Agroterrorism : A Guide for First Responders [1 ed.] 9781603444460, 9781585445868

Citation preview

Agroterrorism Number Ten:

texas a&m university agriculture series C. Allan Jones, General Editor

Agro

terrorism a guide for first responders jason b. moats

texas a&m university press

college station

Copyright © 2007 by Jason B. Moats Manufactured in the United States of America All rights reserved First edition The paper used in this book meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, Z39.48-1984. Binding materials have been chosen for durability. o y Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moats, Jason B. Agroterrorism : a guide for first responders / Jason B. Moats — 1st ed. p. cm. — (Texas A&M University agriculture series ; no. 10) Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-1-58544-572-1 (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58544-572-X (cloth : alk. paper) ISBN-13: 978-1-58544-586-8 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 1-58544-586-X (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Agroterrorism—United States. 2. Emergency management—United States. I. Title. II. Series. HV6433.5.A37 2007 363.325'9630973—dc22 2006029791

contents

Acknowledgments vii Introduction ix 1

Terrorism in the Barnyard 1

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Overview of the Agriculture Industry 5

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WMD and the Farm 10

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Incident Management and Unified Command 30

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Strategies and Tactics 69

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Concepts to Improve the Response 94

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State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program for Agriculture 102

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The National Response to an Agricultural Incident 113

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Using This Book for Training Programs 152 appendix a: Vulnerability Assessment Exercise Summary 163 appendix b: Individual Site/Event Vulnerability Assessment Sheet 164 Notes 167 Glossary and Abbreviations 181 Index 193

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

his book has been a labor of love. It started as a conversation. Six years and two hundred pages later, it is a book. There are many people to thank for this. First, I need to thank my grandparents and parents for teaching me the importance of helping others. Second, this project would not have been possible without the understanding and love of my wife Michelle and our four beautiful children: Todd, Mikayla, Calista, and Marissa. This book is for your children and their children. I would be remiss if I did not mention a group of professional colleagues who are also great friends and wonderful cheerleaders: Patrick Conley, CAPT Noreen Hines USPHS, D. Bruce Lawhorn DVM, Dee Ellis DVM, and George Teagarden. In addition to these people, I have been honored to work with a team of highly skilled professionals from counterterrorism and emergency response disciplines for the last five years. These folks have been supportive at every juncture and have been the voice of reason throughout this project. To all of you, I cannot say thank you enough. Finally, I must acknowledge the American farmer. As I was growing up, I spent many enjoyable, sweaty hours riding in combines, setting fence posts, tossing hay, herding cattle and chasing pigs on the Cedar Crest Farm in rural Dubois County, Indiana. To Maurice and Sharon, Paul and Camella, and Mr. Hopf, thank you for entertaining a little boy. This book is for you and all those like you. Without the American farmer, this project would not be possible.

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introduction

s I teach emergency management courses around the country, I tell first responders and other local government officials—no matter what they have heard before—that if a terrorist strikes their community, the responsibility to respond and manage the incident rests first and foremost on their shoulders.1 The responsibility begins with the appearance of a potential threat and continues until the recovery of costs is completed and the community is returned to some degree of normalcy. This intimidating responsibility cannot be abdicated when the federal government makes its response. The bottom line is that local communities—not the federal government— have the responsibility and the obligation to respond to the needs of the citizens in an emergency. This is not an easy or enviable task. In many cases, the communities least well prepared to deal with the needs of terrorism incidents are the rural communities that provide something the larger and perhaps more capable jurisdictions need: food and crops. Rural communities often lack the personnel and expertise that larger jurisdictions have. Many rural areas are served by volunteer emergency responders who work at other jobs and assist in emergencies when available. Additionally, a community’s emergency preparedness leadership and focus may change as often as elected officials change. Because of these circumstances, the continuity of service is often inconsistent. This is not to say that volunteer emergency response organizations are a poor choice for a community, but volunteer forces do face some inherent challenges. While many volunteer departments are diligent and encourage their members to receive training, others do not. For those who seek training, much of available training for first responders is delivered during the week, when volunteers cannot attend.2 For many of the essential training courses, these dedicated people must take vacation time to participate. Moreover, our nation’s rural communities may have to make do with used emergency equipment that has been purchased from or donated by wealthier communities upgrading to more current technology; often the used equipment is out of date. In many instances where mutual aid assis-

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tance is needed from neighboring communities, the amount of resources is limited, and the time it takes for the mutual aid to arrive is lengthy. Certainly, our nation’s rural communities are not afforded the same benefits in terms of the number of personnel and kinds of technology that larger communities enjoy. Yet rural communities persevere and continue to produce amid hardship. These communities watch as farmland decreases and urban sprawl increases. Young people continue to move away from these areas in search of “greener pastures.” Governmental regulations—like those that limit the amount of dust that can be stirred up, even in farming communities—can cost farming operations greatly.3 The goal of this book is to provide rural communities with information they can use in preparation for the next agroterrorism attack.

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introduction

1 terrorism in the barnyard

t is a warm summer’s day; by all accounts, it is perfect. It is the height of the barbecue season—the Fourth of July is right around the corner. You turn on the network national news and the anchor is explaining that a mysterious outbreak of a disease is affecting cattle, swine, and sheep in several midwestern states. The anchor is saying that Department of Homeland Security officials are concerned that this is not a natural outbreak . . . Some people may find it unbelievable that an individual terrorist or a group of terrorists would want to attack the peaceful farms of the United States. After all, these farms supply the country and a large portion of the world with food and clothing, but they do not possess any “real power.” Why would a terrorist travel to Harrodsburg, Kentucky, to Garden City, Kansas, or to Cuzco, Indiana, when cities such as New York, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C., are the acknowledged seats of financial and political power in the nation? The answer lies in the nature of terrorism itself. The U.S. government defines terrorism as something that “(A) involves an act that: (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended—(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”1 Agroterrorism can be waged in many different ways, including infecting animals or crops as a means to the end of shaking the economic base of the country and causing overwhelming fear and panic. Harrodsburg, Garden City, and a host of other small towns across the country are integral parts of one of the largest and most important industries in the nation.

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what is the purpose of terrorism? Many people want to understand why terrorists do what they do. Terrorists are motivated by various ideologies. Religious ideologies, such as

Agroterrorism can include infecting animals or crops with the intent of causing panic and undermining the economy. Photo by Scott Bauer, courtesy USDA.

the ones held by groups like al Qaeda and their leader, Osama bin Laden, are often the most dangerous because of the fervor and singlemindedness with which they are embraced. Additionally, a terrorist may be motivated by politics, or a deep distrust of or anger toward the government, as in the case of Timothy McVeigh, who bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. The terrorist may be motivated by racial hatred or issues such as genetic engineering, animal rights, or the environment. An example of the latter is the radical group called the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), which is blamed for arson causing millions of dollars’ worth in damage at a Vail ski lodge.2 The agriculture industry is a target for all these reasons and more. It is an appealing target due to its importance to the U.S. economy. The agriculture industry is one of the largest consumers of biotechnology. The industry has been accused, often by groups like the Animal Liberation Front and ELF, of animal cruelty and damaging the environment. Furthermore, the agriculture industry may be a viable target for individuals and organizations wanting to show their willingness to kill but fearful of the retribution for killing human beings.

is agricultural terrorism possible? People often ask if an agricultural attack is really feasible. The answer is a simple yes. Not only is it possible, but it has been used multiple times in recent history. Germany, Japan, the former Soviet Union, and a host of other nations have used agricultural terrorism to meet their objectives. Terrorist organizations have used it as well. For example, in 1970 the Ku Klux Klan supposedly poisoned a herd of cattle on an Alabama farm owned by a group of black Muslims.3 However, the more pertinent question is this: Is an agricultural attack probable? The very nature of how the modern farm operates, combined with the lack of adequate biosecurity measures and surveillance at agriculture facilities, inadequate training for veterinarians in foreign animal disease diagnosis, and the effects of large scale animal husbandry create serious challenges for the protection of the industry against an agroterrorism incident. Add the impediments that occur because industry regulators and producers’ organizations do not trust each other, and the sum is a frightening vulnerability of the nation’s primary source of food.4 All communities, especially rural communities, must adequately assess their vulnerability by understanding the potential terrorist threats to terrorism in the barnyard

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agriculture. Cataloging a community’s available resources and capabilities is an important strategy a community should use to protect the agriculture system. Determining the adequacy of the plans, policies, and procedures is another valid strategy for overcoming the challenges of protecting the agricultural system. Finally, leaders in these communities must evaluate what the direct impact on the community would be in both financial and emotional damage, should an attack occur, and must then prepare the community for that possibility. The preparedness of our agricultural system against terrorism is still widely considered to be a chink in the nation’s armor against a terrorist attack.5 In 1999, the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, more commonly known as the Gilmore Commission, said this about agricultural terrorism: “One area of the [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear] terrorism debate that deserves more attention concerns the biological threat to agriculture.”6 That still holds true even after security efforts have been stepped up in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, in the United States. Lawrence J. Dyckman, then the director for natural resources and the environment for the Government Accountability Office, stated in November 2003 testimony before Congress: “Our current agriculture and food sectors have features that make them vulnerable to terrorist attacks.”7 Increasing the threat to the agricultural industry is the fact that the knowledge required to manufacture a biological weapon is that of a master’s degree in microbiology. Additionally, the risk to deploy weapons is small compared to that of generating chemical, explosive, radiological, or human biological weapons.8 The effects of a biological weapon on agricultural targets would be devastating to our nation.9 Besides the enormous economic impact, it would take years for public confidence in the particular section of the industry affected by the attack to recover. Losses because of exports halted by the World Trade Organization and similar international organizations would cost trillions of dollars a year for many years. Lt. Col. Robert Kadlec perhaps sums up the issue best: “Using BW [biological warfare] to attack livestock, crops, or ecosystems offers an adversary the means to wage a potentially subtle yet devastating form of warfare, one which would impact the political, social, and economic sectors of a society and potentially national survival itself.”10

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chapter 1

2 overview of the agriculture industry

he agriculture industry in the United States has many interconnected and interdependent layers. It includes the production of poultry, swine, cattle (including beef and dairy), horses (including those for work and pleasure), and such animals as alpacas, deer, antelope, emus, ostriches, catfish, tilapia, and oysters. The industry also produces grains, grasses, fruits, and vegetables, which both livestock and people eat. The U.S. agriculture industry produces nearly 13.9 percent of the gross national product (GNP).1 To illustrate the agriculture industry, I often turn to the poem “The Blind Men and the Elephant” by American poet John Godfrey Saxe. Saxe retells an ancient fable in which six blind men visited the palace of the rajah and encountered an elephant for the first time. The first blind man put out his hand and touched the side of the elephant. “How smooth! An elephant is like a wall.” The second blind man put out his hand and touched the trunk of the elephant. “How round! An elephant is like a snake.” The third blind man put out his hand and touched the tusk of the elephant. “How sharp! An elephant is like a spear.” The fourth blind man put out his hand and touched the leg of the elephant. “How tall! An elephant is like a tree.” The fifth blind man reached out his hand and touched the ear of the elephant. “How wide! An elephant is like a fan.” The sixth blind man put out his hand and touched the tail of the elephant. “How thin! An elephant is like a rope.” An argument ensued, each blind man thinking his own perception of the elephant was correct. Then the rajah, awakened by the commotion, called out from the balcony. “The elephant is big,” he said. “Each man touched only one part. You must put all parts together to find out what an elephant is like.” Because the agriculture industry is so robust, many of us recognize agriculture only by what we see in the grocery store. As an example of the industry’s size and scope, consider that the equine (horse) industry provides more to the U.S. gross domestic product than do motion picture services, railroad transportation, furniture and fixtures manufacturing, and tobacco product manufacturing. The equine industry is only slightly smaller than the apparel and other textile products manufacturing industry.2 In addition to the money generated by the

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agriculture industry, it also pays a total of $39.8 billion in taxes to federal, state, and local governments.3 To understand U.S. agriculture better, it may help to see it as several industries rather than one. The agriculture industry is more than the sum of its parts. Although this book is focused largely on the livestock industry, farms also produce crops, which are as important to the economy as livestock production. U.S. farms produce the grains, fruits, and vegetables we eat, the grains used in food production for livestock, cotton and other natural fibers that are used to clothe the world, and many other crops used in everything from rubber to beer to cigarettes. Additionally, industries like heavy machinery manufacturing, the petrochemical industry, and retail grocers rely heavily on the agriculture industry to purchase, consume, and provide goods. If multiple sectors of the agriculture industry were to suffer severe or irreparable damage, certainly these subsidiary industries would also feel a great impact.

the interconnectivity and mobility of the industry Another key aspect to understanding the agriculture industry is its range of locations. The rolling hills of central Kentucky are synonymous with the thoroughbred horse industry; longhorn steers are identified with Texas; and the Great Plains are known for their fields of waving grain. Within each area there are several layers to the industry. It begins with the organism. Whether it is a cow, a pig, or a plant, the organism is the basic “building block” of the industry. The next level is the individual farm. A single farm may grow only one type of crop or may have several different organisms on it. For example, a farm in Kansas may grow a thousand acres of wheat, while a farm in Kentucky may grow wheat, burley tobacco, corn, cattle, and horses. Clusters of farms in the same geographic area make up a local agricultural community. In many places the farms in such a community support other farms in the same community. For example, in southern Indiana many farms grow only grains and beans and sell those beans and grains to feed the cattle and hogs raised on neighboring farms. In central Kentucky and North Carolina, some farms focus solely on growing hay to support the equine industry in their respective regions. The third level in the U.S. agriculture industry is the national agriculture system, which consists of the sum of the local communities plus the 6

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The national agriculture industry begins with the individual farm or ranch but also includes supporting industries—manufacturers and sellers of fertilizer, insecticides, and farm machinery as well as wholesalers, retailers, and even the federal government, which subsidizes, buys, and sells agricultural products. Photo by Jack Dykinga, courtesy USDA.

ancillary or supporting industries, such as petrochemical manufacturing, which creates fertilizers and chemical insecticides, and farm implement manufacturing, which builds and sells farm machinery including tractors, wagons, and hay balers. The national system also includes wholesalers, retailers, and the federal government, which subsidizes, buys, and sells agricultural products. All these individual industries come together to create the national agricultural mega-industry. It is important to note that the final layer of the U.S. agricultural industry is the international market. The United States exports many billions of dollars’ worth of agricultural products every year, and the nation receives hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth in imports from various countries. A local impact is likely to have a global ripple effect and should not be ignored. While the national agricultural system would not collapse if a single farm or community were destroyed, the effects would likely resonate nevertheless throughout the entire industry. However, if several local communities were destroyed or had their production activities severely inhiboverview of the agriculture industry

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ited as a result of a terrorist attack, the effects would likely shake the industry apart. To illustrate the interdependence of the industry, consider what would happen if foot-and-mouth disease were released—a disease affecting swine and cattle as well as sheep. It is likely that all three of these livestock-producing sectors would suffer irreparable damage. As a result of this damage and potential collapse, the industries that support these livestock producers would reel from the effects. Grain and feed producers would no longer have sustained demand for their products and would likely fold under the strain. In addition, farm implement dealers would see a sharp decrease in sales to both the grain and livestock producers. The strain might be felt most by retailers and wholesalers, who would immediately see a spike in the prices of meat until the supply of meat was exhausted. Once the supply is exhausted, so are the profits. As a result many wholesalers would go under, and most retailers would pass the loss of profits on to the consumer. In addition to the interdependence within agriculture, the industry is highly mobile. The movement of one cow is a prime example of this mobility. A calf born on a farm near Jasper, Indiana, may be taken to market and sold in Lexington, Kentucky. After about two years the animal may be sold to a feed lot near Amarillo, Texas. Since air travel is not practical for shipment of livestock, this cow travels with several hundred others by road from Kentucky through Tennessee, Arkansas, and possibly Oklahoma, finally arriving in Texas. When it is time for processing, the cow is taken to the slaughterhouse in Kansas by way of Oklahoma. The meat is then sold to stores across the southeastern United States, including Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi. By the time the cow is brought to the table, so to speak, it may have traveled through fifteen states, nearly 2,500 miles, and may have eaten grains produced on farms in several states.

summary The agriculture industry provides a wide variety of products to the world, ranging from food to raw materials that are used in nearly every facet of manufacturing. The sector produces a significant percentage of the U.S. GNP and is a vital part of the nation’s infrastructure. As this chapter has shown, U.S. agriculture is a complex, multilayered industry. It includes the production of a variety of crops and livestock as well as the industries that provide support to production. The sector is ro8

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bust but also interdependent. This latter characteristic could be detrimental if multiple subindustries were affected by a terrorist attack. The sector is highly mobile. Its mobility is important to the success of the industry but can be a serious complication in a disease outbreak. Contagious diseases could be spread to otherwise healthy animals by traveling infected animals.

overview of the agriculture industry

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3 wmd and the farm

errorism has been defined by several departments and agencies within the U.S. government, including the Department of Defense, the Department of State, and the Department of Justice. While the definition used by the Department of Justice is most familiar to first responders, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 provides the first codified definition. This definition states that terrorism “is any activity that (A) involves an act that (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”1 Often the decision to wage war is made as a means to change the political or social policies of a specific population. But waging a conventional war is costly, in both money and personnel. Imagine the cost of engaging in a war with the United States Armed Forces. This is a possibility for only a handful of countries. Terrorism, however, exploits the greatest vulnerabilities of those being attacked. Terrorism is an effective strategy because of what it creates—fear. Terrorism creates fear by presenting the appearance that the protector of a group, in many cases a government, cannot adequately protect its constituents. Thus terrorism is a form of warfare—psychological warfare. The value of psychological warfare has been well known for thousands of years. Around 500 B.c. the ancient Chinese general and strategist Sun Tzu wrote in his classic work The Art of War: “Achieving victory in every battle is not absolute perfection; neutralizing an adversary’s force without battle is absolute perfection.”2 In other words, if a force generates enough fear in an adversary to make the adversary unwilling to come to the battlefield, the force can win without experiencing any expenditure of resources or loss of personnel. This strategy is likely the only hope for a much smaller force to defeat a power such as the United States.

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Certainly, the policies of a government can change with a change in leadership, and in some cases this can lead to serious weaknesses in policy. These loopholes may permit a terrorist organization to exist or function freely, allowing its operatives to devise and execute a plan of terror. For example, the funding for the enforcement of immigration regulations in the United States decreased throughout the 1980s and 1990s. As a result of these changes, thousands of foreign nationals and illegal aliens entered and resided in the United States. Unfortunately, nineteen of these individuals planned and carried out one of the most horrendous events against humankind in recorded history. Imagine what would happen in a government that was radically changed, perhaps literally overnight.

terrorist ideologies, motives, and tactics Understanding the ideologies and motivations that would direct someone to resort to violence is important in understanding how to protect your community better. An ideology is simply a belief or philosophy. While there are many beliefs that can serve as a basis for terrorism, it is important to differentiate between a terrorist and an extremist. Both share fervent beliefs and are willing to go to great lengths to profess and demonstrate those beliefs. However, terrorists are willing to use force or violence to demonstrate their beliefs. People whose ideologies could make them choose agriculture as a viable target may include pro-environmental groups concerned about the alleged damage farms are causing to the environment or political groups hoping to bring down the U.S. government by undermining public confidence in the economy and/or the government’s ability to protect its citizenry.3 They may also include groups whose basic tenets prohibit the killing of people but not other forms of violence.4 Groups opposing genetically modified organisms are potential candidates as well.5 Terrorists are motivated by a variety of goals and objectives. For example, a terrorist group may desire to gain recognition for its cause by targeting a large event, such as a state fair or rodeo championship that would potentially receive international media attention. Other groups may want to coerce or intimidate a government or section of the government to take a specific action or actions; or the group may want to provoke a response or support insurgent forces. Goals and objectives vary depending on group ideology but typically fall into one of these categories.

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The tactics used to accomplish these goals and objectives are as varied as the motivations. Traditionally, terrorists have used tactics such as assassination, hijacking, bombing (including suicide and homicide bombings), hostage taking, and armed assault, to accomplish their objectives. Some are engaged with emerging tactics such as cyberterrorism, product tampering, and agricultural terrorism. While the threat and consequences of cyberterrorism, or the attacking of computer systems, are significant, product tampering and agricultural terrorism are of particular concern to the agriculture industry. As earlier mentioned, the agriculture industry is extremely vulnerable because of modern animal rearing practices and the high level of mobility within the industry.6 A related advantage for the terrorist is that animals are kept together in high numbers. More than 70 percent of the nation’s cattle population is kept within a 500-mile radius on just 2 percent of the nation’s feedlots. On these large “superlots,” there may be more than 250,000 head of cattle.7 Swine and poultry operations are also very concentrated.8 Other potential terrorist groups that should concern the agriculture industry—beyond those whose ideologies are directed specifically toward agriculture—are groups looking to inflict mass casualties. These groups may choose to tamper with agricultural products during or after processing, and they may not be concerned with an immediate effect. Some groups want to see the results of their work immediately. Others may not care; they may be using time as a deniability factor (this is partly why bombs have timers). A biological toxin such as botulinum toxin, for example, could be used at the end of a processing line, and it might be days or weeks before there is a noticeable problem. In addition to groups who may target agriculture for what it does, groups may also target certain individuals or communities simply because their farms provide targets of opportunity. These targets may be chosen because of the prevalence of highly toxic agricultural chemicals or because inadequate security allows the would-be terrorist to strike with a low probability of being caught. Terrorism might also be used against agriculture as a means to create a profit-making opportunity: extortion. For example, a terrorist group might attempt to extort money from a group of cattle ranchers or the government by threatening to introduce a catastrophic disease that affects cattle. Another scenario could be a group introducing a disease that affects swine and cattle in hopes of running up the poultry futures market.9 12

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weapons Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are defined in title 18 of the United States Code, part I, chapter 113B, section 2332a (18 USC 2332a), which reads as follows: “The term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ means: a) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title; b) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; c) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 178 of this title); or d) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.” These all fall into one of five categories of weapons systems: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE). There are numerous weapons that could be utilized against crops and livestock. This book focuses mainly on biological and chemical weapons without underestimating the threat of explosive, nuclear, or radioactive weapons. All of these weapons could pose a serious threat to the agriculture industry. Radioactive weapons, most likely in the form of a radiological dispersion device, better known as a “dirty bomb,” can cause serious damage to the environment, possibly rendering the land useless for many years. Nuclear weapons can cause severe and widespread destruction but are less likely to be obtained or employed by the terrorists. Explosive weapons are easy to obtain but are more likely to be used in cases of industrial sabotage or against a specific local target. It is not plausible for an explosive to cause widespread and lasting damage to the whole of the agricultural industry. Chemical weapons pose a more serious threat and are more likely to be employed with devastating results. The likely scenario would not involve a complex poison such as a V-agent (VX) or Sarin (GB) or a blistering agent such as hydrogen or nitrogen mustard agent. The effectiveness of these agents is greatly reduced when limited quantities are employed in large or open spaces. More likely, the scenario would involve a toxic chemical or biological toxin with a super absorbent, such as dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO). This is not a new concept and has been employed using a biological toxin against humans.10 The most serious threat to the agriculture industry is biological agents. These agents are divided into two classes, pathogens and toxins. Pathogens are the “bugs” that cause disease in another animal, including wmd and the farm

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humans; these bugs include bacteria, fungi, and viruses. Toxins are the products created by certain animals, plants, molds, fungi, and bacteria; these products are poisonous to other organisms. Diseases that not only affect animals but may also be transmitted to humans are termed zoonotic.11 These diseases pose a double threat because of their potential to affect public health as well as the health of the animals. The weapons described later in this chapter in tables 1 and 2 are suspected to be or are part of offensive weapons programs developed by various countries. The information comes from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Biohazard by Ken Alibek and Stephen Handelman, and Richard Preston’s The Demon in the Freezer.12 Information concerning the characteristics of diseases has been compiled by D. Bruce Lawhorn, a professor at Texas A&M University’s Center for Veterinary Medicine. Some of the material has been obtained from the Gray Book.13

livestock Within the agriculture industry, livestock become a target for terrorism more readily than do crops because of logistical complications in targeting crops. chemical weapons As noted, while any CBRNE weapons systems may be used against livestock, the most likely to be used are chemical and biological weapons. Chemical weapons fall into the categories of nerve agents, blister agents or vesicants, cyanides, pulmonary agents, and toxic industrial chemicals or mixtures. In most instances, chemical weapons designed for use against humans will create similar effects on animals. These weapons have a rapid onset—minutes to hours. The weapons that are in liquid form are designed to produce, through evaporation or sublimation, a gas or vapor that is heavier than air and that will not dissipate quickly. Weapons that come as gases are likewise often heavier than air and generally do not dissipate rapidly. One exception to this is hydrogen cyanide, one of the cyanide agents, which is a rapidly dissipating gas. Most chemical agents require a very low concentration or dose to be lethal. In some cases, 0.5 parts per million or 0.5 mg/kg may be lethal.14

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Challenges Chemical Weapons Present for Responders Chemical weapons provide challenges to the responder because they are often difficult to detect and identify, especially in animals. In many cases, if rapid identification is not made, the chances for recovery are greatly reduced. Complicating this issue is the fact that the amount of antidote on hand and the capability for introducing it to the animals in a timely manner is rarely adequate for a medium-size herd, let alone any megaherd on the superlots mentioned. Other issues associated with the use of chemical weapons include scene and perimeter control; costeffective and timely treatment of contaminated animals; disposition of contaminated and dead animals; and decontamination of the land, animals, and property or equipment. Nerve Agents These chemicals are acetylcholinesterase inhibitors in tissue (see glossary), and their effects are caused by the resulting excess acetylcholine, an enzyme that occurs in the body’s nervous system. The agents are usually organophosphate based, similar to common pesticides and insecticides. Nerve agents are most often liquids that, when inhaled or absorbed into the body, cause the nervous system to malfunction. Exposure, depending on the amount over time, will lead to involuntary muscle twitching, salivation, and tearing (lacrimation). If untreated, the result is most likely death through asphyxiation. The effects of these chemicals are counteracted with anti-convulsants such as pralidoxime chloride (2-PAMCL) or dialantin and diazepam, coupled with atropine sulfate.15 Vesicants Vesicants are also known as blister agents because they cause serious chemical burns and skin irritation. A few of the agents can cause systemic toxicity. Most of these agents, like the nerve agents, are liquid. Many of these substances are thick, viscous liquids that range in consistency from being similar to mineral oil to as thick as molasses. Most have a melting point of around 60ºF, which means that they will be in a solid form at temperatures below 60ºF. These agents are given their name due to the blistering caused by skin contact with the material. If these agents are inhaled, serious damage to the respiratory system will result. They appear to have a more rapid effect on the wet or damp areas of the body, such as the groin, eyes, and mucous membranes. Treatment for this type of agent

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includes rapid fluid intervention, treatment of the symptoms, and prevention of infection in the open wounds.16 Cyanides Cyanides are gaseous substances that can cause death through asphyxiation when inhaled. The cyanide binds itself to the hemoglobin in the blood and is bound to the hemoglobin much longer than the oxygen, thus literally starving the body of oxygen. This can be countered by using sodium thiosulfate or sodium nitrate and oxygen therapy.17 Pulmonary Agents Pulmonary agents are usually gases that when inhaled cause severe damage to the respiratory tract in the form of pulmonary edema. This damage can cause difficulty breathing because it severely inhibits or interrupts the ability of oxygen to pass through the small sacs in the lungs to the bloodstream. This in turn can cause a person literally to drown. The only treatment is symptomatic and oxygen therapy.18 Toxic Industrial Chemicals and Mixtures There are multiple toxic industrial chemicals, the action of which often resembles that described for pulmonary agents. The chemicals may also injure or kill, either by displacing oxygen in the atmosphere or by poisoning the body. These chemicals pose a serious threat because they are shipped in large quantities throughout the United States and are widely used in manufacturing processes as well as in agriculture. They are usually gases, which are heavier than air and are lethal in low concentrations. Treatments vary from chemical to chemical. Difficulties in Using Chemical Weapons against Agriculture The main problem in employing chemical weapons against the agriculture industry is delivering a lethal or “effective” concentration of the chemical to the animal. Livestock are usually kept either outdoors or in buildings where the air is exchanged fairly rapidly. Chemicals that rely on inhalation as a route of exposure are not especially effective in these conditions. The second difficulty is similar in that the quantity needed to affect a 1,500-pound Hereford cow is considerably greater than the amount needed to affect a human. In some cases, effectiveness against animals

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may require several times the lethal doses or concentrations needed for humans. Third, dispersing the agent in an effective form is a challenge for the terrorist. In outdoor agricultural operations, spreading the material in the appropriate areas is difficult unless done with equipment such as an aerial crop-spraying apparatus. Although this may be difficult, it is nevertheless a viable, covert method of deploying a weapon. biological weapons Biological weapons that might be used against livestock pose a serious risk to the industry. These agents are easier to produce than are chemical agents and would have widespread effects on the industry. In a paper entitled “The Threat Beyond 2000” author Peter Chalk writes: “Weaponizing biological agents to destroy agricultural animals is a far easier process than creating munitions designed to kill hundreds of people. Viral or bacterial warfare against human beings requires at least a limited knowledge of microbiology. However, this is not the case with livestock-disease delivery, which is . . . relatively low tech.”19 In many cases, the knowledge required to develop these weapons is that of a person with a master’s degree in microbiology. The technology to develop these weapons can be purchased through businesses that support legitimate operations such as breweries and universities. Unfortunately the Internet, a powerful medium that has many positive uses, can be used to share the recipes and knowledge needed to develop these weapons. Developing biological weapons to destroy livestock is much easier than developing chemical weapons for the same purpose. There are far more highly contagious and lethal biological agents that can be used. Complementing this is the fact that the U.S. livestock population has become more disease prone because of the widespread use of antibiotics and steroids. Finally, the high-mobility breeding and rearing practices contribute to the ease of dissemination of a disease.20 Challenges Biological Weapons Present for Responders Some of the challenges presented by the use of biological weapons include the detection and identification of the disease; scene and perimeter control; cost-effective and timely treatment of diseased animals; vaccination of animals; disposition of diseased and dead animals; and decontamination of the land. Another challenge presented by biological weapons

wmd and the farm

17

is distinguishing an intentional introduction from a natural outbreak. Foot-and-mouth disease, anthrax, Newcastle disease, and many others have occurred in the United States but have been successfully contained or eradicated.21 Disease-Causing Microorganisms As mentioned, biological weapons are either pathogens or toxins. Pathogens are further divided according to the kinds of organisms causing disease. Following is a brief discussion of each disease-causing organism. Bacteria are small, microscopic organisms that come in three principal forms: spherical, rod-shaped, and spiral. These organisms are susceptible to antibiotics; however, they may mutate. Some bacteria, such as the kind causing anthrax, may have a resting stage known as a spore. It is important to understand that spores are very resistant to heat, drying, the action of disinfectants, and variable environmental conditions.22 Viruses are extremely tiny microorganisms that cannot be seen in an ordinary light microscope. They are parasites that rely completely on the nutrients inside a host cell. A virus has no cell wall and can be seen only with an electron microscope. Viruses are not susceptible to antibiotics.23 In most cases viruses are more potent than bacteria. When smallpox, a virus-caused disease in humans, is compared to anthrax, a bacteria-caused disease that can occur both in humans and in animals, this point becomes clear. Inhalational anthrax and smallpox are both caused when the “bug” enters the body by way of the respiratory tract. However, it takes as few as three virus particles to infect an adult with smallpox, whereas it takes between 1,000 and 5,000 bacteria to infect an adult with anthrax. It is even more staggering to know that each virus particle is only a fraction of a micron (1/25000 of an inch) in size, while the bacteria are 1 to 5 microns.24 To illustrate this point, we can use the 7.25-acre RCA Dome complex in Indianapolis, Indiana. If we took a human cell and expanded to the size of the RCA Dome complex, a bacterium expanded on the same scale would be about the size of one ceramic floor tile. In comparison, a virus expanded at the same scale would be about the size of a cross section of a human hair. Routes of Entry In order for the microorganism to affect another organism, it must have a route of entry. Entry routes are inhalation, injection, ingestion, and contact. Inhalation, the most likely route of entry for a weapon, is when 18

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the microorganism is introduced to the body by being sucked in through the respiratory system. Injection occurs when a device, such as a hypodermic needle filled with a pathogen, pierces the skin and places the pathogen directly into the bloodstream or tissues. Another example of injection is when a parasite, such as a tick, is infected or has digested infected blood, bites the host, and regurgitates the infected blood into the host. Ingestion occurs when the microorganism is introduced to the host. For example, eating infected or contaminated meat allows the pathogen to enter the digestive tract. Finally, some pathogens have the ability to work their way through tissues on contact. Potential Weapons Many of the potential weapons are listed in the “Definitions for List A and B Diseases” developed by the Office International des Epizooties.25 An outbreak of any of the diseases on List A is internationally accepted as grounds for export embargo.26 Foot-and-mouth disease is at the top of this list. Many consider this as the animal parallel to the human disease smallpox. Foot-and-mouth disease is caused by a virus and is transmitted through the air.27 Some experts believe that the virus could travel for more than 175 miles on wind currents.28 An infectious dose of foot-andmouth disease is as little as one virus particle, called a virion, inhaled by an animal.29 Although the pathogenic organisms are generally susceptible to environmental conditions, some of the viral and bacteriological agents listed in tables 1 and 2 are hearty and may withstand harsh environmental conditions. Weaponized agents may also be chemically treated or genetically altered so that they have protective coatings to help sustain them in less than favorable conditions. Furthermore, it is possible that some biological agents have been genetically altered to create a type of “superbug” that has the most undesirable characteristics of two or more agents.30 Tables 1 and 2 show potential agricultural biological agents, most of them known to have been weaponized in at least one bioweapons program. Table 1 shows the animals that would be affected by each disease listed at the top of the column. The most likely method of dissemination for a weaponized version of the pathogen is identified, as is whether the disease is can be transmitted from animals to people. Other useful information in the table includes the incubation period of the disease from introduction of the pathogen until clinical signs are visible, the duration of the illness, and the lethality to livestock. wmd and the farm

19

Table 1. Likely or Known Biological Agents That Target Livestock Foot-and-Mouth

Swine Vesicular

Peste des Petits

disease

Disease

Ruminants

Animals

All cloven-hooved animals

Swine

Sheep and goats

Affected

such as cattle, sheep, goats, swine, deer

Likely

Aerosol, direct contact with

Contaminated pork products

Direct contact with

Method of

any body fluid from infected

that are discarded and fed

respiratory secretions,

Dissemination

animal, contaminated meat

to swine; feces and all body

feces, and body fluids

products that are discarded

fluids of infected swine

of infected animals

Potential to cause human

No

and fed to livestock is common Transmissible

No

Animal to

disease but not an important

Human?

risk

Incubation

Usually 3–7 days but may be

Period

up to 21 days

2–7 days

2–6 days

Duration of

Adult animals start to recover

Adult swine recover in 21

5–10 days

Illness

by 14–21 days but are carriers

days

and spread the disease: cattle (2 years), sheep (7 months), swine (3 months) Lethality to

Very low in adult animals; 50%

Essentially no mortality

Livestock

or greater in young animals—

except possibly in piglets

Variable, 10–90 %

calves, lambs, piglets Vaccine?

Yes, but 7 major types and

No

Yes

>80 subtypes with no cross protection between types; cannot distinguish vaccinates from infected—must eventually kill all vaccinates to become free of FMDs Comments

The most contagious live-

Initial outbreaks of SVD

Very similar disease to

stock disease known. Last

usually diagnosed as FMD!

rinderpest in cattle. This

U.S. outbreak was 1929.

Cannot be differentiated

is a foreign animal

Huge FMD outbreak in U.K.

from FMD in swine except

disease (FAD).

and western Europe in 2001.

by laboratory tests. However,

Weaponized by the USSR.

SVD affects only swine.

Table 1 (continued) Lumpy Skin

Bluetongue

Disease Animals

Cattle

African Horse Sickness

Sheep, wild ruminants

Horses, mules, donkeys,

(deer), cattle and goats

zebras

Direct contact with infected

Non-contagious and trans-

Vector-borne disease

Method of

animals and their aerosols,

mitted by biting midge

Dissemination

nasal secretions, saliva and

biting gnats, midges

skin nodules

and mosquitoes

Affected Likely

Transmissible

No

No

4–14 days

5–10 days

transmitted through

No

Animal to Human? Incubation Period

Usually 3–5 days but may be up to 21 days

Duration of

5–50% of cattle become

Severe disease in sheep;

Illness

infected and animals that

abortion and deformed weak

recover after about 2–3

calves may be only sign in

months have obvious hide

cattle; deer and pronghorn

scars

antelope develop severe

7–10 days

hemorrhagic disease and die suddenly Lethality to

Usually low mortality

Usually up to 50% in sheep

Livestock

Variable depending on syndrome; 60–90% is typical

Vaccine?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Comments

Very similar disease to sheep

Last U.S. outbreak in 2001.

