Their defence rests upon some minister or member of Parliament who did not frame them, who is dependent on cramming for all his arguments but those which are perfectly obvious, who

sions,

does not

know

the full strength of his case, nor

the best reasons by which to support it, and is wholly incapable of meeting unforeseen objections.

This

evil, as far as

Government

bills

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

36o

are concerned, admits of remedy, and has been remedied in some representative constitutions,

by allowing the Government to be represented House by persons in its confidence, having a right to speak, though not to vote. If that, as yet considerable, majority of the House of Commons who never desire to move an amendment or make a speech would no

in either

longer leave the whole regulation of business to those who do; if they would bethink themselves that better qualifications for legislation

and may be found if sought for, than a and the faculty of getting elected constituency: it would soon be recognised

exist,

fluent tongue

by a

that, in legislation as well as administration,

the only task to

which a representative assemcompetent is not that of

bly can possibly be

doing the work, but of causing it to be done; whom or to what sort of people it shall be confided, and giving or withholding the national sanction to it when performed. Any government fit for a high state of civilisation would have as one of its fundamental elements a small body, not exceeding

of determining to

number the members of a Cabinet, who should act as a Commission of legislation, havin

ing tor its appointed office to make the laws. the laws of this country were, as surely they will soon be, revised and put into a connected If

form, the Commission of Codification by which this is effected should remain as a permanent institution, to watch over the work, protect it

from deterioration, and make further improvements as often as required. No one would wish that this body should of itself have any power of enacting laws: the Commission would only embody the element of intelligence in their construction: Parliament would represent that of will. No measure would become a law until expressly sanctioned by Parliament:

and Parliament, or either House, would have the power not only of rejecting but of sending back a Bill to the Commission for reconsideration or improvement. Either House might also exercise its initiative, by referring any subject to the Commission, with directions to prepare a law. The Commission, of course, would have no power of refusing its instrumentality to any legislation which the country desired. Instructions, concurred in by both louses, to draw up a Bill which should eflect a particular |)urpose, would be imperative on the Conunissioners, unI

they preferred to resign their office. Once framed, however, Parliament should have no power to alter the measure, but solely to pass or reject it; or, if partially disapproved of, reless

mit

it

to the

Commission

for reconsideration.

The Commissioners

should be appointed by the Crown, but should hold their offices for a time certain, say five years, unless removed on an address from the two Houses of Parliament, grounded either on personal misconduct (as in the case of judges), or a Bill in

obedience

on

to the

refusal to

demands

draw up

of Parlia-

ment. At the expiration of the five vears a member should cease to hold office unless reappointed, in order to provide a convenient mode of getting rid of those who had not been found equal to their duties, and of infusing new and younger blood into the body. The necessity of some provision corresponding to this was felt even in the .Athenian Democracy, where, in the time of its most complete ascendancy, the popular Ecclesia could pass Psephisins (mostly decrees on single matters of policy), but laws, so called, could onlv be made or altered by a different and less numerous body, renewed annually, called the Nomothetae, whose duty it also was to revise the whole of the laws, and keep them consistent with one another. In the English Constitution there is great difficulty in introducing any arrangement which is new both in form and in substance, but comparatively little repugnance is felt to the attainment of new purposes by an adaptation of existing forms and traditions. It appears to me that the means might be devised of enriching the Constitution with this great improvement through the machinery of the House of Lords. .A Conmiission for preparing Bills would in itself be no more an innovation on the Constitution than the Board for the administration of the Poor Laws, or the Inclosure Commission. If, in consideration of the great importance and dignity of the trust, it were made a rule that every person

appointed

a

member

mission, unless dress

of the Legislative

removed from

office

Com-

on an ad-

from Parliament, should be a Peer for probable that the same good sense and which leave the judicial functions of the

life, it is

taste

Peerage practically to the exclusive care of the law lords, would leave the business of legislation, except on questions involving political principles

and

interests,

to

the professional

legislators; that Bills originating in the

I'pper

House would always be drawn up by them; that the Ciovcrnmcnt would dcNolvc on them the framing of all its Bills; and that private members of the House of Commons would gradually find it convenient, and likely to facilitate the passing of their

measures through

ITS the two Houses,

i£

and submitting

it

PROPER FUNCTIONS

instead of bringing in a Bill directly to the House, they

it and have it referred to the Legislative Commission. For it would, of course, be open to the House to refer for the consideration of that body not a subject merely, but any specific proposal, or a Draft of a Bill in extenso, when any member thought himself capable of preparing one such

obtained leave to introduce

pass; and the House would doubtevery such draft to the Commission, the if only as materials, and for the benefit of suggestions it might contain: as they would, in like manner, refer every amendment or objec-

as

I

ought to

less refer

tion which might be proposed in writing by any member of the House after a measure had left

the Commissioners' hands. The alteration by a Committee of the whole House

of Bills

not by formal abolition, but by desuetude; the right not being abandoned, but laid up in the same armoury with the royal veto, the right of withholding the supplies, and other

would

cease,

ancient instruments of political warfare, which

no one

desires to see used, but

part with, to

be

lest

they should at any time be found

needed

still

no one

likes to

in

an extraordinary emer-

gency. By such arrangements as these, legislation would assume its proper place as a work of skilled labour and special study and experience; while the

most important liberty of the

nation, that of being governed only by laws assented to byits elected representatives, would

and made more valuable be by being detached from the serious, but by no means unavoidable, drawbacks which now accompany it in the form of ignorant and illfully preserved,

considered legislation. Instead of the function of governing, for

which

it is

radically unfit, the proper office of

watch and conthrow the light of lo compel a full exposiof all of them which any

a representative assembly trol the government: to

publicity tion

and

on

its acts:

justification

is

to

one considers questionable; to censure them if found condemnable, and, if the men who compose the government abuse their trust, or fulwith the defil it in a manner which conflicts liberate sense of the nation, to expel them from office, and either expressly or virtually

appoint their successors. This is surely ample power, and security enough for the liberty of the nation. In addition to this, the Parliament has an office, not inferior even to this in importance; to be at once the nation's Committee of Grievances, and its Congress of Opinions; an arena in which not only the general

361

opinion of the nation, but that of every section of it, and as far as possible of every eminent individual itself in full

whom

light

it

contains, can produce

and challenge

discussion;

where every person in the country may count upon finding somebody who speaks his mind, as well or better than he could speak it himself—not to friends and partisans exclusively, but in the face of opponents, to be tested by adverse controversy; where those whose opinion

overruled, feel satisfied that it is heard, act of will, but for

is

and set aside not by a mere what are thought superior

reasons,

and com-

themselves as such to the representatives of the majority of the nation; where every party or opinion in the country can muster its strength, and be cured of any illusion concerning the number or power of its adherents;

mend

where the opinion which prevails in the nation makes itself manifest as prevailing, and marshals its hosts in the presence of the government, which is thus enabled and compelled to give

way

to

it

on the mere manifestation,

without the actual employment, of its strength; where statesmen can assure themselves, far more certainly than by any other signs, what elements of opinion and power are growing, and what declining, and are enabled to shape their measures with some regard not solely to present exigencies, but to tendencies in progress.

Representative assemblies are often taunted by their enemies with being places of mere been talk and bavardnge. There has seldom

more misplaced

derision.

I

know

not

how

a

more usefully emwhen the subject of

representative assembly can

ploy talk try,

itself

than in

talk,

the great public interests of the counand every sentence of it represents the is

opinion either of some important body of perwhom sons in the nation, or of an individual in some such body have reposed their confidence. A place where every interest and shade of opinion in the country can have its cause even passionately pleaded, in the face of the government and of all other interests and opincan compel them to listen, and either ions,

comply, or state clearly why they do not, is in purpose, one of itself, if it answered no other that institutions political important most the can exist anywhere, and one of the foremost "talking" benefits of free government. Such would never be looked upon with disparagement if it were not allowed to stop "doing":

which it never would, if assemblies knew and acknowledged that talking and discussion are

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

362

purposes that regard such an inquiry forms an essential part of the present treatise; but many reasons require its postponement, until we have considered the most proper composition of the great representative body, destined to control as sovereign the enactment of laws and the administration of the general affairs of the

their

which ought

sult of discussion,

only

proper business, while doing, as the reis the task not of a miscellaneous body, but of individuals specially trained to it: that the fit office of an assembly is

to see that those individuals are honestly and intelligently chosen, and tointerfereno further

with them, except by unlimited latitude of suggestion and criticism, and by applying or withholding the final seal of national assent. It is for want of this judicious reserve that popular assemblies attempt to do what they cannot do well— to govern and legislate— and provide no machinery but their own for much of it, when of course every hour spent in talk

an hour withdrawn from actual business. But the very fact which most unfits such bodies for a Council of Legislation qualifies them the more for their other office— namely,

to exist for

localities.

And

nation.

Chapti ler Of

the Infirmities

6

and Dangers

to

which Representative Govern-

ment

is

Liable

is

that they are not a selection of the greatest political

minds

in the country,

from whose

opinions little could with certainty be inferred concerning those of the nation, but are, when properly constituted, a fair sample of every grade of intellect among the people which is at all entitled to a voice in public afEairs. Their part is to indicate wants, to be an organ for popular demands, and a place of adverse discussion for all opinions relating to public matters, both great and small; and, along with this, to check by criticism, and eventually by withdrawing their support, those high public officers who really conduct the public business, or who appoint those by whom it is conducted. Nothing but the restriction of the function of representative bodies within these rational limits will enable the benefits of popular control to be enjoyed in conjunction with the no less important requisites (growing ever more important as human affairs increase in scale and in complexity) of skilled legislation and ad-

There are no means of combining these benefits except by separating the functions which guarantee the one from those which essentially require the other; by dis-

ministration.

office of control and criticism from the actual conduct of affairs, and devolving the fcjrmer on the representatives of the Many,

joining the

while securing for the

latter,

under

strict re-

sponsibility to the nation, the acquired knowledge and practised intelligc-nce of a specially

trained and experienced Few. The preceding discussion of the functicjns

on the sovereign representative assembly of the nation would require to be followed by an inquiry into those properly vested in the minor representative bodies, which ought

to devolve

The

defects of any form of government

may

be either negative or positive. It is negatively defective if it does not concentrate in the

hands of the authorities power sufficient to fulfil the necessary offices of a government; or if it does not sufficiently develop by exercise the active capacities and social feelings of the individual citizens. is it

necessary that

On

neither of these points

much should be

said at this

stage of our inquiry.

The want of an amount of power in the government, adequate to preserve order and allow of progress in the people, is incident rather to a wild and rude state of society generally, than to any particular form of political union. When the people are too much attached to savage independence to be tolerant of the amount of power to which it is for their good that they should be subject, the state of society (as already observecl) is not yet ripe for representative government. When the time for that government has

arrived, sufficient

power

for all

needful purposes is sure to reside in the sovereign assembly; and if enough of it is not entrusted to the executive, this can only arise from a jealous feeling on the part of the assembly towards the administration, never likely

where the constitutional power of the assembly to turn them out of office has not yet sufficientlv established itself. Wherever that constitutional right is admitted in principle, to exist but

and

fully operative in practice, there

is

no

fear

that the assembly will not be willing to trust its own ministers with any amount of power

danger

really desiral)le; the lest

and

is,

on the contrary,

they should grant it too ungrudgingly, 100 indefinite in extent, since ihe power

is the power of the body who make and who keep him so. It is, however, very likely, and is one of the dangers of a control-

of the minister

ling assembly, that

it

may be

lavish of powers,

INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS but afterwards interfere with their exercise; may give power by wholesale, and take it back in detail, by multiplied single acts of interference in the business of administration. The actual evils arising from this assumption of the

Heu

of that of criti-

function of governing, in and checking those who govern, have been sufficiently dwelt upon in the preceding chapter. No safeguard can in the nature of

cising

things be provided against this improper meddling, except a strong and general conviction of its injurious character. The other negative defect which may reside in a government, that of not bringing into sufficient exercise the individual faculties, moral, intellectual, and active, of the people, has been

exhibited generally in setting forth the distincone tive mischiefs of despotism. As between the another, and government popular of form

advantage in this respect lies with that which most widely diffuses the exercise of public functions; on the one hand, by excluding fewopening est from the suffrage; on the other, by to all classes of private citizens, so far as

is

consistent with other equally important obof jects, the widest participation in the details judicial

and administrative

business;

as

by

admission to municipal offices, and by the utmost possible publicity and all above liberty of discussion, whereby not merely a few individuals in succession, but the whole pub-

jury

trial,

are made, to a certain extent, participants instrucin the government, and sharers in the tion and mental exercise derivable from it.

lic,

further illustration of these benefits, as well as of the Umitations under which they must be aimed at, will be better deferred until we come to speak of the details of administra-

The

tion.

