All Options on the Table: Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation 9781501760365

Citation preview

All Options on the ­Table

a volume in the series

Cornell Studies in Security Affairs Edited by Robert J. Art, Alexander B. Downes, Kelly M. Greenhill, ­Robert Jervis, Caitlin Talmadge, and Stephen M. Walt

Founding editors: Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis A list of titles in this series is available at cornellpress​.­cornell​.­edu.

All Options on the ­Table Leaders, Preventive War, and Nuclear Proliferation

R ac h e l El i z ab e t h Whitla rk

Cornell University Press Ithaca and London

 Copyright © 2021 by Cornell University All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, New York 14850. Visit our website at cornellpress​.­cornell​.e­ du. First published 2021 by Cornell University Press Library of Congress Cataloging-­in-­Publication Data Names: Whitlark, Rachel Elizabeth, author. Title: All options on the table : leaders, preventive war, and nuclear proliferation / Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark. Description: Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 2021. | Series: Cornell studies in security affairs | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2021014527 (print) | LCCN 2021014528 (ebook) | ISBN 9781501760341 (hardcover) | ISBN 9781501760365 (pdf) | ISBN 9781501760358 (epub) Subjects: LCSH: Preemptive attack (Military science)—Case studies. | Nuclear arms control. | Deterrence (Strategy) | International relations—History—20th century. | International relations— History—21st century. Classification: LCC U163 .W45 2021 (print) | LCC U163 (ebook) | DDC 355.02—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021014527 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021014528 Cover images (top to bottom): Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and outgoing Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, 1977 (courtesy of the National Library of Israel); US President George H. W. Bush in the Oval Office (courtesy of the George H. W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum); US President John F. Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson in the Oval Office, 1963 (photo by Abbie Rowe; White House Photographs; courtesy of the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston)

 To my grand­mother Norma Proshan, the most inspiring and inimitable person I knew

Contents

Acknowl­edgments

ix

1. When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

1

2. Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

14

3. JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program

41

4. Presidents 41 and 42 Engage North ­Korea’s Nuclear Program

85

5. Three US Presidents Tangle with Iraq’s Nuclear Program

119

6. Israel’s Preventive War Decision Making

154

7. Conclusions and Implications

186

Notes 197 References 233 Index 251

vii

Acknowl­edgments

It is surreal to finish a book during a global pandemic. On the one hand, t­ here is so much uncertainty and anxiety that it is difficult to concentrate. On the other hand, working on a book is an excellent distraction from events swirling around outside. Quarantine in par­tic­u­lar is an odd, if useful, forcing mechanism. Long before the final push to complete the manuscript, this book benefited from the support, feedback, and advice of many communities and individuals. At the George Washington University (GW), Charlie Glaser, Jim Goldgeier, and Elizabeth Saunders believed in my work perhaps before I did. Their patience and guidance then and now has been invaluable. I was tremendously lucky to receive the support of a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellowship that brought me to Cambridge, Mas­sa­chu­setts, and the Security Studies Program (SSP) at the Mas­sa­chu­setts Institute of Technology. Owen Coté and Barry Posen w ­ ere generous with their time and their lit­er­a­ ture recommendations. My development as an academic soared through participation in two groups within SSP: the Strategic Forces Working Group and the International Relations Work-­in-­Progress Group. At the time, no similar organ­ization existed at GW, and it was with ­these two groups that I learned how to think—­about both my own work and that of ­others. I am grateful to the members of both groups. My stay in Cambridge continued through the generosity of the International Security Program’s Proj­ect on Managing the Atom (MTA) at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government and Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. What began with a one-­year fellowship morphed into two additional years of work. ­There I found, in Paul Avey, Gene Gerzhoy, Evan Perkoski, Mike Poznansky, Miranda Priebe, Jaganath Sankaran,

ix

Acknowl­e dgments

and Oren Setter, friendship, research advice and support, and collegiality I ­will keep with me long into the ­future. My years in Boston also connected me to Jennifer Erickson and Catherine Zweig Worsnop. Their substantive feedback, professional advice, ­recipe suggestions, and novel recommendations have been unparalleled. I remain forever grateful to the late Marty Malin, as well as Matt Bunn, Steve Miller, and Steve Walt, for letting me stick around the Belfer Center as long as I did. I am writing t­hese acknowl­ edgments a few months ­after Marty’s passing, and it remains nearly impossible to imagine returning to MTA without him t­ here. But for Marty and his cocollaborators, I would have left academia long ago. Instead, ­because of the opportunity to spend consecutive years at MTA, I was able to find the perfect-­ for-me academic job, and I ­will always be grateful. That perfect-­for-me academic job turned out to be in the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Though I never expected to live in the South, I have been gifted with tremendous colleagues and countless opportunities. Though no one could recall previously holding a book workshop in the department, my colleagues and department chair took to the idea and generously supported the effort without hesitation. Jenna Jordan and Adam Stulberg kindly shepherded the workshop and made sure that the conversation stayed on track. Jenna has read the complete book more times than is reasonable. I am tremendously grateful for her friendship, as well as her time and dedication in helping to make the book better. I am also indebted to book workshop participants—­Mälfrid Braut-­ Heghammer, Matthew Fuhrmann, Scott Sagan, and Todd Sechser—­for taking the time out of their busy lives to treat the manuscript with such care. It goes without saying that the substantive feedback and pre­sen­ta­tional advice of this group of scholars was outstanding. The support, encouragement, and kindness they showed throughout the pro­cess ­were what surprised me. ­These four scholars model not only the best of the po­liti­cal science discipline but also the generosity and support of exceptional mentorship. Also at Georgia Tech, Miki Fabry and Larry Rubin offered comments on the manuscript and useful advice for making it stronger and more concise. Getting over the final hurdle would not have happened without the stellar research assistance of Andrew Arrington, Abby Burke, and Jack Crawford. I know they w ­ ill go on to illustrious c­ areers and w ­ ill make our world a better place. To my mind, mentors can be found in many dif­fer­ent places. Through Jim Goldgeier and the Bridging the Gap proj­ect, I met Naazneen Barma, Brent Durbin, Bruce Jentleson, Jordan Tama, and Steve Weber. Their vision, advice, kindness, and humor have made this journey intellectually richer and much more enjoyable than I would have thought pos­si­ble. Through Bridging the Gap and by virtue of living in Washington, DC, I found g ­ reat friends in Jeff Colgan and Michael Weintraub. They are always ready to lend an ear, offer

x

Acknowl­e dgments

professional advice, find an escape route at a conference, and laugh at what­ ever shenanigans come our way. This book—­along with the rest of my scholarship and, frankly, my sanity—­owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the writing groups that have been a consistent feature of my life. At GW, the Yentas—­Shannon Powers and Amir Stepak—­kept me laughing and kept me writing. More recently, the RED writing group has become my lifeline. Elizabeth Acorn, Danielle Gilbert, and I have met nearly weekly for the last few years. I hope someone is keeping track of the many publications and professional successes that emerged during this time. Reading each word of this book repeatedly, they have pushed me to clarify and improve at ­every stage. They have also offered invaluable professional advice along the way. Dani painstakingly edited the final manuscript. Each sentence is tighter and the manuscript that much stronger for her skill and dedication. Honorary RED member Jonathan Pike offered suggestions at critical junctures. I have also benefited from the kindness of many p ­ eople throughout this journey. At MIT, Jolie Divon Saraf, Lynn Levine, Harlene Miller, and Laurie Scheffler welcomed me to Boston, and their warmth continues to this day. At Harvard, Susan Lynch made the trains run on time and made sure that we fellows did what we ­were meant to do. At Georgia Tech, Marilu Suarez literally has the keys to the c­ astle. Since our initial e-­mails to schedule my interview all ­those years ago, Marilu has been the kind of person who treats you like ­family the moment you arrive and makes sure you have the right school supplies at the start of each new term. I am also im­mensely grateful to the librarians whose work and dedication made this book pos­si­ble. The archivists at the John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, George H. W. Bush, and William J. Clinton Presidential Libraries facilitated and advanced the research for this book in ways that I had not ­imagined. Even during a pandemic ­these archivists ­were able to hunt down pieces of information to confirm references and make the contents more precise. I am also indebted to the staff of the National Security Archive and the State Department’s Office of the Historian and the work they do in making document collections available for scholars’ use and publicly accessible on their websites. The resources they provide in a virtual environment are invaluable to students everywhere, myself included. I am especially grateful to the Austin Public Library for assistance tracking down a particularly obscure reference to substantiate a claim I make in chapter 3. Fi­nally, Jay Forrest and the team of librarians at the Georgia Tech Library ­were generous with their time and hunted down too many requests to count. Beyond fellowships, this proj­ect benefited from the generous financial support I received over the years. A research grant from the Israel Foundation allowed me to explore the preventive war be­hav­ior of Israeli prime ministers over time. Research grants from the Lyndon Baines Johnson Foundation, the Harry S. Truman Library Institute, and the Stanton Foundation facilitated

xi

Acknowl­e dgments

travel to multiple presidential libraries to conduct archival research. University and summer fellowships at GW initially allowed this proj­ect to get off the ground. At Cornell University Press, I am grateful for Roger Haydon and Michael McGandy’s careful guidance for this proj­ect from proposal to publication; for series editor Robert Jervis’s thoughtful consideration of the work and encyclopedic recommendations for additional scholarship with which to engage; and to an anonymous reviewer’s kind words, thorough read of the manuscript, and useful suggestions for revision. The publication teams at Cornell Press and Westchester Publishing Ser­vices have brought this proj­ ect over the finish line and have been a joy to work with and learn from. I am particularly indebted to Catherine Cambron, Susan Specter, and Michelle Witkowski for their skill with the manuscript and patience with me. Content from chapters 1, 2, and 3 appeared as “Nuclear Beliefs: A Leader-­Focused Theory of Counter-­Proliferation,” in Security Studies 26, no. 4 (2017): 545–574. I thank the journal and Taylor & Francis Group for permission to reprint this material ­here. Over the years, I have benefited from the support and encouragement of friends and ­family near and far. The Qs—­especially my partners in crime ­here in the Southeast—­Molly Berkemeier and Paige Price Cone—­have become coauthors but, more impor­tant, friends since a conference brought us together in South Bend, Indiana. The Ron f­ amily made my research trips to Israel and my life a wild and wonderful adventure. They welcomed me into their homes and w ­ ere inquisitive and supportive of the proj­ect. Niv in par­ tic­u­lar provided love, laughter, and cheerleading when I needed it most and Veuve Clicquot for impor­tant cele­brations. I hope I have done the chapter on Israeli decision-­making justice, though any m ­ istakes in the book remain my own. Raffaella Ceriello and Havi Goldscher have lived with this book idea since 2007 and with me since long before then. Even when I had to leave Boston, Jessica Grivalsky and Stephanie Yovchev’s support followed me to Atlanta. As roommates at times and the best of friends, t­ hese dear friends always remember to check in, have never been bored with the subject (or at least have Oscar-­worthy per­for­mance abilities to feign as much), and have had my back throughout this meandering and opaque academic journey. Julia Macdonald and I have traveled much of this adventure together, from Washington to Boston and to first jobs out of gradu­ate school. She is an excellent coauthor, gym buddy, sounding board, and general partner in crime. I consider myself especially lucky to have met my best friend in Miss Frolich’s first-­grade class at Ithan Elementary. It is the rare friendship that can withstand the test of time and survive college, gradu­ate school, jobs, families, and the ups and downs of life. But Michele Krengel is always ready for a cup of tea, a book recommendation, a Skype call, or a walk outside—­and surely ­there ­will be addenda to this list as time goes on. ­After all of t­ hese years, I am

xii

Acknowl­e dgments

proud and candidly a ­little relieved to be able to show all of ­these friends a final product. Fi­nally, none of this would have been conceivable without the support and encouragement of my ­family. My parents, Barbara and Henry Whitlark, raised me to believe that anything is pos­si­ble if you only work hard enough. They never questioned my chosen ­career path, even when I did. Or if they did, they never let on. They also encouraged in me a love of reading, education, politics, crossword puzzles, and argumentation. They led by example, and I learned from the best. My ­brother, Michael, has been an unfailing supporter of me and this book as long as I can remember. Even when he was needling me, as only siblings can do, from the other side of the country, his support was clear. His regular check-­ins to see if I’d made it below the final word count got me over the finish line. And fi­nally, my grandparents Harold and Norma Proshan (of blessed memory)—­around whose dining-­room ­table I learned to think and argue, usually over history and politics—­gave me the desire to substantiate my claims with ample research. Their example has guided me from the beginning.

xiii

All Options on the ­Table

chapter 1

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

It was the summer of 1963. Averell Harriman, US ambassador to the Soviet Union, was in Moscow. It is not surprising that Harriman was ­there; the summer agenda of President John F. Kennedy’s administration focused on the ongoing L ­ imited Test Ban Treaty negotiations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). But Harriman was not t­ here only to talk about the treaty. Instead, this secret mission had special priority. On the ­orders of President Kennedy, Harriman was to assess Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s willingness to cooperate in a joint military attack against the P ­ eople’s Republic of China. The Cold War was at its height in 1963. US-­Soviet relations w ­ ere perennially poor. The United States and Soviet Union had some thirty-­five thousand nuclear warheads pointed at each other. Just five years e­ arlier, the Soviets had threatened to consume Berlin and fold it into the Eastern Bloc. The Cuban missile crisis followed in October 1962, pushing the world to the brink of nuclear war. Allegedly, events caused Secretary of State Dean Rusk to quip, “­We’re eyeball to eyeball, and I think the other fellow just blinked.”1 Against this background, President Kennedy was taking all necessary measures—­feasibility studies, discussions with allies, and negotiations with sworn enemies—to try to prevent the Chinese from developing nuclear weapons. He believed t­ here would be dangerous security and foreign policy consequences of a communist Chinese atomic bomb. Within the Cold War context, it is remarkable that joint military intervention with the Soviet Union was a very real consideration in the summer of 1963. But that was exactly Harriman’s assignment: to engage the Soviets regarding a joint mission to destroy the Chinese nuclear endeavor before it came to fruition. Kennedy’s assassination abruptly ended his administration and mobilization against the Chinese. Lyndon Baines Johnson entered office unexpectedly and pledged to adopt the mantle of Kennedy’s vision. While the new president worked for the advancement of civil rights and other domestic programs that Kennedy prioritized, Johnson halted all efforts regarding the

1

chapter 1

Chinese nuclear program. Unlike his pre­de­ces­sor, Johnson possessed no serious concern for Chinese nuclear weapons, and he took no steps to counteract them. This book explains how two leaders facing the same adversary behaved so differently. It does so by highlighting the role of leaders’ nuclear beliefs—­ what they thought about nuclear proliferation generally and about par­tic­u­ lar adversaries’ attempts to go nuclear. This belief-­laden decision-­making pro­cess is relevant ­earlier in the Cold War, when Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower faced Soviet proliferation and confronted the end of the United States’ nuclear mono­poly. ­These historical decisions are also relevant now: within the past de­cade, multiple world leaders considered or used preventive military force against aspiring nuclear powers. In 2002, George W. Bush justified intervention in Iraq as an attempt to rid the world of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear weapons. Five years l­ater, Israel bombed a nuclear fa­cil­ i­ty discovered in the Syrian desert. Discussions of how to prevent a nuclear Iran have permeated the administrations of George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump. If history is any guide, the issues of nuclear proliferation and the use of preventive military force to forestall it are returning to prominence. Many scholars discount the roles of national leaders and their beliefs in hard security ­matters, especially within the nuclear realm. The notion that preventive war, which is traditionally the bailiwick of state-­based, realist theories, actually rests on the individual leaders making decisions within states is a new and in­ter­est­ing theoretical development. And what we learn through the exploration of this idea—­that JFK might very well have attacked the Chinese nuclear program, alone or with Soviet assistance—is one of the more surprising historical details this book returns to our consciousness. All Options on the T ­ able is a book about the consequences of nuclear proliferation and how leaders behave to ­counter it. This book engages the debate between nuclear optimists and nuclear pessimists—­those who see the effect of additional nuclear proliferation on the international system as stabilizing or destabilizing, respectively. Pessimists say absent a second-­strike capability shared by two nuclear-­armed states, proliferation leads to preventive war with one state seeking to arrest the other’s developing program. Conversely, optimists argue that proliferation seldom leads to preventive war or even its consideration. How can both sides be right? The explanation lies with individual leaders: how they understand proliferation and when they w ­ ill rely on preventive war to c­ ounter it. B ­ ecause pessimists see proliferation as destabilizing, they are more likely than optimists to consider even forceful methods to prevent nuclear programs from manifesting. Consequently, this analy­sis offers a dynamic theory of preventive war, demonstrating how in one key empirical area, nuclear proliferation, leaders respond to potential changes in the balance of power between states.

2

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

Accordingly, this is also a book about global power imbalances and what happens when they emerge. This topic of nuclear proliferation and the decision to ­counter it is fruitful to explore ­because in this international po­liti­ cal arena, shifts in the balance of power can be especially dramatic. To make my case, I pre­sent a new theory and new evidence about when states attempt to redress changes in power distribution.

The Argument and Approach This book poses one central question: When do states decide to use preventive military force to forestall or destroy an adversary’s nuclear weapons program? Stated differently, the book seeks to understand why some leaders use preventive war, ­others consider it, and still ­others never contemplate it as a counterproliferation strategy. I argue that leaders have dif­fer­ent prior beliefs about nuclear ­matters, which influence how ­these leaders, once in executive office, approach proliferation challenges that arise. The book documents significant leader disagreement about the magnitude of threats posed by nuclear proliferation generally and by specific states’ nuclear programs, which are central to understanding this variation in be­hav­ior. The very existence of substantial disagreements has been previously overlooked. I argue that leaders’ beliefs formed prior to or early in leaders’ tenure in executive office (before the case of interest) are what shape their ­later preventive war decisions.2 My investigation centers on the interaction of individual leaders and nuclear adversaries and looks at variation in leader be­hav­ior across time. This variation is significant ­because leaders are regularly overlooked as causally consequential. They are assumed to be e­ ither idiosyncratic and too messy for systematic analy­sis or e­ lse irrelevant in that they should respond similarly to events given the same structural conditions. Instead, my leader-­centric argument proposes not only that leaders have divergent beliefs about critical nuclear issues—­proliferation and deterrence chief among them—­but also that t­hese beliefs are meaningful for states’ choices to engage in war. This book thus contributes to our growing understanding of the domestic sources of nuclear politics writ large. To make this argument, I establish a typology of leader beliefs, which is valuable in hypothesizing about likely preventive war be­hav­ior and in determining what leaders find threatening, specifically regarding nuclear weapons. Indeed, leaders have divergent beliefs concerning (1) the consequences of nuclear proliferation in the international system and (2) the ability to deter an adversary, once nuclear-­armed, from challenging the state’s interests. Leaders less concerned about nuclear proliferation and confident in deterrence should be less likely to intervene to prevent it. ­Those more pessimistic about proliferation and less confident in deterrence should be more likely to intervene preventively.3 What is most striking about the resulting

3

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expectations is what they reveal: simply being concerned about the consequences of nuclear proliferation does not guarantee the use of force. Similarly, not e­ very threatening state attempting proliferation w ­ ill suffer a preventive intervention. Instead, it is only when a specific type of leader—­a proliferation pessimist—­confronts a state unlikely to be deterred that force is more likely to result. That this specific combination of f­ actors suggests force should be more likely provides a theoretical understanding of the empirical rarity that is the use of preventive military force.4 To capture the role of leaders and their nuclear beliefs in preventive war decisions, as well as argue against alternative explanations derived from the extant lit­er­a­ture, this book explores the preventive counterproliferation be­ hav­ior of the United States and Israel. The book investigates both the Cold War and post–­Cold War periods to demonstrate that the argument travels across time. I examine cases in East Asia and the M ­ iddle East to show that ­there are no regional limitations to the argument’s applicability. The case studies analyze the presidencies of John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, George H. W. Bush, William J. Clinton, and George W. Bush as they confronted the Chinese, North Korean, and Iraqi nuclear programs. Chapter 6 extends the argument from the US context to explore how consecutive Israeli prime ministers confronted the nuclear weapons programs of Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. Using archival evidence, biographical materials, and government documents, I establish that leaders’ prior nuclear beliefs—­ formed well before the decision-­making period of each case—­shape ­later decisions once in executive office. Focusing on consecutive national executives is critical, given that simpler structural explanations are insufficient: dif­fer­ent leaders within the same polity respond differently to nuclear threats, even when confronting the same adversary within the same approximate time period. Elsewhere, individuals have been shown to m ­ atter for other types of military interventions in dif­fer­ent empirical contexts, challenging Kenneth Waltz’s rejection of their relevance for international po­liti­cal theorizing.5 Over time, scholars beyond ­those adopting psychological frameworks have championed a focus on individual leaders.6 This re­nais­sance has made its way to security studies and into the nuclear realm, where one might be the least inclined to expect leaders to be causally consequential.7 This book contributes to the return of l­ eaders to analytical importance in international security and should help catalyze more attention to domestic ­factors within nuclear politics.

How Leaders Drive Preventive War Decisions A large lit­er­at­ ure focuses on how individual-­level characteristics influence foreign policy be­hav­ior. Perhaps the quin­tes­sen­tial early articulation came from Alexander George’s Operational Code, which described a prism through

4

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

which leaders perceive and diagnose events.8 Central to the operational code is how one views the essential nature of po­liti­cal life, the po­liti­cal realm as essentially cooperative or conflictual, the fundamental character of po­liti­cal opponents, and the best approach to setting po­liti­cal goals.9 Early work gave way to more complex typologies that encompassed dozens of personal characteristics.10 Additional lit­er­a­ture emerged, especially following progressions in brain science, to explore the role of cognition, biases, and other psychological characteristics in po­liti­cal be­hav­ior.11 Following developments in psy­chol­ogy’s Big Five approach to personality, po­liti­cal scientists sought to explain how the five traits of openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism influence a range of subjects, including ideology and foreign policy be­hav­ior such as the use of force.12 ­Others explored individual characteristics, including age, military ser­vice, and education, for their effects on po­liti­cal decision making.13 This research offers useful findings on the relationships between individual-­level and personality-­based ­factors and impor­tant outcomes of interest. However, t­ hese characteristics are generally static. As such, they cannot explain varying be­hav­ior by the same leader; that the same president confronting multiple potential proliferants during his administration often pursues dif­fer­ent strategies. To offer something more dynamic, I focus on beliefs.14 To demonstrate the limits of t­ hese characteristic or personality-­based approaches, it is useful to briefly explore, as one of the more compelling alternatives, the role of age in intervention decisions. Even though age is dynamic, it too is problematic. The conventional wisdom argues that younger p ­ eople tend to be brash and bold, whereas older ­people tend t­oward caution and judiciousness. While this idea is plausible empirically, we know that wars are started by older leaders just as they are by younger leaders. Skepticism about the conventional wisdom is instead warranted. Michael Horo­witz, Rose McDermott, and Allan Stam set out to rigorously scrutinize the effect of age on leader be­hav­ior.15 Drawing on biological scholarship, they hypothesized against the conventional wisdom, arguing that age, legacy concerns, and shortened time horizons make older leaders more likely to initiate or escalate militarized disputes. T ­ hese scholars found that as age increases, initiation and the use of force against other states indeed becomes more likely. Horo­witz, McDermott, and Stam tested cross-­national and cross-­time propositions about the impact of age on general proclivities ­toward all types of military disputes. It is pos­si­ble that age may also influence the proclivity t­oward force in the context of counterproliferation. As ­table 1.1 makes clear, however, age alone offers an insufficient explanation for preventive counterproliferation be­hav­ior among US presidents. First, age is problematic as an explanation for preventive counterproliferation since it is inconclusive. The same individual presidents exhibit dif­ fer­ent be­hav­iors across relevant cases: George H. W. Bush at sixty-­four used

5

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­Table 1.1  Presidential age and preventive war be­hav­ior President

Age upon taking office

Case

Outcome

Kennedy Johnson G. H. W. Bush

43 55 64

Clinton

46

G. W. Bush

54

Obama Trump

47 70

China China Iraq DPRK Iraq DPRK Iraq DPRK Iran Iran

Serious consideration No consideration Use No consideration Use Consideration Use Unknown Consideration Consideration

force in the Gulf War but did not consider it against North ­Korea; likewise, George W. Bush at fifty-­four used force against Iraq but did not against North ­Korea, though the details of this ­later episode remain unknown. Second, the evidence goes against Horo­witz, McDermott, and Stam’s findings, as several younger men both considered and used military force. Third, it is not objectively clear when youth ends and when old age begins. One might reasonably argue that all of t­ hese presidents, with the exceptions of George H. W. Bush and Donald Trump, w ­ ere middle-­aged when entering office. To the extent that the categories of young and old are social constructions, it is not obvious which presidents we would expect to be inclined ­toward the use of preventive military force based on age alone.

Nuclear Beliefs and Preventive War I argue that leaders enter executive office possessing dif­fer­ent views about the dangers of nuclear proliferation and about specific threats posed by individual states attempting to go nuclear. ­These divergent prior views shape leaders’ adoption of divergent counterproliferation policies once in office. Specifically, ­these views affect the likelihood that a leader ­will consider preventive military force or use military intervention as a counterproliferation strategy. This is a leader-­centric argument for understanding decisions about the use of force, with cost-­ benefit analyses by vari­ ous leaders differing ­because of individual disagreements over the requirements of deterrence and the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such an argument can be understood in light of existing Cold War scholarship suggesting that leaders have patterned, entrenched, and divergent beliefs on topics fundamental to interventions.16 Borrowing from psy­chol­ogy, and following existing international relations lit­er­a­ture, I contend that dif­fer­ent ­people viewing the same evidence can disagree about the nature of a threat posed by a specific adversary and that ­these beliefs drive variation in counterproliferation decisions.17 That beliefs,

6

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

beyond individuals themselves, are consequential in international relations and foreign policy decision making is well established. While the formative lit­er­a­ture emerged in the 1960s and 1970s to document the relevance of individual beliefs, recent additions to the scholarship continue to advance our understanding of the precise mechanisms of influence and the scope conditions for applicability.18 The leader-­centric model aims to refine our understanding of prevention by using beliefs to connect the logic of preventive war to foreign policy decision making. The main alternative explanations against which the leader-­ centric model is tested largely offer static explanations of preventive force dynamics, including t­ hose focusing on regime type, alliance protection, and the balance of power between states. Some argue, for example, that preventive war can be understood by exploring power asymmetries across a dyad. ­Others articulate a logic whereby two states with dissimilar regime types, a history of disputes, and conflictual foreign policies would likely experience preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy. T ­ hese alternatives suggest not only that a focus on leaders and their beliefs is unnecessary but also that examining structural or state-­level characteristics is key to explaining historical variation in preventive war decisions. Though intuitively appealing, ­these models provide an insufficient explanation. Instead, my dynamic framework allows individuals to be the key decision makers and offers significant analytical traction. In the leader-­driven model, individuals facing the same evidence and same prob­lem are likely to have dif­fer­ent beliefs and expectations, which lead to dif­fer­ent strategy choices. Where relevant, the cases explore competing structural arguments that might expect leaders to consider or use preventive force only when ­there is a high likelihood of success. Fi­nally, to the extent that each case raises additional alternative logics, ­these logics are addressed in each respective chapter. The preventive logic looms large in international relations and argues that one state is likely to use military force to forestall a perceived decline in power relative to another.19 The motivation stems from the fear of this rising other, the implications of the decline for loss of power and prestige, and the adverse consequences of the other state’s gain in power and leverage. The thinking can be described as a “better now than l­ater” attitude: a state acts now to avoid paying concessions or suffering adverse consequences in the ­future. The preventive logic emerges from the more ubiquitous commitment prob­lem, which can lead rational states to fight a costly war when, ex ante, a negotiated settlement should be preferable.20 The preventive logic should be salient not only generally when one state ­will overtake another in terms of relative military and economic power but also when an adversary threatens to cross a critical threshold of military power that would radically and quickly change the balance of power. Nevertheless, the logic is underspecified as it fails to predict where or when force ­will be used.21 One military achievement that can relatively quickly change

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the balance of power and is thus potentially likely to result in the preventive use of force is the subject of this book: the acquisition of nuclear weapons.22 We might expect situations in which one state ­faces a nuclear-­seeking adversary to be easily captured by the preventive logic. Instead, we find variation in how and when the preventive logic applies; to date, this variation has not been convincingly explained.23 My argument improves the specification of the preventive logic by refining the mechanisms through which it operates. Whereas the preventive logic is a prominent feature of the scholarship, the lit­er­a­ture exploring preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy is particularly thin.24 This lit­er­a­ture is also striking for its almost uniform emphasis on the state as the relevant decision maker. Whereas I highlight the role of leaders and their divergent beliefs in explaining preventive be­hav­ior, the existing explanations that focus on the unitary state implicitly argue that the dangers from nuclear weapons are so ­great that almost any leader facing an adversary pursuing them ­will think and act similarly. I argue that leaders do not always behave similarly b ­ ecause this context, while grave, is not existential, especially for the United States. Even in Israel, which might face an existential threat, we also find divergent perspectives. This focus on the unitary state is but one shortcoming of the existing scholarship. Given this theoretical approach, key variables in the decision-­ making process—­most significantly the role of individual leaders—­are overlooked.25 ­There is also major overprediction of the frequency with which preventive war w ­ ill be used to forestall another state’s nuclear program. This overprediction may stem in part from the theoretical focus on the unitary state as the decision maker, as well as from the methodological choice to conduct statistical analy­sis or game theoretic modeling.26 By exploring the role of the national executive as well as conducting archival research and case studies, this book advances our understanding of the phenomenon by approaching it from new a­ ngles. While all methodological approaches have limitations, taking an archival approach can advance the scholarship beyond what previous studies have provided. Additionally problematic from a methodological perspective is that relevant scholarship often investigates all types of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological, and radiological) si­mul­ta­neously and therefore does not compare similar cases.27 The threat in the nuclear realm differs sufficiently from the threat of ­either chemical or biological weapons to warrant separate analy­sis. T ­ here are myriad reasons, but chief among them are the ubiquity of chemical and biological weapons relative to nuclear weapons, the relative ease of concealing chemical and biological programs, and the specific risks of retaliation inherent to striking ­these facilities as compared with striking nuclear installations.28 To maintain an analogous comparison across cases, I exclusively examine the development of nuclear weapons programs and the potential use of preventive war to forestall them.

8

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

Over time, the nuclear lit­er­at­ ure has developed from understanding proliferation dynamics from a state perspective to a new focus on leaders, their perceptions, and their preferences.29 This follows the trajectory within international relations, which despite an initial focus on leaders, shifted to a near exclusive focus on the system and the state, only to slowly return to leaders and their role in state be­hav­ior.30 Reflecting this progression and evidence suggesting that leaders are the key decision makers in this context, the next step is focused analy­sis on the role of leaders. A focus on leaders is necessary when we recognize that rationalist models assume that the cost-­benefit analy­sis a state undertakes when comparing the costs of war with the costs of ­doing nothing looks the same from ­every actor’s perspective. Yet, the “costs of preventive war” is a category incorporating many m ­ atters of interpretation that depend on leader beliefs. ­Under consideration are the concrete costs of the military action, risk of retaliation, and risk of escalation to wider war, as well as the very nature of international security and the requirements of deterrence. Additionally, notions about the costs of d ­ oing nothing, consequences of proliferation, utility of the use of force, and nature of the adversary in question—­all consequential for the decision—­are individually held. Furthermore, behavioral economics and po­liti­cal psy­chol­ogy have both called strict rationalist assumptions into question and frequently demonstrated them to be empirically false.31 Instead, I argue that a leader’s key nuclear beliefs shape each of t­hese ­factors. What might seem like a straightforward calculation that would produce similar reasoning in dif­fer­ent p ­ eople is actually a subjective estimation that varies by individual, based on e­ arlier life events and salient experiences. An individual leader’s beliefs both about the par­tic­u­lar crisis at hand and about the nature of international politics generally ­factor heavi­ly into the decision to use preventive military force. The leader atop the state apparatus is making t­ hese gut-­wrenching decisions; to overlook a leader’s role within ­those decisions would be shortsighted.

Research Design In order to both offer a theory of preventive war and explore the causal role of leaders’ nuclear beliefs in shaping intervention decisions, this book utilizes the small-­N comparative case method. This method achieves high concept validity by delving into the history to identify and mea­sure the indicators of interest. This method also allows for pro­cess tracing the causal mechanisms I theorize to be at work in this environment. This study is longitudinal in that it looks at the same dyads over time, to discover how consecutive administrations viewed the same adversary. The study is also cross-­sectional in examining multiple administrations within the same

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would-be preventer states that are contemplating preventive military force against a variety of adversaries. I employ an archival-­based research strategy to probe into the historical details of each case u ­ nder analy­sis.32 To identify and code leaders’ prior nuclear beliefs, I primarily explored the prepresidential period and asked a common set of questions across leaders to assess their individual threat perceptions. Focusing on the prepresidential period as distinct from the crisis period itself allows for disentangling beliefs from the politics and logistics of each case, which in turn avoids the criticism that beliefs are merely hooks through which leaders sell preferred policy. Pro­cess tracing then allows me to follow the formation of leaders’ beliefs through to the executive period to investigate what impact, if any, ­these beliefs had during the decision-­making period. Separating early beliefs from the case episode similarly demonstrates that something more than leaders’ beliefs about the efficacy of a par­tic­u­lar strategy is ­doing the causal work. The case se­lection strategy has allowed me to take advantage of a variety of sources in constructing cases. The earliest historical cases permit examination of declassified government documents, as well as memoirs and biographies of deceased decision makers. For post–­Cold War cases, beyond available government documents and secondary lit­er­at­ ure, I used extensive journalistic accounts, published interviews, and contemporaneous materials. For all cases, I also sought evidence that would support alternative explanations. Where I have found such evidence, I note it within the narratives. Data are drawn primarily from site visits to US archival institutions, including the National Security Archive and the relevant presidential libraries. ­Because my argument concerns prepresidential and individually held beliefs, I explored leaders’ personal rec­ords and materials from their prior positions. To understand a leader’s threat perception generally and regarding specific proliferants, I examined general subject files (that is, “nuclear” broadly defined) and also country-­specific files. For the dependent variable in each case, I searched decision-­making rec­ords from administration officials and secondary sources. At each location, I used available finding aids and sought guidance from resident archivists. They ­were especially helpful in identifying unlikely information sources, such as materials in a lesser-­ known personal secretary’s file, which I had not thought to survey. Fi­nally, a complementary approach involved footnote tracing from impor­tant secondary sources for relevant archival materials that might tend e­ ither to confirm or disconfirm my argument.33 Additionally, I examined pertinent published volumes from the Foreign Relations of the United States and Public Papers of the Presidents collections. As in the physical locations, I explored the available historical rec­ords including recorded minutes and transcripts of executive or cabinet meetings; private diplomatic correspondence; government documents including speeches, testimony, voting rec­ords, military plans, bud­get estimates, and declassified

10

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

intelligence reports; and also memos, letters, and memoirs of relevant actors. As ­there is a rich secondary lit­er­a­ture on the history of nuclear weapons and par­tic­ul­ar states’ nuclear pursuits, I used diplomatic history and international relations texts on ­these cases to guide the archival search. T ­ here is an abundant journalistic rec­ord that I explored in depth. Fi­nally, I examined presidential biographies, diaries, and historical recordings as relevant. By exploring this combination of diverse sources, I re-­create rich historical accounts of the cases ­under analy­sis. I triangulate across evidentiary materials both within the archives and between vari­ous types of sources.34 Exploiting both official government sources and unofficial personal rec­ords, I document how dif­fer­ent leaders perceived the threats they faced looking specifically at their beliefs about deterrence and nuclear weapons, the options the leaders felt they had in confronting ­those threats, and the justification the leaders provided for the policy ultimately implemented. B ­ ecause I explore the prepresidential rec­ords of each leader and examine that leader’s beliefs prior to holding the presidency, I disentangle personal, individually held beliefs from the details of a specific crisis.35 By comparing how multiple administrations viewed the same adversary, I ascertain how dif­fer­ent ­people viewed the same situation; understood their choices; and de­cided to consider preventive force, use preventive force, or abstain. The case universe spans the nuclear era, from its early stages in 1942 ­until 2018. For reasons of data availability that would arise in trying to acquire material on the most recent cases, arguably the most impor­tant ongoing case—­ that of the Ira­nian nuclear program—is discussed only in the conclusion. Much of the scholarship on this topic is understandably US-­centric, given the ease of access to information in the United States and the country’s role as a leader in nonproliferation and counterproliferation. ­Because of its regular election cycles, the US context is fruitful for testing an argument about the role of leaders in foreign policy decision making. Especially within the nuclear context, in which the president has outsized influence, the US environment is ripe for analy­sis. That said, this US-­centricity characterizes much of the nuclear scholarship writ large and has led to a potentially problematic bias within the theoretical understanding of the nuclear realm, inasmuch as we have overgeneralized lessons from the US (and Soviet) experience to new nuclear states.36 We should therefore temper our conclusions for other contexts. By exploring cases primarily within the US context, I hold constant f­ actors that might other­wise confound my argument, including regime type, global position, and regional dynamics. Narrowing the core empirical chapters in this way allows for a “structured, focused comparison” of the role that leader beliefs play in preventive war decision making.37 By examining a single state and its be­hav­ior over time, as well as exploring consecutive presidential administrations, I control for the target state and isolate the effect of the individuals themselves. This approach extends a research design employed by

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Elizabeth Saunders into an empirical area where some may doubt the existence and significance of belief variation across leaders.38 To analyze US decision making, I explore one case from the Cold War and two cases from the post–­Cold War period. I do so to assess the specific role of the Cold War in intervention decisions, as it might have influenced strategy se­lection by encouraging or discouraging the use of force. For the Cold War, in chapter 3, I examine US deliberations about the Chinese nuclear program in both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For the more con­ temporary period, chapters 4 and 5 explore the Iraq and North ­Korea cases, respectively. T ­ hese post–­Cold War cases are especially useful b ­ ecause they allow me to hold the target states constant and explore multiple administrations’ be­hav­ior ­toward Iraq and North ­Korea, as well as to examine variation within each administration across adversaries. Stated differently, looking at Iraq and North K ­ orea allows me to examine how both George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton dealt with both Iraq and North K ­ orea during approximately the same time frame. This examination allows me to understand why force was used repeatedly against Iraq but never against North K ­ orea, even though it presented a similar situation confronted by the same leaders who used force against Iraq. As an additional test of generalizability beyond the Cold War, the book also explores US be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis Iraq ­under George W. Bush, both as the newest instance of US preventive war be­hav­ior and as a test of the model’s traction in the post–­September 11 environment. Next, I test the argument’s generalizability by applying the theory to Israeli preventive war be­hav­ior. Israel is arguably the most impor­tant other actor within this empirical space given the frequency with which the country has considered and used preventive force as a counterproliferation strategy. Moreover, given Israel’s similar characteristics to the United States—­regional power, status as a Western democracy, semiregular leadership turnover, and a similar national security apparatus—­there are reasons to expect similar dynamics in this new environment. T ­ hese characteristics and o ­ thers are described fully in chapter 6 along with brief analyses of Israel’s be­hav­ior regarding the nuclear programs of Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria. This chapter is impor­tant for demonstrating the leader-­centric argument’s ability to move beyond the US decision-­making environment. Chapter 7 concludes the book by reviewing the argument and its implications for both the academic lit­er­a­ture and the policy community. The chapter discusses how the leader-­ centric argument applies to the ongoing situation with the Ira­nian nuclear program as well as con­temporary circumstances with North K ­ orea. While North K ­ orea has had nuclear weapons since approximately 2006 and possesses a significant ballistic missile program, the country no longer pre­sents an analogous situation for comparison for the leader-­centric framework. I discuss the implications of ­these and other developments, paying par­tic­u­lar attention to events during the Trump administration. For Iran, the focus is on the critical period following the

12

When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force

United States’ withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018. I emphasize relevant domestic po­liti­cal developments within both the United States and Israel and evaluate their consequences for the ­future of this situation. As Israel and the United States are engaging the Ira­nian nuclear development in­de­pen­dently and in concert with one another, a discussion of both states is warranted.

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

When do leaders use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy? Some national executives use preventive military force to destroy or forestall an adversarial nuclear program in formation, while o ­ thers consider force but then abstain. Still other leaders never contemplate force in the first place. To address this variation, I argue that leaders and their beliefs are key to understanding state responses to nuclear proliferation and that their role has been previously overlooked. Specifically, leaders enter executive office possessing dif­fer­ent views about the dangers of nuclear proliferation generally and about the threats posed by individual states attempting to go nuclear. ­These divergent prior views encourage leaders to adopt dif­fer­ent preventive force policies once in office, when they may use or consider using military force as a counterproliferation strategy. Instead of focusing on the unitary state, as the authors of much of the existing lit­er­a­ture have, I offer a leader-­centric argument for understanding preventive war decisions. The counterproliferation policies ­adopted by subsequent leaders in the same polity differ b ­ ecause of individual disagreements over the requirements of deterrence and the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

Understanding Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy Preventive wars are wars fought now to avoid the risk of fighting ­under less favorable conditions ­later. ­These wars begin “when a state attacks b ­ ecause it feels that in the longer term (usually the next few years) it w ­ ill be attacked or ­will suffer relatively increasing strategic inferiority.”1 The preventive logic stipulates that one state is likely to use military force to forestall a perceived decline in power relative to another state, likely acting out of fear of this rising state and concomitant consequences in lost power, leverage, and prestige.2 Even if the rising state is currently peaceful, t­here exists uncertainty

14

Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

concerning that rising state’s ­future intentions, given that preferences and interests can change. In the nuclear arena, a preventive war occurs when one state, facing another state in the pro­cess of acquiring nuclear weapons, attacks its nuclear program to attempt to destroy or forestall it and remove the ­future possibility of fighting a nuclear-­armed adversary.3 Thus, a state considers the extent to which military power is shifting in the other’s f­ avor.4 The more the adversary stands to gain in terms of both material capabilities and bargaining leverage, the more likely the declining state should be to try to prevent this outcome. Though prevention to thwart nuclear acquisition should be an easy case to explain, the ­little extant scholarship lacks comprehensive explanations of the phenomenon, failing to predict where or when the use of force w ­ ill likely occur.5 Also included in my analy­sis are preventive strikes, or the use of military attacks to target a ­limited number of nuclear assets within an adversary’s territory so as to inflict damage on or destroy the nuclear infrastructure, eliminate the ability to produce a nuclear weapon, or both. T ­ hese strikes are distinct in that they do not occur within the context of a larger war or intervention. Rather, they are often “pinprick” attacks directed at one target or a relatively small number of targets. The 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear installation is classified as a preventive strike. By contrast, the 2003 war in Iraq is considered a preventive war in that the US focus on Iraq’s nuclear infrastructure took place as part of a full-­scale invasion. Both forms of preventive military force—­wars and strikes—­are distinct from wars of preemption, despite regular confusion between the two. Preemption “involves the initiation of military action b ­ ecause it is perceived that an adversary’s attack is imminent and that ­there are advantages to striking first, or at least preventing the adversary from ­doing so.”6 The imminence of the adversary’s attack is the key distinguishing feature. The quin­tes­sen­ tial historical example is the 1967 Six-­Day War when Israel launched an attack ­after receiving intelligence that Syria and Egypt w ­ ere mobilizing on Israel’s borders for an invasion.7 Fi­nally, the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy is empirically rare. By contrast, consideration of the use of preventive force occurs with relative frequency. Furthermore, puzzling dynamics surround this consideration: sometimes one executive seriously considers military force, but his successor does not, despite a looming nuclear acquisition. For example, despite John F. Kennedy’s serious consideration of preventing China’s nascent nuclear weapons program, Lyndon Johnson did not seriously consider the issue ­after Kennedy’s assassination. Consideration of the use of preventive military force requires a sizable investment of time, personnel, leadership, and resources within a state, so it is significant that this consideration takes place frequently. B ­ ecause the use of force cannot occur

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without prior consideration, ascertaining the mechanisms linking consideration to ­actual use of force is a way of understanding when preventive strikes and wars are likely to occur. Negative cases are therefore not only instances in which preventive force is not used; rather, t­hese cases also include both episodes in which preventive force is not considered and t­hose in which force is considered but not deployed.

Alternative Explanations and Hypotheses What might explain variation in the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy? Existing international relations lit­er­a­ture offers two sets of possibilities: structural considerations and politics at the state level, often within a state’s domestic po­liti­cal environment. The first class of logics rests at the structural level of the international system and focuses on the distribution of power between states. This lit­er­a­ture describes how changes in relative power could cause states to go to war with one another and how power transitions, in which one state overtakes another in power potential, can be especially dangerous.8 ­Here, the general preventive logic holds that states w ­ ill go to war when they fear decline. Dale Copeland’s book The Origins of Major War offers a useful example of this type of logic; his “dynamic differentials theory” argues that still-­dominant military powers initiate wars when they fear significant decline, especially in a situation of bi­polar­ity, with one major power facing only one other major potential adversary.9 For Copeland and o ­ thers, the logic implies that states should objectively assess changes in the international system and respond accordingly. Therefore, in the case of a developing nuclear program, one would expect a state to react to the program’s potential to change the balance of power through the use of force. While that expectation is intuitive, this lit­er­at­ure lacks precise empirical specifications for when declines precipitate wars and does not explain why some do and ­others do not. A small number of analyses from the nuclear lit­er­a­ture offer a similar structural focus. Alexandre Debs and Nuno Monteiro argue that nuclear proliferation is likely to succeed if the proliferator is militarily strong relative to its adversaries and protected by a power­ful ally.10 Specifically, the higher the proliferating state’s relative power to its foes, the greater the likelihood it ­will succeed in its nuclear endeavor, given the costs for the adversary attacking it. Additionally, absent a strong relative power position, a security guarantee by a patron w ­ ill also deter attack by an adversary, again increasing the likelihood of successful proliferation. Elsewhere, the authors investigate the effect of transparent or covert military investments, including attempts at nuclear acquisition, to show, using game theory, how transparency leads to peace.11 By contrast, when acquisition attempts are undetected, other states may be willing to attack militarily rather than suffer a f­ uture power shift that

16

Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

would undermine their strategic position. Similarly, Lyle Goldstein emphasizes the power asymmetry between states and argues that militarily superior states are “likely to see a ticking clock with re­spect to an inferior state’s WMD [weapons of mass destruction] program,” b ­ ecause of sensitivities about shifts in the balance of power and a desire to fight sooner rather than ­later.12 Superior states are therefore likely to attack given a sizable power imbalance. Such arguments are problematic b ­ ecause slow-­moving variables like power asymmetry do not well explain observed variation that transpires over only a handful of years. While each of ­these works offers its own take on the mechanisms at play, together they yield an expectation that states make objective assessments of their rivals’ nuclear acquisitions and take mea­sures to balance accordingly. Therefore, any such nuclear development should catalyze a similar state response. Any variation between leader responses should be driven by significant changes in a program’s development and not stem from the leaders themselves. Thus, changes in the distribution of power, especially in the form of attempted nuclear weapons acquisition by a weaker power, should lead the more power­ful state to use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. Alternatively, the explanation for variation in preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy may operate at the domestic level, exemplifying the second image of international relations.13 First, states may be likely to consider attacking or to attack a nuclear program in formation when they are highly threatened by the proliferator’s acquisition of the bomb. Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah Kreps find that threats are particularly salient when ­there is a history of violent conflict within a dyad, when the country attempting to proliferate is autocratic, and when t­ here is a history of divergent foreign policy preferences between the two states.14 The authors pre­sent a rigorous statistical analy­sis and compile the first comprehensive case universe based on an abundance of qualitative evidence. While I concur that divergent foreign policy preferences influence the likelihood of the consideration of preventive military force (­these divergent preferences are subsumed into a broader variable regarding the potential proliferator’s deterrability), the other two variables offer l­ittle traction ­because of their static nature. For example, a state’s regime type is unlikely to change in the period ­under analy­sis, and yet we see variation in the dependent variable. Stated more concretely, China remained a communist, authoritarian regime throughout the period 1961–1964, yet President Kennedy seriously considered the use of preventive force, while his successor Lyndon Johnson did not. Second, arguments about bureaucratic politics or public opinion could offer traction in explaining the empirical variation in question, though are less useful as in­de­pen­dent alternative explanations ­because they do not address the counterproliferation environment specifically.15 Theories of diversionary war might also be relevant if some domestic po­liti­cal crisis ­causes a state’s leader

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­Table 2.1  Alternative explanation summary ­table Type

Analytical focus

Limitations

Structural

Changes in relative power

Underspecified; static variables; state-centric

Domestic

Threat posed by proliferator (violent conflict history, divergent regime type, divergent foreign policy preferences)

Static variables

Bureaucratic politics (pulling and hauling; power­ful advisers); diversionary war; public opinion

Empirically unsupported

to use preventive military force as a way to distract from prob­lems at home.16 Alternatively, the decision to use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy could result from the bureaucratic pro­cess of pulling and hauling among cabinet or other relevant national security officials or from the influence of well-­positioned advisers.17 This explanation fails to account for variation in preventive war strategy, however; President Kennedy and President Johnson had identical cabinets during the relevant time period yet pursued dif­fer­ent policies. Likewise, in other cases, ­there is no historical evidence of bureaucratic logrolling or bureaucratic debate driving the decision-­making pro­cess. Fi­nally, if public opinion is dramatically in f­ avor of the use of military force, then a leader might succumb to electoral pressures and order an intervention despite the leader’s individual preferences. Regardless of the precise mechanism, if any of ­ these logics offer traction, we should observe the decision-­making pro­cess unfold within the state polity, with internal bureaucratic actors driving the deliberations, public opinion leading the executive into action, or a domestic po­liti­cal challenge offering the executive the opportunity to distract the population through external conflict. I explore t­ hese and other domestic po­liti­cal arguments as relevant in the case chapters. A summary of ­these alternatives and their expectations appears in t­ able 2.1.

Explaining Intervention: A Leader-­centric Argument The leader-­centric model of preventive war decision making focuses on the heterogeneity of beliefs across individual leaders and in par­tic­u­lar how key nuclear beliefs are consequential for preventive war strategy. My claim is that ­there are categories of beliefs about which leaders w ­ ill disagree in patterned ways; ­these beliefs are overlooked in the lit­er­a­ture but germane to preventive war decisions occurring ­under uncertainty. Specifically, beliefs influence how leaders perceive and prioritize the threats they confront, and beliefs lead decision makers to their preferred responses. In this section, I explain the

18

Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

decision to focus on leaders, situate the argument within the relevant lit­er­ a­tures, explore the specific disagreement relevant to preventive war, and develop the model and its components in detail.18 International relations has over time recognized that individuals—­who ­were once relegated to the purview of historians and psychologists—­play a consistent and impor­tant role in directing state be­hav­ior. Leaders have been shown to play a central role in shaping ­causes of war, alliance patterns, and more. This validation has brought individuals back into f­ avor as a causal explanation for impor­tant interstate and intrastate dynamics. Although scholars have demonstrated the role of individual leaders in a state’s intervention decision making, this approach has not yet carried over to preventive decision making in the nuclear context.19 Given the large lit­er­a­ture finding that leaders are critical for explaining variation in other international outcomes of interest, and the fact that the counterproliferation lit­er­at­ ure predominantly focuses on unitary actors, my argument advances our understanding of this topic. Furthermore, within the nuclear lit­er­a­ture, a significant trend is to recognize the key role individuals play in other aspects of decision making, including decisions on both proliferation and arms control.20 By similarly focusing on leaders, I develop new insights about key nuclear beliefs consequential for understanding the rarity of preventive force as a counterproliferation strategy, and I highlight two discrete pathways that result in no intervention. In this way, I augment the lit­er­a­ture on the critical role of individual leaders in foreign policy and international security to address the crucial role leaders play in counterproliferation decision making. t h reat percepti o n a n d i n d i vi dua l le a d e r s ­There are empirical reasons to suspect that leaders may m ­ atter in counterproliferation decisions. Specifically, executive dominance in decisions about use of force elevates the importance of leaders in explaining policy outcomes. Leaders are likely consequential for counterproliferation and other nuclear decisions b ­ ecause leaders are at least relatively insulated from traditional po­liti­cal bargaining.21 Consider that foreign policy debates normally include congressional hearings, interagency discussions, and interactions between the executive and legislature as each party advances its interests.22 For example, in procurement decisions, interbranch military politics and local congressional considerations influence what the United States acquires for its arsenal. In this area and elsewhere Congress has a vested interest, controls the bud­get, and actively participates. Conversely, in the counterproliferation context, ­because interagency strug­gles, pork-­barrel politics, and congressional authorization are less relevant, intervention decisions should rest more firmly with executives.23 An existing theoretical framework seeks to explain why executives might dominate this pro­cess. Elizabeth Saunders theorizes the conditions ­under

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which domestic f­ actors should be relevant for nuclear choices.24 ­Whether executives must co-­opt other domestic actors to achieve their desired policy, and the degree of threat uncertainty, should determine which domestic actors are relevant and in what ways. Accordingly, as preventive war decisions require secrecy, we should expect a leader to maintain a tight decision-­ making circle. ­Because ­there are few outsiders to co-­opt, and ­because the threat posed by a proliferator is subjective, leaders could be incentivized to exclude ­others, as t­ hose with divergent perspectives and strategy preferences may seek to undermine a leader’s preferred policy. Thus, both ­factors encourage a centralized decision environment where the executive is insulated from the institutional apparatus. This centralization may be increasingly true over time; US presidential power has grown significantly, making it especially likely that the executive dominates t­ hese ­matters.25 Despite arguments that expect ­every leader to think and act similarly when facing an adversary pursuing nuclear weapons, I argue that such a convergence around a central notion of security or national interest does not occur ­because this context, while grave, is not always existential. Especially for the United States, given its size and power preponderance, a single proliferation development should rarely threaten the state’s existence, making convergence around a single view unlikely.26 I argue instead that dif­fer­ent leaders within a single state assess an intervention decision and the supporting cost-­benefit calculation in very dif­fer­ ent ways, meaning ­there is no one state-­level assessment of a preventive situation. Consequently, the leader-­centric argument focuses on rational disagreement across individuals along the key input variables in a preventive war cost-­benefit analy­sis. Focusing at this individual level of analy­sis offers more precision in understanding the use of preventive war historically and moves beyond traditional preventive war arguments that offer indeterminate expectations.27 r atio nal d isagreemen t a mo n g i n d i vi dua l s I offer a leader-­centric model focusing on variation in leader beliefs regardless of their origin.28 Specifically, I argue that leaders possess divergent beliefs about the consequences of proliferation and the threat posed by an adversary, leading to dif­fer­ent strategy preferences. This claim is distinct from claims of computational ­mistakes, a lack of rationality, or individual bias that might other­wise drive t­ hese divergences.29 ­Because leaders possess divergent prior beliefs about the nature of international threats and global proliferation, leaders also prioritize differently the potential challenges facing their state and appropriate policy responses.30 Thus, leaders draw on their prior beliefs to assess both threats and potential solutions when confronting proliferation. Accordingly, even though they all still conduct a

20

Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

cost-­benefit analy­sis to formulate strategy, leaders with divergent beliefs ­will pursue dif­fer­ent strategies.31 According to the Oxford En­glish Dictionary, a belief is “an ac­cep­tance that something exists or is true.”32 Along with worldviews and principled beliefs, causal beliefs, or beliefs about cause-­effect relationships, are one type of consequential idea within international relations and foreign policy.33 Inclusion of ­these ideas followed the cognitive turn in psy­chol­ogy that explored patterns of ­human thinking to document systematic deviations from rationalist assumptions.34 International relations sought to examine t­ hese new insights for their potential application to questions including how decision making affected po­liti­cal outcomes of interest. The new scholarship included analyses of bounded rationality, risk assessments or anchoring be­hav­ior, and heuristics that influence information pro­cessing, and ­these efforts generated related scholarship on the use and misuse of analogies and history in decision making.35 Collectively, t­ hese works examine “nonstandard” preferences, beliefs, or decision-­making procedures.36 ­These authors’ findings demonstrate that p ­ eople have formative experiences, develop relevant beliefs, and carry both with them when they take office and use their beliefs to interpret the evidence and situations ­these leaders ­later encounter.37 Recently, two related themes have developed in the burgeoning international relations scholarship as outgrowths of the initial pathbreaking studies. First, new work examines heterogeneity of preferences, beliefs, and decision-­making pro­cesses across similarly positioned individuals, and investigates ­whether such traits converge with rationalist expectations.38 This scholarship explores dif­fer­ent types of beliefs held by individuals, variation in attitudes about f­actors key to international politics such as resolve, and differences in personal experience.39 Second, new lit­er­a­ture studies so-­called aggregation issues—­whether and how to extrapolate be­hav­ior from the individual to aggregate decision making, critical for connecting the dots between levels of analy­sis in international relations.40 This book follows in the vein of this new lit­er­a­ture by focusing on the heterogeneity of beliefs across individual leaders. Instead of offering a nonstandard or nonrational theory of decision making, this book explores a “new” behavioral model for how beliefs could be incorporated into rationalist models.41 Methodologically, whereas some recent work relies on experiments or surveys to understand how individuals behave on average, I use a qualitative approach to explore how specific individual leaders talked or wrote about the beliefs in question. I do so both as a way to understand how key world leaders behaved in critical historical episodes and as a necessity given the difficulty of screening former leaders, a task made especially problematic by the passage of time. Using documentary and historical evidence allows me to examine the body of material left b ­ ehind by an individual leader and compare across similarly situated p ­ eople.

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It is well documented that leaders’ beliefs are causally impor­tant for foreign policy outcomes.42 This is also true for military decisions: “The most impor­tant source of willingness to intervene is the perception of a threat to national security, but even within the same state, leaders may differ in how they identify such threats. As dif­fer­ent individual leaders survey the landscape of international ­hazards, they use causal beliefs [about the nature of the international system] . . . ​to sort and prioritize the many pos­si­ble threats they face.”43 I argue that during their formative years, p ­ eople form substantive beliefs that are useful l­ater when they become state leaders and confront potential interventions. The beliefs provide guidance for achieving leaders’ identified priorities.44 This is an analogous claim to one made by Saunders in her analy­sis of Third World interventions: she argues that, once in executive office, leaders use their prior beliefs to achieve goals.45 Saunders’s argument, however, centers on ­whether leaders view threats as emerging from internal state characteristics or external state actions. My argument builds on the prior lit­er­a­ture by drawing on previously formed, per­sis­tent beliefs about threats; however, the content of ­these substantive beliefs is dif­fer­ent in the preventive counterproliferation context. The key nuclear beliefs explore the degree to which leaders view nuclear proliferation as negatively consequential for the international system. The counterproliferation environment could be challenging for a theory based on beliefs, as some might expect beliefs to be dwarfed by considerations of the balance of power. Especially b ­ ecause some may doubt the existence of significant divergences in nuclear beliefs across leaders, my test is useful in exploring substantial and unexplained variation in preventive be­hav­ior. As leaders confront an adversarial proliferant, they conduct an expected utility calculation aimed at maximizing state security. They use their individually held nuclear beliefs to weigh the costs and benefits of intervening against the costs and benefits of not intervening, as well as the likelihood of success of each action. Beliefs thus act as the lens through which leaders determine the inputs of their cost-­benefit calculations. Beliefs are a leader’s subjective views and relevant perceptions regarding the nuclear context and international affairs more broadly. Included in this cost-­benefit assessment might be military and ­human costs, relative power considerations, domestic and international reputational costs, normative costs associated with the nuclear taboo, l­egal prohibitions against prevention, or some combination of ­these.46 Subjectively, t­hese costs are weighed against the potential benefits: the adversary w ­ ill not go nuclear, and t­ here may be normative gains in upholding a nonproliferation norm or commitment. Among ­these diverse inputs, two are specifically influential for strategy decisions: the perceived consequences of global proliferation and the perceived threat from the specific proliferant once nuclear armed. Indeed, the historical rec­ord bears out that, while t­hese other f­ actors may theoretically enter into the calculation, ­there is ­little to no evidence to suggest they ­matter in the decision.

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Moreover, given uncertainty regarding the success and consequences of intervention, beliefs are useful for decision making, which might other­wise be stymied by that uncertainty.47 nuclea r beliefs The most consequential sources of disagreement across individuals and the most relevant beliefs for this intervention decision are a leader’s view of the consequences of nuclear proliferation and the probability of deterring the proliferator from attack once armed with nuclear weapons.48 ­These two ­factors thus comprise the leader-­centric theory’s first two in­de­pen­dent variables. That ­people debate ­these issues and have disagreements over what is threatening is unsurprising, as perceptions of danger are inherently subjective.49 Given divergences in t­hese perceptions, leaders confronting the same proliferant are expected to recognize dif­fer­ent threat levels. The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation. ​Academic debates over the impact of nuclear proliferation concern ­whether additional proliferation results in a higher or lower probability of nuclear use. A voluminous lit­er­a­ture documents the main debate perspectives: optimism, pessimism, and relativism.50 Proliferation optimists expect that war w ­ ill be less likely with additional states in the system acquiring nuclear weapons. Given that the extreme costs of nuclear war make even a nuclear victory a Pyrrhic one, optimists expect the costs to induce caution among all parties. Optimists focus on minimum requirements for nuclear deterrence and their peace-­creating nature.51 One particularly colorful optimist, R. Robert Sandoval, articulates the “porcupine theory,” saying that even states with modest capabilities would “walk like a porcupine through the forests of international affairs: no threat to its neighbors, and too prickly for predators to swallow.”52 Likewise, Waltz describes how the very possibility of nuclear use induces caution, meaning that as ­there are more weapons, the less likely war becomes.53 Though optimists differ on the durability of peace through proliferation, they share a focus on the deterrent value of nuclear weapons in light of the high costs that the presence of the weapons risks imposing.54 Conversely, proliferation pessimists emphasize the risks of additional states’ nuclear acquisition. Some focus on orga­nizational aspects and bureaucratic pathologies that create risks; o ­ thers doubt that all new nuclear states ­will abide by Western conceptions of deterrence.55 For Lewis Dunn, new ­owners of nuclear weapons may see coercive or ­actual use value in newly acquired arsenals, which is especially destabilizing when coupled with vari­ous domestic disturbances that could lead to use of the weapons.56 Scott Sagan explored pathological impediments to rational calculation and coordination, and described how complex organ­izations possess conflicting goals, are intensely po­liti­cal, and exhibit fierce internal competition;

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collectively, t­ hese characteristics undermine safety and security.57 Together, ­these views challenge optimists’ deterrence logic, positing instead that additional proliferation is dangerous for the international system.58 Fi­nally, proliferation relativists focus on the proliferants themselves to determine the consequences of their proliferation, examining the type of state, its regime type, and its ideology.59 Prior to becoming Richard Nixon’s secretary of defense, James Schlesinger notably wrote that the consequences of a state’s proliferation depend on the character of the state, not the details of its program.60 He and like-­minded ­others argued that it is the internal structure and characteristics of a state, not its larger environment, that determine the impact of the state’s proliferation. ­These same cleavages are especially likely to exist among leaders who must consider the consequences of proliferation for their states’ security. I use only two ideal types—­optimist and pessimist—­and locate ­people across this spectrum, incorporating the characteristics on which relativists focus into the categorization. Creating archetypes, I expect a general divide between the two perspectives, with the specific characteristics manifesting depending on what is salient for the individuals themselves. The Probability of Deterring the Proliferator. ​Whereas the “consequences of proliferation” variable concerns the international arena, the second variable, the probability of deterring the proliferator from attack once armed with nuclear weapons, looks at the impact of a specific state’s proliferation attempt on the security and foreign policy of the would-be preventer state. Yet in the same way that the consequences of proliferation are contentious, so too is determining how threatening a given state is likely to be once in possession of nuclear weapons. Assessing this threat is necessarily complicated, as nuclear strategy requires understanding the state’s intentions, type, and likelihood of pursuing specific strategies, as well as what is necessary to deter the state once armed with nuclear weapons.61 Similarly, the validity of assumptions about the requirements of deterrence are difficult to prove given the lack of data to analyze, as no nuclear wars have been fought between nuclear-­armed adversaries.62 Furthermore, ­these debates typically do not concern the well-­documented cost-­benefit logic: rational states are deterred from action when the costs and likelihood of a countervailing threat outweigh the expected benefits and likelihood of achieving the state’s desired action.63 ­Because the deterrence logic is not contentious, the complication concerns how to translate this logic into policy for a specific prob­lem.64 It is impossible to discern from the outside what exact goals an e­ nemy has or the utility it attaches to achieving them.65 It is therefore difficult if not impossible to know what is necessary to prevent the e­ nemy from trying to achieve ­those goals and to deter the ­enemy from action. Moreover, the inherent subjectivity of threat perception adds to the subjectivity and disputability of the threat posed by an adversary.66

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

In light of the complexity surrounding threat perception and deterrability, I assess a leader’s beliefs about the threat posed by a par­tic­u­lar adversary by exploring the leader’s thinking about closely related f­ actors. ­These ­factors include (1) the proliferator’s ability to limit the preventer’s freedom of action; (2) the proliferator’s intentions and level of dedication in pursuit of its goals; and (3) what would be necessary to deter the proliferator from undesirable be­hav­ior. This assessment explores what a par­tic­u­lar leader believed about the goals and aims of the adversary in question and what level of costs the adversary might be willing to expend in achieving them. The inquiry asks w ­ hether some sufficient, hy­po­thet­i­cal cost might change the adversary’s be­hav­ior.67 In sum, ­these ­factors indicate how consequential the nuclear acquisition would be for the freedom of mobility of the leader’s own state. Of related interest is what a par­tic­u­lar leader thought broadly about deterrence, including his or her own state’s deterrent capacity, based primarily on the nature of that state’s own nuclear arsenal. Where relevant, the analy­sis also describes the leader’s views of the potential impact of the nuclear acquisition on other ele­ments of the state’s national security and foreign policy, including but not l­imited to allies and regional interests. Such ­factors help complete the picture of how deterrable a leader perceived a specific adversary to be once armed with nuclear weapons. A well-­documented Cold War debate over the threat posed by and the requirements of deterring the Soviet Union lends further credence and empirical support to the argument that leaders w ­ ill have divergent beliefs about deterrence that ­will influence subsequent strategies.68 This debate also showcases the previously described variables in play. Given the debate’s contours, despite the period’s unique Soviet focus, similar debates over other states should also manifest. During the Cold War, even the savviest members of the American po­liti­ cal establishment hotly debated the intentions of the Soviet Union and what could and should be done to deter it: “Should [the] Soviets be seen as analogous to Nazi Germany, an implacably aggressive ­enemy, malevolent and bent on world domination? . . . ​Or should the Soviet Union be seen, as a nation led by ‘cautious and rather fearful men,’ a nation capable of aggressive action but concerned above all, with ensuring its own security?”69 Three main perspectives emerged with potential answers: (1) the Soviets ­were inherently expansionist and sought to dominate the world; (2) they ­were primarily concerned with their own vulnerabilities and sought security to improve them; and (3) they had conflicting goals, being highly competitive and seeking opportunities to compete while also being subject to rival domestic priorities and international pressures that constrained Soviet actions. Central to this debate was a disagreement over type—­that is, the kind of state that the Soviet Union was—­and how US foreign policy should be conducted against the country.70 Should deterrence be pursued at ­every turn to quell

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aggressive Soviet be­hav­ior, or instead should the US, mindful of the possibility that a conflict could spiral out of control, exercise caution?71 The three main views offered competing answers. ­Those who viewed the Soviets as expansionist and unalterably committed to achieving global dominance expected them to do so through coercive military means.72 ­These observers argued that the interests of the United States and the USSR ­were in profound conflict and that only US military strength would limit Soviet expansion.73 Accordingly, Americans thought the Soviets prioritized expansion, ­were willing to pay large costs to achieve their goals, and ­were therefore very difficult to deter.74 Proponents of this view would likely have advocated preventive military force to forestall Soviet nuclear acquisition. Conversely, a second approach saw the Soviet Union as singularly focused on improving its own security against po­liti­cal, military, and geo­graph­i­cal vulnerabilities. With their territory having suffered repeated invasions historically, Soviet foreign and military policies aimed above all e­ lse to achieve security for the Soviet state.75 Accordingly, this perspective saw the United States and the USSR as sharing considerable mutual interests, principally ­because the USSR was viewed as neither inherently aggressive nor expansionist but instead, like the United States, seeking nuclear deterrence only to protect the homeland. Furthermore, given the strong deterrent value of nuclear weapons embedded in this view, proponents would have been less likely to advocate for preventive military force against the Soviet nuclear program. A final view of the Soviets argued that their foreign policy was highly competitive, even expansionist, and that they ­were seeking military superiority. However, this perspective recognized that Soviet foreign policy was also highly constrained by both domestic and international considerations. This view saw the Soviet Union, very much like a traditional g ­ reat power, as out to maximize the state’s self-­interest and ready to exploit any opportunities to do so.76 As a hybrid position, focusing on both expansionist tendencies and the benefits of mutual cooperation, this view is not analytically distinct from the other two. Beyond the Soviet case, over time many scholars have focused on the tendency of states to balance or bandwagon against one another given shifting distributions of power. Central to the expectations of balancing is one’s perception of what type of state is being confronted. Though spectra of state type abound, the basic division concerns states that are comfortable with the status quo and t­ hose that wish to overturn it.77 Charles Glaser, for example, focuses on assessments of what a state wants and the value it places on achieving par­tic­u­lar outcomes. In his categorization, t­here are two relevant dimensions: security seeking and greed. We can predict that security seekers should be relatively less prone to aggression against o ­ thers. If security seekers pursue nuclear weapons, we expect them to do so to enhance their own security. Conversely, greedy states are likely to be more offensive-­minded,

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

outwardly aggressive, and out to overthrow the status quo in order to exercise their motivations and satiate their expansive desires. Related to the issue of state type is an adversary’s willingness to bear costs in pursuit of its goals, reflecting the stakes involved in the dispute.78 An adversary that is highly resolved, or very willing to bear costs, so values the potential benefits it aims to acquire that it is willing to bear high costs in order to do so. As an example, historian Richard Pipes argued that the Soviets ­were so committed to expansion and resolved in their efforts that they would be nearly impossible to deter, making them incredibly threatening and dangerous for the United States. He based this assessment on the cost insensitivity the Soviets displayed during World War II, when tremendous population losses did not deter them from continued outward aggression.79 Often high levels of resolve are associated with conflicts over homeland, strategic territory, or objects of cultural significance with e­ ither intrinsic or strategic value (or both). As a result, the imposition of very high costs is unlikely to deter the state in question, given the high values associated with ­these benefits. Reflecting t­ hese characteristics, we can hypothesize that states that are highly resolved are less likely to be deterrable and more threatening to the potential preventer. On the other hand, less resolved states are more likely to be deterrable and less threatening.80 Examining what a leader perceives as the proliferator’s intentions and willingness to bear costs allows for an assessment of what the subjective threat estimation was at the time the leader confronted a specific case of proliferation. If one believes an adversary to be expansionist, seeking to overturn the status quo, or out for domination, this adversary should likewise be seen as difficult to deter. Moreover, achieving one’s own goals becomes more difficult when an expansionist adversary is armed with nuclear weapons. Conversely, viewing the other as seeking security should lead to the view that the other is more likely to be deterred and less likely to limit pursuit of one’s own intentions. By extension, the first view should be more likely to advocate for preventive military force to disarm an adversary. The second, seeing deterrence as feasible, should be less likely to do so. In sum, the first in­de­pen­dent variable (IV1) reflects w ­ hether a leader believes that nuclear proliferation is generally stabilizing and reduces the likelihood of nuclear use (and so is an optimist) or that nuclear proliferation is destabilizing and increases the likelihood of nuclear use (and so is a pessimist). The second in­de­pen­dent variable (IV2) captures a leader’s general and adversary-­specific threat perception. I code leaders as ­either confident or not confident in deterring a given nuclear-­armed adversary. To the extent pos­si­ ble given data availability, both in­de­pen­dent variables are coded in the prepresidential period. D ­ oing so allows me to temporally disaggregate prior beliefs from the crisis period, avoid tautology, and exclude a purely role-­ based explanation for desired policy.