Only spread by vectors

pox and goat pox. This FAD

Can be confused with foot-

or blood-contaminated

has never occurred in U.S.

and-mouth disease (FMD).

needles used on horses sick with AHS. Not transmitted directly from horse to horse. This is a FAD.

continued

Table 1 (continued) Classical Swine Fever Animals

Swine

Affected

Exotic Newcastle Disease

Vesicular Stomatitis

Chickens, turkeys, various

Horses, donkeys, mules,

other birds, domestic and

cattle, swine, deer

wild Likely

Contaminated pork products

Direct contact with body

Method of

that are discarded and fed

secretions (and aerosols) and sand fly and black fly;

Dissemination

to swine; direct contact and

feces from infected birds:

spread by direct contact

indirect contact with feces

contaminated equipment;

with infected animals

and all body fluids of

contaminated artificial

via body fluids and aero-

infected swine

insemination and vaccina-

sols and contaminated

tion crews

Vector borne through

equipment, feed and waterers

Transmissible

No

Animal to

Severe transient

Flulike symptoms after

conjunctivitis in people

1- to 2-day incubation

Human?

period with throat, mouth, lip and nose sores in some cases

Incubation

3–7 days

2–12 days (5 days average)

2–8 days

10–30 days

7–21 days

Usually self-limiting

Period Duration of Illness

disease that is over in 14 days

Lethality to

Variable, 10–90%

Livestock

Mortality higher in young

Usually none

flocks but may even reach 100% in older flocks

Vaccine?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Comments

This disease is also called

This is one of the most

Tends to be a seasonal

hog cholera. It was officially

severe diseases in birds.

disease in the U.S. be-

eradicated from the U.S. in

Recent outbreak in

cause it is spread by

1978. It is now a FAD.

California in game and

vectors. Must differ-

backyard birds.

entiate from FMD, and this is only possible via lab tests. It affects horses, unlike FMD.

continued

Table 1 (continued) Rinderpest

Contagious Bovine

Rift Valley Fever

Pleuropneumonia Animals

Cattle, water buffalo, any

Affected

cloven-hoofed animal

Cattle

Likely

Direct contact with infected

Direct contact through

Vector borne through

Method of

animals or indirectly to body

inhalation of droplets from

mosquitoes, biting

Dissemination

secretions; highly contagious

the cough of infected

insects, and by direct

animals

Cattle, sheep, goats

contact with body fluids from infected animals and aerosol transmission

Transmissible

No

No

Yes, severe flulike dis-

Animal to

ease with CNS symptoms

Human?

including blindness, hemorrhagic syndrome, and usual 1% mortality; Sept. 2000 outbreak in Arabian Peninsula in sheep, goats and people had 12% death rate in humans

Incubation

3–10 days

Period Duration of Illness

10 days to 6 months

12 hours–4 days

(average is 3–6 weeks) 7–10 days; symptoms are

3–28 days

4 Ds: diarrhea, dehydration,

Hepatitis is main condition caused by RVF; abortion

depression, and death

in affected livestock may be the only symptom; runs its course in 10–21 days

Lethality to

90% +

50%

Livestock

70–100% in lambs, kids and calves; adult cattle, sheep, and goats have 10–30% mortality

Vaccine?

Yes

Yes

Yes

Comments

Weaponized by USSR.

Officially eradicated

Never has occurred in U.S.

from the U.S. in 1893.

but mosquitoes in North

This is a FAD.

America are capable of transmitting RVF. This is a FAD. Weaponized. continued

Table 1 (continued) Sheep Pox/Goat Pox

African Swine Fever

Highly Pathogenic Strains of Avian Influenza

Animals

Sheep and goats

Affected

Swine; warthogs, forest

Chickens, turkeys,

hogs, and bush pigs are

wild and exotic birds,

proven reservoirs (can

ratites, shorebirds and

spread the disease); the

migrating waterfowl

American javelina is resistant Likely

Direct contact with infected

Direct contact with in-

Method of

animals and aerosols, nasal

fected, recovered swine

aerosols and fecal/oral

Dissemination

secretions, saliva and dried

or carrier pigs or inges-

exposure from infected

scabs

Direct contact through

tion of contaminated

birds; mechanical

pork scraps in discarded

transmission from work

food; contaminated feces

crews with contam-

or urine and carcasses;

inated equipment

also a tick-borne disease Transmissible

No

No

Yes

Incubation

4–8 days in sheep and 5–14

5–15 days

3–7 days

Period

days in goats 6–18 days or longer

1 month

Up to 100%

Variable, up to 100%

No

Yes

Animal to Human?

Duration

Runs its course in 21–28

of Illness

days; less severe in goats

Lethality to

5–10% in adult animals and

Livestock

up to 80% in lambs

Vaccine?

Yes

Comments

This FAD has never occurred

Weaponized by USSR.

Many cases of Low

in U.S.

Must use laboratory

Path AI in Virginia and

tests to tell from classical

Texas in 2002 and the

swine fever (hog cholera).

southwestern U.S. in

This FAD has never

2003–2004.

occurred in U.S.

Table 1 (continued) BSE (Mad Cow Disease)

Scrapie

Glanders

Cattle

Sheep and goats

Horses, mules, donkeys

Likely

Ingestion of feed contain-

Ingestion of afterbirth from

Ingestion of feed or

Method of

ing beef or sheep meat and

infected animal and some

water contaminated by

Dissemination

bone meal contaminated

undefined vertical trans-

nasal discharge of carrier

with the infectious agent of

mission from dam to off-

animals

BSE (an abnormal prion

spring in some lines of sheep;

protein)

goats are more resistant

Animals Affected

than sheep Transmissible

New variant Creutzfeldt-

Animal to

Jakob disease

No

Yes

6 months–5 years (most

2 days–2 months

Human? Incubation

2–5 years

Period Duration of

3.5 years) 3 months

2 weeks–6 months

Illness

Death in 2–3 weeks in acute infections; some live 2–3 years before dying

Lethality to

100%

100%

Up to 100%

Vaccine?

No

No

No

Comments

BSE was not found in cattle

Scrapie occurs in many

Weaponized and used

in the U.S. until Dec. 2003.

countries throughout the

by Japanese WWI/WWII;

Countries with BSE such

world with a moderate

Germans used it during

as U.K. only slaughter 250 species of wild

Cattle, horses, mules,

Horses, mules

Affected

goats, swine,

and domestic animals,

donkeys, sheep, goats

donkeys

bison and other

birds, reptiles and fish;

swine, exotic and

mammals

commonly called

wild deer, many other

rabbit fever

mammals

Likely

Ingestion of repro-

Contact with infected

Ingestion of anthrax

Mosquito and other

Method of

ductive fluids of

animals; bites from

spores while grazing

blood-sucking insects

Dissemination aborted fetus, in-

Transmissible

ticks, horse flies, deer

or eating contam-

gestion of unpas-

flies; ingestion of

inated feed; getting

teurized milk or

contaminated meat

spores into skin cuts

milk products (espe- and drinking water

or abrasions;

cially goat cheese);

and aerosols from

inhalation of spores

veneral transmis-

contaminated dust

sion in swine

or feed

Yes

Yes

Yes, through inges-

Animal to

tion, cutaneous ex-

Human?

posure or inhalation

Incubation

3–7 days

1–10 days

Duration of

Typically a non-

Illness

fatal disease that

Yes

3–7 days

5–15 days

Sudden disease

Sudden death (as

2–7 days

onset with death

soon as first symptoms

causes abortion,

in 2–3 days in 15%

occur) in cattle, sheep,

infertility, orchitis,

of sheep

goats and deer; death

Period

arthritis

after 24 hours of symptoms in cattle, sheep, horses, and deer; swine may take several days to die or recover

Lethality to

Usually

Livestock

nonfatal

Up to 15%

Up to 100%

50–75%

Vaccine?

Yes

Yes—in humans

Yes

Yes

Comments

Last outbreak

Weaponized and used

Weaponized by

in 2002.

by Germany in WWI;

USSR.

weaponized by USSR.

Table 2. Likely or Known Biological Agents That Target Crops

Plant(s) Affected

Stem Rust

Stripe Rust

Wheat, oats, barleys

Wheat, oats, barleys

Leaf Rust Wheat (especially winter wheat), oats, barleys

Likely Method of

Aerosol

Aerosol

Aerosol

Lethality to Crops

Up to 70%

Up to 70%

Up to 70%

Cause

Spore of fungus

Spore of fungus

Spore of fungus

Protection/

Fungicide

Fungicide

Fungicide

Known to cause

Known to cause

Known to cause

Dissemination

Eradication Comments

epidemics;

epidemics; will

epidemics; will

weaponized by Iraq;

winter over; grows

winter over; grows

Germany WWII;

fastest in cooler

fastest in cooler

USSR

temperatures;

temperatures;

weaponized by

weaponized by

USSR

USSR

Common Bunt

Colorado Potato

Tobacco Blue Mold

Beetles Plant(s) Affected

Tobacco

Wheat

Any

Likely Method of

Aerosol

Aerosol

Air drop

Mold

Spore/fungus

Dissemination Lethality to Crops Cause Protection/

Fungicide

Insecticide

Weaponized

Known to have

Eradication Comments

Believed to have been weaponized

been weaponized;

by USSR/Cuba

used against Britain on Isle of Wight

wmd and the farm

27

Information on vaccines is also included in the table. It is important to note that in some cases, especially in foot-and-mouth disease, vaccines are not as useful in animals as they are in human application. This is because many vaccines can not be clinically differentiated from the pathogen. Finally, there are some miscellaneous comments on each disease. Toxins The second type of biological weapons is toxins. Toxins are produced by animals, plants, or microbes. David Franz has written one of the definitive works on biologic toxins, “Defense against Toxin Weapons.”31 According to Franz, it is important to remember that the knowledge about toxins is based on their effects on humans. In some cases, a toxin may affect animals differently than humans. However, some are known to act similarly in animals, among them botulinum toxin and ricin. These substances are often mistaken for chemical agents during clinical observation because of their rapid onset of symptoms. Biological toxins have been used in terrorist incidents. In 1952, the Mau Mau group used a plant toxin from the African milk bush to poison cattle at a Kenyan mission station.32 Ricin, a plant toxin derived from the castor bean, was used to kill a Bulgarian dissident in September of 1977.33 Botulinum toxin, commonly known as botox, is used in cosmetic procedures to reduce wrinkles. The same toxin can be mixed with animal feed to create disastrous results. The technology to grow or culture biological agents, including toxins, is little more complicated than making starter for sourdough bread or brewing beer. Culturing other toxins is often as easy.34

chemical and biological weapons used against crops Chemical weapons are of less value against plants than against animals. Chemicals would be applied to specific areas and would require massive amounts to be effective. Nerve agents, vesicants, and pulmonary agents are not effective against plants. Chemicals such as chlorine and anhydrous ammonia, which are extremely toxic to plants, would most likely be used as opportunistic weapons; meaning that they are used only if or when it is convenient to do so.35 Chemical weapons may also be used in storage or processing areas.36 The types of biological weapons that may be used on plants include the categories that might be used on animals—bacteria, viruses, microbes, 28

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and toxins. Additionally, insects, such as the Colorado potato beetle, and nutrient-robbing weeds that are resistant to common herbicides could be used.37 While there are literally thousands of diseases that could be introduced to plants in the field, table 2 includes only a few that are known to have been weaponized. Most of these agents are for use on grains—rice, wheat, and corn in particular. Agents that affect citrus and tobacco crops are also included. The likelihood of biological toxins being used to destroy crops in the fields is slim. Use of toxins would probably render the harvested crops useless for consumption or poison the consumer of the crops. As with the use of chemicals, this is not the most likely method of choice for a terrorist. The problems in getting a contaminated crop to the table are great, given the type and extent of processing between harvest and table.38 Using plant pathogens in the field to get a desired result is more difficult than using pathogens against animals; however, in some cases, simply being exposed to a pathogen is justification for export restrictions.39 To review the challenges when dealing with animal and plant biological warfare agents, detection and identification of the agent are the most pressing matters for first responders. Containment of the agent or outbreak is another serious issue that must be addressed thoroughly and rapidly. The epidemiological and criminal investigations required to determine the source and extent of an outbreak present a further challenge, and the most complex problem for the agriculture industry is recovery, both financial and emotional.

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29

4 incident management and unified command he sheer magnitude of an incident caused by terrorism may be staggering. The quantities of personnel and resources required to mitigate a terrorism event can be huge. Community officials, including those from emergency response agencies, not only have the responsibility to develop plans and systems to respond to terrorism incidents—they are also expected to account for, assign, and track the resources and personnel for the duration of an event, even if it lasts days or months. There are many ways to accomplish these objectives; however, no method is as effective or efficient as a properly planned and implemented Incident Command System (ICS). In short, an ICS provides the method of systematically addressing the challenges that any situation—natural or human induced—may present. The 1993 and 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City demonstrate the complexity of terrorist attacks and the challenge of managing highly complex, dynamic incidents. These incidents involved issues such as multiple fatalities; evacuation of thousands from a large geographic area; the release of toxic substances; fire; and mass casualties. Other problems of concern to the incident managers were traffic snarls, a complicated forensic investigation, rescue efforts requiring nonstandard actions, a massive outpouring of volunteers, and a damaged infrastructure. An incident involving agriculture would be as complex as either World Trade Center response, if not more so. In a presentation at the First International Symposium on Agroterrorism, Ann Waters, head of the contingency planning division in the state veterinary service of the United Kingdom’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, described the complexity of the response issues during the 2001 U.K. outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. She stated that the incident, which was not terrorism related, was of unprecedented size and scale. The resources available were quickly overwhelmed by the needs, to the point that this incident rapidly became not only a state problem but a national one. The outbreak was also of intense media and public interest. As a result there

T

figure 1. Agroterrorism Incident Command Structure

was great political pressure to resolve the incident. The incident was of such a large scale and the response requirements lasted for such an extended period that new government structures and organizations had to be developed to meet the needs.1 Any of the complicating factors experienced in this instance—the potential involvement of hazardous materials, the potential for widespread destruction, the significant lack of trained personnel to care for and treat susceptible and affected animals, or the overwhelming information inflow—would be very difficult to manage in any incident. However, these

incident management and unified command

31

challenges may be present in multiple manifestations in an attack on agriculture. Furthermore, jurisdictional issues arise for the incident managers, including the establishment of open channels of communication (flowing vertically as well as horizontally); clear communication of roles and responsibilities of responding jurisdictions so that the response is effective, efficient, and safe for all involved; and clearly defining the response goals and objectives that allow for the mitigation and investigation of the incident. All of these issues must be dealt with through an orderly, coordinated approach. This approach must also allow for the expansion and contraction of the organizational structure in correlation to the requirements of the response. It must provide the best possible management and most proficient and efficient use of available resources. How can all of these things be accomplished with any sort of efficiency? The answer is by using an Incident Command System.

the national incident management system (nims) In the October 2004 Fire Chief magazine, John Linstrom, a battalion chief and paramedic in Apple Valley, California, wrote: “In the military services there is a foundation of common history; shared values; stated mission; individual responsibilities; and rules of order, behavior and conduct. This foundation is called ‘doctrine.’ . . . The fire service, for all intents and purposes, is lacking this rigid, immovable foundation on which to build decision-making models that will operate consistently.”2 Linstrom’s point goes well beyond the fire service. Emergency response disciplines in general struggle with providing a consistent manner of managing incidents. The struggle to provide the foundation of which Linstrom writes extends from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and response discipline or response discipline; however, the struggle does not stop at that level. As Linstrom notes, the struggle sometimes applies even from shift to shift. The results of this lack of doctrine have never been more apparent than on September 11, 2001. The Honorable Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security, painted a vivid picture in a speech to the National Association of Counties Annual Legislative Conference in March 2004. Ridge said: “First responders are often the first on the scene and the last to leave, and their ability to communicate and work together is paramount. We saw what incompatibility could mean on September 11. Fire 32

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chiefs standing 50 yards from one another couldn’t communicate by radio; some firefighters from neighboring jurisdictions were unable to even attach their hoses to the hydrants.”3 In recognizing this, the president of the United States issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) on February 28, 2003. HSPD-5 directed the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to develop a National Incident Management System (NIMS). HSPD-5 also requires that all federal agencies begin using NIMS and require their grant recipients to do the same. As a result, the models and terminology in this chapter are all based on NIMS. It is important to recognize that NIMS is more than an Incident Command System. NIMS is a comprehensive system that includes publication management, research and development, and many other things that are focused on supporting the first response efforts, regardless of the size and scope of the incident. The National Incident Management System has six components: command and management, preparedness, resource management, communications and information management, supporting technologies, and ongoing management and maintenance. Each component is described in the following section. command and management Three standard command structures are outlined in this component: the Incident Command System (ICS), which is expanded upon later in this chapter; Multiagency Coordination Systems (MACS); and public information systems. The Incident Command System defines the on-scene management of operations, and the incident management and emergency response structures, throughout the life of an incident. Multiagency Coordination Systems define the operating characteristics, interagency management, and organizational structure of supporting incident management entities. These entities may involve federal, state, local, tribal, and regional levels of government. Public information systems are processes and procedures used for communicating public information in a timely and accurate fashion in emergency situations. The preparedness component consists of seven activities: planning, training, exercises, personnel qualification and certification, equipment acquisition and certification, mutual aid, and publications management. These activities are integrated and are intended to be carried out well in advance of the incident. Resource management is important to the success of any incident. incident management and unified command

33

NIMS recognizes this and through the resource management component provides standardized mechanisms and establishes requirements for processes to describe, mobilize, dispatch, track, and recover resources going to and from an incident. Effective communications and the proper management of information are essential to the efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the response to an incident. The communications and information management component of NIMS addresses these issues. Emerging technologies and technological systems are changing and providing responders with greater capabilities. NIMS supplies methods to adapt and integrate these technologies into incident management activities. Finally, the needs of emergency responders change over time. For example, a few years ago, the likelihood of multiple simultaneous but geographically separated attacks was unthinkable. However, the needs that responders encountered on and after September 11, 2001, have changed incident management forever. NIMS is intent on living up to its charge, to provide the foundation for the motto “One mission, one team, one fight.”4 NIMS provides the “doctrine” that has been missing from the emergency services for so long. Some may say we have done fairly well without NIMS, but that archaic line of thought has no place in today’s emergency response disciplines. using the incident command system (ics) The Incident Command System is a very robust and versatile management tool. Even so, experts in the field of emergency response debate whether an ICS is adaptable and robust enough to manage an incident involving biological weapons used against people or animals. Some believe that disasters without well-defined physical perimeters undermine the effectiveness of the ICS. Others have noted that in a biological attack, traditional first responders would not be used in the roles they traditionally would perform in a chemical or explosive attack. Finally, some critics state that the Incident Command System does not allow for the cooperation required between government officials, agencies, and individuals, both to mitigate the incident and to catch the perpetrators. While these points have their merits, they do not nullify the use of ICS. These important points should be considered as communities plan their response to disasters involving biological weapons.

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ics basics Adequately explaining the breadth and depth of the Incident Command System is difficult to complete in a single book, let alone in a chapter. The origins of the ICS can be traced back to the late 1940s as methods used to manage large wildfires in the western United States. These methods were formalized under a project called Firefighting Resources of Southern California Organized for Potential Emergencies (FIRESCOPE). Developed in the 1970s, FIRESCOPE adapts elements from military command and control and logistics, combines these with successful business practices, and places them in the inherently fast-paced, dynamic, and dangerous environment of emergency response. These elements form the basis of a solid, effective, and efficient ICS that emphasize responder safety, along with victim safety, as a primary responsibility of all personnel. The following common elements must be present in any Incident Command System for it to be effective: • • • • • • • • • • • • • •

Common terminology A modular organization Management by objectives Reliance on consolidated incident action plans that include written, easy-to-understand objectives A manageable span of control Predesignated locations and facilities Comprehensive resource management Integrated communications Establishment and transfer of command Chain of command and unity of command Unified command Accountability Deployment Information and intelligence management

The section that follows gives descriptions of these elements and how they could apply to a response involving agriculture. Common Terminology Terminology is important, especially when dealing with emergency responders from different backgrounds and disciplines. In any given large-

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scale response, professional rescuers, lay persons who are volunteering, members of the military, international rescue teams, and other specialized personnel such as doctors and nurses would be involved. Each is dedicated and likely to be highly knowledgeable in his or her field. However, communication among these groups of people can be a real challenge. For example, if you gathered a group of responders from various disciplines and asked them to define what the term tanker means to them, you might hear anything from an airplane that is specially fitted to carry large amounts of water for wildland firefighting to a person who drives a military tank. Another exercise that demonstrates this point is to ask responders what the phrase cover me means to them. Members of the fire service might understand the phrase to mean to spray copious amounts of water on a rescuer to provide a protective barrier against impinging flames or dangerous heat. A law enforcement professional understands the phrase to mean to observe the incident scene for an attacker who would threaten the rescuer. Those in the military understand the phrase to mean that they should deliver a barrage of small arms fire to protect the movement of troops. Imagine the results of an incident commanded by the fire captain and involving a response by law enforcement and military personnel. If that seems exaggerated, consider this anecdote, which comes from the riots in southern California during the early 1990s. During this period, U.S. marines were teamed up with sheriff’s deputies to conduct patrols in and around the areas of the riots. At some point, a sheriff’s deputy told some of the military members to provide cover for deputies serving a warrant. Much to the amazement of the deputies, the military personnel began firing their weapons and riddled the house with bullets. Whether this is fact or an urban legend, it certainly demonstrates the need to develop and use common terminology. The terminology must be clearly understood to those who are sending it and those who are receiving it. Common terminology provides standardized and consistent definitions for major functions of the system, functional units, resource elements, and even facilities. Common terminology also requires that the traditional 10 codes (10–4 = OK; 10–8 = In service) give way to “plain text.” The National Incident Management System requires that common terminology cover both organizational functions and resource descriptions—which include the kinds and types of resources that better define

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their capabilities. NIMS also requires common definitions for incident facilities such as a command post, staging area, base, camp, heliport, and helispot. With respect to an agricultural incident response, this is essential. It is nearly guaranteed that responders will be a mix of animal health professionals with one vernacular working beside fire, law enforcement, and emergency managers with another set of terms. Modular Organization To respond effectively to any incident, whether a day-to-day emergency or a terrorist attack, the on-scene organizational requirements will increase. As the event begins to wane, the numbers of resources will likely decrease. The organization managing these resources and personnel must expand and contract to accommodate the integration of each response asset into the management of the incident. The responsibility to establish and expand the Incident Command System lies with the Incident Commander. The following example from the attack on the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, illustrates the need for a modular organization. “On September 11, 2001 at the Pentagon, in the first hour after the terrorist plane crashed, the agencies on scene grew from the Fort Myers Federal Fire Department based in Virginia and members of the United States Armed Forces to more than five fire departments; four federal, one state, and three local law enforcement agencies; several civilian agencies; and a host of other public and private agencies.”5 The Incident Command System was implemented almost immediately to accommodate the rapid expansion of the number of emergency responders and response agencies.6 Responding agencies were integrated efficiently and effectively into the response at the Pentagon because of the modular organization provided by the Incident Command System. In a terrorist event involving agriculture, responding agencies would be from all levels of government and plentiful. Complicating the problem and increasing the organizational requirements, the incident would likely be spread over a significant geographic area of the United States. Competition for the limited resources would present serious incident management challenges. Management by Objectives Management by objectives represents an approach that is communicated throughout the entire incident command organization. This ap-

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proach, ultimately providing for the safety of every responder, includes establishing overarching management objectives and specific control objectives; developing and issuing assignments, plans, procedures, and protocols; and the establishment and analysis of control objectives for the various incident management activities. It also paints a clear view of the common operating picture in which every responder knows where he or she belongs in the incident command organization. The overarching objectives mentioned should be developed so that they are SMART: specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, and timebased. The objectives should cover incident management activities as well as the efforts required to attain them. Finally, these objectives must support the strategic objectives that have been established and approved by the Incident Commander or unified command. Consolidated Action Plans Having a written, comprehensive plan that encompasses all aspects of the incident is important for the safety of all persons involved as well as for the general efficiency and effectiveness of the response. The Incident Action Plan (IAP) is written and communicated to all personnel responding to the incident. This plan represents the unification of command in the sense that the overall incident objectives and operational and support activities are outlined in the document. All key responding agencies influence the plan’s development. Not only is this plan a key document for the incident management, but it will also serve as the official record of the incident for later review for both educational and legal purposes. Manageable Span of Control In the business environment, a manager has the capacity to manage or supervise a finite amount of things or people. Exceeding the capacity can lead to system failures and potential safety breaches. In an emergency— a time when stress, emotions, and risks run high for responders, bystanders, and victims alike—the capacity to manage people and resources is even more limited. The Incident Command System limits the number of people a supervisor directs. Experience has shown that an effective supervisor-tosubordinate ratio ranges from 1:3 to 1:8, with a ratio of 1:5 being optimum. However, this is a general guideline and not absolute. For example, if a person is overseeing intricate operations or operations are spread over a large geographic area, the number may be reduced. This is important for the 38

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safety of all and the efficiency of the operations. NIMS permits a slightly larger span of control ratio, up to 1:10 under certain circumstances.7 Predesignated Locations and Facilities Identifying the capabilities of the various facilities required to accommodate an incident response is an important managerial function. For example, it is important to know the locations of laboratories that can provide diagnostic services and to locate specialized areas such as burial or burn areas before an incident occurs. Designating facilities and their capabilities must be done well in advance of any incident. These facilities should be tested and maintained. Comprehensive Resource Management In a large incident, no matter the cause, there is a great need to manage a huge number of resources. In addition, the capabilities of some resources may not be fully understood. Therefore, having a system in place that categorizes, checks in, tracks, and uses the resources to their fullest potential is essential for efficient incident management. Any Incident Command System organization must have this capability. Integrated Communications Communication is the lifeblood of any emergency response operation. Integrated communications are so important to an emergency response that even a slight failure could result in catastrophe. Therefore communications must be planned and integrated into all facets of the response. Integrating communications requires ensuring that the mechanical devices used in the communications are compatible. Just as important, it includes ensuring that the individuals communicating are using a coordinated communications plan. In this day of wireless communications, email, the Internet, 800 and 900 MHz communications, instant messaging, and the plethora of other communications media, the potential is great for information to overload the person(s) managing the terrorism response. Nevertheless, all communications traffic must be captured, recorded, analyzed, and recapitulated for it to be useful to the response and recovery efforts. Additionally, units and responders from different jurisdictions, and even states, must be able to talk to one another in difficult situations, including power loss and other technical difficulties, which may be combined or multiplied in ways not experienced during a more traditional incident management and unified command

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emergency response. This is not an easy task with the wide variety of technologies available. Communications challenges must be addressed before the incident. Planning and testing the communications methods and systems are essential to their usefulness. During an incident, it is essential to develop and follow a written communication plan that meets the needs of the specific incident. Establishment of Command and Transfer of Command In any emergency, there is a great need for leadership and for an accurate tracking of personnel and equipment. Responders must know who their leaders will be as well as who they are leading. The command function must therefore be clearly identified from the very beginning of the incident. The jurisdiction with the primary authority over the incident must exercise its responsibility to establish the initial command. In an agriculture incident, determining which jurisdiction has authority over the incident may not be as easy as in other incidents. Initially, the response may be made by a local veterinarian in private practice, a veterinarian employed by a feedlot, a member of the state department of agriculture or animal health agency, or even a USDA veterinarian. However, the incident also belongs to the community. Community leaders, emergency responders, and private industry must meet before the incident to determine this authority. Waiting until the incident occurs is too late. In the same vein, one person cannot possibly manage an incident on the enormous scale of an agroterrorism incident. Therefore, when command is transferred, there is a five-step process: 1. The incoming Incident Commander or Unified Command team (IC/UC) will perform an assessment of the situation with the outgoing IC or UC counterpart. 2. The incoming IC/UC will be briefed. Typically, this is a face-to-face briefing that covers the current situation in great detail, including such things as resource assignments and order status; priorities and objectives; the Incident Action Plan; facilities; and the potential of the incident. 3. Once this incident briefing occurs, the incoming IC/UC will determine an appropriate time for the transfer of command. 4. The notice of the change of command should be broadcast to all incident personnel, including the general and command staff members. 40

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5. The incoming IC/UC may give the previous IC another assignment on the incident to retain the institutional knowledge of the incident and/or to evaluate the progress of the incident. In doing these five steps, the incoming Incident Commander receives the best possible picture of the status of the incident and maximum ability to predict what may occur as it progresses. In addition, the command structure must be adaptable to meet the needs of the incident. This command structure provides responders with the knowledge of who is in charge of the direction of the incident (chain of command) and identifies each responder’s specific supervisor (unity of command). As noted, this command structure is able to expand and contract based on the needs of the incident.

Chain of Command and Unity of Command These are important concepts that provide for an orderly operation. Chain of command refers to the lines of authority within the incident command organization. Unity of command ensures that each person has a supervisor to whom he or she reports. This clarifies the on-scene reporting relationships. It also eliminates confusion arising due to intraagency lines of authority and other rank structures that are not related to the incident.

Accountability, Deployment, and Information and Intelligence Management To keep personnel and victims safe, prevent unnecessary losses of equipment and supplies, and prevent bilking by unscrupulous vendors, an effective and efficient accountability system is crucial. This system must include procedures to check in personnel and provide them with a clear chain of command and assignments that are communicated through the Incident Action Plan. Other mechanisms that aid the Incident Commander with accountability are span of control and resource tracking. A serious problem that often occurs in a response is freelancing by both trained and untrained responders. NIMS addresses this issue by insisting that personnel and equipment should respond (deploy) only when requested or dispatched by an appropriate authority—a local or state emergency management agency, the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), or other authorities, such incident management and unified command

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as the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) or the American Red Cross.

functional areas of an incident command system In addition to the common elements, the Incident Command System has five basic functional areas: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration. NIMS adds a sixth function—Information and Intelligence—that may be placed in one of several possible locations in the organization based on the needs of the incident and on available resources. Following are brief descriptions of each of these functional areas, commonly referred to as sections, and their roles and responsibilities. incident command Although the ultimate responsibility for managing the incident lies with the chief elected official or his/her designee, the command section is responsible for all activities on the incident scene. The command section consists of the Incident Commander or a unified command team and the command staff consisting of the Safety Officer, Public Information Officer, and Liaison Officer. Incident Commander The Incident Commander is responsible for maintaining the view of the on-scene “big picture.” The IC should be an experienced official who has both an understanding of the discipline in which he or she is working (in this case agriculture) and a knowledge of the Incident Command Sys-

figure 2. Functional Areas of an Incident Command Organization

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figure 3. Incident Command Structure

tem. Above all, the IC must be a capable decision maker. This person should be highly experienced and able to lead people from varied backgrounds. The IC is the person with the final decision concerning the onscene response operations. He or she develops the response objectives that guide how the response will be handled. Single Command Usually in smaller incidents, the Incident Commander is the sole decision maker operating as a single command. A single command structure would be appropriate when there is not an overlap in jurisdictional or disciplinary boundaries and there is one agency with the primary responsibility for the response. Single command situations can work in long-term operations, provided that the incident has a single focus. However, in most cases of a WMD/terrorist attack, a single command would not be an effective means of managing the incident. Unified Command Unified command makes a complex response effort more efficient by providing stakeholders the ability to organize multiple agencies into one concerted response effort. A complex response without unified command could result in multiple simultaneous and uncoordinated response efforts, leading to the duplication of effort and the misuse of valuable resources. Unified command should be implemented when the response effort is multijurisdictional and/or multifunctional. Additional criteria for the use of unified command are when there is a prolonged response or the de-

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mands of the incident response are more complex than that of an incident typically encountered.8 When unified command is used, there is not a single Incident Commander.9 Instead, the unified command team is formed and assumes the duties of the single IC. Unified command is not meant to replace the Incident Commander; instead it expands the effectiveness and efficiency of the incident management. The unified command team is a group of senior representatives of responding agencies and organizations. Each representative has the authority to make decisions on the agency’s behalf. The team jointly determines the overall direction of the response. Unified command may appear difficult because of the requirement for teamwork between agencies, especially when many of them do not work together on a normal basis. An agricultural WMD/terrorism incident nevertheless requires a unified command. The incident will require that members of the various agencies with “a piece of the incident pie” set objectives cooperatively for entire incident instead of individually for one specific facet of the incident. Choosing an Incident Commander Determining who should be an Incident Commander is an important process and should be well thought out before an incident occurs. Many incidents, especially in their early stages, are dynamic and fast-paced. Gary Klein and others have done extensive research on how people make decisions in these types of environments. Klein’s findings have shown that more than 80 percent of the decisions are made in less than a minute and that decisions are rarely made by a single person. In addition, decision makers in dynamic, fast-paced environments make decisions by breaking down the problem until it becomes something familiar. Once the familiar is identified, the decision maker reaches back into his or her memory to identify how this familiar problem was previously solved and then uses that information to solve the current problem, which Klein calls “recognition primed decision making.”10 All of this is to say that the decision makers—in essence the IC or incident management team—must have significant experience in dealing with such issues. Although a veterinarian may understand animal diseases and may have a great deal of experience with treating them, and the local fire chief may have experience in dealing with hazardous materials incidents, and law enforcement officials are well versed in criminal inves-

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tigations, not one of these professionals will have the complete breadth or depth of competencies to address all aspects of the required response. Allowing a veterinarian to be the sole IC is likely not the best answer. Nor is the best answer to allow the fire chief, sheriff, or police chief to command the incident. The management of the incident must be shared by a team of professionals who are able and willing to work together and to check their egos at the door in the interests of the greater good. command staff Incident Safety Officer The Safety Officer is essential for the safety of all personnel on the scene. The person in this position serves the Incident Commander as an advisor for all aspects of scene safety. The Safety Officer’s role must be staffed by an experienced expert in the subject matter, who has an understanding of the command system. One unique but significant authority given to the Safety Officer is the ability to alter or suspend all operations when people’s lives are in imminent jeopardy. Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations require a Safety Officer during hazardous materials emergency response operations. Although there may be some debate over whether a terrorist event is a hazardous materials incident, weapons of mass destruction are hazardous materials and must be treated as such. The Safety Officer’s responsibilities during an animal health emergency are to:11 • • • • • • • • •

Identify hazardous situations associated with the incident. Participate in planning meetings. Review the Incident Action Plan for safety implications. Exercise emergency authority to stop and prevent unsafe acts. Investigate accidents that have occurred within the incident area. Assign assistants as needed. Review and approve the medical plan. Maintain a log of all major or significant safety-related events. Assist personnel in filling out accident reports and be responsible for the submission of all accident reports. • Review safety training records to ensure that workers who may be exposed to hazardous noise, dust, or noxious or oxygen-deficient environments have medical documentation and can demonstrate

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proper fit and proper use of personal protective equipment, as required by current Occupational Safety and Health Standards. • Ensure that Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS) on all chemical materials used in eradicating the foreign animal disease agent are maintained by the Operations Section Chief and are readily available for all employees to read. Public Information Officer (PIO) The Public Information Officer is also an essential position within the response organization. Any incident, especially one suspected to be a WMD/terrorist incident, is certainly newsworthy. Members of the media will be looking for information concerning the incident to relay to the public. The PIO must develop a system for timely and accurate information. The person in this position is responsible for the coordination of media briefings, tours, and the media pool. The PIO also monitors media reports. Without this position, inaccurate information that may hamper the response effort and the investigation could be released. It is easier to have the media working in concert with the response effort than to have them work freelance; and it is easier to provide accurate information than to recover from inaccuracies. The PIO must coordinate various agency public information officers through a coordinated joint information system. A joint information system provides the ability to organize, integrate, and coordinate the delivery of information that is easy to understand, timely, accurate, and consistent. This system consists of plans, protocols, and structures and includes all levels of government. As with unified command, there must be a high level of interagency coordination and integration, development and delivery of coordinated messages, consistent support of decision makers, and a flexible, modular and adaptable character conforming to the needs of the incident. A key part of this is system is the Joint Information Center (JIC), the physical location for the public information operations to collocate and to perform critical emergency public information functions. The public information system as defined by NIMS provides the organizational structure for the coordination and dissemination of official information concerning the incident. A JIC may be established at each level of incident management; however, it is not necessary to do so. While it is preferable to have a single location for the JIC, the public information system must be coordinated, adaptable, and flexible enough to accommodate multiple 46

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JICs. In the case of an agricultural event, the JIC is likely to become part of the Joint Field Office (JFO), the central coordination point for the federal-level agency coordination. During a response to an animal health emergency, only one PIO is assigned for each incident. The PIO may assign assistants as necessary, and the assistants may also represent assisting agencies or jurisdictions. However, it is important to note that the Incident Commander or unified command must approve the release of all incident-related information. During a response to an animal health emergency the responsibilities of the PIO are to:12 • Plan, develop, supervise, and maintain information activities of the response. • Provide liaison for information between the response organization, the public information officer(s) of the local and state agencies involved, the industry, the public, the news media, and other interested parties. • Coordinate the writing of news releases, radio and TV scripts, backgrounders, fact sheets, and feature articles to provide information regarding response activities. • Consult with and advise the Incident Commander or unified command regarding matters relating to information for public release. After consultation with and approval from the IC/UC, release various types of public information materials in accordance with USDA and Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) policy and established clearance procedures. • Coordinate the preparation of slides, exhibits, brochures, and other visual materials for the response organization. • Keep abreast of all response operations, policies, and plans to disseminate factual public information. • Serve as the IC/UC’s representative—to the extent that it is feasible and desirable—in assisting response organization personnel during interviews with media representatives. The PIO must be advised, preferably in advance, whenever news media representatives request and/or conduct an interview with response personnel. • Assist in training task force personnel pertaining to contacts with news media. incident management and unified command

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• Determine from the IC/UC if there are any limits on information release. • Develop material for use in media briefings. • Obtain IC/UC approval of media releases. • Inform media and conduct media briefings. • Arrange for tours and other interviews or briefings that may be required. • Monitor media information that may be useful to incident planning. • Maintain current information summaries and/or displays on the incident and provide information on incident status to assigned personnel. • Maintain a log of significant activities related to the responsibilities of the PIO. Liaison Officer The liaison position is needed to ensure the efficient and effective integration of outside agencies into the response organization. This position is the IC/UC’s official point of contact for all incoming agencies and the families of deceased victims. The Liaison Officer provides a buffer for the Incident Commander or the unified command team so that the command can concentrate on the primary task: overseeing the response. As with the other command staff positions, there must only be one Liaison Officer, but the Liaison Officer may have assistants. The responsibilities of the Liaison Officer during an animal health emergency are to:13 • Be a contact point for agency representatives. • Maintain a list of assisting and cooperating agencies and agency representatives. • Assist in establishing and coordinating interagency contacts. • Keep agencies supporting the incident aware of incident status. • Monitor incident operations to identify current or potential interorganizational problems. • Participate in planning meetings, providing current resource status, including limitations and capability of assisting agency resources. • Maintain a log of all significant activities relating to the responsibilities of the position. 48

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oper ations section The operations section is primarily concerned with determining and executing the best tactics to reduce the immediate hazard, establishing situational control, and restoring normal operations. This section traditionally includes functions such as rescue, fire suppression, hazardous materials control, law enforcement, public health, and a myriad of other functions that would be directly involved in mitigating the problem. In an agroterrorism response, these traditional functional areas give way to the functions needed to mitigate the incident. This does not mean that the fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, and emergency management disciplines are not involved in the response effort. Law enforcement officials would likely be used in the biosecurity group, the regulatory enforcement group, the surveillance group, and even in the air support and air tactical groups. Hazardous materials resources would likely be used in the cleaning and disposal group, while fire resources would be used in the disposal group. Operations Section Chief The Operations Section Chief is responsible for accomplishing the goals and objectives assigned to the operations section. The person chosen to fill this position should be a specialist in dealing with the hazard involved. The assignment of Operations Section Chief is the responsibility of the Incident Commander/Unified Command. The Operations Section Chief may change as the needs of the incident changes. This position serves as the final arbiter on how incident objectives are met. This person may elect to have deputies from other disciplines to provide tactical or specific information. Staging Officer The Staging Officer is responsible for the management of the staging area(s). The staging area is a location a reasonable distance from the incident scene where units that are not yet assigned are placed so that they may be accounted for and assigned rapidly. This is an important task for maintaining accurate personnel accountability and the comprehensive management of resources. The Staging Officer is responsible for accounting for the unassigned equipment and keeping the list current for the planning section.