The

positive evils

and dangers

of the repre-

sentative, as of every other form of government, may be reduced to two heads: first, gen-

and incapacity, or, more moderately, insufficient mental

eral ignorance

to speak qualifica-

body; secondly, the being under the influence of innot identical with the general welfare

tions, in the controlling

danger of terests

its

of the community. The former of these

evils, deficiency in high mental qualifications, is one to which it is generally supposed that popular government is liable in a greater degree than any other. The energy of a monarch, the steadiness and prudence of an aristocracy, are thought to contrast

most favourably with the vacillation and shortsightedness of even a qualified democracy.

These means

363

propositions, however, are not by any so well founded as they at first sight ap-

pear.

Compared with simple monarchy, ative

government

is

represent-

in these respects at

no

dis-

rude age, hereditary monarchy, when it is really such, and not aristocracy in disguise, far surpasses democracy in all the forms of incapacity supposed to be characteristic of the last. I say, except in a rude age, because in a really rude state of society there is a considerable guarantee for the

advantage. Except in

intellectual

and

a

active capacities of the sov-

ereign. His personal will is constantly encountering obstacles from the wilfulness of his subtheir jects, and of powerful individuals among

number. The circumstances of

society

do not

him much temptation to mere luxurious self-indulgence; mental and bodily activity, especially political and military, are his principal excitements; and among turbulent chiefs and lawless followers he has little authority, and is seldom long secure even of his throne, unless he possesses a considerable amount of personal daring, dexterity, and energy. The reason why the average of talent is so high among the Henries and Edwards of our history may be read in the tragical fate of the second Edward and the second Richard, and the civil wars and disturbances of the reigns of John and his incapable successor. The troubled pe-

afford

riod of the Reformation also produced several eminent hereditary monarchs, Elizabeth, Henri Quatre, Gustavus Adolphus; but they

were mostly bred up in adversity, succeeded to the throne by the unexpected failure of nearer heirs, or had to contend with great difficulties in the

commencement

European

life

of their reign. Since settled aspect, any-

assumed a

thing above mediocrity in an hereditary king has become extremely rare, while the general average has been even below mediocrity, both in talent and in vigour of character. A monarchy constitutionally absolute now only maintains itself in existence (except temporarily usurper) in the hands of some active-minded

through the mental qualifications of a permanent bureaucracy. The Russian and Austrian Governments, and even the French Govern-

ment of

in

its

officials,

normal condition, are oligarchies whom the head of the State does

of

more than select the chiefs. I am speaking of the regular course of their administradetion; for the will of the master of course

little

many of their particular acts. The governments which have been remark-

termines

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

364

able in history for sustained mental ability and vigour in the conduct of affairs have generally been aristocracies. But they have been, without any exception, aristocracies of public functionaries. The ruling bodies have been so narrow, that each member, or at least each influential member, of the body, was able to

make, and did make, public business an active profession, and the principal occupation of his life. The only aristocracies which have manifested high governing capacities, and acted on steady maxims of policy, through many generations, are those of

Rome and

Venice.

But. at Venice, though the privileged order was numerous, the actual management of affairs was rigidlv concentrated in a small oli-

garchy within the oligarchy, whose whole lives were devoted to the study and conduct of the affairs of the state.

The Roman government

partook more of the character of an open aristocracy like our own. But the really governing body, the Senate, was in general exclusively composed of persons who had exercised public

functions,

and had

were looking forward

either already filled or to

fill

the higher offices

of the state, at the peril of a severe responsibility in case of incapacity and failure. When once

members

of the Senate, their lives were pledged

conduct of public affairs; they were not permitted even to leave Italy except in the discharge of some public trust; and unless turned out of the Senate by the censors for character or conduct deemed disgraceful, they retained to the

powers and responsibilities to the end of life. In an aristocracy thus constituted, every member felt his personal importance entirely their

bound up with the dignity and estimation of thecommonwealth which he administered, and with the part he was able to play in its councils. This dignity and estimation were quite different things from the prosperity or happiness of the general body of the citizens, and were often wholly incompatible with it. But they

were closely linked with the external success and aggrandisement of the State: and it was, consecjuently, in the pursuit of that object almost cxrlusivcly that either the Roman or the

Venetian aristocracies manifested the systematically wise collective policy,

and

the great in-

dividual capacities for government, for which history has deservedly given them credit. It thus appears that the only governments, not representative, in which high political skill ;ind ability have been otlier than exceptional, wlietlur under monarchical or aristocratic

forms.havcljeen essentially bureaucracies. The

work of government has been in the hands of governors by profession; which is the essence and meaning of bureaucracy. Whether the work is done by them because they have been trained to it, or they are trained to it because it is to be done by them, makes a great difference in many respects, but none at all as to the essential character of the rule. Aristocraon the other hand, like that of England, in

cies,

which the

class

who

possessed the

power

de-

merely from their social position, without being specially trained or devoting themselves exclusively to it (and in which, therefore, the power was not exercised directly, but through representative institutions oligarchically constituted) have been, in respect to intellectual endowments, much on a par with democracies; that is, they have manifested such qualities in any considerable degree only during the temporary ascendancy which great and popular talents, united with a distinguished position, have given to some one man. Therived

it

mistocles

and

Pericles,

Washington and

Jeffer-

were not more completely exceptions in their sexeral democracies, and were assuredly much more splendid exceptions, than the

son,

Chathams and

Peels of the representative aris-

tocracy of Great Britain, or even the SuUys and Colberts of the aristocratic monarchy of France.

A

great minister, in the aristocratic governis almost as rare a

ments of modern Europe,

phenomenon as a great king. The comparison, therefore,

as to the intel-

government, has to be made between a representative democracy and a bureaucracy; all other governments may be left out of the account. And here it must be lectual attributes of a

acknowledged that a bureaucratic government has, in some important respects, greatly the advantage.

It

accumulates experience, acquires

maxand makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs. But it is not equally favour-

well-tried andwell-considered traditional ims,

individual energy of mind. The disease bureaucratic governments, and whic h they iiMialiy die of, is routine. They perish by the inunutability of their maxims; and, still more, by the universal law that whatever

al)le to

which

afliicts

becomes a routine loses its vital principle, and having no longer a mind acting within it, goes on revolving mechanically though the work it is iniendecl to do remains undone. A burcaucracy always tends to l)ecome a pedantocracy. When the i)ureaucracy is the real government,

the spirit of the corps

(as

with the Jesuits)

INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS

365

with trained and skilled administration. There could not be a

bears down the individuality of its more distinguished members. In the profession of government, as in other professions, the sole idea

can be found of combining

of the majority is to do what they have been taught; and it requires a popular government to enable the conceptions of the man of origi-

government, among a people in any degree ripe for it, and the most perfect imaginable bureaucracy. But it is, at the same time, one of the most important ends of political insti-

nal genius

among them

to prevail over the ob-

structive spirit of trained mediocrity. a

popular government

Only

in

(setting apart the ac-

cident of a highly intelligent despot) could Sir Rowland Hill have been victorious over the

Post Office.

him

A

popular government installed

in the Post Office,

and made

the body, in

obey the impulse given by the united special knowledge with individual vigour and originality. That the Roman aristocracy escaped this characteristic disease of a bureaucracy was evidently owing to its popular element. All special offices, both those which gave a seat in the Senate and those which were sought by senators, were conferred

spite of itself,

man who

by popidar election.

The Russian government

is a characteristic exemplification of both the good and bad side of bureaucracy: its fixed

maxims, directed with Roman perseverance to the same unHinchingly-pursued ends from age to age; the remarkable skill with which those ends are generally pursued; the frightful internal corruption, and the permanent organised hostility to improvements from without, which even the autocratic power of a vigorous-minded Emperor is seldom or never sufficient to overcome; the patient obstructiveness of the body being in the long run more than a match for the fitful energy of one man. The Chinese Government, a bureaucracy of Mandarins, is, as far as known to us, another apparent example of the same qualities and defects. In

all

human

affairs conflicting influences

one another alive and efficient even for their own proper uses; and the exclusive pursuit of one good object, apart from some other which should accompany it, ends not in excess of one and defect of the other, but in the decay and loss even of that which has been exclusively cared for. Government by trained officials cannot do, for a country, the things which can be done by a free government; but it might be supposed capable of doing some things which free government, of itself, cannot do. We find, however, that an outside element of freedom is necessary to enable it to do effectually or permanently even its own business. And so, also, freedom cannot produce its best effects, and often breaks down altogether, unless means

are required to keep

it

moment's hesitation between representative

many

tutions, to attain as

of the qualities of

with the other; to secure, as far as they can be made compatible, the great advantage of the conduct of affairs by the

one

as are consistent

skilled persons,

bred to

as

it

an intellectual

profession, along with that of a general control vested in, and seriously exercised by, bodies

representative of the entire people. Much this end by recognising

would be done towards

the line of separation, discussed in the pre-

ceding chapter, between the work of government properly so called, which can only be well performed after special cultivation, and that of selecting, watching, and, when needful,

controlling the governors, which in this case, as in others, properly devolves, not on those who do the work, but on those for whose benefit it ought to be done. No progress at all can be made towards obtaining a skilled democ-

racy unless the democracy are willing that the work which requires skill should be done b) those

who

possess

it.

do in providing mental competency to

A

democracy has enough with an amount of

itself

sufficient for its

own

prop-

and check. obtain and secure this amount is

er work, that of superintendence

How

to

one of the questions to be taken into consideration in judging of the proper constitution of a representative body. In proportion as its composition fails to secure this amount, the assembly will encroach, by special acts, on the province of the executive; it will expel a good, or elevate and uphold a bad, ministry; it will connive at, or overlook in them, abuses of trust, will be deluded by their false pretences, or will withhold support from those who en-

deavour will

to fulfil their trust conscientiously: it selfish, a capri-

countenance, or impose, a

and impulsive, a short-sighted, ignorant, and prejudiced general policy, foreign and domestic; it will abrogate good laws, or enact cious

bad ones,

let in

new

evils,

verse obstinacy to old;

it

or cling with per-

will even, perhaps,

under misleading impulses, momentary or permanent, emanating from itself or from its conconnive at proceedings law aside altogether, in cases where equal justice would not be agreeable to popular feeling. Such are among the dangers of rep-

stituents, tolerate or

which

set

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

366

resentative government, arising from a consti-

tution of the representation which does not secure an adequate amount of intelligence and knowledge in the representative assembly.

que. All these things are for the interest of a king or aristocracy, in a purely selfish point of view, unless a sufficiently strong counter-interest is created by the fear of provoking re-

have been, and many produced by the sinister interests of kings and aristocracies, where their power is sufficient to raise them above the opinion of the rest of the community; nor is it rational to expect, as a consequence of such a position, any other condtict. These things are superabundantly evident in the case of a monarchy or an aristocracy: but it is sometimes rather gratuitously assumed that the same kind of injurious influences do not operate in a democracy. Looking at democracy in the way in which it is commonly conceived, as the rule of the numerical majority, it is surely possible that the ruling power may be under the dominion of sectional or class interests, pointing to conduct different from that which would be dictated by impartial regard for the interest of all. Suppose the

sistance. All these evils

We

next proceed to the evils arising from the prevalence of modes of action in the representative body, dictated by sinister interests (to employ the useful phrase introduced by is, interests conflicting more or with the general good of the community. It is universally admitted that, of the evils

Bentham), that less

incident to monarchical

and

aristocratic gov-

ernments, a large proportion arise from cause.

The

interest of the

this

monarch, or the

in-

terest of the aristocracy, either collective or

that of its individual members, is promoted, or they themselves think that it will be promoted, by conduct opposed to that which the general interest of the community requires. The interest, for example, of the government is

to tax heavily: that of the

community

is

to

taxed as the necessary expenses of good government permit. The interest of the

be

as little

and of the governing aristocracy, is to possess, and exercise, unlimited power over the people: to enforce, on their part, complete conformity to the will and preferences of the king,

rulers.