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The Decision to Intervene The first two in­de­pen­dent variables help determine consideration. When deliberating the decision to order a military intervention, however, a leader relies on additional variables beyond the leader’s own nuclear beliefs. Chief among ­these variables is the wider international and domestic po­liti­cal environment in which the decision is taking place; an intervention does not occur within a vacuum. This wider context includes domestic po­liti­cal support, or lack thereof, for military endeavors; existing or ongoing military commitments; and the position of other key states in the international system—­allies and adversaries alike. Paramount in this contextual consideration, however, is the likelihood of military success, which is the third in­ de­pen­dent variable for this decision pathway. t h e li keli h oo d o f su ccess Should a leader’s nuclear beliefs so require, the leader w ­ ill task the state’s military and intelligence apparatus with assessing the feasibility of conducting a military intervention against the nuclear program in question. The leader may request a variety of options to consider along with the implications of each option. Depending on the circumstances, t­ hese options may require the cooperation of other states in the international community, e­ ither to conduct joint missions or for flyover or basing rights for geo­graph­i­cally distant targets. Regardless, the relevant agencies and individuals—­from the defense and military establishment, as well as pertinent intelligence organ­ izations in conjunction with the military ser­vices tasked with the mission itself—­will pre­sent their estimations of the feasibility of the interventions ­under consideration. ­These include the likelihood of successfully destroying or damaging the target, the potential casualty estimates on the part of both the counterproliferator and the potential proliferant, and the expectations of what might happen subsequently. Included in such considerations could be the likelihood of military or po­liti­cal retaliation against the state or its allies both at home and abroad and the risk of catalyzing a full-­scale war. Decision-­making rec­ords, such as meeting notes and executive or cabinet secretary memos, w ­ ill reflect such tasking o ­ rders and contain drafts of options ­under investigation. Depending on the duration of a decision-­ making period, it is pos­si­ble that the archives w ­ ill document multiple iterations as time goes on and the analy­sis is conducted and updated over time. ­These plans and analyses w ­ ill reveal the assessment of the relevant agencies about the likelihood of mission success for each option. As multiple units—in the United States, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff—­often have a role in mission planning, it is likely that t­here may not be a unified perspective on the 28

Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

outcome and consequences of a mission. Such divergences, should they exist, ­will be reflected in the case narratives. Total destruction of a nuclear program has grown more difficult over time given improvements in attempts to conceal, disperse, and protect programs from attack. ­Today, if parts of an infrastructure are damaged or destroyed, other components may remain for f­ uture salvage. External attack may also confirm for the proliferator that nuclear weapons are critical to its defense and survival; subsequently the proliferator may seek to rebuild with par­tic­ u­lar zeal. Moreover, ­because destroying a program’s physical components does not destroy the technical and scientific know-­how, the proliferating state may choose to reconstitute its program regardless of the extent of the initial destruction.81 ­Because of t­ hese challenges, the decision to use preventive military force is complicated, even when a superior military force renders success highly likely. Given the difficulties of permanently destroying a nuclear program outright, as well as the uncertainty surrounding an attack’s aftermath, the choice to intervene must reflect some decision rule that is applied given ­there is no obvious or easy solution. It is a leader’s prior beliefs that assist in making this decision. Specifically, a leader weighs, according to their beliefs about proliferation generally and by the specific state in question, the pros of military intervention against the cons: the leader’s perception of the consequences of not intervening and allowing the proliferator to acquire nuclear weapons.82 The strategy se­lection reflects, therefore, not only campaign feasibility but also individuals’ beliefs regarding the consequences of allowing a par­tic­u­lar state to become nuclear armed. Consequently, intervention decisions reflect not just material ­factors, but individual ­will and assessment. For example, in 1981, following his perception of the dire consequences of Iraq’s nuclear acquisition, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin ordered the bombing of Iraq’s Osiraq fa­cil­i­ty despite expectations of the mission’s high cost and significant risk of provoking a war in retaliation.83 Thus, a leader combines long-­held beliefs about the general consequences of proliferation with their subjective assessment of the adversary and how it is likely to act once nuclear armed (the likelihood of deterring the proliferator). In light of the role prior beliefs play, a two-­stage decision-­making pro­cess develops that yields, first, an estimation of the degree to which the par­tic­u­lar proliferator is a critical threat to the national security of the state and, second, a decision about what action, if any, ­will be necessary to confront the proliferator. Beliefs are therefore crucial for consideration; for the ­actual use of force, feasibility also comes into play. The decision pathway works as follows: in the first stage, if a leader’s nuclear beliefs deem it necessary, then the leader requests feasibility studies and options. If not, the second stage does not occur, and the case ends. However, in cases that pro­gress to the second stage, a leader uses the results of the feasibility assessments (IV3)—­that is, the likelihood that an intervention

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Figure 2.1. ​The decision-­making pro­cess following discovery of a proliferation attempt

­ ill succeed—to decide ­whether or not to proceed. To do so, the leader w weighs intervention against not intervening and allowing the state in question to go nuclear. The leader does so by relying on the same prior beliefs (IV1 and IV2) that inform their assessment of the consequences of nuclear proliferation, both generally and by the par­tic­u­lar adversary state specifically, and assessing additional material f­actors including existing military deployments, potential po­liti­cal consequences, and the risk of retaliation. In this way, both ideational ­factors (prior beliefs) and material ­factors (feasibility and the wider context) influence the decision to intervene.84 Figure 2.1 illustrates the pro­cess. Thus, beliefs are consequential in both stages of the decision pro­cess. First, beliefs establish w ­ hether or not consideration of preventive force is likely to occur for a given leader. To consider intervention is a nontrivial investment of time, resources, and personnel, so this is no small ­matter. Substantively, focusing on consideration is significant; as the empirical universe makes clear, when presented with an adversarial proliferator, not all leaders ­will consider military force. Second, beliefs frame a leader’s weighting of an intervention’s feasibility, costs, and benefits and help determine when to intervene (or abstain from intervention) and the consequences of ­either strategy. Consequently, I conceptualize the dependent variable as trichotomous, taking three potential forms: preventive military force can be used as a counterproliferation strategy; preventive military force can be considered but not used; and no consideration of preventive military force can occur. To qualify as the use of force, the military campaign must be overt, conducted by the military, and state-­sanctioned. The use of force generally takes the form of air campaigns, strategic bombings, and surgical strikes.85 To qualify as consideration, this pro­cess must be done by the national executive. Consideration ­will likely occur with key cabinet members and include requests for military options and feasibility assessments for an intervention. Consideration may also include discussions with third parties if a joint mission or

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

­Table 2.2  Stage 1 expectations: Consideration of the use of force Beliefs about the likelihood of deterring the proliferator (IV2) Beliefs about the consequences of proliferation (IV1)

Pessimist Optimist

Not confident Very likely Likely

Confident Likely Unlikely

overflight rights are relevant for the given case. Note that for the national executive or an opposition party member to make a one-­off comment about the use of force is insufficient to be coded as consideration. Leaders’ prior nuclear beliefs thus shape the likelihood of both the consideration and use of force. In the first stage, combining the two in­de­pen­ dent variables yields four expectations for the likelihood of an individual leader’s consideration of forcible options (­table 2.2). Stage 1 Hypotheses:

•  If a leader is a proliferation pessimist and is not confident in deterrence, then the leader is very likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. •  If a leader is a proliferation optimist and is not confident in deterrence, then the leader is likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. •  If a leader is a proliferation pessimist and is confident in deterrence, then the leader is likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. •  If a leader is a proliferation optimist and is confident in deterrence, then the leader is unlikely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

Given the considerable uncertainty associated with even the best military and intelligence estimations of an intervention’s outcome, many have argued that attacking a proliferator’s nuclear program is a poor strategy se­lection.86 ­Others maintain that even temporarily delaying another state’s nuclear program is enough to warrant an attempted intervention, since even partial destruction can successfully deter that proliferator from further attempts. In an attack’s aftermath, a proliferator may forgo further effort ­because of international pressure, experience a regime change empowering a new government opposed to the nuclear pursuits of its pre­de­ces­sor, or change in such a way that the proliferator is no longer hostile to the would-be preventer.87 Moreover, states contemplating prevention have verbalized this logic historically in arguing for preventive military force, despite their inability to be completely successful in permanently destroying an adversarial program. For example, before Operation Desert Fox, Clinton administration officials described the mission’s aim as degrading, not eliminating, Iraq’s ability to

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manufacture and use weapons of mass destruction. When asked about this distinction, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright offered the following explanation: I ­don’t think ­we’re pretending that we can get every­thing, so this is—­I think— we are being very honest about what our ability is. We are lessening, degrading his ability to use this. The weapons of mass destruction are the threat of the ­future. I think the president explained very clearly to the American ­people that this is the threat of the 21st ­century. . . . ​What it means is that we know we ­can’t get every­thing, but degrading is the right word.88

This tension highlights the subjective aspects of the decision to use force, given the inherent limitations of a preventive attack and the desire to attempt the intervention nevertheless.89 This tension also emphasizes how during this second stage of deliberations, between the use of force and mere consideration, a leader leverages their prior nuclear beliefs to explain the ultimate strategy chosen. Stated differently, ­because success can never be completely guaranteed, even in scenarios with a high likelihood of success, a leader’s evaluation of the goals, benefits, risks, and costs associated with the campaign (and ­those associated with d ­ oing nothing) together influence the decision to give the attack order. Consequently, to understand when the consideration of preventive military force occurs, it is necessary to explore a leader’s prior beliefs about the general consequences of nuclear proliferation, the perceived threat posed by a specific proliferant, and ­whether or not that threat can be deterred. When the threat assessment dictates consideration, the prior beliefs shape a leader’s subjective evaluation of the intervention’s utility. Therefore, the leader-­centric model, by examining the role of prior beliefs, predicts what a leader’s proclivity regarding the use of force should be. Once the second stage is underway and a leader is considering preventive intervention, expectations for the use of force result from belief-­laden assessments of the likelihood of conducting a successful intervention (­table 2.3). Stage 2 Hypotheses:

•  If a leader is considering the use of force, and the likelihood of conducting a successful intervention is low, then the leader is less likely to use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. •  If a leader is considering the use of force, and the likelihood of conducting a successful intervention is high, then the leader is more likely to use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

Perhaps the most striking revelation resulting from t­ hese expectations is that being a proliferation pessimist is insufficient to guarantee the use of force. Similarly, not ­every high-­threat proliferant ­will suffer a preventive counterproliferation attack. Instead, a very precise combination of ­factors is

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

­Table 2.3  Stage 2 expectations: The use of force Likelihood of success (IV3)

Use of force

Low High

Less likely More likely

necessary for the use of force to result. Specifically, consideration is most likely when a proliferation pessimist, not confident in deterring the proliferator, is in office; then, only with an expected high likelihood of success is that leader likely to utilize preventive intervention. Recognizing that without ­these conditions we are highly unlikely to see intervention helps explain why the use of force as a counterproliferation strategy is extremely rare. Furthermore, the pro­cess reveals two discrete pathways to not using force—­first with an optimist, confident in deterrence, who never considers using force; and second with a leader who considers intervention but opts against it. By articulating the decision in full, the theory brings both pathways to the fore. This articulation is crucial both for highlighting how rarely force is used and also for understanding the mechanisms that lead to all relevant empirical outcomes. Whereas in other substantive areas beliefs may derive from po­liti­cal party or ideology, in this context I argue that relevant beliefs form much ­earlier in a leader’s life. While ­there is no one pathway for this pro­cess, t­ here are a few likely scenarios. First, leaders’ formative years may shape their worldviews and determine their individual threat perceptions, especially if leaders served in the military. Second, early life, education, or po­liti­cal ser­vice may produce defining moments. Likewise, key lessons, critical junctures, or significant events might remain salient from youth through adulthood. ­Because of the diversity of channels through which they are formed, the beliefs consequential for preventive decision making may vary not only based on party, military experience, or other affiliation but rather across individuals themselves. Indeed, the empirical rec­ord supports this claim: both Republicans and Demo­crats, as well as both veterans and t­hose who did not serve, considered, did not consider, and used force. At first blush, Demo­crats might appear to view proliferation as more dangerous than Republicans, as Kennedy, Clinton, and Obama considered or used force. Real­ity is more complex, however; Johnson, also a Demo­crat, did not. Furthermore, Republicans may have grown increasingly pessimistic about proliferation with George W. Bush’s bombing of Iraq and Donald Trump’s potential contemplation of the use of force against Iran. Party alone appears insufficient to explain the observed variation. I therefore interrogate at the level of the individual, focusing on the prepresidential period as the source for individually held beliefs.90

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Arguments concerning the role of leaders’ beliefs raise questions about ­ hether beliefs can change over time.91 My research found l­ ittle evidence of w this during the relevant period of analy­sis, with a sole exception occurring ­after catastrophic shocks: a­ fter September 11, 2001, the available evidence suggests that George W. Bush’s beliefs shifted. Although he still perceived a threat from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the salience of rogues and terrorists increased exponentially. While noteworthy, the leader-­ centric theory does not require perfect belief consistency; what is consequential is that prior beliefs are identifiable and salient for l­ater strategy se­lections. Of course, leaders may learn in office, especially given their access to more and dif­fer­ent information once they assume the presidency. Nevertheless, I find no evidence of an “in-­office treatment” as each leader receives intelligence consistent with taking office and no discernible re­orientation occurs regarding the relevant proliferation challenges relative to the leaders’ prepresidential positions. While such learning may depend on baseline levels of prior subject m ­ atter familiarity, this alone cannot explain the be­hav­ior observed, as the leaders explored ­here vary significantly in their international security knowledge and experience.92

Mea­sure­ment and Methodology The first two in­de­pen­dent variables employ a dichotomous coding scheme, with coding decisions reflecting leaders’ public and private writings and statements identified by primary and secondary source research. The “general consequences of proliferation” variable is coded primarily in the prepresidential period and reflects ­whether a leader believes that nuclear weapons are stabilizing and reduce the likelihood of nuclear use (nuclear optimist), or that nuclear weapons are destabilizing and increase the likelihood of nuclear use (nuclear pessimist). Also captured are a leader’s views regarding the potential for nuclear weapons to embolden states, or, b ­ ecause of the stability-­instability paradox, encourage lower-­level, conventional conflict ­because of the low risk of nuclear escalation.93 Coding decisions for this variable reflect the balance of evidence yielded by a leader’s prepresidential history: if a leader more often than not associates nuclear weapons with increased danger and a greater risk of conflict between states, then the leader is coded as a pessimist. Conversely, if a leader associates nuclear weapons with improving deterrence and peace between states, then the leader is coded as an optimist.94 To the extent pos­si­ble, the “likelihood of deterring the proliferator” coding also reflects writings and utterances from the prepresidential period regarding the threats a leader perceived, both generally and regarding the proliferant that the leader would ­later face in executive office. A leader may

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

be confident in his or her ability to deter a f­ uture attack from a now-­nuclear armed opponent or may lack such confidence. Coding decisions for this variable thus reflect ­whether the preponderance of evidence available indicates that the leader perceived nuclear weapons as likely to complicate or facilitate attempts at deterrence. For example, a leader who regularly connected an adversary’s nuclear weapons acquisition with difficulties in achieving the leader’s regional or global goals w ­ ill be coded not confident in deterring the adversary once armed with nuclear weapons. By contrast, if a leader sees deterrence as disconnected from nuclear ­matters or believes that the state can deter the adversary regardless of the adversary’s technical capacity in the f­ uture, the leader ­will be coded as confident in deterrence. Note that history provides unequal amounts of data from the preexecutive experience of the leaders studied. While some leaders have extensive preexecutive po­liti­cal c­ areers and ­there are a variety of early written sources to analyze, o ­ thers provide less material with which to work. For this reason, I attempt to code the leader’s beliefs in the prepresidential period, but if this effort is not feasible ­because of data limitations, then as a secondary approach I explore the early administration period, prior to the specific crisis ­under analy­sis. Coding the in­de­pen­dent variables primarily during the preexecutive period is significant ­because it allows me to temporally disaggregate the prior beliefs from the crisis period, avoiding both tautology and the criticism that beliefs are merely proxies through which a leader sells a desired policy. The use of the prepresidential period to code nuclear beliefs, with the rest of the employed research design, allows me to be more confident in my argument. As Saunders and ­others have noted, isolating leader beliefs can be a tricky undertaking; politicians say and do ­things b ­ ecause of crisis decision making, for instrumental reasons, or as post-­hoc justifications for other preferences. The prepresidential period offers a general portrait of what the leader found threatening well before the specific crisis emerged.95 In addition, when the historical evidence pre­sents a mixed rec­ord, as may very well happen given that ­humans are not perfect automatons, I assess the weight of the evidence to determine the coding. This task may be especially difficult for leaders who have not left ­behind a large trail of historical evidence or said or written much regarding nuclear weapons. All scholars working with historical and archival evidence confront similar issues; I introduce mixed evidence forthrightly and describe the coding conclusions even when coding is a close call. Data for the third in­de­pen­dent variable, the likelihood of conducting a successful military intervention, is drawn entirely from the leader’s administration period and reflects the results of feasibility studies, presidential tasking, and administration reports concerning all military options (if any) ­under consideration during the period in question. This third variable also employs a dichotomous coding scheme and can take a low or high value,

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depending on the degree of confidence expressed inside the administration reporting. This assessment of high or low confidence in mission success includes estimations of the costs, risks, and implications of an intervention. Intelligence estimates usually describe general expectations instead of offering a specific point estimate (for example, a 43 ­percent likelihood of success); accordingly, the high-­low coding scheme reflects the uncertain nature of the mission and the relevant f­ actors. Coding follows the general assessments from the pertinent military and intelligence agencies regarding the mission’s feasibility, the risks and costs involved, and the expected overall outcome. Coding for the dependent variable similarly takes place during the administration period. To be coded as the use of preventive military force, a situation must exhibit the state-­sanctioned use of surgical strikes, ­limited military intervention, or full-­scale invasion to target the nuclear program of an adversarial proliferant to destroy or forestall that program.96 To be coded as consideration of preventive military force requires high-­level discussion of the military option by the national executive and some portion of the cabinet or national security apparatus. Also necessary is a request for feasibility assessments from appropriate bodies regarding the state’s practical ability to conduct the military campaign or campaigns in question. A case may also include high-­level discussions with allies or other external actors ­either for the purpose of conducting joint military action or to request overflight rights, safe passage, or some other practical assistance for the intervention. Should none of ­these indicators of consideration occur in a given case history, then the case is identified as involving no consideration of military force.

Case Se­lection and Research Method This book does not explore the entire universe of cases in which any state could have possibly intervened to target another state’s nuclear program. ­Doing so would require examining all pos­si­ble dyadic combinations of states in the international community and nuclear states, plus states that attempted to become nuclear. This conceptualization of the universe would dramatically inflate the relevant population, introducing many more cases into the universe that are simply unrealistic.97 Accordingly, I follow James Mahoney and Gary Goertz’s “possibility princi­ple” to scope out all instances in which the observed outcome is beyond the realm of possibility.98 I truncate the population to situations in which contemplating force was plausible. However, b ­ ecause I seek to determine what leads to consideration and what leads consideration to become action, I take the potential for consideration as the starting point in the empirical cases rather than including the entire potential universe of cases of attacking or not attacking.99 Drawing on the existing lit­er­a­ture, I begin with the universe explored by Fuhrmann and

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Kreps, which I augment temporally to account for recent cases.100 I then set aside cases in which the use of force could have been contemplated (in that the potential preventer had the necessary military means) but was not ­because the threat environment did not so warrant. This portion of the population is characterized by ­either formal or informal alliances, the sharing of civilian or military nuclear technology, or both. My theory would expect ­these cases of existing po­liti­cal and scientific relationships to lead to no consideration of the use of preventive military force.101 This expectation stems from the special relationship that exists between the states and an elite consensus that no direct threat to national security is posed by the attempted nuclear acquisition. It is not surprising therefore that the United States did not consider force when, for example, Britain, France, or Israel pursued nuclear weapons, as ­these dyads are distinguished from the rest of the universe by close po­liti­cal or military relationships, technological assistance, or sharing of nuclear expertise.102 Next, I include cases in which one leader considers preventive military force but the proximate leader does not, as this inclusion allows for an analy­ sis of instances in which no consideration occurred, avoids selecting on the dependent variable, and permits understanding the c­ auses of this variation across leaders. Thus, the design allows me to ascertain the conditions ­under which consideration becomes the use of force and ­those ­under which consideration does not lead to use of force; when consideration occurs and when it does not; and fi­nally the precise causal mechanisms of each scenario. Defining the proj­ect in this way provides for an analogous comparison across cases, yields an opportunity for both theory building and testing, and supports a precise focus on the exact decision pro­cess ­under investigation. This book explores the full variation found in the empirical universe—­why certain leaders consider and attack adversarial nuclear programs, but other leaders, confronting the same adversarial nuclear program, do not consider the use of preventive force. The book also explains why the same leader uses preventive military force against some proliferants but refrains from d ­ oing so against ­others. By extension, I am not exploring the choice among counterproliferation tools—­that is, the choice between implementing sanctions or the use of military force, or using force versus some other alternative. I do so to understand the precise mechanisms of the decision to use force, something previously overlooked in the lit­er­a­ture. I deliberately set aside other policy choices within the counterproliferation tool kit, including sanctions, sabotage, assassination, diplomatic pressure, and cyber strategies. While ­these tools may appear in the cases, they do not operate according to a preventive logic and are thus set aside.103 With ­these considerations and the previously articulated scope conditions in mind, the universe of dyads of historically antagonistic states where the use of force was at least contemplated as one state confronted an adversarial proliferant appears in the following list (N = 24). 37

chapter 2

c a se u ni verse •  Egypt–­Israel (1967) •  India–­Pakistan (1982, 1984, 1986–1987) •  Iran–­Iraq (1980) •  Iraq–­Iran (1984–1988) •  Israel–­Iran (2003–2018) •  Israel–­Iraq (1977–1981) •  Israel–­Pakistan (1979–1987) •  Israel–­Syria (?–2007) •  Norway–­Germany (1941–1944) •  Pakistan–­India (1984) •  South ­Korea–­North ­Korea (1991, 1993–1994) •  Taiwan–­China (1963) •  United Kingdom–­Germany (1941–1945) •  United Kingdom–­Iraq (1998) •  United States–­China (1961–1964) •  United States–­Germany (1942–1945) •  United States–­Iran (2003–2018) •  United States–­Iraq (1990–1991, 1998, 2002–2003) •  United States–­North K ­ orea (1992–1994) •  United States–­Soviet Union (1945–1949) •  United States–­Syria (?–2007) •  Soviet Union–­China (1969) •  Soviet Union–­Israel (1967) •  Soviet Union–­South Africa (1976)

I do not include the United States–­Cuba dyad as an in­de­pen­dent case ­because the weapons in question during the Cuban missile crisis w ­ ere not Cuban but Soviet weapons placed in Cuba. As relevant, the Cuban missile crisis is discussed in chapter 3. Since my argument centers on leaders and their beliefs, I examine cases that span multiple (at least two) consecutive administrations to isolate individual leaders’ roles in preventive war decision making. By d ­ oing so, I can control for the role of the target state and isolate the effect of the leaders themselves. I choose consecutive administrations in order to minimize the amount of time that elapsed for further development of the adversary’s nuclear program, which might other­wise account for dif­fer­ent assessments of the program by dif­fer­ent administrations. This more ­limited universe is as follows (N = 9). c a ses w i th m ulti ple, co n secu ti ve a dm i ni s t r at i o ns •  India–­Pakistan (1979–1981, 1984, 1987) •  Israel–­Iran (2003–2018) •  Israel–­Iraq (1977–1981) •  Israel–­Pakistan (1979–1987)

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Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy

•  Israel–­Syria (?–2007) •  United States–­China (1960–1964) •  United States–­North K ­ orea (1989–1994) •  United States–­Iran (2003–2018) •  United States–­Iraq (1990–2003)

One might consider including two additional cases on this list, Soviet Union–­ Israel (1967) and Soviet Union–­South Africa (1976). I exclude ­these cases ­because during this time period the Soviet Union was governed by a troika of Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin, and Nikolai Podgorny. As this was a collective form of leadership as opposed to a consecutive sequence of leaders, the cases are not useful for an analy­sis intended to isolate the role of individual leaders and their nuclear beliefs. ­Because this smaller universe comprises only nine cases, it would be useful to examine each of them in detail. In light of space and other constraints, however, treating all nine in full is not feasible. Instead, one might pursue a comparison of democracies with nondemocracies that would theoretically allow for a test of how regime type determines preventive war decisions. As the smaller universe of nine cases contains only demo­cratic potential preventer states, t­ here is no useful variation on this variable. Moreover, authoritarian leaders should theoretically exhibit variation in beliefs similar to that of their demo­cratic counter­parts. Furthermore, my theory suggests that leader type, not regime type, is the crucial explanatory f­actor. Variation within the United States also calls into question regime-­based arguments.104 I therefore focus primarily on the decision making of the United States. ­Doing so allows me to explore variation in both the in­de­pen­dent and dependent variables, control for as much of the changing empirical circumstances as pos­si­ble within each case, and explore the precise causal mechanisms at work. The three main case studies explore American be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis the Chinese, North Korean, and Iraqi nuclear programs and analyze the decision making of five American presidents—­Kennedy, Johnson, George H. W. Bush, Clinton, and George W. Bush. To explore the generalizability of the findings from ­these US-­based investigations, and to begin to correct the lit­er­a­ture’s US bias, a fourth empirical chapter moves to the Israeli context to assess how Israeli prime ministers behaved ­toward the Iraqi, Pakistani, and Syrian nuclear programs. The conclusion offers preliminary assessments of recent experiences with the North Korean and Ira­nian nuclear programs. In this way, I cover eight of the nine critical cases listed to demonstrate the strength of the leader-­centric argument. Making the choice to use preventive military force is a complex and rare decision. The theory offered ­here is a probabilistic one. It explores how leaders with certain belief profiles are likely to behave, while also recognizing that other ­factors are relevant to the decision-­making pro­cess. Indeed, leaders

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are likely to have dif­fer­ent beliefs about the consequences of nuclear proliferation generally and about their ability to deter specific actors once armed with nuclear weapons. It is t­hese nuclear beliefs that are critical to the choice to consider or use preventive force as a counterproliferation strategy. Ignoring leaders and ­these beliefs obscures critical variation that exists in this impor­tant substantive arena. I turn now to the empirical evidence, beginning with how John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson engaged the Chinese nuclear program between 1961 and 1964.

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JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program

Prior to his untimely death, President John F. Kennedy seriously considered and planned for a military attack; yet almost immediately ­after Kennedy’s assassination, President Johnson saw no need for military action. Through archival evidence, this chapter demonstrates that Kennedy and Johnson had significantly dif­fer­ent approaches to the Chinese nuclear program; their divergent beliefs led to divergent be­hav­iors. Whereas Kennedy was distressed about the dangers from nuclear proliferation—­and specifically frightened by the threat of a nuclear “Red Chinese menace”—­Johnson was far less concerned about the Chinese nuclear danger. Instead, he thought that a direct nuclear attack on the US homeland was unlikely and that the Chinese w ­ ere deterrable even with nuclear weapons. Indeed, the explanation for US counterproliferation decision making vis-­à-­vis the Chinese nuclear program, and specifically the decision to abstain from preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy, rests with the change in leadership from Kennedy to Johnson.

Methodological Note The China case provides an impor­tant methodological test for my argument. As the introduction explains, the research design employed requires selecting cases where at least two consecutive administrations confronted the same adversary, limiting the time frame in which the adversary could advance a nuclear program. The study of the Chinese nuclear program is particularly significant in this regard. Unlike most eras in US politics, where the transition from one administration is institutionalized and protracted—­due to Kennedy’s assassination, the unexpected transition from Presidents Kennedy to Johnson occurred overnight.1 Thus, both the US position in the international system and the state of the Chinese nuclear program ­were unlikely to have changed between the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. It is

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therefore safe to conclude that any change from Kennedy’s to Johnson’s threat perception is likely to originate with the man himself. In addition, an elected president could be selected by characteristics that would make him more or less likely to take significant risks, such as a nonproliferation attack. The fact that Johnson was not elected through the course of normal domestic po­liti­cal pro­cesses allows me to conclude that it is Johnson himself, and not implicit voter preferences, that had causal effect.2 The two men hailed from the same party and worked initially in the same administration, whose structure and personnel Johnson inherited. Especially poignant is Johnson’s deliberate focus on maintaining continuity in the aftermath of the assassination. He initially retained all of Kennedy’s cabinet to serve in his new administration, which makes LBJ’s divergent be­hav­ior especially remarkable and analytically identifiable. ­Because the cabinet remained consistent, we can rule out a bureaucratic po­liti­cal explanation for the change in strategy over time. Though LBJ was a generation older, both men served in Congress and ­were socialized into the same American system. Moreover, the assassination functions as an exogenous shock, allowing for a strong comparison of events both prior to and in its aftermath, yielding a more robust demonstration of causality. However, evidentiary challenges are presented by Kennedy’s untimely death. Unlike many US presidents who have left a considerable paper trail following their time in office, Kennedy could not offer interviews, memoirs, or an autobiography. Nevertheless, ­there is still abundant evidence from which research can be conducted and conclusions drawn. Significantly, much of the material comes from Kennedy’s prepresidential period, the period in which I code nuclear beliefs. First, Kennedy wrote multiple books and articles prior to his term in the White House, leaving b ­ ehind evidence of some of his early thinking. Second, though his total po­liti­cal ­career was short, he did spend eight years in Congress, so ­there is a congressional rec­ord on which to draw. Fi­nally, given the public fascination with and scrutiny of Camelot and Kennedy in par­tic­u­lar, countless biographies and articles provide a rich secondary source environment in which to find germane evidence. ­There are also evidentiary challenges related to Lyndon Johnson. Johnson was notorious for not taking notes in meetings or generally writing much down. Thus, relative to other politicians, ­there is a dearth of information available for analy­sis. He was also excluded from Kennedy administration discussions of foreign policy, leaving ­little relevant information from his vice-­presidential period. Taken together, and especially relative to Kennedy, who left ­behind an extensive historical rec­ord, ­there is more ­limited information available for analyzing Johnson’s beliefs. This scarcity is unsurprising, however, in light of my argument for LBJ’s relative lack of concern for nuclear ­matters in the first place. The scarcity is further understandable ­because the relevant time period of the Johnson administration—­from LBJ’s

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JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program

assumption of presidential office to the Chinese nuclear test—­spanned less than eleven months. Nevertheless, for both Kennedy and Johnson, as well as the other presidents treated in this book, I bring absent, incomplete, or contradictory evidence to the reader’s attention. The remainder of this chapter is or­ga­nized as follows. First, I pre­sent the alternative explanations and their expectations for the China case. Second, I briefly discuss the history of the Chinese nuclear program and early US reactions to it. Next, I explore Kennedy’s key beliefs concerning nuclear proliferation, deterrence, and threats in the international arena and his threat assessment of the Chinese Communists. Subsequent sections describe Johnson’s beliefs on the same issues, focusing on his divergent approaches to them during his early po­liti­cal ­career. I then compare and contrast Kennedy and Johnson’s beliefs and connect them to their divergent policy preferences.

Alternative Explanations The first competing explanation for US be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis the Chinese nuclear program derives from structural theories that focus on the power distribution between states. When one power observes a potential challenger augmenting its capabilities via attempted nuclear acquisition, t­ hese theories would expect a preventive attack to occur. That the United States did not attack China’s nuclear program in development immediately calls such expectations into question. More specified structural models allow for the possibility that the difficulty of conducting the preventive operation might stymie an other­wise expected attack. Indeed, both Debs and Monteiro as well as Goldstein might argue that the United States was inclined to attack the Chinese nuclear program, but ultimately opted against it given the difficulty and cost of such a mission.3 While more precise, ­these models still fall short in obscuring within-­country variation. President Kennedy was inclined to pursue a preventive attack against China despite the costs; President Johnson was not. ­These realities cannot be accounted for by any structural logic. Looking within the second image or at the state level for explanation, Kreps and Fuhrmann argue that preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy is more likely when a dyad is characterized by a history of violent conflict, contrasting regime types, and divergent foreign policy goals. Force should be expected in the US-­China dyad, which meets most, if not all, of ­these criteria: the two states fought on opposite sides of the Korean War and engaged in repeated conflicts over the Taiwan Straits; the United States and China are respectively demo­cratic and autocratic; and they have historically held competing international preferences. For example, the United States supported Taiwanese retention of the United Nations Security Council seat despite its loss in the Chinese Civil War. That the United States ultimately

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did not attack China’s nuclear program in formation calls this logic into question. Fi­nally, the most compelling competing explanation for US be­hav­ior ­toward China’s nuclear program comes from bureaucratic politics. Although I argue that the president is the “decider-­in-­chief,” US be­hav­ior might have been determined by bureaucratic concerns as individual agencies competed to determine strategy.4 Indeed, bureaucratic models would expect significant haggling within the bureaucracy or “pulling and hauling” between agencies and individual actors within the agencies as they compete for resources, prestige, and policy preferences.5 The evidence does not demonstrate, however, that anyone acted as a policy entrepreneur, within an administration, Congress, or a relevant agency; nor is ­there suggestion of the “pulling and hauling” characteristic of po­liti­cal bargaining.6 It is also pos­si­ble that key administration personnel exerted determinative pressure and orchestrated their desired outcome. This explanation might be plausible given the skilled individuals composing the cabinet at that time, including Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and Dean Rusk. However, ­because the cabinet remained consistent across the Kennedy and Johnson administrations (at least u ­ ntil well a­ fter the China episode), this type of bureaucratic alternative cannot explain the abrupt shift that happened when Johnson took over for Kennedy.7 Alternatively, one might expect that the representatives of the Department of Defense (DoD), State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Joint Chiefs of Staff might have driven the decision making in preventive war decisions such as this. We might expect the defense establishment to advocate force and diplomats to prefer negotiations. Yet t­ here was no consensus position regarding force among all relevant individuals, nor ­were ­these views consistent over time. First, as a nuclear pessimist, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was concerned about nuclear proliferation generally and favored further consideration of force against the Chinese program.8 In a September 30, 1964, interview he said, “The danger to other nations of the world increases geometrically with the increase in the number of nations possessing t­ hose warheads.”9 Henry Rowen, of DoD’s International Security Affairs Office, offered a more dire assessment, comparing China’s trajectory with nuclear weapons to that of the Soviets, and argued that the negatives associated with a military mission w ­ ere tolerable.10 Specifically, he felt that even if the military option offered only a temporary fix, ­those few years would be consequential. He also argued that though the Soviets would have to criticize US action publicly, he believed they would privately support the US effort. Fi­nally, Rowen believed that any potential Chinese retaliation would be minimal.11 Conversely, Secretary of State Dean Rusk viewed the threat from Chinese proliferation as small and opposed the use of force ­unless wider hostilities

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JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program

erupted. He even seemed to f­avor increased proliferation for its deterrent benefits. Prior to the Chinese test, Rusk argued that the detonation of a first nuclear device did not imply a weapons stockpile and modern delivery systems.12 ­Later, a 1965 memo for National Security Advisor Bundy described the widespread view that Rusk and ­others at State ­were uncommitted to nonproliferation and even favored selective proliferation in certain cases.13 During the Gilpatric Committee meetings,14 Rusk indicated that he was unwilling to sacrifice much for the nonproliferation agenda, as this “was not the overriding ele­ment in US relations with the rest of the world.”15 Nuclear optimism was not ­limited to State, however, as Deputy National Security Advisor Walt W. Rostow argued that nuclear weapons bring caution to the international system.16 Robert Johnson, author of the Department of Policy Planning’s assessment of the available US options, critiqued Rowen’s comparison of the Chinese to the Soviets on the grounds that the Chinese w ­ ere generally weaker, had an immature program, and ­were likely to cause only psychological implications, rather than strategic or military. In 1963, however, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research argued for the possibility of greater militancy resulting from the Sino-­Soviet split, manifesting in continued Chinese regional expansion and belligerence.17 In light of ­these diverse perspectives, it is evident that neither a bureaucratic consensus nor a co­ali­tion existed to explain US be­hav­ior.18 Especially ­because the same individuals populated both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, a bureaucratic consensus or co­ali­tion cannot explain Kennedy’s serious consideration of the use of force and Johnson’s lack of consideration. Instead, each president and his personal views drove the decision-­making pro­cess, with their cabinets reasoning along b ­ ehind them. Thus, while a bureaucratic po­liti­cal explanation may be especially productive elsewhere, it offers ­little traction in the preventive nuclear context. This case also raises a potential electoral explanation given LBJ’s well-­ documented obsessions with domestic politics. Johnson’s be­hav­ior might plausibly be explained not by beliefs, but rather by electoral considerations before the 1964 presidential election. However, an electoral explanation for Johnson’s China policy is weak. First, polling information from the fall of 1964 reveals that the US public feared the Communist Chinese more than the Soviets by almost a three-­to-­one ratio, suggesting conceivable support for proactive action against the Chinese.19 Second, Barry Goldwater, Johnson’s Republican presidential opponent, had done significant, self-­inflicted damage to his chances at securing the Oval Office by seeming ill-­informed, ignorant, and dangerously flippant ­toward nuclear issues. As one example, Goldwater was repeatedly criticized for inaccurate statements about a lack of presidential control over nuclear weapons, despite briefings by the appropriate governmental agencies.20 Johnson could have demonstrated his comparative mastery of the subject, but chose not to.

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Fi­nally, surveying the US intelligence community’s assessment of the development and implications of the Chinese nuclear program could yield an alternative explanation of the China episode.21 Specifically, chronologically exploring the relevant intelligence evaluations could reveal the extent to which the president was in good com­pany in his perspective at any given time or, conversely, w ­ hether the president’s positions regarding China w ­ ere at odds with t­ hose of the intelligence apparatus. Such an analy­sis can yield impor­tant conclusions regarding the productivity of the leader-­centric model. As described ­later, analy­sis of the intelligence time line highlights the importance of presidential beliefs in explaining preventive war be­hav­ior. Before the Kennedy administration, US intelligence regarding China’s nuclear developments was mostly speculative. By 1960, the Chinese w ­ ere believed to have a nuclear program underway, but details w ­ ere unconfirmed. At the start of Kennedy’s term, in June 1961, General Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported that the Communist Chinese nuclear acquisition would have a “marked impact” psychologically, po­liti­ cally, and especially in terms of propaganda potential in Asia. The military consequences remained somewhat far off, however, given the expectation that a deliverable missile capability would not emerge for three to five years. Thus, Lemnitzer recommended that the US should move to postpone the development, lessen its psychological impact on allies, and work with t­hose allies to augment regional deterrence.22 Subsequently, in April 1962, National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 13-2-62 provided more details, describing how the Chinese began their program in the 1950s with Soviet assistance, which ceased in mid-1960. This external assistance and its cessation suggested a Chinese ability to detonate a weapon in 1963; in real­ity development of that ability might take many more years.23 By May 1963, a Bureau of Intelligence and Research report expected that despite an eventual nuclear test, the Chinese would behave cautiously, given their continued relative weakness in the international system.24 This report was followed in July by Special NIE (SNIE) 13-2-63 that highlighted the continued gaps in the intelligence that left vague what specific components of the Chinese nuclear program w ­ ere operational. The SNIE concluded that a nuclear test would come at the earliest in 1964 and was more likely in 1964 or 1965. Still, an eventual test was expected to improve morale and increase Chinese confidence in the region. It was also anticipated that the Chinese would maintain a ­limited role for nuclear weapons in warfare, given their superiority with ground troops. While this could change, the estimate noted, no major foreign policy changes w ­ ere expected, the likelihood of Chinese nuclear initiation was low, and open military aggression would not result.25 Fi­nally, a 1964 policy planning report authored by Robert Johnson echoed previous sentiments regarding the fairly l­imited implications of a Chinese

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JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program

test and described the use of force as “not justifiable.” This conclusion was amplified with per­sis­tent intelligence gaps complicating any intervention. A final SNIE confirmed the existence of the Lop Nur test site and described an expected test sometime ­after 1964.26 The looming test provoked considerable discussion within the State Department and yielded diverse opinions about the test’s implications across the Johnson government. As one example, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton lobbied to describe the Chinese nuclear development as an “ever increasing threat to freedom and security.”27 The following conclusions thus emerge. First, the United States government had ­limited specific understanding of the technical capacity and development level of the Chinese nuclear program from its inception through 1964. Second, government officials held conflicting views of the Chinese nuclear development and first nuclear test during the 1960–64 period. While the majority deemed the consequences of a test minor, t­ here was hardly consensus; over time, divergent perspectives remained. Compared to the general sentiment of the intelligence community, Kennedy seemed more alarmed about the Chinese nuclear development. His consideration of military force did not follow directly from the intelligence reports he received. Similarly, Johnson was perhaps less concerned than some intelligence about the looming Chinese nuclear test. Given that ballistic missile capability was expected by the end of the de­cade, and the inability of the Chinese to target the US mainland was seemingly impor­tant to Johnson’s assessment of the situation, his calm is particularly surprising. Overall, the evidentiary picture from the intelligence assessment demonstrates that ­there was no single view of the Chinese nuclear program and its consequences and that Kennedy and Johnson’s perspectives ­were not in lockstep with their respective intelligence community’s position. This finding confirms that changing intelligence was not driving US be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis China during this period. Simply observing that neither Kennedy nor Johnson used force against China is insufficient for understanding leaders’ role in considering preventive war: ­until his untimely death, Kennedy took all available steps to seriously consider and plan for preventive action, discussing missions with both allies and adversaries, activating the bureaucracy, and exploring options. Had he lived, he might very well have ordered an intervention, especially in light of his proactive approach to prob­lems and deep concern with Chinese proliferation. Conversely, Johnson minimally engaged with the Chinese nuclear issue and did not consider force. ­Because consideration must precede intervention, the role of leaders’ beliefs in shaping consideration is consequential. The leader-­centric model’s ability to illuminate the decision pro­cess and the vital role of nuclear beliefs therein offers a significant contribution. We turn now to explore this proposition.

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The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program In 1960, US intelligence about China was poor, so what ­little the Americans knew about the Chinese nuclear program was superficial and outdated.28 Five years ­earlier, Sherman Kent of the Office of National Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had prepared the first significant memo on Chinese nuclear assets and concluded that China would almost certainly not develop significant capabilities for weapons production within the next ten years, ­unless it received substantial external assistance.29 Though his time line would prove accurate, Kent’s assessment was based on what ­little he knew or believed about China’s scientific and industrial capabilities—­their inability to produce uranium ore and inexperience in both theoretical and experimental physics. Furthermore, the United States believed China was unwilling to divert significant resources away from the basic economic and military needs of the country, which at the time w ­ ere substantial. On nearly e­ very count, Kent’s estimations w ­ ere wrong. Not only was China pursuing both uranium and plutonium paths to the bomb, but the Chinese ­were also receiving extensive assistance from the Soviets, had worked diligently to import or learn the requisite scientific expertise, and w ­ ere willing to take what­ever means necessary to fund the nuclear program, regardless of other considerations. Beyond the nuclear context, in the US dialogue, China had been problematic for some time. When the Communists prevailed in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, their leadership immediately targeted the United States as “public ­enemy number one” and attempted to erase all memory of more than a ­century of goodwill and friendly relations between the two p ­ eoples.30 In May 1958, a National Security Council paper identified “hostile Soviet and Chinese Communist regimes” as a “basic threat to US Security.”31 As Secretary of State Dean Rusk described, b ­ ecause of the formerly close relationship and the benevolent attitude of the United States t­oward the Chinese p ­ eople, the country’s reaction to the fall of China in 1949 was that of a jilted lover.32 In addition to the evident hostility and deterioration of the bilateral relationship, Mao Zedong’s be­hav­ior in the nuclear realm offered Kennedy and ­others further reason for concern. Mao had a bizarre view of nuclear weapons, saying that if they ­were not banned and ­were used, the “monsters would be destroyed, and [the] victorious ­people [the Communists] ­will rebuild a new civilization thousands of times higher than the cap­it­ al­ist system.”33 Further demonstrating his unconventional perspective, Mao told Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in late 1954 that in the event of nuclear war, the imperialists would be totally wiped off the face of the earth, but the socialist camp would survive.34 Beyond such peculiar statements, the Chinese Communist foreign policy throughout the 1950s and 1960s was aggressive, revisionist, and belligerent, ­doing ­little to assuage US concerns about Chinese intentions. China actively used terrorist tactics to support Communist parties throughout Southeast

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Asia and mobilize Communists into military force in both Laos and Vietnam, pushed Asian solidarity throughout Indochina, and encouraged civil wars using guerilla tactics.35 The Chinese Communists also emphasized the contours of the Cold War, championed the strug­gle of East versus West, and directly threatened Japan and offshore islands in a series of Taiwan Straits crises.36 During the eight years of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Peking was a “militant, aggressive power . . . ​[sending] men across the northeastern frontier of Burma, attack[ing] India, send[ing] agents into northern Thailand, and of course, send[ing] massive supplies and arms to North Vietnam. . . . ​Communist China even broke with the Soviet Union over how militant to be in support of world revolution; the Chinese preached extreme militancy, while the Soviets urged more caution.”37

John F. Kennedy Many familiar with President John F. Kennedy’s legacy would be unsurprised to hear him described as a proliferation pessimist—­someone who viewed nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation as dangerous and destabilizing to the international system. Kennedy extolled a logic that focused on nuclear cascades (proliferation begetting proliferation), nuclear accidents or accidental launches by field commanders, the vulnerabilities of new and small arsenals, and their propensity to be used rather than maintained for deterrent value.38 Early in office, Kennedy predicted that the not-­too-­distant ­future would feature an ever-­increasing number of nuclear weapon states; this idea drove him to pursue nonproliferation upon entering the White House. Dating from his youth and his congressional ­career, Kennedy also articulated a belief in the need for a strong US military, one that was ready, flexible, and proactive in meeting challenges wherever they might emerge.39 He developed ­these views while traveling and studying overseas, during his ser­vice in World War II, and in the war’s aftermath as a journalist reporting on the postwar environment. Kennedy was also an anti-­Communist, but the specific threat he identified emanated from the internal dynamics of the Communist system itself and the threats that communist ideology posed to his liberal and demo­cratic worldview.40 In a perspective similar to his early thinking on the Soviet Union, he saw Communist China as an aggressive, cost-­insensitive, and revisionist rising power, interested in dominance both in Asia and across the globe. He feared China’s coming challenge to the United States and US interests, and he viewed its successful effort at nuclear proliferation as the most dangerous potential development of the 1960s. In light of t­ hese beliefs, the leader-­centric theory anticipates that Kennedy would have been very likely to consider preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy, and the historical rec­ord of his tenure as president confirms this expectation.

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JFK and International Affairs From a young age, John F. Kennedy was inquisitive about the world and curious about his surroundings. He had a knack for competition and was prone to flouting the rules and challenging his ­brothers. Though never a diligent student, young Jack demonstrated a consistent interest in international affairs. His ­family’s wealth afforded him multiple opportunities to traverse the Atlantic, which sparked a won­der about how Eu­ro­pean affairs affected Amer­i­ca and how Eu­ro­pe­ans interacted with one another. His curiosity about the world, skepticism about common wisdom, and enthusiasm for world affairs would persist throughout his po­liti­cal ­career. Likewise, the same competitiveness and inquisitiveness became a zeal for foreign policy and global prob­lems that continued throughout his presidency: as a May 1, 1964, memo from National Security Council staffer Robert W. Komer to National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy explained, “JFK was unique in his omnivorous devouring of ­every scrap on foreign affairs.”41 Kennedy’s early travels to Eu­rope inspired his se­nior thesis at Harvard University, in which he offered the first glimpses of the pragmatic approach to international affairs that would characterize his ­career. Writing on Munich and the reasons ­behind British appeasement, Kennedy was critical of what he perceived as overly sentimental reasoning about world affairs and ­people who tried to wish away international dangers. Specifically, Kennedy argued that the under­lying explanation for Munich rested with Britain’s complacent attitude to early German rearmament efforts and a pacifist popu­ lar sentiment.42 He criticized Britain as slow to accept the dangers of Germany’s buildup and as naïve in clinging to the League of Nations, whose powers would turn out to be non­ex­is­tent.43 Kennedy concluded that while liberal democracy was the preferred form of government, one of its main perils was its slow ability to change, which when dangers arose could lead to vulnerability. As he argued, in the interwar period the British population was slow to recognize the danger of Nazism and Germany’s violations of the Versailles Treaty, and when the British should have been mobilizing for the coming conflict, they ­were instead dangerously complacent and postponed preparations ­until almost too late. This thesis, l­ater published as a book, provides early evidence for the foreign policy approach that Kennedy carried into politics. In par­tic­u­lar, ­Kennedy was critical of Britain’s lackadaisical attitude with danger looming on the continent; this criticism caused him to adopt the view that preparedness was key to combating mounting international threats wherever they emerged. ­Later, serving in the Pacific theater for an undersupplied US Navy, he made similar arguments about the consequences of the lack of battlefield preparation.44 Fi­nally, in 1945, Kennedy called for vigilance at the first signs of the growing rift between the US and the Soviet Union, while the

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overwhelming majority of his contemporaries w ­ ere blind to the storm clouds warning of the advancing Cold War.45 He repeated this sentiment as a young congressman, cautioning that if the United States was slow to rearm it would lead to war in Eu­rope.46 He thus consistently argued that as threats emerge internationally, one must be ready to challenge them proactively, lest one be caught ill prepared to make the required efforts. The highly active spirit that characterized Kennedy’s youth emerged as a similar activism in his chosen ­career of politics ­after the conclusion of World War II. His go-­getter spirit was evident in many of the positions he took as a ju­nior congressman and a US senator. Unlike George Kennan, then US ambassador to the Soviet Union, Kennedy described defeating communism, not containing it. He spoke of the need to expand US efforts as necessary to defeat Communism wherever it appeared.47 ­Later, Senator Kennedy warned of the dangers of resting on one’s laurels instead of meeting trou­ble head on: “Yet, did we not learn in Indochina, where we delayed action as the result of similar warnings, that we might have served both the French and our own ­causes infinitely better, had we taken a more firm stand much e­ arlier than we did?”48 While campaigning for the presidency, Kennedy was critical of Eisenhower for what Kennedy saw as Eisenhower’s complacency and inaction: “For the last eight years we have faced prob­lem ­after prob­lem, and the solution to each of them has been to appoint a committee. I think it is time for action. I think it is time we met our prob­lems. It takes more than words, hard or soft, more than tours, more than parades, more than conferences. It takes a stronger Amer­i­ca.”49 Kennedy further criticized Eisenhower for a reactive approach to the challenges facing the United States: “Reacting instead of acting, they [the Eisenhower Administration] usually found themselves at the mercy of events instead of anticipating the danger and shaping a firm and consistent policy to meet it.”50 JFK maintained this commitment to activism as president. Kennedy described programs and goals that reflected his image of Soviet and Chinese strategies and tactics: “The adversaries of freedom . . . ​have fired no missile, and their troops are seldom seen. They send arms, agitators, aid technicians and propaganda to ­every trou­ble area. But where fighting is required, it is usually done by ­others, by guerrillas striking at night, by assassins striking alone.” He was prepared to confront ­these challenges wherever they arose, even if indirect or clandestine.51 Kennedy’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk described a similar activism that permeated the entire administration: “Many of Kennedy’s staffers and the President himself favored a more activist approach. ‘Vigor’ was the word of the day. The Kennedy administration, all of us, had a bias ­toward taking action, even when ­doing nothing might better serve American diplomacy and our national interest.”52

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General Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation As a proliferation pessimist, John F. Kennedy was worried about the dangers of the global spread of nuclear weapons to new states in the international system. He was an alarmist in his approach, particularly attuned to the catastrophic dangers of new nuclear arsenals, concerned about the risks of accidental use or launch, and worried about the cascade of nuclear weapons as newly nuclear states inspired o ­ thers to proliferate. Though multifaceted, his fear was also ­simple: in 1962, during his speech to the nation on the Cuban missile crisis, he said, “Nuclear weapons are so destructive, and ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to the peace.”53 Though this remark is hardly surprising given the nature of the missile crisis and the need to demonstrate strength to US and international audiences, this is but one of dozens of remarks Kennedy made on the topic from his early c­ areer through his time as a congressman, his campaign for president, and his tenure in the Oval Office. In the very first entry of the diary Kennedy kept while traveling abroad during the summer of 1945, he expressed his belief that “the clash with Rus­ sia ­will be greatly postponed . . . ​by the eventual discovery of a weapon so horrible that it ­will truthfully mean the abolishment of all the nations employing it.”54 Though at the time the Manhattan Proj­ect was still secret, given the circle of military and po­liti­cal leaders with whom Kennedy associated, it is pos­si­ble he knew about the weapon u ­ nder development.55 Regardless of what par­tic­u­lar knowledge Kennedy may have had in early 1945, his fear of the idea of such a weapon was already evident in ­these early writings. ­Later, as a member of Congress, Kennedy was quick to identify the spread and existence of nuclear weapons as among the greatest challenges confronting the world at the time. In 1950, Congressman Kennedy introduced for the rec­ord a new Atomic Energy Commission report entitled “The Effects of Atomic Weapons.”56 That Kennedy felt compelled to submit this report for the rec­ord suggests an early awareness and interest in nuclear issues and a focus on the increasingly destructive nature of nuclear weapons, which the report described in detail. Speaking to a student convocation at the University of California, Los Angeles on November 2, 1959, Kennedy said: “No change in a fast-­changing world pre­sents a greater challenge—no prob­lem in a world full of prob­lems calls for greater leadership and vision—­than the control of nuclear weapons, the utter destruction which would result in their use in war, and the radioactive pollution of our atmosphere by their continued testing in peacetime.”57 In December, Kennedy delivered a major address on nuclear disarmament criticizing the Eisenhower administration for the lack of a concerted effort on this topic and reiterating that the nuclear issue was among the most pressing items on the foreign policy agenda.58

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Together, ­these remarks reveal a consistent level of concern with and consciousness of the prob­lems associated with nuclear weapons.59 Kennedy’s fears of nuclear weapons w ­ ere not focused on a par­tic­u­lar region or on a specific state’s proliferation. Instead he was opposed to both horizontal (additional state) and vertical (within-­state) proliferation and made critical remarks regarding nuclear developments in France, China, and West Germany. Likewise, Kennedy consistently addressed the need to rein in the dangerous arms race between the United States and the USSR.60 Thus, Kennedy’s nuclear pessimism was both broad and deep—he was opposed to proliferation among US allies and adversaries alike, and he saw the virtues of pursuing nuclear disarmament among the existing nuclear powers and working diligently to lessen the worst characteristics of the Cold War.61 As he told David Ormsby-­Gore, British ambassador to the United States, during the Cuban missile crisis, “a world in which t­ here are large quantities of nuclear weapons is an impossible world to ­handle. We ­really must try to get on with disarmament if we get through this crisis . . . ​­because this is just too much.”62 Kennedy repeatedly expressed concern about the dangers of a nuclear cascade. In his inaugural address, Kennedy spoke of the two superpowers “rightly alarmed by the steady spread of the deadly atom.”63 He also demonstrated a par­tic­u­lar fear of small arsenals, saying that “only when arms are sufficient beyond doubt can we be certain beyond doubt that they w ­ ill never be employed.”64 In July 1962, the dangers of nuclear proliferation consumed Kennedy as he “reckoned that by 1972, twenty more nations would acquire nukes, with China being the first.”65 ­Later, at a March 21, 1963, press conference regarding the Test Ban Treaty negotiations he said, “I see the possibility in the 1970s of the President of the United States having to face a world in which fifteen or twenty or twenty-­five nations may have t­hese weapons.”66 Likewise, Kennedy worried about the dangers of accidental launch ­because of command and control failures or the fog of war—­both key ele­ ments of the proliferation pessimist narrative. Kennedy was alarmed by irrational individuals armed with nuclear weapons, and he was concerned about nuclear blackmail. Speaking in 1959, Senator Kennedy described ­these fears inherent to a world with more nuclear weapons and nuclear states: “[The] possibilities of accidental war ­will be enormously increased—­the possibilities of a nuclear holocaust being initiated for irrational reasons by a fanatic or demagogue ­will be tremendously increased—so w ­ ill the possibilities of nuclear blackmail by any nation that chooses to use its atomic armaments as a diplomatic tool or threat.”67 Shortly a­ fter taking office, President Kennedy reviewed North American Treaty Organ­ization (NATO) operational procedures given his concern that accidental use of a nuclear weapon could trigger a world war.68 Specifically, he fretted about the command and

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control rules inherited from the Eisenhower administration and, in par­tic­u­ lar, the fact that any subordinate commander facing Rus­sian military action could launch nuclear weapons. Both issues added to his worries about inadvertent escalation.69 ­Later, ­after a June 1961 trip to Eu­rope, Kennedy asked for analy­sis on the consequences of nuclear war between the superpowers. When he wondered how many Americans would die in an all-­out nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, the Pentagon’s estimate stood at seventy million Americans, or half the population at the time. Curious about how many Americans would die if just one e­ nemy missile got through and hit somewhere near a US city, Kennedy was told t­here would be six hundred thousand causalities. He responded, “That’s the total number of casualties in the Civil War, and we ­haven’t gotten over that in a hundred years.”70 What this evidence demonstrates is that the same issues that concerned Kennedy as a young politician motivated his inquiries and investigations when he became president. Beyond his public statements, both Kennedy biographers and his contemporaries have documented Kennedy’s nuclear apprehensions. Biographer Robert Dallek describes Kennedy’s general opposition to excessive reliance on nuclear weapons and to international proliferation.71 Dallek notes that at the beginning of his presidency Kennedy expressed that an all-­out nuclear war would be “a truly monstrous event in the US—­let alone in world history” and that Kennedy found it inconceivable that anyone could speak casually about nuclear war, which some midcentury military and far-­right politicians did.72 Kennedy’s head of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, Walt W. Rostow, recalled that nuclear war was Kennedy’s “greatest nightmare.”73 President Kennedy’s fears of nuclear proliferation and the dangers of nuclear weapons made arms control one of the top three items on his administration’s foreign policy agenda.74 Arms control also held deep personal interest.75 He had promised as much during the 1960 presidential campaign when he critiqued the Eisenhower administration on this issue: “Disarmament planning is the most glaring omission in the field of national security and world peace of the last eight years.”76 Policies ­toward individual proliferation attempts, bilateral efforts with the USSR, and international control regimes demonstrated Kennedy’s commitment to nonproliferation and disarmament. Kennedy saw disarmament as more than “an idle dream,” and his accomplishments in the arms control arena during his administration ­were significant.77 During his first year in office, Kennedy created the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose mission was “to strengthen the national security of the United States by formulating, advocating, negotiating, implementing and verifying effective arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament policies, strategies, and agreements.”78 ­Later, he began talks with the Soviets that ultimately produced the ­Limited Test Ban Treaty, which

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prohibits nuclear weapons tests or any other nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, in outer space, and u ­ nder ­water. Kennedy was a firm believer that the treaty would significantly slow, if not halt, the proliferation of nuclear weapons.”79 Even when treaty negotiations ­were stalling in early 1963, Kennedy maintained that it was necessary to keep moving, “­because personally I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, ­unless we are successful, ­there may be 10 nuclear powers instead of 4, and by 1975, 15 or 20. . . . ​I regard that as the greatest pos­si­ble danger and h ­ azard.”80 Robert F. Kennedy confirmed his b ­ rother’s dedication to the disarmament and nonproliferation agenda, writing that JFK “thought that all of our energies and all of our efforts should be ­toward getting control over the distribution of the knowledge of making atomic weapons, the construction and the testing of atomic weapons. His greatest disappointment through ’62 and ’63 was the fact that we ­hadn’t done that, ­hadn’t been able to get any [agreement]. He was willing to go back and go back and go back—­and walk, as he described it, the last mile.”81 Furthermore, Kennedy laid the groundwork for the Nuclear Non-­ Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Anti-­Ballistic Missile Treaty that ­were ultimately signed by President Nixon.82 At his first State of the Union address as president on January 30, 1961, Kennedy announced, “I have already taken steps to coordinate and expand our disarmament effort—to increase our programs of research and study—­and to make arms control a central goal of our national policy u ­ nder my direction.”83 This was a promise that Kennedy would fulfill both during his short time in office and through his legacy with the presidents who succeeded him. Overall, Kennedy’s commitment to arms control and nonproliferation was evident in his significant accomplishments in the nuclear arena, leaving a legacy that influenced US arms control efforts for de­cades to come. His personal dedication was observed by Glenn Seaborg, then chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, who came away from Kennedy’s 1961 talks with British prime minister Harold MacMillan with the “distinct impression that in private JFK was considerably more in f­avor of accepting risks and making compromises in order to achieve a test ban than e­ ither he or US negotiators ever allowed themselves to be in public.”84 In addition, Kennedy himself expressed the depths of his commitment to t­ hese issues. Of the greatest lows he had experienced in office, he said, his greatest disappointment was “our failure to get an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing, ­because . . . ​that might have been a very impor­tant step in easing the tension and preventing a proliferation of [nuclear] weapons.”85 Despite his many efforts to lessen the dangers of the nuclear age and regardless of the many arms control agreements that w ­ ere signed between the Soviet Union and the United States throughout the Cold War, the years a­ fter Kennedy’s tenure saw an increase in the numbers of nuclear weapons in the superpowers’ arsenals; advanced technologies (like MIRVs) made t­hese

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weapons more destabilizing. Though perhaps the most dangerous periods of the Cold War occurred early during the Berlin and Cuban missile crises, the l­ater de­cades ­were still worrisome. To that end, biographer Herbert S. Parmet has argued that JFK “would have been profoundly disturbed to know that so many historians would ­later stress that his contribution to ­human existence was the extension of the cold war and the escalation of the arms race” rather than a legacy of peaceful coexistence.86 In summary, Kennedy was a strong nuclear proliferation pessimist, believing that more nuclear weapons would be worse for the international arena. He was fearful of their rapid spread around the world, as the technological know-­how and scientific materials required became cheaper to acquire. Kennedy was especially concerned about new nuclear weapons states—­those lacking in strong command and control procedures, vulnerable to external attack, and prone to accidental launch or a “use them or lose them” mentality. This pessimism led Kennedy early on to make commitments to arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament during his time in Congress and, ­later, to undertake actions and fulfill campaign promises once president. His devotion to t­ hese issues applied to allies and adversaries alike, as he worked diligently to prevent the construction of in­de­pen­dent deterrent forces on the Eu­ro­pean continent, sought significant limitations on nuclear testing with the Soviets, and fought to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of the Communist Chinese.

Probability of Deterring the Proliferator Kennedy’s general views of nuclear proliferation have just been described. What follows aims to document Kennedy’s views of international threats and compares them to his observation of the Communist Chinese and their pursuit of nuclear weapons. This comparison is useful as it helps assess Kennedy’s larger threat perception. Together, this information offers a portrait of what Kennedy perceived as broadly threatening to US national security and also reveals what danger he believed the communist Chinese nuclear pursuit posed to the United States. Arguably one of the most impor­tant challenges Kennedy confronted during his lifetime was the challenge from imperialism, first from Nazi Germany and ­later from Soviet Communism. As evidenced by his university thesis, he believed that passivity in the face of a rising challenger was a dangerous strategy, and he therefore articulated the need to meet the Japa­nese and German prob­lems head-on. His early commitment manifested as enthusiastic enlistment in the US war effort. Consistently throughout his youth, Kennedy supported a strong effort to prevent the emergence of any hegemon on the Eu­ro­pean continent lest such a power challenge US national security and interests.87 While traveling

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abroad ­after the war, he described Hitler’s “boundless ambition for his country which rendered him a menace to the peace of the world.”88 In the winter of 1944–45, recovering from his exertions during his military ser­vice, JFK authored an article entitled “Let’s Try an Experiment for Peace” in which he took a dif­fer­ent ­angle, warning of the dangers of a destabilizing and expensive arms race with the much larger Soviet Union.89 Though the opinion of the article reflects a dif­fer­ent view and a less activist approach than e­ arlier commentary, it does suggest an early recognition of the challenge emerging in the Soviet Union. To that point, ­later in 1945, on behalf of the Hearst News Organ­ization, Kennedy traveled to San Francisco for the inaugural conference of the United Nations. T ­ here, distinguishing himself from his many contemporaries who viewed Stalin and the USSR as an ally (if a persnickety one), Kennedy reported on the emerging tensions with the Soviets and advocated a realistic approach to what the new world organ­ization could achieve. Warning against expecting continued good relations with the Soviets, he correctly predicted that conflict with them was forthcoming and that the UN would function as an in­effec­tive peacemaker—­the same criticism he voiced about the League of Nations in his collegiate thesis.90 By the mid-1950s, Kennedy was firm in his view of the dangers of Communism and its imperial tendencies, and he viewed the Soviets as aggressive in nature and imperialist in perspective. The “single most impor­tant test of foreign policy ­today is how we meet the challenge of imperialism,” he said at this time.91 Despite warning about the forthcoming arms race and its negative consequences in 1944–45, in general throughout his po­liti­cal ­career Kennedy preached a firm support for proactive and strategic decision making and its deterrent effects. In 1945 Kennedy commented, “[The] g ­ reat issue facing the world ­today . . . ​is Soviet Rus­sia . . . ​a slave state of the worst sort . . . ​embarked upon a program of world aggression. . . . ​­Unless the freedom-­loving countries [­stopped Rus­sia they] would be destroyed.”92 ­Later, upon meeting Nikita Khrushchev for the first time, Kennedy told Hugh Sidey, “I never met a man like this. [I] talked about how a nuclear exchange would kill 70 million p ­ eople in 10 minutes and he just looked at me as if to say, ‘So what?’ My impression was that he just d ­ idn’t give a damn if it came to that.”93 Similar themes would characterize Kennedy’s concerns ­later when confronting the Communist Chinese. ­Later, while ­running for Senate, a common theme in Kennedy’s campaign speeches was strong defense of the West and Western values against the threatening communist advance.94 Once in Congress, he advocated a show of strength against Soviet continental imperialism, as he believed it would discourage Moscow from dangerous f­ uture adventurism.95 Following the Chinese Civil War, he criticized the Truman administration for its foreign policy failure in the Far East and for having lost sight of the tremendous importance of a non-­Communist China; that the United States had not given military aid to the Chinese Nationalists had crippled them in their ­battle

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against the mainland Communists, who ultimately emerged victorious.96 ­Later, Kennedy again warned of the rising threat from communism in the aftermath of the loss of the Chinese mainland.97 Addressing the 1956 Demo­ cratic National Convention, Kennedy spoke of the threats to US national security that the next president would be forced to oppose: “Of overwhelming importance are the ever-­mounting threats to our survival that confront us abroad, threats that require a prompt return to firm, decisive leadership. Each Republican year of indecision and hesitation has brought new communist advances—in Indochina, in the M ­ iddle East, in North Africa, in all the tense and troubled areas of the world.”98 Thus, throughout this period of prepresidential po­liti­cal life, Kennedy consistently demonstrated his view that communism posed a serious challenge to US interests and advocated for a firm and proactive approach to confronting communism wherever necessary. As the 1950s ­were waning, Kennedy had identified reasons for optimism when approaching the Soviets. First, early in his Senate term, Kennedy introduced for the rec­ord an article that concluded that the Soviets w ­ ere not interested in attacking the United States.99 ­Later, Kennedy described areas of potentially common interest between the United States and the USSR and used ­these to push for compromise and pro­gress between the two superpowers. Speaking at the University of Rochester on October 1, 1959, Kennedy said: “For we can discern in Mr. Khrushchev’s speeches the germs of ­these potential common interests: First, both the US and the USSR would like to be ­free of the crushing burden of the arms race . . . ​Secondly, neither the US nor the USSR wants a nuclear war . . . ​Third, neither the US nor the USSR wants nuclear weapons—­and the power to initiate nuclear war—to pass into the hands of too many other nations—­Red China, France, Sweden, and a host of o ­ thers now preparing to join the atomic club . . . ​­These are the real interests we could share in common.”100 While it is prob­ably ­going too far to suggest that Kennedy saw the Soviet Union as purely security-­seeking, it is pos­si­ble that ­these areas of commonality allowed Kennedy to focus on cooperation with the Soviets, especially in the nuclear arena, and to distinguish between the Soviet prob­lem and the rising Chinese Communist threat of which he was acutely aware. Travelling across Eu­rope as a member of Congress in 1951, Kennedy also began internalizing a belief in the deterrent powers of nuclear weapons—­ significantly, however, only at certain levels. His trip confirmed that the Rus­ sians ­ were unlikely to invade the continent since, as he argued, “the Rus­sians had not attacked before, why should they now when the bomb is still as much a deterrent as it was before?”101 Indeed, Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev both believed that no president or premier was actually ­going to use nuclear weapons if the ­enemy had the ability to retaliate in kind, as by then both the United States and the USSR did. In early 1961, for example, in a “Special Message to Congress on Defense Policies and Princi­ples,” Kennedy argued for an increase in US defense spending to guarantee

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defense through deterrence: “Our strategic arms and defenses must be adequate to deter any deliberate nuclear attack on the United States or our allies—by making clear to any potential aggressor that sufficient retaliatory forces ­will be able to survive a first strike and penetrate his defense in order to inflict unacceptable losses on him.”102 Over time, as the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) grew in ac­cep­tance, the danger from the Soviet arsenal was no longer that of a direct nuclear attack on the US mainland, as both sides’ massive arsenals deterred such recklessness and inspired caution.103 At the same time, however, the administration recognized that it was necessary to maintain parity with the Soviets, lest newfound strategic superiority encourage aggressive Soviet be­hav­ior.104 To that end, during the 1962 debate over the resumption of US nuclear testing, Kennedy argued, “and I must report to you in all candor that further Soviet tests, in the absence of further Western pro­gress, could well provide the Soviet Union with a nuclear attack and defense capability so power­ful as to encourage aggressive designs.”105 Thus, while mutual deterrence existed with parity in nuclear arsenals, the absence of such parity bred dangerous instability. Much of what was threatening to Kennedy about the Soviet Union in 1945—­the Soviets’ cost-­insensitivity, aggressive tendencies, and proclivity ­toward imperialism—­Kennedy also identified as threatening characteristics of Communist China. He wrote to his friend Lem Billings in 1942, “I d ­ on’t think anyone ­really realizes that nothing stands between us and the defeat of our Christian crusade against Paganism expect a lot of Chinks who never heard of God and a lot of Rus­sians who have heard about him but d ­ on’t want Him.”106 This was just the first time that Kennedy articulated his belief in the dangers emanating from Red China. At the Cathedral Club in Brooklyn, New York, on January 21, 1954, Senator Kennedy gave an address titled “A Strong and Vigorous Foreign Policy.” In the speech, Kennedy warned of the growing danger of Red China: Their [Communist China’s] assistance to the forces of Vietminh is thus steadily growing, and they themselves, and this is a most significant fact, are steadily increasing their own military strength. Some observers believe that within 2 years the Chinese Communists ­will have developed over 150 modern divisions. They w ­ ill then become, a­ fter the Soviet Union and the United States, the greatest single military power in the world, lacking only an atomic arsenal and an industrial capacity to sustain it, to put them in the first rank. This power ­will be ­under the direction of a native leadership which has increasingly evidenced aggressive and rapacious intentions ­toward the countries along their southern border.107

Thus, already by 1954, Kennedy identified Communist China as a rising power growing in military strength. He highlighted the country’s aggressive and expansive intentions and warned of a declining situation should

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the Chinese acquire nuclear weapons. By the close of 1959 and with Kennedy’s declaration of his candidacy for president on the horizon, Kennedy again addressed ­these issues in an interview with Harper’s Magazine: “[The Eisenhower administration] ­will leave on the next Administration’s doorstep the most critical prob­lems we have ever faced: the growing missile gap, the rise of Communist China . . . ​the lack of an arms control agreement.”108 In a major address on foreign policy and national security in June 1960, Kennedy, then candidate for president, outlined twelve core agenda items to concern the next US president: “We must reassess a China policy which has failed dismally to move t­oward its principal objective of weakening Communist rule in the mainland—­a policy which has failed to prevent a steady growth in Communist strength—­and a policy which offers no real solution to the prob­lems of a militant China. . . . ​And, . . . ​we should not now recognize Red China or agree to its admission to the United Nations without a genuine change in her belligerent attitude t­oward her Asian neighbors and the world—­and regrettably ­there is evidence that her belligerence is rising rather than receding.”109 Overall, from his military ser­vice to his candidacy for president, Kennedy consistently argued for recognition of the dangers posed by imperialism. ­After 1949, ­these fears included a rising Communist China—­ one with hostile intentions ­toward the United States and its allies, a rec­ord of antagonism ­toward the Asian region, and a history of aggression, expansion, and menacing be­hav­ior ­toward the noncommunist world. Significantly, though ­there w ­ ere similarities between the Soviet menace and the Chinese one, ­there was one very impor­tant distinction between them in the nuclear arena: Kennedy and his advisers recognized that the same deterrent effect governing the interactions between the United States and the USSR did not translate to new nuclear states or to small and vulnerable arsenals to which the logic of MAD did not apply. Whereas National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy confirmed the administration’s belief in MAD’s deterrent power while discussing the Berlin Crisis of 1961 and the constraint that leaders on both sides demonstrated, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara disparaged lesser capabilities, saying that “­limited nuclear capabilities, operating in­de­pen­dently, are dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.”110 Kennedy himself articulated this same nuclear pessimist logic when describing the dangers inherent to new instances of nuclear proliferation in previously nonnuclear countries: “As ­these weapons proliferate into other countries, and more and more countries get them which may not have this sophisticated means of control, then the chance of accidental explosion increases.”111 This distinction is meaningful; it explains how the Kennedy team would have perceived a significant threat in a potential new and small nuclear arsenal (like the Chinese Communists’) and the deterrent value of the Soviet arsenal during the same era.

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Given Kennedy’s nuclear pessimism and his concern over the Communist Chinese, it is unsurprising that the specifically nuclear ele­ment of the looming crisis with China was cause for alarm. Furthermore, Kennedy’s remarks about the Chinese nuclear program prior to 1960 reveal that he viewed Chinese proliferation as a dangerous development, one that threatened the safety and security of the United States. Though Kennedy never explic­itly addressed it, in 1946 Mao famously satirized the atomic bomb, calling it “a paper tiger” and mocking the power it gave the United States and ­others. Given Kennedy’s concern with irrational leaders in possession of nuclear weapons, Mao’s cavalier attitude (well known at the time) would likely have unsettled Kennedy. Speaking in 1959 at the University of California, Los Angeles, he identified China as one of a small group of states whose nuclear ambitions would damage US security: “The ability of other nations to test, develop and stockpile atomic weapons ­will alter drastically the ­whole balance of power, and put us all at the mercy of inadvertent, irresponsible, or deliberate attacks from many corners of the globe. . . . ​For one China, or France, or Sweden, or half a dozen other nations successfully test the atomic bomb, then the security of both Rus­sians and Americans is dangerously weakened.”112 Speaking on the Senate floor in 1959, Kennedy reiterated his ­earlier concerns about the incredible growth in Chinese power and highlighted the nuclear ele­ment of the Chinese rise: “Within the last year the Chinese have produced their first automobile. Within the next year they may have launched their first earth satellite. Even more seriously, they may well begin to take their place among the select com­pany of nuclear powers.”113 Furthermore, given both McNamara’s pronouncements about the dangers of small arsenals and Kennedy’s early concerns about accidental launches and the lack of command and control capabilities in new nuclear proliferants, it is unsurprising that Kennedy viewed the small and new Chinese arsenal as destabilizing and highly problematic given that this small arsenal did not offer the deterrent protection of a dyadic relationship governed by MAD. Vulnerable to external attack, nascent arsenals like the Chinese would be poised for use rather than loss to an outside aggressor. Fi­nally, Kennedy explic­itly connected China’s attempted proliferation to a negative impact on the balance of states in the international arena. By 1960 he was explicit, saying that “Red Chinese possession of atomic weapons could drastically alter the balance of power. . . . ​The Chinese are increasingly impor­tant, increasingly menacing, and increasingly impossible to omit from effective international agreements.”114 Kennedy even noted that the Vietnam War was of l­imited consequence, given the prospects of a nuclear China. He told New York Times columnist Arthur Krock in October 1961 that the domino theory had lost its validity: “China was bound to develop an atomic bomb, and when it did, all of Southeast Asia would fall to the Chinese Communists.” Subsequently,

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Kennedy tasked the National Security Council (NSC) to “confront and resolve” the “special unresolved prob­lem” of a nuclear-­armed China, given its effects “on our dispositions in Southeast Asia.”115 Once president and with the contours of the Chinese nuclear crisis taking shape, Kennedy described how he feared Chinese nuclear weapons and their precipitation of a decline in US foreign policy prowess—­making US defense of Asian allies basically infeasible.116 He also consistently recognized and articulated his fears of the threat posed to the world by communist expansion.117 China had exhibited over time a distressing meddlesomeness in the region and had overtly threatened vari­ous neighbors, including brazenly attacking India in 1962. T ­ hese military maneuvers, combined with growth in other metrics of power, caused Kennedy and his cabinet a significant level of concern.118 Furthermore, since the Chinese Revolution, the communists had been extremely clear about making the Americans “­enemy number one,” and nuclear weapons would give them the ability to act on this sentiment. Kennedy summarized his fears, saying that a nuclear China “would so upset the world po­liti­cal scene [that] it would be intolerable.”119 Robert F. Kennedy recalled a similar view: “He [JFK] said once, if this continued and the Chicoms got the bomb and went ahead in the direction they ­were heading, in the seventies this world would be even more dangerous than it was now.”120 JFK confirmed t­ hese fears in November 1962, telling Bundy that the Chinese program “was the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years.”121 The evidence suggests a clear picture of what Kennedy found threatening. From his early life and c­ areer, Kennedy felt imperialism and its insidious global expansion threatened the United States. Furthermore, Kennedy feared nuclear weapons for their destabilizing and dangerous nature. When ­these issues combined in the form of the Chinese communist pursuit of nuclear weapons, two of Kennedy’s major fears w ­ ere married in one menacing form. The idea of the most problematic weapons in the hands of an adversary openly aggressive to its neighbors, hostile to the United States, and revisionist in its aims of remaking the world in the Communist image struck Kennedy as a dangerous development in international affairs. Additionally problematic was the fact that the deterrent security of MAD did not apply in the Chinese nuclear context. Given t­ hese features, Kennedy felt that the Chinese nuclear situation needed to be proactively dealt with, not just allowed to develop while the world sat idly by. John F. Kennedy was deeply concerned with nuclear proliferation and its negative consequences for the United States and the world. His threat perception focused on the dangers of imperialism, Communism, and expansion, all of which manifested in Communist China. Given China’s aggression t­oward its neighbors, overt hostility t­oward the United States and its interests, and pursuit of nuclear weapons, the leader-­centric argument predicts that Kennedy, a

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pessimist lacking confidence in deterrence, would have been highly likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. The model expects him to have requested military options and feasibility assessments from his military and intelligence apparatus, and to see manifestations of such requests in the administration’s decision-­making rec­ords.

Lyndon B. Johnson Though a product of an e­ arlier generation, Lyndon B. Johnson was also a cold warrior focused on the defense of the US homeland. However, his views about nuclear proliferation ­were fundamentally dif­fer­ent from Kennedy’s, suggesting that LBJ was a mild nuclear optimist. Despite believing that nuclear war posed a grave danger, he was much less of an alarmist than President Kennedy. Whereas Kennedy spent much of his early life thinking about international affairs and world politics, as a young man, Johnson paid much more attention to the challenges of domestic poverty, racial in­equality, and domestic politics. Like Kennedy, Johnson worked diligently in Congress to advocate preparedness and a strong national defense. Whereas for Kennedy ­these preparations at home ­were a means ­toward proactive strategy abroad, Johnson believed that domestic preparedness would on its own deter attacks on the homeland. While Kennedy saw communist ideology as threatening, Johnson instead worried about communism’s expansive aims and the likelihood of a direct attack against US interests.122 While Johnson perceived some danger emanating from China, he believed that the threat was not nearly as imminent as Kennedy warned, as the Chinese did not have a near-­term ability to deliver any nuclear weapons produced in the 1960s. Nor did Johnson believe the Chinese ­were likely to attack the US in the first place. Given this mild nuclear optimism and relative confidence in deterrence against Chinese nuclear weapons, the theory argued ­here predicts that President Johnson would be unlikely to consider the use of preventive military force.