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figure 4. Operations Section Structure

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Grouping Resources: Divisions, Groups, and Branches In order to maintain span of control and effective management of the multiple activities taking place at an agroterrorism incident, there must be a way to divide the incident management organization further, beyond the functional areas. The designation of resources, divisions, groups, and branches provide this mechanism. Following are descriptions of each. A resource is considered to be a combination of equipment and the personnel required to operate the equipment in incident management operations. Resources are arranged and managed in three different ways: as single resources, strike teams, and task forces. Single resources—These are the individual items of equipment and the operators associated with them, for example a fire engine and its crew or a bulldozer and its operator. Strike teams—Teams of a designated number of like resources are formed into strike teams for a specific function. Strike teams have common communications and a designated leader. An example may be five veterinarians charged with diagnosing animals. Task forces—These consist of a combination of dissimilar single resources assembled in support of a specific mission or tactical need. Like a strike team, a task force also has common communications and a designated leader. An example of a task force would be a group of hazardous materials technicians, veterinary technicians, and epidemiological personnel formed to decontaminate the premises. Divisions and groups are established when the combined number of single resources, strike teams, and task forces exceeds the manageable span of control of either the Incident Commander or the Operations Section Chief. Divisions are established when there is a need to divide the incident into geographic areas of operation. Groups are used to divide the incident into functional areas of operation. Branches are used for several purposes and can be either functional or jurisdictional. A branch is established when the number of divisions or groups exceeds a manageable span of control. In some cases, the number of branches can be as many as ten. The Operations Section Chief has the authority to activate or deactivate any organizational element such as a branch, division, or group. However, if an organizational element is not activated, the section chief is responsible for that element’s function. Position titles are used to reinforce the unity of command as well as to designate the leaders in the incident command organization. Table 3 shows the organizational element and the corresponding title of the incident management and unified command

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Table 3. Leadership Titles and Roles Organizational Element

Leadership Position

Incident Command

Incident Commander

Command Staff

Officer

Section

Section Chief

Branch

Branch Director

Group/Division

Group/Division Supervisor

Team

Leader

Unit

Leader

leader of that element. These titles are intended to eliminate confusion about who is supervising what level in the incident command organization. the oper ations section for an agroterrorism response The operations section in an agroterrorism incident has several responsibilities concerning appraisal, euthanasia, disposal, surveillance, inspection, decontamination, quarantine, and biosecurity, to name a few. Although there are many ways to organize the response activity, it is useful to organize these functions into one branch that addresses functions associated with contaminated premises; a second branch that addresses the issues associated with non-contaminated premises; a third branch for biosecurity issues; and a fourth branch for air operations. Contaminated Branch The contaminated branch works on premises where disease is already known to exist. This branch has the responsibility of appraising the value of the affected animals, euthanizing and disposing of the affected animals, and decontaminating of the premises. Because of the technical issues and potential numbers associated with each function, groups are formed to address the requisite functions. Non-Contaminated Branch The issues with non-contaminated premises are different than those with contaminated premises; likewise, the resources needed are different. The non-contaminated premises branch is concerned with the sur52

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veillance of exposed, susceptible species; inspection of premises in the contaminated zone and adjacent premises; and the vaccination of susceptible species. Disease Biosecurity Branch The disease control and biosecurity functions are very important to the stabilization of the incident. This branch is responsible for the implementation and enforcement of biosecurity measures; the enforcement and oversight of regulatory matters; biosecurity measures for vectors such as mosquitoes, fleas, and wildlife; issuing permits for the movement and sale of animals and for carcasses and disposal methods; and the implementation and enforcement of quarantine and release of cleared animals and premises. The controls this branch implements will slow and eventually halt the spread of the disease. Air Operations Branch The air operations branch is responsible for the coordination and operations using aircraft. These activities can include tasks such as transportation of equipment as well as air spraying for vectors. The air operations branch may not be used in every incident and its functions can be done in other branches. planning The planning section is important to the overall response effort, especially in long-term operations. This section gathers information about the status of the situation and resources; documents and analyzes the information for use by the incident command team; and writes and distributes this information and other written plans concerning the incident. This section also develops demobilization plans that facilitate an orderly and efficient return of responding units to service after they are no longer needed, without compromising personnel safety.14 Resources Unit—This unit is responsible for maintaining the status of all assigned resources (primary and support) at an incident. All units, groups, branches, and sections are responsible for reporting status changes to the resources unit. Situation Unit (Epidemiology Unit)—The collection, processing, and organizing of all incident information takes place within the situation unit. This unit may prepare projections of future incident growth, develops maps, and processes internal and external information. In an agriculincident management and unified command

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figure 5. Planning Section Structure

tural incident, the situation unit is responsible for maintaining data on the current status of the disease spread and containment in addition to the traditional duties of the situation unit. The duties of this unit overlap significantly with those of the Information and Intelligence function, especially in the early stages of the incident. Documentation Unit—This unit is responsible for the maintenance of accurate, up-to-date incident files. Duplication services are also provided by the Documentation Unit. Incident files are stored for legal, analytical, and historical purposes. Demobilization Unit—This unit is responsible for developing the inci54

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dent demobilization plan. In large incidents, demobilization can be quite complex, requiring a separate planning activity. Note that not all agencies require specific demobilization instructions. Technical Specialists—Certain incidents or events may require the use of technical specialists who have specialized knowledge and expertise. Technical specialists may function within the planning section or be assigned wherever their services are required. In an agricultural incident, the role of technical specialists is likely to be significant. Functions such as community outreach and training for responders as well as disease specialists can be incorporated into the response organization quickly and efficiently. Integrating responders is an essential element of making an effective response to an incident involving agriculture. This type of response will include many nontraditional responders, many responders who are unfamiliar with the particulars of farm operations, and others who are not familiar with emergency operations. Including training specialists in the incident command organization facilitates the smooth transition of this training in a timely fashion during a response. This will ultimately aid in the efficient integration of resources into the response effort. Like training, community outreach should be an important part of the response effort. Rural communities can suffer enormous financial and emotional losses during an agricultural emergency. The report Oklahoma City—Seven Years Later: Lessons for Other Communities makes the case repeatedly that communication with the public is essential. Community outreach specialists are trained personnel who interact with the local community. This function provides the community with a face for the response and a clear line of communication to and from the incident command. These lines of communication can help the community recover and understand what is being done in response to the disaster. The community outreach function may be placed in one of two different locations in the incident command organization. The function can remain in the planning section as a unit of technical specialists reporting to the Planning Section Chief. However, a better placement of the function is probably as a unit supervised by the Public Information Officer that can later transition to the Joint Information Center. The Planning Section for an Agroterrorism Response The planning section in an agroterrorism response can be organized into two branches. One branch conducts planning activities for commerincident management and unified command

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cial operations, while the other plans for noncommercial operations. The reasoning for this division is simple. The planning required for a response involving commercial livestock operations is enormously different than the planning for a response to noncommercial operation. Each branch has the same functional elements. Commercial farm operations are those farms that sell more than $50,000 in farm products per year. Noncommercial operations are small part-time farms and smaller family operations, including backyard flocks of poultry and fowl. logistics section The logistics section is responsible for ensuring that responders have the supplies and facilities they need in order to conduct a response effectively and efficiently. These include providing Ground Support Units for transportation of equipment and establishing and maintaining the feeding areas, sleeping areas, and sanitary facilities for responders. This section also provides services for response personnel, such as first aid for responders, and it has the communications unit, which develops the communications plan in cooperation with the Operations and Planning sections. Following are brief descriptions of the units that may be established within the logistics section:15 Supply Unit (procurement, property, and supply officer)—The Supply Unit is responsible for ordering, receiving, processing, and storing all incident-related resources. All off-incident resources are ordered through the Supply Unit. Facilities Unit—This unit is responsible for setup, maintenance, and demobilization of all incident support facilities except staging areas. The Facilities Unit also provides security services to the incident as needed. Ground Support Unit—The Ground Support Unit is primarily responsible for the maintenance, service, and fueling of all mobile equipment and vehicles, with the exception of aviation resources. The unit also has responsibility for the ground transportation of personnel, supplies, and equipment and for the development of the incident traffic plan. Communications Unit—The Communications Unit is responsible for developing plans for the use of incident communications equipment and facilities; installing and testing of communications equipment; supervision of the Incident Communications Center; and the distribution and maintenance of communications equipment.

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figure 6. Logistics Section Structure

Food Unit—The Food Unit is responsible for supplying the food needs for the entire incident, including all remote locations (e.g., camps, staging areas), as well as for providing food for personnel unable to leave tactical field assignments. Medical Unit—The Medical Unit develops an incident medical plan (to be included in the Incident Action Plan); develops procedures for managing major medical emergencies involving responders; provides medical aid to responders; and assists the finance and administration section with processing injury-related claims. Note that the provision of medical assistance to the public or to victims of the emergency is an operational function and would be conducted by the operations section and not by the medical unit of the logistics section. finance and administr ation section The finance and administration section is extremely important during and after a response to any large-scale incident, including a terrorist event. This section is responsible for procurement of services and supplies, tracking personnel time, processing and paying claims, and compiling and processing costs for an incident. Without this section, the true

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figure 7. Finance and Administration Section Structure

cost of an incident would not be recorded, and reimbursement would not be possible. Another duty of this section is to validate the need for purchases. This duty in many ways provides a system of checks and balances for the incident’s fiscal management, saving departments from being accused of unscrupulous practices. Several units fall under the control of the finance section. Following are brief descriptions of each. Time Unit—The Time Unit is responsible for ensuring the accurate recording of daily personnel time, compliance with the time-recording policies of different agencies, and managing commissary operations if established at the incident. As applicable, personnel time records are collected and processed for each operational period.16 Procurement Unit—All financial matters pertaining to vendor contracts, leases, and fiscal agreements are managed by the Procurement Unit. The unit is also responsible for maintaining equipment time records. The Procurement Unit establishes local sources for equipment and supplies; manages all equipment rental agreements; and processes all rental and supply fiscal document billing invoices. The unit works closely with the emergency operations center and local fiscal authorities to ensure efficiency.17 Compensation/Claims Unit—These functions are becoming increasingly important on many kinds of incidents. Compensation-for-Injury oversees the completion of all forms required by workers’ compensation and local agencies. A file of injuries and illnesses associated with the inci58

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dent is also maintained, and all witness statements are obtained in writing. Close coordination with the medical unit is essential. Claims are responsible for investigating all claims involving property associated with or involved in the incident. This can be an extremely important function on some incidents.18 Cost Unit—The Cost Unit provides all incident cost analysis. It ensures the proper identification of all equipment and personnel requiring payment; records all cost data; analyzes and prepares estimates of incident costs; and maintains accurate records of incident costs.19 intelligence and information function According to NIMS, the Information and Intelligence function involves analyzing and sharing information and intelligence during an incident. Intelligence can include national security or classified information but can also include operational information about risk assessments, medical intelligence, weather information, structural designs of buildings, toxic contaminant levels, and the like—information may come from a variety of sources. The responsibilities and duties of this function overlap significantly with those of the situation unit. It is appropriate that the I&I function starts out as part of the situation unit. In the case of a terrorist or criminal incident, the proper handling of the incident information and intelligence is imperative to the development of the criminal case. In some cases, the proper handling of information and intelligence may be essential to national security and to the safety and security of rescuers and the public. However, the intelligence and information function is more than the traditional law enforcement uses. In any large-scale event, including one involving a foreign animal disease—and especially if the event is a terrorist incident—the amount of information flowing into the command post will be overwhelming. Proper processing, analysis and dissemination of this information is essential to the effectiveness of the response. roles and responsibilities A properly developed ICS does not discriminate against any agency. The importance of interagency cooperation has been attested to before Congress by members of organizations such as the International Association of Fire Chiefs; by officials from local, state, and federal government; and by experts in the field of emergency response. In their testimony, these people have put it bluntly: no one department can handle the reincident management and unified command

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sponse to a terrorist incident. An Incident Command System does not appoint one department in charge; in most cases, if such an appointment is made, it is done by statute, local ordinance, or regulation. The Incident Command System encourages enough flexibility for the best qualified person for the specific response to be placed in the Incident Commander role. If there is a variety of issues, then the unified command allows for a broad-spectrum approach in which all stakeholders have a part to play in directing the response effort. By its very nature, the Incident Command System promotes cooperation among all levels of responders. However, the response effort can benefit from the appointment of a lead agency to guide the unified command. However, ICS cannot be thrown together at the last moment. The Incident Command System provides crucial tools that must be used in order to survive a WMD/terrorism event safely, effectively and efficiently. It is not something that can be learned during an event. To have an effective system, you must plan it, practice with it, and keep it current. Failure to do these things could be disastrous.

ics advanced While it has proven very important to establish an Incident Command System at the earliest possible moment in a response, one can be established at any point during the response. In the report A Failure of Initiative, the lack of the command and control guaranteed by the establishment of the Incident Command System was noted as a contributing factor to the delays in getting relief to the people of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina.20 The logistical, administrative, and financial management and the planning resources that an Incident Command System provides are essential for recovery operations, especially for long-term incidents. Such management and resources were noticeably absent in the initial days following Katrina’s landfall. As for the physical boundaries of the incident, using an area command or a unified command working closely with an emergency operations center (EOC) allows management of an incident that is spread over several states. area command Understanding the area command concept is essential to building an incident command organization capable of handling a large scale foreign animal disease (FAD) incident. In most cases of a highly contagious dis60

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ease, such as highly pathogenic avian influenza or foot-and-mouth disease, it is likely that multiple states will be affected and even more likely that infection will occur within multiple jurisdictions. Each of these areas will be in need of similar resources and will use similar strategies to mitigate the effects of the disease. The area command concept is designed specifically for this type of incident. Area command is activated for very complex incidents or incidents that require intricate operations. Another reason for the activation of area command is maintaining an appropriate incident management span of control. If the incidents under the authority of area command are multijurisdictional, then a unified area command should be established. Area command is established either to oversee the management of multiple incidents being handled by a separate ICS organization or to oversee the management of a very large incident that involves multiple ICS organizations. The latter describes the situation a large-scale FAD incident presents. Additionally, area command can be used to manage incidents that are not site specific, that are geographically dispersed, or that evolve over a long period, as a biological event does. Area command also is used when there are large numbers of the same types of incidents in the same area. These represent incidents that may compete for the same resources. Area command should not be confused with the functions performed by an EOC. An area command oversees management of incidents, while the EOC coordinates support functions and provides resources support. When incidents do not have similar resource demands, they are usually handled separately and are coordinated through the emergency operations center. It is important to note that area command does not have operational responsibilities. For incidents under its authority, the tasks of area command are to: • • • • •

Set overall agency incident-related priorities. Allocate critical resources according to established priorities. Ensure that incidents are managed properly. Ensure effective communications. Ensure that incident management objectives are met and do not conflict with each other or with agency policies. • Identify critical resource needs and report them to the EOC(s) • Ensure that short-term emergency recovery is coordinated to assist in the transition to full recovery operations. incident management and unified command

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• Provide for personnel accountability and a safe operating environment. the incident action planning process The incident action planning process is important to successful incident operations. The generation and dissemination of the Incident Action Plan is the responsibility of the Planning Section Chief, although it is the Incident Commander’s responsibility to approve the plan. The planning process is a combination of meetings of different members of the Command and General Staffs and preparation time used to continue the assessment of the situation, consider alternatives, and commit the plan to paper. The obvious product of this process is the Incident Action Plan (IAP). The IAP is usually a written document that includes the overall incident objectives and strategies, tactical objectives, and support activities for a single operational period. The operational period is generally twelve to twenty-four hours in length; however, this may vary based on the incident. For example, the initial operational periods in the response to the 1995 bombing at Oklahoma City were significantly shorter due to the intensity of the work. While there is only one planning process, the complexion of the planning process is different during the initial response from that of later stages of the response. The incipient phase of the incident typically requires a much more pronounced intelligence-gathering process, whereas during the later stages of the incident, planners build on the information already gathered. The information is passed on to the next incident command organization through transfer of command briefings. The planning process always begins with getting the best possible situational awareness. This means that the Situation Unit, operations section, Intelligence function and Incident Command must work together to develop a clear and accurate common operating picture. In doing this, the ability to identify the tasks to be completed becomes easier, as does the identification of the resources needed to accomplish those tasks. The next step, setting the incident objectives and establishing the response strategy, is extremely important in shaping the rest of the response. The objectives and strategy establish the direction of the incident response. In the case of a unified command, these objectives and strategies must adequately address the mission and policy needs of each jurisdictional agency as well as interaction between jurisdictions, functional agencies, and private organizations. Developing inappropriate or inade62

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quate objectives can result in the responders having to backtrack or, worse, may result in the unnecessary injury or death of responders or the public. The incident command organization should be developed to accomplish the objectives. In the initial stages of a response, it may be helpful to have a meeting of the unified command (UC) members to discuss and concur on the issues. This is the appropriate time to lay out potential constraints and concerns; identify the priorities of the jurisdictions involved; and establish a collective set of objectives and agree on the priorities. Additionally, the unified command designates the best qualified people for the general command positions, especially for the position of Operations Section Chief. This initial UC meeting is also the time when procedures for resource ordering, planning, and financial agreements are established. This meeting is facilitated by a member of the unified command and only attended by the UC members. This meeting is essentially the first planning meeting for the incident response and the only meeting that addresses the current operational period. The next meeting in the schedule is the unified command objectives meeting. This meeting focuses on the development of the objectives for the next operational period. The meeting is facilitated by a UC member and attended by certain members of the general and command staffs. During the meeting, the objectives from the current operational period are reviewed and agenda items that remain open are addressed. Once the objectives have been designated, it must be determined how best to deploy resources for the tactical response. This is the purpose of the tactics meeting: a 30-minute meeting facilitated by the Planning Section Chief and attended by the Logistics Section Chief, Operations Section Chief, and Resource Unit Leader. Once the objectives, strategies, and tactics have been determined, it is time for all of the command staff to meet to develop the Incident Action Plan. This is accomplished through the planning meeting, a 30- to 45minute meeting facilitated by the Planning Section Chief and attended by the unified command, command staff, and others, although the attendees are traditionally determined by unified command. During this meeting, the current situation is briefed to the group, and the objectives and strategies as well as the tactics for each division are reviewed. The resources required to carry out the tactics are specified, and resource orders are developed. Locations of critical facilities, reporting locations, and hazards are plotted on a map. As the meeting draws to a close, support incident management and unified command

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plans—such as traffic, media, safety, demobilization, and expenditure reports and claims—are briefed or considered. Finally, the work plan for the next operational period is finalized. This may seem like a lot of information for a 30- to 45-minute meeting; however, if each attendee comes prepared, it is possible to complete the meeting in 30 minutes. If members come unprepared or the meeting does not follow the agenda, the meeting will drag on for a very long time. At this point, the information has been developed and assembled and it is time to develop and disseminate the IAP. This information is taken by the planning section to write the Incident Action Plan. The deadline for completion of the IAP is set by the Planning Section Chief. Once drafted, the plan is submitted for approval to the unified commander. After approval, the documentation unit in the planning section duplicates the IAP in preparation for the operations briefing, when the oncoming shift is briefed. Once the plan has been disseminated, there is an ongoing evaluation process to ensure that the plan remains relevant to the response. Failure to complete this evaluation process can result in the response getting off track or bogging down. When deviations to the plan occur or new information emerges, it must be analyzed to determine if and how it affects the response. The planning process is cyclic. One of the best resources for the planning process is the U.S. Coast Guard’s Incident Management Handbook.21 Chapter 3 of this reference provides a map (called “Planning P”) to the planning process and agendas for each of the meetings involved in that process. Information Flows inside the ICP Understanding the flow of information in the incident command post is very important. The collection and sharing of information can literally make or break the incident response efforts. Information flows into and out of the command post through various channels. A large amount of information from the field enters the incident command post through the operations section. Often the operations section is the first to know about changes in the situation, injuries to responders, and low resource inventories. While it is the responsibility of the Operations Section Chief to relay this information, there are times in the response when the operations section may be overwhelmed and other sections should periodically check to see if any new information is available. 64

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figure 8. United States Coast Guard Operational Planning P

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The process in which resource orders are determined, developed, and made is essential to smooth and continuous operations on-scene. As described in the preceding discussion of the planning process, Command sets the objectives, and Operations determines the tactics. The resource needs are determined through a cooperative process between the operations and planning sections. Once the resource needs are determined, the planning and logistics sections develop the resource order and pass it to the finance and administration section to procure the resources. A copy of the resource order returns to the operations section so that the items can be identified as they arrive. The original order is returned to the planning section so that it may be incorporated into the historical record of the incident. All plans and orders must be approved by the unified command unless that authority as been delegated. These information flows may vary based on local procedure. Nevertheless, these and other information flows must be established early to avoid congestion and troubles in the incident command operations. multiagency coordination systems (macs) In any emergency operations center around the nation, you might very well find this description: “This EOC is an unfamiliar place where leaders of an organization go to make decisions in little or no time based on little or no information.”22 Although obviously tongue in cheek, this description is also accurate. This is why the increased prominence of multiagency coordination systems (MACS) in NIMS is a significant change. These systems are a combination of procedures, facilities and equipment, and personnel incorporated into a common system with responsibility for coordinating and supporting the incident management activities. These entities support the Incident Commander/unified command and their operations, while leaving the direct tactical and operational responsibility for the incident with the Incident Commander/unified command. NIMS defines the multiagency coordination system as “a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications integrated into a common system with responsibility for coordinating and supporting domestic incident management activities.”23 The system includes such things as the emergency operations center and multiagency coordination entities. The EOC is the physical location where the coordination takes place. The EOC, as with other multiagency coordination centers (MACCs), has no operational or tactical control. Instead the EOC supports the response effort through the support of incident management 66

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policies and priorities; facilitation of logistics support and resource tracking; making resource allocation decisions using incident management priorities; coordination of information related to incident management; and coordination of interagency and intergovernmental issues regarding incident management policies, priorities, and strategies. EOCs and other MACCs, such as departmental operations centers (DOCs), provide a location and direct access for policy-level officials. Multiagency coordination entities (MCEs) are the people and organizations that staff the multiagency coordination centers. The staffing of an EOC/MACC will depend on the needs of the incident, including its size, scope, and makeup. However, the center must be staffed with people who are knowledgeable in the capabilities of their agency or organization. Additionally, these representatives must be capable of making decisions for the organization they represent. In some organizations, these MCEs are referred to as crisis action teams or incident management groups. These entities can also be used remove some of the ancillary tasking from the incident command post to allow the incident command organization to focus on incident response efforts. The EOC can coordinate public information and other support activities for the ICP. In an agriculture incident response, multiagency coordination centers and entities play an essential role. The demand for coordination of resources and efforts in an agriculture incident will be unprecedented. the icp-eoc relationship The relationship between the incident command post and the EOC/ MACC is important to understand. Failure to understand the relationship can result in duplication of efforts, confusing communications, and ultimately serious danger to the response efforts. The EOC/MACC has no onscene command authority and therefore must assist the ICP through providing coordination and support and broad, policy-level guidance. Specifically, the MCE can aid the incident command post by working to: • Ensure that each agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information. • Establish priorities between incidents and/or area commands in concert with the IC(s) or UC(s) involved. • Acquire and allocate resources required by incident management personnel in concert with the priorities established by the IC or UC; incident management and unified command

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• Anticipate and identify future resource requirements. • Coordinate and resolve policy issues arising from the incident(s). • Provide strategic coordination as required.24 The results of not using a multiagency coordination system are clearly shown in the after action reports from Hurricane Katrina. Logistical support failed; communications failed at all levels before, during, and after the hurricane. Had local, state, and federal authorities studied, planned, and used the MACS as intended, recovery would have been faster and the loss of many lives would have been prevented. This should serve as a call to all communities to know their plans, understand and implement the multiagency coordination system, and most important, know and implement the Incident Command System.

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5 strategies and tactics

s communities start planning the response to an agroterrorism incident, there are several issues to address in their plans. To begin this process, each community should review the applicable state animal health emergency response plan so as to better understand the expectations of their state in the case of an animal health emergency. Additionally, local communities should take the time to study the state emergency operations plan, particularly the annexes that may be utilized in the case of an animal health emergency or a terrorist incident. This warrants repeating: study the animal health emergency response plan and terrorism annex for both the local and state emergency operations plans.

A

surveillance and detection Surveillance is a key part of the response to a bioterrorism incident, regardless of whether the target is livestock, crops, or people. It is important to understand that the earlier a bioattack is noticed, the more effective medical treatment will be.1 As shown with the National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan (NAHERP), detection of an animal disease is assumed to take place at the livestock owner or county extension agent level. In a November 2000 article published by the Federation of American Scientists, Dorothy Preslar writes: “The observations of the animal owner or farm manager, the general impressions of the herd or flock noted by a veterinarian or agriculture extension officer, or examinations or tests of individual animals when disease is suspected or evident are basic to surveillance.”2 So what is surveillance? Many have their opinions, and the United States does have an animal health surveillance program, but it is limited to only a few diseases. Preslar defines surveillance as “the creation of important and essential information on all significant factors of disease outbreaks information that may allow us to know how and why the disease has occurred, and if the disease is changing, spreading into new areas or infecting new species; and that may suggest ways to prevent future occurrences.”3

Preslar goes on to state the root of the problem with the state of the surveillance in the United States animal health system. “However, with our [U.S.] system of notifiable diseases, this base of information may be set aside, and sometimes not even preserved in an easily accessible form, if the diagnostic test indicates a disease not on the notification list, or is inconclusive in a situation where the problem is confined to a few small farms, a kind of hit-and-run scenario.”4 In essence, if the disease is not on a state or national watch list, then medical surveillance is not very helpful. In a proposal to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Marc Mattix states: “Efforts should be directed toward improving our surveillance system in order to more quickly detect a bio-terrorism incident based on the appearance of disease symptoms.”5 Besides monitoring the herd on the farm, surveillance should also include information from port-of-entry import inspection and quarantine, immigration screening and fumigation, extension services and field investigations, and diagnostic and research facilities.6 The USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), U.S. Customs, U.S. Border Patrol, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and U.S. Coast Guard are the segments of border security and have had a highly effective system for ports of entry. However, when one considers the number of containers that enter the United States from foreign ports, it is unrealistic to expect APHIS to be able to inspect all of these containers.7 Therefore, instead of limiting the information gathered to an exclusive list of diseases from a select group of people, signs and symptoms should be gathered and compiled on a central database that is available to a variety of sources, including private veterinarians, farm owners, USDA county extension agents, and educational and research institutions. These people must make timely and accurate reports. Additionally, this database must be analyzed by persons with expertise in animal diseases.8 Finally, this database must have controls on it that provide security, yet allow timely, unfettered access to the information for those with a need to know. One method of providing this database would be to couple it with the human health surveillance system. Much of the computerization and hardware would be the same. In fact, with current capabilities, it could be placed on the Internet with heavy encryption capabilities to protect the privacy of those in the system and prevent accidental release of this sensitive information.9

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Another important part of surveillance is the timely identification of the disease. Currently there are few field bioassays for the animal agents. Most of the bioassay agents are for zoonotic diseases such as plague and anthrax. Moreover, the accuracy of these tests has recently been called into question.10 The scientific community must improve the technology for rapid field assessment of potential biological agents that affect animals.11 surveillance of wildlife An additional consideration is the need for active surveillance of indigenous wildlife. This is important because certain species of wildlife can serve as a sentry to the onset of a disease. Just as necessary is the monitoring of wildlife during an outbreak. Deer, elk, feral pigs, feral chickens, and many other wild animals are prevalent in many areas of the United States. Unfortunately, these animals can serve as a reservoir for serious diseases that affect domestic animals.12 To control the spread of a disease, a strong wildlife surveillance program should be developed and implemented rapidly once a presumptive case is made.13 The consequences of an inadequate wildlife surveillance program can be detrimental to the response aimed at controlling a foreign animal disease.

scene control One of the most urgent tasks that local jurisdictions are going to be called upon to execute is to provide scene control. Issues such as personnel accountability, establishing perimeters, and equipment tracking are essential to preventing the spread of the FAD. The responsibility for this task may fall to a multitude of agencies, including local and state law enforcement agencies, fire and rescue services, and the National Guard. Systems for rapid identification of persons and equipment (including vehicles), their work zones, and their skills and abilities should be developed. Picture identification is essential to accomplish this task. Local jurisdictions should develop agreements with the state agency responsible for creating driver’s licenses and in-processing prisoners to accomplish this task. One benefit of the Incident Command System is the “T-card,” ICS form 219. This card, named for its shape, is helpful for the unified

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command team, operations section, and planning section to identify the available equipment and the operators needed to run it. Should an FAD be confirmed, a movement hold of all susceptible animals will be established for a minimum of 72 hours. Simultaneously, all movement of affected animals would stop throughout the country for a minimum of 72 hours.14 In many states, responsibility for this may fall to local and state law enforcement agencies.15 These agencies must be prepared for processing (counting and labeling) the livestock, feeding and boarding them, and acquiring veterinary services. Because the hold means that animals must be stopped on-site without further movement, there may not be the opportunity to organize marshaling areas. Therefore, vendors for items such as fencing, feed, water and sanitation should be identified in the local plans—before they are needed.16 Here is an example of why this is important. After the September 11 attack on the Pentagon, the Arlington County ICS logistics section ordered the equipment needed for the response. However, in addition to the ordered materials and supplies, vendors decided to increase the orders with “equipment that might be useful.” The report states: “Occasionally, vendors increased the number of items ordered, anticipating future requirements. Six months later, the ACFD [fire department] was still negotiating the return of unused goods with some vendors.”17 Additionally, although to a lesser degree than in other terrorist events, panic may cause the spiking of some prices. During and subsequent to the September 11 attacks, there was a significant amount of price gouging on gasoline.18 Because of these potential needs for personnel and equipment, jurisdictions should review and exercise their personnel recall plans and procedures. oper ational security As part of scene control, operational security involves both physical and informational security measures to protect the information and actions being taken to mitigate the incident. Although this term sounds militaristic, it has applications in the civilian world. informational security Informational security is important to the safety of the emergency responders and to the ultimate success of the operation. The information in the emergency response and operations plans needs to be protected, as does the Incident Action Plan. Information concerning the status of emergency operations should be guarded. Public affairs and emergency public 72

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information should be distributed only by the Public Information Officer and his or her deputies. Guidelines must be made known ahead of time to prevent breaches in security. physical security Physical security is as important. Imagine working on an incident and having the incident command post or emergency operations center taken hostage. Imagine having the command post overrun by nonessential personnel or concerned citizens. These situations are likely if physical security is absent. Control zones, commonly referred to as the hot, warm, and cold zones, are important to both physical security and incident containment. In addition to the control zones, there should be a security perimeter established. By denying unnecessary personnel entry, this perimeter will provide a protective barrier and provide a safe working area for unprotected personnel. The perimeter is a method of establishing and maintaining

figure 9. Incident Scene Control Zones strategies and tactics

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personnel accountability. Another purpose is to help control the loss of potential evidence and to restrict the movement of animals.

incident containment There are two main concerns with incident containment. The first is the containment of the pathogen and potential evidence. The second is the containment of unauthorized movement of animals, conveyances, and animal products. As mentioned, control zones provide a great deal of assistance in this area. biosecurity (containment of the pathogen) Biosecurity is a widely used buzzword with which all responders need to become familiar. Biosecurity refers to “security from transmission of infectious diseases, parasites and pests among livestock, poultry, wildlife and zoo animals, and if the disease is zoonotic, among humans as well.”19 Steps must be taken to control to the spread of the pathogen. Issues such as communicating the hazard to the responders and the owners of the animals need to be addressed so that the exact hazards are known, especially if the disease is zoonotic. Other issues include the handling and decontamination of unaffected animals, including pets, of visitors to the area, and of clothing. Another important part of biosecurity ties in with accountability. As personnel from various areas of the United States and the world arrive to lend assistance, special care needs to be taken to identify them. Every person working on the incident scene will need to be “processed” so that they are given specific information pertaining to the incident, assignments, and the pathogen. Appendix A to the APHIS Operational Guidelines for Biosecurity (ninth draft) provides a list of biosecurity “do’s and don’ts” from the ninth draft of the APHIS Operational Guidelines for Biosecurity.20 The hot zone or exclusion zone is an area where all known hazards are grouped. In a highly contagious animal disease outbreak, the hot zone is divided into the first ring and the second ring. The parameters of this zone are determined by technical specialists, including the area veterinarian in charge (AVIC) or other Veterinary Services and state veterinarians. The inner ring is where depopulation will occur. Personnel entering and exiting this area are required to wear personal protective equipment as determined by the site Safety Officer and described in the site safety plan. Additionally, there should be a safe refuge area in this zone. This refuge area 74

