Algeria and the Cold War: International Relations and the Struggle for Autonomy 9781350985247, 9781786732590

Table of contents :
Front Cover
Author Bio
Title
Copyright
Dedication
Contents
Acknowledgements
Introduction
1. Strategy for Development, 1969–70
2. The Triumph of Realism, 1971–2
3. The Challenge of Third Worldism, 1973–4
4. Western Sahara, 1975–6
5. Safeguarding the Socialist Revolution, 1977–8
Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Back Cover

Citation preview

T

“Students and scholars alike will learn much from this deeply informed and carefully crafted study.” John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science, Fordham University.

Mohammed Lakhdar Ghettas is currently Senior Program Officer at the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, and previously founded the Maghreb Studies Initiative within the Africa Affairs Program at the London School of Economics (LSE) IDEAS Center for Diplomacy and Strategy. He has published several articles on the international affairs of North Africa and the Middle East. His PhD in International History is from LSE.

Picture credit: Algerian President Houari Boumediene during the Arab Summit, 1974, in Rabat, Morocco. (Photo by Keystone-France/ Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images) Design: Positive2

www.ibtauris.com

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

“Makes a convincing case, and along the way provides a great deal of useful background about the issues that still confront Algeria.” William B. Quandt, Professor of Politics, Emeritus, University of Virginia; author of Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968.

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

This book offers an international history of US-Algerian relations at the height of the Cold War. The Algerian president, Houari Boumediene, actively adjusted Algeria’s foreign policy to promote the country’s national development, pursuing its own commitment to non-alignment and ‘Third World’ leadership. Algeria’s foreign policy was directly opposed to that of the US on major issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Western Sahara conflict, and the Algerian government was avowedly socialist. Yet, as this book outlines, Algeria was able to negotiate a position for itself between the US and the Soviet bloc, winning support from both and becoming a key actor in international affairs. Based on materials from recently opened archives, this book sheds new light on the importance of Boumediene’s era in Algeria and will be an essential resource for historians and political scientists alike.

MohamMed Lakhdar Ghettas

hroughout the Cold War, Africa was a theater for superpower rivalry. That the US and the Soviet Union used countries in sub-Saharan Africa to their own advantage is well-known. Sub-Saharan countries also exploited Cold War hostilities in turn. But what role did countries in North Africa play?

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR International Relations and the Struggle for Autonomy

MOHAMMED LAKHDAR GHETTAS

Mohammed Lakhdar Ghettas is currently Senior Program Officer at the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, and previously founded the Maghreb Studies Initiative within the Africa Affairs Program at the London School of Economics (LSE) IDEAS Center for Diplomacy and Strategy. He has published several articles on the international affairs of North Africa and the Middle East. His PhD in International History is from LSE.

“This richly detailed assessment of Algeria’s international posture during the Cold War provides important insights into the dynamics of Algeria’s view of itself and the progressive image it sought to project to the outside world, an image derived from its own revolutionary heritage. The complexity of Algerian-American relations during the turbulent decades of the Cold War receives especially insightful treatment. Students and scholars alike will learn much from this deeply informed and carefully crafted study.” John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science, Fordham University “This deeply researched book argues that an understanding of Algeria’s foreign policy in the 1970s, when President Houari Boumediene tried to assert a leadership role for his recently independent country, can help us understand much about Algeria today. I think he makes a convincing case, and along the way provides a great deal of useful background about the issues that still confront Algeria.” William B. Quandt, Professor of Politics, Emeritus, University of Virginia; author of Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954 –1968

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR International Relations and the Struggle for Autonomy

MOHAMMED LAKHDAR GHETTAS

Published in 2018 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2018 Mohammed Lakhdar Ghettas The right of Mohammed Lakhdar Ghettas to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. Library of International Relations 84 ISBN: 978 1 78453 515 5 eISBN: 978 1 78672 259 1 ePDF: 978 1 78673 259 0 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Stone Serif by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

To my parents, Fatima and Mohamed Tahar

CONTENTS

Acknowledgements Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Strategy for Development, 1969 –70 The Triumph of Realism, 1971 –2 The Challenge of Third Worldism, 1973 –4 Western Sahara, 1975 –6 Safeguarding the Socialist Revolution, 1977 –8

ix 1 19 50 91 131 174

Conclusion

207

Notes Bibliography Index

225 265 277

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to my supervisor Odd Arne Westad for his invaluable guidance and advice, for which I am most grateful. Many people have supported me in different ways in the course of the research I have conducted for this book. I am very grateful to Richard Crockatt and Jacqueline Fear-Segal, my MA degree tutors at the University of East Anglia, as well as to Ahmed Bendania for his encouragement and his support for my application to the LSE. At the LSE, I wish to express my special thanks to Rajak Svetozar, Sue Onslow, Nigel Ashton, Anthony Best, Artemy Kalinovsky, Tanya Harmer and Roham Alvandi, all of whom offered helpful feedback on parts of this work during the LSE IDEAS Cold War Seminar as well as on other occasions. My research would not have been possible without the financial support I have received from the LSE IDEAS Center for Diplomacy and Strategy, the International History Department and the Middle East Center. I will be forever grateful to Cato Stonex both for his commitment to the support of research and for the many insightful conversations I have shared with him during my stay here in London. I would also like to put on record my thanks to Tiha Franulovic for writing letters in support of my visa applications. I am very thankful to John King for undertaking the task of editing this work, as well as for drawing my attention to very useful and out of print source material. In Algiers, I would like to thank Abdelkadar Hellal and Mrs. Boudjemlin, with her team at the Algerian National Archives, for their help during my research trips there. Lakhdar Brahimi, Yahia Zoubir, and Yahioui Lamine have all kindly granted me interviews which

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filled the gaps in the archival record. In the United States, my thanks are due to my cousin Kaceem for facilitating my trips there, to Mark Fischer at the Ford Library, and to Keith Shuler and James Yancey at the Carter Library. Thomas W. Zeiler of the University of Colorado at Boulder, Mario Del Pero of the University of Bologna, and Michael Hopkins of the University of Liverpool, all offered helpful comments at the 2011 meeting of the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations, where I presented some of my work. Particular thanks are also due to Zhu Danni at the Chinese Foreign Affairs University for putting me in touch with Wang Suola and Li Anshan at Peking University. In Switzerland, I am very grateful to the Hoggar Institute in Geneva for granting me access to its impressive library on Maghreb affairs. My thanks are also due to Marco Wyss, at the Universite´ de Neuchaˆtel, for drawing my attention to the holdings of the Swiss Federal Archives, and to the staff there in Bern for facilitating my work on their premises. Last but not least, I would like to thank all those who have helped me in various ways but wish to remain anonymous.

INTRODUCTION

On 23 March 2008 in Washington, Mohammed Bedjaoui, the Algerian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, met the US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. At this meeting, Rice offered her Algerian counterpart a copy of the Treaty of Amity and Peace of 5 September 1795 between the US and Algeria, signed after the naval battles between the two countries in the Mediterranean in earlier years. Rice’s symbolic gesture was intended to be a reminder of the long history of US-Algerian relations, stretching back to the earliest years after the proclamation of the United States as a sovereign republic. Bedjaoui responded by expressing Algeria’s willingness to strengthen further the bilateral relations of the two countries but also reiterated what he described as “Algeria’s unwavering support for the right to selfdetermination of the people of the Western Sahara, and for a Palestinian homeland, in conformity with international legality and the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions.”1 History, in any relationship, weighs heavily and is often the determining factor in the shape of current bilateral relations between two countries. This is certainly so in the case of US-Algerian relations in relation to issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Western Sahara conflict. Both of these emerged in the 1970s and each came to be a significant factor in relations between Washington and Algiers. Algeria’s commitment to unreserved moral, political and material support for the Palestinian cause had the consequence that it was frequently on a collision course with US foreign policy. In the Cold War dynamics of the era, the Algerian government, which was avowedly left-wing and socialist, was often identified by Washington

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with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, the clash over the Western Sahara, which pitted socialist Algeria against pro-Western Morocco, was viewed in both Washington and in Algiers as a Cold War issue. This was especially so as the global de´tente that had been built in the 1970s, following the accession of President Richard Nixon in January 1969 and the Nixon Doctrine pronounced on 25 July that year, led in effect to the displacement of superpower confrontation by proxy to Africa and elsewhere. According to the Nixon Doctrine, the US would honour its treaty commitments and provide a guarantee against aggression against nuclear threats to any friendly third state threatened by a nuclear power. However, the US would expect its allies to undertake what was necessary for their own defense, and while providing arms where appropriate would expect nations to be responsible for their own defense. The implication was that the US would undertake no further large scale military interventions such as that in which it had become involved in Vietnam, but that conflict by proxy remained an option.2 The origin of the Maghreb’s conflicts and rivalries lay in any case in the Cold War years and were therefore coloured from the start by the influence of bi-polar ideology and rivalry. These issues have remained in many ways unresolved up to the present day and it is for this reason that the study of US-Algerian relations in the 1970s is of relevance. In addition, an unprecedented opportunity to reconsider the history of the Cold War has been presented by the recent opening of archives, especially those in Russia, Eastern Europe and China.3 Such reconsideration holds the potential not only to shed light on US-USSR relations but also on issues related to the Third World countries that in the 1970s were often the theatres in which Cold War conflicts were played out. Algerian policy is of particular interest because of the country’s role as a leader in the Third World, and its interactions with the US offer insights into relations between the US and the Third World in general. Thanks to geopolitical considerations, Algeria has become a point of convergence for diverse interests. The Maghreb in general has been of strategic significance in the policies of the US, the European Union and Russia, and Algeria’s role as an energy supplier has made it a crucial element in the global strategic planning of the West as well as a key concern for emerging markets. However, while most countries round the world enjoy relations with all the countries of the

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Maghreb that are on the whole problem-free, prospects for US-Algerian relations still suffer from the unhealthy consequences of the Cold War. The US-Algerian relationship in the 1970s was, therefore, part of the dynamics of the Cold War at that time, as it shifted from Europe to the Third World, which became the new theatre of superpower rivalry.4 This shift coincided with continuing decolonization in Africa and with progress in superpower de´tente. The arrival of the Nixon administration and Henry Kissinger’s energetic pursuit of US national interest coupled with de´tente in his roles first as National Security Advisor and subsequently as Secretary of State, had coincided with the adoption by Algeria’s Revolutionary Council Chairman and President Houari Boumediene of ambitious development and nation-building plans.5 In order to create the conditions for the fulfillment of these plans, he conceived the principle of regional de´tente and better relations with Algeria’s neighbors, which he placed at the heart of his foreign policy. At the same time, in the spirit of the new realism in US-Algerian relations, ideology made way for pragmatism and global de´tente was the guarantor of the tacit agreement. However, as soon as de´tente began to crumble, the old ideological considerations immediately re-emerged and were never again to disappear.6 At the time when the Western Sahara conflict erupted into violence in 1975, after Spain withdrew from its former colony, de´tente was being compromised and the Cold War mind-set once more took hold. This is the trajectory that accounts for the improvement and subsequent deterioration in US-Algerian relations during that period. National development was Boumediene’s primary goal and its precondition had been regional de´tente in the Maghreb, which was meant to have created the diminution in regional tension in which the strategy of development could be implemented. In addition, however, Algeria intended de´tente in the Maghreb to improve the country’s image in Washington, with the economic benefits that could bring. Boumediene hoped to win support from the Nixon administration for Algeria’s development project as well as attracting the private sector in the US to invest in Algeria. Simultaneously, however, and to an extent paradoxically, the stridency of Algeria’s foreign policy in its areas of fundamental disagreement with the US continued unabated. In addition, Algeria’s strategic assets, such as the Mers-el-Kebir naval base, with its associated deep bunker designed to

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resist nuclear attack, were attractive enough to both NATO and the Warsaw Pact to give the Algerian leadership sufficient leverage to play off one power against the other. Algeria was thus able to consolidate its development strategy, free of binding commitment to one side or the other, and to further its ambitions to be a leader of the NonAligned Movement and the Third World. The intensification of the Western Sahara conflict was a further local factor that affected Algeria at the regional level. The benefit Algeria had derived from the conciliatory gestures Boumediene had already made towards Morocco in 1972, as part of his plans for regional de´tente, were undermined by the Western Sahara conflict. In addition, the conflict was both a direct threat to Algeria’s national security and an issue over which Algeria’s ideological commitments could not be ignored. As Boumediene saw it, however, Algeria was simply unable to stand aloof from the Western Sahara. Both the integrity of its own territory and its commitment to the support of liberation in Africa were at stake. Relations between the US and the Soviet Union were in decline in such areas as Angola and the Horn of Africa and this was reflected in the Maghreb. When the Ford administration decided to offer support to Morocco, considerations of both ideological and national security motivated the Algerian leadership to seek the support of the Socialist bloc. In the 1970s, the urgent Cold War priorities of the Nixon-Ford administration were the determining factor in the evolution of USAlgerian relations. The US presidential agenda was preoccupied by global de´tente, including such issues as the SALT I Treaty of 1972, the Helsinki process and the negotiations that would lead to SALT II in 1979, and by the regional conflicts that were taking place in parallel, especially the embroilment of the US in the Vietnam War, which led the White House to relegate issues of secondary importance to the Department of State. Together with the severance of diplomatic relations between the US and Algeria following the June 1967 war in the Middle East, this meant that the White House showed no real interest in Algeria despite the growth of economic ties. Nevertheless Algeria was able to take advantage of the US administration’s promotion of de´tente to further its development plans. Algiers thus had a vested interest in fostering regional de´tente and the normalization of its relations with the rest of its Maghreb neighbors. This strategy, Boumediene believed, would be emulated by moderate Arab

INTRODUCTION

5

leaders and would also attract Washington’s attention and hopefully its support. Mindful of Nixon and Kissinger’s efforts to escape from the Vietnamese quagmire in which the US had immersed itself, Algeria sought to gain favor from the US by doing what it could to help. Algiers exploited the special relationship it had developed with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front (NLF) in order to reach out to Washington. Algeria was able to bring itself to the attention of the US administration by playing a mediatory role in negotiations over the fate of American prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese NLF, thus succeeding in establishing a friendlier relationship with Washington. This was consolidated by the efforts of the US private sector, the interests of which in Algeria were ever increasing, to lobby the US administration in Algeria’s favor. Subsequently there was an even greater upsurge of economic cooperation between the US and Algeria, despite the continuing ideological divergence between the two countries on certain issues central to Algerian foreign policy. Algeria’s emergence as a leading figure in the Third World movement, however, coincided with the October War of 1973 in the Middle East, which put Algiers on an inevitable collision course with Washington. In addition, the eruption into violence of the Western Sahara conflict two years later, when Spain withdrew, coming at the same time as the renewal of the proxy Cold War, first in Angola and then in Afghanistan, was a factor beyond Algeria’s control that aggravated the decline of regional de´tente. In 1977, however, when the Carter administration came to office with its pledge to introduce human rights as a key component in America’s foreign policy, a new phase began. There were immediate consequences to Carter’s policies in the Maghreb that conduced to the success of Algeria’s policy goals. Boumediene was able to make use of President Carter’s commitment to human rights issues, and of the new restrictions the US placed on arms transfers, to halt the US support for Rabat that had characterized the Nixon-Ford years. The US suspended its arms transfers to Morocco, despite the lengths to which King Hassan II went to ingratiate himself with Washington. The Moroccan interventions in 1977, in Shaba in former Zaire and in Benin, were intended to serve as a demonstration of Morocco’s continuing usefulness to the US but without reaping the expected rewards. Meanwhile, though the conflict, on Algeria’s borders, was

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evidently of geopolitical concern to Algeria, Algiers also maintained its ideologically based support for the Polisario Front in the Western Sahara conflict. Algeria viewed Polisario as a liberation movement deserving of the same solidarity it had always shown towards liberation movements, including those in Palestine, Vietnam, Angola and South Africa. Algeria welcomed President Carter’s policy of neutrality with regard to the Western Sahara conflict and went as far as to ask Washington to exert pressure on Rabat to open negotiations with the Polisario Front. However, any new rapprochement with Washington was not destined to last indefinitely. There were to be complications in Algeria’s relationship with the US as a spin-off of Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat’s visit to Israel in November 1977. Algeria became once more involved in the affairs of the Middle East, from which it had to some extent withdrawn since the outbreak of the Western Sahara conflict. Algeria, Syria, Libya and South Yemen formed the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, whose purpose was to rally Arab support for Palestinian rights. In February 1978, the Front’s second meeting was held in Algiers. In late December 1978, the threat to Algeria’s development plans represented by the burden of the Western Sahara conflict on Algeria’s budget prompted Boumediene to revitalize Algeria’s ties with Moscow and Havana in order to preserve both the country’s economy and its national security. Boumediene’s untimely death at the age of 42 from a rare blood disease marked the end of an era and the subsequent Algerian leadership acquiesced to a different outcome in the Western Sahara. The prior course of US-Algerian relations during the President Johnson’s term of office, from November 1963 to January 1969, is of course also crucial to understand what happened under Boumediene. US-Algerian relations under the Johnson administration had been extremely confrontational over a number of issues. These included Algeria’s material involvement in Congo, and the support it gave to liberation movements throughout Africa, the Middle East and Vietnam, as well as the link Ben Bella had established with Cuba. Johnson’s Secretary of State Dean Rusk set out the US position when he instructed William Porter, the US ambassador to Algeria, to lodge a protest with Ben Bella against what they considered pro-communist propaganda in the Algerian media. As Rusk put it, the State Department “realizes there is a genuine strength in Algerian public attitudes related

INTRODUCTION

7

to Bloc and Arab support for social change; opposition to colonialism; support for militant nationalism . . . Nevertheless, Algerian quasiofficial support continues for issues far removed from North Africa and of apparent significance only in general support reflected for antiAmericanism.”7 By December 1964, the Johnson administration had decided to halt American food aid and its small-scale rural development programs in Algeria, and this was reinforced following Ben Bella’s visit to Moscow in May 1964. U.S governmental agencies were, however, divided between themselves over how to bring home to Ben Bella the message that opposition to Washington’s policies and support for its adversaries entailed a cost. President Johnson favored cutting off all aid, but Secretary of State Rusk and USAID officials did not support Johnson’s extreme position, fearing it could further radicalize Ben Bella and lead him to align Algeria wholly with the Soviet Union. Robert W. Komer, a member of the National Security Council’s staff, told Cherif Guellal, Algeria’s ambassador to Washington, that while President Johnson was as committed as President Kennedy had been “to develop good relations with key nations like Algeria . . . he naturally doesn’t have the same standing personal feeling for Algeria,” and warned the Algerian ambassador that, “bad atmospherics could hurt.”8 American friends of Algeria in the Johnson administration (or those who had survived from the Kennedy years such as Porter and Komer) believed in a gradualist approach whereby Algeria’s sales of wheat on credit, as well as the other limited medical and rural programs that still existed, would be slowly phased out until Ben Bella was either brought to see Algeria’s pressing need for American aid or took the decision to carry on regardless with his confrontational course. John McCone, Director of the CIA, argued that the US should, “cut off aid to countries which supported the rebels in the Congo.”9 While the Johnson administration was determined either immediately or gradually to phase out its limited aid programs in Algeria, depending on which view prevailed, it hoped to be able to allow the decision to appear to be the result of technical problems rather than political motives. In Algiers, however, avoiding the cancelation of the US medical and rural aid programs was not seen as a pressing concern. Guellal explained to Rusk that though these programs were undoubtedly “useful”, they did not measure up to Algeria’s urgent development needs. Guellal went on to say that, unlike the Americans,

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“the Soviets . . . promptly selected and studied projects they were interested in and six months later had agreed to begin.”10 By then, however, even Algeria’s friends in Washington had become disillusioned with the Ben Bella regime. “This makes life difficult for Algeria’s friends here,” Komer observed, adding that he was “sorry” to see Algeria “waste its money on building a large military establishment,” while the US administration’s four “Area Projects”, which had the potential to create 60,000 jobs before the summer of 1964, struggled to find their way through the Ben Bella government’s bureaucracy. Komer told Guellal that the Ben Bella regime would be well advised “to avoid nationalization of oil assets of Western companies until Algeria was on a surer footing . . . down the development track, it could then seek more advantageous arrangements.” Komer concluded by saying to Guellal that, “if you must follow the Yugoslav model so be it, but for Pete’s sake, not the Cubans or Chicoms [Chinese communists]. Their economic performance is pitiful.”11 However, Washington did not want to sit by and watch Algeria departing entirely from the American sphere. In May 1964, the “lavish treatment” Ben Bella was accorded during his visit to Moscow and the medal with which he was decorated were enough to prompt the initiation of a new action plan for Algeria in Washington. The State Department believed the way Ben Bella was received in Moscow was, “primarily a response to the Zhou Enlai trip to Algeria. It was a response to the new challenge to the Soviets from the Chinese for influence in the Third World,” concluding that, given Algeria’s revolutionary past, Moscow simply wanted Algerian support for various Soviet positions in the world, “rather than acquiring a new satellite.” The memorandum written by State Department officials for the Secretary of State proposed that the US should continue to recognize the “primary role” in Algeria of the French, taking account of France’s annual transfer to Algeria of $200 million in aid. France should continue to be the principal representative of Western influence, the US diplomats recommended, and should serve as a counter-balance to the penetration of Algeria by the Soviets, who, it was noted, were currently giving Algeria $228 million in credits and military assistance. The memorandum proposed a carrot-and-stick policy in response to Ben Bella’s further tilt to the Soviet Union, while conceding that Washington’s options were very limited.12

INTRODUCTION

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Ben Bella’s comments after his visit to Moscow nullified what remained of the willingness of the US ambassador William J. Porter to give him the benefit of the doubt. The Algerian leader was said to have made such remarks as, “the Soviet Union is our shield,” and, “French aid is important but not indispensable,” as well as accusing the CIA of being in contact with the Algerian opposition and of fostering its subversive activities in the Berber region of Kabylie. From Moscow, Ben Bella flew on to Cairo where he joined Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser and the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev at the opening ceremony of the Aswan dam. In his report to Washington about Ben Bella’s activities, Porter commented that, Like most observers, I originally looked on him as a nationalist with a messianic complex who was determined to lead Algeria and Africa upward and onward . . . . But developments in recent months, and now the trip to Moscow, raise doubts that this analysis goes far enough. At present, I suspect that his relationship to [the] Soviet Union probably goes beyond what he has admitted, or what was revealed by the Moscow communique.13 In Washington, Dean Rusk now faced the prospect of giving evidence to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about US relations with Algeria. He summoned Ambassador Guellal to demand further information on Ben Bella’s Moscow visit, questioning him about Ben Bella’s allegations against the CIA, and also about a report that Ben Bella had described US food aid to Algeria as “poisoned bread”.14 Rusk rejected Algeria’s allegations regarding the activities of the CIA and pressed Guellal to persuade Ben Bella to designate a high ranking Algerian official to examine the allegations, conjointly with a US official, Norris Haselton.15 In August, Guellal reported to Rusk that in regard to the CIA Ben Bella was “finally satisfied with . . . [the US government’s] assurances and considered the matter closed, at least for the time being.” Rusk, however, was not satisfied by this answer and sought the “help and advice” of Guinea’s President Sekou Toure´ to “allay Ben Bella’s suspicions.”16 In November, when Guellal sounded out Robert Komer on the possibility of a meeting between President Johnson and Ben Bella at the occasion of the upcoming UN General Assembly meeting, Komer poured cold water on the idea and asked ironically whether Ben Bella “would plan to go on directly from

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the US to Peking,” in reference to Ben Bella’s visit to Cuba in 1962 just as the Cuban Missile Crisis began, immediately after his first visit to the US and his meeting with President Kennedy.17 In December 1964, as consensus was building within the US administration to disengage from Algeria, Komer faced the difficult task of slowing its momentum. As he commented, “I can well understand our mounting disillusionment over Algeria. Ben Bella has been hard to swallow in the past, but his antics in the Congo will be the last straw for a lot of people,” and he added, “it is essentially whether things would not get a lot worse if we cut Algeria off. I’d hate to see us abandon the field to the French, Soviets, and Chicoms.”18 Komer warned Averell Harriman, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, that cutting off aid to Algeria could provide the pretext for Ben Bella to increase Algeria’s aid to Congo, Cuba, and Guinea, and could be the occasion for the resumption of “trouble” with Morocco. Komer argued that there were two alternative ways forward for the administration. The first of these would be to cut slowly “until the shoe pinches,” which would force Ben Bella to ask for the renewal of aid for the 1965 fiscal year. Komer’s advice was that at that point the administration should “bargain hard for restoring cuts,” which he justified on the grounds that since the assumption was that US food aid was providing a bulwark against starvation for a third of the Algerian population, then Ben Bella would either face up to this reality or face unrest in the streets. If this did not happen, Komer speculated, the administration would have “already started phasing out anyway.” Komer’s other alternative was for the US to take a longer view and to “keep trying to build some Algerian stake in rational relations with [the US].”19 Robert Komer won approval for his approach from McGeorge Bundy, the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs. He also sought support in the State Department and other agencies for “an administrative slow-down of wheat shipments” to Algeria in order to “draw down” the size of its existing four to six month stock. This “smart way,” Komer argued, would avoid “a flat confrontation which would lead to a repetition of Aswan but at the same time getting the word across” to Ben Bella.20 Bundy then advised President Johnson to authorize a gradual slow-down in aid shipments to Algeria, rather than an immediate cut-off. As Bundy warned Johnson, “cutting off Algeria would play right into Soviet hands. It’s precisely

INTRODUCTION

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what Moscow would like us to do.”21 Finally, Komer wrote directly to Johnson in mid-May explaining the merits of a slow-down of aid in comparison to immediate disengagement. He explained that the wheat credit sale to Algeria under Public Law 480 (the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act)22 had already been reduced from $53 million for Fiscal Year 1964 to $24 million for Fiscal Year 1965. Komer argued that, in the light of the existing $100 million US investment in the Algerian oil sector by American firms, and in the run up to the Afro-Asian Conference due to be held in Algiers in June 1965, “postponing another minor flap here at a time when we’re under the gun in many other places,” made more sense. In addition, he said, it would send a signal to President Nasser as to the prospect of the renewal of US aid programs to the UAR.23 In Algiers, Ben Bella was preparing to host the second Afro-Asian Conference. The run-up to Bandung II, as it was dubbed, was marred by divisions between two groups of countries. These were those that supported China and believed the Soviet Union should be excluded from the conference and those, on the other side, who supported Soviet participation. Domestically, meanwhile, the conference exacerbated a widening split within the Algerian leadership. The first group included Ben Bella and his supporters, while the Soviet Union was supported by Houari Boumediene, the minister of defense, and Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the minister of foreign affairs, together with their supporters. The latter had reportedly already threatened to offer their collective resignations, either during or immediately before the proceedings of the Afro-Asian meeting, in an effort to embarrass Ben Bella and deny him what they believed could be his moment of glory. In these circumstances, Ben Bella reportedly sought the help of Colonel Tahar Zbiri, his Chief of Staff, to neutralize Boumediene.24 It had come to Boumediene’s ears while he was in Cairo that Ben Bella had decided to take over the foreign affairs portfolio himself, moving Bouteflika to the relatively powerless position of adviser to the presidency. This was the last straw for Boumediene, who took the momentous decision to depose Ben Bella before the Afro-Asian gathering.25 By the early dawn hours of 19 June Ben Bella had been ousted and put under house arrest.26 A Council of the Revolution presided over by Boumediene was immediately set up to run the affairs of the state.27 In Washington the news of Ben Bella’s fall was met with cautious optimism. A CIA assessment was as follows:

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Boumedienne’s government is likely to pay more attention to the badly faltering Algerian economy than to foreign ventures and entanglements – especially in Black Africa . . . . He is an avid nationalist and socialist, and has long felt that the army had a political mission to lead the people of Algeria. In fact, in many areas of Algeria the army has probably already provided sounder leadership and administration than Ben Bella’s government or the FLN Party. Boumediene will probably lead Algeria on more genuinely non-aligned course than did Ben Bella. He is realistic enough to appreciate the French assistance . . . is not likely to be forthcoming from any other source.28 The CIA believed Boumediene would also want to preserve the balance by maintaining Algeria’s relations with the Eastern bloc, because, as an CIA analyst pointed out, he was aware of the importance of the Soviet Union’s $85 million in military aid, which had, as the analyst put it, transformed his once ragtag forces into a well-equipped army, with a respectable air arm of modern jet fighters and bombers . . . Only a small portion of [the Soviet $250 million in economic credits] has been utilized, and Boumediene probably does not intend to sacrifice this. On the other hand, the CIA conjectured Boumediene would allow the relationship to cool, since Boumediene was believed, as the CIA thought, “to have become disillusioned with Castro’s Cuba, following a visit there in 1963, largely because it was so patently a Soviet satellite.”29 Four days after the coup, on 23 June, the State Department instructed William Porter to “see Bouteflika as soon as possible”. His brief was to express Washington’s hope for friendly relations and for the initiation of a joint effort to establish opportunities for cooperation.30 When Guellal was received by President Johnson, four days later, to express Boumediene’s hope for an improvement of US-Algerian relations, disagreement over the Vietnam issue threatened to spoil the meeting after a heated outburst from Johnson. President Johnson, however, left open the possibility for improved cooperation, concluding his heated outburst on a positive note.31

INTRODUCTION

13

Johnson was then briefed that it would be wise not to turn down Boumediene’s request for the continuation of US food aid and other assistance programs, especially in the sensitive period before the AfroAsian Conference’s rescheduled date of 5 November.32 In the end, however, the Afro-Asian gathering did not actually take place. Instead, in December, Boumediene visited Moscow, where he reiterated Algeria’s unconditional support for Vietnam, just at the time when Johnson had stepped up the US bombing of that country. In Washington, Secretary of State Rusk preached patience and sought further information on the outcome of Boumediene’s Moscow trip.33 Meanwhile, Robert Komer tried to convince Johnson that Boumediene, “still looks more hopeful than Ben Bella,” while reminding him of America’s oil interests in Algeria.34 By late February, Johnson signed a PL-480 wheat agreement while the US administration paused to re-assess the transformed North African strategic balance amid growing fears in Tunis and Rabat, following Boumediene’s takeover in Algiers.35 King Hassan II of Morocco and Tunisia’s President Habib Bourguiba had already asked for US military aid and for guarantees for their national security. The State Department feared that such a trend in North Africa could lead to a state of renewed Maghreb “Cold War” fueled by a “polarization” between pro-West Morocco and Tunisia and pro-East Algeria. In addition, the State Department noted that, thanks to Moscow, Algeria’s military was now stronger than those of Tunis and Rabat combined. In addition to these security considerations the study pointed to the strategic importance of Algeria’s huge reserves of hydrocarbons, geographically close to the European market, and to the strategic advantage Algeria could offer to NATO as an alternative oil supplier in case of a conflict in the Suez region. The US administration conceded that it faced difficulties in the Maghreb, due to the limitations of its leverage in Algeria, where the Soviet Union was enjoying growing economic influence.36 A further source of the indecision of the Johnson administration over its Algerian policy was that it could not reach consensus on whether or not to take note of Algeria’s position on the Vietnam issue in determining its policy towards Algeria. When Boumediene sent a message of support to Ho Chi Minh, even after the US wheat aid to Algeria was authorized, Johnson fumed, “don’t send another thing to Algeria without checking with me.”37 By mid-December, Averell Harriman, now promoted to US Ambassador at Large, had concluded

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it was time he went to Algiers to speak personally with Boumediene. Harriman returned with the conclusion that, “the Algerian government is worth cultivating,” adding that, “they may be helpful in finding a peaceful solution to Vietnam.” Harriman concluded by recommending the resumption of wheat aid to Algeria.38 Encouraged by the outcome of Harriman’s meeting with Boumediene, Walt Rostow, President Johnson’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs sent three memoranda to Johnson in which he made the case for food aid to Algeria, based on the conclusion Secretary of State Rusk had reached, “after much soul-searching.” Rostow laid stress on the economic aspect of the deal. In December 1966, he explained to Johnson that Algeria was suffering from the effects of a harsh drought with the result that its need for wheat stood at around 900,000 tons. It had bought 500,000 tons for cash, including 400,000 tons from the US. Even after Moscow had offered another 200,000 tons, Rostow continued, Algeria would still be short of 200,000 tons of grain.39 By early February, Rostow wrote again to Johnson urging him to authorize wheat aid to the Algerian government which had by then bought grain in the American market for a total of around $31 million cash.40 Despite Rostow’s efforts, his memoranda to Johnson went unanswered. This was the state of US-Algerian affairs on the eve of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War. Therefore, when Algeria severed diplomatic ties with the United States in the aftermath of the June war, some circles in Washington took the view that the underlying motive for Boumediene’s decision was his resentment at the failure by the US to provide food aid rather than American support for Israel. Lakhdar Brahimi, however, at the time Algeria’s ambassador to Cairo, was one observer who categorically rejects this explanation. Instead, he stresses Algeria’s principled anti-colonialism and its sentiment of Arab solidarity as the cornerstones of Algeria’s foreign policy.41 Seven weeks later, the Algerian government nationalized the five American oil distributing companies active in Algeria (Esso Standard-Alge´rie, Esso Africa, Esso Saharienne, Mobiloil Nord-Africaine, and Mobiloil Franc aise).42 The US administration urged the Algerian government to offer compensation, in an initiative that was taken without consultation with the companies themselves, and though Algeria did in fact promise compensation for the nationalized assets Standard Oil expressed concern. Some companies, the Standard Oil spokesman

INTRODUCTION

15

said, would have preferred a demand for “restitution . . . under the international law as interpreted by the United States,” rather than compensation.43 The Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) took the view that the nationalization of the American oil assets, which was presented as a demonstration to the public of the Algerian government’s militancy was a ploy by Boumediene’s regime to boost its domestic popularity. The INR cautioned American oil firms operating in Algeria that Algiers would adopt a “strategy of gradual harassment” in order to force the US enterprises into joint ventures with the Algerian state company Sonatrach. The intelligence community in Washington believed that Boumediene’s call to Arab leaders to reject Nasser’s defeatism and to resume war against Israel would have a very limited impact, given Algeria’s geographic remoteness from the Middle East and the refusal of the USSR to enter the war on the side of Arabs.44 Algiers, however, took a different view. Boumediene was convinced that despite the devastating and swift defeat Israel had inflicted on the Arabs, surrender was not an option. The Algerian leadership continued to express its belief that both the geography and demography of the Middle East would work to the detriment of Israel.45 On 9 June, when Egypt’s President Nasser announced his resignation, he called Boumediene to brief the Algerian leader about the rallies in the streets of Egypt that were demanding that he stay in office. Boumediene said to him, “you can only remain in office if you resume war.” When Nasser excused his cessation of hostilities, arguing that, Egypt “did not have a single soldier between the Suez and Cairo . . . and Israel could occupy Cairo,” Boumediene replied, “So what? What if they occupied Cairo and Damascus . . . It would have been the beginning of their [the Israelis’] end . . . Israel cannot survive a long-drawn war, in vast territories . . . and on multiple fronts . . . real people’s war is the path towards victory.”46 Boumediene warned the Arab leaders that “a submissive environment would act like a stimulus for future [Israeli] expansion.”47 Giving practical reinforcement to his words, Boumediene dispatched to Cairo a squadron of 15 MIG-21 aircraft (which Algeria had just purchased) and another squadron of MIG-17s, to add to the three armored brigades that had already been sent to Egypt when the war had first broken out. Boumediene then flew to Belgrade and Moscow to attempt to enlist Eastern bloc help.48 A stormy meeting took place

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ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

between Boumediene and Khrushchev, with the Algerian leader refusing to accept defeat and expressing his belief the war should continue, while Khrushchev took a different view. When Khrushchev told Boumediene: “Does it matter if the Israeli flag sails through the Suez Canal or not?” Boumediene replied sharply, “in that case tractors would be more useful to us than tanks.”49 Algeria did in fact maintain its troops on the Egyptian front throughout the war of attrition until Cairo accepted the Rogers Plan in August 1970.50 Boumediene’s performance during the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict won him considerable popularity inside Algeria, which he had lacked since he overthrew Ben Bella. However, by December Colonel Tahar Zbiri, the Chief of Staff, who had executed Boumediene’s coup against Ben Bella, had already decided on another coup to topple Boumediene. Zbiri decided to act against Boumediene for a number of reasons. These included a disagreement over the management of the affairs of the army, and opposition to Boumediene’s style of rule, in addition, of course, to Zbiri’s own desire for power.51 On 14 December, Zbiri staged his coup, which failed when Zbiri’s advancing motorized armored units were blocked in Blida, 50 kilometers (km) south of Algiers. Zbiri believed that the balance of the battle was tilted towards Boumediene when, at around 10 a.m. on the day of the coup, the Soviet pilots who were in Algiers as pilot instructors flew their MIG-15 and MIG-17 menacingly over the columns of rebel tanks at supersonic speed.52 By early morning on 15 December, the rebellion was crushed and Zbiri and his men were on the run. Zbiri was in the event able to leave the country and lived in exile until Boumediene’s death.53 In Washington, the Middle East issue exacerbated the already tense US-Algerian relationship. Following Zbiri’s attempted coup, an initial assessment of the situation in Algeria concluded that, the rivalry grows out of an internal power struggle, basically without ideological connotations. In the longer run ZBiri might be worse than Boumediene since he is even more vociferous about Israel and resents the technocrats who are trying to put Algeria on its feet.54 Even though Zbiri’s rebellion was crushed the day after it was launched, Boumediene’s troubles were not over. In late April 1968, two members

INTRODUCTION

17

of the republican guard loyal to Zbiri sprayed Boumediene’s car with bullets as it passed by a government building.55 Boumediene was slightly injured in the upper lip, while his driver sustained more serious wounds. Zbiri claimed in his memoirs that, as he was a fugitive at the time, he was not aware of the plan by men loyal to him to assassinate Boumediene. In Algiers, responsibility for the attempted coup was laid on Belkacem Krim, a respected leader of the Algerian war for independence who had been the leader of the delegation that concluded the 1962 Evian Accords with France that led to Algeria’s independence. In 1967, Krim had formed the Mouvement de´mocratique pour le renouveau alge´rien (MDRA), which sought to overthrow Boumediene’s regime. Krim’s activities were to be another source of suspicion and distrust in Algerian-US relations until his assassination two years later. According to a state department memorandum, dated 3 October 1968, Krim had contacted John F. Root, Country Director of the Office of Northern African Affairs at the State Department, through Michel Leroy, Krim’s representative in Washington. Leroy’s message was that Krim was seeking the help of the Johnson administration, including the CIA, to topple Boumediene, and that Krim was prepared to come to Washington to discuss the matter. In return, Leroy had said to Root that, “Krim would be prepared to conclude political and economic accords of various sorts whenever he should assume power.” Root replied that the suspicions Algeria had expressed regarding the activities of the CIA were already a source of distrust between Washington and Algiers, and that “Algeria was not an area of major American concern.” Root concluded the meeting by conveying that Krim should not think of coming to Washington. A subsequent memorandum, dated 7 October, indicated that Root spoke to the CIA about the issue, but that the CIA had responded that, “not only there was no disposition to provide such assistance to Krim, [but also] the CIA thought it was unwise to give him any encouragement.” When Leroy phoned to follow up the issue he was told “there was no change in the US position.”56 This by no means put an end, however, to the Johnson administration’s troubles with the Boumediene regime. On 23 July 1968, Palestinian militants belonging to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an Israeli El Al airliner bound for Tel Aviv from Rome and forced it to land in Algiers. The hijacking

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of the Israeli plane was the first hijacking of an aircraft by any Palestinian militant movement. The El Al jet was carrying 38 passengers and ten crew members, of whom the women and children were soon released. Although Algeria came under intense international pressure, including pressure from Arab states, Boumediene supported the PFLP demands for an exchange of the remaining Israeli passengers for Palestinian prisoners in Israeli. After almost 40 days of intense negotiations a deal was reached through Italian mediation whereby the Israeli passengers and the crew of the plane were released and flown back to Rome. The plane, however, remained in Algerian custody. In return, some weeks later, 16 Arab prisoners were released by Israel, including Palestinians as well as Egyptian, Lebanese, and Jordanian nationals. The El Al aircraft was then permitted to be flown to Tel Aviv by an Air France crew, as the Algerian leadership refused to allow Israel to send a crew to Algiers.57 Algeria, which had rejected the June war ceasefire and considered itself still to be in a state of war with Israel, became, in the aftermath of this episode, the trusted ally of the militant Palestinian movements. In consequence, while Boumediene’s stature, domestically and in the Arab world, reached higher levels as a result, Algeria’s relations with the United States reached their lowest ebb. As Johnson left office and a Republican administration prepared to take over the reins of government in Washington, Boumediene came to believe the time had come to realign Algeria’s foreign policy once more, and to attempt to repair his relationship with the US.

CHAPTER 1 STRATEGY FOR DEVELOPMENT, 1969 – 70

By 1969, Algerian President Houari Boumediene’s position of leadership within the ruling Council of the Revolution was undisputed. In 1967, he had crushed the attempted coup d’e´tat by former chief of staff Colonel Tahar Zbiri, and in 1968 he escaped an attempt on his life when his car was fired on by two members of his security staff. On the domestic front, he was concentrating on regional development plans while also working to consolidate the central state apparatus through elections for local and departmental assemblies. In addition under his aegis, the National Liberation Front (FLN) was being restructured to put the socialist program of the party’s Politburo into action at the popular local level, with the reorganization of the various social and cultural movements that came under the FLN’s umbrella. After the failure of the two attempts to depose Boumediene, the voices of dissent at home, as well as those of opposition from abroad, were increasingly weakened. Meanwhile, the development projects that formed part of the 1967 –9 Pre-Plan began to give the population at the local level a stronger sense of the presence of the state, for instance through the local assembly elections of February 1967 and the institution of improved public services, by comparison with the chaotic years that had immediately followed independence. Furthermore, in the wake of the part played by Algeria during the Arab-Israeli War of June 1967, Boumediene’s personal esteem had increased, both at home and in the wider Arab World, and his standing was further enhanced by the evacuation by

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France of their erstwhile military bases in Bechar and Reggane and of the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, Oran, in February 1968. Since Boumediene had deposed Ben Bella in June 1965, he had focused on the domestic front. Neglect of domestic affairs was a charge that had been leveled against Ben Bella’s regime, as well as his adventurism in foreign policy. In 1969, as the government was finalizing its highly ambitious Four-Year Plan for rapid and heavy industrialization in the period 1970 – 3, Boumediene began to reorient Algeria’s foreign policy to conduce to the success of his modernization project, instrumentalizing Algeria’s foreign policy to ensure the funds for development would be available. The view of Algeria taken by Nixon administration in the US and its subsequent review of its options toward Algeria were substantially modified by the rearrangement of the geopolitical setting brought about by Boumediene’s strategy.

Maghreb De´tente In the 1960s the Maghreb had been paralyzed by a regional “Cold War” that was fueled by mistrust and mutual suspicion between the Maghreb countries together with perceptions of national security threats. Ideological antagonisms and border-demarcation disputes hampered the various development projects each country was attempting to implement. One consequence was that it was not feasible to exploit reserves of natural resources that were located in the proximity of international borders or to construct cross-border oil pipelines. Boumediene’s principle had always been that it was, “through the economy that we should first establish the new Maghreb; the rest will follow by itself,” and he warned that, “intermediate steps should not be omitted: instead, we should establish our relations on proposals that have been studied in advance and in depth.”1 Boumediene believed that only economic cooperation could remedy the state of instability that dominated the Maghreb. In January 1969, he initiated plans for Maghreb cooperation within a framework that would contribute to Algeria’s development strategy. Regional stability, within which an Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement was fundamental, was crucial to the success of Algeria’s development policy. Boumediene’s reorientation of Algeria’s foreign policy was based on a reassessment of the country’s regional relations. The Tunisian

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21

leader Habib Bourguiba was weakened by illness. Meanwhile, there were growing socio-economic pressures on King Hassan II, who had just embarked on his own economic Five-Year Plan. In the circumstances, Boumediene’s calculation was that it would be more productive to attempt first to strike a deal with the King. His hope was to persuade Morocco to compromise over its territorial claims in the region of Tindouf in exchange for long-term economic cooperation and joint exploitation of the disputed area, which was rich in iron ore. Morocco’s situation was aggravated by the strained relations between Morocco and France over the Moroccan opposition figure Mehdi Ben Barka, the founder of the left-wing Moroccan political party, the National Union of Popular Forces (UNPF), who had been abducted in Paris in 1965 and was never seen again, with the result that French aid to Rabat had been suspended since 1966.2 The conclusion of such an agreement with Morocco, Boumediene calculated, would put pressure on Tunisia to follow suit by accepting a similar offer by Algeria in relation to the El-Borma oilfield. The conclusion of these two deals would reduce instability in the region and permit Algeria to focus its efforts on its plans for industrialization. As to the other two Maghreb countries, Algeria already had good relations with the Libyan monarchy and had assisted Mauritania with political support and economic aid in the face of King Hassan’s claim that the entire country formed part of Morocco’s southern territory, together with the Spanish Sahara and Algeria’s south-western region of Tindouf. Hence, a rapprochement with Morocco, Boumediene believed, would act as an incentive for all the rest of Algeria’s neighbors to follow suit. Thus, Boumediene instructed Colonel Chadli Bendjedid to shut down what remained of the operations of the Ben Barka loyalists and Moroccan opposition hosted in Algeria. Algeria extended material and logistical support to the Moroccan opposition, but since the assassination of its leader Ben Barka, Bendjedid believed it was weakened and infiltrated by Moroccan intelligence services. On dismantling the activity of Moroccan opposition elements in western Algeria, Boumediene offered them two alternatives. Either benefit from permanent Algerian residency and jobs or return to Morocco, where Boumediene had arranged for them to be pardoned by King Hassan II.3 Boumediene’s plan for an era of de´tente in the Maghreb was not only motivated by the immediate ambitious industrialization

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program on which Algeria was about to embark but was also underpinned by long-term strategic considerations. Algeria’s FourYear Plan had been conceived on a vast scale. Its emphasis was on rapid industrialization through the use of the most modern technology, investment in which would be funded by foreign loans that would need to be serviced. The funds for the repayment of the loans would be furnished by the export of Algeria’s surplus industrial production, which was planned to exceed by far the needs of the Algerian market. Algeria therefore needed to ensure that it could identify markets abroad that would generate the necessary revenues. In this context, the Maghreb market for Algerian manufactured goods and agricultural equipment was seen as vital. The estimate was that by 1980 the population of the Maghreb would approach 50 million and in the latter half of the 1970s, the Maghreb, if opened up by de´tente to Algerian exports, would already be crucial.4 The strategy for Maghreb de´tente, however, was just a stepping stone to a more distant objective. Boumediene calculated that the funds needed for the successful execution of the Four-Year Plan would be colossal. No country other than the US would be able to commit to such a gigantic investment, either directly on its own account or indirectly through the world financial institutions. Even the countries of Western Europe would not be able to rise to the challenge. Moreover, in the context of the intention of the Algerian leadership to develop Algeria rapidly on the basis of the country’s energy resources, it was clear that only the American oil companies had the necessary expertise. De´tente in the Maghreb that took the form of rapprochement with Morocco, with its pro-US tilt, as well as with Tunisia, would help improve Algeria’s standing in Washington, especially within the congressional committees which held the decisive say in the ratification of certain major economic deals. In January 1969, therefore, Boumediene made a historic visit to Morocco, where he met King Hassan II and concluded with him the Treaty of Ifrane. The treaty made headlines in the Arab world but more importantly Paris and Washington took serious note of it. Its significance was that the leaders of Algeria and Morocco had brought to an end a chapter of hostility that had cost the Maghreb dear, with their declaration of agreement on the border issues that had divided them and also on broad plans for economic cooperation.5

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23

With the conclusion of the Ifrane Treaty between Algeria and Morocco, President Bourguiba had little option but to agree to a similar agreement offered by Boumediene to Tunisia, with the irresistible incentive that Algerian oil from the El-Borma oilfield would be channeled across Tunisia to the port of Skhira, with the payment of transit fees to the Tunisian treasury. In February 1969, Libya was the beneficiary of a similar agreement, signed in Tripoli by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria’s Foreign Minister.6 Boumediene, keen to keep up the pace, sent his Minister of Education, Ahmed TalebIbrahimi, to follow up the agreements with a diplomatic charm offensive directed at both King Hassan and Libya’s King Idris. In April, the Libyan Crown Prince, Hassan al-Senoussi, was invited to Algeria, and Taleb-Ibrahimi then flew to Rabat as Boumediene’s personal envoy. Almost 30 years later, Taleb-Ibrahimi would reveal the details of a teˆte-a`-teˆte meeting on 16 June in Rabat where King Hassan entrusted him to relay to Boumediene Morocco’s willingness to implement the Treaty of Ifrane. In years to come, this direct channel between King Hassan and Boumediene would be Morocco’s preferred medium of communication with Algeria on confidential matters.7 A month later, in July 1969, Algiers and Rabat exchanged ambassadors, inaugurating a new era of dialogue and cooperation between the two countries. This period of intense diplomatic activity made a strong contribution to the normalization of inter-Maghreb relations, which was, however, to some extent disrupted by the regional geopolitical upheaval that ensued from the overthrow of the monarchy in Libya by Colonel Muammar Qaddafi on 1 September. Nevertheless the rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco was further consolidated by Algeria’s participation in the first Islamic Summit, sponsored by King Hassan II and King Faisal Bin Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, which opened in Rabat on 25 September 1969 and culminated in the establishment of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, of which Libya, Tunisia and Mauritania were also founding members.8 The advent of the Libyan coup introduced a new element in interMaghreb relations: a sense of renewed national threat, especially in Tunisia. Boumediene, however, saw in it both a risk and opportunity for his grand strategy. It was a risk, in that the radical posture of Libya, with its leanings towards Egypt and the philosophy of Nasserism, might undermine the regional de´tente which Algeria was determined

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to establish. On the other hand, the coup presented an opportunity in that Algeria had gained a radical ally which would back its efforts within the oil producers’ organization OPEC for a unified front in oil price talks with the multi-national oil companies. In addition, in November 1969, Algeria was about to start negotiations with France regarding the revision of the 1965 oil agreement between the two countries. Boumediene was therefore quick to extend recognition to the new Libyan leadership. Maghreb de´tente was consolidated further by two significant developments. First, on 20 September, just three weeks after Qaddafi’s coup, Algerian oil began to flow as planned from the El-Borma field to the port of Skhira in Tunisia. Secondly, in November 1969, the Moroccan foreign minister, speaking in Algiers, announced the official abolition in Rabat of Morocco’s Ministry of Mauritanian Affairs, the existence of which had until then been an expression of Morocco’s territorial claims over Mauritania.9 However, this period also saw the beginning of a tentative rivalry between Algeria and Morocco as to who would exercise the hegemonic role in the region. Aware that Algeria had the geographical advantage of bordering on both Tunisia and Libya, King Hassan sought to normalize his relationship with Mauritania in preparation for the arrangements Morocco intended to follow the decolonization of the Spanish Sahara. Five weeks after the Libyan coup, Algeria signed nine separate economic cooperation agreements with Libya. One aspect of Algeria’s new relationship with Libya was that it was part of a competition for influence there with Nasser’s United Arab Republic (UAR), as Egypt was still officially known. Since the 1967 war, Algerian-Egyptian relations had been strained. Algeria had blamed Egypt for the defeat of the Arabs, criticizing Nasser’s acceptance of the Rogers Plan for an end to belligerence in the Arab-Israeli conflict and opposing Nasser’s request for Arab funds to rebuild the armed forces of the UAR. Instead, Algeria opted to give its support directly to the Palestinian militant organizations. The change of leadership in Libya, together with its identification with Nasser’s ideology, opened up a new possibility for Cairo, with the prospect of funds from oil-rich Libya for Egyptian military reconstruction. Boumediene’s objective in drawing Tripoli into a greater degree of Maghreb cooperation was to bar the way for the realization of Nasser’s plans in this direction. As for Tunisia, President Bourguiba, observing Algeria’s success in enlisting all the

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25

states of the Maghreb in cooperation partnerships, must have concluded that it was probably wise to fall in with Algeria’s plans while the offer was still on the table. Hence, on 17 December 1969, it was announced that Algiers and Tunis had reached a final agreement over all their outstanding border disputes.10 To sum up, therefore, the central element in Boumediene’s Maghreb policy in this period was to defuse Algeria’s regional disputes in order to install the lasting stability needed as a background for the launch of Algeria’s modernization project. Such a policy of regional stability and cooperation, Boumediene believed, would send a useful signal to Washington, which it would hear through its existing allies in the Maghreb. Boumediene therefore declared 1969 to be the “year of the Maghreb”. Over a period of just 12 months of intensive diplomatic offensive, Boumediene succeeded in engaging with each of the other four states of the Maghreb, connecting them to Algeria through economic cooperation treaties which consolidated the new era of de´tente.11 Beginning with a single shrewd act of rapprochement with Morocco, a process of political chain reaction was triggered within the region, achieving in the space of a year the final solution to territorial disputes that dated back to the era of French colonization. In 1964, Boumediene had said, “the solution to our disagreement with this fraternal state [Morocco] is above all economic . . . . In five or ten years we shall be ready to discuss the real political solution: a confederation.” In 1969, this prophecy appeared to have begun to come true.12 Algeria’s leaders had always been suspicious of unity projects involving various Arab countries that were hasty and imposed from the top down. The fiasco of the Egyptian-Syrian union that had resulted in the establishment of the short-lived UAR was still fresh in the minds of the Algerian leadership when they were formulating the founding texts of Algeria’s foreign policy a year or so after independence. Hence, both the Tripoli Program of May 1962, formulated just before the declaration of Algeria’s independence, and the Charter of Algiers, issued under Ben Bella in 1964, both basic Algerian policy documents, cautioned against rushed unity projects. In addition, while they called for the pursuit of the goal of unity as a matter of principle, they also emphasized that, “at the level of states, the development of exchanges, the implementation of common economic cooperation projects . . . are objectives which, being in the

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interest of the peoples, would help to advance with a firm step on the path of unity.”13 In other words, what Boumediene sought through his tactics of de´tente in the Maghreb was not to pursue the chimera of short-term political unity but rather to establish an environment of underlying stability that would be a vital factor for Algeria’s industrialization projects. By the same token, since de´tente included the normalization of relations with America’s friends in the region it would also serve as a gesture of goodwill toward the US. But was Washington impressed?

The View from Washington A month after Algeria’s rapprochement with Morocco and Tunisia, the charge´ d’affaires of the US Interests Section in Algiers, Lewis Hoffacker, sent the State Department his assessment of US policy for Algeria. Hoffacker explained that Algeria had endeavored to, “improve significantly [its] cooperation with the Maghreb neighbors.” And while Hoffacker recognized that what he called the Soviet Union’s “leverage” was, as he put it, “stronger”, he nevertheless assured Washington that on the ground US-Algerian relations had been gradually improving, especially in the private business sector, where the level of American business involvement in Algeria was unprecedented. This situation, Hoffacker believed, offered an opportunity for the US to consolidate its role in Algeria, especially with the appearance of signs of strain in Algerian-French relations. Nevertheless, Hoffacker admitted that the Middle East and Vietnam remained huge stumbling blocks on the path to the normalization of US-Algerian ties.14 The US Bureau of Intelligence and Research interpreted Algeria’s participation in the first Islamic Summit, organized by King Hassan II and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia in Rabat in September, as evidence of moderation in its behavior. Egypt’s President Nasser had sought actively to undermine this Summit but failed. The intelligence study predicted that the moderates’ success in gaining endorsement for a modest declaration on the Middle East issue would consolidate their case in opposing the call for another Arab Summit which would provide a platform for the radical states (UAR and Iraq) to seek more financial support for the war effort against Israel.15 The fifth Arab Summit did take place but it ended in “disarray”, as another

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intelligence note concluded. That outcome was due to Algeria’s decision on this occasion to back the moderates.16 Algeria refused to commit to further financial support for the UAR, “as long as no satisfactory military strategy has been formulated.”17 Algeria’s declaration of its position at the Summit, following which Nasser took his leave, was based on two considerations. First, Algeria had actively backed the PLO since its foundation in 1964 and had consistently called for all Arab financial aid to be channeled directly to the Palestinian militants themselves. Algiers justified this position by reference to failure of the armed forces of the Arab nations successfully to wage war on Israel and to regain the usurped Palestinian territories. This position was in line with one of the pillars of Algeria’s foreign policy, namely that the Palestinians should draw the lesson from the Algerian revolution and learn to rely only on themselves, first and foremost. The second reason for Algeria’s position was that since Algeria was embarking on its FourYear Plan, with all the funding this required, Boumediene was more inclined to side with the moderates, thus reaching out not only to Morocco but also to the Gulf states and especially to Saudi Arabia, which was a key player in OPEC. On 10 October, two weeks after the Islamic Summit, Bouteflika met the US Secretary of State, William Rogers, in New York. Bouteflika’s remit was to gauge the mood in Washington and to express Algeria’s intention to improve relations with the US if Washington would embark on peace initiatives in Vietnam and the Middle East. Bouteflika also hinted at Algeria’s willingness to see enhanced cooperation with Washington supersede the role of French business in Algeria. To that end, he proposed the establishment of direct points of contact in the two capitals. Rogers, for his part, explained that Algeria’s problem lay in its identification in the eyes of Congress with the Soviet Union, but left the door ajar, suggesting that the US would be prepared to improve relations but only if it could “meet [Algeria] half way.”18 On 20 October, Boumediene summoned home Algeria’s ambassadors from the world’s capitals to address them on the new diplomatic line that should henceforth be followed. This was the subject of a memorandum submitted by the State Department to Henry Kissinger, the National Security Advisor. Boumediene reaffirmed to his diplomats that the founding principles of Algeria’s foreign policy

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were deeply rooted in its revolution and independence, which should guide Algeria in its dealings with all other countries, large or small. International spheres of influence and rivalry between the world’s power blocs were not to be taken into account in reaching policy decisions. Algeria had a responsibility to extend what Boumediene called unreserved “moral, political, and material” support to all Third World liberation movements. Finally, Boumediene made the point that Maghreb cooperation was not aimed at the creation of a bloc directed against the Mashreq.19 In its assessment of Boumediene’s speech, the State Department discerned a reorientation of Algeria’s foreign policy; in that “the downgrading of political and ideological concerns may signal the emergence of a more pragmatic, technocratically oriented Algeria.” The memorandum drew Kissinger’s attention to the fact that, “nowhere in the October 21 [sic] speech was the US attacked,” which did not imply, however, that “Algeria had renounced its revolutionary heritage.” Finally, the memo concluded that Boumediene’s strong language in the speech in relation to the Middle East was moderated privately in talks with US diplomats in Algiers.20 Kissinger must have taken note of this new development in Algeria and the whole trend of de´tente in North Africa, since, less than a month after Boumediene’s speech, the State Department dispatched a new career diplomat to head the US Interests Section in Algiers. In November 1969, William Eagleton took over the duties from Lewis Hoffacker, who had been deputy chief of the US embassy at the time when diplomatic relations were broken off in June 1967. Twenty years later, as he recalled his arrival in Algiers, Eagleton explained that there was a US willingness to resume diplomatic relations with Algeria with “no pre-conditions” as long as the initiative came from Algiers. Eagleton took steps to upgrade the role of the US Interests Section, housed in the Swiss Embassy, by expanding the already existing consulates in Constantine and Oran, which had not been affected following the 1967 break. He laid particular emphasis on raising the level of US contact with the Algerian government from the Chief of Protocol at the Foreign Ministry to what he called “mid-level contacts”. This took the form of the establishment of “a close and useful relationship” with Boumediene’s chef de cabinet in charge of political affairs. Eagleton also persuaded Bouteflika to establish a direct line of communication between the US Interests Section and

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the Foreign Ministry instead of routing all correspondence via officials of the Swiss embassy.21 By the end of 1969, Boumediene could look back on the achievement of having turned around the geopolitical environment of the Maghreb in the course of just one year. Thirty-three separate cooperation agreements and treaties had been signed with the various Maghreb states. This process would be consolidated over the next year when another 29 agreements would be signed. On the occasion of the historic official visit of King Hassan II to Algeria, on 27 May 1970, a final agreement on joint Algerian-Moroccan exploitation of the Ghar Djebilat mines was signed. On 16 June 1970, King Hassan’s visit was followed by a further historic visit to Algeria by King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, marking the normalization of Algerian-Saudi relations after years of hostility.22 Boumediene’s political strategy had paid off, winning the trust of the Arab moderates. In the communique´ issued after the visit, Boumediene praised the Maghreb’s new climate of de´tente.23 The US State Department took note.24 Boumediene was aware, however, that Maghreb de´tente was not enough on its own to enlist US support and American funds for Algeria’s ambitious modernization plan. In addition, Boumediene was certainly well aware that the overthrow of the monarchy in Libya and the disturbingly radical posture of its new leadership, as well as its excessive identification with Nasser, had combined to introduce a new element of insecurity in both Tunis and Rabat.25 In an effort to mollify his anxious neighbors, Boumediene, therefore set out to distance Algeria as much as possible from the Soviet Union by resisting Moscow’s requests to use the Mers-el-Kebir naval base.

The Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans Underlying the caution implicit in relations between Algeria and the Soviet Union lay Algeria’s obdurate commitment to the independence of its decision-making, which persisted despite the ideological concept of socialist state-building that Algeria and the Soviet Union shared.26 In the immediate post-independence years, Ben Bella had reinforced Algeria’s ties with the Soviet Union. By 1965, however, Algerian foreign policy under Ben Bella was leaning more to Beijing than to Moscow. In the context of the increasing Sino-Soviet split, however, the overthrow of Ben Bella by Boumediene, alarmed Beijing,

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prompting China’s foreign minister, Marshal Chen Yi, to visit Algiers three days after the coup, and then twice more on 7 and 17 September.27 Despite Boumediene’s repression of radical left-wing and pro-Ben Bella figures such as Mohamed Harbi, who was the editor-in-chief of Re´volution Africaine and one of Ben Bella’s advisers, Moscow swiftly accepted Boumediene. The new leader of Algeria, however, though he had been in Moscow just two months before the coup, waited until 13 December, six months after his coup, before he undertook an official state visit to the Soviet Union. Boumediene’s agenda in Moscow was to explain the reasons why the new Algerian leadership had undertaken the coup and to assure the Soviets of Algeria’s commitment to socialism, though tailored to Algeria’s specific conditions and traditions. In his presentation to the Soviet leadership, Boumediene emphasized the absence of a class struggle within Algerian society, owing to its having been forged entirely by the country’s eight-year struggle for independence. Algeria’s aspiration in the post-independence years, Boumediene told his Soviet hosts, was to re-build the nation through a socialism adapted to the Islamic dimensions of Algerian society. Moscow’s suspicions were assuaged and cooperation was resumed as soon as Boumediene returned from Moscow, in late December 1965.28 From then on, Moscow’s technical, economic and military aid to Algiers was resumed, and relations were given a further boost when, from 1968 onward, Moscow took steps to help alleviate Algeria’s economic crisis. In particular, the Soviets bought up large quantities of Algeria’s wine production, following France’s decision in 1966 to cease importing Algerian wine after pressure by French wine producers. This was crucial at a time when Algeria’s revenue from exports of wine rivaled or even exceeded what it received from the sale of oil.29 However, with improving relations, Moscow began to agitate for the use of Algeria’s naval base at Mers-el-Kebir. At the beginning of 1968, the base was still under French control. Under the provisions of the Evian Accords, signed by Algeria and France in March 1962 which set the parameters for Algeria’s independence in July 1962, the French were to keep control of the Mers-el-Kebir base for 15 years after Algeria’s independence.30 In February 1968, however, France evacuated the base earlier than planned. Moscow regarded this as an opportunity and requested an agreement giving it long-term access to Mers-el-Kebir. The Soviets’ aim was to establish a bridgehead in the

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Western Mediterranean similar to the right of permanent access rights to Egyptian and Syrian facilities it enjoyed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Actually, this was not the first time Moscow had approached Boumediene on the subject. There had been a similar Soviet request only a month after the June 1965 coup against Ben Bella which Boumediene had declined. During an inspection visit to the port of Algiers, Boumediene had spoken confidentially to Tahar Zbiri, the then Chief of Staff, about the Soviet request, when he commented that, “if the Soviets were to enter Algeria, they would not leave.”31 Algeria had already made a concession to the Soviets in 1968, when, as a member of the UN Security Council, it had abstained on a resolution condemning the Soviet’s invasion of Czechoslovakia. Access to the base at Mers-el-Kebir, however, was a major request which if granted would seriously undermine Algeria’s policy of nonalignment. In addition, Algeria had given an assurance to France at the time of its withdrawal that it would not grant the Soviets access to the base.32 In March 1969, during an official visit to Algeria made by President Nicolai Podgorny, Boumediene reiterated this position, telling his visitor that one of the pillars of Algeria’s foreign policy was “the dismantling of all military bases and the elimination of all forms of foreign military presence,” and that this particularly applied to the Mediterranean region.33 Algeria was also obliged to navigate a delicate course in its relations with the USSR so as not to undermine its Maghreb de´tente plans. The Soviet approach to Algeria triggered security concerns in Tunis and Rabat which soon found an echo in Washington. Morocco responded by making its own overtures to Moscow. After Podgorny’s visit to Algeria, King Hassan received him in Rabat and used the occasion to sign significant cooperation agreements with the Soviet Union. Morocco was facing economic difficulties and the Moroccan public had not been slow to show its disapproval of the monarchy’s less than militant position over the Arab-Israeli conflict. The King’s tactics were intended to give the impression that Morocco was adopting a more neutralist position. Boumediene soon became aware of the rapprochement between Rabat and Moscow. King Hassan also calculated that his stratagem would arouse concern in Washington leading the US to commit to higher levels of economic and military aid for Rabat. Tunisia, incidentally, also asked

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the US for military assistance but this was turned down by the Defense Department. Morocco’s move, however, prompted a policy reassessment within the State Department.34 This reached the conclusion that the “strategic importance and economic potential of Morocco warrant special effort to blunt [the] Soviet drive,” and recommended massive financial and military assistance to distance Morocco from what appeared to be a growing tendency in the Mediterranean region towards neutralization.35 A CIA memorandum offered an assurance that “Algeria’s foreign policies . . . maintain freedom from outside domination [consistent] with its revolutionary principles,” and that “Soviet influence remains limited.”36 In mid-February 1970, Secretary of State William Rogers flew to Morocco and Tunisia where discussions focussed on Maghreb de´tente, Libya and the Rogers Plan, which had been floated in early December 1969. The memoranda of the meetings Rogers held in Rabat and Tunis showed that Algeria’s bid to achieve de´tente and Mediterranean policy had started to yield results. Rabat actually encouraged Rogers to resume relations with Algeria in order to consolidate the position of Algeria among the moderates. This was especially evident during a meeting arranged by the Moroccan Foreign Ministry and held in the office of the Director of the Royal Cabinet for Secretary Rogers to hold a conversation with Algeria’s ambassador to Morocco. It was also apparent that Washington was keen to enlist Algeria’s support for the Rogers Plan and the US was giving indications that it was ready for a resumption of relations with Algeria.37 Aware that his policy of de´tente was generating the desired results, and determinedly ignoring the Soviet bid to gain access to Mers-elKebir, Boumediene continued to diminish Algeria’s identification with Moscow to the minimum consistent with national interests. In late March 1970, when Admiral Sergey Gorshkov, the Soviet Vice Minister of Defense, visited Algeria and again requested special privileges for the Soviet fleet at the Mers-el-Kebir base, Boumediene firmly turned the request down. The Yugoslav military attache´ in Algiers, Commander Boziadar Marinkovic, told the US Consul in Algiers in confidence that Gorshkov had earlier made a proposal to supply Algeria with two Soviet submarines, which would conduct joint exercises in Algerian waters with the Algerian navy’s antisubmarine craft. A senior French diplomat, whom the US diplomats

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regarded as reliable, confirmed this proposal to the US Interests Section in Algiers and added that Moscow had requested access to the port of Annaba for what it described as “bunkering and supplies,” as well as the use of the military airfield in Ain Ouessara, in inland Algeria.38 Gorshkov’s visit was intended to persuade Boumediene to change his mind on the Soviet approach, but reportedly he failed. A US intelligence source reported there was a degree of uneasiness in Soviet-Algerian relations as the result of Moscow’s failure to obtain from Algeria, facilities in the Western Mediterranean similar to those it enjoyed in the Eastern Mediterranean.39 Algeria’s policy was manifest in the different ways it treated visits by French and Soviet naval vessels. While a French vessel that visited the port of Oran would be welcomed by senior Algerian naval officers, with the visit given local publicity, European military attache´s in Algiers observed that a similar visit by a Soviet vessel would receive only a muted reaction in the local Algerian press.40 In an interview he gave to the French national newspaper Le Monde, Boumediene reiterated his Mediterranean policy. He explained that when he spoke of “the Mediterranean for the Mediterraneans” and qualified the Mediterranean as a “Lake of Peace” what he meant was that what was required was “genuine cooperation among those on the shores of the Mediterranean.”41 Boumediene was mindful that Libya, continuing to take the Egyptian line, might grant facilities to the Soviets, following the withdrawal by the US from their air base at Wheelus Field. Such a development, he was well aware, would undermine Algeria’s Mediterranean policy. In mid-April 1970, therefore, when Colonel Qaddafi visited Algeria, the joint communique´ issued after the visit emphasized the importance of non-alignment and the need to keep the Maghreb free from foreign military bases.42 Privately, as one of Boumediene’s advisers confided to William Eagleton, Qaddafi was told emphatically that Algeria did not “want to see the Americans evacuate Wheelus only to see [it] turned over to the Russians.”43 The spring and summer of 1970 constituted a period of intensive naval activity at the Algerian ports of Annaba and Oran. French and Italian vessels were invited to visit Algeria. Despite Boumediene’s determination not to cede rights at Mers-el-Kebir to the Soviet Union, the Algerian armed forces were still dependent on Soviet arms and training. Boumediene therefore set about enhancing Algeria’s military cooperation with France and Italy. In 1969, Algeria had

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already purchased 28 Fouga Magister training aircraft from France and also reached an agreement with France to establish a military aviation school, at the Bousfer air-base near Oran. The French commander of the base, Colonel Ferlin, informed the US Consul in Oran that training of Algerian cadets had started on 22 January 1970.44 France was also giving Algeria “modest” military assistance of between $11 and $15 million per year. By December 1970, there were between 200 and 250 French instructors and technicians at Bousfer, and around 250 to 400 Algerian trainees in military schools in France.45 On 6 March 1970, a French naval squadron called at the port of Oran with a 40-man delegation on board from the French Institute of Higher Defense Studies. The delegation was received by Boumediene in person.46 The Italian navy training vessel Stella Polare had already called at Oran in September 1968, followed by the training ship Amerigo Vespucci in August 1969. In June 1970, it was the Italian Divisional Admiral Aldo Baldini who paid a courtesy call at the port of Oran with the missile-training escort cruiser, Caio Duilio. The visit was well received and was seen as successful, so that a month later the Italian navy made another call, at Algeria’s request, to further strengthen military cooperation and provide training for Algeria’s emergent navy.47 The US Navy Command monitored this naval activity, which was confirmed by intelligence reports from US embassies and by European and Maghreb sources. The Navy approached the head of the Interests Section, William Eagleton over the possibility of a US naval visit to Oran or Annaba. Eagleton advised that the absence of diplomatic relations would mean that there was no channel through which Algeria could receive the request, which it would in any case be certain to refuse since the proposed visit would contradict Algeria’s Mediterranean policy of neutrality. Eagleton argued that Algeria’s policy did at least have the benefit that it was resisting Moscow’s quest for a permanent naval base in the Western Mediterranean. This was in the US strategic interest, Eagleton concluded.48 This assessment was approved by Secretary of State Rogers in a message to the US Navy.49 Algeria’s Mediterranean policy, with its exclusion of the Soviets from the Mers-el-Kebir base, was nevertheless balanced by a continued military relationship with the Soviets in other fields. While Algeria steadfastly refused to grant permanent facilities to the Soviets at

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Mers-el-Kebir, military cooperation and joint exercises with the Soviet navy continued to take place. It remained the case that Algeria was dependent on the Soviet Union for its armaments. In January 1970, the US Consul in Oran, Glenn R. Cella, reported that a Russian-made P-30 air search radar facility was instaled on the Murdjadjo ridge overlooking Mers-el-Kebir.50 French intelligence sources told Cella of a significant arms delivery made by a Soviet ship at Mers-el-Kebir as well as of nocturnal activity in the port.51 Meanwhile the US Consul in Constantine reported that four Soviet vessels, including a submarine, called at the port of Annaba in mid-August. Based on a briefing by Louis Bouroux, the French Consul General at Annaba, however, he took the view that the visit was apparently just “a stop-over for short leave and some supplies.”52 Algeria’s Mediterranean policy thus seemed to be sailing smoothly ahead, in a climate of Maghreb de´tente, as part of Boumediene’s grand strategy to engage the United States as an economic partner while preserving the independence of Algeria’s foreign policy. Nevertheless, the two elements of the strategy needed a third to complete Boumediene’s strategic triangle. Mindful of the significance of the weight of the US private sector as an effective lobby in Washington, Boumediene embarked on a plan to pave the way for US investments in the Algerian hydrocarbons sector. If American funds and expertise were to be attracted to Algeria, Boumediene concluded, France’s monopoly over energy production in Algeria had to be ended. Boumediene’s oft repeated principle was that July 1962 represented only Algeria’s political independence, while the country’s full independence would be achieved only when it had become the master of its own natural resources. Algeria might have been the victor of the Battle of Algiers, but the “Battle of Oil”, as Boumediene put it, remained to be won.