LBJ and International Affairs Though early portrayals described Johnson as ignorant of foreign policy, newer scholarship suggests considerable exposure to foreign affairs.123 Rather than being ignorant, Johnson is better described as somewhat disinterested—­keen to focus on domestic rather than international ­matters. This is not to say, however, that he ignored international issues or stumbled through foreign policy choices; in fact, Vietnam dominated Johnson’s time as president. Waldo Heinrichs confirms Johnson’s involvement on the issues, contending that Johnson was very well informed as president and maintained the details of what he read.124 A May 14, 1965, diary entry from Lady

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Bird Johnson confirms Johnson’s dedication: “It’s odd to hear ­people like Adlai Stevenson and many, many columnists say that the President, alas, is not as interested in—­does not give as much time to foreign affairs as he does to domestic affairs. Foreign affairs devour his days and nights. It’s just that the prob­lems are harder to solve than domestic affairs. True, he takes less joy in them, but what­ever bad happens in them, it’s not for lack of trying.”125 Johnson himself confirmed this prioritization, writing in 1964, “I am spending more time on foreign affairs than on any other subject.”126 Though certainly anti-­Communist and a strong supporter of US military strength, Johnson held simplistic views of international affairs, favored a cooperative approach to challenges, and often reflected the perspectives of the Eisenhower administration and Eisenhower-­Dulles foreign policy. Johnson’s brand of internationalism lacked nuance, despite extensive exposure to the many foreign policy challenges of the twentieth c­ entury. Indeed, Johnson’s congressional ser­vice included participation on the House Naval Affairs and Armed Ser­vices Committees, as well as on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In the Senate, Johnson served on the Armed Ser­vices Committee and chaired the Preparedness Subcommittee. While Johnson had been instrumental in ending the McCarthy era in US politics, he did not share Kennedy’s more aggressive, proactive foreign policy approach to combating challenges where they emerged. Nor did Johnson have many fine-­grained or complex views on international affairs. Early in his presidency, he wrote of his approach to problem-­solving in the international arena to Brazilian president João Goulart, “I believe that all ­these prob­lems are soluble if approached within a framework of expanding international cooperation.”127 Though in this letter the two are discussing economic issues specifically, the cooperative attitude carries over to security and nuclear issues as well. Perhaps t­ hese differences are unsurprising given the distinct backgrounds and natu­ral proclivities of Kennedy and Johnson. Johnson, a southerner, was drawn ­toward local issues, focusing on the difficulties he encountered in the isolation of the Texas backwoods. He had a natu­ral affinity for improvement—­ for himself, his ­ family, and society at large—­ that was understandable largely as a product of his small-­town background.128 He quickly identified a role for the federal government in achieving this improvement and would champion both the New Deal ­under Franklin D. Roo­se­velt and ­later LBJ’s own ­Great Society. What arms control represented for Kennedy, racial discrimination and poverty alleviation ­were for LBJ. Therefore, while Johnson was certainly knowledgeable about foreign affairs, especially given his long experience in politics, he lacked personal zeal or pressing interest. Johnson’s congressional ser­vice put him in Washington while many key foreign policy challenges and the US role in the world ­were being debated. Johnson emerged as a leading advocate for defense spending ­because he believed that a strong and prepared Amer­i­ca would ­counter any mounting external threats. Though frequently voting with FDR on defense mea­sures,

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like most Americans Johnson was reluctant to see the United States become too heavi­ly enmeshed abroad. T ­ hese positions reflected that Johnson was highly sensitive to external threats and of the opinion that military expenditures ­were meant for defense as opposed to offense.129 Unlike ­those who advocated for defense spending and supported strategies to compel challengers to back down—­Kennedy among them—­Johnson’s view reflected a preference for a strong defense at home to dissuade challengers from threatening in the first place. For example, whereas some of his contemporaries ­were quick to advocate US involvement in World War II, Johnson only supported US entry into the war once ­Great Britain was ­under siege. He was concerned for Britain and also feared that by not acting, the United States would encourage the Nazi thirst for global conquest and become vulnerable to direct attack.130 This view is consistent with Johnson’s overarching fear of external aggression, imperialism, and direct territorial attacks. While overseas with a congressional del­eg ­ a­tion, Johnson became more aware of the threat of communist expansion across Eu­rope and the need to challenge such outward enlargement. Solutions, LBJ thought, could be found through collective, international effort. Johnson saw NATO as “essential to containing the Soviet Union and dealing with . . . ​Germany’s . . . ​nationalist tendencies.” NATO would also help defend Eu­rope through trade liberalization.131 This same spirit echoed in his Vietnam policy years l­ ater when he argued that American failure to act would allow a communist takeover throughout much if not all of Southeast Asia.132 For many of the same reasons, Johnson supported Lend Lease, the Truman Doctrine, and the Marshall Plan.133 Consistently over time, Johnson feared that the rest of the world would end up ­behind an iron curtain if the United States failed to act to ­counter the expansion of communism.134 As an internationalist, Johnson found it sensible to spend money on peace.135 In 1961, as Kennedy’s vice president, Johnson was sent to South Asia to assess the regional situation. His report gave a standard recounting of domino theory—­the Eisenhower-­Dulles strategy that claimed that if one state succumbed to Communism, the surrounding states would soon fall like a line of dominoes—­and argued that the United States must stand strong on communism in South Asia or be prepared to take up arms to confront it eventually at home. This sentiment is unsurprising coming from Johnson, who was afraid of Communism’s expansion, not of the system itself.136 Taken together, this evidence suggests that LBJ perceived global threats acutely when the US homeland was directly threatened by territorial or imperial expansion.

General Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation LBJ held dif­fer­ent nuclear views than his pre­de­ces­sor. Like Kennedy, Johnson was aware of the tremendous costs of nuclear war. At the same time, he

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was not nearly as alarmist as Kennedy about the high likelihood of a nuclear detonation or accident. Nor was LBJ as nuanced in his perceptions of the specific dangers of nuclear weapons, instead focusing simply on “avoiding a nuclear holocaust.”137 In the aftermath of World War II, Johnson advocated for a cooperative and liberal agenda. In 1946, speaking to the League of ­Women Voters, Johnson followed FDR’s collaborative spirit and suggested giving the Soviet Union the secret of the atomic bomb.138 As a member of Congress in 1946, Johnson introduced an address on the subject of atomic energy and world cooperation. Cognizant of the dangers of nuclear war, this address offered a cooperative solution to the atomic prob­lem, which Johnson supported.139 As a senator discussing the situation in ­Korea, Johnson expressed his certainty that the United States would use nuclear weapons as if they ­were any other weapon: “Discussions about w ­ hether we should use the Atomic Bomb are elementary by comparison. I am sure that we w ­ ill use the Atomic Bomb—if and when it can be used to stem the tide of aggression.”140 Significantly, when Senator Ralph Flanders of Vermont introduced a resolution calling on the United States to work ­toward universal disarmament, Senator Kennedy was one of thirty-­three amendment cosponsors. Senator Johnson was not.141 While president in June 1964, Johnson wrote a memorandum approving further nuclear sharing, this time within the NATO alliance.142 More broadly, Johnson believed in international organ­izations, supported the ill-­conceived Baruch Plan for international atomic cooperation, and had high hopes for the peaceful abilities of the nascent United Nations, both in the nuclear arena and elsewhere.143 During the 1964 presidential campaign Johnson articulated details about the unique destructiveness of nuclear weapons that suggest he understood their grievous nature. In light of MAD and the decline in US nuclear superiority, Johnson felt that nuclear weapons could be used only for deterrence, not for war fighting or for preemption.144 To that end, in September 1964, he told a Seattle audience that “our nuclear power alone has deterred Soviet aggression,” suggesting that he had more confidence in deterrence than JFK did.145 Upon becoming president, Johnson declared, “A nuclear war w ­ ill be the death of all of our hopes and it is our task to see that it does not happen.”146 However, Johnson’s belief that nuclear war was not a high-­probability scenario allowed him to pursue other priorities.147 Thus, while on the one hand Johnson understood the devastating nature of nuclear weapons, his support for nuclear sharing with both the Soviets and NATO allies and his belief in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons suggest a weak nuclear optimist position. While this perspective does not extend to the view that more weapons ­will necessarily be better, it does suggest a belief in a lower likelihood of nuclear war and a strong deterrent ability inherent to nuclear weapons, which together yield a lower likelihood of finding significant threats emerging from nuclear issues. Furthermore, LBJ’s early comments about the

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usability of nuclear weapons suggest at least an initial belief that ­there was nothing particularly special about them. Taking this evidence collectively reveals that Johnson’s beliefs about nuclear weapons ­were radically dif­fer­ent from Kennedy’s proliferation pessimism. The limits of Johnson’s nuclear optimism are evident in the context of the Cuban missile crisis. This event in par­tic­u­lar reveals that Johnson was hardly passive or ignorant of the potential dangers in the nuclear age. Early in the crisis, Johnson took a hawkish view, advocating for the use of force against the Soviet missile sites ­under construction in Cuba.148 Johnson disagreed with Kennedy’s implementation of a naval blockade. According to Director of Central Intelligence John McCone, Johnson viewed the blockade as “locking the barn ­after the ­horse was gone,” since missiles w ­ ere already in Cuba.149 This position is unsurprising given the significant Soviet arsenal, their ability to target the US with ballistic missiles, and their increased chances of success given the missiles’ proximity to the US mainland from the Cuban island. As Johnson saw the Soviet menace as much more acute and the danger of missiles in Cuba as severe given their proximity to the US homeland, his advocacy for force aligns with his wider threat perception, focusing on external attack. By contrast, the Chinese nuclear episode did not hold similar salience for Johnson. Unlike the missiles in Cuba, which posed an immediate threat to the United States—­ one backed by the Soviet adversary—­the Chinese nuclear program was nascent, far away, and backed by a relatively weak military power that was unable to realistically target the United States. Johnson believed in arms control though he lacked Kennedy’s “effervescence and contagious enthusiasm for it” and never took a strong personal interest in the subject.150 Nuclear issues w ­ ere among the top three agenda items of the Kennedy administration. For Johnson, though he viewed “the spread of nuclear weapons [as] one of the ­great dangers to peace,” arms control was hardly an administration priority.151 Like Kennedy before him, however, Johnson had a variety of arms control successes. On December 17, 1963, Johnson highlighted in an address to the United Nations his desire to prevent the dissemination of nuclear weapons to states without them. He called for a continuation of the arms control and reduction mea­sures instigated u ­ nder President Kennedy.152 To that end, Johnson presided over a mutual cutback in fissionable material production by the United States and the USSR and signed an Outer Space Treaty, which prohibited the stationing of nuclear bombs on the moon, the planets, or anywhere in outer space. He supported the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty, though for po­liti­cal reasons the Soviets declined to actually sign u ­ ntil the Nixon administration began in 1969. How can we explain the successes Johnson oversaw in the nuclear arena given his lack of enthusiasm for the issues? Johnson was adamant about the need to keep continuity with the JFK administration in the aftermath of

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Kennedy’s assassination. This desire extended to Kennedy’s many pending initiatives both on racial equality (which was also personally impor­tant to LBJ) and on the nonproliferation agenda. To that end, Johnson not only supported the many nonproliferation and arms control efforts spearheaded by his pre­de­ces­sor and championed deals with the Soviets wherever they emerged, but also moved forward with his own initiatives, calling on President Kennedy’s legacy to encourage additional support. Moreover, the evidence from within the Johnson administration and elsewhere reveals that the Chinese nuclear test itself had a significant impact on Johnson personally and the nonproliferation agenda, lending newfound urgency to the nuclear prob­lem and efforts to combat it.153 At the November 23, 1964, meeting of the Committee of Principals, participants discussed the formation of a group to evaluate US positions on nuclear ­matters, the Gilpatric Committee, and the need to “investigate the desirability of a nonproliferation policy.”154 This suggests that such a policy did not exist previously. Indeed, Johnson asked the committee to “explore the widest range of [nonproliferation] mea­sures the United States might undertake in conjunction with other governments or by itself.”155 ­Later, a draft of the Gilpatric Committee report explained that “the Chinese explosion has had an im­ mensely catalytic effect upon national nuclear decisions . . . ​it has lent urgency to the prob­lem everywhere.”156 A New York Times article on December 2, 1964, confirmed the impact of the Chinese test, highlighting the committee’s creation and the administration’s recognition that ­others could follow the Chinese and acquire the bomb, too.157 Additionally, a memorandum for the president prior to his meeting with the Gilpatric Committee in January 1965 described how nuclear proliferation was a threat requiring attention, given an approaching point of no return in controlling the spread.158 Fi­nally, a memo from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy describing the postelection agenda for the Johnson administration in 1965 listed nuclear proliferation as an impor­tant agenda item: “Pending Chicom test forces us to face up to the issue. Of course, we are in fact the greatest promoters of proliferation when we sell reactors, know-­how, e­ tc., all over the world, at the same time when ­we’re trying desperately to forestall it via arms control. I’m a realist ­here and maybe best t­hing is to carry w ­ ater on both shoulders. But let’s do so consciously at any rate.”159 In the end, Johnson’s varying positions are understandable. He supported ­later nonproliferation efforts, while opposing prevention of China’s program given his ­limited perception of its negative consequences for US security. The point is not that LBJ failed to prioritize nonproliferation; rather, it is that he was insufficiently threatened to pay the costs associated with military intervention. Furthermore, the bulk of his effort occurred ­after the China episode.160

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Probability of Deterring the Proliferator Johnson’s prepresidential period also offers evidence of the threats he perceived internationally. From his youth, Johnson developed a par­tic­u­lar approach to enemies, bullies, and threats he confronted. Johnson learned early that if you ran from a bully, “he is ­going to wind up charging you right out of your own ­house.”161 Indeed, Johnson conveyed this sentiment in 1964 when he asked, “What in the hell is Vietnam worth to me?” He then answered: “Of course, if you start r­ unning from the Communists, they may chase you right into your own kitchen.”162 This need to confront an ­enemy head-on, lest the ­enemy capitalize on one’s weakness, characterized Johnson’s approach to Vietnam in par­tic­u­lar. In a conversation with Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen on February 17, 1965, Johnson said, “That we know, from Munich on, that when you give, the dictators feed on raw meat. If they take South Vietnam, they take Thailand, they take Indonesia, they take Burma, they come right on back to the Philippines.”163 That Johnson did not attach a similar logic to the communist Chinese nuclear program suggests that he did not see this situation as dangerous for the United States. If he had, we can speculate that LBJ would have felt compelled to meet the threat directly, given the danger he perceived would result from backing down. What worried Johnson most consistently was US vulnerability to external attack. Specifically, he feared Communist imperial expansion and sought a strong and secure United States through significant military buildup, an effort he began as a congressman. Johnson’s work t­ oward preparedness was not designed to permit a US military offensive; rather, the effort was directed at fostering peace abroad through readiness at home. Similarly, Johnson’s favorable view of international institutions suggested a liberal and cooperative spirit of engagement abroad. On both counts, Johnson stood apart from Kennedy, who saw the internal characteristics and nature of the Communist system as inherently threatening and who viewed international organ­ izations as weak and unhelpful for confronting global challenges.164 Moreover, whereas Kennedy raised the alarm about the dangers posed by the Soviet Union as early as 1945, Johnson was much slower to reclassify the Soviets from complicated ally to dangerous threat. So while the two men agreed about the need for a military second to none, their end games ­were dif­fer­ent. Johnson saw strength at home as fostering deterrence and security; Kennedy saw domestic military strength as a means of combating prob­ lems abroad wherever they should arise. As a congressman, Johnson voted consistently with the Truman and Eisenhower administrations on defense mea­sures, but like most Americans in 1940 he “was reluctant to see the United States become enmeshed in foreign affairs. He was sensitive to protecting against external threats, but he saw military expenditures as meant for defense and not offense.”165 By the

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summer of 1941, he believed it essential for the US to enter the war quickly before it was too late to assist the British and stem the tide of Nazi occupation. ­Later, he saw Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union as evidence of the need to combat the Nazis’ plans for world conquest.166 ­These views suggest that what concerned Johnson was not the Nazis per se, but rather their desire to digest the Eu­ro­pean continent and then the United States. ­Later, Johnson was shaken by the Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb and the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. He was motivated to work with President Truman, who shared Johnson’s concern for augmenting US capacity to combat the Communist threat.167 Johnson’s approach to international challenges was consistent as time progressed and he supported US entrance into K ­ orea. He thought that the North’s attack on the South represented a challenge to the f­ ree world, reminiscent of Hitler’s aggression against Czecho­slo­va­kia in 1938; Johnson saw the attack as part of an imperial design for world domination.168 Once again, it was the threat of external aggression and conquest that compelled Johnson to act. Significantly, this view did not extend to the early years in the war in Vietnam, given that the communists had no power to directly injure the United States.169 This suggests that while LBJ believed communist expansion was threatening, the crucial ele­ment was an ­enemy’s ability to directly target the United States. As articulated in a constituent letter penned while vice president, China did not pose this kind of threat; though hostile to the United States, China threatened only its neighbors.170 In 1964, he noted, “We face an ambitious and aggressive China, but we have the w ­ ill and the strength to help our Asian friends resist that ambition.”171 Thus, while Johnson did not ignore the nuclear prob­lem in Communist China, he was much less focused on it, given the l­ imited ability of the Chinese to attack the United States. He was also focused on thwarting Communist expansion already ­under way in Southeast Asia. Contributing to Johnson’s feeling of security was the fact that the US military apparatus had grown significantly early in Kennedy’s administration. Kennedy and Johnson had campaigned against years of Republican irresponsibility that allowed postwar US military dominance to wane, and they prioritized defense preparedness accordingly. By 1964, Johnson articulated a sense of security in light of newfound US strength, focusing on the deterrent value of the strategic arsenal. In January 1964 in his first State of the Union address, Johnson said, “We must maintain . . . ​that margin of military safety and superiority obtained through 3 years of steadily increasing both the quality and the quantity of our strategic, our conventional, and our antiguerrilla forces.”172 ­Later, Johnson articulated the deterrent logic: “We can only be ­free to pursue our passion for peace b ­ ehind a shield so power­ ful that no aggressor dares try its strength against Amer­ic­ a. I am ­here to say to you and to them that Amer­i­ca has created such a shield. In the past 3 years, we have more than doubled our Minuteman missile program.”173 In June,

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he connected this increase in strength to nuclear deterrence: “In ­every area of national strength Amer­i­ca t­ oday is stronger than it has ever been before. It is stronger than any adversary or combination of adversaries. It is stronger than the combined might of all the nations in the history of the world. And I confidently predict that strength ­will continue to grow more rapidly than the might of all ­others. The first area of this increasing strength is our ability to deter atomic destruction.”174 In September 1964, just prior to the first Chinese nuclear test, Johnson repeated his perception of a strong US military as the pillar of US policy: “First is the effort to persuade our adversaries that any attack upon us would immediately bring their own destruction. . . . ​Our strength is our surest shelter against war.”175 Even years ­later, Johnson took comfort in the arsenal and was confident that it could deter any deliberate Chinese attack.176 This attitude suggests that, as the US military grew, Johnson perceived additional layers of security that would deter any potential aggressor contemplating attack, including the Communist Chinese, whose nuclear program Johnson did not view as threatening. Given that the weight of the evidence points t­ oward Johnson’s weak proliferation optimism, a threat perception focused on imperial expansion and direct attacks on the United States, and ­limited early concern for China relative to the Soviet Union, the leader-­centric argument expects ­little commitment from President Johnson to pursuing a counterproliferation strategy centered on the use of preventive military force against the Chinese nuclear program. ­Because Johnson saw this as a low-­threat environment (one with ­limited consequences of nuclear proliferation generally and a high likelihood of deterring the Chinese), the theory does not expect specific military studies at Johnson’s request and therefore no consideration of preventive military force. The theory, however, expects Kennedy’s consideration of force and would assume that as president, Johnson might have to confront the planning that Kennedy put into place. Such activity would not undermine the theoretical expectations for Johnson, as this activity would not be at Johnson’s request, but rather a legacy of the Kennedy period.

The Kennedy Administration and the Chinese Nuclear Program When President Kennedy took office, he ruled out any changes to US China policy and maintained a one-­China approach with the Nationalists occupying the Chinese seat at the United Nations.177 Early contacts with Peking ­were not promising, according to Secretary Rusk, who thought the communists showed l­ittle interest in improving US-­China relations and instead acted violently ­toward Americans abroad.178 China’s foreign policy indicated that the Chinese sought to play a strong role in the world, have a large voice in international affairs, and attempt to dominate all of Asia, driving the US

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and its interests back across the Pacific.179 Kennedy’s team viewed China as an “aggressive and expansionist power, intent on usurping American influence in Asia.”180 Furthermore, perceptions of the threat increased as China demonstrated its willingness to use force to achieve its interests.181 Although t­here was broad consensus at the surface, administration members held contrasting views of communist intentions and the consequences of their nuclear acquisition. In June 1961, for example, a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) report concluded that the impact of a Chinese nuclear capability would be significant for US security globally and in Asia.182 The CIA, by contrast, did not believe that explosion of the first Chinese bomb or even acquisition of a ­limited nuclear weapons capability would result in a “general policy of military aggression or even [Chinese willingness] to take significantly greater military risks.” Rather, such a step would reemphasize to the Chinese their ­limited capabilities and lead to caution.183 At the State Department, Director of Policy Planning George McGhee argued that the effect would be po­liti­cal and psychological rather than pose concrete military implications: states in the region might opt to band together with the Chinese, seeing communism instead of capitalism and democracy as the wave of the ­future.184 McGhee further suggested that the way to deal with this development was to encourage Indian proliferation. Rusk vetoed this idea immediately, saying that it would contradict the administration’s policy of opposition to further extension of nuclear weapons around the globe.185 ­Later, in February 1963, former Atomic Energy Commission chairman and new CIA director John A. McCone met with McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy’s national security advisor, and described the president’s fear that a nuclear China “would so upset the world po­liti­cal scene [that] it would be intolerable.” Bundy confirmed that Cuba and China’s nuclear program ­were the “two issues foremost in the minds of the highest authority and therefore should be treated accordingly by the CIA.”186 Despite dif­fer­ent assessments within his administration, President Kennedy remained focused on the dangers of China’s nuclear program and led the charge to confront it: “I’ll go to the last mile to try to prevent new testing of nuclear weapons . . . ​and to find a way to prevent China from developing its first nuclear bomb.”187 A memorandum to National Security Council secretary Bromley Smith from Bundy documents JFK’s initiative to this end when he asked for a dedicated NSC meeting to investigate the Chinese Communists and their agenda.188 Repeatedly and especially during the lead up to the Test Ban Treaty negotiations, Kennedy articulated that his greatest fear was Chinese nuclear weapons. “Any negotiations that can hold back the Chinese communists are most impor­tant,” he said at an NSC meeting, “­because they loom as our major antagonists of the late 60’s and beyond.”189 He viewed the Test Ban Treaty as potentially able to rein in Chinese development of nuclear arms and had an “almost romantic attachment to the idea that, somehow, the Americans and the Rus­sians could combine to block China’s nuclear programs.”190

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The intensity of Kennedy’s concerns soared in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. He perceived the Chinese nuclear issue as a wedge to further dismantle the fracturing Sino-­Soviet alliance. By early 1963, JFK was practically obsessed with the Chinese nuclear proj­ect and its dire implications for US security. “We’ve won a ­great victory,” Kennedy told Congressional leaders ­after the missile crisis: “We have resolved one of the g ­ reat crises of mankind. . . . ​­There ­will be another one—­when and if the Chinese get the hydrogen bomb.”191 In the first months of the Kennedy administration, a memorandum from the secretary of defense to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff described the significant po­liti­cal and military implications of Chinese nuclear acquisition and endorsed an interagency study to analyze the prob­lem, its consequences, and potential steps to counteract it.192 In the fall of 1962, prior to a visit to the United States by General Chiang Ching-­Kuo (Chiang Kai-­Shek’s son, sent to discuss US-­Nationalist military cooperation against the communist nuclear program), Secretary of State Rusk penned a memo to Kennedy describing how Rusk expected Chiang to want to discuss a potential sabotage operation to target the nuclear installations on the mainland. Rusk suggested keeping all available options open.193 On September 11, 1963, President Kennedy asked the JCS about conducting a commando operation to target the Chinese nuclear facilities. The plan was to use three hundred to five hundred men traveling by air to target distant locations. Kennedy was specifically concerned with the likelihood that the planes conducting the operations would be shot down. Though Chiang maintained that the operation was feasible, Kennedy was skeptical. This skepticism was understandable given his recent experience with the failure at the Bay of Pigs.194 On the other hand, on November 18, General Maxwell Taylor, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told his colleagues that they would be discussing options for how to delay or prevent the Chinese from succeeding in their nuclear development. He said that the Chinese nuclear effort was fraught with scientific, technological, and industrial trou­bles, so that a coordinated program of covert activities designed to intensify ­those trou­bles could cause significant delay.195 Additionally, a policy planning report commissioned at this time, though not released ­until ­after Kennedy’s death, described four military options for consideration. Included ­were an overt nonnuclear air attack, a bombing campaign executed by the Nationalists, a covert ground attack with agents inside China, and an airdrop of Nationalist sabotage teams.196 That JFK asked for military and intelligence assessments of the Chinese nuclear program’s pro­gress and options to target the program are evidence to support his high threat assessment. That he also contemplated and discussed options involving US allies indicates serious consideration of preventive force. ­Under any scenario, no military agency could guarantee an operation’s military feasibility. Despite this uncertainty and the competing administration

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perspectives on using force, Kennedy forged ahead with the pursuit of vari­ ous military options. For example, Kennedy, although he was aware of arguments by both the CIA and George McGhee, ­under secretary of state for po­liti­cal affairs, against a rising Chinese challenge once in possession of nuclear weapons, nevertheless told CIA director McCone and National Security Advisor Bundy in January of 1963, “we should be prepared to take some form of action ­unless they [the Chinese] agreed to desist from further efforts in this field.”197 The evidence never suggests that any potential risk of retaliation or difficulty conducting the military campaign would prevent Kennedy from attempting to destroy or delay the Chinese nuclear program. Similarly, ­there is no indication that the risk of e­ ither domestic po­liti­cal costs or international condemnation interfered with his deliberation over available options. Together, t­ hese notions intimate that feasibility (IV3) concerns would not alone have deterred Kennedy from progressing. JFK told the NSC that “the Chinese nuclear program was a principal driving force ­behind his quest for a test ban,” designed “to halt or delay the development of an atomic capability by the Chinese Communists.”198 It remains unclear precisely why Kennedy placed such hope for preventing Chinese proliferation in the test ban, which would limit atmospheric and under­ground nuclear testing. The Chinese ­were unsurprisingly uninterested in agreeing to such a ban. Nevertheless, with the test ban as one piece of his approach, in 1963 Kennedy seriously contemplated other schemes for “removing the potential capability” or “action to deny the ChiComs a nuclear capability.”199 In the lead up to US-­Soviet negotiations over the Test Ban Treaty, Kennedy instructed US representative and former ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman to push Khrushchev on cooperating to prevent the Chinese nuclear development.200 Once Harriman had traveled overseas for the meeting, and even ­after Khrushchev had rebuffed the idea, remarking that it would be many years before the Chinese could be considered a true nuclear threat, Kennedy repeated his desire to discuss potential options with the Soviets. He sent Harriman a tele­gram emphasizing Kennedy’s original points and rearticulating his call to action.201 “Your report is encouraging on l­imited test ban. . . . ​I remain confident that Chinese prob­ lem is more serious than Khrushchev suggests and believe you should press question with him in private meeting. . . . ​Consider that relatively small forces in hands of ­people like Chicoms could be very dangerous to us all. You should try to elicit Khrushchev’s view of means of limiting or preventing Chinese nuclear development and his willingness e­ ither to take Soviet action or accept US action aimed in this direction.”202 The US-­Soviet cooperative action described in Harriman’s briefing books was but one option considered by Kennedy and his administration for preventing China from developing nuclear weapons. William Bundy, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, tasked the JCS with developing a contingency plan for a conventional attack designed to cause

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“the severest impact and delay to the Chinese nuclear program.203 The JCS proposed exploring a nuclear option. An unconventional warfare program code-­named BRAVO described paramilitary action for consideration. The Chinese Nationalists sought US assistance in attacking the Chinese nuclear program as a means of returning to power. Chiang Kai-­Kuo discussed a commando raid with the CIA’s Chief of Station William Nelson and ­later with National Security Advisor Bundy. Bundy told Chiang that the United States was very interested in a plan that could “delay and prevent” nuclear growth in China.204 The evidence, therefore, reveals that serious consideration of preventive force took place from the start of JFK’s administration u ­ ntil its sudden end. JFK held discussions with allies and adversaries alike; he ordered intelligence assessments, feasibility studies, and pursued all available options. The reports by the JCS and the Department of Policy Planning, and discussions with both the Chinese Nationalists and the Soviets, are the observable manifestations of this effort, driven by President Kennedy’s desire to prevent the Chinese nuclear program from becoming a real­ity. It is apparent that the threats Kennedy perceived early in life from both nuclear proliferation and international aggressors continued through his presidency. The threats converged with an aggressive Communist China’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and caused him to seriously contemplate preventive military action. But for his assassination, Kennedy might very well have ordered an intervention. While this difficult counterfactual is beyond the scope of analy­sis ­here, this case nevertheless demonstrates the decision-­ making pro­cess and the role of nuclear beliefs: Kennedy’s nuclear pessimism and lack of confidence in deterring a nuclear-­armed China led him to consider the use of force to forestall Chinese proliferation.205 With his threat perception guiding his assessment of the situation, Kennedy requested feasibility studies and military plans and discussed options with both allies and adversaries. Despite the abrupt conclusion to the Kennedy period, the evidence nevertheless shows the leader-­centric model at work.

The Johnson Administration and the Chinese Nuclear Program As 1964 began, the CIA reported that the Chinese test was likely forthcoming sometime during the calendar year. Reports surfaced that Premier Zhou Enlai told the premier of Mali that the test would happen in October, but many inside the CIA and the State Department discounted the rumors. US intelligence collection had steadily improved since 1960, and between July 1963 and July 1964 multiple Corona intelligence-­gathering satellites had flown into Chinese airspace. In April, satellite imagery revealed a tower at Lop Nur, though most analysts discounted its relevance to the looming nuclear test. By August, intelligence confirmed that the suspect fa­cil­i­ty was

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indeed the nuclear test site while also suggesting that the site would not be operational for at least two months, reflecting the misguided US assumption that the Chinese ­were using plutonium rather than uranium.206 Also in April, Robert Johnson of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council authored a report describing four options for forestalling the program. First, the United States could conduct an overt nonnuclear air attack, which would require a heavy attack to destroy the facilities. The report assumed that the United States would have the capability to conduct a conventional attack and eliminate the Chinese nuclear sites.207 Second, inadequate capabilities ruled out bombing by the Republic of China. Similarly, a lack of inside assets removed from consideration a covert ground attack by mainland China. A final option required an airdrop of Nationalist sabotage teams. The report determined that a one-­hundred-­man team could overwhelm the security forces at the relevant installations and damage the fa­cil­i­ty and also noted that the mission, while difficult, was receiving further consideration within the agency.208 The same report noted that destruction of the fissionable materials would last only five years; for something more permanent, it would be necessary to destroy the research facilities and personnel.209 Ultimately this report concluded that military action was not justifiable based on technical feasibility, the impermanence of the effect, the po­liti­cal difficulty, and “arguments to the effect that the near and medium term consequences in Asia of a Chinese nuclear capability ­will be small, and that the direct threat to the US ­will be very small.”210 Conversely, a US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) paper that August undermined the more optimistic nature of e­arlier reporting, warning of additional proliferation to balance Chinese capabilities. Echoing Kennedy, the report warned: “If we do not solve this prob­lem . . . ​we ­will soon be faced with a world in which t­here are ten and then possibly twenty states having national nuclear capabilities. This would be a world of the greatest danger and insecurity.”211 Shortly thereafter, a December 1964 extension of the original State Department report questioned its sanguine conclusions and noted how even a small Chinese offensive investment could do ­great damage, especially considering the relative vulnerability of a comparatively smaller US population.212 The report also noted impor­tant demonstration effects to other countries pursuing nuclear weapons that might themselves reconsider following a preventive attack. Fi­nally, the l­ater addendum criticized the report’s underestimation of the medium-­and long-­term effects of Chinese weapons on the US-­Chinese confrontation and the near-­term antiproliferation effects of destroying the Chinese capabilities. Collectively, t­hese reports demonstrate not only the variety of military efforts ­under consideration in 1964, but also the diversity of opinions even within the State Department itself. By September, the issue was ripe for presidential decision, with the CIA reassessing the agency’s e­ arlier reports and State Department China specialist Allen Whiting saying that the test was imminent. National security

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officials repeatedly discussed the issue at Tuesday lunchtime meetings, though without forging consensus. On September 15, 1964, a memorandum for the rec­ord confirmed a meeting between McCone, McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy occurring at Rusk’s State Department dining room.213 ­There they heard McCone’s estimation that a test was imminent, echoed by Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin to US ambassador Llewellyn Thompson. The group concluded that they opposed an unprovoked military attack but de­cided that in the event of hostilities it would be advisable to target the Chinese nuclear program. When they took the issue to the president, Johnson concurred with their assessment and concluded that it would be best to allow the Chinese to test rather than to conduct unprovoked unilateral action against them. Attacks, Johnson argued, would only be pos­si­ble in the aftermath of military hostilities.214 In the end, how can we understand Johnson’s decision to stop the consideration of preventive military force against the Chinese nuclear program and to accept it as a real­ity? First, Johnson demonstrated calm in the face of l­ ittle perceived threat from the Chinese nuclear development. Recall that Johnson was sensitive to dangers of external attack on the US homeland, such as during the Cuban missile crisis, with Soviet military might immediately offshore.215 By fall 1964, given US deterrent strength and the lack of Chinese delivery vehicles, LBJ considered a Chinese nuclear attack as a low-­ probability scenario. Indeed, when the test occurred, the president’s statement declared that “its [the nuclear test] military significance should not be overestimated. . . . ​The Chinese Communist nuclear detonation is a reflection of policies which do not serve the cause of peace. But ­there is no reason to fear that it w ­ ill lead to immediate dangers of war.”216 In a news conference, President Johnson downplayed the test’s strategic impact and emphasized the United States’ deterrent capacity, which made the nation safe from potential aggression: “Secretary McNamara reported in detail on the US defense plans and deployments which take full account of the Chinese effort now and for the ­future. He emphasized as well the enormous cost to all mankind of any nuclear holocaust, and he showed how the heavy strategic superiority of the United States deters, and w ­ ill continue to deter, all pos­si­ble opponents.”217 That said, Johnson did not view the test as a positive development, remarking in a report to the American ­people, “The lesson of Lop Nor is that we are right to recognize the danger of nuclear spread; that we must continue to work against it, and we w ­ ill.”218 Moreover, Johnson noted that the threat was localized. Following a meeting with the president of the Philippines, Johnson said, “the two presidents recognized that the aggressive intentions and activities of Communist China continue to pre­sent an imminent threat in the Far East and in southeast Asia.”219 ­These statements reveal that prior to the first Chinese nuclear test, Johnson did not perceive the situation as dangerous for immediate US security. Given Johnson’s nuclear optimism, he believed that the overwhelming

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strength of the US arsenal would deter any aggressor, including the Chinese. ­Because of China’s lack of ballistic missile capabilities, t­ here was no way for the Chinese to directly target the US homeland, making for a very low likelihood of nuclear attack against the United States. Combined, ­these ­factors made President Johnson relatively unconcerned for the safety of the United States in the immediate aftermath of a Chinese nuclear test. For this reason, Johnson did not request additional military assessments confirming the theoretical expectations that he would be unlikely to consider preventive military force. Indeed, Johnson’s weak proliferation optimism and confidence in US deterrence generally, and vis-­à-­vis China specifically, yielded no administration activity beyond definitively ruling out the consideration of force that Kennedy had put into motion. While the JFK period was characterized by alarm over the Chinese nuclear program and the consideration of how best to confront it, the LBJ period was focused elsewhere. In the aftermath of the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964, President Johnson described it as not a g ­ reat surprise and said that he had been expecting it for some time. “Nonetheless, the fact that a large country with a hostile government had mastered the technology of nuclear explosives was necessarily a source of worry.”220 I was not concerned for the immediate ­future. A long and expensive road separated setting off a nuclear blast and developing the power­ful and accurate missiles to carry nuclear weapons across seas and continents. . . . ​Some ­future President would have to face the question of how to deal with this situation. . . . ​[The] prob­lem was not just a ­matter of China. It was a question of how to deal with a g ­ reat many nations . . . ​equipped with nuclear weapons. All I could do was to move as fast and as far as pos­si­ble during my Presidency to slow the arms race, to achieve international agreements on their control, and to prevent the continuing proliferation of weapons that could mean the end of civilization.221

Though materials from an individual’s memoirs must be approached skeptically, the view articulated h ­ ere is consistent with Johnson’s complacency about the Chinese nuclear program seen elsewhere. White House tapes from 1964, for example, document Johnson’s attitude t­oward the nuclear bomb both before it was tested and in the immediate aftermath. First, in a discussion between National Security Advisor Bundy and President Johnson on September 24, 1964, Bundy said to the president, “You—or, if not you, then the Secretary of State—­should call attention to what we now estimate is a real possibility that the Chinese may do a nuclear test on their anniversary, which is the first of October.”222 Johnson responded, “Hmm” and the conversation abruptly concluded.223 Given the mounting evidence about the looming nuclear test, Johnson’s lack of real response stands in stark contrast

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to Kennedy’s hypersensitivity to the same issue only months e­ arlier. The disparity between Johnson and Kennedy is even clearer a­ fter the test itself: a mere eleven days l­ater, on October 27, Johnson met with his speechwriter Richard Goodwin to discuss the content of the speeches the president would be making in the coming days and weeks. During the brief conversation, Johnson mentioned Alexei Kosygin’s succession to the Soviet premiership and noted, “The last good piece of news I’ve had, I guess, was . . . ​the Chinese Bomb.”224 Though the conversation between Johnson and Goodwin was quite short, even this brief remark about the Chinese nuclear test suggests a casual attitude. While it could be pos­si­ble that Johnson’s comment was intended to be sarcastic, even still, in contrast to President Kennedy, who never joked about nuclear proliferation, Johnson shows an attitude that is surprising for its jovial and seemingly lackadaisical nature.

Explaining the Divergent Perspectives How can we understand the significant contrast between Kennedy’s alarmist approach and intense personal dedication to finding a solution to the Chinese nuclear situation and Johnson’s more complacent and much less worried perspective? In the last weeks of his life President Kennedy pushed for action; just days ­later, President Johnson showed remarkable calm t­ oward the identical development. One potential explanation is that President Johnson received new intelligence upon assuming office that President Kennedy did not have access to before he died and that if Kennedy did indeed have access to that information he would have behaved identically to Johnson. One possibility is the 1964 State Department report penned by Robert Johnson arguing that the Chinese would behave more peacefully in a successful test’s aftermath. The report described how the minimal capability was unlikely to be an umbrella for aggression and that the Chinese would be additionally deterred by US nuclear superiority.225 Robert Johnson further argued that among the consequences of the test would be more psychological weakening of Washington’s regional po­liti­cal influence as ­others flocked to the Chinese model. Though perhaps compelling, ­there is no concrete evidence to demonstrate that President Johnson saw the report or was swayed by its contents.226 Furthermore, the view espoused in this report was not a novel one, as ­others within the administration had made similar arguments in the months prior to the report’s release and while JFK was still alive.227 Moreover, the CIA’s special intelligence estimates throughout the Kennedy and Johnson administration do not demonstrate any radically changing assessments. While ­there was growth in the Chinese infrastructure as well as continuously improving US intelligence that revealed additional program details, as well as an improved ability to target the facilities directly, as

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described ­earlier in this chapter, the intelligence community maintained a fairly consistent belief from 1963 onward that China would not behave recklessly.228 Arguably, too, the 1964 ACDA report described a worsening situation, making President Johnson’s calm even more striking. Consequently, the most compelling explanation for the divergent be­hav­iors rests with two presidents viewing the situation in fundamentally dif­fer­ent terms. Subsequent to the China episode, during the war in Vietnam, Johnson described a desire to avoid actions that would lead to a wider war with China; Richelson argues that this desire prob­ably also influenced LBJ’s thinking on prevention. Given his desire to avoid escalation in the Vietnam context, it is plausible that similar fears motivated Johnson’s decision to forgo preventive force against China. While evidence of such logic in the Chinese nuclear context is not identifiable, it would be unsurprising in light of Johnson’s threat perception. Recall that Johnson was specifically concerned with external aggression and direct attacks on the homeland, while Kennedy perceived threats emanating from the internal characteristics of Communism.229 Consequently, a preventive strike against China’s nuclear program with potential to incite a retaliatory attack risked provoking the aggression that Johnson specifically perceived to be problematic in the first place. Thus, for Johnson, who perceived a ­limited threat from the Chinese nuclear program, the treatment was worse than the original prob­lem.230 Absent direct evidence, assessments to this effect remain conjecture. However, they are understandable in light of Johnson’s general nuclear optimism and assessment of the Chinese nuclear program as largely deterrable. The leader-­centric argument thus offers a perspective consistent with this reasoning. In this light, it is evident that Johnson’s nuclear optimism, focus on the deterrent strength of nuclear weapons, and low perceived threat of nuclear war particularly with a now nuclear-­armed China made Johnson much less anxious about ­these issues than his pre­de­ces­sor. Furthermore, unlike Kennedy, Johnson made no public comments about China’s nuclear program prior to the Chinese test, let alone discussing publicly actions to destroy it. This fact also lends credence to the existence of divergent threat perceptions and divergent beliefs about the risks of nuclear war in general and with the Chinese in par­tic­u­lar, yielding divergent approaches to the Chinese nuclear program. Historian Michael Beschloss confirms this disjuncture in describing the day of the test: “On Friday, [October 16, 1964,] the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon. Unlike his pre­de­ces­sor, Johnson remained calm. From a CIA briefing, he knew that the Chinese would have to travel a long and expensive road before they developed accurate ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles]; some f­ uture President would have to deal with that prob­lem.”231 It is also worth noting that once the USSR expressed no interest in joining the US effort, any proposed military action became unilateral. We know from his preferences in ­ earlier foreign policy crises that Johnson favored

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multilateral efforts to solve most prob­lems. The lack of Soviet cooperation, or at minimum the Soviets’ refusal to even tacitly support US military action, prob­ably also weighed on Johnson’s mind. As William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson argue, Johnson was rhetorically more cautious about China. He argued against military action absent global opinion or Beijing directly menacing its neighbors (and the United States). Burr and Richelson conclude that “President Johnson was troubled enough by the implications of a nuclear China to approve an overture to Moscow, but his rejection of unilateral action suggested that he saw no ‘intolerable’ threats if Beijing successfully tested a weapon.”232 Indeed, on September 25, 1964, National Security Advisor Bundy met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin for what Bundy described as “a long and cordial lunch . . . ​in which we touched lightly on a large number of topics of only casual interest.” Following discussion of the upcoming 1964 presidential campaign and the Multilateral Force Treaty, the conversation turned to Chinese communist nuclear weapons. Bundy notes in the memo of the conversation that he “made it plain that we would be ready for private and serious talk on what to do about this prob­lem if ­there ­were any interest in the Soviet Government. The Ambassador gave no direct reply, but he gave me clearly to understand that in the thinking of the Soviet Government the Chinese nuclear capability was already, in effect, taken for granted.”233 While this could be construed as an overture by the United States to assess the willingness of the Soviets to support an effort to engage the weapons development issue, the nature of that effort remains ambiguous. Moreover, the fact that this conversation occurred a mere twenty-­one days before the Chinese nuclear test, and that the topic of Chinese nuclear capability was, in Bundy’s own words, “of only casual interest,” suggest that this conversation is not evidence of serious consideration of preventive military force. Without the attendant indications of the surrounding administration activity that one would expect to precede a military intervention, only ­limited conclusions are appropriate in light of the available evidence. The conversation is anomalous when placed in context of the rest of Johnson’s own beliefs and be­ hav­ior and his administration’s actions. Though at least in theory the United States had the military wherewithal to target the Chinese program, having Soviet cooperation might have improved their likelihood of success and would have also prob­ably lessened the likelihood of a wider war. Given Johnson’s personal sensitivity to this escalation risk, we can imagine that the Soviets had already accepted a nuclear-­armed China and further lessened Johnson’s already weak enthusiasm for prevention. Fi­nally, on the day ­after the Chinese nuclear test, President Johnson tasked the NSC with a full study of the Chinese communist weapons program.234 This move supports ­earlier claims from both within and beyond the administration that the test itself ushered in a new period of commitment to the

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nonproliferation agenda and a focus on nuclear issues.235 The action also confirms that the Chinese nuclear issue was not a high priority on Johnson’s radar u ­ ntil the program had already come to pass. That LBJ did not prioritize this issue is confirmed by his national address on October 18, 1964.236 First, Johnson reiterated the details of the test itself and reaffirmed its ­limited significance: the US knew the test was coming, accounted for it in security planning, and remained much stronger than China, especially in nuclear terms.237 Maintaining calm, LBJ also repeated a central notion of his threat perception—­that a long and hard road separated a first nuclear test from a significant deliverable arsenal. Second, Johnson pivoted to the test’s implications and stated, perhaps for the first time, that the lesson from the Chinese test was that nuclear proliferation undermined the cause of peace. The United States would work to stop nuclear spread ­going forward. Taken as a ­whole, the available historical rec­ord of US decision making regarding China’s nuclear weapons program demonstrates the utility of exploring a leader’s early beliefs about nuclear proliferation and threats in the international arena b ­ ecause they can serve as predictive guides to f­ uture preventive war be­hav­ior. Indeed, understanding of both President Kennedy and Johnson’s actions against the Chinese nuclear endeavor begins with an exploration of their early beliefs about deterring threats in the international arena, nuclear proliferation generally, and the challenges confronting the United States.

Two Historical Footnotes an a lternati ve h i sto ry It is impossible to know precisely how Kennedy would have acted had he lived through the successful Chinese nuclear test. Certainly, his personality inclined him to tackle challenges in a proactive and sometimes risky manner, suggesting that the culmination of this proactive approach might therefore have been a unilateral and preventive attack on China’s nuclear facilities. Especially given Kennedy’s clear statements regarding the serious threat posed to US national security by the Chinese nuclear program, as well as the program’s implications for both proliferation and East Asian stability, his threat perception further supports this conclusion. Though Kennedy was fully aware that it “may take some years, maybe a de­cade, before they become a full-­fledged nuclear power,” he was also explicit in an August 1963 press conference that “we would like to take some steps now which would lessen that prospect that a f­ uture President might have to deal with.”238 In this context, his request to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for military options demonstrates his seriousness on the subject and his desire to know

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what options ­were realistically available. Furthermore, Kennedy told the French minister of culture, André Malraux, that China was “the ­great menace in the f­uture to humanity, the f­ree world and freedom on earth. The Chinese would be perfectly prepared to sacrifice hundreds of millions of their own life [for] their aggressive and militant policies”; this statement further supports an expectation for the use of force.239 Nevertheless, the Chinese nuclear experience might have turned out similarly to the Cuban missile crisis, with Kennedy first advocating military force but ­later preferring a less aggressive option. Indeed, Kennedy himself explained this change of heart: “First, ­there was no certainty that an air strike would destroy all missiles now in Cuba. We would be able to get a large percentage of t­ hese missiles, but could not get them all. . . . ​We w ­ ere not certain that our intelligence had discovered all the missiles. . . . ​An air strike would involve an action comparable to the Japa­nese attack on Pearl Harbor.”240 It is pos­si­ble that the Chinese case could have ended similarly, with President Kennedy considering the use of force early on, only to rule it out ­later. That said, t­ here is no evidence indicating that such a change of heart took place regarding the Chinese prob­lem. For the pre­sent purposes, my argument is simply that based on his prior beliefs about nuclear proliferation and deterrence, Kennedy should have been highly likely to consider the use of preventive military force, and he indeed did. A se­nior Kennedy adviser recalled JFK saying that “the Chicom nuclear explosion [was] likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s.”241 But for his untimely death, Kennedy might have been highly likely not only to consider but also perhaps to use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy against the Chinese nuclear program. Had Kennedy’s vice president been someone other than Lyndon Johnson, with nuclear beliefs more similar to Kennedy’s own, the China case might have ended differently still, with Kennedy’s successor assuming the mantle and ordering the attack to destroy China’s nuclear program in formation. t h e ro le of cu ba The Cuban missile crisis appears repeatedly in this narrative. This crisis was not only a critical event in the Cold War and in the history of US national security but also a central episode in the history of the atomic age. As such, the episode is an impor­tant source of information regarding both Kennedy and Johnson’s nuclear beliefs. Indeed, we learn from the missile crisis that both men took a fairly hawkish and aggressive position regarding the Soviet placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba, at least initially. Kennedy repeatedly made explicit during the thirteen-­day period that nuclear weapons ­were destructive, dangerous, and threatening to international peace. He concluded that as the number of nuclear weapons and nuclear states globally grew over time, ­there would be an increase in danger, with the rise in

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potential for nuclear-­armed conflict. During the crisis itself, however, Kennedy moderated his position as the risks of military attack—­both the risk of failing to destroy 100 ­percent of the nuclear weapons and the likelihood for escalation to nuclear war with the Soviets—­emerged. Johnson by contrast, took a hawkish position early during the crisis, given the proximity of Soviet nuclear missiles to the US mainland. Johnson opposed Kennedy’s se­ lection of a naval blockade, viewing it as too l­ittle, too late to address the prob­lem of missiles in Cuba. Moving from the Cuba episode to the China case, it is evident that characteristics of Cuba w ­ ere salient in the l­ater period for both men. For Kennedy, nuclear weapons in the hands of Communist China posed similar dangers. In contrast, Johnson perceived less danger to the United States, given the geographic distance separating the United States and China and the lack of intercontinental ballistic missile capability that would allow the Chinese to target the United States directly. It is beyond the scope of this book to investigate why the two men learned dif­fer­ent lessons from the same experience during the Cuban missile crisis. It is also impossible to know w ­ hether Kennedy, had he lived, would have experienced a similar moderation of position over time regarding China. Nevertheless, what remains clear is that e­ arlier, critical nuclear events w ­ ere influential in shaping how two US presidents thought and acted vis-­à-­vis nuclear weapons. For this reason, among ­others, the use of history is significant inasmuch as it can help teach us about both the pre­sent and the ­future.

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Presidents 41 and 42 Engage North ­Korea’s Nuclear Program

The US response to the nuclear program of North K ­ orea, officially the Demo­ cratic ­People’s Republic of ­Korea (DPRK), was puzzling, as the response was characterized first by a lack of presidential concern and then by rapid escalation to the brink of war. I argue ­these two sets of be­hav­iors, relative lack of prioritization in the late 1980s and early 1990s and then escalation in 1993–1994, can be explained by the nuclear beliefs of Presidents George H. W. Bush and William J. Clinton. I demonstrate that Bush was a (weak) nuclear optimist, focused on stability and largely confident in deterrence. Accordingly, Bush did not consider a preventive attack against North ­Korea. By contrast, Clinton, a nuclear pessimist generally and regarding North K ­ orea, seriously considered the use of preventive military force to forestall the North Korean program. Compared with the China case, the North Korean case pre­sents a more difficult environment for analy­sis: scholars must confront a relative lack of available archival evidence, as significant amounts of material remain classified. Thus, this chapter leans on public statements, contemporaneous accounts, and the secondary lit­er­a­ture, itself dependent on ­limited archival material. Public statements can be difficult to evaluate given leaders’ incentives to misrepresent beliefs, especially while campaigning for elected office. Accordingly, I compare across multiple sources when pos­si­ble, in order to corroborate the material I marshal. Assessing Bill Clinton’s prepresidential period is especially difficult ­because of his lack of prepresidential experience in foreign policy. Although his gubernatorial ­career has been well documented in archives, ­these rec­ords are unhelpful for the issues at hand b ­ ecause governors focus primarily on domestic ­matters. Instead, I rely on campaign materials, contemporaneous accounts, and personal memoirs, with their concomitant challenges. Nevertheless, what is available—­from a variety of individual and administration sources—is helpful in determining Clinton’s early foreign policy perspective.

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Despite data limitations, the observed outcomes are consistent with the model’s theoretical expectations. Consequently, the North Korean case offers an impor­tant test of the leader-­centric model’s generalizability beyond the Cold War. Especially since the model offers traction in a difficult information environment, the conclusions should only strengthen with time as more documentary evidence becomes available.

Alternative Explanations Existing explanations posit that structural considerations, bureaucratic po­ liti­cal haggling, or cost considerations might explain US decision making vis-­ à-­ vis North K ­orea. The evidence, however, does not support such explanations. Recall that a traditional structural argument theorizes that a state ­will act preventively to forestall another state’s nuclear acquisition and avoid a negative change to the first state’s relative position. Accordingly, North ­Korea can be understood as pursuing nuclear weapons to augment its power vis-­à-­vis the United States and ­others in the international community. Consequently, the United States should have been inclined to use preventive war to forestall North K ­ orea’s effort. The empirical facts challenge the structural logic, however: the United States at first did not consider prevention despite knowledge of the North Korean program and l­ ater refrained from attacking despite serious consideration of ­doing so. Instead, the suspected high costs of an attack on North K ­ orea’s nuclear program may have prevented a US intervention. As Debs and Monteiro argue, states with superpower protectors and t­ hose that can exact high punishment costs on a would-be attacker can successfully prevent an attack.1 If true, the corollary proposition would suggest that only weak states (­those lacking a superpower patron for protection or of weak relative military position and lacking significant conventional military capabilities) are t­ hose targeted by preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. This proposition might help explain the North Korean case, with high costs anticipated to accompany any US attack and potentially preventing the United States from intervening. North K ­ orea maintained significant conventional capability and was expected to inflict substantial damage to US regional allies and assets. Though plausible on the surface, unpacking this narrative reveals reason for skepticism: feasibility concerns did not drive Clinton’s decision-­making pro­cess. Military options came with both predictions of a high likelihood of success and estimations of associated high costs and g ­ reat risks, especially for escalation to a wider peninsular war.2 Nevertheless, Clinton moved forward with military plans. As Secretary of Defense Perry said regarding the principals’ meeting on June 16, 1994, participants w ­ ere about to give the president of the United States the “choice between a disastrous option—­allowing

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North ­Korea to get a nuclear arsenal which we might have to face someday—­ and an unpalatable option, blocking this development, but thereby risking a destructive non-­nuclear war.”3 Despite this dilemma, Clinton appeared inclined to proceed. From the president’s perspective, the threat of a nuclear-­ armed North ­Korea was worth the potential risks and associated costs of a military intervention. Hence, cost assessments and the relative weakness of the potential target alone cannot explain preventive war be­hav­ior in the North Korean case. A third structural alternative suggests that specific characteristics of the United States–­North K ­ orea dyad explain the outcome. Following Kreps and Fuhrmann, we should expect preventive war between a democracy and an autocracy with a history of violent conflict and divergent foreign policy goals. Indeed, the United States and DPRK have fought over security on the Korean peninsula and in East Asia and have clashed over communism’s regional influence. ­These very issues ­were central to the Korean War. While President Clinton’s serious consideration of preventive military force accords with this logic, the theory remains unable to explain President George H. W. Bush’s dif­fer­ent approach. A fourth alternative, drawn from bureaucratic politics, would expect bureaucratic haggling or an interagency logroll to explain US be­hav­ior ­toward the DPRK. Such an argument is problematic for multiple reasons. First, President Clinton was an engaged and active participant in the decision-­ making pro­cess, not one to go along with the bureaucracy absent much participation or discussion. Second, while Defense Secretary Perry supported the military option, he and ­others ­were deeply concerned about the costs of an intervention and the risks of escalation to wider war. This concern suggests a more nuanced Defense Department position than one might expect from the classic bureaucratic maxim that “where you stand depends on where you sit.”4 Likewise, President Bush did not argue against an overly active Defense Department, or advisers singularly focused on attacking North ­Korea, in order to avoid the use of force. In fact, despite his institutional position, Defense Secretary Richard Cheney opposed even discussing military options in 1991 out of concern that ­doing so would derail the administration’s engagement strategy. The evidence from the North Korean case therefore calls each variant of bureaucratic po­liti­cal explanations into question. Fi­nally, ­there are ­factors specific to this case that might explain the decision-­ making pro­cess leading to the (non) use of preventive war. None, however, offers better leverage on the outcome than the leader-­centric argument. One likely possibility raised by this case concerns concurrent distractions for the administrations: perhaps both Bush’s and Clinton’s be­hav­ior vis-­à-­ vis North ­Korea can be explained by something ­else that was happening si­ mul­ta­neously. One could argue, for example, that Bush avoided the use of force in North ­Korea ­because of the Persian Gulf War, and similarly, that

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Clinton pursued the military option to distract the US population from the government shutdown that occurred during his tenure. With Bush, however, although it is easy to imagine the sizable Gulf War intervention drawing resources away from any potential North Korean endeavor, the timing does not match. The Gulf War occurred from August 1990 to February 1991; Bush had ample time to respond to the challenge of North ­Korea before or ­after the Gulf War, had he seen fit. Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, nearly a year ­after the United States discovered the North’s high explosives testing. ­After the Gulf War concluded, Bush had almost two years left in office to consider military options. During both periods (and during the intervening months) t­ here is no evidence that President Bush considered military action. Had Bush found the situation alarming, we would expect the rec­ord to reflect his interest in using force to confront the North Korean threat. That Bush refrained reveals not that the Gulf War was an unwelcome distraction from the real prob­lem of North ­Korea, but rather that his attention was focused on Iraq.5 Furthermore, that Bush was willing to use overwhelming force elsewhere in the new post–­Cold War environment suggests that t­ here would have been no reason to stand down in the Korean context had it been necessary. The United States used the new freedom of mobility offered by the dissolution of the Soviet Union to intervene in Iraq, but Bush felt no similar need to draw upon this freedom regarding the DPRK. Likewise, for Clinton, we would similarly expect private internal administration deliberations to reveal his true sentiments, namely, that po­liti­cal rather than national security considerations drove the intervention preparations ­under way in mid-1994. Thus far, t­here is no compelling evidence to support this claim. Most significantly, b ­ ecause the government shutdown did not occur ­until late 1995 and early 1996, and the most impor­tant military deliberations happened in spring and early summer 1994, this argument is chronologically nonviable. The DPRK case also raises questions regarding the role that the end of the Cold War played in preventive decision making. One could argue that Clinton’s be­hav­ior and willingness to consider force was driven by a post–­Cold War environment that recognized the dangers of proliferation with a loose and unprotected former Soviet arsenal. In this case, it was the new environment that conditioned Clinton’s be­hav­ior, rather than his individual beliefs. Such an argument does not withstand scrutiny, however, as we would expect Bush to likewise internalize or at least recognize a new global norm against proliferation. Had this been the case, we would expect evidence of Bush’s recognition in the two-­plus years of his administration ­after the end of the Cold War. Especially given improving intelligence on and consensus regarding the nature of the North’s nuclear intentions during this time period, the normative alternative is problematic. Furthermore, b ­ ecause Bush’s presidency spans the end of the Cold War, we would have expected him to address such a change in the threat environment, e­ ither b ­ ecause a new threat

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emerged or b ­ ecause an opportunity for action presented when the Soviets dis­appeared. That Bush did not engage on ­either ele­ment suggests that the end of the Cold War did not do much causal work. Despite qualitative circumstantial differences between the two administrations—­given that North K ­ orea advanced its nuclear program and withdrew from the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT) only during Clinton’s tenure—­there are impor­tant parallel developments between the Bush and Clinton terms that make the comparison worthwhile. Certainly, facts on the ground w ­ ere changing between 1990 and 1994, more than is preferable for a perfectly analogous comparison.6 However, a series of intelligence discoveries from 1989 to 1992 should have been sufficient for the Bush administration to show some increased level of alarm once the extent of the North’s proliferation attempt was revealed. First, in May 1989, the CIA identified a covert plutonium repro­cessing fa­cil­i­ty and a third research reactor, both previously undeclared by the North Koreans to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Second, in May 1992, IAEA inspector Hans Blix returned to North ­Korea and revealed significant discrepancies between the amount of separated plutonium (useful for nuclear bomb fuel) the North reported to the IAEA and the amount expected by Blix’s calculations. Furthermore, the spent fuel withdrawal that occurred in 1989 ­under Bush is analogous to the 1993–94 withdrawal that took place u ­ nder Clinton, providing an opportunity to see how both administrations responded to the same on-­the-­ground developments. That Bush’s only response was a policy review and an engagement strategy suggests that ­these developments ­were insufficient to elevate the situation’s threat level in his mind. Conversely, Clinton viewed the spent fuel withdrawal as incontrovertible evidence that the North intended to weaponize and took the necessary steps to consider military options. Therefore, I argue that the broad threat perceptions of Bush and Clinton and the threat they perceived from North Korean nuclear weapons ­were sufficiently dif­fer­ent, that even had Bush been reelected president in 1992 and presided over the crisis period in 1993–94, he would not have considered force. Thus, in the North Korean case, as with China, the leader-­centric argument offers the most compelling explanation for when leaders consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

The United States and the North Korean Nuclear Program The United States used the first nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. During the Korean War, US officials entertained the idea of using nuclear weapons against North Korean and Chinese adversaries. Though President Eisenhower did not authorize the use of nuclear weapons, in 1953 he did hint that the United States would employ them if the ongoing armistice negotiations failed to end the Korean conflict.7

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Following repeated nuclear threats from the United States and the development of a self-­reliant military policy, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung became interested in an indigenous nuclear capacity.8 In 1956, Pyongyang and Moscow inked two nuclear cooperation agreements, and Korean scientists began nuclear physics training at the Soviet Dubna Nuclear Research Complex.9 Over time, continuing assistance included a Soviet-­supplied research reactor at Yongbyon, research fa­cil­i­ty construction, and training for Korean engineers.10 Subsequent to the Chinese test in 1964, North K ­ orea also sought Chinese nuclear assistance. Kim sent a del­e­ga­tion to Chairman Mao for help producing a parallel program, “as b ­ rother countries who shared d ­ ying and fighting on the battlefield, China and North ­Korea should also share the atomic secret.” Mao rejected this plan, replying that a nuclear program was unnecessary and far too expensive for such a small country.11 Despite the Chinese rejection, the North’s program continued, as the original Soviet-­built reactor became operational in 1967, and construction began on a five-­megawatt graphite-­moderated reactor for the production of plutonium—­the pathway the DPRK would ultimately pursue to nuclear weapons acquisition.12 The 1970s brought not only the global oil crisis but also an intensification of global nuclear ambitions.13 The North sought to upgrade its nuclear capacity, building multiple large reactors. In April 1982, US intelligence photographed the vessel of a large nuclear reactor u ­ nder construction at the Yongbyon nuclear complex.14 By 1984, US satellite imagery showed the outline of a cylindrical nuclear smokestack. In June, the images showed a reactor, cooling tower, power lines, and electrical grid connections for the purpose of local energy transmission.15 Alone, the pieces could have been civilian in nature. But by 1986, satellites identified cylindrical craters and residue of experimental high-­explosives detonation “in a certain pattern familiar to nuclear weapons experts: the precisely simultaneous explosions that are basic to implosion” weapons design.16 Additional details regarding the North’s program came into focus as the 1980s progressed.17 In 1987, the United States identified a building that exhibited the typical configuration for a plutonium separation plant.18 By 1989, the US detected a plutonium repro­cessing plant, additional evidence of high-­ explosives testing, and a third reactor at Yongbyon with a two-­hundred-­ megawatt output. This ­giant fa­cil­i­ty could churn out enough plutonium for several weapons a year.19 In light of ­these discoveries, the United States pressured the Soviet Union to help stem the flow of nuclear materials to the DPRK.20 They also encouraged the DPRK to expand their Nuclear Non-­ Proliferation Treaty obligations; the North had acceded in 1985 in exchange for four full-­size nuclear power plants.21 The US also pushed for International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. While North ­Korea had signed the NPT and submitted to IAEA inspections, the North did so while retaining its nuclear ambitions, repro­cessing nuclear materials, and hiding critical fuel

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supplies from inspectors.22 Despite the North’s secretive be­hav­ior, by the time the presidency of George H. W. Bush began, ­there remained no doubt about the nature of the North’s initiative.

George H. W. Bush Unlike ­those who have succeeded him, George Herbert Walker Bush came to presidential office with extensive international and po­liti­cal experience. This was not a lifelong interest, however, as both his passion for international affairs and his po­liti­cal activism developed over time. Beginning with his first po­liti­cal position as a member of Congress and continuing through to the vice presidency, Bush internalized certain core princi­ples that he carried with him to the Oval Office. He felt a strong sense of internationalism and need for US leadership abroad, an aversion to aggression, and a belief that global instability was a serious threat to US interests.

Bush and International Affairs From his youth, Bush stood up for ­others in the face of older or bigger kids. He did so formally ­after graduation, enlisting in the US Navy during World War II.23 As David Halberstam argues, this ser­vice led Bush with his “instinct to resist overt aggression” to hawkish views on Vietnam and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, discussed in chapter 5.24 Bush’s formal po­liti­cal experience spanned four de­cades from his time as Representative for Texas’s 7th Congressional District to the forty-­first president of the United States. When he successfully ran for Congress in 1966, Bush campaigned on a platform that mixed the Eastern establishment and internationalist Republicanism of his youth with the “stringent frontier conservatism” then developing in Texas.25 Once in office, he was exposed to many of the key foreign policy issues of the time and, l­ ater, to the key agencies of US foreign and national security policy making. However, the Congressional Rec­ord during Bush’s tenure reveals no evidence of overarching concern for nuclear weapons or regarding North K ­ orea. Instead, his remarks over the four-­year period center on domestic m ­ atters, including drugs, crime, government oversight, population growth and control, natu­ral resources, and environmental issues. ­After Bush served only two terms in Congress, President Gerald Ford appointed Bush as chief of the US Liaison Office, the de facto US embassy in Beijing.26 During this tenure, Bush developed the foreign policy princi­ples that would guide him through executive office. In the preface to a published compilation of the diary he kept while in China, Bush described his experience at the Liaison Office as “one of the greatest adventures of [his and wife

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Barbara’s] lives.”27 Among other t­hings, it inspired his passion for foreign affairs.28 During this period, Bush ­adopted the domino theory as a guiding princi­ ple to international politics. Witnessing events in South Asia, he feared the collapse of Asian dominoes to communism in the same way that Eu­rope had previously fallen to fascism. As he had in the Eu­ro­pean context, Bush articulated the need to confront tyrannical aggression in Southeast Asia with resolve and commitment.29 Where Bush perceived threats, he met them resolutely and with force; where no threats manifest, no consideration of force should be required. Bush’s early ­career reveals no focus on ­either nuclear proliferation or North ­Korea, intimating that ­these issues ­were not salient for him ­until he entered presidential office.30

General Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation Prior to assuming presidential office, George H. W. Bush said l­ittle about nuclear proliferation, in stark contrast to JFK, who spoke, acted, and wrote in Congress and throughout his prepresidential ­career about nuclear weapons. It is perhaps odd that Bush paid l­ ittle attention to nuclear m ­ atters, given his significant international experience. Nevertheless, ­there are some data points useful for assessing Bush’s early nuclear beliefs. During his first (unsuccessful) run for US Congress in 1964, Bush opposed the first US-­Soviet arms control agreement—­the Partial Test Ban Treaty—­ which President Kennedy negotiated with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev in 1963 in hopes of preventing Chinese and French proliferation.31 This opposition could represent nuclear optimism on Bush’s part, if he thought the treaty would have irresponsibly l­ imited proliferation by limiting testing.32 Conversely, his opposition could be a m ­ atter of politics, with Bush’s acting against the Demo­cratic president’s initiative as a means to securing congressional office.33 During this period, Bush’s be­hav­ior did not offer any reason to suspect he was concerned about the dangers of nuclear proliferation. While Bush was a member of Congress in 1967, 1968, and 1969, the United States debated and negotiated the Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty. Bush’s colleagues, including William Proxmire and Albert Gore Sr., offered many comments for the rec­ord and statements on the floor. That Bush was not similarly vocal reveals a lack of focus on what was perhaps the key nuclear issue of the time.34 While Bush was in Beijing as chief of the US Liaison Office, the Australian ambassador, Steve Fitzgerald, informed Bush that Taiwan was trying to procure nuclear weapons. In an editorial footnote to the diary entry dated May 18, 1975, in The China Diary of George H.W. Bush, Jeffrey Engel describes how Bush cabled this information to Washington “with ­little comment.”35 At face value, this action suggests that Bush had no precise concern for the

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proliferation attempt then underway in Taiwan, perhaps indicating that additional nuclear proliferation was not seen as dangerous or threatening from his vantage point, or that allied proliferation was not cause for concern.36 Beyond Taiwan, however, the evidence reveals no utterances by Bush regarding the Indian, Chinese, and Soviet nuclear tests that had occurred in 1974, 1964, and 1949, respectively. One could argue that in 1949 Bush was too young to have taken note of the Soviet test. However, given that this test broke the US nuclear mono­poly and that it occurred just a­ fter Bush’s World War II ser­vice, such an explanation is not compelling. Regarding China, it is more difficult to argue that the 1964 Chinese test should have been inconsequential for Bush, as he was r­ unning for Congress in its immediate aftermath and was stationed in the region just a few short years l­ater. Although Bush’s China diary mentions the growing Indian nuclear capability, it is only in the context of Australia’s concern that t­ here was a greater miscalculation risk between India and China with India’s newfound nuclear power and China’s overall growth. The tone of Bush’s writing, however, suggests he viewed Australia’s concern as overblown, and the issue received no additional discussion.37 While a lack of concern about the individual Soviet, Chinese, Indian, and Taiwanese attempts at proliferation may not be revealing, taken together, the lack of concern on Bush’s part suggests that horizontal proliferation was not salient for him between the late 1940s and the mid-1970s. Writing in Looking Forward, Bush supported President Truman’s use of two nuclear weapons to end World War II and described their decisive nature on the battlefield: “Now, years l­ ater, whenever I hear anyone criticize President Truman’s decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, I won­der ­whether the critic remembers ­those days and has ­really considered the alternative: millions of fighting men killed on both sides, possibly tens of millions of Japa­nese civilians. Harry Truman’s decision w ­ asn’t just courageous, it was far-­sighted.”38 In the first months of his presidential administration, Bush made consecutive speeches that shed additional light on his nuclear views. First, while addressing the commencement ceremony of the United States Coast Guard Acad­emy, Bush told his audience, “Our task is clear: We must curb the proliferation of advanced weaponry.”39 ­There was no additional mention of proliferation or the type of weaponry he was identifying as cause for concern. However, just one week l­ater, President Bush offered remarks to the citizens of Mainz, Germany, that carried the discussion forward. He said, “­We’re also challenged by developments outside of NATO’s traditional areas of concern. ­Every Western nation still f­aces the global proliferation of lethal technologies, including ballistic missiles and chemical weapons. We must collectively control the spread of t­ hese growing threats. So, we should begin as soon as pos­si­ble with a worldwide ban on chemical weapons.”40 ­Here, Bush specifies what advanced and lethal weapons are cause for

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concern—­ballistic missiles and chemical weapons, not nuclear weapons.41 Taking the two remarks in conjunction, we can begin to conclude that it is not nuclear weapons that Bush found threatening to the United States or to international stability. In academic scholarship, stability is intimately connected to the idea of deterrence.42 Especially in the post–­World War II environment, stability and deterrence are often associated with nuclear weapons.43 Early in his presidency, Bush connected ­these two issues: “How we and our allies deal with ­these diverse challenges depends on how well we understand the key ele­ ments of defense strategy . . . ​two points in par­tic­u­lar: first, the need for an effective deterrent, one that demonstrates to our allies and adversaries alike American strength, American resolve; and second, the need to maintain an approach to arms reduction that promotes stability at the lowest feasible level of armaments.”44 Bush continued: “Deterrence is central to our defense strategy. The key to keeping the peace is convincing our adversaries that the cost of aggression against us or our allies is simply unacceptable. In t­ oday’s world, nuclear forces are essential to deterrence.”45 Bush’s description of nuclear weapons and deterrence together demonstrate the connection he perceived, and to some extent, confidence in the US deterrent capability. It underscores his focus on and confidence in peace through (nuclear) deterrence and suggests optimist tendencies.46 At the same time, Bush made other remarks that seemed to suggest a relatively weak proliferation pessimist attitude. Addressing a question-­and-­ answer session for White House journalists on March 31, 1989, Bush remarked, “I strongly stand against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We must strengthen IAEA safeguards to be sure that t­here is as much inspection as pos­si­ble.”47 In July, Bush called nonproliferation an “impor­tant ele­ ment of our overall national security policy, which seeks to reduce the risk of war and increase international stability.”48 And yet t­here is ­little to suggest that the administration’s actions followed up on this pessimist rhe­toric, indicating it was only rhe­toric. It is worth noting the additional nuclear activity Bush undertook during his presidency. As I argue ­later, George H. W. Bush was largely confident in the US deterrent as time went on and focused on maintaining and improving stability. The steps he took elsewhere in the nuclear arena seem consistent with his broader set of strategic concerns. Much of this work focused on increasing stability, reducing the nuclear stockpile, and improving the US-­ Soviet strategic situation. First, in the realm of nuclear testing in 1989 and 1991, Bush authorized the Aqueduct and Sculpin Nuclear Test Programs.49 Second, in terms of the nuclear stockpile, Bush renewed a Strategic Defense Initiative proj­ect adopting new missiles and satellites. With Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, Bush signed new protocols to Nixon’s 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty to provide for additional advanced notifications and onsite inspections. Through verification procedures, the treaty sought to improve

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stability between the United States and the USSR and to foster continued cooperation.50 Also in 1991, Bush and Gorbachev signed the START II Treaty, cutting long-­range nuclear warheads from both the US and Soviet arsenals.51 ­Later in 1991, Bush unilaterally cut some tactical nuclear weapons from the US arsenal including the MX and SCRAM II programs. He also took the B-1B and B-52 bombers off alert status.52 Last, other critical nuclear events occurred during this period. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar initiated the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, which aimed to manage and destroy the nuclear capacities of former Soviet states. The multibillion-­dollar program deactivated more than 7,500 warheads, disposed of chemical weapons, safeguarded fissile materials, and converted critical pieces of weapons complexes for peaceful use.53 A critical component of this effort started with the Lisbon Protocol, which helped denuclearize Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—­newly in­de­pen­dent states “born” with enormous segments of the former Soviet arsenal. Especially for a president serving during the Cold War and ultimately overseeing its end, it is not surprising that Bush dealt with a sizable number of nuclear ­matters. The actions are understandable when perceived as achieving the goal of stability between the Soviet Union and United States. Cutting the number of warheads in the arsenal and terminating individual weapons types w ­ ere reasonable steps if t­ hese weapons w ­ ere unnecessary for US strategic goals or destabilizing within the United States–­Soviet Union dyad. It is unclear to what extent such decisions are indicative of related proliferation considerations, if at all, beyond the possibility that Bush perceived the US arsenal as creating deterrence—­a perception potentially consistent with a nuclear optimist perspective. None of t­hese pieces of evidence offers a smoking gun for determining Bush’s views on the consequences of nuclear proliferation as a clear optimist or a pessimist. In aggregate, the evidence suggests he was focused neither on nuclear proliferation nor nuclear weapons. When Bush did mention the issue, especially before becoming president, what he said or wrote points ­toward a very weak nuclear optimist perspective. Additionally, the overall paucity of data regarding this issue from his prepresidential period further supports the idea that nuclear weapons w ­ ere not an early focus.54 On balance, I code Bush as a (weak) optimist, despite the ambiguity in the rec­ord, and turn ­later to the empirical rec­ord to explore to what extent this attitude continued through his presidency.