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provides the personnel working in the hot zone an area to seek shelter from an unexpected or rapidly expanding escalation in the incident. The warm zone in a hazardous materials incident is also known as the contamination reduction zone. In a highly contagious disease outbreak, this zone will be a buffer zone and will include the decontamination corridor. Anything transiting into or out of this zone will require decontamination, and movement will be limited. The decontamination method and solution should be determined by the planning section, described in detail, and included as part of the Incident Action Plan. Finally, the cold zone is an area where personnel can work without the requirement of personal protective equipment. This zone is also called the inclusion zone. It is a protected zone that provides a safe working area for response personnel. This area may hold the on-site incident command post, equipment staging, and the medical treatment area. The size of this area will be determined by the technical specialists and included in the Incident Action Plan. Each of these zones must be clearly marked and designated, both with physical markers and in the IAP. Each zone must have a clearly marked entry point and an egress point. In most cases, there will need to be an accountability log to document the who, what, when, why, and how of the individuals who enter the zone. In some cases, this entry and egress point may need 24-hour monitoring or staffing due to resistance or the potential for smuggling of animals or looting of property. A significant difference between the control zones as they are used in an FAD response and the use of control zones in another type of incident response is that for an FAD these zones are exponentially larger. The cold zone has the potential of being more than 10 miles in diameter. The hot zone may be 0.25 to 6 miles in diameter. It cannot be stressed enough that there are several extenuating circumstances that will be factored into the size of the zone. The sizes of most exclusion zones are described in many state and local emergency operations plans. The final decision concerning the dimensions of the control zones are the responsibility of the state and USDA veterinarians.

evidence preservation Evidence protection is a fundamental issue in a potential or suspected terrorist incident. Preserving evidence is the responsibility of every responder. However, the proper collection of evidence requires special strategies and tactics

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training. Each animal carcass, laboratory report, and all other things on a scene are evidence and should be documented and preserved until personnel are told otherwise. In the case of a biological incident, the evidence may serve a dual purpose. Evidence has obvious significance to the criminal investigation of the incident. However, evidence also has epidemiological significance in many cases. Therefore, extreme care should be taken to preserve evidence. Only at the peril of human lives should evidence be destroyed before it can be properly processed by criminal investigators. Likewise, the epidemiological evidence has significant value to the criminal investigation. As was shown in the Amerithrax case, laboratory results have identified the exact strain of the anthrax used in the letters sent to Representative Tom Daschle, broadcaster Tom Brokaw, and Senator Patrick Leahy.21 The results from these laboratory analyses will be important in identifying possible suspects in the case. Because of this, it is of the utmost importance to the integrity of the criminal investigation that the responders to an animal health emergency created by terrorism plan and work together early to preserve, collect, and properly process any and all evidence. Key players in the criminal investigation are the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the USDA’s Office of the Inspector General. However, other essential players are the farm/yard/lot manager, who will be the first to see anything that is out of place on the facility; the local veterinarian, who is in essence the first responder and the foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD) who will draw the samples for analysis; and the lab workers who are performing the diagnostic testing. It is important to the integrity of the criminal investigation that the organizations these people represent develop valid written procedures that will withstand the scrutiny of the courtroom. Important considerations for preservation of evidence are: Documentation of the scene—including locations of any suspicious items, locations of casualties, a sketch of the scene, and as many details as possible concerning the scene. Photographs of the scene—these may be motion pictures or videotape of the scene, still photographs, or digital pictures. Local policies and procedures should be written to direct which is best to use. Contaminated evidence—any contaminated clothing or articles taken from the scene must be bagged and tagged appropriately to prevent the spread of the disease or any danger to human or animal health. 76

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Chain of custody—the chain of custody is a complete accounting for the evidence from the time it is discovered to the time it is presented in court. In some states, this chain of custody can only be maintained by peace officers. Nevertheless, the chain of custody is a documented cradle-to-grave accounting for every piece of evidence and is essential to the integrity of the evidence when it is presented in the courtroom.

vaccination, depopulation, and carcass disposal Some difficult special requirements arise in a disease or bioterrorism incident involving livestock. Animals that constitute the living of their owners may have to be killed. Disposal may involve large numbers of carcasses. Emotions are intense at the scene and well beyond it. vaccination Contentious issues concerning the containment of a foreign animal disease are vaccination and depopulation. Vaccination is the administration of a live or dead virus to increase a body’s protection against a disease.22 However, in the case of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) and some other animal diseases, vaccinated animals cannot be differentiated in serological studies from animals with the actual diseases. Therefore, vaccinated animals cannot be exported or sent out of the infected zone; farmers suffer losses even if animals remain alive and well. Additionally, the amount of FMD vaccine in the United States and abroad is very limited, and deployment of the vaccine takes a significant period of time. The vaccine can be requested by the states but can only be released by the secretary of agriculture. Some states may resist the use of the vaccine; however, the secretary of agriculture does have the legal power to force decisions on states that cannot or will not control an FAD under the provisions of the new National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS). depopulation Depopulation is the euthanasia of animals. The disease and the animals involved dictate the method of depopulation. This activity will most likely be left to the veterinarians and animal health technicians. However, assistance in corralling or otherwise capturing the animals may require non–animal health personnel. Some methods of depopulation can pose dangers to response personnel. strategies and tactics

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Complicating matters further, depopulation is a focus for animal rights organizations concerned about the ethical handling of animals. Many farmers are also concerned about vaccination and depopulation because of the extreme financial losses these measures mean. Because of these issues, there is potential for demonstrations and even violence against the response workers. Responders should be aware of their surroundings and note anything that is out of place. The potential for a secondary device may be small but is nevertheless present. Wider depopulation efforts may be required in the case of a disease that can spread to wildlife. This may call for an open hunt supervised by game wardens and wildlife managers to remove susceptible and infected wild animals. Policies and procedures should be drawn up well before they are needed. The possible combination of distressed livestock owners, strained emergency officials, armed hunters, and angry animal rights activists all near the scene could be an explosive mix. carcass disposal Dee Ellis of the Texas Animal Health Commission writes this concerning carcass disposal: “The difficulties encountered by officials involved in carcass disposal management during recent disaster events have highlighted the need for the establishment of efficient and effective advance planning mechanisms, to mitigate the consequences of future carcass disposal situations.”23 This is a serious issue that could have lasting effects on the public psyche as well as public and animal health and the economy.24 Determining when, how, and where to dispose of carcasses requires extensive coordination of local, state, and federal authorities.25 It is a task that needs to be preplanned and then reconsidered by a unified command organization because of the numerous stakeholders in such an incident.26 There are several different types of carcass disposal that may be utilized in an animal health emergency; however, some may not be acceptable in an agroterrorism incident. Following are descriptions of the commonly accepted disposal methods and their advantages and disadvantages. Burial This is the method of choice for carcass disposal in an animal health emergency involving an infectious agent. However, this is contingent upon having the necessary amount of appropriate land to bury the ani78

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mals, and the drawback of consigning land to this use is the potential for deed restrictions to be placed on the land where the carcasses are buried.27 The USDA recommends a trench 7 feet wide by 9 feet deep and about 3 feet long per cow.28 This equates to one linear mile of trench for about every 1,700 cattle. For a feedlot of 100,000 head of cattle, the trench would need to be more than 58 linear miles and would require moving more than 21 million cubic feet of earth! Another consideration that burial raises involves the gases deriving from decomposing organic materials. These gases may produce potentially toxic atmospheres and/or aesthetic problems.29 Finally, inspections should be made on a regular basis to detect seepage and tampering. Incineration The burning of animal carcasses is also a viable method of carcass disposal during an FAD incident. The three commonly used methods are open-air, air curtain, and pathology or biological incineration. In open-air incineration, carcasses are placed in open pits lined with combustible materials such as straw, wood, coal, or liquid fuel.30 In air curtain incineration the carcasses are placed in a burn pit or refractory box, and air is forced into the pit at speeds up to 120 miles per hour. This high-speed air works as a curtain and forces oxygen into the fire, increasing the efficiency of combustion.31 Pathological or biological incineration means burning carcasses in an incinerator. However, there are some factors that require consideration before choosing incineration as an option:32 Type and number of carcasses—Carcasses with a high fat content burn better than those without fat or with nominal fat content. For example, hogs burn better than chickens. Additionally, the space needed to burn one adult hog is 80 percent less than the space needed to burn one cow. Site location and access—Burning animals upwind of a facility such as a school or hospital or high population areas may be a public health concern. Having pyres near a scenic highway may be a public relations nightmare. It is important to have a solid access path to the property. Many farms and commercial facilities are built in outlying areas. Access may be difficult in inclement weather, such as rain and snow. Fuel and equipment availability—Some methods of incineration require additional fuels to burn at temperatures adequate to reduce animal carcasses to ash and bone. These fuels may range from straw to fossil strategies and tactics

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Burial is the method of choice for carcass disposal in an animal health emergency involving an infectious agent, but it can require a large amount of land if large animals are involved. Open-air incineration in a pit lined with combustible materials is an alternative. Courtesy Air Burners, LLC.

fuels. Fuel requirements must be discussed and supported in the logistics section. The National Animal Health Emergency Management System Operational Guidelines for disposal issued by the USDA provide resources and tables for estimating the needs. Equipment may limit some options. Biological incinerators are usually in fixed locations and are few and far between; further, such equipment can incinerate only small amounts of material. Environmental considerations—The environmental considerations involved in disposal by incineration are significant. Hazardous substances can be created as a by-product of combustion. These materials can leach into the soil and groundwater, rendering them useless for many years. The EPA and state counterparts assess hefty fines for violations of environmental regulations, regardless of the operations. Composting—This is the controlled decomposition of organic materials and consists of two stages. The first stage is a high-temperature active stage and the second is lower-temperature “curing” phase. This can occur 80

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Burning carcasses in an incinerator is termed pathology incineration. Courtesy Air Burners, LLC.

either in bins or in windrows.33 However, the use of composting is discouraged if the proper management and equipment are unavailable.34 Rendering—This is a process of separating the animal fats and proteins through a cooking process.35 By far, this is the most economical carcass disposal method. However, a rendering plant may not be available, and the movement of carcasses to a suitable rendering plant may be prohibited to prevent the spread of the disease.36 Alkaline hydrolysis—In this process, carcasses are placed in one of two chemicals—potassium hydroxide or sodium hydroxide—and then placed under heat and pressure. During this process the carcass tissue is chemically decomposed. This is a very inexpensive process in cost per pound. However, as with rendering, the necessary equipment is costly and permanently installed. Research and development are under way for portable alkaline hydrolysis equipment.37 Whether carcass disposal is to be by burial or incineration, numerous matters require consideration before answering the questions of when, how, and where. Biosecurity is a primary issue.38 In events that are caused by a disease agent, avoiding the spread of the disease requires biosecurity measures to be taken, particularly for agents that warrant a movement restriction or hold. These biosecurity measures may restrict the options for carcass disposal to a select method.39 Again, this requires preplanning that is integrated at the local, state, and federal levels. A second issue is that of protection of the environment.40 As noted, strategies and tactics

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there are many environmental restrictions in place to protect the soil, sources of water, and the air. It is important to be cognizant of the various local, state, and federal laws and regulations to safeguard the environment. Additionally, it is beneficial to include environmental and natural resources authorities in the planning process to define the issues better and to determine what regulations might be waived in the event of a disaster. The logistics of disposal are a third issue. As already mentioned, equipment, fuels, and qualified personnel must be planned for and secured. Coordination, including permitting for the various functions, should be planned for rather than conducted on an ad hoc basis. Finally, as also already noted, the aesthetic impact that a carcass disposal operation will have on the surrounding area requires consideration. While this may seem minor in light of the gravity of the situation, it is important to evaluate how the placement of the operation, the pit, or the pyre will affect the community.

cleaning and disinfection (decontamination) Decontamination, commonly referred to as C&D, is the physical and chemical removal of contaminants. On the scene of an animal health emergency, it is a very broad subject. The decontamination of unaffected animals, response workers, equipment, and the facility are all concerns. Additionally, the different types of decontamination may be handled by various agencies during the distinct phases of a response. Six basic types of decontamination substances are used on the scene of an animal health emergency: Soaps and detergents—Examples of these are disinfectants found in hospitals and households. These are probably the best known disinfectant agents for human skin. They work on many types of viruses and bacteria if used in combination with water temperatures of 100ºF or higher.41 Oxidizing agents—Examples of these are chlorine and sodium hypochlorite. These agents can pose serious human health risks and should be used carefully. They are not meant for use on skin, and if mixed with hydrocarbons they can cause a chemical chain reaction resulting in fire. A commercially available disinfectant that is commonly used is Virkon®. This agent is effective against most types of pathogens and has a low toxicity level.42

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Alkalis—Sodium hydroxide (caustic soda) is the best example of an alkali. It is a low-cost and easily accessible chemical. Alkalis are the best agents for decontaminating housing, yards, drain waste, and sewage collection areas.43 Acids—Citric acid and hydrochloric acid are examples of effective acids. However, their use is for very different purposes. Citric acid in low concentrations can be used effectively on human skin and clothing. Hydrochloric acid is a stronger acid and may be used for concrete surfaces.44 Aldehydes—These are toxic substances and must be used with extreme care. They are mildly corrosive and can be used in large-scale decontamination of facilities.45 Insecticides—Insecticides are not likely to be used unless the disease vector is an insect. Many states require that personnel using insecticides have special training prior to disseminating the chemicals. These are very toxic and can result in dangerous consequences if used improperly. Most of the decontaminants listed pose significant health risks to humans if handled incorrectly. The determination of which substance(s) will be used should be made cooperatively in the unified command section in consultation with the planning section. Material safety data sheets are required for all hazardous substances employed, and environmental health personnel should be consulted if substances hazardous to the environment are to be used. Additionally, a written plan should be developed and briefed to all personnel on the incident scene. The plan should include the precise steps of decontamination and who is to do the decontamination. In many cases, personnel are allowed to self-decontaminate. This should be monitored carefully by the site biosecurity unit leader or decontamination officer.

movement and trade The issues of movement and trade are complex. Determining when and where livestock can be moved during which stage of an incident is confusing, even for those who are regulating the movement restrictions. Further complicating this is the fact that for certain FADs, one failure in the movement restriction or hold can mean the difference between isolation of products from one state or the entire nation. For example, if a presumptive diagnosis of foot-and-mouth disease occurred in New Mexico and the interstate movement restriction was violated, the OIE and other

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international organizations like the European Union’s Common Market would not allow trade with the United States. However, if the restriction were maintained, it is conceivable that trade with states other than New Mexico might be restored in a timely fashion.46 Should a movement restriction or hold be enacted, local communities are forced to answer the who, when, where, and how of the issue. Agencies need to work in cooperation with the state veterinarian to determine who has the legal authority to stop and hold animals in transit. The state department of agriculture, working with local and state law enforcement agencies, must determine whether the animals will be turned around and sent to their location of origin or held in place. Neighboring states must work together to ensure that one state’s plan is not be thwarted by another state’s plan. If the decision is made to hold the animals, local communities must identify areas for marshaling animals in transit. The personnel and supplies required to accomplish the task will need to be stockpiled or arranged for through memoranda of understanding. Items such as food, hay, fencing, and water should all be identified and planned for before they are needed. Provision should be made for site security, maintaining an inventory of all the animals, and supplying them with medical care. The cost of this type of operation has the potential to be enormous; therefore, the plan for reimbursement or funding should be established and evaluated before it is actually used. Finally, plans for the deployment and implementation of these personnel and provisions will need to be written and exercised. If animals are to be turned around at the state borders, all ingress and egress points or nearest “bottlenecks” or control points will need to be identified and the information disseminated to those tasked with the duties of turning these animals around. Much of this work has already been done by state and local law enforcement agencies; therefore, including those agencies in the planning is helpful and prevents duplication of effort. Additionally, areas must be identified where a turnaround can be accommodated without potentially cross-infecting the animals, or backing up, or otherwise disrupting the flow of traffic. Roadblocks will need to be established and staffed as necessary to prevent opportunistic smuggling of potentially infected animals into uninfected areas. The humane society and similar organizations can provide valuable guidance on proper care for the animals. While this suggestion and the guidance may seem superfluous in a crisis, the use of these organizations 84

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During an agricultural incident, movement restrictions may be imposed on livestock or poultry in transit, which will need to be halted and marshaled. Photo by Scott Bauer, courtesy USDA.

can provide helpful information that can keep up public confidence during a terrible situation. It is important to remember that the movement restriction does not apply only to live animals. Animal products such as milk and meat and conveyances such as the railcars and trucks used to ship these animals are also to be halted. Communities and food-processing facilities should examine their capacity to store animal products.

volunteers and freelancing Volunteers and freelancing responders are not unique to animal health emergencies or terrorist acts. However, they are complicating factors that local communities must address. The after-action report following the attack on the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, states the problem well: “Organizations, response units, and individuals proceeding on their own initiative directly to an incident site, without the knowledge and permission of the host jurisdiction and the Incident Commander, complicate the exercise of command, increase the risks faced by bona fide responders, and exacerbate the challenge of accountability.”47 strategies and tactics

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Volunteers Volunteers are people who render a service or take part in a transaction while having no legal concern or interest in the matter.48 They provide a host of much needed services that can be invaluable in times of crisis in a community. As the same September 11 after-action report noted: The outpouring of support from the residents of Arlington County was another source of strength for the firefighters. Neighbors showed up at fire stations, cooked and served dinner, then stayed to clean up. . . . Logistical support came from many sources and directions. . . . The volume of contracted food services was significantly reduced as the abundance of other sources grew. On September 12, the North Carolina Baptist Disaster Men’s Relief unit, working under the American Red Cross, arrived on the scene and announced that, by dinner time, all feeding requirements would be met. Their dining services offered a complete range of menu choices and functioned day and night during operations. Over the course of several days, Outback Steakhouse, Burger King, and McDonald’s also set up operations onsite as part of the American Red Cross disaster relief mass care support mission under Federal Response Plan Emergency Support Function #6. The American Red Cross–coordinated organizations prepared and fed 187,941 meals at the Pentagon.49 The outpouring of assistance that took place in the United States after 9–11 was new to some; but as any preacher in a farm community can tell you, when a crisis hits in the community, the assistance pours in.50 Volunteers provide various services in the aftermath of disasters, including distribution of clothing and personal care items, provision of shelter and food, debris removal, and cleanup of damage, among other deeds.51 Many communities already take for granted the fact that their fire protection service is supplied by volunteers, but it is essential that communities anticipate the arrival and work of additional valuable people and prepare for this.52 Here is some advice from the emergency responders at Oklahoma City on how to prepare for volunteers:53 • Establish clearinghouses for donations and volunteers that verify the needs of the response, inform the public of those needs, and maintain accountability for donations.

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• • • •

Inform families of what assistance is available. Manage the volunteers to include personnel accountability. Provide on-site relief for rescue workers. Plan how to demobilize the volunteer forces.

In addition to these points, there are several logistical considerations to bear in mind. A complicating factor of many natural disasters such as hurricanes and floods can be the reduction in consumable resources— potable water and food—and in shelter, restroom facilities, and viable transportation routes. These problems can arise in a terrorist attack too. In light of all of these considerations, it is essential to develop a plan to meet the needs of volunteers. Freelancing Freelancing means acting independently without being affiliated with or authorized by an organization.54 This is a serious problem that must be dealt with immediately, even if it means sending assisting units home.55 Many individuals, possibly including those who are directly affected by an FAD, will attempt to assist in the response efforts. Some will bypass the efforts of the Incident Command System. This may be by intent or through not knowing what is in process, but it is essential that the Incident Commander get a firm hold on the freelancers early in the incident. The best methods of doing so are through an education program on the Incident Command System and response operations and by providing all arriving responders an indoctrination period so that they can become familiar with the operations. A strong command presence also aids in curtailing freelancing.56 Additionally, a strong personnel accountability program is essential in meeting this challenge. Finally, there are legal remedies that can be taken to address these types of situations, if required. Most states have laws that attach charges to interfering with police or firefighting operations, and some states have taken this further and made interfering with disaster response a misdemeanor.

working with the media If the past is any indication of the future, one of the most formidable challenges a community will face during an FAD incident is managing the

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media. Communities should divide media management into two areas: emergency public information and public affairs. Emergency public information is defined by FEMA as “information which is disseminated primarily in anticipation of an emergency or at the actual time of an emergency and in addition to providing information, frequently directs actions, instructs and transmits direct orders.”57 The public affairs component contributes to the well-being of the community after a disaster by disseminating accurate, consistent, timely, and easy-tounderstand information. This is accomplished by instilling confidence that government will conduct response and recovery operations fast, effectively, and efficiently; by providing critical information about how to apply for assistance and about the location and status of life-sustaining shelters and resources; and by supplying authoritative information to counter unsubstantiated rumors.58 Within emergency response organizations there is often a degree of distrust of the media. Famous (and infamous) journalists have pretended to be emergency responders or public officials in order to get the story, and some responders have felt the sting of the pen or the camera. Members of media have a mission: to make high ratings so as to sell advertising spots and help their employers make a profit. The quest for high ratings can lead to sensationalism bordering on the ludicrous; as with other industries, the actions of a few have spoiled the broth for all. Yet it is also true that media outlets are a key part of the response effort. They can reach a large portion of the local area and wider region in a rapid fashion. In a time of disaster, many journalists will flock to the scene. In the NAHERP, the USDA states that it will coordinate the flow of information on-site and from the Joint Information Center (JIC) that will be established in Riverdale, Maryland. Experience has shown, however, that in their pursuit of the story, journalists will go to the site to gather information. During the search phase after the Columbia space shuttle disaster in East Texas, the media not only used NASA’s JIC but also responded by turning up en masse in Nacogdoches and the surrounding towns.59 The same occurred before and after Hurricane Katrina. Presumably the same would happen if a foreign animal disease broke out. Every community must therefore anticipate an influx of media and plan for this occurrence. Strategies to handle the media onslaught during an FAD will vary, but there are several things a community can do to prepare for this and to cope once the media arrive.

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1. be accur ate and timely. To gain and maintain credibility, with both the media and the public, it is essential to be a credible and timely source of information. Those in the public sector—whether responders or elected officials—understand that things change rapidly, especially in the early stages of an incident. Because of this, accuracy may seem questionable. This point should be made to the public and media often. The second point to make is that efforts are focused on providing timely information. Although this is difficult in the early stages of incident response, it is important for the entire run. A method for doing this is to have regularly scheduled news conferences, even if this means stating that nothing has changed. 2. have a plan. It is also essential that there be a media plan defining the responsibilities of the Public Information Officer and outlining the flow of information. It is important that local media outlets, including print and radio, are informed of the plan. 3. tr ain the response agencies. Most emergency responders understand that having a media presence is a double-edged sword. However, some responders may seek their moment of fame and may jeopardize the response effort or derail public confidence by making statements contrary to those of the officials. Even a simple statement made to a roving reporter during a response can have widespread repercussions. For example, on the evening of September 11, 2001, a well-meaning New York City firefighter was interviewed by an NBC reporter near the World Trade Center collapse zone. During the 20second segment televised internationally, the firefighter made an urgent appeal for gloves and helmets. As a result, the Kentucky State Emergency Operations Center received several calls from citizens offering to send gloves and helmets. As part of the training program, it is useful to advise local media of possible hazards arising from independent reporting on a crisis situation. In Oklahoma City, for example, a nurse was killed after she self-dispatched to the Murrah Building because the media put out a broad, inaccurate request for assistance; both reporter and nurse aimed to help, but the result was lethal.

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4. work through local media outlets to disseminate information. This may seem trivial, but it is a big deal to the local media outlets. This tactic gives the local media power and helps the local community to maintain some control on the information distribution. The community’s responders have the opportunity to plan and develop professional relationships with local media in advance, building trust between the organizations. 5. set ground rules and stick with them. The best way to avoid getting in a bad place during an interview or press conference is to establish the ground rules and stick to them. Determining what purpose the interview or press conference has is a necessary task. If the established ground rules are violated, the media can take that as a signal to proceed with further violations. 6. be prepared for the ambush interview. We watch them on television—the pool of reporters lying in wait for someone to walk past or drive up and then firing a barrage of questions. To avoid having officials caught with that “deer-in-the-headlights” look, it is important to keep the potential ambushees informed. It can also be relayed to the media that the emergency organization will decline to respond to such tactics. A solid step toward prevention of this sort of media gathering is to provide reporters with timely and accurate information (see item 1). Following are some tips found in the January 3, 2003, online edition of the Tallahassee Democrat.60 While some may seem frivolous, they often hold true and should be taken to heart. • • • • • • • • • • 90

Be organized. Be in charge. Never wear dark glasses during an interview. Never say “no comment.” Always get your story out first. Truth never catches up to a lie. Say it in 30 seconds. If you don’t want it in print, don’t say it. Never give your personal opinion. Don’t assume the interview is over until the crew drives away. Avoid being outwardly hostile toward the media. Don’t screw up on a slow news day.

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Responders and other officials have little choice but to accept that in this country, the media will flock to the scene of an incident because it is news. It does not matter whether the previous relationship with the media has been good or poor. It does not matter whether the media is loved or disliked. What does matter is that they will be there, and you will have to work with them.

recovery The National Response Plan defines recovery as actions and programs that “help individuals, communities, and the environment directly impacted by the incident return to normal where feasible. Recovery actions assist victims and their families, restore institutions to regain economic stability and confidence, rebuild or replace destroyed property, and reconstitute government operations and services. Recovery actions often extend long after the incident itself. Recovery programs include hazard mitigation components designed to avoid damage from future incidents.”61 Recovery is concerned with returning the community, the responders, and even the country back to as close to normal as possible. It is a substantial task that requires a great deal of preparation and effort to accomplish effectively and efficiently. The recovery issues for an FAD are extremely complex. Recovery, like the response, occurs along two parallel tracks with some overlap. Repayment of some costs incurred will be through the Robert T. Stafford Act Declaration, while other costs are covered by the authorities of the U.S. secretary of agriculture. For example, reimbursement to a farmer for infected animals euthanized would be paid by the USDA, but payment for disposal of carcasses would be through a disaster declaration using the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Assistance and Recovery Act. Each community must evaluate current laws to determine how costs would be reimbursed or paid in the case of a terrorist incident involving agriculture and must plan accordingly. The key to recovering costs is documentation of the incident. importance of documentation There are some universal strategies for an efficient recovery process, and none is more important than the complete documentation of the incident. Each agency likely has policies and procedures to capture the staffing and other resource expenditures. The National Incident Management System has provisions such as unit logs, incident action plans, and strategies and tactics

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financial documents, which help ensure the documentation of an incident. Documentation functions are also critical parts of the Incident Command System organization. These functions are accomplished by units including the documentation unit in the planning section and the administration and finance section. Documentation serves many purposes for recovery. It provides as the official, legal record for the incident response; the record of expenditures; a record of injuries; and the record of appraisal and restitution paid. In effect, if an action is not recorded, or if a purchase is not written down, then legally speaking, it never occurred. As mentioned, it is likely that the trajectory of an incident of this magnitude will involve legal proceedings. If not in actual court cases, all aspects of the incident will be reviewed and investigated by Congress and likely by independent commissions, such as those associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. These investigations are important for many reasons, including the closure and the sense of healing that they foster. Incident action plans, unit logs, compensation forms, injury reports, and other kinds of documentation are reviewed and help supply an understanding of procedures. In addition, documentation helps improve future responses. The documentation serves as the basis for after-action reports that include lessons learned. These lessons learned can help responders refine their response for a future, similar incident. The after-action report helps policymakers of local, state, and federal governments improve existing laws and regulations and develop new ones that can strengthen the response to a future event or even prevent it. In short, the documentation provides the foundation for responders, the public, and the world—the fullest accounting of the actions taken before, during, and after an incident has occurred.

critical incident stress management Critical incident stress management (CISM) is essential in any disaster. The emotional impact a terrorist incident can have on a community is huge. The fear created by these events is overwhelming. The stress on responders who witness the horrific scenes of mass depopulation and carcass disposal can weigh heavily on their psychological health. This applies especially for those conducting the depopulation efforts. During a 1997 foot-and-mouth disease crisis in Taiwan, many of those who were tasked 92

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with depopulating herds were treated for psychological distress.62 If depopulation is left to veterinarians or other animal health professionals, the emotional injury can be significant because what they have to do is the antithesis of their training. These professionals are charged with healing animals and are trained to use euthanasia as a last resort. Communities should contact organizations that provide training and services in CISM, including the International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, to develop CISM teams for such an emergency. Agencies and organizations should have policies that mandate the responder’s attendance at debriefing sessions but that make participation voluntary. Efforts should be made to provide counseling to the community as well.

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6 concepts to improve the response here are many challenges to responding to a WMD incident involving agriculture. However, the capabilities provided by specialized response teams and mechanisms lead to the surveillance of susceptible species, including those in the wild, and can aid communities as they address the challenges of an agroterrorism incident.

T

specialized response teams A significant challenge for the agriculture community is a lack of depth in response resources—in equipment, and even more so in personnel. A prime example of this lack of depth is the fact that there are less than three hundred foreign animal disease diagnosticians (FADD) in the nation. The USDA states that there is a FADD within less than a four-hour drive from any part of the continental United States, but the average number of FADDs per state is less than six.1 An intentional, covert introduction of a foreign animal disease would overwhelm the capabilities of these valuable resources, resulting in increased vulnerability to foreign animal diseases. There are numerous examples of how the limitations in personnel affect the incident response. During the 2003 Exotic Newcastle Disease outbreak in California, incident management teams from the U.S. Forest Service had limited availability, as did overhead teams from California’s Governor’s Office of Emergency Services and California Department of Forestry. This resulted in an incident management organization that, while somewhat effective, was not efficient; and this affected the response by limiting the finance and logistics functions of the effort.2 This case is one of many that call attention to a major concern of first response agencies as well as the federal government—states and local jurisdictions may be depending on limited assets that may not be available during a terrorist attack on the United States.3 Overall, there are limited numbers of specialized response teams with the skills required to mitigate a terrorist incident involving use of weapons

Specialized response teams can provide capabilities for the surveillance of susceptible species, including those in the wild. Photo by Scott Bauer, courtesy USDA.

of mass destruction against agriculture. The specialized teams essential to euthanizing animals humanely to cleaning and disinfecting premises or conveyances are very few. Because of this, the resources communities need may be significantly delayed in arriving to some places if a terrorist incident involves multiple venues or multiple regions of the nation. A solution to these challenges is for states and local jurisdictions to develop their own specialized response teams. Texas and North Carolina have already developed teams that specialize in animal health emergency response. While dedicated animal health response teams may not be an option for every state, teams with dual uses could be trained to manage certain functions within an animal health emergency response. For example, hazardous materials decontamination teams could be developed to conduct cleaning and disinfection operations for an animal health emergency. However, they must be trained to do so. Teams would be certified through the National Mutual Aid and Resource Management Initiative, training would be standardized, and members would be certified, as required by the National Incident Management System (NIMS). This would ensure that a euthanasia team leader in Washington would have the same skills and capabilities as a euthanasia team leader in Florida. Finally, these teams, especially those that would be considered state assets, could be made available to other states under mutual aid agreements such as the National Emergency Management Association’s Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). Descriptions of teams that may be needed to mitigate the effects of a terrorism incident involving agriculture are given in the sections that follow. Many of their roles and procedures are defined in a series of National Animal Health Emergency Management System Guideline documents. Therefore, specific responsibilities of the teams are not explained in the present book.

incident management teams Incident management teams, commonly referred to as overhead teams, have been utilized for decades. The U.S. Forest Service and many states have developed incident management teams to manage large incidents, such as wildfires. Incident management teams are highly trained and experienced in the Incident Command System. Their background includes specific training for individual positions within the system. Local communities and states should develop their own incident man96

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agement teams. The teams should be based out of moderate to large communities or from regions made up of smaller communities. Communities will certainly benefit by having these teams, chiefly in not having to rely on resources out of their control and not having to wait for teams from other parts of the country arrive. Further, an incident may require multiple incident management teams, especially if it involves large and widely separated geographic areas, as in the Columbia shuttle disaster.4 Additionally, incident management teams can be used for more than agriculture emergencies. There is much overlap in the management needs from one incident to another because many of the functions are the same regardless of the incident. Technical specialists can be used to modify the incident management team’s focus. It is important to note that these incident management teams should not be developed purely for agricultural incidents; rather they should be developed for all hazards.5 Nevertheless, an incident management team does not fit all incidents. The skills and experience required for the incident management team to be effective, as well as efficient, are commensurate with the complexity of the incident. For example, an incident involving only local response assets, occurring in a single jurisdiction, lasting for a less than a day, and within the same geographic area might require an incident management team that has handled only day-to-day incidents and that has had minimal training. By contrast, managing a complex incident involving many emergency response assets and personnel and multiple jurisdictions, lasting for several days, and/or occurring in separated geographic areas requires a team that has handled multiple large-scale incidents and in which members are all highly skilled, experienced specialists. Moreover, these specialists must be a well-developed team experienced in all facets of operations, logistical management, administration and financial management, and incident planning.6 A committee under the auspices of the USDA is defining the incident management team requirements for various incident types. Once this process is completed, incidents will be defined by their complexity so as to ensure that the skills and capabilities of an incident management team correspond to requirements of the incident.7

cleaning and disinfecting (c&d) team Cleaning and disinfection of contaminated areas and equipment is essential for the control of the incident, and this is a task requiring significoncepts to improve the response

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cant staffing and specialization. It is important to have personnel capable of executing the C&D plan in an efficient and effective fashion. It is feasible to train hazardous materials decontamination teams, including remediation teams from private contractors, to conduct the C&D operations. Training for certain tasks, such as the cleaning and disinfection of conveyances, can be done on-site for specialized responders, such as hazardous materials responders.8 However, the expertise required to lead such a team is highly specialized and should not be taught on-site. Therefore, team leaders must be trained in the proper techniques of cleaning and disinfecting before responding to an incident.9 The teams should consist primarily of veterinary technicians and hazardous materials emergency responders; teams should also have access to epidemiologists for technical guidance and to other subject matter experts who can address issues raised by the cleaning and disinfection process, including environmental damage, thoroughness of the work, and documentation of operations.

euthanasia teams The euthanasia of ill and injured animals is possibly the most contentious issue in a response to a foreign animal disease incident, whether it involves terrorism or not. Animal rights organizations, such as the Humane Society, are genuinely concerned that animals be treated humanely. Other groups, including terrorist groups, may use the mistreatment of animals as a reason to attack the response effort. Thus it becomes extremely important to the overall response effort that animals are not being mistreated, and that this is evident to all concerned. Animal rights organizations attempted to prosecute egg producers in southern California, for example, during the 2003 Exotic Newcastle Disease outbreak. The farmers were being charged with animal cruelty because they depopulated a flock of more than thirty thousand live birds by shredding them in a wood chipper. This may be an acceptable practice for carcass disposal, but it is not a recommended form of euthanasia sanctioned by the American Veterinary Medical Association.10 As a result, the incident turned into a publicity nightmare for an egg production operation in California and for the USDA.11 Had a euthanasia team been used, the chickens would have been euthanized with carbon dioxide. Another example of the need for euthanasia teams comes from the

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1997 foot-and-mouth disease outbreak in Taiwan. During this incident, military conscripts were used to depopulate large numbers of swine. Many of the personnel involved required extensive counseling to help them recover emotionally due to the amount of death and the poor training they received in preparation for the gruesome task.12 Furthermore, imagine the state of public opinion concerning a response effort that included National Guard soldiers shooting cow after cow on farm after farm using M-16s and pistols. Although gunshot is an approved method of euthanasia, it may be among the least favorable for animal rights groups and public opinion.13 Many states plan to use narcotics to euthanize large animals. This process, while effective and humane, can also be time-consuming and requires veterinarians to administer the medication.14 Because of these and many other examples, states should develop multiple teams trained in the proper techniques of euthanasia, including the use of proper euthanasia devices. It is possible that the development of these teams and certification requirements may allow the Food and Drug Administration and the Drug Enforcement Agency to loosen restrictions on the use of narcotics in extreme situations. Such a loosening of regulations would allow teams to administer the narcotics without the presence of a veterinarian, thus speeding up the process.

surveillance One of the weakest areas of preparing for a disaster involving biological agents for human health is medical surveillance.15 As noted in chapter 1, agriculture has received less attention than all other areas when it comes to funding for preparedness. Advanced technology for medical surveillance for agriculture is nearly nonexistent, even though this is essential to the early detection of a disease outbreak.16 There are two parts to surveillance for agriculture: surveillance of livestock and surveillance of wildlife. Each presents its own challenge; and each requires extensive resources. The Intermountain West states (Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, North Dakota, and South Dakota) have jointly forged a unique disease surveillance and reporting system to bring about early disease detection and response. With funding from a grant through the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, this project links together the public health surveillance systems and veterinary health surveillance

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systems of the five states by creating a partnership involving public health, veterinary health, poison control centers, emergency communication centers, animal shelters, game wardens, ask-a-nurse services, and similar agencies and organizations to acquire and compile disease intelligence. Should this intelligence indicate an unexplained, acute illness or early stage disease symptoms, the system initiates focused surveillance.17 This surveillance is especially helpful in the situations where animals are regularly checked by qualified people, such as in feedlots and zoos. The reporting program has four primary provisions: 1. Syndromic surveillance—This means looking for organ system syndromes in susceptible populations. 2. Regional surveillance—The program is based on geography rather than political boundaries. 3. Integration—Animal and human disease surveillance are jointly addressed. 4. Partnerships—By forming nontraditional partnerships with a diverse set of professionals, the reporting program casts a broader net of information gathering.18 Through this program, the issues of animal health surveillance are being overcome. States and local communities should seek to build similar relationships to accomplish the same functions. The Intermountain West program is focused on the health of farm animals. Most veterinarians seldom encounter wild animals and birds unless dead, sick, or injured. Wildlife is more likely to be encountered by wildlife biologists, game wardens, and hunters. Thomas Walton describes the wildlife industry thus: Like traditional animal agriculture, the wildlife industry in many countries is diverse, rapidly growing, and supported broadly by numerous advocacy groups, producers, and private owners. This industry includes production of captive wildlife, free-ranging and relocated wildlife cherished by sports enthusiasts and environmentalists, and importers of exotic animals and products. The number and diversity of captive-held nontraditional agricultural and pet species are dramatically increased by the millions of exotic animals imported annually. In addition, free-ranging populations in many countries have expanded because of governmental and private conservation initiatives; adap-

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tive, natural selection processes to changing ecologic niches; reduced pressures from hunters and predators; and an abundance of food.19 For this and other reasons, the issue of wildlife surveillance presents many more challenges.20 Overcoming these challenges requires forethought and planning. Communities should set up programs that actively monitor the health of wildlife.