The

interest of the people

as little control exercised over

them

is

in

have any re-

to

spect as is consistent with attaining the legitimate ends of government. The interest, or apparent and supposed interest, of the king or aristocracy

is

permit no censure of themany form which they may conthreaten their power, or serious-

to

selves, at least in

sider either to

with their free agency. The inpeople is that there should be full liberty of censure on every public officer, and on every public act or measure. The interest of a ruling class, whether in an aristocracy or an aristocratic monarchy, is to assume to themly to interfere

terest of the

selves an endless variety of unjust privileges, sometimes benefiting tlieir pockets at the expense of the people, sometimes merely tending to exalt

them above

others, or,

what is the same degrade others

thing in different words, to below themselves. If the people are disaffected, which under such a government they are very likely to be, it is the interest of the king or

of

them

still

are.

majority to be whites, the minority negroes, or is it likely that the majority would

vice versa:

allow equal justice to the minority? Suppose the majority Catholics, the minority Protestants, or the reverse; will there not be the same danger? Or let the majority be English, the minority Irish, or the contrary: is there not a great probability of similar evil? In all countries there

is

minority who,

a majority of poor, a

in contradistinction,

may be

called rich. Be-

tween these two classes, on many questions, there is complete opposition of apparent interest. We will suppose the majority sufficiently intelligent to be aware that it is not for their advantage to weaken the security of property, and that it would be weakened by any act of arbitrary spoliation. But is there not a considerable clanger lest they should throw the possessors of what is called realised property, and upon the larger incomes, an unfair share, or even the whole, of the bur-

upon

den of taxation: and having done so, add to the amount without scruple, expending the proceeds in modes supposed to conduce to the profit and advantage of the labouring class? Suppose, again, a minority of skilled labourers, a majority of unskilled: the experience of

trade unions, unless they are greatly

aristocracy to keep

many

telligence

calumiiiatc-d, justifies the a|)prehcnsion

kick"; agreeably to the maxim of Cardiiuil Richelieu in his celebrated Testament Politi-

rior industry or .ibililies to gain a superior

them at a low level of inand education, tonunl dissensions among tliem, and even prevent tliem from Ijeing loo well off, lest they should "wax fat, and

that

an t(iuality of earnings might be imposed as obligation, and that piecework, payment by the hour, and all practices which c-nalile supe-

INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS reward might be put down. Legislative attempts to raise wages, limitation of competition in the labour market, taxes or restrictions on machinery, and on improvements of any of the all kinds tending to dispense with existing labour-even, perhaps, protection of the home producer against foreign industryare very natural (I do not venture to say

Avhether probable) results of a feeling of class interest in a governing majority of manual labourers. It will

be said that none of these things are

for the real interest of the most numerous class: to which I answer, that if the conduct

beings was determined by no other interested considerations than those which constitute their "real" interest, neither monarchy of

human

nor oligarchy would be such bad governments as they are;

for assuredly very strong argu-

ments may be, and often have been, adduced to show that either a king or a governing senate are in much the most enviable position, when ruling justly and vigilantly over an active, wealthy, enlightened, and high-minded people. But a king only now and then, and an oligarchy in no known instance, have taken this exalted view of their self-interest: and why should we expect a loftier mode of thinking

from the labouring classes? It is not what their interest is, but what they suppose it to be, that with respect is the important consideration to their conduct:

and

it

is

quite conclusive

government that it assumes the numerical majority to do habitually what is never done, nor expected to be done, save in very exceptional cases, by any other against any theory of

power— namely, to direct their conduct by their real ultimate interest, in opposition to their immediate and apparent interest. No one, surely, can doubt that many of the pernicious measures above enumerated, and many others as bad, Avould be for the im-

depositaries of

mediate interest of the general body of unskilled labourers. It

would be

is

quite possible that they

for the selfish interest of the

existing generation of the class. of industry

and

couragement

to

whole

The relaxation

and diminished ensaving which would be their activity,

the graces of in all

monuments of literary genius dazzling to the imaginations of shallow readers of history, who do not reHect that the men to Avhom the despotism of Augustus (as well as of Lorenzo de' Medici and of Louis XIV.) owes its brilliancy, were all formed in the generation preceding. riches, and the mental energy and activity, produced by centuries of freedom, remained for the benefit of the first

The accumulated

generation of slaves. Yet this was the commencement of a regime by whose gradual operation

had been

which had conquered and embraced the world in its grasp, so completely lost even its pire,

military efficiency, that invaders whom three or four legions had always sufficed to coerce were able to overrun and occupy nearly the

whole of its vast territory. The fresh impulse given by Christianity came but just in time to save arts and letters from perishing, and the human race from sinking back into perhaps endless night.

When we

talk of the interest of a body of as a prin-

men, or even of an individual man,

determining their actions, the question what would be considered their interest by an unprejudiced observer is one of the least important parts of the whole matter. As Coleridge observes, the man makes the motive, not the motive the man. What it is the man's inon terest to do or refrain from depends less any outward circumstances than upon what what sort of man he is. If you wish to know you must know is practically a man's interest, the cast of his habitual feelings and thoughts. Everybodv has two kinds of interests, interests which he cares for, and interests which he does not care for. Everybody has selfish and unsel-

ciple

and a selfish man has cultivated the habit of caring for the former, and not

fish interests,

caring for the

latter.

Every one has present

distant interests, and the improvident man he who cares for the present interests and

and

space of a single lifetime.

that

of the most fatal changes in human have been, as to their more manifest immediate effects, beneficial. The establishment of the despotism of the Caesars was a great benefit to the entire generation in which it

the civilisation which

all

gained insensibly faded away, until the Em-

is

Some

and proconsuls; it fostered many of life, and intellectual cultivation departments not political; it produced

praetors

ultimate consequence, might perhaps be little felt by the class of unskilled labourers in the

affairs

367

took place. It put a stop to civil war, abated a vast amount of malversation and tyranny by

does not care for the distant.

It

matters

little

on any correct calculation the latter may be the more considerable, if the habits of his mind lead him to fix his thoughts and wishes solely on the former. It would be vain to attempt

and

to

man who beats his wife children that he would be

persuade a

illtreats his

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

368

happier if he hved in love and kindness with them. He would be happier if he were the kind of person who could so live: but he is not, and it is probably too late for him to become, that kind of person. Being what he is, the gratification of his love of domineering, and the indulgence of his ferocious temper, are to his perceptions a greater good to himself than he would be capable of deriving from the pleasure and affection of those dependent on him. He has no pleasure in their pleasure, and does not care for their affection. His neighbour. who does, is probably a happier man than he; but could he be persuaded of this, the persuasion would, most likely, only still further exasperate his malignity or his irritability. On the average, a person who cares for other people, for his country, or for mankind, is a happier man than one who does not; but of

what use

who own if

is it

this

doctrine to a

cares for nothing but his own ease, or his pocket? He cannot care for other people

he would.

who

preach

to

man

like

It is

preaching to the

crawls on the ground

would be

Now

it

is

how much

better

it

he were an eagle. universally observed fact that

him

for

worm

a

if

the two evil dispositions in question, the disposition to prefer a man's selfish interests to those which he shares with other people, and

immediate and direct interests to those which are indirect and remote, are characterfostered istics most especially called forth and bv the possession of power. The moment a man, or a class of men, find themselves with power in their hands, the man's individual in-

his

terest,

or the

class's

separate interest, acquires

an entirely new degree of importance in their eyes. Finding themselves worshipped by others,

become worshippers

they

of themselves,

and

be counted at a hundred times the value of other people; while the facility they actjuire of doing as they think themselves entitled to

like

without regard to consecpienc

es insensibly

weakens the habits which make men look forward even to such consequences as affect themselves. This is the meaning of the universal tradition, grounded on universal experience, of men's i)eing corrupted i)y power. Every one knows how absurd it would be to infer from

what

a

man

ticm, that

when

he

is

or does

will l)C

a despot

on

a

when

in a i)rivaie sta-

and do exactly the like ihione: where the bad

nature, instead of being pans of his restrained and kept in subordination i)y every circumstance of his life and by every person surrounding him, are courted by all persons.

human

and ministered toby all circimistances. Itwould be quite as absurd to entertain a similar expectation in regard to a class of men; the Demos, or any other. Let them be ever so modest and amenable to reason while there is a power over them stronger than they, we ought expect a total change in this respect when they themselves become the strongest power. to

Governments must be made

for

human

be-

ings as they are, or as they are capable of speedilv becoming: and in any state of cultivation

which mankind, or any

class

among them, have

vet attained, or are likely soon to attain, the interests by which they will be led, when thev

are thinking only of self-interest, will be almost exclusively those which are obvious at presfirst sight, and which operate on their

ent condition.

It is

and

for others,

only a disinterested regard

especially for

what comes after

them, for the idea of posterity, of their country, or of mankind, whether grounded on sym-

pathy or on a conscientious tceling, which ever directs the minds and purposes of classes or bodies of men towards distant or unobvious interests. And it cannot be maintained that any form of government would be rational as a condition that these exalted principles of action should be the guiding and master motives in the conduct of average human beings. .\ certain amount of con-

which required

and of

science,

disinterested

public

spirit,

be calculated on in the citizens of any conununity ripe for representative government. But it would be ridiculous to expect such a degree of it, combined with such intellectual discernment, as would be proof against any plausible fallacy tending to make that which was for their class interest appear the

may

fairly

dictate of justice

We

and

know what

all

of the general good. specious fallacies may be

urged in defence of every act of injustice yet proposed for the imaginary benefit of the mass. We know how manv, not otherwise fools or bad nun, have tlumght it justifiai)le to repudiate the national debt. We know how many, not destitute of abilitv, and of consideral)le popular influence, ilunk it fair to throw tlu

whole burthen of taxation upon der the

name

savings,

un

of realised property, allowing

those whose progenitors and themselves have all thev received to remain, as a

always spent re\v:ird

for such

uinaxecl.

exemplary conduct, wholly what powerful arguments,

We know

more (l.mgcroiis because there is a portion oi trutii in tliein, may be l)rought against Ijecpiest, jII nihciil.iiuc, against the power oi ilic

!

j

INFIRMITIES AND DANGERS

369

against every advantage which one person seems to have over another. We know how easily the uselessness of ahiiost every branch of knowledge may be proved, to the complete satisfaction of those who do not possess it. How many, not altogether stupid men, think the scientific study of languages useless, think

spond on the whole with two divergent

ancient literature useless, all erudition useless, logic and metaphysics useless, poetry and the

paid description of labourers (such as the professions) whose education and way of life assimilate them with the rich, and whose prospect and ambition it is to raise themselves into that class. With the labourers, on the other hand, may be ranked those smaller employers of labour, who by interests, habits, and educa-

fine arts idle

and

frivolous, political

economy

purely mischievous? Even history has been pronounced useless and mischievous by able men. Nothing but that acquaintance with external nature, empirically acquired, which serves directly for the production of objects necessary

would

to existence or agreeable to the senses,

get

its

utility

recognised

encouragement

if

people had the

to disbelieve

it.

Is it

least

reason-

able to think that even much more cultivated minds than those of the numerical majority

be will have so delicate a an appreciation of what against their own apparent interest, that

can be expected conscience, is

and

to

so just

they will reject these

and the innumerable

other fallacies which will press in upon them from all quarters as soon as they come into power, to induce them to follow their own selfish inclinations and short-sighted notions of their own good, in opposition to justice, at the expense of all other classes and of posterity?

