American opinion of France, 1940–1943

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AMEBICAH OFIIIIOM OF FRAICE, 1940-1945

by Bene Girard

Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree, Doctor of Philosophy, in the Department of History, Indiana University June, 1950

ProQuest Number: 10295238

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peeface

The object of the present study was to determine the impact of French affairs fro® June, 194Q, to June, 1945, on American opinion* The French defeat of June, 1940, was a major event and its effect on American thinking was tremendous*

The defeat was envisaged, in this study, from

the viewpoint of American political philosophy and an analysis of the various comments provoked by the quick destruction of French democracy was made*

In a sense a trial of French democratic institutions took

place in an atmosphere of American insecurity unprecedented in recent American history. This study attempts to show how Americans adjusted their thinking to the destruction of the world balance of power* The place formerly occupied by France appeared suddenly empty and the reali­ sation of this fact had Its effect also on French cultural influence in the United States* The creation of the Vichy government in July, 1940, created new problems for American opinion# The political philosophy of Pltain’s government was a radical departure from the French democratic tradition# The problem of how much this new situation should affect traditionally friendly Franco-American relations became acute when the maintenance of diplomatic ties with Vichy appeared to many Americans to be in contra­ diction with the avowed American policy of supporting the cause of the nations at war with Germany and Italy# This problem was not solved when America entered the war or even when diplomatic relations with Vichy were finally severed following the United Hattons* landing in Horth Africa* ii

It only took a new fora with the setting-up of a pro-Allied administra­ tion which stemmed directly from the Vichy government# For the purpose of this study, the French defeat of June, 1940, appeared a more logical starting point than the declaration of war on September 2, 1939, for this second ©vent had little effect on American opinion* the "phony war” of 1939-1940 seemed to belong to the preceding era, and a study of American attitudes toward France during that period could not be separated from earlier American reactions to Munich and previous crises# The logical place to close this study seemed to be the formation of the French Committee of national Liberation in Algiers, an event which marked the end of the disunity between the two French groups fighting Germany# It brought also the end of the American policy of dealing separately with three rival authorities in the French Empire# Vichy was deprived of its last vestige of power with the loss of its colonial outposts in the Western Hemisphere; de Gaulle and Giraud merged their territories and set up an administration which, for all practical purposes and in spite of the attitude of the American government, became the de facto provisional government of the French Republic. From that time on, although many Americans questioned the committee*® ability to become the government of liberated France, the strained relations between Algiers and Washington were widely interpreted as resulting chiefly from the distrust of President Roosevelt and other American officials of General de Gaulle, the head of the committee# The purpose of this study was principally to indicate trends in American opinion* Compiling complete statistics on press opinion would only have shown the influence of syndicated columnists and the importance of press associations and newspaper chains. Although public opinion ill

polls were used upon occasion, it seemed to the writer unwise to give too much space to the opinions of those whom the poll-takers called "fairly well-informed persons." Statistics and percentages would hare added little significance to this study. As a rule, each notation of public opinion was illustrated by at least one characteristic example chosen from sources representative of the various shades of American political opinion* The writer desires to express his deep appreciation for the patient guidance he has received fro® Professor F. lee Benns in the preparation of this dissertation* He also wishes to thank the Informa** tion Division of the French Embassy in the United State® and the staff of the library of Indiana University for the aid rendered him in the collection of the material*

iv

TABLE OF

contents

Page PREFACE • * . ....................

« ........

ii

Chapter I* AMERICAN OPINION OF THE CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT W 1940 The Franco-German War of 1959-1940

...........

1

Influence of Foreign Comments on American Opinion . . . .

5

The Bightist Interpretation

9

Influence of Vichy Propaganda on this Interpretation * Attacks against the French Left and the Popular Front • Attacks against Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Influence of this Interpretation on American Opinion • The Liberal Interpretation . . . . . . . .

..........

The '’Betrayal Theory” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Attacks against the French Rightists* . . . . . . . . . Attitude of the Liberals toward French Democracy • . . Attacks against the Church, the Army and Business* * . Attacks against French Foreign Policy........ . . . Influence of the Liberal Views on American Opinion • • Comments Influenced by the Rightist Interpretation

...

Difficulty in finding a Common Criterion for these Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Comments on French Political Disorder . . . . . . . . . Comments on French ’’Moral Decadence” . . . . . . . . . Answers to these Attacks . . . . . . .............. Miscellaneous Comments

.

..................

Comments on French Military Inferiority . . . . . . . . Comments on the Fighting Qualities of the French Army * Comments on the French Psychological Preparation for the War . . . . .......... Conclusion . . II*

1

........

. .

IMPACT OF THE FREHCH DEFEAT OK AMERICAN POLITICAL THINKING v

9 10 13 14 15 15 17 19 22 £5 25 27 27 27 32 34 35 35 38 40 44 46

Chapter

^S® The American Feeling of Insecurity after the French Defeat ................ .. . . . ......

46

The Progress of the Interventionist Movement

SI

#•••»*

The Weakening of Isolationism......................... 56 Impact of the French Defeat on the Presidential Campaign in 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . ......................

61

Leftist Isolationism

65

* ...........

The American Nationalist Reaction

.• ....................

67

III* THE TEMPORARY DECLINE OF FRENCH CULTURAL INFLUENCE IK THE UNITED STATES

72

American Tributes to French Culture and Concern for Its Future after the Defeat * * * ....... .......... . •

72

Criticism of France among American Intellectuals

77

• • ..

American MIntellectual Isolationism11

34

Criticism of the French System of Education • * « • * • »

89

The French Language in American Schools after the Armistice................................... . .

92

American Opinion of the Future of French Fashion Leader*ahip after the Defeat

96

The Decline of French Cultural Influence in the United States »

101

IV. AMERICAN MOTIONS TO DEVELOPMENTS IK OVERSEAS FRANCE IN . , * . 105 1940 . . . . ............... Developments in Overseas France from June to October, 1940 . * 105 American Attitude toward the French Colonies at the Time of the Armistice .....................

107

American Opinion of Franco-British Relations after the Armistice British Attempts to Keep the Colonies in the War • •* Growing Hostility between France and Great Britain .. The Gran Battle The Consequences of the Oran Battle on American Opinion vi

Ill 111 115 115 120

Chapter

Page the Problem of French Possessions in the Western hemisphere * .......... 122 The Problem of Japanese Penetration into Indo-China * • • 127 Be Gaulle and the Free French » . * ............... ISO First American Reactions to de Gaulle fs Attitude after the Armistice * • « • * » « » # * * * * • • • » • * • * ISO The Coolness of the American Government toward de Gaulle and Its Consequences on American Opinion • * 132 The Bakar Fiasco * . . ..........................135

V. AMERICAN OPINION W THE VICHT ‘T O ORDER"............... 159 The Political and Economic Situation of France under the Vichy Regime « * * , * * . . . * * * . * . . . * . • * *

159

American Sources of Information on France during the Vichy Regime « * « • * » * ...........

140

The Influence of German and Vichy Propaganda on American Opinion »*• « « , * * * . » • • *

144

American Comments Favorable to Marshal Retain until Laval*s Return to Power in April, 1942 , . * . * « . * *

148

....... . . .

155

American Comments Unfavorable to Retain

American Opinion of the Attitude of the French People during the Vichy Regime ....... * * « ........... 162 American Opinion of Vichy* s Achievements in France

• * « 166

American Hostility to the Vichy Regime • • « * « . « • American Opinion of Vichy1s Political Reforms . » » . « American Opinion of Life in France during the German Occupation and the Vichy Regime • • • • • • • • • « • • American Opinion of the Economic Situation during the Vichy Regime , . » « * • * • » # • * » « • * * • • • » American Opinion of the German-Vichy Political Terror . American Belief In France « * * . . . • • • « • • « * * VI*

AMERICAN OPINION OF WASHINGTON'S RELATIONS WITH VXGHY, 1940-1941 ..........

166 169 171 175 178 180 182

Political Developments Influencing Franco-American Rela­ tions from the Fall of France to Pearl Harbor .........

182

The Problem of the Relations between Branco and the United States in the Summer of 1940

185

vii

Chapter

Page American Opinion of Vichy’s Foreign Policy during the Fall of 1940 . . . ♦ * ........................ Laval and the "Latin Bloc” ............... The Montoire Interview

107 188 1B9

The French Diplomatic Problem at the End of 1940 . • • . 132 The Mopes Haloed Africa • * » . The Dismissal of American Concern

by the Presence of Weygand in North ..................... Laval •• ....... • 195 for the French Food Problem • * • • • 196

American Opinion of Franeo-American Relations from December, 1940, to May, 1941 , » * * • • « • » • * » * «

198

fhe Arrival of Admiral Leahy in Vichy • * « . « • • • • 198 199 Petain’a attitude toward Laval ............... The Murphy-Weygand Agreement in North Africa « « • • » 200 The American Government’s Decision to Garry this Policy to Unoccupied France ............ 201 Liberal Opposition to the American Policy » » » . » • « 203 Darlan’s Policy of Collaboration in May, 1941, and Its Effect on American Opinion ........ * .......... 205 Durian’s negotiations with the Germans * ........... 205 Liberal Demands for a Break with Vichy « • • • • • • • 209 The Paris Protocols • • • • • ................. 2X0 Later American If&uaents on Vichy’s Refusal to Sign the Paris Protocols 212 American Opinion of Vichy’s Foreign PollGy fro® June to December, 1941 « » . * » « * ..........

215

French Hesistance to the British Campaign in Syria . , 215 Vichy’s Concessions to Japan in Xndo-China * * • • » « 219 The Dismissal of Weygand and the Saint Plorentin Interview « « . . » . * * . t * . . . * « « » » * • * » 220 VII.

AMERICAN OPINION OF DI GAULLE, RETAIN AND UVAL, 1941-1942

225

Political Developments Influencing Franco-American Rela­ tions from December, 1941, to November, 1942 . * • * . ,

225

American Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement fro® Septem­ ber, 1940, to December, 1941 ....... . » . .......

226

The Saint-Pierre and Miquelon Incident

vlii

• • * .......... 229

192

Chapter Americas! Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement from January, 1942, to April, 1942 The Blow Trials * *

..........

. *

Laval*a Return to Power........... . ,

236

. * 239 ............. 246

Significance of Laval’s Return to Power* * * ......... 246 American Distrust of Laval . » ............ •. » 248 Attacks against the Vichy Policy after Laval’s Return to Power « • • » * ........... 250 The Recall of Admiral Leahy from Vichy * • • • • « • « 252 Demands for a Complete Break with Vichy * * • » • » • * 252 The Interpretation of Laval’s Return to Power . . . . . 285 Defense of the American Policy « * • » » • » « » • • * 258 Attacks against the Vichy Policy during the Sumer and Fall of 1942 ........ * ............... 2S9 American Opinion of the de Gaulle Movement from April, 1942, to November, 1942 ........ State Department Attempts to Broaden the Basis of the .Movement « * * .« t . * • « . * . » * . < * * . * » * The Caledonia Incident Demands for Recognition of de Gaulle and the Battle of Blr Hackeiia , . * * ................... . . . . . The State Department Note to Fighting Franc© on July 9, 1942 ...............

261

261 264 265 270

The Martinique Problem....... * .................... 271 VIII*

AMERICAN OPINION OF THE ALLIED DEALINGS WITH DARLAN IN NORTH AFRICA * . . ....................

277

Political Events in North Africa from the Allied Landings to Darlan’s Assassination ........... 277 American Interest in Africa and in Dakar before the Landings ......... • » » « • • «

278

The Diplomatic Preparation for theLandings........... * 2S3 The United States Government and the French Political Problem before the Landings •

287

Exclusion of de Gaulle from the North African Operation * « . . . . » * * * * * .... • ....... 287 The Search for a Leaders Giraud. . . . . . . . . . . 289 American Reactions during the Landings and the Fighting between American and French Forces . * *• ............ 291 Ix

Chapter

?&g* the Darlan Appointment and the Opposition to It . . . . . 295 First American Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . the Problem of Darien*s Presence in Algiers at the Time of the Landings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flews of the Different Croups of American Opinion re* garding the French Political Problem . . » « . . * » » The Declaration of Roosevelt on November 17 and Its Consequences • ........ The Liberal Opposition and the Campaign in Favor of de Gaulle ..........* . .. ............. The Result of the Censorship ....... . . . . . . . . The Intervention of Wendell L. lUlki© and Its Consequences . . . . . . . . . .......... . . . . .

295 296 500 301 302 305 504

The Defense of the Darlan Appointment

506

Political Reasons which Influenced Conservative Opinion in Favor of the Darlan Appointment The Attitude of the Average American The Argument of Military Necessity • • . . « • • • • « Conservative Attacks on the Fighting French and American Liberals • The Rallying of West Africa to the Darlan Administration ..........

306 309 311 312 314

American Opinion of the Scuttling of the French Fleet .. 315 The Assassination of Darlan The First American Reactions American Opinion of Darlan

317 ............. ........... . . . . . .

IX. AMERICAN OPINION OF THE GXHAHD-DE GAULLE RIVALRY IN 1945

317 318

. 825

Political Events Influencing Praneo-Aiaerican Relations from January to June, 1943 « * « • • • . * . . . . • « .

325

Comments on Giraud’s Accession to Power ♦ * . ....... 524 American Opinion of Giraud

328

American Opinion of the North African Situation after Qiraud's Appointment • • • ....... . * • • • • . . . »

335

American Desire for Allied Intervention in the North African Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... 355 The Political Arrest® in North Africa and their inter­ pretation by American Opinion........... 356 American Views on North African Opinion........ • • 337

x

Chapter The Attitude of the American Correspondents in North Africa ........ • • 341 British Criticism of Elsenhower and Its Effect on American Opinion ...........344 The loyalist Efforts in North Africa and their Inter­ pretation in America ..................... 346 Criticism of the American Policy in North Africa • * • 348 The Casablanca Conference

549

The French Problem at Casablanca , » » « * . » • » » * 349 Hopes of American Opinion after the Conference , * • « 351 American Opinion of the Bsyrouton Appointment • * * « » •

354

The Appointment of Marcel Peyrouton as Governor General of Algeria • • « * • * * * * * * » « • * # . . • * • * 354 Liberal Protests against the Peyrouton Appointment • * 55? Defense of the Peyrouton Appointment and Attacks against the Liberal Attitude * » * * * « * » • » * • « 361 De Gaulle and the North African Administration

• * . . » 565

American Misconception of the Relative Strength of Giraud and de Gaulle * • * * « » • * » « * * * » » * • 365 The Weakening of de Gaulle*s Position in American Opin­ ion after the Casablanca Conference * * • « • « * * * * 366 The "Richelieu* Affair . . . • ................. 367 De Gaulle1$ Political Successes in his Rivalry with Giraud ....... . ........... . • » 371 The Political Improvements in North Africa « » • * • « The Distrust of the American Liberals for Giraud • » * The Military Successes of Fighting Prance and their Effect on American Opinion ....... The Weak Legal Foundations of Giraudfs Authority • . * Giraud1® Speech on March 15 and Its Effect on American Opinion « Giraud*» Failure to Reestablish the Cremieux Decree and It® Effect on American Opinion « • • » • • ' • • * * *

372 572 375 374 379 381

American Opinion of the Negotiations Leading to the For­ mation of the French Committee of National Liberation • • 384 The Guiana Incident between Giraud and de Gaulle and It® Interpretation in the American Press * • » « • • • 304 Til© Developments in Martinique and the Demands for an American Military Occupation ...........365

xi

Chapter American Reactions to the negotiations between Catroux end Giraud . . . . . . ......... American Efforts to Keep de Gaulle out of Africa « • * The Formation of the French Goroittee of national Liberation The Reestablishment of French Unity In Overseas France • BIBLIOGHAHCT * . * * ........ * ** ................ . . . * * *

adl

386 386 380 391 393

ch a p te r

x

AMERICAN OPINION OF IKK CAUSES OF THE FRENCH DEFEAT IN 1940

X In March, 1938, Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, repudiated the treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pact.

France did not interfere

on that occasion and she did not interfere either during the Ethiopian or the Spanish venture of the dictators. At Munich, In September, 1988, France accepted the destruction of her ally, Czechoslovakia, at the hands of Nazi Germany.

One of the most serious consequences of Munich was

Russia*s apparent abandonment of the hope of forming a common diplomatic front with Britain and France, a decision which evidently led the Soviet government to sign a non-aggression pact with Germany in August, 1989. Following the lead of Britain, France decided to make good her pledge to defend Poland against any aggression. Poland.

On September 1, Hitler Invaded

On September 8, France declared war on Germany. Germany destroyed Poland in four weeks and divided the country

between Russia and herself*

In spite of the welcome "non-belligerence*

of Italy, the French high command, probably mindful of the terrible and useless blood-letting of the last war, remained curiously inactive. situation remained unchanged during the winter of 1989-1940.