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7 state homeland security assessment and strategy program for agriculture ince the late 1990s, the Office of Grants and Training, formerly known as the Office for Domestic Preparedness, an office originally under the U.S. Department of Justice but now under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has been the agency responsible for the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (SHSAS) process.1 The intent of this program is to assess threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs related to community preparedness at the state and local levels for terrorism incidents involving weapons of mass destruction. Following is a brief explanation of the process.

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overview of the agricultural assessment component The SHSAS issued by the Office of Grants and Training for fiscal year 2003 incorporates the post–September 11 realities. One of those is a realistic evaluation of the threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs related to use of WMD against agriculture. This assessment tool has been developed by Office of Grants and Training and the USDA in accordance with the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.2 The Office of Grants and Training SHSAS is a three-volume set consisting of a Jurisdiction Handbook, State Handbook, and Reference Handbook. The information that follows is largely from those volumes. This chapter is not intended to replace that process. It is strongly recommended that communities and states participate in the SHSAS and complete the optional agriculture portions. The books, and technical assistance in completing the assessment, are available from the Office of Grants and Training online at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp or through the Office of Grants and Training helpline at (800) 368-6498.

Assessment of the threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs in community preparedness must take place at the state and local levels, each community evaluating its own situation. Photo by Scott Bauer, courtesy USDA.

jurisdictional and state assessment processes This process of identification of potential threats, vulnerabilities, capabilities, and needs is essential to overall emergency response system. The process assists states and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to learn where needs exist and then to allocate resources appropriately. To aid states and other jurisdictions, the process has been made as simple as possible, including the posting of results to the Office of Grants and Training website instead of filling out bundles of forms. The process begins with the local jurisdiction. Each jurisdiction must individually complete the assessment and submit the information to the state administrative agency. Each state has identified a state administrative agency (SAA) to be the central contact point for the Office of Grants and Training. In addition the SAA is the collection point for the information from local jurisdiction assessments. The information thus gathered is analyzed and reflected in the state assessment, to be used to update the State Homeland Security Strategy and to guide the allocation of domestic preparedness resources.3 The assessment evaluates information about the following:4

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• • • •

Potential threat elements in your jurisdictions Conducting vulnerability assessments for potential targets Developing planning scenarios Identifying current equipment, training, exercise, planning, and organizational capabilities • Determining equipment, training, exercise, planning, organizational, and technical assistance needs The process for the risk and needs assessment begins with the jurisdiction appointing an assessment point of contact. From there, the jurisdiction should organize a working group of stakeholders in the community. This group should consist of leadership from the following disciplines and services: fire, law enforcement, emergency medical services, emergency management, public works, government, public health, hazardous materials, public safety communications, health care, and of course the agriculture community, including animal health and cooperative extension services. Those serving in the group must be leaders who are capable of speaking for the disciplines and agencies which they represent. threat assessment Once the group has been formed, members need to review the jurisdictional handbook and instructions from the state administrative agency prior to completing the threat and vulnerability assessments.5 The threat assessment is largely driven by law enforcement agencies in a jurisdiction. However, other disciplines do have insights to offer to the process. The threat assessment is conducted to determine the relative likelihood of an attempted attack using a WMD. By conducting the threat assessment, communities will (1) promote interagency collaboration/coordination of criminal investigative intelligence information relating to WMD terrorist potential threat elements (PTEs); (2) assess the threat(s) to potential targets, enabling a jurisdiction to focus its prevention and preparedness effort and to enhance response capabilities; (3) identify the types of WMD likely to be produced and/or developed by the existing PTE so as to identify equipment and training requirements needed to respond to the likely WMD incident. vulner ability assessment The purpose of the vulnerability assessment is to provide communities with a current vulnerability profile for potential targets located within the 104

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community’s jurisdictional boundary.6 The vulnerability assessment requires the input of all the disciplines represented in the community. This group should include all the entities listed for threats assessment as well as commercial and industrial facilities, recreational facilities, banking and finance, and transportation centers. Once organized, the group must identify critical infrastructure facilities, sites, systems, and special events that are located or take place within the jurisdiction. By identifying these venues and events, the community has developed a target list and the basis for the vulnerability assessment. Included in the SHSAS Reference Handbook are a number of worksheets to guide the vulnerability assessment group through the process. Issues and subjects to be considered and rated to determine the vulnerability of a site are: • Will an attack cause large numbers of deaths and injuries?—If an attack were to occur on this site or at this event, what would the number of deaths and injuries be? For example, if the community has a large stadium, such as Texas A&M University’s 82,600-seat Kyle Field in College Station, Texas, large numbers of deaths and injuries would be likely if it were attacked.7 • Is the site highly visible?—This is concerned with public’s general knowledge of the site’s existence. Is the site classified and virtually unknown to the public (low visibility)? Or is the site well known, such as the Gateway Arch in St. Louis, Missouri (high visibility). • Is the site or event critical to the jurisdiction and its neighbors?— Criticality of a site or facility relates to its usefulness to the community and neighboring communities. The community can be defined as the population, economy, government, and so on. For example, a water treatment facility may treat water for several communities. If that facility were attacked, multiple communities would be without fresh water. This type of facility would be critical. • Does a PTE have access to the target?—This item concerns the security measures taken at a facility. The greater the security measures in place at a facility, the less access there is for a PTE to the target. • Are there WMD materials present at the target site?—Some sites have materials that could be used as opportunistic WMDs. For example, companies involved in the electroplating industry often state homeland security assessment and strategy

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use hydrogen cyanide, and many water treatment facilities use chlorine in their processes. Both these chemicals can be used as weapons of mass destruction. cbrne scenarios Once vulnerability issues have been discussed and rated, communities are ready to develop scenarios for chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, and explosive weapons. These scenarios are simple suppositions of what if, for each of the five CBRNE weapons types for the identified targets. The scenarios are expressed in terms of the likelihood of the use of a specific CBRNE weapon; a projection of affected people in the categories of terms of noninjured, walking wounded, stretcher patients, and the worried well; and finally a projection of the deceased.8 capabilities assessment The scenarios are then used to help communities determine the current capabilities of the jurisdiction.9 The capabilities assessment is used to identify planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercise needs to respond safely, effectively, and efficiently to WMD incidents. This assessment evaluates the number of response assets a community has available—discipline by discipline—to respond to a particular CBRNE material. The assessment also takes into account the presence and relevance of plans and interagency cooperation; the level of training completed by emergency responders; and the frequency and intensity of exercises conducted to test the capabilities of the community’s response force. As in previous steps of the process, the Reference Handbook has thorough forms to walk members of each discipline through the process. Further assistance is available through the Office of Grants and Training’s helpline. needs assessment All the steps already listed lead to this point, the needs assessment. There are five areas in the needs assessment:10 Planning Treatment of this subject in the Jurisdiction Handbook primarily involves the emergency operations plan and terrorism annex, which will provide direction should a WMD incident occur. Issues considered are: 106

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• • • • •

Does a plan exist? If so, is the plan current? Does the annex have a current terrorism annex? If so, is it up to date? Does the plan address the identified issues appropriately? What disciplines provide mutual aid? What disciplines receive mutual aid?

Organization This area covers the efforts a jurisdiction has addressed by creating emergency response teams, developing mutual aid agreements with private industry, neighboring communities, and regional jurisdictions for those areas that must do so. Issues addressed are: • Identifying emergency response teams. • Defining their capabilities in terms of personnel. • Does the team provide or receive mutual aid through written agreements? Equipment As one might imagine, this addresses the desired and current resources of a community to respond to WMD incidents. They are broken down by discipline. The assessment includes not only equipment on hand in a jurisdiction but also equipment on order. Jurisdictions are required to itemize the equipment they have for use to respond to CBRNE incidents. Equipment gaps are noted and recorded. To estimate the cost of purchasing new equipment to close the gap, the Reference Handbook provides jurisdictions with the Standardized Equipment List of the ODP State Domestic Preparedness Equipment Program. Technical assistance for equipment is available in the following areas: • • • • • •

Maintenance and calibration of specific equipment Use of chemical protective clothing Use of equipment Establishing standardized equipment lists Identifying interoperability needs Development of terrorism early warning technology requirements for data and information management • Identification of terrorism early warning interoperable communication equipment and software requirements • Identification of interoperable communications technology used for terrorism early warning radio and data systems state homeland security assessment and strategy

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Additionally, jurisdictions are encouraged to recommend equipment needs to be researched. These recommendations are important because they help direct the funding allocations to research and development. An example of a recommendation, which came from the New York City Fire Department after the September 11 attacks, was to develop a global positioning system with a z-axis so that firefighters and other rescuers could be located, not only by where they were on a grid but also by how high they were in a building.11 Training This is a comparison, by discipline, of current and needed training, using training guidelines provided for increased response capabilities. There are three basic levels of training: awareness, performance, and planning/management. The performance level is divided into two sublevels, defensive and offensive, which replace the operations and technician WMD training levels, respectively. Jurisdictions are asked to assess the current level of training for each discipline in the community and to compare those levels with the levels of training needed by each discipline to respond to each scenario. The difference is the training gap to be met. ODP offers significant training for all levels at no cost. Exercises This area assesses the exercise program for the jurisdiction. Jurisdictions complete this section to determine the type of exercise required by the jurisdiction and the planning guidelines for it; to identify the CBRNE materials to use in the exercise scenario; and to indicate which response agencies and how many people from each need to take part in the exercise. There are tools to assist jurisdictions in estimating the costs of an exercise program.

agricultural vulnerability assessment The agricultural vulnerability assessment is different from the basic vulnerability assessment because of the group used to complete it. The group conducting the agricultural vulnerability assessment should consist of individuals with a working knowledge of agricultural facilities, sites, systems, and special events in the jurisdiction.12 One of the most significant agricultural events in many communities throughout the United States is the county or state fair. This means that members of the agencies 108

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and organizations that sponsor fairs and animal exhibitions should be part of the agricultural vulnerability assessment group. Other entities and categories of people who should be represented in the agricultural vulnerability assessment group are: • • • • • •

Feedlot and feed mill owners and/or managers Livestock producer representatives Agrochemical manufacturing owners/managers Ranch owners/managers Local veterinarians Representatives from botanical gardens, zoological parks, petting zoos, and other animal activities in the jurisdiction.

As with the basic vulnerability assessment, the assessment group should develop a list of facilities, sites, and events within the jurisdiction. Each site is evaluated as in the basic vulnerability report already outlined, using the same criteria as are applicable for that report except where special criteria are indicated in the following: • Level of visibility. • Criticality of the target. • Impact upon the industry—This rates the impact upon the whole industry should the facility being evaluated be destroyed or otherwise incapable of performing its function. • PTE access to the target. • Potential target threat hazard. • Capacities of the facility—The values are based on the number of livestock or the number of bushels of crops held on-site. • Product distribution area—The values are based on whether the product is disseminated locally, countywide, statewide, regionally, nationally, or internationally. Once these sites have been rated, it may be helpful to do a site-specific vulnerability assessment. This includes evaluation of site plans, biosecurity measures in place, and site security measures in place. After this process of assessing the vulnerability has been completed, scenarios must be developed, for animals and plants. The animal scenarios are expressed in terms of the likelihood of an attack on a specific target and then dead animals, symptomatic animals, exposed animals with no symptoms, and possibly exposed animals. The plant scenarios are expressed in terms of contaminated and possibly contaminated plants. state homeland security assessment and strategy

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capabilities assessment for agriculture This is similar to the capabilities assessment earlier described.13 The scenarios provide the foundation to determine the capabilities of the jurisdiction. Many communities may find this challenging because of a lack of experience in the tasks. This is another point at which the Office of Grants and Training’s technical assistance can play a role. The capabilities assessment for agriculture differs from the overall one in that the personnel capabilities are rated by WMD response level capability, equipment, and training. The WMD response levels are:14 Level 0 = No capability—The community is in no way equipped to respond to a WMD incident involving agriculture. Level 1 = WMD Awareness Capability Level—This means that there is an ability to respond and provide support for the lead state agencies; personnel are able to recognize the presence of a potential terrorism incident involving agriculture and able to take self-protection measures, secure the area, and make notifications to the appropriate agencies. Level 2 = WMD Performance (Defensive) Level—These are the people who can respond to a WMD event as part of the initial response element or in support of the response for the purpose of protecting nearby persons, the environment, and property in a defensive fashion; they have an understanding of the Incident Command System and unified command and a knowledge of general agricultural WMD agents; and they can perform actions from a safe distance intended to stop the spread of the incident. Level 3 = WMD Performance (Offensive) Level—Responders at this level are those who respond to a WMD event as part of the initial response element or in support of the response for the purpose of reducing or stopping the source or effects of the WMD materials. The true definition of this level can be attained only if the jurisdiction has at least one certified agricultural response teams. Level 4 = WMD Advanced Operations and Technician Capability—This level is for emergency responders who have met or surpassed the requirements for response level 3; they know and follow protocols for medical monitoring of all response personnel. The following questions are answered to determine communities’ capabilities vis-à-vis agricultural tasks: • What are the specific tasks required by the jurisdiction to respond to a biological incident involving agriculture?

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• What specific tasks should only the state be responsible for completing? • Are there current and appropriate plans and procedures in place to accomplish the task? • Is a specialized agricultural response team required? If so, is that team in place? • Are responders equipped to make the response? • Are responders trained to make the response? • Have the plans, equipment and training been exercised using a realistic, credible scenario? agricultur al needs assessment and planning The needs assessment is important to identifying what a jurisdiction must do to prepare properly for a WMD incident involving agriculture. Assessing the planning needs for a jurisdiction includes identifying the presence of an updated emergency operations plan with a current agricultural incident annex; and the existence of written and current mutual aid agreements for capabilities the jurisdiction provides and receives.15 Assessing the organizational needs of a jurisdiction’s ability to respond to a WMD incident involving agriculture includes identifying the presence and capabilities of any specialized agricultural response team(s) within the jurisdiction. It is important to note that the teams identified by the Office of Grants and Training are not agricultural response teams but are specialized response teams with some agricultural response capabilities. Assessing the equipment, training, and exercise needs of the jurisdiction to respond to an agricultural incident are, in essence, the same as the processes for the basic capabilities assessment already described, as is the procedure for research and development recommendations. However, there are items specific to an agriculture response that should be reviewed. It should be noted that in the “participating disciplines” box on all the worksheets, a checkbox for agricultural specialists is missing. Communities should consider this as they complete the discipline-specific worksheets and should calculate this as they identify equipment and training shortfalls. Furthermore, much of the equipment needed for an agriculture response is not on the selected equipment list provided in the Reference Handbook. Captive bolts, trench burners, and C&D agents are among the items not listed there.

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All in all, the SHSAS program is an excellent beginning to a process communities must conduct on a continuous basis. Understanding the threats to and vulnerabilities of a community and then comparing those to the current capabilities to identify the community’s needs if it is to respond to a terrorist event are highly important to a community’s overall response effort. Certainly, there is room for improvement, especially in the agriculture portion of the assessment. However, the Office for Domestic Preparedness has established a successful assessment program and provides technical assistance to any jurisdiction that requests it. As mentioned, the onus for preparation and initial response is upon the local jurisdiction. Therefore, it is imperative that communities participate actively in the SHSAS program. Failure or complacency would be and has been disastrous.

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8 the national response to an agricultural incident ollowing the issuance of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 on February 28, 2003, changes to the emergency management community have been occurring at a rapid pace and continue to do so. Among the developments that resulted from HSPD-5 are the National Incident Management System and the National Response Plan. Interagency plans and many other supporting documents and guidelines are evolving at a pace of one or two a week. Therefore, it is paramount to search for the most current reference documents. This chapter is intended to provide a guide to the primary documents that have shaped the world of emergency response since September 11, 2001. The most significant changes in the emergency management community since September 11, 2001, by virtue of the release of HSPD-5 and the advent of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are the development of NIMS and the National Response Plan. As a result of these new components, the response that would come in the wake of a highly contagious animal or plant disease would be much different than what has been seen before. Local, state, and federal responders and agencies alike should pay attention to this chapter. The investigators into the failures of the Hurricane Katrina response agree: one of the most significant failures was the ignorance within the response agencies about the emergency plans, including the NRP. The National Response Plan combines several previously existing plans and supporting documents—including the Federal Response Plan, the U.S. Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, Mass Migration Response Plans, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan—into a comprehensive, all-hazards emergency response plan that directs federal response assistance to state and local jurisdictions. The National Response Plan goes beyond the Federal Response Plan because it defines the response in terms of a national effort, instead of the federal-led effort of previous eras. This plan and Homeland Security Presidential Directives 7, 8, and 9 provide guidance for the pro-

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tection of the agriculture sector. The National Response Plan was approved and promulgated by the secretary of homeland security and other federal government department and agency heads during December 2004. The National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan for an Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease or Other Highly Contagious Animal Diseases (NAHERP) and the Animal Emergency Response Organization: Roles and Responsibilities (AERO) provide the foundation for the concept of operations for the response to a highly contagious animal disease and will eventually become an interagency plan for the response to an incident involving agriculture.1 Additionally, NAHERP and AERO provide the foundation for agriculture-related annexes to the National Response Plan, presented as NRP’s Emergency Support Function No. 11: Agriculture and Natural Resource Annex, and the hazard-specific incident annex for food safety and agriculture response (still pending at the time of writing). These annexes are intended to address the outbreak of a highly contagious disease, regardless of whether the outbreak is due to intentional introduction or natural occurrence. The annexes may be activated in conjunction with other annexes if the situation requires it. Each document has a purpose. The HSPDs provide policy-level direction and guidance from the president to the departments and agencies of the federal government. The National Response Plan describes the various responses that would involve resources of the federal government in cooperation with state, tribal, and local governments and private and nongovernmental organizations. It also describes the concept of operations for how federal government departments and agencies will assist states and local governments. The AERO document is a self-described practical field resource that focuses on the activities of the emergency response organization at the national, regional, and local levels (including states) during animal health emergency.2 NAHERP is an interagency plan that describes the authorities, policies, situation, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and federal resources for responding to a highly infectious disease, such as foot-and-mouth disease.3

homeland security presidential directives As noted, major new components of the nation’s procedures for emergency response have come into being as a result of a series of presidential directives. Key aspects of the directives are profiled next. 114

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hspd-5: management of domestic incidents HSPD-5 was written in the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. It directs the formation of a single, comprehensive national incident management system. The directive unifies the concepts of consequence and crisis management introduced in Presidential Decision Directive 39 by President Bill Clinton after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The functions have been preserved but are now consolidated into one comprehensive response effort. The directive designates the secretary of homeland security as the principal federal official (PFO) for domestic incident management. This means that the secretary of homeland security is the responsible for the coordination of federal operations within the United States. The document also designates the U.S. attorney general as the lead official responsible for any criminal investigation of terrorist acts or threats. The directive tasks all federal departments and agencies to cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security and the efforts to protect national security. The secretary of homeland security was tasked in HSPD-5 to develop the National Response Plan. The directive outlined what should be included and provided a timeline for implementation. HSPD-5 states: “Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005 [October 1, 2004], Federal departments and agencies shall make adoption of the NIMS a requirement, to the extent permitted by law, for providing Federal preparedness assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities. The Secretary [of Homeland Security] shall develop standards and guidelines for determining whether a state or local entity has adopted NIMS.”4 This means that local and state governments must have adopted NIMS to be eligible to receive federal funding. While this timeline was adjusted somewhat for local and state jurisdictions, the hard deadline was October 1, 2006, the beginning of fiscal year 2007. In a letter dated September 8, 2004, Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge detailed to all governors what was expected to be accomplished in order to comply with the NIMS mandate. These expectations include the following: • Incorporating NIMS into existing training programs and exercises • Ensuring that federal preparedness funding (including DHS Homeland Security Grant Program, Urban Area Security Initiative funds) support NIMS implementation at the state and local levels the national response to an agricultural incident

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• Incorporating NIMS into Emergency Operations Plans • Promotion of intrastate mutual aid agreements • Coordinating and providing technical assistance to local entities regarding NIMS • Institutionalizing the use of the Incident Command System (ICS) There are further requirements for fiscal years 2006 and 2007, but the preceding list covers the requirements essential to preparing for the response to an agroterrorism incident. hspd-7: critical infr astructure identification, prioritization, and protection This establishes the national policy for federal departments and agencies to identify and prioritize U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks. The directive tasks the secretary of homeland security to coordinate the effort to enhance the protection of critical infrastructure and key U.S. resources. The directive also designates the U.S. Department of Agriculture as a sector-specific federal agency, which means that USDA is the lead federal agency for the protection of agriculture. USDA must work within the parameters established by the secretary of homeland security and collaborate with other federal agencies; conduct vulnerability assessments; and encourage risk management strategies to protect agriculture.5 In addition, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Agriculture must coordinate their efforts with private industry and state and local governments. The directive requires the Department of Homeland Security to develop a national indications and warnings architecture for protecting the infrastructure. This architecture should facilitate an understanding of the baseline infrastructure operations; identify the indicators and precursors to an attack; and facilitate a surge capacity for the detection and analysis of patterns of potential attacks. This HSPD supersedes the critical infrastructure identification provisions of PDD-63, issued by President Bill Clinton in the wake of the 1995 Murrah Federal Building bombing. hspd-8: national preparedness This directive establishes policies intended to strengthen the preparedness to prevent and respond to threatened or actual terrorist incidents and other disasters or catastrophes. The intent is to develop an all-hazards preparedness goal and to strengthen the preparedness capa116

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bilities of federal, state, and local entities. The directive calls for a national preparedness goal. In meeting this goal, the secretary of homeland security must coordinate the preparedness of federal response assets and the support for, and assessment of, the preparedness of state and local first responders. Furthermore, federal departments and agencies have been directed to provide timely, effective, and efficient delivery of federal preparedness assistance to state and local governments and to support efforts to ensure that first responders are prepared to respond to major events, especially terrorist incidents. To do this, the federal government is developing training and readiness standards that address planning, equipment, and training and exercises. The secretary of homeland security must inform the president every year in an annual status report of federal, state, and local response preparedness, including state capabilities, the utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the federal first responder preparedness assistance programs support the national preparedness goal. The funding to local and state governments is tied to their working toward the national preparedness goal. This document requires that exercise and training programs to enhance domestic preparedness be developed by the Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The document also encourages active citizen participation in volunteer organizations, such as the Citizen Corps. A direct result of the events of September 11, 2001, the Citizen Corps was created to drive local citizen participation in community preparedness and response through various programs, such as Community Emergency Response Teams (CERT), the Fire Corps, the Medical Reserve Corps, Neighborhood Watch programs, and Volunteers in Police Service. In addition, oversight councils, called Citizen Corps Councils, develop community action plans, assess possible threats, and identify local resources. These activities are coordinated nationally through DHS.6 One program that may help during an agricultural incident is the National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps, which provides a reserve of animal health technicians and veterinarians who are ready to respond to outbreaks of diseases to livestock and poultry.7 hspd-9: defense of united states agriculture and food HSPD-9 establishes a national policy concerning the defense of agriculture and the food system against terrorist attacks and other disasters and emergencies. It calls for the protection of agriculture by identifying the national response to an agricultural incident

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and prioritizing critical infrastructure and key resources specific to agriculture, so that protection requirements can be prioritized. It also calls for developing awareness and early warning capabilities; the mitigation of vulnerabilities at critical production and processing nodes; the enhancement of screening procedures for domestic and imported products; and the enhancement of response and recovery procedures.8 In order to do these things, the secretaries of the Departments of Interior, Agriculture, and Health and Human Services and the administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency are to expand current monitoring and surveillance programs to make them comprehensive, robust, and fully coordinated to monitor for animal, plant, and wildlife diseases and to monitor food, public health, and water quality, so that early detection is possible. This surveillance and monitoring system should track specific animals, plants, commodities, and food. Finally, this program should include a system of laboratory networks for food, veterinary and plant health, and water quality that integrates existing state and federal lab resources using standardized procedures and diagnostic protocols. The secretaries of agriculture, health and human services, and homeland security are to expand the existing vulnerability assessments of the agriculture and food sectors and conduct assessments every two years. In addition, DHS and the U.S. attorney general are to work with the secretaries of agriculture and health and human services, the EPA administrator, and the director of Central Intelligence to prioritize, develop, and implement mitigation strategies to protect critical nodes of production or processing from the introduction of disease and pests. The secretaries of homeland security and health and human services, the attorney general, and the EPA administrator are to ensure that the combined federal, state, and local response capabilities are adequate to respond quickly to a major disease outbreak, whether a natural occurrence or a terrorist attack. In addition, the same agencies are required to develop a coordinated agriculture and food-specific standardized response plan that will be integrated into the National Response Plan. Finally, these departments and agencies are to enhance the recovery systems for stabilizing agricultural production, the food supply, and the economy. These systems must address the rapid removal of contaminated agriculture and food products or infected plants and animals. A National Veterinary Stockpile should also be developed, which would be the animal equivalent to the strategic national stockpile for humans. Issues such as higher education programs, research programs, and in118

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formation sharing are also addressed in this directive. It calls for the development of biocontainment facilities that research and develops diagnostic capabilities for foreign animal diseases and zoonotic diseases. In addition, it calls for the establishment of university-based centers of excellence in agriculture and food safety.

the national response plan (nrp) The NRP provides an all-hazards approach toward domestic incident management. It is designed to guarantee that state, local, tribal, and federal governments in the United States have the capability to work safely, efficiently, and effectively by using a national approach to incident management. The core components of the approach are prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The NRP has five basic elements: the basic plan, appendixes, emergency support function annexes, support annexes, and hazard-specific incident annexes. The NRP is not a stand-alone document. It is one document in a family of documents providing the framework for domestic incident management. Other documents in the family include the National Incident Management System, national interagency plans, agency-specific plans, operational supplements, regional plans, state/local/tribal emergency plans, private sector plans, voluntary organization plans, international plans, and procedures. Following are brief descriptions of each.9 • National Incident Management System—Discussed in detail in chapter 4, this provides the core doctrine, concept of operation, common terminology, and organizational processes enabling effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels. • National interagency plans—These are required by law or regulations. Examples are the National Maritime Security Plan and Mass Migration Emergency Plan. They provide protocols for incidents that can be managed without DHS coordination. These plans can be implemented independently or concurrently with the NRP. • Agency-specific plans—Created to respond to single hazards or contingencies that belong to a specific department or agency, these can include continuity of operations and continuity of government plans. the national response to an agricultural incident

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• Operational supplements—Detailed plans relating to specific incidents or events are termed operational supplements. They are typically used to support an event considered a national special security event (NSSE), such as the Super Bowl or the Olympic Games. • Regional plans—Supplements to national plans are developed to provide region-specific guidance to those plans. • State/ local /tribal emergency plans—These are emergency operations plans for their respective regions and levels of government. (State/local/tribal multihazard mitigation plans are developed to provide a framework for understanding vulnerability to and risk from hazards and for identifying the pre- and postdisaster mitigation measures. These are requirements of the Stafford Act.) • Private sector plans—Private industry and certain companies develop emergency operations plans or emergency response plans. Some may be mandated by statute, and all should be developed to be consistent with the NRP. • Volunteer and nongovernmental organization plans—These are plans created to support local emergency response and recovery operations at local, state, and federal levels of government. • International plans—Agreed upon between the federal government and foreign countries, these typically deal with natural disasters, mass casualties, or pollution incidents. • Procedures—These provide operational guidance to emergency teams and other personnel conducting or supporting incident management operations. They may include standard operating procedures/general operating guidelines; points of contact lists; field operating guides and handbooks; and job aids. purpose of the national response plan The NRP provides a mechanism to facilitate a comprehensive, allhazards response to a domestic incident, bringing together all levels of government, nongovernment organizations (NGOs), and private industry covering all disciplines through all stages of the incident. To do this, the NRP, using the framework of NIMS, establishes mechanisms to:10 • Maximize the integration of incident-related prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery activities. 120

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• Improve coordination and integration of all levels of government, private industry, and nongovernmental organizations. • Maximize the efficient use of resources needed for effective incident management and protection and restoration of critical infrastructure and key resources. • Improve incident management communications and increase situational awareness across jurisdictions and between the public and private sectors. • Facilitate emergency mutual aid and federal emergency support to state, tribal, and local governments. • Facilitate federal-to-federal interaction in emergency support. • Provide a proactive and integrated federal response to catastrophic events. • Address linkages to other federal incident management and emergency response plans developed for specific types of incidents or hazards. applicability The NRP is to be activated for or in anticipation of incidents of national significance. These are incidents that meet one or more of the following criteria:11 • A federal department or agency acting under its own authority has requested the assistance of the secretary of homeland security. • The resources of state and local authorities are overwhelmed, and federal assistance has been requested by the appropriate authorities. Examples of this include major disasters or emergencies, as defined under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act; and catastrophic incidents— human-induced incidents that result in national impacts over a prolonged period, exceeding resources normally available in local, state, federal, and private sectors, and that interrupt governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. (See emergency, major disaster, and catastrophic incident in the NRP terminology section that follows and in the glossary.) • More than one federal department or agency has become substantially involved in responding to an incident. Examples include credible threats, indications, or acts of terrorism within the the national response to an agricultural incident

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United States or unique situations that may require the involvement of the secretary of homeland security to aid in coordination of incident management. Situations of this kind would include an extraordinary emergency (see glossary) as declared by the secretary of agriculture or a national special security event like the Olympics. • The secretary of homeland security has been directed by the president to assume responsibility for managing a domestic incident. assumptions and consider ations The NRP is built on several assumptions and considerations.12 Among the most significant of these are that all incident management activities, at every level of government, will be initiated and conducted using NIMS. Incidents of national significance (see definition under NRP terminology) require the secretary of homeland security to coordinate operations. Such incidents may occur at any time with little or no warning, may require information sharing across all levels and of multiple classifications, and may involve multiple geographic areas and have significant international impact; they span the spectrum of incident management. No single private or governmental agency at the state, local, tribal, or federal level can go it alone. The combined expertise and capabilities of government, the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations are required to prepare for, respond to, and recover from national incidents, yet incidents are to be managed at the lowest possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional level. In addition, if an incident is an actual or potential terrorist incident, the deployment of resources and incident management activities is to be coordinated with the U.S. Department of Justice. Federal departments and agencies are expected to support the homeland security mission under their own funding, if necessary, and this support is supposed to be proactive and timely. nrp terminology There are several key terms that are important to understand. For the purposes of the NRP, the following terms and definitions apply.13 Catastrophic incident—Any natural or human-induced incident, including terrorism, that results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, and/or government functions. 122

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A catastrophic event could result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period; almost immediately exceeds resources normally available to state, local, tribal, and private-sector authorities in the impacted area; and significantly interrupts governmental operations and emergency services to such an extent that national security could be threatened. All catastrophic events qualify as incidents of national significance. Consequence management—Predominantly an emergency management function, including measures to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP. Crisis management—Predominantly a law enforcement function, including measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. As noted, the requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP. Emergency—As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is “any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States.” Federal coordinating officer (FCO)—The federal officer who is appointed to manage federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO is responsible for coordinating the timely delivery of federal disaster assistance resources and programs to the affected state and local governments, individual victims, and the private sector. Federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC or OSC)—The federal official predesignated by EPA or the U.S. Coast Guard to coordinate and direct responses to incidents involving oil and hazardous substances under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (known as the NCP). First responder—Local and nongovernmental police, fire, and emergency personnel who in the early stages of an incident are responsible for the protection of life, property, evidence, and the environment. This definition includes emergency response providers as defined in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 USC 101). First responders may include fedthe national response to an agricultural incident

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eral, state, or local responders and may include personnel from law enforcement, fire protection, emergency medical services, emergency management, public works, hazardous materials, public health, public safety, communications, and other related disciplines. Hazard—Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. Incident—An occurrence, either human-caused or arising from natural phenomena, that requires action by emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources. Incident of national significance—Based on criteria established in HSPD-5 (paragraph 4), an actual or potential high-impact event that requires a coordinated and effective response by an appropriate combination of federal, state, local, tribal, nongovernmental, and/or privatesector entities in order to save lives and minimize damage and provide the basis for long-term community recovery and mitigation activities. Joint Field Office (JFO)—A temporary federal facility established to unify the federal assistance effort at the state and local level and to coordinate the provision of federal assistance to the affected jurisdiction(s) during national incidents. Joint Information Center (JIC)—A center established to coordinate the federal public information activities on-scene. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident. Public information officials from all participating federal agencies should collocate at the JIC. Public information officials from participating state and local agencies also may collocate at the JIC. Joint Operations Center (JOC)—The focal point for all investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or potential terrorist incident. The JOC integrates into the JFO when the NRP is activated. Jurisdiction—The range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority for incident mitigation. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political or geographical (e.g., city, county, state, or federal boundary lines) or functional (e.g., police department, health department.). Local government—A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under state law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local gov124

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ernment; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization or, in Alaska, a Native village or Alaska regional Native corporation; or a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity. (As defined in section 2(10) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, et seq., 2002.) Major disaster—As defined under the Stafford Act, any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, winddriven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the president causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under this act to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Mitigation—Activities designed to reduce or eliminate risks to persons or property or to lessen the actual or potential effects or consequences of an incident. Mitigation measures may be implemented prior to, during, or after an incident. Mitigation measures are often developed in accordance with lessons learned from prior incidents. Mitigation involves ongoing actions to reduce exposure to, probability of, or potential loss from hazards. Multiagency coordination entity (MCE)—Functions within a broader multiagency coordination system. It may establish priorities among incidents and associated resource allocations, deconflict agency policies, and provide strategic guidance and direction to support incident management activities. National special security event (NSSE)—A designated event that, by virtue of its political, economic, social, or religious significance, may be the target of terrorism or other criminal activity. Nongovernmental organization (NGO)—A nonprofit entity that is based on interests of its members, individuals, or institutions and that is not created by a government but may work cooperatively with government. Such organizations serve a public purpose, not a private benefit. Examples of NGOs include faith-based charity organizations and the American Red Cross. Preparedness—Preparedness encompasses the full range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover the national response to an agricultural incident