Probability of Deterring the Proliferator Stemming from his deterrence confidence, Bush saw North K ­ orea not as a threat or prob­lem for the United States, but rather as a marginal challenge for regional stability following US withdrawal from Vietnam. Bush’s first

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reference to North K ­ orea appears in 1969, following the downing of a US plane flying in international air space. Supporting President Nixon’s decision to have all ­future flights receive adequate protection, Congressman Bush called the North’s be­hav­ior “criminal” and the leadership “outrageous.”55 While he also said that the North Koreans respond only to shows of force, this is the strongest utterance he made in reference to North ­Korea throughout his ­career. Two diary entries from Bush’s time in Beijing document his early focus on stability and the negative consequences of North ­Korea’s be­hav­ior for regional instability and US interests. First, on April 22, 1975, Bush wrote in his private diary, “I worry about the fall of [South Viet­nam­ese President Nguyen Van] Thieu—no personal attachment whatsoever. I have complete conviction that ­there is such a t­ hing as a domino theory. Thailand and the Philippines and o ­ thers rushing ­toward new alignment. Kim Il Sung of ­Korea talking much tougher now about the South in Peking.”56 This highlights Bush’s focus on the domino theory. A week ­later, Bush again described the role of North ­Korea in destabilizing the Asian theater: “The Kim Il Sung communiqué with China came out. It . . . ​blasts against the United States, glorification of revolution in Africa, strong anti-­Israel position, strong anti-­imperialistic language. . . . ​Yet nobody focuses in on the ridicu­lous leadership role of Kim Il Sung, with its self-­ adulation and its totalitarianism. A communiqué like this makes us realize how far we have got to go in our work with China.”57 Combined with Bush’s focus on the totalitarian nature of the North Korean state, this suggests that he viewed North K ­ orea as fomenting regional instability and making US relations with China and other regional actors more difficult. At the same time, it is consequential that t­here was no specific mention of any threat posed by the North Koreans to the United States itself. Rather it was a consequence of the shifting balance of power and growing regional instability that the North could act in ways that could undermine US interests. Furthermore, Bush called Kim’s regime ridicu­lous, perhaps emphasizing a lack of serious, direct threat emanating from the state. Together, ­these two diary entries suggest a regional focus for Bush at this time, which is unsurprising given that he was writing from Beijing at the end of the Vietnam War. However, they also demonstrate a larger focus on stability as consequential for US security. In the mid-1970s, North ­Korea was on Bush’s radar, but only in a ­limited way.58 It is also worth recalling the contours of the US defense apparatus during Bush’s time as vice president and early in his tenure as president.59 Reagan had come to office as a long-­time critic of arms control and détente with the Soviets and quickly initiated a massive military buildup and increase in defense spending.60 Out of growing fears of falling ­behind the Soviets and concern for the vulnerability of US long-­range weapons, Reagan accelerated nuclear modernization and led efforts to build national missile defense. He

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authorized funding for advanced aircraft, including the B-2 bomber and stealth technology; resurrected the B-1 bomber; and initiated a significant modernization of US nuclear options, including submarine-­launched ballistic missiles, air-­and sea-­launched cruise missiles, and the MX missile. This campaign to upgrade weapons research, production, and testing was supported by the controversial view that nuclear superiority would provide greater military and po­liti­cal leverage vis-­à-­vis the Soviets and also allow the United States to win a nuclear war.61 While it is difficult to definitively show that Bush was supportive of ­these programs as vice president, he was temperamentally inclined to support the president following a decision.62 That Bush continued improving ­these capabilities during his own administration suggests at least some support for strengthening the US deterrent to promote peace and stability.63 Combined with his ­limited early attention to North ­Korea (beyond the Southeast Asian context), this support leads to the conclusion that during his pre-­and early presidential years, Bush was confident in the deterrent capability of the United States and was not threatened by North ­Korea, viewing it instead as a regional nuisance. In light of Bush’s weak proliferation optimism, confidence in deterrence, and l­imited focus on North K ­ orea as a threat to the United States, the leader-­centric model predicts that Bush would be unlikely to consider preventive military force against North K ­ orea.64

William J. Clinton Observers of the 1992 presidential campaign noted a high degree of foreign policy position similarity between candidate Clinton and President Bush, describing both as committed internationalists.65 Digging into the details reveals differences between the two perspectives that lead to contrasting approaches on a variety of issues, including North K ­ orea’s nuclear program.66 As I argue, Clinton demonstrated an early proliferation pessimism and focused on the danger of rogue regimes, including North K ­ orea, pursuing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. He prioritized nonproliferation and counterproliferation, including the very serious consideration (and almost the use of) preventive military force against North ­Korea’s nuclear program. This stands in contrast to Bush, whose ­limited focus on nuclear issues and North K ­ orea made him unlikely to consider the use of preventive force.

Clinton and International Affairs Though exclusively holding state-­level offices during his early po­liti­cal years, Clinton kept focused on national politics, emerging eventually as a national

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figure in the Demo­cratic Party. Though Clinton mentioned international affairs only infrequently, when he did so, the domestic sphere still claimed half his attention. Over time, however, hints of an internationalism similar to Bush’s emerged, as Clinton transformed his commitment to democracy and freedom at home to a similar commitment abroad. In a major foreign affairs pronouncement Clinton proclaimed, “Retreating from the world or discounting its dangers is wrong for the country and sets back every­thing we hope to accomplish as Demo­crats. The defense of freedom and the promotion of democracy around the world ­aren’t merely a reflection of our deepest values; they are vital to our national interests.”67 On the campaign trail in 1992, Clinton recognized his deficit in international affairs and constructed his campaign accordingly. While the other presidential candidates took an almost deferential view to President Bush’s abundant international experience, Clinton engaged head-on. To distinguish himself from the Bush administration and distance himself from other Demo­ cratic hopefuls, Clinton offered a full enunciation of his foreign policy views in a speech entitled “A New Covenant for American Security.”68 He described three foreign policy objectives: “First, we must restructure our military forces for a new era. Second, we must work with our allies to encourage the spread and consolidation of democracy abroad. And third, we must reestablish Amer­i­ca’s economic leadership at home and in the world.”69 Clinton highlighted changes in the post–­Cold War international environment that required action from the United States, including the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

General Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation The earliest hints of Clinton’s views on nuclear weapons and nuclear proliferation appeared in the 1980s. When combined with the early agenda and overall accomplishments of the Clinton administration in the field of nuclear proliferation and security, t­ hese views suggest that Clinton should be coded as a proliferation pessimist. In a 1984 speech entitled, “Remembering Truman: Be Bold in Fighting for Amer­i­ca’s ­Future,” Clinton called for the United States to be strong defensively and to act boldly in reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons. He said, “Amer­i­ca needs both a strong defense and a strong effort to aggressively reduce the chances of nuclear war.”70 While this approach is similar to Bush’s attitude ­toward the US deterrent, the similarities end t­ here. Clinton’s comments exemplify the nuclear pessimist logic. First, suggesting the pessimist’s “more ­will be worse,” Clinton said: “We can dramatically reduce our nuclear arsenals through negotiations and other reciprocal actions.” Second, zeroing in on the proliferation threat of loss, theft, or sale of nuclear weapons or material, Clinton said, “we must do more to stop the

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threat of weapons of mass destruction from spreading. We must clamp down on countries and companies that sell ­these technologies, punish violators, and work urgently for all countries for tough enforceable, international nonproliferation agreements.” He singled out China as an offender, calling Chinese exports of nuclear and missile technology “irresponsible.” Third, homing in on a critical post–­Cold War national security challenge, Clinton said, “no national-­security issue is more urgent than the question of who w ­ ill control the nuclear weapons and technology of the former Soviet empire. ­Those weapons pose a threat to the security of e­ very American, to our allies, and to the republics themselves.”71 Beyond the “New Covenant” speech, Clinton warned elsewhere of proliferation’s challenges. Addressing the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, he identified the spread of WMD to the Third World as dangerous and spoke of the need to prevent such technology transfers through a multipronged approach, hinting at the preventive logic: “One of the most dangerous new threats is the spread of military technology, especially weapons of mass destruction. We ­can’t afford to wait ­until a host of Third World nations acquires full arsenals of First World weapons. . . . ​We need to clamp down on countries and companies that sell proscribed technologies, punish violators, and work urgently with all countries for tough, enforceable, nonproliferation agreements. We need better intelligence to identify at an ­earlier stage foreign nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs.”72 Early in his presidency, Clinton upheld his campaign promises and maintained combating proliferation as a top priority.73 Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in September, Clinton spent nearly a quarter of his speech discussing proliferation and efforts to combat it.74 Journalistic accounts from this period offer additional evidence to support the idea that Clinton’s proliferation pessimism continued through to his time in the Oval Office. As one example, a November 1993 article captured the foreign policy priorities of the nascent administration, as described in congressional testimony by Secretary of State Warren Christopher. The article claimed the administration’s priorities w ­ ere “US economic interests abroad; reform in Rus­sia; renewing the NATO alliance; relations with Asia; ­Middle East peace; and nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.”75 Additional early activities suggested a continued focus on the threat posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In February 1994, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake described the most serious challenge facing the United States as the “proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the missiles that can deliver them.”76 ­Later, on November 14, 1994, Clinton issued Executive Order 12938 and declared a national emergency in light of the fact that the “proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons . . . ​constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.”77 The order initiated multilateral negotiations, tightened export controls, and

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granted sanctions-­authorization permission—­all designed to curb the spread of WMD. Clinton himself and other high-­ranking administration officials offer support for the view of him as a proliferation pessimist. According to former secretary of defense William Perry and Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Car­ter, the Clinton administration set a high and early priority of removing “the lethal legacy” from Ukraine, which would have been the third-­largest nuclear arsenal in the world ­after Rus­sia and the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union.78 Further, Perry and Car­ter describe how the Nunn-­Lugar program to remove Ukrainian nuclear weapons and additional loose nuclear material received “constant support and intervention [by] President Clinton and Vice President Gore.”79 Also in 1994, speaking at a joint press conference with Indian prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, Clinton verbalized the pessimist logic when he said, “We also believe very strongly that the fewer countries who become nuclear powers, the better off ­we’re all ­going to be. . . . ​What w ­ e’re trying to do is to keep the number of p ­ eople in the nuclear club as small as pos­si­ble and then reduce the arsenals that they have, including our own.”80 Thus nonproliferation efforts continued in the administration subsequent to the campaign promises, and the President prioritized the issue both personally and for his administration.81 In his memoirs, Clinton describes how “their nuclear arsenals made both India and Pakistan less secure,” explic­itly connecting nuclear weapons to insecurity and expressing deep regret that he was unable to stop the Indians and Pakistanis from conducting tests.82 Thus, the evidence demonstrates a consistent pessimist attitude from Clinton’s early prepresidential ­career, to the presidential campaign, through his administration, and even subsequent to his presidency.

Probability of Deterring the Proliferator During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Clinton described what he found threatening and likely to require proactive action. In his “New Covenant for National Security” speech, Clinton said: “A new consensus is emerging on the nature of the post-­Cold War security. It assumes that the gravest threats we are most likely to face in the years ahead include . . . ​the spread of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical, and biological, as well as the means for delivering them . . . ​[and] enduring tensions in vari­ ous regions, especially the Korean peninsula and the ­Middle East.”83 ­These significant remarks articulate the vari­ous forms of WMD threat that confronted the United States, including nuclear weapons; they singled out challenges in the M ­ iddle East and North K ­ orea that he would l­ ater confront. This concern stands in contrast to Bush, who did not include nuclear weapons or North ­Korea among his priorities despite a similar context and similar

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developments in the North Korean nuclear program during his tenure in the Oval Office. In the same speech, Clinton described the Republican-­led Star Wars initiative as a “futile pursuit of a fool-­proof defense against nuclear attack.” In contrast to Bush, who supported the initiative as Reagan’s vice president and expanded it himself as president, Clinton advocated limiting nuclear weapons to “an irreducible minimum” to deter any conceivable threat. Together, this evidence suggests that Clinton saw defense against nuclear attack as nearly impossible but also believed in some deterrent ability for nuclear weapons. Clinton also identified North Korean as problematic from an alliance perspective but did not yet go so far as calling it a national security or direct threat to US interests. Clinton remarked, “We should continue to keep some US forces in Northeast Asia as long as North ­Korea pre­sents a threat to our South Korean ally.”84 That he identified no threat to the US directly is telling in its own right, since it indicates only a moderate challenge to US interests, not a threat to the safety of the homeland. In the nuclear context, Clinton characterized which nuclear ele­ments ­were threatening to the United States and which w ­ ere not. He drew a distinction between nuclear-­armed states that he perceived as threatening and ­those that ­were not problematic for US security, and he did so according to their regime type. “It should ­matter to us how ­others govern themselves,” he said. “Democracies ­don’t go to war with each other. The French and British have nuclear weapons, but we ­don’t fear annihilation at their hands. Democracies ­don’t sponsor terrorist acts against each other. They are more likely to be reliable trading partners, protect the global environment, and abide by international law.”85 Echoing the tenets of demo­cratic peace theory, Clinton argued that nuclear-­armed democracies are not cause for concern and, by extension, implied that autocracies with nuclear weapons ­were dangerous to the United States and its interests. Presumably, therefore, he should view a nuclear program in the hands of a totalitarian state like North ­Korea as relatively dangerous for the United States.86 Recall the distress Clinton expressed at being unable to prevent India and Pakistan from testing nuclear weapons in 1998. Combining the demo­cratic peace theory with this episode suggests two points. First, new nuclear states, even demo­cratic ones, are cause for concern when part of a hostile dyad. Second, Clinton’s nuclear pessimism dictated a logic whereby his first-­order preference was for fewer countries to have nuclear weapons rather than more, but if some states ­were ­going to be nuclear, then it was preferable for ­those states to be democracies rather than authoritarian regimes. Thus, nuclear-­armed dictatorships ­were the most vexing of all possibilities. The 1992 campaign also illustrates how Clinton thought he might react to ­future prob­lems. First, similarly to Bush, Clinton “pledged to maintain military forces strong enough to deter and when necessary to defeat any threat

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to our essential interests.”87 Additionally, he spoke of the US ability to “dramatically reduce our nuclear arsenals. . . . ​But as an irreducible minimum, we must retain a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat.”88 ­These two utterances together suggest that Clinton connected a survivable second-­strike nuclear capability to a strong deterrent posture for the United States. However, Clinton was not completely comfortable with US deterrent capability in 1992; he thought the end of the nuclear arms race would allow the United States to slow down its strategic modernization but also required “R & D on missile defense within the framework of the ABM treaty—­a prudent step as more and more countries acquire missile technology.”89 Thus, for Clinton, the post–­Cold War environment ushered in many challenges for US security: weapons of mass destruction, loose nuclear materials, and rogue states with advancing missile capabilities. He pledged that the United States would combat ­these international threats, by maintaining a secure and survivable nuclear capability at the minimum number of weapons pos­si­ble and by continuing to improve its deterrent capacity with missile defense. Commentators at the time identified many of ­these themes in the opening months of the administration. In a September 1993 column, Thomas Friedman described the administration’s policy princi­ples as, among ­others, strengthening democracies, expanding the circle of democracy and markets, and minimizing the rogue state threat.90 Furthermore, members of the administration characterized their proactive approach to the new ­century’s prob­lems in a similar manner. As Defense Secretary Perry and Deputy Secretary Car­ter describe, Clinton argued that the US “must approach the new terrorist challenges of the 21st ­century with the same rigor and determination we applied to the toughest security challenges of this c­ entury.”91 The available evidence thus demonstrates that the prob­lem of North K ­ orea was a salient aspect of Clinton’s international awareness prior to becoming president. Especially given the new threat environment of the post–­Cold War world and Clinton’s focus on the threats from rogue states, nonstate actors, and weapons of mass destruction, my a priori expectation is that when ­these issues arose, Clinton is likely to have been worried by them; given his proactive approach to confronting threats, he also would have been likely to meet them head-on, through the consideration of preventive military force. Stated differently, Clinton’s nuclear beliefs—­his nuclear pessimism and lack of confidence in deterring rogue and nonstate actors armed with nuclear weapons—­would be expected to lead him to the consideration of preventive military force to confront North K ­ orea’s nuclear program.

The Bush Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Program Within three months of entering office, Bush ordered an assessment of all major policies and priorities. In March 1989, with National Security Review

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(NSR) 12, Bush instructed his team to conduct a “Review of National Defense Strategy.”92 The language of the review spoke of the need to keep focused on US strength as a key to maintaining a successful deterrent. Unsurprisingly, since the Berlin Wall would not fall for another eight months, the review maintained the central US focus on the dangers posed by the Soviet Union. Throughout the language of NSR 12, Bush described other challenges for the United States and spoke of “Third Country Threats” that merited consideration. Iraq was explic­itly mentioned given its pursuit of chemical weapons. North K ­ orea, by contrast, garnered no attention, despite improved intelligence regarding its nuclear program. This suggests that while Iraq featured early in the Bush administration’s consciousness, North K ­ orea did not. Bush maintained his focus on peace and stability during his first year in office. Offering the commencement address at the Coast Guard Acad­emy in May, he emphasized his commitment to maintaining an effective nuclear deterrent while also promising to seek arms reductions that would allow for stability at lower numbers.93 Around this time, some members of the administration expressed concern over the North Korean construction activities. ­Under Reagan, ­there had been some dispute over what precisely the North was constructing; some argued that US satellites ­were merely capturing pictures of a chemical fiber fa­cil­i­ty.94 By late 1989, despite improved intelligence and a near consensus that the North was building a nuclear weapons program, only a small number of individuals w ­ ere concerned over what they saw as a dangerous development. In May, however, the issue became international news when a South Korean newspaper leaked CIA evidence of a North Korean nuclear program in development, catalyzing world and administration attention.95 Subsequently, the State Department began discussions with the Soviets and the Chinese regarding the North Korean nuclear issue.96 In his memoirs, Secretary of State James Baker described the initiative as follows: “Our diplomatic strategy was designed to build international pressure against North ­Korea to force them to live up to their agreement to sign a safeguards agreement permitting inspections.”97 Following ­these developments, in the early months of 1990, President Bush ordered a review of US nonproliferation policy, assigning it “major importance” in light of his concern for both chemical weapons and the ballistic missiles that could carry them. He described the proliferation prob­lem and the resultant weapons systems as “destabilizing,” echoing his larger concern with the maintenance of international stability. Despite improving intelligence regarding North ­Korea’s growing nuclear program and increased international attention on the issue, North ­Korea was not mentioned by name anywhere in the document.98 In June 1990, President Bush ordered a review of US policy t­ oward North ­Korea. In the official letter tasking the review (NSR 28), Bush proposed the

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goal of “better relations once they abandon their nuclear development” by maintaining a strong deterrent against North Korean aggression, promoting North-­South dialogue, strengthening nuclear nonproliferation obligations, and preventing access to dual-­use technologies.99 To that end, the United States began an extended campaign to persuade the North to sign a “safeguards agreement” to increase international observation of their nuclear activities.100 By 1990, therefore, North K ­ orea had emerged as a topic for deliberation. The resultant policy was, however, one of engagement, not a consideration of sanctions or force, which one would expect from a leader more concerned by North ­Korea’s proliferation attempt. In 1991, ­there was a mixed rec­ord of American activity. First, President Bush articulated the US position vis-­à-­vis North ­Korea and previewed the engagement strategy to follow: “The United States reaffirms that it is not a threat to North Korean security,” Bush said, “and we seek to improve relations with that country.”101 Bush directed the Strategic Defense Initiative program to refocus on “providing protection from ­limited ballistic missile strikes,” given that the Patriot Missile system had come online to deter much larger-­scale attacks.102 Though Bush did not specify which threat the system was designed to mitigate, given the increased intelligence on the DPRK’s nuclear pro­gress and refueling capabilities, North ­Korea’s nuclear program was one likely concern. In spring 1991, results emerged from National Security Review 28, assessing North ­Korea’s nuclear program and US responses to it. According to ­those familiar with the pro­cess, the reports described potential North Korean nuclear weapons as presenting “grave difficulties” should they come to fruition.103 Significantly, however, the issue was not that t­hese weapons presented grave difficulties for the United States, but instead that the weapons might encourage South Korean nuclear proliferation or efforts to prevent the North’s program. North Korean weapons might disrupt the stability of East Asia if they altered Japan’s security perception; the weapons might be sold abroad; or they might target South ­Korea or US forces therein. Overall, this analy­sis suggests that although the administration saw this potential development as producing undesirable consequences for US foreign policy interests in Asia, the administration did not see a direct threat to the United States. Instead, the risk to US forces in the region was one among many potential “difficulties” with which the US might have to contend. This is consistent with Bush’s e­ arlier focus on challenges to stability in the international system: it was not North K ­ orea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons per se that threatened the United States, but rather the regional consequences of the North’s nuclear program, which risked disturbing an already tenuous balance. While some of ­these sentiments echo proliferation pessimist concerns, the threat assessment remained low enough to suggest a minimum level of US concern, especially with no direct threat posed to the United States.

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The interagency policy review explored multiple options. First, the United States could “stay the course” with l­ imited exchanges, some easing of travel restrictions, and modest inducements to urge the North to sign the safeguards agreement. Second, the United States could expand engagement: offering direct dialogue between the two countries, moving ­toward diplomatic relations, reducing joint US–­South Korean military exercises viewed as possibly threatening, providing assurances against US nuclear use, and withdrawing US nuclear weapons located in ­Korea. The third option, “coercion,” required using economic, diplomatic, and military means. Of the three options presented to President Bush and the national security team, ­there was consensus among the review participants that the first option was inadequate and that the third was premature.104 Though t­ here was some disagreement over the proper scope, engagement was the chosen strategy moving forward. A paper from fall 1991 offers insight into the operative logic of the administration at this time. First, the North Korean nuclear program was described as posing a “serious challenge to the peace and stability not only of the Korean peninsula but also of Northeast Asia as a ­whole.”105 While the North’s program challenged peace and stability on the peninsula and in the region, the assessment ­stopped short of highlighting a threat to the United States. The document also described how the United States and South ­Korea should meet this challenge: by “making use of all pos­si­ble diplomatic means and international pressure to bring North K ­ orea to implement fully the provisions of the IAEA safeguards agreement.”106 This could be achieved by declaring all nuclear-­related materials and facilities, putting them ­under international inspection, and forgoing the repro­cessing and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel. A handwritten note by Paul Wol­fo­witz, then undersecretary of defense for policy, suggested that the United States would be willing to lift economic sanctions should such steps be taken. The situation on the ground evolved into fall 1991. President Bush surprised the global community by unilaterally withdrawing all of the United States’ naval and land-­launched tactical nuclear weapons in Asia, including one hundred formerly positioned in South ­Korea.107 As the year was ending, a Deputies Committee meeting, including representatives from the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA, and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, convened to evaluate the United States’ goals and preferred approaches. According to a declassified briefing book, the December 17 meeting was intended to formulate a “game plan” to “bring North ­Korea’s nuclear weapons program ­under control.” This would involve an invitation to the North to send a high-­level official to meet with a US counterpart in New York, and discussions with China—­a country with the potential to influence Pyongyang.108 The strategy featured direct engagement between the United States and North ­Korea, negotiations between North ­Korea and South ­Korea, and increased international pressure on the DPRK.

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The accompanying materials offer a glimpse into the agency-­level thinking at the time. First, a memo for the Assistant Secretary of Defense James R. Lilley noted that the Pentagon was concerned that the talking points w ­ ere too “forward-­leaning” and expressed concern that the nuclear issue not be neglected in ­favor of nonaggression priorities on the peninsula.109 Second, a State Department paper enumerated the diplomatic, po­liti­cal, and economic steps that composed the overarching strategy. The paper acknowledged the difficulty of success, given the North’s “pattern of stalling on the safeguard’s issue” and the possibility that “Pyongyang has no intention of changing course.”110 Most impor­tant, the State Department paper noted explic­itly that Secretary of Defense Cheney “told ROK and Japa­nese leaders that we should not consider ‘military mea­sures’ since such discussion could jeopardize our initial diplomatic strategy.”111 Collectively, ­these materials demonstrate the components of the administration’s engagement strategy. They note explic­ itly that military options w ­ ere not u ­ nder consideration b ­ ecause of their potential to disrupt the diplomatic campaign underway. The year 1992 began with reasons for optimism regarding the North Korean nuclear situation. In January, the North and South jointly issued a declaration supporting the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.112 The declaration included steps North K ­ orea agreed to undertake t­ oward ending the nuclear crisis, including vari­ous verification and inspection mea­sures. Speaking to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul on January 6, 1992, Bush si­mul­ta­neously praised the negotiated agreements and warned that the nuclear pursuit was incredibly dangerous to the world community: “­These positive developments [a nonaggression agreement and a ban on nuclear weapons on the peninsula] come at a critical time of rising concern, at a time when North ­Korea’s pursuit of nuclear arms stands as the single greatest source of danger to peace in all of northeast Asia.”113 While the nuclear program was regionally the “single greatest source of danger,” praising the negotiated agreements was the administration’s only response. On January 30, the North went a step further and signed the IAEA’s safeguards agreement. Hope was short-­lived, however; by early February, administration officials ­were concerned that this was merely a North Korean play for time, a stalling tactic that would be followed by a failure to actually ratify the agreement. Reflecting this concern, plans for a forthcoming Deputies Committee meeting described the need to determine what “nooses” might be available to tighten around the North, should stalling continue.114 A March 12, 1992 memorandum described the administration’s position throughout the spring: “Our basic policy remains that nuclear weapons in North Korean hands are intolerable.”115 While ­there ­were signs of pro­gress toward safeguards ratification, the regime continued worrisome foot-­ ­ dragging be­hav­ior. T ­ here ­were also doubts regarding the potential to encourage China and Rus­sia to take a firmer line, should the delaying tactics continue. For the time being, the administration appeared to want to accept

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the possibility that the North Koreans would eventually meet their obligations, while si­mul­ta­neously laying the foundation for tightening international pressure should it become necessary.116 The memo noted that should coercive mea­sures be required, “such mea­sures would be achieved through the UN, with economic sanctions being the chief instrument pursued. Alternatively, we could consider a variety of coercive steps, e­ ither on our own or in concert with like-­minded nations.”117 This is noteworthy both for its demonstration of the administration’s awareness of the potential duplicity of the regime but also for explic­itly mentioning sanctions as the chief coercive tool to be pursued. While the last sentence is vague about what other tools might be available, ­there is not even an oblique reference to military options, underscoring the lack of even minimal consideration of the issue.118 A new crisis emerged in May 1992 when the new safeguards agreement allowed the IAEA to return to the North Korean nuclear complex. Initially, lead IAEA inspector Hans Blix reported on the components subject to IAEA oversight. He then traveled to the North on May 11–16 and discovered significant inconsistencies. Blix identified discrepancies between how much plutonium the DPRK claimed to have separated and what the evidence suggested. Furthermore, other IAEA member states offered additional intelligence on suspected nuclear facilities not known to the IAEA.119 ­These other member states included the United States, which discovered two suspicious facilities not reported by the North; one of t­hese was a “hill”—­a building the DPRK had hastily buried ­under tons of dirt and freshly planted trees.120 No significant additional executive activity resulted, however, according to both the primary source rec­ord and existing contemporaneous accounts, that describe only continued negotiations, nothing further.121 Especially significant for the pre­sent discussion, ­there is no evidence of consideration of the military option at any time.122 That engagement was the chosen option reflected the fact that neither Bush nor his administration appeared to believe that North ­Korea’s nuclear endeavors presented a threat to the United States. This attitude was confirmed that December, when Secretary Cheney stated that a North ­Korea with nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems was “the most serious threat to peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and indeed in East Asia”; the threat he described remained localized.123 Throughout 1992, the press reported on the advanced military capabilities of the regime. In March, the Washington Post described the production of Scud D missiles with a range of 625 miles capable of hitting South ­Korea and much of Japan. The article spoke of a potential North Korean willingness to sell ­these missiles to actors who would use them to target Israel or Eu­ro­pean cities.124 ­There was also the possibility of North Korean selling missiles directly to Iran, Syria, or Libya.125 To the extent that the American public was even remotely concerned about t­ hese issues, it is noteworthy that the Bush administration did not prioritize North Korean policy to a greater extent and chose a broad engagement policy over other more coercive options

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(including the preventive one). Despite revelations of the North’s duplicity and repeated repro­cessing activities, as well as published accounts of North ­Korea’s growing military potential, ­there is no evidence of growing concern or the need to revisit US North ­Korea policy, even with six months left in the term and the expectation of four more years in the White House. In this way, my model’s expectations are confirmed: given Bush’s early beliefs—­his weak nuclear optimism, confidence in US deterrence, and lack of significant concern over North ­Korea—­his administration undertook no serious consideration of the use of preventive military force.126 By contrast, Clinton took a dif­fer­ent approach, considering significant military force just a short time ­later.

The Clinton Administration and the North Korean Nuclear Program North ­Korea and its nuclear program ­were near, but not atop the new administration’s busy nonproliferation agenda.127 An additional priority was strong backing for the IAEA as a critical component of Clinton’s campaign strategy, which had focused on the need to elevate nonproliferation within the national security agenda. As president, Clinton reiterated this commitment when announcing a national export strategy: “I am more concerned about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction than I was when I became President. ­Every day I have this job, I become more worried about it.”128 The Clinton administration be­hav­ior contrasts with that of the prior Bush administration, which had maintained relatively ­little focus on proliferation or North K ­ orea. Subsequent to Clinton’s creation of a new Nonproliferation and Export Controls Directorate within the NSC, an interagency review pro­cess yielded Presidential Decision Directive 13, an ambitious plan for countering proliferation and meeting the national security challenges of the new global landscape.129 Concerns included nuclear weapons and materials, biological and chemical weapons, and ballistic and cruise missiles. In January 1994, the administration published its official counterproliferation strategy in the Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress. The section of the report describing counterproliferation articulates both the administration’s lack of confidence in deterrence in the new threat environment and the administration’s negative view of the consequences of additional nuclear proliferation: The danger posed by new possessor states is complicated ­because they may not respond to traditional deterrence approaches. Throughout the Cold War, deterrence efforts focused on the Soviet Union, whose force structure, doctrine, history, and mind set grew familiar to US strategists. Deterrence approaches designed for the Soviet Union might not be effective against new possessors of WMD for two reasons. First, they can be expected to have

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dif­fer­ent doctrines, histories, organ­izations, command and control systems, and purposes for their unconventional military forces. In addition, proliferators may have acquired such weapons for the express purpose of blackmail or terrorism and thus have a fundamentally dif­fer­ent calculus not amenable to deterrence. For ­these reasons, new proliferators might not be susceptible to basic deterrence as practiced during the Cold War. New deterrent approaches are needed as well as new strategies should deterrence fail. Fi­nally, any increase in the number of states with WMD raises the potential for accidental or unauthorized use.130

This articulation of the new threat environment highlights the negative consequences of additional proliferation in the international system and the potential limitations of deterrence in the post–­Cold War environment. The report also singled out North K ­ orea as a “potentially hostile power” against which the United States needed to preserve the ability to proj­ect forces.131 The DPRK was used in one of two scenario-­planning exercises that the Defense Department explored to determine f­ uture force size and structure requirements (the other was Iraq). Collectively, this report reveals that the early Clinton administration identified dangers from nuclear weapons (and other weapons of mass destruction) as threatening to the security of the United States and concluded that traditional models of deterrence ­were insufficient for responding to nuclear-­armed rogue actors. Critically, the report identified North ­Korea and its nuclear program as one of the most significant challenges likely to confront the new administration. Writing a­ fter his tenure in the administration, Secretary of State Warren Christopher concurred, noting that of all of the foreign policy challenges facing the new administration, “none was more immediately dangerous than North K ­ orea,” which became among the administration’s “highest strategic priorities.”132 In February 1993, the IAEA and North ­Korea again found themselves at an impasse regarding inspections. In light of continued discrepancies between what had been reported to the agency and what inspectors found, as well as blocked access to suspected nuclear waste storage sites, lead IAEA inspector Blix called for “special inspections.” Viewing this move as a violation of North Korean sovereignty and a general affront to the regime, the DPRK escalated. According to its guidelines, the IAEA referred the ­matter to the UN Security Council, which promptly issued a 13–0 resolution rebuking the DPRK and ordering North K ­ orea to allow inspections to proceed. Responding harshly on March 12, the North announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT ­under Article 10, which grants states the right to exit the treaty if their “supreme national interests are threatened.”133 The Clinton administration was understandably concerned, focusing on the security threat posed to the United States, its allies, and the world, as well as to global efforts against nuclear proliferation. Three Clinton administration officials ­later wrote, “Left unchecked, Pyongyang’s withdrawal would pre­sent a grave security threat to the world and weaken the NPT’s impor­tant bulwark

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against the spread of nuclear weapons. . . . ​Withdrawal threatened not only the nonproliferation regime but also the security of the United States and its allies in Northeast Asia: South K ­ orea and Japan.”134 North Korean expert Don Oberdorfer concurred: the withdrawal was seen as “an incomprehensible act of defiance and an ominous sign that North K ­ orea was hell-­bent on the production of nuclear weapons.”135 The IAEA found the North in noncompliance with the treaty as understood by the safeguards agreement. In response, the North declared its intention to shut down the five-­megawatt reactor at Yongbyon in order to remove the spent fuel. Estimating this reactor contained approximately enough plutonium to yield four or five nuclear weapons, the US referred the issue to the Security Council for the consideration of sanctions and strengthened its defenses in South K ­ orea in the event that hostilities should emerge.136 Though Clinton wanted to pursue sanctions from the start of his presidency, negotiations between the West and the DPRK emerged as a means to breach the impasse and prevent an escalation of the crisis. Multiple rounds of talks in Manhattan and Geneva in the summer of 1993 yielded no result.137 When asked in July about a pos­si­ble North Korean nuclear weapons capability, Clinton replied, “that is not something we can afford to let happen.” He went further and described the North as the “scariest” place on Earth, one of the few remaining locations where Cold War confrontations continued, with “a long track rec­ord of unpredictable be­hav­ior.”138 A mere week ­later, Clinton warned that the North appeared intent on developing Scud missiles and related technology and expressed deep concern that North ­Korea would sell ­these advanced weapons components to states in the M ­ iddle East.139 This warning is notable in that no major changes in the North’s program occurred during the waning months of 1992 and the start of 1993, and yet Clinton responded strongly, considering sanctions and publicly describing the threat posed to the United States, whereas Bush had shown no similar motivation. Clinton thus viewed the emerging threat from North ­Korea as multifaceted, comprising Cold War hostilities with the potential to spark massive conflict, an unpredictable and perhaps undeterrable actor pursuing the world’s most dangerous weapons, and a proliferation threat of advanced weapons and materials. Over time the US perspective changed, and the goal shifted from suspending to eliminating the North’s nuclear weapons program. General John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked to draw up plans for “destroying key components of the reactor site with a military attack.”140 This request is evidence of consideration of preventive force and the initiation of the second stage of the decision-­making pro­cess. Meanwhile, the operating reactor at Yongbyon was completing its initial fuel cycle, allowing for a full load of fuel rods—­enough for an additional 5–6 weapons—to be repro­cessed in short order, as the DPRK had previously

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announced its intention to do. Once in full-­scale operation, this reactor alone could produce enough weapons-­grade material for 10–12 nuclear weapons annually. When additional reactors came online, North K ­ orea would have enough weapons material for more.141 As Perry and Car­ter l­ ater wrote, “This was not just another nonproliferation issue to be dealt with by diplomats, this had the potential of dramatically increasing the military threat to South ­Korea, to US troops in South ­Korea, to Japan, our essential ally in the region, and indeed, to nations all over the world.”142 Foreshadowing ­things to come, National Security Advisor Lake warned that “backlash states like North ­Korea . . . ​that sponsor terrorism and traffic in weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technology, w ­ ill face isolation,” and if this does not inhibit them from aggressive actions, “we clearly must be prepared to strike back decisively and unilaterally.”143 The president echoed ­these sentiments, telling Meet the Press that the North Koreans “cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.”144 He demonstrated significant commitment to the issue, remarking, “I spend a lot of time on this issue. It’s a very, very major issue. We have got to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and particularly North ­Korea needs to stay in the control regime.”145 As 1993 came to a close, it was clear that the WMD threat from North ­Korea was an administration priority.146 The Defense Department rolled out its “Defense Counter-­proliferation Initiative” describing how to confront new threats in the post–­Cold War environment. At the heart of the agenda, and posing grave concern, ­were a handful of nuclear devices in the hands of rogue states or even terrorists.147 Additionally, the Pentagon and the Japa­ nese Defense Agency launched secret discussions on contingency planning in the event of a crisis.148 The year ended with trepidation. Speaking to reporters on December 12, 1993, Clinton said “God forbid” any kind of conflict should arise; he was also unsure, however, if it was pos­si­ble to avoid. When asked pointedly ­whether force was an option, he replied that he hoped other forms of pressure would suffice, but “we can do what we’d have to do.”149 Adding to the military planning ­under way, General Gary Luck, commander of US forces in ­Korea, flew to Washington to make sure that the politicians understood the dangers inherent to any military option. The United States faced a formidable foe on the ground—­reasonably well modernized, though weak in the air. That the United States would ultimately win was not in doubt; but such a win would be a Pyrrhic victory.150 At this time and despite knowledge of the potential associated costs, preparation for hostilities became more than just a conceptual exercise—­US command in ­Korea elevated OPlan 50-27 from a computer program to a real plan for operation, should it become necessary.151 The year 1994 began much the same way 1993 ended—­with administration officials deeply concerned with North ­Korea’s nuclear program. Time was ­running out before spent fuel could be removed from Yongbyon. As

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Secretary Perry remarked, “We ­were faced with the highly dangerous prospect that North K ­ orea could, within months, have five or six nuclear bombs and an active weapons program. . . . ​My se­nior military and civilian policy advisors all agreed with my assessment that this would pose an unacceptable risk and that the United States had to seek the elimination of the North Korean nuclear program.”152 National Security Advisor Lake described the threat environment as follows: “In the North Korean case . . . ​its nuclear program is our most urgent concern. The prospect of a nuclear-­armed North ­Korea poses extraordinary risks to our security interests in Asia and the integrity of the global nonproliferation regime.”153 What elevated the threat environment surrounding the program, in addition to the quickly shrinking win­dow of time before the fuel was removed, was what Perry called a “­triple threat: they would further increase the carnage of war on the peninsula; they might provoke an arms race in the region causing Japan and South ­Korea to reconsider their own decisions to forgo nuclear weapons; and they would undermine nonproliferation worldwide if ­others witnessed North ­Korea ‘succeeding’ in thwarting the Nonproliferation Treaty or even selling nuclear weapons to other aspiring proliferators.”154 Thus in his (and the administration’s) view, the threat was complex: North Korean nuclear weapons increased the likelihood of catastrophic war in the region; they could launch an arms race, further destabilizing an already tenuous balance on the peninsula and in Asia writ large; and they would radically undermine international nonproliferation efforts designed to curtail additional pursuit or purchasing of nuclear weapons. In March, the IAEA resumed inspections, but North K ­ orea prohibited the collection of desired samples. Seals the IAEA had arranged during August 1993 site visits appeared broken, and the agency sought to verify ­whether North K ­ orea had removed sensitive materials. The North prevented the inspectors from making the necessary assessments. Meanwhile, during tense negotiations, the North Korean negotiator told his South Korean counterpart, “Seoul is not far from ­here. If a war breaks out, it ­will be a sea of fire. Mr. Song, it w ­ ill prob­ably be difficult for you to survive.”155 With the inspectors hamstrung, and the North increasingly bellicose, the United States canceled the next round of talks and resumed discussions with South K ­ orea regarding annual joint military exercises. The IAEA ordered agency personnel home and referred the issue back to the Security Council for further consideration.156 The crisis escalated to new heights in April, when the DPRK announced that the previously threatened shutdown of the five-­megawatt reactor for refueling was set to begin. In early May, the North told the IAEA that the unloading of some eight thousand fuel rods was already underway. Secretary Perry ­later described this as a key turning point in the crisis, when dialogue and “preventive diplomacy” failed and US strategy shifted to coercion; fuel rods w ­ ere a tangible or physical threat that represented the North’s

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potential to move ahead and pursue weaponization.157 President Clinton himself echoed t­ hese sentiments in his memoirs, writing that “rods w ­ ere a dangerous asset in the hands of the most isolated country in the world . . . ​ [which] might feel the temptation to sell the plutonium to the wrong buyer. Within a week I had de­cided to send Patriot missiles to South ­Korea . . . ​Perry told a group . . . ​[that] I was determined to stop North K ­ orea from developing a nuclear arsenal, even at the risk of war.”158 At the time, Clinton ordered new Apache attack he­li­cop­ters, aircraft spare parts, and maintenance crews to be sent to South K ­ orea and Japan, in addition to the second Patriot Battalion mentioned above.159 Such moves provide further evidence of the consideration of and preparation for military options. Speaking on May 3, Secretary Perry began laying the groundwork for the forthcoming flurry of administration activity and highlighted the inability of traditional deterrence to provide for US and international security: It is not satisfactory to say, as some have argued, that we could accept such a program and seek to deter North ­Korea from ­actual use of its nuclear arsenal as we deterred the Soviet Union during the Cold War. For even assuming that we could reliably deter ­actual use of North ­Korea’s nuclear weapons, an unchecked nuclear capability—­coupled with North ­Korea’s large conventional military forces—­could put North ­Korea in a position to subject South ­Korea to extortion in establishing its terms for unification. It could undermine the security of the w ­ hole Northeast Asia region and tempt other countries to seek their own nuclear weapons in self-­defense. . . . ​A nuclear North ­Korea could be in a position to export nuclear technologies and weapons to terrorist or rogue regimes around the world.160

The military realities ­were difficult. Perry described the North’s huge conventional forces, explaining that despite keeping their population on the brink of starvation, the Kim regime spent 25 ­percent of its gross domestic product on its military. In addition, two thirds of its million-­person army was positioned within sixty miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—­the line of demarcation separating North and South from the armistice that ended the Korean War. Furthermore, Perry detailed thousands of tanks and artillery pieces, tunnels ­under the DMZ, and a large special operations force. Most of ­these facts had been true for de­cades, but only recently had the North increased both the size and forward deployment of its forces. Beyond ­these observables, North Korean be­hav­ior was unsettling. The North Koreans ­were (and are still) among the world leaders in exporting advanced weapons technology, including ballistic missiles. The concern was that with nuclear know-­how, the DPRK could offer a nuclear-­tipped ballistic missile to the highest bidder. Combined, ­these ele­ments set the stage for a looming confrontation between the United States and the DPRK.161 On May 18, Secretary Perry and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Shalikashvili summoned all four-­star generals in the United States to a secure

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Pentagon conference room, “The Tank,” to discuss how the US would plan for military activity in K ­ orea, including the potential for a second Korean War. The following day, Secretary Perry and Generals Luck and Shalikashvili briefed the president regarding the gravity of the developing situation.162 Perry noted the “increasingly obnoxious” North Korean rhe­ toric and highlighted the dangerous export practices of the DPRK that raised the prospect that North ­Korea might sell a matched set of ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. He warned that the North Koreans might sell to ­either Iran or Libya. National Security Advisor Lake asked ­whether it was pos­si­ble to destroy Yongbyon. Perry had a contingency plan in place and indicated that the Air Force had both the technical ability to locate and destroy the target quickly and effectively, without spreading radiation, suggesting a high likelihood of success (IV3). His fear, however, was that a ­limited strike would spark a wider war on the peninsula.163 Cost estimates expected approximately 52,000 US military casualties, 490,000 South Korean casualties, and a ­great number of North Korean troop and civilian lives lost. The financial estimate assumed $61 billion.164 Shalikashvili described additional risks and complications with military action: the location of any previously withdrawn plutonium was unknown, the air defenses around Yongbyon ­were heavy, and the terrain was unfortunately hilly. At best, an attack would set back the program by some years, but it would likely spur action over the 38th parallel.165 General Luck quipped, “If we pull an Osirak, they ­will be coming south.”166 Discussion focused on three potential military plans for augmenting existing forces in the region and gaining presidential authorization quickly, in order to avoid a preemptive move by the North Koreans. The first option required immediate dispatch of two thousand troops necessary for rapid deployment l­ ater—­teams who could h ­ andle logistics, administration requirements, and supplies. Option 2, favored by both Perry and the JCS, added squadrons of frontline tactical aircraft, including F117 stealth bombers and additional long-­range bombers nearby; deployed several battalions of combat-­ready ground troops; and stationed the second aircraft b ­ attle group in the area. This option would add an additional 10,000 troops to the 37,000 already deployed. The last option would send additional tens of thousands of Marine Corps ground forces and army troops as well as more air power.167 As tensions r­ ose, the principals met on May 27 to discuss the situation and draft a memo to the president. They supported a strong and unan­i­mous Security Council statement condemning the North’s actions and highlighting that Secretary of State Christopher had been in touch with his Chinese counter­parts to seek their intervention with the North Koreans. With tensions showing no sign of abating, the principals recommended pursuing sanctions. Despite the risks that the North might interpret sanctions provocatively, the administration could not allow the DPRK to flout its nonproliferation obligations. As an inducement to return to the negotiating ­table, the United

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States also offered high-­level talks to the North Koreans, if they would allow the IAEA to continue their inspections. The president and principals met on May 31 to set the sanctions strategy in place. North ­Korea rejected the offer and continued defueling the reactor at an alarming rate. The IAEA warned that the agency’s ­limited ability to verify North Korean activity, and the spent fuel, would soon entirely dis­appear.168 On June 2, Blix terminated the inspection mission, saying all ability to monitor North Korean activity had been compromised. Having warned that global economic sanctions would result if the North failed to comply with the inspections, Clinton withdrew his offer of high-­level talks, initiated sanctions, and quietly explored the possibility of attacking Yongbyon with the South Koreans, Japan, and China.169 Meeting the principals again on June 10, Shalikashvili and Perry reviewed the current military posture. Clinton had approved sending an advance party of 250 to ­Korea to manage the coming deployments, indicating that military force was a very serious possibility, despite the associated costs and risks. Again, the principals discussed three deployment options: (1) 2,000 additional personnel but not combat troops, only t­ hose necessary to prepare for large-­scale deployments; (2) 10,000 troops along with squadrons of aircraft and a second carrier b ­ attle group; and (3) 50,000 troops, four hundred aircraft, fifty ships, and vari­ous other installations. This third option would be accompanied by a call-up of reserves. Perry’s view was that the stronger and more vigorous the buildup, the more effective deterrent established.170 The situation evolved quickly. Multilateral support for sanctions was growing. Accelerated preparations w ­ ere underway for military action, as was a last-­ditch effort at negotiations in an attempt to keep events from spiraling out of control. By June 14, a new military plan was on the t­ able: the so-­called “Osirak option.” Three new military plans entered the discussion. First, the United States could destroy the repro­cessing fa­cil­it­y. This would set back the program, minimize the radioactivity risk, and be least likely to incite a military response. Alternatively, the United States could attack the repro­cessing plant itself and the other nuclear installations at Yongbyon— an additional five-­megawatt reactor and spent-­fuel pool, among other potential targets. This would be a more severe blow to the North’s program but would increase all associated risks. Third, the United States could conduct a much wider operation, targeting all known nuclear facilities, removing key military assets, and degrading the North’s ability to retaliate or incite ­future vio­lence.171 Publicly some w ­ ere already pushing for such options: former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft and undersecretary of state Arnold Kanter penned a Washington Post opinion piece to that effect, adding their prominent voices to the debate.172 The public also favored a coercive approach: in June, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that 46 ­percent of US respondents said that the North Korean nuclear developments “­were the most serious foreign policy issue facing the United States t­ oday,” outdistancing the

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next issue—­instability in Russia—by a three-­to-­one margin. Likewise, a national poll by CBS and Time found that 51 ­percent favored military action to destroy facilities if the DPRK continued to refuse inspections, and 48 ­percent said it was “worth risking war” to prevent North K ­ orea from manufacturing nuclear weapons.173 On June 16, Clinton reviewed the pros and cons of the available options.174 While a tense debate continued, a call came in from Pyongyang, where (with President Clinton’s approval) former president Jimmy Car­ter had traveled and from where he now spoke of a breakthrough negotiated with Kim Il Sung.175 Though it would be announced publicly on the 22, the North agreed to freeze its nuclear program, to not refuel or repro­cess its nuclear fuel, and to begin talks with the West in short order.176 Speaking in South K ­ orea a few weeks ­later, President Clinton put the situation in ­these terms: “When you examine the nature of the American security commitment to K ­ orea, to Japan, to this region, it is pointless for [the North Koreans] to try to develop nuclear weapons, b ­ ecause if they ever use them it would be the end of their country.”177 Looking back on the episode, Perry recalled that despite the serious risk of war, “we believed that it was even more dangerous to allow North ­Korea to proceed with a large-­scale nuclear weapons program.”178 Clinton’s efforts t­ oward North K ­ orea in 1993–94 had the effect of at least temporarily slowing down the program’s development, arguably a short-­ term nonproliferation success.179 Furthermore, the following years of the Clinton administration ­were marked by additional nonproliferation achievements, including the entrance into force of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, with the Rus­sians, which eliminated significant portions of both the US and Soviet arsenals; the push to make the Nuclear Non-­ Proliferation Treaty a permanent fixture of the international landscape; pro­ gress ­toward additional international safeguards standards; dismantling and securing nuclear materials globally through the Nunn-­Lugar cooperative threat initiative; and continued efforts on the nonproliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Reading his memoirs, one gets the sense that Clinton is quite proud of ­these efforts and wished that he could have done more, especially on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which Congress failed to ratify, despite significant pressure from the president. Elsewhere, Clinton demonstrated similar commitment and dedication to pursuing nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts, in securing and removing the Soviet-­ era arsenals in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine and in attempting (unsuccessfully) to get both India and Pakistan to remain nonnuclear. Together ­these issues suggest a leader dedicated to preventing the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and demonstrate that the North Korean crisis was not an isolated incident. Rather, this was one of Clinton’s myriad nonproliferation efforts as president, the roots of which can be traced to Clinton’s prepresidential period, when he offered hints of the vision he would ­later execute.

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Postscript: George W. Bush and North ­Korea’s Nuclear Pro­gress Despite a peaceful resolution to the 1994 crisis, the same issues continued to plague the region and challenge policy makers. North ­Korea’s advancing nuclear program and belligerence in the region have vexed subsequent US presidents, including the forty-­fifth president, Donald J. Trump, whose interactions with North K ­ orea are discussed in the conclusion. A few key points about the George W. Bush era, however, are worth noting h ­ ere.180 Although the Agreed Framework succeeded in temporarily freezing North ­Korea’s plutonium production capability—­halting operation at Yongbyon and elsewhere, and placing the DPRK ­under IAEA safeguards—­the calm was temporary. Throughout 1996, 1997, and 1998, repeated violations of UN Security Council resolutions limiting the North’s pursuit of ballistic missile capabilities soured relations, escalating markedly in 1998 when the North tested a Taepodong intermediate-­range ballistic missile. The subsequent policy review conducted by the Clinton administration called for a new agreement to be layered over the previous one, though the implementation was interrupted by the election of George W. Bush. Though the next chapter describes the prepresidential nuclear beliefs of the forty-­third president in full, let me note h ­ ere that I code Bush a proliferation pessimist—­concerned about the destabilizing and conflict-­inducing nature of nuclear weapons as they spread around the globe. At first, Bush was also confident in deterrence, believing that the military might and nuclear ele­ments of the US arsenal w ­ ere collectively sufficient to discourage most, if not all, adversaries from attacking the United States. Confident in this position, the Bush team campaigned for office on the need to refocus attention on relationship-­building with major state actors, including Rus­sia and China.181 The September 11, 2001, attacks dramatically altered Bush’s perspective, however—­not fundamentally changing his proliferation pessimism, but rather exacerbating his concern for the spread of nuclear materials and know-­how. His concern was greatest where that proliferation risk intersected with threats from difficult-­to-­deter nonstate actors and terrorist organ­izations. Thus, following September 11, the leader-­centric model would expect Bush to become even more likely to consider and potentially use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. So what happened? From the outset of the administration, the new Bush team was inclined t­ oward further negotiations with North K ­ orea regarding missiles, nuclear m ­ atters, and terrorism. Following September 11, however, tensions escalated when President Bush identified North K ­ orea as being on the “axis of evil,” and the North responded poorly both to the speech and to the perceived hostility against North ­Korea in the Nuclear Posture Review.182 This episode was succeeded by US intelligence revealing that the DPRK was pursuing a clandestine uranium enrichment pathway to weapons, a revelation that catalyzed a breakdown in relations, the suspension of

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economic assistance, and eventually the dismissal of the IAEA from North ­Korea, coupled with the North’s announcement of its intention to withdraw from the NPT. While negotiations called the Six-­Party Talks including the United States, North ­Korea, South ­Korea, Japan, China, and Rus­sia continued throughout the Bush 43 administration and occasionally yielded hints of pro­gress, a fairly consistent level of conflict persisted.183 Over time, the North Korean regime was sanctioned for repeated WMD violations, state sponsorship of terrorism, and vari­ous missile and nuclear transgressions. The DPRK responded with repeated ballistic missile tests of increasing capability and, critically, six nuclear tests since 2006. ­These interactions between the Bush administration and North K ­ orea stand somewhat in contrast to the expectations of the leader-­centric model. The model would expect Bush to seriously consider preventive military force against the North Korean nuclear threat, especially in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks. To date, the evidentiary rec­ord to that effect is murky, with only negotiations and sanctions described. Although rumors allude to military consideration especially during the 2004–2005 period, it is not currently pos­si­ble to corroborate that Bush considered military options.184 That said, it is pos­si­ble to speculate that had the US intervention and subsequent efforts in Iraq proved more successful, perhaps Bush would have turned his attention to military tools in North ­Korea (and Iran). Only ­future evidence ­will tell ­whether Bush entertained this possibility.

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Three US Presidents Tangle with Iraq’s Nuclear Program

This chapter explores three consecutive episodes of US-­Iraqi interaction over Iraq’s nuclear weapons program between 1989 and 2003. I argue that US preventive be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis Iraq throughout this period can be explained by the threat perceptions of the United States’ 41st, 42nd, and 43rd presidents. Understanding the Gulf War requires analyzing how George H. W. Bush viewed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as a challenge to both regional and global stability as well as a threat to vital American interests. Studying Operation Desert Fox necessitates exploring how repeated Iraqi violations of the international inspections regime caused Bill Clinton, for whom the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat was salient, to attack Iraq’s weapons programs. Fi­nally, the 2003 Iraq War rests on George W. Bush’s prepresidential focus on rogue states and WMD threats, exacerbated by the attacks on September 11, 2001. In the post-9/11 environment, he concluded that containment and deterrence no longer worked to protect US national security against weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. Beliefs thus help explain how, three times in twenty years, the United States took military action against Iraq and its nuclear program u ­ nder the leadership of consecutive presidents. Methodologically this chapter is dif­fer­ent from the previous two in that it looks at three consecutive presidents confronting the same adversary, with longer periods of time elapsing between each episode. Consequently, the analy­sis relaxes a key facet of the research design that attempts to isolate the role of leaders by holding the passage of time, and by extension the on-­the-­ ground developments, constant. Relaxing this feature is less consequential ­here, however, as I treat the three episodes not to compare them to one another, but rather to show how Bush 41 and Clinton behaved as the leader-­ centric model would expect when confronting a second adversary. Moreover, what remains constant is that each of the three leaders confronted the same adversary: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. Both theoretical and empirical reasons make this an impor­tant part of the research design.

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First, by including chapters on both Iraq and North ­Korea, the analy­sis includes a cross-­sectional component, allowing me to explore how the same leaders, George H. W. Bush and Bill Clinton, dealt with a second instance of proliferation during their administrations. D ­ oing so lets me explore the relative levels of importance of my two in­de­pen­dent variables and also assess to what extent a leader’s be­hav­ior is consistent across cases. Both presidents demonstrate relative consistency regarding nuclear proliferation in the Iraq and North ­Korea contexts. That Bush intervened in Iraq but not in North ­Korea reflects his heightened threat perception regarding the former and almost total lack of concern for the latter. Clinton, conversely, carried his sensitivity to proliferation concerns over to a new context and perceived significant threat emerging from Iraqi WMD be­hav­ior, as he had in the North Korean context. In this way, past experiences influence how leaders perceive subsequent threats and assess the likelihood of success in ­later episodes; they then serve as data points brought to bear in l­ ater decision making. Second, Iraq offers an impor­tant test of my model’s generalizability across empirical arenas. I argue that the Persian Gulf War is not a typical case of preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy, despite much of the lit­er­ a­ture treating it as such. The Gulf War is therefore not precisely analogous to the other cases in the manuscript.1 Rather, the Gulf War is a more opportunistic episode, in which nuclear sites w ­ ere targeted during the course of a wider military intervention with other purposes. While dif­fer­ent, it is impor­ tant nevertheless to explore this case to elucidate its differences from a standard case of preventive war as it has been defined h ­ ere. Lastly, whereas the North Korean case explored the model’s generalizability beyond the Cold War, Iraq offers an initial probe of the post-9/11 environment. Although George W. Bush’s prior beliefs about proliferation and threats successfully predict consideration of military force, September 11 played some role in getting Bush to the ­actual use of force. A full explanation for how shocks of this magnitude affect strategy preferences is beyond the scope of analy­sis h ­ ere but may be an area for ­future research. Empirically, note that the 2003 Iraq War is the most recently concluded case of US preventive military action against an adversarial proliferant, and as such its exploration is worthwhile prima facie. Especially considering that the United States spent years and billions of dollars in blood and trea­sure conducting the war, even a preliminary investigation is useful for shedding light on the lead-up to the campaign. My analy­sis does not debate the veracity or merits of the war’s justification; instead, I take the Bush administration at its word when it described the preventive counterproliferation logic as the public motivation for intervention. Before proceeding, note that this case examines the three presidents differently than in previous chapters. Chapter 4 offered an extensive exploration of Bush and Clinton’s prepresidential beliefs, so they are not rehashed

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­ ere. Rather, the key points are reiterated prior to the discussion of the Gulf h War and Operation Desert Fox. Further, with George W. Bush as a very recent former US president, the data limitations are acute. While the George W. Bush Presidential Library opened to the public in April 2013, ­there is an extremely ­limited amount of material available for documentary research. In addition, b ­ ecause such a short amount of time has passed since Bush left office, only ­limited contemporaneous accounts are available. Nevertheless, it is impor­tant to conduct a preliminary investigation into Bush’s prepresidential beliefs and preventive war decision making with the materials currently available. Especially ­because the September 11 attacks occurred during the Bush 43 administration, this investigation allows for a second opportunity to assess the impact of major exogenous events on a leader’s beliefs regarding proliferation, threats, and deterrence, as the Cold War’s end did ­under Bush 41. In this instance, both weapons of mass destruction and rogue regimes ­were salient threats for Bush 43 prior to his presidency and before September 11. They grew exponentially more worrisome and required a new, preventive strategy in the aftermath of September 11.

Alternative Explanations Recall that the basic structural alternative expects states to take preventive action to forestall changes to the relative balance of power that would occur when another state acquires nuclear weapons. Such an explanation does fairly well in the Iraq case, as it leads one to expect that the United States would be aggrieved by Iraq’s attempted nuclear development and would take military action to prevent it. Focusing on comparisons of relative strength between two states, that a strong United States might attack a relatively weak Iraq is not especially controversial, given that the United States was a superpower confronting a much weaker adversary’s nuclear attempt. In this way, structural explanations can partly describe how the US presidents used force against Iraq. However, structural logics miss impor­tant variation that occurs within the United States–­ Iraq dyad, as this chapter demonstrates. A domestic-­level explanation focusing on regime type, foreign policy convergence, and conflict history similarly offers some traction. The United States–­Iraq dyad consists of one democracy and one autocracy. The two states have divergent foreign policy goals on a wide array of issues, including international terrorism and the Israeli-­Palestinian conflict. Only recently, however, with the Gulf War, have the two engaged in direct vio­lence. The United States even supported Iraq against fundamentalist Iran during the Iran-­Iraq War. Thus, the precise expectation from this domestic-­level alternative explanation regarding w ­ hether the US would be likely to use force

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against Iraq is unclear. Both alternatives, therefore, make additional explanation warranted. The empirical facts of the Iraq case suggest two other relevant domestic po­liti­cal alternatives, which relate to the precise timing of Operation Desert Fox and the 2003 War in Iraq. A diversionary war logic might argue that Clinton’s 1998 preventive strikes ­were designed to distract from the Monica Lewinsky scandal that occupied the United States throughout 1998.2 While plausible, the available documentary rec­ord is too weak to support this hypothesis. In addition, a logrolling argument might suggest that neoconservative ele­ments within the Bush 43 administration w ­ ere responsible for leading the country to war in Iraq.3 ­Here, too, contemporaneous accounts do not suggest that neoconservative ele­ments pushed Bush and other administration individuals to war. ­There is also ­little evidence that Bush was duped by power­ful individuals within the cabinet, at least not beyond what his beliefs would allow. More pointedly, if Bush had not held the nuclear beliefs I argue he did about the dangers of weapons of mass destruction (and nonstate actors ­after September 11), he would not have gone along with the military operation. Thus, t­ hese two additional domestic logics do not offer much traction. Collectively, while the main structural and domestic po­liti­cal alternatives do comparatively better than they have in previous chapters, none is sufficiently specified or comprehensive to account for each of the cases explored in this book. None of ­these explanations is therefore preferable to the leader-­ centric argument, to which we now turn.

The United States and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program As he was for most of what occurred in post-­coup Iraq, Saddam Hussein was the driving force b ­ ehind Iraq’s nuclear weapons proj­ect.4 The program began with the creation of the Atomic Energy Commission in January 1959 and ended when Hussein was removed from power by the US invasion in 2003. Iraq’s nuclear program initially required outside assistance from vari­ ous actors. First, in the mid-1960s, the Soviets agreed to provide nuclear research facilities, with operations beginning in late 1967 or early 1968.5 ­Later, in August 1976, Iraq inked a deal with France for two additional reactors, which the French dubbed Osiraq, a­ fter their Osiris-­class reactor design. Although Iraq’s efforts in the 1970s did not concern the Americans, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin viewed the developments as an existential concern and ordered the bombing of the Osiraq fa­cil­i­ty on June 7, 1981.6 US intelligence assessments conducted in the bombing’s aftermath in both 1981 and 1983 concluded that it would take Hussein years to reconstitute the program.7 The assessments agreed, however, that Saddam’s ambition to rebuild remained despite the costly effort required. While much of Iraq’s

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program went under­ground following the Israeli attack, the program grew in size, diversification, and sophistication.8 In 1986, the United States learned of a Chinese feasibility study of Iraq’s nuclear weapons capabilities at four dif­fer­ent locations, projecting a completion deadline of 1990. In the aftermath of the Iran-­Iraq war, the CIA assessed that Iraq considered nuclear weapons essential to deter further Ira­nian aggression.9 The Persian Gulf War and its aftermath revealed to the international community just how far Iraq had proceeded with its redeveloped nuclear weapons program. By this time, the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center h ­ oused labs, centrifuge testing, and uranium research and development, among many other components. The massive Tarmiya complex contained four hundred buildings, including weapons design and assembly facilities.10 The United States and its allies wanted to keep better tabs on regional developments, so they increased surveillance, which illuminated Iraq’s WMD development. This surveillance occurred both via increased satellite over flights and an extensive UN-­led inspections campaign. The postwar ­legal apparatus barred Iraq from having a WMD arsenal, constructed the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) to ensure Iraq’s compliance with the requirement that the country not possess the ability to produce WMD, and led to nearly a de­cade of weapons inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency to identify and dismantle the program’s components. Through t­ hese inspections and via the testimony of vari­ous Iraqi defectors, the world learned the extent of Iraq’s pro­gress ­toward nuclear weapons. This pro­cess was not easy, however, as harassment of inspectors was nearly constant, obstruction of their work happened regularly, and Hussein attempted to hide sensitive material from international observation by moving documents and materials around, inside and outside the country. Hussein’s obstruction peaked in 1998, when he brazenly ejected the inspection teams, terminating any semblance of cooperation with UNSCOM and prompting the United States to intervene militarily in Operation Desert Fox. A 1999 US report titled “Reconstitution of Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox,” claimed that while UNSCOM had successfully demolished much of Iraq’s nuclear program, Iraq still maintained the basis for reconstitution—in both scientific know-­how and materials. The report estimated it would take Iraq approximately five to seven years to manufacture sufficient quantities of the necessary highly enriched uranium (HEU) for a bomb, though a crude bomb could be assembled within one year, especially if an external actor provided the necessary materials.11 In October 2002, the National Intelligence Council repeated this assessment, claiming that if left unchecked Hussein would have nuclear weapons by the close of the de­cade.12 Around the same time, British intelligence concurred with the US estimate, saying that Iraq continued to work on its WMD

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program; was attempting to purchase dual-­use technologies from abroad; and, as the US had feared, had tried to acquire uranium internationally.13 By fall 2002, no one knew precisely how close Saddam Hussein was to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability, but the fear was that once he did, he could dominate the Persian Gulf, threaten the United States, and pass the technology to terrorists bent on targeting the United States or its interests abroad. With ­these concerns in mind, the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, ending both Hussein’s regime and his pursuit of nuclear weapons.14

President George H. W. Bush As described previously, George H. W. Bush paid no par­tic­u­lar attention to nuclear weapons or nuclear proliferation during his prepresidential ­career. Bush was mostly confident in the deterrent strength of the US military, especially following the nuclear modernization and defense build-up presided over by Ronald Reagan and continued u ­ nder Bush’s own administration. Bush 41 instead worried about threats to the international system from challenges to international peace and stability and from aggression by one state ­toward another. Having served in World War II fighting the Axis powers, Bush internalized a fear of falling dominos, first while combating the spread of fascism and ­later while witnessing the US loss in Vietnam. The lessons of ­these experiences and his time in China guided his l­ ater responses to the Gulf War; he said that “history taught that dictators ­were only ­stopped by resolute force . . . ​comparing Saddam Hussein to Adolf Hitler.”15 ­These issues remained salient in the Iraq context in 1990 and 1991. Compared to North ­Korea, Iraq posed a much more significant challenge to Bush’s sensibilities, originally for reasons having nothing to do with nuclear proliferation. Ultimately, following a failure of deterrence, the nature of the Iraqi challenge would drive him to military intervention. Bush developed a growing concern with nuclear proliferation and the threat thereof only following the discovery of Iraq’s advancing nuclear weapons capabilities. Previously, proliferation was only of l­ imited salience for him, and as a result the North Korean nuclear program received no consideration of preventive military action. The difference between the two cases is explained by the fact that Bush perceived Iraq as far more threatening to the United States and the world community, both as a general m ­ atter and especially if armed with nuclear weapons.

George H. W. Bush and Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program Iraq was a salient aspect of Bush’s foreign policy considerations. Iraq’s nuclear program, like North ­Korea’s, was not a very prominent issue for Bush

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during the prepresidential period, but it became a priority as his administration continued. Although chemical and ballistic missile proliferation entered Bush’s consciousness first, only as president and with continued revelations about Iraq’s nuclear developments did he begin to understand the nuclear component of the broader Iraqi challenge. Moreover, what focused Bush’s attention was Iraq’s hostile invasion of Kuwait, which upset the balance of power and stability in the Gulf region, exposed the pro­gress of Iraq’s nuclear capability, and revealed the extent of Iraq’s duplicity to the international community. Even before Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, he challenged the international community. As one Bush biographer noted, “no key American policymaker doubted he [Hussein] was a thug—­but he still did not pose a threat to the balance of power in the region.”16 At the same time, President Bush did not yet connect the danger of Iraq to the challenge of nuclear proliferation. Rather, nuclear proliferation, while regrettable, seemed to him an inevitability the world community would need to come to terms with: “Nuclear weapons capabilities are proliferating, much to my regret and the regret of every­body h ­ ere. And inevitably, high-­tech weapons ­will fall into the hands of ­those whose hatred of Amer­i­ca and contempt for civilized norms is well-­known. We ­will continue to work hard to prevent this dangerous proliferation. But one t­hing is certain: we must be ready for its consequences. And we ­will be ready.”17 Bush reaffirmed his commitment to Reagan’s policy on Iraq, seeking “normal relations between the United States and Iraq that would serve our long-­term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the M ­ iddle East.” But he warned si­mul­ta­neously that any illegal use of chemical or biological weapons would lead to economic and po­liti­cal sanctions. Violations of IAEA agreements in the nuclear realm would do the same.18 Thus, at least initially, Bush sought to contain and manage the challenge from Iraq in the abstract and where weapons ­were concerned. US anxiety over Iraq’s illicit weapons arsenal did not begin with the invasion of Kuwait. Of major concern to US decision makers, especially prior to the Gulf War, was Hussein’s chemical and biological arsenal, both of which he had used previously on the battlefield and against his own citizens. Iraq was known as a “leader” in chemical weapons production since the Iran-­ Iraq War. In 1988 Hussein targeted the Iraqi Kurdish population, and in 1991 he used ­these weapons to quell a popu­lar domestic uprising. T ­ hese issues concerned Bush, who worried in both public and private about the dangers of the proliferation of chemical weapons.19 As time progressed, American nonproliferation concerns about Iraq expanded to include a nuclear component. The scope of Iraq’s nuclear development became clearer, as the United States learned more about the extent of the proj­ects via the Soviet collapse.20 The situation took on new meaning for President Bush and his national security team, however, when in

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March 1990 the United States intercepted a shipment of nuclear-­related devices bound for Iraq. According to Bush and National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, this was the moment that proliferation concerns regarding Iraq took on a nuclear nature: “In addition to the strident anti-­Israel rhe­toric, ­there emerged disturbing signs that Iraq was still seeking to develop weapons of mass destruction. In March, we uncovered and successfully blocked its attempt to procure—­illegally—­triggering devices, which could be used for nuclear weapons . . . ​­Later, in July, we intercepted at dockside in New Jersey special tungsten furnaces which could be useful to their nuclear weapons program.”21 Bush said, “The arrest [of Iraqis involved in procurement] . . . ​raises once again the administration’s deep concern about the issue of nuclear proliferation in the M ­ iddle East. Nuclear proliferation, along with the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons and intermediate range missiles, continues to pose serious threats to US interests, as well as the interests of our friends in the region.”22 The intelligence community, early to recognize the challenge for what it was, warned of the dangers of Hussein’s expansionist tendencies. National Security Advisor Scowcroft said Hussein was a major threat to the vital interests of the United States dating back to President Car­ ter’s 1980 articulation that “an attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf w ­ ill be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of Amer­i­ca. And such an assault w ­ ill be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”23 Chairman Colin Powell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, writing a­ fter his time in office, described Iraq’s possession of the fourth-­largest military power in the world and worried that “hanging like a specter over the desert was the Iraqi biological arsenal and Saddam’s feverish drive for nuclear capability.”24 Thus, before the Gulf War, t­ here was a growing sense of concern for Bush 41 and his national security team regarding Saddam Hussein’s WMD program. Recall, however, that I coded Bush in the previous chapter as a weak proliferation optimist, given his relatively l­imited concern for nuclear proliferation. While his concern for t­ hese ­matters grew throughout the 1990s as new information about Iraqi WMD emerged, his views did not change sufficiently prior to the Gulf War as to warrant a change in my coding of his general views about nuclear proliferation. What was more salient for Bush was the threat posed to the Persian Gulf region and to the United States by Iraq’s aggression and hostility. Iraq’s nuclear development was an auxiliary issue. ­Here a comparison with North ­Korea is warranted. Whereas Bush demonstrated a relatively calm attitude ­toward the North Korean nuclear program, over time he grew more vocal about the dangers posed by Iraq’s nuclear program. Critically, it is not the nuclear program per se that drove the situation; rather, Bush was motivated by the rest of Iraq’s bad be­hav­ior. Iraq posed a major threat to the strategically impor­tant Persian Gulf region

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and to the security and interests of the United States. Especially given the risks to regional and global peace and stability, both critically impor­tant issues for Bush’s worldview, the leader-­centric model would expect him to be much more threatened by the Iraqi situation. I expect that Bush’s weak but growing concern for nuclear proliferation and specific concern for a potentially undeterrable threat from Iraq ­were likely to have led him to consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

The Gulf War Concern about Iraq’s petulance turned to shock for the United States and the international community on August 2, 1990, when Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait. Events caused former secretary of state James Baker to quip, “Practically overnight, we went from trying to work with Saddam to likening him to Hitler.”25 US policy would take shape over the coming days and weeks, but according to Bush’s d ­ aughter, on the day of the invasion he said, “I did know for sure that aggression had to be ­stopped and Kuwait’s sovereignty restored,” suggesting a heightened sense of alarm and focus immediately following this radical development.26 On August 3, Bush’s National Security Council met to review the CIA’s report of the situation, which argued that Iraq’s invasion posed a threat to the current world order and risked a long-­run negative impact on the global economy.27 The meeting ushered in a variety of administration efforts to confront Hussein. An executive order freezing Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets in the United States went further, adding a WMD component to the traditional balance of power concerns articulated above: “Saddam had chemical and biological weapons programs and had used chemical weapons against the Ira­ni­ans as well as the Kurds in his own country. . . . ​More ominous we knew he was attempting to build a nuclear weapons capability, although our intelligence estimates on the amount of pro­gress he had made varied widely.”28 Preinvasion intelligence estimates suggested Iraq would not acquire nuclear weapons for five to ten years.29 Formally codifying the initial shift in policy beyond the executive order, National Security Directive 45 articulated that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait put “vital US interests at risk” and stated that the United States would defend t­ hose interests “through the use of US military force if necessary and appropriate.”30 On August 5, the team traveled to Camp David to discuss military options, including augmented air power, and details such as how long it would take to put the proper number of troops on the ground to repel any Iraqi attack.31 Though the Gulf War would not begin for a few months, potential military responses to the invasion w ­ ere ­under consideration almost immediately, as ­were additional efforts to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and back down in the face of pressure from the international community.