The

In April,

1940, Germany successfully invaded Denmark and Norway and hastened to complete the occupation of northern Norway in spite of a feeble British-French attempt to maintain a foothold in this area. With HItier*s invasion of the Low Countries and of France Itself 1

£ on May 10, 1940, the military consequences of the gradual weakening of France became obvious*

General Ganelin rushed the best French armies to

the defense of Belgium In spite of the latter*s previous refusal to conalder common military measures in the ease of a German attack* The quick annihilation of Holland deflected the attention of many from the southern­ most portion of the battleline, the mountainous Ardennes region where the famous fortifications of the Maginot Line ended* Suddenly, on Hay 15, the Germans forced a break through the French lines near Sedan*

General

Gamelin, the Allied Commander, underestimated the potentialities of the German armored divisions which, instead of driving toward Paris, were de­ scribing a wide are pointing toward the Channel and threatening to close in on the Allied armies in Flanders*

The incredible speed of the Geraan

columns revealed the failure of the French command to grasp the significance of the new mechanical weapons* Premier Paul Reynaud understood how desperate the situation was* General Weygand was appointed to succeed Gamelin* Marshal Petain, who was then the French Ambassador to Spain, was made vice-premier*

General

Charles de Gaulle, the disregarded and almost unknown advocate of a mecha­ nised warfare, was appointed under-secretary for war*

But these changes

could not stop the German columns which reached Boulogne on the Channel on May £3* Among those trapped in the Flanders pocket was the whole Bel­ gian army which capitulated on May 28,

British and French units were

successfully evacuated by sea after a heroic resistance in the harbor of Dunkirk but they lost all their materiel* The British contribution to the campaign on the land was practically ended, Weygand*s attempt to es­ tablish a line of defense on the Somme was unsuccessful*

In a series of

frantic appeals Paul Raynaud pleaded with President Roosevelt for American

3 help*

On June 6 the government left Paris, which was occupied by the

Germans on June 14* On June 10 Mussolini declared war on France*

By

that time the French army could no longer oppose a continued line of de­ fense to the German tanks*

General Weygand was applying pressure on the

government to end the fighting.

Led by Marshal Petain, the pacifist group

in the French government forced Reynaud to resign on June 16, 1940*

Petain

immediately formed a new cabinet and, through the intermediary of Spain, asked Germany for armistice terms. An armistice between Germany and France was signed on June 22 in the Goapiegn© forest* An armistice with Italy followed on June 24*

lighting ceased the next day. II

The fall of France came as a shock to international public opin­ ion.

Even though many people believed no longer that the French army was

the best in the world, the swiftness of its collapse provoked a universal amazement. This major international event aroused more comments in the United States than in any other country because, as many American jour­ nalists pointed out, It was of immediate concern to the United States* Many people were conscious not only of the fact that their security was endangered by the rise of Germany to world supremacy but also that the fate of democracy in the Western Hemisphere could not be separated from its fate in Europe*

Moreover, Franc© had symbolised for a century and a

half certain values and a certain way of life. Because of the French failure to defend these successfully, many felt compelled to reconsider these values or at least to ask or search for the causes of the French debacle* American explanations of the French defeat were, in turn,

4 strongly Influenced by the clash between French factions, which was not suppressed by the French defeat but continued in all places where freedom of expression was guaranteed to French political refugees end more especially in the United States* Many books and articles were written, purporting to explain the causes of the French collapse*

These works constituted the main source-

material of some American commentators, ©specially those who were not in France during the critical period of May-June 1940*

the testimony of

French and other eye-witnesses carried naturally a great weight since they could all pretend to bring confidential revelations to the uninformed American public* These bodes were of unequal value*

Their very number and the

repetitious character of some of them finally killed the curiosity of the readers who became critical*

The book-reviewer of The Atlantic Monthly

warned his compatriots against hastily prepared works on current events t Although it may be listed ason© of the minor tragedies, the year 1940 was not much fun for a bookreviewer • . • % there were ten books purporting to tell true inside stories of the fall of France* * * » The authors of the ’fall* books were not conceivably in aposition to know very much about their subjects (the fog ofwar still obscures the campaigns) and the confession stories often had a smugness about them that cancelled their virtues* * * * The quickies are part of an intellectual atmosphere that makes it almost impossible to discuss anything rationally* * . *^ Some authors took advantage of a well-established literary repu­ tation and wrote on matters of whichthey had

only a superficial knowledge.

The works of the French writer AndreMaurois, for instance, were not taken seriously by all observers*

Professor Henri Peyr© of Xale University

^The Atlantic Monthly* March, 1941*

5 described Maurois * literary activity in America daring the war by stating that he "related the fall of France, then the history of America, the love affairs of great literary heroines, and then his own loves and mar­ riages*^ With the help of a few well-chosen quotations, the journalist Porter Sargent with sarcasm showed his readers what a shrewd observer of the European scene Maurois had been?

"It was on a 1beautiful summer

night* that 1negligently sipping champagne1 at the ball of the Polish Embassy* * • .« Maurois gathered his confidential information*

Porter

Sargent termed tragedy in France "the sort of pabulum he [Mauroisl serves up to formas and womens clubs.“ 3 Some critics saw the work of novelist Jules Remains, The Seven Mysteries of Europe, in the same light*

The personality of its author

made the book popular for a while and It was much quoted during the sum­ mer of 1940j but, according to Henri Peyre, the book was only m attempt "to wield the detective-story technique#«* As a general rule, works on the French defeat were greeted accord­ ing to the reader*s political bias*

The nationality of the author mat­

tered less than his political opinions*

It is rare to find remarks like

that of R* K* Gooch, who, in the Virginia Quarterly Review, advised Americana to beware "French sophism*11 An attitude characterized by an unquestioning assumption of pos­ session of the truth may readily be imagined to be connected closely ^Franco-American Pamphlets, Third series, Ho. 4 (Hew York, 1945), p. 19* 3Porter Sargent, Getting Us into War (Boston, 1942), p. 560# For further comments on Tragedy '&>' France, see Frederick L* Schuman, Hight over Europe (Hew York, 1945), p T T B T ^FTanco-Aaerican Pamphlets, Third series, Ho* 4, p* 19.

6 with the tragic downfall of France* * . . Typical French accounts are, from the nature of the case, scarcely likely to be valuable* * • * The serious reader will find their contribution to a fundamental explanation of the downfall of France worthless, if not worse*5 A study of Mr* Gooch's article reveals that the books which he considered as typical French accounts were those which failed to consider the po­ litical attitude of the French upper class as responsible for the catastrophe*

He supported the conclusions of other books because they de­

nounced "men who had no scruples about aiding the forces of evil against their own country, and who have accepted and are employing the support of a victorious ene^y in order to further their own interests and to do away with their country's democracy* • . *tt5 It is possible to conclude that the criterion of Mr* Gooch is political, but this fact was not apparent to him because the French accounts which he mentioned offered a conserva­ tive interpretation of the French defeat* These were Maurois1 and Remains1 works as well as the book published by Laval's son-in-law, Rene de Chambrun*? According to him, the American observer Glare Booth5 was also a victim of the "same French mental disease." Books presenting the leftist point of view had considerable suc­ cess in the liberal press.® Hone of them was written by a Frenchman**® Syirginla Quarterly Review, Winter, 1941, p* 1S2* %r# Gooch her© referred to Andre Simone, J*accuse J (Hew York, 1940) and Heins Pol, Suicide of a Democracy (Hew Yoric,' 1§40). 7Rene de Ghambrun, I Saw France Fall (Hew York, 1940). 8Clare Booth, Kurope in the Spring (Hew York, 1940). % s a general rule, more conservative newspapers did not pay so much attention to foreign sources* l®Gnly the books published before 1942 are taken into account in this chapter*

7 They were the work of political exiles who had taken refuge in France before coming to America#31 they were especially bitter because of the treatment of anti-Fascist refugees in republican France and because of French bureaucratic methods#^ British and Belgian accounts were chiefly concerned with present­ ing their various national points of view.^S Both countries wanted to retain or acquire the favor of African opinion# The British, for obvious reasons, were especially eager to Improve their standing in American pub­ lic opinion.

British activity helps explain why most American comments

on the campaign of May-Jun© 1940 adopted the British view of the Dunkirk operation*^ Although there was no important work presenting the genuinely liberal French point of view,IS many French journalists of leftist *^%any believed that it was a Frenchman who had published J1accuse under the French pseudonym of Andre Simone. Among the proposed identifications were the names of Andre Malraux, Fertinax (Geraud), Edouard Harriot, Jacques Maritain# Professor Andre Morlse, writing in the Boston Herald. January 28, 1941, revealed that Andre Simone was a German refugee# 3%ans Hftbe, A Thousand Shall Pall (Hew Tork, 1941) | Arthur Koestler, Scum of the*"Earth Kfijwr York, '"1^41); Leo Lania, The Darkest Hour (Boston, I^SlTT* ^%elgian American Educational Foundation, The Belgian Campaign and the Surrender of the Belgian Army (1940); Belgian *feEHstiy ofForelgn Adairs ,'feelgiiMt*"The HpfTIoiar’Account of What Happened 1989-1940 (1941); E. Gamraaerts, The PriSQner ^ LaeScent King Leopold— legend and Fact (1941)# count Gort, Despatches, Summary in the Hew Tork Times, Octo­ ber 17, 1941; Memorandum of lnFoSatlon on Foreign Affairs anBTES? World Crisis, July, 1940 (Imperial 'Policy Group, Loncion, 1940) f"Harry j# Greenwoll, "Franc© in a Coma,11 in The Nation, September 14*21, 1940# ^Robert de Saint-Jean’s France Speaking (1941) is not repre­ sentative of French liberal outlook# llle j 7 Bois* The Truth on the Tragedy of iFranc® m mrnmmmlmpMmm mmm ninuWwiwwiiiwe (London, 9 1941) did not have a large diffusion in America at the time#

tendencies voiced their opinion in numerous newspaper articles #3,6 xhey even entered heated arguments with other French, American, or foreign journalists in the columns of American newspapers and magazines •*?

a 1j>-

Minister Pierre Got defended hia position in The Sew Republic,*® Foreign Affairs,*® and The Nation# ^

Articles by Raoul de Eoussy de Sales,

Genevieve Tabouis, Fertinax, and Henri de Kerillis were also favorably commented upon by the liberal press, which they provided with many argu­ ments#

Although de Kerillis was far from being a liberal, he united with

the others in denouncing the pro-Fascist feelings of many wealthy and powerful Frenchmen* They were not all able to remain objective, however, and followed the natural human tendency to over-emphasiz© the points with which they had had personal contacts#

Nevertheless, some Americans gave

them too much Importance or mistook their point of view for that of all the Frenchmen who were opposed to the policy of appeasement#

In “Contem­

porary Explanation of the French Debacle” Mary Steele Owen, trying to find out the causes of defeat, expressed the opinion that “eminent French journalists, notably Tabouis, Pertinax, and Kerillis, should have been

*®Pfcrtinax in the Boston Herald, December 8, 1940; Living Age# September, 1840; Foreign Affairs . January# 1941. Pierre LaiareSf in Life, August 26, 1 ^ ; Harper'1s Slagasine, December, 1940. P&re Couturier, Bnmanuel Mounter and BeiEsetoTtougemont in The Commonweal. Pivert in Common Sense, August, 1940; etc, *?See for Instance the exchange of letters between Hans Habe, Heinz Pol, Kay Boyle, Thomas Keman on the military role played by the anti-Nad refugees in the New Tork Times Book Review, October 19, November 2, December 28, 1941, and January 4, KHE7" *®January, 1941. 19July, 1941. K W o h 14, 1942.

9 utilised, but Instead they were humiliated and treated with suspicion, thus neutralising any effect they might have had*®** Americans were told repeatedly in all these works that french democracy was more similar to the American than any other. This was enough to make the fall of France very disturbing. A study of the causes of the French debacle seemed to be a national duty since only a wellinformed America could be sure to avoid the mistakes which had brought about the downfall of her sister-democracy*

it is perhaps not surprising

N

that American anxieties were exploited for political ends.

Political

quarrels played a prominent part in the American debate on the causes of the French defeat. As Edmond Taylor noted, The so-called collapse of Franc® is a subject of controversy and sometimes very heated controversy in this country. It is so con­ troversial that there is not only disagreement on the causes of the collapse but even In the understanding of the event itself Moreover, preoccupation with domestic politics very often took pre­ cedence over a critical study of the French situation.

Since the voices

of those who had an “ax© to grind” wore the loudest and since their in­ fluence was very considerable, it appears natural to study first those American comments which were most obviously inspired by a pre-conceived political bias. XII The first group of American answers to the problem of the French defeat contains all the arguments tending to prove that a radical policy ^Mary Steele Owen, "Contemporary Explanation of the French Debacle of 1940” (Master's thesis, Indiana University, 1944), p. 173. ^Public Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940.

10 of social progress endangers the country ’which pursues it* Most of the reasons which were brought forward by American observers were taken from the French rightist press, the supporters of the Vichy Government, or books published by refugees of a conservative oast of mind* Very often it is hard to decide whether there is a direct influence from the French rightist circles or whether the similarity of expression is due only to an identical outlook on lift* There was nevertheless an important difference between the out­ look of the Vichy propagandists and that of their American counterparts. The Vichy propagandists intended to prove that the French democratic tra­ dition was a source of corruption, but they maintained that the "real France" had been contaminated only superficially by the leftist theories* In other words their argument was more a political weapon for French use than a purely masochistic reaction in front of the German might. While American observers also used their conclusions as a political weapon, this time for American use, they neglected to make a distinction between the Frenchmen who had kept aloof from the evils of social democracy and those whose corruption had brought about the disaster* Their writings constituted an all-out attack against French society as such and did not spare even the rightist "prophets." There was also a difference in vo­ cabulary.

There was naturally no attack against "democracy" in American

newspapers; the attacks were against "socialism" and "Hew Deal policies." Every group chose from the set of "explanations" on hand those which were in accord with its own political, social, or religious bias. The Catholic World, commenting on Thomas Kernar^s France on Berlin Time, ^ was an example. 23Thomas Keraan, France on Berlin Time (Mew York, 1941).

11 The religious attitude of a people in which m commonly find the men of the middle-class family anti-clerical, while the women are devout church-goersj the preoccupations with sex which ate into the institu­ tions of family and marriage; the practice of abortion and intoxica­ tion unchecked until the Germans cam©} the shabby moral atmosphere * . * all this makes the great debacle comparatively easy to understand*^ r

On the other hand, publications which were usually considered as representing the ideas of big business emphasised chiefly the economic policies of the late Popular Front* Typical was an article by Hartley W. Barclay in Mill and Factory for duly 1, 1940, which Senator Vandenberg Judged worthy of being reprinted in the Congressional Hecord* According to it, the “theories of Henri Barbusse, Leon Jouhaux, Leon Blum and other assorted Leftists of varied hues had brought the nation finally to its knees* * * *rt^& Why? Because they had not dedicated themselves to “eco­ nomic stability*11 Mr* Barclay's conclusion was the usual warning to American opinions

“If Leftist power remained unchecked here* • .

William Philip Simms wrote that “everyone admits that France is paying the price for having attempted too rapid social progress* * * *H^® His conclusion also was that this should be a lesson for the United States* Columnist Westbrook Pegler was then given an opportunity to develop themes with which he already was very familiar. According to hi® Franc© had fallen because she had allowed too much freedom of action to her tradeunions and had allowed too many ant1-Fascist refugees to enter.^? The g4The Catholic World, October, 1941, p. 113. ^Congressional Hecord, August 21, 1940. 26Chicago Daily Hews, dune 6, 1940* ^7Se© The nation, December 8, 1940,

46?58

n fall Street Journal expressed the opinion that France had collapsed be* cause the Popular Front m s opposed to "sound business methods*1* It ad* vised the United States to return to "sound business methods" In the fora of wage sacrifices for the workers in armament factories, otherwise America would suffer the same fate as France*^® But it was in the Chicago tribune that the "Popular Front theory" found Its most perfect expressions "France is prostrate because Leon Blum sent her best arms to the Gommu* nists in Spain and because the Communists sat down in her aras-making factories."^

xt

is sometimes difficult to determine which was the more

powerful motive behind these attacks, isolationism or antl-iew-Deal Re~ publican!sin* In the above-sentioned article it was obviously isolation­ ism. The Chicago Tribune was even more outspoken when it proclaimed on the next day?

"Like M. Blum in France, Mr* Roosevelt is sending

military equipment abroad which will be needed. . , The most curious thing about these attacks is that they did not prevent the same newspaper from commenting unfavorably upon the "Maginot Line mentality," which kept France from helping her allies offensively and brought about her final isolation. The Tribune decided that it was politically preferable to accuse France of too much "interventionism" rather than of too much "isolationism*" It finally attempted to suppress the contradiction, which led it to conceal the way the French system of European alliances was destroyedi "France had constructed a protective system of alliances which, when tested, were too frail."532%ee The Nation, September 7, 1940. 29Chicago Tribune. June 17, 1940. ^Jiine 10, 1940, s*June 89, 1940.

Italics mine.

