American Foreign Policy since the Vietnam War : The Search for Consensus from Nixon to Clinton [4 ed.] 9781315706559, 9780765611987

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

SINCE THE

VIETNAM WAR

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AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE

VIETNAM AI Fourth Edition

The Search for Consensus from Richard Nixon to George W. Bush RICHARD A. MELANSON Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published2005 by M.E. Sharpe Published2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square,Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue,New York, NY 10017,USA

Routledgeis an imprint ofthe Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 2005 Taylor & Francis.All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprintedor reproducedor utilised in any form or by any electronic,mechanical,or other means,now known or hereafterinvented,including photocopyingand recording,or in any information storageor retrieval system,without permissionin writing from the publishers. Notices No responsibilityis assumedby the publisherfor any injury and/ordamageto personsor propertyas a matterof productsliability, negligenceor otherwise, or from any useof operationof any methods,products,instructionsor ideas containedin the materialherein. Practitionersand researchersmust alwaysrely on their own experienceand knowledgein evaluatingandusing any information, methods,compounds,or experimentsdescribedherein.In using suchinformation or methodsthey should be mindful of their own safetyandthe safetyof others,including partiesfor whom they havea professionalresponsibility. Productor corporatenamesmay be trademarksor registeredtrademarks,and are usedonly for identification and explanationwithout intent to infringe.

Library of CongressCataloging-In-Publication Data Melanson,RichardA. Americanforeign policy sincethe Vietnam War : the searchfor consensusfrom Richard Nixon to GeorgeW. BushI by RichardA. Melanson.-4thed. p.cm. Includesbibliographicalreferencesand index. ISBN 0-7656-1198-8(cloth: alk. paper)-ISBN0-7656-1199-6(pbk.: alk. paper) 1. United States-Foreignrelations-1945-1989.2. United States-Foreign relations-1989- I. Title. E840.M432005 327.73'OO9'045-dc22

ISBN 13: 9780765611994(Pbk) ISBN 13: 9780765611987(hbk)

2004018549

To Smiley

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Contents

Preface

ix PartOne The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus

Chapter1. In Searchof Consensus The Elementsof Consensus After Vietnam After the Cold War After September11 ForeignPolicy Legitimation

3 6 17

26 32 36

PartTwo AmericanForeignPolicy After Vietnam Chapter2. The Nixon Administration The New Majority Peacewith Honor A Full Generationof Peace A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

4S 47 55 66 78

Chapter3. The CarterAdministration The People'sPresident A ComplexNew World TheArc of Crisis A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

87 88 93 108 117

Chapter4. The ReaganAdministration We the People A Shining City on the Hill The "RescueMission" and the "DemocraticResistance" A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

128 129 136 157 179 vii

viii

PartThree The Post-ColdWar Interlude Chapter5. The BushAdministration The ProceduralPresident From Containmentto the New World Order A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

Chapter6. The Clinton Administration The Governor-President The Dilemmasof Armed Intervention A Strategyof Engagementand Enlargement A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

193 193 200 222

233 234 241 256 281

PartFour The Global War on Terror Chapter7. The GeorgeW. BushAdministration The Compassionate Conservative September11 and OperationEnduringFreedom A Strategyof Preventionand Enlargement A New ForeignPolicy Consensus?

291 292 299 308 326

Part Five Conclusions Chapter8. AmericanForeignPolicy SinceNixon The Nixon Administration The CarterAdministration The ReaganAdministration The BushAdministration The Clinton Administration The GeorgeW. BushAdministration Notes Bibliography Index

333 346 348 349 349 350 351 353 379 397

Preface

The VietnamWar seriouslydamagedthe domesticforeign policy consensus so painstakinglyconstructedby presidentsTruman,Eisenhower,andKennedy andlargely discreditedAmerica'scold war strategyof global containment.It shatteredthe DemocraticParty'sformer foreign policy unity and played an importantrole in helpingto electa seriesof Republicanpresidentsbeginning with RichardNixon. The sudden,unexpectedendingof the Cold War in the late 1980scompletedthe destructionof this nationalconsensusby removing the Soviet Union as America'sprimary externalenemy(and strategiclodestar)andby exposingsomeratherseriousforeign policy disagreements within theRepublicanParty,especiallyaboutimmigration,protectionism,the United Nations,and humanitarianinterventions.The terrorist attacksof September 11,2001,temporarily galvanizedthe nation behind GeorgeW. Bush's war againstal-Qaeda,but largely becauseof the difficulties encounteredin the aftermathof the invasion of Iraq, a new domesticforeign policy consensus proveddifficult to sustain. In light of thefrequentlydifficult domesticpolitical circumstances in which U.S. foreign policy has beenformulatedsincethe late 1960s,this book has two aims: (1) to describeandevaluatethe granddesigns,foreign policy strategies,and tacticsof presidentssinceRichardNixon, and (2) to examinethe efforts of thesepost-Vietnam,post-ColdWar, and post-9fll presidentsto sell their foreign policies to an often skepticalCongressand public.! Becauseof the divisive impact and remarkablylong-termlegacyof Vietnam, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan,George Bush, Bill Clinton, and GeorgeW. Bush all believedthat the reconstruction of a domesticconsensusconstituteda fundamentalforeign policy challenge. Immediatelyafter the PersianGulf War in 1991, PresidentBush proclaimed that the "Vietnamsyndrome"lay buriedin the sandsof Iraq. But the termination of the Cold War did not really erasethe collective public memory of Vietnamas eventsin Somalia,Bosnia,and Kosovo soonmadeclear. Rather, it servedto further complicatethe efforts of GeorgeBush and Bill Clinton to ix

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PREFACE

build a domesticforeign policy consensus. And even after the al-Qaedaattacks of September11,2001,the GeorgeW. Bush administrationwageda war in Afghanistandesignedto avoid transformingthat conflict into another Vietnamandlaterfrettedthat the prolongedoccupationof Iraq could degenerateinto a new quagmire. This book paysa greatdeal of attentionto the rhetoric usedby thesepresidentsto mobilizemassandelite supportfor their foreign policy granddesigns, strategies,andtactics.I will arguethatthis blizzardof presidentialwords,while not a wholly new phenomenon,is, nevertheless,intimately connectedto the systematic"packaging"and "selling" of the presidentand the "image" of the presidency,which beganin earnestduring the Nixon administration.2 3 of theseadministrations'foreign To structureandfocus the comparisons policies,I haveposedthe samesix questionsto all of them: 1. What were the domesticpriorities of eachpresident? 2. How did eachperceivethe problemof governance? 3. What were the relationshipsof (1) and (2) to eachadministration's foreign policy? 4. What werethe granddesigns,strategicobjectives,andtacticsof the Nixon (Ford), Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, and GeorgeW. Bush foreign policies? 5. How did thesepresidentsattemptto legitimatetheir foreign policies to the bureaucracyand the public? 6. Did any of them succeedin rebuilding a domesticforeign policy consensuscomparableto that of the pre-Vietnamera? This book is divided into five parts. Part One (which is also chapter1) discussesthe elusive,yet important,conceptof domesticforeign policy consensusanddisaggregates it into policy, cultural, andproceduralcomponents. It then reviewsthe main axioms and conditionsof the Cold War consensus andshowshow theVietnamWar, the endingof the Cold War, andthe attacks of 9/11 alteredthemin varying degrees.Next it arguesthat modern/rhetorical presidentssinceWorld War II havetried to constructandsustainconsensusby seekingto legitimatethegranddesigns,strategicobjectives,andtactics of their foreign policies to the public andpolitical elites. Finally, it reviews someof the legitimation techniquesusedby Cold War, post-Vietnam,postCold War, and post-September 11 presidents. PartTwo (chapters2 through4) focuseson the post-Vietnampresidencies of Nixon, Carter,and Reagan,with GeraldFord treatedbriefly in the Nixon chapter.4 Each chapteranswersthe six questionsposedabove.There are, however,a few variationsin the format of each.Chapter2 supplementsdis-

PREFACE xi

cussionof the granddesign,strategy,and tacticsof the Nixon foreign policy with an examinationof his attemptsto legitimatehis Vietnampolicy. It does so becauseNixon perceiveda close link betweenthe attainmentof "peace with honor" and the developmentof superpowerdetente.Becauseof the dramaticshifts in Jimmy Carter'sforeign policy betweenthe first two years and the last two yearsof his presidency,chapter3 arguesthat therewere, in effect, distinct granddesigns,strategies,andtacticsthat separatedthe earlier period from the later one. Thus it comparesand contraststhese"world order" and"neo-containment"approaches.Chapter4 looks at two casestudies aswell asthe overall design,strategy,andtacticsof the Reaganforeign policy. Two specific legitimation efforts are highlighted (one successfuland one largely failed)-the Grenada"rescuemission" and aid for the Nicaraguan "DemocraticResistance." PartThree(chapters5 and 6) considersAmerica'stwo post-ColdWar administrations,thoseof GeorgeBush and Bill Clinton. Chapter5 tries to understandBush'sforeign policy approachby analyzing his administration's efforts to makesenseof the collapseof the SovietUnion and the revolutions in EasternEuropeas well as to chart a "new world order" after the Persian Gulf War. Chapter6 confronts the dilemmasof armed intervention in the post-ColdWar world by examiningfour casesin which Americanforce was used-Somalia,Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. It also analyzesClinton's containmentof five "rogue" statesdeemedthreatsto regional security;the evolution of his Russianpolicy; and the fate of his "big, emerging markets" (BEM) foreign economicstrategy.Chapters5 and 6 will also show how the post-ColdWar world confrontedboth Bush and Clinton with very similar kinds of issuesand dilemmas. PartFour, "The Global War on Terror," arguesthat the attacksof September 11,2001,effectively endedthe post-ColdWar interludeand usheredin a new periodof Americanforeign policy more reminiscentof the tensionsand anxietiesof the Cold War. This part considersthe first term of GeorgeW. Bush and focuseson "OperationEnduring Freedom"and "OperationIraqi Freedom." On the basisof the structured,focusedcomparisonsundertakenin chapters 2 through7, Part Five (chapter8) offers a summaryof their major conclusionsand a matrix of their highlights. My researchstrategyrelies on unclassifieddocuments,particularly presidential speeches. Thesehaveprovedvery useful to a study partly focusedon presidentialrhetoric. I have supplementedthesematerials with secondary sources,the memoirsof leading participants,and personalinterviews conductedwith Nixon, Carter,Reagan,Bush,Clinton, andGeorgeW. Bush officials over a period of severalyears.

xii

PREFACE

This book constitutesa revision andexpansionof my AmericanForeign Policy Since the Vietnam War: The Searchfor Consensusfrom Nixon to Clinton (M.E. Sharpe,2000). I have revised sectionsof chapter1 to account for someof the changesin the domesticpolitical landscapeas a result of the attacksof September11, 2001, OperationEnduring Freedom, and OperationIraqi Freedom.Moreover,I haveupdatedthe Clinton chapter to accountfor his entire tenurein office and written a new chapteron the first term of GeorgeW. Bush. The views expressedhereare thoseof the authorexclusively and do not representthe views of the National DefenseUniversity, the Departmentof Defense,or the United StatesGovernment.

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE THE

VIETNAM WAR

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_______ PartOne The Rise and Fall of the Cold War Consensus

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1

In Search of Consensus

Consensus,like balanceo/power, national interest, and bipartisanship,is a frequently used and much abusedterm. More than three decadesago the sociologistEdwardShils offered a now classicdefinition: Consensusis a particularstateof the belief systemof a society. It exists when a large proportionof the adult membersof a society,more particularly a large proportion of thoseconcernedwith decisionsregardingthe allocationsof authority, status,rights, wealth and income, and other importantandscarcevaluesaboutwhich conflict might occur,arein approximateagreementin their beliefs aboutwhat decisionsshouldbe madeand havesomefeeling of unity with eachotherandwith the societyasa whole.1 To claim that consensusexists wheneverinterestedadults are in approximate agreementabout what decisionsshouldbe made implies that consensusdescribessocialagreementalonga wide spectrumrangingfrom thegeneral to the specific and from the lofty to the mundane.Even the more narrow notion of political consensusembracesa near-universeof activity. In short, becausethe word consensushas beenusedto describeagreementaboutalmost anything, it might be a hopelesslyambiguousconcept. Yet investigatingthe domesticdimensionsof Americanforeign policy virtually compelsa discussionof consensus,if only becausepresidents,their advisers,membersof Congress,and the media routinely do so. The term must be taken seriously becauseof its central role in contemporaryAmerican political discourse.And, indeed,if carefully defined and applied, it can provideusefulinsightsinto the domesticlandscapeof Americanforeign policy. A brief review of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century illustrates this point. Seriousforeign policy disagreementsdominatedin the decades beforeWorld War II. The bitter debatesover overseasannexationsfoIl ow3

4

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

ing the Spanish-American War, entry into the GreatWar, membershipin the Leagueof Nations,and neutrality legislationin the 1930srepresentimportant episodesin the internal politics of American foreign policy. Someof thesestrugglesinvolved vital constitutionalissuesaboutexecutiveand legislative powers in foreign affairs. Thus Henry Cabot Lodge opposedthe Treaty of Versailles,not as an isolationist, but as a senatorconvincedthat the LeagueCovenantwould lure presidentsinto making commitmentsand waging wars without congressionalapproval. The Neutrality Acts of the 1930s,Lend Lease,and Franklin Roosevelt'sundeclarednaval war against Germanyin 1941 provokedsimilarly importantconstitutionalquestionsabout presidential-congressional procedures.Theseseriouspolicy and procedural disputesreflectedprofounddisagreements aboutthe requirementsof American national security. What kinds of internationalconditions promotedor weakenedUnited Statessecurity?Shouldthe nation seekmerely to protect its physicalsecurityor mustit alsoact to preserveor exportits political and economicvaluesand institutions?How bestcould either of thesegoals be achieved?Thesequestionsproducedharshly discordantanswersbetween 1900 and 1941. From the late 1940sto the mid-1960s,however, presidentsoffered foreign policies that enjoyedsubstantialpublic andelite support.2 The apparent demandsof the Cold War largely overcamethe often paralyzingdivisiveness ofthe interwarperiod andlent a certaincoherence, purpose, and predictability to Americanforeign policy. Somecritics, however,havearguedthat Cold War presidents,by baldly andsimplistically inflating the communist"threat," manufacturedan artificial consensusthat stifled domesticdissent,rigidified U.S. foreign policy, and ultimately trappedthem in their own inflammatory rhetoric.3 Accordingto this view, a ratherdesperatesearchfor consensushad encouragedCold War presidentsto presentplatitudinous,highly symbolic foreign policies embodyingvaguenational valuesmasqueradingas universal truths. But to ask if presidentsshould try to createa domestic foreign policy consensusmissesthe point inasmuchas most presidents-Nixonwas a partial exception-haveacted on the premisethat consensusis both possible and desirable,have worked hard to achieveit, and havedone so despitethe fact that thereexistsno generallyaccepteddefinition of consensus! Cold War presidentsfrom Harry S Trumanto Lyndon Johnsonsharedthe conviction that public and elite supportfor foreign policy could be most effectively built on a strategicframeworkof global, anticommunistcontainment.Then from the late 1960sto the late 1980s,U.S. presidents-haunted and constrainedby the legacyof Vietnam-triedto sustainAmerica'sinternational"relevance"in the face of widespreaddomesticfearsaboutthe costs

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 5

of military interventionand global activism. Thesepost-Vietnampresidents confronteda public increasinglypreoccupiedwith domesticeconomicinterests,but simultaneouslydemandingthat the United Statesremain a world leader.PresidentsRichardNixon, Jimmy Carter,andRonaldReaganattempted to grapplewith this post-Vietnamworld by unveiling granddesignsand foreign policy strategiesin conflict with thoseof their immediatepredecessors. These,in tum, provoked vigorous reactionsfrom divided domestic elites now arrayedalong ideologically adversariallines.Thesepresidents,in reaction to suchdifficult andoften contradictorydomesticrealities,relied heavily on rhetoric,theater,and public relationsto mobilize supportfor their foreign policies,with Reaganandhis "handlers"merelycontinuinga trendbegunby Nixon in 1968.The result was that by the late 1980s"rhetorical" presidents had further widenedthe frequently prominentgapbetweenwords anddeeds in Americanforeign policy. There were, of course,severalreasonsfor this disturbing development. communications,congressionalinsistence The availability of instantaneous on a centralrole in foreign policymaking,andthe growing cultural diversity of American society since the 1960sconspiredto tempt presidentsto portray all decisionsas "simple and stark choices betweengood and evil."4 Theserhetoricalexcessescould perhapsbe defendedas necessarywhile the Cold War raged,for behind the overheatedwords lay a reasonablegeopolitical analysisthat focusedon the reality of the Soviet threat. But with the demiseof the Soviet Union, and with it the central organizingconceptof forty plus yearsof American strategy,post-ColdWar presidentshaveoften reachedback to the old rhetoric in order to mobilize public support for internationalundertakingswhosestrategicrationaleshavebeenvery difficult to define.Did GeorgeBushreally think that SaddamHusseinwas"worse than Hitler"? Did Bill Clinton really believe that the United Statesis the "conscienceof the international community"? Or should statementslike thesebe dismissedas rhetorical flourishesdesignedto achievethat elusive public consensusaboutthe U.S. role in the post-ColdWar world? The answersare not at all clear. In sum, the questfor foreign policy consensushas beenboth an understandablepresidentialresponseto a fragmented,sometimesstalemateddomesticpolitical system,anda dangeroustemptationfor themto misrepresent their foreign policies and thoseof other nations.The absenceof consensus risks turning every foreign policy issue into a highly politicized domestic dispute; yet the searchfor consensushas often entailedthe articulation of doctrinal, moralistic foreign policies ill-suited to servethe interestsof the United States.If anything,the geopoliticaluncertaintyunleashedby the ending of the Cold War exacerbatedthis tendency.

6

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

The Elementsof Consensus To help clarify the inevitably slippery yet important conceptof domestic foreign policy consensusI will disaggregateit into threecomponents:policy, cultural, and procedural. Policy consensusinvolves substantialpublic and elite agreementaboutthe granddesign,strategy,andtacticsof foreign policy. Cultural consensusentailsbroad,grassrootsagreementaboutan appropriate setof privateandpublic valueslinked to America'sinternationalrole. Procedural consensusrefers to presidential-congressional understandingsabout therespectivetasksto be performedby eachgovernmentalbranch.The meaning of eachwill be madecleareras concreteexamplesaregiven. Here I will suggestthat for about twenty years beginning shortly after World War II, Americanforeign policy was characterizedby a relatively stablepolicy, cultural, and proceduraldomesticconsensus. Policy Consensus

During thesetwo decadespolitical elites, most notably the so-calledforeign policy establishment,and the wider public, especiallythe betterinformedor attentivepart of it, subscribedto a set of fundamentalpropositionsaboutthe natureof the internationalsystem,the requirementsof American security, and the nation'sproperorientationto the world. Chief amongthem were: 1. Alone amongthe nationsof the Free World the United Stateshas both the material powerand the moral responsibilityto create a just and stable international order. While isolationismlingeredfor a time after 1945, most prominentlywithin partsof theRepublicanParty,SenatorArthur Vandenberg's well-known conversionto internationalismand Dwight Eisenhower'svictory over Robert Taft at the 1952 national conventionsignified important triumphs for the emergingactivist consensus.To be sure, there remaineda residueof "Asialationist" sentimentamong some RepUblicans,which led themto equateU.S. interestssolely with EastAsia's,while Democraticleaders inclined toward a Eurocentricorientation,but thesedivergenttendencies largely subsidedafter the termination of the Korean War in 1953. Public opinion data on this issue of global involvementrepeatedlyrevealedwide supportfor the propositionthat it was betterfor the United States"to takean active role in," rather than "stay out of," world affairs. Typically, support hoveredaround70 percent,dipping a bit in 1946and 1947 and againimmediately after the Korean cease-fireand soaringto 79 percentin June 1965.5 No comparablesurveyswere done on elite attitudesuntil 1974, but most analystsbelieve that until at least the early 1960s,political leadersled the public into acceptinga greaterU.S. role in the world.

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 7

2. In light of the interdependentnature of the world, U.S. security interestsmustbe necessarilyglobal. As JohnLewis Gaddishasshown,GeorgeF. Kennan and other Truman administrationofficials initially wished to limit America'sintereststo WesternEurope,Japan,and the Westernhemisphere becauseof both the perceivednatureof the Soviet threat and the finite resourcesavailableto the United States.But the psychologicaldifficulties of drawing and sustainingdistinctions betweenvital and peripheralinterests, the reluctanceof Congressto provide aid to Greeceand Turkey in 1947, the frightening global eventsof 1949, and the outbreakof the Korean War the following yearcombinedto compel the Trumanadministration,first rhetorically and then in reality, to embracea dramatically more expansivedefinition of the nature of the Soviet threat and the requirementsof American security.6The operativemetaphorsbecameSecretaryof StateDeanAcheson's infectious rotten apple and Eisenhower'srow of falling dominoes,for they expressedthe widely held conviction that the United Statescould not afford to "pick and choose"its overseascommitments.Nevertheless,opinion surveys from theseyears indicatedthat the public retaineda certain senseof geographicalpriorities. For example,whereasopinion supportedthe EuropeanMarshall Plan 57 percentto 21 percentin July 1947 and 65 percentto 13 percentin November1948,the public was considerablymore divided in July 1950aboutsendingmilitary suppliesto ChiangKai-shekin China,with 48 percentin favor and 35 percentopposed.And while 74 percentapproved of NATO in May 1950, only 55 percentwished to back this commitment with U.S. groundforcesin January1951.Supportfor sendingAmericantroops to Indochinarangedfrom 8 percentin August 1953 to 20 percentin May 1954, though approval increasedrapidly-to 59 percentin March 1966-oncemilitary action was taken.And on the issueof dispatchingU.S. armed forces to the Middle East to stop a hypotheticalRussianinvasion, opinion was divided in January 1957 with 50 percentin favor and 34 percentopposed.On the other hand, a March 1959 poll showedthat fully 81 percent favored retention of U.S. troops in West Berlin even if it risked war.? We shouldbe wary of readingtoo much into thesepolling results,but in general it appearsthat the commitmentto WesternEuropewas moreimportantto the public thanAsia andthe Middle East,andthat this supportinevitably grew in the immediateaftermathof all actual U.S. commitments. 3. SovietandSoviet-inspiredaggressionandsubversionconstitutesthe primary threat to world peace.Here again Gallup poll resultshelp to illuminate the public's attitude.As late as January1947,43percentthoughtthat Russia would cooperatewith the United Statesin world affairs,but by June1949only 20 percentcontinuedto believeSO.8The opinion that "Russiais trying to build

8

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

herselfup to be the ruling powerof the world" reached76 percentin October 1947 and remainedat comparablyhigh levels for most of the next two decades.This apparentlypervasiveconsensus, however,largely maskedtwo complicating elements.First, even amongthe elites thereremaineddisagreement aboutthe sourcesof Soviet expansion,with someanalystsstressingMarxistLeninist ideology, othersemphasizingthe long-standingaims of Russiannationalism, and still othersfocusing on the peculiaritiesof Stalin'spersonality. While thesedivergentperceptionsimpliedpolicydifferencesover whetheror not Soviet-Americancooperationwould everbe possible,they remaineddormant,for the mostpart, until at leastthe 1960s.The Sovietthreatappearedso seriousand immediatethat speculationabout its roots seemedabstractand irrelevantto most political leadersand almost all of the public. Second,U.S. policymakers,especiallyafter the outbreakof the Korean War, repeatedly warnedof an internationalcommunistconspiracy,a monolithic threat to the FreeWorld, an alien way of life dedicatedto the extinction of American values, an unholy alliance cementedby an evil ideology. The American public sharedthis view, yet it wasnot oneactuallyheldby mostTrumanandEisenhower officials. Recentscholarshiphasshownthat foreign policy specialistsasotherwise different as GeorgeF. Kennanand John FosterDulles believedthat real opportunitiesexistedfor fragmentingthe Soviet bloc, though they disagreed aboutthe appropriatetactics to pursue.9 For them the Soviet empire was surprisingly fragile, probablyoverextended,and vulnerableto fissures.The anticommunistpublic consensusof theseyears,in fact, resulted,in part, from a decadeof rhetoricalexaggerationsof presidentsand their advisers.1o

4. Thepolicy ofcontainmentrepresentsthe bestway to stopfurther Soviet and Soviet-sponsored expansion.Containment,though originally designed to deny WesternEuropeand Japanto the Soviet Union, was gradually universalized,first, rhetorically,in the TrumanDoctrine, and later, in deed,during the KoreanWar.Yet evenin its mostexuberantform, containmentremained a boundedcrusade,more toleratedthan loved by a public and elite consensusthat preferredit to the alternativesof isolationism,rollback, and preventive war. Somecommentators,like Kennanand Walter Lippmann, worried about the cohesivenessof far-flung "collective security" pacts, and many more people (particularly within the Eisenhoweradministration)doubted America's ability to pay for global containmentwithout incurring severe domesticcosts,but, on balance,this policy seemeda responsiblemixture of idealism and pragmatism.While some prominentRepublicansin the early 1950spaid rhetoricalhomageto a "liberation theology"that preachedagainst the Yalta "surrender"and the China sellout, its hollownessbecameevident as early asJune1953 whencommunistrollback enthusiastsremainedgener-

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 9

ally silent during worker unrestin EastBerlin andit wasfully discreditedby similar behaviorduring the HungarianRevolutionin 1956.What little opinion dataexist suggesta public unwilling to risk war in orderto recapturelost territory but equally opposedto acceptingadditional communisttriumphs. For example,in September1962, at a time of severeU.S.-Cubantension, only 24 percentofthosepolled by Gallup countenanced the useof American 11 In sum,despite troopsto overthrowCastro,while 63 percentwere opposed. the psychologicalfrustrationsand financial expenseof containment,most Americanssaw it as a' prudent coursethat promisedto keep the peaceby demonstrating strength, resolve,and restraintto communistadversaries. 5. The United Statesmustpossessnuclearweaponsin order to help deter a Sovietattackon it and its allies. Much of the public certainlyworried about the risks of nuclear war during theseyears, and this nervousnessdramatically increasedduring episodeslike the Berlin andCubanmissile crises,but mostAmericansbelievedthat nuclearweaponsenhancedU.S. security and wishedto preservenuclearsuperiority.Interestingly,a 1955 Gallup poll indicatedthat only 27 percentthoughtthat humankindwould be destroyedin a full-scale Soviet-Americannuclearwar,12thoughlarge majoritiesopposeda U.S. preemptivenuclearattack. Indeed,this "deterrencethrough superiority" tenet so thoroughly dominateddiscoursethat policy alternatives-for example,equivalence,freeze,build-down,mutualelimination-werenot even posedto the public by polling organizationsuntil the issueof atmospheric testingemergedin the late 1950s.

6. A stable.openworld economyrequiresAmericanleadership.While the public typically focusedattentionmore on personal,pocketbookissueslike unemployment,recession,and inflation, political leaderssharedthe grander of 1944would convictionthat adherenceto the BrettonWoodsarrangements lessenthe likelihood of a new world depression.Someprotectionistsentiment lingered and occasionallyproved politically potent as, for example, when the InternationalTrade Organizationtreaty failed to win Senateapproval; but on balancethe presumedlessonsof the 1930sconvincedmost in Congressand almosteveryonein the executivethat the tradewars,competitive devaluations,andcurrencyblocs of that decadehad directly contributed to the outbreakof World War II. A powerful U.S. economytied to multilateral institutions like the GeneralAgreementon Tariffs and Trade (GAIT), the World Bank, and the InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF) would encourage growth and inoculate the Free World againstinstability that could be exploitedby communists.Nevertheless,internationaleconomicissueswere clearly subordinatein theseyearsto themesof political and military security.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

7. The United Statesmust assumeleadership in organizationslike the United Nations. Public supportfor the United Nationsremainedremarkably high during theseyearsdespitemisgivings aboutho'q' well the organization performed.In a 1947 Gallup survey 85 percentfavored the United Nations, as did 77 percenta decadelater. In 1947, when askedif the United States shouldstay in the organizationevenif Russiacontinuedto block the will of the majority of members,73 percentsaid yes. Four years later, 75 percent approvedof U.S. membership,andin 1962,90percentfavoredmembership. At the sametime, however,far fewer Americansexpressedsatisfactionwith the performanceof the United Nations.Thus in 1947 only 39 percentwere pleasedwith the progressmadeby the United Nations,and in 1951,24percent rated its performanceas good, 30 percentfair, and 36 percentpoor, in large part, no doubt, becauseof the frustrationsbrought on by the Korean War.13 This high and sustainedlevel of supportfor U.S. membership(and leadership)bringsus back,in fact, to the first tenetof the Cold War consensus -thatthe United Statesmust play an activerole in world affairs. During the early postwardecades,large majorities of the public and the political elites believed that this active role could best be servedas the leaderof a Free World military and economic alliance. Taken togetherthesefundamental propositionsformed a foreign policy ethosfor twenty-oddyearsthat lay at the heart of the policy consensus. Cultural Consensus The Cold War cultural consensus was firmly groundedin a setof valuesthat one study called"cosmopolitanliberalism."14Accordingto this definition of nationalidentity, to be anAmericana personhadonly to subscribeto values suchas liberty, individualism, popularsovereignty,and equality of opportunity. One'sethnicorigin wasmuchlessimportantin defining ''Americanness'' than allegianceto theseliberal ideals. In reality, of course,this definition discriminatedagainstAfrican Americans,Native Americans,and women. Particularly in the 1950s, social analystslike David Riesman,Vance Packard,William H. Whyte, and Paul Goodmanridiculed the conformity, materialism,and banality of American life and warnedthat large organizations, suburbia,the public educationsystem,and othercontemporaryatrocities threatenedto transform the population into herds of exceptionally well-behavedsheep.Others noted the growing intoleranceof Cold War America and pointed to McCarthyism, loyalty oaths, security checks,the intrusivenessof the House Un-AmericanActivities Committee,and a renewedfocus on the symbolsof civil religion (e.g.,"underGod" in the Pledge of Allegianceand "In God We Trust" on the currency)as trendsthat would

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 11

eventuatein the imposition of a repressive"garrison state."15Eisenhow{jr himself worried that the economicand political costsof the Cold War, expressedmost vividly in the military-industrial complex, would destroyfundamentalindividual liberties. Yet if somecommentatorsemphasizedthestultifying conformity of American society,many more celebratedthe "American way of life." Much of the popularmedia,from Life magazineto suchtelevisionshowsas"FatherKnows Best," projectedwidely sharedsymbols of normalcy and respectability:a stablefamily life, home ownership,rising prosperity, and community statuS.16 In the academiccommunityTalcott Parsonsand Walt W. Rostow disseminatedstronglypositiveviews of "Americanism."Parsonscontendedthat American society retaineda "moral mission" rooted in family life and religious values wherein the individual sacrificedfor the good of community and nation.17 And Rostow celebrateda unique "American style" whoseenduring strengthhad withstood the insecuritiesproducedby the Cold War. For him, too, family, religion, and social stability demonstratedstrong evidenceof the fundamentalhealth and characterof the American identity.18 Nothing better capturedthe cultural core of this era than the NixonKhrushchev"kitchen debate"at the openingof the AmericanNationalExhibition in Moscow during the summerof 1959. The vice president's performancereceivedan extraordinarilyenthusiasticreceptionat home, all the more remarkablebecauseinsteadof discussingweapons,geopolitics,or ideology,the two leaderscarriedon a lengthy, often heated,exchangeabout the relativemerits of AmericanandSovietappliances.For Nixon the essence of the good life lay within the walls of the suburbanhouse,and he "proclaimedthat the 'model home,'with a male breadwinnerand a full-time female homemaker,and adornedwith a wide array of consumergoods, representedthe essenceof American freedom."19Under the shadowof the bomb and the communistthreatthe "nuclear" family had emergedas a dramatically private statementof stability. All of theseanalysts,whethercritical or admiring, saw an America during thesedecadesthatevinceda strongmeasureof cultural consensus. Moreover, there appearedto be a solid symbiotic relationship betweenthis consensusand thosebroadly sharedpropositionsaboutU.S. foreign policy. Indeed,more than one policymakerwelcomedthe "communistchallenge" as a catalystthat could reinvigorateAmericans'senseof duty and mission. Dwight Eisenhowerand JohnFosterDulles repeatedlysoundedthis theme, and evenGeorgeKennanseemedmomentarilycapturedby its allure, for he concluded"The Sourcesof Soviet Conduct" by asking Americans to be grateful to a Providencewhich, by "providing this ... implacablechallenge,has madetheir entire security as a nation dependenton their pulling

12 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

themselvestogetherand acceptingthe responsibilitiesof moral and political leadershipthat history plainly intendedthem to bear."20And, indeed, this cultural consensuswas characterizedby an ethic of national sacrifice. No doubtthe oft-bemoanedrampantconsumerismof this periodseemedto clash with the exigenciesof the "struggle againstcommunism,"but these consumersneverthelesstolerateda peacetimedraft and a defense spending burdenthat represented9 percentof the grossnational productand almost half of the federal budget.21 ~oceduralConsensus ~oceduralConsensus

Central to the proceduralCold War consensuswas a seriesof votes in the Congressfrom 1945 to 1964 highly supportiveof major presidentialinitiatives. U.S. membershipin the United Nations, NATO, the Organizationof American States(OAS), and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO); aid to Greeceand Turkey; the Marshall Plan; ratification of the JapanPeaceTreaty,the KoreaDefensePact,the Formosa(Taiwan) Security Pact,andthe NuclearTestBan Treaty; andregionalresolutionscoveringthe Middle East,Berlin, Cuba,and Indochinaall receivedat least70 percentof the vote with severalclaiming virtually unanimoussupport.Yet theseoverwhelming majoritiespointedas well to a proceduralconsensusin executivecongressionalrelationsthat hadbeenfosteredby Roosevelt,partly threatened by Truman,revived by Eisenhower,and sustainedby Kennedy.At the same time, however,the strengthof this consensuscaneasily be exaggerated.For example,Congresspreventedthe State Departmentfrom administering Marshall Planaid despiteTruman'svehementprotests;the NuclearTestBan Treaty was ratified only after many false startsand a greatdeal of compromise; and the EisenhowerDoctrine (Middle East Resolution)was delayed by severalmonthsby a Congressthat ultimately diluted its contents. The experienceof the interwarperiodplayeda major role in defining the nature of this proceduralconsensus.After the bitternessproducedby the Leagueof Nations debateand sharpdivisions evidentin the 1930son the neutrality issue,Rooseveltbegana seriouseffort in 1942 to makeplanning more coherentand unified for postwar internationalorganizations.It involved, in essence,a three-stepprocessthat would be utilized in regardto a broadrangeof foreign policy themesduring the next quarter-century.First, in particular-andleaders FORincludedkey membersof Congress-senators of prominent public organizationsin the postwar planning process.This direct involvementhelpedto win their approvalfor the outline of an internationalistforeign policy that featuredU.S. leadershipin a hostof multilateral institutions.Second,FOR, in concertwith thesemembersof Congress

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 13

and private citizens, launcheda public relationscampaignto win the support of the broaderpublic and the remainderof Congress.The final step involved obtainingcongressionalapproval for a joint resolutionendorsing of action.22 the proposed course But this proceduredid not alwayswork. Roosevelthimselfseriouslycompromisedit by his refusal to involve membersof Congressor the leadersof influential private associationsin anotheraspectof postwar planning-the future of EasternEuropeandEastAsia as embodiedin theYalta agreements. Somewould later call theseaccordstreasonous;for othersthey were merely unconstitutional,but their legacy would haunt the DemocraticParty for the next twenty years. Truman'sdecisionnot to ask Congressfor a declarationof war or some otherlegislativeactionduring the Koreanconflict cUd not directly violate the proceduralconsensus,for seniorcongressionalDemocratshad warnedthat suchan authorizationwas both constitutionallyunnecessaryand politically risky. Nevertheless,as the costsof the war mounted,manyin Congress(some of them Democrats)criticized Truman'sdecision and, after the president announcedthe dispatchof troopsto Europein early 1951,the Senatepassed a nonbinding resolution directing the executiveto seek congressionalapproval for additional deployments. The processfunctionedmost smoothlyduring the Eisenhoweryears,but even Ike was compelledto fend off the Bricker amendmentin its various manifestations.This amendment,which receivedsurprisinglystrong(though primarily Republican)Senatesupport in an era of supposedunchallenged presidentialsupremacyin foreign affairs, would havemadeexecutiveagreementsmore difficult to concludeand treatiesharderto ratify. Someproponentsdid view it as a meansto preventfutureYaltas and Koreas,but Senator John Bricker (R-OH) and his chief ally, the American Bar Association,proposedtheseamendmentsprimarily becauseof their belief that treatieslike the UN Charterand the proposedinternationalagreementson humanrights violated the U.S. Constitution.And many southernerswho backed these amendmentsspecifically hopedthat they would preventcourts from ruling that the UN Charterinvalidatedstate segregation laws. PresidentEisenhower and his advisers,in order to try and defeat the Bricker amendments,portrayedthemas dangerousthreatsto executiveprerogativesin foreign affairs, but, in fact, their primary appealwas to states'rights and racial politics.23 Notwithstandingthis ratherpeculiarepisode,it wasduring the Eisenhower administrationthat the proceduralCold War consensusflourished.The congressionaljoint resolutionbecamean effectivepolicy device-anelementin the containmentstrategy-wherebypresidentssoughtto win public andcongressionalsupportfor proposedactionsin orderto deterwould-beadversar-

14 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

ies from doubtingthe genuineness of U.S. commitments.Somemembersof Congressobjectedto thesepredateddeclarationsof war on the groundsthat they constitutedpresidentialblank checksto deploytroopsandspendmoney without restriction, but most felt that they strengthenedU.S. foreign policy anddeterredwar.24 Interestingly,eventheseconstitutionalreservationslargely vanishedduring the Kennedyandearly JohnsonadministrationsastheCuba, Berlin (concurrentratherthan joint), and Gulf of Tonkin resolutionsswept throughCongresswith enormousmajorities. In sum,the proceduralconsensusrestedon the widely sharedassumption that the presidentwas the ultimate authority in making foreign policy commitmentsand in decidingif threatsto them requiredthe useof force. But the strengthof bipartisanshipduring this era should not be exaggerated.As JamesMcCormick and EugeneWittkopf have shown,it was most pronouncedduring the Eisenhoweryears whena majority of both parties supportedthe president'sforeign policy positionsalmost70 percentof the time in the Houseand the Senate.Lyndon Johnsonreceivedcomparablelevels of bipartisansupportin the Senatebut fared much worse in the House wherebipartisanlevels reachedonly 40 percent.2S Perhapsnot surprisingly the KoreanWar profoundly damagedPresidentTruman'sability to win bipartisanbacking for his foreign policy initiatives. In the Republicancontrolled Eightieth Congress(1947 and 1948) bipartisanshipwas only slightly lower than Eisenhower'slevels but sankto a mere29 percentin Democratic Congressesafter the North Koreanattackin June 1950.26 Moreover,evenduring this "goldenage"of proceduralconsensus, ideology remaineda "primary determinantof congressionalforeign policy voting, . . . often moreimportantthanpartisanship"27in determiningsupportfor the president.In general,EisenhowerandTrumanreceivedtheir strongestbackingfrom Houseliberals,somewhatlesssupportfrom moderates,andthe leastfrom conservatives.Senatepatternsvaried only slightly.