One

of the greatest dangers, therefore, of

democracy, as of all other forms of government, lies in the sinister interest of the holders of power: it is the danger of class legislation; of government intended for (whether really effecting

it

dominant whole.

or not) the immediate benefit of the class, to

And one

the lasting detriment of the

of the

most important ques-

tions demandingconsideration, in determining

the best constitution of a representative gov-

ernment,

is

how

to

provide efficacious securi-

against this evil.

ties

If

we consider

as a class, politically speaking,

any number of persons who have the same sinister interest— that is, whose direct and apparent interest points towards the same description of bad measures; the desirable object would be that no class, and no combination of classes likely to combine, should be able to exercise a preponderant influence in the government. A modern community, not divided within itself by strong antipathies of race, language, or nationality, as

in

which,

the

main

inspite

may be considered

divisible

of

partial

into two sections, variations,

corre-

direc-

them on the one

tions of apparent interest. Let us call (in brief general terms) labourers

hand, employers of labour on the other: including however along with employers of labour, not only retired capitalists, and the possessors of inherited wealth, but all that highly

tional impressions are assimilated in wishes, tastes, and objects to the labouring classes; comprehending a large proportion of petty

tradesmen. In a state of society thus composed, the representative system could be made ideally perfect, and if it were possible to maintain it in that state, its organisation must be such that these two classes, manual labourers and their affinities on one side, employers of labour and their affinities on the other, should

if

be, in the

system,

arrangement of the representative

equally balanced,

each influencing

an equal number of votes in Parliament: since, assuming that the majority of each class, in any difference between them, would be mainly governed by their class interests, there would be a minority of each in whom that consideration would be subordinate to reason,

aljout

and the good of the whole; and this minority of either, joining with the whole of the other, would turn the scale against any demands of their own majority which were not justice,

such as ought to prevail. The reason why, in any tolerable constituted society, justice and the general interest mostly in the end carry their point, is that the separate and selfish interests of mankind are almost

always divided; some are interested in what is wrong, but some, also, have their private

on the side of what is right: and those are governed by higher considerations, though too few and weak to prevail against the interest

who

whole of the others, usually

after sufficient

become strong enough to turn the balance in favour of the body of private interests which is on the same side with

discussion and agitation

The representative system ought to be constituted as to maintain this state of things: it ought not to allow any of the various

them. so

sectional interests to be so powerful as to be capable of prevailing against truth and justice

and the other

sectional interests combined.

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

370

be such a balance prepersonal interests as may render

There ought always served

among

any one of them dependent carrying with

it

The

to

at least a

for

successes

its

on

large proportion

who act on higher motives and more comprehensive and distant views. of those

confusion of ideas here

so easily cleared

the simplest idea,

Chapter 7 Of True and

Democracy; Repreand Representation

of the Majority only It has been seen that the dangers incident to a representative democracy are of two kinds: danger of a low grade of intelligence in the representative body, and in the popular opin-

ion which controls it; and danger of class legislation on the part of the numerical majority, these being all composed of the same class. have next to consider how far it is possible so

We

to organise the

democracy

as,

without

inter-

fering materially with the characteristic beneof democratic government, to do away with these two great evils, or at least to abate them,

fits

in the

utmost degree attainable by

human con-

trivance.

The common mode of attempting this is by limiting the democratic character of the representation, through a more or less restricted suffrage. But there

is

a previous consideration

which, duly kept in view, considerably modifies the circumstances which are supposed to

render such a restriction necessary. A completely equal democracy, in a nation in which a single class composes the numerical majority, cannot be divested of certain evils: but those evils are greatly aggravated by the fact that the democracies which at present exist are not equal, but systematically unequal in favour of

predominant class. Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracv. The pure idea of democracy, according to its definition, is the government of the whole people by the whole people, equally represented. Democracy as comnnjnly conthe

ceived and hitherto practised is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively represented. The former is synonymous with the equality of all citi/ens: the latter, strangely confounded with in favour of it, is a government of privilege, the numerical majority, who alone possess

pra(ti(allv any voice in the State. inevital)le

This

is

the

consequciueof ihemanner in which now taken, to the complete dis-

up

great,

but

it

if

that

unfamiliar, has as great

way to the mind as a more complicated one. That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to the greater, is a familiar idea; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between al-

difficulty in

False

sentation of All

is

one would suppose the slightest indication would be sufficient to place the matter in its true light before any mind of average intelligence. It would be so, but for the power of habit: owing to which

is

making

its

far

lowing thesmallernumberto be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually deliberating, the minority must of course be overruled; and in an equal democ(since the opinions of the constituents,

racy

they insist on them, determine those of the representative body) the majority of the people, through their representatives, will out-

when

vote

and

prevail over the minority and their But does it follow that the

representatives.

minority should have no representatives at all? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard? Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not disproportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a majority of the representatives; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the representatives. Man for man they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a governof inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence in the

ment

is withheld from them; contrary government, but. al)ove all. contrary the principle of democracy, which professes

representation to all just to

equality as

The not

its

very root and foundation. and violation of principle are

injustice

less flagrant

because those

who

sutler

by

them are a minority: for there is not etjual not suffrage where every single individual does count for as

nuuh

any other single indiviclit is not only a miDemocracy, thus constitut-

as

ual in the coiiununity. But

who

suffer.

the votes are

nority

franchisement of minorities.

ed, does not even attain

its

osiensii)le oljject.

|

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES that of giving the powers of government cases to the numerical majority. It does something very different: it gives them to a majority of the majority; who may be. and often are, in all

but a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. Suppose then, that, in a country governed by equal and universal suffrage, there is a contested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare majority of the people.

This Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of itself. What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a majority of the people? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no influence at all in the decision; and the whole of these may be, a majority of them probably are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those by whom they have been carried. Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and not at all improbable, that the opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority of that portion of

it

whom

the institu-

tions of the country have erected into a ruling class. If democracy means the certain ascend-

ancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring that but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to the majority, but to a minority in some other

part of the scale. The only answer which can possibly be made to this reasoning is, that as different opinions predominate in different localities, the opinion which is in a minority in some places has a majority in others, and on the whole every opinion which exists in the constituencies obtains

its

fair share of voices in the representa-

And

roughly true in the present state of the constituency; if it were not, the discordance of the House with the general sentiment of the country would soon become evident. But it would be no longer true if the present constituency were much enlarged; still less, if made co-extensive with the whole population; for in that case the majority in every tion.

this

is

would consist of manual labourers; and when there was any question pending, on locality

which these

classes

were

at issue

with the

rest

371

of the community, no other class could succeed in getting represented anywhere. Even now, is it not a great grievance that in every

Parliament a very numerous portion of the electors, willing and anxious to be represented, have no member in the House for whom they have voted? Is it just that every elector of Marylebone is obliged to be represented by

two nominees of the vestries, every elector of Finsbury or Lambeth by those (as is generally believed) of the publicans? The constituencies to which most of the highly educated and public spirited persons in the country belong, those of the large towns, are now, in great part, either unrepresented or misrepresented. The electors

who

are

from the

on

a different side in party politics

local majority are unrepresented.

Of

those who are on the same side, a large proportion are misrepresented; having been obliged to accept the man who had the greatest num-

ber of supporters in their political party, though his opinions may differ from theirs on every other point. The state of things is, in some respects, even worse than if the minority were not allowed to vote at all; for then, at least, the

majority might have a

own

member who

mind: while now, the necessity of not dividing the party, for

would represent

their

best

its opponents, induces all to vote either for the first person who presents himself wearing their colours, or for the one

fear of letting in

brought forward by their local leaders; and these, if we pay them the compliment, which they very seldom deserve, of supposing their choice to be unbiassed by their personal interests, are compelled, that they may be sure of mustering their whole strength, to bring forward a candidate whom none of the party will strongly object to— that is, a man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known opinions except the shibboleth of the party. This is strikingly exemplified in the United

where, at the election of President, the strongest party never dares put forward any of of these, its strongest men, because every one States;

from the mere

fact that

he has been long in

the public eye, has made himself objectionable to some portion or other of the party, and is therefore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes as a person who has never been heard of by the public at all until he is produced as the candidate. Thus, the man who is chosen, even by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real wishes only of the narrow margin by which that party outnumbers the other. Any section whose support is necessary

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

372

on the candidate. which holds out more obstinately than the rest can compel all the others to adopt its nominee: and this superior pertinacity is unhappily more likely to be found among to success possesses a veto

Any

section

those

who

are holding out for their

own

in-

than for that of the public. The choice of the majority is therefore very likely to be determined by that portion of the body who are the most timid, the most narrow-minded terest

only for two; and Mr. Disraeli, in the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by reproaching him for it: being of opinion, apparently, that it befits a Conservative statesman to regard only means, and to disown scornfully all fellow-feeling with any one who is betrayed, even once, into thinking of ends.^ Others have proposed that each elector should

be allowed to vote only for one. By either of these plans, a minority equalling or exceeding

would be one

and prejudiced, or who cling most tenaciously to the exclusive class-interest: in which case

a third of the local constituency,

the electoral rights of the minority, Avhile useless for the purposes for which votes are given,

out of three members. The same result might be attained in a still better way if, as proposed in an able pamphlet by Mr. James Garth Marshall, the elector retained his three votes, but was at liberty to bestow them all upon the same candidate. These schemes, though infinitely better than none at all, are yet but makeshifts, and attain the end in a very im-

serve only for compelling the majority to accept the candidate of the weakest or worst portion of themselves.

That, while recognising these evils, many should consider them as the necessary price paid for a free government is in no way surprising: it was the opinion of all the friends of

freedom up to a recent period. But the habit of pa.ssing them over as irremediable has become so inveterate that many persons seem to

have

lost the

would be glad

From despairing

they could.

them as remedy if

capacity of looking at

things which they

to

of a cure, there

too olten but one step to denying the disease; and from this follows dislike to having a is

as if the proposer were creating a mischief instead of offering relief from one. People are so inured to the evils that they feel as if it were unreasonable, if not wrong, to

remedy proposed,

complain of them. Yet, avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of liberty on whose mind they do not weigh; who would not rejoice at the discovery that they could be dis-

pensed with. Now, nothing

is

more

certain

than that the virtual blotting-out of the minority is no necessary or natural consequence of freedom; that, far from having any connection wiih democracy, to the

first

it

is

diametrically opposed

principle of democracy, representa-

tion in proportion to niunbcrs. It is an essential part f)f democracy that minorities should

be adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is possible without it. Those who have seen and ielt, in some degree, the force of these tonsideralioMs, have proposed various expedients by which the e\ il

may

be, in a greater or less degree, miligated.

Lord [ohn introduced

Russell, in

one

of his

Reform

Hills,

a provision, that certain constitu-

encies should return three members, in these each elector

and

that

should be allowed to vote

able,

if

perfect

it

attempted no more,

manner: since

all local

to return

minorities of

however numerous, which are made up from several constituencies, would remain unrepresented. It is much to be lamented, however, that none of these plans have been carried into effect, as any of them would have recognised the right principle, and prepared the way for its more complete applicaticm. But real equality of representation is not obtained unless any set of less

than a third, and

all

minorities,

amounting to the average number of wherever in the country they constituency, a happen to reside, have the power of combining with one another to return a representaelectors

iThisblunderof Mr. Disraeli (from which. greatIlls credit. .Sir John rakington took an op-

ly to

soon after, ol separating hiinsclf^ is a s[)eakingiiistaiuc among many, liou little iheConscrvativc leaders mulorsiand Conservative principorliiiiitv,

ples.

Without presuming

to reciuire

from

political

parties mkIi an amonnt of virtue and discernment as that tliev slioulil com|)reliend, and know when to apjilv, llic principles of their opi^oncnts, we may yet sav that it would be a gicat imi)iovcment its own. if each party understood and acted upon Well would il l)e for Kngland if Consei vatives voted consislcntlv foi cvervihing conserxativc. and

for cvcrvthinj> liberal. We slioiild not then have to wait long for things wliich, like tiic present and many oilier ,u,ieat measures, are emincntlv both the one and tiie other. The Conservatives, as l)cing i)y the law of llieir existence the

I.ilierals

sinpidest party, liave much tiie greatest sins of this description lo answer for: and it is a melan(liolv truth, that if am measure were proposed,

on auN suhjed. iruh. larpely. and farsii;liiedlv (onseivatiNc, e\eu il Liberals weie willing 10 vote for it. tlie great hulk of the Conseivative ])ariy would rusli hlindlv in and prevent it from lieing cariied.