15 President Roosevelt remained the main target of the Isolationist and anti-Hew-Deal politicians* the Chicago tribone presented its readers with a completely original explanation of the French defeat which was di­ rected against him* the origin of this theory was undoubtedly the dis­ patch sent from Paris by Alex Small, which was published on dune 18, 1940* this dispatch reads They [the Parisians] were discussing tiae cause of the catastrophe * * * , the majority at that little cafe followed the national propensity of finding a scapegoat for their sins* Whom do you imagine it was? You are rightj nobody but mean old uncle Shylock* It was, 1 heard, the fault of America that France had not and could not build enough airplanes; that their equipment is often poor; that their general staff had been incompetent, and their soldiers half-hearted, and especially that their statesmen rushed into a war they were not ready to wage.^ The editorial interpretation of this dispatch the next day was probably a surprise to Mr. Smallj American reporters in Paris write that the common people of France are blaming America for their defeat* It is to be expected, of course, that a nation worsted in war will seek a scapegoat to account for the disaster, but there is also much rational justification for the feeling of the French that this country betrayed them. Mr. Roosevelt had given France every reason to think that America was guaranteeing their victory and he didn*t make it good.&S The same day the Tribune published a cartoon entitled ”the will-ot-thewiap, how it led two great nations to their destruction.” The cartoon showed two soldiers, one French, one English, tramping in the mud and looking hopefully toward a pale sun which was labeled ^Roosevelt war promises.” This allegory purported to show that France and Great Britain had been lured into war by the fallacious promises of Roosevelt. ^Chicago Tribune, June 18, 1940. SSlbld*. June 19, 1940.

14 Although this theory seems to be a creation of the Chicago Tri­ bune, it should be connected with the attacks against William 0* Bullitt which were so frequent In France among pro-Munich newspapers. As Newsweek pointed outt

"Former Ambassador William G. Bullitt has been accused in

France and by isolationists in this country of urging France into the war#«S4 Colonel Charles A. Lindbergh, too, violently denounced American diplomacy at the time of Reynaud's appeals to Roosevelt. He accused the United States of doing "to England and France what they did to Abyssinia, to Chechoslovakia, to Poland, to Finland and to Norway."^* Attacks against the Popular Front, French "socialist philosophy," or American diplomacy, even if the logical link between them was weak, were launched at the same time by the conservative and Isolationist oppo­ sition to the Roosevelt administration. The same factors— Gersan triumphs and French collapse— which played in France in favor of a violent shift to the right, had a diminished but still sensible effect in far-away America.

They gave the offensive to the conservative opposition* This

explains a curious result of the French defeat on American opinion,

Pub­

lic opinion polls showed that "war-feeling," which was on the increase immediately after the invasion of the Low Countries and France, somewhat subsided when it became apparent that France was rapidly being defeated.^ In the United States political conservatism tried, as it did in France, to prove that the battle of the Meuse had been a test which "New-Deal democracy" had failed to pass. The relative success of their efforts was 34Chicago Tribune, February IT, 1941, York Times, June 16, 1940, **%ee p. 5"9'

IS reflected in the public opinion polls. Many Americana saw in the French collapse a proof of the political acumen of these conservative news* papers* They were thus all the more disposed to follow them on the ground of isolationism*

IV Another proof that the French defeat gave the offensive to the conservative elements in the relentless struggle for political preferment is to be found in the correlatively defensive attitude which the liberal newspapers had to adopt, at least during the first days which followed the collapse*

They had to fight their opponents on their own ground be*

fore trying to present their own interpretation of the events*

The

Nation was the first one to attack the "Popular Front theory**: An attempt is being made in this country to blame the lack of pre­ paredness in Franc© on the Blum government and its program of social reforms and nationalisation of the armaments industry. This is a most unjust accusation, obviously for domestic political purposes. It takes no account of the fact that labor standards had been allowed to lag far behind those of other industrial countries. It omits to mention the pressure maintained on the workers by the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few families * • »nor does it explain the equal unpreparedness of Great Britain.37 Raymond Gram Swing made the same observation in the Mew York Herald Tribunes It may be good politics to tell people in this country that France fell only because of the mistakes of the Bins government. The state­ ment has some factual authenticity* But it is not truth, it is only a fragment of the truth which is to say that it is untruth in its effects on the people to whoa it is told.®8 S7The Nation, June 22, 1940. ®%ew York Herald Tribune* November 24, 1940.

16

The almost total silence of the French leftist circles, either stunned by the blow or silenced by Vichy and by the Germans, did not facilitate the task of the liberal newspapers*

Helther did the presence

at the head of the reactionary French government of a man like Fetaln, who was not yet very vulnerable to direct attaok# In France, as in America, liberal elements had been hit the hardest by the blow# Their first reaction had often been the negative "France was betrayed*"

It was the same thing as the w0n a &te tr&hi" of the

French soldiers who suddenly found themselves behind the German lines* In its first and genuine form, this "explanation" was non-political*

It

fed upon the fifth-column stories which were so numerous at the time*

It

was the protective and normal reaction of dazzled minds looking for a magic word capable of breaking a chain of causes and effects, the evidence of which was not tolerable. The word was "treason."

From this first and

instinctive stage, the "France-was-betrayed theory" developed into the interpretation of the French defeat which will new be considered.

This

development was much faster In America than it was in France because it was helped by the free expression of the liberal refugees and American journalists in the liberal press. In France the Vichy Government attempted to use this reaction against pre-war French democracy, but its normal evolution did not lead to a rightist interpretation of the French defeat, especially in America where the initial shock which made It possible could not be caused by frustrated nationalism as in France, but had to stem from a genuine con­ cern for the fate of democratic principles in Europe and in the whole world. In France, patriotic sentiment, as well as love for democracy,

17 was likely to provoke a "betrayal complex'1 of patriotic origin was un­ doubtedly more susceptible of being influenced by a propaganda of the Vichy type then one due to a vigilant democratic consciousness.

Petain's

popularity in France was partly the result of a skilful utilization of the wounds suffered by French pride* As a matter of fact, certain French elements in the United States reacted as Vichy wanted them to react and passed from the "we were be­ trayed" attitude to a Betainlst attitude*

Sheer sympathy could also pro­

duce such a reaction among old friends of France, like General Hugh Johnson, who declared on June 25:

"The collapse of French resistance

simply can't be explained except by soft spots.n$° As a general rule those Americans who said "France was betrayed1* in June shifted to "democracy was betrayed" in July and August*

On

June 29, 1940, The Nation was still writing "the brave and steadfast men of France have been sold out • • «

but as early as June 22, the same

newspaper was already improving on the "betrayal theory*"

"In so far as

treachery has played a part in the French defeat, it is the treachery mainly of those in high places who intrigued with the Nazis before the war and are now creep-back as Nazi puppets*" This shift was also apparent in The Hew Republic* which combined "treachery" with "appeasement" as the main reasons for the debacle:

"When

the whole story of the French surrender is known, we may find that the defeat was caused far more by treachery and appeasement40 than by German military might. s%argent, Getting Ua into War, p. 545. ^Italics mine. 4^The Hew Republic. July 8, 1940.

IB

In a book written after America^ entrance Into the war, Homan Thomas took a position against the over-simplified "treachery theory*1* While it is conventional to say we are fighting fascism, in effect the most articulate preachers of the crusade against it have reduced it to m expression of the German character* * * * It is a sort of corollary of this theory that fascist manifestations in other coun­ tries— for example • * * the temporary eclipse of French democracy— was due not to more or less universal causes or to those profound social changes which constitute the revolution of our times, but spe­ cifically to German intrigue* Of course there was and is such in­ trigue* It was active in France before France fell* But the weak­ nesses of French democracy were by no means chiefly of German cre­ ation, and the assumption that the fall of Franc© was mostly due to these weaknesses is an exaggeration if not a complete fiction* • • *42 From the simple "treachery theoryliberal elements in the United States moved toward an explanation of the French defeat which, politically, was the exact opposite of the explanation of the Petain Government in France and of the ultra-conservative newspapers in America. Scholastic summarised it in one sentence?

The magazine

"There were a few xich and

powerful men who wanted to undo all that had been done since the French Revolution,,,4S Those who adopted this theory saw in the French situation a political lesson for the United States. The Hew Republic wrote? The lesson for the United States is all too plain* We have our traitors to the democratic ideal— including some of the men who talk In its praise most loudly and persistently* They may prove as dan­ gerous to us as their French counterpart have been to the cradle of liberty, equality and fraternity.44 At first, the supporters of this theory hesitated to say that France had been the victim of a plan carefully laid and carried out in ^Norman Thomas, VSfhat Is Our Destiny? (1944), p. 24.

4SSohola8tlc, January 13, 1941. 44to» Hew Republic* July 15, 1940.

19 cold blood# They talked of the “blindness of the governing classes,11 of their fear of Bolshevism which prevented any practical action against aggression#

It mas only after Retain fs suppression of the third Republic

that the liberal theory found its perfect expression#

Retainfs first

totalitarian measures helped its formulation# The surrender became the central point of the argument and the defeat of the French armies on the field was considered a secondary consequence of the rightist betrayal# In the Virginia Quarterly Review, E# K# Gooch denounced the m m who had "no scruples about aiding the forces of evil against their own country, and who have accepted and are employing the support of a victo­ rious enemy in order to further their own interests#*1^ these two points;

Gooch linked

aiding the forces of evil before and during the war

and collaborating with the enemy* The weak point in this reasoning was the fact that the French governments of the Third Republic had been elected by the French people and that the free play of democratic insti­ tutions had never been seriously disturbed until after the French defeat# It was difficult to believe that & premeditated plot against French Republican institutions could have been successful in such circumstances# There were two solutions to this problem*

The first one was to

refuse to admit that the French leaders were real democrats and to show that they were either hypocritical or at least passive traitors to de­ mocracy.

This view was held by Communists and by most extremists among

American liberals#

They looked with the earn© contempt at the reaction­

aries of the right and at those of the left.

It mattered little to them

whether they had been sold out to British or to German imperialism. a Quarterly Heview, Winter, 1941, p# 13£#

20 Earl Browder, Secretary General of the American Communist Party, entitled a collection of his articles and public addresses during the *phonytt war The Second Imperialist War*4$ The second solution was to emphasise the tremendous power wielded behind the scene by the rightist opposition and the weakness of the French governments*

This solution was the most widely utilised* The

conservative theory had tried to show that the Popular Front had been successful not only in destroying this leftist coalition but also in de­ stroying the whole nation* The French governments which succeeded each other during that period were not considered as full of traitors as they were of weaklings who lacked the democratic courage necessary in the struggle against Fascism* William L* Shirer, for instance, accused them of confusing "democracy with weakness* To take action against those who would overthrow democracy, they argued, would in itself be overthrowing democracy* • • *m47 Shirer characterised Dalsdier as "the courageous but confused leader of the Eadical-Soeialists ♦* The main problem remained to decide which elements in the French people openly or secretly favored a German victory* Many newspapers searched back In French history and decided with Herbert Guterman that national defeatism on th© part of the ruling class is nothing new* The history of France in the nineteenth century is articulated by crises resulting from attempts to carry out th© promises inherent in the revolution of 1789, and to transform formal freedom into real freedom* The predecessors of the Levels, Flandins and Retains were always on the other side of the barricade, often at the expense of the national interest*48 ^%arl Browder, The Second Imperialist War (Hew fork, 1940)* 47The Atlantic Monthly* May, 1942. 48The Mew Republic, September 16, 1940*

21 It is interesting te note that American newspapers were much more outspoken when dealing with French affairs than they would have been when talking about America.

They felt much more free to carry their thinking

to Its logical extremes*

Anti-labor columnists, when they discuss Ameri­

can trade-unions, make a careful distinction between th© deceived masses and their corrupt leaders* about France*

There was no such distinction in the argument

Fighting on alien ground, th© opposed ideologies or in­

terests did not have to respect fair-play rules, since there was no na­ tional unity to safeguard and no hope to win over at least some of the most passive opponents* Professor Schuman*s attacks against the French lack of democratic vigilance are so far-reaching that at first glance, they seem to be based on a nationalist rather than on a political criterion: The quest for scapegoats after the debacle became interminable* The details of the witch-hunt are tedious* Each group exculpated itself and blamed its enemies* * # * In each case the targets of accusation accused their accusers* Each saw truly some elements of the total and terrifying truth* France succumbed less to brutal assault from without than to a cancer within which had spread unseen through ©very organ and limb.4® Following this general Indictment, however, Professor Schuman formulated more precise accusations which place his book in the class of explanations which is now studied* Many of the pygmies and parasites who were the lost leaders of the Republic placed Property above Patriotism. In their delusion regard­ ing the means by which Property could beet be protected, they made Communism at home and the U* S* S* R. abroad their favorite enemies, thou# neither had power to threaten their privileges. . . * While the enemy of the Left was smitten hip and thigh, the enemy of the Right was studiously ignored* » • • The Cagoulerds • . . had friends

4®Schuman, Ki#t over Europe, p* 510*

zz In high places including Weygand, Retain, Laval and numerous army officers* * • * For them French defeat at the hands of the Fascist Caesars waa preferable to French victory in the name of a ’democracy* which they equated with Communism and deemed a menace to Property.^ The Hew Republic was especially bitter against th© Catholic Church. Answering a reader who reproached the newspaper for confusing Fascism and Catholicism, the editor maintained: It cannot be denied there is a strong fascist element in the Catholic church. . . . Historically th© church has been th© enemy of liberal­ ism in general and of the democratic French Republic in particular* It is therefor© no surprise that in Franc© the leaders of th© surren­ der to Fascism should be catholics* One would hardly expect them to be followers of Rousseau and Voltaire*^1

The Army and th© French military traditions got their full share of criticism* The liberals did not emphasize the Army’s military role during the operations but its political role at th© time of the surrender. Weygand was denounced as a reactionary, who, during the campaign, was more worried by the attitude of th© Communists in Paris tlian by the ad­ vance of the German troops. Th® Havy was spared only until the battle of Oran*52 it had not played a prominent part in the wsurj its leaders had not reached important political positions 5 and before July 5 there was still so m hope that certain units would rally to the British*

The "in­

terventionist” liberals did not want to say anything which could h a m the British cause* Even the most liberal newspapers had little to say about th© failure of French industry to provide weapons for th© French army. They ®%chuman, Right over Europe, pp. 511-512. slThe Hew Republic. July ZZ, 1940. ^See p. 105.

25 repeated what they read in ^accuse or other foreign sources on the trea­ sonable attitude of certain banking concerns and the Grands Cartels# While the conservatives focused their attention on French domestic policy in their search for the causes of the French defeat, liberals turned toward French foreign policy* They refused to admit that the enforcement of the Versailles Treaty might have solved the Franco-German problem* They believed with The Jfew Republic that?

“In 1919 th® problem of French

security could have been solved once and for all, if the German revolu­ tion had been allowed to run its course*

Clemenceau preferred to grant

machine guns to th® Russian reactionaries.“S® French policy toward Germany, according to th© liberals, obliged France to rely on a protective system of alliances which was wrecked by the Munich policy of appeasement*

Former Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet

was considered as th® main engineer of this policy which had been planned by th© treasonable elements. Th© most useful of these alliances was the 1955 pact with Russia which French reactionaries and, among them, the man who had affixed his signature on this document, Herr© Laval, had decided to sabotage from the outset.

Professor Schuman wrote:

Had it been firmly based, it might have prevented the war. Too many politicians in France were fundamentally opposed to the new alliance, however* they disliked the Nazis, but they liked the Communists even less* The pact was seldom worth more than a scrap of paper. . • • Here was sheer tragedy*54 Bom people would not have admitted that these French politicians disliked the Nazis.

They pointed mainly to Laval and

5%he Hew Republic, September 16, 1940# ^Sohuman, Might over Europe, p. 470.