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Offering a glimpse into their motivations and also highlighting the failure of deterrence that catalyzed the administration into action, Scowcroft and Bush ­later wrote: “We need not, indeed should not, become embroiled in ­every upheaval, but we must help develop multilateral responses to them. We can unilaterally broker disputes, but we must act . . . ​when major aggression cannot be deterred, as in the Persian Gulf.”32 Further addressing the failure of deterrence or Hussein’s apparent lack of deterrability, in a Joint Address to Congress on September 11, 1990, Bush said: “Our interest and role in the Gulf was not transitory. It predated Saddam and would outlast him. We had to deter ­future aggression, to assist in the self-­defense of our friends, and to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction.”33 As summer turned to fall, Bush clarified both publicly and privately his personal view of Hussein. Dictating to his personal diary following the invasion, Bush described Hussein as radical.34 A few weeks ­later, referring to Hussein’s deliberate placement of hostages in harm’s way, Bush wrote privately of Hussein’s “blatant disregard of international law” and called him a “cruel and ruthless dictator.”35 In a November letter to Fahd bin Abd al-­ Aziz al Saud, king of Saudi Arabia, Bush wrote, “I am proud that we are standing shoulder against Iraq’s evil dictator, Saddam Hussein.”36 Thus, in a series of private correspondences, Bush called the Iraqi leader cruel, ruthless, and evil. This characterization is especially significant when we recall that, as discussed in chapter 4, Bush referred to Kim Il Sung of North K ­ orea as “ridicu­lous,” demonstrating the divergent views President Bush had of the two leaders. As the crisis in the Persian Gulf escalated, troops w ­ ere forward deployed in the hope of coercing Saddam into compliance with the international sanctions regime. Harkening back to Bush’s original threat salience, Bush spoke to US troops and described the prob­lem that they faced: “What w ­ e’re confronting is a classic bully. . . . ​And ­every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one-­step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that’s another reason . . . ​our mission is marked by a real sense of urgency. . . . ​ In World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been s­ topped early on. W ­ e’re not g ­ oing to make that m ­ istake again. We ­will not appease this aggressor.”37 This statement signifies that the nuclear component was one, but only one, aspect of the threat from Saddam. Also relevant w ­ ere the threat from aggression and the regional consequences of Saddam’s actions, prompting an analogy to World War II. O ­ thers have elsewhere argued that Bush’s military ser­vice ­shaped his worldview and response to threats in the international system, and this episode demonstrates consistency in his threat perception.38 As Jeffrey Engel claimed, Kuwait mattered less to Bush than the princi­ple of sovereignty and the practical effect of its loss on the region.39 Inaction would allow regional dominos to fall, not necessarily b ­ ecause Iraq would digest them one by one, but ­because a strategic realignment would follow: ­others would look to Hussein for

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leadership as the United States returned to pre–­World War II isolationism and avoided a leadership role. While traveling in the region, Bush put an even finer point on the nuclear ­angle of the threat from Saddam, saying that “­those who would mea­sure the timetable for Saddam’s atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the real­ity of that situation and the gravity of the threat. . . . ​You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: he has never possessed a weapon that he d ­ idn’t use.”40 This statement suggests a graver threat in Bush’s mind and a link to the developing preventive logic that postponing action would be dangerous ­because it would introduce the possibility of confronting an undeterrable nuclear-­ armed adversary at some ­future point. Returning to the salience of World War II in the Iraq episode, we find extensive evidence of Bush’s related comments and comments by third-­party observers who make the same connection.41 While making private notes to himself for a televised national address on August 8, 1990, President Bush indicated the connection he perceived between history and the pre­sent day. In a diary entry Bush jotted prior to a speaking engagement, he wrote: “tightened up the language to strengthen the similarity I saw between the Persian Gulf and the situation in the Rhineland in the 1930s, when Hitler simply defied the Treaty of Versailles and marched in. This time I wanted no appeasement.”42 Writing in his memoirs, Colin Powell noted a similar connection, saying that Bush had taken to demonizing Saddam: “We are dealing with Hitler revisited,” “a tyrant unmoved by ­human decency.”43 In an interview on January 2, 1991, Bush said that peace was pos­si­ble if the co­ali­tion stood up to Saddam, as they had done to confront similar evil in the past: “It w ­ on’t happen if we compromise. When you have such a clear case of good and—­ good versus evil. We have such a clear moral case. . . . ​It’s that big. It’s that impor­tant. Nothing like this since World War II. Nothing of this moral importance since World War II.”44 Privately, Bush wrote to his c­ hildren on New Year’s Eve 1990 of the burden he felt in sending soldiers to war, “My mind goes back to history: How many lives might have been saved if appeasement had given way to force ­earlier on in the late 30s or earliest 40s? How many Jews might have been spared the gas chambers, or how many Polish patriots might be alive ­today? I look at ­today’s crisis as ‘good’ vs. ‘evil.’ Yes, it is that clear.”45 ­Here again Bush linked the threat from Saddam to the threat facing the United States in World War II and underscored the need to avoid appeasing a dictator and meet the challenge with strength and resolve. By October, the Pentagon’s J5 Policy and Planning Staff identified four options for the administration to explore: protect the status quo, pursue long-­ term containment, increase forces in the region sufficient to demonstrate a credible offensive threat, or go to war. Lieutenant General George Lee Butler, head of the J5, supported containment, given that the fourth option, war,

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“would be very messy.”46 Nevertheless, support for the military option eventually took shape. The intervention would include a four-­phased military approach to target the Iraqi military and drive it out of Kuwait, with three of the phases taking place by air and one on the ground. While the planning and analy­sis continued, the US Air Force was confident its ability to “take care of it all,” meaning the targeting necessary to ensure critical air superiority.47 Elsewhere concern centered on the ground effort that required sizeable troop and equipment deployments and a massive logistical and supply effort to sustain.48 The administration expected a difficult and bloody fight ahead.49 This was the first test of the post–­Cold War military environment. The campaign was also the first in which precision military equipment and the so-­called first offset strategy ­were to be deployed by the US military. The administration expected high casualties, given that the US faced a significant battlefield foe armed with a vast but secret chemical weapons arsenal. According to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s national intelligence officer for the ­Middle East and South Asia, Iraq’s military had evolved dramatically during the Iran-­ Iraq War, even while the war had badly strained the Iraqi economy. With a population of eigh­teen million and a nearly one-­million-­person army (then the fourth largest in the world), Iraq was a major military power and especially dangerous ­because it was driven by nationalistic zeal. However, Iraq did not excel offensively, and the country possessed a critical weakness in its very centralized (and therefore easily targetable) command structure.50 A se­nior medical officer placed the worst-­case casualty estimate at twenty thousand US soldiers, including seven thousand killed in action.51 Chairman Powell warned President Bush that this conflict would be far more difficult than previous campaigns in Panama and Libya.52 Despite ­these potential difficulties, Bush, driven by his princi­ples, forged ahead. The plan recognized the need to go in with overwhelming force, following the Powell Doctrine.53 Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, for his part, was not g ­ oing to recommend any military mission u ­ nless he was sure of its success.54 The air campaign included plans to repeatedly strike key targets ­until they ­were destroyed. As Chairman Powell put it while trying to corral ­eager members of the Air Force who wanted to proceed before their colleagues in other military branches ­were fully supplied, “we go, we win”—­ meaning that if the United States was g ­ oing to war, it would do so with appropriate preparations.55 By the end of planning, one intelligence estimate expected that with the achievement of tactical surprise, 80–85 ­percent of Iraqi airpower could be destroyed in the first days of the campaign.56 Collectively, ­these details suggest an expected high likelihood of success for the campaign, though not without associated costs. In the end, President George H. W. Bush was driven to action by the continued salience of the lessons of World War II in the Persian Gulf policy he oversaw.57 While the threat from nuclear proliferation did not drive Bush’s

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be­hav­ior, his views regarding World War II and confronting aggression are useful for demonstrating Bush’s consistency of perspective across time. The nuclear ­angle was added to a long list of the Bush administration’s justifications for war as the campaign approached. The same issues that ­were salient for Bush’s early threat perception—­international stability, appeasement of dictators—­later emerged as significant d ­ rivers of Bush’s policy choices for confronting Saddam Hussein. For Bush, the dangers of appeasing dictators and backing down in the face of aggression carried g ­ reat risks both to the United States and to international peace and stability. Though Kuwait had ­limited intrinsic value to US interests, the princi­ple of the m ­ atter and the po­ liti­cal and economic effects of Kuwait’s loss for the broader region and international community w ­ ere of much greater magnitude from President Bush’s perspective. This view is remarkable both for the consistency Bush demonstrated over time and also as a contrast to Bush’s perspective on North ­Korea, where no such threat salience was evident despite that country’s similar attempt to go nuclear. Bush’s perspective is also significant in that it exposes how the dif­fer­ent values of the model’s explanatory variables led to dif­fer­ent outcomes (no consideration in North K ­ orea versus consideration and war in Iraq) when one president confronted two adversarial proliferants during his tenure in office and viewed the threats they posed to the United States quite differently. It is conceivable that a change occurred in the value of the second in­de­ pen­dent variable, ­whether or not Iraq was deterrable generally and once armed with nuclear weapons. A meeting in Geneva on January 10, 1991, brings this possibility to the forefront. On that day, Secretary of State Baker met with Iraqi foreign minister Tariq Aziz for “a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a po­liti­cal solution to the crisis in the gulf.”58 The message Baker conveyed was that Iraq must ­either abide by the UN resolutions and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait, or be expelled forcefully. When this effort failed, the administration had no choice but to continue with the intervention.59 Before the invasion of Kuwait, Bush and his team believed containment and management to be the appropriate policies for Hussein’s Iraq, but over time the administration learned that Hussein was actually not deterrable (or compellable). The Geneva meeting placed the final nail in the coffin of hopes to avoid war. Following this meeting, and in conjunction with the changes they witnessed over time, Bush concluded that Hussein would not back down and that force would be necessary to end the occupation of Kuwait. As the evidentiary rec­ord does not directly address this possibility, it is difficult to conclude definitively that such a change in Bush’s beliefs occurred.60 That said, it stands to reason that over time, Bush updated his beliefs incrementally ­until he deemed Iraq fully undeterrable, beyond his initial concerns to that effect. When President Bush addressed the nation on January 16, 1991, announcing military action in the Persian Gulf, he enumerated a list of weapons of

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mass destruction being targeted during the operation: “As I report to you, air attacks are ­under way against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein’s nuclear bomb potential. We ­will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam’s artillery and tanks ­will be destroyed. . . . ​While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction—­a nuclear weapon.”61 Throughout the campaign, allied forces targeted Saddam Hussein’s command, control, and communications systems; air defense and radar installations; SCUD launching sites; nuclear reactor; production and storage facilities for chemical and biological weapons; and vari­ous facilities associated with Iraq’s Republican Guard.62 Beyond this target list, the overarching goal of Operation Desert Storm was to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait, restore Kuwait’s sovereignty, and return to the status quo ante according to the previous international ­legal bound­aries.63 In the end, the Gulf War was an overwhelming military success, with Iraq expelled quickly from Kuwait by an international co­ali­tion united to restore international order and stability. Despite the aforementioned concerns regarding casualties, only 137 US soldiers w ­ ere killed in action, with an additional 7 missing in action. This case therefore exhibits, at least as an auxiliary mission, the use of preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy, as state-­sanctioned military force was used to forestall Iraq’s nuclear program. Following Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait on August 2–4, 1990, initial American deliberations regarding the appropriate response did not focus on WMD. Instead, decision makers centered their attention on Hussein’s “naked aggression” and potential ability to control a majority of the global oil supply, and they w ­ ere determined to oppose him.64 However, as an ancillary concern, at least for some members of the Bush administration, Secretary of Defense Cheney among them, new oil money would mean the ability to acquire new weapons.65 This focus expanded, however, shortly a­ fter the invasion, as sanctions failed to coerce the Iraqi regime to withdraw from Kuwait and revelations continued about the nuclear aspects of Hussein’s expansive WMD efforts. The intervention, initially designed to restore Kuwait’s sovereignty, became additionally focused on WMD proliferation.66 Thus the Gulf War can be considered an episode in counterproliferation, as the co­ali­tion targeted Iraq’s WMD installations to degrade Hussein’s capabilities and prevent him from ­future WMD use. This effort suggests a “better now than ­later attitude,” with the administration aiming to avoid eventually having to fight a more sophisticated WMD-­capable Iraq; however, this aim was only one of a variety of justifications for the war itself.67 As Scowcroft wrote subsequently, “The core of our argument rested on long-­held security and economic interests: preserving the balance of power in the Gulf, opposing unprovoked international

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aggression, and ensuring that no hostile regional power could hold hostage much of the world’s oil supply. President Bush, appalled by the evidence of Iraqi atrocities, added the Hitler, holocaust, and morality arguments.”68 As described, preventing the spread of nuclear proliferation was not central to the intervention but was added over time to the justification for the war. Nevertheless, this intervention was the result of President Bush’s prior beliefs and threat perception: Bush focused early on threats to international stability; saw a need to stand up to aggressive dictators with expansionist tendencies; and was concerned with Iraq’s frequent and open hostility to the United States, its neighbors, and the region. Accordingly, while I include the Persian Gulf War for analy­sis, I do so recognizing that it is a case dif­fer­ent from the ­others explored in the book. Still, this episode highlights the utility of focusing on prior leader beliefs for predicting ­later intervention be­hav­ ior, even if the nuclear aspects ­were not the main driver of US intervention policy. While admittedly complicated, this case confirms my argument that Bush did not find the threat of nuclear proliferation compelling on its own; only once it was married with the threat from Iraq and its egregious invasion of Kuwait was Bush compelled to act. Then, nuclear ele­ments joined Bush’s focus on international stability and confronting expansion and warranted attention. This episode is additionally significant as an initial signal of the model’s generalizability beyond the narrow counterproliferation context. The Persian Gulf War ushered in a slow change in perspective about the dangers of nuclear proliferation for many, including President Bush. As a result, the president ordered his administration to investigate new ways of thinking about this issue. One manifestation of this new attention was the negotiation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START, which pledged to cut twenty-­three thousand operational nuclear warheads down to eight thousand by 2003.69 As Bush and Scowcroft l­ater described, reaching the START agreement “was a momentous and exhilarating moment: we had just reached a historic agreement to reduce our arsenals by several thousand of the deadliest of our nuclear weapons.”70 Elsewhere, ­there ­were additional signs of a growing commitment to mitigate the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the new republics of Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus ­were born into statehood with tremendous nuclear arsenals. The loss of physical control of the weapons was of immediate concern: “While the specific danger to the United States was fairly remote, we did worry that t­hese states could pose a host of new security, control, and proliferation prob­lems for one another as well for themselves and ­those republics around them.”71 Nevertheless, any newfound interest had its limits; it did not carry over to North K ­ orea’s nuclear program, which remained a low-­level concern for the duration of the Bush administration, even ­after the Gulf War. This divergence suggests that although Bush did

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recognize a challenge from proliferation in the Persian Gulf context, the change in his perspective was ­limited to situations in which proliferation was aggregated with other issues—­stability, aggression, and so on—­that w ­ ere more consequential in his mind. Absent ­these other challenges, North ­Korea’s nuclear weapons program did not constitute a significant threat from Bush’s perspective.

Confounding Considerations for the Gulf War Despite the evidence just described, potential confounding ­factors are worth addressing. First, one might argue that the Bush administration possessed an excessively convivial decision-­making style, leading the administration to meet all key players’ goals with the Persian Gulf invasion and a bureaucratic po­liti­cal logroll. The rec­ord, however, does not support this notion. In most foreign policy circumstances, it is rare that a true consensus actually develops among the key players. Elsewhere scholars have demonstrated that Bush’s presidential style was to listen to his advisers debate the issue at hand and then choose his preferred strategy. Bush proceeded in this way with the decision making on Iraq; t­ here was no singular administration view of the best strategy forward.72 Prior to the invasion, President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft traveled to Bush’s home at Walker’s Point to discuss the US response to Iraq’s actions. While the two w ­ ere fishing on August 23, 1990, their discussions centered on the fact that not every­one on the national security team shared the president’s view that it was time to consider using force to drive Hussein out of Kuwait. Secretary of State Baker was reluctant to contemplate the use of force, as he favored diplomacy and sanctions to complete the job. When the decision was fi­nally made for force, Baker did not shy away; he simply would have preferred more time to let the nonmilitary means run their course. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, on the other hand, recognized that sooner or l­ ater the mission would require force; in many ways he was ahead of the military planners. Cheney’s key concern was ensuring that the operation could be successful. ­Until he was certain of success, he would not advocate strongly for this option.73 The military itself did not try to avoid force, though Chairman Powell of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, having learned the negative lessons of Vietnam like most members of his generation, wanted to ensure that the job was done correctly and without complicating half-­ measures.74 Baker and Powell ­were alike in preferring dealmaking to confrontation and containment to preventive action. Powell, though, did not ultimately advocate containment, recognizing that patience was not the order of the day. While neither was thrilled with the decision to intervene, once the decision was made both supported the president and his determination.75 In the end, it was President Bush and National Security Advisor Scowcroft

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who led the charge for military intervention, with Bush ultimately acting as “decider-­in-­chief.” Second, one might argue that the Bush administration did not see the consideration or use of preventive military force against Iraq’s nuclear program as necessary given doubts that the program would succeed. Jacques Hymans explores the degree of internal institutionalization across states to explain their proliferation efficiency and suggests that Hussein’s nuclear program would have failed even without repeated US military interventions.76 Hymans relates that, before the Gulf War, US estimates on Iraq’s nuclear time line ranged from six months to ten years.77 Details of the regime’s inner workings and nuclear program suggest that even this time line was generous given Iraq’s extreme inefficiency and mismanagement.78 While descriptions of the program’s downward trajectory may be accurate, t­ here is no evidence that the Bush administration was thinking along t­ hese lines prior to the military intervention. Instead, the evidence reveals only that early on Bush was not personally attuned to the threat from Iraqi nuclear acquisition—­not that he recognized the program’s impending failure and thus chose to focus his attention elsewhere. In any event, the record shows that President George H. W. Bush considered and used military force against the Iraqi nuclear infrastructure during the Persian Gulf War. Given Bush’s focus on Iraq as threatening to the region and to the United States, this outcome is perhaps unsurprising. Although the model predicted some likelihood of consideration, the specifics of the case take it somewhat beyond the argument’s scope, given that t­ here was very l­imited prepresidential concern for the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Especially ­because Bush’s perception of the overall level of threat from Iraq dramatically increased only ­after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the nuclear-­driven logic is embedded in the wider Persian Gulf context. Nevertheless, the model did correctly predict the consideration of preventive military force, which led to Operation Desert Storm and forestalled Iraq’s WMD programs, including its nuclear efforts. To reiterate, however, this was not a preventive war akin to the ­others analyzed ­here. Instead, the operation aimed to restore stability, combat aggression, and uphold international order, items of deep personal concern to President Bush. Confronting weapons of mass destruction and containing nuclear proliferation ­were ancillary considerations and grew in salience for President Bush only with time. Still, this episode is revealing for exposing how close Iraq came to nuclear weapons possession and for demonstrating the traction the leader-­centric model offers in a dif­fer­ent empirical context. Furthermore, this incident is significant in showing the utility of the second in­de­pen­dent variable—­a leader’s threat perception of the likelihood of deterring a specific nuclear-­armed adversary—as dif­fer­ent values produced dif­fer­ent outcomes for George H. W. Bush vis-­à-­vis North ­Korea and Iraq.

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President William J. Clinton Recall from the previous chapter that Bill Clinton demonstrated an early concern for the challenges of nuclear proliferation, paying par­tic­u­lar attention to the pursuit of illicit weapons by North ­Korea and Iraq, among ­others. He recognized the potential difficulties in transferring state-­based deterrence models from the bipolar world to the complicated post–­Cold War environment of nonstate actors and rogue states.79 ­These issues ­were consequential both during Clinton’s presidential campaign and through his first term in the White House; they grew in magnitude during his second administration. Prior to becoming president, Clinton had repeated opportunities to discuss Iraq, given previous events. Following congressional authorization in 1991 for Operation Desert Storm, Clinton was asked how he would have voted. His response indicated l­imited support for the effort, but also some hedging: “I guess I would have voted with the majority if it was a close vote. But I agree with the arguments the minority made.”80 ­Later, formally on the 1992 presidential campaign trail, he was more forceful: “I have agreed with President Bush on a number of foreign-­policy questions. I supported his efforts to kick Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.”81 Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and challenges from terrorism continued to resonate with the new administration. First, following an April 1993 visit to Kuwait by former president Bush and former secretary of state Baker and the discovery of an assassination plot linked to the Iraqi intelligence ser­ vices, Clinton ordered a military response.82 On July 27, 1993, twenty-­three Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) flattened Iraqi intelligence headquarters in Baghdad, sending a message to Hussein that the new US administration would not tolerate such be­hav­ior.83 Si­mul­ta­neously, Clinton maintained an overarching containment strategy, relying on the Gulf War sanctions regime and no-­fly zones to enforce the weapons inspections designed to keep Iraq without WMD capability. Speaking at the United States Military Acad­emy in May 1993, Clinton brought the challenges of the post–­ Cold War environment and the dangers posed by Iraq together: “The end of the bipolar superpower cold war leaves us with unfamiliar threats, not the absence of danger. . . . ​A particularly troubling new ele­ment . . . ​is the proliferation around the globe of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery . . . ​as we discovered in Iraq, surging stocks . . . ​have enabled outlaw nations to extend the threat of mass destruction a long way beyond their own borders.”84 More formally, the administration recognized that the threat Iraq posed to the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States had continued unabated since the Gulf War. In July 1994, President Clinton authorized the extension of President Bush’s national emergency declaration from August 1990, citing the “unusual and extraordinary threat” Iraq posed.85 Over time, the dangers took a more ominous turn as Hussein’s meddling

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escalated. In October 1994, Saddam moved eighty thousand Iraqi troops to the Kuwaiti border and demanded the lifting of the sanctions that w ­ ere squeezing his regime. In response, Clinton ordered fifty thousand US troops to Saudi Arabia to deter a repeat invasion.86 Though the escalation was only temporary, it was a harbinger of more confrontation to come. In light of Clinton’s proliferation pessimism, explicit concern for Iraq’s proliferation attempts, perceived threat from Iraq’s historically belligerent be­ hav­ior, and focus on rogue and nonstate actor threats, the model predicts Clinton would be highly likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy against Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. Clinton’s lack of confidence in deterrence in the post–­Cold War international order strengthens this proposition.

President Clinton and Operation Desert Fox President Clinton told Secretary of State Madeleine Albright at the start of his second term that he wanted to pursue a more activist policy, perhaps embracing his role as a foreign policy president.87 At the same time, ­there was widespread recognition within the administration that containment of Iraq was failing. Iraq was not simply a regional nuisance; it was a threatening country with a continuing weapons program that posed a very real danger to the national security of the United States.88 ­There was acknowl­edgment within the administration that the threat would not dissipate without removing Hussein from power. The more conservative ele­ments of the national security establishment, including Strobe Talbott and Paul Wol­fo­witz, a prominent Republican outsider, began contemplating the need to act beyond the failing sanctions. They supported the United States’ ­going it alone and paying the associated costs, as the costs of inaction ­were mounting quickly.89 Following continued difficulties with Iraqi intransigence, obstruction, and hostility, the Clinton administration began considering the use of force in 1997. Frustrated with the intrusive weapons inspections, Hussein made repeated attempts to block access to sites of interest in the Iraqi weapons and military installations, ultimately forcing the United Nations to withdraw its team. In response, Clinton threatened decisive military action u ­ nless the inspections team was permitted to return and resume its work immediately.90 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan brokered a deal with Hussein for the team’s return and unfettered access, thus forestalling temporarily any need to further consider a military option.91 The lull proved short-­lived, as the brokered deal collapsed following continued violations of the inspections agreement. In February 1998, the escalation continued, as Clinton issued a stark warning to the international community: “If w ­ e’re serious about WMD being the biggest threat to the twenty-­first ­century, ­we’ve got to be ready to use force.”92 To that end,

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Clinton, working in concert with British prime minister Tony Blair, started exploring the use of force to punish Hussein for his continued obstinacy. Blair visited Washington in February 1998. Speaking during Clinton’s weekly radio address, the two hoped for a diplomatic solution to the crisis over Hussein’s pursuit of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons but explained that force would be used, if necessary, to prevent the threat from materializing.93 ­Later, speaking at the Pentagon, Clinton warned of the “predators of the 21st ­century,” threats that “­will be all the more lethal if we allow them to build arsenals of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and the missiles to deliver them.”94 Clinton said of Hussein’s Iraq, “his regime threatens the safety of his p ­ eople, the stability of his region, and the security of all of the rest of us.”95 Although force was ruled out for the spring, the administration continued to pursue significant action, enacting that October, the Iraq Liberation Act, making Iraqi regime change official US policy and offering $100 million to support the Iraqi opposition.96 As if by clockwork, Hussein again ­violated the terms of the inspection regime the first week of November, kicking out inspectors and casting doubt on his be­hav­ior ­behind closed doors. The UN Security Council voted unanimously to condemn Iraq’s “flagrant violations,” and Secretary of Defense William Cohen travelled around the ­Middle East to get support for air strikes. Demonstrating the serious nature of the situation and the high level of consideration taking place, the president secured Britain’s willingness to participate in an intervention.97 Speaking with Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah, Clinton obtained the ability to use materials located on Saudi territory should it become necessary.98 Clinton likewise discussed the military campaign with French president Jacques Chirac, conveying that force was on the t­able if Hussein failed to comply with the UNSCOM mission.99 Though the National Security team traveled to Camp David on November 8th to discuss options, the mission was temporarily called off when Hussein capitulated and again agreed to let inspections continue. Clinton vented his frustration with the Iraqi leader and the merry-­go-­round with the international community: “I hate that son of a bitch. . . . ​Saddam had his ­people terrorized . . . ​left alone, he would only get worse.”100 Time ran out on December 12, when Hussein again denied access to inspectors, and Operation Desert Fox got underway. Describing the threat from Hussein and his weapons programs to the United States, the region, and the world, Clinton said: “­Earlier t­ oday, I ordered Amer­ic­ a’s armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. . . . ​Their mission is to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors. Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States. . . . ​Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas, or biological weapons.”101 The mission was designed to target more than one hundred locations using Tomahawk cruise missiles over a four-­day campaign and coerce

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the regime into allowing inspections to continue unimpeded.102 As Clinton explained, the aim was primarily to degrade Iraq’s WMD capability but also to debilitate Saddam’s hold on power.103 Recognizing that surgical strikes of this nature are by definition l­imited, as one can only target known aspects of a weapons program, the goal was articulated as setting the WMD program back two years. The mission was accomplished a­ fter four days of strikes.104 A high likelihood of success (IV3) was seemingly expected with the mission’s narrow goals, the ­limited air defenses of the Iraqi state, and the significant power and military advantage of the United States. Furthermore, the mission had been designed to achieve a strategic surprise and targeted facilities known with a high degree of confidence.105 The numerous private conversations that President Clinton had with leaders from around the world in fall 1998 demonstrate the high-­level nature and personal concern with the mission at hand. It also suggests a high degree of consultation and cooperation between the United States and its allies abroad. Speaking to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, Clinton said, “I wanted to call you to tell you that I have de­cided to take action against Iraq very soon. I have spoken with Prime Minister Blair, and the British w ­ ill participate.” The call also described Clinton’s per­sis­tent dedication to the mission and the back-­and-­forth that had taken place between the world community and Hussein over the previous months: “On November 14, I called off a military strike to try one more time to find a peaceful solution. Then Iraq committed to provide full and unconditional cooperation as provided by UNSC resolutions. Since that time, Baghdad has repeatedly ­violated that commitment and consistently refused to provide documents and information, barred access and harassed inspectors, lied repeatedly and destroyed documents.”106 On the eve of the mission, Clinton told Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak of the nature of the mission and secured passage for the military campaign, saying, “I think it is impor­tant to degrade his capacity to develop weapons of mass destruction and his ability to threaten his neighbors as much as pos­si­ble. . . . ​I am grateful for your prompt clearance and for over-­flights and Suez passage.”107 ­These private calls demonstrate extensive executive consideration of the use of preventive military force during fall 1998. From the highest-­level consultations with Clinton’s own National Security Council, to deliberations and cooperation with allies around the world, to conducting a joint military mission with British forces, ­there is clear evidence of executive-­level consideration and the use of preventive military force by President Clinton vis-­à-­ vis the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. The mission, designed to degrade the threat from WMD to the United States, the region, and the world, also sought to demonstrate the serious level of commitment by the United States to the UNSCOM inspections regime and to nonproliferation more broadly.108 As predicted by the leader-­centric model, President Clinton’s serious consideration and use of preventive military force is unsurprising, given his

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early concern for the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and dedication to combating the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Taking the North Korean and Iraqi cases in concert, it is fair to ask why Clinton used preventive military force in Iraq but not in North K ­ orea, especially as the leader-­centric model predicted likely consideration in both instances. Recall that ­there are two stages to the decision-­making model advanced ­here. Whereas the model’s prediction of ­whether or not a leader is likely to consider military force relies on the leader’s nuclear beliefs, the ­actual ordering of a mission introduces ­others ­factors into the decision. This second stage of the pro­cess, once a leader is considering the use of preventive military force, recognizes that contextual ele­ments and mission feasibility (IV3) influence the ­actual decision to intervene. In the North Korean case, the deal that would become the Agreed Framework obviated the need for Clinton to use military force. But for this negotiated outcome, both the available rec­ord and members of the president’s cabinet and larger national security team suggest that Clinton would have ordered the intervention to forestall the nuclear threat from North ­Korea. Nevertheless, the predictions regarding serious consideration by Clinton are borne out in both cases, adding support to the model’s utility in both the DPRK and Iraq.

President George W. Bush This section examines George W. Bush’s prior beliefs. B ­ ecause of the unavailability of most primary source materials for the period in question, conclusions are preliminary regarding the importance of George W. Bush’s prior beliefs for his l­ater presidential be­hav­ior. Nevertheless, using contemporaneous accounts, what follows offers an initial assessment of the case history and demonstrates the applicability of the leader-­centric theory to this episode. It is perhaps unsurprising that Iraq had salience for Bush 43; Iraq was a major source of hostility for the better part of two de­cades and an adversary for two previous presidents. That said, it was not a foregone conclusion that Bush would focus on the nuclear and WMD-­related ele­ments of the Iraqi prob­lem. Evidence for that statement is the fact that other elites focused elsewhere—­such as on Iraq’s ­human rights violations—or viewed the situation as less threatening to the security of the United States when the war was being debated, or did both. While cognizant of the limitations that prohibit definitive conclusions regarding the causal mechanisms in this case, it is still useful to include this last episode for exploration; it is the most recently completed case of US counterproliferation be­hav­ior and provides an initial post–­September 11 test of the model’s generalizability. Despite ­ limited prepresidential experience in international affairs, George W. Bush’s comments on the campaign trail and early in his presidency

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reveal much relevant information for analy­sis. In par­tic­ul­ar, Bush early on identified the threat from Iraq, connecting the danger to its rogue status and its potential for WMD acquisition. Bush lacked confidence in deterrence in a post–­Cold War environment and linked his early desire to build ballistic missile defenses to the threat posed to the United States from rogue states including Iraq. Given Bush’s early proliferation pessimism and lack of confidence in deterring rogue actors—­including an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons and other WMD—­the theory predicts that he would have been highly likely to consider preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy against Iraq. September 11 had the effect of hardening Bush’s beliefs about ­these issues and made him even less confident in deterrence, especially where terrorists ­were concerned. For this reason, in the aftermath of September 11, President George W. Bush became even more likely to consider preventive military force.

George W. Bush’s Prepresidential Beliefs Distancing himself from the more interventionist style of President Clinton, Bush used the presidential campaign in 1999 and 2000 to identify places around the globe warranting activism and par­tic­u­lar international threats that demanded action. Chief among them w ­ ere the dangers posed by weapons of mass destruction and the state-­based threats China and Iraq. At the outset, Bush presented a rather conventional, state-­centric approach to international affairs, railing against “globaloney” or the post–­Cold War tendency of p ­ eople to concern themselves with globalization, disease, and other transnational agenda items. Instead, Bush wanted to focus on major powers, state-­centered threats to US national security, and a clear set of national interests that needed protecting.109 He outlined a defensive policy, ­limited in decrying nation building as overextending US interests and overtaxing the military but also expansive in calling for new defense spending on weapons to meet modern-­day threats, including the rise of China.110 To that end, in the October 2000 presidential debates, Bush explic­itly linked US action to Iraq’s development of weapons of mass destruction and called for a ballistic missile defense capability that would protect against the Iraqi and other threats. He pledged to realign US force structure to better manage the post–­ Cold War environment and intended to invest in precision weapons.111 This was an advancement of an ­earlier, less forceful approach advocated in 1999, when Bush insisted t­here could be no easing of sanctions, and instead expressed a willingness to try to negotiate to ensure that Iraq lived up to its previous agreements. However, in a debate that December, Bush said that if “in any way shape or form . . . ​[Saddam Hussein] was developing any weapons of mass destruction, I’d take him out. I’m surprised he’s still ­there.”112

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­These prepresidential remarks thus demonstrate an early concern that Iraq threatened the United States, as well as a healthy sense of proliferation pessimism. They also suggest less than total confidence in deterring the twenty-­ first ­century threats now facing the United States and a need to combat ­these threats through missile defense to augment US deterrent capabilities. At the same time, Bush was hostile to what he saw as the overly interventionist style of the previous administration and sought a more defensive posture to protect the United States and its interests. Writing on behalf of the Bush foreign policy team in 2000, Bush’s eventual national security advisor and secretary of state, Condoleezza Rice, articulated a pro-­deterrence and anti-­interventionist attitude. As of yet, she said, ­there was no need to invade and overthrow Hussein or regimes like ­those of Iraq or North ­Korea, as they ­were “living on borrowed time, so ­there need be no sense of panic about them.” Instead, “the first line of defense should be a clear and classical statement of deterrence—if they do acquire WMD, their weapons w ­ ill be unusable ­because any attempt to use them ­will bring national obliteration.”113 Taken together this somewhat mixed evidence leads me to conclude that, before he assumed presidential office, Bush was mostly confident about deterring Iraq but also believed that strengthening the US deterrent and containment capacity with advanced weapons systems was the best strategy for mitigating such threats and protecting the United States from t­ hose with nefarious designs. Collectively, this evidence yields a preliminary assessment of Bush as a proliferation pessimist—­focused on the dangers of rogue states pursuing nuclear weapons and ­these states’ apparent imperviousness to coercion by traditional deterrence models. Prior to assuming office, Bush was also focused on the dangers posed by Saddam Hussein: his failure to abide by previously signed agreements, repeated historical challenges to the United States and international community, and continued pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. Iraq was among the main reasons Bush advocated for an augmented US antiballistic missile capability, suggesting that the Iraqi threat was significant for him even early on. At the same time, given his anti-­ interventionist attitude and confidence in deterring Hussein from attacking the United States directly, I expect Bush to have been merely likely to consider military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

President Bush and the 2003 Iraq War Transitioning to presidential office, Bush carried his foreign policy views from the campaign trail to his administration’s early investments and activities. He maintained that the United States needed to focus on its relationships with major countries, concern itself with state-­based threats, and articulate a clear sense of US interests to guide policy. He distanced himself

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from what he described as Clinton’s issues, including globalization, nonstate actors, and terrorism.114 On Iraq, however, it was initially unclear exactly where the administration was heading. Though Bush often spoke of Iraq’s rogue nature and pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, the exact nature of the threat remained ambiguous.115 While on one hand Bush promised a tougher line on Iraq and Saddam in par­tic­u­lar, on the other hand he and his team si­mul­ta­neously opposed anything resembling nation building, which Bush had vociferously critiqued before entering office.116 In practice, he maintained much of the sanctions policy that Clinton initiated. Former president Clinton had this to say about his perception of Bush’s early mindset: “He wanted to point out the bad guys and lead a charge. ­There are not many places in the world where that kind of leadership is ­going to work. Including Iraq, where I know he wants to take on Saddam Hussein.”117 This resembles other perspectives that describe an early administration discussion of good versus evil and where both ­were located around the world, though they fail to specify the prob­lem precisely.118 Below the level of President Bush and the principals, other administration officials met regularly to discuss Iraq. Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley convened four deputies’ committee meetings during spring and summer 2001 to discuss Iraq and how best to support the Iraqi opposition. Though many meetings and memos purportedly resulted from this interagency pro­cess, a policy proposal never made it to the president. Likewise, across the river at the Pentagon, a lot of “suppose we ever needed to have to do this” thinking took place, with Paul Wol­fo­ witz reportedly spearheading the support for military intervention and regime change.119 Regarding nuclear proliferation and the dangers of WMD broadly, the Bush administration was active early, engaging in a variety of policy initiatives to combat the threat the administration perceived. In his first speech to Congress in February 2001, Bush warned of the threat from “rogue states intent on developing weapons of mass destruction” and spoke of his increasing emphasis on counterproliferation activities, including working t­ oward ballistic missile defense, and creating a “proliferation strategy, counterproliferation and homeland defense directorate within the National Security Council.”120 To that end, the new administration invested heavi­ly in the Nunn-­Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative to combat the spread of loose nuclear weapons and materials, and focused on import and export controls to tighten the flows of technologies useful in weapons production. Subsequent to the September 11 attacks, Bush joined other world leaders to establish the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction to stop trafficking in WMD among state and nonstate actors.121 Many have suggested that the September 11 attacks caused a major change in Bush’s thinking about the world. Based on the ­limited information

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available presently, a more accurate assessment suggests that rather than changing the core nature of the threats Bush perceived, September 11 changed how proximate or imminent he sensed ­these threats to be. This notion of idea assimilation is supported in the scholarship, which has demonstrated with Bush in par­ tic­ u­ lar how preexisting beliefs can become entrenched even following external shocks.122 Whereas Bush’s pre-9/11 threat perception focused on state-­based threats, the attack introduced nonstate actors into Bush’s lexicon, in addition to global rogue ele­ments. Likewise, whereas deterrence and containment w ­ ere ­viable strategies for US foreign policy previously, in a post-9/11 environment, challenges had to be dealt with preemptively, before they manifested and targeted the United States directly. As Bush said in a news conference just prior to the war in Iraq, “September the 11 changed the strategic thinking, at least, as far as I was concerned, for how to protect our country. My job is to protect the American ­people. It used to be that we could think that you could contain a person like Saddam Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror. September the 11 should say to the American ­people that ­we’re now a battlefield, that weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist organ­ization could be deployed ­here at home.”123 In the immediate aftermath of September 11, the Bush administration was acutely aware of the dangers of additional terrorist attacks on the homeland and in par­tic­ul­ ar the risk of WMD terrorism. In a national security briefing on September 14, 2001, the CIA warned of additional Al-­Qaeda operatives inside the United States and their expressed desire to attack with biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. For Bush, “it was hard to imagine anything more devastating than 9/11, but a terrorist attack with weapons of mass destruction would qualify.”124 In the following weeks, aides told President Bush that a CIA asset code-­named Dragonfire reported that Al-­Qaeda had obtained a ten-­kiloton Rus­sian weapon and had hidden it in New York. Bush also worried about weapons smuggled into Washington, DC.125 The changed threat environment set into motion a series of new initiatives for the administration. Key among them was tasking the Federal Bureau of Investigation with preventing attacks, suggesting a newfound focus on a preventive rather than reactive policy approach.126 Bush and his team also took the opportunity that September 11 provided to act on one of Bush’s main campaign pledges, which was to build a ­viable ballistic missile defense program to protect the homeland. To that end, the Bush administration announced in December its formal withdrawal from the Anti-­Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.127 As Bush described in his memoirs, “in the post–­Cold War era, the idea of shooting down incoming missiles became more attractive as worries spread about the nuclear programs of Iran and North ­Korea. The new fear was that terrorist groups could launch missiles bearing chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The fear became more real a­ fter September 11.”128 Although the first order of business would take US troops to Af­ghan­i­stan to target the

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Taliban and Al-Qaeda directly, Bush pulled Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld aside soon a­ fter September 11 to ask that he investigate military options available for targeting Iraq, should the use of force become necessary.129 This request offers the earliest evidence of preventive consideration. The perceived threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and its pursuit of WMD became that much more severe following the terrorist attacks. According to Rice, “­after 9/11, Saddam in possession of WMD in the world’s most volatile region was a terrifying prospect.”130 Subsequent to the terrorist attacks, Bush and Rice began receiving many more intelligence assessments, as well as more raw data and incomplete analy­sis, in order to ensure that no one would miss a pos­si­ble threat. Rice said the new environment had “a power­ful effect on Bush’s state of mind and on hers. She felt like she was constantly on edge, in a state of paranoia, but rational paranoia, even old threats—­and Iraq would soon be one—­took on new meaning. She was worried about . . . ​the terrifying prospect of another 9/11 on her watch. Bush shared her anx­i­eties.”131 Thus, in a post-9/11 environment, the threat from Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons became even more dangerous a prospect to President Bush, one that would require preventive action in the coming months of the administration. Si­mul­ta­neously, Bush’s prior proliferation pessimism grew more severe in a post-9/11 environment. Where associated with terrorism, the nuclear threat was especially acute. Between 1999 and 2000, Iraq was waging a low-­grade war against the United States, firing more than seven hundred times against US pi­lots surveying the no-­fly zone.132 At the outset of their tenure, the Bush administration focused on tightening sanctions and maintaining at least some attention on Iraq as one ele­ment of the larger nonproliferation campaign. ­After September 11, however, threats ­were reexamined, and Iraq surged to the top of the list: “­There ­were state sponsors of terror. ­There ­were sworn enemies of Amer­i­ca. T ­ here ­were hostile governments that threatened their neighbors. ­There ­were nations that ­violated international demands. T ­ here ­were dictators who repressed their ­people. And ­there w ­ ere regimes that pursued WMD. Iraq combined all ­those threats.”133 Bush’s 2002 State of the Union address outlined the new post-9/11 environment and the challenges confronting the United States. First, Bush said that the United States could defend itself only by taking on the proliferation challenge. He put Iraq, Iran, and North ­Korea—­the “axis of evil” and their terrorist allies—on notice that the United States would “not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of Amer­i­ca [would] not permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most destructive weapons.”134 The speech went further, however, identifying the specific be­hav­iors that ­were problematic: North ­Korea was arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction; Iran was aggressively pursuing WMD; and Iraq had plotted to develop anthrax, nerve gas, and nuclear weapons for more than a de­cade.135

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Bush’s next major policy speech articulated the policy designed to mitigate ­these threats. Addressing an audience at West Point, Bush said that deterrence meant nothing against shadowy terrorists with no land to defend, and containment was not pos­si­ble against un­balanced dictators with WMD who can deliver them with missiles or give the WMD to terrorist allies.136 This speech unveiled what would become the Bush Doctrine, spelling out the basic conditions for the use of preemptive war. Where defense, containment, and deterrence do not apply—­that is, in a world of rogue states, WMD, and terrorist proxies—­the US had to be forward-­looking and resolute, primed for preemptive action, and ready to defend both life and liberty.137 In September, formally codifying what President Bush had verbalized at West Point, the administration released a new national security strategy. Preemption was the new foundation of US defense strategy, and containment and deterrence w ­ ere relegated to the past as outdated modes of be­hav­ior.138 According to President Bush’s executive summary, “as a ­matter of common sense and self-­defense, Amer­i­ca ­will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed.”139 Thus, no longer could the United States wait ­until threats emerged internationally. Instead, challengers would be met head-on, and cut off, before the danger manifested. At a more micro level and as time went on, Bush’s focus on Iraq intensified. In September, he told an audience at the United Nations General Assembly that Iraq was “aggressively pursuing nuclear weapons.”140 He said that t­here was evidence that Hussein was aiding and protecting terrorists and could provide t­ hose terrorists with weapons of mass destruction without detection by the international community. Bush also warned that ­doing so was a brazen act of defiance against the Security Council by a leader intent on a robust weapons capability, which risked dramatically destabilizing the M ­ iddle East and posed a serious threat to all other nations.141 Elsewhere, Bush drew an explicit connection between Hussein and Al-Qaeda and like-­minded ­others intent on harming the United States. Hussein in par­ tic­u­lar, Bush said, could have nuclear weapons within a year and would be in a position to pass them onto his terrorist allies.142 On the eve of war, the condemnation of Iraq and its leadership sharply increased. Justifying the focus on Iraq, but not yet on Iran or North K ­ orea, Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld described that while ­there ­were “a number of terrorist states pursuing such weapons of mass murder ­today . . . ​as the president has made clear, Iraq poses a threat to the security of our p ­ eople, and the stability of the world, that is distinct from o ­ thers.” Rumsfeld rattled off the litany of Hussein’s offenses, which included invading neighbors, launching ballistic missiles around the region, hosting terrorist networks and sponsoring their activities, spending billions of dollars to pursue a WMD program, and repeatedly violating sixteen dif­fer­ent United Nations resolutions.143 As National Security Advisor Rice described in her memoirs, though some said Hussein would not risk transferring WMD to terrorists out of the

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fear that it could be traced back to him, his established pattern of recklessness, penchant for miscalculating the international community’s responses to his be­hav­ior, and support for terrorism together did not make it unreasonable that Hussein could supply some group with a weapon to detonate inside the United States.144 Furthermore, Rice explained, Hussein had previously used WMD against his own population and against his neighbors. The WMD threat was not a theoretical one; “waiting ­until a threat explodes was not an option a­ fter the experience of 9/11.”145 Thus, for the Bush administration, the threat from Saddam Hussein’s Iraq centered on his rogue nature, his (purported) connections to terrorists bent on targeting the United States, and his long-­standing pursuit of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. A similar evolution occurred in the British context with Prime Minister Tony Blair.146 Recall from ­earlier in this chapter that in 1998, the United Kingdom participated with Bill Clinton in Operation Desert Fox, bombing Iraqi WMD sites. At the time, Blair noted that Hussein “must be e­ ither persuaded by diplomacy or made by force to yield up his long cherished ambition to develop nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; weapons which threaten not only his immediate neighbours in the M ­ iddle East, but pose a direct and fundamental challenge to world peace.”147 Blair further remarked, according to his spokesman and Downing Street press secretary, “It was not an option to do nothing. We ­either got the inspectors in or we had to take action.”148 Though this material is not from Blair’s pre–­prime ministerial period, it is relevant evidence for his ­earlier thinking about the threat posed by Iraqi pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and the response Blair thought necessary prior to the 2002–2003 period. Like Bush’s threat perception, Blair’s seemed to evolve over time. By April 2002, Blair noted in a speech to the House of Commons that Hussein “is developing weapons of mass destruction, and we cannot leave him ­doing so unchecked. He is a threat to his own ­people and to the region and, if allowed to develop ­these weapons, a threat to us also.”149 This statement suggests an expansion of a threat that was once localized but that with nuclear weapons had extended to the region and the United Kingdom directly. By March 2003, Blair, like Bush, pointed to “dictatorships with highly repressive regimes . . . ​desperately trying to acquire . . . ​particularly nuclear weapons capability.” Further, Blair said, the possibility of terrorist groups obtaining and using such weapons of mass destruction changed the dynamic entirely.150 ­There is similarity too, in how Bush and Blair preferred to meet the Iraqi threat. Prior to September 11, both preferred containing or deterring Saddam and his bad be­hav­ior. Should that not work, however, then their preferences diverged. For Blair, diplomatic options w ­ ere to be explored first. Only once it was understood that diplomacy was failing to limit the threat from Hussein and his pursuit of nuclear weapons, then multilateral force authorized by the United Nations was acceptable. Ultimately Blair supported

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force, even if ­others in his administration or the British public generally disagreed.151 Conversely, George W. Bush prioritized a forceful, unilateral response to advance US interests. Hussein’s demonstrated unwillingness to be deterred or coerced by the international community meant that the threat he posed with nuclear weapons was too ­great for the administration to ignore in the aftermath of September 11. In the eyes of Bush and his team, what could once have been dealt with through deterrence now required proactive action, suggesting a change over time in confidence in deterrence. Verbalizing this sentiment, Rice said, “One cannot reliably judge the intentions of an adversary, but Saddam had shown a willingness to act recklessly before. We ­didn’t believe that we had the luxury of inaction.”152 President Bush addressed this ­gamble, saying that the administration had been concerned during the initial war planning that Saddam Hussein had anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, ricin, and unmanned aerial vehicles giving him more lethal means to deliver ­these weapons.153 Further, experience had shown Hussein produced ­these weapons for their use, not just for the purpose of deterrence: “Given every­thing we knew, allowing Saddam to stay in power would have amounted to an enormous ­gamble. I would have to bet that e­ ither ­every major intelligence agency was wrong or that Saddam would have a change of heart. ­After seeing the horror of 9/11, that was not a chance I was willing to take.”154 Though most of the precise decision-­making documentation from this period remains classified, what is known from interviews and con­temporary accounts provides useful information for understanding the pro­cess as it unfolded.155 Moreover, the contemporaneous accounts confirm the president’s early request for military options (confirming the theoretical expectations of the model) and document his decision to go to war when the inspections regime failed definitively in 2003. T ­ hese accounts also provide preliminary information regarding the administration’s ex ante expectations for a high likelihood of conducting a successful intervention. From the outset, the mission was clear: change the regime, overthrow Hussein, and eliminate the associated threats—­weapons of mass destruction, links to terrorism, and dangers posed to Iraq’s neighbors in the region, including especially Israel.156 To achieve ­these goals, the defense department’s plan relied on a light-­footprint invasion using far fewer troops than ­were necessary during the Gulf War. The plan demanded speed and advanced technology; as for postwar planning, the team expected rejoicing in the streets of Baghdad.157 Internally at the Pentagon, estimates for the time necessary to achieve regime change ranged from seven to thirty days. Intelligence indicated that critical Iraqi divisions would capitulate quickly; if they did not, it would take two to three months for the fight to play out.158 Although ­these numbers do not appear to have percolated up to the president, Bush “suspected weeks” but “was prepared for the worst.”159

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Nevertheless, advisers raised a variety of concerns. Secretary Powell recounted to Bush a long litany of considerations: follow-on consequences of the invasion itself, costs to international unity, the possibility of global oil price spikes, potential destabilization of Saudi Arabia and other US allies in the region, and so on. The United States would also possess responsibility for shattering a country of twenty-­five million ­people.160 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld listed his so-­called “parade of horribles”—­chemical or biological weapons attack, massive refugee crisis, significant Iraqi attacks drawing Israel into the war, and widespread destruction of Iraqi oil fields.161 General Tommy Franks estimated approximately one thousand casualties on the US side; President Bush worried about Saddam using weapons of mass destruction against his own ­people.162 In October 2002, Rumsfeld penned a memo to the president listing some twenty-­nine pos­si­ble prob­lems that could emerge from the conflict.163 In August 2003, Bush 41’s former national security advisor Scowcroft wrote an op-ed arguing against attack. Attacking Iraq, he said, would distract from the global war on terror, and while the United States could certainly defeat the Iraqi military and destroy the Hussein regime, it would not “be a cake-­walk.” Instead, war would be very expensive and very bloody.164 Internally, General Eric Shinseki, US Army chief of staff, expressed concerns both about the logistical requirements of the operation and the small troop numbers selected for the light footprint approach. Testifying before the Senate Armed Ser­vices committee, Shinseki estimated several hundred thousand troops would be necessary for the mission at hand.165 This estimate was totally at odds with the fast-­moving operational design, which aimed to get in and out quickly and turn the country over to the next generation of Iraqi leaders.166 Concerns w ­ ere expressed even further afield from the administration: Rice gave Bush an article written by a retired Rus­sian general who had visited Baghdad and who stated that although the United States would win the war, Bush would need to carpet-­bomb Baghdad. This assessment left Bush distressed that p ­ eople did not appreciate that his war plan spared civilians as much as pos­si­ble, avoided collateral damage, and aimed to target Iraqi leaders and their means of fighting and maintaining power.167 Despite ­these considerations, a sense of optimism ruled the day. In a now infamous statement, CIA Director George Tenet referred to the intelligence on Iraqi WMD as a “slam dunk.”168 Likewise, when asked by Meet the Press’s Tim Russert w ­ hether the American p ­ eople ­were prepared for a long and costly ­battle with significant casualties, Vice President Cheney replied, “I ­don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way.” While he was not predicting a cost-­ free operation, Cheney argued that that cost would be far greater if Hussein ever provided Al-­Qaeda with unconventional weapons.169 When Bush made his decision, he asked each of the commanders if they had every­thing they needed to accomplish the mission of regime change. No hesitation was

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expressed.170 The mission would be fast and fierce.171 All costs and risks ­were weighed against the pos­si­ble prob­lems that would emerge if Hussein was allowed to stay.172 This evidence shows a high likelihood of a successful campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power (IV3) and rid the world of the threat posed by Iraqi nuclear weapons. By New Year’s Day in 2003, Bush had made the final decision to go to war, when he told Rice that the inspections regime was not working and that Hussein was growing more confident with time, not less. Moreover, US troops ­were amassing in the Persian Gulf and could not be kept ­there forever.173 In a private message to his f­ather on March 19, 2003, Bush wrote, “In spite of the fact that I had de­cided a few months ago to use force, if need be, to liberate Iraq and rid the country of WMD, the decision was an emotional one.”174 Post-­hoc, we now know that the expectations that led to war rested on “fundamentally flawed and per­sis­tent assumption[s]” that the war in Iraq would be short.175 Instead, a fast-­moving conventional offensive quickly devolved into a stability and reconstruction mission (the dreaded nation building that the administration had come into office rejecting). Nevertheless, that the war occurred is evidence of the ­actual use of force, ­going beyond the initial expectations of consideration. Bush’s prepresidential beliefs made him highly likely to consider the use of preventive military force. At the same time, the events of September 11 had the effect of changing Bush’s views on the precise nature of the response required to address the threats posed by the intersection of undeterrable rogue regimes and nuclear proliferation. In the post-9/11 environment, containment and deterrence ­were no longer ­viable, and as the Bush administration’s national security strategy revealed, preemption became the strategy of choice to thwart proliferation challenges. In the aftermath of this change, the use of preventive military force against Iraq became even more likely.

A Presidential Logroll? Still, one might argue that the 2003 Iraq War was a product of preconceived notions on the part of Bush’s cabinet members, many of whom had occupied po­liti­cal positions inside the Bush 41 administration and had unfinished business with the Iraqi dictator. Jon Western argues that many of the hardliners in the Bush 43 administration came into office intent on removing Saddam Hussein from power ­because of their previous interaction.176 Indeed, it would be surprising if high-­level po­liti­cal figures like Condoleezza Rice, Donald Rumsfeld, and Dick Cheney (among ­others) did not have Iraq on the mind in 2001, given a full de­cade of Hussein’s bad be­hav­ior vis-­à-­vis the international community, the UNSCOM inspections regime, and the United States. As noted ­earlier, I would expect Bush to find Iraq a salient concern,

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given the considerable interaction between Saddam and consecutive US leaders since the 1980s. On some level, this narrative confirms my argument that p ­ eople have previously held beliefs that are consequential for their ­later decisions, though of course my model is formally relevant only to executive decision makers. At the same time, it is hardly the case that ­there was uniformity inside the administration in beating the drums t­oward war or in believing that Hussein had a rapidly growing nuclear program. On the latter point, the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate noted that “Iraq has continued its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs in defiance of UN resolutions and restrictions. Baghdad has chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of UN restrictions; if left unchecked, it prob­ably w ­ ill have a nuclear weapon during this de­cade.” But the report also contained an alternative view from the assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research (INR) saying that though the agency concurred on the chemical and biological weapons, ­there was insufficient evidence to confirm that Hussein was pursuing a nuclear program.177 Furthermore, it is well known that Secretary of State Powell, among ­others, was opposed to military intervention for much of the crucial decision-­making period and supported the effort only as his view of his position demanded, once the president had de­cided to intervene. Moreover, the bureaucratic logroll version suggests that some group of individuals had conspired, first, to get George W. Bush to run for the presidency; second, to appoint t­ hese anti-­ Iraq individuals to the highest cabinet positions; and, fi­nally, to support the mission to invade and overthrow Iraq not ­because Bush perceived the threat himself but ­because ­these individuals told him that Iraq posed a threat to the United States. While at pre­sent the documentary evidence is insufficient to disprove t­ hese notions entirely, this view contradicts at least some of the secondary lit­er­a­ture, which concludes that despite the early recognition that US policy was not working to coerce the Iraqi dictator into better be­hav­ior, Iraq was not a top priority before the September 11 attacks.178 Even Vice President Cheney, who is often pointed to as the most virulent Iraq hawk in the administration, felt that targeting Iraq immediately ­after September 11 would be counterproductive, as it would cause the United States to lose its moral high ground ­after falling victim to the terrorist attacks.179 More likely, perhaps, is that in the new post-9/11 international environment, the WMD frame—as opposed to h ­ uman rights violations, anti-­Israel be­hav­ior, or even support for international terrorism—­was deemed preferable to make the case for war. This perspective squares with the portrait of Bush advanced e­ arlier. It is pos­si­ble that the WMD framing gained traction not only nationally but with the president himself, given his prior beliefs. Stated differently, had Bush not been predisposed to view nuclear proliferation as dangerous for US security, then the argument for war against Iraq might have been a much tougher sell.

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As time goes on, we ­will continue to learn the full story of the Iraq war. Though the Bush administration’s claims have been questioned or debunked, the full truth may remain unknown ­until the pertinent documents are declassified. Taking the president at his own words reveals that he felt that he was acting with the best interests of the United States at heart. He wrote in his memoirs: “Seven years l­ater, I strongly believe that removing Saddam from power was the right decision. For all the difficulties that followed, Amer­i­ca is safer without a homicidal dictator pursuing WMD and supporting terror at the heart of the ­Middle East.”180 Additionally, Bush wrote of the change that 9/11 brought to the international community: “Before 9/11, Saddam was a prob­lem Amer­ic­ a might have been able to manage. Through the lens of the post-9/11 world, my view changed. . . . ​I could only imagine the destruction pos­si­ble if an ­enemy dictator passed his WMD to terrorists. With threats flowing into the Oval Office daily—­many about chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons—­a WMD attack seemed like a frighteningly real possibility. The stakes ­were too high to trust the dictator’s word against the weight of the evidence and the consensus of the world. The lesson of 9/11 was that if we waited for a danger to fully materialize, we would have waited for too long.”181 At minimum, President Bush believed that the threats posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, and its nuclear program in par­tic­u­ lar, ­were sufficiently dangerous that the costs of inaction ­were too grave for the United States to stand idly by. And as his beliefs (and ­later the post-9/11 strategic environment) demanded, he acted accordingly. This chapter has briefly explored three consecutive US presidents, three sets of beliefs concerning nuclear proliferation and the threat from Iraq itself and from an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons, and three discrete instances of US consideration and use of preventive military force against Iraq. Though data limitations and the timing of history preclude a formal comparison across the three presidents and the three episodes in the exact manner of the previous two empirical chapters, what we observe at this juncture demonstrates that prepresidential beliefs and threat perceptions are salient for a president’s ­later preventive war decisions once in executive office. Furthermore, in conjunction with chapter 4, this case helps to demonstrate the consistency of key beliefs held by George H. W. Bush and Clinton beyond the North Korean context. Given Bush 41’s ­limited early concern for nuclear proliferation, this chapter has highlighted the increased importance of the threat posed by the proliferator and the proliferator’s deterrability or lack thereof. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait threatened regional stability, peace, and sovereignty and compelled George H. W. Bush to act. The occupation afforded him an opportunity to target Hussein’s WMD pursuits si­mul­ta­neously. For Clinton, his consistent proliferation pessimism and view of Iraq as threatening for the region and the United States, coupled with a de­cade of defiant and hostile Iraqi be­hav­ior, led to the US (and British) military intervention in Operation

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Desert Fox. Fi­nally, this chapter suggests how major events like the September 11 attacks seem to have encouraged the hardening of George W. Bush’s beliefs and a new, more proactive strategy for the new strategic environment. Although Bush’s prepresidential pessimism and view of the dangers of Iraq caused him to consider force, September 11 appears to have catalyzed his willingness to preventively intervene. In sum, this chapter has just begun to skim the surface of what has happened between the United States and Iraq since 2003. Scholars have much to learn about ­these three presidents’ views, especially ­those of George W. Bush, and the actions taken during each administration as the relevant archival material becomes increasingly available. For now, this chapter and chapter 4 demonstrate that the leader-­centric model offers traction in the post–­Cold War strategic environment. The model also seemingly provides explanatory power in the post-9/11 world in the case of Iraqi nuclear weapons and US preventive war be­hav­ior. This explanatory utility suggests that the model is generalizable across time, including in the aftermath of major shocks like the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attacks. This explanatory power also means that the model can account for variation across empirical cases within the same presidential administration. The leader-­ centric model can explain both why Clinton nearly intervened in North ­Korea and attacked Iraq, as well as why George H. W. Bush intervened only in the Gulf War. As new nuclear proliferation challenges emerge, as the model indicates, ­there is useful information to glean from presidents’ preexecutive beliefs that tell us how they are likely to act once in office. Such information is critically impor­tant in helping citizens determine what type of leader they might elect when they enter the voting booth. In the next chapter, we turn to examine the extent to which the leader-­centric model travels beyond the US context. Thus, the next and last empirical chapter moves beyond US foreign policy decision making and explores preventive war be­hav­ior of Israeli leaders.

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Israel’s Preventive War Decision Making

Up to this point, this book has explored US presidential decision making. Focusing on US leadership has made intuitive sense as the United States is the lone superpower and main guarantor of the nonproliferation regime. Moreover, given the demo­cratic and open information environment, extensive evidence is available to support such an investigation. But if the argument advanced heretofore is correct, we should expect similar dynamics to manifest elsewhere. To briefly investigate this proposition, this last empirical chapter explores a series of Israeli prime ministers and how they dealt with adversarial nuclear proliferation over time. What follows explores three Israeli prime ministers and their responses to three episodes of nuclear proliferation. The Iraq episode compares the administrations of Yitzhak Rabin (1974–1977) and Menachem Begin (1977– 1983). To demonstrate the consistency of Begin’s threat perception regarding nuclear weapons, the Pakistan section examines how Begin responded to Pakistan’s growing nuclear program during his tenure. I examine Israel’s response to Syria’s nuclear weapons program during the tenure of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (2006–2009). The Iraq case receives the most attention, given an abundance of available evidence. The leader-­centric argument may also apply in the cases of Syria and Pakistan, but evidence is far more l­ imited and so t­ hese cases are discussed in less detail. Despite such limitations, the Pakistan and Syria cases are especially helpful for exploring the role of the third in­de­pen­dent variable—­the likelihood of success of a preventive military intervention—­and the connection of that variable to the outcomes observed. Collectively, the cases demonstrate how Begin perceived existential threats in the form of adversaries armed with nuclear weapons, and therefore he twice considered (against Iraq and Pakistan) and once used (Iraq) preventive military force to forestall the programs in formation. Olmert felt similarly threatened by Syrian nuclear weapons and used force to destroy the program. Rabin, by contrast, seemingly held no such views about the systemic consequences of nuclear proliferation or its consequences for Israel

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specifically and at no time explored military options to c­ ounter Iraq’s nuclear development. The leader-­centric argument does travel to the Israeli context.

Why Israel? The United States has many allies and partners in its campaign against proliferation. One state, however, stands out as substantively impor­tant for the use or contemplation of preventive military force. Like the United States, Israel demonstrates significant historical activity to prevent adversarial efforts at proliferation from coming to fruition. Israel is one of the most prolific users of this counterproliferation strategy. Additionally, Israel is a parliamentary democracy, where the prime minister has significant authority over counterproliferation decisions of this nature, making the comparison to the US president a useful one. Fi­nally, internal societal-­level characteristics make this an in­ter­est­ing environment for investigation. Israel is often known as the “inventor” of the “Osiraq” model. The Israelis ­were the first in recent history to use the strategy of preventive military strikes against an adversary’s nuclear program. Israel was not, however, the historical first: the Allies targeted the Nazi nuclear program during World War II, the United States contemplated attacking communist China (see chapter 3), and Iran and Iraq targeted each other’s facilities during the Iran-­ Iraq War. Since Osiraq, Israel considered the use of preventive military force against Pakistan in the early 1980s and deployed it against Syria in 2007. Recently, in conjunction with the United States and also in­de­pen­dently, Israel has considered using military force against Iran. Given the empirical evidence, Israel pre­sents a worthwhile state for exploration. Israel is also appropriate for an extension of the leader-­centric model ­because the prime minister has significant, in­de­pen­dent authority for counterproliferation strategy, similar in many ways to the US president’s authority. Israel is a democracy with some routinized decision making for ­matters of national security affairs. The country has a proportional repre­sen­ta­tion system to elect its parliament, the Knesset, and it is through this system that the prime minister takes office. While this system is not analogous to the electoral system of the United States, Israel is useful for comparative analy­sis, which preliminarily demonstrates the similarities and differences in the ways presidential and prime ministerial systems approach counterproliferation challenges. Thus, in the Israeli case I expect the leader-­centric model to offer traction. Fi­nally, ­there are internal sociocultural reasons for continuing this investigation with Israel. First, some have argued that preemption and prevention have been impor­tant aspects of the security discourse inside Israel since its inception.1 Similarly impor­tant have been the related strategic princi­ples

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of early warning and transferring war to the territory of the adversary (as opposed to fighting at home), understandable given the state’s small size and related geo­graph­i­cal vulnerabilities. Second, ele­ments of Israel’s strategic culture may be relevant.2 Israel is considered by some to be prone to preferring military solutions for addressing challenges.3 It has often exhibited a historical preference for deterrence by punishment.4 Yet despite ­these characteristics, which might make Israeli prime ministers consistently likely to use preventive military force, t­ here is significant internal variation over time. This variation and inconsistency suggest that something other than Israel’s national strategic culture is driving be­hav­ior. ­Others describe this variation as subjective within the Israeli context: “The proposition that the [nuclear proliferation attempt] is directly and immediately threatening a vital interest of the country considering the preemptive strike, is highly dependent on the perception of the preemptor. T ­ here is no objective way of mea­sur­ing it.”5 The Israeli context is therefore useful as a preliminary test of generalizability. ­There are evidentiary challenges with conducting research into Israel’s national security policy. First, far less information is available for primary research as compared with what is available in the United States. This stems largely from the more strict governance structure of archival materials in Israel and more recently from the fact that the state archive possesses all relevant information on national security and at the time of writing is closed to outside researchers.6 Second, as ­these episodes ­under investigation ­here are comparatively recent, especially for the Syria case, less information is publicly available in the first place. Thankfully, between the rich secondary source lit­er­a­ture, vibrant journalistic rec­ords, and available individual accounts, enough material exists for a preliminary test.7 I also conducted background conversations with decision makers and academics to augment the accessible rec­ord.

Overview: Israel’s Foreign Policy Decision-­Making Apparatus For issues like nuclear proliferation and the concomitant deliberations about ­whether and how to try to stop it, the cabinet is a relevant starting point for exploring Israeli decision making. The cabinet declares war; authorizes major military operations; and, importantly for my purposes, also delegates to the prime minister and the defense minister the power to “approve immediate military responses.”8 While the cabinet can be seen as the collective chief executive, the prime minister is the central figure and the key subject of analy­sis.9 Before we explore the role of the prime minister, note that ­there are a variety of actors, traditionally associated with national security elsewhere, who are of l­ittle substantive importance within the Israeli national security

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decision-­making environment. First, the Knesset (legislature) has l­ittle role in national security; in contrast, the US Congress shares constitutional foreign policy authority with the president. Second, while the individual minister of foreign affairs might be included in a prime minister’s small decision-­making circle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is relatively weak and secondary for national security ­matters.10 Third, the Ministry of Defense is primarily responsible for arms procurements and defense bud­gets and plays a ­limited role in policy decisions.11 Fi­nally, whereas in the United States the National Security Council performs a deliberative function, in Israel such deliberations occur within the security cabinet (a body I return to l­ater), relegating to the Israeli National Security Council coordination and integration responsibilities. Thus, the prime minister remains the main actor for investigation. Within Israel, one of the main reasons the prime minister leads stems from the overall lack of national security institutionalization and overall decentralization of the national security apparatus. B ­ ecause of t­ hese characteristics, decision making becomes more ad hoc; leaders and their individual preferences therefore become consequential.12 The prime minister in par­tic­ u­lar can have an outsized influence on the pro­cess, and decisions can reflect the prime minister’s own preferences.13 He or she can more easily sidestep strategic planning or information that might emerge from within the rest of the apparatus. While a national “can-do” attitude permeates Israeli society and especially its approach to challenges both foreign and domestic, it is incorrect to conclude that this attitude pushes uniformly ­toward a preference for preventive war. Empirically, this is not the case; leaders remain critically impor­tant, with some considering preventive war and o ­ thers not.14 In contrast to the US electoral system, in which cabinet positions are po­ liti­cal appointments resulting from the outcome of the first-­past-­the-­post presidential election, in the Israeli system, ministerial positions reflect the po­liti­cal parties’ showing in national elections and the subsequent bargain struck when a prime minister forms his or her governing co­ali­tion.15 As the threshold for each party to earn its proportional repre­sen­ta­tion in the Knesset is only 3.25 ­percent of the vote, ­there is a much more diverse group with more perspectives represented. The fractionalized nature of the po­liti­cal landscape, as well as institutional characteristics of the national security apparatus, thus require that the prime minister hold national security authority.16 Other­wise, it would be incredibly difficult to get anything done on ­matters in which speed and secrecy are paramount. Israel’s permissive institutional structure and national po­liti­cal environment allow the prime minister to emerge with a critical role in preventive war decision making. Additionally, ­there is reason to believe that individual ministers who might other­wise have de facto veto power are instead relatively constrained. The lit­er­a­ture on parliamentary actors suggests that ministers may be more deferential.17 Although a minister’s withdrawal of support could indirectly

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cause a ruling co­ali­tion to collapse, he or she might be relatively cautious about triggering such governmental collapse, which could also cost the minister his or her job. Beyond this institutional real­ity, the real power of the prime minister’s office comes from the force of each individual occupant’s personality, po­liti­ cal skill, and management of the co­ali­tional requirements and constraints at any given time.18 Especially b ­ ecause national security is broad in nature and no one individual ministry’s bailiwick, the prime minister is naturally involved. This real­ity facilitates his or her ability to gain control over security ­matters.19 Most prime ministers create their own small group or forum to focus on national security.20 Ehud Olmert had a special collective of former premiers; Benjamin Netanyahu has a “Forum of Eight.” The specific form and format of this deliberative group, as well as the specific individuals who compose it, vary and change over time.21 Other prime ministers, by contrast, have preferred to work on their own, including Yitzhak Rabin, Shimon Peres, and Yitzhak Shamir. Additionally, prime ministers often choose to act as their own staff and rely on their own judgments for critical issues. Rabin followed his own expertise; Ehud Barak famously said, “I do not need experts”; Begin trusted his own intellectual capacity.22 Most have substantial military experience, and some have relevant substantive expertise, which combined may yield strongly held views on ­matters of national security. ­There are also no real bureaucratic structures to curb any excesses that result.23 The decision to construct a national security forum or to work alone results not only from the individual prime minister’s proclivities but also as a conscious prime ministerial choice given the larger institutional environment. With the full cabinet containing too many ­people for useful deliberation and fraught with politicking as the individual ministerial fiefdoms wage ­battles over their parochial interests and domestic po­liti­cal concerns, this group is ill-­suited for sensitive ­matters such as preventive intervention.24 In addition, in 1991, Israel formally mandated the creation of a security cabinet for national security decision making. This smaller subgroup within the larger cabinet often contains the prime minister; vice prime minister; and ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and finance. While the security cabinet may contain a maximum of half of the members of full cabinet, the security cabinet is itself too large for productive discussion. As the cases demonstrate, successive prime ministers have used their personal deliberative entity first for the most sensitive stages of discussion, before taking m ­ atters to the larger security cabinet and then to the full cabinet in succession, given the cabinet’s mandated inclusion in all military mobilization discussions.25 Thus, the prime minister cannot go to war without relevant government approval. Beyond the prime minister, Israel’s military, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), is also substantively relevant to this decision-­making environment, as the actor tasked with carry­ing out this type of military missions.26 The IDF,

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led by a chief of staff, is responsible for defense policy, including the size and structure of forces, operational conduct, intelligence gathering, strategic planning, training, doctrine, and logistics. The IDF is large and power­ ful within the rest of the government bureaucracy and also contains its own internal military intelligence body, the AMAN. Moreover, three of Israel’s twelve prime ministers ­were former IDF generals, and all but four of eigh­ teen former IDF chiefs of staff have gone into politics, suggesting that an abundance of experience from the IDF travels with leaders who ­later, in office, apply that experience to substantive po­liti­cal issues. That said, although a strict assessment of the IDF’s bureaucratic portfolio might suggest other­ wise, within policy deliberations the IDF is often a moderating voice, stressing diplomatic rather than military solutions.27 In addition to the IDF, the Mossad, or national intelligence agency, bears responsibility for international affairs and ­matters beyond Israel’s borders. The Mossad also has a research division, often tasked with generating reports and assessments of potential challenges brewing overseas for the prime minister’s office, including for proliferation developments.28

Alternative Explanations First, the structural alternative to the leader-­centric model presented in chapter 2 suggests that states make objective assessments of their rival’s nuclear acquisition and take steps to balance against it accordingly. One variation of this logic indicates that states that anticipate significant losses to the status quo with an adversary’s nuclear acquisition consider preventive action to forestall it. This argument may be of less utility h ­ ere; although Israel is dominant militarily in the region, it is significantly smaller and at the times relevant to my investigation was less power­ful than Iraq, Pakistan, and Syria.29 Consider state population: in 1981, Israel had a population of 3.956 million; in contrast, Iraq and Pakistan had populations of 14.046 million and 80.696 million, respectively.30 Territorially, Israel covers 20,770 square miles; Iraq and Pakistan mea­sure 437,317 and 796,095.31 Only when one looks at gross domestic product (GDP) per capita does Israel appear more power­ ful: Israel’s GDP in 1981 was US$6,423 per capita; Iraq and Pakistan’s totaled US$2,735 and US$348.32 Fi­nally, using Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores that include military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, and urban and total population, we find something similar.33 CINC mea­sures ­these indicators in the global arena annually and determines what portion each state possesses in e­ very year.34 In 1981, the CINC scores for Israel, Iraq, and Pakistan, w ­ ere 0.33 ­percent, 0.66 ­percent, and 0.99 ­percent, respectively. In 2007, Israel mea­sured 0.4 ­percent; Syria accounted for 0.44 ­percent. While all four states appear relatively weak compared to the

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rest of the international system, t­ hese numbers indicate that Israel’s counterproliferation be­hav­ior could appropriately be categorized as action taken to forestall an even further weakening of the power asymmetry the country faced. Israel was already the weaker state, and its enemies’ nuclear acquisition would only have exacerbated an already sizable disadvantage. Moreover, given that Israel did not use the preventive option in each case and that Israeli leaders approached each adversary differently, something beyond basic structural considerations must be operating.35 A second structural argument might expect that any behavioral change from one leader to the next should follow changes in the adversary’s nuclear development. If, for example, the l­ ater national executive uses force and the ­earlier one does not, this change could be explained by the nuclear program’s advancement between time periods. Although the Iraqi nuclear program had just been discovered during Rabin’s tenure, the fact that Rabin sought only diplomatic options reflects more than just the program’s development. Rather, the be­hav­ior reflects Rabin’s worldview, approach to problem-­ solving, and nuclear views. Begin, by contrast, encountered a more developed nuclear program on the verge of ­going “hot,” but his worldview and approach to enemies took him down a more aggressive and proactive path. His personality and perspective, I suggest, would have inclined Begin t­ oward prevention even if he had preceded Rabin rather than following him. Thus, neither structural argument offers compelling logic. Next, ­because Israel has something akin to a classic bureaucratic model of decision making within the w ­ hole government, a bureaucratic explanation might offer traction.36 If true, policy should reflect logrolling interest groups or the negotiation between actors whose position reflects their place in government.37 Co­ali­tion politics are often how competing agendas are reconciled within the Israeli polity, and parochial concerns appear to trump any notion of a state-­level national interest.38 Despite this bureaucratic real­ ity, scholars argue parochial interests are far less relevant for decisions to use force and should therefore be less consequential for preventive war decisions.39 This minor role for bureaucratic interests is empirically borne out: while ­there are disagreements concerning the nature of threats and the appropriate responses to them, the contours of ­these debates do not reflect partisan divides akin to the hostility between the Republican and Demo­cratic Parties that often plagues the United States. In addition, ­there are vari­ous examples of actors making recommendations opposite to what their bureaucratic position might suggest. For instance, despite being the defense establishment, the IDF preferred a diplomatic approach to the nuclear issue in Iraq. Furthermore, despite the bureaucratic power of the IDF, Prime Minister Begin went against its recommendation and ordered the Osiraq attack. Such instances further call into question that a bureaucratic model offers explanatory power ­here.

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Fi­nally, though one might expect party ideology to be significant, it appears largely inconsequential for decisions about the use of force.40 While we might expect right-­leaning parties to be tough on adversaries and support prevention, the empirical rec­ord demonstrates that prime ministers from across the po­liti­cal spectrum considered the strategy. Furthermore, within par­tic­u­lar administrations, support and opposition have cut across party lines. For example, ­under Begin’s right-­wing co­ali­tion led by Likud (the historically center-­right to right-­wing secular party) in 1981, both support for and opposition to the Osiraq attack came from both the right and the left. In addition, Ehud Olmert conducted the 2007 operation in Syria as leader of Kadima, a centrist and liberal party. ­These national security ­matters therefore appear to transcend strictly partisan politics.41 Thus, the structural explanations, a bureaucratic po­liti­cal model, and a partisanship-­based logic do not offer sufficient explanation of Israel’s variation in consideration and use of preventive war as a counterproliferation strategy. As the cases that follow demonstrate, focusing on leaders and their nuclear beliefs offers comparatively more explanatory power.