The Foreign Policy Establishment The so-calledforeign policy establishmentconstitutedthe most important parainstitutionalexpressionof the Cold War consensus.Indeed,so invisible did the establishmentseemthat few observersevennotedits existenceuntil it had begun to disintegratein the late 1960s.Not until 1973 did it receive seriousanalytical attention,and then, quite tellingly, it fell to a left-leaning British journalist,Godfrey Hodgson,to write its obituary.28In part, this general neglectstemmedfrom a reluctanceto acknowledgethat a foreign policy establishmentcould function at the very centerof a democraticpolity. To do so would havechallengedcherishednational myths. Moreover,the concept

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 15

itself sufferedfrom ambiguity. While the establishmentmay have playeda role in Cold War U.S. foreign policy comparableto that of the permanent governmentat Whitehall or the Quai d'Orsay,its lack of a clearinstitutional basemadeit moredifficult to identify its membersandchartits activities.Yet surelythis relatively smallgroupof foreign policy "amateurs"who frequently "went down" to Washingtonfrom New York and Boston in theseyearsmenlike JohnMcCloy, RobertLovett,Averill Harriman,JohnMcCone,Robert Bowie, DeanAcheson,C. DouglasDillon, and Paul Nitze-formedan identifiable elite sharingsomefairly obviouscharacteristics.Although a disproportionatenumberof its members(particularly amongthe older generation) camefrom privileged northeasternbackgroundsfeaturing prep school and Ivy Leagueeducations,it ultimately dependedlesson sociologyandgenealogy than on "a common history, a sharedapproach,a preferredpolicy, an aspiration,an instinct, and a technique."29 Though this foreign policy elite did not emergeas a powerful force until afterWorld War II, its origins canbe tracedbackto the small group of advisersthat gatheredaroundColonelEdwin Houseat Versaillesto help lay plans for a democraticpostwarworld underAmericanleadership.When the treaty was defeatedin 1920, thesebusinessmenand academics,now joined by a handful of internationalbankersand corporatelawyers, continuedto press for an internationalistforeign policy. Through meetingsand seminarsat the Council on ForeignRelationsin New York and articlespublishedin Foreign Affairs, this group was able to survive the "normalcy" of the 1920sand the economicnationalismof the 1930s,even if it was unableto convert many Americansto its cause.World War II providedthe opportunityto implement its vision, and many of its membersgained valuablegovernmentalexperience, particularly in the OSS (Office of StrategicServices).The war imparteda senseof power, accomplishment,destiny,and political involvement that gavethem the confidenceand statureto eagerlyseekkey roles in postwar Americanforeign policy. Seeingthemselvesas bipartisancounterweightsto the anticipatedisolationist resurgence(especiallyin Congress),membersof this influential group were convincedthat America'sreluctanceto rearmand exert its powerduring the interwaryearshad helpedtrigger World War II, and weredetermined to employ the presidencyto build an internationalistconsensusat home. Certain that the United Statespossessedthe material resourcesto achieve world leadership,the establishmentbelievedthat it hadto supplythe missing moral and spiritual ingredientsnecessaryto transformcrude power into internationalauthority.Thoughthey themselvesrarely stoodfor election,these men had an instinct for the political center-aninstinct that buttressedtheir aspirationto serveas educatorsto an America whoseallegedtraditional ten-

16

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

dency had beento vacillate dangerouslybetweenself-righteouswithdrawal and evangelicalactivism. And while membersof the establishmentfeared internationalcommunismas a mortal threat to westernvalues and institutions, they were unsympatheticto thosewho wishedto ferret out subversives at home.They were, moreover,animatedby a passionatedevotionto public service,seeingit not asa careeropportunityor a chanceto makecontactsfor a lucrative, postgovernmentlife, but as a calling, a moral obligation to serve the presidentand the nation. In short, the establishmentboth embodiedand helped to constructthe Cold War consensus.Substantivelyits membersembracedthat widely shared set of Cold War axioms about the nature of the international systemand America'srole in it. Procedurallythey desireda strong presidency willing to enlist congressionalsupportfor its foreign policy initiatives but determined to assertits broad constitutionalprerogatives.And culturally theseunusual Americans,while far from typical in their backgroundsand positions,neverthelessthoughtthey reflectedthosespiritual and civic valuesoptimistically identified by Parsonsand Rostowas central to the "American way of life." The Cold War consensuswas frequently idealizedin the yearsafter Vietnamandthe Cold War. This nostalgiahasoverlookedthe fact that U.S. policy successes during the Cold War largely resultedfrom the nation'senjoyment of a unique-andtemporary-hegemony producedby the outcomeof World War II. It hasalsoforgottenthat the old consensussupporteda foreign policy sometimescharacterizedby ideologicalrigidity andgeopoliticalimprudence. On the otherhand,contemporaryobserversand participantstendedsimultaneouslyto underratethe solidity of the domesticconsensusand exaggerate the permanenceandinevitability of America'sextraordinaryglobal position. Embroiled as they were in the demandsand frustrationsof daily duties, Cold War policymakersunderstandably focusedon immediateproblems,and theseissuesoften did seemto pulsatewith those"partisan,utterly consensus-freeforeign policy debates"notedby RichardNeustadtandErnestMay.30 Easily overlookedwas the widespreadpublic adherenceto fundamentaltenetsaboutthe properU.S. approachto the world, the generalizeddeference to a wise and powerful presidency,and the broadly held conviction that sacrifice was necessaryto preservethe superiorityof the Americanway of life. Yet theseelementsdid contributesignificantly to a relatively stableand orderly policymakingenvironment. At the sametime, both the public and the political elitestendedto assume that America'sextraordinaryinternationalposition was natural and permanent, providentialevidenceof moral superiority.The highly unusualcircumstancesthat had producedthis happy situation were largely ignored,though much later it seemedclearerthat U.S. global dominancehad, in fact, facili-

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 17

tated the creationof the domesticforeign policy consensus.America could afford the lUxury of the essentiallysuperficialsquabblesthat passedfor foreign policy debatesin theseearly Cold War years,for it enjoyeda significant margin of power. This margin provedless sustainablethan many at the time believed,and with its erosionthis largely unappreciateddomesticconsensus reemerged,in retrospect,as a centralfeatureof the early postwarera.

After Vietnam Changesin Public Opinion The domesticdivisivenessspawnedby the VietnamWar deeply eroded,but did not completelydestroy,the Cold War consensus. A substantialmajority of the American people continuedto believe that containing communism remainedan importantforeign policy goal. But the public grew notably more skepticalafterVietnamaboutthe desirabilityof using military force andeconomic assistanceto stop communism.3' Foreign policy issueshad dominatedpublic opinion polls for more than twenty years after World War II. The public consistentlycited themeslike the containmentof communismor the dangerof war as being of primary importanceto the nation. By the time of the 1964, 1968,and 1972elections, however,surveysindicateda fairly evensplit betweendomesticand international concerns.But after 1976the economy-usuallyconcernsaboutinflation and unemployment-wasperceivedby the public as its most urgent priority, and in the late 1980s drugs briefly emergedas the chief national concern.In 1976, for example,78 percentmentionedeconomicproblems andonly 6 percentnamedinternationalissuesas important;andevenin 1980, in the wake of Afghanistanand with U.s. hostagesstill in Iran, 77 percent listed economic problems as of primary importanceand only 15 percent mentionedforeign policy.32 In 1988 the budgetdeficit and drug trafficking toppedthe list. Comparedwith their Cold War counterparts,post-Vietnam presidentsfaced a public more concernedwith the quality of domesticlife than with more traditional national security issues.In sum, the salienceof foreign policy issuesfor the public declinedin the wake of Vietnam. Moreover,the structureof public opinion changed.A "followership" model had best capturedits essencefrom the late 1940s to the late 1960s. This model featureda layer of political leadershipthat in largemeasureagreedon the endsand meansof U.S. foreign policy, an attentivepublic that followed this leadership,and a mostly inert, masspublic generally uninterestedand uninvolved in foreign affairs, but neverthelesshostile to communism.The prevalentforeign policy valuesof the Cold War reflectedthosefundamental

18

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

propositionsthat were enumeratedearlierin this chapterand were sharedby leadersand the attentive publicalike. The masspublic-lesseducatedand largely ignorantof world affairs-wassomewhatmore suspiciousof an active U.S. global role and inclined to opposelengthy, costly military involvements not obviously related to U.S. security, but simultaneouslywished Americato remainstrongand securein its struggleagainstcommunism.33 The simple eleganceof the followership model, however, was replaced after Vietnamby a more complexand ideological structureof opinion. Four distinct attitudeclustersaboutforeign policy emergedamongboth the political elites and the broaderpublic. Isolationism,of course,remainedone outlook and found considerablymore support with the mass public than the elites. For example,in the quadrennialpolls of the ChicagoCouncil on Foreign Relations(CCFR) donebetween1974 and 1986,isolationismattracted aboutonequarterof the masspublic but only between2 and 7 percentof the opinion leaders. But internationalistshad divided accordingto their attitudesabout communism,the useof force abroad,and relationswith the Soviet Union. There werenow two identifiablegroupsof intemationalists:hardlinersandaccommodationists.34 The first group,believingthat the Cold War still raged,supported the continuedcontainmentof the Soviet Union, overt and covert aid to antileftists in the Third World, and a well-funded defenseestablishment.It saw considerablevalidity in the domino theory, believedthe SovietUnion to be expansionist,and were convincedthat the United Statesmust be willing and able to employ its military power unilaterally in pursuit of its interests. Not surprisingly,this group portrayedthe internationalsystemin East-West terms: totalitarianismversusdemocracy,communismversuscapitalism,repressionversusfreedom. Accommodationists arguedthat for a variety of reasons-theSino-Soviet split, the Vietnam quagmire,the diffusion of global military and economic power, Third World nationalism,the emergenceof complex, transnational interdependence-the world of the 1970shad fundamentallychangedfrom that of the 1940sand 1950s.They rejectedthe domino theory as a dangerous,self-fulfilling prophecy,viewed theSovietUnion as primarily defensive in its goals,and weredeeplyskepticalaboutthe utility (andmorality) of U.S. military force in peripheralareas.They viewedthe internationalsystemmore as a global unity besetby common problems,and in need of multilateral solutions,than as the arenaof zero-sumsuperpowercompetition.Thus the armsrace,naturalresourcedepletion,environmentaldegradation,and internationaleconomicinequality were perceivedas the most pressingproblems. For them the Cold War was all but over. Yet both hardliners and accommodationists bestowedon the United Statesprimary responsibilityfor

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implementingtheir respectiveagendasand both approachedforeign policy in highly moralistic ways. Those who held the fourth foreign policy outlook-thetraditional internationalists-supported activeAmericaninvolvementin world affairs andfavoredthatcombinationof militant andcooperative, unilateral and multilateral approachesreminiscentof the pre-Vietnaminternationalistparadigm.35 In the CCFR surveysfrom 1974 to 1986 the masspublic divided quite evenly and consistentlyinto eachof thesefour attitudeclusters.In contrast, almost all of the opinion leaderswere internationalistsof one stripe or another, though relatively few held hardliner outlooks (5 to 13 percent).For example,in 1974 about 54 percenthad accommodationistattitudes,while just under40 percentevincedtraditional internationalistbeliefs. In the ensuing surveysthe proportionsgradually reversedso that by 1986 traditional internationalistsaccountedfor almost 60 percentof the elites, whereasthe 36 accommodationists had fallen to about one-quarter. To win elite supportfor their foreign policies, post-Vietnampresidents were obliged to constructcoalitionscomprisingat leasttwo of the three internationalistgroupings.Although a traditionalist-accommodationist coalition wasin theory the mostreadily availablealliance,the rising visibility and influence of hardlinersamong opinion leadersin the late 1970s and early 1980smadeit difficult for presidentsto ignore this group. Indeed,the backboneof RonaldReagan'ssupportcamefrom it. Furthermore,the muchhigher proportionsof hardlinersandisolationistsamongthe masspublic meantthat post-Vietnampresidents,in fact, risked the loss of broadersupportif they overlookedtheseconstituencies.Jimmy Carter'sdifficulties stemmed,in part, from accommodationist policiesthat repeatedlyalienatedhardlinersandeven sometraditional internationalists. This unstablecoalition patternwas madeevenmore volatile by the growing impact of television news on foreign policy attitudes.By exposingthe masspublic to information aboutforeign affairs that could earlierhavebeen easily ignoredin newspapersand magazines,televisionnewscreateda "vast inadvertentaudience"for foreign policy issues.37 The impact of this information, frequently conveyedthrough vividly dramatic images,was significantin helpingto form new,thoughshallowandunstable,opinions.Moreover, this relentlessbombardmentof bad news tendedto make the public even more impatientfor quick resultsfrom U.S. foreign policy.38 In sum, a complex four-celled model replacedCold War followership as the most accuratedepiction of foreign policy attitudes in post-Vietnam America,andits emergencesurelycomplicatedthe efforts of RichardNixon, Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reaganto win and keep elite and public supportfor their foreign policies.

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

Institutional Changes Severalinstitutional changesfurther addedto the increasedcomplexity of the foreign policymaking environmentand altered the conditions that had formerly helped facilitate the executive-congressional proceduralconsensus. In part, thesechangesresultedfrom the fragmentationof the Cold War internationalistconsensusand,in part, they madeit moredifficult to heal the resulting ideological splits. While Congresswas neverquite asdocile anddeferentialin the early postwar decadesas critics of the imperial presidencylater claimed, executivelegislative relations in that era did embody more order and harmony than thosein the aftermathof Vietnam. Importantstructuralchangesin Congress made it much more difficult for presidentsto strike and enforce deals by working with a handful of seniorlegislativeleaders.Strippedof manyof their old privileges and prerogativesby the reform movementof the early 1970s, theseleadersfound it more difficult to deliver votes on presidentialforeign policy initiatives. Moreover,the proliferation of committeesand subcommitteesdealingwith variousaspectsof foreign policy vastly increasedthe number of legislatorswhosesupportneededto be curried.39 Congressas a body, largely becauseof Vietnam and Watergate,no longer automaticallytrusted presidentsand their advisersto provide accurateinformation, one major result being a dramaticincreasein the size of Capitol Hill staffs. From 1947 to 1976the numberof personalstaffersrosefrom 2,030to 10,190,and whereas it wasa rare senatorbeforeVietnamwho had a foreign policy specialist,now almostall did, as did a growing numberof Housemembers.By 1979 the 539 senators,representatives,and nonvoting delegatesemployedapproximately twenty-four thousandpeople working in fifteen different buildings around Washington.The sizeof committeestaffssimilarly grew. For example,theSenateForeignRelationsstaff wentfrom twenty-five in 1960,to thirty-onein 1970, to sixty-two in 1975, and the HouseForeignAffairs Committeestaff jumped from fourteento twenty-oneand then to fifty-four over the sameperiod.40 Far from simply providing foreign policy information to legislators,who in earlierdays had beenwholly dependenton executivesources,thesestaffers frequently functionedas powerful advocatesof positionsopposedby the White House.Staffexpertslike Carl Marcy, RichardMoose,RobertDockery, William Miller, JohnFord, JerryChristianson,Michael Van Dusen,andPeter Galbraithplayedcrucial roles in contentiousissuesrangingfrom theJacksonVanik amendmentandSALT II to the Turkish armsembargoand the Panama Canal treaties.And again, in contrastto the Cold War era when many members of Congressseemedto relish their ignoranceof foreign policy as a reflection of their trust in presidentialjudgment,during the next two decades

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 21

many becameavid consumersof congressionalforeign policy expertise.One result was the emergenceof a new type of legislator-thebonafide foreign policy expert-who,by total immersionin a necessarilynarrow rangeof issues(or subissues),could often mountdamagingchallengesto executivepositions or, occasionally,provide useful support. Membersinterestedin foreign policy but unableto obtain a seaton oneof the relevantcommitteeswere instrumentalin fosteringa new kind of institution: the legislativeserviceorganization.This forum allowed junior legislators to exert greaterinfluence on issueslike arms control than their regular committeeassignmentswould haveallowed. Indeed,the bestknown of these organizations-the Arms Control andForeignPolicy Caucus(originally called Membersof Congressfor PeaceThrough Law) eventuallycountedamong its membershipfully one-quarterof the Houseand Senate. The preferredCold War era device of the joint congressionalresolution was replacedby an extended,yet fitful, seriesof efforts by Congressto limit the foreign affairs prerogativesof the president.Beginning with senatorial attemptsin the early 1970sto restrict Nixon's ability to wage war in SoutheastAsia, they sooncameto involve both housesof Congressin issuesthat included arms control, humanrights, arms sales,covert operations,and the deploymentof U.S. armedforces abroad.The legislative veto, at least until the Chadhadecisionby the SupremeCourt in 1983,functionedas a favored instrumentof congressionalassertiveness in foreign affairs. The House,citing its constitutionallymandatedpower of the purse,relied on severalcreative devicesto intrude into foreign affairs and defenseissues.In short, the proceduralconsensusof the early postwardecadeslargely evaporatedandin its placeemergeda protracted,inconclusivestrugglebetweenpresidentswho resentedthis so-called legislative micromanagement,and a Congressthat had grown deeply suspiciousof allegedpresidentialattemptsto subvertthe Constitution.The resultsoften borderedon chaos. The explosionof television news, coupledwith advancesin telecommunicationstechnology,madeit much easierfor membersof Congressto gain wide audiencesfor their views. The proliferation of television shows like ABC's "This Week with David Brinkley," CNN's "Crossfire," and "The MacNeil-LehrerNewsHour" on PBS, which purportedto examinecurrent issuesin depth, almost guaranteedaccessto senatorsand House members who might opposethe foreign policy initiatives of the president.The resulting "point/counterpoint"format provided legislatorswith enormousincentives to dissentfrom executive positions and thus made policy consensus ever more elusive. Moreover, developmentsin satellite technologyallowed membersof Congressto appeardaily on local television showsin their districts through video feedsusing equipmentprovidedby the Republicanand

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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

Democraticparties.If local outlets were willing to acceptthesefeeds,it becamea simple matterfor membersto explain the independenceof their foreign policy positionsdirectly to the folks back home.41 Finally, lobbying, while hardly a new phenomenonin American politics, becamean integral part of the foreign policy processas domesticpressure groups,foreign governments,and the executivefound the post-Vietnamenvironmentparticularly conduciveto theseactivities. The lack of a domestic foreign policy consensus,the declineof party discipline on Capitol Hill, the emergenceof single-issuepolitics, the growing importanceof "intermestic" issues(e.g., foreign trade), and the dramaticdiffusion of powerin Congress all contributedto this environment.42 By 1987 there were 23,011 lobbyists registeredwith the secretaryof the Senate-compared with 365 in 1961-or 43 43 for every memberof Congress. The presidentbecamebut one lobbyist -though an exceptionallyinfluential one-in a continual bidding war for congressionalsupport.Obviouslysuchan atmospheredrasticallydiminished the chancesof establishingand sustaininga workable executive-legislative foreign policy proceduralconsensus. In general,congressionalbipartisanshiperoded significantly from preVietnamlevels andcontinuedto do so throughoutthe 1980s.RichardNixon receivedthe mostbackingfrom majoritiesof both parties-about50 percent RonaldReaganthe least,averagingaround30 percent. in both houses-and GeraldFord did the bestof the post-Vietnampresidentsin the Senatewith a 52 percentbacking,but the worst in the Housewhere his former colleagues gavehim bipartisansupportless than one-quarterof the time.44 Not surprisingly, as the major parties becamemore ideologically distinct during the 1970sand 1980s,foreign policy voting in the Houseand Senatereflectedthis growing polarity. A majority of conservativeinternationalists in the HousesupportedJimmy Carterless than 40 percentof the time but backedPresidentReaganon fully 80 percentof foreign policy votes,while a majority of Houseliberal internationalistssupportedReagan only 40 percentof the time but voted with Carteron more than 70 percent 45 of all occasions. The post-Vietnampresidencyalso changedin important ways. Sincethe early 1950sthe locus of foreign policymaking power had shifted back and forth betweenthe national security assistantand the secretaryof state,and this patterncontinuedin the post-Vietnamera. On balance,the result was a relativeincreasein the powerof the NationalSecurityCouncil (andtheWhite Housestaff) at the expenseof the StateDepartment,yet theseperturbations, while inevitably well publicized,remainedquite superficial,for they occurred within the contextof a muchmorefundamentalinstitutionalreality: the modem presidency.

IN SEARCH OF CONSENSUS 23

Franklin Roosevelt'screation of the "plebiscitory presidency"vastly increasedcentralizedpolitical power and stimulatedultimately unreasonable demandsby the public on whomeveroccupiedtheWhite House.These"personalpresidents;'thoughapparentlyinvestedwith enormouspower,inevita46 By slavishlyfollowing the dictum, bly failed to fulfill popularexpectations. "He who canmobilize the massesmay alsomobilize the elite," modempresidents,at least until Reagan,have frequently succeededin alienatingalmost everybody.47 TheodoreRooseveltbeganand Woodrow Wilson completedthe institutionalization of a "rhetorical presidency,"which, in its quest for effective, 48 Orapopularleadership,spawnedseveralseriousdilemmasof govemance. torical skill becamea sine qua non of presidentialleadership,and presidents were expectedto make direct appealsto the peoplefor support.Presidents had once reservedthis tool for genuinecrises-worldwar or severeecosinceFDR they haveoften relied on popular,rhetorinomic depression-but cal leadershipto create crises, real and spurious.49 According to one presidentialscholar: This surfeit of speechby politicians constitutesa decay of political discourse.It replacesdiscussionstructuredby the contestabilityof opinion inherentto issueswith a competitionto pleaseor manipulatethe public. It is increasinglythe casethatpresidentialspeeches themselveshavebecome the issuesand eventsof modernpolitics ratherthan the medium through 50 which issuesand eventsare discussedand assessed. Post-Vietnampresidentsdid not reversethis trend.Indeed,beginningwith Richard Nixon, the "personal president" model rapidly transmutedinto a "stage-managed presidency"in which an allegedly hostile news media was systematicallycounteredby presidentialstaffs obsessedwith the image of their chief executive.According to this model: What a Presidentor (Presidentialcandidate)saysor doesmust alwaysbe calculatedfor its effect on his image,plotted as points alongthe arc of his ideal persona,a constructlargely determinedby what the pollsterssay the peopleregardas the ideal at the moment.51 Confrontedwith presumablycynical reportersand mediasuperstarseager to find flaws and inconsistenciesin this carefully manufacturedpresidential image, White House "handlers" relentlesslymarket the presidentand his policies directly to the public through stagedtelevision eventsand urgent rhetorical appeals.

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After Vietnam, presidentsdelivered their foreign policy messagesin a domesticenvironmentof relativedissensus.They often tried to restoredirection anddeterminationto Americanforeign policy "by subsumingall policy discoursewithin anyoneof severalincommensurable setsofbeliefs."52Some of thesepresidentsalsoheaded "politicalfactionscommittedto distinct,even ideological, policy positions," which they sought to implement once they were in office.53 As a result rhetorical, personalappealsby presidentsfrequently proveddivisive and, in tum, stimulatedrhetorical,personalappeals by political opponents.Furthermore,in contrastto Cold War presidents,who could ground their foreign policy initiatives in the set of core axioms that enjoyedbroadpublic support,their post-Vietnamsuccessors, largely lacking that ready-madebase apartfrom a continuing public hostility toward communism, were compelledto constructworking coalitions on an issue-byissuebasis,often at a considerableprice. The difficult task of building these alliances,in turn, intensified the pressureon presidentsto engagein direct, rhetorical,and frequently inflated appealsto the public.

ParainstitutionalChanges Not only did post-Vietnampresidentsconfront a Congressthat bore scant resemblanceto its Cold War counterpart,but the old foreign policy establishment had been similarly fragmented.In place of the remarkablegroup of gifted, privileged, foreign policy amateursthat shareda common internationalist outlook, the unifying experienceof World War II, and a passionfor public service,therearoseambitious,professional,highly visible counterelites vying for influence over American foreign policy. In part, this rather dramatic changeresultedfrom a gradual but inevitable generationalturnover. Aging membersof the old establishmentwere replacedby a successorgenerationdifferent in severalrespectsfrom its Cold War elders.The diffusion of political power away from the Northeast,the growing democratizationof Americanculture,the emergenceof strong,professionalgraduatetraining in internationalrelationsat severaluniversities,the divisive experienceof Vietnam, and the increasedimportanceof "intermestic" issuesall undermined the authority of the old establishment.Foreign policy advice in the postVietnamdecadeswas dominatedby full-time foreign policy professionalsprolific, seeminglyubiquitous expertswho waged ink wars, air wars, and partisanbattlesin the hopeof catchingthe attentionof powerful politicians.54 Frequentlyhousedin highly ideological think tanks and writing for openly partisanjournals, many of theseexpertseschewedthe proper decorumof disagreementthat had characterizedthe old establishmentin favor of shibbolethsand caricature:

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Professionalpoliticians might havebeenable to shrugoff such things as just business,but not intellectuals.Thus, personalanimositiesaddeda bitter edgeto everythingelse! Motives werealwaysbeingquestioned,and no one in the opposingcampswas to be given the benefit of the doubt. For thoseout of power, it meantgetting back in. It meantnot giving the President an inch.55 Whateverthe flaws of the old establishment,it did function as a reasonably reliable anchorfor Cold War presidents-areservoirof steady,centrist advice. Post-Vietnampresidentslackedthis important resource,for warring countereliteshadreplacedthe cohesiveold establishment.In this atmosphere the achievementof elite consensusfor foreign policy initiatives becamean exceedinglyrare event.

The Erosion ofthe Cultural Consensus The stable,white, middle-class,nuclearfamily composedof working father and housewifemotherand cementedby such valuesas patriotism,anticommunism, and civic-mindednessprovided the Cold War consensuswith cultural stability, if only as a unifying myth. No doubt this model remained compellingfor millions of Americansin the post-Vietnamera. But it should be obviousthat the old cultural consensuswas deeply shakenby successive challengesto its domination.Racial conflict, the civil rights movement,and the youthful countercultureofthe 1960s;the sexualrevolution and women's movement;large-scaleimmigration from Asia, Central America, and the Caribbean;the emergenceof a drug culture; growing public fears of violent crime; and the aging of the Americanpopulationconstitutedbut a few of the phenomenathat in many ways transformedCold War America. At the very leastthey muddiedthe notion of a single, preferred"American way of life" by forging alternativelifestyles and emergent,competingsocial structures. The foreign policy consequences of this cultural fragmentationwere less clear. No doubt African Americansplayed a major role in elevatingthe importanceof South Africa in the public consciousness.Likewise Latin and Asian immigrants attachedless importanceto Soviet and Europeanissues than had their Europeanpredecessors. And by the late 1980sstemmingthe flow of illegal drugshad surfacedas a major national securityconcernof the American people.On balance,thesesocial changesprobably madeforeign policy issueslessdominantand increasedthe importanceof newerconcerns like child day care,the homeless,crime, education,and the environment.At the sametime, military conscription,which had been widely acceptedby Americansin the 1950sandearly 1960sasa necessarysacrificein the struggle

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againstcommunism,becamean extraordinarilydivisive issue.Furthermore, and particularly during the late 1960s and early 1970s,the legitimacy of existing political processeswas seriouslyquestioned,especiallyamongthe well educatedof the Vietnam generation.56

After the Cold War

Changesin Public Opinion The public greetedthe end of the Cold War with a combinationof weariness and relief. Neither the fall of the Berlin Wall nor the disintegrationof the Soviet Union elicited much interest,much less any celebratoryoutpourings in the United States.Indeed,exceptfor the remarkablyshort-livedeuphoria that followed the victory in the PersianGulf War in 1991,the public generally appearedto be angry, impatient,and distractedby domesticeconomicworries. But the relatively low importancethe American peopleattachedto foreign policy issuesafter the Cold War continueda trend that had beenevident sincethe U.S. withdrawalfrom Vietnam.In the early 1990sthe public considered the economy,health care, crime, the budgetdeficit, and educationfar more significant than foreign policy and defense.When a TimesMirror poll in late 1993 askedrespondentsto rank their foreign policy goals,"protecting thejobs of Americanworkers" (85 percenta "top priority") easily toppedthe list. Next in importancewere "preventing the spreadof weaponsof mass destruction"(69 percent)and"ensuringadequateenergysuppliesfor theU.S." (60 percent).At thebottomof the public'sforeign policy priorities were"promoting humanrights abroad"(22 percent),fosteringdemocracyoverseas(18 percent),and aiding developingcountries(18 percent).57In other words, issuesof economicsecuritydominatedthe public'sglobal anddomesticpriorities after the Cold War as they had in the yearsfollowing Vietnam. If thesaliencethe public attachedto foreign policy issuesremainedlargely unchangedfor the post-Vietnamera, so too did the structure of its attitudes. In the 1990sinternationalistsentimentcontinuedat the samelevels as the 1980s-roughly70 percent(which was higher than the 1970s)-withabout one-quarterof the American people resisting an active world role for the United States.Thusthe evaporationofthe Sovietthreat-only8 percentperceived Russiaas the "greatestdanger" in 1993--did not translateinto an increasein isolationistattitudesafter the Cold War.58 Furthermore,the three varietiesof internationalism-accommodationist (liberal), hardliner(conservative), and traditionalist (moderate)-wereevident in the post-ColdWar era as well. But the endingof the Cold War forced this internationallyinclined public

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to confront a seriesof difficult issuesthat frequently involved the potential overseasdeploymentof U.S. combattroops. Civil wars, politically caused famine, ethnic strife, and massivehumanrights violations in areasof questionable importanceto the world's "sole, remainingsuperpower"presented the public with complexchoicesquite unlike thoseof the Cold War or even the post-Vietnamera. Despite the disappearance of the Soviet Union, and thus the possibility that local crisescould escalateinto global, nuclearconfrontation,the American peopleremainedextremelywary of committingU.S. forcesabroad.The end of the Cold War did not erasethe legacy of Vietnam from public consciousness,and its survival explains much about the continuing caution regarding the expenditureof resourceson foreign adventures.On the other hand,as we will discoverin chapter6, the PersianGulf War offered a much more positive, alternative "model" that could assistthe public in forming opinionsaboutthe advisability of future military operations.The public ultimately cameto supportthe Gulf War in 1991 becausea clear act of aggression hadoccurred,the securityof a resource(oil) vital to theWest'seconomic survival was perceivedto be at risk, the United Statesfought the war as part of a broad internationalcoalition, and, most importantly, becausethe war was won cheaplyand quickly. None of theseconditions,the public believed retrospectively,had beenpresentin Vietnam. Nor were many of them likely to be found in placeslike Somalia,Bosnia, Kosovo, Rwanda,Haiti, and the Russian"Near Abroad." Thus any post-ColdWar presidentcontemplating putting U.S. troops in harm's way would first be obliged to convince the public that the experiencewould more closely resemblethe PersianGulf than Vietnam.

Institutional Changes The "national securitystate" institutionalizedduring the Cold War hadconferredunusualauthorityon presidentsto help themmeetthe clearandpresent dangerallegedly posedby the Soviet Union and internationalcommunism. Post-Vietnampresidents,newly constrainedby a resurgentCongressless deferentialto executiveprerogativesand confrontedby a public demanding the avoidanceof future foreign quagmires,could, nevertheless,still rather effectively raise the specterof Soviet global expansionto mobilize public andcongressionalsupport.But the suddenterminationof the Sovietthreatin the late 1980sremoveda durablepresidentialtrump card and threatenedthe foundationsof nationalsecurityinstitutions.59 Furthermore,a feeling emerged acrossthe political spectrumthat the demandsof the Cold War had greatly weakenedAmerica'sdomesticinfrastructureand thus its ability to compete

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successfullyin a new world of economiccompetition.Bill Clinton'screation of a National EconomicCouncil constituteda ratherobviouseffort to redefine "national security" after the Cold War and to meld the domestic and internationaldimensionsof economicissueslike tradeand nationalcompetitiveness.Thesekinds of "intermesticissues,"plus thoserelating to U.S. participation in United Nations peacekeeping,peacemaking,and peace enforcementoperations,dominatedthe post-ColdWar agendaand necessarily compelledpresidentialattention to congressionalrequestsfor a significant role in refining, if not defining, foreign policy. Overall, then, the diminution of presidentialauthority in foreign affairs that followed Vietnam(andWatergate)intensifiedafter the Cold War evenas presidenciescontinuedto be "rhetorical" and "stage-managed." The disappearanceof the SovietUnion-andwith it a coherentU.S. global strategyfurther strengthenedthe desire of Congressto help influence policy.60 Moreover,the dramatic takeover of both housesof Congressby Republicans in 1994for the first time in forty yearsportendedheightenedtensionwith the White House,at leastas long as its occupantwas a Democrat.Many of those newly electedto Congressowed their victories to the growing public cynicism about politics and seemedto sharetheir constituents'concernsabout the deteriorationof Americansociety.Unlike the professionalreformerswho cameto Congressin the wake of Vietnam andWatergate,this newercrop of legislatorsappearedmuch more inclined to define their congressionalroles like the citizen-legislatorsof the nineteenthcentury.61The new Republican majority's dismantlingof the caucussystem,its desireto return power and programsto the states,andits deepsuspicionof the United Nationsappeared to representa seaof changein American politics. And, indeed, by the late 1990scongressionalRepublicanscould claim much of the credit for balancingthe federal budgetfor the first time in thirty yearsand in overhaulingthe nation'swelfare system.Yet, at the sametime, ideological zeal demonstratedby many HouseRepublicans,which much of the public perceivedas callousand mean-spirited,led to a political backlash that quickly bluntedthe "Republicanrevolution" of 1994. By 1998the electorate, flush with severalyears of economicprosperity, no longer seemed 62 And intent on punishingcandidateswith Washingtonpolitical experience. in the aftermathof thesemid-termelections,in which the Republicansactually lost seatsin the House,SpeakerNewt Gingrich (R-GA), the revolution's mastermind,quit his post underpressureand resignedfrom Congress. In an important sensethe Balkanizationof the post-ColdWar worldafter the simple eleganceof superpowercompetition-createda policy vacuumthat somemembersof Congresssoughtto fill evenbeforethe "revolution of 1994." For example,in the early 1990s,hearingswere held on a

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variety of emergingissuessuchas nuclearwastein the former SovietUnion, migration, religious fundamentalism,and peacekeepingin orderto prod the executiveinto offering guidanceon thesesubjects.The Republican l04th Congressthreatenedto disembowelforeign assistanceprograms,placesignificant restrictionson the president'spowerto commit American troops to United Nationsoperations,andevenderail PresidentClinton'sefforts to save the Mexican economyfrom collapse.Yet, as we will seein chapter6, President Clinton often encounteredmore resistanceto his foreign policy initiatives from membersof his own party, than from the Republicanmajority.

ParainstitutionalChanges Theendof the Cold War hadseveralimportantparainstitutionalconsequences. First, it threatenedto marginalizethosenationalsecurityexpertswhosecredibility dependedheavily on the permanenceof a Sovietthreatand who failed notablyto predictthe imminent demiseof the enemy.Membersof this traditional "politico-military" elite scrambledin different ways to copewith this new internationalenvironment.A few, like LawrenceEagleberger,openly mournedthe passingof the Cold War.63 Edward Luttwak saw an unfolding geoeconomicstruggleof mercantilistproportions,64while SamuelHuntington discovereda world of clashingcivilizations potentially dangerousto the West.65 Henry Kissingerarguedthat a new, more maturemultipolar balance had emergedand wassubjectto the sameforces presentin previousequilibria.66 CharlesKrauthamrnerwarnedof the clear and presentdangersposed by outlaw, terrorist stateswhose behaviormade the conduct of the Soviet Union appearalmost benign in retrospect.67 Similarly, researchand advocacyorganizationslike the AmericanEnterpriseInstitute,the HeritageFoundation, and the HudsonInstitute, whoseagendaswere intertwined with the Cold War, found themselvesnow trying to remainrelevantin a world bereft of old verities. On the other hand, the end of the Cold War significantly improved the fortunesof thosemembersof the old foreign policy establishment(andtheir disciples)who, after Vietnam, had arguedfor new global U.S. priorities focusedon transnationalthemessuchas economicinterdependence, the environment, population, and migration. After facing the ridicule of the "politico-military" elite as Soviet-Americanrelationsagainworsenedby the late 1970s,theseexpertsre-emergedafter the Cold War as part of a nascent "politico-economic" elite eagerto exert primary influence over American foreign policy.68 Indeed,as we shall discoverin chapter6, membersof this new elite-adviserslike Ron Brown and Jeffrey Garten-wereto be found at the very centerof the Clinton administration'sforeign economicpolicy

30 THE RISE AND FALL OF THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

team.At the sametime, economics-oriented organizationslike the Economic StrategyInstituteandthe Institutefor InternationalEconomicsthreatenedto eclipsethe influence of more traditional national security groups.Whether this new elite will constitutethe coreof a new foreign policy establishmentcomparablein unity and authority to its Cold War predecessor-depends in large measureon whether its agenda-trade,open markets,national economic competitiveness-remains relevant in the post-ColdWar world or whethermore traditional securityissuesagainemerge.69 Finally, the end of the Cold War helpedgive to the national media additional power te help set the U.S. foreign policy agenda.This development was, of course,not wholly new, for leading print and broadcastjournalists had playeda major role in shapingforeign policy sinceat leastVietnam,but the strategicvacuumcreatedby the demiseof the containmentpolicy gaveto the mediaan increasedopportunityto defineAmericaninterests.According to one observer: By focusingon particularcrisesaroundthe world [the mediaarein a better position] to pressuregovernmentto act. ... Humanitarianismhastakenon new dimensionsas a componentof Americanforeign policy, and the me70 dia are largely responsible. Furthermore,sincethe late 1960smedia figures had gainedconsiderable accessto the bastionsof the foreign policy establishment,most notably the Council on ForeignRelations.By the 1990sthey accountedfor fully 10 percentof the Council'smembership;the editor of its flagship publication,Foreign Affairs, JamesHoge, was the former publisherof the New York Daily News; and the Council'spresidentwas former New York Timeseditor Leslie Gelb. The resultantblurring of the heretoforerather distinct identities of policymakers and policy reportersconstituteda significant feature on the post-ColdWar parainstitutionallandscape.