The Zeghar Connection Boumediene had metaphorically underlined the year 1969 in his calendar. While French officials dreaded the year laid down by the July 1965 French-Algerian agreement for the review of oil prices, Algiers awaited it impatiently. The 1965 Oil Agreement had itself been a milestone at the time it was concluded. For oil produced by French companies operating in the Sahara, Algeria’s fiscal reference price was

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increased to $2.08 per barrel. This was a fixed price used for the calculation of duties and taxes on production. Most important within the Oil Agreement were articles 27 and 52, which stipulated that negotiations between the two parties be reopened in January 1969, when the whole agreement, including its fiscal provisions, would be subject to review.53 Shortly after Boumediene’s coup, a highly confidential meeting was held between Boumediene, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, the PresidentDirector of Sonatrach (the state oil company), and Belaid Abdessalam, the Minister of Energy and Industry. Abdessalam presented a 50-page hand-written document which presented in broad outline a plan he and Ghozali had made for the eventual nationalization of Algeria’s energy sector in its entirety. In fact, even before Boumediene’s coup, there had been a will in Algeria to establish state control over the country’s oil resources. Sonatrach had been established in December 1963 under Ben Bella’s leadership, In 1964, Sonatrach had concluded an agreement with the USSR to set up the “African Center for Hydrocarbons” and also created seven companies in joint ventures with American firms, such as the Algerian-American drilling company ALFOR, in which Sonatrach had a controlling share of 51 per cent. Boumediene was satisfied with the plan presented by Ghozali and Abdessalam but insisted for the time being on keeping it “absolutely secret,” as Ghozali revealed some 39 years later, when he added, “that is why Bouteflika [the foreign minister] was not informed.”54 Boumediene was keenly aware that an endeavor as perilous as oil nationalization would require careful planning over the five years that were to elapse before the re-opening of negotiations in 1969. If Algeria were to be able take over control of its natural resources, the outline scheme explained, it needed to develop a long-term policy in which there would be no room for “activism”.55 The Algerian leadership was aware that Third World experiments in nationalization previously undertaken elsewhere had been undermined by ostentatiously radical decisions intended for populist consumption.56 In order to avoid any such unfortunate outcome, Abdessalam’s plan included the development by Sonatrach of a fully professional ability to participate in the main five aspects of the oil industry, namely exploration, production, transport, refining and commercialization. Unless Sonatrach was prepared to participate effectively in every aspect of the oil sector’s activities, or if the multi-national companies

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37

were able to retain control of one or more of the five links on the grounds that Sonatrach was unprepared to take it over, any attempt to assume control would be abortive. The measures taken by Boumediene and his oil chiefs, intended to place Algeria in a strong position when it eventually sat down at the negotiating table in 1969 to discuss its new relationship with the French-owned oil industry, are of a complex and technical nature and too lengthy to recount in detail here. In brief, Abdessalam laid down three main phases. First, the construction of Algeria’s own pipeline was to be completed; secondly, Algeria would assume control of the distribution of refined oil products; and finally, the assets of the non-French oil foreign companies would be nationalized.57 If Abdessalam’s strategy were to come to fruition, Algerian personnel would be required to develop full competence in oil exploration and expertise in its exploitation, and there would need to be a body of competent Algerian professionals who would be able to rise to the challenge of running the assets once nationalized. Sonatrach’s construction of its own OZ1 pipeline, intended to transport the oil Algeria’s national company produced, was completed by March 1966. In May 1966 the foreign owned mining industry was nationalized; Anglo-Saxon companies were taken over in August 1967; and finally all mineral resources came under state control by June 1968. This effort to acquire expertise and majority control of oil and related mineral industries was accompanied by political maneuvers. In July 1968, Algeria became a member of the oil producers’ association OPEC and a year later, in June 1969, Algeria hosted OPEC’s annual conference.58 By early 1969, Algiers and Paris were each preparing their tactics for the upcoming negotiations. At the same time, four major developments in the political and economic fields took place. First, France’s President Charles de Gaulle stepped down from office, removing from Franco-Algerian relations the involvement of a figure with an almost mythological status. He was replaced as President by Georges Pompidou, a more pragmatic and prosaic figure, in dealings with whom the Algerians were less inhibited. Pompidou took the view, given the instability of the French economy, that relations with Algeria should be based on economic interests, in contrast to de Gaulle, rather than on de Gaulle’s political commitment to maintain France’s foothold in Algeria, whatever the cost to France.59 Secondly, there took place the coup carried out by Qaddafi and his group of

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young officers in Algeria’s oil-rich neighbour, Libya. Thirdly, as a new member of OPEC, Algeria had launched itself into intensive activity in order to bring about a unified front with the Gulf oil-producing countries. Fourthly, and most important, however, was the Sonatrach’s conclusion in November 1969, of a historic contract with the American company El Paso for the provision of 10 billion cubic meters per year of Algerian natural gas to the American market over a period of 25 years.60 The unprecedented scale of this deal startled and unsettled the French Foreign Ministry.61 Negotiations between France and Algeria opened in Algiers in November 1969 and stretched out over seven months. In June 1970, the negotiations were suspended when the French delegation walked out. Algeria responded by unilaterally increasing its fiscal reference price per barrel of oil from $2.08 to $2.85 (France had been willing to offer $2.18 rising to $2.35 by 1970). The French were horrified and President Pompidou asked Algeria to retract its action in return for the resumption of talks and the offer of new concessions. Boumediene agreed and talks re-opened again on 29 August, stretching over a further eight months, with sessions both in Algiers and in Paris. On 4 February 1971, however, in the face of the Algerian negotiating team’s obduracy and skillful tactics, the French delegation walked out again.62 The CIA had predicted this outcome in a 17-page memorandum prepared on the eve of the negotiations. This analysis observed that France enjoyed the leverage of the still valuable wine market as well as its control over the access of Algerian migrant workers to France and their ability to remit funds to Algeria, both of which were bargaining counters that Paris could use against Algiers. In addition, France had the option of boycotting Algerian oil and of coercing countries which might serve as alternative markets, should Boumediene dare to nationalize France’s remaining interests. As to the Algerian side’s advantages, the CIA study noted that Sonatrach had already set up a number of joint ventures with American companies, taking a 51 per cent majority share of ownership, of which the latest was the deal Sonatrach had made with Getty Oil. In addition, Algeria had enlisted the support of other oil producing states which were now its fellow OPEC members. The CIA speculated that a further factor was that Boumediene might take advantage of France’s current economic difficulties to pressure France into agreeing to the “Getty Formula”,

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with majority Algerian ownership of joint ventures, which the CIA opined was preferable to full nationalization. This would have the incidental effect of releasing more funds Algeria could then devote to its demanding Four-Year Plan. In addition, Algeria might take the option, the CIA paper conjectured, of making a deal with the Soviets to exchange imports of technical equipment for Algerian oil to avert the effects of any Western attempt at a boycott. The report’s conclusion was that it was clear that Boumediene did not shrink from high risks and that it was difficult to predict his next move.63 Boumediene was indeed willing to take a gamble, placing his faith not only in the expertise of his technocrats but also in his own political adroitness. Ghozali has disclosed that while France was being led to believe by Bouteflika that Algeria was negotiating with the goal of reaching a compromise agreement, Algiers was in fact eager to provoke a crisis.64 The French delegation to the talks was led by Franc ois-Xavier Ortoli, Minister of Scientific and Industrial Development. Examination of Ortoli’s papers reveals his frustration with the failure to achieve any meaningful progress in the latter half of December 1970, and especially his irritation over three particularly stormy meetings that were held on 22 December. What seemed to be happening was that no sooner did preliminary understanding between Ortoli and Bouteflika on any given aspect of the negotiations appear to be within reach, Ghozali would return to his calculations relating to the fiscal reference price, the quality of Algeria’s oil, and other technical aspects, thus dragging the already apparently endlessly protracted talks back to their point of origin.65 A media battle over the talks was waged between the Algerian newspaper El Moudjahid and the French newspaper Le Monde, and Algeria began to import extraneous political issues into the debate.66 The objective was to heighten the tension in relations with France. For example, Algeria arrested ten French nationals on espionage charges67 and then went on to break the conventions of diplomatic immunity with the arrest of a junior official of the French embassy on similar charges.68 In September 1970, the Algerian authorities cut off road access to the Bousfer air base, still manned by French pilot instructors, and a deadline was given to Paris to evacuate the base by the end of the year.69 When the oil talks reached a deadlock in late December the French in fact “abruptly” evacuated the base, fearing its personnel could become hostages.70

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The French government’s intransigence was based on a number of false assumptions. For instance, on 19 December, a confidential analysis of the Algerian negotiating position prepared for Jean-Pierre Brunet, Director of the Economic Division at France’s Foreign Ministry, concluded that the Algerian government’s radical posture was intended to give the impression that it might carry out its threats. This did not necessarily represent the actual situation, however, according to the French analysis, which continued, “Algiers in fact hopes not to have to resort to extreme nationalization measures in order to obtain its demands.” The paper justified this conclusion by reference to what its authors believed would be the impact of nationalizations on Algeria’s capacity to attract funds from the US, the World Bank and the European Economic Community for Algeria’s Four-Year Plan. Algeria’s need for French private sector investment and French involvement in oil exploitation, which would continue for some years to come, and the financial burden that the absence of French investment and assistance would place on Sonatrach, in addition to the personnel and technical challenges the Algerian oil company would face, were put forward in this document as two other reasons why Boumediene would not dare to nationalize French assets.71 All this was to a great extent wishful thinking. Other experts at the French Economic Division took a different view, advising in a top secret note to Franc ois-Xavier Ortoli in his capacity as head of the French negotiating team that the French government should accept Algeria’s offer of a 51 per cent nationalization, as well as the proposed compensation. They believed this concession would preserve France’s long-term interests in Algeria, as well as its immediate energy security. Such a concession to Algerian demands could be presented, the advisers suggested, as a “reassertion of France’s traditional (and innovative) policy toward the Third World.”72 Four days later, Bouteflika was in Paris with his last take-itor-leave-it offer, which once more included Algeria’s unilaterally fixed fiscal reference price of $2.85 per barrel. The French government was left deeply divided and undecided. One official warned in a confidential memorandum that, “[if] we let Bouteflika leave this afternoon without a breakthrough, we run the grave risk of seeing events overtaking us.”73 As far as Algiers was concerned, all was proceeding according to plan. At this point, Boumediene made his own contribution to the

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strategy, with the mobilization of Algeria’s intelligence services. For this sensitive task, Boumediene resorted to the services of an old and trusted friend, Messaoud Zeghar, whose career is still shrouded in a certain amount of uncertainty.74 Boumediene had known him during his time as commander of the Algerian Army of Liberation (ALN), the FLN’s armed wing, during the war of independence. His role in the nationalization of French interests became public knowledge only in 2006.75 Previously, Ghozali had revealed only the code name of the operation, which was “Operation Tony”. Zeghar had left the ALN in 1962 and had henceforth concentrated on business dealings with American oil companies and on ensuring the logistics of Algeria’s covert operations in support of various African liberation movements. He now put his connections at the service of Boumediene. According to a recent biography, Zeghar succeeded in extracting a guarantee from the Americans that they would not intervene over the nationalizations in Algeria. This he achieved by persuading his networks of contacts in the US that the nationalization of the oil companies of the former colonial power would profit the US, who could expect large-scale economic returns as well as the neutralization of Soviet hegemony in Algeria.76 Meanwhile, support for Zeghar’s clandestine efforts in Washington was provided by the public efforts of Cherif Guellal, a well-connected and influential diplomat who had been Algeria’s first ambassador to the US, serving from 1963 until diplomatic ties were broken in 1967. Belaid Abdessalam had appointed Guellal to be Sonatrach’s representative in the US, with the role of serving the international interests of Algeria’s oil industry.77 The number of obituaries published by leading American newspapers (including the Washington Post, the Boston Globe, and the Los Angeles Times) following Guellal’s death on 8 April 2009, at the age of 76, serves as testimony to the esteem in which Guellal was held in Washington and the range of his acquaintances in politics and business.78 In Paris, another shadowy Algerian figure was enlisted. Rachid Tabti, a flamboyant and successful polyglot Algerian lawyer familiar with in the world of celebrity, media and political circles, was tasked with the mission of seducing the secretary of the director of the French negotiating delegation in order to obtain the delegation’s files. In addition to his other multifarious talents, Tabti was an amateur boxer, and contact had been made with him through another boxing

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enthusiast, Tayeb Boumaaza, who had been a trainee officer under Abdessalam in 1956, in the wartime FLN’s Ministe`re de l’Armement et des Liaisons Ge´ne´rales (MALG).79 Suffice to say that Tabti conducted his mission successfully. Thus, throughout the three years the negotiations lasted, the Algerian team had access to most of the French documents, enabling the Algerians to prepare counter arguments ready for each round of talks. The French government remained unaware that its delegation was compromised until well after the talks were over. Tabti was arrested and jailed but in 1973 the Algerian government contrived to obtain his release in exchange for the French “spies” whom Algeria had arrested earlier.80 On 24 February 1971, Boumediene announced the nationalization of French petroleum assets. As predicted, the nationalizations opened wide the door for American companies to penetrate the lucrative Algerian hydrocarbons sector. As Boumediene made his “Battle of Oil” victory speech, Messaoud Zeghar was continuing work, ringing around his wide network of businessmen and lobbyists in Washington to urge them to raise funds preparatory to opening up shop in Algeria.81 France was furious at the success of his activities. Zeghar, however, had only just begun, as will be seen in the next chapter of this study.82 With the nationalization of France’s assets, Boumediene had effectively completed the third element in his strategic triangle, which was designed to have the knock-on effect of obtaining US funding for Algeria’s modernization project. In Washington, Henry Kissinger, as President Nixon’s National Security Advisor, had in fact been following the tortuous progress of the talks, as well as other developments in North Africa and the result was that on 19 January 1970, as Boumediene and his advisers had hoped, he had already recommended to Nixon a major review of US policy in the region.

Kissinger and US North African Policy In the light of the de´tente in the Maghreb that Boumediene had promoted, and the changed situation that had resulted from the Libyan coup, Kissinger had in fact already recommended a detailed review of recent trends and US options in North Africa, to take into account the shifting dynamics of the Cold War and the Nixon administration’s foreign policy principles of realism and the primacy

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of American national interests.83 The president’s resulting memorandum ordered a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and an options study to be prepared by the CIA and the National Security Council’s Interdepartmental Group for Africa before 18 March 1970.84 The study was duly completed and submitted to the White House.85 The study prepared for the NIE concluded, first, that Boumediene’s Maghreb de´tente had been beneficial to the Maghreb and would continue to be so, though it was most probable that it would be confined to economic cooperation rather than evolving into a regional union. Secondly, it suggested the Maghreb was seeking closer ties with Western Europe rather than with the two superpowers. Thirdly, this trend would continue as long as Washington was associated in the region with Israel. In terms of each individual country, the study concluded that Algeria was politically stable, together with economic growth, and that it was on the way to achieving regional hegemony. Tunisia and Morocco, however, faced a high degree of political unrest and very difficult economic prospects. The report cautioned that, should the present Tunisian and Moroccan regimes fall, they would probably be replaced by radical regimes that would be inclined to align them more closely with the Palestinian cause and therefore to oppose Israel. With regard to Libya, the CIA concluded that the young leadership was still experimenting with the mechanism of government and that political upheavals could not be excluded. The NIE assured the White House that while Soviet influence in the Maghreb was real it was still limited, adding that the Soviets were unlikely to make headway as long as the current regimes continued to hold in power.86 In the light of the CIA study, the Interdepartmental Group for Africa predicted what it called a “relative decline” in American standing in North Africa over a period of three to five years, resulting from the rapprochement between the Maghreb and Western Europe, as well as from the decrease in US aid to the region and from the reaction to US policy toward Israel. The Group offered four policy alternatives to mitigate the situation. First, it was suggested that the US could adopt a “low political profile,” leaving the Maghreb for a while to form part of the sphere of influence of Western Europe. The second would be “selectivity,” favoring Algeria and Libya which were judged to be the long-term political and economic powers in the region. A third option would be to maintain the current policy

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that tended to favor Tunisia and Morocco, which were already pro-American. The fourth option would be for the US to adopt a “forward strategy” in the whole Maghreb, playing a more active role in order to enhance its influence in the four countries. The study concluded, however, that this option would require the commitment of resources that would be difficult to obtain from Congress and would also mean supporting countries perceived as “enemies of Israel.”87 The Interdepartmental Group faced a difficult choice, particularly since there were advantages and disadvantages to each of the policy options it had outlined, rendering the choice between them more difficult. The US administration certainly hoped it could achieve better governmental relations with Algiers, though its reluctance to accept the fact that Algeria’s support for the Palestinian and Vietnamese struggles was non-negotiable for Boumediene may have meant its hopes were to some extent unrealistic. In October 1969, M’hamed Yazid, the Head of Algeria’s Delegation to the UN, had asked the State Department to give support in congressional committees to Algeria’s prospective American oil partners, who needed approval for their commercial ventures. In response, both Richard Pederson, Counsellor to the State Department, and Charles Bray, acting Director for North African Affairs, echoed William Rogers’ rhetorical query, when he had asked the Algerians to consider whether “Palestine for the Palestinians” was more important to Algeria than its access to American capital markets.88 On 11 February 1970, pursuing the same theme, at William Rogers’ first meeting with Ambassador Osman, Algeria’s envoy to Rabat, the Secretary of State had expressed the hope that disagreement between Algeria and the US on the Middle East and Vietnam would not preclude the two governments from normalizing their relations.89 In May the Interdepartmental Group decided that while the US should not lose sight of its own interests in the region, it should be “generally receptive to Western European involvement” in the Maghreb. However, in terms of US relations with individual governments, Washington should avoid becoming too closely associated with the governments of Tunisia and Morocco, which were predicted to fall.90 Until the spring of 1969, US North Africa policy was the preserve of the Department of State and was not a prime concern of the White House. For Nixon and Kissinger, the priority lay in American policy

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towards the Soviet Union, towards Europe, especially the southern flank of NATO, and in regard to Southeast Asia.91 It was the advent of the Libyan coup that first prompted Kissinger’s interest in North African affairs, though in practice to a limited extent since the State Department team working under Secretary of State Rogers continued to concern itself with the management of Maghreb affairs, in general terms and in detail. In addition, for Kissinger, and in the context of his global approach to the dynamics of the “Cold War”, the complexity of Maghreb relations constituted a challenge. Kissinger decided to wait-and-see, while the State Department continued its cautious opening to Algeria as agreed in general terms by the Nixon administration. This trend was evident in the statement made by Nixon on 16 September 1970, before his first Mediterranean trip as US president, when he declared that, “Algeria is more hopeful at the moment, even though we do not have diplomatic relations established on a formal basis. They have been making certainly rather generous comments, or at least more generous than you would normally expect.”92 Just two weeks after the end of President Nixon’s European tour, from 27 September to 5 October 1970, a major development took place in Algerian domestic affairs which had bearing on the relationship between Algerian and the US. On 18 October, Belkacem Krim, one of the revolutionary leaders of the Algerian liberation struggle, now a leading opposition figure in exile, who had founded the banned MDRA (Movement for the Defense of the Algerian Revolution), was found murdered in his hotel room in Frankfurt. He had been strangled with his own tie.93 The death sentence passed on Belkacem Krim’s in absentia by the Revolutionary Court of Oran on 7 April 1969 had been extensively covered by the media in Algeria. In contrast the news of his death was almost muted, as the US Consul in Oran reported.94 When Jean-Denis Grandjean, the Swiss ambassador to Algiers, asked Messaoud Zeghar if Boumediene was responsible for Krim’s death, Zeghar replied that he had been personally assured by Boumediene that he had nothing to do with it. Zeghar thought Boumediene was telling the truth, since Boumediene’s own brother was, as it happened, undergoing surgery at a Paris hospital at the time. “Had Boumediene been responsible for Krim’s assassination,” Zeghar said, “he would have made sure his brother was back in Algeria first.” Zeghar reportedly believed the killing the “settlement of scores

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between arms traffickers.”95 From the Algerian government’s point of view Krim’s death removed a cause of residual suspicion between Algiers and Washington, since, in October 1968, Krim had sought Washington’s support to help him overthrow Boumediene’s regime. Despite Washington having declined Krim’s request, Boumediene’s regime had been vigilant in regard to Krim’s activities in Europe and was aware that with the change of administration in Washington he had made fresh attempts to get in touch with the Americans.96 While Kissinger was busy reviewing his policy towards Algeria in particular and the Maghreb in general, Messaoud Zeghar was liaising with US administration to facilitate a visit to Algeria of the astronaut Frank Borman, who was acting as an emissary on behalf of President Nixon. Borman’s remit was to ask Algeria to intervene with the Vietnamese National Liberation Front on the fate of the American prisoners of war held by Vietnam. Boumediene gave a warm welcome to Borman, promising that Bouteflika would raise the issue during his next visit to Hanoi.97 Since the Kennedy years, Algeria’s unconditional political and material support for the Vietnamese had been a source of strain in US-Algerian relations, but at the same time Washington was aware that Algeria was the only mediator trusted by Hanoi. The Algerian back-channel between Washington and Hanoi dated back to the Ben Bella years. For example, in April 1965, Senator Edward Kennedy had approached Algiers to use its good offices with the Vietnamese in order to obtain the freedom of a number of American prisoners, and in November 1965, as Boumediene assumed power, Kennedy had visited Algiers to renew the request.98 In addition to Algeria’s material support for Vietnam, for which Vietnam was still paying back in the form of rice exports as recently as 2008, the Algerian newspaper El Moudjahid provided a daily platform for the Vietnamese cause. In the course of 1969, Algeria hosted Mrs. Thi Binh, president of the delegation of the Government of Vietnam, and received Pham Van Quang as Vietnam’s ambassador.99

Conclusion In view of the colossal funds required to carry out Algeria’s ambitious Four-Year Plan (1970 –3), Algiers adopted a foreign policy oriented towards the needs of its economy. Its strategy was aimed at attracting US funding to develop the country’s vast energy resources. Algeria’s

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energy sales were intended to generate the necessary funds for the country’s development. Boumediene’s strategy relied on a process where the geopolitics of the Maghreb would be transformed by Maghreb de´tente. Boumediene’s conclusion was that reconciliation with Morocco would be the way to begin this process, correctly calculating that King Hassan would agree to joint exploitation of the rich mineral resources on the disputed border between Algeria and Morocco. Once the Algiers-Rabat rapprochement was concluded, the rest of the Maghreb was keen to be involved. President Bourguiba of Tunisia calculated it was better to join in before Boumediene withdrew the similar offer it had made to him, while Libya and Mauritania also followed suit. With Maghreb de´tente established, and once Algeria’s standing in Washington had begun to show improvement, Boumediene embarked on the second element of his strategy, which was to strengthen Algeria’s non-aligned status through the reduction of its military dependence on Moscow. To this end, Boumediene’s policy was to resist Soviet pressure in the Mediterranean region, which achieved its purpose. As negotiations with Paris on the future of the French oil companies began, Boumediene indicated his willingness to compromise by concluding a deal similar to those he had already concluded with the American companies, with a majority Algerian stake in joint ventures. France’s President Pompidou thought he could resist Boumediene but underestimated him. Algeria sought new allies by joining OPEC and Algeria moved ahead with its nationalization plans, while the Libyan coup brought new momentum to OPEC and to the Maghreb. Once Algeria had taken the decision to nationalize the French oil companies, the way was open for the American private sector to establish itself in Algeria. Boumediene was aware that he needed to navigate a delicate course in order to balance Algeria’s non-alignment with the requirements of its development program. He also needed to attract American funds while at the same time maintaining strong ties with Moscow, which was still the guarantor of Algeria’s armed forces. Boumediene’s policy could be described as strategic pragmatism, underpinned by calculated risk-management as he had shown in the oil negotiations. Washington found it hard to predict Boumediene’s intentions, while Paris fatally underestimated his determination and his ability to prevail in negotiations. Boumediene’s strategy revealed

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he was a shrewd politician who based his decisions on the advice of the technocrats. Simultaneously, however, he was still at heart a revolutionary whose changeable moods were subject to mercurial whims. His decision to side with the moderates at the first Islamic Summit in Rabat was an occasion where he pursued his own strategic interests while continuing to support the Palestinian militant movements. Algeria was aware that it would never fully win over the US in the climate of Cold War competition as long as it maintained its Palestinian policy. It therefore continued to side with those who took a moderate stance on the Palestinian issue while also establishing strong ties with the American private sector. Boumediene believed that relationships with private US companies could only in the end bring Washington closer to Algiers. The deal struck by Algeria with the El Paso oil company was the first element of this process, which was continued. The US administration encouraged the improvement of links between US companies and Algeria as a long-term policy, while officially continuing to deal with Algiers on a day-to-day basis in the light of de´tente and Middle Eastern issues. In such a period of major realignment of Algeria’s foreign policy, perhaps the major element of Boumediene’s strategy was to balance the continuation of Algeria’s prior Soviet and Middle Eastern policies with its overtures to the US. In the Middle East, Algeria continued to commit its troops to the war of attrition on the Egyptian front which had continued since the 1967 war. Algeria did not finally withdraw its troops from Egypt until summer 1970, after Nasser had agreed to the Rogers Plan, which Algiers opposed. Despite the fact that Nasser’s standing in the Arab world was much weakened following the defeat of the Arab armies in the 1967 war, Boumediene did not exploit the vacuum that ensued, as Qaddafi had done, to advocate unrealistic adventures. Instead, Boumediene opted for direct and pragmatic material support for the Palestinian militant groups. The Algerian leadership believed that the Achilles heel of the Palestinian struggle was the disunity of its various movements, which was in part a reflection of the existence of rivalries between Arab states and their leaders. Nevertheless, despite its approaches to the United States, Algeria insisted on the maintenance of unreserved political and active support for the Palestinian cause. Boumediene’s famous statement, “Palestine is the unifying cement and the

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explosive dynamite. I am with Palestine be it belligerent or victim,” summed up Algeria’s Middle Eastern policy. In dealing with Moscow, Boumediene was aware of the added strategic value Algeria had acquired following the French withdrawal from the virtually impregnable naval base they had constructed at Mers-el-Kebir. Boumediene made judicious use of the Mers-el-Kebir base as a balancing element in Algeria’s relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. Moscow was confident that Boumediene would never allow American access to Mers-el-Kebir. Washington on the other hand had some concern that Algiers might offer Moscow the use of the naval base. Boumediene’s policy of Mediterranean de´tente and Algeria’s commitment to non-alignment would, of course, exclude the use of the base by either the Soviet Union or the US. This was not enough, however, to assuage Washington’s concerns. These were based on the awareness that the Soviets were at a strategic disadvantage in the Western Mediterranean, which might lead the Soviets into rash adventures. Boumediene successfully incorporated this new element of concern over the future of the naval base into Algeria’s foreign policy, using it astutely to lobby the US to offer increased funding and more sophisticated technology to Algeria.

CHAPTER 2 THE TRIUMPH OF REALISM, 1971 – 2

“C’est pour demain” – it’s happening tomorrow – were the three words of a brief coded message heard on the telephone by Belaid Abdessalam, the Algerian Minister of Industry and Energy, before President Houari Boumediene rang off. It was the afternoon of 23 February 1971, and Abdessalam was in Tripoli, where he had been sent by his government to negotiate with the Libyans. His task was to finalize tactics with the Libyan government in preparation for talks between the Mediterranean members of OPEC and the Western oil companies. The sensitivity of the issue had obliged Boumediene to keep secret his decision to nationalize French petroleum assets, so that even as late as one day before the official announcement on 24 February only a very limited circle of trusted high-ranking officials were informed of the decision. Abdessalam was informed that he was to fly back to Algiers the following day to listen to a speech by Boumediene at a meeting of the General Union of the Algerian Workers at which he would declare the nationalization of the remaining French oil and gas assets in Algeria.1 More than 30 years after this episode, Abdessalam revealed that even Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had heard the news only on the radio, hours later. Hocine Malti, the co-founder of Sonatrach, Algeria’s state hydrocarbon company, and general director in charge of the affairs of one of the French companies in partnership with Sonatrach, admitted that he only learned the news almost two hours later, at six p.m., from his French counterpart Jean Leduc when the Frenchman burst into his office.2 The spectre of what had happened less than 20 years earlier to the Iranian prime minister Mohammad

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Mossadeq was still fresh in Boumediene’s mind when he decided to move forward with his plans for petroleum nationalization in the utmost secrecy. Mossadeq had nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in 1951 but was deposed in 1953 in a coup orchestrated by the US and British intelligence services. In his nationalization speech, Boumediene summed up the different phases of Algerian-French oil cooperation since 1965 and outlined the deadlock the negotiations had reached. He announced the nationalization of 51 per cent of French oil assets in Algeria, together with all the reserves of gas and the transport pipelines. At the same time, Boumediene promised compensation for all the French companies affected and assured Paris that Algeria would guarantee oil supplies for France.3 The decision was understandably a blow for the French government. Meanwhile, the other members of OPEC, which Algeria had joined only recently, were very impressed by Algeria’s stance in becoming the first country to dare to embark on a nationalization adventure since the fall of Mossadeq. The nationalization measures further aggravated relations between Algeria and France, which had already become strained during the 16 months of negotiations. Paris deemed Algeria to have taken an arbitrary action that had brought to an end the special relationship which had been established by the Evian Accords and de Gaulle’s cooperation policy. In the period 1971 –2, Algeria’s nationalization of French oil interests had its impact on US-Algerian relations, and the US attitude to Algeria also evolved during the petroleum conflict. The Nixon administration found itself caught between two strategic considerations. On the one hand, Washington was concerned to strengthen France’s position within NATO, following the improvement in relations between the US and France that had ensued from Nixon’s tour of Europe in 1969. On the other hand, it also needed to keep in mind America’s growing private sector interests in the Algerian energy sector, not only from the economic point of view but also, and more importantly, as a long-term US investment in a country widely predicted to become North Africa’s dominant regional power. By encouraging American private sector investment in the Algerian economy the US administration aimed to achieve an improvement in relations with Algeria as well as putting in place an economic counterbalance to the Soviet Union’s monopoly of the Algerian military sector, with all the influence that brought the Soviets. On the Algerian

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side, the nationalizations and their aftermath accelerated Algeria’s efforts to disengage its economy from the French market and diversify its economic partners, seeking links both in the East with the Socialist bloc and equally in the West, both with the US and with non-French West European countries. Finally, Algeria benefited from Boumediene’s successful management of the nationalization crisis with France in a further way, when it transpired that the episode had given a boost to Algeria’s revolutionary credentials. This enabled the Algerian leadership to embark on more radical socialist projects at home, and in particular to embark on its cherished program of agrarian reform: the redistribution of land.

Red Oil, and Who Would Blink First? The announcement of the oil nationalizations was the final episode in the “Battle of Oil,” as Boumediene dubbed it, which had been underway since he assumed power in 1965. Prior to the nationalizations, Belaid Abdessalam had already devised a plan for the successful management of the crisis that would ensue from the economic and political retaliation that would be certain to be taken by France in their aftermath. These had been detailed in a confidential 28-page policy paper presented to Boumediene in August 1970 after the first break in the talks between France and Algeria. Abdessalam recommended that, if the negotiations reached deadlock, Algeria would implement the process of nationalization “globally and simultaneously,” while immediately offering compensation to the French companies affected. Consequently, France would find that the issue of compensation, rather than the original nationalizations, would inevitably become the new focus of negotiation.4 A few hours after Boumediene’s speech, a crisis management meeting took place in Algiers to mitigate the consequences of the measures for the Algerian-French relationship. Rather than breaking his country’s relationship with France, Boumediene wished to transform it from one of privilege to something more like an equal partnership. The first thing to follow the nationalizations was a media storm. France and Algeria woke up to headlines in the French press such as, “The fiasco of a Gaullist dream of exemplary cooperation between France and Algeria,” and, “The end of special treatment for Algeria by the E´lyse´e, which fears a Cuba on its southern flank.”5 Le Monde

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entitled its editorial, “An inevitable change.”6 Naturally, however, French retaliation did not limit itself to propaganda. Much more was at stake, and France’s full range of economic, political, diplomatic and coercive assets were therefore mobilized in the hope of forcing the Algerian leadership to change its mind and instead to resume the negotiations.7 Immediate measures of retaliation were put into action. The Algerian government’s position, however, was clear. The nationalizations were a sovereign decision guaranteed by international law, as long as compensation was offered to the companies affected. Algeria had met this legal requirement and any further talks, Algiers was therefore able to argue, should focus only on the aspect of financial compensation.8 Practical measures taken in the early days included the immediate termination of its $35 million per year financial aid program to Algeria, the reduction of quotas for immigration into France by Algerians and restrictions on travel by Algerian citizens to France. It also began to review its programs for technical assistance to Algeria and initiated a review of the preferential tariffs from which Algerian exports to France had benefited. It also began to devise plans to replace Algerian immigrant workers in France with workers from Portugal, Spain, and Italy, as the French Consul General, Pierre Gruffaz, confided to Glenn Cella, the US Consul in Oran.9 Algerian immigrants in France totaled some 600,000, half of whom were economically active and whose remittances contributed some $200 million a year to the Algerian treasury. The French Interior Minister Raymond Marcellin threatened to clamp down on the remittances by paying Algerian immigrants in non-convertible francs. In Algeria, the French companies most affected by the nationalizations, CFP (Compagnie Franc
aise des Pe´troles) and ERAP (Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activite´s Petrolie`res), with 20 per cent and 80 per cent respectively of their world assets in Algeria, retaliated by withdrawing their personnel from the oilfields in an attempt to abort Boumediene’s decision and humiliate Algeria. In addition, the French government imposed an embargo on all Algerian oil exports and threatened it would sue any company that bought Algerian oil.10 Paris also made repeated attempts to undermine the contract between Sonatrach and the US El Paso Corporation for the export of Algerian gas. The deal was an enormous one, which involved gas exploration, the building of refineries and the construction of

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liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers to deliver 10 billion cubic meters of Algerian gas per year, over 25 years, to be marketed on the eastern coast of the US, in a deal which would total $1 billion. The El Paso contract was due to be subjected to scrutiny in the US by the Federal Power Commission (FPC) and Paris wanted the contract canceled. In mid-February 1971, Henry Kearns, the head of the US Export-Import Bank (EXIM), visited Algiers to discuss the viability of a request by Algeria for loans of some $500 million to cover the necessary construction of infrastructure on Algeria’s part to be able to fulfil the contract. He met senior officials including Boumediene himself and came down tentatively in favor of offering the loan.11 The French presidency believed a decision by the FPC favorable to the implementation of the contract and the loan would strengthen Algeria and give it the upper hand in the stalemate over nationalization. Consequently, French diplomats embarked on a lobbying offensive aimed both at gauging Washington’s general position regarding the Algerian-French energy conflict and at bringing pressure to bear on President Nixon to support France by exercising his influence over the outcome of the FPC hearings on the El Paso contract. An unfavorable verdict by the FPC would also have had the effect of blocking Algeria’s request for loans from both the Export-Import Bank and the IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development).12 Algeria responded in kind to France’s diplomatic offensives and coercive economic measures. The Algerian government declared a boycott on all French products other than the most essential and sought diplomatic support from its neighbors and from its fellow OPEC member states, in addition to defending its actions as being in conformity with international law. Libyan support, hailed in an editorial in El Moudjahid as “exemplary solidarity”, was immediately forthcoming and took concrete form.13 It would be revealed two years later that Libya offered Algeria an immediate loan of $100 million to redress the effects of the French retaliatory measures. Algeria accepted the offer of the loan, but did not need to draw on it so that it was later returned to Libya once the crisis had receded.14 Libya’s support was the fruit of Algeria’s efforts to achieve solidarity within OPEC since its adherence to the organization in 1968, when it had collaborated closely with Tripoli over a wider range of issues than the achievement of OPEC’s basic goal of equitable oil prices for the producing countries.15

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Then, on 12 April, Boumediene escalated the conflict when he announced a new series of measures. One of these was the adoption by the Algerian government of a new fiscal reference price of $3.60 per barrel agreed upon at the Tripoli Talks, replacing the figure of $2.85 that had prevailed at the time of the nationalization, while offering $100 million in compensation to the French companies.16 Paris was horrified to observe that its coercive measures had achieved nothing but the further radicalization of the Algerian position. The following day, therefore, the French government moderated its line, announcing that in the light of the new measures the Algerian authorities and the French companies should meet in direct talks to reach a common position on the best practical means to continue operating in Algeria. Algeria appeared to have won. The French Foreign Ministry also declared that Paris would resume its cultural and technical cooperation with Algeria and that it was, “ready to continue its participation in the industrial development of Algeria . . . within the framework of international competition.” The French statement ended with the affirmation that the French government’s decisions were “inspired by the long-term interests of the two countries and their relations as sovereign states.”17 This announcement was naturally very welcome to the Algerian leadership, which had always called for the decoupling of the French companies from the French government in the context of the petroleum conflict. It now seemed that CFP and ERAP were to be left alone by the French government to negotiate for themselves an acceptable deal over compensation. The French Prime Minister, Jacques Chaban Delmas, was then obliged to explain the French presidency’s position to the National Assembly.18 The French government was anxious to save its face in what had begun to appear was a lost cause in its struggle against Boumediene. Algeria appeared to receive favorably Paris’s apparent declaration of the end of hostilities. While Algiers grasped the hand of cooperation that seemed to be being extended by Pompidou, however, Algeria also issued a warning. The resumption of cooperation between France and Algeria should under no circumstances be seen as the re-establishment of a “zone of influence.” The Algerian leadership stressed in the communique´ it issued on the subject that cooperation was beneficial for both parties and that it would serve to restore faith in France’s ideals in the Third World in general, which had been tarnished by France’s colonial war

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against Algeria. Algiers expressed the view that Pompidou’s policy of cooperation would be a contribution to the “growth of France’s prestige in the Third World,” while making it clear that attitudes to the rights and wrongs of the petroleum conflict would be viewed in the Third World as the litmus test of the possibility of cooperation between a country of industrialized Western Europe and any Third World country that “practises a real policy of national independence.”19 It was in the end, therefore, left to the French companies themselves, without government help, to make a last effort to reverse what they considered to be an example of illegal nationalization. The companies took two significant measures. First, they imposed a boycott on the importation of Algerian oil, with the threat of legal action against potential buyers; and secondly, they sent letters to other Western and American oil companies warning them against making commercial deals with Algeria or signing exploration contracts involving the regions of the French oil concessions in Algeria that had been nationalized. These letters, which became known as the “red oil letters”, contained claims by the French companies that all Algerian oil from nationalized assets was “red oil” and therefore their property.20 The French companies also ensured that their view was relayed to American private sector companies. Howard Burris, an American businessman, was one of the first to hear of the existence of the letters, from a French diplomat on a social occasion.21 On the ground, CFP and ERAP proceeded to remove their remaining key personnel from the oilfields in a last ditch effort to cripple Algeria. Sonatrach, however, was successful in overcoming such measures by filling vacant positions with its own technicians, who proved equal to the task. The Algerian technicians had been trained at the African Center for Hydrocarbons, built and staffed by Soviet personnel stationed in Algeria. Abdessalam’s basic scheme, with its contingency plans for such eventualities, proved effective in practice. In addition, on the day after the announcement of the nationalizations, Sonatrach requested technical assistance from Socialist bloc countries, which was in another of the planned contingency measures. However, Hocine Malti, the Sonatrach official who was managing the crisis on the ground, was warned against asking for Soviet personnel, as it was felt that this would provide the French government with evidence for the veracity of their communist scare propaganda.22

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Within a week of the departure of the French technicians, Sonatrach was able to bring production up to pre-crisis levels, to the amazement of Le Monde’s reporter, whose feature was headlined, “The flares are still burning in the sky of Hassi Messaoud.”23 This is not to say the departure of the French technicians and the French boycott of Algerian oil had no impact on Sonatrach’s production and marketing. It did indeed have a significant impact, in that the volume of sales was reduced by half. However, Sonatrach found independent oil dealers in Europe who helped it to earn revenues equal to those of the pre-nationalization period, since Algerian oil traded at the new price of $3.60 per barrel, while Sonatrach was not sharing its revenue with the French companies as had been the case before nationalizations.24 It should be added that Sid Ahmed Ghozali, the Director of Sonatrach, confirmed to Boumediene on the eve of his historic decision that the newly nationalized oil industry would be able to produce and sell 30 million tons of crude oil in 1971, notwithstanding any French boycott that might be imposed. Ghozali recalled in his memoir of the nationalization episode that two months after the announcement, while the crisis was still at its height, Boumediene called him to say: “Ghozali! Where are you? Do you think you can reach the 30 million tons target? You had better, because otherwise we will hang you.”25 Of course, Ghozali also recalls that Boumediene was laughing as he ended the call. The episode is indicative of the way in which Boumediene relied on his trusted technocrats to take crucial decisions pertinent to national security. The Algerian decision to nationalize was well-calculated and meticulously prepared, with regard to its economic, domestic and international consequences. Nevertheless, Boumediene always projected an image of a radical colonel whose moves could not be predicted. On 26 May, the French companies led by CFP agreed to resume negotiations, this time about the level of the compensation of which an assurance had been given in the 12 April decree. On 19 June, on the occasion of the seventh anniversary of his assumption of power, speaking to a popular rally in the oil town of Hassi Messaoud in southern Algeria, Boumediene declared triumphantly that, “the Evian Accords were not favorable to our country, although we acknowledge they led to independence . . . . Three months after the nationalizations I declare . . . that the Algerian people have won the Battle of Oil.”26

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By 30 June CFP had reached an agreement with Sonatrach and on 10 July CFP’s “red oil” warning letters were withdrawn. ERAP, whose assets in Algeria were even larger, followed suit, resuming negotiations and finally concluding an agreement with Sonatrach on 20 September. ERAP’s warning letters were withdrawn on 27 November. The four smaller companies opted to sell Sonatrach the 49 per cent they still owned after the Algerian nationalization of 51 per cent of French oil assets, subsequently leaving the Algerian market entirely.27 The clash between Algeria and France over the French owned petroleum industry had followed a classic trajectory. In such crises, the outcome often depends on who blinks first. In this case, the weaker party proved to be the French government. The moment it effectively conceded defeat came when it withdrew support for the French companies, advising them to talk directly with the Algerian authorities. Paris justified this as a strategic policy intended to secure its long-term interests in Algeria within the framework of enhanced cooperation. The real motives for the reversal of France’s policy are open to debate. The public exchanges between France and Algeria involved media spin, economic retaliation and counter-retaliation, political escalation and the search for support from allied countries and blocs. It would appear, however, that in fact behind this lay the US position, with all its varying nuances, changing as the conflict progressed, which played a significant role in shaping and modifying France’s conduct of the crisis from its outset until the surprise U-turn by the French on 14 April. The narrative of the Algerian nationalizations prevalent at the time, as it was by and large presented by most French observers of Algerian affairs, was that it was an audacious adventure on which the Algerians could not have embarked had it not been for Washington’s tacit approval. This was the position held by Bruno Etienne, for example, or by Pierre Judet, who believed “the support of America [as] advisor had certainly played an important role in consolidating the position of Sonatrach and Algeria during the petroleum negotiations with France.”28 Public opinion in France, led by the French media, generally took the view that Washington had been instrumental in the affair. In Algeria, however, the story was couched in terms of patriotism and struggle against the former colonial power, in which the Algerian leadership had emerged victorious. Not until recently was more light shed on the American role with the publication of

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Hocine Malti’s narrative of the petroleum conflict, especially the information he gives about the part played by Cherif Guellal, at the Sonatrach bureau in New York, and Guellal’s efforts as a lobbyist.29 By the Algerians, Washington’s role has hitherto been either exaggerated, underestimated, or denied altogether. The interpretation presented here is that the key factor was the role played by the Algerian leadership, which made no errors throughout the course of a process of negotiation for which it had carefully prepared. Behind the smoke screen of public statements and media manipulation a different story was being acted out, in both Paris and Algiers in which US attitudes were of great significance. The leaders of both France and Algeria were aware from the outset of the importance of Washington’s influence in affecting the outcome of the Algerian nationalization plans. France was more or less overt in its bid to enlist American support. Algeria, meanwhile, took rapid action to ensure Washington did not offer significant support to France in the confrontation, taking pre-emptive steps on 25 February, just a day after the nationalization of the French companies, by seeking to reassure the US that compensation would swiftly be paid for Algeria’s prior nationalization of US interests. Messaoud Zeghar, who served as Boumediene’s back channel with Washington, transmitted a promise to Henry Kearns, the president of the EXIM Bank, via William Eagleton, the head of the US Interests Section in Algiers, that the Algerian government was ready to settle the compensation claims of the American companies Esso and Newmount whose assets had been affected during the nationalizations of the Anglo-Saxon companies operating in Algeria in 1967.30 From the Swiss Federal Archives we now know that Zeghar settled these US compensation claims on Algeria’s behalf within 24 hours of the announcement of the nationalization of the French companies. Algeria agreed to recompense both Esso and Newmount with shipments of oil worth $9 million over a period of years. Shell’s compensation was valued at $28 million.31 Nine months later, a high-ranking official at the State Department would tell Jean-Denis Grandjean, the then Swiss ambassador to Algeria, that “the US was surprised by the speed [with which] Algeria settled litigations.”32 Then, on 11 March, France’s President Pompidou sent Richard Nixon a personal message which was transmitted verbally to Arthur Watson, the American ambassador in Paris. This was followed by a

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letter sent on 8 April which asked the US not to take any steps that might “complicate Franco-Algerian relations”. This was intended to refer specifically to anything that might interfere with the approval of the El Paso contract by the FPC and the associated EXIM Bank loan requested by Algeria.33 Nixon however did not respond immediately to Pompidou’s messages. In reaction to the absence of a clear reaction from Washington, the French Foreign Ministry instructed the French ambassador in Washington, Charles Lucet, to gauge the views of State Department officials and then fly back to Paris for consultations. On 6 April, Lucet met David Newsom, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Newsom assured the French ambassador that the US was not seeking to supplant France in Algeria and North Africa, despite “doubts within some French circles” that this might be the case. On the other hand, the US spokesman made no definite commitment as to the outcome of the FPC approval of the El Paso contract and the related EXIM Bank loan, explaining to Lucet that three factors would determine the decision of the US government. These were, first, Algeria’s settlement of pending compensation claims by US companies; secondly, the outcome of the FPC hearings; and finally the EXIM Bank’s own conditions for granting the loan, which would be 50 per cent funded by the private sector. The Assistant Secretary of State concluded by agreeing that the Algerian government had made progress with regard to the settlement of US companies’ claims, while pointing out that while the State Department had no control over the EXIM Bank it would be asked to provide clearance for the FPC ruling, in the light of possible objections to the loan on national interest and foreign policy grounds. Lucet could not obtain a definite answer from Newsom as to how long the whole process would take. The US official said it could be assumed it would take a matter of weeks, but confirmed that as far as the State Department was concerned, and under normal circumstances, a favorable decision would be made. A memorandum summarizing this conversation was sent to the US Embassy in Paris and the US Interests Section in Algiers.34 The FPC hearings were scheduled to start imminently, on 8 April. Meanwhile, Nixon and the US administration continued to maintain an uncommitted position over the clash between France and Algeria. Since the complexity of the procedures of the US inter-governmental agencies meant each agency would take several weeks to make its

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recommendations, the administration would have time to elaborate its stance in a delicate position. The US administration needed to express solidarity with Paris but did not wish either to jeopardize US economic investment in Algeria in the short term or in the longer term to do anything to risk Washington’s relations with the country that was emerging as the dominant force in North Africa. The absence of an early commitment on Washington’s part explains why Paris felt able to maintain its confrontational position as regard Algeria until Boumediene’s 12 April speech escalating the conflict with the announcement of more aggressive measures. On the other hand, it seems to have been Washington’s refusal to respond to the stories in the French media about communist influence, or to other scare stories, that led the France government to begin its climb down. On 14 April, France virtually abandoned the French owned oil companies, calling for renewed long-term cooperation with Algeria while urging the oil companies to talk directly to talk to Sonatrach. On 15 April the State Department briefed Nixon about this development and suggested this was an opportune moment to reply to Pompidou’s personal message. Nixon agreed, a month after Pompidou’s approach, to send a verbal message to the French president via the US ambassador in Paris. The State Department continued to advise the adoption of a neutral position which would not offer Pompidou unreserved support. Aware that Nixon’s instinct, and that of some of his advisers, would have been to offer US support to France, the State Department emphasized to him that Algeria was a country of long term strategic importance where an increasing number of American private sector businesses were already operating. It was also explained to him that the El Paso contract was necessary to mitigate the shortage of natural gas in the US and that the deal would be 50 per cent funded by US private businesses. Further, Nixon was cautioned that further delay at the FPC hearings would translate into additional costs to American firms. Finally, the briefing drew Nixon’s attention to the fact that Algeria had settled the claims for compensation of the American companies that dated back to the Johnson years, and that prospects for the resumption of diplomatic relations with Algeria were good. The President was also alerted to the fact that Pompidou’s reference in his message of 11 March to the undesirability of the El Paso contract “raises some difficult problems for us. If we complied with it fully . . . any hope for

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an early resumption of diplomatic relations would be lost . . . with this important North African country.”35 The message finally approved for transmission to President Pompidou on 17 April succeeded to a considerable extent in avoiding the issue, assuring the French president that the approval of the El Paso project and the EXIM Bank loan would “in any case require some six or seven weeks and Pompidou can rest assured that there will be no preliminary commitment to the El Paso project during this period.”36 The French Foreign Ministry was increasingly convinced that Washington was not receptive to its wishes. In a memorandum prepared for the Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministry concluded that, since the beginning of the crisis, the Algerian government had endeavored, “to improve its relations with the US and . . . Washington has not discouraged this tendency.” The French Foreign Ministry official conjectured that although there was clear hesitation at the State Department with regard to the national security aspect of the FPC’s ruling on the El Paso deal, other considerations might be pushing Washington in the other direction. These might include, it was supposed, “the US’s willingness to assert its vocation to play an important role in the Mediterranean region and not to leave the Boumediene government’s advances without a response.”37 The French presidency’s best hope now was to attempt to unsettle the American private sector businesses that were dealing with Algeria. This was certainly the view of Emmanuel de Margerie, Counsellor at the French Embassy, who had been briefed in detail on 20 April during a meeting with Nathaniel Samuels, Deputy Under Secretary of State, and was aware of the US position on the conflict.38 Despite this briefing, de Margerie claimed three weeks later at a gathering of American businessmen in Washington, as reported by a participant, that he was certain that, “the Department of State and the Department of Defense would recommend to the FPC that imports of liquefied natural gas from Algeria not be authorized.” The business leader concerned subsequently sought clarification from the State Department.39 Allegations that American advisers operating in the oil sector or other businesses in Algeria were behind Boumediene’s decision to nationalize the French petroleum assets, and that the motive was to hand them over to American interests, began to gain currency in the international press. When William Eagleton, head of the US Interests

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Section explored the source of these rumors with French diplomats in Algiers, the French diplomats denied any French connection with the allegations of American anti-French activity in Algeria. The Political Counsellor at the France’s embassy conjectured that “the Soviets were [partly] responsible,” since they were concerned about the influence the El Paso contract could yield for the US.40 Boumediene dismissed all such allegations, asking rhetorically, and with some irony, “whether it might not be preferable [for Algeria] to remain under the dominance of a colonial regime where at least the Algerians understand the language rather than having to use interpreters.”41 The truth was that the American presence in the energy sector in Algeria was of long standing, dating back as far as the mid-1960s when Sonatrach set up a number of joint ventures with American companies, such as South Eastern Drilling Company (SEDCO) and the Getty Oil Company. As for the Soviets, they were not in contention, and were well aware the oil sector was not an area in which they could compete against the Americans. Moscow contented itself, as it had hitherto, with its monopoly over the Algerian military armament sector. In fact, concern about the growth of American influence in Algeria was largely restricted to France, which was determined to keep Algeria, and indeed the entire Maghreb, within France’s “sphere of influence.”42 A French official made this view clear in comments made to a researcher in 1972. The American “hands-off” policy, however, began to be taken to an extent that raised serious concerns within the Algerian leadership, especially in relation to the slow progress in the US towards the opening of the FPC hearing, which had not begun on its scheduled date. At the same time, in Washington, James Blake, Director for North African Affairs at the State Department, told Abdelkader Bousselham, the charge´ d’affaires of the Algerian Interests Section in Washington, that there were concerns among certain American businessmen with regard to French claims that the Algerian gas fields designated for the El Paso project were part of the French assets which had been nationalized. Bousselham reported to his government that Blake had told him he was seeking to commission a legal report on the status of the nationalized French assets to reassure those within the State Department who were anxious over the issue.43 On the other hand, those in the State Department favorable to the Algerian position were gratified by the resumption by CFP in late

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May 1971 of its negotiations with Sonatrach and the opening of direct talks on the compensation terms in June, which paved the way for ERAP and the rest of the French companies to follow suit. A State Department policy planning paper recommended a six-point course of action to engage further with Algeria, not only over the El Paso project and private sector investment but also through educational projects, the dissemination of information and cultural activities.44 On 10 July, as soon as CFP announced it had reached a final agreement with Algeria and withdrew the warning letters, Henry Kissinger briefed Nixon that there was no obstacle that would now justify keeping the FPC process on hold any longer. Consequently, on 13 July, Nixon authorized Secretary of State Rogers to respond favorably to the FPC’s inquiry as to the administration’s views regarding applications to import gas from Algeria.45 With the FPC hearing now authorized to begin, the CIA produced a 15-page assessment of Algeria’s international relations, in light of the conflict over the nationalization of the French assets, whose objective was to analyse the positive and negative implications of the approval of the El Paso contract and to judge Algeria’s reliability as a long term energy supplier for the US. The study noted that Algeria was committed to non-alignment and to internal development, and endorsed the view that the export of its natural gas was “Algeria’s real hope” of raising the necessary funds to execute its ambitious development projects. It concluded that while it could not be ruled out that Algeria might ban gas exports in the event of an Arab-Israeli conflict, technocrats “such as Belaid Abdessalam (and very probably Boumediene) are very aware that playing politics with gas sales is not the way to lure more customers.” In fact, the briefing paper added, Algeria was “likely to be a reliable commercial partner” in case of a deal.46 By August 1971, the Algerian charge´ d’affaires in Washington was already in advanced talks with Robert Moore, Deputy Assistant Director for African Affairs in the State Department, in preparation for a visit by American congressmen and business representatives to Algeria. Messaoud Zeghar also worked hard to set up this visit, which was seen as a follow-up to the visit paid to Algeria in February by the president of the EXIM Bank, Henry Kearns, before the nationalizations took place. However, the Algerian leadership made some conditions, one of which was its insistence on the exclusion of a particular congressman from the delegation given his “subjective position and

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opposition to Algeria,” as the Algerian charge´ Abdelkader Bousselham told Moore. The latter alerted Bousselham that there would be a backlash in the American media to this discrimination between US legislators, but Bousselham replied that “Algeria would deal with it.”47 Algeria wanted to send the signal that even in difficult times it would jealously guard the independence of its foreign policy. By October, the US EXIM Bank and the IBRD began to become more heavily involved in the fulfillment of their commitment to facilitate the finance for modernization projects in Algeria. This funding was now not to be limited to the energy sector but would also include agriculture, industry and technical training institutions. The latter included the Institut Agricole de Moustaghanem, the modernization of the petroleum institution, the Institut Alge´rien de Pe´trole (IAP) (formerly the African Center for Hydrocarbons), and the steel industry’s Institut des Mines et de la Metallurgie de Annaba (IMMA). In addition, Bousselham was satisfied to learn from an IBRD representative that the funding prospects of several other projects were very good.48 The irony was that while the IAP had been built and staffed by the Soviets in 1964, it was now due to be modernized by the Americans in 1972. This was also the case with the IMMA, which had also been built by the Soviets and had even been visited by Kosygin during his visit of October 1971, and was now being funded by the Americans in order to train Algerian engineers to run the El Hadjar Steel Complex. The shift from Soviet to American sponsorship was a perfect example of the Algerian concept of using capitalist means to carry out specific socialist projects. The nationalization experience had made clear the extent of Algeria’s erstwhile economic dependence on France, and in consequence the Algerian leadership sought to redress the situation with the exploration of commercial opportunities beyond those offered by its traditional French and Soviet partners. In order to diversify Algeria’s economy, the Algerian Interests Section in Washington was instructed to step up the level of its contacts with the American private sector. Despite the concentration on oil deals, the immediate priority for the Algerian government was to find commercial opportunities for its huge output of wine, whose sales had been hit hard in France and the European market following the introduction of new EEC rules, while the unfavorable price offered for wine by the USSR was also becoming a problem for Algeria.

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Abdelkader Bousselham sought expert advice from Otto Mayer, a leading wine entrepreneur and Director of the Institute of Wine in San Francisco, on how best to introduce Algerian wine to the United States. In a separate move, Bousselham also arranged for Foremost, an American dairy machinery installation company, to send experts to Algeria to assess business opportunities.49 In the latter half of 1971 and throughout 1972, strong penetration by the American private sector of the Algerian hydrocarbons industry was getting under way. In this period, numerous lucrative contracts were signed with Sonatrach, thereby locking Algiers and Washington into an unprecedented number of energy deals. This development was inevitably to have strategic consequences for bilateral and regional relations between Algeria and the US in the future. As Hocine Malti put it, this was to be the “Year of Gas.” The El Paso contract was increased by another 5 billion cubic meters per year; while Distrigas, in Boston, contracted for another 2 billion cubic meters per year over 20 years. The company Williams Brothers, a US pipeline specialist, was entrusted with the completion of an engineering study for an underwater gas pipeline from Arzew to Spain, across the Straits of Gibraltar, while the Commonwealth Oil Refinery Company signed a 20-year agreement to import 360 million tons of Algerian oil, starting in early 1972. By mid-1972, all these contracts had received the FPC’s initial approval. According to Malti, the first shipments of Algerian gas arrived on the eastern coast of the US in October 1971.50 However, the most important breakthrough for the American petroleum companies in Algeria was the Algerian hydrocarbon master plan known as VALHYD (Program de valorisations d’hydrocarbures), which was launched in 1977.51 Throughout the 1970s and the 1980s, VALHYD, together with El Paso, became the catch phrases associated with unprecedented energy deals in international political and economic circles. VALHYD was a strategic enterprise established by the Algerian government to evaluate Algeria’s hydrocarbon reserves, to establish long-term production strategies in accordance with national development needs, and finally to bring operational coherence to the wide range of Sonatrach’s various sectors and partners. In the period 1966–70, a similar program had been entrusted to the Soviets. Now, the Algerian government selected the giant American company Bechtel to implement the VALHYD program, which was ambitious on a scale such that President Boumediene himself would regularly attend

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sessions with his trusted technocrats and a Bechtel representative where he would be briefed on the progress of the program, the details of which were finalized in April 1976.52 As deals in the field of oil were being explored, approved and implemented, general US-Algerian economic relations began to gain a momentum of their own, to the extent that Washington also made an unprecedented intervention in the context of Algeria’s military sector, which had hitherto been the preserve of the Soviets. In 1972, Henry Kissinger, as National Security Advisor, put the case to President Nixon for the authorization of a request by the armaments company Raytheon to participate in a $60– $80 million bid for an air defense communications network to be commissioned by Algeria. Kissinger argued that the contract would, “dilute the Soviet position as the sole supplier of the Algerian air force.” Additionally, while he recognized that the Middle East and Vietnam remained areas of contention between the US and Algeria, Kissinger nonetheless gave it as his view that, “it is in our mutual interests to have an entree to the Algerian military and some leverage on the Soviet position there.” He was aware that this would cause concern to Israel, but recommended that the Israelis would be briefed, “at an appropriate time”. Kissinger noted that the US presence in Algeria was essentially commercial and commented that, “we have encouraged the private sector to look for opportunities.” He suggested that Raytheon’s bid in the military sector could be viewed as primarily of a commercial nature. Kissinger explained that Algeria was a potentially the leader in North Africa, and noted that the US had already been encouraging increasing ties with it, albeit on the commercial level.53 Washington’s unprecedented involvement in Algeria’s military affairs, though presented by Kissinger in his recommendation to the President as a normal extension of the existing commercial relationship between the US and Algeria, was a palpable departure from existing US policy toward Algeria. In the year following the nationalizations, US-Algerian relations had flourished, to the extent that Washington was now offering the resumption of full diplomatic relations, severed since 1967. On 27 March 1972, David Newsom, the Asssistant Secretary of State for North Africa, who was visiting Algeria, held a confidential meeting with Boumediene at Boumediene’s request, which was attended by only one other person, Idriss Djazairi, Boumediene’s Economic Counsellor, who acted as interpreter.

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Newsom enumerated to Boumediene all the efforts Washington had made to bridge the gap with Algeria, with its encouragement of American private sector investment, the facilitation of the EXIM and IBRD loans, its encouragement for FPC’s approval of the gas contract, and most recently Nixon’s approval of the Raytheon bid to participate in the construction of Algeria’s air defense radar system. Boumediene pointed out that Algeria’s relations with the US were for the moment purely commercial, though relations could be renewed on that basis. However, Algeria’s long-standing disagreements with the US on such international issues the Middle East conflict and Vietnam remained significant hurdles to any normalization of diplomatic relations. Boumediene told Newsom, however, that Algeria welcomed Nixon’s overtures to China, which he described as “intelligent”, as well as progress towards finding a solution to the Vietnam War.54 It is clear from the record of the meeting that Boumediene wanted the White House to use its leverage to restart the process of giving clearance to the El Paso deal, which had stalled in technical discussions. He left Newsom with the impression that the resumption of relations was a matter of time rather than principle, and that while political disagreements were bound to remain, bilateral economic relations could speed up the resumption process.55 Newsom understood the message and immediately cabled Washington to say, “we need [to] find urgently possible major economic actions which can demonstrate our interest and maintain our momentum here. I suggest meeting presidents [of] agencies following my return.”56 Newsom’s efforts in fact paid off, since by late June 1972 more of the hurdles that stood in the way of the El Paso deal were overcome, although other obstacles related to inter-agency reviews remained to be dealt with before the deal reached final stages. At this time, with the El Paso clearance stalled in the machinery of bureaucracy, Boumediene clearly judged it was not wise to resume diplomatic relations, despite encouragement from highly placed US officials, together with a suggestion that Secretary of State William Rogers could visit Algeria in person in July to make the official announcement. Algeria was not in fact keen on this proposal, as William Eagleton learned from Smail Hamdani, Deputy Secretary General at the Algerian presidency.57 Rogers had hoped that Newsom’s efforts, together with the example of Yemen’s resumption of relations with the US around that time, could be enough to

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convince Boumediene to follow suit. He was to be disappointed. Nevertheless, US-Algerian relations in the economic field at this point had become sufficiently extensive and diverse to outweigh the delay in the FPC process of approving the El Paso deal, significant though it was. The reality was that both Washington and Algiers had by this time opted for strategic pragmatism in their dealings with each other. The changed mood was clearly demonstrated when even the hijacking to Algeria of an American plane belonging to Delta Airlines by the Black Panther Liberation Army, on 31 July 1972, resulted only in a momentary strain between the two countries. The Algerians neatly solved the problem. The crew and the plane were returned to the United States, together with the $1 million ransom that had been paid for the release of the passengers in Miami, which the Algerians confiscated. The hijackers were released after a few days and later decamped to Europe. The burgeoning of American private sector investments in Algeria was enough to put such passing difficulties into perspective.58 Nevertheless, Boumediene judged that the moment had come to restrict the activities of the Black Panther Party in Algeria after their presence in the country had begun to damage Algeria’s standing in Washington, especially within the Congress, whose role in the FPC’s clearance of the gas deals was crucial. The Algerian decision to curb the Black Panther Party, members of which had been resident in Algeria since 1969, was not motivated solely by the pragmatic concern not to harm the country’s relations with the US. There had already been other considerations, since the Black Panthers were increasingly becoming involved in activities which embarrassed the Algerian leadership. In August 1972, police raids took place at addresses associated with the Black Panthers in Algiers. Once the Delta Airline hijacking was over, the Algerian government began to take steps to improve its overall standing in the United States, which had been thrown into doubt by the episode. Abdelkader Bousselham reported to Algiers on the performance of the Algerian government’s missions and agencies in the US.59 He made suggestions for the encouragement of further commercial opportunities for American enterprises in Algeria in the domains of agriculture and trade, and even looked at the possible expansion of American hotel chains into Algeria, as had taken place in neighboring Tunisia and Morocco. He was, however, led to express some frustration regarding

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the lack of coordination between the various Algerian ministries in their approaches to the various agencies of the US government, complaining to foreign secretary Bouteflika that, “it happens that representatives of [some] departments arrive on a mission to Washington and do not even visit us,” and going on to say that the “absence of coordination in such an important domain is regrettable.” In order to redress the situation, Bousselham urged Bouteflika to send English-speaking economic staff to the Algerian Interests Section in Washington to be briefed before moving on to New York where the Algerian government was planning to open an economic affairs bureau in 1973.60 Overall, Algeria’s intention, having experienced the grave consequences of its excessive economic dependence on the French market, set out to explore opportunities for trade in the US and the rest of Western Europe.