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from domestic incidents. Within the context of the life cycle of an incident, preparedness involves actions to enhance readiness and the ability to respond quickly and effectively to a potential incident. Preparedness includes procedures to share information and disseminate timely notifications, warning, and alerts. Prevention—Within the context of the life cycle of an incident, prevention involves actions to interdict, disrupt, preempt, avert, or minimize the impacts of a potential incident. This includes Homeland Security and law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and hazard mitigation measures to save lives and protect property from the impacts of natural disasters and other events. Principal federal official—The federal official responsible for directing federal operations in the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents; for directing the application of federal resources in specific circumstances; and for managing any domestic incident when so directed by the president. HSPD-5 designates the secretary of homeland security as the PFO for domestic incident management. Public Information Officer—Official at headquarters or in the field responsible for preparing and coordinating the dissemination of public information in cooperation with other responding federal, state, and local agencies. Recovery—Recovery involves actions needed to help individuals and communities return to normal. Recovery programs are designed to assist victims and their families, restore institutions to sustain economic growth and confidence, rebuild destroyed property, and reconstitute government operations and services. These actions often extend long after the incident itself. Recovery programs include mitigation components designed to avoid damage from future incidents. Response—Response includes activities to address the immediate and short-term actions to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic, and political structure of the community. Senior federal official (SFO)—An individual representing a federal department or agency with primary statutory responsibility for incident management. SFOs utilize existing authorities, expertise, and capabilities to aid in management of the incident, working in coordination with other members of the JFO Coordination Group. Strategic—Strategic elements of incident management are characterized by continuous, long-term, high-level planning by organizations 126

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headed by elected or other senior officials. These elements involve the adoption of long-range goals and objectives, the setting of priorities, the establishment of budgets and other fiscal decisions, policy development, and the application of measures of performance or effectiveness. Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC)—The SIOC is operated by the FBI and serves as the focal point for intelligence and investigative law enforcement activities related to a terrorist incident or credible threat. It serves as an information clearinghouse to help collect, process, and disseminate information in a timely manner. Unified command—An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated Incident Commanders at a single incident command post to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan. roles of the pfo and fco One of the primary concepts of the NRP is that the incident be handled at the lowest level possible. To do this, all levels of government have specific roles that they must perform. The local government agencies, including police, fire and emergency medical services, emergency management, and public health, are likely to be among the first to respond to a disaster or terrorist incident. The state government is to support these local entities in their response and, when necessary, request additional resources from the federal government to assist with the incident management operations. HSPD-5 designates the secretary of homeland security as the principal federal official for domestic incident management. This designation tasks the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to coordinate federal operations to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. DHS is responsible for coordinating federal response operations by coordinating federal-level incident management activities, including information sharing and operational support. To support these functions, the secretary of homeland security may designate another principal federal official and/or a federal coordinating officer. Both of these positions serve as the secretary’s representative locally. The PFO is required to ensure the overall coordination of the federal incident management activities and resource allocation on-scene. In addition, the PFO is responsible for the following: the national response to an agricultural incident

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• Ensuring the seamless integration of federal incident management activities in support of state, local and Tribal requirements • Providing strategic guidance to federal entities • Facilitating interagency conflict resolution • Serving as the primary point of contact, although not the exclusive contact, for federal interface with state, local, and tribal government officials, the media, and the private sector • Providing real-time incident information, using the federal on-scene incident management structure • Coordination of the overall federal public communications strategy when information of a national security or sensitive law enforcement nature is part of the response, and for ensuring consistency of federal interagency communications to the public The federal coordinating officer (FCO) manages federal resource support activities related to Stafford Act disasters and emergencies. The FCO supports the PFO, when one is appointed. The FCO also assists the unified command and liaises with the state coordinating officer (SCO). Besides being responsible for coordinating the delivery of federal assistance to state, local, and tribal governments and to disaster victims, the FCO is also the designated disaster recovery manager to administer financial aspects of assistance authorized under the Stafford Act. Finally, the FCO is to work in partnership with the SCO and the governor’s authorized representative to execute all necessary documents for federal assistance. the joint field office The Joint Field Office is a temporary federal facility established to unify the federal response effort at the state and local level. This facility provides a central point for incident oversight, direction, and assistance to conduct and coordinate prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery actions effectively. The JFO uses the organizational structure of NIMS, ICS, and unified command. The JFO organization adapts to the magnitude of the incident and supports NIMS principles regarding span of control and the five main functions of the Incident Command Systems: Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance and Administration. Personnel from state and federal departments and agencies staff the JFO, usually through their respective ESFs. The JFO combines the functions of the FBI’s Joint Operations Center and the FEMA Disaster Field Office into one facility. In most cases, the JFO 128

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figure 10. Joint Field O;ce Organization—Terrorist Act

will be the one-stop shop for federal assistance. In cases where the collocation of other federal agencies is not possible, those agencies will assign liaisons to the JFO. In incidents that span great geographical areas or multiple states, multiple JFOs will likely be established, in accordance with the Stafford Act. Each such JFO will have a PFO assigned to it. The JFO organization consists of the JFO Coordination Group, the JFO coordination staff, and the JFO sections. The JFO Coordination Group consists of the PFO, FCO, and senior federal law enforcement official; state and local representatives; and senior federal officials. The JFO coordination staff consists of a safety officer, Joint Information Center, and the liaison/executive committee. The JFO sections are Operations, which includes the law enforcement/JOC component and response and recovery operations; a planning section; a logistics section; and a finance and administration section. The organization structure of the JFO will change based on the needs of the incident. Figure 10 shows the JFO organization in the case of a terrorist attack while figure 11 shows the JFO organization when federal agencies are needed to support other federal agencies, as in an oil spill. As the organizational charts show, the JFO and incident command post have similar organizational structures. The JFO is, in essence, the federal-level command post, although its purpose is not direct operational or tactical oversight. The JFO is important in the response to an the national response to an agricultural incident

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figure 11. Joint Field O;ce Organization—Federal to Federal Support

agricultural disaster because of the level of federal resources that will be committed. The level and complexity of the coordination that will take place between state and federal level entities will be very high and will require a robust and central point of coordination. The National Response Plan outlines the roles and responsibilities for state and local authorities and for federal government agencies, including the Departments of Homeland Security, Defense, and State. Volunteer, nongovernmental, and other citizen organizations likewise have their roles and responsibilities spelled out in the NRP. The NRP also has implementation guidance for all levels of government. As part of the implementation, state and local governments are requested to modify their plans to ensure alignment with the NRP. annexes of the national response plan Although there are forty proposed annexes to the NRP, this book examines only Emergency Support Function No. 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex and the pending hazard-specific incident annex for food safety and agriculture response. These annexes outline the expected federal response to an agriculture event. One important point is that the known information about the event will drive the federal response. ESF 11: Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex The Agriculture and Natural Resources Annex covers four issues, and Emergency Support Function 11 is therefore divided into four functions: nutritional assistance; animal and plant disease response; assurance of 130

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the safety and security of the commercial food supply; and protection of natural and cultural resources and historic properties (NCH) resources prior to, during, and after an incident of national significance.14 The sections of the ESF are organized in the following manner: • Introduction—describes the purpose and scope of the specific section of the ESF. • Policies—lists specific policies concerning the activation and use of the ESF. • Concept of operations—the “meat” of the ESF, providing a general description of how operations will occur; the organizational structure of the ESF; a description of how the lead agency would be notified to mobilize; and response and continuing actions that will be taken once the ESF has been activated. • Organization—describes the response structures from the headquarters level to the regional level. • Actions—describes the expected initial and ongoing actions to be taken by the federal resources involved to support the response effort. • Responsibilities—lists the details of the primary and supporting agencies as they relate to the carrying out the ESF. ESF 11: Nutritional Assistance This section of ESF 11 is the former ESF 11 in the Federal Response Plan and deals with the identification, security, and arrangements for the transportation of food and/or food stamp benefits to affected areas of a major disaster. The lead federal agency for this ESF is the USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service. To meet the requirements of this function, the Food and Nutrition Service must coordinate with state and local governments as well as with voluntary organizations such as the American Red Cross in determining the nutrition assistance needs. Additionally, the service must obtain the appropriate food supplies, arrange for their transportation to the appropriate areas, and authorize food stamp benefits. The principal response asset for the support of this function is the Food and Nutrition Service Disaster Task Force. ESF 11: Animal and Plant Disease and Pest Response This section of the annex is intended to provide for an integrated local/ state/federal response to an outbreak of a highly contagious disease, the national response to an agricultural incident

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whether it is strictly a disease that affects animals, a zoonotic disease, a disease that affects plants, or even a devastating pest infestation. Another part of this section assures coordination with ESF 8 on animal/ veterinary/wildlife issues in disease and natural disaster incidents. The lead federal agency for this section of the annex is the USDA’s Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). APHIS is tasked to coordinate the functions of this section with local, state, and industry partners. These functions include disease detection, control, and eradication. The control and eradication of a disease may include activities such as quarantine, depopulation, movement control, strategic vaccination, and preemptive slaughter. In addition, the decontamination and/or destruction of animals and/or plants as well as of structures and equipment may be necessary. The activation of this annex will be after the notification of a potential or actual major disaster, emergency, or terrorist attack as determined by the Department of Homeland Security or the USDA. While the annex requires that operational decisions be made at the lowest level possible, it is noted that if concurrent responses are required, resource allocation decisions will be made by the Homeland Security Council’s Threat Reduction and Incident Management Policy Coordination Committee and the Emergency Support Function Leaders Group. The annex defines a disaster that would require the activation of this annex as a natural or intentional introduction of an animal or plant disease pathogen that would result in the outbreak of a highly contagious disease and/or zoonotic disease of livestock or poultry, a highly infective exotic plant disease, or a devastating infestation of pests. It is believed that the annex would require activation when state, tribal, and local resources are insufficient for the required response; when the state, tribal, and local response resources and authorities are overwhelmed and request federal assistance; when impending emergencies such as hurricanes, floods, or terrorist attacks require the predeployment of assets; or when the nature of the outbreak or infestation threatens international trade. The annex also requires that an animal or plant health emergency be handled using the principles of the NIMS Incident Command System. As stated throughout this book, the extent of technical issues and multiple layers of government involved would necessitate a high level of coordination and complex integration to ensure success. It is important to note that if an outbreak involves a zoonotic agent, the response is to be ad132

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dressed under this annex and the human health system annex concurrently. Below are some highlights of the organizational structure and concept of operations: • The National Incident Coordinator will be the Associate Deputy Administrator for Emergency Management. This position will be responsible for the overall direction of the disease response. • The secretary of agriculture may declare an extraordinary emergency to pay compensation and to allow for the use of federal authorities to take action within the state if the state is unable to control and eradicate the disease. • The state coordinating officer is likely to be the state veterinarian or another member of the state government’s animal health community. • The state government may activate its state, regional, or local EOC as needed as its base of operations for interfacing with local governments, state agencies and the private sector. • The state veterinarian and the area veterinarian in charge (AVIC) for USDA’s APHIS will establish a Joint Operations Center to serve as the focal point of coordination for the disease management decision-making process. • The state will establish a Joint Information Center to function as the primary source of information about the response in the state. • Once a positive diagnosis has been made, the USDA will immediately apply the appropriate authorities and closely monitor the situation and need to make additional resources available. • APHIS will address the potential for outbreaks in multiple states and will assist unaffected states by providing guidance concerning immediate precautionary measures within their borders. • If an intentional introduction is suspected, the USDA’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will be notified. If warranted, the OIG will notify and coordinate with the appropriate law enforcement agencies at all levels, including the FBI. Additionally, the OIG will work closely with the responders to ensure proper handling, packing, and shipment of any samples to the appropriate research laboratories for testing and analysis. the national response to an agricultural incident

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• There is a high likelihood that mutual aid and assistance from the federal government and other states will be utilized in a disease outbreak. ESF 11: Food Safety This section is intended to ensure the safety and security of the food supply of meat, poultry, and eggs. This requires the inspection and monitoring of slaughter and processing plants, distribution and retail sites, and import facilities. Laboratory detection and analysis is also important, as are the recall and detention of suspect products; plant closures; surveillance for food-borne disease; on-site investigations; and public information. The lead federal agency for this is the USDA’s Food Safety Inspection Service. ESF 11: NCH Resources Protection This section includes appropriate response actions to conserve, rehabilitate, recover, and restore natural and cultural resources and historic properties. To accomplish this, the following actions will be required: coordinating NCH resources identification and vulnerability assessments; facilitating development and application of protection measures and strategies; assisting in emergency compliance with relevant federal environmental laws during emergency response activities, such as emergency permits or consultation for natural resources use or consumption; management, monitoring, and assisting in or conducting response and recovery actions to minimize damage to NCH resources; coordinating with ESF 3 and ESF 10 on the removal of debris affecting NCH resources; coordinating with ESF 3 to manage, monitor, or provide technical assistance on emergency stabilization (and during recovery or restoration) of shorelines, riparian buffer zones, and hillsides to protect NCH resources; and providing incident management teams to assist in NCH resource response and recovery actions. The lead federal agency for this is the U.S. Department of Interior. Hazard-Specific Incident Annex for Food Safety and Agriculture Response This annex is being developed at the time of writing. Until it takes effect, the National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan remains as it was written in the summer of 2003.

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naherp Although still a “living document”—constantly being reviewed and updated to reflect policy and the lessons learned from actual events—the National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan is the current interagency plan for use in conjunction with the NRP. terminology This document introduces several terms new to many emergency managers and response personnel. Following are definitions of other key terms involving disease diagnosis and containment.15 Area veterinarian in charge (AVIC )—This is the lead federal veterinarian for APHIS, VS in an area, usually a state. Case classification system—This is the classification system used to determine the status of a possible foreign animal disease. There are four levels: Suspect—An animal is displaying clinical signs, which may be consistent with a foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident. Presumptive positive—An animal with clinical signs consistent with a foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident with a sample positive on initial laboratory testing, and other epidemiological information indicates the presence of a foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident. An index case indicates that only one of the extenuating circumstances indicated is present. A secondary case indicates that both circumstances are present. Confirmed positive (CP)—The agent is isolated and identified. Emergency declaration—This is a dual use term. Under the USDA authorities, it is a process by which the secretary of agriculture may transfer funds from other agencies or corporations of the Department of Agriculture to reimburse certain federal, state, and local animal health emergency response expenses, including reimbursement of operational costs, such as quarantine enforcement, perimeter control, depopulation, carcass disposal, and decontamination. Under the Stafford Act, this term refers to any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the president of the United States, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property

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and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. Extraordinary emergency—A declaration made by the secretary of agriculture that allows the secretary to use federal authorities to take action within a state if the state is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the disease. Highly contagious disease (HCD)—A disease that spreads rapidly from animal-to-animal as well as herd-to-herd. Transmission can occur via direct and indirect modes. An HCD may be recognized by above normal morbidity or mortality per unit time where morbidity could be characterized as a loss of production. Infected premises (IP)—Premises on which a highly contagious disease or the agent is presumed or confirmed to exist. Total movement control is imposed and all susceptible animals culled. Infected zone—The initial zone drawn beyond the perimeter of all presumptive or confirmed positive premises. The infected zone includes as many contact premises as is logistically practical. The infected zone should initially be set at least 6.2 miles (10 kilometers) beyond the perimeters of the presumptive or confirmed infected premises. The boundaries must be modified as new information emerges. The actual distance of the perimeter of the infected zone in any one direction is determined by factors such as known characteristics of the agent, terrain, the pattern of livestock movements, livestock concentrations, the weather and prevailing winds, the distribution and movements of susceptible wild and feral animals, processing options (livestock and products), and effect on nonrisk commodities. The infected zone can be modified as tracing and surveillance results become available and wildlife distributions become better defined. Presumed diagnosis—An investigation that yields positive epidemiology, clinical signs and serology (blood test) but the virus has not yet been isolated and identified. Quarantine area—The area comprising the infected zone and surveillance zone. Surveillance zone—The zone established outside the infected zone or the same distance around contact premises (CP) located outside an infected zone. Initially the surveillance zone is set to be large (the entire state or territory). This distance is reduced as the epidemiological information becomes available, but not to less than 10 kilometers from the borders of the infected zone. Once the extent of the outbreak is understood, susceptible livestock can move within that zone with a permit but not out 136

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of the zone. Nonsusceptible livestock or poultry can move within and out of the zone with a permit. Suspect premises (SP)—Premises with susceptible animals that are under investigation for a report of clinical signs with no apparent epidemiological link to infected premises (IP) or a contact premises (CP) or that are in the infected zone and not classified as an IP or CP. These premises are under movement restrictions and intense surveillance for two to three incubation periods. If they prove negative for infection, these premises revert to their previous status. The owners of animals on suspect premises in an infected zone may elect to depopulate their animals. assumptions Several planning assumptions were made in the drafting of NAHERP. These assumptions are the circumstances under which the USDA wrote the plan. They are presented with brief commentary upon each. The traditional emergency management principles required for response to other emergencies apply when responding to a highly contagious animal disease. This is a valid point. In many communities, emergency operations plans provide a solid foundation from which to build a response. It is important that these plans, particularly the parts that address scene security, emergency warnings, law enforcement, water protection, and the like, are kept current and reviewed and exercised often. There are three broad categories of support that will be required.16 • General logistical support—This involves sheltering, feeding, and otherwise caring for the responders; transportation, movement, and positioning of equipment and supplies; general law enforcement; administrative support; etc. • Biohazard response support—This involves movement control, decontamination and carcass disposal, as well as the typical support for communicable disease outbreaks such as laboratory support, pharmaceuticals and medical supplies, etc. • Specialized animal disease support—This is unique to animal health emergencies and involves testing and diagnosis of disease, epidemiology, vaccination, depopulation, and carcass disposal. A major outbreak will require resources beyond those currently available to state agricultural authorities. While many states are prepared for a response to small or isolated incidents, a highly pathogenic disease will spread rapidly and may not be detected until days after exposure. These the national response to an agricultural incident

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facts will most likely conspire to overwhelm the state resources and response tools before they are even launched. USDA will immediately apply the authorities vested in the secretary of agriculture and will closely monitor the need to make additional resources available. This means that once an incident occurs, the USDA will use the authority it has through the secretary of agriculture to acquire, move, and utilize resources, including financial resources. Additionally, USDA will monitor the situation to anticipate the need for additional resources in order to mitigate the situation. The initial response from federal, state, and local agencies will be immediate, integrated, and well coordinated. In order for this plan to work, there must be a rapid yet coordinated response by all agencies. Additionally, there is little room for dispute between state, local, and federal authorities about who is in charge and who has what authority. The best way to achieve a well-integrated response is to exercise this plan within local and state jurisdictions. State veterinarians will work in concert with USDA/APHIS/VS in making operational decisions. This anticipates that state veterinarians will not take any action without consulting with the area veterinarian in charge (AVIC) or another member of the USDA’s Veterinary Services unit. State emergency management agencies and the Federal Emergency Management Agency will also monitor potentially significant collateral impacts from a major highly contagious disease outbreak. This assumption indicates that the state and federal emergency management agencies have a significant role to play in the mitigation of an animal health emergency. This is not a single-agency response. If there is a suspicion that the outbreak was caused by criminal activity, then the USDA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) will work closely with the responding veterinary staff for the proper handling, packaging, and shipment of any samples to the appropriate research laboratory for testing and forensic analysis. The Office of the Inspector General is the enforcement branch of the USDA and holds significant authority over the legal issues present for the USDA. The challenge with this assumption is that it anticipates that the incident is known or suspected to be a criminal incident. In many cases, the involvement or suspected involvement of criminal activities is not known until well into the response. The USDA OIG and FBI will jointly conduct a criminal investigation if a terrorist act is suspected to be the cause of the outbreak. Like the previous as.

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sumption, the challenge is that there is a suspicion of a terrorist event. Especially in the case of a terrorist incident, the introduction of an agent will most likely be clandestine and extreme efforts will have been made to keep the introduction covert for an extended period. Additionally, this assumption challenges other federal documents. The FBI is tasked through Presidential Decision Directive 39 and the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN) to take the crisis management lead on any terrorist incident.17 If the outbreak is determined to be criminal but not a terrorist act, the OIG will assume the federal lead responsibility for law enforcement. During the initial phase of an outbreak, unaffected states will take immediate precautionary measures within their borders. This assumes that states will be notified in a timely manner with accurate information. While this is hopeful, it is not always the case. The early stages of many critical incidents are laden with information flow problems because of the disparity in the speed at which information is generated and how quickly it is collected, analyzed, and disseminated. Licensure requirements for veterinarians who are not state or federal employees, but are requested to provide assistance in an affected state, will be waived by the Emergency Management Assistance Compact or other agreement between states. The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is an agreement among most states in the United States that facilitates the transfer of resources, including personnel, between states without the requirement of a federal declaration. This agreement is managed by the National Emergency Management Association. Additionally, many states that border one another have developed mutual aid agreements that allow for the exchange of resources between neighbors. While EMAC can facilitate most reciprocity issues, reciprocity may be delayed pending the agreement of the appropriate licensing boards. If a highly contagious disease outbreak occurs simultaneously with a natural disaster, terrorist event, or other emergency that requires a concurrent response, resource allocation decisions will be made by the Domestic Threat Reduction and Incident Policy Coordination Committee. The Domestic Threat Reduction and Incident Policy Coordination Committee (DTR/PCC) is a federal interagency group. Its members are senior managers who speak with authority for their organization. The DTR/PCC is an important part of the national emergency management system and is designated by the National Response Plan.

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concept of oper ations The USDA expects the outbreak of a highly contagious animal disease to be a unique type of disaster. In most cases, such an outbreak would have national as well as international consequences. For this reason, there would be a simultaneous activation of federal and state response mechanisms, which would use their authorities and resources jointly with shared responsibility.18 Additionally, close coordination and cooperation between the animal health and emergency management communities as well as with industry and nonprofit organizations would be essential for the successful handling of the incident. Therefore, the principles of the Incident Command System are required. Through the use of the ICS, decisions would be made at the lowest level possible.19 Role of the United States Department of Agriculture The U.S. Department of Agriculture is the lead agency for all agricultural emergencies, with the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service as the designated lead agency for a foot-and-mouth disease outbreak; it is presumed, however, that this authority is not limited to foot-and-mouth but would play that role for most highly contagious diseases. The national incident coordinator has the full authority of the APHIS administrator and would be located in the APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC). Through this authority, the national incident coordinator is to set the national priorities and determine the criteria for allocation of resources in a multistate, multiregion event to minimize the impact on the United States as a whole.20 The state veterinarian can request that the AVIC deploy parts of or a complete disease eradication team that consists of APHIS employees. As the authorized representative of the secretary of agriculture, the AVIC will lead the overall federal component of the integrated response within the state and will be the federal official who will interact with the state coordinating officer.21 The USDA will use the USDA State Emergency Boards (SEBs) to liaison with the USDA Joint Operations Center and to coordinate the activities of non-APHIS USDA agencies. The SEBs are responsible for damage assessment and reporting through the USDA emergency coordinator and the USDA Office of the Chief Economist.22 The USDA County Emergency Boards will liaise at the incident command post in order to facilitate damage assessment and support appraisal activities and indemnity payments to the producers. As the damage as140

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sessment information becomes available, it is to be channeled through the SEBs for the combined assessment of the state.23 USDA county extension agents will assist in the assimilation and dissemination of information to producer groups. The Incident Commander in the field will manage all response operations and may be a state or federal animal health official. This IC will be appointed by the combined AVIC/state coordinating officer team. APHIS, through its own senior public affairs officer, will establish a Joint Information Center within the APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC) in Riverdale, Maryland. This JIC will serve as the principal source of information on all aspects of a disease response and will coordinate with other federal agencies, industry, communications officials, and state-level JICs.24 Role of the Department of Homeland Security and FEMA Although USDA is the lead federal agency for agricultural emergencies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency within the Department of Homeland Security will serve as the federal coordinating agency for disaster response and recovery operations, as so designated by the Stafford Act. The coordinating authority may apply only to federal support.25 FEMA’s assistance may be utilized without a Stafford Act declaration, following a request by the secretary of agriculture. Once a declaration has been approved by the president of the United States or the USDA has asked FEMA to act, FEMA will activate the Emergency Response Team, which is the interagency group that staffs the JFO. The advanced element of the team (ERT-A) deploys during the early stages of an incident to work directly with the state to assess the direct impact to the state and to facilitate state requests for federal incident management assistance. The Federal Incident Response Support Team (FIRST) is a forward component of the ERT-A that provides on-scene support to the local incident command or area command structure in order to facilitate an integrated interjurisdictional response. After linking up with local and state officials, the FIRST team assesses the situation and identifies the potential requirements for federal support, provides protective action recommendations, identifies critical unmet needs, and coordinates response activities with other federal responders. They also oversee on-scene federal assistance, which could include critical life-saving and life-sustaining items.26 the national response to an agricultural incident

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In each infected state, FEMA will appoint a senior FEMA official (SFO) upon the request of the USDA. The role of the SFO is to provide emergency management advice and coordinate federal agency support, with or without a presidential declaration under the Stafford Act.27 The SFO reports directly to the state coordinating officer and works from the emergency operations center or joint operations center.28 In addition to the SFO, FEMA will send key staff to the EOC in each infected state to coordinate federal resources in support of the state’s unmet needs. FEMA is also prepared to provide technical expertise. Among these areas are situation monitoring; Geographic Information System (GIS); emergency communications, including mobile command posts with full satellite-based telephone, network, and Internet service; logistics, including contractual support, field office setup and demobilization, storage and warehousing operations, and resource tracking; and public affairs and emergency public information.29 In addition to the senior FEMA official, should an emergency or major disaster be declared, FEMA will assign a federal coordinating officer and/or a PFO in accordance with the provisions of the Stafford Act. The role of the FCO is to oversee the federal response support operations authorized under the presidential emergency or major disaster declaration in coordination with the state coordinating officer and AVIC. initial animal disease detection and assessment process The flowchart in figure 11 explains the initial process of detection and assessment of a highly contagious disease, according to NAHERP. Initial detection relies solely on the livestock owner/operator or local veterinarian recognizing an anomaly as potentially representing a highly contagious disease. Once notified, the area veterinarian in charge is to appoint a foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD), a veterinarian who has completed a specialized foreign animal disease training course offered at the USDA’s Plum Island facility. The FADD will either rule out an FAD or determine to proceed with the investigation by drawing specimens and submitting them to the laboratory for a definitive diagnosis. If the FADD determines the case to be “highly likely,” a warning notice for other response actions should be initiated to alert other response organizations and agencies so that their response will be more efficient. Because of the gravity and far-reaching effects of a confirmed FAD, the USDA will announce the first confirmed case. 142

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figure 12. Initial Animal Emergency Response Process

Local Responsibilities The local jurisdiction will activate its EOC to provide a local base of operations to assist with the response. Additionally, locals will find the best location for an incident command post. The ICP location needs access to appropriate communications and information technology support and must be located at a safe distance from the areas of infection, while maintaining a practical working distance from the site. State Responsibilities The state will appoint a state coordinating officer. The SCO may be the state veterinarian or a member of the state emergency management community. The state veterinarian and the AVIC will establish a Joint Operations Center, which will become the focal point for coordinating the disease management decision-making process. The state EOC will integrate the national response to an agricultural incident

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the other local, state, and federal response operations. The state will establish a Joint Information Center that will function as the primary source of information on the FAD response in the state.30 The state has several responsibilities and actions to take as well. First, as soon as the FADD determines the case to be “highly likely,” the state should place movement restrictions on the premises under investigation. Furthermore, the state should activate the state emergency response plan and the applicable annexes of the state emergency operations plan in order to assist with the preliminary and interim diagnosis issues, such as movement restrictions, information management, and other emergency management functions. The state should also prepare to deploy resources rapidly for scene containment and control, epidemiology, and decontamination issues. Local and State Actions for a Presumptive Diagnosis The state and local jurisdictions have a responsibility to plan for a disaster; however, the USDA has suggested actions that local and state jurisdictions should take if there is a “presumptive” diagnosis. States and local jurisdictions should quarantine the affected premises and take the appropriate biosecurity measures to prevent the spread of the disease. These include initiating an active case finding and surveillance around infected premises. Local and state EOCs should be activated according to the local and state emergency response plan to aid in coordinating mitigation of the incident. States and local agencies should stop the movement of susceptible animals, articles, and transportation devices that may spread contamination. The local jurisdiction and state authorities should take the necessary steps to prepare to depopulate the affected herd. States and local jurisdictions may be called upon to conduct depopulation efforts with APHIS concurrence. The local jurisdictions should declare an emergency and route it through the appropriate authorities to the state. Once the local emergency declaration is received, the state should initiate the process for a governor’s declaration of emergency.31 National Actions for a Presumptive Diagnosis The USDA should activate the Agriculture Emergency Operations Center (AEOC) in Maryland. Through the AEOC, Veterinary Services officers and state veterinarians will be notified of the situation. The emergency re-

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sponse communications plan will be initiated and some USDA assets will be supplied to the VS assets in the state(s) where the disease exists, as needed by the AVIC. Local and State Actions for a Confirmed Diagnosis If the presumptive FAD diagnosis is confirmed, each state activates its FAD plan. If they have not already done so, states should request a presidential emergency declaration. National Actions for a Confirmed Diagnosis The USDA will activate NAHERP. Accordingly, USDA will issue the secretary’s request to transfer additional funds within USDA. All interstate movement of susceptible animals, articles, and means of conveyance will be stopped as needed. Additionally, the mechanisms of the National Response Plan (NRP) will be activated, with or without a Stafford Act declaration, if needed and requested by USDA. Federal response resource priorities will be determined by the USDA national director, unless the outbreak occurs concurrently with a natural or human-caused disaster. Other Actions to Be Taken Several other actions may need to be taken should an FAD outbreak occur. First, a national response to foot-and-mouth disease may include a hold on the movement of all susceptible livestock, articles, and transportation vehicles for no less than three days or until the potential dissemination of the disease can be determined. It is not clear who has the responsibility for this activity. However, there is no national-based organization or agency with the authority and capabilities of meeting the needs of this task in a timely fashion. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that local and state agencies will be tasked with this job.32 Second, states in the close proximity to the states where the disease is present will be quarantined until the extent of the disease is known. As with the hold on movement, there is little or no mechanism for the USDA to enforce this action. Therefore, the enforcement responsibility will fall on the shoulders of state and local jurisdictions, because most federal response resources will be focused on the areas of known involvement. Farms that are determined to be infected, called “contact premises,” will have all susceptible animals culled. Farms adjoining the contact premises and other potential contact farms will undergo intense surveil-

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lance. It is not clear which agency or organization will conduct the depopulation. The Newcastle incident in southern California, Nevada, and Arizona that began in 2002 has shed some light on this issue. APHIS has established depopulation task forces for the chickens and other birds in the California event. However, because of the limited resources available to USDA, this may not be feasible in a widespread outbreak or in the case of simultaneous, multiple-state outbreaks. In such cases, state and local jurisdictions may be tasked with conducting or assisting with depopulation. Carcass disposal is a demanding task that requires the consultation of local, state, and federal agencies, including those dealing with the enforcement of environmental protection regulations such as the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Toxic Substances Control Act, and the Clean Water Act. Resources such as heavy equipment operators, civil engineers, landfill operators, and others will be involved in this task as well. Cleaning and disinfection (decontamination) is a necessary requirement before operations can cease on any given infected site. Since all vehicles, articles, any means of conveyance, nonsusceptible animals, and all personnel on and around the site must be effectively decontaminated any time they leave the site, this is an awesome responsibility and a large task. As with many of the other tasks, there are federal assets available to address this; and some of the work can be completed through selfdecontamination. However, if there are widespread or simultaneous outbreaks, local jurisdictions will need to provide some of the resources to accomplish this task. other parts of naherp Some of the background, authorities, and specifics of NAHERP and provided in annexes to the plan. Annex A provides the citations of laws and regulations from which NAHERP and USDA get their power and authority. Annex B is a factsheet for foot-and-mouth disease. Annex C outlines in bulleted form much of the same information given in the plan concerning the federal response to an outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease. Annex D outlines the public affairs plan for an FAD outbreak. Annex E describes the possible federal agency resources available for a response by the emergency support functions (ESFs). Additionally, the roles of the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Defense, and the Interior and of the Small Business Administration are outlined. Annex F is not fully developed and remains unpublished. Annex G outlines the law enforcement responsibilities and authorities during an agri146

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cultural event. This pertains primarily to the USDA’s Office of the Inspector General and the formation of the Investigative Emergency Response Teams (IERT), which will do the following:33 • If the outbreak is believed to have been caused by criminal activity, coordinate with USDA veterinarian staff for the proper handling, packaging, and transport of samples to the appropriate laboratory for testing and forensic analysis. • Assist in the enforcement of quarantines. • Enforce the orders of the secretary of agriculture. • Protect USDA employees and facilities. • Coordinate security for the movement of quarantined animals. • Coordinate and work with other law enforcement and non–law enforcement agencies on the local, state, and federal levels. • Conduct criminal investigations and provide other investigative assistance. • Coordinate criminal referrals, or other issues as needed, with local, state and federal prosecutors. challenges of naherp NAHERP provides a great deal of direction for the response to a highly contagious disease. However, this plan may also create difficulty for emergency management and response communities who are familiar with the Stafford Act processes. NAHERP seems to ignore some aspects of the other plans established, such as the former Federal Response Plan, and it does not reflect the mindset of the new National Response Plan.34 NAHERP leaves significant responsibilities unassigned, such as the holding of livestock in transit. It also shows a lack of understanding of the principles of the Incident Command System. While there are many issues that can be adequately addressed by a single command structure, an incident of the size and magnitude of an FAD outbreak requires a unified command structure. An Incident Commander must have the characteristics of a manager of both information and personnel, able to acquire, interpret, and process information quickly. By using the unified command concept, the direction of the response can be established at the state and local levels while using a minimal number of resources. It may not be the best use of resources to place USDA Veterinary Services personnel as Incident Commanders because of the potentially significant lack of qualified technical specialists—especially those from the national response to an agricultural incident

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USDA, VS. The Incident Command System has a location for the technical specialists in many positions throughout the organizational structure. Moreover, this plan incorporates multiple command, coordination, and/or control centers. Studies of large-scale incidents have shown that the more command, coordination, or control centers there are, the more difficult the coordination is, and consequently, the response is less effective.35 While the scope and scale of the attack on the World Trade Center could pale in comparison to the effects of a widespread agricultural incident, the ICS principles are robust and adaptable enough to handle an incident of virtually any scale. NAHERP implies that the unified area command concept will be used for multiple sites within a close proximity. This is a complex concept to implement with a diverse group of agencies with different levels of experience with the Incident Command System. The situation is further complicated by the apparent contradictions between the NRP and NAHERP as they relate to the lines of authority. Area command is the appropriate mechanism for incident management in this setting; however, the principles of area command must be strengthened and standardized. The current guidance is vague at best.

animal emergency response organization (aero) As with the NAHERP, the Animal Emergency Response Organization document remains a living document in the sense of ongoing development and revisions. At the time of writing, AERO was nevertheless in use to guide the response of federal, state, local, and industry agencies to a natural occurrence of the Exotic Newcastle Disease in southern California, Nevada, and Arizona. roles and responsibilities AERO is a resource that bills itself as a “practical guide rather than a comprehensive reference resource,” providing general principles and recommendations as to the response system necessary to guide emergency response workers in the event of a major U.S. animal health emergency.36 The program was written by a steering group consisting of veterinarians, industry personnel, and members of the USDA’s APHIS, U.S. Forest Service, California Department of Agriculture, Texas Animal Health Commission, and Georgia Emergency Management Agency.37 AERO takes many of its principles from NIMS, especially Incident 148

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Command System.38 Figure 12 outlines the chain of command for the national incident management team (as given in AERO, fig. 8). What follows is the explanation of this chain of command provided by AERO. The AERO chain of command begins with (a) the National MultiAgency Coordinator (representing the National Multi-Agency Coordination [MAC] Group), who has overall coordination, information dissemination, and priority-setting functions; (b) the USDA/APHIS Emergency Operations Center, which has intelligence-gathering, mobilization, and coordination functions; and (c) the Geographical Multi-Agency Coordination Groups, which have coordination, information dissemination, and priority-setting functions. The figure also shows that the Geographical Multi-Agency Coordination Groups oversee the activities for the Geographical Emergency Operations Center, which in turn is responsible at this level for intelligence gathering, mobilization, and coordination and for overseeing the work of the Area Command Team. The Area Command team oversees the work of the Unified Incident Management Teams, which are responsible for on-site incident management. Subsequent sections of this document provide further details concerning each of these major components.39 incident typing AERO provides specific guidance for the typing designation of incidents. Table 4 provides the characteristics of each incident type.40 Undoubtedly the greatest value of this document is its outlining the expected roles and responsibilities of all positions within the animal emergency response organization. Additionally it includes a careful description of the area command concept. This will assist in the implementation of the concept, if it is needed. Figure 12 illustrates a probable incident command organization for a local-level Incident Command Post (ICP). Qualified personnel for each position in the organization are supposed to be identified by the state veterinarian or the AVIC. For each position, there is a regimen of training that must be completed according to the plan.41 the challenges of aero AERO is intended as a guideline to establish an animal health emergency response organization, but in many areas its proposed organization creates bottlenecks in the flow of information. the national response to an agricultural incident

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figure 13. USDA National Incident Management Team Structure

As has been noted in many exercises involving an FAD, there is a need for an expedient flow of information to and from the Incident Commander or the unified command team.42 The area command concept is at best difficult to implement, unless there is much practice and training. Informal reports from the response to the Newcastle outbreak in California have revealed serious problems created by the vague delineation of authority. For example, responders in the operations section often waited for hours or up to a day to receive the authority to purchase the tools and supplies needed to accomplish their tasks. The reason was that only one person could grant this authority, and he was often unreachable as he traveled to various sites in the affected area. A second issue is that the nomenclature used in AERO needs to be aligned with the NIMS. And third, its style needs to synchronize better with the NRP.43 The Department of Homeland Security will be setting the 150

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Table 4. AERO—Incident Type and Characteristics Small incident (approximately 80% of responses) or initial Type 4 Initial Response

response to larger incident. Typically one operational period; verbal action plan. Single or few resources Command and general staff positions not activated. Larger incident (approximately 15% of responses).