The Further Erosion ofthe Cultural Consensus The ending of the Cold War coincidedwith, but did not cause,the further erosionof the cultural consensus.That consensushad beenmost evidentin the 1950sand early 1960swhen a relatively unified America led the "Free World" (i.e., liberal and capitalist) againstrevolutionary communism.But the divisions spawnedby the VietnamWar and accompaniedby social challengeslike the civil rights and women'smovementsunderminedthe notion of a rigid "American way of life." By the 1990san evolving, loosely connectedset of beliefs that somecommentatorscalled "multiculturalism" had

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emergedto weakenfurther the dominanceof the old liberal cosmopolitan 71 consensus. At multiculturalism'score lies "an insistenceof the primacy of ethnicity over the individual's sharedand equal status as a citizen in shaping... identity and ... interests."Thus racial group identity constitutes"the preferred choiceof self-definition and validatesthe ongoingaffirmation of ethnic distinctiveness."The apparentpurposeof multiculturalism is "to justify the claims of subordinateethnic groups to a larger shareof society's"tangible and intangiblegoodsand to make "communal representation"the ordering principle of public policymaking. Multicultural nationalism, by replacingthe symbolic melting pot with a permanentmosaic,conceivesof the United States"as a confederationof groupsratherthan acommunity of autonomousindividuals ... and implies that no national creeddoes,can, or shouldexist...."72 And it carriesthe potential to challengesettledpolicy on suchissuesas the role of religious valuesin public life, the contentof school and university curricula, cultural assimilation,and the symbolic hegemony of the English language. Thus far multiculturalism'sappeal has been largely confined to certain collegeand university campuses,though it has also becomean increasingly central part of the political discoursein major urban areas.Yet it has probably helpedcontributeto a "nativist" backlashdemonstratedby widespread anxiety about immigration from non-Europeanregions and efforts to make 73 At the very least, multiculturalism English the official nationallanguage. threatensto open a national debateabout the meaningof "Americanness," and, by implication, complicatesthe achievementof a durable consensus about national interests.It also raises intriguing questionsabout how multicultural advocatesin the United Statesmight respondto the demands of overseasethnic groupsfor rights and territory in placeslike Bosnia, the former SovietUnion, and Rwanda.In the words of Citron, Haas,and Muste, "The domesticunderpinningsfor the long post-WorldWar II hegemonyof cosmopolitanliberalism and internationalismhave frayed, apart from the fact that the United Statesno longer confronts a powerful military adversary."74Post-ColdWar presidentsthus may be hard-pressed to build domestic foreign policy coalitionsfrom an increasinglydisintegratedsocialstructure, one that by the late 1990s featured the disturbing phenomenonof armed, angry "citizen militias" presumablyat war with the U.S. government. Furthermore,ThomasE. Ricks, the military analystfor the Wall StreetJournal, found evidenceof an alarmingand widening cultural chasmbetweenthe professionalmilitary and civilian society.He discoveredthree sourcesof this gap: (1) civilian ignoranceof the military causedby a declinein the numberof Americans(including their electedrepresentatives)with military experience

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since the end of the draft in the early 1970s; (2) a significant and unprecedentedpoliticization of the military, with hugemajoritiesof its membersidentifying themselveswith the RepublicanParty, and many, especiallyjunior officers, expressinga loathing for the values of civilian society; and (3) the post-ColdWar security environment,which lacks a unifying extemalthreat that might createbondsbetweencivilian and military cultures.7s If true, then at century'send America faces two culture wars simultaneously-onethat pits multiculturalists againsttheir conservativeenemies within civilian society,and the otherthat finds the U.S. military in increased conflict with what it seesas a decadentcivilian culture. The foreign policy implicationsof thesefissuresmay be profound.76

After September11 Changesin Public Opinion On Septemberto, 2001, thirty-nine percent of the public consideredeconomic issuesto be the most salientonesfacing the nation, while one percent believedthat terrorismwas the most important.Theseresultsmirrored those of surveystaken over the precedingdecade.Two days later, sixty-four percentwereconvincedthat terrorismposedthe greatestthreatto America,while only twenty percentsaw economicproblemsas paramount.This astonishing reversaloccurred,of course,becauseof the catastrophical-Qaedaattacksof SeptemberlIon the World Trade Centerand the Pentagon,which claimed the lives of more than threethousandcivilians, rescueworkers,and military personnel.PresidentGeorgeW. Bush declareda war on terrorismwith a gloof air strikesagainst bal reach,andon October7 announcedthe commencement theTalibanregimein Afghanistan,which for severalyearshadharboredOsama bin Laden andotheral-Qaedaleaders.Many commentatorsdeclaredthat these eventsmarkedthe end of the post-ColdWar era in American foreign policy and the start of a twilight struggle againstIslamist radicals determinedto destroythis nation and thosewho sharedits liberal democraticvalues. Yet by the spring of 2004thirty-six percentof likely votersconsideredthe economyand jobs to be the single most important issuefacing the country, andseventeenpercentbelievedit was terrorism.While theseresultscertainly did not mark a full return to surveyresultsof the post-ColdWar era, they did signify an important shift away from opinions expressedin the immediate aftermathof the September11 attacks.Indeed,as early as February2002, the public hadbecomeevenly divided aboutwhetherthe economyor terrorism constitutedthe primary national problem. On the other hand, were the United Statesto suffer anotherdevastatingblow to the homeland,elite and

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massopinion would doubtlesschangeagain.In short, it remainedsomewhat unclearwhetherthe eventsof September11 would proveto be as historically enduringas Pearl Harbor or the VietnamWar. After a relatively short period in which the public appearedwilling to follow the presidentin a mannerreminiscentof the Cold War, its partial disillusionmentin the aftermathof the March 2003invasionof Iraq appeared to reflect thepost-Vietnamfissuresamonginternationalists.That is, Republican supportersof the presidentheld "hard line" views of the world, while his Democraticopponents,including his 2004electionrival JohnKerry, tended to embracethe tenetsof "accommodationist"internationalists.

Institutional Changes Yet certaininstitutional changes,primarily the creationof the Departmentof HomelandSecurity and the rapid congressionalpassageof the USA Patriot Act, suggestedthat both the executiveand legislative branchesconsidered September11 to be a watershedevent worthy of dramaticresponses.Internationaleconomicissues,which had beena focus of the post-ColdWar era, wereagainlargely relegatedto "low policy" asa new "nationalsecuritystate" reemergedto fight al-Qaedaon several continentsand SaddamHussein's regime in Iraq. For example,defensespendingsoaredfrom $332 billion in fiscal 2002 to almost$436 billion in fiscal 2004 after remainingnearly constantduring the 1990s,while outlays for homelandsecurity almostdoubled during the first threeGeorgeW. Bush years.And Congress,perhapsbecause both houseswere narrowly controlled by the Republicans,deferredto the presidenton national security issuesto a degreenot seensincebeforeVietnam and Watergate.According to one observer,"In fundamentalways that havegonelargely unrecognized,Congresshasbecomelessvigilant, lessproud and protectiveof its turf, and less important to the conduct of American governmentthan at any time in decades."77 In the wake of the September11 attacks,Attorney GeneralJohnAshcroft offered an ambitiousproposalto give law enforcementpersonneladditional tools to uncoveranddismantledomesticterroristoperations.In October2001 the USA PatriotAct, as it wasdubbed,passedthe Senate98-1 and the House 357-66.What oppositionemergedin the Housecamefrom civil libertarians on the right and the left who worried about privacy issues.The Act provided the following: 78 • Allowed law enforcementto conductelectronicsurveillanceagainstmore crimesof terror including chemicalweaponsoffenses,the useof weapons of massdestruction,the killing of Americansabroad,and terrorism financing;

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• Allowed federal agentsto employ "roving wiretaps" againsta particular suspectratherthan a specific phonenumber; • Allowed officials to issue"delayednotification" searchwarrantsagainst suspectedterroriststo discourageflight, destructioRof evidence,or the intimidation of witnesses; • Allowed agentsto ask for a court order to obtain businessrecordsof terrorist suspects; • Removedthe major legal barriersthat preventedthe FBI, federal prosecutors,and the CIA from sharinginformation; • Minimized the need to obtain multiple search warrants in multiple jurisdictions; • Allowed the victims of computerhacking to obtain the assistanceof law enforcementofficials; • Increasedthe penaltiesfor thosewho commit and supportthe commission of terrorist acts. The Act included a sunsetprovision stipulating that it would automatically expire after five yearsunlessrenewedby Congress. In January2002PresidentBush issuedexecutiveordersthat definedcaptured al-QaedaandTaliban fighters as "enemycombatants"ratherthan prisonersof war. Bush arguedthat al-Qaedawas not a party to the Third Geneva Conventionand could not enjoy its benefits.The stateof Afghanistanhad signedthis Convention,but the administrationcontendedthat theTalibandid not qualify for Prisonerof War statusbecausethey did not wear distinctive uniforms recognizablefrom a distance;they did not carry their armsopenly; and they failed to conducttheir operationsin accordancewith the laws and customsof war. Consequentlythe DefenseDepartmentincarceratedthese "enemy combatants"at GuantanamoBay, Cuba,and other locationsfor an unspecifiedtime period. While civil libertarians in the United Statesand Britain complainedaboutthesedecisions,the administrationcontendedthat thesedetaineeswould be treatedin accordancewith the GenevaConvention "to the extentpracticableandconsistentwith military necessity."In the spring of 2004 reportsbeganto surfacethat, in the words of the InternationalRed Cross,"actstantamountto torture" hadbeencarriedout by U.S. personnelat the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdadin an effort to gatherinformation about the insurgencythathadbrokenout in Iraq during the summerof 2003.Graphic photosand videoswere shownaroundthe world and PresidentBush offered his apologies.In May 2004The WashingtonPostdescribeda vastnetworkof CIA and DOD prisons,jails, and holding facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo,and severalother locations.More than 9,000 detaineeswere being held overseaswith no legal rights, no accessto lawyers,and, in some cases,subjectto physicaland psychologicalabuse.79

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Shortly afterSeptember11, BushcreatedtheWhite HouseOffice for Homeland Securityand namedTom Ridge,the Republicangovernorof Pennsylvania, as its director. But many in Congressbelievedthat the office deserved Cabinetstatusin order to give Ridge the power necessaryto preventfuture attacks.For monthsthe administrationresisted,but in June2002 Bush preemptedCongressand proposedthe creationof the Departmentof Homeland Securityand nominatedRidge to be its secretary.The result was a 180,000employeedepartmentwith a $29.4billion budgetfor fiscal 2004. Moreover, this mammothorganizationmeldedtwenty-twoagenciesandoffices of wildly differing histories, cultures, and responsibilities.Notably, however, neither the FBI nor any of the intelligenceagenciessuch as the CIA, the National SecurityAgency, or the DefenseIntelligenceAgency was brought into this new bureaucracy.Instead,"by his own admission,Ridge [was] merely a consumerof intelligence. What's more, the new intelligence-analyzingoperations that ... sprungup since 9/11-theTerrorist Threat IntegrationCenter 8o and the Terrorist ScreeningCenter-[were]basedoutside"his department. Nevertheless,Ridge'schargewasdaunting-secure Americanborders,skies, and ports. Meanwhile, the so-called"9/11 Commission,"createdover administrationobjections,found numerousintelligencelapsesthat hadoccurred beforethe attacksand recommendedconsolidatingall of the existing intelligenceagenciesunder a national intelligencedirector. It will obviously takemany yearsbeforean assessment of the new Homeland Securitydepartment'sefforts can be offered, but its enormoussize and visibility stood as a reminderof the institutional impact of September11. The federal governmenthad once again been transformedinto a "national security state" that was potentially even more intrusive than its Cold War counterpart.

ParainstitutionalChanges By mid-2004 the Global War on Terror was less than three years old, yet severalpara-institutionalchangeswere alreadyevident. First, the neo-conservativemovementthat had played such a prominentrole in critiquing the Carteradministrationand celebratingthe Reaganpresidencyagainemerged as a powerful intellectual force in American foreign policy. Indeed,we will discover in chapterseventhat severalof them, led by Paul Wolfowitz and others in the Office of the Secretaryof Defense,but also including Undersecretaryof StateJohn Bolton, played key roles in formulating and executingthe Bush administration'sforeign policy. Others,like the columnist CharlesKrauthammer,offered a vision of "democraticglobalism" that combinedthe idealistfervor of WoodrowWilson with TheodoreRoosevelt's

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deepsuspicionof internationalinstitutions. The WeeklyStandard,the flagship magazineof neo-conservatism,featuring commentatorssuch as William Kristol (son of Irving Kristol, a founding neo-conservative),John Podhoretz(son of Norman Podhoretz,anotherfounding neo-con),Daniel Pipes(sonof RichardPipes,a RussianandSoviethistorianwho had advised RonaldReagan),David Frum (a former speechwriter for GeorgeW. Bush), Terry Eastland(who servedin the ReaganJusticeDepartment),FredBarnes (also of Fox News), Max Boot, TuckerCarlson,and David Brooks emerged as a highly influential editorial presence.We will examinethe genesisof neo-conservatism during the 1970sin chaptersthreeand four. And second,a host of military, counterterrorism,and national security expertsbeganto appearon televisionwith regularity.For example,MSNBC, a cable news network, signed contractsafter 9/11 with General Barry McCaffrey, U.S. Army (retired), GeneralMontgomery Meigs, U.S. Army (retired),Lt. Gen.BernardTrainor, U.S. Marine Corps(retired), Colonel Jack Jacobs,U.S. Army (retired),Colonel Ken Allard, U.S. Army (retired),Lt. Col. Rick Francona,U.S. Air Force (retired), Daniel Goure, and William Arkin. Theseanalystsappearedfrequentlyto offer their thoughtson Afghanistan,Iraq, and al-Qaedaand tendedto have conservativeviews. Even CNBC, a cable network devotedto business,launched(with modestsuccess)a handful of shows that focused on the potential effects of terrorism on the American economy.And as this group of "talking heads"becamemore prominent,economic expertslike Fred Bergstenand Robert Hormats, whom the networks had featuredduring the post-ColdWar interlude,receivedlessair time. In sum, with its focus on internationaleconomicissuesand the soaring stock market, the 1990sappeared,in retrospect,much like the interregnum of the 1920s.The first decadeof the twenty-first century,on the otherhand, markeda return to an atmosphereof anxiety, tension,and fear that was reflected in theseinstitutional and parainstitutionalchanges.

Foreign Policy Legitimation At a minimum,domesticconsensus describestheconditionproducedby broad agreementamong membersof the executiveand congress,political elites, the attentivepublic, and the masspublic aboutthe basic purposesof American foreign policy. Exactly how muchagreementmustexist beforea consensus results remains debatable.We have argued that major foreign policy initiatives in the first two postwardecadesreceived more overall support than thoseundertakensincethe VietnamWar, and that during the post-Cold War interlude the public temporarily largely lost interestin non-economic foreign policy issues.We also suggestedthat the attacksof 9/11 may have

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the effect of once again raising national security issuesto preeminence. Moreover,we havesuggestedthat for a pluralistic polity like the United States to sustaina coherent,consistent,and reasonablyeffective long-termforeign policy, a relatively broad and stabledomesticconsensusis essential,though it hardly guaranteessuccessandcan, in fact, prove dangerous.A democratic consensuscan impart authority to foreign policy by sharingand supporting its premises,purposes,and values.While consensuscanhardly assuresteady diplomacy,an effectiveforeign policy may be impossiblewithout it. Furthermore, in a political systemgroundedin popularsovereignty,consensususually implies legitimacy. Different kinds of regimescandraw legitimacy from a variety of sources-religion,tradition, the soil, lineage, ethnic identity, revolution, laws, and so on-but in the United Statesforeign policy legitimacy primarily dependson whetherthat policy is generallyconstruedto be valuedand properwithin the overall domesticpolitical context.81 At thosetimes when a consensusdid exist, it did not "just happen."Cold War presidentsworked diligently to achievedomestic legitimacy for their foreign policies. We have reviewedthe role that historical, political, institutional, para-institutional,and cultural factors have played in facilitating or hamperingthe achievementof consensus.Equally significant,however,have beenthe self-consciousefforts of presidentsto legitimate-or"sell"-their foreign policies. Indeed, this processof policy legitimation constitutesthe primary meanspresidentsemployto constructconsensus. Presidentsandtheir foreign policy adviserstry to provide interpretiveimagesof the international situation that are compatiblewith domesticexperienceto justify the necessity, urgency,andcharacterof their actions.Legitimationestablishesthe broad purposesof policy by translatingits objectivesinto an understandableand compelling reflection of the domesticsociety'Sdominantnorms.As such it representsa political act within the context of national politics and characteristically relies on politically potent symbols to link foreign policy and theseinternal norms.82 Though all of theseactivities are important, presidentscannotexpectto achieveand maintain foreign policy legitimacy merely by adheringscrupulously to constitutionalrequirements,by duly consultingwith Congress,by avoiding unreasonablesecrecyand deception,or by brokering the demands of domesticinterestgroupS.83On the otherhand,thosewho opposethe substanceof a foreign policy frequentlydisguisetheir oppositionby claims that the presidentviolated acceptedproceduresin making that policy. For example, early congressionalopponentsof the Vietnam War usually did not chargethatAmericahadno vital interestsin Vietnam,but thatLyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had exceededtheir constitutional authority in making commitmentsor had deceivedCongressand the public aboutthe natureand

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costof their military strategies.Later, as antiwardissentmushroomed,direct assaultson the content of America's Vietnam policy becamecommon in Congress,but the collapseof the proceduralconsensusantedatedand anticipatedthe declineof the substantiveconsensus.Policy legitimation, then, involves morethan following legitimateprocedures,althougha presidentwho flagrantly ignoresor grosslyviolatesthem risks opposition,especiallyif the substanceof his foreign policy provescontroversial. A presidentcanachieveforeign policy legitimacy only if he canconvince enoughmembersof the executive,the Congress,and the electoratethat his policy objectivesaredesirableandfeasible.Thedesirabilityof foreign policy legitimacydependson the degreeto which the policy appearsto embodyand enhancebasic national valuesand interests,while its feasibility reflects the president'ssuccessin convincingpeoplethat he knows how to achievethese appealinglong-rangegoalS.84AlexanderM. Georgeseparatesthesetwo componentsof policy legitimacy into what he calls the normativeand the cognitive. He suggeststhat foreign policies aiming to establisha new international system or regime-suchas the grand departuresof Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt,Truman,and Nixon-possessed an internal architecturecomprising (1) the design-objectiveof the policy; (2) the strategyusedto achieveit; and (3) the tacticsemployedto implementthat strategy;and that presidents, to be successful,must obtain cognitive legitimacy for all threecomponents. That is, "a presidentmustbe able to plausibly claim that he and his advisers possessthe relevantknowledgeand competenceneededto choosecorrect policies and carry them out effectively."85 In fact, the foreign policies of all presidentssince FDR-whetheror not advertisedas "grand departures"havefeaturedthe sort of internal architecturethat Georgedescribes.For example,thosecritics who chargedthat Jimmy Carterand Bill Clinton lacked the competenceto make foreign policy were, in effect, arguing that their policies lacked"cognitive legitimacy." But foreign policy must also be seen as properand desirableinsofar as it reflects-indesign-objectives,strategy, and tactics---9Many "well-intentioned but misguided people" had persistedin their wrongheadedness. Yet, Reagan,whose domesticcommunity required no permanent enemies,seemedconfidentthat somedaysoon they too-like him and "the people"-wouldmendtheir ways.For "the problemisn't who to blame; it's what to blame,"and the problemwas government,with its built-in "tendency to grow."IO In bold contrastto Carter,who wonderedpublicly aboutthe sourcesof the contemporarynational "moral and spiritual crisis," Ronald Reaganrepeatedly pointedto individual acts of heroismas convincingproof that America remaineda good and vibrant society. SecretService agentTim McCarthy who helpedsaveReagan'slife, airliner crashrescuerLenny Slotnick, Space Shuttle astronauts,community volunteers,and the marinesin Beirut were invokedto demonstratethat "America neverwasa sick society."Indeed,"the heartof America is strong; it's good and true.... We're seeingrededication to bedrockvaluesof faith, family, work, neighborhood,peace,andfreedomvaluesthat bring us togetheras one people,from the youngestchild to the most seniorcitizen."ll For Reagan,America constituteda genuinely moral community of individuals with sharedvalues and a common purpose,and his ability to conveythis appealingvision in humanandunderstandable terms greatly contributedto his personalpopularity. And, not surprisingly, this uniquely virtuous community-this"shining city on a hill"-had beenprovidentiallyinstructedto bring freedomandpeace to the rest of the world. According to Reagan,American foreign policy reflectedthe selflessness, goodness,peacefulness, andgenerosityof theAmericanpeople.In fact, virtually everyonein the world allegedlysharedthe same valuesand aspirationsas the membersof the American community,though many had been frustrated by the actions of oppressivegovernments.Evil still existed,particularlyin theSovietUnion (at leastbefore1988),but Reagan evinced growing confidencethat the rising tide of democraticrevolutions would sweepaway the remnantsof totalitarianism. Reagan'srhetorical vision reflectedfour underlyingthemes-antigovernmentnationalism,communitarianindividualism,free-marketradicalism,and Wilsonian internationalism-whichtogetherformed a seamlessweb that purportedto dip deeplyinto theAmericanexperience,but in fact constituted only one part of it. 12 First, in continually celebratingthe American spirit, Reagandiscovereda preexistingnation of individuals dedicatedto the common interestand generalwelfare, waging a heroic struggle againsta late-

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arriving, alien, corrupt national governmentheld hostageby specialinterest groups.In March 1982 Reaganasked: Did we forget that governmentis the people'sbusiness,and [that] every man, woman,and child becomesa shareholderwith the first pennyof tax paid? ... Did we forget that the function of governmentis not to confer happinesson us, but just to get out of the way and give us the opportunity to work out happinessfor ourselves?I3 In this manner,as Hugh Heclo correctly noted, Reaganrevived "a rhetoric older than the Constitution itself-the country versus the court-the real nation perceivedas morally superior to a corrupt government."14Furthermore,this conceptof a nation of individuals pitted againstoverweeningcentralized powersin Washingtongave voice to those"Main Street"Americans who hadfelt victimized by the GreatSociety,as well as the youthful dissenters of the 1960swho had urgedthe return of "power to the people."Second, with the theme of communitarianindividualism Reagansought to disarm liberal critics who claimedthat his real goal was to rewardthe rich and brutalize the poor by crippling the federal government.But Reaganturned the tablesby arguing that federal social engineerssuffering from moral relativism and secularhumanismwere determinedto imposetheir pervertedform of community on a very reluctant citizenry. He contendedthat a genuine community rooted in the traditional values of family, God, self-help, free enterprise,and individual freedomconstitutedthe real America: "a nation of neighborsandan economyof ruggedindividualists."15Third, in extolling the virtues of a free marketplace,Reaganattemptedto sweepasidethe flotsam of the 1970s-those"doubtingThomases,""doomsayers,""Malthusianpessimists," and "false prophets"who had ominously warnedof a more straitenedfuture. In placeof this depressingcollectionof "handwringers,"President Reaganoffered an America of hard-working individuals, who asked only that the marketbe liberatedfrom governmentalinterference.Allow the market to work its magic, Reaganimplored, and the future will be filled with growth, not tradeoffs.Justas he had shown much successin banishingthe 1 word-liberal-from the American political vocabulary,so did he remove the d word-decline-fromall but academicdiscourse.Finally, as we seein greaterdetail in the next section,RonaldReagansoughtto makeWilsonian internationalismonce again respectable.Notwithstandinghis emphasison thetwin threatsof totalitarianismandterrorism,Reagan'sinternationalrhetoric exudedthe sameremarkableoptimismas his domesticoratory. In contrastto Carter,who seemedcontentto know that as a result of his public statements foreign leadershadbeenforcedto think abouthumanrights, PresidentReagan

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by June 1982 had proclaimedan era of democraticrevolutions that would surely removethe deadhand of communismforever. Not merely an exemplar of freedom,America,Reagansuggested,hada sacredduty to defendthe rights of others. Only after the march of freedom had createddemocratic governments,free markets,and individual liberty everywherecould Americansrest.Andjust asthe tide of history hadswungin favor of "we the people" at home, who had demandedan end to oppressivegovernment,so too did it now favor peopleabroadwho were fighting to destroyrepressivestates. It cannotbe gainsaidthat RonaldReagan'speculiarbrandof "feel good," "pain free" conservatismstruckan enormouslyrespondentchordin theAmerican body politic. His early tax and domesticspendingcuts, coupledwith the ensuing unprecedentedbudget deficits, relegatedthose who wished to expandsignificantly federal social programsto the political sidelines.The issue of the 1980sbecame,rhetorically at least, not whether,but how, to limit the sizeof the nationalgovernment.In that senseNancy Reagan's"JustSay No" antidrug campaignslogan typified Reaganism'sgeneral public posturetoward nondefenseexpenditures.Moreover, in contrastto an older American conservatism,which hadbeentraditionally vulnerableto chargesof privilege andelitism, Reagan'swasbaldly populistin which "we the people"struggled againsta Washingtonsoddenwith experts,specialinterests,social engineers, andsecularhumanists.Masterfully building on the accomplishments of Richard Nixon and GeorgeWallace, but doing so with a "human face," Reagan claimedto speakfor the millions who had for too long beenpatronizedand coercedby an antidemocraticliberal establishment.And, again, unlike Tory conservativeswho had dourly fretted aboutan unretrievablepastand a dangerousfuture, Reagandispensedwith tragedyand offered a vision bubbling with optimism.WhereasCarterhad soberlyspokenof restraint,sacrifice,and complexity, ReaganpromisedAmericansself-described"simple" solutions, unlimited economicgrowth, and technologicalsalvation.Finally, his rhetoric of nationalassertiveness, particularly in regardto America'sadversaries,neatly captureda public weariedby a decadeof "bad news" from abroad.Thus, to offer but onecolorful example,Reagantold the AmericanBar Associationin July 1985 that "we're ... not going to tolerate... attacksfrom outlaw States by the strangestcollectionof misfits, loony tunes,andsqualidcriminals since the adventof the Third Reich."16Whereasthe "Blame-America-FirstCrowd" had allegedly beenbusy defendingtheseunsavorytypes, Reagan(and "we the people")saw the truth and spokeit. Notwithstandingthe apparentlypervasivepolitical appealof thesethemes, nonewas immuneto difficulties that could eventuallythreatenReaganism's agenda.First, as Heclo, Budget Director David Stockman,and others suggested,the Reaganadministrationfailed to developany principled basisfor

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eithercutting or decentralizingfederal social programs.DespiteStockman's initial insistencethat a consistentsenseof equity governpolicy, the administration, with the connivanceof Congress,allowed political expediencyto determinebudgetpriorities. It soonbecameclearto Stockmanthat it was the poor and other unorganizedgroupsthat were particularly victimized, while 17 middle-class"entitlement" programsremainedsacrosanct. And although Reagan'selectoraltriumphsseemedto vindicatethe administration'sunderstandingof political realities,the growing gapbetweenrich andpoorthroughout the 1980s,the emergenceof a permanentunderclass,and the disturbing phenomenonof homelessness servedas remindersof Reaganism'spotential vulnerability on the "fairness issue." Of more immediatepolitical significancewas an issuethat had begun tomanifestitself as early as 1984-defensespending.On an abstractlevel, onewould expectReaganconservatives to find it increasinglydifficult to arguesimultaneouslyfor a strictly limited national governmentand an enormousmilitary establishmentthat, among other things, distorted the market and regulatedimportant parts of the economy.More practically, the perpetuationof massivedeficits and the remarkablediminution of theSovietthreatduringReagan'ssecondtermbrought the long defensebuildup to an abrupthalt. Second,Reagan'ssentimentalvision of a national community of caring neighborseagerto volunteer, yet hamstrungby an arrogant,alien, corrupt federalgovernment,wasseverelydamagedby a seriesof private-sectorabuses culminatingin Wall Streetinsider-tradingscandalsand the savingsand loan crisis. Not evenReagancould plausibly indict the federal governmentas the causeof thoseexcessesor otherinstancesof unbridledindividual greed,nor could he easily blameWashingtonfor provoking a national drug crisis that threatenedthe very "family" values so dear to the president.Furthermore, despitethe apparentbroad popUlarity of Reagan'slimited governmentmessage,opinion polls throughoutthe 1980sindicated widespreadsupportfor public programs,particularly thoseperceivedas personallyrelevant.At the sametime, however,there remaineda great reluctanceto pay for theseservices with highertaxes.In this sense,the federal deficit constitutedthe "free lunch" that conservativeshad traditionally dismissedas an oxymoron,but, in fact, the deficit enabledthe public to fulfill its twin wishesof federal services and lower taxes.Unlike inflation and unemployment,the deficit had an abstract,eschatologicalquality that madeit politically tolerablein the shortrun. Finally, Reagan'soptimisticWilsonianinternationalvision, like his domestic outlook, obscured,as we later see,someimportantoperationaldilemmas. For example,underwhat conditionswould the United Statesemploy military force to "expandfreedom"?Would an American public, told by Reaganthat sacrificeat homewas unnecessary,supportprolongedengagements abroad?

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A ShiningCity on the Hill As a former governorof California, presidentialcandidateRonald Reagan may havelackedforeign policy experience,but he surely did not lack opinions aboutAmerica'sproperrole in the world. He had beendelivering these opinions,as well as thoseon domesticissues,sincehis dayson the "mashed potatocircuit" as a spokesmanfor GeneralElectric, in "the speech"on national televisionin October1964,andin a long seriesof five-minute weekly radio addressesafter leaving Sacramento.In essence,Reagan'sassaulton the Carterforei-gn policy built on theseearlierviews, with an adjustedfocus to takeadvantageof the president'scurrentpredicament.Like Carterin 1976, Reaganleveleda combinationof stylistic andsubstantivechargesagainstthe incumbentdesignedto distancehim from the recentAmericanforeign policy record. Once again the functioning of the National Security Councilpolicy s~ff emergedas a campaign issue with Reagan,who pledged to end the policymaking confusion of the Carter administrationby ensuring the supremacyof the StateDepartment.More tellingly, candidateReaganclaimed that (1) while the United Stateshad been "unilaterally disarming" in the 1970s,theSovietUnion hadundertakenhistory'Smostmassivearmsbuildup; (2) the Sovietshad exploitedthe armscontrol processto threatenthe United Stateswith a window of vulnerability that would soon put at risk its entire land-basedICBM force; (3) PresidentCarterhad unwisely signeda "fatally flawed" SALT II agreement;(4) the Carteradministration,in part becauseof its highly publicized human rights campaign,had abandonedmany of America'straditional friends, while apologizingfor the misdeedsof its adversaries;(5) the United Stateshad placedexcessivefaith in multilateral organizationssuch as the United Nations, which had repeatedlyabusedand humiliatedit; (6) for well overa decade,America'sstandingin the world and the respectafforded it had steadily fallen; and (7) an anemic, inflationary domesticeconomyhaddiminishedAmerica'sability to provideinternational leadership. Upon its electoralvictory in 1980,the Reaganadministrationfaceda public that manifestedseveralnot wholly consistentforeign policy attitudes:a senseof vulnerability in the wake of the Soviet armsbuildup; a preoccupation with Soviet military power; a disinclination for direct military involvement in conflicts abroad;and paradoxicallya simultaneousdesirefor U.S. world leadership.The administrationrespondedwith a programthat allegedly aimedto restorethe domesticeconomy,end the era of Soviet military superiority, reward the anticommunistfriends of the United Statesabroad, halt the spreadof Soviet influence, and combatterrorism. Furthermore,it promisedto accomplishthesegoals without triggering a nuclearwar (some

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early statementsnotwithstanding),risking anotherVietnam-typeconflict, or incurring federal budgetdeficits. Centralto both Reagan'sdomesticandglobal granddesignwas the restoration of theAmericaneconomy,andthe administrationfocusedits attention during 1981 on the federal budget and tax reductions.Indeed, apart from some rather heavy-handeddeclaratory signaling, which reflected the administration'sideologicalinclinations-forexample,oppositionto theLaw of the SeaTreaty, withholding paymentsto the United Nations,and shooting down two Libyan jets in the Gulf of Sidra-theReaganpresidencyappeared devoid of a foreign policy. Secretaryof StateAlexanderHaig's early efforts to "go to the source"of CentralAmerican instability met with seriousresistancefrom the White Housetroika of Edwin Meese,Michael Deaver,and JamesBaker, and the president'sonly important foray into foreign policy involved his rescueof the AdvancedWarning Air Control (AWACs) saleto SaudiArabia beforea skepticalCongress-adeal initiated by the Carteradministration. In contrastto his predecessor,Reagandeliveredno major foreign policy addressesuntil the CaribbeanBasin Initiative in January1982. Yet Reagan'searly foreign policy rhetoricalquiescencehardly meantthat he lackedstrongbeliefs. Indeed,the presidentand his senioradvisersshared a set of overlappingconvictionsbesttermed"conservativeinternationalism" that collided with the world orderoutlook of the early Carteryears.First, and mostfundamentally,they believedthatSoviet-Americancompetitionremained the defining characteristicof contemporaryinternationalrelations,a struggle that the United Stateswas losing througha lack of effort. Second,they were confident that the Soviet Union, despiteits formidable, even preeminent, military power, sufferedfrom graveeconomicand social woesand was vulnerableto externalpressure.Third, previousU.S. efforts to achievedetente had been naive, one-sideddisastersand would continueto be so until the internal natureof the Soviet regimehad beendecisively altered.Fourth, the world wasnot nearlyasdiverseor complexasliberal cantfashionablyclaimed, and thus regional conflicts in Africa, CentralAmerica, and the Middle East shouldbestbe viewedas part of the East-Weststruggle.Fifth, recent administrations,in misguidedattemptsto accommodate Third World Marxist states, had abandonedtraditional, if authoritarian,friends and thus strengthened Moscow's hand. Sixth, the Soviet Union and its clients had exploited America's"Vietnamsyndrome"to expandtheir influence.The UnitedStates, they believed,hadto give renewedpriority to military andparamilitarypolicy instruments-asharpincreasein the defensebudget,covert action, military assistance andarmssales-instead of vainly attemptingto win friendsthrough agreementslike the Law of the Sea and the PanamaCanal treaties.And, finally, they were convincedthat becauseAmerica'swoundshad beenself-

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inflicted and were not the productof inexorableforces suchas the diffusion of economicpowerandhigh technology,its declinecould be reversedandits global preeminencerestored.Much would dependon rebuilding domestic confidencein the strength,morality, and wisdom of the United States. Togethertheseconvictions constituteda grand design reminiscentof a world much like that of the 1950s-onlybetter.This world would resemble the earlier decadeinasmuchas a respected,powerful America would again exertglobal leadership,but now, having lost the Cold War, the SovietUnion would no longer posea seriousthreat.The United Statescould thus escape the securitydilemmasthat had traditionally bedeviledstates.Surroundedby friends-somedemocratic,others authoritarian-theUnited Stateswould not needto manipulatean internationalbalanceof powerto survive,for, with the Cold War now history, international relations-traditionalstatecraftwould be largely obsolete.This enormouslyoptimistic yet quintessentially Reaganesque vision wentconsiderablybeyondcontainment.GeorgeKennan, it may be recalled,hadarguedthat the patientapplicationof pressureagainst the SovietUnion would eventuallyleadto its collapseor moderation,which in tum would usherin a multipolar world with the United Statesplaying a major balancingrole. Moreover, Reagan'sinitial design grew in time even moregrandioseashe took advantageof favorabletrendsfirst in Latin America and later in EasternEuropeand the Soviet Union to proclaim a new age of democraticrevolutions that would universalizethe contagion of liberty. Reagan'saddressto the British Parliamentin June1982assertedthat "around the world today the democraticRevolution is gaining strength" at a time when "a great Revolutionarycrisis . . . is happening. . . in the home of Marxist-Leninism-theSoviet Union." Reagansuggestedthat democracy "is not a fragile flower. Still it needscultivating.... It is time that we committed ourselvesas a nation-in both the public and private sectors-toassistingdemocraticdevelopment."For "freedomis not the soleprerogativeof a lucky few, but the inalienableand universal right of all humanbeings."18 Indeed,Reagan'sgranddesign,while clearly indebtedto Woodrow Wilson, some of the founders, and many nineteenth-centurypublicists, possessed certain advantagesover earlier visions. During other revolutionary democratic ages-the1790sand 1840s-theUnited States hadthe desirebut not the power to assistfellow democrats,while after World War I the United States hadenormouspowerbut confronteda world besetby radical revolutionary change.Now this designstooda betterchanceof being realized,for U.S. powerand favorableinternationaltrendswere presumablyconverging. Thus Reagan'sgrand design entailednothing less than a fully democratic world guided by a resurgentAmerica in which peaceand prosperitycould flourish.