,

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES tive. This degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable until a man of great capacity, fitted alike for large general

views and for the contrivance of practical details-Mr. Thomas Hare-had proved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment, embodied in a Draft of an Act of Parliament: a scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit of carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal perfection as regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several

other ends of scarcely inferior importance. According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be en-

have a member to themselves, would be ascertained by the ordinary process of taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the House: and every candidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a number of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes would, as at present, be given locally; but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate in whatever part of the country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to be represented by any of the local candidates, might aid by their vote in the return of the person they liked best among all those throughout the country who had expressed a willingness to be chosen. This titled to

far, give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise virtually disfranchised minority. But it is important that not those alone

would, so

who refuse to vote for any of the local candidates, but those also who vote for one of them and are defeated, should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they have not succeeded in obtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting paper, containing other names in addition to the one which stands foremost

His vote would only be counted for one candidate; but if the object of his first choice failed to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his second perhaps might be more fortunate. He may extend his list to a greater number, in the order of his preference, so that if the names which stand near the top of the list either cannot make up the quota, or are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some in his preference.

one

whom

it

tain the full

may number

assist in returning.

of

To

ob-

members required

to

complete the House, as well as to prevent very popular candidates from engrossing nearly all

373

the suffrages, it is necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota should be counted for his return: the remainder of those who voted for him would have their votes counted for the

next person on their respective lists who needed them, and could by their aid complete the quota. To determine which of a candidate's votes should be used for his return, and which set free for others, several

methods are pro-

posed, into which we shall not here enter. He would of course retain the votes of all those who would not otherwise be represented; and for the remainder, drawing lots, in default of

would be an unobjectionable expevoting papers would be conveyed central office, where the votes would be

better,

dient. to a

The

counted, the number of first, second, third, and other votes given for each candidate ascertained, and the quota would be allotted to every one who could make it up, until the

number of the House was complete: first votes being preferred to second, second to third, and so forth. The voting papers, and all the elements of the calculation, would be placed in public repositories, accessible to all

whom

they concerned; and if any one who had obtained the quota was not duly returned it

would be in his power easily to prove it. These are the main provisions of the scheme. For a more minute knowledge of its very simple machinery, I must refer to Mr. Hare's Treatise on the Election of Representatives (a small volume published in 1859),' and to a pamphlet by Mr. Henry Fawcett (now Pro-

fessor of Political

Economy

in the University

of Cambridge), published in i860, and entitled Mr. Hare's Reform Bill simplified and ex-

plained. This last is a very clear and concise exposition of the plan, reduced to its simplest

elements, by the omission of some of Mr. Hare's original provisions, which, though in themselves beneficial were thought to take more from the simplicity of the scheme than they added to its practical usefulness. The these works are studied the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impression of

more

the perfect feasibility of the scheme, and its transcendant advantages. Such and so numerous are these, that, in my conviction, they

place Mr. Hare's plan

among

improvements yet made practice of government.

est

the very great-

in the theory

and

iln a second edition, published recently, Mr.

Hare has made important improvements of the detailed provisions.

in

some

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

374

In the first place, it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division of the electoral body: not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional minorities in particular places, but every minorsuffiity in the whole nation, consisting of a ciently large number to be, on principles of

equal

justice,

entitled

to

a

representative.

Secondly, no elector would, as at present, be nominally represented by some one whom he had not chosen. Every member of the House

would be the representative of a unanimous constituency. He would represent a thousand electors, or two thousand, or five thousand, or ten thousand, as the quota might be, every one of whom would have not only voted for him, but selected him from the whole country; not merely from the assortment of two or three perhaps rotten oranges, which may be the only choice offered to him in his local market. Under this relation the tie between the elector and the representative would be of a strength, and a value, of which at present we have no

experience. Every one of the electors would be personally identified with his representaconstittive, and the representative with his uents. Every elector who voted for him would have done so either because, among all the candidates for Parliament who are favourably known to a certain number of electors, he is

the one who best expresses the voter's own opinions, or because he is one of those whose abilities and character the voter most respects, and whom he most willingly trusts to think perfor him. The member would represent the of mortar and bricks mere the not sons, town-the voters themselves, not a few vestry-

or parish notabilities merely. All, how ever, that is worth preserving in the representation of places would be preserved. Though

men

the Pailiament of the nation ought to have as little as possible to do with purely local affairs, yet, while it has to do with them, there

ought

to

be members specially commissioned important

to look after the interests of every locality:

and

these there

would

still

be.

In

every locality wiiidi (ould make uj) the (juota within itself, the majority would generally prefer to be represented by one of tliemselves; by a person of local knowledge, and residing in the locality, if there is any such person to be found among the candidates, who is otherwise well (luahfied to be their representative. It would l)c tlie minorities ( liielly, who l)eing un-

able to return the local member, would look out elsewhere for a candidate likely to obtain

other votes in addition to their own. Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one affords the best security for the intellectual qualifications desirable in the representatives.

At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more difficult for any one who has only talents and character to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only

persons

who can

who

pos-

way by

lav-

get elected are those

sess local influence,

or

make

their

expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are sent

ish

down by one of London clubs,

the two great parties from their as men whose votes the party

can depend on under

all

circumstances.

Mr. Hare's system, those who did not

On

like the

who could not succeed in carrying the local candidate they preferred, would have the power to fill up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons of

local candidates, or

national reputation, on the list of candidates, with whose general political principles they were in sympathy. Almost every person, therefore, who had made himself in any way honourably distinguished, though devoid of local

and having sworn allegiance to no would have a fair chance of making up the quota; and with this encouragement such persons might be expected to offer themselves, in numbers hitherto undreamt of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance whatever of being influence,

political party,

chosen by the majority of any existing constituency, have by their writings, or their exertions in some field of public usefulness, made themselves known and approved by a

few persons in almost every

of the

district

kingdom; and if every vote that would be given for them in every place could be counted for their election, they might be able to complete the numljer of the (juota. In no other way which it seems possible to suggest would Parliament be so certain of containing the very elite of the country. And it is not solely through the votes of minorities that this system of election would raise the intellectual standard of the House of

Conunons. Majorities would be compelled

to look out for menil)ers of a nuich higiier cali-

bre.

the individuals composing the mawould no longer be reduced to lobson's

When

jority

I

choice, of either voting for the person l)rought forward by their local leaders or not voting at all;

have

when to

the

nominee

of the leaders

would

encounter the competition not solely

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES

375

of the candidate of the minority, but of all the men of established reputation in the country

representation, proposed by Mr. Hare, is almost a specific. The minority of instructed

would be impos-

any longer to foist upon the electors the the first person who presents himself with catchwords of the party in his mouth and three or four thousand pounds in his pocket. The majority would insist on having a candidate

minds scattered through the local constituencies would unite to return a number, proportioned to their own numbers, of the very ablest men the country contains. They would be under the strongest inducement to choose such men, since in no other mode could they

worthy of their choice, or they would carry

make

who were

\villing to serve;

it

sible

their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail. The slavery of the majority to

the least estimable portion of their number would be at an end: the very best and most

capable of the local notabilities would be put forward by preference: if possible, such aswere known in some advantageous way beyond the locality, that their local strength might have a chance of being fortified by stray votes from

elsewhere. Constituencies would become competitors for the best candidates, and would vie with one another in selecting from among the

connections those

men of local knowledge and who were most distinguished

in every other

electors

outnumbers the other

natural tendency of representative gov-

ernment,

modern civilisation, is towards and this tendency is inreductions and extensions of the

as of

collective mediocrity:

creased by

instructed few by reasons, at least apparently, and since they could not, as those do who are speaking to persons already unani-

as cogent;

all

national representation), their insensibly raised by the

fairly-chosen

more below the highest level of instruction in the community. But though the superior intellects and characters will necessarily be outnumbered, it makes a great difference whether

influence of the

or not they are heard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs at all in the representative body. It is an admitted fact that in the American democracy, is

constructed on this faulty model, the

highly-cultivated members of the community, except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their own opinions and modes of judgment, and become the servile mouthpieces of their inferiors in knowledge, seldom even offer them-

Congress or the State Legislatures, being returned. plan like Mr. Hare's by good fortune

selves for

so little likelihood have they of

Had

a

itself to the enlightened and patrifounders of the American Republic, the Federal and State Assemblies would have con-

suggested otic

men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest reproach and one of its most formidable tained

evils.

many

of these distinguished

Against this evil the system of personal

right,

would occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the wrong. As they would in general be well-meaning (for thus much may reasonably be expected from a it

franchise, their effect being to place the principal power in the hands of classes more and

which

in the country:

they could always outvote them, but they would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When any difference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the

mous, simply assume that they are in the

respect.

The

their small numerical strength tell for anything considerable. The representatives of the majority, besides that they would themselves be improved in quality by the operation of the system, would no longer have the whole field to themselves. They would indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one class of

own minds would be

minds with which they were in The champions of unpopular doctrines would not put forth their arguments merely in books and periodicals, contact, or even in conflict.

read only by their own side; the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and there would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength in the presence of the country. It would then be found out whether the opinion which prevailed by counting votes would also prevail if the votes were as well as counted. The multitude have often a true instinct for distinguishing an able man, when he has the

weighed

of displaying his ability in a fair field before them. If such a man fails to obtain at least some portion of his just weight, it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old democracies there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man: the bema was open to him; he needed nobody's consent to become a public adviser. It is not

means

so in a representative

government; and the

best friends of representative democracy can hardly be without misgivings that the Themistocles or

Demosthenes, whose counsels would

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

376

have saved the nation, might be unable during if the his whole life ever to obtain a seat. But presence in the representative assembly can be insured of even a few of the first minds in the country, though the remainder consist only of

average minds, the influence of these leading in the spirits is sure to make itself sensiblv felt general deliberations, even though they be known to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. I am un-

able to conceive any mode by which the presence of such minds can be so positively in-

sured as by that proposed by Mr. Hare. This portion of the Assembly would also be the appropriate organ of a great social function, for which there is no provision in any existing democracy, but which in no govern-

ment can remain permanently unfulfilled without condemning that government to infallible degeneracy and decay. This may be called the function

Antagonism. In every govern-

of

ment there is some power stronger than all the tends rest; and the power which is strongest perpetually to become the sole power. Partly by intention, and partly unconsciously, it is ever striving to make all other things bend to is anyitself; and is not content while there thing which makes permanent head against it, any influence not in agreement with

its spirit.

succeeds in suppressing all rival influences, and moulding everything after its own model, improvement, in that country, is imat an end, and decline commences. Human

Yet

it

if

provement is a product of many factors, and no power ever yet constituted among mankind includes them all: even the most beneficent power only contains in itself some of the requisites of good, and the remainder, if progress is to continue, must be derived from some other source. No community has ever

a rival

power, which

I

strong enough

may not be

ever to control the other, but whose opinion and sentiment are a moral, and even a social, support to all who. either from conviction or contrariety of interest, are opposed to any of the tendencies of the ruling authority. But when the Democracv is supreme, there is no

One

or

Yew strong enough

for dissentient

opinions and injured or menaced interests to lean upon. The great difficulty of democratic (government has hitherto seemed to be, how to o 1 provide, in a democratic society, what circumstances have provided hitherto in all the •

•

•

which have maintained themselves ahead of others— a social support, a point

societies

d'appui, for individual resistance to the tendencies of the ruling power: a protection, a rallying point, for opinionsand interests yvhich the ascendant public opinion views with disfavour. For want of such a point d'appui, the older societies, and all but a few modern ones,

either

fell

into dissolution or became stationmeans slow deterioration) through

ary (which

predominance of

the exclusive

a part only of

the conditions of social and mental well-being. Now. this great want the system of Personal

Representation

is

fitted to

supply in the most

the circumstances of modern society admit of. The only quarter in which to look for a supplement, or completing

perfect

manner which

the instincts of a democratic the instructed minority: but, in the ordinary mode of constituting democracy, this minority has no organ: Mr. Hare's system to

corrective,

majority,

is

provides one. The representatives who would be returned to Parliament by the aggregate of minorities would afford that organ in its greatest perfection. A separate organisation of the instructed classes, even if practicable, would be invidious, and could only escape

long continued progressive, but while a constrongest power flict was going on between the in the community and some rival power: be-

from being offensive by being totally without influence. But if the elite of these classes formed part of the Parliament, by the same title as

tween the spiritual and temporal authorities;

any other of

the military or territorial dasse.^; the

and

and the industrious

king and the people; the orthodox

religious reformers.