Type 3 Extended Response

Incident crosses district/unit boundaries. May require multiple operational periods; if so, written action plan. Some command and general staff activated, usually no division/group supervisors. Regionally significant incident (re, police, and emergency medical services personnel, but also veterinarians, veterinary technicians, cooperative extension agents, and feedlot personnel. Photo by Jack Dykinga, courtesy USDA.

Instructions At the end of the presentation of the content, divide the participants into several small groups of three to five people. 1. Provide each group with a flip chart and markers. 2. Allow 20 minutes for each group to answer the question: “What are the consequences of terrorism?” 3. Have each group record their answers on the flip charts. 4. At the end of the 20 minutes, have each group read answers aloud. If there are too many groups to allow each to read their answers, pick out specific answers that are duplicated by the groups or uniquely appropriate. 5. Once a list has been generated, ask the plenary to identify those answers that are specific to terrorism involving agriculture. 6. Have participants explain their reasoning for their answers.

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objectives and suggested activities for chapter 2 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to explain why the agricultural industry in the United States is an essential part of the nation’s infrastructure. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • Define the layers of the agriculture industry. • Explain how highly mobile the agriculture industry is. • Explain the interdependence of segments within the agriculture industry. • Explain how the mobility and interdependence of the industry makes it vulnerable to terrorism. • Identify the largest-grossing agriculture crops and livestock sectors as identified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. activity: understanding the agriculture industry Equipment needed—12 flip charts/newsprint and markers; 12 copies of the National Agricultural Statistics Service/USDA “Agriculture Statistics”; a map of the United States that may be marked Instructions 1. Divide the participants into 5–12 groups. It is acceptable to have groups do more than one area if there are not enough groups for each area. 2. Provide each group with a flip chart and markers. 3. Post the map on a wall or easel in an accessible area. 4. Assign a group one of the following areas of the agriculture industry: Beef cattle production Equine Soybeans Dairy cattle production Poultry production Wheat Sheep/wool production Corn (feed and sweet) Rice Swine Citrus fruits Sugar 5. Have each group identify on the flip chart the annual gross dollar amount of the specified crop/livestock group. 6. On the map, have the groups mark the location of major activities of the specified industry, using a single color for a single industry.

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7. At the end of 20 minutes, have each group report their findings aloud. 8. Contrast the figures provided by the groups with figures from other industries, such as textiles, rail transportation, or the movie or petrochemical industry. 9. Point out to participants that the centers of certain areas are fed by outlying areas. For example, although a substantial part of the beef cattle industry is located in an area ranging from Texas to Kansas, there are also significant breeding and feeding operations in many other states. 10. The result should be a multicolored map showing the widespread nature of many sectors of the agriculture industry across the nation.

objectives and suggested activities for chapter 3 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to describe why weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to the American agriculture industry. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • Define weapons of mass destruction as identified in United States Code. • Identify why terrorism is an effective warfare strategy. • List the contributing factors that make the agriculture industry vulnerable to terrorism. • List the most likely motivations or ideologies of a group that might target the agriculture industry. • Identify the desirable characteristics of a chemical and a biological organism that would make it a preferable to use against livestock. • List the likely biological and chemical weapons that may be used against the agriculture industry. activity: understanding the greatest wmd threats to agriculture Equipment needed—12 flip charts/newsprint and markers

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Instructions 1. Divide the participants into 5–10 groups. 2. Provide each group with markers and a flip chart. 3. Direct the participants to tables 1 and 2 in the present book. 4. Assign each group a different pathogen. 5. Give the groups 20 minutes to determine the following based on the tables. • Species affected • Is it zoonotic? • Mode of transmission • Incubation period • Lethality to livestock • Is this a viable pathogen to use against livestock? • Why or why not? 6. Have participants record their answers on the flip charts. 7. At the end of the 20 minutes, have each group report their findings aloud. The discussion concerning the viability of the pathogen will be a lively one and may need to be facilitated.

objectives and suggested activities for chapter 4 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to describe the basic components of the incident command system that would be used to direct and control the response effort for a terrorism event involving agriculture. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • List and define the common elements of the incident command system. • List and define the functional areas of the incident command system. • List the responsibilities for each of the command staff positions of the incident command system. • List the responsibilities for each of the functional areas of the incident command system. • Describe the unified command concept of the incident command system. • Identify the purpose of the National Incident Management System (NIMS). 156

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activity: using the incident command system Equipment needed—flip charts/newsprint and markers Instructions 1. Divide the participants into groups of 5–10 people. 2. Provide participants with the following scenario: You have just been called by a local farmer who has found rinderpest in his herd (200 head) of beef cattle. He has stated that he has received threats from a known animal rights group stating they will stop him from torturing his animals (farming) by any means necessary. His farm is 1,000 acres surrounded by several other farms that raise beef cattle. You will have to accomplish the following tasks to stop the disease from spreading. • Establish a perimeter around the farm that stops the flow of traffic on and off the premises. • Depopulate the affect animals. • Establish and maintain cleaning and disinfection processes. • Dispose of the carcasses in a manner that will stop the spread of the disease and is safe to the environment. • Establish surveillance for susceptible species in the community’s surrounding premises. • Track the costs of the response. • Maintain adherence to all applicable state and federal regulations. • Provide food and lodging for up to 200 responders arriving in the next 12 hours. • Order all of the materials and supplies for the response effort. • Keep the community, elected officials, and the media informed. • Plan the response effort for the next 24 hours. • Forecast the needs for the response effort which will last for up to six months. • Use the incident command system to organize the response effort to accomplish these tasks. 3. Allow the participants 30 minutes to accomplish this task, including charting their incident management organization on the flip charts. 4. At the end of the 30 minutes have a spokesperson from each group explain their choices. using this book for training programs

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objectives and suggested activities for chapter 5 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to describe the general concept of the response to an animal health emergency response as defined by the USDA. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • State the purpose of the National Response Plan. • State the purpose of the National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan. • State the purpose of the Animal Emergency Response Organization document series. • Recognize the major events of the initial animal emergency response process. • List the responsibilities of the local, state, and federal governments. • Identify the types of incidents and the main characteristics of each. activity: due to the fluid nature of this and the various state policies, an activity is not possible.

objectives and suggested activities for chapter 6 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to list and characterize major strategies required in an incident involving a terrorist attack on agriculture. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • List and define response strategies as they relate to a response to a WMD/terrorism incident involving agriculture. • Explain the importance of operational security as it relates to an animal health emergency involving terrorism. • List the considerations in determining the proper method of carcass disposal. • List the six basic types of cleaning and disinfection substances. • Explain why nonagricultural areas in the United States may have a responsibility to act in an animal health emergency involving terrorism. 158

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• Explain the challenges associated with using volunteers in a response to a WMD/terrorism incident involving agriculture. • Explain the dangers associated with freelancing in a WMD/terrorism incident involving agriculture. • Explain the importance of working with the media during a WMD/terrorism incident involving agriculture. activity: responding to a wmd incident involving agriculture Equipment needed—flip charts/newsprint and markers Instructions 1. Divide the participants into the same groups as for chapter 4. This activity builds from the activity in chapter 4. 2. Provide each group with the following information: The community is a rural community located 50 miles southeast of the sixteenth largest city in the United States and 25 miles west of a city of 120,000 people. The nearby university has a diagnostic laboratory. The farm, belonging to Timothy Hastert, is a 1,200-acre cattle/hog operation. It is surrounded by several other farms of similar makeup. There are several large chicken operations 12 miles downwind of the farm. The Hastert farm uses 300 acres for pasture and has a moderatesized hog operation, including farrow barns, growing barns, and outdoor pens. The farm has 250 head of cattle and 1,115 head of hogs, two horses, and four dogs—two of which are house dogs. Three days ago, a bull of 11,200 pounds was downed due to an unknown illness. The animal was killed, and brain and spinal tissue samples were sent to the local university diagnostic lab for analysis. The lab analysis has been returned today with a positive for Yersinia pestis. Several other animals are presenting with similar symptoms this morning. Tim Hastert is now sick with general flulike symptoms and reports that he found a strange looking sprayer-type device in the cattle feeding barn. 3. Instruct each group to identify the response issues for this incident and record their answers on the flip charts. 4. Allow 30 to 40 minutes for each group to answer the problem. 5. Have each group make a presentation on what they chose to do and why they chose to do it. Limit the group presentations to 10 to 15 minutes each. using this book for training programs

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objectives and suggested activities for chapter 7 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to identify mechanisms that can aid states and local communities in their response to an agroterrorism incident. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • Define the purpose of incident management teams. • Explain the use of specialized response teams. • Explain the importance of animal health surveillance programs in addressing an agroterrorism incident. • Explain the importance of surveillance programs in respect to disease control. activity: br ainstorming new techniques for response to agroterrorism Equipment needed—Flip charts/newsprint and markers Instructions This activity is a brainstorming session to encourage the participants to identify and develop new technologies that would help responders conduct a response to an agroterrorism incident. 1. Divide the participants into the same groups as for chapter 6. 2. Assign each group to focus on one of the following areas: Prevention, preparedness, response, or recovery. 3. Ask each group to develop a feasible plan, project, or technique that could help communities respond to an agroterrorism incident. 4. Have each group consider the cost, implementation, and prolonged use of their concept. 5. Have each group present their concept to the rest of the groups. 6. Debrief the advantages and disadvantages for each idea.

objectives and suggested activities for chapter 8 Terminal objective—By the end of this chapter, participants will be able to identify the major parts of the State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy (SHSAS) program of the U.S. Department of Homeland 160

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Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness, including the optional agricultural assessment components, as they pertain to local jurisdictions. Enabling objectives—By the end of this chapter, participants should be able to do the following: • Define the purpose of the ODP’s SHSAS program. • Explain, in order, the basic process of the OSHSAS. • Identify disciplines that should participate in the SHSAS working group(s), including for the optional agricultural assessment. • List the benefits of conducting the threat assessment. • Identify the purpose of the vulnerability assessment. • Explain how a community determines its needs for planning, organization, equipment, training, and exercises to respond to a WMD incident involving agriculture. • Compare and contrast the optional agricultural assessment components with their respective counterparts in the basic assessment. activity: assessing vulner ability to an attack on agriculture Equipment needed—Flip charts/newsprint and markers Instructions The intent of this activity is to provide participants with the experience of participating in a vulnerability assessment for a particular venue. 1. Divide participants into groups of 5 to 10 people. This activity will work best if each group has participants with varying backgrounds. 2. Have each group choose a community to assess. 3. Provide the Vulnerability Assessment Exercise Summary form to each group so that they may use it as a tool to assess the vulnerability of their chosen community. 4. Have each group identify no more than five targets within the chosen community and list them on the Vulnerability Assessment Exercise Summary sheet. 5. Once the targets are chosen, have each group complete an Individual Site/Event Vulnerability Assessment Sheet for each target. 6. Record each target’s vulnerability rating on this form in the Target’s Vulnerability Rating column. using this book for training programs

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7. After 30 minutes, have the groups present their scores. 8. Compare and contrast the scores for duplicated sites/events. 9. Instruct the plenary group to brainstorm to develop a scenario to use in an exercise, based on their findings. Capture the responses on flip charts. 10. Assign each group one of the following topics: Planning, organization, equipment, or training. 11. Give each group about 30 minutes to develop a list of items required under their assigned topic to make a response to the scenario developed. 12. Have each group present their findings 13. Compare and contrast the answers.

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appendix a vulnerability assessment exercise summary

Vulnerability Assessment Exercise Summary Sheet Site/Target

1 2 3 4 5

Target Name

Target’s Vulnerability Rating

appendix b individual site/event vulnerability assessment sheet

Site/Target Name or Number: Total Score Rating 1 Level of Visibility 0= Existence is secret/Classified

3= Known locally

1= Existence is not publicized

4= Known regionally

2= Not well known

5= Nationally known

2 Criticality – relates to usefulness of assets to local population, economy government, etc. 0= Not useful

2= Moderately useful

4= Highly useful

1= Minorly useful

3= Significantly useful

5= Critical

3 Impact outside the jurisdiction 0= None

2= Low

4= High

1= Very low

3= Medium

5= Very high

4 PTE Access to target 0= Restricted = 24/7 security, fenced, alarmed CCTV, controlled access requiring prior clearance, designated parking, no unauthorized vehicle parking within 300 feet of facility, protected air/consumable entry. 1= Controlled = 24/7 security, fenced, alarmed, controlled access of vehicles and personnel, designated parking, no unauthorized vehicle parking with 300 feet of the facility, protected air/consumable entry. 2= Limited = Security guard at main entrance during business hours, fenced, alarmed, controlled access of visitors, designated parking, no unauthorized vehicles parking within 300 feet of the facility, protected air/consumable entry. 3= Moderate = Controlled access of visitors, alarmed after business hours, protected air/ consumable entry, designated parking, no unauthorized vehicle parking within 50 feet. 4= Open = Open access during business hours, locked during non-business hours, unprotected air/consumable entry. 5= Unlimited = Open access, unprotected air/consumable entry 5 Threat Hazard of Target – Are there legal WMD materials present in quantities to complicate a terrorist incident response? 0= None

1= Minimal

2= Low

3= Moderate

4= High

5= Very high

6 Capacity of Facility Number of animals Bushels of Crops 0= 1–250

3= 1,001–5,000

0=1–2,500

3= 10,001–50,000

1= 251–500

4= 5,001–10,000

1= 2,501–5,000

4= 50,001–250,000

2=501–1,000

5= >10,000

2= 5,001–10,000

5= >250,000

7 Product Distribution Area 0= Locally

2= Statewide

4= Nationally

1= Countywide

3= Regionally

5= International

Raw Score (add lines 1–7) Basic Target Vulnerability Convert Rating 0–2 pts = 1

9–11 pts = 4

18–20 pts = 7

27–29 pts = 10

3–5 pts = 2

12–14 pts = 5

21–23 pts = 8

30–32 pts = 11

6–8 pts = 3

15–17 pts = 6

24–26 pts = 9

33–35 pts = 12

individual site/event vulnerability assessment

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notes

introduction 1. Gilmore Commission, The Third Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing Domestic Response Capabilities Incident Management Handbook (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 15, 2001), 6. 2. Gilmore Commission, Third Annual Report, 10. 3. 40 CFR, chapter 1, part 50, spells out the ambient air quality standard for particulate matter (PM). Particulate matter includes dust.

chapter 1 1. 107th Congress, H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 2, para. 15. 2. ABC News report, ABCNews.com, October 2001. 3. Jason Pate and Gavin Cameron, “Covert Biological Weapons Attacks against Agricultural Targets: Assessing the Impact against U.S. Agriculture,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA) Discussion Paper 2001-9, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, August 2001, 7. 4. Gilmore Commission, The Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing Domestic Response Capabilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 22, 2002), 70. 5. Anne Kohnen, “Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture,” BCSIA Discussion Paper 2000-29, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2000-04, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2000, 6. See also Corrie Brown, “AgroTerrorism: A Cause for Alarm,” The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization, and Arms Control, Winter–Spring 1999, 6. 6. Gilmore Commission, The First Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Threat (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 15, 1999), 27. 7. “Bioterrorism: A Threat to Agriculture and to the Food Supply,” GAO-04-259T (Washington, D.C.: GAO, November 13, 2003), 4. 8. Kohnen, “Responding,” 10. 9. Brown, “Agro-Terrorism,” 6. Brown states: “Bioterrorism aimed at humans would look economically pale [emphasis added] against an attack on the agricultural sector. . . . A terrorist wishing to cause severe and reverberating financial conse-

quences could simply introduce a foreign disease into American livestock, which would set off a chain reaction touching virtually every citizen’s pocketbook.” See also Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report, 68. In this report, the commission echoed their statements of the 1999 report, stating that “agriculture is one area that has received less attention” than other areas of preventing and responding to terrorist threats and incidents. 10. Lt. Col. Robert P. Kadlec, USAF, “Biological Weapons for Waging Economic Warfare,” in Battlefield of the Future:21st Century Warfare Issues, United States Air Force, http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp10.html (last accessed June 4, 2002).

chapter 2 1. Comments by Dr. Floyd P. Horn, Administrator, Agriculture Research Service, USDA, before the United States Senate Emerging Threats and Capabilities Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, October 27, 1999. 2. Stephen M. Apatow, Agricultural Security and Emergency Preparedness: Protecting One of America’s Critical Infrastructures, (Carson City, Nev.: Humanitarian Resource Institute, December 2001), 15; Apatow quotes the American Horse Council, Statistics, available at http://www.horsecouncil.org/ahcstats.html. 3. U.S. Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service, www.ers.usda .gov/briefing/FederalTaxes/TaxesSummary.htm.

chapter 3 1. 107th Congress, H.R. 5005, Homeland Security Act of 2002, section 2, para. 15. 2. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, chap. 6, v. 10. This is my reading of the interpretations. 3. Peter Chalk, “The Threat Beyond 2000,” in Bioterrorism: Home Land Defense: The Next Steps, proceedings from a conference held February 8–10, 2000 (Santa Monica, Calif: Rand, 2001), 6. It is important to understand that undermining the public’s confidence in the economy and the ability of the government to protect its citizenry might have a secondary result of creating mass panic. Chalk sees this as another reason; I do not disagree, but I do see it as a secondary result, at least in the United States. 4. Dorothy B. Preslar, “The Role of Disease Surveillance in the Watch for AgroTerrorism or Economic Sabotage,” AHEAD, November 2000, available at www .fas.org/ahead/agroterror.htm (accessed June 2001), 1. Preslar discusses why a terrorist might target U.S. plant and animal populations. She states that “the use of biological agents against animal and plant populations . . . is not as repugnant to prevailing sensibilities as use against humans.” 5. Jane Fullerton, “The Terrorists among Us,” AgWeb News (online journal), December 7, 2001, available at http://www.agweb.com/news_show_news_article.asp ?file=AgNewsArticle_20011271235_9 (accessed June 4, 2002); Kohnen “Responding,” 11.

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6. Jonathan Ban, “Agricultural Biological Warfare: An Overview,” Arena (Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute), no. 9 (June 2000): 4. 7. George Teagarden, Livestock Commissioner, State of Kansas, Animal Health Department, interview by author, Garden City, Kans., November 13, 2002. 8. Ban, “Agricultural Biological Warfare,” 4. 9. Kohnen, “Responding,” 11; Chalk, “Threat Beyond,” 10; Kohnen discusses using biological weapons to cause fluctuation in the markets, while Chalk discusses this result and coercive blackmail. 10. Jonathon B. Tucker, “Historical Trends Related to Bioterrorism: An Empirical Analysis,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 5, no. 4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ ncidod/eid/v015n04/pdf/tucker.pdf (last accessed December 1, 2003). 11. Clayton L. Thomas (ed.), Taber’s Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary, 17th ed. (Philadelphia, Pa.: E. A. Davis Company 1993), 191–94. 12. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Agricultural Biowarfare: State Programs to Develop Offensive Capabilities, October 2000, available at http://cns.miis .edu/research/cbw/agprogs.htm (accessed December 18, 2002); Ken W. Alibek with Stephen Handelman, Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran It (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 2000); Richard Preston, The Demon in the Freezer (New York: Random House, 2002). 13. Committee on Foreign Animal Diseases of the United States Animal Health Association, Foreign Animal Diseases: “The Gray Book” (Richmond, Va.: Pat Campbell and Associates and Carter Printing Company, 1998); hereafter cited as Gray Book. 14. United States Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense (USAMRICD), Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Handbook, 3rd ed., MCMRUV-ZM (Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md.: Chemical Casualty Care Division, July 2000). I have summarized some of the characteristics of chemical weapons listed in the handbook. 15. USAMRICD, Chemical Casualties Handbook, 56–57. 16. USAMRICD, Chemical Casualties Handbook, 31. 17. USAMRICD, Chemical Casualties Handbook, 19. 18. USAMRICD, Chemical Casualties Handbook, 10. 19. Chalk, “Threat Beyond,” 3. 20. Peter Chalk, “The US Agriculture Sector: A New Target for Terrorism?” Janes Security News, February 9, 2001, available at http://www.janes.com/security/ regional_security/news/jir/jir010209_1_n.shtml (last accessed June 2002). 21. Kevin Varner, Veterinarian in Charge, Kansas, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, interview by author, Garden City, Kans., November 13, 2002. 22. Thomas, Taber’s, 2180. 23. Thomas, Taber’s, 2135. 24. Preston, Demon, 33–34. Preston provides a comparison of the bacteria E. coli, notes to pages 12–18

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the main type of bacteria in the human gut, to anthrax and a virion (virus particle). He notes that comparatively speaking, if E. coli were the size of a small watermelon, an anthrax spore would be the size of an orange, and a virion of smallpox would be the size of a mulberry. Considering that in his analogy a cell from the human body would be the size of a Volkswagen bus, a virion is truly small. A virion for the common cold would be about the size of a marijuana seed. 25. “Definitions for List A and B Diseases,” Office International des Epizooties, available at http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en_classification.htm (accessed October 14, 2002); Kohnen, “Responding,” 13. 26. Kohnen, “Responding,” 13. 27. Gray Book, 186. 28. Kohnen, “Responding,” 15; Kohnen quotes Fredrick Murphy, E. Paul Gibbs, Marian Horzinek, and Michael Studdert, Veterinary Virology (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1999), 527. 29. Preston, Demon, 34. 30. Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, 166–67; Alibek discusses advances made by the Soviet bioweapons program in the late 1980s. The scientists successfully combined a gene causing a toxin that eats away at the protective coating of nerves with Yersinia pestis, the bacteria that cause both pneumonic and bubonic plague. The indications of this would seem to be that a germ causing a disease with the lethality of foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) could be combined with a gene providing the dormant form (spore) of anthrax, thus increasing the hazard presented by the disease. 31. David R. Franz, D.V.M., Ph.D., Col. USA (ret.), “Defense against Toxin Weapons,” U.S. Army Medical Research and Materials Command, Ft. Detrick, Md., 1997. 32. Kohnen, “Responding,” 9. The plant is Synadenium compactum, in the family Euphorbiacaeae; it is available in the U.S. nursery trade. 33. Alibek and Handelman, Biohazard, 173; Alibek discusses the story of Georgy Markov, who was taken to the hospital in London. He later died. The first autopsy conducted yielded nothing. A second autopsy found a small pellet embedded in his leg with traces of ricin produced in a Soviet laboratory. 34. Judith Miller, Stephen Engelberg, and William Broad, Germs: Biological Weapons and America’s Secret War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 163. The authors recount a presentation made by William (Bill) Patrick, a former bioweaponeer for the U.S. offensive weapon program and defensive program. Patrick explained how a terrorist could mount a bioweapons attack using nothing more than a blender, cheesecloth, a garden sprayer, and some easy-to-obtain hospital supplies. See also Franz, “Toxin,” 21; ricin is a protein derived from the castor bean plant. The manufacture of castor oil, also a derivative of the castor bean plant, leaves a residue that is 3 to 5 percent ricin. 35. Anhydrous ammonia is a popular agricultural chemical used to replenish the

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ground with nutrients. An accidental release of 3,000 pounds of chlorine in 1999 resulted in a kill zone of more than a 11/2-mile-diameter circle. The most likely scenario of the use of a chemical against plants is when large storage or transportation tanks are near or travel near crop fields. 36. Food-Processing Security: Voluntary Efforts Are Underway, but Federal Agencies Cannot Fully Assess Their Implementation, GAO-03–342 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, February 14, 2003), 8. 37. Kohnen, “Responding,” 8–9; Colorado potato beetles were allegedly used by Germany on potato fields in southern England, including on the Isle of Wight in 1943. On weeds, see Chalk, “Threat Beyond,” 5. 38. Texas House of Representatives, “Farm and Ranch Biosecurity: Is Texas Prepared?” Focus Report, no. 77-14, December 4, 2001, 6; this report recalls the StarLink controversy. StarLink was a genetically modified corn approved for animal feed and industrial use; however, it was found in more than three hundred brands of food products. The seed traveled on the wind to South America, and contaminated food products were shipped to Japan. 39. Kohnen, “Responding,” 10; agents where this applies render the challenges of spreading the disease irrelevant. Plant pathogens are more sensitive to environmental factors such as ultraviolet light, heat, cold, etc. These environmental factors could destroy or severely weaken the pathogen; however, as mentioned, the wind and other environmental forces can carry contaminants to infect other crops.

chapter 4 1. Ann Waters, The UK Response to the BSE Outbreak, paper presented at the International Symposium on Agroterrorism, Kansas City, Mo., 2005. 2. John Linstrom, “Command Begins with Self-Control,” Fire Chief, October, 2004. 3. Tom Ridge, Remarks by Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge at the National Association of Counties Annual Legislative Conference, March 1, 2004, available at www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=3278. 4. Ridge, Remarks, March 1, 2004. 5. “Arlington County: After Action Report on the Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon,” Titan Systems Corporation, annex A, pp. 3–7. 6. This is my analysis of the report’s discussion of the incident command system. 7. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The National Incident Management System (Washington D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, March 1, 2004), 19. 8. While there is no such thing as a “normal” incident, there are the incidents that require tasking beyond what it normal. The unusual incident, where multiple jurisdictions (either geographical or disciplinary) and a prolonged response effort are needed, is a good incident for which to utilize the unified command concept. 9. This is a point of controversy with many emergency response organization and incident commanders. While the unified command concept does not encourage a single incident commander, the reality is that a personality will rise to the top of the notes to pages 28–44

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organization. Another possibility is that there is a moderator to the unified command team who facilitates the decision making and response goals. 10. Gary Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions (MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1998, 4. 11. Veterinary Services Unit of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal Emergency Response Organization: Roles and Responsibilities (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October 7, 2002), 42–43. This is the fifth draft of the plan, hereafter cited as AERO. 12. AERO, 41–42. 13. AERO, 43. 14. AERO, 70–72. 15. AERO, 52–60. 16. AERO, 48–49. 17. AERO, 49. 18. AERO, 51. 19. AERO, 51. 20. A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, chair Tom Davis, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. House of Representatives, 2006), available at http:// katrina.house.gov/. 21. U.S. Coast Guard, Incident Management Handbook, Publication COMDT PUB P3120.7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 2001). 22. A sign posted in the Dallas–Fort Worth International Airport Emergency Operations Center. This statement is often attributed to Snowshoe Thompson, a nineteenth-century frontier mail carrier. 23. National Incident Management System (Washington, D.C.: Depart of Homeland Security, March 1, 2004), 26, hereafter cited as NIMS. 24. NIMS, 28.

chapter 5 1. Marc Mattix, “Emergency Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism: A Proposal in Response to CDC Program Announcement 99051,” 2. 2. Dorothy B. Preslar, “The Role of Disease Surveillance in the Watch for Agroterrorism or Economic Sabotage,” AHEAD, November 2000, available at www.fas .org/ahead/agroterror.htm (accessed June 5, 2002), 3. 3. Preslar, “Surveillance,” 4. 4. Preslar, “Surveillance,” 3. 5. Mattix, “Emergency Response for Bioterrorism,” 2. 6. Preslar, “Surveillance,” 4. 7. Though numbers vary, millions of containers enter the United States each year, hundreds or thousands on a daily basis. APHIS, U.S. Customs, the Immigration and

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notes to pages 44–7o

Naturalization Service, the U.S. Coast Guard, and the U.S. Border Patrol have all been placed under the Border and Transportation Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security in order to address this problem better. 8. Mattix, “Emergency Response for Bioterrorism,” 2. 9. Mattix, “Emergency Response for Bioterrorism,” 5. 10. Laura Meckler, “White House Memo to FDs: Don’t Buy Anthrax Tests,” available at www.firehouse.com/frontlines/news/02/0720.html (last accessed February 20, 2003). This article references a White House memo that was sent to 250 federal agencies and fire departments. 11. Kohnen, “Responding,” 25–27. 12. Thomas E. Walton, D.V.M., Ph.D., Sc.D., “Impact of Wildlife on the Health Status of Our Industries: Extended Abstract,” available at agriculture.de/acms1/conf6/ ws9walt.htm?&template=/acms1/conf6/tpl/print.tpl, 1. 13. Walton, “Impact of Wildlife,” 2. 14. Veterinary Services Unit of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan for an Outbreak of Foot-and-Mouth Disease or Other Highly Contagious Animal Diseases (Washington, D.C.: GPO, September 19, 2002), 20; hereafter cited as NAHERP. 15. Terry Knowles, “Law Enforcement’s Role in Defending against Bio-Terrorism Threats to Agriculture,” Kansas Peace Officer, March 2002, 3. 16. “Arlington County,” A-60. 17. “Arlington County,” A-60. 18. As a member of the Kentucky Division of Emergency Management (KyEM) staff, I was witness to the influx of reports that came in from the entire state. Some regions of the country saw prices spike to more than 250 percent of the price before the 9-11 attacks. 19. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, U.S. Department of Agriculture Operational Guidelines for Biosecurity, Ninth Draft, October 16, 2002, 8. 20. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Biosecurity, Ninth Draft, 35–36. 21. Federal Bureau of Investigation, transcript of Joseph A. DiZinno, Section Chief of the Scientific Analysis Section, available at www.fbi.gov/anthrax/dizinno/ transcript.htm (last accessed February 26, 2003). 22. For foot-and-mouth disease, the USDA-APHIS VS Plum Island FAD training manual discusses the use of killed or inactivated vaccine only. 23. Dee Ellis, D.V.M., “Carcass Disposal Issues in Recent Disasters, Accepted Methods, and Suggested Plan to Mitigate Future Events,” unpublished applied research project, Department of Political Science, Southwest Texas [now Texas State] University, San Marcos, 2001, vi. 24. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 1. 25. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal.” This is the underlying current throughout the paper.

notes to pages 70–78

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26. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 1. 27. Ken Waldrup, D.V.M., Support Epidemiologist, Texas Animal Health Commission, interview by author, San Antonio, Tex. February 25, 2003. 28. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, U.S. Department of Agriculture Operational Guidelines for Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, February 2002, 21. 29. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 29. 30. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, 25. 31. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, 27. 32. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 29. 33. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 33. 34. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, 29. 35. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 33. 36. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, 28. 37. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Disposal, Fifteenth Draft, 31. 38. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 37. 39. North Carolina Emergency Operations Plan (NCEOP), Tab B, appendix 4, annex B. 40. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 38. 41. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, Operational Procedures Manual for Decontamination, http://www.aahc.com.au/ausvetplan/decfn12.pdf (accessed March 6, 2003), 47. 42. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, 48. 43. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, 48. 44. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, 48. 45. Australian Veterinary Emergency Plan, 48–49. 46. Waldrup interview, February 25, 2003. 47. “Arlington County,” 12. 48. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/home.htm (last accessed March 10, 2003). 49. “Arlington County,” A-51, A-56. 50. Personal experience. 51. Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Quiet Heroes: Voluntary Agencies,” www.fema.gov/diz01/d1379n53.shtm (last accessed March 10, 2003). 52. National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, Oklahoma City— Seven Years Later: Lessons for Other Communities, Publiction 4/03 (Oklahoma City: National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2003), 23.