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It proveddifficult, however,to translatetheseoverlappingconvictionsand this global vision into a coherentforeign policy strategy.Reagan'searly immersion in winning public and congressionalsupportfor his economicrecovery program,as well asa hands-offleadershipstyle, left the White House troika, Secretaryof DefenseCasparWeinberger,Director of the Central IntelligenceAgency William Casey,and Haig vying for control over foreign policy, while a greatly weakenedNational Security Council provided very little coordination.As a result of this organizationalconfusion, the early Reaganforeign policy consistedprimarily of a collection of departmental initiatives, whose sole common thread was an antipathy to anything that smackedof "Carterism."Neither a formal decision-makingapparatusnor a basic national securitydocumentexisteduntil after ReaganconfidantWilliam Clark moved from Stateto the NSC in early 1982. Three monthsafter his arrival, a National Security Decision Directive, coordinatedby former Secretaryof the Air ForceThomasC. Reed,receivedthe president'ssignature. This eight-pagedirective outlined the political, economic,diplomatic, informational, and military componentsof a comprehensivenational strategy.19Its contentsremainedclassified,thoughClark and other senioradvisers publicly offereda generaldescriptionof what someof its architectsdubbed "prevailing with pride." First, becausethe Soviet Union was an "economic basketcase,"the United Statesshould exploit this situationby waging economic warfare. Detentehad createdpowerful interestsin the West whose well-being dependedon expandingSoviet trade and investment.The Soviets, in tum, had manipulatedthoseinterestsinto helping prop up their faltering economy.In the future, the West had to ensurethat its resources,credits, andtechnologycould not be usedin this manner.Instead,everyeffort should be madeto deny the Soviet Union accessto Westerneconomicassets.Thus Weinbergertook the lead in tightening controls over the Westernexport of critical goods,in endingSoviet industrial espionage,in opposingthe extension of credits to Poland, and in demandingthat West Germany cancel a contractwith Russiafor a natural gaspipeline. Moreover,he recommended that weaponssystemsbe built not only for their military utility but in orderto maximize the economic burdensthey would place on Soviet attemptsto counterthem.20 As it turnedout, notonly did vigorousWesternEuropeanand congressionalresistanceto the notion of economicwarfare largely scuttle Weinberger'splans,but by the late 1980sSoviet-Americantradehad reached unprecedented levels as a "DetenteII" was in full bloom. Second,this documentapparentlyendorsedan extremely skeptical approachto nucleararmscontrol. If not for the intrusion of domesticpolitical considerations,first in the FederalRepublicof Germanyin 1981 and then in the United Statesthe following year,the Reaganadministrationwould prob-

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ably havepreferredto offer no armscontrol proposalsat all. Moreover,as part of the "two-track" theaternuclearforce agreementreachedwith NATO in December 1979, the administrationwas obliged to negotiatewith the Soviets while making preparationsto deploy PershingII andCruisemissilesin WesternEurope.Hugeantideploymentrallies in WestGermanyhelpedpressurethe administrationto unveil in November1981 a "zero-zero" option that would haveforced the Sovietsto removetheir theaternuclearforcesin exchangefor a U.S. pledge to forego deploymentof its new weapons.In view of the administration'swell-known doubtsaboutreachingagreementswith a Soviet Union that "had brokenevery treaty it had ever made,"many interpretedthis offer as a propagandaploy. Nevertheless,it did succeedin defusingthe West Germanprotestsand, of course,ultimately servedas the basis for the 1987 IntermediateNuclearForces(INF) treaty. It remainsunclearif the zero-zero option was taken seriouslyby the administrationin 1981, for someDefense Departmentofficials subsequentlyfound it very difficult to tolerateMoscow's acceptanceof the offer. In a somewhatsimilar fashion, Reagan'srejection of the SALT processin favor of the commencement of StrategicArms Reduction Treaty (START), designedto reduceexisting strategicarsenals,struck some observersas public relations hyperbole,especiallyhis Eureka proposalsof May 1982that would havecut deeplyinto land-basedmissiles,but it stolethe thunderfrom the nuclearfreeze movement,which, Reaganclaimed, wished merelyto sanctify a dangerousstatusquo. In any case,"prevailing with pride" evidently urgedthat seriousnegotiationsbe postponedat leastuntil the U.S. force modernizationandexpansionprogramwaswell underway, for positions of strengthneededto be constructedfirst. Third, according to Clark, "the modernizationof our strategicnuclear forces" would "receivefirst priority in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United States."21Whereasthe final Carter military budget hademphasizedgeneral-purpose forces-largelyto help implementthe new commitmentto PersianGulf security-Reagan's fiscal year 1983 increases focused on strategicforces. Specifically, the administration"accordedthe highestpriority to a survivablecommand,control, communications,and intelligencesystem.''22This force modernizationcontainedeleven major elements, eight of which were continuationsof Carter initiatives, while the others-theB-1, air defenses,andsealaunchedCruisemissiles-wereReagan innovations."23Taken together,theseprogramsrepresenteda strategicforce buildup comparableto those of the Korean War and Kennedy years.Yet, somewhatsurprisinglyin view of the 1980campaignrhetoric,little wasdone to deal with the "window of vulnerability," other than undertakinga search for a feasiblebasingmode-asearchthat endedwith the recommendationto deploy the MX in existing Minutemansilos. More innovative was the deci-

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sion to substitutethe threat of escalationin spaceand time for the threat of escalationin weapons.Ratherthan climb a vertical ladder to deter nuclear war, the administrationproposed"horizontal escalation,"wherebythreatsof conventionalcounterattacksagainstmajor Sovietinterestsheld out the prospectof "prolongedwar" in which Westerneconomicsuperioritywould prove decisive.24 Weinberger'sFY 1984-88DefenseGuidancesingled out Cuba, Vietnam, and North Korea as likely targets for conventionalretaliation.25 Central to the strategyof horizontal escalationand prolongedconventional war was a naval expansionprogramaimed at achieving a 600-ship fleet. Equally essential,of course,was the developmentof a domesticindustrial basethat could sustainU.S. forces in a war of long duration. That, in turn, dependedon the restorationof the American economy. Fourth, the Reaganadministrationproposedto launch a comprehensive informationaloffensivestrongly reminiscentof Eisenhower'spsychological warfareefforts of the early 1950s.Concernedthat the Sovietshad beenwinning the propagandastruggle-"nuclearpacifism" in WestGermanyandwidespreadWesternacceptanceof the doctrineof "moral equivalence"were seen asevidenceof Moscow'ssuccess-itwasdeterminedto seizethe moral high ground and exposethe Soviet Union and its friends as ruthless,aggressive totalitarians.Severalstepswere takento implementthis part of the strategy. JeaneKirkpatrick, whose Commentaryarticle "Dictatorships and Double Standards"had beenadmiringly read by Reaganduring the campaign,was madeambassador to the United Nations,whereshequickly earneda reputation as a formidable "Soviet basher."26Similarly, Michael Novak, a 1960s hippie-turned-conservative Catholic philosopher,becamechief representative to the UN Commissionon HumanRights-aposthe usedto promotea distinctly libertarian approach.PresidentReaganappointedCharlesWick, an old friend, to headthe U.S. InformationAgencywith instructionsto transform it into an active combatantin the struggle againstcommunism.The StateDepartmentthrough its Bureauof Public Affairs publisheda long series of reportsthat accusedthe Sovietsof promotingterrorism,causing"yellow rain" in SoutheastAsia, abusinghumanrights, systematicallyviolating treatiesand other international agreements,and a host of other transgressions.PresidentReagan,aswe latersee,unleasheda rhetoricalbarrageagainst Moscow culminatingin his March 1983 "evil empire" speech.The administration, in an effort to exertpressureon Fidel Castro,askedCongressto fund Radio Marti. Finally, plans were laid to createa National Endowmentfor Democracy(NED), an amalgamof American business,labor, academicinstitutions,and the two major political parties,which was to dispersegovernmentfunds abroadin orderto promotepolitical pluralism.Loosely basedon Cold War programsof the CIA, which hadclandestinelychanneledfinancial

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assistanceto democratic(or at least anticommunist)groups, the NED was openly to strengthenpluralism both within and outsidethe Soviet bloc. It was, in fact, establishedin 1983 under the presidencyof Carl Gershman, who oversawsuch activities as training teachers,openingschools,publishing textbooksin Afghanistan,helping Solidarity print undergroundpublications in Poland,providing printing suppliesfor the anti-SandinistapaperLa Prensa,and helping the oppositionin SouthKorea. It also, much more controversially, madea $575,000grant to an ultraright Frenchgroup, the National Inter-University Union.27 All in all, theseinitiatives were designedto put the Soviet Union on the ideological defensiveand to win the "war of ideas" with communism. Finally, theReaganadministrationgraduallyevolveda geopoliticalproject that at its core reflectedthe long-standingconservativeaversionto containment. Ronald Reagan,in particular, a self-describedadmirer of James Burnham,hadduring the 1950sand 1960sspokenof the allegedmoral bankruptcy of containment'sreluctanceto assistpeoplestrugglingagainstcommunist governments.The Eisenhoweradministration,Dulles's rhetoric notwithstanding,had found it impossibleto implementrollback in Eastern Europefor fear of triggering a war with the Soviet Union. But by the early 1980sthe Sovietempirestretchedfar beyondits traditional securityzoneto placessuchasEthiopia,Angola, SouthYemen,Cambodia,Cuba,Nicaragua, andAfghanistan.As we haveseen,most seniorCarterofficials initially suspectedthat the SovietUnion wasoverextendedandthat powerful indigenous nationalistforces would eventuallyloosenMoscow'sgrip on many of these areas.Moreover,becauseof their dreadof anotherVietnam quagmire,they opposedfunding military assistanceto anticommunistorganizationsuntil, of course,the Sovietinvasionof Afghanistan.The Carteradministration'sdecision to help arm the Afghan rebels constitutedthe genesisof what would becomeknown asthe ReaganDoctrine,a synthesisof rollback andthe Nixon Doctrine, wherebythe United Stateswould provide modestfunds for "freedom fighters" struggling to unseatThird World communistgovernments. The Reaganadministrationcameto view this policy as a low-cost, low-risk effort to chip away at the periphery of the Soviet empire.At the least, it would greatly increasethe price that Moscow would haveto pay to retainits Third World clients,andit might evenleadto the overthrowof thesegovernments,which, amongotherthings, would destroythe validity of the Brezhnev Doctrine and adjustthe global "correlationof forces." In sum,the Reaganadministrationby mid-1982had formulateda reasonably comprehensivestrategydesignedto realize its granddesign.Thoughit representedin largemeasurean extensionanda systematizationof programs begun by Carter, as well as the highly moralistic tone of its predecessor,

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Reagan'sstrategyrejectedthe managerialand retreatistdimensionsof that approach.Instead,"prevailing with pride" involved the reassertionof Americanglobal leadershipandthe maintenanceof all existingcommitments.There was, to be sure, disagreementamong senior officials about whether this reassertionshouldbe primarily unilateral or the result of close allied cooperation, with Weinbergerand NSC Director Richard Allen evincing acute impatiencetowardWesternEuropean"detenteniks"andbelievingthatCarter's obsessionwith multilateral initiatives had needlesslyparalyzedAmerican foreign policy. Furthermore,theseadvisersdismissedthe devolution strategies of Nixon and Carteras symptomaticof the post-Vietnamloss of will. But how did the Reaganadministrationproposeto underwritetheseglobal commitments?After all, its predecessors hadperceiveda reality of shrinking resourcesandhadadjustedaccordingly.Cold War presidentshad,asJohn Gaddispointed out, faced similar dilemmas.In Truman'scase,the vast defenseexpendituresrequiredby NSC-68 (the 1950 study that recommended global containment)were to be financed through short-termdeficits that would, his Keynesianadvisersassured,be quickly eliminatedby robusteconomic growth. Walter Heller delivered essentiallythe same messageto Kennedy a dozen years later.28 Neither presidenthad seemedcomfortable with the prospectof budgetdeficits and had beenpersuadedto acceptthem as temporaryevils on the road to economicrecoveryand military expansion. Reagan,citing the theoriesof supply-side economists, reassuredthe electorate in 1980 that as long as federal social spendingwas controlled, tax rates could be slashed,defenseexpendituressignificantly increased,and,in a few years,the budgetbrought into balance,as savingsand investmentsactedto spureconomicgrowth and increasetax revenues.Somecritics, amongthem SenatorDaniel PatrickMoynihan (D-NY) argued,in retrospect,that Reagan had known all along that hugedeficits would be the inevitableresult of this supply-sidevoodoo and that he plannedto exploit the issuein order to reducedrasticallythesizeofthe welfarestate.But thedifficulty with Moynihan's conjectureis that it overlookedthe pressuresthat thesedeficits ultimately exertedon defensespendingas well. Thus, althoughthe defenseshareof the budgetrose from 22.7 percentin 1980 to 28.7 percentin 1987, the defense budget in constantdollars actually declined by more than 10 percentbetweenits peakin fiscal 1985and 1989.29 Indeed,it appearslikely that Reagan andhis original innercircle genuinelybelievedthat a growing U.S. economy could afford "prevailing with pride" without the necessityof long-termdeficits. As it turnedout, during the Reaganpresidencythe national debt tripled to $2.8 trillion. Massiveborrowing,muchof it from foreign sources,allowed the Reaganadministrationto pursueits ambitious national security strategy.30Put differently, othercountriescould, by lending money to the United

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States,in effect subsidizethe cost of U.S. security protectionand thus disguiseany hint of American retrenchment. The Reaganadministrationemployedtacticsthat emphasizedthe centrality of declaratorysignaling,frequentlyin the form of powerful rhetoricemanating from the presidentand his foreign policy advisers.It waged an unrelentingwar of words againstits adversariesdesignedto exposethemas liars, oppressors,hollow failures, terrorists,andthe like andto provethat the United Statespossessedthe will to confront them. And yet, as Coral Bell correctly suggested,even before Gorbachev'saccessionto power in 1985, "all was actually quiet, saveon the rhetorical front, in the centralconfrontation betweenthe superpowers."31The result was a heavily stylized "second Cold War" in which words werechosenwith the samecareusually accorded military weaponsin a real conflict. At home, as we have seen,the Carter tactic had beento welcomethe participationof the American peoplein debating and formulating foreign policy. Reagan,despitea comparablypopulist rhetoric, did not speakof an open, honestforeign policy but one that expressedthe innate strengthof "we the people."And whereasCarter had soughtto demonstratehis devotionto democraticparticipationthroughtown meetingsandcall-in shows,Reagansurroundedhimselfwith the moretraditional trappingsof presidentialpower. His majesty would presumablyembody the grandeurof those"ordinary, extraordinaryAmericans." As the leaderof a self-described"revolution" determinedto challengethe Washingtonstatusquo, Reaganundertooka rathersystematiceffort to assert presidentialcontrol over the entire federal executivebureaucracy,including the various foreign affairs and national security agencies.The central elementsofthis strategyinvolved (1) extensiveuseofthe appointmentpowerto infuse the federal establishmentwith loyalists; (2) developmentof a cabinet council systemand other interagencydevicesto focus the attentionof these political appointeeson the Reaganagenda;(3) strengtheningthe ability of the Office of Managementand Budget (OMB) to implement presidential wishes;and (4) repeatedarticulationof broadprinciplesof acceptably"conservative"ways to managethe federal government.32 The absenceof a foreign policy consensussince the mid-1960s had been reflected in the widespreadhousecleaningof those relevant departmentsand agenciesby Nixon and Carter. Reagan,initially at least, madeideological affinity even more critical, while extendingthis practiceto the domesticbureaucracies in a mannerthat Nixon must haveenvied. This largely successful"infiltration" strategycertainly easedthe task of legitimatingthe Reaganforeign policy within the bureaucracy,for therewere now loyal soldiers in key positions eagerto receive their marchingorders from the president.On the otherhand,Reagan'sradically detachedmanage-

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ment style requireda teamof foreign policy advisersthat had accessto the Oval Office and whom the presidentcould trust to translatehis instinctsand convictionsinto policy. Theserequirements,as we know, were rarely met. Rancorousbureaucraticinfighting, fully as bitter as that which had plagued the Carter administration,infected the ReaganWhite House until the last yearof his presidency.WeinbergerandHaig, andthenWeinbergerandGeorge Shultz,opposedeachotheron a variety of issuesincluding, mostfundamentally, nuclear arms control and the conditions in which U.S. conventional arms shouldbe employed.And when Weinbergerand Shultz did agreethat weaponsought not to be sold to Iranian "moderates,"both were overridden andexcludedby a renegadeNSC in a truly bizarreattemptto freeAmerican hostagesin Lebanonand illegally resupplythe Nicaraguan"democraticresistance."Indeed,the internecinewarfare betweenadministrationpragmatists andideologuesdraggedon until Reagan,deeplyshakenby public reaction to the Iran-contra debacle,allowed most of the remainingideologuesto be purgedfrom the foreign policy apparatus. But, particularly during his first term, when Reaganseemedmore ableto "be Reagan,"his speechwriting office wasremarkablyeffectivein usingpresidential rhetoric to legitimate his foreign and domestic policies to both the federalbureaucracyand, as we later see,the wider public. Like theologians absorbingand interpretinga sacredtext, Reagan'swordsmithsdrew on "the speech"of 1964 for inspiration. Consistingof a central,simple claim-that powerful governmentsweakenedthe characterof free people-thistext was memorizedby the speechwritersand servedas the foundation for the halfmillion wordsannuallyutteredby PresidentReagan.It was,for speechwriter Al Meyer, "the conscienceof the presidency."According to chief writer Bentley Elliott, "What I personallydid to soundlike Reaganwas to spend the three weeksbeforeI went to work for him readingall his speechesand making ... sheavesof notes-onwar, on blacks, on rhetoric, on [the] economy."Reagan,in turn, employedthe resultingrhetoric to transformhis cabinetinto "willing evangelicalswho carried the word to the specialized bureaucraciesand their clienteles."33While suchforeign policy pragmatists as Shultz, Frank Carlucci, and Colin Powell may have ultimately steereda courseinimical to Weinberger,Kirkpatrick, and other "evangelicals,"they did so only after acceptingthe outlines of Reagan'soriginal agenda. The last chapterconcludedby suggestingthat Carterlargely failed to reconstructthe substantiveproceduraland cultural componentsof a domestic foreign policy consensus.How did PresidentReaganattemptto legitimate publicly the granddesign,strategy,and tactics of his foreign policy in view of the fact that it bore a greatresemblanceto the post-Afghanistanapproach of his predecessor?

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Reagan'spublic legitimation efforts consistedof six elements:(1) an oftrepeateddeclaratoryhistory of Americanforeign policy that likenedthe 1970s to the 1930s-asdecadesof economicdecay at home and appeasement of totalitarianismabroad; that extolled the period from 1947 through the mid1960s as an era of strength,wisdom, generosity,prudence,firmness, and achievement;andthat,asthe administrationgraduallycompiledits own record, portrayedthe 1980sas a secondgolden age; (2) the reassurance that the setbacksof the 1970swerebut aberrationsthat could beeasilyreversedwith little pain or sacrificefrom the American people;(3) the assertionthat becausethe contemporaryworld bore a strong resemblanceto that of the early postwar decades,its problemswere thus susceptibleto simple solutions;(4) a moralistic depictionof internationalrelationsthat prominentlyfeatureda strugglebetweengoodandevil anda portrayalof Reagan'sforeign policy asonecommitted to defendingand promoting the universal value of individual liberty; (5) the claim that the American political community and the world community (or partsof it at least)weresimilar in structureand aspiration;and(6) the increasingly confidentpromiseof an emergent,fully democraticworld. In contrast to Carter's unusually ahistorical early rhetoric, Reagan's brimmed with powerful historical images and lessons.By comparingthe 1970sto the 1930s,Reaganand his adviserswere following a tradition of creatingdistancefrom one'simmediatepredecessors. Again and again administration officials portrayedthe 1970sas a decadeof doubt, defeat,deceit, and despair,comparableonly to the 1930sas an era of embarrassment for the UnitedStates.Secretaryof StateAlexanderHaig, for example,claimed that during the 1960s and 1970s "the cohesionof America's foreign, defense,andeconomicpoliciesdisintegrated"in the faceof Vietnam,Watergate, and prolongedeconomic distress,and while the American people wasted their time debatingthe utility of military power, the Sovietsembarkedon a vigorousmilitary modernizationprogram.34 In 1982Haig describedthe 1970s as "a decadewhen negotiationsoften seemedto be a substitutefor strength," for the United Stateshad been "dominatedby the psychologyof Vietnam and rising domesticresistanceto military programs."35 PresidentReaganpepperedhis speecheswith the samesentiments.In 1983 he describedto the American Legion the internationalsituation that he had inheritedas presidentas "truly alarmingfor all who caredaboutAmerica and the causeof peaceand freedom" and suggestedthat only a "truly bipartisan effort" could "make things right again."36The presidentspoketo a group of high school studentsin January 1983 with even fewer qualifications: " ... what we're doing with our presentbuildup of the military is overcomingseveral yearsin which we virtually, unilaterallydisarmed.We let our armsgo. We canceledthings like the B-1 bomberand so forth."3?

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Reminiscencesabout the "lessons"of the 1930soccurredrepeatedlyin the president'simprovisedresponsesto questions.Barely six weeksinto his first term, in an interview with Walter Cronkite,he linked his situationto that of Franklin Roosevelt'son the eve of World War II: I rememberwhen Hitler was arming and had built himself up-no one's createdquite the samemilitary power that the SovietUnion has,but comparativelyhe was in that way-FranklinDelanoRooseveltmadea speech in Chicago.... And in the speechhe calledon the free world to quarantine Nazi Germany.... [B]ut the funny thing was that he was attackedso here in our own country for having said such a thing. Can we honestly look backnow andsaythatWorld War II would havetakenplaceif we haddone what he wantedus to back in 1938 [SiC]?38 Reagancited FDR's "quarantinethe aggressors"speechagain and again, particularly during the yearsof the large U.S. defensebuildup. He also liked to tell a story about the stateof America's war-readinessin the late 1930s. During war gamesin Louisiana,he recalled,"we had soldiersthat were carrying wooden rifles, and we were simulating tank warfare with cardboard tanks." Comparethat to anotheroft-told story aboutthe allegedcondition of U.S. armedforces in 1980: "We had aircraft that couldn't fly and ships that couldn't leave port. Many of our military was on food stampsbecauseof meagerearnings,and reenlistmentswere down. Ammunition was low, and spareparts were in short supply."39Sometimesthe presidentexplicitly connectedthe 1930s to those in Congresswho opposedhis defensespending requests: The calls for cutting the defensebudgetcome in nice, simple arithmetic. They're the samekind of talk that led the democraciesto neglect their defensesin the 1930sand invited the tragedyof World War II. We mustnot let that grim chapterof history repeatitself throughapathyor neglect.This is why I'm speakingto you tonight-to urge you to tell your Senatorsand Congressmenthat you know we must continue to restoreour military strength.40 While not actually accusinghis predecessors of appeasement,Reaganhabitually identified himself with FDR-notthe Rooseveltof Yalta to be sure, but the vigilant presidentwho had warnedthe world of the Nazi threatwhile the Westsleptand thus insinuatedthat his critics were recommittingthe mistakesof the 1930s. Theadministration'scharacterizationof the 1970sno doubtreflectedwidely sharedpopularperceptions.It outlined a declaratoryhistory that was simplis-

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tic andtendentious.Moreover,to scorerhetoricalpointswith the public, Reagan andhis advisersignoredsignificant,but lesshelpful, eventsof that decade.For example,whateverelse may be said of the Carterforeign policy record, the Camp David Accords, formal diplomatic ties with the People'sRepublic of China,the PanamaCanaltreaties,and a rapprochement with muchof southern Yet Reagan'sdeclaratoryhistory Africa surelyqualified assolid achievements. of the 1970sconvenientlyomitted them. Note this telling exchangein May 1983 when Reaganwas askedto evaluatetheseaspectsof the Carterlegacy: Interviewer: Four yearsagowhenthe Carteradministrationwas in its third year, they had completedthe CampDavid agreementand the treaty from that; the SALT II treaty was about to be negotiated;normalizationwith China had taken place; and the PanamaCanal treaty had beenapproved. Canyou nameseveral[tangible things] that you've achieved? Reagan:Well, in the first place,Chinarelationshadbeennormalizedby the visits of a previouspresident.... And he carriedon from there.And I'm not at all surethat he addedto what had alreadybeenaccomplished. With regardto the Camp David agreements,yes, they started,and we're proceedingwithin theframeworkof thoseagreements, becausethoseagreements were simply to begin negotiations... but we're the oneswho've gonea stepbeyondthat with regardto trying to havean overall peacein the area.That had neverbeenproposed.41

Its inaccuraciesaside,this soliloquy underlinedthe purposefor which the administrationusedthe history of the 1970s:to frighten and angerthe public into supportingits foreign policy priorities. Yet while Reaganofficials indiscriminately condemnedthe U.S. diplomatic recordof the 1970s,they enthusiasticallypraisedthe achievementsof Truman,Eisenhower,and Kennedy.It was clearthat the Reaganadministration wished to identify with the feats of thesepresidents.For instance,in askingCongressto authorizeaid to the contrasin April 1983Reaganquoted extensively from theTrumanDoctrineandcontendedthat"PresidentTruman's words are as apt today as they were in 1947 when he, too, spoketo a joint sessionof the Congress."42The presidentalso invoked the words of Eisenhower,repeatedlyciting a letter in which Eisenhowerarguedthat negotiations werethe only alternativeto nucleardestruction.ThusCold War presidents were recalledfor their restraintas weIl as their activism. In order to fend off congressionalcriticism of his dispatchof marinesto the Beirut airport, Reagancomparedhis actionsto thoseof Eisenhower,who in 1958had "useda bipartisancongressionalresolutionto send8,000Americansoldiers andmarinesto Lebanon.Whenorderwasrestored,our military camehome."43 PresidentReaganand his adviserssupplementedtheselargely anecdotal

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referencesto pastleaderswith a somewhatmore systematicpublic account of the Cold War-anaccountthat, in its unambiguouscelebrationof American achievements,stood in stark contrastto the more complex and critical analysesof contemporarydiplomatic historians.Secretaryof StateHaig captured this approachfully when he recalled in April 1982 how the United States,after drifting into a disastrousisolationismin the 1920sand 1930s, had beendeterminedto avoid this mistakeafter World War II by "eagerly" founding a new internationalorder. "American resources,American perseverance,and American wisdom provided the crucial underpinningsof this internationalorder," and"the successfulapplicationof Americanpower" had brought"economichealth and political stability to WesternEuropeand Japan."44Moreover,as PresidentReagansuggestedto the British Parliamentin 1982, the Western democraciesin the 1940s and early 1950s had shown uniquerestraintin refusingto usetheir nuclearmonopolyfor territorial gain.4s A few monthslater he reiteratedthis themein a national television address designedto mobilize public supportfor the MX missile. Reaganreminded his televisionaudiencethat at the endof World War II, with the United States the only undamagedindustrial power, with its military powerat its peak, and with an atomic monopoly,"We didn't usethis wealth and powerto bully; we usedit to rebuild.... We had deeplyheld moral values,"and "Our strength deterred... aggressionagainstUS."46 Just as American power had kept the peacein that earlier era, so the MX-now dubbed"Peacekeeper"-was to do likewise in the 1980s. It wasperhapsappropriatethat JeaneKirkpatrick, the administration'sbestknown professor,was the only official to admit even the slightestpossibility of otherhistoricalinterpretations.Yet shedid so only to disparagethem.Thus, in a speechto the knowledgeableNational Committeeon American Foreign Policy sheobservedthat NATO was "forged as a direct responseto the actual, imminentdangerto WesternEuropeof Sovietsubversionandaggression.No amountof historical revisionismcan explain awayfacts of Sovietexpansion into Europe."47Therewas a certainirony here,for RonaldReagan'sdeclaratory history embracedpoliciesthat he hadoncevilified. While his administration articulateda history that fell well within the old containmentconsensus of the Cold War years,Reagan,for most of that era, had beena disciple of JamesBurnhamand other conservativecritics of U.S. foreign policy. What Reagannow called "restraint" and "generosity,"Burnhamhad labeled "appeasement"and "naivete."Both hadcalled for an offensivestrategythat went well beyondcontainmentto overthrowSoviet client governmentsin Eastern Europe and ultimately the Soviet Union itself. Yet the administration'sdeclaratoryhistory did not aim to convertthe electorateto Burnham'sbrandof "liberation theology." Curiously, despitehis clear indebtednessto Burnham,

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the presidentdid not defendthe ReaganDoctrineby disparagingthe accomplishmentsof containment.Despiteearly efforts of Reagan'sNSC staff to developa forward strategy,in 1981 and 1982the administrationwas publicly attemptingto mobilize supportfor a massivedefensebuildup without deepeningpopularperceptionsof a trigger-happypresident.By portrayingthe Cold War asan eraof U.S. strengthandworld order,administrationofficials sought to allay public fears of a dangerousnew arms race. Yet the shadowof Vietnam intrudedinto this tidy history of U.S. foreign policy. In general,Reaganand his adviserstried to say as little as possible about the Vietnam War, usually lumping it with Watergateas an event that had producednational disillusionmentand self-doubt. Occasionally,when speakingto especiallyfriendly audiences,this circumspectionyieldedto more visceral sentiments.During the 1980 campaignReaganhad told the AmericanLegion that it was"time to recognizethat ourswasin truth a noblecause."48 JeaneKirkpatrick proclaimedto the samegroup two yearslater that "I don't think that we were driven out of Vietnam-I think we left. I think that's an important distinction and one we should not lose sight of."49 In February 1987 Reagansuggestedthat U.S. troops camehome without a victory not becausethey had beendefeatedbut becausethey "had beendeniedpermission to win."50 Overall, it was the pressand not the administrationthat raised the issue.For example,a reporteraskedReaganonly six weeksafter his first inaugurationto comparethe situationin EI Salvadorto Vietnamin the early 196Os,and the presidentreplied ratherdisjointedly: I don't believe it is a valid parallel. I know that many peoplehave been suggestingthat. The situationhereis, you might say,our front yard; it just isn't EI Salvador.What we're doing, in going to the aid of a government that askedthat aid of a neighboringcountry and a friendly country in our hemisphere,is trying to halt the infiltration into theAmericasby terrorists, by outsideinterference,and thosewho aren'tjust aiming at EI Salvador, but, I think, are aiming at the whole of Central and possibly later South America and, I'm sure,eventuallyNorth America.51 Not until 1985,on the occasionof the tenth anniversaryof Saigon'sfall, did Reaganoffer a more elaboratedefense.He told a newsconferencein April: That was the greatdisgrace,to me, of Vietnam-thatthey were fed into this meatgrinder,andyet no oneeverhadany intentionof allowing victory. Well, the truth of the matteris, we did havevictory... . But what happened?We signedthe peaceaccords,... and we madea pledgeto [Saigon].And when the North Vietnamesedid violate the agree-

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ment and the blitz started... and then the administrationin Washington askedthe Congressfor the appropriationsto keepour word, the Congress refused.We brokeour pledge... And so, we didn't lose the war. When the war was all over and we'd comehome-that'swhen the war was lost.52 But the American public's overwhelminglynegativememoryof Vietnam clashedwith the administration'sandcertainlyconstrainedPresidentReagan's foreign policy options,especiallyin Central America. Opinion polls showing hugemajoritiesopposedto sendingU.S. troopsto EI Salvadorand Nicaraguano doubt helpedconvincethe administrationto aid the contras as an alternativeto direct military involvement.It subsequentlybeganto turn the Vietnam issueto its own advantageby arguing that only congressionalsupport of the contra programwould precludethe chancesof anotherVietnam. But this legislativetactic only partially succeeded,for public backingof contra aid remainedaround30 percent,andcongressionalenthusiasmfor it was divided at best. By the late 1980s the Reaganadministrationhad compiled a historical recordthat it eagerlyincorporatedinto its declaratorystatements.In October 1987 Reaganremindeda West Point audiencethat "from the beginning,our administrationhasinsistedthat this Countrybaseits relationswith the Soviet Union upon realism, not illusion. This may sound obvious. But when we took office the historical record neededrestatement.So restateit we did."53 In April 1988 the presidentrecalledthat at first, the expertssaidthis kind of candorwasdangerous,that it would lead to a worseningof Soviet-Americanrelations. But far to the contrary this candormadeclearto the Sovietsthe resilienceandstrengthof theWest.... And now this approachto the Soviets... hasbornefruit. 54 History had vindicatedhis strategy,as he told studentsat the University of Virginia in December1988, for "as I suggestedin 1982, if the West maintained its strength,we would see economic needsclash with the political orderin the SovietUnion."55 Or, as he put it in his FarewellAddress: That's what it was to be an American in the 1980s.We stood, again, for freedom.I know we alwayshave,but in the pastfew yearsthe world again, and in a way, we ourselvesrediscoveredit. ... The fact is, from Grenadato the Washingtonand Moscow summits, from the recessionof '81 and '82, to the expansionthat ... continuesto this day, we've madea difference.56

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For Reagan,then, the eventsof the 1980shad legitimatedhis approachto both foreign anddomesticpolicies and had usheredin a new "goldenage" of American achievement. PresidentReaganalso soughtto legitimatehis foreign policy by reassuring the American peoplethat its goals could be realized with little pain or sacrifice. The 1980 Republicanplatform neatly capturedthe apparentgap betweenthe dire natureof the currentcrisis and the instrumentsavailableto confrontit. After intoning that "the United Statesfacesthe most seriouschallenge to its survival in the last two centuries,"this documentthen recommendeda drastictax reduction,endingthe grain embargoagainstthe Soviet Union, and the abolition of draft registration.57 The massiveincreasesin the defensebudgetbetween1981 and 1985,apartfrom the resourcesthat it may have drawn away from social spending,hardly constituteda national sacrifice because,as we have seen,it was largely financed with foreign funds. Moreover, as Reaganhimself repeatedlyargued,even with this significant defensebuildup, the proportion of the federal budgetand the grossnational productdevotedto the military remainedwell below that of the 1950sand 1960s.Increasesin defensespending-initself a declaratorysignal of future intentions--coupledwith the president'sfamous rhetorical "candor" about communism,the SovietUnion, andThird World adversaries,would together reversethe tide. Of course,as Coral Bell shrewdlyobserved,"since the imageof U.S. military weaknesswascreatedchiefly by words (mostly from the Reagancamp... ) it is logical that more wordsfrom the samesourcesshould have beeneffective in readjustingthat somewhatdistortedimage."58Surely that helps to explain how Reagan,a mere four months into his presidency, could announcethat "the peopleof America haverecovered fromwhat can only be calleda temporaryaberration.Thereis a spiritual revival going on in this country, a hungeron the part of the peopleto once again be proud of America-all that it is and all that it can be."59 But, in fact, Reagandid not demandsacrificebecausehe knew that such rhetoric would inevitably provoke a public weary of twenty years of "bad news" and seriouslydisillusionedwith the risks and burdensof global leadership. Certainly the public was tired of watching America get "pushed around,"but it alsodreadedthe prospectof anotherVietnam. It did not want to be frightened, as its reaction to Reagan'searly loose talk about nuclear war madeclear. It wanted,instead,to be praised,encouraged,andreassured, and Reaganskillfully respondedto thoseneeds,in part because he ~as, by because temperament,uncomfortablewith struggleand sacrifice. Third, Reagansought to legitimate the various elementsof his foreign policy as "simple" responsesto deceptivelysimple problems.In direct contrast to Carter,who had describeda new world of dizzying complexity that

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grudgingly yielded complicatedsolutions,Reaganemphasizedthe essential continuity of the post-1945era.The only significantdisjunctionhadoccurred in the 1970s,whenAmerica had beenbesetby guilt and self-doubt,but that period, Reaganclaimed, had largely endedwith his election. His postwar world had beencharacterizedby threefundamentalrealities-anaggressive SovietUnion determinedto expandits influence;a prudent,selflessAmerica leadingthe Westagainstoppression;and billions of peoplearoundthe globe strugglingfor individual freedom.Hereagain,Reaganrhetorically identified himself with the American peoplewho, unlike unnamed"experts"despairing of the world's intractability, understoodthesesimple truths. The world, of course,Reaganadmitted,was not entirely static-changeshad occurred since1945.But in contrastto Carter,who strivedto "get on the right side" of changeslargely uncontrollableby the United States,Reagansaw changein terms of democraticrevolutionstailor-madefor American leadership.Even Reagan'slegendaryinability to keephis facts straightseeminglyappealedto a public that wantedanswersyet felt inundatedby information overload. PresidentReagan was particularly successfulin employing this "simplemindedness"to legitimate his nucleararms control strategy.By the late 1970sthe arms control "process"had begun to encounterformidable domestic obstacles.It had grown incredibly complex as the array of "sublimits" written into the SALT II treatydemonstrated;it hadbecomelargely detachedfrom other aspectsof Soviet-Americanrelations; even its proponents appearedincreasingly pessimisticthat the processcould defuse the arms race; and the public seemedless willing to acceptthe logic of Mutual AssuredDestruction(MAD), which promisedmore of the sameperceived insecurity,and more interestedin reducingthe nucleararsenalsof the superpowers.60 Carterhad tried to respondto thesedifficulties but found his options narrowedby domesticcritics eagerto junk SALT II and by a seriesof devastatinginternationalshocks.SeveralReaganofficials, particularly in the DefenseDepartment,were, in fact, opposedin principle to any armscontrol agreementswith the Soviets.In short, by the early 1980sthe domesticpolitics of armscontrol hadproduceda strategicstalemate,61andsomeof Reagan's early initiatives-forexample,the zero-zerooption andthe Eurekaproposals -seemedto invite Soviet rejection. But, in fact, Reagangradually unveiled an arms control approachthat addressedthe concernsof the public and that ultimately broke the domestic stalemateby, in effect, statingthat his strategicmodernizationprogramwould senda signal of firmnessand determinationto Moscow that would pressure the Soviets into concluding verifiable arms reduction agreementswith the West.Whetherthe Sovietssignedthe zero-zeroINF treatyandbeganto show great interestin drastic decrease,in nuclearweaponsbecauseof Reagan's