Relations with the Communist Bloc Once US-Algerian economic relations had begun to flourish, the Algerian leadership, in a further effort to diversify its economic partners and break free from its dependency on France, turned its attention to the socialist bloc, to which it had hitherto been close, to strengthen relations further and explore new markets. Algeria’s relations with the communist bloc in fact improved significantly over the period 1971 – 2. Algeria’s goal was to go beyond the ideological sympathy it shared with the socialist countries and put in place practical cooperation that would bear more fruit than the extensive cultural programs implemented by the communist embassies in Algiers. The Algerian leadership’s expansion of its economic cooperation with certain countries from the communist bloc was an indirect result of the oil nationalizations dispute with Paris. A factor in this was the Sino-Soviet split, where the Algerian leadership prudently avoided taking sides but nevertheless derived some benefit from playing one side against the other. Boumediene’s technocratic advisers, including principally Belaid Abdessalam, the Minister of Industry and Energy, and Layachi Yaker, the Minister of Commerce, argued that it was necessary for Algeria to diversify the range and scope of its economic partners. The confrontation between Algeria and France was at its height and Algerian oil boycotted by France and by other countries that were

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sympathetic to the French position. Sonatrach needed to sell its oil and new markets were required. Algeria’s first instinct was to widen its range of exchanges with the socialist bloc, which had long been sympathetic to Algeria without offering much practical help other than in the field of armaments. So far, outside the provision of arms, the contribution of the socialist countries had been limited to the fields of mining, irrigation, the steel industry and geological surveying. Algeria’s needs, however, included technology and expertise in the electronics, electrical, and energy exploitation sectors, for which it had previously relied on the US and Western Europe. Algeria also needed finance for the implementation of the Four-Year Plan, and, in the short term, cash to pay for food imports to compensate for the shortfall in agricultural produce. In the early part of the 1960s, the communist bloc, including both the Soviet Union and China, had extended credit to Algeria on very generous interest rates and with long repayment periods. By the end of the second half of the 1960s, however, Algeria had not yet tapped some of these loans. There were reasons for this. First, during the first five years of his rule, Boumediene had concentrated on domestic affairs, with priority given to the establishment of the new governing institutions of the state and the consolidation of the authority of the Council of the Revolution. There was no impetus as yet to begin to put together trade deals, while economic planning was still at a rudimentary stage. Algeria was not yet ready to put to use the credit that had been extended to it and the offers of cooperation which had been made. For this reason, the scheme for development in 1967 –9 was referred to only as a “pre-Plan”. It was largely concerned with specific regional schemes intended to furnish infrastructure for rural populations and provide them with their basic needs. As Algeria’s technocrats prepared for the long-awaited Four-Year Plan of 1970 –3, they were experimenting with short term planning. Secondly, the climate of international relations within the communist bloc was not conducive to Algeria’s plans. The Sino-Soviet Split had made a marked impact on Boumediene’s first five years in power. In 1965, Boumediene’s deposition of Ben Bella, whose political inclination tilted towards Peking rather than Moscow, had prompted the Chinese leader Zhou Enlai to freeze a very generous loan he had promised to Algeria during his African tour in 1963–4.61 The coup took place just a week before the Afro-Asian Conference due to be held in

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Algiers and which was the topic of major controversy. The Soviet Union was seeking to be invited, while China was vociferously opposed to its presence. Meanwhile, India wanted to exclude the issue of Vietnam from the agenda of the meeting. These splits left Algeria in an awkward situation. Eventually, in the aftermath of Boumediene’s coup, the conference did not take place. This was initially welcomed by the Soviets, though Moscow soon lapsed into an awkward silence as the new Algerian leadership began to act against former members of the banned Algerian Communist Party. Throughout the 1960s, Algeria was obliged to navigate a very delicate course between Peking and Moscow. Moscow’s purchases of Algeria’s wine, when France drastically reduced its intake after Algerian independence in 1964, certainly rescued Algeria’s economy at a time when revenues from wine sales still exceeded those from oil.62 In addition, Algeria relied almost totally on Soviet armaments. However, the Algerian leadership needed to be extremely careful not to become embroiled in the Sino-Soviet dispute, which had begun in 1960 and erupted into total hostility in 1962. In 1966, China descended into the so-called Cultural Revolution, with the result that its foreign policy role in the world shrank, which had implications for North Africa. Algiers took care to maintain a neutral stance, which was in any case not incompatible with the independence in decisionmaking that was already the cornerstone of Algeria’s foreign policy. From its side, China was conspicuous by its absence from Algerian affairs in the period 1965 –70.63 By 1971, however, both developments in the petroleum industry in Algeria and new overtures from China compelled Algiers to revive its ties with Peking. The Pakistani ambassador in Algiers confided to Eagleton how important Bouteflika’s visit was for China at that particular time. From 20 July to 1 August 1971, somewhat reluctantly, after growing pressure from Peking, Abdelaziz Bouteflika eventually led a 13-man Algerian delegation to Peking for an extended official visit.64 The delegation, which was made up of economic experts but also included two military officers, was received by Zhou Enlai and Yuan Huan-ping, the Head of the Armament Department of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), among others. In the joint communique´ issued at the close of the visit, Algeria renewed its call for the “restoration of the legitimate rights of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at the United Nations,” and invited Vice Premier Li

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Hsien-Nien and acting Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei to visit Algeria. Both parties agreed to reactivate China’s economic and technical cooperation with Algeria by drawing on the existing $52 million credit that had been extended by China to Algeria in 1963. Although military matters were not mentioned in the final communique´, the US Consul in Hong Kong reported that he had reason to believe that an agreement had been concluded but not announced.65 In addition to its role in establishing the framework for economic cooperation, the visit held considerable political importance for Peking. It came at a time when momentum was gathering at the UN General Assembly to restore the PRC to China’s seat. Given Algeria’s growing influence in the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Peking aimed to gain support for this move as part of its overall strategy to revitalize its foreign policy, globally and in Africa in particular. The visit also coincided with a period of renewed strain in relations between Moscow and Peking following the 1969 border conflict. Here again, Boumediene may have wished to send a signal to Moscow through the amelioration of Algeria’s relations with Peking. However, it could also be inferred that Algiers intended to send a political message to Moscow, at a moment when the lack of progress in talks on the revision of the ungenerous prices the Soviet Union was offering for Algerian wine was causing serious irritation in Algiers. Algiers and Moscow could not agree on the wine price, which Algeria wanted to bring into line with that previously paid by France. A further problem was that Moscow was continuing to maintain a monopoly over the maritime shipment of goods between Algeria and the Soviet Union, to the detriment of the Algerian Maritime Transport Company (CNAN), which wanted an equal share of the revenue. Belaid Abdessalam had made it clear to Moscow during the second session of the Algerian-Soviet Committee for Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation in January 1971 that this was a problem which needed regulation. China’s accession to the UN seat on 25 October 1971 was widely acclaimed in Algeria, which had vigorously lobbied OAU member countries to vote in favor of the Resolution put to the General Assembly by Albania on that date. In fact, Algerian diplomatic maneuvers had played behind the scenes in order to obtain a favorable outcome in the vote and the Algerian leadership referred to it as the Albanian-Algerian Resolution, because of Algeria’s crucial

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role as a co-sponsor. In the event, China obtained 76 votes, with 35 against and 17 abstentions. Twenty-six African countries voted for the resolution, in addition to Algeria, while 14 African states voted against it (Mauritius abstained).66 Following the vote, Boumediene sent a message to Zhou Enlai in which he hailed what he called “the historic event” and expressed Algeria’s “deep conviction that China, by its power and its commitment [to the cause of all the oppressed peoples], will contribute effectively to the advent of a new international order which will guarantee the security, prosperity and well-being of all peoples with due respect to strict equality and basic national interests . . . .”67 This diplomatic investment by Algiers yielded immense returns which consolidated further the Sino-Algerian rapprochement. It was no coincidence that, just a day after the vote on China’s entry into the UN, Pai Hsiang Kuo, China’s Minister of Foreign Trade, was in Algiers signing a long term Algerian-Chinese commercial agreement (to run from 1972 to 1974) as well as other economic and technical cooperation protocols. These included a $40 million interest-free loan repayable over 15 years to fund the construction of a dam with a capacity of 400 million cubic meters. A team of 17 Chinese irrigation experts was already in Algeria by the end of the year. Meanwhile, China agreed to import 120,000 tons of Algerian pig iron, which would make China the largest importer of that commodity from Algeria. In March 1972, in a further commercial agreement, the Algerian National Company for Cellulose Industries (SONIC) contracted with the China National Light Industrial Products Import Export to provide the latter with 8,000 tons of high quality “alpha” paper valued at $2.4 million. By 1972, Sino-Algerian relations had entered a new phase, bolstered by the close identification of the political philosophies of views of Algeria and China, which helped in the consolidation of bilateral economic cooperation. This also served to fulfil Algeria’s objective of diversifying Algeria’s economic partners, while at the same time also helping Peking to launch its new foreign policy offensive in Africa, especially in the northern and sub-Sahara regions. For Algeria the intention of enhanced cooperation with China was to diversify the country’s range of economic and trade partners, and to that extent it was successful, though it must be borne in mind that China was never comparable to the Soviet Union as an

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economic partner. The Chinese and Russian deals with Algeria were only a small part of overall competition between China and the Soviet Union for contracts in Africa, as well as in the Third World in general. By 1970 Africa strategists in Peking and Moscow had already been working to devise new strategies to promote engagement in Africa.68 In the period 1971 – 2, Moscow suffered a number of setbacks in Africa. The formation of the Federation of Arab Republics (involving Egypt, Libya and Syria) in April 1971, together with the immense difficulties faced by communist parties in revolutionary and socialist Arab countries, presented the Soviet leadership with an awkward reality. The eviction of the Soviet military experts by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in April 1972 was the most difficult point of Moscow’s problems in reconciling its strategic interests in the region with the ideological concerns of Arab revolutionary leaders. There was, it is relevant to point out, an underlying incompatibility. Though the Arab leaders were progressive, and espoused the goal of the establishment of leftist states and socialist development projects, they were at the same time non-communist and were fiercely opposed to what the Soviets called “scientific Marxism” and to the materialist philosophy of the communist states, which all the Arab leaders regarded as incompatible with the Islamic identity of their peoples.69 In the end, however, the link between Algeria and the Soviet Union was strong. The Soviet leadership maintained its large-scale support for the Algerian Four-Year Plan, despite any reservations it might have over Boumediene’s development strategy and any minor disagreements in detail there might be over the implementation of contracts. While the joint Algerian-Soviet communique´ that ensued from Kosygin’s official visit to Algeria in October 1971 was no different from the previous ones, with an emphasis on the independence of Algeria’s foreign policy and its non-alignment, and with a joint condemnation of imperialism and colonialism and an expression of support for Palestine and liberation movements, there was one new element in it, namely an explicit commitment by the Soviets to the implementation of the Algerian Four-Year Plan. It would not be true to say, however, that there were no difficulties between the two countries or misgivings. Soviet experts on Algerian affairs continued to express a level of skepticism about Algerian policies, with one referring to what was described as Algeria’s, “excessive dependence on companies based in developed capitalist countries.”70 Another Soviet

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expert warned that Algeria’s version of socialism “sometimes even contradicts the principles of socialism.” Another Soviet study on Algeria’s socialism concluded that Algerian socialists, “are followers of Fanon and are under the strong influence of Islam. They exaggerate the religious and national differences of Algeria.”71 Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership applauded Boumediene’s nationalization of the French oil assets and his proclamation in mid-1971 of the decree relating to agrarian reform in Algeria. Kosygin’s visit to Algeria in October 1971 was preceded by the announcement in Moscow that an agreement had been reached to expand the production capacity of the El Hadjar Steel Complex from 400,000 to 1.8–2 million tonnes annually. This expansion of capacity was to be funded by a Soviet loan of $189 million at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent, reimbursable over 15 years. In another development, the closure of the French Renault vehicle assembly facility in Algeria as a result of the petroleum conflict was to provide the Soviet vehicle industry with additional opportunities in the Algerian market. A contract for the production of 2,000 passenger cars (based on a Fiat model) was placed with the Russian “Togliatti” plant in Stavropol, while Soviet oil and mining exploration companies expanded their presence in Algeria. Technoexport, a Soviet mining company, was commissioned by the National Algerian Mining Company (SONAREM) to compile an inventory of Algeria’s mineral resources to be completed over a period of seven years, as well as to bring up to date the existing but obsolete geographical surveys. By December 1971, Soviet imports from Algeria totaled around $70 million of which $54.5 consisted of wine imports and $12 million of petroleum. Meanwhile, Algerian imports from the USSR reached approximately $60 million.72 Additionally, on 18 February 1972, a long-term commercial agreement for the period 1971–3 was signed in Algiers during a visit by the Soviet Trade Minister. By April 1972, the American Interests Section in Algiers concluded that the number of Soviet personnel involved in economic cooperation was “believed to be about 2,000.” A report on Algeria’s relations with the communist countries concluded that although technical and economic cooperation between Algiers and Moscow was extensive, Sonatrach still preferred to sell its oil to Western partners for hard currency rather than to the USSR through the Soviet clearing accounts system, where goods would be paid for with their

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value in other goods. This was an illustration of the influence of Algeria’s technocrats in deciding the lines of Algeria’s foreign policy that confirmed the views of the Soviet experts on Algerian socialism. Algeria was by no means a communist country. Boumediene’s aim was to achieve a socialist state by capitalist means. In his annual report, William Eagleton, commenting on the contract with Technoexport to undertake a mineral resources survey, remarked that, “there may be a degree of unintentional US-Soviet cooperation in this venture as the possibility exists [that] the Russians will be using maps and geographical interpretations prepared by the US firm Aero Service for their photogrammetric work.”73 The reinforcement of Algerian relations with the socialist bloc became the topic of dedicated annual reports by the US Interests Section in Algiers which traced and documented all developments, however slight. The Interests Section closely monitored the smallest details of economic cooperation between Algeria and the communist bloc. One telegram, for instance, noted that five Chinese agriculturalists were helping Algerian farmers to master tea growing techniques in a farm near the coastal town Skikda. More importantly, it also tracked the nature and extent of communist propaganda activities in Algeria. Washington was kept informed of such matters as titles of communist films shown and communist publications distributed, audiences that were targeted, and the activities of the Soviet cultural center as well as of communist news agencies accredited in Algiers. Though such propaganda activities were closely reported on by the American consuls and other diplomatic officers in Algeria, William Eagleton tended to conclude his reports with a reassurance that Algerian nationalism, Algeria’s revolutionary credentials, and the independence of the country’s foreign policy, barred the way for such propaganda activities to cross the line between the sphere of culture and that of politics. Here again, Algeria’s Islamic identity proved an insurmountable hurdle to the penetration of Marxist ideology. This was conventionally characterized in FLN propaganda as a vehicle for atheism, which effectively countered the efforts of communist agitators from abroad and frustrated the ambitions of local underground communist parties, such as the “Parti Avant-Garde Socialiste” (PAGS). The American Interests Section’s sources in Algiers believed that Boumediene expelled several Soviet diplomats in 1970 and 1971 for alleged

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connections with PAGS elements who had caused widespread disorder in Algeria’s universities following the announcement by the FLN of its plans to bring the Algerian Student Union (UNEA) under the FLN’s control.74 The UNEA, whose student leaders were believed to be very close to the PAGS, was officially dissolved in January 1971 and its leaders jailed.75 Radical measures such as the expulsion of these Soviet diplomats served to mark a red line that was not to be crossed by the propaganda activities of the diplomats of communist countries in Algeria. This firm retribution compelled them to confine their moves solely to cultural activities and socialist solidarity of a theoretical stamp.76 It also confirmed to Washington that Algeria’s non-alignment was genuine. This, incidentally, later enabled Boumediene to play the role of a mediator in the Vietnam War when Washington sought Algeria’s help in connection with the fate of the American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam. In August 1972, Senator Jack Kemp sent a letter to Boumediene in which he pleaded with him to, “please take whatever action you can from your office of leadership to assure improved adherence to the [Geneva] Convention by all participants in the Vietnam conflict.”77 Algeria also sought to strike up economic relationships with Communist bloc countries other than the USSR and China, whose mutual antagonism imposed limits on Algeria’s room for maneuver. The Algerian leadership was able to take a more flexible approach to the management of its relations with other communist states. In the aftermath of the petroleum nationalization, when diversification of Algeria’s economic partners was a key objective of the government’s trade policy, Belaid Abdessalam and Layachi Yaker toured Eastern Europe in search of novel economic partners for Algeria and new markets for Algerian goods and oil. This economic offensive took the Algerian technocrats to Bulgaria, Poland, East Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. With all these countries, economic and technical cooperation protocols and long-term trade agreements were in due course signed over the period from 1971 –2. Bulgaria was an especially interesting partner for Algeria, where Sonatrach succeeded in finding a market for a not inconsiderable 7 per cent of the oil it had available for export. In addition, Bulgaria made a loan of $40 million available to Algeria, repayable over 15 years at an interest rate of 2.5 per cent. Meanwhile, some 300 Bulgarians were employed

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as medical personnel by the Algerian military. Sonatrach’s oil sales in Bulgaria, together with technical assistance from Romania in the petroleum industry, proved to be important for the success of the policy of oil nationalization. Romania is a country with oil resources of its own and expertise in the refinery industry. By mid-March 1972, when President Nicolae Ceaucescu paid a five day state visit to Algeria, some 120 Romanian petroleum technicians, 80 geologists and 40 irrigation experts were active in Algeria, in addition to the Romanian medical teams.78 A trend discernible in the joint communique´s released at the end of the official visits to Algeria by the leaders of communist countries, such as that of Ceaucescu or the Hungarian president Pal Lozincz, was the extent to which the Algerian leadership emphasized economic cooperation between Third World countries, rather than partnerships with advanced states. In contrast to the previous tendency to open with a joint condemnation of imperialism and colonialism, communique´s issued in 1971 and 1972 began with lengthy statements on cooperation. Clearly, this was a reflection of Algeria’s domestic priorities, but it also marked Algeria’s increasing role within UN agencies related to development such as UNCTAD. Algeria began to promote economic cooperation and development as new themes for Third World states, rather than limiting the concept of non-alignment to the classic political sphere.79

The Mers-el-Kebir Naval Base When Algeria’s relations with France deteriorated after the petroleum nationalization, the effects spread into other domains in addition to the economic sector. Algeria was compelled to diversify its partners in a variety of fields, including that of military cooperation. It should be noted, of course, that this was not necessarily a novel or unwelcome development. Diversification had been elevated to a central position in Algerian trade policy as a safeguard for its cherished independence in foreign policy and its commitment to non-alignment. The aftershocks of the 1971 nationalization crisis reinforced this principle. How best to proceed in military affairs was, however, a source of controversy within the Algerian military and political elite as well as an issue that divided Algerian public opinion.

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The short-lived Algerian-Moroccan border conflict of October 1963 had shaped Boumediene’s attitudes for many years afterward. Algeria had broken free from France only the previous year and did not yet possess an army organized on classical military lines. For this reason, Algeria did not fare well during the brief clash with its neighbor.80 The Algerian Popular National Army (ANP), which had been created out of the National Liberation Army (ALN), did not acquit itself well in conflict with the conventionally disciplined Moroccan forces. The episode led Boumediene, who was at the time Minister of Defense, to take two controversial military decisions, which were to have lasting effects on Algerian politics decades after his death.81 One of those was to incorporate into the country’s armed forces Algerian officers and non-commissioned officers who had served with the French army and only deserted it to join the ALN in the last years of the Algerian revolution, some of them as late as the eve of independence. These deserters from the French force, known to Algerian historiography as les De´serteurs de l’Arme´e Franc
aise (DAF), had received regular training within French military academies and schools and had practical experience on the battlefield as well as knowledge of French training and administration procedures.82 Their inclusion within the army, Boumediene believed, would also keep them loyal, while also enabling the state to keep them under surveillance. Boumediene was not really anxious that the DAF officers might pose a threat to Ben Bella’s government as he believed they would never be in a position to attempt a coup.83 Boumediene took the view that the DAF officers themselves knew how exposed their position was. Given their past in the French colonial army, their problem was that they lacked revolutionary credentials. Some senior officers, however, such as Abdelhamid Brahimi criticized Boumediene’s policy of including and even promoting them within the Arme´e Nationale Populaire (ANP). Brahimi was an ALN officer who would go on to be President Chadli Bendjedid’s prime minister from 1984–8. Boumediene’s angry riposte to Brahimi was that he was merely using the DAF men as “screwdrivers” who served his purposes.84 The other controversial decision taken by Boumediene as a result of the 1963 border conflict was the covert re-institution of a degree of military cooperation with France. While the Soviet Union would provide the military equipment Algeria needed (after the US had turned down a request from Algeria in 1963, when Boumediene was

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Minister of Defense in Ben Bella’s government), France would provide instructors for military training across the ANP. In the atmosphere of post-independence euphoria, and with the memory of the horrendous terrorist actions of the settlers’ Organization de l’Arme´e Secre`te (OAS) still fresh in the minds of Algerians, it was very understandable that such a decision by Boumediene would be kept absolutely secret.85 From the outset, the objective was to modernize the Algerian military forces and ensure their smooth conversion from paramilitary groups into a modern army with agreed procedures and discipline under a normal chain of command. Subsequently, clandestine cooperation with France in various areas continued until AlgerianFrench relations reached their lowest ebb in the aftermath of the oil nationalizations. The nationalization crisis had therefore given rise to serious consequences on all aspects of cooperation between the two countries including the military sphere, but in a somewhat surprising way, as the newly appointed French Liaison Officer in Oran, Captain de Couvette Dos, confided to the US Consul based in Oran, Glenn Cella.86 Given the reluctance with which Algeria had turned back to France in the domain of military training, the country also sought to strike up links with other Western European countries. Algeria soon initiated a degree of cooperation with the Italian Navy, with considerable success. In early 1971, this was raised to a new level with a high profile five day Italian naval visit to Algeria. In March 1971, the commander of the La Spezia First Naval Division, Admiral Ubaldo Benini, arrived at the port of Oran with the Italian missile destroyer Intrepido, together with two frigates, Canope and Castore. This was the fifth Italian naval visit since 1968 but was by far the most significant. The Algerian government gave this exercise a higher status in terms of protocol than previous visits. Chadli Bendjedid, who was at the time Commander of the Second Military Region and a member of the Council of the Revolution, came to Oran personally to welcome Admiral Benini, who was taken for a tour of Air Force training base at Tafraoui, near Oran. This was staffed by Soviet military personnel and had been until then off limits except to visitors from socialist countries. Clearly, in the immediate aftermath of the petroleum nationalization, Boumediene’s strategy was to reach out to other countries in West Europe. From their side, the Italians were equally keen on making contact with a new state that was after all their close neighbor

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across the Mediterranean. The Italian ambassador to Algeria, Adalberto Figarolo Di Gropello, made the journey from Algiers to Oran to take part in the various events celebrating the visit, as well as participating in the working lunches that took place. When the US Consul Glenn Cella enquired, quite properly, about the circumstances of the naval visit and the nature of the Soviet presence in the military facilities Benini was allowed to visit, he was advised by the Italian admiral that in the admiral’s view the visit “had advanced [Italy’s] strategy of encouraging Algeria to cultivate her Western options.”87 This was a win-win situation for both the Algerian and Italian sides. The visit was concluded, as with previous naval visits, with an agreement on the reinforcement of cooperation, as the result of which 20 Algerian cadets were enroled for training at the Italian Naval Academy at Livorno. Washington took a very strong interest in the details of such contacts as well as in any intelligence that could be obtained about the nature of the Soviet presence and its influence within the Algerian military. For example, when Captain Bruno Benvenuti, the Italian Armed Forces Attache´ in Algiers, expressed his admiration at the performance of the Algerian cadets at the Livorno Naval Academy in comparison to the other foreign cadets, US Consul Glenn Cella sought further information. The US Consul was concerned that the training the Algerian cadets were receiving in Italy might eventually benefit the Soviets should the Algerians cadets go for further military training in Moscow after graduating from Livorno. In practice, Cold War dynamics and considerations remained a central theme. Cella was in the event comforted to learn that the Algerian graduates would need further specialized training over a period of years before being ready for advanced training. This was confirmed by the former Italian defense attache´ in Washington, Arrigo Barbi, when he reiterated that “the [Italian] effort is more than justified as a way of [strengthening] Western influence in the Algerian naval officer corps.”88 The effort by the US to glean intelligence from independent sources had been continuous since the French evacuation of the Mersel-Kebir naval base in early 1968. A regular stream of reports to William Eagleton at the US Interests Section in Algiers from the US consuls in Annaba, Constantine and Oran, based on information they had been able to obtain from contacts, kept Washington informed.

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The consuls would often copy their telegrams directly to Washington when sensitive intelligence had been obtained, especially when a Soviet or socialist bloc warship had called at one of the two commercial ports. For example, on 24 February 1971, a Soviet warship identified as “Destroyer 548” was reported to have called at the port of Oran, where it arrived at 21.00 hours in the evening. Such telegrams contained descriptions of the type of the vessel, such identification markings on the vessel as could be observed and its shape and size, as well as the nature of any activity that took place in the course of deliveries. On the occasion noted above, Cella reported to Eagleton that the vessel in question departed the port shortly after it arrived, with less than 20 minutes in the port, with “no conspicuous activity noted during the intermittent observation.”89 Cases such as this, in addition to intelligence obtained from the various European defense attache´s in Algiers, especially those representing Italy and France, convinced Eagleton that he should change his mind and to advise Washington to consider making further overtures towards Algeria in the military sphere. It was significant that Eagleton, who had advised against just such an initiative in the summer of 1970, took the view this time that the experiment could be fruitful. It was an indication of the rapidity with which the two countries had drawn closer that the Pentagon subsequently instructed Eagleton to explore possibility of a military exchange with Algeria. Eagleton held a meeting with Smail Hamdani, Secretary-General at the Algerian presidency, to pass on an invitation from the US Air Force for senior Algerian military medical officers to take part in a one week visit to the United States and attend the Houston Aerospace Meeting in April.90 Naturally, Hamdani expressed interest in this proposal, which had come as a surprise, but on such a delicate issue the decision was up to Boumediene himself. Certainly, Algeria had sought military cooperation with the US in 1963, but a great deal had taken place on the domestic, regional and global fronts since then. The delicacy of the situation was evident in Hamdani’s reply, expressed at a follow-up meeting with Eagleton, when Hamdani informed the head of the American Interests Section that a decision would be made after the return from Moscow in February of Colonel Chabou, the SecretaryGeneral at the Ministry of Defense.91 While Boumediene retained formal responsibility for the defense portfolio, Colonel Chabou

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(incidentally, a former DAF officer) was the de facto minister of defense and a trusted member of Boumediene’s inner circle. In April 1971, however, Colonel Chabou was killed in a helicopter accident, along with two ALN majors. General Khaled Nezzar reported that the pilot had lost control of the helicopter during bad weather. Nezzar, a DAF officer himself, revealed in his memoirs that on the day after Colonel Chabou’s death he had been due to receive a Soviet military delegation led by General-Colonel Vladimir Korotchkin.92 The available documentation does not indicate whether Washington’s proposal was acted upon by Algiers, though Colonel Chabou’s unexpected demise would undoubtedly have delayed the event. Four months after Chabou’s death, Jean-Denis Grandjean, the Swiss ambassador in Algiers, reported to the Swiss government in Bern that talks about arms sales had taken place in the summer of 1971 in Washington between Algerian military envoys and American officials. Grandjean thought such a deal was unlikely to have been concluded, because Algiers would have been nervous that “the US might request in return access of the Sixth Fleet to Algerian ports for supplies, as the Soviets had done.93 The conclusion could be drawn that Washington’s intention was to grasp, cautiously but firmly, the opportunity of Algeria’s eagerness to find a variety partners to modernize its army. Washington may have calculated that cooperation in the relatively innocuous field of military medicine would be an opportunity to build bridges by way of an issue that might seem less sensitive to Algeria, with its commitment to the independence of its foreign policy. A visit to the United States by Algerian military medical personnel would not attract much attention in international circles, and any media leaks that might occur would not be embarrassing or damaging to Algiers. Eagleton argued that the tour would have the added benefit of exposing the Algerian military officers to the American way of life and to an economic and political model different from the Soviet one to which they had become accustomed. Colonel Chabou’s untimely death would have certainly been an untimely setback for those plans. Meanwhile, the Soviets were playing for a bigger prize. Soviet pressure on Algeria to grant Moscow privileged and permanent access to the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir was continuing unabated. Washington, however, was not overly anxious about this, in contrast to the level of concern it had shown the previous year,

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since the intelligence the US had gathered all tended to confirm that Boumediene was now firmly resisting Moscow’s requests, as he apparently had during President Kosygin’s visit to Algeria in October 1971. As recently as 19 April 1971, there had been a scare, when the normally reliable US weekly magazine Aviation Week and Space Technology had claimed that Moscow was deploying MIG-23 and SU-7 aircrafts at Algerian bases, as well as basing submarines at Mers-el-Kebir under a recently concluded clandestine AlgerianSoviet military pact. The article concluded that the move was part of a Soviet “giant stride in establishing military control over North Africa as preparation for [exerting] political control over oil sources in Europe.” Aviation Week’s article set off alarm bells in defense departments in European capitals as well as at US embassies in North Africa, and also aroused the fears of the CIA, the Pentagon and the American delegation to NATO.94 Nevertheless, lacking independently gathered intelligence on the matter, Eagleton decided to rely on the comments of the Italian military attache´, whom he described as “usually well-informed.” The Italian attache´ questioned the professional qualifications of the Aviation Week article’s author and cast doubt on the veracity of his report. Eagleton then reported to Washington to this effect. In addition, the authoritative Algerian newspaper El Moudjahid vociferously denounced the article, describing it as no more than a further exercise in desperate media spin on the part of the French in the aftermath of the petroleum nationalization. El Moudjahid concluded that it was the same interest that customarily accused Algeria of “looking after the American interests” were now spreading the story of alleged “Soviet military penetration” in Algerian bases. The editorial asserted that this was a complete “myth” fabricated by those who refused to accept the evident truth that Algeria was “not for sale” and that it sought protection neither from the US nor from the Soviet Union.95 There ensued a storm of reports from sources across Europe and North Africa about the alleged Soviet air and naval military deployment in Algeria. The US Embassy in Tunis cabled Washington to report that the acting Tunisian foreign minister Mr. Mhedhebi had expressed Tunisia’s satisfaction at the American and European economic role in Algeria, which would in his view help diversify the “alternatives” available to the Algerian government. The US diplomat

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reported that Mhedhebi had expressed his concern that in the aftermath of the oil confrontation Algeria could have been pushed further towards the Soviet Union, and that he was gratified to see American and West European approaches to Algeria.96 As events unrolled in the spring and summer of 1971, the impairment in Algerian-French relations certainly introduced a new source of concern into the overall dynamics of the Cold War. The absence of de Gaulle from the scene was also unhelpful. While Washington had hitherto been confident about Algeria’s ability to resist the blandishments of the Soviets, it was clear from the information that had been gathered that, while there were many reasons to reject the Aviation magazine’s claims, there was still no intelligence strong enough to be able to refute such allegations definitively. When another Soviet naval frigate (ID Number 476) called at the port of Annaba in mid-May, the director of the port explained to Edmund van Gilder, US Consul in Constantine, that this was a routine visit for the crew to take shore leave, while the ship took on water and food supplies, such as took place regularly “about every two months.”97 The US Consul in Oran had an especially important role to play in military intelligence gathering. In addition to Oran’s normal port facilities, the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, the Bousfer air base, evacuated by the French in December 1970, and a military air training base staffed by Soviet instructors were all located within Oran’s departmental territory. A key issue was whether France would continue to offer technical assistance to Algeria at Mers-el-Kebir, or whether the role of the French technicians would be taken over by the Soviets. The number of Soviet personnel at the Mers-el-Kebir base was estimated at 40 by Captain de Couvette Dos, the French Military Liaison Officer in Oran. It can be concluded from his exchanges with Glenn Cella that, while France was being reluctant to continue to provided military cooperation in the aftermath of the oil nationalization, in an attempt to exert pressure on the Algerian government, Algeria was keen to distinguish the issue of French military aid from the oil conflict and had requested France to continue its technical assistance. A key issue was the modernization of the facilities at Mers-el-Kebir. France was also showing reluctance to do this, and also to continue to assist with the underground communications center at

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Mers-el-Kebir and its extensive underground fuel storage facilities and theoretically nuclear-proof bunker. Clearly, Mers-el-Kebir and its integrated facilities would represent a strategic advantage for the Soviets, should they gain permanent access to it. The Algerian leadership was eager to enlist the help of France to reactivate the deep communications center, whose antenna shaft, running 300 meters through solid rock to the surface facility above it, had been “sabotaged,” as de Couvette Dos confided to Cella, by French naval units as they evacuated the base. French technical assistance to help clear and reactivate the antenna shaft, as well as to repair the fuel storage facilities, was crucial to Algiers, and it was precisely for that reason that Paris was “dragging its feet,” as de Couvette Dos put it. It could be concluded that France’s behavior was a last ditch to force Boumediene to modify his stance in the current phase of the oil confrontation.98 By October 1971 the principal French oil companies subject to the Algerian nationalizations were in the last stage of reaching agreement on the terms of the compensation Boumediene had promised to provide, in accordance with international law, when he announced the nationalizations in February 1971. This was a more than welcome development that went some way towards resolving the prevailing tensions. While rumors continued to suggest there was Soviet pressure on Algeria to gain access to Mers-el-Kebir, with some reports going as far as to suggest that the Soviets had offered cash to Algeria in return for a deal, the French Consul General, Pierre-Etienne Gruffaz, told Robert Maxim, the US Consular Officer in Oran, that while “it is certain that there is constant Soviet pressure, it is nonetheless certain that the Algerians will continue to refuse.” Gruffaz went on to reassure Maxim by revealing that France still had some ten advisory military teams in Algeria and that, owing to the presence of the DAF officers in high-ranking positions in the Algerian military, the French influence would be the dominant one, given the “psychological and linguistic ties” France enjoyed with the DAF men.99 The strategic military importance of the Mers-el-Kebir base also became a focus of increased interest within in the Mediterranean subsystem of the global Cold War. The setback which the Soviet Union sustained following the expulsion of its experts from Egypt added a sense of urgency to Moscow’s quest for replacement bases in the Western Mediterranean. Moscow, therefore, made repeated requests

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for permanent access to the naval base for Soviet ships in return for a major package of economic incentives. Boumediene declined the offer, since its acceptance would compromise Algeria’s non-alignment. Moreover, it would undermine Boumediene’s independent Mediterranean policy, which he had endeavored to consolidate, in consultation with the states of Western Europe, as part of Algeria’s development strategy. It was no doubt this that led Boumediene to diversify Algeria’s options by welcoming the Italian initiatives and even offers of assistance from the United States. This was a necessary element of Algeria’s strategy to check the Russians, and was seen by Boumediene as serving Algeria’s goal of diversification in the military sector.

Conclusion The Algerian-French petroleum conflict which started in late 1970 and culminated in the historic nationalization of French energy assets in the Algerian Sahara on 24 February 1971 has hitherto been largely regarded as a bilateral confrontation between a former colonial power and a state newly independent from it, with no bearing on external actors. In Algeria, the nationalization of the French oil companies is seen as a historic moment so crucial in the country’s history that it is regarded as Algeria’s real Independence Day. In France, the prevalent belief is that Boumediene would not have dared to nationalize its assets had it not been for secret encouragement and tacit backing from the US. Some French politicians point to the phenomenal expansion of US private sector investment and trade in Algeria that took place during the few months that followed the final capitulation of the French companies to Algeria’s compensation terms. Careful examination and study of the archival material, however, reveals a different picture. In Paris, Georges Pompidou came to power as president with a determination to rectify what he regarded as a Gaullist policy towards Algeria that on occasion sacrificed France’s own interests at a time of acute economic hardship and social unrest in France. In Algiers, Boumediene had launched his ambitious Four-Year Plan for massive and rapid industrialization which would be dependent on the additional revenues to be earned from the revision of the 1965 Petroleum Accord with France. In 1971, Nixon and Kissinger looked on from Washington as negotiations between France and Algeria

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stalled and Boumediene declared the nationalization of a 51 per cent stake of all French oil and gas assets. As the confrontation between Paris and Algiers raged on, taking the form of economic, political, diplomatic and media propaganda retaliatory measures, Washington’s role would prove crucial but not decisive. Nixon was concerned with the consolidation of France as a key ally within NATO and was willing to meet Pompidou’s request for a show of support in the form of denying Algeria EXIM Bank loans to finance the El Paso gas project. Kissinger, together with key figures in the State Department, however, was more attentive to Algeria’s economic potential and long-term regional role. Hence, Kissinger and his allies were reluctant to offer Paris unconditional support and lobbied to maintain a neutral position which had the surface appearance of support for Paris while keeping Algeria’s interests in mind. This apparently neutral position misled the French government and the French oil companies into believing Washington was on their side, and led them to escalate their punitive measures against Algeria. Consequently, Boumediene was left with no other option but to radicalise Algeria’s position and to adopt, on 12 April 1971, nationalization terms tougher than the ones he had initially offered in February. While Washington still maintained its neutral position, the Quai d’Orsay instructed the French companies involved to open their own independent talks with the Algerian government. It was at this point that the US administration took the decision to respond to the request for support that had been made by Pompidou when the crisis had begun, almost two months earlier. In July, as soon as the French company CFP announced that it had reached an agreement with the Algerian government, the White House authorized the opening of the FPC hearings on the EL Paso contract, with the State Department’s and the CIA’s endorsements already granted. Meanwhile, scores of American businessmen were already flocking to Algeria to explore and sign lucrative contracts in various energy related projects. Kissinger encouraged this trend to the point that he advised Nixon to authorize a major US defense systems company to bid for a radar system contract in Algeria. This was unprecedented in the history of US-Algerian relations since the days of President Kennedy. The nationalization episode prompted the Algerian leadership to pursue more aggressively the diversification of Algeria’s economy.

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Subsequently, Algeria began to explore more energetically opportunities in the American market and markets in Western Europe other than that of France. However, it was still in the Socialist bloc that opportunities were most readily available. Once Algiers had emerged victorious from its bitter standoff with Paris, several Socialist bloc countries offered Algeria very generous loans, the services of technicians, and the signature of contracts in the fields of mining and construction. The Sino-Soviet Split had until then compelled Boumediene to tread a difficult path between Peking and Moscow, in order not to offend either party, but in the period 1971 – 2 Algiers played a key role in securing China’s re-entry to the UN at the same time as Moscow suffered significant setbacks in the Middle East, especially following Sadat’s expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt in April 1972. This coincided with a period when both Peking and Moscow were reviewing their Africa strategies in favor of stronger cooperation and engagement. Thus, Algeria benefited from this combination of factors in its efforts to achieve its diversification goals and to remedy the negative effects of the petroleum conflict with France. Boumediene was wary of communist meddling in the internal affairs of Algeria through the activities of the clandestine Algerian communist parties, especially within the university campuses. He took steps, therefore, to ensure that the activities of the embassies of the socialist bloc embassies were restricted to the cultural plane and never became political. As US-Algerian economic exchanges flourished, Washington was reassured that the US private sector would achieve by economic means the long-term strategic goal of counterbalancing Soviet influence in Algeria, although they never doubted Algeria’s commitment to an independent and nationalist foreign policy. The same logic governed Washington’s policy toward Algeria’s military cooperation with the states of Western Europe, where Kissinger believed that the training programs offered by France and Italy would restrain Soviet penetration of the Algerian armed forces and would consequently make their own contributions to Boumediene’s diversification policy.

CHAPTER 3 THE CHALLENGE OF THIRD WORLDISM, 1973 – 4

Encouraged by the success of the nationalization of Algeria’s petroleum resources in 1971, and with his domestic popularity boosted by the program of land re-distribution he had implemented in 1972, Boumediene also cast his eyes towards the international stage. Here, his ambition was to fulfil his aspirations towards the leadership of the Third World. The oil nationalization and the agrarian reform were both to have domestic, regional and international consequences, all of which contributed to Algeria’s re-emergence in 1973–4 as a de facto Third World spokesman. The state’s control of Algeria’s own petroleum resources enabled him to begin to put into practice the socialist revolution promised since the country’s declaration of independence in 1962. Meanwhile, for the rural population who had suffered much in the liberation struggle, and for whom the main theme of popular mobilization had been the restoration of the land confiscated by the colonists, the agrarian reform began to give a concrete significance to the abstract idea of independence. The redistribution of land was immensely popular and was an incontrovertible demonstration of the FLN’s revolutionary credentials, with the result that even the underground opposition communist party, PAGS, sensed the ground had been cut from under its feet and began to consider a merger with the ruling party. In the regional context, the Algerian government’s achievements, including the evident success of the Four-Year Plan (1970–3), impressed the population of neighboring Morocco, leading them to take a more critical view of their own government’s

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achievements while also arousing discontent within Morocco’s military establishment. The frustration felt by the Moroccan military at what they felt was the inadequacy of King Hassan II, and their desire for immediate change, was translated into the two failed coups in the summers of 1971 and 1972. Domestic and regional developments facilitated Boumediene’s bid to present himself on the international scene as a true revolutionary leader who had dared to implement radical socialist reforms and had put them into practice with impressive speed. When other OPEC countries such as Libya and Iraq nationalized their own oil assets, they were clearly emulating Algeria’s example. In 1972, Algiers was the destination for visits by the full roster of world revolutionary leaders, including Cuba’s Fidel Castro, Salvador Allende from Chile and Yugoslavia’s Marshal Tito, which enhanced the credentials of Boumediene himself as a revolutionary cynosure. During his visit to Algiers in May 1972, Castro averred that Algeria was “the pillar of revolution in the Arab World.”1 By 1973, having shown the way forward by the example of Algeria’s development policies, the Algerian leadership believed it had earned the right to be the Third World’s spokesman in its dealings with the developed North. Algeria’s ambition was to be regarded as the voice of the Third World in the dialogue between the developed North and the developing South, and the consequences this had for US Algerian relations in the period 1973–4, raise questions that demand further examination.

Algiers: a Mecca for Revolutionaries Algeria’s aspiration to be a Third World leader and spokesman had in fact begun to take shape as soon as it achieved independence from France. When Boumediene took over power from Ahmed Ben Bella in 1965, he focused at first almost entirely on the domestic front, despite the noisy rhetoric in Algiers of opposition to imperialism, neocolonialism and racism which he inherited from his predecessor. However, there was one area where Algiers maintained its activist role, namely Algeria’s support for liberation movements in Africa. It was in Africa that Algeria’s revolutionary credentials were constructed, not only on the basis of the prestige of its own liberation struggle but also through the expression in practical terms of its continuing and unconditional support. The founding texts of the Algerian state, dating

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from before the country’s independence, had committed Algeria to the recovery of full control over its own natural resources, and in the same way, Algeria was committed from its origins to assist fellow Africans in their liberation struggles as a matter of moral duty. Algeria pledged its solidarity with the emergent states of Africa in their combat against all forms of racism and colonialism and, in the 1970s, this pledge of solidarity with Africa was still embodied in the guiding principles of Algeria’s international relations.2 Some observers, for example the Russian expert on African affairs Vladimir Shubin, maintain that Algeria was less active in its support for liberation movements under Boumediene between 1965 and 1978 than it had been under Ben Bella, whose rule had lasted from 1962 to 1965.3 It is true that Boumediene’s Algeria was more muted in its vocal solidarity with Africa than the country had been in the Ben Bella period, yet its material assistance was in reality probably more effective after 1965. In other words, as the Algerian expert on Algeria’s African policy Slimane Chick has expressed it, under Boumediene there was a change of style rather than of substance in terms of the strength of Algeria’s commitment to Africa and the amount of the material aid provided.4 Certainly, one of the high points of Algeria’s policy of solidarity with Africa as it found expression in practice was the proactive role played by Algiers as a mediator in the decolonization talks relating to a number of the former African colonies of Portugal that took place at the Algerian embassy in London in 1974.5 For example, it was indubitably true that Algeria’s Third World leadership role was further consolidated at these talks when the Algerian leadership, on 26 August 1974, announced the successful conclusion of the negotiations that had been taking place between Portugal and Guinea-Bissau’s PAIGC. In this case, Algeria’s assistance had assisted another African country to break free from the shackles of its colonial power. When the Sao Tome and Principe’s “Movimento de Libertac
a˜o de Sa˜o Tome´ e Prı´ncipe” (MLSTP) engaged in similar talks in Algiers in December, the Algerian Foreign Ministry trumpeted its achievement, looking ahead to 1975 to predict what it called “the acceleration of decolonization” in the Portuguese colonies in 1975.6 Within the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Algeria had played an active role since the organization’s creation in 1963, soon after Algeria’s own independence, at a founding conference where Ben Bella had made a rousing speech. It was especially active in the OAU’s

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Liberation Committee, where Algeria’s representatives took a militant stance. In October 1965, Boumediene supported the abortive plan by Kwame Nkrumah, the President of Ghana, Chair of the OAU from 1965 to 1966, to endow the OAU with executive powers and the ability to form common policy as a step towards the creation of Nkrumah’s dream of a pan-African Union government. In November 1965, Algeria severed its diplomatic relations with the UK in the wake of the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia declared by Ian Smith, the prime minister of the former British colony. Algeria also opposed the secession of Biafra from Nigeria and played an active role in condemning it at the OAU summit of 1968. The 13th session of the Liberation Committee of the OAU also endorsed Algeria’s initiative to increase the special fund of the organization by 10 per cent. In July– August 1969, Algeria hosted the first Pan-African Cultural Festival, a spectacular event in which all the principal African liberation movements participated. These movements all maintained representative offices in Algiers, with Algerian government encouragement. Meeting from 21–3 June in 1971, the ninth OAU summit gave the Algerian government its support at the moment when Algeria was in the thick of its trial of strength with France over the ownership of the oil resources within its territory. The OAU passed a resolution affirming the right of African states, “to exert their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, in the interest of their national development and in conformity with the spirit and the principles of the UN Charter and the Charter of the OAU.”7 The dynamic role played by Algeria in international organizations was a legacy of its leadership’s struggle for the internationalization of the cause of Algerian liberation at the United Nations and in the main capitals of the world during the period from 1954 to 1962.8 Much of Algeria’s active support for Third World liberation movements, however, was conducted in a more or less clandestine manner, with the consequence that it is difficult to trace in any detail the material support given by Algeria to the African liberation movements, as is also the case with its support for the PLO. During most of the 1960s and a good part of the 1970s, various departments within the Algerian state played differing roles in this process, with no coordination by any central body. Thus, until 1968, the responsible agency was the “Direction des Etudes Internationales” (DEI), officially an organ of the FLN but in practice under the

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oversight of the Presidency, which coordinated and channeled aid to African decolonization movements. The DEI operated under the direct control of Slimane Hoffman and Abdelmadjid Keddadra. At that time, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, who was later to serve from 2005 to 2013 as secretary-general of the FLN, held the post of deputy director of international relations at the presidency, with responsibility for liaison with liberation movements.9 In 1969, a new body was created within the FLN, entitled “De´partement des mouvements de libe´ration” and headed by Jelloul Malaika, in order to improve the coordination of Algeria’s assistance to the liberation movements that it was supporting. On the ground, responsibility was taken by such figures as Noureddine Djoudi, whose nomination as Algeria’s ambassador to Nigeria in October 1970 first prompted Washington’s interest in Boumediene’s African policy offensive. Djoudi studied at the University of Montpellier, and then, in 1959, received a PhD in political science from Bowdoin College in Maine. Washington’s confidential note to its embassy in Lagos warned that Djoudi was the “de facto military advisor to the [OAU]’s African Liberation Committee.”10 The US Interests Section in Algiers added that, until his Nigeria posting, Djoudi was the director of the Socialist Countries Division within Algeria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and that he had accumulated, “solid experience in dealing with the Soviet Union and other communist countries.”11 In Bamako, the US ambassador learned that Algeria was making a “substantial cash contribution” to the Malian government, of which he sought further confirmation from the US Interests Section in Algiers.12 In July 1971, when Abderrahmane Nekli was appointed as Algeria’s ambassador to Niger, the US State Department cabled its ambassador in Niamey to underline the significance of the nomination. It took note of Nekli’s role within the OAU Liberation Committee, and remarked that he was one of Algeria’s, “most senior and experienced officials in African affairs . . . who was [until his Niamey posting] chief of African affairs in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.” During Nekli’s tour in Niger, the US State Department requested the US ambassador in Niamey to provide further details about him, and in particular about his role in the “Direction des Etudes Internationales” (DEI), the department of the Algerian Presidency with specific responsibility for the support of liberation movements.13

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The liberation movements represented in Algiers included the “Partido Africano da Independeˆncia da Guine´ e Cabo Verde” (PAIGC) of Guinea Bissau; the “Frente de Libertac
a˜o de Moc
ambique” (FRELIMO) of Mozambique; the Movimento Popular de Libertac
a˜o de Angola” (MPLA) of Angola; the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) of Namibia; the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa; the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) of Southern Rhodesia; the “Mouvement re´volutionnaire des hommes bleus” (MOREHOB) of Spanish Sahara (which preceded the creation of the Frente Popular de Liberacio´n de Saguı´a el Hamra y Rı´o de Oro” or POLISARIO Front); the movement for the independence of the Canary Islands; the anti-Franco-ist and anti-Salazarist resistance movements opposing the Spanish and Portuguese dictatorships; and finally the PLO.14 Leaders such as Nelson Mandela, Amilcar Cabral, Olivier Tambo, Agostinho Neto, Samora Machel, Samo Nujoma, Mario Soares, and Joshua Nkomo, to name only some of those involved, visited Algiers on a regular basis to hold press conferences or to attend to the affairs of their representative offices at the Villa Boumaraf.15 The Algerian government offered them the opportunity to meet with world leaders from the socialist bloc, who frequently passed through Algiers. In addition to the platforms given by the state newspaper El Moudjahid and the FLN’s weekly Revolution Africaine to the liberation movements represented in Algeria, “Radio Algerie Internationale” aired programs on a daily basis, in various languages, giving members of the liberation movements themselves the opportunity to broadcast. These included “The Voice of the Palestinian Revolution”, “The Voice of the Portuguese Resistance” and “The Voice of the Spanish Resistance”. Following the death of Salvador Allende, “The Voice of the Chilean Resistance” was also launched from Algiers. When the “Voice of Palestine” called for Americans to be killed, David Newsom, then the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, instructed William Eagleton, head of the US Interests Section in Algiers, to register a strong protest with the Algerian government. Eagleton, however, met with a firm response from Smail Hamdani, Deputy Director General at the Presidency, who had previously worked for the FLN radio station that had broadcast to Algeria from Morocco during the Algerian revolution across the MoroccanAlgerian border. When the Moroccan government had asked the FLN to moderate its tone, they had informed the Moroccans that

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either they were to be allowed to broadcast freely or they would go off the air. Morocco, therefore, had to live with the situation. Hamdani added that, “the same situation exists in Algeria with the Voice of Palestine.”16 All these radio stations, together with others that were launched from the mid-1970s onward, after the eruption of the Western Sahara conflict, and in the light of developments in other African countries, were coordinated by Bader Eddine Milli, who was Coordinator of Radio Broadcasts for the Movements of National Liberation at the Algerian Radio in the 1970s.17 During a press conference for foreign journalists convened by Jelloul Malaika, attended by some of the leaders of the African liberation movements, an American reporter asked Malaika about the nature of the arms Algeria was providing to the African groups. Before Malaika could answer, Amilcar Cabral replied thus to the reporter: “Christians make pilgrimage to the Vatican, Muslims to Mecca, and as for Algeria, it is the Mecca of the revolutionaries.”18 Algeria was sometimes faced with a choice as to which independence movements it would extend its support. In Guinea-Bissau, for example, it favored the PAIGC rather than the “Frente de Luta pela Independeˆncia Nacional da Guine´” (FLING), and in Mozambique it preferred FRELIMO to the “Comite Revolucionario de Mocambique” (COREMO). The reason for this was that the Algerian leadership questioned the radicalism of FLING and COREMO. However, the Angolan movements presented problems to the Algerian leadership. In the 1960s, on the advice of Frantz Fanon, Algeria had initially given its support to the “Union of Peoples of Angola” (UPA) Fanon was at that time stationed in Accra as the pre-independence representative of the Algerian Provisional Government (GPRA) in West Africa. Algeria then switched its support for some time to both the “Frente Nacional de Libertac
a˜o de Angola” (FNLA) and the MPLA. From March 1964, however, it began to shift its policy in favor of the MPLA, which became Algeria’s preferred Angolan liberation movement.19 In addition to Djelloul Malaika, another Algerian who worked with different liberation movements in Guinea Bissau, Mozambique and South Africa during the 1960s and 1970s was Boubakeur Adjali. Known to the Angolans as Kapic
a, his memoirs, Va dire a Neto, va leur dire, document the years he spent in the training camps with the MPLA and other guerrilla groups in the Zambian capital Lusaka, as well as the Angolan provinces of Moxico and Lunda, and then in

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Dar Es-Salam.20 A third name, relatively little known in this context, was that of Messaoud Zeghar, Boumediene’s aide and confidential negotiator in Washington, who also, of course, played a decisive role in intelligence gathering during the oil nationalizations episode, and was also involved with the movements through his arms trade dealings in Africa. In 2009, Malaika would be presented with the Medal of Grand Officer of the Order of Liberty by the Portuguese ambassador to Algeria.21 This was in recognition of his and Algeria’s role in supporting the anti-Salazarist opposition.22 As a result of these constant contacts, the Algerian leadership came to feel a moral duty of solidarity with Africa as a matter of emotion as well as of theory. It is often said that Boumediene’s frustration with Arab leaders over the Palestinian question served as the impetus that projected Algeria instead into African affairs. This cannot, however, be wholly true, since Algerian involvement in African affairs pre-dated the Arab-Israeli 1967 war or began in fact even before Algeria’s independence. Prior to 1962, Nelson Mandela and others had received training in the FLN camps on the Tunisian and Moroccan borders. Nevertheless, it is certainly true that the events of Black September in 1970 in Jordan (when thousands of Palestinians were massacred by King Hussein and the PLO was forced to relocate to Lebanon) prompted Boumediene to sever diplomatic relations with Jordan and to distance Algeria from Middle East affairs, which led to an enhancement of Algeria’s involvement in wider challenges relating to development and modernization in the Third World. In September 1971, it was in this context that Boumediene inaugurated the Trans-Saharan African Unity Road which was planned to stretch from Algeria to Niger and Mali, a distance of over 1,120 kilometers (km), at an initial cost of $90 million. The road was to be built by Algerian military engineers and military conscripts during their 24 months of military service.23 This ambitious civil works project, aimed at connecting Algeria with sub-Sahara Africa, did not go unnoticed in Washington.24 The maintenance of Boumediene’s policy of de´tente in the Maghreb was severely threatened by the two failed coups in Morocco against King Hassan II and the ensuing diplomatic crisis between Rabat and Tripoli, following the latter’s media campaign in favor of the Moroccan opposition. Initially, King Hassan believed Algiers was behind the first coup but it soon became clear that Algeria was

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not involved. Boumediene insisted “it was not in Algeria’s strategic interest” to meddle in the affairs of its neighbors, especially Morocco.25 After speaking personally to King Hassan on the phone, Boumediene dismissed Qaddafi’s request that he should back the coup. Boumediene, irritated, responded to Qaddafi by saying, “there are no free officers; this is a palace coup, not a people’s revolution.” He then turned to his media adviser Mohieddine Amimour to say, “he wants to send aircrafts through Algerian airspace to bomb the Skhirat Palace. He probably doesn’t even have a map showing where it is.”26 After this, as the Moroccan consul in Oran, Ahmed Al Kadiri, confided to the US Consul, Boumediene mediated between King Hassan and Qaddafi throughout 1972, at Rabat’s request, in the hope of moderating the “young and impulsive” Libyan leader.27 The radical opposition in Morocco was disappointed by Boumediene’s position. The Algerian leadership, for its part, believed that any support to the Moroccan opposition would be a recipe for a return to the pre-1969 climate of mistrust between Algeria and Morocco that had followed the 1963 border conflict. Algeria feared this could lead to regional instability, especially with the change in leadership in Libya.28 As Boumediene saw it, events in Morocco risked wholly undermining the endeavor to achieve de´tente in the Maghreb to which he had devoted the years 1969 to 1970, which had transformed the image of Algeria in Washington and facilitated the launch of the Four-Year Plan. This would be a huge price, which Boumediene was not prepared to pay. In addition, it would inevitably tarnish and discredit Algeria’s ambition for Third World leadership. Instead, therefore, Boumediene sought to consolidate de´tente in the Maghreb and Maghreb unity, especially after the delicate moment that ensued from the death of Egypt’s President Nasser in September 1970. On 10 June 1971, during an eight-day visit to Mauritania, an Algerian military delegation led by Major Abdelqadir Abdallahi offered Nouakchott military equipment worth $1.1 million, a development the US embassy reported to the State Department.29 In January 1972, in a further development, the French Consul General in Oran, Pierre-Etienne Gruffaz, confirmed to the US Consul Robert Maxim that, “Libyan pilots and ground crews were slated to begin training within the next three months by French instructors at the nearby Bousfer airbase.”30 From 28 May to 5 June 1972, within this framework of African solidarity, Boumediene undertook a program of official and unofficial

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visits to Niger, Liberia, Guinea, Mauritania and Morocco. According to a report by the African Division of the Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Boumediene’s efforts in Niger, Mauritania and Morocco were devoted to the promotion of a policy of good neighborliness. During his visit to Guinea, meanwhile, he attempted to persuade the leadership of that country to set aside its border conflict with Senegal, in accordance with the principles of the OAU. When Boumediene heard that Guinea was unwilling to attend the planned meeting of the OAU arbitration commission that had been convened in the Liberian capital Monrovia he threatened to cancel his official visit to Guinea unless President Se´kou Toure´ changed his mind. Boumediene’s threat was heeded and the OAU commission’s meeting eventually took place on 29 –30 May 1972.31 Boumediene’s African tour was part of Algeria’s campaign to promote solidarity in Africa, in which Algeria hoped a pivotal role would be played by Mauritania, given its mixed Arab and African ethnic composition and identity. Boumediene’s scheme was that Nouakchott could become a bridge between Algeria and subSahara Africa, and to this end Boumediene worked to consolidate a personal relationship between himself and the Mauritanian leader Moukhtar Ould Daddah.32 By the early 1970s, Algeria’s African policy was probably the most consistent aspect of its foreign policy. Boumediene had departed from Ben Bella’s populist and media focused style of publicizing Algeria’s support for the African liberation struggle but remained faithful to the substance and the spirit of the pledges laid down in the founding texts of the Algerian state. Algeria was motivated by the authentic moral duty Algeria’s leaders believed they had to assist in the liberation of countries still under colonial rule and to aid newly independent countries to gain their freedom from the neo-colonial shackles of economic exploitation, dependency and racism. In the course of the leadership’s efforts, Algiers became a focus for Third World liberation and opposition movements. At any given moment, the list of such leaders visiting Algiers constituted a virtual Who’s Who of the leaders of the world’s liberation struggles. In addition to Algeria’s by now traditional activism within the OAU and the UN over African issues it gave material assistance to various liberation movements in such countries as Angola, Mozambique and South Africa. The prestige enjoyed by Algiers thanks to its own revolutionary achievements, together with the victory Algeria had won in the struggle over oil with

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France, its own former colonial oppressor, strengthened its leadership credentials. It now aspired to become the Third World’s interlocutor of choice with the developed North. In September 1973, the fourth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was due to be held in Algiers and by early 1973 Algeria was already deeply immersed in the process of preparing for it. Boumediene felt his turn had come to speak on behalf of the Third World.

Algiers at the Heart of the Third World Challenge During 1973, the preparations being made in Algiers to host the fourth Non-Aligned Movement conference, due to be held in September, consumed the majority of the Algerian government’s attention and effort. By early spring, most of Algeria’s key ambassadors had been recalled to Algiers to help organize the conference.33 Meanwhile, preparatory sessions were being held. For instance joint AlgerianYugoslav working parties drafted and revised the economic cooperation proposals that would be discussed and adopted at the NAM gathering. By mid-May, a 16-page joint proposal had been drafted to address the issue of cooperation among the NAM group in the field of technology.34 This document largely reflected the recommendations drafted during the OAU Ministerial Conference on Trade and Development, over which Abdelaziz Bouteflika had presided in Abidjan in mid-May 1973. On 25 May 1973, its recommendations were later adopted on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the OAU in Addis Ababa.35 In addition, delegations were sent to key Third World leaders to extend official invitations and to ensure the maximum level of participation in the conference. Boumediene was especially anxious to secure the presence of Fidel Castro, who had visited Algeria the year before. The Algerian delegation to Havana was led by Rabah Bitat, a member of the Council of Revolution and one of the “Nine Historic Leaders”, the group who had initiated the Algerian liberation struggle. Rabah Bitat conveyed a formal invitation to Castro and told the Cubans that Boumediene wanted to make his first visit to Cuba at the end of the year. Bitat reported that in the course of a rally at which Castro had spoken, the Cuban leader had said, “if you [the Algerians] do not want the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean, then send it to me in the Caribbean sea.” He concluded that Castro’s remarks were

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actually meant for the ears of Juan Pero´n of Argentina, who “championed the Third Position, distinct from both imperialisms.”36 Boumediene missed no opportunity to denounce Israel but also condemned colonial powers in Africa, such as Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia. He pointed out to the failure of the OAU to condemn unanimously all imperialist and racist states, with the one exception of Israel, which he described as “the ally of racist regimes”. He thus drew attention to an issue that lay behind disagreements that rankled within the OAU.37 Boumediene also strove to keep in focus issues related to the Third World’s economic dependence. The goal of his policy team was to assist the developing countries to break the cycle of dependence and regain control of their natural resources, as Algeria had done. In due course, his speech at the NAM conference would say that what he called nominal political independence should be followed by economic independence. This had been exemplified by Algeria’s experience through the successful process of nationalization, first of its mineral wealth and then of its petroleum resources. Algeria’s diplomatic activity in the run up to the NAM conference reflected the Algerian leadership’s philosophy at this period. Algiers was determined to convince the Third World as a whole that Algeria’s recent experience of development was universally applicable and should be a model for other countries. The Algerian belief was that the necessary conditions were Third World solidarity, the reform of the mechanisms of international trade, a modification of monetary systems and an emphasis on the transfer of technology. For the achievement of such sweeping goals, it would be necessary at the NAM conference to gain the support of Cuba and rest of Latin America, the membership of the OAU, and a wide swathe of Asia. The NAM conference, in addition to its other objectives, was intended to celebrate Algeria’s revolutionary accomplishments. Boumediene wanted to display to his guests from around the Third World Algeria’s practical experience of struggle with the imperialist powers and its success in achieving the level of economic independence that was prerequisite to a meaningful development strategy. In the run-up to the conference, Algeria had worked in close collaboration with Yugoslavia to draft a framework document for North-South cooperation in the fields of technology and trade. Algeria believed the time was right for the restructuring of the international economic order, after the self-confidence of the West

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had been dealt a blow by the signature of the January 1973 ceasefire with Vietnam’s National Liberation Front. As Algiers was focusing on the NAM, Washington was lobbying for what it hoped would be the imminent resumption of diplomatic relations between Algeria and the US. In January 1973 there had been a ceasefire with the Vietnamese NFL, ending the violence in a conflict that Boumediene had long condemned as a fatal obstacle to the resumption of relations with the US. Washington hoped this would remove a significant obstacle on the road back to normalization, while at the same time the US administration believed the boom in economic and commercial relations between the two countries provided a strong incentive to go ahead. The Algerian leadership was aware of Washington’s impatience and while not agreeing at once to normalization continued to offer what the US saw as encouraging proposals. In fact, as Boumediene saw it, the present situation was already optimal for Algeria. Economic relations with the US were at unprecedented levels, thus enabling Algeria to gain access to American technology and funding for its development projects. At the same time, however, Algeria continued to decouple its economic ties with the US from the political issues, with the result that Algiers continued to gain Third World credibility with its denunciations of the Nixon administration on its policies in Vietnam and the Middle East. As long as American private sector investment continued to pour into Algeria, as it had for the last couple of years, Boumediene did not feel the need to take the further step of restoring diplomatic relations with the US, a move which would have many disadvantages. At that time, relations with the US would be widely condemned inside Algeria, while other Arab countries such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq would have regarded it as treason against the Arab cause. Finally, there was also an immediate reason for Boumediene’s footdragging. He wanted to use the US desire for full relations to pressure the US administration into using its influence to obtain final approval from the FPC for the El Paso gas deal. Preliminary approval had been given in 1971, but negotiations between El Paso, Sonatrach and the EXIM bank to secure funding for the project had run up against major difficulties, especially on the issue of loan guarantees. After a breakdown of talks in late December 1972, they were scheduled to resume in March 1973. Boumediene was willing to use the State Department’s

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impatience over the restoration of relations to his advantage as a bargaining chip. Boumediene’s confidant Messaoud Zeghar played a key role in what followed. Smail Hamdani, Deputy Director General at the Presidency, was instructed to convey via the head of the US Interests Section William Eagleton that Algeria would like to invite David Newsom, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to come to Algeria for talks with Boumediene. The purpose would be, as it was deliberately couched in very general terms, to conduct a review of US-Algerian relations. This would take place just three days before the Sonatrach delegation was due to fly to Washington for the next round of talks on the El Paso project. At the same time, Zeghar also contacted Eagleton. letting it be known in confidence that a positive outcome on the El Paso-EXIM bank negotiations would pave the way for the resumption of relations. Eagleton, as the Algerians intended, briefed Newsom about this development who in turn shared it with William Rogers, the Secretary of State, to whom he commented, “we should know more precisely what the Algerians might have in mind in being receptive to a visit by me.”38 Newsom appeared thrilled by the prospect that relations could be resumed during his proposed visit to Algiers, but was also sufficiently cautious to suggest he should meet Zeghar in London first.39 On 12 March 1973, the day the renewed El Paso negotiations were due to open in Washington, Zeghar and Hamdani each separately delivered a verbal message to William Eagleton from Boumediene, to be passed on to David Newsom. Zeghar advised Newsom to time his trip to Algiers so that it would immediately follow the successful conclusion of the El Paso loan, in order to, “see Boumediene at [an] optimum moment,”40 Hamdani, meanwhile, raised Newsom’s expectations with a somewhat explicit message from Boumediene. The gist of what Hamdani had to say was that, bearing in mind that much time had been lost since the El Paso deal was first agreed in late 1969, Boumediene wished to convey an undertaking that a positive outcome of the current round of talks in Washington would mean that the two countries could, “move quickly to other matters of mutual interest.”41 It was hard not to see this as a veiled promise that the renewal of diplomatic relations would soon be on the table. As the El Paso negotiations continued, Zeghar offered further inducements to Washington, telling Eagleton that Boumediene was willing to give

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a “verbal commitment” and commit himself to a “time frame” for the resumption of relations with the US during Newsom’s visit to Algiers, but adding, as before, that this would be “after the conclusion of [the] El Paso-Sonatrach financial accord.”42 On 31 March 1973, the news emerged that an agreement had been reached and that the El Paso deal had finally been approved by the Federal Power Commission. Zeghar then told Eagleton that Boumediene would personally convey to Newsom his commitment on the resumption of relations during the Assistant Secretary of State’s visit to Algeria, now set for April. He explained that Boumediene wished to avoid the kind of media leaks that had preceded Sudan’s resumption of diplomatic ties with the United States in 1972. Eagleton gave his assurance to Zeghar that dealings between the US and Algeria would proceed in accordance with Boumediene’s wishes.43 On 12 April, Assistant Secretary of State Newsom finally arrived in Algiers to begin a visit that was set to continue until 16 April, when he met Boumediene. After two hours of talks with the Algerian leader, Newsom, however, was disappointed at the tone of Boumediene’s remarks. The Algerian leader, despite what appeared to have been a promise to resume relations, was now back-pedaling. Boumediene said he believed “our relations were progressing well,” and asked Newsom “whether diplomatic relations [were] really necessary.”44 Boumediene explained that since diplomatic relations had been simultaneously severed in the wake of the June 1967 conflict by a number of Arab countries including Algeria, he was therefore unable to break the line. He remarked that the assassination of two American diplomats in Khartoum on 2 March 1973, together with Guy Eid, the unfortunate Belgian charge´ d’affaires, who just happened to be present, had occurred as a reaction to Sudan’s resumption of relations with the US. As an alternative, Boumediene suggested an expansion of each country’s Interests Section in the other’s capital. Boumediene then offered a broader justification of his reluctance to resume relations by elevating the discussion from immediate political technicalities to the wider strategic outlook of the Third World and the philosophy of non-alignment. He pointed out that the emergence of the new divide between the rich nations and the poor countries of the world had become the new line of demarcation in international affairs instead of the traditional paradigm of Eastern and Western blocs.45

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Boumediene’s lieutenants were left to follow up this upset for the Americans and to mend fences in the wake of the disappointment suffered by David Newsom. Smail Hamdani explained to William Eagleton four days later that the Israeli attack on PLO targets in Beirut on 9 and 10 April, which had immediately preceded Newsom’s visit to Algiers, had made the timing inappropriate for the announcement of a resumption of US-Algerian relations.46 Meanwhile, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was in Baghdad, persuaded the Head of the US Interests Section in Iraq to accept that Boumediene’s decision not to resume diplomatic relations with the US was actually in the latter’s interest. Bouteflika argued that it would preserve Algeria from isolation in the Arab world, enabling Washington to maintain a channel through Algeria to Baghdad, given the respect with which Algeria was regarded in the Middle East.47 It was clear that Boumediene had succeeded in obtaining what he wanted, namely the El Paso deal and continuing economic relations, without the burden of diplomatic relations with the US to bedevil his standing in the Middle East and the Third World. For this, he had to thank the skillful deployment of official diplomacy, conducted by Hamdani and Bouteflika, together with the back channel messages conveyed by Messaoud Zeghar, which had implied much with no resulting obligations to fulfil. Assistant Secretary of State Newsom had once more failed in his attempt to bring about a resumption of relations, and even a last minute suggestion he made that a high ranking Algerian representative without diplomatic status could be sent to Washington was dismissed by Boumediene. With the funding for the El Paso deal approved, there was now in fact little incentive for Algeria to move to full diplomatic relations with the US, especially while it needed to preserve its Third World credentials intact as it prepared to host the Non-Aligned meeting. Resumption of relations with the US would have reflected badly on Algeria’s image and its standing as a Third World leader. With hindsight, it may be that policymakers in Washington were deluded if it was thought that Boumediene might be tempted to resume relations, just a month ahead of the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the OAU and four months before the Non-Aligned Movement meeting, which may have been an exercise in wishful thinking on the part of the Assistant Secretary of State, David Newsom, and of the US administration in general. Boumediene, meanwhile, was riding high. In June 1973, he

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laid the foundation stone for the first of the four gas liquefaction plants to be constructed as part of the El Paso project, to be funded by the Exim Bank. In addition, contracts for other parts of the infrastructure necessary for LNG exports, to be funded by a consortium of ten international banks, were signed with American and British companies.48 Thus, a major milestone in Algeria’s first Four-Year Plan was at last achieved, albeit with some delay. From 5 September to 9 September 1973, the fourth summit conference of the Non-Aligned Movement took place in Algiers. Attended by more than 70 states and 105 delegations, this was a high point for Algerian diplomacy. In his opening speech, Boumediene warned that Third World de´tente was promising to become a factor of which the privileged world would be obliged to take notice in its relations with the rest of humanity.49 The summit adopted the now customary resolutions condemning the continuation of Portuguese colonialism in Africa and the apartheid regime in South Africa, as well as expressing support for struggles for national liberation. It also passed a resolution on the Middle East conflict that was passed on to the Secretary-General of the United Nations which called for the implementation of the relevant United Nations resolutions relating to the Middle East, as well as for various other measures. The resolution denounced the US for its support for Israel and condemned in no uncertain terms Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories.50 In addition, the Non-Aligned conference also adopted a FourteenPoint Action Program for Economic Cooperation, largely inspired by the 16-page Algerian-Yugoslav joint draft prepared in advance. The Action Program also reflected the input of Latin American countries and the detailed recommendations of development economists such as Rau´l Prebisch. These concerned commodity tariffs, trade between developing countries, technology transfer and more equitable access to credits from the international monetary institutions, as well as the importance of promoting import substitution through industrialization, and economic cooperation.51 The conviction that major advances had been made, together with the feeling of empowerment that came from such a demonstration of Third World solidarity, were such that Boumediene declared in his valedictory remarks at the end of the meeting that the conference had shown that, “decisions cannot be taken without the Third World.”52 The US

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mission at the United Nations in New York found itself endorsing Boumediene’s conclusion when it observed that its accuracy was demonstrated by the “growing cohesion of the non-aligned group in the UN.”53 However, just two days after the closure of the NonAligned Movement’s conference in Algiers, the overthrow and death of the Chilean leader Salvador Allende on 11 September demonstrated to Boumediene and Castro the fragility of regimes that ran Third World countries. Both had attempted to insist, as the Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi recalled, that Allende should come to Algiers, in the hope of saving his life at a time when his overthrow seemed imminent, though in the event Allende decided not to attend. Before the opening of the fourth NAM conference, Boumediene had spent the three months promulgating as widely as possible his views on the implications of what seemed to be a widening division between the rich, developed North and the poor, developing South. He also strove to bring the importance of economic cooperation for non-aligned and Third World countries to the attention of international media outlets. Those who covered the Algerian position on these issues included the Lebanese daily newspaper El-Nahar, the influential Yugoslav radio and TV journalist, Faek Dizdarevitch, and Le Monde’s analyst, Paul Balta.54 The success of the non-aligned summit in Algiers boosted the Algerian leadership’s standing in the Third World at a time when criticism of the purity of Algeria’s brand of socialism had begun to be expressed not only in the Arab East but also within the socialist bloc. Algerian socialism was being accused of being more an enterprise of state capitalism than a true socialist revolutionary project. Dismissing these charges in an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, Boumediene pointed to the range of Algeria’s socialist successes and to its policies of social justice. These included the implementation of the agrarian reform program of land re-distribution, the nationalization of the country’s mineral and petroleum resources, state control of the means of production, and Algeria’s free education system and health services. In addition, Boumediene insisted that Algeria’s aim to build a socialist country could not be implemented at the cost of forfeiting its Arabic-Islamic heritage. For this reason, he concluded, Algeria must reject scientific socialism.55 This was exactly the same position he had expressed to the Soviet leadership as long ago as

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December 1965, during his first visit to Moscow, just six months after the coup which brought him to power. In 1973, a further upheaval closer to home, however, transformed the background to US-Algerian relations and meant that in the short term the circumstances were once more inauspicious for a renewal of diplomatic links with the US. In October 1973 war broke out between Israel and its Arab neighbors, starting with an Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal. The war did not come as a total surprise to the Algerian leadership, since, on 7 February 1972, during a visit to Algiers, General Saad Shazli, the Chief of Staff of the Egyptian army had informed Boumediene of Egypt’s intention to launch an attack on Israel, which would call for the mobilization of Arab military resources for the war effort.56 Boumediene asked for specific dates and promised Algeria would support the Arab cause, “to the last man”. In order to help avoid a repetition of the mistakes of the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict, when Egypt’s aircraft were largely destroyed on the ground, it was agreed that Algerian aircraft should be put on standby. At Boumediene’s insistence, it was agreed that Egypt would give Boumediene an approximate date for the war when this was less than 90 days ahead. On 23 May 1973, Boumediene made a one day visit to Cairo where “a similarity of views on the Middle East” were expressed. On 16 September, as promised, General Shazli secretly visited Algiers under a false name to inform Boumediene that the outbreak of war would be within 90 days. War could therefore break out any time.57 General Shazli recalled in his memoirs that Boumediene expressed doubts about preparations on the Syrian front, to which Shazli replied that it was in a similar state of readiness to the Egyptian front. Boumediene remained unconvinced of Syria’s readiness, commenting that, “if the situation is as you say, can you explain how the Israeli forces shot down 12 Syrian aircraft in the air battle that took place four days ago?”58 Three weeks later, on 6 October, when the Egyptian attack across the Suez Canal was launched, Algerian MIG-21, MIG-17 and Sukhoi 7 squadrons, as well as an armored brigade, joined the battle in the first days of the war.59 On the day the war began, the Algerian Council of Revolution and the government announced Algeria’s intention, “to put all the country’s means at the service of the Arab front.”60 On 7 October, in his capacity as Chairman of the NAM conference, Boumediene sent