When

the victory

on

either side vvas so complete as to put an end to the strife, and no other conflict took its place,

stagnation followed, and then decay. The ascendancy of the numerical majority is less first

unjust,

many

and on the whole lessmischievous, than

others, but

same kind ly;

for

One

it

is

attended with the very

and even more certaingovernment is in the hands of

ol dangers,

when

the

or a Few, the

Man)

are always existent as

niemi)ers-by representing the same numerical presence will-thcir national the of fraction could give umbrage to nobody, while they would be in the position of highest vantage, both for making their opinions and counsels

sanie

its

number

of citizens, the

heard on all important subjects, and for taking an active part in public business. Tlicir abilities would probably draw to them more than their numerical share of the actual administration of government; as the .Athenians did not confide responsible public functions to Cleon or Hyperbolus (the employment of

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES Cleon at Pylos and Amphipolis was purely exceptional), but Nicias, and Theramenes. and Alcibiades, were in constant employment both at

home and

pathise racy.

abroad, though

known

to sym-

more with oligarchy than with democ-

The

instructed minority would, in the

actual voting, count only for their numbers, but as a moral power they would count for

and would give them over the rest. An arrangement better adapted to keep popular opinion within reason and justice, and to guard it from the various deteriorating influences which assail the weak side of democ-

much more,

in virtue of their knowledge,

of the influence

it

could scarcely by human ingenuity be deA democratic people would in this way be provided with what in any other way it would almost certainly miss-leaders of a higher grade of intellect and character than itself. Modern democracy would have its occasional Pericles, and its habitual group of superior

racy,

vised.

With all this array of reasons, of the most fundamental character, on the affirmative side of the question, what is there on the negative? Nothing that will sustain examination, when people can once be induced to bestow any real

examination upon a new thing. Those indeed, under pretence of if any such there be, who, the class substituting at only aim justice, equal ascendancy of the poor for that of the rich, will of course be unfavourable to a scheme which places both on a level. But I do not believe that any such wish exists at present among the working classes of this country, though I would not answer for the effect which opportunity and demagogic artifices ma> hereafter have in exciting it. In the United States, where the numerical majority have long been in full possession

of collective despotism, they

would

probably be as unwilling to part with it as a single despot or an aristocracy. But I believe that the English democracy would as yet be content with protection against the class legislation of others, without claiming the power to exercise

it

in their turn.

Among the ostensible objectors to Mr. Hare's scheme, some profess to think the plan unworkable; but these, it will be found, are generally people who have barely heard of it, or have given it a very slight and cursory examination. Others are unable to reconcile themselves to the loss of what they term the local character of the representation. A nation does not seem to them to consist of persons, but of artificial units, the

the human beings who inhabit them are represented. Local feelings cannot exist with-

when

out somebody who feels them; nor local interests without somebody interested in them. If the human beings whose feelings and interests these are have their proper share of rep-

creation of geography

and

and

presentation, these feelings

represented in

and

common

with

all

interests of those persons.

why the feelings and range mankind according see

interests are

other feelings

But

interests

I cannot which ar-

to localities should be the only one thought worthy of being represented; or why people who have other feelings and interests, which they value more than they do their geographical ones, should be restricted to these as the sole principle of their

political classification.

The

and Middlesex have

shire

and guiding minds.

S11

Parliament must represent towns and counties, not human beings. But no one seeks to annihilate towns and counties. Towns and counties, it may be presumed, are represented,

statistics.

notion that Yorkrights apart

from

those of their inhabitants, or that Liverpool and Exeter are the proper objects of the legislator's care, in contradistinction to the population of those places,

is

a curious specimen of

delusion produced by words. In general, however, objectors cut the matter short by affirming that the people of England will never consent to such a system.

What

the

people of England are likely to think of those who pass such a summary sentence on their capacity of understanding and judgment, deeming it superfluous to consider whether a thing IS

right or

wrong before

certain to reject

affirming that they are

will not

it, I

undertake

to say.

For my own part, I do not think that the people of England have deserved to be, without trial, stigmatised as insurmountably prejudiced against anything which can be proved to be good either for themselves or for others. It also appears to me that when prejudices persist

obstinately,

much

it

as of those

is

the fault of

who make

nobody

so

a point of pro-

claiming them insuperable, as an excuse to themselves for never joining in an attempt to remove them. Any prejudice whatever will be insurmountable if those who do not share it themselves truckle to it, and flatter it, and achowever, it as a law of nature. I believe, general, among that in this case there is those who have yet heard of the proposition, no other hostility to it than the natural and

cept

m

healthy distrust attaching to all novelties which have not been sufficiently canvassed to make generally manifest all the pros and cons of the

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

378

only serious obstacle is the unone, familiarity: this indeed is a formidable reconeasily more much imagination the for

question.

The

ciles itself to a great alteration in

than

to a very small

one

in

substance,

names and forms.

But unfamiliarity is a disadvantage which, when there is any real value in an idea, it only requires time to remove. And in these days of interest discussion, and generally awakened work in improvement, what formerly was the of centuries, often requires only years.

Since the first publication of this Treatise, on several adverse criticisms have been made Mr. Hare's plan, which indicate at least a careexamination of it, and a more intelligent ful

consideration than had previously been given progress to its pretensions. This is the natural

They of the discussion of great improvements. by and prejudice, blind by a met first are at arguments to which only blind prejudice could attach any value. As the prejudice weakens, the arguments it employs for some time increase

plan being better understood, its inevitable inconveniences, and the circumstances which militate against its at once producing all the benefits it is intrinsically capable of, come to light along with its merits. But, of all the objections, having any semblance in strength; since, the

of reason, which have

come under my

notice,

there is not one which had not been foreseen, considered, and canvassed by the supporters of the plan, and found either unreal or easily

surmountable. 1 he most serious, in appearance, of the objections may be the most briefly answered; the assumed impossibility of guarding against fraud, or suspicion of fraud, in the operations of the Central Office. Publicity, and complete liberty of inspecting the voting papers after the election, were the securities provided; but these,

it

is

maintained, would be unavailing;

because, to check the returns, a voter would have to go over all the work that had been

done by the very weighty sity that the

This would be a there were any neces-

staff of clerks.

o!)je( tion,

if

returns should

vidually by every voter.

.\\\

l)c

verified indi-

that a simple voter

could be expected to do in the way of verification vvould be to check the use made of his own voting paper; for which purpose every paper wf)uld be relumed, after a pioper interval, to the place from whence it came. lUit

what he could not do would l)c clone for him by the unsuccessful candidates and tluiragc-nls. Ihose among the defeated who thought that

they ought to have been returned would, singIv or a number together, employ an agency for verifying the entire process of the election; and documents if they detected material error, the the House of Committee a to referred woulci be of

Commons, by whom

the entire electoral

operations of the nation would be examined and verified, at a tenth part the expense of time and money necessary for the scrutiny of a single return before an Election Committee

under the system now in force. Assuming the plan to be workable, two modes have been alleged in which its beneinjurious consefits might be frustrated, and quences produced in lieu of them. First, it is said that undue power would be given to knots or cliques; sectarian combinations; associations for special objects, such as the Maine Law League, the Ballot or Liberation Society; or bodies united by class interests or community of religious persuasion. It is in the second place objected that the system would admit of being worked for party purposes. A central

organ of each political party would send its list of 658 candidates all through the country, to be voted for by the whole of its supporters

m

every constituency. Their votes would far outnumber those which could ever be obtained by any independent candidate. The "ticket" sys-

contended, would, as it does in America, operate solely in favour of the great organised parties, whose tickets would be accepted blindly, and voted for in their integrity; and would hardly ever be outvoted, except occasionally, by the sectarian groups, or knots tem,

it

is

men bound together by a common crotchet, who have been already spoken of. The answer to this appears to be conclusive.

of

pretends that under Mr. Hare's or any organisation would cease to be an plan other advantage. Scattered eieincnts are always at boda disadvantage compared with organised the nature ies. As Mr. Hare's plan cannot alter or of things, we must expect that all parties

No one

sections, great or small,

which possess organisa-

utmost tion, would avail themselves of it to the the to strengthen their inllueiuc. But under existing system those influeiues are everything. The .scattered elements are absolutely nothing.

The

voters

who

are neither

bound

to the great

nor to any of the little sectarian divisions have no means of making their votes available. Mr. Hare's plan gives them the means. They might be more, or less, dexterous in using it. They might obtain their share of influence, or much less than their share. But political

REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES whatever they did acquire would be clear gain. And when it is assumed that every petty interest, or combination for a petty object, would give itself an organisation, why should we suppose that the great interest of national intellect and character would alone remain unorganised? If there would be Temperance

and Ragged School tickets, and the would not one public-spirited person in a

tickets, like,

constituency be sufficient to put forth a "personal merit" ticket, and circulate it through a whole neighbourhood? And might not a few

such persons, meeting in London, select from the list of candidates the most distinguished names, without regard to technical divisions of opinion, and publish them at a trifling ex-

pense through all the constituencies? It must be remembered that the influence of the two

under the present mode of elecunlimited: in Mr. Hare's scheme it

great parties, tion,

is

but confined within bounds. Neither they, nor any of the smaller knots, would be able to elect more members than in proportion to the relative number of their ad-

would be

great,

The ticket system in America operates under conditions the reverse of this. In Amer-

herents.

ica electors vote for the party ticket,

because

the election goes by a mere majority, and a vote for any one who is certain not to obtain the majority is thrown away. But, on Mr. Hare's system, a vote given to a person of

known worth obtaining

its

candidate.

It

has almost as much chance of object as one given to a party might be hoped, therefore, that

every Liberal or Conservative, who was anything besides a Liberal or a Conservative— who had any preferences of his own in addition to those of his party— would scratch through the of the more obscure and insignificant party candidates, and inscribe in their stead some of the men who are an honour to the nation. And the probability of this fact would operate as a strong inducement with those

names

who drew up

the party

lists

not to confine

themselves to pledged party men, but to include along with these, in their respective tickets, such of the national notabilities as were more in sympathy with their side than with the opposite.

The

real difficulty, for

it

is

not to be

dis-

sembled that there is a difficulty, is that the independent voters, those who are desirous of voting for unpatronised persons of merit, would be apt to put down the names of a few such persons, and to fill up the remainder of their helping list with mere party candidates, thus

to swell the

numbers

379

against those by

whom

they would prefer to be represented. There would be an easy remedy for this, should it be necessary to resort to it, namely, to impose a limit to the number of secondary or contin-

No voter is likely to have an independent preference, grounded on knowledge,

gent votes.

100 candidates. There objection to his being limited or whatever might be the num-

for 658, or even for

would be

little

to twenty,

fifty,

ber in the selection of whom there was some probability that his own choice would be exercised—that he would vote as an individual, and not as one of the mere rank and file of a party. But even without this restriction, the evil would be likely to cure itself as soon as the system came to be well understood. To counteract it would become a paramount object

with

fluence

all

so

is

the knots and cliques whose inmuch deprecated. From these,

each in itself a small minority, the word would go forth, "Vote for your special candidates only; or at least put their names foremost, so as to give them the full chance which your numerical strength warrants, of obtaining the quota by means of first votes, or without de-

scending low in the scale." And those voters who did not belong to any clique would profit by the lesson. The minor groups would have precisely the

power which they ought to have. would be The exactly that which their number of voters entitled them to; not a particle more; while, to ensure even that, they would have a motive

amount

of

influence they could exercise

to

put up,

as representatives of their special

whose other recommendawould enable them to obtain the suffrages

objects, candidates

tions

of voters not of the sect or clique. It is curious to observe how the popular line of argument in defence of existing systems veers round, ac-

cording to the nature of the attack made upon them. Not many years ago it was the favourite argument in support of the then existing system of representation, that under it all "interests" or "classes" were represented. And certainly, all interests or classes of any importance ought to be represented, that is. ought to have spokesmen, or advocates, in Parliament. But from thence it was argued that a system ought

be supported which gave to the partial interests not advocates merely, but the tribunal Hare's sysitself. Now behold the change. Mr. to

tem makes have the sures

it

impossible for partial interests to of the tribunal, but it en-

command

them advocates, and

for doing even this

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

38o

the good is reproached. Because it unites points of class representation and the good points of numerical representation, it is attacked from both sides at once. But it is not such objections as these that are

Chapter 8

it

the real difficulty in getting the system accepted; it is the exaggerated notion entertained of its complexity, and the consequent doubt whether it is capable of being carried into objeceffect. The only complete answer to this tion

would be actual

trial.