The Iraqi Nuclear Program Recall from the previous chapter that the Iraqi nuclear program began in 1956 u ­ nder the auspices of Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace. The program first proceeded slowly but accelerated following the 1968 coup that eventually brought Saddam Hussein to power.42 The Soviet Union provided an initial, small reactor; soon, Iraqi delegates traveled to Paris to purchase a more power­ful one.43 In the early 1970s, internal advocates suggested Iraq pursue a weapons option. Following the oil crisis in 1973 and the growing rivalry with Iran, a dedicated plan went into motion.44 Israel had previously flagged Iraq’s nuclear ambitions and mobilized an effort to confront them.45 By 1974, Israel observed significant communication between Iraq and France. Initially, the Iraqis asked France for a gas graphite reactor—­a reactor type especially well suited for plutonium production and inappropriate and inefficient for the production of energy or facilitation of civilian research.46 France refused as it had ­stopped selling this class of reactor,47 in part b ­ ecause of its proliferation sensitivity. Instead, Iraq begrudgingly took an Osiris class reactor, also useful for generating plutonium and therefore capable of generating materials for weapons. Osiris was designed for states producing nuclear power reactors indigenously; Iraq had no such program. With large oil reserves, ­there was no need for large-­scale power generation.48 The choice of the Osiris-­type reactor, insistence on military-­grade uranium, and ancillary installations needed for the fuel cycle removed any uncertainty about the military nature of the program.49 In

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addition to the reactor itself, the sale included two research reactors, hot cells from Italy, and other ele­ments of a nuclear program.50 The French deal significantly expanded what had previously been a fairly l­imited and haphazard program and solidified for Israel the direction of Iraq’s nuclear program.51 Thus by 1975, the Iraqi nuclear program was a top priority for Israel, which sought ways to delay it. Israel knew about the Osiraq reactor’s existence by 1976 or 1977. It was then that the Mossad began an extensive intelligence-­ gathering program; over time the Mossad’s interventions and sabotage efforts delayed the program by two and a half years.52 The historical animosity between Iraq and Israel stems from the Iraqi leadership’s pan-­Arab sentiments, which reject claims of Jewish nationalism. The two states have been at war since 1948, and Iraq does not recognize Israel’s legitimacy. Iraq has sent its military to fight in three wars against Israel; the 1948 War for In­de­pen­dence, the 1967 Six-­Day War, and the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Using newly available Iraqi rec­ords, historian Hal Brands notes that even before Saddam Hussein became president, he advocated for Iraq to lead a “long, bloody war against the Jewish state.”53 ­After what he viewed as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s outrageous decision to make peace with Israel in 1979, Saddam convened two summits in Baghdad for the purpose of resurrecting a united front against Israel.54 This hostility did not go unnoticed. Israel recognized that Saddam saw Israel as an injustice to be eradicated.55 From 1973 ­until the end of the decade—as Iraq undertook a massive arms buildup, nearly doubling its already sizable military forces—­ Israelis ­were watching.56

Yitzhak Rabin, International Affairs, and Nuclear Proliferation Yitzhak Rabin was the first native-­born prime minister in the state of Israel. His ­family was committed to Labor-­Zionism and encouraged both his academic excellence and, l­ ater, his decorated military c­ areer.57 As a teenager, Rabin joined the Palmach, the commando forces of prestatehood Israel. Eventually he ­rose to chief of its operations during the Israeli war of in­de­pen­ dence. Rabin continued his military ser­vice in the newly formed IDF; he climbed the ranks to chief of staff and oversaw Israel’s victory in the Six-­Day War. Rabin was ambassador to the United States from 1968 to 1973, during a formative time in the US-­Israel relationship. Subsequently, he served as prime minster first from 1974 to 1977 and again from 1992 to 1995, ­until an assassin ended his life. In between, Rabin served as defense minister u ­ nder multiple unity governments (1984–90; 1992–95).58 Rabin had a no-­nonsense attitude. He was gruff ­toward ­others and was terribly shy from childhood.59 He had an incisive mind and a diagnostic brain.60 As part of the Palmach generation, Rabin was patriotic, theistically

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agnostic, and deeply anchored in Hebrew culture. He brought ­these characteristics to his view of international affairs and was wholly dedicated to Israel’s defense.61 Rabin was also pro-­American in his global orientation and viewed solutions to policy challenges, such as military procurement, as best resolved by g ­ oing through Washington. He believed that only the Americans could lead an effort to stop nuclear proliferation in the ­Middle East.62 Rabin was also cautious by nature. He did not embrace bold solutions, but rather moved cautiously and deliberately.63 Rabin refused to authorize the Israeli raid on Entebbe, Uganda, to rescue 246 passengers whose plane had been hijacked by a Palestinian terrorist group (headquartered in Baghdad) “before he was absolutely certain it was likely to succeed.”64 Rabin was responsible for the postin­de­pen­dence military build-up that assisted Israel’s victory in the 1967 war. He viewed military might as a precondition for Israel’s ability to survive the protracted Arab-­Israeli conflict. He was criticized for relying only on military tools to determine outcomes in conflicts, especially during the ­earlier phases of his ­career. Rabin advocated for a “defensive strategy” involving maintaining a strong offensive capability that would win decisively in conflict should deterrence fail.65 Nevertheless, Rabin preferred ­limited uses of force and was sensitive to the po­liti­cal ramifications of military action, risks of escalation, and potential casualties. Whereas Israeli leaders like David Ben Gurion, Shimon Peres, and Moshe Dayan initiated and supported Israel’s own nuclear development, Rabin opposed such nuclearization.66 Overall, he appeared averse to risk, preferring to rely on deterrence instead of initiating larger actions. Significantly, Rabin believed in conventional deterrence and preferred to allocate Israel’s l­ imited defense bud­get to augmenting the IDF’s capabilities instead of building an expensive nuclear endeavor.67 Collectively, t­ hese qualities suggest a realpolitik perspective, especially concerning regional and global enemies: Israel should be power­ful, but military options should be used only sparingly, reactively, and with caution.68 Rabin biographer Itamar Ra­bino­vich describes Rabin as prone to act like a “military hawk and a po­liti­cal dove.”69 While Rabin advocated for defensive preparedness and deterrence, he hesitated with offensive and bold undertakings, given their potential risks. To date, I have found no evidence of Rabin’s early views regarding the threat from Iraq’s nuclear program or its leader Saddam Hussein. Rabin’s memoirs mention Iraq only briefly, in the context of Iraq’s participation as a belligerent against Israel in the Six-­Day War.70 On some level, it might seem puzzling that Rabin makes no mention of Iraq’s nuclear program or Israel’s attempts to delay it, especially since its existence was known during his administration. Rabin himself ordered some po­liti­cal initiatives to delay the program’s development. The omission of Iraq from Rabin’s early thought becomes less problematic, however, when viewed from the perspective of the leader-­centric argument, which recognizes that Rabin paid far less attention

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to nuclear ­matters and nuclear threats than his contemporaries, including Menachem Begin. Moreover, as Rabin preferred incremental approaches to prob­lems and avoided bold, proactive solutions, it seems unlikely that he would have felt strongly enough about the Iraqi nuclear threat to address it in his memoirs. The absence of such discussions fits with the portrait of Rabin articulated ­here.71 Iraq did, however, demonstrate threatening be­hav­ior ­toward Israel during Rabin’s time in government. Even before formally assuming the presidency, Saddam Hussein sought to confront Israel. By 1970–71 Hussein was understood to be the strongman of the regime; by 1975, he was the primary decision maker in security and foreign affairs. During this period, he sought to contain Israel, weaken its influence, and force it to yield some (if not all) of the territorial gains from the wars in 1967 and 1973.72 Hussein nationalized foreign-­owned oil companies in order to use oil as a weapon to separate Israel from its backers, supported Palestinian terrorist groups financially and morally, and attempted to restrict Jewish migration to Israel.73 When Egypt signed the Camp David Accords with Israel, Iraq was a vocal critic of the move. Rabin’s preference for reactive instead of preventive operations, combined with his general risk aversion, may have made him less likely to consider the preventive military option generally but also specifically against the Iraqi nuclear program. The leader-­centric argument therefore expects to find no evidence of the consideration of preventive military force against the Iraqi nuclear program by Prime Minister Rabin. Given the paucity of data concerning Rabin’s general nuclear views, however, this expectation is at best preliminary.

Menachem Begin, International Affairs, and Nuclear Proliferation Menachem Begin had a survivor’s sense of guilt that he carried from Poland, where much of his f­ amily perished.74 Some would say he was obsessed with the Holocaust.75 Driving Begin was a mixture of the Jewish religion and Zionism, but compared with his contemporaries, he often approached ­these issues with a more dramatic and theatrical flair.76 His oratorical skills recognized from a young age, Begin lived life as a politician twenty-­four hours a day. He could be convivial though seldom relaxed; he had no hobbies or interests outside of politics.77 Begin saw himself as a rebel and a revolutionary, and he was a maximalist in his approach.78 From his time within the Soviet Union, he championed Zionism, opposed competing forces within the Zionist movement, and worked diligently to establish the Jewish state. A complicated personality, Begin saw dualities in a variety of places—­defeat and victory; the

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“Holocaust and rebirth [perhaps of the Jewish p ­ eople]; fatal attack and rise to office; and peace and war.”79 Begin’s worldview was largely molded by the interwar era. He was almost mechanistically rational and held a par­tic­u­lar fascination with Jewish martyrdom80 of the late eigh­teenth ­century,81 which for Begin, represented the historical strug­gle for Jewish national liberation. He had a personal interest in foreign affairs but, like many Israelis of the time period, preferred focusing on the local.82 As Daniel Gordis describes, one cannot understand Begin without understanding Ze’ev Jabotinsky.83 Jabotinsky was a Rus­sian, Jewish, Revisionist-­Zionist leader and early force in the Polish Jewish defense organ­izations. He created battalions of Jewish volunteers in the British Army whose purpose was expelling the Ottoman Empire from an eventual Jewish homeland. His right-­wing princi­ples imbue Israel’s Likud Party and have influenced Likud leaders from Begin to Benjamin Netanyahu. Along with Joseph Trumpledor, who allegedly said on his deathbed, “It is good to die for our country,” Jabotinsky embodied the Revisionists’ commitment to Jewish military power, self-­defense, and national pride—­notions Begin ­wholeheartedly endorsed.84 Begin’s positions on strategic m ­ atters derived from the conviction that Israel had a nearly permanent and historical requirement for consistent offensive posturing, given the state’s strategic realities. He favored offensive or counteroffensive maneuvers, rather than l­imited retaliatory action. He preferred preventive or preemptive war in response to any offensive ­enemy intentions. Such notions w ­ ere consistent in Begin’s strategic thinking from the Israeli war of in­de­pen­dence ­until the 1982 Lebanon War.85 Interestingly, in 1936–37, Begin and Jabotinsky had a major disagreement about the military actions of the Etzel or Irgun, a Zionist terrorist group that operated in Mandatory Palestine from 1931 to 1948. Jabotinsky, with his original Revisionist credo, favored attack purely in self-­defense. Begin by contrast argued that preemptive action was necessary.86 In September 1938, over Jabotinsky’s objections and with his ­career on the rise, Begin revised the Betar oath to prioritize armed defense as well as preemptive conquest.87 ­These favorable views of preemptive action remained consistent through his government ser­vice. When minister without portfolio, Begin voted in f­ avor of a preemptive strike in the 1967 Six-­Day War.88 In 1973, he criticized Prime Minister Golda Meir for not ordering a preemptive strike when the government had intelligence of invading armies marching ­toward Israel.89 Writing in a December 1954 article, Begin listed three ­factors that determine a state’s national security: manpower, weapon power, and the country’s strategic situation (control of territory). ­Because Israel’s small size posed a strategic disadvantage, the country needed some qualitative advantage.90 To Begin’s mind, po­liti­cal or territorial concessions led to additional concessions; he opposed all peace initiatives and doubled down on this thinking

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a­ fter invading Arab armies surprised Israel in 1967.91 Broadly, Begin drew parallels to the Jewish heroism of the Second T ­ emple Era and vowed “rebellion against any foreign ruler and war against any aggressor.”92 During the early Cold War, Begin doubted that nuclear weapons eliminated the importance of territory or conventional weapons for states that possessed nuclear arms. He believed this was true even for the United States, though Soviet numerical superiority was a significant challenge in Eu­rope.93 In 1954, Begin wrote that territory and infantry, two of three main state security ele­ments in his view, remained consequential even in the nuclear age.94 Over time, it appeared that Begin believed nuclear deterrence meant that world wars ­were less likely ­because of the dangers of annihilating the ­human race. This perspective could suggest ele­ments of a nuclear optimism focusing on the costs of nuclear use and deterrence. He seemed quizzically not to focus on the nuclear aspects of the Cuban missile crisis. Following the wars between India and China in the 1960s, however, Begin changed his mind, deciding that war remained conceivable even in the nuclear age.95 This recognition could indicate a growing nuclear pessimist’s perspective. By 1963, Begin was adamant about weapons of mass destruction. Addressing the Knesset he said, “­Don’t even ask w ­ hether unconventional weapons are a greater threat to our f­ uture than conventional weapons—in my mind t­ here is no doubt regarding the answer. The greatest and gravest threat we can anticipate: to our ­future, our security, our existence, is from unconventional weapons.”96 Collectively, this evidence does not offer a clear portrait of Begin’s thinking on nuclear ­matters before he became prime minister. On the one hand, his early thoughts and writings suggest both a belief in the deterrent power of nuclear weapons and a sense of their limitations in terms of conventional and territorial requirements. On the other hand, his l­ater remarks suggest someone quite threatened by weapons of mass destruction and the challenge they pose. What is clear, however, is his consistent and vociferous support for preventive strategies to confront enemies and security challenges. Therefore, it might be the case that Begin’s general proclivity ­toward military options including preemptive and preventive strategies suggested a belief in the need to confront the threat of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, head-on. In terms of how Begin perceived the threat from Iraq prior to entering executive office, “Arab” was a ste­reo­type for Begin, expressing threat, danger, and the historical possibility of annihilation of the Jewish p ­ eople. While he did not have much personal contact with any Arab individuals, he saw Arabs as the collective ­enemy from the East seeking to undermine and destroy Israel’s in­de­pen­dence. Begin’s biographer describes his image of the “Arabs” and approach to confronting them as “among the most unchanging features of his world view.”97 Begin worked from the Mossad’s psychological portrait of Saddam Hussein as a “hard-­headed megalomaniac, cunning,

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sophisticated, and cruel. . . . ​[He was] willing to take high risks and drastic action to realize his ambition for self-­aggrandizement.” Especially problematic was the Mossad’s assessment that Saddam’s acquisition of nuclear weapons would allow him “to threaten and strike Israel, and thereby win supremacy over the Arab world. He is prepared to act at an early opportunity, even in the awareness that retaliation might follow.”98 Writing well ­after the Osiraq episode, academics similarly note that Saddam appeared “if not undeterrable, then at least more likely to engage in risky aggression than Soviet or Chinese leaders, potentially willing to accept serious retaliatory damage to Iraq in order to achieve the destruction of Israel, and with it the presumptive leadership of the Arab world.”99 Together, this evidence suggests that Begin may have seen in Saddam Hussein a dangerous and power-­hungry leader who was risk acceptant. Given Iraq’s historical animosity ­toward Israel and its pursuit of nuclear weapons, Begin might have concluded such a leader armed with nuclear weapons would pose an undeterrable and existential threat of the highest order. Additionally, with his awareness of the risks from unconventional weapons, including nuclear, it seems likely that Begin would have considered the use of preventive military force to forestall Iraq’s nuclear program. When Begin became prime minister, it appears he felt his responsibility was to block the genocidal capability. “He began to take action against what he called ‘the bloodiest and most irresponsible of all Arab regimes.’ ”100

The Rabin Administration and Iraq’s Nuclear Program Some describe the bombing of the Osiraq nuclear fa­cil­it­ y as the culmination of a long siege, as opposed to a pinpoint operation. The roughly six-­year campaign included covert sabotage, economic sanctions, preventive attack, and diplomacy both before and ­after the intervention.101 Events began in 1974 when the AMAN and Mossad both ranked Iraq’s nuclear program as high intelligence priorities. The program was not yet classified as an imminent threat, however. The Rabin administration observed French and Italian technical sales to Iraq in 1975 and 1976 and chose to confront the development via diplomatic engagement with Eu­ro­pean and other partners.102 Prime Minister Rabin and Defense Minister Shimon Peres pursued the best po­liti­cal and diplomatic options available, ­those most likely to delay the program’s development. Only if t­ hose strategies failed w ­ ere they willing to investigate military options. In the background, the air force prudentially explored military plans, though the leadership never considered or requested anything specific.103 In February 1976, Foreign Minister Yigal Allon discussed the possibility of joint cooperation with Iran, a main ­enemy of Iraq; the Ira­nian response was lukewarm, and nothing further developed. By 1977, out­going

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prime minister Rabin outlined his concerns over the Iraq-­European cooperation and the diplomatic work underway to confront it.104 Peres ­later wrote to Begin and expressed his opposition to any military action.105

The Begin Administration and Iraq’s Nuclear Program Following Begin’s election in June 1977, destruction of the Iraqi reactor was high on his agenda. In November, Begin formed the “new era” committee, tasking its members with quietly assessing how best to confront the threat and hinder Iraq’s nuclear development. Personally, Begin was deeply troubled by the substantial threat he perceived. As Israel’s founding ­father Ben Gurion had before him, Begin worried: “All night I could not sleep. . . . ​What is Israel? . . . ​Only a small spot! One dot! How can it survive in this Arab world?”106 Twenty-­three years l­ater, Begin observed Iraq’s enormous military potential. By 1980 Iraq had thirteen million p ­ eople, a gross national product of $18 billion, and an annual defense bud­get of $3.5 billion. Iraq’s military consisted of 190,000 troops across twelve divisions; 2,200 tanks; three thousand air force personnel with 450 attack aircraft; and an army and navy.107 The threat of “a Nazi like Saddam” was obvious to Begin. His personal trauma in the Holocaust and in several gulags ­were fresh in Begin’s mind as he i­ magined the death of five hundred thousand Jews from an Iraqi nuclear weapon he had no doubt Saddam would use. While the risks to Israel ­were apparent, it was the combination of this threat with the Jewish historical tragedy and trauma—­both collective for the nation and for Begin personally—­that pushed him to act.108 By 1978, the Iraqi nuclear program was progressing quickly.109 Israel observed work on bomb designs and plutonium development. On August 23, Begin convened the first security cabinet meeting to discuss the threat. From the outset, a divide separated the participants. Begin, Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon, and Finance Minister Simha Ehrlich favored using all means necessary, including military attack. Deputy Prime Minister Yigal Yadin, Defense Minister Ezer Weizman, and Weizman’s deputy argued that the costs of a strike outweighed any potential benefits. For this latter group, t­ here was still time to allow other levers to have an impact. The meeting concluded without resolution. It would be the first meeting of dozens held to determine Israel’s approach, indicating the seriousness with which the administration treated the situation.110 The year 1979 commenced with economic and sabotage strategies yielding fruit as part of the counterproliferation campaign. Prior to their shipment from France, key technological components bound for Iraq mysteriously exploded dockside in French ports. Similar explosions happened at Italian facilities that ­were producing exports to Iraq’s nuclear program. Likewise, Egyptian scientists assisting with the Iraqi program’s development w ­ ere

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assassinated.111 Israel was the prime suspect. In October, Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan resigned from Begin’s government for reasons related to the Palestinian conflict and was replaced by Yitzhak Shamir. Security Minister Ezer Weizman quit the following May, for similar reasons. Between Begin’s assuming the defense post and his addition of the hawkish Shamir to the cabinet, the balance now favored the military option. Throughout 1980, Israeli deliberations continued while the Iraqi program gained momentum. In February, Saddam issued his “National Charter” describing how “the Zionist entity is not included [in regional assessments] ­because the Zionist entity is not considered a state, but a deformed entity occupying an Arab territory.”112 Against this background, an in­de­pen­dent committee issued a report assessing the merits of a potential military campaign. Headed by Major General (reserves) Aharon Yariv, the former head of the AMAN, the committee’s report warned of significant direct and indirect costs of a military attack: Iraqi revenge, including attacks on sensitive targets inside Israel like the Dimona nuclear complex; hostile global public opinion, especially if Israel targeted a “hot” reactor and released radioactive contamination; international sanctions stemming from any perceived norm against attacking nuclear reactors; intensified anti-­Israel activity within the Arab world; disruption of the ongoing, fragile peace pro­cess with Egypt; combined military action with Soviet backing; and damage to the US-­Israel relationship.113 Participants debated the consequences of military action and the likely ­international po­liti­cal costs that would follow.114 Key members of the security cabinet—­Yadin, Weizman, and Yehoshua Saguy (director of military intelligence)—­considered the risks and costs and recommended diplomatic and covert action only. Sharon, Ehrlich, and Begin rejected their conclusions. In October, Begin instructed the IDF’s chief of staff to start planning for an attack, confirming the seriousness of the consideration. This directive operationalized something Begin had been personally contemplating for some time, though the cabinet remained divided.115 Four options eventually emerged for discussion. First was the diplomatic route. As it had failed previously, diplomacy was considered unlikely to succeed in the f­uture. Second, a clandestine option was also rejected ­because it had the potential only to limit and delay and could only marginally affect long-­range Iraqi nuclear ambitions. The third option was a full ground assault with Israeli troops attacking Iraq. This option was also rejected as too complicated and risky given the geographic distance between Israel and Iraq and Israel’s general strategic vulnerability. The final option, the surgical attack, was the only option left.116 Meeting again on October 14, the security cabinet remained divided. Some members believed they still had time u ­ ntil Iraq got the bomb, so that military action was not yet necessary. O ­ thers indicated that forceful Israeli action would unite the Arabs, cause a US arms embargo, and be an impermanent

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solution to boot. The prime minister listened to this opposition but remained wedded to the use of force. By October 28, the AMAN indicated that a win­ dow of opportunity had emerged: the unsuccessful Ira­nian attack in September gave Israel potential cover for its own mission.117 The French nationals previously on the ground had left b ­ ecause of Iraq’s ongoing war with Iran. For the time being, the Iraqi air defenses ­were still only partial, suggesting that mission feasibility (IV3) would decrease over time as Iraq’s defensive capabilities expanded. Furthermore, hostile reaction to military action would take time to build, while many in the West might even tacitly support the mission. ­After extensive deliberation, Begin secured the cabinet’s standby approval for the military intervention, conditional on the approval of the prime minister, Foreign Minister Shamir, and the IDF chief of staff.118 The threat from Iraq continued to crystallize during the same period. Following the Ira­nian attack on the Osiraq fa­cil­it­ y that fall, Saddam Hussein issued a statement indicating that “the Ira­nian p ­ eople should not fear the Iraqi nuclear reactor, which is not intended to be used against Iran, but against the Zionist entity.”119 Iraq’s military spending more than doubled between 1975 and 1980, and Iraq appeared to be the dominant power in the Iran-­Iraq War.120 Israel was quite concerned at the prospect of a victorious Iraq emerging as the undisputed regional hegemon, with the world’s third-­largest oil reserves and a military more than four times larger than Israel’s.121 With the military mission ultimately selected, the intervention included F-16 Fighting Falcons and F-15 Ea­gles, the aircraft with the most advanced navigational capabilities in the Israeli Air Force (IAF) at the time.122 Given the distance to the target, ­these aircraft offered the potential longer fuel range, even with larger payloads; the ability to fly closer to the ground to avoid Iraqi air defenses; and greater speed and maneuverability to the target.123 Nevertheless, even with the best aircraft in the fleet undertaking the mission, unavoidable difficulties remained regarding mission feasibility (IV3). The twelve-­hundred-­kilometer distance to travel across ­enemy territory, the need to fly dangerously low to avoid radar detection, and the possibility of being shot down necessarily put the pi­lots’ lives at risk.124 “Yet failure, as far as Begin was concerned, meant risking the ­future of the Jewish ­people.”125 The risks of the mission’s failure and the risks of ­doing nothing consumed Begin. As a former Irgun commander, he valued the lives of his fighters but understood that some would die during the mission. “That was the price of revolt,” Begin said, referring to the strug­gle for a Jewish national state. “If strug­gle was worthwhile, so was the sacrifice.”126 Presumably, Begin would have felt similarly about the risks to the pi­lots conducting the mission. Likewise, he did not relish the international community’s reaction, but his own life story—­his experiences in Soviet Poland and the loss of his f­ amily in the Holocaust—­convinced him that inaction was exponentially more dangerous. For Begin, it was “better condemnation without a reactor than a reactor without condemnation.”127

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At 18:35 local time, the F-16s climbed to their target and dove into position to destroy the reactor. “Supreme national self-­defense” was how Begin described the mission of June 7, 1981, once it was accomplished. Saddam had plotted to destroy Israel’s existence and ­future, with expected casualties estimated at six hundred thousand. “What other country would tolerate such a danger? T ­ here w ­ on’t be another Holocaust in the history of the Jewish ­people. Never again. We s­ hall defend our p ­ eople against any e­ nemy.”128 Following Israel’s action, Begin highlighted Iraq’s repeated history of hostility ­toward Israel, refusal to accept the state’s existence, and lack of deterrability as the reasons for targeting the fa­cil­it­y. He spoke of “existential” and “mortal” danger from a hostile tyrant with Israel in its crosshairs.129 Begin understood the risks—­political, military, diplomatic, and economic—­but was first and foremost concerned with the safety and security of the Israeli ­people. Every­thing ­else was peripheral.130 To Begin’s mind, the Osiraq raid was nothing short of life-­saving: Israel, facing the risk of a second Holocaust, chose to act before it was too late.131 The Begin Doctrine holds that Israel w ­ ill not tolerate the acquisition of nuclear weapons by any Arab state or other ­enemy and ­will take all means necessary to defend the citizens of Israel against the threat of proliferation.132

Potential Counterarguments While the episode just described suggests that Menachem Begin held deep-­ seated concerns over existential threats to the state of Israel—­especially in the form of nuclear-­armed Arab enemies—­skeptics might argue that domestic electoral considerations drove Begin’s decision to order the attack. In early 1981, Begin’s governing co­ali­tion was crumbling, and elections ­were scheduled for September. Polling from the time indicated that the ­Labor Party was likely to be victorious, and with it Shimon Peres would come to power. ­Because of this concern, some have suggested that Begin conducted the intervention in order to secure his reelection. This electoral logic is unconvincing or at least incomplete for three reasons. First, to the extent that a traditional electoral motivation was operating, we would expect to see evidence that Begin pursued the military option ­because he believed that it would help him win the upcoming elections that he was other­wise expected to lose. Rather, we find that Begin was more concerned about Peres’s election than his own loss. It was well-­known that Peres—­then the head of the L ­ abor Party and the former defense minister ­under Rabin—­opposed the military campaign to target Iraq’s nuclear facilities; he had previously attempted to convince Begin to abandon the use of force. When Begin met with Peres as the head of the opposition in December 1980, Peres was unconvinced of the strike’s necessity. L ­ ater, he “called the possibility of such a strike stupid and reckless.”133 Rather than support

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the military option, Peres favored pursuing diplomatic strategies to delay the Iraqi nuclear program, as he had while serving ­under Rabin. When the mission was originally ordered in May 1981, and Peres got wind of it, Begin postponed the attack, citing concerns that the operation was at risk.134 Begin noted following receipt of a letter from Peres, “­Here we are awaiting news that could mean life or death for Israel, and Shimon Peres has the temerity to ask me to desist from taking action.”135 Instead of awaiting the possibility that Peres would become prime minister and allow Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons, Begin ordered the mission himself.136 He did so seemingly not b ­ ecause the move would improve his chances for reelection, but instead ­because of the nuclear threat that would remain ­after he left office. Begin himself disputed potential electoral motivations: “Would I risk the life of a single one of our pi­lots for electoral purposes, I ask you? I’m convinced that if we lose the election, Peres w ­ ill be incapable of deciding on such a raid, and then I would never forgive myself for not having acted when I could. The ­future of our ­people is at stake. All the responsibility is on our shoulders.”137 Second, former members of Begin’s cabinet dispute the electoral motivation. Government Secretary Arye Naor publicly described how Begin was deeply aware of the risks and costs associated with the mission and chose to act anyway, indicating perhaps an expected low or at least problematic likelihood of success. ­These risks included first and foremost that Israeli pi­ lots and fighter planes would not return; also, he might lose the election. A costly mission, Begin thought, could actually harm his chances for reelection. Despite t­ hese concerns, Naor said, the prime minister was determined to hit the reactor “even if it was the last ­thing he did as prime minister.”138 Naor elaborated that Begin could accept relinquishing power; he could not accept “condemning the c­hildren of Israel to living u ­ nder the nuclear shadow.” Another former member of the Begin government notes that planning for the mission was underway far before elections ­were called for the fall of 1981, further casting doubt on the electoral alternative.139 Third, the Iraq episode is not the only time Begin would consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. Instead, when Pakistan, a second adversarial state, edged closer to acquiring nuclear weapons, Begin again took steps to proactively confront the threat. This continuity in threat perception and consideration of similar strategies to forestall nuclear threats is more compelling than any electoral motivation.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Program To the extent that the argument about Menachem Begin is compelling, we should expect some consistency in his be­hav­ior in other potential counterproliferation episodes that occur during his prime ministerial tenure. While

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the primary source evidence is thin, it is still pos­si­ble to review Begin’s approach to the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and observe a similar threat perception during the same period that likewise pushed Begin to explore preventive intervention. This evidence suggests that Begin viewed nuclear weapons in the hands of undeterrable, adversarial Muslim states as deeply threatening to Israel’s security. T ­ hose beliefs led him to consider preventive military options to forestall the nuclear programs in formation. As the Iraq episode unfolded, Begin saw another manifestation of a similar threat: Pakistan was building nuclear weapons and, if successful, would transfer ­those weapons to the hands of another undeterrable dictator hostile to Israel’s existence. As he had before, Begin connected the memory of the Holocaust to the threat of nuclear weapons. Like Iraq, Pakistan started its nuclear program in the 1950s, benefiting from Atoms for Peace.140 From the outset, Foreign Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the program’s major champion. When he became prime minister, Bhutto accelerated the program significantly, following his country’s devastating loss of the territory of Bangladesh in 1971. Pakistan pursued a nuclear weapon to ­counter the threat from neighboring India, which was si­ mul­ta­neously pursuing a nuclear weapons capability.141 During Begin’s tenure as prime minister, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program developed substantially. This effort concerned Begin, not ­because of direct hostility between Pakistan and Israel, but ­because of the states assisting Pakistan’s efforts. As George Perkovich writes, “Israel had concerns that Pakistan was colluding with Libya to develop [an] ‘Islamic Bomb,’ so had interest in removing the threat.”142 Libyan hostility ­toward Israel was direct: Libyan leader Col­o­nel Muammar Gaddafi’s principal foreign policy goal was Israel’s destruction. Gaddafi supported the 1973 oil embargo in the hopes of ending the West’s support for Israel; in 1981, when Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated, Gaddafi noted that the assassination was punishment for Sadat’s landmark peace agreement with Israel.143 Previously, Gaddafi encouraged Egypt’s then president Gamal Abdel Nasser to attack Israel. When Nasser declined ­because of Israel’s nascent nuclear capability, Gaddafi vowed to get atomic bombs for the Arabs to balance the Israeli capability.144 Begin was thus particularly concerned that Bhutto would share the fruits of Pakistan’s l­ abor with Libya. Bhutto had befriended Gaddafi and the two discussed nuclear cooperation. Feroz Khan describes the relationship as a quid pro quo: Libya wanted full access to the Pakistani nuclear program in return for critical financial and material resources. Gaddafi provided financial aid to the tune of approximately $500 million and about 450 tons of yellow cake uranium imported from Niger between 1976 and 1982.145 Given Gaddafi’s pan-­Arab aspirations, it is unsurprising that he might have been readily willing (and able, given Libya’s sizable oil wealth) to help achieve an Islamic bomb.146 Libya had long-­held nuclear aspirations of its own, first trying to buy nuclear weapons directly from China, then from the Soviets,

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who had previously assisted with their conventional capabilities and basic nuclear infrastructure.147 As their own indigenous attempts never developed, Gaddafi ultimately chose to invest in another state’s program. Libya has yet to get a return on its investment, though Pakistan did train Libyan scientists at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH) fa­cil­i­ty.148 With this Pakistani-­Libyan cooperation in mind, it is understandable that Begin was concerned by Pakistan’s nuclear development. The available evidence suggests not only that Begin was threatened by Pakistani nuclear weapons but also that he took steps to consider and plan for a preventive military intervention to destroy the weapons. This consistency of beliefs and subsequent be­hav­ior is indicative of the strength of the leader-­centric argument. The main piece of documentary evidence concerning the seriousness with which Begin perceived the Pakistani nuclear threat comes from his diplomatic communication. In May 1979, Begin wrote a letter to British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, describing the threat emerging from Pakistan.149 The letter spoke of Pakistan’s one-­man, autocratic rule, which Begin saw as dangerous for Southeast Asia. Then, the letter described “the mortal danger” that would arise should Pakistan succeed in acquiring nuclear weapons. The letter also detailed the close partnership between Libya and Pakistan, especially in the nuclear realm. This letter indicates that for Begin, the Pakistani nuclear threat emanated from the nature of the autocratic regime in Pakistan and its relationship with the Libyan dictator, who publicly advocated an aggressive policy to destroy Israel. Begin concluded, “The specter of what could happen to the ­Middle East, and particularly to the men, ­women and ­children in Israel, should the lethal weapons of mass killing and destruction be put at any time into the hands of an absolute ruler like Col­o­nel Gaddafi.”150 The notes from Prime Minister Thatcher’s staff regarding Begin’s letter are also telling.151 They assessed Begin’s concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear intentions and the alleged cooperation between Pakistan and Libya. Significantly, the notes also indicate that “the Israelis are well informed about Pakistani program and Libyan contacts with Pakistan,” suggesting that Israel had accurately assessed the cooperation and development.152 So what happened? This book’s model expects that given Begin’s view of the Pakistani nuclear program as threatening and dangerous for the security of Israel, he would have taken steps to seriously consider the use of preventive military force to forestall the program in formation. At a high level, the available evidence suggests that this is exactly what happened: Israel engaged in a series of conversations, meetings, and joint exercises with the government of India for the express purpose of destroying the Pakistani nuclear program. The secondary lit­er­a­ture sheds light on the vari­ous activities underway during this time period. As Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-­Clark note,

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Pakistan feared an Israeli or Indian attack, or both, knowing that Israel saw the Pakistani program as a “clear and pre­sent” threat. As an early potential indication of Israeli activity, Pakistan believed the Mossad targeted the Abdul Qadeer Khan supply networks supporting the Pakistani program’s development.153 This occurred in parallel to Begin’s letter-­writing campaign.154 In August 1979, the Car­ter Administration also discussed military strikes, though seemingly not at an advanced level.155 Then secretary of state Cyrus Vance asked a staffer for an unofficial memo on available options; it highlighted the difficulty, uncertainty, and complexity of such an undertaking.156 As time progressed, t­ here is evidence of serious consideration and planning that Begin undertook in concert with Indian partners. By 1982, India’s Indira Gandhi grew more serious in her consideration of joint operations.157 Indian scientists and air force officers traveled to Israel to share intelligence and acquire critical technology. The Indians purchased ground-­based and airborne electronic warfare equipment from Israel with which to neutralize Pakistan’s F-16 aircraft and Bofors RBS 70 air defense guns protecting Pakistan’s critical Kahuta nuclear fa­cil­i­ty.158 Israel also provided details on the F-16’s capabilities, radio frequencies, and other impor­tant information that would serve efforts to jam Pakistani capacity. In return, India offered details of the Rus­sian MiG-23 aircraft, similar to many flown by Arab forces. By the next year, Gandhi asked Air Chief Marshall Dilbagh Singh to ready a strike mission.159 Subsequently, the air force’s director of operations planned for a surgical strike on the centrifuges and other critical components h ­ oused at Kahuta. Squadrons of Jaguar aircraft practiced low-­level flying routes to the target, bombing techniques to target the facilities, and spoofing defenses.160 An Indian newspaper article suggests that Prime Minister Gandhi ultimately rejected the plans, though for what reason remains unknown.161 In 1983–84, a new opportunity emerged.162 According to Bharat Karnad and his interview with the late Aharon Yariv, the former head of Israel’s Military Intelligence, a new plan involved Israeli F-16 strike aircraft and F-15 air superiority fighters for escort and combat patrol. Flying from Israel, the aircraft would refuel at India’s Jamnagar air base, top off the fuel in North India, and fly via Kashmir to target the Kahuta fa­cil­i­ty. Flying at high speeds, the attack would leave Pakistani defenses only three to five minutes to react.163 Although Karnad notes that Yariv indicated that Israel, though it could have performed the mission alone using only aerial refueling, preferred the international cover that working with India’s assistance would provide. This remained merely a plan, however, as Gandhi again canceled the mission, perhaps this time b ­ ecause of US intelligence tipping off the Pakistani government and threatening to defend Pakistan against such an attack.164 Sources suggest that India canceled any further operation b ­ ecause of the US role.165 In light of the aforementioned planning and the threat Begin perceived, it is fair to ask why Begin did not order an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear

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program. Given the lack of primary evidence documenting this episode, it is difficult to answer this question. It is challenging to assess both how serious the planning actually was and also what terminated any mission. Nevertheless, ­there are a number of potential ave­nues for speculation, each of which relate to mission feasibility, the third in­de­pen­dent variable. First, it is conceivable that the mission against Iraq’s nuclear program took pre­ce­dence between 1979 and 1981. This consideration seems plausible b ­ ecause, compared to Pakistan, Iraq presented a much more direct threat. The consequences of a closer, undeterrable nuclear-­armed Iraq with its own nuclear weapons are dif­fer­ent from the indirect threat posed by an undeterrable Libya that might have had access to someone e­ lse’s nuclear weapons. In the history of the nuclear age, no nuclear-­armed state has given or sold its nuclear weapons to another state, so the threat from Libya remained hy­po­ thet­i­cal. Second, the deliberations concerning Israel’s use of force took place in collaboration with India, meaning that ­there was another actor involved in the decision-­making pro­cess. In this instance, given the options, which involved ­either Indian planes flying directly or flying Israeli planes using Indian bases for the mission, India had the ability to veto the mission. Barry Schneider points to this difficulty in 1982, when Gandhi refused to grant landing and refueling rights, fundamentally compromising the intended mission.166 While aerial refueling was pos­si­ble, it was a complex option with no guarantee of success. Third, the risks of an attack against Pakistan ­were significant.167 Potentially prohibitive was that Pakistan might respond in kind by targeting Indian nuclear facilities. The fact that even a surgical strike could escalate to a costly wider war, and that the United States might impose punitive mea­sures on Pakistan’s behalf, complicated the scenario. That the CIA might have tipped off Pakistan to the ongoing planning suggests that the United States was not inclined to sit idly by. It is nearly impossible to adjudicate between ­these possibilities, ­because the evidence concerning the Pakistan case is scant. Remarkably, no former Israeli government official I have asked has given any indication that he or she was aware that Begin was conducting serious consideration of preventive attack. Nevertheless, the existing material suggests that Begin’s threat perception was largely consistent across the Iraqi and Pakistani episodes. Fearing the dangers of adversarial nuclear proliferation in both contexts, Begin’s nuclear beliefs encouraged him to consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. The model predicts correctly that Begin would consider the use of preventive force in both cases. It also accounts for variation in the third in­de­pen­ dent variable—­the likelihood of mission success—by explaining why Begin pursued prevention against Iraq but not Pakistan. Begin’s concern for an Iraq ruled by Hussein and armed with nuclear weapons was echoed with re­spect to Libya, which Begin saw as similarly threatening ­because of Gaddafi’s

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dangerous nuclear potential. ­These views led Begin to consider preventive military options to thwart both programs from coming to fruition. In both episodes, we observe the leader-­centric perspective at work.

Syria’s Nuclear Program According to intelligence rec­ords, the United States appears to have had insight into Syria’s nuclear weapons development beginning in the late 1990s.168 During this period, Syrian leader Hafez al-­Assad sought to purchase nuclear research reactors from Argentina and Rus­sia; u ­ nder US pressure, both deals fell through.169 Fast forward to the spring of 2007: in conjunction with its Israeli partners, the United States had conclusive evidence that Syria was constructing a nuclear reactor that was nearing operational capability.170 Military cooperation between Syria and North ­Korea dates back to the 1960s. North Korean troops aided the Syrian government in multiple Arab-­ Israeli wars, trained Syrian officers at DPRK institutions, and provided significant military technology.171 The “love affair” deepened to include WMD technology when Assad invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to Syria prior to the Gulf War.172 The two leaders signed a military and technology cooperation agreement focusing on chemical and biological weapons development. Se­nior North Korean leaders subsequently visited Syria.173 When the se­nior Assad died, his son Bashar continued the conversation and elevated nuclear m ­ atters to a priority. By June 2002, the parties finalized a three-­ way deal, with North K ­ orea agreeing to build a nuclear reactor in Syria and Iran pledging approximately $2 billion for the construction.174 By 2005, North Korean activities inside Syria appeared to cluster in the eastern Deir el-­Zor region. Over time, an unidentified building located in al-­ Kibar became the focus.175 Images of the suspicious fa­cil­it­ y indicated that it was not configured to produce electricity: it had no power lines to connect it to the power grid and had none of the switching facilities necessary for energy generation.176 The installation also appeared unsuitable for scientific research, especially when compared with existing research facilities that the Syrian government had disclosed.177 Given ­these discrepancies, Israel grew concerned about ongoing developments. Structural features had been partly obscured by an earthen wall or mound; the location itself was remote, away from curious eyes. Such characteristics are inconsistent with peaceful intentions.178 In February 2007, an Ira­nian defector, General Ali Reza Askari, revealed to US intelligence that Tehran was both encouraging and funding the establishment of the Syrian reactor.179 In July, the Mossad infiltrated a Syrian official’s computer via spyware. The laptop provided specific details of Syria’s nuclear program, including blueprints of a nuclear reactor, correspondence with

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North Korean officials, and photo­graphs of the reactor in construction. Such information complemented prior Israeli intelligence.180 ­Little doubt remained that the North Koreans ­were building a nuclear reactor in the Syrian desert.

Relations between Israel and Syria Syria and Israel have been at war since 1948. The Assad regime provides weapons and other support to the Shiite militant group Hez­bollah for its “strug­gle for in­de­pen­dence  .  .  . ​from the Zionist regime.”181 According to Israeli intelligence, before North ­Korea assisted Syria with its nuclear proj­ect, the DPRK aided Syria with medium-­range ballistic missiles and the chemical weapons sarin and mustard gas. ­These details, coupled with evidence of intense nuclear cooperation between North ­Korea and Syria, and Ira­nian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s billion-­dollar support for the nuclear endeavor, made the threat quite severe.182 Defense Minister Ehud Barak referred to the prospect of Iran, a regional neighbor and out­spoken ­enemy of Israel, acquiring the ability to destroy the country as a “sword on Israel’s neck.”183 Prime Minister Olmert himself told the Washington Institute’s David Makovsky that “Israel cannot tolerate an e­ nemy with militarized nuclear power. We did not tolerate it in the past, ­whether it was in Iraq or Syria, and we cannot tolerate it in Iran.”184 This narrative portrays a development significantly threatening to Israel.185 The history reflects long-­standing animosity between Syria and Israel, Syria’s support for a terrorist group that denies Israel’s right to exist, and Syria’s connection with Iran—­another adversary that has pledged to see Israel “wiped off the map.”186 Prime Minister Olmert likely perceived the Syrian nuclear development, coupled with the dangers that proximate regional actors armed with nuclear weapons pose, as deeply threatening. Evidentiary limitations notwithstanding, we do observe the serious consideration of preventive force, an assessment of a high likelihood of success (IV3), and its ­actual use in September 2007. This outcome accords with the leader-­centric model’s expectations in such a situation.

The Prime Minister’s Response Following the intelligence revelations, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert convened his security chiefs for a special meeting where they agreed that Israel must act urgently to acquire credible proof of the reactor’s existence. It was clear that Israel could not accept the prospect of Syria—­a “­bitter, belligerent” Israeli rival—­turning into a nuclear-­armed power.187 Therefore, Olmert ordered a dangerous intelligence raid into Syrian territory, and in August 2007, the elite Sayeret Matkal reconnaissance unit collected soil samples from the

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reactor site containing radioactive materials. The prime minister and his security leaders concluded that the threat was substantial.188 Si­mul­ta­neously, Israel reached out to its US partners.189 In April, Defense Minister Amir Peretz traveled to Washington to meet Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The head of Mossad, Meir Dagan, briefed CIA Director Michael Hayden. Former president George W. Bush recounts the discussions in his memoirs. The United States received a classified report from an “intelligence partner,” including photos of the suspicious, well-­hidden building in the eastern Syrian desert.190 The fa­cil­i­ty had striking resemblance to Yongbyon, a critical nuclear site in North ­Korea’s own program. The partner concluded that the structure contained a gas-­cooled, graphite-­moderated reactor capable of producing weapons-­grade plutonium. Significantly, North ­Korea was the only country that had built this reactor model in the past thirty-­five years. Bush’s strong suspicion was that Syria had been caught red-­handed attempting to build nuclear weapons with assistance from North ­Korea. As Bush notes, that was certainly the conclusion of Prime Minister Olmert, who said in a phone call shortly following the report’s delivery, “George, I’m asking you to bomb the compound.” Bush responded by asking for some time to explore the intelligence; he would ­later return to Olmert with an answer.191 Prime Minister Olmert and other high-­ranking Israeli officials reached out to their US counter­parts regarding the Syrian nuclear reactor. This move offers evidence of the seriousness with which Olmert viewed the situation and the high-­level dedication afforded to it. T ­ hese actions catalyzed a simultaneous decision-­making pro­cess within the Bush administration as the Americans assessed the situation and contemplated potential policy options. In this way, a United States–­Syria dyad could also be usefully explored.192 ­Because this chapter focuses on Israeli decision making, however, the US deliberations are only relevant inasmuch as US military action would have obviated the need for Israeli intervention. The leader-­centric theory accounts for third-­party involvement within the third in­de­pen­dent variable—­the likelihood of conducting a successful intervention—­which assesses the extent to which Israel had outside options that could stop the Syrian program. The next section describes US be­hav­ior to shed light on the parallel pro­ cess underway in Israel and highlight the divergent perspectives Bush and Olmert held regarding the severity of the threat and the potential costs of military inaction. In par­tic­u­lar, the discussion elucidates the fact that Olmert felt he had no outside options likely to be successful. Once the United States passed on using force, the ball rested in Olmert’s court.

The United States Deliberates Bush instructed his intelligence community to verify the Israeli claims. On the heels of the Iraq intelligence disaster, Bush indicated that the

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investigation “gotta be secret, and gotta be sure.” A CIA crisis task force was established to investigate. The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency compared the Israeli photo­graphs with the agency’s own satellite overflights and determined that the pictures w ­ ere valid. The CIA’s “red team” concluded, “If it’s not a nuclear reactor, then it’s a fake nuclear reactor.”193 The interagency deputies committee established the “Drafting Committee” to explore policy options. The name and small circle ­were designed to keep discussions secret.194 The group included Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams; James Jeffrey, a top ­Middle East specialist from the State Department; Eric Edelman, a se­nior aide to Secretary Gates and former ambassador to Turkey; and Elliot Cohen, counselor to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Their mission was to assess the information and provide options to the president. Bush highlighted the sensitivity of the undertaking: “If this stuff leaks, I’m ­going to fire all your asses.”195 The decisive meeting of the national security team occurred in June, including the secretaries of state and defense, chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, national security advisor, and director of national intelligence, along with the president and vice president. During the discussion, Bush asked CIA Director Hayden for his assessment. Hayden noted with high confidence that the plant ­housed a nuclear reactor. The team could conceive of no alternative uses for the fa­cil­i­ty. By early June, intelligence data came into focus: “[It] still looked like a Walmart ware­house from above, but t­ here was nothing other than a nuclear reactor that would create enough heat to warrant that kind of cooling. And the fact that the Syrians opted for the low-­ profile under­ground pipes and cooling system rather than the large cooling towers fit the clandestine nature of the fa­cil­i­ty.”196 That said, the CIA could not confirm the location of the necessary facilities to weaponize the plutonium. ­There was no repro­cessing plant or work on a warhead that the agency could identify.197 The CIA therefore had only low confidence that ­there was a Syrian nuclear weapons program of which the nuclear reactor would be a critical component. While the agency identified the reactor itself with high confidence, the CIA remained unable to certify the existence of a surrounding weapons endeavor, casting doubt on the regime’s intentions. Few US decision makers ­were inclined ­toward military action despite its feasibility. The United States knew the location and the specific makeup of the fa­cil­i­ty, making it easy enough to target ­either using Stealth B-2 bombers or land-­or carrier-­based assets in the region. The Syrian air defenses “­were respectable but not prohibitive” and had not yet been augmented around the reactor.198 General Peter Pace assured the president that “this was not much of a military challenge.”199 The larger issue was the prospect of the United States again opting for preventive war in the M ­ iddle East. The Bush administration had already used military force in Iraq, and the administration was coming to the end of its tenure. In this environment, “many in the Administration w ­ ere deeply reluctant to start what they thought would be a third

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­ iddle Eastern war. They thought the American ­people would have no paM tience for it, quite apart from their own aversion to such a prospect.”200 In contrast, Vice President Cheney and Deputy National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams advocated the use of force, though Abrams supported an Israeli mission while Cheney thought the Americans should attack.201 To Abrams, attacking would help Israel reestablish regional deterrence. Tolerating a Syrian (or Ira­nian) nuclear program would undermine the entire US position in the M ­ iddle East.202 In Cheney’s view, attacking the Syrian program would send a strong message to Syria, North ­Korea, and Iran about the consequences of their actions. “We w ­ ere serious,” according to Cheney, “when we warned . . . ​against the proliferation of nuclear technology to terrorist states.”203 In addition, ongoing diplomatic discussions with Iran and North ­Korea regarding their own nuclear proj­ects would have a higher likelihood of success if the two states understood the possibility of military action should diplomacy fail. In Cheney’s mind, the dangers of allowing the nuclear proj­ect to continue in Syria with North Korean assistance ­were “far greater than the prospect of wider conflict.” He also did not share o ­ thers’ concerns that Syria would strike US troops in Iraq. During a private lunch with the president on June 14, 2007, Cheney indicated that he saw the dangers of nuclear proliferation as the greatest long-­term security challenge facing the United States.204 Nevertheless, Vice President Cheney remained the only member of the administration keen for the United States to pursue the military option. The purely diplomatic route also never got much traction, despite advocacy from Secretaries Gates and Rice. Naming and shaming would not be effective, nor would condemnatory language from the United Nations, if the United States could secure it. Assad could stonewall inspectors u ­ ntil the reactor went hot, and any diplomatic démarche would tip the United States’ hand without being decisive.205 Secretary of State Rice, for her part, felt that Israel’s war with Hez­bollah in 2006 had undermined the judgement of the Israeli military. She also feared that military action would lead to a wider regional conflict with Syria and Hez­bollah. Moreover, Rice was invested in two diplomatic initiatives at the time—­the Six-­Party Talks regarding North ­Korea’s own nuclear weapons and a conference on M ­ iddle East peace to be held in Annapolis, Mary­land.206 A war could undermine both efforts. The discussion led ultimately to a hybrid option in which the United States would publicize the fa­cil­i­ty’s discovery and demand that Assad prove it was not a nuclear reactor via international inspections. This declaration would be paired with a time line and an ultimatum. Such a strategy demonstrated restraint and re­spect of international institutions but gave Assad time to prepare defenses and other steps to cover his actions.207 While imperfect, Bush nevertheless de­cided on the diplomatic route backed by the threat of force. The choice, Bush believed, protected Israel’s interests and the Israeli state and made it more likely that the United States would achieve its interests as

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well.208 As a result, Bush told Prime Minister Olmert, “I cannot justify an attack on a sovereign nation u ­ nless my intelligence agencies stand up and say it’s a weapons program.” Bush did not feel he had po­liti­cal cover for a “preemptive” attack absent such a declaration of imminent threat.209

Olmert Considers the Use of Force Prime Minister Olmert was disappointed with the American decision. He thought it would allow Assad to stall and continue developing the nuclear reactor ­until it was fully online. Thus, Olmert continued to pursue options for Israel to deploy on its own. According to retired brigadier general Shlomo Brom, who served as deputy national security advisor u ­ nder Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s ­earlier administration, “Israel would not have acted against the Syria program if it ­hadn’t been convinced ­there was a threat. It may have been a perception of a conviction, but ­there was something ­there. . . . ​It was the beginning of a nuclear proj­ect.”210 As Prime Minister Olmert made clear to President Bush when Bush suggested the diplomatic route, Olmert would not wait for the International Atomic Energy Agency to respond. For Israel, the threat was existential. Olmert told Bush, “If Amer­i­ca would not act, Israel would.”211 ­Little evidence exists to document Olmert’s prior nuclear beliefs. This lack of evidence could reflect a pre–­prime ministerial ­career largely focused on domestic issues, including time as a l­ awyer, minister of the Knesset, cabinet minister (without portfolio; Health; Industry, Trade, and ­Labor; and Communication), and mayor of Jerusalem. Details may be forthcoming as additional materials become available. Nevertheless, Olmert came to leadership on a platform of peace, even if he would grow more hawkish with time. If ­there is an Olmert Doctrine, it is that Israel can act forcefully to neutralize threats while si­mul­ta­neously pursuing peace no less forcefully.212 Early in his administration, Olmert sought secret peace talks with Assad, using Turkey as an intermediary. Though Assad agreed to meet, events intervened. According to the pre­sent model’s logic, the leaders most likely to seriously consider preventive military force are proliferation pessimists who possess ­little confidence that they can deter a nuclear-­armed adversary from bad ­future be­hav­ior. What we can observe in Olmert’s case is that he seriously considered and then used force in the Syria episode. Significantly, in 2006, upon becoming prime minister following Ariel Sharon’s debilitating stroke, Olmert also delegated significant resources to the Mossad to stop or at least delay the Ira­nian program, suggesting again a serious commitment to preventing Ira­nian proliferation through at least covert means. At the time, Olmert did not believe the threat from Iran was immediate enough to warrant military intervention.213 In 2007, he described sanctions as imposing effective pressure on Iran but also noted the potential need to increase Iran’s burden over time. Olmert was also clear in putting Iraq, Syria, and Iran in the

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same category: enemies in whose hands Israel could not tolerate nuclear weapons. In making the case for US preventive action against Syria, “Olmert argued that a U.S. strike would ‘kill two birds with one stone,’ allowing Bush to remind the international community of Assad’s villainy and send a message dissuading Iran from pursuing its own nuclear program.”214 Olmert’s position is noteworthy for indicating a threat perception that views adversarial nuclear proliferation as extremely dangerous for Israel and b ­ ecause, in both cases, Olmert preferred US action. When such military force was unavailable, then he would order the attack himself, at least against Syria. To date, Olmert, like many inside Israel, has opposed unilateral action against Iran. If history is any guide, absent other international action, at some point Olmert may change his mind. Returning to the Syrian case, evidence of the seriousness with which the Olmert administration handled the Syrian nuclear development began in August 2007. Olmert responded to the initial intelligence indicating a nuclear reactor had been discovered by ordering a dangerous mission into Syrian territory to collect soil samples for confirmation.215 The mission was meant to remove any doubt about the purpose of the fa­cil­i­ty u ­ nder construction. Also in 2007, Olmert and officials in his inner circle began a series of discussions with the United States. T ­ hese discussions included intelligence sharing and the discussion of options to confront the Syrian nuclear program. While the al-­Kibar fa­cil­i­ty was not an immediate threat to Israel’s security, Olmert was still inclined t­oward a preventive attack, especially once the United States declined to intervene.216 Following Bush’s decision, Olmert notified the United States of his intention and gave the Israeli military staff authority to bomb the reactor. The IDF and IAF considered three military strategies. The first was a wide-­ranging IAF military strike, nicknamed “Fat Shkedi” ­after the IAF chief. A second, narrower strike option involved a ­limited target set and was nicknamed “Skinny Shkedi.” A third option involved a ground attack undertaken by special forces. The key consideration in weighing ­these three options was the desire to minimize the potential for a military response from Damascus. Psychologists consulted by the IDF to get a better understanding of the Syrian leadership argued that retaliation could be avoided if Israel did not corner President Assad by publicly claiming credit for a strike, preserving a “zone of denial” for Assad. This ele­ment gained credibility in the deliberations when it was noted that Assad had avoided taking any direct military action against Israel during the 2006 Lebanon War, instead opting to work indirectly through Syria’s Hez­bollah proxy. While still hostile, this choice indicated that Assad perhaps saw value in avoiding a direct military confrontation with Israel.217 Beyond the risks of retaliation, Israel weighed other considerations related to the likelihood of success. First, it was helpful that the North Koreans assisting with the program did not work at the nuclear site overnight. No

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North Koreans would be killed, and it would therefore be less likely that North ­Korea would encourage Syrian retaliation. Second, Assad was likely to conclude that the attack had US support—­tacit or other­wise. A Syrian counterattack thus posed the risk of engaging the Americans. Third, Israel had ­little confidence in the United Nations or the IAEA.218 Despite the discovery of an illicit nuclear program in Iran, for example, the international community had been unable to shut the Ira­nian program down by 2007. ­There was therefore not much of an alternative if Israel failed to take action itself.219 In light of ­these options and considerations, the head of the IDF, the Mossad chief Meir Dagan, and Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni all favored a low-­signature attack on the reactor, or the “Skinny Shkedi” option. When Dagan visited the White House in May 2007, he reported that “all Israeli policymakers who saw the evidence agreed that the reactor had to go away,” suggesting near consensus among key decision makers.220 Though ­there is conflicting evidence on this point, some accounts suggest that Defense Minister Barak was afraid an attack would cause a repeat of the 2006 war or might fail to destroy the reactor. Barak thus preferred to delay an attack and take time to prepare for any pos­si­ble Syrian retaliation, as well as develop alternative approaches.221 By contrast, Prime Minister Olmert thought that the 2006 war had established Israel’s deterrent; t­ here had been no Hez­bollah attacks since. Olmert also thought that self-­interest was b ­ ehind Barak’s position.222 The report on Israel’s conduct during the Second Lebanon War was forthcoming, and its findings might have triggered Olmert’s ouster.223 If that happened, Barak would assume the mantle of leadership and could launch the attack himself.224 Nevertheless, on September 5, the security cabinet met and voted to strike. Cabinet members acknowledged an explicit risk of war but recommended attacking that night. Only Avi Dichter, then minister of internal security, abstained. Just before midnight on September 5, 2007, four F-15 and four F-16 fighter aircraft flew north along the Mediterranean coast, turned east, and followed the Syria-­Turkey border ­toward their target. The aircraft used electronic means to scramble Syria’s air defenses, paving the way for an unadulterated arrival. Somewhere between 12:40 and 12:53 a.m., seventeen tons of explosives dropped onto the target. The operation was a total success: the reactor was destroyed, and not a single pi­lot was lost. Prime Minister Olmert called President Bush with the news: “I just want to report to you that something that existed ­doesn’t exist anymore.”225

The Model at Work The analy­sis demonstrates that the leader-­centric argument offers explanatory power beyond the US context. It preliminarily documents the nuclear beliefs of Prime Ministers Rabin, Begin, and Olmert and shows how ­those

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leaders inclined to view nuclear weapons as negatively consequential for the international system and threatening to Israel w ­ ere ­those inclined to consider (and use) preventive military force. Begin and Olmert viewed nuclear weapons in the hands of undeterrable adversaries as existential threats to Israel. ­These prime ministers therefore considered (in the case of Pakistan) as well as used (in Iraq and Syria) preventive military force to destroy hostile nuclear programs in formation. By contrast, Rabin held no such view, and did not take t­ hese actions. Although t­ here is admittedly less information available for analy­sis, we can be confident that even preliminarily, the leader-­ centric argument improves our understanding of the circumstances when both US and Israeli leaders w ­ ill consider and use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy.

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 Conclusions and Implications

This book has explored the use of military force to prevent nuclear proliferation in the international system. The investigation asks, When do states use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy against adversarial proliferants? To answer this impor­tant question, I have argued that leaders’ beliefs are critical in explaining the empirical variation: states sometimes use force to prevent proliferation, other times consider the use of force but do not intervene, and in yet other instances never explore the military option. I have shown that leaders have divergent beliefs about two key issues central to debates over the spread of nuclear weapons—­whether additional proliferation is broadly stabilizing or destabilizing for international politics, and how easy or difficult it is to deter specific states once they are armed with nuclear weapons. It is variation in t­ hese two critical beliefs that shapes variation in the decision to consider preventive intervention. If leaders are proliferation pessimists and not confident in the ability to deter a ­future nuclear-­armed adversary, they should be more likely to consider the preventive option. Subsequently, following a feasibility assessment expecting a high likelihood of success, leaders with ­those beliefs should be more likely to order the use of military force. Exploring archival documents and other key historical and biographical sources, I have demonstrated that leaders form ­these nuclear beliefs early—­ well before entering executive office. ­These beliefs are then carried through to national leadership and help shape how leaders think about and confront individual nuclear challenges. Examining the case of Chinese nuclear weapons in the early part of the Cold War, I have shown that John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson held radically dif­fer­ent beliefs concerning nuclear m ­ atters generally and regarding Chinese nuclear weapons specifically. Kennedy, a strong nuclear pessimist, was deeply concerned about nuclear proliferation in the international system and in the hands of the Chinese communists, viewing Chinese nuclear development as the most dangerous challenge looming in the early 1960s. He seriously considered a preventive military attack to avert this possibility and might have ordered it, had an assassin’s

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bullet not intervened. By contrast, despite inheriting the identical situation Kennedy previously faced, Johnson, a nuclear optimist, felt confident in the US nuclear deterrent generally and vis-­à-­vis China in par­tic­u­lar. He felt no such need to consider an attack against the growing Chinese capability. Similar variation exists across the North Korean and Iraqi cases, which are also explained by the leader-­centric model. George H. W. Bush was a nuclear optimist, concerned about international stability but not particularly attuned to the dangers of nuclear proliferation. He therefore gave no consideration to attacking the North Korean nuclear program between 1989 and 1992. Likewise, his intervention in Iraq was not motivated by counterproliferation concerns, although the Gulf War is often considered a case of the use of preventive military force to forestall nuclear proliferation. Bush’s actions in Iraq w ­ ere taken to protect critical international norms; the nuclear aspects of the Gulf War w ­ ere at best secondary. Conversely, Bill Clinton demonstrated fairly consistent proliferation pessimism as a candidate and early in his executive tenure. He seriously considered a preventive attack against North ­Korea in 1994; but for the Agreed Framework, he would likely have proceeded. Similarly, Clinton was motivated to consider (and use) military force against Iraq in 1998, given concerns about the spread of nuclear weapons to a dangerous and undeterrable Saddam Hussein. The leader-­centric argument also generalizes beyond the United States. Israeli leaders similarly exhibit impor­tant variation in their views of nuclear proliferation and its consequences. ­These divergent views, when paired with similarly divergent perspectives on the deterrability of par­tic­u­lar states, encourage leaders to vary in their proclivity to use preventive military force. Whereas Yitzhak Rabin appears to have had some nuclear optimist tendencies and never considered forceful approaches to counterproliferation, his successor, Menachem Begin, did so repeatedly, attacking Iraq in 1981 and entertaining the possibility of a preventive attack against Pakistan from the late 1970s to early 1980s. As the brief discussion of the recent counterproliferation case of Syria shows, such nuclear pessimism and lack of confidence in deterrence appears to persist in the con­temporary period and continues to influence decision making: Prime Minister Ehud Olmert destroyed the secret nuclear reactor hiding in the Syrian desert, concerned about the dangers of a Syrian dictatorship armed with nuclear weapons and hostile to Israel’s very existence. As more information comes to light on t­ hese leaders and episodes, more firm conclusions should result. The argument and evidence presented challenge conventional wisdom from structural, domestic po­liti­cal, and bureaucratic logics by shining a spotlight on the critical importance of individual national executives in preventive war decision making. All too often, leaders have been overlooked within the nuclear realm, a space historically dominated by structural and state-­centric explanations. By demonstrating the central role leaders play in explaining the state’s use of preventive military force to forestall or destroy

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adversarial nuclear acquisition attempts, All Options on the T ­ able highlights that both scholarship and policy making must pay attention to t­ hese impor­ tant actors to improve our understanding of crucially impor­tant dynamics in international politics.

Con­temporary Relevance: North K­ orea and Iran Two recent developments within the counterproliferation portfolio warrant discussion for their intrinsic interest and ­because they demonstrate the continued applicability of the leader-­centric argument. First, tensions flared between the United States and North ­Korea from 2017 to 2019, returning preventive war to the forefront of discussion. In addition, the international community is currently grappling with how to ­handle the ongoing pro­gress of the Ira­nian nuclear program. The following describes relevant details from both situations and the pertinent leaders’ roles. north ­k o rea’ s n u clea r pro gra m and presid ent d o na ld  j. tru mp ­Because of the con­temporary nature of the Trump presidency and b ­ ecause of Trump’s lack of relevant prepresidential po­liti­cal experience, elsewhere I preliminarily describe Trump as a proliferation pessimist.1 This characterization stems from an early and consistent focus on the dangers of WMD terrorism as a consequence of nuclear proliferation. Notably, since his inauguration in 2016, a dramatic escalation of rhe­toric, hostility, and the risk of war has characterized the US-­DPRK relationship. Nearly si­mul­ta­neously to the North’s expanding intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, the Trump administration expanded its belligerence against the Kim Jong Un regime. What began in 2017 as a policy of “maximum pressure” and engagement evolved into “fire and fury” and explicit, open discussion of military options, including giving North K ­ orea “a bloody nose.”2 Such developments could indicate a growing concern over the North’s lack of deterrability, though this possibility remains conjecture. The North responded with bluster regarding its growing ability to strike the US mainland and threats of preemptive attack and escalation to all-­out war.3 Though international fears ­rose, the aggressive rhe­toric led not to war in 2018, but instead to two historic meetings. President Trump and Leader Kim met initially in June 2018, in the first-­ever meeting of the two countries’ sitting leaders. This Singapore Summit yielded a pledge to improve bilateral relations, build a peaceful and stable Korean peninsula, and recover remains of missing Korean War soldiers. North ­Korea agreed to work ­toward denuclearization, though the precise meaning of and pro­cess for achieving this

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goal was left unspecified. Trump and Kim also appeared to get along swimmingly in terms of their interpersonal relationship. Unfortunately, the bliss was short-­lived. A follow-up meeting in Hanoi in February 2019 ended prematurely, with no agreement secured. Allegedly, Trump demanded that the North surrender all of its nuclear weapons. The North required an end to all sanctions squeezing the regime.4 Both sides refused to budge from their demands, and the meeting concluded without resolution. Since this meeting, tensions have again escalated: intelligence revealed new missile development within North ­Korea, and the North indicated that the United States w ­ ill face “undesired” outcomes if it fails to offer a new position on the nuclear issue.5 Not enough time has passed to know definitively what, if any, military action received serious consideration within the Trump administration. Coupled with the advancing size and range of the DPRK’s nuclear arsenal, however, ­there are sizable risks that such rhe­toric could ignite a conflagration. That said, contemporaneous accounts from the Trump administration indicate that military intervention was likely u ­ nder discussion. However, one critical distinction separates this period from the early 1990s, when Clinton considered the use of force: North ­Korea is now armed with nuclear weapons and has been since at least 2006, and perhaps even as far back as 2003. This distinction is noteworthy for multiple reasons. First, a North ­Korea armed with nuclear weapons is, according to the coding scheme deployed throughout this book, not a target for the consideration of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. As I have used this term throughout this book, “preventive force” is a strategy for trying to prevent a state from acquiring nuclear weapons or to destroy a very nascent capability. For North ­Korea, or any nuclear state with advanced capabilities, that cat is now out of the bag. At pre­sent, when commentators include “preventive war” in their lists of current policy considerations, in real­ity they are describing a counterforce operation, in which the United States would seek to disarm an already nuclear power. While appropriate terminologically to think of another type of preventive war as intended to forestall an adversary’s augmentation of power relative to one’s own, such a use of force is not preventive counterproliferation as described in this book. This is not the first time the United States has contemplated a preventive war to disarm an already nuclear adversary. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower contemplated instigating a war against the Soviet Union while its nuclear arsenal was still nascent. Following the first Soviet atomic test in 1949, the preventive logic grew prevalent within Truman’s State and Defense Departments, as well as in ele­ments of the military establishment, though Truman himself favored attack only in response to Soviet aggression.6 As the Soviet nuclear capability advanced, Eisenhower looked more seriously at prevention, convening Proj­ect Solarium, a national strategy exercise to

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evaluate US policy vis-­à-­vis an increasingly nuclear-­capable USSR.7 ­After significant personal deliberation, Eisenhower de­cided that the aftermath of waging war against the Soviets imperiled the very democracy he sought to protect.8 The costs of winning a nuclear war against a totalitarian regime ­were too high if US democracy would not survive the necessary occupation and reconstruction. Second, this nuance is more than semantic; the implications of the North’s acquisition are significant. In 1994, the Clinton administration was already concerned with the costs of military engagement with North K ­ orea. ­Today, any mission must account for the fact that the DPRK can respond with nuclear weapons against Seoul; US personnel in the region; and, ­after the North’s 2016 and 2017 ICBM tests, the mainland United States. Moreover, the lack of intelligence about the precise location of each nuclear weapon the North has produced since 2006 remains unknown, making any US mission likely to be nuclear instead of conventional.9 Much has been written recently on the merits of such an operation; it is not the time to revisit this discussion ­here.10 Although ­there ­were initial reasons to be concerned that President Trump’s nuclear beliefs might have made him likely to consider a military intervention, no such intervention occurred. Regardless, one discomforting implication of the foregoing analy­sis of US interaction with the North Korean nuclear program is that it may be better to attack early, when a nuclear program is just in formation, rather than wait u ­ ntil ­later, when the e­ nemy is now a fully nuclear-­armed state. While difficult to contemplate the associated risks, this is the central notion at the heart of the preventive logic; it is therefore a question leaders are likely to face if and when additional states pursue nuclear weapons of their own. If the ability to deter the state once armed with nuclear weapons is in doubt, or the consequences for the preventer state’s regional or global policy are severe, then a preventive intervention to forestall a nuclear program may be the least negative option available. is ra el, the u ni ted states, a n d i ra n The Iran case pre­sents a distinct analytical challenge for ­those interested in the international counterproliferation picture. This is a multiparty situation in operation. Not only are ­there two dyads to explore—­the United States–­Iran and Israel-­Iran—­but ­there is also a triangle to analyze as the United States and Israel are working in parallel and in concert to confront the Ira­nian nuclear program.11 Given the number of actors and their vari­ous interactions, exploration of the decision making is more complicated. Tomes have been written on the Ira­nian nuclear program.12 This lit­er­a­ture includes both US and Israeli efforts to forestall Iran’s program.13 Existing material also explores specific strategies that might be or have been deployed to try to prevent the Ira­nian program from successfully yielding nuclear

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weapons.14 Instead, I focus on events following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or Iran deal) in 2017. I highlight what the leader-­centric argument offers in analyzing the situation. In May 2018, President Trump fulfilled an early campaign pledge to withdraw the United States from the “worst deal ever.”15 The JCPOA was signed during the Obama administration and aimed to limit the Ira­nian nuclear capability and prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Since the JCPOA did not remove 100 ­percent of the Ira­nian capacity and knowledge for building nuclear weapons (something theoretically and practically impossible), Trump pledged to do better by removing US participation from the deal. Since then, as in the North Korean case, tensions have risen between the US and Iran and between Iran and its regional rivals, including Israel. Following US withdrawal, the remaining participants—­the permanent five members of the UN Security Council and Germany—­vowed to uphold the agreement and its terms from 2015. In exchange for maintaining peaceful uses of its nuclear program, by limiting sensitive uranium enrichment capabilities and destroying plutonium production ability (the two pathways Iran could use to produce the fissile material fuel necessary for nuclear weapons), Iran would receive economic and po­liti­cal integration with the world community.16 Over time, however, tensions have begun to fray. Subsequent to its withdrawal, the United States imposed a variety of sanctions on Iran for its nuclear program and other nefarious be­ hav­ ior in the ­ Middle East.17 In April 2018, Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu dramatically showcased new intelligence purporting to highlight Ira­nian duplicity and continued efforts to build nuclear weapons.18 In the summer of 2019, t­here ­were two attacks on US assets in the region, for which the United States blames Iran. The attacks targeted two tankers navigating the Strait of Hormuz carry­ ing materials related to the oil and energy markets and a drone conducting reconnaissance in international ­waters.19 In June, President Trump ordered and then recalled an attack on radar and missile batteries. Also in June, the international community learned that Iran would likely exceed materials quotas designed to limit the amount of fissile material Iran maintained inside the country.20 Consequently, concern grew that the Trump administration was marching to war, e­ ither b ­ ecause that was its goal or ­because the administration might stumble into war inadvertently.21 At the time of writing, this situation is ongoing. As such, it is impossible to know how the current interactions or the broader challenges w ­ ill conclude. Deliberations regarding how to proceed are currently shrouded in secrecy. We do know, however, that Israel and the United States have worked in concert before to try to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, for example with the Stuxnet computer virus designed to cause Ira­nian centrifuges to malfunction. We also know that President Obama pushed for the nuclear deal in part to keep Israel from attacking Iran militarily.22 It stands

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to reason, therefore, that if the situation continues to worsen, considerations of the use of force should return to the forefront. Internally, Israeli domestic politics are more complicated than usual. New elections in April 2019 returned Netanyahu to the prime minister’s office for a rec­ord fifth term. Netanyahu appears to be a proliferation pessimist, deeply concerned about the spread of nuclear weapons. He is especially attuned to the dangers of proliferation by Israel’s enemies in the M ­ iddle East. Since the 2000s, he has been vocal about the dangers Iran poses both to Israel and the world, ­because of Iran’s theocratic and fundamentalist religious tenets that suggest a lack of deterrability. Netanyahu has repeatedly compared Iran to Nazi Germany and drawn parallels to the Holocaust, this time with nuclear weapons.23 He has historically supported the use of force to prevent Ira­nian proliferation, including in 2012, when he undertook very serious consideration of the preventive attack strategy.24 A preliminary assessment of Netanyahu thus suggests he would be very likely to consider military force as a counterproliferation strategy against Iran, though it remains unclear how long he w ­ ill remain in office. New elections, the fourth in two years, have been called for spring 2021. Back in the United States, the possibility of the use of preventive military force against Iran has not entirely dis­appeared. Upon entering office, the new presidential administration of Joseph R. Biden Jr. committed to returning to nuclear and other negotiations with Iran. However, returning to negotiations is no small task given tensions among all JCPOA participants following the US withdrawal and changing circumstances on the ground since 2018.25 Further, President Biden has historically, publicly, and repeatedly supported the use of force to forestall an Ira­nian nuclear weapon should negotiations fail.26 If ­these public and preliminary statements reflect Biden’s prepresidential and privately held beliefs, then they suggest that he is like Trump and Netanyahu, a proliferation pessimist who is deeply concerned about an Iran armed with nuclear weapons. Consequently, if negotiations resume between Iran and the US and subsequently fail, or fail to get off the ground in the first place, the use of force may return to consideration. With Biden or other­wise, if any f­uture American and Israeli leaders are both inclined t­ oward the military option, they would make a potent combination. Two proliferation pessimists and two leaders who view a nuclear-­ armed Iran as undeterrable, could make for a volatile situation, especially if Ira­nian regional escalation continues. If potential costs from an intervention can be managed by both the US and Israel, then force may be especially likely to result. And, if the remaining members of the JCPOA move to support military action, hostilities become even more likely to emerge. Additionally, if the United States continues to draw down its regional presence, removing potential Ira­nian targets for retaliation, a ­future American president may be more likely to green-­light or support an in­de­pen­dent Israeli strike. Especially if Netanyahu or the next Israeli leader feels he or she has the domestic

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po­liti­cal and military support to carry out their preferences, this combination of f­ actors could yield a power­ful push for military action. The Ira­nian nuclear situation is changing rapidly and domestic po­liti­cal events in both the United States and Israel continue to shift. What can we say with certainty in light of this book’s findings, is that we must observe and analyze the prior nuclear beliefs of t­ hose in executive office in both the United States and in Israel. Regardless of who they might be, two proliferation pessimists who view Iran as unlikely to be deterred would be very likely to consider and, if circumstances allow, use military force. Potential costs and dangers—­escalation to a wider war, uncertainty over the ability to destroy 100 ­percent of the relevant military targets, and so on—­may be insufficient to prevent a military undertaking.