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"simple" approach,or for their own reasons-afterall, they had responded to U.S. pressurein the early 1960sin a vastly different way-cannotyet be determined.But the American public respondedpositively to a processthat now promisedto reversethe armsraceand bring greatersecurity.Appropriately it was a Reaganslogan-"trustbut verify"-that capturedthe public imaginationby brilliantly blending idealismand realism toward the Soviet Union. And though"experts"shudderedat the destabilizingpotentialof the StrategicDefenseInitiative (SOl), more than two-thirds of the public supported Reagan'sidea of a populationdefenseagainstnuclearweaponsbecauseit confrontedthe moral ambiguity andapparentillogic of MAD. While Reaganmay not haveviewed SOl as a bargainingchip, subsequent negotiating behaviorby the Sovietssuggestedthat their fear of it worked to soften their positions.Again, we cannotbe certainaboutthe cause,but the resultthe prospectof a START treaty-wonwidespreadpublic approval. There were limits, however,to the effectivenessof Reagan'srhetoric of simplicity. Its successin arms control resultedfrom its very appealinggoal and from its fidelity to Reagan'spublic personaas a firm man of peace. Selling arms to Iran provedto be a very different matter.Characteristically, Reaganattemptedto offer a "simple" explanationfor the policy: [The Iranian initiative] was undertakenfor the simplestand bestof reasons:to renewa relationshipwith the nationof Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six-yearwar betweenIran and Iraq, to eliminatestatesponsoredterrorism and subversion,and to effect the safe return of all 62 hostages. But much of the public found this far from simple explanationwholly incomprehensible.In the month following the revelationsthe president'sapproval rating tumbleddramaticallyfrom 67 percentto 46 percent.63 Not even Reagancould legitimate a policy that, despiteits noble intention of freeing Americanhostages,appearedboth immoral-sellingarmsto a terroriststateandillegal-siphoningthe profits to the contras.Reagan'storturedefforts to distinguishthe hatedIranian regimefrom unnamedmoderatessoundedunconvincing, for the presidenthad never before engagedin thesefine, lawyerly distinctions.The world, he had repeatedlyclaimed, was simple. And whereasReagan'spreviousfactual confusions hadseemedalmostcharming -for his granddesignremainedclear-hisprofessedinability to remember key aspectsof the Iranian affair appearedto the public as either woeful incompetenceor outright prevarication.In retrospect,his rather miraculous political recoveryfrom this disasterwas closely tied to the continuing improvementin Soviet-Americanrelations.Someof his hard-lineadviserseven

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cameto suspectthat Reagan'seagerrush to detentein 1987 reflecteda desperatedesireto savehis presidency.64 Fourth,PresidentReaganportrayedthe world in highly moralisticterms and soughtto demonstratethat his administration'sforeign policy embodied this reality. That much he sharedwith Carter-whichdistinguished them both from Nixon-but unlike Carter, who failed to integratehuman rights into a coherentstrategy,Reaganfirmly harnessedmoralism to his strategicpurpose.At first, this moralismappearedlittle morethana warmed over anticommunism.For example,Reagan'soriginal nomineefor Assistant Secretaryof Statefor HumanitarianAffairs, ErnestLeFevre,testified to Congressthat he knew of not a single noncommunistviolator of human rights, and JeaneKirkpatrick's convenientdistinction betweentotalitarian and authoritariangovernmentsappearedto rationalizeAmerican support for right-wing military dictators.Reaganhimself routinely contrastedthe goodnessof the American people to the evil of communistregimes and terrorist organizations. Thesefeaturesneverentirely disappeared from the administration'srhetoric -indeed,many of Reagan'ssupporterswelcomedthem-butover time they weresupplemented with morepositivestatementsthat alignedAmericanforeign policy with thosestrugglingto createdemocratic,capitalistinstitutions. Many observersbelievedthat the administrationwas the lucky beneficiary of a trendtowarddemocracyin Latin Americabegunby Carter,andReagan's initially pro-Marcosactionsraiseddoubtsabout his commitmentto Philippine democracy.But thesesuspicionswere overshadowed,at least among the public, by Reagan'sfierce democraticrhetoric that proclaimedAmerica "a shining city on the hill," drenchedwith virtue, and possessed of universally soughtvalues.As he put it in early 1985:"Our missionis to nourishand defenddemocracy,and to communicatetheseideals everywherewe can."65 "Freedomis the universal right of all God's children."66 Simply by being itself, America could serveas a global inspiration. But America would be more than an exemplarof liberty, it would help to vindicatethe rights of others.In what quickly becameknown as the Reagan Doctrine,the presidentassertedthat "we mustnot breakfaith with thosewho are risking their lives on every continent,from Afghanistanto Nicaraguato defy Soviet-supportedaggressionand securerights which have been ours from birth, ... [for] supportfor freedomis self-defense."67In the next section of this chaptera closerlook will be taken at administrationefforts to legitimateits policies toward Grenadaand CentralAmerica, but here it shouldbe notedthat the ReaganDoctrine, as describedto the public, proclaimedboth a moral obligation and a national securityimperative-self-defense-to assistanti-Soviet"freedomfighters."This deft synthesisof principle andpower

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distinguishedthe Reaganadministrationfrom the legitimation efforts of its immediatepredecessors. The Carteradministrationhad soughtto show that the Americanpolitical experiencewould prove useful in helping the United Statesmanagethose shifting, global coalitions that constituted"complex interdependence."But this rhetorical effort was short-lived, perhapsbecauseit seemedrather abstractandarid. Reagantoo tried to forge a link betweenthe domesticand the internationalrealms.As we haveseen,he repeatedlyclaimedthat the United Statesexemplifieduniversallysharedvalues.In a lessphilosophicalmanner, he also arguedthat the democraticpartsof the world constitutedan enlarged American"neighborhood;'composedof thesamekinds of God-fearing,hardworking "ordinary,extraordinary"peoplethatcouldbefound on Main Street, USA. For example,in early 1982 he suggestedthat the peopleof the Caribbeanand Central America are in a fundamental sensefellow Americans.Freedomis ourcommondestiny....We arebrothers .... [Now], morethanever,the comhistorically as well asgeographically passionate,creativepeoplesof theAmericas havean opportunityto stand together... to build a betterlife for all the Americas.68 And in February1985 Reaganidentified the "freedomfighters" of Nicaragua as "peasants,farmers, shopkeepers,and students.. . ." In short, they were neighbors,the kinds of people"we've aided aroundthe world struggling for freedom,democracy,independence, andliberation from tyranny."69 This metaphorof an extendedneighborhood,global in scopeyet rooted in theAmericanexperience,had, of course,beenusedby otherpresidents.Not only hadFranklin D. Rooseveltannounceda Good NeighborPolicy, but during World War II had likened his Four Policemenidea to neighborhoods patrolledby friendly cops.To reducethe world to the familiar, whetherdone by Rooseveltor Reagan,seemeddesignedto makeforeign policy personally relevant to the public. It could, of course,also encouragethe unfortunate notion that the world was a replica of Main Street. Finally, Reaganrepeatedlyassertedthat his granddesign-or"dream,"as he called it-involved nothing lessthan the realizationof a fully democratic world. This simple,appealing,andpowerfully articulatedvision sharplycontrastedwith the rather murky (or disguised)designsof Carter and Nixon. Carterclaimedthat he had madeAmerican foreign policy moral onceagain and that, as a result, other leadershad beencompelledto weigh the human rights consequences of their actions.But Reaganimplicitly deniedthatAmerican foreign policy had everbeenlessthan totally moral--exceptduring the 1930sand 1970s-andpredictedthat a tidal waveof democraticrevolutions

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would continueto flood the world. Thesegrandioseassertions,if madeby someoneelse,might haveseemedabsurdlyhypocritical or utopian,yet when utteredby Reagan,they appearedto flow naturally and easily from deeply held convictions.

The "RescueMission" and the "DemocraticResistance" At the root of the dissensusthat had plaguedAmericanforeign policy since Vietnam lay a disagreementabout the nation's security requirements.A central manifestationof that disputeconcernedthe issueof the useof force abroad.Where, for what purpose,and under what conditions should the United Statesdeploycombattroops?And, asa relatedtheme,which friendly groups and governmentsshould receiveAmerican military assistance?In fact, this ongoing argumenthad focusedmuch less on the central front in Europeand more on the so-calledperiphery,whereU.S. interestsappeared more ambiguous. The Reaganadministration'sdesireto roll back Soviet influencefrom its new outpostswas boundto reopentheseunresolvedissues.In this sectionof the chapterwe examinethe administration'sefforts to legitimate, bureaucratically and publicly, two specific applicationsof the ReaganDoctrine: the Grenadian"rescuemission" of October1983 and its long-standingsupport for the Nicaraguan"democraticresistance."Theseexamplesneatly illustrate the ways in which the legacyof Vietnam shapedand constrainedthe Reagan administration'sbehavior. If "prevailing with pride" initially functionedas its global strategicblueprint, the Committeeof SantaFe'sJuly 1980reportforeshadowedthe essence of the administration'sapproachto Latin America. Authored by severalregional specialistssuchasRogerFontaine,Lewis Tambs,David C. Jordan,and LieutenantGeneralGordonSumnerJr., all of whom would obtainpostsin the new administration,this documentbluntly rejectedPresidentCarter'sLatin Americanpolicy as indecisiveand naive.In addition,it chargedthat the effort "to socializethe Sovietsand their Hispanic-Americanpuppets"was "merely a camouflagedcoverfor accommodationto aggression."70 The reportclaimed that Latin Americawas being"overrun by Sovietsupportedand suppliedsatellites and surrogates;'and arguedthat "decisiveaction, such as the occupation of the Dominican Republic in 1965" had been"replacedby retrograde reaction,as exemplifiedby the Carter-Torrijostreatiesof 1978, and by anxious accommodation,"such as PresidentCarter'scancellationof the sea-air exercise"Solid Shield '80" after the Panamanianpresidentobjected.71 The Committeeof SantaFe urgedinsteadthat the United States"take the strategic and diplomatic initiative by revitalizing the Rio Treaty and the Organization

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of AmericanStates;reproclaimingthe MonroeDoctrine; tighteningties with key countries;andaiding independentnationsto survivesubversion."72It concludedthat "in war thereis no substitutefor victory; and the United Statesis engagedin World War III." Thus, "containmentof the Soviet Union is not enough.... [O]nly the United Statescan,asa partner,protectthe independent nationsof Latin America from communistconquestand help preserveHispanic-Americanculture from sterilizationby internationalMarxist materialism."73 The Reaganadministration'sdesire to exert pressureon Cuba, Nicaragua,and Grenadaflowed logically from this analysis. The Carter administrationhad greetedwith ambivalencethe nearly bloodlesscoup d'etatthat oustedthe Grenadagovernmentof Eric Gairy on March 13, 1979, and installedMaurice Bishop'sNew JewelMovement. The StateDepartmenthad been appalledby Gairy's human rights record, which featuredthe frequentuse of the so-calledMongooseGang to assault and sometimesmurderhis political opponents.According to one U.S. official he was "a blemish not only on the face of Grenada,but also on the Caribbean.[His] departurewas probably a blessingfor Grenada.It is unfortunatethat his removal was by extraconstitutionalmeans,but let's face it, this is probablythe only way he would havegone."74 The new regime-ominouslycalled the PeoplesRevolutionaryGovernment (PRG)-soonbeganto worry Washington,for in April it receivedtwo armsshipmentsfrom Cuba,and Bishoprepeatedlyaccusedthe United States of plotting to assassinate him andreturnGairy to Grenada.By the summerof 1979the PRGhadclearly becomea problemfor mid-level officials at State. Indeed,Brzezinski'sfirst reactionto the couphadbeento considerblockading the island, and he soon beganto see the entire region as a "circle of crisiS."75 According to one Carter adviser, there was not "an island in the Caribbeanthat couldn'tgo the way of Grenadain five years."Beyondthese geopoliticalconcernsthe administrationgrew increasinglydisturbedby serious PRG humanrights violations and its refusal to hold elections.Bishop and other seniorPRG officials frequently engagedin provocativeanti-U.S. rhetoric, and Grenada'sUN representativerefusedto support a resolution condemningthe Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It was this last action that led the Carteradministrationto reduceofficial contact with Grenada.It had never acceptedthe credentialsof Grenadian ambassador-designate DessimaWilliams, but now it instructedthe U.S. envoy, Sally Shelton,to ceasevisits to the island,thoughshemet severalmore times with Bishop in Barbados.Yet the Carteradministrationneverviewed Grenadaas a major issue.Neither the presidentnor his secretariesof state ever mentionedit publicly; Grenadawas handledat the level of assistant secretary.

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The Reaganteam, in contrast,enteredoffice determinedto isolate, punish, and perhapseven overthrow Bishop. Its multifacetedstrategywas evidently coordinatedat the most senior governmentallevels. Soon after becomingsecretaryof state,AlexanderHaig orderedofficials at the Bureau of Inter-AmericanAffairs to makesurethat Grenadawould not receive"one penny" from any international financial institution (IFI).76 Accordingly, Grenadawas addedto an informal "hit list" of countriesthat the StateDepartmenttried to preventfor political reasonsfrom receivingIFI loans.In the words of one analyst, "Whenevera loan for one of thesecountriescomes under considerationat an IFI"-in 1981 the list reportedly included Vietnam,Cuba,Nicaragua,Afghanistan,andGrenada-experts prepared"a negative critique in the technical, economiclanguagethat IFI usesto evaluate proposals."Then U.S. officials relied on thesecritiques"to lobby againstthe loan with the ... IFI and other countries'foreign ministersand representatives on [the] IFI's executiveboard."77Apparentlythe U.S. executivedirector to the InternationalMonetaryFund (IMF) usedthese"technical" arguments to try to deny loans to Grenadain 1981 and 1983. In November1979the PRGannouncedplansto constructan international airportat PointSalinesto encouragetourism.TheCarteradministration,while skeptical,did nothing,but Reagan'sadvisersfearedthat the airport's10,000foot runway would be usedby Cubanand Soviet military planesand tried vainly to persuadethe EuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC) to refusethe PRG'srequestfor assistance. Arguing that largeloansto Grenadawould add excessivelyto its externaldebt, U.S. officials evidently helpedconvincethe IMF to reducethe loans from $9 million over three yearsto $3 million for one year. In August 1983 the United Statesagain tried to stop or at least reducea three-yearIMF loan of $14.1 million to Grenada,but this time the otherexecutivedirectorssupportedthe staff'sdecisionto offer the aid.78 More than two yearsearlier, in June 1981, the StateDepartmenthad put intense pressureon the CaribbeanDevelopmentBank to eliminateGrenadafrom a $4 million U.S. grantfor basichumanneedsprojects.79 Moreover,the United StatespressuredtheWorld Bank'sInternationalDevelopmentAgencyto refuse a Grenadianrequestfor a $3 million 10an.80 Yet, despitethesevigorous efforts, the PRG was notably successfulin obtaining internationalassistance. For example,the $23 million it received from Cuba,EastGermany,the EEC, and Canadain 1982 was more than twice the amountthat PresidentReagan proposedfor the entire easternCaribbeanin his CaribbeanBasin Initiative. Covert operationsagainstthe Bishop governmenthad beendiscussedby the Carteradministrationin the wake of Grenada'sUN vote on Afghanistan, but after reviewing optionsthe presidentapparently"rejectedall but propagandameasures."In July 1981, however, the CIA approachedthe Senate

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SelectIntelligenceCommitteewith a plan to causethe PRGeconomichardship. In February1983an unnamedCIA official deniedthat it soughtto oust Bishop: "We may causea little economictrouble,a little publicity, and [give] aid [to opposition groups], but we don't overthrow governments."81One memberof the committee,however,characterizedthe proposalas"economic destabilizationaffecting the political viability of the government."In any event, the schemefound little support among the senators.Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX), for example,exclaimed,"You've got to be kidding!" when told of the plan. Military pressure,however,was exertedagainstGrenada.From August 1 to October15, 1981,the United StatesstagedCaribbeanmaneuvers.In large part, of course,they were designedto intimidateCuba.On ViequesIsland, a military installation near PuertoRico, more than 200,000U.S. and NATO personnelnot only invaded"Red," describedas "a mythical island interfering in the region and shipping arms to Central America," but also "Amber andtheAmberdines,"which, accordingto the DefenseDepartment,was"our enemyin the EasternCaribbeanwhere U.S. hostageswere in needof rescue." According to the fictional scenario,the U.S. troops,after rescuingthe hostages,would remain on Amber to "install a regimefavorableto the way of life we espouse."82 The administrationappliedrhetoricalpressuretoo. In June 1982 Stephen D. Bosworth,principal deputyassistantsecretaryof statefor inter-American affairs, told a Housesubcommitteethat U.S.-Grenadianrelationscould not improve unlessthe Bishop government(1) halted its unrelentingstreamof anti-Americanpropagandaand false statementsaboutU.S. policies and actions; (2) movedto "restoreconstitutionaldemocracy,including prompt,free, andfair elections";(3) returnedto "the high standardof humanrights observancethat is typical" of the CaribbeanCommonwealth (CARICOM)states; and (4) practiced"growing nonalignmentratherthan continuing its present role as a surrogateof Cuba."83PresidentReaganhad madepassingreference to "the tightening gripof the totalitarian left in Grenada"when announcing the CaribbeanBasin Initiative in February 1982, but he lingered longer in remarksmadein Barbadoson April 8, 1982,while on a "working vacation": "EI Salvadorisn't the only country that's being threatenedwith Marxism, and I think all of us are concernedwith the overturn of Westminsterparliamentarydemocracyin Grenada.That country now bearsthe Soviet and Cubantrademark,which meansthat it will attemptto spreadthe virus amongits neighbors."84Then, in a speechon Central America and EI Salvadorto the annualmeetingof the NationalAssociationof Manufacturersin Washington on March 10, 1983,ReaganpresentedGrenadain the contextof a geopolitical nightmare:

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Grenada,that tiny little island-with Cuba at the west end of the Caribbean,Grenadaat the eastend-thattiny little island is building now, or having built for it, on its soil and shores,a naval base,a superiorair base, storagebasesandfacilities for the storageof munitions,barracks,andtraining groundfor the military. I'm sureall ofthat is simply to encouragethe exportof nutmeg. Peoplewho maketheseargumentshaven'ttakena good look at a map lately or followed the extraordinarybuildup of Soviet and Cubanmilitary powerin theregionor readthe Soviets'discussionsaboutwhy theregionis importantto them and how they intend to use it. It isn't nutmegthat'sat stakein the CaribbeanandCentralAmerica;it is the United Statesnationalsecurity. Sovietmilitary theoristswant to destroyour capacityto resupplyWestern Europein caseof an emergency.They wantto tie down our attention and focus on our own southernborderand so limit our capacityto act in more distantplaces,such as Europe,the PersianGulf, the Indian Ocean, the Seaof Japan. ThoseSoviettheoristsnoticedwhat we failed to notice: that the CaribbeanSeaand CentralAmerica constitutethis nation'sfourth border.If we must defendourselvesagainst[a] large, hostile military presenceon our border,our freedomto act elsewhereto help othersand to protectstrategically vital sealanesand resourceshas beendrastically diminished.They know this; they'vewritten aboutthis. We've beenslow to understandthat the defenseof the Caribbeanand CentralAmerica againstMarxist-Leninisttakeoveris vital to our national securityin ways we're not accustomedto thinking about.85 Finally, and most spectacularly,in a nationwideaddresson nationalsecurity on the eveningof March 23, 1983, the Presidentunveiled aerial reconnaissancephotographsof Cuba, Nicaragua,and Grenada: On the small islandof Grenada,at the southernendof theCaribbeanchain, the Cubans,with Sovietfinancing andbacking,are in the processof building an airfield with a 1O,000-foot runway.Grenadadoesn'teven havean air force. Who is it intendedfor? The Caribbeanis a very important passagewayfor our internationalcommerceandmilitary lines of communication. More than half of all American oil imports now pass through the Caribbean.The rapid buildup of Grenada'smilitary potential is unrelated to any conceivablethreat to this island country of under 110,000people andtotally at oddswith the patternof othereasternCaribbeanstates,most of which are unarmed. The Soviet-Cubanmilitarization of Grenada,in short,canonly be seen as power projection into the region. And it is in this importanteconomic

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and strategicareathat we're trying to help the Governmentsof El Salvador, CostaRica, Honduras,and others in their strugglesfor democracy againstguerrillassupportedthroughCubaand Nicaragua. Thesepicturesonly tell a small part of the story. I wish I could show you more without compromisingour most sensitiveintelligencesources andmethods.But theSovietUnion is alsosupportingCubanmilitary forces in Angola and Ethiopia. They have basesin Ethiopia and SouthYemen, nearthe PersianGulf oil fields. They'vetakenover the port that we built at CamRanhBay in Vietnam.And now for the first time in history,theSoviet Navy is a force to be reckonedwith in the SouthPacific.86 Thus, by the spring of 1983 the Reaganadministrationhad elevated Grenadato the statusof a serioussecurity threat to the United Statesand its allies. Its strategicposition in the easternCaribbeanallegedly formed the third point on a geopoliticaltriangle that stretchedto Cubaand Nicaragua; its new airport would soon allow the Cubansand Sovietsto threaten vital Caribbeansealanes;and Havanacould use the island as a military bridge to Africa and as an ideological bridge to the easternCaribbean. Finally, the administrationeven raisedthe spectreof anotherCubanmissile crisis. For example,NestorD. Sanchez,deputy assistantsecretaryof statefor inter-Americanaffairs, claimedin February1983 that Grenada's new military facilities "would provide air and naval bases... for the recovery of Sovietaircraft after strategicmissions.It might also furnish missile sitesfor launching attacks againstthe United Stateswith short and intermediaterangemissiles."87 The administrationhad virtually endedformal diplomatic relations with Grenadain 1981 by excluding it from the list of statesto which the U.S. ambassador in Barbadoswas accredited. Occasionally, however,Grenadian Foreign Minister Unison Whiteman or an assistantwas able to meet with mid-level U.S. embassypersonnelin Bridgetown.Bishop wrote severalletters to PresidentReaganaskingfor more normal diplomatic relations,but all went unanswered.Rumors about a U.S. or U.S.-supportedinvasion of Grenada,usually fueledby PRG statements,had routinely sweptthe island sincethe 1979 coup, but Reagan'sMarch 23, 1983, speechseemedto have genuinelyalarmedBishop. Fidel CastroprobablyurgedBishopto try to talk to PresidentReagan.In any case,at the invitation of Transafrica,self-describedas "the Black American Lobby for Africa and the Caribbean,"and with the supportof the congressionalBlack Caucus,Prime Minister Bishop cameto Washingtonin early June 1983 to attemptto seethe president.Not only was he preventedfrom doing so, but he was apparentlyrebuffedby the StateDepartmentaswell until two senators,ClaibornePell (D-RI), andLowell Weicker (R-CT), intervenedon his behalf. Soon thereafter,Bishop met for

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forty minuteswith NationalSecurityAdviserWilliam Clark andDeputySecretaryof StateKennethDam.88 Bishoptermedthe meeting"a useful first step of dialoguebetweenthe governments"andevidently in the recommencement promisedto hold electionswithin two years. He added that the talks had "delayed"an invasionbut admittedthat "we do not think the threathasbeen entirely removed."89U.S. officials declinedto characterizethe talks. On October 19, after a serioussplit developedin the PRG leadership, Bishop was killed by troops loyal to his opponents.An entity calling itself theRevolutionaryMilitary Council (RMC), apparentlyled by GeneralHudson Austin, declareda twenty-four-hourshoot-on-sightcurfew. Six days later, 1,900 U.S. Marines and Army airbornetroops,assistedby 300 men from a handful of Caribbeancountries,landedon Grenada,the first time since1965 that U.S. forces had participatedin a Caribbeanmilitary action. President Reagan,accompaniedby PrimeMinister EugeniaCharlesof Dominica,soon appearedon televisionto announcethe operationandthe reasonsfor it. Reagan explainedthat the United Stateshad respondedto an "urgent,formal request from the five-memberOrganizationof EasternCaribbeanStates(OECS)," plus Barbadosand Jamaica,"to assistin a joint effort to restoreorder and democracy"on Grenada.He emphasizedthat "this collective action" had "beenforced on us by eventsthat haveno precedentin the easternCaribbean and no placein any civilized society." First, "a brutal gang of leftist thugs" had "violently seizedpower," thereby threateningthe "personalsafety" of between800 and 1,000U.S. citizens,including medical studentsand senior citizens. Second,the "rescuemission" had beencarriedout to forestall further chaos.Finally, Reaganproclaimedhis wish "to assistin the restoration of conditionsoflaw andorderandof governmentalinstitutions"to Grenada.90 We will not passjudgmenton the factual accuracyof Reagan'sstatement, althoughit apparentlycontainedseveraldiscrepancies,91 but insteadwill examinethe administration'sefforts to legitimateits actions. The primary impetusfor the pressurecampaignagainstBishopcamefrom the StateDepartment,initially orchestratedby Haig, and later by Shultz and AssistantSecretaryfor Inter-AmericanAffairs LanghorneMotley. It was strongly supportedby a variety of mid-level political appointees,many of them Latin American specialistsat Stateand the NSC, including NestorD. Sanchez,RogerFontaine,Otto Reich, andConstantineMenges.Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) had no objectionsto stagingCaribbean maneuversto intimidate the PRG (and the Sandinistas).92But whereasthe StateDepartmentand National SecurityAdviser RobertMcFarlanestrongly advocatedthe "rescuemission," representativesof the JCS resistedState's desire even to begin contingencyplanning for the evacuationof U.S. citizens.After Bishop'smurder,they reluctantlyagreedto do so, but Weinberger

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evincedlittle enthusiasmfor the actual intervention,apparentlyfearing that it would whet the administration'sappetitefor riskier operationsin Central America.93 In view of the psychological warfare that had been waged againstthe PRG for more than two years,the Reaganadministrationneededto allay the widespreadsuspicionthat this operationwas not simply a unilateralinvasion by the "northerncolossus."Thus Reaganand his spokespersons repeatedly emphasizedthat the United Stateshadbeen"invited" to participatein a multinational humanitarianaction. SecretaryShultz, Deputy Secretaryof State KennethDam, the U.S. ambassador to the Organizationof AmericanStates, andothersofferedelaboratejustifications,but JeaneKirkpatrick and Ronald Reagandelivered the most comprehensivedefenses.At the UN Security Council on October27, Kirkpatrick beganby challengingan alleged perspectiveabout world politics that "treats the prohibition againstthe use of force as an absolute;and the injunction againstinterventionin the internal affairs of otherstatesas the only obligationof statesunderthe U.N. Charter." Instead,Kirkpatrick argued,"the prohibitionsagainstthe useof force in the U.N. Charterare contextual,not absolute.They provide amplejustification for the use of force againstforce in pursuit of other valuesalso inscribedin the Charter-freedom,democracy,peace."Thus, "the Charterdoes not require that peoplessubmitsupinelyto terror, nor that their neighborsbe indifferent to their terrorization." In evaluatingthe U.S. actions,one must begin, not with the October25 landing,the ambassador suggested,but with the characterof the Bishopgovernmentandthe groupthatsupplantedit. Bishop'sgovernmentcameto power in a coup,refusedto hold elections,and"succumbedto superiorforce" when, "with the complicity of certain powers ... it first arrested,then murdered Bishop and his ministers.Thus beganwhat can only be called an authentic reign of terror in Grenada."Political violence thus had gripped the island well beforethe arrival of the task force on October25. Furthermore,the peopleof Grenadahad beensubjectedto "foreign intervention" because Maurice Bishophad"freely offeredhis island asa basefor the projectionof Soviet military powerin this hemisphere.The familiar pattern of militarization andCubanizationwasalreadyfar advancedin Grenada." In effect, "Grenada'sinternal affairs had fallen under the permanentintervention of oneneighboringandone remotetyranny. Its peoplewerehelpless in the grip of terror." But why wasthe U.S. actiondifferent from otherinterventionsthat, under the guiseof restoringself-determination,actually deny it? Because,sheanswered,"we in the taskforce intend ... to leaveGrenadajust as soonas law is restored,and the instrumentalitiesof self-government-democratic

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government-havebeen put in place." But don't all contemporarygovernmentsclaim to be democratic?What would ensurethat this new Grenadian governmentwill representthe authenticexpressionof the peopleany more than the "gang of thugs" from which the island was delivered?"There is," Kirkpatrick asserted,"a simple test," becausefree institutions-afree press, free trade unions, free elections,representative,responsiblegovernmentwill be clearly in evidence. Kirkpatrick thenattemptedto showthat the "U .S. responsewasfully compatible with relevantinternationallaw and practice."Reagan's"brutal gang of leftist thugs" now became "madmen"and "terrorists," who, the United Statesreasonablyconcluded,could at any momentdecideto hold 1,000U.S. citizens hostagein a duplication of Iran. The ambassadoradmittedthat in normal circumstances"concemfor the safety of a state'snationalsin a foreign country" doesnot justify military measuresagainstthat country. But in the Grenadiancaseno new government hadreplacedthe old one; anarchy prevailed;and terrorists had wantonly endangeredthe lives of its own citizens,foreign nationals,and the security of neighboringstates.In thesecircumstances,Kirkpatrick claimed, military action to protect endangered nationalswas legally justified. Second,the OECS concludedthat the heavily armed "madmen" who had engineeredthe coup possessed an oversizedarmy-oneand one-half times the size of Jamaica's-supported by more than 600 armed Cubans and had ambitionsfor using Grenadaas a centerfor subversion,sabotage, and infiltration. Lacking sufficient security forces, the OECS asked the United Statesto join the effort to restoreorderto Grenadaand to removeit as a security threat. Finally, Kirkpatrick vehementlydeniedthat the U.S. action was somehow counterrevolutionary."The issuewas not revolution ... nor wasit the type of governmentGrenadapossessed," for neitherthe OECSnor the United States had ever attempted"to affect the compositionor character"of the Bishop government.Instead,the military power that Grenadahad "amassedwith CubanandSovietbackinghadfallen into the handsof individualswho could reasonablybe expectedto wield that awesomepoweragainstits neighbors." At the sametime, however,"the coupleadershad no arguableclaim to being the responsiblegovernment,"as the failure of otherstatesto recognizethem, the governor-general'said request,and their own declarationsmadeclear. Kirkpatrick concludedthat "in the contextof thesevery particular,very unusual,perhapsuniquecircumstances,the United Statesdecidedto accedeto the requestof the OECS for aiding its collective efforts aimed at securing peaceand stability in the Caribbeanregion."94 That sameevening,PresidentReaganaddressedthe nation in an effort to

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defendhis policies in Lebanonand Grenada.He claimed that the nation's will wasbeingtestedby Soviet-backedterrorismin both the Middle Eastand the Caribbean.After assertingthat the United Statesas a global powerhada variety of vital interestsin the Middle East, the presidentwarned that "if terrorismand intimidation succeed,it'll be a devastatingblow to the peace processand to Israel's searchfor genuinesecurity." Pointing to a massive Soviet military presencein Syria, he asked,"Can the United States,or the free world, for that matter, standby and seethe Middle East incorporated into the Sovietbloc?" Then Reaganturnedto Grenadaand remindedhis audiencethat Maurice Bishop, "a protegeof Fidel Castro," had overthrowna governmentelected undera "constitutionleft to the peopleby the British," soughtCubanhelp to build an airport, "which looks suspiciouslysuitablefor military aircraft including Soviet-built long-rangebombers,"and alarmedhis neighborswith a large army. Bishop, in turn, was oustedand subsequentlykilled by a group "even more radical and more devotedto Castro'sCuba than he had been." Now "Grenadawas without a government,its only authority exercisedby a self-proclaimedbandof military men." Concernedthat upwardof 1,000U.S. citizens on Grenadamight "be harmedor held hostage,"the presidentrecountedhow he had ordereda marine flotilla headedfor Lebanonto be divertedto "the vicinity of Grenadain casethereshouldbe a needto evacuate our people."Then the OECS sent"an urgentrequestthat we join them in a military operationto restoreorder and democracyto Grenada.Thesesmall peacefulnationsneededour help." HenceReaganaccededto their legitimate requestandto his own concernfor the U.S. citizenson the island.Resurrecting a themefrom his InauguralAddress,he assertedthat "the nightmareof our hostagesin Iran must neverbe repeated." PresidentReaganraisedanotherissueconnectedwith the landing,but did not quite offer it as a reasonfor the intervention:"We havediscovereda completebasewith weaponsandcommunicationsequipmentwhich makesit clear that Cubanoccupationof the islandhadbeenplanned."A warehouseof military equipment,stackedwith enoughweaponsandammunitionto supply"thousandsof terrorists," had been discovered.The presidentwas unequivocal. Grenada"was a Soviet-Cubancolony being readiedas a major military base to export terror and underminedemocracy.We got therejust in time." Nor did Reaganleaveany doubt aboutthe relationshipbetweenLebanon and Grenada:"Not only has Moscow assistedand encouragedthe violence in both countries,but it providesdirect supportthrougha network of surrogatesand terrorists.It is no coincidencethat when the thugs tried to wrest control of Grenada,there were 30 Soviet advisersand hundredsof Cuban military and paramilitaryforces on the island."95

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Initial congressionalreaction to the operationwas largely negative.The Senatewas not in sessionon October25, but in the Houseseveralrepresentatives voiced sharpcriticism. For example,Don Bonker (D-WA) accused the administrationof "a cavalierattitude about using military force to deal with diplomatic problems" and claimed that "it flies in the face of the president'scondemnationof Sovietinterferencein othercountries."96Howard Wolpe (D-MI) calledthe action an exampleof "gunboatdiplomacyin direct contradictionto Americanideals,traditions,andinterests."97EdwardJ. Markey (D-MA) askedthe president:"Wheredoesall this military interventionend? Are the Marines going to becomeour new Foreign Serviceofficers?" And GeorgeMiller (D-CA) malignedReaganfor refusingto meet with Maurice Bishop in June. The next day, in the Senate,Gary Hart (D-CO) introduceda resolutionto invoke the War PowersResolutionand "vowed to opposeany further extension of U.S. military involvementin this small island country."98The rest of the Senate,though, had virtually nothing to say about Grenada,and John Melcher (D-MT) warnedthat the intervention"should not distract us from the timely and urgently neededcorrectionof a disastrousLebanonpolicy."99 The Democratscontinuedthe offensivein the Houseon October26. Bob Edgar(D-PA) arguedthat American lives were not endangeredin Grenada, that the peopleof Grenadahadnot beenconsulted,andthat the Congresshad beencircumvented.Noting that bloody coupsd'etatwere a commonoccurrence in the world, he asked,"Are we to send in our marinesand rangers everytime thereis an internationaldisturbance?"IOOMajor R. Owens(D-NY) calledthe invasion"illegal, immoral, anda wastefulexpenditureof resources and humanlives" and predictedthat "the United Stateswill now becomea scapegoat"as the poorandunemployedthroughoutthe Caribbeanwill blame this country for their condition."lol Jim Leach(R-IA) remindedhis colleagues that "our most loyal ally, Great Britain, strongly objects to our decision." Questioningthe legality of the action, Leach complainedthat "we have reconstitutedgunboatdiplomacy in an era when the efficacy as well as the morality of greatpowerinterventionhavecomeincreasinglyinto question."lo2 GusSavage(D-IL) wasevenmoreblunt. He recalledPrimeMinister Charles's briefing of the Black Caucusthe previousday and terming her "this puppet of the president"who "represents'Aunt Jemimaism'in geopolitics,"claimed that the interventionhad raised"to an internationallevel Reagan'santebellum attitudetowardsblacksin this country."103 Most Republicanshad immediatelyleapedto the president'sdefense,but by October26 evensomeDemocratsbeganto offer support.Most notablein this regardwas DanteFascell(D-FL), soonto becomechairmanof the House ForeignAffairs Committee.Although deploringthe administration'sfailure

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to consult Congressprior to the invasion,he statedthat "under the circumstanceswhich existedin that region, which is virtually in our backyard,I believe the U.S. was justified."I04 SpeakerThomasP. ("Tip") O'Neill's (DMA) first reactionwasto urgenationalunity while the fighting wasin progress, thoughhe soonsuggestedthat unlessU.S. citizenshadbeenin actualdanger, the invasion would representgunboatdiplomacy. As the medicalstudentsbeganreturningfrom Grenadaon October26, however,andasU.S. forcesbeganto uncoverevidenceof CubanandSovietweapons,criticism of Reagandiminishedmarkedly.Tim Valentine(R-NC) exclaimed: "What a beautiful sight to see ... our youthful countrymenkiss the soil of SouthCarolinawith praiseand thankson their lips. ThankGod for our Armed Forces."105And Dan Burton (R-IN) echoed:"We haveheardthe terms 'warmonger'and 'gunboatdiplomacy'used.Well, last night we saw the resultsof that action. Studentsweregettingoff the plane.They werekissing the ground. They were saying 'God blessAmerica.'They were thankingthe presidentfor sendingin the marinesand the rangers."I06For William S. Broomfield (R-MI), the rankingRepublicanon the ForeignAffairs Committee:"It appearsobvious ... that the Sovietsand Cubanshad definite plans for turning Grenadainto anotherCuba.With yet anotherbasein that area,the Sovietscould continueto exportrevolution and terrorismto the small countriesof the region.107 On October28 the Senatevoted 64-20 to invoke the War PowersAct in Grenada,but mostof thosewho favoredthe resolutionwerecareful to explain that their supportdid not imply criticism of the invasion.A few senatorssuch as Gary Hart and Paul Sarbanes(D-MD) did usethe resolutionas the occasion to attackReagan'saction,but evenSenatorHart tried to narrowits meaning: "This amendment... has nothing to do with whetherthe U.S. citizens werein danger.It doesnot questionthe authorityof the president.... Whether we could haveadoptedsomedifferent remedy... is not an issue." The House also voted overwhelmingly(403-23)on November1 to apply the War PowersAct to Grenadaon theserestrictedlegal grounds. But when StevenD. Symms (R-ID) rose in the Senateto insert into a laudatoryresolutiona passagethat would have described the rescuemission as "swift and effective action in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine," Majority LeaderHoward Baker (R-TN) indicatedthat the White Housepreferrednot to alter the resolution'slanguage.108This extremely telling exchangeprovided an insight into the Reaganadministration'sdilemma.On the onehand, it wished to use the Grenadaoperationto help dissolve the "Vietnam syndrome" and to put other regional "undesirables"on notice, but it did not want to alienatefriendly governmentsin the CaribbeanandCentralAmerica. "Getting therejust in time" to preventthe Sovietizationof the Caribbeanwas one thing, invoking the Monroe Doctrine was somethingelseagain.