24 Pierre-Etienne Flandin In their attempt to show that there was a deliber­ ate plot against the Republic*

A* J* Liebling, of The Hew Yorker, wrote*

Th© men served by Laval, Ghautemps, and their team of interchangeable shills and blinds at Bordeaux were the chiefs of heavy industry who since late in 1954 had been working for France’s subjection to Ger­ many* they preferred that she be brought into the Gexman orbit as a satellite rather than annexed* They wanted to distribute the patron­ age, subject to confirmation by Germany, rather than have administra­ tors imposed on them direct* they thought that Hitler would leave them their share of Europe and Africa to run, just as their col­ leagues, the German members of the steel and coal cartels, which long ante-dated Hitler, had left them their share of business* Theirs was the really dangerous International •$5 Thus, for the liberals, the real responsibility of politicians and industrialists was not in the failure to organise the war effort suc­ cessfully but in the field of foreign policy* The Ration* also, saw in the wreckage of the French system of continental alliances the result of Fascist and reactionary forces working within France* The result on the French people was the creation of Rth® Maginot line mentality.11 nationalist hostilities, racial prejudices, historical animosities, economic rivalries; such ferments working actively enough in France before the war to destroy the alliance with Russia, continued after the declaration of war# . . . They did this by creating first of all that ’Maginot mind* which goes with a nationalism that has become hostile to cooperation with foreigners and is compelled therefore to fall back upon purely ’defensive’ strategy*SB The Hew York Times also denounced the "Maginot jaind** In an evi­ dent attempt to influence isolationist opinion in the United States, but this newspaper differed from the liberals in its comment upon French opposition to the European alliances s s% * j* Hebling, The Hoad Back to Faris (Hew York, 1944), 56the Nation* February 14, 1942#

25 The Maginot Line was to France what the Atlantic ocean la to the United States* * * * It was a symbol of th® outlook and temper of the French people* The French wanted only to be left alone behind their bulwark# The couaaitments mad© by successive governments in the East— th© Little Entente and the Franco-Soviet pact— never re­ ceived the whole-hearted support of the little people, the petit bourgeois, who are the backbone of the republic*57 Supporters of the liberal theory very soon concentrated their attacks upon the men in power at Vichy#

There were attempts to link

Petain with the Cagoulard plot, investigations of his activities when he was Ambassador in Spain and of his record during the First World War#5® The liberal theory was not as thoroughly thrashed out by con­ servative newspapers as the Popular Front theory had been by liberal newspapers. Edmond Taylor, the author of The Strategy of Terror*5® who claimed to approach the subject without any apolitical or ethical bias” attacked the liberal theory on th© ground that the composition of the "peace- and war-parties” was not ideologically clear-cut since the first included leftist leaders like Paul Faure and, the second, reactionaries like d© Gaulle.

wTo my raind,” he wrote, Bit is a great mistake to attri­

bute th© downfall of France to a deep schism in opinion#” He nevertheless acknowledged that the main difference between the two factions was politi­ cal Then he declared that the division was Bb©tween two concepts of the Nation, th© revolutionary one, whether Jacobin or Bonapartist, and th© Legitimist one# • #

But h® refused to pass judgment on th® decision

S7R©w York Times* June 19, 1940. ®%e© p. 16>o. 5%dmond Taylor, The Strategy of Terror (Boston, 1940). 6QPublic Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940*

26 to surrender. He thus refused to admit that there was a premeditated plot to overthrow the Third Republic. Supporters of the Popular Front theory made sarcastic remarks shout the "Hew Deal politicians11 who wanted to hide their own failure by defending the record of their French counterparts, but the heat of the argument slowly subsided until it was momentarily revived at the time of the Rioja trials*®-** Eventually, the attitude of the Vichy government, in this instance and in many others, America*s entrance into the war, the rise of the French Underground, and especially British and Free French propaganda contributed to spread the conviction that the most important cause of the French defeat was the antidemocratic attitude of certain elements of French society* This belief, however, was still far from general during the summer of 1940*

V It is always easy to trace which political motivation, if any, is hidden behind the reasons brought forward to explain the French defeat; but many observers were not aware of all the political implications of the problem* They were inclined to put more or less emphasis on this or that argument according to the influence brought to bear upon them by French, American, or other "eye-witness accents1* or by their own temperaments and interests*

Between the ultra-conservative views and the lib­

eral theory lay the largest part of American opinion* A study of their reactions to the French defeat brings at first a feeling of hopeless confusion* This feeling of confusion is often caused by the imperfect *%ee pp. 239-2li6.

n assimilation of a French propaganda leitmotiv*

For instance, Edmond

Taylor, in his already-mentionod article, numbered among M s "causes” the influence of French Free Masonry* According to him. Grand Orient Masonry, which had played such a big part In the cre­ ation of the Third Republic, played an important role in its down­ fall by constantly preaching capitulation in the name of some mystic principle of harmony (notably during the sixth of February riots and at th© time of Munich). It is a well known fact, however, that attacks against Free Masonyy— Scottish Rite as well as Grand Orient— were characteristic of pro-Faaeist elements, who denounced them, not for being pacifist, but for having urged France into a hopeless war.

It is clearly impossible to classify

such documents according to a logical criterion. Th© most striking fact about all the comments on the French de­ feat is that those which were influenced by conservative views are more numerous than those which reflect a liberal outlook* This is easily ex­ plainable if one does not forget that the only expressions of French opinion which were allowed to cross the Atlantic came from Vichy or from occupied Paris.

Besides, the books written by the most popular French

writers in America presented American commentators with arguments which generally played into th© hands of reactionaries.

The French collapse

affected liberal circles throughout the world like some sort of anaes­ thesia, while at th© same time the Rawls were clamoring that their tri­ umphs were due both to the moral regeneration of Germany through Hasism and to the democratic decadence of France. Usually writers of conservative tendencies and those who were ^Public Opinion Quarterly. December, 1940.

29 deeply influenced by the rightist interpretation of the French defeat in­ sisted chiefly m the political, moral, and psychological cuases of the collapse.

In their comments they emphasised "internal dissensions, in­

credible factional hatreds which rotted away the spine of France while Germany m w waiting to strike,

m x i a m H. Chamberlin, for example,

repeated the frequent American condemnation of French political life: France*s swift collapse is a stem condemnation of many features of French political life. The multiplicity of parties, the short-lived cabinets, the party bickerings and intrigues, the not infrequent scandals— all that was not a very edifying picture in normal times. It was an utterly intolerable waste of national energy and resources since 1955,64

Emphasis on the French political quarrels actually placed the blame on the pre-war goverranents, since French political life had been practically at a standstill since the advent of the Daladier government. It was very close to the Popular Front theory,

"We shall be told that

the weakness of France was the result of the hopeless divisions created by th® demagogues," protested Albert Guerard, the plain facts.

"This is a bold travesty of

’Hopeless division1 resulted fro® th© refusal of the

minority to co-operate with the Front Popnlalre majority."GS In spite of such protests, most Americans remained convinced that there was something wrong with French democratic methods and the attitude of Leftist French politicians. blame.

The Popular Front received most of the

The state of American public opinion in that respect may be summed

up in the careful statement of Professor William L, Langer in Our Vichy ®%enneth Down In Mewsweek, July 29, 1940, g*The Atlantic Monthly, September, 1940, p, 502* Q%irginia Quarterly Review, Winter, 1940, p. 16,

Gambler "The Popular Front governments, whatever else might be said of them, had served to accentuate the age-old conflict between the democratic, republican elements and the counter-revolutionary forces*"66 Attacks against the French Communists were undoubtedly numerous, but they were not as bitter as those against "Blum’s Hew Beal.® They were naturally milder in liberal newspapers.67 According to some ob­ servers, th© French government had mad© victims out of the Communist leaders.68

In the other newspapers, indictment of th© French Communists

very often turned out to be another occasion to attack the Popular Front because it had not hesitated to collaborate with them.

The Communists

were also accused of having Inspired the sit-down strikes which had handicapped production, William H* Chamberlin wrote in The Atlantic Monthly? The role of the French Communists, following the shifting orders from Moscow, was first to aggravate greatly the class differences within the country, then to push France into a war for which the Communistinspired strikes had made it unprepared and finally to execute an abrupt turn toward defeatism after the war against Hitler’s Germany had actually begun.69 In some instances, attacks against the French Communists were virulent.

Some American commentators, like radio-broadcaster Wythe

William, gave free vent to their imagination: You will recall that late in August France had a military alliance with the Soviet Union. . . • This alliance was strongest when the 6%illiam L. hanger, Gur Vichy Gamble (New York, 1947), p. 66. 67^h0 position of Russia in 1940, however, worked against the French Communists, especially among liberal circles, ®%averley Root, The Secret History of the War (New York, 1945), I, 159-160. ^%he Atlantic Monthly, September, 1940, p. 505,

30 Front Populaire. made up principally of Communists and Socialists *70 conducted the affairs or the French Republic* Aninterchange or military missions between France and Russia took place, with Bed generals invading Parle in considerable numbers. * . • The Red of­ ficers, under the protective guidance of their French comrades, did a thorough job. They mapped every bit of French fortifications that was worth mapping. . . . They carried this information to Moscow. < • • And Stalin, without batting an eyelash, turned the secret maps and other details of the French defense organisation over to Adolf Hitler. Today the allied governments still seem Incapable of drawing con­ clusions from past mistakes. Again they are trying to play marbles with Stalin. Again they are courting the man who gave Hitler the initial dagger with which to stab F r a n c ® . 71 Many people, on the faith of information like the broadcast quoted above, believed that the Communists had played a prominent part in the Popular Front coalition and had even been members of the governments. Th® Spanish Front# Papular had been the victim of exactly the same misconception. Some of th# arguments against pre-war French governments were based on misinformation^ some of them contradicted one another. The same people who disapproved of the Popular Front policy of nationalization of industry, for instance, accused the French governments of having failed to mobilise all th# resources of the nation In time of war. They ex­ pressed the opinion that m "iron directing will" could have saved the country. Th# advocates of free economy blamed governments which had failed to interfere with an economic system, the larger part of which had remained free* Fortune wrote that Hitler’s successes were due to a failure more devastating than the success of th® weap­ ons* the failure of th# democracies to perceive the total implica­ tions of the gathering threat and to mobilize the vast power of ^Italics mine. 71m ax Wylie, ed», Best Broadcasts of 1939-I94Q (Rew York, 1940), p. 346.

u their institutions to me t it* * * * This is really the *n©w conception* that appalled Premier Reynaud*7^

Such conclusions should have led their authors to investigate the «ay in which French Industrialists, left to themselves, had carried out the war effort* This was generally not done, not even by the liberal newspapers*

Bertrand Thompson, who had lived in France for twenty years

and m s industrial expert during the Second World War, was one of the rare American observers who did not deal with this problem from a purely political point of view* Talking about French factories, he blamed their failure, not only on the "collapse of discipline* but also on the "low level of competence among manufacturers#* He termed the industrial con­ sultants a "horde of charlatans*”73 An Associated Press dispatch which could have constituted quite a weapon in the hands of those who suspected the patriotic attitude or competence of some of the French industrialists passed almost unnoticed*

In this dispatch, United States engineering ex­

perts from Spain described French factories as "some of the world *s best equipped,* which under the Germans might turn out as many as 1350 planes

a month**74 Insistence on th© political aspect of th© problems involved in th© French defeat, even if it is not a proof that th© writer ha© an "axe to grind," usually show©, as we have seen, that he was influenced by those who tried to utilise this event for political ends* The same thing is true of those comments which emphasise chiefly th© "moral” and "psychological” reason© for the collapse* ^Fortune, July, 1940, p* 52. 7%he How Republic* December 9, 1940#

7%argent, Getting U® into War, p. 374*

32 The argument of “moral decadence” was exploited by some news­ papers'^ to show the results of a radical policy in a country faced with a national emergency* these papers took for granted that American affairs had taken the same course as French affairs, Hew Deal being the equivalent of Popular Front* Many American® were genuinely sincere in their belief that moral relaxation had been the primary reason for the French debacle, but they were not ready to accept th© idea that America was in the same situation a® France* The very fact that France was a democracy was nev­ ertheless extremely disturbing and many Americans were led to assert that “French democracy had contracted diseases which were hers ©nly.w?$ Comforted by this thought, such Americans felt free to engage in a criti­ cism which Included practically all phases of French history, all /rench institutions, all the features of French life, and all classes of French society during the Third Republic* “Those Frenchmen who have not been corrupted by politics, alcohol and the cheap newspapers are ashamed from th© bottom of their hearts,11 affirmed Life* Typical of thousands of articles published at the same time all over America is th© editorial published by the Carroll County Independent of Center Ossipee (H* fi*)# As feature articles by competent observers continue to be pub­ lished regarding the defeat of the French nation, one is able to slowly secure a fairly complete picture of what happened,. The French High-Gostmand • • » certainly knew th© techniques being used by th® Germans but they simply sat back in smug complacency and did nothing. In the French cabinet and among civilian administration officials, love of self, love of pocket-book, cynicism, and easy living made 7SSee pp 10- U.

76Tha Catholic World, October, 1941, p. 113. 7?Lif». July 1, 1940.

$8 complete surrender the logical way out* Among the great French middle-class, corrupt newspapers, corrupt politics, and soft living had sapped the vitality of th© nation* Socialist government and Socialist propaganda had crippled the airplane industry so that French production of military machines was more or less of a joke* Gone was th© spirit of Verdun of the First World War. The grim cry "on m passe gas1**— Hughes, Las hauriers sont croupes (New York, 1941),

p. 248*

188 at Oran, and Dakar m s successfully defended against a British-supported attack*

Martinique showed no desire to co-operate with America in her

attempts to neutralise the potential danger which European outposts in the Western Hemisphere could constitute for the American republics*

Laval

tried very hard, however, to convince public opinion abroad that France still had an independent foreign policy*

During the months which followed

the armistice, the American press gave much attention to Laval4s policy of a "Latin bloc*"

The Nation recorded In July that "Mussolini Is be­

lieved to have a plan for a powerful federation of fascist Latin states embracing Italy, France, Spain and P o r t u g a l * t h e aim of these rumors was obviously to show to fearful Americans that there would still be a balance of power in the new Europe*

they had little success*

Hswswsek

was willing to concede that the Vichy government has a semblance of a foreign policy— however ghostly it may be— in that Laval is one of those who, assuming that Italy is as much the unwilling prisoner of Germany as France is, believes that a Latin bloc can eventually save Europe from Teutonic domination* Its weak­ ness Is that tbs leaders may fail to get the confidence either of the French people or of Hitler arid hence must exist on the dubious support of Mussolini alone or give way to new men#20 Many people thought that Hitler was going to sign a peace treaty with France*

Newspapers commented on the numerous rumors from neutral

capitals about Hitler*s future treatment of France*

It was said that

Nazi Germany planned a Nazi Flemish state comprising Belgium, Holland and northern France*^! Observers also noted that "Breton separatism" *%he Nation, July 20, 1940 ^Newsweek, July 22, 1940*

21Ibid.

was encouraged by the Germans and some predicted a complete dismemberment of the defeated country. 82 The Montoire interview between Petain and Hitler dealt a death blow to the rumors of a Latin bloc as well as to the belief that Hitler would make peace with Franc© before the end of the war,

Nobody knew what

had taken place at Montoire, however, and American newspaper© were kept guessing*

Most of them naturally believed that Hitler went to Montoire

with a definite plan and specific conditions which B^tain had no choice but to accept.

According to Time, "the German term© were hard but not

unacceptable*"^ American observers were naturally more interested in the concessions which Germany could wring from Franc© than in the advan­ tages which Vichy could gain in the bargain*

Some people predicted that

France was going to be completely occupied, others thought that Petain was going to be replaced by more radically pro-Nazi elements or would have to transfer military bases to Germany in North Africa.^

Just as

after Oran, many newspapers announced that France might declare war on Great Britain*

There were naturally reports that Germany had asked for

the French f l e e t Laval commented on the Montoire interview in a press conference on October 31.

uXn every domain," h© said, "and especially

in the economic and in the colonial sphere, we have envisaged and will continue to examine in what practical forms our collaboration may serve the interests of France, of Germany and of Europe*"86

^Newsweek. July Z Z 9 1940. ^ftrime, November 4, 1940. 24Ibid., November 11, 1940. 2SZbid* ^Longer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 100,

190 This statement calmed many fears.

It was obvious that no

sensational move had been decided upon. As the winter campaign develops, we shall doubtless learn the results of Hitler*e conferences with Laval, Retain and Franco. Laval at least is doubtless eager to offer every possible aid to Fascism, and liis succession to the post of Foreign Minister in the Vichy cabinet— re­ placing Baudoin, who himself was sufficiently pro-Axis— is undoubtedly a bad sign. But it does not seem likely that either France or Spain will join th© war on Hitler1s side in the sense of actually dispatching large armies against Great Britain.^? According to Time, correspondents "began to guess more cautiously."88 Collaboration was still envisaged as a two-sided affair, with th© Germans helping French industry to resume production in th© interest of French consumers.

It was difficult to guess how much would be expected fro®

France in return. The final result of the Montoire interview was to increase Ameri­ can suspicion of the Vichy government.

It soon became obvious that the

meeting had been fruitless, but the French government had taken publicly

a position in favor of the enemies of Great Britain and had thus asserted its conviction that the future of France lay with Germany.

There were

demands for a revision of the American policy toward th© French Antilles.2^ Montoire was for the interventionist© a proof that Hitler dominated a country nominally headed by Petain, a weak old man, and by Laval, “a political chameleon."30

8?Xhe New Republic, November 4, 1940, 8% ! ® © , November 11, 1940. 8% © w Tork Herald Tribune, November 8, 1940. ^Gaspar 0, Bacon and Wendell D. Howie, On© by One (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), p. 89.