Theory, Practice, and ­Future Research All Options on the T ­ able has argued that leaders have prior nuclear beliefs about the broad dangers of nuclear proliferation and the consequences of par­tic­u­lar states armed with nuclear weapons. T ­ hese beliefs shape how leaders view specific nuclear challenges once they are ensconced in executive office and can help analysts and scholars predict how likely leaders are to consider the use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. This argument has implications for theory, empirical knowledge, and the practice of policy. Theoretically, this book sheds light on a critical international relations debate about the consequences of nuclear proliferation. Rather than definitively demonstrating that ­either the nuclear optimists or the nuclear pessimists are “correct,” this book shows that nuclear beliefs are subjectively held and ­will vary depending on the individual in question. In other words, this central debate ­will remain somewhat unsettled, as p ­ eople can reasonably disagree despite having access to the identical information. Furthermore, the leader-­ centric argument offers a useful addition to the scholarship on nuclear weapons by extending the focus of the broader international relations lit­er­a­ture on the role of leaders into the nuclear weapons and counterproliferation environments. We now know that beliefs ­matter for strategy decisions even in the nuclear realm. Empirically, this book demonstrates that the leader-­centric argument offers traction both historically and contemporaneously. It usefully explains Cold War nuclear developments, post–­Cold War instances of proliferation, and events occurring in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. While primarily focusing on US decision making, the book also considers the Israeli context and thus begins to chip away at the limitations of extant scholarship’s US-­centric perspective. In addition, this book sheds light on ongoing con­ temporary situations with Iran and North ­Korea and offers a road map for

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analyzing ­these situations as they develop, as well as the new situations that ­will undoubtedly emerge. Scholars and analysts can therefore look at history to understand how current and ­future leaders ­will approach nuclear challenges as they occur. From a policy perspective, this analy­sis reveals that citizens should pay attention to candidates’ preoffice period for clues about how leaders are likely to behave ­later once in office. In other words, ­people’s early lives and prior government positions offer clues for how they may act in f­ uture situations, and voters can glean useful information that can assist them in deciding how to cast ballots. This attention is especially impor­tant for candidates for the highest office in the land. Likewise, policy professionals should investigate the views and actions of leaders when they w ­ ere candidates and ju­nior officials to anticipate how they may be likely to act in the ­future when nuclear proliferation challenges emerge. Preventive military force, like most military action, can be especially destabilizing in environments that are already volatile or unstable. Policy makers can get out ahead of ­these situations and make better policy decisions with more relevant information on how national leaders may be inclined to behave. In this way, campaigns may offer more useful information than other­wise assumed. A variety of additional areas of research emerge to be explored in light of the pre­sent analy­sis. First, the current investigation has not asked why dif­ fer­ent leaders pursue dif­fer­ent types or scales of interventions. Certain episodes exhibit a ­limited or pinprick preventive attack, ­others showcase a full intervention to target the proliferator, and still ­others involve an intervention aiming for regime change. ­There may well be patterns to this be­hav­ior—­ related to leader beliefs or other­wise—­and ­future research can usefully explore this issue. Second, much more remains to learn about the efficacy of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. Presently, ­there exist competing conclusions from individual proliferation episodes, and a more general assessment of the strategy’s efficacy is warranted.27 Third, lurking ­behind this manuscript is a question about why some states consider and use preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy more than ­others. While the United States and Israel are the subject of this analy­ sis for myriad reasons previously described, this choice is at least in part a result of the variation and frequency of consideration and use of preventive force in t­ hese two states. It remains unclear why other states turn to preventive military force less often or, as in the case of China, never do, as far as the available historical rec­ord suggests. Scholars have argued that t­ here is an existing norm against the use of preventive war to ­counter proliferation and for other purposes. My analy­sis demonstrates that if true, this norm is of marginal consequence in US and Israeli decision making for the cases explored. Scholars should therefore investigate to what extent such a norm has ever existed and to what extent the norm is imperiled now. It is pos­si­ble that ­earlier cases, like that of US

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decision making vis-­à-­vis the Soviet Union, might offer more resonance.28 Shimon Peres referenced international l­egal ramifications as part of his opposition to the Osiraq bombing, as did the chief of operations of the Indian Air Force when he advised Indira Gandhi against attacking Pakistan. But ­these appear as the exceptions to the rule. Over time, to the extent that the norm even exists, the past few de­cades appear to have undermined the norm’s influence, if not negated it entirely. As the frequency of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy appears to be on the rise, ­future research should explore this purported norm’s alleged origins, influence, and continued existence.

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Notes

1. When Leaders Use Preventive Military Force   1. Michael Dobbs, “The Price of a 50-­Year Myth,” New York Times, October 15, 2012, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2012​/­10​/­16​/­opinion/ ​ ­the​-­eyeball-​ ­to​-­eyeball-​ ­myth​-­and​-­the​-­cuban​ -­missile​-­crisiss​-­legacy​.­html.   2.  Saunders 2011; Green 2012.   3.  Nuclear optimism and pessimism are two academic theories of nuclear proliferation; I use (nuclear) “optimist” and “pessimist” slightly differently to describe policy makers who subscribe to such views regarding stability and other­wise.   4. A related question is w ­ hether or not the proliferating state observes the would-be preventer’s decision making and uses this information in the proliferating state’s own decisions. This question requires a dif­fer­ent research design to assess. For relevant work, see Monteiro and Debs 2014.   5.  Greenstein and Immerman 1992; Saunders 2011; Waltz 2001.   6.  George 1969; Byman and Pollack 2001, 2019; Jervis 2013.   7.  Hermann 1980; Goldgeier 1994; Horo­witz and Stam 2014; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2011; Colgan 2013; Saunders 2009; Rosen 2009; Hymans 2006; Fuhrmann and Horo­witz 2015; Lebovic 2013; Way and Weeks 2014; Whitlark 2017.   8.  George 1969.   9.  The operational code research program was continued by Stephen Walker and his protégés. For example, Schafer and Walker 2006. 10.  Barber 1968; Hermann and Hagan 1998. 11.  E. E. Jones and Harris 1967; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Simon 1985; Khong 1992; B. D. Jones 1999; Mercer 2010. 12.  McCrae and Costa 1985; Gerber et al. 2011; Gallagher and Allen 2014. 13.  Horo­witz and Stam 2014 explore the role of previous military experience. This variable offers no useful traction in explaining ­either variation in preventive military be­hav­ior among similarly experienced individuals or varying be­hav­ior by the same leader; see also Sechser 2004. 14. ­These beliefs might be part of a larger belief system. To explore this question would require a dif­fer­ent book. 15.  Horo­witz, McDermott, and Stam 2005. 16.  Murray 1996; Eden and Miller 1989.

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NOTES TO PAGES 6–17

17.  Jervis 1976; Kirshner 2000. 18. Holsti 1962; J. Goldstein et al. 1993; Saunders 2011; Green 2012; Stein 2017; Hafner-­ Burton et al. 2017. 19.  Waltz 1979; Morgenthau 1948; Gilpin 1981; Copeland 2000. 20.  Fearon 1995. 21.  Levy 2011. 22.  Levy 2011, 88. 23.  I use “preventive war,” “preventive use of force,” and “preventive intervention” interchangeably. Distinctions between ­these terms are discussed in chapter 2. 24.  Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Debs and Monteiro 2014; Schneider 1995; L. Goldstein 2006. 25.  Debs and Monteiro 2014, for example, do not discuss substate dynamics within the bureaucracy or at the executive level. Debs and Monteiro, 2016, 19 notes explic­itly, “We wager that more explanatory leverage can be obtained by focusing on the features of the security environment a state ­faces than on the psychological makeup of its leaders.” 26.  The choice of a large-­N quantitative analy­sis for this small universe is questionable, given the disproportionate role that the United States and Israel play. ­These two states may be skewing the findings. 27.  L. Goldstein 2006; Schneider 1995. 28.  Tannenwald 2007, 374–76. 29.  For state-­centric work, see Sagan 1996/1997; Solingen 2007; Paul 2000. For leader-­centric work, see Hymans 2006; Fuhrmann and Horo­witz 2015; Way and Weeks 2014; Whitlark 2017. 30.  On why this is so, see Saunders 2009, 120; see also Byman and Pollack 2001. 31.  Thaler 2000; M. Rabin 1998; Jervis 1976; McDermott 1998. 32.  See Saunders 2011 for a comparable research design. 33.  Darnton 2017/2018, 111–15. 34.  Lustick 1996. 35.  Saunders 2009; Green 2012. 36.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2019. 37.  George and Bennett 2005. 38.  Saunders 2011.

2. Explaining Preventive War as a Counterproliferation Strategy   1.  Reiter 1995, 6–7.   2. The preventive logic features prominently in realist lit­er­a­ture, including Waltz 1979, Morgenthau 1948, Gilpin 1981, and Copeland 2000.   3.  I use “proliferation” and “acquisition” to refer to the same phenomenon of horizontal proliferation: new, successful attainment of nuclear weapons by another state.   4.  Following the 2003 war in Iraq, the mere mention of preventive war raises questions of legality, distinctions between prevention and preemption, and US domestic politics. H ­ ere I set aside the ­legal questions for ­legal experts. For a discussion of terminology, see Reiter 1995, 6.   5.  Levy 2011. This is arguably the case ­because nuclear weapons may dramatically alter the balance of power, significantly augmenting the power of the previously nonnuclear state.   6.  Levy 1987, 90.   7.  For an alternative perspective on this classification, see Kurtulus 2007.   8.  Organski 1968; Gilpin 1981; Copeland 2000.   9.  Copeland 2000, 5. 10.  Monteiro and Debs 2014. 11.  Debs and Monteiro 2014. 12.  L. Goldstein 2006. 13.  Waltz 1979, 2001; Jervis 1970. 14.  Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010. 15.  For bureaucratic politics, see Allison 1969; on public opinion, Berinsky 2009; other pos­si­ble explanations exist, including normative arguments and explanations concerning

198

NOTES TO PAGES 18–23

civil-­military relations. ­These are not compelling. Normative arguments have difficulty explaining the post–­Cold War period, in which prevention was used frequently; the cases demonstrate that leaders often go against the military’s recommendation. On t­hese arguments see Silverstone 2007, Quester 2000, Sechser 2004, and Sagan 1993. 16.  See for example, Wright 1964, Fordham 1998, and Mansfield and Snyder 1995. 17.  Saunders 2017. 18.  I do not explain belief formation or why certain ­people have certain beliefs; both topics are beyond the scope of this book. 19.  Saunders 2011; Horo­witz and Stam 2014; Chiozza and Goemans 2011; Croco 2011; Colgan 2013; Rosen 2009. 20.  Fuhrmann and Horo­witz 2015; Hymans 2006; Lebovic 2013; Way and Weeks 2014. 21.  Allison and Halperin 1972. 22.  Milner and Tingley 2015. 23.  On Congress’s constraining role, see Howell and Peve­house 2007; for a more ­limited role, see Meernik 1994. 24.  Saunders 2019. 25.  Goldgeier and Saunders 2018. 26.  This may be less true in the US-­Soviet context when the Soviets first developed a nuclear capability, but even then potential conflict became existential only when both states had massive arsenals. Moreover, b ­ ecause what is “existential” is a subjective question, beliefs should still be relevant, though variation may be narrower. 27.  Jervis 1976, chap. 1; Wolfers 1962, chap. 1. For an example of recent first-­image scholarship, see Yarhi-­Milo 2018. 28.  I leave the question of origins for ­future work. 29.  Wendt 1999; Finnemore 2004; Barnett 1998; Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1999. 30.  This notion draws on Saunders 2009. 31.  Belief divergence is consistent with rationalist models. See Kirshner 2000, 145–50; and Fearon 1995. 32. “Belief,” Oxford En­glish Dictionary, accessed September 24, 2018, https://­en​.­oxford​dic​ tionaries​.­com​/­definition​/­belief. 33.  J. Goldstein et al. 1993, 7–8. 34.  Stein 2017. 35.  Simon 1985; Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Allison 1971; Janis 1972; Jervis 1970, 1976; Larson 1989; McDermott 1998; Khong 1992; Neustadt and May 1988; May 1973. 36.  Hafner-­Burton et al. 2017, S14. 37.  Holsti 1962; George 1969; cited in Saunders 2011, chap. 2. 38.  Hafner-­Burton et al. 2017, S4; 2014. 39.  Saunders 2011; Kertzer 2017; Horo­witz, Stam, and Ellis 2015. 40.  Hafner-­Burton et al. 2017, S18–21. 41.  Hafner-­Burton et al. 2017, S22. 42.  George 1969; Schafer and Walker 2006. 43.  Saunders 2011, 5. 44.  Yarhi-­Milo 2013. 45.  Saunders 2011. 46.  On relative power, see Morgenthau 1948, Gilpin 1981, R. Powell 1991, and Copeland 2000. On reputation and credibility, see, for example, Press 2005 and Mercer 2010. From the voluminous audience costs lit­er­a­ture, see Fearon 1994 and Schultz 2001. On the nuclear taboo, see Tannenwald 2007. On ­legal considerations, see Silverstone 2007. 47.  J. Goldstein et al. 1993. On decision making u ­ nder uncertainty, see Tversky and Kahneman 1974; March and Olsen 1975. 48. Disagreement over other ­factors is less likely; while leaders may disagree about the meaning derived from intelligence estimates (reflecting beliefs I argue are consequential), debating content is less likely. While we might suspect beliefs about the efficacy of the use of force or leaders’ relative risk propensities to be causally significant, empirically ­those suspicions are not borne out.

199

NOTES TO PAGES 23–26

49.  Jervis 1976, 20. 50.  For an overview of the debate, see Lavoy 1995 and Feaver 1995. 51.  For optimism’s intellectual history, see Kroenig 2015 and Lavoy 1995. Well-­known examples include Waltz 1981; Sandoval 1976, 17–19; Viner 1946, 53–58. 52.  Sandoval 1976, 19. 53.  Waltz 1981; t­hose arguing similarly include Weltman 1995, Mesquita and Riker 1982, Brito and Intriligator 1983, and Van Creveld 1993. 54.  Additional optimists have focused on specific regions: Shai Feldman, Steven Rosen, and Paul Jabber on the M ­ iddle East; George Perkovich, Devin Hagerty, and Peter Lavoy on South Asia; and John Mearsheimer, Steven Van Evera, and Barry Posen on Eu­rope. 55.  Sagan and Waltz 2002; Sagan 1993; Iklé 1960. 56.  Dunn 1977. 57.  Sagan 1993; see especially chapters 2 and 5 in Sagan and Waltz 2002. 58. Many pessimists noted the special f­actors that governed the US-­Soviet relationship, making it relatively stable. T ­ hese included geographic separation, learning that developed before the Soviets acquired a large arsenal, and good intelligence about each other. 59.  This relativist view has been articulated by scholars including Michael Mandelbaum, Robert Jervis, and Jed Snyder and, as Peter Lavoy describes in detail, has characterized much of American administration proliferation policy in the latter part of the twentieth ­century. See Mandelbaum 1995, Jervis 1988, and Wohlstetter et al. 1991. 60.  Schlesinger, 174–84 in Dougherty and Lehman 1967. 61.  Following Glaser, I define state type according to motivations and identify states as ­either status quo or revisionist. Glaser 2010. 62.  Glaser 1989; Jervis 1984, 37–40. 63.  Glaser 1989, 111; Snyder 1961; Jervis 1979. 64.  Eden and Miller (1989) describe the nature of nuclear arguments as mostly irresolvable and resting on ­people’s interpretations. For example, though some data w ­ ere available for attempting to understand the Soviets’ intentions, much remained unknown. It is almost impossible to perfectly divine another’s intentions. Analyzing the other’s actions for hints about intentions requires significant amounts of interpretation. State intentions are often shrouded in secrecy, especially when facing an adversary; enemies locked in a contest of survival often deliberately aim for misperception. Even when unintentional, so much requires interpretation that the same evidence often appears differently to dif­fer­ent ­people. 65.  Yarhi-­Milo 2013. 66.  Jervis 1976, 19–20; Saunders 2011, 28. 67.  International relations uses the language of a state’s type and level of resolve. With national executives unlikely to use this vocabulary, I explore instead what leaders believed regarding the other state’s goals or intentions, the adversary’s desire and ability to limit the would-be preventer state’s mobility, and the adversary’s level of cost sensitivity. 68.  Eden and Miller 1989. 69.  Eden 1989, 4; quoting Howard 1981, 8. 70.  Morgenthau 1967 uses this terminology; Jervis 1976 describes ac­cep­tance or rejection of the status quo or definitions of state be­hav­ior based on the costs and risks a state is willing to tolerate in achieving its goals. 71.  Jervis 1976; see chap. 3 for the deterrence and spiral models of interaction. 72.  Seay 1989, 52. 73.  Seay 1989, 49. Champions of this perspective include former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, Defense Department official Richard Perle, and Rus­sian historian Richard Pipes. 74.  Glaser 1989, 118, 120. 75.  Proponents of this view include Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I negotiator Raymond Garthoff, scholar David Holloway, and former ambassador George Kennan. 76.  Seay 1989, 51. Subscribers to this view include former national security advisor Henry Kissinger, Sovietologist Coit Blacker, and Adam Ulam, among o ­ thers. 77.  See for example, Morgenthau 1948; Glaser 2010; Schweller 1994.

200

NOTES TO PAGES 27–36

78. Another significant issue in deterrence calculations is the credibility of the would-be preventer. The preventer’s credibility or lack thereof should affect the state attempting to go nuclear. For a similar discussion concerning proliferation, see Debs and Monteiro 2014. Since this proj­ect examines only the decision making of the would-be preventer and not that of the proliferator, this issue is beyond the scope of analy­sis ­here. 79.  Seay 1989, 120. 80.  An alternative possibility is that a state could be highly resolved and also deterred, if the complementary assurance is clear and credible. If, however, leaders focus on resolve as high-­ cost tolerance (as described e­ arlier), such resolve would indicate greed or a desire to overturn the status quo. I treat this question as an empirical one. 81. An in­ter­est­ing duality exists regarding the dilemma of timing: a preventive strike can theoretically be most effective if done early in a program’s development, but unambiguous information about a program often develops only l­ ater. 82.  This decision remains centrally a cost-­benefit analy­sis in which the vari­ous costs and consequences of an intervention are assessed against the vari­ous costs and consequences of not intervening. The leader’s nuclear beliefs facilitate individual assessment of the relevant input ­factors. 83.  Raas and Long 2007, 30. 84.  For simplicity, I describe this pro­cess as linear, though in real­ity components may interact si­mul­ta­neously. 85.  Planning for and conducting a preventive intervention may occur in secret. To enter into the universe, however, cases must become known, even if a­ fter the fact. 86. US intelligence estimates have often been inaccurate regarding other states’ nuclear programs—­their speed of development and their very existence or lack thereof. See, for example, Bowen, Dover, and Goodman 2014. Despite such flawed estimates, the situation can still catalyze the belief-­driven decision-­making pro­cess described ­here. 87.  Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011. 88.  Madeleine Albright, interviewed by Jim Lehrer, December 17, 1998, transcript, US Department of State Archives, Washington, DC, accessed July 27, 2020, https://­1997​-­2001​.­state​ .­gov​/­statements​/­1998​/­981217b​.­html. 89. ­People may therefore have dif­fer­ent valuations as well as definitions of success. Such differences should affect individuals’ assessments of the potential costs and benefits of any par­ tic­u­lar intervention. 90.  I use “prepresidential” and “preexecutive” interchangeably to refer to the period before a leader assumes executive office. 91.  On learning, see Jervis 1976, chap. 4; Axelrod 1984; Levy 1994; Reiter 1994; Renshon 2008; On learning from history, see Jervis 1976, chap. 6; Khong 1992; Vertzberger 1986; Bennett 1999; May 1973; see also Saunders 2009, 131. 92.  Leaders without much thought on related topics may be more susceptible to persuasion by advisers. Where relevant, this possibility is explored in the cases. Saunders 2017. 93.  Kapur 2005; Bell 2015. Leaders are unlikely to speak in terms of “emboldenment” or the “stability-­instability paradox” but could engage similar concepts regarding the potential implications of nuclear weapons acquisition. 94.  For each president, I describe other nuclear be­hav­ior undertaken during his administration. This be­hav­ior includes, but is not l­imited to, arms control negotiations and treaties and participation in relevant international organ­izations. This material is not specifically related to the coding of the first in­de­pen­dent variable. However, I pre­sent the information to provide a more complete portrait of the leader in question. The security studies scholarship does not directly address potential connections between one’s views on the consequences of nuclear proliferation and positions on arms control. While some logical connections can be hypothesized, ­future work should explore this intersection. 95.  Saunders 2009; Green 2012. 96.  The pre­sent analy­sis combines the types of use of force. ­Future work should separate the types according to their associated costs and analyze the pathways that lead to each type of intervention strategy.

201

NOTES TO PAGES 36–44

97.  The possibility princi­ple holds that “only cases where the outcome of interest is pos­si­ble should be included in the set of negative cases; cases where the outcome is impossible should be relegated to a set of uninformative and hence irrelevant observations.” Mahoney and Goertz 2004. 98.  As an example, consider the combination of Samoa and Tuvalu. Samoa has no armed forces and thus it is beyond the realm of possibility for them to attack Tuvalu, or any state in the manner described h ­ ere. Furthermore, Tuvalu never pursued a nuclear weapons program, so t­ here is no program for Samoa to target. 99.  Cases are bounded to reflect the time period when one state had u ­ nder consideration the use of force against the adversary, and cases include the short-­term post-­nuclear test period when a state might have had a nascent nuclear arsenal, as appropriate. While some might argue cases should conclude with an adversary’s first nuclear test, the posttest period may still be considered appropriate for preventive military force, as it is unlikely that changes in the strategic balance would happen immediately thereafter. Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, appendix. 100.  Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, 837. 101.  Stated differently, an adversarial relationship is a necessary but not sufficient condition to trigger the contemplation of the use of force. 102.  This is not to say that elites in ­these circumstances uniformly supported ­these instances of proliferation. Rather, the use of force was simply not contemplated as a potential strategy to prevent the proliferation. 103. For work exploring a broad array of counterproliferation tools, see Cone 2020 and Mehta 2020. On US nonproliferation policy and decision making, see Taliaferro 2019 and Miller 2018. On US nuclear policy broadly, see Maddock 2010 and Gavin 2012a. 104.  Schweller 1992; Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010.

3. JFK and LBJ Confront China’s Nuclear Program   1.  For a similar research design, see Saunders 2009.   2.  Theoretically ­there could have been some latent quality of electability that Kennedy used in choosing Johnson, thinking of a f­ uture presidential election. This possibility is unlikely, however, given the well-­documented and terse relationship that existed between the two. Furthermore, Kennedy frequently excluded Johnson from impor­tant ­matters especially on foreign affairs. As one illustrative example, a­ fter the Cuban missile crisis JFK did not include Johnson on a list of ­people from Kennedy’s team whom he would like to see as president. See Caro 2012, 196, 222, for a discussion of this episode and the broader relationship.   3.  Debs and Monteiro 2014; Goldstein 2006.   4.  Allison and Halperin 1972; Bendor and Hammond 1992.   5.  Allison 1971, 175.   6.  Mintrom 1997; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Kingdon 1984.   7.  Johnson had a very ­limited role in Kennedy’s foreign policy deliberations, as Kennedy believed LBJ to be of ­little to no value in foreign relations. Indeed, Kennedy deliberately kept LBJ “at arm’s length in the management of foreign affairs” and “had no desire to give Johnson a more central part in shaping foreign policy.” Dallek 1998, 16–17, citing an oral history by Charles Bartlett, Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas (hereafter LBJL).   8. “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Status of the Gilpatric Report Authored by Spurgeon Keeny” March 26, 1965, document 17, folder “Gilpatric Panel [2 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL.   9.  “Selected Statements on Non-­dissemination of Nuclear Weapons by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara: January–­November 1964,” no author listed, folder “General Selected Statements on Non-­dissemination of Nuclear Weapons—­ Pres./Rusk/McNamara, 1/64-11/64,” National Security File, Committee File Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, box 7, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 10.  I thank the LBJ Library for assistance with Rowen’s identification.

202

NOTES TO PAGES 44–46

11.  Memo to McGeorge Bundy from Robert W. Komer, September 18, 1964, document 94, folder “Nuclear Testing China, Vol. 1 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 31, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 12.  “Selected Statements on Non-­dissemination of Nuclear Weapons by President Johnson, Secretary of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense McNamara: January–­November 1964,” folder “Nuclear Testing China, Vol. 1 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 31, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 13.  “Memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject: Status of the Gilpatric Report Authored by Spurgeon Keeny,” March 26, 1965, document 17, folder “Gilpatric Panel [2 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. This document further confirms McNamara’s nuclear pessimism in contrast to Rusk’s perceived optimism. 14. In late 1964, LBJ convened a group of distinguished private citizens to consider the spread of nuclear weapons globally. Following weeks of discussion, the group recommended a major change in US policy, including a sharp increase in nonproliferation efforts. 15.  “Memorandum of Conversation Secretary’s Meeting with the Gilpatric Committee on Non-­proliferation,” January 7, 1965, document 36, folder “Presidential Task Force Committee on Nuclear Proliferation [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 35, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 16.  Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). National Security File, Nuclear Testing—China. Top Secret. FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXX, document 51, LBJL. https://history.state​ .gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d51. 17.  Thomas L. Hughes, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to the Secretary (of State), “The Possibility of Greater Chinese Communist Militance,” Research Memorandum RFE-70, August 12, 1963, folder “China (CPR) 1961–63,” folder 1 of 3, box 410, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File (NSF), Robert W. Komer, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston (hereafter JFKL). 18.  Opinions ­were also mixed inside the NSA: Bundy was interested in force through 1964. Deputy Komer was more skeptical. M. Jones 2010, 432. 19.  The Gallup question asked, “Looking ahead to 1970, which country do you think w ­ ill be the greater threat to world peace—­Russia or Communist China?” Gallup Poll (AIPO), conducted November 6 to November 11, 1964, and based on 1,568 personal interviews. From the iPOLL Databank, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut. 20.  Folder “Nuclear Control—­Miscellaneous,” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, LBJL. This folder contains a variety of documents describing Senator Barry Goldwater and nuclear issues in the context of the 1964 presidential campaign. ­There are speech notes, memoranda, news articles and other miscellaneous items that recount Goldwater’s misstatements and high-­ranking individuals coming out prominently to correct him, including President Eisenhower. 21.  For a broad overview and additional intelligence rec­ords, see “China’s First Nuclear Test 1964–50th Anniversary,” National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 488, edited by William Burr, October 16, 2014, National Security Archive, George Washington University, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­nukevault​/­ebb488​/­. 22.  Memorandum from General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Analy­sis of the Impact of the Acquisition by Communist China of a Nuclear Capability,” June 26, 1961, Secret, John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Robert W. Komer Files, box 410, China (CPR) Nuclear Explosion (folder 2 of 2), https://­ nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­nukevault​/­ebb488​/­docs​/­Doc%202%206​-­26​-­61%20JCS%20report​.­pdf. 23.  Special Intelligence Estimate Number 13-2-62, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” April 25, 1962, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­readingroom​/­docs​/­DOC​_­0001097940​ .­pdf. 24.  Memorandum from George C. Denney, Jr., Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Secretary of State, “Probable Consequences of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Detonation,” INR Research Memorandum R-17, May 6, 1963, Secret; RG 59, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Assistant

203

NOTES TO PAGES 46–51

Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Subject, Personnel, and Country Files, 1960–63, box 21, CSM-­ Communism, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­nukevault​/­ebb488​/­docs​/­Doc%209%205​-­6​-­63%20 inr%20report​.­pdf. 25. Special Intelligence Estimate Number 13-2-63, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” July 24, 1963, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­readingroom​/­docs​/­DOC​_­0001097947​.­pdf. 26.  Director of Central Intelligence to US Intelligence Board, Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” August 26, 1964, Top Secret, excised copy, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­library​/­readingroom​/­docs​/­DOC​ _­0001095915​.­pdf. 27.  W. W. Rostow, Policy Planning Staff, to Secretary Rusk, “The H ­ andling of a Pos­si­ble Chinese Communist Nuclear Test,” September 26, 1964, Secret; RG 59, Policy Planning Council Rec­ords, 1963–64, box 265, RJ Chron File July–­December 1964, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu​ /­nukevault​/­ebb488​/­docs​/­doc%2019%20handling%20(1)​.­pdf. 28.  NIE, December 6, 1960. 29.  Richelson 2006, 143. 30.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 157. 31.  NSC 5810/1 5-5-1958, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS) 1958–60, vol. III (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1994), 100–101; see also Lüthi 2008, 249. 32.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 158. 33.  NIE 4-2-1961 in FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 37; see also Lüthi 2008, 251. 34. Lüthi 2008, 77. 35.  Hilsman 1967, 285, 290. 36.  Hilsman 1967, 289–290. 37.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 289. 38. John F. Kennedy, tele­vi­sion and radio interview, “­After Two-­Years—­a Conversation With the President,” December 17, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1963, 903. 39.  JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1, Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why ­England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—­Page 29,” pp. 1, 6. 40.  Saunders 2011. 41.  Memo from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, May 1, 1964, document 164, folder “Komer Memos, Volume 1 [3 of 3],” National Security File, Name File, box 6 [1 of 2], Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 42.  JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1, Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why ­England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—­Page 29,” pp. 1, 6. 43.  JFKL, John F. Kennedy 1 Personal Papers, box 26, series 10.1, “Appeasement at Munich”; series 10.2, Why ­England Slept; folder “Final Thesis, Carbon Typescript with Corrections, Preface—­Page 29,” pp. 1, 6. 44.  Kennedy entered ser­vice in the US Navy in October 1941 as an ensign. He served initially for the Foreign Intelligence Branch of the Office of National Intelligence in Washington, DC. Eventually, a­ fter per­sis­tent petitioning, Kennedy was granted active duty and sent to the South Pacific. 45.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, xxxi. In the introduction to Kennedy’s diary, journalist and Kennedy friend Hugh Sidey argues that by the time Franklin D. Roo­se­velt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met at Yalta to discuss the post–­World War II reor­ga­ni­za­tion of Germany and Eu­ rope, Kennedy had already discerned the Soviet threat and the looming Cold War. As Sidey says, “at the very least he discerned Soviet brutishness, the dark clouds that would turn into the cold war and the need for allied arsenals to face that challenge.” 46.  JFK, floor debate, August 17, 1951, Congressional Rec­ord, 82nd Congress, 1st session, 10234–35. 47.  Reeves 1993, 140. 48.  J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice 1964, 520; speech entitled “Imperialism: The ­Enemy of Freedom,” delivered on July 2, 1957.

204

NOTES TO PAGES 51–55

49.  J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 117–18; campaign speech, San Francisco, California, November 2, 1960. 50.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 227; discussion with John Fischer, editor-­in-­chief of Harper’s Magazine, December 9, 1959. 51.  Reeves 1993, 140; referring to President Kennedy’s May 25, 1961, speech entitled “The Goal of Sending a Man to the Moon.” 52.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 294. 53.  Hilsman 1967, 211; Kennedy, John F., “Radio and Tele­vi­sion Report to the American ­People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba,” October 22, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 80. 54.  J. F. Kennedy 1995, 7. 55.  J. F. Kennedy 1995. Hugh Sidey makes this point in the volume’s introduction. 56.  JFK, floor debate, House Congressional Resolution 252, August 24, 1950, Congressional Rec­ord, 81st Congress, 2nd session, 13400. 57.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 19; “Student Convocation at UCLA,” Los Angeles, California, November 2, 1959. 58.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 26–30. 59.  The JFK Library collection has a variety of constituent letters penned by Kennedy in which he describes his views on the dangers of proliferation and the need to have a concerted effort for international disarmament. See for example, letter from JFK to Mr. Albert Rudnick, August 11, 1959, folder “Foreign Policy Disarmament,” box 718, Papers of President Kennedy, Pre-­presidential Papers, Senate Files, Legislation, Legislation Files 1953–60, JFKL. This folder contains a variety of constituent letters with very similar content. 60.  For JFK’s views on Eu­ro­pean proliferation, see “Multilateral Nuclear Force,” Summary Rec­ord of NSC Executive Committee Meeting no. 41, February 12, 1963, FRUS 1961–1963, vol. 13, document 173; Summary Rec­ord of NSC Executive Committee Meeting no. 38 (pt. II), January 25, 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 13, document 169. 61.  One potential exception is French proliferation. Gavin 2012a argues that Kennedy appeared to assist the French nuclear development. 62.  Beschloss 1991, 570. 63. John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address,” January 20, 1961, http://­www​.­presidency​ .­ucsb​.­edu​/­ws​/­​?­pid​=8­ 032. 64.  Coleman 2006, 44. 65. Lüthi 2008, 249. 66.  Quoted in Reeves 1993, 477; J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice, 1964, 280. 67.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 24; “Student Convocation at U.C.L.A. Los Angeles, California, November 2, 1959.” 68.  Dallek 2003, 344. 69.  Dallek 2003, 344. 70.  Reeves 1993, 175. 71.  Dallek 2003, 705. 72.  Dallek 2003, 346, 608. 73. Oral history interview with Walt Rostow, http://­www​.­jfklibrary​.­org​/­Asset​-­Viewer​ /­Archives​/­JFKOH​-­WWR​-­01​.­aspx; Dallek 2003, 343. 74.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 251. 75.  “Draft—­Avoiding Nuclear War,” folder “Foreign Policy: “Avoiding Nuclear War,” Office Files of Harry J. Middleton, box 90, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 76.  J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 118. 77.  Dallek 2003, 613. 78. “U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency: Mission,” Wayback Machine, accessed July 27, 2020, https://­web​.­archive​.­org​/­web​/­20060603002952​/­http://­dosfan​.­lib​.­uic​.­edu​/­acda​ /­aboutacd​/­mission​.­htm. 79.  Dallek 2003, 613; Lebovic 2013, 54. See also Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 188.

205

NOTES TO PAGES 55–61

  80.  Dallek 2003, 615; J. F. Kennedy 1964, 280, “President’s News Conference of March 21, 1963.”   81.  R. F. Kennedy 1988, 327.   82.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 251.   83.  “State of the Union,” January 30, 1961, http://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­ws​/­index​ .­php​?­pid​=­8045.   84.  Dallek 2003, 462.   85.  Dallek 2003, 463; John F. Kennedy, “President’s News Conference of January 15, 1962,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 18.   86.  Dallek 2003, 348.   87.  Dallek 2003, 148.   88.  J. F. Kennedy 1995, 74.   89.  Dallek 2003, 74. Quoting JFK’s unpublished article “Let’s Try an Experiment for Peace.”   90.  Dallek 2003, 115.   91.  Dallek 2003, 222; “Imperialism: The E ­ nemy of Freedom,” July 2, 1957, J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice 1964.   92.  Dallek 2003, 132–33. JFK Speech, “The Time Has Come,” October 1946, JFKL Pre-­ presidential Papers, box 94.   93.  Dallek 2003, 357; quoted in Hersh 1997.   94.  Dallek 2003, 159.   95.  Dallek 2003, 149.   96.  Dallek 2003, 160. J. F. Kennedy, “Our Foreign Policy in Connection with China,” January 29, 1949, 81st Congress, 1st session, compendium, p. 41.   97.  J. F. Kennedy, “China-­Statement of Hon. John F. Kennedy, of Mas­sa­chu­setts,” February 21, 1949, Congressional Rec­ord, 81st Congress, 1st session, A993.   98.  J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 83. Nomination of Adlai E. Stevenson for President of the United States, Demo­cratic National Convention, 1956.   99.  JFK, “­Future of Soviet Foreign Policy by John Fox,” April 7, 1953, Congressional Rec­ ord, 83rd Congress, 1st session, A1833–34. 100.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 103; emphasis in original. 101.  Dallek 2003, 164. JFKL, John F. Kennedy Pre-Presidential Papers, box 95, “Remarks of Representative John F. Kennedy Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,” Washington, D.C., February 22, 1951. https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy​ -speeches/united-states-senate-committee-on-foreign-relations-19510222. 102.  J. F. Kennedy and Sorensen 1988, 238. 103.  Reeves 1993, 222. 104.  This was not a new theme for Kennedy. In 1952 on the House floor, Kennedy articulated this sentiment, arguing that falling ­behind the Soviets militarily would invite danger. J. F. Kennedy, April 9, 1952, Congressional Rec­ord, 82nd Congress, 2nd session, 3871–72. 105.  John F. Kennedy, “Radio and Tele­vi­sion Address to the American ­People: “Nuclear Testing and Disarmament,” March 2, 1962, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1962, 188. 106.  Dallek 2003, 112. JFK to Billings, February 12, 1942, Nigel Hamilton Papers, Mas­sa­chu­ setts Historical Society, Boston. 107.  J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice 1964, 994. 108.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 226. 109.  J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice 1964, 932–33. Kennedy, “A Time of Decision,” June 14, 1960. 110.  Bundy 1988, 381, 485. 111.  J. F. Kennedy 1964, 611. 112.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 20. 113.  J. F. Kennedy 1960, 48. John F. Kennedy, “The Economic Gap,” February 2, 1959, Congressional Rec­ord, 86th Congress, 1st session. 114.  J. F. Kennedy and Library of Congress Legislative Reference Ser­vice 1964, 932–33. Kennedy, “A Time of Decision,” June 14, 1960.

206

NOTES TO PAGES 62–67

115.  Chang 1988, 1290, citing Arthur Krock, no. 393, Memoranda, Book III, October 1961, Arthur Krock Papers, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Prince­ton University, Prince­ton, New Jersey; “Summary of the President’s Remarks to the National Security Council, January 18, 1962,” National Security Council Meetings, 1962, box 313, National Security files, Kennedy Papers. 116. Lüthi 2008, 249. 117.  Letter from President Kennedy to President Chiang Kai-­Shek, April 16, 1961, President’s Office Files, Countries, box 113A (China), JFKL. 118.  “Summary Rec­ord of National Security Council Meeting, July 31, 1963, 4:30 p.m.—­ Chinese Communist Intentions,” document 26, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—­NSC Meetings, [1 of 2],” box 23, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL. 119.  Burr and Richelson 2001, 67, as described by McGeorge Bundy to John McCone. 120.  R. F. Kennedy 1988, 385. 121.  Gavin 2010, 402–3. See also “Memo from Bundy to JFK,” FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 598. 122.  Saunders 2011. 123.  See Saunders 2011, 134, on the change in Johnson scholarship over time. See, for example, Goodwin 1976 for scholarship that portrays Johnson as ignorant on foreign affairs. See Dallek 1991, 1998, for the revisionist view. 124.  Heinrichs 1994, 23. 125.  Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 327. 126.  “General,” dated January 31, 1964, document 8a, folder “The President and Foreign Affairs,” National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 127.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Exchange of Letters with President Goulart of Brazil,” December 23, 1963, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 81. 128.  Wicker 1968, 195. 129.  Dallek 1991, 198. 130.  Dallek 1991, 225. 131.  Ellis 2010, 250. 132.  Dallek 1991, 272. 133.  LBJ, “Our Stake in Greece,” May 9, 1947, Congressional Rec­ord, 80th Congress, 1st session, A2202-4. 134.  Walker 1999, 83. 135.  Unger and Unger 1999, 131, citing Congressional Rec­ord, 80th Congress, 2nd session, March 5, 1948, 1056. 136.  Wicker 1968, 200–202. 137.  Dallek 1998, 86. 138.  Dallek 1991, 275, citing “Johnson Would Give Bomb to Rus­sia,” Austin Statesman, January 9, 1946. I am grateful to librarian Andrea Schwartz at the Austin Public Library, Austin, Texas, for assistance in acquiring this article. 139.  LBJ, February 18, 1946, Congressional Rec­ord, 79th Congress, 2nd session, A827-8. 140.  “Text of Speech Transcribed for Broadcast on Texas State Network” from Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, July 18, 1950, folder—­“7/18/50 Release by Sen. Johnson, regarding ‘Korean Situation,’ ” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1950–­October 1951, box 10, LBJL. 141.  June 3, 1953, Congressional Rec­ord, 83rd Congress, 1st session, 5945. 142.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Memorandum Approving Agreement on Exchange of Atomic Information with NATO and Member Nations,” June 30, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 837. 143.  Dallek 1991, 275, 300. 144.  Burr and Rosenberg 2010, 91. 145.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks in Seattle on the Control of Nuclear Weapons,” September 16, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1079. 146.  Costigliola 2010, 127. 147.  Costigliola 2010, 127. 148.  Caro 2012, 208.

207

NOTES TO PAGES 67–70

149.  Caro 2012, 212, quoting “Memorandum for the File, Meeting with the Vice President on October 21, 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The G ­ reat Crises, vol. III, October 22–28, 1962, 7. 150.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 340. 151.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “President’s News Conference of October 3, 1964,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1199; text of speech transcribed for broadcast on Texas State Network, Senator Lyndon B. Johnson, July 18, 1950, “7/18/50 Release by Sen. Johnson, regarding ‘Korean Situation,’ ” Statements of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1950–­October 1951, box 10, LBJL. 152.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Address to the U.N. General Assembly,” December 17, 1963, https://­millercenter​.­org​/­the​-­presidency​/­presidential​-­speeches​/­december​-­17​-­1963​-­address​ -­un​-­general​-­assembly#embed​-­code. 153.  “Editorial Note,” Johnson Administration, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 9, document 49. “Telephone Conversation between McGeorge Bundy and U ­ nder Secretary of State George Ball,” October 29, 1964, 9:10 a.m., Ball Papers, Disarmament, box 3, LBJL; see also Gavin 2012a, chap. 4. 154.  “Meeting of the Committee of Principals, Monday, November 23, 1964–4:30 p.m. Secretary of State’s Conference Room,” document 3, folder “CMTE of PRINS MTG Minutes Years 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965 (except ­those in other folders),” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 2, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 155.  Seaborg and Loeb 1987, 136–37. 156.  “The President’s Committee on Nuclear Proliferation: A Report to the President,” RAC no. NLJ-009R-9-1-2-1, RAC Work Station, LBJL. 157.  “US Opens Review of Atomic Policy,” New York Times, December 2, 1964, document 7, folder “Gilpatric Panel [1 of 2],” National Security File, Files of Spurgeon Keeny, box 6, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 158.  “Memorandum for the President Subject: Your Meeting with the Committee on Nuclear Proliferation,” January 21, 1965, document 37, folder “Presidential Task Force Committee on Nuclear Proliferation [2 of 2],” National Security File, Subject File, box 35, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 159.  “Memo from Robert W. Komer to McGeorge Bundy, October 6, 1964,” folder “Komer Memos, Volume 1 [3 of 3],” National Security File, Name File, box 6 (1 of 2), Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 160.  On Johnson’s foreign and nuclear policy, see Gavin 2012a; Brands 1999; Schwartz 2003. 161.  Costigliola 2010, 126, citing Fetzer 1989, 182. 162.  Costigliola 2010, 126, citing Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 219; “Telephone Conversation between Johnson and Bundy,” May 27, 1964, FRUS 1964–68, vol. 27, 135. 163.  Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 181–82. L ­ ater, in March 1965, Johnson made very similar remarks expressing the dangers of appeasement and backing down when confronting a dictator: “I ­don’t believe I can walk out [of Vietnam]. . . . ​If I did, ­they’d take Thailand. . . . ​­They’d take Cambodia. . . . ​­They’d take Burma. . . . ​­They’d take Indonesia. . . . ​­They’d take India. . . . ​ ­They’d come right back and take the Philippines . . . ​I’d be another Chamberlain and . . . ​ we’d have another Munich. The aggressors feed on blood”; quoted in Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 238. 164.  Saunders 2011. 165.  Dallek 1991, 198. 166.  Dallek 1991, 225. 167.  Dallek 1991, 382. 168.  Dallek 1991, 383–86. 169.  Dallek 1998, 291. 170.  “Letter to Mr. William F. Wingren from Lee Thomson Stull, Foreign Affairs Aide,” February 14, 1963, folder “Foreign Relations [CHINA],” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, Vice President, 1961–63, box 195, LBJL.

208

NOTES TO PAGES 70–74

171.  Garson 1997, 63. 172.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” January 8, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 116. 173.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks at Miami Beach at a Demo­cratic Party Dinner,” February 27, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 319. 174.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Commencement Address in New London at the United States Coast Guard Acad­emy,” June 3, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963, 742. 175.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Remarks in Manchester to the Members of the New Hampshire Weekly Newspaper Editors Association,” September 28, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1161. 176. “Out­ going Department of State Tele­ gram,” August 3, 1967, document 4, folder “NUCLEAR—­Nuclear Detonation—­Chinese Nuclear Tests, Joint Comm. Report On,” National Security File, Files of Charles E. Johnson, box 36, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 177.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 282. 178.  Rusk and Papp 1990, 283. 179.  Hilsman 1967, 291. 180.  M. Jones 2010, 404. 181.  M. Jones 2010, 416. 182.  Richelson 2006, 145. 183.  Richelson 2006, 152. 184.  Richelson 2006, 144. 185.  Richelson 2006, 145. 186.  Richelson 2006, 149. 187.  Reeves 1993, 136–37. 188.  “Memorandum to Mr. Bromley Smith from McGeorge Bundy,” July 30, 1963, document 34, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—­NSC Meetings, [1 of 2]),” box 23, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL. 189.  Dallek 2003, 615. See also “Rec­ord of the 508th Meeting of the National Security Council,” January 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 8 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), document 125. 190.  Reeves 1993, 510. 191.  Reeves 1993, 734. 192.  “Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff,” July 3, 1961, signed by Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, folder “China (CPR) 1961–63,” folder 2 of 3, box 410, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File, Robert W. Komer, JFKL. 193.  “The President’s Appointment with General Chiang Ching-­Kuo,” September 11, 1962, folder “China, Security, 1962–63,” box “President’s Office Files, Countries, Box 113A (China),” JFKL. 194.  Richelson 2006, 155. 195.  Richelson 2006, 155. 196.  “The Bases for Direct Action against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 22, 1964, document 111, folder—­“China Memos Vol. 1, 12/63-9/64 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Country File, Asian and the Pacific, Cambodia, China, box 237, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 197.  “Memorandum for the Rec­ord by McCone,” January 11, 1963, editorial note, FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. 12 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1996), document 162, p. 339. 198. Lüthi 2008, 254, citing Seaborg and Loeb 1981, 181, and “Notes on Remarks by the President Kennedy before NSC, 1/22/1963,” JFK, National Security Files, box 314, JFKL, “NSC Meetings 1963 No. 508, 1/22/1963.” 199.  Chang 1990, 241; Lüthi 2008, 262. 200.  For Kennedy and Harriman’s discussions, see “Tele­gram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State,” July 15, 1963, FRUS 1961–63, vol. 7, document 325, and also Chang 1990, 243; Lüthi 2008, 262.

209

NOTES TO PAGES 74–80

201.  See “Editorial Note,” FRUS 1961–63, vol. 12, document 164, describing a January 23 letter to JFK from Harriman; Richelson 2006, 548; see tele­gram to Soviet Union Embassy of the United States, FRUS 1961–63, vol. VII, 832. 202.  Reeves 1993, 547; Richelson 2006, 154. 203.  Richelson 2006, 154; see also Public Papers of the President, August 1, 1963; FRUS 1964– 68, vol. XXX, China, 24 n.7. 204.  Richelson 2006, 155. 205.  “Counterfactual Analy­sis in Security Studies: A Symposium,” 2015. 206.  Richelson 2006, 160; see August 26, 1964, SNIE—­“Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” FRUS 1964–68, vol. XXX, China, document 43. 207.  “Memo to Bundy from Rostow: The Bases for Direct Action Against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 22, 1964, document 111, folder—­“China Memos Vol. 1, 12/639/64 [2 of 2],” National Security File, Country File, Asian and the Pacific, Cambodia, China, box 237, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 208. George Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 24, 1964, National Security File, Committee File Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, box 5, folder “China,” Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 209.  Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.” 210.  Rathjens, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities.” 211.  “Non-­proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” draft position paper, August 14, 1964, FRUS 1964–1968, vol. 11 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997), document 44. 212.  George G. Rathjens, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, “Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities,” December 14, 1964, National Security Archive, George Washington University, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­NSAEBB​/­NSAEBB38​/­document21​.­pdf. 213.  McGeorge Bundy, “Memorandum for the Rec­ord,” September 15, 1964, document 2, folder “Meetings, Rec­ords, Memoranda on the Use of Nuclear Weapons,” National Security File, Intelligence File, box 9, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 214.  Richelson 2006, 162. 215.  Caro 2012, 208, 212, quoting “Memorandum for the File, Meeting with the Vice President on October 21, 1962,” in The Presidential Recordings, John F. Kennedy: The G ­ reat Crises, vol. III, October 22–28, 1962, 7. 216.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device,” October 16, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1357. 217.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “President’s News Conference of October 19, 1964,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1964, 1381. 218.  Johnson, Lyndon B., Radio and Tele­vi­sion Report to the American P ­ eople on Recent Events in Rus­sia, China, and ­Great Britain, October 18, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1379. 219.  Johnson, Lyndon B., Joint Statement Following Discussions With the President of the Philippines, October 6, 1964, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1213. 220.  Johnson 1971, 469. 221.  Johnson 1971, 469–70. 222.  Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 43. Bundy is referring to the fiftieth anniversary of Chairman Mao’s 1949 Communist Revolution. 223.  Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 43. 224.  Johnson and Beschloss 2001, 97. 225.  Richelson 2006, 153. 226.  Burr and Richelson 2001. The contents ­were conveyed to LBJ but not explored. Moreover, even if the report ended discussion, the lack of previous presidential attention is not explained. To explain this lack of attention, beliefs are required. 227.  For example, State Department cable, “Trends and Prospects in Communist China; Implications for US Policy,” August 16, 1963, folder “China (CPR) 1961–1963,” folder 1 of 3, Papers of President Kennedy, National Security File, Robert W. Komer, box 410, JFKL. 228.  “SNIE 13-4-63 Possibilities of Greater Militancy by the Chinese Communists,” document 20, 31 July 1963, folder “BKS (Kennedy Admin.—­NSC Meetings, [1 of 2], box 23, Papers

210

NOTES TO PAGES 80–90

of Bromley Smith, LBJL. SNIE 13-2-63 Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program, dated July 24, 1963, folder “13–61 to 13–65, Communist China [2 of 2],” National Security File, National Intelligence Estimates, box 4, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 229.  Saunders 2011. 230.  We can similarly speculate that had Kennedy lived to order an intervention, Johnson would likely have opposed the mission given such feasibility and cost-­centered concerns and in light of his dramatically dif­fer­ent view of the (much more l­imited) threat posed by the Chinese nuclear program. 231.  Beschloss 1991, 701. 232.  Burr and Richelson 2001. 233.  LBJL, National Security File, Country File, USSR, Dobrynin Conversations, vol. 1, Secret; prepared by Bundy on October 1, https://­history​.­state​.­gov​/­historicaldocuments​/­frus1964​ -­68v14​/­d45 234. “Summary Notes of 543rd NSC Meeting October 17, 1964: Communist China—­ Nuclear Weapon Test,” folder “NSC Meetings, Vol. 3, Tab 25, 10/17/64 Communist China,” National Security File, NSC Meetings File, box 1, Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, President, 1963–69, LBJL. 235.  Gavin 2012a, chap. 4. 236.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Report to the Nation on Events in China and the USSR,” October 18, 1964, LBJL, accessed June 9, 2020, https://­millercenter​.­org​/­the​-­presidency​/­presidential​ -­speeches​/­october​-­18​-­1964​-­report​-­nation​-­events​-­china​-­and​-­ussr. 237.  Lyndon B. Johnson, “Statement by the President on the First Chinese Nuclear Device,” October 16, 1964, accessed June 9, 2020, https://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­documents​/­statement​ -­the​-­president​-­the​-­first​-­chinese​-­nuclear​-­device. 238.  Hilsman 1967, 339. 239.  Chang, 1988, 1293. 240.  Untitled typed notes by Bromley Smith, document 4a, p. 6, especially “Portion of the NSC Meeting Minutes, Monday, October 22, 1962,” folder 5, “BKS (Kennedy Admin)—­NSC Meetings, 1962 [1 of 2],” box 22, Papers of Bromley Smith, LBJL. 241.  Costigliola 2010, 113, citing Fetzer 1989, 182.

4. Presidents 41 and 42 Engage North K­ orea’s Nuclear Program   1.  Monteiro and Debs 2014.   2. ­There is no indication that the intervention’s feasibility was questioned. Rather, each military campaign (from ­limited to expansive) was deemed doable given US air force superiority and outmatched North Korean defenses. More problematic ­were intelligence gaps about the full DPRK program and escalation risks. The risks of a wider war, however, though grave, ­were insufficient to prevent Clinton from pursuing the military option, according to Charles Allen, national intelligence officer for warning, who briefed the president on ­these ­matters. Sigal 1998, 155.   3.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 123–24.   4.  Allison 1971, 176.   5.  This theme is discussed in chapter 5.   6.  In the Chinese case, a more perfect comparison results from JFK’s assassination, yielding an exogenous shock whereby facts on the ground remain nearly constant between presidents, with the exception of the leadership change, which no one could have predicted. This comparison allows for a much stronger demonstration of the causal impact of leader beliefs. However, it is impor­tant that the argument carries into the con­temporary period even if it does so imperfectly, given the longer time period of the DPRK case.   7.  Bleiker 2003, 725.   8.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2.   9.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2.   10.  Mazarr 1995a, 93–94; Perry 2006, 80–81.

211

NOTES TO PAGES 90–92

11.  Oberdorfer 1997, 252. 12.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 2. 13.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 3. 14.  Central Intelligence Agency, “North ­Korea: Nuclear Reactor,” July 9, 1982, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­www2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​ /­NSAEBB87​/­nk01​.­pdf. 15.  Oberdorfer 1997, 250. 16.  Oberdorfer 1997, 250. 17.  Experts dispute the specific time line of t­hese assessments from 1984 to 1986 and from 1987 to 1989. However, by 1989 ­there was no doubt in the US government that the North was pursuing a nuclear program. 18.  Oberdorfer 1997, 251. 19.  Mazarr 1995a, 94. 20.  “Department of State briefing paper, ca. January 5, 1985,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­www2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​/­NSAEBB87​/­nk05​.­pdf. 21.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 3. 22.  Perry 2006, 80–81. 23.  Koch 2006, 9. 24.  Halberstam 2001, 69–70. 25.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 407. Bush ran first for this seat in 1964. Though unsuccessful, the campaign revealed his discomfort with Republican Party ideologies, especially the anti-­internationalist. 26.  From March 1971 to January 1973, Bush served as ambassador to the United Nations; from January 1973 to September 1974, Bush was chairman of the Republican National Committee. 27.  The China diary Bush kept demonstrates his prepresidential beliefs. Although many presidents write memoirs, usually they are written a­ fter the author’s tenure in office, allowing for memory modification, alterations for self-­preservation, or preferential historical revision. Very few presidents, by contrast, have kept private journals documenting their prepresidential period. Additionally, only a smaller number of presidents have expounded on international politics prior to hitting the campaign trail, and t­ hose who do are often seeking high office and writing for the public. By contrast, Bush wrote for himself and never intended the diary to be read by anyone, let alone be published. Thus, his diary reveals private views written as events ­were unfolding, allowing scholars a unique glimpse into his person, his experiences, and their effect on ­later decisions. Like all historical rec­ords, however, the diary is imperfect: its entries are not consecutive, and the surviving rec­ords are what assistants transcribed. The original tapes of this pro­cess have been lost. For more on this, see G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, xviii–­xix. Engel described the diary as follows: “His China Diary was thus more than a daily rec­ord of his activities. It became instead his private sketchbook for his l­ ater presidential diplomacy, the canvas upon which he first seriously began to paint his own diplomatic image” (G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 400). 28.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, xxii. 29.  For an example of Bush’s aggressive attitude during World War II, see “Letter to Mum and Dad,” August 24, 1944, Donated Historical Rec­ords, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, World War II Correspondence, August 1944, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library, College Station, Texas (hereafter GHWBPL). For Bush’s commentary on the domino theory in South East Asia, see Donated Historical Materials, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, China File, Peking Diary, box “Range Peking Diary Volume I to Peking Diary Volume III,” folder “Peking Diary Volume I,” p. 162, GHWBPL. 30.  The absence of evidence is not necessarily evidence of absence. Thus, firm conclusions remain elusive on this point. 31.  Naftali 2007, 14. 32.  The Americans and Soviets put forward an argument to this effect to justify the pressure they exerted on the Chinese to sign the treaty prior to becoming a nuclear weapons state.

212

NOTES TO PAGES 92–95

33.  Bush’s stance could also represent a broad opposition to limitations on US freedom of action, but that spirit is not evidenced by hostility to all treaties or participation in international organ­izations, undermining this alternative. 34. Congressional Rec­ ord: Proceedings and Debates of the United States Congress 1967–1971. 35.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 210n39. 36.  It is difficult to know definitively ­whether this is evidence of nuclear optimism. Working with the GHWBPL, I have attempted to acquire this cable, which would offer a more certain assessment of its significance for Bush’s nuclear beliefs. ­ Until then, conclusions remain preliminary. 37.  Donated Historical Materials, George H. W. Bush Collection, Personal Papers, China File, Peking Diary, box “Range Peking Diary Volume I to Peking Diary Volume III,” folder “Peking Diary Volume I,” p. 15, GHWBPL. 38.  G. H. W. Bush and Gold 1987, 41. 39.  G. H. W. Bush 2009, 48, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Acad­emy Commencement Ceremony, Nitchman Field, New London, Connecticut, May 24, 1989. 40.  G. H. W. Bush 2009, 57, remarks to the citizens of Mainz, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989. 41.  Chemical weapons w ­ ere used in March 1988, when Hussein attacked the Kurdish population in Halabja. This background should make chemical weapons a seemingly more urgent point of concern. Nevertheless, arguably a nuclear pessimist would have mentioned both chemical and nuclear weapons as dangerous and necessitating action. Both in Halabja’s aftermath and subsequently, that Bush did not is revealing for his lack of focus on nuclear proliferation. It could also be the case that ballistic missiles ­were a proxy for nuclear weapons in Bush’s mind, but I find no evidence to support this possibility. Nor do I find a specific focus on ballistic missiles elsewhere in the documentary rec­ord. 42.  On the stability-­instability paradox, see for example G. Snyder 1961; Kapur 2005. 43.  For this view, see Trachtenberg 1999. For an alternative view, see Mueller 2009. 44.  G. H. W. Bush 2009, 49, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Acad­emy Commencement Ceremony. 45.  G. H. W. Bush 2009, 49, remarks at the United States Coast Guard Acad­emy Commencement Ceremony. 46.  One might won­der ­whether Bush believed that nuclear weapons caused stability only in the hands of “responsible” actors, such as the United States. The documentary rec­ord reveals no evidence connecting regime type to consequences for proliferation. 47.  George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and a Question-­and-­Answer Session at a White House Luncheon for Journalists,” March 31, 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1989, 339. 48.  George H. W. Bush, “Message to the Congress Transmitting the Annual Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” July 19, 1989, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1989, 984. 49.  National Security Directive 29, “The FY 1990 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program,” October 30, 1989, http://­www​.­nuclearfiles​.­org​/­menu​/­key​-­issues​/­nuclear​-­weapons​/­history​/­prez​ _­policies​/­bush1​/­aqueduct​.­pdf. National Security Directive 52, “The FY 1991 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program,” October 22, 1990, http://­www​.­nuclearfiles​.­org​/­menu​/­key​-­issues​/­nuclear​ -­weapons​/­history​/­prez​_­policies​/­bush1​/­sculpin​.­pdf. 50.  Treaty between the United States of Amer­i­ca and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Under­ground Nuclear Weapons Tests (and Protocol Thereto) (also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty), US Department of State archives, https://­2009​-­2017​.­state​ .­gov​/­t​/­isn​/­5204​.­htm. 51.  Treaty between the United States of Amer­i­ca and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START II), available on Nuclear Threat Initiative website, https://­w ww​.­n ti​.­o rg​/­l earn​/­t reaties​-­a nd​-­regimes​/­t reaty​-­b etween​-­u nited​-­s tates​-­america​ -­and​-­union​-­soviet​-­socialist​-­republics​-­strategic​-­offensive​-­reductions​-­start​-­ii​/­.

213

NOTES TO PAGES 95–98

52.  On Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiatives, see Fuhrmann and Early, “Following START,” 21–43. 53.  For more on the program, see “Agency Functions,” Defense Threat Reduction Agency, https://­www​.­dtra​.­mil​/­Mission​/­Partnering​/­Cooperative​-­Threat​-­Reduction​-­Program​/­. 54.  I have filed Freedom of Information Act and Mandatory Declassification Review requests with the GHWBPL for access to classified materials that might shed light on ­these issues. While I preliminarily code Bush as a weak nuclear optimist regarding the consequences of additional nuclear proliferation in the international system, it is difficult to know w ­ hether the absence of evidence is suggestive of Bush’s views in this way. 55.  George H. W. Bush, floor debate, April 21, 1969, Congressional Rec­ord, 91st Congress, 1st session, 9684. 56.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 264. 57.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 270–71. 58.  During Kim Il Sung’s visit to Beijing, which produced the communiqué, he called for the communist world to seize the opportunity of the fall of Saigon to “reinvigorate his dream of unifying the Korean peninsula, by force if necessary.” See G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 264n12. 59.  For a discussion of the arms buildup and subsequent arms control policies of the Reagan administration, see Lebovic 2013, chap. 4. 60. ­Later in his administration, Reagan initiated critical arms control efforts between the United States and the USSR and emerged as a strong nuclear pessimist. I would argue, g ­ oing beyond the analy­sis presented in this book, that this transition was pos­si­ble only a­ fter the massive buildup over which he presided. Bush may have under­gone a similar transition, beginning as a weak nuclear optimist but then presiding over the START I arms control treaty pro­cess, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when Bush began to recognize the dangers of nuclear proliferation. 61.  Arms Control Association 1989. See also Kimball 2004. 62.  For a general discussion of Bush as Reagan’s vice president, see Naftali 2007, 42; G. H. W. Bush 1999, 303, “Letter to President-­elect and Mrs. Ronald Reagan,” November 10, 1980. 63.  The United States discovered North ­Korea’s nuclear program in 1982, so it is unsurprising that Bush’s rec­ord before then does not mention this issue. L ­ ater, however, given that Bush was vice president when the discovery occurred, we might expect more information on this topic to emerge during that period. That it does not is revealing. 64.  Bush could not have known about the nascent North Korean nuclear program during this period, as even the US government did not. At the same time, North K ­ orea—­its regime, its be­hav­ior, and so on—­could have been seen by Bush as more directly threatening or challenging to US interests and allies. That Bush did not describe North K ­ orea in such terms and wrote only briefly about it lends support to the view that North ­Korea was more of an annoyance to Bush than a threat. 65.  Don Oberdorfer, “On Global M ­ atters, Two Candidates’ Positions Are Mostly in Sync,” Washington Post, September 29, 1992, https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­archive​/­politics​/­1992​ /­09​/­29​/­on​-­global​-­matters​-­two​-­candidates​-­positions​-­are​-­mostly​-­in​-­sync​/­a505fc9c​-­ccf0​-­4266​ -­ba28​-­cfd75f69f221​/­. 66.  Saunders 2011, 191–96, for a discussion of Bush’s and Clinton’s contrasting approaches on Somalia. 67.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, cited in Clinton and Smith 1996, 114. 68. During the 1992 campaign, Clinton gave three formal platform addresses dubbed “New Covenant” speeches. They focused on responsible citizenry, the economy, and foreign policy. While ­these speeches are highly po­liti­cal in nature, they are also telling ­because they offer Clinton’s vision for presidential office. Especially since the other Demo­cratic candidates avoided addressing foreign policy issues as much as pos­si­ble given Bush’s subject m ­ atter expertise, ­these are issues that Clinton chose to engage. 69.  Clinton and Smith 1996, 114.

214

NOTES TO PAGES 98–103

70.  “Remembering Truman: Be Bold in Fighting for Amer­i­ca’s F ­ uture,” speech delivered to the Demo­cratic National Convention, San Francisco, California, July 16, 1984, Clinton and Smith 1996, 47. 71.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., December 12, 1991, Clinton and Smith 1996, 115, 116, 119, 120. 72.  “Strategic Security in a Changing World,” speech at Los Angeles World Affairs Council, Los Angeles, California, August 13, 1992, Clinton and Smith 1996, 275. 73.  Lebovic 2013, 197. 74.  William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the 48th Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York City,” September 27, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1612–16. 75.  Warren Strobel, “Foreign Policy Mars Clinton’s First Year: Clinton Fails to Define Foreign Policy in First Year,” Washington Times, November 9, 1993. 76.  “Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by National Security Adviser Lake,” Pierson College, Yale University, February 24, 1994, “Lake—­Proliferation—­Yale 2/24/94,” box FOIA 2006-0459-­F, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords: White House Staff and Office Files, National Security Council, box 1 of 39, William J. Clinton Presidential Library, L ­ ittle Rock, Arkansas (hereafter WJCPL). 77. “Executive Order #12938,” September 30, 1994, document 4137, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 13 Nuclear Weapons, WJCPL. 78. Bush also supported Ukraine as a nonnuclear state following the dissolution of the USSR. However, as I argue in chapter 5, only in the aftermath of the Gulf War did Bush internalize a more systematic concern for nuclear proliferation. 79.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 76. 80.  William J. Clinton, “The President’s News Conference with Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao of India,” May 19, 1994, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1994, 955–56. 81.  For both Clinton and Bush, it is difficult to prove the counterfactual that they would have wanted to draw down the US nuclear arsenal absent the disappearance of the Soviet Union. However, what is impor­tant for the argument h ­ ere is that Clinton pegged this issue of lower numbers to the nuclear pessimist logic, saying that fewer states armed with nuclear weapons would be better for international relations. Bush, conversely, did not, and thus disarmament was merely about lower numbers for the sake of stability. 82.  Clinton 2004, 597, 786. 83.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, Clinton and Smith 1996, 115. 84.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 116. 85.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 118. 86. ­There is a voluminous lit­er­a­ture on demo­cratic peace theory. Early examples include Doyle 1986; Russett 1994; D. A. Lake 1992. For overviews, see Chan 1997; Brown, Lynn-­Jones, and Miller 1996. See Bell and Quek 2018 for an assessment of the more recent lit­er­a­ture. 87.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 114. 88.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 115. 89.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” Clinton and Smith 1996, 116. 90.  Thomas L. Friedman, “U.S. Vision of Foreign Policy Reversed,” New York Times, September 22, 1993. 91.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 153. 92. Memorandum from George Bush to National Security Cabinet, March 3, 1989, “National Security Review 12,” OA/ID 20091, GHWBPL, http://­bushlibrary​.­tamu​.­edu​/­research​ /­nsr​.­php. 93.  Maynard 2008, 137. 94.  Oberdorfer 1997, 255. 95.  Mack 1991, 88. 96. Department of State “Talking Points” paper for ­ Under Secretary of State Bartholomew’s China trip, ca. May 30, 1991, subject: North Korean Nuclear Program (for China)

215

NOTES TO PAGES 103–107

(FOIA-­declassified 2002), National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­ www2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​/­NSAEBB87​/­nk15​.­pdf.   97.  Baker and DeFrank 1995, 595.   98.  Memorandum from George Bush to National Security Cabinet, March 3, 1989, “National Security Review 12,” OA/ID 20091, GHWBPL, http://­bushlibrary​.­tamu​.­edu​/­research​ /­pdfs​/­nsr​/­nsr12​.­pdf.   99.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 7. 100.  Mazarr 1995a, 94–95. The safeguards system provides credible assurance to the international community that nuclear material and other specified items are not diverted from peaceful nuclear uses. The North, though it acceded to the NPT in 1985, did not conclude a safeguards agreement with the IAEA ­until 1991. For more on safeguards, see http://­www​.­iaea​.­org​ /­safeguards​/­sv​.­html. 101.  Sigal 1998, 26. 102.  “Address before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union,” US Capitol, Washington, DC, January 29, 1991, in G. H. W. Bush 2009, 185. 103.  Albright and O’Neill 2000, 204. 104.  Sigal 1998, 27. 105.  “Paper, US-­ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991,” National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​ .­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=4­ 176668​-­Document​-­03a​-­Paper​-­US​-­ROK​-­Basic​-­Positions​-­ca. 106.  “Paper, US-­ROK Basic Positions, ca. August/September 1991,” p. 1. 107.  Bush kept some tactical weapons stationed in Eu­rope. 108.  “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North ­Korea,” ca. December 13, 1991, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­ nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=­4176673​-­Document​-­07​-­Briefing​-­Book​-­Deputies​-­Committee. 109. “Memorandum for ASD/ISA, DC Meeting on North Korean Nuclear Program” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North K ­ orea,” p. 5, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu//­dc​ .­html​?­doc​=­4176673​-­Document​-­07​-­Briefing​-­Book​-­Deputies​-­Committee. 110.  “Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue,” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North K ­ orea,” pp. 8–16, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=4­ 176673​ -­Document​-­07​-­Briefing​-­Book​-­Deputies​-­Committee. 111.  “Strategy for Dealing with North Korean Nuclear Issue,” in “Briefing Book, Deputies Committee Meeting on North ­Korea,” p. 14. 112.  Joint Declaration of South and North K ­ orea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, available on Nuclear Threat Initiative website, http://­www​.­nti​.­org​/­learn​/­treaties​ -­and​-­regimes​/­joint​-­declaration​-­south​-­and​-­north​-­korea​-­denuclearization​-­korean​-­peninsula​/­. 113.  George H. W. Bush, “Remarks to the Korean National Assembly in Seoul,” January 6, 1992, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1992, 41. 114.  “Memorandum for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Subject: North Korean Nuclear Issue and DC Meeting, February 7, 1992,” p. 2, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=4­ 176674​ -­Document​-­08​-­Memorandum​-­for​-­Undersecretary​-­of. 115.  “Memorandum: North K ­ orea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” p. 1, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​ .­gwu​.­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=­4176675​-­Document​-­09​-­Memorandum​-­North​-­Korea​-­Deputies. 116.  “Memorandum: North ­Korea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” pp. 1–4. 117.  “Memorandum: North ­Korea Deputies’ Committee, March 12, 1992,” p. 4. 118.  A March 20 memo updated the previous one and noted three types of coercive mea­ sures the United States could pursue outside of international organ­izations following additional DPRK delays: economic, po­liti­cal, and a third that has been redacted. “Memorandum: North Korean Deputies’ Committee, March 20, 1992,” p. 4, National Security Archive, George Washington University, accessed February 14, 2018, https://­nsarchive2​.­gwu​.­edu//­dc​.­html​?­doc​=4­ 176676​ -­Document​-­10​-­Memorandum​-­North​-­Korean​-­Deputies.

216

NOTES TO PAGES 107–111

119.  Albright and O’Neill 2000. 120.  Baker and DeFrank 1995, 597. 121. A memo from National Security Advisor Scowcroft to a presidential scheduler describes a September 1992 meeting between Bush and Korean president Roh. On the meeting’s agenda is the “nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula.” The meeting’s details remain classified. “Schedule Proposal from Brent Scowcroft to Katherine Super, Deputy Assistant to the President for Appointments and Scheduling,” document 6313, “[Korean President] Roh [Tae-­Woo] Visit—­September 1992 OA/ID CF01492-010.” NSC, Torkel Patterson Files, Subject File, OA/ID CF01492, GHWBPL. 122.  Secretary of State Baker’s memoirs confirm that “the situation never reached the point of our actively considering a military strike against North ­Korea’s nuclear facilities.” See Baker and DeFrank 1995, 596. 123.  Berry 1995, 28, citing the Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 5 (December 1991). 124.  Jack Anderson and Michael Binstein, “North K ­ orea: Loose Nuclear Cannon,” Washington Post, March 29, 1992, https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­archive​/­opinions​/­1992​/­03​/­29​ /­north​-­korea​-­loose​-­nuclear​-­cannon​/­1a87a86d​-­1c4e​-­4abc​-­a1db​-­87dbe19691a0​/­. 125.  The NSC was aware of t­ hese sales and was “monitoring the situation,” according to a letter from National Security Advisor Scowcroft to Congressman Jim Saxton. No alarm is evident in the tone of the letter. “Letter from Brent Scowcroft to Congressman Jim Saxton, March 27, 1992, North Korea-­US [OA/ID CF01519-005].” NSC, Torkel Patterson Files, Subject Files OA/ ID CF01519, Range CF01519-001 to CF01519-020, GHWBPL. 126.  One folder in the GHWBPL contains materials concerning the 1981 Israeli raid on Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear fa­cil­i­ty. The files reference a memo entitled “Available ­Legal Options to Dissuade North Korean Nuclear Weapons Program”; given its enclosure with materials on the Osiraq bombing, it is pos­si­ble that the Bush administration gave force more attention. I have requested the memo’s declassification and related files, but presently t­ here is no evidence of considerations of preventive force. “North K ­ orea, Nuclear Issues, Draft,” Ronald Von Lembke Files, Subject Files, OA/ID CF00751, box NSC, GHWBPL. 127.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 17. 128.  William J. Clinton, “Remarks Announcing the National Export Strategy and an Exchange with Reporters,” September 29, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1630. 129.  Litwak 2002, 75. 130.  Les Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1994), 34–35, http://­history​.­defense​.­gov​ /­resources​/­1994​_­DoD​_­AR​.­pdf. 131. Aspin, Report of the Secretary of Defense to the President and the Congress, 12. 132.  Christopher 1998, 213. 133. For the text of the Nuclear Non-­ Proliferation Treaty, see https://­www​.­un​.­org​ /­disarmament​/­wmd​/­nuclear​/­npt​/­text​/­. 134.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 27. Wit and Poneman served also in the Bush administration; Gallucci joined the Clinton administration in February 1993. This consistency of administration officials undermines a bureaucratic po­liti­cal argument and demonstrates the transformation from the Bush to Clinton administrations. 135.  Oberdorfer 1997, 280. 136.  Litwak 2002, 64. 137.  For an account of the negotiations, see Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004. 138.  Berry 1995, 13. 139. Berry 1995, 14, citing “Fundamentals of Security for a New Pacific Community,” July 10, 1993, in US Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Dispatch 4, no. 29 (July 19, 1993), 509–12. 140.  Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010, appendix 13. 141.  On the varying estimates and growth potential, see Sigal 1998, 91; Oberdorfer 1997, 308. 142.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 126. 143.  Sigal 1998, 71.