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Despitethe administration'selaborateefforts to portray the Grenadainresponseto an terventionas a humanitarianrescuemission,a compassionate urgent requestfor help by small, friendly, democraticneighbors,and the successfulfoiling of a Soviet-Cubancolony, the American public supported the action becauseit was swift, conclusive,and relatively free of cost. Several polls conductedin the immediateaftermathofthe operationaffirmed the overwhelminglypragmaticnatureof the public's reactions.The November ABC-WashingtonPostsurvey,for example,showed71 percentin favor and only 22 percentopposedto the Grenadalanding.Yet althoughmost people50 to 35 percentin the New York Timespoll takenafter Reagan'sOctober27 speech-thought the United States had intervenedto protectU.S. lives rather than overthrow a Marxist government,most people also believed that the U.S. citizens in Grenadahad not beenin a "great deal of danger."And in a Newsweek-Gallup canvassmorerespondentsfavoredthe withdrawal of U.S. troopsas soonas the safetyofthe U.S. nationalswas assuredthan thosewho wantedthe troopsto stay until Grenadawas able to install a democraticgovernment.Consistentwith this finding was a New York Times-CBSsurvey that indicatedthat the public was opposedby a 60 to 21 percentmargin to U.S. supportfor the Nicaraguancontras. Furthermore,at the sametime that the public supportedthe presidenton Grenada,a plurality-47 to 43 percent -continuedto believe that he was "too quick to employ U.S. forces," and anotherplurality-49 to 44 percent-feltmore "uneasy" than "confident" about Reagan'sability to handle internationalcrises. The public, in short, liked the Grenadainvasion becauseit worked, but was unwilling to read broaderlessonsinto the affair. Nevertheless,despitethis public assessment and despitethe judgmentof thosesuch as AlexanderHaig, who later claimed that Grenadacould have been capturedby the "Providencepolice force,"I09 Reaganrepeatedlyinvoked the episodeas one of his greatestachievements,a turning point in Americanforeign policy that had successfullychallengedthe BrezhnevDoctrine. But rhetoric aside,Reaganofficials, as we later see,showeda curious reluctanceto use the successin Grenadaas a springboardto direct military action in CentralAmerica. The Reaganadministration,as it frequently remindedthe public, had inheritedfrom Cartera CentralAmericansituationmarkedby pervasiveinstability. In El Salvadorleftist guerrillashadrecentlyfailed to topplethe military governmentin a "final offensive" but seemedready to try again.The Carter administration'sefforts to encouragepolitical reforms had not beennotably successful,and right-wing death squadswere suspectedof murderingfour American nuns in late 1980. In Nicaragua,Carter officials had watched Somozafall in July 1979 to a revolutionary coalition subsequentlydomi-

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lIo Yet despitethe avowedradicalnatedmore and more by the Sandinistas. ism of this group,theCarteradministration,recallinghow Eisenhower'srough treatmentof Castrohad allegedly pushedCubatoward Moscow, tried to establish normal relationswith it. A leadingSandinista,Daniel Ortega,visited the White House,and Carter afterwardaskedCongressto authorizea $75 million loan to the new Nicaraguangovernment.A lengthy debateensued, and thoughthe administrationeventuallysent$118 million in direct aid and encouraged$262 million in multilateral assistance,it had to competewith a rapidly growing Cubanpresencein Nicaragua.The CIA uncoveredevidence of large arms shipmentsfrom the Sandinistasto the Salvadoranguerrillas, FarabundoMarti LiberacionNacional(FMLN), therebyendangeringthe continuation of U.S. aid. By January1981 it had becomeincreasinglyobvious that Nicaraguawished to reserveits closestrelationshipsfor Cuba and the Soviet Union, while rhetorically brandingthe United Statesas the "enemy." The twin legaciesof the Vietnam War and the CubanRevolution would alsohelp shapeandconstrainthe Reaganadministration'spoliciesin Central America. Many of theseofficials agreedthat Eisenhowerhad mishandled Castroby allowing him to consolidatehis power before attemptingto oust him in a "covert/overt,"half-heartedinvasion.Yet largely becauseof the limits imposedby fears of anotherVietnam, the Reaganadministrationevolved a policy toward Nicaraguathat in its bogussecrecyand limited supportfor proxiescameto resemblean eight-year-longBay of Pigs. SecretaryHaig had not desiredsuch an outcome.From the beginninghe had wantedto "go to the source"of CentralAmerican instability--Cubaand in June1981 had submittedto the NSC a specific proposalto bring "the overwhelmingeconomicstrength andpolitical influenceof the UnitedStates, togetherwith the reality of its military power, to bear on Cuba by a naval blockadeand other military actions." He "stood virtually alone," however, and the plan was rejectedbecause(1) Weinbergerfeared anotherVietnam quagmire,and the JCSfeareda Sovietcounteroffensiveagainsta vulnerable U.S. asset;(2) the administrationdoubtedthat suchactionscould be publicly justified without prior Cubanprovocation;(3) someStateDepartmentofficials thought that Castro would continue to "export revolution" despitea blockade;and (4) the White Housetroika did not want to divert public attention from Reagan'seconomicprioritiesYI Two monthslater, in a surprisingmove perhapsfacilitated by the fact that Reaganhad not yet filled key Statepositionswith political appointees,AssistantSecretaryof Statefor Inter-AmericanAffairs ThomasEndersbegana seriesof meetingswith the Sandinistasto reach an agreementthat would renew U.s. economicaid (halted in April) if Managuastoppedarming the FMLN. Specifically, Endersproposedthat (1) Nicaraguawould ceaseits

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supportof CentralAmericaninsurgents;(2) Nicaraguawould reduceits armed forces from 23,000 to 15,000; (3) the United Stateswould promiseto enforce its neutrality laws and to refrain from interfering in Nicaraguaninternal affairs; (4) Washingtonwould resumeeconomicaid; and(5) both countries would expandcultural relations. Enderstold the Sandinistasof U.S. concernsabout political pluralism, a mixed economy,and their close ties with Moscow and Havanabut, significantly, in the light of subsequentdemands, did not include them in the proposal.112 It appearsunlikely, however, that Enderscould have in any casepersuadedthe administrationto supportthe scheme.He hadalreadyprovokedresentmentby excludingkey officials from planning discussionsand had travelled secretly and alone to Nicaragua.1I3 Moreover,hardlinersat the White Housedoubtedthat the Sandinistaswould fulfill their promises,and thesesuspicionswere fueled by reports that the commandantes"had continuedto expresssupport for the FMLN." In any case,the Nicaraguans,insteadof directly respondingto Enders'sproposals, complainedaboutU.S. naval exercisesoff the Hondurancoast,the termination of aid, and Washington'sreluctanceto stop training exile groups.The Reaganadministration,in searchof a pretextto endnegotiations,interpreted the Sandinistaresponseas a final rejection.Yet Enders,in his eagernessfor secrecy,had failed to leave a clear documentarytrail, therebycomplicating later administrationattemptsto demonstratepublicly that it had exhausted diplomacy beforeadoptingstrongermeasures. 114 Largely as a resultof the persistenceof JohnCarbaugh,an aide to Senator JesseHelms (R-NC), the 1980 Republicanconventionhad adopteda plank that supported"the efforts of the Nicaraguanpeopleto establisha free and independentgovernment."On March 9, 1981, Reagansigneda presidential finding, authorizingthe CIA to help interdict arms flowing from Nicaragua to Central American guerrillas. CIA Director William Caseyused this authority to begin organizing Nicaraguansopposedto the Sandinistas.Since late 1980 the Argentine military had been training some of Somoza'sexGuardsmenin Honduras,and at an August 1981 meetingin Guatemala,U.S. officials persuadedthesegroups to unite and form the NicaraguanDemocratic Force (FDN)}l5 Reagan'ssigning of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 17 on November23, 1981, made support for the contras official U.S. policy by authorizing $19 million for a 500-memberforce to counter"the Cubaninfrastructurein Nicaragua"that was "training and supplying arms to the Salvadoranguerrillas." Haig vehementlyobjectedto the decision,arguingthat it failed to addressthe larger problemof Soviet-Cuban intervention and correctly predicting that it would commit the administration to replacingthe Sandinistaswith a more congenialgovernment."1l6 In March 1982 ex-Guardsmentrainedby the CIA blew up two bridgesin

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northern Nicaragua.This act not only had the effect of strengtheningthe administration'scommitmentto armedstrugglebut alsocausedtheSandinistas to intensify their repressionof suspectedsympathizers,therebywinning additional convertsto the FDN. The HousePermanentSelectIntelligenceCommitteehad voted to approveU.S. covert actionsas long as their soleaim was arms interdiction. When news reports claimed that the contras wished to overthrowtheNicaraguangovernment,theHouse,in December1982,adopted the first Boland amendment,411-0, to prohibit expendingU.S. funds for that purpose.Meanwhile,the Reaganadministration,to its greatannoyance, was also burdenedwith a regional initiative by Mexico, Panama,Colombia, and Venezuela-the"Contadora"countries-tonegotiatea settlementwith the Sandinistas. During 1982and 1983 it had becomeincreasinglyobviousto U.S. intelligenceagenciesthat the flow of Nicaraguanarmsto EI Salvadorhad virtually stopped.But insteadof moving to resuscitatethe Endersproposalsof 1981, Reagansigned anotherpresidentialfinding in September1983 that authorized supportfor the FDN in orderto inducethe Sandinistasto negotiatewith its neighborsandto "pressure" them to ceaseassistingthe FMLN. This openendedgoal pavedthe way for a greatly increasedU.S. naval and military presencein Hondurasandoff the Nicaraguancoast,as well as a contingency plan for an invasion, if provoked.Yet, despitethe heady atmospherethat prevailedat the White Housein the aftermathof the Grenada"rescuemission;' the administrationrefusedto considerseriouslydirectly interveningin Nicaragua,andit evendiscouragedthe FDN from capturingNicaraguanterritory for the purposeof proclaiminga "FreeNicaragua"government.And it did so, at leastin part,becauseof the vehementobjectionsof Weinbergerand the JCS.The secretaryof defenserepeatedlyraisedthe specterof Vietnamin high-level policy discussionsand "worried over the possibility that the presi117 esc~lation."'1l7 dent would be drawn into 'involuntary extraordinary In October1984Weinbergertook the extraordinarystep of publicly laying down six "tests" that any proposedU.S. military action must meetprior to presidentialapproval.If followed, thesetests would have effectively removed"limited war" as a foreign policy option.Yet the effectivenessof the Departmentof Defense's(DOD) preferredtactic-conductingprovocative maneuversin Hondurasand along Nicaragua'scoastlines-wasseriously damagedby the White Housedecisionto announcetheseoperationsin advance and to issue assurancesthat they did not presagean invasion. This practice,of course,stemmedfrom the perceivedneedto avoid provoking a hostile domesticreaction. During 1984the House,partly in responseto crediblereportsthat the CIA had participatedin mining Nicaraguanharborsand had helped the contras

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compile an "assassinationmanual," repeatedlyvoted to end funding of the "covert" war. It had first done so in September1983 (H.R. 2760). Yet the Senate,controlled by the Republicans,refusedto go along until late 1984. Finally, in March 1985 the HouserejectedReagan'srequestfor $14 million in military aid as well as two requestsfor "humanitarianassistance."118 Soon thereafter,Daniel Ortega,in a politically obtusemove, visited Moscow, and the administrationembarkedon a fierce rhetorical campaignagainsthim. Democrats,their ranks split and on the defensive,soughtpolitical cover in the form of "nonlethal,humanitarian"assistancefor the contras.Reagan,for his part, senta letter to Congresspromisingto "pursuepolitical, not military solutions,in Central America." In June 1985 both housesvoted to provide $27 million in humanitarianaid to the FDN as long as the contrasstayedin their Hondurancampsand observeda cease-fire.With this action Reagan had establishedthe principle that the contraswere a legitimateorganization worthy of U.S. support,though it remainedunclearexactly how humanitarian aid could do much more than feed them. In February1986Reaganwent back to Congressto ask for another$100 million, three-quartersof which was military. Onceagainthe administration combinedharsh rhetoric and symbolic concessions-the widely respected Philip Habib was appointedas specialambassadorto CentralAmerica-to wear down congressionalresistance.The administration,despiteReagan's pledgeto seeka diplomatic resolution,tried its best to frustrate Contadora efforts while blaming Nicaraguafor the failure to produce an acceptable treaty. In fact, neither nation wished to compromise,and Habib eventually resigned.When the World Court decidedin June1986that the United States had violated internationallaw by helping the contrasmine Nicaraguanharbors and destroytransportationfacilities, the Reaganadministrationrejected the judgmentand reiteratedits commitmentto the FDN. But the administrationfound it much more difficult to sustainits Nicaraguanpolicy in the wake of the sensationalIran-contra revelations.In its zeal to provide Nicaraguawith a "democratic"alternative,Reaganofficials had solicited contra funds from the Saudi royal family, the sultanof Brunei, and Taiwan. Moreover,in orderto evadeearliercongressionalprohibitionsagainst aiding the FDN, the NSC had helpedto organizean "enterprise"to train and fund the contras.ThusReagan'scaB for volunteerismandprivate-sectortakeoversof previouslypublic responsibilitiesreachedtheir ultimateconcJusiona private foreign policy! Nevertheless,Reagansurvivedpolitically andin the autumnof 1987asked Congressto re-fund the FDN for yet anotheryear. The administrationskillfully exploitedthe public'sinfatuationwith LieutenantColonelOliver North, a mastermindof the Iran-contra scam,and the congressionaltestimonyof a

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Sandinistadefector, which, among other things, claimed that some of the commandantesmaintainedsecretSwiss bank accounts.In late December Congressvoted to keepthe contrasalive with $8 million in humanitarianaid and promisedto vote again in February1988. By then,CostaRicanPresidentOscarArias haddevelopeda regionalpeace plan that seemedto meetalmostall of the administration'sprofessedgoals, including internal democratizationprocessesand verification proceduresto ensurean end to arms trafficking. Reaganofficials, however, while awkwardly welcomingthe proposalsin public, undertooka campaignto damage Arias's credibility and privately urgedthe FDN to hardenits negotiatingposition. On March 23, 1988,the Sandinistasand the contrassignedan agreement that Reaganofficials feared would lead to the surrenderof the FDN. One week later HouseSpeakerJim Wright (D-TX) succeededin putting together$47 million in aid that included humanitarianassistancechanneled through "neutral organizations,"a fund to help children victimized by the war, and money for a verification commission.Both chambersoverwhelmingly approvedthis package. Yet many in the administrationremainedconvincedthat the Sandinistas would neverallow "democracy"in Nicaraguaand would interpretcongressional action as an invitation to destroy the FDN. When, early in March, Congressrefusedto re-fund the contras, Reaganpoundedhis desk and exploded: "This is the sameold thing by Congress.Look at all the countries that went down the tubesright after Vietnambecauseof congressionalinterferencein foreign policy."119 Reagan'sfrustrationshouldbe measuredagainstthe administration'sstubborn seven-yeareffort publicly to legitimateits Nicaraguanpolicy. From the beginning,its CentralAmericaninitiatives had provokedcontroversy.Public hostility hadgreetedearly efforts to shoreup the Salvadoranjunta with military aid anda few dozenU.S. advisersbecauseit triggeredwidespreadfears aboutanotherVietnamin the making.Deathsquadatrocities,apparentlycarried out with the connivanceof the Salvadorangovernment,outragedmany membersof Congress,as did JeaneKirkpatrick's suggestionthat the four murderedAmerican nuns were partly responsiblefor their own deaths.But when the administrationbeganto shift towarda policy of reform in EI Salvador, primarily by encouraginglegislativeand presidentialelections,congressional and public supportnotably increased.While a substantialnumberof congressionalDemocratscontinuedto question the Duarte government's commitmentto land reform andhumanrights, by 1984Reagan'sSalvadoran policy had beensubstantiallylegitimated. But NicaraguasoonreplacedEI Salvadorasan objectof domesticcontroversy and remainedso despitethe administration'sunendingverbal offen-

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sive designedto mobilize public support.Reaganliterally tried everythingto persuadeCongressand the public of the wisdom of his Nicaraguanpolicy. At the core of this effort lay the multifacetedcontention,coordinatedby the Office of Public Diplomacy, that America's vital interestswere at stakein CentralAmerica and that NicaraguathreatenedU.S. security. In contrastto Vietnam, where Haig now claimed that national security had not beendirectly at issueafter all, "in CentralAmerica we're talking aboutthe strategic vulnerability of the Canal.... We are ... at the core of United Stateshemispheric interests."I20Unlike SoutheastAsia, which was half a world away, CentralAmerica,the administrationargued,wasin "our backyard,"and,with the Caribbean,formed "our fourth border," a "strategic basin" containing "vital" shipping lanes.Reaganrecalledhow Nazi submarinesin 1942 had threatenedtheseroutesand had sunk severalAllied ships.Otheradministration officials occasionallyclaimedthat the CaribbeanBasin possessed critical strategicmaterials.They evencontendedthat the United States needed to preserveaccessto regionalair and naval facilities in PuertoRico, Cuba,and Honduras.More significant was the assertionthat Nicaraguaas a SovietCubanoutpostwould posea genuinethreatto CentralAmericanstability and ultimately U.S. nationalsecurity.Like Grenada,a SovietizedNicaraguacould be usedas a missile and submarinebaseto launch attacksagainstthe U.S. mainland.Administrationspokespersons more frequently invoked a domino scenario,wherebyotherCentralAmericanstateswould be subverted,intimidated,or invadedby Nicaraguauntil Mexico itself crumbled.Moreover,they predictedthat the resultantturmoil would unleashfloods of refugeesthat would weaken-inunspecifiedways-thesocial fabric ofthe United States. But the administrationimplied that somethingmorethanAmericanphysical securitywas at stake-itscredibility as a beaconof freedomanda world leaderdependedon its willingness to supportthe FDN. If the United States failed to act in Central America, where would it act? The line had to be drawn,or elseour allies would doubt its reliability and its adversarieswould be emboldened.Similar argumentshad, of course,been usedby Cold War presidentsin a variety of contexts,but they hadbeenrarely heardsinceVietnam. After initially denying the validity of the Vietnam analogyto Central America, Reaganofficials, as they scrambledfor contra votes in Congress, beganto encouragethe comparison.In April 1985 SecretaryShultz noted that during the Vietnam War someAmericanshad made"an endlessand shifting sequenceof apologiesfor the Communists,"had condemned"military solutions,"and had then turnedtheir attackson the United Statesitself. He warnedthat "we shouldbearthis pastexperiencein mind in our contemporary debates,"for "the litany of apology for Communistsand condemnation for America and our friends is beginningagain." In fact, "our goals in

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Central America are like those we had in Vietnam: democracy,economic progress,andsecurityagainstaggression."121Reaganofficials treadvery carefully, however,andrepeatedlyclaimedthat U.S. supportfor the FDN constituted an alternativeto direct intervention,not the preludethat congressional opponentsfeared.Indeed,Reagan argued that to opposecontra aid now made direct U.S. involvementin the future more likely. He also tried to castthe Nicaraguanissueasa moral drama.What hadthe Sandinistasdoneto incur Reagan'swrath?After solemnlypledgingto liberate Nicaraguafrom tyranny, they had instead"betrayed"their revolution by refusing to createa genuinedemocracy.By imprisoning their opponents, persecutingthe Catholic church, forcibly relocating the Mesquito Indians, shuttingdown a free press,and building an enormousarmy, the Sandinistas had transformedNicaraguainto a "totalitarian dungeon."Not only had they welcomedCubanand Soviet military personneland receivedvastquantities of offensive weapons,but they had invited "terrorists" to Nicaraguafrom Libya, Iran, and North Korea and had spearheaded a drive to export illegal drugsto the United States.Facingthis unspeakableevil was the "democratic resistance,""our brothers,thesefreedomfighters of Nicaragua,""the moral equal of our FoundingFathersand the bravemen and womenof the French Resistance."For Reagan,"the strugglehereis not right versusleft; it is right versus wrong."122 Rarely had a presidentused such words to describethe U.S. Army, let alone a five-year-old organizationthat critics claimed was dominatedby Somozistas.Certainly no seniorU.S. official hadeverlavished such praiseon the governmentof SouthVietnam, for example.But that, of course,was the point. Yet theseefforts weredamagedby claimsthatthe administrationwasseeking to overthrow the Nicaraguangovernment.Reaganand his advisersat times halfheartedlydeniedthesecharges,but on otheroccasionsimplied that the Sandinistashad to be replacedor at least say "uncle." Thesecongressional concernscompelledReaganto legitimatehis Nicaraguanpolicy as an effort to find a diplomatic solution.As a result,Reaganappointeda string of special ambassadorsto Central America. They and Shultz engagedthe Sandinistasin desultorybilateral discussionsin Mexico and Nicaragua.But nothing was accomplished,for the Sandinistasdemandedthat the United Stateswithdraw supportfrom the contras, while the administrationwould acceptnothing less than FDN participation in the Nicaraguangovernment. Nevertheless,diplomaticinitiatives probablyconvincedtwenty to thirty House Democratsto vote for contra aid. Reaganalso attemptedto portray his policy as bipartisanand consensual andaspart of a largereffort to bring democracyandstability to all of Central America.His CaribbeanBasinInitiative, announcedi'l early 1982andpassed

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by Congressin August 1983,providedeconomicand military assistanceand investmentand tradeincentivesto the entire region,except,of course,Cuba, Nicaragua,and Grenada. Turningto a favorite device,Reaganappointedthe allegedly bipartisanKissingerCommission,chargedwith developingadditional policy recommendations for CentralAmerica.Composedof conservative to moderateRepublicansand Democrats,it contendedthat the "roots of the crisis are both indigenousand foreign," but also claimed that "in the CentralAmerican-Caribbeanregion, our credibility world wide is engaged. The triumph of hostile forces in what the Sovietscall the 'strategicrear' of the United Stateswould be read as a sign of U.S. impotence."123Despiteits endorsementof land reform, congressionalliberals correctly saw the commission as a disguisedattemptby the administrationto createa center-right coalition supportiveof aid to the contras. Finally, Reaganofficials portrayednon-NicaraguanCentralAmerica as a hotbedof democraticvitality. The Sandinistas'totalitariangrip thus became ludicrously anachronisticas such statesas Hondurasand Guatemalaallegedly becameincreasinglydemocratic.Yet CostaRica, indisputablythe region's foremostdemocracy,seemedequallycritical of both ManaguaandWashington, andby 1988the administrationwasevenmoreseriouslyembarrassed by revelationstying the CIA to the drug trafficking Manuel Noriegaof Panama. Reagan'spresumablyclear moral categoriesappearedto be blurring. Until the blossomingof Soviet-Americandetentein 1987 and 1988 the tiny nation of Nicaraguahad becomethe central preoccupationof American foreign policy and the focal point of presidentialrhetoric. It was also partly responsiblefor creatingthe paramountcrisis of the Reaganpresidency.Yet the reasonsfor the administration'sratherextraordinaryexertionsagainstit remainedelusive. From the vantagepoint of the early 1980s, this policy seemeddesignedto implementthe "prevailing with pride" strategy.At the least, it would haveraisedthe cost that Moscow would be obliged to pay to retain a peripheralclient, and a policy of unremitting pressuremight have evensucceededin toppling the Sandinistasand thus puncturedthe Brezhnev Doctrine. Moreover, it would have provided an opportunity for the United Statesto atonein part for its mishandlingof the CubanRevolutionin the late 1950s and early 1960s. Reagan,after all, had been disappointedwhen Kennedy had resolvedthe missile crisis without invading Cuba.124 But the paltry sumsthat the administrationrequestedfrom Congressto supportthe FDN underminedthis explanation.While it was true that by the late 1980s the Nicaraguaneconomylay in ruins, the reasonsfor its collapsehad lessto do with the contras than with governmentalmismanagement,decreasesin Sovietaid, and the U.S. tradeembargo.125 On the otherhand,the administration could plausibly haveclaimedthat its economicpressurehadcontributed

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to this situation.Yet the destructionof the Nicaraguaneconomyhad never beenpublicly offered as a policy aim. By the late 1980stherewas a growing suspicion,however,that Reagan's Nicaraguapolicy had beena sop to pacify the hard right, while the administrationbuilt bridgesto Gorbachev.JohnCarbaugh,theHelmsaidewho played an early role in bringing the contras to the administration'sattention,suggestedthat "Haig and Endersrealizedthey had to throw a boneto the rightwingers. They can't have the Soviet Union or the Middle East or Western Europe.All are too important."'26But this explanationignoredReagan'sattitude. Was he part of this scheme,or had he beenpersuadedby Kirkpatrick, Casey,and other zealotsto lead the chargeagainstthe Sandinistas?Given the fact that Reaganremainedcommittedto the "democraticresistance"even after virtually all the original supportershadleft the government, Carbaugh's thesis appearedrather dubious. But it did acknowledgethe anomaly of a fiercely anti-Sandinistapresidentstrolling arm-in-armthrough Red Square with his "friend," Mikhail Gorbachev,in May 1988. A third, and somewhatmore compelling, explanationwould interpret Reagan'sNicaraguanpolicy as yet anotherexampleof the president'suncanny ability to know exactly how far to push a pet project in the face of public andcongressionalresistance.Recognizingfrom the beginningthat his would inevitably be a Vietnam-traumatizedadministration,Reagannevertheless saw in Central America the opportunity to defeat a Soviet proxy with relatively little risk. According to this view, the administrationneverhad the slightestinclination to sendU.S. troops to Nicaragua.At the least,Reagan's fierce rhetoric would havedriven dissentingDemocratsinto a political tizzy by questioningtheir commitmentto freedomanddemocracy.The Democratic Party could then be chargedwith "losing Nicaragua,"and the Republicans could evenmore thoroughly dominatethe national security issue. But unlike Grenada,whereCongressand the public applaudedthe success of the"rescuemission,"theadministrationneverobtainedmajority public backing for its Nicaraguanpolicy. By March 1986,thosewho believedthat Nicaragua poseda threatto the securityof the United Stateshad risen to 56 percent, though only 29 percentdeemedit a "major" threat.Yet at no time between 1983 and 1987did more than 28 percentbelievethat the United Statesshould try secretlyto overthrowthe Sandinistas(March 1986),and by January1987, immediatelyafter Iran-contra, that figure had fallen to 16 percent.Opposition to a U.S. invasionof Nicaraguawascomparablyhigh. Most ofthe public (5759 percent)blamedthe trouble in CentralAmerica on poverty and the lack of humanrights, thoughaboutthe samenumberopposedthe spreadof communism there.A large part of the public favorednonmilitary approachesto Nicaragua.For example,a May 1984Harris poll revealedth':lt 81 percentsupported

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theContadoraprocess.And while public fearsthat the UnitedStateswasheaded for anotherVietnamin CentralAmericafell from 68 percentin the early 1980s to 30 percentby 1986, support for the contras rarely rose above one-third. Most telling, perhaps,was that Reagan'soverall approval rating consistently ran from 15 to 28 percentaheadof his Nicaraguanpolicy.'27 Just before leaving office in January 1989, Lieutenant GeneralColin Powell, Reagan'ssixth NSC adviser, admitted that the administrationhad of the Nicaraguanproblem failed to educatethe public aboutthe seriousness and blamed it on insufficient effort. Interviews that were conductedwith NSC staffersconfirmed that view.128 It was certainly true that the public's understandingof the CentralAmerican situation remainedvery low. For example, an April 1986 CBS-NewYork Timespoll showedthat 50 percentof the public did not know anythingaboutthe Nicaraguangovernmentand that amongthosewho did, half believedit to be a right-wing dictatorship.129 Nor did Reagan'srhetorical warfare changemany people'sminds. From mid1983 to 1985 those who supportedthe overthrow of the Sandinistasrose from 23 to 32 percent,andfrom March 1985to July 1986approvalof Reagan's handling of Nicaraguaincreasednine points to 35 percent.130 Yet even this modestshift was erasedby Iran-contra. What more could Reaganhavedone to "educate"the public? But the Nicaraguaissuedid have a significant differential impact on the major political parties.A May 1986 National Journal poll indicatedthat 16 percentof Democratsand36 percentof Republicansfavoredaid to the contras, while 75 percentof Democratsand 51 percentof GOPsupportersopposedit. A 1985 poll showedthat of the 38 percentof the public that knew of u.s. support forthe contras, 67 percentof Republicansapprovedand 64 percent of Democratsopposedthis policy.'31 In short, this issueseemedto divide the attentivepublic along party lines.

A New ForeignPolicy Consensus? PresidentReagan'srhetoric left little doubt aboutthe answerto this question. As he put it in December1988, In the decadeof the eightiesthe causeof freedom and humanrights has prosperedandthe spectreof nuclearwar hasbeenpushedbackbecausethe democracieshaverecoveredtheir strength,their compass.Hereat homea nationalconsensus on the importanceof strongnationalleadershipis emerging. No legacy would make me more proud than leaving in place such a consensusfor the causeof world freedom, a consensusthat preventsa paralysisof Americanpower from everoccurringagain.132

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Nor was he shy aboutclaiming credit: And as I walk off into the city streets,a final word to the men and women of theReaganrevolution.... My friends: We did it. We weren'tjust marking time. We madea difference.We madethe city stronger.We madethe city freer, andwe left her in goodhands.All in all, not bad,not badat all. 133 And, in fact, a persuasivecasecould be madeto supportReagan'sclaims. The United Statesdid seem"more prosperous,more secureand happier"134 than it had eight years before. An unprecedentedperiod of recession-free, low-inflation economic growth had replacedthe stagflationaryrut of the 1970s.A resurgenceof national self-confidenceand pride, predictedby Reaganin 1981,had apparentlysweptaway the guilt, doubt, and introspection of the previousdecade.An ambitiousprogramof military expansionand modernization,coupled with the administration'sdeterminationto deploy PershingII and Cruise missiles,had frightenedthe Soviets into signing an asymmetricalarmscontrol agreementandhad pavedthe way for deepstrategic cuts.The ReaganDoctrine,by deftly exploiting Soviet vulnerabilitieson the peripheryof its empire, had compelleda withdrawal from Afghanistan and had facilitated a settlementin Angola. The result was a new and infinitely betterdetente,basednot on Soviet promisesof domesticreform and internationalrestraintbut on deeds.And in contrastto the 1970s,when superpowerdetentehad often beenhauntedby the spectreof Americandecline and Russianascendancy,the 1980s version featured a reenergizedUnited Statesand an enervated,bankruptSoviet Union. Finally, the Reaganforeign policy had evidently beeninstrumentalin once again making America relevantto the restof the world, for its messageof freedomanddemocracyhad found eageraudienceseverywhere.Now a democraticrevolution wassweeping the globe from the Philippines and Latin America to EasternEurope, China, and eventhe Soviet Union. Indeed,it was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Cold War had ended(or nearly so), that the West had won, andthatthe old Americandreamof a world of liberal democraticstateswould soonbe realized. In the light of theseachievementsand prospects,was not Reaganalsocorrect in claiming as his legacy the reemergenceof a domesticforeign policy consensus? After all, signs of consensusabounded.At the elite level, scholars, pundits,andparticipantsduring the 1970shademphasizedthe seemingly intractabledivisions that hinderedefforts to achievea coherent,supportable foreign policy. The notion of consensuswas rarely discussed.JamesChace, in a 1978 Foreign Affairs essay,did so, but only to dismiss·it as a remote possibility, and, as we have seen,neoconservativeswaged a four-year war

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againstthe Carterforeign policy. J35 Yet by the mid-1980sthis situation had begun tochange.During the 1984presidentialcampaignthe Centerfor Security and InternationalStudiessponsoreda symposiumon bipartisanshipand consensus,andin early 1985 RichardLugar (R-IN), the new chairmanof the SenateForeignRelationsCommittee,conductedhearingson "Commitments, Consensus,and U.S. Foreign Policy." And while neither exercisemay have shownmuch interestin exposinga broadspectrumof opinion, more difficult to dismisswas a 1988 Foreign Affairs article by Henry Kissingerand Cyrus Vance,who buriedold hatchetsin orderto formulatethe outlinesof a consensual foreign policy.136 More pessimistically,the Foreign Policy Institute of JohnsHopkins University acknowledgedthat "during the past dozen years, the numberand intensity of contentiousissuesin U.S. foreign and defense policy, already severesince the mid-1960s,have risen markedly and now threatena seriousbreakdownin the policy process."But in early 1988 it launcheda programdesignedto identify a "middle ground" wherea bipartisanconsensuscould be built on significant issuesof immediaterelevance."131 In short, on the eve of the 1988 presidentialelection, consensus,if not yet achieved,had onceagain becomea prominentfeatureof elite discourse. Moreover, by 1988 public attitudesabout foreign policy, carefully measuredin two extraordinarilydetailedsurveys-Americans Talk Security(ATS) and the Public Agenda Foundation(PAF)138 project appearedto vindicate Reagan'sclaim of an emergentnationalconsensus.DemocraticpollsterJohn Marttila, oneof the principalATS researchers, announcedthat "the president's successin negotiatingwith Mr. Gorbachevhas ... reestablisheda national bipartisanconsensuson U.S.-Soviet relations."139The twelve ATS reports demonstratedthat about two-thirds of the public believedthat the Reagan military buildup had been necessary,that about the samepercentagecounseledcautiousnegotiationwith the Sovietsfrom a position of U.S. strength, and that a strong majority thoughtthat real opportunitiesexistedfor important breakthroughsin the superpowerrelationship.l40The PAF project characterizedtheseattitudesas a "rational, hard-headedstanceon which a new national consensuscan be firmly built."141 Though voters remainedsuspicious of Sovietintentions,57 percentbelievedthat relationswith the Soviets would continueto improveandleadto fundamentalchange.142 In a May 1988 ATS survey 75 percentof the respondentsgave excellentor good marks to Reaganfor "standing up to the Soviets," 73 percentfor "keepingAmerica out of war," 73 percentfor his armscontrol record,71 percentfor "developing a soundnationaldefense,"and 61 percentfor using U.S. military power appropriately.143 Thatsamepoll indicatedthatclearmajoritiescreditedReagan with "promoting the spreadof democracy,""preventingthe spreadof communism," and "winning respectfor America." According to Mitchell E.

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Daniels,former chief political adviserto Reagan,"Right now, in at leastits generaloutlines,Reagan'sview ofthe world seemsto be vindicatedin the eyesof most people."l44And thesepublic perceptionsprovided theRepublicanParty with an importantpolitical edge,for mostAmericanshadcometo view it as the party of both strengthand peace. GeorgeBush and Michael Dukakis conductedtheir fall 1988 campaigns as if convincedof an emergentforeign policy consensus.Bush skillfully portrayedhimselfas Reagan'srightful heir, willing and able to combinenegotiationswith nationalpower,while dismissingthe inexperiencedgovernor of Massachusetts as a warmed-overJimmy Carterwho would bargainaway American strengthin order to cut imprudentdeals with the Soviet Union. Dukakis,thoughsuggestingthat Gorbachevdeservedmuch of the credit for improved superpowerrelations,pledgedto pursueReagan'sSoviet policy, and applaudedthe window of opportunity openedby the presidentwith an enthusiasmthatevenBushfound difficult to match.145 Stungby Bush'scharges of weaknesson national security issues,Dukakis softenedhis earlier stand againstmodernizingthe U.S. land-basednucleardeterrent,promisedto continue SDI research,and took an unfortunateride in a tank to demonstratehis toughness.Indeed,he did his best to avoid foreign policy issuesexceptto implicate Bush in Iran-contra and sleazydealingswith GeneralNoriega. Had RonaldReaganleft Americawith its first genuineforeign policy consensusin twenty-five years?Had he, in the conceptualvocabularyof our study, legitimatedhis granddesign,strategy,and tactics? Certainly Reagan'sgranddesignpossessed enormousappeal,largely becauseit deftly employedpowerful symbolsto tap into importantdimensions of America's civil religion. Reagan'sarticulation of a shining city on the hill--compassionate,moral, strong, and exceptional--constituted the secular equivalentof a stem yet loving Providenceso ingrained in traditional AmericanProtestantism.This city, dedicatedto individual freedomanddemocratic government,had long servedas a beaconof hope for all humanity. Reagan's"dream" was for the rest of the world to experiencethe exhilaration of a democraticrevolution, and now that America was onceagainprosperousand strong,it could help othersachievefreedom. Whatgavethis granddesignsignificancewasriot its originality. Woodrow Wilson and early Cold War presidentshad sharedcomparablevisions. But Reaganwasthe first in a generationto invoke unabashedlythesethingswithout fueling firestormsof protestsandderision.This "dream"resonatedpositively throughmuch of the populationin part becauseit capturedthe essence of the new patriotismand in part because,with the decline of communism and the retreatof the Soviet Union, it seemedboth more plausibleand less dangerous.