When

the merits

of the plan shall have become more generally known, and shall have gained for it a wider

support among impartial thinkers, an effort should be made to obtain its introduction experimentally in some limited field, such as the municipal election of some great town. An opportunity was lost when the decision was taken to divide the West Riding of Yorkshire for the purpose of giving it four members; instead of trying the new principle, by leaving the constituency undivided, and allowing a

candidate to be returned on obtaining either in first or secondary votes a fourth part of the

whole number of votes given. Such experiments would be a very imperfect test of the worth of the plan: but they would be an exemplification of

its

mode

would enable people

to

of working; they convince themselves

not impracticable; would familiarise its machinery, and afford some with them materials for judging whether the difficulties which are thought to be so formidable are real or only imaginary. The day when such a parParliament tial trial shall be sanctioned by that

it is

will, I believe,

inaugurate a new era of Parliato give to Repre-

mentary Reform; destined

mature and triumphant period, when it shall have passed through the militant stage in which

sentative

Government

a shape fitted to

alone the world has yet seen

its

it.'

the interval between the last and present editions of this treatise, it has become known that the ex|jeriinent here suggested has actually been made on a larger than any municipal or provincial scale, and has been in course of trial for several years. In the Danish Constiliilion (not that of Denmark proper, hni the Clonstiliition framed for

Mn

the entire Danish kingdom) the ctiiial representation of minorities was provided for on a plan so nearly identical with Mr. Hare's, as to add another to the many exiimples iiow the ideas which resolve diiruidties arising out of a general situation of ilie hiMiian mind or of so(iiiy. jjresent ihemselves, withoin (onnnnnication, to several superior minds at once. Ihis feature of the Danish electoral law has been brought fully and clearly before the llritish |nil)lic in an able |)aper by Mr. Robert I.vtlon. fornuug one of the valuable re-

the Extension of the Suffrage Such a representative democracy as has now been sketched, representative of all, and not solely of the majority-in which the interests, the opinions, the grades of intellect which are outnumbered would nevertheless be heard, and

Of

would have

a

chance of obtaining by w^eight

and strength of argument an influence which would not belong to their numerical force— this democracy, which is alone equal, alone impartial, alone the government of all by all, the only true type of democracywould be free from the greatest evils of the falsely-called democracies which now prevail, and from which the current idea of democracy is exclusively derived. But even in this

of character

democracy, absolute power,

if

they chose to

ports bv Secretaries of Legation, printed by order of the House of Commons in 1864. Mr. Hare's plan, which may now be also called M. .\ndrae's, has thus advanced from the position of a simple project to that of a realised political fact. Though Denmark is as yet the only country in which Personal Representation has become an institution, the progress of the idea among thinking minds has been very rapid. In almost all the countries in which universal suffrage is now regarded as a necessity, the scheme is rapidly making its way: with the friends of democracy, as a logical consequence of their principle; with those who rather accept than prefer democratic government, as an indispensable corrective of its inconveniences. The political thinkers of Switzerland led the way. of France followed. To mention no others, within a very recent period two of the most influential and authoritative political writers in France, one belonging to the moderate liberal and the other to the extreme democratic school, have given in

Those

a public adhesion to the plan, .\mong its German supporters is numbered one of the most eminent political thinkers in Germany, who is also a dis-

tinguished membei of the liberal Cabinet of the Grand Duke of Baden. This subject, among othhas its share in the important awakening of thought in the .American republic, which is already one of the fruus of the great pending conjirincipal of test for luunan freedom. In the two our Australian colonies Mr. Hares plan has been brought luider the consideration of their resj^echas tive legislatures, and though not yet adopted, alreads a strong party in its favour; while the clear and complete muterstanding of its principles, shown by the majority of the speakers i)oth on the Conservati'.e and on the Riidical side of general of its politics, shows how unfounded is the notion being too rrsa. His abilities, in these cases, might only enable him to go greater lengths, and act with greater cllect. in

to

kept,

this

him altogether

without any reference to their own opinions. The ablest candidate may be a Tory and the electors L.iberals: or a laberal and they may be Tories. The political questicms of the day may be Church questions, and he may be a High Churchman or a Rationalist, while they may

bv

If

have almost exclusive reference to

are, thev

measure possible, for the function of government the benefits of superior intellect, trained clisci|)line to i)y long meditation and practical task.

and how are they

by the standard of their own opinions? How are they even to select him in the first instance but by the same standard? It will not do to choose by mere brilliancy— by superiority of showy talent. The tests by which an ordinary man can judge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect: such as they

to be. and alvvavs professes to be, emjjloyed: and jointly therewith to obtain, in the greatest

that special

fulfils his trust:

to judge, except

!)(

a

what they may consc ientiously believe course: and they may be Ixnnid,

wrong

tlicir

sincere convictions, to think

it

more

important that their representative should be to what they deem the than that they should be repreperson of more than average abil-

on these points,

die tate of duty,

sented by

a

PLEDGES They may also have to consider, not solehow they can be most ably represented, but how their particular moral position and menities.

ly

point of view shall be represented at all. influence of every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the legislature: and the constitution being supposed to have made due provision that other and conflicting modes of thinking shall tal

The

proper be representation for their own mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the particular occasion have to attend to. In represented likewise, to secure the

some

cases, too,

it

may be

necessary that the

403

positive rule of duty: and the result will depend, less on any exact prescription, or authoritative doctrine of political morality, than on

the general tone of

mind

ence to mental superiority. Individuals, and who are acutely sensible of the value of superior wisdom, are likely to recognise it,

peoples,

where

it

exists,

by other signs than thinking and even in spite of con-

exactly as they do.

siderable differences of opinion:

be prone

to

impose their own opinion

upon persons whom

public interest as they conceive it. This would not be needful under a political system which assured them an indefinite choice of honest and

a character of

ways obliged, by the expenses of election and the general circumstances of society, to select their representative from persons of a station

from

in life widely different

theirs,

and having

a diff'erent class-interest, who will affirm that they ought to abandon themselves to his discretion? Can we blame an elector of the poorer classes, who has only the choice among two or three rich men, for requiring from the one

pledge to those measures which emancipation from the class-interests of the rich? It moreover always

he votes for he considers

a

as a test of

happens to some members of the electoral body to be obliged to accept the representative selected by a majority of their own side. But though a candidate of their own choosing would have no chance, their votes may be necessary to the success of the one chosen for them;

and

their only

of influence

on

means

of exerting their share

his subsequent conduct,

may

and when

they have recognised it they will be far too desirous to secure it, at any admissible cost, to

representative should have his hands tied, to keep him true to their interest, or rather to the

unprejudiced candidates; but under the existing system, in which the electors are almost al-

of the electoral body,

in respect to the important requisite of defer-

than themselves.

they look

On

up

as a

law

to as wiser

the other hand, there

is

mind which does not look up

to any one; which thinks no other person's opinion much better than its own, or nearly so good as that of a hundred or a thousand

persons like

itself.

Where

this

is

the turn of

of the electors, they will elect no one is not, or at least who does not profess to

mind

who

image of their own sentiments, and continue him no longer than while he reflects those sentiments in his conduct: and all aspirants to political honours will endeavour, as Plato says in the "Gorgias," to fashion them-

be, the will

Demos, and make cannot be denied that a complete democracy has a

selves after the

model

themselves as like to

of the

it

as possible. It

strong tendency to cast the sentiments of the Democracy is not favourable to the reverential spirit. That it destroys reverence for mere social position must be

electors in this mould.

counted among the good, not the bad part of its influences; though by doing this it closes the principal school of reverence (as to merely human relations) which exists in society. Bui very essence, insists so

also democracy, in

its

much more

on the things

forcibly

in

which

all

him dependent on

are entitled to be considered equally, than on those in which one person is entitled to more

These considerations and counter-considera-

consideration than another, that respect for even personal superiority is likely to be below the mark. It is for this, among other reasons, 1

be to make his pledging himself to certain conditions. their support of

tions are so intimately interwoven with one another; it is so important that the electors

should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves, and should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom, while it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions, when they have opinions,

should not enter largely into their judgment as to who possesses the wisdom, and how far its presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct; that it seems quite impracticable to lay

down

for the elector

any

it of so much importance that the institutions of the country should stamp the opinions of persons of a more educated class as entitled to greater weight than those of the less

hold

I should still contend for assigning plurality of votes to authenticated superiority of education, were it only to give the

educated: and

tone to public feeling, irrespective of any rect political consequences.

When

there does exist in the electoral

di-

body

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

404

an adequate sense of the extraordinary difference in value between one person and another, they will not lack signs by which to distinguish the persons whose worth for their purposes is the greatest. Actual public services w'ill naturally be the foremost indication: to have filled posts of magnitude, and done important things in them, of which the wisdom has been justified by the results; to have been the author of measures which appear from their effects to have been wisely planned; to have made predictions which have been often verified by the event, seldom or never falsified by it; to have given advice, which when taken has been fol-

lowed by good consecjuences, when neglected, by bad. There is doubtless a large portion of uncertainty in these signs of wasdom; but we are seeking for such as can be applied by persons

They will do well much on any one indication, unless

of ordinary discernment.

not corroborated by the to rely

rest;

and, in their estima-

tion of the success or merit of any practical on the general opinion

effort, to lay great stress

of disinterested persons conversant with the subject matter. The tests which I have spoken of are only applicable to tried men; among whom must be reckoned those who, though

untried practically, have been tried speculatively; who, in public speech or in print, have discussed public affairs in a manner which proves that they have given serious study to them. Such persons may, in the mere character of political thinkers, have exhibited a considerable

dence

amount of the same titles to confiwho have been proved in the

as those

position of practical statesmen.

When

it is

nec-

essary to choose persons wholly untried, the best criteria arc, reputation for ability among those who personally know them, and the confidence placed and rcconnncndations given by

persons already looked up these,

mental

constituencies ability,

and

who

to.

By

tests

sulhciently

eagerly seek for

like

value it,

will

generally succeed in obtaining men beyond mediocrity, and often men whom they can trust to carry on public affairs according to their unfettered judgment; to whom it would be an affront to require that they siiould give up that

judgment

at the behest of their inferiors in

knowledge. If such persons, hcmcstly sought, are not to be found, then indeed the electors are justitaking other precautions; for they cannot be expected to postpone their particular opinions, unless in cjrder that they may be served by a person of superior knowledge to fied in

own. They would do well, indeed, even remember, that when once chosen, the representative, if he devotes himself to his

their

then, to

duty, has greater opportunities of correcting an original false judgment than fall to the lot of

his constituents; a consideration to prevent them (unless

most of

w hich generally ought

compelled by necessity to choose some one whose impartiality they do not fully trust) from exacting a pledge not to change his opinion, or, if he does, to resign his seat. But when an person, not certified in unmistakable terms by some high authority, is elected for the first time, the elector cannot be expected not to make confonnity to his own sentiments the primary requisite. It is enough if he does

unknown

not regard a subsequent change of those sentiments, honestly avowed, with its grounds undisguisedly stated, as a peremptory reason for

withdrawing his confidence. Even supposing the most tried ability and acknowledged eminence of character in the representative, the private opinions of the electors are not to be placed entirely in abeyance.

Deference

to

mental superiority

is

not to go

the length of self-annihilation— abnegation of any personal opinion. But when the difference

does not relate to the fundamentals of politics, however decided the elector may be in his own sentiments, he ought to consider that when

man differs from him there is at least considerable chance of his being in the wrong, and that even if otherwise, it is worth while to give up his opinion in things not absolutely essential, for the sake of the inestimable

an able a

advantage of having an able man to act for him in the many matters in which he himself is not qualified to form a judgment. In such cases he often endeavours to reconcile both wishes, by inducing the able man to sacrifice his own opinion on the points of difference: but, for the able

man

to lend himself to this

treason against his especial office; abdication of the peculiar duties of mental superiority, of which it is one of the

compromise,

is

most sacred not to desert the cause which has the clamour against it, nor to deprive of his services those of his opinions which need them

and known abilon full freedom to act as he in his own judgment deems best; and should not consent to ser\e on any other terms. But the electors are entitled to know how he means conto act; what opinions, on all things which

the most. ity

A man

should

of conscience

insist

cern his public duty, he intends should guide unacceptable his conduct. If some of these are

PLEDGES

pelled to fix it on a person presumptively under the influence of partialities hostile to their interest: That they are entitled to a full knowledge of the political opinions and sentiments

opinions and their

of the candidate; and not only entitled, but often bound, to reject one who differs from themselves on the few articles which are the

to them, it is for him to satisfy nevertheless deserves to be their representaoverlook, tive; and if they are wise, they will great and many value, general his of favour in

differences

between

his

own.