191

It was later explained, in America as in France, that Petain had successfully resisted German demand® during that period and that he was fighting a "rearguard battle" which gained more time for the democracies. This theory was especially popular with those who approved the American policy of upholding the Vichy government in its allegedly anti-German policies.SI pro® the German record of the Montoire interview,32 it is obvious that this interpretation of Retain*s attitude was based on the false assumption that th© Montoire interview, like all other phase® of Franco-German relations during the occupation, was the result of Hitler*s desire to acquire military bases in th© French empire and use of the French fleet* William L* hanger concluded that "Hitler did not press Petain for any specific engagement" because, "having just come from a disappointing and Irritating debate with Franco, he was not in an exuber­ ant mood."33 if Hitler had wanted something specific from France, the Franco interview would probably have mad© him more exacting than ever* Th© turth doubtless was that Hitler*a main objective was to demon­ strate to the British "how completely the Continent m s under Nazi con­ trol,"

hanger mentioned only in two footnotes Erich Kordt*®3^ testimony

on that point.3S Hitler understood that the unstable equilibrium which was reached after th© armistice and was so advantageous to Germany could be maintained indefinitely.

He knew that the men of Vichy would be the

^Anne 0*Har© McCormick, in lew York Times, April 15, 1942. ®^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble,pp. 89-100.

55Ibld», p. 96. ^German official who accompanied Hitler to th® meeting* S5Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 9o, n, 31j p. 96, n* 35.

192

prisoners of their own prejudices and that German interests would be pro­ tected by the new and old quarrels which would develop between the French and the British.

The armistice allowed th® Massia to exploit French eco­

nomic resources to the limit without having to account to anyone» The territory Hitler occupied in France was all he needed to pursue the war. Th© French fleet and the empire were immobilised.

Obviously all Germany

was interested in was in maintaining the status quo* hanger himself quoted a text essential in that respect, the ”Graaiani Papers,” in which was recorded the conversation between Hitler and Mussolini on June 18, 1940, just after Petain*s plea for armistice negotiations.

Mussolini

wanted to take everything he could but Hitler explained to him that it would be a mistake to occupy all France, in order not to favor the establishment of a French government In England or elsewhere. It would be better to permit the existence of a French government in France, which would be the sole responsible one* * * * With regard to the French fleet the Fuhrer said that the best thing that could happen would be to have the French sink it. . * . It would not be well to demand purely and simply that the French surrender their fleet. France will not agree to that and, as against the very slight probability that the French may sink the fleet, there would be the much greater probability that they would send it to join the British fleet* . . . Furthermore, it seems wise to leave France the hope of regaining her fleet once peace has been made.56 IV Meanwhile, General Maxim® Weygand had bean appointed delegate general of the French government in Horth Africa.

This was considered

by the State Department as a very fortunate development. To us it seemed that Yieygand in Horth Africa might become a cornerstone around which to build a policy of resistance to Germany. We could have no hopes that he would declare in favor of the Free S3 “Graziani Papers,” in Langer, Our Vichy Gamble* pp. 48-49.

195

French, as French Equatorial had done, but we could hope he would organize the French Army in North Africa, shy away from any conces­ sion to the Axis, and bide the time when an Allied army could join in aligning French North Africa in the battle against Hitler*37 Many American observers accepted the official hints that some hope should be staked on the presence of Weygand in North Africa, in the event of intolerable Axis demands the Vichy regime can always flee across the Mediterranean and continue the war* • . , There have been many indications that Weygand has been adopting an increasingly independent attitude toward the Vichy authorities. Two events might influence Weygand to place French Africa on the side of Britain again s 1) humiliating demands by the Axis on the Vichy government and 2) a general Mediterranean offensive by Britain that showed real promise of defeating Italy.38 Such comments opened the door to the theory that Weygand could be coaxed away from Germany by shipments of food and by a display of American friendship.^

For a large part of the American press the whole problem

of Vichy consisted in showing the French how nice the Allies— and ©spe­ cially still neutral America— were.

Weygandfs choice was almost thought

to be between the "American way of life" and the bad manners of the Nazi chieftains.

Life, however, considered "tenuous11 the "hope of aid from

France*s General Maxime Weygand who does not much like the English but may now be learning to hate the Germans and Italians even more.'‘4° The liberals did not accept such a simplified view of the situ­ ation.

They did not yet oppose a policy which had not completely taken

shape, but they were worried by the American tendency to believe that 3?Hull, Memoirs, p. 855. ^Newsweek, November 25, 1940. 3%anger, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 104-108; Hull, Memoirs, p. 855, ^ L i f e , December 16, 1940.

194

some of the Vichy men were secretly trying to join the fight against the common foe or were driven into Germany1® arms by Allied attacks against them. 41

Weygand repeated time and again that his only allegiance was to

Petain.

"There is no reason," warned The New Republic, "to doubt

Weygand1s remarks as to where his duty lies."42

The liberals did not

doubt that French Africa was "Vichy*s hole card."43 They reasoned that the man entrusted with guarding this last trump would be a faithful Vichy devotee.

It was equally certain that he would be conscious that his

power in the Vichy set-up was the result of his privileged position. Ac­ cording to the liberals, there was no hope that Weygand would move his little finger to help th© Allies until he was sure that th© Allies had won the war.44 Before that day, an Allied occupation of North Africa was just as catastrophic as a German occupation.

It would suppress any hope

to maintain the power of Vichy. Weygandfs nationalism could not be dis­ tinguished from his fear of a social revolution. Vichy was the only pos­ sible way to save the French Empire and to save France from socialism at the same time.

Extreme collaborators In Paris who had no nationalist

scruples and who advocated complete submission to Germany, rightly pointed out that this argument was totally unrealistic.45 in a white peace between England and Germany.

its only hope resided

Resistants who accepted

4%©r an example of this last point of view, see Felix Morley, "United States Responsibilities to France," Philadelphia Evening Bulletin, October 25, 1940. 4^The New Republic, December 23, 1940. 4%ewaweek, November 25, 1940. ^4yhe New Republic, December 23, 1942 j The Nation, January 18, 1941, p. SlfT ^Robert de Bauplan in L *Illustration, February 1, 1941.

195 the risk of social transformations or desired them were indignant. Ameri­ can liberals had exactly the same reaction* They thought that any com­ promise with the sordid calculations of the men of Vichy was a useless betrayal of the democratic ideals.

In the fall of 1940, however, American

opinion, including liberal opinion was extremely confused# 40 France ap­ parently accepted the Vichy rule#

The whole diplomatic and ideological

picture was blurred and obscured by mysteries of which the German-Soviet pact was only the most shocking example. The dismissal of Laval on December 13, 1940, made Petain look Ilk© a bigger weygand playing for higher stakes*

There was no doubt in

the minds of most Americans that Retain had dismissed Laval because the latter wanted to help the Germans beyond the conditions required by the a r m i s t i c e . 47

Petain was a prisoner of the Germans, no doubt, but he also

was a vigilant patriot, determined to do everything to "save France"— in th© traditional meaning of the term*

Hull declared that American "diffi­

culties with Vichy France seemed suddenly and somewhat alleviated by the dramatic dismissal of

Laval*

fireside chat on December 2j ing to win this war* tion*"

"48 Roosevelt concluded optimistically his "I believe that the Axis powers are not go­

I base my belief on the latest and best informa­

Very little in the military situation justified such a statement.

Laval*a dismissal was the only favorable news item in the last month, ex­ cept for the Italian failure in Greece which had little bearing on the general situation.

Hull actually mentioned in his Memoirs that

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p# 116* ^Newsweek, December 23, 1940. ^Huil, Memoirs* p* 882.

196 Roosevelt*® information "included such items as , , * the dismissal of Laval, a resurgence of spirit in North Africa."49 The liberals were not so easily satisfied.

They were glad to see

that everything m s not going smoothly In collaborationist France but they warned that it could not mean that Vichy would change its policy. They suspected that the dismissal was the result of a French Internal feud and that a new faction had won over the easily Influenced old marshal.

"Whatever the reason," wrote The New Republic, "th® change

means little in practical fact."50 Even some liberals, however, were hopeful.

They assumed falsely that Germany m s exerting a violent pres­

sure in order to get military assistance.

The dismissal of Laval seemed

to be an indication that Retain would rather scuttle his government than surrender to German demands* The final say about th© extent of Franco-German collaboration rests with Retain, who so far shows no sign of yielding to demands for the use of French bases and the French fleet against Britain. Yet th® Germans* need of such assistance is growing with the losses suffered by Italy. The possibility of Nazi occupation of the whole of Franc® has been mooted in case Retain maintains his stand. This would give Hitler Toulon, but it might easily mean the return to the side of Britain of the French Empire and the fleet. An important factor in the foreign policy of Vichy was the food situation in metropolitan France.

Americans were very much concerned over

the food situation in western Europe after the French defeat*

All ob­

servers reported that there would be general starvation in the winter* According to some people, the situation in France was "somewhat better" 4%ull, Memoirs. p. 885.

3®The New Republic, December 23, 1940, S1The Nation, December 28, 1940,

197

because France had been "able to raise export surpluses of wheat in re­ cent years."SB Various dispatches, however, described th® French food problem as acute after the armistice. colored by the Germans.

S e w dispatches were obviously

"Even French farmers were reported living off

German relief," announced the Chicago Tribune on July 26.

Newsweek

reported:

The German Army . , * was having trouble getting French township© to feed the horde of prisoners. Consequently they began shipping them across the demarcation line into unoccupied France, The Vichy gov­ ernment was alarmed at their coming, having a food problem of his own. Those who lived in th® unoccupied area were sent home, but the others were kept in the French army in the hope that the Gomans would take them back again.53

Such dispatches had obviously a double objective:

firstly, to

convince American opinion that th® Germans were doing their best to help the French; secondly, to emphasize French need for more food supplies. The Germans were interested In convincing Americans that they should send food to Europe.

Regardless of its military value, any leak in the Brit­

ish blockade was a psychological success for the Germans.

Any movement

of opinion in America in favor of sending food to occupied countries put the British in a very embarrassing situation.

The German efforts were

partially successful. American concern for the conditions in war-torn Europe was not due to German propaganda but this propaganda undoubtedly tried to exploit the feelings of kind-hearted Americans for political purposes.

Anti-British and isolationist newspapers particularly stressed

the European need for food.

The Mew York Daily Hews, for instance,

revealed that 5%ew York Herald Tribune, July 7, 1940. 5%ewgweek, August 5, 1940,

Italics mine.

198 Europe * • « faces a horrible winter, with actual starvation threat­ ening millions of noncombatants, men, women and children* Malnutri­ tion lowers resistance to disease, meaning that those who go on liv­ ing will suffer more and more of such things a® pellagra, scurvy, mastoiditis, influence, anemia, stomach trouble, trench mouth, etc*, etc* This state of affairs * * * can only work against the British* Xou don’t love somebody who proposes to starve you, even though he does so in the name of democracy, righteousness, the rights of th© small nations to exist and govern themselves*5a

Most American newspaper® believed that food should be sent, pro­ vided Germany agreed to fulfill certain conditions such as American con­ trol of the distribution of supplies, control of German food requisitions in France, and th© like*

The more ninterventionist” the newspapers were,

the more stringent their minimum requirements were.

Hull explained in

his Memoirs what was at that time his own attitude and that of th© Presidents Our own humanitarian feeling® were stirred by th© plight of th© occupied countries, but it was obvious to th© President and me that the sending of supplies to the conquered nations would simply lighten Hitler1© obligation® to furnish such supplies * * * • Former President Hoover, whose relief operations in Belgium dur­ ing th© first World War were well and warmly remembered, was now mak­ ing relief plans for France, Belgium, and Holland* He cam© several times to enlist my support* 1 got along well with him, and I could appreciate his sincerity and hum&nitari&rxism; but, since his plans were in conflict with our ideas and those of Britain on winning the war, 1 could not encourage him.55 The American government finally agreed to the shipment of medical supplies and food for children through the International Red Cross* ¥

Th© early days of 1941 saw a new development in Franco-American

^I’ Jew fork Daily Mews, October 21, 1940* SSHull, Memoir®, p* 804.

199 relations.

Admiral William B. Leahy was appointed the American ambassa­

dor to Vichy France and sailed for France, via Spain, on the American warship Tuscaloosa*

Life termed this mission 55one of the touchiest * . *

any United States diplomat ever undertook* ”56 Leahy was to uphold the old marshal in his resistance to German orders and make France aware of "America’s compelling desire for a British victory and the restoration of a free democratic France.”57 Apparently liberal newspapers paid little attention to Leahy’s mission*

It was only later that they wondered

whether these goals would be best achieved by honoring with the visit of such a distinguished ambassador those who had destroyed French democracy and were helping Germany destroy Great Britain* Meanwhile, relations between Vichy and Germany had cooled off as a result of Laval’s dismissal.

Humors from neutral capitals kept Ameri­

can observers in a state of great agitation*

There were, for instance,

reports that Petain had delivered ills own ultimatum to illtier threat­ ening to resume the fight as Britain’s ally from Africa rather than yield to repeated demands for the French fleet. Airplanes were even said to be waiting at Vichy to fly th© French government to Africa* Some French warships were reported to have been shifted to Africa so the officers and men could have ’vacations* ’58 The liberals did not attach much importance to these rumors and pointed out that Laval was in the background, ready

to comeback on

German orders.

’’The Nazi campaign to force Laval on Marshal Petain appears to have suc­ ceeded,” asserted The Nation on February 8 ,

"and bythe end

of the week

he is expected to bo in power in Vichy, endowed with greater power than

56Ufe, January 6, 1941.

57jbid. 5%ewaweek, January 6, 1941.

200 before.” Laval did not come back but The Christian Century remarked a week later that it Mdo®s not appear that Petain defied Hitler by refusing to admit Laval to his Cabinet.”59 Laval was the main concern of the American press but the State Department had other problems#

Th© economic agreement, which had been

initiated by the negotiations between Robert D# Murphy, Count do Bose, the representative of Weygand, and finally Weygand himself, had been de­ layed by friction between the American and th© British governments con­ cerning the lifting of th© blockade.

The British were hostile to any

favor given to the Vichy government.

Their blockade, however, m s "any­

thing but tight”

and the State Department finally decided to go ahead

without British agreement*

This fact, when it became known to the lib­

erals at a time when they had frankly taken a position against the Ameri­ can policy, provoked their indignant comments.

Four months later Th©

Nation addressed one of its editorials to the British peoples We want you to know that w© are as shocked as you are by the news that our State Department has brought pressure on th© British govern­ ment to permit shipment of American oil and other supplies to Vichydominated North Africa; and that th© State Department’s action was not the result of any decision arrived at after democratic, debate in Congress or elsewhere. The idea that Weygand can be weaned from Vichy by special favors seems to us as dangerous as the idea some of your diplomats nourished — that Mussolini might be weaned from th® Axis, Goring separated from Hitler.51 Washington wanted to avoid having the final agreement signed by Darlan, the French premier, and wanted to consider it a© a strictly North 5%ho Christian Century. February 19, 1941* 5°Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 150* Nation, July 12, 1941.

201

African affair.Weygand signed on February 26 and went to Vichy fro® March 5 to March 10*

Admiral Darlan sanctioned the agreement on

March 10.®5 Bloat American observers thought that leygand*® trip m s motivated by the perpetual rumors of a German invasion in Horth Africa* They even saw a connection between Weygand1s visit to Vichy and the Brit­ ish efforts in Libya*

The Saginaw (Michigan) Hews wrote for instance

that;

One guess which appears to have a fair basis is that th© French commander is looking ahead to th© time when th© British win— as they evidently hope to— control of western Libya and Tripolitania from the Italians. Then they will stand on the frontier of French Algeria CsicJ • It is more than possible that they will attempt to strike some kind of active partnership with the French to continue th© war*64

Longer recounted in Our Vichy Gamble how rumors of German infil­ tration in Horth Africa kept London and lashington in a state of anxiety. tt®very effort was mad© to substantiate these reports, which in th© end proved to be quit© u n f o u n d e d , H e assumed, however, that Weygand went to Vichy **in connection with th© possibilities11®® ©f German action in Horth Africa*

He gave no evidence of this, however, and it was more

likely that the main reason for leygand*® trip was his desire to secure Darlan1a approval of his dealings with th© Americans. The State Department wanted now to carry its policy of calculated ^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 1S5.

6gIbid* ®%agin«w (Michigan) Hews, March 7, 1941. ®®Lang©r, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 136.

66Ibid.

202

relief to unoccupied France.

But, according to Danger, th© situation in

Vichy was thoroughly discouraging”®?5 Hull described it as tone too encouraging.According to Leahy*s reports, Petain m s obsessed by his hatred of de Gaulle*

As for Darian, Petain himself told the American

ambassador that ”his trouble is his habit of telling anecdotes about the B r i t i s h * T h e State Department, however, saw some hope of establishing a policy of resistance to the Germans.

American and British intelligence

were more convinced than ever that Hitler was planning an invasion of Horth Africa.

Actually th© Germans were preparing for their campaign

against Russia, but the British tried to communicate their anxiety to the Americans and to involve them in a shooting war.