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messages to Moscow, Washington, London, and Paris drawing their attention to Israel’s disregard of UN resolutions. As the war intensified, the US initiative to resupply Israel by air got under way. Boumediene called on Washington to halt its aid to Israel, addressing letters to 17 West European leaders to call their attention to what he described as “the serious dimension which the conflict may assume on account of the political encouragement and various forms of aid given to Israel by certain countries.”61 Boumediene believed that in a situation as grave as this, if socialist solidarity had any meaning, now, if ever, was the time for the socialist bloc to demonstrate it. On 14 October, therefore, he flew to Moscow for a one day visit, to speak out on behalf of the Arab states, including Jordan, with which Algeria had now restored relations after breaking them off in July 1971 in the aftermath of Black September. It was on this occasion that the notorious exchange took place between Boumediene and Brezhnev. Boumediene probed Moscow’s willingness to guarantee military supplies to the Egyptian and Syrian armies. He told Brezhnev that he was drawing up plans for a prolonged conflict and wished to ascertain what the Soviet Union’s position would be. The Soviets, however, were reluctant to commit themselves, owing to their mistrust of Sadat, who had expelled 20,000 Soviet advisers the previous year. In his frustration, Boumediene placed a blank cheque on the table before him and made an angry comment: “I am not here to discuss such things, I came here to buy arms and equipment and I ask to be treated like a customer.” In this way, a deal was concluded whereby Algeria purchased $200 million worth of military supplies to be placed at the immediately disposal of the Arab combatants.62 Boumediene’s intention was to restore relative military parity with the Israeli army, in view of the vast scale of the assistance being provided to Israel by the US. The joint Egyptian-Syrian army command was not short of troops but lacked effective heavy combat equipment. The extent of Algeria’s own contribution had already been discussed during Boumediene’s visit to Cairo and General Shazli’s trip to Algiers, and Boumediene had already sent Algeria’s own aircraft and tanks to the front. During his trip to Moscow, he was attempting to remedy the remaining deficit. On 22 October Egypt accepted a ceasefire, much to Algeria’s disappointment. Nevertheless, even after the ceasefire had been agreed, Algeria maintained its diplomatic offensive, calling for an

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Arab Summit to be convened. Meanwhile, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia had proposed the imposition of an oil embargo in retaliation for the arms package agreed by the US Congress in support of Israel, worth two billion dollars, and Arab consensus on this plan began to gain momentum. Boumediene had already formulated some ideas in this direction a month before the Algiers conference, when he said, “the US judges and acts . . . on the basis that it has only one ally in our region, namely Israel. To them, the other countries are nothing but ad hoc and ephemeral friendships. It is therefore in our interest to destroy this American assumption.”63 On the specific use of the oil weapon in relation to the Middle East conflict, Boumediene’s view was that it was a weapon the Arab countries could and should use in the event of war against Israel.64 The Algerian Interests Section in Washington took note of a statement made, on 26 July, by the CEO of the Standard Oil Company to the effect that, “it is in the best interest of all [US citizens] to urge our government to work toward peace and stability. We must acknowledge the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the Middle East and help them to achieve security and a dependable economic future.” The Algerian diplomat who filed the report on this statement commented that the Standard Oil CEO’s words had, “provoked a strong reaction in pro-Zionist circles.”65 The oil weapon was soon brought into play. On 16 October 1973, OPEC, meeting in Kuwait, raised oil prices by 70 per cent. Then, on 17 October, after the non-Arab OPEC members withdrew from the meeting, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) adopted the oil embargo proposed earlier by Saudi Arabia. OAPEC consisted of the seven Arab members of OPEC plus the three non-OPEC members of OAPEC (Bahrain, Egypt and Syria). Its current president was Belaid Abdessalam. Their decision was to cut oil production and exports by five per cent each month until Israel withdrew from the occupied Arab territories. On 4 November, they set the cut in production at a maximum of 25 per cent. In addition, however, OAPEC embargoed all oil exports to the United States. Later this was extended to other countries which had supported Israeli policy, including the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia.66 By January 1974, the price of oil on international markets, thanks to the OAPEC embargo and OPEC’s price increases, was to rise from three dollars a barrel to almost twelve dollars.67 The effects of the embargo were significant,

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inasmuch as, in the words of Henry Kissinger, it exposed the “dangerous vulnerability” of the developed North as well as undermining the “economic well-being and security” of America’s allies.68 Washington immediately went on the offensive to attempt to secure an early end to the embargo, promising the Arab leaders that it would play a neutral role in the Middle East talks and would try to obtain military disengagement on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts. Subsequently, on 5 December, Kissinger, who had the previous month been promoted to be Nixon’s Secretary of State, held a meeting in Washington with the Algerian Energy Minister Belaid Abdessalam and his Saudi counterpart Zaki Yamani. Yamani and Abdessalam had been mandated by the Arab oil producers to tour the Western states to explain the reasoning behind the Arab oil embargo.69 Kissinger reached into ancient history and the esoteric recesses of international trade agreements when he told the two oil ministers that the embargo was a breach of the US-Saudi Arabia Provisional Agreement of 1933, and of Kuwait’s GATT obligations. It was also, he claimed, “a breach of the Declaration of the UN General Assembly.”70 On 11 December, after their encounter with Kissinger, the two Arab oil ministers were invited to a debate in Washington organized by the Council on Foreign Relations and attended by many senior figures. At this gathering, it was Belaid Abdessalam who put the Arab case, prompting a favorable comment from William Quandt, of the National Security Council, who remarked on what he called Belaid Abdessalam’s “intellectual depth”. Abdessalam explained to the meeting that the Arab countries were well aware that the embargo would be counter-productive in the long-term for their relations with the consuming countries. However, he argued, “the best guarantee against the Arabs using oil as a weapon will be the industrialization of their countries;” since as long as the Arab countries continued to be “largely peasant societies” the embargo would have only a “minimal effect” on their local economies and on most people’s standard of living. Abdessalam explained that this assessment would continue to be valid until the Arab economies were “industrially developed.” Only then, the Algerian minister concluded, would they experience the same strains that were felt by the developed countries, and hence would cease to use oil to achieve their political objectives.71

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Testing Boumediene’s Resolve After the October War, Kissinger had immediately embarked on his gruelling session of intensive shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East, by which he hoped to secure military disengagement between the parties, and then their agreement to a Geneva Conference, which would bring together all parties under the auspices of the United Nations. At the same time, he also attempted to persuade the leaders of the oil-producing Arab states to suspend the oil embargo, and was attempting simultaneously to rally support in Western Europe and elsewhere for a further project. Kissinger hoped to be able to establish an organization representing oil-consuming countries that would be sufficiently strong and united to confront the Arab oil producers and OPEC over the issue of oil prices. As to Boumediene, he seemed to have developed misgivings about the indiscriminate use of oil as a threat. On 8 November 1973, he remarked in an interview he gave to Paul Balta that, “as to oil, it is a useful weapon if you know how to use it effectively and very selectively, because if you don’t it risks missing its target.”72 However, Kissinger was also aware there was unfinished business he had to complete in Algiers, where an uphill task awaited him in the aftermath of the Algiers Arab Summit held there on 26–8 November 1973. On 13 December, two days after Abdessalam’s lecture at the Council for Foreign Relations, making his first visit to Algeria, Kissinger was met at the airport by Bouteflika and whisked off to Boumediene’s official residence. Kissinger was impressed with the incisiveness and style of his hosts, with their long black capes and Cuban cigars.73 The meeting was held in the “Algerian style”, as Boumediene put it to Kissinger. This meant that it was to be conducted in frank speech, free from diplomatic circumlocution.74 Kissinger knew that even if Egypt and Syria were to give concessions following the ceasefire, making possible the implementation of Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, the oil embargo could be lifted only with Algeria’s consent, given Algeria’s pivotal role in OPEC and its revolutionary record. As Kissinger himself, declared, “This is a period in which Algeria can morally and politically play a very important role.” However, Boumediene insisted that his guest should define the US view of, “where the line would be drawn between the United States and Russia in the region.” In addition, he quizzed Kissinger closely on

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Washington’s views on the issues involved in the future of the Middle East, including the importance of the recovery of the Arab territories lost in 1967 in their entirety, on the future status of Jerusalem, and, crucially, on the rights of the Palestinians. Kissinger made a plea for Boumediene’s help in persuading OAPEC to lift the oil embargo, since, as he put it, “it is unacceptable that pressure is put on us while we are trying to obtain some of the Arab demands. It is morally difficult.” Boumediene, however, stuck to the view that, as he put it, “each uses the weapons available to [him],” and that, “the beginning of withdrawal . . . is not enough to bring about the lifting of the oil blockade.” Changing his tactics, Kissinger then warned Boumediene against the continuation of the embargo to the point where it would begin to cause “serious economic dislocation” in the United States. Kissinger warned that at this point the Arabs would lose the sympathy of the US, which was the only country capable of imposing a solution in the Middle East. Europe could talk, he pointed out, but not act. As he argued, “the Arab foreign ministers can go to the Europeans and can get very clear answers [which] don’t mean anything.”75 Faced by Boumediene’s insistence that the core issue must be the rights of the Palestinians, Kissinger made a concession, saying, “Mr President [sic], serious people cannot be won. We are not going to win you . . . . You will act on your interests. So there will never be permanent victories. The question for us is whether your views and our views can be parallel.” Kissinger went on to make one last attempt to convince Boumediene that means intended to exert pressure, such as the oil embargo, should be used only at what he called “a moment of deadlock”, and not from the outset. Boumediene did not budge. Instead, he warned his guest that if the rights of the Palestinian were not taken into consideration the Palestinian question would, in the end, “be settled by the extremists, the revolutionaries.”76 Kissinger’s meeting with Boumediene was not, however, a total failure. He did appear to have succeeded in convincing Boumediene over one point, namely that the US was the only outside party with the ability to play a meaningful role in the Middle East crisis and secure Israel’s disengagement. Boumediene had in fact already been moving to this conclusion himself, following the nugatory outcome of his one-day trip to Moscow during the war, and after Egypt’s acceptance of the UN’s call for a ceasefire on 22 October. Kissinger also obtained Algeria’s agreement not to oppose the principle of a

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Geneva Conference that would bring together all parties, which paved the way for Kissinger’s trip to Cairo and later to Damascus. “You have pushed us into it” was Boumediene’s reply when Kissinger showed his concern about “the danger that the Third World [was] becoming a bloc and therefore losing its own freedom of choice.” Concluding the meeting, Kissinger raised the bilateral issue of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the US and Algeria, to which Boumediene agreed in principle. However, Boumediene continued to find a convincing pretext not to do so in the fact that Algeria was known for its independence of decision, and that the midst of a crisis was not an appropriate moment for such a move. Boumediene explained that since Egypt had just resumed diplomatic relations with the US it would appear as if Algiers was simply following suit, and he could not allow it to appear that Algeria was following the lead of another country.77 In his memoirs, Kissinger expressed the view that Boumediene, “was of the generation to which the pop liturgy of Third World rhetoric had become second nature,” and remarked that “the amity of Algeria was limited: it amounted to tactical cooperation for a brief period and therefore tacit understanding not to exacerbate the inevitable differences in our approaches to world affairs.” Nevertheless, Kissinger admitted that during “the most fragile beginning phase of our Mideast diplomacy we enjoyed a degree of Algerian support that, given Algeria’s stature in the Third World, was a not insignificant factor in enabling us to move matters forward.”78 Beyond the repercussions of the oil embargo, another effect of the crisis was that Algeria’s leadership role within the Third World was further consolidated, particularly regarding its relations with Africa. On 5 November 1973, a stunning total of 17 African countries broke relations with Israel, joining Uganda, Chad, Congo People’s Republic, Niger, Mali, Burundi, Togo and Zaire which had already severed their relations with Israel during the period of 18 months that had preceded the war. A total of 25 African countries had now had severed relations with Israel leaving only ten out of the 41 non-Arab members of the OAU that maintained ties with Israel.79 Algeria’s policy of solidarity with the independent states of Africa had paid off. It was clear that this gesture of support for the Arab cause on the part of the African countries would not have taken place had it not been for what had come to be recognized as the leading role of Algeria in Africa,

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where Algeria was now better placed than any other Arab state in the OAU thanks to its assiduous cultivation of independence movements. What distinguished the African policy of Algeria from that of Egypt, which had also striven to play a role in Africa, under President Nasser in particular, was the prestige of Algeria’s own liberation struggle. The Algerian leadership had forged links with such African leaders as Nelson Mandela, even before Algeria’s independence, when the FLN was itself a liberation movement. Another issue for the Arabs was the historical issue of racism on the part of Arabs against Africans, and of slavery perpetrated by Arab slave masters. These matters were neither forgotten nor forgiven in some sub-Sahara countries and remained a thorny element in Afro-Arab relations. In this regard, Algerians, unlike the remainder of the Arabs, were largely regarded as more African than Arab because of Algeria’s long-standing support for the African liberation struggle. This was an asset that defused to a considerable extent the historical grievance held by sub-Saharan Africans against the peoples of North Africa. In terms of geopolitics, it was also a factor that Algeria shared long borders with sub-Sahara countries where the Tuareg tribes were present on both sides of the barrier represented by the Sahara and the Sahel. A further link between Algeria and Africa was Islam itself, in its regional manifestations. Sufi brotherhoods were widespread both to the north and the south of the Sahara and were part of a common heritage. The spread of Islam throughout sub-Saharan Africa had been largely undertaken by Sufi orders whose mother houses were located in North Africa in general and in particular in Algeria. The Algerian leadership, since independence, had capitalized on all these geopolitical and ethno-cultural assets, extending bridges of solidarity deep into Africa. Meanwhile, there were problems in Africa that Algeria needed to resolve. One of these, of which the Algerian leadership was well aware, as were other Arab states, was represented by the activity of Israel in Africa. Under the guise of economic cooperation, Israel had made efforts to sway African leaders away from supporting Arabsponsored resolutions condemning Israel, whether at the OAU or in the United Nations itself. A study prepared by the Algerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, apparently in late 1973, distinguished eight aspects of Israeli action in Africa. (1) Israel offered practical assistance to recently independent African countries. (2) Israel did not make its aid

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conditional on disengagement from the Arab states, thus avoiding the trap of alienating recipient countries. (3) Israel systematically presented itself as an emergent post-colonial nation struggling to construct a socialist state, but with the advantage of expertise from which the African states could benefit. (4) Israel did not shrink from capitalizing on the weakness of those African leaders who could be corrupted. (5) Many African leaders had studied in the UK where they had established contacts with the British Labour Party, which included a strong Jewish lobby. (6) Israel played on the ethnic distinction between North Africa and the sub-Sahara countries in order to disrupt the growing Afro-Arab solidarity. (7) The Arab history in the slave trade was used by Israel to drive a wedge between Arab and African countries. (8) Having established friendly relations with African states, Israel then pointed out the hostility of the Arabs towards Israel and asked for African support.80 In addition, there were economic issues. The African states had been far from immune from the effects of the oil embargo the Arabs had implemented. In the aftermath of the imposition of the embargo, and following the quadrupling of oil prices in just a few months, the Arab states were not oblivious to the impact this would inevitably have on the economies of the non-OPEC African countries. Hence, in addition to the existing aid programs that had already been agreed within the OAU, Algeria provided support for African countries with aid granted on an individual basis. In this way, $4.4 million of aid was offered by Algeria to seven African countries, in the period from April 1973 to March 1974, as recorded by the Africa Division of the Algerian Foreign Affairs Ministry.81 As time went on, the Algerian leadership also became aware of the potential for Third World solidarity of Group of 77, a group of developing countries established on 15 June 1964 after the inaugural meeting of UNCTAD (the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). The sub-Sahara African countries were all members of the Group, which had excluded Israel despite its initial attempt to join. In the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Group 77 members were exhorted to take further measures to isolate Israel.82 The Arab states in general had been highly appreciative of the decision of many African countries to sever relations with Israel. However, the Algerian Foreign Ministry did not hide its concern that the political value of the gesture was being undermined by the

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attempt on the part of some African leaders, “to obtain a concrete price for this by requesting, often vociferously, economic and financial aid.” A report drafted in 1974 which looked back on events after the October War denounced this as blackmail on the part of certain African leaders, who appeared to have forgotten the aid and low-interest loans offered by Arab states to African countries at times of hardship.83 Such attempts to exercise coercion were apparently the reason for some of the visits made by the presidents of certain African states to Algeria in the aftermath of the oil embargo. On 5 November 1973, Niger’s President Hamani Diori came to Algiers, and Zaire’s President Mobutu Sese Seko arrived on 15 December, to cite just two examples. Meanwhile, Washington’s assessment of Algeria’s role in the Third World was that, “growing Afro-Arab cohesion and militancy in pursuing objectives often contrary to our interests will make defense of US positions and achievement of our goals in UN context even more difficult next year.”84 That was exactly what Boumediene intended, and what he hoped to achieve with the escalation of his policy to the next level. As 1973 drew to its close, Boumediene had become aware of the danger inherent in Kissinger’s parallel project to counter the effects of the oil embargo. The US Secretary of State was making great efforts to carry out his scheme to rally the state of Europe to form themselves into what would in effect be a cartel of oil-consuming countries, though this was a plan with which France’s President Giscard d’Estaing, for one, was reluctant to involve himself. Algeria was also aware that Washington was attempting to exploit the splits that had begun to appear between the Third World countries with regard to the impact the oil embargo had begun to have on the economies of the non-oil producing members of the Non-Aligned Movement and the G-77. On 18 January 1974, when France asked for a UN session to discuss energy problems, Boumediene wrote to Kurt Waldheim, the UN Secretary General, that the French government’s proposal “could have significance if it were not limited to the problems of energy but rather included all questions related to raw materials.” Boumediene subsequently suggested the need to call a special meeting of the United Nations General Assembly in order to discuss the issue of primary commodities.85 His intention was to outflank the US plan to create a cartel of oil consumers by turning it into a global consultation among consumers, both of energy and of commodities. Boumediene

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was beginning to think about the proposal of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), which would supplant and subvert the more simplistic US notion of an oil consumers’ consortium. Meanwhile, the US Bureau of Intelligence and Research prepared a study entitled “The Non-Aligned Group in the UN, Challenge or Obstacle for the US?” This warned that, “the cumulative effect of such confrontations raises the spectre of growing US isolation in the UN, unless enough progress is made . . . to satisfy an increasing number among the non-aligned.”86 In late February and early March 1974, prior to Boumediene’s first visit to the US in April, which was also to be his first visit as head of state to a country of the developed North, he also made a bid to raise his international profile with a tour of the Far East, taking in China, North Korea and finally Vietnam. Boumediene was received by the Chinese leader, Zhou Enlai, North Korea’s Kim Il Sung, and President Tan Duc Thang of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The point Boumediene was trying to make, in the run up to the UN special session asked for by France, was that Algeria was able to speak on behalf of the entire Third World, the Far East included. When Boumediene met President Nixon in April he would present himself as a leader of the Third World, representing Third World interests rather than narrowly Algerian concerns. This was the formula settled upon during unofficial contacts between the two sides in Algiers and Washington ahead of the American visit. From the US side, it would help to justify, in the eyes of American public opinion, Nixon’s decision to welcome to the White House the leader of a country with which the US had not had diplomatic relations since 1967.87 Kissinger advised Nixon that for Boumediene to come to the US as a “representative of the non-aligned nations,” the capacity in which he would be received, would be “an important gesture,” because of Algeria’s pivotal role in the Third World as well in the Arab world, with its energy exports to the US.88 On 10 April 1974, before going to Washington, Boumediene delivered his first speech at the UN General Assembly in New York where, at a special session convened by Algeria, he made a strong case for a New International Economic Order. Arabic had been included as one of the UN General Assembly’s official and working languages since late 1973 and this was the first occasion on which the Arabic language was used at the United Nations. It was a symbolic gesture that enhanced Boumediene’s prestige in the collective perception of

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the Arab world. In his address, Boumediene defended the actions of OPEC and described his own oil nationalization as “an act of development.” He dismissed the philosophies of development advocated by international experts as “confining the developing countries to a vicious circle,” and went on to plead for reform of the international monetary system on a democratic basis, arguing for his notion of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) based on the principle that development in the Third World is also in the interests of the developed countries. The strategy by which the NIEO was to be achieved was presented in an exhaustive study devised by the Non-Aligned Movement’s experts as well as those of UNCTAD.89 On 11 April, Boumediene met Nixon in Washington. Also present were Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. With Boumediene were Abelaziz Bouteflika and Idriss Djazairi, the Economic Counsellor. The conversation for the most part skirted around the issue of the NIEO, focusing instead on issues connected with the Middle East conflict, including the Geneva Conference (which was finally held from 21 December 1973 to 9 January 1974, achieving little), as well as the Golan Heights and the rights of the Palestinians. On this last issue, which he regarded as central, Boumediene repeatedly stressed the need to find a permanent solution. Meanwhile Kissinger, who wanted to demonstrate to Nixon that Algeria’s stance was not entirely confrontational, told Nixon that President Assad of Syria had informed him that, “without Boumediene, [the Geneva Conference] would not have happened.”90 As 1973 had come to its end, Kissinger had not failed to notice the success of the Non Aligned Movement conference in Algiers on 5–9 September 1973, and the additional prestige that had thereby accrued to Boumediene, and he was also conscious of the significant threat represented by the continuing OAPEC oil embargo. He therefore began to make what would be a series of three visits to Algiers over the space of less than a year, on 13 December 1973, 29 April 1974 and 14 October 1974, hoping to persuade the Algerian leadership to opt for cooperation rather than confrontation in resolving the Third World’s differences with the North. Kissinger was under no illusion that he would be able to change Boumediene’s convictions. However, he sought more limited objectives. In the first place, in December 1973, he hoped to obtain Algeria’s agreement not to obstruct

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Washington’s Middle East diplomacy in order to help him to bring Syria to the table at the Geneva Conference he was still planning. Boumediene reluctantly cooperated (though Syria never came), but this was not the result of Kissinger’s diplomatic skill but rather sprang from the conclusions Boumediene had himself come to, following his own one-day visit to Moscow. Boumediene had returned from Moscow convinced that there was not much that could be done to further the Palestinian cause, especially after Egypt’s acceptance of a ceasefire, which Algiers considered a major blow. Later, Kissinger had other objectives. While Boumediene had acted pragmatically with regard to Kissinger’s plans for the Geneva Conference, he made no concessions on the oil embargo as far as it impacted the developed world and the West. At the same time, the Algerian leadership was not unaware of the severe impact the embargo was having on the economies of the non-oil producing African countries during the five months it was in effect. Thus, it acted swiftly to arrange for an OAPEC-OAU framework within which the Arab oil-producing countries would offer financial aid to redress the situation. Algeria led the way by offering a contribution of $4.4 million. Boumediene wished to safeguard Afro-Arab solidarity, especially after 25 African countries had severed their diplomatic ties with Israel following the October War. The embargo was lifted on 18 March 1974 and, soon after this, Boumediene was at the United Nations making his speech. Boumediene was now promoting the concept of the NIEO, and the ball was now in Washington’s court.

Kissinger’s Counter-Offensive In the spring of 1974, in response to Boumediene’s initiative in suggesting a NIEO, Kissinger made speeches on related issues at the UN and the Organization of American States. In addition, he set his State Department team to develop ways to put into practice various proposals on US relations with the Third World.91 Kissinger also reviewed urgently existing US thinking on relations with the Third World,92 while meeting with a group of outside experts in order to discuss novel ideas on how to deal with Third World issues.93 On the diplomatic front, Kissinger protested (apparently without irony) against what he described as the use of “steamroller tactics” by

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Third World countries and the exercise by the Non-Aligned group and the G-77 of what he resentfully said was their in-built majority at the UN General Assembly’s sixth Special Session to pass the resolutions of which they approved and to block the adoption of others. Kissinger instructed all US diplomatic posts to express Washington’s “deep and high level concerns” at these developments to their host governments.94 There remained, however, the issue of the aftermath of the oil embargo. Although the embargo was lifted on 18 March 1974, almost five months since it was first enforced, the oil blockade had been in force long enough to begin to have a lasting effect on the economies of the developed countries, an issue to which Boumediene had already reacted in his own way. Kissinger, from his side, discussed with his State Department staff how to deal with the consequences of this “oil shock”. Kissinger remained convinced that a consortium of consumer countries, able to coordinate their responses to the prices set by OPEC and OAPEC, would be the best response. He explained that the US should ideally take the lead, given the indecisive responses shown by the European states, but added that since, “Boumediene [is] certainly a psycho on oil prices . . . Algeria would mount a campaign.” An effort would have to be made, however, to get Japan on board, as well as bringing the states of Western Europe into line, though William Simon, the Secretary of the Treasury, expressed his doubts over the reliability of Europe in such an endeavor, a view with which Brent Scowcroft and others attending the meeting concurred.95 Kissinger knew his troubles with Algeria were not over yet, especially as Algeria had been elected president of the UN General Assembly for the Assembly’s 29th Session, due to run from 1974 to 1975, and meetings would be presided over by Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algeria’s Foreign Minister. On the basis of Algeria’s track record, Kissinger was sure something unusual would take place. On 9 August 1974, during a meeting he had organized for President Gerald Ford to meet a group of Arab ambassadors, where Ford was intended to reassure the Arab representatives that the United States hoped to carry on with business as usual, Kissinger turned to the head of the Algerian Interests Section to say, “I understand that my friend Mr. Bouteflika will be President of the General Assembly this fall. Can he actually bring himself to be neutral about anything? I know that it is not in his normal nature. Please give him my very warm regards.”96

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Kissinger was to be disappointed, however, for old habits would die hard and Bouteflika, who was not overawed by Kissinger, would soon live up to Algeria’s reputation. On 13 November, one of the General Assembly’s most remarkable sessions took place when Yasser Arafat, the Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), delivered from the podium the famous address (written for him by the Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish) in which he spoke of “the olive branch in one hand and the rifle in the other.” Then, on 22 November, General Assembly Resolution 3237 was adopted, granting the PLO Observer Status at the General Assembly, much to the chagrin of Israel and the US. If anything, more dramatic still was the expulsion of South Africa from the General Assembly. Though the draft resolution to this effect was vetoed in the UN Security Council by the US, the UK, and France, Bouteflika overrode the Security Council by submitting the proposal to a vote in the General Assembly, which adopted it by 91 to 22 votes, with 19 abstentions. Thus, South Africa was banned from attending the UN General Assembly from that date until the apartheid regime was dismantled and democratic elections were held in South Africa on 27 April 1994.97 Meanwhile, despite all these events on the plane of international politics, relations on the economic plane between Algeria and the US continued with vigor and unabated. By 1974, around a hundred American consultants were operating in Algeria, with consultancy firms in some cases earning fees of up to $10 million a year. The US was importing more than 56 per cent of Algeria’s oil and 28 per cent of its natural gas. US exports to Algeria reached $315 million while imports from Algeria breached the $1 billion mark.98 Commercial relations were booming despite the differences between the two countries on world affairs. Finally, on 12 November 1974, the historic resumption of relations between Algeria and the US took place, after the Algerian leadership decided that whatever their disagreements with the US, the balance of advantage lay in the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with Washington. Kissinger opted for an Arab specialist for the important position of US ambassador to Algiers, and selected Richard Parker for the mission. By then, Kissinger had visited Algeria no less than three times within a single year, with his last trip on 14 October, and had developed a degree of respect for Boumediene. These visits were a

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reflection of Washington’s recognition of what they saw as Boumediene’s “leading role among the non-aligned” and a demonstration, as Kissinger commented, that “his views on international affairs and economic matters [are taken] with a great deal of seriousness.”99 Yet old habits die hard and it was difficult for Algiers to bring itself to show much actual enthusiasm for the country’s new relationship with the US. The actual resumption of relations was given very low key treatment by Algeria, with coverage in the local media almost non-existent. Richard Parker arrived in Algiers and duly assumed his duties, but Algeria would let three more years elapse before sending an ambassador to Washington. On 21 December 1974, as the year drew to an end, Kissinger and Bouteflika met at the Algerian foreign minister’s office at the United Nations to review the 29th UN General Assembly session and to discuss the issue of the role of the Third World in international affairs. After a long and frank discussion (perhaps, once more, conducted in the Algerian style), in which Bouteflika warned that more of what had happened during the 29th session would be repeated the following year, Kissinger issued a warning. “Europe and Japan are no longer that strong,” he said, “[so] the US cannot have the Third World demoralizing Japan and Europe . . . . If we can work together during this special session it must become a symbol of the cooperation between us then we can do much. If it becomes a session of confrontation, then that worries me greatly.”100 Kissinger’s sense of frustration and helplessness before the Third World challenge was not expressed only in the warnings and implied threats he made in the course of his meeting with Bouteflika. He also put his views very much in the public sphere in an interview he gave to Business Week which was published on 13 January 1975 and then reprinted in the Washington Post. Asked whether the US would use military force in order to resolve the problem of the oil price, which had quadrupled following the embargo, Kissinger answered that “no nation can be expected not to react to protect its vital interests when those interests are placed in jeopardy.” In Algiers these statements were decoded as a veiled threat of war. Boumediene summoned Parker to exclaim, “what are all these threats we have been hearing?” Parker did his best to explain to Boumediene that Kissinger’s answer was to a hypothetical question put by the journalist. Parker then reported to Kissinger, informing him that, “frankly the Algerians were surprised

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and disappointed . . . . This was not time for us to be using the big stick.” Four days later, an apparently contrite Kissinger sent a three page letter to Boumediene in which he explained that he was addressing a hypothetical question and repeated that his objective was “cooperation, not confrontation.” Kissinger then agreed to Boumediene’s earlier proposal to convene an international conference to discuss the issues of international development and the NIEO, but suggested that its remit must also include his original idea of an exchange between the producing and consuming countries over the problem of oil prices.

Conclusion With Algeria’s socialist revolutionary credentials firmly established, following the successful petroleum nationalization and the momentum this created on the domestic front for pushing ahead with agrarian reform and other policies of social justice, the way was then paved for Boumediene to pursue his international Third World ambitions. The year 1973 would mark the tenth anniversary of the creation of the OAU. Algeria had invested a great deal of political and material capital in the cause of African unity and solidarity. Algeria’s undisputed militant role within the OAU’s Liberation Commission reflected the political aspect of its African policy. “The Direction des Etudes Internationales” (DEI) within the Presidency as well as other liaison departments within the FLN, were Algeria’s chosen instruments for extending material support to serious left-inclined liberation movements, throughout Africa and well beyond. Algeria’s policy of militant solidarity in Africa then served as a springboard for Boumediene to claim the leadership of the Third World cause. Here again, Algiers presented itself to the Global South as having led by example, pointing to the success of its own struggle to regain control of its own oil resources and putting forward Algeria’s recent experience as a blueprint for mounting a challenge to the international order established by imperialism and neo-colonialism. Thus, at the fourth Non-Aligned Movement conference, which Algeria hosted in from 5 to 9 September 1973, Algeria promoted the principle of economic independence as equal in importance to the idea of political independence. Boumediene’s speech at the UN special session, in April 1974, ushered in the beginning of the Global

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South’s challenge to the developed North, at a time when the latter’s economies were embattled by unprecedentedly high oil prices. The Algerian blueprint for economic independence combined with political self-reliance had worked for Algeria itself but the bid to reproduce it on a global scale by exhorting others to follow the example of Algiers served as a test of Boumediene’s prestige. Boumediene quickly understood that if the Third World’s challenge was to bring any significant results then the Third World should be safeguarded against the shock waves of the oil embargo. However, the aid given by Boumediene to weak African economies raised serious concerns in Washington as recession threatened to undermine the economies of the developed world, especially those of Western Europe and Japan. More troubling for Kissinger was Algeria’s success in persuading 25 African countries to break diplomatic ties with Israel, which threatened Israel with further isolation. The Third World challenge had the potential to undermine Washington’s global strategy in areas such as the Middle East, Germany, South and Southeast Asia and Africa itself. Washington feared that the changed reality of global affairs had the potential to offer opportunities to be exploited by the hydrocarbonrich Soviet Union, to the detriment of the West. Boumediene’s eyes were fixed on taking advantage of the new reality of the post-embargo era in order to step up the Third World’s challenge to the developed economies. Boumediene’s resolution to develop his own proposals regarding relations between the Third World and the developed countries alarmed the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Algeria seized the opportunity of its presidency of the UN General Assembly to make it clear that business would no longer be as usual when two historic resolutions were passed, one to admit the PLO to the UN with observer status and the other to expel South Africa from it. Washington could only look on, helpless before what Kissinger, perhaps fantasizing somewhat, described as Algeria’s “steamroller” tactics. Kissinger’s attempt at a counter-offensive, aimed at neutralizing Boumediene’s proposal that a New International Economic Order (NIEO) should be introduced, was reduced to an instruction to US diplomats to veto any NIEO-related resolution or draft agreement on the Third World issues, as far as this lay within their powers. However, Kissinger was disappointed by France’s President Giscard d’Estaing, who thought Washington’s plan for an oil consumers’ cartel could drive the Western confrontation with

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OPEC to an extreme. Through being outflanked over the NIEO question, Kissinger had a taste of the limits of his Cold War approach to global affairs. Even Washington’s strongest allies in Western Europe had opted for dialogue rather than confrontation with the Third World, and especially with the oil-producing countries which formed its spearhead. This episode represented a pause in de´tente and the onset of a new series of crises in US-Algerian relations. Affairs had come full circle since 1969, when Boumediene set out to reshape Algeria’s foreign policy with the initial objective of conciliating the US and thus promoting the country’s development strategy. In this context, the geopolitical situation faced by Boumediene in early 1969 had presented more risks than opportunities. First, Algeria had traditionally been a radical, leftist country that opposed Washington’s policies in Vietnam, the Middle East and Africa. Secondly, there was a climate of regional confrontation in the Maghreb, where Algeria was the object of suspicion on the part of its pro-American Moroccan and Tunisian neighbors, which reflected global Cold War confrontation at a regional scale. Thirdly, the SinoSoviet split represented a difficulty, since Boumediene was unable to take any significant initiative towards either Moscow or Beijing for fear of attracting the opprobrium of the other. And finally, there was the challenge of taking charge of Algeria’s own tremendous hydrocarbon resources, of which much were still controled by France, the former colonial power. Opportunities were presented, however, by the arrival in the White House of the Nixon administration, which set out to pursue a policy of realism and cooperation with the Soviet Union in international affairs. This allowed Algeria the chance to escape from the confrontational relationship with the US that had characterized the Johnson years. However, Algeria also faced challenges. The renegotiation of the 1965 oil agreement with France had been set to take place in 1969. This was crucial to Algeria, which planned to use the additional revenues that renegotiated oil prices would generate to finance in part the Four-Year Plan for heavy industrialization due to be carried out in the period 1970–3. Algeria also intended to build useful economic cooperation between North Africa and sub-Sahara Africa on the basis of its long record of practical and moral support for African liberation movements, which would provide markets for Algerian production in the areas that were included in its plans for its industrial modernization,

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such as petroleum derivatives, machinery, fertilizer and other such manufactured products. Within this broad scheme of risks and opportunities, Boumediene devised a three-track strategy for development. First, in 1969, he launched an impressive year-long diplomatic offensive in the Maghreb, beginning with a historic visit to Morocco that ended a troubling five-year period of crisis. This defused the climate of hostility within the Maghreb, paving the way for de´tente across the whole region. It also reconciled moderate Arab leaders, including the monarchies, such as Saudi Arabia, which were basically sympathetic to Morocco but whose funding Algeria needed for its modernization plans. Secondly, Boumediene reached out across the Mediterranean to the states of Europe. Here, he took practical measures to distance Algeria from the Soviet Union, for example by encouraging visits to Algerian ports by French and Italian naval squadrons and warships, replacing the traditional visits by Soviet vessels. He also set up naval and air force training programs in cooperation with various Mediterranean military academies. Boumediene also resisted Moscow’s repeated requests for an agreement to grant it long-term access to the strategic naval base at Mers-el-Kebir. The third track of the strategy was the dramatic nationalization of France’s petroleum interests in Algeria, in February 1971. The nationalizations underlined the fact that though Algeria’s foreign policy might appear to be realistic, in the sense of open to compromise, it was in the last resort always underpinned by Algeria’s key principles of independence and non-alignment. In Washington, the three aspects of Boumediene’s strategy prompted a major review of the North African policy of the US. Henry Kissinger concluded that, given Algeria’s genuine non-alignment, Washington’s aim should not be the unrealistic one of winning Algeria over to its side, but that the US should be content with bolstering Algeria’s ability to resist the pressure of the Soviet Union. As part of this policy, US private sector companies were positively encouraged by the White House to invest in Algeria. On the other hand, the expulsion of the Soviet experts from Egypt led to a determination on the part of the Soviet Union to strengthen its relationship with Algeria. Moscow now felt obliged to redouble its already generous cooperation efforts in order not to lose Algeria as well. All these developments, together with the climate of de´tente, contributed to Algeria’s policy of economic diversification to

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the point that in the end it even decided to recognize the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), despite the evident dismay of the authorities in West Germany (the Federal Republic of Germany). At home, as the second Four-Year Plan was inaugurated in the spring of 1973, Boumediene was at the apogee of his leadership of Algeria. The extensive and hugely important deal with the US-based El Paso company for the import of Algerian gas, together with its funding by the US Export-Import bank and a consortium of international commercial banks, had at last received approval from the Federal Power Commission (FPC). On the domestic front, a raft of Boumediene’s policies in the health and education sectors in Algeria had been implemented, which were intended to raise the level of social justice. In addition, the milestone measure of agrarian reform had been put into effect with the redistribution of land. Boumediene’s success was such that even his internal opponents were melting away. Even the remaining members of the clandestine communist party (PAGS) decided to lend their support to Boumediene, offering his regime what they called their critical support. Regionally, Boumediene acted prudently to safeguard peace and stability in the Maghreb when a series of attempted coups against King Hassan II created an atmosphere of instability in Morocco. Boumediene was aware that any conflict in a neighboring state would put an end to his development plans, since Algeria would inevitably be drawn into regional conflict, thus diverting thereby precious time and resources. He therefore acted swiftly to make it clear he did not wish to see the end of King Hassan’s rule in Morocco and to ensure no trouble could be caused by Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi, who had been supportive of the coup attempts in Morocco. In Moscow, however, there was a certain amount of skepticism about the importance of a relationship with Algeria, with some veiled criticism of Algeria’s brand of socialism. Certain Soviet experts, in addition to some left-wing Arab observers, dismissed Algeria’s style as state capitalism rather than revolutionary socialism. In response, Boumediene would vaunt the independence of Algeria’s development path, which rejected scientific socialism as incompatible with Algeria’s Islamic tradition. In Washington, by this time, with booming economic cooperation between the two countries, the moment seemed appropriate for a resumption of diplomatic ties between the US and Algeria, which would enhance the influence of the US in what

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was becoming an increasingly important Arab country. Boumediene skillfully drew the line between what would benefit Algeria’s development strategy and moves that could be to Algeria’s detriment. Until it suited him to do otherwise, Boumediene would resist US pressure to resume full relations. On the other hand, when he perceived that David Newsom, the US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, was anxious to score a personal victory by re-establishing relations with Algeria, Boumediene was able to turn this to his advantage, extracting promises of further deals with the US. All the while, Boumediene had privileged information that the October War in the Middle East would soon be launched by the Egyptians. Boumediene’s handling of the oil embargo imposed by the Arab states after the October War was another aspect of his skillful transformation of setbacks into challenges. Algeria saw in it an opportunity to force an overhaul of the international economic order and its monetary and financial institutions. Boumediene’s meeting with Nixon at the White House, before diplomatic ties between Algeria and the US had been restored, amounted to a recognition of the challenge Algeria’s Third World policy represented for the North. On 12 November 1974, diplomatic relations between Algeria and the US were restored, though there were still many points of tension between the two countries. By the end of 1974, however, after Algeria’s presidency of the 29th session of the UN General Assembly had seen some controversial decisions, no further proof was needed for Washington that ideology was still very much alive in Algeria’s foreign policy. A further era of confrontation was about to unfold in US-Algerian relations.

CHAPTER 4 WESTERN SAHARA, 1975 – 6

“Something is brewing on our frontiers . . . the explanations I am getting from Ould Daddah don’t add up,” confided Boumediene in January 1975 to Taleb-Ibrahimi, his Minister of Information and Culture.1 By that time, Boumediene had sufficient reason to believe that the President of Mauritania, Mokhtar Ould Daddah, was not being entirely straightforward in his statements regarding the issue of the decolonization of the Western Sahara. On 20 August 1974, Spain had announced its intention to hold a referendum on the future of the part of the Sahara under its colonial control, which lay to the south of Morocco and the west of Mauritania, with an Atlantic coastline. Known to Spain as the Spanish Sahara, the territory was by that time referred to in diplomatic exchanges as Western Sahara. A liberation movement, known as the Polisario Front, had been formed in 1973 to represent the aspirations of the territory, to which Algeria had given its backing and which aimed to establish a Sahrawi sovereign state. On 17 September King Hassan, with Ould Daddah’s support, challenged the Spanish move to hold a referendum, declaring he would bring the matter before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) at The Hague in December. Morocco and Mauritania both claimed they could produce claims to prior ownership of the territory before it had been a Spanish colony, based on historical tribal links and allegiances going back to the eleventh century. Spain agreed to delay the referendum until the court had ruled. On 13 December, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 3292, put forward by Morocco with Algerian support, which provided for the dispatch of a factfinding mission to the region to report on the situation in Western

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Sahara after consultation with all the parties concerned.2 Rabat’s departure from its position of supporting a referendum was hardly a surprise to Boumediene, who knew Morocco had ambitions to absorb the territory. However, the leaders of all the regional states, Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania, had given verbal support to the idea of a referendum on the future of the Western Sahara since the issue was first raised at the UN in December 1965, and this was still the position favored by Algeria. Now, Ould Daddah’s disturbing alliance with King Hassan gave the Algerian leadership further cause for concern. Boumediene was concerned lest Algeria’s two neighbors to the west and southwest had in secret already agreed to divide the territory, and that this was why they had opposed the holding by Spain of a referendum on self-determination, for which all three leaders had called from the moment it became clear that Spain wished to divest itself of the territory. This was a development that would clearly undermine the era of Maghreb de´tente inaugurated in 1969 by Algeria, and Boumediene quickly reached the conclusion that the whole process of seeking the advice of the International Court of Justice was no more than a diversion. He concluded it was part of a wider assault on Algerian policy, and that Morocco’s disregard of Algeria’s stand in support of the autonomy in the territory was part of a broader move to “dislodge Algeria from its positions in support of the Third World,” and to obstruct its central program to establish a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that would govern relationships between the developed states and the Third World.3 By early 1975, the advocacy by Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State, of a conference of the oil-consuming countries and his plan to create an International Energy Agency had become a serious threat to Algeria’s ambitions. In the view of the Algerian leadership, Kissinger had two aims. First, he hoped to break the alliance between OPEC countries and the non-oil producing Third World countries; and secondly, to establish the oil-consuming countries as a counter-balancing force to OPEC, both of which would impede the Algerian goal of the establishment of a NIEO. The response of the Algerian leadership to Kissinger’s maneuvers was to redouble its efforts to reinforce the alliance it had forged between OPEC and the G-77 (a group of 77 developing countries set up within UNCTAD). Meeting in Dakar in early February, the representatives of the G-77 formulated proposals

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for the members of OPEC to channel petrodollar funds into the weaker economies of the developing countries. In March the Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) convened in Lima. On 26 March, the Lima Declaration and Plan for Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation was adopted. The Lima Declaration was a lengthy and complex document, which essentially called on the Third World to back the NIEO. Among its resolutions were calls for an industrial development fund, for the national control of resources such as minerals and oil, conservation, technology transfer and development. Eighty-two UN member states voted for it, but the US voted against, and seven states abstained, including the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan, Belgium and Israel. The US opposition was a blow and a challenge to the principle of the NIEO. Undaunted, Boumediene called for a summit conference of the OPEC states, the first to be held since OPEC’s creation, with the participation of a delegate representing the G-77. Algiers was anxious to present a united front of the Third World during the upcoming Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation, provisionally set to be held in October.4 As all this took place, however, the UN fact-finding mission had arrived in the Western Sahara in May 1975 and this issue once more became uppermost for Algeria, as well as for Morocco, and Mauritania. Spain made itself constantly aware of what was taking place in in its colonial territory and from a distance, the US kept a vigilant eye on the outcome. June 1975 would mark the tenth anniversary of Boumediene’s accession to power and the entire year was intended to be a celebration of the Algerian regime’s accomplishments within the three revolutionary socialist projects it had pledged to implement. First among these was Boumediene’s pledge of a new industrial revolution, embodied in the pre-plan of 1967 – 9, and the Four-Year Plans of 1970 –3 and 1974 –7, within which the 1971 hydrocarbon nationalizations were also part. Secondly, was the redistribution of land that had ensued from the agrarian reform law of 1972. In addition to the re-assignment of land, this had included a plan to build a thousand new villages in rural Algeria, together with the provision of free education and free health care. Thirdly came the cultural revolution which was intended to revitalize Algeria’s identity

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and heritage after over 130 years of colonial domination, with the Arabization of Algeria’s administration, education and media. Internationally, Algeria had emerged as the champion of the Third World’s demands for a re-negotiated international economic system. It had also become the trusted ally of liberation movements across the world in countries as diverse as Chile, the Canary Islands and Palestine, as well as in Africa from Western Sahara in the north of the continent to Angola and Mozambique in the south. Even the antiSalazar and anti-Franco freedom movements, directed against the dictators of the Iberian Peninsula, found a home in Algiers. In 1975, Boumediene judged the time to be ripe to invite the President of France to make the first visit to Algeria by the French head of state since the country’s independence, especially as Algerian-French relations had started to recover from the petroleum nationalization. Thirteen years after independence, Boumediene wanted to demonstrate to the leader of Algeria’s former colonial power the extent of independent Algeria’s accomplishments. On 10 April 1975, therefore, President Valery Giscard d’Estaing began his first visit to Algeria. Relations between the two countries had improved in the previous six months, thanks to the position France had adopted as regards the Middle East after the October War. In October 1974, the PLO had been allowed to open an office in France. In addition, France had opposed Kissinger’s call to set up a consortium of oil-consuming countries and had taken a leading role in calling instead for more consultations within the existing framework of North-South dialogue at the United Nations.5 Furthermore, unlike the seven industrialized countries which had failed to vote for the Lima Declaration, France had adopted a sympathetic position with regard to the demands of the Third World.6 Given the trauma and brutality of the Algerian war of liberation, however, the first visit by a French president to independent Algeria could not be other than emotionally highly charged. Therefore, every detail of both style and substance was carefully considered by the Algerian authorities ahead of the visit. This was a historic encounter which the Algerians were determined would not be marred unpredictably by some random factor. During Giscard d’Estaing’s visit, the issue of the decolonization of the Western Sahara was discussed in a private conversation between Boumediene and the French president. In January 1976, Boumediene confided to Paul Balta, Le Monde’s correspondent in Algiers, that he

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had told Giscard d’Estaing that, “given France’s links and past, present and future interests in the Maghreb countries it should adopt strict neutrality in the Western Sahara conflict . . . the day is coming when France will be called upon to play a conciliation or mediatory role.” It may be concluded from this that as early as mid-April, and certainly before the arrival in the region of the UN Fact-finding Mission and the ICJ delegations, set to visit the territory in May and June respectively, Boumediene already had strong reasons to believe that the Western Sahara crisis was destined to shatter the state of de´tente in the Maghreb to the construction of which Algeria had dedicated a substantial period of time and effort. The eruption of the Western Sahara conflict had consequences for inter-Maghreb relations, and on regional de´tente, while the collapse of regional de´tente in turn re-organized Washington’s priorities in its relations with hydrocarbon-rich Algeria and its old ally, Morocco. All this came at a time when the renewed Cold War tension that had followed the Cuban intervention in Angola, together with the eruption of the Lebanese Civil War, had enhanced the American perception of Morocco as a key strategic ally in the Mediterranean. Washington was faced by a dilemma, however. While US private sector business interests were increasingly centered on Algeria, Washington’s strategic interests, in an era of eroding global de´tente, would still be best served by supporting its embattled but longstanding ally, King Hassan II of Morocco. King Hassan was more than happy to stand firm on the West’s new frontier against what Washington perceived as renewed Soviet penetration of North and Central Africa. It was against this broader global context that Maghreb de´tente was shattered and a Cold War in the region became hot.

Maghreb De´tente Shattered by the Western Sahara Crisis What Morocco sought was the annexation of Western Sahara, bringing it under Moroccan sovereignty, and by mid-1975 Rabat was stepping up its diplomatic offensive to garner Arab and African acquiescence for this objective, accompanied by an internal media campaign to attract domestic support. Meanwhile in Algeria, the spirit of the “Year of the Maghreb”, as Boumediene had long ago dubbed the year 1969 as he had embarked on his scheme for Maghreb de´tente, seemed a distant memory. The historic visit Boumediene had

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made to Morocco in January 1969, during which the Ifrane Treaty had been signed, which provided for good neighborliness and cooperation, had been a memorable event. In local terms, it was as significant, and as much of a departure from the status quo of many years, as had been Nixon’s first visit to China. Indeed, only a statesman as bold as Boumediene could have had the courage to take such a step, since diplomatic relations between the two Maghreb neighbors had not been resumed since the desert war of 1963 had set Algeria and Morocco at each other’s throats. The clash in 1963, sometimes known as the Sand War, had begun on 13 October, with an armed Moroccan incursion into the mineralrich Algerian border region of Tindouf, administered by the Algerian Provisional Government but claimed by Morocco since its independence in 1956. Morocco’s intention had been to integrate the area into Morocco, on the basis of what it claimed were historic entitlements, and to gain the rights to exploit the iron ore and other mineral resources Tindouf had to offer. Algeria had been very much at a disadvantage in the fighting as it was only a year from independence, and as yet had no conventionally organized troops, while Morocco possessed a traditionally structured army built up in the seven years since its own independence from France. Understandably, the Algerian volunteers who were rushed to the front lacked training, military equipment and organization. During the brief armed encounter, the Moroccan army therefore had the advantage. On 30 October, a ceasefire was declared, and Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Algeria on 31 October.7 The dispute was finally settled by the Bamako Agreement signed on 20 February 1964. At the time, Boumediene was minister of defense. From the Moroccan point of view, the clash had been part of the nationalist policy of the re-establishment of what the nationalist political leadership in the country referred to as “Greater Morocco”. This was the philosophy of Mohammed Allal El-Fassi, leader of the Istiqlal (Independence) Party, which had led Morocco to independence, and of other Moroccan nationalist leaders. What they advocated was the re-unification with the Moroccan motherland of the Saharan territories to the south of Morocco’s present frontiers, including not only Spanish Sahara, but the entire state of Mauritania and even territory lying as far south as Saint-Louis in Senegal. In addition, however, their ambitions also extended to the annexation

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of Saharan territory to the east of Morocco, namely Algeria’s Bechar and Tindouf regions, and it was this they unwisely attempted to implement in 1963 at a moment when Algeria was perceived as relatively weak. The “Greater Morocco” claim was justified, they argued, by the existence of historical tribal ties and allegiances to the sultans of Morocco, attested by the very documents, dating back to the eleventh century, to which they also made reference in the Spanish Sahara dispute. This continues to be the principle accepted by the Istiqlal party, and indeed by the broader Moroccan establishment, as may be deduced from the relatively recently published memoirs of Abdelatif Filali, the former Moroccan statesman.8 Filali’s memoirs, published in 2008, just one year before he died, indicate that claims to the right to a swathe of territory defined as “Greater Morocco” still runs deep in the thinking of Morocco’s elite. As a result, the war of 1963 sowed the seeds of mistrust and suspicion between the two countries that has been hard to eradicate. The Algerians felt that they had been stabbed in the back by their neighbor at a time when Algeria was still emerging from the process of decolonization. In 1969, when Boumediene visited Morocco, it was still almost unthinkable that an Algerian leader could extend a hand of friendship to Morocco, let alone go there in person to bury the hatchet. This, however, was what Boumediene did, and only Boumediene could have done it. As has been explained, he deemed the benefits too far outweigh the apparent shame of offering forgiveness to an unrepentant enemy. What Boumediene wanted was de´tente in the Maghreb, which he saw as a goal of the highest importance. Of course, he had to offer Morocco a quid pro quo, and this consisted of the offer of joint exploitation rights with Algeria over the mineral deposits in the disputed Tindouf area. Boumediene’s hope was to resolve once and for all Algeria’s border disputes, in order to achieve the regional calm that was necessary for him to be able to embark on his modernization project for Algeria. The timing of Boumediene’s decision to make his offer to King Hassan was also critical. He chose a moment when the Moroccan monarch was in a weak domestic position and was also still on bad terms with France, having been frozen out by de Gaulle after the unexplained murder of Mehdi ben Barka in Paris. In the circumstances, King Hassan had little choice but to accept Boumediene’s offer of joint development rather than pursue the ideological and historically-based territorial claims

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that were still persistently being made by Istiqlal and the other Moroccan nationalist parties. Rabat’s recognition of Mauritania in 1969, with the corresponding abolition of the Moroccan Ministry for Mauritanian Affairs, was also the result of an Algerian diplomatic effort. Algeria had for some time been offering active support to the government in Nouakchott. Algerian teachers, together with advisers in water resources, fishing, commerce, transport, and telecommunications, had set up and manned a large part of the machinery of the as yet emergent Mauritanian state. The Algerian career diplomat, Salih Benkobbi, who was Algeria’s ambassador to Mauritania, describes in his memoirs how Mauritania’s currency, the “ouguiya”, was initially minted and printed in Algiers. Algeria also helped to establish the Mauritanian police force and army.9 In December 1970, in another project, an Algerian delegation would conduct a study of the port of Nouakchott, and examine the feasibility of a road to link Tindouf to the Mauritanian city of Moghrein.10 In May 1970, a further significant step was taken when it was King Hassan’s turn to visit Algeria. During his visit to Tlemcen on 27 –8 May, he signed the Tlemcen Agreement, which provided for joint exploitation of the rich deposits of iron ore at Ghar Djebilat in the border area close to Tindouf. Since the agreement implied Algeria’s sovereignty of the region, it seemed that King Hassan had finally renounced to his territorial claims. In June, the Mauritanian leader Ould Daddah visited Casablanca, where he and King Hassan signed a treaty providing for mutual support, good neighborliness and economic cooperation. With de´tente progressing apace, with Algeria in the driving seat, Boumediene believed the time was ripe for a tripartite meeting to discuss the Western Sahara issue. Hassan Fassi, the Moroccan Consul in Oran, was with the King’s delegation in Tlemcen. As he saw it, major concessions were made at the meeting by both leaders. His belief was that the reason Morocco accepted Algeria’s principle of settling frontier disputes on the basis of colonial borders was a quid pro quo in return for Algeria’s acquiescence in Morocco’s claim to Spanish Sahara, and for Algeria’s agreement to the joint exploitation of the mineral deposits along the southern section of the border between the two countries, which had been one of the motives for Morocco’s original incursion.11 The Moroccan prime minister, Azzedine Laraki, speaking to Stuart

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Rockwell, the US ambassador, took a similar view. As he put it, “Morocco can now be sure of the total support of Algeria as regards Spanish Sahara.” Acknowledging the significance of the outcome of the Tlemcen meeting, and noting the Istiqlal party’s disapproval of the agreement, for which it paid with the imposition of censorship on its daily newspaper, Al Alam, Rockwell suggested the US view should be “cautious optimism.”12 In Algiers, however, the reaction to the Tlemcen meeting was hedged around with reservations. Local press coverage was more extensive than in Morocco, with positive comment on what was described as the “definitive” settlement of the border problem that had led to the 1963 desert war.13 For William Eagleton, the head of the US Interests Section in Algiers, “agreement on coordination [of] action re Spanish Sahara could mean much or little, depending on what GOA [the Government of Algeria] and GOM [the Government of Morocco] have in mind.”14 The communique´ issued after the Tlemcen meeting did not make specific reference to the “Spanish Sahara” but spoke instead about “territories occupied by Spain,” thus implicitly including enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in the north of Morocco. The communique´ referred to “the UN resolution relative to these territories” and the “principle of self-determination” as underpinning the joint decision to “coordinate . . . action to liberate and guarantee the decolonization of these territories.”15 Bearing this in mind, Boumediene’s presidential adviser Smail Hamdani had told William Eagleton, five days after the Tlemcen meeting, that “Algeria would not be at all averse to a process resulting in an independent Spanish Sahara.”16 When Eagleton raised the possibility of the partition of the Spanish colony between Morocco and Mauritania, Hamdani answered him that “another possibility was an independent Saharan territory.”17 Clearly the four-hour private conversation between Boumediene and King Hassan at Tlemcen, in addition to the subsequent meetings between the Algerian and Moroccan delegations to draft the final communique´, had produced an ambiguous document that was understood in each capital in the way the respective leaderships would have hoped. For Rabat, the agreement was taken to mean that Algeria would support Morocco’s claims over the Spanish territory. In Algiers, however, it was assumed to signify a definitive settlement of the frontier problems (and even conceivably the problem of the

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Spanish enclaves) in return for the joint development of the border mineral deposits, within a general framework of Maghreb economic cooperation. Across the Mediterranean, Madrid was watching this rapprochement between Algeria and Morocco with growing concern. In February 1972, the Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo arrived in Algiers with an offer of technical and economic aid, in an effort to “moderate” Algeria’s position on the Spanish Sahara issue. Despite the enthusiasm over this initiative shown by Carlos De Urgoiti, the Spanish Consul General, Robert Maxim, the US Consul in Oran, reported to Washington casting doubt on its usefulness.18 Meanwhile, in Libya, Qaddafi was still looking towards Libya’s eastern Arab neighbors and in 1969, 1971, and again in 1972, he had continued to experiment with short-lived unions with Egypt, Syria, and Sudan. What did the new agreement on the borders concluded at Tlemcen on 27 May 1970 truly mean for the two parties? Certainly, progress thereafter was slow. The first follow-up meeting was held on 14 September 1970 at Nouadhibou, in Mauritania, when the leaders of Morocco and Algeria were joined by the Mauritanian president to discuss a common strategy for the decolonization of Western Sahara. The principle agreed at this meeting was decolonization through selfdetermination but the meeting was brief, however, since none of the three leaders were anxious to discuss the matter in detail while the newly established atmosphere of de´tente in the Maghreb was not yet fully entrenched. They contented themselves on this occasion with an agreement on the general principle of self-determination.19 However, on 12 June 1972, when the Ninth OAU summit was due to open in Rabat, bringing Boumediene and King Hassan together in the presence of their African peers, there seemed to be a propitious occasion for progress to be made. Algeria, which had been anxious to move forward from the Tlemcen Agreement to a definitive frontier accord, believed the moment had come when a final settlement with Morocco would be possible. A week earlier Boumediene had been passing through Nouakchott on his way back from an official visit to Guinea when Ahmed Taibi Benhima, the Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, telephoned Salih Benkobbi, the Algerian ambassador to Mauritania, to ask when Boumediene would arrive in Rabat for the African meeting. Boumediene was irritated by Benhima’s query and said to Benkobbi, “first, ask him whether they are ready to sign the border agreement, then we can talk about it when I arrive in

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Morocco.” Half an hour later, Benhima called back confirming King Hassan’s decision to sign the treaty.20 This story can now be verified by reference to the telegram sent to Washington by Stuart Rockwell, the US ambassador, in which he reported that Boumediene left Rabat on 6 June “after [an] unexpected 22 hour visit at the end of his trip to Mauritania.” The same day Rabat issued a joint communique´ confirming the agreement would be signed at the closure of the 9th OAU Conference.21 On 15 June, the final day of the OAU conference, as promised, an agreement embodying a precise demarcation of the Algerian-Moroccan border in the disputed region based on the Tlemcen Agreement was signed by Boumediene and King Hassan. On this occasion, the three leaders also discussed the future of Western Sahara, but once more the public declarations stopped short of going into details. On a broader issue, King Hassan affirmed his willingness to become involved in a Maghreb Union, which could even include Libya, as he put it, “if one day it wished to.” Boumediene, for his part, expressed “total solidarity with fraternal Morocco in its struggle to re-establish its sovereignty over its territories which are still under colonial domination.” This statement at the closing session of the summit could have been even more acceptable to King Hassan were it not for Boumediene’s specific reservation regarding the Western Sahara issue. As he said, “For the Sahara, which still carries a colonial name, the moment has come to apply the policy of liberation we set at Nouadhibou.”22 The tripartite agreement in Nouadhibou in 1970, it should be recalled, laid stress on self-determination. However, in June 1972 the King, who had faced an attempted coup d’e´tat the previous year, was still feeling insecure. Members of his armed forces had tried to kill him at his 42nd birthday party at his palace at the seaside resort of Skhirat and he had narrowly escaped a massacre in which 92 people died while other troops fought to seize the radio station and other objectives in Rabat. In addition, the political opposition in Morocco was challenging his authority and he did not feel sure of the result of a referendum. By early 1973, Western Sahara again began to emerge as a problem undermining relations between the three Maghreb states. Boumediene, Ould Daddah and King Hassan, who had in August 1972 faced another attempted coup, when Moroccan air force planes tried to shoot him down as he returned from France, began to have doubts about each other’s intentions with regard to the future of the

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Spanish colony. Anxiety about Western Sahara’s fate particularly affected Morocco and Mauritania. On 3 March 1973, leftist dissidents in Morocco attempted to strike yet another blow at the King when they launched a number of armed operations in the middle and high Atlas regions. A brutal crackdown followed. The “Union National des Forces Populaires” (UNFP) bore the brunt of the King’s wrath, and its Rabat branch was blamed for what had become known as the “3 March Plot”. It was alleged at the trials that were held in Kenitra and Casablanca that the perpetrators were part of a clandestine organization, formed in 1966 in Paris and Oran, who had received training in Libya. While the King was sure that Algeria had nothing to do with the coup attempts of 1971 and 1972, on this occasion he was convinced the UNFP elements in Rabat had been trained in Libya and had infiltrated into Morocco through Algeria.23 No Algerian source throws any light on this affair. The foreign ministers of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania had held a preparatory meeting in May 1973 in Nouakchott. The Moroccan position appeared to harden when it did not ratify the border demarcation and the plan for joint exploitation of the Ghar Djebilat mines, unlike Algeria, which did so.24 Though King Hassan’s pretext was that the Moroccan parliament had been dissolved, following the failed second coup against him in August 1972, it was clear that the Tlemcen Agreement was not popular in Morocco. Commenting on the issue US ambassador Rockwell concluded that King Hassan “wants, among other things, a more forthcoming Algerian attitude on Spanish Sahara and subversion from Libya.”25 On 23–4 July 1973, the three heads of state of Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania met once more at the Agadir Summit, which coincided with Madrid’s replacement of its foreign affairs minister Lopez Bravo. At Agadir, the three Maghreb leaders renewed their consensus in support of self-determination in the Spanish Sahara colony.26 According to a confidential report by Stuart Rockwell, the King went further at Agadir, saying he could not tolerate any kind of Algerian hegemony in the Sahara, explicit or implicit, and would rather it remained with Spain, while reproaching Boumediene for supposedly making claims on the Sahara. The Moroccan foreign minister accused Algiers of wanting the Sahara to give Algeria what he called “a window on the Atlantic.”27 The economic importance of the Western Sahara began at around this time to be underscored by new geological discoveries.