217

NOTES TO PAGES 111–116

144.  Mazarr 1995a, 102, citing Clinton’s comments on “Meet the Press” cited in FBIS-­EAS, November 8, 1993, 29. 145. William J. Clinton, “Interview with Timothy Russert and Tom Brokaw on Meet the Press, November 7, 1993,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 1923. 146.  Michael R. Gordon, “Pentagon Begins Effort to Combat More Lethal Arms in Third World,” New York Times, December 8, 1993. 147.  Litwak 2002, 55. 148.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 177. 149.  Barton Gellman, “Trepidation at Root of U.S. K ­ orea Policy,” Washington Post, December 12, 1993. 150.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 102. 151.  Oberdorfer 1997, 312. See https://­www​.­globalsecurity​.­org​/­military​/­ops​/­oplan​-­5027​.­htm. 152.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 128. Perry replaced Les Aspin as secretary of defense on February 3, 1994. 153.  A. Lake 1994, 46–47. 154.  Car­ter and Perry 1999, 221. 155.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 179; Oberdorfer 1997, 304. 156.  Oberdorfer 1997, 301–03. 157.  Oberdorfer 1997, 316. 158.  Clinton 2004, 591. 159.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 164–65. 160.  Perry 1994, 277. 161.  Perry 1994. 162.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci describe this briefing as critical for shaping events to come. Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 179. 163.  Oberdorfer 1997, 323. 164.  Oberdorfer 1997, 315. 165.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 107. 166.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 104. Luck is referring to Israel’s 1981 raid on Iraq’s nuclear reactor, discussed in chapter 6. 167.  Oberdorfer 1997, 324–25. 168.  Sigal 1998, 117. 169.  Sigal 1998, 118. 170.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 205. 171.  Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004, 210. 172. Brent Scowcroft and Arnold Kanter, “­Korea: Time for Action,” Washington Post, June 15, 1994, https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­archive​/­opinions​/­1994​/­06​/­15​/­korea​-­time​ -­for​-­action​/­73e7cb5b​-­73e9​-­4503​-­916f​-­9b601b67087d​/­. 173.  Oberdorfer 1997, 323. 174.  While the United States could target the known facilities, t­ here was significant uncertainty regarding aspects of the program that remained hidden. In addition, though estimates indicated the United States would ultimately win a war against North ­Korea, the costs (direct and indirect, to allies, and so on) would be considerable. In a narrow sense, while ­there was a high likelihood of success estimated for the mission, the larger contextual picture was more complicated. 175.  An initial public statement about the agreement was given by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Gallucci on June 16, 1994, at 4:52 p.m. For the text of his remarks, see “Press Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for Po­liti­cal and Military Affairs Robert Gallucci,” June 16, 1994, document 3391, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 10 North ­Korea, WJCPL. 176.  “Press Conference of the President,” June 22, 1994, 5:34 p.m., document 3434, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords, Press Office, Press Release Subject File, box 14, OA number 8692, folder 10 North ­Korea, WJCPL. The Agreed Framework was signed by the United States and North

218

NOTES TO PAGES 116–125

­ orea on October 17, 1994. For a detailed description of the run-up to the agreement and the K agreement itself, see Mazarr 1995b, 163–80. 177.  Gwen Ifill, “In ­Korea, Chilling Reminders of Cold War,” New York Times, July 18, 1993, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­1993​/­07​/­18​/­weekinreview​/­in​-­korea​-­chilling​-­reminders​-­of​-­cold​ -­war​.­html; quoted in Sigal 1998, 68. 178.  Oberdorfer 1997, 316 citing Perry’s remarks at the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia, November 3, 1994. 179.  The long-­term legacy of this era is less clear, however; while this crisis did not escalate to force, the challenge from North ­Korea and its nuclear program has escalated over time. 180.  For a year-­by-­year chronology, see “Chronology of US-­North Korean Nuclear and Missile Diplomacy,” accessed February 16, 2018, https://­www​.­armscontrol​.­org​/­factsheets​ /­dprkchron. 181.  Rice 2000. 182.  “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” press release, January 29, 2002, accessed February 15, 2018, https://­georgewbush​-­whitehouse​.­archives​.­gov​/­news​/­releases​/­2002​ /­01​/­20020129​-­11​.­html. 183.  Bajoria and Xu 2013. 184.  G. W. Bush 2010, 422–26.

5. Three US Presidents Tangle with Iraq’s Nuclear Program   1.  See for example, Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010; Goldstein 2006.   2.  Chiozza and Goemans 2003; Mitchell and Prins 2004.   3.  J. Snyder 2013.   4.  For a deep dive into the Iraqi nuclear program, see Braut-­Hegghammer 2016.   5.  Richelson 2006, 318.   6. On the campaign itself, see Richelson 2006, 321–22; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­ Joseph 2003; Raas and Long 2007; Claire 2004. See also chapter 6.   7.  Richelson 2006, 333–34; Director of Central Intelligence, Interagency Intelligence Assessment, “Implications of Israeli Attack on Iraq,” July 1, 1981, p. 3, http://­www​.­foia​.­cia​.­gov​ /­sites​/­default​/­files​/­document​_­conversions​/­89801​/­DOC​_­0000211961​.­pdf.   8.  Reiter 2005; Braut-­Hegghammer 2011; Sadot 2016.   9.  Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s National Security Goals: An Intelligence Assessment,” December 1988, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­www2​ .­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​/­NSAEBB80​/­wmd02​.­pdf.   10.  Richelson 2006, 348–49.   11.  “Reconstitution of Iraq’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Post Desert Fox,” n.d., National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­www2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​ /­NSAEBB129​/­part3​-­icnuclear​.­pdf.   12. Central Intelligence Agency, “Iraq’s Continuing Program for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2002, http://­www​.­dni​.­gov​/­files​/­documents​/­Iraq​_­NIE​_­Excerpts​_­2003​.­pdf.   13.  Intelligence and Security Committee, “Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction—­Intelligence and Assessments,” September 2003, https://­www​.­gov​.­uk​/­government​/­uploads​/­system​/­up​ loads​/­attachment​_­data​/­file​/­272079​/­5972​.­pdf.   14.  George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq,” Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002, https://­www​.­presidency​.­ucsb​.­edu​/­documents​/­address​-­the​-­nation​-­iraq​-­from​-­cincinnati​-­ohio.   15.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 452, 454.   16.  Naftali 2007, 101.   17. George H. W. Bush, “Remarks and a Question-­and-­Answer Session at a Luncheon Hosted by the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco, California,” February 7, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1990, 176.   18.  National Security Directive 26, October 2, 1989, George H. W. Bush Presidential Library (hereafter GHWBPL), http://­bushlibrary​.­tamu​.­edu​/­research​/­pdfs​/­nsd​/­nsd26​.­pdf.

219

NOTES TO PAGES 125–131

19.  Remarks to the Citizens of Mainz, Rheingoldhalle, Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31, 1989, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 57. 20.  L. Goldstein 2006. 21.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 307. 22.  George H. W. Bush, “Statement on the Seizure of Nuclear Weapon Component Shipments to Iraq,” March 28, 1990, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George H. W. Bush, 1990, 429. 23.  Woodward 1991, 230. 24.  Powell 1995, 493. 25.  J. A. Baker and DeFrank 1995, 331. 26.  Koch 2006, 335. 27.  Woodward 1991, 236–7. 28.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 305. 29.  Russell 2002, 201. 30.  National Security Directive 45, August 20, 1990, Subject: US Policy in Response to the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Bush Presidential Rec­ords, GHWBPL, http://­bushlibrary​.­tamu​.­edu​ /­research​/­pdfs​/­nsd​/­nsd45​.­pdf. 31.  G. H. W. Bush 1999, 476. 32.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 566. 33.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 371. 34.  G. H. W. Bush 1999, 476. 35.  G. H. W. Bush 1999, 478. 36.  Private letter to Fahd bin Abd al-­Aziz al Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, G. H. W. Bush 1999, 490. 37.  Remarks to American and co­ali­tion troops in the Persian Gulf Area on Thanksgiving Day, November 22, 1990, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 154. 38.  See, among ­others, Naftali 2007; Halberstam 2001. 39.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 454–55. 40.  Remarks to Allied Armed Forces near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, November 22, 1990, G. Bush 2009, 163. 41.  On the misuse and nature of false historical analogies, see Jervis 1976, chap. 6. 42.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 340. 43.  Powell 1995, 491. 44.  Woodward 1991, 343–44. 45.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 435. 46.  Woodward 1991, 308. 47.  Woodward 1991, 290, 305. 48.  Woodward 1991, 305. 49.  Rebecca Friedman Lissner, “The Long Shadow of the Gulf War,” War on the Rocks 24, 2016, https://­warontherocks​.­com​/­2016​/­02​/­the​-­long​-­shadow​-­of​-­the​-­gulf​-­war​/­. 50.  Woodward 1991, 207, 269. 51.  On casualty estimates, see Woodward 1991, 349. 52.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 324. 53.  Powell 1992. 54.  Woodward 1991, 319. 55.  Woodward 1991, 314. 56.  Woodward 1991, 347. This suggests an improving intelligence estimate over time. 57.  G. H. W. Bush and Engel 2008, 455. 58. ­Reuters, “Confrontation in the Gulf; Remarks by Baker at News Conference in Geneva on Standoff in the Gulf,” New York Times, January 10, 1991, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­1991​ /­01​/­10​/­world​/­confrontation​-­gulf​-­remarks​-­baker​-­conference​-­geneva​-­standoff​-­gulf​.­html. 59.  Had the United States preferred war by this point, with Geneva serving only po­liti­cal ends, this would be akin to a game of “Big Bully.” G. H. Snyder and Diesing 2015, 46–47. 60.  It is also pos­si­ble that Bush was incorrect in this view and Saddam was deterrable. US assurances to not intervene ­were instead insufficient and failed to end Hussein’s campaign.

220

NOTES TO PAGES 132–138

61.  Address to the nation announcing allied military action in the Persian Gulf, Oval Office of the White House, Washington, DC, January 16, 1991, G. H. W. Bush 2009, 166–67. 62.  Woodward 1991, 330–31. 63.  For a detailed account of Gulf War decision making, see Woodward 1991. 64.  L. Goldstein 2006, 129. 65.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 323. 66.  As described, the United States knew of Hussein’s nuclear program beginning at least in the 1970s. It was only in 1990 and 1991, however, with intrusive inspections and co­ali­tion troops on the ground, that the extent of the program became clear. 67.  L. Goldstein 2006, 130. 68.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 399–400. 69.  Powell 1995, 541. 70.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 508. 71.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 544. 72.  Naftali 2007, 107. 73.  Woodward 1991, 319. 74.  G. H. W. Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 354. 75.  Woodward 1991, 300, 302. 76.  Hymans 2012. 77.  Hymans 2012, 84; Committee on Armed Ser­vices 1993, 24. 78.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2011, 110. 79.  “A New Covenant for American Security,” speech delivered at Georgetown University, Washington, DC, December 12, 1991, cited in Clinton and Smith 1996, 115. 80.  Clinton 2004, 435. 81.  Clinton and Smith 1996, 112. 82.  Western 2005, 182–83. 83.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 184. 84.  William J. Clinton, “Remarks at the United States Military Acad­emy Commencement Ceremony in West Point, New York,” May 29, 1993, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: William J. Clinton, 1993, 781. 85.  “Continuation of Iraqi Emergency,” Office of the Press Secretary, July 19, 1994, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords Press Office, folder 18, box 10, Iraq, Press Release Subject File OA 8691, William J. Clinton Presidential Library (hereafter WJCPL). 86.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 185. 87.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 148. 88.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 189. 89.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 192. 90.  The preventive ­angle and the seriousness of consideration are documented in speech notes from November 1997: “Insert on Iraq for POTUS Remarks,” November 19, 1997, 11:45 a.m., “POTUS Insert on Iraq 11/19/97” [OA/ID 3378], box FOIA 2006-0459-­F, Clinton Presidential Rec­ords: White House Staff and Office Files, National Security Council, box 32 of 39, WJCPL. 91.  Western 2005, 183. 92.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 193. 93. “President William Jefferson Clinton Radio Address, The White House, February 6, 1998,” “Blair Radio Address 2/6/98” [OD/ID 3380], box FOIA 2006-0459-­F, National Security Council, box 34 of 39, WJCPL; Branch 2009, 498. 94.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 195. 95.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 195. 96.  For a full articulation of the administration’s concern with Iraq in February 1998, see “Iraq and the National Interest,” a speech given by National Security Advisor Samuel R. Berger, “As prepared for Delivery,” Samuel R. Berger, assistant to the president for National Security Affairs, Washington, DC, February 13, 1998, “SRB Iraq Speech 2/13/98 [OA/ID 3378],” box FOIA 2006-0459-­F, National Security Council, box 34 of 39, WJCPL. 97.  Clinton 2004, 827.

221

NOTES TO PAGES 138–144

  98.  “Memorandum for Samuel R. Berger, November 2, 1998, from Joseph Marty, Subject: Briefing Memo for POTUS Call to Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia,” WJCPL, http://­ www​.­clintonlibrary​.­gov​/­assets​/­storage​/­Research%20​-­%20Digital%20Library​/­Declassified​ /­2009​-­1292​-­M​.­pdf.   99.  “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, Telcon with President Chirac of France, The White House, November 4, 1998, 3:08–3:31 p.m.,” WJCPL, http://­www​.­clintonlibrary​.­gov​ /­assets​/­storage​/­Research%20​-­%20Digital%20Library​/­Declassified​/­2009​-­1292​-­M​.­pdf. 100.  Branch 2009, 516–17. 101.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 178. 102.  Western 2005, 183. 103.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 201–202. 104.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 201–202. 105.  Conversino 2005. 106.  “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, The President and Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, December 15, 1998, 1:00–1:15 p.m. EDT, Oval Office,” WJCPL, http://­www​ .­clintonlibrary​.­gov​/­assets​/­storage​/­Research%20​-­%20Digital%20Library​/­Declassified​/­2009​ -­1292​-­M​.­pdf. 107. “Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, The President and President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, December 17, 1998, 12:18 p.m.–12:23 p.m. EST, Oval Office,” WJCPL, http://­ www​.­clintonlibrary​.­gov​/­assets​/­storage​/­Research%20​-­%20Digital%20Library​/­Declassified​ /­2009​-­1292​-­M​.­pdf. 108.  Regarding the mission and military campaign, see “Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Briefing on Operation Desert Fox,” December 19, 1998, http://­ www​.­defense​.­gov​/­Transcripts​/­Transcript​.­aspx​?­TranscriptID​=1­ 791. 109.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 295. 110.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 298. 111.  G. W. Bush 2010, 83. 112.  “Text From New Hampshire Debate Involving G.O.P. Presidential Candidates,” New York Times, December 3, 1999, https://­archive​.­nytimes​.­com​/­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­library​/­politics​ /­camp​/­120399wh​-­gop​-­debate​-­text​.­html; Saunders 2011, 198–99. 113.  Rice 2000, 45. 114.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, 295, 310. 115.  Saunders 2011, 199. 116.  Chollet and Goldgeier 2008, xvi. 117.  Branch 2009, 657. 118.  Western 2005. 119.  Woodward 2004, 21. 120. “Address to the Joint Session of Congress,” Washington Post, February 27, 2001, http://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­wp​-­srv​/­onpolitics​/­transcripts​/­bushtext022701​.­htm; Litwak 2002, 57. 121.  Rice 2011, 157. Bush also spearheaded the Proliferation Security Initiative. 122.  Renshon 2008; see also Saunders 2011, 203. 123.  Saunders 2011, 203, citing “George W. Bush, News Conference,” March 6, 2003, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: George W. Bush, 2003, 247. 124.  G. W. Bush 2010, 144. 125.  Nicholas D. Kristof, “An American Hiroshima,” New York Times, August 11, 2004. https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2004​/­08​/­11​/­opinion​/­an​-­american​-­hiroshima​.­html; Allison 2004, 1–2; Massimo Calabresi and Romesh Ratnesar, “Can We Stop the Next Attack?” Time, March 11, 2002. http://­content​.­time​.­com​/­time​/­magazine​/­article​/­0,9171,1001961,00​.­html. 126.  G. W. Bush 2010, 145. 127.  The ABM Treaty between the United States and Soviet Union ­limited antiballistic missile systems used for defense against nuclear weapons delivered via ballistic missiles. US Department of State, accessed February 12, 2018, https://­2009​-­2017​.­state​.­gov​/­t​/­avc​/­trty​/­101888​ .­htm. 128.  Bumiller 2007, 171.

222

NOTES TO PAGES 145–148

129.  Woodward 2004, 1–2. 130.  Rice 2011, 237. 131.  Bumiller 2007, 168. 132.  G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29. 133.  G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29. 134.  George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, https://­millercenter​ .­org​/­the​-­presidency​/­presidential​-­speeches​/­january​-­29​-­2002​-­state​-­union​-­address. 135.  Bumiller 2007, 174. 136. George W. Bush, “Commencement Address, United States Military Acad­emy, West Point,” New York Times, June 1, 2002, http://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2002​/­06​/­01​/­international​ /­02PTEX​-­WEB​.­html​?­pagewanted​=­all. 137.  Western 2005, 197. 138.  Bumiller 2007, 193. Though the administration used the language of preemption, preemption requires an imminent threat, which is mitigated by (or is attempted to be mitigated by) the threatened state moving first. Part of the criticism of the 2003 Iraq War concerns a lack of intelligence demonstrating that t­ here was an imminent threat by Saddam Hussein to target the United States with nuclear weapons or more generally. Though I do not attempt to adjudicate this debate h ­ ere, I argue that if Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program, if successful, it would have caused a relative decline in the balance of power between the United States and Iraq. That the United States acted to prevent such a decline, or to forestall a ­future need to fight a now-­nuclear armed adversary, makes this a case of preventive war (not preemptive). Thus, it is rightfully included as part of the pre­sent analytical universe. 139.  “The National Security Strategy,” September 2002, White House: President George W. Bush, http://­georgewbush​-­whitehouse​.­archives​.­gov​/­nsc​/­nss​/­2002​/­. 140.  Western 2005, 213. 141.  Western 2005, 203. 142.  “President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat: Remarks by the President on Iraq,” Cincinnati, Ohio, October 7, 2002, White House: President George W. Bush, http://­georgewbush​ -­whitehouse​.­archives​.­gov​/­news​/­releases​/­2002​/­10​/­20021007​-­8​.­html; Western 2005, 209. 143.  Donald Rumsfeld, “Secretary Rumsfeld Contrasts Iraq and North ­Korea,” US Department of Defense news release, January 20, 2003, http://­www​.­defense​.­gov​/­Releases​/­Release​ .­aspx​?­ReleaseID​=3­ 605. 144.  Rice 2011, 170. 145.  Rice 2011, 198. 146.  The United Kingdom, like Israel, demonstrates that the leader-­centric argument travels beyond the US context. 147.  Excerpt of Blair speech, January 1998, cited in The Report of the Iraq Inquiry, vol. 1, 103, https://­www​.­gov​.­uk​/­government​/­publications​/­the​-­report​-­of​-­the​-­iraq​-­inquiry. 148.  Campbell 2007, 279. 149. Prime Minister Tony Blair remarks to the House of Commons, UK Parliament, April 10, 2002, https://­publications​.­parliament​.­uk​/­pa​/­cm200102​/­cmhansrd​/­vo020410​ /­debtext​/­20410​-­04​.­htm. 150. Prime Minister Tony Blair remarks to the House of Commons, UK Parliament, March 18, 2003, columns 760–774, https://­publications​.­parliament​.­uk​/­pa​/­cm200203​/­cmhansrd​ /­vo030318​/­debtext​/­30318​-­06​.­htm#30318​-­06​_­head1. 151.  Chilcot et al., The Report of the Iraq Inquiry: Executive Summary, 14, 22, 27, https://­www​ .­gov​.­uk​/­government​/­publications​/­the​-­report​-­of​-­the​-­iraq​-­inquiry. 152.  Rice 2011, 198. 153.  G. W. Bush 2010, 236. 154.  G. W. Bush 2010, 253. 155.  For a detailed accounting of the iterative pro­cess that lead to the Iraq invasion, see Woodward 2004. 156.  Woodward 2004, 41–42. 157.  P. Baker 2013, 207. 158.  Woodward 2004, 326.

223

NOTES TO PAGES 148–157

159.  Woodward 2004, 327. 160.  P. Baker 2013, 208. 161.  P. Baker 2013, 262. 162.  Woodward 2004, 327. 163.  Woodward 2004, 206. 164.  Brent Scowcroft, “­Don’t Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002, https://­ www​.­wsj​.­com​/­articles​/­SB1029371773228069195; P. Baker 2013, 209. 165.  Eric Schmitt, “Army Chief Raises Estimate of G.I.’s Needed in Postwar Iraq,” New York Times, February 25, 2003, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2003​/­02​/­25​/­international​/­middleeast​ /­army​-­chief​-­raises​-­estimate​-­of​-­gis​-­needed​-­in​-­postwar​.­html. 166.  P. Baker 2013, 243, 248. 167.  Woodward 2004, 405. 168.  P. Baker 2013, 239–40. 169.  P. Baker 2013, 253. 170.  P. Baker 2013, 257. 171.  Woodward 2004, 188. 172.  Woodward 2004, 206. 173.  Bumiller 2007, 201. 174.  G. W. Bush 2010, 224. 175.  Gates 2014, 104. 176.  Western 2005, 216. 177.  CIA, “National Intelligence Estimate: Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction,” October 2002, National Security Archive, George Washington University, http://­www2​.­gwu​.­edu​/­~nsarchiv​/­NSAEBB​/­NSAEBB129​/­nie​.­pdf. See also Rice 2011, 169. 178.  Woodward 2004, 12. 179.  Woodward 2004, 25. 180.  G. W. Bush 2010, 267. 181.  G. W. Bush 2010, 228–29.

6. Israel’s Preventive War Decision Making   1.  Brom 2005, 133.   2.  Johnston 1995.   3.  Bar-­Joseph 2009, 512.   4.  Adamsky 2017, 166.   5.  Brom 2005, 140.   6.  In 2016, Israel closed the reading room of the state archive and made its collection available online; to date, less than 5 ­percent of the holdings are estimated to be available, and very l­ittle is relevant for counterproliferation. Ofer Aderet, “Ninety-­five ­Percent of Israel State Archives Files Concealed From the Public,” Haaretz, November 2, 2017, https://­www​.­haaretz​ .­c om​ /­i srael​ -­n ews​ /­​ .­p remium​ -­9 5​ -­o f​ -­i srael​ -­s tate​ -­a rchives​ -­f iles​ -­c oncealed​ -­f rom​ -­p ublic​ -­1​ .­5461925.   7.  I do not speak Hebrew and thus am ­limited to English-­language sources or translations. Even for ­those who speak Hebrew, however, a lack of available evidence remains the main barrier.   8.  Freilich 2012, 17.   9.  Freilich 2012, 18.   10.  Krasna 2018, 29–31.   11.  A similarly ­limited role is played by the Israeli Supreme Court, which usually does not interfere in national security. Cohen 2014.   12.  Israel is not alone in ceding similar power to the executive. The British prime minister is vested with royal authority for national security. Likewise, France’s semipresidential system historically delegates much of foreign policy to the president. Dover 2005; Heffernan 2005; Risse-­Kappen 1991; Wong 2006.

224

NOTES TO PAGES 157–161

13.  Kaarbo 1997; Freilich 2012, 53. 14.  Brom 2005; Freilich 2012, 54. 15.  Israeli law mandates certain offices are represented within the cabinet, though which individual fills each role is determined by co­ali­tion bargaining. 16.  In 2019, Benjamin Netanyahu’s co­ali­tion contained five parties; the wider Knesset had ten. 17.  Huber 1996; Diermeier and Feddersen 1998. 18.  Freilich 2012, 18. 19.  Freilich 2012, 44. 20.  Krasna 2018, esp. 14. 21.  Freilich 2012, 47. 22.  Freilich 2012, 54. 23.  Freilich 2012, 53–56. 24.  Freilich 2012, 49. 25.  Preventive military force is considered mobilization, and thus the cabinet or subcabinet must be engaged. 26.  Israeli Defense Forces, https://­www​.­idf​.­il​/­en​/­. Only the cabinet has the authority to authorize IDF missions; the prime minister lacks in­de­pen­dent authority. 27.  Freilich 2012, 61. 28.  Bar-­Joseph 2009, 520. 29.  Israel has approximately 20,000 square miles; Syria has 185,887. “Syria,” Central Intelligence Agency, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­countries​/­syria​/­ . In 2007, Syria’s population was 19,878,254, whereas Israel had 7,180,100. Israel’s GDP per capita was $24,924.33; by contrast, Syria’s mea­sured $2,032.62. https://­data​.­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​ ?­locations​=I­ L​-­SY. 30. For population statistics, see World Bank Open Data (data updated through 2019): https://­data​.­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​?­locations​=­IL, https://­data​.­worldbank​ .­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​?­locations​=­IQ, https://­data​.­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​ .­TOTL​?­locations​=P ­ K. 31. For territorial geography, see “The World Factbook,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 26, 2019, https://­www​.­cia​.­gov​/­the​-­world​-­factbook​/­. 32.  For GDP per capita, see World Bank Open Data (data updated through 2019): https://­data​ .­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​?­locations​=I­ L, https://­data​.­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​ /­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​?­locations​=I­ Q, https://­data​.­worldbank​.­org​/­indicator​/­SP​.­POP​.­TOTL​?­locations​ =­PK. 33.  Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972. 34.  A CINC score of 1 represents 100 ­percent of global capabilities; 0 indicates 0 ­percent. The Correlates of War Proj­ect, “Data Sets, National Material Capabilities,” n.d., accessed February 17, 2021, http://­www​.­correlatesofwar​.­org​/­data​-­sets​/­national​-­material​-­capabilities. 35.  It is tempting to think of modern Israel as eco­nom­ically and militarily power­ful compared to current foes. Even examining Israel as the stronger state in each dyad, however, does not reveal consistent preventive war be­hav­ior, as a structural argument would expect. 36.  Freilich 2012, 37. 37.  Allison 1969, 711. 38.  Freilich 2012, 37. 39.  Freilich 2012, 40. 40.  Partisanship may be more consequential during domestic elections, but this is an empirical question. 41.  Brom 2005, 144. 42.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2011, 105. 43.  Tamsett 2004, 73. 44. For a comprehensive analy­sis of the Iraqi nuclear program, see Braut-­Hegghammer 2016. 45.  Sadot 2016, 653. 46.  J. C. Snyder 1983, 567. 47.  Government of Israel 1981, 9.

225

NOTES TO PAGES 161–166

48.  J. C. Snyder 1983, 569. 49.  Government of Israel 1981, 1. 50.  Tamsett 2004, 73. 51.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2016, 53–56. 52.  Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pi­lots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2016, https://­www​.­timesofisrael​.­com​/­35​-­years​-­on​-­iaf​ -­pilots​-­recall​-­daring​-­mission​-­to​-­bomb​-­saddams​-­nuke​-­reactor​/­#:~:text​=­Thirty%2Dfive%20 years%20after%20Operation,aired%20on%20Channel%2010%2C%20Col. 53.  Brands 2011, 504. 54.  Brands 2011, 504. 55.  Government of Israel 1981, 3. 56.  Government of Israel 1981, 5. 57.  Zionism is the movement for the establishment or development of a Jewish nation inside Israel. 58.  Inbar 1997, 25. 59.  Avner 2010, 179. 60.  Avner 2010, 180. 61.  Inbar 1997, 35; Avner 2010, 183. 62.  Inbar 1997, 29. 63.  I. Ra­bino­vich 2017, 106. 64.  I. Ra­bino­vich 2017, 129. 65.  Inbar 1997, 31; Rabin, “Israel’s Security Policy ­After the 1991 Gulf War,” in Israel’s National Security Thinking (Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar Ilan Center for Strategic Studies, August 1991). 66.  Author conversation with former government official. 67.  I. Ra­bino­vich 2017, 43, 75; Rabin changed his mind in 1963 upon recognizing that Israel could not sustain a conventional arms race with the Arab world. 68.  Inbar 1997, 31. 69.  I. Ra­bino­vich 2017, 156. 70.  Y. Rabin 1979, 100, 105. 71.  Memoirs are admittedly problematic sources of evidence. Conclusions therefore remain preliminary. 72.  Brands and Palkki 2011, 141. 73.  Brands and Palkki 2011, 141–42. 74.  Silver 1984, 23. 75.  Silver 1984, 23; see also Avner 2010, 551. 76.  Silver 1984, 182. 77.  Silver 1984, 182. 78.  Sofer 1988, 234. 79.  Sofer 1988, 237. 80.  Shilon 2016, 263–64. 81.  Sofer 1988, 30. 82.  On Begin’s general worldview, see Sofer 1988. 83.  Gordis 2014, 10. 84.  Gordis 2014, 13. 85.  Sofer 1988, 115. 86.  Gordis 2014, 23. 87.  Gordis 2014, 239. Betar was the Revisionist Zionist youth movement founded by Jabotinsky and closely affiliated with the Irgun. Begin was a Betar member from his youth in Poland. 88.  Oren 2002, 89. 89.  Avner 2010, 251. 90.  Sofer 1988, 116 citing “Bituchen or Security,” Herut, December 24, 1954. 91.  Sofer 1988, 117. 92.  Sofer 1988, 112. The Second ­Temple was the Jewish holy ­temple that stood on the ­Temple Mount in Jerusalem from 516 BCE to 70 CE. The Romans destroyed the ­Temple in 70 CE as retaliation against an ongoing Jewish revolt against Roman rule.

226

NOTES TO PAGES 166–171

  93.  Sofer 1988, 144.   94.  Sofer 1988, 116.   95.  Sofer 1988, 144.   96.  Gordis 2014, 187, citing “On the Dangers of Non-­Conventional Weapons in the Hands of Arab states,” Menachem Begin address during Knesset deliberations on June 24, 1963; Israel’s Strike Against the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor 7 June 1981: A Collection of Articles and Lectures, edited by Moshe Fuksman-­Sha’al (Menachem Begin Heritage Center, 2003).   97.  Sofer 1988, 124.   98.  Avner 2010, 552.   99.  Mueller et al. 2006, 213. 100.  Brands and Palkki 2011, 155; Gordis 2014, 187. 101.  Sadot 2016, 652. 102.  Sadot 2016, 656. 103.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 66. 104.  Sadot 2016, 656. 105.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, xliv. 106.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 2. 107.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 38. 108.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 70. 109.  Although this progression might explain the distinctiveness of Begin’s approach relative to Rabin’s, Begin’s dif­fer­ent prob­lem prioritization when he entered office in 1977 suggests something ­else. Peres’s continuing opposition to military force in 1981 following ­these developments supports the theory that individual beliefs, not the Iraqi program’s advancement, did the work. 110.  Gordis 2014, 187. 111.  Sadot 2016, 657; Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 54–55. 112.  Government of Israel 1981, 4. 113.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, xxxv. 114.  Mueller et al. 2006, 215. 115.  Mueller et al. 2006, 214. 116.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 77–79; see also chap. 12. 117.  In September 1980, Ira­nian jets attacked Osiraq but caused ­little damage. 118.  Gordis 2014, 188. 119.  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with Prime Minister Begin, Chief of Staff Eitan, I.A.F. Commander Ivri and Director of Military Intelligence Saguy,” June 9, 1981, https://­mfa.​ ­gov​.­il​/­MFA​/­ForeignPolicy/ ​ ­MFADocuments/ ​ ­Yearbook5/ ​ ­Pages/ ​ ­28%20Press%20 Conference%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin​-­%20IDF​.­aspx. 120.  Parsi 2007, 60. 121.  Parsi 2007, 104. 122.  The F-16 Fighting Falcons ­were intended for Iran. Following the Ira­nian revolution, they ­were sold to Israel instead. 123.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 97. 124.  Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pi­lots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2016, https://­www​.­timesofisrael​.­com​/­35​-­years​-­on​-­iaf​ -­pilots​-­recall​-­daring​-­mission​-­to​-­bomb​-­saddams​-­nuke​-­reactor​/­#:~:text​=­Thirty%2Dfive%20 years%20after%20Operation,aired%20on%20Channel%2010%2C%20Col; this sense of risk was confirmed in an author conversation with a former Israeli Air Force F-16 pi­lot with knowledge of the mission. 125.  Gordis 2014, 188. 126.  Silver 1984, 75. 127.  Gordis 2014, 190, quoting Shamir, “The Failure of Diplomacy,” 16. 128.  Silver 1984, 219. 129.  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Statement by the Government of Israel on the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear fa­cil­i­ty near Baghdad,” June 8, 1981, http://­www​.­mfa​.­gov​.­il​/­MFA​ /­ForeignPolicy​/­MFADocuments​/­Yearbook5​/­Pages​/­26%20Statement%20by%20the%20Gov​ ernment%20of%20Israel%20on%20the%20Bo​.­aspx.

227

NOTES TO PAGES 171–175

130.  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Interview with Prime Minister Begin,” June 8, 1981, https://­mfa​.­gov​.­il​/­MFA​/­ForeignPolicy​/­MFADocuments​/­Yearbook5​/­Pages​/­27%20Interview%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin​-­%208%20June%20198​.­aspx. 131.  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Conference with Prime Minister Begin, Chief of Staff Eitan, I.A.F. Commander Ivri and Director of Military Intelligence Saguy,” June 9, 1981, https://­mfa.​ ­gov​.­il​/­MFA​/­ForeignPolicy/ ​ ­MFADocuments/ ​ ­Yearbook5/ ​ ­Pages/ ​ ­28%20Press%20 Conference%20with%20Prime%20Minister%20Begin​-­%20IDF​.­aspx. 132.  Avner 2010, 555. 133.  Gordis 2014, 185. 134.  Gordis 2014, 189. 135.  Avner 2010, 552. 136.  Gordis 2014, 185. 137.  Avner 2010, 553. 138.  Times of Israel Staff, “35 Years on, IAF Pi­lots Recall Daring Mission to Bomb Saddam’s Nuke Reactor.” 139.  Author conversation with former government official. 140.  Khan 2012, esp. chap. 2. 141.  For additional program details, see Khan 2012; Perkovich 1999; Sagan and Waltz 2002. 142.  Sidhu 1997, 240–41. 143.  Edward Cody, “Sadat’s Arab Antagonists Salute His Killers,” Washington Post, October 7, 1981, https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​/­archive​/­politics​/­1981​/­10​/­07​/­sadats​-­arab​ -­antagonists​-­salute​-­his​-­killers​/­28406159​-­30ee​-­47ff​-­ba46​-­0abe4eba394e​/­. 144.  Perlmutter, Handel, and Bar-­Joseph 2003, 17–18. 145.  Khan 2012, 110–12. 146.  Schneider 1999, 38; Weissman and Krosney 1981, 210–13. 147.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2016, 141, 162. 148.  Khan 2012, 110–11. 149.  “Letter from Israeli PM Menachem Begin to British PM Margaret Thatcher on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program,” May 17, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FCO93/2105, Israel: nuclear m ­ atters (Kew: National Archives, January 8, 2010). Obtained for the Nuclear Proliferation International History Proj­ect (NPIHP) by Or Rabinowitz. Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://­digitalarchive​.­wilsoncenter​.­org​/­document​/­120204. 150.  “Letter from Israeli PM Menachem Begin to British PM Margaret Thatcher on Pakistan’s Nuclear Program.” 151.  “Memorandum for Margaret Thatcher in Response to a Letter from Menachem Begin,” May 22, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FCO93/2105, Israel: nuclear ­matters (Kew: National Archives, January 8, 2010). Obtained for NPIHP by Or Rabinowitz. Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://­digitalarchive​.­wilsoncenter​.­org​/­document​/­120208. 152.  Rabinowitz 2014, esp. 151. 153.  Levy and Scott-­Clark 2007, 87. 154.  Rabinowitz 2014, 151. 155.  Rabinowitz 2014, 143; see also Don Oberdorfer, “Pakistan Concerned About Attack on Atomic Plants,” Washington Post, October 12, 1984, https://­www​.­washingtonpost​.­com​ /­archive​/­politics​/­1984​/­10​/­12​/­pakistan​-­concerned​-­about​-­attack​-­on​-­atomic​-­plants​/­a63b98e0​ -­f7cb​-­4629​-­8ade​-­14088c4d1af2​/­; Richard Burt, “U.S. ­Will Press Pakistan to Halt A-­Arms Proj­ ect,” New York Times, August 12, 1979, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­1979​/­08​/­12​/­archives​/­us​ -­will​-­press​-­pakistan​-­to​-­halt​-­aarms​-­project​-­series​-­of​-­steps​.­html. 156.  Khan 2012, 211; Rabinowitz 2014, 18. 157. Exact timing remains unclear, though all possibilities are during Begin’s tenure. Perkovich and Sidhu suggest 1981, Rabinowitz suggests 1983, and Karnad suggests 1983. Perkovich 1999, 240–41. See Sidhu 1997, 331; Rabinowitz 2014, 151; Karnad 2002. 158.  Kahuta is Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons research laboratory as well as the central location for uranium enrichment. 159.  Karnad 2002, 346. 160.  Karnad 2002, 347.

228

NOTES TO PAGES 175–179

161.  Sushant Singh, “In Fact: Did India Plan a Covert Military Attack on a Pakistani Nuclear Reactor?,” Indian Express, October 26, 2015, https://­indianexpress​.­com​/­article​/­explained​/­in​ -­fact​-­did​-­india​-­plan​-­a​-­covert​-­military​-­attack​-­on​-­a​-­pakistani​-­nuclear​-­reactor​/­. 162.  Kreps and Fuhrmann describe joint Israeli-­Indian activity through 1987, as Begin’s successor, Yitzhak Shamir, continued serious planning for an attack. See Fuhrmann and Kreps 2010. See also Perkovich 1999, 280; Sagan 2001; Sagan and Waltz 2002, 95; Karnad 2002, 350. 163.  Karnad 2002, 349. 164.  “India and Israel Planned to Hit Kahuta in 1980s,” Business Recorder, October 29, 2007, https://­fp​.­brecorder​.­com​/­2007​/­10​/­20071029645356​/­. 165.  Feaver, Sagan, and Karl 1997. 166.  Schneider 1999, 148. 167. Singh, “In Fact: Did India Plan a Covert Military Attack on a Pakistani Nuclear Reactor?” 168. ­Because of the temporal proximity of this case and the fact that the government of Israel claimed responsibility only in 2018, ­there are significant evidentiary limitations. Nevertheless, I include a brief discussion of the Syrian episode h ­ ere, as the most recent empirical example of the consideration and use of preventive military force as a counterproliferation strategy. With more evidence, f­ uture work can address events more fully. 169.  Makovsky 2012. 170.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008. 171.  Alexandre Mansourov, “North ­Korea: Entering Syria’s Civil War,” 38 North, November 25, 2013, https://­www​.­38north​.­org​/­2013​/­11​/­amansourov112513​/­; Samuel Ramani, “North ­Korea’s Syrian Connection,” Diplomat, February 27, 2018, https://­thediplomat​.­com​/­2018​/­02​ /­north​-­koreas​-­syrian​-­connection​/­. 172.  Michael Bar-­Zohar and Nissim Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria,” Ynetnews, August 26, 2010, https://­www​.­ynetnews​.­com​/­articles​/­0,7340,L​-­3944303,00​.­html. 173.  Cheney and Cheney 2011, 466–67. 174.  Bar-­Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.” 175.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 1–2. 176.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 6. 177.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 2–3. 178.  Office of the Director of National Intelligence 2008, 4–6. 179.  Bar-­Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.” 180.  Bar-­Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.” 181.  Erich Follach and Holger Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor,” Der Spiegel Online, November 2, 2009, https://­www​ .­spiegel​.­de​/­international​/­world​/­the​-­story​-­of​-­operation​-­orchard​-­how​-­israel​-­destroyed​-­syria​-­s​ -­al​-­kibar​-­nuclear​-­reactor​-­a​-­658663​.­html. 182.  Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.” 183.  Makovsky 2012, 39. 184.  Makovsky 2012, 39. 185. A former government official described the administration’s sense that Israel’s very existence was threatened and that Israel could not allow the program to materialize. 186.  Nazila Fathi, “Wipe Israel ‘off the Map’ Ira­nian Says,” New York Times, October 27, 2005, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2005​/­10​/­27​/­world​/­africa​/­wipe​-­israel​-­off​-­the​-­map​-­iranian​-­says​ .­html. 187.  Bar-­Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.” 188.  Bar-­Zohar and Mishal, “The Long Road to Syria.” 189.  Makovsky 2012. 190.  Bush’s memoir was published in 2010, prior to the Israeli government’s disclosure of its involvement. We now know Bush is referring to Israel. 191.  Bush 2010, 420–21. 192. Given Bush’s nuclear beliefs, described in chapter 5, the leader-­centric argument would expect Bush to have seriously considered the preventive option. With the US po­liti­cal

229

NOTES TO PAGES 180–188

climate and fallout over the Iraq War, however, it is not surprising that Bush did not view the available options as worth the costs. In this way, the model would also account for Bush’s refusal to attack. 193.  Makovsky 2012. 194.  P. Baker 2013, 542. 195.  P. Baker 2013, 542. 196.  Hayden 2017, 257–58. 197.  Hayden 2017, 258. 198.  Hayden 2017, 259. 199.  Abrams 2013, 20. 200.  Makovsky 2012. 201.  Abrams 2013, 20. 202.  Abrams 2013, 21. 203.  Cheney and Cheney 2011, 468. 204.  Cheney and Cheney 2011, 469. 205.  Hayden 2017, 259. 206.  Makovsky 2012. 207.  Hayden 2017, 259. 208.  Bush 2010, 420–22; Abrams 2013, 21, confirms this logic but notes it does not explain why Bush did not support an Israeli attack. 209.  Makovsky 2012; Hayden 2017, 262. 210.  Hersh 2008. 211.  P. Baker 2013, 533; Abrams 2013, 22. 212.  Tal Kra-­Oz, “The Last Dove: An Interview with Ehud Olmert,” Fathom, February 2020, https://­fathomjournal​.­org​/­the​-­last​-­dove​-­an​-­interview​-­with​-­ehud​-­olmert​/­. 213.  Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­09​/­04​/­magazine​/­iran​ -­strike​-­israel​-­america​.­html. 214.  Makovsky 2012, 36. 215.  Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.” 216.  Follach and Stark, “The Story of ‘Operation Orchard’: How Israel Destroyed Syria’s Al Kibar Nuclear Reactor.” 217.  Makovsky 2012. 218.  On the relationship between intelligence and international organ­izations, see Car­ne­gie and Carson 2019. 219.  Hersh 2008. 220.  Abrams 2013, 18. 221.  Barak 2018, 412. 222.  Members of the Israeli po­liti­cal elite, including participants in ­these deliberations, suggested privately that po­liti­cal self-­interest drove Barak’s position. 223.  “En­glish Summary of the Winograd Commission Report,” New York Times, January 30, 2008, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2008​/­01​/­30​/­world​/­middleeast​/­31winograd​-­web​.­html. 224.  Makovsky 2012. 225.  Makovsky 2012.

7. Conclusions and Implications   1.  Rachel Elizabeth Whitlark, “Where ­Will the Next President Stand on Nuclear Weapons?,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 3, 2016, https://­thebulletin​.­org​/­where​-­will​-­next​ -­president​-­stand​-­nuclear​-­weapons9391.   2.  Peter Baker and Choe Sang-­Hun, “Trump Threatens ‘Fire and Fury’ against North ­Korea if It Endangers U.S.,” New York Times, August 8, 2017, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2017​/­08​/­08​

230

NOTES TO PAGES 188–191

/­world​/­asia​/­north​-­korea​-­un​-­sanctions​-­nuclear​-­missile​-­united​-­nations​.­html; Rebecca Kheel, “Trump Official Denies US Planning ‘Bloody Nose’ Strike on North K ­ orea,” The Hill, February 15, 2018, https://­thehill​.­com​/­policy​/­defense​/­374049​-­state​-­official​-­senators​-­administration​ -­does​-­not​-­have​-­bloody​-­nose​-­strategy​-­for.   3.  Meghan Keneally, “From ‘Fire and Fury’ to ‘Rocket Man,’ the Vari­ous Barbs Traded between Trump and Kim Jong Un,” ABC News, June 12, 2018, https://­abcnews​.­go​.­com​ /­International​/­fire​-­fury​-­rocket​-­man​-­barbs​-­traded​-­trump​-­kim​/­story​?­id​=­53634996.   4.  David E. Sanger, “Trump-­Kim Summit’s Collapse Exposes the Risks of One-­to-­One Diplomacy,” New York Times, February 28, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­02​/­28​/­world​ /­asia​/­trump​-­north​-­korea​-­nuclear​-­sanctions​.­html.   5.  North ­Korea Warns of ‘Undesired’ Outcome if No Change in US Nuclear Stance,” NBC News, April 30, 2019, https://­www​.­cnbc​.­com​/­2019​/­04​/­30​/­north​-­korea​-­warns​-­of​-­undesired​ -­outcome​-­if​-­us​-­fails​-­to​-­change​-­position​-­in​-­nuclear​-­talks​.­html.   6.  Buhite and Hamel 1990; Trachtenberg 1991, 109–112.   7.  “Discussion at the 204th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, June 24, 1954,” in Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers as President of the United States (Ann Whitman File), 11–12, box 5, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, and also on the Declassified Documents Reference System website (rec­ord number CK3100224086); cited in Trachtenberg 1988.   8.  Trachtenberg 2007; 1988.   9.  David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “The Growing Danger of a U.S. Nuclear First Strike on North ­Korea,” War on the Rocks, October 10, 2017, https://­warontherocks​.­com​/­2017​/­10​/­the​ -­growing​-­danger​-­of​-­a​-­u​-­s​-­nuclear​-­first​-­strike​-­on​-­north​-­korea​/­. 10.  Michael Green and Matthew Kroenig, “A New Strategy for Deterrence and Rollback with North ­Korea,” War on the Rocks, October 19, 2017, https://­warontherocks​.­com​/­2017​/­10​ /­a​-­new​-­strategy​-­for​-­deterrence​-­and​-­rollback​-­w ith​-­north​-­korea​/­; Ankit Panda and Vipin Narang, “Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North K ­ orea and the Lessons from Pakistan,” War on the Rocks, November 20, 2017, https://­warontherocks​.­com​/­2017​/­11​/­nuclear​ -­stability​-­conventional​-­instability​-­north​-­korea​-­lessons​-­pakistan​/­; Hecker 2017. 11. ­These actions may be strategic or coercive be­hav­ior. Sobelman 2018; See also Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­09​/­04​/­magazine​/­iran​-­strike​-­israel​ -­america​.­html. 12.  Chubin 2010; Dueck and Takeyh 2007; Hymans 2012. 13.  Brom 2005; Kroenig 2012; Kahl 2012; Reardon 2012; Posen 2006; Parsi 2007. 14.  Raas and Long 2007; Lindsay 2013. 15.  Michael Crowley, “The Iran Crisis, Explained,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://­ www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­06​/­17​/­us​/­politics​/­iran​-­nuclear​-­deal​-­uranium​.­html. 16.  Samore, et al, 2017. 17.  For a list of US sanctions on Iran, see US Department of the Trea­sury, “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” https://­www​.­treasury​.­gov​/­resource​-­center​/­sanctions​/­programs​ /­pages​/­iran​.­aspx. 18.  Andrea Mitchell and Ken Dilanian, “Why Is Netanyahu Sharing Old Iran Nuke Info? To Get to Trump,” NBC News, May 1, 2019, https://­www​.­nbcnews​.­com​/­news​/­us​-­news​/­netanyahu​ -­s​-­info​-­iran​-­nukes​-­known​-­u​-­s​-­intelligence​-­years​-­n870456. 19.  David D. Kirkpatrick, Richard Pérez-­Peña, and Stanley Reed, “Tankers Are Attacked in Mideast, and U.S. Says Video Shows Iran Was Involved,” New York Times, June 14, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­06​/­13​/­world​/­middleeast​/­oil​-­tanker​-­attack​-­gulf​-­oman​ .­html; Helene Cooper, “What We Know About Iran Shooting Down a U.S. Drone,” New York Times, June 20, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­06​/­20​/­us​/­politics​/­drone​-­shot​-­down​ -­iran​-­us​.­html. 20.  Edward Wong, Helene Cooper, and Megan Specia, “Trump Adds Troops ­after Iran Says It ­Will Breach Nuclear Deal,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​ /­06​/­17​/­world​/­middleeast​/­iran​-­nuclear​-­deal​-­compliance​.­html.

231

NOTES TO PAGES 191–195

21.  Vali R. Nasr, “Trump Might Not Want War With Iran. Without Diplomacy He ­Will Get One,” New York Times, June 17, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­06​/­17​/­opinion​/­iran​ -­america​-­crisis​.­html. 22.  Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, “The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,” New York Times, September 4, 2019, https://­www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2019​/­09​/­04​/­magazine​/­iran​ -­strike​-­israel​-­america​.­html. 23.  Peter Hirschberg, “Netanyahu: It’s 1938 and Iran Is Germany; Ahmadinejad Is Preparing Another Holocaust,” Haaretz, November 14, 2006, https://­www​.­haaretz​.­com​/­1​.­4931862. 24.  Ronen Bergman, “­Will Israel Attack Iran?,” New York Times, January 25, 2012, https://­ www​.­nytimes​.­com​/­2012​/­01​/­29​/­magazine​/­will​-­israel​-­attack​-­iran​.­html. 25. Robbie Gramer and Jack Detsch, “Biden Taps Obama Administration Diplomat as New Iran Envoy,” Foreignpolicy​.­com, January 29, 2021, https://­foreignpolicy​.­com​/­2021​/­01​/­29​ /­biden​-­iran​-­envoy​-­rob​-­malley​-­nuclear​-­deal​-­negotiations​-­republican​-­criticisms​-­sanctions​/­. 26. “Joseph R. Biden Jr. Foreign Policy,” New York Times, January 6, 2020, https://­www​ .­nytimes​.­com​/­interactive​/­2020​/­us​/­politics​/­joe​-­biden​-­foreign​-­policy​.­html; “Remarks by the Vice President to the AIPAC Policy Conference,” March 4, 2013, https://­obamawhitehouse​ .­archives​.­gov​/­the​-­press​-­office​/­2013​/­03​/­04​/­remarks​-­vice​-­president​-­aipac​-­policy​-­conference. 27.  Braut-­Hegghammer 2011; Reiter 2005; Tamsett 2004; Kreps and Fuhrmann 2011. 28.  Quester 2000; Buhite and Hamel 1990.

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249

Index

Note: Figures, notes, and ­tables are indicated by f, n, and t following the page number. Abdullah, Crown Prince (Saudi Arabia), 139 Abrams, Elliott, 180, 181 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 178 Albright, Madeleine, 32, 137 Allen, Charles, 211n2 Allon, Yigal, 167 al-­Qaeda, 144, 145, 146, 149 AMAN (Israel), 159, 167, 169–70 Annan, Kofi, 137 Anti-­Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, 55, 144, 222n127 appeasement strategy, 129, 131 Aqueduct Nuclear Test Program, 94 Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (US), 54, 76, 80, 105 arms control negotiations, 19, 54–56, 64, 67–68, 96, 201n94. See also specific treaties Askari, Ali Reza, 177 al-­Assad, Bashar, 177–78, 181–84 al-­Assad, Hafez, 177 Atomic Energy Commission, 52, 122 Atoms for Peace program, 161, 173 Aziz, Tariq, 131 B-1B bombers, 95, 97 B-2 bombers, 97, 180 B-52 bombers, 95 Baker, James, 103, 127, 131, 134, 136, 217n122

balance of power: China’s nuclear program and, 61; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 121, 125, 127, 132–33; leader-­centric model and, 7–8, 22; North K ­ orea’s nuclear program and, 96; nuclear weapons affecting, 16–17, 198n5; preventive military force and, 2–3 Barak, Ehud, 158, 178, 184 Baruch Plan, 66 Begin, Menachem: international affairs and foreign policy approach of, 164–66, 226n87; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 29, 122–23, 154, 160–61, 168–69, 187, 227n109; nuclear beliefs of, 166–67, 173–74, 176; Pakistan’s nuclear program and, 172–77, 187 Belarus, denuclearization of, 95, 116, 133 Ben Gurion, David, 163, 168 Berlin Crisis (1961), 56, 60 Beschloss, Michael, 80 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, 173 Biden, Joe, 192 Billings, Lem, 59 biological weapons, 116, 125–26, 132, 138, 144, 147, 151. See also weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs Blacker, Coit, 200n76 Blair, Tony, 138, 139, 147–48 Blix, Hans, 89, 107, 109, 115 Brands, Hal, 162 Brezhnev, Leonid, 39 Brom, Shlomo, 182

251

index

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 200n73 Bundy, McGeorge, 44–45, 50, 60, 62, 68, 72, 74, 77–78, 81, 203n18 Bundy, William, 74–75 Bureau of Intelligence and Research (US), 45 Burr, William, 81 Bush, George H. W.: Gulf War and, 127–35; international affairs and foreign policy approach of, 91–92, 212n27; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 124–35; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 102–8, 187; nuclear beliefs of, 85, 91–97, 131; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 95–97 Bush, George W.: Iran’s nuclear program and, 2; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 2, 229n192; Iraq War and, 142–50; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 117–18; nuclear beliefs of, 34, 117, 122, 140, 141–42, 151–52; Syria’s nuclear program and, 179, 180–82 Butler, George Lee, 129–30 Camp David Accords, 164 Car­ter, Ashton, 100, 102, 111 Car­ter, Jimmy, 116, 126, 175 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): China’s nuclear program and, 44, 48, 72, 74, 75, 76, 79; decision to use preventive military force and, 28–29; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 89, 103, 105; Pakistan’s nuclear program and, 176; Syria’s nuclear program and, 180; on WMD terrorism threats, 144 chemical weapons, 93–95, 99, 103, 108, 125–27, 132, 144, 213n41. See also weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs Cheney, Richard, 87, 106, 130, 132, 134, 149–51, 181 Chiang Ching-­Kuo, 73 Chiang Kai-­Kuo, 75 China’s nuclear program, 41–84; alternative explanations for US decision making, 43–47; Clinton and, 99; Cuban missile crisis and, 83–84; explaining divergent perspectives on, 79–82; historical footnotes and speculations, 82–84, 211n230; Johnson and, 15, 17, 75–82, 186–87, 208n163; Kennedy and, 15, 17, 71–75, 79–82, 186–87; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 90; US assessments of, 46, 48–49 Chirac, Jacques, 138 Christopher, Warren, 99, 109, 114 Clinton, Bill: consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 98–100; international affairs and foreign policy approach of,

252

97–98, 214n68; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 31–32, 136–40; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 108–16, 187; nuclear beliefs of, 85, 98–102; Operation Desert Fox and, 31–32, 137–40; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 100–102 Cohen, Elliot, 180 Cohen, William, 138 Cold War: China’s nuclear program and, 49; end of, 88–89, 121, 153; Kennedy and, 50–51; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 88; nuclear proliferation and, 55–56; post–­Cold War policy approaches, 12, 88, 98–100, 102, 130, 136–37, 141, 144, 153 Committee of Principals, 68 Communism, 57–58, 62–63, 65, 72, 80, 87, 92. See also China’s nuclear program; Cold War; Soviet Union Composite Index of National Capability (CINC), 159–60, 225n34 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 116 containment strategy, 119, 134, 137, 144, 146, 150 Copeland, Dale, 16 counterproliferation: alternative explanations for use of preventive military force, 16–18, 18t; intervention decision, 28–34, 30f, 31t, 33t; leader-­centric model of preventive military force decision making, 18–27; preventive military force as strategy for, 14–40 countervailing threats, 24 Cuban missile crisis, 52, 56, 67, 73, 83–84, 202n2 Dagan, Meir, 179, 184 Dallek, Robert, 54 Dayan, Moshe, 163, 169 Debs, Alexandre, 16, 43, 86, 198n25 decision-­making pro­cess: consideration of preventive military force, 28–32, 30f, 31t; leader-­centric model of, 18–27; use of preventive military force, 28, 30f, 32–34, 33t Defense Intelligence Agency, 130 Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), 113 Demo­cratic ­People’s Republic of ­Korea (DPRK). See North ­Korea’s nuclear program Department of Defense, 28–29, 44, 105, 111 Department of Policy Planning, 75 deterrence strategy: Begin and, 166; Bush (G.H.W.) and, 85, 94–95, 124, 128; Bush (G.W.) and, 117, 119, 141–42, 144, 146, 148; Clinton and, 85, 102, 108–9; confidence in, 3; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 23–24; Johnson and, 63, 66, 69, 80; Kennedy and, 59, 62–63, 83; nuclear

index

beliefs and, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 23–25, 27; preventer’s credibility and, 201n78; preventive military force decision making and, 33, 35; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 24–25, 27, 31t, 69, 95, 148, 150; Rabin and, 163 Dichter, Avi, 184 Dimona nuclear complex (Israel), 169 diplomacy, 147, 167, 169, 181–82 Dirksen, Everett, 69 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 77, 81 domestic policy, 19–20, 64–65 domino theory, 61, 65, 92, 96 Dubna Nuclear Research Complex (Rus­sia), 90 Dunn, Lewis, 23 Edelman, Eric, 180 Eden, Lynn, 200n64 Egypt: Camp David Accords and, 164; Operation Desert Fox and, 139; Six-­Day War and, 15 Ehrlich, Simha, 168, 169 Eisenhower, Dwight, 2, 51, 54, 64, 89, 161, 189–90 Engel, Jeffrey, 92, 128, 212n27 escalation risks: arms race and, 56; Cuban Missile crisis and, 84; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 137; Israel’s foreign policy choices and, 163; North K ­ orea’s nuclear program and, 84–85, 110, 188; preventive military force decision making and, 9, 163, 193; in Vietnam War, 80 Executive Order 12938 (1994), 99 existential threats, 8, 167, 171, 185 F-15 fighter aircraft, 170, 175, 184 F-16 fighter aircraft, 170–71, 175, 184, 227n122 F-117 stealth bombers, 114 feasibility of intervention, 28–30, 74, 86, 180, 211n2. See also probability of deterring the proliferator Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 144 Feldman, Shai, 200n54 Fitzgerald, Steve, 92 Flanders, Ralph, 66 Ford, Gerald, 91 France: institutional framework for national security in, 224n12; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 122, 138, 161–62, 168; nuclear program in, 37, 53, 58, 61, 205n61 Franks, Tommy, 149 Friedman, Thomas, 102 Fuhrmann, Matthew, 17, 36–37, 43, 87, 229n162

G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, 143 Gaddafi, Muammar, 173–74 Gallucci, Robert, 218n175 Gandhi, Indira, 175, 176, 195 Garthoff, Raymond, 200n75 Gates, Robert, 179, 181 Gavin, Francis J., 205n61 George, Alexander, 4–5 Gilpatric Committee, 68 Glaser, Charles, 26 Goertz, Gary, 36 Goldstein, Lyle, 17, 43 Goldwater, Barry, 45, 203n20 Goodwin, Richard, 79 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 94–95 Gordis, Daniel, 165 Gore, Al, 100 Goulart, João, 64 greedy states, 26–27 Hadley, Stephen, 143 Hagerty, Devin, 200n54 Halberstam, David, 91 Harriman, Averell, 1, 74 Hayden, Michael, 179, 180 Heinrichs, Waldo, 63 Hez­bollah, 178, 181, 183 Holloway, David, 200n75 horizontal proliferation, 53, 93, 198n3 Horo­witz, Michael, 5–6, 197n13 House Armed Ser­vices Committee, 64 Hussein, Saddam: Bush (G.H.W.) and, 124, 125–26; Bush (G.W.) and, 141–50; Clinton and, 136–40; Iraq’s nuclear weapons program and, 122, 124, 135, 151; Iraq’s WMD program and, 126, 148, 151–52, 213n41; Iraq War and, 142–50; Israel’s foreign policy choices and, 161–62, 164, 166–67, 170; nuclear program and, 221n66; Operation Desert Fox and, 137–40; Persian Gulf War and, 127–32 Hymans, Jacques, 135 imperialism, 56–57, 59–60, 62, 65 India: nuclear program in, 93, 100, 101, 116; Pakistan’s nuclear program and, 38–39, 174–76 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Iraq’s nuclear program and, 123; North K ­ orea’s nuclear program and, 89, 94, 105–10, 112, 114–15, 117, 216n100; Syria’s nuclear program and, 182, 184 Iran-­Iraq War, 125, 130

253

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Iran’s nuclear program: Israel and, 190–93; US preventive military force decision making and, 2, 190–93 Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 (US), 138 Iraq’s nuclear program: alternative explanations for US decision making, 121–22; Begin and, 29, 168–69; Clinton and, 31–32, 136–40; Israel and, 15, 29, 160, 161–62, 167–69, 187; Persian Gulf War and, 87–88, 127–35; Rabin and, 167–68; US assessments of, 122–24, 221n66 Iraq War (2003), 15, 120, 142–50, 223n138 Israel: alternative explanations for decision making in, 159–61; Camp David Accords and, 164; institutional framework for foreign policy decision making in, 156–59, 224n12; Iran’s nuclear program and, 190–93; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 15, 161–62, 167–69, 187; Likud Party, 165; Ministry of Defense, 157; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 157; nuclear program in, 37; Pakistan’s nuclear program and, 172–77; preventive war decision making in, 154–85; Six-­Day War and, 15; Syria’s nuclear program and, 2, 177–79, 182–84 Israel Defense Forces (IDF), 158–60, 162, 169, 183 Israeli Air Force (IAF), 170, 183 Israeli Supreme Court, 224n11 Jabber, Paul, 200n54 Jabotinsky, Ze’ev, 165, 226n87 Japan: North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 111; Six-­Party Talks and, 118 Jeffrey, James, 180 Jervis, Robert, 200n59, 200n70 Johnson, Lady Bird, 63–64 Johnson, Lyndon B.: alternative ­explanations for US decision making and, 43–47; China’s nuclear program and, 15, 17, 75–82, 186–87, 208n163; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 65–68; international affairs and foreign policy approach of, 63–65; nuclear beliefs of, 42–43, 65–71, 75, 81–82, 83, 186; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 69–71; as vice president, 202n2, 202n7 Johnson, Robert, 45, 46–47, 76, 79 Joint Chiefs of Staff: China’s nuclear program and, 44, 72, 73, 75, 82; decision to use preventive military force and, 28–29; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 105, 114 Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 64 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, 13, 191

254

Kahuta nuclear fa­cil­i­ty (Pakistan), 175, 228n158 Kanter, Arnold, 115 Karnad, Bharat, 175 Kazakhstan, denuclearization of, 95, 116, 133 Kennan, George, 51, 200n75 Kennedy, John F.: alternative explanations for US decision making and, 43–47; China’s nuclear program and, 15, 17, 71–75, 79–82, 186–87; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 52–56; international affairs and foreign policy approach of, 50–51; Johnson as vice president for, 202n2, 202n7; military ser­vice of, 204n44; nuclear beliefs of, 42–43, 49, 52–63, 75, 82, 83, 186; Partial Test Ban Treaty and, 92; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 56–63 Kennedy, Robert F., 55, 62 Kent, Sherman, 48 Khan, Abdul Qadeer, 175 Khan, Feroz, 173 Khrushchev, Nikita, 1, 57, 58, 74, 92 Kim Il Sung, 90, 96, 116, 128, 214n58 Kim Jong Il, 177 Kim Jong Un, 188–89 Kissinger, Henry, 200n76 Komer, Robert W., 50, 68, 203n18 Korean War, 70, 89–90. See also North ­Korea’s nuclear program; South ­Korea Kosygin, Alexei, 39, 79 Kreps, Sarah, 17, 36–37, 43, 87, 229n162 Krock, Arthur, 61 Kuwait, invasion of, 125, 131–32 Lake, Anthony, 99, 111, 112, 114 Lavoy, Peter, 200n54, 200n59 leader-­centric model of preventive military force decision making: China’s nuclear program and, 46, 62, 71, 75, 80; counter­ proliferation strategy and, 14, 18; ­future research areas, 194; Iran’s nuclear program and, 190–93; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 119, 122, 127, 135, 139–40, 153–54, 187; Israel’s foreign policy choices and, 155, 159, 163–64, 174, 184–85, 187, 191, 193; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 87, 89, 97, 117–18, 187, 188–89; nuclear beliefs in, 6–9, 23–27; rational disagreement among individuals in, 20–23; research methodology, 9–13, 34–36; theoretical approach, 3–4, 18–27, 193–94; threat perception in, 19–20 League of Nations, 50, 57 Lebanon War (1982), 165 Lemnitzer, Lyman, 46

index

Levy, Adrian, 174–75 Libya, 173–74 Lilley, James R., 106 ­Limited Test Ban Treaty, 1, 53, 54–55, 72, 74 Lisbon Protocol, 95 Livni, Tzipi, 184 Luck, Gary, 111, 114 Lugar, Richard, 95, 100, 116, 143 MacMillan, Harold, 55 Mahoney, James, 36 Makovsky, David, 178 Malraux, André, 83 Mandelbaum, Michael, 200n59 Mao Zedong, 48, 61, 90 Marshall Plan, 65 McCone, John, 67, 72, 74, 77 McDermott, Rose, 5–6 McGhee, George, 72, 74 McNamara, Robert, 44, 60, 61, 77 McNaughton, John, 47 Mearsheimer, John, 200n54 Meir, Golda, 165 Miller, Steven E., 200n64 Monteiro, Nuno, 16, 43, 86, 198n25 Morgenthau, Hans, 200n70 Mossad (Israel), 159, 162, 166–67, 175, 177 Mubarak, Hosni, 139 Multilateral Force Treaty, 81 mutually assured destruction (MAD), 59–62, 66 MX missile program, 95, 97 Naor, Arye, 172 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 173 National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, 180 National Intelligence Council, 123 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs), 46, 151 National Security Agency (NSA), 44 National Security Council (NSC): China’s nuclear program and, 62; Nonproliferation and Export Controls Directorate, 108; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 108, 217n125; Persian Gulf War and, 127 National Security Directive 45 (1990), 127 National Security Review 12 (1989), 102–3 National Security Review 28 (1991), 103–4 nation building, 141, 143 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 48 Nelson, William, 75 neoconservatives, 122

Netanyahu, Benjamin, 158, 165, 191–92, 225n16 New York Times on Chinese nuclear testing, 68 Nixon, Richard, 55, 96 Nonproliferation and Export Controls Directorate (US), 108 nonstate actors, 102, 122, 136–37, 143–44 North American Treaty Organization (NATO), 53, 65, 93 North ­Korea’s nuclear program: alternative explanations for US decision making, 86–89; Bush (G.H.W.) and, 102–8, 187; Bush (G.W.) and, 117–18; Clinton and, 108–16, 187; Syria’s nuclear program and, 177–78; Trump and, 188–90; US assessments of, 89–91, 212n17, 214n63, 218n174 nuclear beliefs: of Begin, 166–67, 173–74, 176; of Biden, 192; of Bush (G.H.W.), 85, 91–97, 131; of Bush (G.W.), 34, 117, 122, 140, 141–42, 151–52; of Clinton, 85, 98–102; consequences of nuclear proliferation, 23–24; deterrence strategy and, 3, 6, 9, 11, 14, 23–25, 27; divergence among leaders, 21–23; of Johnson, 42–43, 65–71, 75, 81–82, 83, 186; of Kennedy, 42–43, 49, 52–63, 75, 82, 83, 186; in leader-­centric model, 18–19, 23–27; preventive military force decision making and, 6–11, 14, 28–31, 33–35, 45, 47, 186, 193; probability of deterring the proliferator, 24–27; of Rabin, 163–64; of Trump, 190. See also nuclear optimists; nuclear pessimists Nuclear Non-­Proliferation Treaty (NPT): China’s nuclear program and, 55, 67; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 89, 90, 110, 112, 116, 216n100 nuclear optimists: Bush (G.H.W.) as, 85, 91, 94–95, 126, 213n36, 214n54; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 23–24; defined, 197n3; deterrence strategy and, 31; Johnson as, 63, 66, 187; preventive military force decision making and, 2, 31–34, 31t, 193; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 27 nuclear pessimists: Biden as, 192; Bush (G.W.) as, 117, 142; Clinton as, 85, 98–100; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 23–24; defined, 197n3; deterrence strategy and, 31; Kennedy as, 49, 52–53, 62–63; McNamara as, 44; Netanyahu as, 192; Olmert as, 182; preventive military force decision making and, 2, 4, 31–34, 31t, 186, 193; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 27; Reagan as, 214n60; Trump as, 188; US-­Soviet relationship and, 200n58

255

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nuclear testing: by China, 43, 46–47, 68, 71, 75–82, 93; by India, 93; by North ­Korea, 118; by Soviet Union, 93. See also specific test ban treaties Nunn, Sam, 95, 100, 116, 143 Obama, Barack, 2, 191 Oberdorfer, Don, 110 Olmert, Ehud, 154, 158, 178–79, 187 Operation Desert Fox, 31–32, 137–40, 152–53 Operation Desert Storm, 132. See also Persian Gulf War (1990–91) Ormsby-­Gore, David, 53 Osiraq nuclear fa­cil­i­ty (Iraq), 155, 160, 167–71, 195, 217n126 Outer Space Treaty, 67 Pace, Peter, 180 Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology (PINSTECH), 174 Pakistan’s nuclear program, 100, 101, 116, 154, 172–77, 187 Parmet, Herbert S., 56 Partial Test Ban Treaty, 92 Patriot Missile system, 104 Peres, Shimon, 158, 163, 167–68, 171–72, 195 Peretz, Amir, 179 Perkovich, George, 173, 200n54 Perle, Richard, 200n73 Perry, William, 86–87, 100, 102, 111, 112, 113–14, 115 Persian Gulf War (1990–91), 87–88, 120, 123, 127–35 Pipes, Richard, 27, 200n73 Podgorny, Nikolai, 39 Poneman, Daniel, 217n134 Posen, Barry, 200n54 possibility princi­ple, 36, 202n97 Powell, Colin, 126, 129, 130, 134, 149, 151 preemptive strikes, 15, 66, 146, 150, 155–56, 165 preventive military force: as counterproliferation strategy, 14–40; decisions driven by leaders, 4–6; nuclear beliefs and, 6–9; presidential age and, 5–6, 6t probability of deterring the proliferator: Bush (G.H.W.) and, 95–97; Clinton and, 100–102; deterrence strategy and, 24–25, 27, 31t, 69, 95, 148, 150; Johnson and, 69–71; Kennedy and, 56–63; nuclear beliefs and, 24–27 Proj­ect Solarium (US), 189–90 public opinion (US): on North ­Korea’s nuclear program, 115–16; preventive military force decision making and, 17–18; on threat perceptions of China, 203n19

256

Rabin, Yitzhak: consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 163–64; international affairs and foreign policy approach of, 158, 160, 162–63, 226n67; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 154, 160, 167–68, 187, 227n109; nuclear beliefs of, 163–64 Ra­bino­vich, Itamar, 163 Rao, P. V. Narasimha, 100 Reagan, Ronald, 96–97, 103, 124, 214n60 regime change, 31, 138, 143, 148–49, 194 Rice, Condoleezza, 142, 145, 146–47, 149, 150, 180, 181 Richelson, Jeffrey, 80, 81 rogue states, 102, 111, 119, 136, 141–42, 146 Roh Tae-­Woo, 217n121 Roo­se­velt, Franklin  D., 64, 66 Rosen, Steven, 200n54 Rostow, Walt W., 45, 54 Rowen, Henry, 44 Rumsfeld, Donald, 145, 146, 149, 150 Rusk, Dean, 1, 44–45, 48, 51, 71–73, 77 Russert, Tim, 149 Rus­sia: Clinton and, 99–100; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 106, 116–18; Six-­Party Talks and, 118; Syria’s nuclear program and, 177. See also Soviet Union Sadat, Anwar, 162, 173 safeguards agreement, 103–5, 110 Sagan, Scott, 23 Saguy, Yehoshua, 169 sanctions: as alternative to preventive military force, 37; against Iran, 182, 191; against Iraq, 132, 134, 137, 141, 145; against North ­Korea, 107, 110, 114–15, 118, 189 Sandoval, R. Robert, 23 Saudi Arabia: Iraq War and, 149; Operation Desert Fox and, 139 Saunders, Elizabeth, 12, 19–20, 22, 35 Saxton, Jim, 217n125 Schlesinger, James, 24 Schneider, Barry R., 176 Scott-­Clark, Catherine, 174–75 Scowcroft, Brent, 115, 126, 128, 132–35, 149, 217n121, 217n125 SCRAM II program, 95 Sculpin Nuclear Test Program, 94 Seaborg, Glenn, 55 Security Council (UN): Iraq’s nuclear program and, 138, 146; Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and, 191; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 109, 117 security-­seeking states, 26–27 self-­defense rationale for nuclear programs, 113, 128, 146, 165 Senate Armed Ser­vices Committee, 64

index

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, 34, 117, 143–45 Shalikashvili, John, 110, 113–14, 115 Shamir, Yitzhak, 158, 169, 170, 229n162 Sharon, Ariel, 168, 169, 182 Shinseki, Eric, 149 Sidey, Hugh, 57, 204n45 Singapore Summit (2018), 188 Singh, Dilbagh, 175 Six-­Day War (1967), 15, 162, 163, 165 Six-­Party Talks, 118, 181 Smith, Bromley, 72 Snyder, Jed, 200n59 South ­Korea: Clinton and, 101; joint military exercises with US, 105; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 103–6, 112–15; Six-­Party Talks and, 118; US troops in, 111, 114 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (US), 95, 100, 116, 143 Soviet Union: Bush (G.H.W.) and, 94–95; China’s nuclear program and, 49, 80–81; collective leadership in, 39; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 122, 161; Johnson and, 65, 66; Kennedy and, 50–51, 57, 58–59, 60, 74; ­Limited Test Ban Treaty negotiations and, 1; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 90, 212n32, 215n81; nuclear program in, 2, 26, 199n26; US threat perceptions of, 25–26, 189–90 Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 13-2-63, 46 stability-­instability paradox, 201n93 Stam, Allan, 5–6, 197n13 START I Treaty, 116, 133 START II Treaty, 95 state-­centric approach to international affairs, 141 State Department: China’s nuclear program and, 44, 72, 75, 76; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 103, 105, 106 state sponsors of terror, 118, 145 Stevenson, Adlai, 64 Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 94, 101, 104 Stuxnet computer virus, 191 Syria’s nuclear program, 177–84; Israel’s preventive military force decision making and, 2, 178–79, 182–84, 187; Olmert and, 178–79; Six-­Day War and, 15; US preventive military force decision making and, 179–82

terrorism: deterrence strategy and, 109; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 119, 124, 136, 141; Iraq War and, 143–48; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 111, 113, 117–18; state sponsors of, 118, 145; threat perceptions of, 34; WMDs and, 143–48, 151–52. See also September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks Thatcher, Margaret, 174 Thieu, Nguyen Van, 96 Thompson, Llewellyn, 77 threat perceptions: of Begin, 154, 172–73, 176; of Bush (G.H.W.), 89, 92, 119, 128, 133, 135; of Bush (G.W.), 119, 144, 145; of Clinton, 89, 119, 137; consequences of nuclear proliferation and, 24; countervailing threats, 24; existential threats, 8, 167, 171, 185; of Johnson, 71, 80, 82; of Kennedy, 56, 62, 72, 75, 82; in leader-­centric model, 19–20; nuclear beliefs and, 24; of Olmert, 183; preventive military force decision making and, 10, 19, 22, 24, 25–27, 32–33; probability of deterring the proliferator and, 25–27, 56; salience of threat, 34, 128, 131 Threshold Test Ban Treaty, 94 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), 136, 138–39 Truman, Harry, 2, 69, 93, 189 Truman Doctrine, 65 Trump, Donald: Iran’s nuclear program and, 2, 191; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 117, 188–90; nuclear beliefs of, 190 Trumpledor, Joseph, 165 Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center (Iraq), 123

Taiwan, 38, 92–93 Talbott, Strobe, 137 Taylor, Maxwell, 73 Tenet, George, 149

Vance, Cyrus, 175 Van Evera, Steven, 200n54 vertical proliferation, 53 Vietnam War, 61, 63, 70, 80

Ukraine, denuclearization of, 95, 100, 116, 133, 215n78 Ulam, Adam, 200n76 United Kingdom: institutional framework for national security in, 224n12; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 138, 147–48; nuclear program in, 37 United Nations: China’s nuclear program and, 57, 66; Iraq’s nuclear program and, 137, 138, 146; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 107, 109, 117; Persian Gulf War and, 131. See also Security Council (UN) United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), 123, 150

257

index

Waltz, Kenneth, 4 Washington Post on North ­Korea’s nuclear program, 107 weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs: Iraq’s nuclear program and, 123, 126, 139; Iraq War and, 143–48, 151–52; North ­Korea’s nuclear program and, 97, 99, 100; Persian Gulf War and, 131–32; terrorism and, 143–48, 151–52 Weizman, Ezer, 168, 169 Western, Jon, 150 Whiting, Allen, 76 Wit, Joel S., 217n134 Wol­fo­witz, Paul, 105, 137

258

World War II: appeasement during, 128–29; Bush (G.H.W.) and, 91, 93–94, 128–31; Johnson and, 65–66; Kennedy and, 49, 51; Soviet aggression and cost insensitivity in, 27 Yadin, Yigal, 168, 169 Yariv, Aharon, 169, 175 Yom Kippur War (1973), 162 Yongbyon nuclear fa­cil­i­ty (North ­Korea), 90, 110–11, 114–15, 117, 179 Zhou Enlai, 75 Zionism, 164–65, 226n57