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Furthermore,in contrastto the disguisedand fuzzy designsof Nixon and Carter,which seemedretreatistand,in Nixon's case,amoralas well, Reagan's vision combined an unshakablefaith in the future with moral fervor. In Reagan'sAmerica it becamepolitically impermissibleeven to hint at national declineor to doubt the universalvalidity of the Americandream.Not surprisingly,the presidentandotheradministrationofficials repeatedlyscored pointsby portrayingthe DemocraticParty as "doomsayers"andthe "BlameAmerica-Firstcrowd." The Democrats,includingDukakis,respondedby protesting the genuinenessof their optimism and patriotism. GeorgeBush's pledgeof allegianceploy in the 1988campaignshouldbe viewedasa heavyhanded(andeffective)effort to exploit this componentof the Reaganlegacy. Reagan'sresuscitationof a Wilsonian internationalistgrand design-a world of free, democratic,and thus peacefulstates-achieved both normative and cognitive legitimacy. But he proved less successfulin legitimating his strategy,especiallyin regardto the critical issueof the useof U.S. military power abroad-theprimary cause,after all, of the breakdownof the Cold War consensus. As we have seen,the Reaganadministration,on taking office, believed that a reconstituteddomesticbase-arevived economy,a vast rearmament program,and a renewedvision of andconfidencein America and its role in the world-took priority overanythingelse.This strengthened domesticbase could then be used to stop and gradually reversethe decline in America's international standing,to restorea willingness to employ national power, andto halt the expansionof Sovietinfluenceasa prelude,perhaps,to putting Moscowon the defensive.In retrospect,asRobertW. Tuckercorrectlynoted, PresidentReaganpossessed an evengranderstrategicgoal: the alterationof the essentialconditionsthat had definedAmerican security for most of the postwarera: nucleardeterrenceand the Soviet threat.146 Reagan,to the utter disbelief of many observers,harboreddeeply antinuclearsentiments.Thoughmany of his adviserswishedto transcenddeterrenceby achievingstrategicsuperiorityand war-fightingcapabilities,Reagan embracedSDI primarily becausehe viewednuclearweaponsas intrinsically evil and threateningand only secondarilyas an insurancepolicy againstthe possibility that an agreementeliminating all nuclearweaponsmight eventually be violated.147 Moreover,while theseadvisersoffered armscontrol proposalsandverificationdemandsthatthey knew theSovietUnion would reject, Reagantook these initiatives seriously.When Gorbachevsurprisingly acceptedmany of them, Reagan,to the horror of Weinberger,Richard Perle, andothers,movedto concludeagreementsthat eliminatedintermediate-range nuclearforcesand anticipateddeepstrategicreductions.A clear majority of the public supportedSDI as a population shield and START as a way to

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reducenucleararms.148 Though most expertscontinuedto dismiss SDI as eithertechnologicallyinfeasible-atleastits "leakproof'version-orstrategically destabilizing or both, Reaganneverthelessplayed a major role in forging a nascentantinuclearnationalconsensus.But if Reaganhelpederode the public's faith in nucleardeterrence,it remainedto be seenwhat, if anything, would replaceit. On the otherhand,Reagan'santipathytoward containmenthad beenmore widely recognized-and feared.Theselong-standingmoral andstrategicdoubts, which he sharedwith many American conservatives,datedat least from the 1950s.For Reagan,the United States'sfailure in Vietnam demonstratedthe moral and strategicbankruptcyof containment,not becauseit had produced indiscriminateintervention,as liberal critics had claimed,but becauseit was insufficiently ambitious.Hencethe Johnsonadministration,in its half-hearted attemptto implementcontainmentin Vietnam, refusedto win the war by destroyingthe externalsource,of Vietcong support.That decisionhad produced a military stalemate,which in turn unleashedthe antiwar movementat home. It and Congressthen proceededto preventU.S. forces from winning in Vietnam.Moreover,the war'slegacyleft a deepnationalskepticismabouttheoverall utility andlegitimacy of Americanmilitary power. The Soviet Union, according to this view, had taken advantageof this post-Vietnamparalysisto expandits global influencevastly.The UnitedStates, Reaganand many of his advisersbelieved,might exploit the resultingimperial overstretchif it could move beyondcontainmentto chip away at these new outpostsand perhapstrigger a chain reaction throughout the Soviet empire.By 1985 this vagueaspirationhad beencodified in the ReaganDoctrine, which proclaimedfor the United Statesthe right to interveneagainst Marxist-Leninistgovernmentson the groundsthat they had come to power through illegitimate means. Yet in the absenceof a new public consensusaboutthe properuseof U.S. military power, which in tum requireda drastically revisedmemory of the VietnamWar, the grandobjectivesof the ReaganDoctrine could not be fulfilled. Nevertheless,as we have seen,the administrationin its otherwiseassertivedeclaratoryhistory of recentAmerican foreign policy, tried to avoid even mentioningVietnam. It certainly did not undertakea systematicrevision of the prevailingunderstandingof the war. The very natureof the Reagan Doctrine-thesupportof "freedomfighters" as an alternativeto direct intervention-implicitly acknowledgedthe administration'srefusal to challenge the "Vietnamsyndrome,"despiteoccasionalrhetoricaboutthe "noblecause." It might disparagethe "SolarzDoctrine" as the willingnessto aid anti-Soviet guerrillas as long as they stayed"eight time zonesaway," but the eagerness of anti-contra Democratsto supportAfghan andAngolan rebelswent to the

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heart of the matter. There was, after all, absolutelyno possibility that U.S. troops would be sentto rescuethe mujahadeenor UNITA (National Union for the Total Independenceof Angola), but both Congressand the nation fretted that Reaganwould indeeddirectly interveneto savethe FDN or facilitate their overthrowof the Sandinistas.And, as we have seen,the administration itself remainedambivalentabout whetherthe contras would suck Americainto anotherVietnam-typequagmire.The Grenada"rescuemission" and the April 1986 bombing of Libya demonstratedthat the public would supportlow-risk, ends-specific,limited-costmilitary operations,but it would doubtlesshave also supporteda successful"Desert One" outcomein the Carteryears.After eight yearsof Reaganrhetoric about a fully democratic world, the nation remaineddeeply divided about the externalconditionsof Americansecurity.A January1989ATS poll indicatedthat a 49 to 45 percent plurality agreedthat the failure in Vietnam showedthat the United States shouldonly fight a war to repel an invasionof the nationitself. 149 If, however, the Cold War had all but endedand the world was on the vergeof universal democracy,then the continuingdissensusabout U.S. military power would presumablybe irrelevant,for therewould no longerbe any needto intervene anywhere. Reagan'sdetenteindeedattaineda domesticlegitimacy that far exceeded Nixon's. Unlike the early 1970s, when the so-calledglobal correlation of forces appearedto tilt away from the West toward Moscow (and the Third World as well), DetenteII crystallizedat a time of perceivedU.S. resurgence and growing Soviet weakness.On that basis alone, it becamemuch more difficult for Americanskepticsto dismissReagan'sdetenteas disguisedappeasement.Those who tried did so largely from within the administration, but by late 1987 most of them had resigned.Second,whereasa politically insecureNixon had promisedmuch and delivered relatively little, Detente II's evident accomplishmentscame as a pleasantsurprise in part because Reaganhad not raisedpublic expectations.When, with relatively little forewarning, the Sovietswithdrew from Afghanistan,showednew interestin an Angolan compromise,signedan asymmetricalINF treaty with an intrusive inspection regime, and announcedglasnostand perestroika at home, the Americanpublic grew increasinglyoptimistic aboutthe prospectsfor superpoweramity. Moreover,much of the public rememberedthe disillusionment producedby the disappointmentsof DetenteI and was more inclined to proceedcautiouslythis time.ISO Finally, and perhapsmost important, in contrastto the Nixon-Kissinger strategy, which had insisted that Soviet domestic institutions be insulated from the issue of superpowerrelations,from the start Reaganhad emphasizedthe moral shortcomingsof the Soviet system.And while he neverex-

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plicitly madeinternal reform a preconditionfor improved relations,the administrationdid puthumanrights on the agendaof everyReagan-Gorbachev summit and publicly applaudedSoviet progress.Given this record,the public seemedunderstandablypuzzledwhen Reaganduring the 1988 Moscow summit blamedremaining Soviet domestic repressionnot on communism but on "bureaucracy."The SovietUnion had apparentlybecomejust another overcentralizedstate. But if Nixon's detentelacked domesticlegitimacy becauseit tried to ignore Moscow'smoral turpitude, DetenteII risked becominghostageto ever expandingSoviet political reforms. During 1988 thesereforms, as well as greatly moderatedexternal behavior, were largely responsiblefor lowering by fifteen points (45 percent)the percentageof Americanswho believedthe Soviet Union constituteda seriousthreatto the United States.Nevertheless, 66 percentstill believedthat communismthreatenedAmericanmoral and religious values.151 If Gorbachev's political reformshadbeenhaltedor reversed, DetenteII would have been difficult to sustainin the United Stateseven if Soviet foreign policy had failed to grow more provocative. In this sense, Reagan'sdomesticallyappealingdreamof a democraticworld inevitably endangeredany detentethat did not demandcontinuedSoviet democratization. At the sametime, the rather drastic diminution of the perceivedSoviet threatthrust to the surfacea variety of lessconventionalsecurityissuesthat houndedthe Reaganadministrationduring its final months in office. Thus, in the 1988 ATS surveysthe public consistentlyindicatedthat international drug trafficking, terrorism,nuclearproliferation, and economiccompetition from JapanandWestGermanywould posegreaterthreatsto the United States in the 1990sthan Soviet expansionism.152 Moreover, fewer than 50 percent believedthat the administrationhad handledtheseissueswell, while a mere 26 percentapprovedof its policy toward GeneralManuel Noriega.153 Yet in view of the experienceof the past forty-five years, it seemedlikely that if DetenteII had begun to unravel, public concernsabout the Soviet Union would havepushedthesenewerissuesto the background. In sum, while Ronald Reagandid achievemore domesticlegitimacy for his foreign policy strategythan any other post-Vietnampresident,his accomplishmentsshouldnot be exaggerated. He helpedshakethe public'sfaith in nucleardeterrencewithout necessarilyproviding a workable alternative. He arguedthat U.S. supportfor anti-Soviet"freedom fighters" constituted self-defense,but most of the public remainedunmovedby the primary focus of the ReaganDoctrine. And althoughhis Soviet policies were overwhelmingly popularwith theAmericanpublic, Reagan'sdetente-builton the public expectationof continuingSoviet democratization-could haveprovento be evanescent.

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Yet therecanbe little doubtthat Reagan'srhetoric-centralto his foreign policy tactics-captivated theAmericanpublic like no presidentsinceFranklin D. Rooseveltor perhapsJohnF. Kennedy.Whetheremployedto sendhostile or friendly signals to Moscow or to mobilize domestic support, Reagan's words were paramount.And when his simple moral messagesbecameuncharacteristicallygarbled,as during the Iran-contra affair, Reagan'spublic standingplummeted.Usually, however,Reagan(andhis speechwriters) used words to spectaculareffect to makehis policies appearnot only prudentbut ethically superior.And that, ironically, wasachievedby a presidentwho presidedover an administrationmarkedby more scandalthan any sinceWarren G. Harding. Did Reaganreconstructthe cultural componentsof a domestic foreign policy consensus? At the conclusionof his first InauguralAddressthe new presidenttold a story aboutMartin Treptow,a doughboykilled in France.On his body wasfound a diary containingan entry entitled"My Pledge."It read: "America must win this war. ThereforeI will work, I will save,I will sacrifice, I will endure,I will fight cheerfully anddo my utmost,as if the issueof the whole struggledependedon me alone." But this tale did not foreshadow a "bearany burden,pay any price" message,for Reaganquickly assuredthe nation that the presentcrisis did not demandthe sort of sacrifice madeby Martin Treptow. Instead,it would requireonly "our besteffort and our willingnessto believe in ourselvesand to believe in our capacity to perform great deeds...."154 Threeyearslater, GeorgeShultz, in a surprisinglyfrank statement,admittedthat "We cannotpay any price or bearany burden.We must discriminate.We, must be prudentand careful. ..." Yet while praising Kennedy'sinspiring vision, Shultz ridiculed Jimmy Carter'semphasison global complexity as "a counselof helplessness,"unworthy of an American president.155 Notwithstandingthe secretary'sreproof,Carter,aswe haveseen,did search for ways to reinstall an ethic of sacrifice in the American public and deliveredsoberingsermonsaboutlimits andconstraints.The samecannotbe said for PresidentReagan.Justas his invocationof the traditional domesticsymbols of family and God disguiseda messageof national self-indulgence(except,of course,for the poor),so too did his rhetoricabouta world democratic revolution ask very little of the American people.That was the meaningof his Martin Treptow homily, and it set the tone for the ensuingeight years: pride and confidencewithout sacrifice. According to Reagan,false limits had beenimposedon Americansby an obtrusivefederal government,which constrainedindividual freedom,and naysayingexperts,who had lost faith in the Americandream. The nation had, of course,for most of the post-1945era demonstrateda

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disturbingreluctanceto pay for what it wanted.Harry Truman,for example, faced a public that simultaneouslydemandedmilitary demobilizationand a vigorousassaulton internationalcommunism.NSC-68hadsquaredthis circle by reassuringhim that economicgrowth, ratherthanincreasedtaxation,could finance much higherdefensespending.But what had previouslybeendone sporadically,Ronald Reaganinstitutionalizedby tolerating enormousbudget deficits that eventuallybecamea structuralfeatureof the U.S. economy. Moreover,by banishingwords like decline, limits, and even solvencyfrom contemporarypolitical discourse,Reaganrepeatedlyrefusedto confrontthe public with an honestappraisalof America'strue global position.1s6Reagan satedthe public's understandable desireto "feel good" and thus facilitated a cultural consensusthat involved a large doseof illusion. But not even the irrepressiblyoptimistic Ronald Reagancould claim to have reconstructeda procedural foreign policy consensus.Most observers agreedthat he left executive-legislativerelationsin at leastas much disarray as he had found themin 1981. In one of his valedictoryaddresses he blamed Congressfor "on-again,off-again indecisivenesson resistingSandinistatyranny and aggression"that "left CentralAmerica a region of continuingdanger." Moreover,Reagansuggestedthat somecongressionalactionsin foreign affairs-forexample,the War PowersResolutionand attemptsto restrictthe president'spower to implementtreaties(that is, ABM)-had institutionalized an "adversarialrelationship."Theseand otherlegislativeintrusionshad weakenedthe "strengthand resiliency of the presidency."ls7His words echoed those of Oliver North, who eighteenmonthsbefore had indicted Congressfor its "fickle, vacillating, unpredictable,on-again,off-again policy toward the Nicaraguandemocraticresistance."IS8At leastsomemembersof Congressagreedwith Reagan'sdiagnosis.Two prominentsenators,David L. Boren (D-OK) and John C. Danforth (R-MO), after surveying two decadesof congressionalactivismin foreign affairs, deemedmuch of it "incessant and irrelevant meddling."ls9Thus, membersof Congress"take almost limitless opportunitiesto specify everythingfrom the maximum allowable height abovesealevel of embassiesto the precisemannerof deploymentof U.S. forces in the PersianGulf."I60 Or to cite anotherexample,a task force appointedby the House Foreign Affairs Committeeto review Congress's role in foreign aid programsand cochairedby Lee Hamilton (D-IN) and BenjaminGilman (R-NY) concludedthat "foreign assistanceis vital to promoting U.S. foreign policy and domesticinterests,but the programis hamstrungby too many conflicting objectives,legislativeconditions,earmarks, andbureaucraticred tape."161Onescholar,afterinterviewingsubstantialnumbersof congressionalmembersand staffers,found that most 6f the Republicansand perhapshalf of the Democratsbelievedthat Congressintervened

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too directly in the conductof foreign policy, was too involved in policy formulation, and that its deliberativefunction had consequentlysuffered.162 But someof Reagan'smost exuberantadmirersblamedthe presidentfor allowing Congressto gain this allegedlydisproportionateinfluenceoverforeign policy. Accordingto this reasoning,Reaganhaderredin failing to force an up-or-downvote by Congressthat would haveestablishedclearresponsibility if the contrasweredefeated.Moreover,insteadof permittingAttorney GeneralEdwin Meeseto treat Iran-contra as a possiblecrime, the president should havetold the American peopleimmediatelythat while the diversion of profits had not beenauthorized,it was consistentwith his policy of using the White House to support the FDN. But rather than claim executivesupremacy,he invoked the "ignorance"defenseand thus nearly paralyzedthe presidencyfor his remainingtwo yearsin office.163 As GeorgeBushprepared to enter the White House, op-ed pagesand policy journals brimmed with urgentadviceaboutthe needto restore"bipartisanship."I64 No doubt pervasivecongressionalintrusionsinto the technical minutiae of foreign policy had frequently degeneratedinto absurdity,and someof the proposalsfor proceduralreform would havehelpedeliminatethesesorts of roadblocksand detours.Yet the causesof presidential-congressional frustrations went deeper.Many of thesedisputes,as we have previously noted in our discussionof the Nixon and Carter years,reflectedgenuinepolicy disagreementsaboutthe requirementsof U.S. securityandAmerica'srole in the world, andthey continuedto characterizeexecutive-legislativeconflicts during the Reaganadministration.Nor can this turmoil be attributedprimarily to "mere" partisanship,thoughwith the HouseunderDemocraticcontrol for Reagan'sentire tenure and the Senateas well after 1986, this factor surely played a role. But the DemocraticParty itself continuedto suffer from the ideologicaltensionsthat hadmarkedits foreign policy outlook sincethe mid1960s.During the Reaganadministrationit containedat leastthreeidentifiable foreign policy factions that, althoughall subscribingto a vaguevision of internationalism,differed sharply on severalimportant issuesinvolving, for example,aid to the contras, funding for SDI, free trade,and SouthAfrican sanctions.Indeed,Dukakis'svirtual silenceon foreign policy during the 1988 campaignstemmedfrom his needto keepthe SamNunn-ChuckRobb wing and the JesseJacksonwing from open warfare.And while many observersbelieved that Bush was politically vulnerableon the contra issue, Dukakis could not raise it becausehe and his chosenrunning mate, Lloyd Bentsen(D-TX), took opposingsideson the funding question. But if somecongressionalDemocratsrelied on proceduraldevicesto obstruct administrationpolicies, RonaldReagan'sreluctanceto reassertboldly claims of presidentialsupremacyin foreign affairs demonstratedthe con-

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tinuing relevanceof the Vietnam legacy.To be sure, he grumbledaboutthe Boland amendments,challengedthe constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution,arguedagainststrongerSouthAfrican sanctions,anddenounced Senateefforts to compela strict interpretationof the ABM Treaty.Yet in the end he compromisedor surrenderedon all theseissues.And he did so because,his rhetoric notwithstanding,he appreciatedthe limits imposedon presidentialprerogativesby the public'scollective memoryof Vietnam.

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5 The Bush Administration

The Procedural President In 1988RonaldReaganremainedthe mostpopularpolitical figure in America and, if not constitutionallybarredfrom seekinga third term, could undoubtedly have won reelection.After stumblingbadly becauseof the Iran-contra scandalthat beganto unfold in late 1986, PresidentReagan'sstandingrose again as he rapidly concludedagreementafter agreementwith Mikhail Gorbachev.In October1988 Reagandeclaredthat the Cold War was essentially over. The irony was that neitherVice PresidentGeorgeBush, who otherwise tried to wrap himselfin the Reaganmantle,nor Michael Dukakis,his Democratic opponentin 1988, would acknowledgeReagan'sclaim. Indeed,this was the lastcampaignof the Cold Warl-backward-Iooking,cautious,issueless,and filled with the symbolsof patriotism,crime, and race.Neithercandidateexploredthe potentialopportunitiesawaiting post-ColdWar America. Dukakis, fearful of being branded"just anothertax-and-spendliberal" and virtually devoid of any foreign policy experience,tried to campaignas a technocraticproblem-solver.GeorgeBush,seventeenpointsbehindDukakis after the July Democratic convention, was strongly advised by aides Lee Atwater and RogerAiles to go on the attack.BrandingDukakis a "risk" and "out of the mainstream,"Bushcastigatedhim for vetoing as unconstitutional a Massachusetts law requiringpublic schoolteachersto leadtheir studentsin the Pledgeof Allegiance and for maintaining membershipin the American Civil Liberties Union. In time, Bush'ssupportersunveileda devastatingand sinistertelevisionad informing viewersthat GovernorDukakishadfurloughed (black) convict Willie Horton just prior to a deadly crime spree.Dukakis, evidently surprisedby the viciousnessofthe attacks,seemedparalyzed.His 193

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mostvisible effort to respond-inthis caseto Bush'sclaim that Dukakiswas a CarterDemocratweakon defense-backfired as the usuallydignified governor rode arounda Michigan field in a battle tank looking thoroughly ridiculous.Finally, in the last two weeksof the campaign,the now desperate Dukakis abandonedhis technocratic"ice man" image and accusedReagan and Bush of impoverishingaverageworking Americanswith their "supply side,trickle-down" economicpolicies.This class-warfarethemehelpednarrow Bush'slead,but in the endDukakis could captureonly ten statesand46 percentof the popularvote. Yet few, including the victor, believed that Bush had won an electoral mandate.A Doonesburycartoonfrom early 1989 exaggeratedonly slightly in having the newly inauguratedpresidentexclaim, "So far today I've said the Pledgeand I haven't furloughed any murderers.I've delivered on my entire mandateand it isn't evenlunch yet." In fact, GeorgeBush enteredthe White Housewith "limited political capital,few political advantages,a weak strategicposition" andthe need"to competefor authoritywith congressional Democrats."2 But the real problemwas not the size of Bush'svictory but the difficulty in discerninghis domesticpriorities. Someobserversexpecteda third Reagan administration.After all, Vice PresidentBush had servedloyally for eight years,supervisedReagan'sderegulationefforts, and sometimesreachedout to the Christian evangelicalwing of the RepublicanParty. He was seenby many as Reagan'srightful heir, and his Clint Eastwooddare to Congressat the 1988 Republicanconvention-"Readmy lips, no new taxes"-smacked of pure Reaganism.Furthermore,unlike Eisenhower,who had kept great distancefrom his vice presidentin 1960, Reaganwarmly endorsedBush, even at one point raising questionsabout the mental stability of Michael Dukakis. Yet someconservativesopenlyquestionedthe ideologicalfitnessof George Bush. During the 1988 campaignBush soughtto allay thesefears by selfconsciouslyembracingthe symbols of conservativepopulism, proclaimed his love of pork rinds, andemphasizedhis Texasroots. But in many ways he was by background,training, and temperamenta productof the old foreign policy establishment-the Wise Men who had forty yearsearlier enshrined the internationalistconsensus.Born in Massachusettsthe son of Prescott Bush, a Wall Streettycoon and moderatesenatorfrom Connecticut,George was sentto Phillips AndoverAcademyandYale University, wherehe starred in baseballand achievedmembershipin the ultra-secretSkull and Bones Society.Like manyof his establishmentbrothers,hecompileda distinguished record in World War II and emergeda genuinehero. But in 1947, after receiving a $300,000stakefrom his father, GeorgeBush movedto westTexas

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to sell oil-drilling equipment.Yet he continuedto summerat the family retreatin Kennebunkport,Maine, andevinceda numberof liberal-to-moderate social positionsincluding membershipin PlannedParenthood.By the early 1960s he was chair of the moribund Harris County (Houston) Republican Party and trying hard to openits doorsto newcomers.He had also becomea memberof the Council on ForeignRelations.In 1964he ran for public office -somethingvery few of the Wise Men would have considered.His campaign for the Senateagainstliberal DemocratRalphYarboroughprovedexceedinglyopportunistic,and after his defeathe confidedto his pastor,"You know, John, I took some of the far right positions to get elected.I hope I neverdo it again.I regretit."3 Two yearslater, running as a moderatefrom a prosperousHoustondistrict, Bush waselectedto the House,wherehe served two terms and earnedthe nickname"Rubbers" from Wilbur Mills (D-AR) for his enthusiasticpromotion of world population programs.In 1970 he tried for the Senateagain, this time running to the left of DemocratLloyd Bentsenand hoping to pick up the votes of Yarborough loyalists. But this strategyfizzled whenPresidentNixon andVice PresidentAgnew, campaigning for Bush on hard "law and order" themes,drove many Democratsback to Bentsen. It will be recalledfrom chapter1 that the Wise Men of an older generation had usually shunnedthe messinessof electoral politics for appointive postsin the executivebranch.GeorgeBush, in so many ways the presumptive heir of thesearchitectsof containment,spentthe 1970sloyally serving Nixon and Ford as ambassador to the United Nations,U.S. representativein Beijing, and director of Central Intelligence.4 Again, like the proudly nonpartisanWise Men, Bushwould havebeenpleasedto remainasCIA chief in the Carteradministrationand eventraveledto Plainsto lobby the presidentelect for the position. But GeorgeBush was also an ambitious politician. Declaring his candidacy for the 1980 Republicannominationfor president,he tried, at first, to run as a Ford-like moderate.In anothereraBush would havebeena comfortable part of the eastern,internationalistwing of the party. His famousdenunciation of Reagan'stax cut plan as "voodooeconomics"reflectedhis aversion to federal budgetdeficits. But when conservativesduring the early 1980 primariescriticized him as a liberal elitist, he quickly resignedfrom the Council on Foreign Relationsand the Trilateral Commission.In a further attempt to placatethe Republicanright, Bush appearedto abandonhis long-standing positionson populationand women'srights issues.sIt was then, perhaps,not surprisingthat Bush eagerlyacceptedReagan'sinvitation to be his running mate or that Bush would dutifully and almost invisibly serveas vice president for eight years.

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In sum,GeorgeBush'swidely noted"thick resume"gavefew cluesabout his presidency'spriorities, for the unifying themeof his long public career had been loyalty, not convictions.6 In a generalway he evidently favored lower taxesand smallergovernment,but he had beenrepeatedlypressured by distrustful conservativesto demonstratehis ideologicalcommitment. Reluctantto make his "no new taxes" pledge,his conventioncall for a "kinder, gentlerAmerica" formed the coreof his "emergingsuburban"electoral strategyto appealto fiscally conservative, sociallymoderatevoters.7 Yet Bush had simultaneouslyexploited many of Reaganism'scultural symbols. What ensued,in the words of one White Houseadviser,was "a battle for GeorgeBush's mind right from the beginning of his administration."gOn one side were ideological activists who clusteredaroundan "empowerment agenda"and who were animatedby the "new paradigm," an approachto domesticpolicy articulatedby White HousestafferJamesPinkertonin a February 1990 speechto the World FederalistSociety.TherePinkertonclaimed that the old New Deal-GreatSociety"paradigm"wasshifting to a new model of socioeconomicpolicy featuring five elements: 1. Governmentswere increasinglysubjectto marketforces. 2. Individual citizensdesiredmore choices. 3. Public policiesshouldseekto empowerpeopleto makechoicesthemselves. 4. Decentralizedpublic policies are more effective. 5. Public policies shouldemphasizewhat works.9

Pinkerton and his allies in the Bush administrationwanted to center the president'sdomestic agendaon the empowermentparadigmby providing programmaticcontentfor a "kinder, gentlerAmerica." For one of its leading promoters,CharlesKolb, a presidentialdeputyassistant,"in contrastto Ronald Reagan'selimination of programs,the New Paradigmwould redefinegovernmentin terms of working for and with peopleto restoreindependence and self-sufficiency."10 Accordingly, a dozenor so activistsin the cabinet,White House,andCongressrepeatedlyurged the administrationto emphasizesuchempowerment items as educationalchoice,homeownershipand expandedtenantmanagement in public housing,job training, lower capital gainstax rates,enterprise zones, welfare reform, family-support measures,and Small BusinessAdministrationloansto promoteentrepreneurialcapitalism.11 Economicgrowth, individual opportunity,andinstitutionalreformbecametheir mantra,but they alsopressedPresidentBushto confrontandprovokethe Democraticallycon-

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trolled Congressby implementingthe line-item veto without prior Court approval; by indexing the capital gains tax to inflation through executive rulemaking; by making recessappointments;and by demandingthat Congressreform itself.12 While Bush was loath to challengeCongressin theseways, he did occasionally include much of the New Paradigmagendain his speeches.For example,in his first addressto Congresson February9, 1989, and in an accompanying193-pagedocumententitled "Building a Better America," PresidentBush appearedto embracemuch of the empowermentagenda, thoughhe deletedthe phrase"I am a reformer," that Pinkertonhad inserted becauseit "strainedcredulity."13 From early 1989 throughthe 1992election campaignBush would sometimes,thoughirregularly, pay lip serviceto empowermentinitiatives. But the New Paradigmerswereconstantlydisappointed by what they sawas the president's"failure to follow throughon his rhetoric, to prioritize his goals, and to marshalhis resourcesfor a big drive on Congress."14Evenon the morrow of the Gulf War, when his approvalratingshad soaredto an incredible 90 percent,Bush askednothing more of Congress thanits passageof transportationandcrime bills. Ultimately activistssuchas Kolb, Pinkerton,HousingandDevelopmentSecretaryJackKemp, Drug Czar William Bennett, and CongressmanVin Weber (R-MN) were appalledby Bush'sfailure to appreciate"how ideascould bedeployedaspartof an agenda to bolster, sustain,and advance"15a coherentRepublicanapproachto domesticpolicy. To them, "when it cameto ideologicalquestions,Bush understoodthe words but not the music."16 Arrayed on the otherside in the battle for Bush'smind were suchprocess pragmatistsas Chief of Staff JohnSununu,Office of Managementand Budget (OMB) DirectorRichardDarman,and DomesticPolicy Council Director RogerPorter,variously disparagedby the New Paradigmersas foxes (as opposedto big-thinking hedgehogs),beancounters,technocrats,empiricists, and "gnomishgnostics."Indeed,they seemedto hold few convictionsabout domesticpolicy apartfrom a deepconcernaboutthe corrosiveeffectsof the large and growing federal budgetdeficit. The New Paradigmersconfidently predictedthat "just as we had forced the collapseof communism,we would have grown our way out of the budgetdeficit,"17 but most economistshad concludedthat it had to be significantly cut.DarmanandTreasurySecretary Nicholas Brady agreedwith the economists,and both worked hard to convince Bush to renouncehis "read my lips" pledge. For the first eighteenthmonthsof the administration,however,the deficit issueappearedto serveBush'spurposes,for it allowed him to proposeprogramsfor education,the environment,crime, poverty, and drug control and to challengeCongressto fund them.IS The 1987 Deficit Reduction Act

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("Gramm-Rudman-Hollings")had set mandatoryspendingtargets that, if exceeded,would trigger indiscriminate,across-the-board cuts.To avoid these draconianstepsthe Bush administrationduring 1989 negotiatedwith congressionalDemocratsa budgetagreementpurporting to meet the GrammRudman 1990 deficit target of $100 billion. But the plan relied on highly optimistic economicassumptions,one-timesavings,and variousaccounting gimmicks. It simply postponedthe hard choices. As the economyslowed in late 1989 and early 1990,OMB, warning of a resultingdeclinein revenues,repeatedlyraisedits estimatefor the fiscal 1991 budgetshortfall. The next Gramm-Rudmanmandatorytarget was $64 billion, yet by July 1990 the deficit estimatehad soaredto $231 billion. Bush, awarethat Reaganhad beenable to blamecongressionalDemocratsfor tax increasesduring his administration,tried the sametactic by calling for bipartisan budget negotiations.But this time SenateMajority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) and HouseSpeakerThomasFoley (D-WA) demandedthat Bush first renouncehis famouspledge.The president,understrongpressure from Darmanand Brady, reluctantly did so and promptly triggereda revolt amongHouseRepublicansled by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA).To them and to the New Paradigmersin his administration,Bush'saction constitutedan act of betrayal,his "single biggestmistakeas president,[and] led directly to the unravelingof the Reagancoalition."19They had lost the battle for Bush'smind, and they dismissedhis subsequentspurningof this budget deal in March 1992 as a cynical act of desperation. To understandwhy Bush would risk the destructionof the Reagancoalition we needto considerhis somewhatpeculiarapproachto governance,for it, in largemeasure,constitutedhis real domesticpriority. Or, to put it slightly differently, the flow of current eventslargely determinedBush'sdomestic andforeign policy priorities.As he saw it, his challengewas to reactto these eventsby the consistentapplication of appropriateprocedures.Favorable policy outcomeswould flow from this approach. RonaldReaganhad broughtto the White Housea clearset of substantive convictionsand priorities enshrinedyearsearlier in "The Speech."Aides to Bushhad no comparablestatementto guidethem,but they were issueda list of "golden rules" that the president expected them to follow: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Think big. Challengethe system. Adhereto the highestethical standards. Be on the recordas much as possible. Be frank. Fight hard for your position.

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7. When I makea call, we work as a team. 8. Work with Congress. 9. Representthe United Stateswith dignity.20 In fact, this curious list neatly capturedBush's fear of disorder and unpredictability,his "Tory" senseof the fragility of institutions,and the im21 For Bush, portancehe attachedto good mannersin building consensus. political visionariesthreatenedthe social orderby unleashinguncontrollable passions-hence his disparagementof the "vision thing." By establishing personalrelationshipsresting on reciprocity and loyalty, and by working quietly with fellow insiders-whethermembersof Congressor foreign leaders-GeorgeBush hopedto createeffective policy coalitions.Periodically, of course,it might be necessaryto abandonthis "governing mode" for the rhetorical nastinessof the "campaignmode," but Bush perceivedhimself as an unwilling campaignerand was confidentthat the electorate,like himself, could distinguishbetweentheseactivities.22 Usually cautiousin the governing modeand skepticalof new ideas,he was inclined to acceptthe conventional wisdom of expertsunlessobviouscontrary facts arose.And if events did force change,Bush would typically reactincrementallyand reluctantly. This "processToryism," then, not only helpsto explain why he agreedto new taxesin 1990-theexpertstold him the deficit was out of control-but also why he sentDarmanandSununuto negotiatein secretwith Democratic leaders-agreement amonginsiderswasessential.It alsoshedslight on Bush's extremeslownessin offering initiatives to counterthe stubborneconomic recession.After all, most professionaleconomistsexpecteda "soft landing" for the economy,a mild slowdownin growth, and then arapid recovery.Very few expertsanticipatedthe prolonged,"doubledip" recessionthat mired the economyuntil late in Bush'sterm. In sum, the essenceof governingfor GeorgeBush involved the reliance on insider networks to constructcoalitions designedto resolve problems. Enhancingtheprocesswas his overridingpurpose,for if it workedsmoothly, the social fabric would be preservedand strengthened.Ironically, in view of Dukakis'sclaim that the 1988 election would be about"competence,"Bush sharedthe Massachusetts governor'scommitmentto managerialexcellence. And like his opponent,Bush, too, would be vulnerableto the chargethat he lackedcompassionand convictions. Perhapsbecauseof this emphasison process,PresidentBush found it difficult to relate his domesticpriorities and approachto governanceto his foreign policy objectives.The White House New Paradigmersrepeatedly urgedhim to link their "empowerment"agendato the dramaticchangesoccurring in EasternEuropeandthe SovietUnion by assertingthat his domestic

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mission of enhancingindividual freedomrestedon the sameprinciplesthat hadinspiredthe revolutionsof 1989.23Bush mostly ignoredthis adviceuntil quite late in his term, largely becausehe fearedthe destabilizingpotentialof theserevolutions.His reluctanceto demonstratethat his domesticand foreign policy objectives were mutually reinforcing had unfortunateconsequences,for by late 1991 the public beganto feel that Bush'sinternational activities were actually hurting his ability to handlethe economy. From Containmentto the New World Order

It becamequickly evidentthat GeorgeBush would be both a post-Vietnam and a post-ColdWar president.From July to December1989 Poland,Hungary,EastGermany,Czechoslovakia,Bulgaria,andRomaniaoverthrewcommunist dictators and replacedthem with leadersapparentlycommitted to democraticpolitics and market economies.In 1990 the processof German reunification began,and by the end of the following year the Soviet Union itself had ceasedto exist. Presidentsfrom Eisenhowerto Reaganhadformulated their strategicobjectivesagainstthe backdropof a divided Europeand a hostile Soviet Union. Even post-Vietnampresidents,as Jimmy Carterdiscovered,could hardly afford to ignorethe easternbloc. GeorgeBush, whose outlook, skills, and political constituencywere productsof the Cold War, had inheriteda granddesignthat was four decadesold, groundedin the preceptsof the Truman Doctrine and expressedin the strategyof containment. The Bush administrationwould havebeencomfortablein continuingthis tradition. Its "processTory" preferenceswerewell suitedto managethe Cold War, where cautious,prudentreactionsto Soviet provocationshad always beenat a premium.The president,proudof his credentialsanddeterminedto makeforeign policy his principal activity, createdan inner circle of largely like-minded "professionalbuddies"-Secretaryof StateJamesBaker, National SecurityAdviser Brent Scowcroftand his deputy (later CIA director) RobertGates,andDefenseSecretaryRichardCheney.Noneof theminitially sharedRonaldReagan'senthusiasmfor Mikhail Gorbachevor Reagan'sbelief that the Cold Warhad ended.They enteredoffice fully preparedto contain the Soviet Union. Scowcroft,in particular,viewedsomeof Reagan'sarmscontrol proposals as recklessand myopic. Firm advocatesof deterrence,the Bush team rejected Reagan'snuclear abolitionism-mostevident at the 1986 Iceland summit-andworried that the momentumof START could, if not slowed, producea treaty that denuclearizedU.S. defenses.Furthermore,theseofficials wishedto shortenthe wild swingsthat had allegedlycharacterizedthe American public's approachto East-Westrelations since the early 1970s.