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The territory covers an area of some 266,000 square kilometers, slightly more than the area of Great Britain, and according to the census conducted by Spain in 1974 its population consisted of 73,497 persons. It has a coastline of 700 kilometers on the Atlantic Ocean and is rich in phosphates, which are exploited at the gigantic mines at Bou Craa.28 Spain’s discovery of the phosphate deposits at Bou Craa, which were valued in 1972 at over $100 billion, placed the future of the territory in a new geopolitical context as well as exacerbating the competition between Rabat and Nouakchott over its future and the possibility of its annexation. It should be noted that Algeria never laid claim to the territory and had always abided by the OAU’s fundamental principle of the inviolability of borders established during the colonial era. The Bou Craa deposits matched the entirety of Morocco’s other phosphate production at the time, while the iron ore reserves discovered at the Rio de Oro region were estimated at 70,000 tons. Madrid set up its own company, ENMINSA, in order to inaugurate the exploitation of the huge deposits.29 On the political level, the competition between the three Maghreb capitals to strike up relationships with Sahrawi nationalist movements rendered yet more visible the widening cracks in Maghreb de´tente; despite the attempt by Algiers, Rabat and Nouakchott to present their by now customary unified front. In practice, there was accelerating competition between the three countries to help to found and to host a Sahrawi liberation movement that could claim to be authentically representative of the territory. In July 1972, in Rabat, Bachir Figuigui created the “Mouvement de Resistance des Hommes Bleus” (MOREHOB). Figuigui went by the pseudonym of Edouard Moha. In March 1973, he transferred his base to Algiers, where he was allowed to set up office. This episode remains a subject for heated debate. Some Sahrawis saw Moha as a Moroccan agent sent by the palace simply to disrupt the efforts of El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed, who had at around the same time been working towards the establishment in Algiers of what would in due course become the Polisario Front. This view gained more credibility since MOREHOB never conducted any guerrilla operations. This aroused the suspicions of the Algerian leadership regarding Moha’s objectives, and he was subsequently compelled to leave Algeria.30 In Nouakchott, meanwhile, the “Front de Liberation du Sahara sous Domination Coloniale Espagnole” (FLS) was of long standing,

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having been carrying out anti-Spanish attacks since 1966. David Lynn Price, a former British diplomat, believed the FLS was “probably the first of the anti-Spanish liberation movements.” Price argued that the FLS was present at the UN when the Sahara issue was first raised as a decolonization issue and that the FLS called on that occasion for the territory’s independence.31 The FLS, however, was dissolved following Morocco’s recognition of Mauritania in 1969. In 1974, the “Partido de la Union Nacional Sahraui” (PUNS) headed by Khalihenna Ould Rachid, a graduate of Madrid University, was set up in El-Ayoun, the capital of the Spanish Sahara colony, with Spanish backing, with the objective of fostering economic cooperation with Spain in a future independent Sahrawi state.32 In March 1975, in Rabat, the “Front de Liberation et de l’Unite” (FLU) was set up in Rabat. On 21 March, Radio Rabat announced that the FLU’s mission was to “destroy Spanish colonialism in order to reunite the territory with the Moroccan motherland.” Three days later, the radio station run by the Spanish authorities in El-Ayoun responded that the Sahrawi people would not rally behind what it called a “bogus organization” created by Morocco.33 The FLU’s guerrilla groups, whose personnel were in fact members of the Moroccan armed forces, did in fact conduct a number of subversive operations against Spanish positions. However, the organization disappeared following the tripartite partition Madrid Agreement, in late 1974.34 Finally, on 10 May 1973, the “Frente popular de Liberacio´n de Saguia el-Hamra y Rio de Oro” (POLISARIO Front) was founded by a group of Sahrawi students and intellectuals based in Mauritania and led by El-Ouali Mustaph Sayed.35 The Polisario Front was joined by Ahmed-Baba Miske´ and Ibrahim Hakim, two Mauritanian career diplomats who rejected the Mauritanian-Moroccan plans for the partition of Western Sahara. Miske´ was an eminent writer, journalist and politician and Hakim was charge´ d’affaires at the Mauritanian embassy in Algiers. Hakim had graduated from Algiers University and held a senior post at the “Banque Internationale de Mauritanie” (BIM).36 From 1975 on, both Miske´ and Hakim played a major role in the Polisario Front’s diplomatic offensive. The charismatic leader of the Polisario Front, however, was El-Ouali Mustaph Sayed, from the Sahrawi Reguibi tribe. Eventually, after his death in combat on 9 June 1976 he came to be regarded as a martyr and as the symbol of Sahrawi nationalism. After his very difficult childhood in the southern part of

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the Spanish Sahara, El-Ouali’s family moved north to Morocco. In 1970, he enroled to study law at Mohammed V University in Rabat after passing his school exams with distinction. This was the year of the bloody events of the so-called Zemla intifada, when Spanish police in a region near El-Ayoun crushed a movement known as the “Harakat Tahrir” (the Freedom Movement) that had hoped to peacefully oppose the Spanish occupation. This awakened El-Ouali’s interest in politics and the fate of the Sahrawi people to whom he belonged. He sought support from a number of leftist Moroccan parties such as the FLS, the Istiqlal Party and the UNFP. In February 1972 an offer made by the Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi to the Mauritanian leader Ould Daddah to help liberate the Sahara territory by military means could have compromised the El-Ouali’s independence, but Nouakchott, where he was based, declined Tripoli’s offer.37 By the end of 1972, El-Ouali had become convinced of the inevitability of armed struggle if the independence of the Sahrawi territory was to be achieved, and after unsuccessful approaches in Algiers and Tripoli he sought and obtained support from Mauritania.38 On 20 May 1973, the Polisario Front, whose explicit goal was independence, carried out its first attack against a Spanish garrison. From then on, the movement’s activity continued.39 In contrast to widespread belief, the Algerian leadership had actually begun by giving cautious support to MOREHOB and in late 1972 it was still shunning attempts by El-Ouali to make contact with the Algerian authorities. In 1973, El-Ouali was actually detained in Algeria. In fact, Polisario was snubbed and sometimes even persecuted by Algerian authorities, as Boumediene’s media adviser Amimour and Le Monde’s then correspondent in Algiers Paul Balta have both noted.40 This behavior on Algeria’s part can no doubt be traced to the fact that MOREHOB had already opened its office in Algiers, just two months before Polisario was set up. According to Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, the Algerian leadership’s initial hesitation in supporting Polisario was due to its desire “to avoid Algeria becoming the origin of an interMaghreb crisis.”41 The complexity of the situation demands a closer examination of the motivation of the three countries in relation to the future of Western Sahara. Of course, for Rabat, the importance of the Spanish colony was greatly enhanced by the discovery of its extensive phosphate deposits,

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which utterly transformed the territory’s economic potential. Morocco’s traditional claim had been based on the supposed historical allegiance to Morocco of the Sahrawi tribes, which was given a framework by the Istiqlal Party’s “Greater Morocco” thesis which it developed in 1956. In addition, given the increasing political instability in Morocco, and the determination of the opposition to overthrow the monarchy, King Hassan needed a clear cause around which he could rally the people and regain their support, hopefully thus outflanking the opposition and regaining the initiative. In the 1970s, when the UNFP-Rabat and the students union, the “Union Nationale des Etudiants Marocains” (UNEM), were dissolved, with many of their members imprisoned on charges of plotting to overthrow the monarchy, leaders of the political opposition, including the UNFP itself, were sent abroad by Hassan to gather international support for the right of Morocco to annex the Saharan territory. M’Hamed Boucetta, who became secretary-general of the Istiqlal Party in 1974 after the death of its historic leader El-Fassi, together with another Istiqlal figure, Boubkel Al-Khadiri, were sent off to Africa, while Maati Bouabid of the UNFP, who had held the post of minister of labor in 1958 –60, toured China, Pakistan and India. Bouabid, incidentally, was later to be prime minister, from 1979 to 1983. The veteran communist leader Ali Yata, who had since 1940 headed pro-Moscow communist parties in Morocco, such as the “Parti Communiste Marocain” (PCM, banned in 1960), the “Parti de Libe´ration et du Socialisme” (PLS, banned in 1969), and the “Parti du Progre`s et du Socialisme” (PPS, founded 1974), was recruited to enlist the support of the socialist bloc. While such diplomatic offensives and internal maneuvers were under way, King Hassan ordered the execution of seven members of the UNFP party, sentenced in March 1973 for their alleged part in the attempted coup of 1972.42 Following the coup attempts in 1971 and 1972, and in the context of ongoing subversive activities, it became a necessity for the future of the embattled King to secure the future of the Western Sahara as a part of Morocco. It would scarcely be going too far to say it was vital for the very survival of the monarchist regime. Such was the pressure on King Hassan that the October War of 1973 was almost an opportune development, in that it shifted the focus of domestic indignation to the conflict in the Middle East. The death in May 1974 of Allal El-Fassi, the Istiqlal leader who had been the staunchest advocate of the

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Greater Morocco philosophy, meant that the King was now obliged to carry through Morocco’s annexation of the Western Sahara out of respect for the dead statesman’s memory. Any show of weakness on his part would at this point have been virtual political suicide. By this time, even the principle of a referendum on the issue of selfdetermination was no longer an option for Rabat. On 20 August 1974, King Hassan addressed the nation, rejecting any process of decolonization that would not lead to the “return” of the Western Sahara to Morocco. As he put it, “Morocco prefers the diplomatic, political and peaceful path, but if those do not lead to the recovery of its territories, it will not hesitate to use other means.”43 The following day, Spain announced its intention to hold a referendum in Western Sahara in 1975. Another cardinal determinant of Morocco’s position was its growing concern over Algeria’s dominant role in the Maghreb and in the Third World in general. Rabat feared the ability of Algiers to mobilize its diplomatic machinery and its oil wealth to influence the outcome of the Western Sahara question, thus delivering the territory’s independence. King Hassan probably felt by now that Morocco’s recognition of Mauritania in 1969, a move made under Algerian pressure, had already been a costly concession. To permit a repetition of that episode, the King must have conjectured, could spell the end of his monarchy. Influential Moroccan decision makers were convinced of the truth of the theory that Algeria wished to gain a hegemonic position in the Western Sahara in order to obtain thereby the “window on the Atlantic” that had been referred to at Agadir in 1973. They believed that in practical terms Algeria hoped to secure a shorter transit to the sea for the shipment of its exports of iron ore from the Ghar Djebilat mines in Tindouf. Moroccan concern about what Rabat saw as the machinations of Algeria went back to the experience of Abdelatif Filali, the Moroccan minister of foreign affairs in 1971 –2. He had been shocked to hear Bouteflika tell him in Algiers that, “this territory must be decolonized as soon as possible. It can be recovered by Morocco or Mauritania. It can also return to Algeria. What matters is to decolonize it.” Filali reported this exchange to the King. For Filali the only explanation for Algeria’s attitude was “the ambition to make Algeria the leader of the region.”44 What Morocco was apparently unaware of, however, was that it had more of a friend in Algeria than it knew. Since the first attempted

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coup against King Hassan, Boumediene had been firmly of the opinion that the stability of the Moroccan monarchy was in the strategic interest of Algeria. A military coup in Rabat, bringing to power a new republican regime, could bring the end of de´tente in the Maghreb. Worse, it could even lead to military confrontation, at a time when Algeria was putting all its resources and effort into the Four-Year development plans. That Boumediene held such views was demonstrated by the strong role he had played in defusing the crisis between Rabat and Tripoli. Libya was actively and overtly supporting the Moroccan opposition. Boumediene was aware of the Moroccan monarchy’s acute vulnerability following the two attempted coups in the space of 14 months. It was for this reason that Algeria acted to strengthen Hassan’s grip on the throne with its offer to Rabat of joint exploitation of the border iron ore deposits, a move welcome to the Moroccan population. Given the weakness of Morocco’s economy, it was obvious that the major share of the financial burden of the project would have to be borne by Algeria. The Algerian leadership believed that, “King [Hassan] is needed in Morocco to hold together [a] population which has not yet developed a national identity,” as Smail Hamdani told William Eagleton few days after the Boumediene-Hassan meeting in Tlemcen on 27 –8 May 1970.45 On the other hand, in June 1971, just a month before the attempted coup at Skhirat, Stuart Rockwell, the US ambassador in Morocco, was told by officials at the Algerian Presidency, in a somewhat contradictory statement, that “the form of government in Morocco was of no concern to Algeria.”46 Morocco, however, was certainly not grateful for any Algerian benevolence, pragmatic as it might be and however grudgingly extended. Algeria ratified the agreement on border demarcation and the joint exploitation of mineral deposits in May 1973, but as has been pointed out, Rabat dragged its feet. This behavior raised concerns in Algiers as to King Hassan’s real intentions. It was becoming increasingly difficult for Algiers to continue to give Rabat the benefit of the doubt by explaining erratic actions on the part of the King as a consequence of instability occasioned by the internal challenges to the monarchy. Meanwhile, Algeria simply brushed aside Moroccan allegations that it was seeking a maritime outlet on the Atlantic. The Algerian government pointed to the fact that the Tlemcen Agreement already provided for the shipment of minerals

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through Morocco as part of the joint exploitation deal, which was all that Algeria needed. Indeed, Morocco was aware of this, as has been conceded by Ahmed Taibi Benhima, the former Moroccan minister of foreign affairs.47 By 1975, there was evidence that Algeria was not in fact seeking a route to the Atlantic, when it became clear that it planned to manufacture steel itself at Tindouf and transport it northwards towards the Mediterranean. On 26 February 1975, Belaid Abdesselam, Algeria’s Minister of Energy and Industry, told Richard Parker, the new US ambassador in Algeria since the resumption of relations, and Alfred Atherton, the US Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, that “feasibility studies are being made now,” for the construction of a $10 million steel plant by an American company at the Tindouf mine, whose output would be supplied to a steel mill complex to be built near the northwest port of Oran.48 Throughout this period, Algeria’s stated position on the Western Sahara was that it should be granted self-determination. The development project launched in 1970 was based on the threetrack strategy Boumediene had formulated in early 1969. For Boumediene, no outside circumstance should be allowed to interfere with the overall strategy of development. This was the rationale for Algeria’s pursuit of its own rapprochement with Morocco, and its promotion of Morocco’s rapprochement with Mauritania. All was conducted in the interest of preserving the de´tente that was the necessary background for Algeria’s development plans. The decolonization of Spanish Sahara, in Boumediene’s calculations, would also strengthen Maghreb de´tente and cooperation. However, Algeria did not wish to take its support of Saharan decolonization to the extent of becoming involved. Instead, it limited its involvement to joint diplomatic efforts. This explains Algeria’s lack of enthusiasm in 1972 –4 for the Polisario Front’s solicitation of active and material support. Boumediene believed that a conflict on Algeria’s western border would detract from his plans in two ways. He felt it might push King Hassan, already weakened by internal dissent, into a military adventure on his frontiers to shore up his throne on the basis of patriotic fervor. This would damage de´tente. And secondly, it would simply be a drain on Algeria’s budget, diverting funds from the execution of the country’s development project. In his memoirs former Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid (1979 –92) discloses that Moroccan officers approached him on two separate occasions, while

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on visits to Morocco, in which they sounded Algeria’s readiness to support them in toppling King Hassan. The contacts were rebuffed by Bendjedid on clear instructions from Boumediene.49 Reflecting on this period, the former Algerian ambassador and international statesman Lakhdar Brahimi made the following comment to the author: Brahimi: . . . two attempts on the life of the King of Morocco in 1971 and 1972, twice, that really made a rapprochement between Algeria and the Moroccan establishment. But, at the same time, it disappointed the opposition in Morocco. They were expecting rather stupidly that the Algerians would help overthrow the King. I think Boumediene was extremely wise; that’s not a game that you play with your neighbors, because you know that you get rid of him, but you don’t know what will happen and Morocco is a difficult place, it will blow very high and you do not want anarchy on your borders. So he didn’t play that game. Author: So Boumediene sent a clear signal that [he would help the King} . . .? Brahimi: Oh yes, 100 per cent; the King told me, just a couple of years ago, no I mean before he died.50 As regards Spain’s position, developments in neighboring Portugal, where the decolonization process of its own African colonies was under way, inevitably influenced Spain’s options with regard to the Sahara territory, especially at a time when the health of General Franco, the Spanish leader, was deteriorating, thus causing apprehension in Spain as to internal stability. At the same time, the increasing number of attacks by the Polisario Front was driving Spain to conclude that its occupation could not continue and that what it needed was an honorable exit strategy. Spain was in favor of a referendum and in mid-1974 declared that it would hold one of its own in 1975. Madrid wanted an independent Western Sahara that would look towards Spain rather than to any of its Maghreb neighbors, given the huge discoveries of phosphates, and the investment it had already made in its colony. Spain’s hope was that

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this could be established in the framework of a post-colonial cooperation agreement, such as France’s zone of influence in subSahara Africa or Britain’s Commonwealth, perhaps through the agency of the pro-independence PUNS party, which was inclined towards Madrid.51 In Mauritania, President Mokhtar Ould Daddah was also considering his next move. Like Morocco, Mauritania relied on arguments of historical attachment and tribal affiliation to justify its claim to the former Spanish colony. The Bou Craa phosphate deposits, if acquired by Nouakchott, would propel Mauritania to the level of one of the world’s major phosphate exporters. The Polisario Front, which was increasingly emerging as the leading Sahrawi independence movement, was based in Mauritania, which led Nouakchott to believe it could reach some accommodation. There was, however, a problem for Mauritania, since in an increasingly confrontational atmosphere between Morocco and Algeria it was becoming evident that it would soon need to choose which side to support, though so far, as the most recent addition to the Maghreb family, it had maintained good relations since its independence with both Morocco and Algeria. President Ould Daddah, however, would soon have to make a decision. When the moment came, he seems to have calculated that he could not mount a challenge to Morocco, given the large support King Hassan had already garnered through his diplomatic offensive within the Arab world, and that his only option was to come to an agreement with King Hassan when he visited Morocco on 10 August 1974. The Algerian leadership was surprised by Ould Daddah’s sudden defection and his alliance with King Hassan. Nevertheless, Boumediene decided to hold back while the UN fact-finding mission and the International Court of Justice undertook their mandated tasks.52 On 20 August 1974, Spain announced a referendum would be held the following year. On 9 September, Ould Daddah arrived in Rabat, where he made a deal with King Hassan to file a joint challenge to Madrid’s decision at the ICJ. This was a departure from the consensus of the three countries that had hitherto prevailed at all the OAU, Islamic Conference and Arab League summits since Naouadhibou in 1970. On 9 –10 December 1974, Ould Daddah met King Hassan in Fez to coordinate their joint approach to the ICJ. Boumediene appeared at this stage to acquiesce in the plans being made by Morocco and Mauritania. On 9 October 1974, at the Seventh

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Arab Summit in Rabat, Boumediene, speaking behind closed doors, reportedly said, “from now on the problem concerns Mauritania and Morocco. I agree . . . If the president and the King adopt a formula for an accord between the two countries to undertake the liberation and delimitation of what will be Morocco’s zone and what will be Mauritania’s zone then I will be among those who adopt this formula.”53 At the peak of the Western Sahara conflict three years later, this statement was leaked to Maroc-Soir, a Moroccan daily newspaper that was close to the palace. Hassan hoped to embarrass Boumediene and to undermine the moral case for Algeria’s support for the principle of self-determination and decolonization through armed liberation. In 1975, Mohamed Salah, Minister of State in the Mauritanian government, told Le Monde that Boumediene would not have made such a statement had he not known that Spain was in any case determined to bring into being an independent Western Sahara state through a secret deal between Spain, Algeria and Polisario.54 Salah claimed that an agreement finalizing this plan was made in early 1975, while Boumediene’s statement was made on 9 October 1974. On 16 October 1975, the UN Visiting Mission announced its conclusion that there was genuine Sahrawi nationalism and that the desire of the Sahrawis was independence. On the following day, the ICJ published its “Advisory Opinion”. King Hassan was disturbed to discover that his plan to outflank the referendum by seeking endorsement at the ICJ of Rabat’s claim to have historical and tribal links with the Western Sahara had backfired. In fact, the ICJ opinion was as follows: . . . the court’s conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of selfdetermination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory.55 Faced with this ruling, the King made a speech to the Moroccan people, aired a few hours after the ICJ’s announcement, in which he

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claimed, with no foundation in fact, that the ICJ had recognized Morocco’s sovereignty over Western Sahara. Then he put into action the plan for the so-called “Green March”. The Moroccan authorities set about mustering a vast horde of Moroccan citizens to stage a peaceful march into Western Sahara, to give the appearance of expressing the will of the Moroccan people to reunite it with what the King now began to describe as the motherland. Abdelatif Filali, Morocco’s ambassador to Spain at the time, in the memoirs he published a year before he died, frankly admitted that the move had no basis in the ICJ ruling. As he said, “in the absence of a clear ruling [from the ICJ] we were obliged to imagine another solution in order to recapture the Sahara. This was the ‘Green March.’”56 The ICJ opinion became the basis of the UN Security Council Resolutions 377 of 22 October 1975, 379 of 2 November, and 380 of 6 November 1975, all of which called on Hassan to halt the “Green March”.57 Nevertheless, on 6 November 1975, an estimated 350,000 marchers crossed the border of the Spanish colony. In Spain, a week earlier, General Franco had fallen into coma, causing political uncertainty and indecision in Madrid. The “Green March” was called off three days later, after negotiations between Morocco and Spain. During the three days of the “Green March”, intensive diplomatic activity also took place in the three Maghreb capitals, as well as in Madrid and Washington. Word came to Boumediene that Hassan and Ould Daddah were putting the final touches to a plan to partition the colony. Boumediene moved quickly to isolate Hassan by convening an urgent meeting with Ould Daddah, which was held in the Algerian town of Bechar, near Tindouf, on 10 November. Boumediene’s aim was to sever the Madrid-Rabat-Nouakchott axis. Much has been said about the stormy, five-hour meeting the two leaders held in Bechar on 10 November 1975. What is certain is that Boumediene felt betrayed by Ould Daddah, as he confided to TalebIbrahimi. Boumediene also made the somewhat ambiguous comment that, “we should tolerate Mauritania which has national forces which are hostile to Ould Daddah’s adventurism.”58 For Salih Benkobbi, the Algerian ambassador to Mauritania, the failure of the ill-tempered encounter was due to a misunderstanding on Ould Daddah’s part of Boumediene’s motives in inviting him. Ould Daddah thought the invitation, issued after news of the partition agreement between Mauritania and Morocco had been leaked, was an indication that

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Algiers would give its blessing to the agreement and was looking forward to strengthening its relations with Nouakchott. Ould Daddah therefore had no hesitation in accepting the invitation. Boumediene, however, had understood Ould Daddah’s acceptance as an indication that Nouakchott might switch sides again. As Salih Benkobbi saw it, the misunderstanding was basically a failure of communication.59 No doubt it contributed to dissatisfaction with Ould Daddah within Mauritania that was to culminate in his deposition in a military coup on 10 July 1978. Some observers have even suggested that Boumediene’s vague statement relating to what he described as hostile national forces in Mauritania was more than merely a prediction which happened to come true. In 1977, reflecting on the episode in an interview he gave to Le Nouvel Observateur, Ould Daddah revealed that Boumediene warned him that were he not to extricate himself from the partition plan then Algeria would back Polisario with its full force and Ould Daddah’s government would bear the brunt of Algeria’s wrath.60 Bendjedid’s memoirs are straightforward on what happened during that meeting which he attended a part of. Bendjedid disclosed that, “Boumediene considered Ould Daddah’s reversal of position a stab in the back and a betrayal to his commitments to Algeria . . . . Since then Boumediene gave his instructions to support the Mauritanian opposition until Ould Daddah was toppled in July 1978.”61 On 14 November 1975, despite Algeria’s warnings, a tripartite agreement was concluded between Madrid, Rabat and Nouakchott providing for the joint administration of the Western Sahara by Morocco and Mauritania until 28 February 1976. This became known as the Madrid Accords. Spain would then withdraw from the colony. As Moroccan army units moved in to occupy the Spanish posts and garrisons, thousands of Sahrawis fled to neighboring Algeria, where refugee camps started to take shape in Tindouf. The details of the Madrid Accords were kept secret and only a “Declaration of Principles” was made public. Among the detailed provisions, in return for handing over the territory to Rabat and Nouakchott, it was agreed that Spain would obtain the continuation of its fishing rights off the Western Sahara’s Atlantic coastline as well as concessions covering 35 per cent of the production of phosphates. On 25 November, ten days later, in another concession to Spain, King Hassan announced at a press conference that Morocco would withdraw its claims to the

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enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in northern Morocco, which were under Spanish control, until such time as Spain recovered Gibraltar.62 Boumediene felt as if he had been doubly betrayed. First, he had been traduced by Ould Daddah, to whose regime Algeria had given strong diplomatic and economic support; and secondly by King Hassan, who could not have retained his throne were it not for Algeria’s decision to refrain from supporting either the Moroccan opposition or Qaddafi’s subversive plans. Beyond the bitterness of betrayal, however, Boumediene’s major concern at this stage was that the partition agreement agreed with Madrid would inevitably have repercussions on Maghreb de´tente, a keystone of Algerian policy in which Algeria, under his leadership, had invested much time, effort and resources since 1969. The crisis came at a crucial time for Algeria, a key participant in the North-South dialogue, since Algeria held the presidency of the Non-Aligned Conference and was due to retain it for a further year. Boumediene’s reaction was calculated against the background of these concerns. However, despite Hassan’s declaration of victory, Boumediene continued to believe the crisis could be defused by diplomatic means and that all was not yet lost. As Boumediene saw it, the affair was also highly relevant to his relations with the US. He was convinced that the so-called “Green March”, in relation to which the UN had passed emollient resolutions, would not have been possible without Washington’s tacit approval. Boumediene’s belief was not diminished by the ostensibly neutral position adopted by the US administration of President Ford. He was certain that the intention was to obstruct the role played by Algeria in Third World and Middle East policies. As Boumediene told Le Nouvel Observateur, “while I have been fighting for non-alignment they try, from all sides, to isolate Algeria.”63 The Algerian leadership began to see conspiracies. There was a widespread conviction that actions apparently taken to the detriment of Algeria were payback for the determining role Algiers had played in the Algiers Agreement, reached at the end of the first OPEC Summit, held in Algiers from 4 to 6 March, which had brought about reconciliation between Iraq and Iran. The Algerian leadership was particularly hurt by the position of the PLO, which, in common with most of the Arab states, had supported King Hassan, and had even sent a token contingent to take part in the “Green March”. On 9 December, Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, in a meeting with the PLO’s representative Abou

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Khalil, inquired rhetorically whether the Palestinians were, “oblivious to the international repercussions of this crisis and its negative fallouts on the Palestinian cause, should the Algerian Revolution become caught up in a war in this western wing of the Arab world?”64 On 15 November, the day after the agreement of the Madrid Accords, the Polisario leader El-Ouali Mustapha Sayed declared in Algiers that Polisario regarded them to be “null and void and . . . an act of aggression and plunder.” Algeria backed him fully.65 It should be noted that Edouard Moha of MOREHOB had been in Rabat from the beginning of the crisis in late summer, which tended to reinforce Algeria’s doubts about his true motives.66 Henceforth, Algeria gave its full backing to Polisario,67 and the “Voice of the Free Sahara” soon became the newest recruit to the liberation movements that were making radio broadcasts from Algiers. At the beginning of the crisis in October, Revolution Africaine gave its editorial the evocative headline, “Let us Not Waken the Demons.” By mid-December, however, the demons were well and truly woken: the Western Sahara crisis had shattered de´tente in the Maghreb.68 On 1 December 1975, Algerian diplomats at the United Nations succeeded on obtaining the passage of UN General Assembly Resolution 3458, which favored self-determination in the Western Sahara. Boumediene was once more fighting his corner. The fact that Washington backed, on 10 December, the pro-Moroccan UNGA resolution, 3458B, but abstained on the Algerian-supported 3458A, was another proof, Boumediene believed, of a reactionary plot on the part of the US and Morocco against Algeria, as a Third World leader.69 The MauritanianMoroccan agreement to partition Western Sahara represented by the Madrid Accords in fact marked the end of an era in Maghreb cooperation, at a very critical moment for Algeria’s modernization endeavor. The crisis, and its effect on Algeria’s standing as the leader of the Third World movement, would impact both on the country’s development strategy and on its relations with the US.

An Unexpected Watershed If the degree of change in the relationship between Algeria and the United States is to be appreciated, the evolution of the US-Algeria relationship during 1975, during the period when the Western Sahara crisis was coming to the boil, is of key importance. As 1975 began,

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Algeria was still in the early phases of its second Four-Year Plan, set to run from 1974 to 1977, within which a staggering $26 billion, which Algeria did not yet have, had been set aside for the construction of new industrial plants and development projects. As a result, Algeria was offering a wide range of investment and commercial opportunities to American private sector companies. US exports to Algeria doubled in 1975 to the staggering figure of $631 million, from $315 million in 1974. Meanwhile, US imports from Algeria rose in 1975 to $1.36 billion from $1.1 billion the previous year. More than 55 per cent of Algeria’s oil exports were going to the US, and 42 per cent of its LNG was being sold on the US market. These figures represented 8 per cent and 2 per cent respectively of America’s energy imports. This meant that the balance of trade was running in favor of Algeria, which was becoming dependent on the US energy market. In the construction sector, $6 billion worth of contracts were signed by 1976, of which one of the largest was a $400 million contract won by GTE Sylvania for the construction of an electronics factory in Sidi Bel Abbes in western Algeria. Another consequence was over a thousand Algerian students, engineers and technicians were being trained in the US as part of various cooperation projects.70 While commercial relations were booming, the political relationship between Algeria and the US was failing to keep step, owing to the confrontation between Washington and Algiers over the Algerian concept of a New International Economic Order, which Algiers wished to see instead of the kind of consumers’ cartel favored by the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. In 1975, having chaired the 29th regular session of the United Nations General Assembly the year before, Algeria chaired the seventh Special Session, which would be specifically devoted to development and international economic cooperation. Kissinger therefore had to find a way to persuade Algeria to compromise on the Conference on International Economic Cooperation he planned to hold in Paris by somehow incorporating Algeria’s ideas about a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The Conference was eventually held from 16 to 19 December that year. When Kissinger appointed Charles Robinson as his Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, replacing Tom Enders, he instructed Robinson “to take a more positive attitude towards this north-south dialogue.”71 The American sense that they were being outflanked with regard to the North-South dialogue was best summed up in the

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reminiscences of the US ambassador to Algeria, Richard Parker. “The Algerians were up to all sorts of trouble. They were behind the big debate, the north-south dialogue about sharing of technology and capital and so forth. They were really in our hair all over the place. The people in Washington were very irritated and very interested.”72 Parker was an Arabist who had served in the Middle East and was stationed in Rabat as deputy chief of mission before he was nominated to serve in Algiers. The “very irritated but very interested” attitude in Washington meant that Kissinger needed to cooperate with Boumediene, not only over the NIEO issue and matters concerned with the impending Paris conference but also, and probably more importantly, over Kissinger’s ongoing Middle East peace negotiations. On 24 December 1974, this had already led Kissinger to communicate directly with Boumediene, assuring him that “our objective is cooperation, not confrontation.” In the same letter to Boumediene, Kissinger set out the developed countries’ proposal for preparatory meetings on the NIEO with the representatives of the developing countries in mid-1975.73 Boumediene’s reply, on 16 January 1975, was that Algeria welcomed cooperation and dialogue on the NIEO; but only if issues relating to international development were also discussed and linked to the proposed energy conference for producers and consumers.74 Kissinger’s letter was followed up by a visit to Algeria by Charles Robinson in February 1975, when, in a meeting with Boumediene and Abdessalam, he tried to persuade Algiers to agree to the principles of Kissinger’s planned energy conference and its proposed schedule. Despite the conciliatory atmosphere Robinson maintained during the talks, as he had been instructed to do by Kissinger, Algiers did not budge. Robinson reported on 26 February that Abdessalam had asserted that, “Algeria will not follow this path and will fight any oil price reductions.” In addition, Algiers did not agree with Washington’s proposal to limit the preparatory conference to ten countries and wanted to see it enlarged to 27. In addition to the proposed commissions that would consider energy, development and commodities, Algeria wanted to add another that would consider reform of the IMF and the World Bank. Most importantly, Algeria was categorically opposed to any discussion of oil prices at such a conference, arguing that OPEC was the correct forum for this issue.75 The preparatory meeting for the conference took place in Paris from

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7 to 15 April, with Algeria representing the “South”, and on 15 July Charles Robinson again visited Algiers. Richard Parker warned Robinson ahead of his second visit that, “you will be laboring against a great burden of suspicion bordering on paranoia.”76 The essence of Parker’s warning was that Algeria would want to discuss the linkage of the political side of the North-South development dialogue to its economic aspects. The Algerian leadership suspected that Washington’s aim was to stay away from politics and broader issues, using the conference simply to undermine OPEC and cut oil prices. On 16 July, immediately after Robinson’s second visit to Algiers, Boumediene sent Kissinger a nine page letter in which he went into detail on the positions of the oil-producers and the developing countries. He explained that the April preparatory meeting in Paris must be deemed to have been a failure, since the Third World’s interests had not been addressed. Algeria’s participation in the following rounds of negotiation, Boumediene declared, would be conditional on the demands of the oil-producing countries and the G-77 being satisfactorily met.77 The April preparatory conference in Paris had also caused trouble in US-French relations. Washington had in fact warned the French government not to ask Algeria to the preparatory meeting in Paris before consensus was reached among the consuming countries. The American ambassador to France, Kenneth Rush, warned Geoffroy de Courcel, Secretary General of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that to do so, “would be most unfortunate as it would be construed as evidence of division among the consumers and taken by the producers as a sign of weakness”78 Ignoring the US demand, however, the French Foreign Ministry extended an invitation to Algeria. This was issued before 4 March, the date of OPEC summit in Algiers. When Rush expressed his “dismay” at France’s action, the French Foreign Minister, Jean Sauvagnargues simply informed him that France had acted on the basis that Algeria needed to be invited ahead of the OPEC summit.79 Faced with a lack of cooperation from Paris and the intransigence of Algeria, Kissinger adjusted his tactics. He instructed Robinson to finalize the US draft proposals to be put before the preparatory meeting and get them into the public domain before the French could produce theirs.80 Meanwhile, in reaction to Algeria’s insistence that the proposed energy committee, including producers and consumers, should be be accompanied with similar committees for the discussion of issues

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related to raw materials and development, Kissinger gave Charles Robinson guidelines that were so general that, “each side will be interested in using [the] modalities to serve its respective interests.” Kissinger hoped that Algeria would, “continue to recognize the importance of moving forward promptly and won’t allow any misunderstanding over this question to cause unnecessary delay.”81 The other main theme in US-Algerian relations during this same period was Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. Kissinger had undertaken to keep both Boumediene and King Hassan informed about his Middle East mediation plans and the progress of the negotiations. As Kissinger saw it, Boumediene was the representative in North Africa of the pro-Palestinian and Syrian rights group within the Arab world, while King Hassan represented the moderate Arab camp that supported a negotiated peace process. Kissinger would begin his letters to both North African leaders by stressing how important the Middle East peace talks were for him personally and for the Ford administration.82 In April 1975, when Kissinger informed Boumediene that Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat had accepted an interim settlement, Boumediene affirmed Algeria’s support for the rights of the Palestinians and expressed his doubt whether the Ford administration had enough time to broker a deal between Egypt and Israel before the US election of 1976.83 In his reply, Kissinger acknowledged Boumediene’s analysis and reiterated the Ford administration’s determination to take Palestinian rights into account.84 Boumediene expressed anxiety that the concerns of both Syria and the PLO were being ignored, which would eventually have the effect of leaving Sadat in isolation. He warned Kissinger that the potential for delay after the upcoming US elections could damage the agreement, which could face mounting popular opposition.85 A day later, Kissinger received a more sanguine analysis from King Hassan, who posed the rhetorical question, “. . . [will] Syria fight Israel alone?” to which his response was,: “no, Assad will negotiate.”86 Kissinger replied briefly to the King, but asked Richard Parker in Algiers to say what he made of Boumediene’s response.87 Boumediene told Parker, that in all cases, even in the event of a conflict between the Palestinians and Egypt, Algeria would support the Palestinians. Algeria did not support the Sinai II Agreement, but did not seek to undermine it, although it could have done so, as Boumediene told Sadat when they met at the OAU Conference held between 28 July

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and 1 August in the Ugandan capital, Kampala. Boumediene believed Sadat’s position of diplomatic isolation had begun to put him at risk of “being identified as [the] US’s man, and his options [were] rapidly diminishing.”88 On 16 October 1975, the ICJ had given its ruling that the Western Sahara belonged to the Sahrawis and King Hassan immediately announced his plans for the “Green March” on 6 November. Algeria found itself being distracted from the preparation for the Paris Conference and issues connected with the NIEO negotiations and Kissinger’s mediation. While preparations for the “Green March” went swiftly ahead, Boumediene summoned Richard Parker to notify the US ambassador that if the US did not take action to stop Hassan, then the “problem would have ramifications far beyond simple Algerian-Moroccan dispute.” Boumediene added ominously that if the “Green March” went ahead, “everyone’s interests would suffer.” Parker could not convince Boumediene that Washington was not in a position to change Hassan’s mind.89 Nor could Kissinger persuade Boumediene, though he sent him a direct message to that effect, that the visit to Morocco by the US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, Alfred Atherton, set to take place on 22 October 1975, had been planned long beforehand and merely happened to have coincided with current events. Boumediene simply would not believe that Washington was neutral in the evolving Maghreb crisis.90 Robert Neumann, who was US ambassador in Rabat from 1973 to 1976 and became an unswerving supporter of the King, recommended to Washington that the US should try discreetly to persuade the UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim to undertake a process of mediation that would see the Western Sahara placed initially under Moroccan control, but only on a provisional basis.91 Ambassador Parker, however, a veteran Middle East expert, cautioned Kissinger against such a proposal, warning that any such maneuver at the UN as that suggested by Neumann would be exposed and “would be [seen as a] violation of [the] neutral stance we have consistently sought to maintain.”92 On 1 November, five days before the “Green March”, Parker sent Washington his assessment of Algeria’s intentions. In a partially declassified telegram Parker said he believed that Boumediene would probably not go to war because that would divert effort and resources from the development plan, which

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was Algeria’s priority at the time. Nevertheless, Parker warned that Algeria had the capability to cause trouble for Morocco.93 On 15 November 1975, a day after the Madrid Accords, Boumediene summoned the ambassadors of the member states of the UN Security Council, giving them what Richard Parker commented, “sounds very much like an ultimatum for the Security Council to get the Moroccans out of [the] Sahara.” Although Boumediene made no direct threat, Parker “hoped” that, “someone [could] convince Hassan that the Algerians mean business and that he had better get his people out of the Sahara quickly unless he really wants a military confrontation with Algeria.” Parker informed Washington that his sources indicated that Algeria had already mobilized troops on its border with Morocco.94 On 26 November, according to El-Djeich, the Algerian army’s monthly publication, convoys of Moroccan troops were attacked by Polisario in Jderia and Gara inside Western Sahara. By early December, a military air lift between Casablanca and Nouadhibou was under way, and as Polisario stepped up its offensive, attacking the towns of La Guera, EL-Ayoun, and Smara on 11 December, Nouakchott began hostilities in the southern part of Western Sahara, apparently aiming to secure its portion.95

Saving King Hassan By the beginning of 1976, the situation was growing tougher on the ground in the Western Sahara. On 27 January, at the Amgala oasis, 260 kilometers west of the Algerian border, Moroccan troops attacked an Algerian detachment, which withdrew after two days. Algeria hardened its tone. In its February 1976 editorial, the Algerian army’s publication El-Djeich warned that, “the People’s National Army will strike with efficacy all those who attempt to interfere with the achievements of our hard-working masses, and the Algerian people will remain, as it has always done in the past, on the side of all just causes throughout the world.”96 After the attack, calls for revenge were heard on all sides in Algeria, while the Council of the Revolution convened to decide what response to make. Boumediene appealed for calm, while the communique´ issued after the Council meeting said, “neither peace nor stability will be guaranteed as long as the rights of the Sahrawi people, whose heroic combat will always have our support, are not recognized.”97 Boumediene’s retaliation was swift

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and painful, but limited. On the night of 14 February, a unit of Algerian army special forces crossed into Amgala and encircled a Moroccan army camp housing around 350 soldiers. Around 100 of these perished in the resulting exchange of fire, while 250 were taken prisoners. Algeria denied involvement, saying that Polisario was responsible. King Hassan, wrote to Boumediene to say that such attacks could only legally be carried out under an official declaration of war. Boumediene’s response was to publish the King’s letter, in order to prove to the Algerian population and to other countries how Algeria would retaliate to attacks on its forces. This sorry episode became known as Amgala Two.98 As Algerian-Moroccan relations deteriorated further, the US State Department’s attention was still mainly focused on the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement and peace negotiations.99 US policy took a pro-Moroccan turn, however, as Kissinger decided that it was important for his Middle East policy to secure King Hassan’s support. On 26 February 1976, Spain announced that its forces had completed their withdrawal from Western Sahara. On the following day, 27 February, the Polisario Front proclaimed the Arab Sahrawi Democratic Republic (SADR) and on 5 March it announced the formation of the Sahrawi Popular Liberation Army (SPLA) and established its government in exile.100 Soon afterwards, on 11 March, Martin J. Hillenbrand, the US ambassador to West Germany, reported to Washington that the West German State Secretary Peter Hermes had informed him that the Moroccan Foreign Minister Ahmed Laraki, who had visited Bonn the previous weekend, had asked West Germany for weapons on the grounds that Morocco faced a threat from Algeria. Hermes told Hillenbrand that Rabat’s request had been turned down. However, he also said that, though the Moroccan Foreign Minister exaggerated the danger posed to them by Algeria, he believed that Morocco would be “seriously isolated” if the conflict were not quickly resolved.101 These developments also led Washington to rethink its position regarding Morocco. King Hassan’s annexation of the former Spanish colony was by now beginning to appear to be a reckless adventure whose consequences had the potential to be dangerous. However, the question arises, who took the decision for the administration of Gerald Ford to support it, after the ignominious departure of President Nixon from office on 9 August 1974?

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In 1978, the Spanish parliament opened an inquiry into the circumstances in which the Madrid Accords were concluded, leading to the Moroccan takeover of Western Sahara. Since then a considerable number of researchers, journalists and historians have pondered the question of America’s role in Rabat’s annexation of the colony.102 In the absence of archival documents, the memoirs of former high ranking US officials at the time of the Ford administration have become one of the principal sources of evidence. In 1978, Daniel P. Moynihan, who was US representative at the United Nations at the time of the crisis, wrote as follows in his memoirs: China altogether backed Fretilin in Timor and lost. In Spanish Sahara, Russia just as completely backed Algeria and its front, known as Polisario, and lost. In both instances the United States wished things to turn out as they did, and worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with no inconsiderable success.103 In 1981, the New York Times revealed that, in late 1975, LieutenantGeneral Vernon Walters, the then Deputy Director of the CIA, was dispatched by Kissinger to put pressure on Spain’s King Juan Carlos to agree to Hassan’s takeover plan. Bob Woodward investigated the issue in his CIA book of 1987, and Waters himself related in his memoirs, Silent Missions, how his friendship with King Hassan had begun when the latter was still Crown Prince.104 What is sure is that, on 26 April 1976, King Hassan, together with his Foreign Minister Laraki, Colonel Ahmed Dlimi and two other confidants, gave a very special farewell dinner to Walters, at the end of his mission in Morocco.105 In 1983, Richard Parker recorded that there was, as he put it, “circumstantial evidence, including US lack of support for UN resolutions against the Green March, that lend credence to the allegation. The Spaniards, for their part, were convinced that Hassan could not have organized the Green March without outside help, and suspected the Americans.” Parker believed that, “the official record will never reveal the full truth, but Secretary Kissinger, intentionally or otherwise, may have given Hassan what the latter took to be a green light during a conversation in the summer of 1975.”106 Five years later, Parker was

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more forthcoming. In his 1989 ADST Oral History interview he asserted, “they had gone in the Sahara, I am convinced, with encouragement from Kissinger. I think the historical record will show that someday.”107 Certainly, on 3 October 1975, the CIA informed Kissinger that, “King Hassan has decided to invade Spanish Sahara within the next three weeks.” The memorandum containing this intelligence alert was signed by the CIA Director W. E. Colby himself, and a subsequent three page situation analysis was provided to Kissinger.108 In January 2006, in his paper, “Neutrality or Complicity: the United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” the historian Jacob Mundy pieced together the evidence of the diplomatic record. Using US documents, including some obtained under the Freedom of Information Act, Mundy pinpoints two key conversations in the White House. One of these took place on 3 November and a second one, between Kissinger and his deputies, on 5 November. In essence, Kissinger briefed President Ford as follows: “the UN could do it like West Irian, where they fuzz the ‘consulting the wishes of the people’. And get out of it.” The memorandum of 5 November indicates that the US Assistant Secretary for Near East Affairs, Alfred Atherton, had prior knowledge of a secret agreement between Rabat and Madrid to permit a symbolic and peaceful march. The conversation indicates that Washington played a role in concluding the agreement.109 Whatever the truth may eventually prove to be, historians will for the moment continue to offer differing accounts of what happened. What, however, were Washington’s motivations during the crisis? As global de´tente suffered setbacks in Angola, the Western Sahara conflict came to be viewed as a Cold War hotspot at the regional scale. King Hassan was aware of how important the Middle East negotiations were to Kissinger and hence sought to exploit his role as a moderate figure within the Arab world. Another factor was that the confrontation in Angola gave the King the idea of stigmatizing Polisario as a Maoist movement, as he liked to describe it. The input of middle-ranking State Department and other officials was important and contributed to the formation of the Ford administration’s policy. For instance, Les Janka, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Middle East/North Africa Desk) from 1976 to 1978, argued that a new Sahrawi state, which would not be

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economically viable, would be a client of Soviet-backed Algeria. This would weaken Morocco. Therefore, a Moroccan takeover was to be preferred in order to achieve a series of strategic objectives. These were, first, to prevent Sahrawis from giving a foothold to the Soviets through the sale of rights to establish military bases, and second, to ensure the territory and its port would not be used by Soviet submarines to intercept US communications with the Portuguese islands. Finally, the Moroccan takeover could help bar the road to the establishment of Soviet bases in the neighborhood of the Strait of Gibraltar.110 Another relevant figure was Harold Saunders, who served as Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Middle East Bureau of the State Department, from 1974 to 1975, and as director of Intelligence and Research from 1975 to 1978. Saunders identified the stability of Morocco, an ally of the US, as necessary to safeguard those US interests with which King Hassan was involved. Saunders was therefore in favor of arms sales to Rabat but advised that at the same time every effort should be made to find a solution to the Western Sahara question.111 In addition, Carleton Coon, Deputy Chief of Mission in Rabat (1974 – 6), took a wider view of Morocco’s strategic importance and the military facilities it had the potential to offer, all of which he suggested should incline American policy in to favor King Hassan.112 The most consistent supporter of King Hassan in the US diplomatic establishment at this time, however, was the ambassador in Rabat from 1973 to 1976, Robert Neumann, though in the end his support was not to avail much because of the skeptical reaction in Washington to his excessive enthusiasm. Neumann was regarded in the State Department and the National Security Council as being too close to the King and in 1976 he was replaced by Robert Anderson, a former special adviser to Henry Kissinger.113 In October 1974, for example, a year after Neumann took up his post, he sent an eight page memorandum to Kissinger in which he advocated the acceptance of King Hassan’s offer of military bases in return for an American commitment to support the King against his enemies, both domestic and foreign. Neumann expressed the hope that a preliminary agreement could be signed with the King before his scheduled state visit to Washington, in April 1975 (this was in the event canceled because of events in the Middle East).114

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In late November 1975, apparently disregarding of the scale of Polisario’s reaction to the Madrid Accords, Neumann once again went into bat for King Hassan. He wrote an analysis of the current situation for the State Department under the title “Changed power Relationships and New Opportunities for US Policy”, in which he claimed that, “both Morocco and King Hassan’s regime have emerged from the Sahara conflict greatly strengthened,” adding that, “the new and stronger position of Morocco will also not fail to strengthen Morocco’s role in Middle Eastern affairs.” Neumann expressed his view that the Western Sahara crisis was over and that, “Morocco need no longer concentrate all its energies on the Saharan question.” Therefore, concluded Neumann, the Ford administration should offer King Hassan full scale support through the expansion of military cooperation programs and should even consider accepting Rabat’s offer to permit the establishment of American military bases in Morocco.115 Neumann’s memoranda to Scowcroft and Kissinger were to remain unanswered until in January 1975 when he arrived in person in Washington for consultations and to prepare for Hassan’s visit, scheduled for March. Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council did not share Neumann’s assessment of the situation and had already Oakley warned Scowcroft, in a memorandum dated 19 December, in an introductory note about Neumann’s paper, that, “as you know, he has been pushing this idea for a number of years.” Oakley remarked that Neumann’s assessment was “very optimistic;” and that the reality on the ground did not support the conclusions he reached.116 Now that Neumann had arrived in Washington ahead of the King’s visit Oakley produced a second detailed memorandum for Bent Scowcroft making the case against Neumann’s pro-Morocco lobbying, but this time Oakley made a point of mentioning other officials who shared his view, including William P. Clements and Robert F. Ellsworth at the Department of Defense, as well as Robert Ingersoll and Joseph Sisco in the State Department. For Oakley, “the political risks of significantly expanded U.S. military cooperation with Morocco for both King Hassan and us are too great to justify the modest gain in the form of training facilities and possible strategic advantage.” The existing level of U.S. relationship with Morocco, Oakley argued, served Washington’s interests well enough. He warned that, in contrast to what Neumann advised, which was presumably desired by King Hassan, expanded cooperation with the US would augment the

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challenges the King would have to face at home and in the Arab world. In additon, it would also “severely complicate” America’s relationship with the Spanish, “who, in the long run, can provide more stable military bases than Morocco can.”117 Oakley’s efforts to curb Neumann’s efforts on Morocco’s behalf were backed by Sisco, who, it appeared, succeeded in convincing Alfred Atherton to decline Neumann’s proposal. Sisco argued that Madrid had already complained about America’s sale to Morocco of “just 26 M48A3 tanks,” which indicated that, “it is easy to see why we could do nothing more than pursue our present policy of responsiveness, within supply limits, to Moroccan requests for military equipment, until a resolution of the Sahara question is more certain.” The result was that for the time being a deaf ear was turned to Neumann’s ideas at the White House, and he did not succeed in meeting either President Ford or Secretary of State Kissinger. A year later, however, Neumann’s ambitions were to be realised when the Ford administration decided on a major arms transfer to Morocco. The King was not unaware of the existence of this kind of thinking in Washington and certainly drew encouragement from it. Despite his increasing domestic troubles, and persistent attacks by Polisario, King Hassan must have felt it was fortunate that the Sahrawi conflict had coincided with the crisis in Angola. King Hassan told Neumann in early January 1976, that Angola was “only [the] first phase of a broad infiltration, long-term communist strategy for infiltration of Africa.” The King went on to claim the Western Sahara conflict was an example of this.118 Rabat had already, thanks to Neumann’s lobbying, received a program of planned military assistance worth $500 million, completed by early 1975.119 On 28 January 1976, a day after the Moroccan army attacked the Algerian units in Amgala, the NSC asked Congress to approve the transfer of arms to Morocco. The notification sent to the legislators referred to the sale of twenty F-5E and four F-5F aircraft worth $135 million, and 8,260 Dragon missiles and launchers, valued at $47.4 million.120 Due to holdups in production, however, as well as security clearance issues, arms deliveries to Morocco could not be made as quickly as King Hassan needed them. The King was increasingly anxious and impatient.121 A way round the difficulties was found to accelerate the process. Both Jordan and Iran offered to transfer the required military equipment from their own US supplied stocks of weapons in a gesture

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by the rulers of those two countries to come to their fellow monarch’s rescue. Kissinger was therefore able to cable Anderson in Rabat to brief Hassan that an immediate arms transfer of 36 recoilless rifles from Jordan and 16 155 millimeter howitzers ammunition through Iran had been authorized.122 The transfer of a further 20 T-2 training aircraft, valued at $88.9 million, received the authorization of the State Department and went to Congress for ratification in August, and at the end of 1976 the sale to Morocco of 320 AIM-9J-1 Sidewinder missiles was approved.123 On 27 February 1976, the Polisario Front proclaimed the existence of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), which changed the terms of engagement in the Western Sahara. Algeria recognized the SADR on 6 March, and on 7 March, Morocco broke off diplomatic relations with Algeria. As the Polisario guerrillas began to inflict painful strikes on the Moroccan and Mauritanian troops in Western Sahara, the new administration of President Ford, who had taken over the presidency on 9 August 1974 after Nixon stepped down, was already divided within itself as how to extricate King Hassan from the dangerous situation in which it appeared he had trapped himself. From the high point of his confidence in the Western Sahara, King Hassan was now wary of the longer term consequences. While Robert Neumann continued unrepentantly to dismiss the gravity of the challenges faced by Hassan, and even urged Washington to accept Rabat’s offer of an enhanced military and economic strategic alliance, key senior officials at the NSC, the Department of Defense, and the State Department itself, all argued against the expansion proposal. As the Western Sahara conflict raged on and threatened to draw in Algeria, especially in view of the persistence of Algeria’s fury after the Amgala incidents, the Ford administration was obliged to review its Maghreb policy. The Sahrawi conflict, of course, was taking place in parallel to the serious degradation of global de´tente due to events in Angola. The King and his advisers were not slow to take advantage of the Cuban intervention in Angola to fuel the already strong perceptions in Washington that the developments in the Western Sahara were also related to the Cold War. Examination of the Ford administration’s decision to opt for massive arms transfers to Morocco in 1976 reveals a revival of old Cold War assumptions exacerbated by the gradual decline in global de´tente. In order to supply Morocco with the minimum of delay, American arms already

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assigned to Jordan and Iran were swiftly transferred to Morocco for the use of the King’s armed forces. One of the principal considerations that led to the decision to support Morocco was the fear that an independent Sahrawi state backed by Algeria would fall within the Soviet sphere of influence, and that this could transform the balance of power in the Mediterranean if Soviet submarines gained access to an Atlantic port. King Hassan’s image as a moderate figure in the Arab world, and his usefulness to Kissinger in his efforts in the Middle East, as an Arab ruler not hostile to the US, also played a role. It was not surprising then that other moderate Middle Eastern allies of Washington such as Jordan and Iran were enlisted to rescue what appeared by the end of 1976 to be a crumbing Moroccan monarchy.

Conclusion The signature of the Madrid Accords by Spain, Morocco and Mauritania in November 1975, which led to the partition of Western Sahara between Rabat and Nouakchott, hammered the last nail into the coffin of the project for Maghreb de´tente in which Algeria had invested a great deal of diplomatic and economic effort. The 1969 Ifrane Treaty and the 1970 Tlemcen summit were left as little more than fading memories of a lost dream of Maghreb cooperation. The Tlemcen Agreement, which had been intended to settle the AlgerianMoroccan border dispute, was welcomed in Washington with cautious optimism. However, the agreement left room for ambiguity over the decolonization of the Western Sahara and was hence open to differing interpretations. As King Hassan saw it, concessions made in Tlemcen were in return for Algerian support for Rabat’s claims to the former Spanish colony. Boumediene, on the other hand, regarded the Moroccan concessions as a simple pragmatic quid pro quo in return for the joint exploitation of the iron ore mines along the border close to Tindouf. The growing instability that surrounded King Hassan within Morocco, following a series of coups and persistent subversion by leftist parties, coincided with the appearance of the Polisario Front, the armed Sahrawi independence movement. This led King Hassan to seize the opportunity of Madrid’s decision to hold a referendum in its Saharan colony and to rally popular support for Morocco’s position by defying the UN and the ICJ’s resolutions. The timing was also

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impeccable for Rabat in terms of international developments, in that the whole affair coincided with the Cuban intervention in Angola, as well as with the signature of the Sinai II Disengagement Agreement, which Algeria opposed but did not obstruct. King Hassan was able to ride the wave of anxiety in Washington over renewed Cold War fears and scares over communist infiltration and was able successfully to portray Rabat as a faithful US ally and a strategic buttress for the United States. Ambassador Robert Neumann in Rabat went to great lengths to convince Washington that it should support the King’s invasion of Western Sahara, in return for Morocco’s agreement to the siting of a US military base in Morocco and the expansion of military cooperation. The so-called “Green March” of November 1975, when Morocco effectively annexed the Western Sahara under the guise of a peaceful mass demonstration, coincided with the failure of the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), following a year of strenuous North-South negotiations spearheaded by Algeria. These events might have strengthened Kissinger’s inclination to support Morocco, still seen as a traditional ally of the US, and by the same token to weaken Algeria, regarded as ever by the US as radical. Algeria had by this time caused huge difficulties for Kissinger’s energy strategy and had even succeeded in driving a wedge between Paris and Washington as well as rallying France’s sympathy to some of Algeria’s proposals regarding the NIEO. Nevertheless, as the Polisario Front increased its military action on both fronts with Morocco and Mauritania, Washington began to appreciate the cautious advice offered by its ambassador in Algeria, Richard Parker, which had hitherto been ignored in favor of Robert Neumann’s overzealous support of Morocco. Robert Neumann was removed from his post at around the time the Polisario Front proclaimed its Sahrawi Republic, in February 1976. However, Boumediene crossed the Rubicon, in the eyes of US policy makers, when Algeria recognized the Sahrawi state and extended active support to the Polisario. Following the Amgala clashes, Algeria appeared to be on the brink to deeper involvement in the conflict, while King Hassan seemed to be seriously threatened. In support of the King, a major arms transfer to Rabat was authorized by the Ford administration. Washington’s Middle Eastern allies were enlisted to come to Hassan’s rescue, with transfers of arms and military

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equipment being speeded up by drawing on material already sent to Jordan and Iran, with the agreement of those countries. As Boumediene saw it, the partition of Western Sahara and the “Green March” could not have taken place without Washington’s green light. This conclusion seems to be supported by the recollections of US diplomats active at the time. Algiers believed the intention was to encircle the Algerian socialist revolution. Algeria gave its support to the Polisario Front, which pledged itself at its third congress in August 1976 to a war of attrition under the slogan, “No stability, No Peace before the Liberation of the National Territory and Total Independence.”124 The Polisario offensive left no doubt about Algeria’s resolve in support of the Sahrawi cause. Nevertheless, Algiers ensured the conflict remained within its territorial bounds and did not spill into Algeria itself, as this would have dealt a heavy blow to the development strategy Boumediene was determined to see through. The years 1975 and 1976 were meant to have crowned the tenth anniversary of Boumediene’s rule. In 1976, a National Charter was implemented, a referendum was called to endorse Algeria’s new constitution and a presidential election was held. Disappointments in the field of Maghreb cooperation, however, left a sour feeling. First, Ould Daddah had in effect betrayed Algeria, despite the strong support extended to him by Algeria since Mauritania’s independence in 1960. King Hassan’s “Green March” was also a stab in the back, and the support given by the Arab states to Morocco’s territorial ambitions in the Western Sahara was also a disappointment. Bitterest of all was the death of the plan Algeria had cherished for the establishment of a union of the Maghreb states (which would now not be realized until 1989). Instead, Algeria now supported what it called a “Maghreb of the People.” The 1976 National Charter contained the following observation. “Recent history has shown that unity is not created by summit agreements but can only be forged at grass roots level through solidarity and joint action of the popular masses in pursuit of the same objectives.”125 The Western Sahara conflict obliged Algeria to retreat from international affairs, leaving it once more to focus instead on domestic and regional matters. This withdrawal was most clearly indicated by the positions adopted by Algeria regarding the Middle East issue. For Algeria, the time had come to safeguard the socialist revolution at home, though it did not neglect the support of its

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regional and ideological allies. For instance, Algeria agreed to grant temporary access to one of its airports during the Cuban airlift of military equipment to Angola. In the last two years of Boumediene’s rule, which were also to be the last two years of his life, Algeria’s tilt towards the Soviet Union and Cuba, a diplomatic alignment which never failed to cause irritation and anxiety in Washington, would in practice increase.

CHAPTER 5 SAFEGUARDING THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, 1977 – 8

We are in the presence of a real plot to annihilate the Sahrawi people: France provides arms, Morocco and Mauritania supply men, and a major Middle Eastern bank takes care of the financing. In fact, this plot does not concern Western Sahara alone. It aims to undermine the foundations of the Algerian Revolution in order to bring the entire region to heel and to destroy the progressive countries so as to impose on all the language of submission.1 This was the state of mind of Algeria’s new president, Houari Boumediene, in early 1977. He had been declared President of Algeria on 12 December 1976, having previously been content to be simply the Chairman of Algeria’s Revolutionary Council. He was convinced a conspiracy to undermine Algeria’s progressive revolution was being carried out in the Maghreb by an imperialist power, financed by international capitalism, and with Moroccan and Mauritanian complicity. His belief was reinforced by Rabat’s apparent willingness to become involved in French military adventures in Africa. Moroccan troops had taken part in the French intervention in Benin in mid-January, and King Hassan had sent a military unit to Shaba province in Zaire in March 1977 where the French foreign legion was fighting separatists in defense of the Mobutu regime. The Algerian army’s periodical El-Djeich opined that “imperialism was afoot”, leveling the charge that Algeria was attacked because of its

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economic success, and that Morocco was “an outpost of imperialism”.2 While the Western Sahara conflict raged on, however, with the Polisario Front inflicting painful losses on both the Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, Algiers maintained a “low profile” attitude, both at home and in its conduct of foreign policy. A month after the election of the Algerian National Assembly had taken place in late February 1977, this was observed by Etienne Vallotton, the Swiss ambassador to Algiers. The director of political affairs at the Algerian foreign ministry had asserted that Algeria would resume its active role in international affairs after the installation of the country’s institutional structures. In his report, however, Vallotton concluded that the external setbacks Algiers had suffered had obliged it to withdraw from international affairs in order to focus on the domestic front.3 Since 1969, in fact, Algerian foreign policy had been consistently characterized by a period of relative quiet in the wake of a major crisis or a mobilizing event. This had been the case after the 1971 oil conflict with France, when 1972 was devoted to domestic affairs, and in particular to the implementation of agrarian reform. This was also the case in 1974, following the October War of 1973 and the oil embargo, and the same was true for 1977 following the major eruption in the Western Sahara conflict in 1975 –6. A further factor was that there always tended to be a pause in wider international political activity after the election of a new US president, while the international community deciphered the early policy signals of a new administration. In this regard, Algiers noted President Jimmy Carter’s introduction of human rights as a criterion for action in the conduct of US foreign policy and began to ask whether a “new diplomacy” was in fact in the offing.4 However, Vallotton’s assessment was only partly correct. In early 1977, the Algerian leadership regarded the Western Sahara conflict, which was very close to home, not so much as a foreign policy setback than as a threat to its domestic integrity and development options. It therefore continued to seek a resolution of the issue, the resolution of which it saw as a security matter. Boumediene’s conviction that Algeria’s socialism was under threat was deepseated, and from 1977, he would spend the last two years of his time in power, which were also the last two years of his life, doing what he could to consolidate Algeria’s internal development and its

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socialist revolution. However, as part of this process, he acted swiftly to compensate for the loss of Maghreb de´tente, which thanks to Moroccan activities in the Sahara was by now defunct. First, Boumediene launched a new initiative to strengthen relations across Algeria’s southern Sahara borders with the Sahel countries. This was intended to counteract the new cooperation between France and Spain on the one hand and Morocco and Mauritania on the other, in an alliance that even reached down into Senegal. Boumediene believed that this alliance against him had the backing of the US and what he regarded as the reactionary forces in the Middle East, centered on Egypt, with its new rapprochement with Israel. In response to the threat, Boumediene targeted the weakest links, which, he believed, were Spain and Mauritania.5 By the end of 1977, Boumediene, had succeeded in taking advantage of President Carter’s policy of restricting the transfer of arms from the US to his own advantage and the detriment of Morocco. In addition, he skillfully used Carter’s human rights-based foreign policy to secure his regional objectives in the Maghreb. By the end of the year, King Hassan, deprived of the flow of arms and military support from the US, had secretly asked Boumediene to reopen talks. Meanwhile, the Mauritanian leader Ould Daddah would be deposed in a military coup on 10 July 1978; paving the way for the signature of a ceasefire between Polisario and Mauritania that came a few months before Boumediene’s death in late December that same year and presaged Mauritania’s withdrawal from the conflict.

Protecting African Allies From 14 November 1975, when the territory of the Western Sahara was divided between Moroccan and Mauritanian control under the Madrid Accords, Boumediene had been well aware that Mauritania, as the weakest link, should be relentlessly attacked until the cost of continuing its alliance with Rabat would become insupportable. This tactic, Boumediene believed, would remove Mauritania from the equation, leaving Morocco alone in the arena. As Boumediene saw it, King Hassan would then be obliged to reconsider his options and would need to compromise with the Polisario Front. This in turn would hopefully end a deeply disturbing regional conflict that was diverting Algeria’s attention from its all-important development

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project, sucking up funds to support Polisario’s guerrilla operations. Polisario was striking deep into Mauritania and had also hit the border town of Tan-Tan in Morocco, but the assistance in term of weapon and logistics that this required placed a burden on the budget that Algeria could otherwise use meet the costs of development. To further his plan to grind down Mauritania’s will to continue the conflict, Boumediene decided the time had come to enlist the help of Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi. In December 1975, just a month after the “Green March” had taken place, the rapprochement between Algiers and Tripoli began when Boumediene visited Libya. On 28 December, Boumediene and Qaddafi convened a further meeting in the southern Algerian oil town of Hassi Messaoud, where they concluded what became known as the Hassi Messaoud Accords, agreeing to concert their efforts to counter a situation that threatened progressive regimes in the Third World. This consolidation of Algerian and Libyan policy translated on the ground into a series of attacks by Polisario on the 657 kilometer Zouerate-Nouadhibou railway which carried Mauritania’s ore deposits to the sea and contributed around 80 per cent of Nouakchott’s export revenues.6 In early 1977, Boumediene launched a diplomatic offensive with the goal of securing Algeria’s southern borders. This became all the more pressing as it became clear that Qaddafi had returned to his former policy of meddling in the affairs of African countries, especially in Chad, thus provoking France’s intervention there. From 20 March to 22 March, with this in view, Boumediene convened a five-nation summit in Niamey, the capital of Niger, attended by the leaders of Libya, Mali, Niger, and Chad. This was followed two weeks later by a three-nation summit in Ouargla, a city in the Algerian Sahara, where Libya and Niger were invited by Algiers to defuse an incipient crisis between the two countries following reports of Tripoli’s involvement in an aborted coup in Niamey. Boumediene’s strategy was to persuade Libya to bankroll his operations in Africa in the way Saudi Arabia was financially supporting Morocco. When a border clash between Egypt and Libya threatened to undermine Boumediene’s Sahel policy, and the key role in it he wanted Libya to play, he acted swiftly to prevent it from spiraling into a full-scale conflict. To achieve this, Boumediene shuttled from 24 July to 26 July between Tripoli and Alexandria, eventually obtaining a ceasefire.7 It was reported that Boumediene threatened Egypt’s President Sadat that

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he would if necessary invoke the Algerian-Libyan Common Defense Treaty. Some diplomatic observers in Algiers, however, believed that Sadat in any case only wanted to teach Qaddafi a lesson and was pleased to have Boumediene’s mediation to give him an excuse to end the hostilities. Nevertheless, Boumediene’s mediation boosted his stature in the Arab world.8 By then Boumediene’s new African policy was raising serious concerns in Paris, as Etienne Vallotton learned from Guy de Commines, France’s ambassador to Algeria. De Commines expressed his regret at the deterioration of Algerian-French relations, especially since the lack of any positive outcome from President Giscard d’Estaing’s visit to Algeria in April 1975, when his continuing support for Morocco caused difficulties between the French visitor and his hosts. De Commines’ assessment reflected France’s frustration and annoyance with Boumediene’s African offensive, especially his push to finish the second phase of the trans-Saharan road linking Algiers to Niger and Mali. De Commines did not hide the irritation of the French when he asserted that although the methods of Algeria’s foreign policy might vary, “the ambition remains, as does this intransigent, proud and self-confident Algeria of Boumediene; which we are obliged to keep in our sights.”9 Boumediene’s Sahara-Sahel diplomatic offensive served also the purpose of compensating for Algeria’s failure, first in April 1977 and then in September, to persuade the OAU to pass the necessary resolutions to hold special sessions on the Western Sahara conflict. Although the 14th OAU Summit in Libreville, the capital of Gabon, condemned the French and Moroccan interventions in Benin and Zaire, Algeria’s draft resolution condemning the annexation of Western Sahara failed to secure a simple majority vote of member states. Nevertheless, Algeria derived satisfaction from the recognition by the OAU’s Liberation Committee of the Patriotic Front, which was an alliance of Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African Party (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), as the only representatives of the Zimbabwean decolonization struggle, a move supported by the front line states of Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, Botswana, and Angola.10 The Algerian leadership set considerable store on obtaining political endorsement of the decolonization causes it espoused from international organizations. However, its efforts in regard to the

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Western Sahara conflict faced difficulties both in the Arab world and among Third World nations. On his return from the 5th NonAligned Movement (NAM) conference in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in the summer of 1976, Boumediene had already raised concern about what he believed was the confusion of the leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement states over the realities of the Western Sahara question. He experienced similar disappointment during the Afro-Arab Cairo Summit of March 1977. In fact, Boumediene complained to Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi about what he saw as the ineffectiveness of Algeria’s diplomacy in explaining the nature of the Western Sahara conflict to Arab and Third World countries. In 1977, only the Republic of Seychelles recognized the Sahrawi Republic, by comparison with ten countries the year before. The reported meeting of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia and Ould Daddah in Morocco in June also gave Boumediene reasons for concern.11 With the appointment as his personal counsellor of Taleb-Ibrahimi, one of his most trusted and able lieutenants, Boumediene hoped to remedy the shortcomings in the conduct of Algeria’s Arab policy. Taleb-Ibrahimi had been responsible for the year-long campaign to achieve de´tente in the Maghreb in 1969. Boumediene’s Sahara-Sahel diplomatic offensive was coupled with an increasing tilt towards Belgrade, Moscow and Havana, apparently taking Algeria back to its earlier days. In February 1977, an Algerian military delegation flew to Yugoslavia and in October Josip Tito visited Algiers. General Raul Castro, Fidel’s brother, who was the Cuban Armed Forces Minister and deputy secretary of the Cuban Communist Party, visited Algeria in September 1977 with a military delegation. Raoul Castro held talks on the Algerian-Moroccan border with Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, then commander of the 2nd Military Region and with Abdelhamid Latreche, Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense, as well as with representatives of Polisario. He also visited the Military Academy in Cherchell, the Air Force School in Tafraoui, and the naval base of Mers-el-Kebir, near Oran. El-Djeich reported that the visit would be “only the start of a series of visits to reinforce the achievements of the anti-imperialist struggle.”12 The report of this visit by a Cuban military delegation was intended to send a clear signal to Morocco that national security and socialist solidarity had now superseded non-alignment in the conduct of Algeria’s foreign policy.