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53. National Memorial Institute, Oklahoma City—Seven Years Later, 22–24. 54. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary.. 55. “Arlington County,” A-25–A-26. 56. “Arlington County,” A-32. 57. FEMA, United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), January 2001. 58. FEMA, Federal Response Plan, Public Support Annex, PA-1. 59. Personal observation and anecdotal information from responders. 60. Tallahassee Democrat, January 3, 2003, available at http://www.tallahassee .com/mld/tallahassee/news/columnists/capitol_watch/4863130.htm (last accessed March 22, 2003). 61. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan, draft 2. 62. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 19.

chapter 6 1. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, Veterinary Services, Factsheet: The Significance of Surveillance to Safeguarding American Animal Health, July 2003, 1–2. 2. Dee Ellis, D.V.M., Area Director, Texas Animal Health Commission, telephone interview by author, College Station, Tex., March 25, 2003. 3. Gilmore Commission, The Fourth Annual Report to the President and Congress of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing Domestic Response Capabilities (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, December 22, 2002), 27. 4. Amy K. Donahue, “Incident Management Team All-Risk Operations and Management Study,” Center for Policy Analysis and Management, Institute of Public Affairs, University of Connecticut, Storrs, August 2003, 3. 5. Donahue, “Operations and Management Study,” 1. 6. Donahue, “Operations and Management Study,” 20. 7. The 5-State Incident Command System Typing and Certification Committee has been developed and authorized by the USDA’s Veterinary Services Management Team to define the criteria for incident types. The author is a member of that committee. 8. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, U.S. Department of Agriculture Operational Guidelines for Cleaning and Disinfection, Second Draft, August 2003, 17. 9. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Cleaning and Disinfection, Second Draft, 14. 10. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, U.S. Department of Agriculture Operational Guidelines for Euthanasia, Seventh Draft, May 2003, 28; “2000 Report of the AVMA Panel on Euthanasia,” Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association 218, no. 5 (March 1, 2001): 686. notes to pages 86–98

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11. Elizabeth Fitzsimons, “No Cruelty Charges in Chicken Killings,” San Diego Union-Tribune, April 11, 2003, http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/northcounty/ 20030411–9999_1mi11chip.html (last accessed December 30, 2003). 12. Ellis, “Carcass Disposal,” 19. 13. National Animal Health Emergency Management Guideline, Euthanasia, Seventh Draft, 25. 14. Notes from AMISTAD International Exercise, May 6, 2003. 15. Bioterrorism: Preparedness Varied across State and Local Jurisdictions, GAO03–373 (Washington, D.C.: GAO, April 7, 2003), 18. 16. T. Morner, D. L. Obendorf, M. Artois, and M. H. Woodford, “Surveillance and Monitoring of Wildlife Diseases,” Scientific and Technical Review, World Organization for Animal Health 21, no. 1 (2002): 67. 17. Program Announcement 99051: Public Health Preparedness and Response for Bioterrorism, Executive Summary, 1. 18. Marc Mattix, “Bioterrorism: Issues and Response Concepts,” Montana Policy Review, date unknown, pp. 6–11. 19. Walton, “Impact of Wildlife,” 1. 20. Morner et al., “Surveillance and Monitoring,” 69.

chapter 7 1. State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program: Jurisdiction Handbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S.Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), v; hereafter cited as Jurisdiction Handbook. 2. Jurisdiction Handbook, vi. 3. State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program: State Handbook (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), xi. 4. Jurisdiction Handbook, ix. 5. On threats, see Jurisdiction Handbook, 9–19. 6. On vulnerability, see Jurisdiction Handbook, 20–26. 7. Texas A&M University website, http://sports.tamu.edu/facilities.php?FID=7 (last accessed January 3, 2004). 8. On CBRNE, see Jurisdiction Handbook, 29–31. 9. On capabilities, see Jurisdiction Handbook, 33–39. 10. Jurisdiction Handbook, 41–84. 11. Michael Weinlein, “Terrorist Attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center,” National Institute of Justice Science and Technology Conference, Albuquerque, N.M., May 5, 2002. 12. Jurisdiction Handbook, 87–98. 13. Jurisdiction Handbook, 99–105. 14. State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program: Reference Handbook

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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Office for Domestic Preparedness, 2003), appendix C, 13. 15. Jurisdiction Handbook, 107–44.

chapter 8 1. NAHERP and AERO (fifth draft) were both developed by the Veterinary Services Unit of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture, and published in 2002. 2. AERO, 7. 3. NAHERP, 4. 4. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), section 20. 5. HSPD-7, section 19. 6. http://www.citizencorps.gov/programs/ (last accessed December 12, 2004). 7. Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, December 19, 2004), 14; hereafter cited as NRP. 8. HSPD-9, section 4. 9. NRP, 61–62. 10. NRP, 2. 11. NRP, 4. 12. NRP, 6. 13. NRP, 63–74. 14. NRP, 195–207. 15. NAHERP, 50–57. 16. NAHERP, 10–11. 17. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 states that the delineation between crisis management and consequence management is to be dissolved and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security is to be in command of the response to a terrorist incident with coordination between the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Justice—presumably the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 18. NAHERP, 15. 19. NAHERP, 15–16. 20. NAHERP, 16. 21. NAHERP, 17. 22. NAHERP, 23. 23. NAHERP, 23. 24. NAHERP, 16. 25. NAHERP, 23. 26. NRP, 40. 27. NAHERP, 17. 28. NAHERP, 53. Joint Operations Center is a confusing term. In this case it refers to a center established by the lead federal agency under the operational control of the

notes to pages 111–42

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on-scene commander, as the focal point for the management and direction of on-site activities, coordination/establishment of state requirements/priorities, and coordination of the overall federal response in the state. 29. NAHERP, 24. 30. NAHERP, 24. 31. NAHERP, 19. 32. NAHERP, 20–21. 33. NAHERP, 47. 34. Gilmore Commission, Fourth Annual Report, 71. 35. McKinsey and Company, “Report of the Fire Department of New York’s Response to the World Trade Center Crash and Collapse, September 11, 2001,” 9. 36. AERO, 3. 37. AERO, 4. This document heavily emphasizes interagency cooperation, yet there is no FEMA representation, nor any representation of the American Veterinary Medical Association, two essential groups that must have a presence during an animal health emergency. 38. AERO, 11. 39. AERO, 12–13. 40. AERO, 87. 41. AERO, 79. For a detailed description of each training regimen, consult the AERO document. 42. Texas Engineering Extension Service (TEEX), State of Texas Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Modified Functional Exercise Post-Exercise Report, College Station, Texas, June 2001, 27–30. In this post-exercise report, the after-action review brings to light the need for a better flow of communication between the planning, operations, logistics, command, and finance sections of the incident command post. The same principles can be related to the overall response organization structure. 43. HSPD-5. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has been directed to develop a National Response Plan that encompasses the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the U.S. Government CONPLAN, and several other federallevel plans. It is not clear at the time of writing whether the NAHERP or its successor will be included in this rollup.

glossary 1. U.S. Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense, Medical Management of Chemical Casualties Handbook, 3rd ed. (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md.: Government Printing Office, July 2000), 8. 2. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.m-w.com/home.htm (last accessed June 21, 2004). 3. Gray Book, 186. 4. Committee on Foreign Animal Diseases of the United States Animal Health

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Association, Foreign Animal Diseases, (Richmond, Va., 1998), Gray Book electronic version, 12. 5. NIMS, 7. 6. David T. Stark, “Quarantine: History and Law,” unpublished, April 2001, 7. 7. United States Animal Health Association webpage, www.usaha.org/NAHEMS/ (last accessed June 21, 2004). 8. NRP, 2. 9. Jurisdiction Handbook, 11. 10. Stark, “Quarantine,” 7.

notes to pages 184–88

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glossary and abbreviations

(Note additional definitions and abbreviations in terminology sections of chapter 8.) Acetylcholine (C7H17N03): A chemical naturally produced in the body and known as a neurotransmitter. The chemical is released to help in the proper firing of nerves in the body. See also nerve agent and pralidoxime chloride. Acetylcholinesterase inhibitor: A scientific name for nerve agents. They are so named because they inhibit the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, and their effects are the result of excess acetylcholine.1 Animal Emergency Response Organization (AERO): A document that is part of the National Animal Health Emergency Management System, providing personnel and other emergency response workers with general principles and recommendations as to the response system necessary in the event of a major U.S. animal health emergency. APHIS: Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Area command (unified area command): Established as necessary to provide command authority and coordination for two or more incidents in close proximity. Area command works directly with Incident Commanders. Area command becomes unified area command when incidents are multijurisdictional. Area command may be established at an emergency operations center (EOC) facility or at some location other than an incident command post (ICP). Area veterinarian in charge (AVIC): This person is the lead federal veterinarian for the Veterinary Services section of the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS, VS) in an area, usually a state. Biologic pathogens: Living microorganisms that cause disease in other animals, including humans. These microorganisms are bacteria, molds, fungi, and viruses. Biologic toxins: By-products created by certain animals, plants, molds, fungi, and bacteria that are poisonous to other organisms. Case classification system: This is the classification system used to determine the status of a possible foreign animal disease. There are four levels: Suspect: An animal is displaying clinical signs, which may be consistent with a foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident. Presumptive positive: An animal with clinical signs consistent with a foreign

animal disease or emerging disease incident with a sample positive on initial laboratory testing, and other epidemiological information indicates the presence of a foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident. An index case indicates that only one of the extenuating circumstances indicated is present. A secondary case indicates that both circumstances are present. Confirmed positive: The agent is isolated and identified. Catastrophic incident: Any natural or human-induced incident, including terrorism, that leaves unprecedented levels of damage and disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, and economy. A catastrophic event would result in sustained national impacts over a prolonged period. CBRNE: Chemical, biological, radioactive, nuclear, and explosive—the five basic classifications of weapons of mass destruction. Consequence management: Traditionally, consequence management was predominantly an emergency management function, including measures to protect public health and safety, to restore essential government services, and to provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of terrorism. Under the National Strategy for Homeland Security (July 2002), the National Response Plan (NRP) consolidates existing federal government emergency response plans into one genuinely all-discipline, all-hazard plan and thereby eliminates the distinction between and consequence management and crisis management. See also crisis management. Contact premise: Farms determined to be infected with a foreign animal disease, where all susceptible animals are culled. Crisis management: Traditionally, crisis management was predominantly a law enforcement function, including measures to identify, acquire, and plan the use of resources needed to anticipate, prevent, and/or resolve a threat or act of terrorism. The requirements of consequence management and crisis management are combined in the NRP. See also consequence management. Emergency: Any natural or human-caused situation that results in or may result in substantial injury or harm to the population or substantial damage to or loss of property. As defined by the Stafford Act, an emergency is any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the president, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety. Emergency declaration: This is a dual use term. Under the USDA authorities, it is a process by which the secretary of agriculture may transfer funds from other agencies or corporations of the Department of Agriculture to reimburse certain federal, state, and local animal health emergency response expenses, including reimbursement of operational costs, such as quarantine enforcement, perimeter control, depopulation, carcass disposal, and decontamination. Under the Stafford Act, this term refers to any occasion or instance for which, in the

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determination of the president of the United States, federal assistance is needed to supplement state and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. Emergency operations plan: The plan that each jurisdiction has and maintains for responding to appropriate hazards. Emergency public information: Information disseminated primarily in anticipation of an emergency or at the actual time of an emergency; in addition to providing information, it frequently directs actions, instructs, and transmits direct orders. EOC: Emergency operations center. Event: A significant event or designated special event requiring security, such as inaugurals, State of the Union addresses, the Olympic Games, and international summit conferences. Extraordinary emergency: A declaration made by the secretary of agriculture that allows the secretary to use federal authorities to take action within a state if the state is unable to take appropriate action to control and eradicate the disease. Euthanasia: The practice of killing or permitting the death of hopelessly sick or injured individuals (persons or domestic animals) in a relatively painless way for reasons of mercy.2 Exotic animal disease: See foreign animal disease. FCO: Federal coordinating officer. Federal on-scene commander (FOSC): The federal official designated upon activation of a Joint Operations Center to ensure appropriate coordination of the overall United States government response with federal, state, and local authorities. Federal on-scene coordinator (FOSC or OSC): The federal official predesignated by EPA or the U.S. Coast Guard to coordinate and direct responses to incidents involving oil and hazardous substances under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (known as the NCP). Federal Response Plan (FRP): A plan outlining the federal-level response to a major disaster or terrorist incident. FIRESCOPE: Firefighting Resources of California Organized for Potential Emergencies. First responder: Local police, fire, and emergency medical personnel who first arrive on the scene of an incident and take action to save lives, protect property, and meet basic human needs. First responders may include federal, state, or local responders. Foot-and-mouth disease (FMD): A highly contagious viral infection primarily of cloven-hoofed domestic animals (cattle, pigs, sheep, goats, and water buffalo) and cloven-hoofed wild animals. The disease is characterized by fever and vesicles with subsequent erosions in the mouth, nares, muzzle, feet, or teats.3 glossary and abbreviations

183

Foreign animal disease (FAD): An important transmissible livestock or poultry disease believed to be absent from the United States and its territories and having a potentially significant health or economic impact.4 Foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD): A veterinarian who has been through the FAD training course at Plum Island and receives continuing education in FAD and animal health emergency management. Hazard: Something that is potentially dangerous or harmful, often the root cause of an unwanted outcome. Hemoglobin: An iron-containing respiratory pigment in the blood that functions in oxygen transport to the tissues after conversion to oxygenated form in the lungs or gills, and that assists in carbon dioxide transport back to the lungs or gills after surrender of its oxygen. Highly contagious disease (HCD): A disease that spreads rapidly from animal to animal as well as from herd to herd. Transmission can occur via direct and indirect modes. An HCD may be recognized by above-normal morbidity or mortality per unit time where morbidity could be characterized as a loss of production. HSPD-5: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. IC: Incident Commander. ICS: Incident Command System. ICP: Incident command post. IC/UC: Incident Commander or unified command team. Incident: An occurrence, either human caused or resulting from natural phenomena, that requires action by emergency service personnel to prevent or minimize loss of life or damage to property and/or natural resources. Incident Action Plan: Contains objectives reflecting the overall incident strategy, specific tactical actions, and supporting information for the next operational period. The plan may be oral or written. When written, the plan may have a number of forms as attachments (e.g., traffic plan, safety plan, communications plan, map, etc.). Incident Command System/Incident Management System (ICS/IMS): The ICS/IMS is a management system designed to enable effective and efficient domestic incident management by integrating a combination of facilities, equipment, personnel, procedures, and communications operating within a common organizational structure.5 Infected premises (IP): Premises on which a highly contagious disease or the agent is presumed or confirmed to exist. Total movement control is imposed and all susceptible animals are culled. Infected zone: The initial zone drawn beyond the perimeter of all presumptive or confirmed positive premises. The infected zone includes as many contact premises as is logistically practical. The infected zone should initially be set at least 6.2 miles (10 kilometers) beyond the perimeters of the presumptive or

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confirmed infected premises. The boundaries must be modified as new information emerges. The actual distance of the perimeter of the infected zone in any one direction is determined by factors such as known characteristics of the agent, terrain, pattern of livestock movements, livestock concentrations, weather and prevailing winds, distribution and movements of susceptible wild and feral animals, processing options (livestock and products), and effect on nonrisk commodities. The infected zone can be modified as tracing and surveillance results become available and wildlife distributions become better defined. Information officer: See Public Information Officer. Isolation: Refers to the separation of infected persons/animals from others during the period of communicability so as to prevent transmission of the infectious agent.6 Joint Field Office (JFO): A temporary federal facility established to unify the federal assistance effort at the state and local level and to coordinate the provision of federal assistance to the affected jurisdiction(s) during national incidents. Joint Information Center (JIC): A center established to coordinate the federal public information activities on-scene. It is the central point of contact for all news media at the scene of the incident. Public information officials from all participating federal agencies should collocate at the JIC. Public information officials from participating state and local agencies also may collocate at the JIC. Joint Information System (JIS): A set of guidelines that provides an organized, integrated, and coordinated mechanism to ensure the delivery of understandable, timely, accurate, and consistent information to the public in a crisis. Joint Operations Center (JOC): The focal point for all investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or potential terrorist incident. The JOC integrates into the JFO when the National Response Plan is activated. Jurisdiction: The range or sphere of authority. Public agencies have jurisdiction at an incident related to their legal responsibilities and authority for incident mitigation. Jurisdictional authority at an incident can be political or geographical (e.g., city, county, state, or federal boundary lines) or functional (e.g., police department, health department). Local government: A county, municipality, city, town, township, local public authority, school district, special district, intrastate district, council of governments (regardless of whether the council of governments is incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under state law), regional or interstate government entity, or agency or instrumentality of a local government; an Indian tribe or authorized tribal organization, or in Alaska a Native village or Alaska regional Native corporation; or a rural community, unincorporated town or village, or other public entity. (As defined in Section 2 (10) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Public Law.. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, et seq., 2002.) glossary and abbreviations

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Major disaster: A designation from the Stafford Act that refers to any natural catastrophe (including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought) or, regardless of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion in any part of the United States, which in the determination of the president causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the Stafford Act to supplement the efforts and available resources of states, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. Mitigation: Those activities designed to alleviate the effects of a major disaster or emergency or long-term activities to minimize the potentially adverse effects of future disaster in affected areas. Mobilization: The process and procedures used by all federal, state, and local organizations for activating, assembling, and transporting all resources that have been requested to respond to an incident. National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS): A joint state-federal-industry effort to improve the ability of the United States to deal successfully with animal health emergencies. These emergencies can range from flood and drought to introductions of deadly foreign animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease, hog cholera, or African swine fever.7 National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan (NAHERP): Describes the authorities, policies, situation, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and federal agency resources that will provide the framework for an integrated local-state-federal response to a possible foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) outbreak or an outbreak of other highly contagious diseases in the United States. National Incident Management System (NIMS): A core set of doctrine, concepts, principles, terminology, and organizational processes to enable effective, efficient, and collaborative incident management at all levels, developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to meet objectives established by President George W. Bush through Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5. National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS): A system for responding to a wide range of emergencies, including fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornados, tidal waves, riots, spilling of hazardous materials, and other natural or human-caused incidents. National Operations Center: This is the primary national-level hub for operational communications, information, and resource coordination pertaining to domestic incident management. This center is made up of two branches: the Operational Information and Intelligence Branch and the Resource Management Branch. National Response Plan (NRP): A single comprehensive approach that enhances the ability of the United States to manage domestic incidents. It establishes incident management protocols to help protect the nation from terrorist attacks and other natural and man-made hazards; to save lives; to protect public health,

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safety, property, and the environment; and to reduce adverse psychological consequences and disruptions to the American way of life.8 Nerve agent: A chemical agent that disrupts the normal firing of the body’s nervous system. Most are organophosphate-based chemicals that function similarly to pesticides. Office International des Epizooties (OIE): An intergovernmental organization created by the International Agreement of January 25, 1924, signed by twenty-eight countries. Operational Information and Intelligence Branch: This branch of the Homeland Security Operations Center integrates daily incident reporting, intelligence, and other pertinent information and maintains daily threat monitoring and situational awareness. Potential threat element (PTE): Any group or individual involving whom there are allegations or there is information indicating a possibility of the unlawful use of force or violence, specifically the use of a WMD, against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of a specific motivation or goal, possibly political or social in nature.9 Pralidoxime chloride (2-Pam chloride, 2-PAMCL): Attaches to a nerve agent that is inhibiting the cholinesterase and breaks the agent-enzyme bond to restore the normal activity of the enzyme. Preparedness: Under NIMS, preparedness encompasses the full range of deliberate, critical tasks and activities necessary to build, sustain, and improve the operational capability to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents. Within the context of the life cycle of an incident, preparedness involves actions to enhance readiness and the ability to respond quickly and effectively to a potential incident. Preparedness includes procedures to share information and disseminate timely notifications, warning, and alerts. Presumed diagnosis: An investigation that yields positive epidemiology, clinical signs, and serology (blood test), but the virus has not yet been isolated and identified. See also case classification system. Prevention: Within the context of the life cycle of an incident, prevention involves actions to interdict, disrupt, preempt, avert, or minimize the impacts of a potential incident. This includes Homeland Security and law enforcement efforts to prevent terrorist attacks and hazard mitigation measures to save lives and protect property from the impacts of natural disasters and other events. Principal federal official (PFO): The principal federal official responsible for directing federal operations in the United States to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents; for directing the application of federal resources in specific circumstances; and for managing any domestic incident when directed by the president. HSPD-5 designates the secretary of homeland security as the PFO for domestic incident management. glossary and abbreviations

187

Private sector: Nongovernmental organizations, including voluntary organizations, providing essential services to victims regardless of their eligibility for federal or state assistance. Volunteers enhance community coordination and action at both the national and local levels. Public Information Officer: A member of the incident command post or multiagency coordination center staff responsible for preparing and coordinating the dissemination of information and interfacing with the public and media or with other agencies requiring information directly from the incident. There is only one Public Information Officer per incident. The officer may have assistants. Pulmonary agent: Selected organohalides, oxides of nitrogen (NOx), and other compounds that can cause of pulmonary edema, usually after a symptom-free period that varies in duration with the amount inhaled. Pulmonary edema: The effusion of serous fluid into air vesicles and into interstitial tissue of lungs. Quarantine: Usually refers to the detention of persons/animals that are healthy but have been exposed to a communicable disease, to prevent contact with persons/animals not exposed.10 Quarantine area: See infected zone and surveillance zone. Together they make up the quarantine area. Radiological dispersal device: A bomb that disperses a radiological source upon detonation. It is not a nuclear device but usually a radiological source wrapped around conventional explosives. Recovery: The actions needed to help individuals and communities return to normal. Recovery programs are designed to assist victims and their families, restore institutions to sustain economic growth and confidence, rebuild destroyed property, and reconstitute government operations and services. These actions often extend long after the incident itself. Recovery programs include mitigation components designed to avoid damage from future incidents. Resource Management Branch: This branch of the National Operations Center is maintained by the National Resource Coordination Center at FEMA headquarters. This serves as the hub for interagency coordination and tracking of federal resources and emergency management program implementation. Regional Resource Coordination Center (RRCC): The RRCC is a regional-level hub for operational communications and information pertaining to regional incident management. Like the Homeland Security Operations Center, the RHSOC has two branches serving the same functions as in the HSOC, only at a regional level. Response: Includes activities to address the immediate and short-term actions to preserve life, property, the environment, and the social, economic, and political structure of the community. SCO: State coordinating officer.

188

glossary and abbreviations

Single command: Occurs within a single jurisdiction and there is no jurisdictional or functional agency overlap; a single incident command is designated with overall incident management responsibility by the appropriate jurisdictional authority. (In some cases in which incident management crosses jurisdictional and/or functional agency boundaries, a single incident command may be designated if all parties agree to such an option.) Staging area: Location established where resources committed to the incident are placed while awaiting a tactical assignment. State: Any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any possession of the United States. (As defined in section 2 (14) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, et seq., 2002.) Strategic Information and Operations Center (SIOC): The SIOC is operated by the FBI and serves as the focal point for intelligence and investigative law enforcement activities related to a terrorist incident or credible threat. It serves as an information clearinghouse to help collect, process, and disseminate information in a timely manner. Surveillance zone: The zone established outside the infected zone or the same distance around a farm determined to be infected (“contact premises,” or CP) located outside an infected zone. Initially the surveillance zone is set to be large (the entire state or territory). This distance is reduced as the epidemiological information becomes available, but not to less than 10 kilometers from the borders of the infected zone. Once the extent of the outbreak is understood, susceptible livestock can move within that zone with a permit but not out of the zone. Nonsusceptible livestock or poultry can move within and out of the zone with a permit. Suspect premises (SP): Premises with susceptible animals that are under investigation for a report of clinical signs with no apparent epidemiological link to infected premises (IP) or contact premises (CP) or that are in the infected zone and not classified as an IP or CP. These premises are under movement restrictions and intense surveillance for two to three incubation periods. If they prove negative for infection, these premises revert to their previous status. The owners of animals on suspect premises in an infected zone may elect to depopulate their animals. Terrorism: As defined by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, any activity that (A) involves an act that (i) is dangerous to human life or potentially destructive of critical infrastructure or key resources; and (ii) is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State or other subdivision of the United States; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping. glossary and abbreviations

189

Toxic industrial compound/toxic industrial mixture: Mixtures or compounds of chemicals that are hazardous to the health of animals or humans. Unified command: An application of ICS used when there is more than one agency with incident jurisdiction. Agencies work together through their designated incident commanders at a single ICP to establish a common set of objectives and strategies, and a single Incident Action Plan. United States: When used in relation to section 311(a)(5) of the Clean Water Act, means the states, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the United States Virgin Islands, and the Pacific Island Governments. Vesicants: Chemical agents that cause chemical burns, better known as blister agents. Vesicant agents constitute both a vapor and a liquid threat to all exposed skin and mucous membranes. Organs most commonly affected are the skin (with erythema and vesicles), eyes (with mild conjunctivitis to severe eye damage), and airways (with mild irritation of the upper respiratory tract to severe bronchiolar damage leading to necrosis and hemorrhage of the airway mucosa and musculature). Immediate decontamination is the only way to reduce damage. Volunteer: Any individual accepted to perform services under the lead agency, which has authority to accept volunteer services (see title 16 of the United States Code, 16 USC 742f(c), for examples). A volunteer is subject to the provisions of the authorizing statute and the NRP. Weaponized: Agents that have been modified to make them more effective as a weapon. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD): Defined in title 18 of the United States Code, part 1, chapter 113B, section 2332a (18 USC 2332a), as follows: “The term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ means: a) any destructive device as defined in section 921 of this title; b) any weapon that is designed or intended to cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals, or their precursors; c) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or vector (as those terms are defined in section 178 of this title); or d) any weapon that is designed to release radiation or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life.” Section 921 defines the term destructive device as “(A) any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas: (i) bomb, (ii) grenade, (iii) rocket having a propellant charge of more than four ounces, (iv) missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of more than one-quarter ounce, (v) mine, or (vi) device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding clauses; (B) any type of weapon (other than a shotgun or a shotgun shell which the Secretary finds is generally recognized as particularly suitable for sporting purposes) by whatever name known which will, or which may be readily converted to, expel a projectile by the action of an explosive or other propellant, and which has a barrel with a bore of ore than one-half inch in diameter; and

190

glossary and abbreviations

(C) any combination of parts either designed or intended for use in converting any device into any destructive device described in subparagraph (A) or (B) and from which a destructive device may be readily assembled.” Zoonotic disease: A disease not only affecting animals but that may also be transmitted to humans.

glossary and abbreviations

191

INDEX

accountability, 35, 74, 87

26; classical swine fever, 22; conta-

agriculture industry, 3, 5; building

gious bovine pleuropneumonia, 23;

blocks, 6; community, 6; equine in-

exotic newcastle disease (END), 22,

dustry, 5; interdependence of the

94, 98; foot and mouth disease, 19,

industry, 8; international market, 7;

20, 28, 30, 77, 83, 92, 99; glanders,

national agriculture system, 6, 7

25; highly pathogenic strains of avian

agricultural needs assessment and planning, 111 agriculture vulnerability assessment, 108–12

influenza (bird flu), 24, 61; lumpy skin disease, 21; peste des petits (ruminants), 20; plague (Y. pestis), 71; ricin, 28; rinderpest, 23; scrapie,

Alibek, Ken, 14

25; sheep pox/goat pox, 24; smallpox,

alkaline hydrolysis, 81

18; swine vesicular disease, 20, 61;

American Veterinary Medical Associa-

tularemia, 26; venezuelan equine

tion (AVMA), 98 Animal Emergency Response Organization (AERO), 114, 148–51; challenges

encephalitis (VEE), 26; vesicular stomatitis, 22; viruses, 18. See also pathogens; toxins

of AERO, 149; incident typing, 149;

biosecurity, 74

roles and responsibilities, 148

burial, 78

animal products, 85 animal rights groups/activism, 77–78, 98; Humane Society, 84, 98 area command, 60–61; activation of, 61 atropine sulfate, 15

California Department of Forestry (CDF), 94 California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services (OES), 94 capabilities assessment for agriculture,

bioassays, 71 biological agents/weapons, crop, 28; Colorado potato beetle, 27; common rust, 27; leaf rust, 27; stem rust, 27; stripe rust, 27; tobacco blue mold, 27 biological agents/weapons, livestock, 4, 17; African bush milk, 28; African

109 carcass disposal, 78–82; carcass disposal recommendations (USDA), 79; logistics of carcass disposal, 82 Chalk, Peter, 17 chemical agents, challenges for responders, 15

horse sickness, 21; African swine

chemical agents, crops, 28

fever, 24; anthrax, 18, 26, 71, 76; bac-

chemical agents, livestock

teria, 18; bluetongue, 21; botulinum

—blister agents/vesicants, 14; hydrogen

toxin, 12, 28; bovine spongiform en-

mustard (HD), 13; nitrogen mustard

cephalopathy (BSE), 25; brucellosis,

(HN), 13

chemical agents, livestock (continued)

Ellis, Dee, 78

—cyanides, 14, 16; hydrogen cyanide,

emergency management assistance

14, 105 —difficulty of using, 16–17 —nerve agents, 14, 15; V-agent (VX), 13; sarin (GB), 13

compact (EMAC), 42, 96, 139 emergency operations center (EOC), 58, 60, 61, 66–67, 143. See also multiagency coordination systems (MACS)

—pulmonary agents, 16; chlorine, 105

epidemiology, 53–54

—Toxic Industrial Chemicals/Mixtures

euthanasia team, 98

(TICs/TIMs), 16 choosing an incident commander, 44–45

euthanize, 98–99. See also depopulation evidence preservation, 75–77; chain of

citizen councils, 116

custody, 77; contaminated evidence,

cleaning and disinfection (C&D), 82–83

76; documentation of the scene, 76;

cleaning and disinfection agents: acids,

photographs of the scene, 76

83; aldehydes, 83; alkalis, 83; insecti-

explosive agents, 13

cides, 7, 83; oxidizing agents, 82; soaps and detergents, 82 cleaning and disinfection team, 97 command, 42–43, 62, 64, 66, 87, 147; incident commander, 38, 40, 41, 42, 47, 48, 49, 63, 85; single command,

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 76, 138, 139 federal coordinating officer (FCO), 123, 127, 128, 129, 142 finance and administration section, 57–

43; unified command, 38, 40, 41, 43–

58; compensation and claims unit, 58;

44, 46, 60, 126, 147. See also incident

cost unit, 59; procurement unit, 58;

command system command staff: incident safety officer/

time unit, 58 fire corps, 116

safety officer, 42, 45, 74; liaison officer

Firefighting Resources of Southern Cali-

(LNO), 42, 48; public information of-

fornia Organized for Potential Emer-

ficer (PIO), 42, 46–47, 55, 73, 89, 126 community emergency response teams (CERT), 116 composting, 80 critical incident stress management (CISM), 92–93

gencies (FIRESCOPE), 35 foreign animal disease (FAD), 20, 23, 60, 61, 71, 72, 75, 77, 79, 83, 87, 88, 142, 144, 147 foreign animal disease diagnostician (FADD), 76, 94, 142, 144

crops, 5 Gateway Arch, St. Louis, 105 departmental operations center, 67. See also emergency operations center;

Gillmore Commission, 4 gray book, 14

multiagency coordination system depopulation, 77–78, 92–93, 98–99; of wildlife, 78 detection, 69 dimethyl sulfoxide (DMSO), 13 Dyckman, Lawrence J., 4

194

index

Handelman, Stephen, 14 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), 33, 113, 115–16, 124, 126 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), 113, 116

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8), 113, 116–17 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 9 (HSPD-9), 113, 117–19 Hurricane Katrina, 60, 68, 88, 113

41; unity of command, 41, 51; accountability, 41; deployment, 41; information and intelligence management (see also information and intelligence function), 41 incident containment, 74

ICP/EOC relationship, 67–68 ICS position titles, 51–52 ICS roles and responsibilities, 59 Immigration and Naturalization Service, 70 incident action plan (IAP), 38, 41, 45, 57, 62, 63, 64, 72, 75, 84, 127; medical plan, 45, 57; site safety plan, 74; decontamination plan, 83 incident action planning process 38, 62–66, 91, 106; initial unified command meeting, 63; operations brief-

incident management teams (IMT), 96– 97 incidents of national significant, definition, 121, 124 incineration, 79–80 initial response, 62 intelligence and information function, 54, 59, 62; purpose, 59 International Association of Fire Chiefs (IAFC), 59 International Critical Incident Stress Foundation, 93

ing, 64; planning meeting, 63; tactics meeting, 63; unified command objec-

joint field office (JFO), 47, 124, 128–30;

tives meeting, 63. See also incident

JFO coordination group, 126, 129; JFO

action plan

coordination staff, 129; JFO sections,

incident command post (ICP), 64, 66, 67, 143, 149 incident command system (ICS), 30, 32,

129 joint information center (JIC), 46–47, 55, 88, 124, 133

33–66, 71, 87, 96, 116, 128, 132, 147.

joint information system (JIS), 46

See also command; finance and ad-

joint operations center (JOC), 124, 128,

ministration section; intelligence and

133, 143

information function; logistics section; operations section; planning

Klein, Gary, 44

section

Kradlec, Robert, Lt COL, 4

Incident command system elements, 35; common terminology, 35, 36; modu-

Lawhorn, D. Bruce, 14

lar organization, 37; management by

Linstrom, John, 32

objectives, 37; consolidated incident

livestock: alpacas, 5; antelope, 5; bison,

action plans (see also incident action

26; catfish, 5; cattle/cow, 1, 5, 6, 16,

planning process; incident action

20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26; donkey, 21, 22,

plan), 38; span of control, 38, 61; pre-

25, 26; emu, 5; horses (equine), 5, 6,

designated facilities, 38; comprehen-

21, 22, 25, 26; mules, 21, 22, 25, 26;

sive resource management, 39; inte-

ostriches, 5; oysters, 5; poultry, 5, 22;

grated communications, 39; transfer

pigs (swine), 1, 5, 6, 20, 22, 24, 26;

of command, 40; chain of command,

sheep/goats, 1, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26; index

195

livestock (continued) tilapia, 5; water buffalo, 23; water fowl, 24; zebra, 21 livestock, effects of biological weapons, 17–20

—terminology, 135–37 National Incident Management System (NIMS), 32–34, 36, 37, 39, 41, 42, 46, 66, 91, 96, 113, 116, 119, 120, 128, 148; command and management compo-

livestock, effects of chemicals, 14–16

nent, 33; communications and infor-

logistics section, 56; communications

mation management component, 34;

unit, 56; facilities unit, 56; food unit,

preparedness component, 33; re-

57; ground support unit, 56; logistics

source management component,

section chief, 63; medical unit, 57;

33–34. See also incident command

supply unit, 56

system National Response Plan (NRP), 91, 113,

Mattix, Marc, 70

114, 118, 119–34, 147; agency-specific

medical reserve corps, 116

plans, 119; applicability of the NRP,

movement and trade, 83–85.

121; assumptions and considerations,

multiagency coordination center

122; international plans, 120; national

(MACC), 66 multiagency coordination entities (MCE), 67, 125; staffing of, 67 multiagency coordination system, 33,

interagency plans, 119; operational supplements, 120; private sector plans, 120; procedures, 120; purpose of NRP, 120; regional plans, 120;

66–67; definition, 66. See also emer-

state/local/tribal emergency plans,

gency operations center

120; terminology, 122–27; volunteer and non-governmental organiza-

National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS), 77, 80, 96 National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps, 116 National Animal Health Emergency Response Plan (NAHERP), 69, 88, 114, 134, 135–48

tional plans, 120 National Response Plan emergency support function (ESF), 11, 114; animal and plant disease and pest response, 131; food safety, 134; hazard specific incident annex for food safety and agriculture response, 134 NCH Resources Protection, 134

—assumptions, 137–40

nutritional assistance, 131

—concept of operations, 140–42; role of

national veterinary stockpile, 118

FEMA/DHS, 141; role of USDA, 140

neighborhood watch, 116

(see also USDA)

New Mexico, 83

—initial animal disease detection and assessment process, 142–46; local responsibilities, 143; local and state actions for a confirmed diagnosis,

New York City Fire Department (FDNY), 107 non-governmental organizations (NGO), 120, 125

145; national actions for a confirmed diagnosis, 145; state responsibilities, 143–44

196

index

objectives, 66; SMART objectives, 38; strategic, 62, 126; tactical, 62

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), 45 Office International des Epizootes (OIE), 19, 83

Ridge, Tom, 32 Robert T. Stafford Act, 91, 120, 121, 128, 135, 142 routes of entry, 18–19

Oklahoma City, 3, 55, 62, 86, 89, 115 Operational Guidelines for Biosecurity (USDA), 74 operational period, 62

safe refuge zone, 74–75 Saxe, John Godfrey, 5 scene control, 71; control zones, 73, 74–

operations section, 49, 62, 66; air op-

75; identification, 71; informational

erations branch, 53; branches, 51;

security, 72; movement hold, 72, 83;

contaminated branch, 52; disease

operational security, 72; perimeter,

bio-security branch, 53; divisions,

73; physical security, 73

51; groups, 51; non-contaminated

state administrative agency (SAA), 103

branch, 52; operations section chief,

State Homeland Security Assessment

49, 63, 64; single resources, 51; staging officer, 49; strike teams, 51; task force, 51

and Strategy Jurisdiction Handbook, 106 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Program for Agriculture,

pathogens, 13, 14, 18 pentagon, 72, 85 planning section, 53–56, 66; commercial operations planning, 56; community outreach specialists, 55; demobiliza-

102–12 State Homeland Security Assessment and Strategy Reference Handbook, 105, 106, 111 state homeland security strategy, 103;

tion unit, 54–55; documentation unit,

capabilities assessment, 106; CBRNE

54; for terrorism incident, 55–56; non-

scenarios, 106; exercise summary

commercial operations planning, 56;

(Appendix A), 163; individual site/

planning section chief, 63, 64; re-

event vulnerability assessment sheet

sources unit, 53, 66; resource unit

(Appendix B), 164–65; threat assess-

leader, 63; situation unit (epidemiol-

ment, 104; vulnerability assessment,

ogy unit), 53, 59, 62; technical specialists, 55; training specialists, 55

104–106 sate homeland security strategy, needs

pralidoxime chloride (2-PAMCL), 15

assessment, 106; equipment, 107; ex-

Preslar, Dorothy, 69, 70

ercises, 108; organization, 107; plan-

Preston, Richard, 14 principal federal official (PFO), 115, 126, 127–28, 129, 142

ning, 106; training, 108 surveillance, 69, 99–100; definition of, 69; human health, 70; regional sur-

procurement, 58

veillance, 100; syndromic surveil-

public information systems, 33

lance, 100; wildlife, 71, 101

radioactive dispersal device (RDD), 13

T-Card, 71–72

recovery, 91–92, 126

Tallahassee Democrat, 90

rendering, 81

terrorism: as warfare, 10; definition, 1; index

197

terrorism (continued) definition, Homeland Security Act of 2002, 10; tactics of, 12 terrorist ideologies and motivations, 12; definition, ideology, 11; political, 3;

—Office of Grants and Training (OGT) 102 —United States Coast Guard, 70; United States Coast Guard Incident Management Handbook, 64

racial, 3; religious ideologies, 2, 3;

U.S. Department of Justice, 10, 102, 122

special interest, 3

U.S. Department of the Interior, 118, 134

terrorist organization, 3, 28

U.S Department of State, 10

Texas A&M University, 105

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,

toxins, 13, 14, 28, 29

118

transfer of command, 62

U.S. Gross National Product, 5, 6, 8

United States Congress, 4, 59, 92

vaccination, 77

U.S. Customs Service, 70

volunteers and freelancing, 41, 85–87

U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA),

volunteers in police service (VIPs), 116

40, 88, 91, 94, 97, 116, 117, 118, 131, 135, 137, 138, 144, 145, 147; Animal & Plant

Waters, Ann, 30

Health Inspection Service (APHIS),

weaponized agents, 19

70, 132, 133, 138, 140, 144, 148, 151;

weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

Area Veterinarian In Charge (AVIC),

10, 43, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 111;

74, 133, 135, 138, 140–41, 142, 143, 149;

chemical, biological, radiological, nu-

US Forest Service (USFS), 94, 96, 148;

clear explosive (CBRNE), 13, 106, 108;

Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), 131; Food Safety Inspection Service

definition, 13 wildlife, 78; American javelina, 24; bush

(FSIS), 134, 140; Office of the Inspec-

pigs, 24; deer, 20, 71; elk, 71; feral

tor General (OIG), 76, 133, 138

chickens, 71, 77–78; feral pigs, 71; for-

U.S. Department of Defense, 10 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), 118 U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 1, 41, 102, 103, 113, 115, 116, 117,

est hogs, 24; warthogs, 24 worker’s compensation, 58 working with the media, 87–89; Emergency Public Information, 72, 88 World Trade Center, 30, 89

118, 127, 130, 133 —Federal Emergency Management

zoonotic pathogens, 14, 71, 74, 119, 132.

Agency (FEMA), 41, 138; role of

See also pathogens; biological

DHS/FEMA, 141; Emergency Re-

agents/weapons

sponse Team—Advanced (ERT-A), 141; Federal Incident Response Support Team (FIRST), 141