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They believedthat Reaganhad exacerbatedthis tendencyby first helping to initiate a secondCold War and then prematurelyannouncingits demise.The Bush administrationdesiredinsteada superpowerrelationship immune to exaggeratedfears and unfulfilled hopes. Yet this task was madeeven more difficult by the ongoing dramain the Soviet Union and EasternEurope.Not sinceHarry Truman had anyoneassumedthe presidencyat a time of comparableinternationalflux, and Bush's first challengewas simply to makesenseout of theseupheavals.But by late 1989 a host of questionsstill neededto be answered:What kind of Soviet Union would Gorbachev'spursuit of glasnost and perestroika produce? Should the United Stateswish him well? How attainablewere his goals? What would be the new statusof EasternEurope?Could and shouldNATO survive if the Soviet threatdisappearedor wasdrasticallydiminished?What would be the role of the United Statesin a post-ColdWar environment? Could a domesticforeign policy consensusbe fashionedin the absenceof a Soviet threat? Senioradministrationofficials, comfortablewith the verities of the Cold War, were hard pressedto discernGorbachev'smotives,predict the results of his reforms, or evaluatethe implications for Soviet-Americanrelations. Placedon the defensiveby Gorbachev'senormousinternationalpopularity ("Gorby fever"), the administrationseemedalmost annoyedwith the Soviet leaderas, for example,in May 1989, when a frustratedWhite House PressSecretaryMarlin Fitzwater dismissedhim as a "drugstorecowboy" presumablydispensingphony elixirs to a gullible public. But this outburst reflectedthe confusion felt by the Bush inner circle. When in April 1989 RichardCheney"guessed"that Gorbachevwould fail in his reform efforts and be replacedby a reactionary,Bush publicly disagreedwith his defense secretary. In part to slow down the momentumbegun by the Reagan-Gorbachev rapprochementand in part to buy time, President-electBush had ordereda top-level strategic policy review. By April 1989 this review had yielded a thirty-pagedocumentdesignedto "insure compatibility among... commitments, capabilities,and resources"and recommendedan approachto the SovietUnion called "statusquo plus," provisionallyconcludingthat the processof changein the Soviet Union was likely to continuefor severalyears, evenif Gorbachevwere replaced.24 It counseledthe presidentto broadenthe superpowerdialoguecarefully to include such regional issuesas Africa, as well as functional topics such as terrorism and chemical weapons.At least someadministrationofficials, however,weredisappointedin the results,and one observedthat "the vision ... is not articulatedvery strongly, there are plenty of caveatsand what-ifs in there."25

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The Bush team spentmost of 1989 attemptingto shapea strategyfor a world turning upsidedown. The imminent end of the Cold War era proved positively unsettlingto someold hands,who had grown almost fond of its predictability.In SeptemberDeputySecretaryof StateLawrenceEagleburger voiced thesesentimentsin a GeorgetownUniversity addresssuggestingthat "the processof reform in the Sovietbloc and the relaxationof Sovietcontrol over EasternEurope" were "bringing long-suppressed ethnic antagonisms and national rivalries to the surface,and putting the Germanquestionback on the internationalagenda."The waning of the Soviet-Americanduopoly had produceda' nascentmultipolar world that would not necessarilybe "a saferplacethan the Cold War era ... given the existenceand proliferation of weaponsof massdestruction."26 But building pressureon Bush from WesternEuropeangovernmentsand congressionalDemocratsto engageGorbachevseriouslyforced the administrationto movebeyond"statusquo plus." Borrowing a phrasefrom Michael Dukakis, Baker privately arguedthat "testing Gorbachev"soundedappropriately skeptical and hard-headedto American ears,27and the inner circle agreedthat regional conflicts from AfghanistanthroughAngola to Central Americawould providea good"test." Gorbachev,thoughapparentlyoffended by the condescendingtone of the phrase,moved to end Soviet supportfor severalThird World clients,including Cuba.Nevertheless,only a few weeks before the fall of the Berlin Wall, Brent Scowcrofttold seniorofficials that "it would be dumb if we decidedthe Cold War is over, or that the Soviets aren't a threat anymore,or that we don't need NATO and we can use our defensebudgetto straighten outour domesticeconomicorder."28 Certainly the administration'sresponseto the pro-democracymovement in China smackedof Cold War geopolitics. As student demonstrations mountedin sizeandintensityduring the springof 1989the Bushteamopenly worried aboutthe stability of the Chinesegovernment.Fearingthe removal of a strategiccounterweightto Moscow (the old "China card"), but at a time whenthe Sovietempirewas collapsing,PresidentBushpursueda policy that seemeda parody of triangular diplomacy. When Chinesetroops brutally crushedthe TiananmenSquaredemonstrators,Bush cited the importanceof the Sino-American"relationship"and merely "deplored" the massacre.His secretdispatch of Scowcroft and Eagleburgerto Beijing in December,so reminiscentof Kissinger's 1971 trip, provoked an angry congressionalresponse.But Bush remainedundeterred,vetoing a bill designedto grant permanentresidencyto Chinesestudentsstudying in the United Statesand extendingChina'sMost Favored Nation(MFN) trading statusinto 1991. SecretaryBaker,in particular,however,believedthat Gorbachevhadpassed his "tests" and that it was now time to improve the relationshipfurther. He

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urgedBushto meetGorbachevsoon.The president,who had beenavoiding sucha meetingfor almosta year,reluctantlyagreedbut insistedthat it not be called a "summit." In fact, their "nonsummit" in Malta in early December 1989provedpivotal in inauguratingthe final phaseof Soviet-Americanrelations, onethat Bakersoonreferredto asa "partnership."Accordingto Michael Beschlossand StrobeTalbott, Bush decidedat Malta that Gorbachevwould be a reliable partner.He seemedalmostlike a WesternEuropeanpolitician to the president,and Bush sympathizedwith Gorbachev'sdomestic political predicament. 29 From then until the abortivecoup in August 1991 the Bushadministration attemptedto realize five strategicobjectivesdesignedto easethe transition to a post-ColdWar world: (1) to encourageGorbachevon the path of political and economicreforms; (2) to "lock in" arms control agreementsfavorable to the United Statesin caseGorbachevfell to hardliners;(3) to maintain the territorial and administrativeintegrity of the Soviet Union; (4) to insist that a reunified Germanybe a memberof NATO and the EC; and (5) to achievea stableand democraticEasternEurope. SomeseniorBush officials, amongthemRobertGatesandVice President Dan Quayle, worried that an economicallyand politically reformedSoviet Union might still posea threatto the United States,especiallyif its military capabilitiesremainedintact. Consequentlythey werenot surethat they wanted Gorbachevto succeed,and evenBaker, perhapsthe administration'sbiggest fan of Gorbachev,opposeddirect economicassistanceto Moscow for fear that it would be wastedand might even be usedto prop up the Soviet military-industrialcomplex. Gorbachevdeniedany interestin "charity," but his increasinglydesperatedomesticsituation intensified his pleasfor loans and for admittanceto the G-7, IMF, and World Bank on the groundsthat membershipwould mollify his opponents. Bush,who hadexperiencedGorbachev's economicilliteracy firsthand at Malta, resistedthis pressure,though steps were takento grant the Sovietsobserverstatusin theseinstitutions.Furthermore, the administrationmadeMFN for the Sovietsdependenton their passageof liberal emigrationlaws and refusedto waive the old Jackson-Vanik restrictionsand approvecredit guaranteesfor $1 billion in agricultural purchasesuntil December1990.Even then the commoditycreditsweredelayed for months,MFN statuswas further postponed,and Gorbachevwas actively discouragedfrom attendingthe July 1991 G-7 summit in London. This balancingact of wishing Gorbachevwel1 while refusing to provide much materialhelp was pursued,in part,becauseof thesituationin the Baltics. The United Stateshad never official1y recognizedthe Soviet absorptionof thesethreerepublicsin 1940,and when Lithuaniadeclaredits independence in March 1990 followed by Latvia two monthslater, Bush cameundercon-

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siderabledomestic pressureto acknowledgetheir sovereignty.During the remainderof 1990 the Sovietstried to intimidate thesenew governments, and in January1991 their troops seizedparliamentarybuildings in Vilnius and fired on civilians there and in Riga. PresidentBush repeatedlywarned Gorbachevto find a peacefulsolution but declined to do more for fear of provoking the violent disintegrationof the Soviet Union. While Lithuanian leaderspublicly accusedthe United Statesof "appeasement,"Gorbachev implored Bush to understandhis exceedinglyfragile domesticpredicament. Facedwith a choicebetweenLithuanian self-determinationand Soviet stability, Bushoptedfor thelatteranddelayedrecognitionuntil September1991,30 althoughhe continuedto chastiseGorbachevfor his heavy-handedness. Yet the administration'srefusalto offer significanteconomicassistanceto Gorbachevwent deeperthan the Baltics dispute because,finally, it could neverabandonits suspicionthat aid would be, at best,squandered.This understandablefear explainsBush'santipathy toward the "Grand Bargain," a schemedevisedby Grigori Yavlinsky, a former deputyprime ministerof the RussianRepublic, and a small group of Harvardacademicsled by Graham Allison, deanof the KennedySchool of Government.It proposedthat the G-7 offer, in specific phases,severalkinds of economicassistance,beginning with food, medicine,and technicalhelp, and ultimately progressingto the financing of infrastructurereconstruction.The aid, to be disbursedbetween 1991 and 1993, would have totaled as much as $60 billion. Allison, working at Harvard through a former BushNSC staffer, Robert Blackwill, attemptedto enlist the supportof Undersecretaryof StateRobert Zoellick. But seniorBush officials found the plan risky and expensive,and the Soviet governmenthesitatedto commit to the prescribedreforms. The Bush team decidedto confine its supportfor Gorbachevto largely symbolic actions. On December25, 1991, the Soviet Union officially disbanded,although RussianPresidentBorisYeltsin hadfor sometime actedasthe region'sdominant political figure. Yeltsin appearedto be more serious about economic reform than Gorbachev,but the administrationremainedhesitantto provide much assistance.In March 1992 Richard Nixon publicly lambastedBush's aid programas "a patheticallyinadequateresponsein light of the opportunities and dangers"presentedby the crisis in the former Soviet Union.3! In a memorandumcirculatedamongforeign policy analystsNixon recalledthat the "hot-button issue in the 1950s was 'Who lost China?' If Yeltsin goes down, the question,'Who lost Russia?'will be an infinitely moredevastating issuein the 1990s."The former presidentconcludedthat "the bottom line is thatYeltsin is the most pro-Westernleaderin Russiain history," and the West must help his governmentin six ways: (1) by providing humanitarian,food, and medical aid until the reforms beganto work; (2) by creating a "free-

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enterprisecorps" that would sendthousandsof Westernmanagersto Russia to educatenew enterprisesin the ways of capitalism; (3) by rescheduling debtsincurredunderGorbachevanddeferringinterestpaymentsuntil a market economytook hold; (4) by allowing Russianexports greateraccessto Westernmarkets;(5) by providing tensof billions of dollars throughthe IMF for currencystabilizationassoonas Russiacontrolledits moneysupply; and (6) by creating a single Marshall Plan type of organizationto coordinate private and public assistance.If Yeltsin failed, Nixon warned, "war could breakout in the former SovietUnion as the new despotsuseforce to restore the 'historicalborders'of Russia";the"new EastEuropeandemocracieswould be imperiled ... , China'stotalitarianswould breathea sigh of relief," and the new Russianleaders-incollaborationwith Iraq, Syria, Libya, andNorth Korea-wouldthreatenAmericaninterests"in hot spotsaroundthe world."32 The White Houseprotestedthat it hadpreviouslyproposedthe additionof $645 million in aid to the former SovietUnion to supplementthe $1.5 billion announcedin late 1991 and blamedCongressfor stalling on a $12 billion requestto replenishthe IMF. Stungby Nixon's characterizationof his assistanceprogramas "penny ante,"PresidentBush arguedthat "therearecertain fiscal financial constraintson what we can do, but we have a huge stakein the successof democracyin Russiaand in the otherCIS [Commonwealthof IndependentStates]countries."33 TheWhite Housefearedthat any seriouseffort to increaseassistancewould further alienatea public whosehistoric animosityto foreign aid had recently grown even more pronouncedand who alreadysaw Bush as a presidentexcessivelyinterestedin foreign policy. A 1989survey,for example,found that fully half of the American public believed that foreign aid constitutedthe singlelargestitem in thefederalbudget!34Nevertheless,in the wakeof Nixon's criticisms, a surprisingnumberof senatorsand congressmen, including conservativesJesseHelms (R-NC) andStromThurmond(R-SC), stronglyurged theWhite Houseto provide moreleadershipon this issue.Accordingto RepresentativeDavid Obey (0-WI), "the White Househasbeenso rattledby Pat Buchananthatthey'rebobbingandweavingon manyissues,including this."35 In the endthe domesticpolitical vagariesof 1992whipsawedthe administration andexposedsignificantdivisions within the RepublicanPartyon RussoAmerican relations. Second,President Bushtried to "lock in" arms control agreementswith Gorbachev(and laterYeltsin) in casehardlinerscameto power in Moscow. During the Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reaganadministrations,arms control negotiationshad been at the core of Soviet-Americanrelations. Protracted wrangling over seemingly arcaneminutiae was common, symbolic of the reality that neitherside really trustedthe other. Even when agreementshad

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occasionallybeenreached,Americancritics routinely claimedthat the Soviets would subvertthem anyway. Although initially reluctantto unveil an arms control strategy,domestic pressure,as well as Gorbachev'spenchantfor announcingunilateral reductions, forced a reconsideration.The pace of two interminablenegotiations quickened-Conventional Armed Forcesin Europe(CFE) andStrategicArms Reduction(START)-especiallyafter Malta. By the time Bush left office in January1993CFE andSTART agreementshadbeenreachedwith Gorbachev anda START II pacthadbeenconcludedwith Yeltsin. Togetherthesetreaties effectively endedthe East-Westmilitary confrontationof almosta half-century. Yet becauseof the dizzying speedof political and economicchangein the East, they were widely seenas little more than footnotesto the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, the demoralizationof the Red Army, and the disappearance of the Soviet Union. Theseagreements,however, were significant, for takentogetherthey dramaticallyreducedconventionalforce sizes from the Urals to the Atlantic and ultimately diminishedthe numberof strategic nuclear warheadsfrom about 30,000 to fewer than 7,000. Moreover, the Bush administrationeliminatedlong-standingUnited Statesmanpower and weaponsdisadvantageswith theseunderstandings,although,to reiterate, they may in any event have soon disappeared.Finally, the decision to move quickly in 1990 and 1991 was partially vindicatedby subsequentSoviet foot-draggingovertreaty interpretationandimplementationmadeworse by the August 1991 coup. Third, asdescribedby GeorgeF. Kennanin 1947,the goal of containment was to causeeither the mellowing or collapseof the Soviet Union, but few American strategistshad taken this possibility seriously.To the contrary,as the Cold War becamean apparentlypermanentcondition,U.s. policymakers focusedon the moreimmediateproblemof deterringa Sovietnuclearattack. Although the Nixon-Kissingerstrategyof detentesoughtto modify Soviet behaviorby enmeshingMoscow in a web of linked agreementsand dependencies,even it did not envision a world without the Soviet Union. Some Reaganofficials claimedretrospectivelythat their strategyhad aimedto implode the Soviet empire, but even if true, there is little evidenceto suggest that they had thought through the consequences of success.Gorbachev's political reforms, however,unleashedsuch powerful centrifugal forces that the Bush administrationwas forced to confrontthe likelihood of Sovietcollapse.It decidedto do what it could to preventthe violent breakupof the old adversary.In early 1991 Brent Scowcroft summarizedthe administration's strategicobjectiveat an NSC meeting: "Our policy has to be basedon our own national interest,and we have an interestin the stability of the Soviet Union. The instability of the USSRwould be a threatto us. To peck away at

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the legitimacy of the regime ... would not ... promotestability."36 In particular, seniorBush officials worried that the excessesof "romantic nationalism" could lead to civil war, which in tum could underminethe security of theSovietnucleararsenal.Or, to put theBushstrategyin the syntaxof Kennan: it wantedMoscow to mellow without collapsing. But apartfrom offering reassuringwords to Gorbachev,the administration could (or would) do little to preventdisintegration.On August I, 1991,Bush tried to help in a speechdeliveredto the SupremeSoviet of the Republic of the Ukraine.Bushhad not beeneagerto visit the capital of an outlying republic, fearing his presencewould undermineGorbachev'sefforts to maintain the unity of the Soviet Union, but the administrationwas underconsiderable domestic pressureto support the principle of national self-determination. With the onsetof the 1992 presidentialcampaignonly five months away, senioradvisersconvincedBush to make a "gesture"toward the republicsY But the "gesture"seemeddesignedprimarily to bolster Gorbachev,for the presidentreferredto his Kiev audienceas "Soviet citizens," warmly praised Gorbachev'svision of the Soviet future, and madeclear his lack of enthusi38 Promptly dubbedthe "Chicken Kiev" speech asmfor Ukrainian secession. by NewYork TimesconservativecolumnistWilliam Safireandwidely adopted by other commentators,Bush's remarks were, however, wholly consistent with his desireto preservethe Soviet Union. Gorbachev,squeezedbetweencommunist centralizersand secessionminded republics, wobbled back and forth. His offer of a "Union Treaty," granting significant power to the periphery, precipitatedthe hardline coup that almosttoppled him in August 1991. Soonafterward,Bush and most of his inner circle resignedthemselvesto the collapseof the Soviet Union but still hopedthat the breakupwould be peaceful.The administrationnow began to work with Yeltsin and the leadersof the other republicswith nuclear weapons(Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan)to ensurethe safety of their arsenals.In the end, Bush'sgoal of a reformedSovietUnion provedan oxymoron, and it was forced to confront the prospectof resurgentnationalism and pandemicinstability in Eurasia. Interestingly,in pursuingits fourth interim strategicobjective,the administration showedno hesitancyin supportingGerman national self-determination, probablybecauseit believedthat reunification would lead to greater Europeanstability. For decades,American (declaratory)policy had encouraged the creationof a unified Germanstate as long as it remainedclosely tied to the West, but as the Cold War glacier froze Central Europe,United Statesstrategistslargely stoppedconsideringthat prospectandquietly hoped for a perpetuationof the statusquo. Even as EastGermanycollapsedin late 1989, with thousandsof its citizens voting with their feet againsta divided

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state,it seemedinconceivablethat the nation would soonbe reunified.These eventssurprisedthe administrationand worried LondonandParis.Insteadof placing obstaclesin the path of Germanreunification, however,the United Statesdeviseda negotiatingframework designedto keepthe new Germany anchoredin NATO and the EC. Underthis arrangement,the two Germanies first agreedon thetermsof reunificationafterwhich the four occupyingpowers -Britain, France,the Soviet Union, and the United States-accepted the results.Theadministrationworkedto reassureMargaretThatcherandachieved Fran~ois Mitterrand that they need not fear this Germany and pressedMoscow to acquiescein NATO membershipfor it. Bush'sstrategicobjectivewasachieved in July 1990whenHelmut Kohl promisedsignificanteconomicassistanceto Moscow in exchangefor Gorbachev'ssurrenderon NATO. The administrationpursuedits final transitional strategicobjective-the nurturingof democraticgovernmentsin EasternEurope-withconsiderably less boldnessand creativity than it had demonstratedin handling German reunification.Nevertheless,it surelypassedthe modesttestit setfor itself: to do no damage.As Michael Mandlebaumobserved,the Bush administration could haveerredin two directions.On the onehand,it could haveloudly and ostentatiouslycelebratedthe demiseof the WarsawPact,thus embarrassing Gorbachevand perhapsendangeringthe remarkablepeacefulness of the East Europeanrevolutions.At the otherextreme,it might havenegotiatedthe future of thosenationswith the SovietUnion out of fear that Gorbachevwould otherwiseuseforce to preservethe Pact.But by constantlyreassuringMoscow that theserevolutions need not imperil legitimate Soviet interests,the Bush administrationhelpedeventsin EasternEuroperun their course.39 Yet in the aftermathof the incrediblerevolutionsof 1989, as thesefledgling democraciesstruggledto build viable political institutions and market economies,the administration'sinterestin them appearedto wane. In part, of course,the PersianGulf crisis diverted its attention for severalmonths. Furthermore,the ongoingdramain the Soviet Union preoccupiedit. Nonetheless,as Terry Deibel rightly noted in late 1991, Bush and his advisers failed to appreciatethat theseEast Europeanexperimentsmight indicate whethera successfultransformationfrom commandto market economies was possible.40 Consequently,it offered only meageramountsof assistance to thesegovernments,and evenafter Congressraisedthe total to $500 million, this aid still representedless than .5 percentof the Marshall Plan in 1990dollars. Instead,the administrationencouragedthe EuropeanCommunity to shoulderthe aid burden. From 1989to 1991,the bipolar structureof the internationalsystemwas transformed.Democratic institutions and market economies,in various forms, emergedin EasternEurope,parts of the former Soviet Union, and

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almostall of Latin America. The victory over Iraq in the 100-hourPersian Gulf War in February 1991 confirmed the United Statesas the "world's sole, remainingsuperpower."Even the normally cautiousand incremental GeorgeBush proclaimedin September1990 that a "new world order" was imminent and that Iraqi aggressionconstitutedits first challenge.Critics claimed that Bush had usedthis phrasemerely to gain legitimacy for Operation DesertStorm by rebutting chargesthat oil was the sole reasonfor American action. In fact, Bush had previewed his new world order just prior to the invasion of Kuwait. With MargaretThatcherat his side in Aspen, Colorado, on August 2, 1990, he proposedan active and ambitious role for America in an allegedly unpredictableworld. In this speech,which hadbeengestatingin Bush'sinnercircle for months,the presidentacknowledgedthat the recentchangesin Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union had "transformedour securityenvironment"and greatly lessened"an immediate threat to Europe and the dangerof global war." Yet the United States remained"a pivotal factor for peacefulchange"with "important interests in Europeandthe Pacific, in the Mediterraneanandin the PersianGulf...."41 The world, Bush warned,was still "dangerous,with ... variousthreats.. . wholly unrelatedto the earlier patternsof the U.S.-Sovietrelationship.. . [which] can arise suddenly,unpredictably,and from unexpectedquarters." The presidentarguedthat "terrorism,hostagetaking,renegaderegimeswith unpredictablerulers, new sourcesof instability-all require a strong and engagedAmerica" with military "forcesable to respondto threatsin whatever cornerof the globe they may occur."42 Surprisingly, Bush had not includedaggressionamongthe threatshe anticipated in the wake of the Cold War. Nevertheless,Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on the day of the Aspen speechvalidated for senior administration officials the essentialcorrectnessof their analysis,much as North Korea's attack in June 1950 had confirmed the predictions of NSC-68 for Harry Truman. When Bush first spokeexplicitly of the new world order on September 11, 1990, he now made resistanceto aggressionthe litmus test of global stability. In part, circumstancesdictatedthis changein rhetoric. The disparateinternationalcoalition that Bush organizedagainstIraq sharedbut onecharacteristic: all its membersclaimedto beindependentstates.Sincethe eighteenth century, most stateshad agreed thatan unprovokedattack by one against anotherconstitutedaggressionand justified both unilateral and collective armedresistance.More recently,both the Leagueof Nationsand the United Nationshad soughtto enforcethis principle formally. All victims of aggression, irrespectiveof their sizeor internal characteristics,had the right to collective protection. The United Stateshad occasionallyargued that only

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"democracies"could invoke this principle, as in the ReaganDoctrine, but this claim had nevergainedthe statusof internationallaw. To sustain theinternationalcoalitionandto avoid underminingSaudiArabia and the exiled Kuwaiti government,Bush could hardly allow "democracy" to be at stakein the Gulf, nor could "national self-determination"be at issue for fear of fueling Palestinianclaims againstIsrael. Neither,for obviousreasons, could "defenseof the free world" or "resistanceto communism"be cited by Bush. Deprived of many of the argumentsand symbols used by Cold War presi.dentsto inspire domesticsupport,Bush relied on World War II metaphorsand referredto Kuwait as a victim of Nazi-like aggression. But neitherthe fragility of the internationalcoalition nor the undemocratic natureof the Kuwaiti governmentcan fully explain Bush'sdecisionto place the punishmentof "aggression"at thecenterof his new world order.This choice accuratelyreflectedthe administration'sconservativeunderstandingof world politics, its preferencefor stability to reform, and its identification of stability with the statusquo. LawrenceEagleburger'swistful reminiscencesin 1989 aboutthe orderlinessof the Cold War capturedthis outlook. It also accounted for Bush's decisionsto terminatethe Gulf War without removing Saddam Husseinand to discourageattemptsby Kurds and Shiitesto breakIraq apart. The Bushadministration'swillingnessto useforce to protectinterestsand its recognitionthat conflict remainedan integral featureof world politics put it firmly in the tradition of Alexander Hamilton, Henry Cabot Lodge, and Henry Kissinger.But as RobertW. Tuckerand David Hendricksonobserved, Bush'spost-ColdWar grand design-thenew world order-alsodeparted from that tradition, for althoughthe global balanceof power was no longer threatened,the administrationbehavedas if Americansecuritywas still seriously at risk. Freedfrom the necessityof containingthe Soviet Union, Bush implied that America could now serveas the guarantorof internationallaw and order. Bush, the erstwhile"processTory," agreedwith WoodrowWilson thatAmericacould play this role becauseit alonehadsufficient "moral standing."43 But whereasWilson wished to renouncemilitary force in favor of world publicopinion andeconomicsanctionsto enforcethe democraticpeace, Bush embracedthe instrumentsof the "old diplomacy" to ward off international anarchy.44 In effect, Bush'sAmerica was to function as a kind of benevolenthegemon, protecting the growing "zone of democraticpeace"against regional outlaws,terrorists,nuclearproliferators,and other threatsto order. It would do so in concertwith others,if possible,and unilaterally, if necessary.This vision married the universalistaspirationsof Wilson's liberal internationalism to the military instrumentsof Lodge'snationalism.At the sametime, it also mademore explicit the outlook envelopedby the Cold War chrysalis.

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As the 1992 presidentialcampaignapproachedand as the public evinced a growing concernaboutthe domesticeconomy,GeorgeBush showeda reticenceto elaboratehis potentially controversialgranddesignfurther. He had originally scheduledfour foreign policy speechesfor June 1991 in which he was expectedto addressthe new world order but then decidedto use these occasionsto attackthe GreatSocietyprogramsof the 1960s,condemn"political correctness"on collegecampuses,and malign Congressfor allegedly practicing partisanshipin foreign affairs. According to David Gergen,the president'sstaff feared"that public debateover a new world order was spinning beyond control."45 And so, to stifle that debate,George Bush rarely spokeof a new world order after the summerof 1991 and confined his foreign policy statementsto rhetorical celebrationsof the Gulf victory. Yet within the administration,especiallyin the office of the undersecretary of defensefor policy, work proceededto operationalizethe new world order. Theseefforts had begunshortly after the Gulf War endedas small Pentagon study groupsexaminedalternativestrategicobjectives,tried to identify the regionalimplicationsof the Cold War's demise,and reevaluatedthe size and compositionof the American nucleararsenalas well as the appropriateconventional "baseforce."46The early fruits of theselabors were leakedto the New York Times in Februaryand March 1992 in the form of drafts of two planningdocuments.In the first, the Pentagonarguedthat United Statesmilitary forcesin the post-ColdWar era requiredfunding sufficient to allow it to fight at leasttwo majorregionalconflicts (MRCs) simultaneously,while standing readyto repel an attackon Europeby a resurgentRussia.The document listed seven"illustrative scenarios"that the United Statesshouldbe prepared to deteror resolve: (1) an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and SaudiArabia; (2) a North Koreaattackon SouthKorea; (3) the simultaneousoccurrenceof both; (4) a Russianassaulton Lithuania through Polandwith the help of Belarus; (5) a coup in the Philippines threatening5,000 American residents;(6) a Panamanian coupendangeringaccessto the PanamaCanal;and(7) the emergenceof a new expansionistsuperpower.An accompanyingmemorandum instructedthe three service secretariesto use these scenariosin planning budgetrequestsfrom 1994 to 1999. This documentappearedto envision a baseforce at mid-decadeconsiderablylargerthan the onesuggestedby President Bush in his 1992 Stateof the Union address,but perhapsappropriatefor the expansiveness of the new world order.47 A relatedseriesof studies,coordinatedprimarily by Zalmay Khalilzad, assistantdeputy undersecretaryfor policy planning, produceda second (leaked)document.Khalilzad's group focusedexplicitly on America'srole in the post-ColdWar world and tried to be deliberatelyprovocative.48 It examinedand rejectedthree strategicoptions for the United States:isolation-

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ism, collectivesecurity,and balanceof power. It did so becauseisolationism failed to acknowledgeAmerica'svital overseasinterests;becausecollective securityentrustedthe protectionof this nation'sintereststo others;and becausebalance-of-powersystemshistorically had always resultedin major war. This planning group insteadpreferred"global leadership,"an option that appearedto capturemuch of Bush's new world order. "Global leadership" presumedAmerica'scontinuinginternationalpreeminenceand argued that it shouldactively preventthe emergenceof a bipolaror multipolar world. By using existing securityarrangements to ensurethe safetyof its allies, the United Stateswould view as potentially hostile any statewith sufficient humanandtechnologicalresourcesto dominateEurope,EastAsia, or the Miudle East.This strategyrecognizedthat by early in the next centuryGermanyand Russiamight threatenEurope; Japan,Russia,and eventually China might threatenEastAsia; and the dominationof either region would consequently imperil the Middle East.Yet its architectsdid not considerthe strategyto be anti-Germanor anti-Japanese. While they did fear the emergenceof an unstable"Weimar Russia,"Khalilzad and his colleaguesarguedthat the United Statescould preserveGermanand Japanese friendshipby nurturing existing securityarrangements.Thus thesetwo stateswould presumablyhaveno incentiveto challengeAmericanpreeminence,for their interestswould becared for by Washington.Notably missingfrom the global leadershipstrategywas any significant role for the United Nations. Despite its apparentfidelity to Bush's new world order, this document, "DefensePlanningGuidance,1994-1999"(DPG), deeply embarrassedthe administration.SeniorPentagonofficials quickly disavowedit, eventhough Undersecretaryfor Policy PaulWolfowitz and probablyRichardCheneyhad known of it for sometime. They did so becauseit offendedimportant U.S. allies and threatenedto unleasha potentially divisive domesticdebateabout America'srole in the post-ColdWar world. A revised version of the DPG was written by I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby and leaked to the press in May 1992.It appearedto supporta strategymore seriouslycommittedto multilateral institutions, but, in fact, now envisionedthat "the United Stateswould build up its military capabilitiesto suchan extentthat therecould neverbe a rival. America would developsuch enormoussuperiority in military power and technologythat other countrieswould realizeit would be self-defeating to try to compete."49And, as we will discover in chapterseven, largeelementsof this documentwould form the basisof the nationalsecurity strategy of PresidentGeorgeW. Bush. The new world order also featureda foreign economiccomponent,and responsibilityfor its articulationlargely fell to the Office of the Undersecretary of Statefor EconomicAffairs, RobertZoellick. It haddoneso becausesenior

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TreasuryandCommerceofficials tendedto eschewgrandstrategyin favor of a case-by-case approach,while Zoellick, who enjoyedthe full confidenceof SecretaryBaker, had earneda reputationas one of the administration'sfew genuineconceptualizers.Like the DPG, Zoellick's strategybeganwith the assumptionof American global preeminenceand noted that this nation's economyaccountedfor 22 percentof the world's grossproduct.He enunciatedthis view in an April 1992 speechin which he observedthat the United Statesis the only nationin the world today that ranksat the top of political, military, andeconomicpower.Over the courseof the pastfew years-inEurope,the Gulf, and elsewhere-wehaveonceagaindemonstratedour political and military leadership.But it is also vital that we remainin the forefront of internationaleconomicpolicy. We've takenimportantstepsin this direction.The US is the largestexporter in the world. Nearly one-thirdof our growth in GDP from 1986to 1991 is dueto our increasedexports.The US worker is the mostproductive in the world, 31% aboveJapan,26% abovethe westernstatesof Germany. During the 1980s,the productivity of our manufacturingworkersgrew an averageof 3.6% per year.50 From Zoellick's perspective,the United Statescould bestserveits economic interestby acting as the primary catalystfor a seriesof integrativeeconomic structuresthat would substantiallyincreaseglobal prosperity. By spurring economicgrowth, thesestructureswould encouragefurther democratization of political systems,which in turn would bring to (or keepin) powerleaders committedto evengreaterregional economicintegration.The United States could playakey role in sustainingthis acceleratingcycle of tradeliberalization, democratization,and economicintegration. For Zoellick, ''America's messageshould be that it wants to reducebarriersto trade and investment with all, but will proceedwith thosecountriesthat are willing."51 From these preceptshe and his colleaguesdevelopeda "new world orderof trade" strategy designedto link American economicand geopolitical goals and interests. First, it sought to deepenthe institutionalizedeconomicand security interactionbetweenthe United Statesand its major traditional allies-Western Europeand Japan.Through a variety of bilateral, regional, and global trade agreementstheselong-standingrelationshipswould be further solidified. Economic liberalization betweenthe United Statesand the European Union, for example,would proceedapacewith NATO's evolution. Second,the United Stateswould reach out to a secondtier of potential "partners" in Latin America, East Asia, and EasternEuropeto develop increasinglydenseinstitutional linkages.Devicessuch as the North American

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FreeTradeAssociation(involving the United States,Canada,and Mexico), the Enterprisefor the AmericasInitiative (which envisioneda hemispheric free tradezone),and the Asia-PacificEconomicCooperation(APEC) forum (largely a "talking shop"but possessinginstitutionalpossibilities)represented obviousexamplesof this notion. Thesedevelopinginstitutionswould gradually develophabitsof cooperationamongtheir membersthat could, in times of crisis, "be drawn on to build ad hoc security coalitions underAmerican leadership."52 They might also prove useful in helping to settle regional issuesas, for example,Argentina'sdecision to stop the purchaseof Iranian missilesand to sign a nuclearnonproliferationagreementwith Brazil. While the Bushadministrationdid not regardthesearrangements as"tradingblocs," it did recognizethat they could serveas useful levers to encouragestatesin otherregionsto liberalizetheir tradepoliciesor to increasepressurefor con53 Finally, ZoeIIick andothersunderstood cessionsin the GATT negotiations. that suchmultiple liberalizationefforts could help PresidentBush rally congressionalsupportfor free tradeby seizingthe initiative from protectionists who had benefitedfrom the deadlockin the Uruguay Round. And third, even farther on the periphery,loomed Russia,China, and the Middle East.Zoellick advisedthat "over time we shouldseekto demonstrate to themthe benefitsof their peacefulintegrationinto the systemas well."54 Like its DefenseDepartmentcounterpart,the administration'sforeign economic strategyassertedthe indispensabilityof American global leadership. It strongly supportedthe voluntary creationof a seriesof regionaleconomic integrativeinstitutions (within the GATT framework) in which the United States would act as the common linchpin. In Zoellick's strategy, as in Khalilzad's,all roadsultimately led to Washington. PresidentBush did little more to define his granddesignuntil after the Novemberelection. He had decidedto run on his record and to celebratethe PersianGulf War victory ratherthan offer a potentially controversialforeign policy blueprint. Then, in two valedictory speeches,at TexasA&M University in December1992 and at West Point in January 1993, he spokemore directly aboutAmerica'srole in the post-ColdWar world andsuggestedseveral guidelinesfor the useof U.S. troops abroad.Exceptfor the greateremphasisBush placedon "collective action," his Manichaeandescriptionof the emerginginternationalsystem,his identification of American security with world order,andhis expansivedefinition of this nation'sglobal responsibilities, all bore striking resemblanceto the TrumanDoctrine of 1947. PresidentTruman had seena world riven by two "ways of life"-one free and the other repressive-inwhich free people were threatenedby outsidepressureand subvertedby armedminorities. He claimedthat "to-

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talitarian regimesimposedupon free peoples,by direct or indirect aggression, underminethe foundationsof internationalpeaceand hencethe security of the United States."Trumanconcludedthat "it must be the policy of the United Statesto supportfree peopleswho are resisting attempted subjugationby armed minorities or by outside pressures."55With these words he had createdthe intellectual foundationfor the strategyof global containment. In his TexasA&M speechGeorgeBush describeda similarly divided world: "The alternativeto democracy... is authoritarianism:regimesthat can be repressive,xenophobic,aggressive,and violent." But unlike 1947, when free institutions teetered,Bush suggestedthat "the community of democraticnationsis more robust than ever, and it will gain strengthas it grows." But, he warned,"the collapseof the democraticrevolutionscould posea direct threatto the safetyof everysingleAmerican... [and] the new world could, in time, be as menacingas the old." A failure of the United Statesto lead, Bush predicted,would result in "not more security for our citizensbut less, not the flourishing of Americanprinciplesbut their isolation in a world actively hostile to them."56 In short, a democraticworld orderrestingon this nation'sleadership,Bushclaimed,wasessentialto the security of the United States.It was this equationof global order and national securitythat aboveall linked the analysesof Harry TrumanandGeorge Bush, despitethe obvious fact that in 1992 the United Statesno longer faced a global threat. In contrastto Truman, who had placedno apparentlimits on the instrumentsthe UnitedStateswould employto helpfree peopledefendthemselves, in his January1993 West Point speechPresidentBush tried to define more rigorously America's military role in the post-Cold War world. Speaking againstthe backdropof the recentSomali humanitarianintervention,Bush soughtto distinguish"leadership"from "unilateralism"and "universalism." He notedthat "there is no supportabroador at homefor us to play this role [of world policeman]nor shouldtherebe.We would exhaustourselvesin the process."On the otherhand,the presidentobservedthat as the "only remaining superpower,it is the role of the United Statesto marshalits moral and materialresourcesto promotea democraticpeace.... Thereis no one else." And while "we neednot respondby ourselvesto eachand every outrageof violence... , [at] times real leadershiprequiresa willingnessto use military force." Unfortunately,however,"in the complexnew world we areentering, therecan be no single or simple set of fixed rules for using force.... Each and every caseis unique." Nor could "the relative importanceof an interest [serve as] a guide." Nevertheless,Bush suggestedsome "principles to inform our decisions:

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Using military force makessenseas a policy where the stakeswarrant, whereand whenforce can be effective, whereno otherpolicies are likely to proveeffective, whereits applicationcan be limited in scopeand time, and wherethe potentialbenefitsjustify the potentialcostsand sacrifice.51 He further arguedthat wheneverpossiblethe United Statesshouldleadinternationalcoalitions and contributeto them "in a mannercommensuratewith our wealth ... and strength."But other nationswith a stakein the outcome shouldalso help militarily andeconomically.At the sametime, "a desirefor internationalsupportmust not becomea prerequisitefor acting. Sometimes a great power has to act alone," as for example,in Panama.But, President Bushconcluded,"in everycaseinvolving the useof force, it will be essential to havea clearandachievablemission,a realistic plan for accomplishingthe mission, and criteria no less realistic for withdrawing U.S. forces once the 58 mission is accomplished. Taken togetherthesefarewell addressescarried a decidedly mixed message.In the TexasA&M speechBush embracedthe TrumanDoctrine'sidentification of world orderwith Americansecurity.The endof the Cold War, he inferred,hadnot reducedthis nation'svery demandingsecurityrequirements: Americanscould feel safeonly in a democraticworld. HereBush spokeasan unreconstructedWilsonian. His West Point address,however,strongly echoed theWeinbergerDoctrinein its attemptto providecriteriafor United States military interventions.While Bush's"principles" werenot quite asrestrictive as Weinberger'ssix "tests," they serveda similar purpose-toreassurethe public that blood and treasurewould not be recklesslyrisked. In doing so he inverteda traditional relationshipby suggestingthat, in deciding whetherto intervene,the tactical military "doability" of the missionmight receivepriority over the strategicimportanceof the interestinvolved. This was a curious way for a greatpowerto conductits affairs, but it was testimonyto the continuing pull of the Vietnam legacydespiteBush'sprotestations. As we haveseen,the Bushforeign policy passedthroughthreemajor phases. During the first, which lastedfor mostof 1989,the administrationclung to a largely inherited Cold War outlook to test Gorbachev'scommitmentto domestic reforms and genuinelydifferent Soviet internationalbehavior.In the middle phase,roughly 1990 and 1991, the Bush inner circle attemptedto achieveseveraltransitionalstrategicobjectivesamid fundamentalchangein the Soviet Union and EasternEuropewithout yet having developeda postCold War granddesign.The third phasebeganduring the PersianGulf crisis and thus partly overlappedthe second.It involved the incompletearticulation of a post-ColdWar granddesign-thenew world order-accompanied

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by an ambitious(andpartly disavowed)global strategycalledvariously"global leadership"and "collective engagement."Yet throughoutthese phases the administration'stactics remainedrather constantand simple and very similar to thoseusedto promoteits domesticagenda. GeorgeBush placedan enormousemphasison personaldiplomacy. His relianceon the telephoneto conversewith otherheadsof statequickly earned him the sobriquetof the "rolodex president."This practicereflectedhis belief that warm personalrelationsamongleaderswas essentialto the successful conduct of diplomacy. His Tory instincts attractedhim to established leadersof establishedstates-BrianMulroney, Fran