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In the course of 1977, the pace and scale of Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria increased and in Washington it was the subject of regular confidential reports to the National Security Council by the CIA.13 A top-secret memorandum to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Chairman of the NSC, indicated that four Foxtrot-class submarines had visited the port of Annaba for minor repairs in a single week, escorted by an operational submarine.14 A partially declassified note refers to a “major Soviet arms delivery to Algeria.” However, both memoranda indicated that Algeria continued to refuse Moscow access to the Mersel-Kebir naval base “except for arms deliveries.”15 Another report counted 800 separate agreements between Algeria and the Soviet Union in the course of 1977 relating to conventional arms transfers to Algeria. These included air defense, jet fighters, ground force equipment, guided-missiles and frigates, totalling 209 deliveries, all in the one year.16

Testing the Waters In April 1977, ten years after Algeria had first broken diplomatic ties with the US, and almost three years since they were resumed in November 1974, Algiers finally decided to nominate an ambassador to Washington. The choice fell on Algeria’s former tourism minister Abdelaziz Maoui.17 On 13 July 1977, Ulric Haynes replaced Richard Parker as US ambassador to Algeria. By then the US had overtaken France as Algeria’s leading trading partner, with some 70 American private sector firms operating in Algeria with a global turnover of an estimated $6 billion, while some 1,600 Algerian students were studying in the US on scholarships funded by the Algerian government.18 Algeria’s mission in Washington reported that Algerian exports to the US had reached $3.06 billion per year, while Algeria imported $526.5 million.19 Despite this booming commercial exchange, M. Debagha, the Algerian economic counsellor in Washington, complained that the Algerian maritime transport company CNAN had made only one million dollars from the transport of dry goods in the period July 1977 to March 1978.20 President Carter’s review in Congress of the energy plans of the US was carefully observed by the Algerian mission to Washington, in view of its consequences for Algeria’s pending LNG deals.21 In terms of politics, two main areas dominated the relationship between the

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US and Algeria in this period, namely the North-South dialogue; and the Western Sahara conflict. In view of the legacy of the Nixon-Ford Administration in the Western Sahara conflict, and the state of the NIEO talks, Carter’s State Department set out to re-shape the new administration’s policy towards North Africa.22 There had already been opposition from within the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs to Kissinger’s approach to the Western Sahara issue, seeing it an aspect of global confrontation. The new Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, adopted a regionalist approach, looking at the conflict through the lens of regional issues. Richard Parker, who had by this time been appointed ambassador to Lebanon, recalled that, “the regionalists in the Bureau of African Affairs were very concerned because the African countries were concerned about this Moroccan expansionism into the western Sahara. They opposed the use of American arms . . . in the Sahara.”23 With his nomination of Maoui to the post of ambassador, Boumediene signalled his willingness to start afresh on correct terms with the Carter administration, and in due course made it known to the State Department through unofficial channels that there was a possibility for dialogue with Algiers on the sticking points in the US-Algeria relationship. On 13 April 1977, when Carter asked Vance about ways to improve relations with Algeria, Vance suggested the US administration should “give special priority to Exim Bank financing of Algerian projects and try to have the Federal Power Commission speed up [its] consideration of gas imports from Algeria.” Vance suggested also Dick Cooper should be sent to Algeria, “soon, to discuss North-South economic issues.”24 On the same day, William Quandt at the NSC recommended three short term initiatives to be taken by the administration. First, a new ambassador should be nominated to Algeria whose goal would be to speed up the Federal Power Commission’s consideration of the applications relating to US imports of LNG. Second, President Carter should initiate a correspondence with Boumediene on the North-South dialogue and the Middle East. Third, the most high profile suggestion, an invitation should be extended to Boumediene to come to Washington to meet President Carter.25 The Carter administration’s initiatives towards Algeria did not go unnoticed by the pro-Moroccan lobby in Washington. While Phillip Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, was in Algiers, the former

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US ambassador to Rabat (1973 –6), Robert Neumann, who was by now a senior associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and still an enthusiast for King Hassan, sent a letter to Brzezinski “advising” him to meet with Abdelhadi Boutaleb, the Moroccan ambassador to Washington, who was about to return to Rabat to take up a “top position very close to the throne.” In the letter, Brzezinski has clearly marked a paragraph that gives a very brief account of Boutaleb as the King’s “tutor” in his younger years, and also as a former foreign minister, and explains that he is currently undertaking “innumerable special missions” to Arab states on behalf of the King.26 This letter came to Brzezinski a few weeks after the Moroccan intervention in Zaire. The State Department indicated at that time, in a memorandum to Brzezinski, that after his involvement in the Shaba affair, King Hassan might feel entitled to yet more American “moral and economic support,” despite the existing strength of USMoroccan relations. The confidential note suggested that the White House should explain to Boutaleb that Washington supported the mediation of the Zaire issue by Nigeria within the framework of the OAU. On the Western Sahara, however, the State Department explained to Brzezinski that, although the US official position was one of neutrality, its real preference was for Morocco. “Privately we favor the Moroccan position and have so informed the GOM [Government of Morocco] . . . . The President has just approved sale to Morocco of an air defense/civil air control system and an advanced sidewinder air-toair missile.”27 On 29 April, Brzezinski received Boutaleb and briefed him accordingly.28 The two memoranda above reflect the selective approach the Carter administration was observing in its early months in dealing on the one hand with Morocco, the traditional ally of the US, and on the other hand Algeria, its economic partner and gas supplier. “My instructions from the department were that I was to have no direct or official contact with the representatives of the Polisario in Algeria,” recalled Ulric Haynes in his Oral History Interview in April 2011.29 When Rabat requested the purchase of 100,000 tonnes of US wheat under the provisions of Public Law 480, otherwise known as the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, Carter had to authorize the transaction which he justified by declaring it to be in the national interest of the US He had also to waive the Exclusion Act of 1954, which barred countries trading with Cuba, from benefiting

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from sales under Public Law 480.30 Both the NSC and the State Department recommended the approval of the transaction. With Boumediene, King Hassan, and Tunisian Prime Minister Hedi Nouira all coming to Washington, the visits needed to be prioritized since their order would reflect the order of priority Washington attached to its interests in North Africa. Brzezinski and Vance found it impossible to agree on the priorities. While it was accepted that King Hassan should be invited to Washington first, in late 1977, Brzezinski explained to Carter that the State Department would prefer to receive Nouira before Boumediene, given Tunisia’s friendly relations with Washington. Brzezinski, on the other hand, thought the sequence should be reversed, since Algeria had signaled “some shift” from its radical posture and was a more important country, in view of its economic and political potential. In addition, Brzezinski pointed out to Carter that Algeria could be “quite helpful to you” over Middle East and African issues. As Brzezinski saw it, Boumediene was “more of a world statesman than Prime Minister Nouira, who was no more than a subordinate of President Bourguiba.”31 Carter approved all the invitations for the first half of 1978, with the sequence of visits recommended by Brzezinski, but indicated that he would have no objection to varying the order. In September 1977, Philip Habib was on his second visit to North Africa, taking the pulse in Rabat and Tunis. In Rabat, Habib listened to King Hassan’s boastful narrative of his army’s expedition to Zaire and to a lengthy and self-regarding lecture on Cold War geopolitics, in which the King argued that Soviet penetration in Somalia, South Yemen, Angola and Ethiopia was “directed in no small measure toward [the] control of energy lifelines.” The King concluded his expose´ of the alleged communist threat with the formulation of a request and a recommendation. The request was that in the light of the US administration’s restrictions on arms transfers, the Carter administration should ask the UK, Belgium, or the Netherlands to give Morocco arms, which would be paid for by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. The recommendations were first, that African nationalists should be supported by Washington in order to ward off Soviet penetration in countries such as “Niger, which fear[s] neighboring Algeria.” He also commented further on his own military intervention in the Katanga province, saying that “it was a useful move even in the context of tensions between Algeria and Morocco, as the Algerians

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must think that if he could send troops to Zaire he must have [the] military situation in hand at home.”32 However, despite the King’s upbeat conclusion, he was unable to mask his serious concern over the gravity of the military situation in the Western Sahara. Indeed, the Sahara conflict seemed to have become more an existential issue for Morocco than it was for Algeria. In November, a secret US intelligence assessment concluded that, “the stability of King Hassan’s regime is closely tied to the success of his Saharan venture, leaving very little margin for compromise.” The briefing further commented that, in October, “Polisario attacks have handed Moroccan troops their most severe defeats of the war”.33 Meanwhile, an article appeared in the November 1977 issue of El-Djeich under the title, “SADR: The Struggle continues. Victory is Certain.” The article catalogued the Moroccan losses with 199 killed, an F5 aircraft downed and its pilot taken prisoner, together with other Moroccan prisoners, on the northern Moroccan front. A further 230 were reported killed on the Mauritanian southern front.34 Rabat and Nouakchott had months before signed a defense pact on 13 May placing their forces under a unified command. In Algiers, El-Djeich warned that Polisario’s offensive would continue and that, “with the current speed of developments, the war in Western Sahara will end by toppling the aggressive regimes of [both] Rabat and Nouakchott.”35 French citizens began to be involved. Six French citizens had been taken by Polisario on a raid on the Bou Craa iron ore plant in Zouerate in May 1977. The situation became extremely volatile when another two French technicians were seized, while two other French citizens were killed in the course of the action. The French Defense Minister, Louis de Guiringaud, warned that military intervention to free the prisoners was, as he put it, “not out of the question,” but privately he requested Washington to mediate with Polisario through Algiers while assuring Cyrus Vance that, “no military action against Algeria was seriously envisaged.” Vance briefed Carter that President Giscard d’Estaing had already sent a message to Boumediene “seeking Algerian cooperation,” and that he would do the same.36 On 5 November, however, before mediation could begin, King Hassan made a speech to mark the anniversary of the “Green March”, in which he heightened the tension by threatening to implement a self-declared right of “hot pursuit” of Polisario guerrillas into Algerian territory. On 6 November, the Algerian newspaper

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El Moudjahid carried the Algerian response, saying, “we must impress on the monarchist regime in Rabat that any such action, if it came to pass, would have heavy consequences because it would be considered as a declaration of war. The people of Algeria and its armed forces will know how to reply vigorously.”37 Paris was obliged to swallow its pride and agree to negotiate directly with Polisario representatives in Algiers to secure the release of its prisoners. However, the negotiations hit an impasse. Claude Chayet, the Director of Administrative and Consular Affairs at the French foreign ministry, who was sent to Algiers to talk to the Polisario Front, explained that Paris had asked for its people to be released on a “humanitarian” basis, Polisario wanted to make the exchange part of what it called “global negotiations”. This would have included the withdrawal of French workers from Mauritania, and the suspense of all French military assistance to the Mauritanian armed forces. Chayet confided to Swiss diplomats that the Elyse´e believed Algeria’s goal was to topple Ould Daddah, which they hoped would lead to the fall of King Hassan. The belief was that new and friendly governments would then replace the existing regimes in Morocco and Mauritania, transforming the situation. But most dangerously for Paris was, according to Chayet, “the political imbalance in Western Africa and the concern created within all of non-progressive francophone Black Africa.”38 Polisario’s French hostages brought relations between France and Algeria to a low ebb. A climate of volatility and insecurity reigned within the Algerian immigrant community in France as acts of random reprisal against Algerian citizens in France increased. The right-wing Charles Martel Group kidnapped two Algerian immigrants, while a bomb targeted an Algerian office in Paris. In another incident, an Algerian immigrant was killed by Delta, a terrorist organization linked to the OAS, the French settlers’ organization dating back to the last desperate days of the French occupation of Algeria in 1961–2.39 President Giscard d’Estaing needed to devise a course of action, since the affair would inevitably damage his prospects for re-election should the eight prisoners not be freed. First, he complained to Washington about its alleged lack of help. Concerned about French hostility, the US ambassador to Paris, Arthur Hartman, recommended his government to issue a statement to “correct” the perception in France that Washington, as he put it,

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“cares more for its relations with Algeria than for the return of French hostages.”40 By then, Cyrus Vance had already “urged” the Soviet ambassador to Washington, Anatoly Dobrynin, “to have the Soviets use their influence to move the conflict to the diplomatic level.” For Dobrynin, the Western Sahara conflict was “an issue in which US and Soviet interests are parallel.” On 8 November, Vance talked about the issue of the French prisoners with Abdelaziz Bouteflika, the Algeria foreign minister, who had been in New York to see the UN SecretaryGeneral the previous day to discuss the same issue. On the same day Vance learned from the new French ambassador to Washington, Franc ois Lefebvre de Laboulaye, that French military support had been sent to Dakar at the request of the Senegalese President Le´opold Senghor, “who fears that Ould Daddah may come under Algerian influence.”41 On 5 December, President Carter was briefed that intelligence indicated a Moroccan build-up in northern Mauritania and that France had increased its military assistance to Nouakchott as well as dispatching at least six fighter-bombers to Senegal. “Direct French participation cannot be ruled out,” warned Vance, who also foresaw the potential for what he called, “a more aggressive Moroccan military posture against Algeria . . . especially if Morocco’s losses continue at their present heavy rate.”42 A week later, on 13 December, the French Communist leader, George Marchais visited Algiers and spoke with Boumediene. The following day, Marchais announced the imminent release of the prisoners. Ten days later Kurt Waldheim, the UN secretary-general, came personally to Algiers to receive the freed French hostages. On 18 December, Polisario declared that its units had been targeted by French Jaguar aircraft three days earlier, in other words after the prisoners were handed over to the UN official.43 This led to a further escalation of tension. The US ambassador Ulric Haynes was summoned to the Algerian Foreign Ministry to be told that, “Algeria is satisfied beyond any doubt” that French aircraft had targeted a Polisario column in what was described as “Mauritanianoccupied Sahara.” The ambassador reported to Washington that the Secretary General at the Algerian Foreign Ministry had asked him, “[what was the US] reaction to such [an] action.”44 On the same day, Bouteflika sent a letter to Cyrus Vance which the American Secretary of State found “quite cordial,” commenting that it “seems to indicate a desire for continuing dialogue.” Ambasador Haynes, for his part,

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thought that Boumediene wanted to “keep the Sahara problem separate from US-Algerian relations generally.” A note added by the Middle East desk read: “The same is probably true of the Middle East question.”45 The Swiss Embassy in Algiers concluded that the affair of the French prisoners had come close to being an embarrassment for Boumediene and that it had not gone well for the Polisario Front. The Swiss commented that skilled Algerian diplomacy had devised an exit strategy, but remarked that by having the veteran French communist leader announce the release of the hostages the Algerian leadership dealt a blow to Giscard d’Estaing’s popularity at home. In addition, Algeria had obviated what could potentially have been a pretext for the French to intervene in the Western Sahara at a time when international attention was distracted by the Egyptian-Israeli talks. On the other hand, by having the UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim personally receive the prisoners in Algiers from their Polisario captors, Algeria had ensured wider international recognition for the Polisario Front and had gained publicity for the Sahrawi cause, for which sympathy in Western Europe was in any case growing.46 There were, however, additional strategic motives behind Boumediene’s decision, as well as the immediate considerations. First, Boumediene had calmed the situation down, helping to ensure the Western Sahara conflict did not escalate into a fully-fledged regional war, which would have been the worst possible outcome for Algeria’s development plans. Secondly, Boumediene probably also had it in mind to do Washington a favor in return for the approval on 9 November by the US Federal Power Commission of one of the pending LNG contracts. Thirdly, by releasing the French hostages, Algiers gave satisfaction to both Washington and Moscow, just a day after Vance and Dobrynin acting together had urged Algeria to do all it could to obtain the hostages’ release. Algeria no doubt also desired to have done with what was from its point of view an irrelevance, in order to free it up to proceed with the North-South dialogue and the pursuit of its Third World leadership role. Algeria also asked the US to mediate between Rabat, Nouakchott and the Polisario Front. Had Washington had agreed to mediate, Algiers hoped that the Carter administration’s restrictions on arms would have been more rigorosly applied to Morocco, thus weakening Morocco’s position. In early September 1977, Maoui adverted to this in the course of his first

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meeting with William Quandt. “I made no comment,” reported Quandt to Brzezinski, while suggesting the upcoming Washington visits by King Hassan and Boumediene could offer an opportunity, as he saw it, “to help reduce the tensions between the two countries.”47 Boumediene’s cautious approach to Washington also included the North-South dialogue. Although the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in Paris had stalled in May, despite Washington’s attempts to avoid confrontation with Algeria, the Carter administration departed from Kissinger’s tactics in that Vance was instructed to “accept the desire of the LDCs [Least Developed Countries] for [the] use of the phrase ‘a new economic order’”.48 This had been a taboo for Henry Kissinger. The Americans believed they had sensed a degree of moderation in the tone adopted by Algeria at the UN General Assembly session.49 Nevertheless, this did not amount to a significant shift in Algeria’s demands as regards the NIEO. A CIA memorandum explained that Algeria’s radical influence “has been muted lately in large part” due to internal factors.50 In November 1977, international negotiations on economic cooperation resumed at a different venue. This was the UNCTAD Common Fund talks in Geneva, where the G-77 contended that the Common Fund should not be limited to a stabilizing role but should also contribute to infrastructure development, market promotion and other development areas. They also insisted on direct financing from governments to the Common Fund. The position of the Developed Countries (known as Group B at the talks) was divided. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries supported the G-77’s position while West Germany and Japan opposed it. When deadlock supervened, “Algeria, Ethiopia, Libya, the Sudan and Tanzania were the strongest advocates of the suspension of negotiations,” as the CIA observed. The result was that talks were suspended until Group B was able to demonstrate the required “political will” as the final communique´ put it.51 In fact, the G-77 states were also just as divided between themselves. The suspension of negotiations was a move to preserve Third World solidarity. The Common Fund talks were the last shot in the NIEO initiative. Since the failure of the Paris Conference, Algeria had already reconciled itself to the limited nature of the achievements likely in the North-South dialogue. Henceforth, Algeria’s position departed from the radical posture it had adopted in 1975 –6 of

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sabotaging talks it feared would endanger Algerian interests, as when it had obstructed Kissinger’s attempt to form a cartel of oil consumers. Instead, Algeria now adopted a less strident position, aiming at earning the good will of the US at a time, in the first year of the Carter administration, when it seemed that Washington and Algiers were once more cautiously exploring avenues that could lead to renewed rapprochement. Suspending, rather than abandoning, the Common Fund talks served Algeria’s purposes at no cost. It would give Washington cause to believe that its renewed attempt to persuade Algeria to moderate its posture was having some effect, and the new US administration might thus be persuaded that Boumediene was becoming more cooperative. By the end of 1977, Boumediene’s new moderate approach seemed to have taken effect in an area central to Algeria’s concerns, namely the limitation of US arms sales to Rabat. King Hassan had requested an arms delivery in September to resupply his forces in the Western Sahara but there was no sign of this being delivered. Furious at what he regarded as US indecision, the King delivered the strongest possible diplomatic rebuke by canceling his official visit to Washington, just three days before its scheduled start date of 7 December. This faced the administration with a dilemma. Just a week earlier, Donald Fraser, Chairman of the Congressional Subcommittee on International Organizations, had made a strong case to Vance against the sale of arms to Rabat. Fraser invoked the Foreign Assistance and Military Sales Act and the Arms Export Control Act as legal justifications to block the sale, given that the requested arms would be used in Western Sahara, where the US did not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty. Fraser also invoked the administration’s human rights policy to justify his conclusion that, notwithstanding Morocco’s traditional ties with the US, the Carter administration “should establish with its friends and foes alike that certain fundamental rights, including the right to self-determination, play an integral part in formulating American foreign policy.”52 Were the White House to review its apparent reluctance to deliver King Hassan’s arms supplies, it would evidently face a clash with its own supporters in Congress, though this was postponed by the King’s decision to call off his visit, for which “no new date has been established,” as Quandt informed Donald Fraser.53 Three days later, the Moroccan ambassador Ali Bendjelloun pressed Cyrus Vance for a

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decision on the arms sale request before returning to Rabat for consultations. Vance reported to Carter that, although the original request stated that the arms would be used in Western Sahara and Mauritania, Bendjelloun now referred “only to their prospective use along Morocco’s northern border with Algeria.” Bendjelloun was disappointed to hear the American contention that there were legal provisions to be overcome, but was told a decision would be made “in the fairly near future.”54 Another area where Algeria seemed to be in a better position was over the approval of LNG gas contracts. The Carter administration was facing complaints from state governors who were concerned over the effects on their local economies over the delays in approving the contracts for importation by American companies of LNG purchased from Sonatrach. On 28 December 1977, Meldrim Thomson, the Governor of New Hampshire, wrote to the White House enquiring about the fate of the application by Tenneco, one of the companies involved. The administration assured Thomson that, “assuring adequate future supplies of natural gas for the State of New Hampshire” was a concern “shared by members of this Administration.” On 13 January 1978, Thomson was briefed that the Department of Energy (DOE) had approved a District Gas Algerian LNG contract on 31 December, which was “a most encouraging signal to the Algerian government,” and that shortly thereafter the outstanding applications would be collectively reviewed by the DOE as part of the administration’s energy policy review.55 A similar reply was sent to John Rockefeller, Governor of West Virginia, who expressed similar concerns over the El Paso Gas, District Gas, and Tenneco applications.56

When Ideology Struck Back In the days of the Nixon-Ford administrations, Algeria retreated from involvement in Middle East politics and refrained from attempting to obstruct Kissinger’s Middle East peace initiatives. On 20 November 1977, however, almost a year into the Carter era, there was an event that entirely changed the basis of Middle East politics. This was the apparently momentous decision by President Anwar Sadat of Egypt to make a snap visit to Israel. This changed many things, one of which was that Algeria was dragged back into the Arab-Israeli arena. It also

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led to a somewhat greater tendency in Algeria to tilt back towards the Soviet Union in its choice of international partners. The initial Algerian reaction to Sadat’s visit offered a taste of what would follow. While Morocco and Saudi Arabia welcomed Sadat’s initiative, the Algerian leadership issued a stiff statement. Algeria, which correctly bases itself upon its own experience of anti-imperialist struggle, condemns the interference of former imperialist forces in the affairs of the Arab world, at times with the connivance of Arab regimes. In these moments of grave peril to the Arab world, Algeria believes that now more than ever before it is the responsibility of all to remain united in order to preserve the gains of common struggle and to fortify that struggle until the just cause of the Arab peoples is victorious.57 On 2 December 1977, the radical Arab states as a group held a meeting in Tripoli to discuss their reaction to Sadat’s move. In the Tripoli Declaration, Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO, proclaimed the establishment of a Steadfastness and Confrontation Front. They “froze” their relations with Egypt and imposed an economic embargo on Egyptian companies. They also declared they would henceforth boycott Arab League meetings held in Cairo. In response, Sadat severed diplomatic ties with the Steadfastness Front states. A State Department briefing opined that Saudi Arabia felt that as Sadat’s reaction was disproportionate and failed to take into account that the “Steadfastness Front” posed no serious threat to Egypt. Riyadh, however, was concerned by the Tripoli Summit group’s radicalism, as expressed in the Declaration, and issued a statement broadly in support of Sadat.58 On 3 January 1978, Boumediene embarked on a two-week tour of the Middle East and Moscow to rally support for the Steadfastness Front and as far as possible to isolate Sadat. Boumediene began in Iraq, which had withdrawn its own support from the Front after a quarrel with Syria, accusing the other participants of being insufficiently radical. He then went on over the next two weeks to Riyadh, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, Aden, Sana’a, Qatar, Kuwait, and finally Damascus. From the Middle East, Boumediene flew to the USSR, Yugoslavia and Malta before concluding his tour in Tunis on 16 January. In addition to promoting the cause of Palestinian rights, Boumediene seized upon

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the Sadat initiative as an opportunity to attempt to win the sympathy and support of the Arab states for the right for self-determination for the Sahrawis. All the communique´s issued during the tour, including those issued in Moscow and in Yugoslavia, placed the Western Sahara conflict on an equal footing with the Palestinian struggle. Both were presented as instances of resistance to imperialist and reactionary conspiracies. In the extensive press coverage of the tour in Algeria, great stress was laid on the connection between the Sahrawi and Palestinian causes.59 Once back in Algiers, in order to maintain the initiative, Boumediene lost no time in convening the Algiers Summit of the Steadfastness and Confrontation Front, which met from 2 – 4 February, just two weeks after his January tour. Attended by the states that had signed the declaration in Tripoli, the Algiers Summit renewed the defiant stance of the group, re-asserting the condemnation of the divisive nature of President Sadat’s unheralded move. It also made a clear appeal to the Arab countries, “to work to achieve a strategic balance between Syria and the Zionist enemy.”60 The Swiss embassy in Algiers commented that it would no doubt fall to Libya to finance the secret fund that the Algiers Summit had agreed to set up in support of Syria. Swiss diplomats believed that Boumediene asked for arms for Syria during his two-day visit to Moscow in January.61 The Swiss report also noted that Algeria included a reference to the Western Sahara issue in the final communique´, which had not been the case with the original Tripoli Declaration, from which the conclusion was drawn that Algiers seemed to be equating the cause of the Polisario Front with that of the PLO. The final communique´ also took care to mention the Soviet Union’s support for the Sahrawi struggle, in return for the Steadfastness Front’s acclamation of the Soviet Union as, “the only recourse of the oppressed peoples.”62 In Washington, the NSC also concluded that Boumediene was making a bid to elevate the Sahrawi cause to equivalence with the Palestinian issue, adding that Boumediene “may have made some progress,” since the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen had just recognized Polisario.63 More disturbing to Washington was the increasing frequency and scale of Soviet arms deliveries, and the constant visits to Algerian ports by Soviet naval vessels. Four days after Boumediene left Moscow, a secret NSC memorandum indicated that, “One ship per week is now unloading at Western Algerian Mers-el-Kebir

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naval base.” Another report listed a Soviet delivery of SA-6 surfaceto-air missiles.64 On 10 April 1978, Admiral Ryabinsky, Commander of Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, headed a flotilla of three ships into the port of Algiers, “including the guided missile helicopter ship Moskva”. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recorded its belief that while Algeria would make no agreement with Moscow guaranteeing the Soviet navy access to Mers-el-Kebir, “it may be willing to concede a liberalization of Soviet access to its ports.”65 On 17 April, Algeria was listed as among the top recipients of Soviet aircraft exports in the first quarter of 1978.66 Another top-secret memorandum indicated that Algeria had ordered a squadron of MIG-25 Foxbat aircraft, with delivery “expected in the near future.” Intelligence estimated the order to be for 16 planes.67 East Germany’s bid to increase the level of its military cooperation in Africa was also closely monitored. In early June, when a visit was made to Algeria by the East German Defense Minister, General Heinz Hoffmann, the DIA reported that, in its view, “the GDR is trying to supplement Soviet involvement in countries where Moscow’s influence is strong.”68 Algeria, of course, was just such a country. Five weeks later the DIA estimated the number of East German military and civilian advisers operating in Africa at around 900, with the majority of them, including 200 who were technically civilians, in Algeria.69 On the other hand, on 3 October, in Bonn, Brzezinski ¨ rgen Wischnewski, the West reported that when he met with Hans-Ju German Minister of State, he learnt that Algeria was trying to break away from its dependency on Soviet armament, perhaps reverting to its earlier philosophy of diversification and that Boumediene was dispatching a “special representative” to Bonn in order to discuss the possibility of the construction by West Germany of armaments factories in Algeria on a “turnkey basis.”70 Nevertheless, Algeria’s continuing underlying tilt towards the Eastern bloc was also reflected in its relations with Havana. In May 1978, when there was criticism of Cuba’s link with Moscow at the NAM coordination meeting in Havana, Algeria, along with Angola, gave Cuba its support. During the NAM Foreign Ministers’ conference in Belgrade that began on 25 July, Havana was severely criticized. A number of countries threatened to begin proceedings to expel Cuba from the movement because of its excessive alignment with the socialist states of Eastern Europe. The threat was serious, prompting

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Castro to launch a diplomatic offensive in Africa and Asia to attempt to turn the tide of opinion. The Iraqi Foreign Minister charged that, “some non-aligned countries have become tools of the super powers.” Once again according to the NSC report, Algeria refrained from criticizing Cuba.71 After the meeting, Cuba’s Foreign Minister Isidoro Malmierca visited Algiers.72 At the end of 1977, Algeria was the object of a clandestine initiative on the part of King Hassan. On 14 December 1977, Boumediene told Taleb-Ibrahimi and Bouteflika he had received a confidential approach by the King relating to the Western Sahara. Secret talks between Morocco and Algeria began soon afterwards in Europe. This was a highly sensitive contact that Boumediene suspected could be a trap by the King to embarrass Algeria if revealed. Boumediene chose Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi as his representative and instructed him to keep Polisario informed about whatever transpired. He was to give the Sahrawis an assurance that Algeria would never presume to negotiate on their behalf but would do all possible to get a direct dialogue started between Morocco and Polisario. In what was evidently intended as a guarantee of the King’s personal commitment and good faith, King Hassan’s sister, Lalla Aicha, led the Moroccan team at the opening of the negotiations. Over a period of nine months, seven meetings took place at venues in Switzerland, Belgium and Morocco.73 In his memoirs, published three decades later in 2008, Taleb-Ibrahimi quotes from the minutes of these meetings as he sent them to Boumediene. On 20 December 1977, at the “Beau Rivage” hotel in Geneva, Lalla Aicha opened the meeting with the expression of what she called King Hassan’s “nostalgia for the Ifrane and Tlemcen accords” and his hopes of restoring good relations with Algeria. She then introduced TalebIbrahimo to Colonel Ahmed Dlimi and Ahmed Guedira, who would be the King’s negotiators. Dlimi was the Director of the Moroccan Directorate of General Studies and Documentation, that is to say, the Moroccan intelligence services. He had become notorious in 1966, when he was accused of involvement in the kidnapping and assassination of the leftist opposition leader El-Mehdi Ben Barka in Paris.74 Though Dlimi was acquitted by a French court, the widespread belief was that the murder was a case where French and Moroccan intelligence services had joined forces, one to cover the other’s tracks. Ahmed Guedira, was a straightforward political adviser

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to the King. By profession he was a lawyer and had held half a dozen different ministerial portfolios since Morocco’s independence, including those of defense, interior and foreign affairs.75 With the introductory remarks of the initial meeting completed, the real business began in the second session. On 6 – 7 February 1978, in the second session, which met at ˆ tel de la Re´serve”, another of Geneva’s luxurious hotels, the “Ho both parties stated their respective positions. The Moroccan proposal was that Rabat should retain full sovereignty of the northern part of the territory of the Western Sahara as defined by the Madrid Accords, and that the southern part should enter a federal union with Mauritania. Dlimi proposed a period while media campaigns would hint at what was being suggested, followed by a face-to-face meeting between King Hassan and Boumediene to finalize the agreement. Guedira assured Taleb-Ibrahimi that Rabat would not go to war against Algeria again in King Hassan’s lifetime. What King Hassan was offering was in effect a revised version of the Madrid Accords, except that on this occasion, unlike November 1975, it was Ould Daddah who would be stabbed in the back rather than Boumediene. A week later, at the third session of the talks, Dlimi and Guedira returned with a message from the King pressing for a summit with Boumediene to be held in Spain or Belgium.76 At the fourth meeting, held in Geneva in early March, it was TalebIbrahimi’s turn to lay down firmly what Algeria’s basic conditions were. Algiers could not accept Morocco’s proposal. It was unwilling to see a further 70 kilometers added to the Moroccan-Algerian border in the region where previously there had been a frontier between Algeria and the Western Sahara. A fatal problem however, was that the Moroccan proposal would render nugatory the holding of any referendum, since it pre-empted the result by excluding the possibility of self-determination for the inhabitants in what would become the Moroccan-controled part of the Western Sahara. In addition, the phosphate-rich part of Western Sahara, which gave the territory its economic viability, lay in the northern section and would be ceded to Morocco. Taleb-Ibrahimi offered as an alternative the proposal of provisional self-determination and a referendum, with the goal of establishing a Sahrawi state, whose borders would however be left undefined in the first phase of the process. The following day,

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Dlimi and Guedira came back with a draft proposal which they entitled “First Hypothesis.” This was identical with the proposal the Moroccans had initially put forward at the “Beau Rivage”, with the addition, of a version of limited self-determination that would lead to Moroccan sovereignty in the northern part of Western Sahara and to either an independent Sahrawi state or federation with Mauritania in the southern part.77 The fifth meeting took place in Brussels on 22 –3 March, where the two sides made efforts to discover what common ground there might be between their respective positions before convening a date for a face-to-face meeting between King Hassan and President Boumediene, to be held at some venue on the frontier between the two countries, prior to which the security services of both countries would meet in mid-April to agree details. On 1 May, the sixth meeting between the two sides took place in the Moroccan city of Fes, where Taleb-Ibrahimi, Dlimi and Guedira flew together from Geneva for a private late-night meeting between Taleb-Ibrahimi and King Hassan. Evidently the King, in something of a diplomatic climb-down, was sufficiently anxious to press on with the talks to have agreed to put his position to Boumediene’s representative, rather than to Boumediene himself. The King made a lengthy speech, couched, as he himself admitted, in blunt terms. A notable admission he made, according to Taleb-Ibrahimi, was that that the monarchy in Morocco was facing existential threats that seemed likely to continue for some time. This apparently explained his anxiety to negotiate. On the other hand, he told Taleb-Ibrahimi that Morocco would not shrink from continuing the conflict in Western Sahara if he was obliged to do so. He was aware there would be human and material costs, but for Morocco there would also be, perhaps surprisingly, some advantages. The conflict would give the Moroccan armed forces experience of real warfare, accustom them to the use of military equipment, and permit capable officers to come to the fore and be rewarded with promotion. The king also pointed out that Morocco would be fighting a declared war, whereas Algeria would become bogged down in a covert conflict that could over time lead to difficulties with both the Algerian army and the Algerian people. Taleb-Ibrahimi replied that the Sahrawi nationalism was real, and that while Algeria was supporting Polisario deaths in the field would

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not be Algerian. “Those who are fighting and sacrificing their lives are Sahrawis.” King Hassan then changed tack. He said he was nostalgic for the decade of cooperation with Algeria that had preceded the present crisis and longed for peace. Then he produced what he said was the final proposal he was prepared to put to Boumediene. To the astonishment of the Algerians, this was quite simply the exact same proposal his negotiators had offered in the very first meeting five months earlier, which amounted to asking Algeria to agree to a what would in effect be a conspiracy to integrate half the Sahrawis into Morocco and hand the rest to Mauritania. King Hassan then summoned Dlimi and Guedira and told them they were to go to Algiers, speak directly to Boumediene and get his response to the offer. Then the King simply swept out of the room. Startled and irritated by this histrionic performance, Taleb-Ibrahimi reminded Dlimi and Guedira, who had been left behind by King Hassan’s dramatic exit, that as negotiators they had put much effort into finding common ground and pointed out to them that the King’s position was incompatible with what the two sides had been able to agree in Geneva and Brussels. Taleb-Ibrahimi also reminded his Moroccan interlocutors that there had been, as he somewhat tendentiously put it, “no shortage of opportunities to depose the King in the last ten years.” The Moroccans did not rise to this provocation but conceded that King Hassan was indeed well aware of the framework the negotiators had painstakingly established.78 What had apparently motivated King Hassan to open these secret talks with Boumediene at the end of 1977, in addition to the domestic political instability to which Taleb-Ibrahimi referred, was the relentless and successful war of attrition being waged by Polisario. However, the King also seemed to believe Morocco was being edged out of favor with the US by the success of Boumediene’s political rapprochement with Washington. While Algiers came to the secret talks in the belief that the subject would be the principle of Sahrawi self-determination, King Hassan had in fact made an attempt to enlist Algeria’s aid in a sordid conspiracy, in which Rabat would maintain Morocco’s own claim to part of the Saharan territory as laid down in the partition agreement embodied in the Madrid Accords, while offering little to Algeria and abandoning Nouakchott to its own devices.

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The Confrontation Between White House and Congress By the beginning of 1978, the Carter administration was facing fierce opposition in Congress over the issue of arms for Morocco. The administration was not unwilling to see arms go to Morocco. King Hassan’s support for Sadat, his performance as an ally in Africa, and the general geopolitical consideration of a friendly regime in Africa were all considerations, The foreign and international affairs subcommittees, however, in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, were unwilling to endorse requests for arms sales to Morocco for use in the Western Sahara, which were technically in breach of the US Arms Control Act and of the American-Moroccan military agreement, a long-standing treaty dating from 1960 under which Morocco had agreed not to use US arms for non-defensive purposes.79 In January, Congressman Joseph Addabo requested price and budgeting information from the White House regarding Morocco’s request for A-10 aircraft. Brzezinski replied that that data was not available yet as Morocco’s request was still under review for compliance with the administration’s own arms transfer policy.80 At the NSC, however, William Quandt was advocating “quietly going ahead with [the] liberalization of our arms transfer policy for Morocco.” Quandt, however, joined Ulric Haynes in calling on the US administration not to abandon Boumediene. As Quandt advised, “I see no reason for a confrontation now, and certainly not over the Sahara issue. The Moroccans have not behaved all that well on the Sahara question either.”81 On 8 February, Dick Clark, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, sent a lengthy letter to President Carter making the case against Rabat’s request for the sale of helicopters worth $100 million, invoking the provisions of the various arms export acts. In addition, Clark argued that the complexity of the conflict in Western Sahara could see the US administration accused of endorsing either a civil war or Moroccan colonialism, or of going to Cold-War style East/ West conflict. The fact that SADR was recognized by a quarter of the members of the OAU complicated the matter further. Clark blocked the door to any amendment of the 1960 American-Moroccan military agreement to allow Western Sahara or Mauritania to count as Moroccan territory, arguing that this would simply amount to de facto recognition of Morocco’s claims over the disputed territory, a move

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which would in turn be a breach of the UN resolution itself. Clark carried his case further by arguing that the type of arms requested by Morocco would make it difficult to determine whether they would be used solely for self-defense only. There would therefore be the potential for escalation of the conflict that could lead to Soviet intervention in support of Algeria, just as the Soviet Union had done in support of its clients in the Horn of Africa. Clark therefore urged the White House to observe its own human rights policy and to encourage the resolution of the North African dispute within the framework of the OAU.82 On 17 February 1978, Brzezinski replied to Clark that he had taken note of his “careful analysis” and that he had asked the State Department “to provide a more detailed response” to his questions.83 Around two weeks earlier, the New York Times had revealed that there had already been consultation on the Moroccan arms sale between the State Department and Congress. On 11 March, Cyrus Vance explained to the Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohamed Boucetta, who had come to Washington to press for the arms deal to go through, that a decision had been made to suspend the sale due to strong opposition in Congress. Worse, Vance informed Boucetta that proceeding with the deal would risk placing the entire annual $45 million FSM aid program to Morocco in jeopardy of subjection to Congressional scrutiny.84 King Hassan’s response to all this was to visit the Soviet Union. On 10 March he signed a 20-year contract between Morocco and the Soviets for the exploitation of phosphates as well as agreements on railway development and in other fields. On 27 April, he signed a further agreement on fisheries.85 The King aimed to send a strong signal to Washington about his dissatisfaction at the way he had been treated, as well as to neutralize the potential role of Moscow in the Western Sahara conflict, though Moscow had in fact already recognized the Polisario Front. The fishing port agreement, Rabat hoped, would imply Soviet recognition of Moroccan claims over the Western Sahara. However, Moscow later declared that its policy on the Western Sahara had not changed.86 In that same month of April 1978, a Soviet naval squadron paid a seven-day visit to an Algerian port, indicating that the Soviets did not intend to withdraw their support from Algeria.87 In April and May, there was little diplomatic activity in Washington relating to the Maghreb, though the White House’s

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dealings with Rabat continued to come under the scrutiny of Congress. In addition, with the clandestine Algerian-Moroccan talks going nowhere, there was little progress towards any kind of bilateral accord. Algeria continued to sound out Washington over what role it might play in the resolution of the Western Sahara issue, while King Hassan had already expressed his wish to make a visit to Washington in late May.88 Given President Carter’s busy schedule, however, and the failure of the administration so far to resolve with Congress the legal issues over arms exports, this was not likely to happen. In addition, the King had not yet been entirely forgiven for the eleventh hour cancelation of his last visit. William Quandt recommended a major Policy Review Committee (PRC) meeting on North Africa. He said David Newsom should go to the region first to try and move matters along in the light of the PRC’s policy decisions, after which King Hassan’s proposed visit could perhaps be scheduled, in July or even later. Quandt believed this would serve the primary US interest of “keeping the Soviets out of North Africa” by “quietly” soothing the conflict.89 In the run-up to the PRC meeting, a 25-page NSC study on US policy in North Africa was prepared, which reviewed US strategic interests since WWII, and offered the administration two policy alternatives. The document pointed out Morocco’s traditional role as an old ally of the US, in contrast to radical pro-Soviet Algeria, but also covered Algeria’s new role as the scene of major US economic interests, especially in the energy sector. It also noted that, according to intelligence reports, Moroccan and Algerian delegates had “met twice this spring in unsuccessful efforts to resolve the Sahara dispute through negotiation.” The study also stressed the introduction of two novel elements into relations between the US and North Africa. First, there was King Hassan’s major phosphates contract with Moscow, newly signed, though this was balanced by a pending agreement with Rabat for the construction of a strategically important deep-space optical surveillance station to be run by US Air Force. Secondly, legislation had been put forward in July 1978 by Senator Ribicoff to impose economic sanctions on any state that supported so-called terrorism, which would be interpreted to include the PLO. If passed, this would cause serious difficulties with Algeria due to the support of Algiers for militant Palestinian and liberation movements. Ulric Haynes had already expressed serious concern over this issue, while

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“Quandt . . . would like to see this bill die,” the memorandum noted.90 The NSC study recommended three alternatives: first to maintain the administration’s current policy of neutrality; secondly, to go for a “closer alignment” with Morocco; or thirdly, to promote peace settlement in the Western Sahara. The closer alignment option would entail the amendment of the arms export act to allow for the sale of arms to Rabat and their use in Western Sahara, which would in turn pave the way for gradual recognition of Moroccan sovereignty on the territory. This option, the study argued, would strengthen America’s old ally and induce King Hassan to finalize agreement on the deep-space observation facility. On the other hand, approving some LNG contracts and nonlethal arms sale to Algeria would discourage Algiers from a complete alignment with Moscow. In this case, the study explained, Congress would be the major obstacle. The alternative of promoting a peace settlement would imply an attempt to dragoon the Sahrawi nationalists into some sort of union or confederation with Mauritania and even Morocco, possibly using French mediation, or the input of the Arab League, the OAU and the UN. The study admitted that this would bring difficulties with Saudi Arabia, which was already unhappy with Carter’s hands-off policy in the Western Sahara, which it regarded as a more serious problem than those in the Horn of Africa and Aden.91 On 13 June 1978, when the PRC met, with participants from the departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Energy, the CIA, and elsewhere, they were faced by the relatively unfamiliar problems of North Africa. The situation they faced was not dissimilar to what had arisen in 1970 when Kissinger ordered a major inter-governmental US and North African policy review after the September 1969 coup in Libya. As had happened in Kissinger’s day, the PRC reached no straightforward policy conclusions. Instead, it opted for selective recommendations from the alternatives presented. The group agreed, therefore, not to amend the US position of neutrality in the conflict, but rather to encourage mediated talks. It also offered the sale of Cobra helicopters to Morocco if Hassan agreed to pull out the F-5 aircraft currently being used in Western Sahara and use them only in defense of Mauritania. Finally, to ease tension with Congress, the White House would give verbal notification to Congress of any Moroccan violations of the terms of the arms export act.

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Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, would visit the region, and invitations to visit Washington would be extended to Hassan and Boumediene, in that order, in October 1978 and March 1979 respectively.92 President Carter accepted the PRC’s recommendations and instructed Saunders to visit Rabat and Algiers from 20 to 24 July.93 Before Saunders could travel to Rabat and Algiers to deliver the state visit invitations, however, the situation in the region changed sharply when President of Mauritania, Ould Daddah, was deposed in the coup mounted by officers of his army.94 According to a CIA report, the change in Mauritania came while Spain was mediating between Rabat and Algiers. Polisario’s declaration of a unilateral ceasefire on the Mauritanian front shortly after the coup might enhance the prospects of a settlement, the CIA concluded, while noting that the Western Sahara dispute was primarily a Moroccan-Algerian affair.95 However, it was clear that the North African conflict had entered a new phase and that the US administration would need to re-assess the situation in the light of the Nouakchott coup.96 When the military coup in Mauritania took place, on 10 July 1978, most of the leaders of the African states were attending the OAU conference in Khartoum. The Swiss ambassador to Algiers believed the timing was perfect for Algeria to raise the issue of the Western Sahara at the conference, though there was no official Algerian reaction to the Nouakchott coup.97 Boumediene finally made his proSahrawi speech at the OAU, after three years of tireless lobbying of the organization’s member states by Algiers. He reaffirmed Algeria’s traditional support for Sahrawi self-determination, which, he said, was in line with Algeria’s traditional support for all African liberation movements.98 The OAU passed a resolution accepting it had responsibility to find a solution to the Western Sahara problem and commissioned the chairman of the conference, President Jaafar Nimeiry, of Sudan, to form an ad hoc committee to study the Western Sahara problem. It appeared, however, that the resolution passed by the OAU did not go as far as Algeria wanted. Algeria had hoped that the OAU would explicitly back the resolution of the conflict on the basis of Sahrawi self-determination.99 Nevertheless, another point had been scored by the Algerian leadership, which attached great importance to obtaining the endorsement of international organizations. By this time, the

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accumulation of such resolutions had made it difficult for outside powers to recognize Morocco’s claims of sovereignty over the territory, despite the Madrid Accords, which any case embodied the views of the former colonial power. The linkage of the Sahrawi cause to the UN decolonization resolutions of 1966, which were followed by the conclusions of the UN Mission and the ICJ Advisory Opinion all tended to invalidate the Moroccan claim. The Polisario ceasefire was in any case about to nullify the Madrid Accord by taking Mauritania out of the conflict, leaving Morocco’s annexation plan unsupported by any other state. Morocco’s Foreign Minister Mohammed Boucetta complained to Cyrus Vance what he said was the inconsistency of Washington’s recognition of the Moroccan administration in Western Sahara but not Moroccan sovereignty over the territory. Vance responded that, “we [the US] were compelled to address the question honestly when appearing before the Congress.”100 On 21 July 1978, Harold Saunders was in Rabat, where King Hassan informed him that the F-5s had been withdrawn from Western Sahara as requested. A month later, however, the King was to make a radical speech in which he rejected any concessions over the establishment of a Sahrawi homeland, even in the Mauritanian-controlled territory. A week later, on 17 August, King Hassan angrily accused the Algerian army of attacking a Moroccan army unit inside Morocco. It was clear that the King had decided to go on the offensive, no doubt troubled by the political change in Nouakchott, in order to undermine any attempts to mediate and especially any prospect of a peaceful settlement between the new military leadership in Nouakchott and the Polisario Front. By now the State Department had decided to bring Richard Parker back to Rabat from Beirut after the resignation of Robert Anderson. They might have concluded that no one understood North African politics better than Parker, and in addition he was a fluent Arabist.101 On 7 September, a seventh and final session of secret talks took place at the Hotel Richmond in Geneva between Taleb-Ibrahimi, accompanied this time by Kasdi Merbah, Director of the Algerian Military Intelligence, and the same Moroccan interlocutors, Guedira and Dlimi. Guedira explained that the King was not well informed about the 17 August attack and that after careful analysis of the facts he was personally persuaded that the Algerian army could not have been involved. Guedira and Dlimi pleaded for the King’s angry

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accusations against Algeria to be set aside, and asked for a meeting on 15 or 25 September.102 In fact, there was no hope of success from further secret negotiations, given the anti-Algerian press campaign launched by King Hassan. In addition, on the very day the new session had been due to take place, Washington finally decided to sell King Hassan the Cobra helicopters he wanted. On 13 September, Guedira, in his role as Royal Counsellor, had already told the departing ambassador Robert Anderson that Morocco “[did] not consider that use of F-5’s in the Sahara violates the 1960 USMoroccan agreement and that if the US maintains its position it risks ending its military relationship with Morocco.”103 The stakes were high. Morocco had been allowing US ships to use its ports, including nuclear-armed vessels, as well as permitting the Voice of America to use its radio wavelengths to broadcast to Eastern Europe, as well as the pending facility for observing Soviet satellites. It expected something in return for these favors. On 20 September, a week after Guedira’s conversation with Anderson, King Hassan lashed out again against Boumediene, accusing Algeria of another encroachment by Algerian troops. By then, Boumediene had received Fidel Castro who had made a oneday visit to Algiers on 19 September. He then flew to Damascus for the third summit of the Steadfastness Front, held from 20 to 23 September, where he was taken ill, and arrived in Moscow on 29 September for medical treatment at the Chvedov hospital, accompanied by Taleb-Ibrahimi and Bouteflika. When he arrived in Moscow, he was suffering from fever, chills, anaemia and general malaise, with blood in his urine. The Soviet hospital thought initially he had a kidney disease. On 2 October, King Hassan sent Boumediene an open letter in which he accused Algeria of military attacks against Moroccan troops in Moroccan territory, but he did not reply himself. On 5 October, El-Moudjahid published a letter to King Hassan drafted by Taleb-Ibrahimi and Bouteflika, of which a translated copy was given to President Carter by ambassador Maoui on 6 October. The letter began with an implicit criticism of the King’s recent preference for open communication. “You will, I am sure,” it said, “permit me to express my deep regret of the fact that public diplomacy seems today to be winning over traditional diplomacy.”104 On 5 October, King Hassan had sent Carter a letter accepting an invitation to begin a state visit to the US on

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14 November, which would coincide with the third anniversary of the Madrid Accords.105 Boumediene’s absence in Moscow was prolonged. This naturally fuelled rumors about his health, and it was even whispered that there had been a coup. Boumediene’s protocol team arranged for him to make a public appearance in Moscow, side by side with Leonid Brezhnev and Alexi Kosygin, to calm the Algerian public and refute the wilder rumors, seeking to re-assure the Algerian people. The diplomatic corps in Algiers was, however, unconvinced by what looked like a staged event and there was still speculation about what was taking place.106 Meanwhile, despite the medical reasons for Boumediene’s sojourn in Moscow, he held talks with the Soviet leaders about international issues. The Camp David Accords, the Damascus Steadfastness summit and issues related to the Ethiopian Revolution all came under discussion.107 On 13 November, the day King Hassan’s state visit to Washington began, Boumediene landed in Algiers. Frail and weak, he emerged from his plane accompanied by a team of Soviet doctors. “It is a question of days and I will resume my duties,” he insisted. However, he was visibly unwell, with swollen legs and not wearing shoes. None of this inspired confidence.108 He was admitted to hospital in Algiers on 17 November. On 30 November, Ulric Haynes cabled the White House to report that the previous day, on 29 November, Boumediene had undergone a cranial scan using an advanced scanner provided by the US Air Force which revealed a blood clot in the front of his brain. Haynes reported that, “the Soviet neurosurgeons in Algiers did not think it worth operating, but the Algerians sent for neurosurgeons from the UK and Yugoslavia and requested a US specialist for the operation.” The doctor consulted, Dr Adams of the Massachusetts General Hospital, said it “would only hurt Boumediene’s chances” to wait, Instead of travelling to Algiers, Dr Adams “volunteered to consult over the telephone with the Algerian doctors.”109 A massive medical team, drawn from many countries, assembled in Algiers, including 14 American doctors. Boumediene was finally diagnosed ¨ m’s macroglobulinemia. with a rare disorder of the blood, Waldenstro On 11 December, Libya’s Colonel Qaddafi sent President Carter a message in which he expressed his “sincere thanks and deep appreciation . . . for the humanitarian efforts and the dispatch of a team of doctors to help save President Boumedienne’s life.”110

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On 27 December, having been in a coma for some days, Boumediene was pronounced dead. The later Algerian president’s connection with the US was to continue to the end. His funeral, on 29 December, was attended by a US delegation headed by Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal. President Carter’s son Chip Carter came as the president’s personal representative, with a dozen others including Muhammad Ali, the WBC world heavyweight boxing champion, from the US-based “Nation of Islam”, and additional government and business representatives including William Quandt of the NSC and Howard Boyd, the chairman of El Paso.111 Boumediene died an untimely death at the young age of 45 from a rare blood cancer. Until the end of his life, he had continued to do his utmost for the socialist revolution to which he was so dedicated and for the grand project of development he had envisaged for Algeria.

CONCLUSION

The death of Houari Boumediene on 27 December 1978, just two months before the 1979 FLN congress, was the signal for a power struggle within the Revolutionary Council over who would succeed him as leader of the FLN, and would therefore become the country’s new president. Each of the two leading candidates initially seen as rivals to be Boumediene’s heir was a member of the Revolutionary Council, and the Council was therefore split between those who supported the one and those who backed the other. One of the contenders was Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whose support came from the FLN’s technocrats and administrators. This was the group that represented the liberal aspirations of the bourgeois elements of the population, who had tended to flourish in the context of the plans for rapid development. On the other hand, Mohammed Salah Yahiaoui, a war veteran and FLN leader, represented the hard-line socialist core of the party. In the event, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, who was the army’s candidate, took the leadership of the FLN, due to the failure of the civilians after some weeks to resolve their factional differences. Chadli Bendjedid, a veteran of the Algerian liberation war who had been Commander of the Second Military Region (Oran) since 1964, and had been a member of the Revolutionary Council since its creation in June 1965. He had been promoted to Colonel in 1969 and had assumed control of the military during Boumediene’s recent illness.1 The full details of what really happened during that month of intense power struggle are yet to be revealed, although it is largely accepted that Colonel Kasdi Merbah, the chief of

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intelligence, and Colonel Larbi Belkheir played a crucial and perhaps decisive role in Bendjedid’s nomination. The consensus finally reached by the members of the Revolutionary Council leadership, we are told, was for a moderate figure. Bouteflika was deemed to be too liberal and pro-West, while Yahiaoui was too doctrinaire a leftist with strong ideological socialist convictions.2 Bendjedid was elected president on 7 February 1979 by a majority of 94 per cent of the popular vote in an election where there was no opposition candidate. From the outset, Bendjedid’s posture was moderate. However, he surrounded himself with his own men. On 8 March 1979, at the end of the first FLN meeting of his presidency, he announced a reshuffled cabinet, displacing leading figures from the Boumediene era. Only six of Boumediene’s men were retained, and 16 of the 28 ministers were newcomers to ministerial responsibility.3 Abdelkader Bousselham, Algeria’s charge d’affaires in Washington, who was himself a victim of Bendjedid’s purges, dubbed this the “de-Boumedienization” phase.4 Crucially, Abdelaziz Bouteflika was replaced as minister of foreign affairs by Mohammed Seddik Benyahia, a former ambassador to Moscow who had previously held less important ministerial posts. Bouteflika, became a special adviser to Bendjedid, together with Ahmed Taleb-Ibrahimi, another of Boumediene’s trusted figures. Belaid Abdesslam, whose giant Ministry of Industry and Energy had been downsized in the 1977 major cabinet reshuffle, leaving it responsible only for the light industry sector, was put in charge of one of the FLN’s central committees. Sid Ahmed Ghozali, the former director of Sonatrach and Minister of Energy in Boumediene’s 1977 government, became Minister of Water Resources. Bouteflika and Abdesslam, together with other figures identified with Boumediene, would be purged entirely during the fifth congress of the FLN in 1983.5 Domestically, he adopted a liberal approach intended to appeal to the Algerian people. Radical steps were required to follow successfully an omnipresent figure like Boumediene. Bendjedid’s initial measures included the abolition of exit permits for Algerians wishing to travel abroad, first introduced during the 1967 ArabIsraeli War. Opposition political leaders who had fallen foul of Boumediene were released and military officers involved in the abortive December 1967 coup and the failed April 1968 attempt on Boumediene’s life were released. In April 1979, Youcef Benkheda and

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Ferhat Abbas, both popular and respected leaders of the nationalist struggle, were pardoned and released from house arrest. Eleven prisoners involved in Colonel Zbiri’s failed coup and assassination attempt were also pardoned. On 30 October, Bendjedid pardoned Zbiri himself, who had been in forced exile since December 1967, and released the former president Ahmed Ben Bella who had been in prison since 1965. Zbiri eventually returned to Algeria in November 1980.6 Meanwhile, on 16 April 1979, Bendjedid began to receive foreign ambassadors. The American ambassador Ulric Haynes was the first member of the diplomatic corps to be received by Bendjedid, after which Haynes cabled Washington to report on the new measures of relaxation.7 While this gradual phasing out of Boumediene’s men was underway, accompanied by the side-lining of the former president’s policies, the Polisario Front was inflicting painful and humiliating blows to Moroccan armed forces units, striking within Morocco proper as they did, for instance, at Tan-Tan. This campaign had begun in early 1979 and was designated the Boumediene Offensive, thus explicitly acknowledged Algeria’s support for the Sahrawi struggle.8 It presented a further challenge for US policy. On the one hand, the US administration believed it had a moral commitment to support King Hassan as an old ally of the US. This was perhaps particularly so after the fall of the Shah of Iran, another Middle East monarch who had been a traditional US ally. On the other hand, the legal constraints that surrounded the supply of arms to Morocco were still in place and Congressional oversight of the implementation of the relevant US legislation was inflexible.9 The situation was further complicated when Rabat offered direct negotiations with Algiers on the Sahara issue, attempting to revive the secret talks with Algeria begun under Boumediene. Chadli Bendjedid declined the offer, indicating that henceforth any talks must include Polisario. From 5 August to 18 August 1979, Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, visited the region, travelling to Morocco, Western Sahara, Mauritania and Algeria, before finishing his tour in Spain and France. He met regional leaders, including representatives from the Polisario Front. By this time, President Carter had invited Chadli Bendjedid to come to Washington on an official state visit, but Bendjedid told Solarz bluntly that his acceptance of the invitation was conditional on Washington refraining from giving

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further arms to Morocco. The report sent by Solarz to President Carter on 19 September was substantially the same as the report he later sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in which he said, when I began my visit to the region, I leaned towards the view that there might well be a convincing strategic and political case for changing our arms sales policy toward Morocco. But I came away from my trip persuaded that the proposed sale of offensive arms to Morocco for use in the Western Sahara would have significantly negative consequences for US foreign policy and that the advantages cited on behalf of such a course of action are either minimal or nonexistent.10 Both the White House and Congress appeared divided on how to reconcile legal constraints with American national interests.11 On 18 September, as Solarz was reporting, Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, submitted an action memorandum for the Secretary of State’s approval, laying out policy alternatives ahead of the Secretary’s Congressional hearing on the issue. Even within this paper, serious disagreements were evident between the different agencies of President Carter’s administration, including differences of view between the NSC and the State Department.12 By October, news reports confirmed that the Carter administration had in fact decided that it was not entirely opposed to by-passing the restrictions on arms transfer to Rabat, a development against which Algiers protested.13 Actually, a year earlier, it appears that a clandestine arms transfer to Morocco had already been attempted. Richard Parker, who was directly involved in the talks, revealed in his 2008 Oral History Project Interview that the White House had agreed to the sale of some OV-10 aircrafts only to see its offer turned down by King Hassan, who had by then already made alternative plans for supplies from elsewhere.14 Carter’s change of mind, however, seems not to have resulted in practical consequences. On 1 November 1979, Zbigniew Brzezinski was in Algiers, on his first visit to Algeria, representing the US at the celebrations of the anniversary of the beginning of the war of liberation on 1 November 1954. During this visit, he had intended to sound out Algiers as a possible mediator in the situation in Iran. Evidently, Carter’s change of heart had not alienated the Algerians. During his visit to Algiers,

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Brzezinski invited Chadli Bendjedid to visit Washington during the summer of 1980 while Army Major General Robert Schweitzer extended a separate invitation to Colonel Kasdi Merbah to visit the US.15 Brzezinski reported to President Carter that Mohammed Seddik Ben Yahia, the new Algerian minister of foreign affairs said that, “Algeria would be willing to give careful consideration to any constructive role the US might propose to Algeria for resolving this crisis;” but, Benyahia continued, “it would have to be played out in the strictest secrecy if it were to have any chance of succeeding.”16 By late November, a three-member delegation of the Algerian Air Force was visiting US Air Force bases including Nellis AFB in Nevada, Pope AFB in North Carolina, and Reese AFB in Texas. The Algerian delegation also held talks with Lockheed regarding the sale of C-130 aircraft. A year of long strenuous negotiations were to follow, in which Algerian diplomats played a crucial if not determining role in securing the release of the US hostages in Tehran. By the time President Ronald Reagan was inaugurated on 20 January 1981, however, other tensions between the two countries had surfaced, with the suspension by Algeria of its LNG exports to the United States. The export of gas, which had at last begun in March 1978, had in practice been halted since 31 March 1980, in the wake of a dispute over gas prices between Sonatrach and the El Paso company.17 A month after that, Reagan had sent an envoy to Algiers with a final “take-it-or-leave-it” offer. Algeria rejected the deal and all LNG contracts concluded with American companies were annulled. At the same time, Alexander Haig, Reagan’s Defense Secretary, announced the new administration’s decision to begin the delivery of offensive weapons to Morocco, thereby ending President Carter’s reluctance to override legal and human rights constraints and asserting the new administration’s staunch support for its traditional allies.18 This was a huge blow for the Algerian economy, which gave Algeria an early taste of Reagan’s new style, just one month after his inauguration.19 Another direct consequence of the difficulties with the El Paso deal was the new Algerian leadership’s decision to reduce the level of oil exploitation and exports. This policy was justified by the sharp hike in oil prices caused by the second oil shock of 1979, which had ensued from the Iranian Revolution. Domestically, the cutback in production was explained as a policy of the conservation of resources for future generations. However, it was a fatal decision

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which, a few years later, would rock the foundations of the Algerian state when world oil prices fell sharply in 1986.20 Despite the strain in US-Algerian relations, however, the release of the 52 US hostages in Iran went ahead at the same time as Reagan’s inauguration took place. During the final two weeks preceding the release of the hostages on 20 January 1981, Warren Christopher, the Deputy Secretary of State and Harold Saunders, the Assistant Secretary, together with other officials from Washington, based themselves in Algiers to smooth the way for the release to go ahead after the ambassador, Ulric Haynes, advised they should join him there.21 On the day of the release, the Bank of England confirmed the fulfillment of the final condition for the release of the hostages, namely the transfer of a sum of $7.98 billion dollars, representing frozen Iranian assets, into an escrow account opened for the purpose in the name of the Central Bank of Algeria.22 Two “Air Alge´rie” planes, one of which was a decoy, flew the US hostages from Tehran to Athens for refueling and then on to Algiers, where the Algerian and American delegations were awaiting them. They were then flown by US military transport to Wiesbaden in Germany, for medical checks and treatment at the USAF hospital. Here, they were welcomed by the former President Carter, who had just stepped down following the inauguration of President Ronald Reagan, and then they were flown on to the US.23 This diplomatic success for the Algerian leadership should have added to the momentum of US-Algerian rapprochement, while it incidentally also contributed to the moderation of Algeria’s foreign policy. An intelligence assessment completed in late October 1979 had already spoken of what its author believed was evidence of the moderation of Chadli Bendjedid’s policy.24 By May 1980, Brzezinski was able to give his opinion that the “growing contacts” between the US and the Algerian military since the December Air Force delegation visit, coupled with Algeria’s “private expressions of concern over the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan” and other signs of moderation, should be encouraged by the “first-time sale of L-100 convertible cargo/ passenger aircraft.”25 In addition, the National Security Council in Washington had been briefed that Bendjedid’s handling of an FLN Central Committee meeting in early May 1980 “betokens closer Algerian moves toward the west and a lessening of the influence exerted by both Yahiaoui and Foreign Minister Ben Yahia.”26

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No one has better evaluated the roles of continuity and change in Chadli Bendjedid’s foreign policy during his first term than Lakhdar Brahimi. In his interview with the author, he summed it up, after the death of Boumediene, in the 1980s we have the years of feeling our way: we were trying to find where we were . . . . We were sitting between two chairs; we were not left, we were not right, and I think our foreign policy was really not much.27 Certainly, there were years of trial and error and of “sitting between two chairs”, but the test Bendjedid faced after his succession to power was made easier by domestic and diplomatic successes. Domestically, the release of many political prisoners, together with a relaxation of the austerity measures that had severely restricted consumer spending, which was funded by the sudden boost in oil prices and therefore in national income, was a double bonus for the Algerian population, which welcomed what appeared to be a new era.28 On the international front, Bendjedid was able to match Boumediene’s achievements in terms of international prestige when he delivered two diplomatic successes in the space of a single year after Boumediene’s death. One of these diplomatic victories, of course, was the release of US hostages in Iran. The other came in July 1981, just a few months later, when a sufficient number of OAU member states recognized the Sahrawi Republic to guarantee its membership of the OAU, to which it was to be formally admitted on 22 February 1982.29 Meanwhile, in the North African region, a problem that arose from Boumediene’s death was that his absence removed a restraining factor on the adventurist foreign policy of the Libyan leader, Muammar Qaddafi. In his 1988 study, Imagery and Ideology in US Policy toward Libya, Mahmoud El Warfally concluded that, “although Libya was linked with subversion, destabilization, and terrorism in 1970 –6, such activities were discontinued between 1977 and 1979. However, they started to surface again by early 1980.”30 This indeed corresponds with the dates of the measures taken by Boumediene in relation to the Sahel countries, where he succeeded in restraining Qaddafi from meddling in the affairs of his African neighbors. In the early 1980s, Boumediene’s disappearance from the scene removed this inhibition on Qaddafi and left Chadli Bendjedid with a problem,

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as El Warfally explains, paving the way by the end of 1982 for Qaddafi’s renewed assertion of what he described as “the Libyan people’s right to liquidate Libyan dissidents abroad.”31 By then Qaddafi was involved in a war in Chad while his foreign policy was on a collision course with the US administration of Ronald Reagan.32 By April 1985 when Chadli Bendjedid eventually made his first state visit to Washington, the Cold War was already over in the Maghreb and much had changed. “We Americans particularly welcome the return of cordial relations, which existed in the early days of your independence,” President Reagan told Bendjedid, adding that the agreements that had been signed by the two countries were, as he put it, “tangible signs that relations between the United States and Algeria are moving in a positive direction.”33 Algerian policy was also once more aligned towards better relations with Paris, which incidentally meant that Messaoud Zeghar, always one of Boumediene’s men, who had played a crucial role during the 1971 petroleum nationalizations. Zeghar, a victim of de-Boumedienization, was imprison in Algeria on a charge of espionage, and though he was later released and allowed to leave the country he died in Spain in what some believe were suspicious circumstances on 20 November 1987.34 The convenient death of Zeghar marked the last farewell of the Boumediene era, as the pro-France group, led by Col. Larbi Belkheir, a DAF officer and Bendjedid’s Chief of Staff, completed its takeover of the key positions in the state.35 However, Chadli Bendjedid’s supremacy was not allowed indefinitely to go unchallenged. When world oil prices began rapidly to fall, from January 1986, social tensions and the aspirations of a new generation had already begun to threaten a regime infected by corruption. The combination of a political and executive establishment leading suspiciously comfortable lives with mounting inefficiency in the administration of the country led to jealousy and anger. The resulting crisis culminated in the disturbances of October 1988, which rapidly spiraled into widespread civil unrest that was to lead in the end through a complex chain of events to the democratization of Algeria. On 23 February 1989, a constitutional referendum led to the installation of a pluralist and unrestricted political party system and free elections.36 In addition, there was a bid to institute economic liberalization, with the enactment of the 1991 hydrocarbons law, which aimed at

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encouraging foreign oil companies to invest in Algeria. In hindsight, this was of little relevance, due to political unrest. In the elections held in December 1991, the FIS (“Front Islamique du Salut”) took a commanding position and was poised to win the second round in January 1992. Instead, the second round was scrapped by the army and Algeria plunged into civil conflict. On 11 January 1992, Chadli Bendjedid stood down, and a military council was established to run the state. In Washington, just as American oil companies had started to return to Algeria, these developments were received with mixed feelings. Publicly, the Clinton administration took no view, though privately the coup was welcomed, as it was also in the European capitals. American energy investment in Algeria continued, and Washington dispatched a new ambassador to Algiers. However, violence continued to increase.37 Cooperation between Algeria and the US continued, both in the energy sector and in the military field. The aim was to halt the spiraling violence.38 Later, after Abdelaziz Bouteflika took office as president in 1999, US-Algerian relations gradually regained their past level of interaction. This, however, was achieved only by abandoning the ideals of the Boumediene era.39 Since 2011, the relationship between Algeria and the US has been underpinned by investment in the hydrocarbons sector, together with close military cooperation that has been profitable for the American side. Washington today is certainly disposed to sell weapons and air defense systems to Algeria, but such deals are always hedged around with so-called end-user agreements, and the constraints imposed by congressional lobbying with the objective of ensuring the maintenance of a military balance with the old US ally, Morocco. In practice, Cold War dynamics in the Maghreb have outlived even the collapse of the Soviet Union. Military cooperation with Algeria has been confined to the areas of training, which had already been offered by Kissinger in 1972, though Washington has profited immensely from joint intelligence gathering and the exchange of intelligence with Algeria in its so-called US “War on Terror”.40 In addition, a February 2009 report by the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported a further advantage for the US, with the revelation that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) has maintained personnel in place in Algeria since October 2008.41

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The benefits for the US of cooperation with Algeria have not been limited to the intelligence and military fields. In the energy sector, the Bouteflika regime even risked a U-turn on the 1971 oil nationalization in 2005 when it adopted former minister of energy Chakib Khelil’s hydrocarbons law, which, however, Bouteflika was forced to annul a year later, under strong pressure, it is believed, from some sections in the Algerian army. As Sid Ahmed Ghozali saw it, Khelil was nothing more than an American infiltrator in the energy ministry, and the changes were “taking us back to the pre-1971 situation”. Malti and Ghozali both launched polemics against the 2005 hydrocarbons law.42 Bouteflika also undertook a fruitless mediation exercise in the Horn of Africa, during his first mandate 1999 – 2004, whose outcome was most marked in the boost it gave to his personal standing when he received US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in Algiers in December 2000.43 All these services offered by the Algerian regime to Washington failed to elicit the slightest American support over the Western Sahara issue, however.44 On the contrary, the trend for Algeria to serve US purposes seemed to continue when the Sahel crisis introduced another dimension in US-Algerian relations. Recent developments have relegated the positions adopted by the Algerian foreign policy of the 1970s to the status of a distant memory, while Algeria has stood helplessly by as geopolitical earthquakes have taken place in its immediate environment. The fall of Qaddafi and the resurgence of the Tuareg rebel Azawad issue in Mali have both unsettled Algeria.45 The state of affairs in today’s Algeria can best be understood in the light of historical developments in the decade from 1969 to 1978, which have had their influence on subsequent Algerian policies and decisions from those of Chadli Bendjedid to the present day policies of Bouteflika. The Ifrane Treaty and the Western Sahara conflict lie behind many of today’s policy considerations. The same is true for the oil nationalization, the El Paso gas deal, and Reagan’s take-it-or-leaveit unilateral offer on gas prices, which led in turn to the fatal decisions in the energy market that followed, which have had negative impacts on Algeria’s foreign policy and on its development options in domestic, regional and international terms. To sum up, when Boumediene reshaped Algeria’s foreign policy in 1969 and 1970, with the objective of improving Algeria’s image in Washington following the extremely confrontational years of the

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Johnson administration, domestic factors were his primary motivation. The cardinal goal of development was the primary driving force, while, in this period, de´tente contributed to the success of Boumediene’s strategy. Certainly, global de´tente translated in reduced tensions in the Maghreb regional sub-system, but it was primarily domestic factors that enabled Algeria to harness global de´tente at a local level. Boumediene seized the opportunity to implement a plan that included the consolidation of Maghreb stability through the resolution of border disputes. Boumediene also implemented a Mediterranean policy in line with Algeria’s independent and non-aligned foreign policy principles. France underestimated Boumediene’s determination to secure the necessary funding for its development strategy through the renegotiation of the terms of its 1965 Petroleum Accords. The resulting nationalization of French assets was a risky move but one which the Algerian leadership believed was worth its cost. Algeria emerged stronger from the 1971 confrontation over nationalization, but learned a lesson about Algeria’s economic dependency on France and the consequent need for diversity in its economic partners. This Algeria broadly succeeded in doing. It soon became evident that the American private sector was interested in Algeria and that this would be a valuable influence on the policies of the US administration. Algeria also learned the importance of the solidarity of OPEC, which it had prudently joined. All these considerations had consequences. For example, in 1972 Algeria launched a diplomatic offensive toward the Socialist bloc in order to diversify the Algerian economy and redress the imbalance caused by its erstwhile dependence on the French market. This was also the year when Algeria became aware of the increased value of its naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, after the eviction of the Soviet advisers from Egypt in July 1972 by Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat left the Soviets looking for an alternative base in the Mediterranean. Suddenly, the Algerian leadership found that the negotiating leverage and margin of maneuver it enjoyed in the conduct of its foreign policy had dramatically improved. In Washington the concern was now that Algeria might come to the help of the Soviet Union and offer Moscow facilities in the Western Mediterranean equivalent to those it had lost in Egypt. For Moscow, guaranteed access to Mers-el-Kebir for its fleet, or even regular use of its facilities,

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had acquired great urgency. Washington was well aware of the transformation of the situation in the Mediterranean, where the Soviet Union was now at a disadvantage in terms of anchorage for its deep-water fleet, and the availability to it of ports where repairs, servicing and resupply could be carried out. In 1972, therefore, it was no surprise that Henry Kissinger, who was at that stage the US National Security Adviser, was anxious to prevent the further consolidation of a military relationship between Algeria and the Soviet Union. For this reason, he encouraged the bid by Raytheon, an American weapons systems company to supply an air defense system for Algeria. Despite intensive persuasion, Boumediene refused to open the naval base at Mers-el-Kebir to the Soviets as Moscow wished. Washington’s reaction was to further encourage American private sector investment in Algeria and facilitate loans from the US EXIM bank to underwrite US trade with Algeria. The Nixon administration’s objective was not to win Algeria over to the Western camp, but rather to consolidate Algeria’s non-aligned policy to the detriment of Moscow. Kissinger also encouraged France and Italy to respond favorably to Boumediene’s quest for military cooperation. In domestic terms, the success of the oil nationalization paved the way for the implementation of Boumediene’s agrarian reform. Land redistribution joined the nationalization of oil as Algeria’s badges of authentic revolutionary socialism. It was logical, therefore, for Algeria to bid for Third World leadership. Ideology was never far from Algeria’s foreign policy, and the US was obliged to learn to live with Boumediene’s strident and active support for liberation movements that included movements as diverse as those in the Canary Islands, Oman, Vietnam, Angola and South Africa. This aspect of Algerian foreign policy remained consistent throughout. Boumediene, however, drew the line at risking regional stability in the Maghreb, which was the crucial condition for the success of Algeria’s development plans, though he made an exception for the Western Sahara. At the same time, Boumediene felt strongly that a balance should be maintained in Algeria’s order of priorities. If national development was vitally important, Third World solidarity was also essential. Thus, Boumediene presided over the 1973 Non-Aligned Movement conference while Algerian troops, armored units and aircraft squadrons were already stationed in Libya, waiting to assist Egypt’s

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offensive to re-capture the Arab lands usurped by Israel in the June 1967 war. Moscow’s refusal to intervene in the October 1973 war, as a counter-balance to Washington’s support for Israel, gave Boumediene further proof that de´tente profited principally only the superpowers and their direct clients. In November, as Boumediene returned to Algiers from Moscow to convene the Algiers Arab Summit, the conclusion he reached was that the Third World had to overturn the status quo if it wished to establish more equitable terms in the international political and economic order. On 28 November 1973, the Summit called for an oil embargo. In April 1974, while Algeria held the presidency of the UN General Assembly, Boumediene made the case for the establishment of a New International Economic Order (NIEO), having been mandated to do so by members of the G-77. The confrontation would be at a global scale, with the Third World as a whole facing up to the developed North. The challenge was great, but the Algerian leadership’s belief in the collective power of the Third World, and the potential of its solidarity, was strong. It cannot be denied that the NIEO offensive in 1974 – 5 presented a real challenge to Washington and the North. Kissinger struggled to counter the challenge of the Third World, spearheaded by Algeria. Another characteristic of Algeria’s foreign policy at this time was the speed with which it was able to adapt to political threats. When Kissinger encouraged moderate member states of the G-77 to revolt against the oil-producing states, Algeria moved to establish a framework for Afro-Arab cooperation. On the other hand, in Europe, Algeria played Kissinger at his own game, when it succeeded in winning France’s President Giscard d’Estaing away from the oil-consumers cartel Kissinger had brought into being to undermine OPEC. Algeria took steps to ensure the failure of the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation which Kissinger had struggled to convene in December 1975. Boumediene wished to prevent Kissinger from wresting control of oil prices away from OPEC by instituting a consumers’ cartel. Instead, Algeria favored a comprehensive structure including a range of international development issues, but excluding oil prices, which Algiers strove to retain in OPEC’s sole control. Oil prices constituted the only real leverage the South was able to exercise over the North.46

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While Algeria occupied the center of the international stage in 1974, as the holder of the presidency of the UN General Assembly, it delivered three historic accomplishments. First, the Palestine Liberation Organization was granted Observer Status at the UN and Yasser Arafat delivered his historic “olive branch and gun” speech. Secondly, South Africa was expelled from the UN, remaining excluded until 1994 when the apartheid system collapsed. Thirdly, Israel was declared to be a racist state, a decision reversed only in 1991. It was no surprise, therefore, that in April 1974 Boumediene was received at the Oval Office by President Nixon in April 1974 as a leader of the Third World, a visit advocated by Kissinger even though the United States had still not renewed its diplomatic relations with Algeria. Neither was it surprising that Kissinger came to meet Boumediene in Algiers three times during this period. The acid test for Algeria’s foreign policy, however, and for its relations with the US, came when the decolonization of Spanish Sahara introduced a new element in the regional balance, at a time when global de´tente had already started to suffer a series of blows in Africa.47 Algeria’s decision not to disrupt Washington’s initiative to achieve a Middle East peace settlement, once Sadat had made the choice to commit himself to this essentially defeatist process, was dictated by realism on the part of Boumediene. At the same time, Algeria could not do other than uphold the rights of the Palestinians and maintain its support for the various Palestinian militant factions and for Syria. The invasion of Western Sahara in 1975 by Morocco, however, and the territory’s later partition with Mauritania, reshaped the geopolitics of the Maghreb and necessitated a review of policy in Algiers. The Algerian army’s response to the intervention of French aircraft in support of Morocco and Mauritania, in December 1975, was expressed in an editorial in El-Djeich two years later. “Algeria, which has itself undergone the demands and the contingencies that are inevitable in any colonial war, and which has paid the heavy price of blood shed for its liberty, cannot refuse its aid to the valorous Sahrawi people.”48 Not only was Algeria obliged to support the Sahrawi cause by its own revolutionary prestige and legacy, but not to do so would inevitably undermine the Algerian state itself. Algeria’s national security, therefore, dictated its support for the Polisario Front. This was a moment when ideology corresponded with national interest.