There are some

differences, however,

which

they cannot be expected to overlook. Whoever feels the amount of interest in the government of his country which befits a freeman, has some affairs which are like which the strength of his belief truth, together with the importance

convictions

on national

his life-blood;

in their

405

that he

them

he attaches to them, forbid him to make a subject of compromise, or postpone to the judgment of any person, however greatly his superior. Such convictions, when they exist in a people, or in any appreciable portion of one,

foundation of their political belief: That in proportion to the opinion they entertain of the mental superiority of a candidate, they ought to put up with his expressing and acting on opinions different from theirs on any number of things not included in their fundamental articles of belief: That they ought to be unremitting in their search for a representative of such calibre as to be entrusted with full power of obeying the dictates of his own judgment: That they should consider it a duty which they

fellow-countrymen, to do their ut-

are entitled to influence in virtue of their mere existence, and not solely in that of the

owe

probability of their being grounded A people cannot be well governed in opposi-

the legislature:

tion to their primary notions of right, even though these may be in some points erroneous.

such a

A correct estimate of the relation which should subsist between governors and governed, does not require the electors to consent to be represented by one who intends to govern them in

for the benefits of his ability are certain, while the hypothesis of his being wrong and their

in truth.

opposition to their fundamental convictions. If they avail themselves of his capacities of useful service in other respects, at a time when the points on which he is vitally at issue with

them are not

likely to

tified in dismissing

when

be mooted, they are

him

at the first

jus-

moment

a question arises involving these,

and on

which there is not so assured a majority for what they deem right as to make the dissenting voice of that particular individual unimportant. Thus (I mention names to illustrate my meaning, not for any personal application) the opinions supposed to be entertained by Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright on resistance to foreign aggression might be overlooked during the Crimean war, when there was an overwhelming national feeling on the contrary side, and might yet very properly lead to their rejection by the electors at the time of the Chinese quarrel (though in itself a more doubtful question), because it was then for some time a moot point whether their view of the case might not prevail. As the general result of what precedes, we may affirm that actual pledges should not be required, unless, from unfavourable social circumstances or faulty institutions, the electors are so narrowed in their choice as to be com-

to their

men

most towards placing importance

ment

and

that

to themselves to

man

of

much

greater

be represented by

who number of

than by one

in a greater

of this quality in

it is

professes agreetheir opinions:

being right on the points of difference is a very doubtful one. I have discussed this question on the assumption that the electoral system, in all that deinstitution, conforms to the principles laid down in the preceding chapters.

pends on positive

Even on

this hypothesis, the delegation theory

of representation seems to me false, and its practical operation hurtful, though the mischief

would

in that case

But have endeavoured

certain bounds. I

be confined within

the securities by which to guard the representa-

if

not recognised by the Conis not made for the representation of minorities, nor any difference admitted in the numerical value of votes, active principle are

stitution:

if

provision

cording to some criterion of the amount of education possessed by the voters; in that case no words can exaggerate the importance in principle of leaving an unfettered discretion to the representative; for it would then be the only chance, under universal suffrage, for any other opinions than those of the majority to be

heard in Parliament. In that falsely called democracy which is really the exclusive rule of the operative classes, all others being unrepresented and unheard, the only escape from class legislation in

its

narrowest, and political ignor-

most dangerous, form, would lie in such disposition as the uneducated might have

ance in

its

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

4o6 to choose

educated representatives, and to de-

fer to their opinions.

Some

willingness to

do

might reasonably be expected, and every-

this

thing would depend upon cultivating it to the highest point. But, once invested with politiclasses volun,.al omnipotence, if the operative tarily concurred in imposing in this or any

other manner any considerable limitation up-

on

their self-opinion

and

self-will,

they

would

prove themselves wiser than any class, possessed of absolute power, has shown itself, or, we may \enture to say, is ever likely to show itself, under that corrupting influence.

Of

a

ter 75 Chapti Second Chamber

topics relating to the theory of representative government, none has been the subject of more discussion, especially on the Continent, than what is known as the question of

Of all

the

Two

amount

Chambers.

It

has occupied a greater

of the attention of thinkers than

many

importance, and has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which

questions of ten times

its

distinguishes the partisans of limited from

those of uncontrolled democracy. For my own part, I set little value on any check which a Second Chamber can apply to a democracy otherwise unchecked; and I am inclined to

think that if all other constitutional questions are rightly decided, it is but of secondary importance whether the Parliament consists of two Chambers, or only of one. If there arc two Chambers, they may either be of similar, or of dissimilar composition. If of similar, both will obey the same influences, and whatever has a majority in one of the Houses will be likely to have it in the other. It is true that the necessity of obtaining the consent of both to the passing of any measure may at times be a material obstacle to improvement, since, assuming l)oth the Houses to be

representative,

and equal

in their luimbers, a

exceeding a fourth of the entire representation may prevent the passing of a Bill; while, if there is but one House, a Bill majority. is secure of passing if it has a bare

numl)cr

slightly

But the case supposed

is

rather abstractedly

than likely to occur in practice. It will not often happen that of two Houses similarly composetl, one will be almost unaiiiinoiis. and the other nearly ccjually divided: if a majority

possiljle

one rejects a measure, there will generally have l)cen a large minority unfavourable to it in the other; any improvement, therefore, in

which could be thus impeded, would in almost be one which had not much more than a simple majority in the entire body, and the worst consequence that could ensue would be

all cases

to delay for a short time the passing of the measure, or give rise to a fresh appeal to the electors to ascertain if the small majority in

Parliament corresponded to an effective one in the country. The inconvenience of delay, and the advantages of the appeal to the nation, might be regarded in this case as about equally balanced. I attach little weight to the argument oftenest urged for having two Chambers— to prevent precipitancy, and compel a second deliberation; for it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly in which the established forms of business do not require many

more than two

deliberations.

The

considera-

which tells most, in my judgment, in favour of two Chambers (and this I do regard as of some moment) is the evil effect produced upon the mind of any holder of power, whether an individual or an assembly, by the consciousness of having only themselves to consult. It is important that no set of persons should, in great aff^airs, be able, even temporarily, to make their sic volo prevail without asking any tion

one

else for his consent.

A

majority in a single

when it has assumed a permanent character— when composed of the same persons assembly,

habitually acting together, and always assured of victory in their

own House— easily becomes

despotic and overweening, if released from the necessity of considering whether its acts will be concurred in by another constituted authority. The same reason which induced the to have two consuls makes it desirable there should be two Chambers: that neither of them may be exposed to the corrupting influence of undivided power, even for tlu- space

Romans

of a single year. One of the most indispensable requisites in the practical conduct of politics, especially in the management of free instituis conciliation: a readiness to compromise; a willingness to concede something to opponents, and to shape good measures so as

tions,

to be as little offensive as possible to persons of opposite views: and of this salutary habit, the mutual give and take (as it has been called) between two Ht)uses is a perpetual school; use-

such even now. and its probably l)e even more felt in

ful as

would more demo-

utility

a

cratir constitution of the Legislature.

But the Houses need not both be of the same composition; they

may be intended

as a

check

A

SECOND CHAMBER

on one another. One being supposed demoother will naturally be constituted with a view to its being some restraint upon the democracy. But its efficacy in this respect wholly depends on the social support which it can command outside the House. An assembly cratic, the

some great which does not rest on power in the country is ineffectual against one which does. An aristocratic House is only powthe basis of

an aristocratic state of society. The House of Lords was once the strongest power in our Constitution, and the Commons only a checking body: but this was when the Barons were almost the only power out of doors. I cannot believe that, in a really democratic state of society, the House of Lords would be of any practical value as a moderator of democracy. When the force on one side is feeble in com-

erful in

parison with that on the other, the way to give in line, and it effect is not to draw both out muster their strength in open field over against one another. Such tactics would ensure the utter defeat of the less powerful. It can only act to advantage by not holding itself apart, and compelling every one to declare himself either with or against it, but taking a position among, rather than in opposition to, the crowd, and drawing to itself the elements most capable of allying themselves with it on any given point; not appearing at all as an antagonist

body, to provoke a general rally against it, but working as one of the elements in a mixed its leaven, and often making what would be the weaker part the stronger, by the addition of its influence. The really moderating power in a democratic constitution must act in and through the democratic

mass, infusing

House.

That

there should be, in every polity, a cenpredominant power in

tre of resistance to the

the Constitution— and in a democratic constitution, therefore, a nucleus of resistance to the

democracy— I have already maintained; and I regard it as a fundamental maxim of governIf any people, who possess a democratic representation, are, from their historical antecedents, more willing to tolerate such a centre

ment.

Second Chamber or House of Lords than in any other shape, this constitutes a stronge reason for having it in that shape. But it does not appear to me the best shape in itself, nor by any means the most efficacious for its object. If there are two of resistance in the

form of

a

Houses, one considered to represent the peoonly a class, or not to be representative at all, I cannot think that

ple, the other to represent

407

where democracy is the ruling power ciety the Second House would have any

in soreal

even the aberrations of the first. to exist in deference to suffered be It might habit and association, but not as an effective

ability to resist

check. If

it

exercised an independent will, it to do so in the same general

would be required spirit as the

cratic

with

other House; to be equally demoand to content itself with cor-

it,

recting the accidental oversights of the more popular branch of the legislature, or competing with it in popular measures. The practicability of any real check to the

ascendancy of the majority depends henceforth

on the distribution

of strength in the

most popular branch of the governing body; and I have indicated the mode in which, to the best of my judgment, a balance of forces might most advantageously be established there. I have also pointed out, that even if the numerical majority were allowed to exercise complete predominance by means of a corresponding majority in Parliament, yet if minorities also are permitted to enjoy the equal right due to them on strictly democratic principles, of being represented proportionally to their numbers, this provision will ensure the perpetual

presence in the House, by the same popular title as its other members, of so many of the first intellects in the country, that without being in any way banded apart, or invested with any invidious prerogative, this portion of the national representation will have a personal

weight much more than in proportion to its numerical strength, and will afford, in a most effective form, the moral centre of resistance which is needed. A Second Chamber, therefore, is not required for this purpose, and would not contribute to it, but might even, in some conceivable modes, impede its attainment. If, however, for the other reasons already mentioned, the decision were taken that there should be such a

Chamber,

it is

desirable

should be composed of elements which, without being open to the imputation of class that

it

interests adverse to the majority, would incline interests of the it to oppose itself to the class

and qualify it to raise its voice with authority against their errors and weaknesses. These conditions evidently are not found in a body constituted in the manner of our House

majority,

of Lords. So soon as conventional rank and individual riches no longer overawe the democracy, a House of Lords becomes insignificant. all principles on which a wisely conservabody, destined to moderate and regulate

Of tive

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

4o8

democratic ascendancy, could possibly be constructed, the best seems to be that exemplified in the Roman Senate, itself the most consistently prudent

and sagacious body

that ever ad-

ministered public affairs. The deficiencies of a democratic assembly, which represents the general public, are the deficiencies of the public itself,

The

want of

special training

appropriate corrective

is

and knowledge. with

to associate

and the period of two same term which qualifies them for a pension might entitle them to a senatorship. All who had filled the office of Commander-in-Chief; and all who, having commanded an army or a fleet, had been thanked by Parliament for military or naval successes. All who had held, during ten years, a seat in the Senate;

years

is

suggested, that the

first-class

diplomatic appointments. All

who

body of which special training and knowledgeshould be thecharacteristics. If one House represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service, and fortified by practical experience. If one is the People's Chamber, the other should be the Chamber of Statesmen; a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments. Such a Chamber would be fitted for much more than to be a merely moderating body. It would not be exclusively a check, but also an impelling force. In its hands the power of holding the people back would be vested in those most competent, and who would generally be most inclined, to lead them forward in any right course. The council to whom the task would be

had been Governors-General of India or British America, and all who had held for ten years any Colonial Governorships. The permanent

entrusted of rectifying the people's mistakes would not represent a class believed to be op-

of selection, whereas the other qualifications speak for themselves; if the writings by which

posed to their interest, but would consist of their own natural leaders in the path of progress. No mode of composition could approach

reputation has been gained are unconnected with politics, they are no evidence of the special qualities required, while if political, they would enable successive Ministries to deluge

it

a

weight and efficacy to their function of moderators. It would be impossible to cry down a body always foremost in promoting improvements as a mere obstructive to this in giving

body, whatever

amount

of mischief

it

might

the place vacant in England for such a Senate (I need scarcely say that this is a mere hypothesis), it might be composed of some such

Were

as the following. All

who were

or had

elements been members of the Legislative C^immission described in a former chapter, and which I regard as an indispcnsal)lc ingredient in a well-(onstiluted popular govennnent. AH who

were or liad Iiecn Chief Justices, or h