All they obtained, how­

ever, was a decision to expand the American policy of economic inducements. David Eccles, the representative in Washington of the British ministry of economic warfare, remarked that wit was about 11955 in respect of economic cooperation” with both Spain and France, but h© felt Hhat straw and carrots should be held out for what they were worth. Darlan was really doing his best to get Wstraw and carrots.” In a public statement he threatened to use the French fleet to break th© British blockade in order to secure importation of food into France. Th© problem of feeding the occupied countries regained actuality in th© American pres®.

Again the American press was divided on the matter.

^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 142. w

*

i r t p i. nn n *

m m m m m m m m

*

6®Hu 11, Memoir®, p. 940.

69Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 142. 70Ibid., p. 145. 71Ibid.. p. 157.

The

203 division between isolationists and interventionists on this question was slowly giving way to a division between the radical and liberal elements on the one aide and the rest of American opinion on the other one. A newspaper like The Christian Century was still in favor of sending food for humanitarian reasons and this was in keeping with its isolationist line*

"The people of the United States alone are able to bring about the

lifting of the blockade and to supply the needed food.

If we fail to act

we, along with the nations at war, become responsible for every death which occurs in the preventable f a m i n e , M a n y newspapers, however, following th© lead of the State Department, considered th© sending of food as a mean® of diplomatic pressure.

Time, for instance, explained

that the Vichy thesis was* France did not collapse; France was beaten after a hopeless fight* Under the terms of the armistice France may do nothing to help Britain — but Franc© will do nothing to help Germany. Franc© must collaborate with Germany until Germany lose© th© war, but France hopes Germany will lose. Meanwhile France must be fed, because starvation will drive France into Germany*s arms.?® Admitting that th© "American public is certainly in a dilemna re­ garding France,'* Dorothy Thompson charged that this article in Tim© was "hardly calculated to contribute to clarity," and called it "one of the most remarkably confusing statements ever issued on a matter of policy." She concluded that "America can no longer afford to play the Good Samari­ tan to th© enemies of her basic institutions and ideals.

If we give food

to Franc© w® must be perfectly certain that we are feeding freedom and *^ h © Christian Century* February 26, 1941.

73Time, March 10, 1941.

204 not t y r a n n y t h e main argument of the liberals against those who maintained that an actual sea battle between the French and the British should be avoided by sending food to France and upholding the Vichy gov­ ernment was that the French would not accept to fight Great Britain. The bigger obstacle to that development hitherto has not been the Vichy government, which is wholeheartedly anti-democratic and com­ posed of men who, in effect, have bet their shirt© on a German tri­ umph, but the strongly anti-Nazi and pro-British attitude of the French people. That was the real reason for Laval*s dismissal.?® Those whom The Nation attacked in this editorial were not the isolation­ ists, whose power was diminishing every day, but those who believed that Vichy could be turned against Germany by a clever diplomacy.

Although

many supporters of this policy defended it primarily on humanitarian grounds, some observers were ready to define it as a purely practical en­ terprise.

Demaree Bess, recalling these times less than a year later in

th© Saturday Evening Post, admitted that The only effective weapon w© possessed was a bribe— mid the on© great bribe we could offer was food. Both occupied and unoccupied France were desperately hungry# . . . Our problem was not to regard food as a humane means for saving lives but as a weapon for waging war.?® Once more the State Department dicided to carry out its food policy even without British approval.

Churchill, in view of the American

Insistence on this matter, agreed, because he had come to consider tills problem as a part of the capital question of Brltiah-Aiserloan relations*

74H«w York Herald Tribune# March 10, 1941. 7®Th© Nation, March ZZt 1941. ?%atuyday Evening Post, January 3, 1942*

205

Th© good will of th© American State Department, in the opinion of many British officials, m s well worth two shiploads of wheat to Petain or even Hitler*

The British ministry of economic warfare, however, did not

view th© matter from that angle; neither did American liberals*

The

Hatlon charged that there were "still many people in this country includ­ ing officials of th© State Department, who close their eyes to the true character of Vichy*"77 According to The Hatton* reports on Franco-German relations went

far to justify the British contention that it is impossible to send supplies to France without favorably affecting th® German position. 1© may well ask, therefore, why these facts remained hidden during the recent negotiations over th© dispatch of food to France. The State Department has not asked Ambassador Leahy to make a full re­ port concerning the exchange between the occupied and unoccupied ter­ ritories* * * * That is information to which m are entitled, whether or not the Naais object to Its disclosure, before we are asked to urge Britain to modlty Its blockade.7® VI On April 50, 1941, Leahy was instructed to see Petain “at one© and by all means alone” to explain to him that America was going to send two shiploads of wheat to unoccupied Franc©."7® Danger wrote that "the marshal had departed on May 5 for a week1© rest in southern France and was therefore inaccessible to Admiral Leahy

but he did not explain

why Leahy could not see Petain between April 30 and May 5. Darlan was obviously fearful that he might suffer the fate of Laval during his 77The Nation* April 15, 1941* 78Ibid. ^®Langer, Our Vichy Gamble* p. 147.

60Ibld.

206

absence from Vichy and apparently had decided to keep Petain away from outside influences* Durian had finally succeeded in opening negotiations with th© Germane.

The fact that these negotiations were on French initi­

ative was very important, since many Americans believed that Vichy was yielding inch by inch only under German pressure*

hanger wrote that

Darlan . . . had been wooing th® Haaia ever since December, but only to get the cold shoulder* Th© Germans were still pining for Laval and refused to collaborate with any other French government* • • • Durian*8 procedure in general was to make concession© to the Germans out of hand, in th© hope of attaining later some larger and more definitive arrangement* Thus he agreed at the outset to make available to Rommel a number of French trucks that had been stocked in North Africa* * * * After these preliminaries Darlan was invited to Paris to confer with Abets (May 3). Evidently delighted to be received into the good graces of th© victors, and on assurance that Laval would be left out of account,, ho prowised everything,8* This part of Langer*s book was not based on American or British intelligence work but on the anonymous “Diary of a French Diplomat1* which gave no evidence of German pressure on Darlan.

On the contrary, it

seemed, Darlan wanted to prove that he was better than Laval and he agreed to raake French munitions and airplanes in Syria available to the Iraqi who had rebelled against British rule#®^

It was also decided that German

planes would be refuelled in French Syria.®3 Darlan even instructed General Denta to give the Germans all facilities in Syria and to oppose any British attempt to

i n t e r f e r e ,84

Darlan was then invited to

8Aanger, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 148. 82Ibid. 8 5lbid.

8 4 i b l d . , p.

149.

207

Berchtesgaden and saw Hitler on May 11-12, 1941*

Again, the record of

this interview in hanger* s Our Vichy Gamble showed that Hitler had no in­ tention of launching an expedition in French Africa.

American anxiety,

however, reached its peak when, after Darlan*s return to Vichy, Petain mad© a speech (May 15) in which he announced that the interview between the admiral and Hitler “permits us to light up th© road into th© future and to continue the conversations that had begun with the German government.” He declared* It is no longer a question today of public opinion, often uneasy and badly informed, being able to estimate th© chances we are taking or to measure the risks we take, or to judge our acts. For you, the French people, it is simply a question of following me without mental reservation along th© path of honor and national interest*85

Obviously, American protests against Darlan*a first concessions to th© Germans and the promise of the two shiploads of wheat which Leahy had finally imparted to Petain had not been enough to deter the French government from Its policy of collaboration with Germany.

Roosevelt mad©

a public statement on May 15, appealing to th© French people over the head of their government* The people of the United States can hardly believe that the pres­ ent government of France could be brought to lend itself to a plan of voluntary®® alliance implied or otherwise which would apparently de­ liver upFrance and its colonial Empire, including French African colonies and their Atlantic coasts, with the menace which that involves to the peace and safety of the Western H e m i s p h e r e . ® 7 The Hew York Times asserted Its confidence in the firmness of the French ®%ew York Times* May 16, 1941. Italics mine. ®7Mew York Times* May 16, 1941.

208

people*

"No man on earth, and no power that is conceivable, can trans­

form the French people into willing partners of the ignorant and obscene barbarians who rule Nasi Germany.11 This newspaper, however, was very pessimistic on the future development of the situation. plays for time*

“Franc© still

But all the available evidence indicates that we are

about to witness, in a dark hour for the French people, the tragic, longdelayed denouement of th© enormous miscalculation made by the French gov­ ernment a year ago."®® Th© Hew York Times was typical of the reaction of th© American press*

"Petain and Darlan continued on their course

unmoved."®® Admiral Leahy himself, apparently, had lost confidence in the policy of personal friendship with Petain and suggested the possibility of sending American troops to save at least North Africa, in the hope that some of Weygand*s troops would side with the Allies.®® Sumner Welles prepared with President Roosevelt a message to be delivered to Congress which emphasised American interest in Africa. The seizure of, control over, these areas, some of which are barely sixteen hundred miles from the coast of South America, by powers which are bent on world conquest, would constitute so immediate a threat to the peace and safety of th© Western Hemisphere that the situation arising therefrom could not be regarded passively by the United States. But Cordell Hull talked th© President out of making this statement, argu­ ing that it would be an invitation to Germany to move into Africa and 8% © w York Times* May 16, 1941,

88Lang©r, Our Vichy Gamble* p. 152. ^Ibld.. p. 158. % u n , Memoira. p. 958.

209 pointing out that wit would provoke the fiercely vociferous resentment of the isolationists in and out of Congress.*1 The secretary of state was endeavoring l,to ascertain Just what can be salvaged through the Vichy Government by every kind of practicable, wise treatment. The liberals urged immediate rupture with Vichy.

Like The Hew

Republic, they condemned the whole American policy toward France sine© the armistice. Gnee again m have been guilty of wishful thinking. From the time of the armistice there was never any real hope that the Vichy government would be able to make a stand against Germany or would not ultimately yield to Hitler in everything* . . . Let us abandon our grotesquely unsuccessful policy of trying to aid countries that we hop© will remain neutral and instead limit such aid to the countries that definitely show they are anti-Aids. . . . let us dismiss the pro-Fascists and anti-Semites in th© American State Department who have been largely responsible for the policy mentioned.®® On May 21, 1941, the Hew York Post published its first editorial asking for “recognition1* of the Free French movement. Suppose the whole Vichy headache is washed up by a frank break in diplomatic relations— which looks extremely likely, In view of the Nasi-directed hostility to the United. States— then it should be about time for the Free French struggle of General de Gaulle to receive our sympathetic consideration. Recognizing de Gaulle would place this country again where it wants to be, in congenial association with the custodians of the French tradition, shoulder to shoulder against the oppressor. Hull recorded in his Memoirs that, at that time, the administration “mat with heavy pressure from various quarters, both in Britain and in the United States to recognize" the Free French movement. Memoirs, p. 958. Mo t Republic, May 80, 1941.

210

Neither the President nor I, however, could see any benefit to be derived from recognizing Be Gaulle* Such recognition would have meant the repudiation of our universal policy of noninterference in the internal affairs of another country* It would have meant a com­ plete break with Vichy, th® withdrawal of our diplomatic mission there and of our consular staffs in cities of metropolitan France* It would have left the field clear for th® collaborationists* It would have resulted in a rupture of the fruitful contact we were maintaining with Weygand In North Africa and the recall of all our officials in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and French West Africa*^ Negotiations between the Germans and Darlan continued in great secrecy while American observers tried to guess their object and their results*

Since it was believed that the Germans had taken the initiative

in the negotiations, most American observers were inclined to think that they would give France something in exchange for far-reaching concessions* Wrote Anne 0*11are McCormick in the Wow York Times; "Undoubtedly , . * th® Germans are offering better terms j and this circumstance should warn the French that Hitler himself is less sure of victory."Even The Nation was too optimistic when it declared?

"So far, th© concessions ob­

tained by the Vichy representatives do little more than give France th® privilege of being squeezed to death rather more slowly than heretofore."$® It was Indeed difficult to guess that th© final Paris Protocols, signed on May 28, contained no compensation for the Vichy government, and that, aside from some meaningless minor military concessions, only "vague promises of concessions in political and economic matters"^ were made. There was much pessimism in the United States concerning th©

94Hull, Memoirs. p. 961. York Times, May 17, 1941. ®®The Nation, May 24, 1941* ^Danger, Our Vichy Gamble, p* 156.

/

211

German side of the bargain*

Interventionist newspaper’s declared that the

program of aid to Great Britain should be reconsidered, since Vichy*s aid to Germany would be immediate.9® Darlan*s speech on May 24 was intended to reassure French and world opinion.

He affimed that Hitler had not

asked for the fleet, for colonial territory or a declaration of war on England.

"Germany won the war alone and judges herself able to end it

alone against no matter what coalition." " effect on American opinion.

This statement had a soothing

According to the New York Times,

The very fact that his [Hitler* sj forbearance is calculated is en­ couraging, He cannot work his entire will with the French, except at a cost greater than at the moment he can afford to pay. Whatever may be the case with Vichy or with certain Fascist and pacifist ele­ ments in France, th© French people are not completely defeated.^0 No one knew exactly what had happened in Paris but there was even more uncertainty as to what America should do to counteract the German threat in France.

Th© liberals wanted a rupture with Vichy and maintained

that any attempt to "appease" the French collaborationists was bound to fail. The isolationists, who denied the existence of a German threat anywhere, were also inclined to agree that the policy of meddling in Vichy France had been a failure.

Senator Burton E. Wheeler declared that

"closer collaboration between France and Germany" showed "more than ever the futility of our getting into the war."^^ Vichy*a answer to Roosevelt*s message of May 15 was that nobody in collaborationist Prance "The Nation, May 21, 1941.

99Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 156.

100New York Times, May 24, 1941, i01|feW8Week, May 26, 1941.

212

wanted any harm to the United States.

This reply was for the isolation­

ists sufficient proof that interventionist fears were unfounded.10® When the Paris press wrote that Roosevelt should intervene to stop the war, according to Newsweek, "some of the isolationists urged th© President to avail himself of the *opportunity.1 Most other newspapers denounced the Paris gesture as ’blackmail.1" Still according to Newsweek, most observers were certain that th© efforts to keep France from helping Ger­ many beyond th© terns of th© armistice had failed and agreed "that the time therefore has come for action rather than

words,

Americans did not know how extensive French concessions had been. Government circles, thanks to th® efforts of the American embassy in Vichy, were better informed.

What they learned "fulfilled" their "worst

expectations."^^1 The most dangerous clauses, from an American point of view, were those which gave permission to th© Gormans to use Blzerte in connection with their Libyan campaign and Dakar in connection with their submarine campaign.105 The Paris Protocols were never accepted by th© Vichy government because th© African governors, General Weygand, Admiral Bstevs of Tunisia, and Boisson of lest Africa, were opposed to a plan which would have diminished their authority in th© free parts of the French Empire*^®

Supporters of th© American Vichy policy contended after

th® war that Petain was maintained in th© right direction by th® 10%Newaw©©k, May 26, 1941. 108Ibld. 104Hull, Memoirs, p. 962. 10sIbld.

106Langer, Qur Vichy Gamble f pp. 157-159.

zu influence of Admiral Leahy and by the American influence on General leygand.W

According to Secretary of State Hull,

now we were to see the ripening of the fruits of our many months spent In carefully developing closer and substantial relations with French Africa* leygand and Boisson threw all their weight against the Barlsn agreement. « . . Leahy added his influence to theirs, and P^tain began to see that carrying out the agreement would possi­ bly mean a break of diplomatic relations with the United States and war with Great Britain.^08 Langer, who wrote at the request of Secretary Hull, m s more moderate in his estimate of the effects of the American policy on this specific question*

Admiral Leahy was informed of the situation by anti-

German officials of the trench foreign ministry* interview with Pstain during the period of crisis*

Leahy did not have any All Langer could say

was that ^indirectly, at least, all the influence of Admiral Leahy and M s staff m s brought to bear*n^ ®

He admitted that nto the General

[weygand] belongs the chief credit for frustrating the Harlan policy. Weygand used his favorite argument that everything should be done to pre­ vent a popular uprising against the legal government.*^

fear that

concessions to Germany would excite the revolutionary instincts of the French people at least partly substantiated the liberal claim that col­ laboration was checked by the opposition of the French population* time Weygand*s phobia worked against German interests.

This

He undoubtedly

^^Bexter Perkins, America and Two Wars (Boston, 1944), p* 174.

108Hull, Memoirs, p. 962. 10W r ,

Our Vichff- Gamble, p* 159.

U 0Ibid.. p. 161.

m

Xbld., p. 159.

214 emphasised the repercussions of the Paris Protocols on Franco-American and Franco-British relations but it was difficult to claim that his stand was the aresuit of Robert Murphy’s presence in Rorth Africa or of American exports to this area which had been too insignificant to modify the situation in any sensible

manner.

The most significant fact was that all French officials in Africa were opposed to an agreement which would have destroyed their privileged position in the Vichy set-up.

Bven Admiral Esteva, who collaborated with

the Germans in the defense of Tunisia in 1942, opposed the Paris Proto­ cols. Finally, it should be noted that the French refusal to carry out Harlan’s promises to the Germans did not provoke any reaction on the part of the German government.