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The Algerian leadership was obliged to navigate a careful course, balancing the desirability of continuing its program of modernization against the imperative of safeguarding its national security through involvement in conflict. At a personal level, when Moukhtar Ould Daddah took King Hassan’s side, Boumediene was left with a sour feeling of betrayal. Remembering the request made by King Hassan in 1963 to be permitted to use Tindouf as a base from which to launch attacks against Mauritania, in return for a settlement of the Algerian-Moroccan border dispute (a proposal repeated, incidentally, as recently as 1970 at the Tlemcen summit), Boumediene sadly confided to Taleb-Ibrahimi that he had refused Hassan’s offer, “because the Revolution does not betray its friends.”49 The Western Sahara conflict was a watershed in US-Algerian relations. While Kissinger and Ford rushed to Morocco’s rescue with a program of arms transfers from the US and the Middle East, Boumediene declared Maghreb de´tente to be dead and expressed his hope for the construction in the future of what he called the “Maghreb of the Peoples”. This episode also demonstrated Boumediene’s skills in formulating new strategies to meet new threats. With regional and global de´tente in rapid decline, Algeria moved swiftly to secure its southern Sahel hinterland before Qaddafi could cause further troubles that would be sure to invite French intervention. Boumediene was confident that Algeria could deal with the burden of an active conflict on its western border, but a second simultaneous conflict to the south would overstretch its resources, thereby giving Rabat the chance to regain the initiative on the ground. In parallel to the establishment of Algerian solidarity with the Sahel, Boumediene ensured the maintenance of Algeria’s military superiority over Morocco. During this period, the AlgerianSoviet relationship grew closer, with enhanced arms deliveries to Algeria and closer military and political cooperation with the Soviet Union as well as with Cuba and East Germany. When the Carter administration came to review its policy options in North Africa, it saw at once the challenge represented by Algeria’s foreign policy. Indeed, Algeria’s determination to have the Sahrawi cause recognized by international organizations, presenting it as an issue of self-determination and decolonization, imposed legal constraints on Carter’s White House, which espoused as a principle the promotion of human rights and the limitation of arms transfers to

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the Third World. Algeria’s foreign policy had thus paid off, since the White House found its hands tied by its own Congress, while its old ally, Morocco, stood on the brink of collapse. When Boumediene accepted King Hassan’s offer to engage in secret talks on the Western Sahara conflict, Algeria’s strategy was further reinforced. Boumediene judged that the existence of secret negotiations might well cause Washington to wait for their outcome before committing itself to military support for King Hassan. At the same time, Washington’s continued hands-off policy would sow doubts in Hassan’s mind as to the reliability of the US, possibly leading him to abandon his ambitions in the Western Sahara, especially as Polisario continued to inflict increasing losses on the Moroccan troops. Sadat’s visit to Israel offered another opportunity for Algeria, this time to halt its retreat from the Middle East and to rally the Arab countries and people behind both the Palestinian and the Sahrawi causes, thereby dealing a double blow to Rabat, which had come out in support of Sadat’s initiative. The coup in Mauritania dealt an additional blow to Rabat. Six months later, when Boumediene died, Washington was still undecided over whether to align itself closely with Rabat. Under Boumediene, the relationship between the US and Algeria was not a simple one. It could in some way be characterized as that between friendly foes. At the height of the Vietnam War, for example, while Algeria was vociferously critical of the US, the Nixon administration could still turn to Algeria’s good offices over the American prisoners of war held by North Vietnam.50 Similarly, while the Carter administration was preparing to ease its policy on arms transfers to Morocco, to Algeria’s detriment, it was Algerian diplomacy which played a crucial role in the release of the US hostages in Iran and in bringing about the Algiers Agreement, which is still the basis for US-Iranian relations. Another issue was that USAlgerian relations were not simply a bilateral relationship. Instead, Algeria’s relations with the US pervaded its foreign policy as a whole. Whether in Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America or the OAU, all Algeria’s policies were framed in the light of its links with Washington. Algeria’s role in the OAU and in the support of African liberation movements, as well as its concern with the Palestinian cause and Arab solidarity, its interest in Mediterranean affairs, and its involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement and Third World

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matters, were also areas where Algiers came face-to-face with Washington. A survey of US-Algerian relations is therefore nothing less than a survey of Algeria’s entire foreign policy during the 1970s, which shaped the state of Algeria’s international relations as they now stand.51 The evaluation of the success or otherwise of Boumediene’s foreign policy requires the assessment of diverse aspects of his record. In the last analysis, it is hard to separate domestic matters from foreign affairs. Boumediene was determined to reverse his predecessor Ben Bella’s policy of subjecting domestic policies to foreign ambitions, and in this objective he succeeded. Under Boumediene, foreign policy served the goal of national development. Every policy choice in foreign affairs was dictated by the requirements of domestic modernization. Thus, to examine Boumediene’s record selectively, either through the lens of foreign policy alone, or that of domestic governance, would be a fundamental mistake. Those who do so make one of two errors. Either Boumediene is celebrated as a national hero, on the basis of the achievements of Algerian diplomacy under his presidency. Or, alternatively, he is derided as an authoritarian leader who ruled with an iron fist, squandering vast sums and huge loans on an overly ambitious program of heavy and rapid industrialization which failed in the end to achieve the desired productive capacity.52 In truth, selectivity is one of the dangers of the historian’s craft. The truth does not necessarily lie with one or the other interpretation, and opinion fluctuates over time. Boumediene’s commitment to social justice and his successes in foreign policy inspired the respect of the Algerian people but his austerity measures were not so popular. In Chadli Bendjedid’s early years, consumerism was encouraged, giving the impression of prosperity, and certain diplomatic successes such as the release of the US hostages and the admission of the Sahrawi Republic to the OAU promoted an image that contrasted with the austerity of Boumediene’s era.53 By the time Bendjedid was ousted in 1992, however, Algeria had plunged into violence and, by comparison, Boumediene’s era appeared once more to Algerians as the golden age of Algerian prestige and pride. This perception was strengthened when Algeria’s diplomacy fell into eclipse in 2011 as NATO forces intervened in Libya while Algeria stood helpless. The truth lies in the eyes of the beholder. After over 130 years of colonial rule, Algeria emerged in 1962 exhausted after one of the world’s

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bloodiest liberation struggles. A decade later, it was standing centerstage in international affairs. Its leadership’s ambitions were beyond its means. But it is hard to think of a Third World state that has succeeded in projecting itself so forcefully into global politics, even when confronting, in so many aspects of its policy, the will of the world’s most powerful country, as did Algeria under Boumediene.

NOTES

Introduction 1. “H.E. Mohammed Bedjaoui meets Dr. Condoleezza Rice,” Algeria Today, Algerian Embassy in the US, Vol. 2, Issue 2, 4 April 2007, p. 2. 2. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1999, pp. 544–56; James E Dornan, Jr., “The Nixon Doctrine and the Primacy of De´tente”, The Intercollegiate Review, Spring 1974, pp. 77–97. See also Robert S. Litwak, De´tente and the Nixon Doctrine, LSE Monographs in International Studies, Cambridge: CUP, 1986. 3. See for example, the three volumes of the history of the Cold War published by Cambridge University Press: The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler, and Odd Arne Westad, 3 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010; Richard Crockatt, The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941–1991, reprinted 2003, London and New York: Routledge, 1995. 4. Odd A. Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, Cambridge: CUP, 2007, John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War, Oxford: OUP, 1998, chs 6 and 7. 5. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, ed., Nixon in the World: American Foreign Policy, 1969 – 1977, Oxford: OUP, 2008; FRUS, Foundations of Foreign Policy: 1969 – 72, Vol. I (1969 – 76), Washington D.C.: Office of the Historian, US Government Printing Office, 2003. 6. Jussi M. Hanhimaki and Odd A. Westad, ed., The Cold War: A History in Documents and Eyewitness Accounts, Oxford: OUP, 2004, chs 15 – 16. 7. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Algeria, 13 January 1964, FRUS, Vol. 1964–8, Africa, Document 7, pp. 18–20.

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NOTES TO PAGES 7 – 11

8. Memorandum for the Record, Robert W. Komer, NSC, 10 January 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 2, p. 16. 9. Footnote 2, Memo from Komer to McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 23 December 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 15, p. 34. 10. Telegram from Rusk to US embassy Algiers, 17 June 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 10, p. 26. 11. Memorandum for the Record, Robert W. Komer, NSC, 10 January 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 2, pp. 16 – 18. 12. Action Memorandum from J. Wayne Fredericks, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, to George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State and W. Averell Harriman, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, 14 May 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 8, pp. 20 – 3. 13. Porter, US ambassador to Algiers, to Department of State, 28 May 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 9, pp. 24 – 5. 14. Rusk to Porter, 17 June 1964, FRUS, 1964–8, Africa, Document 10, pp. 26–8. 15. Ibid., 23 June 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 11, p. 29. 16. Rusk to US embassy in Guinea, 23 June 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 11, p. 30. 17. Memorandum for the Record, 19 November 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 13, p. 30. 18. Memo from Komer to Harriman, 5 December 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 14, p. 32. 19. Komer to Harriman 5 December 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 14, p. 33. 20. Komer to Bundy, 23 December 1964, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 15, p. 34. 21. Bundy to President Johnson, 5 January 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 17, pp. 36 – 7. 22. See “Public Law 480: Better than a bomber”, MERIP, http://www. merip.org/mer/mer145/public-law-480-better-bomber. Accessed on 15 November 2015. 23. Komer to President Johnson, 15 May 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 19, pp. 38 – 9. 24. Tahar Zbiri, Nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h: mudhakkira¯t qa¯ʾid arka¯n jaza¯ʾiri [Memoirs of an˙ Algerian Chief of˙ Staff], pp. 105– 6, translated into French as, Tahar Zbiri, Un demi-sie`cle de combat – Me´moires d’un chef d’e´tat-major alge´rien, Algiers: Editions Echorouk, 2012. 25. Ibid., pp. 107 – 15. 26. For an account of the coup by Zbiri, who led the operation that night, see Zbiri, op. cit., pp. 117 –36. 27. “Proclamation du Conseil de la Re´volution,” 19 June 1965, in Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Houari Boumediene

NOTES TO PAGES 11 – 15

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43.

44. 45.

227

19 juin 1965 – 19 juin 1970, Vol. 2, Algiers: Direction de la Documentation et des Publication, 1970, pp. 7– 10. CIA Intelligence Memorandum, Consequences of Algerian Coup, 19 June 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 21, p. 41. CIA Memorandum, Consequences of Algerian Coup, 19 June 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 21, pp. 41 – 2. Rusk to Porter, 23 June 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 23, pp. 43 – 4. Memcon, President Johnson, Guellal, Komer et al, 27 July 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 25, pp. 46 – 8. Komer to Johnson, 13 September 1965, FRUS, 1964 –8, Africa, Document 26, p. 49. Rusk to US embassy Algiers, 23 December 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 27, p. 50. Komer to Johnson, 17 January 1965, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 28, p. 51. NIE 60 – 6, “The Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia),” 5 May 1966, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 1, pp. 1 – 2. Paper prepared in the Department of State, “The Strategic Importance of North Africa,”, FRUS, 1964–8, Africa, Document 1, pp. 3–8. Memorandum from Harold H. Saunders, NSC, to Walt W. Rostow, President’s Special Assistant, 17 November 1966, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 30, pp. 53 – 4. “Memorandum on Algeria,” by ambassador at large Averell Harriman, 12 December 1966, FRUS, 1964–8, Africa, Document 31, pp. 54–5. Rostow to Johnson, “Food for Algeria,” 22 December 1966, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 32, pp. 56 – 7. Rostow to Johnson, “Three North African Decisions,” 7 February 1967, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 33, pp. 58 – 9; Rostow to Johnson, “Algerian Food Deal,” 13 February 1967, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 34, p. 60. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. David Ottaway, Marina Ottaway, Algeria: The Politics of a Socialist Revolution, University of California Press, 1970, p. 249. Intelligence Note, “Algeria Nationalizes Esso and Mobil Affiliates,” 31 August 1967, Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Rusk, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Document 210, pp. 383– 4; memcon, Luke Findley, Standard Oil, William C. Trimble, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs et al, 25 September 1967, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Energy Diplomacy and Global Issues, Document 211. INR, “North Africa Eight Weeks After the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” 3 August 1967, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 5, pp. 12 – 15 Taleb-Ibrahimi, Me´moires d’un Alge´rien. Me´moires d’un Alge´rien. Vol. 2: ˆ tir (1965–1978), Alger, Casbah E´ditions, 2008, p. 307. La passion de ba

NOTES TO PAGES 15 – 21

228

46. Quoted in Mahieddine Amimour, Ayya¯m ma’a al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu ¯ madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with Boumediene], 4th ed., Alger: ENAG, 2005, p. 278; Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 306. 47. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memories, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 308. 48. For an account of Algeria’s military contribution see Khaled Nezzar, Memoires du ge´ne´ral Khaled Nezzar, Algiers: Chihab, 2000, pp. 112– 13; Zbiri, nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h mudhakkira¯t qa¯ʾid arka¯n jaza¯ʾiri ˙ cit., pp. 145 – 67. ˙ [Memoirs], op. 49. Quoted in Mahieddine Amimour, ʾAyya¯m maʿa al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu ¯ madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with Boumediene], op. cit., p. 286. 50. Nezzar, Memoires du Ge´ne´ral Khaled Nezzar, op. cit., pp. 113 – 15. 51. Tahar Zbiri, nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h mudhakkira¯t qa¯ ʾid arka¯n jaza¯ʾiri [Memoirs], op. cit., pp. 169 – 230. 52. Ibid., p. 241. 53. Ibid., pp. 232 – 86. 54. Memo from John Foster and Harold Saunders, NSC to Rostow, “Situation in Algeria,” 15 December 1967, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 36, pp. 61 – 2. 55. Zbiri, nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h mudhakkira¯t qa¯ id arka¯n jaza¯iri [Memoirs], op. cit., pp. 268 – 9. 56. Memo, Root to Moore, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, “Belkacem Krim’s Emissary Asks for US Support,” 3 October 1968, FRUS, 1964 – 8, Africa, Document 39, pp. 67 – 8. 57. For an account of the details of the El-Al plane hijacking see Aljazeera Arabic channel’s documentary series Our History-Their Archives: “Milaf istihda¯f al-ta¯yyara¯ wa al-sufun.. raf’ al-sita¯r” [Targeting Planes and ships.. raising the Veil], episode 1, on 16 August 2007, transcript and audio podcast available online at, http://www.aljazeera.net/ programs/pages/f5ce5a41-a1f8-4263-ab55-68bbc3144d9b; See also recollections of Choaı¨b Taleb-Bendiab, Algerian ambassador to Lebanon, about his talks in Beirut with the leaders of the PFLP during the course of this crisis, Choaı¨b Taleb-Bendiab, Le Liban a` la veille de la guerre civile: journal d’un Ambassadeur 1967–1970, Alger: Casbah Editions, 2007, pp. 69–82.

Chapter 1

Strategy for Development, 1969 –70

1. Ministe`re de l’Information, Documents: Les Discours du Pre´sident Houari Boumediene, Vol. I, Alger: Direction de la Documentation, 1966, p. 108. 2. Aljazeera Arabic Channel programme “Sha¯hid ʿala al-ʿasr” [Century ˙ 2, 11 May Witness], Interview with Colonel Hachad Salah, episode 2009. Script available at http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/

NOTES TO PAGES 21 – 7

3. 4.

5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15.

16. 17. 18.

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9790F3C3-D42F-46D4-B16F-874E07777B7D.htm, accessed on 18 May 2009; on the Ben Barka case see Daniel Gue´rin, Ben Barka, ses assassins: dix ans d’enqueˆte, Paris: Plon, 1982; Pascal Krop, Silence, on tue: crimes et mensonges a` l’Elyse´e, Paris: Flammarion, 2001. Chadli Bendjedid, mudhakkira¯t [Memoirs], Vol. I, 1929 – 1979, Algiers: Casbah Editions, 2012, pp. 251 – 2. Bruno Etienne, “L’unite´ maghre´bine a` l’e´preuve des politiques e´trange`res nationales,” in Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, [AAN hereafter], Vol. IX, 1970, Paris: Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1971, p. 89. Text of Treaty of Ifrane, in Journal Officiel de la Re´publique Alge´rienne De´mocratique et Populaire, [JORADP hereafter], No. 69–3, 22 January 1969 (11) 5/2/69: 82. Text of Algerian-Libyan Treaty, in JORADP, No. 69 –21 (33), 16/4/69: 270. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 364– 5. Ibid., pp. 365– 6. AAN, Vol. VIII, 1969, p. 317 and p. 402; El Moudjahid, 6 December 1969, and El Moudjahid, 11 December 1969. Text of the Algerian-Libyan Treaty, in JORADP, No (5), 15 January 1970: 28; El Moudjahid, 4– 5 January 1970. The “Year of the Maghreb” slogan was first coined by Boumediene, El Moudjahid, 16 January 1970. Statement by Boumediene quoted in AAN, Vol. IX 1970, p. 89. Parti du FLN, La Charte d’Alger: Ensemble des textes adoptés par le 1er congrès du Parti du Front de libération nationale (du 16 au 21 avril 1964), Alger: S.I., 1964; Les Textes Fondateurs de la Re´publique, Programme de Tripoli, June 1962, Charte d’Alger, April 1964, accessed on 17 May 2009, available at the official website of the Algerian Presidency http://www.presidence.dz/francais/symbole/ textes/symbolefr.htm. Hoffacker to Rogers, 7 April 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria (Washington D.C.: Department of State Publications, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2007), Document 13. FRUS Vol. E-5 Part 2, accessed on 10 May 2009, http://history.state.gov/his toricaldocuments/frus1969-76ve05p2/comp1. Bureau of Intelligence and Research INR, “Islamic Summit Produces Moderate Consensus and the Making of a Moslem Bloc,” 29 September 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 1 U.S-North Africa Policy 1969 – 72, Document 2. INR, “Middle East: Arab Summit Ends in Disarray,” 24 December 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 1, Document 3. Boumediene’s statement quoted in AAN, Vol. 1969, p. 419. Memocon of Rogers and Bouteflika, 15 October 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 16.

230

NOTES TO PAGES 28 – 30

19. “Boumediene’s speech delivered at the Conference of Ambassadors,” 20 October 1969, in Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. II (19 June 1965–19 June 1970), pp. 479–90. 20. Memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger: “President Boumediene’s Reorientation of Algerian Foreign Policy: Implications for the United States,” 27 October 1969, White House Central Files [WHCF hereafter], Africa, Algeria, Vol. I., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, RG 59, NARA. College Park, MD. 21. William Eagleton. “Evolution of the U.S Interest Sections in Algiers and Baghdad,” in, Diplomacy Under a Foreign Flag: When Nations Break Relations, ed. David D. Newsom, Washington, D.C: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1990, pp. 92 – 3. 22. Amimour, Boumediene’s media adviser, recalled the visit in his memoirs, ’Ayya¯m ma’a al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu¯madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with Boumediene], 4th ed., Alger: ENAG, 2005, p. 292. 23. “Communique´,” 16 June 1970, in Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. II, pp. 633– 6. 24. Eagleton to Rogers, “Algerian-Saudi Relations,” 25 March 1970; Eagleton to Rogers, Boumediene meeting with King Hassan, 5 May 1970, White House Central Files 1970 – 3, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 25. Memcon of Kissinger, Newsom and H. Saunders (NSC) with Moroccan Minister of Finance M. Tahiri and A. Osama, Moroccan ambassador to Washington, 7 October 1969, NARA, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I; Memcon, Rogers with Bourguiba Jr., Tunisian Foreign Minister, 15 September 1969, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2. Ch. 5 Tunisia, Document 141. 26. Westad, The Global Cold war, op. cit., p. 105; Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era, New York: Oxford University Press USA, 2003, p. 27. 27. Maurice Flory, “Chronique diplomatique,” in AAN, Vol. 1965, p. 212. 28. Taleb-Ibrahimi, who was present during the Boumediene-Kosygin meeting, recalled the awkward way with which Boumediene was received, which led Boumediene to decide to cut the visit short and return to Algeria. Though the meeting with Kosygin was tense, however, Boumediene gave an expose´ of Algeria’s policy. The following day confidence was established and the visit was extended into a full official one by the Soviets. See Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un Algerien, Vol. 2, pp. 236– 9; also the communique´ of 17 December 1965, in Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. I, p. 114. 29. El Moudjahid, 9 October 1969.

NOTES TO PAGES 30 – 4

231

30. Redha Malek, L’Alge´rie a` Evian. Histoire des ne´gociations secre`tes 1956 – 1962, Paris Seuil, 1998; translated into Arabic by Fares Ghasoub as Al-jaza’ir fi Evian: ta¯’rikh al-mufawada¯t al-siriyya 1956 – 1962, Algiers: Dar El Faraabi, 2003, pp. 446 – 52. 31. Zbiri, Nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h mudhakkira¯t qa¯ʾid arka¯n jaza¯ʾiri [Memoirs ˙ ˙ of an Algerian Chief of Staff], pp. 136– 7. 32. Le Monde, 1– 2 December 1968 and El-Djeich (monthly mouthpiece of the Algerian Popular Army), 24 July 1968, as quoted in Mohamed Bouzidi, “Algeria’s Policy toward France: 1962 – 1973,” PhD thesis, University of Denver, 1973, University Microfilms, 1979, p. 174. 33. Visit communique´, 27 March 1969, in Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. II, p. 296. 34. Memocon of Rogers, Bourguiba Jr. et al., 3 April 1969; Defence/State telegram to U.S embassy in Tunis, 23 April 1969, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 5, Tunisia, Document 139 and 140. 35. Dwight Dickenson, US embassy in Rabat to Rogers, 17 February 1969, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 4 Morocco, Document 97. 36. CIA Memorandum: “Algeria: Troubles Ahead?,” 19 August 1969, CIA, NIC Files, Job 79 – R00967A, Box 1, O/NE Memorandum, 1969, May– August. 37. Account of Rogers’ 9 February 1970 meeting, 11 February 1970, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 20; Rogers’ 13 February 1970 report of his talks in Tunis, WHCF, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, NARA. 38. Algiers US Interests Section telegram to Rogers, 11 April 1970, WHCF 1970–1973, Def. Alg-USSR, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 39. INR Intelligence Note, “USSR-Africa: Cooling Trend in SovietAlgerian Relations,” 23 April 1970, CIA, Central Files 1970 – 1973, Def. Alg-USSR, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 40. US Interests Section telegram to State Dept. 30–31 April 1970, WHCF 1970–1973, Def. Alg-USSR, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 41. Le Monde, 6 January 1970. 42. Visit communique´, 18 April 1970, Ministe`re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. II, pp. 604– 5. 43. Eagleton to Rogers, 27 May 1970, Folder ‘Pol. Afr-US’, WHCF 1970 – 1973, RG 59, Entry 1613, Box 2036, NARA. 44. Cella to Rogers, 30 January 1970; and Eagleton to Rogers, 8 April 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 45. Note: Relations franco-alge´riennes, 4 December 1970, Folder “Voyage de H. Alphand a Washington 9–18 de´cembre 1970”, Direction des affaires politiques, Afrique du Nord, MEA, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 46. Cella to Rogers, 21 February, and 16 March 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677. RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA; El Moudjahid, 4 February 1970.

232

NOTES TO PAGES 34 – 8

47. Cella to Rogers, 4 June, and 12 August 1970, WHCF 1970 –1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, NARA. 48. Eagleton to Rogers, 27 May 1970, Folder ‘Pol. AFR-US’, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Box 2036, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 49. Rogers to Eagleton, 14 May 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, NARA. 50. Cella to Rogers, 30 January 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 51. Cella to Rogers, 29 September 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 52. Connors to Rogers, 25 September 1970, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Def., Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 53. Gouvernement Alge´rien, Document sur les relations entre l’Alge´rie et les socie´te´s pe´trolie`re s franc
aises, Alger, 1971, pp. 7 – 9. This collection of official documents was published in May 1971 by the Algerian Government after the nationalization of the French oil interests. The publication takes the form of white book on the whole issue of the negotiation proceedings from 24 November 1969 to 12 April 1971 (Algerian Negotiations White Papers, hereafter). 54. Sid Ahmed Ghozali’s revelation, in an interview granted to former editor-in chief of Algerian daily Le Matin, Mohamed Benchicou, was published in his unauthorized biography of President Bouteflika, which was censured in Algeria and for which he was imprisoned for two years. Mohamed Benchicou, Bouteflika: une imposture alge´rienne, Paris: Jean Picollec, 2004, p. 105. 55. Ghozali’s sweeping survey of the history of Algerian nationalization and energy policy as told to Chafik Mesbah appeared in a series of 20 episodes that stretched over 39 broadsheet newspaper pages published by the Algerian daily Le Soir d’Alge´rie, from 4 to 26 March 2008, in the series Interview of the Month. Le soir d’Alge´rie, episode No. 4, 7– 8 March 2008. 56. Westad, The Global Cold War, p. 96. 57. Ministry of Information, Hydrocarbons, Algiers: Documents and Publications Dept., 1971, pp. 43 – 51. 58. Ghozali’s interview in Le Soir d’Alge´rie, episode no. 4, 7– 8 and 9 March 2008, and no. 5, 9 March 2008. 59. Bouzidi, “Algeria’s policy towards France” PhD thesis, University of Denver, 1973, University Microfilms, 1979, pp. 194 – 5. 60. El Moudjahid, 10 October 1969, and 2 April 1970. 61. U.S embassy Paris to Rogers, 28 March 1970, Folder ‘Pol. Alg.’, WHCF 1970 – 73, Box 2036, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 62. Algerian Government, Algerian Negotiations White Papers, 12 – 23 and Appendix 1.

NOTES TO PAGES 39 – 41

233

63. CIA Memorandum, ‘Algeria: Troubles Ahead’, CIA, NIC Files, 19 August 1970, CIA, NIC Files, Job 79-R00967A, Box 1, O/NE Memorandum, 1969, May August. 64. Ghozali’s revelation in Benchicou, Bouteflika: une imposture alge´rienne, op. cit., p. 104. 65. P.V. de reunions restreintes du 22 December 1970 a 16:00 Hrs, 18:30 Hrs, 22:00 Hrs., Folder ‘Negotiations franco-alge´riennes sur le pe´trole, octobre 1970 – janvier 1971,’ Direction Economique, Papiers J.P. Brunet, Boite 63, MAE, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 66. El Moudjahid, 14 February 1970; 18 February 1970; 23 March 1970; 27 March 1970; Le Monde, 3 August 1970. 67. Eagleton to Rogers, 17 March 70, Folder ‘Pol. 15 –2 Alg’, WHCF 1970 – 1973, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 68. Note: Relations franco-alge´riennes, 4 December 1970, Folder ‘Voyage de H. Alphand a Washington 9–18 de´cembre 1970’, Direction des affaires politiques, Afrique du Nord, MEA, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 69. Cella telegrams to Rogers, 29 July, 29 September, and 18 December 1970, WHCF 1970 –3, Defence. Alg. Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 70. Cella telegrams to Rogers, 30 and 31 December 1970, WHCF 1970–3, Def. Alg. Box 1677. RG 59, Entry 1913, NARA. 71. “Message personnel pour J.P.Brunet de la part du Cabouat,” 19 December 1970, Folder ‘Negotiations franco-alge´riennes sur le pe´trole octobre 1970 – janvier 1971, Direction Economique, Papiers J.P. Brunet, Boite 63, MAE, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 72. “Note pour le Ministre,” 19 January 1971, Folder ‘Negotiations franco-alge´riennes sur le pe´trole octobre 1970 – janvier 1971’, Direction Economique, Papiers J.P. Brunet, Boite 63, MAE, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 73. “Note: Negotiations franco-alge´rienne,” 23 January 1971, Folder ‘Negotiations franco-alge´riennes sur le pe´trole octobre 1970 –janvier 1971’, Direction Economique, Papiers J.P. Brunet, Boite 63, MAE, Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 74. A recent book has shed some light: see: Seddik S. Larkeche, Si Zeghar, l’iconoclaste alge´rien – La ve´ritable histoire de Rachid Casa, Lyon: Ena Editions, 2014. 75. Echorouk, Algiers, 20, 21, and 22 November 2006. 76. See review of Seddik S. Larkeche, op. cit. http://www.lesoirdalgerie. com/articles/2015/06/30/article.php?sid¼180659&cid ¼ 41. 77. Hocine Malti, Histore secre`te du pe´trole algerien, Paris: La Decouverte, 2010, pp. 129 – 34. 78. Washington Post, 11 April 2009, Boston Globe, 13 April 2009; Los Angeles Times, 13 April 2009; El Watan (Algiers), 20 April 2009.

234

NOTES TO PAGES 42 – 4

79. On the MALG see Abderrahmane Berrouane, Aux origines du MALG: Te´moignage d’un compagnon de Boussouf, Alger: EDITIONS Barzakh, 2015. 80. Ghozali’s interview in Benchicou’s, Bouteflika: une imposture alge´rienne, p. 105; Account of interview with Rachid Tabti in Echorouk, 11–12 November 2006. On Abdessalam’s role in the MALG (the ALN’s armament and intelligence organ) see Chafik Messbah’s “Interview of the Month” series about the creation of the MALG, in Le Soir d’Algerie, 23–4 June 2008. For more information on the MALG see El-Djeich (the army), monthly publication of the Algerian Popular Army, issue 472, November 2002, pp. 15–19. 81. Bruno Etienne, a renowned Maghreb affairs expert at CRESM in Paris, believed that Washington might have encouraged Algiers to nationalize French interests in order to finance the El Paso project, see AAN, Vol. 1970, p. 294. 82. Hanafi Taguemout, L’affaire Zeghar, Paris: Editions Publisud, 1994, p. 157. 83. Kissinger, “Central Issues of American Foreign Policy,” FRUS, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Vol. I (1969–72), 24, 45, and 48; Nixon Memocon, 2 September 1969, FRUS, Vol. I, pp. 100–7. 84. Memorandum 87, 22 January 1970, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H –169, NSSM Files, NSSM 87, NARA. 85. NIE No. 60 – 70: “The Outlook for North Africa, 12 March 1970,” CIA, NIC Files, Job 79 – R01012A, Box 390. “Trends and U.S Options in North Africa,” 17 April 1970, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 303, NSC Committees and Panels, Review Group, May 1970. 86. NIE 60 – 90, 12 March 1970, CIA, NIC Files, Job 79 – R01012A, Box 390, pp. 1– 15. 87. “Trends and U.S Options,” 17 April 70, Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 303, NSC Committees and Panels, Review Group, May 1970, pp. 1– 9. 88. Memocon of Yazid, R. Pederson and Charles Bray, New York, 20 October 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 17. 89. Account of Rogers’ 9 February meeting with Prime Minister Laraki and meeting in Rabat with Osman, Algerian Ambassador to Morocco in Rabat, 11 February 1970, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 4 Morocco, Document 20; Rogers’ 13 February 1970 report of his talks with Prime Minister Ladgham and Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr., NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I., Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. 90. Memorandum to the NSC, 11 May 70, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 1 North Africa Policy, Document 10.

NOTES TO PAGES 45 – 52

235

91. Ennio Di Nolfo. “The Cold War and the Transformation of the Mediterranean,” 1960 – 75, in The Cambridge History of the Cold war, Crises and De´tente, Vol. II, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd A. Westad, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, Ch. 12. 92. “Nixon comments before Mediterranean trip to Sixth Fleet (27 September-5 October),” 16 September 1970, FRUS, Vol. I (1969– 72), p. 251. 93. El Moudjahid reported Krim’s death in a very brief note with no comment, 21 October 1970. 94. Cella to State Deptartment, 1 December 1970, Folder ‘Pol 2 ALG 1/1/70’, WHCF 1970 – 3, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 95. Grandjean to Michel Gelzer, Division des Affaires Politiques du De´partement politique fe´de´rale, Bern, “Personnelle et confidentielle, Assassinat Krim Belkacem,” 14 December 1970, Folder 822.0 (3) II (1970 – 5) Prise en charge et remise des inte´reˆts ame´ricains, E2200.73, 1995/191, Boite 22, Archives Fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 96. Hoffacker to State Dept., 14 April 1969, FRUS Vol. E-5 Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 14. With Krim eliminated, a week later Boumediene pardoned those sentenced for involvement in the 1967 attempted coup by Col. Zbiri and the attempt on Ahmed Kaid, in charge of FLN, in February 1968. See Hubert Michel, “Chronique politique,” in AAN, Vol. 1970, pp. 268 – 70. 97. Kissinger to Nixon, 14 October 1970, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence, 1969–74, Algeria, Col. Houari Boumediene, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. 98. Abdelkrim Belkheiri, “US-Algerian relations 1954 – 80,” PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 1987, p. 281 and p. 288. 99. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London; ElMoudjahid, 3 October 1969; and 4 October 1969.

Chapter 2

The Triumph of Realism, 1971 –2

1. Mohamed Benchicou, Bouteflika: une imposture alge´rienne, Paris: Jean Picollec, 2004, pp. 107 –8. 2. Hocine Malti, On l’a appele´ le pe´trole rouge, Paris: e´dition Marinoor, 1997, pp. 193–5. 3. Gouvernement Alge´rien, Documents sur les relations entre l’Alge´rie el les socie´te´s pe´trolie`res franc
aises, Annexe No. 6, les mesures prises par le gouvernement alge´rien le 24 Fe´vrier 1971, A6 – 3/A6 – 12 (a collection of documents relating to the oil negotiations and nationalizations published as a white book by the Algerian government, and printed in Switzerland, May 1971), [the Nationalization White Papers hereafter]. 4. “Copie d’un document e´tabli a` l’intention exclusive du Pre´sident Boumediene et sur sa demande sur la strate´gie et les objectifs de notre

236

5. 6. 7.

8.

9.

10. 11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17. 18. 19.

NOTES TO PAGES 52 – 6 ˆt politique pe´trolie`re. Texte re´dige´ au moment de l’ouverture en aou 1970 des ne´gociations entre les gouvernements alge´rien et franc
ais sur la re´vision des accords conclu entre les deux pays en juillet 1965” (28 pages), see 167, document available at Abdessalam’s website at http://www.belaidabdesselam.com/wpcontent/uploads/2009/08/ documents_cites_dans_le_texte_la_politique_de_developpement_ appliquee_par_l_algerie_au_lendemain_de_son_independance. pdf, accessed on 20 May 2009. French newspaper headlines cited in Malti, On l’a appele´ le pe´trole rouge, op. cit., pp. 195– 6. Le Monde, 26 February 1971. The Nationalizations White Papers, “Memorandum adresse par le gouvernement franc
ais au gouvernement alge´rien”, 9 Mars 1971, document A7 – 3/A7– 4. Algerian government response to French memorandum, The Nationalizations White Papers, document A8 – 3/A8 – 4, dated 9 March 1971. Summary of conversation between Cella and Gruffaz, 10 March 1971, State Dept. telegrams, WHCF1970 – 73, Pol. Alg, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. NIE 62 – 71, “Algeria’s International Relations,” Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 420. NARA (pages10 – 11). The States of North Africa in the 1970s. Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa and the Subcommittee on the Near East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. House of Representatives, Ninetysecond Congress, second session. July 18.19 and August 2, 1972, Washington DC; US Government Printing Office, 1972, p. 196. Summary of conversation between Newsom, Under Secretary of State, and Le Gourrierec and Lany of the French government delegation, 6 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. El Moudjahid, 11 May 1971. Ibid. (weekly Arabic edition, Algiers), 25 February 1973. “Libyan Deputy Prime Minister visit to Algeria 12–18 January 1971,” El Moudjahid, 19 January 1971. The Nationalizations White Papers, measures taken by the Algerian government on 12 April 1971, Annex No. 9, documents A9 – 3/ A9 – 22. “Communique´ du Quai d’Orsay,” 14 April 1971, in the Nationalizations White Papers, document A10 – 3. US embassy Paris telegram to Rogers, 20 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. “De´claration du Conseil de la Re´volution et du Gouvernement,” 22 Avril 1971, The Nationalizations White Papers, Annexe No. 11, document A11 – 3/A11 – 6.

NOTES TO PAGES 56 – 62

237

20. Nicole Grimaud, “Le conflit pe´trolier franco-alge´rien,” in Revue franc
aise de science politique, Vol. 22, no. 6, 1972, pp. 1267 – 1307. 21. Memocon of James Blake, Director for North African Affairs and Howard Burris, businessman, 10 May 1971, WHCF, State Dept. telegrams, Algeria, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 22. Malti, On l’a appele´ le pe´trole rouge, op. cit, p. 229. 23. Le Monde, 19 May 1971. 24. NIE 62 – 71, CIA, p. 10. 25. Sid Ahmed Ghozali, Question d’e´tat, Alger: Casbah Editions, 2009, pp. 82 – 3. 26. Quoted in Malti, le pe´trole rouge, op. cit, p. 273. 27. Nicole Grimaud, “Le conflit pe´trolier franco-alge´rien,” Revue franc
aise de science politique, 1972, Vol. 22, no. 6, pp. 1276 – 1307. 28. Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1976. 29. Hocine Malti, Histoire Secre`te du pe´trole alge´rien, Paris: La De´couverte, 2010, pp. 129 – 36. 30. Eagleton to Rogers, 25 February 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 31. Memorandum of Grandjean, ambassadeur Suisse a` Alger, 16 April 1971, Folder ‘Inte´reˆts ame´ricains, IV Ge´ne´ralite´’, Boite 22, E 2200.73, 1995/191, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 32. Memorandum de Grandjean, 26 November1971, Folder ‘Inte´reˆts ame´ricains, IV Ge´ne´ralite´’, Boite 22, E 2200.73, 1995/191, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 33. Memorandum for President Nixon, 15 April 1971, 1, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA; “Note de Lucet au Dire´ction d’Amerique du Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res (MEA),” 27 April 1971, Folder ‘ 9.4. Etats-Unis, Relations Politiques avec la France (janvier 1971 – juillet 1972), Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 34. Rogers to US embassy in Paris and USINT Algiers, 7 April 1971, FRUS Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 24. 35. Memorandum for President Nixon, 15 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 36. President Nixon’s Message to Pompidou, 17 April 1971 WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. Emphasis mine. 37. “Re´actions ame´ricaines a` la crise pe´trolie`re,” Note pour le Conseil des Ministres, 20 April 1971, MEA, Folder ‘9.4. Etats-Unis, Relations Politiques avec la France (janvier 1971 – juillet 1972), Centre des Archives Diplomatiques, Paris. 38. Summary of meeting: conversation between Mr. Samuels and de Margerie, Rogers to US Embassy Paris, USINT Algiers, 20 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA.

238

NOTES TO PAGES 62 – 8

39. Memocom Howard Burris and James Blake, Director of North African Affairs, 10 May 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 40. Eagleton telegram to Rogers, 21 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 41. Text of Boumediene’s speech sent by Eagleton to Rogers, 14 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 42. Bouzidi, Bouzidi, “Algeria’s Policy toward France,” PhD thesis, University of Denver, 1973, University Microfilms, 1979, p. 167. 43. Re´sume de re´union de Bousselham avec Blake in Washington, 20 April 1971, Document Re´f. AW/AP/NO. 424, Ministe`re des Affaires Etrange`re, MAE, Archives Nationales d’Alge´rie (ANA), se´rie 32/2000, Boite 197. 44. “Algeria: Policy Planning Paper”, State Dept. to US INTS Algiers, 16 June 1971, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 26. 45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, July 13, 1971, NSC Files, Country Files, Africa, Algeria, Vol. I., Box 735, Nixon Presidential Materials, NARA. 46. NIE No. 62 – 71, 31 July 2971, Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 420. 47. Lettre de Bousselhame a` Bouteflika, “Re´sume de re´union avec Mr. Moore”, 27 August 1971, document AW/AE/874, MAE, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 197, ANA, Algiers. 48. “Re´sume de re´union avec un repre´sentant de BIRD”, 2 Octobre 1972, document AW/AE/ 0485, se´rie 32/2000 Boite 197, MEA, ANA, Algiers. 49. “Compte rendu de mission a` San Francisco”, 27 August 1971, document AW/AE/879, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 197, MAE, ANA, Algiers. 50. See Malti, le Pe´trole rouge, op. cit., pp. 276– 80; Bouzidi, “Algeria’s Policy toward France,” PhD thesis, University of Denver, 1973, University Microfilms, 1979, pp. 177 – 9. 51. On the VALHYD Porgramme see http://www.sonatraCh.com/elem ents-histoire.html. 52. Ghozali, Question d’e´tat, op. cit., pp. 105– 7. 53. Memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, 21 January 1972, NSC Files, Country Files, Algeria, Vol. I, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 735, NARA. 54. Newsom from Algiers to Rogers, summary of meeting with Boumediene, 28 March 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 31, Section 1. 55. Newsom from Algiers to Rogers, 28 March 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 31, Section 2. 56. Telegram no. 574, Newsom telegram from Algiers to Rogers, 29 March 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria.

NOTES TO PAGES 68 – 75

239

57. Eagleton to Rogers, 2 July 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 32. 58. Memocon Bousselham and Newsom et al., 31 July 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 33. 59. Memocon Rogers and Bouteflika, New York, 12 October 1972, FRUS, Vol. E-5, Part 2, Ch. 2 Algeria, Document 34. 60. Document 0495, “Relations e´conomiques et commerciales avec les Etats-Unis: Diffe´rents suggestions” (07 pages), 12 September 1972, MAE, ANA, Algiers. 61. Boumediene, then Minister of Defense, accompanied Zhou Enlai during his whole stay in Algeria. Author’s interview with Prof. Wang Suola, Peking University, 21 September 2010, Beijing. I am grateful to Zhu Danni, Chinese Foreign Affairs University, for putting me in touch with Prof. Wang and Prof. Li Anshan. 62. Giulia Meloni and Johan Swinnen, “The Rise and Fall of the World’s Largest Wine Exporter and its Institutional Legacy”, Journal of Wine Economics, Vol. 9, no. 1, 2014, pp. 3 – 33. 63. On the Chinese Cultural Revolution and its consequences on Peking’s foreign policy see Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, London: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp. 160–5; W. A. C. Adie. “China’s Year in Africa,” in Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1971–72, Colin Legum, ed. London: Rex Collings, 1972, pp. A98–A102. [ACR hereafter]. 64. Eagleton to Rogers, 06 August 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry, 1613, NARA. 65. US Consul in Hong Kong telegram to State Dept., 03 August 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 66. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. 67. Radio Algiers, 26 October 1971. 68. On the role of the KGB in renewing Moscow’s Africa strategy see Westad, The Global Cold War, pp. 214– 18. 69. For a discussion of China’s Africa policy in this period see Michel E. Latham. “The Cold War in the Third World, 1963–1975 in The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Crises and De´tente, Vol. II, Leffler and Westad, ed., pp. 258–80; Kuo-kang Shao, Zhou Enlai and the Foundations of Chinese Foreign policy, New York: St. Martin’s, 1996, Ch. 9; Philip Snow. “China and Africa: Consensus and Camouflage,” in Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, Thomas W. Robinson and David Shambaugh, ed. Oxford: Claredon Press, 1994, pp. 283–321. 70. Quoted in David L. Morison. “The Soviet Union’s Year in Africa,” in ACR, Vol. 1970 – 71, A62 – 3; visit communique´, 5 – 7 October 1971, in Ministe` re de l’Information, Discours du Pre´ sident Boumediene (2 juillet 1970 – 1 mai 1972), Vol. III, Alger: Direction de la documentation et la publication, 1972, pp. 261 – 7.

240

NOTES TO PAGES 76 – 81

71. Quoted in Colin Legum and John Drysdale, eds Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1969 – 70, London: Africa Research Ltd., 1970, note 19, p. B18. 72. Eagleton to Rogers, 15 December 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 73. Eagleton for Department of State, “Relations with Communist Countries: Review of Economic Developments,” 4 April 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA, 21 pages. 74. Eagleton’s “Annual Report on Specific Communist Propaganda Activities to USIA,” 17 March 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 75. On the Algerian students protest see Colin Legum. “The Year of Students” in ACR, Vol. 1971 –2, p. A22. 76. Eagleton’s Annual Report on Specific Communist Activities 1972 to USIA, 10 March 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 77. Letter of Senator Jack Kemp to Boumediene, 28 August 1972, Folder ‘822.0(3) Prise en charge et remise des intereˆts des Etats-Unis’, Boite 22, E 2200.73, 1995/191, Archives Suisse fe´de´rales, Bern. 78. “Relations with Communist Countries: Review of Economic Developments,” 4 April 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA; Boumediene-Ceaucescu visit communique´, 12 March 1972, in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. III, pp. 375–6. 79. Boumediene-Lozonczi visit communique´, 30 November 1971, in Discours du Boumediene, Vol. III, pp. 331 – 3. 80. See Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 1963 –4, Bristol: Keesing’s Publications, pp. 19939– 42. 81. In January 1992, President Chadli Bendjedid would be ousted in a coup mounted by a group of DAF generals led by Gel. Khaled Nezzar, the Minister of Defense at the time of the coup, who had himself been a DAF officer. 82. Abdelhamid Brahimi, Aux Origines de la trage´die alge´rienne (1958 – 2000): Te´moignage sur hizb Franc
a, Geneva & London: Hoggar & The Centre for Maghreb Studies, 2000, pp. 93 – 124 and pp. 134 – 47. 83. Ironically, according to the memoirs of Colonel Zbiri, Boumediene’s promotion of the DAF officers was one of the reasons he attempted to depose Boumediene in 1967. 84. See Aljazeera’s “Ziya¯ra Kha¯sa” [Special Visit] programme with ˙ Abdelhamid Brahimi, 13 October2009, programme transcript and audio in Arabic available at http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/ CF6F81B3-3A29-454D-B8E9-07339A59F 61C.htm, accessed on 14 March 2010. 85. Grimaud, La Politique exte´rieure de l’Alge´rie, op. cit, pp. 105 –6.

NOTES TO PAGES 81 – 93

241

86. Cella to Rogers, 22 June 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 87. Cella to Rogers, 17 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 88. Cella to Rogers, 17 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 89. Eagleton to Washington, 24 February 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 90. Eagleton to Washington, 2 March 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 91. El Moudjahid, 1 February 1971. 92. Khaled Nezzar, Memoires du Ge´ne´ral Khaled Nezzar, Algiers: Chihab, 2000, pp. 266 – 8. 93. Memorandum of Grandjean, Swiss ambassador to Algiers, 23 August 1971, Folder “Inte´reˆts ame´ricains, IV Ge´ne´ralite´”, Boite 22, E 2200.73, 1995/191, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 94. Telegram from US Embassy in Madrid to Washington, 26 April 1971; State Dept. telegram to Algiers USINT, 13 May 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 95. Eagleton to Washington, 23 April 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 96. US Embassy in Tunis to Washington, 19 May 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 97. Gilder to Rogers, 15 May 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, RG 59, Box 1677, Entry 1613, NARA. 98. Cella to Rogers, 22 June 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 99. Maxim to Washington, 10 October 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Algeria, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA.

Chapter 3

The Challenge of Third Worldism, 1973 – 4

1. Quoted in Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 1973, p. 25663 A. 2. Ministe`re de l’Information et de la Culture, Textes Fondamentaux du Front de Libe´ration Nationale 1954 – 1962, Algiers: Direction de la Documentation, 1976, pp. 51 – 2. “Tripoli Programme”, June 1962; Front de Libe´ration Nationale, “La Charte D’Alger”, April 1964, Algiers: Commission Central d’Orientation, 1964, pp. 46 – 9. 3. Statement made during the LSE-GWU-UCSB Graduate Cold War Conference, 1 October 2009, LSE, London, UK. 4. See Slimane Chick. “La Politique africaine de l’Alge´rie,” in Le Maghreb et l’Afrique subsaharienne, Slimane Chick, ed. Paris: Edition du CNRS, 1980, p. 6. 5. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. Brahimi was Algeria’s ambassador to the UK (1970 – 7).

242

NOTES TO PAGES 93 – 8

6. “Rapport annuel”, de´cembre 1974, MAE, Division Afrique, se´rie 33/2000, Boite 275, ANA, Algiers. 7. El Moudjahid, 20 – 1 June 1971. 8. For an overview of Algeria’s role within the OAU see Slimane Chick, Le Maghreb et l’Afrique subsaharienne, op. cit., pp. 6 – 9. 9. Amimour, Ana¯ wa hu¯wa wa hum [Myself, Him, and Them], Algiers: ENAG, 2007, pp. 90 – 1. 10. State Dept. telegram to US embassy in Lagos, 6 November 1970, Folder ‘Pol ALG-UAR, 1/1/70’, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 11. USINT Algiers to Washington, 4 October 1970, Folder ‘Pol ALG-UAR, 1/1/70’, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry1613, NARA. 12. US embassy Bamako to Washington, 27 August 1971, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 13. State Dept. telegram to US embassy in Niamey, 23 July 1971, Folder ‘Pol ALG-UAR, 1/1/70’,WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 14. Vladimir Shubin, The Hot “Cold War”: the USSR in Southern Africa, London: Pluto Press, 2008, p. 205; Lauren Dobell, Swapo’s Struggle for Namibia, 1960–1991: war by other means. 2nd ed., Basel Namibia Studies Series 3, Basel: P. Schlettwein Publishing Switzerland, 2000, p. 40. I am grateful to Alicia Altorfer-Ong for sharing her work on Chinese and Tanzanian support to African liberation movements. Part of their material aid was channelled via Algeria, in the mid-1960s. 15. Villa Boumaraf currently hosts the offices of the “Organisation national des Moujahidines”, the liberation war veterans’ organization. 16. Eagleton to Rogers, 14 April 1973, NARA, RG 59, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry1613, NARA. 17. See Milli’s own reflection on his years in that post in L’Expression (Algiers), 20 July 2009. 18. Djelloul Malaika’s recollections in an interview published in El Mousstakbal [Arabic daily newspaper, Algiers], 4 July 2009. 19. For a discussion of Algeria’s recognition of and support for African liberation movements see Slimane Chick, Le Maghreb et l’Afrique subsaharienne, op. cit., pp. 14 – 21. 20. Boubakeur Adjali-Kapica, Va dire a Neto, va leur dire . . ., Alger: Casbah Editions, 2009. Adjali left Algeria following the 1965 coup and embraced the support of African movements as a personal mission and did much to promote the cause of the African liberation struggle. In 1985 he moved to New York where his knowledge of African affairs made him a valuable adviser to the missions of various African states at the UN. He died in New York in 2007. See his obituary in El Watan, 29 December 2007.

NOTES TO PAGES 98 – 104

243

21. See Djelloul Malaika’s interview in El Mousstakbal, 4 July 2009. Malaika passed away on 26 August 2015 at the age of 87, El Watan (Algiers), 28 August 2015. 22. Lakhdar Brahimi mentioned in his interview with the author that some of the Portuguese officers were trained in Algeria, 27 February 2009, London. 23. Slimane Chick, Le Maghreb el l’Afrique subsaharienne, op. cit., p. 35. Ministe`re de l’Information et de la Culture, La route de l’unite africanine, Alger: Direction de la Documentation, 1977. By 1977 around 1,900 km of the road had been constructed, exceeding the planned length of 1120 km and linking Algiers to Tamanrasset close to the borders of Mali and Niger. 24. USINST Algiers to State Department, 22 September 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2037, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 25. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi. Brahimi recalled that King Hassan was aware of Boumediene’s assessment at the time and never doubted Algeria’s involvement in the failed coups. In 1999, two years before his death, King Hassan reiterated this to Brahimi. 26. Mohieddine Amimour, Ayya¯m maʿa al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu¯madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with President Boumediene], pp. 490– 4. 27. US Consul to State Department, 29 February 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 28. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. 29. US Embassy in Nouakchott to State Department, 18 June 1971, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 30. Maxim to State Department, 25 February 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 1677, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 31. Rapport No. 540/MAE/DA, 31 July 1972, Ministe`re des Affaires e´trange`res, MAE, se´rie 33/2000, Boite 275, ANA, Algiers. 32. Interview with Salih Benkkobi, Algeria’s ambassador to Mauritania at the time of Boumediene’s tour, in Echorouk (Algiers), 1 January 2011. 33. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. Brahimi was Algeria’s ambassador to the UK at the time from (1970 – 7). 34. Document 581/VD I4/73, 24 August 1973, MAE, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 197, ANA, Algiers. 35. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973, pp. C211– C217. 36. “Mission Cuba,” 22 August 1973, Document No. ABA/AP/286/73, 22, MAE, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 197, ANA, Algiers. 37. Quoted in Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973, p. B13. 38. Newsom to Rogers, 9 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 39. Newsom to Eagleton, 10 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA.

244

NOTES TO PAGES 104 – 9

40. Eagleton to Newsom, Algiers 0591, 12 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 41. Telegram Algiers 0585, Eagleton to Newsom, 12 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 42. Ibid., 26 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. Emphasis mine. 43. Ibid., 31 March 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 44. Newsom to USINT Cairo, 16 April 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 45. Eagleton to Kissinger, 16 April 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 46. Ibid., 20 April 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 47. USINT Baghdad to Kissinger, 2 June 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 48. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973 – 4, pp. B18 – B19. 49. Ministe`re de l’Information et de la Culture, “Ouverture de la 4e`me Confe´rence des pays non-aligne´s, 5 Septembre 1973” in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. V (Alger: Direction de la documentation, 1975), pp. 65 – 70. 50. 4th Summit Conference of Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Movement, Algiers, Algeria, 5 – 9 September 1973; Political Declaration. See http://cns.miis.edu/nam/index.php/site/ documents?forum_id¼5&forum_name¼NAMþSummits&doctype_ id¼5&doctype_name¼Summitþ Summaries 51. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973 – 4, pp. C217– C223. ˆ ture de la 4eme Confe´rence des pays 52. Ministe`re de l’Information, “Clo non-aligne´s, 9 Septembre 1973” in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. V, pp. 97–102. 53. Telegram 4973, from US UN Mission to SECSTATE, 21 November 1973, NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 9. 54. All interviews reproduced in El Moudjahid, 19, 28, 31 August and 3, 5 September 1973. 55. Interview with Christian Science Monitor in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. V, pp. 103 – 7. 56. Saad el-Shazli, Mudhakira¯t Shazli harb Uktubar 1968 –73 [Shazli’s Memoirs of the October War], Vol. I,˙ Algiers: ENAL, 1988, pp. 270– 1. See also Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of Suez: the October War, London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1980, pp. 90 – 1. 57. Amimour, Ayya¯m maʿa al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu ¯ madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with Boumediene], 311 – 13. See also Saad el-Shazly, The Crossing of Suez: the October War, London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing, 1980, pp. 137 – 8.

NOTES TO PAGES 109 – 13

245

58. Shazli, Mudhakkira¯t Shazli harb Uktubar 1968 – 73 [Shazli’s Memoirs ˙ ENAL, 1988, pp. 297 – 8. of the October War], Algiers: 59. For a detailed inventory of the Algerian troops engaged in the October war see General Khaled Nezzar’s memoirs on the years he spent on the Egyptian front, Khaled Nezzar, Sur le front Egyptien, Algiers: Edition Alpha, 2010, pp. 128 – 30. 60. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973 – 4, p. B10. 61. Radio Algiers news bulletin, 21 October 1973, as quoted in Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973 – 4, p. B10. 62. Quoted in Amimour, Ayya¯m maʿa al-raʾ¯ıs huwa¯rı¯ bu¯madyan wa dhikrayat ukhra¯ [Days with Boumediene], op. cit., pp. 317 – 19. 63. El Moudjahid, 16 August 1973. 64. Interview with the Italian National Office of TV and Radio, published in El Moudjahid, 15 – 16 April 1973. 65. Mekideche, Algerian Interests Section in Washington, to Bouteflika, 05 September 1973, Document No. AW/AE/ No. 604 MK/LA, MAE, ANA, Algiers. 66. John Evans, revised Gavin Brown., OPEC and the World Energy Market: a Comprehensive Reference Guide, 2nd, ed., London: Routledge, 1991, pp. 90–2. See also Abdulaziz al-Sowayegh, Arab Petro-Politics, London: Croom Helm, 1984, pp. 132–4; and Jeffrey Robinson, Yamani: the Inside Story, London: Simon and Schuster, 1988, pp. 92–4, 98–9. 67. Yusuf Sayigh, Arab Oil Policies in the 1970s, London: Croom Helm, 1983, p. 119. 68. Kissinger’s “Statement on Domestic and International Energy Policy,” made before the Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress, 19 September 1975 (Department of State, Selected Documents, No. 3, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services), 31. 69. See Hocine Malti, Histoire secre`te du pe´trole alge´rien, pp. 216 –20. 70. Legal briefing memorandum: Carlyle Maw to Kissinger, 4 December 1973; Memorandum of Meeting with the Saudi and Algerian Oil Ministers, 5 December 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 71. Memorandum of conversation, 13 December 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 72. Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau, La strate´gie de Boumedie`ne, Paris: Sindbad, 1978, p. 295. 73. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval. Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, pp. 761 – 2. 74. Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Boumediene et al., 13 December 1973, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/ HAK Memcons, Box 1027, Memcons–December 1973 Presidential/ HAK [2 of 2], NARA, 17 pages. I am grateful to Jeffrey James Byrne for drawing my attention to this document.

246

NOTES TO PAGES 114 – 20

75. Memocon of Kissinger and Boumediene et al., 13 December 1973, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, Memcons –December 1973 Presidential/HAK [2 of 2], NARA. 76. Memocon of Kissinger and Boumediene et al., 13 December 1973, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Box 1027, Memcons –December 1973 Presidential/HAK [2 of 2], NARA. 77. Ibid. 78. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, Boston: Little, Brown, 1982, p. 766. 79. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1973 – 4, p. C83. On 25 September 1973 Guinea-Bissau declared its independence, which was recognized by Algeria. Bouteflika, as chairman of the OAU Ministerial Council meeting in November, proposed the admission of GuineaBissau as the 42nd member of the OAU. 80. “Les activite´s d’Israel en Afrique,” (undated report but content indicates it was prepared in the aftermath of the October War), MAE, se´rie 33/2000, Boite 275, ANA, Algiers. 81. “Aide alimentaire au pays africains touche´s par la se´cheresse,” March 1974, MAE, se´rie 33/200, Boite 275, ANA, Algiers. 82. See: Mourad Ahmia ed., The Collected Documents of the Group of 77, volume II, Oxford University Press, 2009. 83. “Rapport annuel, 1974”, MAE, Division Afrique, se´rie 33/2000, Boite 275, ANA, Algiers. 22 pages, esp. 5 and 7. 84. Telegram 250151 from Secretary of State to all US diplomatic posts, 26 December 1973, NARA, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, FRUS, 1969 – 76, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 10. 85. “Lettre de Boumediene a` K. Waldheim,” 30 January 1974, in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. V, pp. 135 – 6. 86. INR Research Study, 15 December 1974, NARA, INR/DDR/RGE Files: Lot 94 D 566, Folder 93, FRUS, 1969–76, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973–6, Document 11. 87. Newsom to Kissinger, 28 September 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 88. Memorandum for the President, 03 October 1973, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Box 2038, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 89. Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Petroleum, raw materials and development: Memorandum submitted by Algeria on the occasion of the special session of United Nations General Assembly, April 1974, Algiers: Sonatrach, 1974, pp. II – XXIII, 222 pages. 90. Memorandum of conversation, 18 April 1974, Memocon, Nixon Administration, Box 3, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973 – 7, Ford Library digitized collection, accessed on 12 April 2010, www. fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/dmemcons.asp.

NOTES TO PAGES 121 – 37

247

91. Memorandum of conversation, 27 April 1974, NARA, RG 59, Central Files, P820043-1943, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 12. 92. Telegram 99106, 13 May 1974, NARA, RG 59, Central Files, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 13. 93. Memorandum of conversation, 31 May 1974, NARA, RG 59, Central Files, P820050-0597, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 15. 94. Telegram 104050, from Kissinger to all US Diplomatic Posts, 17 May 1974, NARA, RG 59, Central Files, P820050-0597, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 14. 95. Memorandum of conversation, 3 August 1974, Ford Administration, Box 4, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–7, Ford Library digitized collection, accessed on 12 April 2010, www.fordlibrarymus eum.gov/library/dmemcons.asp. 96. Memorandum of conversation, 9 August 1974, Ford Administration, Box 4, NSA Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–7, Ford Library digitized collection, accessed on 12 April 2010, www.fordlibrarymus eum.gov/library/dmemcons.asp. 97. Apartheid regime officials never forgot that historic day, as one of them told Lakhdar Brahimi decades later. Author’s interview with Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. 98. Business Week quoted in the Arab Report and Record, Vol. 1974, 142; US Department of Commerce, Overseas Business Report, Tables 1 and 2, in Abdelkrim Belkheri, “US-Algerian Relations”, p. 400. 99. “Henry A. Kissinger’s Arrival in Algiers,” 14 October 1974, Department of State Bulletin, LXX, 1826, 614. 100. Memorandum of conversation, 21 December 1974, NARA, RG 59, Central Files, P740058-0148, FRUS, Vol. E-14, Part 1, Documents on the United Nations, 1973 – 6, Document 18.

Chapter 4 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Western Sahara, 1975 –6

Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 380. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 1974, 26714. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Me´moires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 380. Nicole Grimaud, Politique exte´rieure de l’Alge´rie, op. cit., pp. 304– 13. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Me´moires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol.2, p. 346. Grimaud, Politique exte´rieure de l’Alge´rie, op. cit., pp. 312– 13. Keesing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. 1963 – 4, pp. 19939 – 42. Abdelatif Filali, Le Maroc et le monde Arabe, Paris: Editions Scali, 2008, pp. 95–101. Filali served as Morocco’s foreign affairs minister for the periods 1971–2 and 1985–99. He also served as prime minister from 1994–8.

248

NOTES TO PAGES 138 – 43

9. Salih Benkkobi, L’Algerie dans toutes ses e´tats, Alger: Casbah Editions, 2009, pp. 166– 7. 10. Eagleton, USINT Algiers, to Department of State, 10 December 1970, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Folder ‘Pol 2 ALG 1/1/70’, Box 2037, RG59, Entry 1613, NARA, College Park, MD. 11. Cella, US Consul, Oran, to Department of State, 14 June 1970, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 12. Rockwell to SECSTATE, 2 June 1970; and Istiqlal communique´, 4 June 1970, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 13. El Moudjahid, 28 May 1970. 14. Eagleton to SECSTATE, 28 May 1970, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 15. El Moudjahid, 28 May 1970. 16. Eagleton to Department of State, 3 June 1970, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 17. Eagleton to SECSTATE, 2 June 1970, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 18. Maxim to Department of State, 7 February 1972, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-UAR, 1/1/70’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 19. Eagleton to Department of State, 29 September 1970, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams Folder ‘Pol 2 ALG 1/1/70’, Box 2037, RG59, Entry 1613, NARA. 20. Former ambassador Salih Benkobbi interview in Echorouk Elyoumi (Algiers), 1 January 2011. 21. Rockwell, US embassy Rabat, to SECSTATE, 6 June 1972, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, RG 59, Entry 1613, Box 2039, NARA. 22. Rockwell, US Ambassador, Rabat, to SECSTATE Washington DC, 19 June 1972, WHCF, State Dept. Telegrams, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 23. Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 1973, pp. 393 – 8. 24. Eagleton to SECSTATE, 18 May 1973, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 25. Rockwell to SECSTATE, 21 May 1973, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-G’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. 26. Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 1973, p. 438. 27. Rockwell to Department of State, 27 July 1973, Public Library of US Diplomacy, Wikileaks, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 1973RABAT03443_b.html, accessed on 10 November 2015. 28. Richard B. Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, 2nd ed., NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 1987, pp. 105– 7. The best work in English on Western Sahara remains Tony Hodges’ Western Sahara, Westport, Connecticut: Lawrence Hill & Co. Publishers, 1983. See also John Damis, Conflict in Northwest Africa: the Western Sahara Dispute, Stanford: CA, Hoover Institution

NOTES TO PAGES 143 – 51

29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39.

40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49. 50. 51. 52.

249

Press, 1983; for an updated work see Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2010. Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 1974, p. 333. Anthony G. Pazzanita and Tony Hodges, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, 2nd Edition, Metuchen, N.J., & London: the Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1994, pp. 300 –3. David Lynn Price, The Western Sahara, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1979, pp. 13 – 17. Pazzanita and Hodges, Historical Dictionary, pp. 342– 4. Keesing’s Contemporary Archive, p. 27415. Pazzanita and Hodges, Historical Dictionary, pp. 173– 5. To read about the formation of the Polisario Front in the words of one of its intellectual leaders see Ahmed-Baba Miske´, Front Polisario, l’aˆme d’un peuple, Paris: Editions Rupture, 1978. Anthony G. Pazzanita and Tony Hodges, Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara, Lanham MD: Scarecrow Press, 1994, pp. 129 –35. Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 1972 – 3, p. B77. Pazzanita and Hodges, Historical Dictionary, op. cit. p. 222. Tony Hodges, Western Sahara, the Roots of a Desert War, London: Croom Helm, 1981, Ch. 15, pp. 157 – 72. For an overview of the origin of Sahrawi nationalism, see Ch. 14. Al-sharq Al-Awsat, 2 March 2002; Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau, L’Alge´rie des alge´riens: vingt ans apre`s, Paris: Les Editions Ouvrie`res, 1981, p. 228. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Me´moires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 379. Annuaire de l’Afrique du Nord, Vol. 1974, pp. 275 – 6. Ibid., p. 235. Filali, Le Maroc et le monde Arabe, Paris; Scali, 2008, pp. 116– 17. Eagleton to SECSTATE, 2 June 1970, WHCF, Folder ‘Pol ALG-UAR, 1/1/70’, Box 2039, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. Rockwell to Department of State, 2 June 1971, WHCF, Folder ‘1–73 – 12–73/AFR-US’, Box 2036, RG 59, Entry 1613, NARA. Balta et Rulleau, L’Algerie des Alge´riens, op. cit., p. 229. Richard Parker, US ambassador, Algiers, to Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State, Washington, DC., 26 February 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. Bendjedid, mudhakkira¯t [Memoirs] 1929 – 1979, Vol. I, Algiers: Casbah Editions, 2012, pp. 254 –7. Author’s interview with Lakhdar Brahimi, 27 February 2009, London. Price, The Western Sahara, pp. 15 – 16. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 380.

250

NOTES TO PAGES 152 – 8

53. Nicole Grimaud, La politique exte´rieure de l’Alge´rie (1962 – 1978), Paris: Karthala, 1984, p. 210, n. 30. 54. Nicole Grimaud, La politique exte´rieure de l’Alge´rie, op. cit., p. 210, n. 31. 55. See Appendix: The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, in Hodges, Western Sahara, pp. 368 – 72. 56. Filali, Le Maroc et le monde Arabe, p. 115. 57. Yahia H. Zoubir, “Stalemate in the Western Sahara: Ending international legality,” Middle East Policy 4, Winter (2007): 158–77, p. 162. 58. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 386. 59. Benkobbi, L’Algerie dans tous ses etats, p. cit., pp. 168 – 70. 60. Hodges, Western Sahara, 223, n. 82; see also Grimaud, Politique exte´rieure de l’Algerie, p. 211, n. 31. 61. Bendjedid, mudhakkira¯t [Memoirs] 1929 – 1979, Vol. I, p. 259. 62. Hodges, Western Sahara, pp. 223– 5. 63. Le Nouvel Observateur, 10–16 October 1975, El Moudjahid, 9 November 1975. 64. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, Vol. 2, 385 and 289. 65. Quoted in Hodges, Western Sahara, p. 225. 66. Fifteen years later, Edouard Moha published Le Sahara Occidental: ou la sale guerre de Boumediene, Paris: Jean Picollec, 1990. As Miske´ interpreted it, MOREHOB’s relocation to Algiers in 1973 was prompted by Rabat to boost Moha’s revolutionary credentials, through setting up an office in Algiers where most of the serious liberation movements were hosted. See Miske´, Front Polisario, pp. 157 – 9. 67. Miske´, Front Polisario, p. 225. 68. Revolution Africaine, 24 –30 October 1975. 69. Hodges, Western Sahara, p. 355. 70. Abdelkrim Belkheiri, “US-Algerian Relations.”, pp. 395 – 403. 71. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs (ADST hereafter), Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection, Washington D.C. Ambassador Richard B. Parker interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy, 21 April 1989. Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C., accessed on 14 December 2011, http://memory. loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mfdip:@field(DOCIDþmfdip2004 par01). 72. ADST Oral History Parker Interview, 21 April 1989. 73. Kissinger to Parker, 24 December 1974, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams 1974 – 7: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 74. Letter of Boumediene to Kissinger enclosed in telegram from Parker to Kissinger, 16 January 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library.

NOTES TO PAGES 158 – 61

251

75. Parker to Kissinger, 26 February 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 1” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 76. Parker to Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, 15 July 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 2” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 77. Boumediene’s Letter to Kissinger (in French) enclosed in a telegram from Parker to Kissinger, 16 July 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 2” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 78. Rush to Kissinger, 27 February 1975, Folder “France 8 – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 2” Box 4, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for EU and Canada”, Ford Library. 79. Rush to Kissinger, 11 March 1975, Folder “France 8 – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 3” Box 4, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for EU and Canada”, Ford Library. 80. Kissinger to Parker, 19 July 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 81. Kissinger to Parker, 26 July 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 82. Kissinger to Parker, 24 February 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – EXDIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 83. Parker to Kissinger, 2 April 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 84. Kissinger to Parker, 10 April 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 85. Parker to Kissinger, 9 September 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 86. Carleton Coon, deputy chief of mission in Rabat, to Kissinger, 10 September 1975, Folder “Morocco – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 1” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 87. Kissinger to US Embassy Rabat, 17 September 1975, Folder “Morocco – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 4, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 88. Parker to Kissinger, 21 October 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library.

252

NOTES TO PAGES 161 – 4

89. Ibid., 30 October 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 90. Kissinger to Parker, 26 October 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 91. Atherton to Kissinger, 23 October 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS 1” Box 4, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 92. Parker to Kissinger, 23 October 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 93. Ibid., 1 November 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – NODIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 94. Ibid., 15 November 1975, Folder “Algeria – State Department Telegrams: To SECSTATE – EXDIS” Box 1, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa”, Ford Library. 95. El Djeich (The Army), January 1976, 47. 96. Ibid., February 1976, 5. 97. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires d’un alge´rien, Vol. II, p. 392. 98. Interview of former Algerian army officer who took part in Amgala II, Echorouk (Algiers), 21 January 2011. A prisoners of war exchange would take place in 1987, where 102 Algerian POW were exchanged for 250 FAR ones. List of Algerian freed POW published by Echorouk, 22 January 2011. 99. Salim Yaqub. “The Weight of Conquest: Henry Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations 1969 – 1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 241 – 5. 100. The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Basic Information about the S.A.D.R, Asia-Oceania Department of the Polisario Front, 1984. 101. Hillenbrand to Kissinger, 11 March 1976, Folder “Germany – State Department Telegrams 1: To SECSTATE – NODIS 5” Box 7, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for EU and Canada”, Ford Library. 102. Hodges, Western Sahara, 222. 103. Daniel P. Moynihan, A Dangerous Place, London: Secker & Warburg, 1978, p. 247. 104. Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981 – 1987, London, Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1987; Vernon Walters, Silent Missions, Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1978. 105. Anderson, US ambassador to Morocco, to Kissinger, 27 April 1976, Folder “Morocco, NODIS2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library.

NOTES TO PAGES 164 – 8

253

106. Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic concerns, p. 126. n. 7. 107. The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, Ambassador Richard P. Parker, interview date 21 April 1989. ADST. 108. W. E. Colby, CIA director, memo for Kissinger, 3 October 1975, Folder “Morocco 2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library. 109. Jacob Mundy, “Neutrality or Complicity? The United States and the 1975 Moroccan Takeover of the Spanish Sahara,” Journal of North African Studies 11:3 (2006): pp. 292 – 306. 110. Azzedine Layachi, The United States and North Africa: A Cognitive Approach to Foreign Policy, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1990, pp. 122 –5. 111. Ibid., pp. 125– 6. 112. Ibid., pp. 126– 8. 113. Louise Roberts Sheldon, Casablanca Notebook, Bloomington In: Unlimited Publishing LLC, 2002, p. 205. 114. Neumann memo to Kissinger, 15 October 1974, Folder “Morocco 1, Box 4”, Collection ‘NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974–7’, Ford Library. Neumann suggested a cooperation strategy that would include the expansion of the existing Kenitra communications base for the services of the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, placing the Atlantic Command in Tangier and Casablanca, and establishing a staging and refueling base, together with storage facilities with low rust and corrosion hazards. He argued that expansion of cooperation with Morocco would strengthen Washington’s position in its negotiations over military bases with Spain and Portugal. 115. Neumann to Brent Scowcroft. NSA chairman, 26 November 1975, Folder “Morocco 2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library. 116. Memo from Oakley to Scowcroft, 19 December 1975, Folder “Morocco 2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974–7”, Ford Library. 117. Oakley memo to Scowcroft, 23 January 1975, Folder “Morocco 1, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974–7”, Ford Library. 118. Neumann to Kissinger, 8 January 1976, Folder “Morocco, NODIS 2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974–7”, Ford Library. 119. Neumann to Scowcroft, 24 February 1976, Folder “Morocco 1, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974–7”, Ford Library. 120. Memo from Clinton E. Granger for Scowcroft, 28 January 1976, Folder “Morocco 2, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library.

254

NOTES TO PAGES 168 – 80

121. Neumann to Kissinger, 8 January 1976, Folder “Morocco, EXID, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library. 122. Kissinger to Anderson, 13 February 1976, Folder “Morocco 3, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library. 123. Memos for Scowcroft, 4 August and 23 December 1976, Folder “Morocco NODIS, Box 4”, Collection “NSA Presidential Country Files for Africa 1974 – 7”, Ford Library. 124. Front Polisario, Ni stabilite´, ni paix avant le retour au territoire national et l’inde´pendance totale: Textes du troisie`me congre`s du Front Polisario (26 au 30 aouˆt 1976), Paris: Association des amis de la Re´publique arabe sahraouie, 1977. 125. People’s Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, National Charter, Algiers: Ministry of Culture and Information, 1981, pp. 101–2.

Chapter 5 Safeguarding the Socialist Revolution, 1977–8 1. Quoted in Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 397. 2. El-Djeich, April 1977; May 1977. 3. Extraits du R.P. no. 3/VE. Alge´rie, “Politique inte´rieure et exte´rieure en mars 1977,” 24 March 1977, Folder ‘1977, P.A. 21.31 Alge´rie. Politische Berichte’, E 2300-01, 1988/ 91, BD: 10, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 4. El-Djeich, April 1977. 5. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires,. II, p. 396. 6. Tony Hodges, Historical Dictionary, op. cit., p. 470. 7. El-Djeich, August 1977. 8. R.P.no. 7/ BT. “Conflit egypto-lybien: intervention du Pre´sident Boumediene,” 2 August 1977, Folder ‘1977, P.A. 21.31 Alge´rie’, E 2300-01, 1988/ 91, BD: 10, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 9. R.P. no 5 /VE, “Les vise´es africaines du Pre´sident Boumediene,” 10 June 1977, Folder 1977, P.A. 21.31 Alge´rie. E 2300-01, 1988/ 91, BD: 10. Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 10. El-Djeich, August 1977. 11. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, op. cit.,. II, pp. 397 – 8. 12. El-Djeich, September 1977. 13. Stephen T. Hosmer and Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Policy and practice toward Third World Conflicts, Massachusetts & Toronto: The Rand Corporation, 1983, pp. 83 – 5. 14. Memo for Brzezinski, 10 February 1977, NLC-1-1-8-53-3, NSC Declassification Project Collection (Reading Room Stand-Alone Computers), Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, GA. 15. Memo NLC-1-5-3-16-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library.

NOTES TO PAGES 180 – 4

255

16. Memo NLC-31-75-5-13-6, 28 May 1977, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 17. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 1 July 1977, Folder ‘CO 4 Confidential 1/20/77-1/20/81’, White House Central File (WHCF) Subject File 1977 – 81, Countries, CO 4 Algeria, Box CO-10, Carter Library. 18. Memorandum from Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State, to President Carter, 13 April 1977, NLC-128-12-7-11-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 19. R.P. no. AW/AE/STD/AM /No. 115, 28 March 1978, MAE, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 124, ANA, Algiers. 20. R.P.no. AW/AE/STD/CF/No. 175, 7 April 1978, MEA, se´rie 32/2000, Boite 124, ANA, Algiers. 21. Debagha to Bouteflika, “Plan e´ne´rgitique du Pre´sident Carter,” 11 September 1978, No. AW/AE/No 563, MAE, SERIE 32/2000, Boite 197, ANA, Algiers. 22. Memocon Brzezinski, d’Estaing et al., Paris, 26 September 1977, Folder “Memocons: Brzezinski, 1-9/77”, NSA, Brzezinski Material, WHCF Subject File, Box 33, Carter Library. 23. ADST, Oral History Project, Ambassador Richard Parker Interview. 24. Vance memorandum to Carter, 13 April 1977, NLC-128-12-7-11-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 25. Quandt and Gary Sick memorandum to Brzezinski, 13 April 1977, Folder ‘Four Year Goals, Suggestive Initiatives 4/77’, Donated Historical Materials, Zbigniew Brzezinski Collection, WHCF Subject File, Box 23, Carter Library. 26. Neumann letter to Brzezinski, 10 April 1977, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 27. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 26 April 1977, NLC-25-69-4-14-0, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 28. Brzezinski reply letter to Boutaleb, 12 May 1977, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45. Carter Library. 29. ADST, Ambassador Ulric Haynes Oral History Project Interview, 20 April 2011. Interview transcript (89 pages), p. 71, http://www. adst.org/OH%20TOCs/Haynes,%20Ulric,%20Jr.%20toc.pdf, accessed 13 November 2015. 30. Brzezinski memorandum to Carter, 15 July 1977, Folder ‘7/20/77 [3]’, Presidential Papers of Carter, Staff Offices, Office of Staff Secretary Handwriting File, Box 39, Carter Library. 31. Brzezinski memorandum to Carter, 16 August 1977, NLC-126-8-411-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 32. Memocon, Habib and King Hassan for Brzezinski only, 8 September 1977, NLC-16-18-1-29-3, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library.

256

NOTES TO PAGES 184 – 9

33. Western Sahara Background, November 1977, NLC-15-33-5-9-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 34. El-Djeich, November 1977. 35. Ibid., July 1977. 36. Vance memorandum for Carter, 1 November 1977, NLC-128-13-2-1-2, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 37. El Moudjahid, 6 November 1977. 38. R.P. no. 9, “Sahara et relations franco-alge´rienne,” 16 November 1977, Folder ‘1977 P.A. 21.31. Algier’, E 2300-01, 1988/91, BD:10, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 39. Hodges, Western Sahara, p. 253. 40. Memorandum, 14 November 1977, NLC-1-4-4-35-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 41. Vance to White House, 23 November 1977, NLC-16-109-5-4-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 42. Vance memorandum for Carter, 5 December 1977, NLC-128-13-3-39, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 43. For an excellent narrative of these events see Hodges, Western Sahara, Ch. 23: (Operation Lamantin). 44. Memorandum, 20 December 1977, NLC-1-4-8-12-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 45. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 20 December 1977, NLC-25-134-1-10-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 46. R.P. no. 12 / BT, “Libe´ration prochaine des otages du Front Polisario,” 19 December 1977, Folder ‘1977, P.A. 21.31 Alge´rie. Politische Berichte’, E 2300-01, 1988/ 91, BD: 10, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 47. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 12 September 1977, NLC-10-5-7-3-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 48. Memorandum from Brzezinski, 23 May 1977, NLC-10-2-6-21-9, NSC Declassification Collection; Memocon Brzezinski, d’Estaing et el, Paris, 26 September 1977, Folder ‘Memocons: Brzezinski, 1-9/77’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 33, Carter Library. 49. Vance memorandum to Carter, 15 October 1977, NLC-15-68-6-1-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 50. CIA Memorandum: “Key LDCs in the North-South Dialogue: Issues and Forums,” 31 August 1977, NLC-17-29-8-3-1, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 51. CIA Memorandum, “Common Fund Talk Suspended,” 2 December 1977, NLC-132-26-6-3-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 52. Fraser’s letter to Vance, 29 November 1977, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 53. Quandt’s reply letter to Fraser, 19 December 1977, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO45, Carter Library.

NOTES TO PAGES 190 – 3

257

54. Vance memorandum to Carter, 22 December 1977, NLC-128-13-314-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 55. Jack Watson’s reply letter to Thomson, 13 January 1977, Folder ‘CO 4 Confidential 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF, Subject File 1977 – 81, Countries, CO 4 Algeria, Box CO-10, Carter Library. 56. Watson reply letter to Rockefeller, 26 January 1977, Folder ‘CO 4 Confidential 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF, Subject File 1977 – 81, Countries, CO 4 Algeria, Box CO-10, Carter Library. 57. “Statement of the Algerian Council of Ministers,” 20 November 1977, quoted in Abdelmadjid Bennamia, “The Palestinian Issue in Algerian Foreign Policy,” PhD thesis, University of Exeter, 1988, pp. 427 – 8. 58. Alfred Atherton, NEA, and Harold Saunders, INR, to Vance, “Briefing Memorandum: Analysis of Arab-Israeli Developments No. 312,” 6 December 1977, NLC-SAFE 17 B-6-31-7-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 59. “Tourne´e du President Boumediene au Proche-Orient en URSS, en Yougoslavie et Malte (3 – 16 janvier 1978)” in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene (Mars 1977 – 28 novembre 1978), Vol. VIII, pp. 51 – 5. 60. Statement of Algiers Summit quoted in Bennamia, “Palestine in Algerian Foreign Policy,” p. 434. 61. R.P. no. 1, “Le sommet d’Alger,” 8 February 1978, Folder ‘P. A. 21.31. Alger, 1978, E 2300-01, 1988/91. BD: 19. Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 62. R.P. no. 2, “L’Alge´rie et le Proche-Orient ou l’art de tirer la couverture a soi,” 15 February 1978, Folder ‘P. A. 21.31. Alger, 1978, E 2300-01, 1988/91. BD: 19. Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 63. “Algerian Summit,” 3 February 1978, NLC-10-8-5-9-8; NLC-10-6-216-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 64. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 18 January 1978, NLC-28-36-5-6-1, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 65. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 10 April 1978, NLC-1-5-7-37-8, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 66. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 17 April 1978, NLC-1-6-1-14-8, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 67. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 28 August 1978, NLC-1-7-6-45-8, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 68. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 7 June 1978, NLC-1-6-5-18-0, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 69. Memorandum for David Aaron,White House, 14 July 1978, NLC-17-2-32-6, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 70. Memocon, Brzezinski, Wischnewski et al., 3 October 1978, Folder ‘Memcons: Brzezinski, 9/78-2/79’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, WHCF Subject File, Box 33, Carter Library.

258

NOTES TO PAGES 194 – 202

71. NSC memorandum, 28 July 1978, NLC-10-13-7-5-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 72. “Cuba and the Nonaligned Movement,” 13 July 1978, NLC-17-1281-7-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 73. Taleb-Ibrahimi, op. cit., Memoires, Vol. II, pp. 398– 9. 74. Profile brief of Col. Maj. Dlimi, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/771/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 75. Profile brief of Guedira, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 76. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, Vol. II, pp. 400 –6. 77. Ibid., pp. 407 – 9. 78. Ibid., pp. 409 – 14. 79. Hodges, Western Sahara, op. cit., p. 356. 80. Brzezinski reply letter to Joseph Addabo, Congressman, 26 January 1978, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 81. Memorandum for Brzezinski only, 3 February 1978, NLC-10-8-5-9-8, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 82. Dick Clark letter to Carter, 8 February 1978, Folder ‘FO 3-2/CO 107 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, Carter Library. 83. Brzezinski reply letter to Clark, 17 February 1978, Folder ‘FO 3-2/CO 107 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Box FO31. Carter Library. 84. Vance memorandum for Carter, 11 March 1978, NLC-128-13-6-9-0, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 85. Africa Contemporary Record, 1977, B 102. 86. “Western Sahara Chronology,” October 1978, NLC-5-11-3-32-6, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 87. “USSR Weekly Review: Soviet Naval Squadron Visits Algeria (8– 13 April),” 11 May 1978, NLC-3-31-2-15-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 88. Memorandum: “Algeria-Sahara,” 17 April 1978, NLC-10-1—6-20-1, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 89. Quandt memorandum for Brzezinski, 14 April 1978, NLC-15-33-6-12, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 90. William Odem to Brzezinski, “Tying the President’s Hands: The Ribicoff Bill,” 31 May 1978, NLC-12-21-6-13-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 91. Presidential Review Memorandum /NSC-34 for Brzezinski, 12 May 1978, NLC-132-48-3-4-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 92. Policy Review Committee Meeting on North Africa, 13 June 1978, NLC-33-9-36-2-5, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library.

NOTES TO PAGES 202 – 6

259

93. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 11 July 1978, Folder ‘Africa, 7/78’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Africa: 4-6/78 through Algeria 12/80, Box 3, Carter Library. 94. Letters to Hassan and Boumediene, Quandt to Brzezinski, 12 July 1978, Folder ‘Africa, 7/78’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Africa: 4-6/78 through Algeria 12/80, Box 3, Carter Library. 95. CIA State Morning Summary, 14 July 1978, NLC-4-14-2-3-7, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 96. For an account of the Mauritanian coup see Hodges, Western Sahara, op. cit., Ch. 24 (“The Nouakchott Coup”). 97. “Coup d’Etat en Mauritanie,” 11 July 1978, Folder ‘P. A. 21.31. Alger, 1978, E 2300-01, 1988/91. BD: 19, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 98. “Intervention devant la conference au sommet de l’O.U.A (Khartoum, 21-7-1978)” in Discours du Pre´sident Boumediene, Vol. VIII, pp. 109– 11. 99. “Sommet de Khortoum,” 23 July 1978, Folder ‘P. A. 21.31. Alger, 1978, E 2300-01, 1988/91. BD: 19, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 100. Vance to Carter, 11 March 1978, NLC-128-13-6-9-0, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 101. Memorandum for the White House: “Nomination of Richard Parker as Ambassador to the Kingdom of Morocco,” 29 September 1978, Folder ‘FO 2/CO 107/A, 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-9, Carter Library. 102. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 414 – 17. 103. “Western Sahara Chronology,” October 1978, NLC-5-11-3-32-6, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 104. Maoui’s letter to Carter, 6 October 1978, Folder ‘Algeria, 1/77-1/80’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Africa: 4-6/78 through Algeria 12/80, Box 3, Carter Library. 105. Memo for Brzezinski, 5 October 1978, Folder ‘CO 107 General 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF Subject File, Countries, Box CO-45, Carter Library. 106. R.P. no. 11 /AE, “Alge´rie: La re´volution continue,” 24 October 1978, Folder ‘P. A. 21.31. Alger, 1978, E 2300-01, 1988/91. BD: 19, Archives fe´de´rales Suisses, Bern. 107. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, Vol. II, pp. 436 – 7. 108. Ibid., p. 439. 109. Memo for Brzezinski, 30 November 1978, NLC-1-8-6-42-0, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 110. Qaddafi’s letter to Carter, 11 December 1978, Folder ‘CO 4 Confidential 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF, Subject File 1977–81, Countries, CO 4 Algeria, Box CO-10, Carter Library. 111. Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1979, p. 2278.

260

NOTES TO PAGES 207 – 10

Conclusion 1. Algeria files Ref. No. STEEL/B/1/7/3 (Liberal Party external relations), LSE Library Archives, London. 2. On the succession power struggle see Amimour, Ana wa huwa wa hum, op. cit., [Myself, Him, and Them], pp. 113– 50. 3. Hugh Roberts, “The Politics of Algerian Socialism”, in Richard Lawless and Allan Findlay (eds), North Africa: Contemporary Politics and Economic Development, London: Routledge, 2015 (first published 1984), p. 32. 4. Abdelkader Bousselham, Regards sur la diplomatie alge´rienne, Alger: Casbah Editions, 2005, introduction. 5. Amimour, Ana wa huwa wa hum,, [Myself, Him, and Them], Algiers: ENAG, 2007, pp. 175 – 83. 6. Tahar Zbiri, Nisf qarn min al-kifa¯h: mudhakkira¯t qa¯ʾid arka¯n jaza¯ʾiri ˙ ˙ [Fifty Years of the Struggle: Memoirs of an Algerian Chief of Staff], op. cit., pp. 344– 5. 7. Memorandum for Brzezinski, 16 April 1979, NLC-10-19-7-9-4, NSC Declassification Collection, Carter Library. 8. Front Polisario, Dix ans de lutte contre le colonialism et l’expansioninism (20 mai 1973-2o mai 1983), France: Ministe`re de l’Information et de la Culture de la SADR, pp. 56 – 9. 9. Memo for Brzezinski, PRC Meeting, 27 March 1979, NLC-132-74-23-8, NSC Collection. 10. “Arms for Morocco? US policy towards the conflict in Western Sahara”,Report of a Study Mission, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 96th Congress, 1st session, January 1980, p. 6. 11. Stephen Solarz letter to Carter, 19 September 1979; Frank Church letter to Carter, 21 September 1979; State Department reply to Solarz, 24 September 1979, Folder ‘ FO 3-2/CO 107 1/20/77-1/20/81’, WHCF, Subject File, Foreign Affairs, Box FO-31, Carter Library. 12. Action Memorandum from Saunders to the Secretary, “The Western Sahara and U.S Arms Transfer Policy Toward Morocco,” 18 September 1979, NLC-132-48-3-3-6, NSC Collection. 13. El-Shaab (The People, Algerian daily) charged: “the American government has chosen to ignore the Saharan people, turned its back on international legitimacy and abandoned its neutrality in exchange for supporting a policy of aggression and expansion by force,” as cited in the International Herald Tribune, 24 October 1979. 14. ADST Parker Oral History Project Interview; Les Janka, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1976 – 8) confirmed this affair to Layachi in an interview in Washington D.C. in December 1983, see Layachi, The United States and North Africa, op. cit., p. 118 and endnote 29.

NOTES TO PAGES 211 – 13

261

15. “Status of Algerian Visits to US, 28 November 1979,” Folder ‘Algeria 1/77-11/80’, NSA, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Africa: 4-6/78 through Algeria: 12/80, Carter Library. 16. Brzezinski memo to Carter, 20 December 1979, NLC-1-13-5-27-2, NSC Collection. 17. Memo for Carter from Charles W. Duncan, Secretary of Energy: “U.S-Algerian Natural Gas Pricing Development,” 17 September 1980, Folder ‘9/26/80’, Staff Offices, Office of State of Staff Secretary, Handwriting File, Box 207. 18. Layachi, The United States and North Africa, 45 – 6; Washington Post, 5 March 1981. 19. Westad, The Global Cold War, Ch. 9. 20. Algerian oil output was reduced from 1.170 million barrels per day (bpd) in 1978 to 0.625 million bpd in March 1982, see Ahmed Benbitour, Radioscopie de la gouvernance alge´rienne, Alger: EDIF2000 Editions, 2010, pp. 119 – 20. 21. ADST Haynes Oral History Project Interview. 22. Newsom to State Dept., Certification of Transfer of Funds to ESCROW Account, Secret State 015356, NLC-15-99-1-9-7. For an account of the hostages release negotiations see Warren Christopher et al., American Hostages in Iran: The Conduct of a Crisis, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, On the administration’s decision to seek mediation after the failure of the rescue mission see Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977 – 1981, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983, p. 500. 23. ADST Haynes Interview. 24. Intelligence Assessment, “Algeria: Political Dynamics of the Bendjedid Government,” 22 October 1979, NLC-4-39-8-1-6, NSC Collection. 25. Brzezinski memo to Carter, 2 May 1980, Folder ‘Weekly Reports [to the President], 136– 50: [4/80-8/80], Donated Historical Material, Brzezinski Collection, Subject File, Weekly Reports, Box 42. 26. Memo for Brzezinski, 27 May 1980, NLC-10-29-4-3-2, NSC Collection. 27. Author’s Brahimi interview, 27 February 2009, London; Malti, Histoire secre`te du pe´trole alge´rien, 256 –78. 28. It is important to note that while the 4th FLN congress in 1979 (during which Bendjedid was nominated to succeed Boumediene) was held under the slogan: Implementation of the National Charter – Loyalty to President Houari Boumediene,” the 4th Special FLN Congress in June 1980 was held under the slogan: “For a Better Life 1980 – 1984.” Note also that the 1980 congress was considered a fourth one as well; implying that it supersedes the 4th congress of 1979. The 5th congress would be held in 1983 when the purges were completed. See, Ministe`re de L’Information, 4 Congre`s du F.L.N

262

29.

30.

31. 32.

33.

34. 35. 36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

NOTES TO PAGES 213 – 15 (Documents), Alger, 1980; Congre`s Extraordinaire du F.L.N (Documents), Alger, 1981. At the OAU Summit in Freetown 26 member states voted by simple majority for the admission of the SADR to the OAU. Thus, the SADR attended the proceedings of the OAU conference in Addis Ababa as a full member on 22 February 1981, i.e. a month after the release of US hostages. See Front Polisario, Dix ans, pp. 107 – 8. Mahmoud G. ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology in US Policy toward Libya, 1969 – 1982, London: University of Pittsburg Press, 1988, 114. Mahmoud Gibril published his works under the pen name of ElWarfally, in the 1980s and 1990s. During the February 2011 Libyan uprising, Mahmoud Jibril led the Libyan National Transitional Council until the fall of Qaddafi in late 2011. ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology, p. 147. Brian L. Davis, Qaddafi, Terrorism, and the Origins of the US Attack on Libya, London: Praeger, 1990, ElWarfally, Imagery and Ideology, Ch. 10, 11, and Epilogue. “Remarks at the Welcoming Ceremony for President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria,” 17 April 1985, Roland Reagan Presidential Library, available at [http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/s peeches/1985/41785a.htm], accessed on 26 July 2012. Hanafi Taguemout, L’affaire Zeghar, pp. 63 – 187. Brahimi, Aux origines de la trage´die alge´rienne, pp. 197 – 204. For an account of the background and the day-to-day crisis management at the presidency, see the memoirs of the then premier Abdelhamid Brahimi, Aux origines de la trage´die Alge´rienne, op. cit., pp. 222– 41. See also Martin Evans and John Philips, Algeria: Anger of the Dispossessed, New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2007, Ch. 4. See for example Robert Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam, London: University of California Press, 1996; Luis Martı´nez, The Algerian Civil War, 1990 – 1998, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000. Evans and Philips, Algeria, op. cit., chs. 4– 5. See the memoirs of US ambassador to Algiers (1996–2000), Cameron R. Hume, Mission to Algeria: Diplomacy by Engagement, Oxford & New York: Lexington Books, 2006; Abdennour Benantar, ed. Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb: Regain d’inte´reˆt? Alger: Centre de recherche en e´conomie applique´e et en de´veloppement (CREAD), 2007. See for example Bouteflika’s own open letter to the Bush administration in 2002 “A friend in Algeria,” Washington Times, 25 November 2002, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/ nov/25/20021125-102241-4358r/. For example see Wikileaks Telegram 09ALGIERS1077, Embassy Algiers to SECSTATE Washington, “Bouteflika to AFRICAM Commander Gen.

NOTES TO PAGES 215 – 20

41.

42. 43.

44.

45.

46.

47.

263

William Ward: We Want a Strategic Partnership,” 6 December 2009, http://www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html; Telegram 09ALGIERS1162, “Over-flight clearance for AFRICOM EP-3 Missions: Preliminary Algerian Response,” 30 December 2009, http:// www.wikileaks.ch/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1162.html; accessed 30 June 2012. Report to the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives: Defense Management “Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the US Africa Command, Washington DC.: United States Government Accountability Office, February 2009, 26. Malti, Histoire secre`te du pe´trole Algerien, op. cit., pp. 305– 23; Ghozali, Question d ‘Etat, op. cit., pp. 133 –58 and p.308. See for example an assessment of that mediation mission in Mohamed Bouacha, al-diblumasya al-jaza’yria [The Algerian Diplomacy: Conflict of the Small Powers in the Horn of Africa and the Management of the Ethiopian-Eritrean War], Beirut, Lebanon: Daraljil, 2004. The current UN Enovy on the Western Sahara conflict is Ambassador Christopher Ross, who was Deputy Chief of Mission at the US embassy in Algeria when the Western Sahara conflict erupted. After over a decade of disengagement from African affairs under Bouteflika the Algerian leadership have been forced to rethink Algeria’s Africa policy. Since 2014 Algeria’s Maghreb and Africa policy has regained momentum under foreign affairs minister Ramtane Lamamra; see for example International Crisis Group’s assessment “Algeria and its neighbours,” MENA Report 164, 12 October 2015, http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/middle-eastnorth-africa/north-africa/algeria/164-algeria-and-its-neighbours.as px. See also “Le re´veil de la diplomatie alge´rienne en Afrique,” Le Monde, 10 November 2015. For a discussion of the North-South dialogue negotiations and the NIEO in general, by a former US State Department official that was directly involved in those negotiations see Robert K. Olson, US Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order: Negotiating Global Problems, 1974 – 1981, Bolder, CO: Westview Press, 1981; see also Bernard D. Nossiter, The Global Struggle for More, New York: Harper & Row, 1987; Mohammed Bedjaoui, Towards a New International Economic Order, Paris: Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1979. See for example Piero Gleijeses. “Cuba and the Cold War, 1959 – 1980,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, eds. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Vol. 2, Cambridge: Cambridge

264

48. 49. 50. 51. 52.

53.

NOTES TO PAGES 220 – 3 University Press, 2010, 335 –48; Olave Njølstad. “The Collapse of Superpower de´tente, 1975 – 1980” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, Vol. 3, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, Ch. 7. El-Djeich, December 1977. Taleb-Ibrahimi, Memoires, Vol. II, p. 398. Taguemout, L’affaire Zeghar, p. 88. Niall Ferguson, ed. The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010). Brahimi, Aux origines de la trage´die alge´rienne, pp. 139–45 and pp. 175– 8; Rachid Tlemc
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INDEX

Abbas, Ferhat, 209 Abdessalam, Belaid, 36, 37, 41, 42, 50, 52, 64, 70, 73, 78, 111, 112, 158 Abidjan, 101 Abu Dhabi, 191 accords, 17, 30, 51, 57, 154, 156, 162, 164, 167, 170, 176, 177, 194, 195, 197, 203, 205, 217 Aden, 191, 201 Adjali, Boubakeur, 97 administration, 3– 7, 10, 12 – 14, 17, 18, 20, 44 – 6, 48, 51, 60, 61, 80, 89, 103, 106, 127, 134, 154, 155, 160, 163, 164, 167– 9, 171, 175, 181– 3, 188– 90, 198, 200, 202, 203, 209, 210, 214, 215, 217, 221, 222 affairs, 1, 6, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 20, 24, 28, 44, 45, 50, 58, 60, 63, 64, 67, 70 – 2, 75, 79, 90, 93, 95, 96, 98 – 100, 104, 105, 115– 17, 120, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 138, 140, 142, 147, 149, 157, 159, 161, 165, 167, 172, 175, 177, 181, 185, 191, 195, 198, 202, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 222 – 4 Afghanistan, 5, 212

Africa, 2 –4, 6, 7, 9, 12 – 14, 28, 42– 4, 60, 61, 67, 72 –5, 85, 90, 92, 93, 96 – 8, 100, 102, 107, 111, 115 – 17, 123, 125 – 7, 134, 135, 146, 151, 160, 165, 168, 174, 177, 181, 183, 185, 193, 194, 198– 201, 209, 215, 216, 218, 220– 2 African, 13, 17, 36, 41, 42, 44, 45, 56, 60, 62 – 5, 71, 73, 74, 93– 100, 104, 115 – 18, 121, 125– 8, 130, 135, 140, 150, 160, 176– 8, 181, 183, 199, 201– 3, 213, 222 AFRICOM, 215 Afro-Arab, 116– 18, 121, 179, 219 Afro-Asian, 11, 13, 71 Agadir, 142, 147 agrarian, 52, 76, 91, 108, 125, 129, 133, 175, 218 Albania, 73 Alexandria, 177 Algeria, 1 – 90, 92 –106, 108– 10, 112– 40, 142– 52, 154 –64, 166, 168– 202, 204, 206, 208– 12, 214– 24 Algerian, 1, 2, 4– 19, 21 – 5, 27 – 30, 32– 42, 45 – 8, 50 – 60, 62 – 70, 72– 103, 105– 109, 111– 13, 115– 17, 119– 24, 126 –9,

278

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131– 4, 136 – 40, 142, 143, 145, 147 – 51, 153, 155 – 7, 159, 162, 163, 168, 170, 172, 174, 175, 177– 81, 184 – 7, 189– 92, 196, 197, 199, 200, 202– 8, 211– 14, 216– 23 Algerian-American, 36 Algerian-Chinese, 74 Algerian-Egyptian, 24 Algerian-French, 26, 51, 52, 54, 81, 86, 88, 134, 178 Algerian-Libyan, 178, 229 Algerian-Moroccan, 20, 29, 80, 141, 161, 163, 170, 179, 200, 221 Algerians, 37, 42, 44, 53, 58, 59, 63, 69, 81, 82, 87, 101, 104, 116, 124, 134, 137, 150, 158, 162, 183, 197, 205, 208, 210, 223 Algerian-Saudi, 29, 230 Algerian-Soviet, 73, 75, 85, 221 Algerian-Yugoslav, 101, 107 Alge´rie, 96 Algiers, 1, 2, 4– 7, 11, 13 –18, 23 – 8, 30– 3, 35, 37 – 40, 44 – 6, 48 – 50, 52 – 6, 59, 60, 63, 66, 69, 70, 72 – 4, 76, 77, 82 – 4, 87 – 90, 92– 6, 98, 100 – 11, 113, 115, 118– 21, 123– 6, 133, 134, 138– 40, 142– 5, 147, 148, 154– 60, 172, 175, 177 – 81, 184– 7, 189, 192 – 5, 197, 200– 2, 204, 205, 209– 12, 215, 216, 219, 220, 222, 223 aligned, 120 Allende, Salvador, 92, 96, 108 America, 58, 102, 204, 222, 271 American, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 15, 17, 22, 26, 29, 35, 36, 38, 41–4, 46–9, 51, 56, 58, 59, 61–6, 68, 69, 76–8, 83–6, 89, 90, 97, 103, 105, 107, 111, 119, 121, 123, 135, 149, 157, 159, 166, 167, 169, 180–2, 186, 189, 190, 205, 209–12, 215–18, 222

American-Moroccan, 198 Americans, 7, 33, 41, 46, 63, 65, 96, 106, 164, 188, 214 Amgala, 162, 163, 168, 169, 171, 252 Amimour, Mahieddine, 99, 145 Anderson, Robert, 166, 169, 203, 204 Anglo-Iranian, 51 Anglo-Saxon, 37, 59 Angola, 4– 6, 96, 97, 100, 134, 135, 165, 168, 169, 171, 173, 178, 183, 193, 218 Annaba, 33 – 5, 65, 82, 86, 180 annexation, 135, 136, 143, 147, 163, 164, 178, 203 ANP, 80, 81 anti-colonialism, 14 anti-Salazar, 134 anti-Salazarist, 96, 98 apartheid, 107, 123, 220, 247 Arab, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 18, 19, 22, 24– 7, 29, 48, 75, 92, 98, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108– 23, 128– 30, 135, 140, 151, 152, 155, 156, 160, 163, 165, 168– 70, 172, 178, 179, 182, 191, 192, 201, 208, 219, 222 Arabic, 119 Arabic-Islamic, 108 Arab-Israeli, 1, 14, 16, 19, 24, 31, 64, 98, 109, 117, 190 Arabist, 158, 203 Arabization, 134 Arabs, 15, 24, 112, 114, 116, 117 Arafat, Yasser, 123, 220 Argentina, 102 arms, 2, 5, 33, 35, 46, 71, 84, 97, 98, 110, 111, 166, 168, 169, 171, 174, 176, 180, 181, 183, 187, 189, 190, 192, 198– 201, 209, 210, 221, 222 army, 12, 16, 41, 69, 72, 80, 81, 84, 109, 110, 136, 138, 154, 162,

INDEX 163, 168, 196, 202, 203, 211, 215, 216 Arzew, 66 Asia, 45, 102, 126, 194, 267 Assad, Hazez, 120, 160 Aswan, 9, 10 Athens, 212 Atherton, Alfred, 149, 161, 165, 168 Atlanta, 255 Atlantic, 131, 142, 143, 147– 9, 154, 170 Azawad, 216 Bahrain, 111, 191 Baldini, Aldo, 34 Balta, Paul, 108, 113, 134, 145 Bamako, 95, 136, 242 Bandung, 11 Barbi, Ariggo, 82 Barka, Mehdi Ben, 21, 137, 194 Bechar, 20, 137, 153 Bechtel, 66, 67 Bedjaoui, Mohamed, 1 Beijing, 29, 127 Beirut, 106, 203 Belaid, Abdesslam, 36, 41, 50, 52, 64, 70, 73, 78, 111, 112, 149, 208 Belgian, 105 Belgium, 133, 183, 194, 195 Belgrade, 15, 179, 193 Belkacem, Krim, 17, 45 Belkhadem, Abdelaziz, 95 Belkheir, Larbi, 208, 214 Ben Bella, Ahmed, 6 – 13, 16, 20, 25, 29 – 31, 36, 46, 71, 80, 81, 92, 93, 100, 209, 223 Benbitour, Ahmed, 261, 271 Bendjedid, Chadli, 21, 80, 81, 149, 150, 154, 179, 207– 9, 211– 16, 223 Bendjelloun, Ali, 189, 190 Benhima, 140, 141, 149 Benin, 5, 174, 178 Benini, Ahmed Taibi, 81, 82

279

Benkheda, Youcef, 208 Benvenuti, Bruno, 82 Benyahia, Mohammed Seddik, 208, 211 Berber, 9 Bern, 84 Biafra, 94 Bitat, Rabah, 101 Blida, 16 Bonn, 163, 193 Boston, 41, 66 Botswana, 178 Bouabid, Maati, 146 Boucetta, M’Hamed, 146, 199, 203 Boumaaza, Tayeb, 42 Boumaraf (Villa), 96 Boumediene, Houari, 3 –6, 11 –42, 44– 52, 54, 55, 57, 59, 61 – 4, 66– 9, 70 – 2, 74, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 87 – 95, 98 – 111, 113– 15, 118– 42, 148 –56, 158– 63, 170– 2, 174, 176– 9, 181, 183, 184, 186– 9, 191 – 8, 202, 204– 9, 213 – 24 Bourguiba, Habib, 13, 21, 23, 24, 47, 183 Bouroux, Louis, 35 Bousfer, 34, 39, 86, 99 Bousselham, Abdelkader, 63, 65, 66, 69, 70, 208 Boutaleb, Abdelhadi, 182 Bouteflika, 11, 12, 23, 27, 28, 36, 39, 40, 46, 70, 72, 101, 106, 113, 120, 122 – 4, 147, 186, 194, 204, 207, 208, 215, 216 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 14, 80, 108, 150, 213 Brezhnev, Leonid, 110, 205 Britain, 143, 151 British, 51, 94, 107, 117, 144 Brunet, Jean-Pierre, 40 Brussels, 196, 197 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 180, 182, 183, 188, 193, 198, 199, 210– 12

280

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

Bulgaria, 78, 79 Bulgarians, 78 Burundi, 115 Cabral, Amilcar, 96, 97 Cairo, 9, 11, 14 – 16, 24, 109, 110, 115 Canary Islands, 96 capitalism, 108 Caribbean, 101 Carlos, Juan, 164 Carter, Jimmy, 5, 6, 175, 176, 180, 181, 200, 201, 206, 210, 211, 221 Casablanca, 138, 142, 162 Ceaucescu, Nicolae, 79 Cella, Glenn R., 35, 53, 81 – 3, 86, 87 CFP, 53, 55 – 8, 63, 64, 89 Chabou, Colonel, 83, 84 Chad, 115, 177, 214 Chadli (see Bendjedid) Cherchell, 179 Chile, 92, 134 Chilean, 96, 108 China, 2, 11, 30, 68, 73, 74, 71 – 5, 78, 90, 119, 136, 146, 164 Chinese, 8, 71, 74, 75, 77, 119 Christian, 97, 108 Chvedov (Hospital, USSR), 204 CIA, 7, 9, 11, 12, 17, 32, 38, 39, 43, 64, 85, 164, 165, 180, 188, 201, 202 Clark, Dick, 198, 199 Clements, Williams P., 167 Colby, W.E., 165 Cold War, 1– 6, 8, 10, 12 – 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 26, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44 – 6, 48, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 70, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 82, 84, 86 – 8, 90, 92, 94, 96, 98, 100, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110, 112, 114, 116, 118, 120, 122, 124, 126– 225

Colombo, 179 colonialism, 7, 75, 79, 93, 107, 144, 198 colonization, 25 Commonwealth, 66, 151 communist, 8, 56, 61, 70 – 2, 75 – 9, 90, 91, 95, 129, 146, 168, 171, 179, 183, 186, 187, 240 conflict, 1– 6, 13, 16, 24, 31, 51, 54– 6, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 68, 73, 76, 78, 80, 86, 88, 90, 97, 99, 100, 103, 105, 107, 109– 11, 117, 120, 129, 135, 146, 149, 152, 160, 163, 165, 167 – 9, 171, 172, 175 – 9, 181, 184, 186, 187, 192, 196, 198– 203, 215, 216, 221, 222 Congo, 6, 7, 10, 115 congress, 27, 44, 69, 96, 111, 168, 169, 172, 180, 189, 198– 201, 203, 207, 208, 210, 222 COREMO, 97 Cuba, 6, 8, 10, 12, 52, 92, 101, 102, 113, 135, 169, 171, 173, 179, 182, 193, 194, 221 Cyrus, 181, 184, 186, 189, 199, 203 Czechoslovakia, 31, 78 Daddah, Moukhtar Ould, 100, 131, 132, 138, 141, 145, 151, 153– 5, 172, 176, 179, 185, 186, 195, 202, 221 DAF, 80, 84, 87 Dakar, 132, 186 Damascus, 15, 115, 191, 204, 205 Darwish, Mahmoud, 123 Debagha, M., 180 de-Boumedienization, 208, 214 Delmas, Jacques Chaban, 55 democratic, 119, 120, 123, 129, 163, 169, 192 democratization, 214 d’Estaing, Giscard, 118, 126, 134, 135, 178, 184, 185, 187, 219, 255, 257

INDEX de´tente, 2– 5, 20 – 6, 28, 29, 31, 32, 35, 42, 43, 130, 135, 137– 40, 148, 149, 155, 156, 165, 169, 170, 176, 179, 217, 219– 21 developed, 5, 75, 92, 101, 108, 112, 113, 119– 23, 126, 132, 146, 148, 158, 188, 219 developing, 92, 102, 107, 108, 117, 120, 132, 133, 158, 159 development, 3, 4, 6– 8, 11, 19 – 21, 23, 25, 27 – 9, 31, 33, 35 – 7, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 54, 55, 61, 64, 66, 71, 75, 76, 79, 87, 88, 92, 94, 98, 99, 101 – 4, 107, 117, 120, 125, 127– 30, 132, 133, 137, 140, 146, 148, 149, 156– 61, 172, 175 – 7, 182, 187, 188, 199, 206, 207, 210, 216– 19, 223 dialogue, 23, 92, 127, 134, 155, 157– 9, 181, 186 – 8, 194 Diori, Hamani, 118 diplomacy, 106, 107, 113, 115, 121, 160, 175, 179, 187, 204, 222, 223 diplomat, 28, 32, 41, 56, 85, 108, 111, 138, 144 diplomatic, 4, 14, 23, 25, 27, 28, 34, 39, 41, 45, 53, 54, 61, 62, 67, 68, 73, 74, 77, 89, 94, 98, 102– 6, 109, 110, 113, 115, 119, 121– 3, 126, 128– 31, 135, 136, 138, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 161, 165, 166, 169, 170, 173, 177– 80, 186, 189, 191, 194, 196, 199, 205, 209, 212, 213, 217, 220, 223 diplomats, 8, 27, 28, 32, 54, 63, 77, 78, 105, 126, 144, 156, 172, 185, 192, 211 Dizdarevitch, Faek, 108 Djazairi, Idriss, 67, 120 Djebilat, see Ghar Djebilat

281

Djoudi, Noureddine, 95 Dlimi, Ahmed, 164, 194 – 7, 203 Dobrynin, Anatoly, 186, 187 Eagleton, William, 28, 33, 34, 59, 62, 68, 72, 77, 82 – 5, 96, 104– 6, 139, 148 Egypt, 6, 15, 23, 24, 26, 48, 75, 87, 90, 99, 103, 109 – 11, 113, 115, 116, 121, 128, 140, 160, 176, 177, 190, 191, 217, 218 Egyptian, 9, 16, 18, 24, 31, 33, 48, 75, 109, 110, 112, 130, 191 Egyptian-Israeli, 163, 187 Egyptian-Syrian, 25, 110 El-Ayoun, 144, 145, 162 El-Borma, 21, 23, 24 El-Djeich, 162, 174, 179, 184, 220 El-Fassi, Allal, 136, 138, 146 Ellsworth, Robert F., 167 El-Ouali, see Sayed England, 212 Enlai, Zhou, 8, 71, 72, 74, 119 ERAP, 53, 55, 56, 58, 64 Ethiopia, 183, 188, 205 Ethiopian-Eritrean, 263, 271 European, 2, 13, 33, 34, 40, 44, 45, 52, 65, 81, 83, 85, 86, 110, 114, 122, 215 EXIM, 54, 59, 60, 62, 64, 65, 68, 89, 103, 107, 181, 218 Export-Import, 54, 129 Fahd (Prince, later King), 179 Faisal (King Bin Abdulaziz), 23, 26, 29, 111 Fanon, Frantz, 97 Ferlin, Col. 34 Fes, 196 Figuigui, Bachir, 143 Filali, Abdelatif, 137, 147, 153 FLN, 12, 19, 77, 78, 94 – 6, 98, 116, 125, 207, 208, 212

282

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FLS, 143– 5 FLU, 144 FNLA, 97 foreign, 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, 14, 18, 20, 22 – 5, 27 – 33, 35 – 8, 40, 42, 46, 48 – 50, 55, 60, 62, 65, 70, 72 – 5, 77, 79, 82, 84, 85, 90, 93, 95, 97, 100, 112 – 14, 116, 117, 122, 124, 127, 128, 130, 140, 142, 147, 149, 159, 163, 164, 166, 174 – 6, 178, 179, 182, 185, 186, 189, 193 – 5, 198, 199, 203, 208 – 23 Ford, Gerald (Ford administration), 4, 5, 122, 155, 160, 163, 164, 165, 167– 9, 171, 181, 190, 221 FPC, 54, 60 – 4, 69, 89, 103, 129 France, 8, 17, 18, 20, 21, 24, 30, 31, 33, 34, 37 – 9, 42, 51 – 5, 58 – 61, 63, 65, 70, 72, 73, 79 – 81, 83, 86– 90, 92, 94, 101, 118, 119, 123, 127, 134 – 7, 141, 159, 174– 6, 180, 185, 186, 209, 217, 218 Franco, General, 150, 153 Franco-Algerian, 37, 60 Francophone, 185 French, 8– 10, 12, 21, 25, 27, 30, 32 – 5, 37 – 42, 47, 49 – 65, 70, 71, 76, 80 – 2, 85 – 9, 99, 118, 128, 134, 159, 174, 178, 184– 7, 194, 201, 217, 220, 221 Gabon, 178 Gaulle, General de, 37, 86, 137 Gaullist, 52, 88 GDR, 193 Geneva, 78, 113, 115, 120, 121, 188, 194– 7, 203 geopolitical, 2, 6, 20, 23, 29, 116, 127, 143, 198, 216 geopolitics, 47, 116, 183, 220

Georgetown, 272 German, 129, 163, 193 Germany, 78, 126, 129, 133, 163, 188, 193, 212, 221 Getty Oil, 38, 63 Ghar Djebilat, 29, 138, 142, 147 Ghozali, Sid Ahmed, 36, 39, 41, 57, 208, 216 Gibraltar, 66, 155, 166 Gilder, Edmund Van, 86 global, 2– 4, 45, 83, 87, 118, 125– 7, 135, 165, 169, 180, 181, 185, 217, 219– 21, 224 Golan Heights, 120 Gorshkov, 32 GPRA, 97 Grandjean, Jean-Denis, 45, 59, 84 Gropello, Adalberto Figarolo, 82 Gruffaz, Pierre-Etienne, 53, 87, 99 Guinea, 9, 10, 96, 97, 100, 140 Guinea-Bissau, 93, 97 Gulf, 27, 38 Hadjar, 65, 76 Hague, 131 Haig, Alexander, 211 Hakim, Ibrahim, 144 Hamdani, Smail, 68, 83, 96, 97, 104, 106, 139, 148 Harbi, Mohamed, 30 Harriman, W. Averell, 10, 13, 14 Haselton, Norris, 9 Hassan, King, 5, 13, 21 – 4, 26, 29, 31, 47, 92, 98, 99, 129, 131, 132, 135, 137 – 42, 146 – 55, 160– 71, 174, 176, 182 – 5, 188, 189, 194– 7, 200 – 4, 209, 210, 221, 222 Hassi Messaoud, 41, 42, 45, 46, 57, 59, 64, 98, 104, 106, 177, 214 Havana, 6, 101, 179, 193 Haynes, Ulric, 180, 182, 186, 198, 200, 205, 209, 212 Hermes, Peter, 163 Hillenbrand, Martin J., 163

INDEX historiography, 80 history, 1, 2, 88, 89, 112, 117, 165, 172, 182, 210 Hoffacker, Lewis, 26, 28 Hoffman, Slimane, 95 Hoffmann, Heinz General, 193 Hong Kong, 73, 239 Houston, 83 Hungarian, 79 Hungary, 78 Hussein, King (of Jordan), 98 hydrocarbon-rich, 126, 135 hydrocarbons, 13, 35, 36, 42, 50, 56, 65, 66, 127, 133, 214 – 16 ideology, 2, 3, 24, 77, 130, 213, 218, 220 India, 72, 146 international relations, 64, 71, 93, 95, 223 Iran, 50 – 1, 155, 168 – 9, 170, 172, 209– 13, 222 Iraq, 26, 92, 103, 106, 155, 191, 194 Israel, 1, 6, 14 – 19, 24, 26, 27, 31, 43, 44, 64, 67, 98, 102, 106–11, 114–17, 121, 123, 126, 133, 160, 163, 176, 187, 190, 208, 219–22 Italy, 33, 53, 81 – 3, 90, 133, 218 Japan, 122, 124, 126, 133, 188 Jerusalem, 114 Jewish, 117 Jibril, (Mahmoud) Warfally, 262 Jordan, 18, 98, 110, 168 – 70, 172 Judet, Pierre, 58 Kabylie, 9 Kadiri, Ahmed Al, 99 Kaid, Ahmed, 235 Kampala, 161 Kapic¸a, Boubakeur Adjali, 97 Kasdi (see Merbah), 203, 207, 211 Katanga, 183

283

Kearns, Henry, 54, 59, 64 Keddadra, Abdelmadjid, 95 Kemp, Jack, 78 Kenitra, 142 Kennedy, Robert, 7, 10, 46, 89 Khalil, Abou, 156 Khartoum, 105, 202 Khelil, Chakib, 216 Khrushchev, Nikita, 9, 16 Kissinger, Henry, 27, 28, 42, 44 – 6, 64, 67, 88–90, 112–15, 119–28, 132, 157–61, 163–70, 188, 201, 215, 218–21 Komer, Robert, 7 – 11, 13 Korea, 119 Korotchkin, Vladimir, 84 Kosygin, Alexi, 65, 205 Krim, Belkacem, 17, 45, 46 Kuo, PainHsiang, 74 Kuwait, 111, 183, 191 Laboulaye, Franc¸ois Lefebvre de, 186 Lagos, 95 Latreche, Abdelhamid, 179 LDC, 188 Lebanese, 18, 108, 135 Lebanon, 98, 181 Leduc, Jean, 50 liberalization, 193, 198, 311 liberation, 4– 6, 17, 19, 28, 41, 45, 46, 69, 72, 75, 80, 91 – 7, 100, 101, 103, 107, 116, 123, 125, 127, 131, 134, 141, 143, 144, 152, 156, 163, 172, 178, 200, 202, 207, 210, 218, 220, 222, 224 Liberia, 100 Libreville, 178 Libya, 6, 21, 23, 24, 29, 32, 33, 38, 42, 43, 45, 47, 50, 54, 75, 92, 99, 140 – 2, 145, 148, 177, 188, 191, 192, 201, 213, 214, 218, 223 Lima, 133, 134

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Livorno, 82 Lozincz, Pal, 79 Lucet, Charles, 60 Lusaka, 97 Machel, Samora, 96 Madrid, 140, 143, 144, 150, 151, 153– 6, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 170, 176, 195, 197, 203, 205 Madrid-Rabat-Nouakchott, 153 Maghreb, 2 – 5, 13, 20 – 2, 24 – 6, 28, 29, 31 – 5, 42 – 7, 63, 98, 99, 127 – 9, 132, 135 – 7, 140 – 3, 147 – 51, 153, 155, 156, 161, 169, 170, 172, 174, 176, 179, 199, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220, 221 Malaika, Jelloul, 95, 97, 98 MALG, 42 Mali, 95, 98, 115, 177, 178, 216 Malmierca, Isidoro, 194 Malta, 191 Malti, Hocine, 50, 56, 66, 216 Maoui, Abdelaziz, 180, 181, 187, 204 Marcellin, Raymond, 53 Marchais, George, 186 Margerie, Emmanuel de, 62 Marinkovic, Boziadar, 32 Martel Martel Group, 185 Marxism, 75 Marxist, 77 Mashreq, 28 Mauritania, 21, 23, 24, 47, 99, 100, 131– 3, 136, 138 –42, 144, 145, 147, 149, 151 – 4, 170, 171, 174, 176, 177, 185, 186, 190, 195– 8, 201 – 3, 209, 220 – 2 Mauritanian, 24, 100, 138, 140, 144, 145, 152, 154, 169, 174– 6, 184, 185, 186, 202, 203 Mauritanian-Moroccan, 144, 156 Mauritius, 74 Maxim, Robert, 87, 99, 140

Mecca, 92, 97 mediation, 18, 160, 161, 178, 182, 184, 201, 216 mediator, 46, 78, 93, 210 mediatory, 5, 135 Mediterranean, 1, 29, 31 – 5, 45, 47, 49, 50, 62, 82, 87, 88, 101, 128, 135, 140, 149, 170, 193, 217, 218, 222 Melilla, 139, 155 Merbah, Kasdi, 203, 207, 211 Mers-el-kebir, 3, 20, 29 – 34, 35, 49, 79, 82, 84 – 7, 128, 179, 180, 192, 193, 217, 218 Miami, 69 military, 2, 8, 12, 13, 20, 24, 27, 30– 5, 47, 51, 63, 67, 72, 73, 75, 79 – 88, 90, 92, 95, 98, 99, 109, 110, 112, 113, 124, 128, 136, 145, 148, 149, 154, 162, 166– 9, 171, 173, 174, 176, 179, 183– 6, 189, 193, 196, 198, 202– 4, 207, 208, 212, 215, 216, 218, 221, 222 Miske, 144 Mobutu, Sese Seko, 118, 174 modernization, 20, 25, 29, 42, 65, 86, 98, 127, 128, 137, 156, 221, 223 Moha, Edouard, 143, 156 Monrovia, 100 MOREHOB, 96, 143, 145, 156 Moroccan-Algerian, 96, 195, 202 Moroccans, 96, 162, 196 – 8 Morocco, 2, 4, 5, 10, 13, 21 – 7, 31, 32, 43, 44, 47, 69, 91, 96 – 100, 128, 129, 131 – 3, 135– 42, 144– 56, 161– 4, 166 – 71, 174– 9, 182 – 5, 187, 191, 194– 9, 201, 203, 204, 209 – 11, 215, 220– 2 Moscow, 6 – 9, 11, 13 – 15, 29 – 33, 47, 49, 63, 71 – 3, 75, 76, 82 – 5, 87, 90, 109, 110, 114, 121, 127 – 9, 179, 180, 187,

INDEX 191 – 3, 199 – 201, 204, 205, 208, 217 – 19 Mossadeq, Mohammad, 50, 51 Moudjahid, El, 39, 46, 54, 85, 96, 185 Moynihan, Daniel P., 164 Mozambique, 96, 97, 100, 134, 178 MPLA, 96, 97 Mugabe, Robert, 178 NAM, 101 –3, 108, 109, 179, 193 Namibia, 96 Naouadhibou, 151 Nasser, Gamel Abdel (Nasserism), 9, 11, 15, 23, 26, 27, 29, 48, 99, 116 nationalism, 7, 77, 144, 152, 196 nationalization, 8, 15, 36, 39 – 42, 47, 50 – 2, 54 – 9, 64, 65, 76, 78, 79, 81, 85, 86, 88, 89, 91, 102, 108, 120, 125, 128, 134, 216– 18 nation-building, 3 NATO, 4, 13, 45, 51, 85, 89, 223 negotiations, 4– 6, 18, 24, 36 – 9, 42, 47, 51 – 3, 57, 58, 64, 88, 93, 103, 104, 153, 158, 160, 161, 163, 165, 171, 185, 188, 194, 204, 209, 211, 222 Nekli, Abderrahmane, 95 neo-colonial, 100 neo-colonialism, 92, 125 Netherlands, 111, 183, 188 Neto, Agostinho, 96, 97, 270 Neumann, Robert, 161, 166 –9, 171, 182 Nevada, 211 Newmount, 59 Newsom, David, 60, 67, 68, 96, 104– 6, 130, 200 Nezzar, Khaled, 84 NFL, 103 Niamey, 95, 177 NIE, 43

285

NIEO, 119– 21, 125 –7, 132, 133, 157, 158, 161, 171, 181, 188, 219 Niger, 95, 98, 100, 115, 177, 178, 183 Nigeria, 94, 95, 182 Nimeiry, Jafaar, 202 Nixon, Richard, 2, 3, 5, 20, 42, 44– 6, 51, 54, 59 – 61, 64, 67, 88, 89, 103, 119, 120, 127, 130, 163, 169, 218, 220, 222 Nixon-Ford, 4, 5, 181, 190 Nkomo, Joshua, 96, 178 Nkrumah, Kwame, 94 NLF, 5 non-aligned, 12, 47, 101, 106 – 8, 118– 20, 122, 124, 125, 155, 179, 194, 217, 218, 222 Non-Aligned Movement, 4, 108, 179 non-alignment, 31, 33, 47, 49, 64, 75, 78, 79, 88, 105, 128, 155, 179 north, 7, 13, 28, 42–5, 51, 60–3, 67, 72, 78, 85, 92, 101, 108, 112, 116, 117, 119, 120, 126–8, 130, 134, 135, 139, 145, 160, 165, 181, 183, 199–203, 211, 213, 219, 221, 222 North Africa, 7, 13, 28, 42 – 4, 51, 60, 61, 67, 72, 85, 116, 117, 127, 160, 165, 181, 183, 200, 201, 221 North Carolina, 211 North-South, 102, 134, 155, 157– 9, 171, 181, 187, 188 North Vietnam, 78, 222 Nouadhibou, 140, 141, 162 Nouakchott, 99, 100, 138, 140, 142, 143, 145, 151, 154, 162, 170, 184, 186, 187, 197, 202, 203 Nouira, Hedi Amara, 183 NSC, 168, 169, 180, 181, 183, 192, 194, 198, 200, 201, 206, 210

286

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

nuclear, 2, 4 nuclear-armed, 204 nuclear-proof, 87 Oakley, Robert B., 167 OAPEC, 111, 114, 120, 122 OAPEC-OAU, 121 OAS, 81, 185 OAU, 73, 93 – 5, 100 – 2, 106, 115– 17, 125, 140, 141, 151, 160, 178, 182, 198, 199, 201, 202, 213, 222, 223 oil, 8, 11, 13 – 15, 20, 22 –4, 30, 35– 42, 44, 47, 48, 50 – 4, 56 – 9, 61– 3, 65 –7, 70 –2, 76, 78, 79, 81, 85 – 9, 91, 92, 94, 98, 100, 111– 15, 117– 27, 130, 133, 147, 157– 9, 175, 177, 189, 211– 16, 218, 219 oil-consumers, 219 oil-consuming, 113, 118, 132, 134 oil-producers, 159 oil-producing, 38, 113, 121, 127, 159, 219 OPEC, 24, 27, 37, 38, 47, 50, 51, 54, 92, 111, 113, 120, 122, 127, 132, 133, 155, 158, 159, 217, 219 Oran, 20, 28, 33 – 5, 45, 53, 81 – 3, 86, 87, 99, 138, 140, 142, 149, 179, 207 Ortoli, Franc¸ois-Xavier, 39, 40 PAIGC, 93, 96, 97 Pakistan, 146 Palestine, 1, 6, 17, 18, 24, 27, 43, 44, 48, 49, 75, 96, 97, 98, 114, 121, 123, 134, 156, 160, 191, 192, 200, 220, 222 Palestinian, 1, 6, 17, 18, 24, 27, 43, 44, 48, 49, 75, 96, 97, 98, 114, 121, 123, 134, 156, 160, 191, 192, 200, 220, 222 Pan-African, 94

Parker, Richard, 123, 124, 149, 158– 62, 164, 171, 180, 181, 203, 210 Parti Avant-Garde Socialiste (PAGS), 77 Paso, 38, 48, 53, 54, 60 – 4, 66, 68, 69, 89, 103 –7, 129, 190, 206, 211, 216 PCM, 146 Pederson, Richard, 44 Peking, 10, 71 – 5, 90 Pentagon, 83, 85 PFLP, 17, 18 PLA, 72 PLO, 27, 94, 96, 98, 106, 123, 126, 134, 155, 160, 191, 192, 200 PLS, 146 Podgorny, Nicolai, 31 Polisario, 6, 96, 131, 143 – 5, 149– 52, 154, 156, 162 – 5, 168– 72, 175– 7, 179, 182, 184– 7, 192, 194, 196, 197, 199, 203, 209, 220, 222 Pompidou, Georges, 37, 38, 47, 55, 59, 61, 62, 88, 89 Porter, William, 6, 7, 9, 12 Portugal, 53, 93, 102, 111, 150 Portuguese, 93, 96, 98, 107, 166 post-colonial, 117, 151 PRC, 72, 73, 200, 201 Qaddafi, 23, 33, 37, 48, 99, 129, 140, 145, 177, 178, 205, 213, 214, 216, 221 Qatar, 191 Quai d’Orsay, 89, 236 Quandt, William, 112, 181, 188, 189, 198, 200, 201, 206 Quang, Pham Van, 46 Rabat, 5, 6, 13, 21, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 44, 48, 98, 135, 139– 45, 147, 148, 151, 152, 154, 156, 158, 161, 165, 166, 168– 71, 176, 182– 5, 187, 189,

INDEX 190, 195, 197, 199– 203, 209, 210, 221, 222 racism, 92, 93, 100, 116 racist, 102, 220 radical, 23, 24, 26, 29, 30, 36, 40, 43, 52, 57, 78, 92, 99, 127, 171, 183, 188, 191, 200, 203, 208 radicalise, 7, 89 radicalism, 97, 191 rapprochement, 6, 20 –3, 25, 26, 31, 43, 47, 74, 140, 149, 150, 176, 177, 189, 197, 212 Raytheon, 67, 68, 218 Reagan, Roland, 211, 212, 214 realism, 3, 42, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57, 59, 61, 63, 65, 67, 69, 71, 73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 85, 87, 89, 127, 220 reconciliation, 47, 155 reform, 52, 76, 91, 102, 108, 120, 125, 129, 133, 158, 175, 218 Reggane, 20 relations, 1 – 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 12, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26 – 34, 37, 39, 44 – 6, 49, 51, 55, 60 – 2, 64, 66– 71, 73, 74, 76 –9, 81, 86, 89, 92 – 5, 98, 103 –7, 109, 110, 112, 113, 115– 17, 119, 121, 123, 124, 126, 127, 130, 134– 6, 141, 149, 151, 154 – 7, 159, 160, 163, 169, 176, 178, 181– 3, 185 – 7, 191, 193, 194, 198, 200, 210, 212, 214– 16, 220– 3 republic, 1, 24, 72, 115, 119, 129, 133, 163, 169, 171, 179, 192, 213, 223 republican, 17, 18, 148 resolution, 31, 73, 74, 94, 107, 123, 126, 131, 139, 152, 156, 168, 175, 178, 199, 200, 202, 217 resolutions, 1, 107, 110, 113, 116, 122, 126, 133, 153, 155, 164, 170, 178, 203

287

revolution, 11, 19, 27, 28, 45, 71, 72, 80, 81, 91, 92, 96, 99, 101, 109, 133, 156, 162, 172, 174 – 7, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205, 206, 211, 221 revolutionaries, 92, 97, 114 revolutionary, 3, 8, 28, 32, 45, 48, 52, 75, 77, 80, 91, 92, 100, 102, 108, 113, 125, 129, 133, 174, 207, 208, 218, 220 Rice, Condoleezza, 1 Riyadh, 191 Rockefeller, John, 190 Rockwell, Stuart, 139, 141, 142, 148 Rogers, William P. (Rogers Plan), 16, 24, 27, 32, 34, 44, 45, 48, 64, 68, 104 Romania, 78, 79 Rome, 17, 18 Rostow, Walt W., 14 Rusk, Dean, 6, 7, 9, 13, 14 Russia, 2, 33, 35, 75, 76, 77, 88, 93, 113, 164 Ryabinsky (Admiral, Soviet Mediterranean Squadron), 193 Sadat, Anwar, 6, 75, 110, 160, 177, 178, 190– 2, 198, 217, 220 Sahara, 1 –6, 21, 24, 35, 88, 96, 97, 116, 131– 47, 149 – 57, 159, 161– 79, 181, 182, 184, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 194– 6, 198– 204, 209, 210, 216, 218, 220– 2 Saharan, 136, 137, 139, 146, 149, 167, 170, 184, 197 Sahara-Sahel, 178, 179 Sahel, 116, 176, 177, 213, 216, 221 Sahrawi, 131, 143– 6, 151, 152, 154, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 168– 72, 174, 179, 187, 192, 194, 195– 7, 201 – 3, 209, 213, 220– 3

288

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Samuels, Nathaniel, 62 Sana’a, 191 Saudi Arabia, 23, 26, 27, 29, 111, 112, 128, 177, 179, 183, 191, 201 Saunders, Harold, 166, 202, 203, 210, 212 Sauvagnargues, Jean, 159 Sayed, El Ouali Mustapha, 143, 144, 156 Scandinavian, 188 Schweitzer, Robert, 211 self-determination, 1, 132, 139–42, 147, 149, 152, 156, 189, 192, 195–7, 202, 221 Senegal, 100, 136, 176, 186 Senghor, Le´opard, 186 Seychelles, 179 Shaba, 5, 174, 182 Shazli, Saad, 109 Simon, William, 122 Sinai, 160, 171 Sino-Algerian, 74 Sino-Soviet, 29, 70 – 2, 90, 127 Skhirat, 99, 141, 148 Smara, 162 socialism, 30, 76, 77, 108, 129, 175, 218 socialist, 1, 2, 4, 12, 19, 29, 52, 56, 65, 70, 71, 75, 77, 78, 81, 83, 90– 2, 95, 96, 108, 110, 117, 125, 133, 146, 172, 174– 7, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 191, 193, 195, 197, 199, 201, 203, 205– 8, 217 Sonatrach, 15, 36 – 8, 40, 50, 53, 56– 9, 61, 63, 64, 66, 71, 76, 78, 103, 104, 190, 208, 211 Soviet, 2, 4, 7–13, 16, 26, 27, 29–33, 35, 41, 43, 45, 47 – 9, 51, 56, 65, 67, 71 – 8, 80 – 8, 90, 95, 101, 108, 110, 126 – 9, 135, 166, 170, 173, 180, 183, 186, 191 – 3, 199, 204, 205, 212, 215, 217, 218, 221

Soviet-Algerian, 33, 231 Soviets, 8, 10, 30, 31, 33, 34, 39, 43, 49, 51, 63, 65 – 7, 72, 75, 82, 84, 86, 87, 110, 166, 186, 199, 200, 217, 218 Spain, 3, 5, 53, 66, 131– 3, 139, 142– 4, 147, 150 – 5, 163, 170, 176, 195, 202, 209, 214 Spaniards, 164 Spanish, 21, 24, 96, 131, 136– 40, 142, 144, 145, 149 – 51, 153– 5, 163– 5, 168, 170, 220 SPLA, 163 Sri Lanka, 179 strategic, 2, 3, 13, 22, 32, 34, 35, 42, 47 – 9, 51, 58, 61, 66, 69, 75, 87, 90, 99, 105, 128, 135, 148, 166, 167, 169, 171, 182, 187, 192, 200, 210 strategy, 3, 4, 15, 19 – 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43 – 9, 73, 75, 81, 82, 88, 102, 120, 126– 8, 130, 140, 149, 150, 156, 168, 171, 172, 177, 187, 217, 222 sub-Sahara, 74, 98, 100, 116, 117, 127, 151 Sudan, 140, 188, 202 Suez, 13, 15, 16, 109 Sukhoi, 109 summit, 23, 26, 27, 48, 94, 101, 107, 108, 111, 113, 133, 140–2, 152, 155, 159, 170, 172, 177–9, 191, 192, 195, 204, 205, 219, 221 SWAPO, 96 Syria, 6, 31, 75, 103, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 120, 121, 140, 160, 191, 192, 220 Tabti, Rachid, 41, 42 Tafraoui, 81, 179 Taleb-Ibrahimi, Ahmed, 23, 131, 145, 153, 155, 179, 194– 7, 203, 204, 208, 221

INDEX Tambo, Olivier, 96 Tan-Tan, 177, 209 Tanzania, 178, 188 Tanzanian, 242 Tehran, 212 Third World, 2– 5, 8, 28, 36, 40, 55, 56, 75, 79, 91 – 4, 98 – 103, 105– 8, 115, 117 – 22, 124– 7, 130, 132– 4, 147, 155, 156, 159, 177, 179, 187, 188, 218– 20, 222, 224 Third Worldism, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 109, 111, 113, 115, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 127, 129 Tlemcen, 138 – 42, 148, 170, 194, 221 trade, 11, 69 – 71, 74, 76, 78, 79, 88, 98, 101, 102, 107, 112, 117, 157, 182, 218 trans-Saharan, 98, 178 Tuareg, 116, 216 Tunisia (Tunis), 13, 20 – 6, 29, 31, 32, 43, 44, 47, 69, 85, 98, 127, 183, 191 UAR, 11, 24 – 7 Uganda, 115, 161 UK, 94, 117, 123, 133, 183, 205 UN, 1, 9, 31, 44, 73, 74, 79, 89, 94, 100, 108, 109, 112, 118, 119, 121, 122– 6, 130 – 5, 139, 144, 151– 6, 161, 162, 164, 165, 170, 186– 8, 199, 201, 203, 219– 20 UNCTAD, 79, 117, 120, 132, 188 UNEA, 78 UNFP, 142, 145, 146 UNFP-Rabat, 146 UNIDO, 133 UPA, 97 US, 1 –11, 13 – 18, 20, 22, 26 – 9, 31– 5, 40 –6, 48, 49, 51 – 4, 58– 71, 73, 77, 80 –90, 92,

289

95, 96, 99, 103– 7, 109 – 11, 113– 15, 118, 119, 121 – 30, 132, 133, 135, 139– 42, 148, 149, 155– 61, 163 – 8, 170– 2, 175, 176, 180 – 7, 189, 197, 198, 200– 6, 209 – 18, 220– 3 USA, 230 USAF, 212 USAID, 7 US-Algeria, 156, 181 US-Algerian, 1 – 4, 6, 12, 14, 16, 26, 46, 51, 67, 69, 70, 89, 90, 104, 106, 109, 130, 160, 187, 212, 215, 221– 3 US-French, 159 US-Iranian, 222 US-Moroccan, 182, 204 US-Saudi, 112 US-Soviet, 77 USSR, 15, 31, 36, 65, 76, 78, 191 US-USSR, 2 VALHYD, 66 Vallotton, Etienne, 175, 178 Vietnam, Vietnamese, 5, 44, 46, 103 Virginia, 190 Waldheim, Kurt, 118, 161, 186, 187 Walters, Vernon, 164 Warfally, Mahmoud Jibril, 213, 214 Washington, 1 – 3, 5 –9, 11, 13 – 18, 22, 25 – 7, 31, 32, 35, 41 –4, 46– 9, 51, 58 – 60, 62 – 70, 77, 78, 82 – 6, 88 – 90, 98, 99, 103, 104, 106, 110 – 12, 118 – 20, 123, 124, 126, 128– 30, 135, 140, 141, 153, 156– 9, 161 – 3, 165– 71, 173, 180 – 9, 192, 197, 199, 200, 202, 204, 205, 208, 209, 211, 212, 214– 19, 222, 223 Watson, Arthur, 59

290

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

Western, 1 – 6, 8, 21, 22, 31, 33, 34, 39, 43, 44, 49, 50, 56, 70, 71, 76, 81, 82, 87, 88, 90, 97, 105, 112, 113, 122, 126, 127, 131 – 5, 137 – 47, 149 – 57, 159, 161 – 76, 178, 179, 181, 182, 184 – 7, 189, 190, 192, 194 – 6, 198 – 203, 209, 210, 216 – 18, 220 – 2 Yahiaoui, Mohammed Salah, 207, 208, 212 Yaker, Layachi, 70, 78 Yata Ali, 146

Yazid, M’Hamed, 44 Yemen, 6, 183, 191, 192 Yugoslav, 8, 32, 108 Yugoslavia, 102, 179, 191, 192, 205 Zaire, 5, 115, 174, 178, 182– 4 Zambia, 178 Zbiri, Tahar, 11, 16, 17, 19, 31, 209 Zeghar, Messaoud, 35, 41, 42, 45, 46, 59, 64, 98, 104 – 6, 214 Zimbabwe, 96, 178, 179

T

“Students and scholars alike will learn much from this deeply informed and carefully crafted study.” John P. Entelis, Professor of Political Science, Fordham University.

Mohammed Lakhdar Ghettas is currently Senior Program Officer at the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva, and previously founded the Maghreb Studies Initiative within the Africa Affairs Program at the London School of Economics (LSE) IDEAS Center for Diplomacy and Strategy. He has published several articles on the international affairs of North Africa and the Middle East. His PhD in International History is from LSE.

Picture credit: Algerian President Houari Boumediene during the Arab Summit, 1974, in Rabat, Morocco. (Photo by Keystone-France/ Gamma-Rapho via Getty Images) Design: Positive2

www.ibtauris.com

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

“Makes a convincing case, and along the way provides a great deal of useful background about the issues that still confront Algeria.” William B. Quandt, Professor of Politics, Emeritus, University of Virginia; author of Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954–1968.

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR

This book offers an international history of US-Algerian relations at the height of the Cold War. The Algerian president, Houari Boumediene, actively adjusted Algeria’s foreign policy to promote the country’s national development, pursuing its own commitment to non-alignment and ‘Third World’ leadership. Algeria’s foreign policy was directly opposed to that of the US on major issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict and Western Sahara conflict, and the Algerian government was avowedly socialist. Yet, as this book outlines, Algeria was able to negotiate a position for itself between the US and the Soviet bloc, winning support from both and becoming a key actor in international affairs. Based on materials from recently opened archives, this book sheds new light on the importance of Boumediene’s era in Algeria and will be an essential resource for historians and political scientists alike.

MohamMed Lakhdar Ghettas

hroughout the Cold War, Africa was a theater for superpower rivalry. That the US and the Soviet Union used countries in sub-Saharan Africa to their own advantage is well-known. Sub-Saharan countries also exploited Cold War hostilities in turn. But what role did countries in North Africa play?

ALGERIA AND THE COLD WAR International Relations and the Struggle for Autonomy

MOHAMMED LAKHDAR GHETTAS