This complete inaction was hard to conciliate

with the theory of a Vichy government successfully resisting the pressure of Hast diplomacy, thanks to American moral and economic help.

The whole

affair was the result of Harlan’s political ambitions which coincided with Gtto Abeta’s dream of solving the Franco-German problem in a senti­ mental— although still Haai— way and his desire to please his fuehrer. Langer wondered how Harlan made his peace with the Germans and noted that since the latter were tTon the eve of the great attack upon Russia . . . this entailed, for the time being at least, abandonment of the grandiose plans that had been elaborated for the Mediterranean. "US The German attack on Russia had been planned long before the beginning of the negotiations which led to the Paris Protocols and was only delayed by the Balkan operations.

Hitler probably never entertained these

^ T h © list of American exports to Horth Africa figures in the Appendix of Harold Callender, A Preface to Peace (London, 1944), p. 260. ^ “®Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, pp. 159-160.

215 "grandiose plans.11 The Germane were ready to accept military concessions which would have helped Eommel in Libya and the submarine campaign in the Atlantic.

They were obviously not ready and not willing to assume the

responsibilities which a full-fledged campaign in Africa would have en­ tailed.

The text of the Paris Protocols showed very clearly that the

military concessions granted by the Germans to the French were not a re­ ward for the French docility. The German general staff understood very literally the clause of the agreement stating that he Gouvernement Frangais se chargo d*assurer, par ses propres moyens, la defense desdites organisations untilisees du cote all©mand,H4 ainsi que cells do I1ensemble des possessions francaises en A.O.^8 ©t do resister a toutes attaques, merae en passant le oas echeant, b une action offensive contre les points d ’appui ennemis d*ou sont parties les attaques m question#^® The Germans were obviously afraid that military cooperation with the French might lead to a breakdown of th© French Kmpire and the destruction of the situation created by th© French armistice. The Germans did not attempt to carry out th© agreement and one may wonder whether the Paris Protocols, while they were being scuttled in Vichy, were not suffering th© same fat© in Berlin when they reached the desk of th© real German policy-makers• VII Th© best proof that Germany and the United States were apparently carrying out th® same policy in the French Empire— that of maintaining ^%arbor facilities at Dakar. ^^Afrique Occidental© Frangaise* d a n g e r , Our Vichy Gamble, Appendix II, p. 408.

216

th© unity of the French colonies behind Vichy— m s given during the Syrian campaign.

The American people, ©specially the liberals, under­

stood perfectly the reasons which motivated the British intervention in the French mandate *2.17 The British-Free French invasion of this terri­ tory was the only practical result of the Darlan’s policy.

The Germans

were not long in understanding th© results of military collaboration with the French.

In spite of what m s probably a great temptation, since the

Free Frenoh-British force® which invaded Syria were militarily weak, they refrained from helping Vichy’s efforts to maintain the Ra d privileged position in this area.

They understood that the advantages to be gained

from a military adventure in the French Empire were not worth compromis­ ing th© authority of th© Vichy government*

American opinion did not un­

derstand this and Interpreted Franco-German collaboration in Syria as an Indication that Germany was going to defend the territory.

The Ration,

for instance, advised Britain ttto call Vichy’s bluff and march into Syria before th© Raals establish themselves there in any strength* **21.8 It was only after th© beginning of th© struggle that some observers were sur­ prised at th© German attitude*

The Christian Century noted?

many mysterious elements about this campaign*

"There are

Most important are th©

reasons as to why the Germans haven’t fought against th© invader and why the French have,"2-19 Most American newspapers predicted that th© conquest of Syria could be achieved very easily. 117The SatIon, Juno 7, 1941. U 8Xbld. •^ T h a Christian Century, June 25, 1941.

21?

It Is highly probable that th© occupation would prove a bloodless operation for there are many signs that th© French arsy in Syria, if not completely disaffected, had little stomach for a fight against the former ally. I© do not believe that many Frenchmen would resent such a movement. On th© contrary, they would regard it as a sensi­ ble step toward thwarting Hitler and therefore entirely in the interests of the true France.^0 Many observers also expected that th© Arab population would revolt against French r u l e a n d d© Gaulle*s promise to make Syria and Lebanon independent states was considered not only democratically right but po­ litically wise.

In these circumstances, the slow advance of th® invading

ansy was disappointing to Americans| according to most observers it was the result of a "comiaendable If somewhat misguided effort to save lives*"3^

During this campaign, American indignation against Vichy

reached heights unknown until that time#

Among some commentators it de­

veloped into attacks against France as a whole*

The Christian Century

reminded Americansj Under any circumstance, there is nothing to be gained by trying to stir up American hatred against a people who are facing the dilemma which confronts the French. let that is just what such a widely syn­ dicated columnist as Westbrook Pegler has tried to do, with refer­ ences to fa selfish country which 1ms shown th© United States nothing but ingratitude and g r e e d 3 Most newspapers, however, refused to believe that Vichy spoke for Franc©, and were all th© more resentful towards the French government* ^ ®The Nation, June 7, 1941* •^*The Christian Century, June 7, 1941. "^^New fork Herald Tribune* July 10, 1941* ^^The Christian Century, May 20, 1941.

218

Of all th® lesser wars engendered by the colossal crime of Nazi aggression this was the most useless, th© most pathetic, the most confusedly disingenuous in its motives* Good men were killed on both sides for no reason except th© tortuous dishonesties and self-decep­ tions of the Vichy politicians who are pretending to be France* In most wars th© loathesomeness is touched with nobility* About the Vichy effort, first to capitalise on Syria by lending it secretly to th© betrayal of the democratic position and then to hold it, mainly with the blood of native African troops, against the reaction to which the British and the Free French were thus forced, there is nothing to excite anything save distaste tinged with disgust* The whole episode is a commentary upon Vichy too obvious to b© emphasized,1^4

Criticism of the State Department for maintaining its relation with Vichy acquired in certain liberal newspapers a sarcastic bitterness* the Hation, for instance, found the solemn marches and counter-marches of traditional diplomacy a little out of step in a period of blitzkrieg; there is a growing suspicion here that American diplomacy has already delivered a crushing blow to Vichy* On Friday M* Henry-Haye, the French Ambassador, asked Mr* Hull for an interview* M* Henry-Haye was kept waiting* M* Kenry-Haye, after a wait, was informed that un­ fortunately th© Secretary of State was very busy* The suspicion spread that M* Henry-Haye, as evidence of this government*® displeas­ ure, had been snubbed. Th© clever part of tills, if X remember my Grotiua, is that a ©nub, even th© snub intentional, is not a casus belli. The sly foxes of th® State Department had again taken measures short of war.^5 The "Fight For Freedom" Association published a paid advertise­ ment in th© lew York Times before Bastille Day, 1942*

"Just an idea,

Mr, President, to break with Vlohy on the fourteenth of July.f*^26 But the State Department resisted "the wav© of emotionalism"^’? and kept 2£%ew York Herald Tribune, duly 10, 1941.

12SSj® Nation* June 14, 1941. ^ K e w York Xiwws. July 11, 1941. ^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 160*

219

Ambassador Leahy in Vichy*

The German campaign in Russia m s by then in

fell swing bat no on© thought that Russia could withstand the Nazi on­ slaught and American interventionists were not people to forget that Germany would probably soon be free to turn against th© French Empire and Dakar.

According to Freda Kirchwey,

Hitler's press in Paris has indicated clearly enough what is going to happen as soon as Hitler's hands are freed. Vichy will find that Dakar and other key points are threatened by th© United States which, as th© Paris newspapers point out— and their contention is backed up by such helpful American observers as Senator Wheeler and Mr. Lind­ bergh— is now assuming the role of 'aggressor* in the Eastern At­ lantic. Vichy will beg its good neighbor, Germany, following th© generous example of Japan, to assist it in defending these outposts of empire. . . . Vichy is a little worse than Berlin because it is Berlin in dis­ guise. The State Department has been dealing with the disguise, pla­ cating it, honoring its representatives, snubbing its o p p o n e n t 3.128 Ihen, in July, Vichy agreed to surrender southern Indo-Qhina to th© Japanese, anger against th© Vichy government spread to all sections of American opinion. Hull described the reaction of th© American public when it learned that Vichy had invited” the Japanese government to Mefend the integrity” of Indo-Ghina against aggression. Popular reaction her© to the occupation seemed more bitter against Vichy Franc© for legalising the move than against Japan for making it. W!© again received a wave of demands that urn break relations with Vichy and occupy Dakar. This wav© rose when Retain mad© a radio ad­ dress on August 12 that seemed to pull the last underpinnings out from under whatever remained of democracy in France, placed all pow­ ers in the hands of the Government, and doubled th© police force. ^29 Ambassador Henry-Haye called on the secretary of state on August 20 to

128Th® Nation, August 2, 1941. ^%ull, Memoirs, p. 1038.

220

protest against the attitude of the American press. had chargedi

"The abasement of Vichy Is complete*

Freda Kircfcwey Further acts of sub­

servience can reveal no new d e p t h . u . k a all other liberals, she at­ tacked the American economic agreement with North Africa*

uIf Vichy sur­

rendered Indo-Ghina under duress, on what theory could w© continue to sell oil to the Victor forces in North Africa? Do we have reason to think that they will 'defend the Empire* there by tactics different from those applied in th© Far East? let us turn to Syria for our answer.**1® Further proofs of Vichy pro-Axis policies were yet to come.

In

spite of nthe wholesale shooting of hostages by th© Germans in October,” th® Darlan-Pucheu faction of the Vichy government decided that Weygand should be deaoted.^S Daniel T. Brigham cabled from Berne to the Hew fork Times on November 16?

’'Decisions are about to be taken in an effort

to break the apparent deadlock between two schools of thought prevailing in the Vichy government,"18* Th© faction which was in favor of offering military collaboration to the Germans won out.^®5 Many American newspa­ pers considered that the dismissal of Weygand was the result of German pressure.

Such was the opinion of Langer, although h© admitted that

Barian and Fuohsu agreed on "the need of getting rid of Weygand.” Retain naturally complained to Leahy that he was the victim of a German

130Hull, Memoirs, p. 1088. 1 5 1 ^ Nation, August 2, 1941. lgaIbid. ^®®Langer, Our Vichy* Gamble, p. 192* 3*®*New York Times, November 17, 1941. ^^Weygand was dismissed on November IS, 1940.

ZZ1 ultimatum. 136

xt was hia usual defense when the United States protested

some pro-Axis action of th® Vichy government.

Undoubtedly Otto Abets,

the German ambassador in Paris, used his influence against leygand but one© more his pressure may have been the result of French intrigues a® well as that of orders from his government.

German distrust of Weygand

was very natural, however, in view of th© hopes his presence in Worth Africa had raised in the American press.

A Washington report to the Hew

fork limes noted that there were several interpretations of th© significance of Weyganddismissal. For some time now the possibilities that th® United States or Britain might land an expeditionary force in North Africa to cooper­ ate with General Weygand in a campaign that would eventually lead to an Allied attack of th© continent from across the Mediterranean has been freely discussed in the American press. Robert I). Murphy • . • has been in North Africa, as have been a number of United States 1observers*1 Thus, as cm© official stated tonight, ’the democracies have again talked too much and done too little in implementing their policies of war.1 This interpretation of th® events of th® day does not mean that the Germans have abandoned their schemes to take over Casablanca and Dakar . . . but for the moment there is little reliable evidence to g?PP a month later the unexpected occupation by the Free French of Saint-Pierre and Miquelon, small French islands off the coast of Newfoundland which were still under Vichy rule, created much displeasure in the State Department# Early in April, 191*2, an American consul was sent to Brazzaville, the capital of Free French Equatorial Africa, but it was only in accord with the American policy of dealing with all local authorities in th© French empire and in no way constituted recognition. Meanwhile, the prestige of th© Vichy government was further im­ paired by the Riom trials, in which the government failed to prove that responsibility for th© defeat of June, 19LG, lay solely with th© liberal politicians who had preceded Vichy in power.

The proceedings were fi­

nally discontinued on Hitler*s order in April, 191*2. A few days later Petain appointed Laval prim® minister. This event led to Admiral Leahy’s recall to Washington but diplomatic relations between Vichy and th© United States were not broken off. 225

226 Th© American government did not help th® Free French force® in their attempt to bring more French territory into th® war.

In Marti­

nique , for instance, an agreement aiming at the protection of Pan* American interests against possible German infiltration was concluded in December, 19lil, between State Department representatives and Admiral Robert, the governor of th® French possessions in*$he Western Hemisphere, who signed as Vichy* s representative.

Laval*9 return to power, however,

led the American government for security reasons to seek tighter mili­ tary control of th® French Antilles*

Mew negotiations were initiated

with Admiral Robert, this time without reference to Vichy in spite of Robert*s continued allegiance to Retain but also without reference to d® Gaulle despite his claims to the French colonial possessions. D© Gaulle1a position was improved, however, when, after long ne­ gotiations over the political future of France, representatives of the French resistance movements, who had gathered in London, recognised him as the spokesman abroad of the French underground.

Th© Free French move­

ment then changed its name to that of Fighting France.

On duly 3, 19h2,

this new situation was sanctioned by th® British government, which gave to th® French National Committee, presided over by ds Gaulle, a large measure of practical recognition as th® nsymbol*1 of French resistance to the Axis*

On July 9 th® American government, however, went only so far

as to recognise 11the contribution” of the French National Committee and to pledge its military assistance. II The future of the d@ Gaulle movement seemed doubtful after th© "i Dakar Mfiasco.K French Equatorial Africa and the French islands in th©

^Se©

p p.

227 Pacific had accepted his leadership and broken away from Vichy, but these colonies were remote and had little strategical importance,

then d© Gaulle

completed his bloodless conquest of French Equatorial Africa by occupying Gabon, Current History remarked that strategically the victory amounted to little* It prevented the Axis from securing a useful submarine base and furnished the Allies with an outlet for the cocoa, vegetable oils, and other products of French Equatorial Africa. More importantwas its effect on de Gaulle*a wavering prestige* Once more the Radio general could afford to thunders *Join me— to save Franc©.*2 Th©

term ‘'Radio general,*' was

commonly used at the time.In Radio Goes

to War, Charles J« Role notedthat Md® Gaulle is superbly ©quipped by nature for th© role of Radio General*

Ha has a genius for martial oratory

that is in keeping with the best Gallic tradition. • » . Unquestionably th© Fro© French movement owes its existence as much to the power of radio as to the aid of th© British government.^ During th© months which followed d® Gaulle made very little pro­ gress in American opinion.

It was only in the spring of 19kl that lib­

eral newspapers took a position in favor of his movement.

On May 31,

19kl, th© New York Poet asked for “recognition” of th® Free French.

The

Jewish newspaper, Opinion, demanded at that time “that every Jew in America, who lived in France yesterday and throughout th© years, shall stand sturdily, helpfully, sacrificially by th© side of General d© Gaulle and under the banner of Free Francs

A public opinion poll, however,

taken in July, 191*1, revealed that only about one third of th© American 2 Current History, December 10, 19kG»

\olo, Radio Goes to gar, pp. 197-198. h Opinion, June, 19kl* ,

228

peoples knew approximately who de Gaulle was*

It was veiy significant to

note, however, that the better Informed an American was, the more in­ clined he was to consider that do Gaulle represented the opinion of the French people as a whole*

The better informed Americans were, the more

suspicious they also were of Vichy fs policy* A total of 73*h per cent of those who had heard of do Gaulle saw in him the real representative of France*

Only XO*ii per cent thought that Fetain could talk for the French

peopled A poll taken one month later showed that about Ih per cent of the population also favored extension of the LencHGease program to the Free French forces, and that only about 16 per cent were opposed to that

6 measure*u On September 2t, %9bX> the Free French national Committee was organised in London* Cordell Bull noted in hi® Memoirs that ffthe British Government accorded it a considerable degree of practical recognition* To the President and m cam© a renewed flood, of demands that m do likewise*”? The Secretary of State was quite opposed to such a recognition* Be Gaulle had just scandalised American diplomatic circles by an inter­ view he had given to George Weller of the Chicago Daily hews. This inter­ view was in fact a demand for direct American support*

teller had quoted

de Gaulle as offering to the United States bases in the African terri­ tories and Pacific islands under Free French control ^without demanding destroyers in return*u*

According to Bemarce Bess, when do Gaulle

^Questions asked on July 29, 19hl* (This poll was communicated by the information Division of the French Embassy. ) A Public Opinion Quarterly, Winter, 19&L, p* 630* 7 B e ll, Utaaoirs, p* 10t$* "ww~ rw Ilebllng, The Bocd Back to Paris, p« 1*>6.

229 realised 11how badly this interview was received,’1 both In th© baited 9 States and in Britain, ”h© attempted to repudiate it.” Old school dip­ lomats were very shocked by de Gaulle’s direct methods.

His territories 10 were, however, included in the Lend-Lease program on November 11, 19ul* In November, too, the free French were given permission to constitute a 11 delegation to the United States* The "Official belegation of Free

France to the United States” was presided over by Adrien TiadLer, who had been a collaborator of John finant, United States ambassador to France. The conversations between Rene Pleven and th© State Department resulted in various economic and financial advantages for th® Free french.

Every

sign pointed towards recognition by the United States government of the increased importance of the Free French movement.

12

Ill Th© relations between th© Free French movement and the United States government reached a critical low in the winter of 19hl, however, as a result of de Gaulle’s occupation of Saint Pierre and Miquelon, the two small French islands off th® coast of Newfoundland.

These two tiny

islands, whose small population was entirely French, were under the jur­ isdiction of Admiral Robert, th© governor of the French Antilles, with whom the American State Department had juat signed an agreement guaran­ teeing th© status quo of all territories under his command. The origin of the incident was the fear of the Canadian govern­ ment that th© radio station on Saint Pierre might be used as a guide to ^Bemaree Bess in The Saturday Evening Post, January 3, 19U2. 10Hull, Memoirs, p. 1GL2.

•^itoot, The Secret History of the War, II, 12Ibid., II, pp. 195-96.

. 228.

230

German submarines. It was thought that the pro-Vichy representative of Admiral Robert on Saint Pierre could not be trusted, and the British sug­ gested as a natural solution an occupation of th© islands by the Free French*3^

secretary of State M l rejected this solution because It was

incompatible with the pursuance of his Vichy policy.

Be also added in

his Memoirs that he 'locked with something like horror on any action that would bring conflict between th© Vichy French and the Free French or the

B r i t i s h B u t such a conflict had been going on unabated for one year and a half and it turned out that no Frenchman on the islands was ready to shed blood in defense of P&baln's rule. The Canadian govexment was in a difficult situation since the British were opposed to any direct allied intervention in the islands.*^ They probably feared that such a move might be misinterpreted by French opinion#

The Americans were opposed to any solution in which the Free

French would play a p&rt.^

Admiral Bawdier, commander of th© Free

French navy, who had been sent by de Gaulle to "inspect the Free French

corvettes in Newfoundland," promised to abide by the American decision.18 Later he was ordered by d© Gaulle to carry out his instructions in spite of American opposition. Be occupied the island® without firing a shot and the population cheered heartily the sailors of Free France. There *%ull, Memoirs, p# 1128. ^Xbld.

lgIbid. l6ionger, Par Vichy Gamble, p# 215*

*^Hull, Memoirs, pp. 1128-113?. 18 Unger, tor Vichjr Gamble, pp.

were two foreign reporters m the spot, a correspondent of Le Jour in Montreal and Ira Wolfer who cabled his story to th© Har York Tima?. "A little less than half an hoar after the first sailor had jumped ashore the islands had been secured in the military sense#^

The next day

there were elections and only one and a half p m emit of the population voted in favor of returning the islands to Vioby rule*2® Robert Sherwood described the American reaction in his book, Roosevelt and Hopkins; "The American people hailed this m m joyfully* They had been absorbed by terrible news for th© past eighteen days and they were delighted to cheer any evidence that anyone on the Allied side had actually don© something that was bold, adventurous and successful#”2^ American newspapers applauded the Free French gesture and war© ready to forget it. Then th© State Department published a statement condemning th© Free French action In the most sever© terms, and, as Waverley Hoot noted, the effect was "to convert a on©~day newspaper story into a major inter­ national incident, thus producing fatally by its own action, the very re22 suits which it blamed Admiral l-uselier for producing#" It was actually impossible for the American press to interpret the bitter American note as anything but th© result of Hull’s personal resentment o f the ire© French disregard of the State Department *s decision#

To many liberals

th© State Department appeared more concerned with m$pty diplomatic forms ^Hew Toxk Times, December 25, l$il# *^Eoot, The Secret History of the War, II, &+ 205* ”19 per cent of th© ballots were InvSIdT" be¥a\ise tS^r were Improperly filled out or illegible, 1 1/2 per cent in favor of collaboration with the Axis through Fie^fl 79 1/2 per cent in favor of the'Free French#"

21

Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 181#

232

than with th© broader Issues involved in the Saint Plerr© incident.2^ Th© State Department *s not© was baaed on the agreement between the United State® and Martinique, the Monroe Doctrine, and the Havana conference which forbade any transfer of sovereignty in European posses­ sions in th© Western Hemisphere*

This was ©specially surprising in view

of th© State Department’s alleged policy of maintaining French unity with­ in and without the Vichy orbit*

The not© issued by the State Department

mentioned that the islands had been occupied by "three so-called 11?©© French ships which had landed m th© island” of Saint Pierre.2^ Ibis sentence particularly infuriated liberal opinion.2'* The State Depart­ ment received letters of protest addressed to the "so-called” Secretary of State*2** Cordell Hull never foxgav© da Qaulle for this outburst of criticism*

According to Sherwood, he did not accept it in a spirit of

"amused indifference.” Hull had been, until that time* "virtually exesgjt” from the criticism directed against all th© other members of Presi­ dent Roosevelt’s cabinet*. As an elder stateuam and a figure of great dignity, M l had established for himself a position that was almost sacrosanct* It was bewildering m well as infuriating for M m to find himself the target of the kind of insults and gibes to which many of his «« colleagues in th© had long sine© become acatstoraed. ^The Hm Republic, January 5, 19^2* December 25, W kl*

Hull, Memoirs, p. 1129*

2%elegram of the Union for Democratic Action to the State Depart­ ment, in New York Herald Tribune, December 23, 19i*l| telegram of "fifty prominent citizens'* to Ibosevalt’, claiming that the action was a violation of "both th© letter and th© spirit of the Atlantic Charier,” in Hesr York Times, January 2, X9l|2* ^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. i*32* Hull, Memoirs, p. 1131* 27 'Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p# k$3*

233 la his lesaolrs Hull gave the impression that Admiral Muselier’s quarrel with de c&ulle had teen caused primarily by the former's consciousness of having offended the American Secretary of States#2^ from that time on, Hull1® resentment against de Gaulle became an important factor in the

American attitude totrarcte the free French movement * As Hull put it him­ self, "few actions that seemed so minor have ever aroused opposition that became so bitter*"2^ Secretary of Far Hemy L. Stiaison wrote that «He could not believe that it was wise of the State Department to have so long a memory for such annoyances* ”3® All American attempts to bring about a withdrawal of the Free French forces on Saint Pierre and Miquelon proved futile*

Sherwood noted

erroneously that "the semblance of fichy sovereignty over St Fierro and Miquelon was restored, with provisions for strict Allied supervision of the activities of the radio station*

The British, however,, refused to

accept any solution which would not have the consent of de Gaulle* Speaking at Ottawa, ?/instou Churchill attacked Vichy and praised de Gaulle in a speech which sounded Ilka a condemnation o f the State Department*s attitude*32 This, coupled with th© attitude of the American press, caused, in the words of Sherwood, "Hull’s rage to mount to hurricane pr op o r t i o n s . B u t the New York Herald Tribune commented favorably on

08 H&ll, Memoirs, p# 1129* 59Ibid., p. 1130* ^Quoted In Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p* 1*89# 3lIbid* **2Hew York Times, December 31# 191*1# ^Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 1$3 *

aft Churchill *s speech* If there wm mgr logger any qu©stion about it, the Prims Minister has certainly blown. all questions of Saint Pierre and Miquelon and Washington*s wso-called Tm& French* through the dusty windows of th© Stats department. Her© as elsewhere, Mr* Churchill understands that In the grim psychology of war there are moments when the fortright and ag­ gressive spirit, the boldness to demand as well as dicker, and the capacity to grasp emotional values of a situation, are more important than all the gains of deviousness and subtlety* That is what the State Department has failed to realize in respect to th© problem of France* Uninformed as to what the Department Is trying to do, most Americana will still hesitate to criticize its recent action) few after this can do otherwise than criticise the befuddlement and want of courage in the manner of its utterances*^ The speech of Churchill had a great influence on American opinion. According to the figures compiled by the lamas S* Tewtiey Associates, *it was one of th© most collet© reversals of press opinion in a ye&r**^ «Why this sudden reversal?® asked P»M*

ffXn the first place the press,

immediately after the occupation of the islands, had thought it a fine thing*

Only after the State Department*$ protest did it swing into line*

Then came public reaction*

% m came the speech of Churchill. ^

Hew York Post led the attack*

the

In front-page editorials this paper de­

manded that the #nullifiersw be swept out.*^ Samuel Grafton was °so hap­ py over th© St.Piexre-Mlquelon incident® that he «could sing# ^

He sug­

gested that Wendell Wtllkie be appointed the Secretary of State and ^ I n Sherwood, Booseveli and Hopkins, p. M3* January 6, 19t2* ^^Ibid# Z'fitm York Post, December 29, 19lil«

^Xbld*, January 3, lft2.

235 attacked the whole American foreign policy*

w© shall begin to win the war when we give up our pose of injured innocence, confess frankly that we spent the last fire years playing a shrewd and in many respect® a naughty game, and heat our head® to the earth as a m r k of repentance and reform***# It is m t Inmcence, fee bullet-pocked walls of fee world and fee orphan® of the democratic dead cay ou t feat it is not innocence $ fee wounds of France laid open by Hitler and salted by us, speak with their red, mouths, saying that the cosing of the war has not yet changed our policy *35* The Slew York Times tried to defend the State Department#

Ann©

OUl&re YscGonaicik approved de Gaulle's action but oppressed the opinion that

The St* Pierre affair cannot be considered apart from our policy toward France a® a whole, and to criticize it as State Dqparfeent policy is absurd to anyone who knows the f&et***«The fact Is feat Washington lias hmxi fighting a delaying action in France as truly as General l&cArtkur has h e m playing for time in the Philippines * ***lt may b© argued that our entry into the war changes our rela­ tion to the United nations fighting Hitler, but our belligerency does not diminish the necessity of waging diplomatic battles as successfully as we can until we are ready for military battles*^ This article showed to feat an extent the incident had shocked American public opinion*

ISns* McCormick was appealing to the habitual supporters

of the Vichy policy who were puzzled by more ^appeasement# aright after Pearl Harbor. The final, result of fee Saint FieiTe-Miquelon affair was not fav­

orable to de Gaulle* Although he acquired faithful supporters among American liberals and all those who thought he was persecuted by the American government, his rm h action created a deep resentment in loan governmental circles, including- the President himself#

totk Post, December 31, 19hX» Yolk Tfcaes, January ?, 1^2*

"Ostensibly

236 d© Gaulle geared a resounding success,** wrote ir* langer, % ui he had for­ gotten fee old diplomatic adage that it is dangerous to play little tricks on great powers.*^ Sherwood also condemned 4© Gaulle*® initiative m plainly outrageous and taoamsable, oven though it was in con** fonaance wife Allied militaxy policy, and sound policy at that* It was an act calculated - and it would seem - deliberately cal­ culated. - to cause acute embarrassment to three of France *s most powerful friends and Allies - Britain, Canada and the United States* It was a daaensir&iiea of the arrogance and recalcitrance as well m the courage and fierce devotion to the cause of French sovereignty which made him fee strange character he was***2 IV After the Saint Fierre-Miquelon incident, fee de Gaulle movement once m m

appeared to b© taring its end*

Even the supporters of General

de Gaulle had doubts concerning his ability to give political importance to his movement#

Yhe editorials of the newspapers which supported the

State Department *s policy certainly did not help the Free French in this task#

Th© Christian Science Monitor, for instance, rmarked that "fee

political activity of fee movement has not measured up to its fine mili­ tary achievements,** and that "th© amorphous political state of the Free French movement leads to frequent blunders fetch weaken th© prestige of the movement*" the conclusion was typical of many similar editorials? "For fee French, General d© Gaulle remains a brilliant general and a gal­ lant manj he is not recognized a® the political leader of a n m France which shall rise from defeat **^3 Liberal newspapers continued to fight for de Gaulle*

Begardless of the fact feat he was a "difficult man to

deal with," he was the only french leader fighting Oermqy. ^Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p# 221* ^Sherwood, Bposevelt and. Mopklna, pp* 480-481*

^Christian Science Monitor, January 8, 1$42*

Liberals

237 charged that most of the difficulties had been created by Washington's ^appeasement" of Vichy and that tills inexperienced diplomat had been up­ set by th© State Department*s perfidious tactics* The "logic

of war obliged the United States to deal with de

Gaulle in the Pacific*

In order to get bases against the Japanese, the

United States agreed to eo-oper&i© with the Free French in the defense of the French Pacific islands*

This was done very unceremoniously but

The Nation optimistically noted that it was "left-handed recognition at least * * • and a real slap at Vichy*

Early in April, 19k2, the State

Department sent a consul to Brazzaville, the capital of Free French Africa*^ This was naturally done without consultation with Vichy#

The

American press applauded the move* The New Tork &un remarked that In Brazzaville there are - we say be thankful for it - no Vichy officials* Equatorial Africa is administered by Frenchmen who will not abandon their territory to Japanese or Germans or Italians without a fight* To ask Vichy*s permission to send an American consular rep­ resentative to our friends in Brazzaville would be to proffer a gratuitous insult to every French lover of and fighter for liberty.k? Although Washington *s attitude in Equatorial Africa was m de­ parture from its policy of dealing with authorities in control on the spot - as in Martinique ~ some coroentators attached a special signifi­ cance to the State Departments gesture* According to Edwin L* James, "the move was more than an ordinary step" as "shown by the statement in Hatlon, March 7, 19h2. k%bid. ^lesr Yoift Ttaes, April 5, 19li2.

“h m roxk Sun, April 9 , 19k2.

&8 Washington that It m s a recognition of the potential value of the tor* rltories Involved in the united wax effort#^

This was, however, a

meagre consolation for those who wanted to see the free French accepted a full-fledged ally#

tim fork Herald Tribune felt tlrnt »The an*

x m m m m t might be applauded politely If it could be considered to rep­ resent a spontaneous step in the crab-wise progress of the State Depart­ ment toward a realisation of the significance of the Free French noire** ment*#^

The San Francisco Chronicle reacted in the same maimer*

We are recognising F m e France on the installment plan* First It was lew Caledoni&g n m It is French Fquatorial Africa* Both of these are parts of Wrm France**** Recognition wouM strengthen the hand of the Free French and encourage them mightily* We ought to recognise the Free Iranch# They are fighting m m t side| they are entitled to our help* We could make them more useful to our side* Why do we wait? why do we still sen! supplies to the Vichy French in Africa when we know such supplies have been handed over to the Arts? This is one of the mysteries of our State Department *5® An American fighting with the Free Franch in Africa, Hassoldt Davis, de­ scribed in his bode Half Fast When his reaction aid that of his French friends to the attitude of the State Department* The United States had promised m m planes half a year ago, but the policy of deliberate discouragement of the Fighting French was as effective then as now* 1 begged in cables, broadcasts and articles for essential material, but there m s no sign of m ? recognition of our needs, except, finally, the posting of a consul to Br&m&ville# 'Oils cheered us somewhat3 it should have meant that American rela­ tions with Vichy were at an end* It meant nothing ox the sort* It was merely a preparatory move towards America *s using the French

Mew Xork Times , April 5$ 191*2. k%ew xorfe Herald Tribune, April 6, X9hZ* ^®$on Francisco Chronicle, April 6, 191*2*

zw facilities of air and hafhor bases while remaining disdainful of the Fighting French themselves ,51 Hobody denied that the situation relative to the Free French was lamentable* but many people did not think that it m s only the result of the State Department fs policy.

Even Waverley Boot admitted in The Secret

History of the War that the Fro© French wore handicapped by political dis­ sension.^

The Christian Selene® Monitor answered negatively the question

«!las France a Government?M With the Has! sabotage of France, the Petaxi**Vichy minority maneuvering to be acclaimed the real masters of France* and General de Gaulle seeing to establish his group as a French Government, it can b® said that France today has no true goverrsaent. In this sit­ uation, friends of France are reduced to encouraging both groups' to oppose the lads, measswhil© seeking by every means to support the spirit of freedom in the French people - who will eventually obtain a true and representative gOK&rmm%*$3

? During the spring' of 1$|2 American attention was also focused on Vichy France.

The long awaited political trials of French leaders had

begun at H i m on February 19, 19&2* Criminal proceedings had been insti­ tuted by the Vichy government against members of falser governments ac­ cused of being responsible for the declaration, the conduct, and the dis­ astrous course taken by the war in 1939 and

Cementing upon that

^H&ssoldt Davie, Half Fast When (Em Xork, 19U*}, P* £>* Hoot, The Secret History o£ tie War, 11, f& 19$* ^Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 19ii2. ^Constitutional Act of August 1, 1$ 40, in Lemkin, Axis Buie in Stain®. no. 180-81* nThe court shall try persons who"have camBitted offenses or nave violated their m x x m by acts which contributed to passing from a state of peace to a state of war before September 1*, 1939, and also those persons who later on aggravated the consequences of the situation thus created.0

22*0

procedure fro® a legal point of view# Baph&el La&in declared In Axis Fule in Occupied Burope that FSueh a fortaulatlon of criminal reaponsi-

***********

»ini